Himmelreich, Johannes (2015) Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
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We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility.
|Item Type:||Thesis (PhD)|
|Additional Information:||© 2015 Johannes Himmelreich|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
|Supervisor:||List, Christian and Bradley, Richard|
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