Criminalising Resistance, Entrenching Neoliberalism: The Fayyadist Paradigm in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank

Alaa Tartir

A thesis submitted to
the Department of International Development of
the London School of Economics and Political Science for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, July 2014
Re-submitted, June 2015
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 98,016 words, excluding appendices.

Statement of conjoint work

I confirm that Chapter Four of this thesis was co-authored with Jeremy Wildeman. We jointly developed the overall argument of this Chapter, the research question, the data gathering tools, and the main findings. I contributed to the analysis of the interviews, conducted the majority of the interviews, and wrote the empirical section of the Chapter. Jeremy wrote the theoretical section and contributed to the analysis of the interviews. We carry equal authorship of the Chapter.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Stephanie Mayell and Victoria Mallinckrodt.

Abstract

This paper-based thesis consists of five interlinked chapters/articles that explore dimensions of both the style of governance and the state-building endeavour in the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, primarily between 2007 and 2013. This governance and state-building project came to be known as the Fayyadist paradigm, or Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad. The thesis examines the transformations that occurred under Fayyadism in the two spheres of security and economy, and elucidates their consequences on the people’s security and well-being, as well as the broader dynamics of resistance against the Israeli military occupation and settler-colonialism. Therefore, the primary contribution of this thesis is empirical and ethnographic in nature.

This thesis examines the transformations in the security sphere at three levels. First, to historicise Fayyadism, the thesis contextually analyses the evolution of Palestinian security forces and reforms over the past two decades. Second, the thesis unpacks and critically assesses perceptions about the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant literatures. Third, this thesis investigates in-depth the security campaigns to induce “law and order” as a defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm, and through a bottom-up ethnographic approach, analyses the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on the people’s security in Balata and Jenin refugee camps and on the broader dynamics of resistance against Israel.

This thesis examines and analyses the transformations in the economic sphere at two levels. It addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid industry through an aid-dependency lens to examine whether the transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of the aid industry. It also utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model and the authoritarian transformations it induced, and also to expand the conceptual underpinnings of the contentious politics theories through proposing the notions of contentious economics and resistance economy.
# Table of Contents

**List of Illustrations** ............................................................................................................ 7

**Abbreviations** ...................................................................................................................... 8

**Acknowledgements** ............................................................................................................. 9

**Introduction** ......................................................................................................................... 11

- A Brief History of the Palestinian Authority (PA) .......................................................... 14
- Who is Salam Fayyad? .......................................................................................................... 19
- Research Methodology ......................................................................................................... 24
- Conceptual Reflection ........................................................................................................... 37
- Fayyadism and the Notion of Resistance ........................................................................... 40
- Abbas and Fayyad ................................................................................................................ 43
- Hamasism and Fayyadism ...................................................................................................... 45
- The Refugees and The UNRWA .......................................................................................... 47
- Outline of the Thesis .............................................................................................................. 50

**Chapter One** ....................................................................................................................... 58

**1. The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces Since the Oslo Accords** .................................................................................................................................. 58

- 1.1. Introduction and Background ...................................................................................... 59
  - 1.2.1. The Origins .......................................................................................................... 68
  - 1.2.2. Proliferation, Patronage and Corruption .............................................................. 69
  - 1.3.1. Security Vacuum .................................................................................................. 73
  - 1.3.2. The Road to Reform ............................................................................................ 74
  - 1.3.3. Clashing Paradigms ............................................................................................. 76
- 1.4. The Fayyadism Phase: Re-Inventing Palestinian Security Forces and Eliminating Hybridity (Beyond 2007) ........................................................................................................ 80
  - 1.4.1. The Essence of Fayyadism ................................................................................. 81
  - 1.4.2. Technical Success, National Failures ................................................................. 83
  - 1.4.3. The Cost of Success ............................................................................................. 84
- 1.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 89
Chapter Two

2. Securitised Development and Palestinian Authoritarianism under Fayyadism

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Understanding Fayyadism

2.2.1. The Successes of Fayyadism

2.2.2. The Failures of Fayyadism

2.3. Voices from Below: Perspectives from Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps

2.3.1. Anger, Legitimacy Gap and Insecurity

2.3.2. “Fayyad is Not Hasan Nasrallah”

2.3.3. “Miracle of Ramallah”

2.3.4. “Fayyad’s Dangerous Policies”

2.4. Post-Fayyad?

2.5. Conclusion

Chapter Three

3. Criminalising Resistance: The Cases of Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps

3.1. Introduction and Contextual Background

3.2. Effectiveness of Security Reform under Occupation: Perspectives from the Literature

3.2.1. Impact of International Aid and Donors’ Intervention

3.2.2. Corruption but with Better Bookkeeping

3.2.3. Creating a Police State

3.2.4. Addressing Imbalances of Power

3.3. Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps: Echoing the Voices from Below

3.3.1. Brief Background

3.3.2. Unorganised, Incomplete, and Ineffective Security Campaigns

3.3.3. Using Informality to Induce Formality

3.3.4. Taming Camps, Taming Resistance

3.3.5. Authoritarian Transformations: Arbitrary Detention and Torturing

3.3.6. Security Collaboration: Domination as Cooperation

3.3.7. No Space for Opposition

3.3.8. Reflecting an Intra-Fatah Factional Crises

3.3.9. “We Are Doing Our Job”

3.4. Conclusion
Chapter Four .................................................................................................................. 164

4. Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings ................................................................. 164

4.1. Introduction and Contextual Background ................................................................. 165
4.2. Research Interviews ............................................................................................... 171
4.3. Protesting Aid: A Link to the Arab Uprisings? ....................................................... 173
4.4. Aid Industry in the OPT: Transfixed on the Same Old Rules ............................... 176
4.5. Aid Patterns in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings ............................................ 180
4.6. Conclusion: Business as Usual ............................................................................... 183

Chapter Five .................................................................................................................. 185

5. Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine ....................................................... 185

5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 186
5.2. Conceptualising Contentious Politics and Economics ........................................... 190
5.3. Explaining the Roots of Contentious Economics: Neoliberalism with a Palestinian Flavour ........................................................................................................... 197
5.4. Aiding Occupation: Critiquing the Aid Industry as a Source of Contention ....... 202
5.5. Challenging Authorities: Towards a Viable Resistance Economy Model .......... 209
5.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 214

6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 216

The “New Palestinian” .................................................................................................. 219
Explaining and Contextualising Palestinian In-Fighting ............................................... 220
Revisiting the Refugee Camps ..................................................................................... 223
Fayyadism Self-Assessment ....................................................................................... 227
Future Avenues for Research ...................................................................................... 233

7. Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 237

8. List of Semi-Structured Interviews ......................................................................... 275

9. Appendix .................................................................................................................... 278
List of Illustrations

Figures

Figure 1: Thematic and Chronological Evolution of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 .....63
Figure 2: Mapping the Statutory and Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups ..................65
Figure 3: Reform vs. Hybridity clash in the Second Intifada Phase ..................................77
Figure 4: Palestine’s Percentile Rank- Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2012 ..........99
Figure 5: A Sketch of the Palestinian Authority’s Prison in Jericho, West Bank ..................151
Figure 6: Total International Aid to Palestinians 1993-2012 ........................................167
Figure 7: Aid as percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s GNI 1994-2012 .........................168
Figure 8: Visualising the Theoretical Framework of Contentious Politics .......................197
Figure 9: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 1995 ....279
Figure 10: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 1998 ....280
Figure 11: PA Security Organisations and Command Structure, June 2008 ......................280
Figure 12: Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 2011 ...............................281
Figure 13: West Bank, Area (C) Map ..........................................................................282
Figure 14: The PLO vs. The PA ..............................................................................286
Figure 15: Aid Management Structure in Palestine .........................................................287
Figure 16: The EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support ..............289
Figure 17: United States Security Coordinator (USSC) .................................................290
Figure 18: Al-Istiqlal University (Palestinian Academy for Security Science) ..............291
Figure 19: Photos Illustrating Security Reform, Authoritarianism and Refugee Camps .......292

Tables

Table 1: Fayyadism’s Rhetorical versus Practiced Pillars ................................................104
Table 2: List of Interviews-Balata Refugee Camp, August-December 2012 ..................275
Table 3: List of Interviews-Jenin Refugee Camp, August-December 2012 ..................276
Table 4: List of Interviews-Aid Industry Experts, May-July 2013 ................................277
Table 5: Transformations in the Security Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism ....................278
Table 6: Transformation in the Economy Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism ....................278
Table 7: A Chronology for the Evolution of the Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 ....283
Table 8: Key Economic Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza ..................................288
Table 9: PA’s Statutory Security Forces: Financing, Functions and Capacity ..............298
Table 10: Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups: Financing, Functions and Capacity ..302
Abbreviations

BDS  Boycott, Divestment, Sanction Movement
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CRS  Congressional Research Service
DCAF  The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DFID  UK Department for International Development
EU  European Union
EUPOL COPPS  European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNI  Gross National Product
GoI  Government of Israel
HRW  Human Rights Watch
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICHR  The Independent Commission for Human Rights
ICRC  The International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF  Israeli Defence Forces
IFI  International Financial Institution
IGO  International Governmental Organisation
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INGO  International Non-governmental Organisation
JD  Jordanian Dinar
JICA  The Japan International Cooperation Agency
MAS  The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MoI  Ministry of Interior
NDP  National Development Plan
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS  New Israeli Sheqel
NYT  The New York Times
OCHA  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPT  Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA  Palestinian Authority
PASSFA  Palestinian Authority Security Force
PASSIA  Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PCBS  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PLA  Palestine Liberation Army
PLC  Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation
PM  Prime Minister
PMA  Palestine Monetary Authority
PNC  The Palestinian National Council
PNGO  Palestinian Non-governmental Organisation
PPM  Political Process Model
PRDP  Palestinian Reform and Development Plan
QQR  Office of the Quartet Representative
SMT  Social Movements Theory
SSR  Security Sector Reform
UN  United Nations
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNRWA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO  Office Of The United Nations Special Coordinator For The Middle East Peace Process
USAID  The United States Agency for International Development
USSC  United States Security Coordinator
Acknowledgements

My time at LSE has been extremely rewarding and challenging, and I would like to say thank you to many of those who have supported me over the years.

I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Mary Kaldor and Dr. Denisa Kostovicova, for all their patient, engagement, encouragement, support, and supervision. Also I would like to thank Dr. Diana Weinhold, Susan Hoult, and Dominika Spyratou for all their great support during the PhD journey. The support, feedback and discussions with all the academics and administrative staff at the department were truly valuable, inspiring and helpful, and I thank everyone for that. A special thanks also goes out to my fellow PhD students at the Department of International Development. Simply without you the journey will not be a joyful one.

I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Jeremey Wildeman, for making our work together so inspiring and stimulating. Chapter four would not have been the same without you. A special thanks also to my two wonderful mentors and colleagues: Nadia Hijab and Mandy Turner. Whatever I say, I could not express enough how much I have learned from you over the years.

Thank you to all my colleagues at Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network for all the inspiration, dedication, and work for justice and freedom in Palestine. My thanks also go out to all whom I interviewed over the years and spent hours talking to. Thank you for the inspiring ideas, engaging discussions, and very generous input.

Thank you for all my friends and wonderful human beings who accompanied me over the years, who were there for me and shared all the beautiful and sad moments, and for surrounding me with all your warm love. A special thanks to Victoria for being next to me, supporting me and helping me hugely during the finalizing process of the thesis. Thank you for all your warm and beautiful love.

With gratitude, I acknowledge financial support from the following: The LSE Dahdaleh Foundation Scholarship for Global Politics between 2010 and 2013, The LSE Middle East Centre Emirates Scholarship 2013-14, Newby PhD Award and
financial support from the LSE Department of International Development 2012-2013, and The Palestinian American Research Center (PARC) Fellowship 2012-13.

I dedicate this thesis to my family in Palestine: to my parents, Tahani and Adel, and to my siblings Yazan, Haneen and Jamil. Thank you for all your love, for believing in me, and for allowing me to dream without borders. My success is dedicated to you.

I also dedicate this thesis in particular to the people of Jenin and Balata refugee camps who not only welcomed me warmly in their camps, but also inspired me through their powerful narrative and dedication. Justice will prevail and one day you will leave these camps and go back to your villages and cities that you and your families were ethnically cleansed from by Israel in 1948.

Finally, this thesis was originally finalised in the midst of yet another war on Gaza Strip. I dedicate this thesis to the souls of the martyrs, particularly to Ismail, Zakaria, 'Ahed and Mohammed, whom were killed by the Israeli bombs while playing on the beach of Gaza. For the 1.8 million human beings in Gaza, I dedicate this thesis.

All errors remain my own.

London, 31 July 2014
Introduction

This paper-based thesis consists of five chapters/articles that address the overarching themes of governance and state-building.¹ It explores dimensions of both the style of governance and the state-building endeavour in the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), primarily between 2007 and 2013. This contemporary governance and state-building project came to be known as the Fayyadist paradigm, or Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad. In particular, this thesis examines the shifts and transformations that occurred under Fayyadism in the two spheres of security and economy, and elucidates their consequences and implications on the people’s security and well-being, as well as the broader dynamics of resistance against the Israeli military occupation and settler-colonialism.

Even though Fayyadism is both externally funded and internationally sponsored, and thus deeply influenced by donors’ prescriptions and funds, it is a home-grown state-building and governance paradigm. The main tenets of Fayyadism aimed at establishing a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere, despite the Israeli occupation and intra-Palestinian fragmentation. The Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel, and the international donors’ community sought state-building and good governance through four pillars: reform of the security sector and the enforcement of the rule of law; the building of accountable PA institutions; the provision of effective public service delivery; and, economic growth led by the private sector in an open and free market economy. Through these policies a “new” West Bank reportedly emerged; the “Bantustan” was thus transformed, at least in rhetoric, to a functioning state. In August 2011, Fayyad announced that the “West Bank is already a state in all but name”. In November 2012, Palestine was offered a non-member observer state status in the United Nations. Examining the consequences of these transformations is the broad objective of this thesis.

¹ Throughout the thesis, I use the term Chapter to refer to the articles/papers to be in conformity with the PhD submission regulation at LSE. The articles/chapters of this thesis are interlinked and organically connected, but it remains a paper-based PhD thesis.
Therefore, on one hand, this thesis examines and analyses the transformations in the security sphere at three levels. First, and in order to historicise the Fayyadist paradigm, it traces and contextually analyses the evolution and reform processes of the Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 until the era of Fayyadism through to 2013. Second, it unpacks and critically assesses the Fayyadist paradigm itself by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant literatures. This allowed an investigation into whether there is a gap between the rhetoric from the top and the reality from below in relation to the Fayyadist paradigm and the consequences of its policies. By comparing the different perceptions about the Fayyadist paradigm and contrasting them with the voices coming from the Palestinian people, this thesis examines whether the proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism were reflected positively in the everyday lives of the people, or whether the reform project had detrimental effects on their security, well-being, and their ability to resist the occupation—which remains the main source of their insecurity. Third, by taking an ethnographic bottom-up methodological approach, and looking at Jenin and Balata refugee camps, this thesis further examines the security reform pillar of the Fayyadist paradigm. It does so by examining and analysing the consequences of the Fayyadist security campaigns, designed to induce ‘law and order’, on the security of the Palestinian people, as well as the broader dynamics of resistance against Israeli occupation. The authoritarian transformations of the Palestinian Authority and the criminalisation of resistance against Israeli occupation were the two main themes that emerged from the ethnographic data; both illustrate the consequences of the enhanced functionality of the Palestinian statutory security forces, and the Fayyadist reforms in general.

On the other hand, this thesis examines and analyses the political economy transformations in the economic sphere at two levels: the international aid industry, and the implications of the neoliberal economic model adopted by the Fayyadist paradigm. This thesis addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid industry through an aid-dependency lens. The dependency of the Fayyadist paradigm on donors’ aid and policy prescriptions was manifested by the dominance of the donors’ instrumentalist framework on the aid industry, and also by the fact that the
Palestinian Authority received more aid money specifically allocated for the Fayyadism state-building project (in comparison with the total aid received between 1993 and 2006). The investment of donors in Fayyadism essentially characterised the paradigm and by extension stripped it of its local legitimacy, ownership, and accountability. Therefore, this thesis explores the domination of instrumentalists, the failing patterns of neoliberal aid, and the preoccupation of donors with an ‘Investment in Peace’ framework; all of which consequently meant that Fayyadism failed to change any of these stated dynamics, and also that it further entrenched neoliberal approaches that sustained the status of aid-dependency. The discussion on aid is highly relevant not only because of the attached political, security, and governance reform conditionalities associated with it, but also because the figures are striking; Palestinians have received US$ 24.6 billion of aid over the last two decades, which made them one of the highest per capita recipients of non-military aid in the world. In the post-Arafat era (2004 onwards), aid represented between 24% and 42% of the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the per capita aid averaged around US$530 per year (OECD-DAC 2014).

Finally, this thesis utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model and the authoritarian transformations it induced. These implications are explored by addressing the roots and sources of the emerged cycles of contention and contentious collective actions in the West Bank during the Fayyadism era, and particularly in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. The examination investigates whether the cycles of contention transformed into social movements for political and economic rights under the Fayyadist paradigm. Additionally, and inspired by the empirical and ethnographic evidence of this research, this thesis attempts to expand the conceptual framework of the theories of contentious politics by engaging with the notion of contentious economics proposed by this research, based on the Palestinian indigenous notion of resistance economy.

In sum, the core unit of analysis is the Fayyadist paradigm, and each chapter is devoted to addressing one aspect of it: the first chapter is concerned with contextualizing Fayyadism; the second chapter focuses on understanding the paradigm itself; the third chapter examines the consequences of Fayyadism on the
security of the Palestinian people; the fourth chapter critically examines the role of international donors and the aid industry in its policies; and the fifth and final chapter analyses the implications of Fayyadism’s neoliberal economic model through the application of a contentious politics and economics framework.

**A Brief History of the Palestinian Authority (PA)**

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in the 1964 Arab League Cairo summit and was recognized by the international community, including the UN, at the Arab League Rabat summit in 1974, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people living inside and outside Palestine. It was a revolutionary and political-military body that believed in the liberation of the historical Palestine. Yasser Arafat, who became the president of the PA, served as the chairman of the PLO from 1969 until his death in 2004. Over the years, the PLO’s character and tools for struggle (*Al-Nidal*) witnessed remarkable changes. One major change was the move away from the liberation of historical Palestine as an overarching goal and military resistance as a tool, towards the acceptance of a future Palestinian state on 1967 borders, recognition of the Israeli state, and the acceptance of peace negotiations. It led to the signing of Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 which resulted in the establishment of an interim self-governing authority, called the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hence, the PA was an outcome not only of the peace accords, but also of the changes in the PLO.²

The PA is an administrative and executive authority created to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) (areas A and B³); build institutions for the promised state in 1999; provide public services; guarantee Israeli security; allocate aid to sustain peace, and pursue the final status negotiations (Khan et al.2004). However, the PA has limited powers because of the constraints of the Oslo Accords; it does not have any sovereignty or control over borders or resources; it can’t design

---

² Figure 14 in the appendix depicts the structures of the PLO and PA as of today (PASSIA 2014).

³ According to Oslo Accords, Area A is under the civilian and security control of the PA, while area B is under civilian control only. The total governed area by the PA is 29% of the West Bank and 70% of Gaza Strip. This classification became less relevant after 2002 when Israel re-occupies the West Bank and unilaterally disengages from Gaza Strip in 2005. Today the PA has territorial control over 22% of the West Bank, and Hamas has full control inside but not over Gaza, as it persists under a tight Israeli-Egyptian siege since 2007.
its macroeconomic and fiscal policies because it is limited by Paris Economic Protocol (PEP); and it is almost fully dependent on the ‘mercy’ of the Israel and international community’s aid. It is a body akin to big municipality, although on various occasions it is asked to pursue a state’s role. The PA consists of executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. The president of the PA (Yasir Arafat until 2004, followed by Mahmoud Abbas until today) is the highest political figure, serves as the chairman of the PLO, the commander-in-chief, and is elected directly by the Palestinian people inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, although elections occurred only twice in the history of the PA, in 1996 and 2006.

In 2003, under the reform agenda and pressure on Arafat from the donor’s community, the Prime Minister (PM) office was created. The PM is appointed by the PA president and the “ruling party” and should be approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). While the first three PMs were members of Fatah, Haniyeh (leader of Hamas) was appointed in 2006 following the elections, and between 2007 and 2013, Salam Fayyad (Third Way electoral list) served as the Prime Minister. The PLC remains the main check and balances institution, however it is a very weak institution; was controlled by Arafat clientism system until 2004, and it became completely dysfunctional after 2006 elections. The judiciary branch remains not independent, inefficient and controlled by the executive branch. The duties of the PA’s security forces are dictated by the peace accords and include six main bodies as national forces and internal security: National Security Forces; Presidential Guards; Military Intelligence; General Intelligence Department; Preventive Security Apparatus; and Civil Police. The overall economic framework is controlled by the PEP which led to a closed, subaltern, weak and dependent economy that is ultimately dependent on international aid to operate, and not on local production or internal revenues.

The establishment of the PA changed the Palestinian and regional political—and by extension, the international- scene, and its failures in issues related to corruption and public provision of services allowed the Islamic resistance movement (Hamas) to flourish. Additionally, the establishment of an authority under occupation formed a new élite and affected the social structures. The dominant perception about the PA, mainly by the international community and the PA leadership, is that the PA is an
interim form of authority that will transform itself into a state. However others argue that the PA is akin to a big municipality (UNCTAD 2008, Shtayeh 2011), and has been transformed from an interim administration into a “de facto international (financial) trusteeship” (Khalidi 2005; Brown 2008), and that it represented the beginning of the end to the Palestinians’ long struggle for statehood and self-determination (Turner 2009). Hence, the perceptions range from viewing the PA as the occupation subcontractors (Roy 1995, 2011 and Gordon 2008); as a transitional client quasi-state (Hilal 2004, 2007; Khan 2004, 2009; Brown 2003, 2010); as elite disunity (Jamal 2005 and Shikaki 2002); as a tool for Chequebook diplomacy (Le More 2005, 2008 and Brynen 2000, 2005); and finally as phantom and subaltern for the western great powers and imperialism (Samara 2005; Nakhleh 2004, 2011; Sbeih 2011). These “classifications” are vital not only to understand the PA and its role, but also to understated the failure of aid, particularly in transforming it from the indefinite nascent nature toward a strong independent state.

Since 1993 the PA had passed through four main phases:

- **PA 1.0 (1993-2000): Oslo Period (Genuine Arafatism)**

In this period the PA approach was an extension of the mentality that governed the PLO in exile. It aimed to build the nascent body while protecting Israeli security; and to create peace dividends to become more legitimate locally and internationally. However, in this period, Arafat was the holder of all possible powers, politically and financially, that allowed him to create client-patron and personalised systems, with high levels of corruption and badly functioning institutions. While the PA partially replaced the occupying power, it suffered from an identity crisis between a revolutionary body and a civil administration.

The overall mantra was to build institutions for peace-building. The PA created monopolies and owned significant public assets, while the PLC was almost irrelevant. However, a substantial amount of aid money was channelled to officials and Arafat’s loyalist and special accounts, all without donors’ accountability, in part because they aimed to sustain the peace process. Thus in this period, the type of state and economy that emerged in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was “a product of the peculiarities of the development context as created by the peace process and Israel’s
occupation. But when Arafat was no longer deemed an acceptable ‘partner for peace’ by Israel and the US, the PA was forced to submit to a process of reform” (Turner 2011).

- **PA 2.0 (2000-2004): Roadmap Period (Arafatism Plus)**

The failures to reach sustainable peace during the Oslo period were deepened in this period by the failure of the Camp David Summit, the eruption of the Second Intifada, and the reoccupation/incursion of the West Bank. The escalation of violence and the vanishing of the rationale to support Arafat necessitated the establishment of the International Quartet, the aid politburo and the Road Map peace agreement/plan. This meant that the PA was required to meet certain conditions to be a credible partner for peace. The “peace now, democracy later” paradigm became “democracy now, peace later” and a long list of governance reforms were put in place. A single central treasury account was created, managed by the finance minister Salam Fayyad who was part of the conditionality; a prime minister office was created; donor’s money had to be submitted to stricter audit and control; and the PA was asked to conduct elections. It was the period of democratic reform for state-building. It ended with the death of Arafat after the Israeli siege, leaving a massive infrastructure destruction, a bankrupted PA, and a long list of reform agendas ahead.

- **PA 3.0 (2004-2007): Fragmentation Period (Gaza Strip-West Bank Divide)**

This period revealed the difficult and painful process of moving away from Arafatism. As a result of the donors’ intervention, elections took place and Mahmoud Abbas became the new president in 2005. In 2006, Hamas acquired 76 out of 132 seats in the PLC and formed the government. It was the first time that the Islamic movement lead the Authority. Since the international community considers Hamas as a “terrorist group”, aid was poured exclusively through the president office and donors’ mechanisms such as TIM and PEGASE. Besides hurting the governance reform, donors fuelled the Palestinian fragmentation (Turner 2011; Le More 2008). Thus, the PLC was dysfunctional; Hamas government was replaced; emergency status was declared; clashes in West Bank and Gaza Strip took place; a caretaker government was appointed in the West Bank, and a socio-political and territorial
fragmentation characterises this period. The PA became a body with two heads, but without legs or teeth. This period can be encapsulated as a period of denying Palestinian democracy, resisting democratic change, and building peace through exclusion and marginalization of the “wrong” type of leadership. As Turner (2011) puts it, “peace-building-via-exclusion thereby promoted the logic of homo sacer, where people could be killed without it being considered a crime”.

- **PA 4.0 (2007- 2013): Fayyadism Period**

This period revealed that the PA’s decisions and existence are highly conditional on the will of the international community and Israel. The West Bank PA’s government became the exclusive address for donors, while Gaza initiated its own isolated governance system under siege. The PA’s financial fragility became apparent once again. Fayyad was appointed as Prime Minister for the 12th and 13th governments and re-initiated a programme of state-building, despite the absence of peace negotiations. The PA and donor community prepared various development and state-building plans that established for a new planning paradigm based on high managerial capacities and measurable milestones. However, this period also witnessed forcible and strict reforms of the PA that prioritised the neo-liberal agenda, exclusive peaceful resistance, and strict security governance based on Webrian prescriptions. The results were mixed, however they lead to the emergence of Fayyadism. Thus, it was argued by the Palestinian leadership and major international institutions that the PA became a credible “partner for peace”, its capacities were enhanced, it started to deliver and raise more internal revenues despite continued aid dependency, the security forces became more professional, and the levels of corruption declined. The international community testified that the PA became ready to govern a state. However, the emergence of this “West Bank First” strategy sustained the fragmentation, affected the struggle and resistance dynamics, reinforced the “partners for peace” paradigm that is based on exclusion, and covered political problems with economic solutions. This created a PA that is more accountable to the international community, than to its people. A brief reflection on the post-Fayyadism phase is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis.

---

4 This research views the external players, particularly donors, as part of the problem and can surely be part of the solution (Anderson 1999), and therefore it is crucial to understand the role of aid and donors through a political economy and conflict sensitivity analysis lenses.
Who is Salam Fayyad?

Salam Fayyad was the Prime and Finance Minister of the Palestinian Authority between 2007 and 2013. He joined the Palestinian polity in 2002 when the PA President and Chairman of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, appointed him as the Finance Minister, in part due to pressure from the USA and Israel. Fayyad’s role was to conduct fiscal reform and tackle corruption. Apart from the period between November 2005 and March 2006 (the PLC election, and the formation of the exclusive Hamas government), Fayyad did not leave the political leadership scene and had been rooting his presence in the Palestinian political system through his technocratic card. Fayyad is an economist, a student of William Barnett, who received his training at The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Fayyad, married and with three children, was born in 1952 in the small village of Dayr al-Ghuṣūn in northern West Bank. He only received his primary education in Palestine, and then moved to Jordan with his family, where he obtained his secondary school education. Fayyad graduated from the American University of Beirut in 1975, and worked in the banking sector in Jordan from 1975 to 1979. He moved to St. Edward’s University in the USA and received an MBA degree in 1980, and a Ph.D. degree in Economics from the University of Texas in 1986. Fayyad served as an academic at the University of Texas and at Yarmouk University in Jordan, and was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the World Bank in Washington, D.C. He joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1987 to 2001 where his tenure included serving as the IMF Resident Representative for the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1996 to 2001. In 2001 he briefly became the Regional Manager of the Arab Bank in the West Bank and Gaza Strip before being appointed as Finance Minister of the PA in 2002.5 This brief journey into Fayyad’s career indicates that he hardly lived in Palestine and only as a professional expert, which is a criticism that that is made until today, affecting his public legitimacy. This is why it is common to hear that Fayyad landed in Palestine in a parachute. He never pursued a political career and was not associated with any Palestinian political party.

Fayyad’s entry into politics occurred in 2002, when a World Bank high ranking official who had an excellent relationship with Arafat, and whom I interviewed for my research, took Salam Fayyad to Arafat’s compound/headquarter (Mukaata’) in Ramallah and made the introduction and gently pressured Arafat by stating that “Fayyad is the only person who will rescue you, who can satisfy the US administration and fulfil their conditions, who will please the donor community to donate more funds, and who Israel can’t veto”. Arafat was under the Israeli siege at that time in his compound in Ramallah, so he wanted to send clear signals to Israel that he is a “partner for peace” through bringing Fayyad on board. This was particularly the case because Israel accused Arafat of financing the “Palestinian terrorism”, a major task that Fayyad had to tackle. So from the beginning of his entry to the Palestinian polity, his duty was to do the “dirty work” that politicians wanted to avoid because of the effect this type of work would have on their popular legitimacy. The nature of this “dirty work” that was assigned to Fayyad meant that he was in a constant state of “clash and hostility” with armed groups and with the very network that Arafat established through his neo-patrimonial style of governance. Fayyad spent days and nights with Arafat in his sieged compound working under the light of the candles as Israel cut electricity supply. The infamous photo of Arafat and Fayyad working together in darkness under siege to bring some transparency to the PA’s financial accounts, is a photo that Fayyad keeps on his desk, and indeed posts –as necessary- on his Facebook page since 2007 until today whenever his legitimacy is under threat.

Fayyad took the new responsibilities seriously, and he prioritised the technical and “apolitical” solutions based on his technocratic expertise. He started a process of institutional revolutionary reform at that time, while dealing with the self-enforcing corruption dynamics that are inherent in the structure of the PA. His major achievement between 2002 and 2005 was the creation of the Single Treasury Account, a central and unified account for the PA. However, until today, it is not exactly a central and unified account, but it nevertheless represents a major development in the realm of the Palestinian governance.

---

In late 2005, Fayyad resigned as a minister and founded The Third Way electoral list to run for the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC-PA’s parliament in the West Bank and Gaza) elections. Fayyad joined forces with the veteran PLO leader and educator Hanan Ashrawi who is widely respected and known in the Palestinian society, and also with Yaser Abed Rabbo, another member in the PLO’s executive committee who does not enjoy a good local reputation but a good international one, and is liked by the Israelis. This was a strategic move by Fayyad as he built up an electoral list with members from the PLO, the sole legitimate body of the Palestinian people. Therefore, Fayyad’s pragmatism and shift to be part of the political game became apparent, and his electrical list aimed to appeal to different groups and sectors in the Palestinian society and even abroad. The main objective of the Third Way bloc was to provide a real alternative to the two-party system of Fatah and Hamas. The Third Way promoted good governance, peace-making, and democracy as guiding principles for the future vision of a Palestinian state. The list received only 2.41% of the popular vote and won two of the Council’s 132 seats in 2006 (Fayyad and Ashrawi). Then, Fayyad served as the Chairman of the Finance Committee at the PLC, and in March 2007 he was appointed as Minister of Finance in a national unity government. By then, Fayyad had become a corner stone in the Palestinian political system as far as the financial management is concerned. He became the face that the donor community wanted to see in order to transfer their funds to the PA. Indeed, it became a very personalised matter.

In the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas (West Bank and Gaza), Fayyad was the first candidate of the PA’s President, Mahmoud Abbas, to serve as the prime minister. In June 2007, immediately after Hamas took over Gaza, Abbas declared the status of emergency in the West Bank, and appointed Fayyad as the Prime and Finance Minister of the PA. He served both positions until he stepped down in June 2013. In December 2008, Fayyad announced his plan to build the institutions of the future Palestinian state during a donor community conference in Paris. He announced a number of plans afterwards that aimed to create new realities on the ground as pre-requisites for the state of Palestine, notably the plan entitled “Palestine: Ending Occupation, Establishing the State”, which served as the backbone of Fayyad’s plan.
In his 2010 essay *Our Man in Palestine*, Nathan Thrall summarised it well by arguing that Fayyad’s “reputation as a fiscally responsible and trustworthy manager ensures the steady supply of international aid on which the Palestinian economy depends. Though he has neither a popular following nor backing from a large political party, today he is responsible for nearly every aspect of Palestinian governance” (Thrall 2010). Fayyad was criticised locally for many of the same reasons for which he is lauded globally. Thrall (2010) argued that Fayyad, “has condemned violence against Israel as antithetical to his people’s national aspirations, stated that Palestinian refugees could be resettled not in Israel but in a future Palestinian state, and suggested that this state would offer citizenship to Jews”.

In 2010, Fayyad was ranked as number 10 of the top world leaders according to *Time Magazine*, and in 2011 as number 28 top global thinker by *Foreign Policy* for forging a path between violence and surrender. The Hollywood documentary "State 194" documents part of Fayyad's state-building. Fayyad was praised by the daily Israeli newspaper Haaretz as “everyone's favorite Palestinian” (Ravid 2007), and “the Palestinian Ben-Gurion who wakes up in the morning to work to build a state for his people” (Eldar 2010). In 2013, the University of Texas created the Salam Fayyad Excellence Fund for Economics, and currently he serves a Distinguished Statesman with the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.7

After his resignation as a prime minister in mid-2013, Fayyad never ruled out resuming his political career. However, and meanwhile, he was appointed by the World Bank as the lead expert on the Yemeni economic reform process through serving in Yemen’s Executive Bureau for the Acceleration of Aid Absorption and as the Strategic Advisor to the Executive Device of donor pledges and economic reform.8 This appointment validated to some extent the argument of Fayyad’s critics that he is merely an expert of a major international financial institution that can serve almost in any context. In addition to this position, Fayyad led a team to write the

---

7 Atlantic Council, Salam Fayyad, [Online], Available: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/salam-fayyad#fullbio

UNDP’s Human Development report for Palestine which was, in essence, a self-assessment exercise for his state-building project (UNDP 2015). But more importantly, in August 2013, Fayyad established his non-profit development company, called Future for Palestine (FFP) to “fill the developmental gap in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. Through generous funding from the United Arab Emirates, with around $6.2 million expenditures on projects in 2014, FFP’s mission is “to strengthen the resilience of Palestinians in their homeland, especially in marginalised areas by providing the basic requirements for steadfastness through sustainable development, and by improving the availability and quality of services at the local level”. It is quite astonishing to see how many areas of operation the FFP is engaged in: education, Palestinian identity (culture and arts), social sector and civil society, agriculture development, marginalised and most affected areas, economic empowerment, and renewable energy. Fayyad argues that the different initiatives of the FFP do not only cultivate ingenuity, but also “inspire a sense of possibility that stands in direct opposition to the sense of hopelessness and despair precipitated by a seemingly endless occupation” (FFP 2015:2).

In sum, the profile of Fayyad is intriguing and raises more questions than answers, such as: how could such a technocratic character who lacks constitutional legitimacy and more importantly lacks political constituency, and who lacks the “traditional trappings” of a national leader, be able to rule and lead a society, decide upon its priorities and reshape them, and draw the way forward to liberation and statehood? What are the politics of change behind Fayyad’s program? Why have good governance and the building of institutions (Dawlat Al-Mo’sasat) been elevated to the status of a national goal in and of itself? Do Palestinians need a “state” or “homeland” (Dawlah or Watan)? Why do opinions about Fayyad range between a Palestinian Messiah and the new model of the Middle Eastern leaders, to a traitor, puppet, fundraiser and an agent for imperialism? What explains this wide gap? How was Fayyad able to “sell” technical achievements in an area where politics and its dynamics are dominant? How was he able to transform the national goals and aspirations to encapsulate them in the goal of state-building and thus change the historical equation “liberation before state” to become “state before liberation”?

What kind of powers did he use, is it only the power of achievements, or the power of money and force? The donor community viewed Fayyad and his plans as credible, genuine, and legitimate, while he gained less support from the governed people. A crucial question to ask, in order to understand the different dynamics of the crisis of legitimacy in the Palestinian political system, is: To whom is Fayyadism more accountable, to the people or the donors? This brief introduction of the main actor of this thesis does not intend to “personalise” the studied phenomenon; in contrary, a major premise of this thesis is that single actors can’t be understood in isolation as they are surrounded by a very complex institutional setting. The purpose of this introduction of Fayyad is to provide some background that could explain part of the complexities analysed throughout the thesis. Understanding the “sociology” of main actors is an integral part of understanding complex phenomena, this thesis assumes.

**Research Methodology**

Methodologically, this thesis employs a number of research methods and approaches. Due to its empirical and ethnographic design, the research fieldtrips to the occupied West Bank between 2010 and 2014 constitute the major source of its original contribution.

The chapters that address the transformations in the security sphere deployed a bottom-up ethnographic methodological approach. I conducted fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews in both Balata and Jenin camps. The sample interviewees included representatives from different sectors and categories, including: local and national leaders, political faction cadres, armed group members, men and women, youth and ex-fighters, as well as people who had been detained by the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, I conducted five focused groups in the two camps. My fieldwork took place between August and December 2012, and my ethnographic investigation, through living in these camps comprised of participant observation and engaging in conversation with the people in their stores and workshops, in their houses, on streets and in cafes, in local institutions, and at weddings and public gatherings.

The synthesis of a deconstructed state-building project and associated governance phenomenon with the narratives of people reflecting on their everyday life
conditions characterises the primary scholarly contribution of this thesis and its distinctive feature. The ethnographic research and gathered evidence was acquired from two locations, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps in Nablus and Jenin governorates in the northern part of the occupied West Bank. This research design, however, poses a number of methodological challenges concerning the representation of the cases, and the justification for selection is explained as follows: first, the similarities between both camps in terms of the ethnographic evidence they offered were striking, and therefore this thesis does not aim to compare and contrast both camps but rather to use them as one unit of analysis; second, two valid questions can be raised: to what extent are these camps representative of the whole occupied West Bank? And, to what extent are the people interviewed and interacted with in these camps over the course of my field research representative of the camps themselves?

Acknowledging these two levels of methodological tensions, this thesis, in its chapters on the security dimensions of Fayyadism, follows a case-study ethnographic research design (Mahoney 2007; Brady 2008), and the main criteria for sampling was based on covering different actors from different categories representing multiple segments of the community (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Malki 2011). This approach, in combination with intensive observations and participation based on living in the camps, was crucial in terms of guaranteeing that the perspectives presented here are representative of the camps. Additionally, the cases of Balata and Jenin camps, and the ethnographic evidence they offer, are not particularly exceptional or outliers when contextualised within the overall perceptions about Fayyadism and its performance amongst the residents of the West Bank. Over the years, multiple public opinion polls and surveys offered different insights that correspond with the original qualitative perspectives gathered from both camps (this is discussed further in the second chapter, and the methodological caveats associated them are discussed later in this introduction).

What remains particularly special about these camps is their excessive exposure to the security campaigns conducted by the Palestinian Authority and the associated repercussions. More broadly speaking, these cases represent the yardstick for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to success
in other areas across the occupied West Bank. That said, both camps were purposively selected, and this thesis does not claim that the findings can be fully generalised, a limitation that exists in any small, case-study based research project (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Yin 2009). However, the qualitative dimensions that the case studies illustrate can be tested elsewhere and are relevant to the broader empirical and theoretical contexts beyond the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

A different methodological approach was used in the chapters that address the economic sphere. The fourth chapter is primarily built on thirty original semi-structured interviews with experts working directly in the aid industry or studying it in the Palestinian context; thus all experts work in the OPT. Some were international donors or aid experts, while others included Palestinians working for local or international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Respondents represented International Financial Institutions (IFIs), government aid agencies, International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), as well as researchers associated with policy units that helped design aid packages or economic plans like the Paris Protocol, the economic annex of the Oslo Peace Accords. Meanwhile, non-donor experts expressed the critical perspectives of how aid is disbursed. They include IGOs, Palestinian Non-governmental Organisations (PNGOs), the Palestinian private sector, representatives of the Palestinian youth movement, and researchers working on international aid associated with a university or policy unit.

Finally, the fifth chapter follows a mixed research approach inherent to its design. It looks to the empirical evidence in order to expand the conceptual foundations of contentious politics theories. Such empirical evidence, in particular the notion of resistance economy, is discussed according to an approach combining action-research and observation. I observed closely many of the protests, including their preparation, and had conversations with many of the different actors involved in contentious actions in the occupied West Bank mentioned in the chapter. Last, I have been engaged in discussing the concept of resistance economy through my institutional capacity via Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network and my
affiliation with other research centres, networks, and policy circles in Palestine (I elaborate on my positionality later on in this introduction).

**Field Research: Obstacles, Challenges, and Solutions**

I expected and assumed that conducting field research at home, in my country, would be fairly straightforward. I am very familiar with the overall context, culture, norms and traditions, and language, and after all, I am partially a product of the society and culture being studied. However, I can conclude now -with confidence- after several research trips between 2010 and 2015, that researching in one’s home country is far from being straightforward. The “surprises” that presented themselves during the field research required a high level of creativity and adjustment, and availability to adapt and re-learn. Above all, conducting research at home requires lots of patient, careful and genuine listening, and objective distance. Additionally, when other human beings are the key respondents and subjects to the research enquires -as opposed to documents or archive- a certain set of ethical considerations prevail that need to be addressed thoroughly and persistently. But when the researcher and the researched people live in an unstable and very dangerous environment under a brutal foreign military occupation and a domination of settler-colonialism, the peculiarity of the researcher task, I argue, requires additional creativity, resilience, patient, trust, and care.

When I started my major field research in the refugee camps in 2012, I did not expect that I would be perceived as a complete stranger and foreigner, as I was just coming from another Palestinian locality. People, at the beginning, did not recognise that I am also a Palestinian -like them- and they started talking to me in English, German, Italian and even Hebrew. I replied to the people in Arabic, but they insisted to reply again in other languages and they kept telling me that I went to an excellent schooling to study Arabic. There was a consensus at the perception level, that I am not a Palestinian. This was due to multiple reasons according to the people including my appearance (relatively long hair and semi-light-coloured beard), lighter skin than the “typical” Palestinian, the way I carry my bag, the way I walk, and even the brand of my jeans, shirt, and shoes. I took immediate measures to change the initial perceptions that people built up in their minds about me, at two levels: appearance and trust-building. I shortened my hair, carried the bag differently or not at all,
bought a new pair of jeans, shirts, shoes and even a pen and notebook from the local market. Then I started having deeper conversations with people talking about things that a stranger or foreigners will not be aware of, and using certain phrases, words, and references that requires local knowledge, to prove that I am a local “indigenous” researcher. This initial response helped me to build a high level of trust quickly so as to address the initial perception that I am a foreigner (of course I do acknowledge that I am a foreigner to the camp in the sense that I am stranger who does not live there).

However, I had to deal with another level of trust-building measure when I started discussing the sensitive topics such as security, weapons, resistance, security collaboration, political arrests and detention, financial compensations and disarmament, and torture and violation of human rights. All of this is in addition to dealing with the dire economic conditions of the people. So, I started by taking the “blessing” from the local leaders and heads of the Services Committee- al-Lijan al-Sha’bia’ (the local governing body whom members are appointed, in most cases, by Fatah leadership), who helped me in spreading the word that I am a researcher who will spend a few months in the camps researching security and economic issues. To be perceived as a legitimate researcher is particularly crucial in such settings to be protected at the personal level first and foremost. In each interview I had to spend some time building trust, and I had to take it slowly and gradually with the aim to address the more difficult questions at a later stage in the field research. The key was to take things in a gradual manner, and build a solid base of trust and mutual respect. Indeed, living with the people in the camps accelerated the process dramatically, and people started opening up voluntarily, which would often “snowball” by them taking me to listen to the stories of their relatives or friends. The human connection that was built up as a result was crucial for the execution of a successful fieldwork.

As a researcher who is studying security-related matters, I had to justify my objectives to the security personnel in the camps (including militants, or members of the PA’s security forces). I also had to explain my research to the UNRWA’s director of the camp. Overall, I had to answer a very wide range of questions including if the gathered information will go to the Israeli, Palestinian or British intelligence. I had to have coffee on a regular basis with key figures in the camp
partially to take their “continuous blessing”. Through engagement with all actors coming from different backgrounds and representing different political affiliations along the political spectrum, my objectivity and neutrality was never questioned, which boosted the level of trust between me and the people in the camps. People were so eager to share their stories, opinions and thoughts. It was obvious that people wanted their voice to be heard and they wanted someone to echo their voices and listen to them. This indicated clearly to the legitimacy gap and crisis of representation where people, particularly refugees, remain marginalised in the political and governance systems and structures in the occupied West Bank.

I used to start my day early in the morning, sometimes as early as 6 a.m. to have a morning conversation with the Palestinian workers who go to Israel for employment –mainly in construction-, and finish late, sometimes until midnight. This meant that I was able to talk to different categories of the people (for instance housewives, unemployed people, or shop owners during the day; and professionals who work during the day, students, or workers in Israel or with the PA or in other Palestinian cities during the evenings).

Building trust and creating a safe space for conversations were not only important to tackle the sensitive topics, but also to overcome the culture of fear that the PA and its security forces had created, particularly in the camps and more generally in the Palestinian society. Engaging with the people over and over throughout the fieldwork was instrumental to access new insights and acquire additional stories and reflections over time. I under-estimated the extent and entrenchment of the culture of fear due to the PA security forces practices, but being in the camps observing the people’s behaviour revealed a reality check that pointed out to the police state in the making. Observing respondents and their initial reactions to certain questions represented a methodological tool throughout the field research. Careful observation was a key pillar to conduct this research, the challenge was how to process and digest all the images and input which proved to be a daunting task. But on the other hand, it exposed me to the real life in the camps through the lenses of its refugees. Similar to the centrality of participants observation method, listening carefully to the powerful narrative of the people and engaging with them in a dialogue is another methodological choice that this research utilised. This created a huge and
overwhelming input which posed a challenge on how best to deal with this issue. I used to write a detailed daily diary during the field work phase, in addition to the notes I took during the interviews and the audio recording.

As I was listening to many horrific stories of torturing, political arrest, severe violations of human rights, and collective punishment, I also had to shield my psychological well-being very well in order not to be severely affected on a personal level. This posed another challenge. Therefore, I created some “virtual and artificial” distance between me as a Palestinian whose heart aches when hearing these stories, and the other me as a researcher who is following his research enquiry and curiosity and puts his emotions aside, at least during the time in the field. Striking the right balance is challenging indeed, however I made sure that my “investigator hat” led me during the time of the fieldwork which encouraged me to look for additional complex dynamics, to push the right and sensitive buttons, and to reveal more hidden suffering due to the PA’s security campaigns in these refugee camps. This is directly linked to my positionality as a researcher. The moving and in many cases heart-breaking incidents throughout the field research, were main sources of inspiration despite the associated pain with it, and therefore the challenges and obstacles transformed into opportunities and strength.

Lastly, with the dire economic conditions, it was important to declare clearly that I am not a social worker or financial assistance provider, and that I am not doing any research for the UNRWA or the PA. Securing my independence during the field research was another challenge and issue that I always wanted to overcome and secure. My training as a field researcher for over three years between 2002 and 2005 when I was an undergraduate student at Birzeit University in Palestine, equipped me with a set of skills that was very helpful during my field research. I used to fill questionnaires for public polls and surveys, and I was exposed to at least 30 localities (camps, villages, or cities) in the occupied West Bank. This training, which is also linked with my positionality as a researcher, equipped me with some of the needed skills to overcome many daily challenges and obstacles.10

10 For instance, to ensure the participation of women, especially the younger generation (youth), I collaborated with women associations in the refugee camps in organising focus groups. In one
**Researcher Positionality**

As I am combing classical political science approaches with more anthropological ones in my research, the issue of “researcher positionality” becomes more crucial and central to the analysis. As an engaged Palestinian scholar who is also directing Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, and who is an active actor in the Palestinian academic and public sphere, I am positioned at a number of intersects between academia, public policy arenas, and scholarly activism. This is reflected in the nature and design of the chapters, and possibly the roots for that go back to my childhood. My childhood was very much influenced by the work of Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani and Palestinian political cartoonist Naji Al-Ali, which considerably affected my current role as a researcher. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali were assassinated by Israel due to their political engagement through writings and drawings. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali taught me how to express the grand ideas in simple and direct ways without harming the deep meaning or the quality of the analysis. They also taught me that the voices from below and the power of the people should always be in the centre of any analysis. Both Kanafani and Al-Ali taught me that novel ideas need to be felt before they are understood, in order to assess their purity and value. Additionally, and in more generic terms that goes beyond this thesis, I am influenced by the approach of Susan George to understand the role of the social scientists. Susan George argues that, "The job of the responsible social scientist is first to uncover these forces [of wealth, power and control], to write about them clearly, without jargon... and finally...to take an advocacy position in favour of the disadvantaged, the underdogs, the victims of injustice". These are leading principles for me as a responsible social scientist, and a philosophy that I carried with me, as a researcher, during my anthropological fieldwork journey in the refugee camps in particular, which affected my positionality as a researcher. Edward Said once argued “everything we research, everything we write, the very analysis we are able to see or piece together on a particular topic is shaped by where we as intellectual and academics choose to place our point of beginning”. Placing the point of the beginning inside, around, and about people’s life, is my objective in this thesis.

occasion I was expecting 6 female youth in the focus group, but to my surprise I had 32 women in that focus group. Instead of lasting for 1.30 hours, it lasted for 3.30 hours.
Being a Palestinian refugee myself who lived his whole life (apart from the last few years of studies in the United Kingdom (UK)) in Ramallah in the occupied West Bank adds another layer to my positionality as a researcher. I can be seen as an indigenous researcher who has a number of built-in values, biases, judgments, and political views that directly and indirectly may influence my approach to research, and how I look at things. I am a product and output of my own research field, with academic training in the UK. But being away from Palestine for a few years has also opened my eyes to a number of new things “at home” and allowed me to look at things with some distance as a researcher and not only as a Palestinian. For instance, I never questioned so many things about the Israeli military occupation when I was living under its daily control and oppression. But after a few years of not living under its daily control and oppression, I look at this occupation fundamentally differently. This reflexivity had its impact on me as a person and also as a researcher. This is simply to say that I also grew with the progress of my research, and I transformed myself while studying the transformations that my own society went through or was going through.

Additionally and very importantly, during my PhD research years -precisely since 2012- I am directing and managing the programs of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, which indeed affected my positionality as a researcher and as an engaged actor in the Palestinian academic and public sphere. It offered me additional agency and power, not only through networks and connections, but also through the ability to change and impact the narrative and policy in certain realms and through the production of knowledge in a number of Palestine-related issues. Directing and managing the programs of Al-Shabaka shaped me as a researcher and an engaged actor in my own society, and indeed empowered me during my research. Al-Shabaka aims to transform the Palestinian weakness of fragmentation into a strength through working towards a Palestinian intellectual cohesion and encouragement of a the culture of debate, and also aims to strategise for Palestine and put a critical Palestinian policy voice on the map globally. Through Al-Shabaka, I was not only able to communicate my findings and my research trajectories with a network of 150 intellectual members spread all over the world, but it also allowed me to engage with the wider audience to present my work-in-progress throughout the years. This occurred through the avenues of Al-Shabaka itself, and also through other avenues as
major media outlets, locally and internationally. Publishing some very preliminary findings from the refugee camps, for instance, in the *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, or *Al-Jazeera*, and highlighting the issue of resistance criminalisation and authoritarian transformation, illustrated to me the level of agency that I do have as a researcher and how it affects my positionality, and the level of responsibility that I carry. Communicating my ideas in Arabic and English attracted different audiences with different and unique input, which was instrumental throughout my research. Analysing the operations of the World Bank in Palestine, assessing the overall economic framework of Oslo Peace Accords, and spelling out a few pillars of the resistance economy model, are a number of ideas that I developed through Al-Shabaka. The intellectual community and engaged scholarship through Al-Shabaka had a positive impact on my legitimacy as a researcher and as a scholar/actor in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Engaged scholarship comes with its own caveats though, but being aware of these caveats and striking the right balance is key for a rigorous engaged scholarship (Succarie 2014; Nayel 2013). At times, particularly in parts of the last chapter on contentious politics and resistance economy, the advocacy-policy tune might be dominant, however, chapter five is characterised by it serious attempt to expand the theoretical underpinning of the theories of contentious politics though the utilisation of the economic element building-up on the case of Palestine. This partial policy domination might be a limitation of the last quarter of the last chapter that I do acknowledge, however this was also impacted by my positionality and by the form and nature of the voices from below. Being at the intersect between different activist groups and grassroots movements who challenged the consequences of the PA’s state-building project, the Fayyadist neo-liberal economic agenda, and the legitimacy of the political leadership, and being driven by an action-research approach in an attempt to operationalise the notion of resistance economy, positioned me in a particular way to reflect on the voices from the field that aimed to challenge Fayyadism. Those voices, that I witnessed first-hand, were repressed by the very authoritarian trends that were built under Fayyadism, which influenced the design of the last quarter of the last chapter in the thesis vis-à-vis my positionality as a researcher.
Lastly, and very importantly, being a researcher from LSE, a hugely respected institution, positively impacted my positionality as a researcher. This was particularly evident when I conducted interviews with actors in the aid industry realm and with the donor community. The legitimacy of the LSE reflected itself on me as a researcher.

This positionality represents an element in the process of reflexivity and illustrates the impact of being a Palestinian, an academic researcher at LSE, and an engaged scholar through my work at Al-Shabaka. This positionality as argued by England (1994) is an “exploration of the investigator’s reflection on one’s own placement within the many contexts, layers, power structures, identities, and subjectivities of the viewpoint”, and the whole rationale behind positioning is to provide a further validation to the conclusions, to the confidence levels in the findings, to the transparency of the research inquiry, and to inform the research process, as research is a process and not just a product. After all, there is a need for an understanding of the nature of and appreciation for the subjectivity of the principal investigator as vital and needed processes for self-reflection and a determination of self within social constructs under investigation (Behar, 1994; Kirschner, 1987; Rose, 1997). Methodologically, as was argued by Hall (1190:18), “there’s no enunciation without positionality. You have to position yourself somewhere in order to say anything at all”. And therefore, as was argued by Bourke (2014), positionality represents a space in which objectivism and subjectivism meet, in a “dialectic relationship” of existence (Freire, 2000: 50). Thus, this dialectic relationship between the objectivism and subjectivism of positionality is framed within the overall academic scholarly understanding of the studied phenomenon in this thesis.

**Triangulation Process**

Due to the research design and the sensitive topics that are discussed with the people and different actors through a bottom-up ethnographic approach, the process of triangulation is an integral and crucial methodological choice that is used in this thesis to ensure accuracy, credibility and rigoursity (Olsen 2004; Hammersley 2008). Triangulation is particularly relevant and instrumental when researching contested issues and engaging with different actors with conflicting interests and diverse expectations (Golafshani 2003). To cross-validate and enhance the rigoursity of the
gathered information and data from the field, I utilise various sources of information (data triangulation), a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods, top-down/bottom-up approaches, primary/secondary data for analysis (methodological triangulation), and to some extent play the role of an investigator to review the gathered data (investigator triangulation). Therefore, in this thesis, I use multiple forms of triangulation to generate better confidence in the original results, to allow for a larger space for creativity, to enhance the validity, quality and credibility of the research findings, and to map out trends of regularity and consistency. The processes of triangulation allow this research to dig deeper to reveal some hidden dynamics and to have a more confident understanding of the studied phenomenon. These processes of triangulation were indeed time and energy consuming, in an already highly contested research environment. This thesis distinguishes itself from other studies in the field through the utilisation of different tools (profiling of actors, following a dialogical participatory approach, conducting in-depth interviews and natural and systematic focus groups, and living in the refugee camps for original ethnographic research), the quality and originality of the gathered data, and the rigoursity of the powerful narrative that is coming directly from the people/refugees.

Limitations of Surveys

The use of opinion polls and results from public surveys in the thesis, needs to be understood with the usual and traditional methodological caveats associated with such methodological choice. The occupied West Bank can be seen as a “republic of polling centres”. Over the last twenty years, polling has become an industry in Palestine, attracting local, regional and international actors. Some of the results, from around ten different polling and public surveys institutions, are used in this thesis to illustrate certain indictors or trends. They are used to support the points made in this thesis, and not to generate sweeping conclusions. The findings from the opinion polls are an additional, supporting tool to reflect the people’s voices at a certain point in time regarding a number of inter-linked issues. This thesis does not aim to build a matrix of the different surveys, or provide a critical reading to them or their methodologies. It is certain that the various surveys referred to in this thesis used a number of methodologies, samples and tools for analysis, aimed to serve different purposes, are prone to donors conditionality, contain natural biases, and differ in
terms of quality and reliability. That said, the survey results used in this thesis were selected carefully after considerable assessment, to quantify particular trends or provide evidence for certain arguments and claims. These results are particularly important in the triangulation process when they reveal similar trends about contested issues as popular legitimacy, corruption, human rights violations, and security and economic policies. They are also helpful to better contextualise the evidence gathered from both refugee camps, and they give a quick glance of some of the trends in the occupied West Bank. These are key reasons to utilise them in parts of the analysis in the thesis, particularly where the perceptions about Fayyadism are discussed, and case studies are contextualised. But in the final analysis, they present a unique set of information to deal with, especially if the triangulation process is taken into account and the data are utilised from ten different sources.

**Interdisciplinary Contribution**

Methodologically, this interdisciplinary thesis is featured by its contribution to a number of fields of knowledge and disciplines. In its core design it reflects the inter- and multi-disciplinary nature of the international development studies discipline. In the broader theme, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the development-security nexuses through using the empirical case study of the occupied West Bank in Palestine, via combining classical political science approaches with anthropological ones. In more specific terms, and as illustrated throughout the different nature and design of each chapter and through the subsequent raised research questions, this thesis contributes to the fields of political economy of international aid and development, political science approaches, contentious politics and social movement theory, security sector reform studies and securitised development processes, institutional and human ethnography, anthropology and sociology of refugees, state-building and governance in conflict-affected areas, and Middle Eastern politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict discipline. This is not merely a long list of fields; as the epistemological contribution is also associated with the utilisation of different research methods and tools that are borrowed from the above-mentioned fields of knowledge. The complexity of the studied phenomenon puts this thesis at the intersection of these different fields of knowledge to better explain the multiple dynamics of the studied phenomenon. Using only one conceptual
framework to understand the state-building project and governance reform processes in the occupied West Bank in Palestine will not be sufficient to grasp the causes and consequences of these processes, and will fall short in explaining the issues. The utilisation of different tools and the adoption of conceptual understandings from different disciplines, help in ensuring that the chapters of this thesis are inter-linked and organically connected through the broader dimensions of the development-security nexuses.

**Conceptual Reflection**

As an extension to the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis that engages with, contributes to, and was inspired by a number of conceptual frameworks and theoretical understandings. This includes accounts of the historical-development work of Paul Kingston who examined Britain’s aid for development and state-building in the 1940s and 1950s in the Middle East; the anthropological-development work of David Mosse; the “governance without government/state” theories as was particularly developed in the international relations and political science disciplines by Thomas Risse; and the work of Sidney Tarrow on contentious politics and social movements theory.

Paul Kingston (1996) in his *Britain and the politics of modernization in the Middle East, 1945-1958* analysed the underlying state-building models of the British Middle East Office and Point IV (the ancestor of USAID) and the role of aid, which is closely related to the research conducted for this thesis. Notably, the international community started to deliver aid to the PA in the context of “emerging optimism” (the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords), while for Kingston, the emerging optimism was in the aftermath of dismantling the British colonialism in the Middle East. What is striking is that the set of assumptions for aid intervention, the set of raised questions, and the set of criteria used to evaluate aid in the 1940s and 1950s, are very similar to the ones under Fayyadism today. The set of assumptions includes that aid is to be used to ensure stability, build regional alliances and support moderate leaders; aid to induce a particular style of governance and build institutions with a selective governance approach; aid that is based on the assumption of the positive relationship between economic development and political modernization and that economic
progress will bring political stability; and finally that the agents for change are the external donors themselves. All these assumptions are arguably even more valid in the case of the state-building in Palestine because they were framed in a neoliberal setting. However, it is not only about the similar assumptions, but also about the similar questions that are raised until today, such as “what is the real purpose of development, who are the most appropriate agents of development, and what is the best kind of development assistance” (Kingston 1996:3). As for evaluating the effectiveness of aid, strikingly similar criteria is used in Palestine today compared to the criteria used in the Middle East more than half a century ago, namely: “the political motivations behind the provision of development assistance, the economic model which guides development policy decisions, and the mechanisms used to deliver development assistance” (Kingston 1996:3).

The geostrategic element in the aid industry is alive until today in the era of Fayyadism, where political order is perceived as superior to socio-economic development, which results in strengthening “inequitable and elite-based structures of power”. Having the donors in the front lines of policy arenas, and the adoption of a “retail”, as opposed to a “wholesale” development approach, through supporting small fragmented projects instead of a big macro package, are elements that shaped the overall aid industry in Palestine and in particular during Fayyadism. In the final analysis, aid for state-building attempted to replicate the experience of the West in the East to impose modernization or Westernization. In this global era that Fayyadism interacted with, the aid for state-building was imposed in a standardised neoliberal package and the repercussions of that is a key objective of this thesis.

Furthermore, the politics of aid and the overall framework of the aid industry constitute the main driving forces behind the Fayyadist paradigm. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the combination of the role of aid experts, the local technocrats, and the liberal peace conditionality on aid, replicate the aid-development industry trends and crisis. The seminal work of Timothy Mitchell in the Rule of Experts, and David Mosse and David Lewis’s Development Brokers and Translators, along with the work of Arturo Escobar, Amartya Sen, and James Ferguson, amongst others, constituted major inspirational contributions to the thesis and to my understanding of the impact of aid on the processes of development or de-
development. The case of Palestine and the trajectories of the aid industry over the last two decades, provide further evidence for the inherent structural limitations of aid in inducing structural transformations in the recipient’s economy—especially in conflict-affected areas,—or introduce more democratic styles of governance and regimes.

In particular, the work of David Mosse and his theorisation of the two opposing views on development policy, namely the instrumentalists and the critics, matches perfectly with the situation of the development-aid industry in the OPT. As such, Mosse’s categorization and conceptual framing was utilised in this thesis in the fourth and fifth chapters on the failing patterns of aid in the OPT. However, Mosse himself acknowledges that neither the instrumentalist view nor the critical view “does justice to the complexity of policy making and its relationship to project practice, or to the creativity and skill involved in negotiating development” (Mosse 2005:2). Agreeing with this assertion and conclusion, this thesis aims to tease out further elements in the complex structures of aid and introduces two additional views on aid to expand the conceptual framing and understanding: “the critical instrumentalist and the neo-colonialist”.

Lastly, in addition to the theories of contentious politics, particularly as developed by Sidney Tarrow, the conceptualisation of the initial overarching governance sphere in this thesis was influenced by the theories of governance without state/government, and mainly through the work of The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 (Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood) with the leadership of Thomas Risse. The conventional, idealistic and western-centric good governance and state-building literature and standardised blueprint frameworks proved to be not sufficient nor appropriate to explain the different dynamics in the governance and state-building realms in areas that are very far from standardised processes (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007; Grindle 2004 and 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009). Therefore, in cases of quasi states (Jackson 1990), state-like (Khan 2009), limited-self-government (Khan et al. 2004) and areas of limited statehood (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006), there is an utmost need to explore the proposition that the “good” governance approach

---

11 There is no consensus on the definition of the epithet “good”, although some similarities do exist. Many scholars explain it as a synonym for the western model of liberal democracy and institutionalization. While others argue that “good” simply means the implementation of the
state-building\textsuperscript{12} is only relevant if the historical specificity, the contextual circumstances and realities, the indigenous mechanisms, and the existing social norms are taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{13} The hybrid understanding of governance as a concept and practice, as developed by the streams of research by SFB 700 amongst others, on the other hand, is more suitable for places like Palestine, especially given that governance and state-building are taking place in the absence of state and sovereignty. Theories of good governance for/as state-building impacted the overall design of this research. Elements of this can be found in the first chapter when the notion of hybridity is briefly discussed, but more importantly, Fayyadism as a paradigm is understood here as an illustration for the standardised framework of “good governance for state-building”, which is deeply influenced by donor’s prescriptions and funds.

**Fayyadism and the Notion of Resistance**

Conceptually, and before discussing the main elements of each chapter below in this introduction, it is crucial to affirm that Fayyadism does not exist in vacuum. It is not only about Salam Fayyad, Fayyadism was also impacted by the overall political decisions and approaches of Mahmoud Abbas, the PA and PLO president, which are considerably different than those of Arafat. This is why Fayyadism is not only an externally-sponsored paradigm, but also a home-grown one. Therefore, the conceptual basis of the strategy of change underpinning Fayyadism’s pillars can be universally accepted core principles of participation, fairness, decency, accountability, transparency and efficiency (Hyden et al. 2004; Court 2006; UNCTAD 2009; WB 2003, 2007; DFID 2007; Chandler 2009). Additionally, in the realm of “good governance”, there are a number of unsolved dilemmas such as which institutions matter more (Rodrik 2004; Khan 2006; Dervis 2006), what are the consequences of the governance reform (Fukuyama 2008; Brinkerhoff 2007), how good governance is measured (Arndt and Oman 2006; Iqbal and Shah 2008; Kaufman et al. 2009; and Hyden et al. 2004), and if good governance for state formation is good option, particularly in the Palestinian case (Khan et al. 2004; Khan 2004; Khan 2009).

\textsuperscript{12} Although “state-building” and “state-formation” are mostly used interchangeably in the literature, however it can be argued that state-building emphasizes the importance of external forces while state-formation sees the development of political institutions as an indigenous process (Bates 2001; Dorussen 2005).

\textsuperscript{13} In short, “good governance” is understood in this thesis as effective and legitimate. Broadly speaking, “legitimate” concerns the popular acceptance, locally and internationally, of the governance systems, processes, actors and authorities. While, “effective” is closely correlated with sovereignty and self-sufficiency and concerns the ability of the governance mechanisms and processes to ensure the provision of public services and goods with the best utilization of the available scare resources.
seen as the outcome and result of a set of strategic, institutional, and operational transformations, induced by the main governance actors in the West Bank.

At the strategic level, the PA adopted a strategy that gave the statutory security forces the exclusive responsibility for security provision. This aimed to achieve the political slogan of the PA under Fayyadism “one gun, one law, one authority”. At the institutional level, the PA had changed its policies so to enforce the rule of law, achieve monopoly of violence and reform the security sector through the adoption of a Weberian principles in distorted environment. Consequently, in order to implement these strategic and institutional changes, the PA induced operational transformations that shaped the operationalisation of the security sector reform.

These operationalising factors include: (i) security operations, old-fashioned strong arm methods and redeployment of the PA US/EU trained and equipped security forces such as the ‘Smile and Hope’ operation conducted in Jenin governorate; (ii) cooperation and coordination with the Israeli forces, which is one of the most problematic factors not only because it affects the legitimacy of the PA forces, but also because it represents a division of labour between the occupying power and the occupied; (iii) “weapons cleansing” and arms collection targeting armed resistance groups that belong to political parties as the PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah. These parties used to provide public services, including security provision. But, the favouritism embedded in the process of arms collection made it a debateable and non-transparent process; since certain groups were killed or arrested, while others were offered financial compensations or amnesties; (iv) finally, practices of demobilisation, reintegration, and co-option was coupled with changes in the goals and priorities of the international aid community. More than thirty per cent of aid was allocated to the security realm and towards creating stability through “filling pockets” approaches as reintegration and co-option. Overall, these factors had direct impacts on the informal security arrangements, mass assemblies, popular protection

---

14 I am using the phrase “weapons cleansing” for a couple of reasons, inspired by the conducted fieldworks. Firstly, to indicate the fact that weapons cleansing was a more serious and genuine process in comparison with previous attempts, particularly compared to the Arafatsim era. Secondly, to reflect the fear expressed by the ordinary citizens that the PA’s security forces, through replicating and conducting the “dirty work” on behalf of Israel, such as arresting fighters and confiscating their weapons, are acting as sub-contractors to the occupation. Thirdly, to indicate that the disarmament process targeted all the military groups including the ones that are affiliated with the Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.
and people’s freedom of expression; and therefore it had ultimate consequences on the people’s security and economic well-being.

One particular dimension that acquires major attention in the thesis is the relationship between the Fayyadist paradigm and the notion and concept of resistance. Resistance in its broad and all-encompassing meaning was a central theme that always exposed the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm in both the security and economy spheres, as discussed and revealed by the ethnographic and empirical evidence in the following chapters. From a critical perspective, the Fayyadist paradigm could be seen as an anti-resistance paradigm, or a paradigm that allows for only one form of resistance (as expressed by the people in the camps): financially-sponsored peaceful resistance (as opposed to “real voluntary resistance”, as one respondent from Jenin camp argued). And therefore, critics argued that the Fayyadist paradigm created an industry for peaceful resistance, and by extension professionalised it by recruiting people and offering them monthly allowances or salaries to engage in such activities. This commodification of resistance interacted with a good governance, modernity, and state-building frameworks under Fayyadism, as such a transformation was new to the Palestinian national movement. Under Arafat, the commodification of resistance was expressed in a neo-patrimonial patronage-based politics and a highly personalised style of governance; Arafat was not “exclusivist” in the sense that he prioritised armed resistance (as the establishment of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades indicates), but he did not seek to eliminate other sorts of resistance so long as he could manipulate and exploit them to his own end.

Additionally, as far as resistance is concerned, Arafat was primarily concerned about local and regional dynamics, while Fayyad was preoccupied with the way that the international community would perceive Palestinians. All this was reflected in the dynamics of local legitimacy and popular accountability. These transformations were also associated with overall changes in the Palestinian national liberation project, the trajectories of the peace process, and the dynamics of the so-called Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that the notion and practice of resistance under the Fayyadist paradigm was a dominant theme expressed by the Palestinian
people, and constituted a major source of tension between the people and the authorities as illustrated in the discussions presented in the following chapters.

This is particularly the case when the security campaigns and disarmament processes are considered; however, it also extends to the exclusivity of neoliberal economic thinking and planning in the economic domain. This thesis reveals through ethnography the popularity and legitimacy of both the non-statutory security forces and the political factions’ armed groups, as well as the celebration of resistance as a way of living under occupation. In this way, the Palestinian people were critical of the attempts made under the Fayyadist paradigm to eradicate, tame, and criminalise resistance. Moreover, people were highly critical about the tactics and tools that the Fayyadist paradigm employed in its efforts to tame and criminalise resistance, such as the doctrine of security collaboration with Israel, the use of informal mechanisms to induce the formal rule of the PA forces, the (ab)use of the judicial system to entrench authoritarian rule instead of ensuing justice, and finally the use of excessive violence aimed at perpetuating a culture of fear and ultimately discredit resistance.

Tension around resistance, this thesis argues, demonstrates the fundamental flaw of executing a security reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy in the absence of sovereign national authority or a unified leadership, and in the presence of a foreign military occupation without fundamentally addressing the imbalances of power. After all, Fayyadism aimed and claimed to build a state, reform its security forces and security doctrine, and adopt a set of neoliberal economic policies; yet, all of this was meant to happen in the absence of sovereignty and state.

**Abbas and Fayyad**

Although the core focus of this thesis is on Salam Fayyad and his philosophy as the main protagonist of Fayyadism, this should not be understood as if Fayyad is a “deus ex-machina”. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the President of the PA, the Chairman of the PLO, the Leader of Fatah, and recently the President of the State of Palestine, represents the highest political authority. Indeed, he is the one who nominated, appointed, and dismissed Salam Fayyad. He and his team are the ones who negotiate “peace” with Israel, not Fayyad. The reason that this thesis does not provide a significant analysis and focus on Abbas is because this thesis does not address the
very macro political framework of the Palestinian Israeli conflict per se. Instead, this thesis addresses the operational dimensions and reform processes in the security and development spheres, and assesses the emergence and consequences of these processes at the micro level, on peoples’ lives. In other words, this thesis uses Fayyadism to understand its implications on the broader picture of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and does not use the trajectories of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to assess Fayyadism. Hence, the analysis moves from a meso to macro level, but not necessarily from a macro to meso level. This meso analysis is supported by micro-level evidence. This distinction might appear arbitrary, artificial or unrealistic as it is not possible to completely separate the macro-meso-micro levels from each other. However, the research design and the methodological choices and approaches aimed to look at the emergence, consequences and repercussions of the security sector reform policies and the neo-liberal economic policies as spelled out and implemented in and according to the documents and plans prepared by Fayyad’s governments. Therefore, the point of reference has Fayyad at its core, not Abbas.

That said, neither Fayyad nor Fayyadism, exist in vacuum. They are surrounded by institutional settings, political system and parties, and complex frameworks. A path-dependent understanding needs to be used to recognise that Fayyadism is indeed a home-grown phenomenon even though it is externally sponsored and financed. Abbas and Fatah remain the ones who dominated the Palestinian Authority and its politics, and Fayyad was seen as a stranger internally but still attractive to the international donor community. Abbas and the internal politics of Fatah, together with their undemocratic norms, can be supportive or hugely destructive to the Palestinian polity and political system, which depend on factional politics and unilateral decisions. The PA or PLO “traditional” Palestinian leadership did not perceive Fayyad as an equal partner in the leadership, but more as a service provider and as the “man of this phase- Rajol al-Marhala”, as a high ranking official from Fatah told me. Fayyad, the technocrat, was engaged to implement a technical, procedural, and operational institutional reform as part of a state-building process, from the traditional leadership perspective. When Fayyad started dealing with “real politics” that impacted the intra-Fatah dynamics and the legitimacy of the traditional Palestinian leadership in the international arenas, Fayyad knew he would be counting his remaining days as a prime minister of the PA.
This illustrates the role of Abbas and the traditional Palestinian leadership vis-à-vis Fayyadism as far as this thesis is concerned. The aim is not to marginalise them in the analysis, as this is simply not possible and naïve. The institutional complexity and the overlap of responsibilities, the domination of the political élite and the dynamics of neo-patrimonial structures and client-patron relations, are some of the main characteristics of the Palestinian political system within which the Fayyadist paradigm needs to be framed and contextualised. However, what is crucial not to be dismissed in this overall picture, is that neither Abbas nor Fayyad, nor the traditional leadership or even Hamas and other non-PLO political factions or armed groups have sovereign authority or even an independent viable state. Everyone lives under the control of an Israeli settler colonial regime and military occupation. The self-ruling of the Palestinians and the adopted style of governance and the state-building agenda, has to be understood in an overall colonial context in order to appreciate the multiple levels of complexities of building a state, reform its security apparatuses, and build its neo-liberal economy, in the absence of the basic pillars of the state.

**Hamasism and Fayyadism**

Fayyadism is a *West Bank First* strategy, and therefore it can be seen as a model opposed to Hamasism, the style of governance of Hamas in Gaza after 2007. Both Fayyadism and Hamasism followed different approaches, competing assumptions, varying objective and subjective contexts, and aimed to serve different purposes. However, both of them emerged in the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian division in 2007, entrenching the fragmentation of the Palestinians and distorting the Palestinian national movement. Both models are dependent on regional, international, and external actors for sustainability and financial and political support. Both models affected the lives of the Palestinian people negatively, and both models shared the transformation towards authoritarianism to sustain their rule, with rising levels of human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza. Both Fayyadism and Hamasism failed to bring the Palestinian people any closer to realise their self-determination, acquire their rights, or fulfil their aspirations. Just the contrary, this thesis argues.

Although both models function within the overall context of the Israeli settler colonialism, they were nevertheless executed in different contextual settings.
Fayyadism was supported and facilitated by the colonial power (Israel), as Fayyadism did not aim to challenge Israel or address the imbalances of power. However, Hamasism was a model developed under an Israeli-Egyptian imposed tight siege and under three major wars on the Gaza Strip with devastating levels of destruction and human loss (Shaban 2014; Bashir and Rappaport 2014). The set of the neo-liberal economic policies in the West Bank was contrasted with a “tunnel economy” in Gaza (Pelham 2011). The joint Palestinian-Israeli businesses in the West Bank were contrasted with tightening of the siege on Gaza and the movement of people and goods. The set of normative liberal values in the occupied West Bank were contrasted with a set of Islamic rules and regulations that aimed for the “islamisization” of the Palestinian society. While Fayyadism was enjoying the generosity of the international donors and their political support, Hamasism was suffering from the scarcity of resources and the international boycott even though it won the last legislative elections in 2006. While Fayyadism was building showcase new cities such as Rawabi near Ramallah, Hamasism and the international humanitarian community were negotiating with Israel how many bags of cement were allowed to enter Gaza to reconstruct the Strip in the aftermath of the three wars on Gaza in 2008/9, 2012, and 2014.

This brief comparison does not aim to judge which style of governance is better or worse. Similarly, this thesis does not aim to compare and contrast Fayyadism and Hamasism. This is one of the suggested future avenues for research indeed. The purpose of this very brief comparison between these two paradigms, however, is to illustrate that the West Bank and Gaza Strip initiated two different styles of governance that had their impact on the overall Palestinian body politics and the ability of the people to resist the colonial rule and military occupation of Israel. The authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza cared most about stability and the sustainability of their rule, instead of protecting the people, empowering them and enhancing their capabilities to engage in a meaningful development process and to develop liberation strategies.
The Refugees and The UNRWA

The two main locations of my ethnographic fieldwork are refugee camps in the occupied West Bank, Balata and Jenin. Balata is the largest refugee camp in the West Bank in terms of population. The selection of the two refugee camps –the reasons and justifications are explained later- requires a brief contextualization on the Palestinian refugees overall and the particular conditions of these two camps.

The question of the Palestinian refugees emerged in the aftermath of the Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) in 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel. More than 750,000 Palestinians were expelled, disposed and ethnically cleansed in 1948 and were forced by the Zionist terrorist and military groups to leave their original homes and lands to become refugees in other parts of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) or leave Palestine all together (Pappe 2006; Beinin and Hajjar 2014). In 1967, another wave of Palestinian refugees emerged in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Until today, as was evident by the Israeli war on Gaza in the summer of 2014, new waves of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) continue to emerge. To deal with the issue of the Palestinian refugees, the international community created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) which started its operation in May 1950. The UNRWA’s services “encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance”.15 Currently, the UNRWA has around 5 million registered Palestinian refugee. Palestinian refugees are defined as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”.16

The right of return of the Palestinian refugees was recognised in United Nations Resolution 194 which stated in its 11th article that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of

15 UNRWA’s Website, Who are we, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are
16 UNRWA’s Website, Palestine Refugees, [Online], Available: http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees
those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible”.17

The right of return to the Palestinian Refugees remains the core issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Al-Mukayam asl al-hekayah (the camp is the origin of the story) is one of the most publically repeated statements to indicate to the significance of the refugee camps in the Palestinian-Israeli context. The refugee camps, either in al-watan (homeland) or al-manafa (exile), encapsulate the Palestinian story of suffering, but also represent its pride through their resilience and resistance. The Palestinian refugees represent almost half of the Palestinian people, and they are not merely a minor segment of the Palestinian nation. However, the refugees are the ones who paid the heaviest price for the Oslo Peace Accords, which side-lined their right of return, and kept the Palestinian refugees outside Palestine in a permanent state of crisis as stateless and refugees without offering them any positive future horizon. Palestinian refugees always suffered from marginalisation despite being the ones who sacrificed most for the Palestinian national movement. The socio-economic and security conditions are dire both in the camps in or outside Palestine. The camps are heavily populated areas, with poor housing, and poor health and education services provided by the UNRWA. Despite the symbolic national representation of these camps as castles of resistance, the everyday life differs from this symbolism. The everyday life in the camps is full of humiliation, repression, and dependency on many levels. This can be witnessed on a rainy and cold day when refugees wait for half of the day for food assistance provided by the UNRWA. The level of humiliation on such an occasion is beyond description in words, and I, as someone who lived it throughout his childhood and teenage life, I was able to see the years of suffering in the faces and eyes of the people in the camps. With the semi-permanent financial crisis of the UNRWA, it provides very basic services to the camps (8 camps in Gaza Strip servicing around 1.3 million refugees; 19 camps in the West Bank servicing around 762,0000 refugee; 9 camps in Syria and 12 camps in Lebanon servicing around half a million refugees each; and 10 camps in Jordan servicing around 2 million

17 UNRWA’s Website, Resolution 194, [Online]. Available: http://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194
refugees).\textsuperscript{18} This thesis does not intent to evaluate the quality or scope of the UNRWA’s services and operations.\textsuperscript{19}

On the eve of the International Day of Refugees in June 2015, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reported that 41.2\% of the total Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza are refugees (25\% of the West Bank’s population; 67\% of the Gaza Strip’s population). The percentage of persons aged less than 15 years in the camps reached 40.9\%, and 4.2\% for the elderly aged 60 years and over. Consumption-based poverty rates among refugees in the West Bank and Gaza averaged around 35.4\% in comparison with 21.8\% for non-refugees. The unemployment rate among refugees reached up to 33.7\% compared to 22.3\% among non-refugees, with a 3.3\% illiteracy rate for individuals aged 15 years and over (PCBS 2015). Despite the horrific nature of these figures and their translation to the everyday life of the Palestinian refugees, they fall short in reflecting the real daily tragedies, not to mention the methodological limitations of these figures.

However, this brief socio-demographic profile shows that Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in a worse condition than their non-refugee peers. This should not come as a surprise given the structural disadvantages, neglect, and continuous marginalisation to which they are exposed and subjected. Methodologically, this thesis does not tackle the reasons behind the marginalisation and surrounding structural disadvantages. Also, it does not tackle the operation or role of the UNRWA. The UNRWA does not intervene in the provision of the public security. For the people in the camps, based on my interviews, the UNRWA is merely one of their major symbols of their refuge, and there is a consensus on the need to “keep in seeing the blue flag [UNRWA/UN flag] in the camp until we return to our original homes”, as an 82 year old woman in Jenin camp and expelled from Haifa in 1948, told me.

In addition to the dire living conditions, these camps were submitted to major raids and continuous repression and persecutions by the Israeli army over the years. These camps were a “nightmare” to Israel and its security as they are known for their active

\textsuperscript{18} UNRWA’s Website, \textit{Where we work}, [Online], Available: \url{http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work}

\textsuperscript{19} For further analysis on the UNRWA and Palestinian refugees, please refer to Farah (2010, 2012).
role in armed resistance and in building up and nourishing the emergence of strong armed groups. The camps also played a major and pioneering role during the popular protests and civil obedience during the first intifada 1987-1993. During the second Intifada (2000-2005/6), the infamous Jenin Battle/Massacre took place in April 2002 during the Israeli incursion of the West Bank. According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch the Israeli army committed war crimes during that operation. In addition to the human losses, major parts of the camp were completely destroyed and it took years before the problematic re-construction process started (a number of photos are offered in the Appendix to illustrate Jenin Battle). The resistance and steadfastness of the Jenin camp during this battle made it a symbol of resistance during the second intifada, and the camp was celebrated by Arafat as “Jeningrad”, a model that resembles Leningrad. That battle is a major source of pride for its leaders and the refugees overall, and the interviews I conducted with both the battle’s leaders and the camp’s refugees highlighted the centrality of that battle in shaping the people’s collective identity. Both the Balata and Jenin camps, witnessed the birth of Fatah’s armed group, The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, during the second intifada. This is why these camps remained a permanent target for Israel, and this is also why they were the first and main locations to be targeted by the PA’s security campaigns. Both camps as “militarised spaces” with legacies of resistance and steadfastness (Moqawama wa Sumud) gave them particular features in the Palestinian context that comes with positive and negative implications. The elaboration and analysis presented in this thesis illustrates elements in the transformation process of these camps due to the Fayyadist state-building project and governance paradigm.

**Outline of the Thesis**

This thesis comprises five chapters/articles. The first chapter examines the evolution and reform of the Palestinian security forces and groups over the last two decades by explicating changes in the relationship and distinction between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups, and also through the notion of hybridity in the realm of security provision. This analytical angle provides a fresh critical reading to the existing literature, and therefore it builds on and expands the scholarly work of Lia (2006, 2007), Agha and Khalidi (2005), Friedrich and Luethold (2007, 2008),
Frisch (2008), Leech (2012b, 2014a,b), and Bouris (2014). It also addresses the gap in the literature during the era of Fayyadism, contrasts the different security paradigms and doctrines throughout the analysis, and categorises reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase.

The first phase was characterised by a clash between state-building and national liberation projects, and also by a proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s style of governance; which permitted the emergence of a hybrid security model. The second phase was characterised by the increasing role of non-statutory security forces and groups in addressing the security vacuum in the aftermath of the 2002 Israeli incursion into the West Bank, and also by the emergence of the externally-imposed security reform agenda as an integral part of the peace process. The third phase was characterised by the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of state-building and security which resulted in a shift from a hybrid security model under Arafat to an anti-hybrid security model under Fayyad.

Conceptually, in an anti-hybridity paradigm, the Palestinian Authority’s statutory security forces are the only bodies that have the exclusive right to dominate the security realm. Other non-state actors, non-statutory bodies, and armed resistance groups have to be marginalised, dismantled, co-opted, integrated, disarmed, or punished according to this anti-hybridity model. In a hybrid model, however, statutory and non-statutory forces and groups constitute an alternative parallel security model whereby these groups can collaborate, clash, or be used or abused by the political leadership. The existence of one does not mean the absence of the other. Empirically, as discussed in the chapter, Arafat’s security governance model represented a hybrid approach, while the Fayyadist approach constitutes an anti-hybridity approach. The notion of hybridity in this chapter is particularly influenced and inspired by the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual accounts of Risse (2011), Schneckener (2011), Börzel (2010), Börzel and Risse (2010), Boege et al. (2009), Menkhaus (2006/07), IDS (2010), and Luckham et al. (2011).

This chapter concludes that the proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s rule resulted in further insecurities for the Palestinian people. Despite the attempt to reverse this condition under Fayyadism through security reform, new tensions
between the PA’s security forces, the resistance movements, and non-statutory groups emerged. This was manifested in authoritarian transformations and constitutes another form of institutionalised insecurities; this time framed in a state-building and good governance project. Therefore, at best, the security transformation and reform under Fayyadism resulted in better stability and more security for Israel and its occupation, but did not result in better security conditions for Palestinians. At worst, the enhanced functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in authoritarian transformations and the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation; in this way, Fayyadism directly and indirectly sustained the occupation.

The second chapter aims to address one central question: How was the Fayyadist paradigm, and the consequences of its policies, perceived by the different actors and end-users involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s perspective reveal about Fayyadism? The chapter illustrates the tensions between the perspectives coming from the top and those of the people from below regarding the comprehension of Fayyadism, its pillars, and the consequences of its policies on the people’s security, well-being, and their national struggle for liberation. The voices from below challenged the glowing rhetoric of the authorities and their claims to institution-building and readiness for statehood, and instead revealed mounting anger, frustration, inequality, insecurity, and a widening legitimacy gap.

The emergence of the Fayyadist paradigm and its successes and failures has polarised scholars and practitioners. Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that the improved performance of the PA has contributed to peace-building and the enhancement of Palestinians lives (World Bank 2011a,b; IMF 2011a,b; Freidman 2009, 2011). Others argue that it has sustained the occupation, re-structured and re-engineered Palestinian society, created a new élite, and revised the historical national goals (Khalidi and Samour 2011; Brown 2010 a,b; Khan 2010; Turner 2011; Bisan 2011). These perspectives emerged from the literature and were contrasted with the voices of the people gathered through ethnographic investigations at Balata and Jenin refugee camps. This ethnographic data revealed that despite the institutional and technical successes of Fayyadism, these achievements failed to have a meaningful impact on the daily lives or basic rights of Palestinians.
The voices from below articulated the detrimental effects Fayyadism has on resistance against the Israeli military occupation, and by extension on their own protection and security. They also exposed the absence of local legitimacy and local accountability, and questioned Fayyadism’s agenda, political basis, and trajectory as they relate to the Palestinian struggle for freedom. Additionally, the claims made by authorities that Fayyadism is the best and only approach for Palestinians to achieve their aspirations was challenged by the people; instead they perceived Fayyadism as the enforcement of an authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as modernity. In light of Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013, this chapter concludes that the security reform named after him is primarily about the “ism”, and not only about “Fayyad”; therefore the approach that Fayyad ushered in became entrenched during his six years of rule, and remains the force driving the state-building and governance trajectories in Palestine today.

The third chapter tackles in-depth the security campaigns as a defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm, and this chapter is guided by the central question: From the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps, what are the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on their security and on resistance against Israel? Balata and Jenin refugee camps were particularly selected because methodologically these cases represent the benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to other areas across the occupied West Bank. Both camps were regularly celebrated by the Palestinian Authority, the international donor community, and proponents of Fayyadism as indicators of the success of Fayyadism as an outstanding model for state-building and good governance. Balata and Jenin camps were celebrated as camps that transformed from places that “export terror” to stable camps operating under the rule of law (on account of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces). However, a representative voice from below argued that “the security campaigns are like giving someone paracetamol to cure cancer”; a statement that summarises the wide gap between the claims of authorities and the reality experienced by the people. The powerful narrative of the people expresses their ability to unpack and problematise the security reform pillar of Fayyadism, and is also discussed in the chapter.
Furthermore, the ethnographic evidence from both Balata and Jenin refugee camps not only unpacks and deconstructs the implications of the security campaigns on the lives of the people, but also expands and challenges the debates in the literature (Sayigh 2011; Tabar 2012; Schroeder et al. 2014; Marten 2014; Mustafa 2014). The people focused on the notion of resistance as the centre of analysis to explore the consequences of the security reform on their lives and their national struggle. This meant that they problematised and unpacked the security campaigns through a resistance lens, as opposed to the conventional institutional lenses available in the literature. These voices from below not only clarified the link between security reform and resistance against Israel, but they also illustrated how and why resistance against Israel has been criminalised.

Additionally, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the security reform and campaigns resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security forces operations. This authoritarianism is manifest in the excessive use of arbitrary detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Furthermore, the unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security campaigns employed informal tools and mechanisms in an effort to induce formality and exclusivity to the PA security forces in governing these camps. The findings also suggest that the security reforms were used to address intra-Fatah factional politics. Fundamentally, the core objective of the security reform and campaigns was to silence, marginalise, and criminalise resistance against the Israeli occupation and its colonial dominance, as suggested by the ethnographic evidence.

This chapter concludes by arguing that conducting security reform to ensure stability within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of power or revisiting the terms of the peace agreements can only ever have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the colonial occupying power, and a violation of the security and (national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own leadership and (national) security forces.

The last two chapters in the thesis examine dimensions in the political economy sphere of the Fayyadist paradigm by discussing its interaction with the aid industry, and by noting the implications of its neoliberal economic policies on the emerged
cycles of contentions, particularly in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. The fourth chapter, which is co-authored with Jeremy Wildeman from the University of Exeter, deviates from the bottom-up methodological approach and instead builds on thirty original semi-structured interviews conducted with Palestine aid actors that sought to investigate whether patterns in OPT donor aid have changed following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Put differently, have the transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of the aid industry? With the dominance of donors’ prescriptions and the dependency on aid money, this chapter argues that the Fayyadist paradigm not only failed to trickle down its institutional and technical successes, such that Palestinian people’s lives were positively impacted, but it also failed to change the flawed patterns of aid, its framework, the priorities of the donors, and thus the whole aid industry remains dictated by the instrumental donors from the top.

In other words, the failure of aid to bring peace and development is well-documented in the literature (Khan et al. 2004; Keating et al. 2005; Le More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 2011; Nakhleh 2011). However, the implications and consequences of Fayyyadism and the transformations in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings are still lacking. By addressing this gap, this chapter argues that the aid patterns remain unchanged and that donors remain transfixed on a long failed “Investment in Peace” framework that was designed for economic development by the World Bank back in 1993 (Tartir and Wildeman 2012, 2013). By contrasting the findings of this research with the existing literature, this chapters argues that donors are not ready to alter a framework dominated by policy instrumentalists who emphasise pre-determined normative values over actual results, quietly trading financial inducements to Palestinians to forego political rights within a “peace dividends” model.

In addition to the original empirical evidence that this chapter offers, it also provides a fresh reading and categorisation of the existing literature based on the theoretical underpinnings of Mosse (2005). The distinction between the “instrumentalists” and “critics” throughout the chapter constitute a new take on the literature, both methodologically and analytically. Another distinctive feature of this chapter is its regional settings and its interaction with the consequences of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. This chapter argues that it is the very resilience of the Palestinian aid
Introduction

model, and the scale of that intervention, which signifies its importance in the story of Middle East regional aid. At the same time, the OPT has acted as a “laboratory” where donors have been able to test models that appear not only secure but successful enough that the managing directors of major international financial institutions in the OPT would consider exporting the post-Oslo Palestinian aid model to other Arab states in the wake of the 2011 uprisings.

Nothing illustrates this better than the appointment of Salam Fayyad as the lead economist and advisor to the Yemeni government by the World Bank in 2014 to lead the economic reform of Yemen. This shows that the transformation induced by the Fayyadist paradigm not only failed to change the dynamics and power imbalances in the aid industry in the OPT, but also that the Fayyadist paradigm was used by donors to testify the validity of their governance reform policy prescriptions to the whole Middle East. In other words, the application of the Fayyadist paradigm in Balata and Jenin refugee camps sought to indicate to the world its ability to govern and its readiness for statehood, while the donors themselves used the Fayyadist paradigm, and Fayyad himself, as evidencing the validity of their policy prescriptions and framework for the “new” Middle East.

Finally, the fifth chapter problematises the neoliberal policies of the Fayyadist paradigm and the failing patterns of international aid as root causes for the contentions in the era of Fayyadism. Protests against the Fayyadist neoliberal economic policies, the international aid industry, and the economic framework of the Oslo Peace Accords, albeit fragmented or repressed, constituted forms of contentious collective actions where different actors joined forces to confront, challenge, and expose repressive authorities and propose alternatives. Inspired by the theoretical underpinnings of contentious politics discussed in the chapter, these collective actions were triggered by political opportunities, constraints, or threats; however, these protests failed to draw on social networks, common purposes, or cultural frameworks, and thus failed to build solidarity or collective identities. Therefore, this chapter argues that in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings, the political and economic protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constituted cycles of contention but failed to transform into a social movement for political and economic rights. This is majorly due to the authoritarian transformation of the Palestinian
Authority and Israeli settler colonialism, but this is also attributed to intra-Palestinian fragmentation, the absence of alternative or unified leadership, the entrenchment of the neoliberal economic policies, and the structural changes and social engineering processes that the Palestinian society underwent during the era of Fayyadism (Khalidi 2012; Hanieh 2013; Hilal 2014; Samour 2014).

This chapter also engages with contentious politics theories, particularly the conceptual underpinnings of Tarrow (2012) and Beinin and Vairel (2013), in order to expand them through their application to the case of Palestine during the era of Fayyadism. This chapter argues that the concepts, dynamics, processes, and tools of contentious politics are also applicable to the economic domain, and therefore through the case of Palestine it attempts to operationalises the notion of contentious economics as an integral, but also distinctive, feature in the theories of contentious politics. This chapter defines the notion of contentious economics through the concept of resistance economy, an alternative model that is emerging as an output of the cycles of contentions and contentious collective actions. The chapter concludes by arguing that in contrast to Fayyadist neoliberalism, the failed patterns of the aid industry, and the public and critical intellectual rejection of the economic policies of the PA and the overall economic framework of Oslo Accords, the notion of a resistance economy could be an ultimate expression of contentious economics. Moreover, this chapter uses existing empirical evidence to contribute to the expansion of theoretical debates, and as such the interaction between the theories of contentious politics, the concept of contentious economics, and the empirical dimensions of resistance economy constitute the primary contributions of this chapter to the corpus of literature.

In sum, the predominant contribution of this thesis to scholarly literature on state-building and governance is empirical and ethnographic in nature. In its overarching conclusion, this thesis shows how problematic it is to initiate a state-building program without a state, and how an externally-sponsored security and economic reform agenda could, if the imbalances of power are not addressed, lead to the entrenchment of injustices and thus sustain a foreign military occupation and a settler colonial regime.
Chapter One

1. The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces Since the Oslo Accords

Abstract

This chapter provides a contextualised analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 until the era of Fayyadism up until 2013. It examines this evolution and the associated reform processes by exploring the relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups, and in consideration of the notion of hybridity in the realm of security provision. This analytical angle provides a fresh critical reading to the existing literature, and provides a contextualised setting to historicise Fayyadism.

This chapter categorises the evolution of Palestinian security reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The first phase was characterised by a clash between state-building and national liberation projects, and by a proliferation of security forces under Arafat’s style of governance. The second phase was characterised by the increasing role of non-statutory security forces to address the security vacuum, and also by the emergence of an externally-imposed security reform agenda. The third phase was characterised by the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of state-building and security, which resulted in a shift from a hybrid security model under Arafat to an anti-hybrid security model under Fayyad.

This chapter concludes that despite the attempt to reverse the conditions of insecurity under Fayyadism through security reform, new tensions between the PA’s security forces, the resistance movements, and non-statutory groups emerged. This was manifested in authoritarian transformations; this time framed in a state-building and good governance project. Therefore, the enhanced functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation; in this way, Fayyadism directly and indirectly sustained the occupation.
1.1. Introduction and Background

Since the 1993 Oslo Accords through to the present, the trajectories undertaken by the Palestinian statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups have been fraught with contradictions and dilemmas. The role of statutory forces (in reference to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security forces) has transformed according to the evolution of political developments, conflict dynamics, as well as changes in the composition of Palestinian leadership, its strategies, and security doctrines. However, such transformations remained within the framework of the Oslo Accords and its security arrangements, which intended to fulfil the Oslo Accords’ clauses to protect Israeli security through its statutory forces (Khan 2010) and to maintain law, order, and stability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).

In the meantime, the Palestinian non-statutory forces, armed groups and non-state actors (in reference to the non-PA’s security forces and groups) continued in their role of resisting Israeli military occupation while providing security and protection to the Palestinian people. However, this dichotomy between the roles of, and the relationship between, the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups is not linear or straightforward. This chapter argues that at the conceptual level, considering the Palestinian resistance armed groups and non-state actors (for example, pre-2006 Hamas) as non-statutory, implies a certain level of illegality and unlawfulness. At the contextual level, it is argued here that such conceptualisation contradicts with the right of nations to resist foreign occupations and attain their right of self-determination by any means at their disposal as affirmed by the UN Resolution 2649.

Given that the majority of the Palestinian non-statutory groups were established before the creation of the PA, they are deeply engrained locally and traditionally, embedded in the struggle, and viewed by Palestinian people as major actors for protection and resistance. As such, they challenge the legitimacy of the PA’s statutory security forces. The terms “statutory and non-statutory” has to be understood and analysed in this context, this chapter argues. The relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups is the lens that
this chapter uses to understand and analyse the evolution and reform of Palestinian security forces since the Oslo Accords.

Theoretically, this relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups is understood and analysed in the chapter through the notion of hybridity. This means that an anti-hybridity paradigm implies the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of the monopoly of violence where the PA’s statutory security forces are the only bodies that have the right and exclusivity to dominate the security realm. Other non-state actors, non-statutory bodies, and armed resistance groups have to be marginalised, dismantled, co-opted, integrated, disarmed or punished according to this anti-hybridity model. An anti-hybridity security model therefore implies the exclusivity for state-like forces within the overall context of an Israeli occupation. In a hybrid model, however, statutory and non-statutory forces and groups constitute an alternative parallel security models where they can collaborate, clash, and be used or abused by the political leadership. The existence of one does not mean the absence of the other.

Empirically, this chapter argues that the governance and security model adopted by Arafat since the establishment of the PA in 1993 until his death in 2004 formed a hybrid approach in the realm of security provision. Through Arafat’s model, the existence of the PA’s security forces did not fundamentally threaten the existence of other non-statutory actors and armed groups. An example is the Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which was formed and financed by Arafat himself in 2000. However, in the post-Arafat era (the Fayyadism era), the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of state-building and security meant that this very Fatah non-statutory body, in addition to the other non-state actors, became targets of the new security approach and doctrine under the Fayyadist paradigm.20 This resulted in a

20 Yasir Arafat was the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969; the president of the Palestinian Authority since its establishment 1993; the leader of Fatah since 1959; the Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces; and, the head of the PLO’s Political Department and Executive Committee until his death in November 2004. Mahmoud Abbas was the successor of Arafat in all the above-mentioned positions since 2005 until today. Salam Fayyad was the Palestinian Prime and Finance Minister from 2007 until mid-2013. Fayyad joined the Palestinian polity in 2002 as Finance Minister after serving for a decade in the IMF and World Bank. Both styles of governance, Arafatism and Fayyadism, are explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Hamasism refers to the rule and style of governance of Hamas after winning the parliamentary elections in 2006. Following the intra-Palestinian divide in 2007, the dominance of Hamas style is exclusive to Gaza (Baconi 2014; Bert 2015; Shobaki 2015).
shift from a hybrid security model under Arafat to an anti-hybrid security model under Fayyad.\textsuperscript{21} Yet, the continuation and further entrenchment of the Israeli occupation, which has ultimate consequences for the security forces and their doctrines, remains a constant variable.

Based on this conceptualisation and framing, this chapter provides a contextualised analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces over the last two decades. It does so through critical engagement with the literature to provide a fresh and original perspective through the hybridity lens. Additionally it addresses the periodisation gap during the Fayyadism era in the literature and contrast the different security paradigms through analysing the evolution of the security forces since the Oslo Accords and through categorising them in three main phases. This chapter highlights that the Oslo Accords and Arafatism introduced many security forces however their proliferation was associated with higher levels of insecurity and coupled with high levels of corruption, patronage-based politics and personalised style of governance. Furthermore, this chapter highlights that while Fayyadism meant to reverse the negative outcomes of the Oslo Accords and Arafatism, it resulted in rising tensions between the PA’s security forces and the resistance movements and the non-statutory groups and forces. The contextual setting is provided to test the hypothesis that the transformations, reforms, and paradigm shifts in the security realm during the Fayyadism era achieved better stability for Israel but not better security for the Palestinian people. Despite the security reform processes under Fayyadism, the transformations, reforms, and paradigm shifts led to authoritarian transformations in the OPT.

The evolution of the Palestinian security forces underwent three major phases:\textsuperscript{22}

1. **The Oslo Accords Phase (1993-1999):** Entailed the establishment and building-up of the PA’s security forces in the West Bank and Gaza according to Oslo Accords. This phase was characterised by a hybrid approach in the realm of security provision which was associated with Arafat’s style of

\textsuperscript{21} Table.5 and Table.6 in the Appendix contrast the security and economy models of Arafatism and Fayyadism and highlight the major transformations and shifts in these spheres.

\textsuperscript{22} A detailed chronology of the evolution of Palestinian security forces over the past two decades, prepared by the author, is provided in the appendix (Table.7). It divides the evolution into five categories and presents the major characteristics and main events of each phase.
governance. An identity crisis featured the PA institutions in the aftermath of transforming from a liberation movement to a civil administration. This led to the proliferation of the security forces which was associated with a state of insecurity to the Palestinian people. This phase is also characterised by the lack of civil democratic governing expertise, excessive corruption, and the absence of Palestinian sovereignty or real authority;

II. The Second Intifada Phase (2000-2006): The existing PA security forces and infrastructure were destroyed in the aftermath of the second intifada, which was brought on by the Israeli incursion of the West Bank as well as the continuous attacks on Gaza, particularly between 2000 and 2002. These attacks resulted in the emergence of an influential role for non-statutory forces/non-state actors to fulfil the security gap and vacuum. However, due to the mixed results that emerged from the dominance of the non-statutory bodies, as well as the failure of the Camp David Summit, the establishment of the Quartet, and finally the death of Arafat, the security sector reform became the major priority for the PA, Israel, and international donors. This era culminated in the victory of Hamas in the parliamentary elections, a win that allowed Hamas to lead the PA’s institutions until mid-2007 when the intra-Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza took place, causing a rupture in the security establishment;

III. The Fayyadism Phase (2007 until Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013): This phase witnessed the reinvention of the Palestinian security forces through a major security sector reform initiative. The PA statutory forces performed security campaigns and disarmament processes in an effort to maintain law and order and to enforce their exclusive legitimate use of force through the adoption of a Weberian conceptualisation of the monopoly of violence. The security reform was heavily supported and sponsored by the international community and Israel, and its ultimate aim was to eliminate the hybridity in the security provision and to criminalise resistance despite the absence of a Palestinian sovereignty and the presence of the Israeli military occupation.23

A thematic and chronological evolution of Palestinian security forces, and the main characteristics of each phase, is illustrated in Figure.1, prepared by the author.

23 In Gaza Hamas initiated its own self-reliant security governance model while persisting under Israeli and Egyptian siege and western official boycott. The results were mixed, particularly when examining the human rights violations, but it was argued that Hamas forces owned its security sector, had clearer chains of commands, and had developed local professional training and planning capacities (Sayigh 2009; Sayigh 2010, 2011a,b; ICG 2008a,b, 2010).
**Figure 1: Thematic and Chronological Evolution of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993-1999 The Oslo Accords Phase</strong></td>
<td>Identity crisis between revolutionary liberation movement vs. civil state-like administration / authority due to the Oslo Accords’ clauses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proliferation of the statutory security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Legitimacy and trust gap among actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Factional, non-transparent recruiting process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Al’-aedeen (the returnees) leading the security forces and PA’s institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Personalized, neo-patrimonial style of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trial and error learning process for building-up security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000-2006 The Second Intifada Phase</strong></td>
<td>Security vacuum, rising of non-statutory security forces and groups, and entrenchment of the hybrid security model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Destruction of the PA security forces and security infrastructure in the aftermath of the second intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Non-statutory/non-state actor dominate the security realm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Chaos, lawful and criminal outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security sector reform as the top priority for the PA, Israel and donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Elected Hamas leading the PA institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intra-Palestinian divide and fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007- Mid 2013 The Fayyadism Phase</strong></td>
<td>Eliminate the hybridity in the security provision and adopt a Weberian monopoly of violence conceptualization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘One law, one gun, one authority’ paradigm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Declaration of state of emergency and overhaul the PA’s security establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security campaigns to disarm resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Criminalizing resistance against occupation; and security collaboration with Israel as defining features of the PA security doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International security missions on the ground and unprecedented financial support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Context**

- Persistence of Israeli military occupation
- Absence of Palestinian sovereignty, control and statehood
- SSR and DDR under occupation and blackout and criminalize the resistance movement
- National security forces to protect the security of the occupier not the occupied
- Stability equalized with security
Furthermore, Figure.2, prepared by the author, introduces the statutory and non-statutory security forces. It divides the PA’s statutory security forces into internal security forces and national security forces (PA’s “Proto-army”), and combined they are comprised of some fifteen active bodies. By contrast, the non-statutory security forces and groups are mainly associated with political factions, social movements, families and clans, popular protection committees, and other informal bodies that are embedded in Palestinian traditions, and combined they are comprised of some thirteen active groups. The chart also introduces the major international security actors. Further elaboration concerning the statutory and non-statutory security forces’ functions, capacities and sources of funding is provided in the appendix (Table.9 and Table.10).
Figure 2: Mapping the Statutory and Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups
These security forces, as one component of the Palestinian security sector, performed their duties in a highly fragmented space. According to the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three areas: Area (A) under the civilian and security control of the PA (17%); area (B) under PA’s civilian control only (24%); and area (C) under full Israeli control (59%). Hebron was divided into Areas H1 and H2, and Gaza was divided into Yellow and White areas (UNCTAD 2006). Two decades after the Oslo Accords, the level of territorial fragmentation was further exacerbated with the construction of an Israeli separation wall, more than half a million Jewish settlers living in illegal settlements, five hundred checkpoints and barriers to tighten up the matrix of control, and daily lands confiscation and ethnic cleansing (Halper 2010). This level of fragmentation (UNDP 2010) carried direct consequences for the operations of the security forces and not only affected their efficacy, but constituted the major source of insecurity for Palestinians.

The revolutionary legacy of the Palestinian national movement posed another challenge for the security forces created after the Oslo Accords (Agha and Khalidi 2005; Parsons 2005). The Palestinian security sector was established in exile with the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 (Sayigh 1999). At that time, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was its core security force, in addition to other armed groups; hence, the PLO had a history and culture of informal or insurgent policing (Khalidi 2006). These forces were trained and equipped by their host countries and other allies, and as such they were affected by different styles of governance (Le More 2008). The operations were revolutionary in nature; however, four decades before the PA’s establishment they had created a base for various levels of contradictions with the civil nature of the PA (Frisch 2008; Sayigh 2011). This revolutionary legacy has impacted today’s public perceptions of Palestinian security forces.

This chapter is structured in a chronological order. It starts by addressing the tensions between state-building and national liberation projects, and their impact on the evolution of Palestinian security forces. It focuses on the proliferation of the security forces, the complex dynamics of corruption, and Arafat’s personalised style of governance, as these are the major features of the Arafatism era. In the second

---

24 A map illustrating areas A, B and C in the West Bank appears in the appendix (Figure.13).
section, the chapter discusses the road to reform as a consequence of the security vacuum that emerged in the aftermath of the second intifada. It also highlights the dominance of armed groups and the hybrid model of security provision in the security realm; and the clashes between the different security paradigms constitute the main focus of the section. Lastly, the third section reflects on the security model of Fayyadism, discusses its essence, technical successes, and national failures. The appendix offers further elaboration on the Palestinian statutory and non-statutory security forces and their functions and capacities (Table.9 and Table.10).


During this phase, the process of building-up the PA’s security forces was neither inclusive nor transparent, was fraught with corruption and nepotism, and was exposed to the inside-outside leadership clashes (Lia 2006; Khatib 2010). This resulted in the proliferation of security forces, increased internal conflicts and competition, the absence of a unified security strategy or chain of command, and a failure to protect the Palestinian people. This failure to protect Palestinians was partly due to the lack of expertise and professionalism of the security forces, but more importantly it was the consequence of the Oslo Accords’ design (Khan 2005) and the failure to resolve the dilemma of state-building versus national liberation. Meyers (2000:91) argued that, “it is an anomaly in the Palestinian case, created by the agreements, that the functions of the Palestinian security forces are very specifically limited, but for the interests of an outside state, not to protect Palestinian citizens”. Therefore, as was argued by Agha and Khalidi (2005:88), the PA was “torn between reining in armed elements and thus providing security to its adversary Israel, and indulging those elements and thus participating in the struggle for national liberation”. Consequently, the PA has not as yet won sufficient credibility or power to be able to assert its primacy over the resistance-oriented factions. At the same time, the PA has been totally incapable of defending its people in the sense of actively confronting Israeli armed actions or incursions onto Palestinian soil, or raising the cost of the occupation (Agha and Khalidi 2005:88). The legacy of corruption, absence of professionalism, and Arafat’s personalised style of
governance allowed the Palestinian people to perceive the PA’s security forces as ineffective and unreliable (Lia 2007).

1.2.1. The Origins

The 1994 Cairo Agreement stipulated the establishment of a “strong police force” with a maximum of 9,000 recruits (7,000 from abroad and 2,000 from the occupied territories) to guarantee “public order and internal security within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority” (Lia 2006:96). It set up various Palestinian-Israeli joint security bodies, such as the Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes, the District Coordination Offices, and the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee, as well as Joint Patrols and Joint Mobile Units. Ten days after signing the Cairo Agreement, PLA soldiers and the returnees (Al-‘aedin) started to return back to Gaza and Jericho to set up the PA’s security forces and institutions. The 1995 Oslo II increased the number of policemen to 30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000 for Gaza); however, by then the Palestinian police force had already reached 22,000 in Gaza and Jericho alone. In 1995, Arafat arrived in the West Bank and Palestinian forces were deployed in Areas (A), touring in the Palestinian cities in their PLA military uniform in an act of revolutionary victory (Frisch 2008:86-88).

In 1998 the number of security personnel reached between 30,000 and 40,000, in 2000 this number had increased to 50,000, and by 2003 there were 53,000 (Le More 2008). According to Oslo Accords, the police would constitute the “only Palestinian security authority”, form “one integral unit under the control” of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and have six categories: civil, public security, preventive security, presidential guard, emergency services and rescue, and intelligence (Friedrich and Luethold 2007:19-20).25 However, by 2004 there were more than 15 different security bodies.26 This proliferation of security forces urged Ramadan Shallah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, to argue in 1996: “Arafat has so many

---

25 The different structure of the PA’s security sector between 1995 and 2011 can be found in the appendix (Figures 9,10,11 and 12).

26 The appendix provides a detailed account –compiled by the author- of the PA’s security forces and describes their main functions, their main sources of financing, and their capacities (Tables 9 and 10).
intelligence services in the self-rule areas that if you open your window, Preventive Security peeps in; if you open your door, the Presidential Security Service comes in; if you go out to your garden, you bump into Military Intelligence; and if you go out to the street, you come across General Intelligence” (cited in Lia 2006:307). While Edward Said (1995:xxxi) stated that “Arafat established several security forces, five of them were intelligence services all spying on each other”.

1.2.2. Proliferation, Patronage and Corruption

The proliferation of the security forces in this phase did not occur incidentally. It was a tool that Arafat used to keep his control over the security establishment and to enforce his approach of divide-to-rule. He created a system in which the heads of security forces reported to him exclusively. In turn, they themselves were in rivalry in their operations, often leading to bloody clashes. This mode of personalised governance and patronage led to the establishment of self-interested groups that resisted any form of reform. Arafat, up until 2003, refused to use the word “reform” preferring, at the best of times, the word “development”. Arafat once stated: “no one can intervene between me and my children” in reference to the security forces leadership (Al-Shu’aibi 2012:5). This personalised style of governance was interrelated with corruption and nepotism, and as such generated negative consequences on the security forces’ operations. Not only did it damage the forces reputation, but it also impeded the security and safety of the Palestinian people. This de-institutionalizing mode of governance was coupled with an intra-Palestinian conflict between the inside and outside leaderships. Additionally, there were problematic recruitment policies, as well as managerial and administrative weaknesses, which were ultimately impeded the effectiveness of these forces and the services that they provided.

During this phase, one of the most striking manifestations of corruption was the distribution of cash salaries. The head of the security force (Jihaz) would visit Arafat’s office, receive a bag full of cash; soldiers were supposed to queue up to receive their cash in hand (Le More 2008). This phase also featured the emergence of a “gun culture” in Palestinian society (Lia 2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007), whereby it was normal scenery to see men in plain clothes walking in the streets with a gun on their side ready to be used for the resolution of any small problem. The
matter in which the PA forces dealt with such chaos and violence was also corrupted. They managed to control the weak personnel, who did not belong to an influential family or to a strong political body; however, the stronger and better-connected personnel were merely required to conceal their gun rather than display it. The corruption dynamics expanded to reach both procurement and inventory systems, as well as the benefits systems with the misuse of resources, powers, and public facilities. All of these dynamics were felt and seen by the public, which intensified the legitimacy gap between the PA’s forces and people.

Additionally, there had been an absence of effective mechanisms to ensure inter-agency cooperation, which resulted in a waste of resources and inefficient performance. There was no space for developing effective civil-democratic oversight or accountability mechanisms, particularly since the Palestinian Legislative Council had been neglected and bypassed due to Arafat’s mode of governance. The executive branch of the Authority was dominating the realm in the absence of effective judiciary or legislative branches.

The corruption thread was also reflected at the political level, which witnessed a divide between the Palestinian inside and outside leaderships. This divide proved to be problematic when the returnees arrived to the West Bank and Gaza and established the security forces. These forces and their leadership were returning from exile, an imposition that made the local Palestinians uncomfortable. Many felt that these security forces were “theirs” not “ours”, and the last thing local Palestinians wished for was to replace the foreign occupation with a local one (Lia 2007). Palestinians were not expecting practices such as Black Friday in Gaza in November 1994, when Palestinian police fired live ammunition at civilian demonstrators thus killing 13 and wounding another 200, or the arresting and torturing of the opposition (Frisch 2008). Hence, there was a problem of inclusiveness from the beginning.

This inclusiveness problem was reinforced through recruitment policies; since the vast majority of the recruited security personnel belonged to one political party, Fatah. Such policies served to “de-legitimize the whole institution and was not viewed as neutral national institution by the public” (Al-Shu’aibi 2012:2). Moreover, the recruitment process lacked transparency and accountability, and was managed through political and social bases. This meant that wasta (nepotism) was the marker
of merit rather than actual training or skill set. As pointed out in 1997 by Mohammed Dahlan, then the PA Preventive Security Chief in Gaza: “We have 36,000 people of whom we only need 10,000. This huge number is a burden on the PA and a burden on the security organ. We view it as a social issue because I cannot tell a prisoner who spent 15 years in jail that I have no job for him” (cited in Le More 2008:78). Thirteen years later in summer 2010, I asked Dahlan about the progress of the PA security forces, he told me: “the major problem for our misery now and the defeat in Gaza in 2007 is attributed to prioritizing quantity over quality”.

On the other hand, and in technical terms, the PA’s security forces fulfilled many of their obligations dictated by the Oslo Accords, as they engaged in a process of dismantling the Palestinian “infrastructure of terror” as well as protecting Israeli security. The PA forces, along with their duties to enforce law and order, targeted, arrested, and harassed many Palestinian activists and members of the opposition. They also conducted a “controlling campaign” to regulate, license, and organise the possession of arms. The PA forces managed to “impress” the Israelis, despite their lack of expertise (Brown 2003; Friedrich and Luethold 2007). This partially explains why Israel and the international community were silent about, and complicit in, sustaining the network of corruption and perpetuating the absence of reform in Palestinian security institutions. By 1999, a few security forces had developed their capacities more than others and acquired a certain stock of expertise. From the perspective of the PA’s supporters, the mere existence of the PA’s security forces, despite all the challenges, was their biggest success.

In sum, this phase was characterised by a clash between two parallel projects: state-building versus national liberation. While the former implied building the institutional underpinnings and capacities for the interim authority to transform into the statehood phase one the 1967 borders by 1999, the later assumed that that the PA security forces will be an extension to the PLO’s PLA and therefore engage in a national liberation endeavour of historical Palestine based on 1948 borders. Clearly, these are two parallel ventures. One implemented by state-like institutions and the other is implemented by a national liberation movement. These two contradictory approaches meant that the emerged tensions and clashes between the two approaches
were also reflected on the style of governance and the security doctrine of the Palestinian leadership. These clashes and tensions, in addition to the deep distortions in the processes accompanying the evolution of the PA forces as a result of the asymmetry of power relations, resulted in a mixed record concerning the PA’s security forces’ effectiveness.

However after all, Arafat’s personalised style of governance or the complex network of corruption were not the only reasons to blame and such explanation will be “overtly simplistic, if not disingenuous” as argued by Le More (2008:82). Any contextualised analysis should consider the complexity of the internal and external dimensions of the growth of authoritarianism and patronage-based system in the West Bank and Gaza. For instance, Robinson (1997) has argued that the PA became an authoritarian polity because the exiled leadership of the PLO had to recapture and centralise power and marginalise the local political leaders. Brynen (1995, 2000) argued that the Oslo Accords managed to create new Palestinian elite that sustained its operation with a framework of neo-patrimonial style of governance. However, Khan et al. (2004) argued that Israel’s intention was to create a “client state” upon which it could continue to exert considerable control and leverage through the rents it distributed to the PA, which was coupled with territorial fragmentation and a strategy of asymmetric containment. Therefore, the tenets of the Oslo Accords and Israeli policies were also major reasons to blame as the next section demonstrates.

1.3. Destroying and Reforming Palestinian Security

Infrastructure: Dominance of Non-state Actors (2000-2006)

A new round of violence began after the failures of Camp David and Taba Peace Summits in 2000. This was in addition to the infamous visit of Ariel Sharon, the leader of the Israeli Likud political party at the time, to Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Temple Mount) in September 2000 accompanied by 1,000 security guards; 47 Palestinians were killed, 1,855 were injured, and 5 Israelis were killed in a matter of five days. The second intifada erupted, and the PA security forces engaged actively in it. This intifada took on a militarised character from the Palestinian side as well, and all armed resistance groups intensified their operations. The newly established Fatah’s
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were influential and controversial, having acquired substantive resources from Arafat and the PA leadership.\(^\text{27}\)

### 1.3.1. Security Vacuum

A major incident that signalled the PA’s security forces engagement in the intifada occurred in Ramallah on the 12\(^{th}\) of October, 2000. The PA police stopped two Israeli soldiers in plain clothes and dragged them to the main police station where they were beaten, stabbed, and killed. This incident made the Israeli security establishment lose trust in the PA forces, and they reconsidered their relationship. On the same day, Israel launched airstrikes against PA security targets, completely destroying the security premises. In March 2002 Israel launched *Operation Defensive Shield*, and this military operation caused massive destruction and losses in both human and economic measures. Palestinian security personnel were detained and disarmed en masse, their facilities destroyed, and PA civil institutions ransacked. The destruction of physical infrastructure is estimated to have cost the economy $3.5 billion, equivalent to 30 per cent of pre-2000 capital stock (UNCTAD 2005). The UNCTAD estimated that the cumulative economic opportunity cost in terms of loss of potential income over the period 2000–2004 is $6.4 billion, or 140 per cent the size of the Palestinian GDP before 2000. The destruction of the PA’s security apparatus and facilities exceeded $38.5 million in the West Bank and $34.5 million in Gaza Strip up to early 2002 (Dajani 2005; World Bank 2004).

With their diminished capacity, the activities of the security forces became more haphazard. Traffic police with civilian attire, or a city governor detaining thieves in his own home due to the absence of prison facilities, became common occurrences (Al-Basoos 2005). The destruction of the PA forces’ capabilities, capacities, and resources created a gap which was filled by armed groups, military wings, and non-state security actors, including Hamas (Milton-Edward 2009).

This security vacuum filled by non-statutory and non-state actors imposed new challenges to security provision and governance, as Palestinian people perceived the non-state actors as more trustworthy and legitimate than the state-actors (PASSIA

---

\(^{27}\) The appendix offers a detailed account –compiled by the author- of the major military groups and armed wings and describes their main functions, their main sources of financing, and their capacities.
and DCAF 2006). For instance, a national survey conducted in 2005 by DCAF and IUED revealed that 34 per cent of the interviewees had great trust in the Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas), and 29 per cent had great trust in the Saraya Al-Quds (Islamic Jihad), as opposed to 21 per cent in the Civil Police and 18 per cent in the Preventive Security. In another national survey (a sample of 1,800 Palestinians) conducted by DCAF in 2006, 74% of the camps respondents and 60% of the outside the camps respondents felt insecure. More than 70% of the respondents trusted non-statutory forces very much or to some extent, while the trust in the PA security forces remain shaky. The most trustworthy groups were the military wings of Hamas (79%) and Islamic Jihad (78%). This was confirmed when the people were asked how the PA should deal with armed groups. A majority of 86% favoured dialogue and consensus over the use of force. 76% of the respondents rejected the use of force against the militias (DCAF 2006). The popularity of armed non-statutory groups and non-state actors emerged not only because of the destruction of the PA security infrastructure, but also because resisting Israeli military occupation is a national popular duty, as was expressed by many people. Therefore, a decade after the establishment of the PA and despite the billions of aid money, it remained weak and fragile.

1.3.2. The Road to Reform

The rising influence of armed groups and non-state actors was a threat to Israeli security; therefore, under Israeli and international pressure, the PA was forced to start a reform project for its security sector and forces (Sigman et al. 2005). On the 23rd of June 2002, one day before President Bush delivered a speech on his vision for peace in the Middle East, the PA announced its 100-Day Reform Plan. The 100-Day Plan called for a “comprehensive reform throughout the government, renewal of the legitimacy of elected officials through democratic elections, rearranged ministerial structures, and reinforced separation of powers” (UNDP 2003:3). It aimed to reduce the power of the President, increase the power of the Parliament, institute the rule of law, and increase the scrutiny of Palestinian finances (Turner 2009) as a prerequisites for peace and state recognition (ICG 2002, 2004). In the domain of “public security”, the 100-Day Plan aimed to restructure the Ministry of

28 Following the 100-Day Plan, the PA worked towards implementing a 60-Day Action Plan in 2003 and a Six-Month Reform Plan in the first half of 2004, and put forward a One-Year Reform Action Plan in September 2004.
Chapter One: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces

Interior (MoI) and modernise its apparatus; attach the Preventive Security Services, the Police and the Civil Defence to the MoI; and activate the role of the MoI and its apparatuses in the enforcement of court rulings. It also aimed to reinforce loyalty to the Authority; end the role of the security services in civilian affairs; and give utmost attention to the needs of the population, whose support and cooperation would be acquired by inducing law and order (PA 2002).

Meanwhile in 2002, the role of the CIA was expanded, and the Quartet and its International Task Force on Palestinian Reform were established as international bodies to supervise the Palestinian security sector reform. With the proliferation of international controlling bodies, scholars argued that Palestine became under (financial) international trusteeship and lost any kind of ownership on the reform processes (Khalidi 2005; Brown 2010a). As argued by Turner (2009:568), “the PA, still reeling from the ‘shock and awe’ of Operation Defensive Shield and lacking the resources to rebuild what had been destroyed, had little choice but to take the shock doctors’ medicine”. This was further entrenched by the launch of the Road Map in 2003 by the Quartet. 29 Under the heading “Ending terror and violence, normalising Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions”, phase I of the Road Map demanded the PA to undertake “visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere” (Road Map 2003:2).

The plan demanded that “rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus” had to confront “all those engaged in terror” and dismantle “the terrorist capabilities and infrastructure” (Road Map 2003:2). The text stipulated that this includes confiscating illegal weapons, and “consolidating security authority, free of association with terror and corruption” (Road Map 2003:2). In other words, the PA’s security sector was forced to: combat terrorism; apprehend suspects; outlaw incitement; collect all illegal weapons; provide Israel with a list of Palestinian police recruits; and report progress to the United States (Khalidi and Agha 2005). This meant that the Palestinian security reform,

---

29 The full title of the roadmap is: A Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. It is a gradualist peace plan consisting of three phases. The Quartet is headed by Tony Blair and consists of the United Nations, United States, European Union, and Russia.
Has remained, in essence, an externally-controlled process, driven by the national security interests of Israel and the United States, and characterised by very limited ownership on the part of Palestinian society. The asymmetric relations of power, inherent in the occupation, have enabled Israel and the US to exert control over the direction of the reform process, its objectives, implementation and evaluation. As the texts of the Wye River Agreement, the Tenet Work Plan\(^{30}\) and the Road Map illustrate, the primary Israeli and American interest is to transform the Palestinian security sector into an instrument in their fight against terror…[and] the Palestinian security interests play at best a subordinate role in the design and implementation of this transformation process (Friedrich and Luethold 2008:192).

These reform plans forced Arafat to appoint Mahmoud Abbas as the PA’s first Prime Minister, and a loyalist as the first Minister of Interior in 2003. Salam Fayyad was appointed as finance minister as per the World Bank’s conditionality, and as far as security forces are concerned, he created a single treasury account and enhanced financial transparency. This meant that after a decade of its establishment, the PA’s security personnel were able to receive their salaries through bank transfers; however, these reforms were superficial. Abbas remained as Prime Minister for less than six months because he was marginalised and kept in clashes with Arafat, and within five months, four Ministers of Interiors were appointed. Thus, internal power dynamics dominated the reform scene (Friedrich and Luethold 2007).

1.3.3. Clashing Paradigms

The clashes between the security reform paradigm and the challenges posed by the dominance of non-statutory groups and the hybrid model in the security domain with the dominance of the non-state actors, continued to accelerate until the death of Arafat in November 2004. With Arafat’s death, a new security doctrine started to emerge. Figure 3, prepared by the author, depicts the tensions between the clashing paradigms that led to the adoption of a new security doctrine. It illustrates how the non-state and non-statutory actors’ dominance, as well as the hybrid security provision paradigm, started to weaken after the presidential elections, until it was

\(^{30}\) Wye River Memorandum was an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to implement the earlier Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995. It was signed on October 23, 1998. However, the agreement’s understandings and goals were unimplemented. The Tenet work plan was a ceasefire and security plan proposed by CIA director George Tenet in June 2001 based on the security agreements forged at Sharm el-Sheikh agreement in October 2000, embedded in the Mitchell Report of April 2001.
temporarily reinvented in the aftermath of Hamas’s parliamentary victory in 2006. In 2007, it underwent another dramatic reinvention under the Fayyadist paradigm as the last section of the chapter discusses.

In his presidential victory speech in 2005, Abbas declared his determination to establish the PA’s monopoly of violence as the main priority, and to implement the electoral slogan “one law, one gun, one authority”. In an immediate reaction to this renewal of the security sector reform approach, Abbas forced the Palestinian factions including Hamas and Islamic Jihad to agree in Cairo on a period of calm (Tahdi’a). This entailed a temporary ceasefire based on reciprocity. The international community reacted to this through organizing the London Meeting on Supporting the Palestinian Authority. In that international conference, the PA promised to “create the conditions conducive to the peace process with the immediate objective of restoring internal law and order and preventing violence” (London Meeting 2005:4),

**Figure 3: Reform vs. Hybridity clash in the Second Intifada Phase**

In 2005, Abbas was elected as the PA president and his major electoral slogan was ‘one law, one gun, one authority’.

In January 2006, Hamas, won the vast majority of the parliamentary seats, formed the Palestinian government, and ruled the PA and officially, on paper at least, its security forces.

Hamas victory was built on its heritage as a non-state actor who-through its military armed group- had followed a hybrid notion of security provision that it also used in other public services and goods provision.

In 2007, this era reached to an end in the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza.

Which resulted in the emergence of

- The Fayyadism model in the West Bank
- The Hamasism model in Gaza
while the international community promised to provide advice and assistance on legal, structural, and organisational aspects to strengthen the security sector, through establishing the EUPOL COPPS and the USSC.

As a consequence for this speedy entry into security sector reform processes, modest progress was made that can be categorised at five levels: (i) structural reorganisation through merging numerous security forces, sending long-standing security commanders into early retirement, disbanding the Special Forces and the Special Security, and reactivating the National Security Council; (ii) commence working on a White Paper to establish a normative-legal framework for the security sector; (iii) initiation of the Civil Police reform programme with the establishment of the EUPOL COPPS to assist the PA in improving its law-enforcement capacity; (iv) the PA embarked on tentative Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes, such as dismantling Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; and, (v) improving the capabilities of the PA security forces through better human resource management, increase in salaries and benefits, and local and regional training. Additionally, the MoI banned the PA’s security bodies from receiving foreign aid directly, and all aid was supposed to be channelled through the Ministry of Finance. The logistical and procurements procedures were reviewed, and an inventory check started to develop (Friedrich and Luethold 2007; Hussein 2007).

However, despite these promised transformations, the overall evaluation of the security reform process by the end of 2005 was bleak. The DfID (2006:19) concluded that:

The PA security forces lack a monopoly over the means of violence. Israel continues to control significant portions of the West Bank. Communications between West Bank and Gaza are difficult. Command and control of the PASF is factionalised and personalised. There are overlapping responsibilities among the different services and no unifying doctrine. The security services have limited political support, and there is an inadequate legislative framework to guide them. The judiciary is weak. Parliamentary and other forms of oversight are virtually non-existent.

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections halted this one year of reform (Le More 2006). The attempt to impose a new security doctrine led by Abbas and donors was put on hold until the new dynamics were figured out. The victory of
Hamas rearranged all the cards, confused all the actors, and challenged the PA security doctrine. This was mainly due to Hamas’ legacy as a non-state actor that provided informal but effective public services, including security, through its committees, military groups, charities, and institutions. However, the existing Fatah-PA’s security forces’ leadership refused to deal with Hamas-government, and therefore the chain of commands, responsibilities, interests, ideologies, and approaches began to clash. The refusal of Fatah to accept the electoral defeat made the year 2006 instable and ambiguous, and thus a new round of archery and negligence of citizen’s basic security needs emerged.

The international community’s boycott of the Hamas-led Palestinian government resulted in the inability to pay salaries to 150,000 public employees, including the security forces. This led to deteriorating effects that further eroded the legitimacy and functionality of the PA institutions. Israel, in turn, withheld the transfer of tax revenues that it collects on behalf of the PA (UNCTAD 2006, 2010). The international community created parallel routes\(^{31}\) to bypass Hamas and continue its support for the PA and its security apparatus; a selective process that supported the moderate and pragmatic Fatah leadership, and excluded the rest. This represented a rejection of Palestinian democracy and an anti-good governance move that fuelled the Palestinian divide, and created new elite that were viewed as credible partners for peace (Turner 2011). Thus, it reinstituted the old Arafat modes of governance, as was argued by Turner (2009:571),

Funds were channelled directly to the Office of the President, payments were made to political allies and opponents were excluded, petty corruption flourished as access to scarce services were exchanged for favours, and suitcases of money were carried through the Rafah checkpoint into Gaza. NGOs were brought in to fill the gap in providing public services, though with even less public accountability than PA ministries.

As a consequence for this Palestinian schism, the PA’s President initiated measures to keep control over security forces. Abbas separated the National Security Forces from the MoI; nominated a Chief-of-Staff to report directly to him; appointed a loyal

\(^{31}\) TIM and PEGASE were the major EU mechanisms used to bypass Hamas. They aimed to channel aid directly through the EU to the beneficiaries’ accounts (public servants and security personnel salaries) or through the Office of the President. The European countries and union provide 60 per cent of aid to Palestinians (Tartir and DeVoir 2009).
Fatah leader as the head of three internal security bodies; and, created new bodies and expanded others, particularly the Presidential Guard (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). In June 2006, the PLC was disbanded. Hamas in turn took its measures, first by establishing a unity government and subsequently by violently taking over Gaza. Meanwhile, Hamas was building-up its back up plans; it built the Back-Up forces in Gaza, which later became the Executive Forces. These Forces continue to remain a key obstacle for the intra-Palestinian reconciliation, and a challenge for security reform. Hamas managed to establish a strong military base in Gaza that combined both a state-like security apparatus and an armed resistance wing in an ultimate expression of hybridity in this context. However, in July 2007, violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas erupted and resulted in 118 casualties and 555 injuries, which brought a new phase of fragmentation and instability into the Palestinian polity (Brown 2009). This intra-Palestinian divide had multi-level consequences on the security sector, its structures, and the further steps for its reform. The Fayyadist paradigm, discussed in the following section, emerged as the only way forward to reform the security sector and build a Palestinian state.

1.4. The Fayyadism Phase: Re-Inventing Palestinian Security Forces and Eliminating Hybridity (Beyond 2007)

In the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestinian divide, Hamas controlled Gaza and Fatah controlled the West Bank. Both parties took parallel measures to sustain the fragmentation (Tartir 2012; Cooley and Pace 2012). The PA President declared a state of emergency,\(^{32}\) and after dismissing the Hamas-led cabinet, appointed Fayyad to head an emergency government. With the appointment of Fayyad, a new era in the Palestinian polity and style of governance had emerged. Fayyad, through his West Bank First approach,\(^{33}\) declared a commitment to both a strict reform agenda based on establishing a monopoly of violence by the PA security apparatus and the

\(^{32}\) A state of emergency can last for up to thirty days. After that, it may be renewed only with the consent of two-thirds the PLC. Up to now Palestinians live under a state of emergency, in violation of the Palestinian Basic Law (Brown 2007a,b; PCHR 2007).

\(^{33}\) West Bank First strategy simply means to focus on the West Bank and leave Gaza behind for now. The strategy was largely born out of the American and Israeli desire with the tacit approval of the PA to either isolate Hamas, weaken it, force it to moderate, or defeat it altogether. The aim of the strategy is to create two drastically different realities in the two Palestinian territories, whereby the West Bank prospers and Gaza despairs (Samhouri 2007).
adoption of a neoliberal post-Washington economic agenda aimed at creating the institutional underpinning for a future Palestinian state (PA 2008, 2010).

1.4.1. The Essence of Fayyadism

Fayyad’s major plans (PRDP, 13th Government Plan, and NDP)\textsuperscript{34} spelled out a commitment to modernizing and professionalizing the Palestinian security services under the banner of “One Homeland, One Flag and One Law”. It aimed to reinvent the security forces through:

Rebuilding, restructuring and reforming the security services and developing democratic oversight mechanisms...creating an appropriate legal and institutional framework; enhancing the professional and operational effectiveness of security forces; ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the security forces; re-inforcing democratic governance and accountability; and addressing the legacies of conflict (e.g. unlawful ownership and use of weapons) (PA 2008:38).

Fayyad’s plans were premised on the idea that:

A capable, well-trained and well-equipped security establishment that is professional and loyal in its service of the nation is critical to creating an enabling environment for social and economic development...complementary to this objective are activities to address the need to reintegrate certain militia and other surplus security related personnel back into general society’ (PA 2008:36).

Therefore, a major thinking behind the security reform process under Fayyadism to eliminate any form of hybridity in the security provision was that:

Informal “law” enforcement mechanisms have tended to fill the vacuum left by incapacitated PA security institutions. Continued lack of capacity to deliver security and rule of law is reinforcing the reliance on these informal mechanisms. This poses a number of problems: “law” enforcement is not always equitable (i.e., based on affiliation with and proximity to informal powers); discrimination against women and traditionally weak groups has increased; and, emergence of informal institutions undermines incentives to rehabilitate and develop formal ones. Reversing this legacy will require determined and sustained organisational capacity building;

\textsuperscript{34} PRDP refers to the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008; the 13th Government Plan refers to Ending the Occupation: Establishing the State plan 2009-2010; the NDP refers to the National Development Plan 2011-13.
it will also require strengthening of democratic oversight mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the security services to the people (PA 2008:37).

This “Security First” approach under Fayyadism posited that security reform will prove that Palestinians are credible partners for peace and able to govern themselves despite the existence of the occupation. However, notwithstanding the glowing rhetoric, the major problem that remains unsolved is related to the meaning of security and political reform in the first place. As argued by Brown (2007:14),

For Palestinians, political reform was a means of obtaining a more functional government and creating a leadership that was both more capable and more effective in defending Palestinian interests internally and externally. For the international supporters of Palestinian reform, the primary (and sometimes only) purpose of reforming Palestinian institutions was to support a peace settlement with Israel.

In other words, the various understandings of the security reform under Fayyad implied the creation of a monopoly of violence through a “weapons cleansing” process which was conducted to disarm or render dysfunctional the military groups that are committed to armed resistance of Israeli occupation. Hence, the PA security plan under Fayyad has several overlapping elements:

Checking Hamas and its armed wing, the Qassam Brigades; containing Fatah-allied militants through co-optation and amnesty; restoring public order by cracking down on criminals; conduct security campaign in Nablus and Jenin; and strengthening security forces through training, weapons procurement and security reform (ICG 2008:4).

The rationale was to consolidate the PA’s power and provide stability to achieve economic progress. As was spelled out by PA officials, this process came out of a belief that good governance represents the highest form of resistance; and by fulfilling the security commitments, Palestinians are turning the tables and strengthening their hand in the negotiations (ICG 2010).

More than 70,000 employees serve in the security sector which acquires 47% of the monthly public payroll. However, the public spending on education and health sectors does not exceed 5% of the PA budget (Sadeq 2011).
1.4.2. Technical Success, National Failures

Although the Oslo Accords framework had not been altered in this phase, the Palestinian security forces became better defined. The international actors were able to dominate the reform process with their funds and policy advice, stripping Palestinians of any level of ownership. That being said, clear improvement in the functionality of the forces can be observed. Disarmament and security campaigns were conducted to enforce law and order and collect “illegal” arms, the destroyed security sector’s physical infrastructure was rebuilt, strategic plans for the sector were drafted, and the USSC and EUPOL COPPS, as well as the Palestinian Security Academy, became the major illustration of the new PA security doctrine and approach. Furthermore, the security forces were reorganised into six main operational branches and two smaller ones, besides auxiliary services, with formal control divided between the PA presidency and the MoI (Friedrich and Luethold 2007). Corruption declined in the security spheres, and the security personnel were better equipped, trained, educated, dressed, and compensated. Many of the “old security guards” appointed by Arafat were discharged and replaced by a new security elite. Finally, this phase witnessed a proliferation in the number of local and foreign NGOs working in the security realm (Tartir, 2012b). All these transformations were completely dependent upon donors’ funds, with more than thirty percent of total aid to Palestinians been devoted to the security sector (Taghdisi-Rad 2010).

Therefore, in technical terms, the PA’s security forces became professional, well-trained, and engaged in daily coordination with the Israeli counterpart despite the existence of the asymmetry of power. Their technical achievements reached the highest levels since the establishment of the PA, and even won international and regional Excellency prizes. The DfID (2011:16) highlighted the positive developments in the security sector and argued that “the redeployment of the Palestinian Security forces in the West Bank from the second half of 2007 was an important and successful step which had immediate benefits for people’s sense of security and for the economy”. The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, MAS (2011:14) argued for the readiness of the PA institutional transformation into a statehood phase; “since the backbone of this state, the monopoly of violence, does
Accordingly, the Palestinian security sector was reinvented under Fayyadism and an overhaul to its functionality was conducted, which led many scholars to celebrate its success (Sellwood 2009; Bröning 2011; Giambi 2009).

### 1.4.3. The Cost of Success

This reform process was not without costs, and the implications of the enhanced functionality of PA security forces on the national struggle and resistance against the occupation were detrimental (Khan 2009). The reformed security forces were accused of human rights violations, suppression of freedom of speech, and political affiliation (Amrov 2013). The PA has twice ranked lower in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index than any Arab government, and Freedom House gives it the same rating for political rights and civil liberties, “not free” (Thrall 2010 and Danin 2011). They were accused of creating a police state and an authoritarian regime (Sayigh 2011). Moreover, they were blamed for adding another layer of repression, for failing to protect the foundation of a Palestinian democratic system, and for sustaining the occupation through their sub-contractor role that protected Israeli security through coordination mechanisms and disarmament process (Leech 2012a,b). The excessive use of violence, torture, arbitrary detention, and intimidation by the PA’s security forces has been documented by numerous local and international human rights organisation (Human Rights Watch 2008,2010; ICG 2008,2010; ICHR 2010; MEM 2010; Al-Haq 2011). Further examples include political imprisonment, humiliation, torture, dismissal of public servants due to their political affiliation, the closing of Hamas-affiliated NGOs and civil society organisations, money laundering regulation (Al-Barghouti and Jadallah 2011).

The 2010 ICG report warned that Palestinian security forces had violated human rights and circumvented the Basic Law through extra-judicial arrest campaigns and detention without a court order, as well as through torture and ill-treatment at PA detention centres. This warning was repeated over the years; however, the brutality of PA forces increased. Following the brutal crackdown on protestors in Ramallah between June and July of 2012, an Amnesty International report (2013:1) argued that

---

36 For further elaboration on the achieved successes please refer to UN (2011); World Bank (2011a,b); PA (2010a, 2011b)
“The brutality that followed was shocking even by the standards of the PA security forces, whose use of excessive force on previous occasions and abuses against detainees had already earned them an unenviable reputation at home and internationally”.

The practices of the security forces were observed by scholars as a reform unfolding in an authoritarian context. Brown (2011) argued that Fayyadism had no domestic foundation, and that the maintenance of the existing institutions was done “in an authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic legitimacy. Hence, the entire program is based not simply on de-emphasizing or postponing democracy and human rights, but on actively denying them for the present” (Brown 2010a:2). This made Palestinian authoritarianism different from the one under Arafat, insofar as it was “regularised and softened” and “less venal and probably less capricious. But it is also more stultifying” (Brown 2010a:10). Hence, “the main problem with Fayyadism is not the way it undermines democracy in the short term but in the way it masks the absence of any long-term strategy” (Brown 2009:5).

Likewise, Sayigh (2011) argued that although the security forces in the West Bank received $450 million, their capacities were hindered. This was due to the lack of ownership in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, lack of democratic governance and constitutional order, and the exclusive focus on technical issues. Sayigh (2011) concluded that the authoritarian and securitisation transformation in the West Bank will threaten not only long-term security, but also the ability to achieve Palestinian statehood. This was reflected in the ICG report (2010:ii), which stated that the “undeniable success of the (security) reform agenda has been built in part on popular fatigue and despair”.

Al-Shu’aibi (2012:1) in turn argued that “the security institution is viewed by the Palestinian public, civil society organisations including political parties, the private sector and the media, not to mention Israel and the international community, as a failure in protecting the foundations of a Palestinian democratic system”. Meanwhile, Leech (2014a,b) argued that while the process of reforming the security sector may manifest a genuine, even existential, improvement in the lives of people, the regime treated this as a starting point for increasing authoritarianism not the reason for its conclusion.
Furthermore, the security doctrine under Fayyadism argued that it can overcome the asymmetry of power relations through security coordination with Israel. But this security coordination, which is rejected by the vast majority of Palestinian people, had a detrimental impact on PA legitimacy; Palestinians perceived the PA as a sub-contractor to the Israeli occupation. Despite the official claims by the PA that Palestinians also benefit from security coordination, the overall security conditions of the Palestinian people in the West Bank remain dismal, and basic security needs are still lacking. According to surveys conducted by the UNDP (2010) and DCAF (2006, 2009), around 54-60 per cent of Palestinians feel insecure, with the highest levels of insecurity found among refugees (reaching 74 per cent).

Additionally, during the Fayyadism era the most controversial element of its security paradigm was “that it assumes the abandonment of all forms of armed struggle as a means of pressuring Israel to accept Palestinian rights” (Kanafani 2011:1). The pursued disarmament strategy forced the PA forces to clash with their own people, increase the number of Palestinian activists in the PA prisons, increase dependency on intelligence forces, and induce de-mobilizing measures (such as requiring a written permit for any demonstration or public gathering). These disarmament and demobilisation processes did not move beyond the limitations of the Oslo Accords and aimed to eliminate hybrid mechanisms in security provision developed over the years. Additionally, these disarmament processes were perceived as implausible and non-viable because the Palestinians and their leadership persist under Israeli military occupation, and they have failed to bring economic dividends as promised (Brown 2011; Sayigh 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Tartir et al.2012).

Finally, the evolution of security forces during the Fayyadism phase was influenced by the contested role of the international community and their security missions,

37 In 2009, Palestinian and Israeli forces took part in 1,297 coordinated activities (Thrall 2010). However, in only one month in the same year (July 2009) the Israeli army carried out 773 military raids into Palestinian residential locales, opening fire on 66 occasions and imposing curfews when the raids were being carried out (World Bank 2009:21). The year 2011 witnessed a further increase in joint security measures, with 5% compared to 2010 (State of Israel 2012).

38 A baseline study prepare by/for the Palestinian Government Media Centre (2011) revealed that two in five (44 per cent) are concerned about being mistreated or abused by the Palestinian security services; the majority of the public agree with the statement that “the Israeli government has control over the Palestinian security services” (61 per cent agree); and while asking exclusively about the PA security forces, the services with the highest levels of negative public attitudes are Preventative Security Apparatus (25 per cent) and the Intelligence Apparatus (24 per cent).
particularly the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS. Supporting the unelected Fatah leadership to conduct security campaigns against the elected Hamas representatives undermined the donor’s demands for accountability and adherence to the rule of law. An aid official commented on this by arguing:

On one hand, we demand democratic processes, transparency and accountability and constantly stress the importance of human rights. But on the other hand, we have for the most part been silent about the PA’s extra-judicial campaign against Hamas. There is a huge contradiction in our message (cited in ICG 2010:33).

The USSC and the EUPOL COPPS missions were instrumental in shaping the relationship between statutory and non-statutory security forces, and were part and parcel to the transformations that took place in the security sphere under Fayyadism. As such, they bear a share of responsibility in the consequences of these security transformations on the lives of Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank. They are not only new actors, but also influential ones that shape discourse and strategies, and affect the dimensions of the Palestinian struggle. This constituted a major transformation in the role of external actors from being sponsors of the reform process to become real implementers of it through real presence on the ground. This shift from being observers to implementers had its own repercussions on the ownership of the security reform processes and opened-up a whole new section in the international aid industry as a further amplification of securitisation and the securitised development process.39

However, both the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS failed to support democratic governance and improve civil oversight and accountability due to the technical

---

39 It is also worth highlighting that it was only during the Fayyadism era that the Palestinian private sector security companies emerged in the West Bank as PalSafe and Hemaya Security Solutions. Both companies employ more than 1200 security personnel, many of them served previously in one of the PA security forces and left the public sector mainly because of the higher and more secure salary offered by the private sector. This element of privatizing security services constituted a new trajectory in the security sphere. A problematic feature that characterizes the operations of these security companies in their relationship and cooperation with Israeli security companies. In one of my trips to the West Bank in November 2013, I asked a number of security personnel working for PalSafe who were servicing in front of a nightclub in Ramallah about the training they have acquired. Proudly, one of them said, “I came back from Tel Aviv last night after attending a one week intensive training course by the best security company in Israel and possibly in the world. It was great and we do this very often and this is why we are well advanced in our techniques and equipment that the PA forces, we are modern and they are old fashioned”. These security companies were only established in 2008 in a further illustration of security amplification under Fayyadism. Other international private security companies started their operations in the West Bank mainly as subcontractors to the USSC.
nature of their intervention and their lack of local sensitivity. Both bodies focused on a conventional train-and-equip approach which created a more skilful security forces, but failed to generate a genuine institutional capacity to design, plan, and conduct training indigenously. Finally, their support paved the way for moving toward authoritarianism and the establishment of a police state (Rose 2008; Sayigh 2011; Bouris 2012; Bouris and Reigeluth 2012; Kristoff 2012).

Despite technical successes, such as the training of more than 3,000 Palestinian police officers and supporting the justice system, the EUPOL COPPS were criticised for their limited and technical scope, for their attempts to promote the rule of law in an authoritarian rather than democratic manner, and for their role in sustaining the occupation through failing to challenge the Israeli measures (Kerkkänen et al. 2008; Bulut 2009; Bouris 2010; Bouris 2014; Persson 2011; Youngs and Michou 2011). The USSC was criticised for “brainwashing” the young Palestinians that were recruited, entrenching the security collaboration with Israel at the expense of Palestinian security, criminalising resistance, and also for protecting Israeli security through the creation of “new Palestinian men” (as argued by Keith Dayton who headed the mission from 2005 until 2010). The people referred to forces that were trained by the USSC as the “Dayton forces”, and not only were they engaged in a brutal crackdown on Palestinians, they were accused of an unprecedented level of human rights violations (Byrne 2009; Dayton 2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; Thrall 2010).\footnote{The Appendix of the thesis offers further information about the EUPOL COOPS, USSC, and al-Istiqlal University in Jericho.}

In sum, the reinvention of Palestinian security forces during the Fayyadism era constituted a major pillar that demonstrated the ability of the Palestinian Authority to govern the Palestinian people and build public institutions that are able to deliver effectively. However, the security reform agenda had detrimental consequences for the Palestinian national struggle, the everyday security of the people, the role of resistance movements, as well as intra-Palestinian politics.
1.5. Conclusion

This chapter provided a contextualised analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 until the era of Fayyadism. It examined this evolution through the relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups, and the notion of hybridity in the realm of security provision. This framing and critical analysis and reading of the literature constitute a primary contribution of the this chapter to the scholarly knowledge. Through the theoretical and empirical implications of this framing on the literature, this chapter analysed and chronologically categorised the main phases of the security forces, highlighting their main features and characteristics.

There were three distinct phases: (i) the phase between 1993-1999 saw the establishment and building-up of the PA’s security forces in the West Bank and Gaza according to Oslo Accords; (ii) between 2000-2006, the existing security forces were destroyed in the aftermath of the intifada and when the non-statutory forces filled the security gap; (iii) and finally, from 2007 until the departure of Fayyad in mid-2013, the phase during which the reinvention of the Palestinian security forces took place through a major security reform project, which aimed to eliminate the hybridity in the security provision, despite the absence of Palestinian sovereignty and the presence of Israeli military occupation. The chapter concludes that the proliferation of the security forces under Arafatism resulted in further insecurities for the Palestinian people. Despite the attempt to reverse this condition under Fayyadism through security reform, however this raises new tensions between the PA’s security forces and the resistance movements and the non-statutory forces and groups. This was eventually manifested in authoritarian transformations and therefore constitute another form of institutionalised insecurities, but farmed in a state-building and good governance project.

The complex relationship between the statutory and non-statutory security forces and groups in the Palestinian context posed an additional challenge to the security governance reform initiatives. This relationship had transformed with the shift in the security doctrine from a pro-hybridity paradigm under Arafatism to an anti-hybridity
paradigm under Fayyadism. Despite this shift in the security doctrine, what remained constant was the problematic reality and fundamental flaw of conducting a security sector reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy in the absence of sovereign authority, and while living under a foreign military occupation.

At best, the security reform under Fayyadism resulted in better stability and more security to Israel and its occupation, but it did not result in better security conditions for the Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank. At worst, the enhanced functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in creating authoritarian transformations and criminalising resistance against the Israeli occupation, and as such directly and indirectly sustained it.
Chapter Two

2. Securitised Development and Palestinian Authoritarianism under Fayyadism

Abstract

This chapter unpacks and critically assesses perceptions about the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant literatures. This chapter aims to address one central question: How was the Fayyadist paradigm, and the consequences of its policies, perceived by the different actors and end-users involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s perspective reveal about Fayyadism?

The application of a bottom-up ethnographic methodological approach reveals that the voices from below challenge the rhetoric of the authorities and their claims to institution-building and readiness for statehood. The ethnographic data revealed that despite the proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism, these achievements failed to have a meaningful impact on the basic rights of Palestinians. Instead, the voices from below highlights mounting anger, frustration, inequality, insecurity, and a widening legitimacy gap.

In particular, the voices from below articulated the detrimental effects Fayyadism has on resistance against the Israeli military occupation, and by extension on their own protection and security. They also exposed the absence of local legitimacy and local accountability, and questioned Fayyadism’s agenda, political basis, and trajectory as they relate to the Palestinian struggle for freedom. Additionally, the claims made by authorities that Fayyadism is the best and only approach for Palestinians to achieve their aspirations was challenged by the people; instead they perceived Fayyadism as the enforcement of an authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as modernity. In light of Fayyad’s resignation in mid-2013, this chapter concludes that the security reform named after him is primarily about the “ism”, and not only about “Fayyad”; therefore the approach that Fayyad ushered in became entrenched during his six years of rule, and remains the force driving the state-building and governance trajectories in Palestine today.
“The Palestinians want an independent and sovereign state, and they are not looking for a state of leftovers”.

“We have crossed the threshold of readiness for statehood...we are ready for statehood”.

“We get closer to the Rendezvous with freedom...West Bank is already a state in all but name”.

Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, April 2010, April 2011, and August 2011 respectively

2.1. Introduction

Since taking office in 2007, Palestinian Prime Minister of the West Bank Salam Fayyad, along with Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership, argued that they have created in effect a functioning state under Israeli military occupation, as the above-mentioned quotations and the official documents of the PA affirm (PA 2011a,b; PA 2013a,b). Hoping to convince the international community to testify to its ability to govern the Palestinian people, the PA approached the United Nations (UN) in 2011 and 2012 demanding the recognition of Palestine as an independent state (Quigley 2013; Azarov 2014). In 2012, Palestine was offered a non-member observer state status in the UN (UN 2012).

This new status of Palestine in the international arenas meant very little to the Palestinian people and their everyday lives. Despite the UN recognition and the claimed institutional building successes under Fayyad, Palestinians continue to live under an Israeli settler-colonial rule and military occupation (Roy 2012; Salamanca et al. 2012). Moreover, ruled by two Palestinian governments (Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza), Palestinians exist within an unprecedented level of territorial and political fragmentation. More disturbingly, under Fayyad both the PA and the Palestinian people became more dependent on international aid and as such they increasingly lost confidence in the peace process. During this time Palestinian democracy and its political institutions tasked with checks and balances, such as the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), became dysfunctional. Furthermore, under the leadership of Fayyad the PA conformed to a strict governance reform agenda drawn up by the international donors’ community and Israel.

These reform agendas are not new in the Palestinian context; ironically, the PA was asked by the international community to reform its institutions before they were built. Furthermore, when contrasted with the Arafat era, the PA lost its small margin...
to manoeuvre, dismiss, control, and negotiate within the state-building context under Fayyadism. Notably, the PA’s shrinking level of manoeuvring is mainly attributed to the political trajectories that unfolded over the last two decades. The accumulation of the above mentioned conditions, particularly aid dependency, triggered the emergence of a new discourse and practice: Fayyadism.

In the words of Fayyad himself, Fayyadism is a “strategy of self-reliance and self-empowerment, focused on providing good government, economic opportunity and the rule of law, to build strong state institutions capable of providing for the needs of our citizens under occupation, and despite the occupation” (PA 2011:7). The PA, Israel and the international community sought state-building through four pillars: reform of the security sector and the enforcement of the rule of law; the building of accountable PA institutions; the provision of effective public service delivery; and, economic growth led by the private sector in an open and free market economy (PA 2008, 2009, 2011a,b, 2012a,b). Through these policies a “new” West Bank reportedly emerged; the “Bantustan”41 was thus transformed, at least in rhetoric, to a functioning state.42

This chapter unpacks and critically assesses perceptions about the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on relevant literatures and fieldwork at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps. Echoing the voices of the people in both camps, this chapter examines whether there is any gap between the rhetoric at the top and the reality from below in relation to the Fayyadist paradigm and the consequences of its policies. This exploration and critical analysis is guided by the following research questions: How were the Fayyadist paradigm and

---

41 The term “Bantustanization” was originally used in the South African apartheid literature to refer to the development of the reserves set aside for African occupation into self-governing states, colloquially known as “Bantustans”. In this system, the whites retained exclusive rights in their own part of the country, where any native African (officially known as ‘Bantu’) was regarded only as a visitor and could only enter the white areas with a permit (Alissa 2007:141 in Hilal 2007). The term is used to refer to the territorial, political and economic fragmentation model that the Israeli government has created in the West Bank and Gaza. Azmi Bishara (1995) defines the Palestinian Bantustan as “a place that lacks sovereignty and at the same time is not part of Israel. It’s neither one thing nor the other” (Cited in Alissa 2007:128).

42 The notion of a “miraculous” or “new” West Bank was highlighted in the literature as an evidence for the success of Fayyadism: “The West Bank has been transformed from a besieged and impoverished bantustan into a rough sketch of what a functioning Palestinian state might look like” (Weiss 2009); and “Fayyad has completely transformed the West Bank from an immiserated backwater into a thriving, integrated society” (Weiss 2010).
the consequences of its policies perceived by the different actors and end-users involved? And, what does a critical unpacking from the people’s perspective reveal about Fayyadism?

This chapter is structured into the following sub-sections: a discussion of the perceptions about Fayyadism as found in the scholarly and practitioner literature; an analysis of the major successes and failures of Fayyadism spelled out by its proponents and critics, followed by a critical reflection on these perceptions; and a discussion of the perspectives about Fayyadism amongst those living in Balata and Jenin refugee camps in the occupied West Bank, gathered by the author in 2012. This chapter opted to utilise a bottom-up methodology to gather the original empirical evidence from both camps. Finally, the last section is a brief epilogue in the aftermath of Fayyad’s resignation in June 2013, and presents different views that aimed to re-define Fayyadism after six years of coining it.

2.2. Understanding Fayyadism

The emergence of the Fayyadist paradigm and its successes and failures has polarised scholars. Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that the improved performance of the PA has contributed to peace-building and the enhancement of Palestinians lives; others argue that it has sustained the occupation, re-structured and re-engineered Palestinian society, created a new élite, and revised the historical national goals. Fayyad’s critics questioned his legitimacy and political agenda, while Fayyad’s competency and transparency were the focus of his proponents. Therefore, Fayyad was viewed as a Palestinian Messiah and as a traitor to the Palestinian cause, and everything in between (Bröning 2011).

Proponents argue that Fayyadism has: led to better functioning institutions and public service delivery; built the PA local legitimacy through its achievements; created better security conditions, and achieved constant economic growth since 2007 (World Bank 2011a,b; IMF 2011a,b; Freidman 2009, 2011). Additionally, they argue that Fayyadism followed new public management approaches; increased

---

43 In 2010 Fayyad was ranked as number 10 top world leaders according to the Time magazine, and number 28 in 2011 as top global thinking by Foreign Policy for forging a path between violence and surrender.
transparency while decreasing corruption; created a leadership that is viewed as a credible partner for peace; built public institutions ready for statehood; minimised the levels of aid dependency; and empowered the Palestinian people.

Critics argue that Fayyadism: has not built new institutions; has achieved only fragmented successes; has created an economic bubble; has achieved economic growth without creating employment; and, that it is non-sustainable, inequitable, aid-driven, and anti-poor (Stop the Wall 2008; Turner 2009, 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Khan 2010; Brown 2010a,b; Smith 2011; Khalidi 2011; Bisan 2011; Dana 2013, 2014; Knutter 2013; Shikaki and Springer 2015). These scholars argue that in contrast to policies under Arafat, Fayyadism: functions with improved financial management, albeit with corruption; achieved monopoly of violence through suppressing activism and creating a police state; remained heavily dependent on funds from the international donor community; altered the goals of the national struggle; functioned as sub-contractor to the Israelis military occupation; pursued non-plausible policies; de-politicised the Palestinian cause and provided economic solutions for political problems; and finally, aimed to acquire international recognition and statehood on only twenty two per cent of the historical Palestine.

These polarised assessments can be explained by examining the different understandings of and about Fayyadism between the proponents who celebrated its success and the critics who exposed its negative repercussions and failures. Both strands in the literature, however, either focus on Fayyad himself or analyse the transformations at the institutional ethnographic level; but none so far have focused on the voices of the people in their assessment of the impact of Fayyadist policies. It is the purpose of this chapter to address this gap in the literature through a critical reflection on the existing literature and through the presentation of original ethnographic evidence from the West Bank.

2.2.1. The Successes of Fayyadism

From the perspective of its proponents, Fayyadism was understood as a process of state-building focused on improved public administration that was marked by a fundamental attitudinal shift. Western media and many international journalists, such as the New York Time’s Thomas Freidman, perceived Fayyadism as “the most
exciting new idea in Arab governance ever” and “as a new approach to Palestinian governance: basing legitimacy on transparent and efficient administration, rather than the rejectionism, personality cults, and security services that marked Yasser Arafat's regime” (Freidman 2009:A21). Freidman considered Fayyadism to be one of the main reasons for the emergence of the Arab Spring (Freidman 2011). Echoing Freidman’s celebration of Fayyadism, Robert Danin argued that Fayyadism “represents, above all, a fundamental attitudinal shift. Its emphasis on self-reliance is a conscious effort to change the role of the Palestinians in their narrative from that of victims to that of agents of their own fate…It strives to replace cynicism and hopelessness, rampant among Palestinians, who have repeatedly seen their dreams squelched, with reasons for hope. The process itself is transformational and repudiates the use of violence” (Danin 2011:4). In this sense, Fayyadism “replaced reform and minor technocratic goals with bold, revolutionary aspirations… provided an important safety net for the Palestinians and the Israelis…and thus empowers Palestinian leaders to convince their constituents that it is worthwhile to make the painful compromises that will be necessary for a genuine settlement to be reached” (Danin 2011:1).

Quoting Dan Bern’s statement that “true revolutionaries never bomb buildings”, Michael Bröning argued that the PA under Fayyad has undergone an untold technocratic revolution by moving away from the dogma of “liberation before state”. This technocratic revolution was based on “factual attainment of the basic requirements associated with a sovereign state rather than on the abstract rights legacy” (Bröning 2011:64). Furthermore, Fayyad was celebrated as a responsible statesman, who embodies the “best hope for Palestine” and the “most important phenomenon in the Middle East” (Cohen 2010a,b), and “probably the best partner for peace that Israel has ever had” (Horovitz 2010) and a “real revolutionary” (Danin 2011). Noam Chomsky described Fayyad’s policies as sensible and developing concrete achievements of the ground, as the Zionist movement did previously, and these policies could turn into a viable Palestinian state (Chomsky 2010). The Israeli president Peres described Fayyad as the Palestinian Ben-Gurion. Fayyad is still seen by many on the outside as the embodiment of a kind of “Palestinianness” that is both reasonable and moderate. The sentiment expressed by these observers was similar to the opinion held by Thatcher about the Soviet Union, when Thatcher famously
claimed that Gorbachev was someone “we can do business with” and “found easy to deal with” (Leech 2012:2).

Consequently, the perceived institutional and governance successes attributed to Fayyadism led to the publication of numerous reports by various international community organisations, particularly the ones submitted to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in 2010 and 2011 (World Bank 2009, 2011a,b, 2012; IMF 2011a,b;UN 2011; QQR 2011), testifying to the readiness of the PA for statehood.44 The World Bank, while assuming that strong institutions and sustainable economic growth remain the foundations of Palestine’s state, wrote in 2010 that “if the PA maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services; it is well-positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future” (World Bank 2011a:5). The World Bank summarised the success of Fayyadism by stating that “the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. The quality of its public financial management has further improved. Education and health in the West Bank and Gaza are highly developed, comparing favourably to the performance of countries in the region as well as globally. Significant reforms still lie ahead for the PA – but no more than those facing other middle income countries” (World Bank 2011a:5).

The IMF stated that “the PA is now able to conduct the sound economic policies expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian state, given its solid track record in reforms and institution-building in the public finance and financial areas” (IMF 2011a:5). While MAS concluded its evaluation of Palestine’s readiness for statehood by stating that “Our analysis showed that the PA is ready for the transformation into statehood phase as the backbone of this state is there: the monopoly over violence, the power to represent and enter into agreement, the capacity to deliver public services, and with (apart from the oppressive and blackmailing behaviour of the Government of Israel) a financial system that can be contained to achieve stability in the long term. The PA institutions have the physical infrastructure, the legal environment, the technology, the institutional culture, the required human resources,

44 Mainly attributed to political reason, the very same institutions issued less enthusiastic reports in 2012 and 2013 (World Bank 2012, 2013a,b; IMF 2013a,b).
and the financial resources” (MAS 2011:14). A number of other United Nation bodies, the European Union and a number of its institutions, the Quartet, and many DC-based think tanks published similar evaluations.

The PA, in turn, produced a number of documents focusing exclusively on its own achievements (PA 2010a,b,c,d,e; 2011a,b). For instance, a 2011 report celebrated an endless list of achievements including: the consolidation of the rule of law throughout the criminal justice chain; the setting of new standards for the security and justice systems, the expansion of the justice system, and the formation of a specialised courts; the rehabilitation of the security sector infrastructure; economic growth of 9%; increased internal government revenues to exceed 2 billion US dollars, and the resulting reduction in dependency on aid funds; a reduction in unemployment and an improvement of social services; the adoption of a more holistic approach to health management; and, the implementation of a social safety net reform and the enhancement of associated infrastructure (PA 2011, 2012c).

From an international institutions indicator-based perspective, Figure.4 depicts a quantitative evaluation of Fayyadism based on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. It highlights the substantial improvement of the measured indicators mainly between 2008-2010, particularly the ones related to government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory quality.45 However, the decline in all indictors in years 2011 and 2012 speaks to the unsustainability and fragility of Fayyadism. Therefore, it is important to remain critical of the conclusions drawn from these indicators, and to consider the impact that the perceived progress in governance terms has had on the population. In other words, these indictors need to be understood in a context where the number of families receiving financial assistance increased from 30,000 to 100,000 between 2007 and 2010.

---

45 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are widely debated in the scholarly community (Hyden et. al 2004) and in the context of Palestine. However, given the vital role of the World Bank in Palestine, the indicators play an important role in the aid industry with its political ramifications on the peace process.
2.2.2. The Failures of Fayyadism

From the perspective of its critics, as was argued by Nathan Brown, Fayyadism at best was understood as “a program of improved public administration rather than a state-building effort”. However, even with this understanding, Fayyadism was perceived as a dangerous endeavour because “Fayyad's soft talk and cheery dedication enabled policymakers throughout the world to ignore the brewing crisis. And this may be where Fayyad, despite his impressive management skills, did Palestinians a disservice” (Brown 2011:5). Importantly, Philip Leech understood Fayyadism to be a program that “does little to challenge the basic structures of Israel’s rule”, and he noted that it elevated the PA to be “the primary agent extending neoliberal hegemony in the West Bank” (Leech 2012:1).

Others describe Fayyadism as the program of “a bunch of traitors to their own cause” (Black 2012), and accused Fayyad of being “a collaborator with the Israeli occupation and a pioneer in normalisation” (Massad 2010). Azmi Bishara labelled Fayyad as “the man who abandoned the national discourse, forswore national rights and came from outside the national movements to present a Palestinian state as a solution for the Israeli demographic problem” (Bishara 2010:2). Bishara has accused Fayyad of organising state-building as a “contrived fold festival which prioritise the protection of Israel’s security over fundamental Palestinian interests” (Bishara 2010:3). In my interviews with them, Hamas leaders describe Fayyad as being part
of the Zionist project and considered his policies to be a “major national crime”. The Islamic Jihad leaders described him as “politically mutinous”. Few in Fatah’s leadership described Fayyad as the “policeman of the occupation, the good employee and fundraiser, and the puppet”.46

Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour criticised the notion “neoliberalism as liberation”, as pursued by Fayyadism, and argued that it “redefines and diverts the Palestinian liberation struggle”. They concluded that with the utilisation of a neoliberal agenda for state-building, the program “cannot succeed either as the midwife of independence or as a strategy for Palestinian economic development...neoliberal ‘governance’ under occupation, however ‘good’, cannot substitute for the broader struggle for national rights nor ensure the Palestinian right to development” (Khalidi and Samour 2011:6). These neoliberal governance reforms under occupation were also criticised for being unrealistic and “surrealistic demands” (Hilal and Khan 2004), simply because basic pillars, as sovereignty and rights, are not attainable to guarantee their materiality (Khan 2010). Bröning argued that “the work of Fayyad government must be viewed as highly personalised and as of yet, precarious”. Thus the ambiguity of Fayyadism is compared to “turning wine into water”. Moreover, Bröning argues that due to Palestinian internal politics, Fayyadism “shifted from a program of statehood to a program to preparing for negotiations for statehood” (Bröning 2011:64).

Nathan Brown acknowledged that Fayyad was successful on a number of fronts, but he argued that “Fayyad is not the problem, but Fayyadism is not the solution to Palestine's political crisis”. Fayyad’s successes included winning the trust of western governments, gaining the respect of the international political arena, and achieving modest victories in Palestinian governance: “the security services became less partisan, public finances became more transparent (even without any domestic oversight), corruption likely decreased, pockets of the civil service were rebuilt on a more professional basis, and basic order in Palestinian cities was improved” (Brown 2011:4). Despite these successes, however, the overall failure of Fayyad to create

46 Nathan Brown argued that Fayyad could proudly claim to be Palestine's most accomplished prime minister ever because all of his predecessors “were impotent, transitory, or frustrated occupants of the post, and collectively set a very low bar”. Hence, he described Fayyad as someone who could not walk on the water, “but did an almost miraculous job of not drowning” (Brown 2011:3).
both a short and long-term strategy is apparent: Fayyad failed to establish any new institutions during his time in office. All institutions in place during his time in power pre-existed and were built either in the early 1990s, during the Jordanian rule, or during the previous British rule. In this way, Fayyad merely protected these institutions from a failure to continue to provide public services. Evidence exists to support the fact that Palestinians were as close, or perhaps even closer, to achieving statehood in 1999 compared to today, thus Fayyad did not bring Palestinians closer to statehood. Furthermore, the Palestinian parliament has not met since Fayyad came to power in 2007, thus he did not prove to Palestinians that they should or could be self-reliant. In fact, he actually achieved the opposite through full dependence on international aid and donors’ policy prescriptions; as such, Fayyad did not achieve sustainable economic development and instead entrenched dependency on the Israeli economy and international aid (Brown 2010a,b,c). In conclusion, Brown argued that “the main problem with Fayyadism is not the way it undermines democracy in the short term but in the way it masks the absence of any long-term strategy” (Brown 2009:5).

Alarmingly, the security sector reform and disarmament processes that took place under Fayyadism had detrimental consequences on the dynamics of the Palestinian national struggle and resistance against Israeli occupation (Khan 2009). As the previous and the following chapters show, reinvention of the Palestinian security sector under Fayyadism was associated with an increasing level of Palestinian authoritarianism. Critics accused the reformed PA’s security bodies of human rights violations, the practice of arbitrary detention, and excessive torturing (HRW 2008, 2010; ICHR 2010; ICG 2008a,b; ICG 2010; Al-Haq 2011; MEM 2010). The PA security forces were accused by critics of creating a police state and an authoritarian regime (Sayigh 2011), and they were blamed for adding another level of repression by sustaining the Israeli military occupation through its enhanced functionality and security collaboration (Leech 2012a,b; 2014a,b).

My fieldwork in Balata and Jenin refugee camps indicated that the attempts made by the Fayyadist paradigm to induce law and order were successful to some extent; however, the consequences on peoples’ lives were severe. Due to the incomplete and ineffective nature of the security campaigns, people argued that the concept and
practice of resistance was targeted; first to tame it, and then to criminalise it. Members of armed groups committed to resisting the Israeli occupation and to protecting the Palestinian people were arrested and tortured in the PA’s jails. The security campaigns not only meant arbitrary detention and excessive torturing for local leaders from the camps, but it also meant that the security collaboration with Israel became the panacea to induce stability and security for Israel and the Israeli people and settlers. Consequently, the basic needs of the Palestinian people were denied, and any opposing voices (even from the elected opposition) were suppressed; illustrating the authoritarian transformations of the PA under Fayyadism. The next chapter will expand on this authoritarian dimension and provides ethnographic evidence on the impact of Fayyadism on both resistance and the basic security needs of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The idea and notion of resistance, in its broad meaning, is prominent both analytically and empirically because it constitutes a major characteristic of Palestinian society and its struggle, and also because it was a major target for eradication under the Fayyadist paradigm and state-building agenda. From the people’s perspective, the occupation had to be resisted by all possible means; however, the agreements and security arrangements that the PA signed over the years since the Oslo Accords regarded any form of resistance as “terror that had to be criminalised”. This tension justifies the focus on resistance at the analytical and empirical levels, and hence it was a major component in the gathered ethnographic evidence for this research.

Furthermore, the above-mentioned PA documents and plans, as well as the international community reports and evaluations, were fundamentally questioned by

47 Security collaboration/coordination/cooperation between the PA forces and the Israeli establishment is manifested in different ways. Security coordination most often implies Israeli forces ordering the arrest of suspect Palestinians and having the PA forces hand them over. A high official from the Preventive Security told me: “We get lists with names, they need someone, and we are tasked to get that person for them.” The suppression of any Palestinian protests that aim to confront with the Israeli soldiers or settlers is another example. The facilitation of arrests to Israel, the withdrawal from the streets if Israeli forces would like to invade an area under the PA control, the exchange of intelligence information, the “revolving door” phenomenon where Palestinian activists are imprisoned in both the Israeli and the PA jails for the same reasons, the regular joint Israeli-Palestinian meetings, workshops and trainings between security leaders, are just few additional examples. Over the years, security coordination had detrimental impacts on the legitimacy of the PA and was perceived by any people as national betrayal. The complicity of the PA in 2008/9 war or Gaza and the revealed information about the shocking extent of security coordination by the leaked Palestine Papers showed the centrality of the security collaboration as a defining feature of the PA security doctrine under Fayyadism. The impact of security collaboration will be further explained in empirical terms in the next chapter.
critics. These critics perceived the reports that celebrated Fayyadism as attempts to mask reality and hide behind narrow, static, numeric, and technical measurements of success. Additionally, they critiqued the guiding neoliberal norms which failed to account for the trajectories of the de-development processes and the political construct of poverty, unemployment, and other developmental challenges. These critics viewed the PA plans under Fayyadism as fundraising proposals to the donors, and therefore they neither perceive them as liberation strategies nor a bottom-up participatory approach as claimed by the proponents of Fayyadism. The UNCTAD revealed that the celebrated economic growth of 7.1% in 2008, 7.4% in 2009 and 9.3% in 2010, was a jobless growth, aid driven, based on an eroded productive base, anti-poor, and reflects an economy recovering from a low base (UNCTAD 2011). Evidence suggested that this growth was associated with high unemployment levels (30%), poverty reaching 26% (18% in WB, and 38% in Gaza), public debt increased by 100%, and the fact that 50% of Palestinian households were impacted by food insecurity (Bisan 2011).

This chapter argues that the different understandings of what Fayyadism is and what constitutes its pillars led to conflicting conclusions. While Fayyadism in its rhetoric was built on four main pillars (reforming the security sector and enforcing the rule of law; building accountable PA institutions; providing effective public service delivery; and achieving market-oriented economic growth), this chapter argues that the emphasis on these four rhetorical pillars marginalised another four practiced/implemented pillars that actually constitute the core thrust of Fayyadism. An exploration of these four practiced and implemented pillars was informed by the voices coming from below regarding the implementation of Fayyadist policies, and as such they are highlighted to challenge the existing literature and address its gaps.

First, essentially Fayyadism is a paradigm that prioritises security matters and considers the security collaboration with Israel as its major defining feature in its

48 The titles of the plans can be telling. The plan in 2008 was called the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. In 2009 the plan was called Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. In 2010, the plan was called Homestretch to Freedom, and in 2011 the plan was called National Development Plan: Establishing the State, Building our Future. What is noticeable here is the dropped words. It starts by dropping ‘Reform’, followed by ‘Occupation’ and then ‘Freedom’; as if these tasks were achieved and what is remaining is how Palestinians will build their future. As stated by Fayyad in September 2011: ‘our effort has been to make statehood inevitable...we are now ready’. This reflects part of the “war of discourses and narratives” between the various actors.
security sector reform project. Therefore, the development process was a securitised one par excellence, and the Fayyadist paradigm only accepts one way of resistance against the Israeli military occupation; peaceful popular resistance (Ghandour-Demiri 2014). Any other form of political resistance must be repressed and eliminated at all costs, even if it meant an authoritarian transformation in the PA’s practices. Popular peaceful resistance is not new to the Palestinian struggle, however its forced exclusivity is new. It was adopted as a window-dressing to cover up the authoritarian transformations of the PA and to keep all its opponents under control.

Second, in its core Fayyadism was not concerned with building checks and balances institutions that are accountable to the Palestinian people, instead the Fayyadist paradigm enjoyed the absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council and followed a mantra that achievements will build local legitimacy regardless of the de jure legitimacy. Therefore it was a paradigm that actively denied Palestinian democratic traditions and institutions.

Third, by aiming to effectively deliver public services under occupation, as opposed to under a full sovereign context, implied that the Fayyadist paradigm aimed to de-politicise Palestinian life and favoured normalcy under military occupation; in this way the Fayyadist paradigm both directly and indirectly sustained Israeli occupation. Fourth and finally, the leading role of the private sector in the Palestinian economy did not directly translate to the adoption of a market-oriented economic growth approach, but rather the entrenchment of a neoliberal economic agenda that proposed economic solutions to political challenges. This economic dimension corresponded with the Israeli notion of economic peace, rather than political peace.

**Table 1: Fayyadism’s Rhetorical versus Practiced Pillars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fayyadism’s Rhetorical Pillars</th>
<th>Fayyadism’s Practiced/Implemented Pillars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly of Violence and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Exclusive Peaceful Popular Resistance, Security Collaboration with Israel, and armed resistance criminalisation as a major bulk of the SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable PA Institutions</td>
<td>Building Local Legitimacy via ‘Achievements’ but Lacks Checks and Balances Institutions or local accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Public Service Delivery</td>
<td>Adapt with the existence of occupation, de-politicisation of the Palestinian cause and enhanced functionality to sustain the status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented Economic Growth</td>
<td>Neoliberal Economic Agenda and the practice of ‘Economic Peace’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3. Voices from Below: Perspectives from Balata and Jenin

Refugee Camps

The case studies of Balata and Jenin refugee camps have been selected to facilitate the unpacking of Fayyadism, identify its pillars, and explicate their consequences on the lives of people in the West Bank. Methodologically, these cases represent the benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to other areas across the occupied West Bank. Both camps were regularly celebrated by the PA, the international donor community, and proponents of Fayyadism as indicators of the success of Fayyadism as an outstanding model for state-building and good governance. Balata and Jenin camps were celebrated as camps that transformed from places that “export terror” to stable camps operating under the rule of law on account of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. They were used as showcases to testify the ability of the PA to govern its people and provide security to Israel, and as signs of its readiness for statehood. This celebration was mainly attributed to the security and disarmament campaigns that began in 2007 and continue today. The PA conducted these campaigns in coordination with Israel, and they were made possible by the financial support of the international donor community.

However, my extensive ethnographic fieldwork in these two camps between August and December 2012 revealed a wide gap between the perceptions of the people and those of the authorities. The voices from below challenged the proclaimed successes and the glowing discourse of Fayyadism; alternatively they drew a picture that depicted the ultimate failure of Fayyadism to both protect them and fulfil their basic needs. The dominant narrative of the people questioned the building blocks of Fayyadism, and as such revealed a different version of reality. This new reality was characterised by anger against the PA, its security forces and security doctrine, as well as its economic policies that were recognised to result in a high level of inequality, injustice, and frustration.

The cases of Balata and Jenin camps, and the ethnographic evidence they offer, are not particularly exceptional or outliers when contextualised within the overall perceptions about Fayyadism and its performance amongst the residents of the West...
Bank. Over the years, multiple public opinion polls and surveys offered different insights that correspond with the original qualitative perspectives gathered from both camps. What remains particularly special about these camps, however, is their excessive exposure to the security campaigns conducted by the PA and the associated repercussions. Examining a sample of those public opinion polls and surveys, with all the associated methodological caveats, also indicate a gap between the rhetoric from the top and the views on reality from the bottom.

For instance, contrary to the Fayyadism’s claim of bridging the tryst and legitimacy gap, in February 2010 MaanNews Agency, through its online polling of 23,480 participants, revealed that 95.5% believe that politicians lie (MaanNews Agency 2010a). Later in the same month, this time with 28,673 participants, 78% believed that the PA security forces were engaged in surveillance, monitoring activities, and intervening in people’s privacy (MaanNews Agency 2010b). Such figures clearly contradict with the claimed professionalism of the PA security forces. While Fayyadism claimed that it uprooted the phenomenon of nepotism in March 2010, the statistics of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) revealed that 76% of respondents believed there to be widespread bribery in the public sector, and 92% believed there to be widespread nepotism and favouritism in the public sector (PCBS 2010). A public opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) in October 2010, with a sample of 1,200 respondents, revealed that 73% argued that under Fayyad’s government they perceived the presence of nepotism in providing public services (JMCC 2010). Similar results were reported in May 2012 (JMCC 2012a).

Additionally, despite the fact that Fayyadism professed to eradicate corruption, in November 2012 a public opinion poll conducted by the JMCC, with a sample of 750 respondents from the West Bank, revealed that 82% think that there is corruption in the PA. Moreover, Fayyadism claims to protect civil rights; yet around 40% of respondents stated that freedom of expression is permissible to a low or very low extent, 18% stated that it is not permissible at all, and 56% declared that the PA does not respect civil right and political freedom (JMCC 2012b). In March 2013 another survey by the JMCC revealed that 60% of participants did not think that security cooperation with Israel benefit the Palestinians and should be stopped (JMCC 2013),
reflecting the public rejection of a major pillar of Fayyadism. In an ultimate illustration of the ongoing crisis of legitimacy, more than 30% of respondents expressed that they do not trust any political figure or political faction.

In contradiction to the claim that the success of Fayyadism is due to local accountability, the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) revealed in a May 2012 survey that 50 percent of West Bank respondents believed that Fayyad’s government is not accountable to the people (AWRAD 2012). In February 2013 another AWRAD public poll, with a 1,200 respondents sample, indicated that 46 percent of West Bank respondents evaluate the performance of the government led by Salam Fayyad negatively, while only 18 per cent of West Bank respondents view Fayyad’s government positively. Notably, 56% of West Bank respondents disapproved of the overall performance of Fayyad (AWRAD 2013a). In April 2013, West Bank respondents with a positive evaluation of the Fayyad government declined to 13 percent, while 63% of West Bank respondents disapproved the overall performance of Fayyad (AWRAD 2013b). Furthermore, according to a public poll conducted by The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in September 2012, only 2% and 17% evaluate the performance of the government headed by Fayyad as very good and good respectively, 35% evaluated its performance as bad, and 18% as very bad (PCPSR 2012). After six years of Fayyad rule, another survey by PSR in June 2013 showed that 70% of the West Bank respondents supported the resignation of Fayyad (PCPSR 2013). This raises many questions regarding the claimed popularity of Fayyad and the policies Fayyadism.

The bottom-up methodological approach I have taken in this research highlights and prioritises the voices and perspectives of the people, and as such illustrates the complexity of and contradictions in attempting to conduct security campaigns aimed at inducing law and order from within a persistent foreign military occupation. This research also reveals the fragility of the PA’s legitimacy, even within the political constituency of the PA-supporters at Jenin and Balata camps. In other words, the voices of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps do not support the claims of the authorities. One respondent from Balata camp told me in a tone full of anger:

Fayyad sits in his air-conditioned and elegant office in Ramallah, and then go in his fancy black armed Audi to his house in
Jerusalem that is guarded by a British security company. Abbas is surrounded by thousands of US-trained guards (Dayton forces) in his compound in Ramallah. They live in their castles and we are 30,000 people living in one square kilometre. I am sure that they told you about all their successes and how much the people are happy with their achievements. But I want to assure you and say it very loud [he literally screamed] that I wish to go back and live under direct Israeli occupation instead of having an authority that subcontracts this occupation and claims it represents me and receives billions of dollars on my behalf. All what I see from this authority is humiliation, national deterioration, repression, corruption and injustices. I keep hearing in the news about their successes; but whenever I hear that I ask myself who is living on Mars, me or them? The situation on the ground is just miserable. They lie and then they believe their lie and act accordingly. This is just a farce.

Methodologically, I have conducted fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews in both camps. The sample interviewees included representatives from different sectors and categories, including local and national leaders, political faction cadres, armed groups members, and men and women, youth, ex-fighters, and those previously detained by the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, I have conducted five focused groups in the two camps (A list of interviews is provided in the appendix). Through observing participants between August and December 2012, I adopted an ethnographic approach and therefore I had conversations with the people in their stores and workshops, in their houses, in streets and cafes, in local institutions, and at weddings and public gatherings. I witnessed first-hand clashes with the PA forces over the course of my fieldwork, including examples of infighting and chaos, as well as the tendency to escalate violence, and some of these observations are embedded in the details in the following chapter.

2.3.1. Anger, Legitimacy Gap and Insecurity

I entered the camps with the hypothesis that the institutional successes of Fayyadism trickled down and affected the people positively. However, I was confronted with the opposite. With very few exceptions, the vast majority pointed out to the high levels of insecurity, unemployment, poverty, frustration, and anger. The youth in particular, who suffer forty per cent unemployment amongst them, argued that despite the claims and international reports, nepotism, corruption, and wasata were never addressed by Fayyad. One youth argued, “I truly wish to see this authority clean
without corruption, but this will never happen even if Prophet Muhammad replaces Salam Fayyad”.

This lack of trust was accompanied by feelings of anger against the PA and Fayyad’s policies. The anger amongst the ex-fighters and members of armed groups, who were previously arrested by the PA and tortured in their jails, as well as their families, pointed out vividly that the PA’s security campaigns occurred with a high cost. “I want to revenge from the PA. Firstly through election and then I will use my weapon to take revenge from those who interrogated me in the PA’s jails in Jericho”, a former member of the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Group from Balata camp who was arrested in the PA jails for 83 days told me. Another respondent from Balata camp who is affiliated with Hamas argued, “I feel that I live in a police state full of informants. If I just think of opposing the PA and Fayyad policies, I feel that the PA security forces will be on the door of the house”. Calls for revenge and anger at the PA security forces and Fayyad security doctrine overshadowed the partial successes that the security campaigns achieved over the years. The PA’s legitimacy under Fayyad was particularly questioned by respondents. A local leader affiliated with the Palestinian Left from Jenin camp argued:

There is no parliament, no election, and no democracy. I don’t know who represents me. I did not elect Fayyad, well no one elected him. He reached us with a parachute. No one can talk on my behalf. Fayyad claims he is accountable to us; however we see him only in the news. He is accountable to the donors because he is the finance minister of the donors money, not the Palestinian people money. We only trust God.

The crisis of legitimacy was further exemplified when the security collaboration with Israel was discussed. “Do you want me to tell you how many people and freedom fighters were killed because of Fayyad’s security collaboration doctrine?”, a female activist from Jenin camp asked me. This practice of security collaboration was a defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm, and it was focused on quelling resistance. The perception that Fayyadism aimed in the first place to tame resistance against the Israeli occupation was a dominate view amongst the camps’ population. “All what have happened over the last five years served one objective: use us to show others that resistance is a crime”, a Fatah cadre from Jenin camp told me.
Another Fatah local leader from Balata looked at the other side of the resistance equation and argued:

Fayyad wanted to be the Palestinian Ghandi and wanted to win the Nobel Prize after all our sacrifices. I tell you what: we don’t believe in peaceful resistance. Do you want to convince me that playing a violin will urge a settler to leave his settlement, or hitting on a bowl will dismantle the wall, or holding a carton with a slogan on it will reclaim Jerusalem. This peaceful resistance is not for us, it is for tourists and foreigners and for the international community consumption.

While these camps can be perceived as “securitised spaces”, they should be located in the overall context of Israeli aggression and Palestinian authoritarianism. The legacy of armed resistance and use of weapons are dominant in the popular narrative and vivid in the collective consciousness, and there seemed to be different sorts of classification for weapons. One person could have at least four different types of weapons: one for his personal security; one for resistance; one for “problems-solving” in the local community, and one that belongs to the security force he is co-opted by/work for. In one incident, a respondent illustrated this to me and showed me which weapons belong to which category.

“Taming resistance was not conducted in an arbitrary way”, one respondent argued. A representative of the youth told me:

Fayyad is not stupid. Probably he is the smartest in the so-called Palestinian leadership. He knows what he is doing and I can claim that he is the only one who has a plan and an agenda. It is another question though if this plan is for or against the Palestinians. Fayyad was smart because he offered us, through the banks, loans and easy credit so we get busy with repaying them instead of resisting the occupation. He simply promised money to give up resistance. This is exactly what Israel and the donors also wanted since Oslo Accords two decades ago. It is all to achieve economic peace instead of real peace and benefit the elite in the top. Fayyad is their master.

2.3.2. “Fayyad is Not Hasan Nasrallah”

Illustrating the lack of local accountability and absence of any form of local ownership in the Fayyadist paradigm, respondents pointed out that at best Fayyadism serves the interest of the PA’s élite, and at worst it serves an external, and even an
Israeli, agenda. While this may appear to be an extreme judgment, people questioned the local roots of Fayyadism and pointed out that he joined the Palestinian polity as part of the donors’ conditionalities. “What is the national history of Fayyad? He was never arrested in the Israeli jails, and he never belonged to any political factions. He spent his life in Washington and now he is our prime minister falling on our head with a parachute”, one respondent commented. The claim that Fayyadism is a bottom-up approach did not resonate for the people in the slightest. A respondent argued:

They [Fayyad’s governments] claim that the plan echo our needs, however no one visited the camp to ask us about our needs. I don’t care if the PA rented a building for $100,000 per year in Ramallah and moved the offices of the Ministry of Interior to it. I care about why I am not feeling secured, why I am not employed or way my income has declined. I also care about our national struggle and goals. If the security forces are there to supress but not to protect us, why I should care or be happy if their ministry has a new building? If the so-called Fayyadism was a national and local plan it will care about the human beings not about the stones for the buildings.

The majority of respondents raised questions about the local legitimacy of Fayyadism and how it is perceived it public consciousness. A respondent from Jenin camp took this theme further and argued, “it is straight forward and not a rocket science. Why do you see and hear the Israelis praising Fayyad all the time. You must raise a question mark. He can’t be loyal to Palestine while being celebrated by the enemies”. A youth activist from Balata camp claimed that Fayyad is “an infiltrator who was successful in replacing the Palestinian factions with the PA’s security forces, and now forcing us to live in his ideology of economic realism as prescribed by the US. This will be the real disaster”. A mother of a martyr and a prisoner in the PA jails argued that “Fayyad is implementing a Zionist-American plan, and I will never elect Fatah or Fayyad”. In turn, a leftist local leader in Balata camp concluded our two hours conversation by stating:

Let us make it simple. Under Fayyad’s rule the only thing that happened in the security sphere is that the PA forces are helping the Israeli occupying forces in their tasks; they are subsiding the occupation. Therefore, Fayyad is implementing an American-European policies imposed on the PA, and since the PA officials are bunch of corrupted people, then the American-European
coalition brought someone to clean up that mess. However Fayyad remains the finance minister of the donor’s money. Fayyad is not Hasan Nasrallah.

2.3.3. “Miracle of Ramallah”

Highlighting case study examples of their own successes was an integral part of Fayyadism, and it also illustrates the tension between the perspectives from below and the ones from above. While the liberal model of modern Ramallah was held up by Fayyadist enterprise proponents to be replicated elsewhere, the voices coming from the camp argued that the Ramallah model is an “imposed and strange model, even though its appears as a miracle”. The “miracle of Ramallah” was perceived in the camps as “fake” and a case for living under a “five-stars occupation”. A respondent from Balata camp argued, “Ramallah represents what is Fayyadism: It is inequality with the exclusive focus on the core while marginalizing the periphery. Ramallah was transformed into a model city, I call it the postcard and billboards city. It is fake and dangerous”. The focus on Ramallah, the de facto capital of the PA, marginalised other cities and locations and was echoed by many respondents. A local leader from Balata argued:

Over the years Fayyad governments ignored and marginalised Nablus as a city since it was causing them troubles in terms of security and therefore decided to punish it. The result was the transformation of Nablus from the economic capital of the West Bank, into a capital of misery, unemployment and poverty.

A female activist and a member in the Balata camp committee argued that “what Fayyad has created is a resort to relax from occupation in Ramallah. When I want to take a break from the occupation I take my kids and go to Ramallah”. Another respondent from Jenin camp argued that “Ramallah is not under occupation. It is in the heart of Switzerland”.49 The idea here is not about Ramallah per se, but rather about its symbolic meaning and about the aim of Fayyadism to depoliticise the Palestinian struggle for rights and assume normalcy under occupation. “Ramallah is

49 For further elaboration on the transformations occurred in Ramallah please refer to Taraki (2008a,b); Barthe (2011); Yahya (2012); Khalidi (2012); and Rabie (2013). A major feature of Fayyadism is the real estate sector showcase as Rawabi, a new city not far from Ramallah. For Grandinetti (2015;2) while the middle-class ethos being cultivated by Rawabi “views neoliberal capitalism and consumerism as a sign of modernity and a new form of resistance, it rather, operates to depoliticize economic development under occupation, preclude alternative models for “resistance” economies, and make the occupation less costly, or even profitable, to Israeli and Palestinian elite”.

112
a city of consumerism, nightclubs, and elitism”, a respondent from Balata argued before elaborating further and stating:

Fayyad wanted us to believe that we can have a normal life under occupation. Of course we are a resilient nation, however that does not mean that we can forget about the occupation and our political demands. Yes maybe it is important to have growing businesses, fancy cafes and cars, build new cities, have five stars hotel, organise investment conferences and international festivals, and open up new KFC restaurants. However, all of these can’t mask the picture of reality. Depoliticising our struggle can only help Israel and sustains its occupation and accept its mere existence. Fayyad believed that building a modern and peaceful city like Ramallah is a form of peaceful and civilized resistance.

In Ramallah, it was common to refer to the people from the northern part of the West Bank, such as Jenin and Balata refugee camps, as “Thai people” because they are used as cheap labour in Ramallah. Under the Fayyadist paradigm, the “blonde Ramallah” and the de facto political capital of the PA acquired the benefits of the core, as opposed to the periphery. The benefits were mainly reflected in the economic and business spheres, and were evident in the associated culture of consumerism. By extension, this created the impression that Ramallah is a city superior to the others, and this meant that other areas, such as the camps, were viewed as “inferior and residual areas”, as “spaces for chaos”, and as “a bunch of trouble makers who are threatening our profits and businesses”. The ‘modernity’ package that covered Ramallah induced multiple behavioural transformations that affected the unity and cohesion of the Palestinian people and society, yet another example of the detrimental consequences of Fayyadism.50

2.3.4. “Fayyad’s Dangerous Policies”

Unsurprisingly, Fayyad’s call to adopt an exclusively peaceful resistance strategy was not taken seriously in the camps. Almost none of the interviewees thought that a peaceful resistance strategy would be effective, instead preferring a strategy that aimed to clash with and confront the occupying power. A local Islamic leader in Jenin camps argued “I am telling Fayyad that the armed resistance is about

---

50 For further elaboration on the neoliberal consequences of Fayyadism, please refer to chapter five entitled “contentious economics in the OPT” in this thesis.
preserving dignity despite that it could result in speedy death. Negotiation is a humiliation for dignity and it is a slow death”. Another respondent stated, “the PA adopted a weekly super peaceful protest aiming for appearances in the media, but not resisting the occupation. Maybe these peaceful protests are important; however they will never fulfil our rights”. Fayyad’s polices were perceived by many to be not only dangerous, but apathetic. A respondent from Jenin camp stated “Fayyad wanted us to face a whale with peaceful resistance. It is a joke, apathetic, fake, betrayal, and catastrophe”. While others argued that the concept of resistance does not exist in the Fayyadist dictionary. “Fayyadism is an approach based on begging the occupier to give us some leftovers, but never to clash with or confront the occupying power to acquire our full rights”, a youth activist argued in Balata camp. An active member in Fatah and a former fighters in its armed wing, told me:

I am not saying that the exclusivity of armed resistance is the solution. Actually it is not especially if we think about the international community. And also any exclusivity implies a certain level of dictatorship that may go against the public will. However, I do not see why we do not adopt different methods of resisting the occupation. We are under occupation and even the international law allowed us to resist in any possible way to achieve our self-determination. Under Fayyad, the word resistance became even a dirty word and in many occasions it is not allowed. It is only allowed if we go with the foreigners and the activists from the Israeli left and start singing together in front of the 7 meters wall. This is not resistance Mr. Fayyad, it is a celebration of the military occupation and the colonial subjugation.

The notion of resistance was not the only disputable pillar of Fayyadism, and many described Fayyad’s other policies as very dangerous. A local political leader in Balata camp contented that:

Fayyad policies are very, very dangerous. They are not based on a clear political basis, his existence reinforces the Palestinian divide and his economic policies only bring disasters unto the Palestinian people. Fayyad tried to co-opt the freedom fighter and transform the army of fighters to an army of public sector employees, who are waiting for their monthly salary.

Another grassroots activist argued that “Fayyad followed policies to mainly ensure the domestication of people: an economic one through offering easy credit and a security one through empowering the security forces. All of these shackled the trust
in Fayyad and his government”.^51 The shaky base of Fayyadism urged a local leader from Jenin camp, and a member of the PLC, to tell me:

The security operations, whether justified or unjustified, resulted in distrust between the PA force and the people, and created a hostile atmosphere in the camp against the PA and its security forces. What Fayyad was not aware of is that I, as a citizen, need to be convinced that this police officer or soldier is there to protect me and that therefore I will respect him and not to be afraid of him. If today I am afraid of him, tomorrow I will threaten him.

Other voices from below argued that “Fayyad only helped the people around him and just entrenched the inequality in our society. He took the lead in the security coordination with the Israelis, which is a national betrayal and a catastrophe for the Palestinian people”. A local female activist in Balata camp declared to me that “things at the surface look better in terms of personal security; however 30% of women in camp suffer from internal violence and 70% are harassed in one way or another including sexual ones in the alley of the camp but they can’t go and complain anywhere”. Speaking to the ultimate consequences of Fayyadism, a local cadre of Hamas in Balata camp told me:

Fayyad and his governments are making us busy with the glowing talk about economic growth and security; however what they are missing is that they make the Palestinians chase jobs but never attain them. This is like the tires of the car; the front tires are the jobs and growth the PA and Fayyad are talking about, and the back tires are the Palestinian people. They run and run but they will never meet.

Finally, the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm was highlighted by the local leader in Jenin camp, a legendary figure of the 2002 Jenin battle and member of the PLC, when he argued:

With my due respect to Fayyad, but in a matter of two days Israel can destroy everything he has built. With Fayyad’s rule, 67% or more of the public servants are in long term debts with the banks, no factories were built, unemployment levels are the same as before, the cost of living has increased, one million Palestinians have become dependent on the PA’s monthly salary and the

---

^51 For further elaboration on the damaging economic policies of Fayyadism, please refer to Khalidi and Samour (2011); Hanieh (2013); Samour (2014); and Abunimah (2014).
uncertainty associated with it, and corruption remains, albeit packaged differently. To me, Fayyad is a World Bank employee.

The most wanted fighter by Israel in the second intifada concluded by saying:

Fayyad did his best, he is surrounded by agreements and existing frameworks, he does not have a magical tool but he has a vision to build the institutions for the future state. However, no one is ready to give him a state and therefore all of what he built is for nothing. So I argue that Abbas and Fayyad should dismantle the PA and hand in the keys to the Europeans.

The voices from below presented above clearly told a different story than the official one of Fayyadism. It is not only a rhetorical difference, but it is also an illustration of what the practice of Fayyadist policies meant on the ground and how they have affected people’s lives. The following section addresses the different views on Fayyadism after six years of initiating it and after the departure of Fayyad from the Palestinian polity. The brief elaboration below reveals the existing gap in the literature as well as the tensions between the proponents and critics of Fayyadism.

2.4. Post-Fayyad?

Principally as a consequence of intra-Fatah politics and infighting, Fayyad was forced to leave the Palestinian polity in June 2013. Fayyad’s resignation raised the questions: Is this the end of Fayyadism? Is it about Fayyad or the “ism”? This chapter argues that is about both, “Fayyad” and the “ism”. Although the defining features of the “ism”, the security and economic collaboration with Israel, were established with the Oslo Accords in 1993, Fayyad was the right fit at the right moment with the right tools who gained the support of the donor community to implement the set of policies they had prescribed. This made Fayyad a unique prime minister. However, Fayyad’s resignation was an opportunity for his critics and proponents to re-define Fayyadism after six years of its inception. Strikingly, the views about Fayyadism remained sharply polarised.

Proponents of Fayyadism considered his resignation to be a “pivotal moment in the history of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians” (Tobin 2013). Roger Cohen, NYT’s columnist, redefined Fayyadism as a “revolution of acts over narrative, of state-building over slogans, of pragmatism over posturing” (Cohen
2013). Khaled Elgindy argued that “for many in the U.S. and Israel, Fayyadism is seen not just as a pathway to Palestinian statehood but as a means of “reinventing” Palestinian politics along the way” (Elgindy 2013). Isabel Kershner argued that Fayyadism was “a byword for the new norms of a well-run Palestinian government” (Kershner 2013). Christa Case Bryant argued that Fayyadism was “a paradigm about self-empowerment instead of victimhood”, and quoted Robert Danin stating that Fayyadism was “a can-do paradigm to pursue a peaceful, cooperative path with Israel and is also about self-empowerment” (Bryant 2013). Thomas Friedman, who is normally cited for coining the term Fayyadism, argued in his article “Goodbye to All That” that Fayyad was the ‘Arab Spring’ before there was an Arab Spring since Fayyadism is “the all-too-rare notion that an Arab leader’s legitimacy should be based not on slogans or resistance to Israel and the West or on personality cults or security services, but on delivering decent, transparent, accountable governance” (Friedman 2013).

Dov Weisglass, the Bureau Chief to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, argued that Fayyadism had “created a revolution in the Palestinian lifestyle and in Israel-PA relations. The security forces were reorganised: The "Intifada generation" was replaced with worthy people, who were trained to do their jobs; the armed gangs dominating the streets were driven away and crime was terminated; the terrorism against Israelis from Judea and Samaria came to an almost complete halt; the government and public fund management underwent a fundamental reform; the "family" monopolies controlling imports and trade were dissolved” (Weisglass 2013). Defence analyst for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Amos Harel, argued that Fayyadism had created a significant contribution to the security of the State of Israel, and in particular to the public’s sense of personal security for Israelis (Harel 2013). Congressman Elliot Abrams argued that Fayyadism was “western, dedicated to efficiency, productivity, and clean government...It was a bottom-up and entirely non-violent approach to state-building” (Abrams 2013). Daoud Kuttab, summarised the view of Fayyad’s proponents and argued that “If anyone could have imagined what the perfect prime minister should be, Salam Fayyad would have fit that description” (Kuttab 2013).
However, Fayyad’s accomplishments were not without serious dispute. Nathan Brown argued that “Fayyadism was supposed to constitute Palestinian self-reliance, but it was sustained only because foreign countries bankrolled it. Unsurprisingly, then, it decayed as international attention began to wander. Fayyadism was said to promise political reform, but it was based on the denial of democracy and the continuation of authoritarian rule…Fayyadism was supposed to be based on building institutions, but it was completely dependent on a single, indispensable individual” (Brown 2013). In May 2013, the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) conducted a poll of opinion leaders (238 interviewees) to evaluate the performance of the Fayyadist enterprise. The poll found that 58% of respondents believed that Fayyad failed to root out corruption (3% believed that Fayyad was able to root out corruption); 32% believed that Fayyad’s government did not improve transparency and accountability in the PA (31% believed that he achieved an improvement); 32% believed that the provision of social services did not improve (30% believed in the opposite) (AWRAD 2013).

In summary, Fayyad, who was seen as the “Palestinian Karazi” (Dana 2014), failed to find the right formula and balance to meet the demands of the West Bankers or to wage a more effective resistance to Israeli occupation that did not reduce living standards or suffer the effects of another intifada, as was argued by Nathan Thrall (Thrall 2013). Fayyad paid the price for lacking the political constituency and was a scapegoat for Palestinian internal politics. However, despite his departure from the Palestinian polity, the “ism” that he built is still driving the state-building path.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to unpack and critically assess the perceptions about the style of governance and state-building paradigm known as Fayyadism by drawing on relevant literatures in combination with the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The chapter illustrates the tensions between the perspectives coming from the top and those of the people regarding the comprehension of Fayyadism, its pillars, and the consequences of its policies on the people’s security, well-being, and their national struggle for liberation. The voices from below challenged the glowing
rhetoric of the authorities and their claims to institution building and readiness for statehood, and instead revealed mounting anger, frustration, inequality, insecurity, and a widening legitimacy gap.

Fayyadism was perceived by the various actors and end-users as both a strategy for state-building through the rhetoric of good governance as well as a predicted outcome for the status of aid dependency status and weak Palestinian Authority. Despite external funding and sponsorship, Fayyadism is a home-grown phenomenon and achieved a number of successes for the PA at the level of institutions and induced transformations in its functionality. However, these successes failed to have a meaningful impact on the daily lives or basic rights of Palestinians, as was revealed by the ethnographic evidence gathered from Balata and Jenin refugee camps particularly, and the occupied West Bank generally.

The ethnographic findings revealed the consequences of Fayyadism and its policies on the resistance against Israeli military occupation, as well as the implications of the enhanced functionality of the PA’s institutions, particularly the security forces, on the sustainability of the status quo. The voices from below exposed the absence of local legitimacy and local accountability for the Fayyadist paradigm. They also questioned the agenda and political basis of Fayyadism, as well as the trajectory it aimed to direct the Palestinian struggle for freedom. In brief, the voices from below rejected the claimed successes of the Palestinian Authority made by the PA itself, Israel, and the donor community. Clearly what mattered to the people was different than what mattered to the authorities.

Therefore, contrary to official claims and narratives, Fayyadism failed in a number of ways: it did not create a sustainable socioeconomic development or even a national security paradigm; by eliminating the hybridity in the security provision, the Fayyadist paradigm altered Palestinian national liberation goals; the Fayyadist paradigm suppressed informal mechanisms for resistance and protection as tools for struggle against the occupation; Fayyadism did not necessarily result in protecting the basic security rights of Palestinians; and finally, Fayyadism was presented as the only, exclusive, and best approach for Palestinians to achieve their aspirations, which in turn enforced an authoritarian and securitised development policy disguised as modernity. Did Fayyad’s resignation from the Palestinian polity in mid-2013 equate
to the automatic end of Fayyadism? This chapter argues that it is mainly about the “ism” and not only about “Fayyad”, and therefore the approach that Fayyad ushered in became entrenched during his six years of rule, and remains the force driving the state-building and governance trajectories in Palestine today.
Chapter Three

3. Criminalising Resistance: The Cases of Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps

Abstract

This chapter tackles in-depth the security campaigns to induce “law and order” as a defining feature of the Fayyadist paradigm. It is guided by the central question: From the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps, what are the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on their security and on resistance against Israel? Balata and Jenin refugee camps were selected because methodologically they represent the benchmarks for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically their success extends to other areas across the occupied West Bank.

The ethnographic evidence from both camps discussed not only unpacks and deconstructs the implications of the security campaigns, but also expands and challenges the debates in the literature. As opposed to the conventional institutional explanation to the security reform processes in the literature, the voices from below problematise and unpack the security campaigns through a resistance lens. This means that these voices not only clarified the link between security reform and resistance against Israel, but they also illustrate how and why resistance against Israel has been criminalised.

Additionally, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the security campaigns resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security forces operations. This is manifest in the excessive use of arbitrary detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Furthermore, the unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security campaigns employed informal mechanisms to induce formality and exclusivity to the PA security forces in governing these camps. The findings also suggest that the security reforms were used to address intra-Fatah factional politics. This chapter concludes by arguing that conducting security reform within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of power can only ever have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the occupying power, and a violation of the security and (national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own government and (national) security forces.
“We are clear. The only legitimate and legal weapon is the PA’s security forces one. We will not allow anyone to claim that they represent the resistance front”.  
Adnan Al-Damiri, Spokesman of the PA’s security forces, July 2009

“I am a freedom fighter. I am not a thief or a member of a criminal gang. Criminalising my operations and illegalizing my weapon are acts of national betrayal”.  
Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Jenin camp, September 2012

“I am against the security campaigns. I support regular and permanent security activities and routine operations”.  
The PA’s Prime Minister, Rami Al-Hamdallah, December 2013

“Security coordination [with Israel] is sacred, is sacred. And we’ll continue it whether we disagree or agree over policy”.  
Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, May 2014

3.1. Introduction and Contextual Background

Security sector reform (SSR) has become a crucial element of any state-building or peace-building endeavour (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Chandler and Sisk 2013). It aims not only to enhance the capabilities of the security forces through equipment and training, but also to: foster norms and standards; reorganise structures, hierarchies, and chains of command; enhance democratic governance and control; and, advance oversight, accountability, and transparency mechanisms (Schroeder et al. 2014). These were integral elements of the Palestinian SSR doctrine, particularly during the era of Fayyadism between 2007 and 2013 (Thrall 2010; Sayigh 2011; Bouris 2014). During this epoch, however, the domination of technical, neutral, and apolitical understandings of the externally-sponsored, and aid-dependent, security reform processes led the Palestinian people to question the effectiveness and legitimacy of these reforms. To this end, Palestinians look to the consequences these security reforms have had on their highly politicised lives, as the case studies of this chapter testify. While “depoliticizing the political” is particularly relevant in the case of Palestine, it also characterises the agenda of international aid regimes in the developing world, as was discussed in James Ferguson’s The Anti-politics Machines. Aid regimes suspend “politics from even the most sensitive political operations” and insist on understanding these issues as “technical problems” (Ferguson 1994). The case of Palestine, particularly under Fayyadism, is no exception (Rand 2007a,b,c; Sayigh 2007; Sellwood 2009, 2011; Zomlot 2010; Menocal 2011).
The central tenet of the Fayyadist paradigm is the dominance of security reform as a major pre-requisite for state-building, thus under Fayyadism the West Bank became a space for security amplification. Today, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security sector employs around 44 per cent of the total 150,000 civil servants in the public sector, and received nearly $1 billion in the PA’s 2013 budget (UNSCO 2013a,b). The PA witnessed an eight per cent growth in job creation in the security sector from 2011 to 2012 alone, which translates to one security personnel for every fifty-two Palestinian residents; as compared to one educator for every seventy-five resident (Shtayyeh 2012). Around thirty per cent of international aid is spent on the security sector, mainly from the United States, European Union, and Canada (Human Rights Watch 2014). This aid was not only spent on equipment and training activities, but it also supported the development of the PA’s security infrastructure, including the security academy in Jericho, fifty-two new prisons, and the construction of eight new security compounds throughout the West Bank (Byrne 2011).

Reform of the PA’s security sector and enhancement of the effectiveness of its security forces was conducted under Israeli military occupation and colonial domination. Therefore, and as obvious manifestation of the asymmetric relations of power, the prerequisites and conditionalities of the colonial occupying power, as well as the international sponsors, dictated the reform of the Palestinian security doctrine. Specifically, the major pillar of Fayyadism was the further entrenchment of the security collaboration/coordination between the PA and Israel, which proponents of Fayyadism argued would guarantee Israeli security, eradicate Palestinian resistance, and ensure conformity to the peace agreements and security arrangements. This security collaboration was criticised by the Palestinian people precisely because it aimed to “tame the struggle and resistance against the Israeli occupation”. On one hand, security collaboration as a defining feature of the security

---

52 International aid provided to the Palestinians between 1993-2012 was US$ 24.6 billion. To illustrate the intensity of aid dependency, from 2004 onward aid represented between 24% and 42% of GDP. Per capita aid for the same period averaged around $530 per year, ranging from a low of $306 in 2005 to $761 in 2009 to $US 498 in 2012 (OECD-DAC Database 2014).

53 There is a semantic debate over coordination and collaboration as terms to describe the relationship between the Israeli forces and Palestinian security forces. The distinction between these two terms is crucial in Arabic. The different authorities use the term “coordination”, تانسق في العربي. The majority of the people use the word “collaboration”, تعاون في العربي. The former implies normalcy and technicality but also trust, while the latter implies feelings of disrespect, vilify and accusation of being traitors.
reform had contributed significantly to the erosion of the PA’s local legitimacy (Amrov and Tartir 2014a,b). On the other hand, the PA’s leadership argued that the security coordination with Israel protected the Palestinian people (Al-Damiri 2013). The rationale of the latter was not convincing to the Palestinian people, whom are facing daily violations and insecurities. The PA, Israel, and the donors’ community attempted to complement their rationale with aid money in the form of “security-economic dividends”. But, the persistent failure of this “peace-dividends model” since the establishment of the PA in 1993 (Tartir and Wildeman 2013) continued with no exceptions. Therefore, security collaboration with Israel as the defining feature of the PA’s security reform; remained a highly contested issue, particularly when it is contrasted with its consequences on the resistance and political opposition realms.

To implement its security policies and its security reform efforts, the PA and its US-trained security forces conducted a number of security campaigns in the occupied West Bank in the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestinian divide. These security campaigns aimed to: check both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and their armed wings (The Qassam Brigades and Sarya Al-Quds); contain Fatah-affiliated militants through co-optation, integration, and amnesty arrangements; restore public order by cracking down on criminals; conduct security campaigns in Nablus and Jenin in particular; and, strengthen security forces through training programs and weapons procurement (ICG 2008a). Former Prime Minister of the PA in the West Bank (2007-2013), Salam Fayyad, argued that:

A capable, well-trained and well-equipped security establishment that is professional and loyal in its service of the nation is critical to creating an enabling environment for social and economic development...complementary to this objective are activities to address the need to reintegrate certain militia and other surplus security related personnel back into general society (PA 2008:36).

In this context, the governorates of Nablus and Jenin, and their camps (Balata and Jenin) in the northern part of the West Bank, were the “pilot projects” (RRT 2008; Giambi 2009) of these security campaigns due to their reputations as “castles of resistance” and/or “spaces of chaos and anarchy”. This chapter examines the consequences of these security campaigns on the people’s security, as well as the broader dynamics of resistance against the occupation from the perspectives of the
people living in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The contestation surrounding the security campaigns, as also illustrated by the four quotations at the beginning of this chapter, was summarised by a respondent from Balata refugee camp in one sentence: “the security campaigns are like giving someone paracetamol to cure cancer”.

Thus, the apparent gap between the Palestinian leadership and the people, including those militants who were one of the major targets of the security campaigns, highlight the tensions surrounding attempts to criminalise resistance vis-à-vis the induction of law and order. While Palestinians in Balata and Jenin claimed that the PA, through its security campaigns, aimed to tame resistance and create a police state; the Palestinian leadership argued that the miraculous success of the security campaigns was a building bloc in the state-building project, a victory for the rule of law, and marked the establishment of public order. Acknowledging the voices from below and unpacking the security campaigns from the refugees’ and end-users’ perspectives elucidates the consequences of the security campaigns on resistance and everyday (in)security, and is the primary contribution of this chapter. Through the application of a bottom-up research design, the original ethnographic findings and evidence presented and analysed in this chapter challenges and expands the existing literature, and more importantly reveals further insights into the lived experiences of Palestinians in the Balata and Jenin refugee camps. The chapter is guided by the central question: From the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps, what are the consequences of Fayyadist security campaigns on their security and on resistance against Israel?

Methodologically, I conducted fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews in both Balata and Jenin camps. The sample interviewees included representatives from different sectors and categories, including: local and national leaders, political faction cadres, armed group members, men and women, youth and ex-fighters, as well as people who had been detained by the Palestinian Authority. Additionally, I conducted five focused groups in the two camps (A list of interviews is included in the appendix). My fieldwork took place between August and December 2012, and my ethnographic investigation comprised of participant observation and engaging in conversation with the people in their stores and workshops, in their houses, on streets and in cafes, in local institutions, and at weddings and public gatherings.
The similarities between both camps in terms of the ethnographic evidence they offered were striking, and therefore this chapter does not aim to compare and contrast both camps but rather to use them as one unit of analysis. From this approach, two challenging questions emerge: to what extent are these camps representative of the whole West Bank? And, to what extent are the people interviewed and interacted with in these camps over the course of my field research representative of the camps themselves? Acknowledging these two levels of methodological tensions, this chapter follows a case-study ethnographic research design, and the main criteria for sampling was based on covering different actors from different categories representing multiple segments of the community. This approach, in combination with intensive observations and participation, was crucial in terms of guaranteeing that the perspectives presented here are representative of the camps. More broadly speaking, these cases represent the yardstick for the Fayyadist paradigm, and analytically this means that their success extends to success in other areas across the occupied West Bank. Indeed both camps were purposively selected, and this chapter does not claim that the findings can be fully generalised, a limitation that exists in any small, case-study based research project; however, the qualitative dimensions that the case studies illustrate can be tested elsewhere and are relevant to the broader empirical and theoretical contexts beyond the Palestinian case.

The major argument advanced in this chapter is that despite the better everyday security conditions of Palestinians under Fayyadism, particularly if contrasted with the security conditions during the second intifada era 2000-06, the people feel that these improvements are fragile because the major source of insecurity, the Israeli occupation, was not addressed or targeted. Beyond this argument, the ethnographic evidence presented below suggests that the security reform campaigns resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security forces operations. This authoritarianism is manifest in the excessive use of arbitrary detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. Additionally, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the unorganised, incomplete, and therefore ineffective security campaigns had used informal tools and mechanisms in an effort to induce formality and exclusivity to the PA security forces in governing these camps. The findings also suggest that the security reforms were used to address an intra-Fatah factional
politics. Fundamentally, the core objective of the security reform and campaigns was to silence and criminalise resistance against the Israeli occupation and its colonial dominance, as the ethnographic evidence presented in this chapter suggests.

This chapter is structured to first discuss perspectives found in the literature, and proceeds to contrast these perspectives with the original insights and perspectives that emerged from the ethnographic data. The discussion drawn from the literature is focused on the effectiveness of security reform under Fayyadism, and is critically presented through three lenses: impact of international aid and donors; corruption dynamics; and, the creation of a police state. The second part of the chapter, which constitutes the major original contribution, engages with the ethnographic data I gathered at Balata and Jenin refugee camps, and proceeds to analyse the consequences of the security reforms on the lives of people from all sectors within the camps. Lastly, the chapter concludes by addressing the gap between the perspectives found in the literature and those of Palestinians living in the camps, and suggests that despite the establishment of professional security forces under Fayyadism the people most wanted protection from the major source of their insecurity, the Israeli occupation.

3.2. Effectiveness of Security Reform under Occupation: Perspectives from the Literature

The viability, effectiveness, and consequences of conducting security reform within a context of foreign occupation and colonial dominance are questionable at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Such reforms could, directly or indirectly, further entrench the occupation and reinforce colonial dominance through local agents and institutions that are backed by the international donor community and their funds. On the other hand, however, better trained, equipped, and governed security forces are able to protect the people and deliver security provision more efficiently, at least

---

54 Mustafa (2014:21) argued that “SSR has served to reinforce the paradigm of occupation at the same time as linking the PA and its population into the macro-structure of bio-political imperialism and its program of global pacification.” Mustafa’s argument continues that in the case of Palestine, SSR is intended not to secure Palestine’s security but Israel’s, but this is not particularly surprising not only because of the bases of Oslo Accords but also because “in the context of a neo-colonial state-building project, [SSR] will be primarily intended to serve the interests of the (hegemonic) international community”.
theoretically. Recognizing the tension between these two understandings is crucial to understanding the polarisation that exists in the literature. Furthermore, from this tension emerges the argument that despite the aim of the security forces to induce law and order and enhance the effectiveness of the security forces, the Fayyadist paradigm lead to authoritarian transformations; this hypothesis is validated by the ethnographic data, as the second part of this chapter illustrates.

Accordingly, the literature and scholarly work is divided. One strand argues that the security reform under Fayyadism resulted in greater protection of the people and better security and economic conditions. The DFID (2011:16) argued, and it was also testified by the PA (2011b), that “the redeployment of the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank from the second half of 2007 was an important and successful step which had immediate benefits for people’s sense of security and for the economy.” The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute-MAS (2011:14) has argued for the institutional readiness of the PA into a statehood phase; “since the backbone of this state, the monopoly of violence, does exist.” To affirm the positive impact of the security reforms and the disarmament process, usually the peaceful status of Jenin and Nablus were highlighted; “…Jenin and Nablus were once no-go areas are now safe and bustling at all hours” (Danin 2011). The impact on the peace process was also tackled by the literature, not only because the disarmament process “created the best ever Palestinian partner for peace” (Thrall 2010), but also because the “Fayyadist enterprise provided a safety net for Palestinians and Israelis and it can keep hope, people and peace process alive” (Weiss 2009, 2010). Finally, proponents argued the security reform under Fayyadism represented a pre-requisite for sustainable neoliberal socio-economic development (QQR2011; PA 2011).

On the other hand, some argue that the security reform under Fayyadism created a police state designed to guarantee Israeli security and to perform as a sub-contractor to the occupation. Brown (2011) argued that the maintenance of existing institutions was done “in an authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic legitimacy. Hence, the entire program [of Fayyadism] is based not simply on de-emphasizing or postponing democracy and human rights but on actively denying them for the present.” This made Fayyadist authoritarianism different from the one of Arafat, by being “regularised and softened” and “less venal and probably less capricious. But it
is also more stultifying”, according to Brown (2010a:10). Additionally, Sayigh (2011) concluded that reform in the security sector resulted in an authoritarian transformation that threatens not only long-term security, but also the ability to achieve Palestinian statehood. Security reform was also perceived as problematic since it forbade Palestinians and their leadership to resist the Israeli occupation (Leech 2012a,b); and it also failed to bring economic benefits and dividends (DCAF 2009; Al-Barghouti and Jadallah 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011). In other words, as was argued by Friedrich and Luethold (2008:208), “the intended overall strategy of the dominant, externally-driven security sector reform process currently unfolding in Palestine, both in vision and in practice, appears to be the transformation of the Palestinian security apparatus into a reliable instrument for Israeli security policy and the US-led war on terror.”

The effectiveness of security reform under Fayyad, as expressed by the perspectives of its proponents and critics, can be understood only in consideration of its three dominant characteristics and themes, namely: the impact of international aid and donors on the reform process; the dynamics of corruption; and the authoritarian transformations under Fayyad’s rule.

3.2.1. Impact of International Aid and Donors’ Intervention

In addition to enhancing the functionality and capacity of the PA’s security forces, the intervention of international aid and donors resulted in: the exacerbation of Palestinian fragmentation; the depoliticisation of the security sphere, with focus on technical matters that lead to symbolic changes; and, the criminalisation of resistance against Israeli occupation. Cambrezy (2014:2) argued that “SSR programs not only failed to lead to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Palestine but they also contributed to the upsurge of violence in Palestine”. Further, Cambrezy argued that with the focus on Israeli security, the international actors neglected to look at the impacts of their SSR programs in Palestine. In other words, “SSR has contributed to the fragmentation of the political scene, to the upsurge of violence between the main political factions and to an erosion of the credibility of the Palestinian Authority's institutions…this is not only a problem of unintended consequences; it is due to the normative framing and the core objective of international assistance” (Cambrezy 2014:2). This adopted normative framing had
negative implications not only because it was a top-down imposed approach, but also because it actively denied the local context.

Because of its focus on technical matters, Schroeder et al. (2014) argued that between 2006 and 2012 (Fayyadism era) there was nearly a complete absence of formal democratic control and governance in the PA security service. First, they argued that the evidence suggests that international sponsorship of the security reform resulted in the further weakening of civilian, democratic political control over the PA security forces. Second, they asserted that with the shift towards governance-oriented reform programs, the adoption of good governance and accountability standards by the PA security forces remained “mostly symbolic” (Schroeder et al. 2014:219). As a result, the donors approach to security reform strengthened the “already powerful security commanders and further weakened the institutionalisation of civilian political control over the security forces in the West Bank” (Schroeder et al. 2014: 220). Undoubtedly, this particular dimension helped usher in the rise of the Palestinian authoritarianism. The establishment of a number of units in the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, such as the Inspector General’s Office and The Strategic Planning Department, tasked with conforming to democratic governance reform prerequisites and donors’ conditionality remained “isolated bubbles” with no influence on the security operations. In an effort to address the rising number of citizens’ complaints about human rights infringement and ill-treatment by West Bank security forces, the EU sponsored and created the Police Security and Discipline Department as well as the Bureau for Grievances and Human Rights, both of which remained “ineffective and little was known about their actual tasks and work” (Schroeder et al. 2014: 221). Bouris (2014:95) argued that “in reality, the EU has supported a technical and training approach rather than a genuine security sector reform process promoting democratic civilian oversight and accountability”. Bouris (2014:95) also argued that “the main obstacle to the EU’s efficiency in the domain of SSR is the EU itself and this has significant reverberations not only for the security sector, but for the whole state-building project carried out in the OPTs”. This technically-oriented and politically-constrained EU approach can be understood as the EU “trying to promote the rule of law dimension in the OPTs in an authoritarian rather than democratic manner” (Bouris 2014:162).
Beyond these technical dimensions, the external intervention, particularly from the US, aimed to criminalise resistance and to “depoliticise the political”. As cited in Cambrezy (2014:29), in November 2013, a former high-level American agent who served at the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) mission expressed this in his statement that “Condoleezza Rice [former US Secretary of State] asked us to build a Palestinian security sector that would convince Israelis that Palestinians could be a partner”. This meant that the overall aim of the ‘Train, Build and Equip’ program was "to build organised units, with a national identity, that would reinforce the civil police in appropriate situation, and fight against criminals and terrorists” (Cambrezy 2014:31). This dimension of criminalising resistance served to depoliticise the most pressing issue in the conflict, the politics of security, and thus reduced it to the level of a technicality. As Le More (2008) argued, the agenda of the security reform was and remains in the service of Americans and Israelis, with other donors merely footing the bill. In sum, donors’ intervention meant that the security sector was handled in technical terms without any consideration for the political implications or the wider consequences these had on the Palestinian national struggle. As discussed below, this de-contextualised understanding is problematic in the security sphere, particularly when it is associated with corruption; as evidenced by the findings from Balata and Jenin refugee camps.

3.2.2. Corruption but with Better Bookkeeping

Despite the rhetoric of institutional building and good governance, the complex dynamics of corruption and patronage politics remained constant elements in the reform projects of the PA. Consequently, inspired by the voices from below, it is argued here that under Fayyadism the dynamics of corruption were manifest differently. One commentator told me that under Fayyadism, and particularly in the security domain, corruption still existed but with better bookkeeping. Mustafa (2014:26) argued that “the rampant corruption, as well as nepotistic, unaccountable and repressive personalised style of politics favoured by the leadership has no doubt significantly hindered the development of SSR”. In turn, Weinberger (2013:23)

55 For further analysis on the “partners for peace” paradigm and on peace-building as counterinsurgency, please refer to Turner (2009, 2011, 2014).

56 According to the US state department, by 2012, US security mission had trained and equipped nine NSF Special Battalions and two Presidential Guard battalions, totalling over 5,500 personnel.
argued that “security sector reform cannot succeed unless Palestinian leaders, accountable to their public, assume local ownership”. Weinberger concluded by stating that “despite improvements in the personal security of West Bank Palestinians, corruption and human rights abuses continued” (Weinberger 2013:8).

While security reform under Fayyadism aimed to professionalise the security forces, Marten (2013:1) argues that “old patronage networks ultimately proved stronger than the technocrats. Fayyad never managed to control the rat’s nest of overlapping Palestinian security agencies, whose constant infighting was encouraged by struggles within President Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah party”. Security forces, therefore, “despite generous international assistance and markedly improved technical capabilities, remained beset by violent, personality-based patronage politics”, Marten (2014:181) concluded. Such conclusions not only challenge the claims of transparency and accountability under Fayyadism, but also elucidate that executing security reform from within a vacuum and without reforming the overall political domain actually fostered patronage politics and enabled it to continue; an assertion supported by the perspectives of people in the camps. Moreover, Schroeder et al. (2014:215) argued that “in states where political authority is weak or contested, democratic control over the security forces is often completely lacking. Instead, governance of the security sector can be characterised by alternative mechanisms of control based on patronage politics or rooted in informal power structures. In some cases, state leaders exert direct, centralised control over the security sector, while in others, individual security agencies serve specific clientelistic factions in the domestic political spectrum”. The Palestinian security sector is characterised by presidential control over operations, budgets, and personnel, as well as the dominance of personal patronage in the security service; this led Marten (2013:2) to conclude that “despite massive international assistance, including over $500 million from the U.S. State Department in recent years, reform of the West Bank security forces has frayed”.

Additionally, Marten (2013:2) argued that in the case of Jenin, “when the dust settled, it became clear that factions inside the supposedly reformed security forces had been fighting one another for control over territory and patronage in Jenin. At least two of the senior officers who were arrested had recently undergone U.S.-funded training in Jordan”. The people I spoke to from Jenin camp went further and
argued that it is not only the factional infighting that is to blame, but also the intra-families infighting and infighting between different geographical localities. Many respondents pointed out how one particular US-trained security official from a neighbouring village wanted revenge against the camp and its resident (for no specific reason), and that such personal considerations, far from being factional, created huge insecurities. When this US-trained security official was dismissed due to intra-Fatah factional politics, and hence “transformed from an official who commanded six hundred soldiers trained by the US general Keith Dayton to not even command six goats” as one respondent put it, he was accused of murdering the governor of Jenin city, an act that led to another full-fledged security campaign in early 2012. A similar incident happened later in the year and led to yet another security campaign that saw hundreds of newly-donated American anti-riot vehicles touring the governorate and camp in an act that was described by the head of Jenin camp as “totally exaggerated and un-needed, and only to show off”. Such incidents are related to corruption and patronage politics, and reveal two main considerations. First, security personnel are perceived by the camp’s residents as having been “brainwashed” and as being criminals, despite the years of training towards professionalism. Second, security conditions must be fragile if the behaviour of one person can cause a security campaign that justifies the arrest and detention of seven hundred residents of Jenin camp just because the PA forces “thought they may be responsible about the murdering of the governor”, as one respondent put it.

3.2.3. Creating a Police State

Beyond the above-mentioned observations, Fayyadist security reforms were also characterised by an acceleration of authoritarian practices by the PA and its security forces. In the era of Fayyadism, Palestinian security forces were mandated to quell demonstrations and repress protestors, and to this end they engaged in arresting activists, the violent disarmament of political military wings, the routine torture of fighters and militants, as well as the torture of political activists, to the point that they killed a few of them. Furthermore, security forces have accelerated security coordination and cooperation with the Israeli security establishment to an unprecedented level under the supervision of the USSC. There are daily announcements for bids to construct more prisons, as well as bidding for anti-
demonstrations weapons. There are regular meetings between PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the security forces leadership, where it has been repeatedly reported that he has ordered them to “rule with an iron fist”. The dominance of the security narrative and security sector in the PA is indicated by the recent upgrading of security personnel to PA leadership positions. These are just a few examples of the authoritarian consequences of the security reform.

To illustrate this quantitatively, the Arab Organisation for Human Rights in UK (2012:11) reported that “the data collected from June 2007 to the end of 2011 indicates that PA security forces detained 13,271 Palestinian citizens, 96 per cent of whom were subjected to various methods of torture resulting in the killing of six detainees and causing chronic illness in others. Ninety-nine per cent of the detainees had experienced detention by the Israelis after which they were also detained by the PA on the same charges”. The Euro-Med Observer for Human Rights (2013) reported recently that in 2013 the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank arbitrarily arrested 723 persons and interrogated 1,137 without any clear charge or a court decision or memo of arrestment. Additionally, the PA security forces arrested 56 persons because of critical Facebook status updates, as well as arresting 19 journalists and a number of cartoonists and writers. Furthermore, 117 cases of extreme torturing were documented. Similar numbers were reported by the Independent Commission on Human Rights (ICHR), which further evidence an increase in violations committed by the security agencies/and or civil institutions. In 2012, the ICHR received 3,185 complaints, compared to 2,876 complaints in 2011, and 3,828 complaints in 2010 (ICHR 2012). Moreover, in 2013 the ICHR received 123 complaints on the disrespect of court rulings by civil and security authorities, compared with 102 complaints of disrespect and non-implemention of court rulings in 2012 (ICHR 2013).

In other words, the judicial system, which is required to abide by the security reform mandate, is not providing the opportunity for civilians to demand accountability with regards to mistreatments by their own government officials. Human Rights Watch (2014) pointed to this serious lacuna in the judicial system in a report published on 19 May 2014 wherein it criticised the courts for prosecuting activists assaulted by the police during a protest on 12 April 2014. The police officers who exercised force
were discharged by the courts while protesters who were victims of police assault were charged. Because of the lack of democratic oversight, the security forces have the leverage to utilise the judicial system to their advantage, and in turn, the judicial system fails to protect civilians from security force brutality. In the above-mentioned HRW report, the organisation’s deputy MENA director puts it like this: “It’s absurd that the Palestinian justice system is prosecuting the victims of police brutality rather than their attackers. Palestine should start living up to its human rights obligations by exonerating the victims and holding the police to account” (HRW 2014:1).

The spread of excessive forms of authoritarianism and human rights violations in the West Bank led Sayigh (2011:21) to argue that “human rights are bestowed or withheld as a matter of discretion rather than obligation”. Leech (2012:13) argued that the “reform of the security services has tightened the PA’s grip on the social freedoms that were previously considered standard, for instance, free expression, political affiliation and public assembly”. Furthermore, Leech (2014b:2) argued that “the PA’s authoritarian nature had effectively entered a new, more directly coercive, phase” between 2007 and 2013. This authoritarian nature is exemplified in three particular characteristics, according to Leech (2014b:3): first, “the PA maintains a robust security apparatus in order to ensure control over its own civilian population; second, it [the PA] has undermined mechanisms of accountability including elections and freedom of the press; and third, it [the PA] engages in large scale clientalism or ‘crony capitalism’”. Throughout 2011-12, Leech (2014b) estimated that there were a total of 59 incidents of protests across the West Bank (those against Israel and its occupation are not included). Out of these incidents, 42 were against the PA and involved clashes with or suppression by the PA security forces. One of the most brutal crackdown of protestors occurred in June-July 2012 in Ramallah, and Amnesty International’s account of this incident reveals: “The brutality that followed was shocking even by the standards of the PA security forces, whose use of excessive force on previous occasions and abuses against detainees had already earned them an unenviable reputation at home and internationally” (Amnesty International 2013:1).

Consequently, Leech (2012) and Mustafa (2014), based on Henry and Springborg (2001), characterised the PA as “a bully praetorian republic”, wherein power rests
almost exclusively on the operations of the “military/security/party apparatus”. Hence, those elites leading the apparatus who are heavily reliant on coercion, co-optation, and rent-seeking measures are not drawn from a clearly identifiable social subset and are therefore “at least not unrepresentative of their relatively homogeneous political communities”. This scholarly illustration of the PA’s authoritarian transformation echoes the perspectives of the camps’ residents in the following sections. These voices from below not only illustrate the practices of a police-state and an authoritarian regime, but also explain why and how this transformation happened and how it is linked to multiple resistance dimensions.

3.2.4. Addressing Imbalances of Power

The ethnographic data from both Balata and Jenin camps expands and challenges the debate in the literature. Indeed, the people in the camps reveal that security reform under Fayyadism was characterised by three words: momawillen, fasad, and dawlat police (donors, corruption, and police state). These key words correspond with the sub-themes in the literature discussed above. However, in a challenge to this literature, the people focused on the notion of resistance as the centre of analysis to explore the consequences of the security reform on their lives and their national struggle. This meant that they problematised and unpacked the security campaigns from a resistance lenses, instead of the conventional institutional lenses available in the literature. Accordingly, the mere technical successes of the security forces were seen as fragile, temporary, and conditional to the will of Israel and generosity of the donors. Fundamentally, the collective consensus from people is that “after all, it is a game of power dynamics. This is what security all about”, as one respondent from Jenin camp told me. This power play is expressed in the tools used to tame resistance and criminalise it, such as the doctrine of security collaboration, the use of informal mechanisms to induce the formal rule of the PA forces, the (ab)use of the judicial system to entrench authoritarian rule instead of ensuing justice, and finally the use of excessive violence aimed at perpetuating a culture of fear and to discredit resistance.

The effectiveness of Palestinian security forces operating under Israeli military occupation needs to be contextualised within a framework that acknowledges the power dynamics and imbalances, the realities on the ground, and the terms and clauses of the peace agreements and interim arrangements. According to agreements,
the role of the PA security forces is primarily to protect Israeli security (both the security of the Israeli state and people), prevent any clashes with Israeli soldiers or settlers, and fight against “Palestinian terrorism”. People in both camps affirmed that these are the fundamental pillars; however, the people argue that these mandates always get denied by the PA. In other words, conducting security reform to ensure stability within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of power and revisiting the terms of the peace agreements, can only ever have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the occupying power, and a violation of the security and (national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own government/authority and (national) security forces.57

As international law expert Charles Shamas (2012) explains, “There is nothing wrong with wanting a good law enforcement system, a good justice system or a responsible police, what is wrong is when you don’t consider the environmental parameters, if you are willing to accept to go about it as such, then what SSR does is simply ensure a permanent state of crisis management for a permanent occupation”. The ultimate result of SSR in this case will be the creation of “an authoritarian regime” (Byrne 2011) and/or a future “police state” (Schanzer 2012). After all, security forces’ effectiveness means the ability of well-equipped and well-trained soldiers to follow orders and commands and to induce the political vision of the ruling authorities. In the West Bank, these authorities are the PA, Israel, and the donors. Effectiveness, then, is an outcome shaped by the dominance of powers and authorities. A look at the security coordination system between Israel and the PA, reveals that Palestinians must confront two levels of oppression (Israel and PA) from the same centrifuge of power, and therefore public anger at the PA and a crisis of legitimacy are the consequences of Fayyadism, as the following section will discuss.

57 In his 2002 speech before the Herzliya Conference, the former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon asserted that the Palestinian security reform “must accompany a sincere and real effort to stop terrorism, while applying the "chain of preventive measures" outlined by the Americans: intelligence gathering, arrest, interrogation, prosecution and punishment” (Sharon 2002).
3.3. Balata and Jenin Refugee Camps: Echoing the Voices from Below

3.3.1. Brief Background

Jenin refugee camp is located in Jenin governorate in the north of the occupied West Bank. It was established by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in 1953 to host Palestinians from the Carmel region of Haifa (from 54 villages and cities) after Al-Nakba in 1948. It sits on 0.42 square kilometres and its population is around 16,260 inhabitants comprised of 3,645 families (with 5.2 as an average household size). Sixty percent of the population is younger than 24 years old, with poverty and unemployment rates of thirty-five and forty percent respectively. The camp has two schools, one running double shifts, and one health centre. High unemployment, overcrowded schools, and extensive damage from the second intifada are the camp’s major problems according to the UNRWA (OCHA 2008a; UNRWA 2014).

Balata refugee camp is located in Nablus governorate in the north of the occupied West Bank. It was established by the UNRWA in 1950 to host Palestinians from 60 villages and the cities of Lydd, Jaffa, and Ramleh after Al-Nakba in 1948. It is the largest camp in the West Bank in terms of population. It sits on 0.25 square kilometres, and its population is around 23,600 inhabitants comprised of 5,100 families (with 5.9 as an average household size). Sixty-two percent of the population is younger than 24 years old, with poverty and unemployment rates of thirty-five and forty-six percent respectively (64% among youth between 18-30 years old). The camp has four schools and one UNRWA health centre. High unemployment, high population density, bad water and sewage network, and overcrowded schools are the camp’s major problems according to the UNRWA (OCHA 2008b; UNRWA 2014).

The centrality and legacy of both Balata and Jenin refugee camps to the resistance movement during the second Palestinian intifada made them the candidates for the security campaigns of the PA under Fayyadism. The debate about these security campaigns revolved around the meaning, and consequently the implications, of inducing law and order vis-à-vis armed resistance movements as well as the voices of the political opposition. Nablus’s security campaign began in November 2007,
followed in May 2008 by Jenin’s security campaign, which was named “Smile and Hope”. From the PA’s perspective the idea was simple, as a high-ranking PA official told me: “we want to demonstrate to the donors and Israel that the PA can govern the Palestinian society even in the impossible areas as Balata and Jenin camps. We want to show them that nothing is impossible and if we are successful in these difficult spaces, then we can do it anywhere else”.

This idea of establishing a showpiece of security reform was shared by the top political level in the international community arena. At a dinner in Israel with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and top U.S. diplomats from the region, US Gen. Jones “proposed a new approach: instead of going for a grand deal, they would pick one place under Israeli occupation and make it a model” (Calabresi 2009). This “Pilot Project” was also supported by Israel, and according to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the “Pilot Jenin and Nablus” program “is an Israeli initiative implemented through direct coordination between the Palestinians and Israel, with limited American involvement, and “attempt to strengthen the moderate Palestinian camp, led by Abu-Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], implementing results from the Annapolis Conference” (IDF 2008). Moreover, Marten (2013) noted that “U.S.-funded and Jordanian-trained PA forces swept through in 2008, arresting militias which had long spread terror and extortion among residents…It was Fayyadism at its best.” This led the former Mayor of Jenin to name the years 2008-2009 as the “Golden Age” (Giambi 2009:33). This “quiet revolution” (Bronner 2008) let Giambi (2009:33) to argue that Jenin “has gained a reputation as a model security area where armed gangs and warlords have been replaced by organised security forces that respect one chain of command”.

However, this idea of making Jenin and Nablus as models for others in the West Bank (Zanotti 2010) came under severe dispute. Tabar (2012:48) argued that “resistance in Jenin over time was subdued by separately intervening technologies of power, including most notably a long colonial counterinsurgency campaign that was followed by donor-driven projects to revamp the camp and re-establish security collaboration with Israel”. While in the case of Balata, Leech (2014a:1) argued that despite the perceived success of the PA in imposing law and order in Balata and Nablus after 2007, and the popular consent of the PA’s security agenda initially, this
“does not demonstrate public endorsement of the PA’s legitimacy. Rather it is more likely that such consent was a product of a recent experience [2001-2007] of extreme violence followed by the restoration of some basic services”. In other words, a closer examination to the general consensus about the popular consent to the PA security campaigns in Nablus reveals that “this consensus was superficial and did not last. Indeed by 2012 the popularity of the regime had waned” (Leech 2014a:11).

Such critical observations were shared and further expanded by the perspectives of the people in these camps. As cited in Giambi (2009:25), a civil society activist explained, “The security situation seems very stable but actually it is not. It is like a crystal ball that can break into a thousand pieces at any time with a minimum movement. Israel in one day can destroy everything Palestinians have built in a long time and with many efforts”. During our interview a local leader, and the head of Jenin camp, put it to me as follows: “there was no phenomenon of security chaos. The PA just exaggerated it which reflects their inability to lead. They used the media machine to portray us as a threat to the national and community security”. A theatre trainer in Balata camp with leftist political views told me:

In these security campaigns there are three key words: lies, media, and money. The PA forces used these three pillars to ensure the implementation of the campaigns. A media machine was behind and in front of them covering their lies, and there was no scarcity in resources when it comes to security issues.

When asked about the security conditions and campaigns, other respondents from the camps pointed to what they claim to be the accurate picture of reality based on hard-core facts. A 25 year old youth from Balata asked in frustration: “what does security mean if you are unemployed and struggle to survive? We want jobs we don’t want anything else. Those security forces can’t protect themselves, so how do you expect them to protect me?” A local woman, and leader in Balata, asked “why don’t we have a police station inside the camp? This will change the behaviours”. On the other hand, a psychologist and counsellor suggested: “I feel secure because of my community’s values and behaviour, not because of the PA security forces or its campaigns”. A mechanic from Jenin camp echoed this by stating “There is no sense of security at all. It is so fragile and Israel can invade any time. Now we are also
afraid of the PA invasions. We are protected by our culture and values only; and of course by God”.

3.3.2. Unorganised, Incomplete, and Ineffective Security Campaigns

People from both camps criticised the security campaigns for being unorganised and lacking a singular source of command and authority. They attributed this to internal fighting and clashes among the forces and the different interests pursued by their leadership. “I was arrested by the Preventative Security Force, and then the Military Intelligence Force came to my house to arrest me”, one respondent told me. Another stated, “It was rather ironic that the Preventative Security Force and the Civil Police had a major argument and fired shots in the air in front of my house over who will arrest me”. A third respondent argued, “security forces follow the political decisions. If you have fights at the political front, you will have them exemplified on the ground and in the operations of the security forces. At the end, we the people pay the costs of their infighting. They almost shot each other at the entrance of the camp the other day”. A fourth respondent stated: “when you see the PA security forces themselves fighting against each other, how do you expect them to protect us?”.

Despite coming from different categories and segments of the population, people in both camps share similar perspectives regarding the efficacy of PA security forces, and this perspective contradicts the official rhetoric and is therefore challenged and denied by the authorities.

The incomplete, unorganised, and unplanned nature of these security campaigns, in addition to the absence of any level of local consultation, meant these campaigns were publically perceived as both ineffective and illegitimate. One respondent told me:

When they began in 2007 we felt some hope and optimism, and it felt that all of us wanted to end the chaos and instability. We helped them to protect us. But then things started to deteriorate because we never understood what they were doing, which kind of weapons they are targeting, why they are arresting great people and local leaders who lead the intifada, or why they killed others. Then we started seeing the corruption very vividly. After a promising start, they became just a mess and unbelievably aggressive, dealing with us as murderers and enemies. We used to give them flowers and make them coffee and even food, but they thanked us with
bullets and breaking into our houses. We never understood their behaviour and therefore we forgot about the short term achievements of 2007, and after that we just noticed failures and a different sort of insecurity. They addressed the chaos by a greater one, however this time in the name of inducing “law and order”.

Another respondent argued, with a sarcastic tone:

Have you ever seen the PA doing anything until the end, or complete any project? Never. And they will never do .There is nothing systematic or structured in the PA, and security campaigns are not an exception. They are just random and this is why they have created problems between families and within the community. They are just making holes in our cause and national struggle, and even in our bodies –literally- and they never try to close these holes. With the incomplete security campaigns, the PA made our communities like Swiss cheese full of holes.

Reflecting on the consequences of incomplete security campaigns, a local leader of Fatah in Balata camp exposed the campaigns and warned of their implications:

The security campaigns were very thin and fragile. Unless the occupation ends, it will remain fragile and thin by its design. It remained unsquared and incomplete and characterised by corruption and nepotism. It did not prosecute thieves; it did not answer the questions: who killed whom and who put fire in this or that? Even though the Khawaat (a group of armed men who go to shops and forcefully ask for a sum of money) do not exist anymore, but the security campaigns lacked any punishment mechanisms against the criminals, they are free but the fighters are arrested and tortured. People can see that, and this is what is putting them off and affecting the legitimacy of these campaigns. People could revolt against the PA now. We don’t need campaigns; we need the regular and routine work of the security forces because, after all, having one unified authority is better than having tens of groups and networks. I am worried about the consequences of these security campaigns on civil and social peace, those who were tortured will never forgive and will one day revenge in one way or another.

The dynamics of corruption and lack of accountability in these security campaigns were apparent. A civil society actor directing a local NGO in Balata raised the dilemma of mistrust:

In principle, the security campaigns should be great news for all, but not for the small group of militant gangs who benefited from the chaos few years ago. Their monthly income was 10,000 JOD,
now they are unemployed with zero income. So they have a vested interest in the continuation of the anarchy and chaos. However the PA forces who are conducting the security campaigns are not “clean” either. They are part of the corruption and people do not trust them either.

A respondent from the youth club in Jenin camp tackled the legitimacy gap that resulted from the incomplete security campaign from a legal dimension. He told me:

We have paid a high price to feel a little bit more secure. The security campaigns were ok, but lacking at many dimensions including the lack of legal and legislative framework. We need to have legislation to enforce the law. However, these enforcement tools have to be perceived as legitimate by the people to be implemented voluntarily, not forcefully and aggressively by the security forces. We, as people, are able to rule ourselves by ourselves, our values, customs and traditions in addition to our sense of unity are valuable assets that we have. But on the other hand, in the absence of a unifying national framework, any weapon outside the domain and control of the PA can be harmful. I trust the armed resistance groups, but not everyone who is carrying a gun is a freedom fighter. The leader of the camp was killed in the midst of the security campaign, so this is a criminal activity that also shows the limitation of the security campaign. Jenin camp was targeted not because we are bunch of thugs or criminals, but because we are like a tree full of fruits, everyone wants to throw a stone on it and collect one of the fruits.

The lack of trust between PA security forces and the residents of the camp is tangible. The language of “them” and “us” is dominant, and a number of interviewees revealed different attempts made aimed at bridging this gap. An unemployed 23 year-old youth from Jenin camp, who is a footballer as well, argued that to address the tense relationship between the PA forces and the people, more social activities are needed. “The people were really delighted the other day when the PA forces organised a health-day and showed the people that they are also kind and helpful. We are an emotional society and such incident means a lot for us”, he added. Additionally, a local female leader and member of the Women Centre in Jenin camp added:

We tried to bridge the trust gap through organizing trips for the kids between 8-14 years old to the police station in the city of Jenin. We wanted to teach the kids from that these forces are not ghosts or sources of threats. We would like these kids to welcome the police with flowers, not stones when they come to the camp.
3.3.3. Using Informality to Induce Formality

Interestingly, in their attempts to implement the mission of “one gun, one law, one authority”, the PA security forces used informal mechanisms, networks, and tools to achieve such formality. In the cases of Balata and Jenin camps, the PA security forces relied on a number of local leaders to facilitate the security campaigns and operations, and to grant them some legitimacy. Local leaders were not only facilitators but also an integral part of the disarmament and weapons collection processes, and they were witness to the financial compensation procedures that took place when weapons were handed in to the PA. The role of local leaders was contested by many people in the camps, and they were accused of being complicit and financial beneficiaries from the security campaigns. Such technique of co-opting informal routes to the service of formal goals is not unique to the Palestinian case. A local Fatah leader, and the head of Jenin camp, told me:

I was the first one in the camp who handed in my weapon to the PA so to be an example for others, I helped the PA forces in the security operations, I helped the PA Presidential Forces to be spread on the roofs of the houses in the camp. I took wanted people from their hands to the police offices to hand in their weapons and receive cash as a compensation for that.

At the commencement of a security campaign, a member of the PLC, and leader of the 2002 Jenin Battle, appealed to the public to cooperate with the Palestinian security forces that were surrounding the camp. He wrote: "These soldiers are your brothers and dear ones...Your enemy is the Zionist occupiers who will pay a price every time they enter the camp". However, and ironically, when the PA security forces gained power they dismissed the local leaders and arrested many of them. To this end, the head of Jenin camp, quoted above, was arrested and held for five months in 2012; and the PLC member who encouraged cooperation with the PA security forces was regularly subjected to harassments, but never arrested due to his parliamentary immunity. The head of Jenin camp, anxious to tell his story, told me:

After we were done with handing in Hamas and Islamic Jihad people, and indeed all the gang members, things got calmer. However, we were not aware of what would follow was that it was our turn: Fatah members who helped the PA in their campaigns. They dismantled our armed wing, they confiscated our weapons, and we said ok. Now they are arresting us to change our beliefs and
threaten that we will lose our jobs. 200 members in the PA forces who are from the camp lost their jobs and salaries just because they wanted to collectively punish us. In May 2012, after the death of the governor of Jenin, 700 residents of the camp were arrested and tortured by the PA security forces (500 were interrogated for a few days, while the remaining 200 stayed in jails for months). They have arrested and tortured my son who is 19 years old, to blackmail and pressure me to confess something I never did. In a nutshell, the PA lost its legitimacy in the camp, if it ever had it, because of its un-needed security operations.

This use of security reform and campaigns to deal with intra-Fatah factional politics was also echoed by a former member of the dissolved Fatah’s military wing, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, in Balata camp:

We are the ones who protected the PA institutions from a Hamas take-over in the West Bank. The PA forces did not have rifles or any authority by then. We arrested, killed, and tortured Hamas people, and then the PA did with us exactly what we did with Hamas a few years ago.

This use of informal tools to enforce formality went beyond the operational dimension of the security campaigns and was extended to the judicial one. Many of the human rights violations committed by the PA forces were addressed by families and clans vis-à-vis security forces and not through courts or the formal judicial system. A 35 year-old woman told me:

My husband was arrested and tortured by the PA for 45 days. When we wanted to go and litigate the PA, the elder of the family came to our house with 50 men to pressure my husband to solve the issue in a friendly manner. They killed us and now they tell us to solve it friendly. We did not have any choice but to address it this way. But of course this means nothing other than we carry this suffering and humiliation with us until we die. I will never forgive anyone who forces us to give up our rights.

The use of informality to enforce formality was also extended to the domain of security collaboration vis-à-vis armed resistance. In June 2014, for instance, three Israeli settlers were allegedly kidnapped by Palestinian militants in the West Bank. The PA security leadership used the elder Muktars to pressure the youngsters into providing information to Israel, via the PA security forces, about the potential kidnappers. A Palestinian high-ranking security official declared: “we are worried that criminality will increase in the West Bank and this is why we are seeking help
from the *Muktars*. Similar examples manifested differently in other locations using similar informal tools, particularly when popular resistance against the occupation accelerates as it did in June and July 2014. This was also the case during the peak of security campaigns in Jenin for instance, where the governor and other security personnel held meetings with Israeli counterparts in the presence of local leaders and *Muktars* of Jenin.

### 3.3.4. Taming Camps, Taming Resistance

The security campaigns were not only ineffective and insufficient in protecting Palestinians’ rights, but they also had detrimental effects on the resistance movement; in fact, this was the core message of the voices from below. This failure, or “intentional error” as one respondent argued, of the PA to make a clear distinction between *chaos weapons* and *armed resistance weapons* meant that criminal gangs and resistance fighters were targeted in a similar way. One respondent passionately argued during our long conversation:

How come a thief could be the same as a *muqaom* (freedom fighter)? How come they could be even in the same cell in jail? Those *muqaomeen* (freedom fighters) represent our pride, dignity and the protection front for our cause.

This criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation was a common theme among respondents. A former member in al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, who was arrested by the PA during the security campaigns, argued:

They view us as criminal and they put us in front of the judges in military courts because we resist the occupation. Is it a crime to resist the occupation? Of course it is not, it is a duty for the occupied people. But the PA, Abbas, Fayyad and the rest of the gang believe it is a crime. They want us to be slaves and people without dignity. They just want all of us to protect the security of the Israelis. Aren’t we human beings as well? In this weapon [holding his gun in his hand] we protect ourselves, our nation and our cause. When Arafat was alive our weapons and resistance were our pride, now we are ashamed of that and they see us as criminals and gangs. I was tortured in the Jericho jail of the PA for 83 days without court or lawyer. Then they assign a lawyer for me themselves. The lawyer advised me to confess and sign the form that I will not engage in any “criminal” activities. I am a freedom fighter, I am not a thief.
Another former member of the Fatah’s dissolved military wing al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, who was integrated into the Civil Police force and is a father of 4 children, was arrested during one of the security campaigns; he was held for 54 days in the PA’s Al-Jneed prison in Nablus, and then in Al-Thairyha prison in Hebron from 25 June until 27 July 2012. He was accused of ambiguous and contradictory crimes, including: being a security threat to his community; a drug addict and a dealer; a criminal engaged in illegal activities and corruption; a weapons trader and keeper; a follower of Mohammad Dahlan; and even of being a member of Hamas (despite having fought Hamas for the PA in 2007 in Nablus). In November 2007, Naser handed in two rifles to the PA, one short M16 with an Israeli logo, and one long M16 with the cedar of Lebanon; he received $18,500 as compensation for these two pieces, as well as conditional amnesty from Israel after one month of handing in his rifles. The amnesty document, which he carries with him at all times (and presented it to me during the interview), states that if any other person reported him, or if he is seen walking with people wanted by the authorities, or if he carries any weapon including the official PA one during his service, the amnesty will be cancelled.

In the three hours I spoke with him, he said:

It was a terrorism party in Al-Thairyha prison. They just want to scare you there. Blood is all over the walls and torturing sings everywhere. Screaming and shouting and loud slapping of doors and hitting on walls, all while your eyes are covered is what you hear. It was a scary welcome indeed. I never witnessed something like that in Israeli jails, even though I was arrested there for years. I am wondering from where they have learned all of this aggression? They enjoyed torturing me. I spent my days in tiny small cells (120 cm x 200 cm). One day they came with a carrier of dirty water and pour it in the cell. It was a nightmare: torturing, interrogating, stretching for hours on a chair or wall, controlling via cameras and sound sensors all over, preventing sleep at night, raiding cells after midnight, changing interrogators every day, and much more. All of this is because they wanted to stop me from resisting the occupation.

Our conversation was interrupted by a very loud war siren, which happened to be the tune of his mobile phone. Continuing in a tone of bitterness, with very shaky legs, and sweating profusely, he said:
These 54 days were the hardest in my life. In these days I had long conversations with the spiders, ants, and mosquitos in my cell. I was telling them: take your portion of my blood and just leave me alone please. I was looking intensely at the slow movements of the ants in my cell, and then I drove them crazy. I was feeding them and then kill them. This is exactly what the PA is doing with us. They pay us our salaries and then they kill us.

Suddenly, he stopped. He held his stomach, felt dizzy, and was sweating and shaking further. He said, “whenever I talk about this topic, I get huge pains in my stomach and all over my body”. He was released from the jail after the PA President, Abbas, ordered the security forces to offer amnesties because of the month of Ramadan and Eid Al-Fitr. Fearing that he may approach a human rights organisation and litigate the PA and its security forces, they asked him for a fiscal guarantee of 7000 Jordanian Dinars (around £6000) to be obtained from the Chambers of Commerce of Nablus. Also they asked him to sign a commitment form, which was written in Arabic, English and Hebrew, not to carry any weapon, not to travel or move within the West Bank, and to stay every night from 8 pm – 8 am in the PA’s main police station in Nablus. Naser’s story is just one example, but I am using it as a microsom to illustrate multiple dynamics in the disarmament process, its financial costs and implications, the security collaboration with Israel, the human right violations in the name of law and order, the co-opting attempts of the military groups in to the PA security statutory bodies, and the complicit role of the military judicial system in entrenching the human rights violations. “The bottom line is clear”, one respondent stated, “It is a process of domestication and eradicating resistance from Palestinian society. The PA, Fayyad, and Abbas want to transform us from warriors and tigers into cowards and chickens”.

Another former member of the dissolved *al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades*, a thirty-year old who was integrated in the Criminal Detection Force, told me during our 2-hour interview:

I was tortured in the PA jails for 90 days as the torture we heard about in Abu Ghraib in Iraq. For 15 days I was not allowed to sleep. Instead of saluting and supporting us and our families, the PA humiliated us. I was arrested because I am preserving the rifle of my cousin who was killed by Israel in this camp. We are the true legitimate group, or how can you explain that people in more than
50 cars were waiting for me and my fellows when we were released from the PA prisons?

I also spoke with Zakaria Zubeidi, who was one of the leaders of the 2002 Jenin Battle and, as the former leader of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in Jenin, also Israel’s most wanted person during the second intifada. Presently, in the aftermath of the security campaigns, Zakaria is a director with level-A at a PA’s ministry and is also co-founder of The Freedom Theatre in Jenin camp. He insisted I mention his name in my research and in our two-hour conversation, Zakaria described his arrest and subsequent detention in the PA’s Jericho prison between May until October 2012:

I received a call from the head of the Civil Police to go and have coffee together. I went there but it was a trap. All of a sudden, a group of Preventive Security forces invaded the office. They tied my hands behind my back aggressively, covered my head, and dragged me like an animal down the stairs to the jeep all the way to Jericho and through all the Israeli checkpoints. All the checkpoints were open for me when I was arrested by the PA, how ironic is this? I even heard them speaking on the phone in Hebrew saying “we got him”. I do have health issues. I still have 5 bullets in my legs and 4 bullets in my back from the year 2002. A bomb exploded in my face as well, “look at my face”; however, they [the PA security forces] refused to allow the doctors to see me at the prison. After one week of being on the dirty wet floor in my cell, I got a bacterial infection in my back. Then they started to torture me physically and violently, such as pushing me so aggressively to the wall and stretching me on a chair for three days. After 8 days of this, I had my mattress but they refused to offer it to me unless I confess that I killed the governor of Jenin, even though they know very well that I had nothing to do with that. In my five months in the prison, I was not questioned by the public prosecutor. They used me to show all the other “security prisons” that no one is an exception, and that even the leaders of armed resistance are arrested and tortured. They covered my eyes, laid me on the ground with the boots of the integrator on my head, and they opened the door’s window so the other prisoners can see me in this situation. It is too humiliating, and therefore I decided to start a hunger strike. Talking about this makes me very sad and devastated. All this lead me to one conclusion, which is the need to

58 In July 2004, Zubeidi had told a Western reporter, “I am the highest authority” (Bennett 2004). A week later, he told another Western journalist “I’m in charge. The police? They just disturb the traffic. If there’s a problem, people come to me. If I catch a thief, I make him return what he steals – and sometimes we get him to join the brigades, so he can help us catch the other thieves. A while ago, someone shot at me, so I broke his hands” (Prusher 2004). In early 2005, while Abbas and Zubeidi went about Jenin together during a presidential election campaign, crowds chanted Zubeidi’s name and not Abbas’s (Toomey 2006 cited in Marten 2014).
dismantle the PA. We stayed 60 years under occupation and we never heard the words “security chaos- *falatan amni*”.

The culture of resistance is palpable in the camps among the people. Expressions of resistance are highly valued and socially respected, and by extension resistance is embedded in the everyday life dynamics of people at both Balata and Jenin camps. Notably, people are able to distinguish rather easily between those who claim to represent the resistance movements, or “the fake resistance” as one respondent put it, and the genuine resistance movements and freedom fighters. While I was interviewing her husband, and after one and half hours of her silence, his wife (Um Mohammad) joined the conversation and said:

Listen, it is simple and straightforward. I want the armed wings to be back. The more of them around my house, the merrier. When those fighters spent the nights in the camps’ streets protecting us, they also spread love over all. They are genuine, they are not strangers or brainwashed, they are one of us.

3.3.5. **Authoritarian Transformations: Arbitrary Detention and Torturing**

Violations of human rights, which are regularly marginalised by the mainstream narratives, was one of the most dominant dimensions discussed by the people in both camps. A local field researcher for a major Palestinian human rights organisation told me:

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 security campaigns, a presidential decree was issued in September 2009 prohibiting torture in the PA’s prisons, but it was never applied. In February 2010 there was a wave of violence and the number of complaints had increased. In early 2011, new stricter orders from the PA regarding torture of prisoners were issued and stated it was prohibited to use the military courts and instead all stakeholders were asked to use the civil courts. However, violation of the regulations continued as was evident in the May 2012 security campaign. Arrest and house raids without legal court memos, interrogation for a long time in a security force compound without trial, and appearance in a court after weeks of detention without indictment, formal charge, or specific accusation of a crime, are just few examples of legal violations. Actually, I just received a call from the preventive security to go and see them. I know what they want. They want to question me about the latest report that I wrote.
The following observations were testified by respondents who had been previously arrested during security campaigns and detained in PA prisons over the years. A few weeks after his release, an 18 year-old youth from Jenin camp, with the marks of torturing still visible on many parts of his body, told me:

I was arrested and detained twice in Jericho prison. I was accused of causing social unrest and threats through leading “the devils gang”. They accused me of writing a statement and spreading it all over in the camp; however, I can’t read or write! I was detained 82 days first, and then 15 days. I was released after paying 5000JD in cash and 2000JD in guarantee.

Another 24 year-old youth, a carpenter, had a similar story to tell, and he too had visible signs of torture months after his release. In the midst of his workshop he told me sadly face with shaky hands and legs:

In 2012, I was arrested and detained three times in the PA jails in Jericho and Jenin. I was never ever humiliated in my life like I was that year. 12 days without sleep, stretched on a broken and painful chair. The chains in my hand ate my skin and bones. 17 days alone in a very cold cell with a rotten and disgusting mattress and the worst possible meals. I felt I was in Guantanamo. The ICRC visited us but did nothing. In the underground Jericho prison there are 28 cells, 3 bigger rooms, a kitchen that is often used for torturing, a room for interrogators which includes a “health-care” unit. It is the same design as the Israeli prisons.

It was very difficult for this young man, at the psychological level, to describe the jail, so I asked him instead if he would like to draw it on my notebook. While dropping tears, he managed to draw this.

**Figure 5: A Sketch of the Palestinian Authority’s Prison in Jericho, West Bank**
He continued by saying:

After 40 days in jail, I thought it was over, but after less than three weeks I was arrested and detained for 17 days in Jenin “jail”. It is basically a big room opposite to the PA’s interrogators room. The place is not prepared to be a prison; it is an office for the military intelligence force but became a prison due to the lack space in other jails. The kitchen and the stairwell became rooms for prisoners, and the toilets became small cells (4 cells, each one is 1 x 2 meters). I spent 17 days in Jenin prison without knowing why and without any list of accusations. Nothing but interrogation about random stuff. Then in May 2012, I was arrested again and detained for 16 days with the same ill-treatment. They fired me from my job in the PA security service. After all of this suffering I feel physiologically broken. I am taking medicine to cure my nerves and stay calm. I can’t even work as a carpenter because I keep shaking, and I injured myself twice and already lost two fingers while cutting wood. I don’t know what to do with myself or my family and kids.

A civil society actor running a local NGO in Balata expressed his feelings about the culture of fear that the PA has created through its security operations and campaigns. In his office, full of foreigner volunteers who came to Palestine to help educate the kids, he reflected on the many horror stories he heard about in relation to the arbitrary detention and torturing, stating:

The PA security forces are trying to create a police state. They want to create a state within a state. We don’t trust the security forces. Even when I go to Paris, as part of my work, when I see a police man on one side, I cross the road to walk on the other side. I do have a phobia because of them and I feel so awkward whenever I see a group of people in a uniform. The PA forces created lots of fears inside of me.

3.3.6. Security Collaboration: Domination as Cooperation

As noted in previous sections, security collaboration remains until today the defining feature of the PA security doctrine and is a major source of tension (Dana 2014). It could be argued that this is an outcome of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which is true. However, under the leadership of Abbas and Fayyad it was dramatically entrenched and gained dominance in both rhetoric and actions. Abbas declared in May 2014 that “security coordination [with Israel] is sacred, is sacred. And we’ll continue it whether we disagree or agree over policy” (Abbas 2014). Additionally, in June 2014,
Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah central committee and long-standing security leader, stated that “there is nothing called security coordination. It is merely security communication” (Al-Tirawi 2014). The vast majority of people simply disagree, and the above-mentioned two statements by Abbas and Al-Tirawi caused major public anger and led to protests in the streets; however, protestors were violently attacked by the PA security forces.59

Such anger at the PA over the paradigm of security collaboration was also reflected in the way security forces were perceived. Many people called the PA security forces during the era of Fayyadism “the Dayton forces”, in reference to US General Keith Dayton. Dayton led the US security mission and was responsible for the training of the nine battalions which participated in the security campaigns in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. In his infamous 2009 speech in Washington, Dayton saluted the “new Palestinian men” he had created and hailed their ability to restrain mass uprisings, arguing that those men turn their guns now not against Israel but on the real enemies from within Palestinian society (Dayton 2009). This caused major anger and outrage among the Palestinian people, as well as a feeling of humiliation. Additionally, this security collaboration with Israel was saluted by Israel over the years, to the extent that on 28 November 2010 the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reported that the number of occupation soldiers in the West Bank is the lowest since the First Intifada of 1987, thanks to the security coordination (Zaid 2013).

A small number of people in Balata and Jenin camps recognised the Palestinian benefit from the security coordination with Israel. During a focus group discussion, a 30 year-old male stated “I am a realist, coordination with Israel is the oxygen to Palestinian life. We are completely dependent on Israel on all fronts, and security is not an exception”. However, the vast majority of the people in these camps hold a different view, as expressed by a community leader in Jenin camp:

I don’t have a problem with the security coordination if it is reciprocal. However this is not the case. When the PA can ask Israel to arrest a settler to protect the Palestinian peoples’ security,

---

59 From an Israeli perspective, the Israeli president Shimon Peres, in a speech before the European Parliament in 2013, expressed Israel’s satisfaction with the state of Palestinian security. He stated “a Palestinian security force was formed. You and the Americans trained it. And now we work together to prevent terror and crime” (Peres 2013).
this will be a different story. Security coordination occurs between countries, like when France hands over accused murderers to Britain, but between us and Israel are seas of blood and the freedom fighters are not criminals. There is no sense of coordination, there is domination only.

Another community leader from Balata camp echoed the above perspective, and talked about the division of labour between Israel and the PA as a result of the security coordination. He bluntly stated:

The security campaigns and SSR venture did one thing: minimised the direct daily Israeli aggression and outsourced the PA security forces to perform the role of the occupation force. It created a division of labour. Israel used to confiscate weapons, now the PA is doing that in the name of protecting the Palestinian society. This is so surreal because we all know it is to protect Israeli security.

At the operational levels, the “revolving door/al-bab al-dawar” phenomenon in the security collaboration domain was particularly suspicious to those who were arrested and detained in both PA and Israeli jails. A respondent from Jenin camp told me:

After I was arrested and detained for 9 months in the PA’s Preventative Security Forces prison because I am a member of Hamas, after 3 weeks of my release from the PA prison Israel arrested me and accused me of the same exact crimes. Literally they used the same words.

Another respondent from Balata camp told me,

After six months administrative detention in an Israeli prison, and before I enjoyed the flavour of freedom, the PA forces raided our house after midnight, arrested me, and detained me for eight months. They did not ask me any question in the jail. They showed me a document and told me in Hebrew beseder [which means alright], your file is ready and just wait for God until he comes and recuses you.

3.3.7. No Space for Opposition

The authoritarian transformations induced by the security reforms also meant that there was little space for those opposed to the path dictated by the PA. A local leader of Hamas in Balata argued that ultimately the security campaigns meant further internal Palestinian fragmentation and caused harm to the Palestinian cause and struggle. He stated:
The PA’s security campaigns failed at the operational and strategic levels. The 2007 campaign, for instance, is like the 1996 one. I was arrested in both campaigns for the same reasons: being at the opposition camp of the PA. The so-called security campaigns aimed to empty the Palestinians of their content and the values that support resistance as a way of living under military occupation. In 2009, I was arrested again by the PA forces and they accused me of being active and influential in Hamas’ social work within the camp’s community. Of course they accused me of having an illegal rifle, but honestly I don’t know how to use it. In 2009, I was arrested and detained for six months including 45 days of interrogation, and I was tortured violently. I was crying while being stretched and tied to the chair and in the end God’s will was bigger and I was released. But I don’t feel free because I know that I am being followed by the PA’s intelligence forces all the time. Now after you leave this house, they will report that a foreigner was at my home for two hours and they will come or stop me in street and ask me about you and about everything we talked about. Additionally, they tried to impact my job and push my employer to fire me. Additionally, my youngest son, Omar, who was born while I was in the PA’s jails does not accept me yet as his dad. Overall, these security campaigns had created social fragmentation and problems.

Opposition from the Left was also exposed to the PA’s repressive authoritarian measures. A local leftist leader in Jenin camp pointed out the authoritarian transformation that took place under Fayyadism, and argued:

The various security operations and the arrest of local leaders in the camp indicate one conclusion: No justice. The justice system is not effective, partisan and defunct and therefore the security forces have the first and last word. In other words: what they want, will happen. These forces’ became more corrupted. One reasons for this corruption was due to the buy-in of security personnel by offering them higher positions and higher salaries. The PA security forces have more officers and generals than the British army! However, people don’t trust the PA security forces. The PA and its security forces are only a big bureaucracy that offer people jobs.

According to a community leader in Jenin camp, demobilisation, dis-empowerment, and dis-encouragement of political participation were consequences of the Fayyadist security reforms. He went on to state:

Before 2007 all factions were allowed to enjoy free political participation. After 2007, one could not protest without permission from the Ministry of Interior and without providing details about the location, invitees, speeches, and so on. Under Fayyad rule, you
can’t print a manifesto or a poster and distribute it freely. We as Palestinians express our political views through writing on the walls, which today we are not allowed to do anymore because it will cause pollution. Today, we will be arrested for defacing the public space. Even in the Friday prayer, the PA distributes to the Shieks their speeches. The list of repression methods is really long.

Furthermore, a local leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin camp insisted that despite all the PA’s repression ultimately God’s will prevail and resistance will dominate. Despite his bad health conditions, he argued passionately that:

There is a systematic program by the PA to weaken the resistance movement. I was arrested because I helped and visited some of the prisoners’ families in the Israeli jails. This is an integral part of our culture, now it is on the list of forbidden activities. Thanks to the security campaigns, I feel that the PA informants are everywhere. Since 2007, public gathering are only allowed in three occasions: wedding, funeral, or a gathering in the prison. The PA arrested me three times. In 2010, I was arrested for distributing an assistance of 180 NIS (£30) to 63 prisoner’s families in the Israeli jails, and then twice in 2012 I was detained for seven months. In these months I reached clear conclusions: a) when the PA was weak, they offered $10,000 for the M16 rifle. Now they are in a powerful position so they confiscate the rifle, arrest you, and fire you from your job if you have one, b) the security forces had a proper brainwash by the US army officer Keith Dayton and colleagues, to work for the exclusive benefit of Israel, and c) the security collaboration with Israel is huge national betrayal.

With his highly religious discourse, and after smoking 16 cigarettes in a matter of two hours despite his five heart operations, he concluded by saying: “God harnesses 2-4 people in each area to defend resistance and his will. Fayyad and the PA want us to follow the peaceful resistance path against God’s will. This is farce, farce, farce”.

3.3.8. Reflecting an Intra-Fatah Factional Crises

Not only did the space for opposition in the Palestinian political scene shrink for the opposition, but also for some Fatah cadres as well. The observations from the camps and the conversations with the people revealed that particularly after 2010 the security campaigns were used mainly to tackle intra-Fatah politics, and therefore entrenched its fragmentation. A member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) from Jenin camp argued:
The security operations, whether justified or unjustified, resulted in mistrust between the PA forces and the people, and created a hostile atmosphere in the camp against the PA and its security forces. How come can you arrest people because you suspect they are engaged in criminal activities? You need to have proof before doing that. I survived two assassination attempts, by Palestinians, and I am a leader of Fatah and a member of the Parliament, but the PA security forces did not care to follow-up on my case. Why? Because I am from the intra-Fatah opposition voices. Is this an inclusive security agenda?

Unanswered, this question was echoed by another leader of Fatah in Jenin who argued that the security campaigns were an internal Fatah issue, particularly from 2011 onwards, and that these security campaigns affected Fatah negatively first and foremost. While keeping in mind the 2006 parliamentary election results, he argued:

Security is a science, not an arbitrary practice. The crisis of the security campaigns reflects the internal crisis of Fatah itself. It is the responsibility of Fatah to evaluate the consequences of these security campaigns on its cadres and the unity of the movement. After all, weapons are pieces of metal and they come and go. What matters the most are the spirit and the attached beliefs. If the latter are broken, then a whole nation and a liberation movement are broken too.

Interestingly, others pointed out the harmful effects of these security campaigns on the trajectories of any future elections. Many Fatah members, particularly in Balata camp, stated that their first step in revenging the PA will occur through the ballot box. Furthermore, others pointed out that they know when and how to violently revenge the PA, its security forces, and most importantly from its interrogators. In her late 70s, a mother of a martyr and a prisoner in the PA’s jails, stated:

Listen my dear son, we are Fatah. Why is the PA arresting us? We used the same rifle to shot the Israeli army and later on Hamas militant to defend its mere existence. Now the PA took our weapons, so who will defend us from Israel and Hamas? Is this how we get rewarded?

Sitting in her house, surrounded by television screens and security cameras, she continued:

This house is a martyr house and they [PA forces] stepped in and defiled it many times. My other son, Ahmad, was just released from the PA’s jails after spending 35 days in his cell is looking for
options to migrate. They promised us better security, but they did not tell us that the cost will be migration. I want to have my kids around me, not in jails or abroad that I will never see again. This is a Zionist-American plan implemented by the PA forces. I will never elect Fatah again.

Other non-Fatah voices expressed the same conclusion concerning the use of security reform to address factional politics and rivalries within Fatah. An activist from the Palestinian Left told me:

Well, security campaigns didn’t uproot the causes of the chaos falatan wa fawda [a mix of chaos with the might of gun-toting militants trying to impose their own brand of law and order]. Who caused the chaos are the PA personnel themselves, 90% of them serve in the PA security forces.

A civil society actor from Balata confirmed the above, stating:

In 2007, the PA targeted everyone including those involved in resisting Israel, those whom are creating chaos, and gangs engaged in criminal activities. In 2012, it was more about dealing with internal Fatah issues and factional politics. However, the people of the camp paid the price. The campaigns were purposively incomplete and stopped at certain threshold so popular anger do not transform and spill over into a movement against the PA and Israel.

3.3.9. “We Are Doing Our Job”

Despite the realities discussed above, security personnel were of a different opinion. They understood their job in technical terms, and cared about the rules they had received from their leaders. “Business is business, and I am doing my job”, a security personnel told me in Nablus. He continued, “go and ask the people and you

---

60 Brief observations from the short visit to the Jneed security compound/prison in Nablus in September 2012: After witnessing the operations and the number of security leaders, I thought of two things: either this is a military state, or that Palestinians are in the midst of the revolution and all the commanders are on the fighting front. Because my security check-up and clearance took weeks without any good luck, I used the network that I have developed to visit Al-Jneed. I was welcomed by the head of security forces for Nablus region and 12 high ranking security personnel. I explained that my questions are about the security campaigns, PA’s security doctrine, and the conditions of the prisoners. “Oh, you are one of those who asks the difficult questions. Enjoy your coffee, it is a better topic.” This answer was quite telling and was reinforced when I visited the common operations room. Fully equipped by Canadian aid, security personnel were following up on a shooting incident. “We have to report back to our Israeli counterparts”, one respondent told me. When I asked to visit the underground prison, or to get just closer to it, I was faced by laughs, warnings that I may hear scary stuff, and I was gently requested to leave the compound.
will know that we are right and the rest are wrong”; however, the people did not support the security narrative. Notably, those few who believed that the security campaigns and reforms had achieved miraculous results took care and expressed their satisfaction in a careful and cautious way.61

A female member in Balata camp’s popular committee argued, “we do not live in secure conditions, however we witnessed a dramatic shift. At least we are able to sleep at night and experience less dominance of the thugs’ activities. But will this be sustainable? We don’t know, maybe not”. A female Fatah activist and director of a local TV channel in Jenin camp argued, “I support confiscating the weapons 100% and that the rule of law governs our lives. We do not live in a forest. However, this is hard to achieve”. In turn, a respondent from the Women's Worker Centre at Jenin camp told me, “I don’t want armed resistance to revive. I don’t want to lose my children. I want to offer them a better future; I want to live in a normal country under the rule of law in peace and stability. But we are very far from this vision”.

From the perspective of the security personnel, a local security official stated with confidence: “You can’t have two roosters in the same coop. It is either the PA security forces or the military gangs. There is no justification for the existence of the PA if it does not perform security as its major task”. To operationalise these thoughts, the deputy-head of the camp’s popular committee in Balata, and an officer in the Preventive Security forces, put it like this:

There is no such thing as resistance, and this is why security conditions are better. In 2012, shooting by Palestinians on houses in the camp occurred only 60 times. However, the execution of security campaigns meant that the PA has to eat its own sons. I mean everyone talks about prisoners and torturing, even though there is no torturing at all, and no one talks about the problems that interrogators face. This is their job and they need to interrogate the prisoners, but no one protects them if the prisoners decide to revenge later on. The most effective security force/Jihaz in the security campaigns over the years was the Preventive Security Force. We are the most equipped and trained ones and we

61 In both camps, there was rather a dominant feeling among the people and local leaders that “the PA and its security forces hate us”. The head of Jenin camp, offered one explanation for this and stated, “The PA was isolated, marginalized and absent over the last 8 years when the intifada committees led the society. Now the PA is back, stronger and they want to compensate all the years of missing leadership and they also want to revenge”.
discovered tens of military networks of Hamas and handed the
details to Israel in accordance with the security and political
agreements.

When I asked about the aggression and use of violence in the campaigns, and later
on in the PA’s prisons, the head of the liaison office for the Nablus Police told me:

Well, excessive use of violence may be a problem, but in some
cases you have to use it. International humanitarian law allows us
to use a certain level of violence. Those laws are very biased and
they should be amended to offer a larger space for the use of
physical violence against prisoners. The European and Palestinian
trainers told us how we can deal with issues related to human
rights.

When I stated the above view to the head of Balata camp’s popular committee, and a
Level-A director at the Ministry of Interior, his first reaction was, “why you are
surprised? This is our job”. He expanded, and told me:

Currently the security conditions are much better in the aftermath
of the security campaigns. It was a complete chaos before that. If
20% of people felt safe before the security campaigns, now the
percentage is 70%. Security is not only a police jeep touring
around, security is letting the people feel that you are around them
all the time and for them. Security is offering all the requirements
to disallow any person to think of killing or stealing or hurting each
other. However, having Palestinian security forces under
occupation is embarrassing for everyone because people wish that
these security forces will protect them from the Israeli aggression.
This will never be the case.

While there was consensus among the security personnel that they have done their
job very well in terms of uprooting the “forests of weapons” in the camps, the
camp’s leader had a different view that challenged those of the PA. When I asked
directly if weapons still exist in the camps after all the security campaigns, one of the
first reactions I received was a smile, followed by few statements.

A community leader who formerly led the 2002 Jenin Battle and is currently a
parliament member, who also spent seven years in the Israeli jails between 2002 and
2009, told me that “the camp is a dynamite barrel that can explode at any time. And
weapons are available and hidden”. Moreover, despite calm appearances “the camp
is on fire. We know when and how to set that fire”, I was told by a local leader in
Balata, before our conversation was interrupted by a youth who came in to his office screaming after he sold his kidney to repay his loan. Others in Jenin camp associated leadership with the existence of weapons, as expressed by a respondent who claimed: “the camp is full of weapons, different sorts of weapons. Whatever you need we have! I can’t be a leader without having the power of weapons. It is a must to have a weapon if you live in a forest of weapons. Weapons are the authority”.

The celebration of weapons as a symbol of authority was echoed in most conversations in the camps. One respondent made this analogy to illustrate the normalcy of weapons in any context under occupation: “I will give you the bottom line: if I am a cook, then you will find cooking utensils in my house; if I am a construction worker, then you will find constructing materials and tools in my house; and if I am a freedom fighter/Munadil, then the weapons are my tools and you will find them in my house. I assure you every house has a weapon of some kind”. Other interviewees summarised it simply: “Jenin camp is the power, power is the authority, and authority is the weapon”.

In the end, capturing the narrative of the people during fieldwork is a challenging and daunting task. This case is particularly difficult not only because security issues are sensitive per se, but also because of the high level of frustration and despair among the people that results from Israeli occupation and the practices of the PA. One respondent from Balata told me, “the West Bank is like a rotten and carious bean, and the security campaigns are making it even worst. Still they ask us to eat it, and accept to live in such conditions”. Another respondent from Jenin camp compared the PA’s leadership to a drunken bus driver who will either crash or end in nowhere, and stated:

I feel as if we are very quiet and respectful passengers, but the bus driver (the PA) is drunk. We are unemployed, with no jobs in the horizon and dependent on our families who are dependent on their small salary and large loan. Still they ask us to deal with security campaigns and their consequences, and give us nothing in return. Actually they are leading us to a mysterious future. We don’t know where this drunken bus driver will stop so we can take off safely and pursue our lives. It seems to me that the driver (the PA) will keep driving until we crash or end in nowhere. We are sick and tired of the many vicious circles that we live in, and these security campaigns are yet another one.
Chapter Three: Criminalising Resistance

Human suffering in these camps is manifested everywhere, and its antecedents are consistently connected to the security campaigns. On my way out of Jenin camp in the last day of my fieldwork, a number of people gathered around a man who tried to set fire to himself and his young daughter. He screamed loudly, “when my child wishes to die, it is so painful to hear such wish. When I don’t have one Shekel to give her, then I better go and kill myself. When the Palestinian leadership is hanging us up-side-down in the air, then what is left out of this life?” Holding the gasoline bottle and matches in one hand, and his daughter in the other hand, it was only the screams and cries of the frightened young girl that broke him, and he fell on the floor without setting fire to the bottle. Such dramatic and tragic incidents are not particularly exceptional when misery, anger, and injustice are the defining features of daily life.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter examined and analysed the consequences of the security campaigns on the people’s security, as well as the broader dynamics of the resistance against Israeli occupation from the perspectives of the people in Balata and Jenin refugee camps. These two ethnographic case studies were used to unpack and problematise the security reform under Fayyadism by giving voice to those below, and this is the primary scholarly contribution of this chapter. The original ethnographic data presented and analysed in this chapter aimed to challenge and expand the existing contestation in the literature surrounding the security reform under Fayyadism between the proponents and critics. The powerful narrative of the people deconstructed and unpacked the complex dynamics of security reform and expressed in simple words that the security reforms failed to fundamentally alter their life under occupation. In his evaluation of the PA’s 2007 security campaign to induce law and order, one respondent succinctly stated: “the security campaigns are like giving someone paracetamol to cure cancer”.

Security reform under Fayyadism not only aimed to enhance the functionality of the PA’s security forces, to ensure stability and security for Israel, but it also focused on taming resistance against Israeli occupation and colonial subjugation by criminalising resistance and by striping it from its infrastructure; the former was
accomplished through harassing, marginalizing, arresting, detaining, and torturing anyone engaged in militantly resisting Israel, and the latter was accomplished by conducting aggressive security and disarmament campaigns in the West Bank. From the perspective of the people, as the ethnographic evidence from Balata and Jenin refugee camps suggests, these security campaigns and disarmament processes were incomplete, unorganised, and therefore ineffective. Furthermore, these campaigns were perceived to be used as a tool to address intra-Fatah factional conflicts and infighting. While the PA’s security personnel argued that they have been “doing their job to maintain law and order”, the voices from below fundamentally challenged this claim and argued that instead of feeling secure they witnessed an authoritarian transformations in the PA and its security forces approaches; citing the police-state practices of the PA, such as arbitrary detention, excessive torturing, suppression of opposition voices, as evidence.

Furthermore, the ethnographic evidence suggests that criminalising resistance was practiced as a result of the security doctrine being defined by security collaboration and coordination with Israel and other international and regional actors. In this way, the top-down narrative and claims of the authorities viewed the achievements of the PA’s security reform in shallow terms that ultimately failed to recognise the repercussions and consequences of these campaigns on people’s lives. These implications are elucidated by the voices from below, and the perspectives of the residents of Jenin and Balata camps facilitated the unpacking and problematisation of the security reforms under Fayyadism beyond the conception of authorities. These voices from below not only clarified the link between security reform and resistance against Israel, but they also these illustrated how and why resistance against Israel has been criminalised. In sum, while the benchmark of security reform under Fayyadism was to build a professional security establishment, the people wanted protection from the major source for their insecurity, the Israeli military occupation. As one respondent put it “It does not mean anything to me if we have the best security forces and army in the world if they are not able to protect me”.

163
Chapter Four

4. Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings

Abstract

This chapter addresses the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid industry through an aid-dependency lens, particularly in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. The dependency of the Fayyadist paradigm on donors’ aid and policy prescriptions was manifested by the dominance of the donors’ instrumentalist aid framework, and by the fact that the Palestinian Authority received more aid specifically allocated for the Fayyadism state-building project, in comparison with the total aid received between 1993 and 2006. The investment of donors in the Fayyadist paradigm characterised the paradigm and stripped it of its local legitimacy, ownership, and accountability.

While examining donor operations, priorities, and the “aid-for-peace” agenda, this chapter investigates whether patterns of donor aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) have changed following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Differently stated, have the transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of the aid industry? Building on thirty original semi-structured interviews with Palestine aid actors, this chapter argues that aid patterns remain unchanged and that donors remain transfixed on a long-failed “Investment in Peace” framework that was designed by the World Bank in 1993. By comparing these research findings with the literature on Palestine aid, this chapter argues that donors are not ready to alter a framework dominated by policy instrumentalists who emphasise pre-determined normative values over actual results, quietly trading financial inducements to Palestinians to forego political rights within a “peace dividends” model. Meanwhile, critics of the existing aid framework remain largely ignored and have little influence on aid policy.

Ultimately, this demonstrates that the proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism not only fail to trickle down and positively affect Palestinian people’s lives, but it also failed to change the flawed patterns of aid dictated by the instrumentals donors from the top.
4.1. Introduction and Contextual Background

The year 2011 saw protests in nearly all the Arab countries. By comparison with its neighbours, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) witnessed fewer protests and less general turmoil. Those protests that did take place were on a smaller scale, when compared to those in countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. Yet, the Palestinian protests uniquely targeted international donors and foreign aid, a specificity which alone justifies including a chapter on Palestine. Since the envelope of aid disbursed in the OPT is vast, and bearing in mind the importance of both military and civilian aid to states in the region, it is worth assessing what link exists between the Arab uprisings and donor aid in Palestine. This is particularly poignant considering the long-standing importance of the Palestinian question on politics in the Middle East.

The goal of this chapter is to determine whether or not there was a change in the way aid was disbursed by donors in the international community to Palestinians in the OPT following the Arab Uprisings of 2011. This has been done bearing in mind International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates indicating a sizeable drop in development and budget support to Palestinians in the OPT between 2010 and 2013 as compared to 2006 to 2009. Between those periods, funding went from an average annual allotment of $1.5 - 2 billion down to $1.1 - 1.3 billion respectively (IMF 2013a). However, beyond this quantitative shift downward, overall funding remained significant while there are qualitative indicators of consistency with past patterns in the way aid was structured. For example, the IMF has estimated that prior to 2001, roughly one-third of aid was disbursed as budget support to the Palestinian Authority (PA), while after 2007 more than eighty per cent was allocated to budget support on an annual basis, despite an overall drop in funding after 2009 (IMF 2013b). This structural consistency seems to indicate an entrenchment of existing patterns rather than change. To find out whether or not change to the OPT aid regime took place we approached 44 experts working in or conducting research on Palestinian aid. We classified each interviewee into one of two types of aid actor, based on two different development aid viewpoints outlined in David Mosse’s ethnography of aid policy and practice *Cultivating Development* (Mosse 2005): critics and instrumentalists.
The international community has used foreign aid to fund development in the occupied West Bank and Gaza for decades. Following the 1993 Oslo Accord, this was done to encourage Palestinians to “buy into” a peace plan with the state of Israel. Poor results though have sparked a profound debate over the very nature of aid, whose antecedents can be placed on the normative fault line that exists between critics and instrumentalists in development aid literature. Critics, on one hand, consider development policy to be a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power, or dominance. That power is sustained by unspoken and unwritten intent that constitutes a hidden reality, which is the true reason development aid is given. As such, critics argue that aid is not simply policy to be implemented, but domination to be resisted (Mosse 2005). By contrast, policy instrumentalists are persistently optimistic about the power of policy design as a rational problem solving exercise to remedy real world problems (Mosse 2005). In the OPT aid instrumentalists dominate the way funding is disbursed, first as researchers and policy analysts designing models for how Palestinian aid should be given at institutions such as the IMF and World Bank; and then as aid workers within the major donor organisations.

The relationship between aid and development is particularly problematic in the Palestinian context. Since the aim of the international community was to foster economic development in the OPT to stimulate the peace process (Keating, Le More, and Lowe 2005), there is fairly broad agreement among researchers that aid has failed (Roy 1999; BISAN 2011; Nakhleh 2004, 2011; Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Tartir and Wildeman 2012; Barghouti 2012). The post-Oslo “peace process” has been characterised by economic decline, large increases in unemployment, intense violence and a moribund peace process. Israeli settlement building and the confiscation of Palestinian land accelerated after Oslo, along with closure policies that restrict Palestinians from working in Israel or moving freely in the OPT. This policy of closure contravened the spirit of the peace process, and took place almost immediately after it began (Halper 2010; OCHA 2013; UNDP 2010). It is a primary reason for the sharp decline of the Palestinian economy, owing to the subsequent loss of remittances from Palestinian workers in Israel and the inability of Palestinians to move freely to engage in commerce at home, in Israel or abroad. Simultaneous Israeli settlement building undid Palestinian
territorial contiguity, which became further fragmented into separate communities governed by Hamas in Gaza and a donor-backed PA in the West Bank. As a result, Palestinians have developed a deep set dependency relying on aid to sustain the economy of their isolated enclaves, which are contained by and dependent on Israel for all commerce (Hever 2010).

International aid disbursements to Palestinians are therefore high and one calculation put total aid at around US$ 24.6 billion between 1993 and 2012. Aid inflows increased from an annual average of US$ 656 million between 1993 and 2003, to over US$ 1.9 billion since 2004; and international aid increased by seventeen times overall between 1993 and 2009. To illustrate the intensity of aid dependency, from 2004 onward aid was equal to between 24 per cent and 42 per cent of GDP. Per capita aid for the same period averaged around $530 per year, ranging from a low of $US 306 in 2005 to $US 761 in 2009 to $US 498 in 2012 (OECD-DAC 2014). Figure 1 and 2 show the total amount of aid to Palestinian over the last two decades and its percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s Gross National Income (GNI).

**Figure 6: Total International Aid to Palestinians 1993-2012**

Source: As compiled by the Author based on OECD/DAC Aid Database (OECD-DAC 2014).
Yet despite the sheer volume of aid which has poured into the Palestinian economy, ordinary Palestinians still lack basic economic rights and personal security from violence (Tartir 2012a). Socio-economic indicators provide an impression of failure by aid to at least improve the economic and living circumstances of ordinary Palestinians. The neoliberal economic model enforced with vigour by a donor-backed Fayyad government from 2007 to 2013 was fuelled by aid, but also by personal and government debt, and drove up the cost of living for Palestinians in an economy that had already shrunk and de-developed during the peace process. Using a consumption-based definition of poverty, 26.2 per cent of the Palestinians lived in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 19 per cent in the West Bank and 38 per cent in Gaza. By using an income-based definition of poverty, the reality can be understood to be much worse with 50 per cent of Palestinians living in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 38 per cent in the West Bank and 70 per cent in Gaza (MAS 2012). According to the World Food Programme (WFP 2011), 50 per cent of Palestinian households suffered from food insecurity: 33 per cent being food-insecure and 17 per cent vulnerable to food insecurity.

Conservative figures estimate unemployment has remained stuck at around 30 per cent since 2009, with 47 per cent unemployed in Gaza in 2010 and 20 per cent in the West Bank. A 2014 published report on labour rights listed the OPT as one of the eight worst countries to work in alongside countries like Somalia and the Central African Republic, and below countries infamous for poor working conditions like Bangladesh, China and the United Arab Emirates (ITUC 2014). The income and
opportunities inequality gap continues to widen not only between the West Bank and Gaza, but also within the West Bank. Manufacturing and production capacities continue to erode, as had been predicted by Sara Roy’s mid-1990s theory of “De-development” (Roy 1995), while the vital agriculture sector remains sorely neglected. Public debt has doubled, while private debts for Palestinians have ballooned because of easier access to credit – itself a type of “market of dispossession” (Elyachar 2005; Hanieh 2013). Real income per capita is in need of a proper deconstruction to take account of an unbearable increase in the cost of living and consumer price index (PCBS 2013). At the macro-economic level, vaunted economic growth of 7.1 per cent in 2008, 7.4 per cent in 2009 and 9.3 per cent in 2010, 12.2 per cent in 2011, 5.9 per cent in 2012, and 4.5 per cent in 2013 (IMF 2013b) was a jobless growth, aid driven, with an eroded productive base (deindustrialised), is non-Jerusalemite, anti-poor and reflects an economy recovering from a low base (Bahour 2011; UNCTAD 2011; Khalidi 2011; Tartir 2012b).

This is an aid driven economy surviving under occupation. Aid induced inflation, personal debt and rising costs-of-living have now been linked to the stalled peace process they were supposed to support; a process that has seen life for Palestinians get steadily worse along with an erosion on their claim to a sovereign territory (Khalidi 2012). That aid is guided by a 1993 World Bank development plan, An Investment in Peace (World Bank 1993), which informs major bilateral donors on how to disburse their aid to Palestinians. The instrumentalist approach adopted by the Bank and major donors is highly bureaucratic (Challand 2008) and has been the visibly dominant aid viewpoint throughout the Oslo peace process. As implied by the name of the plan, it was developed for Palestinians to improve their standard of living and encourage them to participate in the peace process, producing “peace dividends” (Le More 2008). Similar to other programs developed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for the developing world in the 1990s (Hickel 2012), it aims to build institutions (in fact an entire Palestinian state) on a “good governance” model to “prepare” Palestinians for statehood. The core normative values behind that plan include open markets, economic integration with Israel, regional economic integration, financial liberalisation, “good governance” and support for “democracy” (Khan, Giacaman, and Amundsen 2004; Hanieh 2011).
Within this economically neoliberal framework some key aims include: encouraging closer economic integration between the OPT and Israel, establishing a semi-autonomous Palestinian regional government based on principles of good governance, for that government to police Palestinians in lieu of the Israeli military, and for the economy to open up to international trade and investment (Taghdisi-Rad 2010). An early success for these instrumentalists was the 1994 Paris Economic Protocol, an annex to the Oslo Accords. The Protocol created a customs-envelope for Israel and the OPT, meaning that all foreign aid donated to the Palestinians was required to pass through Israeli customs, which allows the Israeli government to take tariffs from that aid. The agreement stipulated that Palestinian workers be allowed to enter Israel to seek employment, yet Israel never fulfilled that part of the agreement, instead imposing blanket closures on the pretext of security (Farsakh 2002) and preventing Palestinians from getting to their jobs in Israel, stimulating further aid dependency (Hever 2008, 2010). An Israeli negotiator involved in designing the protocol noted: “the Paris Protocol basically legalised the forced marriage of the two economies since 1967” (Kleiman 2013).

While the good governance project failed to deliver the desired outcomes, the World Bank and other instrumentalists continued to argue that the fundamentals of the program were sound. Instead they preferred to blame “exogenous” factors, complicating political events such as violence during the second intifada or the PA for not implementing policy well enough, thereby placing disproportionate blame on a nominally autonomous PA for not achieving results (Brynen 2000). Yet blaming politics ignores a well-established understanding that aid becomes a political factor in any conflict situation it is exposed to (Anderson 1999). Critics will also point out that the PA is an institution of the donors’ creation, and that the Israeli and OPT economies had already been deeply intertwined through decades of occupation before Oslo, all facts which pose “a serious challenge to [donors’] uniform analytical frameworks and rigid assumptions” (Taghdisi-Rad 2010). Critics argue that the fundamentals behind the World Bank model are wrong, such as

---

62 The following World Bank report only rarely mentions the role of Israel in destabilising the Palestinian economy and completely ignores the critical role the occupation plays to that effect. Rather, it often blames politics as an exogenous factor separate from aid, sabotaging an otherwise ‘sound’ World Bank-led aid model: Government of Japan and World Bank. (2000) Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza.
miscategorising Israel-Palestine as a post-conflict situation, even though it never left the conflict stage. They also charge that the major donors and IFIs are sanitising and muting their criticism of Israel (CDS-BZU 2011). By contrast with instrumentalists, the critics are certain that Israeli settler-colonialism in the OPT is the fundamental problem which needs to be addressed before peace or development can take place.

4.2. Research Interviews

This chapter takes into consideration what change has taken place with the way donors work in the OPT following 2011 and whether there are any links between the protest movements that did take place in the OPT post 2011 with protests elsewhere in the Arab world. It does this by providing an analysis of original interviews conducted in May, June and July of 2013 with OPT donors and aid observers to learn from them how aid has changed, or how it has not. To determine whether there is a link between recent Palestinian protests and the Arab uprisings, or if there has been any change to the way in which foreign aid has been disbursed, we approached 44 experts working directly in the aid industry or studying it. Some were international donors or aid experts, while others included Palestinians working for local or international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Those that responded represented International Financial Institutions (IFIs), government aid agencies, International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), as well as researchers associated with policy units that helped design aid packages or economic plans like the Paris Protocol. Meanwhile we found non-donor experts represented the critical view of how aid is disbursed. They include IGOs, Palestinian Non-governmental Organisations (PNGOs), the Palestinian private sector, representatives of the Palestinian youth movement, and researchers working on foreign aid associated with a university or policy unit.

All interviews were kept anonymous, to protect the identity of interviewees. Interviews were semi-structured and completed in English or Arabic via Skype, telephone, face-to-face, or written by email. Of our requests, 22 were made to donors and we received just 8 responses. Several major donors did not respond to our request, while two felt they were not well suited to provide an opinion. Of those
donors who accepted our request for an interview, 2 represented an IFI, 1 an IGO, 2 a government aid agency, 2 INGO donors and finally 1 researcher.  

Meanwhile, a total of 22 requests were made to non-donors, of which 20 provided feedback, one refused to participate due to a theoretical disagreement over the research question, and only a PA Ministry did not reply. Of the respondents, 2 represented an IGO, 5 a PNGO, 1 the Palestinian private sector, 2 the youth movement and 10 researchers.

We found that the donors who interviewed with us nearly all took an instrumentalist approach to aid, either as a funding agent or as an aid policy designer. At the opposite end, the answers we received from the non-donors fell into what Mosse described as the “critics”. Since there happened to be a neat overlap of the donors (as instrumentalists) away from the non-donors (as critics), we decided that the overall identifier Instrumentalist – Critic was a useful shortcut to locate the type of responses given on the impact of the Arab uprisings. Since the material gathered has been kept anonymous, we will list respondents with the letter [C] for Critic and [I] for Instrumentalist, followed by an identifying number, and a generic description of the type of interviewee (I, PNGO, donor, etc.).

The interview guide for each differed slightly, with two general questions asked to all interviewees.

For **donors**, the interview guide consisted of two specific questions:

1. How have your operations or priorities changed since the start of the Arab Spring of 2011?
2. Have you seen a difference in how Palestinian partners work with you since the start of the Arab Spring? In what way is it different?

---

63 The researchers were affiliated with various Palestinian and international research institutions or centres.

64 Note that we used the term Arab “Spring” in the interviews, in lieu of “uprising”. One interviewee, [C15 - Researcher] objected to the use of the phrase Arab Spring: “Overall, I don’t think that the use of phrase Arab Spring is appropriate; it decontextualizes what is happening in relation to the history and it is a very depoliticizing term. The mainstream media repackaged what these revolutions are about: they are popular uprisings/intifadas”.

172
For non-donors, these two questions were adapted as follow:

1. How have the operations and priorities of donors changed since the Arab Spring of 2011?
2. Have you seen a change in the way international donors work with Palestinian organisations since the start of the Arab Spring? In what way has this changed?

To both groups, we asked the final two identical questions:

1. Do you believe there is a link between recent protests against the Palestinian Authority (PA) and aid donors, with the Arab Spring?
2. What is the key for effective aid in the OPT after the Arab Spring?

4.3. Protesting Aid: A Link to the Arab Uprisings?

Palestinian attitudes toward aid may have soured. Growing anger toward international aid agencies has moved beyond elite circles to the street level, with protests targeting not only USAID but also aid given by sectors of the EU delegation and the ICRC. In June 2013 Palestinian youth called for mass protests against the Paris Protocol in Ramallah (Palestinians for Dignity 2012). So to start we wanted to determine if there were any links between these protests and the Arab uprisings, before seeing if the uprisings impacted on the way aid is given in the OPT. We found that interviewees gave conflicting accounts for why they think the protests took place, and disagreed as to whether or what degree there was a link to the Arab uprisings.

Many interviewees, particularly donors, felt there was no link or at most a tenuous link between the aid-related Palestinian protests and the Arab uprisings. Often they

---

65 Other than the protest against the Paris Protocol, there had been protests organized by the youth movements against USAID and their role brainwashing Palestinian youth https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=oa.159277987491886&type=1. During Obama’s visit to the OPT in 2013 many slogans were against USAID http://on.fb.me/1bcCCaq. In September 2012, the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) offices were closed by the youth http://bit.ly/1beCJCK. A protest was organized in June 2013 in front of the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) for supporting normalization activities http://bit.ly/1beCTu5. A few protests were organized against The International Committee of the Red Cross http://on.fb.me/1kWhmFI and one of the messages was ‘the prisoners need a decision, not financial assistance’ http://on.fb.me/JJeIYA.
felt the Palestinian case was unique and that the protests reflected pre-existing realities. One instrumentalist [I10 - Researcher] said: “No, I don’t see any connection at all between the protests which have occurred in OPT and the Arab Spring. Palestinian protests pre-existed the Arab Spring and have their own causes and dynamics”. Instrumentalist [I9 - INGO] postulated that:

There could be a link, especially because the Arab Spring empowered people and made them believe they have influence. Nonetheless … because our situation is unique to other Arab countries, and because our preoccupation is the Israeli occupation, people are more tolerant of the leadership but nevertheless critical and sceptical of the leadership.

A number of interviewees suggested that there could be several different pre-existing points of origin for the protests, related to economy and occupation, not the Arab uprisings. One critic [C7 - PNGO] provided three different reasons: the high cost of living, protests for unpaid salaries and protests against the existence of the PA itself. C7 went on argue that that donor aid, which the IMF has characterised as budgetary support for the PA, is used for political reasons to keep the donor-backed PA in existence for fear Hamas might gain power and confront Israel:

Israel has shown that it considers the PA’s existence, if not its flourishing, to be in its own national interest. … Western diplomats and many Palestinians believe that, for the foreseeable future, enough money will continue to flow to keep the PA alive, and President Abbas will stick around and do what he can to delay much-feared steps toward confrontation with Israel (ICG 2013:ii).

Another critic [C6 – Youth Movement] also noted a connection between the protests and the role of the PA within the occupation:

Donor aid to the PA has started 20 years ago with Oslo, and the wave of protests in some Arab countries gave a push forward and encouraged the Palestinians to come to the streets against the PA – which has increasingly been considered an arm of the Israeli occupation. However we should not be so optimistic about the link between all of them because the Arab Spring has turned to something not really related to any spring. Donor aid to the PA, especially to the enlarged security forces is definitely one of the reasons for the protests.
Economic reasons were often given as the basis for the protests. A prominent government aid instrumentalist [I1 – Government Aid Agency] supported the idea that economics and politics may both have played a role, related to the aforementioned reduction in overall funding to the PA from 2010 to 2013:

Protests against the PA have largely been against the backdrop of the crisis in the PA’s finances. The Government of Israel’s withholding of clearance revenues was a major factor. The decline in donor funding has been another factor, at a time of domestic economic difficulties in donor countries, and increasing calls on donor funds in the region linked to the Syria crisis and other events in the region. So you could say there was some indirect link [to the Arab uprisings]. But the wider backdrop remains frustrations over the lack of political progress in the peace process.

Referring to the different points of origin for the OPT protests, instrumentalist [I9 - INGO] felt the Palestinian protests focused on limited issues that do not really challenge the central political problem, the occupation:

PA finances and hunger-striking prisoners were the issues that galvanised large protests [which] illustrates the timidity and limited horizons of Palestinian politics. While both are vital for individuals and in national life, there are reasons political activity crystallised around them. They excite little dissent or rancour (beyond that directed at Fayyad).

That donor went on to suggest that secondary issues have traction precisely because it is only there that the major Palestinian factions allow mobilisation to make ordinary Palestinians feel empowered to demand change, but that once protests threaten to exceed the boundaries the leadership set, they get reined back in: “Those are tactical actions with limited goals, not bids for a strategic readjustment internally or vis-à-vis Israel”. Critic [C3 – Private Sector] provided a similar explanation:

I actually think the recent protests against the PA have more to do with internal politics, namely Fatah trying to topple the Fayyad government to take his place in the West Bank. There is nothing here to do with better managing of donor aid and interventions, but more like how to get more of the pie, or should I say crumbs.

The possibility of government backed protests contrasts sharply with the initial anti-government protests of the Arab uprisings.
The protests may have been petering out by mid-2013, with critic [C7 – PNGO] validating the possibility that they are limited in nature while suggesting that, in addition to not challenging the occupation, they do not challenge the main economic problems. C7 felt that the youth movement may have been energised by the Arab uprisings and acknowledged upsurges in protest. However, C7 notes that those protests were intermittent, not unified, and believed that there is a great deal of complacency over economic issues. C7 surmises that: “The Arab Spring seems to have shown how entrenched the neoliberal economic development agenda of Israel/PA has truly become”. Critic [C13 - Researcher] felt that while the Arab uprisings made the general population realise that they can do things and demonstrate, people in Palestine have seen many times that different forms of protests against Israel, or settlements, or the PA, has not changed much. For this reason C13 does not know if it is possible to link the protests to the Arab uprisings.

Although we conducted semi-structured interviews that do not require “yes” or “no” answers to specific questions, many interviewees offered direct answers. Of the instrumentalists and critics interviewed, the 11 that felt there was no link between the Palestinian protests and Arab uprisings comprised 3 instrumentalists and 8 critics. The 9 that felt there was a link comprised 2 instrumentalists and 7 critics. This revealed a fairly even split, though it must be warned this was done without elaborating the degree to which they felt there was or was not a connection, which as we saw with C7 and C13 may be a limited connection. Even so, the interviewees generally felt the protests were not on a scale that seriously challenges the central economic and political issues, or how donors interact with Palestinians.

4.4. Aid Industry in the OPT: Transfixed on the Same Old Rules

There was a prevailing feeling among interviewees that little had changed in the way aid was given after 2011. For example, a major donor-instrumentalist [I1 – Government Aid Agency] noted that they made no specific change other than to re-emphasise the regional importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the relevance of their approach to Palestinian state building. Critic [C8 - PNGO] noted that few major donors added new programs to their operations and often

66 Four instrumentalists and three critics did not provide a direct answer.
entrenched existing ones, while any new programs were directly linked to concepts of peace and normalisation that are intrinsic to the existing peace dividends approach.

Some interviewees felt donors in Europe were aware of the failure of aid, yet remained transfixed on old programs. Critic [C3 – Private Sector] said:

I did note the Europeans are becoming much more aware of the failure of the political paradigm that they have built their entire intervention around, a two state solution (Witney 2013). That noted, they remain transfixed on following the US’s cue while all the while continuing to foot the bill of sustained occupation.

One of the reasons for a lack of change may be a dearth of innovation or unwillingness to change, which has been noted by many researchers as characteristic of aid over the past twenty years and is consistent with the instrumentalist approach to development. Critic [C13 - Researcher] said:

The Arab Spring has not changed anything for Palestine, on any level. Politically it has not, and in terms therefore of what aid does and does not do, and can and cannot do, has not changed one iota since 1993 or 1994. Basically the donors are stuck in the rut of pretending to hope that somehow by improving the economic conditions, peace will somehow miraculously happen.

Critic [C16 - Researcher] noted that:

Since Oslo, donor operations and priorities have been strictly associated with the Oslo framework. To date changes in operations and priorities remain subject to the same paradigm and I cannot really perceive any serious changes in the way donors relate to the Palestinian political cause, economy and society.

Critic [C1 - IGO] working at a prominent research agency stated that:

The basic dynamic between PA-Donors relations was established 10 years ago: Budget Support. In one sentence, Fayyad policies equal running to the wall of reality. Democracy and governance programs will flourish even better than before: they are the donor-darling subjects, so this should not be surprising if it is happening or will happen.
Interestingly, critic C1 went on to state that Palestinians do no need these good governance projects, but rather efficient public institutions, suggesting that the donor good governance project is not producing anything institutionally useful.

A number of critics did feel that there was a rebalancing of priorities with donors shifting funds out of the OPT to other countries caught up in the Arab uprisings, particularly Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. For example critic [C4 - PNGO], an aid provider in the West Bank, said: “Well, they [donors] got really interested in Egypt. Everybody went there (meaning they left here) or became less important than their colleagues covering Egypt. Everyone wanted to give money because it was hot and exciting”. However, these claims were not corroborated by donors and often based on hearsay without evidence, a potential fallacy noted by many critics themselves. Some donors and critics did suggest that any change in funding levels might be linked to the financial crisis in Europe.67 A number of critics such as critic [C19 - PNGO] also noted that even if donors had moved funding elsewhere in the Middle East, or were hit by the financial crisis, donors also seemed to be hesitating, taking a “wait and see” approach to gauge the impact of the Arab uprisings on Palestinians.

Meanwhile, interviewee instrumentalist [I6 - IFI] working at an important donor institution noted that even if there is no change to Palestinian aid, it does provide a model for intervention elsewhere in the Arab world:

Basically Palestine teaches lessons to the region and provides expertise. In the aftermath of the Arab spring it is questionable how much change had happened in Palestine. For us, we are part of regional strategy, and I can tell you that we are well advanced in terms of our projects and policies here in Palestine than the rest of the Arab world. We have civil society engagement and also [the] inclusion of social protection programs. So we can export the last two decades’ models to the new Arab world and Palestine is teaching lessons in this regards, since we are doing this here for so many years. But there is no paradigm shift of course. Maybe the lists of demands from the government had changed after the Arab Spring, however the PA has not changed its plan mainly due to financial problems.

So while many donors admit aid has failed and critics often consider its impact an unmitigated disaster, this donor considers the Investment in Peace model to be a

67 Many INGOs or donors, notably from Spain, Italy and Greece, closed their offices in the OPT.
successful model that can be exported to other Arab Spring countries, illustrating the diffusion of common patterns of aid in the Mediterranean basin.

For the rare interviewee who felt change had taken place, critic [C6 – Youth Movement] said it was becoming more negative. This standpoint may make sense, because so many critics in the interviews and literature feel that aid is being used to keep the Palestinians quiet while sustaining the occupation:

I think donors realise even more the power of economics in suppressing peoples' desires to revolt and ask for change. For example, the Arab Spring increased the urgency by donor countries (and Israel) to come to the rescue of the Palestinian Authority in September 2012 when economic protests began against austerity measures imposed by Fayyad's government.

This may be because, as critic [C9 - PNGO] concluded:

The overall framework has not changed and the operations after the Arab spring remain within the European understanding to the nature of the region that is based on keeping the same regional balances on one hand, while on the other hand assuring stability and preserving the interests of Israel.

Of those interviewees who answered directly whether or not they felt aid had changed after 2011, those who felt donor operations or priorities had not changed numbered an overwhelming 21: 6 instrumentalists and 15 critics. Only 4 felt there was a change: 1 instrumentalist and 3 critics. Of those four, it is important to note that critic [C15 - Researcher] felt the changes were only minor, while critic [C10 - Researcher] felt there was a withdrawal of funding and change for the worse.

Meanwhile, 5 instrumentalists did not notice a change in the way Palestinian partners work with them since the Arab uprisings, while 0 noted a change. Of the critics interviewed, 9 offered the view that they did not perceive a change in the way international donors work with Palestinian organisations, while just 3 perceived a change. There seems to be little evidence that there was change in the way aid and Palestinians interact with one another after 2011, and the interviewees create an overwhelming impression of continuity in the OPT aid model.

---

68 Two critics and one donor did not provide a direct answer.
4.5. Aid Patterns in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings

To conclude each interview we asked the interviewees what they think are the keys to effective aid in the OPT following the Arab uprisings. So while the aim of this chapter is not to speculate on ways Palestinian aid can be reformed to make it more effective, some of the responses provided by the interviewees shed further light on the aid process in the OPT. This is especially important bearing in mind the general consensus of interviewees that aid has not changed in response to the uprisings, and that the Palestinian protests are likely linked to long-standing socio-political and economic factors tied to their unresolved conflict with Israel. These factors accrue value when taking into consideration the importance of the Palestinian issue in Middle East relations, geo-political stability, US and EU management of conflict in the region, that the OPT represents the largest and deepest penetration of long-standing Western aid in an Arab country, and how this experience might affect Western policy-makers designing policy for the region.

Instrumentalists and critics hold fundamentally different views on how aid should be given in the OPT, linked more to historical processes for which the Arab uprisings may or may not be relevant. Instrumentalists sustain a very bureaucratised and securitised institutional approach, which the critics argue should be openly resisted in favour of indigenous leadership and self-determination. Thus the impression conveyed by instrumentalist donors was to “stay the course”, that the original policy model is sound and should simply be applied with renewed vigour. Critics on the other hand believe that aid is reinforcing the occupation, the colonisation of Palestinian land and ultimately the destruction of Palestinian society. This process is enabled by a donor-backed PA which operates without legislative or open accountability in the OPT.

Instrumentalist policy recommendations appear not to have evolved since the start of Oslo-aid in 1993, or at all following the Arab uprisings (Tartir and Wildeman 2013). They display the same normative values organised into the same processes for intervention. Instrumentalist [I1 – Government Aid Agency] said the: “key for effective aid is to focus on state building with an emphasis on effective, transparent and accountable governance and human rights”. For instrumentalist [I10 - INGO]
these policy prescriptions included: “identifying the most vulnerable groups, effective co-ordination with all stakeholders, participatory planning, accountability mechanisms, and unfettered humanitarian access”. Another prominent instrumentalist [I14 - IFI] said: “the key issues for effective aid are: predictability, clear priorities and ownership”.

Critics focused on the need to dramatically reform aid to strive toward Palestinian self-determination. As part of that process of liberation, that aid needs to be structured in a way to challenge the forces that sustain the status quo, such as an authoritarian PA and the Israeli military occupation. Critic [C9 - PNGO] made it clear that aid needs to challenge Israel, support democracy, and not sustain a repressive PA. In complete contradiction to instrumentalists, most critics have little faith in the PA because it is dependent on donors and a failed Oslo paradigm. Some critics, such as critic [C8 – PNGO] call for the abolition of the PA and Oslo altogether, considering them to be part of the problem rather than the solution. A participant in the protests that hit the OPT in 2011, critic [C6 – Youth Movement] was unequivocal that the occupation needs to be challenged: “Any effective aid model needs to challenge Israel’s control over the resources and borders”.

Critics further demonstrate a deep-held cynicism about the aid process, disclosing a belief that donors have hidden aims, which constitute the real reason for aid being given. Critic [C6 – Youth Movement] argued that aid is another tool of colonisation:

> In my view international aid as it is applied in the West Bank and Gaza is just one of many tools used to colonise what remains of Palestine and subdue the Palestinian population under occupation. This is not only true when talking about aid from Western countries, but to some extent the aid given by Qatar to Gaza serves a similar purpose.

Building on these suspicions, critics such as [C7 - PNGO] consider donors complicit in the occupation: “Most conscious, young Palestinians, activists, etc. see the international community as completely complicit in the occupation”. Critic [C8 - PNGO] felt that aid is used to weaken Palestinian civil society and nonviolent resistance to the occupation. Critic [C14 - Researcher] points out that donors provide

---

69 For further analysis on the complicity of the donor community in occupation, please refer to Lester-Murad (2014).
aid for self-interests that contradict the spirit of the peace process: “Donors undeniably have vested interest[s] in the region, whether it is the strategic relationship with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, their co-operation with Israel, or the lucrative relationship with oil rich gulf countries”. Critic [C11 - Researcher] went so far as to express a feeling that donor reports cannot be trusted because they do not reveal their real intentions, while musing that aid may actually be quite effective for cynical reasons because it keeps the Palestinians under control. 70

Overall these points about effective aid are remarkably consistent with the viewpoints held by instrumentalists and critics elsewhere in the development literature. The instrumentalist approach to aid intervention in Palestine retains a very centralised and bureaucratic model that is based on liberal economic principals used to “modernise” a “less developed” society. Instrumentalists are famous for their unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to change, 71 as per their response to the Arab uprisings. This could reflect some form of institutional path dependency, bureaucratic sluggishness or gaps in the co-ordination between various bodies.

Critics on the other hand attribute this lack of change to the hidden intentions of donors. Those donors, far from being neutral observers, are effectively using aid to keep the Palestinians quiet during on-going Israeli colonisation of their land. That aid is aimed less at the elimination of poverty than the expansion of PA power used to dominate OPT Palestinians while simultaneously depoliticising the Palestinian struggle. James Ferguson observed a very similar process in Lesotho in the 1970s in the Anti-Politics Machine, where he suspected World Bank / IFI transformation of the agricultural sector, and other aid intervention, was simply a point of entry for an intervention that included the expansion and entrenchment of a donor-backed state’s

70 Critic [C11 - Researcher] said: “Western aid is being very effective, don’t you think? It is keeping the Palestinians relatively acquiescent, and ensuring Israel’s security. I consider it misguided to regard the goal of Western aid as being to build a viable Palestinian state and economy. I no longer believe what is written in donor reports as in essence actions speak louder than words, and the actions are about ensuring Palestinian acquiescence and Israeli security”.

71 One criticism of the instrumentalists is that they habitually confirm self-fulfilling prophecies about the viability of the programs they have designed. In the case of Palestinian aid based on the normative values laid out in the Oslo aid model, support for programs is renewed based less on results than the values and norms the intervention supports, such as good governance and free markets (Mosse 2005: 3-4).
power (Ferguson 1994). From either perspective, there is no argument about why instrumentalist donors are slow to react to the Arab uprisings, because for the instrumentalists aid is working just fine. For critics aid is working, but for all the wrong reasons. Either way, inertia exists because there is no need to change, meaning there is no sluggishness and no gap in co-ordination.

4.6. Conclusion: Business as Usual

Taken in the context of the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, protests in the OPT have been muted by comparison. While opposition to foreign aid, the Oslo Accord and the World Bank economic model moved tentatively beyond elite circles to the Palestinian street, it is not immediately apparent why this has happened or if there is any link to the uprisings. Many interviewees noted that the OPT exists under unique conditions for the region, and that Palestinian protestors were responding to long-standing problems linked to the occupation. Those protests may or may not have been encouraged by the broader regional uprisings. If anything, a stalled political process and economic difficulties spurred forth the protests, while the interviews with the critics provide some insight into the dynamics behind the protestors’ way of reasoning. Meanwhile, instrumentalist donors seem unfazed by the protests and have, as our interviews indicated, not changed their approach following the Arab uprisings, indicative of faith in the path laid out well before 2011. There was not even an increase in the amount of aid spent in the OPT after 2011, which may indicate that donors were not concerned that the Palestinian protests would grow and pose a threat to regional stability. Donors instead seem content sticking with the same Investment in Peace aid model they have followed since 1993. The absence of a clear connection between the Arab uprisings and Palestinian protests only further decouples any notion that the uprisings affected donor-funding patterns.

The most notable shift may be a slight rebalancing of contributors to the existing aid model with Arab donors stepping in to support it, such as Qatari investment in Gaza noted by critic [C16 - Researcher] (Ephron 2012). Otherwise, United States Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest economic peace initiative (Greenwood 2013) exhibits remarkable continuity with the long-standing American policy of funding a “peace dividend” to buy Palestinians into a peace process. The 2013 Kerry
investment plan (Palestinian Economic Initiative) means to increase OPT GDP by 50 per cent over three years, and crucially to pacify the conflict (Tartir 2014). It parallels the “Breaking the Impasse” initiative where 200 - 300 Palestinian and Israeli businessmen gathered to work together and put pressure on their respective governments, kick-starting a new wave of economic normalisation. A process of normalisation that critics argue is part of the problem. And while the Kerry plan aims to enhance the economic situation, Kerry makes it clear that “the proposal would depend on progress on a peace deal between the Palestinians and Israel”, emphasising the conditional nature of aid linked to the Oslo peace paradigm and that rejects any radical departure (Breaking the Impasse 2013; Kerry 2013).

Meanwhile an argument has emerged, set forth by some critics, that OPT aid may be having unintended, unwritten benefits for donors. From a national interest and security perspective, aid may be working because it is pacifying the Palestinians and promoting regional security. Whether or not the aid model is sustaining development and peace then becomes irrelevant, and instrumentalist policy only obscures the real dynamics behind Palestinian aid. Whether those critics are right or wrong, it is possible to conclude with confidence that the model and the normative values of donor aid in the OPT appear set to remain unchanged despite minor variations discussed above, and regardless of aid’s failure to sustain peace or development.

Decoupling aside, it is the very resilience of the Palestinian aid model and the scale of that intervention, which marks out its importance in the story about Middle East regional aid. At the same time, the OPT has acted as a ‘laboratory’ where donors have been able to test a model which not only seems secure but successful enough that a major donor, instrumentalist [I6 - IFI], would consider exporting the post-Oslo Palestinian aid model to other Arab states in the wake of the 2011 uprisings. Even rich Gulf Arab donors are showing interest in what that model has to offer, as evidenced by the recent Qatari investment in Gaza. Rather than massive Arab uprisings being exported to the OPT and changing the approach of donors there, it is past Palestinian aid recipes focused on security priorities and neoliberal solutions which may be exported out of the OPT and around the Mediterranean. Thus the inclusion of Palestine, a polity generally considered inactive in the 2011 uprisings, helps us rethink patterns of aid for the whole region.
Chapter Five

5. Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine

Abstract

This chapter utilises theories of contentious politics to analyse the implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic model and the authoritarian transformations it induced. In the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings, this chapter problematises the economic neoliberal policies and the failing patterns of aid as root causes for the contention in the era of Fayyadism. It argues that protests against the neoliberal policies, the international aid industry, and the economic framework of the Oslo Peace Accords, albeit fragmented or repressed, constituted forms of contentious collective actions and formed cycles of contention where different actors joined forces to confront, challenge, and expose repressive authorities and proposed alternatives. However, these cycles of contention failed to transform into a social movement for political and economic rights due to their failure to draw on social networks, common purposes, or cultural frameworks, and thus failed to build solidarity or collective identities.

Theoretically, this chapter uses the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory to operationalise the notion of contentious economics as an integral but distinctive feature in the theories of contentious politics. This chapter defines the notion of contentious economics through the Palestinian indigenous notion of resistance economy, an alternative model that is emerging as an output of the cycles of contentions and contentious collective actions. Therefore, based on the concepts of contentious politics and the exercise of contentious collective actions, and inspired by the empirical and ethnographic evidence of this research, this chapter proposes the model of resistance economy as opposed to the neoliberal Fayyadism model.

This chapter uses empirical evidences to contribute to the expansion of theoretical debates, and as such the interaction between the theories of contentious politics, the concept of contentious economics, and the empirical dimensions of resistance economy constitute the primary contributions of this chapter to the corpus of literature.
Chapter Five: Contentious Economics in Occupied Palestine

5.1. Introduction

The case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) constitutes a prime example from which to explore and expand the dynamics of contentious politics and social movement theories, both from a historical and contemporary perspective. As an occupied, fragmented, ethnically-cleansed (Pappe 2006), dispossessed, and resilient nation, Palestinians could be seen as a social movement society. By resisting different forms of dominance, military occupations, and repressive authorities for several decades, Palestinians accumulated multiple cycles of contention and engaged in contentious collective actions to give birth to the Palestinian revolution (Al-Thawra Al-Filstiniya). This revolution and its characteristics has changed dramatically over the years, particularly with the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 (Shlaim 2010; Nusseibeh 2011; Kabha 2014). At that point, the Palestinian liberation movement declared the beginning of the end for the Palestinian national project (Khalil 2013). The revolution’s institutions transformed gradually into the bureaucracy run by the nascent and non-sovereign governing body, the Palestinian Authority (PA).

These institutions suffered from a profound identity crisis, impacting their functionality. But despite this, their mere existence induced changes to how the colonisation of Palestinian land is understood, and how social and resistance movements are constructed (Peters and Newman 2013). The PA’s pragmatic political position, the absence of a vision for a self-reliant economy, and the prioritisation of the Israeli security demands, resulted in a number of outcomes; a gradual erosion of the PA’s legitimacy, a complete dependency on international aid, a forced dependency on the Israeli economy, and an authoritarian trend in the PA’s character and in the operations of its security forces. Therefore, the authority’s institutions became a burden on the Palestinian people and added another layer of repression. The Palestinian people were further alienated and marginalised from the national decision-making process while a handful élite, largely undemocratic and illegitimate, claimed the representation. The combination of these factors formed a base for cycles of contention over the last two decades.
The process of alienation and marginalisation was entrenched in the era of Fayyadism (Leech 2012). Fayyadism, in reference to the former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, is the term used to describe the style of governance and state-building in the West Bank from 2007 until the present time. Fayyadism is a strategy for state-building through good governance, and an outcome for the status of aid dependency, the weak PA, and the limited political options which Palestinians have. Fayyadism is home-grown, even though it is an externally funded and sponsored paradigm, one which has been deeply influenced by donor’s prescriptions and funds (Khalidi and Samour 2011). It is aimed at establishing a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere. Both are seen as the fundamental pillars for the Palestinian state, despite the existence of the Israeli occupation and the intra-Palestinian fragmentation.

The PA, Israel and the international community have decided that the best and only route for state-building to occur is through achieving four pillars: security sector reform and enforcement of the rule of law; building accountable PA institutions; provision of effective public service delivery; and achievement of private sector led economic growth in an open and free market economy (PA 2008, 2009, 2011a,b). In the words of Fayyad himself, Fayyadism is about “focusing on establishing solid institutions, guided by the principles of good governance, respect for human rights, rule of law, and the efficient and effective delivery of public services” (PA 2011:7).

Some celebrate Fayyad’s reforms and argue that the improved performance of the PA has contributed to peace-building and the enhancement of Palestinians lives (World Bank 2011a,b, 2013a,b; IMF 2011a,b); while others argue that it has sustained the occupation, reengineered parts of the Palestinian society, created a new élite and revised the national goals (Khan 2010; Brown 2010a,b).

During this Fayyadist era, and in particular in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Palestinians have hardly been able to mobilise and act collectively en masse, and in instance where they have been able to do so, their collective actions were unsustainable (Hoigilt 2013).72 This is largely attributed to the authoritarian

---

72 Apart from the civil society led Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement which is gaining more momentum over the years and achieving remarkable successes (Barghouti 2011). The BDS is an international campaign led by Palestinian activists and calling for the boycott of Israel. In
transformation of the PA’s security forces, but is also due to a set of reasons, including the Israeli occupation, the political divide between Gaza and West Bank, the lack of legitimate representative leadership, the consequences of the neoliberal economic agenda, and the failure of international aid (Pace 2013; Haddad 2013). However, as argued by Adam Hanieh, despite the relative success of the neoliberal Fayyadist project in demobilizing social movements,

It would be wrong to assume its permanent ability to pacify the Palestinian population. In many ways, these neoliberal structures act to undermine their own conditions of existence. Most notably, they have clarified the role of the PA to a degree not previously witnessed in the West Bank (Hanieh 2013:120).

The emergence of the youth movement in 2011 is just a case in point that directly confronted the policies of the PA and the dire economic conditions. The exposure of the real roles of the authorities through the collective actions of the opponents goes in harmony with the theories of contentious politics.

Multiple common political and economic challenges exist between Palestine and the Arab world. These challenges came to be correlated or causally linked following the 2011 Arab uprisings (Hanieh 2013; Gerges 2013), but Palestinians remained largely silent and failed to gather in masses against the regime, the layers of oppression and repression, or the neoliberal economic policies. Inspired by the theoretical underpinnings of contentious politics discussed below, this chapter therefore argues that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Palestinian political and/or economic protests constituted cycles of contention, but failed to effectively transform into a social movement. In particular, protests against the economic policies of the PA, the international aid industry, and the economic framework of the Oslo Accords all constitute a form of contentious collective action where different actors join forces to confront and challenge authorities and élite around their claims to represent. These contentious collective actions were triggered by political

---

2005, and inspired by the South African experience and the apartheid nature of the Israeli state, Palestinian civil society issued a call for a global campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel until it complies with international law by: “ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall; recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194” (BDS, Introducing the BDS Movement, [Online]. Available: http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro).
opportunities and constraints or threats which urged those actors lacking in resources to act. However, the actions were not “backed by well-structured social networks [nor] galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols,” (Tarrow 2012:6) and therefore did not allow this form of contention to lead to a sustained interaction with the opponents. In other words, it did not develop into a social movement for political and economic rights.

Consequently, in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the protests against the repressing authorities in the OPT indicated that a movement was in the process of formation; however these protests failed to draw on the social networks, common purposes, or cultural frameworks, and failed to build solidarity through connective structures and collective identities to sustain the mounting collective challenges and actions. According to the theoretical framework of contentious politics developed by Sidney Tarrow, the protests failed to transform into “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2012:9).

At the theoretical level, this chapter aims to use the case of Palestine to expand the dynamics of the contentious politics theories through engaging with the notion of contentious economics. At the empirical level, this chapter aims to discuss the implications of the neoliberal paradigm during the Fayyadism era, and problematise them as root causes for contention. Additionally, this chapter will provide a critique for the international aid industry in the OPT, which forms a source of contention, through engaging with scholarly literature and also through activism at the street level. Finally, this chapter will propose the notion of resistance economy as a model that is based on the concepts of contentious politics and the exercise of the contentious collective actions. It is a model that challenges the repressive authorities and faces the multiple layers of oppression to reverse the cycles of de-development and fulfil economic rights in an ultimate expression of self-determination. It is argued here that the marriage of the concepts of contentious politics theories with the empirical dimensions of the resistance economy model constitutes the original contribution of this chapter to scholarly work. This is operationalised through the initial effort, presented here, to engage with the concept of contentious economics.
5.2. Conceptualising Contentious Politics and Economics

Contentious politics can be defined as “what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent” (Tarrow 2012:4). It is triggered by “changing political opportunities and constraints [which] create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own” (Tarrow 2012:6). Contentious politics occurs “when threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed” (Tarrow 2012:33). Repressed people resisted and contend through locally built repertoires of contention which are expanded through innovation and technologies of networking. Contentious politics, based on these repertoires of contention, lead to sustained interaction with opponents and to social movements when they are “backed by well-structured social networks and galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols” (Tarrow 2012:6).

According to the theories of contentious politics, the basis of social movements, protests, and uprisings, is the contentious collective action. Collective action can be “brief or sustained, institutionalised or disruptive, humdrum or dramatic” (Tarrow 2012:7); however it becomes contentious when “it is used by people who lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow 2012:7). In particular, contentious forms of collective action “bring ordinary people into confrontation with opponents, elites, or authorities” (Tarrow 2012:8). Those contentious collective actions could be upgraded into the social movement level if they involve mounting collective challenges; drawing on social networks, common purposes, and cultural frameworks; and build solidarity through connective structures and collective identities to sustain collective action (Tarrow 2012:8).

Therefore, as argued by Sidney Tarrow, “rather than defining social movements as expressions of extremism, violence, and deprivation, they are better defined as collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 2012:9). With the change
in the political opportunities and constraints or threats, people engage in contentious politics by

strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society; when they bring people together around inherited cultural symbols; and when they can build on – or construct – dense social networks and connective structures, these episodes of contention result in sustained interactions with opponents in social movements (Tarrow 2012:28-29).

This highlights that contentious politics are “culturally inscribed and socially communicated” (Tarrow 2012:29). It also reflects the centrality of the notion of the repertoire of contention and social movements as repertoires of knowledge of certain routines in a nation’s history and traditions.

Other than the way social movements are embedded in the theories of contentious politics, the concept of cycles of contention is another crucial element and building bloc. Beinin and Vairel credit Tarrow for inventing this term and define it as “a structured process by which social movements formed, mobilised, and declined due to political opportunities, innovations in forms of contention, successful articulation of collective action frames, coexistence of organised and unorganised activities, and increased interaction between challengers and constituted authority” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:19).

However, these concepts of contention are also disputed theoretically and empirically. Most recently by the edited volume Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa edited by Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel. They argue that Tilly’s notion of repertories of collective action best links the logics of actions and the logics of context, and they argue that the concept of repertoire “also assumes a universe of shared meaning, prior to mobilization” (Siméant 1993:315). It includes “routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1986:26). The repertoire is also a “‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986:273). But perhaps most importantly, Beinin and Vairel argue that “analysing repertories allows us to examine anticipations, perceptions, and self-definitions of contentious
actors and how they take up a position in the political field”. Finally the notion of repertories leads to a dynamic perspective on collective action and “facilities adopting a relational perspective on contentious politics. It is all the more important in authoritarian situations where activists feel more heavily the authorities’ arbitrary behaviour and violence” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:15). This is the case in Palestine particularly in the era of Fayyadism, with the entrenchment of the authoritarian transformations in the character, practices and policies of the Palestinian Authority (Brown 2010a,b; Leech 2012; Sayigh 2011).

In these authoritarian contexts, it is crucial to look at the “politics under the threshold” as argued by Steven Heydemann (cited in Beinin and Vairel 2013:25). This implies a better understanding of the configurations and transformations of the authoritarian regime and how collective action functions, where “contention faces huge constraints, the collective dimension of protest is far from given, and the security apparatus are omnipresent” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:25). This conceptual expansion and critique confirms that “repertoires of contention, social networks, and cultural frames lower the costs of bringing people into collective action, induce confidence that they are not alone, and give broader meaning to their claims” (Tarrow 2012:33).

Beinin and Vairel and the contributing authors to the edited volume mentioned earlier provide a constructive critique to the ideas of and conceptualisation offered by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly. They expand the McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s ideas using empirical evidence from the Middle East in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. They rightly argue that Tarrow, McAdam, and Tilly’s revised conceptual model is “far better suited [for] studying social and political mobilisations and contestations in the Middle East and North Africa than classical SMT and PPM [Political Process Model]” (Beinin and Vairel 2013:7). Their justification for this overarching conclusion is based on a number of reasons: a) most of the social

---

73 Tarrow’s views on Palestine seem to be problematic, misguided and fraught with contradictions. In his 3rd edition of his *Power in Movement*, Tarrow views the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a “civil war between Jews and Arabs” (p.107), and views the first Palestinian intifada as a “phase of radicalization” (p.174). Further, the narrative about the 2010 Turkish-led flotilla to Gaza presented in the introduction of the book (p.1-4) is one-sided in support of the Israeli narrative, subjective, dismisses crucial facts, and contains major factual inaccuracies. These understandings completely dismiss the Israeli settler colonial project and military occupation, and the ongoing process of ethnic cleansing by Israel taking place since 1948.
movements in the Middle East operate in the interstices of persisting authoritarianism that subject them to varying degrees of coercion and offer them few openings for mobilisation; b) many of social movements have very limited resources and weak formal organisations; and c) social movements typically rely on informal networks and innovative repertories to mobilise. These remarks resonate in the case of Palestine, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. This chapter argues that the Palestinian case adds a further dimension to the dynamics of contentious politics theories through the additional particularity and complexity of colonial conditions and the multiple layers of oppression and repression Palestinians have been, and continue to be exposed to. Additionally, the case of Palestine emphasises the importance of a perceived collective threat, rather than an “opportunity,” as the impetus for action (Beinin and Vairel 2013:8-9).

The case of Palestine is positioned within this broader Middle Eastern context and its interaction with the contentious politics theories. As Adam Hanieh argued, the question of Palestine “cannot be reduced to a purely “humanitarian” issue or simply an issue of national liberation; it is an essential component of the broader struggle against the uneven development and control of wealth across the Middle East” (Hanieh 2013:122). The utilisation of the classical concepts of the Social Movements Theory (SMT) in the case of Palestine-Israel, can be found in the work of Amal Jamal (2005), Eitan Alimi (2006, 2007, 2009), Elisabeth Marteu (2009), Julie Norman (2010), and Wendy Pearlman (2011); however their major shortcoming as cited in Beinin and Vairel is their failure to engage critically and take a step back from the classical concepts of the SMT. In addition, the social movements and the movements for self-determination are not homogenous, and their subjugation to a colonial actor adds a further layer of complicity that is still not absorbed sufficiently by the classical dynamics of the SMT.

This chapter argues that the concepts, dynamics, processes and tools of contentious politics are also applicable to the economic domain. Political protests have their own political economy dynamics, and economic reasons are often cited for the emergence of political contention. The intrinsic relationship between politics and economics is particularly explicit in the trajectory of the Arab uprisings. Protests based on economic justification also form a contentious form of collective action that
principally clashes with the authorities, elite and their economic policies which have political underpinnings and implications that have a profound effect on the everyday lives of people. The impact is particularly problematic in authoritarian contexts, thereby adding another level of economic repression to the political one. Changes in the trajectories of repression, rather than opportunities, could trigger the contention. The contentious collective actions that make up a form of resistance are not merely protests against, for instance, privatisation policies, tax laws, inflation, or high unemployment. Rather they have their own political bases that challenge, among other issues, the effectiveness of the ruling authorities, and the policy prescriptions proposed or dictated in the majority of the cases by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) through their “reform agendas”. The economic neoliberal packages adopted by the Arab governments prior to the Arab uprisings had been one of the major reasons for the emergence of the uprisings themselves with their political, economic, and social demands. Therefore, the centrality of the political economy dimension in the theories of contentious politics sheds light on another form of contention in the economic domain, which I refer to in this chapter as contentious economics.

This chapter uses the case of Palestine, in particular in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, to operationalise and expand the notion of contentious economics as an integral but also distinctive feature in the theories of contentious politics. This chapter uses existing empirical evidence to contribute to the expansion of the theoretical debates. Therefore, this chapter defines the notion of contentious economics through the concept of resistance and a steadfastness economy (resistant and steadfast economy)\(^\text{74}\) - an alternative model that is emerging as an output of the cycles of contentions and contentious collective actions.\(^\text{75}\) This model, as discussed


\(^\text{75}\) Many scholars and practitioners, mainly from the mainstream domains, view the concept of resistance economy as a concept that implies negativity, violence, and aggression. They view it as a pessimistic, backwards, and old-fashioned idea. They go further in viewing it as unrealistic, fantastical, and unviable in both economic and political terms. Additionally, they argue that it is merely a nostalgic concept to romanticize old indigenous approaches. However, I simply argue that the notion of resistance economy represents a complete opposite of what the counter-argument
later in the chapter, is based on confronting neoliberalism as a panacea for solving economic deterioration and de-development.\textsuperscript{76} This model advances the concepts of freedom and dignity as integral parts in exercising self-determination, and in fulfilling and acquiring economic rights. Therefore, in essence, this model is based on confronting the multiple authorities of repression, oppression and authoritarianism. This model, and the concept of contentious economics, are not exclusive or particular to the case of Palestine. In fact, comparable experiences can be found in other parts of the world, for instance the notions of solidarity and self-reliance in the economies of Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and even villages in Spain. Of particular interest are the alternative economic models developed by liberation or social movements which demand for political rights. The dynamics and processes of contentious economics are particularly vivid in such settings.

The application of the theories of contentious politics to the Palestinian case in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings can be depicted in the below figure based on the theoretical elaboration developed by Sidney Tarrow. This figure visualises the theoretical framework of this chapter. On one hand, the Palestinian society can be seen as a “social movement society” in a permanent status of confrontation with the authorities and occupying forces, that has lasted for at least the last century. On the other hand, the Palestinian context is characterised by the existence of multiple cycles of contention over the decades. Either way, the contentious collective actions proponents are proposing. It is an approach that has its roots in the local context and which was built up to react to the realities of the ground through acknowledging the potential of the people and aiming to expand their capabilities. It is an approach that understands development as freedom and dignity. It is based on clashing with repressive authorities in the short term, but with an optimistic and strategic vision for the economic and political spheres. It is a concept that celebrates resistance through practice as the main source of achieving rights under colonial subjugation and authoritarian conditions. The legacy of this concept is based on the legacy of the resistance movement itself in the Palestinian context. Intellectually, it is also based on a rich legacy of a revolution-based research and knowledge production, as Faris Giacaman (2014) reminded us recently through the utilization of the concept of “militant researchers.” Further elaboration on the notion of resistance economy can be found in the last section of this chapter. For further elaboration on nostalgia and mass mobilisation, please refer to Al-Azzeh (2015).

\textsuperscript{76} De-development is “the deliberate, systematic and progressive dismemberment of an indigenous economy by a dominant one, where economic – and by extension, societal – potential is not only distorted but denied” (Roy 2007). Therefore, de-development is a process that forestalls development by “depriving or ridding the economy of its capacity and potential for rational structural transformation [i.e., natural patterns of growth and development] and preventing the emergence of any self-correcting measures.” (Roy 1995). De-development, occurs when normal economic relations are impaired or abandoned, preventing any logical or rational arrangement of the economy or its constituent parts, diminishing productive capacity and precluding sustainable growth. Over time, de-development represents nothing less than the denial of economic potential (Roy 2014).
were always present in the Palestinian case by utilizing different ways and approaches to express the contentious feature of the collective actions. These cycles of contention and contentious collective actions, however, have to be put into a historical context and contextualised by the legacy of the Palestinian liberation movement, the ongoing Israeli military occupation and the colonisation of Palestinian land.

As indicated above, the accumulation of contentious collective actions, and the continuation of cycles of contention, lead to the emergence of social movements or a status where elements of contentious politics are expressed. The latter took place in Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as the contention in the economic domain was featured. This provides the reasoning for the use of the contentious economics concept. However, the expressions of contention were either repressed or fragmented in Palestine’s case, and therefore failed to emerge as a social movement, as they did in other parts of the Arab world. Reasons for the failure to create a social movement include a repression by the authoritarian tendencies of the PA, and the continuous oppression by Israel. Alternatively, they were fragmented as a result of internal Palestinian politics, a lack of leadership, the absence of a unifying strategy, or the bleak horizon for the future, amongst others. Either way, cycles of contention were the output and result of the fragmentation and repression trajectories and dynamics. This does not mean an absolute negativity or a failure of the opposition front. In fact, and in line with the theoretical underpinnings, the cycles of contention were successful in exposing the vulnerabilities, fragilities and failures of the authorities and to clash with them at the intellectual, policy, and strategy levels, as well as at the street level. A clash which illustrated the changing political opportunities and threats. The local-level initiatives on the ground, coupled with the intellectual efforts to develop the notion of a resistance economy, as opposed to neoliberalism, the failed aid industry, and the rejection of the economic policies of the PA, are ultimate expressions of contentious economics.

The figure below, prepared by the author, depicts the application of the theories of contentious politics to the Palestinian case in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings based on the theoretical elaboration developed by Sidney Tarrow.
Figure 8: Visualising the Theoretical Framework of Contentious Politics

Source: Prepared by the author based on the theoretical foundation of Sidney Tarrow (2012).

5.3. Explaining the Roots of Contentious Economics: Neoliberalism with a Palestinian Flavour

The signature of the Oslo Peace Accords and the establishment of the PA two decades ago gave rise to the roots of economic neoliberalism as a defining feature of the Palestinian economy and development process (Haddad 2012; Abunimah 2014). Therefore, the roots of contentious economics in the OPT are political (Hanieh 2013b). The Oslo economic framework implied that the PA had to adopt neoliberalism as its leading and defining ideology in both the political and economic spheres. Article 21 of the Palestinian Basic Law specifies that “the economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principles of a free market economy” (The 2003 Amended Palestinian Basic Law 2003). This secures the leading role of the private sector and the capitalist élite through offering them monopolies and political influence (Tartir 2012a; Dana 2014; Nakhleh 2014). In addition, the international

---

77 For further reading about the Oslo economic framework, please refer to Tartir and Wildeman (2013).
community assured that such adoption was inherent in the PA’s structure and in its state of dependency on aid (Hamdan 2010).

The philosophical rationale of the Oslo economic framework was to improve Palestinians’ standard of living, encourage them to participate in the peace process and to sustain peace by cashing in on peace dividends. The mantra for this model was a linear equation: invest more money to make Palestinians feel better economically to make it easier for them to compromise politically (Le More 2008). This notion of peace dividends is a derivative of the economic peace framework that seeks economic solutions for political problems and for normalcy between the colonisers and the colonised through joint ventures, cooperation and collaboration (Hever 2010).

By adopting such a model, the PA failed to play a crucial developmental role as a state-like body, and operated within a framework characterised by a complex network of corruption, nepotism, and a personalised style of governance that adopted a rent and rent seeking economic model (Khan et al. 2004; Hanafi and Tabar 2005; Le More 2008). This distorted neoliberal economic model suppressed the indigenous calls that any form of economic thinking must acknowledge that the dynamics of the free market are dictated by the dynamics of the real power. By ignoring this demand, the PA helped, directly and indirectly, in achieving one of the aims of the colonial power through realizing individual richness for few and national impoverishment for all.

The economic neoliberal agendas, as a major root for contention, were further entrenched during the Fayyadism era and gained a momentum due to the political transformations in the aftermath of the intra-Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza. Under Fayyad’s rule, the PA used the neoliberal ideology explicitly for packaging its state-building project and seeking the approval of the international community and broad segment of the Palestinian society (Samour 2014:68). Fayyad was the right person to implement the renewed rules of the game (political conditionality) as dictated by the international community and Israel. The Palestinian economic vision according to Fayyad’s plan
...is to have a diversified and thriving free market economy led by a pioneering private sector that is in harmony with the Arab world, is open to regional and global markets, and that provides the economic basis for a free, democratic and equitable society (PA 2007:18).

In addition, due to the condition of Israeli settler colonialism, Palestinian neoliberalism has its own flavour. Palestinians do not have basic pillars to implement the one-size-fit-all post-Washington consensus neoliberal policies since they lack sovereignty, control over borders, national currency, independent trade policy, central bank, protection of property rights or freedom of movement for labour or goods (Khan 2010).

Neoliberalism with its Palestinian flavour meant the superiority of the technocratic model over the national one, the accomplishment of the economic peace pillars through the private security led growth, the establishment of bureaucratic institutions for a liberation movement as a prerequisite for independence, the acceptance of normalcy of life under occupation, and the shift toward authoritarianism and securitised-development. In other words, and as was argued by Sobhi Samour:

The significance of the PA’s neoliberalism - be it as an economic doctrine, discursive instrument, class project, or form of social engineering- consists not so much in its failure to build a state and its inability to deliver sustainable economic growth, or in the biting austerity measures that it has imposed and the rising number of indebted households. None of this is an aberration of neoliberalism. Its significance, rather, lies in its political implication in a context of an objective reality that remains an anti-colonial struggle...the outcome of the PA’s neoliberalism is to erode further the basis of collective political power, the investment in and reliance on community resources, and the sense of solidarity among a people fighting for their freedom (Samour 2014:70).

The technocratic government model, as opposed to the national one, became the synonym for peace-loving and moderate governments that denounce ‘terror’ and view the world as a small village. They rely on the western governments and the US administration, to speak their language, promote the trappings of democracy, and master the jargon of transparency and accountability. These technocratic governments were the panacea for the PA’s reform and enjoyed the support of Israel as credible partners for peace. All this resulted in a further widening of the legitimacy gap between the Palestinian society and the ruling authority. Eroding
legitimacy is a source of contention and a justification for clashing with the élite. Adam Hanieh argues that the term technocrat was used to convoy a sense of neutrality, describing someone allegedly disinterested in “politics” and therefore supposedly [a] more responsible leader.’ By extension, this meant that the development process had to be an apolitical one, despite Israeli settler-colonialism, which meant that Israeli settler-colonialism was ‘portrayed as merely a set of administrative regulations that may (or may not) “hinder” Palestinian development (Hanieh 2013:118).

Therefore, the Israeli military occupation was framed “as a partner of Palestinian development rather than its antithesis” (Hanieh 2013:118).

The prevalence of market dynamics was translated into benefits for the powerful actors, Palestinian capitalists, PA élite, and Israeli firms. These actors engaged in joint businesses either voluntarily or compulsorily as required by the economic peace framework. The rationale was that the economic benefits would trickle down from the stronger economy in Israel to the weaker economy in Palestine; however, the result was a subaltern Palestinian economy forcefully contained by the Israeli one. Therefore, as a consequence of the way the PA and its economic élite intersected and gained their power from the occupation and the Oslo Accords structures, a new élite has emerged (Hilal 2014b). This chapter refers to this new elite as “the new entrepreneurs”. With the rapid accumulation of wealth, they transformed into the new rich category as a direct consequence of benefiting from the status quo. The failure of neoliberalism to address the inequality gap meant the rise of a new category in the Palestinian society, referred to as “the new poor”. The profits calculus of economic viability, which meant the commodification of resources or services such as agriculture and education, that led the private sector in their operations was in many cases at the expense of the Palestinian national project. Hence, this had implications on the cycles of contention and the clashes with a powerful economic élite covered by the political leadership and peace-building arrangements.

In addition to Palestine’s complete dependency on international aid, the economic growth achieved during the Fayyadism era was fuelled by easier access to credit
facilities. The PA, with the support of the donor community, launched credit programmes which came to be known locally as the “Americanization of the Palestinian society”. In 2010, the overall consumption in the West Bank and Gaza totalled US$7.3 billion, while GDP was merely US$5.7 billion. This meant that consumption as a percentage of GDP was 128 percent, making it one of the highest ratios in the world. Additionally, since 2006 the lending rate increased by 13% annually, while the growth in GDP per capita never exceeded 2%. Therefore, the ratio of the bank loans to deposits increased from 28% in 2008 to 45% in 2011. According to the May 2013 data from Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), loans to the agriculture sector did not exceed US$10 million, while credit cards loans were around US$45 million, consumption loans totalled US$99 million, and cars loan recorded US$239 million (Shikaki 2014; Hilal 2014).

From 2008 to 2011, the amount of credit extended for real estate, automobile purchases and credit cards increased by a remarkable 245 percent (Hanied 2013:119). Hanied rightly warns that “these forms of individual consumer and household debt had a deep impact on how people viewed their capacities for social struggle and their relation to society. Increasingly caught in the web of financial relationships, individuals are taught to satisfy needs through the market – usually through borrowing money - rather than through collective struggle for social rights” (Hanied 2013:119). Therefore, “much of the population became more concerned with “stability” and the ability to pay off debt rather than the possibility of popular resistance” (Hanied 2013:120). This implication of neoliberalism accepts the normalcy of life under the military occupation and has a major impact on the social structures, not only in terms of class, but also in terms of enforcing the superiority of individualism over collectivism. If social movements require collective actions, then such neoliberal measures undermine a major pillar for mobility and for sustainable cycles of contention.

Finally, a more stultifying Palestinian authoritarianism was coupled with the execution of economic neoliberalism. Authoritarianism was manifested at the planning and economic thinking level, as well as in its pure (in)security-focused meaning. PA officials during the Fayyadism era were convinced that there was only one right way for economic planning; the one prescribed by the international
financial institutions. This resulted in various clashes with the authorities and fuelled protests in the West Bank, including those which related to the income tax law, early retirement law, and water and electricity meters in 2012. In the pure security-focused sense, the whole development industry was securitised, with more than a third of international aid and governmental spending being allocated to the security sector as a pillar for the securitised-development approach. The operations of the Palestinian security forces and security sector reform, which was implemented as part of the aid conditionality and political decisions, resulted in an authoritarian regime that suppressed any form of contentious collective actions, including those in the economic domain. This is particularly the case in the aftermath of the post-2011 Arab uprisings. Nathan Brown argues that under Fayyadism, the maintenance of institutions was done “in an authoritarian context that robs the results of domestic legitimacy. Hence, the entire program is based not simply on de-emphasizing or postponing democracy and human rights but on actively denying them for the present” (Brown 2010a:2). This is what distinguished the present PA authoritarianism from Arafat’s: being “regularised and softened” and “less venal and probably less capricious. But it is also more stultifying” (Brown 2010a:10).

To better contextualise this authoritarian transformation, the neoliberal Fayyadism linked the Israeli security demands with the Palestinian economic growth (Samour 2014:67). This exchange between the security of the coloniser and the economic growth of the colonised meant the economic (and military) dominance of Israel and the entrenchment of Palestinian authoritarianism to fulfil the Israeli security demand.

### 5.4. Aiding Occupation: Critiquing the Aid Industry as a Source of Contention

The industry of international aid is a major source of contention, particularly in conflict-affected areas. The OPT is not an exception (Calis 2013). But with the existence of the Israeli military occupation, aid was “as much aid to Israel as it was to Palestinians” (Hanieh 2013:110). Despite the US$24 billion of aid given to Palestinians over the last two decades, aid has not brought peace, development, or security for the Palestinian people, let alone justice. Between 1993 and 2012, international aid disbursements to Palestinians totalled around US$ 24.6 billion.

Yet despite the sheer volume of aid, the socio-economic indicators show an ultimate failure in Palestine’s case. Using the consumption-based definition of poverty, 26.2% of the Palestinians lived in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 19% in the West Bank and 38% in Gaza. By using the income-based definition of poverty, the reality can be understood to be much worse, with 50% of Palestinians living in poverty in 2009 and 2010: 38% in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza (MAS 2012). According to the World Food Programme (2011), 50% of Palestinian households suffered from food insecurity: 33% were food-insecure and 17% were vulnerable to food insecurity. Unemployment has remained constant at around 30% since 2009, with 47% unemployed in Gaza in 2010 and 20% in the West Bank. The unemployment rate for Palestinian youth under 30 is particularly alarming at 43% (Bisan 2011; UNRWA 2011). The income and opportunities inequality gap continues to widen not only between the West Bank and Gaza, but also within the West Bank (Khalidi 2011a). Manufacturing and production capacities continue to erode (Smith 2011), while the vital agriculture sector remains sorely neglected (Abdelnour et al. 2012). The celebrated economic growth of 7.1% in 2008, 7.4% in 2009 and 9.3% in 2010, was a jobless growth driven by aid with an eroded productive base, anti-poor, and reflected an economy which was recovering from a low base (PASSIA 2009; Bahour 2011; UNCTAD 2011; IMF 2013).

The aid-development dilemma exemplifies outcomes of the de-development process, despite all international aid (Roy 1987, 1999). Aid administered as a “gap-filler” and “fire extinguisher solution for persistent crisis” (Nakhleh 2004, 2011) served as a major pillar to guarantee the existence of the PA, and rescued the Palestinian society

---

78 Despite the claims of enhanced ownership in the process of development planning, particularly in anti-poverty policies, Safadi et al. (2015:34) based on original set of interviews with policy makers unsurprisingly concluded that “international donor organizations continue to exert extraordinary influence on the policy-making process through financial and technical assistance”.

203
from further deteriorating of living conditions (Barsalou 2003; Said 2005; Abdel Majeed 2010; Tartir 2011). However, aid helped to sustain the status quo, subsidise the occupation, and contribute to the de-development process as a result of the diplomatic failures (Anderson 2005; Lasensky 2005; Keating et al. 2005). These failures exhibited an inability to understand or acknowledge the de-development process; unwillingness to address the main problems for such de-development (the Israeli military occupation); and finally the adoption of an irrelevant post-conflict conceptual framework (Abdel Karim 2005; Taghdisi-Rad 2011; Wildeman 2012; Tartir 2012b).

At the scholarly level, four schools of thought can be identified to better understand the aid-related contention.79 One group can be termed “instrumentalist”. This mainly includes the international financial institutions and many bilateral government donor agencies, and argues that the fundamentals of the Oslo economic framework are sound and the model should be maintained but simply needs to be better applied. This group tends to sanitise the Israeli occupation and the settler colonial nature of the Israeli state. It also lays a disproportionate amount of blame on the PA for the failure of aid to achieve results. A second group, the “critical instrumentalists”, does focus on the occupation as the main obstacle to peace and development, and they consider aid and politics to be intrinsically linked. They are not however very critical of the neoliberal normative values that define Palestinian aid. They believe the policy should be re-evaluated and retooled, and they share the instrumentalist faith in the ability of policy to bring about positive change.

The third group consists of “critics” of the Oslo aid model. Many in this group assert that the aid model is itself a part of the occupation, because it is designed in a way that subverts Palestinian development while reinforcing and subsidizing the Israeli occupation, along with longstanding Israeli policies dating back to the 1948 Nakba and beyond. For these critics, development is not a policy to be implemented, but domination to be resisted, because in the case of Israel-Palestine, the hidden intent behind development aid is to reinforce the occupation. The “critics” argue that economic integration benefits Israel at the expense of the Palestinian economy and

---

79 The classification of critics and instrumentalists was outlined in David Mosse’s ethnography of aid policy and practice ‘Cultivating Development (Mosse 2005).
they view policy as a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power or dominance, and that this hidden reality is the true political intention of development (Nakhleh 2011; Khalidi and Samour 2011; Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009; Tartir et al. 2012).

A fourth group, which is not often considered when analysing the impact of aid, is the “neo-colonialists”, who consider aspects of foreign aid to have been a success. Particularly in the West Bank, Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation has largely been mollified and Israel’s policy aims have largely been achieved. This perspective is highly influential, especially in the US, and can be seen in the approach of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy advocating an approach to aid. This approach provides economic incentives to Palestinians in return for them giving up rights. Also, the Congressional Research Service reports spell out the duty of aid to Palestinians: combating terrorism against Israel; encouraging Palestinian peaceful coexistence with Israel while preparing Palestinians for self-governance; and meeting humanitarian needs to prevent further destabilisation (Zanotti 2013). Therefore, when aid to Palestinians is analysed from a neo-colonial perspective, it may not be failing at all.

This chapter argues that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the debate and contention around the aid industry and donor policies in the OPT, and the PA economic policies, have moved beyond the scholarly and élite circles onto the Palestinian streets. As a result, there have been numerous protests which, despite being small in size, constitute a form of contentious collective action. They formed cycles of contention and were one of the driving forces behind the resignation of Prime Minister Fayyad in mid-2013.

Targeting the aid industry and donors’ policies, multiple protests took place between 2011 and 2013. There were mainly organised by the youth movements which emerged in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. USAID was the major target of the protests, particularly during the 2012 Obama visit to the OPT. “USAID go out”, “USAID is entrenching the occupation and hindering our development”, “we reject funding that undermines the exercise of our self-determination”, are a sample of the slogans that appeared in a protest against USAID on September 10, 2011 in Ramallah (Al-Herak Al-Shababi Al-Mustaqel 2011). Posters critical of USAID were
designed by youth activists and disseminated over social media, in activist circles and among the public. USAID was not the only target; the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) (Palestinians for Dignity 2012a) was targeted for their role in supporting Palestinian authoritarianism, and due to the European Union’s “hypocritical and duplicitous positions towards the Palestinian people and rights”. The youth even warned that they will escalate their actions to include direct confrontation with those who facilitate the work of the occupation and normalisation (Palestinians for Dignity 2012a). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Al-Quds Newspaper 2013) and the European Union were targeted for their role in supporting and organizing normalisation activities and sponsoring joint Palestinian-Israeli projects. Even The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was under criticism for not assuming its responsibilities in protecting Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

Forms of protest included occupying offices (sit-ins) as in the case of ICRC, blocking entrances to offices and protesting at 7 a.m. in front of the EUPOL COPPS offices; waiting for USAID representatives with shoes in front of a conference they were sponsoring; holding slogans against USAID during Obama’s visit; and organizing a peaceful gathering in front of the Japanese embassy in Ramallah. A particular form of protest was designing posters and visuals to convey the message and spread it over social media. This proved to be a very influential tool to raise awareness among people and move the discussion about aid from the intellectual élite circles to the people in their homes in the form of a poster, song, or novel. Additionally, a number of youth-led initiatives were launched precisely to counter the status of aid dependency, promote concepts and practices of self-reliance, and revive the traditions of collective actions and voluntarism.

The protests were not only against the donor community and their policies and practices, but also against the PA’s neoliberal economic policies and the rising cost of living. People protested against the income tax law, the increase in the value added taxes, the prices of fuel and gas, and the early retirement law. Public servants protested for not receiving their salaries due to the financial crisis of the PA. Other

---

80 Poster designers Hafez Omar (Walls) and Walid Idris (Palestine Posters) were key figures in this domain.
economic demands of the protestors concerned price controls on basic goods, public investment, the protection of local producers, a cap on top earners in the public sector, and the introduction of minimum wage (Samour 2014:72). But most importantly, the overall Oslo economic framework and Paris Protocol (the economic annex of the Oslo Peace Accords) were major targets of the protesters. This formed the ultimate exemplification of the marriage between political and economic protests. In September 2012 for instance demonstrations took place throughout the West Bank. Protests were characterised by road closures, tire burning, self-immolations or attempts to do so, peaceful demonstrations, stone throwing, clashes with the PA security forces, and workers’ strikes.

In a major protest against the Paris Protocol on September 11, 2012, Palestinians for Dignity (the umbrella for the youth movements post-2011) stated in their press release and call for action that,

…building upon the popular anger that rejects being turned into beggars who are preoccupied with making a living instead of our national struggle, Palestinians for Dignity calls upon you to join a mass march to demand: Social justice and the termination of the Paris Economic Protocol…Let us all emerge from our silence and tolerance of the Palestinian Authority’s dependence on the Occupying State, the rampant corruption in our institutions, and our leadership that no longer has options, only justifications (Palestinians for Dignity 2012b).

Meanwhile, as was argued by the economist Raja Khalidi in 2012, “a series of sarcastic, graphic postings and humorous songs on Palestinian youth internet/Facebook networks depict a series of accusations against the PA encompassing grievances about Ministerial privileges, urban and rural poverty, runaway prices, and political dysfunction” (Khalidi 2012:4). In turn, the protests against the rapid increase in the cost of living could be summarised by the words of a protestor who told me during a protest in Ramallah, “we receive the salaries of Somalia and pay the prices of Switzerland”. A poster that was widely circulated stated clearly that “subjugation will lead to a revolution”.

---

81 For further analysis on Paris Protocol, please refer to Ahmad (2014).
The results and implications of these protests were mixed depending on their sustainability and regularity, demands’ ceilings, repression and co-option attempts by the PA, and the political trajectories.\(^{82}\) A notable example includes the protests against the income tax law in January 2012. As noted by Raja Khalidi, “this Law is notable for being the most significant, if not first-ever, economic measure since 2005 to be rejected by public outcry. In January, the PA was obliged to announce its suspension and reformulation after a “public dialogue”’”(Khalidi 2012:4). The protests against the Paris Protocol were not successful in changing that Protocol or dismissing it, but they accumulated enough anger that its rejection became a popular demand.\(^{83}\)

Regardless of the final results, the cycles of contention and contentious collective actions over the last three years indicate that despite the demobilizing policies of Fayyadism and the authoritarian transformation, Palestinians remain able to clash with the repressive authorities and engage in contentious collective actions, albeit at very small numbers if compared with the past. As Sobhi Samour summarised it:

Within just a few days, the protests helped to counter the ubiquitous feeling of collective apathy, created a vehicle for widespread public discussion around the political economy of the Oslo framework, and produced initial victories by forcing the PA to reverse tax and price increases and its decision to table a proposal for a minimum wage law (Samour 2014:73).

In this realm of contentious politics and economics, it is crucial to acknowledge the limitations and contradictions of the contention. A major challenge for the cycles of contention in the OPT, discussed above, is to overcome their very own contradictions, and face collectively the attempts of the authorities to suppress and

\(^{82}\) With the emergence of the economic protests in the OPT, the Israeli government voluntarily transferred an advance payment of PA tax revenues collected by Israel, and Israel also asked the EU and the US to grant more funds to the PA. Additionally, they lifted a number of checkpoints in the West Bank and issued more permits for Palestinian workers to work in Israel and its colonies in the West Bank. This was due to Israeli fears that these economic protests could turn into an intifada against the PA and Israel and threaten the overall framework of the Oslo Peace Accords.

\(^{83}\) Put simply, the Paris Protocol institutionalized Israel’s total control over the Palestinian economy and necessitated that the PA would follow the decisions taken by Israel in relation to taxes and prices. As summarized by Samour, the Paris Protocol “gave Israel the right to collect monthly trade taxes on the PA’s behalf (thus seizing leverage over roughly two-thirds of the PA’s total revenues); to set the PA’s VAT rate at a level no less than two percentage points below that of Israel despite the enormous difference in the size of the two economies and personal incomes (so as not to threaten Israeli producers); and to force the PA to import fuel and electricity from Israel at Israeli consumer prices” (Samour 2014:72). For further elaboration, read Husseini and Khalidi (2013).
co-opt them. In the theories of contentious politics, Sidney Tarrow rightly reminds us that “although movements usually conceive of themselves as outside of and opposed to institutions, acting collectively inserts them into complex political networks, and thus within the reach of the state” (Tarrow 2012:34). This reminder is extremely relevant to the case of Palestine, particularly within the overall framework of Palestinian authoritarianism and Israeli colonisation.

5.5. Challenging Authorities: Towards a Viable Resistance Economy Model

Critics of the aid industry, donors’ policy prescriptions, and the PA economic policies, have not only passively critiqued but also actively provided contributions, albeit fragmented, to an alternative paradigm that moves away from neoliberalism. These attempts illustrate an ultimate challenge to the authorities and their dominant models (Abdel Karim 2009; Abdel Karim and Sbieh 2011; Cali 2012; Bisan 2013; Farsakh 2014). They are acts of resistance that fit into contentious economics and politics frameworks. These contentious actions lay at the heart of reclaiming economic rights both in theory and practice. And therefore, this chapter views these efforts as contributing towards building a model of a resistance economy.

This chapter defines the resistance economy, through a developmental lens, as a model that understands the development process as a cumulative, complementary, economic, social and political one that fundamentally seeks to liberate human beings from dependency and humiliation. Philosophically, the concept of a “resistance economy” is a process that sets out to emancipate human beings by freeing them from poverty, inequality, fear and oppression, empowering them to cultivate their lands, and expanding their options, capabilities and potentials to ensure their happiness. As such, this socially-inclusive model rejects economic unity with the colonizing power and resists attempts to sustain the status of asymmetric containment. In other words, the model is the opposite of the Paris Protocol, working at dismantling the regime of oppression and acting as a model that is socially inclusive, and which can ultimately play a role in ending the occupation and colonisation of Palestine.
On this basis, this chapter argues that a resistance economy is a very real alternative that can, through a good system of collaboration and creativity, be implemented and maintained for a sustainable and progressive Palestinian economy. It begins by understanding economy as more than a monetary transaction for financial profit. Instead, the economy should be understood and viewed as an extension of a people’s *mode de vie* that connects through the intersection of the global and local efforts. A resistance economy is an indigenous approach which is well-rooted in Palestinian history and in the pre-PA era, long before the monopolisation of the Palestinian economy by the development-industrial-complex (Tartir in Amrov 2013).

Put differently, the neoliberal Fayyadism model and the resistance economy model are based on fundamentally different rationales and lead different paths. Neoliberal Fayyadism is a top-down approach, while resistance economy is socially inclusive and built from below. Neoliberal Fayyadism is a model that is inherently unable and unwilling to clash with the occupying power, but rather cooperates and lives with it. Neoliberal Fayyadism is a local phenomenon sponsored externally, while resistance economy is an indigenous, locally rooted and sponsored model. Neoliberal Fayyadism focuses on institution building while resistance economy is about the people. If neoliberal Fayyadism is about standards and neoliberal governance, resistance economy is about rights and the national struggle. While one is centred on individualism, the other is focused on collectivism. Resistance economy then is not only about resisting the Israeli control of Palestinian economy, but also about being courageous enough to self-reflect about mistakes that are being made within the Palestinian socio-economic environment.

Interestingly, the youth movement in the OPT provided its own definition for the resistance economy model and spelled out a number of its pillars. In their 2012 press release, mentioned earlier, they were asked: What is the solution? Is there really a solution? This is what they answered:

Of course there is an alternative. The alternative is an economic resistance that can achieve a redistribution of resources, social justice, and dignity for the Palestinian people. This is not just a slogan! The most important alternative steps we can take are: to start a comprehensive boycott of all Israeli products; to refuse to adhere to the Paris Protocol and to call on the Palestinian Authority to announce this explicitly; to impose high taxes on imported
products to protect our national products and agriculture; to reclaim the Palestinian lands dubbed “Areas C” that comprise 60% of the West Bank, to unite these areas with the rest of the West Bank; to work together to plant these lands; and to establish agricultural cooperatives to fulfil local needs. Furthermore, there are many other ideas that Palestinian economists can put forth if there is only the political will to implement suggestions and rid ourselves of economic dependency (Palestinians for Dignity 2012b).

Other scholars and practitioners defined resistance economy as part and parcel of the liberation process. In an interview with, Rena Zuabi, a sustainable human and environmental developmental specialist, she stated that:

The goal of the resistance economy is to build Palestinian self-determination and unification as part and parcel of the liberation process. It forges communities’ mechanisms and processes of resistance by increasing community interdependence and self-sufficiency. Therefore, the resistance economy is not a prototypical economic development concept. The resistance economy does not expand vertically i.e. it is not in the business of neoliberal institution building and it is not building an industrialised, globalised economy. The goal of the resistance economy is not to measure productivity per se, but to measure levels of community interdependence and self-sufficiency. It requires horizontal growth across the grassroots, using local capital resources. The resistance economy undermines international obsession with the Palestinian victim, and instead focus on the strengths, power, and resources of the Palestinian people. It puts meaning back into the notion of agency in development. The resistance economy merges the economic, the political, the social. It is an organic product of the Palestinian reality (Zuabi 2014).

From the same point of departure but from a different perspective, political economist, Ibrahim Shikaki, argued that:

The goal of resistance economy is very much a political one; on the short run dismantling the dependency relations with the Israeli economy and satisfy local demand. And on the long run resistance economy is part of a wider strategy of resistance meant to end Israeli colonialism. Therefore, resistance economy is not envisaged to be a viable long-term alternative. The role of economic resistance is similar to that of military resistance, culture resistance, BDS and political resistance; attrition. The asymmetric balance of power is a core feature of the Palestinian liberation process; therefor the role of any resistance/steadfastness strategy is attrition of the coloniser on all arenas. After all, the social
component is also imperative, since the sense of collectiveness is crucial for any resistance/steadfastness strategy (Shikaki 2014).

However, there are few prerequisites to ensure the viability of the resistance economy model. These prerequisites include, but are not limited to, the need to reinvent the aid industry practically; redefine development conceptually; utilise indigenous approaches for livelihood and governance; resist and reject the Israeli matrix of control beyond rhetoric; and resist and challenge any form of Palestinian authoritarianism. In other words, Palestinians need an economy that reinforces solidarity, social ties and accumulates social capital and national cohesion. This can be done through subjecting the market and its transactions and mechanisms to the principles of equality, justice and local democratic inclusive participation in the processes of decision-making. The economy should be placed within societal dynamics, rather than restricting and containing the society through economic dynamics. The challenge remains on how to operationalise these prerequisites.

This alternative framework provides a different approach to the much-criticised aid industry that considers development as a technocratic, apolitical and neutral process. Shifting towards a model that recognises structures of power and relations of colonial dominance (Nagarajan 2012), and which rearticulates processes of development as being linked to the struggle for rights, resistance and emancipation requires problematizing the mainstream notion of development as one which is centred on free-market economy, toward shifting the focus into people-centred participatory democratic approaches and steadfastness/Al-Summud strategies (Barghouti 2011). Such an approach also implies shifting the framework of the humanitarian assistance from ‘destroying agency’ toward ‘promoting solidarity’ (Tabar 2012), and problematizing the liberal notion of individualism that is associated with and reproduced through donor democracy schemes as an alternative to the grassroots participatory democratic forms and processes (Nakhleh 2004, 2011; Samara 2005; CDS-BZU 2011; Al-Kadri 2011a,b; 2014). In other words, the alternative economic vision has to sit at the heart of the Palestinian struggle and follow a genuine bottom-up participatory citizen-centric development model. This model needs to be legitimate. Therefore there is also a need to think about how Palestinians can institutionalise and create a bureaucracy around a democratic people-driven development agenda.
These theoretical understandings and propositions were coupled with initiatives on the ground that aim to examine the viability of the resistance economy model, and as in, by extension the social mobilisation that practices contentious economics. These forms of mobilisation utilised different tools that are normally used in building-up social movements. Such tools include public awareness about certain issues; lobbying for change at the policy level; working with and mobilizing grassroots communities; working directly with neglected and marginalised actors; building-up different discourse through innovative media outlets, and finally publishing books, composing music and different forms of arts and poster designs. What is vital about these initiatives, as far as the contentious politics and economic theories are concerned, is their courageous determination to challenge and confront the authorities while representing and empowering others.

These initiatives as a practice of contentious economics include for instance the work of Bisan Centre for Research and Development on the importance of raising public awareness to create cycles of contention. In particular, the initiative they took against the neoliberal joint industrial zones in the West Bank is a case in point. The work of Dalia Association through engagement with grassroots communities and marginalised women groups in rural areas, built the case for the importance of self-determination in the aid industry and development process. Other civil society organisations working in the agriculture sector, such as MA'AN Development Center and The Union of Agricultural Work Committees, are particularly important in contributing to the building blocks of the resistance economy and the agriculture sector.

The research production of critical institutions such as the Center for Development Studies at Birzeit University was a crucial base for informing the alternative agenda. The policy-oriented production of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian policy Network provided a cutting edge analysis that informed activism in the streets, in addition to the impact at the public policy level. Finally, newly established media outlets, particularly by youth, such as Quds News Network, played an invaluable role in disseminating information and increasing public awareness. Media was not the only form of communication, but also artists and writers devoted their effort to this matter. Novels which protested the consequence of neoliberalism were under
unprecedented demand. Posters’ designers who were among the youth activists were influential in their production to fuel activism, and the same goes for songs, films and theatre plays. Such micro-examples constitute a component of the overall framework of the resistance economy. However, these cycles of contention are still fragmented, and the channels which allow them to contribute to the framework of resistance economy are still a work-in-progress that had accelerated in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.

5.6. Conclusion

The entrenchment of the neoliberal economic policies during the Fayyadism era, backed with the international community and their financial assistance, triggered activism -despite limited- in the streets of the West Bank in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The policies of the neoliberal Fayyadism deepened the crisis of legitimacy, sustained the de-development process, and directly and indirectly entrenched the Israeli military occupation and the colonial condition. The fragilities, limitations and harmful consequences of the Fayyadism paradigm, pointed out to the need for a viable alternative that is able to start a process of reversing the de-development condition. Critical scholars and intellectuals, coupled with the work of a number of Palestinian institutions, initiated a process of operationalizing the concept of resistance economy.

Using the theories of contentious politics and social movements, this chapter aimed to understand the economic-related protests in the OPT in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The analysis showed that these protests constituted cycles of contention but failed to transform into a social movement. However, these protests and the tools and approaches they used, showed that they illustrated a form of contentious collective actions where multiple actors joined forces to challenge and confront authorities of repression and oppression. Although protests were not backed by well-structured social networks or galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, they managed to challenge neoliberalism and suggest an alternative paradigm through intellectual efforts and actions on the ground, one which could build towards a model of resistance economy. The notion of resistance economy was used to reflect on the broader dynamics of contentious politics theories and
contribute to its expansion through introducing the concept and the practice of contentious economics.

The focus of this chapter was not on the analysis of the reasons that contributed to the failure of cycles of contention to transform into a social movement in the OPT in the aftermath of Arab uprising. Rather, the roots and sources of such contention were explored through discussing the consequences of the neoliberal economic policies, and the impact of international aid. The notion of a resistance economy was advanced as an ultimate expression of contentious politics and economics, and as a framework that theorises and operationalises the cycles of contention in the era of Arab uprisings and Fayyadism. However, efforts to establish an alternative model in an ultimate expression of clashing with the repressive authorities, remain fragmented or repressed. This is the reason why these contentious politics and economics in the OPT have not yet emerged as a social movement in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. But as a social movement society, for Palestinians, the pillars and roots of contentious economics are political in nature and are subject to social dynamics that, in instances of contention, are stirred by injustice and inequality.
6. Conclusion

This thesis consisted of five chapters/articles and explored the overarching themes of governance and state-building in the occupied West Bank, with particular focus on the time when Dr. Salam Fayyad was the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority between 2007 and 2013. It explored dimensions of the Fayyadist paradigm for state-building and its associated style of governance that ruled the occupied West Bank primarily during this time. This home-grown but externally funded and sponsored paradigm had polarised scholars and practitioners, however it equally fascinated them. For its proponents, Fayyadism, or the Fayyadist paradigm, was a technocratic revolution that re-invented the Palestinian Authority’s institutions and put the Palestinian Authority on the path for statehood and independence. For its critics, Fayyadism was an approach that sustained the Israeli occupation through masking the reality of the Israeli settler colonial domination with a rhetoric of aid-dependent institutional and state building. Despite these polarised perspectives, Fayyadism induced and was also associated with shifts and transformations in the Palestinian polity and its systems of governance, especially when compared to the era of Arafatism particularly between 1993 (establishment of the PA) and 2004 (death of Arafat). Examining the consequences of some of these transformations in the security and economic spheres on the daily lives of people, their security, and their ability to resist the Israeli occupation and the broader dynamics of the Palestinian struggle for freedom and liberation, constituted the main line of inquiry for this thesis and contribution to the body of knowledge in this realm.

A central tenet of the Fayyadist paradigm was the dominance of security reform as a major pre-requisite for state-building. Thus, under Fayyadism the West Bank became a space for security amplification and security campaigns to induce “law and order”. This security amplification also extended and dominated the economic development sphere and created a securitised-development paradigm reinforced by a set of classical neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the major international financial institutions, albeit with their Palestinian flavour. Therefore, Fayyadism aimed at establishing a Weberian monopoly of violence in the security sphere and a post-Washington Consensus neoliberal agenda in the economic sphere, despite the Israeli occupation and intra-Palestinian fragmentation.
This thesis tackled the transformations in the security sphere at three levels. First, through contextually analysing the evolution and reform processes of the Palestinian security forces between 1993 and 2013 (Chapter one). Second, through critically assessing and unpacking the Fayyadist paradigm by drawing on the findings of an ethnographic fieldwork investigation conducted at two sites in the occupied West Bank, namely Balata and Jenin refugee camps, as well as the associated relevant literatures (Chapter two). Third, through tackling in-depth the consequences of the Fayyadist security campaigns - from the perspectives of the people - on their security and the broader dynamics of resistance against Israel (Chapter three).

Furthermore, this thesis examined and analysed the transformations in the economic sphere at two levels. It addressed the interaction between Fayyadism and the aid industry to examine whether the transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist paradigm impacted donors’ operations and the overall framework of the aid industry (Chapter four). This thesis also utilised theories of contentious politics to analyse the implications of the Fayyadist paradigm’s neoliberal economic framework and policies and also the associated authoritarian transformations it induced (Chapter five), to expand the conceptual underpinnings of the contentious politics theories through proposing the notions of contentious economics and resistance economy.

In sum, the core unit of analysis is the Fayyadist paradigm, and each chapter/article was devoted to addressing one aspect of it: the first chapter was concerned with contextualizing Fayyadism; the second chapter focused on understanding the paradigm itself; the third chapter examined the consequences of Fayyadism on the security of the Palestinian people; the fourth chapter critically examined the role of international donors and the aid industry in its policies; and the fifth and final chapter analysed the implications of Fayyadism’s neoliberal economic model through the application of a contentious politics and economics framework.

Methodologically, this thesis employed a number of research methods and approaches. Due to its empirical and ethnographic design and contribution, the research fieldtrips to the occupied West Bank between 2010 and 2014 constituted the major source of its original contribution to the scholarly knowledge. The chapters that addressed the transformations in the security sphere (Chapters one, two, and three) deployed a bottom-up ethnographic approach, while the chapters that
addressed the economic sphere (Chapters four and five) deployed an experts semi-structured interviews model combined with action-research and observation approach.

Conceptually, the basis of the strategy of change underpinning Fayyadism’s pillars was an outcome of a set of strategic, institutional, and operational transformations, induced by the main governance actors in the occupied West Bank. In particular, the relationship between the Fayyadist paradigm and the notion and practice of resistance was the main common theme between the five chapters. Resistance in its broad and all-encompassing meaning was a central common theme that always exposed the fragility of the Fayyadist paradigm in both the security and economy spheres, as discussed and revealed by the ethnographic and empirical evidence. This thesis argued that the tensions around resistance, demonstrate the fundamental flaw of executing a security reform and pursuing a disarmament strategy and security campaigns in the absence of sovereign national authority, and in the presence of a foreign military occupation, without fundamentally addressing the imbalances of power. After all, Fayyadism aimed and claimed to build a state, reform its security forces and security doctrine, and adopt a set of neoliberal economic policies; yet, all of this was meant to happen in the absence of sovereignty and state.

The ethnographic data and empirical evidence discussed in chapters revealed that despite the proclaimed institutional successes of Fayyadism, these achievements failed to have a meaningful impact on the basic rights of Palestinians or to the overall framework of the international aid industry. The voices from below articulated the detrimental effects Fayyadism has on resistance against the Israeli military occupation, and by extension on their own protection and security. The ethnographic evidence also suggested that the Fayyadism security campaigns resulted in an authoritarian transformation in both the PA’s character and its security forces operations which was manifested in the excessive use of arbitrary detention and torture in the PA’s prisons, as well as the minimal space for opposition voices or resistance in the Palestinian polity. The voices from below pointed out that conducting security reform within a context of colonial occupation and without addressing the imbalances of power can only ever have two outcomes: “better” collaboration with the occupying power, and a violation of the security and
(national) rights of the Palestinian people by their own government and (national) security forces. This was manifested in authoritarian transformations; this time framed in a state-building and good governance project. Therefore, the enhanced functionality of the PA’s security forces and the reformed style of governance that was defined through security collaboration with Israel, resulted in the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation; in this way, Fayyadism directly and indirectly sustained the occupation. Therefore, the shifts and transformations that occurred during the Fayyad paradigm in occupied Palestine resulted in two major outcomes: criminalising resistance and entrenching neoliberalism.

Beyond this fundamental and macro conclusion, the following sub-sections of this conclusion reflect further on the notion of the “new Palestinian” as an illustration of the transformation that occurred under Fayyadism, and also discuss and explain the Palestinian in-fighting. Additionally, this conclusion discusses in length the outcome of a very brief visit to both Balata and Jenin refugee camps in June 2015. It also engages in a discussion on the “self-assessment” exercise conducted by Fayyad to “self-evaluate” Fayyadism and test its philosophy further through the operations of his new development enterprise/foundation. The conclusion ends with a detailed reflection on the future avenues for research with some additional focus on the operationalisation of the notion of resistance economy.

The “New Palestinian”

The notion of the “new Palestinian- al-Falastini al-Jadeed” could encapsulate the transformation that the Palestinian society and its social fabric has gone through during the Fayyadism era, particularly in the security sphere. From the perspective of the Fayyadist paradigm and its international backers, the Palestinian Fidaie’ (freedom fighter) is a main obstacle for peace and state building and constitutes a backward element in this modern era. This “new Palestinian” meant that the leaders of the PA’s security establishment were upgraded to senior positions in the political leadership or in municipalities and governorates. The “old guards” of the PA’s security forces were replaced with new leadership, with fresh blood, new mentality, and western training. The technocratic approach extended to the PA’s security establishment as part of the new security doctrine of the PA. The “new Palestinians”
were not only the “moderate, peaceful, civil, and realistic/pragmatic” leaders at the top level, but also they exist at the micro level.

For instance, the politics of recruiting in the PA’s security forces had new criteria. A process of security vetting became a pre-requisite for the recruited security personnel, particularly the ones who are selected for training in Jordan or Jericho under the supervision of the US Security Coordinator (USSC) mission. The recruited members in the national security forces must have a clear and clean security history with no political affiliation in opposition parties or any past in armed groups, including the Fatah’s one, or any record in resisting the occupation even in peaceful ways. The recruited soldiers are young, mostly between 19-22 years old, who go through an intense training process, or what critics call, “brainwashing sessions”. The “new Palestinian” became to be the professional, well-trained security personnel, who follows a clear chain of command, and ensure the sustainability of security collaboration with Israel to impose stability and public order. The filtering process based on the security check-up and clean records, and the emergence of a new segment in the structure of Palestinian society, had its impact on the social dynamics as the “new Palestinians” were perceived by a considerable portion of the Palestinian population as a new repression tool in the hands of an authoritarian authority who claim to be build a state, but effectively, they argued, it entrenched and reinforced the Israeli occupation and the structures of control and oppression.

**Explaining and Contextualising Palestinian In-Fighting**

Although it can be argued that the “new Palestinian” is an outcome of the Fayyadist paradigm, however, it is safe to conclude that the notion of the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” is not an outcome of the Fayyadist paradigm per se. It has existed historically, but was institutionalised and standardised and became officially embedded in the operations of the PA’s security apparatuses during the Fayyadism era. The trajectories that the Palestinian national movement passed through, and the politics of the PLO, led to multiple clashes among the Palestinians, mainly while in exile in the seventies and eighties. The leadership of the PLO, represented by Arafat, was accused of silencing and assassinating voices from the Palestinian opposition, which represented another form of the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” notion. With
the establishment of the PA, the intra-Palestinian fighting and torturing took on a new form, through for example, the creation of the PA Preventive Security Force’s Death Squad, which was tasked to arrest and torture the voices who opposed the Oslo Peace Accords during the Arafat era. The Palestinian authoritarian trends during Arafism were not only targeting political opposition, journalists or artists, but also other voices from the Palestinian civil society who called for accountability and transparency to tackle corruption. In 1999, twenty prominent academics, intellectuals and members of the PLC signed the “The Nation Calls Us” manifesto, to demand accountability and immediate tackling of corruption. The PA security forces arrested many of the signatories and accused them of threatening national unity. However, due to his popular legitimacy and as a legendary figure of the Palestinian revolution, Arafat considered himself as the father of the Palestinian nation/people and therefore dealt with such matters as the head of the family. It was a very common practice of Arafat to send one group to arrest, torture, threaten or harass someone, and the next day to send another group to check on that person and apologise indirectly.

However, during the Fayyad era, these dynamics transformed to become further formalised and institutionalised in the security doctrine of the PA, as was explained in the previous chapters. These transformations were also associated with the further entrenchment of authoritarian trends and the criminalisation of resistance. The biggest and most harmful illustration of the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” happened in 2006 and 2007, and is lasting until today, when the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, engaged in a destructive process of internal-fighting that included horrific scenes of torturing and killing of Palestinians by Palestinians, that ultimately led to the intra Palestinian divide between West Bank and Gaza. It is precisely this fragmentation and the violence in Gaza during the intra-Palestinian clashes that led to Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, that triggered a new security doctrine in the West Bank under Fayyadism. This new security doctrine was defined by repressing any voices that aimed to question the PA, or threatened its rule, or impact the stability of the region and the security of Israel and the Israelis. This

---

84 According to Pogodda and Richmond (2015:893), between October 2006 and August 2010 “more than 470 Palestinians were killed in inter-factional fighting, while torture in Palestinian prisons became pervasive. In addition, inter-factional structural violence perpetuates the repressive and discriminatory conduct of the occupation: campaigns of political arrests, the obstruction of political participation, crackdowns on political rights and civil liberties, and discrimination in public sector employment”. 
domination of exclusion and fragmentation was fuelled, supported, and entrenched by regional and international actors through the conditionality of aid. In addition, Israel encouraged this divide as it makes its ability to rule and justify its aggression easier.

The previous chapters illustrate how the “Palestinian-against-Palestinian” notion was materialised and executed during the Fayyadism paradigm of state-building and security sector reform (a number of photos in the Appendix illustrate this further). The ultimate result was further fragmentation of the very fragmented Palestinian society. Territorial, social, political, and economic fragmentations became characteristics of the Palestinian reality. The lack of internal cohesion amongst Palestinians became a key reason for their weakness and their limited ability to exercise power to change the dynamics of the conflict and the imbalances of power embedded in it. The Israeli-induced fragmentation measures are also crucial for Israel to sustain its occupation and matrix of control. The UNDP’s Human Development Report (2010:15) argued that “the State of Israel has systematically segregated Palestinians communities into a series of fragmented archipelagos (referred to variously as isolated islands, enclaves, cantons, and Bantustans) under a system that has been deemed “one of the most intensively territorialized control systems ever created”.

However, these elements of destructive fragmentation and Palestinian in-fighting do not exist in vacuum. The Palestinian society underwent major transformations over the last two decades. Sociologist Jamil Hilal argues that the Palestinian society underwent three major transformations, namely: the emergence of a political discourse that evicts Palestinians from history and geography and denies them a national identity; the escalation of collective repression, and settler-colonization; and the localization of Palestinian politics and the atomization of Palestinian society under the impact of settler-colonialism and neo-liberalism (Hilal 2015:1). These transformations had their repercussions on the collective resistance to settler-colonialism, and the factors responsible for this regression in collective resistance are due to the “demise of national institutions, the vertical divisions within Palestinian politics, the atomization of society in the WBG, the accentuation of class inequality, the individualist and consumerist values in the prevailing neo-liberal setting, the
PA’s and NGOs’ dependency on external aid” (Hilal 2015:9). Anthropologist Ala Al-Azzeh due the lack of mass participation in anti-colonial resistance in the post-Oslo Accords phase, to three interlinks factors: shifts in the mechanisms of colonial control, structural sociocultural changes, and discursive representations of popular resistance (Al-Azzeh 2015). These elements and outcomes have lasting implications on the Palestinian struggle for self-determination if they don’t be addressed urgently.

**Revisiting the Refugee Camps**

In June 2015, I went back to Palestine to put the final touches on this thesis. I visited both camps and met with some of the people that I interviewed during the main field research phase. I also managed to have a 30-minutes phone conversation with Dr. Salam Fayyad as he was travelling. The purpose of the follow-up visits to the camp was to pose a number of questions that emerged in the aftermath of the PhD viva, and to further validate some of my findings. “Business as usual”, is the main conclusion that emerged as a result of these visits. “All what had happened since we last met is that you and I got older, I was arrested by the PA for 17 days, I was fired from my job because of my political views, and I had a heart attack. Other than that, Al-Hamdulliah (thanks god) all is going well”, my 55 years old respondent with leftist political orientation from Jenin refugee camp told me. I asked my respondent about his neighbour whom I also interviewed earlier and promised him to come back, however my respondent smiled bitterly and answered, “well, he was fixing the washing machines two days ago [he is a technician], but now god knows what the PA security forces are doing with him. He was arrested from his work shop again for the same reason [being affiliate with Hamas] after the new collapse of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation”.

At that point, I went to see the carpenter whom I also interviewed earlier in 2012 and who was suffering from deep psychological consequences due to his arrest and time spent in the PA jails. The workshop was closed, and the carpenter was at home in worse conditions and permanent disability in his hands [he used to shake severely when we met earlier and due to that he cut his fingers], and unable to resume his life. I left his home heart-broken, but I still wanted to see some of the youth whom I had interviewed earlier in 2012. Many of them are still unemployed despite being
university graduates, and another three migrated to Germany, Sweden, and Norway. One of the militants that I interviewed was killed by the Israeli army. I went to a number of women associations, but still faced similar trends of sadness and despair, and also some of their productive operations and initiatives that offered employment to women had stopped due to the lack of funding, support, or access to external markets.

Fearing that I selected a biased and convenient sample, and wanting to avoid the usage of an anecdotal examples to generalise observations -while acknowledging that this follow up trip was mainly to sense what is going on-, I tried to listen to more promising stories. I talked to new people in the streets and narrow lanes of the camp and their shops, in the youth club, in the camp services committee, in the theatre, in front of the mosque, and even in the internet cafes. The overall picture hardly changed and the feeling of frustration was hitting me from everywhere. “Now we feel all the pain deep inside our bodies. Over the last few years, they [the PA’s security forces] were hitting our bodies through all their operations and we were just recipients of the shocked. Now it is sinking in and we feel what it means”, an angry Fatah member from Jenin refugee camp told me. I entered the internet café, two young men were sitting in the corner filling up an online application form to migrate to Canada. “There is nothing here, we need hope, security, work, and we deserve a better future. Enough suffering. Khalas, khalas, khalas (enough, enough, enough)”, one of the youth told me. I walked out of the camp to catch a taxi with the company of a key figure in the camp, and his message was straight-forward: “We live in vicious circles and in a permanent déjà vu. We are stuck, not only here in the camp, but all over Palestine. However, we as refugees, always –no matter what- pay the highest price”.

Where is hope and how can we revive it, and where is the resilient and strong will spirit that characterises this camp? I asked him. “It is in our hearts, deep inside, and will never die” was the last sentence he told me before I jumped into the taxi, and left Jenin camp.

In the previous chapters I argued that the structural transformations that occurred under the Fayyadist state-building project will have a long term and lasting impact, and the consequences will take some time to sink in and be felt further by the people.
The wide-spread feeling of frustration in Jenin refugee camp is due to multiple reasons and cannot be attributed to one reason only, or to the mere practices of the PA security forces. However, this points out to one of the main problems of the state-building project - which had an “expiry/completion date” - which is fundamentally problematic as the state-building venture is a process first and foremost. Additionally, people voiced out that if this state-building project is executed under a foreign military occupation in a settler colonial context, then this occupation and settler colonialism needs to vanish first, before a statehood is materialised. Otherwise, this state-building project will only create structural deficiencies in the overall societal dynamics in the short and long run, with some of these consequences more visible than others, and some requires more time to sink in and be felt as the above-mentioned brief elaboration clearly indicated.

In contrast to the domination of authorities-made human suffering and frustration in Jenin refugee camp I witnessed in my “get-a-feel” ad-hoc trip in June 2015, the situation in Balata refugee camp was a little different and was clearly characterised by anger. The “traditional” security campaigns, political arrests, torturing practices, and other forms of resistance criminalisation are still taking place until today (this does not mean that it stopped in Jenin refugee camp, but it is extra intense in Balata as of summer 2015 (Mulder 2015)). Just the night before I visited the camp in June 2015, the PA security forces and their head-covered commandos, under the supervision of the relatively new governor of Nablus who is also coming from the security establishment, raided the camp aggressively to arrest a number of ex-militant/militant from Fatah, two affiliates with Hamas, and one affiliate with the Islamic Jihad. The main street of the camp was full of stones that people, youth, kids and women threw on the security forces, according to eye-witnessed I talked to. The next morning people closed the main street outside and in front of the camp as a sign of protest against the PA. From the perspective of the governorate and security forces, the rationale was straightforward: there are criminals and thugs in these camps who need to be arrested in order to induce law and order.

The aggression and anger I felt in the camp against the governor and PA security personnel was remarkable, and in some cases very personal. During our conversation, a local Fatah leader in the camp who is known for his public criticism
of the governor and security forces stated bluntly: “we are truly bored of this continuous attempts to silence us and keep portraying us in the media and to the people and leadership that we are a group of thugs, criminals, drugs dealers, the boys of Mohammad Dahlan, and the trouble makers. I just don’t understand why we are under continuous attack. Is it because of our Facebook statuses that call for accountability and transparency and reform of Fatah?” Another senior Fatah member told me, “well, earlier this year I took three wanted ex-militants to the PA security forces to have a conversation as they had requested, and as agreed after a mediation meeting with the governor. However, I still don’t understand why they tortured them, accuse them of threatening the national security, and until today they are still in the prison. This is not how issues should be solved, neither how the rule of law should be enforced. This is a proper police state practices that generate and re-generate repression and oppression, and with the absence of trust and a horizon for solutions, all this will lead to explosion eventually”.

It was truly remarkable that some of the people remembered what they told me years ago, and they were proud of their ability to predict the future, despite it being an unpleasant future according to them. “We thought there would be an end to the aggression, however it has become part of the norm now to the extent that is embedded in our dreams/nightmares”, a theatre trainer and social activist told me. He continued by arguing, “there is an obvious political impasse and we are used as a scapegoat. Camps and marginalised refugees are always easy targets, but they exhausted us and exhausted everything here, and I just don’t understand why we are still targeted”.

By visiting two women associations, three local NGOs, the clinic, and the youth club, the message was rather consistent: “things are similar to when we last met. It feels as if we are seeing the same movie over and over again”, was a statement by a local female community leader that summarises the persistence of the status quo. The largest refugee camp in the West Bank, Balata, felt more crowded with further social tensions, and on the edge of explosion. “We, the people live in a pressure cooker that can explode any time, and there are so many cooks around [PA security forces, governors, and also local camp leaders] fighting about when/if to open it. Sometimes they agree and we feel things are calmer, other times they disagree and
they start fighting and we, the people, get suffocated” was the last sentence I heard while leaving Balata refugee camp.

The persistence of the dire status quo, and the cycles of oppression and repression, testified that indeed business is as usual and people continue to pay the highest price. This reflects the dynamics of a political system that does not give a space for the voices from below, for the people. The crisis of legitimacy and the trust gap, therefore, continue to expand, and as one respondent told me, “all of this is just to please the coloniser. In this settler-colonial context, we as Palestinians fight against each other to entrench the Israeli colonial dominance instead of uniting to address our fragmentation to resist the Israeli settler colonial regime”. With that sad reality check, I left Balata camp.

Going back to the field for a very quick visit in June 2015 was indeed a challenging methodological choice. However the very brief visits to Balata and Jenin refugee camps illustrated even more explicitly than before the detrimental consequences and the multiple levels of contradictions and tensions as a result of conducting a standard Weberian security sector reform under a foreign military occupation and settler colonialism before addressing the asymmetry of power relations. Then, security reform, in the way it was conducted by the PA, can be seen at best as a tool that reinforced the status quo and therefore helped the occupying force and its colonial project in tightening the control on the occupied and colonised people using local tools and “national authorities”. The cases of Balata and Jenin refugee camps expose the fragility of a state-building project in the absence of a political solution, national sovereignty, and a representative and legitimate leadership. A distorted state-building project, as the one of the Palestinian Authority in the post-2007 era, resulted in structural deficiencies and transformations that did not only bring detrimental consequences for the lives of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and their ability to resist the occupation, but they also had detrimental consequences on the overall Palestinian struggle for freedom and self-determination, this thesis concludes.

**Fayyadism Self-Assessment**

I intended to counter the voices from below, with the assessment of Fayyad himself after some time of being outside the prime minister office. In my phone conversation
with Dr. Salam Fayyad in June 2015, I mainly aimed for a reflection on Fayyadism by its creator. “The answer for this request is ready as we conducted an objective evaluation and wrote in the newly released UNDP’s Human Development Report for Palestine”, Fayyad answered.

The UNDP’s Human Development Report 2015 for Palestine was written by a team led by Salam Fayyad. The team was mainly composed of a number of staff and board member of his newly established development company (Future for Palestine). While the selection of Fayyad’s team by the UNDP remains questionable and lacks transparency, the team selection poses methodological concerns and inherent biases. The report team is in complete harmony, and the report itself is akin to a self-assessment exercise for the post-2007 state-building project by those who executed that very state-building project. In a way, such setting, reflects the vicious circles of the development industry, I would argue. That said, the report concluded that the overall status “of human development in Palestine based on traditional indicators shows limited relative progress in recent years compared to earlier periods” (UNDP 2015:67); and that “while some have had a positive impact, on the whole there has been a marked deterioration in the state of Palestinian empowerment over the past four years” (UNDP 2015:18). The reasons for this deterioration is not the policies of Fayyadism though, according to Fayyad and his team, but due to other political reasons.

For Fayyad, the plan for the state-building project under his premiership constituted “a fully integrated political vision in the sense of it being an instrument for capitalizing on the success in doing the necessary, namely, preparing for statehood, to bolster the case for ending the Israeli occupation by discrediting the various pretexts that had effectively, albeit unfairly, conditioned the Palestinians’ fundamental right of self-determination on their success in demonstrating that they were state-worthy” (UNDP 2015:18). Therefore, the implementation of this plan “amounted to an act of Palestinian self-empowerment” (UNDP 2015:19), according to Fayyad. However, Fayyad argues that despite the successful implementation of the plan, “its ultimate political objective was not achieved” (UNDP 2015:19). This conclusion is rather puzzling as the state-building project is a political one par
excellence, and therefore the technical successes hardly means anything if the political objectives failed dramatically.

In the best case scenario, these technical successes contributed to the international recognition of Palestinian readiness for statehood. This achievement had no impact on the lives of the people who live under occupation and therefore these are merely symbolic successes that will never trickle down to impact their lives positively. Therefore, following the line of argumentation of Fayyad, the question remains as to why and how this state-building plan did fail? Fayyad attributed the failure of the political dimension of the state-building plan to four main reasons (UNDP 2015:20-22). First, contrary to the claimed and reported Israeli enthusiasm about the state-building plan, Israel did very little to provide an enabling environment. Second, the PA's donor community failed to deliver adequate and timely aid at the critical junctures of the plan implementation (an average shortfall of nearly 30% annually over the period 2010-2012). Third, the persistent intra-Palestinian divide harmed the potential of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state on the 1967 borders and complicated the task of the top-down component of the “peace process”. Fourth, the international enthusiasm about the state-building plan was not matched by the extent of its adoption at the national level as the plan was not endorsed by key players of the Palestinian political system, particularly in the choice and the timing of Palestinian diplomatic moves. I would argue that this last point was the straw that broke the camel's back, and led to the clashes and eventually the disagreements between Fayyad and Abbas/Fatah that led to the resignation of Fayyad in mid-2013.

However, as a continuation to his philosophy (Fayyadism), Fayyad pointed out and talked in length about the work of his development enterprise (Future for Palestine-FFP). “I am implementing the same philosophy at FFP as the one during my tenure as prime minister: it is all about empowering people and creating new realities on the ground”, Fayyad stated. The motto of his private enterprise is “enhancing the resilience of the Palestinian people is not just a slogan”. Fayyad is persistent and believes in his philosophy, despite all the critique he and his philosophy are prone to. He makes this public and argues:

Throughout my eleven years in government, I have promoted the principle of strengthening and empowering Palestinian institutions
in a context that aims principally at enhancing our citizens’ ability to remain on their land and persevere in the face of the occupation, on the path to ending it. After leaving office, I thought carefully of how best to continue serving our people and cause. I decided to work in the context of the very message I carried throughout my years of service in government, taking advantage of my understanding of the needs of the people, as well as capacity to mobilize the support and assistance needed to meet their needs. It is my belief that I can succeed in this endeavour. Hence, Future for Palestine was born.\textsuperscript{85}

Indeed, the reader of the first annual report of the FFP can easily get confused whether the opening statement for FFP has been written by the chairman of the foundation or the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Fayyad wrote:

\begin{quote}
We are determined to build a state that is worthy of our people’s sacrifices and our children’s promise, a state that advances values that are universally shared: tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity. We want a state that derives its strength from its transformative potential by unleashing new ideas and empowering its citizens to create positive realities on the ground. This means building and equipping schools; providing access to new technologies that improve agricultural productivity; investing in renewable energy to enhance sustainability; revitalizing historic sites as a means of reclaiming our national heritage; and empowering the marginalized segments of our society by investing in small and medium-sized enterprises that harness their productivity and lift them out of poverty. In essence, not only do these initiatives cultivate ingenuity; they inspire a sense of possibility that stands in direct opposition to the sense of hopelessness and despair precipitated by a seemingly endless occupation. By enabling us to see a state in the making, they undercut the pervasive sentiment of defeatism that so often afflicts us...It is this fundamental principle—enduring, in spite of the occupation, to end it—that is the bedrock of Future for Palestine” (FFP 2015:2).
\end{quote}

The persistence of Fayyad and his ideological commitment to his values and principles, remain a feature that observes highlight about Fayyad. In an interview in June 2015 in Ramallah, a senior political analyst told me,

\begin{quote}
Fayyad is very smart, and very ideologically committed to his philosophy and agenda. He will be back to the Palestinian polity soon. He is combining tools and approaches that were used by the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{85} Future for Palestine’s website, \textit{Chairman’s Message - Dr. Salam Fayyad}, [Online], Available: http://ffp.ps/en/content/chairmans-message-dr-salam-fayyad
Palestinian Left and Hamas in terms of how to win the hearts and minds of the people. His work in his new foundation represents almost the work of a mini shadow government. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent in 2014 on projects that increase his popular legitimacy, and he is depending on the psychological element that people still perceive him as a public figure. Look at his Facebook page with its 1.1 million likers, and you can tell that Fayyad as a politician never left the scene and he will be back in the near future, and maybe in a more powerful and aggressive way.86

Ironically, Fayyad and his foundation were exposed to the PA’s harassment as the PA’s Preventive Security Forces raided the offices of Fayyad’s Foundation in Summer 2014, interrogated two employees and checked internal documents, financial records, and personal laptops (Ravid and Khoury 2014). This was triggered by the efforts and campaigns of Fayyad’s foundation to provide humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza in the aftermath of the 2014 summers attacked on the Strip. The main funding of Fayyad’s foundation comes from the United Arab Emirates, where former Fatah leader and current rival of Abbas, Mohammad Dahlan lives, and this is what triggered the investigation into possible connections between Dahlan and Fayyad. In June 2015, the Palestinian Attorney General issued an order to confiscate the funds of Fayyad’s foundation.87 Fayyad decided to go to the Palestinian High Court of Justice to appeal this decision. The question that remains open: Is Fayyad the victim of the authoritarian trends he built, and as a consequence, could the governance reform that he induced put an end to his political career?

The self-assessment of Fayyadism as a governance paradigm, or as a philosophy that led Fayyad in his new organisation (FFP), need to be contrasted with the findings of the most recent critical scholarly production in order to develop a fuller picture and a more comprehensive understanding. Hilal (2015) argues that Salam Fayyad advocated a myth that contended “that Palestinian statehood would be hastened with the building of efficient and transparent institutions under occupation”. Hilal argues that this myth “asked Palestinians to prove that they are capable of managing a state. Apart from its ‘orientalist’ and racist implications, it denies Palestinians the right to self-determination” (Hilal 2015:3). Pogodda (2012:547) argues that “security,
democratization, and state-building have not been pursued simultaneously during any phase in the PA’s history”. While Mustafa (2015) argues that security sector reform under Fayyadism “actually perpetuates authoritarianism by advancing the security agendas of international stakeholders at the expense of target populations” (Mustafa 2015:3). Mustafa concludes by stating that security sector reform under Fayyadism “has produced a conflicted version of the security-led model of governance in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority, entrenching rather than challenging or tempering the paradigm of Israeli occupation. As such, SSR under the PA has served to reinforce bio-political initiatives on both the micro-level of Israeli colonialism” (Mustafa 2015:16).

Furthermore, Pogodda and Richmond (2015:892) argues that in the case of Palestine “external intervention through direct, structural and governmental power has systematically prevented the formation of a state”. Pogodda and Richmond (2015:892) concludes that internationally financed statebuilding efforts meanwhile remain within the liberal peace and subsequent neoliberal state framework: limited and focused on security and institution building, rather than on an emancipatory social contract and social justice. Even the liberal character of this enterprise is debatable, given that neither democratisation nor trade liberalisation has been pursued, while security measures are solely geared towards Israeli needs. In addition, the internationally sponsored Israeli–Palestinian peace process has tried to establish a governmentality that aimed to make the current ‘matrix of control’ acceptable as a step towards Palestinian sovereignty.

In brief, Fayyadism needs to be understood within the overall context that considers the occupied West Bank as a “laboratory of technologies of control” (Weizman 2007). It is a laboratory not only where advanced military technologies are tested, but also where technologies of governance, social engineering, economic development, and embedded institutionalization are tested and advanced by the technocrats and international donors community (Dana 2014). This thesis advanced the argument that “good governance” has been very selectively interpreted in the occupied West Bank, reinforcing the abuses of the Palestinian Authority and particularly and fundamentally its security forces.
Future Avenues for Research

This thesis opened-up a number of avenues for future research in the security and development spheres. Firstly, the notion of resistance economy, as opposed to the neo-liberal economic model, was proposed and contextualised in this thesis, and a number of its elements and pillars were discussed. This attempt represented a major step towards operationalising the concept of resistance economy and towards transforming its applicability away from the theoretical and romantic domains to the practical ones. However, a considerable amount of work is still needed for a topic that is still very much in infancy, and a further construction and de-construction of the concept/model and its pillars is required. This represents a major space for future scholarly engagement and contribution, particularly when a comparative element is brought to the analysis. Through the work of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, we tried to take the debate further and organised a virtual roundtable with the participation of ten experts in the field in late 2014. The idea was to engage with a number of questions in order to define and assess the workability of the resistance economy and its ability to address the root causes of the de-development process and the present disastrous Palestinian mode of socio-economic development under occupation. The questions, as far as the notion of resistance economy is concerned, included:

- How could the concept of "resistance economy" be defined? What are its key attributes? Does it provide a viable option?
- Assuming that the resistance economy model should not be understood purely in economic terms, but rather it should aim to lay the foundation of an emancipatory social order and solid political base to emerge, the question is: How can this happen, and what would be the social, political and economic dimensions and objectives of a resistance economy?
- Arguing that Palestinians have engaged in economic forms of resistance for generations (we can go back to the thirties during the Arab general strike, in addition to the model of the first Palestinian intifada), the pending question remains: What does historical as well as present day experience have to tell us about alternatives that could be components of a comprehensive approach to economic resistance?
• Is it true that agriculture would provide the backbone of a resistance economy?
• How could the model of resistance economy be inspired by other models around the world such as the solidarity economy in Brazil, the experiences on South Africa, and from Gandhi’s non-violent and non-cooperation strategy?

This set of questions opens the space for future research and points out to the need to go beyond Palestine and adopt a comparative approach to examine other cases particularly those persisted under settler-colonial rule. After all, resistance economy is a counterhegemonic strategy that challenges Israel’s colonial subjugation and the PA’s neoliberal agenda for economic development. The strategy of Swadeshi (self-sufficiency) in India and the resistant economic model adopted by Gandhi, in addition to the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, are two examples that come up as inspiring model towards further operationalisation of the notion of resistance economy in Palestine. The common principles between these experiences as solidarity, cooperation, self-determination, collective authority, reciprocity, and democratic participation, make the need for a comparative future research more apparent.

The future research could start from the definition of resistance economy that emerged in the aftermath of the roundtable where resistance economy is defined as an institutionalized form of economic struggle that envisages a transitional reorganization of the economy and social relations to be in harmony with the political requirements and objectives of the Palestinian national liberation process. In other words, resistance economy is a politically driven economic development strategy, underpinned by a set of social values and norms. Therefore, by its very nature, resistance economy is a multifunctional and multidimensional strategy that aims to lay the foundation for the emergence of an emancipatory social order and solid political base in order to assist Palestinians in their struggle to achieve liberation and self-determination (Dana et al. 2014).

The need for further operationalisation of resistance economy opens up another avenue for future research: the need for a new and alternative development doctrine in Palestine that reverses the cycles of de-development and the failing patterns of international aid. This new economic-development thinking/model needs to adopt fresh ideas that go beyond the limitations of the Oslo economic framework, and to
engage with the broader picture of the political economy of the one and two state solutions. A future research, rooted in an interdisciplinary academic approach, is envisaged to offer concrete, action-oriented, evidence-based, and policy-driven recommendations that are contextualised in the broader dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and based on indigenous conceptions and approaches that take the facts on the ground and the voices of the civil society as its starting point. Additionally, in light of the regular failures on the political fronts, how can the dominance of the economic solutions to solve the political problems effectively entrench and sustain the very conflict it aims to resolve?

By extension, this opens up the space for another much-needed research on the political economy of the one-state reality/solution. The Oslo Peace Accords framework succeeded, to a considerable extent, in limiting the horizon of the produced research to manoeuvre within its two-state solution frame, and to tackle the issue of development from the very fragmented spaces Oslo had created. Therefore, with the rising popularity of the one-state solution, which is the de facto situation, the economy of the one-state solution needs to be discussed and analysed in order to bridge a crucial gap in the literature.\footnote{A major RAND Corporation’s report in 2015 aimed to measure the costs of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the two-state framework. It found that “a two-state solution provides by far the best economic outcomes for both Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis would gain over two times more than the Palestinians in absolute terms — $123 billion versus $50 billion over ten years” (RAND 2015).}

In addition to these three further research avenues in the economic-development sphere (new aid and development doctrine; resistance economy operationalisation; and the economics of the one-state reality), this thesis also created a number of spaces for scholarly debate in the security-governance realm. How can the current security paradigm of the Palestinian Authority be democratised, and is this possible in the currently existing frameworks? This is a major question that requires tackling. What are the implications of resistance criminalisation and authoritarianism in the long run, and how do they impact the prospect of a future just negotiated peace, is another question requiring scholarly analytical answers. This macro-level question needs to be accompanied by another complementary avenue for future research that aims to understand and analyse the complex dynamics between the “securitised spaces” created by the Palestinian Authority’s security reform agenda in the
occupied West Bank and the trajectories of the people’s everyday lives. In other words, how does the state-building project of the Palestinian Authority interact with the everyday state-formation by the people? These are questions that need to be addressed in order to take the scholarly level on Palestine a step further.

In addition to this, the thesis highlights the centrality of the Palestinian fragmentation and its severe consequences on the Palestinian people. Sufficient political analysis on this fragmentation exists, however the consequences of the entrenched fragmentation on the Palestinian society, particularly after the 2007’s West Bank-Gaza Strip divide, and their interaction with the societal relations and structures, represents another avenue for future research. Furthermore, with the emergence of the post-2007 fragmentation, two opposing governance models were created: Fayyadism in the West Bank, and Hamasism in Gaza Strip. Both models were studied separately, and this thesis claims to be the most comprehensive one that studied Fayyadism, however there is no research effort yet that aims to compare and contrast both models and draw lessons for the future and for a third paradigm. This represents another vital dimension for future research.

Finally, this thesis, with its focus on the voices from below, highlights the continuous marginalisation of the Palestinian people and particularly the refugees, and the repression of their aspirations. It also highlights the complex dynamics that could potentially explain the sustainability of the status quo and the persistence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict overall. Accordingly, these observations opened-up the space for two overarching questions to be covered in a future research: Where are the Palestinian people in their own political system? And why is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so persistent and protracted and how could the complex dynamics that sustain this conflict be deconstructed towards opening up new avenues for lasting peace?
7. Bibliography


Al-Kadri, A. (2011a) *Security, Sovereignty and De-Development in the Arab World*, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, [Online], Available: [http://english.dohainstitute.org/Home/Details?entityID=f4c16d5a-893e-4b10-bce4-fda7bb6493c7&resourceId=db288f4f-c55c-4e3f-825f-1e9fe6f8578f](http://english.dohainstitute.org/Home/Details?entityID=f4c16d5a-893e-4b10-bce4-fda7bb6493c7&resourceId=db288f4f-c55c-4e3f-825f-1e9fe6f8578f)


AWRAD (2012) *Results of an Opinion Poll*, May, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), [Online], Available: http://www.awrad.org/page.php?id=HPFtOAaorna275790AXoAdkYtt0q

AWRAD (2012a) *Results of an Opinion Poll*, February, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), [Online], Available: http://www.awrad.org/page.php?id=rHSmZktVa9u9840948A5I9SAUItp

AWRAD (2013b) *Results of an Opinion Poll*, April, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), [Online], Available: http://www.awrad.org/page.php?id=tJSjCWcC4Pa9841899AMMfMoJAze

AWRAD (2013c) *The Aftermath of the Fayyad Resignation, Results of a Poll among Opinion Leaders*, May, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), [Online], Available: http://www.awrad.org/page.php?id=N5p0KE8inn9a9842850ACtVf8CHBf


CDS-BZU (2011) Public Debate on Alternatives to Aid and Neoliberal Development in the oPt, Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine.


IDF (2008) *Pilot "Jenin": Details and Focal Points*, Military Strategic Information Section, Israeli Defence Forces, August 5, Tel Aviv, Israel.


IMF (2011b) *Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza*, International Monetary Fund, Jerusalem, Palestine.


JMCC (2012b) Poll No. 77, Nov. 2012 - Governance, the UN Bid and the Arab Spring, Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC), [Online], Available: http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=856


Nayel, M. (2013) *Palestinian Refugees are not at your Service*, The Electronic Intifada, May 17, [Online], Available: [https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-refugees-are-not-your-service/12464](https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-refugees-are-not-your-service/12464)


PA (2010c) Homestretch to Freedom, Palestinian Authority, Ramallah, Palestine.


PA (2011a) Building Palestine Achievements and Challenges, Palestinian Authority, Ramallah, Palestine.


PA (2012a) Equitable Development: Moving Forward Despite the Occupation, Palestinian Authority, Ramallah, Palestine.


Palestinians for Dignity (2012) Mass March Calling for Social Justice on Tuesday Sept 11 at 5:00 pm in Ramallah, Press Release, September 10, [Online], Available: http://on.fb.me/1beCkQM


Taraki, L. (2008b) ‘Urban Modernity on the Periphery: A New Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City’, *Social Text* 95, 26, 2: 61-81.


# 8. List of Semi-Structured Interviews

Table 2: List of Interviews—Balata Refugee Camp, August-December 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Specification of Interviewee</th>
<th>Interview’s Duration-hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director of a civil society organisation</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Community leader and director of cultural centre</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Psychologist and counsellor</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and prisoners in the PA jails</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mother of a martyr and prisoners in both the Israeli and PA jails</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Local leader of Hamas and educator</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Member of the camps popular committee and officer in the Preventive Security forces</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Local female leader and member of Women Centre</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Local Fatah leader and PLC member</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Officer at the liaison office, Nablus’s Police</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Theatre's trainer and leftist political activist</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Unemployed youth</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Local Fatah leader and member of the PNC</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Member of the camps popular committee and director at the Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Member of the camps popular committee and leftist political activist</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Female member of the camps popular committee</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Former member of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and prisoners in the PA jails</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Area leader-National Security forces</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Security personnel serving at Aljneed security compound</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Security personnel serving at Aljneed security compound</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Males focus group- 4 Participants</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Females focus group- 21 Participants</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Local UNRWA’s official</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Duration of the Interviews** 1.20
## Table 3: List of Interviews-Jenin Refugee Camp, August-December 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Specification of Interviewee</th>
<th>Interview’s Duration-hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Doctor and local community leader</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Member of the camps popular committee, former security personnel, and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guard and leftist political activist</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Local leader of Hamas and mechanics</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Field researcher for human rights organisation</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Local female political activist</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iconic figure of the 2002 Jenin camp battle and former leader of Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PLC member and local Fatah leader</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Local Fatah leader and member of the PNC</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Local leader of Islamic Jihad and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Local female leader and member of Women Centre</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Local UNRWA’s official</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Males focus group- 4 Participants</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Local female leader and member of Women Centre</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>PLC member and local Fatah leader</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance provider</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unemployed youth and former member of militant group</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Community leader and employee in private sector</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Males focus group- 4 Participants</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Carpenter and prisoner in the PA jails</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Official from the Freedom Theatre</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Females focus group- 4 Participants</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Unemployed youth and prisoner in the PA and Israeli jails</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>A father of a martyr and political activist</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Average Duration of the Interviews

1.30
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview No.</th>
<th>Specification of Interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conflict Adviser, European development agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Deputy Director, UN institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Researcher, UN institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Palestinian Private sector representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Country Director, major International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aid specialist, Northern American development agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Official in aid coordinating body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Founder of a Palestinian NGO and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Youth activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Youth activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Development specialist, Palestinian NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Director of a Palestinian research centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Palestinian Researcher and intellectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Program director, international donor organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Economist and Director of a research centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>European Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Israeli Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Israeli Academic and economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Researcher, international think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Palestinian economist and Youth activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Former aid official, and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Country Director, major International Financial Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Associate Professor of economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Academic and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Founder of a Palestinian NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Founder of a Palestinian NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Programs manager, UN institution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Appendix

Table 5: Transformations in the Security Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arafatism (Pro-Hybridity Paradigm)</th>
<th>Fayyadism (Anti-Hybridity Paradigm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionary security sector and proliferation of security forces as a source for public employment; quantity not quality</td>
<td>Re-govern and re-structure security sector; discharge the ‘old guards’, create new élite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty tool and buying in supporters / spoilers</td>
<td>Apolitical and professional forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel (shadow)- militias Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades security model</td>
<td>Silence and criminalise resistance; collaboration with the Israeli security forces; and move toward EUPOL COPPS and USSC model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridity as a tool for maneuvering and card in negotiations; and tool for resistance and revolutionary legacy</td>
<td>Anti-Hybridity as monopoly of violence and tool for modern nation state building, and disarmed future state of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and cash in hand and bags</td>
<td>Less or hidden corruption; more transparent and different sort of incentive mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One man show and personalized control</td>
<td>More institutional control and systematic division of labor; and less intra-competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher levels of ownership, only donors money but not hands and minds</td>
<td>All is donor-driven to train, buy and pay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Transformation in the Economy Sector: Arafatism vs. Fayyadism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arafatism Paradigm</th>
<th>Fayyadism Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics first, economy later: Political solution will bring economic development</td>
<td>The notion and practice of ‘economic peace’: Economic solutions for political problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An economy based on rents, rent seeking activities, centralisation and monopolies</td>
<td>The economy shifts toward the implementation of good governance and neoliberal agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special and secret bank accounts as tools for the neo-patrimonial system</td>
<td>The creation of the Single Treasury Account as the unified account for the PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of financial audit under the slogan than ‘these funds are for the revolution’ (Anti Public financial management)</td>
<td>More transparent, audited, but not locally accountable records- New Public management approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat is a politician, fighter and revolution leader who dealt with economic matters</td>
<td>Fayyad is an economist by education and training; a technocrat government official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide-spread corruption, misallocated funds and wasted money in private pockets</td>
<td>Less or hidden corruption that became inherent in the institutional structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favours informality since it brings less restrictions and more room to manoeuvre</td>
<td>Favours formality since it is a building block for a future modern state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer exemptions, tax less efficiently and compensate it with politised aid</td>
<td>More generation of internal resources and reform of tax laws and enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PA’s economic planning was characterised by ignorance and confusion (1993-1997) and pressure and coercion (1998-2004) vis-à-vis the policy prescriptions and reform agenda of the World Bank and IMF</td>
<td>The PA’s economic planning was characterised by conviction and promotion phase (2005-Today) vis-à-vis the policy prescriptions and reform agenda of the World Bank and IMF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 9: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 1995

Figure 10: Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 1998

![Organogram of the Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 1998](image)


Figure 11: PA Security Organisations and Command Structure, June 2008

![PA Security Organisations and Command Structure, June 2008](image)

Source: Zanotti, CRS 2010.
Figure 12: Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF), Spring 2011

Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Formal authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dashed</td>
<td>De facto control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dotted</td>
<td>Local authority, de facto control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Dashed</td>
<td>Official donor assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Dashed</td>
<td>Court donor assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total PASF: 27,000–29,000 (including 1,000+ in auxiliary services)

† The PA President is designated Commander-in-Chief under the revised Basic Law of 2002, with ultimate authority over all PASF branches, but delegates responsibility for internal security to the Council of Ministers under the Law for the Palestinian Security Forces of 2005. The President has full control over National Security (comprising the NSR, PIG, and MI and the General Intelligence, and a more de facto limited role in Internal Security comprising CPI and PSAP).
†† The two agencies may have another 5,000 informants.

Not shown for West Bank and Gaza: auxiliary services (Civil Defence, Military Medical Services, Political and Moral Guidance Commission, and Military Judicial Staff).

Source: Sayigh 2011.
Figure 13: West Bank, Area (C) Map

Source: OCHA 2011.
Table 7: A Chronology for the Evolution of the Palestinian Security Forces
1993-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Year</th>
<th>Major Characteristics and Main Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>- The PLO’s Palestine Liberation Army was the major security organisation in the exile, in addition to the political factions’ armed groups and military wings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Before 1993)</td>
<td>- The Israeli occupation forces were in charge of (in)security matters in the OPT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Palestinian political factions were the security providers through their armed groups and other informal mechanisms as families, popular committees, cooperatives and grassroots and civil society organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 – 1999</td>
<td>- Identity crisis between the revolutionary legacy of the PLO and the constraints and arrangements of the Oslo Accords. This identity crisis affected the operations of the security forces and their systems of governance. Gradual deployment of the PA security forces started by Gaza-Jericho First arrangements and then expanded to cover areas (A).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Oslo Accords Phase)</td>
<td>- Proliferation of security forces and the adoption of a ‘divide to rule’ approach by Arafat; and the spread of corruption and misuse of authority and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Trial and error learning process in building the security forces and their institutional capacities; and personalised governance system by Arafat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols; and limited professional training and equipping for the PA forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Limited clashes with the oppositions and torture at the ‘Death Squad’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The PA’s forces suffered from legitimacy crisis and trust gap which was publically witnesses in the intra-forces infighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The recruitment process was not transparent and almost Fatah-exclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Al-‘aedeen (the returnees) led the security bodies and they were considered as strangers in the eyes of the local population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Second Intifada Phase)</td>
<td>- The establishment of a new Fatah military wing, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The PA security forces engaged actively and militarily in the Second Intifada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Israel incursion of the West Bank ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, and complete destruction of the PA security infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A security vacuum had emerged and the Palestinian armed groups dominated the security realm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 – 2004</td>
<td>- The PA was forced to initiate serious reforms and a 100-day reform plan was announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Roadmap)</td>
<td>- The Quartet was created with the security agenda on the top of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period/Year</td>
<td>Major Characteristics and Main Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Reform Phase</td>
<td>reforms list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In 2003, the Prime Minister post was created as part of the reform package and Mahmoud Abbas became the first Palestinian Prime Minister and Salam Fayyad as a World Bank conditionality was appointed as Finance Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In 2004, PA’s President Yasser Arafat passed away after being under the Israeli siege in his compound for two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Road Map explicitly called on the PA to rebuild and consolidate the Palestinian forces, into three main bodies reporting to a newly empowered interior minister, providing law and order, dismantling ‘terrorist’ organisations, and ensuring high cooperating with Israel. The primary goal was to transform the Palestinian security forces into instruments to fight against ‘terror’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (The London Meeting for Palestinian Security Sector Reform)</td>
<td>• Mahmoud Abbas became the PA’s President and aimed to achieve his major electoral slogan ‘one law, one gun, one authority’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In March, the London Meeting on Supporting the Palestinian Authority took place as the major event to set the guidance for the Palestinian security reform. The PA promised to ‘create the conditions conducive to the peace process with the immediate objective of restoring internal law and order and preventing violence’, through the creation of a legal framework for its security organisations and overhaul their command structure as to support the Palestinian National Security Council, appoint a National Chief of Police, consolidate and unify the security/intelligence services, and ensure strict financial accountability of services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The international community designed the future of the PA security forces and promised through aid, advice, training capacities, and drafting strategies and policies. The European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support and the United States Security Coordinator were established to support both the civil police and national security forces respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The London Meeting operationalise the new Palestinian security doctrine and paved the way for a greater role for external intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 – Mid-2007 (Hamas Phase)</td>
<td>• After the victory of Hamas in the Parliamentary elections, reform agenda were put on hold and donors started to look for alternative routes to bypass Hamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The existing Fatah security forces leadership prioritised their political affiliation over professionalism and refused to deal with Hamas and its government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hamas offered a long term Hudna (ceasefire) with Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hamas government was not able to pay salaries for the public employees including the security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The refusal of Fatah to accept the electoral defeat and the insistence of Hamas to govern, led to clashes in both the West Bank and Gaza.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Period/Year | Major Characteristics and Main Events
--- | ---
 | To bypass Hamas rule, the PA leadership (Abbas) and the donors returned back to replicate Arafat model for security governance to bypass Hamas. Abbas separated the National Security Forces from the Ministry of Interior, changed the heads of the security bodies, created new bodies and expanded others, and put many under his direct control.
 | Hamas created the Back-Up Force which became later the Executive Forces.
 | Tensions in summer 2007 led to the Palestinian divide and Hamas took over Gaza, and Fatah took over the West Bank. The intra-Palestinian divide implied consequences on the security structures and priorities in both places.
 | Hamas initiated its independent security model and the West Bank-PA conducted the strictest security reform since its establishment.
 | Abbas declared the state of emergency in 2007 and Salam Fayyad was appointed as the Prime and Finance Minister to create the institutional underpinning for a Palestinian state.
 | Fayyadism aimed to create apolitical, professional and well-trained and equipped security forces, respected by the Palestinian people. Fayyadism restructured the security sector and enforced a clear segregation of duties and change or discharge the ‘old guards’ and brought new security élite.
 | Fayyad, with the support of the international community, rebuilt the destroyed security sector physical infrastructure.
 | The USSC and EUPOL COPPS and the Palestinian Security Academy became the major illustration of the new PA security doctrine.
 | Disarmament and security campaigns were launched to enforce law and order, collect ‘illegal’ arms and punish opposition.
 | The human rights violation record kept in increase due to the PA’Ss authoritarian transformations.
 | A proliferation in the number of the local and foreign NGOs working in the security realm, and a third of the international aid provided to the Palestinians continued to be allocated to the security domain.
 | In technical term, the PA’s security forces became professional, well-trained, engaged in a daily coordination with the Israeli counterpart despite the existence of the asymmetry of power, and their achievements and capacity records reached to the highest levels since the establishment of the PA.
 | The donors community and the government of Israel believed that the PA major success story and achievement under Fayyadism was the immense progress in the security realm.
 | Security collaboration with Israel to criminalise resistance against the occupation was the most detrimental feature of this phase.

Source: Prepared by the Author.
Figure 14: The PLO vs. The PA

**Establishment**


**Head**

- **Chairman**: Head of the Executive Committee elected by the PNC, Mahmoud Abbas (PLO)
- **President**: ex-officio member of the PLC elected by the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, Mahmoud Abbas (PA)

**Executive**

- **Executive Committee**: elected by the PNC, 18 members (PLO)
- **Cabinet**: appointed by the President, 18 Ministers (including the Prime Minister) (PA)

**Legislative**

- **Palestinian National Council (PNC)**: Parliament in exile - members are mostly appointed by the Executive Committee (reps trade unions, professional organizations, etc., and most factions, incl. Hamas) (PLO)
- **Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)**: Parliament, 132 members - elected by the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem (does not represent Palestinians in the Diaspora; members are independents or affiliated with various factions, incl. Hamas) (PA)

- **Members**
  - **Vote**: for the Executive, Declared Palestinian independence on 15 Nov. 1988
  - **Powers**: limited by the Palestinian-Israeli agreements; legislation excludes issues left for the final status negotiations.

**Armed Forces**

- **Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)**: outside the occupied Palestinian Territories (PLO)
- **Palestinian Security and Police Forces**
  - West Bank
  - Gaza Strip (PA)

**Foreign Relations**

- **Conducts foreign relations and related activities (e.g., negotiations)** (PLO)
- **No formal but de facto foreign relations powers** (PA)

**Finance**

- **Palestinian National Fund** (PLO)
- **PA Finance Ministry / Palestinian Monetary Authority** (PA)

Source: PASSIA (2014).
Figure 15: Aid Management Structure in Palestine

Source: Local Development Forum, [http://www.lacs.ps/showLevelDiagram.aspx](http://www.lacs.ps/showLevelDiagram.aspx)
Table 8: Key Economic Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012(^a)</th>
<th>2013(^b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic performance(^c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real gross domestic product growth (percentage)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(5.2)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product, nominal (million dollars)</td>
<td>3 220</td>
<td>4 179</td>
<td>3 433</td>
<td>4 619</td>
<td>8 331</td>
<td>9 775</td>
<td>10 255</td>
<td>10 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income, nominal (million dollars)</td>
<td>3 699</td>
<td>4 932</td>
<td>3 656</td>
<td>5 047</td>
<td>8 930</td>
<td>10 484</td>
<td>10 973</td>
<td>11 626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national disposable income (million dollars)</td>
<td>4 099</td>
<td>5 306</td>
<td>4 708</td>
<td>6 323</td>
<td>10 921</td>
<td>11 730</td>
<td>12 090</td>
<td>13 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product per capita (dollars)</td>
<td>1 400</td>
<td>1 493</td>
<td>1 125</td>
<td>1 363</td>
<td>2 185</td>
<td>2 489</td>
<td>2 524</td>
<td>2 578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income per capita (dollars)</td>
<td>1 608</td>
<td>1 763</td>
<td>1 199</td>
<td>1 489</td>
<td>2 342</td>
<td>2 670</td>
<td>2 711</td>
<td>2 788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real gross domestic product per capita growth (percentage)</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>(15.7)</td>
<td>(8.1)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real gross national income per capita growth (percentage)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>(16.7)</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (percentage(^b))</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employment (thousands)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel and settlements</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal balance (percentage, gross domestic product)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue net of arrears/clearance withheld</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current expenditure – commitment basis</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure – cash basis</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall balance – cash basis</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(27.0)</td>
<td>(30.0)</td>
<td>(18.9)</td>
<td>(10.4)</td>
<td>(8.9)</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net current transfers (million dollars)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>1 052</td>
<td>1 276</td>
<td>1 991</td>
<td>1 246</td>
<td>1 116</td>
<td>1 874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, goods and services (million dollars)</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1 152</td>
<td>1 510</td>
<td>1 670</td>
<td>2 067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, goods and services (million dollars)</td>
<td>2 176</td>
<td>3 353</td>
<td>2 519</td>
<td>3 202</td>
<td>4 626</td>
<td>5 775</td>
<td>6 467</td>
<td>6 447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance (million dollars)</td>
<td>(1 677)</td>
<td>(2 670)</td>
<td>(2 139)</td>
<td>(2 523)</td>
<td>(3 474)</td>
<td>(4 266)</td>
<td>(4 797)</td>
<td>(4 380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance (percentage, gross domestic product)</td>
<td>(52.1)</td>
<td>(63.9)</td>
<td>(62.3)</td>
<td>(54.6)</td>
<td>(41.7)</td>
<td>(43.6)</td>
<td>(46.8)</td>
<td>(40.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance with Israel (million dollars)</td>
<td>(922)</td>
<td>(1 598)</td>
<td>(886)</td>
<td>(1 887)</td>
<td>(2 737)</td>
<td>(3 085)</td>
<td>(3 481)</td>
<td>(3 096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance with Israel (percentage, gross domestic product)</td>
<td>(28.6)</td>
<td>(38.2)</td>
<td>(25.8)</td>
<td>(40.9)</td>
<td>(32.9)</td>
<td>(31.6)</td>
<td>(33.9)</td>
<td>(28.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian National Authority trade with Israel/total Palestinian National Authority trade (percentage)(^c)</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian National Authority trade with Israel/total Israeli trade (percentage)(^c)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Palestinian Ministry of Finance, International Monetary Fund, ILO and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

Note: Except for the population figures, all data exclude East Jerusalem, since the PCBS has no access to the city.

\(^a\) Preliminary estimates. The PCBS is currently revising its national accounts data and rebasing real values to 2010.

\(^b\) ILO’s relaxed definition of unemployment includes discouraged workers.

\(^c\) Palestinian and Israeli trade data refer to goods, and non-factor and factor services.

Source: UNCTAD 2014.
EUPOL COPPS was established in January 2006, building on the work of the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support which was established in 2005. EUPOL COPPS is a European Common Security and Defence Policy mission that is based and operational in the West Bank to support the Palestinian state-building mission based on the two-state solution. It aims to “contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements and to advise Palestinian counterparts on criminal justice and rule of law related aspects under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with the best international standards and in co-operation with the EU institution-building programmes conducted by the European Commission and with other international efforts in the wider context of the security sector, including criminal justice reform”. Therefore, its main tasks are threefold; to assist the Palestinian Civil Police mentoring and advising it, to co-ordinate and facilitate EU member financial assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police and to give advice on politically related Criminal Justice elements. According to the EU, the EUPOL COPPS can be seen as “an expression of the EU’s continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with regard to security and institution building…. Furthermore, the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the safety and security of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law” (EUPOL COPPS 2012, European Council 2005). Currently, the mission has 71 International staff and 41 local staff. 21 EU member states, in addition to Canada, Norway, and Turkey are the contributing states to this mission. The mission’s budget for 2014/15 totalled EUR 8.97 million.

EUPOL COPPS works exclusively with the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), which comprises approximately 8,000 officers in the West Bank (EUPOL COPPS 2014). EUPOL COPPS provided technical support to the Palestine College of Police Sciences in Jericho (inaugurated in July 2012), maintained its focus on and assistance to the PCP Family Protection Unit, supported the creation of the Programme Steering Committee to enable the Civil Police and the Ministry of Interior to improve the coordination matters; remains the main provider of support to the Anti-Corruption Commission and the specialised Crimes Corruption Court created in 2010; and provided technical advice in relation to a full range of Criminal Investigation Department-related issues and improved the Civil Police infrastructure and capacity building on IT, data, radio communication, administration, logistics, finance and training (EUPOL COPPS 2015).

On the other hand, the major criticism for the operations of the EUPOL COPPS is that it has a very limited scope and mandate; it pursues a technical mandate that is not necessarily responsive to the political reality in the West Bank; its contribution to the sustainability of the Israeli occupation and to the process of establishing a Palestinian police state; its failure to challenge the Israeli security establishment when equipment and other resources are not allowed or confiscated; its control over a major part of the Palestinian security doctrine and the imposition of its own frameworks and structures, which undermine the principles of local ownership; its focus on micro issues while neglecting macro and strategic issues despite its contribution to the long term planning and reforming process; and finally that it has not paid much attention to improving democratic civilian oversight and accountability.

Source: Prepared by the Author. This brief profiling has consulted few studies as Kerkkänen et al. 2008; Bulut 2009; Bouris 2010; Persson 2011; Youngs and Michou 2011; Bouris and Reigeluth 2012; and Kristoff 2012.
The USSC was established in 2005 to “meet U.S. commitments under the Middle East Roadmap for Peace”. It is publically better known as the Dayton mission, which is a reference to Keith Dayton, who headed the mission from 2005 until 2010. The USSC is to “assist the PA to transform and professionalize its security sector; engage with the Israelis and Palestinians on security initiatives that build trust and confidence in order to meet Roadmap obligations and to support U.S. and international whole-of-government efforts that set the conditions for a negotiated two-state solution”. The goal is to allow the PA to “possesses professional and self-sustaining security institutions, accountable to and under legitimate civilian authority, that effectively combat terrorism and criminal threats to law and order, perpetuate an environment of security and stability for the Palestinian people, are able to provide for the national security of a future Palestinian State, and serve as a stable and peaceful neighbour to the State of Israel” (US State Department website). In the words of Dayton, “the idea in forming the USSC was to create an entity to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the PA to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve” (Dayton 2009).

The four areas that the USSC work in are, (i) training and equipping the National Security Forces, with nearly 4500 troops having been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center; (ii) capacity building for the MoI; (iii) investing in security infrastructure through building a state-of-the-art training college for the Presidential Guard and an operational base that will house one thousand of the NSF gendarmes; and (iv) provide a senior leadership training for around forty senior security personnel with the aim to “learn how to think about current-day problems and how to operate jointly and with respect for international standards” in the words of Dayton.

The USSC was criticized for making a “brainwash” to the recruited young Palestinians. These chosen men whom were vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations and/or criminal records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA; are called by the critics as, Dayton Forces. Or what Dayton called the “new Palestinian men” who “have shown motivation, discipline and professionalism, and they have made such a difference that senior [Israeli Defence Forces] IDF commanders ask me frequently: How many more of these new Palestinians can you generate, and how quickly?” (Dayton 2009). The Palestine Papers and many human rights organisation reports revealed that the US-trained and supervised forces were engaged in torture and aimed to attack Hamas and its presence and authority. It was documented that since 2007 until early 2011, over 10,000 supporters of Hamas were arrested by the US-trained PA security forces (Perry 2012).

Source: Prepared by the Author. This profile had consulted few studies such as Byrne 2009; Dayton 2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; and Thrall 2010, in addition to U.S. State Department’s website, United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), [Online], Available: http://www.state.gov/s/ussc/index.htm.
The idea of establishing a security academy started in 1998; however it materialized in 2006 and was opened in September 2007. It is considered to be the baby or pet project of the former head of the General Intelligence and a major security figure and leader in Fatah, Twafiq Al-Tirawi, and was supported by different actors financially, politically and logistically. Nearly $2 million in funding came from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in addition to EU Member States, Turkey, and Malaysia. The United States provided “indirect support” through earmarking funds for three other training centres in Jericho. It is located in the city of Jericho in the West Bank as the only national high education institution specialised in security and policing studies. By 2011, the academy was upgraded into a university and started to offer both vocational diploma (8 diplomas each for 2-semesters) and bachelor degrees.

Currently it offers seven 4-years bachelor degrees (Psychology; Security Sciences; English and Hebrew Languages; Public Administration and Military Sciences; Management Information Systems; Law and Policing Sciences; Crimes and Law). The staff of the university grew from 70 in 2007 to reach 320 in 2014. In 2011, the university had more than 300 students with around 32 per cent females, with the aim to reach 1200 student in 2015. The university had four research and scientific centres: Al-Istiqlal Centre for Strategic Studies (formerly, The Palestinian Centre for Security Sector Studies); the Legal Clinic; Measurement and Evaluation Center; Center of Continuing Education and Social Service; and a Polygraph Centre.

Al-Istiqlal Centre for Strategic Studies envisions its role in creating a large and expanding reservoir of factual, multi-sided knowledge about the Palestinian security sector and its involvement in the Palestinian society. Its mission statement mentions that “security in post conflict environment is crucial for peace making and peace implementation” (Centre’s website). The focus on a post conflict environment in the key here, and a major critique for the operation of the whole University. Sayigh (2011) argued that the academy is the “closest thing to having a genuine indigenous capability for human resource development in the PA Security Forces, with an all-Palestinian teaching and administrative staff”.

However, on a more critical note, according to a HRW report (2008:87), “the academy is an integral part of Abbas’s security plan to combat Hamas and other Islamic militants, with training in a broad range of fields, including military tactics, information technology, crisis management, political parties and movements, security investigations, anti-terrorism, human rights and Hebrew language”. Therefore, it is seen as an extension for Abbas/Fayyad security plans, which aim to create a police state.

Figure 19: Photos Illustrating Security Reform, Authoritarianism and Refugee Camps

1. Palestinians from Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, look at a list of Fatah’s gunmen who were given amnesty, and deliver weapons in exchange for financial compensation and integration in the PA security forces.


2. Prime Minister Fayyad (left photo) and US Colonel Dayton (right photo) supervising the process of security reform.

Sources: [bit.ly/1Ju8ad1](http://bit.ly/1Ju8ad1); [bit.ly/1Ju89pt](http://bit.ly/1Ju89pt)
3. Detention based on Political views, and repression via violence in the camps


4. The Palestinian security forces operations during the security campaigns in Jenin and Balata

Sources: [http://bit.ly/1T0gYsu](http://bit.ly/1T0gYsu); [http://bit.ly/1T0h3MP](http://bit.ly/1T0h3MP)
5. The “new Palestinian” commandos for and during the PA’s security campaigns and military training

6. EUPOLCOPPS: Training and supervision

Sources:  [http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Pqw](http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Pqw); [http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Nip](http://on.fb.me/1Ju7Nip)

7. In Ramallah 30 June and 1 July 2012 - Violently repressing a peaceful protest

8. Jenin camp in April 2002 in the aftermath of Jenin Battle/Massacre

9. Researcher’s observations during field work 2012

Source: Author’s photos.
### Table 9: PA’s Statutory Security Forces: Financing, Functions and Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity*</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PA’s Internal Security Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Police</td>
<td>The main law enforcement body. Responsible for daily policing duties as to maintain law and order, prevent and investigate crime, capture suspects, protect lives and property, and maintain prisons. Has sub-branches as the Criminal Investigations Department; Anti-Drug Department; Public Orders Forces; Border Police; Traffic Police; Emergency Response Department and Women’s Police.</td>
<td>The European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) was established in January 2006, as a European Common Security and Defence Policy mission to support, train and fund the Palestinian police. European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah. EU individual countries support the Palestinian police.</td>
<td>Employs some 18,500 policemen (around 10,500 in Gaza; 8000 in West Bank). Wear dark blue uniforms, except for the Public Orders Forces which wear blue-black-white camouflage fatigues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Security</td>
<td>Powerful and controversial internal intelligence body. Responsible for conducting “counterterrorism” efforts, monitoring opposition groups, particularly through the Security and Protection Department (Death Squad). Conducting reconnaissance and intelligence operations.</td>
<td>Since 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is supporting and building its capacities through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and techniques.</td>
<td>Employs some 8,500 agent (around 4,500 in Gaza; 4000 in West Bank). A major reasons for the intra-Palestinian divide, and since its establishment the most non-transparent security body. The best equipped body with light green dress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Defence</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible for common protection services, such as emergency rescue and fire department services.</td>
<td>PA’s budget</td>
<td>Employs some 1,000 personnel. Other auxiliary services include bodies as the Military Medical Service; Military Judicial Staff; and Political and Moral Guidance Commission (estimated 1000 personnel).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Defence</th>
<th>Other auxiliary services include bodies as the Military Medical Service; Military Judicial Staff; and Political and Moral Guidance Commission (estimated 1000 personnel).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### PA’s National Security Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Forces</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PA’S National Security Forces</td>
<td>The successor body of the PLO’s military in the exile, the Palestine Liberation Army. PA’S proto-army, a lightly armed and equipped gendarmerie-style force charged with supporting civil police; delivering law and order; and combating terrorism, short of acting as a true military force.</td>
<td>Since 2005, United States Security Coordinator (USSC) is supporting and building its capacities through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and techniques.</td>
<td>Three brigades in Gaza and 9 in West Bank. Employs some 11,000 personnel plus around hundred personnel in the Military Liaison which is responsible for coordinating security with the Israeli forces. Wear plain green or green US-style camouflage dress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PA’s National Security Forces</th>
<th>PA’s National Security Forces</th>
<th>PA’s National Security Forces</th>
<th>PA’s National Security Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PA’s National Security Forces</td>
<td>PA’s National Security Forces</td>
<td>PA’s National Security Forces</td>
<td>PA’s National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Guard</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Guard</td>
<td>A separate force since 2006 after a US legal restriction that prevented cooperating with the Presidential Security. Its responsibilities include personal protection for the PA’s president and counter-insurgency and rapid intervention tasks.</td>
<td>Since 2005, United States Security Coordinator is supporting and building its capacities through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and techniques. Received training from Jordan and Egypt.</td>
<td>Estimates of its size around 8000 personnel. Wear green and the rapid deployment unit black dress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Main Functions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</strong></th>
<th><strong>Estimated Size, and Others</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>Official PA’s intelligence service and it is independent under the direct command of the PA’s President.</td>
<td>Employed some 7000 agents divided almost equally between Gaza and West Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is responsible for collecting intelligence domestically and internationally, conducting</td>
<td>The major body that was in charge of the building up of the Palestinian Academy for Security Sciences in Jericho, West Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>counterespionage, and cooperates with other governments’ intelligence agencies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 1994, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is supporting and building its capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through funds, training, vehicles, weapons and techniques.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Security/Force 17</strong></td>
<td>An elite military unit responsible for the protection of the key figures of the PA’s leadership and</td>
<td>Employed some 5400 men (2500 troops in three battalions in Gaza; and 2000 in the West Bank).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vital infrastructure, in addition to the quick reaction forces.</td>
<td>Wear green US-style camouflage dress with Bordeaux-red berets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>Collects intelligence on the external military environment and responsible for arresting and</td>
<td>Employed some 6000 agents plain-clothes agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interrogating opposition activists considered a threat to the PA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under Arafat leadership they acted as an internal security body for monitoring opposition from within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fatah.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Police</strong></td>
<td>‘Proto-navy’ is responsible to protect the PA’s territorial waters particularly in Gaza.</td>
<td>Employed some 1000 men (700 in Gaza; 300 in Nablus).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in interrogating opposition activists and collaborators with Israel and protection of</td>
<td>Wear white or the brown-beige US camouflage uniforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the PA’s president.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PA’s Statutory Security Forces Financing, Functions and Capacity*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Police</strong></td>
<td>A separate force since 2005 and responsible for enforcing orders and discipline among the various security bodies of the PA and provides backup support to riot control and infrastructure protection.</td>
<td>PA’s budget</td>
<td>Employs some 2000 personnel (one reinforced battalion in Gaza (1400 personnel); and one regular battalion in Ramallah (600 personnel). Wear plain green or green US-style camouflage with red berets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Force</strong></td>
<td>Established in 2007 exclusively in Gaza by Hamas’s government. It aimed to replaces the PA forces in Gaza and provide their duties in marinating law and order and protect Hamas leadership and rule.</td>
<td>Hamas’s budget</td>
<td>Estimated 12,000 members of the armed wings of Hamas and the popular Resistance Committees in Gaza. Wear either black-blue-white camouflage or black dress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Otherwise stated, all the PA security forces were established in 1993/4. The estimated number of the personnel employed in the security forces is around 70,000-82,000 consuming around 30 per cent of the PA budget and making up around half of the monthly public payroll (Lia 2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007; Friedrich and Luethold 2007; Hussein 2007; Taghdisi-Rad 2010; Sadeq 2011; Sayigh 2011; Bouris 2014).

Source: Prepared by the Author.
### Table 10: Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups: Financing, Functions and Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups*: Financing, Functions and Capacity+</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political factions and armed resistance groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades</strong></td>
<td>The military wing of Hamas, established in 1991. It operates under Hamas’s ideological guidance. It aims to evoke the spirit of Jihad amongst Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims; defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its aggression; and liberate Palestinians and the land usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.</td>
<td>Receive funding from Hamas inside and outside Palestine. Iran is a main sponsor for the Brigades with estimates of $3 million annually. Charities and non-governmental organisation in Saudi Arabic and Gulf sponsor Hamas as well. Zakat Committees and Hamas-run business and tunnels are another source of funding.</td>
<td>Estimates for the number of personnel between 10,000 to 17,000 with vast majority in Gaza. Equipped with assault rifles, imported and self-made RPG launchers, home-made Qassam rockets and was responsible for the majority of suicide bombing in the Second Intifada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saraya Al-Quds Brigades</strong></td>
<td>The armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, established in 1992. Armed struggle is the raison d’etre of the Islamic Jihad and its major objective is ‘the liberation of all Palestine, the end of the Zionist presence, and the establishment of Islamic rule over the land of Palestine which guarantees justice, freedom and equality’.</td>
<td>Iran is the main financial sponsor, whereas Hizbullah provides training, armament and logistical support with a rough estimates of around $2 million annually.</td>
<td>Most estimates put its strength at around 2000 operatives. They are particularly active and focus in Gaza and northern West Bank (Jenin) and almost as equipped as Hamas force but with additional Grade missiles. It rejects the ‘reformist approach’ of Hamas and it is the only party that entirely rejected the Oslo Peace Accords.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Non-Statutory Security Forces and Groups*: Financing, Functions and Capacity+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Main Functions</th>
<th>Main Sources of Finance/Sponsorship</th>
<th>Estimated Size, and Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades</td>
<td>The military arm of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, formed in 2000 under direct supervision of Yasir Arafat. Its ideology is based on nationalism and secular principles despite the religious rhetoric and symbols. It aimed to resist the occupation and was formed of horizontal military sub-groups.</td>
<td>The major funding was from Arafat special accounts directly or through loyalist intermediaries. After his death and after Fatah refusal to provide systematic and continued funding, they received conditional funding from Iran, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad despite it remained very limited and for short period.</td>
<td>Estimations between 1000-5000 due to the absence of clear criteria and centralised leadership. Corruption and engagement in criminal, chaos and gangster activities. Officially banned by a presidential decree from PA’s president Mahmoud Abbas and was largely put on the payroll of the PA security services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades</td>
<td>The military arm of the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza Strip.</td>
<td>Major funding is acquired through illegal activities and external patronage, smuggling and tunnel business. Additional funding through Hizbullah, Iran and other Palestinian factions.</td>
<td>Estimated 500 operatives divided into three branches in Gaza. Its personnel constituted of different factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Battalions and National Resistance Brigades</td>
<td>The military arms of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) respectively.</td>
<td>Major funding from the political parties and from the PLO subsidies. Historically they were supported by the Soviet union camp and other Marxist and leftist alliances.</td>
<td>They don’t exceed 500 personnel, conduct unique military operations and they are one of the oldest who has their golden age in the seventies and eighties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note (*): Other non-statutory security actors include: families; camps’ popular committees; private security companies; salafist groups; collaborators with Israel; tunnel lords; and criminal groups

Note (+): It is more difficult to track the figures of funding or personnel for these groups due to the nature of their operation (Najib and Friedrich 2007; Friedrich and Luethold 2007; Lia 2007).

Source: Prepared by the Author.