A Critical Geopolitics of American “Imperialism” and Grand Strategy (Post-9/11): The Role of Language and Ideology

Melissa Gonca Koluksuz

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I declare that my thesis consists of 99,568 words.
To my parents

Bahar Bastuzel and Andre Koluksuz
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Abstract

This thesis examines the methods through which the administration of George W. Bush utilized the events surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) to legitimize a type of imperial American foreign policy. The central argument of this research is that 9/11 was used by the Bush administration to present a perceived shift in the danger and threat that America faced, thus legitimating a more aggressive foreign policy, which this thesis categorizes as ‘informal imperialism’. It argues that an American grand strategy of global dominance is not new, but rather constitutes a continuation of policies whose ideological roots date back to the 1990s.

This thesis explores this argument through the lens of critical geopolitics (CGP), which provides a critical and interdisciplinary framework for unpacking geographical assumptions in geopolitics and questions how they function within ideology. CGP serves as a framework for understanding the use of language in constructing and normalizing imperial policies in the United States after 9/11. Methodologically, this thesis used critical discourse analysis (CDA), which provides tools for analyzing discourse, and examining how language is the key to understanding how power functions.

This thesis deploys a critical analysis and definition of American imperialism and the contributions of CGP to the debate of a ‘post 9/11 world’. A CDA of the writings of key people in the Bush administration traces their foreign policy and its ideological roots. Further, a CDA of post 9/11 discourses focuses on the changing geography of danger, fear, threat and the act of Othering as it relates to a post 9/11 world. Finally, a CDA of the discourses surrounding the Global War on Terror is conducted, arguing that the frames set up in relation to a new and dangerous world paved the way for policies that justified a war with Iraq.
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Bibliography
List of abbreviations

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
CBS – Columbia Broadcasting Corporation (CBS Broadcasting Inc)
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
CGP – Critical geopolitics
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DOD – Department of Defense
DPG – Defense Planning Guidance
FISA – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
GWOT – Global War On Terror
ICC – International Criminal Court
IR – International Relations
KN – Knowledge Networks
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC – National Broadcasting Company
NSS – National Security Strategy
OEO - Office of Economic Opportunity
Patriot Act - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
PBS – Public Broadcasting Service
PIPA – Policy on International Attitudes
PNAC – Project for the New American Century
PSP – President’s Surveillance Program
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
TG – Tabloid Geopolitics
UN – United Nations
US – United States
USA – United States of America
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
“What do all those words mean ... what are the best ones to use that will benefit the United States of America” - Donald Rumsfeld (Morris, 2013)
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. – Senior advisor to Bush, in a 2002 interview (Suskind 2004)

This thesis is an analysis of the ways in which the Bush administration tried to legitimize American imperialism after September 11, 2001 (9/11) through the use of ideology and the perception of a new and dangerous world. This thesis uses critical geopolitics (CGP) as a framework for analysis, and combines this with critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodology to approach the research question. CGP stands at the intersection of human geography and international relations, and provides a critical and interdisciplinary framework for analysis. In Chapter Two, a CGP framework will specify three major themes that will be used to approach the research question. They are: the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory. Complimentary to this is a CDA method. This method argues that language is power, and language is intentional. Hence, discourses are socially constructed and act as a way to naturalize ideologies. CDA examines the way that power is produced and reproduced through discourse. Using a CGP approach with a CDA methodology, this thesis seeks to answer the question of how President Bush used the 9/11 attacks as a way to legitimize American imperialism.

The opening quote above provides a glimpse of what was happening after 9/11: America was acting like an empire. September 11, 2001, and all of the fear and propaganda around terrorists, Iraq, and Al Qaeda, were all justifications, and legitimizing factors of the reality that American power was changing. Over a decade has now passed since the attacks of September 2001 and it has had profound effects on not only American citizens and American government, but the entire international system. After 9/11, President George W. Bush introduced the world to his own version
of a new world order, which saw the relevance of American imperialism once more.

The perceived ‘sudden emergence’ of global terrorism after 9/11 changed the dynamics of international relations after 9/11, as America was under attack on its own soil, not during a time of war. Historically, imperial policies have been justified by an external, centralized threat (such as the USSR, during the Cold War). However, since September 11th, the intrinsic nature of the threat was perceived to have changed and the instruments used to legitimate American imperialism have also changed. Because of this, danger is now perceived to be everywhere. The reality that ‘terrorism’ is an unidentifiable and dispersed enemy resulted in an instant panic within America, which made its citizens more susceptible to be manipulated into a constant state of fear immediately following the attacks.

The “Bush Doctrine”, which put forward pre-emption and unilateralism as a written policy, was solidified after the invasion of Iraq. It was not, however, the first time in history that American administrations had used these techniques. The idea that America has the right to assert its power and be a global leader is not a new idea and has been present since the days of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (Nelson 1999: 53). America occupies the self-assigned role as ‘global policeman’, meddling and interfering economically and militarily in the affairs of other sovereign states. In fact, Stephen Kinzer noted this fact in his book Overthrow when he argued that,

the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not an isolated episode. It was the culmination of a 110-year period during which America overthrew fourteen governments that displeased them for various ideological, political, and economic reasons (Kinzer 2006: 1).

Kinzer argues that throughout the twentieth, and into the twenty-first century, the United States has used its military strength to overthrow governments. Each circumstance might have been different; i.e. for humanitarian reasons, to ‘save’ a nation from corruption, to spread democracy, or to protect American interests abroad (Ibid). Kinzer's argument is relevant to give some background, and serves as a reminder that the overthrowing of governments, as in Iraq, is not new, and the simple act of overthrowing Saddam Hussein post 9/11 is not what marked this ‘new world order’.
The significant change, and what can be said to be new, is that post 9/11 the geographical conceptions of danger had changed. It presented a clear shift in how we perceive danger, how it should be handled, and what its consequences are. This was the first time a ‘global’ war as such had been declared. It was also the first time war, with intentions to use the full force of the military, had been declared against non-state actors (i.e. unlike war on ‘drugs’, or ‘poverty’). The perception that danger is everywhere (in the form of global terrorism), does not have a territory, and can strike America on American soil represents an important change in how the United States proceeded to deal with this new threat. In 2004, George W. Bush said this about how he understood 9/11 to change the nature of the threat:

See, September the 11th changed the equation. It used to be that oceans would protect us, that we saw a threat, we didn’t have to worry about it because there was two vast oceans. And we could pick and choose as to how we deal with the threat. That changed on September the 11th (Bush 2004c).

The foreign policies that America had previously implemented were presented as outdated for dealing with the new threat at hand. Originally geographical and physical borders could stop attacks, whereas in a globalized world they cannot. This is the backdrop against which this thesis will explore the consequences of 9/11 on the legitimacy of American imperialism. Legitimacy in this context will be analyzed in socio-political terms. Dijk asserts that legitimacy is a social function of ideology; therefore, in this context, legitimation techniques can be understood as social and political acts in which “the speaker is providing good reasons, grounds or acceptable motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticized by others” (Dijk 1998: 255). Dunmire argues that the most important of these techniques is ‘naturalization’ which legitimates a policy by making it seem a natural response to the “given state of the world” (Dunmire 2009: 198). In the context of this research, Smith’s three ‘levels’ of justification will be considered. Smith makes an interesting, and important distinction for whom these ideas are geared toward, to justify means. These levels coincide with the three levels of critical geopolitics laid out by Dalby and Toal, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter Two. The first ‘level’ is the popular level, which includes propaganda put forward on a daily basis to convince the general public
(Smith 2007: xxv). This coincides with Dalby and Toal’s ‘popular geopolitics’ which includes media outlets, cinema, and popular culture (Toal and Dalby 1998). This tactic uses simple ideas to create a snowball effect in support of American imperialism. For example, Smith argues the idea of opposing terror would mean that one endorses human freedoms, which in turn means that in order to secure these freedoms, troops need to be deployed (Smith 2007: xxv). The second level, justification for the elites, is through policy such as the Bush Doctrine. This level coincides with Dalby and Toal’s practical geopolitics, which would include those who make foreign policy, institutions and the bureaucracy (Toal and Dalby 1998). This is meant to gather support for a grand strategy by targeting the international foreign policy elite such as scholars, journalists, professional political activists and government officials. The third level is where the core of the ideology lies – within academics and theorists of international relations and political science (Smith 2007: xxvi). This final level coincides with the formal form of geopolitics identified by Toal and Dalby, which include academics, but also think tanks (Toal and Dalby 1998). Within this sphere the terms for the Bush Doctrine emerged, and this is where understanding how power is justified in Washington lies (Smith 2007: xxvi).

1.2 Existing Research

At present, there is vast literature on post 9/11 American foreign policy, specifically on George W. Bush’s foreign policies during his time in office. As over a decade has now passed, the following section is a representational collection of some of the broader main arguments put forth by other theorists/theories in their attempts to analyze the change in the direction of policy during the Bush years after 9/11. Research in this area can be grouped under journalistic, rationalist, realist, liberal, critical, and ideational views.

Journalistic views such as James Man, and Bob Woodward’s popular books on the Bush administration and the influences behind it are quite simple, and highly descriptive, but remain a good source for empirical background information. Mann gives an account of a group called the ‘Vulcans’ and consisted of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Condoleezza Rice
His account goes over in detail their involvement with the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and their previous work experience together both in- and outside politics. Woodward’s journalistic account for the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks is very descriptive. For example, his book, *Bush at War* (2002), documents several key conversations between important members of the Bush administration without offering much interpretation. His account of ‘Bush at war’ neither outlines reasons for going to war in terms of any previous agendas, nor does it cover in depth any external reasons that are not reactionary to the September 11th attacks. The book itself only accounts for the first one hundred days after 9/11, and is more of a personal view by Bush and those involved in decision making, emphasizing their personalities versus an in depth attempt at foreign policy analysis. The Bush Doctrine, discussed in both in Mann and Woodward’s work, does not address why the foreign policy actions were ‘necessary’; neither did it explain how Iraq became a central threat and a target in the newly declared GWOT. These are not issues discussed in critical ways by those who employ a journalistic account of Bush’s policies. These are examples of quickly produced journalistic accounts of the Bush administration’s policies that do not offer much in the way of critical analysis. They are mainly a good source for empirical information, but remain limited, as they are very descriptive.

Analyses that focus on how specific policies are made in terms of decision-making, and differences in management styles that lead to foreign policy decisions that can be grouped together under rationalist accounts. These accounts of post 9/11 analysis take a rational and individualist approach to foreign policy. For example, in assessing Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, Mitchell and Massoud outline several management styles. They categorize Bush as relying on a hierarchical structure, constituting a formal management style (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 268). This model states that policy options are created by advisors and ultimately in the end, the President makes a choice from those options (Ibid). Such models incorporate leadership, small group dynamics, and bureaucratic politics to explain how the Bush administration essentially failed to prepare for the Iraq War in specific (Ibid: 267). Others such as Dina Badie for example, suggests that group think was the most important aspect of foreign policy analysis in
Bush’s decisions to go to war in Iraq. She acknowledges that 9/11 was not only an opportunity to implement a pre-existing policy, but in fact argues that the actions of the Bush administration regarding Saddam Hussein demonstrated a shift in their views towards him. Instead of seeing Iraq as an isolated threat, Saddam and Iraq were incorporated into the larger theme of the Global War on Terror (Badie 2010: 293). Badie’s view of American foreign policy in Iraq contrasts with the view that it was always ‘about Iraq’ and instead Iraq was used as a way to "connect the dots" – demonstrating a shift in Bush’s thinking, caused by group think (Badie 2010: 293). In this case, the author acknowledges the shifting perceptions of danger, but rejects the thesis that 9/11 was just a window of opportunity, and bases the decision to invade Iraq on a model of group-think and a series of decisions by those in the administration. In essence, both of these are examples of rationalist approaches that assess Bush’s decisions and understand them in light of policy processes (in this case, bad policy processes), versus a more critical approach such as critical geopolitics, that would argue that they were not mistakes, but rather ideologically justified policies. These accounts provide a simple analysis of reasons for the War in Iraq, and focus heavily on decision makers and making, as opposed to larger conceptual ideas such as American grand strategy or imperialism in motivators for war.

Litwak, who does not fall starkly into any one category, for example, has posed the question of whether pre-emption in the Bush Doctrine is a new general doctrine for US foreign policy, or if it is a traditional instrument of self-defense that has gained more relevance in the “transformed post-11 September political context” (Litwak 2002: 59). Litwak concludes that because the security context has been indeed transformed after 9/11, the “new character of the threat” is leading to a new “calculus of pre-emption” (Ibid: 71). According to Litwak, pre-emption is becoming more “common-sensical” due to the change in the nature of the threat – global terrorism. Motivations for a grand strategy or imperial ambitions are not discussed by Litwak, and his analysis is based on an assessment of US foreign policy that focuses on the changing nature of threat as an excuse, and the failures of the UN to protect global security. The above examples do not critically engage with the construction of fear and threat, and further, the necessity of war that these perceptions legitimizened.
Realists and Liberal theories have also engaged with this material over the last decade. For example, Andrew Bacevich’s work on American Empire which is often cited in post 9/11 analysis is an attempt to explain American statecraft in the 1990s, and covers the early days of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Bacevich argues that the United States has had a clear and well-defined grand strategy since the 1990s (Bacevich 2002: 3). Following the main principles of realism that states will at minimum seek their own preservation, and at maximum seek greater domination, Bacevich asserts that American grand strategy is essentially to “preserve and, where feasible and conducive to US interest, to expand an American imperium” (Ibid). Bacevich claims that U.S. policy did not in fact change after 9/11 in terms of commitment to an ‘open world’; on the contrary, it “energized them to press on” (Ibid: 226). In representing all that is good in the world, ‘America the reluctant superpower’ was ‘forced’ to act in carrying on to spread liberalism (Ibid). Quoting Donald Rumsfeld, September 11th actually created the “kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world” (Ibid: 227). The war on terror that Bush called for articulated something that had not been present since the collapse of the Soviet Union which was a readily identifiable enemy: “a compelling rationale for a sustained and proactive use of American power on a global scale justified as a necessary protective measure” (Ibid: 229). Bacevich’s analysis points to three important ways in which defining the war against terror as a war on behalf of freedom served the administration’s purposes. One was that it allowed Bush to claim American innocence; second was it allowed Bush to link this new war to great wars of the past in which great evils were defeated (i.e. fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism); and thirdly, it allowed Bush to remove the constrains on the use of force, and “Bush’s war on terror made it possible for policy-makers to reclaim the freedom of action provided by the Truman Doctrine” (Bacevich 2002: 230). Above all, September 11th and Bush’s policies “reinforced the post-cold war consensus for maintaining unquestioned military superiority” (Ibid: 238).

However, missing from Bacevich’s realist accounts of American foreign policy, or even by his books’ title, ‘American Empire’, is an account of the power of ideas and the social construction of discourses. Bacevich does not discuss how America was ‘forced to spread liberalism’, or the ideological basis of a ‘reluctant superpower’. He
does not provide a critical analysis of these concepts, which are central to the ideological basis of President Bush’s foreign policy. He states that 9/11 provided a chance to refashion the world; but how? The ways in which these concepts (ex. America is needed to fulfill the role of benevolent hegemon) were presented to the American people, and further the international community are not discussed. Bacevich’s realist account misses other important dimensions that can provide insight into the way the Bush administration framed the important of 9/11 in relation to their foreign policy, such as ideational elements.

Grand strategy has featured as a fundamental part of American politics and those who study it. After the attacks of 2001, several theories emerged once more about American grand strategy, and how the policies that ‘resulted’ from 9/11 fit into the big picture. Theorists such as Ikenberry argue that in the past, America has subscribed to one of two grand strategies. One was the realist worldview, which was organized around containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of the global balance of power (Ikenberry 2002: 45). Stability of the international system was achieved through nuclear deterrence until the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, Ikenberry, along with many other liberals theorized that great powers would “compete with each other, and although war is not unthinkable, sober statecraft and the balance of power offer the best hope for stability and peace” (Ikenberry 2002: 46). George W. Bush ran for the Presidency describing his platform as a “new realism” which aimed to shift focus away from “Clinton-era preoccupations with nation building, international social work, and the promiscuous use of force, and toward cultivating great-power relations and rebuilding the nation’s military” (Ikenberry 2002: 46). The second grand strategy has been a liberal one, aimed at a system in where the US uses its political weight to create rules that will protect American interests, maintain its power and extend its influence (Ikenberry 2002: 47). However the new grand strategy under President Bush is outlined in seven main elements by Ikenberry; amongst them maintaining a unipolar world, a new assessment of how to handle the ‘new’ threats, an offensive foreign policy involving pre-emption and preventive wars and the right to rewrite the rules of sovereignty (Ikenberry 2002). Ikenberry’s analysis of Bush’s new foreign policy concludes that his version of neo-imperialism cannot be sustained (Ibid:
His main argument is that this will lead inevitably to imperial overstretch and that it will cause the United States more harm than good as allies will turn against it and the world will ultimately become less secure, and so will America (Ikenberry 2002). As a result, he posits that the old grand strategies will reappear and a realist or a liberal strategy will come back into existence (Ibid: 57).

As many liberal critiques of grand strategy, or imperialism, Ikenberry’s account addresses the real issues of overstretch, and the unsustainability of such aggressive foreign policy. However, in consistence with much of IR literature, it does not address the issues this research is seeking to analyze. His account is that of two competing theories of grand strategy. Nowhere does it address how these grand strategies gain legitimacy on an ideological level, for instance. The preoccupation with whether or not Bush’s new imperialism will result in an overstretch or not, takes away from the issues at the core that this type of literature misses, that CGP seeks to address. How did the neoconservatives create justification for the war in the first place, and naturalize US dominance in the world? How did America become the only superpower, and why is it that it continues to fill this role? These are questions that are overlooked at the ideological level by many liberals, and some schools of IR that this research seeks to investigate through a CGP approach.

Alternatively, authors such as Edwards Rhodes have engaged with the notion of imperial ambitions. Although he acknowledges the promotion of American hegemony in the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002, and the emotionally charged political messages of the Bush administration both in writing and in speech, his analysis does not seek to question the assumptions and implications behind the shifting perceptions of danger presented in the NSS. His critique of the Bush administration focuses on how realistic it is for the Bush administration to implement or ‘spread’ liberalism around the world, as a mission. He criticizes Bush’s policies as he states that “strike down one tyrant or one terrorist and another will grow in his place” (Rhodes 2003: 141). His critique targets the limitations to spreading liberalism around the world; not engaging with how the idea of spreading liberalism is an ideology to maintain American hegemony. In another example, Rhodes assesses how progress is presented through the
eyes of the Bush administration, and how liberalism will result in progress and therefore a secure world (Rhodes 2003: 145). He does not critically assess the idea of progress, how it is socially constructed, or how the idea of progress itself may be used as justification for certain policies. His analysis only focuses on the fact that the Bush administration attempts to link progress to liberalism and whether or not that is achievable. This only skims the surface of certain aspects of imperial thinking. He concludes by saying Bush’s grand strategy of spreading liberalism isn’t attainable as it jeopardizes international peace and individual freedom (Rhodes 2003: 147). The analysis of the policies touch on some important points, but is not a multidimensional approach, and thus does not address the pre-existing ideas constituting the Bush Doctrine, or more explicitly the neoconservative agenda for example, that arguably had a greater effect on Bush’s policies.

Views more critical or ideational such as Jean-Francois Drolet, take into account the neoconservative agenda and its influences on US foreign policy. He takes an ideational approach, arguing that neoconservatives’ claims to promote a liberal agenda are false, and in fact mask the militaristic approach they have to foreign policy (Drolet 2010: 92). He argues that neoconservatives promote the spread of democracy as part of their foreign policy initiative to counter Islamic-terrorism, not necessarily the ideological concept of democracy itself, which prior to the 1980s, Kristol argues, Americans didn’t even support vehemently as they had partnerships with dictators (Ibid: 97). He cites Toby Dodge’s argument that neoconservatives “envisage democracy promotion as the establishment by force of a set of institutions and electoral mechanisms designed to transform the ‘deficient’ political culture of the targeted states and manufacture consent from above for an externally imposed neoliberal political-economic structure” (Drolet 2010: 97). Drolet sees democracy promotion as a strategy of statecraft that is designed to make the international system safe for American hegemony (Ibid: 100). Drolet’s analysis is critical of the neoconservatives, and their views of foreign policy. He draws attention to some important factors such as ‘true’ motives behind the neoconservative agenda – a military dominance of the globe, versus a genuine desire to spread liberal democracy. That being acknowledged, an analytical framework that allows us to move away from mainstream notions of foreign policy is
needed; one that deals with more complex aspects such as ideology. Drolet’s analysis is a start, and makes useful contributions to this research. However, CGP in comparison offers an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account ideology as a product of hegemonic discourses. Drolet’s view of democracy promotion as a tool of statecraft puts the state at the centre of the equation. Alternatively, CGP questions statecraft as manmade, questions the state as a taken for granted entity, and the implications of such assumptions on foreign policy.

Another ideational perspective presented by Tony Smith hones in on the importance of ideas for the justification of American empire after 9/11. Smith argues that after the attacks, the decision to go into Afghanistan was supported internationally and by the UN as an act of self-defense that required “no special interpretation” (Smith 2007: xx). However, in the case of the choice to go to war in Iraq, Smith asserts that this was justified on “highly ideological terms”, with underlying motivations for American foreign policy (Ibid). The Bush Doctrine, which was the most explicit document in American history according to Smith, was used to justify actions in Iraq (Ibid). Having Iraq under US control via regime change would also create a new order in the “broader Middle East” which was part of a larger mission to structure world affairs in America’s favour – “a grand design presented by Washington without precedent in American history” (Ibid: xxi). Smith’s different levels of justification, mentioned in earlier parts of this chapter are most useful in understanding for whom legitimacy and justification are created. His emphasis on the power of ideas is most useful in this research, especially regarding concepts of legitimacy. This research seeks to use Smith’s framework around justification, and incorporate it into the major themes in CGP to address some of the gaps in IR literature, presenting an interdisciplinary and critical analysis.

A more critical view involving methodology similar to CDA shows that the ideology that “9/11 changed everything” was the starting point for the Bush administration to implement a new domestic and foreign policy. The terror from 9/11, in the eyes of the administration, represented a shift in danger, threat, fear, and above all how to handle their foreign policy. An intertextual analysis of the Bush administration’s claims that 9/11 changed everything, by Patricia Dunmire, argues that in fact this
discourse was a return to the desire by the United States to maintain global supremacy by maintaining military pre-eminence (Dunmire 2009: 196). She provides an interesting analysis of how the NSS 2002 was presented as a “natural” response to the 9/11 attacks; one that was inevitable (Dunmire 2009: 198). Her analysis is similar to a type of discourse analysis, and proves to be useful. However, her end argument that 9/11 is but a continuation of policies related to a new world order declared at the end of the Cold War misses the importance of the discourses put forward by the Bush administration that geographical categories of danger had changed.

Constructivism has also tackled the ideational elements. As Mabee argues, it has challenged “conventional approaches to international security by adding normative dimension: that ideational factors constitute social relations” (Mabee 2007: 387). However, the downfall of some constructivist work as argued by Mabee is that, “while important, the study of security norms has ignored the ways in which actors construct ideas about what threats are, and what security itself is” (Ibid). However, he argues that the Copenhagen school has made significant contributions in looking at the discursive constructions of threat. He praises the school for its “rich understanding of agency, potentially not just confined to states” (Ibid). The Copenhagen school has indeed looked at some elements of language, discourse and the role of ideas, but only so far as it relates specifically to securitization. Buzan et al. in their popular book, Security: a new framework for analysis, look at ‘language theory’ (which mainly focuses on speech acts (Waever 1995: 55)) as it applies to security and securitization, arguing that something becomes a security issue not necessarily because there is a real threat, but it is presented as such (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). The distinguishing feature of securitization, as Buzan et al. explain, is its specific rhetorical structure and how threats are presented, handled, and perceived (Ibid: 26), and the outcome is decided by its audience. The ‘bonus’ of categorizing something as a security issue gives it the priority of urgency. It also makes it a political choice, by labeling it specifically as a national security issue that needs intervention by the state (Waever 1995: 65). Critical geopolitics, and critical discourse analysis seek to analyze the discourse beyond just the ‘securitization’ issue, to a broader range of understanding regarding power, imperialism, grand strategy and legitimacy.
Stuart Croft’s work, a part of the field of critical constructivism also addresses the importance of discourses in America’s War on Terror. Importantly, he argues that discourses have the power to “create and reflect identities” and hence they construct who is seen as an enemy, or ally (Croft 2006:1). He also argues that in turn, these constructions legitimate actions and stipulate whose actions are tolerable, and whose are not (Ibid). One of his central arguments is that these discourses emerge in times of crisis, and hence crises are “the engines of radical discursive change” as we have seen with the events of 9/11 (Croft 2006: 1). Like many authors of CGP, Croft also argues that discourses that take on a sense of credibility in a crisis situation will soon turn into common sense, and hence get repeated from the government levels, through the media, and down to public understanding of events. Importantly, Croft’s work recognizes the importance of discourses on our everyday lives, as he argues it forms how we behave towards ‘ourselves’ and also towards ‘others’ (Croft 2006: 43). As a critical author, he also points out that the events of 9/11 were socially constructed thereafter to gives a certain meaning, and a key discourse in the War on Terror that the United States was attacked ‘out of the blue’, something that this research will discuss in key CDA chapters (Croft 2006: 85). He also stresses the importance of the discourses of the War on Terror and its appearance in popular culture. He argues that

On a daily basis, it was the organs of popular culture that reproduced the ‘war on terror’ as common sense, as the way that life had to be lived. In novels, popular music, humour, television and film, the ‘war on terror’ was marked, and its messages reproduced (Croft 2006: 204)

Croft's work is an important critical view of the discourses of the War on Terror and how crisis situations bring about the radical changes in policy through socially constructed meanings.

Another critical constructivist work, and the most in depth engagement that addresses language and discourse in the Bush administration is Richard Jackson’s book *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Political and Counter-terrorism*. Published in 2005, his work is classified as a critical discourse analysis. As Jackson states in his opening chapter, his book is about “the public language of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the way in which language has been deployed to justify and normalise a global
campaign of counter-terrorism” (Jackson 2005: 1). As this book is a claim to critical discourse analysis, and the language of the Bush administration surrounding the GWOT, it is important to mark the differences between Jackson’s work and that of this research. First, his timeframe of focus is from September 11, 2001 through January 31, 2004 and includes speeches, interviews, radio broadcasts and reports to Congress. He does not include policy documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review or the National Security Strategy, which this thesis takes into account. While this thesis and Jackson’s work argue that the War on Terror is an elite based project, he does not make mention of the use of critical geopolitics. While his work is a CDA, he does not specify the ‘tools’ of CDA that are used to analyze the use of language – and why he has specifically focused on certain quotes. For example, he does not necessarily say that ‘X quote’ is an example of rhetorical devices, or framing. Hence, in regards to CDA, this thesis provides a more methodologically rigorous analysis.

Jackson does link Bush administration policies to previous US approaches, however unlike this thesis, his focus is on previous uses of variations of the ‘war on terrorism’, not necessarily connecting it to the larger concept of American imperialism, or American grand strategy. While he argues that the “activity” after 9/11 was not a consequence of the events themselves (Jackson 2005: 16), he claims that this is in relation specifically to previous counter-terrorism rhetoric in the United States. Related to this point, where he refers to the “genealogical origins” of Bush’s language, he only specifies five quotes from before 9/11 (Jackson 2005: 155) and again they are in reference to terminology about terrorism. No other references are made in any detail to previous documents or speeches tracing back the origins of George W. Bush’s foreign policy, or showing continuity. At one point, Jackson makes reference to the policy agenda of the Bush administration being linked with the neoconservative agenda (2005: 27), however, he does not provide any evidence or analysis of this claim. Overall, Jackson’s CDA of the GWOT is important, but there are gaps in his work and approach which this research adds to. Jackson’s analysis does not link his findings to a clear continuity in American foreign policy, nor does it mention imperialism or grand strategy. This thesis seeks to do both these things, and in the process will trace the origins of the Bush administration’s foreign policy to specific documents and influential
people dating back to the 1990s. This thesis will also analyze policy documents, where Jackson has omitted them. Additionally, this research combines critical geopolitics with critical discourse analysis to show continuity in foreign policy that goes beyond terrorism and the language surrounding it.

The above represents a variety of approaches on American foreign policy, Bush’s agenda, and the policy implications of 9/11. Although there are some arguments worth incorporating, they do not engage with how discourses are created and perpetuated on ideological terms, with the exception of Jackson’s analysis that comes closest in methodology to this research. The implementation of the Bush Doctrine, the declaration of a war on terror, the decision to go to war in Iraq as part of a grand strategy and justification of American imperialism are not discussed in depth. In the next chapter, a framework for the critical geopolitics approach along with a critical discourse analysis methodology will be put forward. Together, they provide a critical approach to address some of the missing gaps in the literature. Presented above were some major types of approaches and their critiques. Journalistic approaches are very descriptive, and full of empirical information that lacks critical analysis. The rationalist approaches are very focused on decision making, management styles, foreign policy processes and they are largely rational and individualistic. Both these approaches miss the intention of constructed discourses to shape foreign policy, and instead conclude that management styles or poor foreign policy processes shape outcomes. CGP would argue that it is an intentional construction of language in discourses that shape ideologies that in turn explain foreign policy outcomes and legitimacy. Other popular accounts like Bacevich’s focus on empire actually leave out the crucial part of analysis in how imperial states assume their role; in the case of America, the ‘reluctant’ superpower. There are no mentions of ideational elements, and instead focuses on rational processes. Ikenberry, Rhodes, and some liberal camps whom are critical of American imperialism are analyzing it from the approach of the effects of imperial overstretch; i.e. the most important criticism in this approach are the limitations to empire no necessarily its legitimacy, ideology or maintenance on deeper level. This is something CGP seeks to move away from; discussing the limitations of imperialism and overstretch have been discussed by many, but what is missing is how they are justified
in the first place, on an ideological level. More critical views such as Drolet and Dunmire for example, incorporate the importance of language. But in Dunmire’s case, she falls short of linking the past and present policies together in American grand strategy. While she recognizes the continuum of American foreign policy, she fails to incorporate the importance of the discourses that came from the Bush administration after 9/11. This thesis seeks to compare and contrast the discourse of the 1990s when this imperial style foreign policy began, with Bush’s discourse post 9/11 to understand the connection and hence, the ideological basis. Constructivism declares its interest in the ideational, and makes this the centre of their approach, but once again falls short as their analysis focuses heavily on norms, but fails to analyze how those norms came to existence. In an attempt to build on that, the Copenhagen school has tried to further incorporate the importance of language, but its focus is generally on the language around securitization specifically. CGP and CDA seek to broaden the focus past norms and securitization and look at the different ways in which discourse is used to naturalize imperial policies ideologically. Just to reiterate, there is a large amount of literature that covers ‘post 9/11’ policy in international relations. This selection is only a representation of that, and offers an example of the kind of literature this thesis seeks to move away from and critique during the course of research.

1.3 Contribution

The pairing of critical geopolitics with critical discourse analysis offers a unique and critical engagement with materials such as government documents, speeches, and think tank publications, and provides an in depth analysis and understanding of ideology, via its construction by language, which is at the heart of power. The three themes that can be extracted from critical geopolitics (and which will be discussed at length in Chapter Two) are the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory. This research seeks to apply these to the gaps in IR concerning how we understand power, how imperialism is understood, and how it is socially constructed. Critical discourse analysis provides a tool by which to apply the principles of CGP to this research methodologically.

In 1993, R.B.J. Walker made a very important point about the limits of
international relations theories. He argued that theories of IR are “expressions of a historically specific understanding of the character and location of political life in general”, and are less important as substantive explanations they offer about political conditions in the modern world (Walker 1993: 5). Walker also alludes to taken-for-granted beliefs by pointing out that political analysis is constrained by categorization (ibid). Whether or not the importance of states is growing, or fading; the importance of state versus non state actors; or whether states are becoming more interdependent, are common questions for international relations theories, and do not necessarily provide an in depth view of phenomena (Walker 1993: 7). Walker’s critique of IR theories is important here, because he essentially points to one of the gaps in IR that this research seeks to address; which is that most IR theories are “taking a modernist framing of all spatiotemporal options as an unquestionable given” (Walker 1993: 7). Addressing taken-for-granted beliefs is a key part of this research. Therefore, introducing critical geopolitics into the field of IR as an alternative and critical view is an aim of this research in addressing the gaps in IR dealing with post 9/11 analyses.

Since Walker’s argument in 1993, there have been many developments in critical geopolitics, and within departments of geography across the world. However, within the discipline of international relations, critical geopolitics is not commonly seen as a tool of analysis; neither is it understood as a theory or framework. Foreign policy analysis, realism and power politics dominate IR theories of imperialism, American grand strategy and foreign policy more generally. Theorists like Keohane, Ikenberry, Morgenthau, Nye and Snyder are often cited in regards to American imperialism and its theories. Variations of constructivism take on ideational elements, but still take the state as a given entity as much of the core focus is on norms, and how states and actors within them behave based on these shared norms. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink cite Checkle’s study that researched how international norms influence different actors, whom are usually states, differently (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 397). The basis for analysis in most cases are states, and the focus of these studies are usually norms. The field of international relations at large does not specifically account for the roots of power in discourse and language. The ways in which ideologies are normalized through common sense beliefs are not something that IR has vast literature on. However,
international relations as a field of study can incorporate such practices into its realm. At the crossroads of international relations and critical geopolitics, is a way to practice IR called “dissident international relations”. Discussed by authors such as Ashley and Walker, dissident IR problematizes the “deterritorialization” and then “reterritorialization” of global political life (Toal 1996: 171). Following the principles of Critical Geopolitics (CGP), these authors seek to question the boundary-producing practices of modern discourse that use divisions such as self and other, rationality and irrationality, and divide the inside from the outside (Toal 1996: 171). They question how the “Other” is created, on a larger global scale and how we come to understand our world by creating distinctions, emphasizing the importance of social construction in global politics. Modern statecraft, in Ashley’s words, can be seen as “modern mancraft”, which is effectively the fact that man constructs his problems, dangers and fears (Toal 1996: 172). Dissident IR “explicitly repudiates” itself as a “new” perspective or a single philosophical approach, but instead recognizes the act of practicing dissident IR as a “critical attitude” (Toal 1996: 172). This research seeks to incorporate critical geopolitics into international relations, using a critical and interdisciplinary approach, attempting to present new ways to analyze the prospect of American imperialism in a post 9/11 world by combining critical geopolitics with the methods of critical discourse analysis in the understanding of power.

Additionally, this research is not only a move away from journalistic accounts of the events that followed 9/11, but also to move away from theories of foreign policy analysis that only skim the surface of the change in direction of American policy after 9/11. Accounts like those discussed above rely on descriptive and rational analyses of foreign policy. They are decision based, and often not critical. This thesis offers deeper level critical analysis that takes into account the importance of key players and previous documents and their ties to the ‘post 9/11’ foreign policy the Bush administration implemented. This interdisciplinary method draws upon several influential areas and theorists in international relations, human geography, political science, and within the methodological tools of critical discourse analysis to offer a combined effort at answering questions at the level of the ideational. This central focus of this thesis will be on the analysis of the ideologies and discourses that justified and attempted to
legitimate American imperialism. By incorporating critical geopolitics and critical discourse analysis into the field of international relations as a framework, this research seeks to address some of the gaps in literature on the importance of social construction of ideologies as legitimating discourses. It is a project in the critical analysis of the root of policies put forward by the Bush administration during George W. Bush’s eight years in office.

This thesis pinpoints specific ideologies that run through the discourse from the 1990s using critical discourse analysis, and then highlights how the same discourses were used after 9/11 as ‘new’ justifications for foreign policy after the attacks. This creates a narrative tracing back the ideological roots of George W. Bush’s foreign policy by carefully examining the influence of specific people, their writing and ideological roots, and extending the narrative to the Bush administration where we saw radical changes in foreign policy as a ‘reaction’ to 9/11, which this thesis will prove otherwise.

The issue with theories that attempt to understand risk and threat and its implications, such as the risk society thesis, is that it does not analyze in depth how dangers and threats become classified as risks (Isin 2004: 218). This is where discourse and the power of ideas become very important, and an area that CGP and CDA together can contribute. Structurally, this thesis will combine the framework of CGP with the methods of CDA to provide a complimentary, critical way to analyze American power, by focusing on the role of ideas and discourses and how they constitute perceptions that form specific worldviews. This combined framework and method provides a tool to analyze international relations and power in a way that is at the intersection of human geography, IR, and political science.

This research will proceed with five core chapters. In Chapter Two, the framework and methodology of the project will be presented. Here an in-depth look at critical geopolitics and its principles, and critical discourse analysis and its tools will be explored. In Chapter Three, a critical analysis and definition of imperialism, American imperialism, and the contribution of CGP to that discussion in the context of a ‘post
9/11 world’. Following this, Chapter Four will be a CDA of the writings of key people in the Bush administration will be examined, tracing their foreign policy and ideological roots, making it evident that the policies after 9/11 were in fact not a reaction to the events themselves, but a continuation in foreign policy largely started in the 1990s. Once this agenda has been made clear, Chapter Five will offer a CDA of post 9/11 discourses and will focus on the changing geography of danger, fear, threat, and also the act of Othering as it relates to a post 9/11 world. This is where most of the framing for a ‘new’ world took place, evoking the original ideas of American imperialism from the 1990s, while presenting them as a new reaction to the attacks. The final section of this thesis, Chapter Six, will be a CDA exploring the discourses surrounding the Global War on Terror, arguing that the frames set up in relation to a new and dangerous world paved the way for policies that justified a war with Iraq before concluding in Chapter Seven.
Chapter Two
Framework and Methodology

2.1 Analytical framework

This research seeks to move away from ‘theory testing’ within international relations that seeks to apply general theories to a variety of political phenomenon. As such, this thesis will argue that critical geopolitics (CGP) can fill in a part of the gap in current methods and theoretical approaches within the field of international relations, by focusing on the power of ideas. CGP is unique in that it can be understood as an analytical framework, or a lens, rather than a theory. The first part of this chapter will discuss the influences and theoretical underpinnings to the CGP approach by briefly discussing the relevant contributions of Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Antonio Gramsci. Following this, the principles of CGP will be laid out, followed by the three themes that this research extracts from CCP (the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory) and will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. The second part of this chapter will cover methodology: critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is intertwined and complimentary to CGP and as such, this research fuses the two together to analyze how the attempt to legitimize American imperialism was presented. The methodology section of this chapter will cover definitions of discourse, the principles of CDA, the importance of language, power and ideology in CDA, and finally the framework that this research will employ throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that employing CDA under the analytical framework – or lens- of critical geopolitics creates a unique critical tool for analysis in the study of imperialism.

2.1.1 Influences and theoretical underpinnings: Foucault, Said, &

Many lead theorists in the field of critical geopolitics have been influenced by theories in the areas of post modernism, post structuralism, and post colonialism. Specifically, the works of Edward Said, especially in regards to Othering, Gramsci’s theories on hegemony, power, and imaginative geographies, and Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, power-knowledge, and discourse analysis have been
major influences among critical geographers. Hence, these ideas form some of the most fundamental underpinnings to the CGP and specifically to the study of imperialism and will be introduced in this section.

**Michel Foucault**

Michel Foucault is very important to the field of discourse analysis, and well known and recognized for his contribution to the method. However, he also has concepts that are fundamental to the foundations of CGP. Foucault recognized the importance of geographers in studying international relations; he talks about this in the following passage:

> Geography must be made a means of reading the global crisis of imperialism, capitalism and centralism in all its forms…space is the place where history inscribes itself, and geography should be the analysis of that which dwells and is born there….Geographers become that they should be: awakeners of consciousness, educators and thereby liberators (Foucault as cited in Riou 2007: 35).

Foucault’s key political-geographic arguments are his theories on governmentality, which many political geographers have adopted. He advocates a rethinking of power relations beyond the state as a centralized apparatus of interest and strategies (Coleman and Agnew 2007: 320). Critical geographers such as Dalby and Toal promote ‘thinking outside the box’ – i.e. outside the state as a given entity, and argue for a move away from thinking of the state as the only unit of interaction in the international system. Foucault suggests that the state should not be seen as something developed “above individuals”, ignoring their agency and existence, but rather as a “sophisticated structure” which individuals are integrated into (Ibid). This is essentially an argument of social construction. Agnew and Coleman suggest that Foucault is arguing for what they call a “geosociology of political power”, which is understanding the “complex sociological contexts of power that are overlapping and discontinuous spatialities of power in the plural” (2007: 321).

Another influential concept among political geographers is Foucault’s concept of governmentality. According to Rose, the study of governmentality is to analyze the emergence of specific “regimes of truth concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of
speaking the truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs of so doing” (Rose as cited in Huxley 2007: 187). Critical geopolitics seeks to question how ‘truths’ are created and legitimized; therefore, this concept has been of great importance to the field of CGP. Space is a special concern for political geographers, and Foucault maintains that “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (Foucault cited in Huxley 2007: 190). Legg (2007) claims that Foucault’s writings on governmentality have appeal to political geographers for several reasons, one of them being that it presents an analytical program for analyzing modern regimes of government, and the literature also refers to a mode of power that has gone beyond the power regimes of sovereignty looking into how power is used to stabilize and normalize populations (Legg, 2007: 278). However, governmentality, as discussed within sociological and political frameworks does not adequately give depth to the discussion of space, which is where critical geopolitics seeks to expand on Foucault’s ideas and integrate the importance of space and place into the discussion of international relations (Huxley 2007: 190). Still, Foucault’s contributions to political geography and specifically, to the field of CGP are worth noting, and have been of great importance in both theory and method.

Foucault’s theories on power/knowledge have also had great influence, both theoretically for critical geographers, but also methodologically, as much of his work regarding power/knowledge is integrated in various types of discourse analysis. The types of questions involving power that Foucault seeks to answer are: “if power is exercised, what sort of exercise does power involve? And what are its mechanisms?” (Foucault 1980: 89). He contends that “one should try to locate power at the extreme points of its exercise where it is always less legal in character” (Foucault 1980: 97). The powers granted to Bush after 9/11 under a “state of emergency”, which later turned into a permanent state of emergency during his eight years, is a prime example for analysis and hence the importance of this time period. The puzzle regarding power is not only who has power, but a deeper understanding of power that seeks to understand its effects. Hence, the importance in critical geopolitics thinking, and discourse analysis specifically, are questions surrounding ideology. Foucault asks: “What rules of right are
implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of truth? What type of power is susceptible of producing discourse of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed with such potent effects?” (1980: 93). What he is capitalizing on is the importance of discourse. Foucault claims that there are manifold relations of power, which “permeate, characterise and constitute the social body” and these relations of power cannot circulate or be produced without a specific discourse (1980: 93). Foucault’s teacher, Althusser, introduced the conception of ideology in a discursive light. He lead discussions on how ideology becomes internalized and the role that discourse plays (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 483). The importance of discourse is key to Foucault, and to the study of critical geopolitics in understanding the ‘how’ question: how discourses become prominent, and how ideology is sedimented in society, for example. On the relation of power and truth, Foucault concludes that “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault 1980: 93). Since, according to Foucault, truth is what makes laws, and produces discourses, which then transmits and extends itself upon the effect of power, our mode of living depends on the “true discourses” (1980: 94). This connects directly to discourse and the power of ideas – a main theme in critical geopolitics. It provides importance to studying discourse in the production of “truth” and ideology a priority in the social sciences, and therefore, many social science theorists have used Foucault’s thoughts as a blueprint to the development of their own theories.

Edward Said

The influential work of Edward Said crosses disciplines. His ideas have been debated and incorporated into a number of fields, and the continued importance of his ideas, especially in light of the re-emergence of imperialism as a focus of study will be discussed here. In Edward Said’s words, his book *Orientalism* “once again raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended” (2003: xvi). In his later work, *Culture and Imperialism*, he echoes this point in a quote from Michael Barratt-Brown that,

imperialism is still without question a most powerful force in the economic, political and military relations by which the less economically developed
lands are subjected to the more economically developed. We may still look forward to its ending (Said 1994: 341).

The term “empire” or “imperialism”, has been cited by many who are skeptical of using the term, and view it as outdated or representative to current affairs. However, Said points out that uncertainty about whether the “past really is past”, or whether it continues in different forms perhaps, allows us to continue to investigate modern day imperialism (1994: 1).

Said’s work on Orientalism, and the Other is an immensely influential concept in the field of politics and international relations. The Other is part of what sustains imperialism; as such, critical theorists have specifically used his theories to explain imperialism and uneven development. A definition of how Said explains his concept of Orientalism is below:

[Orientalism is a] distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two halves, Oriental and Occident) but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world it is (Said 2003: 12).

The relationship between us and them - the Occident and the Orient - is essentially “a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said 2003: 5). Said argues that it is used to produce and maintain an uneven exchange of various kinds of power, and a way to understand our identity against an Other (Ibid: 12). In the context of post 9/11 studies, the other largely refers to the Muslim world, primarily those in Arab nations. Said claims that binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’ - a very “settled, clear, unassailably self-evident” identity - began with the exchange between Europeans and ‘others’ that became systematic over half a millennium ago (1994: xxviii). It changes and morphs depending on what is deemed to be evil. During the Cold War it was the USSR and communism, today it is global terrorism, Al Qaeda, and more generally Islam. The production and sedimentation of
these discourses into everyday life is a process CGP thinkers seek to uncover. The acceptance of specific discourse into daily life is a way in which policies surrounding how to ‘deal’ with the other are legitimated; therefore, understanding the discourse that surround them is crucial.

A part of Othering depends upon Said’s work on imaginative geographies, which is also hugely important to CGP. He emphasizes that imaginative geographies do not necessarily need to be acknowledged by the Other. He argues that it is enough for ‘us’ to create boundaries in our own minds and hence ‘they’ become ‘they’ accordingly and therefore they are territorially and mentally separated from ‘us’ (Said 2003: 54). Using the language of Orientalism, argues Said, is just a way to compartmentalize things of the Orient into “manageable parts” (Ibid: 72). After all, imagined does not mean false, it only means perceived.

Critical theories generally incorporate Said’s work into their foundations, especially in exploring imperialism. In order for a nation to be superior and maintain power, it needs a strategy that keeps them in a position of authority. One of the ways in which this can be accomplished, bearing in mind that governments still seek legitimacy from their populations, is to rally their nations against the Other. Political and social ways of Othering are an essential part of foreign policy and the manipulation of the public.

Said’s stance in short is that imperialism did not in fact end. It did not “suddenly become ‘past’, once decolonization had set in motion the dismantling of the classical empires” (Said 1994: 341). Imperialism is real, and continues in other ways. Emphasizing ideology and discourse, Said’s work forms some of the fundamental issues critical geopolitics seeks to address. He argues that imperialism and colonialism are driven by ideological formations that promote specific discourses; such as the ‘need’ for certain peoples to be dominated by others (1994: 8). As Said puts it, “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism” and underlines why the study of discourse and ideology is so important in understanding political phenomena (Ibid: xiii).
Importantly, both Gramsci and Foucault have a lot to say about power. Like Foucault and Said, Gramsci’s work has crossed disciplines, and proved to be foundational to some of the concepts of CGP. Specifically, his concepts of consent and hegemony will be discussed in some detail. Both Foucault and Gramsci would agree that power is not something imposed from above, but that power and its success depends on consent from below (Holub 1992: 29). How this consent is created, through a careful selection of discourses that create ideological associations is a central point in this research, and therefore it is important to recognize the influences of these ideas. These two theorists also share the notion that power and domination function in so far as there is consent by those dominated (Ibid: 199). Without consent, in their view, domination is not possible. Whereas Foucault focuses on how power exists, Gramsci asks why it exists (Ibid: 200). In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci pays particular attention to ways in which the hegemonic classes produce and maintain “ways of seeing” that do not challenge the status quo but create a “spontaneous consent” (Ibid: 136). Gramsci’s influence on CGP, therefore, mainly stems from his theories of power and hegemony. Many would argue that the United States is in fact a hegemonic power, as opposed to an imperial power, and therefore theorists generally use Gramsci’s idea of power by consensus to explain America’s ‘superpower’. Gramsci theorized that in order for a state to become hegemonic, it would have to present a world order which is ‘universal’ in its principles, so that one state isn’t seemingly ruling over another, but that mutual interests are evident (Cox 1993: 61). The Global War on Terror is an example of an attempt at this consensus: in order for the good of the world, and by declaring the war on terror as ‘global’, Bush and his administration made attempts to present an invasion as necessary to protect ‘global freedoms’.

Augelli and Murphy describe Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as “an ability of a social group to exercise a function of political and moral direction in society” (1993: 130). In this view, a hegemon would be responsive to the interests of its allies. There is plenty of literature to support the idea of an American hegemonic superpower in contrast to an imperial power; the basis of that debate which will be discussed in chapter
two. For now, the importance of Gramsci’s theories on hegemony and its influence to the field of critical geopolitics is important to understand. How certain ideologies become hegemonic, and therefore become ‘common sense’ is central to CGP, and finds its foundations in Gramsci’s theories. As Sharp puts it “the scripting of geopolitics cannot be removed from the process of the social reproduction of knowledge” (1993: 494). Combining Gramsci and Said’s theories, Sharp argues that popular culture constructs ‘our’ space against ‘their’ space, and hence maintains hegemony by specific representations of geopolitical spaces (Dalby and Toal 1996: 453). Gramsci’s focus on how hegemonic ideas become common sense is something critical geopolitics adopts and seeks to explore the further repercussions of. Sharp argues that “common sense appeals through the obviousness of its claims; it makes the world simple, and manageable” (Sharp 1993: 494). Gramsci’s concept of common sense is what critical geopolitical theorists analyze as ‘taken for granted beliefs’, and therefore, Gramsci’s ideas are foundational in the theoretical basis of CGP.

Additionally, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony forms much of the foundations for discourse analysis. According to Laclau, “hegemonic struggles are antagonisms which take the form of struggles over the articulation of discursive practices” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 123). Laclau and Mouffé take a post-structural position, and see hegemony as many ideas struggling against one another – not a single idea that Gramsci proposes in his work (Ibid). The different tensions that arise from his theories provide a blueprint for not only theory, but also a methodology which will be discussed in subsequent sections.

2.2 Critical Geopolitics

Critical geopolitics (CGP) goes a level beyond realist assumptions that underlie geopolitical theory, and instead provide a way to critique geopolitical theory. It incorporates some aspects of constructivism to ground political analysis in the realities of the social construction of our world. However, unlike constructivism, it does not take the state as a given entity, instead, it moves away from the thinking that implies that politics, international relations, or the structures that are present now are ‘out there’, but rather focuses on agency and the understanding of how and why these structures are
created. Explaining the foundations of critical geopolitics, Dalby and Toal (1998) state that

Critical geopolitics has emerged out of the work of a number of scholars in the fields of geography and international relations who...have sought to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural, and political practice, rather than as a manifest and legible reality of world politics.

Following this, an argument for how critical geopolitics can function as an analytical framework is laid out by Dalby:

Rather than a single analytical or methodological endeavour, critical geopolitics encompasses various ways of unpacking the geographical assumptions in politics...and challenges common sense and “modern” assumptions that national identities and the states that govern populations are the necessary starting point for both policy discussion and scholarly analysis (2010: 51).

Influenced largely by postmodern critiques that focus on the “epistemological limits of the ethnocentric practices” forming the basis of Cold War geopolitics, Dalby and Toal outline *five main arguments* that critical geopolitics seeks to address, which they claim have been influenced by a “variety of postmodernisms” (Toal and Dalby, 1998). The first argument is that geopolitics is not only a “specific school of statecraft” but can be understood in terms of spatial practices, “both material and representational of statecraft itself” (Ibid). Therefore, the critical study of geopolitics “must be grounded in the particular cultural mythologies of the state” (Ibid). The argument is that the specification of a state in itself, which involves the making of a national identity, establishing boundaries of inside and outside and transforming diverse places into a “unitary internal space” is a geopolitical act in itself and should be recognized as such (Ibid).

The second argument is that critical geopolitics pays special attention to the “boundary drawing practices and performances that characterize the everyday life of states” (Toal and Dalby, 1998). An important part of the second argument, and of CGP as a method, is that CGP “is not about ‘the outside’ of the state but about the very construction of boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘domestic’ and
the ‘foreign’ (Ibid). Campell argues that the study of foreign policy isn’t only about inter-state relations. States are not “prior” to the international system, but are continually constituted by their relation to “an outside” against which they define themselves (Ibid). Foreign policy is therefore “the making of the foreign” as an identity in which the domestic is created against (Ibid). As such, Ashley argues that foreign policy is actually a type of “boundary-producing” political act (Toal and Dalby, 1998).

To expand on the second argument, Dalby and Toal (1998) assert that practicing CGP is the act of investigating how specific “conceptual spatializations of identity, nationhood and danger manifest themselves across the landscapes of states” and how particular political, social and “physical geo-graphies” create and maintain understanding of “self and other, security and danger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility”.

The third argument put forward by Dalby and Toal (1998) is that CGP is not a singularity, but a plurality referring to a collection of representational practices that are scattered throughout societies. There is a three-fold typology of geopolitical reasoning which constitutes a de-centered set of practices of elitist and popular forms, which are practical geopolitics (foreign policy, bureaucracy and political institutions), formal geopolitics (strategic institutes, think tanks and academia) and popular geopolitics (mass media, cinema, and novels) (Ibid).

The fourth argument concerning CGP is that the practice of studying geopolitics cannot be a politically neutral act. The goal of CGP analysis is to counter the myth that objectivity is possible, a common theme in the history of geopolitics, and instead argues that CGP is a “situated knowledge” interpretation (Toal and Dalby, 1998). It aims to “disturb the ‘god trick’” of geopolitics, which claims to objectively represent international politics without interpretation (Ibid). Dalby and Toal argue that classical geopolitics is a form of discourse that “seeks to repress its own politics and geography”, seeing itself as a sort of objective truth that is beyond judgment (Ibid). CGP responds to this by insisting that geopolitical reasoning is situated, contextual, and is not an objective form of reasoning (Ibid).

Typically, geopolitical questions are surrounding states and their societies, and technological networks and their relationship to territoriality (Toal and Dalby, 1998).
Realizing that classical geopolitics is rooted in questions about the path to national greatness for states, or how states can be reformed so that empires can grow, means that the literature is inherently catered to answering questions about the control and management of territories. Therefore, the fifth and final argument of CGP is that it seeks to theorize broader “socio-spatial and techno-territorial” circumstances and use by conceptualizing geopolitics as “situated reasoning” (Ibid).

There are three major themes to be taken from CGP that will be used in this research. The first theme is ideology and the power of ideas. This includes an analysis of the importance of (hegemonic) discourses. The second prominent theme is that of identity and difference – where ideas of ‘us’ and ‘them’ originate, and importantly, Said’s work on Othering. The third major theme is the critical analysis of territory and the meanings given to space. These major themes are what constitute an analytical framework whereby to ask questions about the legitimacy of American imperialism in the context of this thesis.

**The Power of Ideas**

*Discourse, Hegemony & Ideology*

The use of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical theories allow one to examine discourses in terms of how they “legitimate and hence reproduce structures of power” (Dalby 1990: 4). Postmodern approaches underlie the principles behind critical geopolitics. They have a special concern for the politics of representation, i.e. the way in which specific political discourses are used in “world-making” (Ibid: 5). Gerard Toal begins his argument against mainstream geopolitics from Foucault’s premise that geography as a discourse, is a form of power/knowledge (1996: 59). Toal, along with Agnew, argue that geopolitics

should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize/ international politics in such away as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of place, peoples and dramas….The study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states (Toal 1996: 59). The importance of discourses are crucial to this research, as discourses are political resources that enable political mobilization, and therefore, they are a part of making the
world in terms of how they construct reality through practices and rules, which they in turn construct and legitimize (Dalby 1990: 171). The power of ideas can be an enabling, or a manipulative force. Many IR theories neglect their significance, but they are key to understanding how discourses are used towards a goal and maintained. Agnew and Toal discuss the importance of discourse in practical geopolitics by arguing that discourses are like a set of capabilities that people have which are made up of socio-cultural resources that people use to help them construct meaning about their world (1992: 193). Taking apart the construction of these discourses is what will allow us to understand how they are in fact socially constructed, and how they have a real affect on policy making, and our everyday lives. The things we have come to know as “taken-for-granted beliefs” are constructed, and are not natural; knowing this can help us change our world; “discourses enable” (Ibid). As Agnew and Toal point out, “discourses are never static but are constantly mutating and being modified by human practice” (1992: 193), and thus so should our theories and ways of understanding them. The challenge then, is to understand how geographical knowledge is transformed by intellectuals of statecraft (Ibid: 195), and critically asses this to understand how they create specific discourses that legitimate their actions; a crucial part of this research which will be exemplified by CDA.

The specific discourses created by the Bush administration implied that in order to be on the side of freedom and all things good, Americans must be willing to do anything to defeat the terrorists; including giving up their own rights and supporting what was deemed to be an illegal war by the United Nations (UN). The discourses created after 9/11 leading to the Iraq war proved to be very successful in mobilizing support in the short term. Most of the mainstream media fell into line and the political parties followed suit which allowed the Bush administration to “enact repressive legislation with scarcely any opposition – most notably the Patriot and Homeland Security Acts” (Harvey 2003: 193). Creating fear was central to this operation, and as Harvey puts it, “to sustain the momentum and realize their ambitions, the paranoid style of American politics had to be put to work” (Ibid: 194). Iraq had in fact been of importance to neoconservatives for a long time¹, however creating support for a military

¹ See discussion in Chapter Four
intervention would be difficult to create support for without some sort of justification – something ‘catastrophic’ (Ibid: 193). Harvey also maintains that 9/11 created the ‘Pearl Harbour’ moment they were waiting for to create social solidarity and the patriotism that emerged from it was used to provide the basis for an “imperialist endeavor and internal control” (Ibid). This special moment after 9/11 leading to the declaration of a Global War on Terror had the support of even the ‘usual liberals’, who in the past had criticized American imperialist policies (Ibid: 193). Accusations of being ‘unpatriotic’ were used to suppress critical engagement and meaningful dissent (Ibid). How was justification to be created? Harvey answers this by suggesting that the administration, assiduously cultivated the new-found nationalism that was created after 9/11 and harnessed it to the imperial project of regime change in Iraq as essential for domestic security, at the same time as it used the imperial project to put in place ever tighter internal controls (fuelled by terror alerts and other security fears on the domestic front) (2003: 196).

Behind all of this, claims Harvey, is a certain geopolitical vision; to ensure continued global dominance, which would put America in a position to control the whole globe militarily and, through oil, economically as well (2003: 199). As Harvey puts it, “the neo-conservatives are, it seems, committed to nothing short of a plan for total domination of the globe” (2003: 211). He concludes that in 2003 the United States was in fact heading for a “raw militaristic imperialism” lead by neoconservatives. Although anti-imperialist/American movement existed, they were struggling against the suppression of dissent, especially amongst all the patriotism after 9/11, alongside accusations of being ‘unpatriotic’ or siding with the terrorists if one did not support American policies (Ibid).

As mentioned earlier, the Copenhagen school has attempted to look at the role of ideas but only as it pertained to securitization, which omits many elements. Constructivists look at social construction, which could include language, however, they do not necessarily ask how language creates ideas. There is not a clear approach

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2 This references a statement by the think tank The Project for the New American Century, in their key publication *Rebuilding America’s Defences*. "Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor” (Donnelly 2000: 51).
that would indicate that, for example, discourses of fear can perpetuate ideologies that are embedded into geopolitics. For example, constructivists rightly criticize liberals and realists for the simplicity of their argument: “realism and most liberals do not investigate interests; they assume them. Interests are givens in these approaches and need to be specified before analysis can begin” (Finnemore 2002: 3). Finnemore continues to state the missing elements in these two theories and poses constructivism as an alternative, arguing that it fills in the missing questions: “a constructivist approach does not deny that power and interest are important. They are. Rather, it asks a different and prior set of questions: it asks what interests are, and it investigates the ends to which and the means by which power will be used” (Ibid). While that does add another dimension to the analysis, what this thesis would argue is missing in IR is the ‘how’ question. So while constructivism adds to the literature, it is still asking ‘what’. CGP asks questions such as ‘how’ is power legitimated? It would argue through ideologies that are embedded in geopolitics. How can we understand how they are naturalized? Through discourse, this thesis would argue. Further, how can we take apart discourse? Through methodology such as CDA, which systematically offers a tool to take apart language in order to reveal the ways in which power is constructed and legitimized. When states justify their actions over a humanitarian intervention for example, they are justifying that within the norms of the international state system, and internationally accepted standards (Ibid: 4). The question that CGP would ask is, how are these norms created in the first place? If it is the United States ‘job’ to intervene because it is ‘needed’ to help solve a civil war, for example, what kinds of ideologies and discourses have created this role for the United States? How has American power been accepted as needed? The social construction element of constructivism is interesting, but it is focused on norms and again, misses one further element that CGP can add to IR.

The capacity for discourses to enable, but also to be a manipulative force is important and noteworthy. The foundation for communication in our society is language, and how that language is used is a form of power. Who creates and maintains discourses and how they form the ideologies that become naturalized are all intertwined. Hence, the importance of the power of ideas – the ideational aspect CGP seeks to bring out in this research, and one that is missing from much of IR debates, is key to the study of
imperialism and seeking the basis of its legitimacy.

The link between hegemony and ideology is particularly important in this thesis, both to CGP as well to the methodology of critical discourse analysis will be introduced at the end of this chapter. Hegemonic discourse is full of ideological statements. Hegemonic discourses become ‘common sense’ as Gramsci described (1999: 630), and it is the ideologies that create these common sense values in society. Behind ideology, is discourse. As they are interlinked, looking at the root of how hegemonic discourses become naturalized become more important. Given the importance of these concepts, a great deal of CGP literature deals with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Toal asserts that the study of geopolitical reasoning should take place within the Gramscian sense of hegemony, adding that, “a hegemonic power like the United States is by definition a “rule writer” for the world community” (1996: 61). Themes around the importance of ideology in the justification and legitimacy of actions are central to critical geopolitical thinking, and will be analyzed in the context of American imperialism. CGP is therefore more than a tool for policy makers; its goal is to investigate how “geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations domination within contemporary global politics” (Dalby 1990: 15). As CGP is an interdisciplinary approach at the intersection of politics, geography and international relations, it requires critical and creative thinking, as it employs a deeper and holistic approach to the notion of imperialism. It also provides a framework for understanding how these boxes were constructed in the first place, which is key. Questioning the taken-for-granted beliefs that form our ideologies is of central importance to critical geopolitics. CGP is a call to look beyond what ‘just is’ to understand how we have come to accept something as natural, i.e. what we take for granted.

To construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a study of the geography of politics within pre-given, taken-for-granted, commonsense spaces, but investigate the politics of the geographical specification of politics. That is to practice critical geopolitics (Toal 1996: 62).

Toal views the critical study of geopolitics as ways in which we can question the “writing of truth” in geopolitics, where ideological inscriptions assign certain identities
as part of its “nature” and relationship to state and society (Ibid: 142).

The interlinking of these concepts will become clearer below, when they are introduced through the method of critical discourse analysis. CDA is a method by which CGP can have a methodological outlet as it combines the importance of discourse, language, ideology and hegemony to study imperialism and uncover the taken for granted beliefs that create and sustain modes of imperialism. The reason CGP and CDA work so well together, is that the power of ideas which encompasses discourse, hegemony and ideology is so central to a CGP framework, while CDA allows it’s execution in research.

**Identity & difference: Othering**

Shapiro and Said have been important influences in postmodern theory concerning the practice of CGP because they stress a concern with questions of power and discourse, using linguistics, philosophy and literary theory to critique modernity (Dalby 1990: 5). The concept of the Other, used famously by Said in his book *Orientalism*, is central to critical geopolitical analysis. It provides a framework for understanding how foreign policy initiatives and justifications for war are created. “Political identity is related to these geopolitical specifications of us and them; their space and our space” (Ibid: 13). The Other creates guidelines by which political activities are acceptable or not, and creates specific types of identities. Said focuses on the construction of the discourses of Orientalism, rather than the interaction of the Orient with the view that has been constructed by Orientalism. The importance of Said’s work is the fact that he is aware that conceptual categories of identity and difference should be treated as “contingent *productions*, not as ontologically given categories” (Dalby 1990: 25). The social creation of the Other is a theme that is constant in CGP analysis and in turn adds another dimension of how we understand the world, our own identity, the identity of others, and how certain policy actions are legitimated through relation to the Other.

Derek Gregory also focuses on Othering in relation to how space is constructed and used politically. He looks at the constructions of enemies, and other concepts such
as danger and our understanding of what is ‘foreign’. He quotes an Iraqi woman’s views on the war on terror:

Bush speaks of ‘abroad’ as if it is a vague desert-filled land ... a land of inferior people – less deserving of peace, prosperity and even life ... Don’t Americans realize that ‘abroad’ is a country full of people – men, women, children who are dying hourly? ‘Abroad’ is a home for millions of us. It’s the place we were raised and the place we hope to raise our children – your field of war and terror (Gregory 2010: 178).

This quote perfectly demonstrates how space is subjective and embodies different meanings to different people. In the above quote, America’s “field of war and terror” is actually a “family home” to a different group. It is then understandable how Iraq came to be constructed as a dangerous breeding ground for terrorists, and how Iraqi’s were seen as the Other is not a natural process – it is completely socially constructed. Ideologies therefore naturalize concepts that are socially constructed.

Gregory also argues that America, especially post 9/11, was not only in a state of exception, but also an exceptional state. Drawing on the theories of Georgio Agamben, Gregory argues that the double exception of America is important in understanding it’s foreign policy actions (Gregory 2006). America ‘the exceptional’ is one of the discourses used to justify imperial policies, and has been a long standing ideology. This also formed a key part of neoconservative thought in post 9/11 policy making.

Others in the field like Matthew Sparke discuss the ideological effects of fear mongering in what he calls “false geopolitical fears”. He focuses on how taken for granted beliefs and specific ideologies create false fears, with real consequences. In specific, these fears were used to manipulate a public into war in Iraq, which is Sparke’s primary example (2007: 340). Othering is especially important in creating an enemy to be feared; a sort of ‘evil’ that the public can unite together over defeating. As Bush said, the “evil ones” must be stopped so that “our children and grandchildren can know peace and security and freedom in the greatest nation on the face of the earth” (Bush cited in Nabers 2009: 104). After 9/11, and with no clear state enemy, the Bush administration pointed their finger at Saddam Hussein. The “geopolitical fears” were groundless, but
for Bush and his administration the “groundless nature of the fears did not matter in terms of geopolitical policymaking” (2007: 341). Sparke expands on this point here,

it was specifically fear of this evil other that was most instrumental because it made it possible for the President and his administration to connect widespread and visceral feelings of insecurity among Americans in the post-9/11 present to much narrower and calculative concerns with America’s strategic future. It was in this way that the futurological fears ironically became a retroactive justification for war (2007: 341).

The analysis of the Other and concepts of identity and difference are not looked at in much of liberalism and realism. Even in Marxism, identity and difference are based largely on where one fits into the capitalist (class) system. What one’s stance is in society is reduced to whether or not one control the means of production. It has little to add about this concept on a larger international scale, that is not again, linked with class. Constructivism has incorporated the use of language in forming identity and recognizes that identity is “understood as emerging from discourse” (Tekin 2010: 9). This thesis seeks to build on that and use the tools of CDA to employ a deeper understanding of identity and difference through discourse, and its effects on the geopolitical scale.

Othering will prove to be very important in discourse and the legitimacy of certain policies, especially that of the decision to go to war in Iraq. Identity and difference: how we see ourselves against how we see the Other, is a recurrent theme in this research and within the study of CGP. What we are, is what ‘they’ are not. These distinctions are used to create simple binaries and ways of seeing the world that have the ability to manipulate rather complex situations into simple ‘black and white’ understandings of the world. Good and evil, us and them, right and wrong. Several examples of this will be made clear in later empirical chapters where CDA is used to demonstrate the use of Othering in geopolitical discourses.

**The Critical Analysis of Territory: How Space is Given Meaning**

Dalby argues that while “geopolitics challenges the essential formulation of its terms by pointing to the presupposition of absolute space on which the theory is built”, it assumes a “pre-given territorial space”, and then fills this “pre-given” space with
superpower rivalry; a view in some ways similar to realism (1990: 172). A critical geopolitical framework allows us to question power not only as a matter of elite control or state rule. As 9/11 so fantastically proved, terror isn’t necessarily the product of state elites, but is also a matter of “contested localities where rule is resisted, thwarted and subverted by social movements” (Dalby and Toal 1996: 453). This needs to be studied in particular contexts, and not by trying to apply general theories of international relations to specific contexts. Toal argues that the challenge of critical geopolitics then is to “document and deconstruct the institutional, technological, and material forms of these new congealments of geo-power”, to question how global space is continually re-created and rewritten by great powers (1996: 249).

Agnew uses the term hegemony to define US power, instead of imperialism, arguing that, because the United States has not simply gained power through territorial rule, and is not an empire by the same standards as Rome, for example, that the best way to describe the United States is a hegemony (Agnew 2005). While this research disagrees with the term hegemony, the importance of Agnew’s work is to draw attention to the dangers of taking the state as a given. The state is not “ontologically prior to a set of interstate relations”, he says paraphrasing Ashley, and is not the outcome of action at a single geographical scale (Ibid: 49). States become powerful as they interact with other states, and form certain relationships, both locally and globally, and in turn form a socially constructed hierarchy (Ibid). America is not by ‘nature’ a superpower, or the state, which can ‘best lead the world’; these are all socially constructed notions that are assumed as natural, having great implications for international relations and foreign policy.

A CGP analysis of President Bush’s policies must include a critical analysis of territory. Stuart Elden discusses the importance of territory, and in fact, he makes an argument against the myth of a de-territorialized world. He claims that the importance of territory has not faded, and that “terror” has renewed the importance of territory in international politics. While many talk about deterritorialization and then reterritorialization, Elden draws on Neil Smith’s point that “power is never deterritorialized; it is always specific to particular places. Reterritorialization counters
deteritorialization at every turn” (Smith 2005: 51). Although the GWOT is presented to have no boundaries, the power attached to imperialism is concentrated within a state. Hence, although ‘terror’ may be deteritorialized, in that, as the claim goes that it has ‘no state’ nor ‘territory’, the responses to that terrorism still come from nation states, and the legitimacy of that power is through state reactions. It is what defines and separates terrorism from war; and terrorists from legitimate leaders, according to popular discourse. For example, Al Qaeda, is a ‘global network’ with no state, responsible for killing thousands in the 9/11 attacks, and are deemed terrorists; whereas the United States, a nation state, responsible for killing thousands of Iraqi’s in war, is somehow legitimated, or justified as it is a state action. It is also true that non-state actors can control territory that states cannot (Elden 2009: 34). Although territories have become “deteritorialized”, they later become “reterritorialized”. For example, the Middle East as a region is often associated with terrorism, or as the breeding grounds for terrorists. Related to this argument, Elden claims that territorial integrity is especially important in the context of the war on terror, because it isn’t only about powerful nations controlling their own territory, but it is also important because states that cannot control their own territory are seen as “breeding grounds” for non-state power (i.e. terrorists) (2009: 109).

This in turn has bearing on the understanding of sovereignty. If a state does not adequately control its own territory and prevent terrorists from fostering within their boundaries, does it justify another state taking over control? Elden argues that the states that “fail to play by the security rules” that America hold dear like not harboring terrorists within state borders, and not seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) require attention, imply that “their sovereignty is no longer absolute but necessarily contingent” (2009: 23). This provides insight into the ways in which imperialism can be legitimized; by questioning the sovereignty of a state, and by its connections to terrorism post 9/11. The specific portrayal of ‘rogue states’, ‘terrorist states’, and the ‘axis of evil’ amongst others in the context of a global war on terror gives the impression that “an omnipresent terrorist threat as evil as it is widespread”; with that, the ability for the U.S. to legitimate “any punitive action it might take, anywhere at any time” (Elden 2009: 32). Bush has repeatedly and clearly noted the “global scale” of the
campaign: “from the mountains of Afghanistan, to the border regions of Pakistan, to the Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, to the plains of North Central Iraq” (Ibid). Based on this premise, there is not politically, spatially, and temporally any limit to America’s response (Ibid).

The meanings that fill space are socially constructed, and need to be recognized as such, as these meanings have the capacity to legitimate policy decisions. Take for example Blomley’s assessment of how space matters in terms of legitimizing violence. Prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are perfect examples of how violence is legitimized within certain spaces (Blomley 2003: 123). Geography is important in considering violence and how it can be legitimized. Instances of torture are now well documented, especially in light of some disturbing images that were released of what goes in inside the prisons of the GWOT. As Coutin notes, law used to represent order, control and rationality; and in the absence of this was violence, which conveys the opposite: chaos, irrationality, and lack of control (1995: 518). What happens then, when a space, such as the prisons of the GWOT allow violence? It then becomes evident, Coutin argues, that law and violence are not necessarily in opposition (1995: 518). Gregory (2006) also discusses the meaning of territory for the legitimacy of violence as he discusses Guantanamo and how violence within the walls are seen as ‘okay’. Both these instances will be elaborated in Chapter Five.

Geography and the meanings associated with space have a significant affect on how we understand them. For example, the geographical region of the “Middle East” is a contested space, and what it ‘means’ and to who change constantly. At one time, it was the cradle of civilization, and now it is generally understood as a ‘dangerous’, ‘backwards’ place. In most theories of IR, national states are taken as the basic units of analysis, and accordingly the state itself is a taken-for-granted entity. This creates the assumption that the world is inherently divided this way: into nation states (Agnew 2007: 141). Assuming that states are the starting point of political analysis, these theories are already limited in their ability to conduct critical analysis. Agnew argues that,

projecting the assumption that [states] are indeed both ancient and universal
produces an image of the world as a mosaic of bounded “peoples,” “cultures,” and “societies.” It is to and across these entities that the cultivation of knowledge is thus often fallaciously ascribed (2007: 141).

From this view emerges debates such as the “clash of civilizations”, where certain people are bound to certain areas by theory, and therefore are pitted against each other in endless conflict and difference. This creates what Timothy Brennan calls “a religious approach to knowledge, that is, the creation of like-thinking communities based on transcendental convictions”; those who claim to have the monopoly on “truth” (Ibid). The problem with this is that critical methods are abandoned, and international phenomena are reduced to fit narrow views created by these theories.

Since geopolitics is the study of geography and politics, then critical analyses of space are needed. This is perhaps an area where IR theory has been most weak. More than just physical spaces and places, CGP looks at the ways in which the meanings of these places change, and how they are understood. Their classification by powers has a profound impact on the ways in which they are understood in international relations. IR theories have failed to assess critically, the ways in which space is given meaning, through discourse and ideologies that become embedded in our everyday understanding about certain regions and areas. The implications of the meanings given to space are often overlooked, and also get taken for granted. The way that places and spaces can be designated as dangerous or safe have policy implications. These impressions of spaces become part of our naturalized ideologies (such as the example of the Middle East). Identities assigned to places are created through Othering, and that of course is through the discourses that are dominant. As such, everything is interlinked. CGP brings these important elements together through a framework, or a lens, providing a critical tool for analysis.

CGP has it’s own critics from within the discipline as well, which should be addressed. There have been variations, and branches to CGP under the headings of feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics, and emotional geopolitics, to name a few. Some that research in the field of CGP suggest that CGP is too narrow, and not critical enough, thus some of their criticisms will be briefly addressed.
Popular geopolitics, a ‘branch’ of critical geopolitics has taken off and become a discipline in itself. Pieces like *popular geopolitics 2.0* (Dittmer and Gray 2010) discuss some of the criticisms CGP has faced in the rise of other branches of geopolitics. Muller argues that CGP traditionally focuses too much on elite discourses, and misses the ‘everyday’ discourses that move away from elite discussions (Dittmer and Gray 2010: 1665). Popular geopolitics advocates moving away from texts for example, and looking at everyday events such as movies, and pop culture; essentially away from elite agents (Dittmer and Gray 2010: 1666). There is also the work of ‘feminist geopolitics’ which challenges masculinist binaries such as public/private, or public/political, focusing on the gendered nature of these divides (Dittmer and Gray 2010: 1666). Emotional geopolitics has also gained considerable attention recently and has put emotions on the map within critical geopolitics, such as the importance of fear (Pain 2009). All of these are important and growing fields of study, and they do have criticisms toward more traditional forms of CGP; mainly the focus on elites, and texts.

Megoran argues that CGP is often criticized for providing a weak normative engagement with social institutions and practices of warfare (Megoran 2008: 474). Additionally, there is criticism surrounding the lack of incorporation of a broader range of values and ethics, or in some arguments, it lacks a real solution to the problems it criticizes (Megoran 2008: 475). Then, there is the critical question of war, argues Megoran, which every student of international relations grapples with which is “in what circumstances, if at all, should a state be considered right in making or joining war?” (Megoran 2008: 493). He then faults CGP for not dealing with this question in a systematic and consistent way. However, this thesis doesn’t set out to answer this question, although it may be a fair consideration. This is an analysis into the language and comparative discourses that signified a looming change in American foreign policy, using 9/11 as its foundational justification. Perhaps further research in this field could take this information, and then look at this a step beyond to discuss some of these criticisms, but this research attempted to answer some questions still left with holes from previous analysis of American grand strategy and the 9/11 effect.

Perhaps the most outspoken and cited in this regard is Nigel Thrift’s 2000 piece
that problematizes several arenas in which the discursive model of critical geopolitics runs into problems. As an example, he cites the arena of the human body, which he says, “eludes discursive inscription through special qualities of embodiment which fashion semblances and conjure social worlds” (Thrift 2000: 383). He argues these qualities get lost in the study of critical geopolitics as there is a lack of attention for embodiment. A second example, is the arena of words, in which he argues that “what we do not get from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of how words function to bring about geopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as geopolitical forces continue to be framed as ‘big’ and ‘commanding’” (Ibid).

In a response to some of this criticism, specifically from Thrift, Dalby has a few responses to consider. Thrift’s main criticism that CGP has left out the “little things” gives rise to two main arguments, mentioned above which are the focus of CGP on texts, and second, the failure of CGP to address matters of the actual functions of people in defense departments who actually make foreign and military agencies operate (Dalby 2010a: 281). In response to this, Dalby argues that in fact, Thrift has misrepresented the critique by presenting texts as merely texts, rather than “discourses embedded in the practices of security with all their multitudinous representation of places as sources of threats requiring military action and practices of security” (Ibid: 282). Dalby adds that such criticisms expect CGP to do “all sorts of things” but not engage with the critique of the reasoning of the intellectuals of statecraft.

Coming back to the first point then, Thrift argues it is the ‘little things’ that matter and cites Bakhtain, in his reference to, ‘verbal sideward glances, reservations, hints” that also make a difference in discourse. Thrift cites some anthropological and psychological studies that examine this; but, as Dalby argues, CGP cannot do everything. As he argues, “perhaps the time has come to recognise that “critical geopolitics” is simply too loose a catchall category to be of much use if it incorporates all this. Many of these things might now be more usefully done under such other rubrics” (Dalby 2010a: 285). Yes, it is interdisciplinary, and promotes interdisciplinary research, but the criticism that CGP is missing certain elements, while focusing too much on others (ex. text) steers away from what CGP intended to do.
Dalby argues that if we divert attention away from the political purpose of critique to practical lived experiences of people in bureaucracies and ‘non representational’ parts of text and identity production, then this also brings on a critique that this in fact “facilitates the traditional modes of doing geography”, such as field work, ethnography, and interviews, however, the engagements with the rationale of military power and the legitimacy of violence are then overlooked (Ibid: 284). Thrift’s criticism concludes by arguing a parallel agenda for CGP, that focuses on actual practices as opposed to representations. While his criticism is useful, advocating for parallel practices, does not render current CGP methods irrelevant or outdated. There are different ways, and levels, to analyze discourse for example. All of the important and useful in some way. All of them leading to different kinds of projects and research. This research is a study of discourses at the elite level where violence and power are legitimated. As Dalby also points out, the key arguments in CGP are not “taken up widely” in international relations, and therefore this research is an opportunity to address how CGP literature and framework can contribute to some of the debates in IR, especially in how it relates to imperialism, power, grand strategy and the legitimacy of military action.

The following section will discuss critical discourse analysis, the methodology for this research that is complementary to CGP and with both a critical method and lens, it will be clearer the contributions this approach can make.

2.3 Methodology

This section will be an in-depth look at critical discourse analysis (CDA), a complementary method to CGP and the chosen methodology for this research. First, the question of what constitutes a discourse will be covered. Following this, the principles of CDA will be outlined. Afterwards, the importance of language, power, and ideology will be discussed before presenting a framework for conducting CDA in this research. As there is no ‘correct’ or agreed way to employ critical discourse analysis, and there are a variety of ways to use CDA as a method, the framework this research lays out is one created by extracting the most useful, critical, and relevant parts of CDA to the study of imperialism.
Critical discourse analysis is defined by van Dijk as “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power, abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk 2001: 354). CDA, pioneered and practiced in various forms by authors such as van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak, Chouliaraki, Weldes – most notably - is an interdisciplinary method and tool in which to understand how language, and discourses shape our world, (re-)produce power, and embody ideological assumptions that significantly contribute to how we understand everyday life. The theoretical origins of CDA have mainly developed within theories of Marxism and postmodernism, and the influence of those such as the above mentioned, with roots in Foucault, Althusser, Habermas and others who have given ideology and language important in the study of power. Van Dijk asserts that the goal of those who choose to use CDA can be separated from most social and political scientists as they strive to gain more insight into the importance of discourse in the reproduction of dominance and inequality (1993: 253).

What are discourses?

How do those who study CDA understand discourse? The answer to that may vary depending on the discipline, and study at hand. Because CDA is a relatively ‘new’ approach in qualitative studies, especially now that it is being incorporated across disciplines outside linguistics, it is also changing quite quickly. Schieble details discourse as “‘ways of representing’…macro-level ideas…through everyday language use. Discourses are larger themes that represent participants’ multiple (and/or competing) ideological stances” (Schieble 2012: 212). The approach to language taken by those who use CDA highlight how language use is purposeful and embedded within social practice and have active material consequences because on how problems are framed (Schieble 2012: 211). Fairclough and Wodak maintain that discourses, language use in speech and writing, as a form of social practice, which is socially constitutive (1997: 258). According to Fairclough, discourse involves two parts: social conditions of production, and social conditions of interpretation (2001: 20). These further correspond to another three levels of social organization: the level of the social situation, the level of the social institution, which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse, and the level of society as whole (Ibid). CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing –
as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situation, institutions and social structure, but it also shapes them (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Discourse is also an intentional action; it is controlled and a purposeful human activity (van Dijk 1997: 8). Van Dijk argues that the study of discourse is not only about the properties of text and talk but about the ‘bigger picture’, which includes the consequences for social, political and cultural actions in general (1997: 4).

That being said, there is a wide literature on the definitions of discourse and ways to implement CDA across disciplines. David Manchin argues that discourses are not only political speeches and news items, but can also be considered as computer games, movies, fashion, toys, music, architecture, and many other ‘everyday life’ practices (Manchin 2013: 347). Through this wide variety of discourses, he argues, “communicative activity are infused by and shaped by, power relations and ideologies” (Ibid). For example, Manchin argues that discourses of war exist not only through political speeches but also through everyday outlets such as the games children play on computers, war toys, and the central monuments in cities (Manchin 2013: 351). Some of his work looks at how these material things can influence our ideologies. For example, taking a monument as an object of analysis, or a war game and assessing how attitudes toward war are naturalized and legitimized (Manchin 2013: 350). Although these are useful and important, this research focuses on text and speech as it is an analysis of the way that the ‘elite’ (the Bush administration) used specific discourses in speeches, and publications to legitimate a type of American imperialism. This does not go without problems, and criticisms have been made about the focus of CDA on texts and speeches only. Blommaert and Bulcaen note that CDA is “burdened by a very “linguistic outlook, which does not necessarily include nonlinguistic dimensions, such as some of those mentioned by Manchin above (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 452). While that criticism is taken into account, there are in fact several layers for analysis for discourse and their role in ideology. This research focuses on the specific elements of Presidential and high-level administration personnel speeches and publications as its point of
analysis in order to understand the discourse of the administration at this level. Further analysis could taken into consideration elements of ‘everyday life’, including images, games, social media and so on; an entirely different project.

The emphasis in CDA is on “the understanding of discourse in relations to social problems; to social structural variables such as race, gender, and class; and above all to power” (Wood and Kroger 2000: 21). Through CDA, a critical interpretation of text and speech in search to expose the discourses that maintain dominant ideologies can be conducted. The aim is to deconstruct taken-for-granted beliefs and understand how these beliefs and ideologies become naturalized, hence understanding how policies come to reflect these discourses, creating justification for past and future actions of governments. This methodology is well suited for a critical geopolitics project because similar to the principles of CGP, CDA calls for an engagement with the contemporary world while recognizing that the current status quo does not “exhaust what is possible” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). It also involves the recognition of discourse as “one moment in the dialectics of social practice”, and therefore, changes in discourse can open up new possibilities (Ibid).

**Principles of critical discourse analysis**

Fairclough and Wodak outline eight main principles to critical discourse analysis. (1) First is that CDA addresses social problems. This first point emphasizes the interdisciplinary methods of CDA, by highlighting the analysis of language and semiotic aspects of social problems (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271). The key claim of CDA is that social and political processes have a linguistic-discursive character. Take, for example, “Thatcherism”; it is an ideological project for creating a new hegemony and can be seen in this light as an attempt to restructure political discourse by combining already existing discourse together in a new way (Ibid: 271). (2) Second is that power relations are discursive. CDA highlights how power relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse (Ibid: 272). (3) The third principle is that discourse constitutes society and culture in a dialectical relationship. This also looks at how passages constitute identities (Ibid: 275). For example, when a politician uses the term ‘we’ (‘we’ believe freedom, or ‘we’ are hard workers), this is an assumption that all
people think the same thing; and hence it groups a nation of people into one category, in this case, ‘we’ (Ibid: 275). This is important because this usage of language attempts to unify people together, especially in times of crisis to project the image that an entire nation has the same interests. (4) The fourth important principle is that discourse does ideological work. As Fairclough and Wodak maintain, ideologies are “particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation” (Ibid: 275). (5) The fifth principle is that discourse is historical. Importantly, discourse cannot be produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration, which means that those contexts also have to be uncovered (Ibid: 277). (6) Sixth is that the link between text and society is mediated. CDA looks to make connections between social and cultural processes and properties of text (Ibid: 278). The authors claim, that not only are these relations complex, but they are mediated. (7) The seventh principle is that discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. This principle states that specific readings of text takes place against a background of emotions, attitudes, and knowledge (Ibid: 278). As a critical method, this requires the researcher to evaluate their own beliefs as it will affect the readings of texts and the meanings assigned to them. (8) The eighth and last principle is that discourse is a form of social action (Ibid: 280).

Now that the basic definition and principles of CDA have been outlined, the remainder of this section will look at some of the important aspects of CDA in greater detail.

**Importance of Language**

As discourse analysis is the study of language, it is then appropriate to explain why language is so important in the first place. Neumann explains how people sort and combine sensory impressions of our world through categories. He further explains that language is a social system with its “own relations logic” and produces “reality for humans by mediating these sense data” (Neumann 2008: 61). It is also social and political, constituting an “inherently unstable system of signs” that creates meaning through the construction of identity and difference, simultaneously (Hansen 2006: 17). Language is a political tool that produces and reproduces specific identities while others
are simultaneously excluded (Hansen 2006: 18). Those who employ various forms of discourse analysis maintain that these meanings are socially constructed and therefore they are “representations”, which in time become institutionalized and ‘normalized’ (Neumann 2008: 62). Discourses are important as they maintain regularity, and therefore they determine and potentially constrain how we think about the world and how it is ordered (Ibid). They are also more than just written treatise on a topic, but are also the ways in which people are able to take what they hear or read and construct it in a meaningful way (Dalby 1990: 7).

Manchin and Mayr argue that since language is assumed to be an available set of options, authors make the choice to use certain words for their own “motivated reasons” (2012: 32). The following is a simple example put forward by Manchin and Mayr: ‘youths attack local building’, ‘youths attack local addresses’, ‘youths attack local family homes’ (2012: 32). All three headlines are describing the same event, but the wording creates a distinctly different impact on the audience. The last option, for example, presents something more sacred, i.e. a ‘family home’. It represents something to be protected, generally creating more sympathy for those ‘attacked’. In this example, without overtly presenting it as such, the discourse alludes to certain identities, and values, and therefore elicits a different reaction from the audience than the first two headlines. For example, in the context of this research, the attack on the twin towers, two physical building in New York City, was presented by President Bush and his administration as an ‘attack on American freedoms’ or ‘an attack on American way of life’. In a speech on Sept 12, 2001, Bush said, “today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (Bush 2001k). Uniting a population around the idea that their freedoms have been attacked is far more effective than uniting them over fallen pieces of infrastructure. This is a simple example about how the choice of words and language matter. If it is assumed that there is no neutral way to represent a person/event/phenomenon, then all choices in language are purposefully made to draw attention to specific identities and ideas (Manchin and Mayr 2012: 77).

If it is then an assumption of CDA that all language is a choice, the chosen
words then become very important. Hansen argues that is it a key aim of any kind of discourse analysis to show how our understanding of meanings are “dependent upon a particular discursive framing of the issue in question and that this framing has political effects” (2006: 22). For example, Iraq’s status as a ‘rogue state’ or Saddam Hussein as a ‘dangerous’ man justifies political actions to remove him militarily. For example, Hansen argues that understanding ‘democracy’ as a foreign policy discourse rather than an independent variable calls for an analysis of how it has been articulated in contrast to something that is non- or anti-democratic (Hansen 2006: 25). The definition of democracy becomes partly contingent on what it is not like (the “Other) and this in turn has in the past justified and legitimated specific policies.

In the context of security discourse, Hansen argues that state sovereignty “organizes authority, space, time, and identity by separating the domestic sphere on the one side from the international realm on the other” (2006: 34). ‘Inside’ (domestic) and ‘outside’ (international) are seen as each other’s opposites and therefore each other’s “other” (Ibid). This kind of discourse is created to defend the national self, from the radical other – such as defending America from the international terrorists. Our understanding of ‘terrorist’, for example, is understood in relation to a ‘freedom fighter’, or ‘state sanctioned solider’ (Ibid: 19). This is why it was so important that Bush used discourse that implies to not be on side with America, automatically meant that one was with the terrorists. CDA is a method to understand how these categories of difference are socially constructed, and it is vital in understanding foreign policy, as foreign policy in itself is based on Othering – who is dangerous, and who needs to be defended/protected.

Weiss and Wodak maintain that most forms of critical discourse analysis would approve of Habermas’s claim that language is a medium of domination and social force, legitimizing organized power (2003: 15). However, for CDA, language on its own its not powerful; it gains its power by who uses it and to what ends (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 14). CDA is essentially a linguistic interest in how manipulations of power can be understood (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 15). To understand language as political, Hansen argues that it needs to be understood as a site for the production and reproduction of
particular identities, at the exclusion of others (Hansen 2006: 18).

**Power**

CDA is especially useful when studying situations where “power is maintained by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited degree”, which is as discussed earlier a concept Gramsci (1992) calls hegemony (Neumann 2008: 70). When these taken for granted beliefs become naturalized, and become a part of our collective ideology, they become ‘common sense’ beliefs. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall argue that the process of denaturalizing these ‘common sense’ beliefs is a part of critical practices, exposing these understanding as constructed. (Weldes et al. 1999: 20). Gramsci wrote “every social stratum has its own “common sense” which is ultimately the most widespread conception of life and morals” (1992: 173). However, how and why some ideas become ‘common sense’, while others fade is a part of the hegemonic process in which certain ideas become more influential, or powerful than others. Doty argues that the “hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to representational practices” (1996: 8). Therefore, critical discourse analysts are interested in knowing what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events contribute to the reproduction of these discourses (van Dijk 1993: 250). Therefore, power is central to the CDA project. CDA argues that power is rooted in privileged access to social resources such as education, wealth and status (Manchin and Mayr 2012: 24). Van Dijk argues that power involves control, usually by one group/person over another; not only by limiting their freedoms and actions, but by influencing their mind, which is why ideology is so important (1993: 254). Fairclough and Wodak argue that critical discourse analysis (CDA) assumes that power relations are discursive, and therefore “power is transmitted and practiced through discourse” (Manchin and Mayr 2012: 4). Therefore, they advocate a study of how power relations can be understood through analyzing discourse. However, understanding power through discourse is not always overt. The crucial point made by van Dijk is that such “mind management” is not always overtly manipulative; on the contrary, dominance may be made to seem natural and acceptable (1993: 254). Doty would agree, and argue that thinking in terms of representational practices that are made to seem natural such as ‘developed/underdeveloped’, or ‘core/periphery’, ‘first world/third world’, and so on, is
socially constructed and there is nothing natural or inevitable about such distinctions (1996: 2). However, these accepted binaries become “legitimate ways to categorize regions and peoples of the world” (Doty 1996: 2). Thus, CDA needs to pay special attention to the discursive strategies that legitimate, control and ‘naturalize’ social order (van Dijk 1993: 254). With the exception of various forms of military, police, or judicial force, in which the exercise of power is usually thought of, mind management - involving the “influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values” - is actually more common (Ibid: 257). The control of knowledge is key in shaping how we understand our world. At the core of CDA is a detailed description, explanation and critique of how dominant discourses influence socially shared knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies (van Dijk 1993: 258). As a method, CDA seeks to understand how specific discourse structures facilitate the formation of specific social representations (Ibid: 258). Manchin and Mayr argue that the “critical” part of CDA is rooted in “denaturalizing” the language in order to uncover taken-for-granted beliefs in text, consistent with the aims of CGP (2012: 5). This in turn is a step towards revealing the kinds of power interests hidden in text. Thus, the aim of CDA is to reveal both implicit and explicit social relations of power (Ibid: 24).

Ideaology

Critical discourse analysis seeks to understand and uncover how discourses create and maintain ideologies that are key to how we understand the world. In more technical terms of how ideology functions, van Dijk offers the following definition:

Ideologies are basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group...Ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (attitudes, knowledge) of the group, and thus indirectly monitor the group-related social practices, and hence also the text and talk of its members (1995: 248).

For CDA, ideology is a way to create and maintain unequal power relations, and therefore, it is a key part of analysis. Weiss and Wodak argue that language mediates ideology and it is the job for those who practice CDA to uncover this (2003:14). Similarly, Fairclough argues that conventions routinely drawn upon in discourse
embody ideological assumptions which come to be understood as ‘common sense’ in our everyday lives, and therefore, they aid in sustaining existing power relations (1989: 77). Fairclough pays special attention to how ideologies are embedded in discourses, and how ‘common sense’ in fact services power, and therefore, ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible (Fairclough 1989: 85). Following this, if one realizes that a particular aspect of common sense is being used to sustain power inequality, then it ceases to be common sense, and therefore, to function ideologically (Ibid).

A ‘naturalized type’ (ideology) is likely to be perceived not as that of a particular group within an institution, but the institution itself (Fairclough 1989: 92). In Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, ideology becomes naturalized. Likewise, in order for imperial policies to be ‘accepted’, it needs to appeal to an audience in a way that seems it is ‘natural’ to react in a specific way. Take the earlier example in which President Bush presented 9/11 as an attack on freedoms and the American way of life. The specific discourses that created the view of an ‘attack on freedoms’ and subsequently a no-limit reaction to this are what is in question. CDA offers an approach that questions power, which then has the potential to reveal how imperialism may be legitimated. The meaning system, according to Fairclough, is sustained by power: relevant experts, those seen as intelligent (professors, teachers, etc) who are ‘guarantors’ of the ideological understandings in standard language (1989: 95). As ideologies function to provide legitimacy by naturalizing forms of domination, and present ideas as ‘natural’, ‘benign’ or ‘inevitable’ (van Dijk 1997: 25), discourse analysis is especially important in uncovering and exposing these ideologies as creations. The important point made by van Dijk is that “the criterion of ideological validity is not truth, but social effectiveness”, meaning that the importance is on how ideologies function, and what their consequences are (1997: 28).

2.4 CDA: A Framework

Now that the principles of CDA have been discussed, the following section will look at how CDA is applied methodologically. It should be noted that those in the field do not necessarily agree on one correct systematic way to apply discourse analysis. It
has been argued by many that “there is no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used consistently within CDA”, making it very subjective (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 6). Which texts are selected for analysis, and what meanings are assigned to them can differ, as well as the frameworks in which those who deploy CDA work within.

Fairclough outlines three ‘stages’ of critical discourse analysis which are the description of text, the interpretation of it, and the explanation of the text (2001: 21). Description involves the formal properties of the text itself, whereas interpretation and explanation are more important to the analysis itself. Interpretation refers to the relationship between the text as a product of a process of production and as resources in the interpretation (Ibid). Explanation is the relationship between interaction and social context; the social effects of discourse (Ibid: 22). Explanation is where discourses are portrayed as part of a social process as a social practice and show what reproductive effects discourses can have on social structures (Ibid: 135).

That being said, all discourse has to somehow fit in with previous experiences of the world, and must have pre-existing conditions, what Fairclough calls coherence. To expand, coherence is what aspects of the world discourses relate to, or what kind of conception of the world it presupposes (Fairclough 2001: 65). Fairclough clarifies however, that these are not connections within the texts themselves, but connections we make as interpreters as we draw upon our own background and knowledge (2001: 65). The term that Fairclough uses to refer to this body of knowledge is ‘member’s resources’, which includes their knowledge of language, presentations of the natural and social world, values, beliefs, assumptions and so forth (2001: 20). Those who want people to subscribe to a certain view, for example those who produce mass communications, have an effective means of ‘manipulating’ audiences by connecting their current experiences to pre existing discourses (Fairclough 2001: 128). In fact, Fairclough suggests that presuppositions can either be sincere or manipulative; it depends on the situation.

On a more technical level, according to the methodology laid out by van Dijk, the discursive reproduction of power, which is the main object of critical analysis, has
two major dimensions: production and reception (1993: 259). Van Dijk distinguishes between the “enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the (production of the) various structures of text and talk”, and the “functions, consequences or results of such structures for the (social) mind of recipients” (1993: 259). Van Dijk argues that there are a variety of variables or properties that one can choose from when conducting CDA. However, focus must be on the text and speeches “that most clearly exhibit the discursive properties of the exercise of dominance” (van Dijk 1993: 270). As it is agreed that there is no ‘correct’ way to conduct discourse analysis, choosing the most appropriate ‘framework’ entirely depends upon the project at hand. Given the focus of this research, elements of van Dijk’s framework are most well suited to the focus of this research on asking how a form of American imperialism was legitimated after 9/11. Additionally, focus is on Othering and creating distinctions with which the Bush administration’s argument rested upon. Therefore, the following (van Dijk 1993: 264) is an example of a framework for conducting CDA by choosing representative variables to analyze discourses:

a) Argumentation: the negative evaluation follows from the ‘facts’
b) Rhetorical figures: hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative actions and ‘our’ positive actions; euphemisms, denials, understatements of ‘our’ negative actions
c) Lexical style: choice of words that imply negative (or positive) evaluations
d) Storytelling: telling above negative events as personally experienced; giving plausible details above negative features of the events
e) Structural emphasis of ‘their’ negative actions, e.g. in headlines, leads, summaries, or other properties of text schemata (e.g. those of news reports), transitivity structures of sentence syntax (e.g. mentioning negative agents in prominent, topical position)
f) Quoting credible witnesses, sources or experts, e.g. in news reports

The goal is to systematically analyze the discourses that promote certain ideologies that legitimated American imperialism. The first task is to systematically examine the textual and contextual properties of the exercise of dominance, and to provide evidence for such an account, bearing in mind this analysis is not ‘neutral’ (van Dijk 1993: 270). Research in CDA is largely concerned with the persuasive influence of power, a
concept associated with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Manchin and Mayr 2012: 24), an underlying influence to both CDA and CGP, discussed in earlier chapters. On a technical level, for example, lexical analysis provides us with an in depth look at how certain chosen words can signify particular values and ideas. Which words are chosen in speech and text and which are left out are equally important. The goal is that through lexical analysis, specific ideologies may be revealed (Ibid: 30).

The key criteria chosen are those that most accurately represent the discourses in the remainder of this thesis. They are (a) lexical style, vocabulary, and choice; (b) implicitness which involves implications, presuppositions, and vagueness; (c) argumentation and persuasive devices; (d) rhetorical figures, and, (e) framing. These five aspects of analysis are most commonly used in the discourses presented in this research, and several examples of them will be seen throughout speeches and policy documents in following chapters. The following are general definitions of the criteria of CDA used throughout the entirety of this research.

**Lexical style, vocabulary and choice:** This accounts for the tone, and the choice of words, and how they are used to convey negative or positive connotations. The words chosen to describe the situation are of utmost importance. Examples of this are emphasis of ‘our’ (American) good values with ‘their’ (the Other) negative values. Additional to this, is the use of what Fowler (1991) calls ‘over-lexicalization” in which “the existence of an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and ideas that are particular preoccupation or problem in the culture’s discourse” (Fowler 1991: 85). This can be seen in several examples throughout the discourse in Chapters Four, Five and Six. For example, the recurrence of the word ‘evil’, or ‘enemy’ in Bush’s speeches consistently. Language can demonize an Other and hence create an identity of good versus bad (identity and difference). Power works in the background as it naturalizes dichotomies of ‘us/them’ and therefore naturalizes the power that America as ‘good’ should have over the Other as the ‘evil enemy’. For example, in Chapter Four, this refers to the way US hegemony is presented as good, while others cannot be trusted. In Chapter Five, an attack on ‘our way of life’ and ‘our freedoms’ versus an attack on ‘our
territory’, for example, are discussed to highlight the significant difference in how events are perceived, and consequently the reaction to them.

**Implicitness:** A central part of the discourse relies on its vagueness, assumptions, presuppositions and implications. This includes the vagueness of who the enemies are, and where they are located, for example. Presuppositions include examples such as ‘*obviously* good Americans’, and inherently evil ‘others’. Of special importance to this research is the need to ‘avoid global dangers’, ‘emerging’ or ‘future’ threats, and ‘hostile’ powers; all which are very vague. It is also the ‘obvious’ need for American hegemony to secure a peaceful world. In fact, a ‘global’ war on terror in itself is very vague. Claims about indefinite time spans, estimated and vague numbers of spending, the dispersed nature of terrorism ‘everywhere’ all fall under this category. Also included are implicit assumptions and myths, such as ‘they hate our freedoms’. This is as an assumption that acts were carried out by terrorists in an act of sheer hate. Creating discourses around vague and implicit assumptions, give free reign to an administration that is looking to project imperial power. A ‘never ending’ war, coupled with assumptions about the ‘evil’ that could potentially harm America, legitimizes power to act to counter such potentialities.

**Argumentation and persuasive devices:** When a statement, either positive or negative, follows from the ‘facts’, it sounds more convincing; hence why ‘facts’ are like ‘proof’ about the statement that will be made. In many instances, President Bush and other members of his administration will cite facts from credible sources such as the United Nations, various ‘statistics’, or other ‘expert’ sources and will then follow this by a statement (usually negative) about the Other. This includes what Carvalho (1998) refers to as ‘claims-making’, which involves language used at aiming to ‘show’, ‘prove’ or ‘call attention’ to a given point or matter. As all language is intentional, so too is the usage of facts to draw attention towards certain factors, and away from others. The ‘facts’ are chosen carefully as to paint a particular picture, which supports American ambitions. For example, in Chapter Four, this research highlights the argumentative way that military spending is justified, by arguing for protection of American nationals and interests. Alternate arguments such as not sitting back and waiting for threats to
appear, and rather to be assertive and fend off threats before they materialize will be given importance. Chapter Five highlights the ‘fact’ that American foreign policy is outdated, and new policies must be implemented to cope with the new world facing America. Specifically in this chapter, there is a focus on persuasive devices in the form of an argument to demonstrate – ‘prove’ – new methods are needed to deal with the ‘enemy’. Chapter Six focuses on the GWOT and Iraq and in many instances, Bush and/or his administration will quote facts from an organization such as the United Nations, polls and statistics, or other ‘expert’ sources, and will then follow this by a specifically negative statement about ‘them’. For example, there are several instances in which President Bush emphasizes that the UN has given Iraq several chances to disarm, followed by a string of UN violations, and concludes his argument with a stance that Saddam is ‘evil’ and will not therefore disarm. Statements made in an argumentative style, by referencing ‘facts’, make an argument seem more legitimate. It also draws attention away from personal (or American) interests, and diverts the attention towards the issue at hand as an objective crisis that involves outside factors (such as the ‘evidence’ of WMD, or the number of UN Security Council resolutions that were defied). It gives the impression that this is greater than direct American interest in Iraq.

**Rhetorical figures and devices:** This includes euphemisms, denials, metaphors and contrasts. In specific, metaphors and contrasts are often used to emphasize a certain point to create clear binaries. Such devices strive to maintain dominance and inequalities, such as the use of contrasts in identifying a ‘dangerous and evil’ terrorist/state, against a ‘good’ and ‘pure’ America. Rhetorical devices also make the use of emotive statements in aims to unite people, such as claims of America as an innocent victim to senseless terrorist attacks. Emotionally charged statements used in aims to gain support are also typical of this category. Many examples of this category can be found in Chapter Six. There are many examples of metaphors and contrasts to create the binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that are so prominent in the Bush administration’s discourse. These devices are used to portray the ideology that America is needed to ‘save’ unfortunate peoples (such in Iraq) from their tyrannical leaders, for example.
**Framing:** Framing (Carvalho 2008) is to organize discourse according to a certain point of view or perspective. In involves a selection and composition, and therefore, selection is an exercise of inclusion and exclusion of facts, opinions, value judgments, etc. Composition is the arrangement of these elements in order to produce a certain meaning. What is excluded is in many cases, as important as what is included. Specifically in this section, framing is used to set up the narrative of a ‘post Cold War world’, and the ‘unique responsibility of America’.

The importance of these elements in analyzing discourse is that it helps to uncover the narrative that Bush and his administration created directly after 9/11, and especially in the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003. This research will be primarily a critical discourse analysis of primary documents such as the National Security Strategy (specifically the NSS 2002), speeches by George W. Bush and other key members of his administration, the 9/11 commission report, The Quadrennial defense review, the Defense Planning Guidance’s of a few key years in the 1990s, the Patriot Act, and other government documents. The speeches and documents chosen for this research are the ones that most clearly provide evidence to the themes within each chapter such as the changing nature of threat and danger, the need for American involvement – militarily and otherwise, imperial ambitions, a turn toward an aggressive foreign policy, American supremacy and grand strategy. As this is a thesis where the ideological roots of power through language are analyzed, the materials chosen are explicit, and representative of evidence pertaining to the research question.

More specifically, the materials chosen for CDA analysis are based on the assumption of this research that the use of language is intentional, and therefore ideology as presented through discourse is of great importance. The quotes chosen in this research exemplify specific discourses that provide materials for analysis on an ideological level. In some cases the language is very emotive, and has a specific purpose (which is expanded upon after each quote). In other cases, the language is used politically, to justify a policy. The quotes also exemplify the ways that language is used to unify and divide people, which will again, be expanded after each quote. As with any database of information, there are a vast number of quotes that could have been used.
that are associated with the George W. Bush administration during this time period. However, the examples chosen have the strongest impact on their audience (the American public generally), and hence are most representative of the ideologies perpetuated.

For example, in Chapter Four, the focus of the quotes chosen pertain to those who have been named major influences of President Bush’s ideological foreign policy thought. Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith’s materials are analyzed using CDA. Further, they are then divided into the main themes: unilateralism, ensuring no rival to American power, America’s job to protect the peace, pre-emption, and military spending and power. The quotes chosen for each person, and theme are those that most clearly embody the ideological assumptions of the person and theme. The speeches, documents, and reports by each individual preceding 2001 were scanned to look for language that exemplifies their foreign policy objectives surrounding the themes outlined above. From those, samples from each person were taken that provided evidence that foreign policy thought that formed the basis of post 9/11 policies were present at an earlier time. A CDA was then conducted to identify key discourse that set up ideological basis for foreign policy implementation.

Similarly, in Chapter Five, the focus is on the changing geography of danger, and the discourses surrounding new geographical dangers and our understandings of spaces. In particular, this chapter looks at the importance of framing as the focus is on the ‘script’ of a new world that was created after 9/11. Of crucial importance in this chapter are discourses surrounding the perceptions of the changing nature of geopolitics – both physically and ideologically. Hence, the quotes chosen for analysis were those that most clearly demonstrated language that signified a physical and ideological change in the direction of geopolitics after 9/11. The quotes most clearly demonstrate a rational for who is dangerous, where is dangerous, and what is considered dangerous in the new world the Bush administration was advocating after the attacks. Specific attention is also given to quotes that use language that provide a rational for military engagement and intervention based on the very threats, risks and dangers brought to light by the Bush administration. Also featured for analysis in this chapter once more, are the quotes
and language that demonstrate the simple binaries created for good/evil, us/them, here/there. These were then used as arguments over legitimacy for military intervention in justifying danger and evil in a new world. The quotes chosen exemplify the themes in the chapter relating specifically to: the ‘9/11 prism’; freedom and lifestyles under attack; understanding the conflict: good and evil; geographical uncertainty: danger is everywhere; new enemy, new policies; media framing, and unified by fear. The sections selected for analysis focus on the language that most clearly focuses on these themes as representative material for the type of discourses evident during the time immediately after the attacks.

The last chapter for CDA analysis, Chapter Six focuses on the GWOT. The chapters are in order of a narrative beginning from Chapter Four in the 1990s, to Chapter Six, which is after 9/11, during the build up to the GWOT. The quotes chosen for this section are mainly justifications from President Bush, and specifically focus on just war legitimacy, humanitarian discourses and themes surrounding justifications for military intervention (such as pre-emption, for example). The themes also mirror the earlier discourses of the 1990s from Chapter Four. These quotes are representative and exemplary of the arguments made by Bush and his administration for military measures, and the declaration of a Global War on Terror. The quotes in this chapter specifically focus on justifications and rationales for instigating a GWOT, and more specifically, the invasion of Iraq, and preoccupations around the danger of Saddam Hussein. A focus is also given to two key documents: the NSS of 2002, and the QDR of 2001. These were the two most important documents produced after the 9/11 attacks which make direct reference to, and justify use of force in a GWOT, hence their importance for analysis in this chapter.

Most of the primary materials range from the 1990s until 2005. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent 2004 State of the Union address, the economy started to take focus in American politics. By that time (2005), the Bush administration had accomplished most of what it wanted to implement: legislation such as the Patriot Act, war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and various other new and aggressive policies as a ‘reaction’ to
9/11. Therefore, the focus of the documents are in the run up to the war in Iraq, and the implementation of these policies. A variety of secondary sources such as scholarly articles, books, and interviews conducted with officials within and close to the Bush administration will also be used. The aim is to critically analyze the discourses used by the Bush administration and how they made their way into policy justifying actions after 9/11, and furthermore to legitimate future imperial actions of the United States.

A critical discourse analysis will seek to explore whether the ideas for policies implemented after 9/11 were in the works before hand, and whether 9/11 was an opportunity for neoconservatives to implement these measures. How they then used 9/11 to justify these actions and also use the changing notions of fear and danger to legitimate further imperial policies is the subject of this thesis. Understanding how the discourses were created, and used as justification for foreign policy will prove the power of ideology and hegemonic discourses in the practice of legitimating foreign policy.

2.5 CDA, CGP and Imperialism

CDA leaves us with some important things to think about. First, the importance of language and discourse in shaping our world, producing and reproducing power, and how it embodies ideological assumptions. Language is a social system, and the choice of words is powerful. Given this, discourses are intentional actions; they are powerful. The importance of power is a central area of focus for the CDA project. Finally, it is contextual, like CGP, and therefore the two together serve as a unique and critical tool. Moving through this research, we can then ask, what is the role of critical discourse analysis in understanding and analyzing imperialism specifically? One of the tasks of CDA is to trace the narratives of imperialism. This means uncovering the discourses of imperialism to reveal how they are constructed, maintained, and ultimately taken for granted beliefs about our world and global political system. Understanding how imperialism is presented in mainstream society (through speeches for example, that are heard nation wide by the public), analyzing the kind of language that is used to justify, legitimate and normalize it specifically in the context of post 9/11 policies is a central aim of this research.
CDA takes on the critical perspective of CGP and highlights its understanding of imperialism. CDA as a method also meshes together with the major themes of CGP. CDA can help to uncover how the discourses work, what they are really saying beneath the surface about imperialism and analyze the language used to legitimate this – a part of the first theme of CGP (the power of ideas). The second major theme, identity and difference, looks at how the Other is constructed. It also looks at how policies and identities are created and legitimated in relation to the constructed other. CDA therefore can look at the language of Othering, how it is created within discourse and how that is then used to justify imperialism and therefore actions against the Other. The last theme, the critical analysis of territory and how space is given meaning, is an analysis into how meanings that fill space are socially constructed and need to be acknowledged as such. It is these meanings that legitimate policy. Certain spaces are therefore constructed in particular meaningful ways (for example the axis of evil) and the language that constructs those meanings is vital to how such places and spaces are understood. CDA seeks to highlight that very language and how for example, actions can be legitimated against an ‘evil’ space and further the language that allows certain powers to take action.

As mentioned previously, the goal of CDA is to systematically analyze the discourses that promote certain ideologies that legitimate American power. CDA combined with CGP is a different approach for a number of reasons. First, it asks and answers the question ‘how’. How imperialism is legitimized, how language is used to do this, and how it becomes normalized and accepted in mainstream geopolitics. Whereas much of mainstream international relations is looking to create a ‘testable’ theory, critical geopolitics is a problem based approach that takes an interdisciplinary perspective to answer questions that are left incomplete by much of IR theory. CGP avoids the label of ‘theory’ and instead can be understood as a ‘lens’ in which to critically analyze the world. Critical discourse analysis takes this a step further by providing a method to execute the CGP methodologically. For example, if CGP questions how certain ideologies become normalized through discourse, CDA can answer that question by providing a systematic means to take apart language and trace the origins of the very discourses that legitimate actions. CDA complements critical
geopolitics and in unison they provide a critical and interdisciplinary approach to the question of imperialism, and how it can be legitimized. Chapters Four, Five and Six are an application of CDA under the themes of CGP with focus on the construction of foreign policy from the early 1990s until the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the Global War on Terror, and changing geographies post 9/11.

The next chapter will critique the main theories within international relations that have attempted to address the topic of imperialism. Following this, critical geopolitics will be introduced as a more critical way to analyze imperialism, addressing some of the missing gaps in the literature and the study of this topic, specifically post 9/11. In this section imperialism will be presented under the three main themes of CGP introduced in this chapter (the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory). Chapters Four, Five and Six will be an application of critical discourse analysis as discussed in the second part of this chapter.
3.1 Introduction

The academic argument that (American) imperialism is back was one made by Cox in 2003, amongst others (see for example, Bellamy Foster 2006; Gokay 2005; Steinmetz 2003). Following the reactions of the Bush administration to the 2001 terrorist attacks, empire also regained popularity in the media, and across several academic disciplines. Was this a ‘new’ imperialism, or was it continuity in American foreign policy? Cox argues that there was an ‘imperial turn’ during the Bush years, and it was “by any stretch of the imagination, a most extraordinary phenomenon” (2004a: 589). How and why this marked a turn in events is an important question. In his words,

“Previously, the United States had at least paid formal lip-service to international institutions and global rules. Now, it appeared to have arrogated to itself the right to set standards, determine threats, use force, and mete out justice to those whom it deemed unworthy. Call it unilateralism; accept perhaps that it was the necessary response to real threats; define it how you will. It was still imperialism by any other name” (Cox 2003: 6).

However, does this mean that American imperialism was new? Were the foreign policies a reaction to 9/11 or were they consistent with a long history of American grand strategy. The central argument in this research is that 9/11 presented a perceived shift in danger and threat by the Bush administration, thus legitimating a more aggressive foreign policy, which this thesis categorizes as ‘informal imperialism’. Details of the argument to justify the use of the term imperialism are presented in a later part of the chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a nuanced and contextual account of how American imperialism has developed through it’s history, and why that is a matter of importance for critical geopolitics. There are four key parts to this chapter. First, will be an ideological account of imperialism within the key concepts of exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Their main tenants and significance will be discussed in relation
to its impact on American imperialism. Second, several key points in history where American imperialism was a matter of debate, or proved to be a significant development in American empire will be discussed. This section will look at whether or not Americans regarded themselves as an empire or not, the great debates of 1890s, as well as the second round of debates in the 1920s, World War Two, Post 1945 and the Cold War era, and finally the post 9/11 world will be addressed. After a historical grounding of American imperialism, the third section will provide a definition of how this research classifies US imperialism will be presented among a debate of hegemony versus empire. Fourth and finally, this chapter will consider why this is important to the field of CGP and how the three themes will be relevant in assessing US imperialism before concluding.

3.2 Ideological roots: Manifest Destiny and American Exceptionalism

The concept of manifest destiny and benevolent hegemony have both played into America’s larger discourse of exceptionalism since its very early days as an independent nation. These terms are important and foundational to the ideologies that become naturalized in geopolitics discourse, specifically. They have become a taken-for-granted belief and have further become a part of the national identity. The importance of this, above all, is that these narratives are used to legitimize policies; specifically, military interventions in the name of fulfilling a manifest destiny, because of America’s exceptionalism or their ‘duty’ as a benevolent hegemon on the world stage.

At the core of the founding of the United States of America was the belief that empire was wrong, and as a result the American Revolution sought to overthrow British imperial rule, rejecting both its monarchy and aristocracy. However, although rejecting this type of empire in its founding, in 1803 Thomas Jefferson declared an ‘empire of liberty’ by which he saw that it was America’s responsibility to spread freedom across the world. Along with the Louisiana purchase in the same year, the expansion of America westward was the beginning of the roots of the American empire. Territorial expansion was rationalized in this context as Americans believed their nation to be “chosen by Providence to spread its virtues far and wide” (McCrisken 2003: 12).
Weinberg argues that the Americans of 1803 were too close to the events of 1776, which rejected imperialism, and hence the imperialistic thesis had to be supplied with a “sugar coating” (Weinberg 1935: 34). He argues that the justification of the conquest to the Louisianans was that they would find “true liberty” by accepting Jefferson’s benevolent rule (Ibid). Jefferson’s rationale was that by expanding westward, and introducing American laws and government, the French settlers would assimilate into the United States. By ensuring American settlers migrated beyond America’s borders, it would spread republican culture and institutions without “traditional instruments of conquest”, hence spreading the Empire of Liberty (Cogliano 2014: 179).

At the core of American imperialism, and American national identity are two interlinked ideologies: that of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. The first time the words ‘exceptional’ were used in regards to America, was in 1831 by Alexis De Tocqueville in his book Democracy in America where he says, “The position of the American is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one” (De Tocqueville 1961: 42). McCrisken defines American exceptionalism as “the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history; not only unique but also superior among nation” (McCrisken 2003: 1). It is a concept that has permeated every period of American history and as Madsen argues, is the single most powerful ideology in regards to American identity (Madsen 1998:1). As such, McCrisken notes two different strands of exceptionalism. One is the view that the United States is an exemplar nation; one that is anti-imperialist, isolationist, as defined by the term ‘fortress America’ (McCrisken 2003: 2). The second is a missionary brand of exceptionalism that is represented by Manifest Destiny, imperialism, internationalism and the United States as leader of the free world (Ibid). To understand the difference then, it is necessary to first understand what is meant in this context, by Manifest Destiny.

Weinberg defines Manifest Destiny as “the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and…unique rights in the
application of moral principles” (Weinberg 1935: 8). Further expanding on this point he writes:

The alchemy which transmuted natural right from a doctrine of democratic nationalism into a doctrine of imperialism was thus the very idea of manifest destiny. Which the doctrine of natural right created. But manifest destiny was such a creature as Frankenstein fashioned. Gaining control over the doctrine of natural right, it in effect changed the impartial law of nature into the unique code favorable to the rights of one nation (Ibid: 41).

Manifest Destiny was used to therefore justify and rationalize territorial expansion because Americans believed their nation was unique. It was also the duty of Americans to “regenerate backward peoples of the continent” (Merk 1963:32). It seems that the term may have been first used in 1836, when Winthrop made a speech in Congress addressing the joint occupation of Oregon and said, “I mean that new revelation of right which has been designated as the right of our manifest destiny to spread over this whole continent” (Winthrop quoted in Pratt 1927: 79). Others such as Robert Johannsen and Anders Stephanson argue that it was John O’Sullivan in 1845 who coined the phrase manifest destiny in reference to the mission of the United States “to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions” (Stephanson 1995: xi). Merk argues it was born out of a “special variety of nationalism” - in the resentment of European interference in the affairs of Texas (Merk 1963: 59). Stephanson argues that through the eyes of Americans, they had seen the light, and hence had a duty to develop and “spread the blessings of the most perfect principles imaginable” (Stephanson 1995: xii). Bell posits that Manifest Destiny was the “civil religion of 19th century America”, driven by the belief that America had the right to define it’s own fate, and that Americans were different from everyone else in world history (Bell 1975: 5).

The first strand of exceptionalism embodies three key beliefs, according to McCrisken. One is that America is a “special nation with a special destiny” (McCriskien 2003: 8). The second is that it is a nation different from the rest of the world, and specifically different from Europe; and third, that it will “avoid the laws of history that determine the rise and fall of all great nations” (Ibid). Americans did not see leadership
as an “international collaboration”, but to lead by their “brilliant example” in which America’s “moral influence was that of ‘mistress of the world’” (Weinberg 1935: 460).

The first belief of the first strand of imperialism is embodied by the famous quote from John Winthrop in 1630 about the Massachusetts Bay colonists that it is a ‘city upon a hill’ is one that has been formative in American identity and has been evoked repeatedly over the centuries (Winthrop 1630: 20). The concept of the ‘city on a hill’ is a belief that America and Americans are special, and they must save the world from itself, while displaying a spiritual, moral, and political commitment to their destiny (Madsen 1998: 2). Hence, this has proven to be an inherent part of American self-identity, and continues to be today. The second belief of this particular strand of exceptionalism, strongly rooted in Manifest Destiny, that claims by separating Americans from the European’s “class systems and structure of inheritance” by establishing a democratic society, they will have a chance to better their lives, unlike in the European class systems of old Monarchies (Ibid: 36). Hence America sought imperial expansion abroad to increase their power; as Thomas Paine said ‘to begin the world over again’ (Paine 1894: 83). The third belief is that America would avoid the fall of a great nation, and was driven by the belief that geographic isolation from Europe would enable them to pursue a different course and prevent them from making the same mistakes that led to the fall of other great nations (McCrisken 2003: 10).

The second main strand of exceptionalism – the missionary view- advocates a more aggressive presence of the United States in the world. This includes the expansion of the US into the affairs of other nations, but at the same time believing that America is “incapable of seeking domination over other peoples in its self-interest” due to the ‘nature’ of America as a selfless nation, only seeking the betterment of others (McCrisken 2003: 11). This interventionist view, with it principles of American right and duty to intervene in other parts of the world, is what Theodore Roosevelt called an “international police power” (Weinberg 1935: 414). McCrisken argues that these Americans believe that “inside every foreigner there is the potential, even the desire, to be an American”, making it difficult for Americans to understand that other peoples
around the world have different values, norms, and perceptions that effect how they see the world (i.e. differently from Americans) (McCrisken 2003: 11).

Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny took turns throughout the course of American history in the role that they played in the debates and development of American imperialism. The significance of these ideologies has spanned from America’s identity as a nation, and how individuals in society view and understand themselves as American citizens, to its foreign policy. From its self-identity to its actions on the international stage, the ideology of American exceptionalism and its Manifest Destiny have been, and continue to be profoundly significant in American history. The next part of this chapter will discuss the importance of how these concepts have shaped American imperialism, in a historical context. There are a few key moments in American history that will be the focus of understanding the development of imperialism. They are: the great debate and Spanish War in years 1898-1901, the 1920s debate of isolationism versus internationalism, the outcome of WWII, the post 1945 world and Cold War era, and finally a post 9/11 world.

3.3 Manifest Destiny and American Exceptionalism Applied: The Development of American Imperialism

The 1890s: The Great Debate & The Spanish American War

During the 1890s, there was a crisis in America. Williams Appleman Williams argues that the Americans thought the continental frontier was gone and hence they needed to expand overseas in the form of economic and territorial empire that would provide the only way to maintain their freedom and prosperity (Williams 1979: 23). During this time, Williams argues that it marked the “death of the individual entrepreneur” and the success and rise of the corporation in America (Williams 1979: 29). The crisis of unemployment led to the need for more markets abroad, driving an expansionist foreign policy objective. In 1896, industrial and political leaders viewed expansionist foreign policy as necessary (Williams 1979: 30). Williams writes that President Cleveland had deployed the Navy to defeat rebels in Brazil who were opposing unequal developing in economic relations with America (Ibid). In 1893, a newspaper in Omaha used the term Manifest Destiny to refer to Cleveland’s ability to
promote Manifest Destiny as ‘far as possible’ (Williams 1979: 30). In the same year Frederick Jackson Turner put forward the ‘Frontier Thesis’ that essentially claimed that expansion would equal democracy and prosperity (Ibid).

In 1898, during the Spanish America war, a ‘Great Debate’ flared up between expansionists who wanted to annex the former Spanish colonies and the ‘anti-imperialists’ who opposed this (McCriskin 2003: 12). This is where the two strands of exceptionalism clashed. The anti-imperialists believed that America was acting in a way inconsistent with their founding father’s principles, but still believed in the exemplary strand of American exceptionalism (McCriskin 2003: 13). The military intervention was necessary to ‘clean up the Cuban mess’ so that other foreign policy issues could be dealt with (Williams 1979: 37). The type of imperialism Bryan’s camp was advocating was framed around the view that the United States should ‘protect’ these nations through means such as the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba (Williams 1979: 47).

The imperialist policies of Cleveland and McKinley were to defeat the revolution in Cuba, amidst pressures from metropolitan expansionists to confront Spain (Williams 1979: 40). The ideology of the Cuban invasion was justified by McKinley as based on the duty to save the Cubans from oppression; a humanitarian argument (Weinberg 1935: 186). In such arguments, the “general obligation to respect the right of self-determination is suspended when the allowance of such a right amounts to permitting a suicide” (Ibid: 292). That argument is still currently used by American administrations when presenting the American position to save a nation from itself, or its own leaders. All imperial policies were seen as altruistic in the eyes of Americans. Weinberg notes the Boston Journal claimed, that “to abandon Cuba to its own turbulent politicians seemed an imperilment… to the peace of the world” (Weinberg 1935: 425). Not only that, but the Americans went to war with Spain not only because of expansionist reasons, but also as an act of escaping some of the domestic turmoil at home; hence the war unified and served as a distraction (Williams 1979: 42).

The first two groups debated the fate of Cuba and the Philippines as a matter of keeping them as traditional colonies or quasi-independent nations (Williams 1979: 46).
The imperialists claimed that it was “the duty and the manifest destiny of the United States to civilize and Christianize” (Weinberg 1935: 289). In response to the invasion of the Philippines and the controversy over consent, McKinley argued the following: “Did we need their consent to perform a great act for humanity? We had it in every aspiration of their minds, in every hope of their hearts” (Weinberg 1935: 294). He addressed non-consent with the rhetoric that their interference was welcome and needed, and America’s involvement can only be seen as a force for good. Interestingly, this discourse reappears at several points in America’s history, especially after 9/11, which will be addressed in later chapters. In order with their moral justification, the expansionists concealed their imperialism with the view that self-determination was not necessarily being taken away from the Filipinos, it was just being “held in trust until they were fit to exercise it” (Weinberg 1935: 297). As the first two groups debated, it was actually the third group, Williams notes, that was made of mainly business men, politicians and intellectuals who opposed traditional colonialism but instead advocated open door policy (Williams 1979: 45).

The third group eventually won the debate and open door policy became official foreign policy in America for the next half century (Ibid). Open door policy was essentially a policy that would see America’s economic strength “enter and dominate all underdeveloped areas of the world” (Williams 1979: 45). Brooks Adams called the policy America’s “economic supremacy” which would establish America as the world’s great economic superpower, without the “embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism” (Williams 1979: 50). But as Williams points out, when any advanced industrial nation tries to control the development of a weaker economy, this can only be essentially described as imperialism (Williams 1979: 55).

1920’s debate: Isolationalism versus Internationalism

The Open Door Policy continued after the Spanish American War, and became official foreign policy of the United States. However, another debate emerged yet again that would bring America’s power into consideration. After WWI, during the 1920s, a debate emerged in how to move American foreign policy forward: to engage in internationalism, or retreat and be isolationist. The two sides of the debate consisted of
those in Wilson’s camp who advocated joining the League of Nations with the premise that collective security would make the world safer for America’s Open Door Policy, and the anti-imperialist camp (led by Senator Borah, Lodge and Hoover) who were critical of American imperial expansion arguing it was neither economically necessary or morally just (Williams 1979: 122). The isolationists believed that avoiding the “petty squabbles” of Europe and sticking to their own hemisphere was the better idea (McCrisken 2003: 13). On the other hand, the internationalists believed that the United States had a “duty to intervene in world affairs” (McCrisken 2003: 14).

The critical arguments of Borah and the anti-imperialists were important. He argued that America could not and should not take on a role that would keep the world safe for democracy. He saw this as an unrealistic argument as this view ignored the different cultural traditions of the world, and the potential of other nations to react against the US unfavorably (Williams 1979: 123). In essence, he argued that this view violated the spirit of democracy itself (Ibid). His anti-imperialists arguments were rooted in his belief that democracy could not be ‘exported’, or that citizens of a country could simply be given freedom by Americans or outsiders (Williams 1979: 125). On the other side, President Coolidge argued exactly the opposite, that any action that was deemed wrong within the United States should be equally wrong outside the United States (Williams 1979: 130). This clearly exemplifies the idea of exceptionalism: that the United States should serve as a model to the rest of the world, and is morally superior; hence, anything acting as an alternative to the values and norms of America deems it incorrect. The result of the debate was to reject collective security, but to continue to push American overseas political and economic expansion (Williams 1979: 97). As Weinberg writes, “world empire demanded abandonment of isolation but the expansionists preferred to assert that abandonment of isolation demanded world empire” (Weinberg 1935: 457).

When Roosevelt came to power and implemented the New Deal principles, it paved the way for a type of free trade informal empire (Williams 1979: 173). However, its success depending on the acceptance of American policies by the rest of the world, hence it led to some questioning if American imperial power could be dangerous (Ibid).
Because the United States had defined overseas economic activity as crucial to the interests of Americans, policy makers viewed any type of social revolution in those countries as a threat to their own interests at home (Williams 1979: 174). Hence, Roosevelt implemented the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ with Latin America, which stated that good neighbours did not rock the boat. If these nations stayed friendly to American interests, there would not be any problems. This can be understood by no other means than informal imperialism: a way to influence the internal affairs of several other nations via a policy that implies that as long as said countries comply with American friendly interests, they will not have any problems. It sounds paradoxically, like a friendly threat; one that is not necessarily enforced by direct military force or economic coercion, but using the fear of non-compliance as a motivator.

The road forward was eventually solidified when the internationalists ‘won’ the debate, when Pearl Harbour was attacked. In 1941 Henry Luce wrote in Life magazine that the “US must accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence” (Luce as quoted in McCrisken 2003: 20). Hence, America entered WWII as a “fully engaged” global power (Ibid).

World War Two

Williams argues that the United States fought World War Two (WWII) under the assumption that they were defending an anti-colonial democracy coupled with the duty to restore the world (Williams 1979: 201). With a continued importance on pushing the Open Door Policy forward, their own success and democracy therefore depended on their economic success and hence victory in the war (Ibid). Roosevelt’s goal was more than winning the war. His central objectives were freedom of speech, freedom to practice whichever religion ones chooses, freedom from want (which he defined as economic understandings that secure a peaceful world), and freedom from fear everywhere in the world (Roosevelt 1941). In order to win the war in his view, it would mean that peace and security in the world would be based on ‘universal values’, which meant those traditionally championed by Americans (McCrisken 2003: 14). Furthermore, ensuring this goal was an American ‘duty’. A poll at the end of the war in
1945 showed that 71% of Americans agreed that the USA should take an active role in world affairs (McCrisken 2003: 21). After WWII, American exceptionalism became more militant and missionary. In instances where there were any radical changes to the national economies in which the United States had an interest, it would use US troops, threats of violence, economic pressures, or embargoes to achieve the results it wanted (Kolko 1969: 82). During Eisenhower’s 1953 inaugural address, he stated, that “destiny has aid upon our country the responsibility of the free world’s leadership” (Eisenhower 1953). Hence, American exceptionalism was in full force, as part of overt foreign policy that it is American responsibility to lead the free world. Those who did not accept this view of open door expansion, both in the missionary sense and economically were not only considered to be wrong, but also they were seen as “incapable of thinking correctly” (Williams 1979: 206). Being American is an “ideological commitment”, argues Lipset (1996: 31). Hence, rejecting or challenging American values, would be ‘un-American’ (Ibid). There was a strong sense of what it meant to be American after the victory of WWII, and why being American meant being exceptional and inherently a good force fighting evil as the US emerged a victor in the war.

**Post 1945 and The Cold War**

Post 1945, the US perceptions of itself had changed, producing political and economic circumstances that provided a unique opportunity for the US to shape the world in its own image (Kiely 2010: 97). Therefore, it has often been asked, ‘what is new about the American empire/ American imperialism after 2001?’ A brief and contextual history of modern American imperialism stresses the importance of imperialism in the nation’s past and present. As has been evidenced in earlier parts of this chapter, America as an imperial power is not a new concept, but its emergence post 9/11 in a more aggressive form, is. The attitudes and ideologies that promoted American imperialism have been present, especially so since after the end of the Second World War, and specifically more so since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Chomsky argues that in the post-war period, the United States sought to hold ‘unquestioned power’, acting to ensure “limitation of any ‘exercise of sovereignty’ by states that might interfere with its global designs” (2003: 15). America was essentially
constructing policies with ‘allies’ in aims to achieve military and economic supremacy (Ibid). Kolko argues that the US government made it clear that its role in the world post 1945 was to protect and advance American economic power, hence controlling the world economy (Kolko 1969: 83). When the Cold War was under way in 1947, the missionary strand of American exceptionalism was the focus of foreign policy (McCrisken 2003: 21). One of the key assumptions the Americans made during the Cold War was the American would be an agent of positivity and good in the world, against the evil Russians, providing the US with a “wonderful opportunity” to exercise their authority (Williams 1979: 231). This move toward an assertive missionary exceptionalism followed from Truman’s belief that it was not enough for American to provide an example in the world, but as the chosen nation, that they had to defend the rights of free people around the world against totalitarianism (McCrisken 2003: 22).

President Kennedy also evoked references to the City upon a Hill, when he said, “we must always consider…that we shall be as a city upon a hill-the eyes of all people are upon us”, during the Cold War to remind Americans about their special role and purpose (Kennedy 1961). Following Kennedy, President Johnson also suggested exceptionalism in his discourse regarding Vietnam, which ultimately ended up to be one of the greatest failures of US foreign policy. He argued to the American people that, “because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending” (Johnson 1965). His argument is moral, based on an American responsibility and duty to help the Vietnamese people. Kolko argues that the Vietnamese intervention was the “most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War”, which reveals most clearly the ideological basis and motivating forces of the United States (Kolko 1969: 88).

Systematically, the missionary brand of exceptionalism was being used by each President during the Cold War. However, the failure of Vietnam sparked a debate in America once more that in fact it was not exceptional, and in fact as Daniel Bell wrote in his article *The End of American Exceptionalism*, that America was a nation like any other (Bell 1975: 6). Kissinger also commented that the most important casualty of the Vietnam War was American exceptionalism (Kissinger 2000). Those who opposed,
such as Senator Fulbright, said that American power had succumbed to the arrogance of power, as his book title suggests, which he describes as “a psychological need that nations seem to have in order to prove they are bigger, better, or stronger than other nations” (Fulbright 1966: 5). He further argues that such nations, such as America, equate power and virtue with major responsibilities and universal missions (Ibid: 9). Because of this, Fulbright argues that America has in the past ‘hurt’ those who it has tried to help and suggests that Americans allow their “neighbours to make their own judgments and mistakes” (Ibid: 14).

Hence, with America’s ego damaged, when President Ford came into power, his goal was to move American foreign policy back to traditional belief in US exceptionalism (McCrisken 2003: 48). During Ford’s time in office, the Mayaguez incident set a precedent for the use of US force; that it could be applied as long as there was a morally justifiable objectives and could be swiftly used with the maximum force necessary with fewest lives risked (McCrisken 2003: 53). Ford later recalled that the incident “resurrected America’s morale. It got us out of the depths of defeat in Vietnam” (Ford as cited in Cannon 2013: 378). It was a signal from the United States that it would pay whatever price to preserve its national honour. By the time President Carter came into office, McCrisken argues that America’s “moral compass had been lost”, and the traditional beliefs of the meaning of being American had been put into question (McCrisken 2003: 56). Carter, therefore said, that “the US will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just and peaceful world order” (Carter 1977a). Interestingly, Carter also uses the term ‘obligation’, hence still deploying exceptionalist rhetoric, but perhaps with a softer tone. At a question and answer session in Mississippi in 1977, Carter remarked that

we’ve been filled with the worlds of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington, and others – that all men are created equal…so human rights is a part of the American consciousness. These kinds of commitments that I share with all other Americans make it almost inevitable that our country will be a leader in the world in standing up for the same principles on which our Nation was founded (Carter 1977: 1326).
Carter’s moral and humanitarian foreign policy combined missionary and traditional strands of US exceptionalism as he supported US military intervention if needed, but based his argument on moral grounds. This echoes Ignatieff’s argument for ‘Empire Lite’ in which imperial actions and policies are based on moral and humanitarian grounds. However, it was Ronald Reagan’s time in office, beginning in 1981, that saw the birth of the “new” American Empire, according to Cox. The first part of this new empire was the changes immediately following the collapse of the USSR, as American power was largely enhanced (Cox 2004a: 595). Cox argues, that years before George W. Bush’s election, the intellectual ground was laid for a more aggressive America on the international stage, with increases in military spending and a far more proactive role in shaping the world to its benefit (Ibid: 597). It is 9/11 that created the window of opportunity to implement the policies that had been on the back burner for years during the Reagan administration, that could not be passed through during the Clinton years. Cox argues that the American administration presented the world to be a very dangerous place after the attacks, and had taken it upon itself to fight the “savage war of peace”, protecting and expanding its empire of liberty (2003: 6). Therefore, Regan’s administration proved to be an important part of the more aggressive foreign policy that began to form after the Carter years. As a strong believer in US exceptionalism, Reagan, like Presidents before him, evoked the discourse of exceptionalism. In 1986 on the campaign trail he stated that “America [is] a land of hope, a light unto the nation, a shining city on the hill” (Regan as quoted in Boyd 1986). Once again, the image of the shining city upon a hill was brought forward, always grounding American policies in a form of US exceptionalism. Reagan also famously said, “America has no territorial ambitions. We occupy no countries, and we have built no walls to lock our people in. Our commitment to self-determination, freedom, and peace is the very soul of America” (Reagan 1982). Like those before him, Reagan presented a discourse that explicitly stated that the United States was not a formal empire, as it does not seek territory. And also like those before him, his discourse did not in fact match American foreign policy actions. All of the imperial policies, military interventions, and various other avenues of influence taken by America were only in the best interest of others, to help them be more like America – the great nation, a shining city upon the hill.
Throughout the events of the Cold War, the rhetoric of US exceptionalism was evoked by each President, and by the time George H. W. Bush came into office, the world had entered the Post Cold War period, with Bush declaring a new world order. Bush declared that, “America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral principles’ (Bush as cited in WAUDAG 1990). Bush saw the end of the Cold War as the acceptance of American values across the world, and solidified America’s ‘special’ place in history (McCriskin 2003: 133). In line with benevolent empirical discourse, he claimed that it was the duty of the United States to help other nations reach the same level of freedoms enjoyed by Americans (Ibid). In his 1991 State of the Union address, George H.W. Bush said, “we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works” (Bush 1991). Over and over again, President Bush used the discourse of America’s special role in the world to justify American actions and promote a world led by American values.

Moral justifications were used during the Iraq war of 1990, where he stated that “standing up for our principle is an American tradition” (Bush 1990). He also used arguments of morality in the Panama invasion – evident in its title, “Operation Just Cause”. And in the Somalian crisis, where he explicitly said “to the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes” (Bush 1992). He emphasized America’s humanitarian role when he stated ‘let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian (Ibid). President Clinton, despite his softer approach, stated that, “America remains the indispensible nation. There are times when America, and only America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear in the world” (Clinton 1996: 1257). Nothing can be clearer in declaring America as the only nation who can make a difference of such magnanimous proportions.

Williams identifies three main conceptions that America is guided by in the realm of ideas, which becomes solidified by the Clinton years. One is the humanitarian impulse to help others; the second is to protect the principles of self-determination internationally (Williams 1979: 13). The third and most clearly imperial, is that “other
people cannot *really* solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States” (Williams 1979: 13). This thought specifically forms much of the ideological basis of American imperial thinking. Hence, since America’s early days, their experience has always been as an ‘exceptional’ people; their uniqueness has been central to their identity and their foreign policy. As Whitcomb says, “morality became the reference point of uniqueness; Americans were simply “better” than the common run-of-the-mill peoples of the world” (McCrisken 2003: 5). The reason this discourse has been so effective is that, as Hunt has argued, public rhetoric needs to draw upon values and concerns that are widely shared and easily understood by the public (Hunt 1987: 15). This is the thought underlying manifest destiny and exceptionalism, which was evoked once more after 9/11 under President George W. Bush. Ravenal argues that because this type of discourse “glosses over divisions and binds a society together”, Americans are used to hearing discourse about their identity depending upon foreign policy actions on the international stage, and hence, feel that their identity would be compromised if they shifted to a policy of restraint (Hunt 1987: 3). This will become even more stark following 9/11. With an understanding of the historical significance of manifest destiny, exceptionalism, and the developments and debates of American empire, the following section will discuss American imperialism post 9/11.

**Post 9/11**

Post 9/11 saw many policy changes, and the direction of American foreign policy took a sharp turn. It presented an opportunity to push through domestic and foreign policies that could be legitimated on an ideological level using 9/11 as its basis for legitimacy. The mainstream media and the public understood these to be a *reaction* to the events of 2011, which is why 9/11 worked so well in the favour of neoconservatives who came into power to implement these measures, along with President George W. Bush. Taken out of context, the attacks of 9/11 were regarded by the American administration as irrational attacks, materializing out of nowhere, paying no attention to context or the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East, as pointed out by Kiely (2010: 202). Chomsky also argues that the American administration intentionally removed the intent from the action of the terrorists, and
argues that the Actions of Americans in the Middle East were also removed from the analysis (Chomsky 2001: 31). Hence, we are left with an irrational terrorist act, and an innocent and unsuspecting American administration. Following this, the US administration used it as an excuse to reshape its role in the world; turning to an assertive foreign policy, which would include writing pre-emption into the National Security Strategy (NSS). The policy decisions and discourse of the Bush administration reflected strongly the underlying ideologies of American Exceptionalism, as evidenced in later chapters during CDA.

During the Bush years, the classification empire made several appearances, as his administration had exhibited some worrisome behaviour. Not only the decision to go into Iraq ‘illegally’, but also the outright refusal of Washington to enter international agreements from the Kyoto Protocol to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which confirmed that the United States had redefined their position in international politics (Munkler 2007: 1). Moreover, the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA) was strained after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. After an initial speech by George W. Bush stating that America would have to handle things alone even if UN backing was not present confirmed that America was going down a different path (Ibid). A part of this can be attributed to the long held ideologies of American exceptionalism. When the UN was presented as ‘unable’ to do its job properly, Bush made a case that it is America’s responsibility to protect the safety of the world.

Dalby argues that the Bush Doctrine documents not only make explicit statements about pre-eminence and preventive war, but forcible regime change and interventions to handle ‘rogue states’, compromising other states’ sovereignty (even when not ‘at war’ with such states) (2008: 424). With what Dalby says is the ultimate foreign policy objective – eliminating tyranny on earth – it was made clear that “military coercion was back on the agenda in a manner that suggested an explicitly imperial agenda” (Ibid).
In contrast, a view such as Michael Ignatieff’s ‘Empire Lite’, presents American power as a new type of imperialism for the modern age that is perhaps just as explicit as the agenda Dalby is criticizing, but with a ‘softer’ approach and rationale. It is characterized by using force if needed, and militarily intervening, but by doing so with a commitment to human rights and democracy, as well as the promotion of free markets (Munkler 2007: 150). This bears resemblance to the ways in which manifest destiny and American exceptionalism have come through in pervious foreign policy initiatives. The idea of ‘Empire Lite’, like manifest destiny, guises itself as a responsibility of a ‘chosen’ nation. It implies that America’s role in the world is unique, and its commitment to humanitarianism is strong and hence it must fulfill this responsibility and destiny. Alain Joxe, in his 2002 book Empire of Disorder makes a clear case for categorizing America as an empire. Joxe’s main argument about American influence is that America believes that all those who do not meet the standard of the American way, are either undeveloped, and therefore America will impose policies friendly to their interests; or in some cases they are labeled as enemies or dangerous, in which then military intervention becomes an option (Dalby 2008: 427). This is a reminder of McCrisken’s argument made earlier, that Americans find it difficult to sometimes accept opinions and world views different from their own. It may lead them to think others are ‘backwards’ or ‘underdeveloped’, or ‘wrong’ in their beliefs. Joxe maintains that the policies post 9/11 were a mutation, engaging both a military and imperial vision (2002: 65). Bush basically threatened the world with Iraq’s fate; it was an example of what not to do, and to always play by America’s rules (Ibid: 67).

After 9/11, Bush presented an urgent crisis and the American people responded. There was an overwhelming nationalist response from the American population giving Bush “free reign” to pursue military operations throughout the world (Joxe 2002: 70). Joxe argues that this is where the problem lies: that Bush “seems to be free to do practically anything he wants both inside and outside the United States. It’s an unheard-of, frightening situation” (Ibid). He used the fears of the people after 9/11 to essentially legitimate American military involvement around the world by pre-empting danger. Along the same lines, Panitch and Gindin argue that,
Only the American state could arrogate to itself the right to intervene against the sovereignty of other states (which it repeatedly did around the world) and only the American state reserved for itself the “sovereign” right to reject international rules and norms when necessary. It is in this sense that only the American state was actively “imperialist (2004:16).

This creates a strong context to term American power as imperial. One of the reasons why 9/11 was an important turning point in US foreign policy was that is allowed previously controversial policies seem “far more acceptable” at home (Cox 2003: 13), temporarily legitimizing a new sort of informal American imperialism. It is on these foundations that the term imperialism is justified in the context of this research. Michael Mann writes that the world should be made aware that America actually embraces its ‘new’ imperialism; all the unilateral actions (withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM), not ratifying Kyoto, the Star Wars program, etc) are connected (2003: 2). “They are all part of the grand strategy for a global American Empire, first envisioned as theory, then after 9-11, becoming reality”, as he says (Ibid). Chomsky’s definition of how American imperialism works is that,

the idea is to have independent states, but with weak governments that must rely on the imperial power for their survival. They can rip off the population if they like. That’s fine but they have to provide a façade behind which the real power can rule. That’s standard imperialism (Chomsky 2005: 45).

Typical of American foreign policy actions past and present, by definition then, it seems America was an imperial power.

To recap, the reasons this research will use the term informal imperialism is that; one, it is not solely based on territory, making it informal and immediately striking out the formal imperialism option. As Mann writes, “the new imperialists do not want to rule permanently over foreign lands. They want only an indirect and informal Empire, though one that threatens, coerces and even sometimes invades foreign states, improves them and then leaves” (2003: 13). Military intervention is still central, but it is not everything. Further, permanent control of those places which it invades is not a criterion either. Two, as part of the definition of informal imperialism, the state exercises economic influence, which is also very important. It doesn’t have to
be politics over economics, as realists suggest, or economics over politics, as Marxists would argue. It is multifaceted, as American power has proven. Authors such as David Harvey stress the importance of both, but is also careful not to underestimate economic imperialism. He argues that capitalist imperialist logic is about “exploiting the uneven geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs”, which keeps economic imperialism alive (Harvey 2003: 31). Michael Cox is correct to point out that although the economic and military capabilities are not as strong, considering the rise of China and the importance of Europe, in relative terms, the United States is still all powerful (Cox 2003: 21). In the first term of Bush’s Presidency, when Cox presented his view on American power, the United States still accounted for nearly thirty percent of world product, Wall Street was still the financial centre, and most ‘international’ institutions took orders from Washington (Ibid). Importantly, the success of the American empire is a mix of being feared and being respected, as Cox argues (Ibid: 22). A third point about the classification of American power as an informal empire is, as Cox argues, that the United States performs tasks that others would not want to perform in the international system (some economic, some political) and argues that in large part this may contribute to its continued imperial power (Ibid). Lastly, what separates it from a hegemon and makes it imperial, while being informally so, is that often it first seeks a consensus (like most hegemons) but failing this, it will still carry forward with whatever objective it was seeking (such as the war in Iraq). In cases where consensus is reached, the power seems more likeable and less forceful. The balance of sometimes seeking consensus, while sometimes charging ahead regardless makes it more than a hegemon, but not a formal imperial power. Keeping all this in mind, Bush declared a war on an ideology, gave America the right to pre-empt danger, and stated its intentions to act unilaterally. It is appropriate, given the state of America in the Bush era to call it for what it was, an imperial power. What makes it most interesting, is perhaps the beliefs of Americans and the discourse of the American administrations past and present that insist that they are not an empire, nor are they interested in imperialism. The common thread throughout, is the reference to America’s duty, role, responsibility to protect the world from some sort of danger, or protect its peace. Interventions that can not make a direct link to threat, are justified in terms of humanitarianism which is in line with their national identity to ‘stand up for
what’s right’, or help those ‘backwards’ nations of the world that ‘do not know how to help themselves’. These ideas of exceptionalism and manifest destiny make it clearer to understand the self-proclaimed legitimacy behind the actions of the American administration.

The following sections will discuss defining American power based on the debate on hegemony versus empire, and how CGP can contribute to the debate about American imperialism.

3.4 Defining American Power: Hegemony versus Empire

A defense of the term informal imperialism as it is used in this research is necessary, and as such it must clearly be defended against the term hegemony before defining American imperialism in the following section. There are endless debates represented by existing literature on the question of whether America is in fact a hegemon or an imperial power. Michael Doyle in his book, Empires, discusses this difference in terminology. Doyle suggests that a hegemonic power controls much of the external, but little or none of the internal policy of other states (1986: 12). He argues that the control of only foreign policy is what characterizes a hegemonic power, and control of both foreign and domestic policy characterizes empire (Ibid: 40). Alternatively, Reich and Lebow argue that the definition that realists and liberals use has never really existed in practice. They claim that these schools frame hegemony as a question of power in the sense that material capabilities constitute power, and power therefore confers influence (2014: 5). They also argue that effective influence relies on persuasion – the act of convincing other that it is too in their interest to do what you want (Ibid: 6). However, what we have seen with America is that when the path of influence and persuasion do not work, they turn to force and coercion. Therefore, by either account, the United States as a hegemon does not quite fit.

In contrast to this, Doyle defines the behaviour of empires to have effective control, formal or not, of a subordinate society (1986: 30), and therefore empires “determine who rules another society’s political life” (Ibid: 36). In the past, the United States had at several points in its history, militarily removed hostile governments in
place of ‘American-friendly’ ones. Although they have not annexed lands, expanded their territories, nor have had official ‘rules’ in place to determine the outcome of political life in other nations, the truth remains that America has still indirectly controlled several internal policies of other nations in the past. It also continues to do so today through military, economic, political and cultural avenues of power and influence. As Doyle argues, effective control of sovereignty does not necessarily require “a colonial governor with all the trapping of formal imperialism” (1986: 37). He describes informal empire in further detail:

If enough of the articulation of interests in a peripheral state can be influenced, the aggregation of coalitions will be controlled; and if aggregation is thoroughly shaped, sovereign decisions will be controlled. Influence over implementation of adjudication of communication is roughly equivalent to influence over the aggregation or articulation of interests, since the first form of influence controls which policies can be carried out. The result is informal imperial control (Doyle 1986: 37).

In fact, formal and informal imperialism can have the same outcome; only different forms of control. Therefore, Doyle’s definition of empire is a “relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society”, which can be achieved by force, political collaboration, cultural, economic or social dependence (1986: 45).

Other theorists such as Henry Kissinger and Heinrich Triepl use the terms synonymously, not emphasizing any categorical difference between them (Munkler 2007: 43). Munkler, on the other hand clearly differentiates between the two uses, arguing that hegemony is supremacy within a group of formally equal political players whereas imperality dissolves this equality and regards subordinate states as “client states” or “satellites” (2007: 6). More traditional theorists would argue that empires must go through rises and declines as well as spatial reach. However, as John Mearsheimer argues, in a multipolar system, all great powers are always “searching for opportunities” to acquire power over their competitors, and hegemony is their final goal (2001: 39). Empires are far less open to challenges from other powers unlike hegemons, as there is no ‘equal’ competition, and the imperial centre functions as a sort of umpire to ensure rivalry amongst other states does not lead to war (Munkler
Michael Mann also differentiates the two defining a hegemon as an imperial power playing by the rules, where a real imperial power abandons the rules and plays its own game (2003: 12). President Bush in his speeches, and in government policy has repeated that America will (and did) act unilaterally, and as was most evident in the invasion of Iraq, abandon the ‘rules’, making it an imperial power. What’s also interesting is that a part of what makes their imperialism informal is the Americans’ refusal to accept their power as imperial to being with. Instead they invoke long standing ideological notions of manifest destiny and exceptionalism, which exempt them from being ‘imperial’, but instead present American actions as benign. Hence, their image is one who only acts in the interests of others to protect them from themselves, or its duty to protect the world from danger and keep the peace. McCrisken’s argument earlier that Americans themselves believe they are incapable of domination purely in self interest, serves as a reminder of the ongoing importance of these ideologies in self-identity as a nation, and in foreign policy in real terms.

As the existing literature demonstrates, the basis of the debate is whether to label America as a hegemon or an imperial power; and within the debate of empire/imperialism, whether their power can be defined as formal or informal imperialism. Based on policies and the behaviour of the Bush administration, the most suitable way to classify American power is as an informal empire. One of the prominent reasons that imperialism would be a better suited term, is that a hegemon requires some sort of consensus to rule. For example, a consensus was originally sought for the decision to go to war in Iraq as the UN was ‘consulted’, but as is known the war in Iraq went forth without UN backing. It was also heavily criticized by the international community. President Bush made it very clear that America will seek consent, however, failing that (and clearly indicated in the Bush Doctrine, and NSS) America will do as it sees fit should it not receive international support. The American administration basically gave itself a blank cheque to do whatever they wanted (or in their terms, whatever “necessary”) to protect American security and interests at home and abroad. The actions Bush took to invade Iraq is an example of an imperial power, following its own rules in fulfillment of its own interests. Therefore, it seems far more appropriate to categorize America as an imperial power, than merely a hegemon.
3.5 CGP and Imperialism

If we understand America as an imperial power, how terror is defined and handled, is of special importance in the context of imperial policy. For this reason, Dalby argues the continued use of critical geopolitics in challenging our understandings, and making explicit the hidden agendas, and geopolitical discourses that define terror, and enemy, danger, and fear, which ultimately justify or legitimate military action (Dalby 2008: 426). How can we explain American imperialism given the turn of events after 9/11? This is where CGP can make a contribution to the debate.

There are three main themes that can be extracted from CGP throughout this research. The first is the power of ideas, which refers to how discourses legitimate and reproduce structures of power, and the social construction of taken-for-granted beliefs. It also incorporates the importance of ideology in the justification and legitimacy of actions, which is central to critical geopolitical thinking. Critical geopolitics is therefore more than a tool for policy makers; its goal is to investigate how “geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations domination within contemporary global politics” (Dalby 1990: 15). The second major theme looks at identity and difference. Much of this is influenced by Edward Said’s work and the construction of the Other. Further, this accounts for how policies and identities are created and legitimated in relation to the Other. The last theme is the critical analysis of territory, and how space is given meaning. The meanings that fill space are socially constructed, and need to be recognized as such, as these meanings will legitimate policy decisions.

Dalby writes that, “formulating matters in terms of empire has the huge advantage of putting the precise geography of the United States into question” (Ibid: 429). He argues that following the standard international relations theories of classifying the United States as just ‘another great power’ is no longer enough as imperial policies and actions have developed. Ingram and Dodds suggest that geographical imaginations are essential to any critique of the GWOT and the understanding of security, and furthermore, to the construction of alternative imaginations (2009: 3). Geographical imaginations, in this meaning, are what Gregory
refers to as “the spatialized cultural and historical knowledge that characterizes social groups” (Gregory 1994), stemming from Edward Said’s imaginative geographies discussed in Chapter One. Michael Chertoff, the second Secretary of Homeland Security under George W. Bush had a vision to create a ‘world wide security envelope’ – a way to work with allies around the world to secure the entire globe (Ingram and Dodds 2009: 2). The goal is to treat those ‘inside the envelope’ with a high degree of trust and information necessary to make sure those seeking to harm America and its allies don’t slip through the cracks (Ibid). Ingram and Dodds rightly point out that such visions are founded upon “simplistic binaries”, but have profound geographical effects (Ibid). This type of language is essentially linked to the wider project of securing liberal globalization, and an imperial role for America in the world. As Ingram and Dodds argue, “this project is couched in terms of a simple imaginative geography, but it conceals a world of complexity” (Ibid). They suggest that rather than trying to reduce the complexity that is inherent in these discourses, we should instead recognize the geopolitical present as being constituted by multiple temporalities and spatialities that go beyond the state (Ibid: 3).

Sparke claims that the informality of American imperialism “has not only allowed for exaggerated academic arguments about hegemonic decline”, but it has also enabled the rhetoric of American exceptionalism and thus self-denial of an empire (2005: 246). Contrary to Bush’s claims that America was not seeking any sort of empire, because they do not seek to acquire new territory, America was in fact an imperial power (Sparke 2005: 246). As highlighted earlier, American power isn’t only about territory, or even acquiring new territory at all; nor is it only about economic power. To be the world’s only superpower requires several avenues of influence, alongside military power. This is why CGP discusses American power in terms of informal imperialism. As Sparke writes,

this mediated informal imperialism has effectively deterrirotialized and reterritorized the hyphen in the American nation-state, stretching American state authority in informal ways across national boundaries to create a hybrid and transnational hyphen-nation-state of market – as well as military mediated dominance (Ibid: 248).
Instead of trying to resolve these complex issues straight off the bat, Sparke says the goal of Critical Geopolitics (CGP) is to use the geographical challenges these issues present as tools with which to “unpack the complicity of the simplified geopolitical and geoeconomic visions” (2005: 28), which is precisely what this research seeks to accomplish. What is also important is that ‘America’, as a greater ideological category, is presented to us in a very specific way; sometimes over exaggerated, but also taken-for-granted. Whether or not America is on the decline, or these post 9/11 wars are ‘new’, misses the most important point. The point is that they are perceived to be new; America is perceived inherently and unquestionably to be the most powerful nation; they believe that they are the exception. Therefore, there are very real policies that reflect these perceptions – founded or not. What is important about 9/11 is that the people in power presented a specific vision of the aftermath to Americans and the world and these perceptions were used to legitimize real policies.

The presentation of the consequences after 9/11 led to what Debrix calls ‘tabloid imperialism’. Stemming from his original argument about tabloid realism and tabloid geopolitics, tabloid imperialism is the way in which dominant popular geopolitical narratives of revenge, offense, attack, and conquest were made mainstream (Debrix 2007: 938). Built upon the binaries of ‘out there’ and ‘over here’ that tabloid geopolitics promotes, tabloid imperialism has promoted Huntington’s Clash of the Civilizations thesis about ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and discourses emerged about how the United States had no choice but to attack back (Ibid: 937). Debrix argues that the discourse that emerged after 9/11, about fighting terrorism over there, before it comes over here quickly turned tabloid realism into tabloid imperialism (2007: 938).

This imperialism is fuelled by endless fears and an endless war; where war becomes the norm. Boal et al. argue that 9/11 has “marked the elevation into a state of permanent war- of a long and consistent pattern of military expansionism in the service

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3 Debrix defines tabloid geopolitics as: “The result of mediatized discursive formations that take advantage of contemporary fears, anxieties, and insecurities to produce certain political and cultural realities and meanings that are presented as common sensical popular truths about the present condition” (Debrix 2008: 5). This will be discussed at length in Chapter Five.
of empire” (2005: 80). This type of permanent war serves empire as the permanence of the war itself becomes normalized and becomes a natural part of the state’s political life (ibid). An important point Boal et al. make is that the constant threats keep the empire functioning and always looking for and leaning toward war, as it is needed to sustain it (Ibid: 102).

In a criticism of Huntington’s clash of the civilizations thesis, and Fukuyama’s arguments combined, Dodds argues that the major themes in their assessments are anti-geographical in that they ignore the complexities of the geography in international relations (2005: 6). What both authors do, and what Dodds criticizes, is a common criticism CGP makes when looking at ‘mainstream’ arguments which is that the division of the world into specific regions and zones underestimates the complexity of international relations, and leads precisely to the simplistic binaries that CGP seeks to debunk (Ibid). An example of this is when President Bush made his famous ‘axis of evil’ speech in which he “re-imagined global political space”, casting together three nations which previously had no common denominator to one another: North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and simply cast them as evil (Ibid: 4).

Edward Said has also criticized Huntington’s binaries and his Clash of Civilizations thesis as forcing the entire world into categories – “sealed off identities” – that are mostly detached from human history to create a simplistic explanation of international relations (Dodds 2005: 10). Barnett’s thesis poses a similar problem. He categorizes the world into the Core (capitalist, liberal governments, open markets) and the Gap (globalization thinning or absent, corrupt governments) (Barnett 2004). His simple binary is much like Huntington’s but its focus is on the development and acceptance (or lack of) of globalization in various nations. Debra also criticizes Barnett’s thesis by stating that it is essentially a grand strategy of hegemonic power, coupled with ideological control and permanent war for the US and it’s military (2007: 938). One of the tasks of critical geopolitics is to document the glorification and implicit normalization (taken-for-granted beliefs) of military force and institutions (Kuus 2010: 9).
In essence, CGP problematizes simple binaries. It is a problem based approach that seeks to question perceptions and taken-for-granted beliefs. It takes into account geopolitics in the sense of how space is given meaning, and seeks to unpack the mainstream notions of how the world is categorized. Where imperialism is concerned, it provides an avenue to fill the gap in international relations theory as it seeks to uncover how ideologies become naturalized. This approach asks how; how perceptions are created, maintained, and used for justification in policy decisions.

When considering how American imperialism has been thought of, and how the underlying principles of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism have influenced Critical Geopolitics, we are reminded that the root cause of CGP is to take apart taken for granted beliefs. At the core of American foreign policy and identity are the now taken for granted, and deeply embedded ideologies of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism as this chapter has explored. In fact, Blomley argues that American imperial actions are often ‘excused’ as it belongs to their manifest destiny. He argues that “foundational violences are frequently forgotten, or are rationalized according to some higher logic, such as manifest destiny”, which seems “commonplace” in American history (Blomely 2003: 6). This is precisely how discourses work, to normalize such ideologies to seem natural. The ‘duty’ of America to rid the world of evil (terrorism/terrorists) was a common discourse after the 2001 attacks. This continued as part of the legitimation into the invasion of Iraq. Part of the legitimacy being created was specifically through the discourses that surround America’s manifest destiny. This is exactly why words matter, why discourse matters, and above all why ideas matter. If the central claim of CGP is to dig deeper into the discourses and ideologies that inform foreign policy and help us understand the legitimacy behind empire, then the core ideologies of American identity and foreign policy inform the foundations of understanding American power. Hence, the importance of the core values of American foreign policy can be found in ideologies dating back as far as their founding.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss a critical geopolitics view on American imperialism, divided into its three main themes: the power of ideas, identity
and difference, and the critical analysis of territory. This will provide a clearer application of the CGP lens in discussing imperialism.

**Power of Ideas**

The power of ideas concerns how discourses can legitimate and reproduce structures of power, and how these social constructions have an effect on policy making. It addresses the ideologies that become naturalized, and turn into common sense, or taken-for-granted beliefs. Once these discourses are naturalized, they are used to legitimate imperial actions. Underlying these taken for granted beliefs are the ideas of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. As the first part of this chapter has proven, these ideas have significantly impacted American self-identity and foreign policy. These two underlying beliefs are arguable the foundations of much of American policy and identity, and hence strengthen the claim that the power of ideas are crucial in understanding American power.

The end of the Cold War and the 1990s saw America’s unrivalled power in the world. Cold War discourse may have lost its credibility as a consequence of 1989, but the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ and the military industrial complex behind them tried to create a ‘new’ set of enemies, as the Gulf crisis proved, in an attempt to re-structure a new world order once again (Agnew and Toal 1992: 202). Even after 1989, the first Bush administration continued to use Cold War discourses up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, which forced them to publicly recognize the threat form the Soviet Union had changed (Toal 1992: 440).

The first Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the changes after 1989 were shaped around the “unquestioned sense of Western superiority” (Toal 1992: 446). In his first foreign policy speech, Bush senior stated that with “prudence, realism and patience, we seek to promote the evolution of freedom” (Ibid: 443). The implications of this were that the world was still a dangerous place, and American hegemony is needed (Ibid: 447). Cold War reasoning worked because it was a means to persuade national security elites into an American conception of a world order (Ibid: 449). When this reasoning finally came to an end, there was an absence of a ‘scary’ enemy,
which is why 9/11 proved to be so effective. Toal notes that this foreign policy was a mix of geopolitics and ideology, as this goal could only be achieved through free markets, free trade, and American style modernization (Ibid: 447).

Most of the 9/11 discourses were around a liberal imperial view of America. This meant the need for America to interfere globally to maintain peace, fight wars to save populations from tyranny, eradicate terrorism, and for a variety of humanitarian rationales. These attitudes are derived from the long standing notion that America is a ‘City Upon a Hill’, and it’s special place in the world requires it to fulfill its role to better the world. Hence the notion for America’s ‘needed’ interference. There are imperial themes throughout many of the policy documents even before 9/11, but the difference is that after 2001, they were actually implemented. A central reason for this goes back to perception: the reasons for why 9/11 happened, how danger was perceived, and what the appropriate response to this was. The new danger of ‘global’ terror prompted serious changes in US foreign policy. The 9/11 commission concluded that if 9/11 has taught America anything, it is that “American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here’. In this same sense, the American homeland is the planet” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004: 362). This basically meant that the strategy for Homeland defence was that home and away were the same thing, which legitimated interference abroad. Elden argues that in terms of foreign policy, this meant that “America needs to secure and extend the zone of democratic peace and globalized markets and pursue strategies of integration and, where necessary, intervention” (2009: 20). The idea that far away lands should be treated the same as a threat on American soil legitimated military intervention abroad.

Lawrence Kaplan, member of PNAC, argues that America became an empire regardless of its intentions; that because of inevitable geopolitical rivalry and conflict, America needed to assume this role (Dalby 2007: 593). Again, this relates back to notions present since its founding that responsibility has been thrust upon America as the ‘chosen’ nation. There has always been a sense within America that has become naturalized, which is America’s role as global leader, world police, and defender of
liberty (depending on the situation). As mentioned above, this is what Theodore Roosevelt deemed international police power. However, with 9/11 scaring the American public into what Sparke calls “false geopolitical fears”, it was time once again for America to answer what it sees as its call of duty. The United States must protect its territory and sovereignty of course, however how it sees the territorial integrity of other nations is entirely contingent on what is deemed a ‘threat’ from other nations (Elden 2009: 25). These discourses create situations in which America must ‘protect’ itself, but really this provides the potential to invade any nation not compatible with American interests (or, in the context of a GWOT, categorized as a “threat”).

As Mamadouh and Dijkink argue, major changes in geopolitical contexts result in a reformulation of geopolitical visions, and “a re-articulation of geographical representations that is necessary to acknowledge and justify foreign policy changes” (2006: 357). This is precisely what happened. The Bush Doctrine marked a sharp turn in American foreign policy, making it official for the United States to basically do whatever it wants (unilateralism), with or without the UN, or any other international consensus. The language of the Bush Doctrine uses 9/11 to exploit their military supremacy and to shift the global balance further into their own advantage. According to Bush, the previous policies did not adequately address the geopolitics of this “new” world (post 9/11), and therefore, his administration put in place several policies that came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. In essence, it provided “an overarching conceptualization of how the world is organized, of what America’s role in that world is, and how American power is to be understood and used” (Dalby 2006: 34). After 9/11, it was elaborated to specifically address the new issues that America faced. The doctrine drew on “existing geopolitical thinking and focused on ‘war’ as the primary response to what was understood as new ‘global’ dangers” (Ibid). The perceived shift in danger and the declaration of a Global War on Terror, which was very ambiguous, became an attempt to legitimate military intervention for decades to come.

The ideas that are understood to be common sense, such as the United States as the global police, or America’s role, duty or need to lead the fight for liberty, stem
largely from the ongoing ideologies of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Hence, they are all socially constructed and attempt to legitimate imperialism as they present a specific world view that gives them ‘right’ to project their dominance on the global stage. Critical geopolitics can be useful to “deconstruct, unravel and expose discourses in order to lay bare the schemes of power operating beneath them” (Muller 2008: 324)

These discourses become naturalized in our everyday language of American foreign policy. They become overarching ideologies that we subscribe to and are therefore used to legitimate a specific vision. In this case, it is the underlying ideologies of manifest destiny and exceptionalism that create specific discourses such as America’s natural ‘role to lead’, based on ‘new dangers’ that are ‘global’, that justified a GWOT and a basis for global military intervention. Not only that, but domestic measures at home in the United States that are by any measure, controversial (such as the Patriot Act). As Muller argues, “individuals shape discourses, draw on them intentionally, and deploy them strategically to pursue certain ends” (Ibid: 325). This is the importance of the power of ideas, which the Bush administration used to its advantage to ideologically legitimate American imperialism, using 9/11 as its rationale.

Identity and Difference

Identity and difference is one of the main themes found in CGP, and key in its approach to understanding foreign policy. The importance of the Other is that it creates foundations on which political activities, and policies are acceptable or not, creating specific types of identities. How we understand our own identity, is in relation to an Other. Themes of American exceptionalism are particularly important here. As discussed at length earlier in the chapter, exceptionalism embodies the belief that Americans are different from everybody else. It began with an understanding that Americans were different from Europeans, but later spread to a more general belief that they are different from the rest of the world. Much of American identity is built upon the ideas that make them different to the Other from their founding, to their current principles, values and norms. Who the Other is has varied in the past, but nonetheless, there was always the high held belief that Americans were not only different, but better.
In this regard, Amy Kaplan’s work on imperialism is worth mentioning. In her book, Anarchy of Empire, Kaplan compares the foreign, outward expansion (gendered as male) with the domestic understanding of the United States (gendered as female). Kaplan also analyzes how imperialism constructs domestic life. Instead of viewing imperialism as an ‘outward’ expansion, from the domestic to the foreign or alien, she looks at how imperialism creates identities at home in America. In her words, “the idea of a nation as home…is inextricable from the political, economic, an cultural movements of empire, movements that both erect and unsettle the ever shifting boundaries between the domestic and the foreign, between “at home” and “abroad”” (Kaplan 2002: 1). Additionally, Kaplan also looks at other elements such as film and literature in forming American identity and understanding how imperialism was culturally reproduced. Hence, her work is an interesting look at the construction of difference and identity through cultural and gendered understandings of American imperialism. Kaplan also analyzes how domestic metaphors of national identity are intertwined with understandings of the ‘other’, and hence they mutually constitute one another in an imperial context (Kaplan 2002: 4) In this case, the Other can be a political entity – a state, a terrorist organization, or an abstract Other (‘evil’). Why did America need an Other to legitimize its actions against? Edward Said saw the concept of the Other as an ideological tool to sustain imperialism. His point that Orientalism is a way to control, manipulate, and understand the Other is of great importance in the context of the question of American imperialism and its legitimacy. By creating an Other, it helps to mobilize a population to create an ‘us’, and identify a ‘them’. The act of socially constructed common enemy provided a unification point and attempted legitimacy to Bush’s actions towards in his decisions post 9/11.

Examples of this can be found throughout American political history. The most obvious comparative example is the USSR. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union proved to be an effective Other for America to unite against. Dalby argues that,

The discourses of ‘sovietology’, ‘realism’, ‘geopolitics’, were mobilized to describe, explain and legitimate the doctrines of ‘containment’, ‘deterrence’, and the provision of ‘national security’ around the portrayal of the Soviet Union as a dangerous, antagonistic other (1990b: 175).
Justifying foreign policy against an external threat creates unity at home, and potentially legitimacy abroad. At this time, realism was dominant in international relations and focused on power and war-making capabilities (Ibid). This type of discourse limits the possibilities for critical political intervention “precisely by its definitions of community and anarchy”, argues Ashley, and by how it specifies the realm of power (Ibid: 172).

Post 9/11, the discourses have changed. The enemy is ‘unknown’, ‘dispersed’, ‘everywhere’. Discourses are important in understanding power dynamics. Simple categories of good and evil ignore critical views of how policy can be shaped by ideology (Ibid: 175).

Othering is especially useful when analyzing foreign policy. It investigates the geopolitical practices of security discourse, and the policies of containment militarism in terms of how security is constructed in spatial terms using classical geopolitical themes (Ibid: 172). It is in doing this that foreign policy is created, as it is literally a process of “making foreign” and creating ‘others’ to contrast the domestic ‘self’ against (Ibid). By creating an image of the ‘enemy’ that was a dangerous, unknown and a dispersed ‘evil’ that could strike at any time, propelled America full force into a Global War on Terror. Regardless of who the Other is, American history an foreign policy have proven to always use the Other to self identify what it means to be American. By creating these ideological binaries, legitimacy is created amongst Americans for their foreign policies. Hence, the notions of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism have been and continue to be important taken for granted beliefs in forming binaries that impact foreign policy decisions. This will become especially important in Chapter Four when justification for war in Iraq was pitched to the American public, where blatant examples of Othering can be seen. The final of the three themes, the critical analysis of territory, will focus on the meanings of space and how they are constructed and sustained through geopolitical discourse.

**Critical Analysis of Territory**

This section focuses on how space is created, recreated and rewritten by great powers, as outlined in Chapter Two. The quote from the 9/11 commission report,
“American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here’” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004: 362), gives a clear indication of how Bush intended to use 9/11 as an excuse to interfere anywhere he feels is a threat. If he categorized international space as part of the American ‘homeland’, then the ‘right’ to interfere is self-evident. In addition to this, the perception of any state, terrorist or not, that does not agree with US policies could be deemed a ‘rogue’, ‘enemy’, or ‘terrorist’ state, further legitimating military action. Such foreign policies have the underlying assumption of the missionary brands of American exceptionalism, that would argue that it is acceptable to intervene militarily for a good cause. The way that spaces are branded and categorized have a deep impact on foreign policy implementation. If this is coupled with beliefs of an ‘Empire of liberty’, American superiority (morally, and militarily), and notions of a special role in the world to execute these beliefs, the consequences can be significant.

Space is a geographical factor, and therefore violence within these spaces should also be looked at through a critical geopolitics understanding. Blomley’s criticism of liberals and their views in regards to violence and law is mainly that they see violence as something outside the law, and outside the state (2003: 121). In fact, much of the violence today is actually state violence – violence that is on some grounds ‘legal’ or legitimized by states themselves. Blomley points out that violence has a geography and is important, because as he says “space matters to violence”, and part of our understanding of war and violence would benefit greatly from more geographical analysis than is immediately in front of us. As it relates to the exception and the creation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binaries, Blomley asserts, “territorial imagery and constructions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are put to work to justify violence, whether of the state or of paramilitary organizations” (Ibid: 123). For example, prison is a geographical space. The prisons of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are prime examples of how violence is legitimized against “them” (the detainees) to protect “us” (citizens of America/the world). Blomley’s argument should be kept in the back of our minds, as a reminder of the geographical importance of violence and law, as we move forth in this analysis. His important argument is in regards to the relationship between law, violence and geography, as he argues, “an attention to violence is incomplete without a
critical geographic imaginary” (Ibid). He writes,

> Space gets produced, invoked, pulverized, marked, and differentiated through practical and discursive forms of legal violence. And property’s violence is itself instantiated and legitimized, yet also complicated and contradicted in and through such spaces (Ibid: 135).

The most evident example for this is Guantanamo Bay prison. Gregory’s makes some notable points about the perception of space, the meanings that fill it and how those legitimize violence. He first points to how Agamben actually refers to the state of exception as a space of exception, noting that little attention has been given to the analysis of it as a ‘space’ (Gregory 2006: 407). Gregory writes that “conceptions of space need not be limited to the container model… and I prefer to treat space as a performance, a doing, because only in this way do I think it possible to show how the passages between inside and outside, law and violence, are effected” (Ibid). Guantanamo, and the context in which prisoners were put there, as terrorists in a Global War on Terror, made it ‘okay’ to commit violent acts against ‘them’ because it was necessary to protect ‘us’ from their threat. It is also the ideology of the GWOT that gives the space of exception its existence, and its ‘legitimacy’ to exist. In a ‘new’ world perceived to be full of unknown, dispersed dangers, lurking in every corner of every city necessitates places like Guantanamo to exist, according to President Bush, as is draws boundaries between inside and outside, ‘containing’ the threat.

Sharp wrote that “strategies of power always require the use of space and, thus, the use of discourses to create particular spatial images, primarily of territory and boundaries in statecraft, is inseparable from the formation and use of power” (1993: 492). The way in which Bush defined certain spaces as dangerous (for example, Iraq), and certain spaces as legitimate for the use of violence (for example, Guantanamo), and others such as America as inherently good (for example, ‘land of freedom’) are important in how we understand the power of discourses in legitimacy. Ideas such as the ‘land of freedom’, and America’s ‘inherently good’ character are rooted in the self-identity of Americans as a special nation, built on unique moral, spiritual and political commitments. They are important here as a big part of the legitimacy to intervene elsewhere, or to declare a foreign land as dangerous, stems from the idea that America
is benign and pure; only using force out of necessity as a chosen nation to protect the world. The ability to change, to its favour, the meanings of space in itself is an imperial action. To deem a place ‘over there’ a threat, and to then legitimate use of force against it as it is the ‘same’ as ‘over here’ would imply changing boundaries and the meanings of these places in terms of foreign policy, legitimating imperial actions.

Conclusion

The perceived shift that constituted a change in geographical imaginations ushered in what George W. Bush wanted the international community to believe was a ‘new world’. The realization that borders can no longer protect America, and that the world was now dealing with an enemy who was dispersed, unknown, non-state, and potentially ‘everywhere’, meant that new policies needed to be implemented to respond to this new reality. The central question to this research seeks to understand how the Bush administration used 9/11 to legitimate American imperialism. This chapter has covered the ideological roots to American identity and foreign policy in its key conceptions of manifest destiny and exceptionalism, exploring the main debates in American history concerning imperialism. This chapter has also defined American power, and why imperialism, as a term, is justified in the context of American power. Also discussed, was the debate about the differences in hegemony and empire. Hegemons seek consensus, as does America, however when consensus is not reached, unilateral action will be taken, as made clear by Bush. As it was concluded at the end of the debate, Bush saw a version of American power that could pre-empt danger, declare preventive wars, act alone and if there was ever a question, 9/11 was used as a legitimizing point at every turn. On the basis of this debate, America is classified as an informal imperial power. Present throughout each section, and point in history, are the underlying ideologies of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Their significance is evident in understanding American self-identity, and American foreign policy legitimation. These ideas have formed the basis of much of the discourse that will be analyzed in coming chapters, and hence tracing their roots back to the founding of America through to the present provides a useful way of evidencing how ideas matter.
This chapter provides an analysis of the legitimacy of American imperialism by introducing it under the three main themes: the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory and the meaning given to space. This section outlines ways in which to understand how imperialism was legitimized post 9/11. The power of ideas is important as it draws attention to discourses as social constructions in naturalizing ideologies. These ideologies form the basis of the beliefs we take for granted that are used to legitimate policies. Edwards Said’s work and Othering proves to be important in discussing identity and difference in creating an enemy in which Bush used to justify policy against. How space is given meaning, and the example of Guantanamo Bay prison shed light on how territory needs to be critically analyzed, as the meaning of spaces were changed under Bush legitimizing the use of violence in ways that previously did not exist.

Coleman following Dijink argues that geopolitics is a narrative or story about political arrangements in the international space of the state system (Coleman 2004: 484), and therefore when one set of ideas – a new frame, or lens is re-evaluated (ex. After 9/11, security and terror were re-evaluated), then the ‘new’ frame or lens invalidates the one before it. This is precisely what this research seeks to analyze. Language is powerful, and the discourses that construct such views become naturalized and therefore legitimate policy. A part of critical analysis is to ask how this is the case. The perception of a new world, a new danger, and a new era – all seen through the prism of 9/11 – invalidated all the notions of security, danger and threat that came before it and naturalized the responses to this ‘new’ threat. The goal then, is to understand how this happened through discourse, and what the consequences of those changed perceptions are for policy decisions that ultimately led to a legitimacy of American imperialism during the Bush years. In fact, one of the goals of CGP is to “document the explicit glorification and implicit normalization of military force and military institutions throughout society” (Kuus 2010: 9). Through the prism of 9/11, Americans were being prepared to accept permanent war as a normal way of life. The narrative of the ‘expected’ permanence of conflict started to become naturalized in everyday discourse in America. The re-imaging of space that Dodds discusses, also
applies to America, as it was filled with colour coded terror charts and constant warnings of pending threats.

Armed with a CGP framework, a CDA methodology, and a critical understanding of imperialism, the next chapter will be the first of three chapters in the application of CDA through the lens of CGP to analyze the beginning of the foreign policy that would come to define the Bush regime after 9/11. The next chapter is the beginning of a narrative about the policies that were seen as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, but were in fact formulated a decade or so prior to 2001. Beginning with a history of Neoconservatism, and some detail on the influences behind the Bush administration’s foreign policy, the chapter will then use CDA to look at some of the major themes that were prominent after the 9/11 attacks as part of policy (unilateralism, America’s role to preserve the peace, pre-emption, military spending, and others).
Chapter Four
The Roots of American Imperial Ideology

4.1 Introduction

George W. Bush’s policies of unilateralism, pre-emption, and America’s ‘role’ or ‘job’ to protect world peace were made with no apology, and presented as a necessary consequence and reaction to the 9/11 attacks. However, these policies were foreshadowed by various documents in the 1990s, and influenced by the ideas of a few key people. These individuals had an aggressive, and expansionist agenda for US foreign policy. Formulated in the 1990s, their agenda became official policy when President George W. Bush took office, and more specifically after 9/11.

Critical geopolitics is about unpacking the assumptions that surround geopolitical discourse. It seeks to unwrap the mythologies of the state, asking how national identities are created. This chapter focuses much attention on the notion of America as protector of peace, sole superpower, and the taken for granted belief in everyday discourse that has become common sense—namely, that the US is necessary as a superpower and protector of global security. It is evident in the language used that these assertions are taken for granted, as will become clearer in the sections where critical discourse analysis is used. For example, statements such as ‘since world peace is due to American efforts,’ or ‘because the United States is the only superpower’ imply that these are presented as common sense.

The first of the three main themes of critical geopolitics adapted in this research is the power of ideas--for example, how discourses can legitimate actions or policies, the US as the ‘needed’ superpower in the world, and military strength as a necessity. This chapter looks at how issues are framed, and ideas are naturalized. The second theme, identity and difference will analyze the discourse to understand the implications of how national identity and the Other are created against one another. For example, much of the discourse implies that only the US can be trusted with such a great task as world peace, or leading the world with the strongest military, while ‘others’ cannot be trusted. Others are seen to be potential threats, dangerous, or not worthy of such a task.
The final theme of CGP focuses on the critical analysis of territory and how space is given meaning. Many explicit references are made in the discourse in regards to physically protecting American territory, but what is more interesting is what this implies for how the physical is used to protect the ideological. It is not only the threat of nuclear weapons causing physical damage, for example, but that the United States is spreading ‘freedom’ and protecting its ‘rights’ – which are non-territorial. Following the principles of CGP, this chapter seeks to question the ‘writing of truth’ in geopolitical discourse, and examines the social construction of geopolitical phenomena through the use of CDA methodology.

The first part of this chapter covers a brief history of neoconservatism, and focuses on its beliefs about foreign policy. It also takes a look at the difference between the common understanding of ‘neoconservatives’ and those who may be called American supremacists. It then discusses the influences behind President Bush’s foreign policies. Five main people are within this influential group: Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith. Following this, a critical discourse analysis will be presented on the ‘pre-existing conditions,’ i.e. the documents that came before the 9/11 attacks. These date back to the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, attention will be shifted to the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a right wing think tank, which combines neoconservatives and American supremacists that so influenced George W. Bush’s foreign policy. This group represents a merging of views within the right, which would serve as a blueprint to Bush’s foreign policy. A critical discourse analysis of its documents will be presented, which shows a continuity in the policy suggestions of the early 1990s. Finally, the beginnings of the Bush government, where these individuals come together as a collective influence will be briefly discussed before concluding.

This chapter represents a contribution to the overall research as it touches upon a few key important points. First, it will show that foreign policy after 9/11 was not a reaction to the attacks themselves, but rather, a continuation in foreign policy from the 1990s. Second, it contributes to the research in pinning down the main influences in Bush’s ideology and formation of foreign policy. This sheds light on the rise and
importance of the neoconservative foreign policy ideology. Chapters Four and Five will demonstrate these themes recurring after 9/11, except at that point they are presented through the ‘new prism of 9/11’ (discussed in Chapter Four). This chapter serves the important purpose of pinpointing the origins of these policies and the assertion that in fact what was seen after 9/11 was but a continuation, and that 9/11 marked a turning point only in that it served as a window of opportunity to implement the policies fully.

4.2 History of Neoconservatism

The following provides only a brief and short history of neoconservatism as to ground the influences and rise of neoconservatism in America and to provide a background for the underpinnings of some of the major ideas and influences behind George W. Bush’s foreign policy. The background to the development of neoconservatism as a legitimate movement is important for a number of reasons. First, because of its influence from the Reagan years onwards, and especially during the Bush presidency (2000-2008) in policy making, understanding its cause and origins becomes more important. Second, many use the term neoconservatism without really understanding what it means. Understanding the ideological roots of how it formed as a reaction to liberals is important in understanding the foundations of neoconservatives’ ideology and policies. Third, a world view once seen as extreme or controversial became legitimate, and those who professed this worldview made it into spots of influence in Washington— in government, policy making, and beyond. Understanding their development and rise to prominence is an important piece of the puzzle.

The roots of neoconservatism lie in the events of the 1960s and 1970s. The word itself came about originally to refer to those liberals who were troubled by the social movements in the 1960s and adopted more conservative view in response (Drew 2003). Two individuals stand out in the history of neoconservatism and the formation of a cohesive intellectual drive. Irving Kristol, dubbed the ‘godfather of Neoconservatism’ and Leo Strauss, who is credited with intellectually grounding the movement. Some of their views are said to have personally influenced prominent members of the Bush cabinet, like Paul Wolfowitz. Irving Kristol saw neoconservatism as ‘reformationist’. To him, it was an attempt to “reach beyond” contemporary liberalism, returning to the
original sources of a liberal vision and energy so as to “correct the warped version of liberalism that is today’s orthodoxy” (Drolet 2011: 5). Since the 1970s however, Leo Strauss was perhaps the most important thinker in developing neoconservatism as an intellectual movement. It is Strauss’s critique of the modern liberal democratic state that provided many neoconservatives with intellectual foundations for their struggle to reform political culture after the 1960s (Norton 2004: 10).

Leo Strauss’s contribution and importance to the development and rise of neoconservatism comes from his critique of modernity. It was the way he presented the crisis of modernity that became a central element in neoconservative thought (Ibid: 117). His ideas are based on the belief that the contradictions between the way of life and practices of society could be resolved in thought but not in practice. One of his core arguments is that by

consigning happiness and virtue to the private sphere, modern liberalism has rendered impossible the notion of a common to which the political community must aspire in these conditions, the purpose of the modern state is limited to guaranteeing human life while refraining from ‘imposing on its members happiness of any sort’ (Drolet 2011: 83).

As a reaction to the cultural revolution of the time, neoconservatism represented an opposition to the ‘left-wing’ intellectual movements of multiculturalism, post-colonialism, post-modernism and feminism in American academics (High 2009: 479). It was triggered by the collapse of the liberal consensus in the 1960s, in which a loose ideological faction formed (Ibid: 278). Neoconservative ideology can be identified by three main categories, according to Drolet, which are capitalism, nationalism and imperialism (2011: 16). The amalgamation of neoconservatism as a political ideology, along with its ‘reluctant realignment’ with the Republican Party during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a return to ideology and an increased involvement in foreign policy debates (Ibid: 39).

It is argued that the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was in part due to the efforts of neoconservatives. Following this, neoconservatives were in legitimate positions of power and no longer confined to magazines and newspaper columns; they
held important national roles in government (Drolet 2011: 51). Brandon High argues that “the neoconservatives could never have sustained political careers without developing a network of pressure groups and think-tanks. In this, neoconservatism was scarcely unique” (2009: 484). After the Cold War, neoconservatives had to regroup as their major enemy had been defeated. Irving Kristol (1996) wrote that

with the end of the Cold War, what we really need is an obvious ideological and threatening enemy, one worthy of our mettle, one that can unite us in opposition. Isn’t that what the most successful movie of the year, “Independence Day”, is telling us? Where are our aliens when we most need them?

Kristol’s quote sums up the neoconservative ideology: the search for enemies in order to legitimate military action and allow the United States to meddle in affairs outside its borders. William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) and Robert Kagan wrote one of many pieces in Foreign Affairs calling for the movement not only to focus on domestic policy, but to apply Reagan’s policies to foreign policy. They argue that the “remoralization of America at home ultimately required the remoralization of American foreign policy” (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 30). Jonathan Monten argues that neoconservatism is not new, or necessarily a deviation, but rather it is consistent with the history of nationalist ideology in the United States, which has its foundation in liberal exceptionalism and the capacity for American power to bring about democratic change in the international system (Monten 2005: 116).

**What does it mean to be a neoconservative doing foreign policy?**

Neoconservative foreign policy is generally guided by unilateral action to promote democracy, free markets, and the maintenance of US primacy on the international stage. It also promotes pre-emption, vigorous action (i.e. using force when necessary), to champion the interests and ideals of America. Above all, it is putting US security concerns first in foreign policy, and rejecting ‘negotiations’ with ‘rogue’, ‘terrorist’ or ‘communist’ states.

Max Boot, an outspoken neoconservative, member of PNAC, and regular contributor to the Weekly Standard writes that,
the ambitious NSS that the administration issued in September 2002 – with its call for U.S. primacy, the promotion of democracy, and vigorous action, pre-emptive if necessary, to stop terrorism and weapons proliferation – was a quintessentially neoconservative document (2004: 21).

These are the main components of neoconservative foreign policy, as seen in what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Boot openly writes on this matter and states plainly, what it means to make foreign policy as a neoconservative: using force when necessary to “champion” American ideals and interests, specifically for the spread of democracy which is seen to benefit the entire world, making it a less dangerous place (Boot 2004: 23). Through neoconservatism runs the common theme that the world is inherently dangerous, and that the United States can help (in fact is needed) to make it safe. This language is observed in the speeches of Bush and his cabinet, with heightened emphasis after 9/11. Another prominent theme, brought to attention by Boot, is regime change. Boot argues that although it may seem radical, in fact, it is the “best way” to prevent crisis and war (Ibid). Boot, like other neoconservatives, is against negotiating with governments of rogue, terrorist or hostile states, as it is believed that this will only bring about further crises (Ibid). In an earlier book, Boot wrote that in fact democracy promotion is of utmost importance, as it will bring about peace. He concludes that “though the reasons have changed over the years, the United States has always found itself being drawn into ‘the savage wars of peace’ (Boot 2002: xix). Muravchik has also been outspoken about the idea that (imposed) democracy promotion is America’s most effective foreign policy, and should therefore take centre stage in its policy. He proposes three reasons why this is of great importance, which are: empathy for fellow humans, the belief that the more democratic the world, the friendlier it will be to America, and finally, the hope that a more democratic world will be a more peaceful one (Muravchik 1991: 8). Regime change and democracy promotion are therefore vital to the neoconservative foreign policy agenda.

Finally, another major theme is the deep distrust and suspicion of the United Nations (UN), as Bush’s appointment of John Bolton as Ambassador has demonstrated. The UN naturally acts as a barrier to unilateralism, which neoconservatives promote. In fact, Irving Kristol argues that world government is a “terrible idea” leading the world to tyranny and further argues that international institutions lead to the “ultimate world
government…and should be regarded with the deepest suspicion” (Kristol 2003). In an interesting point relating to geopolitics and grand strategy, Kristol describes American interests and power as ideological, in the sense that its interests and goals are beyond material, beyond geographical boundaries. He argues that because of these ideological interests, inevitably the United States will be “obligated” to defend itself and its allies beyond its borders (Kristol 2003).

Ultimately, what this means for America on the global stage is a “benevolent global hegemony”, write Kagan and the younger Kristol in 1996, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1996: 20). A neoconservative making foreign policy therefore looks like an attempt to bring about global domination. America has been the sole hegemon since the end of the Cold War and therefore should exert its leadership and influence over “all others in its domain”, as neoconservatives would have it (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 20). They believe that the principles that make up the Declaration of Independence are “not merely the choices of a particular culture, but are universal, enduring, ‘self-evident’ truths” (Ibid: 31). If they are taken as fundamental values of neoconservatism, which by their own words they are, then they clearly set out an agenda for what neoconservative foreign policy would look like, seeking to shape the world in America’s image. It is after the Cold War in the 1990s that neoconservatism in its current form really took off. However, it is important to note that those in Bush’s inner circle who are said to be most influential represent a mix of ‘neoconservatives’ and American supremacists. The differentiation between them is important, and will be addressed in the following section.

**Neoconservatives & American supremacists**

It is important to differentiate between what is commonly referred to as ‘neoconservative’ and those in Bush’s cabinet who were influential, and can be said to be ‘American supremacists’. Neoconservatives view themselves as the protectors of a ‘liberalism betrayed’ by the events of the 1960s (Drolet 2011: 5). It emerges from the belief that liberalism as an ideology is unable to address the contradictions of the social world and often they see it as the sources of these contradictions (Drolet 2011: 8).
In the international arena neoconservatives are often nationalistic and believe in the cultivation and maintenance of a homogenous national identity, which has its basis in subordinating minority cultures to the white Anglo-Saxon worldview (Drolet 2011: 16). They believe in the maintaining and deepening of America’s economic, political, cultural, and, importantly, military global supremacy (Ibid). In this category we can find the ideologies of Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Zalmay Khalilzad.

The second category of influential people in Bush’s cabinet can be called ‘supremacists’, ‘hegemonists’, or ‘imperialists’. Often lumped together with neoconservatives, American supremacists have a slightly different agenda, and much of their focus of America’s primacy is especially in regards to the use of force. There is a wide consensus that the neoconservatives took over the White House with the beginning of the Bush Presidency in 2001. However, as Daalder and Lindsay note, this is in fact wrong on two accounts. First, it misrepresents the different intellectual streams within the Bush administration, and also running through the Republican Party (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 14). According to their account, neoconservatives, whom they dub “democratic imperialists”, were more prominent outside the administration than within it. They were commonly seen on Fox News, and writing for the Weekly Standard (Ibid). The most important of Bush’s advisors, namely Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld are not neoconservatives, and they argue, neither is Bush. They are what can be classified as “American supremacists”— assertive nationalists that are interested in using American military power to neutralise threats and ensure military supremacy and control (Ibid: 15). However, these two groups share in common the idea that America had failed its primacy to advance its interests, especially under the Clinton administration. The neoconservatives are more concerned with remaking the world in America’s image, the American supremacists in projecting military force to ensure dominance. Therefore, their mutual goal is uniting militarily, economically, or otherwise to ensure America’s primacy is cemented.

It is worth noting that Colin Powell, who was often sidelined, and Condoleezza Rice are generally lumped in with this group. They were realists who, although consulted by Bush on foreign policy, were not driving influences in his administration.
It was mainly Cheney and Rumsfeld who then installed Wolfowitz and Feith to the number two and three spots in the Department of Defence. This group together constituted the major influences behind President Bush’s foreign policy. These two ‘strains’ – American supremacists and neoconservatives - came together in an influential think tank called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), which will be the focus of the later part of this chapter.

4.3 Influences behind President Bush’s foreign policy

Of the many influential individuals linked to the drivers behind Bush’s policies, five are at the forefront as influential ‘neoconservatives’ or ‘American supremacists’ in Bush’s foreign policies. They are Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Douglas Feith. The ideas and implementation of policies that came about after 9/11 as a ‘reaction’ to the attacks can be traced back to some of the central ideas of these key people, hence their importance. Their writings prior to September 11, 2001 exemplify this. Behind every president is a group of influential people who advise the head of state on foreign and domestic policy, speech writing, legal implications, and so forth. This President in particular chose a group of people that constituted a very specific world view, one that began in the early 90s, if not slightly before in some cases. The ideas that came forward after 9/11 as a reaction to the attacks were in fact loosely formulated over a decade beforehand. Additionally, as will become clearer in this section, these individuals also have a long history with one another, working together on various projects both inside and outside of government positions, think tanks, and academic posts. Their personal history on foreign policy, as well as their history together during collaboration, proves to be an insightful education on the foundations and beginnings of what essentially formulated President Bush’s foreign policies, war plans, and discourse during his presidency.

This section of the chapter will introduce each individual and through a critical discourse analysis of the materials written by them prior to 9/11, it will become evident that the policies of the Bush administration after the attacks were influenced in large part by the above mentioned individuals who actually advocated similar if not identical
policies during the 1990s. This also demonstrates that the policies were not a *reaction* to the events, but were formulated prior to the Global War on Terror.

**Richard Cheney**

Richard Cheney was arguably the most influential, and most powerful Vice President in American history. Montgomery wrote that “in the annals of the Vice Presidency…no President prior to George W. Bush was willing to give his vice president such enormous power. Few, if any, may be willing to do so again” (Montgomery 2009: xi). However, his views were formed far before his time as Vice President under Bush. Cheney is what could be classified as an American supremacist. His views do not necessarily represent mainstream neoconservatism. He himself said in his memoir, in reference to a conversation with George W. Bush and himself when he was being considered as his running mate:

> I told the governor he needed to understand how deeply conservative I was…I mean really conservative. I had a reputation of being somewhat moderate, partly, I think, because I wasn’t a ‘bomb thrower’ like some of my conservative colleagues, and partly because I got along with people all across the political spectrum. I needed to make sure the governor understood that my voting record was certainly not moderate (Cheney 2011: 264).

Cheney’s political career began in the late sixties when he was an intern under the Nixon administration. Later, under Rumsfeld he worked in congressional relations in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and once again as his assistant in the White House in the early 1970s. They met again when he worked with Rumsfeld in the transition period after the Watergate scandal, and also as his Chief of Staff under the Ford administration. Cheney has a long standing history with Donald Rumsfeld, in which as Bush’s Vice President, he chose Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence.

During the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States, Cheney’s direction represented the Pentagon’s increasing willingness to use military force unilaterally (Montgomery 2009: 81). Cheney’s inclination towards large military missions became evident through the Panamanian invasion, and it is in fact Panama that established the “emotional predicate” that allowed the United States to gather support for Operation
Desert Storm a year later (Ibid: 84). Cheney’s advocacy of American military force and unilateralism again became apparent in 1991, when he advised that Congress be bypassed altogether in order to use force against Saddam Hussein. Bush senior did in fact turn to Congress, but Cheney was not pleased. Montgomery argues that if Cheney had been President, unrestrained unilateralism might have “ruled the day”, which we can see later as he was a major influence over George W. Bush (Ibid: 99).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cheney who was then Secretary of Defence, spearheaded a way to think about American foreign policy at the grand strategic level alongside “bigger-thinking, tougher-minded” ‘neoconservatives’ which included Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby and Eric Edelman (Lemann 2002: 42). In the 1990s, his involvement in the published papers for Defence Planning Guidance, and defence policies of the 1990s would make these views evident. It was in these documents that Cheney’s clear support for high military spending, unilateral policy, and American supremacy became clear. Additionally, the 1992, and 1993 documents promoted American pre-eminence and pre-emptive strikes. It also promoted the idea that no rival to America should be allowed or encouraged to emerge, ensuring US dominance of the international system. Specific examples to the documents bearing Cheney’s ideas will be detailed in following sections.

Richard Cheney’s history provides us with a few important facts about his ideological roots. He is a self-proclaimed very conservative person, first and foremost. His actions, voting record, and personal admissions have outlined that he has always had a willingness to use military force, and an inclination toward large military missions. Not only that, but he is a supporter of unilateral policies, and high military spending to achieve them. Understanding his history gives insight to his thought about foreign policy, which will be important when critical discourse analysis reveals his vision for American grand strategy. His views on a clear grand strategy continued to form into the 1990s, but became overt under the Bush presidency, which will be the focus of the following section on the major influences after 9/11 in Bush’s foreign policy moving forward.
**Donald Rumsfeld**

Cheney and Rumsfeld together were very influential in the President’s foreign policies. As indicated previously, they have a long history of working together in government. Rumsfeld began his career in politics early. In the 1960s he was a Congressman from Illinois, and later that decade was director of the OEO. Later, Nixon had appointed Rumsfeld as Counselor to the President where he had more exposure to top aides in the White House (Rumsfeld 2011: 130). He was representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early seventies before becoming the Chief of Staff under President Ford. In 1975 Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defence. He was only at this post a few months when he introduced a plan for a surge in defence spending and warned that the Soviet Union would be a military threat (Graham 2009: 131). His 1976 budget requested an 8.9 billion dollar increase in defence spending. He justified this by warning that military trends were against the US unless it increased investment in the defence establishment and dedicated resources to developing new strategic weapons (Ibid). Without this, he warned, there would be a military imbalance and the US would be at a disadvantage. He eventually gained the approval of Congress for the increase in defence spending.

Rumsfeld’s views on grand strategy were apparent in his early days in government. By the time of the Vietnam War, he was already an outspoken conservative and had little tolerance for views that promoted scaling back US involvement and reducing military posture (Ibid: 132). In his memoir he commented on this, saying that “I was willing to support a more robust military campaigning in Vietnam” (Rumsfeld 2011: 70). During the 1990s, he stayed in the political scene, even if not in a government role. He was a part of an advisory group of Republican congressional leaders on security issues. Rumsfeld had little confidence in the United Nations, which gave insight to his unilateral tendencies. He also signed the 1998 letter to Clinton by PNAC (discussed below), and although he was grouped into the mainstream as a ‘neoconservative’, his views advocated a far more imperial outlook.

Herspring argues that “not since Robert McNamara in the 1960s has a secretary of defence been so hated by the military, nor has any secretary since McNamara played such a critical role in the formulation of national security policy” (2008: xv). He also
maintains that Rumsfeld was the only senior civilian decision maker who played such a central role not only in the transformation of the military, but also in the invasion of Iraq (Ibid).

Rumsfeld’s personal history reveals a few noteworthy points. First, he had positions in several administrations including the Nixon and Ford administrations. Early in his career as Secretary of Defense in 1978 he already pitched a case for increased military spending. At that time he was already concerned with the ‘disadvantages’ the lack of military spending could cause (a point later echoed aggressively by PNAC). During the Vietnam War, not only did he not support scaling back, but in fact he was eager for more robust measures, signifying his commitment to an aggressive military presence. Additionally, like many neoconservatives and American supremacists especially, he made his distrust for the United Nations known. It was his long relationship with Richard Cheney that proved to be powerful and influential during the Bush years. It was especially after 9/11 that he became a popular figure in the media, and his influence became clearer.

**Paul Wolfowitz**

Paul Wolfowitz, like many in the Bush administration, has a long history of involvement in American politics both in and outside the White House. The influences of Wolfowitz’s ideology can be traced back to three major influences in his life. His father, his undergraduate years at Cornell and his relationship with Albert Wohlstetter. He grew up with the events of the Holocaust, as narrated by his father, having a big impact on his life (Solomon 2007: 9). In short, he came to the conclusion, through his father’s influence, that America has a moral responsibility in the world to rid the world of peril (Ibid: 10). At Cornell University, during his undergraduate degree, he met one of his personal influences Allan Bloom, a well-known and respected academic and neoconservative (Ibid: 11). Third, his relationship with Albert Wohlstetter, a senior policy analyst at RAND and academic at the University of Chicago. His work focused on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which inspired Wolfowitz’s own PhD research (Ibid: 14).
In the late 1960s, Wolfowitz was recruited by Wohlstetter to conduct research for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defence Policy. Together with PhD student Richard Perle (who would later become chairman of the Defence Policy Board under George W. Bush), they produced a series of papers promoting funding for missile defence, which was authorized by the senate (Immerman 2010: 201). Following this he worked for the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, but it was during Reagan’s time that his views of global supremacy began to develop in full (Ibid: 206). His personal draft of the DPG in 1992 (which will follow in the next section) was dubbed the ‘Wolfowitz Doctrine’ (Ibid: 217), and proved to be a controversial document arguing for American supremacy and imperialism.

In the 1980s, Wolfowitz was a strong proponent of the notion that the United States should act more unilaterally. He believed that America did not need to reach ‘an accommodation’ with any other world power (Solomon 2007: 45). He also had a long standing obsession with the danger of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Iraq, which will be highlighted in the next part of this chapter. As is evident in his history, Wolfowitz was a supporter of unilateralism, using military power to ensure America’s place at the top of the international system as hegemon and his particular interest in the Middle East and Iraq. After 9/11, he became a household name to those who were unfamiliar with him before. He was a key influential member in the lead up to the Iraq War. In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks, along with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz immediately suggested that Bush should invade Iraq (Dorrien 2004: 3). He believed that Hussein was behind the attacks themselves. Upon their advice, Bush asked that links between Saddam Hussein, Iraq and 9/11 be extensively explored. Wolfowitz strongly believed that the use of force should not and can not be approached in an “experimental way”, meaning that the US should be able to quickly decide to use force wherever it deems it to be needed (Ibid: 65). This would ensure that America remains at the top of the international pyramid. As it turned out, the war in Iraq did not result in the finding of hundreds of weapons of mass destruction, but to Wolfowitz that wasn’t important. As he summed up:

The purpose of the war was to remove a threat to national and international security. Whether the Iraq War was right or wrong, it was not about
imposing democracy, and the decision to establish a representative government afterward was the most realistic option, compared with the alternatives of installing another dictator or prolonging the US occupation (Drolet 2011: 158).

Wolfowitz was a staunch believer in assertive nationalism and “the number one theoretician of the administration’s ‘neoconservative phalanx’ (Immerman 2010: 223). His views were instrumental in the development of Bush’s conceptual framework in regards to global goals, and were said to be in sync completely with the President’s agenda (Ibid). James Mann referred to him as the most influential underling in Washington (Ibid). As such, 9/11 was a self-fulfilling prophecy for Wolfowitz that confirmed his worldview that was present from his early childhood (Ibid: 224).

Like the others, Wolfowitz has a long history in US government and politics. Working with Ford, Carter and Reagan, his ideological views formed long ago. His central role in the drafting of the DPG is of great importance, and the document itself will be analyzed later in this chapter. Also like the others, he let it be known he was not a huge proponent of the UN, and believed in American unilateral action. His long standing fixation with Saddam Hussein and Iraq also proved to be central to the 2003 invasion under the George W. Bush administration. Wolfowitz, perhaps not seen in the media as much as Cheney and Rumsfeld, was a hugely influential voice in policy making and his presence and ideological views were definitely felt during President Bush’s presidency.

Zalmay Khalilzad

Zalmay Khalilzad was originally born in Afghanistan, but carried out much of his education in Lebanon, and completed his PhD in Chicago. Like Wolfowitz, he was largely influenced by Albert Wohlstetter. Khalilzad has been influential throughout his career, and his posts have varied from being an academic, to working for think tank RAND, to serving under several Republican administrations, most influentially under George W. Bush. Under Bush, he was first the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, then to Iraq, and finally to the United Nations. Under the first Bush administration in the 1990s, Khalilzad was Deputy Undersecretary of Policy Planning. Under the Reagan administration, he advised on the Iran-Iraq War, as well as the Soviet war in
Afghanistan. During the 1990s, he was part of an active group of neoconservatives who wrote about American global leadership.

As part of RAND in 1995, Khalilzad prepared a report for the United States’ Air Force called *From Containment to Global Leadership? America and the World After the Cold War*. In it, he clearly outlines his stance on American power. The document outlines three potential routes that the United States could take, which he labels as neoisolationism, multipolarity and US global leadership. He suggests that if the first option is adopted, the US pre-eminence would be abandoned and focus would be on domestic problems. He argues that this would likely increase “major conflicts” and in the long run would result in large defence efforts, undermining US prosperity (Khalilzad 1995: viii). The second option presented is returning to pre World War Two multipolarity which would rely on a balance of power among several nations to dissuade the rise of a super power. In this option he projects “severe risks” which would result in the decline of US influence, negative economic consequences and competition from other powers (Ibid). The third and final option, which he sets up as being the best and obvious solution, is US global leadership and primacy. In this option he presents the world to be a safer place under US leadership, where liberal democracy and the rule of law would flourish. This is one of many pieces he would write on what role he sees for America on the global stage.

Perhaps one of the least known influential figures to the public, Khalilzad made a name for himself early in his career. Not seen in the media spotlight often, he has a long history in government policy making. His views about the way American grand strategy implemented by George W. Bush were seen early on in the 1990s, when he wrote as part of a think tank under the Clinton presidency, which did not support his views. He warned of the dangers if America did not step forward, and most overt were his strong views of US global leadership. Again, these formed the foundations of policies implemented after 9/11, but Khalilzad like Wolfowitz had a hand in drafting early version of the DPG, perhaps the most telling document of American grand strategy before 2001. His ideas proved to be influential under the Bush administration,
as many of the key policy ideas drafted but not implemented under Clinton, were realized under Bush.

**Douglas Feith**

Douglas Feith was a protégé of Richard Perle under the Reagan administration, and who is a well-known and outspoken neoconservative who served on Bush’s administration’s Defense Policy Board. Feith’s role in the Bush administration was to work under Rumsfeld forming defense planning guidance, from 2001 to 2005. Said to be one of the few that Rumsfeld trusted, he was loyal to him and often faced intense criticism (Woodward 2006: 208). His role in the government was to ensure that the policies advocated by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were implemented (Herspring 2008: 10).

Feith has a law degree, but focused on national security issues and the Middle East (Ibid). He worked on the National Security Council before moving to the Pentagon where he remained until 1986 (Ibid). He was also a part of the group that signed an open letter to Clinton in 1999 calling the removal of Saddam Hussein. In his book, War and Decision, he defended the President’s decision to use the term ‘War on Terror’. He argues that the United States could not label a single set of terrorist organizations, nor the states that were involved with them which would result in declaring war against multiple nations (Feith 2008: 8). He also pointed out that in fact some of these nations are those who the United States would consider friends, and this would complicate matters. Therefore, a ‘better’ way to define the enemy, according to his own account, was to leave the definition vague and flexible to include a variety of categories of the enemy. He writes, “we needed a better way to define the enemy, one that would cover all the relevant bases but preserve our flexibility regarding how, when, and against whom we should act” (Ibid). What he is essentially advocating here, echoing what was heard from members across the administration: anyone/nation/group could be considered a terrorist; any place is a potential danger or threat, and America can act at any time it feels its security is threatened to eradicate this threat.

Feith’s views on American foreign policy were typically neoconservative. He referred to the ABM treaty as an ancient text (Feith 2003:1), and although he was upset with the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, he was a strong proponent of pre-
emptive strikes. He actually wanted the Pentagon to have control of post-war Iraq, and was unhappy with the handling of post-war Iraq and Afghanistan by the State Department (Woodward 2006: 108). Feith thought, like many others in the Bush administration, that an ideology can be defeated, and militarily so by declaring it a ‘war’. He said ‘we know’ ideologies can be defeated, like Soviet Communism and Nazism, radical Islamism can be discredited by failure (Feith 2003: 6). He did not take seriously the idea that interference would potentially give the ideological movement fuel. He claimed that Iraq and Afghanistan would welcome American troops as liberators because their people see “the potential for modernization, democratization, and liberalization of the economy, and they oppose and fear what they see” (Ibid). It was in fact American interference which they opposed.

Few know of Feith’s role in American foreign policy. Like Khalilzad, his place was not in the media spotlight, but in the background. His history of policy writing, and focus on the Middle East made him a trustworthy asset to Rumsfeld. Like some of the others, he adamantly supported removing Saddam Hussein from office, and joined in on the open letter to Clinton in 1999; years before 9/11 and the issue of Iraq publicly resurfaced. His telling quotes about defining the enemy in his own words, is insightful to the processes by which language was used to specifically construct the enemy in such a way that it was open-ended.

Each of these individuals came to play a significant role in the formation of Bush’s foreign policy; some behind the scenes, some like Rumsfeld and Cheney were in the centre of media attention. It is important to understand their ideological roots, as well as their historical interaction with one another and work in various government administrations. All this would suggest that this is not just any group of qualified individuals, but they were specifically chosen as they were representative of a world view that through the opportunity of 9/11, would usher in an era of imperial American policy. The following section looks at the materials written by these key players, and subjects them to a critical discourse analysis to unveil common themes of foreign policy initiatives in the 1990s, which would later be implemented after 9/11 during Bush’s presidency.
4.4 Pre-existing conditions: Critical Discourse Analysis

The 1990s marked a new type of neoconservative agenda. After the fall of the USSR, the United States remained the only ‘superpower’, which further legitimized their role as leader of the free world. This section will follow some of the main themes that will be highlighted in Chapter Six: unilateralism, ensuring there is no rival to the USA, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, pre-emption, and military spending and power. The views, documents, and policies below are mainly from the 1990s, up until just before the 9/11 attacks. The relevance of this section seeks to provide evidence that that the discourses in the aftermath of 9/11 were not promoting a reactionary agenda, but rather, that those discourses were part of a previous agenda. These ideas and the influence of this group put into context our understanding of the ‘pre-planned’ agenda that promoted American imperialism long before Bush was elected to office, and changed the course of foreign policy after 9/11. These materials are evidence of the gradual influence, and formation of a ‘neoconservative’ - supremacist agenda, that Bush would adopt as his own in his time in office.

Using CDA this section will focus on the ideological views of the most influential people to Bush’s foreign policy. There are six major themes that come up in the documents below. Many of them mirror the themes in Chapter Six and hence show that the original arguments for the policies that were seen as a reaction to the events of 9/11 actually existed more than a decade prior. It is also evident that these key players and authors of these documents were very influential as their ideas carry through as they take up posts in the Bush administration and the policies they advocated for in the 1990s were implemented.

Unilateralism

Unilateralism was one of the things that defined Bush’s term in office, and in fact, the Bush Doctrine. President Bush’s foreign policy took shape after 9/11 and focused on pre-emption, unilateralism and democratic regime change. However, long before the ‘need’ for pre-emption as a reaction to 9/11 was argued, in the early 90s, pre-emption was already mentioned in the first draft of the DPG for 1994-99 written largely by Wolfowitz and Khalilzad under Richard Cheney as Secretary of Defence. Three of
the most influential to Bush were responsible for the document that later Cheney took ownership of and published under his name in 1993. It was later revised and ‘toned down’. In the first draft, the authors wrote that

A confluence of friendly though potentially competing powers holds considerable promise for promoting collective action to regional or local aggression, as was the case in the recent Gulf War, but also requires that the United States be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response (Department of Defense 1991).

Nothing can really determine what is ‘necessary’ and would therefore determine an immediate response. The structure of the policy is vague, and it is also argumentative in that it presents an argument for unilateralism when collective action either fails, or there is not enough time to ‘consult’. As is now known, Bush backed out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ABM when he came to office, but long before then Rumsfeld also advocated that treaties such as the ABM muddle America’s power and it is best to retract from such treaties as he says here:

There just isn't a doubt in my mind. If we relieve ourselves of the restrictions of that [ABM] treaty so that we do not have to do contortions to do what is the quickest, cheapest, most effective way of doing this [providing missile defenses], and organize to do it in an effective way, that the United States will be able to do it (Rumsfeld 1999).

Here, Rumsfeld uses argumentation to advocate for a withdrawal, as the ABM treaty is seen as an obstacle. Instead, he argues that the alternative when America can deal with the problem alone, is the best way, i.e. cheaper, quicker and more effective, presenting his arguments as facts.

Douglas Feith in the summer of 2001, preceding the attacks, while Bush was already in office was involved in a hearing on the ABM Treaty and presented his view that the treaty is an obstacle to American interests. Emphasizing the fear of what could happen if left for too long – the danger, and the race against time – he suggested America make a quick exit:
We are in a race against time—and we are starting from behind. Thanks in no small part to the constraints of the antiquated ABM Treaty, we have wasted the better part of a decade. We cannot afford to waste another one (Feith 2001: 18).

Again, in an argumentative tone, he warns that time ‘cannot be wasted’ in such a situation. Again, with some fear mongering below, he accuses past governments of not taking the threats seriously, and further accuses them of putting the Treaty before American national security and interests:

For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously the challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have not adequately funded it, we have not believed in it, and we have given the ABM Treaty priority over it (Feith 2001: 17).

Further, he argues that:

The countries pursuing these capabilities are doing so because they believe they will enhance their power and influence; because they believe that if they can hold the American people at risk, they can prevent us from projecting force to stop acts of aggression, and deter us from defending our interests around the world (Feith 2001: 18).

He uses fear and the argument that other nations are enhancing their abilities with aims to put Americans at risk, and to further deter the United States from pursuing interests. He is presenting a case for the withdrawal, based on ‘facts’ as his argues for unilateral action and an exit from the treaty.

Most of the unilateral action is focused around the arguments against the ABM treaty. The language is always in that of an argumentative tone, using persuasion – warning of future problem that could arise if policies are not amended. Unilateralism is a policy of imperialism and therefore the links would seem evident. However, it is interesting that as imperialism can never be ‘advocated’ by a government, the language used to frame the issues is of utmost importance. It is a type of persuasive language that argues that there is no other choice; i.e. for the safety and prosperity of Americans, withdrawing from the ABM Treaty is the only reasonable option. This type of
persuasion is common to the discourses of these individuals, PNAC and the Bush administration, therefore suggesting a continuation of foreign policy objectives.

**Ensuring no rival to American Power**

Another key theme which will be explored in Chapter Six is the belief that there should be ‘no rival to American power’. With the confidence of winning the Cold War, the 1990s saw the beginning of an era for American dominance, with no real competition. An earlier version of the DPG, which was leaked to the New York Times before it was published, was featured in the paper and it caused much uproar. This was the first time the public was made aware of a grand strategy for global domination and American hegemony. Parts of it were therefore rewritten, softened and scaled back in the final publication. However, the original leaked document had already done the damage and made aware the true policy initiatives. It states that:

> There are other potential nations of coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defence posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor…we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge (Department of Defense 1992).

These threats are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the US and its allies….the US will be concerned with preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power (Department of Defense 1992).

In plain language, the above statements explicitly state that America should ensure that no global competitor should emerge. This is how the post-Cold War world was being framed. Framing, as mentioned, is especially important as it creates a foundational narrative whereby the rest of the ‘plot’ fits in. Additionally, it is vague as he states that ‘potential nations’ that ‘could, in the future’ develop means to globally dominate. It is vague, and very futuristic, avoiding any concrete statements about who or which nations, or what those means could be, and therefore, justifying preparedness for any situation.

The leaked version of the DPG also openly argues that the United States must retain access to the region’s oil (in the Middle east and Southwest Asia). Special attention is also given to the Arabian Peninsula:
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region’s oil. We also seek to...protect US nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways...it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian Peninsula. (Department of Defense 1992).

Again here it is plainly stated that no other power should come to dominate, ensuring that the United State is the sole hegemon. Also, there is some use of argumentation as the document states this is to ensure the protection of nationals, property, and the safeguarding of air and seaways.

In a copy that has been declassified, however remains heavily excised, it states that the United States should prevent any

> Hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia ((Department of Defense 1992a).

Not only is the rise of a global rival again explicitly discouraged, but the regions that are named nearly encompass the world in an attempt to leave it open and vague. Additional to this objective is the following, that the United States must

> Show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests (Department of Defense 1992a).

It is made clear that rivals ‘need not aspire’ to greater roles, and that the United States has a role to play as a leader in making sure this does not happen. This is a part of the framing over the overall objective of American grand strategy: that America’s is a necessary role, and that special role is to ensure that it is the sole leader of the world.

It is evident that principles of imperial policy are embedded into this document. This is also made evident by the outcry that the leaked document to the *New York Times*
caused and the shock the public felt when it was implied America seeks imperial powers.

One year later in 1993, Cheney who was then Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush Presidency, solidified this world view. In 1993, his Regional Defense Strategy called for America to shape the future of international relations, and preserve the peace. His strategy advocated for a special role for America in the world, under the assumption that it is their job to protect world peace. With the end of the Cold War and no global threat immediately in sigh, Cheney advocated that

it is the intent of the new Regional Defense strategy to enable the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains (Cheney 1993).

Here, he remains vague in addressing the ‘uncertain future’, but frames the issue around the new strategic depth the US has won (i.e. sole superpower). He advocates that it is indeed America’s strategy and goal to lead the world. Khalilzad was another key and influential player in the formation of Bush’s foreign policy, and as such, his writings from the 1990s also demonstrate his neoconservative objectives for American’s role in the world. In 1995, Khalilzad wrote a paper with RAND for Project Air Force entitled From Containment to Global Leadership? America and the World After the Cold War, suggesting similar key themes to the effect of ensuring that there is no challenger to the United States. Khalilzad makes overtly clear that force should be used if any hegemon attempts to take over critical regions:

[The United States must] prevent hegemony over critical regions: the United States should be willing to use force if necessary for this purpose (Khalilzad 1995: ix).

He also argues that the America should be prepared to defeat any potential challenger not allied with the United States, and this should be done by ensuring military pre-eminence. He states the goals are to:

Preserve US military pre-eminence: for the foreseeable future, this means having the capability for fighting two major regional contingencies nearly
...For the longer term, it should consider moving toward sizing its forces to be able to defeat the plausible military challenges to critical American interests that might be posed by the two next most powerful military forces in the world – which are not allied with the US (Khalilzad 1995: x).

This crosses over two major themes: one is ensuring that there is no rival power to America, and second, the argument for military spending. Because he warns of the dangers of emerging threats, by using argumentation he posits that America should have the military power and force to pursue these goals.

Two years later, in 1997, Khalilzad co-authored a piece for RAND called *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st century*. In it, he reiterates his previously held views that

> U.S. leadership will help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival and multipolarity, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all its dangers. (Khalilzad 1997: 14)

Here, implicit is that American leadership is the only way to avoid war(s). This presumes that the US should lead, that it’s leadership is necessary, and that its leadership maintains peace. It is full of assumptions and presumptions about American power. Overall, Khalilzad’s key opinion that unilateralism is best for the United States, as he sees dangers in the possibility of a multipolar international system. Not only does he advise the United States remain the sole superpower, but that other nations are clearly dissuaded from rising to challenge the US.

In the quote below, Rumsfeld reiterates America’s ‘unique’ role in the world to lead. He is framing the issue around America’s special role, requiring the nation to act as leader of the world.

> We have to deal with shifting ambiguities in ways that advance our own national interests while also meeting our unique leadership responsibilities in the world (Rumsfeld 1998: 12).

The general argument for ensuring that there is no rival power to America is a mixture of argumentative statements that it is because American leadership is needed
for peace and stability, as well as more implicit statements that suggest the world is better off with one superpower. The language is not only to preserve America’s status as hegemon, but to ensure that no potential competitor gets the idea to rise to superpower status. This is for a variety of reasons, though some are blunt. For example, the reference to ensuring America has access to oil, while others are more subtle and vague – ‘protecting American interests’, which could mean anything. All of this is being framed within the context of ‘the post Cold War era’ in which America is the only superpower, and unique provider of peace and security. Framing is a very important tool, because once the frame is in place, further narratives can fit easily into the larger frame of American power. It then becomes clearer to understand how the common sense beliefs such as ‘America the sole super power’ become naturalized, and accepted into everyday geopolitical discourse. It is clear then once examined, that the discourse leads to yet another aspect of imperialism: leader of the international system, and additionally, ensuring no other state aspires to such a role.

**America’s job to protect the peace**

The idea that it is America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace is familiar in political discourse. It is also framed within the larger responsibility of the USA as sole superpower. Once that frame is set up, it seems ‘natural’ that because the US has assumed this role, that they are now protectors of world peace.

In the 1990s, where the bulk of these imperial views come to light, Wolfowitz wrote a piece of *Foreign Affairs* in 1994 about Clinton’s first year in office. He concludes that,

> In the longer term, much greater threats could emerge if the United States fails to maintain the broad peace and stability that has been achieved in the great power centres of Europe and Asia (Wolfowitz 1994: 34).

> The world is still sufficiently dangerous that it requires leadership to maintain peace, leadership that only the United States can provide and from which the United States benefits along with most other nations (Wolfowitz 1994: 34).

In the above quotes, the world is framed as still being ‘sufficiently dangerous’, and warns of potential emerging dangers once more, which sets up the narrative that a
powerful player is needed to make it safe. The argument is also made that it will continue to be dangerous if the US isn’t involved in ensuring peace and security. Implicit is that it is America’s job therefore to maintain this peace, and second, it is argued that American leadership is welcome around the world, benefitting not only America but the rest of the world.

Not too long after, in 1997, Khalilzad co-authored another RAND piece with Ochmanek which was a Strategic Appraisal entitled Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st century. They conclude that

put simply, the United States is the world's preeminent military power and the chief "exporter" of security (Khalilzad and Ochmanek 1997 preface: iv). They maintain that for the foreseeable future, it will be America that will need to defeat the challenges posed by insecurity. It in therefore in their opinion that

even in the absence of a superpower adversary, much depends on the United States getting its defense strategy, planning, and resource allocation right (Khalilzad and Ochmanek 1997 preface: iv).

The above passages argue that the United States is once again required to provide and promote peace, and that they are the primary exporter of security, as the authors write. It is assumed that because the US is the sole superpower, it automatically puts them in the role of responsibility to world peace and security. This also implicitly promotes high military spending for defense, for the good of international safety, as much as its own. Again, they capitalize on the ‘unique’ position of the United States and its capacity and duty to lead:

Because of its unique capacity to lead, the United States has both the opportunity and the responsibility to work actively to foster an environment in which such values can spread. For these reasons, there can be no responsible alternative for the United States to an ambitious strategy of global leadership and engagement in the affairs of these regions (Khalilzad and Ochmanek 1997: 3).
In the above passage specifically, the issue is clearly being framed around the unique role of America, and its responsibility. These two frames are among the most important in advocating for American global dominance. It is also argued that there can be no alternative, that this is the *only way* forward for America. In 1998, one year after the above publication, Rumsfeld stated that:

> As the sole world power, we have an opportunity to contribute to peace and stability in our still dangerous and untidy world. But we can do so only if our diplomacy is backed by military capabilities appropriate to the next century (Rumsfeld 1998: 13).

Again, the issue is first being framed as America as the sole superpower of the world. The ‘opportunity’ for the US to protect that peace is once again made evident as part of the frame. Further, the continued reminder of a dangerous world is argued, and ultimately this argumentation style results in a promotion of defence spending.

America’s special and unique role, and even more so its ‘job’ to protect the peace is central to the frame for US global dominance. This theme will be seen reoccurring in later chapters in the discussions of discourse after 9/11, where it was spun as a reaction to the events. Frames are of special importance when taking into account taken for granted beliefs, which critical geopolitics strives to expose. The idea that it is ‘natural’ or that it’s a given that America’s role is to dominate and protect world peace, can be traced back to specific discourses and a set of ideas at specific times in American history. Of special importance is the end of the Cold War as it marked a moment in history where one nation remained as superpower. Despite the end of the Cold War, the argument is that the world is still dangerous, and the US is expected to protect the world from those dangers. A mix of framing and argumentation, the ‘dangers’ of the world afford an opportunity for the US to ‘protect’ all. This discourse is a taken for granted geopolitical discourse to this day; that the world ‘depends’ on the US, it is the Americans’ ‘role’. However, what is also interesting is that this fits in to America’s long history with benevolent hegemony. They argue time and time again, that they never asked for this role, but have no choice but to fulfill it. This is clear also by the references made above to ‘no responsible alternative’ – it is taken for granted that America provides the only solution. The United Nations in fact is
the world’s ‘peacekeeper’ but the United States does not emphasize their role as such, and argues for peace on its terms – an imperial outlook.

**Pre-emption**

Another prominent and important theme that will be discussed in Chapter Six will be discourses around pre-emption. After 9/11, pre-emption was seen as necessary, and as a direct reaction to the attacks of 2001. However, like many of the points discussed, this idea started to form in the 1990s, due to an effort from key influential people who would later become a part of Bush’s foreign policy team. Although there is not much dialogue about pre-emption, at it was evident form the leaked document that it was far too contentious and ‘extreme’ for its time, it is important to note a few key lines that existed in the early drafts of the DPG in 1991 which evidence that pre-emption was in the minds of neoconservatives.

The first real mention of pre-emption can be found in the official first draft of the Defence Planning Guidance in 1991. In it, it states that

The new strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces it requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary, to offset the challenge or a revitalized global threat (Department of Defense 1991).

The warnings of “future or emerging threats” and the need to “offset” these potential threats, are perhaps the beginnings of pre-emption. The language, however, is again vague. Any ‘emerging’ or ‘potential’ threat is a justification for preemptive action. Intentionally so, such wording allows a more open script towards dealing with future scenarios. The only other reference to pre-emption is again found in the 1991 draft and states the United States will

retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing those wrongs which threaten not only its own interests, but those of its allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations…In general the US role will be that of a leader and galvanizer of the world community (Department of Defense 1991).
Here, it is implied that the United States may possibly act first – pre-emptively – in ‘addressing wrongs’. It is also vague, because it is stated that this action can be directed toward not only America’s interests, but any ally or friend. Ultimately, the issue is framed once more with an overt message that the United States is the global hegemon: ‘leader and galvanizer’ of the world. More overt instances of pre-emption occur in the early 2000’s in PNAC documents, which will be analyzed in the following section.

**Military spending and power**

Another common theme that is central to neoconservative ideology is a sustained military presence around the world, which above all requires high defence spending. This argument appears several times throughout the 1990s especially when it was believed by the core of neoconservatives that the Clinton administration was not doing enough defence spending wise. Post Cold War, during a peaceful period, this was more difficult to rationalize, which is why post-9/11 the argument for defence spending was supported by many across party lines.

In 1992, when Cheney was Secretary of Defence, he presented his annual report to the President and Congress in which he wrote:

> Today, the United States faces a fundamental choice. We can make the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we have won – a much smaller investment than we made to secure it. Or we can fail to secure these advantages, and eventually the threats will not be remote, they will not be vague, and we will not have the alliances and the capabilities to deal with them. The cost of waiting until then to respond would likely be much more expensive, and the outcomes much riskier, than the cost of sustaining adequate military capabilities now (Cheney 1992: 2).

The above is a mixture of a warning and a responsibility. Cheney uses argumentation in presenting an ultimatum to the United States: that it can either invest and secure their ‘strategic depth’ (hegemony), or failing this, threats will develop and it will be too late. Scare tactics in an argumentative style will later become a hallmark of the George W. Bush presidency’s discourse. Cheney’s influence is made clear as his ideas of high military spending are promoted throughout his time as Secretary of Defence. He continues with this train of thought in the same document; an excerpt below:
It is important that we exploit our advantageous position and preserve capabilities needed to keep threats small. If we do not maintain sufficient military power, we are likely to find that a hostile power fills the vacuum and once again presents a regional challenge. This in turn will force the United States to accept higher levels of defence expenditures at a higher level of threat to our security and a higher risk of war (Cheney 1992: 2).

Once more, Cheney presents a scary ultimatum in an argumentative style. The choice is to keep spending high, maintain military power while maintaining their ‘advantageous position’ (hegemony), or risk a ‘hostile power’ competing or taking over American power and dominance. The term ‘hostile powers’ is vague as there is no direct threat at the time of this document, and claiming any hostile power could potentially develop leaves room for maneuver as the threat is undefined. Additionally, a separate argument is made that Cheney is actually trying to save the government money by investing now, before ‘things get out of hand’.

Wolfowitz, known for his aggressive neoconservative views, particularly in regards to military force wrote that:

The use of force cannot be approached in an experimental way, by dispatching military personnel to Haiti to withdraw them if they meet opposition; or embarking on a hunt for Aideed to abandon if it gets difficult. Nor can leadership be exercised simply by going and asking other countries for their views (Wolfowitz 1994: 34).

Here he alludes to unilateralism in his statement that ‘leadership cannot be exercised by asking other nations for their views’. Clearly, to him, this is not an option for America. Additionally, it shows weakness in the ability to lead. He also argues that the use of force should be a decisive action (‘not experimental) in reference to Clinton’s track record. He advocates that America should have a strong presence in the world. During the Clinton years is when the rise of neoconservatism really surged, mainly in retaliation to Clinton’s multilateral way of governing. In 1998, Rumsfeld gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation and spoke about the future of defence spending:

The U.S. spends only about 3 percent of gross national product on national defence, a level below even that of the pre World War II period. This is not enough to keep us ahead of other countries in exploiting the revolution in
military affairs, in seizing the growing opportunities and meeting the mounting requirements in information warfare, and in gathering the necessary intelligence in our modern world (Rumsfeld 1998: 13).

Using argumentation, Rumsfeld argues that the current amount spent on military defences are not enough to compete with other countries, and will not be enough for the United States to capitalize on opportunities. Implicit is the argument that this can pose a danger if America is not number one in defence spending as he mentions the ‘mounting requirements’ in various types of warfare. Also implicit, is that the United States should be number one when it comes to defence spending, not only that it should ‘keep up’ but that it should surpass other nations as he says that the current amounts will not keep America ahead of others.

A similar argument is seen in Douglas Feith’s views in 2001 when he was appointed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Before 9/11, but after Bush came to power, he presented at the hearing for the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. He said:

If we do not build defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will soon have—or may already have—the ability to strike U.S. and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. They will have the power to hold our people hostage to blackmail and terror. They may secure, in their estimation, the capability to prevent us from forming international coalitions to challenge their acts of aggression and force us into a truly isolationist posture. And they would not even have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and achieve their ends (Feith 2001: 18).

Similar to the fear mongering argumentation seen throughout much of neoconservative arguments, Feith’s assertion that not building defences and spending more money now, will lead to disaster later. Again, there is talk of ‘hostile powers’, which is vague and could be any nation or group. Even more vague is his claim that they could potentially use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. To cover all his bases, he asserts that a potential hostile power could then potentially use any sort of weapon to attack. The type of attack? Again very vague: blackmail, hostage-taking, terror. He also argues that a potential international coalition may compete with the United States. So again, the issue is being framed around the understanding that America should be the sole superpower. He continues:
This threat is not fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. And it is not going to disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears (Feith 2001: 23).

Technically, at that point, the threat was fictional, however he claims otherwise. He also argues that even if one ‘troublesome’ regime is to disappear, America is still not safe. This is important because implicit here is the argument that America can go after any regime that poses a threat, and because there are so many ‘hostile’ to America, it leaves the door open, as he emphasizes the threat is ‘not limited’. He also frames the issue around being ‘American’ and Americans uniting for a common cause. His lexical style that ‘we are all Americans’ (seen many times after 9/11) appears in the statement below:

This is not a partisan issue. We do not now know whether the President who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking Los Angeles, Detroit or New York with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat. But we do know that individual will be an American. And that is how we too must proceed—not as Republicans, or Democrats, but as Americans (Feith 2001: 23).

He argues ‘Americans’ should unite against the hostile enemy – the Other. In an argumentative style, he asserts this is not a partisan issue. He also emphasizes once more using over-lexicalization the weapons could be of a ‘nuclear, chemical, or biological’ nature. Given this, he is arguing for a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as it constrains Americans efforts to combat these hostilities, and argues for a more aggressive ‘exploration’ of technologies:

It requires more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready, and then adding new capabilities over time as they become mature (Feith 2001: 19).

The plea for a withdrawal and for increases in military spending are made in an argumentative style as to emphasize the benefits to America and the dangers if they continue on the same path.
Military spending and power are within the frame that America should be the world’s only superpower. Following this, the argument is that America must spend money on the military. The persuasive devices are all warnings of vague hostile or potential powers rising, or showing the world the US is weak. Most of the scenarios are based on ‘what if’s’, presenting spending as a necessity to fulfill their role. Persuasion and argumentation are ways at claims making, and help ‘prove’ a point, as the discourses is in the formulation of ‘facts’. However, most of these ‘facts’ are vague, and the potential and hostile dangers that have not yet formed, are hardly evidence. No imperial power can be a true influence without a strong (if not the strongest) military, and therefore, military supremacy goes hand in hand with imperialism.

The themes highlighted in this section by this specific group of influential people summarize the major themes which would come to define the Bush Doctrine. These measures were not implemented during Clinton’s administration in the 1990s. However, the ideas presented in the documents above were implemented under President Bush, and promoted through specific discourses that sought to introduce these measures to the public as a reaction to the events of 9/11, which will be analyzed in Chapter Six. Given the history of these influential people and the critical discourse analysis of their key writings in the period preceding 9/11, what can be concluded? It is apparent that all of these key players advocated implicitly or in some cases, more explicitly for American imperialism. Overtly, they all advocate American hegemony, but the fact that they all support unilateralism, and withdrawal from the AMB Treaty for example would make apparent that it is a step beyond hegemony, for global domination. Arguments for being the sole hegemon are complimented by stating that they should clearly be ‘ahead’ of other nations, even preventing them from surpassing the United States in any way or even coalescing together to provide any competition. Imperial undertones are evident in the framing of US power as ‘unique’, a ‘responsibility’, and a ‘duty’.

Perhaps what is most telling is the content of the various drafts of the DPG by Wolfowitz, Cheney and Khalilzad. These are among the most contentious and direct
documents advocating American primacy. Most telling perhaps is that the original language was changed after the document had been leaked to the *New York Times*, which tells us two key things. One is that for its time it was ‘too direct’, even too aggressive. The fact it raised so many eyebrows suggests it was something new – a departure in some ways from previous foreign policy, where it was evident that the influence and ‘rise’ of neoconservatism could be felt. Two, it says something about the ‘acceptance’ of these policies post 9/11 when they were in fact put into practice (to be discussed in chapter six). It makes clear then, that 9/11 acted as a crucial window of opportunity for this group of individuals to implement their policies, without as many raised eyebrows as 9/11 was enough justification for all.

What else is interesting, is that the language post-9/11 was more emotional, whereas the language of these documents are more in an argumentative style, using little to no metaphor and rhetorical devices. A more detailed comparison will be made after the post-9/11 materials are presented in Chapter Six. Another key finding is that the language remains vague. In the post-Cold War period, when the general world situation was peaceful, the threats and dangers remained very vague. Several references are made to potential ‘hostile’ enemies, or rogue states. Also vague are the weapons that may or may not be used: predictions of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons are made reference to several times.

Key is the language of warnings throughout these documents. *If* the United States does not do this, then *even* more dangerous thing *may* happen. Leaving it vague, fears about future and potential enemies, weapons and events are created. The benefit of vague language is an open script, while still being able to argue a dangerous scenario. This is especially true of the argument for increased military spending, and American military supremacy. The solution to all of these dangerous potential situations is an increase in military spending and to ensure that America remains the only hegemon. Mostly, this means a powerful military presence around the world. The grand strategy in the 1990s pointed toward an American imperial power, provided by the unique ‘moment’ that the Soviet Union fell, leaving America as sole superpower. The following section will explore what happened when these neoconservatives and
American supremacists came together in a think tank called the Project for the New American Century, consolidating their worldviews in a more assertive argument for American imperial power.

4.5 Merging of views: The Project for the New American Century & the Ideological Basis of Bush’s Foreign Policy

In the late 1990s, the neoconservatives and the American supremacists came together to join what is largely regarded as a right wing think tank called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), urging the United States to pursue a more aggressive and forward foreign policy. Of the above mentioned individuals, all but Feith were members of PNAC (Rumsfeld, Khalilzad, Wolfowitz and Cheney). It was founded by William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) and Robert Kagan, two very outspoken neoconservatives whose popular book *Present Dangers* echoed what the PNAC advocated. Many accounts of the ‘neoconservative’ influence on Bush’s foreign policy point fingers at PNAC, and thus, much of existing analysis takes PNAC as its starting point. However, before PNAC was formed, the members were already advocating for similar policies, as seen in the sections above. Hence, it is important to consider that 1997 is not in fact the beginning point, and therefore the analysis is more thorough when considering how the views of those involved came together in the formation of this group and how their ideological roots merged into this think tank.

Established in 1997, the themes that are most important to PNAC are pre-emption, America’s role as world peacekeeper, large increases in military spending, and ensuring that there is no possible rival to America, solidifying America as the most powerful nation on earth. The PNAC is concerned with America’s defenses and holds that the decrease in military spending would jeopardize America’s role as superpower in the world. Dalby writes that

This PNAC blueprint was an explicit attempt to provide continuity with the earlier Cheney defence department planning in the first Bush administration. As such it provides a loosely consistent set of priorities and a geopolitical framework for a grand strategy based on military supremacy against any potential state rivals to American power (2006: 39).
In other words, these documents suggest a blueprint for American imperialism in the 21st century. The organization was formed during the Clinton years. However, Clinton ran a very different administration and therefore the PNAC did not have much hope in him. However, the election of George W. Bush in 2000 opened up many possibilities. Many members of PNAC joined the Bush administration and became credible claim makers, who constructed news reports (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 624). Additionally, many of these people constructed the discourses that were popularized before the invasion of Iraq. At least seventeen members of PNAC held positions in the Bush Cabinet; some more public positions than others. Among the members who laid down the foundation for a new American empire (other than the above mentioned key players) were former and current (at the time) governmental officials, including Jeb Bush, Bush’s brother. Richard Armitage, another member of PNAC was named Deputy Secretary of State, and John Bolton was the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, and later became U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. This was a controversial choice to most people, as John Bolton is known for being a ‘far right neoconservative’ who is known for having contempt for the UN and international law in general, and his views would suggest he believes in American supremacy.

Slowly but surely, other members joined the Bush administration. Elliott Abrams, who ranks high up in PNAC was appointed to direct the Global Democracy campaign and also appointed to oversee Middle Eastern Policy from his “perch in the National Security Council” (Barry 2005). Abrams became one of the Bush administration’s highest profile officials, as he later acted as Bush’s envoy to Europe and Israel among other responsibilities (Ibid). Other well known officials include Richard Perle who became chairman of the board for the Defence policy Board Advisory Committee and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, whose career ended in scandal, was Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Cheney. Project directors William Kristol and Robert Kagan also have a long history of involvement in U.S. politics, and their influence on both Bush administrations has been significant. William Kristol, son of Irving Kristol, was chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the first Bush Administration. He is also a regular on Fox News, and is editor of the Weekly Standard.
Robert Kagan is co-founder of PNAC alongside William Kristol. He is a contributing editor to the *Weekly Standard*, a columnist for the *Washington Post* and has had plenty of involvement in the previous American administrations. From 1985-1988, Kagan was Deputy for Policy in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. From 1984-1985, he was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and principal speechwriter to Secretary of State George P. Schultz. In 1983, he served as foreign policy advisor to Congressman Jack Kemp and as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (https://web.archive.org/web/20050203005007/http://www.newamericancentury.org/robertkaganbio.htm).

PNAC was eventually ‘shut down’ in 2006, into the second term of the Bush presidency. The reason for this, as cited by former Executive Director of the think tank was that their mission was accomplished, “we felt at the time that there were flaws in American foreign policy, that it was neo-isolationist. We tried to resurrect a Reaganite policy. Our view has been adopted” (Reynolds 2006). Although PNAC is no longer, its influence and effects can be traced back to the members who comprised it. Their major document, released in 2000, was much more open than the official policy documents of the 1990s. Here, the imperial American dream is far more overt. The final section is a critical discourse analysis of the PNAC documents that can be understood as a merging of the neoconservatives and American supremacist views which make up the underpinnings of Bush foreign policy

There are four main principles outlined by PNAC, which are as follows: 1) defend the American homeland, 2) fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars, 3) perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions and 4) transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs” (Donnelly 2000: v). It is specified that the organization seeks to build upon a defence strategy outlined by the Cheney Defence Department towards the end of Bush Senior’s administration (Ibid: ii). These themes are then echoed by what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, and written into policy in documents like the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review in
2001 and 2002. The following is a critical discourse analysis on the documents by PNAC exemplifying imperial roots in foreign policy.

**Ensuring no rival to American Power**

The deterrence of any rival to American power was a theme seen in the documents in the preceding section. With the coming together of the two ‘strands’ of Bush’s influence in the Project for the New American Century, the themes continue, and at time become more overt. Importantly, the issue continued to be framed within the context of America as the sole superpower, and unique role to protect the peace and remain as global leader. Because some time had now passed since the end of the Cold War, the frames are mainly surrounding American military superiority and the role of America to be leader of the world.

In a book called *Present Dangers* published by two leading member of PNAC, listed under the PNAC publications list, they openly argue for an aggressive American hegemony. In this first passage, interestingly, not only is American hegemony promoted, but it is also framed in such a way that it is actually welcome by the world:

> Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 21).

Furthermore, they argue that,

> American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 23).

So the argument presents no alternative, in fact. They argue that the *only* reliable defense option against crisis and a breakdown of world peace is for American hegemony to be maintained. This means that there should be no competition, leaving America as the sole hegemon. The joint argument is made here for military supremacy, American hegemony and ensuring there is no rival as they imply this in the statement America is the only reliable power.
The passage below, again taken from Kagan and Kristol’s article:

But the enormous disparity between U.S. military strength and that of any potential challenger is a good thing for America and the world. After all, America's world role is entirely different from that of the other powers (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 26).

Similar to the first quote, they also argue here that the disparities between militaries is not only good for America, but good for the world. They imply that the world should desire an American hegemon. Once more, the argument is framed around America’s ‘unique role’ as is implied in the last sentence. In 2000, when PNAC’s key publication was released, it opened with the statement that there should only be one superpower, unchallenged, and that should be America:

At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible (Donnelly 2000: i).

Additionally, stated is the need to:

deter the rise of a great power competitor as one of the main military missions (Donnelly 2000: 2).

In one of the more blunt statements, they plainly argue that America should remain sole superpower, additionally ensuring no power is to emerge as competition. This is made as an argument for a main military mission; again linking the two together. The lexical style is consistently that American hegemony is good; it is always presented in a positive light for America, and for the world.

In language very similar to that of the leaked 1992 DPG, the PNAC plainly state their position that no rival is to emerge, posing a challenge to the United States. It is clear that the neoconservative position on foreign policy it to maintain dominance, while deterring any other possible challenge to that domination. The following quote restates this point:
Today, that same security can only be acquired at the “retail” level, by deterring or, when needed, by compelling regional foes to act in ways that protect American interests and principles (Donnelly 2000: 3).

In argumentative language, the authors suggest that ensuring there is no rival would ensure the protection of American interests. Their arguments are always put in context of what would happen if they ‘do not’ do something. The authors argue that the reason no great power has risen to challenge the States has been due to its overwhelming military presence in the world. Therefore, if America wants to retain this position, they maintain that it must continue to project its military power:

Up to now, they have been deterred from doing so by the capability and global presence of American military power. But, as that power declines, relatively and absolutely, the happy conditions that follow from it will be inevitably undermined (Donnelly 2000: i).

Here, ensuring there is no rival to America is being framed within the larger issue that this has only been successful because they have had military might to back American political power up. Without this, they argue that competitors may rise, and the goal of the US should be to ensure this does not happen. As in the first section of documents, the arguments are framed around American unique role in the world, and American supremacy – emphasizing no rival is to emerge. A difference in the PNAC documents is that often the discourse is more direct in some ways, as they are a think tank and not responsible to the public, the same way official government discourse (like that of the 1990s) is. The next section will continue the theme from the first section on American’s job to protect the peace.

**America’s job to protect the peace**

Throughout the 1990s, we saw that the ‘neoconservatives’ and the American supremacists both argued that it was America’s duty, job or unique role to protect the peace. When PNAC was formed, their views carried forward, and protecting the peace was central to PNAC discourse.

Stated in the opening remarks of their key document, *Rebuilding America’s Defenses* in 2000, they write:
From its inception, the Project has been concerned with the decline in the strength of America’s defenses, and in the problems this would create for the exercise of American leadership around the globe and, ultimately, for the preservation of peace (Donnelly 2000: i).

Behind most of what the PNAC argue, is always an argument involving a warning. In this instance, they argue that the decline in the strength of the US military will cause problems for American leadership and, ultimately, they tie this to the preservation of world peace. They use argumentation in most their discourse while framing issues around American leadership. Below, a similar point is made:

…we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership, of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East… (Donnelly 2000: preface).

Once more the issue is framed within the ‘natural’ role of American global leadership, and its emphasis on that leadership’s necessity to maintain global peace and security. It is presented in an argumentative manner to imply that the responsibility of this great power of world leader, requires America to protect the peace. Several more references to the vital role of America to maintain peace are made throughout the publication:

America’s global leadership, and its role as the guarantor of the current great-power peace, relies upon the safety of the American homeland; the preservation of a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and surrounding energy-producing region, and East Asia; and the general stability of the international system of nation-states relative to terrorists, organized crime, and other ‘non-state actors’ (Donnelly 2000: 5).

Here, without question, they title America as ‘the guarantor of the current great-power peace’. This is a primary example of a taken for granted belief, as it is presented as a given. Again, the issues are being framed around America’s global leadership and responsibility as a common sense understanding of how the international system works.

The statement below demonstrates the implicit belief in America’s role in protecting world peace. As the quote begins with “since”, it implies the belief that this is a fact:
Since today’s peace is the unique product of American pre-eminence, a failure to preserve that pre-eminence allows others an opportunity to shape the world in ways antithetical to American interests and principles (Donnelly 2000: 73).

This is an important statement because it implies firstly that the peace enjoyed in the world at present is a not only a product of American involvement, but American preeminence. Second, using argumentation, it plainly states that if global dominance is not maintained, other powers may try and ‘shape the world’ to suit their interests, which runs the risk that they may not be in line with American interests. This is the typical fashion of much of the statements the PNAC makes: in the tone of a ‘warning’. In this case, ‘if’ America doesn’t remain as sole superpower’, then the peace could be compromised, and worse yet – another superpower may emerge. This statement is loaded with assumptions about American power, its role in the world, its right to preeminence, and naturalizes the expectation that American interests should dominate the world, while preventing others from taking over.

Not only is the point about protecting peace, but using American military force in order to do this. These statements attempt to legitimize American military involvement all over the globe under the guise of world peace. Maintaining peace is correlated to having a strong military, and subsequently if peace is to continue, more money must be spent on military capacities. There is also mention of ‘potential’ or ‘future’ threats, and ‘very different’ challenges – all using vague language. Militarily preparation is essential, even taking pre-emptive measures to secure the peace.

Keeping the American peace requires the U.S. military to undertake a broad array of missions today and rise to very different challenges tomorrow, but there can be no retreat from these missions without compromising American leadership and the benevolent order it secures. This is the choice we face (Donnelly 2000: 75).

Framing a policy as a peace-keeping measure is far more persuasive to not only those inside government, but to the wider public. This was especially important after 9/11, and these themes will reemerge in later parts of this thesis to provide rationale for imperial policies implemented after 2001 under the Bush presidency. Below, the warning is sent again with argumentation:
The current American peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself (Donnelly 2000: 75).

Again, the issue is that the American peace will vanish if money isn’t spent on military and defense. It is made clear that an alternative to American power should not rise and the argument is that this can jeopardize world peace, and American interests. Their final warning is that:

The blessings of the American peace, purchased at fearful cost and a century of effort, should not be so trivially squandered (Donnelly 2000: 75).

Here, it is framed as the ‘blessing’ of American peace. Implicit is that the world should be thankful in a way for the peace the American has given it. Following this, a final warning that this ‘blessing’ should not be squandered. Assumed is that America is needed to maintain this peace.

The majority of the arguments made through these discourses are the necessity for American leadership in maintaining the peace, protecting America and protecting others around the world. Much of the language is presented through argumentation, with a constant warning tone, ridden with warnings of what can happen if America is not there to protect the world. In the 1990s, the documents focused on the main event, the immediate end of the Cold War. Now that some time has passed, the discourse from these documents is framed not only within Post Cold War context, but with the added provisions that if America wants to continue its success, it should: be dominant, protect world peace, spend money on the military, and so on. There is a slight change in the frame, with the same message coming through – American dominance. The next section will discuss another theme from the preceding section: pre-emption.
Pre-emption

Whereas pre-emption was a more contentious topic in the early 1990s, and it was difficult to advocate through official policy documents, and especially after the backlash of the leaked DPG. However, by the late 1990s when PNAC was formed, their publications were far more overt. Largely unknown to the public, their publications did not cause alarm. But those in policy circles were listening; as many members of PNAC went on to take up position in the Bush government. On the PNAC website, under their list of publications, a mixture of documents can be found. The major theme is American military dominance.

In a 1998 article, Gary Schmitt, former project director, wrote that:

The simple but critical point is that size counts. It matters especially when the US military is expected to deter aggression around the globe, maintain a presence to provide stability in various regions, handle smaller contingencies such as Bosnia, and fight a major conventional war if and when called upon (Schmitt 1998: 53).

Here, Schmitt is hinting at pre-emption. Again, the frame of the situation is the expectation that global security is America’s responsibility. The lexical choice that implies pre-emption is that the United States is ‘expected to deter aggression’. Not only should it defend itself when attacked, but it should actively deter threats before they can reach America. He follows this in the same publication at a later point by arguing:

As the dominant power in the world, it need not sit passively on its hands, trusting that other countries will remain friendly to its interests. An improvement over previous defence studies, the QDR report addresses not only potential threats but how the United States- by forward deployment, military operation other than war, and alliances – can mould the international environment (Schmitt 1998: 55).

Again, first his argument is framed around America as the ‘dominant power’, which in itself justifies a variety of military actions. The words used in this passage that America cannot be ‘passive’, addressing ‘potential threats’ and ‘forward deployment’ all suggest that Schmitt like those in PNAC are promoting pre-emption as a strategy. Here however, he uses argumentation by again sending a warning that passive behaviour, and too much
trust in others can lead to a crisis in which the US is not in control of the ‘international environment’.

In the same year, another publication cited on the PNAC website, written by Schmitt and Kagan maintain that:

…although we may not know precisely when the new threats will emerge, we should know for a certainty that we have entered a new strategic environment. In that environment, the number of states trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them will grow, and the threat posed by such weapons will become increasingly standard feature of international life (Kagan and Schmitt 1998: 21).

In the above passage, the authors keep the language vague— the ‘precise’ time the threats will emerge is unknown. But they advocate that there will be some sort of weapons of mass destruction. All this is done in an argumentative warning tone to set up the following argument:

As the QDR points out, adversaries can exploit our vulnerability in order to deter or, if it comes to that, defeat an otherwise vastly superior American military force (Schmitt and Kagan 1998: 22).

Here, the authors warn that if they do not step up their defences, this will leave America in a vulnerable position, again using argumentation. Ultimately, they argue that either the US can choose to wait until a disaster occurs (by coping), or, as they make evidently clear, make the first move:

Either we are going to be endlessly trying to “cope” with problems that are increasingly difficult to cope with—to “manage” situations that become inherently less manageable—or we are going to move aggressively to shape the international environment (Weekly Standard Editorial Board 1998: 8).

The ultimatum is pre-emption – ‘move aggressively to shape the international environment’ – implies that waiting until threats reach America’s shores is not an option, and the imperative is instead to take the first step to prevent those threats from fully emerging. Finally, in the bluntest of arguments, in the preface of the 2000 document, the authors open by affirming that,
The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership (Donnelly 2000: preface).

Above, the argument for pre-emption is made much more explicitly than in the DPG of the early 1990s. It is clear in the wording to “shape circumstances before crises emerge”. Again, implying that a crisis could occur, and arguing that the situation must be controlled before it can fully materialize, pre-emption is a central focus. In the same paragraph, they also argue the need to “meet threats before they become dire”. As always, the tone is of a warning, the potential for a situation to become “dire”, if action is not taken. The idea of pre-emption is presented mainly in terms of the dangers that could exist if the United States does not consider pre-emption. The language is vague; filled with ‘potential threats’ and various ‘crises’ and the need to shape ‘circumstances’. If not, they argue that the US remains ‘vulnerable’, and thus ‘forward’ deployment is needed. All of this culminates in the need to ensure military power to sustain American global dominance– the primary goal of the project’s advocacy. The next section will focus on military spending and power.

Military spending and Power

Throughout a majority of their publications, much of their rationale for defence spending increases are technical in nature (number of aircrafts, personnel required, type of equipment, etc). However, the examples provided are those where authors make arguments that tie the demand for increases in spending to broader arguments for imperial grand strategy.

The first example is from the opening pages of the 2000 document, Rebuilding America’s Defenses:

In sum, the 1990s have been a “decade of defense neglect.” This leaves the next president of the United States with an enormous challenge: he must increase military spending to preserve American geopolitical leadership, or he must pull back from the security commitments that are the measure of America’s position as the world’s sole superpower and the final guarantee of security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights (Donnelly 2000:4).
Most of the material by PNAC regarding military spending is blunt and straightforward. In the above example, using argumentation, they clearly state that increasing military power is directly linked to the preservation of American global power. Not only that but their lexical style in choice of words that not only is America the sole superpower, but also the ‘final guarantee’ of security, democracy and political rights. The responsibility to preserve the peace is brought up in a way that requires the need for military might to do so:

And in fact, over the past decade, the failure to establish a security strategy responsive to new realities and to provide adequate resources for the full range of missions needed to exercise U.S. global leadership has placed the American peace at growing risk (Donnelly 2000: iv).

In the above passage, again in a warning-like tone, the argument made is that it is the fault of the government for not spending an adequate amount on military that has put America at ‘risk’, and that as a result their global leadership role may diminish. As most of their material, it is always presented as an ultimatum, and warning, prefaced by dangerous situation that may occur as a result of non-action. This point is made again explicitly in the following:

American peace is to be maintained, and expanded, it must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence (Donnelly 2000: 4).

Again, in an argumentative tone, peace is being threatened if America does not maintain military superiority, which of course means high spending. Again below, they argue that to translate US pre-eminence into results, they must maintain military strength:

American land power remains the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence (Donnelly 2000: 30).

Below they argue that military power is linked to political results. Here it is implied that policies can be secured (forcefully if needed) through military power.

the need for ground maneuvers to achieve decisive political results endures (Donnelly 2000: 30).
Again, in warning-like argumentation, the project argues that America currently lacks the ability to achieve these political response, stressing once more the importance of the military:

Conversely, an American military force that lacks the ability to employ ground forces that can survive and maneuver rapidly on future battlefields will deprive U.S. political leaders of a decisive tool of diplomacy (Donnelly 2000: 30).

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a “strategic pause” while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied interests (Donnelly 2000: 50).

In the second paragraph especially, they refer to larger national security issues as interlinked to military preeminence. Once more, the absence of a prepared military would result in problems for the US. In an argumentative style once more, they focus on the negative effects this would have to American and allied interests. Similar, the statement below focusing on the link between American military preeminence and overall American grand strategy:

in general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership (Donnelly 2000: 51).

Consistent with the majority of their publications, the need to increase military spending, and maintain levels that allow American primacy are framed within the fact of America as sole superpower, and its ‘job’ to protect the peace, ensure there is no rival, and fulfill their unique role. All of this, they argue, cannot be achieved without military preeminence. In turn, high levels of defense spending are needed to maintain America’s role in the world. They argue that military power is directly linked to American grand strategy, and that without it, their political objectives may be jeopardized. Again, the warning of a world where America is not sole superpower is presented as a dangerous place – more dangerous than present- in which there is chaos and crisis.
What has a critical discourse analysis told us about the Project for the New American Century and its influence on President Bush’s foreign policy? The difference here, and in the previous section is that the PNAC is where the American supremacists and neoconservatives come together, largely identifying uniformly as ‘right wing’ in the representation of the think tank. A few important points to note are that first, the language is more explicit in some areas. For example, whereas pre-emption was far more contentious in the earlier documents (such as the DPG), here it is more overt. This is likely because as a think tank, it does not have to answer to the entire population. In the case of the DPG, or any official government document, language is at times more guarded, and more carefully chosen. Because of this fact, it is conceivable that the language is more overt.

Second, with the exception of Feith, all the major influential people mentioned in this chapter were signatories and members of PNAC. This means that after they left government posts, and prior to entering the Bush administration, they were publishing their ideas and had a clear vision for American grand strategy.

Third, as with the previous section, the critical discourse analysis unveils that the principles behind the Bush Doctrine, and the War on Terror were formulated long before 9/11. They were not a reaction to events, but rather a window of opportunity to position these ideas better to be accepted as policy. As with the previous section, the language is less emotional than that of the documents and speeches post-9/11, and the discourses are largely presented in a form of argumentation. Where as the discourses after 9/11 used the attacks as ‘proof’ of what could happen if aggressive foreign policy was not pursued, the documents presented here are warning of vague and future threats (perhaps alluding to a 9/11 type event) and frame the issue around the end of the Cold War, and America’s sole super power status. Post-9/11, there is the new frame of the ‘9/11 prism’, which will be explored in the next chapter.

4.6 The Beginnings of the Bush Government

What September 2001 provided was a rationale to implement an agenda that had its beginnings in the 1990s. It was Krauthammer who urged for an “America Unbound”,
and after 9/11, with a group of influential ‘neoconservatives’ (although the term is used loosely to refer to the people mentioned above) made that possible (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 12). Bush had outlined some of the implemented policies on his campaign trail, and parts of it were in fact put into place when he took office. However, the ‘revolution’ observed in foreign policy came largely after, and was attributed to 9/11 (Ibid).

Daalder and Lindsay summarize Bush’s revolution in two main beliefs. First was that in a new and dangerous world, the best if not the only way to ensure security was if America sheds the ‘constraints’ imposed on it by friends and allies alike; second, that America’s position in the world made it an appealing target to countries hostile to the West and therefore America could not count on others to protect it (Ibid). These ‘beliefs’ led to what is known and previously discussed as the Bush Doctrine.

Cheney and Rumsfeld no doubt had the largest role behind the personal and intellectual influences of Bush’s view on foreign policy, especially after 9/11. However, this influential group of individuals above all had a very important role to play in the new direction of American foreign policy after 2001. In the summer of 2001, months before the 9/11 attacks, in his first public appearance, Rumsfeld declared that the current strategy at the time was not working and instead he called for the US forces to be able to swiftly defeat one enemy, and hold a second enemy at bay (Graham 2009: 243). This was actually a ‘softer’ approach from the previous strategy that would require the military to win two simultaneous wars. However, a new requirement was added that said the US homeland should be defended. Like many statements to follow it, it was vague and only those in the inner circle of the Pentagon really knew what this meant (Ibid). Rumsfeld also made evident signs of a more aggressive US military stance by dissuading enemies from “even thinking of developing certain weapons or taking menacing action” (Ibid). He was setting the scene for a profound shift towards a restructured armed forces and new weapons choices, and with 9/11, his hopes had become a reality. His major role immediately after 9/11 was to educate opinion leaders on how the world had “changed” and how the increase in spending was necessary in
order to implement Bush’s plans after 2001 in the “new” and “dangerous” world (Ibid: 269).

Cheney claimed in his own memoir that America was embarking on a “fundamentally new policy” (Cheney 2011: 332). He said no longer was America hunting down individual people or terrorist cells, it had to be bigger, bringing down entire networks, organizations and nations who support them (Ibid). He claimed, as Rumsfeld had, and the world would hear Bush say, “it was all new”, and they (the inner policy circle) knew it was going to be a long war (Ibid). Cheney’s influence should not be underestimated. Subhawong writes that, “his influence in the Bush Administration touches everything from energy concerns and foreign policy to editing tax proposals and refereeing cabinet disputes” (2008: 282). In Cheney’s view, the attacks of 2001 created an ‘urgent necessity’ of granting the President ‘unrestrained authority’ to defend the nation (Montgomery 2009: x). In his eyes, this was a rationale to use any and all means at the government’s disposal, which fit in with his ideological thoughts on American supremacy. These thoughts would come to greatly influence Bush himself and the policies implemented thereafter.

Cheney and Rumsfeld’s desire for a more assertive American presence in the world, coupled with increase in military spending that would allow them to project greater force was acknowledged by Bush after 9/11. Additionally, the ‘emergency’ measures that were put into place after September 11th left the Presidential power nearly unchecked, largely due to Cheney’s influence in the matter. Wolfowitz’s influence was also evident. Immerman writes that while Cheney was advocating that America save the world from itself, Wolfowitz believed that the Untied States had the capability to remake the world (Immerman 2010: 219). A worldview that he held personally since a young boy, Wolfowitz started a campaign to actualize the vision of America he always believed in; an image of a nation with moral purpose and “unassailable military might” (Ibid: 216).

Following the same neoconservative thought, Feith indicated that after 9/11, America could not count on its security by being defensive, and there was no practical
alternative than to pursue and offensive strategy. He said, “we have to reach out and hit the terrorists where they reside, plan and train, and not wait to try to defeat their plans while they are executing them on U.S. soil” (Feith 2003: 3). Feith actually compared Political Islam to Communism, accusing it of promising a ‘utopia’ it cannot deliver, creating a uniform enemy for America (Ibid: 6).

The invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein was something all of these individuals advocated for in the past; and in a serious way during the 1990s. Wolfowitz had a special preoccupation with unseating Saddam, as did Khalilzad, which is made blatantly clear from their article ‘Overthrow Him’, written in 1997. Wolfowitz’s top priority after the 9/11 attacks was to rid the world of Saddam Hussein (Immerman 2010: 221). He believed that publicly calling for his removal would send the right signals to the world that America would not be tolerant of those who reject US values and primacy (Ibid). Rumsfeld has also ordered that a link be found between Saddam and 9/11 minutes after the attacks. Cheney also made clear his position after the ball got rolling on Iraq that Saddam Hussein has ‘perfected’ cheating and deception tactics and there would never be any assurance he would comply with UN resolutions even if they were imposed (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 136). The combination of neoconservative policies, coupled with the ideological drive of Rumsfeld and Cheney can be seen in the documents of the Project for the New American Century, which was essentially the blueprint for the Bush Doctrine, a brand of American imperialism after 9/11.

**Conclusion**

Critical geopolitics asks us to question the world, and especially those beliefs we take for granted about our geopolitical environment. Critical discourse analysis provides a way to methodologically do that. As it is evidenced through this analysis, the language is carefully constructed to frame American imperialism in several important ways. One is that imperialism is essential; American dominance is needed, to protect interests and keep America safe. Two, that is actually favoured, and better for the rest of the world leading to a peaceful and secure international environment. Three, is that it is a duty; America’s role as the benevolent hegemon is not asked for, but needed as it has ‘no choice’ as superpower to take responsibility and fulfill its destiny.
American imperial power is presented within two key frames: the end of the Cold War, and its unique role in the world. These two are the main frames in which the rest of the narratives fall. The major ‘themes’ or discourses create a parallel narrative that is evident once highlighted. The discourses in the first part of the chapter pertaining to the documents of the 1990s, and those of the late 1990s and early year 2000 when PNAC was formed are nearly identical. So are too the discourses in Chapter Six. This is of importance as it shows a continuation in foreign policy thought from the early 1990s through the presidency of George W. Bush.

The key themes or discourses highlighted are all indicative of imperial power. There are clear policy objectives that not only should America remain the global hegemon, but that no other should come to rival it, the high spending on military, unilateral actions and its monopoly on ‘protecting the peace’. This means America can decide who is dangerous and who is not. For example, one of the quotes directly states that the United States is the only reliable power to do this.

Critical discourse analysis has highlighted that language is power. Our understanding and perceptions of our geopolitical environment are shaped in large part by how it is presented to us. This will become even more important after 9/11, which allowed a window for these policies to be implemented. Critical geopolitics gives us a lens in which to ask these questions, and consider their implications. The next chapter will focus on how perceptions of a changed world were reason to implement new policies. The most important point that the continuation of policy ideas and discourse shows, is that the policies after 9/11 were not a reaction to the attacks, but were framed as such, with a realization that the same ideas existed beforehand. The significance of the next chapter will be the frames that were set up to create the perceptions of a ‘new’ era, a changed world that can never be the same again, the ‘new’ threats, dangers and fears that accompany this new world, and what that means for America and its actions.
Chapter Five
Changing Geographies

There is no use in pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and geography, is more than anything else imaginative (Said 2003: 55).

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11 -Rumsfeld 2003. (Sparke 2007: 342)

5.1 Introduction

Key to the analysis of how the Bush administration attempted to legitimize a type of American imperialism, are specific perceptions of the changing nature of threat, danger and fear, that were present after 9/11. Geared mainly at an American audience, but received internationally, perceptions about the changing nature of geography and geopolitics aimed to gather support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as domestic measures that were implemented, such as the Patriot Act, and other ‘tougher’ regulations at home, to combat terrorism. Many have argued whether or not these were ‘new wars’, or if Al Qaeda, or Iraq and Saddam Hussein were ‘real’ threats that would warrant action. However, whether or not the threats were real, or whether geography had changed, or whether the security of the United States was truly at risk, are not the most important elements in analyzing the legitimacy that the US administration was seeking. What is perhaps more important to assess, is how the perception that the wars were new, that the threats had changed, that the geopolitical landscape had morphed into the unknown, warranted an aggressive and assertive response from the Americans.

As Toal states, “geopolitics is a discursive event and a cultural production; modes of writing and representation, used to convey public messages (political or not) are of necessity the media through which the geopolitical discourse circulates” (Toal as quoted in Debrix 2008: 11). Therefore, critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodology, is complementatory to the application of critical geopolitics as a tool for analysis. As mentioned in Chapter Two, CDA is both an interdisciplinary method, and a tool by
which to understand how language and discourses shape our world. It provides a critical framework to understand how power is (re-)produced, embodying ideological assumptions that meaningfully shape how we understand the world around us, in our everyday lives. Of specific importance in this chapter is ‘framing’. Framing is the way that discourses are used or organized according to a certain viewpoint or perspective. It is an exercise in the specific selection (and exclusion) of language to produce certain meanings. In the second part of this chapter, the CDA method will be expanded upon, and applied to the discourses focused on the changing nature of danger, and perceptions of a new world after 9/11.

The first section of this chapter will focus on the work of critical geopolitics on the changing nature of danger, geopolitical fears, and media ‘tabloid’ geopolitics. The changing geography of danger covers the fear of the unknown Other and future fears. This is an analysis of how those in CGP looked at how Othering and the perceptions of the fear of the unknown, created a narrative for geopolitical fears. Tabloid geopolitics covers the media and ‘pop culture’ elements of how discourses move from administrative levels to media politics, and how the population is affected by these discourses. Following this, the second section will be a critical discourse analysis. In part two of this chapter, attention is focused on the days, weeks and months following 9/11 in the year 2001. This is where the majority of framing took place, setting up notions of a dangerous world, a new enemy, and a need to rearrange American life. This in turn, laid down much of the discursive framework used for the justification of the wars in Afghanistan, and in particular, Iraq.

5.2 The Changing Geography of Danger

The production of a story of how the geography of danger had changed, was being put into place quickly after 9/11, as the emotions and fears of that day were fresh in the minds of the international community, and above all, the American people. The Rumsfeld quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates perfectly what this chapter seeks to make sense of. It is actually the last line that is applicable beyond the war in Iraq, to domestic policy: “through the prism of our experience on 9/11” (Rumsfeld 2003). It is this ‘prism’ that was constructed through perceptions of a changed world,
filled with unknown unknowns, new and unforeseeable danger and threats. As Sparke argues, this was formulated in such a way that it created a script or a sales pitch, geared at the American public (2007: 341). When the geography of danger is understood to have changed, what does this mean for the spaces that are impacted? How does this change the way we think about, and respond to the ‘new’ geographical dangers?

What made 9/11 particularly important to Americans was the spectacular way in which it happened, on live TV, for everyone to see. It has been claimed that the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are important elements in what has been called the ‘American imagination’ (Dittmer 2005: 634). They were therefore particularly important to the script that resulted from the attacks. Since the attacks, Ground Zero has often been labeled ‘sacred space’, in the media especially, as has New York City (Dittmer 2005: 634). After 9/11, the phrase “We’re all New Yorkers now” (Ibid) was often heard in interviews in the media, as the entire nation rallied behind their sacred city.

Perceptions are arguably very powerful. Ulrich Beck, in his writing on the *Risk Society*, states that we now live in a word where risks, “whether they are imagined, potential or happening now”, are part of a society that is “unpredictable, uncontrollable and ultimately incommunicable” (Beck 1999: 41). Rachel Pain states that actually, Beck is not indicating that the world is more dangerous per se (2009: 469), but that risk is debounded in “spatial, temporal and social terms”, so that the central issue becomes how to control the uncontrollable, in everything from politics to everyday life (Beck 1999). Bush used precisely this storyline, making constant references to how America could be attacked anywhere at anytime, perpetuating fear among many of the American population.

Before 9/11, many Americans were under the assumption that they lived in some sort of exempt state where such fears did not exist. It was argued by the Bush administration that 9/11 ‘changed’ all of this (i.e. the new ‘prism’ that everything can now be seen through), and today, as Robin maintains, the “fear of terrorism, orchestrated and manipulated by the powerful, is being used to reorganize the structure
of power in American society” (Pain 2009: 470). The attacks, and the realization that terrorism is something that merges national and transnational concerns, resulted in several geographical changes. The language had also changed to reiterate the change in danger. One of the most blatant ways in which the Bush administration made it clear that they saw the geography of danger had changed, was in creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In a “monumental act of restructuring the architecture of US government”, the creation of the DHS consolidated twenty-two government agencies together, with over 180,000 employees, to ensure that efforts “to defend this country are comprehensive and united”, as Bush put it (Mabee 2007: 386). Katz argues that the very formation of the DHS, with little to no popular objection as an “uber security apparatus”, despite the fact that in fact such an institution goes against some of America’s more ‘sacred myths about itself’, exposes what she called ‘banal nationalism’ (2007: 351). In turn, she says this leads to ‘banal terrorism’, which produces a sense of terror and fear in an ‘everyday way’. She writes,

The common (non)sense constructed and assumed around terrorism (and terrorists) in all sorts of banal ways can be hailed at moments of crisis to authorize such things as a suspension of civil liberties or an open-ended and clearly never-ending “War on Terrorism” (Katz 2007: 350).

Katz argues that banal terrorism aids in creating the binaries that we come to take for granted; i.e. ‘we’ are threatened by ‘them’, ‘they’ hate ‘us’, or ‘we’ share a homeland (Ibid: 351). A further step that is problematic, is how these notions legitimize and authorize actions to be taken against ‘them’. Katz argues that not only does this produce xenophobic discourses, but it allows us to channel threat and danger. Even more problematic, is the way in which these discourses then lead to ideas about “duty” and “honour” which are exhibited in legislation, such as the Patriot Act (Ibid). The Patriot Act is not the only controversial legislation with damaging effects on civil liberties. However, it is the most cited and well known example, due to the extreme nature of the bill. There were several others. Among them, passed immediately after 9/11, was the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), which greatly expanded the National Security Agency’s (NSA) authority. The legislation permitted the NSA to conduct electronic surveillance within the USA, without an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), providing certain ‘conditions’ were met (Offices of
Inspectors General of the Department of Defense Department et al. 2009). A second example is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, mainly targeted at airport security measures, but may be better known for its provision allowing fully body scans at airports (United States Congress 2004). Another example, is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA 2008 amendments), which although passed towards the end of Bush’s Presidency, allowed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to authorize the electronic communications of Americans’ without a warrant (United States Congress 2008: 3). This particular sense of patriotism is dangerous. Moreover, the American ‘homeland’ is given a different meaning through the discourses in which Othering takes place. The emphasis of ‘terrorism’ and ‘homeland security’ together, created the perception that everything had changed. In the new world that we now live (i.e. post 9/11), terrorism is of key concern, and therefore defending the ‘homeland’ is of utmost importance. Mabee argues that,

the articulation of international and transnational terrorism as a key issue in US security policy, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, has not only led to a policy rethink, it has also included a bureaucratic shift within the US, showing a re-thinking of the role of borders within US security policy (2007: 386).

As a result, not only was international security and foreign policy reordered, but the state itself became securitized, on a domestic level as well. More policing on the streets of America itself, laws and legislations that effect American citizens at home, in their everyday lives were introduced. Additionally, this securitization, and the ‘acceptance’ of terrorism into a permanent and dangerous threat, along with the creation of the DHS,

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4 The unclassified document states that: “The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by the Presidential Authorizations remain highly classified, except that beginning in December 2005 the President and other Administration officials acknowledged that these activities included the interception without a court order of certain international communications where there is "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa'ida, affiliated with al-Qa'ida, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida" (Offices of Inspectors General of the Department of Defense Department et al. 2009: 4). Additionally, “Each Presidential Authorization also included a requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program” (Offices of Inspectors General of the Department of Defense Department et al. 2009: 5).

5 The legislation states that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the issuance of an order in accordance with subsection (i)(3) or a determination under subsection (c)(2), the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information” (United States Congress 2008: 3).
normalized the US government’s actions in response to the threats. In particular, both that which should constitute a threat, and how to respond to it (Mabee 2007: 389). Theoretically, Bush argued that anywhere in the world could be dangerous, because terrorists themselves are dispersed throughout. Borders became the centre of focus once again.

There are a few ways to look at the issue of borders and how they have changed post 9/11. From one perspective, borders meant nothing to the terrorists as they flew planes into the heart of America. Due to this realization, physical borders were tightened, not only in the United States but also internationally. For instance, the immediate increase in security at airports, especially at US-Canadian and US-Mexican borders, was just the first step. Immigration laws also became stricter. All of this was meant to keep ‘them’ on the outside, and away from ‘us’. Kolossov argues that “in the mass consciousness, the perception of external threat gives rise to the aspiration to minimise or to cease all contacts” with the undesirable Other (2005: 619). An alternate perspective on borders is that while physical borders were being tightened, the borders of America, with regard to protecting their interests, were stretched to constitute the whole world. The entire planet became the American homeland. The main narrative of the Bush administration was that “the state boundary is now not merely the line marking the limits of the state territory and territorial waters”, as some postmodern accounts of border studies literature state (Kolossov 2005: 623). 9/11 changed the geopolitics of borders in two ways – physically at home with tighter security allowing fewer ‘in’, and also by giving America unlimited scope to protect its interests worldwide.

How danger is perceived, where it is perceived to be coming from, and who it targets, are all factored into policy making. The fear mongering produced by the Bush administration created a certain view of danger, and what to be fearful of. Many of our views are based on what we hear and see in the media, and what our leaders tell us. The official response to the 9/11 attacks securitized international terrorism, as well as ushering in a new environment of security, in the form of the GWOT. What 9/11 accomplished for the Bush administration, is what Pearl Harbour did decades ago - a comparison which is often made. It served to warn Americans of the “dangers of a new
era, of a new environment of threat” (Mabee 2007: 391). In the discourse of the administration, this environment required a “new environment, and effectively, a new concept of security” (Ibid).

As such, certain areas became more, or newly, dangerous. The labeling of these areas as ‘threats’ or ‘risks’, justifies certain parts of the world as ‘requiring involvement’; whether they are rogue states, zones of instability or ‘states of concern’. The United States used this as a justification and legitimate reason for military or even economic involvement (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 411). It is an exercise in how space is given meaning, and how meaning changes to fit policy. Sharp argues that strategies of power always require the use of space, and thus discourses are used to create specific spatial images, which are inseparable from the establishment and use of power (Sharp 1993: 492). At the same time, while the US is designating certain areas as dangerous, and certain nations as part of the “axis of evil”, it has itself entered an exceptional space, where the law is suspended and the space inside the United States is given a different meaning – i.e. exemption from the law. Barnett assesses the ‘pre-emptive’ war’s implications, concluding that it was an instrument by the state that essentially sought to “extend its stable security rule set into the essentially lawless Gap” (Barnett, 2004: 7). As the United States was making new ‘rules’ for the Other state, it was simultaneously exempting itself from all.

What these authors are arguing is that perceptions of danger had changed, and this change in danger was the excuse for the exception and all that was to come after 9/11. What makes CGP a useful addition to the discussions surrounding 9/11 and its consequences, is that CGP focuses on taking apart the taken for granted beliefs by shedding light on how the change in perceptions of danger have been used as justification for policies, both domestic and foreign, and ultimately the declaration of the Global War on Terror. These authors analyze the taken for granted beliefs in tabloid geopolitics, and the perceptions of danger involving futuristic geopolitical fears. They reintroduce the importance of borders and territory as a crucial part of the analysis of 9/11’s consequences. Therefore, it can be seen that CGP advances our knowledge and
understanding of the exception by allowing us to see how geographical perceptions of
danger were ultimately the excuse for the exception after 9/11.

5.3 Geopolitics Fears

Unknown & future fears

As the focus of this chapter is on perceptions, specifically that of the changing
nature of danger, it is important to understand the geopolitical nature and implications
of this. In what Matthew Sparke calls “geopolitical fears”, this section will cover the
geopolitical elements and their implications. This involves what can be generally placed
into two main categories: future fears (‘unknowns’) and Othering.

After 9/11, the fear of terrorism was widespread in America. It became a central
concern for Americans who were suddenly alerted to this ‘new’ danger. What does it
mean to terrify? Who was more terrifying: the terrorists or the American government?
Allan Pred defines what it means to terrify; it is to

frighten greatly, to instill intense fear, to drum up image of horrible disaster,
brutal punishment, or death hovering just around the next corner, or the one
after that or at least some proximate corner – out of sight, waiting to pounce,
to strike arbitrarily, to perhaps target YOU. To terrify is to subject others to
extreme dread to produce in them an anxiety of the anticipated but
unpredictable, to colour their minds with shades or trepidation, to pack their
mental baggage with images and advance notices – or “threat advisories” –
that cause worry and disease, and, consequently, to insist upon their being

This definition would indicate that it was in fact the American government doing most
of the terrifying of its citizens; altering them to the dangers and simultaneously offering
the solution of policies that would ‘require’ more government control over everyday life.
For example, in 2004, President Bush stated that “it is tempting to believe that the
danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting -- and false” (Bush 2004b).
Not only the aggressive foreign policies of unilateralism, and the pre-emption of danger
(that would eventually lead to the invasion of Iraq), but domestically as well. For
instance, in the exchange of their civil liberties and freedoms (Patriot Act, FISA 2008,
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, PSP and others) for their ‘security’.
Rachel Pain argues that Davis’ prophesy that “fear has a brilliant future” (Davis 2001: 390) in light of Americans’ anxieties, have led them to trust a ‘revamped National Security State’ (Pain 2009: 470). This is precisely why a key part of the critical geopolitical framework is to question and take apart common sense beliefs, and hence Sparke argues that it is the responsibility of geographers to “examine persistently, collaboratively, and critically the geographical grounds of hope and fear” (2007). In doing so, he maintains that we can “debunk the false hopes and groundless fears” (Sparke 2007), thereby lifting the veil of the taken for granted beliefs that many critical geopolitics scholars seek to do. Sparke’s view provides an insightful interpretation on the consequences of September 11th. He argues that the contemporary issue of “geopolitical fears” - political fears and their implications, played a big role in how the war in Iraq, and post 9/11 policies were structured and consequently sold, to the American public. His view is that the American establishment manufactures fear like a product that its citizens will want to buy. Sparke claims that fear has become an essential part of politics in the United States, and the selling of fear was crucial in order to gather support for the Iraq War from the general American public. Notably, support never came from the international community or the United Nations.

The support for the GWOT has relied significantly upon the production of anxiety, as argued by Pred (2007: 364) and others. The geopolitical fears and anxieties produced by “fear filled forms of situated knowledge” that are further “infused with distortions, misrepresentations and disinformation” (Ibid), were produced by discourses by the Bush administration, and further perpetuated by the media (which the next section will cover). The next chapter will cover in detail the lead up to the GWOT, however, the ‘geopolitical fears’ created by the perception of a change in danger provided justification and legitimacy for policy actions both domestically, and in the case of Iraq, internationally. Sparke expands on this point here:

It was specifically fear of this evil other that was most instrumental because it made it possible for the President and his administration to connect widespread and visceral feelings of insecurity among Americans in the post-9/11 present to much narrower and calculative concerns with America’s strategic future. It was in this way that the futurological fears ironically became a retroactive justification for war (Sparke 2007: 341).
It is more than just about Iraq, the centerpiece of the Bush Doctrine. Sparke draws attention to the fact that the argument of America needing to see the world through a new ‘prism’ was a powerful one, ultimately altering America’s strategic vision (2007: 343).

All of these play on the emotions of the public. Discourses around the changing nature of threat, specifically after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, built on narratives of ‘inside’ (i.e. white, western populations) and ‘outside’, which was created by “imaginary geographies which reproduce discourse about dangerous spaces and others” (Pain 2009: 470). Pain questions the fact that given all of these discourses, little attention is paid to whose fear it is, that is being discussed; i.e. who names fear, who claims it and who ultimately feels it (2009: 471). Engin Isin argues that in fact, managing the population around risks has resulted in what he called the ‘neurotic citizen’. Isin argues that the “neurotic subject that has become the object of various governmental projects whose conduct is based not merely on calculating rationalities but also arises from and responds to fears, anxieties and insecurities” (2004: 217). The central argument this research is making in this respect is that these discourses are constructed in a way that benefits those in power, and further that these discourses are born from perceptions about a change to the nature of danger. Therefore, the geopolitical fears that Americans experienced after 9/11 were crafted to fit a wider policy agenda of imperialism.

It was not relevant how futuristic, real or unreal these fears were for the Bush administration. The chief of British intelligence later recorded in the Downing Street memos, “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” (Sparke 2007: 341). Debrix and Barder argue that a shift took place whereby conditions of heightened security were legitimised by the production of fear, which in turn legitimised violence. This made it ‘normal’ and expected for a population who had been told their lives were constantly at risk (2009: 401). Rubin writes that “[a]lthough fear has a politics, we often ignore or misconstrue it, making it difficult to understand how and why fear is used” (2004: 3). This is where critical geopolitics can help us understand the reasons why. While a critical discourse analysis will help us understand how it is used. In the second
part of this chapter, CDA is employed as a methodology to put the CGP lens to use. The questions that CGP asks about power, taken for granted beliefs, the social construction of fear, good and evil, and the construction of an enemy will be analyzed through the use of CDA. This will make clearer the importance of the ideational, and the power of language in created and sustaining these perceptions.

**Othering: Fear of the Foreign**

The ‘future fears’ that Sparke argues are so important in the justification and legitimacy of current policies, are further exaggerated by the Othering that takes place in political discourse. Jodi Dean contends that the “geopolitical imagining of an ‘evil’ other was undoubtedly key in this regard because it created an imaginative space where all sorts of illogical and pre-political, if not always religious, feelings of fantasy and faith could be projected with gung-ho conviction” (Dean 2005). Hence, the scripts about the Other, who were characterized to be “despotic, hate-filled Orientals” turned out to play an important role in the support for American actions at home (Sparke 2007: 343).

Othering has been the focus of much of the analysis in this research, however, how it fits into the larger geopolitical scripts about the perceived change in the nature of danger, fear, and threat as seen through the ‘prism’ of 9/11 is the specific focus of this chapter. Said’s work on imaginative geographies (2003: 72), mentioned in chapter two, is particularly important in contextualizing this analysis. The next chapter will demonstrate the specific discourses that went into legitimating the GWOT; Othering being a crucial element of the rhetoric. Dean stresses that Bush’s “ontological evil” (i.e. Other) conflates all violence, crimes, threats and even the potential or possibility of any sort of these things into one “theatre of absolute struggle” (Dean 2005). Essentially, the facts are not the key issue. It is Bush’s language in his conviction that portrays a world with the “excesses of evil flowing throughout” (Ibid) the globe that enables all the fingers to be pointed toward one massive, decentralized evil. This evil Other will serve as legitimacy for policies in the foreseeable future, setting up an everlasting system of legitimacy, providing it is maintained.
Fear (and hatred) of the Other unites people as it becomes a common experience that is shared. Rubin argues that when people lack the moral and political principles to bind them together (which was often the story in America pre 9/11 at the time) an event such as this, and an enemy to rally against brings people together – beyond the lines of divide. Rubin maintains that it is the “experience of being afraid...for only fear we believe, can turn us from isolated men and women into a united people” (2004: 3). He argues that we blind ourselves to the real world conflicts that make fear an instrument of political rule and advance, and instead, remain in a state of fear (Ibid). As such, Americans rallied behind their ‘homeland’ and the space in America was given a revamped meaning; it was the place that was not that other place – the one full of terrorists. Definition against an Other and terrorists is not a completely new comparison in American history. As mentioned before, in the past the USSR was considered the Other, communism was an ‘evil’, even further back once Britain was the Other. The identity and difference of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not unique, but the way that 9/11 gave such a broad, vague and indefinite justification to using this Other is new. Americans understood what they were, in relation to what they were not; always in opposition to an Other. Guntram Herb looks at the way that physical territory constructs national identities and concludes that the rationale behind the territorial strategy is what he calls ‘territorial scripts’ and it is conceived as a ‘geography’ (2004: 141). There are two main categories: territorial differentiation, and territorial bonding in the construction of national identity. Differentiation defines who is included and who is excluded and makes the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ visible. It bonds the opposite, fusing the population together and creates an emotional bond (Ibid: 144). This will be further elaborated in later parts of this chapter through a critical discourse analysis. The script, therefore, is what acts as the narrative that serves as a justification for the strategy (Ibid). Conversi also makes the point that what unifies nations are by opposing others; i.e. internal cohesion is attained by external differentiation (Ibid: 142).

Geopolitical fears of the unknown and of the other were instrumental in legitimizing policy decisions, at the very least to the American public, if not abroad. The anxieties that inevitably arose out of the constant fear mongering of the Bush administration after 9/11, were a success due to the abstract nature of the fears
themselves. They were unknown, and futuristic. No one could really pinpoint anything, which is why they were so effective. It was the connection between the already high anxieties of the public, with the exaggerated misrepresentations of the actual level of threat from global terrorism that meshed together to form a security state. This, of course, was perpetuated largely by the media, which the next section will look at.

5.4 Tabloid Geopolitics

The discourses about changing danger and threat may have originated at the top levels of government, but what makes them resonate with the general population? Not surprisingly, the media is the major outlet of information for most people. Generally, television is the most dominant and effective as it allows repetition. A study by Scott Althaus, conducted after the 9/11 attacks, found that the majority of media consumption in the US still comes through television news. Cable TV, local TV and network TV news together made up a large majority, followed by newspapers, radio then internet (Althaus 2002: 519). In 2014, the American Press Institute published that 87% of Americans get their news from “TV” sources, while 69% get their news from their laptops, followed by radio (65%), and print media (61%) (American Press Institute 2014). For example, the morning of September 11th, the world watched the planes fly into the tower over, and over and over again; ensuring the images were cemented to memory. Although the media can in fact inform us, and provide us with a great deal of insight about the world, it can as easily distort what we see and hear, thus becoming a form of misinformation as well. The media can in fact perpetuate the fear mongering tactics that are observable at the government level.

Francois Debrix investigates the representation of geopolitical news in the media and discovers what he calls “tabloid geopolitics” (TG). He defines it as

The result of mediatized discursive formations that take advantage of contemporary fears, anxieties, and insecurities to produce certain political and cultural realities and meanings that are presented as commonsensical popular truths about the present condition (Debrix 2008: 5).
As a discursive formation, TG is a mode of knowledge production, and can be easily created, transmitted and redirected to produce ‘truth-and-knowledge-effects’ (Debrix 2008: 14). Debrix argues that tabloid geopolitics played a big role in selling the war to the American public, by capitalizing on their fears. He maintains that that tabloid geopolitics is a form of geopolitics that is taken by the media, especially in the United States, in matters regarding national security, war, and global terror (Debrix 2008: 5). Not only is it a medium, it is also a discourse, and all those who claim to speak in the interests of the public can partake in it (Ibid). However, used as a form of propaganda, it can be misleading. Tabloid geopolitics is a “discursive public enterprise that seeks to proliferate narratives and images intended to saturate and satisfy the global cultural landscape” (Ibid: 5). As such, TG is sometimes just there ‘to sell’; i.e. it has abandoned a more meaningful goal to actually relay real life news events, and in its place, caters to the audience of the ‘tabloid universe’ (Ibid: 7) where they can manipulate stories to give them a guise of ‘truth’ or real news-telling, but in fact are inaccurate, and sometimes as a result are detrimental.

In a study on the critical geopolitics of danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Nick Megoran looks at the differences between the two nations and how danger is represented in the media. What is important to take away from his analysis is how this can be generalized and what it says about discourse, power and policy. One case study is of the Uzbekistan government who bombarded the population with the idea their state was in mortal danger (similar to what happened after 9/11 in America), and how it legitimized authoritarian rule (of President Islam Karimov) against the dangers of the state (Megoran 2005: 556). In this case, the government was then able to seize control of pop culture outlets, such as various media sources to perpetuate its message. In the United States, media has protections under the constitution, however, Alan Pred argues that following the 9/11 attacks, government at all levels began to restrict information that was available to the public. Although the media outlets were not coerced, they began to “read like official gazettes…television news simply gave up and followed the order of its corporate owners” and in the period before the war (2007: 365). Pred’s argument suggests that US journalists were “far too reliant on sources sympathetic to the administration”, while dissenting views were generally shut out (2007: 365).
Therefore, parallels can be drawn between Megoran’s analysis and Pred’s critical reading of the influence of media on our understanding of geopolitics. Megoran goes on to assess the US foreign policy impact and concludes that foreign policy is in fact “a series of boundary-producing practices that are central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of US political identity” (2005: 558).

The role of critical geopolitics in this is to question and unveil the production of geographical knowledge, in how it pertains to foreign policy and interstate relations (Megoran 2005: 558). The “texts” that guide the foreign policy making process are “actively concerned with the scripting of a particular American identity” and it becomes an exercise in boundaries, which depend on identifying ‘danger’ (Ibid: 560). Going back to the Uzbekistan case, interestingly, similar language was used in the media discourse (i.e. the ‘others’ as ‘evil’ – a parallel with post 9/11 rhetoric). Dissenting views in the media were treated as outsiders or traitors who were ‘evil’; motivated purely by irrationality (Ibid: 563). Similarly, Bush’s famous quote that “you’re either with us or with the terrorists” sought to portray anyone not in complete agreement with US actions as siding with terrorists.

Much of what was being said in the media complemented - almost echoed - what was being said at the top levels of government. Altheide, in his analysis of mass media and terrorism, argues that the attacks on America were defined in the media as an assault on American culture (2003: 991). This brought citizens of different political strokes together, collectively as ‘Americans’, allowing the population to unify as a collective. Altheide contends that in fact “news media and popular culture depictions of the US reaction to terror attacks reflects a culture and collective identities steeped in marketing, popular culture, consumerism and fear” (2003: 991). Further, he argues that the mass media actually have a role in promoting fear, which has accordingly been on the increase since the ‘discovery’ of international terrorism on 9/11 (Ibid: 986).

An important tactic in the fear mongering that Altheide draws attention to, is the linking of terrorism to crime and security, where terrorism is constructed in such a way that implies the law alone is not enough to deal with or provide security (2003: 992).
Hence, the implementation of ‘emergency measures’, such as the PSP or the Patriot Act. Altheide draws upon the work of Giroux who argues that the sense of urgency, like the panic visible after 9/11 and the rush to push through policies, results in ‘emergency time’ as Giroux calls it. This essentially stops citizens from rationally and collectively debating over issues democratically (Altheide 2003: 993), and in its place, the sense of urgency legitimizes legislation such as the Patriot Act, PSP, and FISA amendments, and so on because of a declaration of a GWOT. “The major impact of the discourse of fear is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out of control’” (Ferraro as cited in Altheide 2003: 995). The logic to this is that then policies and actions can be justified and legitimated in order to keep the population ‘safe’. Both the invasion of Iraq, and the passing of the Patriot Act and other similar documents symbolized measures that were ‘necessary’ for the US government to take to secure their citizens.

To demonstrate how important perceptions, and media specifically are in legitimizing behaviour, take for example a study conducted by Kull et al. on perceptions and knowledge of audiences. The key findings revealed that “gross misperceptions” were linked with general support for the war in Iraq, and even more so, with those who watched Fox news (Kull et al. 2003: 582). Some additional data on this point may be useful in emphasizing how reliance on media sources can significantly alter world perceptions, and even more in the case of Fox news mentioned above, as it is most sympathetic to the administration. In fact, a study in 2010 by Aday, found that Fox News,

not only tilts right, but serves as a reliable megaphone for the Bush administration’s arguments, including allowing administration officials (and their allies) to dominate other voices, and giving less play to critical sources and even-handed analyses”; an important finding (Aday 2010: 157).

Given this, it is important to note that Kull et al. concluded that those who watched Fox news as their primary news source were

2.0 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 1.6 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, 1.7 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.1 times more likely to have at least one misperception (Kull et al. 2003: 589).
It is not only Fox news that echoed the fears of the administration. It was understood that to question the administration in the matter of the GWOT and Iraq specifically, would be unpatriotic. Coupled with this was the idea that it would be ‘disrespectful’ to the troops to not show full support. Conclusive to their findings, Kull et al. argue that the reluctance of the media to challenge the administration and simple become a “means of transmission” (Ibid: 593) of those in top levels of government, makes getting a balanced opinion from the media nearly impossible. Furthermore, they conclude that it appears that President Bush has the capacity to lead the public to assume false beliefs in support of the administration’s position (Kull et al. 2003).

Further, Althiede claims that because these are matters of national security, that journalists rely on administration news sources for information about the operations, reactions to counter-attacks, reports about soldiers, and so on (Altheide 2003: 995). These become authoritative sources, and the messages from the administration get passed down through the media and they all ‘merge’ together as propaganda (Ibid). Bill O’Reilly, a popular and controversial conservative commentator on the Fox News network, is a representation of the type of realist tabloid geopolitics that many Americans gather their day-to-day information from. Debrix argues that O’Reilly’s cultural and political representations are part of the phenomenon in American culture that fashion similar techniques, ideologies and sometimes ‘practical outcomes of tabloid geopolitics’ since the late 1990s (Debrix 2008: 146).

Shirlow and Pain argue that the sensational headlines by the media often obscure rational debate (2003: 17) and in place tell an incomplete story to feed the appetite of the audience. Tabloid realists want their audience to believe that by engaging in /supporting a war (i.e. the GWOT, Iraq, Afghanistan) is to be on the side of ‘good’, with ‘us’, which creates a ‘triumphalist’ meaning, while distorting, confusing and destabilizing meanings of what to be afraid of (Debrix 2008: 77). The simple binaries created by the Bush administration therefore, get passed down and repeated in the mainstream media. This results in average citizens hearing the same thing repeatedly, constructing a uniform story. Media analysis is a vast area of research, and its depth is largely outside the work of this thesis, however, popular geopolitics is a part of the three
type typology that Toal and Dalby describe, and therefore it is important that it be recognized as an important force in shaping our world view.

What this section contributes is the use of CGP literature to draw attention to the power of language, discourse and the power of perception. As discussed in Chapter Three, much of international relations theories overlook ideational factors. They also omit the root causes, and opt for theory testing instead. This chapter is again addressing the question of ‘how’ the perceptions are created, not solely their consequences. The contribution of using a CGP lens to draw attention to missing pieces of the analysis, and then using CDA to fill in some of those gaps is the goal in the following section. The discussions in this section around media, framing, the language of the attacks of freedoms and life style, the binaries of good and evil, the ‘changed’ nature of danger and the ‘new’ enemy have been brought to light through CGP. In the following section, the goal is to take apart these discourses and show how the power of language can create ideologies used to legitimate imperialistic policies.

5.5 Critical Discourse Analysis

But, see, our fellow citizens must understand that September the 11th, 2001 changed the equation. It's changed the strategic outlook of this country – Bush 2003.

In its simplest form, Foucault states that discourses are anything that can be said or written, or represented by someone or some institution with or without a specific objective (Debrix 2008: 13). Jackson reminds us that the language of politics is deliberately structured to shape our perception of the world (2005: 21). Therefore, he maintains that there is “no way can we assume that the words of these ranking officials are unconscious, accidental or unplanned” (Ibid: 27). This research argues that the discourses used in politics are intentional and are a form of power, manipulation, and they construct ideologies. As it is maintained that discourses do ideological work, there are three aspects to CDA that are considered, and interlinked: language, power and ideology. In this chapter, the focus has been on the perceptions of the changing nature of the threat and the new world, and the ‘prism of 9/11’, that the Bush administration expected America and the world to view international relations through. Specifically, framing is of importance here, and is described below. These geopolitical fears, that the
previous section describes, are an important part of the discourses of a ‘post 9/11 world’ that Bush presented to America (and the world). As Weldes et al. remind us, all insecurities are culturally produced (1991:1). This is where CDA is most useful. Van Dijk argues that the core of CDA involves a “detailed description, explanation and critique of the way dominant discourses (indirectly) influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of concrete models” (1993: 259).

The discourses in this chapter focus on the days to months immediately after 9/11 in 2001, mainly September through to December. This is because this is when the major ‘shift’ took place within the Bush administration, and the focus of the discourses were on the ‘changed world’ after 9/11. Beginning toward the end of 2001, and start of 2002 (as the next chapter will demonstrate), the discourses shifted much more toward Saddam Hussein and the pending war with Iraq. However, soon after the 9/11 attacks were when the framework of all that was to follow was set up. This is when Bush and his administration presented the idea of a new world, a dangerous world; a world full of unknown dangers and dispersed enemies.

Framing: The ‘9/11 prism’

Framing as Carvalho (2008) describes is to organize discourses according to a certain point of view or perspective. This is of utmost importance to how the Bush administration sought legitimacy for its imperial policies post 9/11. Framing is crucial because it sets up the entire narrative to follow. Once the ‘situation’ is contextualized, everything else follows in that context. CGP analyzes political phenomena as situation and contextual and therefore it is important to understand how the issue is being framed, in order to unpack the discourses around it. In the case of this research, and this chapter, the frame in which everything was constructed around was the ‘prism’ of 9/11 that the Rumsfeld quote at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates:

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light—through the prism of our experience on 9/11 (Rumsfeld 2003 as cited in Sparke 2007).
The Bush administration told the American public, and the world, that everything
should now be seen through this new prism. Bush and his cabinet also emphasized that
this is a ‘new war’, a ‘new era’, a ‘new world’, a ‘new enemy’ and so on. This is
perhaps the most crucial factor in this entire analysis as framing is what sets up the
initial equation. Once it was established that everyone was now living in a ‘new world’
changed forever by September 11th, the rest of the narratives fit into the main plot of a
changed world. Below are prime examples in the early days, weeks and months
following the September 2001 attacks, that use these discourses to frame the new world
Bush wanted the world to accept.

Exemplified in the first set of quotes is the general notion that the world and life for
Americans changed on September 11th. The discourses are representative of what Bush
and his administration saw to be a clear shift, ushering in a new world. Vice President
Richard Cheney clearly frames the issue below:

I think the important thing here is for people to understand that things have
changed since last Tuesday [September 11, 2001], the world has shifted in
some respects. This is a qualitatively different set of circumstances. This is
going to be the type of work that will probably take years (Cheney 2001b).

Cheney asserts that there has been a worldwide shift. The events of 9/11 ushered in a
new world, and with that he says a different set of circumstances. Following this, he
makes a vague statement that this ‘type of work’ - implicit is the conflict – will
‘probably take years’; an unidentified length of time. In the quote below, Attorney
General John Ashcroft makes use of rhetorical devices such as metaphor in describing
the events as turning wheel of history, and assertively stating the world will ‘never be
the same’. He frames the event as a major turning point, providing the set up for further
action to be taken.

On September 11 the wheel of history turned, and the world will never be
the same. A turning point was reached, as well, in the administration of
Justice. The fight against terrorism is now the first and overriding priority of
the Department of Justice (Ashcroft 2001).
This kind of fact-finding and information-sharing conference is so critically important to the new environment that we find ourselves confronted with since September 11 (Ridge 2001).

Similarly, in the quote above, Tom Ridge, head of Homeland Security, argues that the world and America have entered a ‘new environment’ as a result of 9/11. Below Bush emphasizes the ‘new and sudden’ challenges that face America as a consequence of the attacks. Second, is Tom Ridge speaking on a similar point that the new challenges have presented a need for new solutions, overtly arguing that these problems ‘did not exist’ before.

Since the 11th of September, the men and women of our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been relentless in their response to new and sudden challenges (Bush 2001g).

It's going to take all of us--private and public, federal and local--working together to find solutions to problems that did not exist before September 11 (Ridge 2001).

On September 10, when you went into your office…there were certain challenges that you ... As of September 11, in addition to those challenges to our security and prosperity, we discovered that there's a new set of challenges (Ridge 2001).

Further, Bush maintains that America has become a ‘different country’ overnight. This emphasizes that the world and America should come to understand 9/11 as a clear cut turning point, and beginning of a new world. See below:

We are a different country than we were on September the 10th, sadder and less innocent, stronger and more united. And in the face of ongoing threats, determined and courageous (Bush 2001j).

Below, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s quote demonstrates that not only has the world changed, that life has also change, framing the situation as more than a change in politics but a change in the daily lives of Americans. Similarly, Bush’s statement also frames it the same way.
I think that every American understands that life changed on September 11 (Rice 2001).

Tonight,…many of us are…the world that seems very different than it was on September the 10th (Bush 2001j).

The moment the second plane hit the second building, when we knew it was a terrorist attack, many felt that our lives would never be the same (Bush 2001j).

Below is a quote from Tom Ridge, in which he states that lives are different now. They have to constantly think about their security, how to maintain safe. Again, this emphasizes that September 11th constituted a turning point:

And literally of Americans go to work every day trying to think of ways to make their community, their county, their city, their commonwealth or state, their country more secure. We just never looked at them that way before September 10, and now we do (Ridge 2001).

The issue is subsequently framed as a ‘new kind of conflict’. Below, Rumsfeld demonstrates this by defining 9/11 as a new battlefield, a different conflict, and specifically one that is new for America. Geographically, they are potentially at war with up to ’60 different countries’, meaning the geography of danger has changed. No one single nation state is an enemy, nor wholly responsible for the acts of terrorism.

We are, in a sense, seeing the definition of a new battlefield in the world, a 21st-century battlefield. And it is a different kind of conflict… it is in a major sense new for this country (Rumsfeld 2001).

..It's a new kind of war. And I understand it's a new kind of war… and this government will adjust, and this government will call others to join us… (Bush 2001a).

This is a different war from any our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different countries. And this is a war that must be fought not only overseas, but also here at home (Bush 2001j).

In this last quote especially, the idea of equating a war that is fought overseas and at home implies war may affect Americans, domestically – more than their tax money alone. The script is framed to implement policies that would combat this ‘at home’ as
well. Not only is it a new war, Bush and his administration argue, it also changes the way people ‘see’ terrorism. Taken out of context, 9/11 is seen as the first act of global terrorism. However, as it is the first on American soil, previous events worldwide are almost disregarded and 9/11 stands alone as the day that changed everything:

But I think it is also fair to say that the events of the 11th of September have fundamentally changed the way in which people look at terrorism and acts of terrorism (Powell 2001b).

Cheney echoes this in the following quote, emphasizing that because it happened in America, it is different:

…but this time because of what happened in New York and what happened in Washington, it's a qualitatively different set of circumstances (Cheney 2001).

The next subset of discourse refers to the ‘new enemy’ and the ‘different enemy’, that has confronted America:

This is different. The enemy is in many places. The enemy is not looking to be found. The enemy is hidden. The enemy is very often right here within our own country….(Powell 2001b).

In the quote above, Powell makes use of over-lexicalization while framing. He makes repeated reference to ‘the enemy’, which is considered ‘new’, within the same paragraph. The geography of danger has clearly changed in his view, as the enemy is everywhere, hidden and not looking to be found. Due to its geographical uncertainty, he follows this by saying that:

it isn't always blunt force military, although that is certainly an option. It may well be that diplomatic efforts, political efforts, legal, financial, other efforts may be just as effective against that kind of an enemy as would military force be (Powell 2001b).

The enemy is ‘new’, and therefore how it should be dealt with is uncertain. Geographically, borders will no longer protect America, and there is no specific target site to ‘attack’ in retaliation, as understood below:
I know that an act of war was declared against America, but this will be a different type of war than we're used to. In the past, there have been beaches to storm, islands to conquer... But I know that this is a different type of enemy than we're used to (Bush 2001c).

Bush reiterates this point again below. The enemy is framed to be new, and the enemy is different both psychologically and geographically as the enemy is everywhere and hidden:

Secondly, they understand that unlike previous war, this enemy likes to hide... And they [other nations] join me in understanding, not only the concept of the enemy but that the enemy is a different type of enemy (Bush 2001k).

Further emphasized is the ‘new’ thought process required to deal with the ‘new’ type of war. Additionally, any enemy that is hidden, is one that is geographically difficult to find. Implicit is then the idea that they must search ‘everywhere’; everywhere is now a legitimate target if it means combating terrorism. The quotes below, first by Bush himself, then by Rumsfeld, demonstrate the framing of this issue as a new conflict/war:

It's going to require a new thought process. And I'm proud to report our military, led by the secretary of defense, understands that; understands it's a new type of war (Bush 2001c).

As we have said, and I don't think it can be repeated enough, this is a very new type of conflict, or battle or campaign or war or effort, for the United States...(Rumsfeld 2001a).

White House representative Ari Fleischer echoed this and briefed the press:

Finally, as the president said in his remarks this morning, freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we are facing a different enemy than we have ever faced...(Fleischer 2001).

His statement also makes use of very pointed vocabulary in his lexis. For instance, he chooses to say that ‘freedom and democracy’ are under attack. A point which will be emphasized again later in this section.
Framing is crucial because it constitutes the foundation of the narrative. Framing contextualizes 9/11 as a new danger, dramatically changing the way of life for Americans, and a turning point for international relations. It is the blueprint to the discourses that will then build upon the notion of the ‘prism’ of 9/11. It constructs a certain worldview, or perspective that becomes taken for granted once it is repeated over, and over again. As critical geopolitics seeks to question and take apart the taken for granted beliefs, it is important to first understand the ‘frame’ in which they are created.

**Freedom and lifestyles under attack**

Categorically, the attacks on 9/11 were described as attacks on the ‘American way of life’, by President Bush and his entire administration. The way that they were framed as an attack on freedoms, American lifestyles, liberty, and so on, make it a war beyond territory and politics. The perception was that the new war was more than a territorial, ethnic, or political war. Accordingly, the discourses exemplify the importance of the use of words, what is implicit in what is being said, the way it is being said, and it sets up an argument for what the appropriate reaction should be. It also helps to unite ‘us’, and vilify ‘them’, which the lead up to the Afghanistan, but more so, the Iraq War, provided legitimacy especially at home in the United States. The following two statements by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld demonstrate this point perfectly as he claims that the attacks,

> strikes directly at our way of life: way of life of a free people (Rumsfeld 2001c).

> It's not restricted to a single entity--state or non-state entity. It is an attack on a way of life (Rumsfeld 2001).

Using terms such as ‘way of life’ use rhetorical devices by presenting the audience with emotionally charged statements. The reaction to a ‘war on terror’ is different to a “war over territory”, and distinctly so from a ‘war on a way of life’. The latter is emotionally charged, implying it affects every single American because of the way that they live – politics aside. Not only is it seen as an attack on American life, but he emphasizes that it
is an attack on free people. Implicit in this is that the enemy is not free and does not support freedom. Within the same speech, Rumsfeld reiterates again that this war is over a way of life, and adds that it is unlike wars of the past.

What this war is about is our way of life. And our way of life is worth losing lives for. The era of antiseptic warfare...no one getting hurt in the US...will not work with this enemy...let there be no doubt (Rumsfeld 2001c).

Bush makes several statements about the attack on freedoms leading up to the Iraq war and beyond. Below is a representation of some of those in the days, weeks and months just after the September 11th attacks, which framed the issue as an attack on a certain way of life.

In reference to the ‘enemy’, Bush depicts them as such that are filled with hate and everything associated with American lifestyles. He uses emotionally charged statements, his tone and lexical style emphasize how much they ‘hate’ everything:

These people can't stand freedom. They hate our values. They hate what America stands for (Bush 2001k).
We're fighting people that hates our values. They can't stand what America stands for and they really don't like the fact that we exist (Bush 2001h).

So again, Bush is assuming that they hate freedoms, all Americans, and their values. He does not receive it or project it as a political exercise, but instead, solely focuses on emotions and feelings of ‘hate’, which is in his opinion, is why the terrorists committed such acts. Further, the second quote uses exaggeration to claim that they do not even like the fact America exists. Vague and exaggerated, this is meant to elicit an emotional response of rage from Americans towards the enemy. He reiterates this point again below:

But there are other terrorists in the world. There are people who hate freedom. This is a fight for freedom. This is a fight to say to the freedom-loving people of the world: “We will not allow ourselves to be terrorized by somebody who think they can hit and hide in some cage somewhere' (Bush 2001c).
Once more, categorically the attack is understood to be an attack on freedom by people who hate freedom. Also, a new category is created, i.e. “freedom-loving people of the world” versus the freedom hating enemy. He also contrasts freedom with fear below:

Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us (Bush 2001e).

In the above passage, Bush uses rhetoric to contrast freedom and fear, in constructing ideological divide between the enemy and Americans. In the same speech, Bush makes references, again which are rhetorical and vague, to describe the threat:

Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail (Bush 2001e).

He uses emotionally charged language and metaphor, to appeal to the public. For example, to rally people ‘by courage’ to unite them together in the fight against the ‘dark threat’. Below he uses similar tactics:

We will not be terrorized so that our hearts are hardened. Nobody can threaten this country. Oh, they may be able to bomb buildings and obviously disrupt lives, but we're too great a nation to allow the evildoers to affect our soul and our spirit (Bush 2001d).

A few different things are going on in this passage. Again he makes use of emotion and metaphor, stating that American hearts are ‘hardened’. Following this, he again refers to evil, ‘the evildoers’, and finally, he says they cannot affect their ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, using rhetoric and alluding to a greater effect outside the physical bombing of American soil, i.e. their souls cannot be touched.

Most of these emotionally charged, implicit and suggestive statements are all framing the issue in such a way as to generate a specific response. Namely, that there are evil people whose inherent hatred for America, their freedoms, and their lifestyles, have attacked America for no other purpose other than because their hearts are filled with hate. The quotes also suggest that the purpose of the terrorists’ threats, is to instill fear.
Moreover, Americans should simultaneously not be afraid and live life, while also being fearful of the enemy, lurking at every corner. The mixed message is vague and either side of this coin is used where applicable.

It is especially interesting that the Bush administration emphasizes how the terrorists’ goals are to instill fear, given that the United States created a colour coded fear chart (the terror alert of the Department of Homeland Security). If anyone was responsible for scaring Americans daily, it was the multiple news reports, and constant interviews with ‘experts’, and the fear-mongering by the Bush administration. However, while there were those ‘experts’ who brought up American foreign policy in the Middle East, and the military involvement of American in several nations as a possible driving force of terrorist activity, none of these political messages were carried through by the Bush administration. To them, it was simple: the terrorists are evil doers who hate Americans, liberty and freedom, and thus this is a war directly on the American way of life and freedom itself by ‘freedom-haters’. Simple binaries were being introduced and perpetuated, to gain support for the actions America would take. The next section provides more pointed examples of Othering and contrasts, used to create these binaries in the context of a ‘new world’.

**Understanding the conflict: good and evil**

In the days and weeks following the attacks, a picture of the enemy was painted by the Bush administration, and following this, the media. According to them, the contrast was simple; it was a matter of good and evil. These are examples of what Herb (2004) calls differentiation: who are ‘they’ are, and who ‘we’ are by contrast. The opening two quotes are within the same speech, and directly contrast each other. Below, first is a description of the terrorists, followed by a description of Americans:

Those who struck our country didn't realize--didn't realize, because they're so evil and so dark and so negative. They couldn't realize that there's going to be such good that comes out of what took place in America (Bush 2001f).

We're resolved. We are strong. We're determined. We're patient. And this nation is going to do whatever it takes (Bush 2001f).
In the first instance, Bush depicts terrorists as evil, dark, and negative, before contrasting ‘them’ with ‘us’ (Americans), who are resolved, strong, determined. He sets up very clear binaries about the Other – whom is implicitly evil, and Americans – inherently good. Below Cheney describes them as follow:

What we have here are a group of barbarians that they threaten all of us, that the US is the target at the moment (Cheney 2001b).

He describes them as a ‘group of barbarians’ targeting Americans. Bush also uses the word barbaric to describe the enemy in a speech below:

It's an enemy that likes to hide and burrow in and their network is extensive. There's no rules. It's barbaric behavior. They slit throats of women on airplanes in order to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension. And they like to hit and then they like to hideout. But we're going to smoke them out. And we're adjusting our thinking to the new type of enemy. These are terrorist that have no borders (Bush 2001c).

The above statement has several different elements. Firstly, it is very emotionally charged and the choice words present a clear image of the terrorist. For example, Bush chooses to focus on an enemy that ‘slits the throats of women’, as opposed to saying kills many people. The graphic imagery builds public rage against an enemy that commits appalling acts. Secondly, he refers to the goals of the enemy as ‘objectives beyond comprehension’. Once more, an apolitical Other is presented that has no goal but to directly harm Americans, only because they are full of hate. The actual objectives outlined by Al Qaeda (specifically political), are ignored, and not even brought up. It is as if they do not exist, and the enemy is reduced to a barbaric irrational monster. Again, geography is brought into light when Bush states that the ‘new’ enemy has no border, they hide, they burrow; essentially they are everywhere. In contrast, below, Bush argues that ‘they’ cannot stand American values, which are wonderful, free, and grounded in education. These are all presented as characteristics that ‘bother’ the enemy:

They can't stand what America stands for. It must bother them greatly to know we're such a free and wonderful place, a place where all religions can flourish, a place where women are free, a place where children can be
educated. It must grate on them greatly. But that's what we're going to keep doing, because that's what America is about (Bush 2001i)

The contrasts are mostly clear, representing simple binaries but some implicit. For example, ‘our’ (American) children can be educated, by free women, in a tolerant society accepting of all religions, whereas the barbaric enemy does not tolerate any of these things because they are presented to implicitly be against American values. Cheney is asked in once instance about his response to a video on Bin Laden that was released. The interviewer asks him, ‘why someone would do what he does?’ and Cheney responds:

Obviously he’s filled with hated for the US and everything we stand for – freedom and democracy. He has for whatever reason developed this hatred of everything that relates to the US (Cheney 2001b).

In a separate statement, Cheney similarly responds to why anyone would target America by saying,

I think we have to recognize we are the strongest, most powerful nation on Earth, that we've got a tremendous set of accomplishments and an enormously bright future ahead of us. There are those in the world who hate us and will do everything they can to impose pain, and we can't let them win (Cheney 2001).

Here, Cheney’s lexical choices to describe America as ‘strong’, ‘powerful’, a nation with ‘tremendous accomplishments’ and a ‘bright future’, is implicitly contrasted again a jealous and dark enemy who hates America’s ‘goodness’ and will do all it can to bring them down. Here the enemy is not understood to be political, or rational, but jealous and evil – seeking only to destroy America for what it does not have itself. Again below, the negative attributes of the enemy are portrayed; it is an irrational, apolitical, and evil enemy in Bush’s presentation:

We’ve seen the enemy in the murder of thousands of innocent unsuspecting people. They recognize no barrier of morality; they have no conscience. The terrorists cannot be reasoned with; witness the recent anthrax attacks through our Postal Service (Bush 2001g).
The enemy is an amoral type of evil, with no conscious. This is a stark contrast to the moral American citizen who has deep ‘values’. The enemy loves war, and Americans do not seek it. Rumsfeld makes use of this contrast is below:

The Americans, as you know, do not seek war. We did not seek this war. It was thrust upon us. It is a matter of self-defense, and the only way to defend against terrorist acts is to take the battle to the terrorists. It was thrust upon us, and we love liberty, and we need to do whatever it will take to defend it (Rumsfeld 2001b).

Here, Rumsfeld insists, through the use of over-lexicalization, that the war was ‘thrust’ upon the United States. He also implicitly says, by claims-making that, ‘obviously’ American are not war seekers: ‘Americans, as you know, do not seek war’. He argues that Americans love liberty, implying that the terrorists do not. In his rhetoric, it all boils down to a fight between good and evil, the framing of the entire GWOT:

We are at the beginning of what I view as a very long struggle against evil. We're not fighting a nation and we're not fighting a religion. We're fighting evil. And we have no choice but to prevail (Bush 2001h).

This is vague because it is a ‘very long struggle’, with no identifiable, single enemy, and also vague and negative because it is ultimately ‘evil’. In President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union speech, he continued with this binary, even after the invasion of Iraq:

As democracy takes hold in Iraq, the enemies of freedom will do all in their power to spread violence and fear. They are trying to shake the will of our country and our friends, but the United States of America will never be intimidated by thugs and assassins (Bush 2004b).

The enemy is referred to as an enemy of freedom, who wishes to spread violence and fear, as they are thugs and assassins. In contrast, Bush makes it clear that America (and its friends) will not be intimidated by them. Again, Americans (and allies) are ‘good’ and the enemy is ‘evil’; the sharp contrasts continue through his discourse even after the invasion, and the start of a new government. This always reminds Americans, and the world, that an evil enemy is still out there. In his conclusion to his 2004 address, he stated:
Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better (Bush 2004b).

Here, the presupposition that is it *because* of America that the world is a better place. This implies America’s good nature, its necessity to fight evil, and the outcome of the world as a ‘better place’. Again, a very simplistic binary is presented: good and evil. Bush’s language, and that of his administration, are full of contrasts. They surround what it means to be us-good-Americans, and what it is to me them-evil-terrorists. The stark black and white categories make it easier to ignore the complexities behind them, so ‘everyday’ citizens can rally together against ‘them’, simply because they are evil. Void of political intent and motivation, the evil enemy has come to attack the good and peaceful Americans. They are barbaric, warmongers who only want to destroy all that is free and peaceful. The discourse does not leave any room for anything in between,. This prepares the nation to rally collectively against them, while they unite as Americans. The identity of Americans is presented as constituting everything that the terrorists are not; and vice versa. Once again, Othering takes centre stage in the discourse of the Bush administration.

**Geographical uncertainty: danger is everywhere**

Earlier in this chapter, a quote by Ferraro appeared: “the major impact of the discourse of fear is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out of control’” (Ferraro in Altheide 2003: 995). The perception that the enemy is everywhere was a result of a new era, which made a big difference in rallying Americans together against a common Other. One attack may have scared Americans, but the fear needed to be long lasting in order to create legitimacy for long lasting policies. Below are prime examples in the days, weeks and months after 9/11 that speak to the quote above. The goal is to scare the public into believing the enemy is everywhere, and that because the geography of danger has changed, nowhere is safe.

Rumsfeld makes this explicit in an interview with ABC just days after the attacks. He says:
To be realistic we have to recognize a terrorist can attack at any time at any place it may be an airplane one day, it may be a ship or a subway or a car. Therefore the only thing we can do is what the president said. We have to wage a war it has to be taken to them where they are, and it will be a broadly based sustained effort, not in a matter of days or weeks but over years (Rumsfeld 2001c).

Not only is Rumsfeld being vague in his lexical choices, such as ‘broadly based sustained effort’, and that it will take a number of years, but he also expresses the geographical implications. They can be anywhere, at any time, at any place. He emphasizes what this can mean, instilling fear in every aspect of life, i.e. they can be in airplanes, ships, subways, even cars. The fear-mongering continues: within the same interview, Rumsfeld suggests the terrorists are well financed and organized. This is suggestive that rather than the very loose network that constitutes Al Qaeda, they are very organized and pose a real danger on a daily basis:

We will need to do a host of things and I should underline, these people, these terrorists, are clever and purposeful and well financed. They can’t function without the tolerance of other states. Countries around the world have even harbouring and permitting the terrorist activities. They need to be dealt with as well (Rumsfeld 2001c).

Cheney echoes the vague assertions about the lifespan of the potential GWOT:

This is going to be a struggle that the US is going to be involved with for the foreseeable future, there’s not going to be an end date…it will require constant vigilance on our parts… a major effort and use of military force (Cheney 2001b).

Above Cheney makes clear that Americans should be prepared to be involved in this conflict for the long haul. The danger of the enemy is presented as being dispersed and as there is not a single geographic area to target, the only ‘solution’ is to essentially attack everywhere if needed. Again, he is vague. However, he says this will be a major effort and involve military force – not specifying how. Geography comes into play once more when Bush asserts that the enemy knows ‘no border’:

Many world leaders understand that that could have easily--the attack could have easily happened on their land. And they also understand that this
enemy knows no border (Bush 2001c).

Bush also asserts that this could have happened to any other nation, as there are no more borders in this new dangerous world full of global terrorism. Below, Cheney puts the nation on alert to the fear of more attacks:

The direct attack on our nation has put us on notice that the enemy is resourceful and ruthless. We have to assume there will be more attacks. That is the only safe way for us to proceed (Cheney 2001a).

Cheney presupposes that there will be more attacks, and tells the American population so, ensuring to keep them alert. Again, he uses negative adjectives to describe the enemy as they are ‘ruthless’. Similarly, below, Bush goes a step further to argue that the nation is still under attack. He also argues the war is also at home in America. Nowhere is safe is the central message:

But there is another front in this war, and the front is here at home. It's something that obviously we're not used to in America. We've had oceans which have protected us over our history. Except for Pearl Harbor, we've never really been hit before. And yet, on September 11, this great land came under attack, and it's still under attack as we speak (Bush 2001f).

Further assertions about the dangerous enemy being everywhere, are made by Tom Ridge in his description of them as ‘shadow soldiers, that hide amongst the American people’. The vocabulary used exaggerates the situation, since they are described to be lurking in the shadows, everywhere:

The people we are combating are shadow soldiers, and I think we have to look at them that way. They were among us; they turned a commercial airliner into a weapon. And this is just not the kinds of threats that this country has been accustomed to dealing with. But we're working together, we are dealing with them and we will deal with them (Ridge 2001).

Finally, Ashcroft presents an imminent and serious threat, his language suggesting grave danger for America:
The American people face a serious, immediate and ongoing threat from terrorism. At this moment American service men and women are risking their lives to battle the enemy overseas. (Ashcroft 2001).

His language is vague because he says both that the threat is immediate, and also that it is ongoing. The language is meant to cover all situations possible: what America should do now, and what it should continue to prepare for.

The language is chosen to keep Americans on edge, preparing for an attack at anytime. The geographical uncertainty of the enemy makes it impossible to pinpoint a site of attack. Danger is presented to be everywhere and anywhere. Nowhere is safe: one’s car, a subway train, a plane, the streets, and so on. Because danger is so dispersed, the only way to combat it is to monitor the world as if it is your own backyard. This is the proposition the United States made as a foreign policy objective when they declared that threats ‘over there’ should be regarded the same way as ‘over here’, legitimizing their intervention around the globe.

**New enemy, new policies**

What is the solution to all of this? New policies to combat the new world of risks and dangers, of course. After the attacks of 9/11 were framed as the start of a new era filled with new dangers lurking in every corner, the implications of this were that the current policies are not suitable to deal with the new threats. Geographically, there is no limit to terror spatially, and thus Bush called for a revamping of policies directed at terrorism, and the way America conducts war in the new ‘post 9/11 era’.

Rumsfeld argues that because of 9/11, the nation is on high alert, and everything is being done to implement new ‘arrangements’:

> We should all have a heightened sense of awareness…we have a whole set of rules that have existed since decades and what we need to do and what we are doing is to review those and ask ourselves how we have to shift our arrangements now (Rumsfeld 2001c).

This type of argumentation that the entire set of rules that existed are no longer effective, legitimizes the creation of new policies and rules due to the events of 9/11. In a separate
speech, some of these specifics are revealed by Rumsfeld. The new policies reflect the new world as he calls for a ‘distinctly different’ way of handling threat:

We intend to put them on the defensive, to disrupt terrorist networks and remove their sanctuaries and their support systems. This requires a distinctly different approach from any war that we have fought before (Rumsfeld 2001a).

As Bush introduced the ‘anti-terrorist’ law (the Patriot Act) into legislation, he emphasizes that these new laws will take into account ‘new realities and dangers’. Again the situation is being framed within the context of a new world and his argument is that new laws are needed accordingly:

The bill before me takes account of the new realities and dangers posed by modern terrorists (Bush 2001g).

Colin Powell then later confirms this new bill, and emphasizes that the government will do everything and anything it takes to come up with ‘new policies’ - the argument following the new dangers:

… we will come up with new policies. We'll come up with new procedures. We'll come up with new organizations. We'll come up with whatever it takes to prevail on this conflict, as the president has said (Powell 2001).

Again, on the issue of the Patriot Act, Bush said:

Inside the United States, where the war began, we must continue to give our homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to defend us. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which allows federal law enforcement to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets” (Bush 2004b).

President Bush presented the Patriot Act as a necessity – an ‘essential’ tool. He emphasized that it would help track terrorists and seize their assets, but failed to mention what that would mean for civil rights liberties for Americans. In 2004, when the Patriot Act was set to expire, President Bush in his State of the Union address said:

Key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year. (Applause.)
The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule. Our law enforcement needs this vital legislation to protect our citizens. You need to renew the Patriot Act (Bush 2004b).

He is emphasizing the danger of the terrorist threat, by claiming it will not expire when the legislation does and therefore there is a ‘need’ to renew the Act for the safety and security of Americans. Bush also capitalized on how the attacks of 9/11 presented an ‘opportunity’ to revamp US foreign policy. Speaking in reference to Middle Eastern policy, Bush sees this is a window to cooperate with other states and argues that terrorism should be a cause to bring all together against a common enemy:

Let me say that, in terms of foreign policy and in terms of the world, this horrible tragedy has provided us with an interesting opportunity.... I think there are some interesting opportunities to shake terrorism loose from sponsor states (Bush 2001i).

Because the enemy is framed as new and different, Vice President Cheney also uses this frame to persuasively argue that the diplomatic ways, and treaties are a thing of the past as the new enemy will not understand from these. There will not be any negotiations he asserts, and again pinpoints the need for new means to deal with the enemy, ultimately ending in their total destruction:

...In the terrorist, however, we have enemies with nothing to defend. A group like Al Qaeda cannot be deterred or placated or reasoned with at a conference table. For this reason, the war against terror will not end in a treaty. There will be no summit meeting or negotiations with terrorists. The conflicts can only end with their complete and permanent destruction and in victory for the United States and the cause of freedom (Cheney 2001a).

Cheney also describes the Other as those with ‘nothing to defend’ once more removing intention from their actions. The choice of negative words to describe the enemy as those who cannot be reasoned with, or come to a treaty agreement upon, confirms that they are not the ‘same’ as Americans or enemies in the past. Additionally, an enemy with no geographical location cannot be contained or deterred. Ridge also expresses the urgency in the new policies as he summarizes Bush’s intentions and the creation of the department of Homeland Security – a significant change to the structure of government. Framed within the new context of September 11th, he assures the people that new
resolutions are being sought:

President Bush immediately met with his foreign policy experts on the National Security Council and he also took the unprecedented step of creating a Homeland Security Council … I assure you were working hard prior to September 10, but as of September 11 working night and day, working with you to provide for the common defense, to provide for our domestic security (Ridge 2001).

Perhaps one of the most subtle, but important policy changes, was Bush’s desire to go after anyone/nation/organization supporting or not turning in – terrorists. This is potentially a wide range of nations as it is so vague. Hence, the door is open to intervention anywhere in the world. Cheney emphasizes this point in what is different now (post 9/11):

what's different here, what's changed in terms of U.S. policy is the president's determination to also go after those nations and organizations and people that lend support to these terrorist operators (Cheney 2001).

The presentation of a new enemy is very important. If the justification that the enemy is new and the policies are outdated can be presented, then the solution would be new policies. This comes in the way of a Global War on Terror and a pledge to go after not only the terrorists themselves, but any nation that has any connection to the terrorists whether it be financial, or harbouring them. 9/11 was presented as so sudden and severe that it was seen as a total shock to the foreign policy makers (in America, at least). The groundwork is being set here for a dramatic change in foreign policy as demonstrated above when Bush and his team claim that a distinctly different approach is needed.

**Media Framing**

There have been several media studies done in depth, such as Kull et al. on the language used in the mainstream news after 9/11. This research is not an in depth media analysis; this would be an entirely different research project on its own. However, it is important to draw attention to the fact that media does matter, and the ‘tabloid geopolitics’, that Debrinx and others discuss, is real, and has real effects. For more detailed media analysis, there are several good articles covering the media aspect in
depth such as many of the projects conducted by Policy on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)/Knowledge Networks (KN); articles by Kull et al. 2002, Anker 2005, Edy, Meirick and Patrick 2007, and Stroud and Sparrow 2011.

The following are a few select examples of the media’s reaction just days after the attacks when Bush had declared a global war against the ‘evil’ terrorists. The point is to draw attention to the language that trickles down into the media and is used by journalists on air in the major television stations in America, to have a glimpse into the importance of media, and to call attention to further critical discourse analysis on this matter.

The following were taken from news broadcasts from CNN, NBC, FOX and CBS. NBC reports on September 11, 2001 state the following in a conversation on the news between reporters (NBC News 2001):

we are at war;

it will cost us in loss of life and it will cost us in terms of our psychological security that we have in this country we are going to have to revisit a lot of our freedoms as a result of this kind of a attack;

national security event of an untold magnitude that this country will have to deal with;

this place [America] remains an enormous target in the eyes of a lot of people and we are so vulnerable because of all those things that make us so great: our freedoms and our sense of security that we have, America has been changed today by all this.

The above report by commentators for the NBC not only echoes, almost verbatim, much of the rhetoric the Bush administration was using after the attack, but the same rhetorical devices can be seen. What is more important however, is to note that already, from day one, the media was preparing Americans to “revisit a lot of their freedoms”, as they are now “at war” and it is because an enemy filled with hate has attacked the because of the things that make America great, i.e. freedoms and sense of security”. The immediate reaction is not to question any political motive behind the attacks, nor to find out information about the ‘platform’ of the terrorists, but to conclude at once that
America is a great nation that naturally would attract hateful enemies.

On CBS, in an interview with former US ambassador to the United Nations on September 11, 2001, diplomat Richard Holbrooke speaking to Dan Rather is asked about his opinion and analysis on what has happened on 9/11. He responds:

> When America’s resolve is there, when Americans are united...like on Pearl Harbour...when we rally international support behind us, we have always prevailed, and I have no doubt we will prevail here. There will be consequences – the world is going to change... From big things like our mindset and our international leadership, this will not be a day like others. The world will change because of what has happened today.

Specifically of importance is the second part of his answer when he frames the issue as a day different from any other, a day when the world changed, and the impact for Americans, i.e. their ‘mindset’ must change.

Fox News on September 16, 2001 (Fox News 2001), just days after the attacks had a panel of ‘experts’ on their news to discuss 9/11. Brit Hume, Bill Kristol (of PNAC), and Richard Gephardt (the house leader at the time) discussed what 9/11 meant for America, and Americans. Bill Kristol immediately responded:

> Action is the proper response to evil.

Brit Hume echoed this thought and added in:

> I certainly think it has brought us back to some very basic way of looking at the world, that there is good and evil.

Both Hume and Kristol parrot the Bush administrations binaries on good and evil. Later in the program, attention is paid to the ‘new’ war as argued by the Bush administration. The house leader Richard Gephardt says:

> We’re in a new world and we have to think anew, we have to open our minds to new ideas and find the right answers.
Further, he also repeats the framing of the issue around an attack on humanity and civilization, not just a territorial attack. Following this, he reiterates the vagueness of the war as long and difficult, against a new type of enemy:

I think people all over the world now know that this was a strike not just against American but against civilization and against humanity;

A long complicated difficult war against a very unique and new kind of opponent.

Finally, CNN news coverage (CNN News 2001) just three days after the attack, on September 14 2001, covered discussions with Bill Bennett, a conservative American pundit who was being interviewed on the day of the prayer service for 9/11 victims. He states this day as a ‘moment of clarity’ and goes on to explain:

Things that were problems before are not now in the hearts and minds of Americans because things have been put in perspective we now are taking acknowledgement of what’s most important. The lives of Americans are being changed. The best of us is coming to the surface.

The CNN news reporter then asks him ‘how do you explain how something like this could happen?’ He responds:

We’re going to have to re-learn things we forgot. First you explain it is a dangerous world. Second you explain that there is such a thing as good and such a thing as evil, and we saw them on display on Tuesday. Third, you explain that the US although we have had a tremendous 10 years, virtually living in a bubble of peace and prosperity. That bubble has burst – its over. And it is now a dangerous world in a way that a lot of people have forgotten.

Here, Mr. Bennett reiterates how dangerous this new world is. Not only that, but similar to the Bush administration’s claims, that the ‘bubble’ that Americans were previously living in for so long – immune to the dangers of the world – has been burst. Finally, he makes it clear that there is good and that there is evil in the world. These words were used during the Cold War, but they resurfaced uniformly across media and government discourses immediately after the 9/11 attacks. He continues with his analysis:
It’s a dangerous place [the world], the US is a country hated by a lot of people in the world, and we must never lose our vigilance, and must pay much attention to our defenses, intelligence and capabilities.

Here, Bennett reiterates that the world is a dangerous place, and the reasons for attack upon America are implicit to be of jealousy and hate as it is simply a country ‘hated by a lot of people’. Again, political motivations of any kind are not discussed.

The importance of this is to simply demonstrate that within hours to days after the attacks, the media quickly took up the Bush administrations stance, and framed the issue in the same was that the administration did: a new war, a new era, fighting a new and different enemy and above all an irrational attack by evil doers on what it is to be ‘American’. The ‘experts’ and those being chosen for interviews at the most critical times of coverage, in the immediate days following the attacks, all had a unified view on the matter. In fact, it seems that this was the ‘American’ view to take. According to the Bush administration it should be understood as an attack on American lifestyles and freedoms, and it was clear from day one that it was being framed to be understood as a new era. It was no longer post Cold War, it was now post 9/11. The media did not hesitate to follow suit and repeat quickly the discourses coming from the top down from the Bush administration.

**Unified by fear**

Earlier in this chapter, fear was discussed as a unifying force. The experience of going through something together as a collective, even if negative, can end in that collective becoming more cohesive. This is what Herb (2004) refers to as territorial bonding; fear created an emotional bond between Americans, and to their land as it was physically attacked. Fear and hate unite one group against another. In this case, the collective is understood to be the entire American population, and the Other are the terrorists. In order for this unified collective to remain this way, and continue support for further policy, it was essential that they remained in a state of fear, and remember why it was that they came together to unite. The following are examples of how the Bush administration’s discourse promoted this unification.
Speaking at the prayer service for 9/11 victims just three days after the attacks, Bush said:

Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called, "the warm courage of national unity." This is a unity of every faith and every background. This has joined together political parties and both houses of Congress. It is evident in services of prayer and candlelight vigils and American flags, which are displayed in pride and waved in defiance. Our unity is a kinship of grief and a steadfast resolve to prevail against our enemies. And this unity against terror is now extending across the world (Bush 2001b).

The nation is seen to have suddenly unified. He emphasizes that this crosses religious, ethnic, and party politics. He also says that this is a unity of grief, reminding Americans about what it is that has united them. It is emotional language, and he ends by reminding everyone that this unity will help them prevail against the enemy. Below, Powell attributes the unification of the Senate and the Congress due to the crisis at hand. The fear or further attacks, and the sorrow the of event itself has unified even political parties he claims:

We're very grateful for the resolution that has come from the Senate and the support that the Congress is giving to our efforts. It shows the United States as a nation, as a people coming together in this time of crisis and showing our determination to move forward deliberately and decisively to deal with this particular incident, as well as the broader threat represented by world terrorism (Powell 2001b).

Cheney uses this an as opportunity to argue that American have been divided for a long time, but they are now one as they proceed to tackle the enemy:

But I think there is a unity and a spirit out there that I have not seen for a long time in this country. I see it on Capitol Hill between Republicans and Democrats. I see it in the workers who were cleaning up the mess in New York where the president visited yesterday. I see it in the people I've talked with (Cheney 2001).

Cheney also uses emotional language as he makes references to people who helped clean up the streets of New York, and describes it as a story and makes personal references to people he has talked to himself.
The American people are united. They're united in the resolve to help heal the nation. But they're also united in the understanding that we've entered into a new day, and we'll deal with it (Bush 2001f).

Ultimately, Bush asserts that it is the unification that will lead to Americans prevailing under the circumstances. He divides the world once more into good and evil, Americans being on the side of good, and praises them for their remarkable spirit and resolve.

We're learning about terror and evil, and our country is responding forcefully. The American people have got remarkable spirit and remarkable resolve. We are strong, we are united and we are determined to prevail (Bush 2001f).

Those who were not unified, and who were not compliant to Bush’s policies, were not focused on in the immediate aftermath. The newspapers, media, administration officials and most others focused on a united America; united against the other, driven by hate, sorrow and fear.

**Conclusion**

What does CDA reveal? That what is understood to be common sense is not in fact ‘the way it is’. It is constructed as such so that it becomes naturalized. First the set up of a new era and a dangerous and unknown enemy. Next they are plotting America’s demise; they have no political intentions, and only hearts full of darkness and hatred for the American ‘way of life’. Following this, they could be anywhere, in someone’s backyard, on a plane, train, bus, or car; they are hidden amongst the American public and abroad. The constructions build up to create an enemy so scary that the only way to deal with them is to regard everywhere on earth as the American homeland and thus anywhere is subject to American attack. All of these discourses create a certain narrative that becomes the justification and legitimacy points for policy. For example, as it has been demonstrated, an enemy that is hidden and everywhere will require American military resources to track it down and defeat it. This involves conflict and war, which means the American taxpayer’s approval is preferred (although not required). In order for this to happen, Americans need to be afraid and vulnerable when it comes to their safety, so that the solution to their insecurities will be offered by the US government: ‘we’ll go after them’ to ‘make America safer’, and so on. This
legitimates the American government to use military force. Not only that, but as demonstrated above, several quotes also imply that Americans should be willing to ‘give us’ or ‘reconsider’ some of their freedoms in the short term (for example, their privacy) for longer term security and freedom overall (from the terrorists).

What CDA also reveals is that what is left out is equally as important. As demonstrated throughout, the omission of the political aims and objectives of the ‘enemy’ is never mentioned. In fact, it is quite the opposite: they are understood to be driven by hatred and envy alone, because they ‘can’t stand’ the ‘American way of life’. They are reduced to irrational monsters not comparable to Americans; peaceful, freedom loving, strong, etc. The question is repeatedly asked to various members of Bush’s administration: specifically Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush himself, about why the terrorists would do such a thing? The response is repeated over and over again that they hate Americans, and their way of life. This builds up an image of an irrational, hateful enemy, which Americans can point a finger at, and build rage of their own against. Their fear combined with their anger toward the enemy hence unites them. The script is then ready to implement policy. Unknowingly, they are legitimizing American imperialism as they stand behind Bush in his policy toward the GWOT, and treating ‘over there’ like ‘over here’, further legitimizing military force and violence.

Central to the critical geopolitical model is unpacking taken for granted beliefs. How did Americans come to understand what (or who) good and evil is? The focus of this chapter has been on pinpointing the construction of a ‘change in danger’; the perception that danger is everywhere, posing a real risk to Americans. If an American citizen who knows little to nothing about American foreign policy, or Al Qaeda for example, and lived through 9/11 hears their President and the media repeatedly say ‘they hate us’, they hate our ‘freedoms’, our ‘way of life’, a social construct is created. This is evident in a large number of polls conducted between 9/11 and the start of the Iraq war. Many Americans felt so much rage because they were told that a group of irrational hate filled people hate them and what they stand for. Americans were left to feel victims to irrational attacks targeted at civilians, removing the political intent and attack to the US government and its policies. They were ready to give up their freedoms,
to in turn, protect their freedoms. They were prepared to exchange some civil liberties for security because they were scared to death. Most the frightening was done by the government and media with constant references to the new dangers of the world, rather than actual terrorist events. They were also prepared to back their government in an illegal war against Iraq. The beginnings of this are in the framing and how these perceptions are created, which is what this chapter demonstrated. The importance in the choice of words, a political exercise, is telling of the kind of ‘new world’ Bush and his administration wanted Americans to perceive. The vagueness about the enemy being anywhere and everywhere, and a potential counter attack lasting years, decades even was set up in the early days after 9/11. Presuppositions and assumptions fill the language of the Bush administration as they ‘explain’ what 9/11 meant, and what its consequences are. Prevalent again is contrasting ‘us’ with ‘them’ in building a national identity around what the other isn’t. Perhaps the sharpest of contrast, good and evil, divide the world into the simplest of binaries with serious and complex implications for international relations.

The significance of this chapter is the discourse that put in place foundations for a narrative on the ‘new’ world America faced, and the perceived change in danger and threats to not only the US, but the international community. Now that this frame had been introduced, the rest of the story in the lead up to the GWOT fitted perfectly into the new world that the Bush administration created through its carefully chosen discourse. The following chapter will continue this narrative with a focus on the implications of the discourses surround the Global War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq.
Chapter Six
The Global War on Terror

6.1 Introduction

The narrative has come to the final chapter of this thesis, and the final chapter of CDA. So far, several important things have been made clear and understood through a CDA analysis. First, in Chapter Four, it was evident that the discourse of an American grand imperial strategy was not a reaction to the events that took place on September 11, 2001. The beginnings of an aggressive form of American power started to form as early as the 1990s, as was evidenced through the examples of documents, speeches, and publications referenced in Chapter Four. CDA has also revealed that the key influential people behind President Bush’s foreign policy have interacted with one another before, both inside and outside the government in previous administrations. It was their key ideas that were brought to the forefront after the 9/11 attacks, and created the foundations of the Bush Doctrine. Understanding that these foreign policy initiatives were not a reaction to 9/11, but were in fact pre-planned, chapter five revealed through CDA, that a specific narrative of a new world was created and the discourse suggests that this was due to the 9/11 attacks. Further, the Bush administration asked we now see everything through the new ‘prism’ of 9/11, warranting a series of changes in foreign policy, and ultimately a war in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the changing perceptions of geography were created, this provided the basis for the rest of the narrative for a GWOT, a war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and several other policy changes, including the Bush Doctrine initiatives (pre-emption, unilateralism, regime change) to fit into the wider story. This brings this research to this chapter where the final part of the narrative fits in.

This chapter focuses on the discourses that defined the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Doty argues that the importance of ‘how’ questions are that they “examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects and objects” which creates specific interpretations of the world, while simultaneously excluding others (1996: 4). Those who use CDA maintain that the use of language is both a conscious and intentional decision; therefore, language is a powerful tool in constructing our reality, and in understanding power relations. As Jackson argues, language has a
“reality-making” effect; meaning it has a way of constructing reality and not only reflecting it (Jackson 2005: 23). Language is important because it “affects perception, cognition and emotion, it inevitably also affects concrete political action; it has consequences for social processes and structure” (Ibid). Therefore, this chapter looks at the discourses and seeks to answer a part of the question of ‘how’ Bush tried to legitimate American imperialism, with specific focus in the discourses surrounding the Global War on Terror, and the implementation of these in the invasion of Iraq.

Continuing with the same methodology used in Chapters Four and Five, this chapter will focus analysis on the discourses that most clearly demonstrate the legitimacy of American power in the context of the GWOT. To summarize, this will mainly include four main linguistic tools in discourse analysis, which can be found in the methodology section. They are: lexical style, implicitness, rhetorical devices, and argumentation. The data for this chapter is comprised of mainly quotes by George W. Bush, and policy documents such as the National Security Strategy 2002 and the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001, as evidence of the discourses used to legitimate American imperialism, specifically surrounding the GWOT. The data ranges from September 11, 2001 to the lead up to the Iraq war in 2003, and shortly afterwards. The quotes and excerpts used are representative of the types of discourse used to legitimate military action in the Global War on Terror, specifically in the invasion of Iraq.

It begins with a critical discourse analysis of the Global War on Terror, which is divided into ‘themes’ which represent the discourses chosen to represent the way in which the use of American power is justified. The discourses represented in this chapter are: just war discourses, humanitarian discourses, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, pre-emption, ensuring no rival to American power, and unilateralism. These are parallel to some of the discourses in Chapter Four, which show that in fact these claims were not a reaction to 9/11, but rather a continuation of the policy ideas we saw emerge in the 1990s. By analyzing these discourses in parallel, it will become evident that they are in fact the same, or very similar, to the claims of the 1990s, except now the language has been made to fit the narrative of a new world that 9/11 brought with it, as outlined in the previous chapter (Chapter Five). In the second section, attention is paid to the role of the
war in Iraq in American grand strategy and the two main themes are perpetual war, and the intentional confusion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein with Osama Bin Laden and 9/11, in order to justify an invasion.

6.2 The Global War on Terror: A Critical Discourse Analysis

This section looks at discourses used to create legitimacy for the Global War on Terror, and for the invasion of Iraq. The discourses are divided into major themes, which are: just war, humanitarian discourses, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, pre-emption, unilateralism and the belief that there should be no rival to American power. Using CDA, this section seeks to draw attention to specific discourses and how they worked in ways to create legitimacy for Bush’s foreign policy agenda, specifically in regards to the GWOT. The assumptions expressed by Bush and his administration, found in speeches and official policy documents form ideologies about the world, and more specifically, America’s role in it especially post 9/11. Richard Jackson writes that:

The war on terrorism therefore, is simultaneously a set of actual practice – war, covert operations, agencies and institutions – and an accompanying series of assumption, beliefs, justifications and narratives – it is an entire language or discourse (2005: 8).

CGP seeks to expose the social construction behind these ideologies, and how, in turn, it creates identities (good/evil, us/them), and categories of inside and outside, legitimizing military action. CDA compliments this approach methodologically by taking apart discourses in order to understand how they work in ways to serve specific ideologies. Paying special attention to the major themes of CGP, especially the power of ideas through discourse, and identity and difference (which will be especially important in this section), this section will provide a critical reading of the Bush administration’s discourses.

A real effort was made at legitimizing the GWOT, Iraq, the creation of Guantanamo Bay prison, and the Patriot Act, to name the major changes. Therefore, this is a project in understanding how, and through which discourses the Bush administration attempted to create legitimacy for these changes. These discourses matter...
as they constituted major legitimizing points for Bush’s GWOT and the Iraq invasion. This is of importance as the social constructions, represented in these discourses, naturalize ideologies that go on to create justifications for the use of force, and further legitimate the need for American power to deal with the situation. As a key component to imperialism – the ability to project great military force - the following discourses serve as examples as to how an open ended script for war was justified by the GWOT, and left the United States with a blank cheque for American empire.

**Just War**

Post 9/11, Osama Bin Laden could not be found, and therefore Afghanistan but, more importantly Iraq, created distractions from the failure to deal with a missing Bin Laden, and came to represent major actions in the perpetual Global War on Terror. In order to gather support, Bush began to use ‘just war’ discourses, which re-introduced the concept into political discourse in the United States. As Hardt and Negri write:

>The concept of justice serves to universalize war beyond any particular interests toward the interest of humanity as a whole. Justice tends to generalize war beyond its proper scope and confuse it with other social realms, such as morality and religion (2004: 15).

Just war doctrine is a disputed concept because it entirely depends on who defines what is just. There are three main components to just war theory: Jus ad bellum, which refers to actions before war is declared – the justice of war; jus in bello, which is just and fair conduct during war, and lastly, jus post bello, which is the responsibility and accountability of parties after war (Moseley 2009). The section that is relevant to this research is jus ad bellum – pre-war actions taken by the Bush government. To this, there are six further criteria. They are: having a just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the ends being proportional to the means (Ibid).

The international community, while generally supporting a “War on Terror”, saw the war in Iraq to be largely illegitimate. However, in the view of Bush and his administration, the discourse would prove that they believed in their cause and believed they were fighting a just war. Each criterion is demonstrated by Bush below.
(i) Having a just cause

Bush repeatedly justified the war in Iraq, the centerpiece to the GWOT, in terms of having a just cause. The goal of America was to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger” (Bush 2003b). He justifies his cause by demonizing Saddam, emphasizing Saddam’s contempt for peace, and his willingness to put innocents in harm’s way:

America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military; a final atrocity against his people (Bush 2003b).

In the above statement, Bush is using argumentation to provide his audience with ‘facts’ to support his argument that Saddam Hussein needs to be removed, by arguing that Saddam uses innocents as shields for his military. The quote below from the 2002 State of the Union demonstrates implicitness in his use of words:

We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos where they laugh about the loss of innocent life (Bush 2002).

Here, Bush chose to say that the ‘enemy’ is ‘laughing about the loss of life’. In a very vague statement, with no pointed evidence, Bush implies that the enemy is simply laughing at the loss of life, removing any political intention. This would imply they have no aims but to seek entertainment and joy from the loss of American life. This creates a specific view of the ‘enemy’ that makes it easier for the public to ‘hate’, and therefore, legitimize military action against. Below, in the 2004 State of the Union address, after the initial invasion, President Bush emphasizes that the war was a just cause by declaring,

The work of building a new Iraq is hard, and it is right. And America has always been willing to do what it takes for what is right (Bush 2004b).

(ii) Last resort

The second criterion is that war be used as a last resort. Several of Bush’s statements confirm that from his perspective, invading Iraq was a last resort. He begins
his argument in 2002, the year prior to the invasion. The following set of quotes emphasize the negative actions and attributes of the Iraqi government in his lexical style, while emphasizing American ‘goodness’ and innocence. Speaking in Cincinnati, Bush warns:

The world has also tried economic sanctions -- and watched Iraq use billions of dollars in illegal oil revenues to fund more weapons purchases, rather than providing for the needs of the Iraqi people (Bush 2002c).

The world has tried limited military strikes to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities -- only to see them openly rebuilt, while the regime again denies they even exist (Bush 2002c).

The world has tried no-fly zones to keep Saddam from terrorizing his own people -- and in the last year alone, the Iraqi military has fired upon American and British pilots more than 750 times (Bush 2002c).

In the examples above, Bush is really emphasizing that the ‘world’, which consists of American allies, is inherently good and united in its goals to try every means possible to disarm Saddam without the necessity of war. He also emphasizes that they did this in order to stop Saddam from ‘terrorizing his own people’, highlighting Saddam Hussein’s negative attributes. He continues by saying:

After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon (Bush 2002c).

Again, President Bush emphasizes “we” to group those (who represent ‘us’) against the enemy, Saddam (“them”). Not only is he marking a clear divide, in this instance he is also using argumentation again as he presents facts, such as the avenues that have been tried (containment, sanctions, inspections, etc) and the end result is still a negative statement that Saddam is closer to a nuclear weapon. As we now know, there were no such weapons, and even at the time of this statement, solid proof was not offered for the ‘weapon’ that Saddam was developing; only speculation. Statements made in 2003 to the lead up to the invasion, and finally, on the evening of the invasion itself by Bush, maintain that everything was done to peacefully stop Saddam Hussein, and war has
become the last option left:

Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations and for the opinion of the world (Bush 2003).

In the above statement, Bush uses an argumentative form of language in which he states that the United Nations gave Saddam chances to disarm, using facts to support his point. Following this, he uses vague implicit statements to show that Saddam shows “utter contempt” for the UN and the world. These are emotive statements used to provoke negative feelings towards the ‘enemy’. Choosing to use specific words, he also tries to emphasize that everything was done in requirement to justify a just war against Iraq. In his final statements to Americans, the United Nations, Iraq, and indeed the international community, Bush states:

Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands…The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours (Bush 2003c).

In this statement, the President uses argumentation in which he specifically makes reference again to how the United States and the United Nations have tried to disarm Saddam using diplomatic avenues. In his own defense of potentially going to war without the support of the UN, he also makes points that he is forced into this decision by the unwillingness of the UN to “do it’s job”, again supporting his argument that war is a last resort.

It is evident that Bush uses a variety of linguistic devices to gather support; he is also arguing that war is an inevitable last resort, and tries to justify his cause of just war. He uses a mix of argumentation by reference to facts, such as UN Security Council resolutions; an emphasis of the positive attributes of America and the negative attributes of Saddam Hussein in his lexical style; the implicitness in his speeches about the
thoughts and actions of the ‘enemy’ in attempts to prove that war is a last resort, making it a legitimate and just war.

(iii) War declared by a proper authority

This criterion does not need any evidence as the war in Iraq was initiated by George W. Bush, commander in chief of the United States army; and President of the United States of America.

(iv) Possessing right intention

Among the reasons for going to war with Iraq were humanitarian violations by the Iraqi government, their alleged possession of WMD, and posing a real threat to America and its neighbours. Amongst the intentions for war, the two most important were to maintain world peace (as Iraq was presented as a grave threat to this), and, of course, it was an important step in winning the Global War on Terror. Statements supporting these points are below:

In all of these efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to follow a process. It is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world (Bush 2003).

Bush’s lexical style emphasizes America’s inherent ‘good’ qualities, and is advocating that America is selfless in that it wishes to answer a call to a greater purpose, that of abolishing threats to the whole world. Below is a further demonstration of his argument of right intention to pursue Iraq.

Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people (Bush 2003).

**Below, he continues with his emphasis that America only wants peace; that America is pure in its good intentions, and it is with this intention that they must go to war.**

We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all (Bush 2003).
Once more below, America’s positive qualities are emphasized. America is “strong”, “honourable”, and that they, selflessly, sacrifice to save others.

America is a strong nation and honorable in the use of our strength. We exercise power without conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers (Bush 2003).

In the examples above, much of Bush’s linguistic devices are in his lexical style and the emphasis of positive American actions and intentions, such as America as ‘strong’, ‘honorable’, and selfless.

(v) Having a reasonable chance of success

The fifth criterion for pre-war actions in just war is that the operation will have a reasonable chance of success. At the time, Bush assumed that the war would be easier than it was. However, analyzing only the discourse at the time with the knowledge available, Bush presented a case for guaranteed success. At the time he declared war on Iraq, he said:

My fellow citizens, the dangers to our country and the world will be overcome. We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others. And we will prevail (Bush 2003b).

Here, once more, Bush is using very modest reasons, such as ‘bringing freedom to others’ as part of his reasoning to go to war in Iraq. This highlights America’s good intentions, while ensuring that America will ‘win’ the war. Again, he ensures the United States will prevail:

And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military, and we will prevail (Bush 2003).

(vi) The ends proportional to the means

The final condition to jus ad bellum is the justification of the ends being proportional to the means. President Bush reassures the public that everything will be done in order to spare innocent lives and that it will be a targeted operation. The following statement, made at the 2003 State of the Union address demonstrates this:
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent (Bush 2003 state of the union)

Following this, on the eve of the invasion, Bush states in a special message on television declaring war on Iraq:

I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict. And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment (Bush 2003b).

Here, Bush uses very vague statements to support his point, saying that the mission may be “longer and more difficult” than predicted – not really clarifying what that could potentially mean in real terms. He continues by saying it will require “sustained commitment”. This leaves room for an open ended, perpetual war. Bush, intentionally, uses vague statements as not to put off the population from the costs of war, while supporting his point that this is necessary and the means are proportional. He also deploys rhetorical devices, such as metaphors, in explaining that Iraq is “harsh” terrain, the “size of California”, as to provide some imagery that Americans can relate to in his argument.

Through the lens of George W. Bush and his administration, the six criteria for just war were fulfilled and, therefore, by their judgment, they successfully made a case for a just invasion of Iraq. Kofi Anan famously declared it an illegal war (long after it took place), and the United Nations did not support the invasion (BBC 2004). However, according to Bush, America was leading a just mission, as a last resort, to save the world from an evil tyrant. His logic led him to believe he had made a compelling argument to the American public, and to the world, for a justifiable war, coupled by the fact that in his view the United Nations wasn’t ‘doing its job’, leaving him no choice. He did this by using language that is vague, making unclear statements about the length of war, the intentions of the ‘enemy’, and their inherent ‘hatred’ for American freedoms.
In paying specific attention to the language used, CDA always considers how power is at work. A key part of this, as van Dijk (1993) argues, is influencing the mind. The portrayal of Saddam Hussein as not only a dictator, but a person with deep seeded hatred and defiance for the American way of life, is an emotive way to gather support and rally Americans against an Other. The binaries that are created through discourse legitimize military action, and, simultaneously, delegitimize Saddam Hussein and Iraqi regime. He also uses argumentation as a linguistic device, and presents ‘facts’ to support his ideas such as the number of times Saddam has defied the UN Security Council or the atrocities committed against his own people. Above all, Bush frequently emphasizes positive American actions, values or principles while demonizing Saddam and emphasizing negative traits. Richard Jackson argues that central to the counter-terrorism campaign is ‘information management’ and ‘message manipulation’, therefore it is crucial to realize that the language used is planned and conscious, and is in no way accidental (Jackson 2005: 27). CDA takes apart the language to show how power works. In consistence with critical geopolitics, these discourses shed light on the importance of the power of ideas, and identity and difference – two of the keys themes in CGP. The next sub section specifically focuses on humanitarian discourses and how they were used to legitimate war.

**Humanitarian discourses**

This section provides evidence of the humanitarian discourses used in the justification of the invasion of Iraq - the first preemptive strike in the Global War on Terror. President Bush’s emphasis is two-fold: it covers Bush’s demonization of Saddam based on his long record of human rights violations on one hand, and how removing him would be beneficial to the people of Iraq on the other. The importance of this section focuses on the fact that Saddam Hussein’s violations are not new and, certainly, not post-9/11. Granted Saddam did, in fact, inflict terror upon his own people, and was a known mass violator of human rights over the course of his dictatorship. However, the crucial point is how Bush used these factors as a very sudden and emergent threat that needed to be dealt with, connecting the urgency of dealing with Saddam’s human rights violations to the greater GWOT in a ‘post 9/11 world’. These discourses added another dimension to the legitimacy he sought to invade Iraq, and
represent a liberal imperialist platform. In this section are examples of the rhetoric that Ignatieff refers to as ‘Empire Lite’; using humanitarian discourses to legitimate intervention, for the good of the Iraqi people, and as a moral obligation for America.

If the question is how Bush used 9/11 to legitimate American imperialism, a very important part of the Global War on Terror and Bush’s decision to invade Iraq fit ‘humanitarian’ justification. In 2002, one year after the 9/11 attacks, in an address at the United Nations General Assembly, Bush began the humanitarian argument against Saddam Hussein. He begins by outlining his violation of human rights:

Last year, the UN commission on human rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights and that the regime's repression is all-pervasive (Bush 2002b).

In the above quote, Bush is using argumentation by making reference to facts, such as the United Nations human rights violations. He also uses vague statements such as reference to Saddam’s repression in his country to be ‘all pervasive’, without really giving any more detail. Bush also emphasizes the torture of citizens by Saddam’s regime, and the infringement on civil liberties and wrongful imprisonment.

Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation and rape (Bush 2002b).

Wives are tortured in front of their husbands; children in the presence of their parents; and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state (Bush 2002b).

In the two statements above, he continues to use argumentation as he begins with numbers and ‘facts’ about the atrocities that Saddam has committed, to convince people he is a danger to the world and his people. In the second quote, he makes a more emotional argument as he speaks about wives watching husbands being tortured, with children in their presence, culminating in an argumentative statement that Saddam

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6 See Chapter Three for Ignatieff's definition of Empire Lite.
Hussein is responsible for terrible acts, followed by the point that he runs a totalitarian state. Jackson argues that language structures our cognition, and it affects our emotions (Jackson 2005: 22), which is why emotive statements are very appealing. Contrary to the government of Iraq, Bush states that America’s ‘goal’ is the liberation of the Iraqi people from human suffering, and once again emphasizes the good intentions of America:

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. They've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great strategic goal (Bush 2002b).

We must stand up for our security and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind (Bush 2002b).

Bush changes the meaning of war in Iraq using a more emotional approach, stating that they have suffered in ‘silent captivity’, implying that America is their savior who can set them free. He does this by promoting America as an unambiguous good force; one that is committed to a greater ‘moral cause’, whom stands up for human rights. Finally, a promise to Iraqis that the United States will ‘save’ them from an evil dictator, and that America condemns human rights violations and must take action upon principle:

America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer freedom to slavery; prosperity to squalor; self-government to the rule of terror and torture. America is a friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi’a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin (Bush 2002b).

The intention in this statement is to stress the positive attributes of American culture, and the good intentions of the American government. Specifically, in the second sentence, Bush uses contrasts as a rhetorical device by making reference to the opposites in the way that Americans live, in ‘freedom’, to the exaggerated state of Iraqis, who live in ‘slavery’. He continues with contrasts as evident in his examples of ‘prosperity’ and ‘squalor’, ‘self-government’ to the rule of ‘terror and torture’.
One year later in the same year the invasion of Iraq would begin, in his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush continues to outline points previously made about torture, the suffering of women and children, and the oppression resulting from human rights violations by Saddam:

Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained: by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning. And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country, your enemy is ruling your country (Bush 2003).

President Bush carefully chooses his words to emphasize the negative attributes of Iraq’s regime and their ruler instead of focusing on American attributes. He focuses on the methods of torture by giving details of the violent methods used by Saddam’s regime to obtain confessions backing his statement with ‘facts’ that human rights groups have collected. Also, an example of over-lexicalization, “if this isn’t evil, then evil has no meaning” and “your enemy”, where Bush repeats certain key words.

At the time of the invasion, although there were supporting nations, only Britain and Australia made significant contributions with troops and funds; America had no support from the UN or the majority of the international community. The main American justification for war was the belief and ‘evidence’ that Iraq possessed WMD. After they could find no such weapons, the language focused far more on the need to “free the Iraqi people”, as a central justification. Six days into the war with Iraq, Bush made a speech at Macdill Air Force base in Florida. He spoke about the combat in Iraq and the victories so far. He also made several references to the humanitarian reasons that necessitated the invasion:

Iraqis are a good and gifted people. They deserve better than a life spent bowing before a dictator. The people of Iraq deserve to stand on their feet as

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7 Figures: about 255,000 American troops, 45,000 British, and 2,000 Australian. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908900.html>
free men and women -- the citizens of a free country (Bush 2003e).

He follows this by saying that,

This goal of a free and peaceful Iraq unites our coalition. And this goal comes from the deepest convictions of America. The freedom you defend is the right of every person and the future of every nature. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world; it is God's gift to humanity (Bush 2003e).

Bush uses contrasts to differentiate Iraq under Hussein, which is spent ‘bowing’ before a dictator, and Iraq after American intervention, which is a ‘free’ nation. The second statement, in particular, underlines Bush’s portrayal of America and its allies as those who defend freedom, and are inherently of good intention, using positive language in reference to America, and negative uses in references to Saddam’s regime.

Once Bush declared victory on May 1, 2003, with the mission accomplished sign hanging over him on the military ship USS Abraham Lincoln, he said, “In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed” (Bush 2003d). The ongoing battle that would come after this declaration had not been predicted. In the same speech, he spoke about the accomplishments of the war in the humanitarian aid of the Iraqi people:

Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear (Bush 2003d).

The President uses negative statements describing Iraq under Saddam as ‘oppressed’ and ‘enslaved’. He also makes use of both contrasting statements and metaphors in his choice of words in this instance. He firstly contrasts that success has brought Iraq freedom, and has freed them from the lies and intimidation of their old regime. He also makes reference to tyrants who should ‘fear’ freedom, and the rest of the world where ‘humanity’ will ‘rejoice’ in freedom. The third sentence makes use of metaphors as he states that men and women ‘need liberty’ like they would need food or water; stressing the importance of what America has accomplished.
Humanitarian discourses played an important role in justifying the war in Iraq. For those who did not necessarily agree with a preemptive strike on Iraq or were not convinced by the evidence of the existence of WMD, reasons for alarm over human rights violations by Saddam Hussein appealed to an alternative dimension of justification. In the grand scheme of things, Hussein’s human rights violations and stories of the terror he inflicted upon his own people strengthened Bush’s argument for war. His rationale was complimented by the specific language he used in his speeches, which portrayed a carefully constructed image of Saddam Hussein; especially contrast between Hussein’s regime, by identifying the human rights abuses, and declaring him as ‘evil’, while focusing on the good intentions of America and its allies in the moral obligation to ‘save’ the people of Iraq. Humanitarian discourses proved to be an important part of Bush’s narrative for Iraq, and central to how he attempted to create legitimacy for military action as Bush created an Other for the American public to point a finger at. Portrayed as a monster who torments his own people, Bush presented an argument that Saddam must be immediately removed from power. The discourse creates binaries that would justify action to remove Saddam Hussein from power such as equating Saddam and his regime with ‘slavery’, ‘squalor’, ‘terror’, ‘torture’ and ‘captivity’, while using contrasting discourse to portray American values as having a ‘moral cause’, and contrasting the American way of life as being ‘hopeful’, having ‘dignity’, ‘prosperity’ and above all, ‘freedom’. By presenting the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein in a negative light with emphasis on humanitarian violations with binaries, it provided legitimacy to remove him.

**America’s job to protect the Peace**

One of the most emphasized points of legitimacy for preemptive actions, the Global War on Terror, and the invasion of Iraq, was the self-assigned job of the United States to protect the peace. This involves protecting not only America, but also its allies and essentially the world. There is a long history to this point, stretching back centuries. Certain political discourses within America have for a long time, if not since its inception, claimed America as exceptional, and thus given the state the duty, if needs be, of protecting world peace, as discussed in Chapter Three. Doty would argue that the understanding of these meanings to be “fixed and true” is evidence of the link between
power and knowledge (Doty 1996: 7). The ‘role’ or ‘job’ of America to protect the peace has been portrayed as natural. Doty maintains that the link between power and knowledge “permits meanings and identities to become naturalized, taken for granted” (Doty 1996: 7).

As the 1990s proved to be a relatively peaceful era after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was not a direct threat to aim military efforts towards. 9/11 disrupted this peace, altering public perception making them suddenly aware that they were being threatened by dangerous global enemies. In Chapter Three, it was made evident that protecting the peace – via military power – was an argument made in the 1990s by key advisors serving in George Bush Senior's administration and by think tanks associated with neoconservatives during the Clinton administration. September 11 provided a ‘concrete’ reason through which to legitimize increases in military funding to ensure America remained preeminent, as that is what was needed to win the GWOT and protect the peace. The ideology that American power is needed is evident in documents and publications before 2001, but made explicit and implemented with the election of Bush and the events of September 11.

This section covers the discourses surrounding the ideology that it is the job of the United States to protect the peace. Not only that, it has become an official defence policy to protect world peace; doing so by projecting military force around the globe. The goal for foreign policymakers, argues Hansen, is to “present foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience” (Hansen 2006: 28). Through these discourses, it will become evident that war is presented as a means to maintain peace. Part of this rationale are discourses that state the United States cannot be left in a vulnerable position, as it would jeopardize world peace. Therefore, in this view, all must be done to ensure American pre-eminence in the world.

Speaking at Westpoint on June 1, 2002, Bush says the following:

Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will
preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (Bush 2002b).

Here, President Bush presents America as a protector of world peace, a self-assigned job, that does good for the world. He does this by focusing on the positive attributes of America, such as their commitment to fight and be ‘just’; to ‘build good relations’ and ‘encourage’ free societies. These are all positives that America can supply those suffering with. This is done by, again, by separating ‘us’ (America and its allies) against ‘them’ (the ‘terrorists and tyrants’) who pose the threats. This overall idea that America as a nation has a ‘cause’, which is to fight for peace, is communicated by such discourse. As van Dijk notes, discourse serves as the medium by which such ideologies are persuasively communicated to society (van Dijk 1997:25), and therefore there is always an element of power at play, as it is in the interests of the American administration to have military control over strategic areas, which can be accomplished by the ‘role’ of America’s peacekeeper.

In the preface of the 2002 National Security Strategy, which was a key document in the Bush Doctrine as it was published after 9/11 and, therefore, focused a great deal on the aftermath of those events, a similar discourse is put forward:

As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve the peace…Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security (The White House 2002: preface).

In the excerpt above, the role of America to defend the global peace is demonstrated. It is prefaced by a ‘historic opportunity’ and, ironically, suggests that this is a time when America and the world should strive for peace instead of prepare for war. It seems ironic because while military action is seemingly being initiated, it is presented as ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’ by the language in order to legitimize what is otherwise ‘violent’ as a means. A contrast is also made using rhetorical devices to group America and the world who are united, against the terrorists, violence and chaos. Again, in the statement below,
at the 2003 State of the Union address, Bush emphasizes America’s ‘job’ to preserve the peace, as America is the leader in saving the ‘hopes of all mankind’:

Once again, this nation and our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people and the hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility (Bush 2003).

Contrasts are used again in making his point. He places a line between America and its friends, and everyone else, by arguing that America is the last hope for a world that is full of ‘chaos’ and ‘constant alarm’. American power is portrayed as needed in saving the world from chaos. In the last two quotes, ‘chaos’ is repeated to draw attention to a world where terrorists can cause harm; an example of over-lexicalization. The use of contrasts and over-lexicalization make clear the Othering of Saddam and the Iraqi regime, and therefore legitimize the use of American power in maintaining peace.

In a speech that later addresses his ‘message to Iraq’, he says:

The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace (Bush 2003c).

In this statement a few different linguistic devices can be recognized. Firstly, Bush is emphasizing, once more, the positive attributes of America such as their goal to ‘advance liberty’, and to bring peace. Second, he uses contrasts by stating that ‘freedom’ will overcome ‘hatred’ and ‘violence’. Finally, he uses vague language to cover his bases, and states that this goal will be achieved ‘over time’, which leaves the door open for future administrations to use similar rationale to their ends. As all words are choices and all language is intentional, the examples of vague language construct future legitimacy for military intervention. It does this by focusing on how long and undetermined the fight to bring ‘freedom’ to everywhere in the world could take. By associating free societies with the eradication of hatred and violence, these discourses serve to legitimate the use of military action and regime change in order to bring about
‘peaceful’ and ‘stable’ societies.

In 2004, in a speech where Bush defended the war in Iraq, he also outlined three ways that his administration proposes to sustain democratic peace. They are: defending the peace, protecting the peace, and extending the peace, all of which involve military action.

First, we are defending the peace by taking the fight to the enemy. We will confront them overseas so we do not have to confront them here at home (Bush 2004).

President Bush begins by identifying that defending the peace would mean fighting the ‘enemy’ over ‘there’ before they have to confront them on American soil. He continues to explain how terrorist activities are being disrupted, while minimizing the ‘space’ they have to conduct their activities. Second, he states that:

We're protecting the peace by working with friends and allies and international institutions to isolate and confront terrorists and outlaw regimes...To be effective, that global response requires leadership -- and America will lead (Bush 2004).

By using contrasts, the good ‘friends and allies’ against the ‘terrorists’ and ‘outlaw regimes’, Bush sets the tone that it is a battle of us against them. He continues by incorporating all those involved on the side of America, clearly stating that America will take on the job as leader in the preservation of world peace. Lastly, Bush outlines his third part of the formula that America’s goals are to protect the democratic peace, and, subsequently, the only way to do this is through military operations throughout the world.

Third, we are extending the peace by supporting the rise of democracy, and the hope and progress that democracy brings, as the alternative to hatred and terror in the broader Middle East. In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their neighbors. When justice and democracy advance, so does the hope of lasting peace (Bush 2004).
Consistently using contrasts as a rhetorical device, once more, Bush sets a line between those who support democracy as the direct alternative to those who suppose hatred and terror. He continues by contrasting the different ways in which these societies function, i.e. democratic governments live in peace and justice, whereas those who are not a democracy will shelter terrorists and ‘attack their neighbours’. He also makes mention that in democratic and successful societies, people ‘turn their hearts and labor to building better lives’ – an emotional statement – contrasted to those who ‘swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers’. Among the four main tools of CDA outlined in the methodology section, contrast and rhetorical devices are one of the clearest in defining sharply ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Protecting the peace is a broad and vague argument, which is why it is so easily applicable to any threat. After the end of the Cold War, an argument was made by neoconservatives to ‘embrace’ US leadership. Through discourse and time, the aim was that US supremacy would become naturalized. The idea that the world is peaceful due to US leadership was an argument repeatedly made by the neoconservatives, through think tanks like the Project for a New American Century, and through official government documents as seen above. When Bush came into office, following the 9/11 attacks, he took a similar stance. As made clear in the methodology section, power is most effective when we are unaware that it is working (van Dijk 1993), and we come to believe something such as US supremacy being ‘natural’ becomes common sense. After 9/11 and the declared GWOT, Bush equated ridding the world of terrorism and terrorists as the way to world peace, led of course by America. The discourse provided an ideology that made military action seem as it is a task for presented peace, rather than instigating aggression. The binaries created through the contrast of ‘us’ and ‘them’ allowed the US to attack ‘them’ by creating an Other, because they are presented to be ‘evil’.

Following this, the argument to invade Iraq fit in to Bush’s justification for a Global War against Terrorism. The discourses presented by Bush suggested that all

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8 In the preface to Rebuilding America’s Defences, a key publication by the Project for a New American Century, a neoconservative think tank, the authors say: “The history of the past century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership” (Donnelly 2000: preface).
things were linked: Iraq was a threat, and the need to immediately deter threats given America had entered a GWOT was priority in national security strategy after 9/11. The discourse presented an argument for a legitimate initiation of military action by the US as it is seen to be in the ‘best interests’ of the world.

**Pre-emption**

Possibly the most ambitious policy of the Bush Doctrine was pre-emption. Bush’s claims that America could actually pre-empt danger, and thus intervene militarily anywhere that posed a potential threat, was a sharp turn and departure point in American foreign policy. This section will demonstrate how September 11th marked a turning point, and justification to implement these measures as a way to legitimize American imperialism.

The National Security Strategy, which served as the Bush Doctrine in policy terms, echoed what was written in the Project for a New American Century and Defense Planning Guidance publications. The preface to the NSS in 2002 asserts that,

> …As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best (The White House 2002: preface).

The intention to act before threats materialize is a policy that is difficult to defend, and in this specific instance, it is even presented as ‘common sense’. However, with 9/11 being the ‘proof’ of not doing so, pre-emption officially became part of national defense and security policy. The above uses implicit language in the suggestive statement that it is ‘common sense’ for America to act preemptively given the events of 9/11. It also connects the current experiences to pre-existing ones, as Fairclough (2001) outlines as important. This fits in with Americans’ previous experience of the world, as they are prompted to remember 9/11, and what could happen if there is inaction. There is also some exaggeration when Bush states that the US cannot hope for the best and must attack preemptively instead. Surely, one can be prepared without taking action, which is still a far way from ‘hoping’. Jutta Weldes argues that social constructions become common sense when particular representations of reality are treated neutrally, as
representing what is ‘real’ (Weldes 1999: 226). Weldes maintains that common sense is the naturalization of constructed representations which obscure the ideological effects, and become taken-for-granted beliefs (Weldes 1999: 226).

Pre-emption as an argument, in itself, is implicit. It assumes that terrorists will attack and it is implied that the only way to prevent this is to attack first. The 2002 National Security Strategy makes this clear:

Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders…We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (The White House 2002: 6).

The idea that self-defense takes the form of preemptive action is contentious. Simply stated, this is an argument for acting forcefully against a potential threat that has not actually materialized as a matter of ‘self-defense’. Self-defense is generally understood as using force to defend one’s self in a situation where force has already been used. This point is strongly defended below:

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first (The White House 2002: 14).

In this document, the argument for pre-emption is made by using implicit language, and, specifically, vague sweeping statements. The sentence in reference to the ‘goals of rogue states and terrorists’, which actually have not been outlined, continues to state that the ‘magnitude of potential harm’ could mean a number of things. The vagueness of the language allows for assumptions to be made that support an argument without facts. What this statement also contends is that due to the attacks of 9/11, global terror is presented as a new type of threat. This ‘sudden’ realization requires an immediate overhaul of American foreign policy, and an offensive (i.e. preemptive) national
security plan. Paying special attention to demonize rogue states, the document also expands this to their ‘terrorist’ clients, emphasizing negative qualities of the ‘enemy’:

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends (The White House 2002: 14).

Pre-emption is no longer implied, like previous defense planning in the 1990s, or even in the prior PNAC documents – it is explicit in the NSS. Either by explicitly calling for preemptive action, or demonstrating that potential threats need to be handled before they are active threats, it makes clear American foreign policy was heading down a different path. Further, 9/11 is the constant reference for legitimacy as to why foreign policy needs to be overhauled. Bush’s argument that enemies will not ‘warn’ America before they attack means that America must attack first, preemptively. The failure to do this, in his view, will potentially result in another 9/11-type event. This stems from the perception that danger and fear had transformed, ushering in a new era of globalized threats, in the form of global terrorism. The perception of the ‘new’ threat of global terrorism is what Weldes refers to as the construction of crisis, whereby a ‘crisis’ appears as an objective fact, but in fact she argues that they are social constructions forged by state officials; an important point to keep in mind (Weldes 1999a: 37). Central to CDA is to always ask how power is at play. By legitimizing pre-emption as an act of self-defence, America gives itself the power to use force upon any state by referencing 9/11 as an example of not being proactive. It maintains a view that no state can stand in the way of American power as it is justified by discourses of a changed world with new threats.

Finally, an important point in the NSS that attempts to justify pre-emption that provides a summary of the reasons it is necessary is below:

Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning (The White House 2002: 15).
The document uses language that demonizes the terrorists so that it makes it necessary to preemptively attack them in America’s defense. The lexical style of the entire publication is to emphasize American positive qualities while drawing attention to the negative qualities of potential enemies, creating an Other. Much of the attention is on the enemy’s means to harm America through unconventional approaches, using ‘terror’, and potentially ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and that this will be done ‘without warning’. Speaking at a commencement speech at Westpoint, which comprise some of Bush’s most quoted statements, he lays out his case for pre-emption:

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign nonproliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge (Bush 2002b).

President Bush uses language that again calls attention to the negative attributes of the Other, such as making reference to the enemy as a ‘tyrant’, and emphasizes how they ‘systematically’ break treaties they sign for peace. Because of the way that he portrays the enemy (whom is not specified, and could be anyone) through his language, he also argues to legitimize pre-emption as a strategy. He clearly states that it is the ‘only path to safety’, based on the negative attributes he highlights of the enemy provides no other choice. His argument is that, if for any reason, the government feels that a threat could potentially form, it has right to take action before that threat materializes. All of this rhetoric is justified by the fact that there was no overt threat at the time of 9/11, but America was still attacked. Hence, the only reasonable response is to attack others before America is attacked once more.

In one of his most cited statements pertaining to the Iraqi threat, he states that,

Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud (Bush 2002c).
The above statement was made in 2002, when George W. Bush was speaking to a crowd in Cincinnati about the danger of Saddam and the Iraqi threat. He uses metaphor as a rhetorical device to attract attention to the potential dangers that terrorists may cause should they be left unchecked. Jackson argues that the feeling of threat and danger has an important political function in that it usually constructs a collective identity as individuals are known to unify in the ‘face of danger’ (Jackson 2005: 115). The ‘smoking gun’ as a ‘mushroom cloud’ was one of the most cited lines by Bush during his presidency, and he used this metaphor to evoke fear about the potential dangers of another attack, thus justifying the use of preemptive force.

President Bush justifies pre-emption by asserting that the terrorists and tyrants would not give America notice should they strike. He tries to further legitimize his argument by warning that someone like Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted:

> If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option (Bush 2003).

Bush argues that Hussein is not someone who can be trusted, implying by his words that he is potentially insane and out of control. He continues to use negative language to characterize Saddam so that preemptive actions can be justified. In his final warning message to Iraq, Bush says that:

> The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed (Bush 2003c).

The President portrays America as the innocent victim who has not invited such threats, but has no choice but to face them. He uses contrasts as a rhetorical device by arguing that America will be on the course of ‘safety’ instead of the ‘tragedy’ that will be caused by the enemy. He also uses hyperboles such as ‘the day of horror’, which has not yet come, to unite the public and scaring them for what may or may not happen. Bush
has confirmed that before a real threat can materialize, and it is ‘too late’, the military will act to remove the potential danger. Below, he continues to defend his position by suggesting that to not act would result in a greater threat:

We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities (Bush 2003c).

Bush uses rhetorical imagery such as meeting dangers before they are seen ‘in our skies and cities’. The imagery of danger, an obvious reference to that which happened on 9/11, is meant to muster emotions that would lead the public to support his policies. Such emotive language is intended to create legitimacy as he connects potential dangers directly to what happened on September 11th; linking the discourse to past experiences as Fairclough (2001) has defined as coherence, which is how discourse fits in with our previous understanding of the world (2001: 65). As Bush said in 2004, “America must remember the lessons of September the 11th. We must confront serious dangers before they fully materialize” (Bush 2004).

There are several important things to note here. First, are the discourses on the changing notions of danger and threat. Also, are the means in which the potential ‘enemy’ can carry out attacks (chemical/biological weapons, WMD, etc) coupled with the assumption there will be no official warning (similar to the 9/11 attacks). All this creates a discourse of fear and danger geared towards legitimizing preemptive attacks: a proactive strategy for the US military to have a presence anywhere in the world. Of importance are the ways in which President Bush chooses to create this narrative. There are several rhetorical devices such as contrast, hyperboles, vagueness and many assumptions made about ‘potential’ threats, the form they will come in, and what consequences they may produce. The imagery of mushroom clouds and dangers in the ‘cities and skies’ is meant to provoke fear so that the nation will be behind his policy of pre-emption so that it may seem legitimate.

Additionally, the discourse emphasizes that the geography of danger and threat has changed, and the means and actors who pose a challenge to the United States (and the world) have also changed. Hence, global terrorism and global terrorists are to blame for
this ‘new’ form of violence. Given this ‘new’ reality, the discourses legitimize pre-emption as a method of self-defense. By delegitimizing actions of terrorists, based on their inability to be trusted, and the violent means they choose to attain their goals, pre-emption is regarded as not only a form of self-defense, but also a rational and legitimate option in the GWOT. Richard Jackson argues that the authorities have intentionally constructed a very widespread and deep fear of terrorism after 9/11 that not only is it rational to be afraid, but it would be *irrational* to not be afraid (Jackson 2005: 94). The idea that danger can be pre-empted sounds far-fetched, but after 9/11 certain policies became acceptable in order to protect the American homeland. The references to ‘mushroom clouds’ in American cities by Bush, or the reasoning that terrorists will not warn before they strike, all supported this point. With the tragedies of 9/11 and the perception of danger looming around every corner of the earth, the discourses used in policy documents and by Bush made 9/11 an overarching rationale. Intentional efforts to link discourse to previous experience, as to ‘scare’ people into imagining what could happen in the face of inaction, is also evident. The right to pre-emptively intervene anywhere before a real threat materializes in a war that is perpetual provided an open-ended narrative for American imperialism for years to come.

**Ensuring no rival to American power**

Another central discourse to the GWOT was that there should be no rival to American power. After the end of the Cold War, which saw America and liberal democracy as the victor, there was no superpower rival to the United States. This result allowed for a rearrangement of the international system in their favour, as there was no real competitor left to the United States. After President Bush was elected, and the 9/11 attacks that followed, ensuring that there would be no rival to American power re-emerged in discourse. The importance of these discourses are in highlighting the fact that these imperial ambitions were not formulated after 9/11 or as a reaction to the events, as we saw evidence of them in the previous section. It is, however, to show how 9/11 was used as the reason to promote a different, more forward foreign policy agenda to ensure attacks like September 11th does not happen again. Through the American national security lens, these foreign policy initiatives were to be presented as a response to the ‘new world’ that involves global terrorism. President Bush’s administration
presented the argument that the only way to protect America, and to ensure another 9/11 does not happen again is to ensure American global dominance.

Although Bush may not have specifically spoken about this point publicly, it is evident in the policy that deterring any rivals is in the national interest, and should be an active part of national security. The paragraph below taken from the National Security Strategy states that military power needs to be strong enough to ‘dissuade’ any potential challengers to American domination:

We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States (The White House 2002: 30).

In this document, the language makes clear to differentiate the ‘enemy’ from ‘friends and allies’. The discourses create binaries, targeting an Other that ‘we’ (America, friends, allies) need to be shielded from. It also presents the Other or ‘enemy’ in a negative light as they are assumed to be plotting and strengthening their military power to attack, while presenting America as an innocent victim, only striving to protect and defend its ‘freedoms’. No mention is made of any political reasons that may attract enemies. The discourse is in defense of America’s ‘right’ to dissuade any rivals from emerging to contest their power. Gellman argues that “the NSS reflects a strategic worldview ‘substantially similar’ to the Defense Planning Guidance, but ‘this time, they think they can pull it off’ (Bhuta 2003: 18). That is perhaps the most important point: because of what happened on 9/11, and what was perceived as a new ‘era’, these specific discourses validated the policies that were implemented. Again, in a separate government publication, the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001, released shortly after 9/11, states the same danger of a potential regional power to develop:
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests (QDR 2001: 4).

In language that is implicit and vague, the document suggests that ‘the potential exists’ for power to develop ways to harm the United States. In reality, the potential always exists, hence, it is a potential threat. To use a hypothetical situation as justification not only for pre-emption as futuristic ‘evidence’ in the preceding section, but to take it one step further and ensure no one is to emerge as a rival to American power, demonstrates the language used to justify a specific world view of American power. The review document consistently advocates for the ‘deterrence’ and ‘dissuasion’ of its enemies or potential rivals:

DoD [Department of Defense] must always be able to meet its missions. It must deploy forces to assure friends and deter potential adversaries; it must acquire new capabilities to dissuade potential enemies from challenging U.S. interests; and, if necessary, it must defeat foes in combat (QDR 2001: 58).

Emphasis is given to protecting ‘US interests’ and ‘friends’, while ensuring ‘foes’ and ‘enemies’ and potential ‘adversaries’ do not emerge to challenge the United States. There are many contrasts, and back-and-forth between enemies and friends, making sure the distinction is always made. There is reference to ‘potential’ enemies and adversaries, making use of vague language that does not pinpoint an immediate threat, but any potential threat or competitor that may emerge.

The events of 9/11 led to a specific use in the NSS that justifies policy to dissuade nations from becoming potential competitors or rivals. In the QDR written shortly after the attacks, it is again made clear that the United States influences the nature of military competitors, and therefore military spending should be kept high to maintain this influence. The premise of the argument itself is imperialistic: not only does the United States seek to maintain its superpower, but it seeks to dissuade, and eliminate any potential rival. By using language that creates binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the policy documents released after 9/11 made a case for imperial policies against the backdrop of a new and dangerous world presented to the public after 9/11.
Unilateralism

After the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration presented unilateralism as the only option for America, if the UN, specifically, does not respond to its requests. This was seen as a reaction to 9/11, and portrayed a view that the world had changed, and ‘new’ threats such as global terrorism had emerged, leaving no other option for the United States to protect the homeland, diverting another 9/11-style event. In 2003, at the State of the Union address Bush states that

The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups...we will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him (Bush 2003).

In an argumentative style, Bush begins his statement by informing the audience that there will be a presentation of ‘evidence’, such as Saddam’s ‘illegal weapons programs’, and his attempt to ‘hide’ those weapons from inspectors. He presents these as facts that soon the UN Security Council will be briefed about. Further, Bush demonizes Saddam Hussein and uses language in his lexical style that again emphasizes his negative attributes such as his ‘links to terrorist groups’. Not only is this vague, but it implies that he does in fact have such links. He also portrays American unilateral actions in a positive light as he says for the safety not only of his own people, but for ‘the peace of the world’, demonstrating America’s positive attributes once more to ‘save’ the world.

Later in 2003, Bush addressed the nation and sends a message to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. He maintains that America is left with ‘no choice’ but to lead the invasion themselves. At the same address to the nation he asserts that:

Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so
we will rise to ours (Bush 2003c).

Here, Bush argumentatively states the facts about the struggle to disarm Iraq. In this case, not only does he demonize Hussein, who he claims is the reason that Iraq will ‘not disarm’, but he also makes negative statements about the UN, stating they do not share America’s ‘resolve’ to meet the danger posed by Iraq. By stressing negative attributes of the UN in this instance, he makes his case that there is no other choice but to go in unilaterally and remove Hussein. Not only in matters pertaining to the GWOT or Iraq, but in other international realms, Bush lead the United States to a new era of unilateralism. Not only did the President not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, he also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. This was a significant move towards US unilateralism. Bush defended the withdrawal of America by stating that:

I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorists or rogue state missile attacks (Bush 20011).

He continues his defense by justifying it as it relates to the ‘new’ era after 9/11:

Today, as the events of September 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come, not from each other or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction (Bush 20011).

We know that the terrorists and some of those who support them seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks (Bush 20011).

Bush uses a variety of rhetorical devices such as hyperboles as he refers to the terrorists who will ‘deliver death and destruction to our doorstep’. He also assumes that this will be done by missiles, a statement made without any facts presented, which would legitimize opting out of the ABM treaty. Further, his exaggerated and emotional statements all portray the enemy in a negative light, as one that seeks death and destruction; striking without notice, and contrarily portrays his decision to withdraw from the treaty as a self-defense measure in light of the 9/11 attacks. He also uses over-
lexicalization in his constant references to ‘rogue’ states, repeatedly portraying a specific image of a dangerous rogue state. President Bush clearly states that America will not seek the consensus of the international community or be hindered by treaties when it comes to American security. If need be, the United States will act alone, and has the right to develop any defenses necessary to defeat terrorism and ‘win’ the War on Terror.

In a 2003 speech in Michigan, Bush repeated in similar words his support of unilateralism should cooperation with other nation states and the UN fail:

“So I call upon the world to come together and insist that this dangerous man disarm. But should they choose not to continue to pressure Saddam, and should he continue to defy the world, for the sake of our peace, for the sake of the security, this country will lead a coalition of other willing nations and we will disarm Saddam Hussein…And for the name of peace, we will prevail (Bush 2003g).”

In the above quote, Bush’s lexical style is setting a line between those who are on the side of America, and everyone else. In this instance, he makes a distinction by saying ‘should they choose not to continue to pressure Saddam’, then ‘we’ (i.e. America) will use the full force of the military. He also uses negative statements about Saddam such as his continual defiance of the world, and that he is a ‘dangerous man’. To the contrary, by using contrasts as a rhetorical device, America is portrayed as searching for peace and security for itself, and the world. His choice of words make clear the distinctions between enemy and friend, and culminates in his argument that if left with no choice, unilateral action will be taken to disarm Iraq.

When Bush came into office, unilateralism quickly became one of the signatures of his foreign policy. The President did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and additionally withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. His preemptive invasion of Iraq was justified by the logic that the United Nations did not live up to its responsibility, as Saddam Hussein presented an immediate threat. As a result, America declared a preemptive war upon Iraq, which was also deemed an ‘illegal’ war. In the process, President Bush legitimizes not only the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein, but
more importantly the United Nations and every nation that doesn’t ‘share’ America’s ‘resolve’. In turn, the discourses legitimate American unilateralism as a proactive step in combating the GWOT, as no one else can be trusted to collaborate in a situation where America’s securities or interests are at stake. Talks of unilateralism, legitimized by discourses around fears of 9/11 type attacks, took centre stage in Bush’s administration, and formed a part of Bush’s ‘doctrine’, and American foreign policy.

6.3 Iraq and the Global War on Terror

What role does the GWOT play in the legitimacy of American imperialism? After 9/11, discourses of fear, Othering, and the changing notions of threat and danger, were used to legitimate imperial policies, which were implemented after the GWOT was declared. First, because it is a ‘global’ war, it leaves any nation open to attack if it is deemed a threat. The GWOT covers state and non-state actions, which in reality means that America gave itself the right to attack any nation affiliated with terrorism; even if only harbouring terrorists (known by the state or not). Second, the declared War on Terror is inherently a perpetual war. ‘Terrorism’ doesn’t belong to any one state, or as witnessed on 9/11, to a state at all. It is not possible to attack and defeat terror in any conventional sense, and therefore this creates an open-ended script to legitimize American military involvement in combat all over the world as part of the ‘GWOT’. Third, since the United States took on the role of leading the war, it also made clear that if other nations were not on board, including the UN, it would act alone. Finally, the GWOT was being used as a tool to promote peace, however contradictory that sounds. The main argument was that America must fight terrorism on a global scale in order to make the world a more peaceful place. Since America’s role is to protect the peace, in this logic, it seemed ‘natural’ that eradicating terrorism would bring about peace.

The invasion of Iraq was an example to the world of what could happen if a nation defies the United States; an example to other ‘rogue’ states. In the newly declared Global War on Terror, Iraq served as the first concrete example. The lead up to the war is a demonstration of the legitimizing discourses Bush used, mentioned above, which include the just war argument, humanitarian arguments, and the job of America to protect the peace. It also serves as an example of a mainly unilateral effort (U.S. led,
without support of the United Nations at the very least), and the first example of preemptive war under President Bush.

After 9/11 and the declaration of the GWOT, Iraq was presented as an urgent threat, and the invasion was portrayed as a reaction to the events. References were made to the first Iraq war, and Saddam’s continuing defiance of the United States, however removing him was suddenly more urgent given the events of 9/11. This final section below will explore some of the discourses surrounding perpetual war, the use of language that blurred the lines between Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, and also the way in which this was used to link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, legitimizing an invasion through the American national security lens.

**Perpetual war**

Like the War on Poverty or the War on Drugs declared in the past, the War on Terror is a never-ending ‘conflict’. It is not possible to declare war on an ideology and ‘win’. It is an unrealistic endeavor to either kill an ideology or to prevent everyone who chooses to use terror as a means. As Hardt and Negri argue, when Bush announced that there would be Global War on Terror, “they emphasized that it would have to extend throughout the world and continue for an indefinite period, perhaps decades or even generations” (2004:14).

Bush and his cabinet made it a point to emphasize that the war may last for an undetermined period of time; ‘decades’ or ‘generations’, leaving the script open for future Presidents to pursue, and to maintain a foreign policy suited to perpetual war. In theory, as a ‘global war’ on terror can have no end, it must involve the “continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and violence”, and thus leaves the door open to imperial policies for years to come (Ibid). In Multitude, Hardt and Negri argue that:

When crisis is no longer limited and specific but becomes a general omnicrisis, when the state of war and thus the state of exception become indefinite or even permanent, as they do today, then contradiction is fully expressed and the concept takes on an entirely different character (Hardt and Negri 2004: 8).
This speaks to the reality of perpetual war. It is a way to continually legitimate imperial actions and the use of force against a never-ending threat. Even once the immediate threat had passed, the ‘war’ was ongoing. Whenever legitimacy was required for an action or policy that was regarded by others as aggressive (i.e. the Patriot Act, the invasion of Iraq), reference was always made to the “War on Terror”, and the necessity of the action in ‘winning’ the war. Because of the perceived shift in danger and threat, war had also changed: it is now endless in order to deal with unknown dispersed enemies, who can in reality never be defeated entirely. On this basis, it can be argued that a never-ending war against terror was a way to maintain global dominance. Defending the homeland was not the sole or central reason to go into Iraq. Just war doctrine and fighting terrorism served as distractions. As 9/11 provided an overarching legitimacy for action, it served as a reason to implement the American grand strategy of global dominance suggested by neoconservatives and American supremacists a decade prior. In fact, this point was echoed in the 2002 NSS:

The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration (The White House 2002: preface).

It emphasizes its unknown length and ‘new’ qualities:

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time (The White House 2002: 5).

In both the National Security Strategy quotes, implicit language is used by making reference to vague time frames by stating that the war could be of ‘uncertain duration’, and may be fought against ‘an extended period of time’. By using such vague language, it leaves opportunity for future wars and military interventions to fall under the umbrella of the GWOT. “The constant presence of an enemy [via the GWOT] and the threat of disorder are necessary in order to legitimate imperial violence”, write Hardt and Negri (2004: 30). The enemy has become abstract, it is unknown and unseen and yet ever present, proving it’s most important role: “to prop up legitimation where legitimation has declined” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 30). The GWOT essentially legitimizes any military intervention for the foreseeable future.
The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001 makes the case for American military intervention all over the world, using as its justification the GWOT. As such, being a global war, it will *by nature*, require American forces to be dispersed to every corner of the earth for an unknown time:

Unlike the Cold War period, where the key geographic regions of competition were well defined, the current period has already imposed demands for U.S. military intervention or activity on virtually every continent and against a wide variety of adversaries...Instead, the United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities (QDR 2001: 5).

Additionally, in the 2002 State of the Union address, Bush claimed that the GWOT has an indefinite timeline:

far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning (Bush 2002).

Given the events of 9/11, the language of the QDR is far more direct yet ‘acceptable’ than the Defense Planning Guidance reports of the early 1990s that were seen as controversial. The discourses presented the changed nature of threat and danger as a ‘fact’, and allowed for the QDR, in turn, to present the need for military intervention as a fact given the consequences of 9/11. The reality is that September the 11\(^{th}\) has forever become a reference point and legitimizing tool for global domination for the United States, brought upon by a GWOT. The document uses vague language that maintains US intervention is needed ‘on virtually every continent’, implying a never-ending war. The QDR also states that:

The goals of the strategy recognize that the military will continue to generate forces to conduct a wide range of missions for the foreseeable future (QDR 2001: 67).

In both excerpts of the QDR, vague statements allude to the perpetual nature of the GWOT. Speaking in 2004, after the Iraq war had been ‘won’ – a premature statement by Bush – he reiterated that the overall war is not yet over:

In this challenging period of our history, Americans fully understand the dangers to our country. We remain a nation at risk, directly threatened by an
enemy that plots in secret to cause terrible harm and grief. We remain a nation at war, fighting for our security, our freedom, and our way of life. We also see our advantages clearly. Americans have a history of rising to every test; our generation is no exception. We've not forgotten September the 11th, 2001. We will not allow our enemies to forget it, either (Bush 2004).

Several linguistic tools are being deployed. Again, there is vagueness about the enemy and what they seek to accomplish—plots in secret to cause terrible harm and grief’. Additionally, the political intent is once more removed from the intentions of the enemy as Bush says America is ‘fighting for its way of life’, implying the enemy is attacking America out of pure ‘evil’ and ‘hate’. This demonizes the enemy and portrays America as the victim, legitimizing actions to protect themselves while making reference to the 9/11 attacks directly. Contrasts are also made between the enemy and America. Americans are seen to ‘rise to every test’, whereas the enemy plots in secret to cause great harm. The image of the enemy constructs a target in the Global War on Terror, and legitimates American action against them.

The importance of perpetual war is that it provides “an open-ended script for the Global War on Terror” that was “clearly envisioned” (Elden 2009: 16). Donald Rumsfeld had directed his staff to “go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not”, having in mind a bigger picture for U.S. policy (Ibid). The GWOT provided a new opportunity and justification to promote high spending levels under the pretense that America must defend the world from terrorists and maintain world peace by using their military power. The QDR in 2001 replicates this point, and further states that the ‘new’ world post 9/11 demands US military to be present in every corner of the world. The use of language is deliberate in order to present a world view that promotes and legitimizes American imperialism, through its unquestioned power and military presence, as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks. The GWOT was presented as a perpetual war through the use of language that makes references to vague time frames regarding how long it could take to ‘defeat’ terrorism, as well as who the enemy could be, and where the terrorists are located. Further, language used to demonize anyone not sided ‘with America’, automatically assuming they are with the terrorists, set enemy lines making clear that America was on the side of good, whereas anyone opposing
them sided with evil. Weldes argues that in cases like this, where there is little or no challenge to the legitimacy of discourses that become powerful and seem ‘common sense’, those discourses become dominant “and competing representations are easily dismissed as at best naïve, and at worst treasonous” (Weldes et al. 1999: 18). Bush’s statement, "you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" (Bush 2001n), is a prime example of a simplistic binary that he creates with his choice of language. Here, it insinuates that by not siding with America, one is automatically siding with terrorists, implying that America has the right to be suspicious of anyone not on their side, as the alternative leaves only the terrorists.

The Global War on Terror presented a unique opportunity, as it could be justified to go to war anywhere in the world using the same reasoning. As Bush wanted the world to believe, the nature of danger and threat had changed, therefore American foreign policy too had to change to counter this global threat. The ‘new world’ that confronted America so dramatically on 9/11 became the legitimacy behind all future military actions. In any scenario where American interests are at stake, and could require the engagement of military force, a new crisis does not necessarily have to emerge. The GWOT, in itself, is an open-ended script for perpetual war, encompassing anything from human rights violations to engaging in terrorist attacks and all that could potentially exist in-between. It is an intentionally ambiguous rationale, allowing it to be used for a variety of justifications. As was seen during Bush’s time in office, the GWOT was the central justification for the foreign policies he put forward.

6.4 Intentional confusion: Linking Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and 9/11

After the attacks of 2001, and the inability of the Bush administration to locate Osama Bin Laden quickly, mentions of Saddam began circulating, pulling focus towards Iraq and away from Bin Laden. At the time, the persistent references to unseating Saddam Hussein had circulated, Iraq had not attacked America; in fact Iraq never attacked America. It is much harder to persuade the American public to go to war for no reason other than protecting American interests abroad, without there being an active threat. However, after 9/11, by forcefully and falsely connecting Saddam Hussein
to the September 11th attacks, they found public support to finally unseat Hussein. At the height of Bush’s popularity, in March 2003, American support for the President was at 71%, and the support for a war with Iraq had reached 76%; a large majority (Gallup Polls 2004). Dalby argued that,

Once the events of September 11 were interpreted as a ‘global’ war on terror then the geopolitical categories from the first Bush administration and the PNAC documents shaped the subsequent prosecution of American policy. The specific geographies of Al Qaeda and struggles in the Gulf region were swept aside by the geographically inappropriate specifications of global struggle and the discursive repertoire of global security was awkwardly applied to the new circumstances in late 2001 (Dalby 2006: 42).

The above suggests that Saddam Hussein was linked intentionally to Osama Bin Laden and 9/11 in order to fulfill a previous agenda set out by neoconservatives, using the attacks as a reason to tie it all together. Saddam had nothing to do with 9/11, but unable to find Bin Laden, manipulating Americans into believing that Saddam has the capabilities to destroy America was the next best bet as America had plans for Iraq long before 9/11. Why should Americans be afraid of the small nation of Iraq and its nuclear ‘capabilities’ versus another larger nation that already has WMD? Weldes argues that it is because this ‘insecurity’ is socially constructed. She argues that there is an established common sense that is created in discourse, and foregrounds some dangers (like Iraq, for example) while omitting others (Weldes et al. 1999: 12). She asserts that it is the discursive construct of the meaning of the threat that has been made up, not the existence of the weapons themselves, in this example (Weldes et al. 1999: 12).

In all the discourse used by Bush et al, the political motives of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were completely ignored. Bush and his administration constantly stated that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were just “evil doers” who hated America, Americans, democracy, and their freedoms. They were reduced to inflicting terror for terror’s sake, removing any type of political intention from their acts. Americans needed someone to blame, and channel their rage following the attacks towards. Once Bin Laden could not be found, they plugged Saddam Hussein and Iraq into the vacant spot, using the Global War on Terror as a reason to go urgently after Hussein.
Since citizens were already fearful and vulnerable post 9/11, it was the perfect time to forge the Iraqi link. President Bush justified the pre-emptive strike against Iraq by repeatedly claiming that Saddam Hussein was linked to attacks on the United States, that he had not complied with the United Nations about weapons inspections, and still possessed numerous weapons of mass destruction that he planned to use, that the U.S. attack Iraq (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 618). This is a crucial point and says a lot about prior intentions. He stated that Iraq should be “a principal target of the first round in the war against terrorism” (Ibid). Iraq was not immediately attacked in large part due to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s argument that there had to be wide public support of such an attack and therefore the invasion was put off, to Rumsfeld’s disappointment, for another two years (Ibid).

Elden writes, “the justification for action against Iraq was based on a number of conflicting and contentious claims” (2009: 112). Among them were Saddam’s links with, or harbouring terrorists, his threat to neighbours (especially Israel), and, of course, the main argument that he was pursuing or already had weapons of mass destruction (Elden 2009:12). “This was both a confused, and intentionally confusing, rationale,” writes Elden, and he is correct (Ibid). All these reasons were distractions, some had legitimacy, and some were just made to portray a ‘scarier’ Saddam Hussein, so that the public would be behind the administration when it decided to go to war.

An example of this is below, in a speech Bush made in 2003 in Michigan:

The war on terror is not confined strictly to the al Qaeda that we're chasing. The war on terror extends beyond just a shadowy terrorist network. The war on terror involves Saddam Hussein because of the nature of Saddam Hussein, the history of Saddam Hussein and his willingness to terrorize himself....Saddam Hussein has terrorized his own people. He's terrorized his own neighborhood. He is a danger not only to countries in the region, but as I explained last night, because of al Qaeda connections, because of his history, he's a danger to the American people. And we've got to deal with him. We've got to deal with him before it is too late (Bush 2003g).

Demonstrated in the quote above is President Bush’s use of vague language first about the war, as it is ‘not confined’ and ‘extends beyond just a shadowy terrorist
network’, implying that anywhere and anyone could pose a threat to the US. Second, he uses a lot of negative language to characterize Saddam Hussein, some of which does not entirely make sense, such as his willingness to ‘terrorize himself’. His over-lexicalization of the words “terrorist/terrorize” in this quote ensures Hussein is clearly understood as a terrorist, with terrorist ties. He also does the same with the word ‘danger’, using it repeatedly. He emphasizes the dangers associated with Hussein and the risks of not removing him as he has been associated with Al Qaeda. He also says that the United States is needed to make the world a safer place. Once again, he places a line between good and evil and by his language portrays America as one who can ‘save’ the world from evil. This statement by Bush summarizes many of his ideological reasoning for going into Iraq that were brought to light over the course of his campaign to invade Iraq: his alleged connections to terrorism/terrorists, human rights abuses, inflicting terror on his country, his neighbours, and so on. He is presented as a direct danger to his neighbours and the United States.

Following this, Hussein’s human rights violations crept up and were highlighted by Bush and his cabinet, and UN resolutions were quickly passed to deal with the newly dangerous Iraq. Althaus and Largio argue that “long before the war against Iraq actually commenced, and while Osama bin Laden was still on the run, news coverage came to focus squarely on Saddam Hussein and the situation in Iraq” (2004: 795). They uncover that it was after Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address when Iraq was named part of the “Axis of Evil” that focus switched from Bin Laden to Saddam Hussein. In that address, Bush stated that, “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror”, and then followed by saying “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush 2002). Althaus and Largio also found that in the time between May 2002 and August 2003, Bush had publicly mentioned Bin Laden’s name on eight instances, in comparison to Saddam Hussein’s name which was mentioned 185 times in the same period [see figure 2](2004: 796). They additionally found that from about mid-August to September of 2002, a variety of polls conducted by different organizations found that a majority of Americans actually believed that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for 9/11[see figure 3](Ibid: 797). Their article concludes that:
The shift from Osama to Saddam occurred in media coverage during August of 2002, but began four months earlier in the public statements of President George Bush. As Osama bin Laden faded in news coverage and all but disappeared in President Bush’s public statements, clear efforts were made by the Bush administration to replace Osama bin Laden as America’s foremost enemy by linking Saddam Hussein to the War on Terror (Ibid: 799).

Saddam Hussein was not only linked to Bin Laden, but the accusations continued, and Bush attempted to link him to the events of 9/11. In 2002, Bush links the urgency to confront Iraq directly to the events of 9/11:

Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon (Bush 2002c).

Without any evidence of Saddam or an Iraqi involvement to the events of 9/11, Bush tries to forge a link to the urgency to disarm Saddam and invade Iraq as a result of the 9/11 attacks. In his language he implies that a force of evil has attacked Americans, who are innocent, out of pure hatred towards America. He is also implicitly arguing that enemies are ‘eager’ to use weapons against Americans. In 2002, in a separate speech, Bush confronts criticisms about why Iraq, and why now?:

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States (Bush 2002c).

In the above, the President continues to use negative and strong language to describe Saddam, calling him a ‘tyrant’ multiple times and uses an argumentative tone as he lists facts about Saddam’s prior offences: ‘invaded and brutally occupied’ his neighbours, and has ‘struck without warning’, and his rhetorical emphasis of Hussein’s ‘unrelenting hostility toward the United States’, which has the tone of a view that is based on far more than ‘evidence’ or ‘facts’. In another example in a similar tone, Bush links Iraq
and Al Qaeda together by suggesting their enemy is the same – The United States. He additionally expresses the ‘glee’ that Saddam’s regime displayed when America was attacked on 9/11:

We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy -- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq…We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America (Bush 2002c).

The repetitive use of the words ‘we know’ would imply that Bush is referencing a fact. He tries to forge a connection by default by suggesting that both Saddam and Al Qaeda ‘hate’ America. Whether this is true, and for what reasons, are not disclosed. However, the tone is argumentative and he puts forward his statements as facts regarding Saddam’s search for weapons and the links between those Al Qaeda members who have allegedly fled to Iraq. He then makes the statement that Saddam’s regime ‘gleefully’ celebrated the attacks. Many nations in the Arab world demonstrated their ‘glee’, as Bush terms it, after the attacks, however that alone cannot link Iraq to Al Qaeda or become a reason to attack a nation. The President, intentionally, uses emotional language that will likely stir anger in Americans, hence the worlds ‘gleefully celebrated’, as they will be reminded of their pain and feel strongly toward those who find happiness in their loss. Once more, Bush’s statements remove political intent; they remove anything beyond an inherent hatred for Americans by the enemy. In 2003 Bush stated that,

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people (Bush 2003c).

President Bush presents the intelligence as fact, referring to not only American intelligence, but that found by Other governments that leave ‘no doubt’ about Iraq’s WMD. Weldes et al. argue that discourses are sites of social power, especially when coming from official sources, such as the state. One of the reasons being for this, as is
evident in several of Bush’s speeches, are his references to ‘intelligence’, and such, stating what ‘he knows’ as fact. Weldes et al. say that officials often claim access to information that is denied by most outsiders (1999:18), but is presented as a fact which is nearly impossible to dispute as the general public cannot see the intelligence, most of the time. Even after the invasion, when no WMD were found in Iraq, Bush defended his position by continuing to link Saddam Hussein to the attacks of 9/11. In a speech defending the war he argues that:

Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, we were right to go into Iraq. We removed a declared enemy of America, who had the capability of producing weapons of mass murder, and could have passed that capability to terrorists bent on acquiring them. In the world after September the 11th, that was a risk we could not afford to take (Bush 2004).

In a conflicting statement, Bush states that although he admits that no WMD were found, but claims to ‘know’ that Saddam had the capability to produce weapons of mass murder. This is the ‘nature’ of preemptive war that is based on hypotheticals and threats that have not yet fully emerged. Still trying to forge the link between the Iraqi regime and either Al Qaeda, Bin Laden or the 9/11 attacks, he reminds his audience of the September 2001 to remind them of their anger and to gain ‘acceptance’ by the public that his reasons to invade were legitimate, even if only preventative. At a later point in 2004, Bush answers a question from a reporter about the incorrect intelligence on Iraq, and if he still believes it was a justified cause to invade given the lack of WMD found:

Knowing what I know today, we still would have gone on into Iraq. We still would have gone to make our country more secure. He had the capability of making weapons. He had terrorist ties (Bush 2004a).

The only justification here is that he “had terrorist ties”, a vague and inconclusive statement, and that “he was capable of making weapons”. This is also an example of over-lexicalization, where Bush on several instances emphasizes Saddam’s ‘capability’ to make weapons.

This section provided examples of how President Bush repeatedly discursively tied Saddam Hussein and Iraq to Osama Bin Laden and 9/11 in order to justify an
invasion of Iraq based on the need to take action in the GWOT. As various authors have argued, the intentional act of confusing Saddam and Osama, and presenting ‘evidence’ of alleged ties between the government of Iraq and terrorist organizations, were made in attempts to justify an invasion that was portrayed as a reaction to 9/11 and the GWOT, but were in fact on the agenda decades prior. Bush’s insistence of ‘knowing’ that Iraq has WMD, were coupled with his human rights violations to present a case for intervention. Iraq also served as a warning to other states; proving America would and can take military action unilaterally, and preemptively to defend itself in the new GWOT, should other states not side with America.

**Conclusion**

Years before 9/11, a handful of influential neoconservatives had predicted that only a catastrophe could bring revolutionary change, and on September 11, 2001, the revolution began. It was Osama Bin Laden who attacked America, but unable to find him and having interests in Iraq and in the region (more generally), Bush went after Saddam Hussein. With carefully chosen language, Bush created a specific discourse around the Global War on Terror, and the justification for an invasion of Iraq. By linking Saddam Hussein to not only Osama Bin Laden, but to the attacks on 9/11, Bush managed to gather public support in believing the war in Iraq would be the most logical course of action in the GWOT, and in defending America and the world from terrorism. As Iraq was only one part of the War on Terror, it was also a clear example to nations who America had interests in, of what could happen if they don’t comply. The GWOT left the doors open for intervention by America on a number of grounds: humanitarian grounds, harbouring terrorists, being a terrorist state, not cooperating with America on intelligence regarding terrorists, and so on. The GWOT encompasses almost anything, and is so vague that any number of ideologies and discourses could legitimize an intervention, or military conflict. Iraq was the first example of a unilateral and pre-emptive strike justified on the grounds of fighting the GWOT, and therefore serves as a concrete example of the power of discourse in legitimizing action.

This chapter, following the principles of CGP, aimed to highlight the importance of language, and how ideas that seem ‘common sense’ are carefully constructed to
promote specific worldviews and agendas. The emphasis on binaries in the discourses, meant to create distinct but simple categories pitting ‘us’ against ‘them’, can be seen throughout the language used by Bush, but also written into government documents. Creating an Other after 9/11, allowed the Bush administration to legitimize a number of policies based on ‘new’ threats, and dangerous ‘others’. Bush presented a plan to overhaul US foreign policy based on logic based on ‘changed’ nature of danger and threat, legitimized by a global war changed the idea of war itself (preemptive, and ‘global’), and implied a perpetual conflict. The war in Iraq was the first example in the GWOT of a preemptive strike, exemplifying the ‘post 9/11 discourses’ in a legitimizing role. Themes of American dominance are evident throughout, but with the events of 9/11, legitimacy for aggressive foreign policies measures were granted by policy makers. As Armstrong argues:

The plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful (Armstrong as cited in Altheide and Grimes 2005: 624).

This quote demonstrates a summary of ‘American grand strategy’. The implementation of a global war without something as catastrophic as 9/11 seemed unimaginable. Therefore, the attacks and fear of future attacks provided an overarching legitimacy of imperial policies well into the future. In the past, wars such as ‘the war on drugs’ or ‘the war on poverty’ were used to create cohesion in society and unite the public together for a just cause, while implementing some. However, none of these could legitimize preemptive military action in any corner of the globe. The attacks on American soil by ‘unknown’ enemies, who have a variety of nationalities and political motives makes them nearly impossible to target. The vagueness and ambiguity of the discourses surrounding the GWOT make it more acceptable to legitimize further interventions by America on the basis of protecting the peace, fighting terrorists, or staging humanitarian interventions, for example. The reasons are endless in a ‘war’ defined by vague language and open-ended scripts for military intervention. This is the role the GWOT plays in America imperialism: an open-ended legitimation of future military action,
allowing the United States to reign as sole superpower and promote a world that embraces US supremacy.

This chapter is the final piece in the narrative started in Chapter Four, using CDA. In Chapter Four, the ideas about American grand strategy, foreign policy, and imperialism were evidenced through documents which have their origins in the 1990s. By focusing on a key group of influential players and their writings, it was clear that the initiatives seen after 9/11 in the perception of a ‘reaction’ to 9/11, were in fact already in the early stages of planning. This is important as it demonstrates their existence before 9/11, and a continuity in American imperial policy thought. Chapter Five then brought to light the frame of a new world after 9/11, and the changing perception of danger and fear. Through the ‘prism’ of 9/11, a narrative was set up that created a scenario where new policies were needed to deal with new threats. Hence, the foreign policies implemented after 9/11 were understood to be a reaction to the events. Once this narrative was in place, and a frame of a new and dangerous world filled with global terror was set up, Chapter Six demonstrated how the discourses declaring a ‘Global War on Terror’ were formulated, and further, how these led to a war in Afghanistan, and preemptively, in Iraq.
Figures

Figure 2
Mentions of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and the War on Terrorism in Public Statements by President George W. Bush, July 2001–August 2003

Figure 3
Percentage of Americans Holding Saddam Hussein Responsible for the 9/11 Attacks, Sept. 2001–May 2004
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

At the outset of this thesis, this research sought to answer the question ‘how did the Bush administration use 9/11 as a way to legitimize American imperialism’? It answered this question by analyzing the role of discourse and ideology, with the goal of understanding how discourses were used to promote a specific worldview.

This thesis took the angle of combining critical geopolitics (CGP) with critical discourse analysis (CDA) to provide a unique framework and methodology in international relations research that can address the importance of the role of ideas, and hence address some of the missing gaps in the literature that has attempted to tackle post 9/11 power in the United States. To recap, CGP and CDA in conjunction provide critical and important ways to identify the role of ideas in the furtherance of power. Together they emphasize the importance of language and discourse in producing and reproducing power, and in turn how this embodies ideological assumptions. The basis of critical discourse analysis is that language is intentional, and hence it is a choice, making it a powerful source in shaping our understanding of the world. The application of CDA to CGP research provides a more robust framework and method for analysis, especially in the area of language, ideology and power. Previous research in the field of CGP has not systematically applied any given method, and hence, it left CGP more open to criticism in the way of empirics in research. CGP vehemently argues the importance of ideas, but does not present a systematic way to approach this analysis empirically. Too often, CGP has been brushed aside by more ‘rigorous’ theoretical approaches, especially in the field of international relations. CGP provides an alternative, critical framework in the study of international relations, and it has much to add as an interdisciplinary approach. However, the lack of methodological rigor in the field has downplayed its importance and contribution. One of the key contributions of this research has been to bring CGP back into the conversation as a valid theoretical approach, supported by CDA in the analysis of political phenomena. This thesis asserts that not only has this addressed a gap in the theory/method approach within CGP itself,
but also addressed the gap in international relations for an alternative critical frameworks, that move toward a more interdisciplinary analysis.

This thesis has used CGP and CDA together to trace the narrative of imperialism and American grand strategy from the 1990s through some key documents, and compared them to the ‘new’ policy proposals by the Bush administration after 9/11, making evident that there exists a continuum. The ways in which imperial ideas and policies were naturalized, and made common sense in society were presented through a methodological analysis of key text and speeches throughout this research.

The narrative of this thesis began with an exploration of imperialism. Chapter Three explored definitions of imperialism; specifically a contrast of imperialism (formal and informal), and imperialism’s contrast with hegemony. As international relations evolve, so should our definitions. ‘Imperialism’ embodies a different meaning today, than the imperialism of past Roman and British empires, which would seek to annex territories, and conquer through war. Although formal empires are non-existent today, informal imperialism exists, and hence, this thesis has argued that the best way to classify American power would be as an informal imperial power. This thesis has also argued that American imperialism needs to be understood within the larger historical context of their claim to exceptionalism and manifest destiny, which have both shaped America’s understanding of itself. This research has traced the ideological roots of imperialism to two key concepts: manifest destiny and American exceptionalism. Through a historically grounded assessment of the ideological impacts of these concepts, a clear pattern of imperial discourse was evidenced. In unpacking these two overarching ideological notions, a clearer understanding of American self-identity and foreign policy emerged. These narratives have created an overarching identity for America and its role in the world, creating ideas that promote the view that America is the ‘only one’ who can take on the role as world leader, and further that it is its manifest destiny to do so. The discourse surrounding the exceptionalism of America has allowed American power to seem legitimate both inside its borders, and within the international system. While American governments prefer consensus and legitimacy, when lacking, they have, and continue to claim that they will do whatever they find necessary to fulfill their goals.
This may come by force or coercion, and therefore, to simply call American power hegemonic is not quite fitting. The mixed methods America practices, but its ultimate commitment to ‘go it alone’ would make informal imperialism a better suited term.

Once the definition of informal imperialism was made clear, this thesis outlined how a CGP lens can be used in the study of imperialism. The three themes that run through the analysis are the power of ideas, identity and difference and the critical analysis of territory. Combined, these themes look at ways of Othering, the role of language, discourse and hegemony, and the ways in which space is given meaning and changed according to those in power. CDA provides a methodological tool in which to analyze and take apart embedded discourses in depth. Using this framework and methodology, Chapter Four to Six of this thesis constituted a narrative ranging from the 1990s through to George W. Bush’s presidency. It highlighted the ideological roots and drive of the Bush foreign policy agenda and its origins in neoconservative and American supremacist thought. These three key chapters are a critical discourse analysis of speeches and text, tracing the ideology that would make up the Bush foreign policy agenda. Although the policies during his presidency were largely attributed to a reaction to the 9/11 attacks of 2001, this analysis has clearly shown that in fact the policies were a continuum of foreign policy thought.

This thesis has argued that the role of 9/11 was that it presented a unique opportunity to implement these policies. Chapter Four begins with a key group of influential players, and an analysis of their discourses dating back to the 1990s. Here, it becomes evident that a grand strategy of American imperialism was being proposed. Their language is analyzed to expose the imperial tendencies and policy suggestions similar or identical to what was implemented after 9/11. Chapter Five builds on this and details the story told after 9/11, of an image of a ‘new world’ that the Bush administration created. A world where the perceptions of the changing nature of danger and threat presented by the ‘new’ enemy, required new policies to combat them. During the immediate period after 9/11, much of the framing took place for what would set the stage for a war in Afghanistan and more importantly the invasion of Iraq. In Chapter Six, the discourses surrounding the GWOT and the Iraq invasion are analyzed and it
becomes evident how discourses work. By Othering the enemy, and creating simple binaries of good and evil, us and them, inside and outside, the Bush administration sought legitimacy for its imperial actions. Not only the invasion and war with Iraq, but the domestic implications that the ‘new enemy’ posed for civil liberties such as the Patriot Act, the PSP, and the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act.

By systematically implementing CDA within a framework of critical geopolitics, this research has also made a contribution to critical scholarship on contemporary American imperialism. This thesis has highlighted the link between former foreign policy initiatives with the ‘new’ policies post 9/11 to prove that American foreign policy after 2001 is but a continuation of earlier initiatives. Further, the link between ‘old’ and ‘new’ foreign policies are made by examining the ideological basis of these policies with a specific focus on the role of language. Contemporary scholarship in the area - and more specifically within IR - often neglects the importance of language and ideas when it discusses foreign policy. This research has not only emphasized its importance, but also offered a combination of framework and method to provide a robust alternative critical approach to scholarship. The use of critical geopolitics as an overarching framework, and more specifically the three themes (the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory) has presented a concrete and empirical way to analyze contemporary American power, by looking at the role of ideology as an important and often overlooked dimension for analysis. The benefit of an interdisciplinary framework is that it can cross disciplines, hence bringing IR and geography together in dialogue to form an alternative approach to research.

7.2 What structural approaches can be learned from CDA and CGP?

As CGP asks the ‘how’ questions, this research asked how the Bush administration tried to legitimize American imperialism after 9/11. It is therefore important to understand how those in power construct and perpetuate discourses that strive to normalize a certain ideology to benefit themselves. Critical geopolitics provides a framework for those studying international relations to ask these critical questions. The intention of such questions is to dig deeper, to the roots of ideology and ‘common sense’ beliefs and understand how such beliefs become embedded and
naturalized. CDA provides a tool for doing so that is not currently used widely in CGP or international relations. The combined approach represents a critical way to ask a different set of questions that focus on the ideational, and move away from theory testing and assumptions, while incorporating overlooked areas such as discourse, the meaning of space, and the power of language.

For example, while many theories ask ‘what are the conditions necessary for a state to become imperial’, or ‘why do states seek to become powerful’, CGP asks a question such as ‘how is imperialism legitimized’. The CGP approach seeks to understand how ‘truths’ are created, naturalized into our ideology, and then legitimized. Instead of accepting America as an imperial power, or accepting that American power is ‘needed’ to protect peace, different questions need to be asked that question these common sense or taken-for-granted beliefs. The integration of a critical analysis of territory and the ways in which space and place are given meaning, and specifically how power can rewrite those global spaces and places is something that CGP offers for incorporation into international relations. As demonstrated in this thesis, how a certain place such as Iraq can become dangerous or rogue, while other spaces such as Guantanamo with its prison can be exempt from United States laws is something that a great power such as America decides. It is important, therefore, to understand how the classifications of these spaces are created, then normalized, and finally accepted. The ways in which discourse can shape our political (and in fact, everyday) world is something that CGP seeks to uncover, and as this research has demonstrated its unique combination with CDA can provide a way to methodologically analyze the effects of discourse.

Structurally and methodologically, CDA offers a useful tool to analyze the importance of language. Often, sweeping statements are made within literature that state ‘language matters’ or ‘words are powerful’; but, how? It is not often taken to a level beyond that. While other kinds of discourse analysis and linguistic analysis have looked specifically into text, CDA looks into power, ideology, and seeks to connect these insights within the larger picture. The goal is to understand power, question how it is sustained by de-naturalizing the language of power. The incorporation of CDA in a
systematic way into a critical geopolitics framework is something that has not yet been implemented rigorously. This methodology offers CGP the validity of a robust critical alternative to studying international relations. It provides ways to focus on language, by picking apart the ideologies behind the words to understand how discourse becomes normalized. As demonstrated in Chapters Four to Six, there is much to unpack from even the simplest of claims made by the Bush administration. For example, the way in which language is used to advocate a certain point of view can be empirically assessed by looking at it through framing – a technique in CDA analysis. Or, the ways in which metaphors can connect to bigger ideas such as self identity, and bring a nation together are able to be identified through CDA. Alternatively, it also looks at how language can divide people, by Othering, and the repetition of simple binaries until they become accepted and naturalized. Often, metaphors, rhetorical devices and contrasts are heard in speech. CDA provides a way to see the intentional use behind these linguistic devices, and how the can form peoples opinions, self-identity, and in this case, rationalize policies. Importantly, they are also used to create binaries. The systematic use of CDA allows the words used to be picked apart and shows how they fit in with the larger ideological picture. A structural approach combining CGP with CDA therefore provides a way to assess American imperialism on the level of ideas. Hence, the role of ideas is key to this research and key to the framework of CGP and methods of CDA.

7.3 What has critical discourse analysis revealed?

Returning to the research question of how the Bush administration tried to legitimate American imperialism as a consequence of 9/11 would point to a key factor: discourses and the role of ideas are key. Not only has the evidence proved that the policies were not necessarily a reaction to 9/11, as the early 1990s documents exhibited similar if not identical language, but that the discourses and language can be altered to the context. The framing in the discourse that took place after 9/11 of a dark, and newly dangerous world created a specific plot and the necessity for a ‘hero’. The reasoning presented was that since the attacks, America has been confronted by a scary, new, and dispersed enemy (global terrorism). Therefore, as the most powerful nation, leader of the free world, and the nation that has been directly attacked, there is no choice for the United States but to strike back. This discourse was created through various lines of
reasoning such as: just war and humanitarian reasons in the invasion of Iraq, an unknown enemy that ‘hides in the shadows’, and America as the only responsible and powerful nation to deal with this global enemy as their duty, among others. All of these discourses: ‘world leader’, ‘unknown enemy’, ‘just war’, were perpetuated through speech, and policy documents, and further perpetuated by the media, to create a narrative that would allow for the aggressive measured proposed in the 1990s to be implemented after 2001.

The three chapters that constitute a critical discourse analysis present several important findings. Chapter Four and the documents of the early 1990s uncovered a set of important discourses. First, imperialism is essential, and further, that American dominance is needed to keep interests and Americans safe. Second, that American dominance is actually favoured and ‘better’ for the rest of the world in securing a peaceful international environment. Third, that it is America’s duty and role as a benevolent hegemon (hence, not asked for, but accepted) to take responsibility and fulfill their destiny. In the 1990s, the key frames that American imperial power was presented within were the end of the Cold War, making the United States the sole superpower, and its ‘unique’ role in the world. The similarities in the documents of the 1990s and the major PNAC publication in 2000 are striking. Also noteworthy, is the merging of the neoconservative and American supremacist views in the think tank PNAC just before George W. Bush was elected. Chapter Four revealed the key discourses that America should remain the global hegemon, that no other nation should be able to rival it, a continuation of consistently high spending on military, the use of unilateral actions, and its monopoly on protecting the peace. The conclusions revealed that America reserved the right to decide who is dangerous and who is not. Ultimately, the combinations of these analyses revealed that the discourse promotes the idea that the United States is the only reliable power to make these decisions.

In Chapter Five, CDA revealed that what is often thought of as ‘common sense’ is not just ‘the way things are’. The importance of social construction and the role of discourses to naturalize ideologies were once again made evident. CDA demonstrated how a new era and a dangerous new enemy was set up within a specific frame. This
enemy was said to be plotting the demise of America, with no political intentions, driven solely by hate, jealousy, and distaste for the American way of life. This construction was important as it especially antagonized the enemy, and reduced them to nothing more than a hate filled group of fanatics, making it easy to rally behind America to defeat this enemy. Polls showed that the American people approved of President Bush’s actions and his handling of the ‘new’ threat. Important characteristics of the new enemy such as being dispersed, hidden, and everywhere, were the justification of military resources to target and defeat them. Because America cannot necessarily pinpoint who, or where the enemy is at any given time, it provided an open path for military action for the foreseeable future. This was presented as essential in order to make, and keep America safer. There was also an understanding that in order to keep Americans safe, they may need to trade some of their civil rights and freedoms for the greater good (such as certain types of privacy). Importantly, CDA also revealed that what is left out is as important as what is included. For example, the omission of any political aims of Al Qaeda, and the focus instead on a script that presented them as apolitical, and simply hate filled, ‘evildoers’, presented an image of an irrational Other. CDA made it clear how Othering occurred through discourse, and how this was used to rally support behind American actions and against the terrorists in such a way that a blind support for future military intervention was being crafted. CDA presents us with an understanding of the significance of framing through discourse, and how narratives can be created that may justify future military action.

Chapter Six demonstrated that the declaration of a ‘Global War on Terror’ launched an abstract mission. There had not been an event that could make such an abstract, open-ended justification for military intervention in every corner of the earth possible – until September 11, 2001. Once the frame was set up for a new world, the discourse shifted from a focus on Osama Bin Laden (after he could not be found) to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. As Chapter Four revealed, Iraq was a long-standing issue for neoconservatives and American supremacists alike. In the fog of the 9/11 attacks and the American anger toward Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, the Bush administration was able to tilt discourse toward Iraq and the GWOT, which Chapter Six discussed. This chapter had a number of key findings. First, it highlighted how Osama Bin Laden and Saddam
Hussein were intentionally confused, and fused into one another through carefully planned discourses that would link 9/11, the GWOT, Bin Laden, Saddam and the need to protect America from future attacks. In fact, this was accomplished so successfully that by the time of the invasion of Iraq, many Americans were using Bin Laden and Hussein’s names interchangeably. The just war discourses against Iraq and humanitarian reasons, combined with the claim that Hussein was harbouring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) paved the way for a war in Iraq, with Americans in support of the actions of the Bush administration. Also of importance was the vagueness of the language, the open-endedness of the GWOT script, and the specific use of emotional language to try and legitimize American military actions. The invasion of Iraq was the epitome of the Bush Doctrine in practice: unilateralism, pre-emption, and regime change. It also signaled an important message to the rest of the world: if your administrations disagrees with America, they will use their ‘right’ to preempt danger and preemptively attack, proving that they are the sole superpower. The role of the GWOT in the grand strategy of American imperialism therefore was an open-ended legitimation for future military action that would allow America to maintain its role as sole superpower and promote a world that embraces American supremacy. CDA took a part some of the key language that perpetuates this ideology, and can be seen as a narrative through Chapters Four to Six.

One of the key findings of this research at a theoretical level is that language matters. By looking at key examples, CDA methodologically demonstrated just how important language is in constructing our worldview. Throughout the CDA in this thesis, attention was paid to specific ‘tools’ of language construction and how they were used to construct a specific set of ideologies to legitimate imperialism. What proved to be important was firstly, framing. Framing is important because it organizes discourses according to certain points of view. Hence, setting up the narrative from the first speech after 9/11 that introduced a changed world was key. What was also found to be important was what was excluded from the discourse, was just as important as what was included. For example, the intentional a politicization of the enemy, by not addressing any of their political goals, and reducing them solely to a hate-filled, and irrational group, allowed Americans to rally around their government in support of retaliation.
This was specifically important as it ensured that America was portrayed as an innocent victim against an ‘evil’ Other. Additionally, the general vagueness of the language - such as references to unknown time scales, whatever resources ‘necessary’, and the constant references to the enemies geographical reach (i.e. ‘everywhere’) - ensured that no amount is too much to destroy the enemy, no land is too far, and no one too suspicious for America to take action. At the root of much of this discourse was emotional language, filled with rhetorical devices, vivid imagery (ex. ‘mushroom clouds’ in American cities), and metaphors to disastrous potential situations. Above all, the discourses were largely driven by fear: i.e. what might happen if America does not take action. These findings have all brought to light how important language is in constructing, and perpetuation ideologies, and further, how they aid in naturalizing these ideas into common sense beliefs.

7.4 Concluding remarks and further research

This thesis has sought to achieve a deeper understanding of power at the ideological level, asking how discourses were used to legitimize American imperialism. This thesis has argued that a combination of critical geopolitics and critical discourse analysis can shed light on the importance of ideas in international relations and further, offers a critical and interdisciplinary way to examine their power. This combination of framework and method provides a robust form of critical research that has been overlooked in the field of CGP, and hence has left CGP with less validity than it deserves within the larger field of international relations. It is a combination that presents an alternative critical approach to the study of grand strategy and power. Critical discourse analysis is not limited to IR, and neither is CGP. It can act as a way to bring disciplines together in looking at issues that already cross academic fields. CGP is at the intersection of political science, human geography, and international relations. CDA is not a tool for linguists only, and has been broadly used in the past. However, combining them together is a complimentary, comprehensive, and critical way to conduct critical interdisciplinary research.

September 11, 2001 caused shockwaves across the world – politically, and academically. The importance of its repercussions continues to be in the spotlight as
other forms and variations of terrorism surface across the globe. The discourses we hear in the media and from the American administration today provide ample material to analyze, compare and contrast on how the role of ideas matter in forming policy. This thesis has contributed to the existing literature in its combined approach of CGP and CDA within the field of IR. As much as been written about the Bush presidency, and the consequences of the 2001 attacks, especially within the field of IR, there has been a missing set of questions – which are the ‘how’ questions. This thesis has provided a critical analysis of the ways in which discourse and language are important: they form perceptions, and become embedded as common sense into our ideology. Not only that, but the importance of perception was highlighted by comparing many of the speeches and documents post 9/11 and subjecting them to a CDA which was then compared to the documents of the 1990s. Research, and books, such as Richard Jackson’s account have analyzed 9/11 discourse, but not traced its origins in depth to show the comparison of the language. This allows a clear understanding to emerge that focuses on the importance of perceptions. 9/11 discourse has been quoted many times, and its implications explored by various disciplines. The central importance, however, is its continuum by concretely pointing to documents and discourse that existed a decade prior that shows the window of opportunity 9/11 presented.

Further research could take a few different paths. As mentioned in Chapter Two, CGP has branched out into several ‘sister’ disciplines that are important such as feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics and emotional geopolitics. The incorporation of these frameworks or methods into international relations would enrich our understanding of how power works on several different levels. Critical discourse analysis is also not limited to the elite. This thesis was a project in understanding how elites legitimize power, however, CDA can equally be used to analyze other ‘branches’ of power. It is not just a methodology for linguists, and its incorporation into mainstream IR would benefit the existing debates, and perhaps pave the way for alternative ones. Importantly, the incorporation of CDA as a systematic and rigorous method for use, especially within the field of critical geopolitics moving forward, would give CGP much needed validity within the field of international relations as a robust critical approach to research.
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