Kin-States and Kin Majorities from the Bottom-Up: Developing a Model of Nested Integration in Crimea & Moldova

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Abstract

With the increasing importance and prevalence of kin-state policies, this thesis identifies three gaps in existing kin-state research. Theoretically, existing literature focuses on how kin relations can induce or reduce conflict between states, overlooking the dynamics of interaction between kin-states and kin communities. Conceptually, existing literature focuses on kin communities as minorities, overlooking kin majorities. Methodologically, existing literature focuses on top-down institutional and state-level analyses of kin-state relations, overlooking bottom-up agency-centred perspectives.

To address these gaps, the thesis develops a model of nested integration, to analyse relations between kin-states and kin majorities from a bottom-up perspective. Nested integration does not challenge the borders separating kin-state from kin communities, but affects the meaning of this border. The thesis examines the comparative explanatory power of this model of nested integration by generating evidence about the meanings of kin identification and engagement with different kin-state practices, through a cross-case comparison of Crimea vis-à-vis Russia and Moldova vis-à-vis Romania. These cases are selected from a wider kin majority typology as two contrasting examples of kin-state policies: Romanian citizenship in Moldova and Russian quasi-citizenship Compatriot policy in Crimea.

Overall, the thesis argues that Moldova exhibits more nested integration than Crimea because of the type, legitimacy and availability of kin-state provision, which the thesis argues is consequential for the degree of nested integration observed. The thesis also refines the model of nested integration, by taking account of empirical evidence, arguing for the importance of considering internal fractionalization within the kin majority, social dependence and geopolitical dependence. Incorporating these elements within the model shows kin-state relations to concern not only issues of identity, but also security, public goods provision and geopolitical region-building narratives. These elements have been overlooked by existing research and demonstrate the importance of a bottom-up, agency-centred and comparative perspective for kin-state scholarship.
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

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I declare that my thesis consists of 101,904 words.

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Judith Knott.

Parts of this thesis have been published as journal articles:

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Significant thanks goes to my respondents, friends and hosts in Crimea and Moldova, who remain nameless. You are much more than the subjects of this research.

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I am grateful to my mentors and colleagues at the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) and doctoral seminar in nationalism studies. I thank John Hutchinson for keeping the debate on nationalism studies lively. I am indebted for the opportunities that being involved with ASEN has provided, both participating in, and organising, its annual conference and seminars.

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In writing this thesis, I learnt the power of family histories in shaping the present and for disentangling the crucible of politics. It is from the personal and everyday that I hope I can contribute to political science.
“The earth does not particularly care whether Celts or Slavs inhabited Bohemia, whether Romanians or Russians occupy Bessarabia.”

Milan Kundera (1980)
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting
# Contents

List of Figures  
List of Tables  

1 Introducing Kin Majorities and Nested Integration from the Bottom-up  
1.1 Why Study Kin Majorities from Below?  
1.2 A Kin Majority Typology  
1.3 A Bottom-up Approach to Identities and Institutions  
1.4 Main Arguments  
1.5 Methodology and Research Design  
1.6 Thesis Outline  

2 Theorising Nested Integration for Kin Majorities  
2.1 Existing Approaches to Kin-State Relations  
2.2 A Nested Approach for Kin Majorities  
2.3 Conceptualising Kin-State Meanings  
2.4 Conceptualising Kin-State Practices  
2.5 Conclusion: A Model of Nested Integration to Examine Diverse Kin-State Practices  

3 Crimea and Moldova as Kin Majorities  
3.1 Historical Background: Russia and Crimea  
3.2 Historical Background: Romania and Moldova  
3.3 Institutional Background: Russia’s Kin-State Policies in Crimea  
3.4 Institutional Background: Romanian Kin-state Policies in Moldova  
3.5 Conclusion: A Framework to Analyse Kin-state Practices  

4 Kin Majority Identification: What Does it Mean to be Russian in Crimea?  
4.1 Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Crimea  
4.2 Discriminated Russians  
4.3 Ethnic Russians  
4.4 Political Ukrainians  
4.5 Crimeans  
4.6 Ethnic Ukrainians  
4.7 Conclusion  

5 Russian Kin-state Practices in Crimea: the Bottom-up Perspective  
5.1 Existing Approaches to Russian Kin-State Practices  
5.2 Entitlements to Russian Kin-State Practices  


## Contents

5.3 Associational Practices: Compatriot Organisations ................................................. 127
5.4 Membership Practices: Russian Citizenship ............................................................ 132
5.5 Recognition Practices: Compatriot Practices ......................................................... 136
5.6 Educational Practices ............................................................................................... 141
5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 145

6 Kin Majority Identification: What Does it Mean to be Romanian in Moldova? 148
   6.1 Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Moldova ............................................................... 149
   6.2 Organic Romanians ............................................................................................... 152
   6.3 Cultural Romanians ............................................................................................. 158
   6.4 Ambivalent Romanians ....................................................................................... 161
   6.5 Moldovans ........................................................................................................... 164
   6.6 Linguistic Moldovans ......................................................................................... 168
   6.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 171

7 Romanian Kin-state Practices in Moldova: the Bottom-up Perspective 174
   7.1 Existing Approaches to Romanian Kin-State Practices ........................................... 175
   7.2 Entitlements to Romanian Kin-State Practices ...................................................... 177
   7.3 Educational Practices: Romanian Scholarships .................................................... 181
   7.4 Membership Practices: Redobândire ................................................................. 185
   7.5 Participation Practices: Extra-Territorial Voting .................................................. 198
   7.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 202

8 Examining the Model of Nested Integration of Kin Majorities from Below 205
   8.1 Revisiting The Model of Nested Integration ......................................................... 206
   8.2 Meanings: How do Kin Majorities Identify with Kin-States? ............................... 208
   8.3 How do Kin Majorities Engage with Kin-State Practices? ................................... 211
   8.4 Comparing the Evidence of Nested Integration from the Bottom-Up ................. 215
   8.5 A Model of Nested Integration? .......................................................................... 232

9 Conclusion 236
   9.1 Thesis Review ....................................................................................................... 237
   9.2 Thesis Contribution .............................................................................................. 239
   9.3 Future Research ................................................................................................... 249
   9.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 251

Appendices 253

A Interview Guide 254

B Interviews & Correspondence 255

C Crimean Respondents 256

D Moldovan Respondents 258

E Coding Frameworks 260

Bibliography 262
# List of Figures

1. Map of Cases .................................................. 12
2. Historical Map of Crimea, Ukraine and Russia .................. 13
3. Historical Map of Moldova and Romania ......................... 14
1.1 Iterative versus Inductive and Deductive Logics ................. 30
1.2 The Iterative Research Process .................................. 31
1.3 Coding Process .................................................. 35
2.1 Overlapping Versus Nested Integration .......................... 44
3.1 Crimean Ethnicity According to Censuses (1897-2001) ........ 58
3.2 Ethnic Composition of the Population of the USSR in 1991 (by SSR) .... 59
3.3 Support for Ukrainian Independence from Soviet Union in December 1991 Referendum ...................... 60
3.4 Election Results for Crimean parliament (1994-2010) ......... 62
3.5 Ethnicity According to Moldovan Censuses (1897-2004) ....... 64
3.6 Ethnicity in Greater Romania by region (1930 census) .......... 65
3.7 Moldova’s Post-Soviet Elections (1990-2014) .................. 69
3.8 Quota Places for CIS Citizens and Compatriots Abroad to Study at Higher Education Institutions in Russia (2010) ......... 72
3.9 The Hierarchy of Compatriot Councils ............................. 73
3.10 Size of Romanian Communities Abroad (According to Romania) .... 79
3.11 Romanian Aid Allocation (2007-2013) .......................... 80
3.12 Acquisition of Romanian Citizenship ............................. 80
3.13 Acquisition of citizenship by Moldovans in EU/EEA States (1991-2012) ............... 83
3.14 Number of Applications Solved (Article 11, 2005-2014) ....... 83
3.15 Number Eligible Versus Number Participating in Moldova in Romanian Elections (2009-2014) .................. 85
3.16 Eugen Tomac Campaign Sticker – "Bessarabia, Citizenship is Your Right!" .......... 85
3.17 Romania’s Educational Provision (With and Without Bursaries) ........ 87
4.1 Language and Ethnicity in Crimea According to 2001 Ukrainian Census .......... 92
4.2 Russian Language Use in Ukraine According to 2001 Ukrainian Census .......... 96
4.3 Russian Ethnicity in Ukraine According to 2001 Ukrainian Census .......... 96
4.4 Gender Profile of Respondents in Crimea .......................... 97
4.5 Age Profile of Respondents in Crimea ............................. 97
5.1 In your opinion, what should the status of Crimea be? .......... 121
6.1 Ethnicity and Language in Moldova according to 2004 Census ........................................... 151
6.2 Gender Profile of Respondents in Moldova ................................................................. 153
6.3 Age Profile of Respondents in Moldova ................................................................. 153
6.4 Historic Regions of Romania .................................................................................. 156

7.1 Number Acquiring Citizenship (all kinds) by State (1991-2012) ........................................ 175
7.2 Status of Reacquisition of Romanian Citizenship by Respondent Category .................... 187

8.1 The Multiple Layers of Nested Integration ................................................................. 235
# List of Tables

1.1 Research Questions .......................................................... 17
1.2 Conceptualising Differences Between Kin Majorities and Kin Minorities .......... 18
1.3 The Cases of the Kin Majority Typology .................................. 21
1.4 Rational, Institutional and Bottom-up Approaches to Political Science .......... 24
1.5 Similarities and Differences for a Cross-Case Comparison of Moldova and Crimea .... 27
1.6 Examples of Kin-State Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship Policies .............. 28
1.7 Types of Respondents Interviewed in Moldova and Crimea .................... 32
2.1 Positioning the Thesis vis-à-vis Existing Theories ................................ 39
2.2 Cultural and Political Incorporation ........................................... 45
2.3 Conceptualising Kin-State Practices ......................................... 54
3.1 Territorial Changes .................................................................. 55
3.2 Number of Applications Registered and Processed for Reacquisition of Romanian Citizenship (2002-15 August 2011) .................................................. 81
3.3 Data on Romanian citizenship certificates issued by the National Citizenship Authority for Article 11 (2010-2014) ................................................................. 82
3.4 Typology of Kin-State Practices .................................................. 90
4.1 Inductively Derived Identification Categories in Crimean Case .................. 94
4.2 Agreement and Disagreement Between the Identification Categories in Crimean case .......... 118
5.1 Identification Categories for the Crimean Case (from Chapter 4) ................. 123
5.2 Membership Practices in Crimea by Category .................................... 135
5.3 Recognition practices in Crimea by Category .................................... 140
6.1 Inductively Derived Identification Categories in Moldovan Case ................. 154
6.2 Agreement and Disagreement Between the Identification Categories in Moldovan case .......... 173
7.1 Inductively Derived Identification Categories for Moldovan case (from Chapter 6) .... 178
7.2 Unpacking Practices and Motivations by Inductive Categories .................. 197
7.3 Extra-territorial Voting Practices by Respondent Category ...................... 202
8.1 Research Questions ................................................................... 207
8.2 The Original Model of Nested Integration ....................................... 208
8.3 Explaining the Identification Categories ......................................... 210
8.4 Conceptualising Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship Practices .................... 213
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Territorial and Geopolitical Aspirations for Crimean Case</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Mapping Nested Integration Respondents in Crimean Case</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Territorial and Geopolitical for the Moldovan Case</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Mapping Nested Integration Respondents in Moldovan Case</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Empirical Contributions</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Theoretical Contributions</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Examples of Ethnic Enclaves</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1</td>
<td>List of Respondents from Crimean Case</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.1</td>
<td>List of Respondents from Moldovan Case</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.1</td>
<td>Crimea: Coding for Meanings</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.2</td>
<td>Crimea: Coding for Practices</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.3</td>
<td>Moldova: Coding for Meanings</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.4</td>
<td>Moldova: Coding for Practices</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Common Abbreviations

BiH  Bosnia Herzegovina
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE  Council of Europe
EHCR European Court of Human Rights
ELF  Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index
EU   European Union
FSU  Former Soviet Union
GONGO Governmentally-Organised Non-Governmental organisation
MAR  Minorities at Risk
MASSR Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1924-1940)
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSSR Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
RS  Republika Srpska
SSR  Soviet Socialist Republic
UkrSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII World War Two (also known as Great Patriotic War)

Abbreviations of Political Parties & Organisations

Crimea
RE  Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity)
PoR  Partiiia Regionov (Party of Regions)
KPU   Komunistichna Partiiia Ukraini (Communist Party of Ukraine)
BYut  Blok Yuliyi Timoshenko (Bloc Yulia Timoshenko)
RCC  Russkii Kulturnii Tsentr (Russian Cultural Centre, Crimea)
ROC  Russkaia Obshchina Kryma (Russian Community of Crimea)
BSF  Black Sea Fleet (Chernomorskii Flot)

Russia
Rossotrudnichestvo  Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation
RM  Russkii Mir (Russian World)
Moldova

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIE</td>
<td>Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană (Alliance for European Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRM</td>
<td>Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova (Communist Party of Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Partidul Democrat din Moldova (Democrat Party of Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Frontul Popular din Moldova (Popular Front of Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Partidul Liberal (Liberal Party of Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLDM</td>
<td>Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova (Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNL</td>
<td>Partidul Național Liberal (National Liberal Party, Moldova)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRM</td>
<td>Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova (Socialist Party of Moldova)</td>
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Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Autorității Naționale pentru Cetățenie (National Authority for Citizenship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRRP</td>
<td>Departamentul Politici pentru Relația cu Românii de Pretutindeni (Department for Relations with Romanians abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>Institutul Cultural Român (Romanian Cultural Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-DL</td>
<td>Partidul Democrat-Liberal (Liberal Democrat Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Partidul Mișcarea Populară (People’s Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNL</td>
<td>Partidul Național Liberal (National Liberal Party, Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transliteration and Language

For Russian and Ukrainian the “Library of Congress, ALA-LC Romanization Tables: Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts” are used (и/i, ї/i, ы/y, я/ia, ю/iu in Russian, і/i, ї/ï in Ukrainian), except where there are more common forms used (e.g. Yeltsin, not E’tsin, Simferopol, not Simferopol’, Sevastopol, not Sevastopol’, oblast not oblast’).

Romanian is given as written, including ligatures.

English is written in British English, except where quoting directly from American English sources, and for words more commonly given now in American English spelling (e.g. Europeanization, passportization).
Figure 1: Map of Cases
Figure 2: Historical Map of Crimea, Ukraine and Russia
Figure 3: Historical Map of Moldova and Romania
Chapter 1

Introducing Kin Majorities and Nested Integration from the Bottom-up

"Except for those rare cases where it accompanies a formal approach, ethnographic research boring deeply into a particular country is viewed as ‘soft,’ ‘unscientific,’ and inappropriate for scholarship in a truly serious [political science] department."

Diamond (2002:3)

"Imagine you woke up one morning and discovered you were in a different country—not physically transported there; in fact you had awakened in the same place, along with the same neighbours. But the name of your country has changed, you’re supposed to salute a different flag, your loyalty is supposed to be for a different president."

Zevelev (2001:vii)

1.1 Why Study Kin Majorities from Below?

The politics of kin-states—states claiming co-ethnicity with communities beyond their borders—is a rich area of study which brings into focus fundamental questions for the study of politics, linking political science, international relations and identity politics, and the right of states to interact with and/or interfere in the lives of other states’ citizens. It shows that past historical injustices hold sway in contemporary policy-making and nation-building discourses, where certain external communities
remain special to external states, by virtue of co-ethnic bonds. Moreover, there is an interesting variation in how different states behave—how the same state behaves towards co-ethnic communities across different states and how these relations came to exist and be institutionalised—via the proliferation of citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies. Understanding kin-state relations is crucial to studies of nationalism and of state insecurity, citizenship policy, and extra-territorial political practices, such as voting, which affect both domestic policy agendas and electoral outcomes.

This thesis identifies three gaps (theoretical, conceptual and methodological) in existing approaches to kin-state politics. Theoretically, previous approaches have considered kin-state relations only in terms of how they can induce or reduce/neutralise conflict. The antagonistic approach, suggested by Brubaker (1996) and developed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), van Houten (1998), and D. J. Smith (2002), argues that kin-state relations are conflict-inducing by advancing competing territorial claims and forms of nationalism, between the home-state and kin-state, over a shared community. By contrast, the fuzzy approach, theorised by Batt (2002) and Fowler (2004), argues kin-state relations can be conflict-neutral. Here, kin-state policies, such as quasi-citizenship, are not necessarily contested by home-states; instead, kin-states and home-states agree to share these “fuzzy” citizenries. Both approaches overlook the dynamics of interaction between kin communities, kin-states and home-states.

The thesis contributes to this theoretical gap by exploring the dynamics of interaction exhibited by kin communities, to contribute a better understanding of kin-state policies and the impact of these policies on kin-state relations. It proposes a model of nested integration which argues that kin-state policies can advance a type of nested integration, which cannot be explained by the antagonistic or fuzzy approaches. Instead, this type of integration involves the nesting of a kin community within the kin-state, while not undermining the kin majority’s relations with, and affiliation to, their home-state. This nested integration does not challenge the existence of borders separating kin-state from kin communities; rather these kin-state policies change the meaning of the border separating the kin-state from the kin majority by allowing greater interaction and integration “over and above” sovereign borders (Kovács 2006:442; Csergő and Goldgeier 2004, 2001).

The central question of this research is therefore: how far is the interaction of kin majorities with kin-states explained by the model of nested integration? This question is supplemented by second-order conceptual and third-order empirical questions (Table 1.1). These questions indicate how the research is broken down conceptually, to analyse the dynamics of interaction, in terms of meanings and practices, and empirically, in the two kin majority cases of this research (Crimea and Moldova), to examine evidence of nested integration, conceptualised as the presence of both political and cultural incorporation.

Conceptually, this thesis argues research needs to study the phenomenon of kin majorities, moving away from the focus on kin minorities. Kin majorities are defined as communities claimed as co-ethnic by external kin-states, and which form a majority in the state or sub-state unit in which they reside. As more dominant constituents of the state or sub-state than kin minorities, the puzzle of relations—between kin majorities, their home-state and kin-state—needs to be analysed directly. This thesis constructs a kin majority typology from which two kin majority cases, Moldova and Crimea, are studied in depth. In proposing, and refining, the model of nested integration, the thesis presents this as a kin majority theory, given the conceptual limits of the thesis to consider only kin majorities.
1.2. A KIN MAJORITY TYPOLOGY

Table 1.1: Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>How far is the interaction of kin majorities with kin-states explained by the model of nested integration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. Conceptual Questions | a) What do the meanings of kin identification demonstrate about the dynamics of interaction between kin majorities and kin-states?  
|                       | b) What does engagement with kin-state practices demonstrate about the dynamics of interaction between kin majorities and kin-states? |
| 3. Empirical Questions | a) Meanings: How do kin majorities (in Crimea and Moldova) identify with kin-states (Russia and Romania)?  
|                       | b) Practices: How do these kin majorities engage with kin-state practices? |

However, this idea of nesting also offers a novel way to understand relations between kin minorities and kin-states, by the ability to become nested within kin-states while retaining ties of loyalty to home-state, as well as the opportunity to observe whether this nesting is occurring.

Methodologically, this thesis critiques the dominance of top-down state-centred analysis of kin-state relations, ignoring the agency of members of kin communities. To fill this methodological gap, the thesis takes a bottom-up, meaning-centred interpretivist approach. This goes beyond previous interstate approaches to explore, from the perspective of members of kin majorities, how and why they engage with kin-states. This is broken down conceptually to analyse meanings, how kin majorities identify, and practices, how kin majorities engage with kin-state practices such as citizenship and quasi-citizenship.

1.2 A Kin Majority Typology

This research argues that kin majorities require specific attention, contending that kin majorities exhibit different relations with their home-state and kin-state, from kin minorities. To address this lack of kin majority focus, the thesis establishes a kin majority typology, as a universe of cases, to which the two cases examined in this thesis, Moldova and Crimea, have a wider conceptual relevance.

1.2.1 Why are Kin Majorities Different from Kin Minorities?

Previous kin-state literature focuses on kin minorities, rather than majorities. While this literature forms an important conceptual backbone of the research, kin majorities need to be studied in their own right because, as majorities, kin majorities are different from kin minorities, vis-à-vis home-state and kin-state relations, in terms of their genesis and conception of homeland (Table 1.2).

Home-State Power

Kin minorities are demographic minorities and subordinate, to the majority group, in terms of power. By contrast, kin majorities are demographically dominant and generally hold superior political power. Hence, kin majorities have a more privileged position within the state or sub-state, allowing the majority institutional control over key aspects of the polity, such as language laws. Even in cases where
1.2. A Kin Majority Typology

### Table 1.2: Conceptualising Differences Between Kin Majorities and Kin Minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kin Minority</th>
<th>Kin Majority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Home-state relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Power</td>
<td>Subordinated</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where sub-state: autonomy vis-à-vis home-state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Legitimacy</td>
<td>Questioned: via “hosted” discourse</td>
<td>Not questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Discrimination risk</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kin-state relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Relationship</td>
<td>Protector of discriminated minority</td>
<td>Protector of non-discriminated majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Eligibility for kin-state policies</td>
<td>Eligible minority within home-state</td>
<td>Eligible majority within state or sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Homeland</td>
<td>External (kin-state)</td>
<td>Connected (kin-state and home-state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Genesis</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Border change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the kin majority comprise a majority of the sub-state, but not the state, they still possess territorial autonomy which permits de facto (if not de jure) power to create institutions which protect key areas of cultural capital, such as language.

**Home-State Legitimacy**

For kin minorities the home-state is often framed as a “host state” (e.g. Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia), where minorities are framed as illegitimate components of the contemporary state, belonging to a different state (kin-state) and with uncertain rights to remain within their home-state (Pogonyi et al. 2010; M. G. Marshall 1993:197). Even where rights to remain are less questioned (e.g. Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia), their relationship with the state is still inferior, requiring minorities to learn the home-state language and campaign for native language education (Deets and Stroschein 2005). By contrast, kin majorities comprise the historic majority of the state/sub-state in which they reside, and have access to power resources which entrench their language as the functional language of the state/sub-state.

**Discrimination Risk Within Home-State**

Kin minorities are often framed as “minorities at risk” because they face potential discrimination within their home-states (e.g. Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Gurr 1993). The Russian kin minority in Estonia and Latvia found themselves inhabiting a “Kafkaesque nightmare” (Laitin 1998:8) in the post-Soviet period, not only because of their dubious right to remain but because they often lacked political rights to home-state citizenship and cultural rights, to speak, and be educated, in Russian. Moreover, these elements were linked: the right to acquire citizenship required passing a test of home-state language fluency, which was a bar many ethnic Russians and Russian speakers could not, and still do not, meet.
However kin majorities do not face these kinds of restrictions, as legitimate members of the state/sub-state and holders of citizenship; hence kin majorities can participate in daily life, and local institutions, in their language.

**Kin-State Relationship**

Where kin minorities are “minorities at risk”, kin-states are important, if not legitimate, lobbyists for greater protection of their kin minorities at risk from discrimination.¹ The Council of Europe argued too that kin-states offered the possibility of better protection for minorities and thus legitimised the right of kin-states to interact with kin minorities abroad (Udrea 2014; Venice Commission 2001). However, these minority protection arguments, underpinning how and why it is legitimate for an external state to claim interests in the citizens of another state, cannot be levied in the case of kin majorities. They do not need the resources of protection provided by the kin-state because they provide the resources to be self-sufficient, politically and culturally, as the dominant majority within their state/sub-state. Rather in kin majority cases, other ethnic groups, comprising minorities, can be at higher risk, for example their linguistic rights being impinged (e.g. Crimean Tatars in Crimea, Bosnian Muslims in Republika Srpska, Serbians in Kosovo).

**Eligibility for Kin-State Policies**

Whereas kin minorities comprise an eligible minority for kin-state policies within the home-state, kin majorities comprise an eligible majority. This allows for greater and deeper kin-state interaction, between kin majority and kin-state, by granting a more dominant constituent within the state/sub-state access to, and use of kin-state policies, than peripheral kin minorities. Thus, the implications of kin majorities acquiring, using kin-state rights and becoming more integrated with the kin-state are different, the potential for destabilisation is greater, and this requires specific attention.

**Genesis**

Kin majorities often arose from moving borders rather than moving people, whereas kin minorities can arise, or be augmented, either by voluntary or coerced migration (ethnic Russians in Baltic states, Koreans in China and Japan) or by border changes (ethnic Hungarians in Romania). The migratory genesis helps to reinforce the sense of home-states “hosting” these kin minorities who are, in turn, conceived as diaspora, at least by the home-state, which imagines they have an external homeland (kin-state) to which they can “return” (Laitin 1998; Safran 1991). Kin minorities are often associated with a particular regime, e.g. ethnic Russians as illegitimate occupiers in Baltic states and associated with the Soviet regime and Soviet-era migration (Melvin 1995). This reinforces the discourse that home-states are, even generously, hosting communities that do not belong to the home-state, even if they conceive of themselves as “beached”, arising from their detachment from a central state (e.g. collapse of Soviet Union). Kin majorities do not share these experiences, either of migration or the framing of hosting.

¹The absence of a kin-state can explain also why there is not greater consideration of social, cultural and political discrimination, for example in the case of the Roma, who have no external kin-state to lobby for their interests, domestically and internationally, and to provide them with additional resources, which their home-states fail to provide (Pogany 2006).
as they generally arise from border shifts and experiences of ongoing territorial flux, reinforcing their sense of legitimacy at home.

**Homeland**

This experience of border genesis, as opposed to migratory genesis, results in a different framing of homelands. While kin minorities have “external” homelands as Brubaker (1996) argues (and elaborated in Chapter 2), kin majorities have connected homelands disconnected by territorial flux. Hence, kin majorities conceive of their state/sub-state as both their homeland and as part of the wider kin-state homeland.

Kin majorities therefore present an unexplored and interesting puzzle: they do not need the same kin-state support, as kin minorities, because, as local majorities, they are less exposed to home-state discrimination and more empowered. Yet kin-states act in similar, if not more ardent, ways towards kin majorities, rendering them eligible, en masse, for kin-state policies, and access to rights and benefits. Hence kin majorities require analysis, because they pose different questions vis-à-vis kin-state and home-state relations, not least because of majority eligibility for kin-state policies. In turn, this indicates the potential for a majority, within the home-state, to interact with a kin-state, posing, different and unexplored implications for kin majority/kin-state relations.

### 1.2.2 The Kin Majority Typology

Building on the need to investigate kin majorities, this section constructs a kin majority typology according to three criteria which define the universe of cases:

1. Status as a demographic majority,
2. Co-ethnicity claimed by external kin-state,
3. Eligibility for kin-state policies.

Firstly, to be a kin majority, the case must comprise a demographic majority in a state or sub-state, i.e. they must be a local majority and this must be territorially bounded within a polity. Ethnic Russians comprise large territorial concentrations in several post-Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan); however, they are not politico-territorially defined, i.e. the community does not possess autonomy, while in Transnistria ethnic Russians do not comprise (narrowly) a local majority.²

Secondly, the majority must be claimed as co-ethnic by an external kin-state. The majority does not necessarily have to identify co-ethnically with the kin-state, where the external kin-state can claim co-ethnicity even if these claims are resisted or contested by local communities. For example, Bulgaria claims that the majority of Macedonia are, by virtue of being ethnically Macedonian, “Bulgarian by origin”. This is resisted by the Macedonian government and society (Pogany 2006; Smilov and Jileva 2004). Transnistria’s 2004 census reported 32% ethnic Moldovans, 30% ethnic Russians and 29% ethnic Ukrainians (cited by Kramarenko 2005).
1.2. A KIN MAJORITY TYPOLOGY

Table 1.3: The Cases of the Kin Majority Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Kin Majority</th>
<th>Kin (%)</th>
<th>Kin-State</th>
<th>Kin-State Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous and sovereign state</td>
<td>Moldova Romanian/Moldovan 77%³</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo¹</td>
<td>Macedonian/Bulgarian 65%</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous sub-state but not sovereign state</td>
<td>Albanian/ Kosovo 92%</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea³</td>
<td>Russian 59%</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Quasi-citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>Serbian 96%</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De facto state Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Armenian 95%</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Quasi-citizenship⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³74% ethnically Moldovan, 2% ethnically Romanian (National Bureau of Statistics 2004)
⁴Kosovo functions as a largely autonomous and sovereign state recognised by most of UN member states (110/193, 57%) and EU member-states (23/28, 82%) as of May 2015.
⁵Crimea is considered in its pre-2014 configuration, i.e. as an autonomous republic of Ukraine.
⁶Though citizenship is granted for refugees

2010; Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006); yet Bulgaria facilitates the right of Macedonians to acquire Bulgarian citizenship on this basis (Neofotistos 2009). This is evident also in the cases of Romania (vis-à-vis Moldova) and Albania (vis-à-vis Kosovo) though, by comparison, Albania is more reserved, providing social and cultural benefits including university places to its (claimed) ethnic Albanian kin, while not, directly, facilitating full citizenship (Krasniqi 2010). In these cases, the kin-state collapses two ethnic categories by claiming co-ethnicity to legitimise their right to act as a kin-state.

Thirdly, the majority must be eligible for external policies provided by the kin-state (whether citizenship or quasi-citizenship). The Åland Islands (Swedish ethnic majority in Finland) and South Tyrol (ethnic German majority in Northern Italy, Austria as a kin-state) could otherwise be considered kin majority cases; however, their kin-states (Sweden and Austria) do not advance kin-state policies (e.g. citizenship or quasi-citizenship).

These three criteria define the kin majority typology and universe of cases (Table 1.3), while recognising there are differences within these cases, such as presence/absence of conflict and degree of sovereignty/autonomy. This typology gives a wider frame of reference where the insights derived from this thesis, such as the model of nested integration, have external validity beyond the specificities of the cross-case comparison, by allowing for typological theorising (George and Bennett 2005:233).

The insights from this analysis of kin majorities may also have external validity for kin minorities, in terms of their use of kin-state policies and the potential for nested integration. However it is important to study kin majorities in their own right, as this thesis does, given they are eligible en masse for kin-state policies, posing an interesting puzzle in terms of their interaction with their kin-state and relationship with their home-state.
1.3 A Bottom-up Approach to Identities and Institutions

Understanding the agency of kin communities, and particularly kin majorities, requires a bottom-up methodology. This agency-centred approach allows for direct analysis of how members of kin majorities identify and engage with institutions provided by the kin-state, to understand how individuals negotiate and experience these kin-state relations.

The desire to understand the everyday informalities of political practices and meanings, and to collect data to fit this goal, is part of a broader political science debate to understand more about how political practices actually work by gathering data that captures the meanings of these informalities (Ekiert and Ziblatt 2013:102-03). What motivates scholars to conduct bottom-up “people-” and “agency-centred” approaches is that, as a “neglected political arena”, our understanding is based on un-tested assumptions of actors’ preferences and identities constructed from above (Kostovicova and Glasius 2011:14). Bottom-up approaches allow researchers to go further into the “gray zone” and “backstage of politics” by exploring the “lived experience” of (politically relevant) identities and institutions (Auyero 2007; Joseph and Auyero 2007:1), where respondents are treated “not as objects, but as agents” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012:46) and where the agency of individuals, their meanings, actions, and interactions, are important and politically-relevant.

Bottom-up approaches have produced rich research exploring the informality of politics in diverse sub-fields. In post-Communist political studies, scholars argue this approach is fundamental for understanding both the informalities surrounding the politics of transition and post-transition, such as networks of power (sistema) and economies of favours (blat) in Russia (Ledeneva 2013), transitional social movements (Kubik 2010), the politics of clans (Schatz 2004) and land policy (Allina-Pisano 2009). Beyond post-Communist politics, scholars have used bottom-up studies to demonstrate the importance of analysing the symbolism of political practices within authoritarian systems (Wedeen 1999), and democratisation from a bottom-up perspective (Wood 2001). These studies highlight the diversity and necessity of studying informal practices and the lived experiences of state-society relations but demonstrate also how this perspective has not been applied to kin-state relations.

This thesis uses an interpretive logic and an “ethnographic sensibility” (Kubik 2013:63) to analyse the lived experience of identities and institutions. This builds on the ethnographic approach, namely a “close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and space” (Wacquant 2003:5), and “thick description” (Geertz 1973), to advocate for a bottom-up immersive approach to political science problems which tries to “detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and feel the way they do” (Wacquant 2003:5). This bottom-up approach does not have to focus on non-elite

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1Ethnographic methods remain rare in mainstream political science, with only one article published in the American Political Science Review between 1995 and 2006 which used ethnographic methods, by Soss (1999), and even this article used ethnographic methods as part of a mixed method approach (Joseph and Auyero 2007). However, at least two further articles
actors, as this research does, but requires a more immersive and meaning-focused approach (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004), to “move beyond official rhetoric” and explore how this “resonates [...] in everyday contexts by everyday actors” (Blee and Currier 2007:158). Here the researcher has to become involved in everyday situations and analyse problems from the perspective of “what actors are thinking and doing” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:2, 237).

Interpretivists argue existing political science tools, whether rational choice or institutional perspectives, do not provide the right tools to analyse the “gray zone” of politics (Table 1.4, see Auyero 2007). Rational choice theory (RCT), as a deductive actor-centred approach, begins with a “rationality assumption” that “human activity is goal oriented and instrumental and that individual and institutional actors try to maximise their goal achievement” (Tsebelis 1990:6). This ontology of strategic goal maximisation is the “dominant”, even hegemonic, “paradigm for explaining political phenomena” in political science (McDoom 2012:128; Diamond 2002). Even “non-rational” behaviour, such as “impulsive” actions, RCT scholars argue, can be still be modelled from a rationality perspective (Tsebelis 1990:21). Interpretive approaches reject RCT’s normative assumptions about actors’ behaviour: research may produce data that suggests actors may or may not act based on goal maximisation, but goal maximisation remains a question rather than an underlying assumption.

Interpretive, bottom-up approaches deviate also from structural political science approaches. Historical institutionalism analyses how institutional changes affect political outcomes, typically via small-n case studies, to map out causal mechanisms over time (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). This thesis sympathises with historical institutionalism’s favour of case studies, whereas the macro-scale econometric analyses, common to RCT, give a distilled and generalised cross-national picture that obscures important within-case dynamics.

However, bottom-up approaches differ because as a constructivist approach they emphasise the importance of ideas, reflexivity, contingency and agency, and agency-structure interactions, where agency and structure are mutually constitutive of the other, and constituted by “collective meanings” (Wendt 1992:407; Kratochwil 2008; R. B. Hall 2002; Green 2002). Constructivists do not subscribe to the “scientific realism” of positivist approaches, such as RCT, where there is “one true description of how things are” (Kratochwil 2008:86). Rather constructivism emphasises the plurality of interpretations, recognising the subjectivity of experiences, meanings and interpretations and the underpinning idea that reality is socially constructed (Kratochwil 2008:86), as opposed to a measurable, objective reality, as positivists do. Secondly, bottom-up approaches try to understand the everyday perspective, to analyse the ideas, understandings and preferences of actors, whose impact on political outcomes is usually minimalized (Kubik 2013; Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004).

The object of interest of bottom-up approaches are issues hidden within the “gray zone” (Auyero 2007), such as how power “actually works” (Ledeneva 2013) and, for this research, what identities and policies mean in everyday informal contexts. While positivist political science focuses on a particular type of inferred or mechanistic causality, where intervening variables can be identified, measured and used to explain a particular outcome (dependent variable), causality in interpretive work is different.
Table 1.4: Rational, Institutional and Bottom-up Approaches to Political Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rational Choice</th>
<th>Historical Institutionalism(^8)</th>
<th>Bottom-Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency vs. Structure</strong></td>
<td>Agency: agents act rationally to maximise outcome</td>
<td>Structure: role of institutions in constraining and affecting agency</td>
<td>Agency-structure interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of Reasoning</strong></td>
<td>Deductive</td>
<td>Deductive, inductive</td>
<td>Iterative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Positivist, Scientific Realist</td>
<td>Positivist, Scientific Realist</td>
<td>Constructivist and interpretive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td>Macro phenomena</td>
<td>Macro phenomena</td>
<td>Micro-processes and phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data</strong></td>
<td>Statistical correlative (large-N), game theoretic</td>
<td>Case study and small-N (could be quantitative or qualitative)</td>
<td>Super-qualitative: how respondents think, feel, behave and why</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interview Respondents</strong></td>
<td>Informants relaying facts</td>
<td>Informants relaying facts (usually elite)</td>
<td>Holders of valuable insights and experiences (elite or non-elite)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) This table demonstrates the differences between the approaches in their ideal types. It does not deny that research may sometimes fall between these approaches, for example discursive institutionalism which looks at the role of meaning in shaping institutions (Panizza and Miorelli 2013; Kostovicova 2014).
This exposes interpretivism to criticism that it is a “highly abstract and nonempirical” endeavour (Ragin 1989:35). However, this misunderstands what interpretivists try to achieve, where the object of analysis for interpretation is meaning, and the understanding and explanation of context-rich complex systems. Rather causality is constitutive: focusing on “actors’ understandings of their own contexts” and how this affects the “interactions they pursue” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012:52-53). This allows the researcher to deal with issues of endogeneity and to disentangle interaction effects (Hall 2003). This research observes how kin identification (meanings) is associated with engagement with kin-state practices (e.g. citizenship practices), to determine what these meanings and practices indicate about nested integration within the kin-state.

There are, however, problems with using political ethnography as a methodology, where this form of data collection is often considered beyond the “permissible limits of political science” (Gagnon 2008). The assumption is that ethnographic methods cannot meet positivist political science criteria, of verifiability, reliability and replicability, outlined by G. King et al. (1994), because, unless triangulated with other data sources, the data provided by respondents is unverifiable and hence unreliable (Kvale 1996; Elliott 2005). However verifiability, reliability and replicability are inappropriate measures of rigour for interpretive research (Small 2009). The challenge is to design bottom-up political research that can maintain standards of rigour and to determine what rigour means within qualitative research, aside from “applying words” of more positivistic approaches “without adopting their meaning” (Small 2009:10). Rather, interpretive standards should focus on issues such as trustworthiness and reflexivity, to make the researcher aware of how their personal and disciplinary characteristics affects data collection and analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).

1.4 Main Arguments

This chapter argued three gaps exist in kin-state literature. Theoretically, kin-state research focused on antagonistic or fuzzy explanations but overlooked the nature of interaction, existing between these poles of conflict and harmony, between kin communities and kin-states. The chapter proposed that a model of nested integration could help to better explore these dynamics. This model suggests that kin-state policies do not challenge the existence of the border separating kin-state from kin majority, but question the meaning of the border, as an obstacle between kin-state and home-state, by advancing interaction over and above sovereign borders. Conceptually, the chapter argued research had ignored the phenomenon of kin majorities, identified as an important and unexplored phenomenon, eligible en masse for kin-state policies without demonstrating a need for kin-state protection, as kin minorities might. Methodologically, the chapter argued kin-state research had focused on state-level explanations, between kin-states and home-states, leaving aside the agency of members of kin communities, and in particular kin majorities.

To explore the dynamics of interaction, the chapter argued it was important to study the meanings of kin identification and engagement with kin-state practices from the perspective of kin majorities, both to consider the comparative explanatory power of the model of nested integration and to gauge the social and political impacts of kin-state relations for these kin majorities. The chapter explained the interpretive and bottom-up approach of the thesis, in terms of its research design and methodology, to
In terms of meanings, the thesis examines the complexity of kin identification, looking beyond mutually exclusive census categories (e.g. Russian or Ukrainian, Romania or Moldovan). The thesis is interested in exploring not only how people identify but why they identify in certain ways, as well as how they position themselves vis-à-vis the kin-state and home-state. The thesis unpacks the materials, symbols and “legitimising myths” individuals use to embed their identification (see A. D. Smith 1998:183) and define boundaries between themselves and others. This everyday nationalism approach allows a bottom-up assessment of ethnicity in relation to political experiences, given the dynamic political and territorial realities in both cases.

The thesis also systematises this everyday bottom-up data, by constructing inductively derived identification categories that demonstrate the complexities of identification, and the areas of agreement and disagreement, within respondents for both cases. This systematisation of meanings offers a way to consider the relationship between meanings, and strength of co-ethnic identification and identification with the kin-state, and engagement with kin-state practices. The thesis expects that those identifying more strongly co-ethnically and with the kin-state will be more likely to engage with kin-state practices. A second expectation is that, instrumentally, respondents would be more likely to engage with Romanian citizenship than Russian quasi-citizenship practices, because Romanian citizenship offers more significant rights and benefits than Russian practices (elaborated in Chapter 3).

However, as the thesis shows, the situation is more complex than an instrumental explanation would argue (e.g. engagement with kin-state practices is motivated only, or even primarily, by the rights and benefits offered by the kin-state). Rather, there are other key dynamics affecting engagement, including the availability and accessibility of these rights (i.e. how far kin-states facilitate access and how far home-states restrict access) and the justification of these rights and benefits (i.e. how, and how far, they are legitimise and normalised).

Using these observations of meanings and practices across both cases, the thesis considers the model of nested integration in light of the empirical evidence, developed in Chapter 2, to consider how far relations between the kin majority and kin-state are consistent with a post-territorial relationship “over and above” sovereign borders. As an iterative project, the thesis also revises the model of nested integration based on empirical observations. While the thesis conceived of nested integration as evidenced by cultural and political incorporation (Chapter 2), the thesis incorporates the observations from the thesis to argue nested integration should consider the internal fracturing within kin majorities, by using the identification categories in considering the model, and including an analysis of social and geopolitical dependence. Thus kin-states have both a political and cultural function, vis-à-vis kin majorities, a social function (by providing access to public goods and alternative forms of security) and a geopolitical function, through region-building narratives and alliances (Europeanization, Eurasianism).

1.5 Methodology and Research Design

Building on the conceptual and ontological foundation of the thesis, this section outlines the design and conduct of this bottom-up approach.
Table 1.5: Similarities and Differences for a Cross-Case Comparison of Moldova and Crimea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History (until 1991)</td>
<td>1. Type of policy available – i.e. citizenship (Romania) vs. quasi-citizenship (Russia) ⇒ point of comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions (until 1991)</td>
<td>2. Sovereign status – i.e. state vs. sub-state (not point of comparison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected from kin majority typology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5.1 Case Selection

This thesis is a cross-case comparison of two kin majority cases, Moldova and Crimea, as a “purposive selection” of two cases (Gerring 2008) from a larger population (the kin majority typology, Table 1.3). While cherry-picking cases based on their importance has been criticised elsewhere (George and Bennett 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2008), it would be equally inappropriate to select cases randomly for small-n research because the cases would be less representative and insightful. It is more useful to select cases which have sufficient leverage and interest for the research question (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Gerring 2008), and have a basis of comparison, whereby the cases are similar except for a critical difference (the element of comparison).

Here the cases are chosen to compare the type of kin-state policy: quasi-citizenship in Crimea, citizenship in Moldova. This builds on Mill’s method of difference (i.e. selecting similar cases with one element of difference), which, alongside Mill’s method of similarity, remains the dominant approach for comparative research design for small-N empirical research (George and Bennett 2005). The cases are similar in terms of shared histories and institutions (until 1991), are both cases of the kin majority typology, while they are different in terms of the policy made available by the kin-state (citizenship versus quasi-citizenship, Table 1.5). Both cases are domestically complex and potentially unstable (Ciscel 2010) and situated in internationally “strategically important”, and increasingly competitive, space between the EU and Russia (Sasse 2007:1; Korosteleva 2010), performing as “objects of keen geopolitical competition” between the EU neighbourhood¹⁰ and Russian near abroad (Lukyanov 2009:57; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012; Bordachev et al. 2014).¹¹

Typically, the method of difference is applied to positivist research where cases differ on a single independent variable but exhibit a common dependent variable. However, this thesis is not variable-centred, but meaning-centred, and there is also a second element of difference, in terms of their sovereign status: Moldova is a sovereign state, while Crimea is an autonomous but non-sovereign republic within Ukraine (Table 1.5).¹² However, in asking “of what is this a case?” (Lund 2014), the cases are compared as kin majorities rather than as polities with differing sovereign status. In real-world comparisons, it is hard to find a “perfect pair” of cases to compare (Tilly 1984:80).¹³ Brubaker (2000)

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¹⁰The states of both the EU neighbourhood and Russian near abroad: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan.

¹¹Indeed, the relevance of these cases has been heightened by events in Ukraine since 2014

¹²This is conceptualized in terms of Crimea’s relationship with Ukraine at the point fieldwork was conducted (2012-2013).

¹³Mill is cited as believing his method was unsuitable for social science research given the improbability that cases, which seem logical and instructive to compare, could be compared on a single variable (Leiberson 1991).
1.5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Table 1.6: Examples of Kin-State Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia, China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-Citizenship</td>
<td>Hungary (Status Law), Poland (Karta Polaka), Russia (Compatriot Policy), Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea (Overseas Korean Act), India (Person of Indian Origin, Non-Resident Indian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

describes his comparison of Russian post-Soviet and the post-Weimar German diasporas as “large and unruly”, because his comparison could not control for the geographical and temporal differences between cases, yet defends the validity and analytical insights derived from such a complex comparison. Secondly, that Crimea and Moldova differ in terms of sovereign status is less important given that, as a bottom-up study, it compares the lived experience of different institutions and identities, where the different state structures do not interfere with the point of comparison.

Both cases were purposefully selected from the post-Soviet area, as a region of prevalent kin-state engagement. Analysing the kin majority typology (Table 1.3) and available kin-state policies (Table 1.6), the post-Communist/Soviet specificity of these policies is evident. There are other examples of states using such policies, such as Korea. Yet these policies are concentrated in post-Communist Europe and Eurasia, in spaces which span areas of free (EU/Schengen zone) and restricted movement (Tóth 2006; Zaiotti 2007), where kin-states can provide the gateway of membership to these spaces of free movement. These interactions of kin-states, home-states and their concentration in post-Communist/post-Soviet space, makes their comparison a relevant and important endeavour, from a conceptual, empirical and geopolitical perspective.

Area studies and comparative politics are often constructed as competing approaches, because area studies inhibits the generation of generalisable knowledge and theories (G. King et al. 1994; Blanksten 1959) and because there is little rationale to compare cases merely because of “geographical proximity” (Rustow 1968:45). However the cases of the research are not compared because of proximity, but because of common historical and political experiences, governed by the same, highly centralised state until 1991 (Darden 2009). After 1991, both experienced dealing with Soviet “detritus”, namely of state and nation-building in the wake of Soviet collapse (Laitin 1998:10). These cases share also experiences of territorial flux, alongside ongoing territorial questions vis-à-vis their kin-states in the post-Soviet period (Chapter 3). As Lijphart (1971:689) argues, context-similar comparison "offers the possibility of establishing crucial controls". Hence, the thesis defends this area-based cross-case comparison. Practically, area-based comparisons are also more feasible in terms of language skills, which itself permits a deeper, more immersive engagement with the cases than cross-regional comparisons (C. King 1999:41; Diamond 2002).

In terms of the number of cases, trade-offs between breadth and depth of analysis are inevitable. The “small-N problem” can pose “insuperable obstacles” for theory building, because data can be limited in terms of representativeness and external validity (Rueschemeyer 2003:305; G. King et al. 1994). Most interpretivist research uses a single-n approach (i.e. a single in-depth case study) (e.g. Brubaker

¹⁴This however represents a hegemony, with comparative politics conceived as the study of “foreign” cases (Van Biezen and Caramani 2006:29), i.e. not British and American politics. Paradoxically the study of British and American politics (or even of western liberal democracies) is not conceived of as area studies.
1.5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

et al. 2006; Wedeen 2008, 1999), specifying the uniqueness of context. They eschew the “value of any comparison” (Ross 1997:67; Roth and Mehta 2002; Yanow 2013), where comparison is seen as a positivist exercise or at least one dominated by positivist scholars (Yanow 2013).

However the insights from a bottom-up perspective can still be incorporated into a comparative research agenda (see Brubaker et al. 2006), where comparison helps to draw out each case’s idiosyncrasies and offers a greater scope for theory building, by understanding what might be the drivers of certain interactions based on the cases’ similarities and differences (Chabal and Daloz 2006). Hence the deliberate paired comparison widens the scope and relevance, empirical and theoretical, of the analysis. This facilitates theorising about the relationship between kin-states and kin majorities, applicable to other cases within the kin majority typology. Comparison can add value to bottom-up approaches, by aligning observations of micro-processes with a broader macro-dynamic framework of researching kin-state policies, as well as other topics of interest to interpretivists, and political science, such as J. Dawson (2014) who compares cultures of democracy from the bottom-up in Bulgaria and Serbia.

Lastly, the cases are delineated by specific territorial and conceptual limits. For both cases, the research focuses on the ethno-linguistic majority and intra-relations between the majority and its kin-state. It considers neither the position of ethnic minorities nor inter-ethnic relations, despite the sizeable number of ethnic minorities in both cases.¹⁵ The aim of the research is to understand how kin majorities relate to their kin-states and how this is affected by kin-state policies; to investigate inter-ethnic relations in relation to dual citizenship would be separate piece research. Only those who aligned themselves with the kin majority identification (e.g. Russian/Ukrainian, Romanian/Moldovan) are considered, leaving out those who primarily identified with minority ethnic groups (e.g. Ukrainian or Russian in Moldova, or Crimean Tatar in Crimea). The research deliberately avoids two specific issues: the question of Transnistria in Moldova and the position of Sevastopol/Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. These issues, including citizenship acquisition in Transnistria or Gagauzia,¹⁶ acquisition of Russian or Ukrainian citizenship in Moldova, or military relations between Crimea, Ukraine and Russia, would merit separate research projects (see Chamberlain-Creanga and Allin 2010).¹⁷

1.5.2 From Theory to Practice: An Iterative Approach to Research

The logic of this thesis is described as iterative to the extent that it sits between inductive (moving from observations to theory) and deductive approaches (moving from theory to observations) (Figure 1.1). The thesis argues, following Hendriks (2007:281), that while interpretive research has the reputation of being inductive, in fact, “most interpretive research” contains, alongside induction, “some element of deduction” (see also Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). Thus I argue that the research sits between these logics by shifting throughout the research process between theory and evidence (Mahoney 2010:134; see also Layder 1998), by acknowledging the role and importance of prior knowledge, experience and literature, for informing and guiding the initial research design and the importance of evidence for

¹⁵ In Moldova, ethnic minorities include ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians and ethnic Gagauz; in Crimea ethnic minorities include Crimean-Tatar minority and ethnic Ukrainians.

¹⁶ Transnistria seceded from Moldova in 1990, sparking a civil conflict in Moldova (1992-1993) and an intractable, though frozen, secessionist conflict (since 1993). Gagauzia (as a territory comprised of ethnic Gagauz) also attempted secession, causing a brief conflict, though since has been governed within Moldova.

¹⁷ With Moldova the focus of the research, and not Transnistria, I encountered no one who had acquired, or wanted to acquire, Russian citizenship in Moldova (or in Crimea).
refining these theoretical ideas throughout the research process (Hendriks 2007:291). As Kapiszewski et al. (2015:15-22) argue, such an iterative approach in political science fieldwork, even beyond explicitly interpretive projects, is both a “ubiquitous” and “essential” practice to the “generation of political knowledge and development of theory”, and the refinement of that theory, as researchers analyse and learn from the field.

Thus, I argue the overall logic of this thesis is neither inductive nor deductive, but an iterative combination of the two which guided the kinds of data sought and refined the theoretical argument of the thesis. For example, as Figure 1.2 shows, a theoretical framework was devised before fieldwork, building on pre-existing knowledge of the literature and fieldwork sites, which helped deductively to establish the model of nested integration. During fieldwork, this framework provided an outline of the kind of data needed to examine this model in the field, e.g. evidence of political and cultural incorporation. However I was also open, from an inductive perspective, to new and unexpected insights from the field that could be incorporated into the ideas of the thesis and help to refine the theory of nested integration between the two stages of data collection and analysis, and the final production of the thesis, which is explicit (in Chapter 8) in how the model of nested integration is refined using inductive insights from the thesis.

1.5.3 Data Collection and Fieldwork

Following preliminary fieldwork in both cases (2010, 2011),¹⁸ I conducted fieldwork in each site (Chişinău in Moldova and Simferopol in Crimea) twice for a month (2012-2013). I conducted informal semi-structured interviews with local people (55 in Moldova, 53 in Crimea) lasting 30-90 minutes, depending on respondents’ availability. In addition to the main fieldwork sites, several interviews were conducted in second cities (Bălți in Moldova, Yalta in Crimea) to consider how ideas from the main fieldwork (Chişinău, Simferopol) sites travelled.

In both cases, I combined informal semi-structured interviews with observations of everyday activities, such as protests and festivals, conversations and participation in everyday life. I drew insights from conversations in households in both Crimea and Moldova, whether about the families’ life histories and generational differences in perspectives about identity or, in the Moldovan case, about acquisition of Romanian citizenship. These experiences underlined the salience of certain issues and the

¹⁸In 2010, I visited Moldova to research the issue of Romanian citizenship in Moldova for my Master’s dissertation. I then visited Crimea in 2011 to conduct preliminary pre-PhD fieldwork.
irrelevance of other issues from the perspective of these households. I recorded these insights daily in fieldwork notes.

Semi-structured interviews provided the bulk of the data analysed in the thesis, allowing for a systematic analysis attuned to specific thematic areas of interest (meanings and practices), and engagement with a broader variety of actors (e.g. across the political spectrum). These interviews were, depending on respondents’ wishes, either taped or recorded via notes and transcribed promptly. In accordance with the immersive and everyday approach, I conducted interviews and conversations in whatever language respondents felt most comfortable.¹⁹

I used semi-structured interviews because they provide richer and more flexible insights than surveys, which require a deductive logic to structure inflexible questions, thereby restricting interaction between researcher and respondent (Chabal and Daloz 2006:15-16). Interviews also supply more consistent insights than focus groups (group interviews), where the researcher interacts with the experiences and opinions of a group, rather than individuals. While I interviewed individuals occasionally in groups,²⁰ I wanted to interview respondents as individuals rather than as collectives, so that individuals could be distinguished within the same interview (e.g. in terms of their identification and practices), and their personal experiences captured, which would have been harder in larger focus groups (Hollander 2004).

In the interviews, I was consistent across cases and respondents in the methods used, the themes of the questions asked and the types of respondents I approached. While ensuring respondents were informed about the research process and guidelines, I was intentionally vaguer, without being deceptive, about what my specific interests were, when contacting respondents and introducing the research, to minimise my influence on their answers. Using an interview guide, I followed a consistent thematic structure but adapted it or asked further questions depending on a respondent’s position (Appendix A). I used a conversational style so that the respondent felt at ease where the interview flowed across different topics of interest, without obviously using the interview guide. I began with icebreaker topics, such as asking about respondents’ profession and opinions on politics and culture, before broaching the specific areas of interest: how respondents conceptualized their identity, and ethnicity, and how

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¹⁹In Crimea, most interviews were conducted in Russian, while in Moldova interviews were conducted in English and Romanian, and also in Russian where this was most convenient.

²⁰The maximum number of respondents at one time was three; however most interviews were conducted with a single respondent, and occasionally with two or three respondents.
they used kin-state policies. These icebreaker/general questions were useful to determine whether respondents would discuss (or not), without prompting, the specific areas that I was interested in, such as language rights and inter-ethnic relations, to situate respondents in terms of the importance that they ascribed to these issues.

### Research Ethics

I gave respondents written information about the research (in Russian or Romanian), the rationale for the interview and the way in which I would use their data. I established their consent to participate in the research before the interview commenced. I avoided signed consent forms, as this might be counterproductive in a post-Soviet context where signing a form is associated with an official procedure that might have negative repercussions, which could have made interviewing respondents, and building a rapport, harder.

### Research Transparency

A comparative-interpretive approach requires consistency and transparency, in terms of explaining how evidence is generated and analysed, across the different stages of research (Yanow and Schwarz-Shea 2012), as well as the ontological foundations of the research (Cramer 2015).\(^ {31} \) Consistency checks are important both in terms of how the research is conducted, such as interview guides and respondent selection rationales, and analysed. The use of cross-case coding frameworks, for example, allows data to be more manageable, comparable, and accountable. I aspire therefore to be transparent in the way I present the data, analysis and the choices that I made, that are intrinsic to data collection and analysis, as well as maintain “enough of the scaffolding” in discussing the data and its richness in the empirical chapters (Pachirat 2015:29), so that while biases cannot be eliminated they can at least be accounted for and evaluated by peers (Elman and Kapiszewski 2014).

### Respondent Selection

Selecting respondents is crucial in framing the research (see Goldstein 2002). However, due to the intensive nature of this thesis, the number of desired respondents was too small to warrant a random

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\(^{31}\) However, consistent with the shift towards transparency in political science this should not be at the expense of ethical obligations to protect subjects (Cramer 2015), such as by releasing transcripts as may be advocated by the “Data Access and Research Transparency” (DA-RT) policy (see Moravcsik 2014; Elman and Kapiszewski 2014).
selection. The research does not claim to be representative of the wider population (i.e. <0.002% of population in Crimea or Moldova), because the size of respondents is neither large enough nor sufficiently random.\footnote{Surveys would typically sample 1,000-2,000 respondents, using either random or stratified samples, where certain characteristics (e.g. ethnicity) are matched between sample and population to have comparable proportions.} However, after Small (2009), “representativeness” is not a valid criterion for ensuring the rigour of small-n interpretive research where it is preferable to engage with a breadth of “multiple perspectives” and “contradictory narratives” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012:51). I engaged with a diverse range of ordinary citizens residing in the main urban centre of each case, in particular the young post-Soviet generation, without the claim that these were representative of all residents within each case (Adams 2009). Respondents were sought from the political spheres, such as the youth wings of political parties, to get a broad overview of the political spectrum; youth and student organisations not directly involved in politics; as well as those not affiliated to organisations, via university networks and contacts (Table 1.7).

The research did not begin as a deliberate study of the post-Soviet generation, but it became evident that these individuals were both more accessible (via the Internet) and more approachable from an outsider perspective. This is not to say that older respondents were inaccessible, comprising a minority of respondents. Yet in both cases, jokes about being a “spy” were more common among older (Soviet) generation respondents. It was therefore easier to build a trustful rapport with my peers, the younger post-Soviet generation, in these cases, and to maintain contact within and beyond the field (e.g. via email and social media).

The idea was not to engage with expert opinions, because everyday meanings and practices of kin-state engagement were the object of analysis. In terms of identity characteristics, respondents were not chosen based on their ethnicity or citizenship status, as this was unknown until I asked them during the interview. A large number of potential respondents were contacted either by phone or email, either by cold calling (i.e. contacting without recommendations based on Internet sources of organisations) or snowballing (i.e. using previous respondents’ recommendations), with these potential respondents becoming actual respondents when they responded and interviews arranged.

As an interpretivist interview-based project, the data collected could not, nor was it intended, to be triangulated with other data sources (e.g. written texts), as is common to verify the validity of interviews collected from expert informants (Davies 2001; McNabb 2004). Contra to positivist political science approaches, interpretivists do not evaluate their research according to the validity of data, in terms of accuracy and objectivity; rather the goal is to gather and analyse meaning-focused (i.e. subjective) while ensuring trustworthiness (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), rather than fact-focused (i.e. objective) data from elites (c.f. Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Thus the point is not to validate information across respondents, but to treat respondents as if their “story” is “how they would like to be perceived by the relevant audiences” (Gagnon 2006:26). However researchers should not take information at face value, where I tried to encourage respondents to narrate themselves around different ideas and explain not just what and how, they identified, but also why. The focus of the research is also to gain insights from respondents that show their overlapping, contrasting and challenging experiences (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). This richness of explanation, context and respondents’ diverse experiences is the real contribution of interpretive methods (Coffey and Atkinson 1996).
1.5. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Positionality and Reflexivity

In line with interpretivism, being reflexive is important to consider how my positionality (i.e. who I am) affected, and situated, the data I gathered (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006; Henderson 2009; Rose 1997).²³ The post-Soviet context, or at least that which I experienced in Simferopol and Chişinău, offered an interesting paradox in terms of positionality. Initially, it felt easy to conduct research, with willing participants and widely accessible Internet, at least in urban space, even if 24 hours of water was not available. These settings also felt cosmopolitan, with abundant cafes, even if this was only for a socially mobile minority. Yet I realised too how I stood out: entering as a young, lone, British female into more patriarchal environments, where it was uncommon for a young woman to travel alone, let alone to conduct lone research. This made conversation easy, sharing comparative experiences; but I was also regularly posed uncomfortable questions, about my age and marital status. Even as a student, I had access to greater financial resources than many I interacted with, yet rarely paid for coffee with male respondents.

Both sites therefore were places where I came to recognise I did stand out, even if this went against my intentions, from the way I dressed (e.g. wearing flat not high-heels), to the way I treated public space (e.g. sitting in the street) and even in terms of a paler complexion: as I learnt in my first trip to Moldova (in 2008), people in Moldova rarely have freckles. The sites were also more close-knit than I was used to, as “big villages” where common connections were easy to identify and where contacts would discuss their contact with me without my knowledge and/or without knowledge of mutual connections.

While being out-of-place, I nevertheless gained access to youth-wing members of political parties and diverse cohorts of students, who were willing to discuss in detail about their lives. I did not feel my gender or age inhibited my access, with most respondents willing to participate and engage in discussion. My status as a foreigner offered certain benefits, framed as an “objective” outsider, even if I resisted this labelling, and I could use my outsider status to encourage respondents to explain how they interpreted history. Yet I was clearly neither a native speaker nor a participant of these settings and therefore needed to work hard to contact and engage with respondents. Respondents were surprisingly open about their experiences, positive and negative: of their home-state, kin-state, acquisition of citizenship, the hardships they faced in navigating post-Soviet life, and which their relatives had experienced in the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods. I also formed associations and friendships that were maintained out of the field, allowing unique insights in terms of follow-up information (e.g. how respondents behave when they finally receive Romanian citizenship) and an ability to observe how respondents experience unanticipated events, and traumas, such as annexation.

1.5.4 Data analysis

To ensure consistency, data should not only be collected with rigour and comparison in mind, but analysed according to the logic of rigour and comparison. To reduce the large number of lengthy interviews, but to maintain their richness, the data was coded, as is standard in analysis of qualitative

²³Ironically, however, no articles were found in American Journal of Political Science or American Political Science Review referencing positionality.
The emphasis was on coding the meaning of what respondents were saying (Kvale 2007:104), rather than on reducing the data to facilitate quantitative and seemingly objective analysis (c.f. Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Like the research procedure, this took an iterative path, adopting both deductive and inductive practices (Figure 1.3), and adopting a more “grounded theory” approach where codes are formed openly out of the data (Corbin and Strauss 1990).

Firstly, data was coded according to meanings, i.e. how did respondents self-identify and identify vis-à-vis kin-state. From this, a variety of different meanings were visible which were then analysed more consistently using inductive coding procedures to break down respondents into different inductively derived categories according to how they self-identified (Chapters 4 and 6). Secondly, these inductively derived categories were then applied to each case to analyse how each of the different categories engaged with kin-state practices (Chapters 5 and 7), allowing for examining the association between meanings and practices (Appendix E). These categories were therefore derived only in terms of meanings and then used to unpick engagement with kin-state practices, allowing for analytical separation between meanings and practices and, in turn, an analysis of the association between meanings and practices.

I applied this coding framework via tables to summarise and analyse the data. I began by using coding software (NVivo), as a standard approach to coding interviews (Attride-Stirling 2001). However coding software became slightly unwieldy rather than helpful to manage, reduce and analyse the data, and I felt disconnected rather than embedded in the data I was analysing. Instead, tables helped to reduce data into a more manageable form (Appendix E), by creating a reference table which could refer to the full interview, and enable analysis of the interview in relation to the theoretical framework, with columns to dissect interviews according to thematic areas of interest (meanings, practices).

1.6 Thesis Outline

The rest of the thesis implements this bottom-up analysis of two kin majority cases (Crimea and Moldova) to assess how far the cases exhibit nested integration, by investigating the meanings of
kin identification and engagement with kin-state practices. The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 expands on the proposed theory of nested integration, explaining what this theory entails and how it is applied analytically in the thesis. This chapter explains too how the concepts of ethnicity and citizenship are conceptualised and applied in the thesis, from a bottom-up perspective.

Chapter 3 situates the cases of Moldova and Crimea historically, in terms of the development of kin-state relations with Romania and Russia (respectively), and institutionally, by examining contemporary policies that are available for kin majorities in these cases.

The empirical chapters are then split by case, in terms of meanings and practices: with Chapters 4-5 analysing Crimea and Chapters 6-7 analysing Moldova.

Chapter 4 examines the meanings of kin identification in Crimea. The chapter applies an inductive approach to explore the meanings of being Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean, in terms of self-identification and positioning vis-à-vis the kin-state and home-state. The chapter constructs inductively derived identification categories to conceptualise these differences, to explore how the kin majority is internally fragmented along different identification dimensions (cultural, linguistic, political, historical, territorial).

Chapter 5 analyses engagement with Russian kin-state practices in Crimea (e.g. citizenship, quasi-citizenship, scholarships and pro-Russian organisations). Using the inductively derived categories from Chapter 4, the chapter analyses the association between the strength of identification with the kin-state (meanings) is associated with engagement with kin-state practices. The chapter argues there is a narrow and niche engagement with Russian kin-state practices, limited to those identifying most strongly with the kin-state (Russia).

Chapters 6-7 apply the same approach, in terms of meanings and practices, to the Moldovan case. As Chapter 4, Chapter 6 analyses the meanings of kin identification in Moldova, and constructs inductively derived identification categories to conceptualise how respondents self-identify and position themselves vis-à-vis the home-state (Moldova) and kin-state (Romania).

Chapter 7 analyses engagement with Romanian kin-state practices in Moldova. The chapter uses the identification categories from Chapter 6 to consider how far identification with Romania is associated with engagement with kin-state practices. The chapter observes a wide engagement with Romanian kin-state practices across identification categories, indicating that strength of identification was less associated with kin-state engagement in the Moldovan case than the Crimean case (Chapter 5).

Chapter 8 links the empirical and theoretical strands of the thesis together to examine the comparative explanatory power of the model of nested integration in both cases. Firstly, the chapter analyses the conceptual and comparative insights in terms of the meanings of kin identification in both cases. Secondly, the chapter analyses the conceptual and comparative insights in terms of engagement with kin-state practices, to explore why Moldova exhibited wider engagement with kin-state practices (i.e. across the identification categories) than Crimea. Thirdly, the chapter uses this analysis of meanings and practices in examining the evidence of nested integration. The chapter argues, based on the empirical observations, that the model needs to be revised, to consider the internal fracturing of the kin majority (in terms of meanings) as well as the dynamics of social dependence and geopolitical interlocking. This demonstrates that the model incorporates more dimensions than only cultural and political
incorporation as originally conceived.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, highlighting the contributions of the thesis to the study of kin-state relations, as well as to ethnicity and citizenship in comparative politics, and discussing directions for future research.
Chapter 2

Theorising Nested Integration for Kin Majorities

“Soft power speaks to people and societies, rather than governments and elites.”

Tsygankov (2006:1081)

This chapter elaborates the critique of antagonistic and fuzzy approaches to kin-state relations, and outlines why and how the nested integration model is suitable. Following Chapter 1, this chapter argues that the antagonistic and fuzzy approaches have left a theoretical gap, by not exploring the dynamics of interaction; a conceptual gap, by ignoring the phenomenon of kin majorities; and a methodological gap, by focusing on state-level actors but leaving aside the agency of kin majorities. To address these gaps, the chapter explains, theoretically, the model of nested integration, and how the model will be examined vis-à-vis the empirical evidence. Lastly, the chapter justifies the bottom-up study of ethnicity and citizenship by reviewing the top-down and everyday literature on ethnicity and citizenship.

2.1 Existing Approaches to Kin-State Relations

2.1.1 The Antagonistic Model of Kin-State Relations

External states have an important role in affecting domestic outcomes such as “group cohesion and political mobilisation” because external states can provide key “material, political and moral support” tipping the balance of domestic politics (Gurr 1993:128). External states are therefore key actors both in civil wars (Gurr 1993), and in the creation of de facto states, when a “patron” state offers external support in the absence of external legitimacy (Kolstø 2006:723). What defines kin-state relations are the bonds of co-ethnicity which underpin the claims of the external kin-state to the kin community.

Weiner (1971) proposed the first model for understanding the dynamics and importance of external actors in domestic identity politics (Cederman et al. 2009). Using the case of Macedonia, Weiner analysed the “Macedonian syndrome” with three distinct groups of actors: the irredentist state, seeking territory based on ethnic claims; the anti-irredentist neighbour, opposing these claims; and a shared
2.1. EXISTING APPROACHES TO KIN-STATE RELATIONS

Table 2.1: Positioning the Thesis vis-à-vis Existing Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Approaches</th>
<th>Theoretical</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Methodological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>Conflict inducing</td>
<td>Kin minority</td>
<td>Top-down, state-centred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuzzy</td>
<td>Conflict reducing/neutral</td>
<td>Kin minority</td>
<td>Top-down, state-centred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis</td>
<td>Nested integration</td>
<td>Kin majority</td>
<td>Bottom-up, agency-centred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Twodecades later Brubaker (1996), who did not directly reference Weiner (1971), analysed relations between kin-states and their co-ethnic communities abroad. Brubaker (1996:35) theorised the relations within a “triadic configuration” of a kin minority, an “external national homeland” state (kin-state), and a “nationalising” home-state where the kin minority reside. The kin-state, as the “external homeland” of the kin minority, claims an “obligation” to “protect the interests of ‘their’ ethnonational kin” residing in other states (Brubaker 1996:5). Meanwhile the nationalising home-state of “newly independent (or newly configured) states” advanced claims, and policies, “in the name of a ‘core nation’” as the “legitimate ‘owner’ of the state” (Brubaker 1996:4-5). Brubaker used the two cases of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia as evidence of the potential fractions caused by these overlapping nationalist claims.

Brubaker (1996:111) argued that kin-state relations promote antagonism because kin-states claim “ownership” over the same community as the home-state and thus seek to advance “competing jurisdictional claims” over this community. Thus the nationalism pursued by the nationalising state and kin-state are “diametrically opposed and directly conflicting” because the kin community is the site of multiple claims, from the kin-state and the home-state (Ibid). Brubaker’s antagonistic model was used to analyse the likelihood of conflict and secession arising from kin-state relations (Laitin 2001; Fearon 1998; Laitin 1998; Saideman and Ayres 2008; van Houten 1998; D. J. Smith 2002). In particular, the post-Soviet region was imagined as a “cauldron of ethnic conflict” (Figueiredo and Weingast 1999:262) and as the site of the “potentially most dangerous” of modern kin-state claims (Brubaker 1996:108). This focused on analysing relations between post-Soviet Russia and its new “beached” diaspora, conceptualising how far Russia might act to reclaim both the beached ethnic Russian populations and former Soviet territories where they resided, in particular Crimea and Estonia (Laitin 1998:29).

While Fearon (1998:124) argued Russia had a pathological potential to be the “most likely danger” in the region, he identified that Russia suffered a “commitment problem” which inhibited it from engaging in conflict to protect its kin. Fearon (1998:124) explained that, even in the presence of antagonism, kin-states could be “self-limiting”, constraining the spread of conflict like “wildfire”. Hence kin-states were...
key in tipping the balance from antagonistic claims to conflict-inducing intervention, leading to conflict in some triadic relations (e.g. Croatia and Serbia, following Serbian intervention) but not in others (e.g. Estonia and Crimea vis-à-vis Russia, van Houten 1998).

This self-limited explanation holds empirically, given instances of conflict are rare (Laitin 2001). Similarly, Russia (until its annexation of Crimea in 2014) was limited in its desire to engage in conflict. Russia’s only military engagement abroad, since the early 1990s, was not to defend ethnic Russians (as the above theories might suggest) but instead to defend its (newly acquired) citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by invading Georgia in 2008 (Medvedev 2008).

Critiquing the Antagonistic Approach

Brubaker’s theory remains an important conceptual contribution for understanding the ebbs and flow of nationalist politics as arising from such relations, rather than seeing nationalism as a constantly salient aspect of politics (G. Smith and Wilson 1997). However, this thesis critiques certain aspects of the internal and external validity of Brubaker’s theory, in part because of changes to kin-state relations in the twenty years of post-Soviet identity politics, such as the increasing prevalence of kin-state policies which affect kin-state relations, and which this thesis tries to unpack from the perspective of those eligible for these policies.

Thus, in dealing with hard territorial claims Brubaker’s approach does not help to analyse the softer institutions that kin-states have created since the mid-1990s, such as citizenship and quasi-citizenship regimes (Waterbury 2011; Iordachi 2009, 2004). These policies work around borders, rather than overtly contesting them, to maintain and strengthen co-ethnic interaction across state borders (Waterbury 2009:2).

Secondly, the antagonistic approach focuses only on state-level actors, leaving aside the agency of the kin community, in mediating these relations within the triadic nexus. For example, Caspersen (2008) highlights the importance of the role of kin community elites in mediating conflict. However, this still leaves aside the members of kin communities, including kin majorities, indicating the need to analyse these kin majorities from an agency-centred perspective.

Lastly, the antagonistic approach analyses only kin minorities. It fails to distinguish between kin communities that comprise local majorities versus those who comprise local minorities. This research argues that kin majorities need to be analysed, as majorities, because kin minorities behave differently from kin majorities vis-à-vis home-states and kin-states (Chapter 1), and this requires elaboration both domestically and vis-à-vis the kin-state.

Crucial to Brubaker’s focus on kin minorities is the notion of “external homelands”, where kin minorities’ homeland is external to them. Hence the kin minorities’ home-state is not conceived as their homeland because they arise from migration (e.g. Russian minorities in Baltic states). However this ex-

²⁴As Medvedev (2008) said in reaction to the conflict “civilians, women, children and old people, are dying today in South Ossetia, and the majority of them are citizens of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the Constitution and the federal laws, as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be”.

²⁵This is not a criticism only of Brubaker but of all those who have also did not distinguished between kin minorities and kin majorities (Waterbury 2011; Laitin 2001, 1998; Fearon 1998; Saideman and Ayres 2008; D. J. Smith 2002).
2.1. EXISTING APPROACHES TO KIN-STATE RELATIONS

ternal conception of homelands is inappropriate for kin majorities, because they are disconnected from their homeland arising from border changes and conceive of their home-state (as well as kin-state) as their homeland. Kin majorities may therefore have a disconnected rather than external homeland; for example, for the cases selected Moldova is considered Romanian homeland and Crimea is considered Russian homeland.

From these criticisms of the antagonistic approach, research needs to
1. Theoretically, engage with institutions facilitated by kin-states (e.g. citizenship);
2. Conceptually, distinguish between kin minorities and kin majorities, and to analyse kin majorities, given the different function of majorities vis-à-vis their home-state;
3. Methodologically, move beyond state-centred approaches, to examine the agency of members of kin majorities.

2.1.2 Fuzzy Theories of Kin-State Relations

The fuzzy approach argues that instead of provoking conflict, kin-state institutions (citizenship, quasi-citizenship) promote “fuzzy” relations and citizenries which are conflict-reducing/neutral (Batt 2002; Fowler 2004). Rather than advancing antagonistic territorial claims, as theorised by Brubaker, the fuzzy approach argues that kin-state institutions are evidence of “internal pluralism and decentralization, de-territorialization of ethnicity, and permeable borders” (Batt 2002:1).

According to this fuzzy argument, these overlapping citizenries and shared loyalties across borders reflect a cosmopolitan trends towards the post-nationalisation of the nation-state, where states are willing to share the right to govern, and foster the loyalties of, an increasingly shared cross-border citizenry (Faist et al. 2004; Batt 2002; Fowler 2004). This depoliticises the multiplicity of citizenships and sovereignties, where nation-state borders no longer delineate citizenship, legally, ethnically or politically.

A second interpretation argues that fuzzy citizenries, or at least the proliferation of dual citizenship regimes, could “diffuse” conflicts between home-states and kin minorities by reducing the “significance” of home-state citizenship, and the reliance of minorities on the “good will” of states controlled by other ethnic groups (Bieber 2010:20). Bieber (2010:20) argues that dual citizenship could be a solution by easing interethnic relations and tensions in “divided societies” (see also Stavilă 2010). Bieber (2010) makes a convincing case that dual citizenship regimes should not be pathologised primarily because they drive conflict. For example he argues, counterfactually, that even in cases of citizenship-induced conflict (e.g. Russia’s intervention in Abkhazia) this conflict might have occurred regardless of how the regime legitimised its intervention. Lastly, Bieber (2010:20) argues for a material interpretation of engagement with these policies, where they do not concern loyalty, i.e. shifts of political affiliation, but are a “practical tool” offering a form of “insurance” from home-state domestic disputes, by facilitating exit from the home-state to the kin-state.

Critiquing the Fuzzy Approach

However, the fuzzy approach is overly idealistic by ignoring examples where home-states have resisted kin-state policies. Hungary was the main frame of reference for these fuzzy theories. Even here, Roma-
nia and Slovakia opposed Hungary’s (quasi-citizenship) Status Law claiming it allowed Hungary to interfere beyond its jurisdiction. The Status Law was perceived therefore as challenging the “sovereignty of the neighbouring states” by offering a “veiled form of dual citizenship” (Kovács 2006:435; Waterbury 2011), threatening relations between these states (Dumbrava 2014a; Bauböck 2010b). Russia’s “passportization” policy, facilitating en masse acquisition of Russian passports/citizenship, also caused contention with neighbouring states fearing Russia’s increasing geopolitical influence via citizenship/passports in former Soviet territory (Mühlfried 2010; Littlefield 2009; Menon and Spruyt 1998; Shevchuk 1996, see Chapter 3). While kin-states may have focused on policies maintaining relations, instead of advancing territorial claims, home-states still perceive these policies as making implicit sovereignty challenges if not explicit sovereignty threats (Deets 2008), given restrictions which remain in many post-Soviet states to prevent dual citizenship (Schlager 1997:30).

Secondly there needs to be more research which distinguishes between citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies, both in terms of impacts and perceptions, from the perspective of those receiving and the states involved. As Waterbury (2014:46) argues, the addition of “real political rights” to Hungary’s policy, with the shift from the Status Law to citizenship, made Hungary’s policies “potentially more meaningful”. Fuzzy theories focus mostly on the latter “fuzzy” forms of quasi-citizenship (Fowler 2004); however, empirically, there are at least as many states advancing kin-state citizenship as quasi-citizenship policies (Table 1.6, Page 28).

The fuzzy approach overemphasises the cosmopolitan element of kin-state policies. It ignores the ethnically motivated claims-making engaged in by kin-states that was crucial aspect to the antagonistic approach by assuming that claims-making is overridden by an acceptance to share loyalty and sovereignty over the kin community. This fails to scrutinise why kin-states enact these policies, which is rarely to fulfil philanthropic goals of legitimate concern for kin abroad, and ignores too the contentions existing within home-states over kin-states policies (Deets 2008). Rather kin-state policies are designed by self-interested kin-states for instrumental gains, such as to win elections at home, foster support among the kin community and address labour shortages with more desirable migrants (i.e. those who are culturally/linguistically similar by virtue of their co-ethnicity) (Waterbury 2014).

The problem remains, as with the antagonistic approach, that fuzzy theories, ignore kin majorities and agency-centred perspectives. Thus, even if kin-state policies do not provoke territorial claims, or directly promote secessionist and irredentist sentiments, they may still foster kinds of interaction that is worth studying, for example by creating bodies of extra-territorial co-ethnic citizens and quasi-citizens with their own agency, identities and interests (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). However these elements are overlooked, by focusing on state-centred perspectives, such as conflict mediation, or arguments based on assumptions about the relationship between (quasi-)citizenship and loyalty, without exploring, from an agency-centred perspective, what the impacts of these interactions is on identification and affiliation vis-à-vis the home-state and kin-state.

Hence, the fuzzy approach, while offering a different, though equally problematic, theoretical lens from the antagonistic approach, shares the same conceptual and methodological shortcomings, in terms of ignoring the phenomenon of kin majorities and overlooking the agency-centred perspective of members of this kin majority. For example, if the loyalty question was insignificant for minorities, because they do not comprise a demographically dominant constituent of the home-state, it is important to be
2.2. A NESTED APPROACH FOR KIN MAJORITIES

more attentive to this issue, in terms of ethnic identification and political affiliation, for kin majorities, who do comprise a more significant constituency within the home-state.

Hence, in conceptualising these two different approaches—fuzzy and antagonistic—the thesis argues that research needs to:

1. **Theoretically**, situate itself between conflict inducing (antagonistic) and conflict reducing/neutral (fuzzy) perspectives, by considering the potential for kin-state relations in terms of interaction between kin-states and kin communities;
2. **Conceptually**, move beyond the focus of antagonistic and fuzzy approaches on kin minorities, towards studying kin majorities directly;
3. **Methodologically**, move beyond state-level perspectives, towards an agency-centred perspective exploring kin identification (meanings) and engagement with kin-state practices.

2.2 A Nested Approach for Kin Majorities

2.2.1 Defining Nested Integration

Building on these three gaps (theoretical, methodological, conceptual) a model is needed which explores whether identification and affiliation, politically and culturally, is coterminous with citizenship and whether kin majorities imagine themselves to be culturally and politically members of the kin-state, relative to their home-state. This research develops a model of nested integration to allow a deeper analysis of the interaction between the kin majority and kin-state, in relation to kin-state policies, without focusing only and directly on advancing territorial claims. This model argues that kin-state policies need to be conceptualised in terms of nationalistic claims-making, as espoused by the antagonistic approach, because kin-states are vehement in stating their right to interact with kin communities over and above sovereign borders. However, unlike the antagonistic approach, it shifts from a territorial focus towards institutional cross-border relations, as argued by the fuzzy approach. For example restoring Romanian citizenship to Moldovan residents implies also the “restoration” of the state of Greater Romania (i.e. the pre-WWII configuration of Romania before Moldova was annexed by the Soviet Union). However Romania uses the “tools of political membership” (i.e. institutions) rather than “irredentist violence to challenge” the existence of a sovereign border between Romania and Moldova (Waterbury 2014:39). The interaction between the tools of political membership and the implicit recreation of pre-existing state structures, that do not advance territorial claims, needs greater attention, to explore, from below, whether they foster sentiments of political identification, affiliation and participation.

This model of nested integration is defined as a form of embedding of the kin majority within the kin-state. It is more comprehensive than overlapping integration of kin minorities, argued by the fuzzy theories, which occurs via peripheral minorities at the borderlands. Eligible kin minorities are clustered around borderlands and live on the periphery of their home state, physically and culturally.
2.2. A NESTED APPROACH FOR KIN MAJORITIES

The integration of these communities with the kin-state creates overlapping communities at the borderlands, but this integration does not penetrate beyond the borderlands because kin minorities have little influence beyond where they reside. By contrast, kin majorities are not peripheral communities but constitute a central and critical mass of population within the state or sub-state; integration can therefore involve the whole of the kin majority, and thus the majority of the home-state’s population (see a Figure 2.1). However this nested integration neither alters nor contests the sovereign borders separating kin-state from home-state (as argued by Waterbury 2014). Rather this type of integration changes the meaning of the border separating the states, because the kin majority dominate (demographically) the local polity (state or sub-state) and, through kin-state policies, become embedded within another state; hence, via nested integration, individuals no longer interact with the border as an obstacle.

2.2.2 Observing Nested Integration

To observe nested integration there must be evidence that the kin majority are becoming nested within the kin-state, culturally, in terms of cultural identification and affiliation (cultural incorporation), and, politically, in terms of political affiliation and participation (political incorporation). Cultural incorporation is defined by kin majorities identifying as members of the cultural community of the kin-state. This is defined in ethno-national terms such that kin-state policies result in kin majorities feeling more incorporated into the ethno-national component of the kin-state. Political incorporation is defined by kin majorities feeling as if they are members of the political community of the kin-state (via demonstrating of affiliation and participation in the kin-state polity). This separates incorporation with the nation and state, such that to be incorporated with the political community is to associate and participate in the political institutions. Nested integration brings together these separate concepts and requires evidence of both cultural and political incorporation, i.e. feeling as both a member of the cultural community and associating with the political institutions of the kin-state.

This model of nested integration does not propose a zero-sum imagining of political and cultural incorporation. Europeanization literature also faced this conundrum between multiple and singular notions of integration. Haas (1961:366-67) conceptualised political integration as a process concerning the “shift” of “loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center”, arising because the centre’s “institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national


### Table 2.2: Cultural and Political Incorporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Incorporation</th>
<th>Cultural Incorporation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Nested integration (possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not observed</td>
<td>Cultural not political incorporation (possible)</td>
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Kin-state policies have negligible effect (possible). However, more recent studies of Europeanization prefer a multiple loyalty approach. Rather than a “zero-sum terms” conception of European identity and integration, where national loyalty and European loyalty/identity are competing and indirectly proportional, this multiple loyalties approach argues that identities can be “nested, conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matruska (sic) dolls, one inside the next” (Risse 2005:295). This idea of nesting allows for a multiple rather than competing approach where, in the sphere of kin-state relations, identification and affiliation with one polity (i.e. the home-state) are not necessarily inconsistent with, or replaced by, identification and affiliation with another polity (i.e. the kin-state); rather, these identifications and affiliations can become interlocking.

To explain whether cultural and political integration is observed, and whether this can be attributed to kin-state policies, it is necessary to consider how these types of incorporation might be observed. Methodologically, kin-state policies will be observed culturally and politically from the bottom-up in terms of the kin majorities’ meanings and practices, i.e. how they are symbolised and given meaning by those eligible, and how they are used by those eligible. In turn, meanings and practices will be observed culturally and politically: that is how they are symbolised culturally and politically, and how they are used culturally and politically. In cultural terms, meaning and practices will be used to assess whether and how kin-state policies are furthering cultural identification, in ethnic terms, with the kin-state. In political terms, meanings will be used to assess the level of political affiliation with the state institutions of the kin-state. Practices will be used to assess whether the policies are furthering political participation in and affiliation with the kin-state. For example, respondents will be analysed in terms of whether the acquisition of citizenship leads to them taking up other forms of political participation permitted by citizenship acquisition, such as voting in kin-state elections. These participatory practices will be analysed in terms of whether respondents translate their participation into greater political affiliation, and hence what this indicates about their political incorporation into the kin-state. Hence these observations of meanings and practices will be used to assess the level of cultural and political incorporation, which in turn will be used to evaluate whether nested integration has occurred or might be occurring (Table 2.2).

Disentangling the cultural and political components helps to assess the relationship between these aspects. Possible alternative scenarios involve observing only cultural incorporation, observing only political incorporation and observing no cultural or political incorporation (Table 2.2). Kin-state policies may have no discernible cultural or political effect on kin majorities, merely enhancing the rights they enjoy without promoting simultaneous cultural and political incorporation. Observing only cultural incorporation is also possible, where kin-state policies are encouraging more identification with the kin-state but are not encouraging political participation or affiliation with the kin-state, and thus not advancing political incorporation. An unlikely scenario is observing political but not cultural in-
corporation because fostering political affiliation through kin-state policies is unlikely to be advanced without simultaneous advancement of cultural identification.

These alternative scenarios will indicate that nested integration is not occurring. The point of the thesis is therefore to observe, and establish, from a comparative perspective when, if and how nested integration may or may not be occurring, based on the premise that kin-state policies encourage both cultural and political incorporation within the kin-state. As a deductive model, the thesis will also iteratively develop the theory of nested integration, adding further dimensions of incorporation in line with empirical evidence (and the iterative logic of the thesis). The thesis will also use the presence and absence of nested integration to develop theoretical insights about the kinds of interaction between the two kin majority cases of Crimea and Moldova and their respective kin-states, where from a comparative perspective the absence of nested integration signifies interesting insights about the nature of interaction without invalidating the model of nested integration (as elaborated in Chapters 8-9).

2.3 Conceptualising Kin-State Meanings

This section explores existing approaches to ethnicity in political science before explaining the rationale behind adopting an everyday nationalism approach, which fits with the bottom-up ontology of the thesis described above and allows for greater attention on the experiences of ethnicity.

2.3.1 Ethnicity in Political Science

Ethnicity is an important concept for political science, intrinsically, and because of its role as explanatory variable, explaining conflict, or in terms of how diversity affects democratic stability (Pop-Eleches 2007; Wilkinson 2006) and electoral politics (Rovny 2014). In the case of kin-state relations, the claim of co-ethnicity drives how states interact with external communities, and how these communities, and their home-states interact with the kin-states.

When conceptualising ethnicity, the schism lies between primordial and constructivist understandings. On the primordial side, Geertz (1963:109) argued primordial “givens” cause individuals to perceive “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on” which seem to have an “ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” and in turn create a bond to “one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer”. Moreover the nature of these attachments is not instrumentalist as these feelings of cohesion are “not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation” (Geertz 1963:109).

However constructivist understandings of ethnicity have become dominant (Laitin 1998). Particularly respected is Chandra’s analysis of the “descent-based” assumptions through which ethnicity can be analysed (Chandra 2006:397; Chandra 2001; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). This builds on work by M. Weber (1978), Horowitz (1985) and A. D. Smith (1998) who all argue for understanding ethnicity as subjective and descent-based, rather than objectively blood-based (i.e. common descent is imagined rather than really existing), allowing for an understanding of common ethnic bonds beyond individuals sharing face-to-face contact (see also Anderson 2006). As Chandra (2006) explains, this gives ethnicity
the quality of being “visible”, i.e. identifiable, and “sticky”, i.e. difficult to change.

However, a significant criticism against those conducting constructivist analysis of the role of ethnicity in politics is that, even if ethnicity is conceived as constructed, researchers use data that conceptualises ethnicity as “primordially given” (i.e. unchangeable) based on a sense a common “natural history” even if “what is recognized as primordially given (and thus ‘ethnic’) is clearly a matter of political negotiation and convention in many cases” (Fearon and Laitin 2000:19-20). Thus, while there might be sophisticated understandings of how ethnicity is constructed, rather than given (even if it appears as given), this is not reflected in how ethnicity is researched. Ethnic Diversity indices, such as the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF), represents one such contradiction, as the dominant measurement tool used in much econometric analysis of the conflict potential of different groups (Roeder 2011; Alesina et al. 2003; Posner 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2003), and onset of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). For example ELF uses data conducted by Soviet ethnographers, who conceptualized ethnicity as based on objective criteria such as “native language”, adopting the “common Eastern European assumption that native language marks ethnicity” (Fearon 2003:210). The key argument is the ELF can be used as a measurement of grievances; that more ethnically divided societies, may demonstrate higher inter-ethnic grievances which may predict conflict.

It is necessary to pick apart the assumptions on which these diversity indices are based and, hence, the usefulness of these diversity measures in understanding the relationship between ethnicity and politics. Even more nuanced data sets, which focus on aspects beyond measuring diversity, such as socio-economic and political marginalisation (e.g. Minorities at Risk, Gurr 1993) and access to power (Ethnic Power Relations, Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009), still offer a superficial analysis of ethnicity. Most prominently, there is an inherent mismatch between scholars’ “understandings of the ‘nation’ as constructed and imagined” and how ethnicity in these datasets is taken as a “given category of belonging” by assuming that “people are Hutu or Tutsi, Slavs or Germans” (emphasis added) (Wedeen 2002:724). As Laitin and Posner (2001:17) argue, both the data collection techniques and the use of the ELF index maintain an “essentialistic premise” by failing to gather and analyse data which “validly represents the multiple dimensions of ethnic diversity” across time and space. Qualitative political science is also dominated by understanding ethnicity as an independent variable, such as the cause of conflict, where ethnicity is not a given cause of conflict directly but is instrumentalised by elites to mobilise masses to engage or not engage in conflict (Kaufman 2001; Wilkinson 2006; Gagnon 1994).

These approaches see ethnicity as reducible to mutually exclusive categories, operating within a rationality of strategic choices for elites and of relevance only in terms of minority-majority relations. They ignore ethnicity’s potential to be a mode of identification with meaning and importance for everyday people, beyond how it can be manipulated by elites (Wedeen 2002). There are a few exceptions such as Hale (2008:9), who applies a social psychology perspective to argue that ethnicity serves a function of “uncertainty reduction” in everyday life. However this is still a functionalist explanation that focuses on the pragmatic elements of ethnicity, rather than on how and why these identities might convey meaning in everyday settings.

These top-down perspectives, whether quantitative or qualitative, fail to appreciate the cultural and political meanings of different forms of identification, such as ethnic and linguistic, and the ways in which institutionalised approaches to ethnicity are co-opted and subverted by individuals. There needs
2.3. CONCEPTUALISING KIN-STATE MEANINGS

to be a commitment within political science to collect data that “represents the multiple dimensions of ethnic diversity found” (Laitin and Posner 2001:17), and a greater focus on what ethnicity means and “how it (ethnicity) will manifest itself in politics” (Beissinger 2008:88) across minority-majority dyads and within ethnic majorities, as this research does.

2.3.2 Conceptualising a Bottom-Up and Everyday Approach to Ethnicity

This research takes a different approach to defining and operationalising ethnicity. Interpretive bottom-up research requires concepts to be “context-specific, situated” and generated by observing those “native’ to the context” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012:38); hence, the object of analysis is not the nature of the group as ethnic. Instead, the thesis is concerned with how individuals self-identify and identify others, i.e. where they construct boundaries and why. Consistent with an interpretive and inductive approach, the focus is on the processes of “meaning-making” to understand how ethnicity is constructed, and experienced, in relation to other political, linguistic, cultural, territorial and historical forms of identification.

The object of study is not the typical “categories of analysis”, such as census categories, but rather the “lay” categories of “everyday social experience” which are used by “ordinary social actors” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:4). This builds on the “everyday nationalism” approach, derived from anthropological and sociological research, and encourages researchers to shift towards valuing bottom-up discourses of nationalism and ethnicity in political science (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Brubaker et al. 2006; Edensor 2002; J. Dawson 2012; Gagnon 2006:188; Day and Thompson 2004; de Cillia et al. 1999; See also Hobsbawm 1992:10).

Consistent with the ontological approach of the thesis, the everyday nationalism approach is people-centred. It examines the “actual practices through which ordinary people engage and enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied contexts of their everyday lives” and, in turn, how individuals “appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade or transform the categories” such as mutually exclusive census categories “that are imposed upon them” (Brubaker et al. 2006:12; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008:537). This approach allows the researcher to challenge assumptions formed by top-down approaches to identity politics to examine the interaction between identity politics and informal and everyday state practices, and to examine whether ethnicity has salience in everyday life (Brubaker et al. 2006). This approach, as I conceive it, does not deny that researchers derive their own categories of analysis, as this research does by inductively deriving identification categories as a conceptual tool. Rather it argues there should be greater coherence between categories of practice and analysis, by engaging with respondents’ vernacular understandings and meanings of identification.

Rather than focusing on the analytical utility of constructivist vs primordialist approaches, the everyday approach analyses ethnic identification from the perspective of categories of practice, i.e. from an agency-centred perspective. This approach does not necessarily pathologise primordial understandings of ethnicity nor dismiss academic understandings of ethnicity as a constructed group identification, but analyses how agents explain their identification and the materials they use for this explanation. Here the object of analysis is how meanings are “ascribed” (Shevchenko 2008:12), such as via “legitimising myths” (A. D. Smith 1998:183) and how self/other boundaries are constructed. It
2.3. CONCEPTUALISING KIN-STATE MEANINGS

is possible to explore here the diversity of ways of identifying and explanations, such as Kiely et al. (2005) who analyse different constructions of being Scottish according to concepts of “blood, birth and belonging”, in terms of whether belonging is framed by respondents in organic terms (blood), territorially (birth) or voluntaristically (belonging) (see also O. Zimmer 2003).

This is not an unnecessarily complex approach to studying ethnicity (as those supporting ELF measurements argue). Rather everyday approaches to nationalism and ethnicity force researchers to address questions about the assumed function and meaning of ethnicity by engaging with agents who are supposed to cohere with the boundaries constructed for them (and not by them), allowing researchers to challenge empirically the assumptions made by ELF scholars, such as the mutually exclusive nature of ethnic identification categories. Moreover, the everyday approach provides both richer and agency-centred understandings of identification, providing data not only on how individuals identify but also why (e.g. legitimising myths, self/other constructions as described above).

A further criticism of the everyday approach could be that outside moments of conflict, in everyday perspectives, ethnicity does not matter and does not help to explain the world: we should study ethnicity only when it coincides with grave political events, such as conflict. This is wrong for several reasons. Firstly, it is a collapsed view of the role, value and importance of ethnicity. What is important is how ethnicity structures everyday state-society relations and the salience of ethnicity. Too often ethnicity is considered as always important and always structuring state-society relations. Analysing when ethnicity is not important or how it functions in banal settings is important for political science (Brubaker et al. 2006). Secondly, if ethnicity is not necessarily important, this can resolve debates concerning why identity politics remains the central lens through which post-Communist and post-Soviet states are studied (of which this thesis is guilty) (Cash 2007), to encourage understanding of other aspects of politics and state-society relations which have received less attention (such as the informal networks of power). This poses a further paradox: if ethnicity does not matter in everyday contexts, (as I argue in respect of Crimea) why then does ethnicity become salient at crucial points of political unrest (such as debates surrounding Crimea’s secession/annexation in 2014)? Thus understanding ethnicity in everyday terms is important, but is not the only aspect of identification that is important, where it is important to understand how ethnicity matters, and is constructed (e.g. in terms of legitimising myths, primordial tropes), outside periods of conflict and in relation to other aspects of identification (e.g. linguistic, cultural, political, territorial, familial, regional).

This thesis also takes the everyday nationalism approach further by applying it beyond domestic contexts to kin-state relations by exploring the meanings of kin identification. An important aspect is to separate the often elided concepts of identifying co-ethnically with a kin-state and identifying with the kin-state. This fills a niche arising in both the anthropological/sociological perspective, which considered everyday nationalism in domestic settings (Brubaker et al. 2006; Miller-Idriss 2006), and in political science perspectives, where kin-state research focused only on top-down institutional perspectives or at least approaches that analyse only the state-level actors involved (kin-state and home-state).
2.4 Conceptualising Kin-State Practices

Alongside using the everyday nationalism for analysing the meanings of kin-state identification, the thesis analyses engagement with kin-state practices. This bottom-up perspective to practices is crucial by having an engagement-centred understanding of the impacts of these practices. This section conceptualises the different and varied practices that kin-states make available (citizenship, quasi-citizenship, education, voting (via citizenship), and discusses how these can be studied from below, before investigating how these different practices might affect the model of nested integration proposed earlier in the chapter.

Citizenship binds individuals and the state, as a vital democratic (and democratising) institution, providing access to political and social rights (such as residency) and formalising the basis on which individuals have reciprocal obligations to the state (Isin and Turner 2007:16; T. H. Marshall 1950, 1998; Turner 1997). For example, the right to vote as a citizen, implies also a duty to participate in the state as a political actor (by voting) and economic actor (by paying tax) (Bellamy 2008). Citizenship and rules of access imply also the boundaries of the state, as a form of “social closure” demarcating who belongs, and how states wish to demarcate who belongs, whether via *ius sanguinis* (by blood), *ius solis* (by place of birth) or a combination (Brubaker 1992).

Regarding multiple citizenship regimes, dual citizenship has shifted from a pathological form of “polygamy”, underscoring the international principle of “one nationality only” (Hague Convention 1930), to become desecuritized during the late twentieth century (Pogonyi 2011), no longer conceived as a threat to the state (Spiro 2010). This has been accompanied by a de-ethnicization and universalisation of citizenship (Joppke 2003, 2007),²⁶ because of globalisation and migration leading to an increasing number of dual citizen migrants, although there are clearly exceptions (Dumbrava 2014a). Theories of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism endorse the increasing inclusiveness of citizenship, and the post-nationalisation of the state (Tambini 2001; Soysal 1994), where the political boundaries are not the regulatory mechanism of “membership”. Instead states are becoming “fuzzy” entities, by requiring the granting of political and social rights, by granting dual citizenship to migrants and, crucially, not requiring them to renounce their original citizenship (Benhabib et al. 2007:1; Benhabib 2005:1; see also Kastoryano 2005).

This growing acceptance of dual citizenship, as an issue of human rights for immigrants, allowed kin-states to use the same instrument. Here kin-states argue that multiplying citizenship regimes are a normally existing phenomenon in line with “transnational, post-national or cosmopolitan” rather than extra-territorial nation-building (Pogonyi 2011:685). However kin-states’ use of dual citizenship suggests their desire to maintain these co-ethnic extra-territorial ties via citizenship has “nothing to do with cosmopolitan norms” or “political liberalism” (Pogonyi 2011:691). Rather kin-states disguise their strategic and symbolic interests, both domestically, via populist policies of nation-building or electioneering strategies, financially from wealthy external co-ethnic communities (e.g. in China), and externally, by increasing the influence of the kin-state in a neighbouring state (Isin and Turner 2007:11; Waterbury 2014:37; Pogonyi 2011:691).

²⁶Joppke (2003) argues that citizenship, in relation to migration, is becoming both de-ethnicised, by states admitting immigrants, and re-ethnicised, by states trying to retain ties to emigrants.
2.4. CONCEPTUALISING KIN-STATE PRACTICES

These “citizenship constellations” comprising “a web of legal and political ties” across states are interesting to study from below, from the perspective of individual engagement and the impacts of this engagement, because of the interlinking web of relations and interactions between states and populations across borders (Bauböck 2010a:849). These lived experience perspectives, which explore the “contexts, meanings and practices that make citizenship possible”, are a vital but under-developed area within citizenship scholarship (Nyers 2007:79; Isin and Turner 2007:16), from the perspective of the “contexts, meanings and practices that make citizenship possible” (Nyamnjoh 2007:79). Citizenship practices have been analysed elsewhere, in anthropology, sociology and social psychology, from the perspective of informal and “everyday encounters”, in particular in terms of debates around the relationship between multiculturalism and experiences of citizenship (Hopkins and Blackwood 2011:226).²⁷

Dual citizenship has been considered too in terms of the symbolic and ritualistic aspects of citizenship tied up with citizenship acquisition ceremonies (Farquet 2014).

However insufficient attention is paid to engagement with citizenship constellations from below, as a political practice, particularly regarding those tied to kin-state policies. Here Vasiljević (2014:3, 10) stands out through her unique approach which goes beyond viewing citizenship as an objective political/legal institution. Rather she analyses how these “policies and laws are always conditioned by and experienced through social relations” which “treats citizenship in its identity-forming and recognition-bearing social role”. However Vasiljević (2014:3, 10) focuses only on kin-state citizenship, ignoring other kin-state practices (e.g. quasi-citizenship, education) that offer an interesting basis of comparison from the perspective of engagement.

Citizenship is becoming fragmented, operating no longer as a “unitary concept” with the increasing prevalence of “partial citizens” (Stavilă 2010:9). For example quasi-citizenship is a “fuzzy” and “not full citizenship”, offering a “documented relationship”, and certain benefits (scholarships, preferential treatment, cultural support) (Deets 2008:196) but not the full rights (voting), benefits (healthcare, pensions) and obligations (taxation) that citizenship does (Fowler 2004; Bieber 2010; Bellamy 2008). Quasi-citizenship is a diaspora policy created by either kin-states to institutionalise relations with kin communities (e.g. in Ukraine, Lithuania) (Shevel 2010; Pogany et al. 2010) or emigrants/expatriates abroad (by Mexico and India), in particular when dual citizenship is restricted by home-states, as opposed to citizenship, which is an already existing institution used by kin-states. Quasi-citizenship policies are also informal and fluid, morphing over time, as opposed to citizenship policies which form a core part of already existing, and fixed, institutions as part of kin-states’ overall citizenship legislation (Shevel 2011a).

This thesis develops a schema to analyse, and compare, citizenship alongside other kin-state practices. Returning to how citizenship is conceived, as an institution embodying belonging/identity, rights, benefits, duties and participation (Bellamy 2008; Turner 2001:192; Bloemraad et al. 2008), other kin-state practices are considered also in these terms (Table 2.3, p 54). The thesis conceptualises citizenship as a membership practice, conferring full membership and encompassing the kinds of belonging, benefits, rights, duties and participation (in political, social and cultural dimensions) that are analogous to citizens within the kin-state. By comparison, the thesis describes quasi-citizenship as a recogni-

²⁷Citizenship as an agency-centred practice has been studied also by the historian Yekelchyk (2014) who analyses notions of Soviet citizenship, during the Stalin period.
tion/residential practice, offering primarily social and cultural rights and benefits, and restricting political rights, duties and benefits. Scholarships as an educational practice focus on social rights and benefits, to be educated within the kin-state, derived from a cultural sense of belonging. Voting practices, derived from citizenship, are a participatory practice enabling political participation in the kin-state. Organisations, as an associational practice, are the thinnest practice, signifying cultural recognition and some social/cultural rights via organisational support, funding and inter-state networks.

This research moves beyond studying only citizenship from below, and instead also analyses engagement with citizenship alongside a constellation of other practices, to compare engagement, motivations and the impact of these diverse practices.

2.5 Conclusion: A Model of Nested Integration to Examine Diverse Kin-State Practices

Building on the critique that existing approaches, the antagonistic and fuzzy approaches, had theoretical, conceptual and methodological gaps, this chapter developed a model of nested integration. The chapter argued this model could deal better with observing and analysing the dynamics of interaction exhibited by kin majorities, by observing these dynamics from the bottom-up in terms of meanings and practices.

In examining this model of nested integration, the thesis compares kin-state citizenship (Moldova) and quasi-citizenship (Crimea) practices alongside other practices offering weaker forms of belonging, benefits, rights, duties and participation (educational, associational and participatory practices, Table 2.3). Analysing these meanings and practices, using the empirical data collected, offer a useful way of examine the comparative explanatory power of the nested integration model by examining how far these meanings and practices indicate evidence of political and cultural incorporation and, hence, nested integration. Thus the thesis is interested to observe the conditions under which nested integration may or may not explain the kinds of interaction between kin majority and kin-state in the two cases of Moldova and Crimea, as well as to consider how this deductive model might be further refined in line with the empirical observations of the thesis, and its iterative logic, to consider how far other types of incorporation, beyond cultural and political, might be important aspects of nested integration.

So far, the idea that kin-state policies directly contest borders has been rejected. However, indirectly, the greater interaction between kin majority and kin-state might destabilise the territorial integrity of the home-state and the position of the kin majority within it (see Bauböck 2010a:312). As the kin majority becomes increasingly incorporated within the kin-state, culturally and politically, and the border between the kin-state and kin majority decreases in salience, the reasons for separation of kin-state and kin majority may become increasingly fragile. Nested integration of kin majorities might encourage not only the bottom-up nesting of individuals, but also nesting of kin majority elites and political institutions within the kin-state. Whereas in Brubaker’s antagonistic nationalism, the kin-state and home-state advanced oppositional forms of nationalism, within the nested model for kin majorities the problems arise from a lack of oppositional nationalism allowing the two states to become more integrated. Indirectly, the existence of the border between the kin-state and kin majority may be challenged by the kin majority, which begins to contest current territorial configurations in response to
their increasing kin-state rights and benefits. The increasing legitimacy for claims may revert to, and strengthen, territorial claims which are destabilising. For example Russian’s passportization policy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, allowed Russia to claim a “duty” to protect Russian citizens and defend these de facto independent territories facing aggression from Georgia (Medvedev 2008).

These potential impacts augment the reasons to study, from below, how these policies are used, and their relationship with kin identification and political incorporation, given the potential for the heightening of antagonism between kin-state and home-state. With a sense of tragic irony, this research helps to situate the claims Russia made towards Crimea, one of the cases for the project, to legitimise Russia’s annexation of the peninsula in 2014.

Building on this theoretical framework, Chapter 3 situates the two kin majority cases (Crimea and Moldova), historically and institutionally, in terms of their relations with their respective kin-states (Russia and Romania), to contextualise the material considered in the proceeding empirical chapters (Chapters 4-7).
### Table 2.3: Conceptualising Kin-State Practices

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Cultural, political</td>
<td>Political, social</td>
<td>Political, social</td>
<td>Political, social</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Home-state</td>
<td>Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia, China</td>
<td>Membership (full)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-Citizenship</td>
<td>Cultural, political</td>
<td>Cultural, social</td>
<td>Cultural, social</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Kin-state</td>
<td>Hungary (Status Law), Poland (Karta Polaka), Russia (Compatriot Policy) Slovakia, Slovenia, India (Person of Indian Origin, Non-Resident Indian), South Korea (Overseas Korean Act)</td>
<td>Recognition (partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Kin-state</td>
<td>Romania, Russia</td>
<td>Educational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Home-state</td>
<td>Serbia, Hungary; External constituencies: Romania, Croatia</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Cultural, social</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Home-state</td>
<td>Russia (Compatriot network)</td>
<td>Associational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Chapter 3

Crimea and Moldova as Kin Majorities

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that Romanians abroad are part of the Romanian people and spirituality.”

Department for Romanians Abroad (2013)

“The twenty-five million of our Compatriots in these countries must not be forgotten.”

Boris Yeltsin, cited by G. Smith (1999b:490)

In part 1, this chapter provides an ethnographic and historical background by analysing the historical relationship between the kin-states (Russia, Romania) and kin majorities (Crimea, Moldova). In part 2, the chapter analyses Russia’s and Romania’s kin-state policies. Understanding this relationship, and the current policies, forms the context for the bottom-up perspectives provided by the following empirical chapters.

Table 3.1: Territorial Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-tsarist</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khanate under Ottoman suzerainty</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moldovan principality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsarist</td>
<td>Oblast within Russian empire (1783-1802)</td>
<td>Gubernia within Russian empire (1812-1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gubernia within Russian empire (1802-1917)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>Crimean ASSR within RSFSR (1921-1945)</td>
<td>Greater Romania (1918-1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oblast within RSFSR (1945-1954)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>Oblast within RSFSR</td>
<td>USSR (1940-1941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania (1941-1944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>Oblast within RSFRS (until 1954)</td>
<td>MSSR within USSR (1944-1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oblast within UkrSSR (1954-1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 1 – Historical Background

Part 1 situates Crimea and Moldova, historically, by examining their relations with their respective kin-states over time, Russia and Romania, from the perspective of territory, ethnicity and citizenship (Table 3.1). It follows the transition from empires, through the USSR to present day nation-states. It examines the institutions (e.g. citizenship) which created debates concerning the naming of people within these territories, in terms of the meaning and content. It analyses also the development of mechanisms of codifying societies within these expanding territories, via ethnicity and censuses, as well as the contention caused by these questions in post-Soviet Crimea and Moldova.

3.1 Historical Background: Russia and Crimea

3.1.1 Crimea: from Tsarism to the USSR

Territorially, Crimea became part of the Russian Empire in 1783 when it was annexed by Catherine the Great, becoming the Tavricheskaia gubernia (1802).²⁸ This became the Tsarist empire’s first access to the Black Sea,²⁹ which founded the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval base at Sevastopol (1783). As a site of military struggle and glory during the Crimean War (1854–1856) and WWII, Crimea and Sevastopol became imbued with a mythic symbolism (Plokhy 2000, 2008; Qualls 2003). Culturally too, Crimea remains an important part of Russia’s symbolic “heritage” as the site of much classic Russian literature such as novels by Pushkin and Chekhov (Sasse 2007:27) and was imagined by Solzhenitsyn (1995) as Russia’s “natural” border.

During the Tsarist era, there was no concept of citizenship, but rather of “subjecthood” (poddanstvo) to the Tsar (Salenko 2012). Russia’s first census (1897) defined ethnicity as an objective and scientific category, for experts rather than individuals to define, using language and religion as proxies for ethnicity (Cadiot 2005), where those affiliated to Orthodoxy were considered Russian. The category of Ukrainian, then described as Little Russian (malorusskie), was linguistically and ethnically subordinated to the super-category of Great Russian (Cadiot 2005). Only in the Soviet 1939 census were separate ethnic categories of Russian and Ukrainian created. The concept of Russian in pre-Soviet times, along with the notion of ethnicity, was therefore a dynamic, though hegemonic, concept in terms of a Russian national consciousness (Brandenberger 2010).

With the brutal and revolutionary transition from Tsarism to the building of the Soviet state, Lenin sought to transform the “peoples and territories of the former Russian empire” into a “federation of Soviet nation states” (Hirsch 1997:277). Lenin focused too, at least discursively, on the idea of emancipation by rejecting the idea of subjection in favour of citizenship. The first citizenship law (1939), following the first Soviet constitution (1936), established the concept of a single federal citizenship, where every citizen of a Federal Republic was also a citizen of the USSR, transforming those residing in new Federal Republics into Soviet citizens (Taracouzio 1939; Salenko 2012).³⁰

²⁸A gubernia was a Russian imperial subdivision, while Tavricheskaia reflects the imperial preference to reflect Hellenic legacies by using Tavrida, which was the ancient Greek name of the peninsula (Sasse 2007).
²⁹The Black Sea coast to the east of Crimea, currently Kranodar Krai, was only ceded to Russia in 1829.
³⁰A further citizenship law was developed in 1978, following the 1977 constitution, which restricted the holding of dual citizenship by declaring that it was not possible to be a Soviet citizen and hold foreign citizenship (Salenko 2012).
Lenin wanted to deal, institutionally, with the Union’s diverse ethnicities to consolidate a Soviet socialist ideology, in particular among non-Russian ethnic groups by solving first questions of ethnicity by offering them cultural and political rights (Martin 2001; Slezkine 1994; Suny 1998). This enabled Lenin to manage what he pathologised as a tendency towards “Great Russian chauvinism” by enhancing rights of non-ethnic Russians (G. Smith 1996:7, 54). Lastly, Soviet authorities believed that territorial borders based on nationality/ethnicity were more durable than natural geographic or economic borders, motivating their consolidation of official nationalities in particular territories (Hirsch 1997). The Soviet policy of korenizatsiia (nativisation) supported local titular nationalities and cadres within this ethno-territorial hierarchy, spanning from Union Republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions (oblasts) and autonomous districts (okrug) (see Sasse 2007:90), each seeking to make Soviet power “native”, “intimate”, “popular” and “comprehensible” within these micro-units of the vast and diverse USSR (Martin 2001:12). However nativisation remained in tension with the Soviet tendency towards Russification, or at least Sovietization via Russification. Russians remained the “backbone” of the Soviet state, as the “elder brother’ within the Soviet empire of nations” and of other eastern Slavic groups (Belarusians and Ukrainians), and in practice remained the socially, culturally, politically and demographically dominant group (Brandenberger 2010:729; Von Hagen 1995).

In practice, the USSR brutalised ethnic categorisations by promoting “official “nationalities”, to “create some” nationalities, like Moldovan, and “eliminate” others, like Romanian, from Soviet territory (Hirsch 1997:264). Forced and coerced movements of populations were also common, particularly under Stalin. In 1944, Crimean Tatars were expelled from Crimea to Siberia and the Uzbek SSR, as penance for Crimean Tatars “betrayal of the motherland” by (allegedly) collaborating with the Nazis during Crimea’s occupation in WWII (Pohl 1999:112; Stalin 1944). This devastated the population of Crimean Tatars and entrenched Russians as the ethnically and politically dominant group in Crimea, supplemented by the migration of ethnic Russians to Crimea (Figure 3.1, Marples and Duke 1995).

Crimea also experienced flux within the USSR, demoted from an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the RSFSR (1945), to an oblast (region). As an oblast, Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR (1954), as a “gift” to mark 300 years since the Pereiaslav Treaty (1654), signifying the unification and “eternal and unshakeable friendship between Russians and Ukrainians” (Lewytzkyj 1984:5). Within the USSR, this territorial transfer had little impact because, in a highly centralised Soviet system, Crimea was placed, psychologically and demographically, “in” the UkrSSR “but not of it” (Wilson 2009:151; Chinn and Kaiser 1996:148). It was only with Soviet dissolution, and Ukraine’s role in this dissolution, that Crimea’s transferal became a source of contention.

3.1.2 Territory, Ethnicity and Citizenship in post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine and Crimea

With Soviet dissolution, the trauma of Crimea’s location outside post-Soviet Russia was realised as the “most emotive symbol” of loss (Sasse 2007:38). Ethnic Russians residing in Crimea, too, felt the shock of “dislocation” from Russia (Wilson 2009:151). Crimea was framed as a potential hot spot in post-Soviet
citizenship law of 1990 followed Gorbachev’s liberalisation policies of perestroika and glasnost’ (openness), and reduced the harsh terms by which Soviet citizenship could be lost, such as by holding dual citizenship.
³¹These terms are considered here as analogous.
³²The Pereiaslav Treaty (1654) was signed by the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and the Russian Tsar, Aleksei I, signifying the unification of the Cossack Hetmanate, a territory in central Ukraine, with the Russian empire.
3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA AND CRIMEA

Figure 3.1: Crimean Ethnicity According to Censuses (1897-2001)

Source: Sasse (2007:275)

space, given the “imbroglio” between Russia, Ukraine and Crimea (Solchanyk 2001), and the threat of secessionism within Crimea in the early 1990s.

The RSFSR experienced Soviet dissolution, and the signing of the Belavezha accords (1991) as a “trauma” and even an “illegal act” (Beissinger 1996:178-79; Tolz 1998b), rather than as a moment signifying national self-determination, for several reasons. Firstly, there had been no “Russian question” within the USSR, no tension between russkii (ethnic Russian) and rossiian (resident of Russia) and no concern over the location of borders between Soviet republics (Solchanyk 1998). As the USSR’s culturally and socio-economically privileged group, it mattered little whether ethnic Russians resided in the RSFSR or other Soviet republics, where they comprised significant populations (Figure 3.1, Mazower 2009; Tolz 1998b; Laitin 1998). All these questions came to the fore in early post-Soviet politics.

Secondly, the RSFSR experienced, but did not participate in, Soviet dissolution. Perestroika (restructuring) led to the flourishing of nationalist movements in peripheral Soviet republics (e.g. Baltic republics, MSSR, UkrSSR and Georgia SSR). However these were notably absent in the RSFSR (Beissinger 2008; Brubaker 1996), where ethnic Russians were marked by a weaker Russian national consciousness than those who mobilised (Zevelev 2001:34; Lieven 1998). Lastly, it was difficult to separate, conceptually and politically, the RSFSR and the USSR, in comparison to other republics who had a consciousness, and a desire for self-governance, outside of Soviet structures; by contrast, many RSFSR residents conceived of the USSR as their homeland and not the RSFSR (Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Zevelev 2001; Szporluk 2000). Post-Soviet Russia imagined itself as a “‘stump’ of its ‘true’ self” (Shevel 2011b:189), faced with transitioning from issues of domestic policy between Soviet republics to foreign policy between post-Soviet states (Donaldson and Nogee 2009:163), and with a large “beached diaspora” of ethnic and linguistic Russians beyond Russia (Laitin 1998). However this large diaspora did not display the “group cohesion or cult identity typical of immigrants” (Chinn and Kaiser 1996:16). They did not conceive of

The Belavezha accords (Belovezhskie soglashenie) were signed by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and dissolved the Soviet Union (Markedonov 2012).
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA AND CRIMEA

Russia also contested what it framed as arbitrary and illegitimate post-Soviet borders (D’Anieri 2007:9; Tolz 1998b). Russia’s border with Ukraine was most poignant, because of the high concentration of ethnic Russians (Crimea, Donbas), and because Russia conceived of the loss of Ukraine, and Crimea, as a more “traumatic experience” than its loss of other republics (Chinn and Kaiser 1996:145; Solchanyk 1992; Light et al. 2000). Ukraine’s desire to seek a separate future from Russia diverted from the Russian national idea, which framed (and continues to frame) Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation as intrinsically linguistically, culturally and ancestrally within Russia, sharing the “roots” of the Kyivan Rus (President of Russia 2013; see also Olszański 2012; Riabchuk 2012), and being “part of our greater Russian, or Russian-Ukrainian, world” (President of Russia 2013).

Territorially, the location of Crimea and Sevastopol, and their transfer in 1954, were most contentious. Crimea had functioned as part of Russia’s “homeland” and “land of Russian glory” since annexation from the Ottoman empire in 1783 (Chinn and Kaiser 1996:148; Bremmer 1994). Strategically, Sevastopol was also Russia’s only Black Sea naval base, as a closed city administered separately from Crimea within the USSR. Russia sought to make a secondary claim that not only was Khrushchev’s decision arbitrary and illegal, but that this also had not, legally-speaking, included Sevastopol (Wanner 1998; Pikhovshek 1995).

Contentions existed too in Crimea’s relationship with Ukraine. Crimea was Ukraine’s only region where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers formed a majority, and the region, culturally and historically, did not mesh with Ukrainian “national historiography” (Sasse 2007:73; Wilson 1997). It was also

⁴In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, these questions of arbitrary and illegitimate borders remain salient, with political forces within Russia contesting the legality of Ukraine’s and Baltic states’ independence.

Figure 3.2: Ethnic Composition of the Population of the USSR in 1991 (by SSR)

Source: Kolstø (1999):617
3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA AND CRIMEA

Figure 3.3: Support for Ukrainian Independence from Soviet Union in December 1991 Referendum

Source: Potichnyj (1991:130)

the region with the least support for Ukrainian independence from the USSR: 54% in Crimea (Figure 3.3, compared to high support (90%) for independence elsewhere across Ukraine (Plokhy 2008:166), and to higher support (93%) for restoring the Crimean ASSR as a subject of USSR in a referendum held also in 1991 (Solchanyk 1994:51).

Institutionally, Ukraine constructed itself as a post-Soviet state separate from Russia, as a unitary state, against the Russian federal model, with a single state language (Ukrainian) and a singular conception of citizenship, to avoid Russian cultural and linguistic creep, and to establish a state and identity different from Russia (Wilson 1995; Light et al. 2000). This is clearest in Ukraine’s inclusive though restrictive citizenship legislation. While Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia) based post-Soviet citizenship eligibility on 1940 residence, excluding many Soviet-era ethnic Russian migrants (Chinn and Kaiser 1996), Ukraine permitted citizenship to all resident in 1991. However Ukraine also maintained a singular notion of citizenship, prohibiting dual citizenship (Shevel 2010), including in Crimea where campaigns for Russian citizenship were strongest (Drohobycky 1995; Shevel 2009b). Dual citizenship rights were however defeated in parliament in 1991 by only two votes (Shevel 2002), buffered by a logic that Ukraine needed singular citizenship to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Shevel 2010). The “compromise” was that dual citizenship could be held in the case of bilateral agreements, though none yet exist (Shevel 2002). Citizenship rights were therefore contentious in the post-Soviet period, forcing individuals to choose between being a citizen of Ukraine or “a citizen of Russia and leave” (Barrington 1995:742).

3.1.3 Why did Crimean separatism fail in the mid-1990s?

With these contentions between Crimea, Russia and Ukraine, Crimea’s post-Soviet reputation was potentially as “one of the major crises of the post-Soviet period” (Marples and Duke 1995:261), which could involve a “bloody and conceivably nuclear dispute” between Ukraine and Russia (The Economist...
1993). However at the apex of separatist sentiment (1994-1995), the movement failed to crystallise and orchestrate Crimea’s secession.

Key to the failure of secession were pro-Russian elites within Crimea. Though the movement appeared “unstoppable and a very real threat to Russian-Ukrainian relations” (Lieven 1998:256), they were unable to consolidate under a single ideology of “‘separatism’, ‘nationalism or ‘irredentism’” (Sasse 2007:156) or to elicit mass support, with Crimeans concerned more about socioeconomic than ethnic questions (J. I. Dawson 1997; Marples and Duke 1995). Crucial, was the egoism of the movement’s protagonist, Yurii Meshkov, leader of the Crimean Republican Party (Republikanskaia Partiia Kryma) and Crimea’s separatist movement in the early 1990s, who instigated and won Crimea’s 1994 presidential elections. However he failed to recognise the lack of mass support, entrenched by appointing “snooty Muscovites” to key positions of power in Crimea, rather than “native Crimean” Russians (The Economist 1994). This caused a split between Meshkov, as president, and Crimea’s parliament, who tried to weaken Meshkov’s presidential powers (Qualls 2009), framing Meshkov as a “comically incompetent leader and administrator” (Lieven 1998:258).

Ukraine could deal with the Crimean question, becoming more interventionist (1994-1995) with a change of president in Ukraine (from Kravchuk to Kuchma). In March 1995, Ukraine forced the abolition of the Crimean presidency laws and the office of the president; by April 1995 Ukraine encouraged the Crimean Parliament to abandon attempts at further referenda and to draft a new constitution, affirming Crimea’s regional status within Ukraine (Sasse 2007:178-79).

Crimea’s pro-Russian separatist movement was also constrained by Russia’s reluctance to assist them. While Post-Soviet Russia framed Crimea’s transferal as illegal and arbitrary, Yeltsin, as Russia’s President (1991-1999), was not willing to intervene, preferring to leave Ukraine to its own domestic disputes, likely because Russia was already embroiled in the Chechen conflict (Motyl 1998:27; see also Marples and Duke 1995; Galeotti 1994).³⁶ Competing elements of the Russian state, notably the Duma and Supreme Soviet, were displeased by Yeltsin’s passivity, causing a power play between those supporting intervention and Yeltsin. For example in 1993, the Supreme Soviet declared that Sevastopol was a “Russian (rossiiskii) city” (Marples and Duke 1995:278), which, according to Hosking (2006:395), was “one of the main reasons” that Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet, resulting in an armed uprising and suppression by Yeltsin’s orders. Yeltsin also resisted the Duma’s 1996 resolution that the 1954 transfer was “arbitrary” (Solchanyk 2001:177).

Crimea therefore became a “closed issue” for Russia, “confined to the political margins” (Sasse 2007:237). Following the apex, and failure, of Crimean secessionism, the borders between Ukraine and Russia were finally settled (1997) with the signing of the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. This crystallised the borders between Ukraine and Russia as they had been as the UkrSSR and RFSFR and acknowledged Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas (Herrschel 2011). It divided Sevastopol’s BSF 50/50 between Ukraine and Russia and allowed Russia to keep its BSF at Sevastopol through a 20 year lease. For Ukraine, this was a transitional arrangement while Russia developed an alternative site at Novorossiysk; for Russia, this was an opportunity to retain the Sev-
3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA AND CRIMEA

Figure 3.4: Election Results for Crimean parliament (1994-2010)

Source: Parties and Elections in Europe (accessed 2015)

Ukraine displaced the Crimean question by institutionalising Crimea as an autonomous republic, even if this solution “perforates” the unitary Ukrainian state (Sasse 2002:22). This institutional solution did not dissipate contentions, concerning less questions of “ethnic discrimination” and resembling more a “struggle for power” between Kyiv and Crimea (Shevchuk 1996:69). While the Crimean elite resisted Kyiv’s centralising tendencies, Kyiv resisted Crimea’s power creep, by requiring Crimea’s activities to be in line with Ukraine’s constitution, and rejected the right of Crimea to set policy on defence, monetary and citizenship issues (Drohobycky 1995). This power play remained a contemporary factor in Crimean politics, between the locally elected Crimean parliament and Kyiv-appointed Council of Ministers. Paradoxically, Crimean politics was dominated by central Ukrainian politics, the Donetsk-based PoR and KPU, and not by local pro-Russian parties (RE), which won only 4% in Crimea’s 2010 elections (K. Zimmer and Haran 2008) (Figure 3.4). Indeed, in Crimea’s 2006 elections, RE was in coalition with PoR.

This historical background was the contemporary context during fieldwork. However, by February 2014, Crimea’s reputation as a successful case of institutionalised conflict resolution (Sasse 2001) fell away with its swift annexation by Russia. Following Kyiv’s Euromaidan protests (November 2013-February 2014) and President Yanukovych’s disappearance, Crimea was seized by pro-Russian forces, led by Sergei Aksenov (RE leader). These forces orchestrated a secessionist referendum, which was

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37 A process that began in 1991 and was stabilised by 1998 with Ukraine’s ratification of Crimea’s constitution (Sasse 2002).
38 Official Crimean results recorded 83% turnout in Crimea and 89% in Sevastopol of which 97% and 96%, respectively, supported annexation (Source: State Council of the Republic of Crimea, 2014; Legislative Assembly of the City of Sevastopol, 2014). However, results posted on the Council under the President of the Russian Federation for Civil Society and Human
used by Russia to legitimise their institutional annexation of Crimea.

Since March 2014, post-dating fieldwork, Crimea has functioned as republic of the Russian Federation, while its de jure status remains contested. This thesis is not about annexation. Yet it has become impossible to conceive of Crimea, in the period of research, without reflecting on the relationship between the Crimea of 2012-2013 and that of 2014, not least because it demonstrated a shift away from Russia’s post-Soviet passivity, as Russia instigated the first border changes in Europe since 1945.

3.2 Historical Background: Romania and Moldova

This section analyses the same relations of ethnicity, territory and citizenship to unpack Moldova’s relationship Romania over time.

3.2.1 Moldovanism Versus Pan-Romanianism

The Moldovan Soviet Socialist republic (MSSR) was the only Soviet republic sharing a “potential national identity” with a non-Soviet state/population (C. King 2003:61). Moldova remains unique as a post-Soviet state whose “national identity has developed (geographically and conceptually) ‘in between’ two countries: Russia and Romania” (Prina 2014:3; C. King 2003) and the two broader conceptual regions of “Europe and Eurasia” (Roper 2005:502). Within Moldova, two dichotomous approaches, pan-Romanianism and Moldovanism, explain the competing search for “historical truth” concerning the territorial, ethnic and institutional relationship between Moldova and Romania (Zabarah 2011:6-7). The concern is not with the validity of these approaches, but with understanding how each structures interpretations of Moldovan history, and social and political life since independence (March 2007; Ciscel 2008; Musteata 2008).

Moldovanists frame Moldova as a nation deserving its own state and separate language, ethnicity, culture and history from Romania (Protsyk and Osoian 2010:15). Moldovanism was the official Soviet approach, with Soviet intellectuals stressing the Slavic influences, over Latin influences, on Moldovan culture and language, where Cyrillic was the enforced Moldovan alphabet (Lazarev 1974). Moldova’s “neo-Soviet” Communist party (PCRM) continues to endorse Moldovanism, pathologising or ignoring Moldova’s position in Greater Romania and nostalgising Moldova’s status within the USSR (Ihrig 2008; Danero Iglesias 2013). PCRM frame Moldovan and Romanian identities as “competitive” (March 2007:602; Protsyk and Osoian 2010:15), to legitimise the existence of the Moldovan state and PCRM’s rule (at least until 2009) (Danero Iglesias 2013). The intellectual sphere includes Moldovanist historians, such as Vasile Stati (affiliated to PCRM) who argues history from a Moldovanist perspective and has published a Romanian-Moldovan dictionary (Stati 2002, 2003).

Pan-Romanianists consider the inhabitants of Moldova as Romanian, and frame the Moldovanist perspective as pro-Russian (Ihrig 2008). Pan-Romanianists argue that Moldova is an ancient Romanian region, where Moldova’s population are integral to the Romanian nation which was united politically in Greater Romania (Beks and Graur 2006; C. King 1994). Ethnically and linguistically, they see Moldovan as a synonym of Romanian. They reduce any Moldovan “distinctiveness”, e.g. the Moldovan

Rights website reported Crimean a much lower turnout (30-50%) and lower support for unification with Russia (50-60%).
3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

Figure 3.5: Ethnicity According to Moldovan Censuses (1897-2004)


dialect, to “regional variations of a common Romanian history and pan-Romanian culture” (Protsyk and Osoianu 2010:15). Pan-Romanianists frame the USSR and Tsarist regime as the occupiers of Moldova, condemn Soviet-era Russification of Moldova and see it as their duty to overturn this Russification and Sovietization. They frame the Moldovan nation as an “artificial” Soviet creation where Moldovan becomes a synonym for “Soviet Romanian” (Deletant 1978:189). However pan-Romanians ignore that the Moldovan majority define themselves, ethnically, as Moldovan (74%) at least according to Moldova’s 2004 census (C. King 2003; Ciscel 2006). They dispute this durability as a false consciousness, as if those identifying as Moldovan have not yet self-realised they are really Romanian (C. King 2003).

This pan-Romanianist and Moldovanist dichotomy structures interpretations of Moldova’s history, using primordial arguments to argue the similarity (pan-Romanian) or difference (Moldovanist) between Romania and Moldova. Pan-Romanianists stress Romania and Moldova’s contemporary commonalities, using time immemorial arguments to emphasise their ancient common ancestry and history, tracing their common origins to the pre-Romanian Geto-Dacian tribes (≈500BC) and fifteenth century kings, Alexandru cel Bun (1400-1432) and Ştefan cel Mare (1457-1504). Moldovanists agree in their common Geto-Dacian and Roman ancestry with Romanians, but consider this the critical juncture from which the Romanian and Moldovan nations diverged. They stress, for example, the Moldovaness of Ştefan cel Mare (Ihrig 2008).

3.2.2 Moldova: from Tsarism to the USSR

This section examines Moldova’s experience of territorial flux, from the Ottoman Empire, the reign of Ştefan cel Mare, until the eastern half of Moldova (between the Prut and Nistru rivers) was acceded to
3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

Figure 3.6: Ethnicity in Greater Romania by region (1930 census)

Source: Institutul Central de Statistică (1938)

the Russia Empire (1812). This became the Bessarabian gubernia (here Bessarabia), while the western half of Moldova remained under Ottoman rule until the formation of the Romanian state.

Bessarabia, as the “Siberia of the West”, was an underdeveloped periphery of the Russian empire (C. King 1994:648; Schrad 2004). Unlike Crimea, which writers like Pushkin sentimentalised, Bessarabia was the location of Pushkin’s loathed exile. Under Tsarism, Russian culture and language were privileged in Bessarabia. Russian became the official language (1854), while use of Romanian/Moldovan in education and cultural spheres was increasingly prohibited (C. King 1999, 1994). In practice, Russian and Jewish culture dominated urban Bessarabia, while Romanian/Moldovan culture and language dominated rural Bessarabia (C. King 1999:41).

The western half of Moldova, separate from Bessarabia since 1812, achieved greater autonomy, uniting with nearby Wallachia (1859) with the election of the common prince, Alexandru Ioan Cuza. These United Principalities were the beginning of a “single Romanian state”, gaining international recognition in 1878 (C. King 1999:27). This emergent Romanian state expanded its institutional capacity with the introduction of a civic code (1865) and its first constitution (1866). This established a single institution of citizenship, covering state membership and conferring rights and duties, via blood (jus sanguinis) entrenching the principalities as a space of inclusion for ethnic Romanians but exclusion of Jews (Iordachi 2002).

Romania capitalised on Russia’s moment of “weakness”, following the Bolshevik revolution and Russian civil war, shifting its attention to Bessarabia (Suny 1998:73). Romanian troops arrived in Chişinău (Bessarabia’s capital) in January 1918 on the pretext of protecting supply lines from Bolsheviks (C. King 1999:33). In quick succession, Bessarabia’s local government (Sfatul Țării) declared their independence from Russia (24 January 1918), before voting, under some pressure from Roma-
nia, to unify with Romania (27 March 1918) (C. King 1999:35). Transylvania’s secession, from the Austro-Hungarian empire, and accession to Romania, on 1 December 1918, completed the unification of Romania, now Romania’s National Day. This unification created an ethnically heterogeneous state, where Bessarabia’s heterogeneity was no exception (1930 census, Figure 3.2.2). The changing political and ethnic structure of Romania prompted new citizenship legislation (1924). This was more liberal and inclusive than previously, expanding citizenship to include those residing in Romania’s new territory, including Bessarabia, but still restricted non-Orthodox communities, such as Jews, from Romanian citizenship (Iordachi 2002).

Bessarabia’s inclusion in Greater Romania is a source of contention between pan-Romanianists who nostalgise Greater Romania as Moldova’s golden age and a rightful return to its Romanian brothers (Ihrig 2008), and Moldovanists, who frame Greater Romania as a foreign occupier, consistent with the Soviet framing (see Lazarev 1974). Instead, Moldovanists nostalgise the Tsarist and Soviet periods, as symbolising freedom from Romania, politically and culturally (Ihrig 2008).

Aside from these dichotomous debates, Bessarabia, as part of the Russian empire (1812-1918), did not experience the earlier Romania’s nation-building project (Livezeanu 2000:92; Iordachi 2002). In the “sleepy backwater” of Bessarabia, Romanian national consciousness was weak, and Romanian authorities feared the loyalty of these new Romanian citizens (Schrad 2004:470; Livezeanu 2000). To compensate, Romania attempted to make Romanians through a policy of cultural assimilation, by education of local teachers to raise the status of the Romanian language (similar to E. Weber 1976). While the majority of Bessarabia became Romanian speakers by 1930 (C. King 1999), Romanianisation was more successful in transforming elites than peasants, at least in terms of hearts and minds; most in Bessarabia felt more “occupied by their alleged brothers than united with them” (Petrescu 2001:157).

Simultaneous with Romania’s efforts in Bessarabia, the USSR piloted its own Moldovan nation-building project to divorce Moldovan from Romanian, ethnically and linguistically. Within the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR, 1924), carved out of UkrSSR territory (i.e. outside the former Bessarabian gubernia), Moldovan in Cyrillic script became the official MASSR language to be “in line with Bessarabian traditions” (C. King 1999:65). The USSR also used the MASSR to spread Soviet propaganda into Greater Romania, to foster “cross-border ethnic ties” and further its influence in Romania (Martin 2001:274), ensuring the “Bessarabian question” remained a contentious issue in international and Romanian politics (C. King 1999:63).

With Soviet annexation of Bessarabia (and Bukovina) (in 1941 and again in 1944), following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany, this seizure remained a point of aggravation between the USSR and Romania throughout the Communist period (Verdery 1991). While Romania took a cautious approach to the USSR, Romania also had more room for controversy than other satellite/Warsaw Pact states, such as the release of Karl Marx’s Notes on the Romanians (1964) which condemned Russia’s 1812 annexation of Bessarabia (Verdery 1991).

Within the USSR, the MSSR was decimated by “radical sovietisation” in its early years with farm collectivisation and famine (Schrad 2004; Eyal and Smith 1996; Ciscel 2010:577). Many of the pro-

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*For example, Romania neither participated, nor was invited to participate, in the 1969 Warsaw pact invasion of Prague (Deletant 2007).*

*About one in ten died in Moldova as a result of these policies (Eyal and Smith 1996:226).*
Romanian elite fled to Romania, fearing the Soviet regime, with mass deportations to gulags in Siberia and Kazakhstan (Rus 2010). Even laying flowers at the statues of Romanian/Moldovan heroes in Soviet-era Chişinău, such as Mihai Eminescu and Ștefan cel Mare, was punishable as a “manifestation of (Romanian) nationalism and anti-Soviet attitude” (Cașu 2012:287). This brutal sovietization also modernised Moldova, by increasing literacy, though largely in Russian, marginalising Moldovan/Romanian within the public sphere (Eyal and Smith 1996; Ciscel 2010, 2006). Early Soviet Moldovan nation-building was therefore as much a project of destruction, by eradicating local elite and bourgeois Romanians, as it was a project of separation. Economically, the MSSR remained one of the least developed areas of the USSR (Cașu 2012), as an agricultural republic with industry concentrated in the territory of present-day Transnistria (Crowther 1998).

3.2.3 Territory, Ethnicity and Citizenship in Post-Soviet Moldova

During perestroika, as in other Soviet republics (Baltic republics, Ukrainian and Georgia), national sentiment grew in intensity in the MSSR. However compared to other republics, this was not titular (Moldovan) nationalism, but pan-Romanian sentiment, signalling a turning point where pan-Romanianism no longer incurred punishment (Chinn and Kaiser 1996:273; C. King 2003). The composition of Moldovan elite also shifted during perestroika, with key positions filled by Romanians/Moldovans, from former Bessarabia, rather than Transnistria, or ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, as previously (Cașu 2012). The pan-Romanian Popular Front (PF) flourished, intellectually and politically (rather than perished, as previously), beyond the anti-Communist Moldovan Writers’ Union (C. King 1994; Crowther and Roper 1996). PF had mass support too, rallying 300,000-500,000 (1989), 10% of MSSR’s population, in support of Romanian (not Moldovan) language written in Latin script (Kaufman 2001:123).

This campaign successfully instigated the 31 August 1989 language law, as the PF’s and MSSR’s “first symbolic move toward independence from Moscow” (Ciscel 2006:576). By the 1990 parliamentary elections, predating MSSR independence, PF won ≈1/3 of seats (March 2007:187), and appointed Mircea Druc, a pro-Romanian PF deputy, as MSSR Prime Minister (1990-1991). However PF instituted policies that “antagonised wide parts of Moldovan society”, such as the language law, the denunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (1991) and unification with Romania (C. King 1999:145; Laitin 2001), creating fear among non-Romanian speakers of marginalisation, in particular among the regions, Gagauzia and Transnistria, that later sought secession from Moldova (Zabarah 2012; Kolstø 2008).

Post-Communist Romania too, no longer inhibited by the USSR, rekindled relations with Moldova, as the first state to recognise Moldova’s independence (Hamm 1998). However Romania also made claims on Moldova’s newly achieved independence, with unification a popular trope for Romania’s political class. As King (1994) argues, Moldova signalled Romania’s “Kosovo complex” in several dimensions: the “collective wellbeing” of the Romanian “ethnos”, the reversal of Communist and WWII legacies, and Romania’s guilt for not defending these territories from Soviet annexation (C. King 1999; Hamm 1998).

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*Similar language laws were implemented in most Soviet republics (1988-1990).*

*While conflict was swiftly ended in Gagauzia, which achieved partial autonomy, violent conflict in Transnistria lasted longer (1992-1993). Transnistria remains a secessionist de facto state and “intractable”, though frozen, conflict (Roper 2001:101).*
3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

Under these pressures, few predicted Moldova might have a “future as a sovereign state” (Eyal and Smith 1996:242; Löwenhardt et al. 2001). However, similar to Crimea, Moldova’s unification movement, spearheaded by PF, was critically unable to gain mass support after 1994 (Hamm 1998). Instead Moldovan society elected more moderate, less pan-Romanian, politicians, re-electing President Mircea Snegur in Moldova’s first multi-party elections (1994), as an anti-unification candidate endorsing Moldova’s newly acquired statehood (C. King 1994:352). By March 1994, 75% voted in an “opinion poll” to keep Moldova’s independence rather than unite with Romania (Zabarah 2011). The 1994 constitution changed Moldova’s official language to Moldovan, and the anthem was changed to Limba Noastră (Our language), signalling the elite-level manoeuvre away from pan-Romanianism.⁴³

While pan-Romanianism became a marginal political discourse, post-Soviet Moldovan politics remains structured by identity politics (Danero Iglesias 2013), with questions of what to call “our language” and history (the history of Moldovans or Romanians). De-Sovietization caused a shift away from Russian dominating everyday life and politics towards a dominance of Romanian language (C. King 1999), and the acceptance of Romanian interpretations of history, even if this does not engender pan-Romanian sentiments and irredentism. Moldova’s political parties too vary not on economic or social cleavages but on a symbolic programme, i.e. their orientation of Moldova (as a nation and state) vis-à-vis Romania and Russia (Danero Iglesias 2014). The transition from PCRM (2001-2009) as Moldova’s dominant political party towards a more European-centred coalition (AIE: PL, PLDM and PDM, Figure 3.7) in 2009 signalled a shift not only in Moldova’s geopolitics, towards the EU and away from Russia, but also in terms of symbolic politics. For example in 2013 Moldova’s constitutional court ruled to change the official language of Moldova to Romanian, by arguing the declaration of independence (which advocated Romanian language) prevailed over Moldova’s constitution (which advocated Moldovan language). These symbolic debates are the key cleavage of party politics, not least since 2014 parliamentary elections leading to a smaller vote share for pro-European parties and a swing towards a more pro-Russian party, PSRM, which became Moldova’s largest party.

Post-Soviet Moldova established its citizenship based on territorial criteria, and can be acquired via proof of residence before 28 June 1940 of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina or the MASSR (Gasca 2010), i.e. only territories of Greater Romania that lie beyond of the boundaries of Romania.⁴⁴ In 2002, a constitutional amendment allowed dual and multiple citizenship status for Moldovan citizens (Gasca 2010; Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova 2002). However the PCRM government attempted to prevent holders of dual citizenship from holding political office, precipitating an ECHR case brought by Alexandru Tănase (PLDM and constitutional court judge) and Dorin Chirtoacă (PL, Mayor Chișinău 2007-present) against Moldova. Here, the ECHR ruled it was restrictive on democracy to prevent dual citizens from holding office and Moldova was forced to revoke this policy (ECHR 2010).⁴⁵ Issues of language, ethnicity and citizenship remain key areas of contention, domestically in Moldovan politics and internationally vis-à-vis Romania, also implicating international actors such as the ECHR.

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⁴³The idea of “our language” has also been a popular way of addressing the dispute over whether, in Moldova, they speak Romanian or Moldovan (Ciscel 2008).

⁴⁴This right functions asymmetrically, where Moldovans have the right to acquire Romanian citizenship, whereas Romanians are not granted the same rights in Moldova.

⁴⁵By this stage, it had been revoked voluntarily by an interim government, led by Mihai Ghimpu (PL leader, Chirtoacă’s uncle) after the removal of PCRM in 2009.
Part 2 - Institutional Background

This section examines kin-states’ contemporary institutional approaches towards their kin abroad. It argues that Romania showed a greater willingness to offer more to “Romanians” in Moldova, than Russia offers its “Compatriots” (*sootechestvenniki*) in Crimea. Understanding how these policies differ is crucial for situating the bottom-up analysis (Chapters 4-7). This institutional analysis demonstrates the politicisation and volatility of kin-state policies, where those leading these institutions are political appointments subject to political volatility, leading to their frequent replacement, depending on personal preferences of politicians.

3.3 Institutional Background: Russia’s Kin-State Policies in Crimea

Russia has a two-fold approach to those it considers kin: to those Russia consider stateless, such as residents of de facto states (e.g. South Ossetia and Transnistria), Russia offers citizenship; to all other non-stateless kin, it offers rights and benefits under the Compatriot policy. This section analyses the Compatriot policy, as a quasi-citizenship policy, which formalises and legitimises relations between Russia and those Russia claim as “Compatriots” (*sootechestvenniki*).
3.3.1 The Compatriot Concept

Elsewhere the Compatriot policy has been described as a citizenship policy (G. Smith 1999a; Grigas 2012); however this is incorrect because the Compatriot policy does not facilitate citizenship rights. Rather it offers some favourable rights and benefits which reach out to Compatriots without granting them equal legal status or rights (e.g. enfranchisement) as Russian citizens which this thesis conceptualises as an example of “quasi-citizenship”.

Compatriot support was initiated (under President Yeltsin, 1994) by Russia’s government, and a Duma Committee to foster “relations with Compatriots” (Shevel 2011a:87). The Duma Committee was led by Konstantin Zatulin, a prominent figure in Compatriot relations across the CIS, but controversial in Ukraine where he was subject to a travel ban during Yushchenko’s presidency because of his threats to Ukrainian territorial integrity (Kuzio 2010). The first legislation relating to Compatriots was passed in 1999, with several updates since, modifying though not simplifying the concept and policies provided for Compatriots, described below. Since 2002, under Putin’s tutelage, Russia has engaged more with Compatriots, increasing the number of policies and organisations set up to engage with Compatriots across states with Russian populations, such as Russkii Vek (Russian Century) established in 2006 by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to disseminate information about the Compatriot policy.

The Compatriot policy formalises and legitimises relations with communities abroad, including ethnic Russian communities and, more broadly, speakers of Russian language and those engaged with Russian culture abroad, particularly in post-Soviet space (Russkii Mir 2012). This demonstrates Russia’s inclusive diaspora approach, to incorporate “russkie” (ethnic Russian) populations beyond Russia’s borders, who are not citizens (grazhdane) of post-Soviet Russia, and the even larger Russian-speaking population (rosskoiazychnye) who do not necessarily conceive of themselves as russkie (Melvin 1995; Kolstø 1996).

The Compatriot concept reflects this non-ethnic inclusivity, conceiving of Compatriots as those with a “common language, history, cultural heritage, traditions and customs” and those who have made a free choice in “favour of the spiritual, cultural and legal ties with the Russian Federation” (Article 1, Russian MFA 2010; see also President of Russia 2001). This is a “very loose” conceptualisation of Compatriots comprising an “amorphous conglomerate” of former Soviet citizens, and their descendants, who speak Russian and retain “some emotional links to Russia” (Kosmarskaya 2011:60). Kudors (2010) argues Russia deliberately chose this combination of subjective criteria, of identification with Russia (i.e. not only russkie) and objective criteria via evidence of a “practical connection” with Russia by participating in local Compatriot organisations (such as Russian Community of Crimea, ROC).

Shevel (2009a, 2011b) argues this vagueness is fundamental to the Compatriot policy. Firstly, Russia retains flexibility to modify who qualifies as Compatriots, to suit shifting political dynamics over time. Secondly it solves Russia’s “nation-building dilemma” by leaving it to “spiritual self-identification” rather than a clear legal definition (Shevel 2009a:4, 2011b:179). This debate has remained contentious between the different factions of Russian politics: the pragmatic style of politicians like Yeltsin and the more ideological style of the Communist and nationalist elements promoting the idea of “Russia for Russians”, in ethnic terms (Shevel 2009a). These nationalist and Communist factions, including Zatulin is now the director and founder of the Institute of CIS Countries (Institut Stran SNG).
figures such as Zatulin, have been the greatest proponents of engagement with Compatriots, as an almost “natural foreign policy priority” (Solchanyk 1994; Shevel 2011a:87). Adopting this non-ethnic approach, creates a mirage of praising patriotism, “as love for motherland (rodina), devotion to fatherland (otechestvo)” while pathologising nationalism (Daucé et al. 2015).

3.3.2 The Compatriot Policy

Broadly the Compatriot policy has “three pillars”:

1. to consolidate Compatriots as a community,
2. to preserve Russian territorial and ethno-cultural space, and
3. to strengthen ties with the historical homeland (Chepurin 2009b).

This relates to a comprehensive policy where Russia tries to protect Compatriots’ “educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms” in particular in post-Soviet space (President of Russia 2008).

Culture, language and history are important elements guiding the Compatriot policy’s emphasis on protecting the “rights and legitimate interests” of Compatriots abroad (President of Russia 2008; Russian MFA 2012). For example, Russia declares its right to preserve its interpretation of history against “neofascism” and “attempts to rewrite history” (President of Russia 2008; Russian MFA 2012), focusing on preserving the legacy of Soviet interpretations of the Great Patriot War (WWII). Here the Compatriot Policy is entwined with Russia’s foreign policy goals to ensure the “comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and Compatriots abroad” (President of Russia 2008; Russian MFA 2012), and in wider debates concerning Russia’s role in protecting the Soviet legacy and memory of WWII.

The Compatriot policy allows Russia to circumnavigate dual citizenship restrictions and service its own labour demands. Many post-Soviet states, particularly Ukraine, legislated against dual citizenship to reinforce their newly established independence and sought to restrict Russia’s ability to influence society via its citizenry (Zevelev 2008; Barrington 1995). However, if Russian citizenship has the potential to be a “very strong instrument” of Russian foreign policy, by contrast, Zevelev (2008:52) argues that the Compatriot law is weaker.

The Compatriot policy also helps to ease Russia’s demographic crisis, with estimates that Russia’s economically active population may decline by one million by 2017 (Cook 2012). Facilitating Compatriot migration allows Russia to encourage migration among communities which have spiritual connections with Russia and speak Russian, rather than those Muslim migrants from North Caucasus and within Russia against whom popular antipathy, and even violence, has grown (Arnold 2014). From a political perspective, the Compatriot policy channels Russian speaking immigrants to Russia, also solving concerns that immigrants lacked sufficient a knowledge of, and affiliation with, Russian language and culture (President of Russia 2012).

The next sections examine the specifics of the Compatriot policy, analysing the two levels at which it operates: the Russian Federation, and the Moscow government, which has been, after the Russian Federal level, a secondary force engaging with Compatriots in the CIS.
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA’S KIN-STATE POLICIES IN CRIMEA

3.3.3 Russian Federal Policies

The goals of the Compatriot policy are reflected in its implementation, via its cultural, educational and resettlement policies. Its resettlement programme, The State Program for Assistance to the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad, is the focus of the Compatriot policy, facilitating Compatriot migration to their “historic homeland” (Putin, cited by Federal Migration Service 2012). However Kosmarskaya (2011:65) criticises Compatriot resettlement as focusing on solving Russia’s self-interested demographic concerns, “explicitly to lure ‘Compatriots’ into depressed and depopulated regions of Russia”, without offering much to “compensate for all the disadvantages of such a venture” (see also Byford 2012; Jarzyńska 2012). Zatulin (2010) is equally sceptical, believing the only benefit is the eventual possibility of acquiring Russian citizenship. He drafted a law to simplify citizenship acquisition for Compatriots. However this was rejected by the Duma in 2012 (Salenko 2012).

Educationally, Russia provides scholarships for “citizens of the near abroad and Compatriots” in Russia via quotas allocating a number of stipend places (Figure 3.8). Though Crimea has a separate provision from Ukraine,⁴⁷ the number allocated for Compatriots in Crimea is the smallest provision (Ministry of Education and Science for Foreign Citizens 2010). At the non-state level, several Russian

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⁴⁷As do de facto states: Transnistria (from Moldova) and, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (from Georgia)
3.3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: RUSSIA’S KIN-STATE POLICIES IN CRIMEA

Figure 3.9: The Hierarchy of Compatriot Councils

universities have opened branches across the CIS, of which several are based in Crimea and Sevastopol, including Moscow State University in Sevastopol (Chepurin 2009a). However the number of Compatriot scholarships indicates that Russia did not consider, educationally, the region to be a priority, compared to Central Asia states (e.g. Tajikistan) and de facto states. Culturally, the “Russian Language” Federal Target Program (2006-2010, 2011-2015) aims to protect and promote Russian language and culture abroad, including the right to speak Russian abroad, and to “meet the linguistic and cultural needs of Compatriots” abroad (Rossotrudnichestvo 2011a).

3.3.4 Russian Compatriot Organisations

The Compatriot policy is evident at a number of levels of government, via the Russian MFA, and in terms of civil society actors, such as Russkiy Mir, a governmentally-organised NGO (GONGO). At the local level, Russia maintains a network of Compatriot organisations (Figure 3.9), such as ROC in Crimea, to link Russia with local organisations in post-Soviet space, “to ensure more efficient protection” in terms of preserving their “ethnic and cultural identity” and “links with its historic motherland” (President of Russia 2008).

Russia’s MFA plays the governmental biggest role in engaging with Compatriots via the Department for Work with Compatriots Abroad, headed by Aleksandr Chepurin (until 2012). This established The World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots (2006) to coordinate local Compatriot organisations (e.g. ROC in Crimea) and meet periodically, facilitating their contact with the “agencies of executive power in Russia, as well as Russian and foreign NGOs” (Chepurin 2009b).

Subordinate to Russian MFA, and established by presidential decree (2008), Rossotrudnichestvo, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation, coordinates activities through embassies and consulates abroad,
opening cultural and research centres outside Russia, such as providing Russian language training and materials (Rossotrudnichestvo 2011a). *Rossotrudnichestvo* aims to encourage “international humanitarian cooperation” and work with Compatriots to strengthen ties through local organisations and cooperation (cultural, scientific and business) (Rossotrudnichestvo 2011b). Overseeing these activities is the Governmental Commission on Compatriots Abroad chaired by Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister (as of 2006).

In terms of civil society, *Russkii Mir* (RM) is a governmentally-organised NGO (GONGO). RM appears to function as an NGO but has strong ties to the Russian administration (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012), established by presidential decree in 2007, as a joint mission between Russia’s MFA and Ministry of Education and Science, funded by both private and public sources (Russkii Mir 2012). RM’s goals are “to promote understanding and peace in the world by supporting, enhancing and encouraging the appreciation of Russian language, heritage and culture” and to reconnect the “Russian community abroad with their homeland, forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges and assistance” (Russkii Mir 2012). RM represents the institutionalisation of an already existing concept of *Russkii Mir* in post-Soviet space, of a supra-ethnic Orthodox civilizational understanding of Russia and a “virtual Russian supra-state” populated with Compatriots rather than citizens (Conley and Gerber 2011:12; Wawrzonek 2014). The Russian Orthodox Church takes an active role in both the Compatriot policy and *Russkii Mir* (organisation), as “an important resource” for “strengthening the spiritual unity of Compatriots” (Russkii Vek 2012), with *Russkii Mir* working to consolidate the Compatriot community abroad and the church as the “central promoter” of *Russkii Mir* (organisation) (Conley and Gerber 2011; Kudors 2010; Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012).

These organisations, formed in the last ten years, demonstrate Russia’s official expansion of Compatriot engagement and the amalgamation of popular discourse (e.g. *Russkii Mir*), with new policies and organisations. Saari (2014:footnote 12) argues the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was the point at which the Compatriot conference became “a regular and large-scale event organised once every three years”, indicating the importance of changes within post-Soviet states, in particular those with large populations of ethnic Russians, which encouraged Russia to take a more active stance towards Compatriots.

### 3.3.5 The Role of Moscow

Moscow’s city government has been active in the Compatriot policy, via a Moscow Compatriot council (2002). This brings together Compatriot organisations, and an action plan (2012) to implement the state policy towards Compatriots administered by the Department of External Economic and International Relations of Moscow city (Moscow House of Compatriots 2012). Similar to the federal level, Moscow’s government uses the Compatriot policy to promote Russian language, culture, history and links with Russian diaspora.

The involvement of Moscow’s government is interesting, and can be explained by the populism and nationalism of Moscow’s former Mayor, Yurii Luzhkov (1992–2010), who has been vocal in Russia’s claims to Crimea and Sevastopol and is linked to federal level actors such as Zatulin (Plokhy 2008; Zevelev 2001). Luzhkov, who vied with Putin to be Yeltsin’s successor (1999), was instrumental
in establishing organisations in Simferopol (Russian Cultural Centre, RCC) and Sevastopol (Moscow House). These Moscow-level Compatriot structures and organisations have remained in place since Luzhkov resigned (2010), however the funding of these projects remains uncertain.

3.3.6 The Compatriot Policy in Ukraine and Crimea

In Ukraine and Crimea there are both local Compatriot organisations, established by internal actors, and local agencies of Federal and Moscow-level organisations (Figure 3.9).

Local Organisations

Local Compatriot councils in Ukraine and Crimea elect members to attend councils in Russia and Moscow. These councils coordinate pro-Russian groups, classified by the policy as Compatriot organisations. These organisations are spread across all Ukrainian regions and within Crimea include the ROC and the pro-Russian party, RE, which are analysed directly in this thesis.

ROC, led by Sergei Tsekov, was founded by the failed separatist organisation, the Republican Party of Crimea, in 1993 (Sasse 2007). RE was founded (2009) by ROC and “Citizen activists of Crimea” (Grazhdanskii aktiv Kryma) (Russkoe Edinstvo 2013). Since 2010 RE was led by Sergei Aksenov, who was also ROC’s first deputy chairman (and in 2014 was a key actor in Crimea’s annexation). RE won 4%/3 seats in Crimea’s 2010 local elections, compared to PoR and KPU, who were more successful in Crimea (Figure 3.4).

Russian Federal Organisations

Russian Consuls were based in both Simferopol and Sevastopol. Rossotrudnichestvo (as the cultural wing of the Russian MFA’s local agencies) opened in 2011 in the building that had been RCC (which moved to the building behind). Rossotrudnichestvo held regular events, such as information sessions about applying to Russian universities, and cultural events.⁴⁸ Also in 2011, a Russkii Mir Centre, affiliated to the Russkii Mir organisation, of which there are over 100 globally (Russkii Mir 2015), opened in Simferopol’s city library, as a reading hall (including the library’s only WiFi access) and centre for Russian literature and culture.

Moscow organisations

Moscow funded organisations, such as RCC (Roslycky 2011), but concentrated its efforts in Sevastopol. For example, the Department of External Economic and International Relations of Moscow city opened the Moscow House (2006), to help cooperation between Moscow and Sevastopol, support local Compatriots and cultural and educational activities, and promote Moscow economically in Sevastopol (Moscow House 2012).

There is also a branch of the Moscow State University (officially Filial Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni M. V. Lomonsova v Sevastopole, MGU) in Sevastopol affiliated with the Black Sea Fleet.

⁴⁸Following annexation, the Rossotrudnichestvo office in Simferopol closed on 1 August 2014.
This was an initiative of Luzkhov in 1999 and opened in 2008 on the redeveloped site of the Lazarevskaja Russian Naval Barracks in Sevastopol. Since then, MGU have opened other branches in Astana (Kazakhstan), Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and Baku (Azerbaijan), but Sevastopol remains the largest (see Filial MGU imeni M.V.Lomonsova 2014).

3.3.7 Russian Citizenship and “Passportization”

Despite the emphasis on quasi-citizenship forms of engagement, and legal restrictions within Ukraine, it is important to address how Crimea is more often framed as a case of passportization, i.e. of Russian-Ukrainian dual citizens. While Russia has denied passportization policies in Crimea (Ria Novosti 2008), academics and journalists have argued that Russia is pursuing the same tactics in Crimea as in the de facto states of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. For example, Neue Zürcher Zeitung claimed in 2009 that Russia had “generously distributed in Crimea passports to Ukrainian citizens” (Gujer 2009). Similarly, in 2008, the New York Times reported that Ukraine’s MFA had claimed that “in Crimea a general Russian passportization is gaining ground”.

However it is problematic to frame Crimea as a case of passportization because 1) of low reported figures and 2) a lack of verified sourcing for these figures. The most commonly cited evidence comes from Kuzio (2008), who cites a range from 6,000 to 100,000 of Crimean residents holding Russian citizenship. Relatively speaking, this range equates to 0.25-4% of Crimean residents (Kuzio 2008a; Hedenskog 2008:35, Grigas 2016), demonstrating that acquisition was not as prevalent as the frame of passportization might suggest.

In terms of the verifiability of these figures, most sources, such as Hedenskog (2008), cite Kuzio (2008) who uses two sources for these figures, from Newsweek and the Los Angeles Times (both from 2008), which were allegedly citing sources from Ukrainian Security Services. However, searching the online archives for both of these publications, no reference can be found of these figures. In the case of Newsweek, no edition was published on that cited by Kuzio (23 August) while no reference to Crimea was cited by the Los Angeles Times on the day or month cited by Kuzio.

The only alternative to Kuzio’s figures, is the “trusted source” cited by Hedenskog (2008:35) who reports that 40,000 in Crimea held Russian passports, of whom the majority were pensioners residing in Sevastopol. Sevastopol is the sight of the BSF Russian military base, and for this reason empirically situated outside the scope of this thesis, and of Russian nationalism, associated with its military glory. This demonstrates an important nuance to passportization that has rarely been flagged up, where it may not be a process for regular Crimean civilians, but rather for military men and their families, in particular retired former soldiers (Prytula 2008).

Overall, therefore, an uncertain picture emerges concerning the presence of Russian citizens/passport-holders in Crimea, and thus concerning whether Crimea is a case of passportization. Such a picture reinforces the value of circumventing the politics of numbers to instead focus on the agents of Russia’s citizenship and quasi-citizenship policies, and to shift attention towards understanding these policies more deeply in terms of the motivations and experiences of agents engaging with these practices.
3.3.8 Perspectives on Russia’s Policies

In analysing Russia’s Compatriot policy (before 2014) there is a rift between critics, who argue it promotes Russia’s soft, and even hard, power interests, and those who downplay the strength of Russia’s approach. On the side of those downplaying Russia’s approach, scholars argue for the Compatriot policy’s “passivity”, with Russia more concerned about “advancing Russian state interests (military and economic) rather than on protecting the rights of co-ethnics in the ‘near abroad’” (Rutland 2010:131-32). Similarly, Zevelev (2008:49, 54) argues that while the policy offers a “tough rhetoric”, in practice it is a “very modest and moderate in content” policy.

On the other critical side, others pathologise the “soft power” potential of Russia’s Compatriot approach (Nozhenko 2006; Conley and Gerber 2011). They argue Russia is increasing its claims on Compatriots, culturally, and via “financial and organizational support”, creating “Kremlin-friendly networks of influence” in post-Soviet space to entrench “loyal interests groups […] through financing and valuable connections and contracts” (Grigas 2012:9). Conley and Gerber (2011:12) argue Russia has pursued “soft propaganda”, using the Compatriot policy to instill a Russian interpretation of history and politics. Russian policy reflects this view, where politicians like Lavrov and Russia’s foreign policy documents discuss Russia’s new soft power approach designed at influencing Compatriots according to Russia’s values (Shestakov 2008; Russian MFA 2007). This interpretation argues that Russia has realised that Compatriots are useful for Russia’s needs as a “potential supporting force for Russia’s foreign policy and as a tool for raising the status of the Russian language and culture” (Kivirähk et al. 2010:22).

Nye (1990:166) conceptualised soft power, as a “co-optive” kind of power, as opposed to “command power ordering others to do what it wants”. He distinguished too this kind of power, of “getting others to what you want” through “cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions” (Nye 1990:167) but, crucially, not from “coercion or payments” (Nye 2004:x). Russia, therefore, used this co-optive power for “political legitimacy, economic interdependence, and cultural values” and to engage with “people and societies, rather than governments and elites” (Tsygankov 2006:1081). However these patronage and clientelistic framings of the Compatriot policy exceed Nye’s concept of soft power, and suggest that Russia is acting harder, or at least more coercively than soft power. For example, Russia uses the Compatriot policy not only for humanitarian but also geopolitical ends, as a “tactical means for expanding Russian influence” (Kivirähk et al. 2010:321). Secondly Russia’s policy may also meddling in Compatriots’ loyalty by launching a “fierce competition for people’s hearts and minds”, by promoting loyalty to Russia (Kudors 2010:4; Byford 2012).

Reconciling these perspectives, the Compatriot policy appears paradoxical: weakened by the ambiguity of who Russia considers a Compatriot (Kosmarskaya 2011; Shevel 2009a, 2011b), while strengthened by the potential for Russia’s coercion of Compatriot organisations, and funding of local parties, such as the Centre Party in Estonia (Conley and Gerber 2011). This research steers away from this passive-malign dichotomy or at least challenges these conceptions, arguing that too much focus has been on the policies at a discursive or institutional level.

By contrast, there has been little analysis of how Compatriot policies actually work on the ground, analysing whether individuals engage and identify with the Compatriot policy. If the Compatriot
policy tries to wield soft power, to engage “people and societies, rather than governments and elites” (Tsygankov 2006:1081), then it is important to consider the agency of these people. Lastly, as a case study approach, this thesis is concerned with a bottom-up analysis of Compatriot practices in Crimea. Crimea received neither the bulk of Compatriot support nor special attention from Russia (e.g. in terms of citizenship or scholarship access) and yet became the only case of territorial annexation by Russia in the post-Soviet period.

3.4 Institutional Background: Romanian Kin-state Policies in Moldova

Romania engages with “Romanians abroad”, including both diaspora migrants (e.g. in Italy, Spain) and kin communities (e.g. in Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine),⁴⁹ which are the focus of this section. As with Russia, Romania’s engagement with Romanians abroad are part of Romania’s foreign policy strategy, to “preserve, promote and develop the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious identity of Romanians from neighbouring states […] and strengthening ties between Romania and Romanian communities abroad” (Department for Romanians Abroad 2013). For Romania, Moldova’s population is the largest community of Romanians abroad (Figure 3.10). The former territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina, where Moldova is the modern day successor of Bessarabia, also have a special status which incites guilt for Romania as “sacred land” that was seceded to the USSR without a single bullet (Milevschi 2012:162; C. King 1994).

This section examines Romania’s policies of engagement with its kin communities, in particular in Moldova, where this section argues the bulk of Romania’s support is dedicated, in contrast to Russia’s low support of Crimea. This section focuses on these cultural and linguistic aspects of support, as well as Romania’s most significant form of engagement: the right to “reacquire” (redobândire) citizenship for those who can prove descent from citizens of interwar Greater Romania (i.e. Moldova and the Bukovina region of Ukraine). It considers also the bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova, where Moldova receives significant aid and support. By contrast, fewer Serbian citizens have acquired Romanian citizenship (56, 2006-2009, Eurostat 1998-2012), and in terms of aid, Serbia has received no more than half of what Moldova has received (Romanian MFA 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a).

3.4.1 Restitution of Romanian Citizenship

Since the end of Communism, Romania’s citizenship legislation (1991) permitted both dual citizenship (previously forbidden) and the reacquisition (redobândire) of citizenship. Romania facilitated redobândire for individuals, and their relatives (now up to third generation), who had lost Romanian citizenship unwillingly as a result of the territorial transferal of North Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940 (Article 11, Official Gazette of Romania; Iordachi 2010). This is neither citizenship acquisition nor naturalisation but rather a process of reacquisition (redobândire).⁵⁰ Applicants gain analogous rights as Romanian citizens residing in Romania but are required neither to have ever resided, nor presently reside, in Romania (whereas naturalisation requires 4 years residence).

⁴⁹In Ukraine, of which 2,564,849 are Moldovan.
⁵⁰Where dobândire is “to acquire” and thus redobândire is “to reacquire”.

78
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Figure 3.10: Size of Romanian Communities Abroad (According to Romania)


Romania emphasises redobândire as a territorial, rather than an ethnic, right because application requires proof that the individual or their relative, up to great-grandparent, held Romanian citizenship, rather than proof of ethnicity or Romanian linguistic proficiency. However, scholars argue Romania is advancing, implicitly, an ethnicised policy of citizenship restitution, and a post-territorial nation-building project, to “recreate the citizenry of Greater Romania” (Dumbrava 2014a:2348; Iordachi 2009; Waterbury 2014; see also Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011).

Politically, certain EU actors and neighbouring states expressed concern about Romania’s redobândire policy vis-à-vis Moldova. In Moldova, as in Hungary, Vladimir Voronin (PCRM), as Moldova’s president (2001-2009), argued that Romania threatened Moldova’s sovereignty (Iordachi 2002; Chirila 2010:37). Several EU agencies, preceding Romania’s EU accession, were concerned redobândire would promote immigration from Moldova to the EU post-accession; however the European Commission maintained that citizenship rights were an “internal matter for Romania” (Iordachi 2010:14; Dumbrava 2013). During Romania’s pre-accession period (2001-2009), redobândire was intermittently suspended (2001-2007) and the conditions toughened, to encourage applicants to naturalise instead, as a more legitimate form of citizenship acquisition in the eyes of foreign observers. Following
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Figure 3.11: Romanian Aid Allocation (2007-2013)


Figure 3.12: Acquisition of Romanian Citizenship

Source: Eurostat (1998-2012)
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Table 3.2: Number of Applications Registered and Processed for Reacquisition of Romanian Citizenship (2002-15 August 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applications Registered</th>
<th>Applications Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3,126</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16,975</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,883</td>
<td>4,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21,759</td>
<td>21,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94,391</td>
<td>41,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (until August 15)</td>
<td>51,449</td>
<td>47,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>205,372</strong></td>
<td><strong>118,507</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANC, from Iordachi 2012:361

Romania’s EU accession (2007), the block on redobândire was removed by accelerating the processing of applications, and extending the eligibility for redobândire from first to second, and eventually third, generation descendants (Iordachi 2010:10). Redobândire remains an area of contention with other EU member-states, and may explain the delay for Romania’s accession to Schengen given concern over the security of Romania’s border (see comments by France’s EU minister, Pierre Lellouche, cited by Pop 2010). These concerns are not eased by evidence of fraud, including the conviction of workers from Romania’s National Citizenship Authority (ANC) (Dumbrava 2014b).

While redobândire appears popular in Moldova, there is a lack of certainty transparency concerning the aggregate number reacquiring Romanian citizenship. Sometimes the figures are deliberately inflated, with Băsescu claiming in 2007 that 800,000 applications for Romanian citizenship had already been filed by Moldovans, with this figure expected to rise to 1.5 million by the end of 2007 (Chirila 2007:35). By contrast, EU statistics indicate that 11,993 Moldovans acquired Romanian citizenship 1998-2009. However Romania has not submitted its statistics to Eurostat since 2009 (Eurostat 1998-2012).\(^5^\)

Civil society reports indicate higher numbers, such as Soros Romania which reported 226,507 cases were “solved” 1991-2011 (Pantea and Nedelciuc 2012). However, as Iordachi (2012:361) discusses, these “official statistics”, i.e. the 226,507 figure, “do not indicate whether these requests were accepted or rejected (although it is likely that most of them were accepted)“. Thus, the data contained in Table 3.2, indicates how many were registered and processed but not how many were successful, even if according to Iordachi, we can assume most of those processed were successful.

Personal correspondence with Romania’s ANC revealed the agency does not collect citizenship acquisition data by country of origin, even though Romania is required by Eurostat to do so (Table 3.3). They also indicate far fewer applications were successful than the number of applications solved that can be inferred from civil society sources, such as Cetatenie.ro, which gathers data from official online sources from ANC’s “ordin” (decrees) which release records to the internet on applications for Romanian citizenship that have been solved, again without indicating if they were successful or not (Figure 3.14).

\(^5\) Other member-states have already submitted 2012 data (as of March 2015).
Table 3.3: Data on Romanian citizenship certificates issued by the National Citizenship Authority for Article 11 (2010-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Acquiring Romanian citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal correspondence with ANC (2014, 2015)

Thus, there remain significant discrepancies between official and unofficial sources of data, and an willingness of official agencies to provide data that both reliably reflects Romanian citizenship reacquisition, where this data is vastly different to that suggested by civil society sources (e.g. Soros Romania, Cetatenie.Ro). In this environment, it is necessary to consider the data available within the caveat that this represents a potentially unreliable estimate of Romanian citizenship (re)acquisition and does not cover much of the period in which a significant jump in Romanian citizenship (re)acquisition would be expected: after Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007.

Still, the available Eurostat data (1998-2009) does show a significant proportion of those Eurostat figures show the majority acquiring Romanian citizenship (70%) were Moldovans. Moreover, the bulk of these, both for Moldovans and for those acquiring Romanian citizenship in general, were acquired 2008-2009. Outside Moldova, few individuals from other kin communities have received Romanian citizenship (e.g. Ukraine, Hungary, Serbia) whose acquisition is on par with non kin communities (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Figure 3.12). Moldovans, therefore, are predominantly reacquiring citizenship as Romanians abroad, as the majority of others acquiring citizenship are from migrant or refugee naturalisation. Romania is also the main state from which Moldovans are acquiring/reacquiring citizenship, followed by Bulgaria (2002-2008), Portugal (after 2008), Germany and Italy (Figure 3.13). However, in the absence of accurate and consistent data, it is difficult to conclude much regarding the impact of Romanian citizenship in Moldova vis-a-vis acquisition of citizenship from other states.

Voting Rights

Redobândire grants voting rights in Romanian Presidential, Parliamentary, EU elections and referenda regardless of residence. Romania is also among a growing number of states that facilitates external voting (about 100 do, see Kasapović 2012) and institutionalises these votes into external constituencies (since 2008), with four external deputy (lower chamber) constituencies and two senate (upper chamber) constituencies split by geographic areas.

External voting practices have been advanced in several ways in Moldova. Since 2010, Romanian politicians, on both the left and right, have opened local political party offices in Chișinău, both for politicians representing external constituencies (e.g. Senator Viorel Badea, P-DL) and as campaign outreach offices (e.g. Eugen Tomac P-DL, Victor Alexeev PSD, Figure 3.16). While the number partic-
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Figure 3.13: Acquisition of citizenship by Moldovans in EU/EEA States (1991-2012)

Source: Eurostat (1998-2012), where PT = Portugal, IT = Italy, IE = Ireland, DE = Germany, BG = Bulgaria, EL = Greece, FR = France, BE = Belgium, ES = Spain, RO = Romania

Figure 3.14: Number of Applications Solved (Article 11, 2005-2014)

Source: Cetatenie.Ro 2014
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Participating remains small, the number eligible to vote and participating, in particular in Romanian Presidential elections, is expanding (Figure 3.15). Moldovan voters in Romanian elections have favoured Băsescu (91%) against his PSD rival, Geoana, in 2009 presidential elections, and his affiliates, such as Eugen Tomac, who won 82% of vote of those participating in Moldova in Romania’s 2012 parliamentary elections (Biroul Electoral Central 2012b). However these 2012 elections showed a more stark effect also, where 94% of those voting in Tomac’s constituency (“Eastern Europe and Asia”) participated from Moldova, demonstrating the relative power of voters in Moldova within this constituency. This is helped via the fielding of local/Bessarabian candidates in this external constituency: Tomac who reacquired Romanian citizenship, as a native citizen of Ukraine born in the Bessarabian part of Ukraine (that was part of interwar Greater Romania) and his opponent Victor Alexeev (PSD), who was born and resides in Chişinău.

3.4.2 Romania’s Kin-State Organisations in Moldova

Diplomatically, the Romanian embassy in Chişinău is the largest Romanian embassy after Romania’s Representation to the EU (Ghinea et al. 2010). Romania also opened consulates in Moldova’s regional centres in 2010 (Bălţi, Cahul) to process citizenship and visa applications, alongside regional citizenship offices across Romania which also take applications (in Iaşi, Timişoara, Galaţi, Suceava and Cluj).

Culturally, Romania interacts with its diaspora through the Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad (Departamental politici pentru relaţia cu românii de pretutindeni, DPRRP), established first as the Council for the Problems of Romanians abroad (Consiliul pentru Problemele Românilor de Pretutindeni, 1995) before becoming a government department (2001). In Moldova, DPRRP supports Romanian language mass-media, such as Radio Chişinău (2011), cultural projects and support to the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, by funding salaries and building two churches (Ghinea et al. 2010; Costin 2011, DPRRP documents).

DPRRP has been erratic during the period of study (2011-2015), changing its name (DRP, DPRP) and leadership several times (see also Hein 2014:96-98). DPRRP has also been embroiled in Romania’s political rifts, during the cohabitation of Băsescu’s (P-DL) presidency and PSD government, led by parliamentary majority and Victor Ponta (PSD) as Prime Minister. It has been rocked with institutional conflicts and crises (see Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013), as demonstrated by the removal of Băsescu’s allies (e.g. Tomac) from within the department, and replacement with PSD affiliates (Natalia Intotero, May 2012), since Romania’s MFA was controlled by PSD via the Prime Minister.

Similar to Russkii Mir, the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR) is both a civil society actor and, as a GONGO, has a formal relationship with the Romanian state. ICR has 16 centres in Europe, the US and Israel, including in Chişinău, which was established only after PCRM left office, having faced difficulties in registering previously (personal interview, Petre Guran 2012). Chişinău’s ICR supports cultural projects, promoting Romanian language and culture, including several local publications, modest support for scholarships and fellowships, through their work with Moldova’s State University in Chişinău, and support for media. As Guran explained, ICR’s work in Moldova is different from ICR’s work elsewhere, where Romanian culture is both more prevalent and controversial in Moldova (2012 interview). ICR has also been embroiled in political infighting between different factions of the Romanian state,
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Figure 3.15: Number Eligible Versus Number Participating in Moldova in Romanian Elections (2009-2014)

Source: Biroul Electoral Central 2009, 2012b, 2014

Figure 3.16: Eugen Tomac Campaign Sticker – “Bessarabia, Citizenship is Your Right!”

Source: Author’s own, 2013
transferred from the presidential domain (until 2012) to the Senate, a move feared by ICR as signalling a more interventionist direction from the Romanian government in ICR’s activities and leadership. For example, Petre Guran stood down shortly after I interviewed him in 2012.

Local Organisations

Moldova at a local level does not exhibit the same local kin-state agents present in Crimea (e.g. Com-patriot councils, ROC, RE). In terms of civil society organisations, Moldova’s Writers’ Union continues to promote (largely) Romanian language, literature and culture, and has a political arm, via both its previous connection to PF and the contemporary Democrat Forum of Romanians in Moldova (Forumul Democrat al Românilor din Republica Moldova). However the Writers’ Union is not engaged with Romanian state actors, such as DPRRP (personal correspondence with Writers’ Union, March 2015). Other active organisations remain marginal, such as Basarabia Pământ Românesc (Bessarabia is Romanian Land) and small organisations affiliated via the Council of Unification (Consiliului Unirii). This includes the politically marginal Partidul National Liberal (PNL), as an extra-parliamentary party, led by Vitalia Pavlicenco whose central political aim is unification, and perhaps Partidul Liberal (PL) as a parliamentary, though minority party.

3.4.3 State-Level Policies

Scholarships

Romania has provided scholarships to Moldovan students for places in Romanian universities since 2002-2003, which have increased recently. There are currently 14,000 students from Moldova studying in Romania, a significant proportion (≈13%) in comparison to Moldovan universities’ annual intake. Those studying in Romania receive full or partial scholarships from Romania (Figure 3.17). Partial scholarships cover fees only, while full scholarships offer €65/month for undergraduates and school pupils though this figure is not enough to live on in Romania (Ghinea et al. 2010). While Romania’s policy may have “real, material effects” for Moldovan citizens who study in Romania (Ghinea et al. 2010), Romania claims greater provision (5-6,000 per year), and growth, than it provides. For example, additional scholarship places were provided in 2011, by creating links between Romanian (Galați, Iași) and Moldovan universities (Cahul, Bălți) and sponsoring places at these Moldovan universities, rather than creating places within Romanian universities. Additionally, there is concern that Romania, even if acting with “good intentions”, is facilitating the exit of Moldovan students, with reports that only 44% return to Moldova after studying in Romania (Silaghi 2012). Still Romania’s scholarship provision remains significant for Moldovan students, in comparison to Romania’s provision elsewhere and in comparison to Russia’s provision, generally and specifically vis-à-vis Crimea, and in Moldova too (300 per year, Figure 3.8).

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Incidentally, PNL in Moldova has no connections to the more significant PNL in Romania, as the party of Romania’s current President Klaus Iohannis (2014-present).

Incidentally, PNL in Moldova has no connections to the more significant PNL in Romania, as the party of Romania’s current President Klaus Iohannis (2014-present).

Calculated based on intake figures provided by Moldova’s Ministry of Education (2010/11).
3.4. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ROMANIAN KIN-STATE POLICIES IN MOLDOVA

Figure 3.17: Romania’s Educational Provision (With and Without Bursaries)


Bilateral Political Relations

Romania outlines its two goals towards Moldova (Romanian MFA 2011a):

1. To affirm their “special” relations stemming from their “common language, history, culture, traditions” as “realities that cannot be circumvented or denied”,

2. The “European dimension” of their relations where Moldova’s EU integration is Romania’s “strategic objective”

Relations between Romania and Moldova have varied in intensity depending on the political inclinations of Moldova’s government. With PCRM in power in Moldova (2001-2009), inter-state cooperation stalled and relations deteriorated (Milevschi 2012; Chirila 2010). Since 2009, with AIE as Moldova’s government, Romania’s relations with Moldova experienced their “most fruitful and dynamic period” (Romanian MFA 2012), evidenced by regular meetings between the leaders and ministries of both states and the signing of strategic documents (2010, 2012) including the role of Romania in Moldova’s Europeanization.

This period has also seen two major progressions in Romanian-Moldovan relations: small border traffic and the Iași-Ungheni gas pipeline. The small border traffic agreement, facilitated visa-free travel for Moldovans living 50km from the Romanian border, and signified the “re-establishment of ties” between these states (Marcu 2011:123). The 43km gas pipeline between Iași (Romania) and Ungheni (Moldova) was devised to diversify Moldova’s gas supply, to “neutralise Russia’s energy levers” and Gazprom’s stranglehold on Moldova’s energy security (Secreri 2014; Calus 2013). Initiated by Romanian-Moldovan cooperation, it received EU funding also (€7 million, ≈25%, European Commission 2014a). However, currently, the pipeline can only supply one third of Moldova’s consumption, and only to Moldova’s borderland (Ungheni and Nisporeni) without a compressor station.
in Iasi (≈€20 million) to allow the pipeline to meet Moldova’s consumption, which would require an additional 120km pipeline to Chişinău (≈€170 million, Secieru 2014; Calus 2013). While this policy is significant in providing Moldova some alternative source of gas, it is constrained by the need to build further infrastructure to alter Moldova’s dependency on Russian energy.⁵⁴

A crucial, though less successful, policy was the offer of €100 million by the Romanian Development ministry (€25 million instalments across 2010-2013), for infrastructural and development projects in Moldova (Ghinea et al. 2010). This is significant both in terms of Moldova’s small economy (€3.7-6 billion, 2009-2013, i.e. 1.5-2.5% GDP 2009-2013) by equalling ≈18% of EU’s multilateral assistance, given the relative size of Romania’s economy (≈1.8% of EU GDP) (European Commission 2014). However Romania has failed to meet expectations concerning the allocations of these funds. As Ghinea et al. (2013:3) argue, Romania lacks a “mechanism” to implement these funds and to bridge the gap of expectations between Romania and Moldova concerning how this money will be bid for and allocated. Romania therefore appears driven more by headlines than by effective implementation.

### 3.4.4 Perspectives on Romania’s Policies

Interpretations of Romania’s policies are divided between critics (a minority) and those who justify and normalise Romania’s approach towards Moldova. These framings differ from interpretations of Russia’s Compatriot policy, even if Romania offers more rights (citizenship versus quasi-citizenship), given the pathology of Russia wielding soft, if not hard, power. This contrasts with an interesting lack of soft power criticism of Romania’s approach.

Those who justify Romania’s approach argue Romania has a “historical obligation” to interact with Romanians abroad and former citizens and to correct the “great injustice” which resulted in the loss of Romanian citizenship following Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Bukovina (Ghinea et al. 2010; Panainte and Nedelciuc 2012). This injustice is emphasised alongside Romania’s de-ethnicised approach, which applies to former citizens rather than specifying their ethnic origin (Leonescu 2012:483). These analysts endorse Romania’s legitimate right to counter the “image problems” at the EU level vis-à-vis Romania’s policy of redobândire (Ghinea et al. 2010). These analysts argue that Romania is consistent with other EU member-states, as neither a “special case” nor an “exception to European standards”, as many other states, like Germany, have similar policies (Litra 2010; Interlic 2010).

On the critical side are a minority of academics (e.g. Žilović 2012), some EU agencies and politicians (e.g. French foreign minister) and western European, in particular right-wing, media. As described, several EU agencies (though not EU Commission) and politicians voiced concern that Romania’s policies threaten the security of EU borders, in particular given the intractable conflict in Transnistria, and promote immigration of Moldovans to EU member-states. Media criticisms focus on the “granny loophole” permitted by Romanian citizenship towards Moldova that might allow Moldova to enter the EU “through the back door” (Bran 2009; Quinn and Murray 2013; Bidder 2010).

Outside policy and media, Žilović (2012:10) is among a minority of scholars who critique Romania’s policies as a potential “silent” type of irredentism. While the policy masquerades as “moral and reparatory” (Milevschi 2012:176), Žilović (2012:4, 8) argues this is a “veiled form of facilitated natural-

⁵⁴Before the Iaşi-Ungheni pipeline, Moldova was receiving 100% of its gas from Russia via Gazprom (Calus 2013).
isation based on collective ethnic ties” rather than the “genuine and effective” links that are usually required for citizenship acquisition, such as residency. Iordachi (2010:11) is less critical of Romania’s approach, though still argues that Romania’s policy helps to complete the “process of restoration of the citizenship body of interwar Greater Romania”, suggesting that Romania veils its intentions by wanting to appear as reparative. However, Romania’s policy is more about post-territorialising institutions of citizenship than about post-nationalising (and de-ethnicising) Romania (see Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011).

Contrasting the appraisals of Russia and Romania’s kin-state policies, the pathologisation of Russia’s policies, and its soft power, is striking against the absence of criticism of Romania, and of soft power framing. Rather, vis-à-vis Moldova, it is Russia, not Romania, that is the dominant focus of criticism. Russia is framed as having a stranglehold over Moldova, both in terms of energy politics, Transnistria and migrant labour in Moscow (Orenstein and Mizsei 2014). This thesis is concerned more with analysing bottom-up kin-state practices, than contributing to these top-down debates, but the contrast between the framings of Russia and Romania remain pertinent.

3.5 Conclusion: A Framework to Analyse Kin-state Practices

This chapter provided a historical and institutional introduction to the kin majority cases, situating historical debates (territory, ethnicity and institutional) and contemporary kin-state provision (policies, organisational networks) which form the basis of the empirical analysis of this thesis (Chapters 4-7). This historical and institutional background provided further evidence of the comparability of these cases, in terms of their similar experiences of territorial flux, Soviet ethnicity policies and post-Soviet kin-state claims, and their diverging nature in terms of quasi-citizenship (Compatriot policy) and citizenship (redobândire).

Lastly, it compared interpretation of Russia and Romania as kin-state actors, showing the dominance of a pathological framing of Russia compared to a reparative framing of Romania, concerning their rights to interact with post-territorial kin majorities. It also showed a different dynamic in terms of kin-state interest vis-à-vis the kin majority: Romania focuses on Moldova while Russia’s interests, and post-Soviet diaspora, are spread across fourteen post-Soviet states where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers reside. Thus in terms of bilateral aid, and kin-state policies (education, citizenship) Moldova is the focus of Romania’s policies, in comparison to its provision to other kin communities/minorities (e.g. in Serbia or Ukraine). By contrast, at least in terms of Compatriot scholarships, Crimea received separate provision from Ukraine but the lowest number of Compatriot scholarships, signifying (I would argue) Russia’s practical indifference to Crimea. For example, Romania showed a willingness to invest in Moldova’s human capital, even if for instrumental reasons, and an ability both to affect educational change and facilitate brain drain. By contrast, Russia’s few scholarships in Crimea would facilitate neither Russia’s human capacity needs, nor affect Crimean/Ukrainian educational provision.

The thesis now moves to the empirical analysis, with two chapters analysing the meanings of kin identification from the perspective of kin majorities (Crimea: Chapter 4, Moldova: Chapter 6) to analyse debates of ethnicity and territorial flux, discussed here, from a bottom-up perspective.
Table 3.4: Typology of Kin-State Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Practice</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Membership</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Romanian citizenship</td>
<td>Russian citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recognition</td>
<td>Quasi-citizenship</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Compatriot policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Educational</td>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>Romanian scholarships</td>
<td>Compatriot scholarships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participatory</td>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Voting rights</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Associational</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Compatriot organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, the empirical chapters (Crimea: Chapter 5, Moldova: Chapter 7) examine, from the bottom-up, engagement with kin-state practices (Table 3.4) applying the typology of practices from Chapter 2 to those observed in the cases. These chapters compare citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices, and explore engagement with citizenship, as a practice. The thesis compares also engagement with educational practices in both cases, interesting given the large (Romanian) versus small (Russia) comparative provision by the kin-states vis-à-vis the kin majorities. Otherwise two different practices are considered, though not compared, because of different realities on the ground. For example, Romania facilitates participatory practices, so observing how those Moldova engage in Romanian voting practices is therefore an object of interest to determine also the relationship between membership (citizenship) and derived rights of participation. Secondly, in Crimea associational practices are both present, via local pro-Russian organisations (ROC, RE), which also are integral to recognition practices, as these organisations form part of the Compatriot network via local, regional and inter-state Compatriot councils.
Chapter 4

Kin Majority Identification: What Does it Mean to be Russian in Crimea?

“All of us, Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews, are Russians”

Anatol Los (cited by Drohobycky 1995)

“Beyond Perekop, there is no land for us.”

Vasilii Zaytsev (1981)

“Ukraine is not a foreign country for us.”

Vladimir Putin cited by Vesti (2014)

This chapter outlines why it is necessary to look beyond mutually exclusive ethnic identity categories to examine the complexities of kin majority identification in Crimea. By examining the lived experience of Russian identification, the chapter goes beyond common understandings of Crimea, as a region demonstrating weak loyalty to Ukraine and susceptibility to Russian nationalism (Maigre 2008; Shevchuk 1996), Soviet nostalgia, and malign influences from Russia which could make the peninsula “next South Ossetia” (Krushelnycky 2008). Instead, the chapter problematises these homogenising frames and unpacks identification as Russian, and with Russia, constructing inductively derived categories to unpack how respondents identified and situated themselves vis-à-vis Crimea, their home-state (Ukraine) and kin-state (Russia).

4.1 Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Crimea

While in Crimea in 2013, I observed a conversation between a mother and daughter. As a typical Crimean family, they were born in northern Russia and had moved to Crimea in the 1980s with the
father who was a Soviet soldier. Now, in 2013, after almost 30 years of residing in Crimea, the mother disliked Ukraine’s policies which, she felt, made it difficult to speak Russian in Crimea. The daughter found this claim ridiculous, arguing there were no problems of speaking Russian in everyday life. The mother identified as Russian while the daughter identified as Ukrainian.

This issue of different perceptions, even within families, runs through this chapter and hinges on crucial differences within Crimean society. For the young generation, it was easier for them to imagine themselves as part of Ukraine, because the state focused on Ukrainian language education. This increased the legitimacy of Ukraine as a political entity, even in Crimea. For the older generation, and those who felt their Russianness was restrained by Ukraine, they felt threatened in everyday life by Ukraine’s policies, in particular its attitude to language. However, these differences of opinion and generational dynamics, are overlooked when analysing questions of identification and identity politics in the context of post-Soviet Crimea, which instead have framed Crimea as necessarily and uncritically ethnically Russian, pro-Russian and pro-Russia (e.g. Maigre 2008; Kuzio 2010; Hedenskog 2008).

### 4.1.1 Top-down Approaches to Questions of Identification in Ukraine and Crimea

This section outlines the gap existing in understanding identification and identity politics, from the bottom-up. It argues that censuses project a politicised and reductive picture of Crimea, while other academic approaches, commonly using surveys, have overlooked regional specificities or ignored Crimea entirely.
4.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET CRIMEA

A superficial analysis of Crimean census data shows Crimea (and Sevastopol) to be an ethnic outlier within Ukraine, as the only region where the majority, according to the 2001 census, identified ethnically as Russian (State Statistics Committe of Ukraine 2001, Figure 4.1). Crimea was also the only Ukrainian region which did not reduce Russian-language education like other regions (Bilaniuk and Melnyk 2008). Hence, in Crimea, the otherwise Ukrainian majority are a minority, while the otherwise Russian minority are a majority and the Ukrainian minority overwhelmingly speak Russian as their usual language.

However the accuracy of censuses, pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet, is questionable, given the tendency for elites to manipulate censuses to match political ends. Particularly in Crimea, the 2001 census was conducted in a politically fractious environment, whether through the distribution of “alarmist” information by pro-Russian parties (Russkii Blok) because of “fear of undercounting” (Arel 2002a:232), or mediation by census-takers to count individuals as Russian, on the basis of language, rather than self-identification (Uehling 2004:155-56). That a census had not been conducted since 2001, having been scheduled in 2010 but postponed until 2016 (Zerkalo Nedeli 2013), also failed to account for post-Soviet identification dynamics, and to count the size of the Crimean Tatar community who had returned since perestroika.

Beyond the criticism that censuses are inaccurate, and politicised, there is also the problem of requiring individuals to choose from mutually exclusive ethnic and linguistic categories, ignoring the complex lived experience of ethnicity (Burton et al. 2010; Lee 1993; Pirie 1996; Ciscel 2008), and questioning the idea of an accurate census. As Burton et al. (2010:1335) argue, it is “virtually impossible” to have such categories “which are both conceptually coherent and which invite recognition and identification from respondents”. The mutual exclusivity critique is related to a further criticism, that censuses create identities through the categories they make available measuring, not how individuals identify, but how the state wants to measure this identification. As Brubaker (2011:1795) argues, “censuses are a medium through which nationalization is effected, not simply one through which it is described”. Censuses are therefore integral to how nation-states frame themselves and how they want people to be counted (Goldschneider 2002). Hence scholars recognise that censuses fail to capture the complex grey zone between mutually exclusive and linguistic categories of Ukrainian and Russian (Stebelsky 2009).

Surveys, conducted by US NGOs (e.g. International Republican Institute 2014) and respected Kyiv think-tanks (e.g. Razumkov Centre, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology/KIIS) have also adopted a mutually exclusive approach to collecting data about identity. This offers little insight into how and why individuals choose and interpret categories, and experience, negotiate and subvert these categories in their everyday lives. For example, a Razumkov survey asked respondents to choose between different homelands (Ukraine, USSR, Russian, own region) (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2014), assuming that respondents had mutually exclusive, rather than overlapping, notions of homeland.

Beyond this critical approach to censuses, analysis of identification in Ukraine often overlooked Crimea, framing Crimea as unrepresentative of the rest of Ukraine (Fournier 2002). For example, Wilson (2002) conceptualised a “middle ground” in Ukraine comprised by Russian speakers who have a mixed view of their ethnic self-identification, and who prefer to identify with the “Russo-Ukrainian” category than with the mutually exclusive census categories of Russian or Ukrainian. This analysis
### Table 4.1: Inductively Derived Identification Categories in Crimean Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discriminated Russians (n=9)</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea or Russia</td>
<td>Native &amp; everyday</td>
<td>Lack desire &amp; proficiency</td>
<td>Spiritual motherland</td>
<td>Anti-Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians (n=9)</td>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea or Russia</td>
<td>Native &amp; everyday</td>
<td>Lack proficiency</td>
<td>Cultural motherland</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians (n=18)</td>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean (n=5)</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Native &amp; everyday</td>
<td>Relatively proficient</td>
<td>Worse than Ukraine</td>
<td>Immature state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians (n=15)</td>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians (n=6)</td>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ukrainian regions</td>
<td>Everyday</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Malign Other</td>
<td>Cultural motherland</td>
<td>Integral part of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is useful for considering the space between the mutually exclusive census categories of Ukrainian and Russian. However Wilson (2002) studied Ukraine as a whole, ignoring the specificities of Russian identity across a regionally diverse Ukraine. While existing research might consider how Russian identification functions in other regions of Ukraine, such as the Donbas, and how this inter-relates with local/regional economic and social practices (Narvselius 2012; Osipian and Osipian 2012), again this left these debates in Crimea untouched.

It is difficult to extrapolate these insights to understand the meanings of Russian identification in Crimea, given Ukraine’s regional diversity and Crimea’s autonomous status in Ukraine. Crimea was even “hegemonically” an ethnic and linguistic Russian “zone” (Arel 2002a:243), with sub-national institutions that at least, de facto, protected Russian language in official and everyday contexts. There has been some research considering identification within Crimea. For example, Malyarenko and Galbreath (2013:917) argued that Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea “consistently behave as one actor”, i.e. collapsing mutually exclusive categories, and identify overwhelmingly as Crimean. They argued Crimean residents preferred this Crimean multi-ethnic identification because of their “greater sense of regional difference from the rest of Ukraine”, cementing Crimean as the dominant identity, and cleavage vis-à-vis Ukraine, rather than ethnic Russian/Ukrainian cleavage (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013:918). A Razumkov Centre (2009) survey also identified a large “Slavic community” in Crimea, as a part of an “other category”, in contrast to ethnic Russian and ethnic Ukrainian categories, as a pan-ethnic group comprised of “ethnic Russians and Ukrainians”. Like Wilson’s middle ground, members of this category speak Russian at home and consider Russian their native language, only identify with a Russian “ethnic cultural tradition” and see no difference between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. This analysis challenges research in Crimea from the early 1990s that pitted ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as separate categories, and as against each other, or at least as expressing different political preferences (Bremmer 1994).
4.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIEt CRIMEA

4.1.2 Analysing Kin Identification From Below

While the complexities of identification in Crimea are apparent, analysis using survey data retains deductive and mutually exclusive categories which do not allow those being researched agency to explain, negotiate or subvert these categories. This chapter uses a bottom-up approach, using the everyday nationalism approach, to collect and analyse data on the meanings of Russian (and Ukrainian) identification. This allows for analysis of how identification and concepts of homeland can work together, as overlapping rather than competing zero-sum notions.

To conceptualise these experiences, the chapter constructs inductively derived identification categories, to explore the areas of agreement and disagreement concerning respondents’ self-identification and positioning vis-à-vis the kin-state (Russia), home-state (Ukraine) and Crimea. These categories were constructed using “grounded theory”, using first open inductive coding to analyse how similarities and differences emerged from data (Corbin and Strauss 1990). Respondents were then grouped according to these trends by devising these “theoretical” inductive categories (Charmaz 2010:156), to unpack the “logic” by which the “meanings” of identification “were ascribed” by respondents (Shevchenko 2008:12), such as how self/other boundaries were constructed and the “legitimising myths” by which these meanings were expressed (A. D. Smith 1998:183). These categories did not remain fixed throughout the analysis period, but shifted iteratively during data analysis and categorisation to explain, and maintain, the nuances of the data. Neither did these inductive categories seek to evoke the kind of groupist problems that Brubaker (2004) argues explanations of ethnicity should avoid. Rather these categories are a tool to conceptualize the complexity and contestations of co-ethnic identification, where mutually exclusive census categories appear blurred and the relationship with the kin-state more contingent, where only a minority of respondents’ co-ethnic identification corresponded to identifying with the kin-state.

The chapter uses five inductively derived identification categories (Table 4.1), to conceptualise areas of agreement and disagreement in terms of self-identification and positioning vis-à-vis Crimea, home-state (Ukraine) and kin-state (Russia):

1. **Discriminated Russians** emphasised a strong Russian identification and felt threatened by the Ukrainian state;
2. **Ethnic Russians** identified as Russian but without feeling discriminated;
3. **Political Ukrainians** identified as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic identification;
4. **Crimeans** identified regionally and inter-ethnically, situating themselves between Ukrainian/Ukraine and Russian/Russia;
5. **Ethnic Ukrainians** identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian.

In deriving these categories, certain respondents are left out of the analysis (e.g. Crimean Tatars) since they did not align with the kin majority typology; while **Ethnic Ukrainians** are considered, to disentangle the difference between political and cultural/ethnic identification as Ukrainian. The following sections take each of these categories in turn.55

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55In terms of notation, respondents are indicated in square brackets for the Crimean cas [C-1]. A full list of respondents for both cases is included in the appendix (Appendix D). Where respondent numbers are followed by letters e.g. [C-28a, C-28b] this indicates respondents were interviewed together.
4.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET CRIMEA

Figure 4.2: Russian Language Use in Ukraine According to 2001 Ukrainian Census

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001)

Figure 4.3: Russian Ethnicity in Ukraine According to 2001 Ukrainian Census

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001)
4.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET CRIMEA

**Figure 4.4**: Gender Profile of Respondents in Crimea

**Figure 4.5**: Age Profile of Respondents in Crimea
4.2 Discriminated Russians

"Here it is impossible to be anything short of Russian."

Discriminated Russians identified most strongly as ethnically Russian and anti-Ukrainian because they felt discriminated by Ukraine and Ukrainization policies. Unlike other categories, Discriminated Russians were affiliated with local pro-Russian/Compatriot organisations based in Simferopol, such as ROC, its youth wing Dvizhenie Molodie (Youth Movement) and political affiliate, RE.

This group were a mix of ages (Figure 4.5), but were unified in their sympathy for the elderly who they thought were particularly threatened by Ukraine’s policies towards ethnic and linguistic Russians.

4.2.1 Self-Identification

Discriminated Russians exhibited the strongest expression of identification as Russian (russkii) situating themselves on a “scale” as “first Russian, Crimean, then a citizen of Ukraine, on a scale in third place” [C-55]. They felt the “same” as Russians, where they were not only “close” to Russia but also “part of the Russian mentality”, even if this was not reflected geographically [C-19a]. They argued they were “from Russia; we never left” and, hence, were “outraged” when “guests visiting from Moscow” would describe coming “from Russia to Crimea” because Discriminated Russians did not see them as separate [C-20].

To underscore their legitimacy in Crimea, Discriminated Russians framed it as “a Russian cultural enclave” where “it is impossible to be anything short of a Russian” [C-19a]. Not only was Russian culture “very well founded” in Crimea but the dialect of Russian used by the “top of central channels of the Soviet Union” was from Crimea [C-19b]. Thus to heighten the legitimacy and enduring nature of ties between Crimea and Russia, Discriminated Russians emphasised Crimea’s superior Soviet status, culturally, linguistically and politically.

Alongside their historical and nativising connections to Russia, Discriminated Russians debunked the competing myth that Russians were recent migrants to the peninsula. Rather they argued “over 70%” of ethnic Russians in Crimea “were born here […] they did not come, they are not immigrants” [C-24]. This may be true of the younger generation, however Soviet and Tsarist policies which encouraged large migration to the peninsula meant that many of the older generation, and their parents and grandparents, migrated from other regions of Russia and Ukraine (see Lieven 1999; Bremmer 1994). Discriminated Russians felt also in competition with Crimean Tatars, framing themselves as “Crimean Russians” and “patriots of Crimea” to ensure their ties and claims to Crimea as home were evident alongside, and equal to, Crimean Tatars [C-48a, C-48b, C-24].
4.2. DISCRIMINATED RUSSIANS

4.2.2 View of Russia

Consistent with studies of surzhyk, respondents commonly, regardless of how they were categorized, derided surzhyk as an impure and uneducated mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, and generally as something to be avoided rather than endorsed (Bilaniuk 2005).

Discriminated Russians expressed their connection to Russia as individuals and linked Crimea and Russia as coterminous homelands. They described their “love for the motherland, for Russia is the motherland” [C-19a], and regret being separated from Russia “by the will of fate” twice as a result of Khrushchev’s “airy solution” (in 1954) and in 1991 “when the soviet Union collapsed” [C-25, C-19a].

Despite their separation, Russia remained their “motherland (rodina), fatherland (otechestvo)” [C-24].6 They imagined themselves as part of a transnational fraternity because Russia is “more than the Russian Federation” and “exists in the brotherhood” among ethnic Russians within and beyond Russia [C-24]. Yet, Crimea was also “our motherland” and a homeland for ethnic Russians [C-24]. They resisted migrating to Russia because “Russians do not intend to leave their motherland” in Crimea [C-24].

Even if their circumstances meant that they now resided in a separate state to Russia, Discriminated Russians framed both Crimea and Russia as their homeland, which underlined their right to reside in Crimea as a legitimate majority and retain spiritual ties with Russia. As argued in Chapter 1, Discriminated Russians did not frame Russia as their external homeland (c.f. Brubaker 1996), since Crimea too was also their homeland; rather these homelands had become disconnected in the post-Soviet period.

4.2.3 Position Within Ukraine

Discriminated Russians exhibited the lowest affiliation with Ukraine. They felt antipathy towards Ukraine’s policy of “forced Ukrainization” (Ukrainizatsia) which created an “infringement of the rights of Russians” [C-24, C-55]. They felt that “priority was given to Ukrainian programs” in particular regarding the Ukrainian language where “correspondence with citizens today is only in Ukrainian” which failed to respect how the majority in Crimea spoke Russian [C-25]. Hence they perceived “an attempted attack [...] on Russian identity” originating from both from Kyiv and “Ukrainian nationalists whose aim is to assimilate Russians” [C-24]. Similar to the idea of “reactive nationalism” (Chinn and Roper 1995), they believed Ukrainization caused a “backlash response” among those who “expressed their Russian identity” [C-25].

While the policy of Ukrainization “manifested itself in all spheres of society” and meant that “life for Russians was not very comfortable”, the focus of their antipathy was Ukraine’s language policy [C-19a]. Since Ukrainian independence, they perceived an “annual increase” in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar language in Crimean schools and “an annual reduction in the number of schools, classes and students with instruction in Russian” [C-24]. This change was negative because it reduced the possibility of Russian language education, but also because they thought that fewer hours in Russian would lead more students to learn both Ukrainian and Russian less well, and end up speaking surzhyk67 because they “mixed [the languages] in their heads”, to the disapproval of respondents [C-48b].

⁶⁶Otechestvo, as fatherland, is commonly conceived more in terms of a land of common citizens, whereas rodina, as motherland, denotes a homeland based on common familial, and thus ethno-cultural, ties, where rodina is also more colloquially used, with otechestvo seen as more “solemn” term for homeland (see Grosberg 1958; Müller 2007).

⁶⁷Consistent with studies of surzhyk, respondents commonly, regardless of how they were categorized, derided surzhyk as an impure and uneducated mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, and generally as something to be avoided rather than endorsed (Bilaniuk 2005).
Ukrainization discredited the Kyiv authorities because the legal situation did not align with the vernacular of politicians. For example, respondents commented on the hypocrisy of figures like President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Azarov, as “symbol[s] of laughs, of jokes” because they “should” legally-speaking speak Ukrainian but only knew a few words of Ukrainian [C-48b]. Moreover, Discriminated Russians perceived a double hypocrisy of Kyiv politicians, who not only could not speak Ukrainian, but promoted Russian language rights only in election campaigns, failing to implement these proposals once reaching office [C-55, C-48a, C-48b].

They felt the impacts of privileging Ukrainian language in other aspects of life, such as the conversion of road signs from Russian to Ukrainian [C-48a, C-48b], and being forced in court to hire a translator when speaking Russian [C-25]. This “unfair and incomprehensible” position was particularly emphasised with regard to the elderly who, in contrast to the younger generation who were more literate in Ukrainian, were in danger, such as when taking medicines, because they “cannot understand the technical terms in the Ukrainian language” and “medicines can kill” [C-19a, C-19b, C-25, C-55].

They pathologised the ideology of post-Soviet Ukraine’s education system. They resented both the newly privileged status of Ukrainian language and culture within the education system and disliked that their view of history had been displaced by a Ukrainian ethno-cultural version. Even though “communication is in Russian language”, for example in Russian schools in Crimea, they believed, and maligned, how the ideology of the education is “completely Ukrainian” [C-24]. Rather they preferred a “Russian (russkoe) education” because currently schools are mandated to teach Ukrainian history, songs and poems rather than Russian literature [C-24]. In particular, they objected to students in Crimea learning about the history of those conceived as heroes by Ukrainian nationalists, such as Bandera and Shukhevych, who Discriminated Russians, conceived as “criminals” and “collaborators”, during World War II [C-24, C-19a].

Discriminated Russians therefore disliked Ukraine’s efforts to consolidate the nation-state and political identification with Ukraine was absent. As respondents explained, they could not see themselves as a “patriot” of Ukraine, but rather a “patriot” of Russia, while the situation was “against me as a citizen” [C-48a, C-48b, C-24], suggesting some could envisage themselves as a “patriot” of Ukraine if the situation were different [C-48a]. However, in the current environment they felt victimized by Ukraine, as a “stepchild” that was unwanted by Ukraine [C-24, C-19a]. Others were less extreme, supporting a “strong Ukraine”, nostalgicising Ukraine’s position within the USSR [C-46], demonstrating their sense of being a “citizen of Ukraine” while lacking belonging to Ukraine because “I don’t feel like Ukraine is my homeland” [C-55].

4.2.4 Position of Crimea

Discriminated Russians saw ethnic Russians as the legitimate and historical inhabitants of Crimea. Although they felt discriminated by Ukrainization, they framed Crimea as a region of refuge because “without a doubt” Crimea was “better” than elsewhere in Ukraine for Russians [C-19b, C-25]. Out-
side of Crimea everything “is in Ukrainian language all the time” whereas everything in Crimea is “dominated by Russian” language and culture [C-25, C-19a].

Within Crimea, Discriminated Russians claimed it was not only ethnic Russians who were threatened by Ukrainization but also other ethnic groups of which the “vast majority” are Russian speakers [C-24, C-19a]. They tried to legitimise their sense of discrimination, and need for protection, by enlarging the oppressed group beyond themselves to make the issue less about advancing Russian nationalism, because it was “doubly wrong” that Ukrainian language and culture had a privileged status in Crimea because the peninsula is so “multinational” [C-24, C-19a].

However Discriminated Russians’ concern for other ethnic groups was paradoxical given their antipathy towards them. This was especially noticeable vis-à-vis Crimean Tatars, where they believed Crimean Tatar nationalism in Crimea “leaves no room for Russians in Crimea” by framing Crimea as “only the birthplace of Crimean Tatars” and no other group [C-24]. They framed this not only in symbolic but also material terms, because they felt discriminated in how land was distributed more favourably to Tatars in Crimea than themselves [C-20].

Discriminated Russians demonstrated the strongest identification as Russian and weakest identification as Ukrainian, framing Crimea as dominantly and legitimately Russian. They saw Crimea as separate, and a refuge, from elsewhere in Ukraine. However even in Crimea, they felt threatened by Ukraine’s oppressive policies of Ukrainization which did not respect their rights as the historic and demographically dominant inhabitants of Crimea. Their framing of the longevity of ethnic Russians in Crimea was consistent with a wider trope among ethnic Russian discourse of disputing their “immigrant status” in preference for framing themselves as are “indigenes with a long history of continuous settlement” in both Ukraine and Crimea (Wilson 1997:154).

By positioning themselves as threatened, they constructed a “discursive inversion of the power relations” (Vamanu and Vamanu 2013:276) between themselves, as victims, and other groups in Crimea, such as Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, who might be at risk from discrimination and abuse by ardent Russian nationalists. Interestingly, only this small number of Discriminated Russians framed Ukraine as a “regime of discrimination” and themselves as victims of this regime, as Hughes (2005:739) describes the cultural subordination and political marginalisation policies of post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia towards ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. As will be shown, other groups reconciled their identification (Ethnic Russians) or partial identification as Russian (Crimeans) with residing in post-Soviet Ukraine. This discriminated discourse was therefore a specific trait of a minority identifying as ethnically Russian, consistent more with those affiliated to pro-Russian organisations (ROC, RE), given the absence of these fears beyond this category and members of these organisations.
4.3 Ethnic Russians

"For me Russian culture is everything, Pushkin is our everything."

Ethnic Russians emphasised their ethnic identification as Russian and, like Discriminated Russians, framed Russia as their homeland. Unlike Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians were less pro-Russian, questioning how Russia was governed, and did not feel the same sense of threat from Ukraine and Ukrainization, reconciling more easily being ethnically Russian with being part of Ukraine. Ethnic Russians also did not have the same organisational ties to pro-Russian Compatriot organisations as Discriminated Russians; instead, some were affiliated to all-Ukrainian parties such as Party of Regions.

Ethnic Russians were a mix of ages but were mostly under 40 (Figure 4.5). Predominantly, they spoke Russian and included some who were born in the RSFSR and migrated to Crimea during the USSR [C-8, C-52], and some were born and grew up in Sevastopol but were living in Simferopol [C-11c, C-22, C-33].

4.3.1 Self-Identification

Ethnic Russians identified Russian as their “native culture” and “native language” [C-15, C-16, C-14b]. For example, Russian artists and writers were “native” to them [C-34]. Being Russian was neither a choice nor something they could deny because they “think in Russian” [C-3, C-22]. This lack of voluntarism, and the construction of being a “native” Russian, was furthered by their familial and organic identification as Russian [C-7, C-21, C-52] (see O. Zimmer 2003). As C-21 explained, Russian culture was “native” because it was “transmitted” organically and familiarly through “blood and mother’s milk” [C-21], so “who is your mother, who is your father, and you are the one afterwards” [C-52], framing identification as something natural and inherited, rather than a choice.

Ethnic Russians constructed narod (nation, people) “like a family” because even though relatives come from different places, such as Russia and Ukraine, they are, as “pro-Slavic”, all part of the same family of “greater Russians” [C-9, C-34, C-51, C-52]. Being “Slavic” meant it would be “artificially implanted” to distinguish between different Slavic categories, of Ukrainian and Russian [C-51]. For example, respondents reasoned, they could not say, as an ethnic Russian, that “I should not eat borsch (a Ukrainian soup), but eat shchi (a Russian soup)”, because both soups were part of his culture [C-51].

However many respondents described a tension between how they wanted to self-identify and, normatively, how they thought they ought to identify. Here Ethnic Russians’ self-identification was more contested and contingent than Discriminated Russians where respondents were not always consistent in how they self-identified. C-9 described himself both as Russian and then as “Russian-Ukrainian”
because his parents were also a mix (Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish), but his Russian identity dominated because he identified with Russian culture [C-9]. They described also a tension between self-identification and “official” ethnicity as C-51 discussed: “officially by ethnicity, in the passport, I am Polish”, however this conflicted with his self-identification because:

“[…] in my mind I’m culturally Russian, Russian-speaking, as it is now fashionable to express. I do not consider myself Russian, because I’m not Russian by ethnicity. But my native language is Russian; I think in Russian, I speak in Russian. […] As a feeling, I will say it again, I am in essence, I am Russian-speaking person, culturally Russian, Russian-speaking, but not Russian by ethnicity.” [C-51]

This respondent is coded as Ethnic Russian because he described himself as feeling Russian though restricted, in an official sense, from identifying ethnically as Russian. This is not to argue for a false consciousness, since the respondent identified ways in which he identified as Russian. Rather it shows the conflict within respondents, explained by the Soviet legacy and its approach to ethnicity, which left them constrained by official categories and “confused” in how to identify [C-22], because in Soviet passports they contained an ethnic (natsionalnost’) category, the so-called “fifth point” (Simonsen 1999; Polese 2014).

Although the ethnic category has not been part of Ukrainian passports since 1991, younger respondents felt this same conflict between what they were “according to our passport” where “we are all Ukrainians” while explaining that they did not “feel Ukrainian” [C-57b]. C-57b explained that “I like to feel like a Ukrainian” because it is a “pretty good country” but reasoned that they felt more Russian because that was “from birth [how] we were brought up”. Respondents lacked agency in this procedure of self-identification and post-Soviet transitions because “home (i.e. residing in Ukraine) is not chosen, it happens” [C-22].

There were many factors, therefore, influencing how Ethnic Russians wanted to, and felt able to identify, in particular in relation to the current and previous political system, and their family background. Generally, respondents were consistent in their imagining of being Russian as related to their family background, and therefore a common myth of descent, but for some respondents this was complicated by the current and previous political context.

4.3.2 View of Russia

Like Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians saw Russia as their cultural homeland, to which they were still connected through their “love” for their “older brother” [C-3]. However Crimea too was their homeland, as their “small motherland”, while Russia was their “big” and “historical motherland” [C-3, C-15, C-34, C-53].

Ethnic Russians were split between those who lamented being “cut off from the motherland” [C-53] and those who pathologised the modern Russian state. C-53 felt disappointed that, as Russians in Crimea, they were no longer “energised” by Russia, by not receiving the same cultural resources, such as Russian television. Culturally, Ethnic Russians saw Russia as a superior entity from which they got their sense of Russianness.

In contrast were those who, unlike Discriminated Russians, criticised contemporary Russian politics
4.3. ETHNIC RUSSIANS

and its lack of freedom [C-16], and this worked against their sense of cultural connectedness and made them “not want to be Russian (russkii)” [C-22]. This criticism was directed towards Putin, resisting the synecdoche (i.e. where the part stands for the whole, see Wodak 2009:43-44) that collapsed Putin and Russia, because “Putin is not Russia” but rather, was the “KGB” and a “type of Mussolini” [C-22]. Putin’s post-Soviet characterisation, of wearing “expensive watches” and “Brioni suits”,⁶⁰ associated him as the leader of Russia’s malevolent practices of runaway crony capitalism and of not respecting Ukrainian politicians, such as Yushchenko, whom Putin had “offended”, signifying Putin’s lack of respect towards Ukrainian statehood [C-22]. Rather, C-22 had a nostalgic view of Soviet heroes and cult figures including Yuri Gagarin,⁶¹ whom he wanted to “have embodied Russia”. Their cultural connection with Russia, as their “big homeland”, was therefore undermined by their political disappointment with Russia, because these problems made respondents want to neither emulate nor be a part of Russia.

4.3.3 Position within Ukraine

Ethnic Russians, unlike Discriminated Russians, felt more favourable towards Ukraine, happy to consider it as their home-state rather than as somewhere, they felt threatened. They were also more willing to be bound by the norms and policies of Ukraine, that Discriminated Russians had vehemently opposed. For example, Ethnic Russians were more willing to speak Ukrainian, than Discriminated Russians: even though they were Russian speakers “you need to talk to people in their own language” [C-22, C-51].

Compared to Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians did not feel oppressed by the linguistic situation in Crimea or Ukraine, where they felt neither “being gagged, honestly” nor was there a “strangulation of Russian culture” in Crimea [C-22]. In fact, at the local level they recognised that “our (Crimean) government” was successfully able to advocate “Russian language, Russian culture” [C-51]. Hence, the Russian “question” was not seen as such an “acute issue” [C-21]. It was not the issues of language that were of concern to ethnic Russians but rather socio-economic problems because “what is the difference in what language we’re going to talk if you’re thinking about how to feed children” [C-21].

Rather it was the politicisation of language that was a problem whereas at the “everyday level, there are no differences” because people are able speak the language they wish, whether in Crimea or in western Ukraine [C-53, C-16]. Despite this willingness to speak Ukrainian and an absence of feeling oppressed, respondents still, in banal terms, expressed a greater preference for Russian language because it was “native” [C-21], where their banal preference for watching Russian films should not be inferred as signifying Russian speakers to be a “patriot” of Putin [C-22].

Instead, Ethnic Russians framed themselves as a “citizen” [C-16, C-53] and “patriot” of Ukraine [C-8], demonstrating their greater political affiliation with Ukraine than Discriminated Russians. They identified with Ukraine because they saw Crimea as a legitimate Ukrainian region, where they had to respect that Crimea was an “integral part of Ukraine according to the situation today” [C-51, C-16].

However, respondents often combined this affiliation with Ukraine with a sense of confusion about what it meant to reside in, and be a citizen of, Ukraine in part because Ukraine was a “young” state [C-34], and because they had not “chosen” Ukraine as a home after the USSR collapse [C-22]. Crimea

⁶⁰ Putin is an infamous customer of Brioni, a luxury Italian suit manufacturer.
⁶¹ Gagarin was a soviet astronaut/cosmonaut and first man in space, able to develop a positive cult status (Jenks 2011).
as a part of Ukraine was seen as a passive, rather than an active or meaningful, process because “the Soviet Union collapsed and we are in Ukraine” and as a result “the idea is to feel yourself as Ukrainian” [C-22]. Normatively, they felt she should be “more patriotic towards Ukraine” because it “will be right [...] we are a county” [C-33]. However, more practically, they did not necessarily feel “patriotic” towards Ukraine because she did not know about Ukrainian traditions and culture “like they do in west Ukraine” [C-33]. However respondents described how their affiliation towards Ukraine could emerge at particular occasions, such during international football games “that’s when the national anthem plays in Ukraine [...] , that’s when I am Ukrainian” while “frankly [...] in all other days I’m Russian” [C-22].

Ethnic Russians framed Crimea as different from other Ukrainian regions, where they had experienced some discrimination and nationalism in other parts of Ukraine, noting that people “looked askance” when speaking Russian or in restaurants bills were “100 Hryvnia more expensive due to the fact that I speak in Russian” [C-22, C-52, C-3]. By contrast, Crimea was a more tolerant region where “even though we are a Russian-speaking region [...] no one has ever made the remark, why do you speak Ukrainian, not Russian” [C-57b]. Hence western Ukraine was seen as “the opposite of Crimea” because in Lviv, and “even in Kyiv, too” there are people that say “we are sincere Ukrainians” whereas such sincere Ukrainians did not exist in Crimea [C-57b]. This feeling of separateness was highlighted by the way in which travelling from Crimea to other regions of Ukraine was described by members of this group as “when I come to Ukraine [i.e. when I’m outside Crimea], I speak Ukrainian”.

Overall Ethnic Russians indicated a greater acceptance of being governed by Ukraine and its laws, than Discriminated Russians, because they, normatively, felt they should feel Ukrainian even if there was a sense of confusion and uncertainty about fitting the necessary criteria to be fully Ukrainian.

### 4.3.4 Position of Crimea

Ethnic Russians had an emotional attachment to Crimea expressing their “love” for Crimea as a “good place for life” and the “soul of the heart” [C-34, C-33]. They emphasised their attachment to Crimea in two respects, by discussing 1) Crimea in terms of its particularities, 2) Crimea’s cultural Russianness, which worked together to explain how Crime was set apart from other Ukrainian regions.

Like Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians saw Crimea as “Russian land” [C-14b] and a “Russian enclave” in the longue durée [C-53, C-9]. Crimea was a “part of Russian culture” and “a part of Russkii Mir (Russian world)”, and not separate from it, because of the many great Russian writers and symbols of the Russian nation, such as Chekhov, Pushkin and Dostoevsky, who had visited the peninsula [C-8]. Crimea had been the “Russian Riviera” since the time of Catherine II and Potemkin in the eighteenth century [C-9]. Hence, they saw Crimea as “better for Russians” than elsewhere in Ukraine because of the presence of Russian language and culture and the ease of communicating in Russia in Crimea, in comparison to elsewhere in Ukraine [C-3].

While Ethnic Russians felt Crimea was Russian, they also framed it as neither fully Ukrainian nor Russian because “it is Crimea” [C-14b]. Neither Russia nor Ukraine could “understand Crimea” [C-8], because they shared different historical experiences and cultural make-up to Russia and other regions.

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62 The respondent said this in Ukrainian (“mi schiri ukraïntsi”) [C-57b].
of Ukraine, where Crimea was more “multicultural” and “multinational” than other regions of Ukraine, because of the large population of Crimean Tatars and the number of other ethnic groups (e.g. Greeks, Germans) [C-21, C-16].

Overall, Ethnic Russians identified as Russian, culturally and ethnically, although indicated tensions concerning the difference between self-identification and legacies of official identification. They felt Crimea was different from the rest of Ukraine but did not feel threatened by Ukraine, as Discriminated Russians. Hence they reconciled their ethnic identification as Russian with their residence in, and affiliation to, Ukraine, while some expressed a normative obligation of wanting to feel affiliated to Ukraine.

### 4.4 Political Ukrainians

“I feel more like a Ukrainian citizen”

C-18

As previous categories, Political Ukrainians spoke Russian as their native language. However, unlike previous categories, Political Ukrainians emphasised their identification as Ukrainian citizens, even if they identified their parents as ethnically Russian. Political Ukrainians were therefore among the more interesting findings of this research, subverting how identification was analysed in Crimea and Ukraine, as a specifically non-ethnic category, against the common framing of Crimea as a necessarily ethnic Russian region.

Political Ukrainians were younger than other categories, the majority under 30 (Figure 4.5), forming a post-Soviet cohort who were born or grew up in independent Ukraine. It was important therefore that they were socialised in a different political and educational system from their parents and grandparents, where they learnt and internalised a different set of “beliefs and values” (Lemke 1988:59) and “rights, privileges and responsibilities” (Glasberg and Shannon 2010:47) from those raised during the USSR.

#### 4.4.1 Self-Identification

Political Ukrainians identified as Ukrainian citizens first and exhibited varying degrees of identifying as ethnically Russian or Ukrainian. Several respondents disliked talking about ethnicity because it “does not matter” and means “we are on a very low level” [C-23, C-47]. Instead, as C-23 described, he tried to “feel myself as a citizen, regardless of ethnicity”. Similarly, they believed ethnicity was not a reason that people would “live badly” because the most pressing problems, the socio-economic situation, were “independent from nationality” [C-23]. There was little sympathy also for the idea
that Russian language was “discriminated” against, as the ROC suggested, because “there are enough schools in Russian language” [C-18].

Political Ukrainians explained their political connection to Ukraine as “my home” and place of birth [C-31]. They constructed a self-other dichotomy: the self, where Crimea “which is Ukraine” was their place of birth, meaning “I am Ukrainian”; and Russia, as the other because “[I] was not born in Russia” and, hence, was “not Russian” [C-37]. This Political Ukrainian version of the self was constituted by what respondents did not identify as: the Russian other who had been born or experienced Russia because they had experienced Ukraine as an “independent state” [C-31]. However they lacked a nomenclature to explain this political attachment to Ukraine, because Ukraine lacked an “equivalent” of rossiian (i.e. resident of Russia) [C-2b].

Political Ukrainians contrasted themselves against another other—their parents—who respondents identified as being, and identifying as, ethnically Russian [C-11a, C-11b, C-30, C-32]. Even though respondents identified themselves as “slightly Russian” and having “partly Russian blood”, because of their families, they still identified as “more Ukrainian” because of their citizenship [C-59, C-32]. Respondents explained disputes with their parents: C-30 explained her mother usually celebrated New Year twice according to local and Moscow time, whereas she preferred to celebrate only according to local time because she was “from Ukraine”. This highlighted the contingency of ethnic identification where ethnicity was not framed in terms of common descent, as academically conceptualised (Chandra 2006; M. Weber 1978; A. D. Smith 1998; Horowitz 1985). Rather Political Ukrainians explained the importance of political experiences for shaping how they identified, where being Ukrainian was “no problem” even if parents identified as Russian [C-30].

Respondents explained these generational divides and dynamics, because Crimea’s older residents “do not change” and are “stuck in the past” [C-59, C-37]. Hence older residents, they believed, were more likely to identify as Russian and be sympathetic towards the USSR because older people might continue to think, and lament, that Crimea was “part of Russia” because the USSR was “better than now” [C-31]. Thus Political Ukrainians saw it as difficult for older generations to “adjust to these new Ukrainian realities, during last 20 years already” while for the young generation, who grew up in independent Ukraine, “it’s easier to feel themselves Ukrainians” [C-18]. Crucially, they explained the implications of these generational dynamics for themselves: that it was possible for the older generation in Crimea to feel Ukrainian only if they identified as “ethnically Ukrainian” while the younger generation would feel Ukrainian, rather than Russian, if they had been born in Ukraine because they did not “know the Soviet Union” [C-30].

While Political Ukrainians were native speakers of Russian, they had a mixed ability to speak Ukrainian. They had a more normative attitude to the issue of language, believing the Ukrainian President should be able to understand Ukrainian, as the state language [C-2b]. They also wanted to preserve the purity of language, framing language in fixed terms where surzhyk, a sociolect between Russian and Ukraine, was inferior because it was “not beautiful” to “mix” the languages [C-32], which contrasted to their experiences of mixed, Slavic cultures, where neither Ukrainian nor Russian, singularly, were their “native” cultures [C-32, C-31].

Crucial to this contingency of identification was their experience of education, particularly when they had studied outside of Crimea, enabling Political Ukrainians to address how they identified in ways
they had not “thought” about previously [C-30]. Materially, it allowed, and required, them to become more proficient in Ukrainian rather than learning it as a “foreign language” [C-37]. This experience changed respondents’ cultural interests too, precipitating a greater interest in Ukrainian language and culture, for example by studying in Kyiv [C-29]. These experiences caused shifts in respondents’ identification, from ethnic Russian to Russian-speaking Ukrainian, because she now had friends from western Ukraine and came to like the “Ukrainian national idea” [C-29]. Being outside of Crimea was therefore crucial for Political Ukrainians, causing them to reflect more on how they self-identified and to socialise more with people from outside the peninsula.

4.4.2 View of Russia

Political Ukrainians saw Russia as foreign, rather than native, nearby or their homeland, as Discriminated and Ethnic Russians. Within Russia, they felt perceived as foreign because they were not born in Russia [C-28] and felt themselves as foreign, and Russia as foreign, because they did “not feel part of this (Russia)” [C-59].

Alongside this foreign framing, Political Ukrainians constructed Russia as a malign, corrupt other where Putin, oligarchs and business interests had total control over life, contrasting this against what they framed as a “more free”, and hence superior, Crimea and Ukraine, in comparison to Russia [C-29, C-32].

4.4.3 Position Within Ukraine

In contrast to their maligning of Russia, Political Ukrainians stressed the importance of Ukrainian independence and of participating fully in Ukraine, by knowing Ukrainian language and history [C-11b]. They legitimised Crimea’s status within Ukraine, because you just need to “study the map” [C-27]. They wanted to diminish the status of Crimea’s psychological separation from Ukraine. For example, it was not a “very correct statement” to discuss the idea of “citizens of Crimea” because even though “we live here in the area (Crimea) […] we’re still in Ukraine” [C-23]. Rather, they wanted Ukraine to “do more” to integrate Crimea within Ukraine, rather than leaving Crimea alone, to resist russification; instead they wanted elite and society to know Ukrainian language and history [C-11b, C-2b, C-12]. In terms of language, they believed that Crimean residents might start to feel more Ukrainian because now they had “got used to it [Ukrainian]” [C-27].

While they respected Crimea’s position in Ukraine, and supported the idea of a unitary Ukraine, being proud of Ukraine’s language and history, they felt “ashamed” of how Ukraine was governed, politically [C-47]. Similar to respondents in Moldova (Chapter 6-7), they were sympathetic that Ukraine was a “new state” where there was neither the “time” nor “experience” in “how to build” a state [C-18]. This resulted, on the one hand, in “very rude and very quick” decisions about how to treat issues of language, media and education [C-18], and on the other hand of corrupt clan-based politics. They disliked that Crimea was governed by those, from Party of Regions and Donetsk, who lacked a personal attachment to, or knowledge of the peninsula and merely used Crimea, instrumentally, “like a hook” for personal gain [C-28, C-37, C-50].
Thus, respondents were pessimistic about Ukraine, from a political and social perspective, feeling there were few opportunities in Ukraine and Crimea, either wanting themselves [C-28] or their children to “leave here” and to “have a good future” rather than be without work after studying, going nowhere [C-47]. Here Ukraine maintained symbolic legitimacy, as they supported the unitary state Ukraine had become, while feeling Ukraine had been, so far, unable to construct much political or social legitimacy, in terms of governance, and provision of opportunities and public goods.

4.4.4 Position of Crimea

*Political Ukrainians* believed, normatively, that Crimea should be part of Ukraine. They diverged between those who had a strong regional attachment to Crimea and those who did not understand what being Crimean (*krymchan*) “meant” as those from other towns in Ukraine, such as Luhansk, did not identify specifically with that town as “Luganchin” (i.e. a person from Luhansk) [C-30]. In general, however, respondents had a strong connection to Crimea, identifying as Crimean as well as Ukrainian, and with Crimea as their “motherland” because it had been where they grew up. As discussed for *Crimeans* below, *Political Ukrainians* resented how Crimea was governed by Kyiv, via Donetsk-based clans, but also that Crimea not part of “people’s mind” in the rest of Ukraine [C-37].

Overall *Political Ukrainians* had a political and normative attachment to Ukraine, which entrenched their desire to be part of Ukraine and to become educated about Ukrainian language and history. However, in spite of their political and territorial attachments to Ukraine, they were critical of how Crimea and Ukraine was ruled by Donetsk-based clans.

4.5 Crimeans

“Well, *Krymchan* (Crimean), it’s partly Russian, Ukrainian, partly.”

C-38

C-2a, C-4, C-36, C-38, C-57a

*Crimeans* were different from previous categories by stressing their regional and inter-ethnic character. While other categories identified partially as Crimean, this category identified primarily as Crimean, situating themselves, inter-ethnically between Ukrainian and Russian, and geographically between Ukraine and Russia. Demographically, *Crimeans* were split in terms of gender, and were predominantly in their 20s (4/5) with one older respondent (50s, C-38) (Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5).

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*This theme is addressed more substantively in Chapter 8*
4.5.1 Self-Identification

Crimeans identified “firstly” as Crimean because this was where they lived [C-2]. Several respondents had long generational ties to the peninsula because their parents and grandparents were born in Crimea [C-4, C-38]. This sense of generational longevity, discussed also by Discriminated Russians, was important by overriding the usual discourse portraying Crimea as experiencing massive population changes in the twentieth century (Wilson 1997; Magocsi 2010).

This regional particularity meant they did not feel they fully belonged to Ukraine or Russia, ethnically or politically. As C-4 explained, she did not feel Russian because to her being Russian meant being rossiian (Russian resident), rather than russkii (ethnically Russian), and this did not apply to her as she was born on Russian territory. Territorially, too, respondents framed Crimea as partially Ukrainian and Russian because “we are separate” as a peninsula because of “the fact that we began belonging to one country, then to another country” [C-57a].

Crimean was therefore an inter-ethnic category which allowed respondents to feel partially, but not fully, both Ukrainian and Russian. Many identified this inter-ethnicity in relation to how their parents also identified as partially ethnically Ukrainian and Russian. C-36 for example described how she was one third Ukrainian and two thirds Russian,⁶⁴ because her mother was Russian and her father was half Russian and half Ukrainian. Thus she did not feel, or identify fully, as Ukrainian or Russian but liked both Ukrainian and Russian languages and cultures.

This sense of inter-ethnicity and uncertainty was heightened by the idea that “we speak Russian” but “we are by nationality Ukrainian” [C-36], where identifying as Crimean allowed them to negotiate this sense of inter-ethnicity. Similarly, C-38 identified as feeling “as a Crimean (Krymchan)” because:

Well, Crimean, it’s partly Russian, Ukrainian, partly ...Well ...Crimea this is Crimea. [...] Well, I can feel more like a Russian ...But I would not say that I’m Russian, I’m more Crimean...Well, you know, as you say, that for example, the Catalans...They are Spanish or Catalan? I mean, yes, we are Spaniards, but we ourselves feel Catalans.

Thus being Crimean distinguished respondents from being wholly Russian or Ukrainian, situating themselves between these poles.

4.5.2 View of Russia

Crimeans felt neither spiritually nor culturally close to Russia, unlike Ethnic Russians and Discriminated Russians. For example, even though C-36 identified as partially Russian, because of her parents, she did not feel close to Russia: she had “nothing against Russia” but had lived in Ukraine her whole life and never been to Russia [C-36].

Even those with Russian relatives had negative experiences which distanced them from their relatives, and from Russia. C-57a described his relatives from “Piter” (St Petersburg) that “arrive with such an accent” and are patronising, and even angry, about the Russian accent in Crimea, describing them as “oh southerners, southerners”. He emphasised the differences between himself and his relatives,

⁶⁴Mathematically, this does not make sense however the ratio is reported as it was expressed by the respondent.
based on accent and how “we even eat differently” based on the different ways of eating a common food, varenniki (dumplings):

They take varenniki, dip in sour cream and eat...There is no vodka, sour cream, it’s okay!
It is necessary to douse varenniki with sour cream, not dunk! [C-57a]

Hence, this group perceived important elements of difference between themselves and those residing in Russia, compounded by the sense of superiority exhibited by Russians (in Russia) towards their relatives in Crimea.

In contrast to the other Crimeans, C-38 noted this sense of Slavic commonality, by expressing how “we live here side by side, across the border” because “just 20 years ago, we were all one country. We are one nation; we should be one people [C-38]. However, C-38, who identified as other Crimeans as predominantly Crimean, was an anomaly in identifying with Russia, in comparison to the other members of this category who felt more ambiguous about their Russianness. Hence even if respondents felt close to Russia, because of Soviet ties and the common “Slavic” concept, politically they felt nearer to Ukraine, because Russia was somewhere “totalitarian” and “not comfortable” [C-4, C-38, C-2a], whereas, Ukraine was somewhere where “freedom of speech is much better than in Russia” [C-38].

For most Crimeans, their lack of closeness with Russia was based on their hybridisation of identifying as Russian and Ukrainian, by identifying as Crimean, while expressing their distaste for the current political situation in Russia.

4.5.3 Position Within Ukraine

While Crimeans exhibited little negativity to Ukraine, they were mixed in identifying as Ukrainian and affiliating politically with Ukraine. Like Ethnic Russians, Crimeans framed Ukraine as a “young” state which was too defensive towards its unitary character [C-38]. They were critical that Ukraine was unable to manage differences within the state, for example Ukraine cannot “afford to take two official languages” because of the unwillingness to federalise Ukraine and the “fear that Ukraine would collapse” [C-38].

Crimeans expressed their sense of separation from the rest of Ukraine and a sense, like Ethnic Russians, that Ukraine does not understand Crimea. To the rest of Ukraine, Crimea is “like a single town” because they do not understand Crimea’s variety and complexity, only that Crimea is different from the rest of Ukraine [C-4]. Generally, Crimeans were more passive towards Ukraine, in comparison to their negativity towards Russia, and exhibited limited identification with Ukraine, in comparison to their strong regional ties to Crimea.

4.5.4 Position of Crimea

Crimeans framed Crimea as being separate from, but between, Ukraine and Russia. Like other respondents, C-4 discussed going to Ukraine from Crimea, as if Crimea was separate from the rest of Ukraine.

Crimeans framed Crimea’s connection with Russia as timeless, making it hard to imagine Crimea without Russian influence [C-2a]. Some respondents expressed for themselves [C-38], or from the
perspective of their parents [C-36, C-4], a sense of nostalgia for the time when Crimea was “one of the best regions in the Soviet Union […] because of the climate, the level of life” on “the same” level as Moscow, while now it was a “backyard […] just a lot worse” [C-38]. Generational dynamics were important with older respondents revering their Soviet past [C-38] and respondents’ parents [C-36], who “didn’t love Ukraine” wanting Crimea to return to Russia, and to the USSR. This contrasted to respondents’ position where C-36 did “like Ukraine” and was not nostalgic for Crimea’s Soviet past, believing the present was better, and Ukraine was better, and more democratic, than Russia [C-36].

Crimeans framed this nostalgia for the Soviet era as encouraging a conflation and misappropriation of traditions as Russian rather than Soviet, such as street names and statues, which had an almost natural character [C-2a]. These traditions became “like Christmas” because you don’t know whether you like the traditions due to their timeless appearance [C-2a]. Crimea’s connection with Russia was therefore also seen as timeless, dating to Soviet and Tsarist times, with one respondent giving the example of how Tsar Nikolai had visited Crimea, and thereby arguing that Russians had “always” been in Crimea [C-2a].

Overall, Crimeans exhibited the greatest sense of belonging to Crimea, situating themselves inter-ethnically and territorially between Ukraine/Ukrainian and Russia/Russian. Stemming from this territorial and familial between-ness, identifying as Crimean allowed respondents to reconcile this hybrid identification by identifying regionally, and inter-ethnically. This translated to limited identification with Ukraine and Russia, but a greater negativity towards Russia and little resistance to Crimea being part of Ukraine. Lastly, conceptually, Crimeans showed the limitations of mutually exclusive census categories for capturing the richness of identification, by choosing to identify inter-ethnically rather than with a mutually exclusive ethnic category.

4.6 Ethnic Ukrainians

“By birth I’m Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking.”

C-26

C-6, C-13, C-26, C-27, C-45, C-49

Ethnic Ukrainians identified neither as ethnic Russian, nor as a (native) speaker of Russian. Rather they identified, wholly, ethnically and culturally as Ukrainian, connecting this with being born outside of Crimea. While they spoke Russian in everyday life, as a fact of residing in Crimea, they cited either Ukrainian or a combination of Russian and Ukrainian as their native languages. Demographically, they were a mixture of ages and genders (Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5).
4.6. Self-Identification

*Ethnic Ukrainians* declared they were Ukrainian because they were born outside of Crimea, situating themselves against the Crimean (ethnic Russian) majority other. While other categories were constructed plurally (*Crimeans, Political Ukrainians*), *Ethnic Ukrainians* explained themselves singularly, because of their mutually-reinforcing, and exclusive, idea of being from Ukraine, speaking Ukrainian and being part of Ukrainian culture. Respondents identified therefore the overlapping ways in which they were Ukrainian, “by birth”, as speakers of Ukrainian as a native language and identifying with Ukrainian culture: “So I am Ukrainian. I know the language, I love Ukraine, in this sense” [C-45, C-26].

*Ethnic Ukrainians* used speaking Ukrainian as a marker of their Ukrainian self-identification, being born “Ukrainian-speaking”, and this was how they differentiated themselves from the Crimean majority other. Alongside Ukrainian, as their native language, *Ethnic Ukrainians* were willing to adapt to the Crimea’s linguistic reality, that “since all speak Russian, I speak Russian”, constructing Russian language not as native language but a situational and functional language for “communication” even though “Ukrainian is the state language” [C-26, C-13, C-45].

For *Ethnic Ukrainians*, their identification was framed in a significant self-other dyad, with Russian speakers and ethnic Russians as the defining other. This self-other was framed competitively where *Ethnic Ukrainians* argued that “speaking Russian” was analogous with “feel[ing] near to Russia” (an assumption resisted by *Ethnic Russians*). This follows the logic discussed by Shulman (2004), where *Ethnic Ukrainians* distinguished themselves, as those possessing “love for Ukraine”, against the competitive, rather than comparable, Russian other who lacked loyalty to Ukraine [C-45].

This competitiveness extended further, where *Ethnic Ukrainians* claimed a ethnic Russians were subject to a state of false consciousness which did not represent a true identification because Crimean residents had been “made Russian-speaking” during the Soviet period [C-49]. They blamed the Soviet “burden” for creating a false Russian other and this “mark of illness, that today many Ukrainians are against Ukraine” [C-49, C-27].

Thus, the other shifted, including not ethnic Russians within Crimea because “I do not see any difference between me and Russians” but rather to Russia, where there was “now more difference between Russians living in Russia” [C-27]. This demonstrated, again, their argument that Russians in Ukraine were Ukrainians who just had not discovered their misinterpretation of their self-identification (i.e. a false consciousness). Hence, while there were commonalities between the themselves and the Russian other, related to common Soviet experiences, there were factors which differentiated them from Russia, as a greater other.

4.6.2 View of Russia

*Ethnic Ukrainians* constructed Russia as a malign other where being ethnically Russian and speaking Russian were indicators of being pro-Russia. They felt Ukraine was superior to Russia, politically, because “Ukraine is peaceful in comparison to Russia” and economically, because “wealth is more evenly distributed” [C-26].

As above, *Ethnic Ukrainians* undermined the basis of Russian identification in Crimea, by portray-
ing Russians in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine as russified Ukrainians (Wilson 1997; see Magocsi 2010). Ethnic Ukrainians disconnected these ethnic Russians from Russia as a homeland by claiming they were ignorant about the state they longed to belong to. As C-27 reasoned, “the vast majority have never been to Russia” and so their identification as Russian was based on misguided idealisations of Russia, furthered by a lack of experience [C-27]. Overall, this category were the least favourable towards Russia, feeling no sense of connection with the state and trying to advocate that ethnic Russians in Crimea lacked a tangible connection with Russia and Russians in Russia.

4.6.3 Position within Ukraine

Compared to previous categories, Ethnic Ukrainians identified most strongly with Ukraine. Despite this ethnic identification with Ukraine, they supported a political rather an ethnic idea of Ukraine. They pathologised “Ukrainian nationalism”, like Ethnic Russians, and state policies endorsing an “artificial Ukrainization of Crimea”, i.e. what Discriminated Russians felt threatened by. They framed these policies as “forcing” and “speeding up” the integration of Crimean into Ukraine, by creating a deliberate Ukrainian consciousness that “will bring nothing but harm” [C-45]. Instead, C-45 saw Ukrainian language “taking root” as a “natural” rather than a deliberate process, rather than something that was, or should be, imposed by Kyiv [C-45].

Ethnic Ukrainians were optimistic about Crimea’s direction within Ukraine, believing and supporting the idea that a “single political nation [...] was not so far away” and would happen in “10-15 years” [C-45]. As a process of de-Sovietization, the engine of this change, as Political Ukrainians demonstrated, was the younger post-Soviet generation who had only lived through Ukraine’s period of independence and hence would identify with this political idea of Ukraine that was a really-existing concept for this new generation [C-45]. Hence, they saw that, even if Crimea was currently anchored to a Soviet legacy, “Crimea is changing. Slowly, badly but it is changing” [C-27], because the “vast majority of Crimean residents, regardless of nationality consider themselves citizens of Ukraine” [C-26]. Reflecting on the past, they identified how the situation “used to be much worse” when “a lot of people with a Ukrainian passport did not consider themselves [Ukrainian]” in the early 1990s [C-26]. Yet Crimean residents had shown “adaptability” and had come to believe that “I live here – it means that I need to be a citizen. And then to participate in the political life of the country in the elections and so on” [C-26]. Thus while this group tried to malign Russia and undermine the consciousness of ethnic Russians in Crimea, they were becoming more confident that now Crimean residents were becoming increasingly loyal to a political Ukrainian idea, as a process of de-Sovietization.

4.6.4 Position of Crimea

Although, ethnically, Ukrainians are a demographic minority in Crimea (2001 Census), Ethnic Ukrainians, in this research, did not frame themselves as being a minority. They framed Crimea as anchored to the rest of Ukraine, because “Ukraine for me is a single whole, and that the Crimea is a single whole with Ukraine is very important to me” [C-49]. A further reason for this lack of minority sentiment can be explained by the argument that ethnic Russians in Crimea are not really Russian but are instead russified Ukrainians.
In other ways, Ethnic Ukrainians mirrored other categories by professing their belonging to Crimea. This expression of being Crimean, where “I consider myself Crimean” even though “I was not born in the Crimea...” [C-27]. They emphasised and revered Crimea’s enduring multiculturalism, because primordially, “Crimea has always been multicultural” [C-45]. Hence, unlike Discriminated Russians, they did not construct themselves as a threatened minority, but rather celebrated their status within a tolerant multicultural Crimea that was, normatively, an ordinary part of Ukraine, regardless of its regional peculiarities.

Overall Ethnic Ukrainians had the strongest identification as Ukrainian and with Ukraine. They expressed this singularly, stemming from their identification as native Ukrainian speakers, with Ukrainian culture and having been born outside Crimea. Ethnic Ukrainians demonstrated an absence of identification with either Russian culture, personal ties or the Russian state, and undermined the validity of those identifying as ethnically Russian within Crimea, arguing these individuals were not really Russian, nor had ever been to Russia, but rather were russified as part of the Soviet legacy. Comparing Ethnic Ukrainians, with Political Ukrainians, Political Ukrainians showed that it was possible to identify as Ukrainian, and be born in Crimea or even in Russia, as a matter of choice, and political identification, rather than a fact of familial relations, or place of birth.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the diversity of meanings attached to Russia and being Russian in Crimea (Table 4.2). To explain these diverse meanings the chapter used inductively derived identification categories to conceptualise how some respondents, as expected, identified as strongly ethnically Russian and pro-Russia (Discriminated Russians), while others demonstrated limited or no support for Russia as a kin-state. For many respondents, Crimea was a tolerant multi-ethnic and multi-cultural region, rather than a pro-Russia region, which, while special and different from the rest of Ukraine, remained an important part of their political imaginary. This diverges from characterisations of the peninsula as a region susceptible to malign Russian nationalism and imminent conflict (Maigre 2008; Kuzio 2010; Hedenskog 2008), providing important insights for understanding the diverse meanings of being Russian in the period (2012-2013), preceding Crimea’s annexation by Russia in 2014.

Empirically, the chapter argued that identifying as Russian, and with Russia, was varied and uncertain. The identification categories showed how respondents reconciled ethnic identification as Russian with residence and affiliation to Ukraine (Ethnic Russians), expressed a preference for a political kind of identification as Ukrainian (Political Ukrainians) or hybridised Russian and Ukrainian identification forming an inter-ethnic identification of feeling in-between (Crimeans). Discriminated Russians were therefore exceptional by expressing a strong identification as Russian combined with the idea that Russian language and culture were threatened. However, this was a small subset of those interviewed with many, either denying the idea of cultural and linguistic discrimination (Ethnic Russians) or supporting a unitary idea of Ukraine, wanting to speak better Ukrainian, as the state language (Political Ukrainians).
That Discriminated Russians were a small subset of those identifying as ethnically Russian, contests the assumption that ethnic Russians felt discriminated, faced “disempowerment and even disenfranchisement” and a sense of “shock” at becoming “new” minorities in the post-Soviet experience (Chinn and Kaiser 1996:7). In Crimea, this discourse was only espoused by a few, who were also the most pro-Russian and involved with pro-Russian organisations. This ability to distinguish between those who felt and did not feel discriminated in Crimea is useful for understanding how far such a discourse failed to hold traction in the mainstream. It contextualises also claims emerging from Russia, preceding and legitimising Crimea’s annexation, which argued, on behalf of the Crimean majority, that in fact Ukraine had “subject” Russians in Ukraine to “forced assimilation” (President of Russia 2014); a claim that is refuted by this chapter.

Lastly, the chapter showed developments in Crimea that made it possible to be Ukrainian in Crimea, not only by virtue of being not from Crimea or descended from parents who identified as Ukrainian, but combined with post-Soviet experiences, of being Ukrainian because of being from Crimea. These processes, until Crimea’s annexation in 2014, were part of an ongoing reconfiguration of identities and experiences in relation to the flux caused by Soviet disintegration, demonstrating the contingency of identification in relation to political experiences and socialisation. Thus a political idea of Ukraine seemed incipient in the region where it would be least expected, because of the processes of de-Sovietization, with the post-Soviet generation as the engine of this idea, because it was the only state in which they had existed.

This conceptual finding challenges the conceptualisation of ethnicity in descent terms or at least in terms of a “myth” of common descent (Chandra 2006; M. Weber 1978; A. D. Smith 1998; Horowitz 1985), demonstrated this myth as politically contingent. For this chapter, these processes were the disconnection from Russia as a kin-state that has taken place since the USSR due to the slow counter-force of Ukrainian state-building, and the perceived deterioration of the political system in Russia, which discredited Russia as something to which many in Crimea wanted to retain ties (Table 4.1). Those who identified strongly as ethnically Russian felt connected to Russia culturally and spiritually, in particular Discriminated Russians who felt that Russia was the only force that could protect them against Ukrainization. However, Russia had to be seen as a positive political force, for this deep connection to be felt and revered. Identifying as fully or partially ethnically Russian did not, therefore, necessarily equate to endorsing Russia as a kin-state, in stark contrast to how others have tried to discredit the loyalty of ethnic Russians in Crimea to the Ukrainian state (e.g. Maigre 2008; Krushelnycky 2008).

Methodologically, this chapter problematised mutually exclusive categories by demonstrating, from the bottom-up, how identification and concepts of homeland are overlapping rather than dichotomous. In conceptualising homeland, surveys have often analysed an overly reduced notion of homeland, which requires individuals to choose between Ukraine, Russia, Crimea and the USSR (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2014). However this chapter showed complex and overlapping notions of homeland, e.g. between Russia and Crimea, or between Ukraine and Crimea, demonstrating the interweaving of these previously dichotomous ideas and contesting Brubaker’s notion of “external homeland”. Rather, as this chapter shows, for Discriminated and Ethnic Russians the issue is more of disconnected homelands, and the different projections this encourages vis-à-vis Russia. These notions of overlapping, rather than separate, dichotomous or external homelands, need to be the focus of more research. The bottom-up
perspective is especially useful for observing identification in regions of territorial change, to observe the interaction of these processes, i.e. the political contingency of myths of common descent, which might be missed by non-agency-centred and deductive methods that do not allow respondents the ability to discuss their identification, and the rationale behind this identification, in their words.

Moving to the next chapter, Chapter 5 uses the identification categories constructed in this chapter to map engagement with variety of Russian kin-state practices to unpack the association between meanings and practices.
## Table 4.2: Agreement and Disagreement Between the Identification Categories in Crimean case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discriminated Russians</strong></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Russians</strong></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crimean</strong></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ukrainians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Ukrainians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

118
Chapter 5

Russian Kin-state Practices in Crimea: the Bottom-up Perspective

“Today compared with 1993, I go back, back then it was a pro-Russian nightmare. Now the situation is changing.”

Ethnic Ukrainian [C-49]

“When Crimea will go to Russia, for example, how is it there and who ate our salo… I say, you know, I do not know who ate your salo and when Crimea will join Russia, probably it will never happen.”

Ethnic Russian [C-53]

Following the analysis of meanings in Crimea, this chapter analyses engagement with four Russian kin-state practices in Crimea: associational (Russian organisations), membership (Russian citizenship), recognition (Compatriot practices) and educational (Russian scholarships), to examine how, whether and why respondents engaged with these practices. Building on the analysis of meanings in Crimea (Chapter 4), the chapter expects that those identifying most strongly with Russia will be more actively engaged in Russian practices than those with weaker identification.

To unpack this premise, the chapter returns to the inductively derived identification categories from Chapter 4 to unpack the relationship between meanings and practices. The chapter expects that Discriminated Russians, identifying most strongly with Russia in terms of meanings, will be most actively engaged with Russian practices, while those least symbolically attached to Russia in terms of meanings (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians) will be less engaged with Russian practices. Of interest is how those in the middle, with partial but not full identification as Russian and with Russia (Ethnic Russians, Crimeans), engage with Russian practices.

First, the chapter considers the gaps in kin-state research concerning relations between Russia and Crimea, to demonstrate the value of a bottom-up approach to analyse how, whether and why
Crimean residents engage with Russian kin-state practices. Second, the chapter uses the inductively derived categories for the Crimean case, constructed in Chapter 4, to examine how each category engages with different Russian practices (associational, membership, recognition, educational). These categories were derived inductively, in Chapter 4, in terms of the meanings of kin identification and are applied to analyse the kin-state practices of each category, in this chapter, to examine the association between meanings and practices. The chapter argues this nuanced, bottom-up approach offers crucial insights into engagement with Russia, heightened by the fact that this analyses engagement preceding Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

5.1 Existing Approaches to Russian Kin-State Practices

Generally, this chapter argues there is a conceptual gap in analysing engagement with kin-state policies from a bottom-up perspective. Rather, the majority of research regarding kin-state policies has been from the top-down, i.e. from an institutional and legal perspective, analysing the legal basis and political context of these policies (see Waterbury 2011, 2014; Pogonyi et al. 2010). Research institutes such as CITSEE (The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia) and the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship (within the European Union Observatory on Democracy) have conducted vast research, but this concentrates on the legal basis of citizenship regimes. For example, only one paper from CITSEE examined the lived experience of citizenship in the break-up of Yugoslavia (Vasiljević 2014). This paper examines citizenship practices only in former Yugoslavia, leaving a gap firstly in the post-Soviet region. Secondly it considers only citizenship, leaving open the question of citizenship as compared to other kin-state practices (e.g. educational, participatory), as this chapter does.

Specifically, this chapter argues it is necessary to explore engagement with Russian kin-state practices from below. This chapter builds on two assumptions questioned in Chapter 4, that Crimean residents were 1) uncritically pro-Russian, and 2) necessarily pro-Russia, by questioning two further assumptions: 1) that Crimea was a case of passportization 2) that Russian citizenship was accessible and desirable. Questioning these assumptions is vital by examining the relationship between meanings and practices: *did all categories engage with practices in the same way?* Secondly, it challenges the popularity of Russian citizenship in Crimea and the use of Russian citizenship as a proxy of territorial preferences (i.e. of separatism and/or unification with Russia), where mass uptake of Russian citizenship was both presumed to indicate low support for a Ukraine independent from Russia. Hence this chapter challenges a further persistent framing, particularly in the wake of 2014 annexation, that Crimea was a region where the threat of separatism was imminent.

Within Ukraine, Crimea was framed as most exposed to Russian passportization. Mirroring Russia’s policies in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria (Drohobycky 1995), observers feared passportization could provide Russia with a legal impetus for future incursions in Crimea, as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 (Kuzio 2008b; Roslycky 2011:308). Given that Russia legitimised its intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to “protect” Russian citizens residing there (Medvedev 2008).
5.1. EXISTING APPROACHES TO RUSSIAN KIN-STATE PRACTICES

However the existence of passportization in Crimea was not scrutinised. Rather it was assumed to be a part of a “political ploy that might be exploited for geopolitical ends by the Russian and Ukrainian states”, causing enduring instability in relations between Ukraine and Russia over claims towards Crimea (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013:924; Kuzio 2008a; Hedenskog 2008:35). In this scenario, it was supposedly the resilience of Ukrainian sovereignty which kept Crimea within Ukraine, rather than local agency within Crimea endorsing this status quo (Diuk 2001:59). Lastly, Crimea was assumed to be a territory where Compatriot organisations were “much more active” and more supported by Russia because “Crimea occupies a special place in the rhetoric of Russian compatriots”, as a former Russian territory still dominated by Russian language and culture (Kivirähk et al. 2010:258). This presented Crimea as a most likely case of engagement with the Compatriot policy (and passportization).

This chapter contests all these assumptions for several reasons, primarily because of a lack of engagement with those on the ground in Crimea. Framing Crimea as a region of strong Russian support (Barrington and Faranda 2009), without unpacking the meaning or existence of this support, overlooks the potential internal heterogeneity and fluidity of politics within Crimea in terms of relations with Ukraine and Russia. As Malyarenko and Galbreath (2013:913) argue, elite and popular support for separatism, before 2014, had decreased since its apex in the mid-1990s and was unable to “represent a serious threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity” (Mizrokhi 2009:2; Malyarenko and Galbreath 2013:917) (see also Figure 5.1). Rather, Mizrokhi (2009:2) argues, it was in Russia’s interest to “exaggerate the danger and potency” of Russian sentiment, and support of pro-Russian “political and cultural associations” within Crimea, to bolster Russia’s interests within Crimea (e.g. BSF), and hinder Ukraine’s political projects (e.g. NATO relations).

It is problematic to frame Crimea as a case of passportization because this assumes Russian citizen-
ship was accessible and desirable in Crimea. As Chapter 3 indicated, assumptions about passportization in Crimea are based on untrustworthy evidence for which no original source can be located. Even taking the numbers of those Crimean residents who have been passportized at face value indicates a large range from 6,000 to 100,000 of Crimean residents holding Russian citizenship (Kuzio 2008a; Hedenskog 2008:35). These figures, if they could be corroborated, would only be 0.25-4% of Crimean residents, demonstrating that acquisition was not as prevalent as the frame of passportization suggests. Moreover, these figures offer little insight into who has been passportized and where they are located. Perhaps the most trustworthy piece of evidence comes from a “trusted source”, cited by Hedenskog (2008:35), who claims approximately 40,000 passportized individuals within Crimea, of whom the majority were pensioners residing in Sevastopol who in turn, given Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol, have been linked to Russian military families based there (see also Prytula 2008).

This trope of passportization also overlooks Ukrainian domestic constraints (Chapter 3), where Ukraine prohibits holding of dual citizenship to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty (Shevel 2010). This forced individuals, at least legally, to choose between being a citizen of Ukraine or be “a citizen of Russia and leave” (Barrington 1995:742). These assumptions ignore also the agency of Crimean residents by failing to question how, and whether, they engaged with these processes and what were their preferences regarding acquisition of Russian citizenship.

Lastly, these assumptions ignore the policies of the Russian state, which restricted the right to acquire Russian citizenship abroad (legally-speaking) for those not considered stateless (i.e. Russian citizenship was legal, facilitated and accessible in Transnistria and Abkhazia but not Crimea). Instead, Russia advanced the Compatriot policy as a quasi-citizenship policy, to formalise and legitimise relations between Russia and those Russia claimed as Compatriots, a broad category including ethnic Russians, cultural Russians and former Soviet citizens (Chapter 3). As a quasi-citizenship policy, the Compatriot policy offered some but not full citizenship rights and benefits (c.f. G. Smith 1999a; Grigas 2012). So far, analysis of the Compatriot Policy has focused only on legalistic and institutional top-down approaches that explain the “loose” conceptualisation of compatriots and deliberately “ambiguous” institutions which embed the policy (Kosmarskaya 2011:60; Shevel 2009a:179; G. Smith 1999b:509).

Rather it is important to analyse Russian citizenship and quasi-citizenship, from an agency-centred, bottom-up perspective to examine how and whether respondents engaged with these practices. The chapter uses the inductively derived categories constructed in Chapter 4 to disentangle the association between meanings and practices (Table 5.1).

The chapter first analyses each categories’ framing of entitlements vis-à-vis Russia and then analyses how each category engages with four practices:

1. Associational: pro-Russian organisations
2. Membership: engagement with Russian citizenship
3. Recognition: engagement with Compatriot practices
4. Educational: engagement with Compatriot scholarships

The chapter expects that those identifying most strongly as Russian and with Russia (Discriminated Russians) would engage more actively and positively with Russian practices, than those who did not identify strongly with Russia or as Russian (Ethnic Ukrainians, Political Ukrainians). Moreover the practices of those between these poles, who had a mixed identification as Russian and with Russia
5.2 Entitlements to Russian Kin-State Practices

Table 5.1: Identification Categories for the Crimean Case (from Chapter 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Defining Characteristics</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians</td>
<td>emphasised a strong Russian identification and felt threatened by the Ukrainian state</td>
<td>C-1, C-19a, C-19b, C-20, C-24, C-25, C-46, C-48a, C-48b, C-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>identified primarily as Russian but this was expressed without feeling discriminated</td>
<td>C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11c, C-14a, C-14b, C-15, C-16, C-21, C-22, C-33, C-34, C-51, C-53, C-57b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians</td>
<td>identified primarily as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic identification</td>
<td>C-2b, C-11a, C-11b, C-12, C-18, C-23, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-31, C-32, C-37, C-40, C-47, C-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeans</td>
<td>identified primarily regionally and inter-ethnically, identifying as between Ukrainian and Russian</td>
<td>C-2a, C-4, C-36, C-38, C-57a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian</td>
<td>C-6, C-13, C-26, C-27, C-45, C-49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Crimeans) and/or a cultural but not political identification with Russia (Ethnic Russians), is also of interest, given the uncertainty of predicting how they might engage with Russian practices.

5.2 Entitlements to Russian Kin-State Practices

This section considers how each inductively derived category (Table 5.1) framed their sense of entitlement towards Russia as a kin-state. The section examines how far this sense of entitlement vis-à-vis Russia is associated more with those who had stronger identification as Russian and with Russia (Discriminated Russians), while those who were less attached to Russia, neither identifying as Russian nor with Russia (Ethnic Ukrainians, Political Ukrainians), were associated with a more negative appreciation of Russia’s approach to Crimea. Between these poles, with those identifying as Russian but not necessarily (Ethnic Russians) or fully (Crimeans) with Russia, the section explores also how this relates to these categories’ appreciation of Russian kin-state practices.

5.2.1 Discriminated Russians

*Discriminated Russians* had a good knowledge of, and interest in, Russia’s approach to Crimea. They knew *Rossotrudnichestvo* existed and about Russia’s financial assistance for Russian culture festivals in Crimea, such as the Great Russian Word, in part because they were involved in these festivals via ROC/RE [C-19a, C-19b, C-55, C-24, C-25].

Discriminated Russians wanted a maximalist type of support from Russia. However they felt this was not reflected by what Russia currently offered and were displeased by Russia’s “timid” and “passive”

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66 The local arm of the Russian Foreign Ministry which administers the Compatriot Programmes on the ground in Simferopol, and other locations (see Section 3.3.6).
67 The Festival of the Great Russian Word, held since 2008, is a festival of cultural and literary events held every year in June across Crimea. It is sponsored by numerous institutions, including the Crimean government, Council of Ministers and Ministry of Culture, ROC, RE, and Russian institutions, such as Russkiy Mir, the Department for Compatriots, the Moscow government, and Russian and Ukrainian Compatriot Councils.
5.2. ENTITLEMENTS TO RUSSIAN KIN-STATE PRACTICES

approach to Russians in Crimea which made them feel “without Russia” [C-19a, C-24, C-25]. They saw Russia as “doing programmes [...] on paper”, however they did not “feel these changes” because the programmes failed to materialise into tangible benefits [C-24]. They wanted Russia to intervene more in Ukraine’s “language policy” to ensure the “adoption of Russian as a state language” by providing economic incentives if not coercive incentives [C-20, C-24, C-48b], to ensure Russia protected “our humanitarian rights [...] but alas, Russia does not do it” [C-24].

Key to this dissatisfaction, the Compatriot policy was “not enough” support because they wanted to “see more help” [C-19a, C-55, C-25, C-1, C-46]. However their “appeals” to Russia went unheard and Russia needed to do more as the “defender of the rights of Russians” beyond Russia by overcoming this passivity [C-19a, C-55, C-25, C-1, C-46].

5.2.2 Ethnic Russians

Ethnic Russians felt part of Russian culture, and personally, with their relatives in Russia, creating a sense of “kinship” with those in Russia [C-51, C-7, C-8]. However, they distinguished between their interpersonal closeness with Russian people, and their distance from Russia, as a state and government, because of Russia’s political problems [C-22, C-7, C-8, C-51].

Ethnic Russians explained Russia’s engagement in terms of cultural, financial (via pensions) and geopolitical relations, where the BSF kept them close to Russia [C-3, C-9, C-33]. They framed the BSF as demonstrating Russia’s continued symbolic presence in Crimea, however they diverged over their interpretations of its presence: as something that “guarantees [their] safety” against external others [C-53], or as a strong Russian “lever” in Crimea, creating a dependence at least in Sevastopol, on the wealth created by the presence of the fleet [C-22].

Beyond the BSF, Ethnic Russians did not see Russia as an active force in Crimea, providing less help to Crimea, such as citizenship, than before and in comparison to other post-Soviet regions, such as Central Asia [C-34]. Respondents saw relations with Russia not in terms of Crimea’s relationship with Russia, but, more normatively, within the framework of Ukrainian-Russian relations, whether friendly or tense, because Russia realised they needed “good, friendly and constructive relations with Ukraine” where Crimea is part of the “package” [C-34, C-53].

Culturally, Ethnic Russians were split between those who supported, those who maligned and a majority who were more passive towards Russian’s cultural engagement. A minority, maligned Russia’s cultural policy, framing it as one of “blatant annexation” [C-22]. This respondent favoured only minimal support, such as a visa-free regime between Ukraine and Russia [C-22].

A different minority supported a maximalist version of Russian support, as Discriminated Russians, believing Russia’s cultural support was “good, it’s necessary”, because Crimea was “a part of Russia” so Russia had an obligation to them [C-21, C-34]. They wanted Russia to help improve their situation “in situ”, i.e. within Crimea rather than Russia, to foster more “humanitarian ties in society” via “humanitarian projects” for “stuff like cultural life”, such as books, films and conferences to account for the fact that we are “cut-off from the mainland, from our big homeland” [C-53, C-9]. However they objected to political support from Russia, because “Crimea is a part of Ukraine, but Ukraine is an independent state” where this group supported this territorial status quo because “no one wants war” [C-53]. Hence
they equated cultural support with positive aims while equating political support only with negative outcomes, such as territorial conflict.

Ethnic Russians therefore had different ideas regarding their relations with Russia. A minority expressed similar feelings to Discriminated Russians, not because they felt discriminated but disconnected; however most Ethnic Russians were more apathetic about relations with, and support from, Russia.

5.2.3 Political Ukrainians

Political Ukrainians were not interested in specific Russian policies and maligned Russia’s approach to Crimea and Ukraine. Primarily, their objections to Russia were political, arguing there was lots of “squabbling and bickering” between Ukraine and Russia over energy relations and prices, whereas for “ordinary citizens […] everything is fine” [C-47, C-11a, C-11b]. They criticised the presence of Russian political figures, particularly Yurii Luzhkov,⁶⁸ who visited Crimea and Sevastopol to create “scandals” by claiming Crimea “should be part of Russia” [C-18, C-29, C-37].

Political Ukrainians blamed Russia for bad Ukrainian-Russian relations, where Russia used Crimea “like a hook” to coerce Kyiv [C-29, C-37, C-11a, C-11b, C-23]. For example Russia’s naval presence (BSF) “keeps the question [regarding Crimea’s status] pulsating” [C-23]. They maligned also Russia’s instrumental approach towards Crimea, rooted in Russia’s desire and “influence [to] earn[ing] money” and “receive benefits” from Ukraine and Crimea [C-18, C-59, C-30, C-37, C-59, C-40]. Secondly they saw Russia as working to undermine what Ukraine wanted (and Political Ukrainians wanted), such as Europeanization [C-37, C-23]. Political Ukrainians, unlike Ethnic Russians, were therefore unanimously critical of Russia’s involvement in Crimea.

5.2.4 Crimeans

Given Crimeans’ inter-ethnic identification, situating themselves between Ukraine and Russia, they held diverse opinions concerning Russia’s approach to Crimea. Several Crimeans saw Russia as close, because “we have good relations with Russia […] as a family” where relations with Russia were like “how you communicate with my grandmother” [C-57a]. They framed Russia as having a “very strong position here” because of the dominance of Russian media and because, in Crimea and “the entire eastern Ukraine”, everyone speaks Russian [C-38].

However Crimeans differed in the implications of these relations. Some Crimeans framed Russia as having a “debt to pay to the people” in Crimea because “just twenty years ago, we were one country (strana). We were one country, we were one nation (narod)” [C-38]. C-38 was disappointed that Russia did not live up to this “moral obligation”, by using Crimea instrumentally “as a region to visit and relax”. Instead he wanted Crimea to benefit, such as receiving preferential tax treatment on goods exported to Russia [C-38].

Other Crimeans were uninterested in, and critical of, Russia’s approach. They argued Russia did “interfere” in Crimea, by its BSF presence, and disliked Russia as somewhere more totalitarian and

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⁶⁸Luzhkov is the former Mayor of Moscow (1992-2010) and has been active in Crimea, and in particular Sevastopol, via his controversial statements and funding (see also Section 3.3.5).
less comfortable than Ukraine [C-36, C-4]. These Crimeans knew little of Russia’s specific activities, and efforts to engage Crimea, but were similarly critical of Russia’s, and Russian citizens’ (rossiiane), instrumental approach by treating Crimea as a region for holidays and investment, in houses and businesses [C-36].

Crimeans were therefore a diverse category in their sense of entitlement vis-à-vis Russia. They disagreed about whether Russia had a moral obligation, demonstrating the fracturing between respondents who identified similarly, as being between Russia and Ukraine, symbolically and physically, and framing of Russia.

5.2.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians were somewhat informed about Russia’s policies in Crimea. They believed Russia was active in providing Crimea “heaps of programs [...] all sorts of support” for books, scholarships, trolleybuses (in Sevastopol) and “mother tongue” language support for Russian speakers [C-49, C-26]. Unlike Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians did not automatically malign this “help” believing that people “take this help all the same” whether it was “Russian or American” [C-26].

While Ethnic Ukrainians did not necessarily malign Russia’s assistance, as a kin-state, believing this was not exceptional, they were displeased that Russia’s policies privileged Russian over Ukrainian language, given their minority status as native Ukrainian speakers in Crimea. Ethnic Ukrainians criticised how “activists of these Russian organisations” claimed that the support was “not enough” when “every year”, the Crimean government “increased the budget” for Russian language programmes, while Ukrainian cultural and language programmes were not promoted [C-49, C-26]. They recognised the political utility of this discriminated framing, where Russia could “maintain a certain degree of separatist sentiment among the Russian-speaking citizens” by continuing to frame Russian speakers as discriminated, while masking the dominance of Russian in Crimea [C-26].

However beyond cultural policies Ethnic Ukrainians, like Political Ukrainians, criticised the instrumental interests of Russia, Russian businesses and Russian citizens in Crimea, using Crimea to make money and gain political support [C-49, C-26]. Ethnic Ukrainians agreed with Political Ukrainians by pathologising Russia’s instrumentalism further by arguing Russia used Crimea to “blackmail Kyiv” because Crimea was the “anchor that keeps Ukraine near Russia” [C-27, C-49, C-6]. They did not pathologise Crimea, believing Crimea complied with the norm that relations with Russia now depended on “how Ukraine is building relations with Russia” [C-27, C-45]. However Ukraine was still, symbolically and politically, subordinate to Russia because Russia treated Ukraine as a “slightly different foreign” entity than “Britain or the United States or even Czech Republic” because of their Soviet ties [C-27, C-45], which impacted Ukraine’s ability to negotiate as an independent actor with Russia vis-à-vis energy relations and processes such as Europeanization [C-27, C-45].

Ethnic Ukrainians focused on this symbolic framing of Ukrainian-Russian relations, and interdependence, while overlooking some of the more pragmatic interdependencies between Ukraine and Russia. For example, Ukraine remains dependent on Russia, and hence vulnerable, not merely because of symbolic or historic ties but because of its addiction to cheap Russian energy prices and rents (Balmaceda 2013). Equally, Russia’s desire to politically manipulate Ukraine derives neither fully from historical
ties nor symbolic relations, but to protect its domestic interests, such as military bases (BSF) and authoritarianism, which Ukraine’s democratisation could threaten by demonstrating an alternative model to kleptocracy (Ambrosio 2007).

This section supported this chapter’s premise: those who identified most strongly with Russia (Discriminated Russians) engaged most with Russia, felt most entitled to receive Russia’s kin-state support and were dissatisfied with Russia’s passive tendencies towards them. Those who identified least with Russia (Ethnic Ukrainians), were neither interested in engaging with, nor knowledgeable of, Russia’s kin-state practices. Instead they maligned Russia’s self-interested attitude to Crimea and Ukraine, which sought to maintain relations because of their symbolic and historic ties. Similarly, Political Ukrainians maligned Russia’s engagement with Crimea and showed no interest in Russian cultural policies, even though they were speakers of Russian, because they failed to be relevant to their lives and concerns.

Between these poles, the categories demonstrated the limits of interest in engagement with Russia as kin-state, and the fragmentation of the categories of meaning when analysing this engagement. Most Ethnic Russians were uninterested in engaging with Russia, even via cultural practices. However a minority advocated closer cultural ties feeling disconnected from Russia, as Discriminated Russians, even though they did not feel discriminated within Crimea and Ukraine. Similarly Crimeans, situating themselves between Russia and Ukraine, did not align neatly to appreciations of Russian practices, with some believing Russia had an obligation to help Crimea, while others disputed such an obligation, because this went over and above what they believed was acceptable.

The inductive categories of meaning remain analytically useful for demonstrating that Russia appealed most to those who felt discriminated. Further these categories demonstrate that while generally meanings translated to practices, vis-à-vis Russia, this did not hold for all respondents, in particular those with mixed and complex identifications with Russia.

5.3 Assocional Practices: Compatriot Organisations

This section analyses respondents’ interaction with pro-Russian organisations in Crimea: the Russia Community of Crimea (ROC) and its political affiliate, Russian Unity (RE). These were the largest and most entrenched pro-Russian organisations in Crimea, outside of Sevastopol where additional groups existed. They also form part of the Compatriot organisational network which connects local organisations to institutions run by Russia in Crimea, such as Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russian consulate in Simferopol, which were the local arms of the Russian MFA. Again, this section examines whether the inductively categories indicate similar or different engagement with associational practices, and how far strength of identification is associated with greater engagement.

5.3.1 Discriminated Russians

Most Discriminated Russians were, or had been, affiliated with ROC and RE [C-25, C-19a, C-19b, C-1]. Those affiliated were favourable towards these “normal” and “legal” organisations, arguing they oper-
ated the “same as any other ethnicity organisation” and enhanced their life, allowing them to “to feel like full citizens because of the skewed Ukrainization” by giving them a collective voice to lobby Russia for protection [C-24, C-25, C-1]. Against their “normal” organisational self, they constructed Crimea Tatar organisations, e.g. Mejlis⁶⁹ as a malign other which operated illegally [C-24]. They used this good self versus bad other dichotomy to heighten their claims of discrimination by portraying themselves as law-abiding victims, against malevolent near-criminal Crimean Tatar organisations, contrasting to other categories whomaligned ROC and RE.

Discriminated Russians’ claims to organisational legitimacy led them to rebut (without prompting) claims of being a pro-Russian fifth column within Crimea, denying allegations that they represented the Russian security services or “live on money from Russia” [C-19a, C-19b]. They distanced themselves from directly working with the Russian government, associating themselves with smaller branches of the Russian state, such as “the Moscow government” [C-19a]. Rather they framed themselves as fostering “humanitarian” links and promoting “Russian language, culture, the history of the Russian people” instead of working with Russia to protect “politics or economics”, to underplay and depoliticise their activities [C-19a, C-19b].

They reflected also top-down Compatriot discourses, emanating from the Russian state, by encouraging young people in Crimea to pay “much attention” to the Great Patriotic War, which the “Orange power” had “neutralised” (i.e. Yushchenko’s presidency following the Orange Revolution, 2005-2010) [C-19a, C-19b]. Their efforts to promote nostalgic reflection reflected their neotraditional fear that memory of these events was increasingly challenged by “globalisation” and “popular culture (which) comes from the USA”, and which superseded young peoples’ knowledge of Soviet history [C-19a, C-19b].

However, Discriminated Russians now outside these organisations criticised their relevance, because they did not “suit” these individuals nor wider Crimean society, accounting for their lack of success because “otherwise” Crimean society “would have all the time voted for this organisation [RE]” [C-24, C-20, C-48a, C-48b].⁷⁰ Their lack of relevance was explained by the ineptitude of these organisations to protect “their rights”, as Discriminated Russians, because ROC needed to do more than host “just cultural events” [C-24].

Secondly, they criticised ROC and RE’s nepotism, where only those affiliated to these organisations received the benefits of Russia’s Compatriot policies [C-48a, C-48b]. These organisations acted as gatekeepers to the Compatriot Policy via patronage, to create “Kremlin-friendly networks of influence”, as Grigas (2012:9) argues local Russian organisations did in the Baltic states, between these organisations and supporters within Crimea via personal networks, and transnationally, between these organisations and the kin-state. This ensured that Compatriot practices secured “loyal interests” and a system of dependence, of individuals and organisations to the kin-state (Grigas 2012:9; see also Waterbury 2011).

⁶⁹The Mejlis was the executive body of the Crimean Tatar people in Crime. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea it was forcibly closed (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2014).

⁷⁰As discussed in Chapter 2, RE won only 4% in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections (see Figure 3.4, Page 62).
5.3.2 Ethnic Russians

Most Ethnic Russians were “not interested” to engage with these pro-Russian organisations [C-11c, C-22, C-34], framing them as irrelevant, both for Ethnic Russians and for wider Crimean society, because they did not “fully” represent the “interests of 80% of the Russians of Crimea” [C-21]. Ethnic Russians objected also to ROC as an organisation, explaining obshchina (community) as an interpersonal concept; as C-22 explained, “my Russian community” (obshchina russkaiia) are “my friends, daily conversations on the street, or at work. These are Russian people, this is the Russian community” rather than these official organisations [C-22].

There was a dissonance between pro-Russian organisations’ symbolic priorities, which campaigned on Russian language and ethnicity, and respondents’ material concerns “about how to feed children” [C-21]. These organisations, by appealing to nostalgia, appealed to elderly Crimean residents by acting “like Soviet organisations”, rather than being “creative” or “modern”, and adapting themselves to the interests and concerns of younger generations [C-3]. These organisations irritated respondents, because they behaved and “protested” as if they were acting “on our behalf”, when they had the support only of a local minority [C-51, C-53]. Hence the organisations were “illiterate” and “clumsy”, comprised only of the “most advanced patriots” who “loudly shout” about their concerns, namely that “they (Ukraine) infringe on our rights” [C-51, C-53].

Ethnic Russians also criticised the internal dysfunctionality of these organisations: permeated with “crisis” and “internal disagreements”, where they had “just disappeared in general from the information space” in Crimea [C-51, C-53, C-3]. This was in spite of the allegations that ROC and RE received money from Russia, which affiliated Discriminated Russians had tried to rebut, because these funds meant that internal factions “start to fight each other” about the allocation of these resources [C-51].

Their access to Russian state money further “debased” the reputation of these organisations and their campaign issues [C-22, C-51]. Ethnic Russians used a popular trope that these organisations’ members were “Russian by profession”, existing only in these organisations to profit from their relations with Russia, their pro-Russian activities and to offer an outlet for “money laundering” [C-22, C-51]. Hence they contextualised the concerns of these organisations, of fighting for protection of Russian language and culture, alongside how, in reality, they were “paid” for these activities, including letter writing and going to “rallies” [C-51]. Ethnic Russians were therefore unsympathetic to the pro-Russian organisations’ symbolic concerns and their material interests, believing they were part of a “scam” to profit personally from such activities [C-22, C-51].

5.3.3 Political Ukrainians

Political Ukrainians were divided between those who were neither informed nor interested in local pro-Russian organisations [C-11a, C-11b, C-59, C-23], and those who strongly maligned these organisations. In particular, Political Ukrainians criticised the channels of money from Russia which the organisations used to gain power and “increase their political influence” [C-2b, C-18, C-23, C-30, C-18]. Political Ukrainians viewed the organisations as more culturally active, “lovers of culture” promoting “patriotic activities” such as “the birthdays of Russians, of Russian poets, and so on, and some dates, important dates for Russians” [C-18, C-23]. However, despite these funds, and even if RE was a political party,
they saw the organisations as having limited political success [C-18, C-23].

Interestingly, Political Ukrainians less overtly maligned the activities of these organisations less than Ethnic Russians, because they did not belittle the organisations’ cultural endeavours as motivated purely by financial aims, explained by lack of interest and knowledge in their activities.

5.3.4 Crimeans

Crimeans were uninterested in pro-Russian organisational practices and, like Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, saw them as irrelevant for their lives. They associated these organisations with feeling near to Russia, which most Crimeans did not, and with working primarily with pensioners because their supporters “liked the Soviet Union” and they wanted to reflect these cultural Soviet relations [C-4, C-36, C-2a].

Crimeans lacked trust in these organisations, like Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, believing they operated outside the law, via relations between RE and ROC where ROC received money from Russia which they passed to RE and groups of their supporters, such as pensioners [C-2a]. In particular, respondents maligned their connections to Russia believing that German Community organisations, would “of course” receive money from Germany, but would have paperwork detailing this transaction. For ROC, they believed there was no paperwork and rather a denial of these transactions [C-2a], demonstrated by Discriminated Russians’ rebuttal of financing claims. Crimeans therefore framed these organisations as malevolent, like Political Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians, and were uninterested in becoming involved in their activities.

5.3.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians were uninterested in pro-Russian organisations. Like Ethnic Russians, Crimeans and Political Ukrainians, they framed these organisations as “usually marginal” and lacking “broad support from people”, because they were “composed of very few” members and supporters [C-26, C-45, C-27, C-13, C-6, C-27]. Ethnic Ukrainians saw these organisations as campaigning on issues of marginal concern because there was no “prejudice” or infringement of Russians’ cultural and linguistic rights in Crimea [C-26]. Unlike previous categories, Ethnic Ukrainians further undermined these organisations by framing their identification as illegitimate because their leaders were themselves not ethnically Russian, such as Sergei Tsekov (ROC head) who they argued was half Bulgarian [C-27], matching their framing of ethnic Russians in Crimea as not really Russian, but rather russified and sovietized.

Ethnic Ukrainians maligned these organisations’ relationship with Russia as much as Ethnic Russians, and more strongly than Crimeans or Political Ukrainians. While they might campaign primarily on cultural issues, these organisations were “puppets of the Kremlin” facilitating Russia’s “interference” in Crimea’s “internal affairs” and its potential to “destabilise” Crimea [C-27, C-26, C-49]. They criticised relations between local Russian officials, such as the Russian Consul, and these organisations as being too close and preferential, believing Russia’s consul had declared they would “cooperate only” with RE [C-27].

In terms of funding, they believed Russia created a system of dependence by providing “financial
support, moral support” only to those who were “loyal to Moscow” [C-27, C-26]. The funds contributed to their lack of success, causing “internal intrigue, strife” over who would “manage those funds”, as Ethnic Russians described also, and resulted in their lack of success because the “average Crimean” did not identify with these quarrels [C-27, C-26]. These funds embedded corrupt practices because the organisations were only concerned with “making money”, ensuring that the funds went into “their pockets” and “social lives” [C-26, C-49 C-27]. Hence, in their view, these organisations, and their connections to Russia, furthered malevolent political practices and contravened Ukrainian legislation which prevented foreign bodies from “support[ing] or fund[ing] political parties”; yet Russia could channel financial support from Russia via ROC to RE which “formally” was “very difficult to prove” [C-27] (see Wilson and Bilous 1993:701).

This section demonstrates how, outside Discriminated Russians, respondents were uninterested in engaging with these associational practices. This reinforces the marginal position of these organisations (ROC, RE) in Crimea’s social and political landscape in the years preceding Crimea’s 2014 annexation. That these organisations were unable to engage Ethnic Ukrainians and Political Ukrainians, is of little surprise, given these organisations’ objectives (language, culture) were distant from the issues of concern to these categories (socio-economic). However Ethnic Russians’s disinterest is more surprising, demonstrating the niche issues these organisations campaigned on, where Ethnic Russians were uninterested, or unconcerned, at an organisational level to promote the strengthening of Russian language and culture.

Ethnic Russians and Ethnic Ukrainians were the most critical of these organisations. They believed they damaged the landscape of Crimean politics, by engaging in corruption and receiving funding from Russia. This allowed Russia undue influence, and contravened Ukrainian legislation, which these respondents framed too as the reasons for these organisations’ limited success. Even those whose concerns aligned were not necessarily engaged with these organisations, as not all Discriminated Russians were engaged with them. Instead some Discriminated Russians criticised these organisations’ nepotistic practices, both in terms of their preferential treatment vis-à-vis Russia, and their preferential treatment, acting as gatekeepers to the benefits of the Compatriot policy.

Hence these organisations remained marginal not only because of their symbolic concerns, which only appealed to a minority of respondents, but also because they operated via informal networks of favouritism and loyalty of “professional Russians”, that were key to their functioning, and to the distribution of resources provided by Compatriot practices. This may be how Russia envisaged the Compatriot policy operating, reflecting Russia’s emphasis on spiritual connections to Russia and evidence of a free choice, by Compatriots, towards ties with Russia, which organisational practices would demonstrate (Article 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2010). However they demonstrate a patron-client cycle of loyalty and dependence between these organisations, as the patron, and Russia, as the clientelistic kin-state (see also Grigas 2012; Waterbury 2011), which in turn affected how other respondents came to frame Russia more negatively because of Russia’s patronage of these corrupt practices.

131
5.4 Membership Practices: Russian Citizenship

This section considers respondents’ practices of Russian citizenship in Crimea. I had anticipated, as the literature suggests, that acquisition of Russian citizenship would be a prevalent activity, as redobândire was in Moldova (Chapter 7), with Crimea as a further case of Russian “passportization”, alongside South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria (Kuzio 2008a; Hedenskog 2008:35). However, as discussed previously in this chapter, figures on the numbers of Russian passport holders failed to present an accurate or reliable picture of passportization within Crimea.

The bottom-up approach of this thesis therefore helped to avoid the political difficulties of unreliable data by providing a deeper analysis of who and why individuals engaged with Russian citizenship. However, as this section shows and of the people interviewed, no respondents held (or admitted to holding) Russian citizenship. Even if some were unwilling to openly disclose their real citizenship status, it can be reasonably inferred that a majority of respondents did not have Russian citizenship, augmented further by the majority who gave reasons as to why they did not want it. This section explores therefore the absence of the practice of citizenship, and passportization, by analysing how and why each inductively derived identification category did not engage with citizenship practices.

5.4.1 Discriminated Russians

*Discriminated Russians* did not hold Russian citizenship but were the only category who wanted the right to acquire it. They regarded it as a normal state practice because Romania, Poland and Turkey already had programmes facilitating acquisition of their citizenship in Ukraine [C-48a]. They believed this was supported also by “half of the citizens of Ukraine […] just because we’re next to the Russian Federation” [C-19a, C-55, C-1].

*Discriminated Russians* wanted Russian citizenship for its material benefits, such as pensions, the ability to work in Russia more easily where wages were “several times higher” than in Crimea, and without the bureaucracy of having to get a “stamp” every time they travelled to Russia [C-55, C-46, C-55]. Only C-25 believed that Russian citizenship was unnecessary, in terms of material benefits because they could already “calmly cross the Russian border”.

Respondents blamed both Ukraine and Russia for restrictions preventing them from acquiring Russian citizenship. They believed Russia could do more, that it could have “insisted” that Ukraine legalise dual citizenship, believing that Ukraine would be forced to concede, as a “small partner”, to Russia’s requests [C-19a]. This fitted with a narrative where *Discriminated Russians* framed Russia as having the obligation to pressure Ukraine.

They blamed Ukraine by framing Russian citizenship as an “element of defence” [C-25]. Ukraine, as their “native state” (*rodnoe gosudarstvo*), needed to do “more to protect them, politically and socially, rather than Russia, so they were “not tempted […] to get dual citizenship” [C-25]. Hence, their desire for Russian citizenship indicated how they felt Ukraine was not acting in its full state capacity, by allowing them to be discriminated against rather than feel protected. It was therefore Ukraine’s responsibility to do more to disincentivise these preferences and to gain their respect for Ukraine’s legitimacy as a state.
However, Ukraine’s ability to wield legitimacy was strengthened by Discriminated Russians’ respect of Ukrainian law. They did not want to “break any law of Ukraine in anyway” given that holding dual citizenship (DC) currently went against the Ukrainian constitution [C-24]. They knew that there were people “behind the scenes” especially in Sevastopol where “it is easy to get two passports, it’s illegal, but...”, but they wanted to operate through legal channels to access something that they thought they should have the right to access [C-55]. Hence, there was a legitimacy conflict, where desire for citizenship indicated a lack of perceived legitimacy of Ukraine, because it failed to offer them enough protection. However their respect of Ukrainian law demonstrated the limits to which they were willing to act in defiance of Ukrainian law.

5.4.2 Ethnic Russians

Most Ethnic Russians were uninterested in, and negative about, acquisition of Russian citizenship. They believed it was an uncommon practice, because they had not “met anyone with dual citizenship” in Crimea [C-57b]. They framed, unlike Discriminated Russians, Russian citizenship as “nonsense” and “not necessary for anyone” in Ukraine because it offered no material benefits, such as the right to travel and work in Russia, that they could not already access [C-9, C-51, C-57b]. Those who knew people who had acquired Russian citizenship explained that it was about material interests, that it was “just business” and not for a “political motivation”, citing friends who had acquired Russian citizenship to live and work in Moscow (i.e. but not to live in Ukraine) [C-22].

Within Ukraine, Ethnic Russians, unlike Discriminated Russians, respected DC as against the policy of Ukraine. They advocated for this approach, believing that individuals should “choose” between Ukraine and Russia, rather than being a member of both and they were happy to choose Ukraine, and not Russia, as “my country” [C-9, C-33]. Only C-53, similar to Discriminated Russians, made a connection to Ukraine’s unwillingness to allow DC and its legitimacy, arguing that Ukraine’s current position demonstrated its “weakness” as a state, where Ukraine should realise the state would be “fine” and “not fall apart after that, as many think” if it permitted DC.

Overall, most Ethnic Russians supported Ukraine’s singular citizenship policy, which required individuals to choose between Ukraine and Russia. However the opinion of a minority, implicating ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy, demonstrated Ukraine’s paranoia to protect itself against multiple citizenship, which appeared, paradoxically, to question post-Soviet Ukraine’s strength and legitimacy.

5.4.3 Political Ukrainians

While some Political Ukrainians saw DC, in theory, as a “good opportunity” [C-31], most framed it as a malevolent practice, associated only with Russian citizenship, which was unnecessary and undesirable [C-37, C-23, C-32]. Beyond themselves, respondents presumed that Russian citizenship was possible and popular, in Crimea and particularly in Sevastopol as an enclave of pro-Russian sentiment and the home of the BSF [C-18, C-37, C-36]. However, personally, respondents did not know anyone who practised Russian citizenship [C-37, C-59, C-32].

In supporting singular citizenship, Political Ukrainians dismissed the material need for practising
Russian citizenship. They disconnected the debate from linguistic rights because in Ukraine you could “speak Russian” or “talk to him in Ukrainian” but “if we live in Ukraine, we have to have Ukrainian citizenship” [C-40]. Instead, they connected Russian citizenship with emigration to Russia where individuals should “leave to Russia” if they “needed” or wanted Russian citizenship because people “should be citizens of their state” [C-31, C-40, C-47, C-21, C-30]. Hence C-28 legitimised how she might in future gain Russian citizenship because she wanted to remain in Russia after her studies there. However because of the connection between practising Russian citizenship and emigration, respondents criticised Ukraine’s ability to provide for its citizens, thereby encouraging migration to Russia because “the state now does not create jobs” [C-47].

Political Ukrainians’ interpretations of the impact of DC practices were mixed. Some believed Russian citizenship had “no effect” (internally) because it was only about emigration [C-47, C-32]. Others maligned Russian citizenship not only because it promoted emigration but because it demonstrated Russia’s “aggressive mentality” towards Ukraine, and Georgia, for their Russian speaking population, and Russia’s trait of “interfering” as it had in South Ossetia [C-2b, C-29]. Overall, Political Ukrainians were supportive of Ukraine’s singular citizenship policy. However they were also critical of the health of the state, socially and geopolitically, because of these citizenship questions.

5.4.4 Crimeans

Crimeans, like Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, saw Russian citizenship as “not necessary”, materially, for “us mere mortals” [C-2a, C-57a, C-36]. They could already travel to Russia and had no desire to immigrate to Russia. Hence Crimeans associated citizenship, as Political Ukrainians, with being resident in Russia [C-2a, C-57a, C-36]. They supported Ukraine’s policy of singular citizenship believing that it was “better” to have single citizenship to ensure people do not “commute” between different states [C-36, C-57a]. That several deputies from the Party of Regions held DC was therefore an object of concern in demonstrating the hypocrisies of respect for Ukraine’s legal institutions [C-4].

Relating Russian citizenship to emigration, Crimeans did not express a sense of threat emanating from Russian citizenship towards Crimea and Ukraine. They believed that Ukraine should not be “afraid” of DC, for facilitating emigration, and geopolitically [C-38]. They rejected the Abkhazia parallel head on, believing this was a “baseless excuse” not to allow DC because Russia would not “drag Crimea” into a conflict, because Russia “cannot cope” with more problems [C-38]. While it was preferable not to encourage DC, to maintain Ukraine’s workforce, it was problematic for Ukraine to continue its obsession that DC was a threat, demonstrating Ukraine’s sensitivity concerning its ability to maintain security over its territory.

5.4.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians maligned DC, arguing it was both “illegal” and restricted individual rights, because those with DC could not register for a party [C-6, C-45]. They supported these restrictions, and upheld that DC should be legally prohibited [C-49]. However Ethnic Ukrainians knew, like Political Ukrainians...

\[\text{\footnotesize 134}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize There was little that could be found in the media to corroborate this. Most stories focused on deputies who held Ukrainian citizenship and US, EU member-state or Israeli citizenship.}\]
Table 5.2: Membership Practices in Crimea by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Practice Citizenship?</th>
<th>Want Citizenship?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ans, that politicians, especially, had acquired DC, such as Lev Mirimsky, who holds both Israeli and Ukrainian citizenship and was instrumental in trying to legalise the right to acquire DC in Ukraine [C-49].

Ethnic Ukrainians pathologised not only Russian DC but also practices of Turkish citizenship [C-49]. Geopolitically, it was only Israeli citizenship that was not maligned, because both Russian and Turkish citizenship had a “geopolitical connection” and could be a source of “insecurity for Crimea” demonstrating that Crimea “cannot escape” from these states [C-45, C-49]. In this respect, unlike previous categories, Ethnic Ukrainians did not demonstrate the same paradox between prohibition of DC and state legitimacy, believing that singular citizenship was necessary to be able to protect Crimea and Ukraine from external influences.

This section has shown how, contrary to assumptions, Crimea was not a case of passportization, based on the lack of engagement, and lack of interest in engaging, with Russian citizenship. In terms of the trustworthiness of respondents for disclosing their citizenship status, Schaffer (2006:160) argues “ordinary language interviewing” is less prone to issues of “falsification” than elite interviews because of the ways they are required to express their “feelings and opinions” that make fabrication harder. Respondents were, therefore, likely honest because of the ways they explained either their dissatisfaction or disinterest, given that methodologically the issue was not a yes or no question, but was pursued via follow-up questions, and because most respondents, excluding Discriminated Russians who had no interest in acquiring Russian citizenship (Table 5.2).

Only Discriminated Russians, framing Russian citizenship as a source of protection against Ukraine, wanted to, but could not access, Russian citizenship. Paradoxically, Discriminated Russians also respected Ukrainian legislation which forbade DC. As expected, neither Political Ukrainians nor Ethnic Ukrainians wanted to engage with Russian citizenship practices. However it is interesting that Ethnic Russians had no interest in engaging with Russian citizenship, framing it as an unnecessary practice for Ukrainian citizens. This emphasised the disconnection between identifying as Russian and wanting to be affiliated with Russia via citizenship.

The inductive categories showed differences too in terms of the impacts of Russian citizenship in Crimea. While Ethnic Russians believed the impact was minimal, encouraging only emigration to Russia for those interested, Political Ukrainians were more critical, believing that Russia used citizenship...
to influence the region. Most critical, as would be expected, were Ethnic Ukrainians who criticised both Russian and Turkish citizenship as a security risk. However Crimea criticised this obsession, believing that Ukraine needed to move beyond DC restrictions, by realising that DC did not threaten Ukrainian security and sovereignty, vis-à-vis Russia.

5.5 Recognition Practices: Compatriot Practices

With the lack of popularity of Russian citizenship practices in Crimea, this section analyses respondents’ engagement with quasi-citizenship membership practices, i.e. the exercise of partial but not full citizenship rights and benefits, by analysing respondents’ engagement with Russia’s Compatriot practices. The section focuses on two elements to analyse these Compatriot practices:

1. identification as a Compatriot, and
2. engagement with specific Compatriot rights and benefits.

In terms of identification, the section addresses how the “loose” and deliberately “ambiguous” but equally “communitarian logic of protecting the collective rights” of Compatriots (sootechestvennik) resonates in practice (Kosmarskaya 2011:60; Shevel 2009a:179; G. Smith 1999b:509; see also Chapter 3). The section analyses whether respondents conceived of themselves as Compatriots and the basis of this identification, e.g. nostalgia for Soviet Union and/or common language and culture. In terms of engagement, the section analyses Compatriot practices, by examining respondents’ engagement with facilitated resettlement programmes to Russia and scholarships (Section 5.6).

5.5.1 Discriminated Russians

Discriminated Russians were the only respondents (excluding a few Ethnic Russians and Crimea) who identified as Compatriots and were interested in the Compatriot policy. They tied their identification as Compatriots to Russia, and the Soviet Union, as their homeland, and their nostalgia for the status they held during the Soviet Union. It had not mattered where ethnic Russians lived during the Soviet Union, because it was “one country” [C-46]. However “since the collapse […] it has become very essential” because they were left “sort of abroad” from their “homeland” after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, hence, “we are their Compatriots” [C-48a, C-48b, C-46]. Their sense of threat within Ukraine heightened their sense that the Compatriot policy was “certainly necessary” because of the “infringement of my rights” to speak Russian whereas Russia’s “Compatriots should live with dignity in any country of the world” [C-25, C-46].

Beyond nostalgia and discrimination, Discriminated Russians associated being a Compatriot with a civilizational understanding of being Russian, of “a common culture, a civilization” [C-20, C-46]. This separated them from Europe, which was “foreign”, but connected Ukraine to the Russian citizenship, and made members of this civilization Compatriots [C-20, C-46]. They imbued the Russian civilization with a sense of superiority because “we (Russians) are probably […] the second or third largest nation […] after the Chinese, Indians” [C-25]. This civilizational conceptualisation of Compatriots echoes the discourse of far right Russian nationalism, which uses a civilizational perspective to argue that Russia is more than its contemporary borders. These far right nationalists combine nostalgia for a
time when Russia was larger and stronger with a Eurasianist “supra-ethnic” civilizational discourse, to claim Ukraine as subservient part of a Russia, which dominates Eurasian space (Tsygankov 2013:64; Laruelle 2004:121). This ideological coherence between Discriminated Russians and Russian far right nationalist ideologies, is both interesting but unsurprising, and demonstrates why this ideology, and engagement with Compatriot policy, might be restricted to those who were most pro-Russia, and pro-Russian nationalism.

While Discriminated Russians did “appreciate” that Russia “does not forget about our Compatriots”, they wanted to “see Russia doing more active steps” to help them [C-19a, C-25, C-24]. They were disappointed both by what the Compatriot Policy failed to offer, the right to acquire Russian citizenship, and what it did offer, namely resettlement, which facilitated Compatriots’ migration to Russia [C-48a, C-48b, C-46]. Discriminated Russians wanted to stay in “sunny Crimea”, their “homeland” where they had “roots”, and not move to “snowy Siberia” and Russia’s “minor regions” [C-48b, C-19a, C-48a, C-55, C-24, C-46]. This resettlement threatened their existence in the peninsula “because if all Russians leave Crimea to live in Russia, unfortunately, in Crimea, nobody will remain” [C-19b]. This demonstrates, as argued in Chapter 1, how Discriminated Russians did not imagine Russia as their external homeland to which they longed to return. Rather what they wanted from Russia required changes within Ukraine and Russia, to enable them to access Russian citizenship and to ensure this acquisition enabled them to “live by the laws” of Ukraine. It is unlikely, therefore, that Discriminated Russians would ever be satisfied with a Compatriot policy that fell short of offering full citizenship rights.

5.5.2 Ethnic Russians

Consistent with the split of Ethnic Russians in terms of their sense of entitlements vis-à-vis Russia (Section 5.4.2), they were split also in terms of Compatriot practices between: 1) those who identified as Compatriots, and had positive associations, 2) those who identified as Compatriots but had negative associations with the Russian state and 3) those who did not, and had no interest to, identify as Compatriots.

In the first group, a few respondents identified as Russian Compatriots and believed that Russia should offer support to them [C-34, C-9, C-53]. They believed Russia’s help was analogous to other states, because “Muslim countries (e.g. Turkey) help Muslims here”, so it was “right” also for Russia to “help theirCompatriots” [C-34]. They identified as Compatriots on the basis of their symbolic identification, because “I’m Russian” (russkii), and their cultural and spiritual closeness to Russia and/or Moscow, as somewhere they felt they had a personal relationship with, because it was “part of my identity” [C-9, C-53, C-34].

The second group did not understand Russia’s official conception of what it meant to be a Compatriot. At the interpersonal level, they had a sense of “kinship” with Russians in Russia, as their “native people” and often the location of their relatives too [C-22, C-51]. However, this sense of closeness remained “at the level of the household” and did not extent to the state, because of how Russia was governed, and especially “because of Putin” [C-22, C-51]. Hence they identified as Compatriots of

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⁷³ As Laruelle (2004:117) describes, “[T]he definition of a Eurasian third continent” between the Orient and Occident “actually implies the idea of a Russian third way that rejects the European model: Eurasianists expect an authoritarian and messianic theocracy”.

137
5.5. RECOGNITION PRACTICES: COMPATRIOT PRACTICES

Russian people, but not as Compatriots of the Russian state.

However, most Ethnic Russians, the third group, did not identify as Russian Compatriots [C-57b, C-7, C-1]. Some were more informed about Compatriot practices, describing how they held “patriotic meetings”, but were still apathetic, if not negative, about these practices which created an “excuse” for Russia to engage with Russians abroad [C-3, C-8]. Others pathologised the Compatriot policy, because of its associations with organisations like ROC, as a “big corruption scheme to launder money” through “those projects which Russia runs for their Compatriots” because it was “unclear” what they were funding [C-21]. Russia appeared therefore as patron of these corrupt and nepotistic practices within Crimea, with these organisations appearing as local clients of the Compatriot policy, which tainted also any associations with the Compatriot policy as a funder of this malevolence.

While divided in whether they identified as Compatriots or not, Ethnic Russians were unified in their antipathy towards Compatriot rights and benefits. They were “not interested” in the policy of “resettlement” believing there was “no one to leave” Crimea for Russia [C-53, C-51, C-34]. Crucially, they believed that, as a “Russian enclave” Russians “do not have to leave Crimea” because they live freely in Crimea [C-53]. Secondly, they disliked the regions, such as Tuva (southern Siberia), that Russia promoted for resettlement as “not suitable for Crimea” [C-33, C-51 C-53]. Rather than migrate to Russia as Compatriots, they believed it was “better”, if they wanted to migrate, “just to go to England” [C-33, C-51 C-53]. Hence their hypothetic choice of emigration destinations was not motivated by linguistic or cultural closeness, but by material understandings of where would further personal development and opportunities. Ethnic Russians, regardless of whether they disagreed about identifying as Compatriots, were dissatisfied by Compatriot practices because they either offered rights that the majority were uninterested in, or aware of, or for the minority by not offering enough rights.

5.5.3 Political Ukrainians

Few Political Ukrainians were informed about Russia’s Compatriot Policy [e.g. C-32, C-37, C-11a, C-11b, C-12, C-29, C-18, C-47, C-31, C-23] and none identified themselves as Compatriots of Russia. Rather they identified as compatriots of each other, as citizens and residents of Ukraine, while they did not identify with those living in Russia [C-11a, C-11b, C-31]. This lack of self-identification as being a Compatriot contributed to their sense of confusion about what the purpose of the policy was [C-11a, C-11b] and who Russia considered to be Compatriots, whether you had to have “both passports, Russian and Ukrainian” [C-18] or whether you had to have relatives from Russia [C-30].

Political Ukrainians were uninterested in what Russia offered, which they presumed concerned resettlement to Russia [C-23]. They saw this policy of encouraging “all native Russians to get back to Russia” as “not promising good things” and not being used “very widely” by people from Crimea because it did not offer the ability to live in Moscow, which was where those who wanted to move to Russia wanted primarily to live [C-18, C-59].

Only C-28 framed Compatriot practices as “cool (kruto)” and “very great (ochen’ klasno)” because she was a beneficiary, studying as a Compatriot on a Russian scholarship. She was grateful for the mate-
rial benefits it provided, namely access to better opportunities in Russia compared to Crimea/Ukraine. It was significant therefore that the only Political Ukrainian who reflected positively on Compatriot practices was someone who benefited materially, though not symbolically, from Russian opportunities.

5.5.4 Crimeans

Most Crimeans, as most Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, had little knowledge and interest in Russia’s Compatriot Policy and did not identify as Compatriots [C-36, C-4, C-57a]. Only C-2a (excluding C-38 discussed below) described Compatriots as those whose parents and/or grandparents were born in the former territory of the USSR, but did not identify within this framework [C-2a].

Most Crimeans did not connect Russia’s policy of resettlement to the Compatriot Policy. They were also uninterested in resettlement because “no one will go to the hinterland” to live in Russia [C-4, C-2a, C-57a]. As others, Crimeans did not want to move to somewhere so climatically different to Crimea, such as Siberia. Rather, if they ever moved to Russia, it would not be where Russia wanted them to move, but to live where they had familial connections [C-2a], demonstrating the importance of interpersonal connections over state-sponsored programmes. Others oriented themselves away from Russia, explaining that they were more likely to want to visit, or move to elsewhere in Ukraine such as Kyiv and Lviv, as places to which they felt closer [C-36].

Only C-38 was more interested in Compatriot practices. Like C-28, C-38 was a beneficiary of the Compatriot policy as an employee of an organisation within the Compatriot framework and because, more symbolically, he framed Russia as having a post-Soviet “debt” to pay to Ethnic Russians in post-Soviet space. He identified as a Compatriot and invoked a nostalgic explanation framing Compatriots as a supra-ethnic category comprised of those “who lived in the vast Soviet Union”. Hence it was not necessary to be Russian, because a “Compatriot may be Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar” as long as “he speaks Russian well, if he likes Russian culture, Soviet, Russian culture, here” [C-38]. As descendants of the Soviet state, he believed all these groups “belong to our common history” and “we’re not going to give this up” even if the Soviet state no longer exists [C-38]. This discourse was most potent for pensioners, who not only have “a lot of relatives in Russia” but “feel nostalgia, they feel longing” for what no longer exists, but which culturally, can be replicated via the Compatriot idea [C-38]. This was significant for demonstrating the niche appeal of Compatriot practices, which appealed to the elderly, as the dwindling cohort who remembered and experienced the Soviet Union, and those who benefited from being Compatriots, e.g. as employees. However Compatriot practices had little traction beyond the elderly, and the beneficiaries of the policy, and in particular for the post-Soviet generation with neither experience of, nor nostalgia for, the Soviet era.

5.5.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians, like Ethnic Russians, Political Ukrainians and Crimeans, were uninterested in Compatriot practices and did not identify as Compatriots of Russia. They reasoned that they “did not have a relationship with the Russian Federation” and instead were “supporter[s] of Ukrainian statehood” [C-6, C-45, C-49].
Table 5.3: Recognition practices in Crimea by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Compatriot?</th>
<th>Rights and Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Disappointing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>A few</td>
<td>Unnecessary &amp; undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians</td>
<td>N (only beneficiary)</td>
<td>Unnecessary &amp; undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeans</td>
<td>N (only beneficiary)</td>
<td>Unnecessary &amp; undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Unnecessary &amp; undesirable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic Ukrainians explained how “at least in Crimea, very few people [...] use” the Compatriot policy because it was only concerned, from their perspective, with resettlement to “remote areas (okrainy) of Russia [...] where no one from Sevastopol, from Crimea wants to go” [C-26, C-45, C-49]. Russia was therefore not a resettlement threat currently; while Crimean residents had originally left to Russia “now few leave” [C-45]. It would only be if Russia could “implement a higher standard of living of people”, because Ukraine was “beginning to lag behind Russia”, that this declining rate of emigration to Russia might reverse [C-45], indicating the importance of socioeconomic well-being in incentivising or disincentivising emigration to Russia.

Overall, Ethnic Ukrainians were critical of the Compatriot Policy, believing that it neither appealed to them, nor does it “support Russians (russkii)” [C-27]. Rather the policy was about supporting “political movements [...] like pro-Kremlin movements”, reflecting their criticism of pro-Russian organisations, because the Compatriot policy was designed to increase Russia’s “political influence in Ukraine and in other countries” via these organisations [C-27]. They saw Russia as motivated by self-interest: Russia wanted to encourage immigration of more ethnic Russians to ease Russia’s “very bad demographic situation” and “erosion of the Slavic population”, particularly in villages, where Russia wanted to fill them with ethnic Russians otherwise “they will be filled by someone else” and Russia “will be represented by anyone, there [will be only] Asians, Chinese etc.” [C-26].

This section has showed how far recognition practices were contested, rather than engaged with, by respondents. Contrary to expectations, it was not only Discriminated Russians who identified as Compatriots (Table 5.3). However what differed between respondents were the motivations for identifying as Russian Compatriots. Discriminated Russians framed the Compatriot policy as necessary to protect them from Ukraine’s discrimination, and redolent of civilizational discourses: others (one Crimean and one Political Ukrainian) identified as Compatriots, because they were beneficiaries of the policy, demonstrating the patronal network through which Compatriot practices functioned. Several Ethnic Russians also identified as Compatriots wanting to either feel more spiritually close to Russia, or seeing the Russian people, but not the Russian state, as their compatriots. However this did neither challenged, nor replaced, their political affiliation to Ukraine.

However, most respondents from these categories did not identify as Compatriots, showing a lack of understanding and interest in what the policy offered (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians, Crimeans, some Ethnic Russians). Some even pathologised these practices, linking Compatriot practices...
to corrupt pro-Russian organisations (some Ethnic Russians, Ethnic Ukrainians). Respondents’ identification was therefore not a factor determining identification as Compatriots of Russia. Rather, what defined respondents’ identification as a Compatriot was how far they benefited, or wanted to benefit, from this policy, whether via Compatriot organisations, or other opportunities (education, employment).

The Compatriot policies’ “ambiguous” stance toward Russians, and former Soviet citizens, outside Russia demonstrates the difficulties of its appeal. Crimean residents, in particular ethnic Russians, should, in post-Soviet space, have been a key area for Russia to engage everyday citizens, or at least those beyond members of marginal “pro-Kremlin” organisations such as ROC and RE, and those benefiting from Compatriot practices (Shevel 2011b:179). Kivirähk et al. (2010:258) argue that Compatriot discourses and activities were prevalent in Crimea, pre-annexation, because Compatriot organisations were “much more active” than elsewhere and were more supported by Russia because “Crimea occupies a special place in the rhetoric of Russian Compatriots”, not only as a territory dominated by Russian language and culture and but as a former Russian territory (Kivirähk et al. 2010:258). However this was, as shown in this section, not the case beyond specific niche groups who themselves were politically and socially marginal.

Respondents were also dissatisfied with Compatriot practices, but for different reasons. For Discriminated Russians, the Compatriot practices did not go far enough in offering rights they sought (membership), or in protecting their interests, given their feeling of discrimination vis-à-vis Ukraine. The policy of resettlement was not attractive to any respondents, and even failed to be connected as a Compatriot practice by Crimeans, because it offered neither an attractive climate (Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians), nor economic opportunities (Ethnic Ukrainians). Rather if respondents wanted to leave Crimea, it would be to places they chose, such as where they had relatives (Crimeans), to elsewhere in Ukraine (Crimeans) or to Western Europe (Ethnic Russians). Overall, Compatriot practices failed to meet the expectations of those who were engaged (Discriminated Russians) or to engage those the Compatriot policy could have sought to engage with (e.g. ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Crimea).

5.6 Educational Practices

This section analyses educational practices in Crimea, arising from the Compatriot policy. Unlike in Moldova (Chapter 7), this section demonstrates little uptake and interest in Compatriot educational practices, intensified by the few places available to study (<50 per year, Chapter 3), which is fewer by orders of magnitude than Romania makes available (5-6,000 per year). Secondly, respondents focused more on educational practices in institutions closer to home that were affiliated to Russian institutions, in particular Moscow State University’s (MGU) branch in Sevastopol, which was more well-known than external educational opportunities under the umbrella of the Compatriot policy (Chapter 3). This failure to engage, or be interested in engaging, with Compatriot practices, i.e. via its educational practices, provides further evidence of the weakness of these Compatriot practices. This is striking given educational realities, where Crimea remained an enclave, de jure and de facto, of Russian language instruction at university because, beyond Crimea, de jure, the language of instruction was Ukrainian,
even if Russian was used in practice (Ministry of Education and Science 2010).

5.6.1 Discriminated Russians

_Discriminated Russians_ were the most informed and interested in Russian educational practices. The ability to study in Russia was an important and “unique” opportunity which could “solve this problem of Russians” who in Ukraine, outside of Crimea, were no longer able to receive higher education in Russian [C-24, C-19b]. However the opportunities to study in Russia, provided by the Russian state, were “very small” and, crucially, fewer than opportunities than “in a Western University, European, American” [C-24, C-55]. Following their criticisms of the Compatriot policy, they believed Russia could and should do more by having a “separate programme for higher education of Russians living in Crimea” [C-24].

Respondents explained the role of pro-Russian/Compatriot organisations, in particular ROC, which facilitated access to Compatriot scholarships. These organisations ensured their members were “referred to good universities” because “as Compatriots they receive recommendations” [C-25, C-1], demonstrating again the patronage embedded in these organisations’ links with Russia and Compatriot practices. Those outside of these organisations framed ROC’s management of the scholarship programme as overly nepotistic [C-48a].

Paradoxically, _Discriminated Russians_ criticised also the “negative aspect” because Russia, via these scholarships, contributed to an “outflow” of people to Russia of the “best people” when they should “come back here” and “give back” to their “homeland (Crimea)” [C-25]. This reinforces how _Discriminated Russians_ wanted Russia to help them develop in situ, rather than encouraging their migration to the kin-state, illustrating the gap between the supply and demand of Compatriot practices.

5.6.2 Ethnic Russians

Of _Ethnic Russians_ who were aware of Russia’s educational policies in Crimea, the majority focused on the presence of the Russian State University (MGU) branch in Sevastopol. A handful knew of the free places made available but, as C-21 described, few others knew of the possibilities and there were few places available (as Compatriots in Russian universities within Russia). They noted, in particular, that MGU in Sevastopol offered Russian-language education, unlike most universities (at least de jure) in Ukraine outside Crimea, and was associated also with educating the families of Russian military in Sevastopol [C-3, C-22, C-11c, C-57b].

While they believed that a Russian degree had a better reputation than a Ukrainian degree [C-11c, C-57b], the interest of _Ethnic Russians_ in Russia’s educational engagement was minimal. Several _Ethnic Russians_ had studied in Russia (in Moscow, C-53) or Russian-based institutions (MGU in Sevastopol, C-57b) but did not associate this with Compatriot practices. Studying in Moscow had important impacts for C-53, by reinforcing it as part of her “cognitive map […] part of my world” as the place where she had studied and where she had friends.

C-57b offered a more critical stance to her education at MGU Sevastopol. She had chosen this institution because her chosen subject, State Municipal Administration, was only available there. However
this created problems because this institution, providing Russian diplomas, functioned separately from Ukrainian institutions, requiring its graduates to convert their diplomas into Ukrainian diplomas before they could, for example, take up jobs in the Ukrainian civil service. C-57b was pleased by the high level of education, and the lower level of corruption than Ukrainian institutions in Crimea. However, she was critical that her degree focused on Russia, where the teachers had “come from Russia”, leaving her with a lack of knowledge about the system (Ukraine) she eventually she would work in, demonstrating the tensions arising from a foreign education experience in a domestic setting.

Overall few Ethnic Russians linked the Compatriot policy to educational possibilities, even though they framed Russian education as superior to Ukrainian education, and closer to their native language, since in Ukraine (outside Crimea) they had few opportunities to study in Russian.

5.6.3 Political Ukrainians

Only C-28 engaged with Russian educational policies, as a current student who received one of the few free places (for Crimean residents) and free accommodation at university in Krasnodar. She heard about the opportunity to study for free in Russia at school which referred her to a conference at the Rossotrudnichestvo centre in Simferopol which then assisted her with her application, demonstrating the informal connections through which these opportunities were disseminated. As a student of journalism, she saw Russia as providing more opportunities for being a journalist, and more opportunities in general, than Ukraine and wanted to remain in Russia after her studies. Studying in Russia had not changed how she self-identified, as Ukrainian, but had changed how she felt about Russia, which now felt “like home” because she had friends there [C-28].

Those who were not beneficiaries expressed knowledge of, but little interest in, opportunities to study in Russia for free [C-18, C-30, C-31, C-32, C-29] and at MGU in Sevastopol [C-59, C-30, C-32]. They had wanted to remain in Crimea for university to be close to their family and because in Crimea they could study in the Russian language versus elsewhere in Ukraine [C-11a, C-11b]. This demonstrated an interesting constraint, that Crimea offered both the opportunity to be close to remain near family (which Russia did not) and study in their native language (which Ukraine outside of Crimea, officially, did not). This reinforced the importance of Political Ukrainians as a category of native Russian speakers, who still identified themselves primarily as Ukrainian citizens.

Excluding C-28, Political Ukrainians pathologised Russian educational practices, more than other categories, because students did not return to Ukraine after studying abroad “in Russia, or in Turkey” so these scholarships were not “so good in economy, politics” for Ukraine [C-18]. Secondly, they believed these institutions, in particular MGU in Sevastopol, promoted pro-Russia “propaganda”, such as the idea that “[Black] sea divides them from Russia like the river [Neva] divides St Petersburg” [C-30, C-59]. Russia’s policies, for Political Ukrainians, had a stronger geopolitical connotation than French programmes, by encouraging those receiving scholarships to feel “thankful” towards Russia, they were walking towards neo-imperialist goals to further “Slavic integration” (slavianskaia integratsyia) [C-30]. Hence, Political Ukrainians pathologised the power of education to create cohorts sympathetic to the kin-state.

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74Krasnodar is located in Southern Russia, in the part of Russia nearest the Crimean peninsula.
5.6. EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES

5.6.4 Crimeans

While this section focuses on C-38, other Crimeans did not actively discuss educational opportunities in Russia. Stemming from his identification as a Compatriot, and belief that Russia had a “moral obligation” to help its Compatriots, he framed educational policies as a normal gesture for post-imperial states, such as Russia and the UK. For example, he believed it was normal for the UK to be “interested in teaching people from the Commonwealth” [C-38]. This obligation, that Russia could “at least” offer this “free education” as Compatriots, was strengthened by referencing post-Soviet realities concerning the difficulties of getting a job [C-38]. Hence Russia could help Compatriots overcome “half the battle” of getting a good education, allowing them a better chance of securing a job [C-38].

Most Crimeans were uninterested in Russian educational practices, excluding C-38 who saw these practices as consistent with the general obligation that Russia had to its Compatriots, as a post-imperial state with a large cultural diaspora.

5.6.5 Ethnic Ukrainians

Ethnic Ukrainians did not discuss the role of Russia in education.

Educational kin-state practices can have a big impact in educating, and engaging, future kin generations according to the interests of the kin-state, as the Moldovan case will demonstrate. However this was not true in the Crimean case, where the impact was low (given the low number of scholarships) and limited to those within Compatriot networks. Instead, respondents knew more about local Russian educational opportunities, in particular MGU’s branch in Sevastopol, than about Compatriot scholarships in Russia. This is paradoxical, given the higher prestige of Russian education, compared to Ukrainian (Ethnic Russians), and given their preference for Russian-language education, which institutions in Ukraine outside of Crimea could not provide (Political Ukrainians).

An expansion of these opportunities was not what even the most vociferous Compatriots wanted. Discriminated Russians wanted in-situ support for Russians in Crimea, rather than Russia-sponsored programmes to facilitate Crimea’s brain drain, which in turn was seen as unpatriotic to the “homeland” of Crimea. However, beyond Discriminated Russians, education did little to further respondents’ engagement with Russia, given the small provision of scholarships, which in line with nepotism, were accessible largely through pro-Russian Compatriot organisations, meaning that those outside these networks received little information that such provision existed.

This demonstrated the patronage niche of these practices where those inside could gain access (Discriminated Russians) while the access of outsiders was contingent on their informal networks (C-28). This emphasised the outsider status of those who Russia could have sought to engage with, namely Ethnic Russians and Political Ukrainians, as Russian speakers with few opportunities to receive education in Russian elsewhere in Ukraine. Using these inductive categories shows the niche functioning of the Compatriot scholarships, facilitating access of those within Compatriot networks (Discriminated Russians), while failing to reach those outside these organisations who were neither interested nor in-
formed about the few scholarships available, in comparison to Moldova where there was wide knowledge (across identification categories) of the availability and accessibility of Romanian scholarships.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter provides important insights towards understanding everyday engagement in Crimea with Russia in the months preceding Crimea’s annexation by Russia in 2014, an act legitimised by a kin-state who claimed it had a “moral obligation to protect Compatriots (sootechestvenniki)” in Crimea (Wanner 2014:428). That Crimea’s annexation was explained by its uniform pro-Russian orientation, where “many” Crimean residents were “Russian citizens or dual-passport holders” (C. King 2014), demonstrates how far Crimea was an understudied region of Ukraine where assumptions abounded of Crimea as a case of passportization and active Compatriot engagement (Kivirähk et al. 2010), populated by those lacking much loyalty or affinity to Ukraine (Hedenskog 2008; Shevchuk 1996). However these assumptions lacked scrutiny or empirical examination. As Wanner (2014:430) argues, the rationale behind Russia’s intervention suggested that Compatriots were “easily identifiable”, and that they identified themselves as Compatriots, and wanted engagement with Russia as Compatriots, and that the Compatriot policy should have been most effective in Crimea (Kivirähk et al. 2010).

The agency-centred perspective of this chapter problematized, firstly, the prevalence of passportization, by showing how most respondents had little interest in being passportized (except Discriminated Russians), and had little ability to be passportized, should they wish to. Secondly, in terms of Compatriot practices, certainly some respondents identified as Compatriots; however, what is important is who identified as compatriots (chiefly Discriminated Russians), why they identified as Compatriots, and what kind of status, rights and benefits they wanted as Compatriots. It was expected that Discriminated Russians would be most likely to engage with Russia. Yet it is interesting, empirically, that it was predominantly Discriminated Russians who identified as Compatriots. This shows a conflict between how Russia wanted individuals to identify as Compatriots, aligning with a “smart foreign and domestic policy, dictated purely by pragmatic goals” and not about “nostalgia and superstitions” (Shevel 2011b:199; Medvedev 2009), and realities in Crimea where only those espousing a nostalgic attitude towards, and professional ties to, Russia were interested in Compatriot practices. Those lacking this nostalgia, or at least “spiritual” connection to Russia (Ethnic Ukrainians, Political Ukrainians), were confused about how and why they should have any such relationship with Russia.

Among the minority of Ethnic Russians and Crimeans who identified as Compatriots, discrimination was not the motivating trope. Rather these respondents were nostalgic for their former connection with Russia and lamented the feeling of being disconnected from Russian culture. However, by contrast, most Ethnic Russians had little interest in identifying as Compatriots, aligning with how they reconciled themselves as members of Ukrainian political space. That few Ethnic Russians and Crimeans identified as Compatriots demonstrates the niche functioning of this policy which was effective in operating out of nepotistic networks and linking to, and likely reinforcing, tropes of discrimination. It was this organisational nepotism, and its relationship with corrupt practices via Russian funding, that respondents were most critical of, in particular Ethnic Russians and Ethnic Ukrainians, while Political Ukrainians were less (deliberately) informed and, hence, less critical. This nepotism was compounded.
by educational practices, where respondents knew more about local educational opportunities (e.g. at MGU in Sevastopol) than scholarships in Russia, unless they were part of pro-Russian organisations or became aware of scholarships via these organisations.

Contributing to this lack of interest in the Compatriot policy was the criticism of Compatriot rights and benefits. Across the categories, respondents were either uninterested (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians) or disappointed (Discriminated Russians) by what the Compatriot policy offered and failed to offer, with Discriminated Russians content only if citizenship was instituted. Similarly, Compatriot programmes, resettlement in particular, failed to appeal to them, regardless of whether they identified as Compatriots: no respondents wanted to migrate to under-developed “remote areas” (okrainy) of Russia, to service Russia’s demographic needs (see also Saari 2014; Peuch 2008). Perhaps, if the Compatriot policy had offered more attractive rights, or ethnic Russians had experienced more systematic and persistent discrimination at home (e.g. as explains the popularity of kin-state migration to Germany of ethnic Germans from east and central Europe after 1989, Cordell and Wolff 2007), this might have affected respondents’ identification as Compatriots.

Respondents were concerned about Russia’s influence in Crimea, such as Russia’s BSF (particularly Ethnic Ukrainians and Political Ukrainians). However this influence was disconnected from the Compatriot policy, given its failure to attract engagement from those beyond organisational networks and those not aligning with the discrimination trope (i.e. most respondents). Here, this chapter deviates from the two competing perspectives conceptualising the Compatriot policy described in Chapter 3, which explain the Compatriot policy either as a moderate policy (Zevelev 2008; Rutland 2010), or a policy able to wield significant soft, if not hard, power (Kivirähk et al. 2010; Kudors 2010; Byford 2012; Roslycky 2011; Littlefield 2009). For most respondents, regardless of how they identified, and crucially including Ethnic Russians, this was a moderate policy which barely touched their lives. In other ways, as a policy advancing and financing kin-state patronage (see Waterbury 2011), the Compatriot policy offered channels of funding to strengthen organisational networks, and systems of loyalty and dependence between these networks and the Russian state.

This did not make these organisations successful, achieving low electoral success (RE: 4% in 2010 Crimean elections), or make their members satisfied with the possible Compatriot practices, because they wanted even stronger rights in situ. However it enabled the development and maintenance of organisations who could facilitate, and support, the wielding of Russian hard power, as demonstrated by Crimea’s annexation in 2014, which installed the leaders of these organisations, and their friends and family, in key positions of power.⁷⁵

More nuanced approaches to analysing the contentions of kin-state policies are therefore needed to discriminate between policies which engage mass versus niche components of society and politics, and adjusting theories of soft and hard power implications accordingly. In the Crimean case there remains an interesting disjunction between the ability of Russia to engage with, and wield soft (and eventually hard) power over, niche groups of associated interests (symbolic and material), while lacking the ability to engage outside of these niche groups, either symbolically or materially.

⁷⁵The leader of RE, Sergei Aksenov, was key in facilitating this annexation, becoming the leader of the Crimean republic. Aksenov’s father, Valerii Aksenov, and sister in law, Evgeniia Dobrynia, would later win seats in the Crimean parliament post-annexation.
5.7. CONCLUSION

The next chapters move to the Moldovan case to examine the meanings of Romanian identification (Chapter 6) and engagement with Romanian kin-state practices (Chapter 7).
Chapter 6

Kin Majority Identification: What Does it Mean to be Romanian in Moldova?

“If Bessarabia would not be Romania, neither would Romania be Romania!”

Constantin Tănase (2011)

“Yes, we are Moldovans of the old Moldova; however, we are part of the large body of Romanians who are settled throughout Romania, Bukovina and Transylvania. Our brothers from these regions do not name themselves after where they live, but call themselves Romanians. We should do the same.”

Alexei Mateevici 1917, cited by Moldovan (1993)

“As a popular joke goes: Mom’s Russian, Dad’s Romanian, but little Ivan is Moldovan.”

The Economist (2014)

Following the analysis of kin identification in Moldova (Chapter 4), this chapter adopts the same approach to disentangle the meanings of Romanian/kin identification in Moldova in terms of different forms of identification (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political and historical). This chapter outlines why it is necessary to look beyond mutually exclusive census categories, and dichotomous and politicised Moldovanist versus pan-Romanianist perspectives, to examine the complexities of kin majority identification in Moldova by exploring how these identities are experienced by those on the ground, alongside other dimensions of identification, including regional (European) and historical (Soviet).
6.1 Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Moldova

Discussions of ethnicity and identity politics have dominated Moldova’s post-Soviet state-building experience, structuring Moldova’s political spectrum, as “the only cleavage in post-Soviet Moldovan politics” (Danero Iglesias 2013:783; see also Ciscel 2008; C. King 2003). Politically, and academically, the focus remains on questions of ethnicity, where the salience and role of other social identities in structuring everyday life and political activity have been excluded (Cash 2007:589). Yet studying these questions remains an important endeavour, given Moldova’s anomalous status as the “only” post-soviet state “whose titular” and, hence majority population, is “divided over the essentials of its own history and culture” (C. King 2003:61), which perpetuates debates about history, culture, ethnicity and language in Moldova.

Questions of identity and ethnicity remain a part of everyday discourses and experiences. Walking around Chişinău, competing graffiti ask: “who are we?” and respond: “we’re Moldovan”, “we’re Romanian” and “Bessarabia is Romanian land”. However these questions, from an academic and political perspective, are still analysed through reductive categories, which idealise the possibility of being either Romanian or Moldovan, as censuses have required, without considering whether it is possible to be both and how these identities might work together (March 2007). Rather, Eyal and Smith (1996:223; see also Marcu 2009 in one of the most highly-cited texts on post-Soviet ethnic politics, argued that for:

“Moldovans, there can be no doubt, for, according to any conceivable definition of a nation, they can only be considered Romanians. They share exactly the same language, practise the same faith and have the same history.”

This assertion contrasts with Moldova’s post-Soviet census (2004) which reported a majority defining their ethnicity and language as Moldovan, while only a minority identified their language and ethnicity as Romanian (Figure 6.1).76

The two intellectual camps of Moldovanism and pan-Romanianism (Chapter 2) also argue dichotomous positions concerning who Moldovans are and their relationship to Romania, claiming on behalf of this community that the majority are wholly Romanian (pan-Romanianism) or are separate and different from Romanians (Moldovanism). It is “striking” therefore, that on the one hand intellectual pan-Romanianists discount Moldovan identity claiming its artificiality while an enduring majority of the Moldova population continue to define themselves as Moldovan (C. King 2003:60).

This chapter is concerned both with experiences of top-down categories, and how these debates are reconciled on the ground, analysing how respondents explain their identification, construct self/other boundaries, and position themselves vis-à-vis their home-state (Moldova) and kin-state (Romania). The chapter examines both how respondents identified and the rationale for this identification, unpacking how respondents negotiated and appropriated different linguistic, religious, historical and political ways of identifying.

76That these languages are separate is more a political statement given that the languages are mutually intelligible (Ciscel 2006; C. King 1994).
6.1. Top-Down Approaches to Questions of Identity in Moldova

To contextualise the bottom-up data discussed in this chapter, this section considers existing ethnicity data in Moldova at the official and sociological level. This chapter reiterates Chapter 4’s criticisms of census data, that censuses are collected in highly politicised environments where states use censuses to gain verification for the identity discourses they wish to project. Censuses are therefore fundamental to, and inseparable from, nation-building processes (Goldscheider 2002:1795; Brubaker 2011).

This is visible in analysing the results from Moldova’s censuses, from the first Tsarist census to post-Soviet censuses, where the change in the results of Moldovan censuses has stemmed from the changing categories of identification, instigated by those in power who at different stages have tried to Romanianise and de-Romanianise the population of Moldova (Figure 3.5, Page 64).⁷⁷ During the Tsarist empire, ethnicity was analogous with language, where speakers of Moldovan and Romanian were counted together in the Moldovan category (Demoskop Weekly 1897). In Greater Romania’s 1930 census, during the project of Romanianisation, Greater Romania counted everyone, excluding minorities, as Romanian. This was reversed by the USSR, where censuses reflected the coercive policy of Moldovan nation-building in the MSSR, resulting in a low number identifying as Romanian.⁷⁸ Respondents in Moldova described the impossibility of identifying as Romanian in the MSSR where identifying as Romanian was seen as anti-Soviet and faced potential repercussions, such as deportation (see also Caşu 2010; Caşu and Sandle 2014). In Moldova’s 2004 post-Soviet census,⁷⁹ Moldovan remains a durable ethnic category (C. King 2003), with a Moldovan ethnic majority and a Romanian ethnic minority, though larger (by 30 times) than in the 1989 Soviet census.⁸⁰ More also identified their language as Romanian (Figure 6.1).

However the 2004 census should also be viewed critically given that PCRM, as the governing party during the 2004 census, were criticised for coercing individuals to identify as Moldovan, rather than Romanian, to bolster the Moldovan population (Protsyk 2007; March 2007).⁸¹ This is consistent too with PCRM’s ethnic perspective, which is to minimise cultural connections between post-Soviet Moldova and Romania (Arel 2002a, 2002b). One respondent [C-28] reported his experiences of under-counting of Romanians in the 2004 census in his village, explaining there had been pressure not to identify as Romanian because, he reasoned, “everyone feared Voronin” and so “who could at that time to write openly that they are Romanian and boast this”. However, as an affiliate of PL, a pro-Romanian party, C-28 was also offering a politicised perspective of identifying, proudly and unequivocally, as Romanian.

Kin-states also demonstrate a politicised attitude to censuses, by reinterpreting census data collected by the home-state. For example, Romania claims that 78% of the population of Moldova are

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⁷⁷There has been some change from migration, but the changing of identity categories is, as this chapter argues, still more significant.
⁷⁸There were more identifying as Romanian in other Soviet Republics, e.g. UkrSSR, than MSSR.
⁷⁹2004 was the first post-Soviet census, followed by the 2014 census though results have not been made publically available for the 2014 census.
⁸⁰There was some variation among the Romanian population in Moldova, with more identifying as Romanian in urban settlements (3.4%) compared to the rural population (1.3%), around Chişinău and along the Romanian border (National Bureau of Statistics 2004; Ciscel 2008).
⁸¹The question asked for respondents their “nationality” but this was collected by census takers who might be able to influence respondents’ answers.
6.1. IDENTITY POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET MOLDOVA

Figure 6.1: Ethnicity and Language in Moldova according to 2004 Census

Ethnically Romanian (Department for Romanians Abroad 2012). This disregards official census results (Figure 6.1), by combining the ethnic categories of Romanian (2%) and Moldovan (76%) together, and ignoring that these separate categories exist in the Moldovan census. Censuses are open to manipulation by home-state and kin-state political elites to favour their approach to ethnicity.

Sociological surveys have also avoided engaging with the complex relationship between Romania and Moldovan categories, often making arbitrary judgements about how to deal with these categories. An ethno-barometer survey (2006), conducted by a collaboration of prominent Moldovan and Romanian think tanks (IPN, IMAS, with funding from Soros-Moldova), asked respondents first how they identified ethnically, and grouped together those identifying as ethnically Romanian and Moldovan, “Romanian/Moldovan” (Petruți et al. 2006), summing together these dichotomous census categories.

Engaging with what it means to be Romanian versus Moldovan, and what it means to negotiate and experience these categories, has been obscured from official approaches to identification. However, in terms of popular and intellectual discourses, there is an often discussed and contentious relationship between how these categories are constructed and understood, where these identities are often discussed together, whether as different or overlapping categories (see Mateevici quote above, cited by Moldovan 1993). Academic, these complexities have been recognised (C. King 1999; Zabarah 2011), yet empirically this too has not been a direct object of observation, with focus instead on inter-

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Footnote 62: Alexei Mateevici is a poet from Moldova (1888-1917) and is considered prominent in both Romania and Moldova.
6.2. ORGANIC ROMANIANS

ethnic dyads (i.e. Moldovan/Romanian-Russian relations) (Ciscel 2008, 2010), rather than dynamics within the kin majority, as claimed by Romania to be a single category.

This chapter disentangles these mutually exclusive census categories by exploring how respondents identify and situate themselves in relation to Romania as the kin-state and Moldova as the home-state.

6.1.2 Analysing Kin-State Identification from Below

This thesis argues there is an empirical gap in both cases of this research in understanding whether and how individuals identify co-ethnically with the kin-state. Thus in the Moldovan case, it is unclear how individuals identify as Romanian and/or Moldovan and whether they identify with Romania as a kin-state. To unpack this kin majority, this chapter uses the everyday nationalism approach to analyse how respondents experienced and described their identification, and position vis-à-vis Moldova and Romania, to understand, from the bottom-up, how identification and top-down categories are experienced, subverted and negotiated.

As Chapter 4, this chapter constructs five inductively derived identification categories, using grounded theory to conceptualise kin majority identification in the Moldovan case (Table 6.1):

1. Organic Romanians professed the strongest and organic identification as ethnically Romanian
2. Cultural Romanians identified ethnically as Romanian, but qualified this by identifying Moldova as their home
3. Ambivalent Romanians identified as partially but not wholly both Romanian and somewhat Moldovan
4. Moldovans identified as Moldovan but explained this in terms of being a citizen of Moldova
5. Linguistic Moldovans identified as Moldovan on the basis that they were culturally Moldovan and distinct from those who were Romanian.

In deriving these categories, some respondents were left out of the analysis. Firstly, those who identified primarily with a minority group (e.g. Russian or Ukrainian) are not considered in this analysis because they do not fall within Romania’s claim to a Romanian ethnic majority. Secondly, those identifying as Moldovan, and not Romanian (Linguistic Moldovans and Moldovans), are included, even if they identify as speakers of Russian, because they fall within Romania’s claim to a Romanian ethnic majority in Moldova (i.e. Romania claims that Moldovans are Romanian).

The next section analyses each group in turn, to understand how the different groups are constructed, and how they differ in terms of their identification with the kin-state and the home-state.

6.2 Organic Romanians

“All Moldovans are Romanians, but not all Romanians are Moldovans”

MD-25b
6.2. ORGANIC ROMANIANS

Figure 6.2: Gender Profile of Respondents in Moldova

Figure 6.3: Age Profile of Respondents in Moldova
6.2. ORGANIC ROMANIANS

Table 6.1: Inductively Derived Identification Categories in Moldovan Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Relationship of Romanian &amp; Moldovan Languages</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Romanians</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>artificial separation</td>
<td>Brother state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=22)</td>
<td>Organically Romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>primordially Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romanians</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>some differences</td>
<td>More European brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=15)</td>
<td>Ethnically Romanian, Politically Moldovan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home (state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romanians</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>different accent</td>
<td>some differences</td>
<td>Friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=5)</td>
<td>≠ fully Romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More Soviet/Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Romanian, Russian</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Positive neighbour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=10)</td>
<td>Culturally &amp; politically Moldovan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home (state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldovan, Russian</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>Negative influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=3)</td>
<td>Ethnically Moldovan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home nation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MD-28, MD-1, MD-2, MD-8, MD-10, MD-11, MD-14, MD-15, MD-16, MD-18, MD-25a, MD-25b, MD-26a, MD-32, MD-35, MD-39, MD-42, MD-46, MD-47, MD-48, MD-49, MD-53

Organic Romanians collapsed the categories of Romanian and Moldovan, claiming they were both Moldovan and Romanian. They stressed the sameness (ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical) between Romanians and Moldovans to promote how they were “Moldovan and therefore Romanian” [MD-16]. They saw Moldova as an artificial nation, produced (only) by Soviet propaganda. Instead they imagined themselves as part of the Romanian nation, and are described as organic using Zimmer’s (2003:178–79) conceptual framework, which analysed the difference between “organic boundary mechanisms”, which are “deterministic”, and “voluntarist boundary mechanisms”.

Organic Romanians comprised a large number from the post-Soviet generation, aged 20–29; but in terms of age and gender profile, it represented the whole make up of respondents across the sample (Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3). The group was a mixture of those affiliated to and/or supportive of more pro-Romanian/pro-Romania organisations (Acţiunea 2012, Action 2012) and political parties (PNL, PL) and those affiliated to and/or supportive of organisations considered to be less pro-Romanian (PLDM), as well as a large number of respondents who were neither affiliated to, nor supportive of, these organisations and political parties.

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83The slogan of “we are Moldovan therefore Romanian” has been used by the pro-Romanian organisation, Acţiunea 2012, in answer to the question “who are we?”, referring to the book written by Dungaciu (2009 “Who are we? Chronicles from East to West”), a Romanian sociologist who wrote about identity in Moldova.

84Here Moldova means the territory between the Prut and the Nistru rivers, and thereby excludes Transnistria.

85See Common Abbreviations, page 10
6.2. ORGANIC ROMANIANS

6.2.1 Self-Identification

Organic Romanians framed Moldovan and Romanian as overlapping identifications where being Moldovan was framed as proof of being Romanian because “all Moldovans are Romanians, but not all Romanians are Moldovans” [MD-16, MD-25b, MD-28]. As MD-2 explained, he could be Moldovan, Romanian and Bessarabian simultaneously, as he could be a “brother, lover and son” simultaneously. Respondents wanted to identify themselves not as “only Moldovan or only Romanian” because they were “Bessarabian” (a Romanian from Moldova/Bessarabia) and, simultaneously, Moldovan and Romanian [MD-49]. Organic Romanians framed Moldova and Romania as the “same nation” because they were the “same” culturally, historically and linguistically, sharing the same “costumes, clothing, customs, everything we do” [MD-2, MD-10, MD-25a MD-28, MD-32, MD-35, MD-42, MD-46, MD-39, MD-48]. Hence Romania and Moldova were “all part of one Romanian culture” and you “can’t divide this” [MD-39].

Organic Romanians essentialised their identification as Romanian, because “in essence we are Romanian”, portraying their Romanian-ness as an organic and genetic fact [MD-9]. They framed their similarities organically, sharing both “the same language”, “look the same as Romanians” and the “same blood” [MD-18, MD-26a]. Romanians were their “brothers” [MD-10, MD-14, MD-49], reinforcing how they were the same “neam” (people, nation) [MD-10]. These examples demonstrate the absence of voluntarism expressed by Organic Romanians in identifying with Romania as their kin-state, because “you don’t have a choice to choose your mother” either in terms of family or ethnicity [MD-11], in comparison to the other identification categories.

Organic Romanians contrasted their organic belonging to Romania with Soviet propaganda, which was still successful in convincing older generations, such as respondents’ parents, who were socialised by the Soviet system that they were ethnically Moldovan, and not Romanian [MD-32, MD-8, MD-10, MD-11]. By contrast, they framed young people as more likely to feel Romanian than old people because they were socialised under a different, post-Soviet, regime which approached debates, such as history in school, differently [MD-17, MD-32, MD-25a]. Rather, respondents took a paternalistic stance in wanting to re-educate their parents to accept the “right history”, rather than the artificial version of history propagated by the USSR [MD-26a].

Recognising one’s Romanianness, and connection to Romanian history, indicated not only recognition of the correct version of history, as Organic Romanians believed, but a process of de-Sovietization of the self by constructing a continuity with the pre-Soviet past (see also Prina 2013; D. J. Smith 2003). Failing to recognise one’s Romanianness was a mis-categorisation and false consciousness, because it was a false Soviet effort to separate Romania and Moldova. As respondents explained, it was a “problem” that “not all ethnic Moldovans consider themselves Romanian” because the majority are ethnically Romanian, on the basis “everyone [in Moldova] is Romanian but called Moldovan” [MD-14, MD-9, MD-35, MD-28]. Instead, they belittled how Moldovans did not “understand” that because “they were Moldovan, they were Romanian” [MD-11], leaving those who disagreed no agency to self-define as only Moldovan, because this was framed as synonymous with being Romanian.
Organic Romanians framed Moldova as a young state-building project because the “country’s existence is not historical” [MD-39, MD-48]. They framed Moldova as an “artificial” nation that “doesn’t exist” [MD-8, MD-28 MD-48], and the Moldovan language as not existing because it is not a “true” language, but rather a “dialect of Romanian” [MD-48, MD-14]. Instead they blamed external forces, in particular Soviet totalitarianism and “Russian occupation”, for creating and promoting “the idea we’re different” from Romania [MD-1, MD-10, MD-42, M-48, MD-26a], where the Moldovan nation-building project was part of Soviet “propaganda in order to manipulate people’s heads” [MD-46], that would not exist but for Soviet influence.

However Moldova existed in their consciousness as a historical “region” and a “țară” (administrative territory) of Romania because “Romania is made up of several parts”, including Transylvania and Wallachia/Muntenia [MD-8, MD-25a, MD-25b, Figure 6.4]. Moldova, as a Romanian region, was bigger than the current borders of the republic, stretching to Iași and Suceava, in present-day Romania [MD-42], meaning that they are “part of Romania even if” Moldova and Romania are “two different countries” [MD-39, MD-25b]. Thus, it was “not wrong” to identify as Moldovan, as a regional identification, “because I live in this area which is called Moldova geographically, as there is Transylvania, Dobrogea”, and, therefore, “belong to the entire space of Romania” [MD-28]. The false consciousness was, therefore, not in identifying as Moldovan, but in failing to recognise that the Moldovan identity did not exist separately from the Romanian identity, as a regional Romanian identity, where part of the Moldovan region remained in Romania (Figure 6.4).

These regions as shown here are superimposed on Romania’s contemporary borders, while roughly relating to regions as imagined from the fourteenth century until the unification of Romania in 1918.
6.2. ORGANIC ROMANIANS

6.2.3 Romania

Consistent with framing Moldova as a Romanian region, Romania was their “native country” and “bigger homeland” [MD-15, MD-35, MD-8]. They connected these regional (Moldova) and ethnic (Romania) homelands, legitimising their belonging to both. Unlike other categories, who were more negative about experiences of being in Romania, Organic Romanians discussed their positive experiences of being in Romania, of noticing that they “speak as me” and “think as me” [MD-15, MD-46]. Rather Organic Romanians emphasised the similarities that they felt between being in Romania and Moldova where “it’s the same […] It’s like, you don’t go in another country” [MD-32, MD-49].

They historicised and primordialised Moldova’s connection with Romania, using modern historical events, namely Moldova being part of interwar Greater Romania, and an ancient trope based on the pre-modern connections to the reign of Ștefan cel Mare and their shared pre-Roman Dacian origins [MD-2, MD-26a]. They lamented, however, that in spite of these common myths, “we (in Romania and Moldova) were divided in history”, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1940 and by Soviet annexation [MD-35, MD-14], which prevented Moldova from being part of Romania, politically.

The myth of “our king”, Ștefan cel Mare, who was on “our money” [MD-26a], provided a “legitimising myth” (see A. D. Smith 1998:183) to cement how it was impossible to imagine Romania and Moldova to be “different nations when we have Ștefan cel Mare’s statue here and his body is in Putna in Romania” [MD-48]. These “legitimising myths”, primordialising their connection to Romania, dated “further back” to their shared links with the Dacians [MD-1]. The commonalities between Romania and Moldova were seen because they were “the descendants” of Dacian heroes such as Decebal, Burebista and Trajan,⁸⁷, who were the “parents” where “Romania is the brother, Moldova is the sister” [MD-1, MD-35]. These respondents therefore buttressed their organic connection to Romania through their primordial approach to history, where the “base” of respondents and Moldovan history was seen as inherently Romanian [MD-1], embedding their sense of enduring connection to Romania via these longue durée “legitimizing myths” of shared descent via common heroes (A. D. Smith 1998:183). Reaffirming their belief that Moldova was an “artificial nation”, was their framing of Moldova as inherently and historically connected to Romania, as something “right” and “real” in comparison to the Soviet counter-narrative of history that had sought to minimise this connection [MD-16, MD-26a].

This primordialist trope has been a popular discourse used by Romanian nationalists more generally. “Dacomania” was popular during Ceaușescu’s dictatorship, with Dacia seen as pre-eminent for the “ethnogenesis of the Romanians” where the Dacian “state”, created during the first century BC, was seen as anticipating the creation of Greater Romania in 1918, which in turn was portrayed as a “pre-ordained” and “historically inevitable” event of national unity (Deletant 1991:1, 74). Dacia therefore had an “almost messianic ethnic and political role in the creation of the ideal nation state” (Deletant 1991:74, 76). The use of Dacia by respondents in this research is further evidence of this Dacomania where respondents sought to link Romania and Moldova through the sense of pre-ordained past and primordial connection, seeing both Dacia and the unification in 1918 as the golden ages in Moldova’s history. Using Dacia in Communist Romania and contemporary Moldova, ancient history acts as a “retrospective illusion”, allowing adherents to primordialise the connection between Dacia and modern

⁸⁷Burebista (82-44 BC) and Decebal (87-106 AD) were leaders of Dacia. Traian (98-117 AD) was the emperor of the Roman Empire during the empire’s conquests of Dacia.
day Romania, and Moldova for those identifying as strongly Romanian (see Balibar 1990), to offset contemporary political realities.

Organic Romanians identified most vociferously, and organically, as Romanian, framing Moldova as inherently and primordially a region of Romania. Any separation of Moldova from Romania was externalised and blamed on the USSR, and Russia’s “occupation” more generally, for creating the artificial Moldovan nation, as a separate cultural entity from Romania. While they explained their identification as Romanian, organically and primordially, they reasoned this interpretation was objectively correct. Organic Romanians framed any counter-interpretation as a false consciousness where the individual had yet to be de-Sovietized, a process by which individuals came to learn the real history and would identify, henceforth, as Romanian.

Hence, Organic Romanians strongly identified Romania as kin, indicating a shared sense of ethnicity with the kin-state, and quashing the notion of the home-state being separated, ethnically, from the kin-state. They resemble also the wider notions of romantic nationalism, associated with romantic nationalists, such as Herder, who saw the nation as an “organic” being and “a primordial and unique cultural and territorial community” (Hutchinson 2004:110). These organic and primordialising tropes align Organic Romanians not only with Dacomania techniques of Romanian nationalists but with these wider romanticising techniques of essentialising and romantic notions of the nation found in figures such as Herder. Recognising therefore when these primordial “categories of practice” are used (after Brubaker and Cooper 2000), it is important to show that while academically, ethnicity and identity might be framed as constructed, they can be experienced, and legitimised, in organic terms.

6.3 Cultural Romanians

“We are Romanian and live in Moldova.”

MD-19

MD-4, MD-5, MD-9, MD-12, MD-19, MD-20, MD-23, MD-24, MD-26b, MD-33, MD-40, MD-44, MD-43, MD-45, MD-51

Cultural Romanians identified co-ethnically with Romania, as their kin-state, combining this with a political belonging to Moldova as their home-state. This situated them between Ambivalent Romanians, as more certain of their cultural identification as Romanian, and Organic Romanians, as more expressive of differences between themselves and Romanians by residing in a different state to Romania and experiencing a different history and post-Communist path, based on Romania’s faster Europeanization.

This category comprised a mixture of male and female respondents and, as other categories, a large number aged 20-29, but this was representative of the sample of respondents (Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3). In terms of the political affiliation of the respondents, in contrast to Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians were not explicitly affiliated with any particular political parties.
6.3. CULTURAL ROMANIANS

6.3.1 Self-Identification

Cultural Romanians identified as “Romanian” because “my origin is Romanian” [MD-19, MD-20, MD-44, MD-51]. However this was contextualised by their connection to “Moldova as home” because they “live in Moldova” as Moldovan citizens [MD-4, MD-19, MD-20, MD-33, MD-23, MD-51, MD-12, MD-44, MD-40], and “feel Moldovan”, politically, as well as Romanian ethnically and culturally [MD-43, MD-4].

In comparison to Organic Romanians’ essentialistic identification, Cultural Romanians were more voluntaristic in their self-categorisation. They discussed cultural links with Romania, but also voluntaristic political ties to Moldova as their home-state. Unlike Organic Romanians, who problematized the notion of a separate Moldovan identity, Cultural Romanians problematized the absence of differences between them and Romanians in Romania. They also wanted to reconcile their ethnic identification as Romanian and political identification as Moldova by focusing not on ethnicity but on civic values because “the most important thing for our society is to build a new citizenship” [MD-20]. They were more accepting of those identifying exclusively as Moldovan, believing others were “entitled” not to consider themselves Romanian and “have the right to consider themselves as Moldovans” [MD-20, MD-44].

Yet, in terms of explaining their self-identification, respondents were resolute in identifying ethnically and culturally as Romanian. Some respondents expressed organic forms of identification, because “my blood is Romanian” [MD-51]. However it was more common to explain how they “belong to Romanian culture” and they “obviously share history, language, culture” such as traditional clothes and dances with Romanians [MD-33, MD-43, MD-24, MD-12, MD-23, MD-45]. Romanian language too as their “native” language was an important factor underpinning Cultural Romanians’ identification as Romanian [MD-24, MD-43, MD-40, MD-44]. In fact, for some respondents it was “just” speaking Romanian that made them feel Romanian [MD-43].

In comparison to Organic Romanians, they were also more contested in their self-identification as Romanian. For example MD-40 considered herself a “Romanian with Moldovan passport”, she could ignore her Romanian-ness when abroad, because then, for ease, “I don’t say I’m Romanian, I say I’m Moldovan”, as a citizen of Moldova [MD-40]. They experienced “intergenerational conflict” in being Romanian, such as MD-51, the daughter of veteran of the Moldovan army, in Transnistria and Afghanistan, who “would never admit” that he was Romanian, because her parents were “patriots” of Moldova. This highlighted, as Chapter 4, the contingency of identification via this inter-generational contestation. Here political experiences disrupted what has been conceptualised, academically, as a “myth of common ancestry”, because MD-51 and her parents interpreted these myths, and their implications, differently, even though they shared common ancestry.

As described in the following sections, and compared to Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians emphasised the traits that differentiated them from Romanians in Romania, even if, as above, they described many similar traits. This sense of difference was rooted in how they had, in comparison to Romanians in Romania, experienced more Russian influence, culturally, linguistically and historically, and this differentiated them from Romania. Thus, they identified as Romanian, and saw Romania as their cultural kin-state, but differentiated also between themselves and Romanians in Romania, who
were more “European”.

6.3.2 View of Moldova

*Cultural Romanians* identified Moldova as their state. Even as a “recent state” [MD-20], Moldova remained an entity in which people saw “opportunity” and felt pride in, as their place of origin [MD-33, MD-24]. For example, MD-12 explained in football games that she would support either Moldova or Romania if they were playing, but if they played each other, then she would support Moldova [MD-12]. This sense of pride was buttressed by the idea that Moldova was improving and had more become “a lot more European” in terms of “behaviour” and their “ideas” [MD-24].

*Cultural Romanians*, as *Organic Romanians*, saw Moldova as a Romanian “region” [MD-9, MD-23, MD-43] and the Moldovan nation and language as “artificial” and “fake” [MD-12, MD-20]. With Moldova being one of the “big districts of Romania”, this reinforced their sense of Romanian identity [MD-9, MD-23]. Yet, they used the regional aspect of Moldova to highlight the differences between them and Romanians in other Romanian regions [MD-19, MD-4]; because Romania was somewhere they really felt Moldovan (i.e. different) [MD-19].

However, *Cultural Romanians* rejected *Organic Romanians*’ notion that they were the same as Romanians in Romania. *Cultural Romanians* saw Moldova as partly, but not fully Romanian, having “always a mix of Romanian legacy but also Soviet legacy” [MD-40]. It was this “mixture of traditions, of habits, of cultural traits” that “makes us different” to Romanians from Romania [MD-40, MD-45], by framing Moldova as “more Russian”, while Romania “more European” in terms of mentality, different historical experiences and contemporary politics [MD-12, MD-19, MD-5]. This was visible in terms of language, where they differentiated between classical literary Romanian, as the formal language free from Russian influences, and the more “basic” everyday language that they spoke in Moldova which was a more fluid vernacular in terms of the linguistic influences and lexicon [MD-19, MD-24]. In theory, *Cultural Romanians* believed the languages spoken in Romania and Moldova to be the same, linguistically, while in practice they acknowledged differences, because of the different influences on how Romanian was spoken in Romania versus Moldova.

*Cultural Romanians* did not pathologise this cultural hybridity, enjoying both Russian and Romanian literature [MD-24]. Rather they wanted to “make the best” of the multi-ethnic and multicultural realities in Moldova which “are really more peaceful” than divisive political discourses would suggest [MD-45, MD-40]. Overall, *Cultural Romanians* exhibited greater political attachment to Moldova, identifying factors which differentiated them from Romanians in Romania, in comparison to *Organic Romanians* who saw themselves as analogous to Romanians in Romania.

6.3.3 View of Romania

*Cultural Romanians* expressed both closeness to Romania and hesitance to Romania as their kin-state. Romania was “more than a neighbour to us” in comparison to Ukraine because Romania “see us as brothers […] as one historical people” [MD-33, MD-23]. They expressed this closeness via a preference towards Romania. For example MD-24 had to “choose between the same job, in the same company”
in Bucharest and Moscow, choosing Bucharest, against a higher paid job in Moscow, because she felt “much closer to Romanians” and “more comfortable in a Romanian speaking environment than Russian speaking one” [MD-24]. This sense of closeness meant they felt “more at home” than in other neighbouring countries and historical allies, however Romania still did not feel “as comfortable” as in Chișinău/Moldova [MD-45].

This sense of comparative comfort was explained by some negative experiences of being in Romania, of being stereotyped as Russian and speaking Russian, by Romanians in Romania, because in Bessarabia there was “the Russian occupation” [MD-40, MD-51]. These assumptions irritated Cultural Romanians, who disliked the ignorance of Romanians about “what language they speak over the Prut River in Moldova” [MD-51]. This provided an important contrast between the Romanian political class, who Cultural Romanians saw as framing them as “brothers” and Romanian society who framed them as ethnic and linguistic Russians, by virtue of their Soviet and Tsarist legacy. However, respondents also fell back on this stereotype, framing Moldova as tainted by its Russian occupation and Soviet experiences, separating them from Romania which experienced Communism under Ceaușescu [MD-45]. These legacies had a contemporary differentiating effect too with Romania now possessing a “more European mentality” than Moldova [MD-43, MD-45], equating EU-membership with being more European. As an EU member, Romanians could “travel where they want” and “can come to us when they want” whereas their remained constrained by Moldova’s location outside the EU [MD-44].

Overall Cultural Romanians did not question or doubt their ethnic identification with the kin-state (Romania), unlike Ambivalent Romanians, and qualified this identification in terms of a civic bond with their home-state (Moldova), unlike Organic Romanians. They subordinated Moldova as a regional identity, interwoven within a Romanian national identity, while simultaneously indicating their connection to Moldova, not as a regional identity, but as a state separate from Romania. However, they also differentiated themselves from Romania by framing Moldova, and Romanians in Moldova, as having different historical (Tsarism, Soviet) and contemporary (EU membership) experiences which framed Romania as more European and Moldova retaining a more Russian legacy.

6.4 Ambivalent Romanians

“We entered modernity let’s say, from the Russian door.”

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**Note:**

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88The point is not to argue about whether Moldova was or was not occupied by the USSR, as a politicised debate, but rather to consider this framing of occupation by these respondents.

89Although, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, Romanian citizenship reacquisition provided a way to overcome these restrictions.
6.4 AMBIVALENT ROMANIANS

_Ambivalent Romanians_ were a small (n=5) category comprising those who were hesitant, and critical, of identifying as wholly Romanian. This differentiated them from _Organic_ and _Cultural Romanians_, who were resolute in their co-ethnic identification with the kin-state, i.e. identifying as (ethnically) Romanian, as well as from _Moldovans_, since _Ambivalent Romanians_ identified partially co-ethnically with the kin-state. They were all male, a mix of ages (20-50 years old) and were not overtly affiliated to political parties (Figure 6.3, Figure 6.2).

6.4.1 Self-Identification

As previous groups, _Ambivalent Romanians_ were resolute in describing their language as Romanian [MD-3, MD-6, MD-17, MD-27]. It was not the nomenclature of the language that mattered, “you can call it whatever you like”, because, linguistically, it was the “same language” as Romanian [MD-3]. Yet their everyday vernacular was differentiated from Romanian spoken in Romania because they had a “different accent” and used “some Russisms”; however this did not signify a linguistic boundary because “big brother [Romania] speaks in your own language” [MD-17, MD-27].

_Ambivalent Romanians_ were hesitant to discuss their identification and were happier to talk about the population of Moldova as being culturally close to Romania, if not Romanian, while more reticent to discuss how they self-identified [MD-3]. This was because of the difficulties they felt in self-identifying as “entirely” Romanian/Moldovan because, instead, they felt at the “intersection” of ethnicities [MD-50].

Historically, they felt connected to Romania, but this was mediated by contemporary political experiences. They recognised their “common” and “closest culture and history” was with Romania, because they had “common bonds with ancestors from the same lands” [MD-50, MD-3]. Regardless of this primordialising and sentimentalising discourse, vis-à-vis Romania, this was intersected by contemporary cultural and political experiences. This framed Romania as more “occidental” than Moldova, because Moldova was post-Soviet and pro-Russian, while Romania has an “identity of EU integration” [MD-17].

As MD-27 explained, even if “we are the same ethno-culture, basically, and language and so on but we are a little bit different” because:

> We entered modernity from different doors. [...] They imitated the French model. We entered modernity let’s say from the Russian door.

Moldova’s inclusion in the Russian empire and USSR translated into respondents’ hesitance in identifying as wholly Romanian, while their historical connection to Romania inhibited them from identifying as wholly Moldovan. This was amplified not only by different experiences from Romania but also by the Soviet policy heightening these perceptions of difference, where they were “brainwashed” to believe that “Romanians are bad guys [...] from a historical point of view” and that “Moldova has nothing to do with Romania” [MD-50]. They experienced these elements of difference also at the personal level, based on their experiences of prejudice in Romania. Being “Bessarabian” in Romania, meant feeling “not 100% Romanian” and being stereotyped as Russian, because of Moldova/Bessarabia’s inclusion in the USSR [MD-3, MD-27, MD-6].
6.4. AMBIVALENT ROMANIANS

6.4.2 View of Moldova

Like Organic and Cultural Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians framed Moldova as a Romanian region, but were more hesitant to discuss Moldova’s Romanian characteristics. Similar to previous categories, they identified Soviet experiences as the defining difference of Moldova. For example, Victory Day was celebrated on 9 May in Moldova but not in the other Romanian regions [MD-17]. Thus, Ambivalent Romanians used the regionalisation of Moldova discourse, unlike Organic and Cultural Romanians, to differentiate themselves somewhat from, rather than link themselves to, Romanians in Romania.

They were hesitant also towards Moldova as a state. Unlike Cultural Romanians who expressed their “pride” in Moldova, MD-50 explained he was “not hiding it, where I’m from” but felt “very ashamed of being Moldovan”. In part because of Soviet influence, they did not see it as Moldovans’ “fault” for Moldova’s failings because “Russian culture destroyed a lot with vodka and banditry” [MD-50]. Hence, they believed that they lacked the “correct identity” in Moldova because there was a mix of people who identified as Moldovan and Romanian, rather than a consensus among the population, or a “civic identity” to incorporate minority groups present in the state into a single identity [MD-50, MD-6]. Hence Ambivalent Romanians problematized Moldova as a state, augmented by their ambivalent feelings towards Moldova as a state and Romanian region, in comparison to Organic and Cultural Romanians who reconciled their identification with Moldova and Romania more easily.

6.4.3 View of Romania

Stemming from Ambivalent Romanians’ hesitance to identify as wholly Romanian, they saw Romania as somewhere close but different because they framed their political experiences, culture and language as different from that in Romania. Ambivalent Romanians were more critical too of Romania’s approach towards Moldova than Organic and Cultural Romanians, disliking Romania’s tendency to be as “too ideological” and “nationalist” towards Moldova [MD-3, MD-6]. Hence, they wanted good relations not only between Moldova and Romania, but with all of Moldova’s neighbours.

They differed from Organic Romanians who saw the populations as identical by highlighting the modern political experiences, associated with Moldova’s connections to Russia and the USSR, and Romania’s connection to the EU, that are responsible for dividing those in Moldova from those in Romania [MD-17, MD-27]. They framed Romania as a ruptured family member, as a “cousin” or a “friend” but not a “brother” because of these different political experiences where they had been “torn apart” from Romania over 50 years ago [MD-27, MD-17]. Ambivalent Romanians therefore distanced themselves from the essentialism of Organic Romanians by describing the contingency, if not hesitancy, of framing Romania as a family member.

Ambivalent Romanians situated themselves between being wholly Romanian and wholly Moldovan, and instead saw themselves as partially, and culturally, both Romanian and Moldovan. They emphasised, more than Cultural Romanians, what differentiated them from Romania: Moldova’s Soviet experiences and Romania’s European experiences. They framed Moldova more negatively as a contempo-
Moldovans identified as primarily Moldovan, framing Romanian and Moldovan as separate categories and did not identify with Romanian culture. Moldovans expressed voluntaristic notions of belonging to Moldova as their home and state. They explained this identity as “complicated” and “messy” based on the historical experience of the territory as being between Russia and Romania, where Moldova, as a state, was a mix of Russian and Romanian languages and cultures and being Moldovan signalled this hybridity. Unlike Linguistic Moldovans, Moldovans identified their language as Romanian (although many came from multi-lingual backgrounds) and did not pathologise, but rather neutralised, the role of Romania in Moldova. Hence Moldovans hybridised Moldova as a state while identifying their languages singularly (e.g. Romanian and Russian).

Moldovans were mixed equally in terms of their gender and their age (mostly 20-30s), representative of the wider sample. Most of the respondents were not politically active or overtly affiliated to political parties, except for MD-21 who was affiliated to PDM (Democrat Party of Moldova).

### 6.5.1 Self-Identification

Moldovans framed their identification as obviously, and wholly, Moldovan where they were “totally” and “Moldovan of course”, citing their social experiences of education and Moldovan friends as the basis of their identification [MD-7a, MD-38, MD-37, MD-56]. Moldova signified their place of birth and residence, where they felt a part of the state [MD-36, MD-37], if not normatively explaining that you should “conform with the constitution” and identify as Moldovan [MD-37].

However Moldovans also problematized the idea of being Moldovan framing it as a “messy”, “complicated” and “convoluted” identity [MD-56, MD-34], which lacked unique traits because they had the “same language, same history” as Romania but a “different history because, Romanians, proper Romanians, don’t have Russian background” [MD-56]. They too, as Ambivalent Romanians and Cultural Romanians, saw a hazy line between them and Romania because “studying history” it was clear to them they were “either the same people” or “we’re so close that it’s impossible to draw a clear distinction” because they shared a language and a “close mentality” [MD-34, MD-37].
history, for providing objective answers, was a guiding force in terms of the materials this provided for respondents’ interpretation of themselves and Moldova.

Stemming from this complicated and problematized notion of being Moldovan, Moldovans framed ethnicity as an “issue” that was “not really important” and “doesn’t really matter for me personally” [MD-34, MD-21]. Hence, they shared the democratised attitude to identification of Cultural Romanians, compared to Organic Romanians, by believing individuals should be granted the “freedom to identify as whatever you choose” whether Romanian or Moldovan, because at the state level “in Moldova every citizen must understand the civic aspect” which is “bound by that ID card of this state” [MD-21].

While Moldovans identified differently from previous categories, by naming themselves as Moldovan, they agreed that “two centuries” of history, where Moldova experienced a “huge influence of Russian culture and Russian language” differentiated them from Romania [MD-56]. They also, as Ambivalent and Cultural Romanians, felt different to Romania in terms of status, because Romania, politically and economically, was “in front of us” [MD-38, MD-36]. It was their shared sense of complexity of their different and combined historical experiences, that provided this mix of culture due to a “lot of influxes of people going” in Moldova from Romania and the USSR [MD-34]. They blamed the USSR, and its legacy, for Moldova’s lack of a “national identity” because these complexities were transmitted through families and across generations, where identification and mentality could vary even between siblings, based on different political and cultural experiences [MD-37].

In terms of language, the situation was less complicated where Moldovans agreed, linguistically, that Romanian and Moldovan were the same language, where Moldovan was the “official name” for the language [MD-37]. Similar to MD-36’s normative stance towards identification, he explained that “according to the constitution” he spoke Moldovan. However he argued that “being American” does not “mean speaking American […] as they still speak English” [MD-36, MD-34], indicating a popular trope that the state and the identification with that state did not determine language spoken, nor did the naming of the language undermine that state. Language was therefore not seen by Moldovans as something that differentiated them from Romanians because “it’s a different dialect, but still it’s a dialect” of Romanian [MD-56].

What differed for Moldovans were the languages they spoke on a daily basis. Many of the respondents came from multi-lingual and multi-ethnic families, and grew up speaking multiple languages at home although they were generally educated in Romanian-language schools [MD-52, MD-34, MD-7a, MD-56]. In conversations with respondents, they would switch between different languages (Romanian and Russian) as a common practice, to enable them to explain their ideas in a language they felt more suited to this expression [MD-7a, MD-7b, MD-7c].

In this context, the contingency of ethnic identification, and ethnic naming practices (ethnonym) was evident. Individuals would identify themselves as Moldovan but their parents, or grandparents, as Romanian, if they were born in the interwar period of Greater Romania, even given the controversy of identifying as Romanian during the Soviet period, where identifying as Romanian was levied with harsh punishments, such as internment and exile [MD-7a, MD-7b, MD-7c]. This demonstrates the contestation over identification that existed within families and across generations (Abdelal et al. 2006), where the nature of boundary construction was neither “visible” nor “sticky” (c.f. Chandra 2006). Again, this highlights the contingency of ethnic identification vis-à-vis experiences and
the messiness conveyed by respondents in situating themselves against the Romanian other and in creating a Moldovan identity that was unique.

6.5.2 View of Moldova

*Moldovans* respected Moldova as their state which “deserves its existence” [MD-21, MD-7b]. They expressed their “love” for Moldova and the “people” because “it is my country” [MD-38]. They recognised the difficulties of Moldova’s placement and situation, where Moldova was “small but mighty” sandwiched between much bigger and wealthier states [MD-52].

*Moldovans* neither discussed the Moldovan nation nor the claim that it was “artificial”, as voiced by *Organic* and *Cultural* Romanians. Instead, they focused on Moldova’s contemporary hybridity. Contravening the singular conception of origins, that individuals do not have a “choice to choose your mother” [MD-11, *Organic* Romanians], *Moldovans* focused on the mix of cultures present in the state and the “many mothers” of the Moldovan state [MD-52].

The exception was MD-21 who framed Moldova primordially, arguing Ștefan cel Mare was “Moldovan in the true sense” and “wrote in Cyrillic”. He used this figure to dispute the regional status of Moldova, to argue Moldova had a longue durée of state legitimacy where in the fourteenth century Moldova had “not only a regional identity but also a state identity”. He defined Moldova’s state legitimacy against other Romanian regions, framing Moldova under Ștefan cel Mare as even “stronger” than the Romanian region of Muntenia/Wallachia having “conquered” these principalities “three times” [MD-21] (Figure 6.4). Similar to *Organic* Romanians’ “Dacomania”, this respondent’s interpretation of Moldova’s history functioned as a retrospective illusion whereby contemporary state formations were imagined to have longue durée analogues, where Moldova was returning to an international system seen during the medieval period, rather than recognising states to be a modern phenomenon, and the Moldovan state to be a post-1991 reality. However, as discussed, this primordialisation of Moldovan legitimacy was understated by most other *Moldovans*.

Domestically, *Moldovans* were critical of Moldova’s political system, and felt a sense of inertia, arising from their unmet aspirations for change that the change of power in 2009 had precipitated [MD-37, MD-38]. They maligned the Moldovan political elite which “only thinks about themselves” and the image of Moldova abroad, wanting Moldova to no longer be “judged as a poor country” [MD-36, MD-37]. They aspired for a future that was different from the present, where Moldova had a trustworthy political elite and there were “no differences” and “no borders” between Moldova and other states [MD-37, MD-36].

6.5.3 View of Romania

*Moldovans* framed their relationship with Romania as complicated and explained the embodiment of these complexities through their family histories and experiences, particularly during the transition from Greater Romania to the USSR. As MD-56 explained, his grandmother’s four brothers “literally had to fight each other”: two were “forcefully recruited to the Soviet army and two to the Romanian army” as they had been recruited at different times during the war. They explained too their internal
sense of contingency, where their feelings towards Romania had changed over their lives. As MD-34 explained, at school he had been "anti-Romanian", because he was made to learn Romanian, but explained that "you grow up" and "when you study history, there is no way after that to say, now we’re actually totally separate" from Romania [MD-34].

However, Moldovans were less critical of Romania than Linguistic Moldovans. They were pleased that Romania was the first state to recognise Moldova as an independent state, thereby "supporting Moldova’s independence" which was "being challenged by Russia" [MD-21, MD-56]. However they also recognised the claims Romania made towards Moldova and criticised Romania’s behaviour as the “first country that does not recognise it (Moldova) to the full extent” [MD-56]. While Cultural and Organic Romanians saw Romania as a “brother”, Moldovans indicated less of a fraternal bond with Romania and more of a “friendship” where Romania is a “good friend for Moldova” [MD-21, MD-52]. Moldovans identified a somewhat special relationship between Romania and Moldova because there is “a lot in common” [MD-52], but believed that Moldova should not position itself where Romania is Moldova’s only friend.

They were critical of Romania’s tendency to act sentimentally towards Moldova. They framed Romania’s claims to Moldova as primordial explaining it was Romania’s “historic legacy” and in “their genetic code” to believe that “Moldova is a part, it’s always been part of Romania” and to lament this “loss” of Moldova [MD-56]. Moldovans disrupted this discourse by blaming Romania, not Moscow, for the “biggest crime” where “Romania did not fire any guns and no bridge collapsed when the Red Army came” to Moldova in 1940 [MD-21]. They undermined Romania’s essentialism towards Moldova that failed to acknowledge the actions and events of the past where, by not fighting for Moldova, Romania acted as if it was a “donation” of territory towards the USSR [MD-21]. They situated their connection with Romania in the past and accepted that “may be” the contemporary reality “is better” because of the differences, such as Romania’s different “speed of development” as an EU member-state [MD-38]. Moldova’s hybridity, of having Russian speakers, which Romania does not have, and being “ex-Soviet space”, separated contemporary Moldova from Romania [MD-38]. This differentiation from Romania entrenched their perception, that although they had common history, this was more relevant to the past than to the present.

Moldovans differed from the other categories through their interpretation of history and identity. In contrast to Organic, Cultural and Ambivalent Romanians, they indicated no fraternal identification with Romania as a kin-state but did not malign Romania’s influence, like Linguistic Moldovans. They identified their common language with Romania; however this translated neither to a cultural or ethnic identification as Romanian, nor to identifying Romania as their kin-state. Rather Moldovans explained their complicated relationship with Romania which translated to uncertainty as to how or why Romanians were different from Moldovans, where they wanted Moldova to have a friendly, but not exclusive relationship with Romania.

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[90]This respondent grew up a Russian speaker and identified himself as Moldovan, as well as the language spoken as Romanian.
6.6 Linguistic Moldovans

"The Moldovan language still appeared earlier. And Moldova appeared earlier historically than Romania"

MD-41, MD-54, MD-57

Linguistic Moldovans are the contrast group for examining what kin identification means in Moldova, as the only group who describe their ethnic identification as Moldovan and their language as Moldovan. In defining themselves as Moldovan, they defined themselves against not being Romanian, appropriating, Moldovanising and Slavonicising the common hero of Ștefan cel Mare, and arguing that the Moldovan nation and state pre-existed the Romanian nation and state.

This was a small minority of respondents, in contrast to the larger category of Moldovans, who identified less as ethnically Moldovan than Linguistic Moldovans. However the composition of Linguistic Moldovans is also important. In addition to all being male and aged 20-40 years old, they were all politicised, either participating in political parties (PCRM, PSRM) or connected with a Moldovanist organisation (Eu sînt moldovan, Eu grăiesc moldovenește).⁹¹ While Linguistic Moldovans described their native language as Moldovan, they grew up in multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic families and were educated in mixed linguistic environments, similar to Moldovans.

6.6.1 Self-Identification

Linguistic Moldovans identified their language as Moldovan and identified as “ethnically Moldovan”, rationalising that “all censuses show that the majority of citizens they’re Moldovans, speak Moldovan language” [MD-41, MD-57]. This contrasts to Organic Romanians, who denied the legitimacy of the census and collapsed the categories of Romanian and Moldovan.

Linguistic Moldovans identified as “ethnically Moldovan” [MD-41, MD-57] because their relatives were Moldovan and because they identified themselves with specifically “Moldovan traditions and values”, and specificities such as “Moldovan mămăligă (polenta)” [MD-57, MD-54].⁹² They combined this with territorial criteria, where respondents explained that they were “raised here in Moldova” [MD-54].

Importantly, this group defined their language as distinctly Moldovan, in contrast to most respondents, who regardless of ethnic identification, argued the Moldovan language did not exist. Linguistic Moldovans argued a Moldovan language did exist, and was different linguistically from Romanian. Moreover, politically, they believed they had a right to differentiate themselves and their language

⁹¹“I am Moldovan, I speak Moldovan” where speak is translated from grai, but suggests also a deliberate use of grai (speak) as opposed to the common term vorbesc (speak in Romanian) to differentiate the language in Moldova from that in Romania (which is discussed by MD-41 below).

⁹²Mămăligă is a popular polenta dish eaten in both Romania and Moldova.
Linguistic Moldovans reflected also on their negative encounters with Romanians from Romania who claimed that “you do not speak the clean language” in Moldova [MD-41]. MD-41 explained that the word grai, such as the “Eu sînt moldovan, Eu grăiesc moldoveneste” organisation, was still in the Romanian language but “Moldovans keep it as everyday language” while Romanians saw this as a “peasant word” which “only illiterate people use”. Hence, the respondent argued this demonstrated the contemporary differences between the languages because you can speak (grăieşti) Moldovan, whereas you “cannot speak (grăieşti) Romanian. You speak (vorbeşti) Romanian” [MD-41].

They differentiated Moldovan and Romanian languages further because “Moldovan is based on Slavonic languages”, as an “ancient” language which “appeared earlier” than Romanian [MD-57]. Related to this was a primordialising claim where respondents sought to embed the legitimacy of their identity by claiming that Ștefan cel Mare “himself said that he was a Moldovan” at the time that he “led the Moldovan state” [MD-57]. In using the figure of Ștefan cel Mare, they sought to legitimise also the Slavonic claims they made towards the Moldovan language arguing that the “language developing (during the time of Ștefan cel Mare) was in many ways Russian” [MD-54]. As MD-57 explained, the “language of the nobility of Moldavian boyars, Ștefan cel Mare […] they spoke Slavonic” because the “documents of the time, they were mostly made in Old Church Slavonic” [MD-57].

Hence, Linguistic Moldovans identified as specifically ethnically Moldovan, and speakers of the Moldovan language. They differentiated themselves, their language and historical figures like Ștefan cel Mare from Romania, Moldovanising and Slavonicising these heroes, to offer more differentiating material and to historicise, primordialise, and hence legitimise this separation.

6.6.2 View of Moldova

Linguistic Moldovans believed they reflected the majority of Moldova’s population, who also regarded their language and ethnicity as Moldovan. They contrasted this with state policies, which erroneously “teach Romanian” as opposed to the Moldovan language [MD-57]. Moldova was described somewhere also with a “mixed culture” and the respondents identified that they were from “mixed” families, where their parents and/or relatives were also a mixture of Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian, and where they had been raised speaking both Moldovan and Russian [MD-41, MD-54, MD-57]. They explained Moldova as somewhere where there were “Moldovans of other nationalities” because on the “territory of Moldova” there is rarely only “one nation that lived here” but instead there were “forever intertwined different cultures, different people” [MD-57]. Even if these respondents identified themselves and their traditions as Moldovan, because they were “really patriotic” they wanted to go further in “develop(ing) something Moldovan” and in turn to further their sense of differentiation from Romania, which had become increasingly challenged in the post-Soviet period [MD-54]. In differentiating themselves, and Moldova, from Romania, Linguistic Moldovans demonstrated a competitive aspect where they argued the Moldovan language pre-dated the Romanian language and where Moldova, as a state, “appeared earlier historically than Romania” [MD-57, MD-54]. Hence, like some Moldovans, they emphasised a primordial competition, rather than connection, with Romania.
Linguistic Moldovans established a dichotomy between a favourable view of the USSR, in contrast to most respondents who pathologised the Soviet experience, and a negative view of the interwar period when Moldova was part of Greater Romania. They saw the interwar period as a time when Moldova “was occupied” by Romania and when there “many economic problems and the Moldovan part was ruined” [MD-54]. By contrast they could “associate” with the USSR because it was a union of “more states, countries” [MD-54] and, they believed, the Soviet and Tsarist time were a period when Moldova could “prosper” because “they (had) a huge market for sales” [MD-41], in contrast to Moldova’s post-Soviet socioeconomic problems. This historical interpretation translated to a more favourable stance towards Moldova positioning itself less within the sphere of the European Union and more towards greater integration with Moldova’s eastern neighbours, through the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, because it was better for ordinary people” and “for Moldova” [MD-54], opposing the Europeanization discourse voiced by other respondents.

6.6.3 View of Romania

Linguistic Moldovas were the only group of respondents who pathologised Romania and its stance towards Moldova. They framed Romania as a more powerful and malign state that interferes in Moldova. They believed Romania treated Moldova like a “colony” against the wishes of Moldovan society, able to wield power over Moldova because Romania “has more influence, more power, it is already in the European Union” and on this basis, “dictates to us what to do” [MD-54, MD-57]. They criticised also the “funds, channels, media and so on” from the Romanian state through which “Romanian nationalism is introduced into the framework of a state ideology” which did not “pay attention” to the mixed nature of Moldova: to the fact that “there is Transnistria, […] Gagauzia, to the Russian-speaking population, and not to mention the fact that they themselves Moldovans, the majority of ethnic Moldovans speak Moldovan language” [MD-57].

In contrast to Romanian society, who they saw as objecting to unification, they opposed Romanian politicians, in particular President Băsescu, and “professional Romanians who make money” from these projects [MD-41]. They likened Băsescu to Marshall Ion Atonescu, the leader of the Greater Romania (1940-1944), where Băsescu was the “successor of the policy pursued” by the “fascist” and “xenophobic” Antonescu because Băsescu had visited Moldova on 17 July 2014, on the same day in 1941 that “Antonescu came to Bessarabia […] and opened four ghettos in Moldova”. This analogy constructed a historic parallel between interwar and present-day Romania, where Romania posed a threat to Moldova’s statehood.

Linguistic Moldovans were a small minority of respondents, identifying their language and ethnicity as wholly Moldovan. They decoupled themselves from Romanian language and culture, coupling themselves instead with Slavic culture, reflected through their Moldovanist neo-Soviet interpretation of history. These Linguistic Moldovans were politicised (as members of PCRM) and/or affiliated

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Marshall Ion Antonescu was the fascist and “pro-Nazi” military dictator during the Second World War whose regime was responsible for many atrocities committed by Romania during this period (Tismâneanu 2008:168; O. Zimmer 2003:97).
with pro-Moldovanist groups, and in their political affiliation were aligned also with the most pro-
Moldovanist aspects of the political spectrum (PSRM, PCRM). The links between these organisations
and the discourse of Linguistic Moldovans indicates both the ideas prevalent in these organisations and
the marginalisation of these discourses within the body of respondents, given that most respondents
did not pathologise Romania with many identifying wholly or partially as Romanian.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter moved away from the “essentialistic premise” by which ethnic identification has been
analysed, based on census data, and which failed to represent the “multiple dimensions of ethnic diver-
sity” across time and space (Laitin and Posner 2001:17). Rather, the chapter focused on the vernacular
meanings of kin identification by examining, and conceptualising, the complexities of the lived expe-
riences of kin majorities’ identification, demonstrating how kin identification was not experienced in
singular terms (Table 6.2), i.e. identifying as either exclusively Romanian or Moldovan, as censuses
and surveys required.

This finding of multiplicity is important in debates surrounding identity politics in Moldova, pit-
ting essentialised pan-Romanian and Moldovanist debates against each other (Ciscel 2006:575). Rather
this chapter focused not on political debates but on bottom-up experiences of identification, where
identification was described through assemblages of different cultural, ethnic, linguistic, historical and
political dimensions, rather than mutually exclusive notions of identification. Respondents demon-
strated a high variance in terms of the meanings of these forms of identification and the relationship
between these identifications, which did not fit with neat, mutually exclusive census categories; it is
unclear how many of these respondents (particularly Cultural Romanians and Ambivalent Romanians)
would identify themselves in a census.

This chapter does not claim to be representative of Moldova, given the specific context of Chisinau,
as Moldova’s urban and political centre, and the small sample size (n=55). Rather, in line with an in-
terpretive methodology (see Small 2009), the research engaged with a diversity of respondents, both
across the political spectrum and outside of direct involvement in politics. This does not negate the
importance and interest of the findings. For example, it is surprising how most respondents identified
in Romanian terms, either as wholly (Organic Romanians) or partially Romanian (Cultural and Ambiva-
lent Romanians). Organic Romanians claimed, even on behalf of dissenters, the majority of Moldovans,
by virtue of being Moldovan, to be Romanian (naturally), where Moldovan was an artificially Soviet-
created separate category. For Cultural and Ambivalent Romanians, they identified as somewhat cul-
turally and ethnically with Romania, but qualified this in terms of civic links to Moldova (Cultural
Romanians) and questions over their status as totally Romanian (Ambivalent Romanians). It was only
the Moldovan categories that broke from identification with Romania, although many described the
language as Romanian. However Moldovans were not Moldovanists (who instead in this thesis are
described as Linguistic Moldovans), resisting the subordination of their identity to a Romanian national
identity, separating themselves, historically and culturally, from Romania as their kin-state, while not
resisting linguistic similarities.

This indicates a possible directional shift in Moldova in terms of how identity is conceived. This
was particularly apparent among the post-Soviet generation who have been educated and socialised by
an independent Moldovan state which has increasingly endorsed a less Moldovanist perspective and
a more pan-Romanian perspective, at least culturally (Zabarah 2011:192). However many respondents
were also inhibited from identifying as fully Romanian, identifying Romania as more economically,
politically and socially developed, and ultimately more European, and less influenced by the USSR,
than Moldova. The interesting question, therefore, is how far this will change as Moldova moves
closer to the EU, and Europeanization, and temporally away from the Soviet experience, and how this
will affect the key difference constructed between being from Romania and being from Moldova, of
being less European and more Soviet.

Conceptually, this chapter showed the importance of two key phenomena which are also evident
in Crimea Chapter 4): firstly the fractured nature of kin majority, and secondly, the political contin-
gency of myths of common descent. When viewed from below, the kin majority proved not to be a
majority in terms of consensus of how respondents self-identified and identified themselves in relation
to Romania, as the kin-state, and Moldova, as their home-state. This is important given that the no-
tion of ethnic homogeneity has been theorised as important for democratic stability. Rather, it should
not be assumed that ethnic majority groups are necessarily homogenous, given the mismatch between
mutually exclusive census categories and the lived experience of this complex assemblages of different
forms of identification (political, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical). Again, this demonstrates
the importance of studying the contestation of identification, and identification boundaries, beyond
minority-majority dyads (Kachuyevski and Olesker 2014; Abdelal et al. 2006) by examining diversity
and contestation over meanings and boundaries, within seemingly cohesive kin majorities, and ethnic
majorities more generally.

Secondly, this chapter problematised conceptualising ethnicity as a “myth of common descent”, by
demonstrating how this myth can be disrupted and distorted by political experiences and contexts.
Scholars, such as Chandra and Smith, conceptualised ethnicity as a “myth of common ancestry” where
individuals imagined themselves to be descended from common ancestries, giving ethnicity, according
to Chandra (2006), the qualities of being “sticky”, i.e. unchangeable, and visible, i.e. distinguishable.
However, this chapter showed how far respondents subverted these myths of common ancestry, by
identifying differently to their parents, explained by their different systems of socialisation. Ethnicity
as imagined by these respondents aligned more with Abdelal et al. (2006), because there was contes-
tation over the meaning and content of ethnicity, i.e. where the boundaries of ethnicity are (against
Chandra’s idea they are distinguishable and unchangeable). Rather myths of common ancestry were
politically contingent, depending on the regimes in which respondents, and their parents, had been so-
socialised, demonstrating the importance of the political regimes, which each leave their imprint on the
lived experience of identification. As such, the post-Soviet generation, in both Crimea and Moldova, in-
dicated that they had a very different approach to identification from their parents, who were socialised
in the Soviet system.

The next chapter uses the identification categories constructed in this chapter to map engagement
with Romanian kin-state practices, such as citizenship acquisition, to analyse the association between
the meanings, discussed in this chapter, and practices, as discussed in Chapter 7.
**Table 6.2:** Agreement and Disagreement Between the Identification Categories in Moldovan case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Romanians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romanians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romanians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7

Romanian Kin-state Practices in Moldova: the Bottom-up Perspective

“But the EU has a clear stake in the success of Moldova. We share a land border with Romania and many Moldovans also have Romanian, and thus EU, citizenship.”

Iurie Leancă (2013)

“We are Europeans. We have Romanian passports, so we are already Europeans.”


“It is not citizen Dumitrescu from [the Moldovan city of] Cahul who has decided to lose his [Romanian] nationality, it’s Stalin who has decided for him.”

Traian Băsescu (cited by EurActiv 2010)

Building on the meanings of kin majority identification in Moldova (Chapter 6), this chapter analyses respondents’ engagement with Romanian kin-state practices. It focuses on engagement with three types of kin-state practices: educational (scholarships), membership (citizenship/redobândire) and participatory (voting).

The chapter examines how far those identifying more strongly as Romanian, and with Romania, engage more with Romanian kin-state practices, than those exhibiting weaker identification. To examine this assumption, the chapter uses the inductively derived categories constructed in Chapter 6, to unpack this relationship between meanings and engagement practices. The chapter expects that individuals identifying more strongly with Romania (Organic Romanians) will also engage more with
Romanian kin-state practices, such as citizenship, while those less interested identifying as Romanian, or with Romania, will be less interested in Romanian kin-state practices (Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans). The area of uncertainty is those in the middle (Cultural Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians) who identified both as Romanian and Moldovan, and with Romania and Moldova as polities.

First, the chapter outlines the gap existing in understandings of Romanian kin-state practices in Moldova, to demonstrate the contribution of this chapter. This section argues that existing statistical and institutional research ignored the agency of those engaging with theses practices. Second, the chapter considers how and why individuals engage with these practices, examining how each inductive category engages with these different practices and their motivations for doing so (e.g. material, symbolic, normative), to determine how far there is an association between meanings (i.e. inductive categories) and practices by using the inductive categories to examine each category’s engagement with kin-state practices.

7.1 Existing Approaches to Romanian Kin-State Practices

This chapter makes three assertions:

1. most existing research focuses on statistical or institutional observations, ignoring the agency of those on the ground and the untrustworthy nature of acquisition statistics;
2. research which engages with those on the ground privileges material over symbolic motivations, underplays symbolic motivations and ignoring other motivations (e.g. normative);
3. previous research has focused on citizenship and ignored engagement with other kin-state practices, such as educational practices.
As Chapter 5 argued, analysis of kin-state policies in these cases and beyond, has focused on top-down institutional and statistical perspectives. Statistically, analysis of Romanian citizenship acquisition highlights the varying and untrustworthy nature of official Romanian management of citizenship acquisition in Moldova. Romania has failed (as of March 2015) to declare official acquisition statistics to Eurostat, the EU’s statistical agency, since 2009 (Eurostat 1998-2012). As described in Chapter 3, efforts to procure official data from Romania’s National Authority for Citizenship (ANC) were obscured by the claim that ANC did not collect data according to an individuals state of origin (even though they are required by Eurostat to do so), making it impossible to know what percentage of those reacquiring Romanian citizenship were doing so as Moldovan citizens.

Alongside the smoke and mirrors of official citizenship statistics, official figures are smaller, by orders of magnitude, than informal statistics (Iordachi et al. 2012; Panainte and Nedelciuc 2012). These informal statistics are gathered using records (ordin) of those called for their citizenship by the ANC. Relying on the statistical basis of Romania’s citizenship policy in Moldova, and beyond (e.g. Ukraine and Serbia), therefore provides a shaky ground for understanding the prevalence of engagement with Romanian citizenship. Moreover this statistical perspective indicates little about the motivations underpinning this engagement, which are crucial for understanding their social and political impacts.

Significantly, Romanian and Moldovan think tanks have generated a lot of analysis of Romanian citizenship policy towards Moldovans. However these focus on the institutions and on rebuffing criticism, emanating from western European journalism, that Romania has created a “granny loophole” for Moldovans.⁹⁴ Rather these organisations endorse Romania’s approach, arguing Romania acts neither outside its legal competencies, within the EU, nor excessively, with fewer acquiring Romanian citizenship than acquiring UK, French or German citizenship (Figure 7.1) (Litra 2010; Dimulescu and Avram 2011). Statistically, this claim holds, however it ignores a more nuanced institutional understanding of the context of Romania’s policy. While Romania may grant citizenship, just as the UK, France and Germany, the context is different, because of a different relationship to the state where citizenship is being acquired. In the UK, France and Germany, the process naturalises and enfranchises long-term resident migrants, where citizenship is an institution offering the right of abode, whereas Romania facilitates a specifically non-resident extra-territorial right to individuals which Romania claims as kin. Romania imbues this policy with a symbolic discourse explaining that the right to reacquire (redobândire) stems from the loss of Romanian citizenship by individuals, and their relatives, during Soviet annexation of Bukovina (in Ukraine) and Bessarabia (Moldova). Žilović (2012:4, 8, 10) is among a critical minority who pathologise Romania’s policy as a “silent” type of irredentism, facilitating the right to gain citizenship of a state to which individuals lack “genuine and effective” ties.

Hence, research needs to go beyond top-down institutional, legal and statistical analyses, which ignore the agency of those engaging with citizenship and other kin-state practices, to understand better, from a bottom-up/agency-centred perspective, how and why individuals engage with these practices, and to grasp better the political and social impact of these policies. The minority of academic researchers who consider why Moldovans engage with Romanian citizenship (Heintz 2008) argue use of Romania’s policies is just for material (e.g. access to EU rights), rather than symbolic reasons (Heintz

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⁹⁴The right-wing press especially have criticised Romania for the “granny loophole” (Quinn and Murray 2013 in the Daily Express) which facilitates citizenship en masse and allows EU membership of Moldovan citizens “through the back door” (Bidder 2010 in Der Spiegel; see also Bran 2009; Daily Mail Reporter 2010; Barrett 2013).
7.2. ENTITLEMENTS TO ROMANIAN KIN-STATE PRACTICES

These approaches fail to consider how symbolic and material reasons might be combined (c.f. Toderita et al. 2012:430-33), and privilege the rational-symbolic dichotomy above other potential motivating factors. For example, they fail to consider how redobândire as a “remedial right”, underpinned by the notion of returning rights that were taken from individuals’ grandparents and great-grandparents during Moldova’s Soviet annexation (see Dumbrava 2014a; Bauböck 2006), might be reflected in redobândire practices. This chapter explores the lived everyday experiences of these practices, and tries to unpack the different motivations, both material and symbolic, and also normative, i.e. the idea of Romania’s interaction as a “remedial right”. Lastly this chapter analyses membership practices (redobândire), alongside other practices, of education (scholarships) and those practices stemming from membership, i.e. participatory practices of voting, which have so far been overlooked by analyses of Romania as a kin-state actor.

This section argues there are gaps in the bottom-up agency-centred understanding of how and why individuals engage with a variety of kin-state practices, i.e. it is important to consider not only membership/citizenship practices but also other practices that demonstrate kin-state/kin majority interaction. This chapter applies a bottom-up approach to analyse Romanian kin-state practices in Moldova adapting the literature on everyday nationalism (and to a lesser extent everyday citizenship, as discussed in Chapter 2) to investigate engagement with Romanian kin-state practices.

The chapter uses the inductively derived categories from Chapter 6 (Table 7.1) to consider how far engagement with practices is associated with strength of identification as Romanian and with Romania. The empirical analysis begins by assessing respondents’ framing of entitlement vis-à-vis kin-state practices, to analyse whether they imagined themselves to be beneficiaries of kin-state practices. Secondly, the chapter explores, each category’s engagement with three different types of practices:

1. Membership: Romanian citizenship acquisition (redobândire)
2. Participatory: Extra-territorial voting practices
3. Educational: Scholarships

7.2 Entitlements to Romanian Kin-State Practices

This section analyses how each inductively derived category framed their entitlement vis-à-vis Romania as the kin-state, by considering their knowledge and interest in Romania’s activities in Moldova, and their framing of these activities. The section examines how far appreciation of Romania’s kin-state approach is associated with identification with Romania, to understand whether those already more symbolically attached to Romania (Organic Romanians, less so Cultural Romanians), had a more positive appreciation of Romanian kin-state practices as a kin-state than those less attached (Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans).

7.2.1 Organic Romanians

Organic Romanians had a good knowledge and positive appreciation of what Romania offered, such as citizenship, scholarships and books [MD-16, MD-18, MD-26a]. Consistent with their fraternal identification with Romania, they framed Romania as a kin-state willing and obliged to help them as a matter
7.2. ENTITLEMENTS TO ROMANIAN KIN-STATE PRACTICES

Table 7.1: Inductively Derived Identification Categories for Moldovan case (from Chapter 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Kin-state meanings</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organic Romanians</strong></td>
<td>strongest and organic identification as ethnically Romanian</td>
<td>MD-28, MD-1, MD-2, MD-8, MD-10, MD-11, MD-14, MD-15, MD-16, MD-18, MD-25a, MD-25b, MD-26a, MD-32, MD-35, MD-39, MD-42, MD-46, MD-47, MD-48, MD-49, MD-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Romanians</strong></td>
<td>ethnically Romanian, identified Moldova as home</td>
<td>MD-4, MD-5, MD-9, MD-12, MD-19, MD-20, MD-23, MD-24, MD-26b, MD-33, MD-40, MD-44, MD-43, MD-45, MD-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambivalent Romanians</strong></td>
<td>partially but not wholly both Romanian and somewhat Moldovan</td>
<td>MD-3, MD-6, MD-17, MD-27, MD-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moldovans</strong></td>
<td>identified as citizen of Moldova</td>
<td>MD-7a, MD-7b, MD-7c, MD-21, MD-34, MD-36, MD-37, MD-38, MD-52, MD-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistic Moldovans</strong></td>
<td>primarily as Moldovan: culturally Moldovan and distinct from those who were Romanian</td>
<td>MD-41, MD-54, MD-57b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of “blood, language” [MD-16, MD-18, MD-26a]. They appreciated Romania’s willingness to help regardless of the attitude of Moldova’s political administration, where Romania had helped regardless of the “mud” thrown at Romania by Moldovan politicians [MD-11, MD-28, MD-2, MD-53, MD-14, MD-26a, MD-35, MD-47, MD-35].

Crucial to this positive framing of Romania, was their affection for the incumbent Romanian President, Traian Băsescu, who was “taking care of Moldova” by facilitating redobândire [MD-47, MD-11, MD-25a]. Their strong personal connection with Băsescu projected him as their charismatic protector (see M. Weber 1994), because a different presidential administration might not “see Moldova the way Băsescu does” [MD-11, MD-47].

Their gratitude translated to a necessary dependence on Romania, whose assistance was crucial for their survival, and “way of life for Moldova” because “if Romania does not help us, we die here” [MD-32, MD-35, MD-26a]. They needed Romania’s support for navigating the shortcomings of the Moldovan government who had “had not so much money” and “had a lot of crises” [MD-32, MD-35, MD-26a].

This necessary dependence framed Romania as their “saviour” in international politics, facilitating Moldova’s move towards the EU and away from Russia [MD-14]. By providing an alternative source of energy, Romania reduced Moldova’s reliance on Russian energy and, hence, exposure to Russian “blackmail” [MD-14, MD-28].

Secondly Romania was the key facilitator of Moldova’s Europeanization, because they “lobby for us” in the EU, where they framed Moldovan-EU relations as crucial for Moldova’s future development and survival [MD-32]. Hence they framed dependence on Romania as the only possible path towards Moldova’s domestic modernisation and international reforms that might reap benefits, such as dissociation from Russia.

EU has repeated this rhetoric, with EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger criticising Russia’s “pure blackmail” of Moldova via through hikes Russia’s hikes in the price of energy for Moldova (see Călus 2013).
7.2. ENTITLEMENTS TO ROMANIAN KIN-STATE PRACTICES

7.2.2  Cultural Romanians

*Cultural Romanians*, like *Organic Romanians*, believed that Romania was “doing a lot” to foster a “special relationship” with Moldova [MD-9, MD-12, MD-19, MD-26b, MD-40]. They framed Romania as a bridge for Moldova’s Europeanization and modernisation because as “our big brother”, and “main promoter Moldova in the EU”, Romania was “trying to move us away from our past, and trying to integrate us faster into the EU” [MD-40, MD-9, MD-19, MD-26b, MD-24, MD-20].

Implicit was the sense of paternalistic hierarchy: that Romania could help its kin to be more like them, and correspondingly less like, and dependent on, Russia. In zero-sum terms, they framed Romanian investment as outpacing Russia. This provided Moldova with an “alternative connection to other resources” and to “another market”, which is “cheaper, better quality than Russian” such as energy [MD-20, MD-24, MD-51, MD-19].

However, unlike *Organic Romanians*, *Cultural Romanians* problematised Romania’s attitude towards them and Moldova. They described Romania’s paradox, between seeing Moldova as “lost, stolen, invaded by the Soviet Union” which they feel “guilty” about and want to “gain back”, and seeing Moldova as “an independent state” whose sovereignty they respect [MD-19, MD-44, MD-24]. They saw also Romania as a more self-interested kin-state which could benefit materially from Moldova’s “development opportunities”, in particular those arising from “getting Moldova close to the EU” [MD-33].

Still, like *Organic Romanians*, *Cultural Romanians* emphasised their personal affection towards Băsescu because he “likes Moldova” and “gives a feeling of belonging” to them as Romanians in Moldova [MD-9, MD-51, MD-33, MD-45]. Băsescu was framed as being so popular that he could in fact win the Moldovan presidency [MD-51].⁹⁶ They had little trust for other Romanian politicians, believing that Ponta was “more measly [sic] in terms of the relationship with us” so that Moldova’s “privileged” status vis-à-vis Romania was only “as long as Băsescu is in power” [MD-51, MD-45, MD-9].

Overall, *Cultural Romanians* believed, as *Organic Romanians*, in their entitlement to receive assistance from, and shift their dependence towards, Romania, originating from a fraternal hierarchy, where Romania assisted Moldova’s emulation of Romania, and re-orientation away from Russia. However they highlighted the problems this presented for Romanian-Moldovan relations, stuck between maligning their Soviet-induced separation, which made them naturally entitled to Romanian rights, and recognising Moldova’s right to its post-Soviet sovereignty, which questioned the legitimacy of framing kin-state practices as a natural entitlement.

7.2.3  Ambivalent Romanians

*Ambivalent Romanians* believed Romania’s “compatriots” in Moldova were Romania’s priority, with Romania offering scholarships, books and mass-media sponsorship [MD-3, MD-17]. However, consistent with their uncertain identification with Romania, they were critical of Romania’s approach towards them. They blamed Romania’s “duplicitous” attitude towards Moldova as masking a hidden desire for Romanian expansionism [MD-6].

⁹⁶Moldova does not currently have a directly elected President.
Instead of seeing dependence on Romania as a necessary relationship, as Organic and Cultural Romanians, they resented Romania’s “ideological” approach towards Moldova because, having been “torn” from Romania fifty years ago, they were no longer “brothers” [MD-3, MD-17]. They wanted Romania to pursue a more pragmatic or “strategic” approach towards Moldova based on neighbourly, but not fraternal, relations which differentiated this group, as would be expected, from Organic and Cultural Romanians [MD-3, MD-17).

7.2.4 Moldovans

Moldovans, as discussed in Chapter 6, did not identify Romania as their kin-state, and had a variable, if more tempered attitude, to Romania’s approach than previous categories. While they framed Băsescu as a “good partner” [MD-52], they saw themselves as passive and even unwilling recipients of Romania’s help.

Echoing Ambivalent Romanians’ concerns, Moldovans saw Romania as manifesting a “moral, historical obligation” towards it “brother” (Moldova), regardless of how Moldovan residents felt, where Romania was almost fixated “to unite one day” [MD-52, MD-36]. Moldovans distrusted Romania, similarly to Ambivalent Romanians, framing Romania as duplicitous by using these fraternal obligations to disguise “political reasons” to be involved in Moldova, such as via Romania’s scholarship programme [MD-56]. MD-56 believed that Romania deliberately made acquiring a Romanian visa “almost impossible” to compel Moldovans to (re)acquire Romanian citizenship, by creating a bureaucracy where getting a visa, in particular a multi-entry visa, was “shorter but it’s kind of more complicated” than acquiring citizenship.

Moldovans were cynical of Romania’s approach and wanted a more “pragmatic, realistic and visionary” approach from Romania, as Ambivalent Romanians, instead of their current “populist, romantic or poetic” approach towards Moldovan and its population [MD-21].

7.2.5 Linguistic Moldovans

Consistent with their antipathy towards Romania (Chapter 6), Linguistic Moldovans maligned Romania more than previous categories. They resented Romania’s claims to Moldova, as Moldovans and Ambivalent Romanians, and believed it was wrong that Romania “dictates to us what to do” because it has “more influence, more power” than Moldova as an EU member [MD-41, MD-57b, MD-54]. Hence they resisted what they framed as Romania’s paternalistic approach to Moldova believing the goal of Romania was to “capture the state” of Moldova and transform into its “colony” [MD-41, MD-57b, MD-54].

Crucial was their resentment of Romania’s citizenship policy (discussed below) which they framed as allowing Romania to capture the Moldovan state via the masses and elite [MD-41, MD-57b, MD-54]. Secondly, they believed that Romania’s activities, such as DPRP (Department for Romanians Abroad), indicated that a “lot of money flows for propaganda” via their funding of book programmes and “unionist marches”, which they heavily opposed [MD-57b]. Linguistic Moldovans were therefore, as expected, the least interested in engaging with Romania as a kin-state, and the most negative about Romania’s
7.3. EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES: ROMANIAN SCHOLARSHIPS

intentions towards Moldova.

In terms of entitlements, most respondents had a good knowledge of, and interest in, how they could engage with Romanian kin-state practices, regardless of how they identified. Where respondents varied, as expected, was in their framing of these entitlements vis-à-vis Romania: Organic Romanians favoured a necessary dependence on Romania, Cultural Romanians supported a similar approach, while recognising the paradox between this dependence and Moldova as a wholly sovereign independent state. Both Organic and Cultural Romanians saw Romania as a rightful bridge through which Moldova could modernise and Europeanize, and move away from Russia. Hence Romania was framed as a domestic kin-state actor and an international promoter of Moldova vis-à-vis the EU. Beyond Organic and Cultural Romanians, respondents were more negative about Romania’s approach. Ambivalent Romanians preferred a friendly, and not fraternal or dependent relationship with Romania, while Moldovans were more distrusting of Romania’s real political motivations. Contrastingly, Linguistic Moldovans demonstrated the most distrust of Romania, believing Romania wanted to convert Moldova into its colony.

A further interesting finding was respondents’ adoration of Băsescu, particularly Organic and Cultural Romanians. They expressed gratitude to Băsescu for his actions, casting him as a charismatic protector of Romanians abroad, despite Băsescu’s unpopularity at home, suffering two attempted impeachment referenda and a narrow presidential victory in 2009.\(^{97}\) This shrewdly nourished cult of personality, as discussed below (section 6.5), relates too to citizenship with voting practices (discussed below), enabling respondents to reward Băsescu via their extra-territorial voting practices, nervous that a different regime might alter Moldovans’ rights vis-à-vis Romania.

7.3 Educational Practices: Romanian Scholarships

Moldovan students receive the bulk of Romanian scholarships, with and without bursaries, for Romanians abroad (≈74%). This section analyses respondents’ engagement with these educational practices, to explore the role of education as a kin-state tool. This is vital given the lack of attention educational practices have received by existing kin-state research.

Unlike Chapter 5 vis-à-vis engagement with Russia in Crimea, this section shows a greater ability of Romania, as a kin-state, to wield influence via educational practices, by allowing kin-states not only to invest in human capital but to generate future generations favourable to the kin-state, where, for example, Romania could Romanianise and Europeanize Moldova from the bottom-up.

7.3.1 Organic Romanians

Organic Romanians were most positive about educational opportunities in Romania because Romania offered the “most scholarships for students”, estimating 5-10,000 scholarships for Moldovans per year.

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\(^{97}\)In the 2012 impeachment referendum, there was strong popular support to remove Băsescu from office (87.52%), of from those who participated, however, with a turnout of only 46.24% the referendum failed to meet the required 50% turnout threshold, and thus was nullified (Biroul Electoral Central 2012a).
They attributed this not to Romania, as their kin-state, but personally to Băsescu. Hence the number of scholarships provided by Romania was "so big" because Băsescu was "a good friend for Moldova" and was motivated by symbolic concerns, because he "feels that Moldova, Bessarabia is one country with Romania" [MD-48].

Organic Romanians framed Romanian scholarships as necessary by offering a "better" education than in Moldova, to circumnavigate the problem that "our government won’t make opportunities here" [MD-39]. Some of the respondents had lived comfortably on Romanian scholarships [MD-28], and identified how many of the current Moldovan administration had been educated in Romanian universities.

In terms of the impact of these educational practices, some Organic Romanians believed that a "lot (of students) came back" to Moldova following their studies in Romania [MD-48, MD-25a], while others were doubtful that many returned [MD-8]. Beyond the material benefits of studying in Romania, respondents believed studying in Romania enabled students to "promote the ideals and Romanian values" back in Moldova by exposing them to "another view" outside of Moldova [MD-25a, MD-28, MD-48]. They saw scholarships as "more important than regaining citizenship" because these scholarships could "educate a generation" and "educate leaders" [C-46].

Organic Romanians were therefore happy that they could access education, as a key public good, not only from their home-state but from their kin-state, which offered superior opportunities. They viewed these scholarships as crucial for Moldova’s educational development, which did not necessarily contribute to a brain drain, but rather towards a state where its citizens realised they were Romanian, culturally and ethnically.

7.3.2 Cultural Romanians

Like Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians were interested and positive about the large and increasing number of scholarships which Romania made available and from which “our [Moldovan] students benefit” [MD-24, MD-51, MD-20, MD-19]. Most believed these scholarships were beneficial for Moldovan students, and even for Romania, as a “mechanism of promotion of Romania […] of Romanian values here in Moldova” [MD-26b].

Cultural Romanians emphasised the personal benefits of Romanian scholarships, while few discussed the negative impacts for Moldova. Reflecting on their experiences, some described the significance of studying in Romania in the early post-Soviet period as their “first chance to go somewhere outside of Soviet Union […] it was access to another world […] it was unbelievable” [MD-20]. They believed Romania should continue, if not expand its scholarship programme, because of the personal benefits that it could provide via a better education in Romania, in particular for their children [MD-44].

Only MD-19 scaled up the policy beyond the personal level. He criticised how Moldovan universities were “losing intelligent people” where in 10-20 years if this policy continued, Moldova’s higher education could “collapse” because of the numbers now studying in Romania due to the scholarship programme [MD-19]. However that these scholarships could undercut Moldovan educational institutions was not a concern of most Cultural and Organic Romanians, who appreciated the positive personal effects of these scholarships.
7.3.3 Ambivalent Romanians

Ambivalent Romanians framed Romanian scholarships as evidence that Romania is “our friend” because they gave “5,000” bursaries to Moldovan students each year [MD-17]. Several Ambivalent Romanians had studied in Romania since 1990 [MD-6, MD-27, MD-50].

For those who studied in the 1990s, “Romania was the west for us” while the Soviet education system remained more restrictive and “isolated” [MD-27]. However since the 1990s, the “difference is not so big now” between universities in Romania and Moldova as it had been, decreasing the relative educational merit of Romanian versus Moldovan institutions [MD-27]. For MD-50, as a contemporary student in Romania, Romania was his “last choice” behind universities in Western Europe where Moldovans now cast their preferences further afield than Romania. For example, they experienced the chaos of applying, requiring applications to queue “all night” and up to “two days” to receive a place because “we were so many” [MD-50]. Unlike Organic Romanians, they criticised the reality of these scholarships, where only a few full-bursary places were offered and even these, “of 50 euros”, per month “is not (now) enough” to live on in Romania [MD-50, MD-27].

Ambivalent Romanians were concerned, as Cultural Romanians, that students did not return after studying in Romania. They were able to find opportunities outside of Moldova, which impeded their return [MD-17]. For example MD-50, discussed below, explained how redobândire and studying in Romania, encouraged him not to want to return to Moldova after studying in Romania. MD-27 noted, “as a teacher” that he was “not very happy”, because this was bad also for Moldovan universities that “some of the best students are going” to Romania rather than staying in Moldova.

Ambivalent Romanians were critical also of Romania’s intentions. They believed that Romania wanted to appear “very concerned about Moldova” by showing that it “wants to help” via scholarship provision [MD-27]. However this allowed Romania to disguise how far this was a relatively cheap “instrument” financially-speaking to “help lost Romanian lands” by “creat[ing] a link” and to “spread the national message” across different sections of Moldovan society via education in Romania [MD-27]. Ambivalent Romanians, were therefore more willing to see the negatives of Romania’s scholarship programme, resisting the necessary dependence rhetoric of Organic and Cultural Romanians, as they were towards other Romanian practices.

7.3.4 Moldovans

Moldovans appreciated Romania’s scholarship programme as a “good option” and opportunity for them [MD-56]. Romania offered “another level” of education to that available in Moldova, particularly for “low income families [...] because of everything that was provided by the university, by the government” [MD-52, MD-56, MD-21]. They saw Romania also as offering a “much higher” number of scholarships than other states, such as Ukraine and Russia, and a higher level of education, because it was required to meet “European” standards and hence “invest more in education and science” [MD-21].

As others, Moldovans recognised “many of the graduates choose to stay in Romania but many return” because they were unable to find work in Romania and were impeded by not having Romanian citizenship [MD-56]. These students who had studied “in the West” could reinvest “their knowledge”
However it was not only about investing knowledge but also investing more pro-Romanian values because education “influences the way they [young people] think and the way they identify themselves” [MD-34]. Romania was able “to a great extent” to use its education policy as a way of “attracting a lot of young people [from Moldova] on cultural level” to start to identify themselves “as Europeans, pro-European people, pro-Romanian Romanians” [MD-34]. Romania was framed, therefore, as wielding a powerful soft power influence by cultivating ongoing kin-state support from below, among current and future generations, in how they identified as Romanian, pro-Romania, and pro-EU.

### 7.3.5 Linguistic Moldovans

While Linguistic Moldovans maligned Romania’s influence elsewhere, for example in relation to redebândire, they made little reference to, or criticism of, Romania’s scholarship policy. This contrasts to other categories who freely discussed this policy, and its impact, at length.

The main problem they discussed was that the scholarship policy contributed to the depopulation of Moldova. Those studying in Romania do “not want to return back” after finding better opportunities in Romania, and the EU more widely, than “if he returns to Moldova, he’ll never find a better paid job” and this was heightened also by having access to Romanian citizenship [MD-54]. However it was interesting that Romania’s provision of scholarships for Moldovans was not seen as a source of influence for Romania, unlike citizenship, but rather was something “very normal” [MD-54].

This section discussed how Romania’s education practices were an important, but overlooked kin-state “instrument”. Generally, respondents appreciated Romania’s investment in their education and this did not deviate according to how respondents identified. However criticisms of Romania’s approach varied by how respondents identified: those identifying most with Romania (Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians to some extent) were least critical of the negatives of this policy, while those identifying less with Romania (Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans) were more critical of how this might impact Moldova’s education system and disguise Romania’s strategic aims towards Moldova. Unexpectedly, Linguistic Moldovans, who maligned other aspects of Romania’s kin-state approach, did not malign these educational practices, as they did not see them as a significant form of kin-state engagement.

This analysis shows how Romania, or Băsescu, has predominantly, honed a good image of itself, via scholarship provision, because of the number of respondents who knew and praised the large number of scholarships offered by Romania, without necessarily knowing or experiencing how these operated. Crucially, respondents framed this as a significant force for Romanianising, modernising and Europeanizing Moldova via its student body, and linked these three processes together.¹⁹⁸ There are inherent paradoxes with scholarships as a system of development because many students studying in Romania may not return to Moldova, which in turn will further Moldova’s migratory exodus (see Bouton et al. 2011). This dependence on Romania as a gateway of workforce modernisation may

¹⁹⁸With the change of political elite in Moldova in 2009, when the PCRM government fell to a pro-European coalition, a quarter of the ministers had been graduates of Romanian universities (Milevschi 2012:175).
undercut Moldova’s ability and desire to provide education for those who choose not to be educated in Romania, by reducing their student intake.

Hence, kin-state policies can affect home-state public goods provision, particularly in kin majority cases like this, because one state has the ability to affect the invectives of providing public goods to home-state citzensery. However a caveat to this, and to Romania’s positive PR, is that the key area of growth for Romanian scholarships has been those offered to study at universities in Moldova affiliated with Romanian institutions in Bălți and Cahul. This indicates a potential policy ceiling in what Romania is willing to extend, even if, discursively, politicians such as Băsescu support scholarship growth. This section argued too for recognising the dynamics of educational relations between Romania and Moldova, where the significant gap between systems in the early 1990s was since narrowing, in particular for the socially mobile who now looked elsewhere in the EU as their first option, ahead of Romania as their “second option”.

7.4 Membership Practices: Redobândire

This section analyses respondents’ engagement with Romanian citizenship reacquisition (redobândire), by analysing respondents’ motivations and the impact of these practices. To be eligible for redobândire, individuals require proof their grandparents, or great-grandparents, were born in the territory of Greater Romania (1918-1940). Eligibility for redobândire, therefore, has little to do with identifying as, or feeling, Romanian, i.e. it is not ethnically defined or conferred.

As discussed, the absence of reliable, verifiable and consistent statistics regarding the prevalence of Romanian citizenship in Moldova mean that the aggregate-level perspective remains obscured. A bottom-up approach allows for these data problems to be avoided by focusing instead on how respondents engage with redobândire and the motivations underpinning this practice. It unpacks the spectrum of motivations underpinning redobândire: material, i.e. pragmatic reasons, and symbolic, i.e. non-pragmatic reasons related to spiritual and cultural identification. The section analyses also normative motivations, which are overlooked elsewhere, to analyse how far redobândire is linked to its institutional roots, as returning a status that was withdrawn from relatives.

Observing Redobândire

While respondents demonstrated different motivations, elaborated below, the process of redobândire was similar. Firstly, in everyday life, discussions of, and applications for, redobândire were normalised and ubiquitous because there was a “bit of a gold rush right now” [MD-23, MD-24, MD-33, MD-4]. This gold rush included respondents and elites, with respondents detailing the engagement of the political class with redobândire, including many of the current government and judges in the Supreme Court [MD-56, MD-41]. This proliferation attracted peripheral services, with the surroundings of the Romanian embassy in Chişinău saturated with translation, reprographic, advocacy, transport and archival services. This opened up also an informal economy of services, based around “intermediaries”, and the corrupt practices which were endemic to the procedure, where €4-5,000 could procure a Romanian

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²⁹This has been reported in the media also (see Agerpres 2013).

¹⁰⁰MD-36 believed that acquiring a Romanian citizenship/passport using intermediaries could cost €4-5,000.
7.4. MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES: REDOBÂNDIRE

passport, fuelling a connection between corrupt citizenship practices, political scandals and organised crime [MD-17, MD-5, MD-9, MD-15, MD-11, MD-36, MD-42, MD-49].

Secondly, while the rights of Moldovans to travel to the EU improved in 2014, following visa-free access, respondents experienced discrimination, restrictions and “total hell” of travel to EU member states as a Moldovan citizen without a Romanian passport during the period of fieldwork [MD-9, MD-15, MD-40, MD-37]. These restrictions worsened with the tightening of Romanian requirements pre-accession (2002), causing a “real[ly] big change and big shock” for Moldovans [MD-23]. Applying for visas was costly and time-consuming, and it was often harder, in their eyes, to acquire, a Romanian visa than a Schengen visa [MD-3, MD-4, MD-47, MD-42, MD-23, MD-51, MD-8, MD-11, MD-15].

In this context, and in contrast to Russian citizenship in Crimea (Chapter 5), respondents had widespread knowledge of their rights to access redobândire, and of the necessary procedures. However applying was a “complicated” process [MD-26a, MD-14]. It required respondents to wait “too much time” (≅1-2 years) for Romania to complete their application, because of the inefficient and under-staffed Romanian bureaucracy [MD-2, MD-9, MD-44]. Before respondents could apply, it could take many years to gather the necessary documents: to retrieve original documents from the archive, which was a “mess” [MD-32], and to standardise and translate Soviet-era documents, to account for forcible name changes [MD-16, MD-25b, MD-4, MD-56]. Documents could be missing from the archive, in particular for those whose relatives were deported in the early Soviet period [MD-51].

Redobândire was a costly procedure (≅€200) requiring individuals to invest time and money in retrieving and Romanianising their documents, including acquiring Romanian birth certificates [MD-51, MD-25a, MD-4]. These experiences contested simplistic media portrayals, which frame Romania as giving out passports. Instead redobândire was a costly, time-consuming and difficult procedure, even if redobândire was described as less difficult than accessing visas from EU member-states [MD-52, MD-56].

In the context of these common experiences which suggest material motivations could be a strong factor underpinning redobândire, as Heintz (2008) argues, the section analyses each inductively derived category’s engagement with redobândire. The section considers firstly whether material discourses were the primary motivation and, secondly, whether symbolic discourses were more prevalent than material discourses in those with stronger symbolic attachments to Romania (i.e. Organic Romanians, and even Cultural Romanians).

7.4.1 Organic Romanians

Most Organic Romanians had practised redobândire (17/22), or would apply for redobândire (1/22); only a minority (5/22) did not want to acquire Romanian citizenship (Figure 7.2).

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¹⁰¹ These corrupt practices have been covered in the media also: the EU Observer reported applying for Romanian citizenship in Moldova with fake documents (Mogos and Calugareanu 2012), while it is alleged that that Vladimir Plahotniuc, a well-known Moldovan oligarch affiliated to PDM, acquired Romanian citizenship under a different name (Turcanu et al. 2011).

¹⁰² While Romanian visas were cost-free, applicants had to prove bank funds of at least €500 (about 30% of average per capita annual income in 2010).

¹⁰³ Neofotistos (2009) describes the same problems of an inefficient bureaucracy regarding acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by Macedonians.

¹⁰⁴ Respondents noted that names had changed in the Soviet Union because of the requirement of having names listed in Cyrillic, rather than Latin, script [MD-56].

¹⁰⁵ The majority of deportations took place in 1940-1941 and in 1949 to Siberia and Kazakhstan (see Caşu 2010:52-53)
7.4. MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES: REDOBÂNDIRE

Motivations for not Practising Redobândire

Those who did not want to practice redobândire explained they “already consider[ed]” themselves Romanian and saw no reason to “change” this with Romanian citizenship [MD-47, MD-42]. For them, redobândire was too difficult and costly, in terms of collecting the documents and visiting the embassy [MD-47, MD-48, MD-42].

Contrastingly, two younger respondents believed that Romanian citizenship was unnecessary, and unnecessarily costly because unlike most respondents, they would “wait for visa liberalisation” with the EU which the Moldovan administration had “promised” would happen in 2014 [MD-47, MD-48]. These respondents interlocked the costliness of Romanian citizenship, and the material rights it could provide, alongside the idea that these could be overcome by rights acquired as Moldovan citizens, expecting EU visa liberalisation to come soon.

Lastly, those respondents who were most pro-Romanian objected to practising redobândire, as a process of applying for a status that they considered a “natural right” [MD-14, MD-8]. They believed that Romanian citizenship should be conferred on them automatically, as it would be via unification, rather than requiring them to apply for it [MD-8].

Overall, Organic Romanians demonstrated several reasons behind their desire not to practice redobândire: either as a difficult procedure, unnecessary because of an impending EU visa-free regime or an insult, to apply for something that should be automatic.

Motivations for Practising Redobândire

Organic Romanians expressed their practices of redobândire by evoking a contrast between themselves, as true and legitimate holders of Romanian citizenship, and materially-motivated “profiteers” who use Romanian citizenship “not [as] a way to feel Romanian” but as a “formula to go abroad legally” [MD-42, MD-47, MD-28]. They respected the seriousness of the redobândire ceremony, wearing “my suit, tie”, against the vulgar others, who “dressed like they were going to Piaţa Centrală (central market) without
any stress” and who were concerned about “getting the certificate” so they could “go to Italy” [MD-32].

These profiteers were framed predominantly as “true Russian, like speaking native Russian” because they lacked any attachment to Romania, neither able to speak Romanian nor knowing or wanting to know the “history of Romanians” [MD-42, MD-18, MD-49]. This imbued redobândire with a reputation of corruption, believing these profiteers had “paid money […] trying to find some kind of relatives” to prove their right to reacquire Romanian citizenship [MD-49]. Rather, they wanted Romanian citizenship to be restricted to those with evidence of an ethnic (or at least linguistic and historical) commitment to Romania, exceeding Romania’s territorial requirements.

However Organic Romanians accepted they would be “a little disingenuous” if they ignored that the opportunities provided by redobândire did not play “a bit” of a role in encouraging this practice [MD-46], even if it was secondary to symbolic motivations of identifying as Romanian [MD-1, MD-10]. Romanian citizenship was their “salvation”, allowing them to “not depend on the Moldovan passport with which you can only go to three countries”, and granted them also the right to work and be educated in the EU [MD-35, MD-39, MD-11, MD-16, MD-32]. This demonstrates Organic Romanians’ willingness and desire to shift their dependence on Moldova partially towards Romania, who could offer superior material rights and benefits.

Materially, redobândire offered a form of “insurance” domestically, in case respondents felt they had “failed again and again and again” to make a life in Moldova [MD-32], and geopolitically, as a “balance, so to speak, in the area” in case of an eventuality such as if Russia were to “strike” Moldova [MD-46]. Hence material motivations were complex, premised on both a voluntary desire to improve individual rights and benefits, and a more crisis-oriented perspective. Here redobândire offered rights and benefits that might be useful as an insurance against domestic and international emergencies by providing a way out of Moldova.

Symbolic motivations were important for many Organic Romanians, and more important for Organic Romanians than other categories. Reflecting their organic identification, it was “natural” to be both Romanian and Moldovan citizens, because they “equally loved” Romania and Moldova [MD-35, MD-18, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-25b, MD-10, MD-15, MD-39]. Having Romanian citizenship, granted a sense of equality with Romanians in Romania, that they would become “Romanian like them” in Romania and could live in Romania “not as [an] immigrant but as a citizen will all rights and obligations” [MD-32], whereas previously they could feel Romanian but “cannot prove that” [MD-18, MD-49]. Only a few resisted this symbolic importance, believing they did not need Romanian papers to “prove” they were Romanian [MD-11].

Alongside material framings of EU rights, EU rights were imbued with a symbolic discourse. Respondents explained they could now claim, more legitimately, they were not only “European” because they were from Moldova, but had “become European” “through Romanian citizenship” by becoming also a “European citizen” [MD-35, MD-39, 16], allowing them to feel they were “protected as a European” because they had the “same rights” as EU citizens [MD-39].

Beyond material and symbolic discourses, they portrayed redobândire normatively as “my right”; their grandparents had lost their “natural right” to Romanian citizenship in a “very abusive way” when Moldova was annexed by the Soviet Union [MD-1, MD-2, MD-28, MD-25a, MD-26a, MD-46]. Hence
7.4. MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES: REDOBÂNDIRE

redobândire, as a process of “recovery”, recognised the “historic truth” that they had “finally got their right citizenship” [MD-11, MD-26a]. This differed from those framing Romanian citizenship as a natural right they were unwilling to apply for because these respondents were willing to recover what was deprived from their relatives.

Thus, material motivations were a guiding factor behind redobândire, but were accompanied, if not superseded, by important symbolic (both Romanian and European) and normative motivations also.

Impacts of Redobândire

Symbolically, Organic Romanians agreed redobândire had not changed how they identified with Romania, because they already felt Romanian [MD-2, MD-11]. Still, receiving redobândire was a source of pride [MD-16, MD-10] rather than something they wanted to “benefit from” [MD-32].

For Organic Romanians, it was neither problematic, nor zero-sum, to have citizenship and “loyalty” towards Romania. They viewed Moldova as their state even if Romania was their “big brother”; for example they would still support Moldova in football matches between Romania and Moldova [MD-2]. Hence their “obligations” and support for Romania came after, and did not replace, their obligations and support towards Moldova [MD-32, M-2, MD-14].

Rather, in relation to citizenship, the zero-sum game was between closer affiliation with the EU (via Romania) or Russia, because citizenship was a “political tool” used both by Romania and Russia to “take more influence” in Moldova [MD-10, MD-26a]. Redobândire for Organic Romanians was therefore more a signifier of geopolitical allegiances, of a symbolic shift towards Romania and the EU, than political allegiances.

7.4.2 Cultural Romanians

Most Cultural Romanians had reacquired (8/15), were reacquiring (1/15) or would apply (4/15) for redobândire; a minority had not applied (2/15).

Motivations for not Practising Redobândire

In explaining their lack of motivation in practising redobândire, neither of the Cultural Romanians expressed as strong opinions for not applying as Organic Romanians. Both noted the material benefits of redobândire.

MD-26b criticised those motivated only by the “benefits” of citizenship, such as the right to work in Italy or Spain, while defending his undecided stance towards applying, because he was not “against Romania” and promoted “Romanian values”, regardless of his citizenship status. By contrast, MD-20 regretted his status, framing it a “mistake” not to have applied because it was now too late. He had assumed, path dependently, that because it had been easy in the 1990s “to cross the border” to Romania, it would be the same “for the rest of my life, forever”.

Neither respondent appeared to have a consistent approach to their citizenship status, with both indicating it was not the difficulty of practising redobândire, but their inhibitions concerning what
7.4. MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES: REDOBÂNĐIRE

practising redobânđire would signify, that they were behind others [MD-20] or materialist [MD-26].

Motivations for Practising Redobânđire

*Cultural Romanians* were more materially motivated by the “practical reasons” of practising redobânđire, than *Organic Romanians*, appreciating the travel, business and educational opportunities in Romania and beyond [MD-44, MD-45, MD-19, MD-9]. They framed redobânđire as a “necessity” offering them “certainty” and flexibility to “get in the car and go where we want” beyond post-Soviet space [MD-44, MD-26b, MD-33, MD-9, 43, MD-19, MD-51, MD-12, MD-40]. Like *Organic Romanians*, their material motivations were not simplistic. Rather they framed redobânđire as a form of insurance “just in case” the situation deteriorated in Moldova [MD-9, MD-12]. This demonstrated their desire to shift complete dependence on Moldova, as the state which offered them security, towards multiple dependencies on other states.

*Cultural Romanians* framed material motivations both in terms of what Romania offered, but also in terms of EU opportunities, yet framed these more in terms of material EU benefits, than on the symbolic EU content, as *Organic Romanians* did. Hence redobânđire led to the “opening of borders to the EU” and hence was “our backdoor to entering the EU” [MD-40, MD-33].

Like *Organic Romanians*, *Cultural Romanians* were critical of material “opportunism” in acquiring redobânđire to work abroad [MD-24]. They maligned, in particular, those who could not speak Romanian, i.e. ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, claiming they lacked a genuine connection to Romania and instead had to “create a history of [...] proximity to Romania, some sort of lineage” to practice redobânđire [MD-43, MD-19, MD-12, MD-4, MD-43]. As MD-4 censured, “what kind of redobânđire they have?” if they cannot speak the language of the state from which they are reacquiring citizenship, indirectly criticising Romania’s lack of such requirements.

*Cultural Romanians* also voiced less symbolic motivations for practising redobânđire than *Organic Romanians*. Some explained that, as they already identified as Romanian, then “why not” apply for redobânđire as part of their “patriotic feeling” [MD-9, MD-4, MD-19]. Romanian citizenship was not “another passport” but was a “privilege” which granted them a “connection with Romania that’s also certified in an official manner” [MD-24]. Other respondents dismissed the symbolic discourses underpinning redobânđire arguing that it was “not necessary to have it [Romanian identification] written on paper” to feel Romanian [MD-44]. However, implicitly, this respondent invoked symbolic discourses when explaining the desire for easier access to Romania, via redobânđire, to show their children they were “very much connected” to Romania, sharing “the same culture” and “same traditions” as those in Romania. Hence the symbolic motivations underpinning redobânđire were often intertwined with, and disguised by, materialist motivations, because Romanian citizenship was a gateway to equal status with Romanian and EU citizens, yet still imbued with symbolic significance.

*Cultural Romanians* also problematized these symbolic discourses indicating the psychological anguish and interpersonal conflicts that could arise from redobânđire. For MD-55 whose father was a veteran of the Moldovan army in the Transnistrian conflict (1992-1993), she felt a sense of betrayal: “how could I consider myself a citizen of another state?”. For her redobânđire signified the need to “renounce my principles, any patriotic principles I have” by practising redobânđire as a material necessity.
Like Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians also discussed normative aspects of redobândire, associating the practice with getting back their “real” citizenship which was deprived form their grandparents [MD-19, MD-45, MD-24]. Redobândire was an “apology” which “recognis[ed] our common history” and allowed Romania to atone for Antonescu’s failure to “fight” against Moldova’s annexation by the Soviet Union [MD-24, MD-45].

*Cultural Romanians*, placed relatively less weight on symbolic motivations, giving material motivations primacy; they discussed also the symbolic conflicts emerging from this practice, unlike Organic Romanians. Yet, symbolic and normative motivations were still present, demonstrating the complexities of seeing redobândire as only materially driven. In addition, as Organic Romanians, material motivations were also complex including the security aspects to redobândire, to reduce dependence on Moldova as their sole provider of public goods, such as security.

**Impacts of Redobândire**

While Cultural Romanians were “proud” to be Romanian citizens, they did not feel “real” Romanian citizens believing that “loyalty” towards Romania was “too much” to ask from new citizens [MD-12, MD-23, MD-24]. They remained “in love” with Moldova but now “just had two passports, one blue and one red” [MD-9, MD-5, MD-19, MD-12]. Still, they associated redobândire with a greater “legitimacy” to call themselves Romanians, especially outside of Moldova, and to become more interested and “more involved in Romania”, such as in Romanian politics [MD-23, MD-45]. Impacts were therefore subtle implicating participation and legitimacy, but not identification, since this pre-dated redobândire.

Respondents’ noted their increased mobility, to migrate to Romania or other EU member-states. Some appreciated that living abroad offered them “more possibilities” and flexibility in terms of where they could live and work [MD-45, MD-43], while other respondents explained that they wanted to use redobândire to travel and to stay in Moldova, to work and start a family, as it was their “home” [MD-4, MD-51]. Respondents were critical also of this mobility, which contributed to the “depopulation of our country” especially among the “working population” [MD-23, MD-12]. Thus, opportunities to increase individual mobility came at the cost of reducing Moldova’s already declining labour force.

Politically, Cultural Romanians explained the “conflicts” caused by PCRM who portrayed dual citizen parliamentarians as “traitors” to the Moldovan state [MD-51, MD-9]. Respondents rubbished these claims, reducing the significance of redobândire by arguing people “should not make a big thing about it” [MD-12]. They emphasised the material aspects of redobândire, as “simply a document” to enable travel within the EU, rather than something of greater symbolic or political significance [MD-51, MD-12]. Hence Moldovan society should only be “afraid” if a lot of people practised redobândire [MD-12].

However this was undermined by Cultural Romanians’ geopolitical framing of redobândire, implicating it, like Organic Romanians, in a good versus bad zero-sum game. They equated redobândire with furthering the “good influence” of Romania via the “support” of citizenship to advance and “save us from the Russian influence” [MD-23]. However these framings were not necessarily positive, equating Romania’s tactics to Russian policy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where MD-19 argued Romania could, if a majority became Romanian citizens, argue “there now live Romanians and we have the right to annex that territory”.

191
Redobândire’s geopolitical associations demonstrated a willingness to shift dependence away from a malevolent Russia towards a benevolent and non-coercive relationship with, and dependence on, Romania. Equally the significance of redobândire was linked to its prevalence, where redobândire could have a greater significance should it be a majority practice.

7.4.3 Ambivalent Romanians

Although a smaller number of respondents, Ambivalent Romanians were split between those who had (3/5) and had not (2/5) practised redobândire.

Motivations for not Practising Redobândire

As previous respondents, these Ambivalent Romanians explained the costs of application as inhibiting their desire to practise redobândire, especially if they rarely left Moldova [MD-17]. For example they would have to change family documents to harmonise the spelling of surnames [MD-17]. Unlike previous categories, they felt symbolically inhibited to not change their “national identity” [MD-17].

They recognised that “important advantages” could be derived from redobândire, such as equal access to EU rights enabling individuals to become a symbolic part of a “big European family” [MD-3]. However they weighed these material advantages of being mobile, against the difficulties of applying and the idea they did not need greater mobility.

Motivations for Practising Redobândire

Contrasting to Ambivalent Romanians who did not want to change their “national identity”, and hence practice redobândire, those Ambivalent Romanians who practised redobândire argued, symbolically, that it was not a “very nationalistic” practice [MD-50]. Instead they framed their motivations in material terms, especially for those reacquiring in the late 2000s, the material benefits, of access to EU rights such as travel, were important [MD-27, MD-50]. This contrasted to those who acquired in the 1990s, while studying in Romania, because “why not” have it [MD-6].

The material opportunities of citizenship, such as access to a “better education” and to “change” where you live, were also important. Younger respondents did not want to stay in Moldova, as a state with “no prosperity, no future” [MD-50]. This demonstrated how they wanted to practise redobândire as a way to access the superior public goods from a different state, given Moldova’s inadequate provision.

Still, like Cultural and Organic Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians criticised others’ material motivations. They believed that “not everyone is using it (redobândire) in a normal or good way” by using it only to “work in a shitty job (in Spain or Italy) and come back here and buy a cool car” [MD-50]. Rather they wanted individuals to be motivated not by “money” but, still materially, in the “right way” by “developing yourself” to “bring something good back” to Moldova [MD-50].

While symbolic discourses were absent from Ambivalent Romanians’ practices of redobândire, they framed redobândire normatively. Redobândire signified “getting back the citizenship […] because my grandpa, grandmother had it” [MD-27]. Thus, they not only reflected official Romanian state discourses,
framing *redobândire* as restitution, but related this directly to their relatives’ life histories. Hence, as for *Cultural* and *Organic Romanians*, Romania’s policy of “gathering citizens” was a “way of saying we are sorry” demonstrating that Romania “should feel responsible” for having “evacuated” this part of its interwar territory [MD-27].

**Impacts of Redobândire**

As for *Cultural and Organic Romanians*, *redobândire* rarely impacted *Ambivalent Romanians’* partial identification as Romanian, or with Romania [MD-6]. Instead *redobândire* enabled a bottom-up process of “individual European integration” over the last twenty years [MD-3]. This was the “greatest outcome” for them: to be able to travel to the EU and “feel for the first time that I’m a European citizen” [MD-27].

Respondents associated few problems with *redobândire*, excluding PCRM’s opposition to dual citizenship [MD-6] (see Chapter 3). Only MD-17, reflecting his criticism of Romania’s scholarship policy, framed *redobândire* negatively by its demographic effect of facilitating emigration after receiving Romanian citizenship, as his wife and child had emigrated as Romanian citizens [MD-17]. Instead, they normalised *redobândire*, believing Romania was neither “exceptional” in providing *redobândire* nor were they “breaking any laws” in practising *redobândire* [MD-27, MD-6]. Interestingly, *Ambivalent Romanians* discussed neither the political nor geopolitical impacts of *redobândire*, emphasising instead the personal benefits.

**7.4.4 Moldovans**

Most *Moldovans* had acquired (4/10) or were waiting to reacquire (3/10) Romanian citizenship, while a minority had not (3/10).

**Motivations for not Practising Redobândire**

Materially, *Moldovans* who had not practised *redobândire* explained they did not “need it” [MD-52, MD-21]. Like *Ambivalent Romanians*, they were either disincentivised by the “bureaucratic” nature of the process, or did not feel the necessary push factors to see *redobândire* as materially useful [MD-52, MD-21]. Similar to *Ambivalent Romanians*, and unlike *Organic and Cultural Romanians*, they mentioned also a symbolic constraint derived from their “commitment” to Moldova, which precluded acquiring citizenship of another state [MD-21].

MD-56 was the exception having recently decided, materially, he was now “forced” to practise *redobândire*, after having his Romanian visa application refused. Previously, he felt constrained by the costs, watching his wife spend “all the time and money and nerve cells […] to collect all the papers and then stay in those endless lines in front of the consulate in 40 degree Celsius or minus 20 Celsius”, demonstrating also that couples did not necessarily apply together. However he now planned to share the costs (financial and temporal) of applying, because his brother would “take care of the papers”, given the documents would be the same, thereby reducing the burden that had previously inhibited him from applying [MD-56].
These Moldovans therefore showed the importance of a material necessity in incentivising engagement with redobândire and at the same time the material disincentives existing, e.g. Romanian bureaucracy, and the time and money of applying. Equally, respondents showed too the dynamics existing in these motivations which, if pooled with relatives, could reduce the sense of individual burden, for those who could benefit from this eased mobility.

**Motivations for Practising Redobândire**

Material motivations dominated Moldovans’ explanations of why they practised redobândire. They explained that redobândire “makes life easier” by opening “much more possibilities”, such as getting a “good education in western universities” for their children [MD-34]. Redobândire allowed them to travel a “few times a year” to EU states, and remain in Moldova, indicating they did not intend to use redobândire to emigrate [MD-38, MD-37, MD-34]. They framed these material travel rights as reasons their relatives did not want to practice redobândire, as they did [MD-37].

Fewer Moldovans explained symbolic motivations alongside material motivations. It was only MD-36 and MD-34 who framed their “Romanian ancestry” as legitimising their right to practice redobândire. Equally, and interestingly, unlike some Ambivalent and Cultural Romanians, they did not discuss symbolic conflicts either, indicating further how they framed redobândire as a material practice.

**Impacts of Redobândire**

Moldovans agreed redobândire had not changed their identification with Romania or as Moldovan, because redobândire was about the material “opportunity” rather than concerning “an element of identity” [MD-56]. They retained strong ties to Moldova, irrespective of their citizenship status, because you “cannot have two mothers”, so that being Moldovan, and being born of a Moldovan mother (literally and figuratively) was unchanged by acquiring dual citizenship [MD-7a, MD-7b, MD-7c MD-36, MD-38]. Though Moldovans did not feel negative or apathetic towards Romania and saw the process, such as the citizenship ceremony, as an “emotional experience”, it did not change how they felt about Romania or how they self-identified [MD-38].

However respondents indicated some changes resulting from their increasing rights and status vis-à-vis the EU and Romania. For some this resulted in a new desire to “leave Moldova” and work “somewhere outside in Europe” [MD-34]. Others noted, not personal changes but changes in how they were treated by others, such as Romanian authorities: once you have the certification of redobândire “you get a different kind of treatment. They don’t keep you outside […] they invite you inside because you’re already a Romanian citizen” [MD-56].

Moldovans were more critical than other categories of redobândire’s potentially negative impacts, consistent also with their more cynical appraisal of Romania’s kin-state approach to Moldova. As “an instrument to reach Europe” redobândire could contribute to Moldova’s depopulation [MD-36]. However there was a contradiction between respondents’ intentions, where a greater willingness to work abroad was evident, and their discourse about Moldovan society, where they believed “most” who wanted to leave “they already did that”, though not legally [MD-34].
Secondly, several Moldovans framed the prevalence of redobândire as an “indicator of (Moldova’s) lack of performance” [MD-21, MD-56]. Redobândire was a “solution” and “a comfort to travel more easily in the EU without having Romanian identity in the soul” because of the idea that “this means that our commitments with citizens [in Moldova] is not done as it should” [MD-21]. They believed it exposed them to more instability and even a “conflict of identities at some point” [MD-56].

Hence redobândire was framed as a proxy of Moldova’s weak state capacity and inability to provide the necessary public goods and opportunities to its citizens that they desired; instead redobândire offered alternative channels to acquire these goods and opportunities. This was heightened by respondents’ knowledge that many of the Moldovan elite, members of the “parliament, government, constitutional court”, used redobândire as a solution alongside ordinary citizens [MD-56]. They believed Moldova’s political elite had little belief in Moldova’s future because, investing in their children residing abroad with no plans to return, indicated the elite “do not connect their future with the country that they rule [...] they do not believe in the future of the country that they rule” [MD-56]. While other respondents, mostly Organic Romanians, saw redobândire as Moldova’s “saviour” from Russian blackmail, Moldovans were more cynical believing it demonstrated key weaknesses in Moldova’s state capacity, and the willingness of the elite, motivated by self-interest, to invest in themselves and their family, rather than the future of Moldova.

Geopolitically, Moldovans did not equate Romania with Russia’s behaviour in the Caucasus where “Russia gave its citizenship and then it was one of the mechanisms to claim independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [MD-34]. Yet Romania’s policy was still a “very strong tool” of influence even if Romania would act not “aggressively” towards Moldova, because Romania was able to “at least attract[ing] people from Moldova to become closer with Romania [MD-34, MD-56]. Redobândire allowed Romania to at least “claim” its “influence” and “right” in Moldova even if this was not “with arms” [MD-56]. Some respondents believed the proliferation of redobândire went beyond influence, as a process of unification “post-factum” via a growing Romanian body of citizenry in Moldova [MD-7c].

Moldovans’ discussion of the impacts of redobândire was therefore more wide-reaching, and critical, politically and geopolitically, than categories (Organic and Cultural Romanians) with stronger symbolic attachments to Romania. This suggests an inverse relationship between a symbolic attachment to Romania and a critical stance towards Romania. Those more strongly identifying as Romania, and with Romania, lacked a critical distance vis-à-vis Romania and ignored, or did not see the same areas of criticism lodged by those lacking this identification as Romanian and with Romania. Meanwhile, those not framing Romania as a kin-state were willing to both receive redobândire, but criticise what this might signify about both Moldova (a proxy of state weakness) and Romania (a desire to increase its bottom-up influence).

7.4.5 Linguistic Moldovans

No Linguistic Moldovans (3/3) had practised, or wanted to practise, redobândire.
Motivations for not Practising Redobândire

Materially, Linguistic Moldovans felt neither the same push factors, such as problems acquiring visas, nor pull factors, of wanting to work abroad that Linguistic Moldovans believed “forced” others to apply for redobândire [MD-41, MD-57b]. Linguistic Moldovans supported the exercising of the material right to access dual citizenship because of financial necessity, where there is “a large number of people whose main source of income [is from] abroad” [MD-57b].

However, personally and symbolically, they were the only category who maligned redobândire. Rather than normalising redobândire, or promoting a normative discourse of reversing former injustices, as previous categories Linguistic Moldovans framed it as “something like a taboo” because “I say ‘I’m Moldovan’ and that’s it, full stop” [MD-54].

Impacts of Redobândire

Linguistic Moldovans maligned the symbolic and political aspects of redobândire, framing it as the key facilitator of Romania’s “capture” of the Moldovan state [MD-41]. While they were open to citizens practising redobândire, they saw elite practises of redobândire as demonstrating a conflict of interest because “whose state interests do they [officials] defend? Moldovan or Romanian? I have my doubts” [MD-41, MD-57b]. They emphasised the symbolism of ceremonial components of redobândire, unlike most respondents, where individuals had to give “an oath to the Romanian state, kneeling, kissing the flag”, which was problematic for Moldovan officials, whose oath should be only to Moldova [MD-41, MD-57b].

Here, unlike most respondents, Linguistic Moldovans framed Moldova as an anomaly for allowing public officials to hold dual citizenship: “imagine that the [UK] Queen has a US passport. Is that even possible?” [MD-41, MD-57b].¹⁰⁶ These conflicts of interest, heightened their feelings of being “under (Romanian) occupation” because they questioned who the current administration were working for and which state they were loyal to given they “swore allegiance to Romania” [MD-41, MD-57b].

Linguistic Moldovans therefore imbued redobândire with a more significant and negative political and geopolitical influence than most other respondents (especially Organic and Cultural Romanians), who instead deproblematised the proliferation of redobândire.

Practising redobândire, i.e. reacquiring Romanian citizenship, did not differ across the identification categories: how respondents identified was therefore not a driver of engagement with redobândire, contesting the premise of this chapter (Table 7.2). The exception was Linguistic Moldovans, who pathologised redobândire as signifying the colonial attitude of Romania towards Moldova. However the finding that, beyond Linguistic Moldovans, all categories were interested, and were engaging, in redobândire is significant, indicating the prevalence and legitimacy of becoming a Romanian citizen.

¹⁰⁶The law was changed, with Moldova’s change of government in 2009, following the ECHR (2010) ruling on Tănase and Chirtoacă v Moldova (Chapter 3) to allow holders of public office to retain dual citizenship, as long as they did not have access to state secrets.
7.4. MEMBERSHIP PRACTICES: REDOBÂNDIRE

Table 7.2: Unpacking Practices and Motivations by Inductive Categories

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Practice Redobândire?</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
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<td>Organic Romansians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Symbolic, Material &amp; Normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romansians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Material &amp; Normative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romansians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Material &amp; Normative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Material &amp; Normative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
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However, more associated with identification, were the motivations underpinning redobândire. All respondents expressed material motivations; however that Organic Romansians supplemented these material motivations with symbolic motivations differentiating them from others (Moldovans, Ambivalent Romansians and Cultural Romansians). These material motivations were also complex, imbued with the desire to use redobândire as an alternative source of security, to insure themselves against domestic risks, and with the rights (and status, for Organic Romansians) that could be gained from the EU, of becoming equal not only to Romanian citizens, but also to citizens within the whole EU space.

Organic Romansians gave symbolic motivations greater weight outpacing, but not wholly replacing, material motivations. For Cultural Romansians, symbolic motivations were not necessarily as important as material motivations, but still, like Organic Romansians, they criticised those who became Romanian citizens without an adequate connection, or commitment, to Romania (i.e. ethnic Russians and Russian speakers). Organic Romansians, Cultural Romansians, Ambivalent Romansians and Moldovans all expressed also normative reasons for practising redobândire, explaining it as a legitimate practice because Romanian citizenship had been unfairly withdrawn from their grandparents. This demonstrates the resonance of Romania’s kin-state discourse of restitution, which became a frame to legitimise, and personalise, redobândire by linking the notion of restitution specifically to respondents’ grandparents. That this normative motivation was exhibited by Moldovans, who did not identify with Romania as a kin-state, demonstrates that injustice rather than identity can be a powerful motivating factor for engaging in kin-state practices, when accompanied by desirable material rights.

Lastly, this section has shown the normality and legitimacy of redobândire as a Romanian kin-state practice, where Moldova is becoming a state comprised by a large Romanian extra-territorial citizenry irrespective, as the categories show, of whether respondents identify as (wholly) Romanian or with Romania as a kin-state. This process of redobândire-ization brought respondents closer to Romania. It affected also their identification as European, more than as Romanian, and did not imply a loss of loyalty to Moldova. Of respondents who engaged with this practice, Moldovans were most critical, in terms of its facilitation of depopulation, but also in terms of the state weakness it implied, where public goods, such as security, jobs and opportunities for development, could now be sought from Romania. This shifting dependence towards Romania concerns mass everyday practices and elite everyday practices, framed as both banal (Cultural Romansians) and malevolent (Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans) by respondents who saw it as communicating a lack of faith in Moldova’s future. Here there

¹⁰⁷Neofotistos (2009) discusses too the idea that acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by Macedonians, who are acquiring Bulgarian citizenship “by Bulgarian origin”, does not replace their political or cultural identification with, or sense of loyalty, to Macedonia.
is a tension between the ideational/symbolic legitimacy that Moldova maintains, where engaging with Romanian practices does not replace loyalty to the Moldovan state, and the indication of Moldova’s weak political/geopolitical and social capacity to provide the security and opportunities that its citizens want, and can now access elsewhere.

7.5 Participation Practices: Extra-Territorial Voting

This thesis analyses kin-state practices, i.e. education and citizenship, alongside derived practices, such as kin-state political participation. This section focuses on those who practised redobândire to analyse how far this related to the practice of voting in extra-territorial Romanian elections.

Analysing electoral participation, domestically, is useful for “evaluating the instrumental effectiveness of democracy” (Coleman 2013:4). In a kin-state context, when elections are extra-territorial and connected to citizenship practices, individuals practising redobândire automatically gain the right to vote irrespective of where they reside; analysing electoral participation helps to understand how and why individuals choose to participate in the political practices of an external kin-state. In Croatia, these extra-territorial kin communities played a decisive and contentious role determining election results (Antić 2012:638-39; see also Kasapović 1996), for example by forcing a run-off in 2005 between the incumbent president and the Croatian Democratic Union candidate (HDZ), a party favoured by extra-territorial voters, in particular in Bosnia Herzegovina (Kasapović 2012:783). The number participating in Romanian elections within this kin community in Moldova is less electorally numerous and significant than in Croatia. However it presents a further case, alongside Hungary (since 2014), for determining how and why these individuals participate, and how politicians have responded to this growing extra-territorial electorate, in particular since this burgeoning population often falls outside studies of Romanian diaspora participation, which focus only on migrant (e.g. in UK or France) as opposed to co-ethnic participation (Moldova) (Gherghina 2015).

Aggregate statistics indicate an increasing number within Moldova are participating in Romanian elections (especially presidential elections) and in Băsescu’s term (2004-2014), they voted consistently for Băsescu and the parties he endorsed. This macro-level perspective is dominant in political science understandings of voting which “explain and understand” voting preferences via “quantification” (Coleman 2013:28), to understand how far rationality (Franklin 2004), “incentive structures” (Dalton and Anderson 2011:3) or values and norms (Blais 2000) affect these preferences. However this aggregate perspective says little about why an increasing number are participating. As Bevir and Rhodes (2006:70) argue, researchers assume a “correlation or deductive link” between “beliefs and practices” whereby studying practices, from aggregate statistics, captures beliefs. Instead, Bevir and Rhodes (2006:70) argue that “beliefs and practices” are “constitutive of each other”, where practices of voting can only be captured by understanding, and engaging with, the “intersubjective beliefs that underpin the practice” (see also Schwartz 1984). Hence this section, as the rest of the chapter, explores respondents’ engagement with extra-territorial voting practices, as a lens for understanding practices of political participation post-redobândire (see Bevir and Rhodes 2006:70; Schwartz 1984). Here the purpose is not to understand only the affective side of voting, i.e. the experiences and performances of voting, but to determine why new citizens might decide to vote, who they might vote for (i.e. their preferences) and
what might constrain their intention to vote.

7.5.1 Organic Romanians

Organic Romanians felt a “big responsibility” to vote [MD-39]. As individuals who “enjoy” Romanian citizenship, they wanted to “contribute, get involved with the Romanian state” and to help their “mother state” (patria mama) have a good future [MD-39, MD-8, MD-26a, MD-53, MD-6, MD-11]. They used this sense of obligation to prove they were not “opportunists”, preoccupied by the material benefits of redobândire, but rather use it as a “right to express themselves as citizens of a state” by voting in this state [MD-46, MD-39].

Organic Romanians framed Băsescu, the incumbent president, as their preferred candidate where their vote for him, as Romanians abroad, had been “decisive” in his and P-DL’s political successes [MD-28]. They were personally grateful to Băsescu for his help with redobândire, where it was important to keep Băsescu in office, to ensure the Romanian President remained “more open for our, for my country [Moldova]” [MD-26a]. However others were more cynical, explaining how the visibility of Băsescu in Moldova allowed voters also to express their preference for him not because they cared which “colour” or ideology they voted for, but because they associated him personally with Romania’s preferential attitude towards them [MD-11].

However their intentions to give back, via extra-territorial voting, were constrained by the available supply of voting opportunities because the “number of polling stations is too small” to accommodate the numbers that wanted to vote [MD-46, MD-39]. Hence their intention to vote was affected by the realities of electoral constraints, such as number of polling stations, that might inhibit them from participating regularly in Romanian elections.

7.5.2 Cultural Romanians

Like Organic Romanians, most Cultural Romanians framed voting as a “civic duty” and “right and a responsibility” because Romania “gave me these opportunities”, via redobândire, and wanted “to offer something back, something good” [MD-43, MD-44, MD-40, MD-4, MD-20, MD-24]. Hence they wanted to perform as good citizens, and be observed as such, to reinforce how redobândire was not purely a material practice. They noted too how Romania paid attention to these dynamics, feeling that the presence of “Romanian parliamentarians” in Moldova was increasing, with these politicians keen “to promote their candidacy in Moldova” because “Romania is starting to perceive us the electorate, as potential voters” [MD-40]. This demonstrates the links existing between these growing extra-territorial body of citizens and political dynamics within Romania, where Romania’s political class have come to realise the potential electoral capital of these new citizens.

In terms of voting preferences, Cultural Romanians indicated a greater informational deficit, than Organic Romanians, because many had “no clue about Romanian politics” nor about their preferred candidates [MD-33, MD-40, MD-5, MD-45]. Rather they voted more “in an emotional way” than “in an informed way” [MD-33]. They identified Băsescu as personally responsible for making redobândire “easier” because he was “pro-passports”; however they were less willing to name Băsescu as someone
they would be willing vote for [MD-40, MD-43].

Their sense of distance from Romania, and Romanian politics, cemented this informational deficit and encouraged an emotional approach to voting, in part because they lived outside of Romania. This distance could be narrowed by moving to Romania, such as MD-24 who imagined she would become “a lot more aware of who are the main political actors”.

Yet this emotional content of redobândire demonstrated how voting resulted in Cultural Romanians becoming “more involved emotionally” in Romanian politics [MD-45]. This emotional impact of citizenship acquisition has been overlooked, at least by political studies, yet respondents indicated the development of an emotional connection to Romania, and a sense of legitimacy for this connection, even if it did not alter how they self-identified. Secondly it demonstrates the way that citizenship practices created political actors because it became more “legitimate” for them as Romanian citizens “to have a voice” in Romanian politics and to express this by voting [MD-45]. Redobândire was key in transforming Cultural Romanians into political actors from within Moldova in the Romanian state, via their enfranchisement that was packaged within their citizenship practices. However, as Organic Romanians, these intentions to vote were constrained by voting opportunities because respondents did not want to queue for long periods to vote [MD-33], demonstrating how far this sense of “duty” could be affected by electoral constraints.

### 7.5.3 Ambivalent Romanians

Ambivalent Romanians did not exhibit the same desire to vote. They also did not express the same knowledge of their eligibility to vote, as Cultural or Organic Romanians. For example, MD-50 was unsure whether he could vote “with only a passport” or whether he needed to have an ID card.¹⁰⁸ They did not see it as a “priority” for them to vote, because of the small numbers that participated [MD-6].

While Organic and Cultural Romanians explained the institutional barriers which restricted their voting practices, Ambivalent Romanians expressed too the ideological restrictions of not wanting “to decide in a country in which I don’t know too much” because they did not “like to get involved in another country’s politics”, even though he was studying in Romania [MD-52]. Unlike Cultural and Organic Romanians, these respondents indicated the limits of their desire to become involved with Romania, personally and politically, and did not identify the same normative compulsion to vote that others had, resisting the idea that citizenship (re)acquisition implicitly placed a duty on new citizens to become political actors via voting.

### 7.5.4 Moldovans

Of those with Romanian citizenship, Moldovans were the least interested in voting and engaging in an emotional, or political attachment, to Romania. They were not forthcoming about discussing their voting practices and several were uninterested in voting [MD-7b, MD-7c]. When prompted they indicated a greater sense of “responsibility” to vote, not “just to be materialist”, than a desire to vote, because even though they did not “want too much to vote” they believed “every citizen has a duty to

¹⁰⁸However Romania does permit anyone with a Romanian passport or ID card to vote in elections in and outside Romania.
vote” [MD-37, MD-38]. However this sense of responsibility was only theoretical because in reality none had voted, and none would vote unless it was made easier and less time-consuming [MD-37]. Again, others expressed confusion about whether they would be eligible, on the basis that they lacked a Romanian “internal passport” [MD-36].

In terms of preferred candidates, Moldovans diverged between those who believed both Moldovans and Băsescu needed each other [MD-7a] and those respondents who were not “so involved” in Romania’s social and political life and thus “right now I wouldn’t be able to tell the difference” between different candidates and parties [MD-38, MD-34]. Yet MD-34 was still clear in the way her vote could be sought “if somebody would really appeal to me, to the needs of me as a Romanian citizen living abroad” such as more “cooperation between these two, our two countries”.

7.5.5 Linguistic Moldovans

Linguistic Moldovans are not considered because they did not practise redobândire, nor did they discuss voting in Romanian elections.

Respondents’ extra-territorial voting practices varied by how far they identified as Romanian (Table 7.3). Those identifying most as Romanian felt more obliged to, and they wanted to, vote in Romanian elections (Organic more than Cultural Romanians), seeing it as a necessary duty to be involved with the state that had offered them the right of redobândire. Those feeling more ambivalently towards Romania demonstrated less desire to vote (Ambivalent Romanians and Moldovans). Even if they felt a sense of obligation, they did not feel the same imperative to become more involved, personally or politically, in Romanian life. On a practical level, the lack of supply of voting opportunities impeded even the most vociferous believers that they should vote, among Organic and Cultural Romanians, demonstrating the institutions within the system that could facilitate or impede voting behaviour.

Respondents also expressed different preferences: Organic Romanians (and some Moldovans) expressed Băsescu as their favoured candidate, wanting to reciprocate his facilitation of redobândire, and preserve Romania’s favourable attitude towards Moldova. This signified too an extra-territorial rationality of these practices, by voting for a candidate that would be beneficial for their home-state. There was evidence also that Romanian politicians knew this cycle existed because of their increasing visibility in Moldova, for example via the offices in Chişinău both the incumbent President (P-DL) and opposition, who currently form the government, as the largest parliamentary party (PSD).

However respondents, across the categories, explained the blocks within the system that inhibited their voting intentions by constraining the available supply of voting opportunities relative to the demand. Hence respondents, in particular those with less symbolic attachment to Romania and Băsescu (e.g. Cultural Romanians) were less willing to exercise this duty, demonstrating that even if they wanted to perform as good citizens by giving back, this could be inhibited by the costs of waiting to vote.
### Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the contribution of an agency-centred perspective, i.e. focus on how individuals engage with kin-state practices, for understanding the political and social impacts of kin-state practices. By drawing attention, not to the ongoing top-down institutional debates, but to the bottom-up perspective, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of understanding respondents’ engagement with a variety of kin-state practices and the impact of these practices.

The premise of this chapter, that greater symbolic attachment to Romania as a kin-state would be associated with greater engagement with kin-state practices (i.e. that meanings would be associated with practices), was more complex than initially conceived. Across identification categories, individuals engaged similarly with Romanian kin-state practices, whether educational or citizenship, regardless of how they identified. **Linguistic Moldovans** were the exception, pathologising citizenship practices and their implications (but did not pathologise educational practices). What differed between identification categories were the motivations underpinning these practices and the appreciation of their impacts, where respondents’ willingness to be critical of Romania was associated with whether respondents framed Romania as their kin-state (i.e. whether they identified as Romanian and with Romania). **Moldovans** did not frame Romania as a universal good because Romania provided beneficial policies for them as individuals, even if the material motivations underpinned their practices. Rather **Moldovans** were most critical, framing *redobândire* as domestically indicating Moldova’s state weakness and Romanian influence. In comparison, those identifying more strongly as Romanian and with Romania (**Organic** and **Cultural Romanians**) exhibited a less critical distance in evaluating the wider, non-personal, implications of these practices, such as brain drain (scholarships, *redobândire*).

In terms of motivations, the material reasons of greater EU rights were the most prevalent reason for acquiring Romanian citizenship, except for **Organic Romanians** where the symbolic/identity content of citizenship was important: not to feel more Romanian but because they identified as Romanian. Many respondents across the identification categories (especially **Organic** and **Cultural Romanians**, and even **Moldovans**), imbued *redobândire* with a normative content, seeing *redobândire* as an appropriately reparative policy. Even if **Moldovans** did not identify themselves as Romanians, they identified as descended from Romanians, whose Romanian citizenship was withdrawn, which became the basis of this normative motivation. This normative content meant that many respondents saw others, especially

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**Table 7.3: Extra-territorial Voting Practices by Respondent Category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Obligations</th>
<th>Preferences</th>
<th>Intentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Romanians</td>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>Băsescu</td>
<td>Somewhat constrained by low supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romanians</td>
<td>Duty to vote</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Rather constrained by low supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romanians</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Some sense of duty</td>
<td>Some Băsescu, some unsure</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Russian speakers, as manipulating the system and/or engaging in illegal practices, because they did not (allegedly) have the same grandparental connection to Romanian citizenship that respondents did.

These citizenship practices did not replace respondents’ identification or affiliation with Moldova, because respondents across identification categories indicated their relationship with Moldova remained more important than their relationship with Romania. Yet they indicated the extent to which those practising redobândaie were increasingly participating in the Romanian polity. This was accentuated by those with greater symbolic attachment, with Organic Romanians most keen to vote, and vote for Băsescu. However, even those with less attachment, notably Moldovans, felt obliged to behave as citizens ought towards Romania, i.e. to vote, since Romania provided important material benefits. This was met however, by an informational deficit as, excluding Organic Romanians, respondents practising redobândaie did not yet have the necessary information, to know who they preferred in Romanian elections, having not been socialised in the Romanian political system. However, Băsescu’s personal association with redobândaie provided an emerging Moldovan electorate with incentives to reward this association via voting in Romanian elections. New Romanian citizens, residing in Moldova, have therefore become contested electoral capital with Romania’s opposition, PSD, aware of this existing and potential electorate, given the rise both of Romanian citizens in Moldova and the rise of those voting from within Moldova in Romania elections.

What is surprising, given the lack of focus on these debates and impacts by other researchers, is the significance of educational practices, as an attractive way of improving individual opportunities, and a way of Romanianising new kin generations, at relatively little cost to the Romanian state. In line with the categories, Organic Romanians were most appreciative, Cultural Romanians too, of the opportunities to develop, and for the opportunities this provided to Moldova for modernising its workforce. Here a discourse became apparent whereby Moldova’s chance to modernise, and Europeanize, came from a shifting dependence on Romania, because these opportunities could not only be derived within Moldova. However, this Romania-led path of modernisation was more criticised by those with less (Moldovans) or ambiguous (Ambivalent Romanians) attachment with Romania. Pragmatically, Moldovans realised that Romania offered more than other states, but also incentivised the loss of the best Moldovan students, who may never return to Moldova. Ambivalent Romanians were even critical of how far Romania provided good opportunities, since Romanian education was no longer that superior to Moldova, alongside the opportunity to study elsewhere in Europe.

Lastly, reflecting on the impacts of these kin-state practices on Moldova’s state and society, this bottom-up approach demonstrates that individuals were able, and wanted, to acquire rights and privileges from Romania that respondents’ own state, i.e. Moldova, was unable or unwilling to provide. This is demonstrated by the wide engagement, across categories, with multiple practices (membership, educational and participatory). This may indicate the contracting out of key public goods (e.g. ability to travel, receive a better/free education) from the Moldovan state to Romania, reinforced by the prevalence of these practices throughout Moldovan society, including key members of the elite, such as constitutional court judges and members of the government. This contracting out of public goods may undercut the material and symbolic legitimacy of the Moldovan state, for example by reducing the quantity and quality of those studying in Moldovan higher education. It is a surprising, but vital finding, that the ability to gain these rights does not replace, or undermine, respondents’ affiliation...
to Moldova. It is crucial too that this includes both those identifying as Moldovan, and vociferously Romanian, demonstrating that Moldova may be able to maintain symbolic legitimacy in spite of the transfer of its public goods capacity. Yet access to these public goods from Romania still provides, though only for a minority of respondents, a security policy against crises in Moldova, such as conflict, and demonstrates even a lack of belief, or willingness to invest, in Moldova’s future by the elite.

A further concern stems from the desire to be dependent on Romania. This was demonstrated in both a personal capacity, by shifting dependence from Moldova, and geopolitical dependence on Russia, to partial dependence on both Romania and Moldova, as a dual citizen, and in a political and geopolitical capacity, by seeing Romania as the only possible path for modernisation of Moldovan state and society, including its workforce. This tendency, and desire for social dependence, was particularly pronounced for Cultural and Organic Romanians, however other categories were similarly critical of the ability of Moldova to ensure security and stability. Secondly, in terms of geopolitical dependence, that Europeanization, was imagined only via Romania (particularly for Organic and Cultural Romanians), and as a process to reduce Russia’s influence, indicates a reliance on Romania. However this comes when the incentives for Romania are of self-interested extraction, e.g. of votes and Romanian-speaking students and workers, rather than of developing Moldova as a (self-)sustaining neighbour.
Chapter 8

Examining the Model of Nested Integration of Kin Majorities from Below

“A part of the Romanian nation is outside of the EU.”

_Ghinea (2013)_

“I now would like to continue this discussion in another official language of the EU, Romanian, which is also the language of my country [Moldova].”

_Iurie Leancă, cited by European Council (2014)_

“Whatever the case, Russia will have to deal with the effects of Crimea being part of an independent Ukraine for 23 years. […] Russia is not the motherland of an entire generation of Russian-speaking youth who are coming of age, but the motherland of their ancestors.”

_Malgin (2014)_

This chapter returns to the model of nested integration to examine the comparative explanatory power of this model, using the evidence of meanings and practices discussed in the empirical chapters. Chapter 2 defined nested integration as embedding of the kin majority within the kin-state, which neither undermines the kin majority’s relations with, and affiliation to, their home-state, nor challenges the existence of a sovereign border separating kin-state and home-state.

This model of nested integration addressed three gaps in existing kin-state literature:
8.1. REVISITING THE MODEL OF NESTED INTEGRATION

1. *Theoretically*, approaches had focused only on how kin relations could induce (*antagonistic* approach) or reduce/neutralise conflict (*fuzzy* approach) between state-level actors, ignoring the dynamics of interaction between kin communities and kin-states;  
2. *Conceptually*, approaches had considered kin communities only as minorities within their home-state, failing to distinguish between kin minorities and kin majorities, and to study kin majorities in their own right;  
3. *Methodologically*, approaches had focused on the interaction of state-level actors (kin-state and home-state) and had ignored the agency of kin communities (both kin minorities and kin majorities).

To account for these gaps, the thesis examined the *meanings* of kin identification (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) and engagement with kin-state *practices* (Chapter 5 and Chapter 7) in Crimea and Moldova (Table 8.1). This chapter examines the comparative explanatory power of the model of nested integration by considering the evidence of political and cultural incorporation, based on the analysis of meaning and practices.

First, the chapter recaps the model of nested integration before considering the explanatory power of this model using the analysis of meanings and practices from Chapters 4-7. As Chapter 2 argued, this model of nested integration advances a kind of integration “over and above” sovereign borders, without challenging the existence of these borders and advancing territorial claims. In returning to the model of nested integration, as originally conceived in Chapter 2, this chapter refines the model in three ways, based on observations from the empirical chapters, incorporating an analysis of:

1. the internal fractures within the kin majorities,  
2. social dependence,  
3. and geopolitical dependence.

Second, the chapter considers the comparative insights from the cases, concerning meanings and practices. Third, the chapter considers evidence of respondents’ territorial and geopolitical aspirations, demonstrating that respondents showed little support for political reconfiguration. Instead respondents aspired for geopoliticised kin-state relations, demonstrating the need to consider the kinds of post-territorial interactions the model of nested integration is designed to explain.

Lastly, the chapter considers the explanatory power of model of nested integration in each case. The chapter argues that the Moldovan case exhibits greater nesting, compared to the Crimean case, explained not only by the greater means to be nested (citizenship versus quasi-citizenship) but a stronger legitimacy of being nested. Hence, it is important to analyse not only what kin-state policies offer, and how these policies are practised, but also how these practices are legitimised by kin majorities and associated with meanings.

8.1 Revisiting The Model of Nested Integration

Chapter 1 outlined three gaps emerging from previous approaches (the focus on state-level actors, the failure to address bottom-up perspectives, and the failure to address kin majorities). Existing ap-
Table 8.1: Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>How far is the interaction of kin majorities with kin-states explained by the model of nested integration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Conceptual Questions</td>
<td>a) What do the meanings of kin identification demonstrate about the dynamics of interaction between kin majorities and kin-states?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) What does engagement with kin-state practices demonstrate about the dynamics of interaction between kin majorities and kin-states?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Empirical Questions</td>
<td>a) Meanings: How do kin majorities (in Crimea and Moldova) identify with kin-states (Russia and Romania)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Practices: How do these kin majorities engage with kin-state practices?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 2 proposed a model of nested integration to explore these dynamics of interaction. Here nested integration was conceptualised as a form of embedding, i.e. nesting, of the kin majority within the kin-state. This nested type of integration was different from previous understandings of kin-state integration, conceiving of integration as occurring not peripherally, politically involving minorities or geographically involving borderlands, but rather as a process involving those who are politically, culturally, geographically, dominant within the kin majority polity. This thesis builds on Risse’s (2005:295) conceptualisation of European identification, not as a zero-sum process, but as a nesting of “concentric circles”, like a Russian matryoshka doll. For kin-state nested integration, this process of nesting implies a multiple rather than competing idea, where identification and affiliation with one polity (i.e. the home-state) is not inconsistent with, or replaced by, identification and affiliation with another polity (i.e. the kin-state); rather these identifications and affiliations become interlocking.

The thesis proposed a model specific to kin majorities, involving communities which are the culturally and demographically dominant population within a polity (state or sub-state), rather than a peripheralised minority within the polity. As discussed above, it did not conceive of integration as a border-contesting phenomenon, because it does not alter or contest the sovereign borders separating kin-state from home-state. Instead this type of integration changes the meaning of the border separating states, because the kin majority, through kin-state policies, have become embedded within another state.

The thesis defined nested integration as evidence both of cultural and political incorporation (Table 8.2). Cultural incorporation was conceptualised as co-ethnic identification by the kin majority with the kin-state, and identification with the kin-state, where individuals feel more culturally incorporated into the ethno-national component of the kin-state. Political incorporation was conceptualised as a process where kin majorities come to see themselves as part of the political community of the kin-state, such as by participating in the political institutions of the kin-state, and where they come to affiliate themselves with the political component of the kin-state. These cultural and political elements were conceptualised as being observable by meanings, i.e. modes of identification, and practices, i.e. engagement with kin-state practices such as citizenship and quasi-citizenship. To observe nested integration, both the cultural and political elements of incorporation had to be observed: i.e. feeling as a
8.2 Meanings: How do Kin Majorities Identify with Kin-States?

Chapters 4 and 6 examined the breadth of meanings of being Russian/Crimean/Ukrainian (in the Crimean case) and Romanian/Moldovan (in the Moldovan case) via five inductively derived categories for each case (Table 8.3). These categories were constructed out of respondents’ emic explanations of their identification (see Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), using grounded theory to inductively code.

Table 8.2: The Original Model of Nested Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Incorporation</th>
<th>Cultural Incorporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Nested integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not observed</td>
<td>(not nested integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>(not nested integration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter considers, and refines, this model of nested integration using the empirical findings of the thesis, to examine how far the model is borne out by the evidence of the thesis, considering also the potential for comparative insights across the two cases. In line with the iterative logic of the thesis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), the chapter refines the model of nested integration based on observations discussed in the empirical chapters of the thesis, incorporating three additional elements:

1. Internal fractures within kin majorities,
2. Social dependence,

Firstly, in terms of internal fractures, the chapter analyses the model at a higher level of granularity than originally conceived, to consider kin majorities not as homogenous units, but rather, using inductively derived identification categories (Chapter 4, Chapter 6), assesses each category in terms of nested integration. Secondly, the nested integration model, alongside political and cultural incorporation, includes the dimension of social dependence, based on observing how respondents framed kin-state relations in terms of shifting social dependence from the home-state to the kin-state. Thirdly, a further dimension is added to the nested integration model of geopolitical dependence, based on the observation that kin-state relations were framed in terms of wider region-building narratives of Europeanization and Russian-led projects (Eurasianism). Before examining the explanatory power of nested integration model, which argues for a post-territorial kind of integration “over and above” sovereign borders rather than contesting their existence, the chapter considers evidence of respondents’ territorial and geopolitical aspirations (e.g. unification with the kin-state), to examine if this kind of interaction is post-territorial, as this thesis argues, or demonstrates support for territorial reconfiguration.

Before applying this theory of nested integration, the chapter reviews the findings from the previous empirical chapters (Chapters 4-7) and discusses the broader comparative and theoretical questions posed by these chapters.

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and derive, categories that help to conceptualise the complexity of and contestation over meanings, along different political, cultural, linguistic and territorial dimensions. This captured the bottom-up “categories of practice” as opposed to the dominant top-down “categories of analysis”, criticised by Brubaker and Cooper (2000), where scholars use surveys and/or census data to verify top-down assumptions about the configuration of identification, rather than seeking explanation of identification in respondents’ own words. These diverse identification categories showed how kin majorities in both cases were more fractured than expected, because of the different dimensions of agreement and disagreement in respondents’ self-identification and self-positioning vis-à-vis the home-state and kin-state.

These fractures within kin majorities showed the importance of distinguishing between co-ethnic identification, i.e. identifying fully or partially as co-ethnic with the kin-state, and identifying with the kin-state. Previously, this distinction failed to be made; instead co-ethnic identification was, problematically, elided with kin-state identification. Even linguistic realities, e.g. being a speaker of Russian, were scaled up to indicate identification with, and even support of, Russia as a kin-state, framing Crimea as a hotbed of Russian nationalism because it possessed a Russian linguistic and ethnic majority (Hedenskog 2008; Shevchuk 1996; Maigre 2008; Krushelnycky 2008), or Moldova as a state comprised of a cohesive Moldovan or Romanian majority (Eyal and Smith 1996:223). However respondents resisted this elision, arguing their status as Russian speakers did not signify they were a “patriot of Putin” [C-22]. Rather, this research argued that, in both cases, several categories showed partial (Crimeans, Ambivalent Romanians) or full (Ethnic Russians, Cultural Romanians) co-ethnic identification with the kin-state, but lacked identification with the kin-state.

In contrast those who espoused the most pro-kin-state ideologies (Discriminated Russians, Organic Romanians) identified most vociferously, both co-ethnically and with the kin-state. However, between the cases, these most vociferous categories expressed their identification in different ways: in terms of the organic, primordial (culturally) based tropes of Organic Romanians, constructing themselves as the same as Romanians; against the discriminated, discursive inversion trope of Discriminated Russians, which was concerned less with how they identified vis-à-vis Russia, but more with perceived marginalisation within Crimea and Ukraine. Those combining identification with the kin-state and home-state, across the cases, also expressed this in different ways, whether identifying as ethnically analogous to the kin-state but politically different (Ethnic Russians), or identifying as culturally similar but not co-ethnically analogous to the kin-state given different political experiences (Cultural Romanians).

There was more debate concerning the idea of being Romanian in Moldova compared with Russian in Crimea, in terms of being framed as inferior within Romania (Cultural Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians) which were not present for Ethnic Russians. Both cases exhibited categories that wanted to avoid an ethnicised identity (Political Ukrainians, Moldovans). Again this was expressed differently, whether stressing political connections to the home-state (Political Ukrainians), regardless of parental identification, or stressing the primacy of political identification but accompanied by feelings of being Moldovan, and not Romanian (Moldovans). Lastly both cases showed more individual categories: whether identifying primarily as a regional, ethnic hybrid (Crimeans), as a minority within the kin majority explained by their birth outside of the polity (Ethnic Ukrainians), and nostalgising neo-Soviet framings of both identification and language, resisted by most respondents in this case (Linguistic
8.2. MEANINGS: HOW DO KIN MAJORITIES IDENTIFY WITH KIN-STATES?

Table 8.3: Explaining the Identification Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discriminated Russians</strong> (n=9) emphasized not just a strong Russian identification but also how they felt threatened by the Ukrainian state</td>
<td><strong>Organic Romanians</strong> (n=22) professed strongest and organic identification as ethnically Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Russians</strong> (n=18) identified primarily as Russian but this was expressed without feeling discriminated</td>
<td><strong>Cultural Romanians</strong> (n=15) identified ethnically as Romanian, but qualified this by identifying Moldova as their home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ukrainians</strong> (n=15) identified primarily as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic identification</td>
<td><strong>Ambivalent Romanians</strong> (n=5) identified as partially but not wholly both Romanian and somewhat Moldovan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crimeans</strong> (n=5) identified primarily regionally and inter-ethnically, identifying as between Ukrainian and Russian</td>
<td><strong>Moldovans</strong> (n=10) identified primarily as Moldovan but explained this in terms of being a citizen of Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Ukrainians</strong> (n=6) identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian</td>
<td><strong>Linguistic Moldovans</strong> (n=3) identified primarily as Moldovan on the basis that they were culturally and linguistically Moldovan and distinct from those who were Romanian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notion of a cohesive ethnic majority was therefore lacking in each case. There was contestation over who this majority comprised, i.e. the “content” of the majority (Abdelal et al. 2006), and how this group related both to the home-state and kin-state, such that the content of the kin majority, and the meaning of this content, were contested. Secondly, individuals could partially identify as co-ethnic with the kin-state and, simultaneously, hybridise this with other identities (e.g. regional, Crimean), leading them to question kin-state claims.

That majorities are more fractured than previously considered, is an important finding beyond kin-state relations. The homogeneity of ethnic majorities has been assumed, and ethnic diversity/fractionalization associated with increasing the potential for grievance-inducing conflicts (Alesina et al. 2003), inhibiting democratisation and democratic stability (Pop-Eleches 2007; Wilkinson 2006; Przeworski 2000), and democratic inclusion (Horowitz 1993). These approaches consider ethnic politics only in terms of in-group/out-group dynamics (Tajfel 1982), across minority-majority dyads and, as Chandra (2006) argues, ethnicity as visible, implying that that boundaries between ethnic groups are distinguishable, between self/in-group and other/out-group. However this thesis demonstrates how boundaries can be blurred and indistinguishable, not only across minority-majority dyads as Kachuyevski and Olesker (2014) argue, but within (kin) majorities shown by contestation over what this group means vis-à-vis the home-state and kin-state. This demonstrates internal fractures within these supposed majorities, based on different ideas of meaning.

Secondly, both cases disrupted existing conceptualisations of ethnicity as myths of common ancestry/descent across generations (Chandra 2006; A. D. Smith 1991) and hence “sticky” (i.e. unchangeable) across generations (Chandra 2006). Instead the agency-centred perspective revealed the contingency of ethnicity, in relation to experiences of territorial and political flux, arising from state reconfiguration (e.g. Soviet collapse), which impacted, and reconfigured, the position of societies within, and across,
8.3 How do Kin Majorities Engage with Kin-State Practices?

This thesis considered the practices of engagement with kin-states, to examine the relationship between identification and citizenship/quasi-citizenship. Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 used the inductively derived identification categories to analyse how each category, for each case, engaged with different kin-state practices (e.g. citizenship, quasi-citizenship and education). These categories analysed how meanings drove practices or, more specifically, how strength of identification with the kin-state related to engagement with kin-state practices.

Here the cases showed diverging trends in terms of engagement: Crimea showed narrow/specialist engagement, restricted to the most pro-kin-state respondents as members of pro-Russian organisations, while Moldova showed wide/generalist engagement with kin-state practices, where individuals engaged with Romanian practices regardless of whether they identified as Romanian. In other words, meanings, as predictors of engagement with kin-state practice showed different trends: in Crimea, strength of identification as Russian and with Russia was associated with engagement with Russian practices, while in Moldova, strength of identification as Romanian was not associated with engagement with Romanian practices. This section offers an explanation of this diverging trend.

In Moldova, there was wide engagement with Romanian practices: respondents engaged with Romanian citizenship and educational practices regardless of whether they identified as Romanian or with Romania. Instead respondents were divided by their motivations for engaging with these practices. Those identifying most strongly as Romanian and with Romania (Organic Romanians) imbued Romanian citizenship with the most symbolic significance, alongside pragmatic factors, while other categories explained their citizenship practices in terms of more pragmatic/material motivations (Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans). However respondents did not always align on this symbolic-material
spectrum, with respondents across identification categories imbuing Romanian citizenship with a normative legitimacy (Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians, Moldovans), framing practices as reparative where Romanian citizenship was getting back what was wrongly taken from respondents’ ascendants. That Moldovans, who did not identify as Romanian or with Romania, still imbued Romanian citizenship with this normative content is important and demonstrates how and why Romanian citizenship remains a normalised practice (unlike Russian citizenship in Crimea).

In outlining the differences between this thesis and rational choice perspectives, Chapter 1 described how rational-actor explanations were the object of analysis rather than an underlying assumption. This agency-centred analysis was designed to unpack respondents’ motivations to analyse if they were rationally (or symbolically) motivated, not to assume they were always acting rationally. This unpacking showed how material motivations for engaging with Romanian practices were accompanied by non-materialist motivations, of wanting to engage with Romanian policies for symbolic reasons, i.e. identifying as Romanian, and normative reasons, where Romanian citizenship, in particular, was framed as a reparative and remedial right, legitimised by familial loss of Romanian citizenship. Framing this as (only) rationally motivated engagement offers an overly thin account that misses the thickness of understanding also the non-rational significance of engaging with Romanian policies. Moreover, Romanian political discourses, of reparation via redobândire, resonated and were internalised in respondents’ motivations for engagement with this practice.

Respondents in Crimea (Chapter 5) exhibited a narrow niche-based engagement with Russian Compatriot practices. In terms of citizenship, respondents across identification categories recognised Russian citizenship either as inaccessible because it was illegal (Discriminated Russians) or as undesirable and unnecessary (all other categories). Discriminated Russians stood out, relative to other respondents, as the only category that consistently wanted Russian support, to address their discrimination and disempowerment vis-à-vis Ukraine. Discriminated Russians too, as members of Compatriot organisations, had privileged access to Russian benefits (e.g. scholarships) and funding for these organisations. However Discriminated Russians were dissatisfied that Russia did not offer what they wanted (citizenship) and instead provided what they did not want (quasi-citizenship rights, e.g. resettlement).

In contrast, most other respondents, regardless of whether they identified as Russian or with Russia, did not identify as Russian Compatriots and did not want to engage with Russian quasi-citizenship practices. Political Ukrainians, in particular, neither wanted to understand, nor themselves understood, why Russia should conceive of them as Compatriots. The identification categories indicated the niche-based aspects of engagement with Russian practices, associated primarily with feeling discriminated by Ukraine, and the association between these Discriminated Russians and pro-Russian organisations, which acted as gatekeepers for Russian support. Here Russian Compatriot discourses, which projected wide eligibility on the basis of identifying with Russian culture and Soviet descendancy, were not internalised by respondents, demonstrating the failure of a “loose” and deliberately “ambiguous” discourse to be internalised en masse (Kosmarskaya 2011:60; Shevel 2009a:179; G. Smith 1999b:509).

The cases of Moldova and Crimea offer a useful comparison of how and why engagement can differ (wide in Moldova versus narrow in Crimea). The wide/niche engagement with Romanian and Russian practices, here focusing primarily on citizenship and quasi-citizenship, can be explained in relation to three dimensions (Table 8.4):
### Table 8.4: Conceptualising Citizenship and Quasi-Citizenship Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Moldova Citizenship</th>
<th>Crimea Citizenship</th>
<th>Quasi-citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Dimensions

1) **Accessibility & availability**
   - **Moldova**: Legal (in Romania & Moldova), widely accessible
   - **Crimea**: Illegal (in Ukraine & Russia)
   - **Quasi-citizenship**: Niche (via organisations)

2) **Desirability**
   - **Moldova**: Yes: superior, in situ
   - **Crimea**: No: insignificant rights (except DR)
   - **Quasi-citizenship**: No: insignificant rights

3) **Justification**
   - **Moldova**: Reparative
   - **Crimea**: Absence of perceived injustice (except DR)
   - **Quasi-citizenship**: Absence of perceived injustice (except DR)

Where DR = Discriminated Russians

1. Accessibility and availability of the policy,
2. Desirability of the policy,
3. Justification underpinning the policy.

Firstly, the accessibility and availability of the policy concerns kin-state provision, i.e. how far it is made accessible by the kin-state (e.g. who is eligible to access these rights and how they can become aware of their eligibility), and home-state willingness, i.e. how far home-states accept or limit access (e.g. by making dual citizenship illegal). Secondly, the desirability of the policy concerns the rights and benefits that can be derived from the policy, how far these rights and benefits are superior to those already held, and how far they can be exercised in situ (within the kin-state) or only by relocating to the kin-state. Thirdly, the justification of the policy concerns the way in which the policy is (or is not) is framed as legitimate, i.e. how far it might be underpinned by reversing past injustice. These dimensions, as expanded below, explain why there is wide engagement with Romanian citizenship in Moldova compared to narrow/niche engagement with Russian citizenship and quasi-citizenship in Crimea.

Wide engagement in Moldova with Romanian citizenship is explained by its wide accessibility and availability: dual citizenship was not only legalised by Moldova but normalised and endorsed, where it was clear that Moldova’s elite and masses practise Romanian citizenship. Romanian citizenship was based on wide eligibility criteria (great-grandparents born in Greater Romania) which were widely disseminated among the population. Secondly, Romanian citizenship was desirable by offering rights and benefits that significantly improved the rights of Moldovan residents in situ (work and travel, sense of status equality with Romania and EU). Thirdly, Romanian citizenship was buttressed by a strong sense of justification by the idea of “getting back” a right that was lost not only en masse by Moldovans residing in Greater Romania but by respondents’ relatives. Romanian citizenship was therefore widely accessible and available, highly desirable and bolstered by a reparative justification, which helped to legitimise and normalise this practice.

By contrast, no respondents engaged with Russian citizenship, while quasi-citizenship practices were a narrow/niche practice. Firstly, Russian citizenship was inaccessible, illegal in terms of Ukrainian legislation, and accepted as illegal by respondents. Russia also did not make Russian citizenship avail-
able to respondents (only *Discriminated Russians*) who sought it. Secondly Russian citizenship was desirable only for *Discriminated Russians*, because of their sense of discrimination and marginalisation vis-à-vis their home-state, while undesirable for all other respondents by offering rights and benefits they neither needed, wanted nor legally could acquire within Ukraine. Thirdly, only *Discriminated Russians* saw Russian citizenship as justifiable, by granting a right they wanted by virtue of their sense of injustice at being separated from Russia, while all other respondents rejected this sense of injustice. As a region that was framed as a case of passportization, this finding is significant for demonstrating there was little desire for, or legitimacy in, being passportized outside a niche-group of respondents associated with pro-Russian organisations. It demonstrates also why Romanian citizenship was more popular in Moldova, in terms of the wider accessibility, availability, desirability and sense of justification for practising Romanian citizenship in contrast to Russian citizenship in Crimea.

This scenario is repeated for quasi-citizenship, which was available only for a niche-group of the members of pro-Russian organisations, who could restrict access of these rights and benefits to themselves, and controlled dissemination of access to their members. Secondly, the rights and benefits offered by the quasi-citizenship Compatriot policy were undesirable and insignificant even for those who wanted interaction with Russia (*Discriminated Russians*). The quasi-citizenship Compatriot policy offered rights and benefits that could only be accessed within the kin-state (e.g. the right to resettle in Russia’s “*okrayni*” (periphery)), which was attractive neither for *Discriminated Russians*, who wanted to defend, not deplete, Crimea as an ethnically Russian peninsula, nor for other categories who did not want to relocate to “snowy Siberia”. Thirdly, as for Russian citizenship, there was an absence of justification for these rights and benefits, except for *Discriminated Russians*, who framed Compatriot engagement as a way to overcome their sense of injustice in being separated from Russia; however this was not reflected by other categories.

The intention of this analysis is not to generate a general theory of engagement with kin-state practices, in particular citizenship versus quasi-citizenship, but to generate useful analytical insights that could be examined in other cases. There are important theoretical differences in the functioning of citizenship in comparison to quasi-citizenship which, it could be argued, lacks the ability to offer tangible and desirable political, social rights and benefits, in particular by offering rights which are not in situ (e.g. facilitated migration rights) but require migration to the kin-state. Similarly, in Hungary, Waterbury (2014) argues the introduction of non-resident citizenship became more meaningful once attached to “real” political rights.

This suggests that while citizenship, as a social and political institution, is theorised as becoming eroded and fragmented by quasi-citizenship (Turner 2001), it remains the gateway to (kin-) states (so long as it offers desirable/superior rights). Citizenship facilitates participation and sentiments of obligation that quasi-citizenship does not (perhaps deliberately), rendering quasi-citizenship a tokenistic kin-state gesture designed to maintain symbolic ties, without rights and benefits. Citizenship therefore remains a significant and salient political institution, in particular in regions (such as Moldova) where individuals seek to gain more from kin-state citizenship (i.e. desirable rights) and when this citizenship is bolstered by a powerful legitimising discourse which naturalises acquisition even for those who do not identify with the kin-state (e.g. *Moldovans*).

In terms of educational practices, there were also key differences between the two cases, redolent of
the citizenship divide between wide (Moldova) and narrow/niche (Crimea) engagement. Educational policies, as attested by many respondents in the Moldovan case, can be as, if not more, significant as a kin-state policy (in comparison to citizenship), by allowing the kin-state to educate and socialise kin community generations, encouraging the Romanianisation and Europeanization of Moldova from the bottom-up. In terms of quality, Romanian and Russian education were framed as similarly superior to home-state education (although the gap was narrowing between Romania and Moldova). Yet, in terms of numbers, Romania offers vastly more scholarships to Moldovan students (and other Romanian communities abroad, e.g. Serbia), compared to Russia’s offering to Crimean students (about 100 times greater). These scholarships were also publicised and accessible to all (Romanian speakers) in Moldova compared to Russian scholarships with organisations acting as the gatekeepers compared with the small number of competitive scholarships offered by Russia, meaning that Crimean respondents had greater knowledge of local opportunities (MGU in Sevastopol) than of opportunities within the kin-state. As with citizenship, it was clear, from a bottom-up perspective, that Romania was willing to invest in the lives of everyday Moldovans, and more effective in doing so. By contrast, Russia was, as a kin-state, able to maintain interaction only with those most disposed to this interaction (Discriminated Russians), who both identified with Compatriot discourses and participated in Compatriot/pro-Russian organisations.¹⁰⁹

This chapter discussed the comparative and conceptual insights gained from the four empirical chapters. The rest of the chapter takes these insights further by asking whether the model of nested integration (Chapter 2) is supported by this data. As already noted, a crucial aspect of this will also be to discuss and explain the fundamental differences that existed between the two cases of Moldova and Crimea, not only in terms of identification and engagement, but also in terms of their variable support of the nested integration model.

8.4 Comparing the Evidence of Nested Integration from the Bottom-Up

8.4.1 Territorial Versus Geopolitical Aspirations

Before examining the comparative explanatory power of the model of nested integration using the evidence of meanings and practices considered in the empirical chapters, this section reviews evidence of respondents’ territorial aspirations. This is a preliminary examination of the nested integration model, because the model posits a type of post-territorial integration that does not challenge existing borders but rather seeks to interact “over and above” already-existing sovereign borders (see Kovács 2006:442).

Unpacking respondents’ territorial aspirations, considers how far they supported (or not) territorial reconfiguration, if not revisionism, for example to “reunite lost territories” such as Greater Romania (Saideman and Ayres 2000:1126). It considers also the links between territorial aspirations and kin-state practices, scrutinising assumptions concerning the impact of kin-state practices on territorial aspirations, to address whether kin-state meanings and practices impact individuals’ territorial/political conception of their home-state and kin-state. This is important since kin-state relations, particularly

¹⁰⁹This is to say nothing of the maintenance of spiritual and interpersonal relations, which remained quite strong beyond Discriminated Russians but did not convert to relations with the Russian state.
dual citizenship, have been assumed as implying a transferal of loyalty from one polity to another (Shevchuk 1996), but have been neglected empirically from an agency-centred perspective. Hence, territorial aspirations either have been seen as reflective of citizenship preferences, or, according to the fuzzy approach discussed in Chapter 1 described, detached from territorial questions.

This section analyses not only territorial aspirations, discussing observations about how respondents invoked geopolitical narratives as a solution to territorial questions. This demonstrated the interlocking of kin-states within wider, and seemingly zero-sum, geopolitical-territorial narratives (e.g. Europeanization, Eurasianism), which the model of nested integration neither accounted for, nor anticipated. For both cases, the region-building projects of interest are those associated with the EU, i.e. Europeanization, and those associated with Russia, under the auspices of Eurasian institutions (e.g. Eurasian Customs Union, ECU).

Europeanization has become a dominant discourse in the post-Soviet sphere, with the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, which are premised on “sharing everything” (e.g. norms, values and harmonised legislation) with the EU “but the institutions”, i.e. EU membership (Comelli et al. 2007:208, Whitman and Wolff 2010). Traditionally, Europeanization is conceived as a top-down centrifugal process of “unifying and harmonising” policies from the EU centre to EU member-states (Klumbyté 2011:848; see also Radaelli 2003). Europeanization has been increasingly present at a discursive and institutional level beyond EU borders, e.g. in Western Balkans (Kostovicova 2014; Subotic 2011) and post-Soviet space, where there is both a desire to Europeanize (or be Europeanized) by those beyond the EU, and for EU institutions to work within these spaces. Empirically, studying processes of Europeanization, beyond the EU, have focused on the formal institutional aspects, such as incentives for democratisation and reform required by conditionality while preparing for accession (Vachudova 2001; Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002). Some have considered the civil society aspects of Europeanization, as a process implicating civil society actors via cross-border cooperation and socialisation (i.e. adapting to EU norms) (Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut 2011; Şoitu and Şoitu 2010; see also Kelley 2004).

Analysis of Eurasianism, too, has been seen as a top-down strategic and technocratic discourse rather than as a process occurring, or being endorsed, from below. As a civilizational pan-ethnic discourse, Eurasianism re-emerged with the Soviet break-up, as an intellectual movement following a pre-Soviet Slavophile tradition, associated with the “Heartland theory” of Mackinder (1904),¹¹¹ In the post-Soviet period, Eurasianism sought to carve out a dominant position for Russia in post-Soviet space, projecting Russian “exceptionalism” and the West as the “anti-model” (G. Smith 1999a:492-93; Kerr 1995; Tolz 1998a:995). However beyond the intellectual sphere, Eurasianism remained a marginal political discourse (Morozova 2009; Tsygankov 2003). As a popular discourse it was even more marginal: O’Loughlin et al. (2006) avoided asking respondents in Russia directly about Eurasian sentiments because of a lack of salience.

In 2011, Putin resurrected and institutionalised Eurasianism, establishing a technocratic Eurasian

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¹¹⁰ These studies analyse Moldova, however the thesis argues these assertions apply also to Crimea/Ukraine.

¹¹¹ I.e. that whoever controls the heartland (Russia) controls the Eurasian continent.
8.4. COMPARING THE EVIDENCE OF NESTED INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Customs Union and Economic Union (ECU) to offer greater “integration” than previous post-Soviet projects (such as the Commonwealth of Independent States) and to “enable members to take a prominent place in our complicated, 21st century world” (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union 2011; see also Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012). Eurasianism adopted an institutional façade, to offer a competing geopolitical pivot countering the expansion of the EU and NATO in post-Communist/Soviet space. It formalised the already-existing informal imperial post-Soviet relations east of the EU/NATO expansion zone, such as CIS (see also Beissinger 1996; Ambrosio 1999), without requiring the same institutional reforms (democratisation, transparency and rule of law reforms) required by EU conditionality (Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002).

Moldova and Crimea sit “between”, and show “divided loyalties”, to these “two stools” of Europeanization and Eurasianism (Korosteleva 2010; Bordachev et al. 2014; Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanu 2011:476, 81). The analysis below shifts focus away from the top-down institutional and technocratic perspectives of these region-building projects, and shows the geopolitical implications of kin-state relations which elsewhere have been overlooked (c.f. D. J. Smith 2002). The sections compare also respondents’ territorial and geopolitical aspirations, arguing respondents preferred geopolitical interaction with kin-states rather than territorial reconfiguration. The analysis of each case concludes by examining the comparative explanatory power of the model of nested integration.

8.4.2 Geopolitical Versus Territorial Aspirations in Crimea

This section analyses respondents’ territorial aspirations in Crimea to demonstrate that few respondents desired territorial reconfiguration vis-à-vis Russia. This section builds on critiques of two previous framings of Crimea, challenged throughout the thesis, that Crimea was a hotbed of Russian nationalism (Chapter 4) and passportization (Chapter 5). This section challenges two final assumptions: that Crimean residents had low support for an independent Ukraine and that Crimea was a region of separatism. Territorially, Crimea, as one of the Russian “enclaves” of post-Soviet space alongside “Northern Kazakhstan, Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia” was assumed to exhibit a tendency to engage in a “politics of irredentism” and separatism (G. Smith 1999b:501; Roslycky 2011; Kuzio 2010).

However this section argues that territorial reconfiguration, in terms of separatism and unification, were marginal discourses, even among respondents aligned to organisations that, in 2014, supported and facilitated this annexation (ROC, RE, Discriminated Russians). Rather the section argues that instability within Crimea came not from ethnic questions but from centre-periphery relations with Kyiv and Donetsk (i.e. Party of Region’s centre of power), discussed by all respondents across identification categories, creating a sense of political fragility between these centres of power.

This evidence provides an examination of territorial preferences, reinforcing how interaction should be considered more in post-territorial terms, rather than challenging sovereign borders. The following section uses the evidence of meanings and practices considered in the empirical chapters, alongside the evidence of a lack of support for territorial reconfiguration vis-à-vis Russia, to examine the model of nested integration.
Discriminated Russians

Symbolically Discriminated Russians felt part of the “fraternity of Russian people” divided by “artificial” post-Soviet borders which they had no agency in determining because “we did not leave Russia” [C-20, C-55, C-46, C-19b, C-20]. However these symbolic ties did not determine Discriminated Russians’ territorial aspirations, because they neither supported, nor promoted that Crimea “should secede from Ukraine” [C-19b]. Rather they framed Crimean Tatars, destructively, as the “main source of separatism”, while framing themselves as constructively wanting to “develop” Ukraine, rather than dismantle it [C-24, C-25, C-19b].

They maligned separatism as “impossible to do without bloodshed, without a cataclysm”; whereas they “wanted to live peacefully” as a part of a (Russian) Ukraine [C-19b, C-24], similar to Laitin’s observations of a preference for a “bad peace” over a “good war” in early post-Soviet Latvia (Laitin 1998:8). However they still blamed Ukraine for promoting the roots of separatism, via its discriminating policies, believing that if Ukraine was not so discriminatory then no one would “even think about any separatism” [C-19a, C-55].

While not supporting separatism, Discriminated Russians wanted Ukraine to be anchored, and subservient, to Russia. Symbolically, they believed Ukraine and Russia belonged to the same “civilization” and, nostalgically, they wanted to “recreate the historic space”, and prosperity, fostered in the Soviet Union and under Tsarism [C-19a, C-20]. However, they also saw their material and strategic interests tied to Russia, which was “our only way out” for “raising living standards”, for example via Crimea’s dependence on Russian and Belarussian tourists [C-19b, C-55, C-25, C-46].

Discriminated Russians advocated Eurasianism, for its benefits, and maligned Europeanization, as a bad economic option for the “shocks” it could cause [C-19a, C-46]. Eurasianism also reflected their conservative and traditional values, in contrast to their criticism of the EU’s “foreign” values which, an “almost violent” way, they saw trying to impose liberal “European values” such as “union democracy” and “gay marriage” [C-46, C-20, C-19a, C-19b].¹¹² Hence they preferred territorial relations which aligned with their values, and represented a continuation from values they trusted (alignment with Russia and Eurasia), buffered by a “retrospective illusion” of Soviet prosperity (see Balibar 1990), rather than territorial relations which were seen as too costly and/or antithetical to their values (Europeanization, separation from Ukraine).

Ethnic Russians

Most Ethnic Russians, like Discriminated Russians, supported Crimea’s territorial status quo vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. C-34 was an outlier (among all respondents), revering Russia and supporting Crimea’s (re)unification with Russia, framing it a “historical error” that Crimea was part of Ukraine and not Russia [C-34].

By contrast, most Ethnic Russians maligned separatism as unpopular because it was analogous to

¹¹²That Europeanization took the form of Euromaidan, a protest moved that turned violent (in response to the Ukrainian/Yanukovych’s “regime violence” (Diuk, 2014)), resonated within these pre-existing anti-EU-Europeanization frames, portraying it as a violent foreign phenomenon, demonstrating too the potential for Euromaidan protests to cause antipathy among this sector.
8.4. COMPARING THE EVIDENCE OF NESTED INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

“conflict” [C-9, C-53]. Those supporting separatism in the 1990s were “political losers” while those who currently supported separatism were motivated by self-interest to reap “some kind of political, economic and financial benefits” from this project [C-3, C-21]. They wanted good relations with Russia as “two states”, like Germany and Austria—that is, as two separate but culturally/linguistically similar states—because their spiritual closeness to Russia, rather than loyalty (vernost’) to the Russian state, did not undermine their ability to be a “patriot” of Ukraine [C-53, C-8, C-21, C-7, C-22].

Geopolitically, Ethnic Russians framed Ukraine as the “excluded middle” between the EU and Russia with increasingly “no middle ground” between these poles [C-51, C-34]. Like Discriminated Russians, most preferred Eurasianism to Europeanization, because their economic interests were better protected by Russian-endorsed projects than by the economically weak EU [C-34, C-33, C-8, C-53]. However there was more diversity than among Discriminated Russians: some were more supportive of the idea of a “union” of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus [C-3, C-8], while others supported Europeanization, maligning Russia’s imperial Eurasian ambitions and aligning more with the EU’s style of development and mentality [C-22, C-57b, C-16].

Political Ukrainians

Identifying as “patriots” of Ukraine, Political Ukrainians supported Ukraine’s independence and separation from Russia. Moreover they resisted Russification (russifikatsyia), and endorsed Ukraine’s policy of a single state language [C-12, C-31, C-30, C-11a, C-11b, C-18], wanting to strengthen their borders, and sense of independence, vis-à-vis Russia [C-23]. They were pleased that separatism/annexation was “impossible”, because, constitutionally, any decisions on Crimea’s status required an “all-Ukrainian referendum” [C-18].¹¹³ To them, Crimea appeared as “stable” and “very loyal, calm” because there was “no desire” for separatism anymore [C-28, C-32].

Political Ukrainians were the most geopolitically averse to Russia and the greatest supporters of Europeanization. They wanted Ukraine to join the EU, or at least become closer to the EU, framing the EU as a better path for Ukraine than Russia because the EU advocated more democratisation and human rights than Russia [C-23, C-47, C-29, C-37]. The presence of a pro-EU constituency in Crimea, aligning with an emerging post-Soviet generation of Political Ukrainians rather than ethnic Russians, challenges the framing of Crimea as homogeneously, at least geopolitically pro-Russian, if not politically pro-Russian.

Crimeans

As previous categories, Crimeans framed Crimea as “stable”, “normal” and a “part of Ukraine” [C-36, C-38]. Separatism was a historical movement, supported “only in the 1990s” [C-38] which was now undesirable, because it was “great nationalist clashes” that Crimea had been spared [C-38]. Secondly, Russia was not “ready” to support Crimea’s secession (and annexation) because of the financial costs of providing material resources, such as pensions, to “two and a half million people” [C-38].¹¹³

¹¹³This requirement was flagrantly flouted in Crimea’s 2014 annexation referendum, which was held only in Crimea and Sevastopol.
Only C-57a supported a more Russian-focused solution. This was not something he would “speak loudly about”, or campaign for, because he was happy to remain part of Ukraine [C-57a]. However he believed that Crimea was already, cognitively, “separate” and could be “perfectly self-reliant”, if not “better in Russia” for Crimea (even though he had “never been there (to Russia)” [C-57a].

Geopolitically, Crimeans either preferred orientation towards the EU [C-36] or a desire to balance “relations with Russia and the European Union” [C-57a]. Where respondents agreed was that even if Ukraine could be made “more comfortable”, it was still freer and more democratic, and hence better, than Russia [C-36, C-38].

**Ethnic Ukrainians**

_Ethnic Ukrainians_ framed Crimea as “a single whole” with Ukraine as “very important to me” [C-49, C-45]. They were pleased that “Russia’s attractiveness” had weakened for Crimean society where they believed that Ukraine was “developing quite peacefully” with “no bloody conflict” since independence [C-26, C-27, C-49]. However, unlike previous categories, they saw more “insecurity” in Crimea because, even if support for Russia was “decreasing every year”, they believed “tomorrow” there could be a referendum and “63-70% can vote” in support of separatism [C-49].

Geopolitically, _Ethnic Ukrainians_ preferred Europeanization, like _Political Ukrainians_. They wanted Ukraine’s geographical location in Europe to be reflected politically, by becoming “a more European type of state” in terms of democracy and economic development [C-45, C-49]. Conversely, they pathologised Russian-led Eurasianism as a way to “subordinate post-Soviet countries” by securing Russia’s self-interested geopolitical and economic goals [C-49, C-27], resisting such a “return to the past” that _Discriminated Russians_ had seen as a natural direction for Ukraine [C-49, C-26].

**Centre-Periphery Relations**

However, it is necessary to consider a further territorial aspect, aside from unification, namely a perception of Crimea’s lack of political and economic self-sufficiency from Kyiv, voiced across respondent categories [C-55, C-48a, C-48b]. This pitched Crimea’s autonomy as “in quotes”, where Crimea lacked “real power” such as the “right of legislative initiative” [C-40, C-32, C-29, C-23, C-31, C-30, C-22, C-38, C-34, C-51].

In particular, across the categories, respondents felt their autonomy was undermined by the “Donetsk problem”, blaming the Party of Regions’ “Donetsk clan” for “export[ing] power” via “visiting managers” and assuming key positions in Crimea’s regional and local administration to service their “business interests” [C-53, C-51, C-48b, C-34, C-37]. Respondents disliked being governed by people who “don’t see it [Crimea] as home” [C-37, C-32]. Materially, they believed Crimea subsidised the rest of Ukraine and would be better off “if the money did not leave to Kyiv” (even though Crimea was one of the poorer regions of Ukraine) [C-57a].

Hence respondents, regardless of how they identified, felt disempowered and disenfranchised, as if they subsidised Kyiv, rather than were subsidised by Kyiv, which formally they should have been as a
poorer region (see Way 2002). Political cronyism resulted in their feelings of political and economic disempowerment by the current regime so that respondents, who across categories agreed that while Ukraine’s territorial integrity was “stable”, believed the political system was “not stable” [C-37, C-32].

What divided respondents was their prognosis, whether wanting to be left alone by Kyiv (Discriminated Russians), to strengthen Crimea’s autonomy, to retain Crimea’s wealth locally (some Ethnic Russians) or to strengthen the Ukrainian unitary state (some Ethnic Russians, Political Ukrainians). This demonstrates, not ethnically unstable relations within Crimea, but a political instability between Kyiv and Crimea (Shevchuk 1996; Drohobycky 1995), and since the rise of the Donetsk-based Party of Regions, a tension between Donetsk, a Donetsk-run Kyiv, and Crimea, fuelled by political cronyism at local, regional and state-levels.

While Russian meanings and practices divided respondents in Crimea, with some categories wanting more engagement with Russia (Discriminated Russians) than others, there was less variation among territorial aspirations where the majority supported the status quo (Table 8.5). Hence, Crimea appeared, in the period preceding 2014, as decreasingly threatened by pro-Russian separatism. Moreover, identification was not a driver of separatist and unification sentiment among these respondents, with these sentiments associated only with undesirable outcomes, of conflict and bloodshed. Respondents’ territorial aspirations were path dependent, preferring what they knew (status quo), while deviations from this path were imagined as unlikely and undesirable (most respondents) and as too costly/deadly (Discriminated Russians). This was redolent of Laitin’s (1998:8) analysis of early 1990s Latvia, where even ardent supporters of Russia advocated for a “bad peace” over a “good war”. While this might be expected for the groups who were neutral (Ethnic Russians, Crimeans) or positive about Ukraine (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians), it is a crucial finding that Discriminated Russians did not endorse separatism, even though they contained individuals from the same organisations would support separatism/annexation by 2014. Even if they wanted more political engagement (Discriminated Russians) or had cultural/spiritual attachments to Russian society (Ethnic Russians), separatism was neither desirable nor possible, because they wanted Crimea/Ukraine to remain peaceful, as it had since 1991.

Table 8.5: Territorial and Geopolitical Aspirations for Crimean Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th>Geopolitical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeans</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹¹⁴That Osipian and Osipian (2006:500) identify these sentiments also in the Donetsk region, preceding Donetsk and Luhansk’s separatist conflicts, is an interesting similarity.
Table 8.6: Mapping Nested Integration Respondents in Crimean Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nested Integration</th>
<th>Cultural Incorporation</th>
<th>Political Incorporation</th>
<th>Social Dependence</th>
<th>Geopolitical Dependence</th>
<th>Territorial Unification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Russians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Wanted</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimeans</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ukrainians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By contrast, geopolitical aspirations demonstrated greater variation by identification category than political preferences. Eurasianism was supported by those who identified as Russian including both those who wanted more interaction with Russia (Discriminated Russians) and those who were happy to be governed by Ukraine (Ethnic Russians). For Ethnic Russians, their split between political affiliation with Ukraine and geopolitical orientation toward Russia is therefore an interesting facet of kin-state relations, demonstrating geopolitical ties to kin-states in the absence of political ties. Meanwhile, Europeanization was supported more by those who actively engaged in Ukraine, as a political and cultural project (Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians), leaving Crimeans split between older (pro-Eurasia) and younger (pro-EU) respondents.

This demonstrates the interlocking of kin-state and geopolitical narratives. Here Russia could act as a geopolitical magnet for those who ethnically, but not necessarily politically, identified with Russia (Ethnic Russians) as well as those who did (Discriminated Russians), while leaving aside those who did not have this same identification either as Russian or with Russia (Ethnic Ukrainians, Political Ukrainians). These zero-sum imaginations, of either moving closer to the EU or Russia, are stark as respondents’ dominant aspiration, while little preference existed either for the status quo or for deepening relations with both states. This contradicts an academic impulse to argue for the possibility of a “multi-vector foreign policy” deepening relations with both the EU and ECU/Russia (Bordachev et al. 2014; Fomina 2014), as well as EU discourse which denies involvement in “geopolitical competition” or a “zero-sum” game with Russia over this shared area of interest (Delegation of the European Union to Moldova 2014; European Council of the President 2014). However, in both cases, respondents not only preferred a single direction but framed these relations as zero-sum.

8.4.3 Is There Evidence of Nested Integration in the Crimean Case?

This section examines the explanatory power of the model of nested integration on Crimea using the evidence of meanings and practices discussed in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-5). As described above, this model has been revised to examine the model at a higher level of granularity than originally conceived, by examining each inductive category, and by incorporating the dimensions of social dependence and geopolitical dependence (Table 8.6).
Cultural Incorporation

*Discriminated* and *Ethnic Russians* exhibited cultural incorporation, identifying with the kin-state, culturally and spiritually, in particular with the fraternity of Russians, which they felt they belonged to linguistically and culturally. Conversely, *Political* and *Ethnic Ukrainians* did not demonstrate cultural incorporation because they did not demonstrate identification or affiliation with Russia as a cultural entity. *Crimeans* exhibited partial cultural incorporation with the Russian kin-state, situated between Ukraine and Russia, culturally and territorially, and, equally, modified by the experience of being Crimean (and hence in between).

*Discriminated Russians* differed from *Ethnic Russians* and *Crimeans* by demonstrating more incorporation, culturally, in the kin-state. *Discriminated Russians* did not feel the sense of belonging to the home-state that *Ethnic Russians* and *Crimeans* did, derived from *Discriminated Russians’* sense of discrimination which made them feel culturally and linguistically marginal in Ukraine. As much as this model has emphasised the potential duality of identification, as mutually reinforcing rather than exclusive or competitive, *Discriminated Russians* did not show, at least culturally, this dualism, indicating instead their lack of cultural incorporation into Ukraine.

Political Incorporation

In contrast, both to cultural incorporation and to Moldova, Crimean categories demonstrated little evidence of political incorporation. Most were uninterested in political kin-state relations, lacking the desire to engage with Russian practices or participate in Russian institutions (*Ethnic Russians, Crimeans, Political and Ethnic Ukrainians*), as *Organic* and *Cultural Romanians* did in the Moldovan case. *Discriminated Russians* wanted to become politically incorporated, to be able to affiliate themselves politically and participate in the kin-state polity.

However they were restricted by what the kin-state was willing to offer where the Compatriot policy failed to offer them the means to become politically incorporated in Russia, as a kin-state. As Compatriots, receiving education or migration rights failed to offer them the right of political incorporation (which was what they were in fact seeking) by facilitating their departure from Crimea, instead of supporting their rights (e.g. linguistic) in situ, which is what *Discriminated Russians* wanted from Russia. For the remaining Crimean categories, the Compatriot policy offered rights and benefits that were uninteresting and unjustified and hence, unlike Romania, Russia was unable to appeal to a wide net of those interested in political incorporation (beyond their ardent minority supporters: *Discriminated Russians*).

Social Dependence

Only *Discriminated Russians* demonstrated social dependence. Firstly, *Discriminated Russians* framed Russia as the state that should advocate for their cultural and linguistic rights within Ukraine, and secondly, in an organisational sense, via the clientelistic relations between pro-Russian organisations and Russia. This demonstrated the cultivation of socially dependent relations, between organisations, that likely received funding and support from Russia, and a kin-state, that retained influence over these
organisations, even if it was not able to ensure their relevance or success within the peninsula.

Beyond Discriminated Russians, there was little evidence either of social dependence or a desire for social dependence, where respondents had no need to seek public goods or security from Russia, as a kin-state. However, as discussed above, this did not mean that Kyiv functioned as it should vis-à-vis Crimea, in terms of governance and the perception of how resources were distributed. Rather, the corrupt and crony practices of “Donetsk” clans demonstrated the sense that Ukraine was also suffocating the idea of Crimean autonomy, in terms of the distribution of power and capture of resources.

Geopolitical Dependence

There was also a geopolitical dimension to kin-state relations with Discriminated and Ethnic Russians orienting themselves towards Russia, geopolitically, via Eurasianist preferences. This is important for Ethnic Russians who did not unanimously frame Russia as a kin-state (Chapter 5), but framed Russia as a geopolitical patron, securing a better future than Europeanization could offer. This shows the geopolitical framing of kin-state relations (and geopolitical fractures within kin majorities in both cases), where kin-states were framed as geopolitical patron-states even for those who did not consider Romania or Russia as a kin-state.

Overall in Crimea there was no evidence of nested integration. Discriminated Russians lacked the means to become politically incorporated, while Ethnic Russians wanted neither to become politically incorporated nor socially dependent. This challenges Roslycky (2011:304), who argues that Russia’s goal via “soft power tactics” was to “bind Ukraine’s Crimean population […] to the interests and ideologies of another state”. Rather this chapter argued that Russia was unable to wield tactics that were attractive, and thus effective, in binding many Crimean residents to Russia. Russia could not offer the means, whether soft or harder, sufficient to meet Discriminated Russians’ demands.

However focusing only on the lack of separatist support overlooks two important facets of Crimea’s pre-2014 reality: firstly, that Crimea was perceived not as territorially unstable, but politically unstable; secondly, the highly developed networks between pro-Russian organisations in Crimea and the Russia kin-state, which directed the interests, and the dependence, of these organisations towards Russia. Likely Russia kept these cultural (ROC) and political (RE) organisations afloat, via funding (and the channelling of funding via ROC to RE), without stoking their popularity; in fact, this funding made them less not more popular by causing internal disputes. However the relationship between these organisations and was still crucial, maintaining these networks of funding, communication and interests, and for stabilising the Compatriot policy as a niche organisational policy, which sought to maintain these links, rather than with Crimean society en masse.

This does not dispute the absence of nested integration, but it shows the dynamics of interaction between Russia and Crimea were via these Compatriot organisations. As a result, individuals could retain political ties to Russia, should they wish, and, likely profit from these ties and the funding opportunities they offered, without the citizenship ties extended by Romania in the Moldovan case.
The absence of nested integration in the Crimean case does not negate the explanatory power of the model of nested integration by demonstrating the significance of a lack of political incorporation, and thus a lack of nested integration. This is explained by an absence of the means of, and desire for, political incorporation. As the section on Moldova will show the significant difference between these cases is the means and desire to become politically incorporated in Moldova via access to Romanian citizenship. By contrast, in Crimea, those with the desire to become politically incorporated with Russia (Discriminated Russians) did not have the means because of the unwillingness of Russia to provide access to Russian dual citizenship. Rather, in the Crimean case, the absence of nested integration is significant by demonstrating a lack of mass engagement with Russia and instead requiring explanation of a different kind of relation between Crimea and Russia, to Moldova and Romania, premised on Compatriot patron-client relations.

8.4.4 Geopolitical Versus Territorial Aspirations in Moldova

Since independence scholars framed Moldova as a politically and territorially unstable state, threatened by intractable separatist (Transnistria) and pan-Romanian irredentist claims (Eyal and Smith 1996; Ciscel 2010; Löwenhardt et al. 2001). A second direction of weakness, related to these instabilities, was the lack of a “political nation” (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009), or at least the ability to construct a cohesive political nation, because of the cultural conflicts implicated in the Moldovan state (e.g. over language, ethnicity, relations with Romania and Russia). While unification (“unire”) became a marginal political discourse and popular sentiment after its apex in 1994 within Moldova, pan-Romanian sentiment remains in Moldova and Romania. Even in 2013 (during EU Association Agreement negotiations) Băsescu named unification as Romania’s only remaining post-Communist goal that it had not yet achieved (EU and NATO accession ones that had been achieved) (Gotev 2013).

If Moldova’s resilience, and ability to construct a political nation, was weakened by relations with Romania, Romanian citizenship might weaken the Moldovan state further. Yet researchers argued the reverse: that the popularity of Romanian citizenship demonstrates neither an increase in pan-Romanian sentiments (Heintz 2008), nor desire for unification (Iordachi 2004). Rather, they argue, redobândire is motivated by pragmatic goals, by providing an “exit strategy”, even for those holding pan-Romanian sentiments, and therefore signals little about identification as Romanian or with Romania (Iordachi 2004:248-49).

Following the analysis of respondents’ meaning and practices (Chapters 6-7), this section analyses respondents territorial aspirations, showing that there was little support for territorial configuration vis-à-vis Romania but, rather, support for geopoliticised relations with Romania. This provides further support for analysing post-territorial interaction, as is considered in the subsequent section in examining the explanatory power of the model of nested integration (Section 8.4.5).

Organic Romanians

As expected, Organic Romanians were the greatest supporters of unification with Romania [MD-18, MD-8, MD-16, MD-15, MD-2, MD-25a, MD-25b]; however this was a minority preference. Those sup-
porting unification were active in unification movements [MD-8, MD-15, MD-16].[^2] They believed it was “artificial” to be divided from Romania, wanting to experience the kind of unification of East and West Germany [MD-8, MD-25b, MD-46, MD-53]. Importantly, they aspired not only for reunification because of their identification, but believed it was financially, bureaucratically and politically sensible: as a “stronger state”, and EU and NATO member, Romania would facilitate their exit from being perpetually between “east and west” [MD-15, MD-2, MD-25a, MD-25b, MD-18].

However most *Organic Romanians* framed unification as “irrelevant”, after 20 years’ experience of diverging political and social development [MD-47, MD-48, MD-49, MD-28, MD-16], where belonging to the “same nation” as Romania, or being Romanian citizenship, did not determine their territorial aspirations [MD-2, MD-10, MD-25a MD-28, MD-32, MD-35, MD-42, MD-46, MD-39, MD-48]. Instead they framed Romanian citizenship as mediating the sovereign border between Moldova and Romania, and between Moldova and the EU, because “it doesn’t matter today that we do or do not belong to the same state” [MD-28, MD-49].

Rather Europeanized relations with Romania was a common goal for *Organic Romanians*. Europeanization was a “solution” for reducing their separation from Romania, and increasing their separation from the Russian “hammer” and “Soviet concept” [MD-14, MD-1, MD-8, MD-49]. Moreover they imagined Europeanization as a way of being “together” with Romania in the EU “without borders” [MD-35, MD-10, MD-39, MD-42, MD-32, MD-1, MD-2]. Europeanization therefore offered a different and improved future, closer to Romania and further from their past, where unification was a politically irrelevant and unnecessary goal.

However, paradoxically, support for long-term unification for their children’s generation, as a “natural” and “normal” process, was still present as an aspiration for a minority of *Organic Romanians* [MD-10, MD-16, MD-26a]. Hence, *Organic Romanians* exhibited a tension between framing unification as something unlikely, and a distraction from more important goals (Europeanization), and as a desirable, legitimate and natural, process of de-Sovietization which would correct their unjust and unnatural separation from their kin-state.

**Cultural Romanians**

Fewer *Cultural Romanians* supported unification than *Organic Romanians*. Only MD-44 supported unification for her “soul” and pragmatic reasons, as a “solution” to corruption and “Russian influence”. Instead most *Cultural Romanians*, like most *Organic Romanians*, framed unification as “now impossible” and no longer “politically relevant”, even if they felt disappointed that Moldova “should have been part of Romania” after 1991 [MD-45, MD-24, MD-19, MD-33, MD-43]. Nowadays they supported Moldova’s “own statehood”, framing it as “paradoxical” after their short experience of independence to become again a “centre of a region within another country” [MD-51, MD-20, MD-12, MD-33, MD-24, MD-19]. Again their cultural identification as Romanian did not determine their territorial aspirations; instead they were supportive of Moldova as an independent state.

Rather, as *Organic Romanians*, for *Cultural Romanians* Europeanization was their “salvation” [MD-40, MD-9, MD-23, MD-4], by enabling the deepening of cross-border and post-territorial relations with

[^2]: For example the organisation Basarabia Pământ Românesc; Bessarabia is Romanian Land)
8.4. COMPARING THE EVIDENCE OF NESTED INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Romania. Cultural Romanians framed Europeanization as occurring from below, via redobândire and EU citizenship, and from above, via political and economic development. Redobândire performed as a kind of bottom-up Europeanization which could, from “the cultural aspect, from the population’s eyes, from the citizens” transform Moldova, and its relations with Romania and the EU from below by facilitating new opportunities and types of interaction, such as cross-border freedoms, that were previously restricted [MD-23]. From above, Moldova too could come to equal Romania, in terms of economic development, at which point, because of their equal status, unification between Romania and Moldova could “come naturally” [MD-40, MD-9, MD-23, MD-4].

Europeanization therefore offered a way to circumnavigate debates about unification, for both Cultural and Organic Romanians, by facilitating, alongside redobândire, new ways to interact with Romania and the EU.

Ambivalent Romanians

Ambivalent Romanians supported neither Romanian unification nor believed that Romanian citizenship, as a minority phenomenon in Moldova, brought them closer to Romania [MD-6].¹¹⁶ They were more critical of unification than previous categories, blaming Romanian political elite for pursuing unification as a self-interested electoral strategy to rally voters and boost their self-esteem by “hear[ing] that somebody like to unite with them” [MD-27, MD-3, MD-6], without considering the costs of unification or the wishes of those residing in Moldova [MD-27, MD-17, MD-3].

Rather Ambivalent Romanians, like Cultural and Organic Romanians, framed Europeanization as “improving our relations” with Romania and the EU, to “get rid of Russia” and Russia’s influence in Moldova [MD-27, MD-17, MD-50]. Europeanization, as integration with the EU, rather than with Romania directly was “easier” and “more real” for Moldova, and more “palatable” to Russia [MD-17, MD-27, MD-50] by reducing the barrier between them and Romania, and the EU, by not having “the Prut river as a border like in the Soviet period” [MD-27].¹¹⁷ Ambivalent Romanians demonstrated, similar feelings of geopolitical dependence on Romania, and restricted agency vis-à-vis Russia, as Organic and Cultural Romanians, which presented Europeanization, via Romania’s support, as a preferable outcome even if, politically, they were sceptical of Romania’s irredentist aspirations.

Moldovans

Moldovans, like Cultural Romanians, supported Moldova as a state independent from Romania where unification was neither “possible” nor desirable [MD-36, MD-38]. The potential “moment” of unification was in the past, in the early 1990s, when they were “fighting for the Latin alphabet” [MD-36, MD-38]; battles they had since won. They were now critical of unification, and those who supported it who reflected an aggressive” and “extreme right” ideology that they did not “need” [MD-21, MD-52], because they did not want to be a peripheral “working class” community within Romania but rather masters of their own state [MD-52, MD-7a, MD-38].

¹¹⁶Although my observation of the ubiquity of Romanian citizenship would challenge the assertion that reacquisition of Romanian citizenship remains a minority phenomenon in Moldova.

¹¹⁷The Prut river is the current border between Romania and Moldova.
Rather, consistent with previous categories, Moldovans favoured Europeanized relations with Romania, as a geopoliticized way to remove the barriers of borders between them and the EU and as a “catalyst image” for Moldova’s development [MD-52, MD-21]. However, unlike previous groups, Moldovans resisted a geopolitical dependence on Romania/EU, believing Moldova needed “many supporters” rather than “one good friend” (i.e. more than Romania) for Moldova’s future “protection” [MD-52, MD-21]. Moldovans’ support for Europeanization was also not unanimous: C-36 argued that while the EU “helps us”, the Eurasian Union (i.e. in a Russian-led union), offered the possibility of “more money” in their pockets, because the alternative would be that prices, such as energy, would increase.¹¹⁸

Linguistic Moldovans

Linguistic Moldovans pathologised unification as a threat to Moldova’s existence, believing that Romania funded a fifth column of “unionists” within Moldova [MD-57b]. They blamed also the approach of Moldova’s contemporary elite who supported “educating our forces that we are Romanian” which could “in 20 years” lead to Moldova’s disappearance [MD-54].

However, unlike previous categories who preferred Europeanization and framed it as a solution to relations with Romania, by getting nearer to Romania, and with Russia, by getting further from Russia, Linguistic Moldovans maligned Europeanization in favour of Eurasianism and relations with Russia. They framed the Eurasian market, with “Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan” and Russia as a better and bigger market for Moldova compared to the EU [MD-54, MD-41]. Linguistic Moldovans wanted to maintain ties with Russia, on a path dependent logic linking perceived past prosperity in “tsarist and Soviet times” to their ties to Russia [MD-54, MD-41]. Hence they saw Eurasianism, and closer ties to Russia, as their correct future path and geopolitical orientation, in order to return to their former prosperity.

Overall, in terms of territorial aspirations, unification was supported only by a minority of Organic Romanians, and hence a minority of respondents, who supported unification as a short-term goal, to remove the “artificial” border separating them from Romania. For others unification was irrelevant (Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians) and undesirable (Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans), and instead, across these categories, respondents respected and enjoyed Moldova’s recent statehood (Table 8.7).

This might indicate that kin-state meanings and practices, particularly redobândire, had not increased “Romanian patriotism”, as Heintz (2008:16) argues, by not challenging the existence of the border separating Romania and Moldova. However, relations with Romania, and redobândire in particular, had become Europeanized. Thus, not only did Organic, Cultural and Ambivalent Romanians

¹¹⁸This is what Russia has been threatening and implementing, with the price of gas rising from fivefold since 2005 and statements by Dmitrii Rogozin, a Russian official, in relation to Europeanization, that “energy is important […] We hope that you will not freeze this winter” in the months preceding Moldova’s signing of an Association Agreement with the EU (Cañus 2013; Dempsey 2013).
8.4. COMPARING THE EVIDENCE OF NESTED INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Table 8.7: Territorial and Geopolitical for the Moldovan Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th>Geopolitical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Romanians</td>
<td>Minority: support unification,</td>
<td>Majority: oppose unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majority: oppose unification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romanians</td>
<td>Majority: oppose unification</td>
<td>Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romanians</td>
<td>Oppose unification</td>
<td>Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Oppose unification</td>
<td>Not just Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
<td>Pathologise unification</td>
<td>Eurasianism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...favour unilateral Europeanization, but framed Europeanization as occurring through Romania. Interaction with Romania reduced their feeling of a barrier between themselves and Romania, and hence the EU, by offering them equal status and access (via redobândire) to Romania and elsewhere in the EU than previously inaccessible. This Europeanization from below was bolstered by wanting Europeanization from above (i.e. via institutions/elites) which, according to Organic and Cultural Romanians, might lead to the natural and automatic coming together of the Moldovan and Romanians states, which they did not resist. Moldovans demonstrated more dissent, favouring either combining Europeanization with relations beyond Romania/EU (i.e. east) or favouring Eurasianism. More extreme, Linguistic Moldovans, consistent with their pathologisation of Romania and redobândire, preferred a Eurasian path for Moldova, believing, historically, interlocking with Russia had proved a (more) prosperous path for Moldova.

That spaces of European sentiment can be created beyond the formal borders of the EU, by processes of bottom-up Europeanization associated with kin-state practices, is an important finding. For example, both European citizenship and identity literature, considered these phenomena to be deficient within formalised EU spaces because of the lack of shared experiences and collective memories (Strath 2002; Dahl 1990; A. D. Smith 1992; Della Sala 2010). However, empirically, it signalled, among Organic and Cultural Romanians, their geopolitical dependence on Romania and their framing of the EU as a panacea to solve ethnic, territorial and geopolitical questions vis-à-vis Romania and Russia (see also Löwenhardt et al. 2001:618). Secondly, it signalled the zero-sum framing of geopolitical aspirations, with Europeanization framed as a process of de-Sovietization, distancing Moldova from Russia and its Soviet past, whereas Eurasianism was framed as the reverse of this process.

Thus respondents in the Moldovan case, except for a minority of Organic Romanians, neither favoured territorial unification with Romania nor did Romanian practices, such as redobândire, signal changing aspirations with respondents continuing to support Moldova as an independent state regardless of the citizenship status of Moldovan society. This demonstrates the absence of support for territorial reconfiguration vis-à-vis the kin-state. Rather, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of interaction, occurring “over and above” sovereign borders, as the model of nested integration does.

8.4.5 Is There Evidence of Nested Integration in the Moldovan Case?

This section, using the observations of meanings and practices, examines the explanatory power of the model of nested integration on the Moldovan case. Using these inductive categories as an explanatory
### Table 8.8: Mapping Nested Integration Respondents in Moldovan Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cultural Incorporation</th>
<th>Political Incorporation</th>
<th>Social Dependence</th>
<th>Geopolitical Dependence</th>
<th>Territorial Unification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Romanians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Romanians</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent Romanians</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Moldovans</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Maligned</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tool (Table 8.8), which demonstrate the fractures within kin majorities and the different dynamics within kin majorities vis-à-vis the kin-state.

**Cultural Incorporation**

There is a split between respondents exhibiting (Organic and Cultural Romanians) and not exhibiting (Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans) cultural incorporation, based on the presence and absence of ethno-national co-identification with the kin-state. Ambivalent Romanians, exhibited partial identification as Romanian, in combination with identifying as Moldovan, and “not fully Romanian” because of how they felt framed as inferior by those within Romania. Strictly, only Organic Romanians exhibited both co-identification as Romanian, and identification with the kin-state, framing Moldova as being inherently, and organically, Romanian, as a region of the Romanian nation. In comparison, Cultural Romanians identified particularities of being Romanian within Moldova, given their different political experiences (Soviet and post-Soviet) whereby Moldova lagged behind the kin-state.

**Political Incorporation**

Only Linguistic Moldovans did not engage in Romanian kin-state practices, such as citizenship and scholarships. All other categories engaged with kin-state practices, but did not necessarily engage with these practices in a way that exhibited political incorporation. Cultural and Organic Romanians exhibited political incorporation, not only in their motivations for acquiring Romanian citizenship, but in their desire and sense of obligation, to participate in Romania as an extra-territorial demos (greatest for Cultural Romanians). These groups described, and enjoyed, the fact that the border separating them from Romania no longer functioned in the same way for those who had acquired Romanian citizenship. Ambivalent Romanians did not exhibit political incorporation because, while they engaged with Romanian kin-state practices, they did not follow up on these practices via political participation or affiliation with Romania (i.e. for this group, the political impact was neutralised). Moldovans are described as partially exhibiting political incorporation in terms of wanting to participate somewhat, out of obligation, in Romania, and this was interesting given the absence of cultural incorporation for this group.
8.4. COMPARING THE EVIDENCE OF NESTED INTEGRATION FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Social Dependence

Following the split in terms of cultural and political incorporation, this was reflected by social dependence with *Organic* and *Cultural Romanians* exhibiting the greatest social dependence on Romania, framing Romania as a state through which Moldova could modernise and rely on in terms of public goods, such as citizenship and scholarships. By contrast, *Ambivalent Romanians*, *Moldovans* and *Linguistic Moldovans* did not exhibit social dependence on Romania.

This evidence of social dependence, is problematic, and by contrast more problematic than cultural and political incorporation which demonstrated the multiplying rather than replacing of identification, participation and loyalty. Rather social dependence demonstrates the ability of the Romanian state to embed its system of extraction vis-à-vis Moldovan, investing in social programmes (e.g. scholarships), framed by respondents as essential. This replenishes Romania’s workforce and creates a more favourable neighbour (Moldova) but undercuts the incentives for Moldova’s to provide for its own citizens, by creating a different outlet for this provision and expectation of provision.

This suggests two paradoxes: first, that Moldova’s modernisation, a process that usually involves increasing state capacity, might undercut Moldova’s state capacity by convincing the elite they are no longer responsible for functions such as provision of education (i.e. encouraging the outsourcing of Moldova’s state capacity of public goods provision). The second paradox, as described in Chapter 7, is the tension between this social dependence, signifying a lack of state capacity in Moldova, and Moldova’s enduring symbolic legitimacy, where the idea of Moldova, as a state, retains legitimacy. This remains most surprising aspect about Moldova, a state lacking a cohesive “political nation”, “regime legitimacy” (see Carment and Samy 2014:7), faith in future economic and political stability, and instead having a politician class framed as not invested in the future of Moldova. However Moldova retains symbolic state legitimacy and a status as home for those residing in Moldova and abroad. Hence, the Moldovan case showed that individuals could become socially dependent on Romania, as a kin-state, as the locus of public good opportunities (such as education) which could, in turn, reinforce the impetus of cultural and political incorporation discussed above.

Geopolitical Dependence

*Cultural* and *Organic Romanians* demonstrated geopolitical dependence by envisaging Europeanization as a necessary process that could take place only through Romania. This was from official top-down channels with Romania lobbying the EU for Moldova, demonstrating Romania as a kin-state not only for the kin majority but also for the Moldovan state, but also through bottom-up channels, via citizenship, which provided proximity to Romania/EU and equal status to Romanian/EU citizens. In this space, as discussed by *Organic* and *Cultural Romanians*, respondents could imagine Europeanization leading to the “natural” coming together of Romania and Moldova, to a situation where the international border no longer acts as a barrier between these states.

This offers a level of nuance to Charles King’s (2003:78) argument, preceding Romania’s accession to the EU (in 2007), that Europeanization could be a “barrier” to pan-Romanian integration. This section demonstrated how Europeanization could affect relations between Romania and Moldova, whether through Romania acting as a bridge for Moldova’s Europeanization, or Romania and Moldova becom-
ing more proximate, via shared citizenries and the imagination of a shared future where the existence of separate states was no longer a psychological or political construct. This geopolitical interlocking (of Europeanization with kin-state nesting) provided an additional layer of nesting with, and via Romanian citizenship, providing access to EU citizenship. Even for those respondents who did not envisage, or desire, this natural coming together (Ambivalent Romanians and Moldovans) still preferred Europeanization, from above and below, as a process offering modernisation and separation from Russia. Hence Europeanization was framed as a zero-sum process analogous to de-Russification and de-Sovietisation, reinforcing Moldova’s choice of a statehood diverging from its Soviet past, and towards it European future.

Overall, two categories in the Moldovan case exhibited nested integration (Organic and Cultural Romanians). These categories maintained political incorporation into Moldova, retaining identification with, a sense of loyalty to and participation in Moldova. This demonstrated the enduring symbolic legitimacy of Moldova as a nation-state, for dual Moldovan/Romanian citizens, and the importance of the nested model for conceptualising these dual identifications and affiliations, since these worked together rather than in opposition. Categories differed in terms of their cultural incorporation with Moldova, with Organic Romanians seeing themselves as the same as Romanians in Romania while Cultural Romanians differentiated themselves, through their political culture and experiences, from Romanians in Romania, demonstrating the different positioning of categories within this nested framework.

Thus the granularity provided by the inductive categories indicated the internal fractures within the kin majority which showed some (Organic and Cultural Romanians), but not all categories, were becoming nested within the kin-state. The nested model demonstrates how cultural and political incorporation, and social and geopolitical dependence, can exist without support for territorial unification. Only a minority of Organic Romanians sought territorial revision, i.e. the unification of Romania and Moldova, while a majority of those exhibiting nested integration were happy to exist in both, and between, Romania and Moldova, and indeed exist in Romania (and the EU) while residing in Moldova, via these shared citizenry spaces.

Hence, nested integration demonstrates the nuances that exist in this dual loyalty/participation schema, allowing individuals to exist “over and above” sovereign borders (see Kovács 2006:442), and no longer feel these boundaries as sovereign, without fomenting sentiments of territorial unification, which challenge the existence of this border. Similar to Europeanization, where Magnette (2007:670) argues that European citizenship “reveals” Europeanization as wanting to “erode the borders of citizenship”, redobândire allowed respondents to no longer experience a barrier between Romania and Moldova, even if the sovereign border continued to exist.

### 8.5 A Model of Nested Integration?

Instead of focusing on kin-state relations from the perspective of state-level actors, and hypothesising kin-state relations could be antagonistic (conflict-inducing) or fuzzy (conflict-reducing/neutral), this thesis argued that kin-state research needed to engage with the agency of kin communities, and in
particular kin majorities. Hence the thesis focused on the meanings of kin identification and engagement with kin-state practices of kin majorities in the two cases of Crimea and Moldova. Rather than situating kin majorities in a framework of mutually exclusive and competitive fields of identification and loyalty, pitting them against home-state and kin-state, the thesis argued for a model that allowed for multiple expressions of identification and affiliation, where individuals could become nested within one state (kin-state) while remaining part of another (home-state). This research began at the bottom-up using “constitutive causality” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), i.e. not causality from an aggregate macro-perspective but from the micro-perspective of individuals.

In line with the iterative approach of this thesis, the chapter revised the model of nested integration as originally conceived, to adapt to three observations from the thesis. Firstly, recognising the internal fracturing of kin majorities, the chapter examined the model using the inductively derived identification categories. Secondly, by including social dependence (the second alteration of the model), that is the ability and desire to receive public goods increasingly from the kin-state, in addition to the home-state, if not instead of the home-state (e.g. citizenship, education). Thirdly, the nested integration approach incorporated a geopolitical dimension by considering the role of geopolitical interlocking, whereby relations with the kin-state are implicated in wider region-building frames.

In examining the explanatory power of this model, the cases show radically different conclusions. In Moldova there was greater evidence of nested integration and, crucially, beyond those who most vociferously identified with Romania. In Crimea, respondents had neither the means for political incorporation (for Discriminated Russians) nor the desire to engage with the means of political incorporation (for the remaining categories). By contrast, in Moldova, respondents had the ability, and desire, to become more politically incorporated in Romania, stemming from kin-state practices which facilitated this political incorporation (by offering desirable, accessible and legitimate opportunities for political engagement and participation).

The explanatory power of nested integration is thus examined by analysing kin-state practices and meanings, where Romanian and Moldovan forms of identification were reinforcing (for Cultural and Organic Romanians) and Romania provided kin-state practices that were widely accessible and legitimised, including, though extending beyond, those identifying with the kin-state (with Romania) and co-ethnically with the kin-state (as Romanian). Romania’s significant kin-state policy of citizenship reduced the Romania-Moldovan border as a psychological and physical obstacle. This process engendered feelings of obligation towards Romania, and permitted participation to fulfil this obligation, alongside the legitimacy and availability of this policy, which facilitated “post-territorial” relations with Romania (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011).

This is the greatest contrast to Crimea, not only in terms of the comparative citizenship versus quasi-citizenship policy, but the interaction of this undesirable policy, with a lack of availability (beyond pro-Russian organisations) and a lack of legitimising rhetoric. Romanian practices were buttressed by a powerful discourse of injustice that framed these practices, not as the rights of Romanians abroad, but, as the rights of respondents’ antecedents; meanwhile Russian practices were not accompanied, or legitimised, by discourses of injustice (beyond Discriminated Russians). Moldova’s territorial separation from Romania, achieved by Soviet annexation, remained more salient in cultural memory than Crimea’s separation from Russia, implemented by Soviet transferal (by Khrushchev) and crystallised...
by Soviet dissolution, even if Russia disputed the legality and legitimacy of Khrushchev’s decision.

The absence of nested integration in Crimea, by the lack of overlapping dimensions of political, cultural, social and geopolitical incorporation, is an interesting point in itself, that does not negate the comparative explanatory power of the model. Rather, the presence of nested integration in Moldova (for two categories) against the absence of nested integration in Crimea (for all categories) demonstrates a different kind of interaction in Crimea between the kin majority and kin-state. Firstly, it shows an absence of the ability to become politically incorporated, because of the lack of access to Russian citizenship, among the small minority of respondents that sought it, and political incorporation vis-à-vis Russia. Secondly, it shows an absence of mass engagement of the kin majority with the kin-state explained by an absence of desire to demonstrate the four kinds of overlapping incorporation that would signify nested integration. On this basis, it would expected that even in the presence of Russian citizenship that there would still only be small minority that would be interested in political incorporation with Russia.

This sets up a counterfactual situation where nested integration would have been evident in Crimea had Discriminated Russians had access to the political integration they sought, for example via Russian citizenship. Beyond Discriminated Russians, nested integration would have been evident had there been more desire, among those demonstrating (some) cultural incorporation (Ethnic Russians and Crimeans), for political and social incorporation (and for geopolitical for Crimeans). Therefore, the absence of nested integration in the Crimean case highlights the different kinds of relations that existed, where the majority had little interest in further political and social ties with the kin-state. By contrast, a small minority (Discriminated Russians) had developed patron-client relations with the Russian state, via Compatriot organisations, yet these relations fell short of offering the political incorporation they sought. Thus the absence of nested integration demonstrated the networked relations between clients (Discriminated Russians) and the Russian patron-state and highlighted the tensions that existed for access to political incorporation to increase the leverage of Russia’s clients within the Ukrainian state.

Thus, in Moldova, Romania is successfully creating an extra-territorial demos, with a body of citizens who participate, and feel obligated to participate, in Romania. In comparison, Russia was unable to create such a broad-based community in Crimea, via soft power. However Crimea shifted, in a matter of weeks, from a case of successful conflict prevention, built around Crimea’s institutionalised autonomy (Sasse 2002), to a rapid Russian annexation and incorporation of the peninsula, at least nominally, into Russian state structures. Crimea became a chip instrumentalised by Russia to weaken Ukraine, by destabilising Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, pillaging its military and naval assets (in terms of bases and military equipment in Crimea), and challenging Ukraine’s ability to decide its geopolitical positioning, by coercing Ukraine to maintain ties to Russia and loosen Europeanization. However, as this chapter suggests, Crimea was not such a successful case of institutionalised autonomy vis-à-vis Kyiv, in a system where local Crimeans felt they lacked real power, subsidised Kyiv and were run by a corrupt Donetsk clan. However, this is a story, at least in 2012 and 2013, of political fragility and instability rather than ethnic instability.

Lastly, this chapter showed the importance of geopolitical interlocking of kin-state relations within wider region-building narratives (Figure 8.1). From a comparative perspective, respondents in Crimea exhibited greater aspiration for Russian-led geopolitical projects (Eurasianism), while Moldovan re-
spondents preferred Europeanization. Crucially, Eurasianism was supported beyond Discriminated Russians, where Ethnic Russians framed Russia as a geopolitical kin-state (if not political kin-state). In Moldova, the Romanian kin majority is becoming more nested, politically, culturally and socially, within Romania, and the EU, and these processes are inter-dependent, this is not without contentions given the wider split in consent for Moldova proceeding in this direction. Moreover, across the cases, what was evident was a zero-sum framing of these options where the possibility of engaging both in Europeanization and Eurasianism appeared limited. This is interesting because it precedes the contemporary period where the notion of these processes as zero-sum has hardened, and demonstrates how preceding the crises of 2014 that, from a bottom-up perspective, individuals in Ukraine and Moldova were aware of their “in between” status.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

“Duality of rights and identity is, after all, a part of the future.”

Tóth (2006:46)

“Everyday forms of resistance don’t make headlines.”

Scott (1985:xvii)

“We face the problem that the history presented as ours is only part of our history. [...] What of the history of the ‘historyless’, the anonymous people who, in their collective acts, their work, daily lives, and fellowship, have forged our society through the centuries?”

Manifesto of a group of Puerto Rican historians (cited by Bhattacharya 1983:3)

The thesis argued that a bottom-up approach could analyse understudied phenomena (kin majorities) in comparative perspective across different policies (citizenship versus quasi-citizenship). In this way, the thesis claims three interesting, and unexpected, findings:

1. **Meanings**: Kin majorities are not homogenous communities; rather they are highly fractured in terms of their meaning and content.
2. **Practices**: That it is not only the desirability of a kin-state policy (e.g. citizenship) that is associated with the prevalence of engagement, but also how this policy is made available (by kin-state and home-state) and how it is legitimised by those eligible.
3. **Nested Integration**: The thesis found some evidence of nested integration (cultural and political incorporation), among specific kin majority actors, but argued the nested model could be refined by considering aspects of social and geopolitical dependence and examining the model at a
higher level of granularity.

9.1 Thesis Review

Chapter 1 argued three gaps existed in kin-state literature:
1. *Theoretically*, existing literature focused only on how kin relations could induce (*antagonistic* approach) or reduce/neutralise conflict (*fuzzy* approach) between state-level actors,
2. *Conceptually*, existing literature focused on kin minorities, overlooking the phenomenon of kin majorities,
3. *Methodologically*, existing literature focused on top-down inter-state analyses of kin-state relations, overlooking bottom-up and agency-centred perspectives.

To address these gaps, the chapter argued research needed to analyse kin majorities from an agency-centred and bottom-up perspective, by examining the dynamics of interaction. Chapter 1 detailed also the methodology and research design of the thesis, arguing for a combination of an interpretive meaning-centred approach with a rigorous comparative approach. The chapter detailed how the thesis would analyse the meanings of kin identification and engagement with kin-state practices through a cross-case comparison of Crimea and Moldova, as two cases selected from a wider kin majority typology and differing in terms of the type of kin-state practice (citizenship versus quasi-citizenship).

Chapter 2 detailed the model of nested integration, arguing this model could deal better with the nuances of a kin majority, agency-centred perspective. By analysing the meanings (of kin identification) and engagement with kin-state practices, the chapter outlined a theory to examine whether these kin-state relations promoted nested integration, defined as fostering a kind of cultural and political incorporation within the kin-state, which neither challenged nor replaced cultural and political relations with the home-state.

Chapter 3 provided a historical and institutional background of the two cases of Crimea and Moldova. Historically, the chapter discussed, the dynamics of ethnicity, territory and institutions (citizenship) over time in terms of the relations between the case and the kin-state. Secondly the chapter discussed the contemporary policies provided by each kin-state vis-à-vis the kin majority in each case.

Chapters 4-7 dealt with empirical analysis, addressing first the meanings of kin identification and practices of kin-state engagement in Crimea and then Moldova. Chapter 4 examined the meanings of kin identification in Crimea and observed a fractured kin majority, across different historical, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, territorial and political dimensions which were conceptualised via five inductively derived identification categories (*Discriminated Russians, Ethnic Russians, Political Ukrainians, Crimeans, Ethnic Ukrainians*). Conceptually, the chapter argued that kin majorities are not homogenous communities. Rather they are fractured in terms of their meaning and content, according to areas of disagreement (cultural, linguistic, territorial, historical, political), where co-ethnic identification did not determine identification *with* the kin-state. Secondly, these chapters demonstrated inter-generational contestation over identification, questioning the conceptualisation of ethnicity as a “myth of common ancestry” by demonstrating how this myth could be subverted by political experiences, such as territorial flux and changing political regimes (e.g. post-Soviet transition).
Chapter 5 used the inductively derived categories from Chapter 4 to consider how far identification was associated with engagement with Russian practices (associational, membership, recognition and educational). The chapter argued that engagement with practices was more associated with respondents’ identification. For example, only those identifying most strongly as Russian, and with Russia (Discriminated Russians), were interested in engaging with Russian practices, while others neither conceived of themselves as Compatriots nor were interested in engaging with Compatriot practices. Hence, this chapter found a narrow and niche-based engagement with Compatriot practices in Crimea, where engagement was associated with respondents’ identification (as Discriminated Russians) and their organisational networks, as members of pro-Russian organisations (ROC, RE). This framed Compatriot relations between Crimea and Russia as formed on patronage relations between Crimean organisations, as the client, and Russia as the patron kin-state. This left aside the majority of respondents who did not identify as discriminated, were not part of these organisations but instead pathologised and marginalised them.

Chapter 6 adopted the same approach as Chapter 4 in Moldova, finding a similarly fractured kin majority, explained via five inductive categories (Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans, Linguistic Moldovans).¹¹⁹ Conceptually too, Chapter 6, as Chapter 4, argued that the kin majority was internally fractured and exhibited political contingency, in terms of conceptions of ethnicity across generations.

Chapter 7 used these inductive categories, as Chapter 5 did in Crimea, to examine engagement with Romanian kin-state practices in Moldova (educational, membership, participation), to examine how far strength of identification was associated with engagement. Chapter 7 found there was wide engagement with Romanian kin-state practices, across the categories, indicating that engagement with practices was not associated with respondents’ identification. What differed between categories were motivations underpinning these practices. Those identifying more as Romanian, and with Romania, were motivated by more symbolic rationale (Organic Romanians) than those identifying less with Romania, who framed their engagement in more material terms (Cultural Romanians, Ambivalent Romanians, Moldovans). Still, what was also observed across the categories was a normative motivation, bolstered by the association of Romanian citizenship as a reparative device to right the historical injustice their antecedents had experienced.

Chapter 8 brought together the empirical findings to consider the model of nested integration by examining evidence of political and cultural incorporation. The chapter argued Moldova exhibited more nested integration than Crimea because in Moldova there was greater possibility to become politically incorporated, via the accessibility and availability of citizenship citizenship, and desire to become politically incorporated, via superior rights and a legitimacy to accessing these rights and interacting with Romania. By contrast, in Crimea respondents exhibited neither the means (Discriminated Russians) nor the desire (Ethnic Russians) to promote political incorporation, while other categories did not exhibit the desire for cultural incorporation (Crimeans, Political Ukrainians, Ethnic Ukrainians).

Chapter 8 also refined the model of nested integration in three ways. Firstly, it argued the model needed to adopt a granular approach in assessing evidence of nested integration, recognising the ind-

¹¹⁹That the number of inductively derived categories was the same in both cases was not a deliberate strategy but rather is a coincidence.
ternally fractured nature of both kin majorities, using the inductively derived identification categories to assess evidence of cultural and political incorporation. Secondly, Chapter 8 argued that nested integration needed to consider also social incorporation, based on evidence that kin-state relations were frame in terms of social dependency, offering an alternative source of protection from discrimination (in Crimea), or source of security (in Moldova), and the provider of public goods, such as education. This chapter was critical of social dependence, however, as evidence of political fragility within these cases, allowing home-state elites to avoid investing in home-state public goods (Moldova) or maintaining relations of clientelism and corruption (Crimea). Lastly, Chapter 8 argued the nested integration model needed to include geopolitical dependence, given the observation of how far kin-state relations were interwoven with geopolitical framings. Thus, the kin-state could be a preferred geopolitical orientation beyond those engaged with the kin-state (Crimea) or a panacea for geopolitical processes, such as Europeanization, reinforcing the notion of dependence between kin-state and kin majority, and political fragility, indicated too by evidence of social dependence, where the kin-state appeared also to be contributing to political fragility.

9.2 Thesis Contribution

Building on the summary of the findings of the thesis, this section systematises the contributions, theoretically, empirically and methodologically, and in terms of policy-relevance. Here the aim is neither to generate a generalisable, nor representative theory or approach, but rather, in line with the idea of contingent generalisations (George and Bennett 2005), to speak more broadly about the relevance of the specifics of the cases to empirical and theoretical questions beyond the thesis.

9.2.1 Empirical Contribution

Empirically, the thesis explored two kin majority cases from the bottom-up. Based on the context-specific approach of the thesis, these cases were not selected as representative kin majority cases. Rather, these cases allowed analysis of two kin majorities in a cross-case comparison, from the bottom-up, by examining the meanings of kin identification and engagement with kin-state practices. Here the empirical contributions are discussed in terms of the insights provided by analysing meanings of kin identification, engagement with kin-state practices and territorial aspirations for each case (Table 9.1).

In Crimea, the thesis challenged several assumptions, from the perspective of meanings and practices. Rather than focusing only on pro-Russian elements (e.g. organisations) within Crimea, and on the question of BSF and Sevastopol, the thesis took a more cross-sectional approach to Crimea, to gain a diversity of framings of Russia, Ukraine and Crimea, alongside engaging, from below, with those organisations which remained marginal during the period of study (2012, 2013).

The research was not motivated to debunk assumptions about Crimea, and its relations with Russia and Ukraine. Rather the research wanted to scrutinise these debates from a different perspective, by engaging from below with a range of respondents on questions of meanings (i.e. what does it mean to be Russian?) and practices (do individuals have or want Russian citizenship?). However, in addressing these questions directly, the thesis, firstly, challenges these assumptions by showing the diversity of
### Table 9.1: Empirical Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Existing Assumptions</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meanings</strong></td>
<td>Homogenously and vociferously pro-Russian and pro-Russia</td>
<td>Heterogeneity: self-identification and identification with Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practices</strong></td>
<td>Case of passportization, most likely case of Compatriot engagement</td>
<td>Russian citizenship unavailable and largely undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Aspirations</strong></td>
<td>Preference for Russian citizenship = supportive of unification</td>
<td>Territorial status quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Existing Assumptions</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meanings</strong></td>
<td>Moldovan vs. Romanian dichotomy</td>
<td>Heterogeneity: self-identification and identification with Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practices</strong></td>
<td>Romanian citizenship as instrumental</td>
<td>Heterogeneous motivations (material, symbolic and normative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Aspirations</strong></td>
<td>Prevalence of Romanian citizenship ≠ supportive of unification</td>
<td>Europeanized solution vis-à-vis unification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

meanings found in Crimea concerning self-identification and identification with Russia, demonstrated by the five inductively derived identification categories. In the wake of Crimea’s annexation, this finding becomes more significant in critiquing the framing of identity debates in Crimea in terms of mutually exclusive categories (“ethnic Russians”, “ethnic Ukrainians”, “ethnic Crimean Tatars”), by arguing these ethnicised framings fail to explain the complexity within Crimea, where ethnicity might be resisted (Political Ukrainians) or hybridised (Crimeans).

Secondly, the thesis challenged the framing of Crimea as a case of passportization and a most likely case of Compatriot engagement, by showing a narrow and niche engagement with Compatriot practices, and a lack of ability to engage (Discriminated Russians) or desire to engage with citizenship practices (other categories). The thesis showed also the niche-based nature of these kin-state practices by demonstrating Discriminated Russians had privileged access to Compatriot practices, via pro-Russian organisations (ROC, RE) as the gatekeepers, managers and beneficiaries of how these practices operated within Crimea.

Lastly, the thesis criticised the notion that Crimea was a region where separatist or unification sentiments were prevalent (c.f. Sakwa 2014), because no respondents, including the most pro-Russian Discriminated Russians, supported these aims, preferring the status quo to an uncertain conflict. Moreover, Russia, as a state, was rarely framed wholly positively, and instead was often portrayed as worse than Ukraine, politically, socially and economically.

In Moldova, the thesis focused on aspects that are usually obscured: relations between Romania and the majority Romania claims as kin, given the preponderance of studying other questions (e.g. conflict in Transnistria, Russia as a kin-state, inter-ethnic relations). By focusing on the kin majority, the thesis challenged a dichotomous framing of identification where Romanian and Moldovan are separate or analogous categories. The thesis showed the different ways respondents, themselves, dealt with these different categories, such as regionalising Moldova or by citing important experiential differences that maintained a lag between Moldova and Romania (e.g. Soviet/Russian versus EU experiences).
In terms of practices, the thesis disentangled different motivations for engaging with Romanian citizenship, arguing these motivations should not only be seen as instrumental/material, but as also embedded in symbolic framings (Organic Romanians) and normative framings (all respondents, excluding Linguistic Moldovans). The presence of a normative motivation is interesting, reflecting top-down Romanian approaches (of redobândire as restitution) but resonating also with those who did not frame Romania, symbolically, as a kin-state (Moldovans) by the personalisation of this restitution vis-à-vis their grandparents. Hence the Moldovan case exhibited a wide engagement with Romanian kin-state practices, indicating the successful genesis of an extra-territorial demos, embedding a sense of obligation by new Romanian citizens (residing in Moldova) to participate politically, by voting, in Romanian elections.

Lastly, the thesis addressed issues of unification sentiment and showed the extent to which relations with Romania had become Europeanized. Support for political-territorial unification with Romania was low, while the idea that Europeanization, from the top-down and from the bottom-up (via citizenship practices), was a solution to the territorial relations with Romania was emphasised, because within the EU the separation of Romania and Moldova would no longer be an issue of concern.

Empirically, both cases showed the importance of analysing engagement with a diverse set of kin-state practices, in particular education, given the number of scholarships made available annually by Romania. Respondents framed Romania as able to invest in future generations of Moldovans and to socialise them within Romania, and according to Romanian values (e.g. Europeanization). However this reinforced a sense of social dependency, undermining Moldova’s education system, by facilitating exit of future generations, and undermining the willingness of Moldova’s political class to invest in educating its citizens. This shows again the importance of analysing these practices from the perspective of kin majorities. As Deets and Stroschein (2005:300) argue, a similar policy by the Hungarian government “reduces the rationale for its neighbours to provide such goods to their citizens”. However, in the cases of kin majorities, such as Moldova, the argument is that the home-state elite are disincentivised from providing public goods, such as education and security, to a more fundamental component of the state (i.e. the majority), which in turn affects state capacity more acutely than may be the case with kin minorities.

This fragility and “dysfunctionality” of post-Soviet states was unexpected (Ganev 2007:4), and showed the relationship between kin-state provision and home-state capacity, affecting the provision of public goods, and the prevalence of nepotistic, if not corrupt, practices between kin-states and kin majorities. This was demonstrated either by the desire to be dependent on a kin-state (in Moldova) or the desire to have greater political and economic autonomy from a corrupt central government (in Crimea). It remains easier for home-states to frame problems as ethnic to obscure more fundamental issues of governance, in particular as politics and politicians remain the profiteers of this patronage and corruption. Moreover, keeping the issue of Romanian unification in the spotlight only serves to entrench contestation and fragility in the Moldovan political sphere (Popescu cited by Bird 2015). That Europeanization should be framed still in this Romanian-centred rhetoric embeds these frictions going forward in making project appeal to ethnic minorities within Moldova and/or those who resist Romania as a kin-state (e.g. Moldovans and Linguistic Moldovans).

In Crimea, kin-state practices via Compatriot organisations extended, and transnationalised, net-
works of corruption and patronage. Here the Compatriot policy ensured relations by dependency between clients, Compatriot organisations comprised of Discriminated Russians, and the patron, Russia. In Moldova this dysfunctionality took a different tone, with kin-state relations facilitating relations of social (and geopolitical) dependency, imagining Romania as the only channel through which Moldova could modernise, via scholarships, and Europeanize from below (via redobândire) and above. As Chapter 7 argued, this frames Romania as a benevolent kin-state, investing conscientiously in Moldova to atone for not fighting for Moldova during WWII. This disguises Romania’s self-interested investment in Moldova, as a fertile place for Romania to extract what it needs, e.g. migrant Romanian-speaking labour. This research, initially, did not expect that kin-state relations could affect, or demonstrate, state fragility to the extent that they did. However in doing this research it became clear that kin-state relations created and maintained dependencies between kin majority and kin-state, which were beneficial for the kin-state while, at least partially, subsidising home-state dysfunctionality.

In theorising the nested model, the thesis did not foresee the importance of interweaving kin-states with geopolitical discourses and preferences or the fractures that ran through kin majorities in terms of their aspirations. While D. J. Smith (2002) argued international actors could mediate kin-state relations, and the likelihood of kin-state antagonism/intervention, this thesis showed how kin-states become international actors, by the interlocking of geopolitical and kin-state orientations (Figure 8.1). In Moldova, kin-state practices invoked geopolitics by facilitating Europeanization from below, demonstrating how this technocratic process (Europeanization) can be imagined, and yearned for, by social actors existing beyond EU borders. In Crimea, Russia was a pivotal geopolitical actor and could be a preferred orientation even for respondents who did not frame Russia as a kin-state (Ethnic Russians).

This thesis therefore offered a way to challenge assumptions about both cases, in terms of the relations between these kin majorities, their kin-state identification and engagement with kin-state practices. Beyond this, the thesis also contributed empirically in unexpected ways by showing the interweaving of geopolitical framings within these kin-state relations and specific cases, and the importance of social dependence, demonstrating more fundamental aspects concerning public goods provision and political fragility for post-Soviet states.

9.2.2 Theoretical Contribution

Beyond these cases, the thesis also offers theoretical contributions. This is key, given the criticism of interpretive work that it is “nonempirical” (Ragin 1989:35), and overly descriptive, offering only atheoretical insights by using “soft” methodologies (Bates 1997), criticisms this thesis disputes. Outlining this contribution to the wider discipline of political science is important too, given this is an area-based comparison (see Bates 1997:169), where thesis has theoretical insights that extend both beyond these cases and beyond the post-Soviet region.

This section addresses three theoretical contributions: the model of nested integration, approaches to ethnicity in political science, and approaches to citizenship (Table 9.2).
Table 9.2: Theoretical Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gap</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Nested integration</td>
<td>Model which examines dynamics of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonistic vs. fuzzy approaches overlook:</td>
<td>Model which theorises cultural and political incorporation, plus social incorporation and geopolitical dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. kin majorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. dynamics between peace and conflict,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. agency of kin majorities/communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ethnicity</td>
<td>Heterogeneous majorities: intra-ethnic diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on inter-ethnic diversity vis-à-vis minorities, myth of common ancestry</td>
<td>Contingency: political experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Citizenship</td>
<td>Comparison of citizenship, quasi-citizenship and other kin-state practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship, quasi-citizenship as practices (i.e. from agency-centred perspective)</td>
<td>Motivations underpinning various practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nested Integration

This thesis criticised two approaches to kin-state relations, which focus either on how kin-state relations could induce conflict (antagonistic) or abate conflict (fuzzy). Rather the thesis argued for a theoretical approach to kin-state relations which explores kin majorities from an agency-centred perspective to analyse the dynamics of interaction. Hence the thesis theorised a model of nested integration and considered how far each case demonstrated evidence of cultural and political incorporation. In line with the iterative approach of the thesis, and its empirical observations the thesis also revised the model of nested integration in three ways:

1. by considering the model at a higher level of granularity using the inductively derived identification categories, to add a more nuanced understanding of who demonstrated nested integration;
2. by incorporating a dimension of social incorporation based on evidence of framing kin-states as a source of public goods and security;
3. by incorporating a further dimension of geopolitical dependence by observing the interlocking of kin-state relations in wider region-building narratives.

In considering the explanatory power of this model, the thesis found some evidence of nested integration in Moldova, using the inductively derived identification categories to demonstrate two of the five categories exhibited cultural, political and social incorporation and geopolitical dependence. Meanwhile in Crimea, the thesis argued that, while there was some evidence of cultural and social incorporation, there was neither the means (for Discriminated Russians) nor the desire (for other categories) to become politically incorporated.

The thesis did not find evidence of nested integration in Crimea because of an absence of all the four kinds of incorporation. The absence of nested integration in Crimea is therefore interesting by demonstrating a lack of mass engagement, and a lack from the masses for desire to engage with Russia, at the same time of demonstrating the more nefarious relations between specific pro-Russian clients.
within Crimea and Russian patron-state. The nested integration model helps to highlight this lack of mass engagement with Russia and instead point to the significance of an absence of political incorporation. The thesis therefore sets up a counterfactual argument where nested integration in Crimea might have been possible had political incorporation been present. For example had there been the means and desire to be politically incorporated, via access and prevalence to Russian citizenship of the kind demonstrated in Moldova vis-à-vis Romanian citizenship, this would have allowed for political incorporation and, in turn, nested integration, at least for Discriminated Russians who exhibited the three other kinds of incorporation (cultural, social, geopolitical).

The absence of nested integration in the Crimean case does not invalidate the more general theoretical contribution of nested integration by demonstrating the need for four different kinds of incorporation to be present for nested integration to occur (cultural, political, social, geopolitical), highlighting the significance of a kin-state policy of citizenship that is attractive to members of the kin community. The thesis therefore develops a model of nested integration that could be applied elsewhere, in terms of considering evidence for these four different kinds of incorporation and considering how different elements within the kin majority, i.e. via examining evidence of the four kinds of incorporation across different identification categories, exhibit or not these kinds of incorporation, and thus nested integration.

Hence the thesis developed a model of nested integration, using inductively derived identification categories, that could be considered and applied as an argument elsewhere. Here, other cases from the kin majorities would be the most logical application of this theory, consistent with the idea of typological theorising (George and Bennett 2005:233). However this theory could be applied also in the cases of kin minorities, in particular kin minority cases in ethnic enclaves (discussed below), given their localised concentration, even if they are not contiguous (e.g. Hungarian local majorities in Székely land in Romania, Serbians in Kosovo). Here the idea would not be that territory can necessarily become nested within the kin-state, but still that the majority of a localised community could have the means to become culturally and political incorporated in the kin-state. However this model would have to consider also the idea that their home-state ties, affiliation and participation, would be multiplied rather than replaced by these kin-state relations.

Approaches to Ethnicity

As a study of kin majorities, this thesis has two contributions regarding the study of ethnicity within political science. Firstly, in the study of ethnic majorities, ethnicity is usually studied in terms of minority-majority dyads, assuming the boundary between these minorities and majorities is distinguishable (Chandra 2006) or at least significant (Tajfel 1982). Even those who contest this idea of a distinguishable minority-majority boundary (Kachuyevski and Olesker 2014) still imagine the majority within this dyad to be relatively homogenous. That ethnic majorities are internally homogenous, where the diversity concerns these minority-majority dyads, or multiple minorities, is the focus of political science understandings of the role of ethnicity in politics, where ethnic diversity is associated with increasing the potential for grievance-inducing conflicts (Alesina et al. 2003), negative outcomes of democratisation and political stability (Pop-Eleches 2007; Wilkinson 2006; Przeworski 2000) and democratic inclusion (Horowitz 1993).
9.2. THESIS CONTRIBUTION

However this thesis showed how far majorities, when studied directly, exhibit internal heterogeneity. This was evident in terms of the meaning and content of the majority, and its positioning vis-à-vis home-state and kin-state, where differences can be found which demonstrate internal fractures within these supposed majorities, on the basis of different ideas of meaning. Hence, it is necessary to reconfigure how ethnic majorities are conceived, by shifting away from an over-reliance on censuses, where regimes have a desire to seem coherent and reflecting of majorities, even in the face of internal dispute over this meaning and contestation. Minorities may also be internally fragmented (Cheskin 2015), when it is the labelling of these communities as groups that becomes the homogenising lens through which they are viewed, where diversity is imagined across minority-majority dyads and within-group homogeneity is considered “the rule” as opposed to only “ethnic heterogeneity” (Connor 1993:375). Here diversity indices (ELF, MAR) help little with understanding this within-majority heterogeneity and the debates concerning the political outcomes of these within-group contests over meaning (e.g. language debates in Moldova), and the content of majorities (Abdelal et al. 2006). These arguments, concerning within-group heterogeneity, may hold better for the post-Soviet context, given the political, social, cultural, and territorial flux, rendering these states “fundamentally out of equilibria” (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2004:6). However, in western Europe, the UK and US, debates abound concerning what it means to be a constituent of a majority, which itself is “out of equilibria”, or at least constantly dynamic, because of the move towards “super-diversity” (see Vertovec 2007).

This idea of flux relates to the second contribution of this thesis concerning the conceptualisation of ethnicity as myths of common descent, which structure academic understandings of ethnicity. Rather this thesis argued these myths were contingent, in relation to experiences of political and territorial flux, disrupting myths within families. Thus, a generational approach is needed for exploring the “significance of temporal experience”, to analyses of both ethnicity and politics more generally, because generations have “access to (different) resources and therefore affect political outcomes in different ways” (Luecke 2013; Beissinger 1986). These political experiences are heightened by the significant political shifts that occur during territorial reconfigurations, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, where individuals stayed in the same locations, but still “woke up” in a “different country” with different myths, symbols, political figures and institutions (Zevelev 2001:vii). Moreover the dynamics of socialisation, between socialisation by families and the state (e.g. via education and other institutions), in these myths of common descent need to be further explored (as discussed below) in relation to the contingency and reconfiguration of ethnic identification.

Approaches to Citizenship

This thesis argued that previous research had focused on top-down, institutional and legal perspectives, regarding kin-state institutions. Where approaches had considered agency-centred perspectives, these focused on citizenship (Vasiljević 2014:3, 10). A gap existed therefore in terms of analysing different kin-state practices, alongside citizenship, analysing these from a comparative (e.g. citizenship versus quasi-citizenship practices) and bottom-up perspective. To address this gap, the thesis constructed a typology of kin-state practices, in terms of different dynamics of belonging, benefits, rights, duties and participation, implied by five different practices: membership (citizenship), recognition (quasi-citizenship), educational (scholarships), participatory (voting) and associational (organisations).
In comparing citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices, the thesis argued that it is not only the material differences between these practices (e.g. the provision of higher order rights and benefits for citizenship versus quasi-citizenship) but also how the desirability of practices intersects with the policies’ accessibility and legitimacy. Specifically, the thesis argued that Romanian citizenship was more prevalent in Moldova, not only because it offered superior EU rights and benefits, but also because it was widely available and accessible, and underpinned by a discourse of injustice. In comparison, Russian citizenship and quasi-citizenship/Compatriot practices were neither desirable, accessible nor conceived as legitimate.

Hence, the thesis contributes a way to dissect how and why kin-state practices may exhibit wide or narrow engagement, that could be considered elsewhere, including kin minority contexts (e.g. practices of Hungarian citizenship in Romania). It argues also that rational choice perspectives, which emphasise interest-maximization, overlook structural constraints (e.g. the availability and accessibility) and normative motivations, where practices are motivated not by interest-maximization but by justice, or rather, the reversal of an injustice. The thesis cannot speak to the generalisability of these ideas beyond the specifics of these contexts but it does propose a theoretical argument that could be applied elsewhere, when examining motivations underpinning kin-state practices.

The thesis showed also the influence of educational practices as a socialising tool available to kin-states to educate future generations, according to kin-state values, as well as replenish its labour market with students who speak the kin-state language. The power of states in educating, and socialising, future cross-border generations is an area suggested for future research below, both in terms of kin-states and large scholarship programmes more generally.

Here the key difference between the cases was the number of scholarships offered, with a potentially wide engagement (in Moldova) vs a niche engagement (in Crimea). The niche engagement in scholarships in Crimea demonstrated the importance of clientelistic relations between kin-states, as patrons, and kin majority organisations, as clients, which this thesis found, at least in terms of the data gathered, were absent in Moldova vis-à-vis Romania. These clientelistic relations were crucial for determining who had access to kin-state resources, and who knew they had access to them, ensuring the dependence of these pro-Russian actors on the kin-state and demonstrating the mirroring of discourses between these associations, their members and the kin-state (e.g. discrimination, nostalgia).

**9.2.3 Contribution of Methodology and Research Design**

This section explores two methodological contributions:
1. combining an interpretive and comparative approach, and
2. applying everyday nationalism approaches and debates to analysing kin-state relations.

**Interpretive and Comparative**

This thesis designed and implemented a comparison from the bottom-up using an interpretive and comparative approach. This bottom-up approach endorsed an “ethnographic sensibility” (Kubik 2013:63), and the collection of meaning-rich data (Wedeen 2002; P. A. Hall and Lamont 2013), by its agency-centred focus on vernacular expression. Hence, the thesis sought to understand, from respondents’
perspectives, how they identified and how they engaged with kin-state practices, rather than verifying deductive assumptions of agents’ behaviour (e.g. rationality). This research was not designed to be constrained by dependent variables, because it was concerned more with “constitutive causality” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012), i.e. mapping out agents’ different ways of identifying, of engaging with kin-state practices and unpacking the associations between these meanings and practices. These meanings and practices are not the “error term”, i.e. neither relevant nor significant objects of analysis because they fall within the margin of statistical error, but offer crucial insights into the social and political impacts of kin-state policies and interactions, by analysing those who engage with these practices. Moreover, this offers a complex, but not needlessly complex, understanding of relations between kin-states, home-states and kin majorities.

The comparative approach provided a way to overcome idiosyncratic case-specific phenomena, permitting the analysis of overlapping and contradicting perspectives and processes, across the cases, in terms of the dynamics of different kin-state approaches and the interaction of this approaches with the agents, as the object of analysis. The thesis defended an area-based comparison, within the post-Soviet region, to enable the comparison of similar, rather than geographically proximate, cases and to analyse phenomena (kin majorities, kin-state policies) most prevalent within post-Communist/post-Soviet space.

In conducting this bottom-up and comparative approach, the thesis does not aspire to produce generalisable theories, in line with interpretivists who argue for context-specific theory-building. However the thesis aspires to produce arguments that could be applied “out of context” (Peters 2014), in line with typological theorising and contingent generalisations (George and Bennett 2005), so that the arguments of this thesis could be considered in other kin majority cases.

**Applying Everyday Nationalism to Kin-State Relations**

A second methodological contribution of this thesis is its application of everyday nationalism. This approach analyses the function, meaning and subversion of ethnic identification in everyday life and in everyday terms (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Brubaker et al. 2006; J. Dawson 2012), to understand ethnicity not by top-down “categories of analysis” (e.g. by censuses) but via “categories of practice” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:4). Previous applications used this everyday approach to understand ethnicity in a domestic context. Instead this thesis applied everyday nationalism to an international kin-state context, by exploring how respondents identified, in an everyday context, how respondents self-identified, and how they identified with both their home-state and kin-state. This everyday nationalism approach allowed a disentangling of these concepts, of co-ethnic self-identification and identification with the kin-state. Secondly it allowed for an appreciation of where identification functioned in mutually exclusive terms (e.g. in geopolitical framings and aspirations) versus where it functioned in overlapping ways, where the nested integration model conceptualised how kin-state and home-state loyalty could be not competing and shifting, but multiple.

A second application of this everyday nationalism approach is to the study of kin-state practices. Here the thesis studied bottom-up engagement not only with citizenship practices, as Vasiljević (2014),

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¹²⁰Personal discussion with a colleague
but accompanied by a typology of practices: membership (citizenship), recognition (quasi-citizenship), educational (scholarships) and associational (organisations), which were explored from a bottom-up perspective to understand how individuals engaged with these practices in everyday life. This bottom-up perspective showed that while, from an academic perspective, membership of the state has been conceived as becoming fragmented via quasi-citizenship policies (Turner 2001; Isin and Turner 2007; Stavilă 2010), citizenship remains the key entry to kin-states, by providing analogous, and desirable, rights, which quasi-citizenship, as a form of recognition rather than membership, fails to do.

9.2.4 Political and Policy Relevance

Lastly, and unexpectedly, this research began in a different setting, politically and geopolitically, from that in which it ended, with the rapid shift of Crimea from a seemingly successful case of institutionalised conflict resolution (Sasse 2001) to a rapid annexation by Russia. The securitisation of discourses running through this thesis, of Compatriots, Russkii Mir and Russia’s role as a kin-state in post-Soviet space, is a shift that impacts not only Crimea (and Ukraine) but the whole region, with Moldova’s relationship too shifting visibly vis-à-vis Russia and the EU, since, even if socially, Moldova remains split between these poles.

Hence, the thesis tells the history of a political situation, from the bottom-up, of a reality that no longer exists. The reality observed during 2012-2013 appeared path dependent: most Crimean respondents expressed legitimacy in being a member of Ukraine. Even those from organisations which would be key in facilitating Crimea’s annexation in 2014 (ROC, RE) preferred, using Laitin’s (1998:8) expression from post-Soviet Estonia, a “bad peace” over a “good war”. However, change was not path dependent (c.f. McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2004:9), thrusting marginal political actors (RE, Aksenov) and even ideas (of discrimination) to the forefront of annexation, circumventing institutions that were supposed to be a check on Crimea’s separatism, because the state which had previously been unwilling to offer interventionist support, after 23 years, was willing. What is stark is how few loyal, and core, supporters this annexation required alongside mass inertia, and a power vacuum within Ukraine (following the flight of President Yanukovych).

In this setting, Crimea’s annexation becomes a story of ethnic instability, of the salience of Russian identification and language, and trope of discrimination, when it should be a story of political fragility: of corrupt practices within these marginal pro-Russian organisations, and clientelistic relations with a Russian patron-state, as this thesis observed. The absence of nested integration is striking, demonstrating the cleavages existing between a narrow, clientelistic pro-Russian elite, who were marginalised at the time data was collected, and the rest of respondents, who had little interest in engaging with, or being part of, Russia. The notion of autonomy within Crimea was depicted, regardless of identification, as a fiction, demonstrating the tensions existing between the Crimean periphery and the Party of Regions centre (Kyiv and Donetsk). Moldova too exhibits political fragility, not only in the ethnicised version of inclusivity (Zabarah 2011), but in the sense of dependence, geopolitical and social, that it is being cultivated from the top-down and the bottom-up. This demonstrates how far nesting was occurring beyond the political and cultural spheres, as originally conceived, and occurring geopolitically and socially, as observed empirically and inductively.
A second area of political, and policy-relevance, concerns the engagement with kin-state practices (citizenship in particular) exhibited by kin majorities. This thesis argues that existing research focused on kin minorities, where the argument concerning the normative relevance of the rights of kin-states to interact with kin minorities, and to provide extra-territorial rights and benefits (via citizenship or quasi-citizenship), was more understandable given the higher potential for these kin minorities to be discriminated against at home. However kin majorities do not face the same risk of discrimination and, though eligible for the same policies, need these policies less than kin minorities (who may, legitimately, be marginalised and discriminated within their home-state in a way that kin majorities are likely not). Kin-states should not be viewed as the benevolent actors acting reparatively to reverse previous territorial injustices that left them disconnected from their kin, nor does the proliferation of citizenship and quasi-citizenship practices signify post-national tendencies as argued by the fuzzy approach. Equally, however, these kin-state practices do not advance territorial claims, as argued by the antagonistic approach, as the thesis showed the extent to which engagement with kin-state practices was disconnected from unification aspirations.

Rather, as this thesis argues, kin-states now work more in terms of hearts and minds, to secure political capital within the kin-state (e.g. votes) while maintaining kin communities in situ (within their home-state), to ensure the proliferation of pro-kin-state communities who can participate also in their home-state in ways that may benefit the kin-state (and participate in the kin-state in ways that may benefit the home-state). These contemporary kin-state policies advance extra-territorial processes of nation-building (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011), rather than post-national processes. They maintain discourses of past injustice but offer opportunities to overcome these injustices “over and above” sovereign borders, to secure their extra-territorial interests, such as by creating extra-territorial demoi.

More scrutiny has to be given to these tools of nation-building, used by kin-states vis-à-vis kin communities, but in particular vis-à-vis kin majorities because of their majority status at home. The Venice Commission (2001) endorses kin-state protection towards minorities only in the field of education and culture. However granting rights of membership and political participation en masse (as exhibited by Romania vis-à-vis Moldova), even if these must be acquired via stringent and arduous processes, demonstrates how states use these policies as tools of nation-building, if not state-building.

9.3 Future Research

9.3.1 Empirical Areas for Future Research

The first area for future research is the puzzle this research poses: if respondents in Crimea exhibited little evidence of unification as a territorial preference, why then was Crimea successfully annexed in 2014 (just 8 months after the fieldwork for this research ended)? While some research has been conducted in the aftermath of annexation, data on the ground preceding annexation, but coinciding with the Euromaidan protests, in particular from a bottom-up and inductive perspective, remains absent. Instead a more feasible future direction would be the experiences of annexation, in particular of those who have decided to leave Crimea (for abroad or to mainland Ukraine). This includes the experiences of negotiating annexation, and of adapting institutionally (e.g. acquiring Russian citizenship), socioeconomically (e.g. in terms of bank accounts, jobs) and psychologically to this de facto annexation, and the
motivations underpinning who has left Crimea since annexation and why (e.g. in terms of inductive categories derived in this research).

A second important avenue for research concerns the securitisation of Russia as a kin-state. When this research began, it seemed reasonable to assume that Russia would continue to behave as a non-interventionist kin-state. Instead, there has been a securitisation of the discourses central to this thesis, of the Compatriot policy and *Russkii Mir* (Zevelev 2014). It would be significant, therefore, to consider the impact of this on Russia’s kin communities and, in the wake of this securitisation, experiences of being Russian, speaking Russian, identifying as Russian and identifying with Russia (a point of disentanglement emphasised in the thesis) elsewhere in post-Soviet space. In particular, it would be relevant to consider how far discrimination is a motivating force driving interaction with Russia elsewhere in post-Soviet space. A pertinent site to consider the wider explanatory power of this finding would be the Baltic “regimes of discrimination” (Hughes 2005), given the high concentration of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, and policies of marginalisation (e.g. restriction of citizenship and linguistic rights) in Estonia and Latvia. It could be possible to apply the theory of discrimination to determine how far this discourse is present among ethnic Russian communities, within pro-Russian organisations (e.g. the equivalent of ROC in these cases) and parties, to determine how far the niche practices and discourses, of discrimination, resonate in cases where discrimination has been more persistent.

### 9.3.2 Theoretical Areas for Future Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kin-State</th>
<th>Enclave Community</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Home-State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Ethnic Hungarians</td>
<td>Székely Land</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Ethnic Serbs</td>
<td>e.g. Mitrovica</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Ethnic Croats</td>
<td>e.g. Mostar</td>
<td>BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ethnic Russians</td>
<td>Northern Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis argues the insights, such as the model of nested integration, could be considered in other kin majority cases (see Table 1.3, page 21). In particular, Bulgaria’s relations with the kin majority in Macedonia could be a pertinent case for observing the effects of a Europeanized and a Europeanizing kin majority, in a case where, in Moldova, the idea of belonging to this kin majority is contested. Here an interesting comparative case is the practice of Serbian citizenship in Republika Srpska given similar levels of Europeanization (or at least the benefits of Europeanization) in these cases, as well as Albania vis-à-vis the kin majority in Kosovo in the progression towards Kosovan recognition.

Beyond the kin majority typology, this nested theory could be considered vis-à-vis ethnic enclaves where kin communities form local, though non-contiguous, majorities (Table 9.3). Hungary could be a useful case, considering Hungary’s policy transition from offering quasi-citizenship to full citizenship, and its use of this policy in creating electoral capital, and even candidates who stand in both home-state and kin-state elections.

More research could consider further the idea of ethnic identification as contingent. In particular, this could be considered in other post-Soviet and non-post-Soviet contexts, to disentangle how far this is explained by the political and territorial experiences of flux in the wake of Soviet “detritus”
or whether this is a phenomenon found beyond the post-Soviet context. For example, this contingency could be examined in cases which have not experienced the same political and territorial flux (e.g. South Korea and China), given that the post-Soviet region, and particularly central and eastern Europe, have experienced a greater territorial flux than other areas of kin engagement (Brubaker and Kim 2011). Secondly, the intersection of political experiences and the role of political generations in ethnic identification and politics would be an interesting avenue for further conceptualisation. Lastly, competing dynamics of socialisation, between family and the state (e.g. via institutions such as education), could be further explored for post-Soviet cases and beyond, to determine how and why different socialisation forces affect ethnic identification, and to explore these contingent ethnic myths.

In terms of kin-state practices, further research could explore the role of education, in particular scholarship programmes, by studying education as a soft power tool of foreign policy from below, as in the case of Romania, and beyond, to unpack the role of inter-state socialisation from the bottom-up. However this soft power tool need not be considered only in the case of kin-states, but more widely with international scholarship programmes (e.g. ERASMUS programmes or US scholarship programmes) in terms of the relationship between education, socialisation and political culture. The thesis argues there are many aspects of inter-state relations, of which kin-state relations are one example, in which a bottom-up agency-centred perspective could provide useful analysis of issues of political science and policy relevance.

### 9.4 Conclusion

Overall, this thesis endeavoured to provide an agency-centred exploration of kin majorities, in terms of meanings and practices, considering how far these kin majority cases exhibited evidence of nested integration. The thesis claims three major findings (meanings, practices, nested integration). In terms of meanings, the thesis argued that kin majorities were not homogenous communities. Rather, the thesis finds these kin majority cases are highly fractured in terms of their meaning and content and in terms of the contingency of myths of common ancestry. This finding, of contingent myths of common ancestry and the role of political experiences, is significant for reconfiguring how ethnicity is conceived in political science, where diversity across minority-majority dyads is associated with negative political outcomes, while within-majority diversity is overlooked.

In terms of practices, the thesis argues that it is not only the desirability of kin-state practices (e.g. citizenship) that is associated with engagement, but also the availability and accessibility of this practice (vis-à-vis kin-state and home-state) and how it is legitimised by those eligible. This finding could be examined elsewhere, in terms of engagement with kin-state practices both in kin majority cases and also kin minority cases, in particular in cases of ethnic enclaves.

In terms of nested integration, the thesis finds some evidence of nested integration (cultural and political incorporation). However, the thesis argues also that the nested model needs to be refined, in line with the findings of the thesis. Firstly, the model was refined by a granular approach, offering a more nuanced understanding of who exhibited political and cultural incorporation in the two cases and why. Secondly, the thesis argues the model needs to include social dependence, signifying social incorporation, and thirdly, geopolitical dependence, by the interweaving of kin-state and geopolitical
frames. This chapter argues this model of nested integration, in terms of social, political and cultural incorporation, and geopolitical nesting, and using the inductively derived identification categories, establishes a framework that could be considered elsewhere, on other cases of kin majorities and on kin minority cases (in particular ethnic enclaves).

The thesis offers both a micro-political explanation, by examining kin-states from the perspective of individuals, and a systemic/macro perspective. It demonstrates how kin-state relations have become implicated, and imbued, with geopolitical discourses. This will likely lead to continued fractious politics within the post-Soviet region which, though neither pre-determined nor ideal, has become structured according to a zero-sum logic of aligning either with the poles of Europeanization or Russian-led geopolitical projects (e.g. Eurasianism).

Finally, and more generally, the thesis argues political science has been concerned with a rational-choice perspective of interest-maximisation. Institutional approaches offer a counter to this, by showing how institutions structure political outcomes (e.g. via path dependency). For this research, the structural aspect, in terms of the availability and accessibility of kin-state practices (e.g. dissemination of access opportunities) was important. However, the thesis argued for a further important element, that is explained neither by rational-choice agency explanations nor by structural institutional approaches, but rather by an agency-structure interactional approach. Here the thesis argues the normative dimension of kin-state practices is important, in terms of the legitimacy of kin-state practices and the power of a perceived injustice, where kin-state practices can be framed as righting a familial injustice (e.g. Soviet annexation) even in the absence of kin-state identification. Hence, the thesis contributes a thick explanation of kin-state engagement, by demonstrating the importance of looking beyond agency and structural explanations, and by considering the interaction of these explanations, and non-rational explanations. This is not to argue that engagement with kin-state practices lacks logic, but to argue that this logic cannot only be explained by rational interest-maximisation. The challenge is to communicate this argument to the wider discipline by showing how this thesis has combined a “soft”, but thick, context and meaning-centred approach with rigour and comparison, that can speak to contingent generalisations within, and beyond, the post-Soviet region.
Appendices
Appendix A

Interview Guide

1. Basic introduction questions
   - What do you do in [ fieldwork site ]?
   - What does your organisation do?
   - Where were you born? What about your parents/family?

2. Culture and politics
   - What do you think about politics in [ fieldwork site ]?
   - What do you think about culture in [ fieldwork site ]?

3. Self-identification
   - For ethnicity, how do you feel yourself?
   - What makes you feel [ ethnicity ]?
   - What about language? Culture?
   - Do you think that there are differences between [ different groups ] in [ case ]?
   - Do you feel near or far to [ kin-state ]? How do you feel in [ kin-state ]?

4. Kin-state relations
   - What do you think about relations between [ kin-state ] and [ fieldwork site ]?

5. Kin-state policies
   - What do you think about the policies of [ kin-state ] towards [ fieldwork site ]?

**Moldova:**
- What do you think about reacquiring Romanian citizenship?
- Have you applied for Romanian citizenship?
- When did you apply? When did you receive it?
- Why did you apply for Romanian citizenship?
- Has Romanian citizenship changed how you feel about Romania?
- What can you do as a Romanian citizen?

**Crimea:**
- What do you think about the Compatriot policy?
- Do you feel like a Compatriot of Russia?
- What do you think about dual citizenship?
- What do you think about Russian citizenship?
Appendix B

Interviews & Correspondence

In addition to 55 interviews in Moldova (Appendix C) and 53 interviews in Crimea (Appendix D), the following correspondence and interviews are cited in the text.

Personal correspondence:
Moldova’s Writers’ Union, March 2015

Elite interviews:
Petre Guran (ICR, 1/6/2012)
Appendix C

Crimean Respondents
## Table C.1: List of Respondents from Crimean Case

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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Appendix D

Moldovan Respondents
## Table D.1: List of Respondents from Moldovan Case

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Appendix E

Coding Frameworks
### Appendix E.1: Crimea: Coding for Meanings

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### Appendix E.2: Crimea: Coding for Practices

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<th>Being a compatriot</th>
<th>Compatriot practices</th>
<th>View of Russia/integration</th>
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### Appendix E.3: Moldova: Coding for Meanings

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Bibliography


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Bibliography


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Bibliography


Bibliography


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Bibliography


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