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Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility

Himmelreich, Johannes (2015) Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

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Abstract

We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Additional Information: © 2015 Johannes Himmelreich
Library of Congress subject classification: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Supervisor: List, Christian and Bradley, Richard
URI: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3277

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