

First Women at the Polls:
Examination of Women's Early Voting
Behaviour

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The London School of Economics and Political Science

Declaration

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I can confirm that parts of my thesis (Chapter 1 and 2) were copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Charlesworth Group.

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Abstract

My dissertation research provides first systematic analysis of women's early voting behavior. The key contribution of this thesis is that women's suffrage made a significant dent into electoral politics. Such finding provides a direct contradiction to the so frequent claim that women voted as their husbands for most of the twentieth century.

The thesis consists of three separate chapters, each addressing a distinct puzzle in the literature. In the first paper, I argue that, contrary to most of the extant literature, women contributed to the victory of the Republican Party in the 1920 election outside of the Black Belt. In the second paper, I argue that women in Protestant countries supported parties that appealed to their welfare and suffrage preferences in the first election after the vote was won. In the third paper, I argue that the redistributive effects of women's suffrage were mediated by women's support for parties with redistributive agendas.

The key argument of this thesis is that women tended to vote on their redistributive preferences. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that women supported conservative parties, I find robust evidence that women's suffrage mostly benefitted parties with redistributive agendas. While my research does not seek to challenge the notion that women held socially conservative preferences, it directly contradicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties. In the Catholic South, women's support for Christian Democratic parties most likely reflected women's preference for Christian Democratic type of the welfare state, which emphasized family values. In the Protestant North, women supported Socialist parties for their welfare preferences, particularly once they entered the workforce. But even at the time of suffrage, women were mainly attracted to parties on the left, responding to both their welfare and suffrage appeals to women.

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1 Introduction: Motivation for this Research and its Contribution

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and coming to fruition throughout the twentieth century, the introduction of women into the electorate was one of the most significant societal changes to occur over the past 150 years. Scholars as well as contemporary commentators and analysts have always wondered to what extent women's suffrage would affect politics. Would women vote? If so, would they vote as their husbands? Or would they vote on their religious, prohibitionists, moralist or progressive preferences?

In the research presented here, I seek to re-examine some of the conventional claims and wisdoms in the literature on women's voting behavior and its political implications. My research provides first systematic analysis of the effects of women's suffrage on partisan outcomes. I seek to examine whether women voted differently than men and if so, which parties women were more likely to support and to shed light on why women held distinct partisan choices.

The key argument of this thesis is that women voted differently from men both in the long-run and immediately after suffrage. Moreover, women tended to support parties with redistributive agendas. Such findings directly contradict the economic literature which claims that women's suffrage did not affect partisan outcomes. It also directly contradicts the political science literature which argues that women historically supported conservative parties.

The thesis consists of three separate chapters, each addressing a distinct puzzle in the literature. In the first paper, I argue that, contrary to most of the extant literature, women contributed to the victory of the Republican Party in the 1920 election outside of the Black Belt. In the second paper, I argue that women in Protestant countries supported parties that appealed to their welfare and suffrage preferences in the first election after the vote was won. In the third paper, I argue that the redistributive effects of women's suffrage were mediated by women's support for parties with redistributive agendas in the long-run.

This chapter consists of the following sections. Section II provides background information on the timing and causes of women's suffrage reforms. Section III summarizes the relevant literature on women's early voting behavior and identifies

key limitations of the extant literature and shows how I address these limitations in this dissertation research. In section IV, I discuss the methodological approach that underlines my research. In the final section, I summarize the findings of each chapter and highlight the key contributions of my research.

1.1 Background: The Quest for Women’s Suffrage

1.1.1 The Timeline of Female Suffrage Adoption in the West and the World.

The admission of women into the voting public was one of the most remarkable social and political transformations of the last century. While only three countries extended full voting rights to women prior to 1900, by 2000, in nearly every country where men could vote, so too could women. Figure 1 summarizes the adoption of women’s suffrage in 190 countries since 1820.¹ To the extent that female suffrage can be used as a primary indicator of democratization, the graph effectively captures the rise of democracy throughout the twentieth century. While men in many Western countries enjoyed some voting rights since the 1850s, women were formally excluded from political matters throughout most of the nineteenth century. The first country to extend full voting rights to women was New Zealand (1893), followed by Australia (1901) and Finland (1907). Interestingly, the Pitcairn Islands (1838), the Isle of Man (1881), and the Cook Islands (1893) enfranchised women prior to New Zealand.

Adopting women’s suffrage prior to the 1900, however, was well ahead of the time, so to speak. In most cases, women acquired the vote after World War One in the West and after World War Two in the rest of the world. Until 1950, only about half of countries enfranchised women on the same terms as men. The most significant rise in global female suffrage reforms occurred from about 1960s until 1980s, generally enfranchising women in new, decolonized democracies in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The last countries to adopt female suffrage at the federal/national level in the West were Switzerland (1971) and Portugal (1975).

¹Female suffrage is defined as a single piece of legislation which enfranchised most women in national (federal) elections. In the West, these reforms generally enfranchised about 90% of all adult women and 80% of the adult population, mostly leaving out women and men below restrictive voting age limits.

Outside the West, Oman (2003), United Arab Emirates (2006) and Saudi Arabia (2015) allowed women to the polls only in early 2000s.

Figure 1: The Adoption of Women's Suffrage in the World 1820-2015.




The focus of this dissertation is limited to Western countries, which enfranchised most women in the first half of the twentieth century. Most Western women were granted the right to vote following World War One (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and United States) and in few cases after World War Two (Belgium, France, Italy, Malta). Australia, New Zealand and Norway adopted universal female suffrage prior to World War One, while Spain and the UK granted women full voting rights in the interwar period. Countries which allowed women to the polls comparatively late were Greece (1956), Portugal (1975) and Switzerland (1971).

Figure 2 indicates the adoption of full female suffrage in 23 Western countries in comparison to universal male suffrage. Clearly, although male franchise reforms were adopted since the 1850s and generally included rich men before poor men, most women were enfranchised only after men in all Western countries. By 1900, only three countries extended voting rights to women, while men enjoyed full voting rights in about half of all Western countries. As such, women never obtained

full voting rights before men.² While male suffrage was generally adopted gradually from propertied men, taxpayers, literate or otherwise privileged men to all men, most Western women were enfranchised in one fell swoop. Only women in Iceland, Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom were enfranchised gradually and the franchise reforms therefore followed a similar pattern that was applied to men, initially disenfranchising poor and young women. In a similar vein, contrary to the fact that men in most federal states were enfranchised gradually by states and provinces, most federal states enfranchised most women in most states with a single piece of legislation.

Figure 2: The Adoption of Men's and Women's Suffrage in the West 1820-2015.



²Only Finland, Luxembourg and Malta granted female and full male suffrage at the same time, although considerable number of men with property voted in Luxembourg and Malta prior to these 'joint' adoptions.

1.1.2 Explaining the Timing of Women's Suffrage Adoption in the West

The Role of Women's Movement in Political Emancipation

The adoption of women's suffrage in the West did not happen so easily. While women in most countries did not obtain full voting rights until the twentieth century, the origin of women's quest for the vote frequently dates back to the 1850s. American women began organizing as early as 1848 at the first women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, while the House of Commons in the U.K. voted on female suffrage as early as 1832. More organized efforts in both countries began in the 1860s, with membership in national organizations and participation in rallies increasing significantly just before World War One (Pateman 1994, p. 332).

But the strength and efficacy of suffrage movements varied greatly between countries. The 'standard model' of suffrage marked by prolonged and often militant, highly organized campaign efforts, such as in the United Kingdom and United States, was not necessarily applicable to other countries. Perhaps surprisingly, the first countries which enfranchised women, such as New Zealand and Australia, did not experience the window breaking, mass rallies and hunger strikes as witnessed in the United Kingdom or United States (Nolan and Daley 1994, p.2). Indeed, the suffrage movement in countries such as Australia and New Zealand was effective after a relatively short period of rather peaceful campaigning. However, it should not be asserted that women's efforts were negligible or irrelevant for the vote in countries with moderate suffrage movements (Pateman 1994, p.332). Calls for suffrage in New Zealand, for example, can be traced as far back as 1869, with more pronounced calls after the establishment of the New Zealand branch of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1885.

Interestingly, the link between WCTU and the suffrage movement in New Zealand is no coincidence and played a significant role in the suffrage movement. The movement, originating in the U.S., successfully spread its 'gospel' to mostly British colonies, such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In these countries, the quest for female suffrage often emerged from women's movements for prohibition, social reforms and abolition. The WCTU established itself as an international

force in the temperance as well as women's movements. To the temperance women, suffrage was a necessary means to the abolition of the saloon and other social reforms that sought to ameliorate women's position in the home (Tyrrell 1991, p.9).

The Limits of Women's Agency in Political Emancipation

Despite the fact that women's efforts were clearly relevant for the adoption of female suffrage, scholars generally point to the limitations of women's agency in the quest for their political emancipation. Not surprisingly, the suffrage movement in many countries that enfranchised women comparatively late was often vigorous, such as in Switzerland (Nolan and Daly 1994, p.10; Banaszak 1996). Similarly, calls for women's suffrage in France were articulated as early as in 1789 and the first (and the last) mass rally for the cause occurred in 1914 (Offen 1994). It can hardly be asserted that women's efforts were sufficient to explain the timing of suffrage adoptions.

Scholars have thus always wondered which structural factors were relevant for the success of women's movements across the world. For a start, many noted that most of the early enfranchisers were colonial farming societies with a preponderance of men (Dalziel 1994; Braun and Kvasnicka 2013). For example, the opponents of female suffrage in France expressed strong fears that women voters would outnumber men due to significant casualties among men in the Great War (Offen 1994, p. 162).

But such accounts cannot explain why the proportion of women would play a significant role. Others have therefore pointed out that the timing of woman's suffrage in the societies which enfranchised women early is best explained by a political culture which is more perceptible to female suffrage. For example, McCammon et al (2001) asserts that 'frontier' states enfranchised women early for its unique 'gendered' opportunity structures, which altered attitudes of male policy-makers about the role of women in society.

Yet such 'gendered' opportunity structures that are more permissible to suffrage movement should not be limited to 'frontier' states with high sex ratio. Women were historically legally barred from owning property and forming contracts. They had circumscribed rights to divorce, access to education and faced a tremendous

disadvantage in market wages should they choose to work. Only with the rise of the ‘new woman’, who was educated, economically independent, politically active in women’s clubs and other organizations and entered a professional career of her own, could women’s suffrage movement succeed (McCammon et al 2001, DuBois 1975, Przeworski 2009).

Finally, the effect of the World Wars should not be underestimated. Women’s efforts in both wars were extensive and politicians often vigorously called for their assistance and help, from targeting women with wheat-saving measures, appealing to their caring responsibilities for wounded soldiers or encouraging them to assume work previously done by men in factories and farms. After the war, politicians were more amenable to women’s suffrage, considering their service on the home front (Saldin 2010, p.97; McCammon et al 2001). The change in President Wilson’s position on suffrage after World War One is attributed by some to his acknowledgement of women’s efforts during the war (Saldin 2010, p.80). At the same time, many speculated that women in countries such as France, U.K., the Netherlands and Belgium may have been enfranchised long before World War One, had the war not interrupted women’s quest for the vote (Offen 1994; Przeworski 2009).

The Strategic Incentives of Political Actors in Political Emancipation

While the women’s movement and the role of ‘gendered’ opportunity structures jointly explain large variation in the timing of suffrage adoptions, neither of the two explanations consider strategic incentives of politicians and political parties. Political economists studying the adoptions of male suffrage reforms have been long aware of the importance of strategic incentives of the elite in the democratization process (Acemoglu and Robinsons 2000; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Llavador and Oxoby 2005). If the elite possess the power over franchise, why would it ever decide to extend the vote and undermine its power? While the women’s movement never seriously threatened male politicians with revolutions or possessed power to overthrow current regimes, as it was in the case of male suffrage, women’s suffrage could only be adopted if male politicians agreed to it. It follows that, to the extent that politicians believed that women held distinct political preferences, they had an incentive to enfranchise women only when such reform would benefit them

(Bertochci 2011; Przeworski 2009).

Ample examples support the notion that politicians not only expected women to hold distinct preferences, but that they also believed that women would have acted upon them. In France, the republican radical senators blocked suffrage reforms three times during the interwar period, expressing deep fears that the newly enfranchised women would vote for a Catholic/right-wing ticket, undermining the secular republic (Offen 1994, p.160). In the United Kingdom, Liberal Lloyd George opposed women's suffrage bill in 1911, expressing fears that conservative women would 'spell disaster for Liberalism' (Blewett 1965). Interestingly, women's suffrage was not only opposed by liberal and radical politicians. For example, women in New Zealand were expected to support liberal, if not socialist candidates, leaving many conservatives opposing female suffrage in the fear of losing power (Grimshaw 2013).

But the strategic incentives for politicians did not end with suffrage adoption. Once women were granted the vote, politicians tried to 'pander' to women's preferences. For example, the adoption of the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, which aimed to reduce maternal and infant mortality in the U.S., is not only attributed to women's lobbying efforts, but also to politicians' fear that failure to act would be costly at an electoral level (Lemons 1973, p. 157; Skocpol 1992, pp. 497-506). It is therefore less surprising that voting in the U.S. Congress became more liberal/progressive once women became legitimate part of the electorate (Lott and Kenny 1999, Miller 2008).

1.2 Related Literature: Women's Historical Voting Behaviour

1.2.1 Does Suffrage Affect Partisan Outcomes?

Whether women's suffrage was adopted in response to the women's movement, gendered opportunity structures or strategic calculations of politicians, once women were given the vote, they rushed to the polls en masse. Surely not all women turned out in the first election, frequently voting at a lower rate than men, but their large numbers at the polls could hardly be ignored. To the extent that women

held distinct political preferences, the introduction of women into the electorate should alter the power constellation of parties in the parliament.

To what extent and how women's suffrage affected partisan outcomes, however, remains contested. While some scholars noted that women voted mostly as their husbands (Duverger 1955), others pointed out that politicians' expectations about women's voting behaviour were exaggerated and never fully materialised (Andersen 1996, p.153; Freeman 2002, p.2). Moreover, if parties followed 'Downsian' logic and strategically appealed to the new women voters, neither party would benefit from women's suffrage (Lott and Kenny 1999, Miller 2008). Instead, according to this logic, women's suffrage could affect partisan platforms, public policies and challenge men's monopolistic power in the public arena, but may not have affected electoral outcomes (Andersen 1996, p.3; Clark and Clark 2008, p.2; Duverger 1955; Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). Indeed, women's suffrage was followed by more liberal/progressive voting in the U.S. Congress (Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). In Europe, for example, both Socialist and Christian Democratic parties sought to attract women's votes with welfare appeals (Huber and Stephens 2000).

But if instead of a Downsian world, parties respond to the preferences of their electorate and rarely converge on the median (Grofman 2004), then partisan platforms differ from those of their competitors and women's suffrage would have the potential to alter power constellation of parties in national bodies. Ample evidence suggests that while most parties attempted to capture the votes of the newly enfranchised women, strategically altering their platforms, programmatic differences between parties were never completely eliminated. For a start, parties in the European multiparty systems frequently adopted very different ideas about the type of a welfare state and offered very distinct ideas about women's role in the society. Despite the fact that Socialists and Christian Democrats clearly offered better welfare platforms, each proposed very different ideas. Most Socialist parties attempted to attract women's votes with policies that relieved working women from their traditional caregiving responsibilities, such as state funded childcare while Christian Democratic parties frequently supported families with substantial tax, wage and benefit systems, incentivizing women to stay outside of paid employment (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000; Van Kersbergen 1991; Wilensky 1990). But partisan differences

were not unique to multiparty systems. Even in the two party systems, partisan platforms differed substantially on matters important to women. For example, the Republican Party was historically more supportive of prohibition, marginally more supportive of women's suffrage and appealed to women's progressive preferences after they have been enfranchised (Bagby 1960; Lemons 1973, p. 87), in each case better addressing women's preferences at the time.

This thesis relies on the assumption that while parties are strategic actors and attempt to alter their programmatic preferences to capture women's votes, systematic differences between political platforms were never completely erased. To the extent that women held distinct preferences, this dissertation argues that parties which better represented women's interest should benefit from the reforms.

1.2.2 Which Political Parties Benefitted from Women's Suffrage?

There are both theoretical and empirical reasons that support the key argument of this dissertation that male and female voters held distinct preferences for political parties, and that women's enfranchisement affected electoral outcomes. Examining the current political, historical, economic and sociological literature, I formulate three theses which stipulate women's voting behavior in history.

Traditional Voting Gap Thesis

The traditional voting gap thesis attributes conservative values to women, mainly stemming from their roles as mothers, homemakers, and churchgoers.³ These social roles, which gave women power in a 'separate sphere' from (male) public sphere, were often seen as enhancing women's moral superiority vis-a-vis men, and would have driven women to vote based on their moralistic or religious approach to sexuality and family (DuBois 1975; Goldstein 1973; Norris 1988; Randall 1981; Skocpol 1992; Tingsten 1937). In fact, the 'developmental theory of the gender gap' theorizes such 'conventional wisdoms.' Utilizing survey data from the 1950s, its authors argue that in the time of low female labor force and higher education attainment of women, women hold socially conservative values (Inglehart and

³Women's role as mothers and their right to vote as mothers has been frequently emphasized by the suffrage movement. For a cartoon example, see Appendix Figure 1.

Norris 2000).

This line of research often points to women's support for Catholic policies of Christian Democrats in the South, Conservative parties in the Protestant North and parties which supported temperance measures in the U.S. and the British colonies (Duverger 1955; Norris 1988; Randall 1987; Tingsten 1937; Tyrrell 1991). In the U.S., most contemporary explanations repeatedly stress women's prohibitionist and socially conservative preferences as a possible channel for women's Republican preferences (Tingsten 1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn and Goltra 1919). In Canada, the Liberals tended to oppose suffrage in some provinces, fearing that women would support prohibition.⁴ Similarly, in New Zealand, the commonly held perception after the first election under universal suffrage was that women were responsible for the election of the candidates that were more supportive of, among other issues, temperance (Grimshaw 2013).

In Europe, liberal politicians were often against female suffrage on the grounds that women suffrage would increase the conservative vote (Przeworski 2009). Moreover, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that Christian Democratic parties successfully captured women's votes in Catholic countries. Summarizing the limited polling data tallied separately by sex, Duverger (1955) and Tingsten (1937) finds that whenever there were substantial differences between male and female voting patterns, women tended to be more conservative than men. For example in Germany, Catholic Zentrum/CDU received 8-9% more votes from women in both 1920 and 1953 election, while the difference was 15-20% in the most Catholic districts. The post-war survey data in Italy and Belgium also documented a traditionally sex-distinctive base of Christian Democrats, often attracting as many as 20% more women, particularly in the most Catholic districts (Barnes 1974; Hill 1974; Van Kersbergen 1991).

Distributive Politics Thesis

However, the conventional wisdom that women held conservative preferences is not

⁴For example, Ontario's premier Arthur C. Hardy was frequently depicted in cartoons as prohibiting women to the polls given that his 'friends in the trade would not like it.' (Evening Telegram 13 January 1898; Canada), see Appendix Figure 2.

the only channel that can determine women's partisan preferences. In fact, many argue that women held progressive and welfare preferences throughout most of the twentieth century.⁵ Even within classes, women are generally more economically vulnerable than men. Under the fairest economic and legal conditions women are more likely than men to take time away from the labor market in order to bear and raise children, which decreases their lifetime earnings relative to men even when they have considerable labor market power. In the era of women's enfranchisement, the economic vulnerability of women was even more pronounced than it is today. Working women faced an even greater wage gap than exists today (Goldin 1994), and often did not have the right to keep their property when they entered marriage, or to determine the use of their wages (Skocpol 1992; Tilly and Scott 1987).

For these reasons, the suffragists frequently argued that women needed the vote to ameliorate their situation in the home and their communities, often calling for the state to intervene (Burrell 2000, p.6; Skocpol 1992; Tyrrell 1991). In the U.K., the National Union for Women's Suffrage sponsored pamphlets which frequently argued that women's suffrage was essential for improving the economic position of working women (Garner 1984; p.14).⁶ It was argued that without the vote, trade unions could not represent interests of the working women. In the first election where women were granted full voting rights, the U.K. Labour party called for women's votes 'for the sake of children'.⁷ In New Zealand, women's suffrage may have helped the Liberal Party, which was, among other things, more supportive of labor policies (Grimshaw 2013). In the U.S., the Progressive Party is said to have enjoyed substantial support among women, at least until its members rejoined the Republican camp (Goldstein 1973, p. 138; Gustafson 2001, p. 116). The progressive activism of the American women in the first half of the twentieth century has been placed by many at the heart of the Progressive era (Andersen 1996; pp. 153–159; Skocpol 1992, pp. 56, 354; Dye 1991, pp. 1-9). In Protestant Europe, many argued that the newly mobilized women gradually aligned with Socialist parties. In the absence of generous family policies that were common in

⁵See Appendix Figures 3 & 4 for cartoons in which women are attributed progressive preferences.

⁶See Appendix Figure 6.

⁷See Appendix Figure 5.

the Catholic countries, women needed to seek paid employment. Once employed, they developed positive attitudes towards better health, education and welfare services, as well as seek relief from their caregiving responsibilities from the state (Huber and Stephens 2000; Wilensky 1990).

In a similar vein, the political economists have long argued that women's economically vulnerable position leads them to support redistributive policies (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Lott and Kenny 1999). Indeed, vast amount of literature documents that the expansion of public budgets in the West was related to the adoption of women's suffrage (Aidt et al 2006; Bertocchi 2011; Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Lindert 1994; Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). According to this thesis, to the extent that parties adopted different programmatic positions on progressive and redistributive policies, women's enfranchisement should have translated into more support for parties with redistributive and progressive platforms. It follows that women may have aligned with parties with redistributive agendas long before the cultural and structural changes that brought women to the left in the 1980s (Inglehart and Norris 2000).

Electoral Co-Optation Thesis

There is, finally, a third possibility in which women's preferences are determined not by ex-ante economic or social allegiances, but by the very politics of franchise reform. Here, a wedge is driven between a strict left-versus-right hypothesis because female voters will display loyalty for the party that was in power when the reform was extended or that was historically seen as more supportive of women's suffrage.

In many countries, the final vote to enfranchise women often received broad-based support. For example, neither major party in the U.S. adopted suffrage on its platform until both did in 1916 (Banaszak 1996). Subsequently, both the Democratic and Republican parties attempted to use the 'suffrage' card to attract women's votes in the first election under universal suffrage (Andersen 1996).⁸ In

⁸The Progressive party, however, fiercely proposed women's suffrage long before both Democrats and Republicans adopted suffrage on their platforms. Appendix Figure 4 shows a cartoon which attributes women progressive platforms and, in turn, the Progressive party is

Canada, the conservative party in Ontario only enfranchised women once the Liberal Party made a promise to women, hoping to win thankful women's votes (Bacchi 1983, p.138). This suggests that as political tides shifted, strategic parties may have clamored to be seen as the party responsible for the extension, hoping to win women's votes as a show of loyalty.

But politician's effort to enfranchise women in order to play the 'suffrage' card in the following election may not have worked. For example, while the Conservatives passed the second reform act in Britain, which extended suffrage to some working-class men, hoping to bring the new 'thankful' voters into the conservative camp, neither party benefitted from the reform (Berlinski and Dewan 2010). In the case of women's suffrage, women may have remembered which party provided long term support for suffrage and reward such parties instead. For example, while the Republican Party showed a somewhat warmer reception to women's suffrage (Lemons 1973, p.87), the Nineteenth Amendment passed under a Democratic presidency. In Canada, while Liberals passed women's suffrage at the provincial level in seven out of nine provinces, it was the Conservative government which enfranchised women (Cleverdon 1950, p.15). Indeed, analyzing post-war survey data, Bashevkin (1983) argues that Canadian women socialized during the suffrage campaign supported parties which were associated with long-term support of parties with suffrage agendas.

1.2.3 Limitations of Existing Literature and Rationale for this Dissertation Project

This dissertation project seeks to contribute to the existing literature on several accounts. First and foremost, the time period when most women were enfranchised in the West is often neglected by political scientists. As most survey data is only available from the 1950s onwards, the existing evidence on women's historical behavior prior to the 1950s is scarce and mostly relies on anecdotal evidence or limited polling data which tallied votes separately by sex. As such, the only way to make quantitative inferences about women's voting behavior at the time of suffrage is with aggregate electoral data. The methodological challenges of such

willing to accept women into the electorate.

approaches often contribute to the limited attention of political scientist to the issue. In this project, I therefore seek to provide first systematic examination of women's early voting behavior. Such examination is relevant for three reasons.

First, examining women's voting behavior after suffrage allows me to connect women's voting behavior to the suffrage movement, answering questions unique to the relevant time period, such as to what extent women's suffrage movement made a dent into the established partisan politics? Failing to examine such questions, both immediately after the reforms and in the long-run, may misrepresent the mechanism responsible for the redistribution effects of suffrage. If public spending increased in response to women's suffrage, it is essential to determine whether such effects were mediated by parties with redistributive agendas. In this research, I therefore explore whether parties with redistributive agendas benefitted from the reforms.

Second, the lack of substantial evidential support for women's historical voting behavior often gives rise to multiple contradictions in the literature and leaves a number of questions unanswered. This dissertation project therefore seeks to resolve the apparent contradictions in the extant literature: did women vote for conservative or progressive parties? And if women supported parties with redistributive agendas, were such effects immediate or did they develop over time, conditional on factors such as the female labor force? Did the partisan position of women's suffrage matter to women? And if so, did women reward parties which passed the reforms or did they support parties which provided long-term support for suffrage?

Finally, while it is challenging to answer the question of 'why' women supported the parties that they did, the comparative character of this dissertation project makes an effort to do exactly that. Often, parties that supported suffrage were also parties which supported other issues that were relevant to women, making it empirically challenging to determine the extent women's loyalties mattered to their vote choice outside of a comparative context. For example, the newly enfranchised women in New Zealand might have supported the Liberal Party as an expression of their gratitude for suffrage or for liberal's support for prohibition or for liberals' economic agendas. Such a strong 'merging' of issues, however, was not the case in all countries. In a comparative context, it may therefore be possible to trace

whether women were more likely to support parties with redistributive, socially conservative or pro-suffrage agendas.

1.3 Data & Methodology: Estimating the Effects of Suffrage on Political Outcomes

To the extent that women held distinct preferences, women's suffrage should make a dent into partisan politics immediately after suffrage and such effects should persist over time. There are, however, reasons to believe that the effects of women's suffrage may have only emerged in the long-run. First of all, women may have developed redistributive preferences only once they entered the workforce. Alternatively, if women's turnout significantly lags behind that of men, women's suffrage might have made a significant dent in partisan politics only once a sufficient proportion of women were mobilized. Therefore, in this dissertation, I first explore the immediate effects of women's suffrage. I then explore the long-term effects of suffrage and whether they were conditional on other factors, such as women's labor force or women's turnout. To this end, I apply two methodological approaches.

1.3.1 Estimating Short-Term Effects of Female Suffrage

In the first two parts of this thesis, I seek to estimate an immediate effect of suffrage on partisan outcomes using several within-country case studies. Using a smaller sample of countries, this approach allows me to provide in-depth analysis of several cases to complement the more general findings from the cross-sectional analysis.

To this end, I apply a difference in difference method which exploits the variation in the intensity of suffrage reform across locales and estimates the effect of women's vote on partisan outcomes within countries. While female suffrage was generally adopted nationally, and mostly affected all of a country's electoral districts, because the proportion of women often varied geographically, some localities were affected by the reforms more than others.⁹ The idea behind this estimation

⁹This difference in difference method is now a well-established strategy used in uncovering the effects of suffrage on electoral, political and policy outcomes (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013).

strategy is that locales with higher suffrage exposure should witness a larger increase in support for specific parties. Simply put, if giving the vote to women mattered for electoral outcomes, the results should be more pronounced in locales with more women. While the proportion of women across locales generally does not vary much today, the sex ratio has varied significantly throughout history.

The immediate methodological advantage of this approach is that it allows me to derive more precise estimates of suffrage on partisan outcomes. The fixed effects strategy embedded in the difference in difference specification captures confounders which arise if the intensity of suffrage varies with district characteristics. In other words, this identification allows me to eliminate any concerns that my results are biased and inconsistent due to the fact that proportion of women varies with factors that also affect political outcomes. Moreover, by exploiting the variation in the strength of suffrage within one country where the reform was imposed on all geographical units by the government, I can eliminate any concerns that the treatment effects suffer from selection bias that threatens many attempts which exploit cross-country variation.

This identification strategy, however, raises two main threats to causal inference. First, district characteristics may be correlated with trends in partisan support. This would happen if, for example, parties that represented women's preferences were already gaining momentum in districts with more women. In tackling this possibility, I apply a series of placebo tests to examine pre-existing trends in localities with larger intensity of suffrage. Second, my results might be driven by men's rather than women's behavior. Previous research has shown that dominant groups might mobilize at higher levels to 'negate' the voting power of the newly enfranchised oppressed groups (Washington 2006). If men mobilized at higher levels in localities with higher proportion of women, my results would be driven by men's rather than women's voting behavior. In tackling this possibility, I use data from localities which tallied votes separately by sex, such as in Chicago and Norway, and show that men did not mobilize at higher levels in the localities with higher proportion of women.

1.3.2 Estimating Long-Term Effects of Female Suffrage

In the third part of the thesis, I exploit the rich spatial and temporal variation in the timing of women’s suffrage and apply a fixed effects model. Analyzing time-series cross-sectional data of sixteen countries from 1890 to 1975, I provide descriptive estimates of the long-term effect of women’s suffrage on the support of parties with redistributive agendas.

Given the wide availability of electoral data at the national level, this approach allows me to include almost all Western democracies and make general cross-country comparisons in the long-run. The immediate methodological advantage of this approach is that the fixed effects strategy allows me to remove unobserved country effects that are constant over time and unobserved common shocks to partisan support in all countries. To the extent that the timing of women’s suffrage was exogenous to partisan support, this specification approximates a natural experiment that seeks to estimate a causal relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes. If, on the other hand, the adoption of suffrage reforms was not exogenous, this specification could return biased and inconsistent estimates. For example, if the decision to extend franchise was more likely in countries where support for certain parties grew more rapidly, it would be impossible to estimate causal relationship with certainty. In the case of women’s suffrage in the West, these concerns may be of lesser impact, as most reforms were adopted after the shock of the World Wars.

1.4 Organization and Summary Findings

This dissertation project is organized into three separate papers. In this section, I summarize the aims, contributions and limitations of each paper.

In the opening paper, titled ‘*Votes for and by Women: How Did Women Vote after the Nineteenth Amendment?*’, I estimate the immediate effect of women suffrage in the case of the United States. While the general narrative in the early twentieth century associated women with the Republican Party, the idea that women voted as a block prior to the 1950s has been frequently dismissed. Scholars frequently called the reform a ‘failure,’ pointing to its subtle presumed effects on partisan politics or low voter turnout among women.

In this paper, I provide the first systematic evidence for the contemporary narrative that the Nineteenth Amendment affected partisan outcomes. Specifically, I show that counties with more women witnessed a larger increase in Republican support. However, I also find that this effect is conditional on the proportion of blacks in the county, with counties in the Black Belt showing no effect. Much of Southern politics revolved around racial issues, with Southern Democrats upholding white supremacy by disenfranchising most of the black population. I argue that in counties with high black population, the cost of any Republican gains and the threat to white supremacy was at its highest. Contrary to the rest of the country, white Southern women in the Black Belt were incentivized to defend white supremacy.

While this research provides first systematic evidence for the contemporary narratives which linked women to the Republican Party and Democrats in the South, this research cannot answer the question of why most women voted for the Republican Party. The Republican Party at the time of the reforms made progressive appeals to women, and had a historically warmer reception towards women, particularly with respect to prohibition and suffrage. It is therefore difficult to adjudicate between the three theses using the case of the U.S.

In the second paper, titled *'After the Vote: Programmatic Preferences and Loyalty'*, and co-authored with Dawn Teele, I therefore attempt to differentiate between the various theses which stipulate women's voting behavior after suffrage. By extending the scope of this analysis to additional countries such as Norway, United Kingdom and Canada, we can better address the reasons behind women's partisan preferences. In contrast to the U.S. case, particular political parties in these countries either represented women's religious or otherwise socially conservative preferences or better addressed women's welfare preferences.

In this paper, we argue that women in the three Protestant Western countries supported parties with redistributive agendas immediately after suffrage. It follows that such effects were not necessarily conditional on women's labor force or women's voter turnout. In each case, parties which made welfare appeals to women effectively captured women's votes. In contrast, parties with conservative agendas never benefitted from the reforms. We also find that parties with redistributive agendas were often pioneers of women's suffrage and may have therefore benefit-

ted from votes of ‘thankful’ women. Contrary to the previous accounts, however, parties which were in power when women were enfranchised never benefitted from suffrage.

In the third and final paper, titled *‘Universal Suffrage and the Electoral Support for Parties with Redistributive Agenda: Evidence from Sixteen Countries’*, I examine the long-term effects of suffrage on partisan support. While ample empirical evidence documents the link between suffrage and redistribution for both male and female reforms, the channels of such effects are less clear. In this paper, I show that parties with redistributive agendas benefitted from the reforms and may have thus been responsible for the redistributive effects of women’s suffrage. Which redistributive parties benefitted from suffrage, however, depends on Catholicism and female labor force. In Catholic countries, Socialist support was reduced in favor of the Christian Democrats, particularly when the proportion of women in the paid workforce was low. I argue that, conveniently for women, family-friendly policies of the Christian Democrats attracted not only women’s welfare preferences, but also their socially conservative and religious preferences. In Protestant countries, however, female suffrage boosted Socialist support, particularly when the female labor force was at its highest. In this case, I argue that in the absence of Christian Democratic parties, women had to choose between their welfare and socially conservative, religious preferences, favoring the former whenever enough women entered paid employment.

1.4.1 Broader Contribution of This Research

My dissertation research provides the first systematic analysis of women’s early voting behavior. The key contribution of this thesis is that women’s suffrage made a significant dent into electoral politics. Such finding provide a direct contradiction to the so frequent claim that women voted as their husbands for most of the twentieth century. Moreover, it contradicts the economic literature which argues that women’s suffrage increased redistribution, but did not affect the power constellation of parties in the national bodies. Instead, this dissertation provides evidence that women’s votes mattered and that not all parties benefitted equally from the reforms.

The key argument of this thesis is that not only did women vote differently from men, but that they tended to vote on their redistributive preferences. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that women supported conservative parties, I find robust evidence that women's suffrage mostly benefitted parties with redistributive agendas. My research does not seek to challenge the notion that women held socially conservative preferences. History provides ample evidence for the importance of women as mothers and wives, women's religious and moral values and women's emphasis on family and care for children. My research, however, directly contradicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties. In the Catholic South, women's support for Christian Democratic parties most likely reflected women's preference for Christian Democratic type of the welfare state, which emphasized family values. In the Protestant North, women supported Socialist parties for their welfare preferences, particularly once they entered the workforce. But even at the time of suffrage, women were mainly attracted to parties on the left, responding to both their welfare and suffrage appeals to women.

2 Votes for and by Women: How Did Women Vote after the Nineteenth Amendment?

Abstract

While scholars always wondered to what extent women's votes contributed to the Republican landslide in the 1920 election, the existing evidence is mixed. This paper exploits variation in the proportion of women across counties and employs a difference in difference strategy to examine how women voted in the 1920 Congressional elections. It shows that counties with more women witnessed a larger increase in Republican strength. This effect is conditional on the proportion of blacks in the county, with counties in the Black Belt showing no effect. These findings provide supportive evidence for the contemporary narratives that women historically supported the Republican Party, while Southern women helped to maintain white dominance in the region. The paper runs a series of placebo regressions and shows that the partisan effect of female suffrage is not driven by pre-existing trends correlated with the proportion of women.

‘Women oppose prohibition, are in favour of education (presumably because of their love of children), vote morally (referring in a vague way to their attitude toward prostitution) and voted for Wilson rather than Hughes (because the West voted for Wilson, and in the West women vote).’ (*Ogburn and Goltra, 1919*)

2.1 Introduction and Overview

On August 18, 1920 Tennessee ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, which guaranteed voting rights to all women in all states and in all elections in the process. It was the last state necessary for the ratification process to be complete. In the elections on November 2, 1920, women in most states voted for the first time to Congress. The election ended in an historical landslide for the Republican Party and produced larger swings in the electorate than the 1896 contest. The war allowed the pro-business Warren G. Harding to unite the progressive and pro-business factions in the Republican Party in the face of resentment towards the Democratic incumbency. While most attribute the Democrats downfall to a public call for change after the war (Bagby 1962, pp.1922, 150, 157; Hicks 1960, pp.245; Kleppner 1987, pp.144154; Saldin 2010, pp.927), scholars have always wondered to what extent the Nineteenth Amendment may have contributed to the Republican victory in 1920.

The general narrative in the early twentieth century associated women with the Republican Party. Contemporary politicians, commentators and analysts expected women to vote Republican or reported anecdotal evidence that women registered as Republicans (Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Tingsten 1937; Willey and Rice 1924). Polling data recorded by sex showed that women in Illinois were more supportive of Harding than Cox (Goldstein 1973). While survey data documented a substantial gender voting gap after World War Two (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004; Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2000), the idea that women voted as a block prior to the 1950s has been frequently dismissed. This is mostly on the grounds that women voted as their husbands did, that sex was not as divisive as religion or class, that the observed differences rarely exceeded few percentage points and that partisan platforms did not differ much on matters that were important for women (Alpern and Baum 1985; Clart and Clark 2008, p.2;

Duverger 1955, p.122; Freeman 2002, p.2; Manza and Brooks 1998; Skocpol 1992, pp.505-6).

However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that, historically, women supported the Republican Party more than men. The developmental thesis argues that women historically supported conservative parties, changing their values only with long-term cultural and structural changes in the last quarter of the twentieth century (Inglehart and Norris 2000). In particular, women's religiosity, morality and traditional role at the heart of the family may have been responsible for their historical alliance to the Republican Party (Tingsten 1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Randall 1987; Norris 1988). Women were also overwhelmingly supportive of dry policies (Tingsten 1937); the link between religion, morality and prohibition never really evaporated (Kleppner 1987, pp.205-7). Some even speculated that Cox's 'wet' reputation might have contributed to women voting Republican in the 1920 elections (Bagby 1960, p.151).

Women's socially conservative preferences, however, might not be the only channel that can explain their Republican tendencies. Some scholars argue that women valued progressive policies long before their realignment to the Democratic Party in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that the expansion of public budgets in the U.S. has been significantly aided by the adoption of female suffrage (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Miller 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999). In the 1920 election, Harding's pro-business orientation could hardly be considered progressive, yet the former progressives stayed with the Party and Harding's broad social programs would surely have impressed most progressive women (Bagby 1962, p.149; Freeman 2002, p.24; Gustafson 2001, p.191; Lemons 1973, pp.87-9).

Neither the developmental theory nor the economic thesis consider the specific context of the South. Much of Southern politics revolved around racial issues, with Southern Democrats upholding white supremacy by disenfranchising most of the black population (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000, pp.303-368; Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178). While white women in the South supported white supremacy, (Schuyler 2006, pp.185-187; Sims 1997, p.189), Democratic politicians in the region were afraid that women would not support their partisan machines. Republican candidates, in turn, saw women's votes as a great oppor-

tunity (Schuyler 2006, pp.8596). Indeed, the Republican Party made significant gains in the region in the 1920 election, although changes in the Black Belt, which stretched from Eastern Texas to Virginia and Maryland, were minimal. In counties with high black population, the cost of any Republican gains and the threat to white supremacy was at its highest. Contrary to the rest of the country, white Southern women in the Black Belt were incentivized to defend white supremacy.

Quantitative analyses of women's historical voting behavior are scarce. Moreover, the existing analyses of the 1920 election generally focus on presidential elections and exclude most, if not all, Southern states (Alpern and Baum 1985; Corder and Wolbrecht 2011). It follows that no study has, as yet, systematically examined electoral data from all states affected by the Nineteenth Amendment in Congressional elections. This is important as the Republican Party made significant gains throughout the newly enfranchised states, while the changes were minimal in the Black Belt. Moreover, women were generally assumed to have weaker partisan loyalties, which may have allowed them to split their tickets between presidential and congressional candidates (Goldstein 1973, pp.76, 134-138, Schuyler 2006, p.85).

In this paper I provide evidence for the contemporary narrative that associated women with the Republican Party. Moreover, I find that the national pro-Republican trend among women was reversed in the Black Belt, where women supported Democratic candidates as much as white men. These findings are compatible with the explanation that women aligned with the party that best represented their preferences, whether it be supremacist preferences in the Black Belt or progressive and prohibitionist tendencies in the rest of the newly enfranchised states. Women in most parts of the country voted distinctly from men and, as such, contributed to the Republican landslide in the 1920 election.

Empirically, I estimate women's voting behavior by analyzing the U.S. House elections in the states where women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920. In a time before large-scale and reliable survey data, the aggregate electoral data offer the only possibility to examine how women voted in the 1920 elections. It is necessary to isolate the effect of suffrage from other possible confounding factors. For example, if suffrage is adopted in localities which also exhibit socio-economic characteristics that determine partisan outcomes, it is difficult to confidently link

partisan outcomes to the reforms. My estimation strategy goes a long way towards tackling this issue. I exploit a variation in the strength of suffrage within a single country where the reform was imposed on all states by a federal Amendment. In particular, I compare counties which received a higher ‘dosage’ of treatment to those with a lower treatment exposure. To this end, I exploit the variation in the proportion of eligible women across all counties in the sample of the newly enfranchised states. The idea is that counties with more women were more exposed to the treatment; therefore, they should have seen a larger increase in Republican support. This strategy thus allows me to eliminate any concerns that the treatment effects suffer from the selection bias that often halts cross-sectional studies. The idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage in examining its effects on political outcomes was first applied by Berlinski and Dewan (2011). This technique is now frequently used to estimate the effects of suffrage on both political and economic outcomes (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013).

This empirical strategy, however, could still return biased and inconsistent estimates if Republican support was trending differently in counties with different treatment exposures, for example, if there were more eligible women in 1920 in counties which also witnessed faster growth in Republican support. To tackle this possibility I employ two strategies. First, I included a number of socio-economic controls at their pre-suffrage levels, their change over the five years prior to suffrage and district specific shocks. Second, I ran a series of placebo tests confirming the validity of the parallel trend assumption prior to the enfranchisement. This means that counties with more eligible women in 1920 did not witness any trend in partisan outcomes prior to the reform. As part of robustness checks, I provide evidence that the effect was not driven by registration and other restrictive requirements such as poll taxes and literacy tests. Finally, analyzing electoral data from Chicago where authorities kept polling records by sex, I provide supportive evidence that the effect was not driven by higher mobilization of either Republican men or Republican women.

2.2 Background: The 1920 Election

At the turn of the century, partisan support displayed significant regional patterns. The Democratic Party controlled the South by disenfranchising most of the black population using both restrictive, formal and informal measures, effectively diminishing political competition and voter turnout in most of the region (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000, pp.303-368; Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178). The Republican Party, in turn, enjoyed a lead above 20% in around one-third of counties outside the South (Kleppner 1987, pp.34-42). This alignment generally produced a moderate Republican majority at the national level (Sundquist 1973, p.166). After a period of Democratic upheaval under President Wilson, the Republican Party regained some control by the 1918 election, achieving full control in the 1920 elections (Kleppner 1987, p.141). The scale of the Republican victory in 1920, however, exceeded contemporary expectations (Bagby 1962, p.158). The elections produced larger swings in the electorate than the realignment of 1896 (Saldin 2010, p.83). The Republican Party increased its share of the vote in the presidential elections by approximately 14%, capturing the presidency, gaining sixty-three seats in the House and eleven in the Senate. Even the solid Democratic control of the South was challenged by Republican gains in the region, particularly in the Upper South.

The landslide of the Republican Party victory in 1920 is attributed by many to a public call for change after the war (Hicks 1960, pp.245; Kleppner 1987, pp.144-154; Saldin 2010, pp.92-7). The war allowed the pro-business Warren G. Harding to unite the Republicans in the face of general resentment of the Democratic incumbency. Wilson's engagement in the war, together with his unsuccessful campaign for the League of Nations, extensive war-time regulatory measures and the poor post-war economy became too unpopular with the public (Bagby 1962, pp.19-22, 150, 157; Kleppner 1987, pp.144-154; Saldin 2010, pp.92-7). The apparent antipathy to Wilson's administration forced Cox to distance himself from his predecessor, whilst defending Wilson's international efforts. He never recaptured the votes of German, Italian and Irish Americans and women that Wilson's administration alienated during the war (Bagby 1962, pp.141-146, 152-155).

The issues that were relevant in the 1920 election, however, went beyond dis-

agreements over Wilson's administration. The two main parties differed on several issues that were thought to be relevant to the new women voters. For a start, although the war shifted both parties to the right and marked an end to the Progressive Era (Bagby 1962, pp.161-167, Gould 2001, p.80), neither party could entirely ignore the progressive movement. While Harding's nomination meant a victory for the pro-business wing over the progressives in the Republican Party, former progressives stayed with the party. The differences between the two presidential candidates were not large enough to warrant them supporting Cox, it was the Southern fraction of the Democratic Party, seen as the main reactionary force, that needed to be checked. Cox, while slightly less conservative, was thus a candidate of both the South and the reactionaries (Bagby 1962, pp.146-150). Moreover, Harding successfully appeased the urban progressive wing in the Republican Party and women with broad social programs (Lemons 1973, pp.87-9; Gustafson 2001, p.191; Bagby 1962, p.149).

Second, the anti-slavery legacy of the Republican Party attracted black voters, particularly in the face of Cox's blatant racism and the segregationist faction of his party. The Republicans worked hard to register newly enfranchised black women in Border States and once again relied on their votes in the North (Bagby 1962, p.152). Third, although the old associations between prohibition and the Republicans became less divisive by 1920, it never completely evaporated (Kleppner 1987, pp.205-207). Some even speculated that Cox's 'wet' reputation and Harding's calculated 'dry' appeal to women might have contributed to women voting Republican in the 1920 elections (Bagby 1960, p. 151).

The anti-slavery and prohibition movements partially gave rise to the suffrage movement (Freeman 2002, p.42; Kleppner 1987, p.172; Saldin 2010, p.79). Of the two major parties, the Republican Party was considered marginally more supportive of female suffrage and more favorable to women; most early suffragists were publicly supporting the Republican Party (Banaszak 1996, pp.110-112; Freeman 2002, p.24; Gustafson 2001, p.194). The Nineteenth Amendment was passed in a Republican Congress; a vast majority of the ratifying states were Republican controlled (Lemons 1973, p.87). The fiercest opposition, in turn, came from the Southern Democrats (Banaszak 1996, pp.110-112; Freeman 2002, p.50; Schuyler 2006, p.26). Both Democrats and Republicans, however, failed to show serious

efforts to enfranchise women before the war (Andersen 1996, p.77), only lobbying for their support before the 1920 election (Bagby 1962, p.152; Gustafson 2001, p.194; Lemons 1973, p.87). Some even interpreted Wilson's turn from a reluctant to vehement supporter of suffrage as a strategic calculation to capture women's votes (Link 1954, p.60; Lunardi and Knock 1980).

2.3 Related Literature and Contribution

Scholars have always wondered to what extent women contributed to the victory of the Republican Party in 1920. Ample historical evidence shows that contemporary politicians, commentators and analysts associated women with the Republican Party. The newspapers frequently expected women to align with the Republicans and reported anecdotal evidence that women voted or registered as Republicans.¹ For example, just after the 1920 election, the *New York Times* headline claimed 'Mrs. Livermore attributes half of the Republican Majority to Women's Efforts', quoting the head of the Women's Republican Committee of New York State. The earliest studies often concluded that the early women voters leaned to the Republican Party (Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Tingsten 1937; Willey and Rice 1924). Most importantly, polling data recorded by sex in the 1920 election show that women in Illinois were more supportive of Harding over Cox (Goldstein 1973). The Republican gender gap emerged in 95% of all counties in Illinois in the 1920 election, half of which exceeded a gap of 4%.

This contemporary narrative that associated women with the Republican Party, however, was later questioned by many commentators and scholars. Immediately after suffrage, many called the reform a 'failure,' mainly pointing to its subtle effects on partisan politics or low voter turnout among women (Andersen 1996, p.2; Freeman 2002, p.170; Lemons 1973, pp.110-112). This skepticism persists today. The idea that women voted as a block in the 1920 election is frequently dismissed (Andersen 1996, p.153; Bagby 1962; p.160; Clark and Clark 2008, p.2; Freeman 2002, p.2; Kleppner 1987, p.178; Manza and Brooks 1998; Skocpol 1992, pp.505-506). This skepticism generally relies on common perceptions such as women

¹*Chicago Tribune* September 12, 1920; *New York Times* October 10, 1920; *New York Times* November 3, 1920 *Minneapolis Morning Tribune* September 14, 1920 (see Corder and Wollbrecht 2011; Alpern and Baum 1985).

voted like their husbands, that sex was not as divisive as religion or class, that the observed differences rarely exceeded few percentage points and that partisan platforms did not differ much on matters that were important for women. While this skepticism captures important aspects of the historical context, quantitative analyses of women's voting behavior in the 1920 election are scarce. This is not surprising given the fact that the most commonly used techniques, such as large-scale surveys, were hard to find or mostly unreliable throughout the interwar period.² As such, the only way to make quantitative inferences about women's voting behavior in the 1920 election is with aggregate electoral data. The methodological challenges of such approaches then often only add to the skepticism.

Two studies attempted to answer the question of how women voted in the 1920 election and both provide mixed evidence. Alpern and Baum (1985) analyze sixteen Northern states and show that while women in the Mid-Atlantic states supported Harding at a higher rate than men, these trends were reversed in the Midwest and New England. Here, not only did Harding's victory not rely on women's votes, but women even aligned with the Democrats. Overall, they conclude that while women's votes did not copy those of men, Harding's victory at the national level could not be attributed to women.

The most recent analysis applying a Bayesian approach to ecological inference also provides mixed evidence (Corder and Wolbrecht 2011). The authors found that women were more likely to support Harding in most of the ten states they studied, while women in Virginia were more likely to support Democrats. However, they report that these differences were rarely statistically different from zero and conclude that, as a whole, women's votes did not significantly contribute to the Republican landslide in 1920.

While both of these studies provide comprehensive analyses of electoral data, two points should be made. First, both studies focus on a selected number of states with most, if not all, of the Southern states, particularly the area of the Black Belt, being excluded from the analysis. This is important as the Republican Party made significant gains in the region, particularly in the Upper South. Second, both studies analyze presidential elections only. This is important as split-ticketing may

²For example, Gallup was founded only in 1935 and did not start collecting election data before 1936.

have been more pronounced among new voters and this is generally attributed to women's weaker partisan attachments (Andersen 1996, p.100; Goldstein 1973, p.76, 134-138, Schuyler 2006, p.85). In sum, no study has yet systematically examined electoral data from all states affected by the Nineteenth Amendment in Congressional elections. The aim of this study is to analyze a larger, new data set.

2.3.1 Theoretical Explanations for Women's Partisan Tendencies

Along with contemporary anecdotal evidence, there are theoretical reasons that link women to the Republican Party. The developmental thesis of the gender gap argues that in the absence of the more recent structural and cultural trends which affected women's values, women aligned with conservative parties (Inglehart and Norris 2000). While this theory aims to explain women's voting behavior after World War Two, it is plausible that its argument extends to the first half of the twentieth century. Most contemporary explanations repeatedly stress women's social conservatism as a possible channel for their Republican tendencies (Tingsten 1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Randall 1987; Norris 1988). American women at the turn of the twentieth century tended to be more religious than men, overwhelmingly supported temperance and maintained strong moral authority both at home and in their communities (Goldstein 1973, p.168-175; Skocpol 1992, pp.323-328; Tyrrell 1991; US Census Bureau 1926, pp.14-19). In the 1920 election, Harding and the Republican Party were, on the whole, more supportive of 'dry' policies; the link between religion, morality and prohibition never really evaporated (Bagby 1960, p.151; Kleppner 1987, pp.205-207).

However, the conventional wisdom that women held conservative preferences is not the only explanation for their political inclinations. Many argue that women, in fact, held progressive and welfare preferences throughout the twentieth century. Scholars have long emphasized women's economic vulnerability as a predictor of their redistributive preference (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Lott and Kenny 1999), while the expansion of public budgets in the West probably would not have been possible in the absence of female suffrage (Caruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Lindert 1994; Miller 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999). In the U.S., the progressive activism of women in the first half of the twentieth

century has been at the heart of the Progressive era (Andersen 1996; pp.153-159; Skocpol 1992, pp.56, 354; Dye 1991, pp.1-9). For example, the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, which aimed to reduce maternal and infant mortality, is not only attributed to women's lobbying efforts, but also to politicians' fear that failure to act would be costly at an electoral level (Lemons 1973, p.157; Skocpol 1992, pp.497-506). Not surprisingly, the Progressive Party enjoyed substantial support among women, at least until its members re-joined the Republican camp (Goldstein 1973, p.138; Gustafson 2001, p.116). In the 1920 election, Harding's pro-business orientation could hardly be considered progressive, yet former Progressives stayed with the party. Harding's social programs attempted to attract women, most of whom were on the progressive wing of the Party (Bagby 1962, p.149; Freeman 2002, p.24; Gustafson 2001, p.191; Lemons 1973, pp.87-9). To the extent that the Republican Party better addressed women's progressive preferences in the 1920 election, the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment should have produced a Republican shift.

Neither the developmental theory nor the economic thesis, however, consider the specific context of the South. Much of Southern politics revolved around racial issues, with Southern Democrats controlling the region by disenfranchising most of the black population (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000, pp.303-368; Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178). Fearing that women's suffrage might bring the downfall of white supremacy, Southern Democrats fiercely opposed it (Banaszak 1996, p.111; Sims pp.178-180). Indeed, the Nineteenth Amendment was rejected by eight states, all of which were in the South. How Southern white women voted in the 1920 election, however, is still contested. Some argue that white women helped to uphold white supremacy (Sims 1997, p.189). In fact, no organization of Southern white women challenged Jim Crow in the 1920s (Schuyler 2006, pp.185-187). Others suggest that the suffrage benefited the Republican candidates (Schuyler 2006, pp.97-101). Democratic politicians were afraid that women would benefit the Independents or that they would split their votes. Republican candidates, in turn, were often ready to court white women's votes by supporting racial hierarchy in the region (Schuyler 2006, pp.85-96).

While woman's suffrage did not lead to a Republican landslide in the South, the Party made significant gains in the 1920 election. But the South was not a monolith, nor was Republican success uniform throughout the region. The party

had significantly increased its strength in the Upper South, while changes in the Deep South were minimal. The area of the Black Belt, in particular, remained in the strong control of the Democratic Party. The Black Belt was historically heavily reliant on agriculture, signified by a large proportion of the black population. In precisely these areas, the cost of any Republican gains and the threat to white supremacy was at its highest. It follows that white women in the Black Belt might defend white supremacy and vote Democrat, together with white men. White women in other Southern areas might have perceived Republican gains as less threatening and supported the Republican candidates as much as their Northern counterparts.


2.4 Data

The empirical analysis is based on a dataset that covers all counties without boundary changes before and after the Nineteenth Amendment in all states affected by the reform.³ The electoral returns were gathered from the United States Historical Election Returns, 1824-1968 (ICPR 00001). The socio-economic indicators are from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States 1790-2002 (ICPSR 02896). Figure 1 shows a map of states included in the sample. As most states in the West gave women full voting rights prior to the Nineteenth Amendment, the sample consists mostly of states in the Northeast, Midwest and the South. The sample excludes two Southern States, Mississippi and Georgia, which defied the Nineteenth Amendment by failing to update the registration deadline for newly enfranchised women (Andersen 1996, p.50; Schuyler 2006, p.72). The sample also includes three states, Oklahoma, Michigan and South Dakota, which gave women full voting rights before the Nineteenth Amendment, but where women voted for the first time to Congress only in the 1920 election.⁴

³Absentee votes, soldier votes and at-large seats were excluded from the analysis. Only about 1.6% of counties changed boundaries between 1920 and 1918 and about 2.9% between 1918 and 1916.

⁴The inclusion of these states does not alter the substantive results, as shown in the Appendix.

Figure 1: States Where Women Voted to Congress for the First Time in 1920.




Note: States where women voted for the first time in Congressional elections in 1920 are light grey. Dark grey depicts states which were affected by the Nineteenth Amendment, but defied it in the 1920 election.

2.5 Descriptive Statistics

2.5.1 Republican and Democratic Vote Shares 1918-1920

Figure 2 displays the change in support for Republican and Democratic candidates between the 1918 and 1920 elections to the House of Representatives. In all states, public support for the Republican Party rose from 46.4% to 53.9%, increasing its share of the vote by about 7.6%. Support for Democratic candidates dropped by 5.7%. Since women in some states had already voted to Congress in the 1918 elections, we can compare trends in the sample states where women voted for the first time to the House in 1920 to states where women had already voted in 1918 (that is, in states excluded from the sample). As we would expect, while the Republican Party increased its support by nearly 12% in the sample states, it lost 6% in the states where women had already voted to Congress in 1918.

Figure 2: Change in Republican and Democratic Support Between 1918 and 1920 Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, by Sub-Samples.



Notes: ‘Total’ includes all states. ‘Sample’ refers to states in the main sample where women voted to Congress for the first time in 1920. ‘Early’ includes all states which adopted full female suffrage before the Nineteenth Amendment and where women voted to Congress in the 1918 elections.


However, these results do not consider candidates who ran under several party labels, such as ‘Republican and Prohibition’ in New York State. Most of these ran alongside candidates from the main Republican Party and therefore rarely attracted large number of voters. However, some of these candidates in the West and New York State ran unopposed by the main party and received considerable support. If such coalitions were included, the difference between the ‘sample’ and ‘early’ samples for the Republican Party would be significantly reduced: the Republicans would have gained 6.9% in the early sample. At the same time, even if such coalitions of the main and third parties were considered as support for the Republican Party, the increase in support would remain higher in the treated

sample.

2.5.2 Key Independent Variable: Female Vote

In order to estimate the effect of female suffrage on partisan outcomes, I exploit the variation in the proportion of women across counties. My key independent variable, the female vote, thus refers to the proportion of eligible women of voting age at the county level (see Figure 3). The proportion of adult women across counties in the sample varies significantly, with 90% of all observations between 44.2% and 51.8%. There are counties with as few as 22.7% of women and some with as many as 56.3%. The average female vote across all newly enfranchised counties is 48.6%; the median is slightly to the right of the mean (48.9%).


Figure 3: Distribution of the Female Vote in All Counties Included in the Sample.



The proportion of women across counties, however, is not exogenously assigned. Those with a larger proportion of women of voting age can differ systematically from counties with a lower proportion of women. Indeed, in my sample, more women were in counties with higher population density, manufacturing output, crop value and membership in the largest denominations (see correlates of the

female vote in the Appendix). This is not surprising, as more remote areas have been known to show higher sex ratios, often reflecting immigrants attraction for male-dominated industries, such as mining and railroad construction (Hobbs and Stoops 2000, pp.6263). Moreover, in the 1920s, there were five women church members for every four men. The Methodists, in particular, had about two women for every man (US Census Bureau 1926, pp.1419). If the county characteristics that vary systematically with the proportion of women were also correlated with vote choice, a model that regresses partisan support on the proportion of women would return biased and inconsistent estimates. In this paper, I therefore regress change in partisan support before and after the election on the proportion of women (effectively change in the proportion of the newly enfranchised) thus controlling for fixed-county characteristics that could confound the true relationship.

Figure 4: The Black Belt in the South in 1920.



Notes: Dark areas represent counties with a black population higher than 38.6%, that is, the 90th percentile of black distribution in the sample.


2.5.3 Plotting the Change in Partisan Vote Shares on Female Vote

Figure 4 depicts the Black Belt in the South, defined as counties with a higher proportion of black population than the 90th percentile of the black distribution in the sample. This cut-off point represents 38.6%. All counties with a higher proportion of adult black population are in the South. Figure 5 plots the change in the Republican vote share on the female vote. Since the effect of suffrage should be conditional on the proportion of blacks in the South, the fitted line (with 95% confidence intervals) is shown for Southern black counties. All other counties are shown separately. Figure 5 reveals a positive correlation between the change in the Republican vote share and the female vote in white counties, while there is a negative correlation in the counties of the Black Belt. This pattern reverses for the Democratic vote share, as shown in the appendix. While the figure should be interpreted with caution as it does not control for district and county-level characteristics, it provides correlational evidence that women voted for the Republicans in mostly white areas.

2.6 Empirical Strategy: Difference in Difference

To uncover the causal relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes, it is necessary to isolate the effect of suffrage from possible confounding factors. For example, if suffrage is adopted in localities which also exhibit socio-economic characteristics that determine partisan outcomes, it is difficult to confidently link partisan outcomes to the reforms. Moreover, the extension of women's rights was a calculated move by politicians in power who always considered its likely impact (Braun and Kvasnicka 2013; Geddes and Lueck 2002; Przeworski 2009). As such, studies that exploit variation in the adoption of female suffrage across states or countries inevitably suffer from possible selection bias. My estimation strategy goes a long way in tackling this issue. I exploit a variation in the strength of suffrage within one country where the reform was imposed on all counties by a federal amendment. I compare counties who received higher 'dosage' of treatment to counties with lower treatment exposure. To this end, I exploit the variation in the proportion of eligible women across all counties in the sample. The idea is that counties with more women were more exposed to the treatment and therefore

Figure 5: Plotting Change in the Republican Support (1920-1918) on the Female Vote by 90th Percentile Black.



Notes: The grey dots and fitted line correspond to white counties. The black dots and fitted line represents trends in the Black Belt.

should see a larger increase in Republican support. This strategy thus allows me to eliminate any concerns that the treatment effects suffer from selection bias that halts cross-sectional studies.

Using the sample of all counties where women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920, I estimate the following difference in difference specification:

$$\Delta Y_{i1920-1918} = \alpha + \beta FemaleVote_{i1920} + \Delta \epsilon_{i1920-1918} \quad (1)$$

where ΔY refers to a change in the partisan (Republican or Democratic) support between the first election after the enfranchisement in 1920 and the last election before the enfranchisement in 1918 in county i . *Female Vote* refers to the proportion of eligible women in 1920. This variable effectively captures a *change* in the proportion of newly enfranchised that were exposed to the treatment, which

goes from 0 in 1918 to a proportion of eligible women in 1920. All regressions include a constant which accounts for a trend across all enfranchised counties or a coefficient on a single 1920 year dummy in a typical difference in difference setting (Wooldridge 2010). Further, given that $T=2$, equation (1) is equivalent to a fixed effects strategy with county and year dummies. One advantage of this approach is that unobserved fixed county characteristics that could confound the true relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes are accounted for.

However, the estimates could still be biased and inconsistent if Republican support was trending differently in counties with different treatment exposure. In other words, if county characteristics were correlated with trends in partisan support, the estimates might be spurious. This would occur if there were more eligible women in 1920 in counties which also witnessed faster growth in Republican support driven, for example, by black migration from the South to the North. In tackling this possibility I employ two strategies. First, I include a number of socio-economic variables at their pre-suffrage levels, their change over five years prior to suffrage and district specific shocks. The controls consist of population density, value of all crops, total manufacturing output and proportion of adult blacks, illiterates and main religious affiliations. Including the change in these control variables addresses some concerns that the effect of interest might be driven by trends such as migration from South to North. Second, I regress the change in partisan outcomes between the 1918 and 1916 elections on the proportion of eligible women in 1920. I show that these placebo tests confirm the validity of the parallel trend assumption prior to the enfranchisement. This means that counties with more eligible women in 1920 did not witness any trend in partisan outcomes prior to the reform.

The idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage in examining its effects on political outcomes was first applied by Berlinski and Dewan (2011) and is now a frequently used technique in estimating the effects of suffrage on both political and economic outcomes (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013). Contrary to some of the studies that estimate the effect of suffrage on partisan outcomes, however, this study poses an additional advantage. Since women were enfranchised in one fell swoop, the ‘dosage’ of suffrage across counties cannot be manipulated by the government. For example, Berlinski

and Dewan (2011) exploit the fact that male suffrage was gradually extended to men of a certain income. However, precisely because the income level was set by the government, it could be manipulated by the authorities in order to minimize (or enhance) its effect. In this study, the Nineteenth Amendment did not grant votes to some women in a county and therefore did not allow the authorities to manipulate its impact. This strategy thus eliminates any concerns that the treatment is endogenously assigned

2.7 Results: Measuring the Effects of Female Suffrage on Partisan Support

As shown in Figure 2, the pro-Republican shift was most profound in states where women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920. In this section I address whether this pro-Republican shift was caused by female suffrage. In particular, I examine whether the Republicans increased their support more in counties which were most affected by the reform. Table 1 reports baseline results for the effect of the female vote on the change in Republican and Democratic vote shares respectively. The first column shows baseline estimates without any controls. The second column adds controls fixed at the 1919 levels and differenced over the period from 1914-1919. The third column includes district fixed effects and controls fixed at 1919 levels. The fourth column includes all controls and district fixed effects.

Models 1 to 4 show consistently negative coefficients for the Democratic candidates and positive coefficients for the Republican candidates. However, the size of the estimates responds strongly to the addition of controls and district shocks. After adding all controls and district fixed effects, Model 4 estimates that the Republicans gained 0.276% of votes for every 1% increase in the proportion of women, while the Democrats lost 0.361%. Both effects are significant at the 5% level.

However, the specific context of the South might have altered women's preferences, particularly in the areas of the Black Belt. In order to test whether the effect of female suffrage is conditional on the level of threat to white supremacy, I split the sample by the 90th percentile of the black distribution. The 90th percentile corresponds to 38.6% of blacks in a county and all counties with a higher proportion of

Table 1: The Effect of Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and Democratic Candidates 1920-1918

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>				
Female vote (%)	1.072***	1.074***	0.149	0.276**
	(0.155)	(0.224)	(0.127)	(0.13)
 <i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>				
Female vote (%)	-0.423	-0.962***	-0.236	-0.361**
	(0.165)	(0.245)	(0.144)	(0.141)
District FEs	x	x	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	x	Yes	x	Yes
Obs.	2240	2073	2013	1997

Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

blacks are located in the South. The results are reported in Table 2. Once counties of the Black Belt are excluded from the sample, the estimates in the white sample become slightly larger. In the Black Belt counties, however, suffrage increased Democratic vote share. These estimates are not significant at conventional levels. The results are, therefore, compatible with the explanation that while women in all regions preferred the Republican candidates, white women in the Black Belt supported the Democratic candidates as much as white men, if not more so.

The main results are robust to the number of different specifications, as shown in the Appendix. First, splitting the sample with alternative cut-off points does not change the results in the white counties (Table 1 in the Appendix). As the cut-off point decreases, the black counties include more Northern counties with a substantial proportion of enfranchised blacks. As a result, the positive estimate

for the Democratic candidates slowly disappears with decreasing cut-off points. Second, Table 2 in the Appendix shows that including counties with boundary changes does not change the main results. Third, Table 3 in the Appendix shows that the main results are robust to the exclusion of three states which approved female suffrage in the legislatively referred referendum in 1918, but where women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920.

Table 2: The Effect of the Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and Democratic candidates 1920-1918, by 90th Percentile Black.

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>								
Female vote (%)	-0.737***	-0.603	-0.329	-0.505	1.3***	1.428***	0.248*	0.414***
	(0.271)	(0.408)	(0.307)	(0.324)	(0.174)	(0.242)	(0.132)	(0.146)
<i>Model</i>	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
<i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>								
Female vote (%)	1.028***	0.332	0.159	0.323	-0.308*	-1.31***	-0.417***	-0.506***
	(0.359)	(0.438)	(0.299)	(0.325)	(0.184)	(0.265)	(0.143)	(0.158)
District FEs	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes
Obs.	224	214	215	214	2016	1859	1798	1783
Sample	Black	Black	Black	Black	White	White	White	White

Notes: See notes in Table 1. ‘White’ corresponds to counties with less than 39% of blacks (90th percentile of black distribution), ‘Black’ refers to counties with more than 39% of blacks.

2.8 Robustness Checks

2.8.1 Placebo Tests

The difference in difference estimation strategy allows to control for county characteristics correlated with the proportion of women. However, the estimates may still be driven by pre-existing trends in the outcome variable. For example, the support for Republican candidates could have been growing faster in counties with a large proportion of women. Such a violation in the parallel trend assumption can be tested by regressing the change in partisan support between the 1918 and 1916 elections on female vote. Table 3 reports the estimates. Once all controls are included, none of the placebo regressions return large and significant estimates. This only occurs in models that do not control for district fixed effects. Republican support has, therefore, been trending differently prior to the reform, but any such trends were removed with the addition of district fixed effects.

Table 3: The Effect of the Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and Democratic Candidates 1918–1916 (Placebo Regressions)

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1918-1916</i>												
Female vote (%)	-0.935***	-0.361	-0.081	-0.141	0.283	-0.585	0.141	0.146	-0.922***	-0.552*	-0.071	-0.148
	(0.163)	(0.266)	(0.131)	(0.165)	(0.331)	(0.502)	(0.33)	(0.363)	(0.182)	(0.292)	(0.159)	(0.195)
<i>b) Dem. votes 1918-1916</i>												
Female vote (%)	-0.051	0.324	-0.1	-0.098	-0.408	0.607	-0.152	-0.126	-0.1	0.519*	-0.144	-0.123
	(0.141)	(0.263)	(0.132)	(0.162)	(0.389)	(0.555)	(0.331)	(0.359)	(0.158)	(0.288)	(0.156)	(0.187)
District FEs	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes
Sample	All	All	All	All	Black	Black	Black	Black	White	White	White	White
Obs.	2174	2027	1968	1953	212	207	208	207	1962	1820	1760	1728

Notes: See notes for Table 1.

2.8.2 Restricting the Pool of Eligible Voters with Registration, Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests

At the turn of the century, most states restricted the pool of eligible voters by registration, poll taxes and literacy tests (Carlson 1976; Harris 1929; Keyssar 2000). These restrictions could drive the pro-Republican effect in white counties. If, for example, areas with more women also had the most stringent restrictions, the estimates from the difference in difference strategy might be biased and inconsistent, particularly if the restrictions affected mainly poorer and Democratic segments of the society. Moreover, any type of legal restrictions affected women more than men (Anderson 1996, p.51; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Wilkerson-Freeman 2002). Unfortunately, the number of registered voters by county is not systematically available for the relevant period. I have, therefore, run a number of models in various sub-samples by the severity of restrictions. Table 3 splits the white sample by severity of registration restrictions, literacy tests and poll taxes and replicates the results. Since the estimates are comparable across the sub-samples, it is suggestive that the main result in white counties is not driven by variation in restrictions to eligible pool of voters.

Table 4: Restricting the Pool of Eligible Votes with Registration, Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests in White Counties

	No/Low reg.	High reg.	Lit. test	No lit. test	Poll tax	No poll tax
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>						
Female vote (%)	0.554**	0.444**	0.847**	0.339**	0.545*	0.246*
	(0.254)	(0.196)	(0.427)	(0.155)	(0.296)	(0.148)
<i>Model</i>	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>						
Female vote (%)	-0.522**	-0.609***	-0.758*	-0.472***	-0.811**	-0.208
	(0.257)	(0.213)	(.428)	(0.171)	(0.323)	(0.154)
District FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	White	White	White	White	White	White
Obs.	658	1125	314	1469	550	1233

Notes: See notes for Table 1.

2.8.3 Alternative Explanations Examined with Data from Chicago

The most severe concern of my identification strategy is that the national pro-Republican effect might be driven by increased mobilization of men in response to female suffrage. If men mobilized at higher levels in counties with more women, the partisan effect of suffrage would rely on the voting behavior of men rather than women. In this section, I therefore exploit data from Chicago, where the authorities kept polling records separated by sex in the early twentieth century. The first two columns in Table 5 show that there is indeed a positive correlation between the proportion of women and the registration levels of men in both the 1914 and 1916 elections. Men registered at higher levels in wards with more women. There is no effect on men's turnout levels. However, none of these regressions control for third factors. In the last two columns in Table 5, I therefore regress the change in men's registration and turnout levels between the 1914-1916 and 1911 elections on the proportion of women. While women voted in the 1914 and 1916 elections, they did not have the vote until 1911. This identification strategy, as in the main study, thus controls for fixed county characteristics correlated with the proportion of women. If men mobilized more in wards with more women, we should find a positive effect. Yet the models in Table 5 return much smaller coefficients which are not even close to conventional levels of statistical significance. At least in Chicago, it seems that men did not turnout or register at higher levels in localities with a higher proportion of women.

Another concern of my identification strategy is that the pro-Republican effect of female suffrage might be a result of higher mobilization of Republican women. Indeed, scholars argue that Republican women were better organized (Bagby 1962, p.152; Freeman 2002, p.24). I again exploit the data from Chicago where authorities kept polling records separated by sex. Indeed, women were more supportive of Republican candidates in wards where they registered and voted at higher rates (see the first two panels in Table 6). However, none of these models controls for third factors. Socio-economic characteristics at the ward level may both increase women's support for Republican candidates and their electoral participation. I therefore regress the change in the Republican vote share among women between the 1920 and 1916 elections on the change in registration and turnout rates among

Table 5: The Effect of the Proportion of Women in Chicago on Male Registration and Turnout

<i>Dep. variable:</i>	<i>Male registr.</i>	<i>Male registr.</i>	<i>Male registr.</i>	<i>Male registr.</i>
	<i>1914</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1914-1911</i>	<i>1916-1911</i>
Female (%)	1.609***	1.72***	0.029	0.124
	(0.446)	(0.557)	(0.329)	(0.288)
Obs.	35	35	34	34

<i>Dep. variable:</i>	<i>Male turnout</i>	<i>Male turnout</i>	<i>Male turnout</i>	<i>Male turnout</i>
	<i>1914</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1914-1911</i>	<i>1916-1911</i>
Female (%)	0.235	-0.178	0.027	-0.305
	(0.308)	(0.398)	(0.244)	(0.392)
Obs.	35	35	34	34

Notes: Data sourced from Goldstein (1973) and US Census Bureau. Data for registration rates utilizes 1911 municipal elections, 1914 school elections and 1916 presidential elections. Data for voter turnout utilizes 1911 municipal elections, 1914 and 1916 general elections; All regressions include a constant; Voter turnout is defined as a proportion of voters among registered; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

women between 1920 and 1916. Once fixed ward characteristics hold constant, the positive effect disappears (see last panel in Table 6). At least in Chicago, areas where women mobilized at higher levels in the 1920 rather than the 1916 election were not areas where the Republican Party made larger gains.

2.9 Final Remarks

In this paper I show that the newly enfranchised women supported Republican candidates more often than men and as such contributed to the Republican landslide in the 1920 election. In the Southern Black Belt, newly enfranchised white women voted for Democratic candidates as much as white men. This paper thus provides evidence for long-held narratives that associated women with the Republican Party and white Southern women with white supremacy in the region. Contrary to existing research, women's partisan preferences were different from

Table 6: The Effect of Women’s Registration and Turnout on Women’s Vote Choice in Chicago

<i>Dep. variable:</i>	<i>Republican vote 1916 (%)</i>	
Registration 1916 (%)	0.709***	
	(0.126)	
Turnout 1916 (%)		0.633
		(0.424)
Obs.	35	35
<i>Dep. variable:</i>	<i>Republican vote 1920 (%)</i>	
Registration 1920 (%)	0.674***	
	(0.165)	
Turnout 1920 (%)		0.666***
		(0.234)
Obs.	35	35
<i>Dep. variable:</i>	<i>Republican vote 1920-1916 (%)</i>	
Registration 1920-1916 (%)	0.114	
	(0.251)	
Turnout 1920-1916 (%)		-0.058
		(0.155)
Obs.	35	35

Notes: Data are sourced from Goldstein (1973). Data for fall registration rates 1916 and 1920 and presidential electoral returns in 1916 and 1920; All regressions include a constant; Voter turnout is defined as a proportion of voters among registered; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

those of men and had the power to affect the constellation of parties in Congress. While a number of earlier studies addressed the question of how women voted in the early twentieth century, the results have been mixed. Moreover, all studies so far have examined presidential elections in either a single town, state or a group of selected states, excluding most Southern states. It follows that this is the first study that systematically examines women’s voting behavior in all newly

enfranchised states. Future work may try to examine the variation in women's Republican tendencies across states and in additional elections. It may also attempt to further examine whether the developmental or the economic thesis can better explain women's Republican tendencies.

3 After the Vote: Programmatic Preferences and Women's Loyalty

Abstract

Did expanding the electoral franchise to women make a dent in electoral politics? In this paper we examine three hypotheses that link women's political preferences to electoral outcomes: first is the 'traditional' voting gap thesis that claims that women historically supported conservative parties. The second 'distributive politics' thesis argues that because women's economic position was historically insecure, women prefer higher taxation and larger safety nets, and therefore support parties with redistributive programs. Finally, there is an 'electoral co-optation' argument that female voters were loyal to the party that secured their political emancipation. Exploiting variation in the proportion of women across locales for four suffrage reforms in Protestant countries, we use a difference-in-difference strategy to adjudicate between these theories. Because the 'treatment effect' of women's enfranchisement is higher in constituencies with a higher proportion of women, our approach can provide insight into the causal effect of women's enfranchisement on electoral outcomes. Our findings do not support the traditional voting gap theory or the argument that women rewarded their enfranchisers independent of programmatic concerns. Instead, women's enfranchisement bolstered support for parties with redistributive agendas that often provided long-term support for women's suffrage.

‘[Women’s enfranchisement] ‘spells a disaster for Liberalism [it would] add hundreds of thousands of votes throughout the country to the strength of the Tory Party.’ (*Lloyd George of the United Kingdom, 1911*)

‘[Extending the vote to women] ‘will double the majority against us and make the country more communistic than it is already.’ (*G.G. Stead of New Zealand, 1911*)

3.1 Introduction

The admission of women into the voting public was one of the most remarkable social and political transformations of the last century. While only three countries extended full national voting rights to women prior to 1900, by 2000, in nearly every country where men could vote, so too could women.¹ The roots of feminist mobilization are often traced to women’s involvement in the abolition movement in the middle of the nineteenth century, and the quest for the vote itself often emerged from female-driven movements for sanitation, educational reform, property rights, labor protection, and temperance. As the quotes by Lloyd George and G.G. Stead of New Zealand indicate, even before women gained voting rights, male actors were concerned with trying to understand which parties women would support and which public policies they would demand. To the extent that feminist demands for particular public policies were linked to the programmatic commitments of individual parties, bringing women into the electorate should have influenced the policies pursued by political parties that subsequently courted women’s votes, as well as the distribution of political power within national legislatures.

Although the effect of women’s enfranchisement on policy outcomes has been widely studied, the influence of franchise extension on partisan performance after the vote was won has not received much scholarly attention.² Among the few exceptions is a case study of the United States, which suggests that American

¹The early enfranchisers include the Isle of Man, 1881; Cook Islands, 1893, while still a British protectorate; New Zealand 1893; and several territories and states on the United States’ western frontier.

²On the policy effects of women’s enfranchisement see Harvey (1996), Lott and Kenny (1999), Miller (2008), Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Bertocchi (2010).

women mostly supported the Republican Party after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Morgan-Collins 2016),³ and early studies by Duverger (1955) and Tingsten (1937), which relied on only a handful of localities that used separate ballots to tally male and female votes prior to 1960, which argues that when women differed from men, their commitments were generally more conservative. Limited by both geographical scope and temporal reach, previous investigations have hardly settled the question of women’s political behavior after the vote was won.

In this paper we argue that the introduction of women’s suffrage had significant and hitherto unknown consequences for party politics. Using unique sub-national datasets for several countries – in this draft three protestant countries (U.K., Canada, and Norway) – we examine three competing theses that link women’s political preferences to electoral outcomes: first is the ‘traditional’ voting gap thesis that claims that women historically supported conservative parties. Second, is an ‘electoral co-optation’ argument that female voters were loyal to the party that secured their political emancipation. Finally, the ‘distributive politics’ thesis argues that because women’s economic position was historically vulnerable, women preferred higher taxation and larger safety nets, and therefore supported parties with redistributive programs.

We show that neither the electoral co-optation thesis nor the traditional voting gap thesis fully explain women’s preferences in Protestant countries. In neither country women supported a party with a conservative agenda. Parties that presided over suffrage reform for women also did not benefit from the reforms. The impact of women’s enfranchisement did not help the Conservative party in Canada, the Tories in the United Kingdom or the Liberals in Norway. Instead, in the United Kingdom and Canada, the Liberal Party benefitted from the reforms and in Nor-

³Another exception is a cross-sectional study which examines long-term effects of the adoption of suffrage on partisan outcomes (Morgan-Collins 2015). This study shows that while suffrage increased the support for Socialist parties in the Protestant North, Christian Democratic parties benefitted from the reforms in the Catholic South. As Christian Democratic parties catered to both women’s conservative and redistributive preferences, it is argued that, in the absence of such parties, women voted along with their economic needs over their conservative values. However, as women’s support for socialists have only evolved over time (Huber and Stephens 2000), it remains unclear whether women supported parties with redistributive agendas immediately after suffrage. To this end, a comparative study that seeks to unravel causal relationship between suffrage and partisan support immediately after suffrage is essential.

way, a higher share of women in a given locality increased the vote shares of the Labour Party. Our findings, which cut against the traditional voting gap theory, indicate that women's enfranchisement have led to a leftward swing in political power. Where women stayed loyal to a party, it was a party which showed long-term support for women's suffrage rather than the immediate enfranchisers.

In order to analyze the impact of women's enfranchisement on partisanship, we exploit the fact that the effects of a national-level reform were not necessarily homogenous throughout a given country. Because franchise reform would have increased the size of the electorate to a greater extent in places with a lower male to female ratio than in places with a higher ratio, the change in size of the eligible electorate with the addition of women depended on the mix of genders across locales. For example, mining towns or areas where oil is extracted typically have higher ratios of men to women than areas with large manufacturing or service-based industries. The uneven geographical distribution of women can therefore serve as a measure of the intensity of franchise reform in electoral constituencies. Under several assumptions, and when placed in a difference-in-difference framework, variation in the intensity of the reform can be used to estimate the causal impact of women's enfranchisement on partisan outcomes.

The rest of the paper is organized in the typical way. The next section outlines the theoretical reasons why women may have influenced partisan outcomes, and documents the empirical findings that bolster these arguments. The third section describes our empirical approach including selection of the cases that fall inside the relevant scope of this investigation, and the identification strategy that we use to estimate the impact of women's enfranchisement on partisan outcomes. After that, we present the data and summary statistics, followed by results. We present results separately for each country in our analysis so that we can provide background context for the pertinent reforms and describe the relevant context-specific control variables used in each country's analysis. A very brief conclusion closes the paper.

3.2 Why Women’s Enfranchisement May Have Mattered For Political Power

Prominent scholars of democratization, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) have claimed that women’s enfranchisement had no substantive political effects but in fact, many studies have shown that women’s enfranchisement produced dramatic changes in the size and nature of social spending.⁴ Similarly, scholars often argued that, by and large, women voted along with their husbands (Duverger 1955) or that the expected effects of women’s suffrage never really materialized (Andersen 1996). Nevertheless, while the fiscal effects of women’s political inclusion has been well studied, the influence of franchise extension on partisan performance after the vote was won, especially outside of the United States, has not received much scholarly attention.⁵

There are several theoretical reasons to believe that male and female voters held distinct preferences for political parties, and that women’s enfranchisement should have influenced electoral outcomes. The theoretical reasons why introducing women to the electorate will not automatically double the votes for each party have to do with women’s distinctive position in economic and social hierarchies. Especially before the twentieth century, women were often legally barred from owning property, forming contracts, or taking jobs without the consent of their husbands. For these reasons, women of all backgrounds might have preferred family-centered policies or overall larger governments and safety nets. This could militate towards support for conservative or leftist parties.⁶

⁴Acemoglu and Robinson (2000: 1186) claim in particular that women’s enfranchisement did not matter for redistribution, an argument that is contradicted by much of the recent literature. For example, Miller (2008) finds immediate changes in public health expenditures after state-level women’s enfranchisement in the United States. He then links the fiscal flows to major reductions in childhood mortality that emerged relatively shortly after women won the vote. Studying welfare state expenditures in Western Europe from 1869 to 1960, Aidt and Dallal (2008) find that in the period immediately following women’s enfranchisement, public spending as a fraction of GDP rose by one percent, with long-term effects estimated as being between three to eight times larger. Finally, in Switzerland, Abrams and Settle (1999) show a 28 percent increase in the public budget after it enfranchised women in the 1970s.

⁵For women’s voting behaviour in the United States see Corder and Wolbrecht (2006, 2011) and Morgan-Collins (2016)

⁶On the empirical side there is ample documentation of gender-based voting gap in advanced industrialized countries after World War II, which may also have existed before polling became commonplace. For example, in the 1970s, women in Italy, Germany, Britain, Belgium, France and

To the extent that women's distinct political preferences were translated into partisan preferences, we should expect the newly enfranchised women to vote differently than men. Our review of the existing historical, economic and political literature leads us to formulate three competing theses that link women's votes to specific partisan outcomes.

3.2.1 Distributive Politics Thesis

Using economic class as the most important signal of political preferences, political economy accounts of franchise extension generally assume that if poorer voters are enfranchised by a given reform, the reform will benefit the Left. The arguments are iterative, with parties supporting reform based on their expectations about the preferences of the newly enfranchised voters. In several accounts, left-leaning parties support enfranchisement because the working classes are ideologically biased towards the left (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico 2004). On the other hand, if the rural economy is large compared to the industrial economy, landowners may believe that rural workers may be loyal to their cause, and hence will support franchise extension as a way to increase the political power of land over capital (Llavador and Oxoby 2005).

Applying this class-based logic to the partisan effects of women's enfranchisement leads to a prediction that introducing women into the electorate should generally produce a leftward shift in partisanship. Even within classes women are generally more economically vulnerable than men. Under the fairest economic and legal conditions women are more likely than men to take time away from the labor market in order to bear and raise children, which decreases their lifetime earnings relative to men even when they have considerable labor market power. In the era of women's enfranchisement, the economic vulnerability of women was even more pronounced than it is today. To the extent that women participated at all in formal

the Netherlands evinced stronger preferences than men for right-leaning parties, while women in the United States were somewhat more likely to vote for the Left (Inglehart and Norris, 2000: 443). The left-preference of American women has grown considerably since the 1970s, although recent research shows that this trend is more pronounced for college educated women (Gillion et al. 2014). In the 1990s, women were more left-wing in nearly all of the advanced industrial economies save for Britain, France, Australia, Finland, and Spain (Inglehart and Norris, 2000: 449).

economic labor markets, they faced an even greater wage gap than exists today (Goldin 1994); and often did not have the right to keep their property when they entered in marriage; or to determine the use of their wages once earned (Skocpol 1992; Tilly and Scott 1987). The former suggests that women as a whole would have had rational economic reasons to prefer higher levels of redistribution than men, and that women's enfranchisement may have translated into more support for left-leaning parties with redistributive platforms.

H1: Women's vulnerable economic status leads to preferences for left-leaning parties with redistributive agendas. On average, women's enfranchisement should increase support for the left.

3.2.2 Traditional Voting Gap Thesis

Moving away from a purely economic logic of voting, the traditional voting gap thesis attributes conservative values to women stemming from their roles as mothers, homemakers, and churchgoers. These social roles, which gave women power in a 'separate sphere' from the male public sphere, were seen as enhancing women's moral superiority vis--vis men (Skocpol 1992), and would have driven them to vote on issues of social and moral purity, such as for prohibition or against prostitution (Goldstein 1973; Norris 1988; Randall 1981; Tingsten 1937).⁷

According to the 'developmental' history of the gender voting gap, it is only after the long-term structural and cultural trends which affected women's and men's life, such as increased higher education attainment and paid employment of women, that women changed their conservative values and supported parties on the left (Inglehart and Norris 2000). Before the second wave of feminist mobilization, that is, in the era in which many women around the world won the vote, women would have supported conservative parties (Norris 1988; Randall 1987). Summarizing the

⁷However it is important to emphasize that while temperance may have been an important issue in the United States and some of the British colonies, it was not an important issue in most suffrage movements, including the United Kingdom. Moreover, which party picked up the temperance issue varied across countries. While the Republican and Conservative Parties showed somewhat warmer reception to prohibition in the U.S. and Canada, the political right in Norway and New Zealand fiercely opposed such measures as a state intervention of the free market. Such differences generally stemmed from the fact that the temperance movements were both expressions of moral and social gospels as well as progressive demands that sought to ameliorate women's position in the home.

limited polling data available for the Netherlands, Norway, France and Germany in the 1940s and 1950s, Duverger (1955) finds that there are differences between male and female voting patterns, with women tending to be more conservative than men overall. At the same time, the conservative gender gap in Protestant countries often does not exceed few percentage points and relies solely on women's support for Christian Democratic parties in Catholic countries.

H2: Because women have historically more traditional values, bringing them into the electorate should lead to increased support for conservative parties.

3.2.3 Electoral Co-Optation

Women's support for parties with redistributive or conservative agendas, however, might not necessarily mean that women's votes reflected their left or right-leaning political values. It is possible that women instead rewarded parties for their efforts to enfranchise them. In many countries, the final vote to enfranchise women often received broad-based support. For example, neither major party in the U.S. adopted suffrage on its platform until both did in 1916 (Banaszak 1996). Subsequently, both the Democratic and Republican parties attempted to use the 'suffrage' card to attract women's votes in the first election under universal suffrage (Andersen 1996). In Canada, the Conservative Party in Ontario only enfranchised women once the Liberals made a promise to women, hoping to win thankful women's votes (Bacchi 1983, p.138). This suggests that as political tides shifted, strategic parties may have clamored to be seen as the party responsible for the extension, hoping to win women's votes as a show of loyalty.

In fact, Przeworski (2009) argues that political parties support women's suffrage only if they expect to benefit from the reforms. In a similar vein, Teele (2014) shows that one reason why the U.K.'s Labour party took women's enfranchisement on its platform was in the hopes of converting women to their party. In the words of Henry Noel Brailsford, a Labour party activist and British journalist, 'I believe that in the course of a fighting alliance [between Labour and the suffragists] much of them would end by becoming decided and permanent adherents of the Labour party.'⁸ Once such strategic incentives are taken into account,

⁸Writing to Arthur Henderson, who later became the first Labor leader to have a posi-

women should support parties which enfranchised them. To the extent that loyalty dominated women's minds in the first elections following their inclusion, women's suffrage should not have a uniform effect on partisanship.

H3: Women will be loyal to the party that enfranchised them, so adding women to the electorate will increase support for the party that was in power when the reform passed.

3.3 Empirical Approach

We are interested in understanding the electoral consequences of women's enfranchisement within countries. We first describe the criteria used to determine which countries are included in the dataset, and then describe our identification strategy.

3.3.1 Case Selection

We used four criteria to determine which countries should be included in our study: first, a country had to pass a single piece of legislation, mostly enfranchising women at the national level; second, this country had to be a democracy before and after the reform, with a relatively stable party system across the relevant time period; third, the reform must not be concurrent with other major electoral reforms, such as changes to the male franchise laws or during a year in which boundaries of local units were revised; finally, we must be able to locate electoral returns for electoral units smaller than the national level. These criteria are further illuminated in the Appendix with reference to a few concrete examples. The appendix provides, for 152 countries, a summary of whether the country is apt for inclusion in this study. In this version we present results for 4 Protestant countries – Norway, U.K. and Canada.

tion in the cabinet, in May 1912. Letter housed in the Labour History Archive, Manchester, U.K.:LP/WOM/12/14/6-May-2012. Many suffragists also believed that their ties to any given party were fragile: as Lady Selbourn put it, the Conservative Tories were likely to get a shock by seeing her name on a petition alongside the socialist Charlotte Despard, but that is because the parties took for granted the fact that women's votes would go the way of their class: 'Unless these people [the party leaders] can be made to understand that party ties are fragile under the stress of delay, they will not act.'

3.3.2 Identification Strategy

To examine whether electoral outcomes are causally related to women’s suffrage, our identification strategy attempts to isolate the effect of suffrage from its potential confounders by exploiting variation in the intensity of suffrage reform across locales. Although the female suffrage was generally adopted nationally, and mostly affected all of a country’s electoral districts, because the proportion of women varied geographically, some localities were affected by the reforms more than others. Thus, while traditional studies of the effect of franchise extension use temporal and spatial variation in suffrage adoption at the national- or state-level, our approach exploits the fact that reforms will have heterogeneous effects within cases depending on the ratios of men to women in different electoral constituencies.

Variation in the proportion of women across electoral units can be used to estimate causal effect of women’s enfranchisement on partisanship using a difference-in-difference approach. Specifically, we regress the change in partisan support before and after suffrage reforms on a continuous measure of the intensity of suffrage reform. This method is now a well-established strategy used in uncovering the effects of suffrage on electoral, political, and policy outcomes, particularly for reforms that affected the male franchise (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Morgan-Collins 2016; Vernby 2013). To summarize, the idea behind the estimation strategy is simple: if women historically voted differently than men, locales where the reform was more intense – because the female population was relatively large compared to other locales – should witness a larger changes in partisan support than locales with fewer women.

At first glance we might think that women are always and only 50 percent of the population, but while it is generally true on average, it is not necessarily true for every constituency – think of New York City and Denver (‘Menver’), which have higher ratios of women to men today. These differences in sex ratios also varied significantly throughout history. For example, in the U.S., patterns of migration and economic employment opportunities in the frontier states determined sex ratios (Braun and Kvasnicka 2013). In some frontier towns, there may have been only one woman for every five men. For our identification strategy to work,

there must be variation in the intensity of reform as measured by sex ratios, and there must be a large number of observations for any given national unit.

There are two ways in which the intensity of suffrage can be operationalized. First, a proportion of eligible women at a local level can be used as an indicator of the size of suffrage reform. It follows that locales with higher proportion of eligible women are more affected by suffrage than locales with lower proportion of eligible women. Second, a change in the size of the electorate before and after suffrage can also indicate the intensity of suffrage reform, where locales with larger increases in the size of the electorate are assumed to have more eligible women, and have therefore more effected by the reform than districts with a smaller increase in the size of the electorate. While some countries provide detailed census data on the demographic composition of electoral districts, others provide only accounts of the size of the electorate. Given these data limitations, we use whichever of the two specifications is possible.

We present results separately for each country in our analysis, using a difference-in-difference estimator that takes the following form:

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \ln(Electorate)_{it} + \Delta \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where ΔY refers to a change in partisan outcomes before and after suffrage; i refers to the observational unit whether municipalities, constituencies, ridings, or counties (see Table 1); and t refers to the first general election after suffrage. $\Delta \ln(Electorate)$ refers to a difference in the log of district level electorate before and after the reform. The log form allows for a natural interpretation of the change in the electorate in percentage terms. Finally, ϵ_{it} is a random disturbance term. This estimation strategy is equivalent to a fixed effect strategy with district- and time- dummies which capture potential fixed confounders at the local-level.

3.3.3 Causality Concerns

The identification strategy raises several concerns for drawing valid causal inferences. First, if district characteristics are correlated with trends in partisan support, our results might be biased and inconsistent. This would happen, for example, if parties that represented women’s preferences were already gaining momentum in districts with more women. In tackling this possibility, we apply a

series of placebo tests to examine whether districts with larger intensity of suffrage were trending differently before the reform. In neither case we find that parties that benefitted from women's suffrage were already on a rise prior to the reforms.

A second main threat to causality is that our results might be driven by men's rather than women's behavior. Previous research has shown that in some political and historical contexts, dominant groups have mobilize at higher levels to 'negate' the voting power of the newly enfranchised oppressed groups (Washington 2006). In other words, if men mobilized at higher levels in localities with higher proportion of women, our results would be driven by men's rather than women's voting behavior. In tackling this possibility, we can use data from countries which tallied votes separately by sex and investigate whether men mobilized at higher levels in the 'treated' localities, that is localities with higher proportion of women. Our preliminary results using data from Norway before and after suffrage reforms show that this was not the case - men did not turn out in higher numbers in response to women's enfranchisement. Further robustness analyses can be run using data from Chile, Argentina and Germany.

Table 1: Data & Samples Used in the Analysis

Reform	Treatment	Locales	N	Embedded in	Redistricting	Newly Enfranchised Women
Norway 1909	$\Delta \ln(\text{electorate})$	Municipalities	622	Counties*	Yes (1 municipality)	Tax-payers
Norway 1915	$\Delta \ln(\text{electorate})$	Municipalities	660	Counties*	Yes (1 municipality)	Women who did not pay taxes
UK 1929	$\Delta \ln(\text{registered})$	Constituencies*	578	Regions	No	<30 & without property
Canada 1921	$\Delta \ln(\text{electorate})$	Ridings*	221	Provinces	No	No soldier in family

Notes: Star (*) denotes units which refer to electoral constituencies. Units which experienced redistricting during the relevant time period were excluded from the analyses.

3.3.4 Key Independent Variable: The Intensity of Suffrage


We analyze the effect of women’s enfranchisement on partisan outcomes and political competition separately for each country in our sample. The unit of analysis differs by country depending on the level of detail reported in official sources. For some countries we have access to polling station data, while others report only higher-level information, for example, constituency level returns (See Table 1). For each country, we verify that there is a reasonable amount of variation in our key independent variable – the intensity of the ‘treatment’ of electoral reform – within each case. Recall that the treatment intensity is measured as the change in the size of the electorate as a whole. We utilize the (logged) change in electorate size at the local level. A detailed description of our treatment variables is in Table 1.

Figure 1 presents kernel densities for the treatment variable in each country. Importantly, we see that the treatment variable varies substantially within each country. While in some locales the suffrage reforms had smaller impact, in others the size of the electorate increased considerably. In each case, these changes are driven by uneven distribution of the newly enfranchised women across locales. The distributions follow a similar pattern in each country, ranging from just above 0 to 1.8 with an average around 0.5. We find somewhat less variation in the treatment variable for reforms which enfranchised only some women, such as the second reforms in the U.K. and Norway.

3.4 Results

We present results on the partisan effect of women’s suffrage for Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom in this version of the paper. The results are separate for each country but the presentation follows a similar pattern. For each suffrage reform, we discuss the historical background and then present baseline results from regression estimates. Where control variables are available, we include them in nested versions of the models and show full results in the Appendix.

Figure 1: Variation in the Treatment Variable (Kernel Densities)



3.4.1 Canada

The first federal reform that enfranchised Canadian women at the federal level emerged as part of the Wartime Election Act of 1917, which was passed under a Conservative government in an attempt to manipulate the size of the electorate in order to increase support for military conscription (Brodie 1991).⁹ While such manipulation distorted the electorate for political purposes, it allowed about half a million women – about 20 percent of adult women – to vote in federal elections

⁹This was achieved by disenfranchising naturalized citizens before 1902 who were born in enemy countries, and by enfranchising women who had served in the armed forces or who had relatives that were soldiers.

for the first time.

Most Canadian women, however, were enfranchised by the 1920 Dominion Election Act, which allowed all non-indigenous women to exercise federal-level voting rights in time for the 1921 election.¹⁰ Given that the 1917 reform covered only a small share of Canadian women, and also disenfranchised some men, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the two reforms on electoral outcomes. For this reason, we only focus on the second reform, in 1920, which enfranchised the vast majority of women while making only minimal changes to the male electorate.

The suffrage movement in Canada resembled that of its American counterpart. In both cases, the suffrage movement drew much support from the temperance and progressive movements. It is therefore not surprising that women were expected to overwhelmingly support prohibition and, once enfranchised, to ‘clean up’ politics with social reforms (Bacchi 1983). In general, the Conservatives at the turn of the century tended to be slightly more supportive of temperance.¹¹

Although it was the Conservative Party that showed a warmer reception to prohibition and even passed the Dominion Act which enfranchised all women in federal elections, out of the two major parties, the Liberal Party was far more receptive to women’s demands at the provincial level, enfranchising women in seven out of nine provinces (Cleverdon 1950). The Liberals even adopted women’s suffrage on the federal plank before the Conservatives.

Before the 1921 election, the Liberals chose a party leader who did not support conscription during the war, nor were the Liberals part of the conservative-lead Unionist government. The party also proposed to implement a number of labour reforms, which ranged from health and unemployment insurance to workmen’s compensations and opposed the protective tariff. The combination of class conflict and the legacy of the ethno-linguistic conflict over conscription resulted in a strong regional divide in the 1921 election. While Liberals won the election, their support outside Quebec was threatened by the agrarian Progressive Party. In Ontario, the

¹⁰Canada’s Inuit and Indian peoples were excluded from the franchise until after WWII, and there were no rights for people of Japanese origin until 1948.

¹¹The Conservatives provided legislative support to provinces which already passed prohibition and introduced temporary prohibition during the war for efficiency reasons (Blocker et al 2003). While the Liberals were forced by organized interests to hold a plebiscite on the issue in 1898, they refrained from implementing any legislation following the popular ‘yes’ vote (Blocker et al 2003).

Conservative Party received a plurality of votes, while the Liberals in Quebec won every seat.

Figure 1: Results for Canada




Table 2 presents estimates of the shifts in partisan support that followed after women’s suffrage in Canada. Table 3 presents results separately for two largest provinces – Ontario and Quebec. The columns in each table introduce controls progressively, starting with province effects in the baseline models. The proportion of foreign born population and foreign born population in enemy countries are also included in the final models within each party block. These controls capture the size of the population which was affected by changes to male suffrage in the 1920 reform, which disenfranchised alien soldiers and enfranchised previously disenfranchised naturalized citizens from enemy countries. Figure 1 below plots the estimates from models with full controls as presented in Tables 2-3.

After including all controls, women’s votes had a small positive effect on sup-

port for the Liberal party, although this relationship is significant only at the 10 percent level. For every 10 percent increase in the electorate, the Liberals gained 1.8 percent of votes. Neither the Conservative nor Labour parties were affected by women's votes at the federal level. However, a very different picture emerges once only the two largest provinces are examined. Women in Ontario strongly preferred the Liberal party, driving the result in the pooled model. Women in anti-government French-speaking Quebec instead seemed to prefer Labour candidates, although this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Table 2. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Canada (1921-1917)

<i>Dependent Var.</i>	Δ <i>Conservative</i>			Δ <i>Liberal</i>			Δ <i>Labour</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Model</i>									
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.015 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.085)	-0.078 (0.093)	0.07 (0.089)	0.169 (0.103)	0.179* (0.102)	0.035 (0.074)	0.04 (0.087)	0.054 (0.09)
Foreign controls	x	x	Yes	x	x	Yes	x	x	Yes
Province FEs	x	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes
Obs.	192	192	191	192	192	191	192	192	191

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested districts in 1917 are excluded from the analysis (N=31); districts with incomplete data in any election are excluded (N=18); Labour combines votes for Labour party, Socialist party and Opposition-Labour party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government party in 1917; Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in 1917; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 3. The Effect of Suffrage by Region in Canada (1921-1917)

<i>Region</i>		<i>Ontario</i>					
<i>Dependent Var:</i>	Δ <i>Conservative</i>		Δ <i>Liberal</i>		Δ <i>Labour</i>		
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	-0.125 (0.19)	-0.124 (0.198)	0.741*** (0.148)	0.736*** (0.134)	-0.039 (0.073)	-0.033 (0.078)	
Foreign controls	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	
Obs.	80	80	80	80	80	80	
<i>Region</i>		<i>Quebec</i>					
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	Δ <i>Conservative</i>		Δ <i>Liberal</i>		Δ <i>Labour</i>		
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	-0.135 (0.111)	-0.122 (0.123)	0.002 (0.084)	-0.017 (0.071)	0.179 (0.121)	0.181 (0.123)	
Foreign controls	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	
Obs.	46	46	46	46	46	46	

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested districts in 1917 are excluded from the analysis; districts with incomplete data in any election are excluded; Labour combines votes for Labour party, Socialist party and Opposition-Labour party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government party in 1917; Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in 1917; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

3.4.2 Norway

In Norway, women's enfranchisement followed a two-way process. First, women who paid taxes were admitted to the parliamentary franchise in 1906 and voted for the first time in the 1909 election. On June 11, 1913 a paragraph added to the constitution gave universal suffrage to all citizens over 25 years who had resided in the country for 5 years. All women thus voted for the first time in the 1915 election. This reform also enfranchised men on poor relief. However, given the fact that the proportion of men on poor relief was low and can be proxied by the proportion of votes that were suspended in the previous elections, we analyze the effects of both reforms. Our sample consists of about 600 municipalities which are embedded in electoral counties. Only one municipality changed boundaries during each reform.


The suffrage movement in Norway was an important force, particularly due to efforts of Labour women. The movement grew on a tide of nationalist sentiment that was fuelled by the temperance movement. Once the union with Sweden dissolved in 1905, women demanded suffrage as a reward for their efforts in the nationalist movement.¹² Politically, the socialists and radicals were the driving force behind suffrage, accepting partial economic suffrage in 1909 despite the fact that most of their electorate was not affected by the reform (Adams 2014). On the other hand, the Conservative Party fiercely opposed suffrage, agreeing to partial economic suffrage for wealthy and middle-class women in their efforts to increase the support against the rising threat of socialism (Adams 2014). Women's suffrage, in their view, was important for concession laws which aimed to control industrial developments. Since Labour and socialists did not gain legislative power until after World War One, it was the Liberal party under G. Knudsen that granted municipal and national suffrage to all women.

While survey data after World War Two show that women supported Conservatives more often than men (Duverger 1955), women's preferences at the turn of the century would have been better represented by liberal radicals and socialists. For a start, Norwegian Labour Democrats and socialist groups championed

¹²In anticipation of a plebiscite to dissolve the union with Sweden, the National Woman Suffrage Association had prepared a petition with 300,000 signatures in support of seceding, mobilizing nearly all adult women in the country.

the prohibition cause.¹³ The Liberal party, although often split on the issue, initiated a plebiscite on the issue in 1919, attempting to avoid cooperation with Labour. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, perceived prohibition as a violation of economic liberties (Derry 1973). In a similar vein, radical liberals and Labour politicians showed interest in social reforms, seeking to ameliorate economic hardship and control industrial developments. While Labour remained underrepresented in the Storting until World War I, the G. Knudsen Liberal government in cooperation with radical Labour Democrats, passed several laws that improved the lives of women and children at the time of suffrage (Derry 1973).

Figure 2: Results for Norway



Tables 4 and 5 present results from two reforms in Norway. Table 5 also includes models which control for the proportion of suspended votes in the previous election. Most of these votes were suspended from voters who were on poor relief and as such serve as a proxy for the proportion of the newly enfranchised men. Figure 2 presents estimates from models in Tables 4-5 with full controls. While the two reforms enfranchised women of different socio-economic status, Labour benefitted from the reform in both cases. For every 10% increase in the electorate, Labour increased its vote share by about 1.5%. These gains were mainly at the expense of the conservative block.

¹³The first temperance societies were established in the 1830s, organizing a staggering 10% of the population by 1919.

Table 4. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Norway (1915-1912)

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Labour</i> (%)		Δ <i>Liberal</i> (%)		Δ <i>Cons.</i> (%)	
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.165*** (0.047)	0.162*** (0.046)	-0.096 (0.062)	-0.092 (0.062)	-0.123** (0.061)	-0.125** (0.061)
Susp. Votes	x	Y	x	Y	x	Y
Obs	644	644	644	644	644	644

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Municipalities with neative change were excluded (N=16); Conservative refers to a coalition of Conservative Party and Liberal Left. Liberal refers to a coalition of Liberal Party and Labour Democrats; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 5. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Norway (1909-1906)

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Labour</i> (%)	Δ <i>Liberal</i> (%)	Δ <i>Cons.</i> (%)
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.148** (0.073)	-0.148 (0.104)	-0.1 (0.082)
Obs	609	609	609

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Municipalities with neative change were excluded (N=13); Liberal refers to a coalition between Liberal Party and Labour Democrats in 1909. These parties often run in coalition at the municipal level; Conservative refers to a coalition between Conservative Party and Liberal Left in 1909 and Coalition Party - formed by Conservative Party and Moderate Liberal Party - in 1906; All regressions include a constant; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

3.4.3 United Kingdom


In the United Kingdom suffrage was extended to women under two separate pieces of legislation. Although the 1918 Representation of the People Bill admitted British women to the electoral registers for the first time, only women over 30 who met minimum property qualifications were allowed to vote in the following years. At the same time that the 1918 bill expanded the franchise to some women, it also changed eligibility laws for men and ushered in wholesale re-districting. This makes the 1918 reform less than ideal for our analysis.

Instead, we consider the effect of the 1928 Representation of the People Act, which removed the age floor and property requirement making the voting laws universal in the U.K. for the first time. Although all men and women could vote on the same terms after 1928, the U.K.'s electoral law still allowed for plural voting, that is, for owners of multiple residences to vote in the constituencies of each residence. The 1928 reform enfranchised about five million women, two million of which were primarily working-class women and three million who were under 30 years and mostly industrial workers (Joannou and Purvis 1998). Importantly, too, is the fact that the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies remained the same.

The 1928 reform was presided over by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, who led the Tory party from 1923 to 1929. This is curious because the Tories had generally voted against women's enfranchisement both when it was presented on private member bills prior to 1914, and as members of the Speaker's conference on electoral reform in 1916. Although the Conservatives led the parliament, the Tories may have believed their position to be quite vulnerable in 1928. But the Liberal party did not show a warmer reception to women's suffrage. For example, Liberal Lloyd George voted against national suffrage on several occasions before the war, fearing that 'it would spell a disaster for liberalism.' In the end, the Liberal party was targeted by many suffragists, who instead packed with Labour, which believed that its support for suffrage would bring women to the party (Teele 2014). Not surprisingly, it was the Labour party which targeted women in the 1929 election, often appealing to their votes 'for the sake of children.'

Table 6 (and Figure 3 presents estimates which show that the Conservative party seemed to lose from the reform – larger changes in the electorate between

Figure 3: Results for United Kingdom



the two elections resulted in lower levels of support for the Tories. Nor was there any discernible change in the share of voters who supported Labour. On the other hand, the Liberal party seemed to benefit from the reform: for every 10 percent increase in the electorate, the Conservatives lost about 3.5 percent of voters, while the Liberals gained about 2.7 percent. Substantively, the increased support for the Liberal party in constituencies where the impact of the reform was greatest may not have been as important as the fall in support for the Tories. Indeed, the Liberals gained a mere 19 seats while the Labour party picked up 137 seats, surging to power with 288 MPs over the Tories' 260.

Table 6. The Effect of Suffrage in the U.K. (1929-1924)

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Labour</i> (%)	Δ <i>Liberal</i> (%)	Δ <i>Cons.</i> (%)
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.072 (0.048)	0.277*** (0.075)	-0.355*** (0.065)
Obs	578	578	578

Notes: All regressions include a constant; Robust standard errors in brackets;
 * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

3.5 Robustness

In this section we address three main threats to our estimation strategy that our results are driven by pre-existing trends, counter-mobilization of men, and concurrent reforms.


3.5.1 Pre-Existing Trends in Partisan Support

One of the advantages of the difference-in-difference specification is that it holds unobserved local characteristics fixed. The gravest concern of our identification strategy is that the estimates might be driven by pre-existing trends. For example, if partisan support for left parties grew more in locales which were affected by suffrage the most, our estimates would be biased and inconsistent. To address this possibility, we run a series of placebo tests where we regress the change in partisan support prior to the reforms on the key independent variable (difference in logged electorate). Using this method we can probe to see whether the locales that were the most affected by the reform were already becoming subject to pre-existing trends in partisanship than in those locales where the reform was less consequential. The only country for which we cannot test this assumption is Canada, where the War Time Election of Act of 1917 not only enfranchised a small proportion women, but also disenfranchised some men.

We present the results from all other countries in Figure 4. In most cases, the regressions returned small and insignificant estimates, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption is reasonable prior to the reforms. There are, however, number of exceptions. First, the Conservative vote share in the U.K. rose from 1923 to 1924 more in constituencies that would later experience a larger growth in the electorate after the 1928 reform. On the other hand, the Liberals lost considerably in places where the reform had a larger impact. In neither case, however, these trends follow the same direction as the main estimates of the effects of the reform. This result is therefore consistent with an explanation that women's votes stopped the Conservative surge and changed the tides for Liberals. The second exception is a significant and large estimate for Norway in 1915, where support for the Liberal party block was growing in municipalities which were most affected by the reform. Again, these trends are consistent with the explanation that the 1915

reform stopped a liberal surge and instead, benefitted the Labour party. On the whole, we conclude that our results are not driven by pre-existing trends, yet further analyses must be carried (such as including control variables in all countries) to achieve more satisfying results.

Figure 4: Placebo Regressions for U.K. and Norway



3.5.2 Men's Counter-Mobilization

Another concern for our identification strategy is that the partisan effects might be driven by men's mobilization in locales most affected by the reforms. Indeed, some suggest that dominant groups can mobilize at higher levels to suppress the power of the oppressed groups (Enos 2011, Washington 2006). While we cannot address this issue for all countries, we can exploit the fact that some authorities kept voting records separately for women and men at the time of women's suffrage,

and look at whether more men turned out to vote in locales with higher numbers of women. In Table 7 we present results from these analyses in the whole of Norway. We first regress our treatment variable on male turnout in the first election after women's suffrage. We find that locales which were most affected by women's votes were also the locales where men voted at the highest levels. However, such results may be confounded by third factors. In a second set of regressions, we therefore regress a change in men's turnout on our treatment variable. In each case, the initial correlation disappears, indicating that relatively speaking, men were not more likely to turn out in locales that had higher share of women. We conclude that at least in Norway, men did not mobilize at higher levels to negate the effect of women's votes.

Table 7: The Effect of Suffrage on Men's Turnout, Norway 1909

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	<i>Round 1 Turnout (men)</i>	<i>Round 2 Turnout (men)</i>	<i>Round 1 Δ Turnout (men)</i>	<i>Round 2 Δ Turnout (men)</i>
<i>Model</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.289*** (0.064)	0.127** (0.061)	-3.258 (5.205)	0.4 (10.105)
Obs	616	375	616	241

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Municipalities with negative change were excluded (N=16); * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

3.5.3 Concurrent Reforms as Multiple Treatments

Finally, we have to address the coincidence of other minor reforms that affected the scope of the male franchise along with the greater extension to women in Norway and Canada. In Norway, small proportion of men were enfranchised together with women in the 1915 election. As these men were on poor relief, the positive effect on Labour after women's suffrage could be driven by men. In Table 8 we try to address this possibility by using a proportion of votes that were suspended in the previous election as a proxy for municipalities which had a high proportion of men on poor relief. We show that our main results remain unaffected even if we exclude municipalities with the highest proportion of suspended votes in 1912. Moreover, we show that the effect of our treatment does not depend on the proportion of suspended votes.

In Canada, the electorate for the 1917 election was manipulated by the war-time government to secure their continued power and conscription. In the 1917 election, all soldiers regardless of nationality were allowed to vote and naturalized citizens from enemy countries were disenfranchised. These changes were only implemented for the 1917 election, allowing previously disenfranchised immigrants to vote and taking the vote from foreign soldiers. These changes mainly affected Western provinces and parts of Ontario, where the proportion of foreign born citizens was highest. In Table 9, we therefore restrict our sample to ridings which have seen only low proportion of foreign born citizens and those who were born in enemy countries. In each case, our results return comparable estimates regardless of such exclusions.

Table 8. Robustness to Concurrent Reforms for a 1915 Reform in Norway

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>	Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>	Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>	Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	0.152*** (0.051)	-0.059 (0.077)	-0.159** (0.078)	0.162*** (0.057)	-0.079 (0.09)	-0.113 (0.089)	0.133** (0.069)	-0.055 (0.105)	-0.142 (0.108)
Suspended 1912							0.832 (1.01)	-1.113 (1.228)	0.515 (1.057)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})^* \text{ Susp.}$							1.511 (3.241)	-1.903 (3.7)	0.889 (3.451)
Sample	<75 Pctl of Suspended (2.7%)			<50 Pctl of Suspended (1.8%)				All	
Obs.	482	482	482	333	333	333	644	644	644

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Municipalities with neative change were excluded (N=16); Conservative refers to a coalition of Conservative Party and Liberal Left. Liberal refers to a coalition of Liberal Party and Labour Democrats; All regressions include a constant; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

Table 9. Canada: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners

PANEL A: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners.

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Ontario		Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Quebec	
					Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>		Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	-0.137 (0.127)	0.103 (0.09)	0.144 (0.113)	-0.279 (0.514)	0.781** (0.291)	-0.069 (0.081)	-0.133 (0.12)	-0.023 (0.086)	0.185 (0.125)
<i>Sample</i>	<50 Percentile of Foreigners (8%)								
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	x	x	x	x	x
Obs.	91	91	91	33	33	33	40	40	40

PANEL B: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners from Enemy Countries.

<i>Dep. Var.:</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>	Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Ontario		Δ <i>Cons.</i>	Quebec	
					Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>		Δ <i>Lib.</i>	Δ <i>Lab.</i>
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Electorate})$	-0.173 (0.117)	0.117 (0.084)	0.149 (0.115)	-0.236 (0.705)	0.72* (0.381)	-0.085 (0.106)	-0.178* (0.095)	0.046 (0.064)	0.183 (0.124)
<i>Sample</i>	<50 Percentile of Foreigners from Enemy countries (1.6%)								
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	x	x	x	x	x
Obs.	92	92	92	28	28	28	44	44	44

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested districts in 1917 are excluded from the analysis (N=31); districts with incomplete data in any election are excluded (N=18); Labour combines votes for Labour party, Socialist party and Opposition-Labour party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government party in 1917; Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in 1917; The exclusion mainly affects Western provinces, approximately half of Ontario and only lightly Quebec and Maritimes; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.

3.6 Conclusion

We have taken a first pass at examining the electoral consequences of women's enfranchisement on partisan support. Our review of the existing literature on women's political behavior in history reveals three competing theses which predict women's voting behavior. While the traditional voting gap thesis stipulates that women historically supported conservative parties, the distributive politics thesis implies that women should vote for parties with redistributive agendas. Finally, women may remain loyal to parties that enfranchised them. Studying electoral returns in Canada, U.K. and Norway, we suggest that the distributive politics thesis performs the best.

We find that women's enfranchisement benefited Labour and Liberal parties. In Canada, post-war survey data show that women that were socialized during the hype of women's movements in the 1920s and 1960s supported parties associated with women's welfare and suffrage agendas (Bashevkin 1983). Analyzing the first election after federal suffrage in 1921, we find that women indeed preferred the Liberal party at the time of suffrage. In Ontario, women's preferences for the rather reformist Liberal party were particularly strong, while women in Quebec seemed to be more inclined to support Labour. These findings corroborate the view that women voted for parties which showed warmer reception to women's welfare and suffrage.

In the United Kingdom, the post-war survey data frequently show conservative gender voting gap, although the differences between women and men at that time remained minimal (Blondel 1963). At the time of the second suffrage reform in 1928, however, we show that the newly enfranchised women supported the Liberal party. While the reform under study enfranchised women who were below 30 years of age and did not pay taxes in previous elections, the newly enfranchised women did not support the Labour party, suggesting that the Liberal party won the contest with Labour over women's votes.

In Norway, post-war survey data also show a frequent conservative gender voting gap until the 1980s (Oskarson 1995). Women at the time of suffrage, however, turned to support Labour. In Norway, radical liberals and Labour politicians were champions of prohibition, social reforms, as well as women's suffrage. On the

other hand, conservatives supported free industry and opposed prohibition as well as women's suffrage, unless it affected only wealthy women (Derry 1973).

These findings all point in the same direction: in the three largely Protestant countries, in constituencies where women dwelled in higher numbers, parties on the Left performed better. In countries where parties on the political left had programmatic commitments to temperance, like Norway, women supported them. In neither country conservatives benefitted from the reforms. This leads us to cast doubt on the wholesale validity of the 'traditional' voting gap thesis at the time of women's suffrage.

The reforms also did not inevitably produce wins for the parties that resided over the reform, as the Conservatives were in power in both Canada and the U.K. in the relevant moments. For these reasons, we also reject the utility of the loyalty thesis for understanding women's political behavior in these settings. If women voted on suffrage, they stayed loyal to parties which showed a somewhat warmer reception to the cause over the long-run, such as in Norway and Canada.

Our hunch, instead, is that women's economic vulnerability lead to an increase in welfare spending after female suffrage as previous research suggested because women's enfranchisement increased support for parties with redistributive (and pro-suffrage) programmatic agendas. Although many claimed that extending voting rights to women does not have major consequences for politics, with these findings in hand we beg to differ.

4 Universal Suffrage and the Electoral Support for Parties with Redistributive Agendas: Evidence from Sixteen Countries

Abstract

This research examines the effects of suffrage on partisan support. While the economic theory suggests that suffrage increases welfare spending via party convergence on the new median, this paper shows that parties with redistributive agendas were the main beneficiaries of the reforms. Analyzing data from sixteen countries for the period 1880-1975, this research shows that male suffrage correlates positively with Socialist support. The effect of female suffrage depends on Catholicism and the female labour force. In Catholic countries, Socialist support was reduced in favour of the Christian Democrats, particularly when the proportion of women in the paid workforce was low. In Protestant countries, female suffrage boosted Socialist support, particularly when the female labour force was at its largest.

4.1 Introduction and Overview

One of the most important aspects of democratization in the West was the expansion of suffrage to lower-class men and to women. But the effects of suffrage reforms went beyond increased political equality among citizens. In fact, the rise of the welfare state could not be understood without acknowledging the importance of democratization efforts since the early nineteenth century (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Boix 2003). Indeed, ample empirical evidence documents the link between suffrage and redistribution for both male and female reforms (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Husted and Kenny 1997; Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). The prevailing explanation for the redistributive effects of suffrage relies on the electoral model, where all parties converge on the new - more pro-redistributive - median (Meltzer and Richard 1981). It follows that neither political party should benefit from the votes of the newly enfranchised voters. Yet this prediction has not been subjected to systematic empirical tests.

Moreover, ample evidence contradicts the notion that suffrage had no effect on partisan support. Not only was the electoral support for early Socialists among working-class men substantial, but the Socialists also represented distinct preferences of the newly emerged industrial working class (Bartolini 2007, 122-180; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Von Beyme 1985, 248-293). It has also been established that the rise of the welfare state was associated with the strength of Socialist parties (Blais, Blake and Dion 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000). Yet the most recent empirical studies struggle to find an immediate positive effect of male suffrage on the support of left parties (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Larcinese 2014). The fact that neither of these studies examines long-term effects of the reforms might be of particular importance, since the working-class men mobilized only gradually (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 63). Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in suffrage reforms, I show that the support for Socialist parties correlates with universal male suffrage in the long run. Such finding supports the notion that the newly enfranchised poor men voted for the Socialist parties, which in turn helped to drive the rise of the welfare state. It directly contradicts the prediction of the electoral model that the rise of the welfare state after suffrage reforms was driven equally by all political parties.

A great deal of anecdotal evidence also contradicts the prediction of the electoral model for the effects of female suffrage on partisan outcomes. It has been well established that in Catholic countries women strongly preferred Christian Democratic parties (Duverger 1955, 50-67; Tingsten 1937, 36-78). Conveniently for women, the family-friendly policies of the Christian Democrats appealed not only to women's welfare preferences, but also to their socially conservative and religious preferences (Norris 1988; Randall 1987; Van Kersbergen 1991, 136-147). In the absence of Christian Democratic parties, however, women had to choose between their welfare and socially conservative, religious preferences, favouring the former in the long run. As the women in Protestant countries entered the paid workforce, they turned to the Socialists (Huber and Stephens 2000; Przeworski 2009, 313-318). Once employed, women not only developed positive attitudes towards better health, education and welfare services, they were also successfully mobilized by the Socialist parties on their need for state-funded relief from their caregiving responsibilities (Huber and Stephens 2000; Manza and Brooks 1998; Wilensky 1990). It follows that the examination of the long-term effects of female suffrage on partisan support is of the utmost importance. Exploiting the rich spatial and temporal variation in suffrage reforms, this study shows that, contrary to the electoral model, female suffrage increases electoral support for parties with redistributive agendas. In Catholic countries, female suffrage increases Christian Democratic support at the expense of the Socialists, particularly when the female labour force is small. In Protestant countries, female suffrage positively correlates with electoral support for the Socialists in the long run, particularly when the female labour force is at its largest.

This study analyzes data from sixteen Western countries and covers the period from 1880 to 1975. I apply a fixed effects model and show that the results are robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent variable. I also show that the results are robust to various specifications. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature and formulates two main hypotheses. The third section presents the data and discusses relevant facts and descriptive statistics. The fourth section provides a detailed account of the identification strategy, and the fifth section presents the main results and robustness checks. The last section makes final remarks.

4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses

4.2.1 Men's Suffrage

When most Socialist parties were founded at the end of the nineteenth century, a substantial proportion of their natural electorate was still disenfranchised. If the Socialists were to come to power, the revolution would need to come from the inside. Once all men had the right to vote, the electoral victory of Socialism seemed to be only a matter of time. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) pointed out, the ballots became the 'paper stones' of the raging proletariat. The evidence suggests that support for early Socialists among working-class men was indeed considerable (Tingsten 1937, 120-181; Von Beyme 1985, 284-293; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Bartolini 2007, 122-180). For example, Tingsten (1937, 126-127) reports electoral statistics from cantonal elections in Basel-Stadt and Zurich in 1911 and 1933, respectively. He finds a very strong correlation between the strength of the working class and the Social Democratic party, with most districts showing almost identical proportions for the two.

However, recent studies which examine the effects of male suffrage on partisan outcomes cease to provide systematic evidence. Berlinski and Dewan (2011) use evidence from the Second Reform Act in Britain and test the effects of male suffrage on the subsequent victory of the Liberal party in Britain in 1868. Although the authors find that the reform increased political competition, they conclude that the victory of the Liberal party was incidental to the reform. Similarly, while Larcinese (2014) finds that the level of enfranchisement in Italy in 1913 was associated with an increase in electoral support for reformist parties (Liberals and Socialists), he finds no effect of male suffrage on the parliamentary representation of the reformist parties. He concludes that the elite successfully attempted to neutralize the full effect of the reform.

The economic literature, in turn, finds strong evidence that the adoption of male suffrage was followed by an increase in redistribution. In the U.S., Husted and Kenny (1997) provided evidence that the elimination of poll tax and literacy tests increased welfare spending. In Europe, Aidt et al. (2006) found that gradual lifting of economic restrictions on male suffrage was associated with a growth in spending on security, public services, and the total size of the government. In

Latin America, Aidt and Eterovic (2011) found that governmental expansion was associated with the elimination of literacy requirements. Most of these studies relied on the theoretical prediction of the Meltzer and Richard model, which predicts an increase in redistribution after the expansion of the electorate to poorer citizens (Meltzer and Richard 1981). As the median voter gets poorer, political parties converge on the new poorer median and deliver greater redistribution. As such, the electoral model predicts that no political party should benefit from the enlargement of the electorate, not even the Socialists.

The anecdotal evidence for the support of Socialist parties among the working-class electorate, however, should not be ignored. Moreover, some studies suggest that, contrary to the electoral model, political parties may help to mediate the redistributive effects of the suffrage. For example, Kroth et al. (2015) showed that not only did enfranchisement of the black population improve the delivery of public services in South Africa, but that this effect was strongest in the core ANC constituencies. Furthermore, neither of the existing studies examined the long-term effects of male suffrage. This might be particularly important, given the fact that both Berlinski and Dewan (2011), and Larcinese (2014) report that in the first election after the extension of suffrage voter turnout declined. In fact, the decline in voter turnout after suffrage is well documented (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008; Bartolini 2007, 221-225; Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 63). This study therefore exploits spatial and temporal variation in the adoption of universal male suffrage and estimates the long-term effects of male suffrage on Socialist electoral support.

Hypothesis 1: Universal male suffrage, which extends the franchise to most working-class men, increases the support for Socialist parties in the long term.

4.2.2 Women's Suffrage

Whereas male suffrage was generally extended gradually from middle-class men to working-class men, women were mostly enfranchised in one fell swoop. As such, female suffrage could have an effect on partisan support only if women's preferences were on average distinct from those of men. Indeed, the economic experimental

literature shows that women exhibit more pro-redistributive preferences (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). More importantly, women's suffrage has been convincingly linked to the rise of the welfare state. Analysing cross-time, cross-country data, Lindert (1994) identifies a positive association between female suffrage and welfare spending. Bertocchi (2011), in turn, finds that the redistributive effect of female suffrage was exclusive to Protestant countries owing to the high costs of disenfranchisement. In the U.S., Lott and Kenny (1999) exploited the fact that suffrage reforms were forced on some states by the Nineteenth Amendment and found that female suffrage had positive effect on the size of the government. Others link the Nineteenth Amendment to higher levels of spending on education and local spending on health and child mortality (Miller 2008). In Europe, Abrams and Settle (1999) exploited the fact that Switzerland extended the vote to women long after neighbouring countries and showed that the newly enfranchised women increased welfare spending in Switzerland. Funk and Gathmann (2010) found large gender voting gaps on the preferences for the composition of public spending in Switzerland. Finally, analyses of historical data from Europe further confirms the positive association between female suffrage and social spending, particularly after controlling for the gradual mobilization of women (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008).

Most of these studies, however, relied explicitly or implicitly on the electoral model, which predicts that parties respond to the change in the preference of the median voter. According to this logic, no party should attract more votes from the newly enfranchised women than any other. Although it is true that some scholars suggest that women, by and large, cast the same ballot as their husbands (Duverger 1955, 46-49), or that women's distinct preferences were not captured by political parties until more recently (Clart and Clark 2008, 2; Manza and Brooks 1998), most argue that women's socially conservative and religious values led them to vote for the conservative parties until the 1980s, when they realigned to the political left (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin. 2004; Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2000; Norris 1988; Randall 1987).

But how could the newly enfranchised women of the early twentieth century vote for conservative parties, as the political science literature argues, and at the same time prefer higher levels of redistribution, as the economic literature ar-

gues? An immediate explanation would suggest that in the early twentieth century women held both welfare and socially conservative preferences, although parties successfully converged only on the former set of preferences. According to this account, all parties successfully targeted women's welfare preferences, so that women voted solely on their conservative and religious preferences. However, ample evidence shows that political parties did not successfully converge on the welfare issue, with Socialists and Christian Democrats clearly offering and delivering better welfare platforms (Huber and Stephens 2000; Van Kersbergen 1991). In fact, quite conveniently for women, Christian Democratic parties represented women's socially conservative and religious as well as their welfare preferences. Clearly influenced by social Catholicism, Christian Democratic parties endorsed distinctive welfare programmes which allowed them to capture the votes of both lower- and upper-class Catholics. As such, the Christian Democratic welfare state supported families with substantial tax, wage and benefit systems, generally incentivizing women to work at home (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Van Kersbergen 1991, 100-113).

It is therefore hardly a coincidence that ample anecdotal evidence suggests that Christian Democratic parties successfully captured women's votes in Catholic countries. For example, many have documented the traditionally sex-distinctive base of Christian Democrats across all classes in Italy (Van Kersbergen 1991, 67-68). The survey data revealed that in 1968 Italian women preferred the Christian Democratic Party by a staggering 24 per cent (Barnes 1974, 192). The evidence from separate ballots in Germany shows that whereas Catholic Zentrum/CDU received 89 per cent more votes from women in both the 1920 and 1953 elections, the difference was 1520 per cent in the most Catholic districts (Duverger 1955, 52-67; Tingsten 1937, 37-65). In Belgium, the post-war size of the gender gap at the national level was estimated at 7 per cent for the Christian Democrats, although it was likely driven by the Catholic region (Hill 1974, 92-94). Consequently, Przeworski (2009, 313-318) links women's relatively late enfranchisement to their alignment with Christian Democrats in Catholic countries.

In the absence of Christian Democratic parties, however, women had to choose between their welfare and their socially conservative and religious preferences. While some argue that women voted mainly on their socially conservative and re-

ligious preferences in both Protestant and Catholic countries (Norris 1988; Randall 1987), others argue that women's left-leaning preferences in Protestant countries allowed the left parties in power to enfranchise women without much hesitation (Przeworski 2009, 313-318). The evidence as to whether women preferred Conservative over Socialist parties in Protestant countries is inconclusive. The available evidence from separate ballots and first survey data shows that whereas Protestant women preferred Conservative parties more often than Socialists, the gender gap rarely exceeded more than a few percentage points (Duverger 1955, 122; Tingsten 1937, 36-78). It has also been suggested that whenever women were found to prefer Conservative parties in Protestant countries, the gap may have been driven by low turnout among working-class women. For example, using data from Stockholm and Germany, Tingsten (1937, 62) concludes that the low participation rate of working-class women (especially household servants and shop assistants) may 'explain why the more conservative movements have been favoured by women's suffrage'. Similarly, the economic literature estimates that women's voter turnout reached men's levels only with a substantial time lag (Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt and Dallal 2008). As such, the estimation of long-term effects of female suffrage on partisan outcomes in Protestant countries is of the utmost importance. As the mobilization of working-class women reaches men's turnout levels, we should expect women in Protestant countries to move away from the Conservative parties.

Moreover, in the absence of generous family policies, poor and middle-class women must enter paid employment. And once women enter the workforce, not only do they develop positive attitudes towards better health, education and welfare services, they also seek relief from their caregiving responsibilities (Wilensky 1990). With the Socialists gradually responding to these demands, it has been argued that the newly mobilized women align with the Socialists (Huber and Stephens 2000). In the US, Manza and Brooks (1998) show that the rise in the female labour force was responsible for women's realignment to the Democratic Party. It follows that women's tendency to support the Socialists in Protestant countries may be jointly conditional on the absence of Christian Democratic parties (and Catholicism) and on the high proportion of women in the workforce. The Socialists can capture the votes of the (gradually) mobilized women in Protestant countries only if the female labour force is sufficiently great. Wherever the

proportion of women in the workforce in Protestant countries is lower, once the newly enfranchised women mobilize fully, the Socialists may not fully succeed in capturing their votes.

Quite surprisingly, Huber and Stephens (2000) show that the number of women in paid employment promotes welfare spending regardless of the politico- institutional context - even in Catholic countries with strong Christian Democratic parties. They argue that both Socialist and Christian Democratic parties seek women's votes and therefore respond to women's welfare preferences. As such, the Christian Democratic appeal to women in Catholic countries may also be conditional on the female labour force. Female suffrage in Catholic countries may reduce the support for Socialists in favour of the Christian Democrats, but only if the proportion of women in paid employment is low. If the proportion of women in the workforce is sufficiently high, the Socialist version of the welfare state may be able to compete with the family-friendly policies of the Christian Democrats in Catholic countries.

Hypothesis 2: Universal female suffrage increases the support for Socialist parties in Protestant countries in the long term. The effect should be greatest in countries with the largest female labour force. In Catholic countries, universal female suffrage reduces support for the Socialist parties (and increases the support for Christian Democratic parties). This effect is mitigated if the female labour force is sufficiently large.

4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data set consists of sixteen Western countries, listed in Table 1. The compilation of the sample was based on three exclusion criteria. First, all countries with simultaneous introduction of female and male universal suffrage were excluded from the analysis.¹ Whenever both women and men were enfranchised at the same time, it would not be possible to separate the effect of women's and men's

¹This criterion excludes Malta, Finland, Luxembourg, Iceland and Portugal. Female suffrage extensions in Denmark and Sweden which occurred together with minor male extensions (men on public relief) are included in the analysis. However, the robustness analyses show that the results remain intact even after exclusion of these two countries from the sample.

votes on partisan outcomes. Second, universal suffrage adoptions which occurred gradually at the federal level are not included in the analysis.² Third, universal suffrage adoptions which occurred before the establishment of Socialist parties are not included in the analysis.³

The time periods covered for each country are listed in Table 1. Autocratic regimes with long periods without elections are excluded from the panel, mainly Italy 1922-1945, Germany 1934-1948, Austria 1938-1944, Greece after 1967, and Spain 1924-1930 and after 1936. The analysis covers the time period from 1880 until 1975. However, Ireland enters the data set in 1922 with the establishment of the Irish Republic and Australia in 1901 with the establishment of the federation. Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece enter the data set after 1880 owing to missing or unavailable electoral data for relevant periods. All data collected prior to the establishment of the First Austrian Republic in 1919 refers to the approximate land area of modern Austria under Austria-Hungary.

4.3.1 Universal Suffrage

Franchise reforms generally included rich men before poor men, and men before women. Table 1 lists the electoral year when suffrage was first applied. Universal male suffrage was adopted in some countries as early as the first half of the nineteenth century, although the crucial period for male suffrage is generally dated roughly between 1880 and 1920. The earliest adoptions occurred in Greece, Switzerland, France and Denmark in the first half of the nineteenth century, followed by reforms in Spain and Germany. While some states in Australia and Canada adopted universal male suffrage long before most of Europe, unified universal male suffrage at the federal level was adopted around the turn of the century, along with Belgium, Austria, Norway, Sweden and Italy. Men in the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands, however, had to wait for the universal vote until after World

²This criterion excludes the United States and male suffrage reforms in Canada and Australia. Female suffrage adoptions in Canada, Australia and Switzerland are included in the analysis since women gained voting rights in national elections at federal level with single legislation, despite the fact that some women were allowed to vote in some parts in lower elections prior to the adoption of female suffrage

³This excludes New Zealand from the sample and six universal male adoptions. The second adoption of universal male suffrage in Spain in 1891, which occurred after the establishment of Socialist parties, however, is included in the analysis

War One. Women never obtained full voting rights before men. Most women were granted the right to vote following World War One (Denmark, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands and Ireland) or World War Two (France, Italy, Belgium). Australia and Norway adopted universal female suffrage prior to World War One, while Spain and the U.K. granted women full voting rights in the interwar period. The latest female extensions occurred in Greece and Switzerland.


4.3.2 Socialist Parties

Table 1 lists the main Socialist party for each country and the year when it was founded and entered the election. The years in parentheses refer to the first appearance of Socialist parties or candidates with Socialist labels, often long preceding the formation of the main Socialist party. Most Socialist parties were established in the 1880s, with a few forming as early as the late 1870s, such as in Denmark, Spain and Germany. Socialist parties which were formed after 1890 were generally preceded by Socialist candidates, parties or organizations established along with the rest of Europe in the 1870s and 1880s. However, Socialist candidates did not emerge in Canada until 1900 and until 1920 in Greece.

Figure 1 plots the electoral support for the Socialist party family by year and country. The solid black line shows the total electoral support for all parties that belonged to the Socialist party family. For comparison, the solid grey line in Graph 1 summarizes the Christian Democratic family and the dashed black line the electoral support for the Communist family. In most countries, the support for Socialists rose rapidly until the 1930s with a gradual mobilization of workers (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 163). In most cases, when Socialists reached their maximum, their support stabilized and started declining in the 1960s. The support for Socialists in Northern Europe, however, continued rising up to the 1950s, while the Socialists in Canada, Greece and Spain did not emerge until after 1920s.

Upon closer examination of Socialist vote shares and the adoption of universal male suffrage as displayed in Figure 1, it becomes apparent that the Socialist rise generally followed or coincided with the adoption of universal male suffrage, often producing notable jumps in their support. The immediate effects of male suffrage are apparent in Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and Austria. The

Figure 1: Socialist, Communist and Christian Democratic Parties, 1880-1975.



Notes: The solid black line shows the total electoral support for all parties that belonged to the Socialist party family. The solid grey line summarizes the Christian Democratic family and the dashed black line the electoral support for the Communist family. The solid vertical line depicts the adoption of universal male suffrage and the dashed vertical line the adoption of universal female suffrage.


Sources: Mackie and Rose 1982; Eley 2002; Nohlen and Stover 2010; Flora 1983; Caramani 2000; Von Beyme 1985

most notable effects are evident in Belgium and Austria, where the support for Socialists rose from almost zero to 22 per cent and 28 per cent respectively.⁴ The increase in Socialist support in the Netherlands seems to be more modest, although this should not be surprising, given that the suffrage was extended more gradually, with a generous economic reform granted in 1897, which again seems to coincide

⁴It must be noted that the vote shares for Socialists in Austria until 1907 differ substantially from the Socialist seat shares due to a very restrictive curial system, which allocated disproportionately low number of seats to the fifth (general) curia. The establishment of the fifth curia in 1897 can nonetheless be seen as the introduction of universal male suffrage since all men had a right to cast a vote in this curia. As such, all votes cast in the fifth curia reflect the strength of all parties among all electorate, despite the fact that the distribution of power in the parliament did not reflect these votes until 1907.

with the rise in Socialist support. The only countries that do not show a clear correlation between male suffrage and Socialist support are Italy, where Socialists reached almost 20 per cent despite the fact that only about a quarter of all Italian men had the right to vote, and Spain, where the Socialist party was established but did not enter the election until long after the adoption of universal male suffrage.

Figure 2: Average Female Labour Force by Catholicism, 1880-1975.



Sources: Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Flora 1983; Maoz and Henderson 2013; Mitchell 2007

Universal female suffrage, on the other hand, does not show a clear one-way association with Socialist support. While female suffrage appears to contribute to the rise of Socialists in some countries, in others the Socialist vote share seems to decrease or show no effect. Protestant Norway and Australia show the largest immediate increase after adoption of universal female suffrage, whereas Catholic Ireland shows the largest immediate decrease in the Socialist support. Socialists in Austria, with its high proportion of Catholics but also a large female labour force, on the other hand, seem to benefit immediately from the female vote. If Catholicism and the female labour force, however, are jointly to explain the effects of female suffrage, it is important that they are not positively correlated. Figure 2 plots the average share of Catholics on the average female labour force and shows that the two variables do not exhibit a clear relationship. While pre-

dominantly Protestant countries show relatively large female labour forces, mixed or predominantly Catholic countries show both relatively large and small female labour forces.

Table 1: Socialist Parties and Universal Suffrage

Country	Data	Male suffrage*	Female suffrage*	Main Socialist party#		
				Established	First election	
Australia	1901-1975	1900	1903	ALP	1908 (1901)	1910 (1901)
Austria	1891-1975	1897 (A-H)	1919	SDAP	1889	1891
Belgium	1880-1975	1894	1949	PBO	1885	1894
Canada	1880-1975	1917	1921	CCF	1932 (1900)	1935 (1900)
Denmark	1880-1975	1849	1918	SDF	1876	1884
France	1880-1975	1852	1945	SFIO	1905 (1879)	1906 (1881)
Germany	1880-1975	1871	1919	SPD	1875 (1863)	1875 (1871)
Greece	1926-1975	1822	1956	Various	1920	1923
Ireland	1922-1975	1918 (UK)	1923	ILP	1912 (1881 UK)	1922 (1895 UK)
Italy	1880-1975	1913	1946	PSI	1892 (1877)	1895 (1882)
Netherlands	1888-1975	1918	1922	SDAP	1894 (1881)	1894 (1888)
Norway	1880-1975	1900	1915	DNA	1887	1894
Spain	1880-1936	1891	1933	PSOE	1879	1910
Sweden	1887-1975	1911	1921	SAP	1889	1902
Switzerland	1881-1975	1848	1971	SPS	1887	1887
United Kingdom	1880-1975	1918	1929	LP	1900 (1881)	1900 (1895)

* Columns give years when first election under universal suffrage took place. In countries where universal suffrage was adopted multiple times, only the latest adoptions are reported.

The years in brackets refer to the first appearance of Socialist parties or candidates with Socialist labels.

Sources: Caramani 2000; Eley 2002; Flora 1983; Mackie and Rose 1982; Nohlen and Stver 2010; Von Beyme 1985

4.4 Empirical Strategy and Variables

Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in the timing of both female and male suffrage, I estimate a fixed effects model to capture the effect of suffrage on partisan support of Socialist parties. Specifically, for country i and year t , I estimate the following equation:

$$SOC_{it} = \alpha + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \delta SUF_{it} + \beta X'_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where SOC_{it} is the outcome variable of interest measured as a percentage of votes for Socialist parties in country i and year t , SUF_{it} is an indicator for suffrage and ϵ_{it} is an error term. The parameter of interest is δ . Country fixed effects γ_i remove unobserved country effects that are constant over time and five year fixed effects λ_t capture common shocks to Socialist support in all countries. A vector of observed socio-economic and political controls X'_{it} captures the effects of observed time-varying confounders. The estimated standard errors are panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) which are robust to heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. The PCSEs are combined with Prais-Winsten transformation to correct for first-order (ar-1) correlation in the residuals.

Second, I estimate the following lagged dependent variable model, where SOC_{it-1} denotes lagged dependent variable.

$$SOC_{it} = \alpha + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \delta SUF_{it} + \beta X'_{it} + SOC_{it-1}\theta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

The equation (2) estimates panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs), while the lagged dependent variable removes serial correlation. This specification also allows for the separation of the short- and long-run effects of suffrage reforms on partisan support. This may be particularly important, given that previous research has shown that voter turnout drops substantially after franchise extension.

A note of caution should be sounded with respect to the interpretation of the results. The empirical strategy assumes that the timing of the suffrage is exogenous. If, for example, the decision to extend the franchise was more likely in countries where Socialist support grew more rapidly, the effects of the reform could be exaggerated. This is of particular concern for male suffrage, as Socialist parties and the strength of the working masses were major forces in suffrage extensions.

With respect to women's voting rights, these concerns might be lessened, given that most female suffrage reforms were adopted after exogenous events such as World War One and World War Two.

4.4.1 Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable is the total vote share for the Socialist party family. All Socialist parties contribute to the total vote share of the Socialist party family. I also examine the effects of suffrage on the Christian Democratic party family and left (Communist and Socialist) party families. The electoral data were sourced mainly from Caramani (2000), Mackie and Rose (1982) and Nohlen and Stover (2010). The parties were classified into partisan families according to the data presented in Von Beyme (1985), Caramani (2000, 20004), Mackie and Rose (1982) and Volkens et al.(2014).

4.4.2 Key Independent Variable

I define the measure of suffrage in several ways. First I use a continuous measure as a percentage of the enfranchised population over 20 years of age. While this measure takes into account the size of the enfranchisement and captures multiple waves of franchise reforms, it cannot produce separate estimates for male and female suffrage. Unfortunately, separate continuous measures for female and male suffrage are not available. In estimating the effects of male suffrage, I therefore use the available data, which record the percentage of the enfranchised male adult population until female suffrage and a joint percentage of the enfranchised adult female and male population after female suffrage. I then control for female suffrage with a single dummy variable. In estimating the effects of female suffrage, the main results rely on a separate dummy variable coded 1 after female suffrage and 0 otherwise. Given that most countries enfranchised all women with a single reform, a dummy indicator of universal female suffrage captures the similar extent of the reforms across all countries under study.⁵ In testing the second hypothesis, I interact the female dummy with the percentage of Catholics and the percentage

⁵However, women in the U.K., Ireland and Norway were enfranchised by two separate reforms, allowing for substantial pre-treatment franchise levels in these countries. At worst, this could lead to an underestimation of the effects.

of women in the workforce. Data on suffrage levels and reforms were taken from Mackie and Rose (1982), Flora (1983) and Caramani (2000).

4.4.3 Control Variables

All regressions include a vector of political and socio-economic control variables. With respect to political controls, all regressions include a dummy indicator of proportional representation (PR). While PR could have been adopted as a response to the rising left it has also been linked to the success of the left parties and higher redistribution (Boix 1999; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Rokkan 1970; Persson and Tabellini 1999). All regressions also include a measure of voter turnout. It has been well documented that voter turnout tends to drop after suffrage reforms, which could potentially reduce or mitigate the immediate effects of the reforms (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008; Bartolini 2007, 221-225; Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 63). The polity index is included in all regressions and controls for the overall level of democracy as well as helping to account for democratization reforms other than franchise extensions, such as partial suffrage extensions. Finally, all regressions control for electoral support for Christian Democratic and Communist partisan families. Both Christian Democrats and Communists were stronger in Catholic countries and their redistributive agenda may have provided an alternative to the Socialist platform.⁶ Data for PR adoption are sourced from Caramani (2000) and Mackie and Rose (1982). Data for voter turnout are sourced from Flora (1983) or calculated based on electoral returns in Mackie and Rose (1982). Marshall et al. provide data for the Polity index.

With respect to socio-economic variables, all regressions attempt to capture the size of the Socialist and Christian Democratic electorate. All models control for the percentage of workers in industry, the percentage of workers in agriculture, the percentage of the population aged above 65 years, the proportion of the population living in cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants, the percentage of Catholics, and the percentage of women in the workforce. Finally, all regressions control for overall economic development with a natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant

⁶The inclusion of variables that are themselves potential outcomes may bias the estimates (King 2010). I therefore replicate the results without these controls and show that, substantive interpretation remains the same regardless of whether these controls are included in the analysis.

international dollars. Data for all socio-economic indicators are taken from Banks (2001), Flora (1983) and Mitchell (2007) and generally present data from national censuses. Census data are always linearly interpolated. Data on GDP are sourced from Maddison (2003) and data on Catholicism are from Delacroix and Nielsen (2001), Flora (1983) and Maoz and Henderson (2013).

4.5 Results

The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1). Estimates of the lagged specification of equation (2) are shown in Table 3. The first columns in Tables 2 and 3 show the effect of a single continuous measure of the level of enfranchisement, jointly measuring the effect of female and male suffrage. The effect is positive and highly statistically significant. After controlling for all covariates, every one per cent increase in the enfranchised population over 20 years increases the Socialist vote share by 0.097 per cent. This means that suffrage reform which enfranchises a quarter of the adult population, that is about half of all men, leads on average to about a 2.4 per cent increase in Socialist electoral support. After adding a lagged dependent variable, the effect remains positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. Perhaps not surprisingly, the effect of the level of enfranchisement appears only over time. Enfranchising 25 per cent of the adult population increases Socialist support by about 0.5 per cent in the short run to 3.5 per cent in the long run.⁷

The hypotheses formulated above, however, suggest that the effect of suffrage should differ for male and female reforms. In testing the effects of male suffrage, a continuous indicator is available. It records the percentage of the adult male population with a vote in a given year until female suffrage and the percentage of the adult population with a vote in a given year after female suffrage. The Model (2) in Tables 2 and 3 therefore includes the available continuous measure together with a female dummy. Again, the effect is significant at 1 per cent, even in the lagged specification. Enfranchising half of the male population leads to a 6 per cent increase in Socialist support. This effect increases from 1.2 per cent in the

⁷The long-run effect is calculated as $\beta/(1-\theta)$, where β is the estimated coefficient on suffrage reform and θ is the estimated coefficient on lagged dependent variable

short run to 8.4 per cent in the long run.

Table 2: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares in Sixteen Countries, 1880-1975

<i>Dependent Var.:</i>	<i>Socialist Vote Share</i>				
<i>Model</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>
Enfr. popul. (%)	0.097*** (0.015)				
M. suff. (cont.)		0.12*** (0.015)			
M. suff. (dum.)			7.047*** (0.876)	6.764*** (0.865)	7.275*** (0.877)
F. suff. (dum.)		0.876 (0.7)	1.029 (0.69)	4.875*** (0.908)	-5.802** (2.367)
Catholics (%)	-0.065 (0.15)	-0.131 (0.148)	-0.095 (0.146)	-0.19 (0.149)	-0.047 (0.148)
F. labour (%)	-0.207* (0.117)	-0.083 (0.118)	-0.175 (0.117)	-0.224* (0.118)	-0.314** (0.125)
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.091*** (0.017)	
F. suff.*F. lab					0.251*** (0.083)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1301	1301	1301	1301	1301

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Communist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

A continuous separate measure for both male and female suffrage is not available. The Models (3-5) in Tables 2 and 3 therefore estimate the effects of two dummy variables coded 1 if the country allowed universal male or female suffrage and 0 otherwise. This means that these estimates compare the mean pre-suffrage

Table 3: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares in Sixteen Countries, 1880-1975, Lagged Specification

<i>Dependent Var.:</i>	<i>Socialist Vote Share</i>				
<i>Model</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>
Enfr. pop. (%)	0.018*** (0.006)				
M. suff. (cont.)		0.023*** (0.006)			
M. suff. (dum)			1.05*** (0.331)	1.009*** (0.331)	1.173*** (0.347)
F. suff. (dum.)		-0.031 (0.34)	-0.025 (0.342)	0.563 (0.388)	-1.333 (1.06)
Catholics (%)	-0.061 (0.042)	-0.079* (0.042)	-0.069 (0.042)	-0.098** (0.043)	-0.057 (0.044)
F. labour (%)	-0.038 (0.028)	-0.01 (0.029)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.031 (0.029)	-0.056 (0.037)
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.016** (0.007)	
F. suff.*F. lab.					0.048 (0.037)
Lagged End.	0.873*** (0.014)	0.863*** (0.015)	0.871*** (0.014)	0.858*** (0.015)	0.898*** (0.013)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1280	1280	1280	1280	1280

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Communist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

support to the mean post-suffrage support, after controlling for all covariates. Since some countries, mainly the U.K. and The Netherlands, implemented a generous franchise that enfranchised some working-class men before the adoption of


universal male suffrage, the dummy indicators may underestimate the full effects of the universal reforms. The estimate using a male dummy in Model (3) (Tables 2 and 3), however, is positive, strongly significant, and its magnitude is comparable to the estimates using the continuous measure. Since most male suffrage reforms newly enfranchised about half of all adult men, that is about a quarter of the adult population, the estimate using a single male dummy in Model (3) can be compared to the estimates presented above. Indeed, a single male dummy yields a highly comparable estimate of 7 per cent, with an increase from about 1 per cent to 8.2 per cent in the lagged specification.

The effect of a female dummy in Model 3 (Tables 2 and 3) is comparatively small and not significant in any regression. This should not be surprising, since, as hypothesized, the effect of female suffrage should depend on Catholicism and the female labour force. In testing the second hypothesis, I first interact female suffrage with Catholicism and the female labour force separately. Socialists should always do better if the proportion of women in the workforce is at its highest point. On the other hand, regardless of the female labour force, Socialists should always do better in Protestant countries. The last two columns in Tables 2 and 3 show the interaction of the female dummy with the percentage of Catholics (Model 4) and the female labour force (Model 5). The results for the marginal effects are shown in Figure 3.

Model (4) (Tables 2 and 3) shows that female suffrage increases Socialist support in predominantly Protestant countries and reduces the Socialist share in predominantly Catholic countries. Specifically, Model (4) shows that, after controlling for all covariates, when the percentage of Catholics is at 0, the mean Socialist vote share after the enfranchisement is 4.9 per cent higher than the mean Socialist vote share before the enfranchisement. For every additional percentage of Catholics, the difference between Protestant and Catholic countries is reduced by 0.091 per cent, giving a difference of about 0.3 per cent if the share of Catholics is 50 per cent and about -4.2 per cent if the share of Catholics is 100 per cent. The interaction effect is highly significant. The lagged specifications in Table 3 return significant and comparable estimates of the long run effects.

Model (5) (Tables 2 and 3) shows that the effect of female suffrage on Socialist parties also depends on the female labour force. If the percentage of women in the

Figure 3: The Effects of Female Suffrage Conditional on Catholicism and Female Labour Force



Notes: The marginal effects are based on Models (4–5) as displayed in Table 2.

workforce is as high as 40 per cent, which is the highest average female labour force in the sample, the Socialists gain about 4.2 per cent. If, however, the female labour force is as low as 15 per cent, which is the lowest country average in the sample, the Socialists lose about 2 per cent. Although the interaction effect in the lagged specification displayed in Table 3 is not statistically significant at conventional levels, the estimates of the long run effects are very comparable to the estimates in Table 2.

The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 thus show that the effect of female suffrage is independently conditional on both Catholicism and the female labour force. In Table 4 I estimate the effect of the female labour force separately in Catholic and Protestant countries.⁸ Models (1) and (2) in Table 4 show estimates of the effect of female suffrage on the support for Socialists in the Catholic and Protestant sub-samples respectively. The first column (Model 1) fits the model in all countries which are more than 90 per cent Catholic (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Ireland, Spain). The second column (Model 2) includes countries which lack a substantial Catholic minority (Denmark, Greece, Norway, Sweden, UK) or have a substantial Catholic minority (Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,

⁸Splitting the sample by religion dummy is equivalent to interacting all variables in the model with Catholicism.

Switzerland). The results for the marginal effects are shown in Figure 4.


Table 4: The Effect of the Female Labour Force by Catholicism and the Effect of Suffrage on Christian Democratic Votes, 1880-1975

<i>Dependent Var.:</i> <i>Sample</i>	Socialist (%)		<i>Christian Dem. (%)</i>		
	<i>Catholic</i> <i>>90%</i>	<i>Catholic</i> <i>< 90%</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
M. suff. (dum.)	7.607*** (1.615)	5.664*** (0.932)	3.572*** (0.652)	3.568*** (0.654)	3.547*** (0.65)
F. suff. (dum.)	-7.199* (3.838)	-5.795* (3.076)	1.014** (0.493)	-0.347 (0.444)	1.844 (1.861)
Catholics (%)	0.479* (0.276)	-0.81*** (0.189)	0.198 (0.136)	0.232* (0.131)	0.192 (0.137)
F. labour (%)	0.049 (0.2)	-0.576*** (0.15)	0.04 (0.098)	0.059 (0.096)	0.058 (0.107)
F. suff.*Cath.				0.031** (0.013)	
F. suff.*F. lab.	0.196* (0.117)	0.333*** (0.111)			-0.03 (0.074)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	446	855	1301	1301	1301

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Communist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (%) in Models 1–2) and Socialist Vote Share (%) in Models 3–5; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

The results provide further support for the second hypothesis. In both subsamples the main and interaction effects have the same sign, showing that with an increasing number of women in the workforce the support for Socialists increases. Regardless of Catholicism, Socialists always do better when the female labour force is large. Further, the results show that the effect of the female labour force can only

Figure 4: The Effects of Female Suffrage Conditional on Female Labour Force by Catholicism



Notes: The marginal effects are based on Models (1–2) as displayed in Table 4.

lessen the impact of Catholicism on Socialist support. In Protestant countries, the Socialist gains can be highest where the female labour force is greatest. Indeed, while all Protestant countries saw an increase in Socialist support after female suffrage, just an increase of 3 per cent of women in the workforce adds 1 per cent more votes to the Socialists after suffrage (Model 2 in Table 4). Although Socialist support decreases in Catholic countries after female suffrage, their losses can be lessened by a large female labour force (see Figure 4). Indeed, where the average female labour force is at its greatest (40 per cent), the Socialists do not lose any votes (Model 1 in Table 4). As the proportion of women in the workforce decreases, the Socialists in Catholic countries start losing support after female suffrage.

The above results jointly provide evidence for the effects of female suffrage on Socialist support. However, did the Socialists in Catholic countries lose to the Christian Democrats? Models (3-4) in Table 4 provide evidence that the Christian Democrats were the main beneficiaries of female suffrage in Catholic countries. On average, female suffrage increased the support for Christian Democrats by about 1 per cent (Model 3). In Catholic countries, however, the Christian Democrats increased their support after suffrage by as much as 2.8 per cent (Model 4). This is comparable to the estimate of 4.2 per cent losses to Socialists in Catholic countries. Finally, although the interaction effect of the female labour force for Christian

Democratic parties is not statistically significant, the estimates suggest that a large female labour force mitigates Christian Democratic losses (Model 5).

Table 5: Robustness Analyses and Alternative Specifications

<i>Dependent Var.:</i> <i>Sample</i>	<i>Socialist Vote Share</i>				
	<i>1880–1938</i>	<i>1880–1938 & Small</i>	<i>Excl. Swe & Den</i>	<i>Excl. Swe & Den</i>	<i>Excl. Swe & Den</i>
<i>Model</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>
M. suff. (cont.)	0.117*** (0.017)	0.111*** (0.019)	0.148*** (0.033)		
M. suff. (dum.)				6.328*** (0.927)	6.9*** (0.932)
F. suff. (dum.)	1.818** (0.846)	2.604** (1.105)	2.282** (1.12)	4.73*** (1.162)	-6.184** (2.385)
Catholics (%)	-1.125*** (0.267)	-1.387*** (0.329)	-1.351*** (0.331)	-0.168 (0.146)	-0.055 (0.144)
F. lab. (%)	-0.221 (0.196)	-0.422 (0.305)	-0.493 (0.303)	-0.226* (0.122)	-0.302** (0.127)
M. suff.*Cath.			-0.000 (0.000)		
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.087*** (0.019)	
F. suff.*F. lab.					0.246*** (0.084)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	764	414	414	1116	1117

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Small refers to 8 countries which adopted universal suffrage after the establishment of Socialist parties and after 1880; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Communist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (%), Socialist Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

Table 5 provides a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks.

First, Models (12) in Table 5 document that the main results are robust to shorter and smaller panels. Model (1) shows that the effects of male suffrage remain intact when the panel covers only the period 1880-1938, that is when all male reforms have taken place. Model (2) shows that these results persist also after excluding countries that adopted male suffrage prior to the establishment of Socialist parties. Second, Model (3) in Table 5 shows that the effect of male suffrage does not depend on Catholicism. Socialists benefited from male suffrage in both Catholic and Protestant countries. Third, Models (4-5) in Table 5 show that the results remain intact when Sweden and Denmark are excluded from the sample.⁹

The online appendix presents three additional tables. Appendix Table 1 shows that the main result remains highly comparable once ‘left parties’ (Communist and Socialist) are considered as a single dependent variable. Appendix Table 2 shows that the main result remains intact for parliamentary representation of Socialists (seat shares). Finally, since including controls which can be alternative dependent variables may cause post-estimation bias, Appendix Table 3 drops party controls and shows that, substantively, the main result remains intact.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

Although it has been well documented that franchise extension increases the size of the government, the political mechanism that links franchise reforms and redistribution in Western Europe has been much debated. While the economic theory implies no partisan effect, some studies link the strength of left parties to the size of the welfare state provision and the size of the working-class electorate. Moreover, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that the newly enfranchised men supported the Socialists and that the newly enfranchised women supported the Christian Democrats in Catholic countries. Yet previous research provided limited systematic evidence that male suffrage indeed increases support for left parties. The enfranchisement of women, in turn, was generally thought to have no effect on partisan support, despite the fact that women were frequently assumed to hold distinctive redistributive preferences. Contrary to the prediction of economic

⁹Both Sweden and Denmark enfranchised a small proportion of men (on public relief) together with women. If these men voted for the Socialists, the positive effect of female suffrage in Protestant countries on Socialist support could be overestimated.

models, this study has shown that both male and female suffrage are correlated with long-term electoral gains of political parties with a redistributive agenda. The newly enfranchised men voted for the Socialists, whereas the newly enfranchised women voted for either Socialists or Christian Democrats, depending on the level of Catholicism and the size of the female labour force.

I argued that the family-friendly and Catholic policies of Christian Democratic parties in Catholic countries appealed to both the redistributive and socially conservative policies of the newly enfranchised women. However, even in Catholic countries, whenever a large proportion of women entered the paid workforce the Christian Democratic appeal to women was lessened, as the Christian Democrats now had to compete with the Socialist parties for women's votes. In the absence of family-friendly policies and Christian Democratic parties in predominantly Protestant countries, women had to enter the paid workforce. Once employed, they developed a strong reliance on the Socialist welfare system which provided them with state-funded relief from their traditional caregiving responsibilities. The key finding of this study provides an additional piece of evidence that the rise of the welfare state after suffrage reforms was mediated by the strength of political parties with a redistributive agenda. Future research should further examine the effects of suffrage within individual countries and outside the Western context.

5 Summary Findings and Future Agendas

In this dissertation research, I took a first pass at examining women's historical voting behaviour. Such research has been limited, mostly owing to the lack of reliable large-scale survey data prior to the 1950s. Analyzing aggregate electoral results, I re-examined some of the conventional wisdoms in the literature, that are mostly supported with anecdotal evidence or by limited polling data from locations where authorities tallied votes separately for women and men.

To the degree that women had different political preferences than men, bringing them into the electorate should have influenced partisan distribution in the legislatures. In this research I show that women's suffrage indeed affected partisan constellations in the national bodies. The key finding of this research is that women supported parties with redistributive agendas both in the long run and at the time of suffrage. Such findings shed light on several competing theses in the literature.

First, contrary to the so frequent claims that women's voting behaviour did not differ much from that of their husbands, I provide evidence that women's votes affected power constellations between parties in national legislative bodies. In many ways, politicians' fears and hopes that, once enfranchised, women would vote differently from men have materialized.

Second, my research reveals limitations of the economic literature which implies that women's votes were not responsible for the vast redistributive effects of women's suffrage. Contrary to the economic literature, my research shows that while all parties may have strategically sought votes of the newly enfranchised women, not all parties did so equally well. Instead, parties with redistributive agendas likely mediated the redistributive effects of women's suffrage.

Third – and most importantly – there has long been consensus in political science that a 'traditional' gender voting gap existed prior to the 1960s, but that as the second wave of feminism emerged so too did the 'modern' gender voting gap, where women vote more liberally than men. In contrast, I note that particularly at the time of suffrage in most countries – that is long before the second wave of feminism – women's unequal role in the household and their economic vulnerability have driven them to prefer parties with redistributive as well as suffrage agendas.

Substantively, my research does not seek to contradict the notion that women endorsed socially conservative preferences. My research, however, directly contradicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties at the time of the first feminist wave. Moreover, despite the reactionary post-war years, parties with redistributive agendas benefitted from womens suffrage, particularly when women's labour force was large.

Going forward, I plan to build upon this research in several ways. First, I plan to examine further political outcomes, such as political competition of turnout. Second, and more importantly, I aim to develop the third paper into a book length manuscript including more Western as well as non-Western countries. It is only in the comparative perspective that I can convincingly adjudicate between the competing theses which stipulate women's voting behaviour. Moreover, at this stage, women's voting behaviour at the time of suffrage in the vast amount of cases outside the West remains largely neglected in the literature.

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A Appendix

A.1 Appendix for Chapter 1: Introduction

Appendix Figure 1: Women disenfranchised for fears of their prohibitionist preferences.



Caption: P.C. Hardy: 'Tut, tut, lady, I can't let you open the door New Year's Day, because I'd have to shut this door and my friends in the trade wouldn't like it.'

Source: Canada, The Evening Standard, 1898.

Appendix Figure 2: Women being excluded from the electorate as 'Mothers'.



Caption: 'Everybody votes but mother.'

Source: Canada, Grain Growers Guide, 1914

Appendix Figure 3: Women as lobbyists for progressive reforms, including suffrage.



Caption: 'A woman's work is never done.'

Source: U.S., The New York Telegram, 1918

Appendix Figure 4: Progressive Party offering women suffrage in exchange for their progressive votes.



Caption: 'The unanswerable argument for suffrage.'

Source: U.S., NAWSA, 1912

Appendix Figure 5: U.K. Labour Party seeking women's votes.



Source: U.K., Labour Party campaign poster, 1929

Appendix Figure 6: Pamphlet of the National Union in the U.K. that seeks to 'ameliorate economic condition of women'.

A. 78.

THIRD EDITION.

July, 1912.

8

"VOTES AND WAGES"

How Women's Suffrage will improve the
Economic Position of Women.

BY

A. MAUDE ROYDEN.



The Woman-worker: "They have a cheek! I've never been asked!"


Published by The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies,
14, Great Smith Street, Westminster, S.W.; and
Printed by VACHER & SONS, LTD., Westminster House, S.W.—42866.

Price 2d.

Source: U.K., NUWS Pamphlet, 1911

A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2: Votes for and by Women: How Did Women Vote after the Nineteenth Amendment?

Appendix Figure 1: Plotting Change in Democratic Support (1920-1918) on the Female Vote by 90th Percentile Black



Notes: The grey dots and fitted line correspond to white counties. The black dots and fitted line represents trends in the Black Belt.

Appendix Table 1: Correlates of Female Vote 1920-1918

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)
ln(population density)	0.934*** (0.09)	0.934*** (0.09)
Adult black (%)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.011)
Adult illiterate (%)	0.026 (0.018)	0.026 (0.018)
Methodists (%)	0.111*** (0.013)	0.111*** (0.013)
Baptists (%)	0.04*** (0.011)	0.04*** (0.011)
Roman Catholics (%)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)
Value of all crops (millions)	0.168*** (0.045)	0.169*** (0.045)
Total manufacturing output (millions)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.006)
Republican Vote Share 1918	0.007* (0.004)	
Democratic Vote Share 1918		-0.006 (0.004)
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1997	1997
R-sq.	0.717	0.717

Appendix Table 2: Alternative Cut-Off Points

Cut-off point	95th percentile		80th percentile		70th percentile		60th percentile	
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>								
Female vote (%)	-0.305	0.298**	-0.305	0.459***	0.122	0.395***	0.179	0.411**
	(0.417)	(0.141)	(0.292)	(0.145)	(0.26)	(0.149)	(0.236)	(0.159)
<i>Model</i>								
<i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>								
Female vote (%)	0.282	-0.407***	0.402	-0.568***	-0.145	-0.542***	-0.171	-0.676***
	(0.419)	(0.153)	(0.313)	(0.157)	(0.274)	(0.166)	(0.245)	(0.195)
District FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Obs.	109	1888	428	1569	638	1359	855	1142

Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln (population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

Appendix Table 3: Including Counties with Boundary Changes

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>												
Female vote (%)	1.063***	1.114***	0.146	0.272**	-0.742***	-0.584	-0.297	-0.476	1.294***	1.478***	0.238*	0.404***
	(0.153)	(0.222)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.27)	(0.395)	(0.3)	(0.32)	(0.171)	(0.24)	(0.131)	(0.144)
<i>Model</i>	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
<i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>												
Female vote (%)	-0.158	-1.004***	-0.278**	-0.364***	1.034***	0.312	0.142	0.309	-0.33*	-1.365	-0.398***	-0.502***
	(0.162)	(0.242)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.357)	(0.426)	(0.292)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.261)	(0.142)	(0.155)
District FEs	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes
Sample	All	All	All	All	Black	Black	Black	Black	White	White	White	White
Obs.	2275	2102	2039	2023	228	218	219	218	2047	1884	1820	1805

Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

Appendix Table 4: Excluding Three States Which Extended Suffrage in 1918

<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>a) Rep. votes 1920-1918</i>												
Female vote (%)	1.258***	1.3***	0.152	0.255*	-0.737**	-0.603	-0.329	-0.505	1.544***	1.736***	0.259*	0.396**
	(0.173)	(0.236)	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.271)	(0.408)	(0.307)	(0.324)	(0.196)	(0.255)	(0.141)	(0.154)
<i>Model</i>	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
<i>b) Dem. votes 1920-1918</i>												
Female vote (%)	-0.271	-1.13***	-0.303**	-0.359**	1.028***	0.332	0.159	0.323	-0.474**	-1.544***	-0.445***	-0.514***
	(0.18)	(0.262)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.359)	(0.438)	(0.299)	(0.325)	(0.202)	(0.284)	(0.152)	(0.167)
District FEs	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes	x	x	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919)	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	x	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls (1919-1914)	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes	x	Yes
Sample	All	All	All	All	Black	Black	Black	Black	White	White	White	White
Obs.	2022	1884	1819	1808	224	214	215	214	1798	1670	1604	1594

Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%

A.3 Appendix for Chapter 3: After the Vote: Programmatic Preferences and Women's Loyalty

Appendix Material 1: Description of Four Exclusion Criteria.

The first inclusion criterion, of a national level reform to women's voting rights, can be measured in several ways. In many countries such as Finland and New Zealand all women above a certain age became eligible to vote in national elections at the same time. Yet in others, women from different social groups or regions would have received voting rights reform in separate extensions. For example, South Africa and Kenya extended votes to white women before women of color, and states in the United States, and Cantons in Switzerland, extended votes to women within their borders while women in other subnational units were excluded from the right for longer. Finally, some countries extended voting rights to women on a class basis. For example, in 1918 the U.K. allowed propertied women of certain ages to vote before universal suffrage in 1929. For consistency and clarity, we define our key independent variable, national level women's enfranchisement, as a piece of national legislation that guarantees voting rights to the vast majority of women in a given country.

The second criterion for case selection is that the country in question had to be a democracy prior to and after the extension of voting rights to women, and must have a relatively stable party system across the relevant time period. In principle the application of the democracy requirement is obvious, and eliminates a large number of cases off the bat like Angola, which extended universal suffrage in 1992 at the end of the civil war. In some instances, though, it requires clarification. For example, Cambodia extended manhood suffrage in 1946, prior to its official independence from France in 1953. In 1955, the right to vote was extended to Cambodian women, but the election in that year was not competitive and resulted in the same party holding control for 15 years (Rieger et al. 2001). Along with lacking turnover, a key component of the minimalist conception of democracy, it would be difficult to make a meaningful assessment of the reform's effects in uncompetitive elections.

The final aspect of the second inclusion criterion is that the democratic country in question needed a relatively stable party system before and after the reform was enacted. This is an empirical requirement insofar as it would be impossible to estimate a change in partisan support if the same parties were not extant before and after the reform. This criterion excludes countries like Costa Rica, which had manhood suffrage under the secret ballot in 1925, and extended the vote to women in 1949, one year after a coup that not only deposed the government, but also saw a complete transformation in the party makeup in 1949 and again in 1953

(Nohlen 2005: 151ff.). It also excludes New Zealand, which although it extended the suffrage in 1893 in an arguably less volatile environment than Costa Rica, nevertheless only began to solidify the party groups in that same year.

The third criterion by which we exclude cases from our sample occurs when women's enfranchisement was extended in a year in which other major electoral reforms were enacted, such as changes to the male franchise laws or significant changes in boundaries of local units. This excludes from study the United Kingdom's Fourth Reform Act in 1918, which, while it granted the vote to a large share of British women (over 35 whose husbands were taxpayers), also brought a large share of men who were not heads of households into the electorate. The 1928 reform in the U.K., however, which removed the age bar for women without changing constituency boundaries, is amenable to study.

Appendix Table 1: Original Sample Selection of 152 countries

Country Name	ccode	Women's Suffrage	Sample?	Criterion
Afghanistan	AFG	1963	N	2
Algeria	DZA	1962	N	2
Angola	AGO	1975 [1992]	N	2, 3
Argentina	ARG	[1913 (f)] 1947	Y/M	4
Armenia	ARM	1919	N	2
Australia	AUS	[1902 (r)] 1962	Y	
Austria	AUT	1918	N	2,3
Azerbaijan	AZE	1918	N	
Bahrain	BHR	1973	N	3
Bangladesh	BGD	1972	N	4
Belgium	BEL	[1919 (o)] 1948	Y	
Belize	BLZ	1945 (a,r,p); 1954	N	
Benin	BEN	1960	N	2,3
Bhutan	BTN	1953	N	2
Bolivia	BOL	1952	N	3
Botswana	BWA	1965	N	
Brazil	BRA	1932	N	3
Brunei	BRN	1959	N	2
Burkina Faso	BFA	1960	N	
Burundi	BDI	1961	N	
Cambodia	KHM	1955	N	2
Cameroon	CMR	1956	N	
Canada	CAN	[1916 (f)] 1917# 1920 (r)	Y/M	
Cape Verde	CPV	1975	N	
Central African Rep.	CAF	1986	N	
Chad	TCD	1960	N	
Chile	CHL	1949	Y	
China	CHN	1949	N	2
Comoros	COM	1960	N	
Congo, Dem. Rep.		1960	N	
Congo, Rep.	COG	1960	N	
Cook Islands	CIL	1893	N	2
Costa Rica	CRI	1949	N	2
Cote d'Ivoire	CIV	1960	N	
Denmark	DNK	[1908 (1)] 1918	N	3
Djibouti	DJI	1977	N	3

Country Name	ccode	Women's Suffrage	Sample?	Criterion
Dominican Republic	DOM	1942	N	2
Egypt, Arab Rep.	EGY	1956	N	2
El Salvador	SLV	1950	N	2
Eritrea	ERI	1955	N	
Ethiopia	ETH	1955	N	2,3
Fiji	FJO	1963	N	3
Finland	FIN	1906	N	3
France	FRA	1944	N	2
Gabon	GAB	1956	N	2
Gambia, The	GMB	1960	N	2
Georgia	GEO	1918	N	
Germany	DEU	1918	M	3
Ghana	GHA	1957	N	2, 3
Greece	GRC	1952	Y	
Grenada	GRD	1951	N	2
Guatemala	GTM	1945 (e)	N	2
Guinea	GIN	1960, 1956	N	2
Guinea- Bissau	GNB		N	2
Guinea, Equatorial	GIN	1963	N	2
Guyana	GUY	1953	N	2
Haiti	HTI	1957	N	2,3
Honduras	HND	1954; 1957-1955	N	2
Iceland	ISL	[1911/1914] 1915(a) 1919	N	3
India	IND	1949	Y/M	
Indonesia	IDN	1945	N	3
Iran, Islamic Rep.	IRN	[1952 (m)] 1963	M	4
Iraq	IRQ	1967	N	2, 3
Ireland	IRL	1922	N	2?
Israel	ISR	[1920 (r)] 1948	N	2
Italy	ITA	1946	N	2
Jamaica	JAM	1953	N	3
Japan	JPN	1945	N	2
Jordan	JOR	1974	N	2
Kazakhstan	KAZ	1924	N	2
Kenya	KEN	1963	N	2
Kiribati	KIR	1967	N	2

Country Name	ccode	Women's Suffrage	Sample?	Criterion
Korea, North	PRK	1948	N	2
Korea, Republic of	KOR	1948	N	2
Kuwait	KWT	2005	Y/M	
Kyrgyz Republic	KGZ	1918	N	2
Lao PDR	LAO	1958	M	2
Lebanon	LBN	[1952 (e)] 1957	M: 1957	
Lesotho	LSO	1965	N	2
Liberia	LBR	1946	M	3
Libya	LYB	1963	M	2
Luxembourg	LUX	1919	N	3
Madagascar	MDG	1956	N	2
Malawi	MWI	1964	N	3
Malaysia	MYS	1957	N	3
Mali	MLI	1956	N	2,3
Malta	MLT	1947	N	3
Marshall Islands	MHL		N	2
Mauritania	MRT	1961	N	2
Mauritius	MUS	1959	N	2
Mexico	MEX	1953	Y	
Micronesia	FSM		M	2
Mongolia	MNG	1924	N	2
Morocco	MAR	1959	N	2
Mozambique	MOZ	1975	N	2
Myanmar	MMR	1948	N	2
Namibia	NAM	1989	N	2
Nauru		1968	N	2
Nepal	NPL	1951	N	2
Netherlands	NLD	1919	Y	
New Zealand	NZL	1893	N	2
Nicaragua	NIC	1950, 1955	N	2,3
Niger	NER	1960	N	2
Nigeria	NGA	[1960 (r)] 1977	M: 1977	
Norway	NOR	[1907 (p)] 1913	Y	
Oman	OMN		N	2
Pakistan	PAK	1956	N	2
Palau	PLW		N	2
Panama	PAN	1945	N	2

Country Name	ccode	Women's Suffrage	Sample?	Criterion
Papa New Guinea	PNG	1964	N	2
Philippines	PHL	1938	N	3
Portugal	PRT	[1931(e)] 1976, 1974	N	2
Puerto Rico	PRI	[1929 (l)] 1936	Y	
Qatar	QAT		N	
Rwanda	RWA	1961	N	2
Samoa	WSM	1990	M	
Sao Tome and Principe	STP	1975	N	2
Saudi Arabia	SAU		N	2
Senegal	SEN	1960	N	2
Seychelles	SYC	1976	N	2
Sierra Leone	SLE	1961	N	2
Singapore	SGP	[1947?] 1965	M	
Solomon Islands	SLB		N	2
Somalia	SOM	1961	M	
South Africa	ZAF	[1930 (r)] 1994	N	2,3
Spain	ESP	1931(t), 1976	M	3
Sri Lanka	LKA	[1931 ?]	N	3
Sudan	SDN	1964	M	
Swaziland	SWZ	1967	N	2
Sweden	SWE	1919	M	3
Switzerland	CHE	[1959 (f)] 1971	Y	
Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	1949	Y	
Taiwan	TAW	1947	N	2
Tajikistan	TJK	1924	N	
Tanzania	TZA	1961	N	2
Thailand	THA	1932	N	2
Togo	TGO	1958	N	2
Tonga	TON	1960	M	4,3
Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	[1924 (a)] 1946	Y	4
Tunisia	TUN	1959	N	2
Turkey	TUR	1930	Y	
Turkmenistan	TKM	1924	N	3?
Tuvalu		1967	N	2
Uganda	UGA	1962	M	2

Country Name	ccode	Women's Suffrage	Sample?	Criterion
United Arab Emirates	ARE		N	2
United Kingdom	GBR	[1918 (a,p)] 1928	Y: 1928	
United States of America	USA	[1893 (f)] 1920	Y	
Uzbekistan	UZB	1938	N	2
Vanuatu	VUT	1975	N	2
Vietnam	VNM	1946	N	2
Yemen, Rep.	YEM	1970	M	2
Zambia	ZMB		N	2
Zimbabwe	ZWE	1980	M	

Notes: ccode is the World Development Indicators' three-letter country code. The following notes apply: (a) indicates an age restriction different from men; (e) educational restriction; (p) indicates continued property or tax requirements; (f) indicates a limited national suffrage in some federal states; (m) municipal level; (r) indicates continued racial exclusion; (t) lost after regime transition; \hat{A} ge 29; # Canadian women with family members in armed services could vote federally in 1917. Criteria for inclusion: (1) reform administered with a single piece of legislation at the national level; (2) country a democracy before and after reform with relatively stable party system; (3) women's enfranchisement not concurrent with other major electoral reform; (4) availability of data for disaggregated electoral units.

A.4 Appendix for Chapter 4: Universal Suffrage and the Electoral Support for Parties with Redistributive Agendas: Evidence from Sixteen Countries

Appendix Table 1: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist and Communist Vote Shares in Sixteen Countries, 1880–1975

<i>Dependent Var.:</i>	<i>Socialist and Communist Vote Share</i>				
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Enfr. pop. (%)	0.102*** (0.016)				
M. suff. (cont.)		0.127*** (0.016)			
M. suff. (dum.)			6.683*** (0.894)	6.404*** (0.885)	6.98*** (0.895)
F. suff. (dum.)		0.872 (0.745)	1.052 (0.742)	4.475*** (1.016)	-7.583*** (2.503)
Catholics (%)	-0.435*** (0.146)	-0.498*** (0.144)	-0.494*** (0.143)	-0.593*** (0.146)	-0.42*** (0.144)
F. lab. (%)	-0.149 (0.122)	-0.019 (0.123)	-0.111 (0.123)	-0.152 (0.123)	-0.288** (0.131)
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.071*** (0.018)	
F. suff.*F. lab.					0.317*** (0.086)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1301	1301	1301	1301	1301

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Christian Democratic Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Seat Shares in Sixteen Countries, 1880–1975.

<i>Dependent Var.:</i>	<i>Socialist Seat Share</i>				
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Enfr. pop. (%)	0.081*** (0.019)				
M. suff. (cont.)		0.113*** (0.017)			
M. suff. (dum.)			6.935*** (1.153)	6.425*** (1.119)	7.197*** (1.16)
F. suff. (dum.)		1.768* (0.979)	1.895* (0.967)	6.748*** (1.432)	-5.066* (2.984)
Catholics (%)	0.129 (0.195)	0.111 (0.192)	0.134 (0.191)	0.026 (0.181)	0.181 (0.197)
F. lab. (%)	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.156 (0.15)	-0.242 (0.15)	-0.31** (0.145)	-0.383** (0.159)
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.117*** (0.02)	
F. suff.*F. lab.					0.256** (0.101)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1301	1301	1301	1301	1301

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Christian Democratic Vote Share (%); Communist Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.

Appendix Table 3: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares in Sixteen Countries, Without Party Controls, 1880–1975.

<i>Dependent Var.:</i>	<i>Socialist Vote Share</i>				
<i>Model</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Enfr. pop. (%)	0.089*** (0.015)				
M. suff. (cont.)		0.108*** (0.015)			
M. suff. (dum.)			6.958*** (0.896)	6.742*** (0.885)	7.125*** (0.893)
Fem. suff. (dum.)		0.807 (0.713)	0.967 (0.699)	5.1*** (0.948)	-4.748** (2.314)
Catholics (%)	0.173 (0.165)	0.127 (0.16)	0.133 (0.161)	0.044 (0.153)	0.174 (0.164)
F. lab. (%)	-0.252* (0.129)	-0.146 (0.128)	-0.221* (0.128)	-0.273** (0.125)	-0.339** (0.136)
F. suff.*Cath.				-0.097*** (0.017)	
F. suff.*F. lab.					0.209** (0.081)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Five years FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1301	1301	1301	1301	1301

Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.