

A comparative study of French and UK Government programmes to tackle the physical, management, and social problems of postwar social housing estates

James A. Provan

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS





## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the impact of the Estates Action (EA) programme in the UK, and Développement Social des Quartiers (DSQ) programme in France, on run down, post war, marginalised estates. Its focus is the housing management aspects of the problems on the estates. It examines the methodological problems associated with comparative studies of housing estates, then sets out a comparative analysis of the origins, development, and nature of the estates under consideration. The origins and structure of the DSQ/EA programmes are explained, and a descriptive evaluation is given of their impact, based partly 12 detailed case studies.

There is considerable use of primary documentary sources, and interviews with both local and national government officials, including with over 100 housing and other agents on the estates. It also draws on published reports and other material.

I argue that there are a number of factors, shared in both countries, which create the problems:

- the physical state of the estate itself
- poor management of the estate
- failure to carry out the necessary infrastructural works to accompany construction
- the encouragement of low cost home ownership as the natural and desired tenure
- the need to fill the empty properties with anyone who would pay rent, allied with social and racial "dumping"

The provision of EA/DSQ resources to the estates was due to wider imperatives than simply housing problems of voids or disrepair -rather it was the problems of high pockets of unemployment, rising crime rates, and the notion of "social exclusion". Successful aspects of the programme include physical rehabilitation, new devolved management, and better infrastructural provision, although these were often quickly subject to vandalism. Less successful were the attempts to reduce residualisation by tenure mix or social engineering of allocations. Voids were tackled by a variety of



imaginative solutions, and the programmes increasingly included measures to tackle the underlying problems of crime and economic marginalisation.

The most effective remedies were those which involved wholesale remodelling of estates, with demolitions and the introduction of new homes, including new tenures. This type of solution is most likely to be effective in the worst estates; though the less radical measures will be effective in the less problematic areas.

*Note: Throughout this thesis French expressions are generally translated, and where appropriate the original is given between square brackets; for example: APL Housing Benefit [Aide Personnalisée à Logement]*

*In addition, any price comparisons made at an assumed exchange rate of £1 =F10, irrespective of the year of comparison.*



## Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology . . . . .	12
Structure of Thesis . . . . .	12
Introductory Chapter . . . . .	12
Background to the Problems . . . . .	12
Methodological Issues in International Comparative Research . . . . .	16
Methodological Issues in Housing Estate Research . . . . .	21
Detailed Case Study Methodology . . . . .	27
General Interview Structure . . . . .	38
 Chapter Two: The Structure of HLMs . . . . .	 41
Contemporary French Social Housing Organisations . . . . .	41
Contemporary UK Social Housing Organisations . . . . .	49
Summary and Conclusion . . . . .	52
 Chapter Three: The Problems of the Difficult Estates . . . . .	 54
Overview . . . . .	54
Origins of Social Housing in France and the UK . . . . .	54
Why a Mass Housing Programme? . . . . .	55
Where were they built? . . . . .	62
Why High Rise and Industrialised Construction? . . . . .	66
Who was housed in the new, high rise estates? . . . . .	70
Ethnic Minority Tenants on Estates . . . . .	74
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	83
 Chapter Four: Context of the EA and DSQ Programmes . . . . .	 86
Overview . . . . .	86
Stirrings of Awareness . . . . .	86
Initial Programmes . . . . .	94
Relation to other Government Programmes . . . . .	101
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	106



Chapter Five: Estate Action and the DSQ . . . . .	109
Summary . . . . .	109
Creation . . . . .	109
Organisation . . . . .	119
Choice and Approval of Schemes . . . . .	123
Funding Mechanisms and Expenditure Details . . . . .	128
Monitoring . . . . .	133
Evaluation . . . . .	135
Development . . . . .	140
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	143
 Chapter Six: Analysis of The Case Studies . . . . .	 146
Individual Case Studies . . . . .	147
Basic Site Details . . . . .	148
Population . . . . .	150
Ethnic Minority Population . . . . .	155
The Problems on the Estates . . . . .	157
Summary . . . . .	165
Housing Management Objectives . . . . .	166
Summary . . . . .	175
Rehabilitation Objectives . . . . .	176
Summary . . . . .	183
Non Housing Objectives . . . . .	184
Summary . . . . .	186
What happened? . . . . .	189
Expenditure . . . . .	197
Summary . . . . .	201
Concluding Discussion . . . . .	209



Chapter Seven: Synthesis and Concluding Discussion . . . . . 211

Origins of problem . . . . . 211

The Need to Respond . . . . . 214

The Programmes . . . . . 215

The Positive Outcomes . . . . . 216

The Heart of the Problem . . . . . 218

Relation to Programmes . . . . . 221

Comparative Issues . . . . . 222

Case Study Annex . . . . . 223

Bibliography . . . . . 380



## List of Tables

Table 1.1: Interviews conducted . . . . .	32
Table 2.1: Key similarities and differences of HLM and UK housing organisations . . . . .	53
Table 3.1: Pattern of Immigration in France . . . . .	75
Table 5.1: DSQ Total Housing Expenditure. . . . .	130
Table 5.2: Breakdown of Expenditure Sources for Social Housing . . . . .	130
Table 5.3: Estate Action Expenditure . . . . .	131
Table 5.4: Breakdown of Purpose of Expenditure, Estate Action . . . . .	131
Table 5.5: Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France . . . . .	132
Table 6.1: Scheme and Population Sizes . . . . .	151
Table 6.2: Estate Details: Flat and Block Types; and City Politics . . . . .	152
Table 6.3: Population . . . . .	153
Table 6.4: General Statement of Key Original Problems . . . . .	158
Table 6.5: Original Problems (part 1) . . . . .	159
Table 6.6: Original Problems (part 2) . . . . .	160
Table 6.7: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (pt 1) . . . . .	172
Table 6.8: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (pt 2) . . . . .	173
Table 6.9: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (pt 3) . . . . .	174
Table 6.10: Key Rehabilitation Objectives of Programme (part 1) . . . . .	181
Table 6.11: Key Rehabilitation Objectives of Programme (part 2) . . . . .	182
Table 6.12: Key Non Housing Objectives of Programme (part 1) . . . . .	187
Table 6.13: Key Non Housing Objectives of Programme (part 2) . . . . .	188
Table 6.14 Comparative Unit Costs, UK/France, all schemes . . . . .	198
Table 6.15: Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France . . . . .	198
Table 6.16: Comparative Unit Costs: UK/France, highest spending case study schemes . . . . .	199
Table 6.17: Comparative Unit Costs: UK/France, rest of case study schemes . . . . .	199
Table 6.18: Summary of Expenditure . . . . .	200
Table 6.19: Outcomes of Programme (part 1) . . . . .	205



Table 6.20: Outcomes of Programme (part 2)	206
Table 6.21: Outcomes of Programme (part 3)	207
Table 6.22: Outcomes of Programme (part 4): Summary and Main Indicators at End	208

**List of Boxes**

Box 1.1: Interviews at National and Regional Level.	31
Box 2.1: HLM Organisations.	41
Box 2.2: Structure of Office Publics.	43
Box 5.1: Key DSQ Concepts.	111



Case Study Annex

The order of the case studies in the Annex is:

	Page
<b>Full French Case Studies</b>	
Zac de la Noe, Chanteloup les Vignes. . . . .	224
La Pierre Collinet, Meaux . . . . .	243
Mont Liébaut, Béthune. . . . .	258
<b>Full English Case Studies</b>	
Doddington Estate, Wandsworth . . . . .	275
Miles Platting, Manchester . . . . .	288
Precinct Estate, Salford . . . . .	303
<b>Contracted French Case Studies</b>	
Le Clos Saint-Lazare, Stains . . . . .	320
Fort Nieulay, Calais . . . . .	330
Nouvelles Synthe, Grande Synthe . . . . .	339
<b>Contracted English Case Studies</b>	
Stonebridge Estate, Brent . . . . .	352
St Lukes, Islington . . . . .	361
Worsley Mesnes, Wigan . . . . .	371

Each case study is preceeded by colour pictures of the estate.



*Each case study has the following sections:*

Background and History

Population

Original Problems

Original Proposals and Objectives

What Happened?

Comments and Assessment by Main Agents

Summary and Evaluation



*Each case study has the following boxes:*

Box 1: Location

Box 2: Population

Box 3: Estate Details

Box 4: Major Problems at Start

Box 5: Housing Objectives of Programme

Box 6: Non Housing Elements

Box 7: Summary of Outcomes

Box 8: Summary of Expenditure

Box 9: Main Issues from Interviews

Box 10: State of Main Indicators Now



## Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology

### **Structure of Thesis**

This thesis sets out to examine the impact of the Estates Action (EA) programme in the UK, and Développement Social des Quartiers (DSQ) programme in France, on run down, post war, marginalised estates. Its focus is the housing management aspects of the problems on the estates. Chapter by chapter it:

- examines the background to the construction of these estates in the housing and planning policies of the post war period
- outlines the types of problem which they exhibited and sets out the origins of the governmental programmes to combat these problems
- describes the DSQ and Estate Action programmes
- describes and analyses the specific problems with reference to a total of 12 case study estates (6 in each country). The annex sets out full narrative details of six of these case studies, with the full details of the other six provided in more truncated note form.
- looks at what conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the programmes in combatting the problems, and the international comparative issues raised.

### **Introductory Chapter**

This first chapter briefly locates the problem in the wider context of inner city research studies. It then goes on to consider the general methodological issues raised by international comparative social research studies of this type. A second set of methodological problems arise because of the housing management and estate basis of the work, which are also explored. Finally it outlines the structure and methodology of the case studies and overall thesis in more detail, in the light of the earlier methodological issues raised.

### **Background to the Problems**

#### Problem Estates

The problem of difficult estates is one manifestation of the general problem of urban disfunction. It is an important aspect, as the problems of high levels of



unemployment, crime, and social isolation seen on the estates in this thesis exemplify some of the serious urban problems which have been increasingly affecting France and the UK since the mid 70s; and although concentrated on hard to let estates at present, there is clearly government concern that these problems could spread beyond the estates where they are presently concentrated.

Dunleavy (1981) provides a comprehensive overview of the overlapping theoretical perspectives on explaining such disfunctions since 1890. The more specific idea of the "difficult to let estate" or "problem estate" has a history predating the construction of post war high rise social housing. Reynolds (1986) dates the interest from the Chicago school of urban ecology in the 1940s, who saw a

"natural habitat of deviant lifestyles in the transitional zones of deteriorating property ringing the city commercial centre; the correlates were low rents and overcrowded dwellings, presence of immigrant minorities, a changing population, all of which contributed to what they believed to be the causal factor, social disorganisation leading to lack of community cohesion."(p1).

Reynolds charts the development of approaches to the problem: British observers in the 1950s and 1960s were keen to attribute the problems to learned subcultural norms; the idea of "settled" communities was also seen as important, with remedial action aimed at "promoting the forging of bonds and relationships to replace the lost family network" (p3). The possible importance of allocations to estates was considered in Wilson's (1963) analysis of moving to a new housing estate and the problems involved. By the 70s it became evident that poor allocation strategies were not an adequate explanation, as despite settled populations the problems of these estates had not gone away. Then came the development of explanations from an urban geographer's viewpoint (e.g. Herbert 1982, Evans 1980), which were in terms of the allocation of resources in a competitive social and economic system which expresses itself in a spatial dimension to account for the continuing existence of areas of delinquency, deprivation, and other indicators of social malaise.

There was less interest in the problem estate in France, until the emergence of the HVS and DSQ programmes, although there was an extensive neo Marxist interest in



"the urban question" (e.g Castells 1977). This may be because in the UK considerably greater urbanisation provided a much greater impetus for public concern with the problem of slums, and for local government involvement in the problem, from a far earlier stage in the UK - by 1850 half of the UK population lived in towns, a degree of urbanisation not attained in France until 1931 (Toubon 1992). In France there was some interest in the US Model cities programme at the start of the DSQ. Toubon (1983) provides, for example, a comparison between the French inner cities programmes and the Model Cities programme.

### The "Inner City" Problem

The main current UK approach to problem estates is to locate it as part of the wider "inner city" problem. Hall (1981) provides an account of the work of the Social Science Research Council's Inner Cities Working Party, who met between October 1977 and November 1980 to study the problems of the inner city in its temporal, spatial, socioeconomic, and policy context, and from that to develop a review of possible policy responses and a possible research programme; Middleton (1991) provides an updated, though less thorough, account of the programmes; PSI (1992) provides the most up to date assessment of the impact of this general approach.

The approach can be traced back to the slum clearance areas of the 1930s and the Comprehensive Development Areas designated under the 1947 Town and Planning Act, both of which were aimed at tackling concentrations of urban problems localised in small areas. This had been developed following the Milner Holland report on London rented housing, which in 1965 had led to the creation of General Improvement Areas. These approaches were targeted on areas of older housing. The development of the Model Cities programme and the Community Development Programmes in the USA in the second half of the 60s also provided a model for the UK (see Lees and Smith 1975), although they generally failed to produce results. Hall suggests that several factors lead to the burst of policy activity in the late 60s in the UK in addition to Milner Holland: concern about immigration; the Plowden report in 1967 on primary schools; the Seebohm report in 1968 on the coordination of social services for deprived individuals and families; and the "rediscovery of poverty"



following the work of Richard Titmuss, which challenged the belief that economic growth and improved benefits would cure the problems of poverty.

Hall also suggests that the inner city problem should be identified in its spatial context of the rapidly changing economic and urban geography of Britain; in the context of the debate about poverty and deprivation; in its political and governmental context; and in its historical context. Understanding the problem requires a description of the decline in population and collapse of manufacturing employment; and of the nature and incidence of poverty and deprivation.

This general analysis is widely accepted by policy makers, although some writers (e.g. Rees & Lambert (1985)) have criticised Hall for failing to provide the dimension of political struggle which they assert underlies the processes.

### Social Exclusion

The contrasting approach which underlies the French programme is the more recent concentration on problems of "social exclusion". This is a term which, together with its opposite "integration", ["insertion"] was central to the DSQ programme. It is, however, generally viewed with suspicion by many UK policy makers. The first annual report of the European Community Observatory on National Policies to combat Social Exclusion (Room (1991)) admits that

"the notion of "social exclusion" is neither clear nor unambiguous.....Here we define social exclusion first and foremost in relation to the social rights of citizens. Within the countries of the EC it is generally taken for granted that each citizen has the right to a certain basic standard of living....Social exclusion can be analyzed in terms of the denial - or non realisation - of social rights. ...However citizenship consists of more than social rights. it also includes civil and political rights...- the right to participate fully and effectively in the political process" (p5-6)

The observatory is concerned to study

"the evidence that where citizens are unable to secure their social rights, they will tend to suffer generalised and persisting disadvantage and their social and occupational participation will be undermined...We refer to patterns of disadvantage in terms of education, training, employment, housing, financial resources, etc.."(p6)



In fact, as the observatory go on to point out, much UK literature, for example the work of Townsend (e.g Townsend (1979), Atkinson (1969)) has been concerned with exactly these issues.

In the context of the EC, there is currently a move by the Commission (opposed vigorously by the UK government, in line with their opposition to any "social charter" aspects of EC activity) to produce a political statement on social exclusion. This follows the establishment at the end of 1989 of an Interservice Group, coordinated by DG V, to encourage greater consideration of poverty and social exclusion in all Community programmes. The working paper produced at the beginning of 1992 on progress made by the Interservice group notes the need for investigation of "the analysis of the role of housing in the social integration of the most deprived", and amongst its recommendations includes the creation of teams of qualified development agents capable of organising partnerships amongst the local agents, and acting to integrate peripheral or segregated districts into the urban areas.

### **Methodological Issues in International Comparative Research**

This study compares different governmental programmes, and individual case studies, within and between France and England. Prior to setting out my own methodology for the study, there are several general methodological issues which must be considered.

### **The Purpose of Comparative Research**

Oxley (1991) provides a review of a wide range of comparative literature, by way of illustration of his thesis that earlier and older works seem to provide simply descriptions of activities in different countries, rather than provide any genuinely comparative analysis. Looking specifically at the purposes of comparative research Oxley suggests nine:

1. generally extending knowledge
2. getting ideas for new policies
3. getting material that can be used to reject arguments based on narrow perceptions



4. examining theoretical techniques used by housing researchers in other countries
5. investigating the operation of a professional activity in other countries to judge the potential for transfer of personnel
6. examining the operation of some sort of system in a wide context to simply understand the system better or make it work better
7. postulating a housing system and examine the interrelationships of housing system variables to other variables
8. accumulating knowledge and ideas to formulate hypotheses
9. testing well defined postulates

As this thesis develops I will illustrate how it attempts to do 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8, and not to do 4, 5, 7, & 9. Oxley concludes that there is a need for many types of comparative work: exploring, to draw maps of unknown systems; fact finding, and collating and organising the facts (what I am mainly doing); theorising, by building models and hypotheses; and finally more scientific testing of hypotheses with statistical testing.

Another list of purposes of comparative research, not totally dissimilar, is proposed by Berting (1982), who includes specifically an area which reasonably describes this thesis, which is

"descriptive-policy-oriented research: collection of data that are primarily useful for policy makers" (p14)

This makes my study similar to other small scale studies of specific areas, such as Willmott and Murie's study of polarisation in social housing in France and the UK (Willmott & Murie (1988)), or other studies of, for example, housing allowances (such as Kemp (1990)).

### Functional Equivalence

One persistent problem with international comparisons is that of identifying similar



data, within dissimilar contexts. This is explored by Neissen (1982) who describes it in terms of "functional equivalence", defined as

"a concept describing relationships. On the basis of this concept comparability cannot be assumed or not; the context is as important as the elements themselves" (p86)

Armer (1973) notes that this notion of functional or conceptual equivalence has received considerable attention in the comparative sociological literature. He suggests that it

"refers to whether the instruments used in separate societies in fact measure the same concept regardless of whether the manifest content and procedures are identical or not... literally translated questions, identical sampling procedures, and carefully copied methods...are justified only when they lead to conceptual equivalence across societies for the particular research objectives" (p52)

Warwick and Osherson (1973) note that the

"most basic theoretical question in comparative analysis is whether the concepts under study have any meaning or equivalent meaning in the social units studied" (p11)

They go on to explore in detail the problems of not only conceptual equivalence but also equivalence of measurement, linguistic equivalence, and sampling problems, stressing that "researchability" may vary widely from one country to another:- in some countries the citizens may not be accustomed to the type of questioning and approach adopted; and indeed may be unwilling or afraid to reveal the answers to questions posed for religious or political reasons.

Finally Oxley (1991) suggests that the most illuminating analyses can come when the questions asked are few and restricted to a narrow area, pointing out the difficulties of terminology, citing the very different uses of the term "privatisation" in different countries. He advocates, however, that attempts should be made to collect reliable and similarly based data with which to conduct robust statistical analyses.

These extremes of comparative problems are not major problems in this study, where the basically similar cultural norms in France and the UK are applied in relation to



the questions posed. The purpose of the introductory chapters is set out the different national contexts for the programmes and problems on the estates, charting the history of the estates, the background to the programmes, and the different administrative structures of the landlord organisations. I also avoided many of the translation and linguistic problems by virtue of conducting the in depth interviews myself in the interviewee's native language (English or French) and going direct to all primary documentary sources without the intermediary of a translator.

### The Nature and Use of Data

This is a mainly qualitative study, with trends and detailed descriptions provided with the aid of extensive quantitative information, and general policy conclusions drawn. These conclusions are not, however, formally justified by reference to statistically valid testing of a set of hypotheses.

At the most general methodological level, and in a rather rhetorical manner, Bremer (1986), in considering the problems of the attempts to establish causal laws in the explanation of social phenomena, notes that:

"while engaged in apparently rigorous scientific activity, social scientists have successfully failed to accomplish the ultimate goal of social research - valid knowledge" (p147)

Ragin (1987) compares what he calls "case oriented" methods with the more statistical, "variable oriented" methods. He considers that the case oriented method is interested in the totality of phenomena, and all relevant instances of the phenomena in question, rather than in statistical criteria. Amongst the difficulties of the variable oriented or statistical method are that it makes it difficult to address the impact of several different combinations of conditions at the same time, that is to consider a situation as a whole:- it requires the drawing of specific arbitrary boundaries to permit tests of statistical significance; and to disaggregate cases into variables then examine only the relation between these variables. By contrast the "case oriented" approach is forced to account for all relevant instances of a phenomenon, and to explain variations and differences; and to make meaning



comparisons between cases as wholes, forcing the researcher to become familiar with the details of the cases. Raglin concludes

"the comparative method is not a bastard cousin of the statistical method. It is qualitatively different from the statistical method, and it is uniquely suited to the kinds of questions that many comparativists ask. (p16)

Duncan (1991) considers the "paradox of comparative research -the enthusiasm it generates followed by the disappointment at its results", due to unrealistic expectations. One key problem is that, in her view, as positivist empiricist methods are inadequate to explain social phenomena, comparative studies are seen as a way out: - experimental situations where certain variables remain constant and others change. This is not a panacea, but has advantages if used properly, with a theoretical as well as an empirical dimension.

For Duncan, comparative studies have two roles. The first is a "shock value role", which forces researchers to ask new or refined questions about previously accepted conclusions. The second is an "explanatory role", whereby causal significance is attributed to critical factors by observing comparative situations where there are sufficient similarities and differences in the critical variables to permit the isolation of the variables under study.

A critical approach to data is also advocated by Harlowe (1991), who notes that attention to theoretical and methodological issues is overdue in housing research of all types, including comparative research,

"to transcend the limitations of that simple minded empiricism which has characterised much of this work to date" (p129)

He goes on to elaborate:

"the task is not to set out in all its empirical detail descriptive accounts of differing national housing regimes with no further end in view. It is to provide adequate answers to particular questions about why these regimes, or parts of them, take the form that they do, evolve in certain ways, exhibit certain cross-national similarities, together with national specific differences, and so on. This task, unlike simple description, is a critical one, challenging the everyday accounts of what determines housing provision, getting behind the public facade of politics or the market, dispelling mythology which.... may



frequently motivate the actions of housing agencies but should never be taken at face value by analysts" (p129)

For my own part, I consider that certain of the conclusions drawn throughout this study would be amenable to more statistically oriented testing, with attempts to quantify the elusive variables which I discuss. One important aim of this study has been to enable some of the possible candidates for such examination to be identified.

### Methodology of This Study

In this study I have set out to provide detailed, in depth descriptions of the programmes under investigation, and a range of evaluative material on their outcomes, from primary sources. The points are explored in detail through the twelve case studies, which draw on both original documentation (local reports and so on), the extensive collection of specific items of data (such as estate size and structure, voids levels, and so on), and in depth interviews with the key local agents who were responsible for managing or implementing the programmes.

The research seeks to extend knowledge, with a view to examining the problems of housing management of difficult estates in a wider, international, context; and through this process to challenge narrow conceptions and explanations in relation to policy options, providing new ideas. It also begins to formulate certain hypotheses to explain the processes involved. It avoids certain of the problems of comparative research by being based on detailed first hand gathering of information: it does not, for example, rely primarily on statistics provided by separate national statistical bodies and which may suffer from problems of different definitions. On the contrary all the data were collected directly; the explanations of their definition explored on site with the authors of any figures provided, where appropriate, and the wider context of the data are explored in the opening chapters.

### **Methodological Issues in Housing Estate Research**

Further methodological aspects of the study support the choice of a primarily qualitative approach. The research carried out in this thesis concerns the impact of social and renovation programmes on housing estates. There are few established methodological rules about how these types of housing investigations can be carried



out, and the type of conclusions which can be reached. There has been some considerable debate in both France and the UK about this problem, both mainly based on attempts to evaluate their respective programmes.

#### France: Resident Involvement in the Research and Evaluation

Clatin (1990) provides a critique of the methods frequently chosen to evaluate the DSQ in France, and provides a number of important caveats about the method I have pursued and its limitations. He starts from the basis of a meeting organised by the DIV on 15 September 1989, to look at various evaluation studies on aspects of the DSQ.

The need to assess projects from the point of view of the residents was a frequent issue raised. He quotes one of the contributors who states:

"I cannot conceive of an evaluation without ethnographic observation of the population, without which one is left with the reflections of the decision makers" (p57)

The idea of including residents in evaluation raises a number of difficult questions, set out in Gaulejac (1990):

- how to devise the terms and frameworks which will permit all the different agents to understand each other and communicate.
- how to design means to permit residents to enter into a detailed debate about the policy

In fact there is not any representative of residents as a whole, but rather there are groups of residents with different interests and concerns, some of which are mutually antagonistic. Any resident consulted as spokesperson has problems of legitimacy and representativeness - and the groups of most residualised and excluded tenants whom the programme is really designed to assist are seldom able to make their voice heard in this way, so their interests are not represented.

The additional problem is that residents find it particularly difficult to take a point of view which is "objective" on the programme, which is part of their daily lives -



to expect them to make an evaluative judgement from a point of view of distancing themselves from the programme is not reasonable. This does not make their comments worthless, just less not objective.

A more systematic way to canvas resident attitudes is via a survey. I have not carried out any such exercise. Resident surveys are a useful and legitimate way to gather a considerable amount of detailed information on a wide range of measures of satisfaction and general attitudes, as well as basic information on the structure and characteristics of residents. To do such a survey on each estate would have been more work than could reasonably have been undertaken in the context of this thesis. Nor did I attempt to interview any "tenants leaders" or officers of local residents associations. My own experience of housing management work leads me to have a total agreement with those commentators, including the ones cited above, who indicate that such self appointed commentators represent, generally, sectional interests, rather than any overall perspective. Where I had discussions with tenants or residents, these have been reflected in my descriptions of the estates, where appropriate, however.

There is a small literature which presents a picture of life on hard to let estates from an ethnographic, or participant observer approach (for example Péju (1985)).

#### France: Control Comparisons

Cletin (1990) considers a theme by another contributor to the evaluation meeting:

"What has been done is the analysis of the operation of a policy, but without any before/after comparison, or objective/outcome comparison." (p58)

Joel (1990) discusses the difficulties of this: the object of evaluation must be identified; indicators must be constructed; then the comparisons must be done. These comparisons involve the residents, the policy makers and decision makers administering the programme overall, and the officers running the programme on the ground. Comparisons are possible on a before/ after basis; or between one site and a control site, either before and after or simply after works. These are well



established methods, each with its own advantages and problems (and set out in some detail in Deleau (1986)). Applying these to the DSQ is difficult, however:

"everyone agrees on the information gaps (....the nomenclatures are often incompatible). This does not mean that there has been no production of data ....But the minimum level of statistical "visibility" (that is to say good quality statistical information, specially created, produced regularly, presented in an informative manner and easily accessible to all) is rarely attained" (Joel (1990) p116).

This is examined further in Gaulejac (1990). It is never possible have stable comparable variables on estates, as they are always in movement and transformation; there tends to be a concentration on variables which can be measured, at the expense of other variables which cannot be so measured. There is also the temptation to lose sight of the fact that the DSQ programme is intended to have effects which develop over a period of years - whereas many simple indicators (for example the rate of delinquency on an estate) are produced monthly, and the temptation to make constant comparisons is often not resisted.

He further maintains it is important to take into account the points of view of the different agents, in the knowledge that they are jostling for power and influence in their own self interest. In fact the control of the evaluation process is one means to maintain the existing values, and authority, in an organisation. The evaluation is therefore often not so much in terms of the changes on the ground, and in the living conditions, but rather in terms of the changes in the management of the estate, the practices and approaches of the institutions involved (Rosenberg & Béhar (1990) p.14). Gaulejac (1990) quotes as an example the HLM (French housing organisation) which is concerned only with the rate of rent arrears as a measure of good management; and which uses changes in allocations policy to ensure that the arrears stay low. In fact it achieves its objective by denying housing to those who are most in need of it, but this is hidden by the evaluation framework; it also means that other HLMs who pick up these more difficult tenants are branded as worse managers. There is also a tendency in an organisation for the promotion, recruitment, and management of staff to be based around certain measured indicators, and their achievement. The evaluative process can often to work towards



reinforcing the importance of these indicators, and thus the importance of the individuals in positions of authority.

He concludes that:

"evaluation in the DSQ field forces us to renounce illusions of neutrality, of objectivity. Evaluation is an element of action." (p121)

and that the validity of the methods chosen to evaluate programmes like the DSQ must be measured against:

"their ability to analyze what is actually happening: to produce an understanding of the strategies, the resistances, the contradictions and the transformations linked to action taken; and to take into account the concrete effects of the implementation of a development programme" (p122)

In contrast Deleau (1986), in his investigation into methods of evaluation of public policy in France, maintains that despite the presence of a large number of evaluation agencies, their methodologies often are less than adequate. This leads on to the comparison with the problems revealed in the UK literature on housing research.

#### UK: Performance Measurement

There is a much greater UK literature on specifically housing management issues, mainly based on attempting to measure the quality of performance of housing management organisations. Generally they are based on comparisons of estates, or studies of estates over time, and involve monitoring both costs and specified and defined performance measures ranging from voids to tenant satisfaction.

The Audit Commission studies of housing management and maintenance (Audit Commission (1984), (1986a), (1986b)) proceed on the basis of identifying good "performers", judged in terms of simple indicators of "efficiency, effectiveness, and economy", then proposing that other authorities adopt the practices which seem to "work".

A wider assessment of problems and options in housing management is provided by the DOE's study of the nature and effectiveness of housing management (MacLennan



(1989)). This study looks at some of the organisational attributes of housing associations and local authorities which are likely to influence the costs and effectiveness of housing management. The key methodological problems identified by MacLennan are similar to those set out above in the French literature: data may be incomplete, and will be on a large range of services; different groups may place different values on the relations of resources to services; and there is no clear measure of the value of the output, which has a service quality aspect rather than being a unitary product with a definite price. The report stresses the need to identify the context in which the activities take place, but notes that

"only like for like comparisons have any real meaning... all social landlords do perform certain key functions such as letting houses, organising repairs, collecting rents, etc.. It is these activities which are the key elements of our cross-landlord comparison" (p5)

My own methodology adopts this view in relation to the France UK comparison. The jobs of void control, collecting arrears, allocating homes, and so on, are sufficiently similar in both countries to be compared like for like, with the caveat that the success or failure of strategies to improve performance must be seen in the context of the national, regional, and programme frameworks.

More focused attention on difficult estates is provided by Coleman (1985), and here important disputes about methodology do emerge. The study considers the alleged relationship between design variables, such as the numbers of dwellings per entrance or the presence of overhead walkways, and certain other indicators of social malaise such as litter, graffiti, vandalism, or involvement of social services with children. The aim of the study is to establish direct correlations which will form the basis for certain prescriptive design improvements; these will in turn inevitably lead to a higher quality of life on estates - a form of "design determinism". The publication of the study gave rise to an immediate storm in the architectural press (e.g. Anson (1986), Hillier (1986)). Power (1987), while siting aspects of the study in relation to certain design features, notes that in her view

"design can be improved. But rented housing requires good landlords, regardless of design...So whatever is done to enhance design, or remedy past mistakes, there must be a full housing management service if rented housing is to work" (p15f).



More long term evaluation of the thesis of the alleged direct relation of design and quality of life has been commissioned, the study being initiated by the then Prime Minister Margret Thatcher.

Power (1987) also discusses evaluation and measurement models in relation to the Priority Estates Programme (PEP):

"many of the factors influencing an unpopular estate are social and relate to very wide issues which are difficult to quantify...if one of the main benefits of PEP is greater tenant satisfaction and reduced hostility or complaints to the landlord, these gains are impossible to cost or measure precisely..Therefore any attempt to 'measure' PEP is not wholly satisfactory" (Vol 2 p28).

Finally, the general difficulties of this type of approach are set out in a Department of the Environment report on policy evaluation. The problems are summarised as:

"The mass of data from different sources poses problems for producing clear and focused conclusions and policy recommendations. It is recognised that pure laboratory conditions can never exist and that many other features of the estate are changing at the same time as the PEP interventions. While these general features affect both the experimental and control estates used, there is always a risk of "contamination", particularly on the control estates where the very existence of a research study may itself influence outcomes.....Performance indicators are often difficult and time consuming to collect because of the poor standards of recording, poor communications between local authority departments, the lack of storage of information not intended for long term monitoring, and no cross checking of information kept. Excessive vigilance and checking of original sources would be required to test the reliability of the data and re-analysis often needed to put the records into a usable form." (Doig and Littlewood 1992, p80)

### **Detailed Case Study Methodology**

The intention in my case studies is to seek a high level overview of the nature and impact of a wide range of possible policy options on similar estates. The alternative of examining a much smaller number of estates in detail (perhaps two or at the most four), using exactly comparable empirical measures, was rejected in favour of seeking an overview which might permit a better understanding of areas where this type of detailed work might be likely to be useful. I seek to compare the problems which lead to the programme being initiated, with the outcomes after the programme had been running for several years - though in many cases it was still



continuing. This before-after comparison is the basis for the main concluding discussion.

Several items of data on the main facts about the estate, and state of the main indicators (voids, arrears, allocations, and so on) have been obtained. I have also included the views of the agents involved in the process. These views provide the essential background to understanding what actually went on during the improvement process. For example, the fact that in one case study estate there was constant disagreement and antagonism between the various partners to the programme is vital to assessing why it was not successful. Agents views also provide a unique perspective on what the problems actually are on the estate, and whether the measures proposed are actually likely to achieve the desired result - this is particularly so in the case of caretakers, who usually have an opinionated, but insightful, assessment of what is actually happening on an estate. Agents are themselves a key part of the improvement process, as they are implementing the management changes. Where they staff are apathetic or untrained, for example, the estate will suffer; and it is essential to speak to the staff to gain an assessment of this. Finally, agents views are major determinants of the likely continuation and direction of future programmes.

I am aware that the views expressed were subjective. They represented the partial opinions of agents who may have had an axe to grind. However this bias is also clearly present in the selection of data, and evaluation narratives for reports made on the progress of the programme. My approach to this material is set out below.

### Types and Sources of Information

Different types and sources of information have been used to construct the case study profiles of estates.

- background details: each estate has been described in terms of its location, size, construction date, type of dwellings, and so on. I have provided basic details of the population size and structure. This information has been obtained mainly from background reports on the estates, and from



observation and counting on the estate. Some of the details, particularly population structure, are not always of equal reliability, nor are they always complete, but they are sufficiently reliable to indicate the overall nature of the problems on the estates.

- details of the programme proposals: these are normally set out in reports prepared for committees or evaluation reports, as well as descriptions provided by agents.

- details of works executed: again these are frequently available in reports which summarise or evaluate the programmes; and this information has been supplemented by open questions put to the agents, particularly about the extent to which the programme was effectively carried out, and the process followed during its execution.

- key housing management indicators: these are the basic indicators of voids, arrears, turnover, tenure and ownership changes, and so on. As noted above, these indicators are often not available on strictly comparable terms between estates. I have therefore sometimes given a mix of quantitative values and qualitative indicators. More importantly, in relation to changes on the estate I have often indicated the direction of the change (better/ worse/ much better), rather than providing spuriously quantified figures. This information has been obtained from both reports produced on the estates, and from the posing of specific closed questions (e.g. on the current levels of voids or of arrears).

- secondary indicators: by this I mean issues such as the change in image or popularity of the estate, the level of crime and vandalism, the state of degradation or maintenance of the improvements, and the levels and type of participation in the estate by tenants. This information has been partly gathered from reports on the estate; but mainly from the posing of open questions to the main agents on the estate who have been interviewed. Certain conclusions which are drawn in the case studies are therefore based on these assessments by the agents interviewed.

- management arrangements: this includes information on whether there is a local office, the type and nature of training offered to staff, and the



approaches to management which are promoted by the organisation. It includes approaches to allocations policy. This information has been gathered both from reports on the estate and from mainly closed questioning of agents.

- "comments and assessment": one main objective in investigating the estates was to gain an impression of the main problems affecting the estates, the processes which were followed in the implementation of the programmes, and the impact of the programmes. This can be gleaned to an extent by the amassing of physical data, such as the type and extent of building works carried out. However I was interested as much or more in the comments of the people who had been involved in the process of managing the estate during the improvement process. My strategy here was to proceed by way of a series of open questions, aimed at allowing them to express opinions on their personal views on what had happened, its effectiveness, and its appropriateness. This approach is examined in more detail next.

### Interviews the Main Agents

In all 114 full interviews were conducted with agents on the estates (as well as fourteen additional short conversations on estates in France, mainly with shopkeepers or residents). Agents were selected to cover the main housing management areas of the estate, as well as the managers of the housing organisation; in the UK I also always saw the district manager, as well as the relevant assistant director in a number of cases, where this person oversaw the general work of the estate. Interviews were also held with the DSQ project managers, and in many cases some of the DSQ staff as well. A summary list of these interviews is over.

In addition I interviewed officials at the regional and national level on the origins and structure of the programmes. A list of the main people interviewed is in the box below - although this does not reflect the additional people with whom I had many short conversations at the various offices. The purpose of these interviews was varied: with certain of the regional officials, I specifically sought views on the choice of sites for the case studies; at the same time I explored how the programme



was funded, the choice of schemes, monitoring arrangements, the successes and failures of the programme, and their explanation and understanding of what was going on. In certain other cases, particularly with the national officials, I was seeking views on the background to the programmes, the way they had evolved, reasons for their developing as they did, and any insights that they were able and willing to impart about what was actually behind the thinking in setting up the programmes.

---

**France:**

- M. Rault, Prefecture de Nord-Pas de Calais
- Nicole Smadja, Ile de France Prefecture
- Jean Claude Toubon, Social Affairs Manager, National Union of HLMS [UNFOHLM] Paris
- Attended the 50th Annual congress of the National Union of HLMS [UNFOHLM] Paris in June 1990, and made numerous contacts.
- Patrick Kamoun, President of the Association of Paris HLMS
- M. Grass, DIV HQ, Paris
- Marie Christine LeRoi, DSQ HQ Paris
- Several very helpful Librarians at the UNFOHLM Library, and DIV library, in Paris

**UK:**

- Peter Emms, DOE HQ, London
- Mike Brubridge, DOE Research Division
- Steven Dunsmore, DOE HQ London
- John Harvey, ex. DOE HQ London
- Sue Duncan, ex. DOE Research Division
- Brian Leonard, DOE Regional Controller London
- Peter Handley, DOE Regional Office, London
- Alan Cavi, DOE Regional Office, Manchester
- Trevor Butterworth, DOE Regional Office, Manchester
- Anne Power, PEP Director
- Roger Saunders, PEP Training Assistant

---

**Box 1.1: Interviews at National and Regional Level**



	Estate Managr	DSQ Managr	Arrears /rent <sup>1</sup>	Letings /voids	Care-taking	Repairs /works	DSQ staff	Other/ (short) <sup>2</sup>	Total
Chanteloup	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1 (3)	10
Meaux	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	2 (2)	11
Stains	1	1	1	0	3	1	4	1 (2)	12
Calais	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	(2)	8
Béthune	1	1	2	2	3	1	0	(1)	10
Grande Synthe	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	3 (4)	11
Brent	1	x(n/a)	1	1	2	0	x(n/a)	3	8
Islington	1	x	1	0	1 <sup>3</sup>	2	x	4	9
Wandsworth	1	x	1	1	0	1	x	2	6
Manchester	1	x	2	1	3	2	x	3	12
Salford	1	x	2	1	3	0	x	2	9
Wigan	1	x	1	1	2	1	x	2	8
Totals	12	6	16	11	24	11	11	23	114

**Table 1.1: Interviews conducted**

Notes:

1. Includes Housing Officer for UK estates, where this is a generic post
2. Includes architects, external social researchers, central housing department staff such as assistant directors of housing, local councillors, and others. "Short" means that I had a significant, if informal, discussion with someone else on the estate - often a local shopkeeper or resident.
3. This was a concierge. The caretaking staff refused to be interviewed, seeing a management plot



### Choice of Case Study Sites

The sites were chosen from the two sets of regions in each country. The London and Paris regions were chosen as the main population centres around the respective capital cities. The North West and Nord Pas de Calais regions were chosen to represent provincial areas where there were major population centres, as well as agricultural and semi rural areas; they have a tradition of heavy industry, but also of decline in these traditional industries.

The estates were selected to be, as far as was possible, reasonable similar. This was difficult since, as I will show, the average size of UK estate is much smaller than in France, and the UK estate tends to be inner city and not peripheral. The Estate Action programme is also often focused on interwar cottage estates, of a type which does not exist in France. I considered it important, however, that the estates should resemble each other in significant respects, in the hope that a reasonable proportion of the physical problems might be similar. This included physical characteristics and problems of population sizes and densities. I aimed to reduce as far as possible the differences; but at the same time recognising that to pick only exactly similar estates would produce a comparison unrepresentative of the national patterns.

The criteria were therefore that the estates should be of post war construction, with a significant element of non traditional construction. They were chosen in the UK to be (with one exception) over 400 units (larger than the average, but not untypical for Estate Action projects). They should all have had a significant expenditure of EA or DSQ funds - at least £1 million.

The actual selection was achieved by using a complete list of all schemes in all four of the regions. This was supplemented by meetings in each of the regional offices (of the DOE or the Prefecture, except in Paris where it was the DSQ) to discuss the list. In France I chose only Office Public HLMS, that is those which were linked to providing public housing in a local area, rather than the more commercial private HLMs.



From these details (including, for example, the size of the programme and the size and age of the estate) certain estates could be ruled out as unsuitable, and others as promising. Thereafter I visited all the remaining candidates (over 60 in all). These visits, in my camper van, involved a physical inspection of the estates, and in most cases a visit to the local office (or similar facility) to have preliminary conversations with anyone who seemed to have some idea about the estate and the programme. These were often very fruitful "cold calls", in many cases providing easy access later to the management structure to arrange the eventual case studies. Other sites were also reasonable candidates for inclusion. The choice, however, presents a cross section of sites with reasonably comparable basic characteristics in the two pairs of similar regions. Final decisions between estates were influenced by the likely availability of good information.

### Estate Interviews

Interviews on estates were conducted using a mix of closed and open questions. The specific, closed, questions concerned factual matters - such as the location of report on the estate, the levels of voids or arrears, the staffing structures, and so on. These questions would be asked of whoever in the organisation was responsible for the retention of the specific information which I was seeking. Second each category of agent was also asked a series of in depth open questions using a semi structured interview framework. The general interview framework is produced at the end of this chapter.

I have already noted that agents views may be partial, and therefore careful attention must be paid to the general approach in the interview:

"it must not bias the accounting process, and it must ensure that a social effective interaction that helps the informant to report adequately, that is within the frame of reference within which the intensive interviewing is conducted" (Bremer (1986) p152)

The accounts given cannot be taken literally or uncritically. They are blurred and distorted by the informants own selection of information and their own perspectives and biases. Therefore



"the investigator, before proceeding to the account analysis stage, must attempt to detect any such influences, to become able to answer questions related to the reliability and validity of the material gathered, that is its scientific utility for the purposes of description and explanation" (Bremer (1986), p155)

I am also aware that:

"informants have to select from their past experience those aspects that seem significant and, hence, worth reporting, within the frame of reference provided by the investigator" (Bremmer (1986), p149)

I accordingly tried to follow these strictures in my approach to both interviewing and analysis. Each of the interviews was reviewed shortly after its occurrence, and the main themes highlighted and correlated for inclusion in the eventual discussion. I then organised the responses into general categories where either there was consensus, or there were clear differences of opinion which could be coherently set out. I then used the interview material mainly to supplement and explain the more objective data collected and presented in the tables in the case study summary chapters. For example where I make assertions such as "the repairs tended to become degraded after about 2 years", this is based on a combination of my own observation of variable patterns of degradation in different of the estate improved at different times, and a reasonably uniform view expressed by agents that this is the case.

I should note that I have not devoted much attention to issues concerning the development of local political structures. These are important topics, and a study of the DSQ/EA would provide material to illustrate the developments (see e.g. Clatin (1990) for a description of the this issue in relation to the DSQ programme in France). There is an important set of questions about the impact on the programmes of the changing local/central relations in the UK and the impact of the decentralisation of the central state in France. This fascinating issue is not explored, however, except for certain references at some specific points.



### Documentation:

The main initial source of information has been the primary documentation underpinning the programmes. This includes committee papers, reports on the estates, external and internal evaluations, and file documents which were made available to me. These documents were collected from a variety of sources such as the town halls, the local offices, from the bottom of filing cabinets of local agents, from interested external observers, and so on. The aim was to provide some background material of a contemporary nature to the initial and subsequent stages of the project. This permitted the preparation of detailed questions for agents during the interviews, and the checking of agents statements against contemporary accounts.

### UK Material

It should be noted that throughout the background chapters I have provided considerably more details on the French context, compared to the UK. This is a deliberate choice, and reflects the easy availability of literature in English on the UK housing context which would not be enhanced by reiterating it here. I have attempted instead to draw out the comparative issues in relation to the UK context.

### Drawing Conclusions

The methodology has allowed me to gather a considerable range of information from a wide variety of sources about the estates and the programmes which took place on them. These bits of data have been carefully put together in the writing up of the case studies to construct a coherent picture of what actually happened during the programme, and why. This detail is reported in the case study annexes. Because of the constraints of length, six of the case studies have been grammatically compressed into semi-note form, in an attempt to present coherently the full details without to simply tables of data and remarks. The other six case studies are fully expressed.

I have then in Chapter 6 drawn together all the material from the case studies, and related it to the discussion of the wider national objectives and origins of the



programmes which had been already set out in the previous chapters. This has permitted me to draw comparisons between different estates, analyze reasons for different outcomes, and provide suggested explanations of what happened. The important and unique aspect of this work is that it is based not only on the assembling of first hand accounts of the operation of the national programmes, drawn from the agents involved at local and national government level and associated documentation, but is also based on entirely original investigation in depth into the impact of the programmes on the 12 case study estates, also involving first hand discussion with the agents directly involved, and direct consultation of the primary literature and sources on the estates. In the final chapter I move on to present some fairly general conclusions about the effectiveness of the programmes.



## General Interview Structure

**Factual details for all estates:** (These details obtained in the course of interviews with the various agents, requests being made of the most relevant official)

### Physical Characteristics

- total dwellings
- plan and layout of estate
- bedsize breakdown
- construction date and type
- main design problems
- main repair problems
- main environmental and other problems
- graffiti and vandalism

### Social Characteristics

- household size and type (incl. children, aged, single parent etc.)
- racial characteristics
- employment details
- training and qualifications
- benefits and incomes
- main social problems
- crime rates or problems
- drug and alcohol abuse

### Housing Management Indicators

- arrears
- voids
- transfers & turnover
- resident involvement in management

### Housing Organisation

- structure



job specifications and tasks  
training programmes  
relationships to other local organisations  
management arrangements  
relationship to other parts of organisation  
allocations procedures and policy

### Programme Details

original statements of problems  
costed proposals (including EA Forms A & B)  
management changes proposed  
full programme plans  
review documents and reports  
final expenditure details  
consultation proposals  
reports on achievements and other reviews

### **Interview Structures**

*Varying for different agents, but covering the topic areas set out below. The initial set questions were followed by probing of the replies given, the direction of the probing being dependent on the type of answer given.*

Introductory warm up about their job, and how long they have been doing it, to establish their role on the estate/in the programme. This would include discussion with, for example, caretakers on their role, and with allocations officers on the allocations policies and procedures.

What main problems lead the estate to be part of the improvement programme?

What do you think were the most important problems?



What were the housing management problems?

What gave rise to these problems?

What were the main objectives of the intervention (/in your area)?

The intervention programme:

what happened, in your area (and generally)?

what changes to your job/role?

outcomes, as you see them?

What are the main changes that you see?

- improvements/ successes?

- failures?

- remaining problems?

What was the role of residents/your relations with residents?

Roles of DSQ/HLM, and your relation to each?

What has been the main impact of the programme, as you see it?

What other aspects of the programme strike you as important?



## Chapter Two: The Structure of HLMs

This chapter outlines the structure and organisation of the French social housing organisations (HLMs), also considering their political control, financing, allocations structures, and aspects of day to day management. It also notes briefly some aspects of the UK local authority housing management arrangements which are contrasting. The aim of this chapter is to provide sufficient background details on the French HLM organisations to permit me to move on to the subsequent description of the origins of the problem estates.

**Total HLMs:** 1008

**Office Publics:** 296  
(of which 41 are OPACs)

**Average size of O.P.:** 6,000

**Total Employees:** 65,000

**Voluntary Committee Members:**  
15,000

**Total built to date of:**

**rented units:** 3.2m  
    **build for sale:** 1.3m

**OP stock built post 1962:** 70%

**People housed:**  
    **ownership schemes:** 4m  
    **rented homes:** 9m

**(1 in 4 French housed via HLM schemes)**

**Rents:** 40% less than  
equivalent private rented

### **Contemporary French Social Housing Organisations**

Social housing in France is provided by the HLM organisations.

They are also responsible for a large low cost home ownership programme, through which over 1.3 million homes have been provided. Added to the social renting programme, this brings the total contribution of HLMs to the provision of housing generally to about one quarter of the total. Their general role, and the importance of their position in the development of French housing policy, is therefore much wider than simply in the social renting arena. Emms (1991), Power (1992) and Willmott and Murie (1988)

all provide English language descriptions of the structure and

**Box 12: HLM Organisations**  
Source: UNFOHLM 1989

financing of HLMs. A definitive account of the status and organisation of HLMs is in AFPOLS (1987).



## Structure and Organisation

There are in all four main types of HLM, divided roughly between the public HLMs, which are the main providers of the type of rented social housing which is the subject of this thesis, and the private HLM companies. These companies comprise the Sociétés Anonymes, catering for build for sale and higher income renting, and of which there are about 360, managing over 1 million homes; the Sociétés Coopératives de Production HLM, which are based on the seven principle of cooperation set out by the "equitable pioneers of Rochdale" in 1844 (Afpols 1987), and of which there are 190, managing 140,000 homes and responsible for the construction of a further 150,000 homes since 1971; and the Sociétés de Crédit Immobilier, responsible only for the financing and construction of low cost homes, and of which there are about 190.

The public HLMs used all to be "Office Publics", but since 1971 some 41 of them have taken advantage of new legislation enabling them to extend their spheres of activity into non housing areas (concerning industrial and commercial aspects of area development) by becoming "OPACs" [Offices Publics d'Aménagement et Construction]. Each of these public Offices operates within a clear geographical area, either Municipal or Départemental. The Départemental offices cover the many small towns which could not support their own office. Unlike the UK, the local government structure in France is much more fragmented. There are 36,400 communes (each with its own Mayor), of which some 32,000 have fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. Above them there are 99 Départements (including the Overseas Départements, or DOMs) which are more like counties because of the large geographic areas covered (usually about 6,000 km<sup>2</sup>) - whose populations range from 75,000 to 2.5 million.

The quickest way to convey the nature of Offices Publics is to compare them to housing associations, particularly those which have recently been set up by certain Local Authorities (e.g. Newbury or LB Bromley) to own and manage their housing stock. I have drawn my case study sites entirely from the Office Publics, and they have wider responsibilities more akin to Local Authorities in the UK.



**Controlling Body:** Voluntary Management Committee, with appointed members representing various interests

**Executive Control:** Committee Chair, always a local Councillor (usually the Mayor or assistant Mayor)

**Administration:** Permanent staff, usually headed by Director and Service Heads (often Technical, Management, Major Works, Finance and Administration)

**Direct Labour:** Usually restricted to caretakers and cleaners; other services (repairs, construction, gardens) by tender

**Allocations:** Always by allocations committee, a sub committee of the main management committee, which involves tenants, and other agencies (Prefect, Family Allowance Board [CAF]); some quotas (e.g. Prefects; local employers; or social organisations)

**Finance:** Government imposed regulations for most areas; external audit and control of financial administration. Must balance books by matching costs with rent and other income.

**Subsidies:** Mainly reduced interest loans or rebates on local taxes (rates); recently specific subsidies (e.g for rehab)

**Rents:** National controls, setting limits of annual increases

**Housing Benefits:** Administered externally via national scheme

---

## Box 2.2: Structure of Office Publics

### Political Control of the HLM

Although the HLM organisations are technically independent of the local authority, the fact that the controlling role of "Président" of the committee of management is always taken by a locally elected councillor (either City councillor - normally the mayor or assistant mayor - or a Départemental councillor, depending on the territorial competence of the HLM) means that in fact there is a high degree of local political influence. In the context of difficult estates, and as will be seen in the case studies, the presence of a clear political interest and direction can (as at Chanteloup les Vignes or at Meaux) be a driving force behind ensuring that the HLM



tackles its problems effectively and in concert with the wider political and social aims of the local city administration; and conversely, the absence of political interest or frequent changes of administration can (as at Calais) lead to lack of direction and ultimately failure of the improvement programmes.

The composition of the Management Committee is structured to ensure that a range of interests are represented. The composition of the HLM committee, its allocations sub committee, and its executive sub committee is set out in regulations. The main committee comprises a mix of elected council members, appointees of the Prefecture to represent special interests (e.g. families), tenants, employers, and the local Family Allowance Office (CAF). This mixture is intended to ensure a moderate and non political committee - although its direction and vitality can be influenced heavily by a very active Président, and committed city hall administration.

In contrast, the structure of UK Housing committees varies from authority to authority, and indeed may be a joint committee (with, for example, Social Services); and it will have a guaranteed majority of the ruling political party.

### Finance

As with UK housing finance, HLM finance is a complex, highly technical subject (although a clear and comprehensive summary is provided in Heugas-Darraspen 1985). Briefly, the important features of HLM finance which contrast with the UK local authority position are:

- HLMs have always been independent financial organisations who are obliged to break even, without general balancing subsidies (e.g. housing subsidy or the old reate support). Instead, in France subsidy is provided mainly through loans at reduced cost (set out below).
- they are not able to resort to rent pooling, but instead the rents of different blocks are linked closely to the funding arrangements under which



they were built or rehabilitated. This results in anomalous rent levels related to the date of construction and funding programme, and not related to the quality of the accommodation or its location; it also causes major problems due to the system of housing benefits introduced in 1977, as is seen below and in the case studies.

- they have limited control over their rent levels, with the upper and lower ranges of increase being fixed nationally each year. Interestingly in the UK, the ringfencing of the HRA, the increasing reductions in direct subsidy, and the close linking of subsidy to assumed levels of rent increase are making the UK housing organisations much closer to HLMs than before.
- very little of the HLM social rented stock is sold - only about 0.3% annually (Schaefer 1989)
- construction is aided by the 1% employers tax. Every business with over 20 people is obliged to contribute a proportion of its total salary bill to local HLM organisations (originally 1%, then reduced to 0.77% and latterly 0.62%). Nomination rights are normally available in return.
- HLM property is exempt from property tax (similar to rates) for 25 years after its construction. Since 70% of the Office Public stock was built after 1962, this is was recognised during the 1980s as emerging as a major problem for HLM financing (Direction de la Construction 1989).
- eligibility to French housing benefits [APL] was not, until recent reforms, simply on the basis of household income. It was also linked to the property in which the household lived, through a system ["conventionnement"] designed to channel housing benefits to rehabilitated stock. This has meant that only the poorest could afford to live on the difficult to let estates (see below, and e.g. Curci, (1988), and Badet (1982))



This housing benefit problem has been one of the most prominent factors in leading to a concentration of poor and disadvantaged households on difficult estates. The problem has its origins in the Barre Report on housing finance (Barre (1976)), which followed a commission of enquiry into the reform of housing finance chaired by the then Minister of Finance Raymond Barre. The commission reported that there were problems: the immediate post war system

"had not had the social effect which had been expected, and could perhaps not deliver. The aid was badly distributed, generally insufficient in the early years, then overpriced; finally it was the privileged middle classes who benefited, and not the underprivileged who found themselves excluded" (Heugas-Darraspen (1985), p12).

It was also too centralised and complex. The origins of these problems had been in the housing subsidy arrangements introduced after 1945 which were aimed primarily at providing support for construction - bricks and mortar subsidy [*aide à la pierre*]. This subsidy was in the form of reduced interest loans, on long repayment periods. These loans were funded via a central banking mechanism (the Caisse des Dépôts de Consignations) - which used, for the most part, funds deposited in the main savings banks (the Caisses d'Epargne) by French savers, who remain mostly unaware that their savings are used in this way. The original terms (under the law of 3 September 1947) allowed HLMs to borrow up to 90% of the costs of construction at 1% interest over 65 years, but this had gradually been amended. By 1976, the exact details of interest rates, loan periods, and other terms varied according to the type of scheme - certain schemes were built to lower standards, with lower rent levels, and designed exclusively for lower income tenants (see for example Nouyou 1987 for a specific example showing that in Rennes ordinary HLM construction was at 3.6% over 40 years, while lower standard housing for poorer households could be built at 1.2% over 45 years).

The Barre reforms had the major objective of moving from general aid for construction to targeted aid for households in need. The reforming law - of 3 January 1977 - introduced the idea of assistance directed at individuals [*aide à la personne*], to be delivered through a personal housing allowance scheme called APL [*aide personnalisée au logement*]. This, however, was only available in respect of



certain homes built or improved under specific funding regimes. It was paid directly to the landlord (normally the HLM). The previous system of housing allowances called AL [allocation logement], still continued, but it was concentrated on certain low income households, was paid to the household, and was considered part of the social security system, rather than the housing subsidy system (Kemp 1990).

In brief, APL is a means tested benefit payable for homes built or modernised since 1977 with the aid of various state subsidies: for HLMs the main two are PLA [Prets locatifs aidés] or assisted loans for rentals, which had existed pre 1977; and PALULOS [Primes à l'Amélioration des Logements à Usage Locatif et à Occupation Sociale] (or grants for rehabilitation of rented homes for social use). The acceptance of these subsidies leads to certain further conditions (such as on the quality of improvement works) formalised in an agreement known as "conventionnement"; but this then permits substantial rent increases to be applied for these properties. The introduction of APL has had unexpected and negative social and economic consequences, a fact underlined by several official report, principally the report "Badet" (Badet 1982), and most recently in a report on an inquiry into some of the anomalies created by the Barre reforms, and other current problems, the Bloch-Laine Report (Lanco (1989)). Of several anomalies, the principal one of direct relevance to difficult to let estates being the appearance of the phenomenon of

"the part of the housing stock having the highest rents welcoming principally the tenants with the lowest incomes" (Heugas-Darraspen (1985) p21).

That is, there was a problem of a much higher and continually growing cost of the scheme than was foreseen (which for 1986 ran at a level of F20 billion, or over half the total of all housing aid). In addition, there were anomalies in the rented housing market caused by the differential increases of rent in properties subject to "conventionnement", leading to a position where only those who were eligible for APL, that is the poorest and most deprived, were able to afford to live in the improved properties. Since the bulk of the improvement work on difficult to let estates was done using PALULOS, the problem of allocations and of concentrations of underprivileged tenants on these estates was made worse rather than better.



Subsequent reforms in 1989, following the Bloch-Laine report, were introduced in an attempt to resolve some of these problems. They lead to the creation of a new benefit termed APL2, a version of APL payable for a wider range of unimproved rented properties, and to the unification of APL and AL.

Finally it should be noted that the problems of property taxes which are beginning to be levied, and the increasing burden of interest rates, increasing arrears, and voids, combined with increasing problems of disrepair, have led to concern over the continuing financial viability of certain HLMs. The most vulnerable tend to be those who are smaller, and have the youngest stock, rather than the established Office Publics.

### Allocations Policy

All allocations are authorised by the Allocations sub committee of the HLM, a body which each Office HLM is obliged to constitute, involving a sub committee of the main HLM committee comprising 2 local councillors, 2 representatives appointed by the Prefect, one tenant, and one representative of the local Family Allowance Board [CAF].

The allocations strategy is much looser, and less public, than in the UK. Generalised statements of priority may be published; but points systems or computerised allocations systems are extremely uncommon. There are often quotas held by the Prefect, by certain local employers who contribute the 1% housing tax, and local social organisations (representing for example disabled people, or underprivileged groups). Extensive interviewing of applicants is commonly undertaken, including contact with previous landlords, neighbours, and if necessary the local police or social services. Normally the administration of the HLM will supply case histories and recommendations to the Sub Committee, who will make the final (unappealable) decision. Certain HLMs can and do decide to restrict the number of immigrant or destitute household they accept, and use this as an aspect of rehabilitation of problem estates: there is no homelessness legislation (although there has been a recent series of legislative changes to improve the opportunities offered to homeless



people in most need). There is often both a ceiling and a floor level for income, meaning that not only are people denied access because they are too well off, but also if a household is too poor to support the rent with under a fixed minimum portion of their income (the "resources ratio" [taux d'effort]), they will be refused.

Attempts to socially engineer changes in estate population in order to reduce the levels of disadvantaged tenants are very prominent on difficult to let estates - as will be seen in the case studies. Allocations will therefore will be fully discussed in that context.

### Caretaking and Day to Day Housing Management

As will be illustrated in the case studies, the staffing structure of HLMs gives a much greater (and increasing) role to caretaking. Very often they carry out functions which in UK housing authorities would be done by housing officers. Thus caretakers play the role of main contact between the tenant and the organisation. They will often have local (block) office with regular opening hours, where tenants will bring all manner of problems including repairs, neighbour problems, tenancy matters such as changes to occupancy, and so on; they often also collect rents in the office. In addition, however, the caretaker will usually clean, sweep, empty bins and so on; do minor repairs; and often inspect all repairs orders to assess how they should be dealt with, particularly deciding whether they are the responsibility of the HLM or the tenant. This difference should perhaps be seen as more a difference of emphasis than something completely different from in the UK. In certain UK authorities caretakers play this type of role; and it would appear that in the past they did so more than now. The main difference to note, however, is that in HLMs they are effectively fulfilling the housing officer role as well as the caretaking role.

### **Contemporary UK Social Housing Organisations**

As I have already noted, I do not intend to reiterate information about UK housing which is widely available elsewhere. The section here is therefore restricted to issues which are of comparative interest in the context of this thesis.



## Structure and Organisation

There are some 400 housing authorities in England and Wales, managing 4.5 million dwellings (Audit Commission 1986). They have widely divergent structures for managing their housing (see Kirby et al, (1988)). With an average of about 12,000 dwellings each they are about double the size of Office Publics described above.

A key point of contrast with HLMs is the UK local authorities' range of legal obligations, which is linked to the fact that historically the function of provision and management of social housing has been fulfilled by the local authorities themselves, and not through secondary agencies such as HLMs. The legal duties include slum clearance, provision of accommodation for vulnerable homeless people, other duties related to homelessness, the duty to assess housing needs in the area and make arrangements for it to be met, and various public health and building control functions. In fact these need not be discharged by a housing department, and increasingly authorities are reorganising to contract out many of their responsibilities.

## The Emergence of the Right to Buy Policy

As the next chapter will outline, the immediate post war period produced a fair degree of consensus over the general need to have a massive construction drive, although "party differences over the respective roles of public and private sectors were apparent, and have continued to affect policy development since 1945" (Forrest & Murie 1988 p22). These differences have become much more pronounced since 1979, and there has been a change to what is now an even more polarised set of positions on ownership, rent levels, subsidy, management arrangements, and long term objectives for housing policy:

"the housing sector, one of the key areas of the post war "Welfare State", has more directly reflected the "Thatcher Experiment" than most areas of public policy" (Kearns & MacLennan (1992) p9).

One important point of contrast with HLMs is the "right to buy" legislation, which has been one of the most contentious and debated policy shifts of recent UK housing policy. Its origins lie as much in fiscal policy as in housing policy; and it is often held to be as much a political measure as a social measure, being linked to a desire to



promote individual ownership. It is held by some to have led to the increased polarisation of UK social housing to leave a poor quality residualised sector for the more disadvantaged members of society, who become particularly concentrated on the difficult to let estates (e.g. Murie (1991), Forrest & Muire (1988), Willmott & Muire (1988)). This type of mass sale of social housing is not done by HLMs; rather many of the smaller private HLMs[Société Anonymes] have as their sole purpose the provision of low cost owner occupied homes - as mentioned above.

### Allocations

In contrast with France, UK local authorities are required to publish their allocations priorities and procedures. Allocation according to need has been the approach recommended as good practice since the publication of the Central Housing Advisory Committee report on housing priorities (CHAC 1969), advice which was reiterated by the Housing Services Advisory Group (1978). Over half of local authorities now use some form of points system for allocating according to need (Spicker 1983; and MacLennan 1989). This type of scheme has the benefit that the reasons for allocation choices can be explained as being fair, consistent, and in line with stated priorities. Problems remain: Clapham and Kintrea (1991) note that there are still choices to be made about the different weights to be given to specific circumstances and needs, in devising the system; its practical operation may display undesired bias or discrimination (see also Henderson and Karn 1984, 1987); and English (1982) notes that systems based solely on need could move towards the emergence of a purely welfare role for public sector housing. Finally the policy which is common in many authorities of only permitting one reasonable offer to be refused by households who are rehoused as statutorily homeless has led in some instances to these households having to accept offers on hard to let estates which other tenants would refuse in preference for a later, better, offer. This has led to problems of concentrations of disadvantaged tenants on these estates, discussed later.

### Repairs

UK housing authorities are responsible for a much wider range of repairs than in France, where many internal repairs are left to tenants to do. Repairs performance



is therefore a key issue for tenant satisfaction in the UK, being the most frequent reason for between tenants and their landlord (MacLennan 1989). Local authorities spend on average (1986 figures) £425 per dwelling per year on maintenance (Audit Commission 1986). This has been estimated (McNaughton 1991) at 25% of all local authority housing expenditure, 53% if interest charges and loan repayments are excluded, and that maintenance work provides over 100,000 jobs, or one job for every 50 homes. Despite this expenditure, extensive problems remain which would require substantial investment to remedy (Cantle 1986). Two thirds of response (i.e. unplanned) repairs were done by Direct Labour organisations (MacLennan 1989), although the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in 1991 may lead to a change in this figure.

This contrast in responsibilities extends to the position in relation to relet voids. It is a formal part of the letting process for an HLM home that a condition survey [état de lieu] is prepared and agreed, at the start and at the end of the letting. Any disrepair which is found at the end of the letting, and which was not present at the start, is for the tenant to remedy, either by making good the problem or by footing a bill for the repair. The idea that there would be a major investment in relet works due to degradation caused by the previous tenant (which the Audit Commission (1986) found to be a substantial element of repairs expenditure), was seen as incredible by many of the caretaking and technical staff who I interviewed as part of the case studies.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

This short chapter has provided sufficient background on HLMs to permit me to embark on the story of how the problems developed on the hard to let estates. It has indicated that there are important differences between the legal and organisational structures of HLMs and UK housing organisations, summarised over. The later chapters will show that despite these differences the types of problem experienced, and the approach brought to the problem, are in fact very similar.



Feature	France	UK
Control	Autonomous appointed committee	Elected committee of councillors
Statutory Duties	Only financial probity	Considerable housing duties
Allocations	Closed system	Public,open, system
Funding	Self Suporting/ indirect subsidy	Direct subsidies (usually)
Disposal	No disposal: other HLMs provide for this market	Significant Right to Buy activity
Staffing	Prominence to caretaking role	Prominence to housing officer role
Repairs	Areas of clear tenant responsibility	Wider landlord responsibilities

**Table 2.1:** Key similarities and differences of HLM and UK housing organisations



## Chapter Three: The Problems of the Difficult Estates

### **Overview**

This chapter provides a historical overview of the origin and development of the post war system built difficult to let estates which are the subject of this thesis. It looks first at why there was pressure for a housing construction programme; second at the reasons for choosing where the estates were built; third at why high rise industrial construction was prevalent; and finally at who was housed in them, including issues around immigration and ethnic minority tenants.

### **Origins of Social Housing in France and the UK**

The early origins of social housing in the UK have already been extensively documented (e.g. Burnett (1985), Gauldie (1974), Merrett (1979), Bowley (1944), Forrest & Murie (1988)), as they have for France (e.g. Quilliot and Guerrand (1989), HLM Aujourd'hui, (1989), Guerrand (1967), Guinchat et al (1981), Laboratoire Logement (1989), Afpols (1987), Butler et al (1983)). There are now also some English language accounts of the origins and development of French social housing either in translation (Cancellieri et al (1990)) or as part of comparative studies (Emms (1991); Power (1992)). The briefest of outlines will therefore suffice.

During the early period (1850 to 1914) progress was slow. In both countries the period was one of philanthropic activity by utopian industrialists concerned more with either the physical or moral welfare of their employees than with any general housing policy concern; and little involvement by the state at national or local level.

In France the law of 30 November 1894 (called the "Loi Seigfried") created the basis of all later legislation on social housing in France, although it led to very limited activity. By 1939 only 150,000 social housing units had been built, or about 2% of the stock - and 70% of these were in the Paris region (Laboratoire Logement (1989)). This was partly due to the effects of the Loi of 3 August 1914 which had imposed severe rent controls, and remained in place throughout the interwar period, which made it difficult to finance the rented sector. It was also due to the economic crisis



of the 30s which lead to the suspension of the programme of construction in 1934, due to the lack of available public funding (Laboratoire Logement 1989).

In the UK the main originating act for local authority housing was the 1919 Housing and Town Planning etc Act (the "Addison Act"). It set a target of 500,000 new homes in 5 years, to be built by Local Authorities, mainly in cottage estates on garden city lines, and was more successful in stimulating activity. The subsequent period 1921 - 1939 saw completions of local authority homes running at an average of 70,000 a year (Merrett 1979), giving a total of over 1 million local authority homes in the inter war period.

The prewar totals therefore saw a far higher comparative concentration of local authority housing in the UK (about 10%, (Halsey (1988)) than in France (about 2% (Cancellieri et al 1990)); although both countries had a large private rented sector, which subsequently reduced.

### **Why a Mass Housing Programme?**

Generally, there is little mystery about why after 1945 a large scale construction was thought necessary in both France and the UK. First, the sheer weight of housing need following the destruction of the war; second increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, particularly in France; and third the problem of older, dilapidated housing, which in the UK presented itself in the continuing problem of slum clearance. To these was shortly to be added a fourth, the demographic pressure provided by the post war baby boom, although this was not immediately apparent. The immediate post war responses of the two governments was quite different, however, as is set out next.

### **France**

In France in 1945, a study by the Commission de Reparation des Domages de Guerre (cited in Boubilil 1980) found that some 1.3 million homes, or 10% of the total housing stock was uninhabitable, with some 450,000 completely destroyed. Boubilil estimates that the total stock of 14 million habitable homes was about half the



number needed. Of these, the stock in many large cities was old (average of 76 years, with 30% over 90, according to a Boubilil). Some 45% of the population lived in communes of fewer than 2,000 people (although this was reduced to 25% by 1989 (Journal Officiel 1989)) due to rapid industrialisation. Over half the total housing stock of 13.3 million homes was over 100 years old (Journal Officiel 1989). The pressure to produce new homes, particularly for the planned new industrial workforce, was clear. While the pressure slackened during the 50s, it was reapplied in 1960, with the arrival of over one million repatriated French from Algeria.

Despite the appalling housing conditions, housing construction was not an immediate Government priority. Rather it was decided that economic reconstruction must take precedence (Laboratoire Logement 1989 p27). Although there was much repair and re-construction of damaged properties in the immediate post war period, there was little new construction.

By 1950 there were still only a total of 25,000 social rented in the country (Guinchat et al (1981)). What grew up instead was an aggressive organised squatting movement, which during 1949-50 grew to house at least 10,000 families (HLM Aujourd'hui (1989)). Nonetheless three key new laws were passed in the immediate post war period: the law of 1 September 1948 which restructured rent controls; the law 21 July 1950, which set up the Crédit Foncier de France, which provided subsidies in the form of grants and loans for owner occupation; and the law of 3 September 1947 which was aimed at relaunching the HBMs, and providing them with financial aid (in the form of advantageous loan terms). In addition further changes were made by the law of 21 July 1950 which changed the name of HBMs to HLMs, the law of 24 May 1951 which changed some of the financing, and permitted them to borrow from savings banks, and the decree of 9 August 1953 which made obligatory a contribution of 1% of the salary bill of all firms with over 10 employees to HLM construction funds.

The first significant government construction target was fixed as the Plan Courant in 1953, which called for the construction of 240,000 new homes a year. This



coincided with a remarkable social movement which took off in 1954 which was initiated by a Capucin priest, Henry Grouès, known as "Abbé Pierre", born in 1912 in Lyons, and a Deputy for the MRP (centre left party) between 1945 and 1951.

No description of the development of French social housing would be complete without some reference to this campaigner (who resurfaced in 1991 by again taking up the plight of the homeless). Indeed a film ("Hiver '54"), and a bestselling popular account of his life (Lunel 1989) have recently served to reawaken interest in this episode in French social development, which can most easily be understood by comparing it to the impact of "Cathy Come Home" on the popular awareness of homelessness in the UK. As it is by and large unknown in the UK, it is worthwhile devoting a few lines to the trigger of this movement, by way of comparison with the UK events, which are well known to many in the housing field.

The critical event which launched the public awareness was a broadcast which Grouès made on French national radio and Radio-Luxembourg on the lunchtime broadcast on 1 February 1954, during the particularly severe winter weather which had seen several deaths of homeless people. This was despite his attempts, with his colleagues, to provide temporary shelters, done through the Emmaüs Association which he had founded in 1949, using charitable contributions for its work. The broadcast was made possible by a journalist friend of Grouès, who had given only a vague idea of what was happening to the producer of the programme. Speaking live on the first broadcast, Grouès said:

My friends! Help! A woman has just frozen to death, last night at 3a.m., on the pavement of a street in Sébastopol, clutching the papers which had lead to her eviction two days previously. Every night there are more than 2,000 people shrunk up by the cold, without roofs, without bread, sometimes almost naked. Listen: in three hours, two centres of assistance will be set up, one under a tent at the foot of the Parthénon, rue de la Montagne-Sainte-Geneviève, the other at Courbevoie. They are already overflowing; they must be opened everywhere. This evening, in every town in France, in every neighbourhood of Paris, notices must be displayed under a light, in the night, at the door of a place where there can be blankets, straw, soup, and which reads "Fraternal Aid Centre: - you who suffer, whoever you may be, enter, sleep, eat, find hope again, here you are loved". The weather forecast is for a month of terrible frosts. So long as the winter lasts, these centres should



continue. Before their brothers who are dying miserably, one sole wish should exist between men: to render it impossible that this should continue. I beg you, let us care enough, immediately, to do this. That so much grief should have given us this wondrous thing, the shared soul of France. Thanks be! Each one of us can come to the aid of the homeless. For this evening, and later for tomorrow, we need 5,000 blankets, 300 large American tents, 200 heaters. Drop them off quickly at the Hotel Rochester, 92 rue La Boétie. Bring lorries and volunteers for the collection tonight at 11p.m, in front of the tent at la Montagne-Sainte-Geneviève. Thanks to you, no man, no poor kid, will sleep tonight on the asphalt or the pavements of Paris." (quoted in Lunel 1989 p263).

The response was overwhelming. The story was picked up in the press, and overnight "Abbé Pierre" became a household name. 500 lorries arrived the evening of the broadcast, and hundreds of homeless people were rounded up to be given assistance from all over Paris. Collections were held throughout the country, committees were set up to provide aid, and empty dwellings were offered as shelters - "everyone, in a few months, spoke of nothing but housing, homes, crisis, solutions, means of getting things moving" (Quilliot & Guerrand 1989, p123).

In addition to this direct action, important as it was, Grouès achieved what was one of his main underlying aims, the commitment of government funds to the provision of temporary accommodation. This measure had been deferred in early January, but was now agreed in a specially arranged debate, and indeed the provision was greatly increased. The extensive construction of emergency prefabricated housing [cité d'urgence] temporary housing for newcomers [cité de transit] and dormitories [dortoirs] became a feature of French housing policy, and one which lasted for some considerable time, including the crisis caused by the influx of Algerian refugees (see Power 1993; Quilliot & Guerrand 1989 for more details and pictures).

Laboratoire Logement (1989) provide details to show the nature of the problem at this time. Drawing on surveys by INED in 1952 and INSEE in 1954 and 1955, they show that working class households, young households, and residents in the Paris region were disproportionately badly housed. Over a third of working class households living in "non standard" housing such as single rooms in HMOs, furnished rooms, temporary housing, and various hotels and hostels. 22% of households were



severely overcrowded. 23% of newly married couples lived with their parents. 38% of the total housing stock had been constructed before 1871.

The Government response, seen in the financing and development of post war French housing construction prior to the Barre reforms in 1977 (which have been described already), can be divided into three main parts (Journal Officiel 1989). The first lasted from 1950 to 1965 approximately, and was marked by massive state subsidy for construction, for both the HLM movement for rented and build for sale homes, and for the private market. The stimulation of HLM building was through both the 1% employer taxes and the low, fixed, interest rate, 65 year term loans for 90% of the construction costs. The period also saw the development of the legal, financial, and technical means to develop industrialised construction, and the mass planning mechanism of the ZUP (explained below). By the early 1960s, 40% of the construction was of HLM properties.

The second period, 1965 to 1975, saw a reduction in the extent of stimulating private house building, and more attention being paid to specific needs rather than simply aiming for high construction figures. In addition, the proportion of HLM costs met by grants was reduced, and the preferential rates for loans progressively reduced - in 1966, 1970, and 1975, (finally rising to 3.6% in 1977). These increased costs were often directly reflected in the rents charged, and as a result from 1974 HLMs began to experience difficulty in letting new properties (Topalov (1987)). Throughout this period, however, the rhythm of construction gradually grew.

1975 saw the third period, and a complete change of emphasis - a rapid decline in the pace of construction, and the creation, as part of the VIIth plan (1975 - 80) of the Habitat et Vie Sociale programme, which will be described later, aimed at rehabilitation of the HLM estates. Similar changes to those in the UK were introduced to stimulate the rehabilitation of older private properties, following the Nora-Eveno report on the problems and opportunities in this sector (Nora-Eveno 1976). This involved grants to landlords and owners, concentrated in designated



rehabilitation areas, which by 1983 had reached a total of 430 current project areas and an annual expenditure of F60.8 million (Heupgas-Darraspen 1985).

## UK

War damage was extensive in the UK also, with 450,000 homes destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Together with the backlog of slum clearance, the increase in population of some 750,000 new households, and other pressures such as overcrowding, around 1.5 million new homes were needed (AMA 1983). Prior to the end of the war in 1944, a decision had already been taken to embark on a programme of immediate production of temporary dwellings, making extensive use of prefabrication. These dwellings were provided and owned by central government, but their management was left to the local authorities (Merrett 1979). This programme of building "prefabs" created 125,000 temporary dwellings by 1948 (a few of which are still in use) (Short 1982). This programme was, according to Donnison (Donnison (1967), p165) "very expensive, gave prefabrication a bad name, and (was) dropped as soon as possible", although AMA 1983 notes that the dwellings were popular with their residents as they were bungalows, in central sites, with gardens, and well equipped compared to other contemporary council dwellings.

Immediately post war, although the government's highest priority was to repair war damaged property, a new construction programme was also launched. To implement the programme, price control was introduced, arrangements made to ensure an adequate supply of building materials and fittings, house price and rent controls introduced, and all building was controlled by licensing (AMA 1983). Progress was rapid and substantial: by 1951, over a million new homes had been built. Despite this achievement, it was still less than the original targets - mainly due to the economic crisis of 1947, which led to cuts in the programmes of social expenditure, and more resources devoted to investment in the export oriented sectors (Short 1982). However the new Conservative government which came to power in 1951 was committed to a programme of 300,000 homes per annum, just over the parallel Plan Courant in France noted above. This target was achieved in 1954, with the



construction of the 357,000 homes, and although this figure was never bettered, a high rate of construction continued throughout the 50s.

In 1953, however, the publication of the White Paper "Houses: the Next Steps" (MHLG 1953) set a new agenda. New building was to be by the private sector, with the local authorities providing only for the shortfall below the 300,000 target. Owner occupation was to be the main tenure, with council renting only for those who were in need of this form of subsidised housing. The general needs subsidies for local authorities were to be withdrawn (done in 1956 except for housing for the elderly), and the local authorities were to have the primary role of clearing the slums and rebuilding for the residents displaced, which involved "overspill" housing as well as replacing the demolished dwellings with additional numbers of homes, due to the high degree of overcrowding which had been present in the slums. In addition, the final plank of post war housing policy, home improvement grants, were extended by the introduction of 50% grants of up to £400 by the 1954 Housing Repairs and Rents Act.

The arrival of the Labour government in 1964 led to a new White Paper in 1965 "The Housing Programme 1965-70" (MHLG 1965). This set a new target of 500,000 homes to be constructed annually - identified as stemming from, inter alia, the needs caused by the 1 million slums that remained, the 2 million other homes not yet slums but not worth improving, and the 150,000 extra homes needed for the new households forming with the rising population. There was, however, no move away from owner occupation as the "natural" tenure:

"... the programme of subsidised council housing should now decrease. The expansion of the public programme now proposed is to meet exceptional needs....The expansion of owner occupation on the other hand is normal" (MHLG 1965 p8)

The proposed expanded construction programme was short lived, however. Economic crisis, leading to the 1967 devaluation, severely curtailed public investment, and in January 1968 the programme was cut back. The 1968 White Paper "Old Houses into New Homes" (MHLG 1968) announced a significant change of policy: a move from mass clearance areas towards rehabilitation of the older stock. The evidence of the



Conservative gains in the April 1967 and May 1968 local elections, combined with the disaster of the Ronan Point collapse in May 1968 served partly to persuade the Labour government that a mass council housing programme was unpopular (Merrett 1979). By 1970 local authority starts were at a lower level than any year since 1962; the election of a Conservative government in 1970 provided further impetus to owner occupation and rehabilitation, and by the 1974 Housing Act, which introduced a new role for the Housing Association movement in large scale rehabilitation in the new Housing Action Areas, the era of mass local authority construction was over. The process was brought to a conclusion in 1980, however, when the radical policies of the new Conservative government promoted not only council house sales but also the almost complete ban on further local authority construction except in the most exceptional circumstances.

### **Where were they built?**

In both France and the UK the siting of the post war estates was linked to town planning initiatives taken to control and channel the post war building boom.

### France

One of the main images associated with HLM properties in France is that of the monotonous gigantic estates situated on the barren outskirts of otherwise pleasant towns. These are the ZUP estates, in which over 1.2 million homes were constructed (Renard & Comby (1991). ZUPs [zones à urbanisation en priorité] were created under the decree of 31 December 1958, following the consideration of the Bill [loi cadre] creating them in the final session of the IVth Republic. They comprised sites selected by the Ministry of Construction from an office in Paris, which were to be the location of building programmes of social housing. The land was purchased by the developing agent using pre-emption rights to purchase at existing use price - HLMs being able to invoke compulsory purchase powers. Each ZUP had to develop a minimum of 500 homes, and any new developments of over 100 homes had to be located in a ZUP - this was "urban implantation ex nihilo" (Institut Français d'Architecture (1985)), carried out with the support and guidance of the public works department [Direction départementale d'équipement, or DDE], and the support of



the subsidiaries of the CDC [Caisse de Dépôts et Consignations] the SCET, which was responsible for land acquisition, assembly and site preparation, and the SCIC for financing building construction (see Flockton & Kofman (1989) for further details). Development was very extensive; for example in the Paris Region, the ZUP procedure was used in 22 sites between 1958 and 1969, utilising a total of 5,900 hectares (about half the size of Paris) for the construction of 140,000 homes (Scherrer (1992)).

The ZUPs were developed under the authority of the Prefect, who administered the planning and construction processes, including the coordination of different aspects of the development (education, leisure facilities and so on). Rationalisation of the planning process was seen as essential, and was officially guided by the famous "grille Dupont" which set out the benchmarks to calculate the infrastructural requirements for each ZUP (see Institut Français d'Architecture (1985)). These were not always provided, as it was the responsibility of the local municipality, in whose area the ZUP had been (often unwillingly) implanted, to make these provisions - and often this led to extreme financial pressures, or simple inability to provide. What was created was a series of estates which lacked the necessary infrastructure of shops, transport links, schools, hospitals, and recreation facilities which were essential to make them work, and attract and retain a stable population. Of the 153 large estates of over 1,000 units constructed in the Paris region (including the non ZUP sites), 44 were in communes whose population more than doubled because of this implantation of social housing (Guglielmo & Moulin, (1986)). Several of these issues emerge in the case studies, particularly Chanteloup les Vignes, where, as will be set out later, the estate was implanted in the commune (of about 2,000 people) totally against their wishes; and the failure to provide adequate infrastructure from the start left the commune with an enormous financial problem to meet the costs of providing it over the subsequent years.

The shortcomings of the ZUP system were partially corrected in 1967 with the passing of the law which formed the basis for the present planning system in France, the Loi d'orientation foncière. Generally it created a system of two tier planning,



with the SDAU [Schéma directeur d'aménagement et urbanisme] as the overall structure plan in urban centres of over 10,000 inhabitants, and a land use plan, the POS [Plan d'occupation des sols], at commune level. Particularly in relation to social housing it replaced the ZUPs with a new type of zone, the ZAC [Zones d'aménagement concerté] or comprehensive development zones, which could be declared for a range of types of development including for housing, industrial or commercial uses. This was designed to combat not only the insensitivity of ZUP developments based on the technocratic centralism of the procedure, but also the burden on local public finances of the previous system. The new procedure was to be based on encouraging partnership with private capital, which was to undertake the development. This development should also be in accord with the local POS, although exceptions were possible, originally and particularly where there was no POS in existence, an important loophole (Flockton & Kofman (1989), p130). Looking at the grands ensembles constructed in the Paris region, for example, Guglielmo & Moulin (1986) note that the majority of them were constructed following derogations from the local plans. Between 1971 and 1979 1,682 ZACs were designated, 956 for residential use, providing around 750,000 homes (Renard & Comby (1991), p146). Indeed the construction of large estates continued after the abolition of the ZUP planning legislation; for example two thirds of the Paris region large estates were constructed after 1965.

There may also be a more party political aspect to the siting of the large estates. Taking the example of three Départements in the Paris region, Guglielmo & Moulin (1986) set out the disproportionate concentration of estates in communes governed by the Communist Party at the point of beginning the construction, and a corresponding disproportionate lack of starts in communes governed by parties of the right. They attribute this partly to the fact that the residents of the estates, being mainly skilled or unskilled workers, are likely to vote for parties of the left, and the more right of centre communes wished to avoid the possibility of a shift of power following the implantation of large numbers of left voters.



There is also a "New Town programme" in France, but this is not comparable to the UK post war new town programme which is described below, and did not form part of the post war building imperative. Rather they emerged following a major shift of policy direction in 1969, following the report of the Commission "Villes", which was included as part of the VIth Plan (1971-75) (Commisariat General du Plan 1971). Previously the ZUP developments had been focused on existing towns; now new satellite towns were to be created, but for the employed and middle classes.

## UK

In the UK, post war planning pressures were to clear the slums, modernise the towns, and contain urban sprawl. Slum clearance produced usable land in the centres of the older cities, which could be used to construct new council estates. Additional replacement dwellings were needed in order both to relieve the overcrowding of the slums and to cater for the rising population. Similarly to the position in France, owner occupation was expanded by the suburbanisation of the countryside around towns, while social housing was concentrated in high density, often high rise, estates. In the UK these were primarily in the inner city slum clearance sites.

The New Towns Act 1946 provided for a radical solution to the problem of urban sprawl, and congestion of the major cities, particularly London, by creating well planned and self contained communities in the new towns, along Garden City lines. The idea was not new, the original garden city movement having been initiated by Ebenezer Howard with the 1898 publication of his "Garden Cities of Tomorrow", and the founding of Letchworth in 1902 and Welwyn Garden City in 1920. The contribution of this programme of new and expanded town programme was, however, limited. Between 1945 and 1970, it contributed for only 3.7% of the total new housing output in England and Wales (Merrett 1981). In contrast, much more emphasis was given to maximising land use in the inner city sites, by building at higher densities. This policy was supported by the importance given to the green belt planning restrictions, which meant that overspill had to be at a great distance from city centres, making it less attractive and less possible (Cooney, (1974)). Overspill policies were not designed to provide even the majority of new housing, however.



The question arises of whether this pressure on land lead to high rise construction. Dunleavy (1981) and AMA (1985) argue that it did not, but that other pressures were more important, particularly the need to build quickly and cheaply, the architectural and governmental pressures to build at high density, the green belt policies, and the availability of the slum clearance sites, which lead to local authorities concentrating social housing in these inner city locations, as will be seen below. It would have been possible to release land for the construction of extensive low density social housing estates, as was happening for suburban owner occupation development. Dunleavy (1981) also suggests that:

"[b]y the 1950's the social base with least to gain from public housing, primarily the suburban middle class and rural upper class, organised in the Conservative party, had succeeded in orienting the planning system towards urban containment, halting all expansion of the new towns programme and resisting any extension of political control or land availability by inner and core city authorities. The cities were, in effect, forced to meet their housing needs in situ" (p101)

### **Why High Rise and Industrialised Construction?**

It is sometimes suggested that architectural fashion was responsible for high rise construction. The key statement of the general architectural principles which guided the construction of the high rise estates in post war Europe was the architectural manifesto known as the "Charter of Athens" (see Le Corbousier (1957)). It has been summarised (Rambert 1956, p9) as follows:

"Housing estates must respond above all to the rules which we think can be expressed in a few words:

architecture =simplicity  
construction =economy  
layout =green spaces  
orientation =sunny  
facilities =comfort"

However although this argument was to influence the architects who were commissioned to build high rise, particularly in France, the architectural imperative was not in fact the key rationale for choosing high rise. There were a large number of contributory factors.



In their review of high rise development in Europe, Bulos and Walker (1987, p2) list the factors shared by the various countries engaging in high rise construction (including the UK and France) as including:

- enthusiasm for the development and trial of new developments, materials and designs
- drive for rational and economical use of land
- opportunities for private sector developers to benefit from economies of scale, forward planning, high output and labour saving methods of construction

Similarly Dunleavy (1981) charts how consistent patterns of high rise construction were promoted and adopted in many different post war local authorities in England and Wales, attributing this to a collection of forces including government pressure, industrial and commercial influences, as well as the influence of the architectural and planning professions.

### France

In 1949 the Ministère de Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme convened a meeting of architects and planners to examine quick ways to build more and cheaper houses. This led to an experimental project of 200 units at Boulogne-Billancourt (site of the infamous, and now closed, Renault factory) in 1949, using prefabricated external wall panels. This was followed by experiments with the "Camus" method, using prefabricated structural external walls, in Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1951, and most importantly by the third Ministerial sponsored meeting in Strasbourg in 1951. Twenty four teams of architects and engineers submitted projects to this congress, outlining their proposals for a fixed price construction of 800 homes in Strasbourg, to be constructed within an 18 month maximum period. The winning project was built as the Cité Rotterdam. Clearly emerging from the designs and programmes submitted were two elements: emphasis on industrial processes; and a rationalisation and standardisation of the elements of architecture. The method of the large scale estates [grands ensembles] had been clearly set out (see Quilliot & Guerrand (1989) for details of these developments).



Price was a major consideration, and economies of scale were achieved due to the availability of very large scale sites through the ZUP land acquisition procedure. Heavy industrial methods could be used for very large scale industrialisation of construction, even to the point of installing special railway tracks for the mobile cranes to position the wall and floor panels. Laboratoire Logement (1989) quote an interview with a leading architect of the period, Bernard Zehrffuss, which provides a useful insight to the process

" In France, the most important problem is that of price. For a fixed price we must build the best housing possible. ....The programmes are badly set out, and we would achieve better results by a larger organisation, a centralisation, and a mass production of the housing.....Ten years ago housing estates were thought of in runs of 200 units only, now it is 4,000. The largest possible areas must be given to housing developments, for it is not by reducing these areas that the price can be forced down. There are other methods: making up the units in factories. On the other hand, it is deplorable that there should be a multiplicity of plans: 8,000 architects making plans which are almost the same: but small differences are sufficient to prevent mass production" (p 42).

The expression "architecture on mobile crane rails" was coined to describe the mass construction process (cited in Guglielmo & Moulin (1986)). It was also explained, by Lacoste (1959), as a reducing the diversity of construction by mass production, repetition of buildings of the same type for long periods of time, precise and methodical planning of large building sites, the coordination of the work of the different professions, and specialisation of teams of workers in precise and repetitive tasks.

This method of working was also appropriate for the large pools of immigrant workers who were available. However it was only really appropriate for the large industrial firms having the resources to tackle such large contracts, excluding the smaller construction firms and promoters (Guglielmo & Moulin (1986)).

## UK

In the UK there was a similar technical push from the government, initially by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Works and the Scottish Office who set up a programme of research entitled Post War Building Studies on House Construction,



which produced reports examining and evaluating various methods of non traditional construction. This followed the decision set out in the 1945 "Housing" White Paper (MHLG 1945) that prefabrication and other non traditional forms of construction which make a smaller call on building labour than the traditional methods should be used to the fullest practicable extent in the construction of permanent housing during the emergency period

Similar encouragement was given to non traditional houses at the start of the new Conservative programme in 1952, with Circular 28/52 explaining that the non traditional methods

"take up to 50% less man hours on the site and an even lower proportion of skilled labour in certain trades"

This encouragement continued in the form of circulars and reports, being continued with the establishment of the National Building Agency in 1964 which had a wide ranging role in promoting industrialised building, through technical advice and promoting contacts and contracts.

An important role was also played by the subsidy arrangements. The Housing Subsidies Act 1956 played a crucial role in the expansion of the high rise flat: additional subsidy was paid for flats constructed for "special purposes" such as slum clearance or rehousing people from camps or temporary dwellings - but the rate of subsidy was progressively increased for flats in blocks with 4 and additional stories; and a new land purchase subsidy was introduced for developments where all or some of the flats were over 4 stories. This differential subsidy arrangement was continued in the Housing Act 1961, and Dunleavy (1981) has estimated that during the period 1957 to 1966, the proportion housing subsidies spent on supporting high rise grew to between 14 to 17% of the total, or some £1,300 million over the total life of the dwellings from 1953.

Other pressures came from the exercise of discretion in allocating resources:

"Housing authorities who seemed to be cooperating were 'rewarded' in terms of enhanced capital allocations, speeding approvals etc" (AMA 1984, p14).



Again, in Circular 21/65 the Government made the preference for industrialised construction plain:

"In deciding what programmes to approve, the Minister will be influenced by the extent of the proposed use of industrialised methods"

This was reinforced by the 1965 White Paper (MHLG1965) which set a target of 40% of new construction to be industrialised by 1970 - double the 1965 level, pressure which was maintained in the Circular 76/65 which set out the claimed advantages in terms of speed of erection, output, cost, estate design, and quality of these methods.

High rise subsidy was, however, withdrawn in the 1967 Housing Act, and the growing tenant criticism, and general loss of enthusiasm of high rise (see AMA 1984) was brought to a head with the gas explosion in Ronan Point in May 1968. Thereafter the incidence of new high rise and industrial construction declined sharply.

### **Who was housed in the new, high rise estates?**

#### **France**

HLMs have always aimed to house a much wider mix of households than in the UK. Indeed despite a clear social role to provide housing for those with limited resources, they have often sought to choose the best possible tenants, with most resources and fewest problems, to minimise management difficulties (Merlin 1990).

Consequently, initial surveys (primarily by INSEE, described in Laboratoire Logement (1989)) during the 50s indicated that HLMs in general were more likely to reject the poorest people who were living in overcrowded conditions, and rather select those who were better off; and to select disproportionately fewer blue collar workers. The practice of linking allocations to local industries or local communes who had contributed to the construction costs also led to the housing of high proportions of industrial or local government workers. This provoked widespread criticism that the HLMs were not fulfilling their social role, but giving a disproportionate consideration to their financial interest.



By the late 60s the pattern was changing, and also diversifying between different sizes of town. In the smaller towns, there continued to be a high proportion of middle class households, as well as many new formed households. In larger towns, blue collar workers were more likely to be tenants, particularly in the Paris region (except for the Central Paris zone). Despite this growing social role, it remained the case that HLMs were housing proportionately more middle class families than were represented in the population as a whole: in 1968, for example, there 14.5% of the Paris Region population was classed as middle class, but the HLMs had an average of 18.4% middle class tenants; and whereas 38.9% were classed as working class, only 26.2 of the HLMtenants fitted this description. They were also overwhelmingly supplying flats for young families: in 1970, 56% of the population of HLM stock was aged under 8 years: this reflected the predominance of large flats - 72% of flats were 2 or 3 bedroom in 1970. HLMproperty was acting as a staging post for the still underdeveloped low cost owner occupied market (Laboratoire Logement (1989)).

The 70s marked a period of further change. The reforms of housing finance in 1977 had lead to rents in the HLM sector rising faster than in other sectors; and higher earning families were denied access to the housing benefits which could offset these costs. The proportion of better off families declined, and their place taken by both blue collar families and unemployed households. This increasing "social role" accelerated in the 80s. The availability of low cost, run down private sector rents, including furnished rooms, was declining, and the low income households who had been housed in this sector was increasingly turning to HLMs. In addition, the low cost ownership sector (provided by private HLMs) was now growing fast, and proving more attractive to young working families with average incomes or above, who could afford ownership.

Figures from Laboratoire Logement (1989) and Curci (1988) show the fundamental change which had come about nationally by 1984 - 12% of HLM tenants were immigrant households, compared with a national average of 6%. Larger families were over-represented: of families with more than 3 children, 52% lived in HLMs, and of families with more than 4 children, 68%. The proportion of elderly people



housed was growing - up by 14% between 1978 and 1984, compared to a general drop of 15%. This was partly because a many older households had moved into HLM stock, and then were unable to move out, as they aged further. Between 1978 and 1984, the proportion of new tenants rehoused by HLMs with incomes below national average rose from 48% to 62%. By 1984 the proportion of HLM rent paid by housing benefits had increased to 30% from its 1978 level of 20%: and the proportion of HLM tenants receiving these benefits increased from 36% to 42%, reaching 47% for recent tenants in 1984 - this compares with a total of 31% for tenants as a whole in all sectors in 1984.

So, in summary,

"preferring to house the average earners, in 12 years [to 1984] the HLM sector found itself occupied by a population with restricted and lower incomes" (Laboratoire Logement (1989) p95).

## UK

Slum clearance was one of the primary motors of postwar construction: - and rehousing previous slum dwellers was one of the main sources of tenants. This was enshrined in the 1957 Housing Act which gave Local Authorities the obligation to give reasonable preference to people occupying insanitary or overcrowded housed, or living in unsatisfactory housing conditions. Not all slum dwellers were automatically rehoused, and the process of blight and population drift out of slum areas once they had been identified is noted by Dunleavy (1981).

More importantly, perhaps, most authorities also operated a series of filters to others seeking entry to the council sector. These types of restriction are clearly set out in the various versions of the Housing Management classic "Housing Management" (Macy & Baker 1965 & 1973). These commonly involved residential or employment qualifications, and an assessment of the family in terms of cleanliness, rent payment record, and tidiness. Though families might not be excluded because of problems in passing these homemaking tests,

"[i]t will be appreciated that the personal suitability of the applicant and his wife are a guide to the type of dwelling to be offered" (Macy & Baker 1975, p244).



The issue of where to house the "problem family", that is a household whose standards of behaviour and cleanliness, as well as rent record, were not up to scratch, was one of the debates of the period - was it better to house them all together, or to mix them in with the "good" families; would they improve according to the example of their neighbours, or would the one rotten apple ruin a street? Whichever approach was adopted, authorities would try to choose carefully those who were housed in the new estates.

The construction of the New Towns also influenced the residual population on inner city estates. They aimed to have high levels of owner occupation (at least 50% being the target), and had rent levels which were higher than for equivalent local authority flats. This, together with early allocation policies, meant that they attracted mainly skilled workers, the proportion of semi skilled, unskilled, and low income households being small (Short 1982, p214f). Workers moved to the new town for jobs - leaving behind the poorer households in the urban centres. These inner city areas also served to receive and house the new waves of immigrants, albeit in the private sector. Immigrant households were usually excluded from the social rented sector, most importantly by residential qualifications. The pattern of immigrant housing is considered in more detail below.

The most important change in the legislation involving allocations was the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977, which introduced additional rights to immediate rehousing to certain categories of household, primarily those "vulnerable" because of pregnancy, children, age, or disability. This restricted again the ability of authorities to house from their waiting list, and as in the 60s the rehousing burden had been to provide for displaced slum dwellers, in the 70s and 80s providing for homeless households became a primary responsibility. The unpopularity of high rise and industrial estates meant that in many cases the only people who were willing to accept these estates were those for whom only one offer was available - the homeless households. There emerged, therefore, a pattern of unpopular estates being let increasingly to more disadvantaged households - the homeless.



## **Ethnic Minority Tenants on Estates**

It is important to give an account of the growth of ethnic minority populations on estates, as they form a disproportionate proportion of tenants in both countries. Furthermore the extent to which public perception of the problems on the estates is influenced by the high presence of ethnic minority tenants requires a careful unpacking of the facts and issues which lie behind what may often be a prejudicial approach. It also provides an initial introduction to some of the programmes which operate on difficult estates.

## **Patterns of Immigration**

A useful statement of the recent development of immigration and race relations is provided by Lapeyronnie & Frybew's (1990) comparative report on the integration of minority immigrants in France and Great Britain. This report traces the recent patterns of immigration, and their origins.

Both countries experienced immigration post war from their colonies and ex colonies, although the differences in the manner of administration of these colonies (local autonomy in the case of the UK, centralising assimilation for France) led to differences in attitudes to subsequent immigration. The most marked, according to Lapeyronnie & Frybew, is that in the UK there was an early concern over the management of the politics of immigration, and the development of related civil and ethnic issues. Immigrants, from a different race and culture, were seen to present problems. This came much later in France, only starting in the 80s - prior to that the immigration was seen primarily as an economic issue, linked to the need for labour, with only a few specialist agencies concerned with the wider social impact. It was driven by economic planning, not constrained by social concerns, and the immigrants were viewed simply as workers responding to the country's economic needs.



France

Details of the pattern of immigration in France are shown in the Commissariat de Plan's (1988) report on Immigration.

	1954	1975	1982	1985
Immigrants (000)	1,554	3,442	3,680	3,743
% of population	3.63	6.54	6.78	7.26
% European immigrants	90	61	48	0

**Table 3.1: Pattern of Immigration in France**  
Source: Commissariat de Plan (1988)

One third of the growth in manual workers in the period 1964 to 1973 was provided from immigration (having been one half prior to 1964). During the post war years the steady decline in European immigration (mainly Portugal, Spain, and Italy), was matched by an increase in immigrant workers from Africa and North Africa, as well as South East Asia. The 1985 3.7 million figure includes 780,000 Algerians and 504,000 Moroccans. There is also a large Tunisian population (around 200,000), and a distinct community of about 400,000 Harkis - Algerian Arabs who fought with the French in the Algerian war, then fled to metropolitan France at its end. It excludes immigrants from the DOM-TOM (the overseas Dominions and Territories such as Guadeloup or New Caledonia), who numbered a further 282,300 in 1982, an increase of 64% from 1975.

Primary immigration of unskilled workers was severely restricted from 1974 (Circular of 5th July 1974), with a shift of policy around three axes: suspension of primary immigration, aid for repatriation, and an effort to integrate immigrants into French society (see Jacquier (1990)). This led to a marked increase in the arrival of families and children to join workers already here. However the Commissariat de Plan (1988) report, using details from various reports in the mid 80's, shows that immigrants tended to be concentrated in unskilled or semi skilled employment; to have lower incomes than equivalent French households; to suffer from higher rates of illiteracy, and have children with disproportionate problems with schooling; to be



more likely to be renters than owner occupiers (80% rent, including one in 4 in HLMs, which is double the rate for French households); to be more likely to live in overcrowded or substandard homes; to have larger families; and to be younger than French households, mainly due to the absence of elderly family members.

The concentration of immigrants in HLM properties is examined further by Jacquier (1990), who notes the contrary tendencies for the last 15 years where French households are increasingly likely to move to owner occupation, whereas increasing numbers of immigrant households live in HLM flats. There are also high proportions of immigrants in the traditional loci for immigrant populations: the older, rundown inner city houses. The key important fact, however, is the easy access into HLM property, often from cleared or renovated inner city older property, with limited movement out, which occurred in the early 70s:

"[a]fter 1968, housing policy favoured the development of low cost home ownership of a system built individual house in the suburbs. The better off tenants left the large estates for these houses...which had the unforeseen effect of emptying certain large social housing estates of their "good" tenants. Due to the voids and arrears, HLMs found themselves in difficulty. For the first time, the Maghrebin families, who would accept the homes which the French no longer wanted, were seen as mana from heaven for the HLMs" (Blanc (1992) p45)).

The North African (Maghrebin) immigrants included a majority of Moslem households. This has led to additional problems of assimilation, about which there is a live debate in France. Previous waves of immigrants were expected to totally assimilate to French culture - the so called "republican" view by which every immigrant is expected to adopt the attitudes, habits, and values of the French host population. This has not happened to the same extent with the Maghrebin population. On the contrary there is now a thriving Islamic community, and over one thousand Mosques. This is explored in a number of recent publications, including Kepel (1991) who estimates that including not only official immigrant households and their children, but also clandestine immigrants and Moslem households with French nationality, the total Moslem population of France by 1990 had reached some 2.5 to 3 million. He notes that during the mid 70's, following the halt to primary immigration and increase in family immigration, the Moslem population saw



themselves as permanent residents for the first time, and the growth of French Moslem consciousness and organisations began to take off - partly as a consequence of the injection of petrodollars from supportive contacts amongst Moslem OPEC countries. This accelerated sharply in the 1980s, with increasing numbers of organisations of Moslems, increasing political action, and the new phenomenon of organisation by Mahgerbin youth, known sometimes as "beurs". This lead also to conflicts on certain large HLMestates, particularly with the "beaufs" - racist, heavy drinking, chauvinistic, violent, white French residents (see Kepel (1991) p13f for further details).

## UK

The post war period in the UK saw a similar need for unskilled workers, which also initially fuelled immigration. Peach (1981) provides details of immigration into the UK post war. In 1951 the black population of the UK was negligible, at about 50,000. There were then two overlapping waves. The first was the West Indian movement which began in the early 1950s, peaked in 1961, and subsequently died away in the early 70's to become a net decline. The second wave was from India and Pakistan which got into its stride as the West Indian movement had peaked. The 1971 census shows that only 15% of Pakistanis and 25% of Indians had entered the country before 1961, compared with 43% of West Indians. A third wave was that of East African Asians, particularly the 30,000 approximately who were expelled from Uganda in the early 1970s.

There were different reasons behind these waves of immigration. Many West Indian migrants were recruited specifically in relation to the demand for labour, and increases in immigration followed the changing demand for labour. Some industries, particularly British Rail, London Transport, and the National Health Service, recruited labour directly from Barbados, Jamaica, and other islands. By the mid 50s this flow had grown so great that population loss was heavy, with smaller islands such as Montserrat, for example, losing almost a third of its population. Peach (1981) has correlated the unemployment rates with immigration rates from the West Indies, showing a marked inverse correlation. The pattern of immigration during this period



was, generally speaking, controlled from the UK in relation to the demand for labour.

The relationship of Indian, Pakistani, and East African immigration to demand for labour is less clear. The forces of the sending areas seem to have been more important than the demand from the UK. In the case of East African Asians the push forces were clearly dominant.

One essential difference from France, however, was that many commonwealth citizens possessed British passports, and had theoretically and practically free access to the UK, irrespective of any employment programme. The 1949 Royal Commission on Population noted up what it believed to be problems with the integration of immigrants who may not be "of good stock", or the right race or religion; and by the time of the riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958, there was a vigorous debate, lead by the right wing of the Conservative party. The passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 ended this era of free entry - though it had been preceded in the previous two years by a rapid influx of immigrants before the doors closed - 58,000 immigrants from the Caribbean and Indian sub continent in 1960, 115,000 in 1961, and 72,500 in 1962 up to 30 June, compared with an average of 32,000 for each of the previous 5 years. The subsequent waves of immigration from Kenya in 1968, and from Uganda in 1972 were equally seen and debated in terms of the significance and historical consequences of awarding British citizenship - a problem replicated recently in relation to Hong Kong. This early restriction of primary immigration of industrial workers, which continued later in France, lead to the earlier emergence of family immigration, and an earlier concern with social and discriminatory issues.

Further restricting immigrant legislation was passed in 1968 and 1971. By 1982 New Commonwealth immigration had declined further, and was almost entirely made up of dependants of people already settled here. Further, by 1984, the UK black population was over 40% British born, and over half of those who are immigrants had lived here for over 15 years.



Settlement was not even over the country, with in 1971 three quarters of West Indians, two thirds of Pakistani born and well over one half of Indian born people living in the seven largest conurbations, particularly London, Birmingham, and Manchester. This reflected a tendency for these groups to move into areas which were experiencing a high population loss of white households, who were moving out to smaller towns. This led to a higher concentration in areas of housing stress, with for example in 1971 one third of the West Indian population living in areas of housing stress compared to 10% of the population as a whole.

The question of discrimination against ethnic minorities' housing opportunities has been examined by a sizable number of published studies, as well as specific reviews undertaken by local authorities and other organisations (e.g. CRE (1984a), (1984b); GLC (1976); Lambert et al (1978); Rex & Moore (1967)).

These reports suggest that

"[t]he housing circumstances of black people in Britain are in many ways unusual and inferior to those of white people" (PSI (1984), p68)

As in France, there is an imbalance in relation to the proportions of owners and social renters. In the early 80s, white UK owner occupiers (60%) outnumbered white council tenants (30%) by a factor of two to one; but West Indian households were found in only 41% of cases in owner occupation and 46% of cases in council housing. Asian households, by contrast, were found predominantly in owner occupation (72%) and seldom in council housing (19%) - although there are differences between for example Bangladeshis, with 30% owning and 53% in council homes, and Sikhs, with 91% owning and 6% council tenants. (PSI (1984)).

In the council sector, PSI (1984) report that black tenants were twice as likely as whites to be in flats, particularly black single parents; almost four times as many West Indian and Asian households were rehoused in council dwellings as "homeless"; and tended to be housed in flats on higher floors.



The CRE Liverpool report (CRE 1984) provides an illustration of how this disadvantage occurs. The report finds, from an examination of the city's rehousing records, that

"black households have been concentrated certain parts of South City, irrespective of choice. The differences in allocations observed could only be explained by the factor of the racial origin of the applicants. Therefore there is no alternative explanation other than that conscious or unconscious stereotyping of black applicants must have entered into the subjective interpretation of housing officers... [I]t is primarily due to the unintentional racist effect of allocation procedures and practices and also the racial stereotyping of white and black applicants by Council officers" (p87)

South City was the area of town that had been traditionally occupied by black households, for the previous hundred years. The study also found that black households had achieved a lower quality of dwelling overall, and that they had been virtually excluded from the better quality environment of the suburban area of South City.

Henderson & Karn (1987) provide a review of the research on race and housing. Looking at council housing they note the study by Policy and Economic Planning (Daniel (1968)) of six local authorities, which found that ethnic minorities were effectively excluded from access to council housing, a similar conclusion to that reached by Rex and Moore (1967). A further PEP study in 1975 (Smith & Whalley (1975)), looking at 10 local authorities, found that in all of them ethnic minorities were at a disadvantage in getting access to council housing. This was predominantly due to restrictions based on residence requirements of on length of time on the waiting list. In addition, the restrictions on owner occupiers was disadvantaging those Asian and West Indian households who had moved into cheap, substandard housing. Over time the residential qualification problem lost its impact, as more and more of the ethnic minority households, particularly West Indian, had been resident for long periods.

Quality was also a problem. Smith & Whalley (1975) found that there was little awareness of the problem, but that there was a significant impact on the quality of accommodation offered due to the priority system, the nature and location of the



stock available, acceptance of offers through desperation, choice of areas by blacks and whites, poor communication, and racial bias; and they note:

" it is significant that so much was left to the personal judgement of the housing manager who, in spite of his good intentions, may well have stereotyped notions which led to this kind of discrimination" (p61)

Internal monitoring was generally lacking, but in the mid to late 70's some authorities introduced it and examined patterns of allocations (e.g. the GLC, Lewisham, Wandsworth, Bedford, Nottingham, Liverpool, and Islington). The general conclusions were that black families were doing worse, due to a large number of factors, including the disproportionate number of homeless black families, the poor knowledge blacks had of the council housing system, acceptance of the first offer, possibly because of desperation resulting from bad housing conditions, and preference for inner city locations, even where the property available was worse, as well as the likelihood that there was a specifically racial bias in the decisions made. The conclusion drawn by Henderson and Karn was that no matter what the allocations rules and procedures, racial inequality in allocations always emerged, confirmed by their own research into the City of Birmingham's allocations (Henderson and Karn (1987)).

### Official Aid for Immigrants

Measures to combat the difficulties experienced by immigrants differed greatly in each country. In France the establishment in 1958 of the FAS (Immigrant Assistance Fund), initially to assist Algerian immigrants, but extended to include all immigrants in 1964, created a body whose main concern was the settlement and housing of immigrants. The anti discrimination law of 1 July 1972 made it an offence to engage in racist behaviour or discriminatory activities. A national network of welcome agencies was instituted by the Ministry of Labour in 1973, and in June 1974 a new Ministerial post was created, charged with the affairs of immigrant workers, in recognition of the insufficiency of previous measures. Various local programmes for the housing and integration of immigrants were initiated and funded. In addition, special educational and training measures were instituted during the 70s. There was



still, at the end of the 70s, a clear government policy to encourage the return of around 500,000 immigrant workers to their country of origin.

The change of government in 1981 brought an end to the doctrine of repatriation, and brought the right of residence to many workers, and the right to association and organisation in groups to further their own specific needs and aspirations. Following the 1981 rioting on certain hard to let HLM estates, the emphasis moved to the assistance for disadvantaged groups, who included many black households. The programmes of educational priority zones and of assistance to unemployed young people, together with the DSQ programme, formed the core of a diversity of actions. The Commissariat General du Plan (1988) report provided consolidated information and advice on improving these measures to the benefit of the ethnic minority population. However the measures taken to date have been fragmented and poorly focused, in the view of Lapeyronnie & Frybaw (1990).

In the UK the emphasis has been much more on the creation of an institutional framework for the integration of immigrants. The creation in 1962 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory council was followed in 1965 by the Race Relations Act, which (like the 1972 French Act) forbade discriminatory or racist activities, and created the Race Relations Board. The legislation was strengthened in 1968 with measures to outlaw discrimination in housing, services, and employment, and the creation of the Community Relations Commission at a national level, as well as local commissions, to promote good race relations. The creation of Community Relations Officers in local authorities was also funded. The Commission for Racial Equality was created in 1976, with the passing of a further race relations act which forbade indirect discrimination. This new commission had the job of providing policy advice; of taking action for the elimination of discrimination; and of promoting good race relations. There is no equivalent institution in France, with similar powers and duties to the CRE, who between 1977 and 1989 conducted 47 enquiries and published reports on each, as well as publishing guides and codes of good practice on race relations.



Social actions taken began under Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966, which permitted special provisions to be made, and paid for by the Home Office, for "substantial numbers of immigrants whose language or customs differ from those of the community" (from Section 11 of the Act). The majority of these funds went on educational spending, though social services spending was also important. Additional funding from the Urban Programme (see Chapter Four) was also used to support these initiatives, although it was made clear that the presence of ethnic minority groups in an area was only one factor amongst others which would influence spending. In 1983, 38% of the ethnic minority population lived in Urban Programme areas, and in the London area this increased to 60% (cited in Lapeyronnie & Frybaw (1990) p93). Programmes for the training of unemployed young people were also initiated, as in France, under the Manpower Services Commission which was created in 1974. This led to the Job Creation programme, the Youth Opportunities Programme, and finally the Youth Training Scheme.

The absence of a body such as the CRE in France has meant that this type of study, concerned with indirect discrimination, has been much less common. In the UK the need for equal opportunities policies in employment or housing, to take two examples, has become absorbed into management and service delivery culture in the public sector as a whole, and in some cases in the large private sector companies. There has been a constant emphasis on the civil notion of racial equality, and measures to promote anti racism monitored by the CRE and supported by the Home Office. In France, in contrast, the emphasis has been on social action, managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the FAS, and the civil dimension has been almost totally absent. One small indication of the differences may be the manner in which the French debate is still in terms of "immigrants", a term since replaced in the UK with the less emotive and discriminatory term "ethnic minorities" (although the French attitude to the Politically Correct language debate is generally cold).

## **Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter has set out to sketch in the background to the construction and development of the post war difficult estates. It has illustrated that:



- both countries were faced with a post war imperative to build due to extensive war damage, large pockets of poorer older housing, and, subsequently, a growing population
- in the UK the problem of the slums and of slum clearance was a much greater motor of local authority activity, reflecting earlier urbanisation.
- the siting of high rise estates in peripheral areas was a deliberate and clearly publicised choice of French government planners; whereas in the UK the siting of high rise in inner city locations was less overtly linked to a positive planning policy, being more the result of the discouragement of greenfield social housing sites. In neither country was the new towns programme a main provider of social housing.
- lack of development funds in France often left the new estates without suitable infrastructure such as transport links, schools, or shops.
- the design and construction methods of high rise were linked to costs, labour availability, and to a much lesser extent architectural fashion. However the greenfield nature of the French sites permitted a programme of full scale industrial construction of a scale not possible in the UK infill sites built on slum clearance land.
- both countries increasingly promoted low cost home ownership from the late 60s, via the private HLMs in France
- in the UK the original occupants had by and large been the respectable ex slum dwellers, and in France there was an attempt to attract middle income groups at the start of the programme. But both countries experienced residualisation in the populations of the estates during the 70s. The increasing unpopularity of the high rise estates meant that the populations allocated



flats there tended to be drawn more and more from disadvantaged groups with no other options.

- more specifically, ethnic minority tenants began to be disproportionately concentrated on these estates from the late 70s. This was due to a variety of factors, including their willingness to accept properties there, discriminatory allocations practices, and their inability to find alternative accommodation in other tenures or areas. Immigrant households were therefore used in this way to meet the financial needs of housing organisations to fill the void properties on hard to let estates.

It can be seen then that there are two main factors: first, although the original objective of providing a large number of new homes had been achieved, the method adopted (low cost high rise) had produced estates which were unpopular because of their isolation, design, scale, and physical defects. This unpopularity developed at a time when there was a growing support for owner occupation in both countries and an increasing provision of opportunities for lower income households to move to this tenure.

The result was that mass housing estates found that their units were no longer needed or wanted by a cross section of the community. Instead, housing organisations had to resort to taking anyone who was willing to move there, and indeed many people who were not willing but had no other option. Even this was not sufficient to fill all the voids, as will be seen later. The next chapter will document the gradual realisation of the origins and nature of these problems, and the initial plans to combat them.



## Chapter Four: Context of the EA and DSQ Programmes

### **Overview**

This chapter starts by examining the early governmental awareness of problems on difficult estates, looking at what these problems were, and at the initial programmes which preceded Estates Action and DSQ. The context of other governmental action to combat social exclusion is then provided, illustrating the much longer and more varied history of intervention in the UK.

### **Stirrings of Awareness**

#### France

Particularly in France, many commentators initially had high hopes for the estates. Kaes, a French sociologist, in a study of the newly developing social phenomenon of the large estates suggested, for example (Kaes 1963), that it would lead to the growth of a new, mass culture.

In contrast, the first statement of the problems of the difficult estates to make an impact on thinking about the issues was the Chamboredon & Lemaire's celebrated article in the *Revue Francaise de Sociologie* (Chamboredon & Lemaire (1970)), based on a research study of an estate in the north of Paris. Their exploration of social relations on the estate leads them to reject many of the utopian notions of communal life on estates. The population on these estates is not homogeneous, since allocations have been made from a wide range of sources, including employees quotas, social service quotas for difficult families, and Prefects quotas. In this sense it was totally unlike a normal "neighbourhood" in a town, where self selection would bring together similar minded people. Consequently there tended to be no group who imposed its values, or set the tone, on the estate. Most people allocated flats are denied the ability to choose their neighbours, and the heterogeneity meant they could have little in common through which to make real contact, and often feel no impetus to be neighbourly. Attitudes to the estate were, however, very closely related to the social group to which the respondent belonged. The study's research found that the manual and unskilled workers were much more content with life on the estate, knowing that there were others housed in much poorer conditions, as they



may themselves have been. They also saw themselves as staying on the estate. In contrast the young middle class households, or young skilled workers saw the estate as simply a stepping stone to owner occupation; and were also much more likely to be involved in local associations or organisations.

This evidence leads them to be very critical of previous assumptions about population and social structure on estates -such as the study published by Clerc (Clerc (1967)) which simply concluded that there is likely to be an "average" mix of population on an estate, compared to the population as a whole. Quoting extensively from contemporary commentators on these estates, they also criticise the "utopian" approaches which are common. These tend to see the estates as either "miraculous diffusions of the needs and aspirations, supposedly universal, of the middle classes" (p15) or places permitting the "emergence of a new man, either a little universal bourgeois or an eternal man relieved of his alienation his myths and his conditioning" (p 15), a view which has much in common with the English ideas of garden cities or ideal villages. In fact those who are socially mobile appeared to like the mixture of people on the estates, while those who are at one extreme or the other disliked the contrasts of lifestyle - particularly the worst off. This also explained, in part, the prominence of complaints about noise on these estates: people were forced to live alongside strangers with different aspirations and lifestyles, which were all too evident in the poorly insulated buildings - a complaint which was as much about the type of neighbours as the noise. This antagonism arose from the point of moving in, where the better off tenants coped with the generally higher expenses of living on peripheral estates, and of new furnishing, whereas the poorer tenants found their limited budgets extremely stretched and disrupted.

This conflict expressed itself strongly in relation to children and young people, where the middle class groups objected strongly to the habits and permissiveness of poorer tenants. Young people, particularly adolescents, formed a very prominent group on estates, partly due to demographic factors (many young parents and few third generation adults). The majority were working class youths, whose main gathering place was the streets (in contrast to middle class youth who tended to gather in



other places, such as schools). If they were unemployed, as many were, they tended also to gather until late at night, while the working population was trying to sleep. These contrasts of both class and age tended to reinforce each other, and contribute to conflicts. What is noticeable about this article is that although it was written over 20 years ago, and although the conflict of classes has now been in many cases overlaid by the conflict of ethnic groups, nonetheless the basic analysis provides considerable insight to the problems of these estates.

In 1965 the initial official concern about certain of the large HLM estates manifested itself in the form of the "Groupes d'Action Municipale", set up by the then Mayor of Grenoble, Hubert Dubedout, later to become the first president of the DSQ. This was a discussion group of decision makers who wished to change the rules of urban development, seeking a more integrated construction programme, better infrastructural improvements, more social life, and a more participative style with residents on estates - developing the principles which were to be part of the "DSQ method" to be developed later. This group was the first to flag up the change in the problem: from being a problem of simply having inadequate numbers of homes built (construction crisis [crise de logement]), the problem had moved to being one of housing conditions ([crise de l'habitat]).

Toubon & Renaudin (1987), in their analysis of difficulties on estates, divide the housing problem further into one of physical problems ([crise de produit]) and social problems ([crise sociale]). They note several factors lead to increasing problems for the HLM estates: the development of city centre rehabilitation programmes, for that housing which had traditionally provided low cost rented homes, removed one means of avoiding high concentrations of low income households in large estates; the rapidly increasing numbers of HLM properties meant that the previous allocation policies to be fairly selective of stable households was undermined; and this was compounded by the various programmes promoting low cost home ownership which lead to the better off tenants leaving the large estates, an avenue not open to the poorest. Immigration began to be an issue in the late 60s: citing the Paris region, in 1968 14,000 HLM properties were occupied by immigrant households. By 1975 this



had grown to between 60-65,000. Finally they identify the economic crisis following the 1973 petrol price hike as a factor which both increased poverty and lowered mobility on estates.

By the early 70s, official circulars had begun to promote a change of direction: following three reports on problems on estates (dealing with estate facilities, housing conditions, and problems of young people) a circular (of 15 June 1971) set out changes to be adopted to develop social and cultural action on estates: developers were to try to avoid oppressive, monotonous estates, to avoid segregation of groups, develop the social life for groups on the estate, and to improve management. In addition, the Circular "Guichard" (after the then Minister of Housing) in 1973 urged a reduction in the size of housing estates, restricting the size of new ZAC housing estates to 1,000 in communes of under 50,000 residents, and 2,000 elsewhere. By the time of these circulars, however, many of the estates had progressed too far down the road of planning and construction to be affected.

1972 saw the establishment of "Plan Construction", set up by the Ministry of Urbanism, to stimulate meetings of architects, launch a programme of experimental construction, rehabilitation, and involvement with the residents, and develop the programme "Programme Architecture Nouvelle" which would reward projects which brought a marked architectural innovation in the direction of improvements and quality (Institut Francaise d'Architecture (1985)). It presented the first results of these experiments in an exhibition "Habitat et Innovation" in Paris in 1973 - a parallel with the previous 1949 meeting of architects and planners organised by the same Ministry, which had initiated the mass high rise construction programme. The organisation has grown and developed, and continues to take an active part in the development of solutions to the problems of the Grands Ensembles. Its interests are mainly architectural and planning, rather than housing management. The first actual operations of rehabilitation of the large estates were in 1975, in Saint-Jean in Beauvais and in Grammone in Rouen (Grimaud (1984)).



A further organisation, the "Club Habitat et Vie Sociale", which started in 1971 with a seminar and address organised by M Dourdan (Toubon & Renaudin (1987)), was more concerned with the management problems. There followed a series of meetings held across France, organised from 1972 by the then Director of Coinstruction, Robert Lions (later to be Director of the National Union of HLMs and author of their critical "White Paper on Housing" published in 1975 (UNFOHLM(1975))).

Further illustration of the problems which had begun to show themselves can be seen from a study of Nancy carried out in 1972 and 1979 (cited in Laboratoire Logement (1989)). In this report, two main complaints concerned the buildings themselves - they were noisy, and generally people did not like living in flats, preferring individual houses. The newly acquired modern facilities were welcome, but they could not completely compensate for the monotony of the estates. The problems of social polarisation were already evident, with better off tenants often opting for HLM home ownership schemes to move off, leaving poorer tenants, who often felt trapped. These problems were not severe, compared with those which were to emerge later, but were sufficient to prompt concern and action.

The consequences for HLMs of the increasing polarisation were that they were now beginning to play a role to which they had neither expected nor been accustomed, with massive problems of arrears, and severe management problems. They were ill equipped and hardly able to deal with these problems. The large scale repairs problems, due to construction defects, were particularly sources of complaint for residents and problems for the HLMs; but inexperience and lack of resources left them uncertain as to how to cope. This prompted wide ranging discussions on the emerging problems, which were incorporated into the Lion's UNFOHLM "White Paper" (UNFOHLM1975). This report notes that the main post war task of providing homes in bulk had been largely achieved. The speed of urbanisation had produced social inequalities, however - overcrowding remained a problem, and social segregation between those who were part of the main housing market and those left on the HLM waiting lists. Residents were also rejecting the new housing estates, and the identified problems of anonymity, poor sound insulation, social segregation and



isolation on the large and monotonous estates were all leading to frustrations and passivity.

The White Paper identified two main causes of these problems. First the market factors of urban land use meant that the estates had been concentrated on the cheaper land outside of towns, even though in the long term this immediate financial economy might prove costly. Secondly the structure of housing subsidies tended to provide housing mainly for certain restricted middle income households, at the expense of those in greatest need - a reference to the wider context of housing finance and support for ownership. The rent levels needed to balance HLM accounts were higher than low income households could pay, due partly to inadequate public subsidy of social housing (in UNFOHLM's view), and consequently less benefit accrued to the poorest. The report also stated:

"The aspirations of a new lifestyle throws a more intense light on the mistakes of contemporary urban policies, and feeds a more intense demand for a return to truly social housing, less segregated, meeting more of the needs of the users, taking much more account of the future" (quoted in Guinchat et al (1981) p186)

## UK

As has been outlined in Chapter 1, the development of awareness of problems on UK estates was much less of a novel discovery of a previously unknown problem, and more the extension of an old problem.

- "there have always been bad, unpopular or problem estates (terms which are interchangeable with "difficult to let") and a degree of social polarization between the best and worst in public housing" (DOE 1980 p2).

Despite this, the origins of the Estates Action programme are much more tied to housing design and management concerns than was the case with the HVS, which focused as much on social issues. The original DOE study which formed the basis for much of the UK policy ((DOE 1980) was based on a 1974 postal survey of authorities. Its analysis and recommendations anticipated closely the later Estates Action policy. The report set out the origins of the problem as:

"some London Boroughs found themselves having to advertise new tower block dwellings in order to fill them;.... The reports were disturbing because they involved new dwellings of a technically high standard...its unacceptability was thought to lie largely with its design." (p1).



This description of the problem was immediately qualified, however. Having large numbers of unfilled vacancies was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of a "difficult to let estate":

"the term is misleading ...in that such estates may be easy to let, but only to households in need of immediate rehousing who cannot afford to wait for an offer.....difficult to let is therefore a description in most cases of the process whereby certain estates progressively accumulate a concentration of families who are on low incomes, who are unemployed or who have other related social problems. This tendency for families who are less able to cope to end up in housing which is in least demand we have called "social polarisation"; it is perhaps a more accurate description of the problem than "difficult to let". (p1)

Discussion with the coordinating author of the report (Mike Burbridge) revealed more of the background: during the 60's, there had been a view that the key problem was the design of the estates; this was matched by a belief that social engineering of the populations of estates - mixing young with old, poor with better off - would produce new communities. This was further reinforced by an optimism about the increasing general affluence - that people moving onto estates would naturally be employed, and would have little need of social support. Surveying and enquiries concerned themselves primarily with design issues - the initial dissatisfactions which became evident as soon as people moved onto estates was put down to design problems requiring architectural solutions.

The report suggested that there was a new stigmatised, polarised, sector of public housing forming in the estates of 60s and 70s multi storey blocks, due to:

- increased variety and quantity of council stock
- rising expectations leading to high priority tenants "holding out" for good offers
- a wider range of tenants, including increasing numbers with social problems
- self selection away from bad estates, and "dumping" of problem tenants

Underlying this polarisation the report identified that there were wider factors (many of which were explored in the preceding chapter), such as



- the postwar concentration on speed and volume building had produced developments which were inhuman in scale, uniform and repetitive in appearance, and inadequately provided with social and community facilities.
- technical problems, such as water penetration and damp, were symptomatic of the fact that the systems had been adopted without proper evaluation and testing. Maintenance problems were unfamiliar to repairs teams used to traditional dwellings, and left unattended to pending disputes with the construction companies.
- housing management staff would often be too preoccupied with the problems of letting the next estate to be completed to be able to properly assist and manage the newly occupied estate. Compounding this problem was the low status of housing management staff, and inadequate provision for maintenance.

The report boldly presented an "approach" to tackle these problems. The key to improvements was stated to be a "combined approach" which meant:

- the problems must be identified accurately and comprehensively;
- tenant involvement
- constant monitoring

The remedial measures which were proposed included not only physical improvements, with better management and maintenance, but also revised allocations and transfers policies. The allocations initiatives were prompted by the fact that it was

"often just those families finding the greatest difficulties in coping who ended up in forms of housing which made the greatest demands on their inhabitants.... apathy and low morale could result from a feeling of being trapped in unsuitable housing with no hope of transferring out" (p10)

Strategies suggested included

- letting flats to childless or non family households: (including teachers and other young professionals)
- reducing child densities



- liberalising transfers, with the idea of trading up off a difficult to let estate after a fixed minimum period.

The report notes that the option of disposal of blocks or individual sales was not mentioned as few authorities had attempted this.

The ideas were proposed at a series of seminars for council members and officers organised by the DOE. In 1978, initial ideas were developed concerning a pilot programme to put them into practice; and in 1979, following the earlier appointment of permanent staff under the Labour government, the new Conservative government agreed to the formal launching of the Priority Estates Project.

## **Initial Programmes**

### France: Habitat et Vie Sociale

Government action came under the auspices of the VIIth Plan, which had within it (the report of the interministerial group 28) a programme for the rehabilitation of certain large peripheral HLM estates. This was to be done through the interministerial group "Habitat et Vie Sociale" (HVS), set up in 1977 to provide a permanent coordination committee linking the various ministries concerned with the problems of the large estates. The then Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, noted in his letter to the Prefects who were taking part in the programme that the new estates

"seldom had the diversity and the roots which make for a rich social life. Above all, their anarchic transformation brings to bear on our society the danger of a dangerous social segregation....certain Grands Ensembles ...risk becoming ghettos at the gates of our cities" (quoted in Toubon & Renaudin (1987) p 5).

HVS was set up by the Arrete of 3 March 1977, this date marking the start of the formal government programme to tackle problems on hard to let estates. Its concerns covered both physical degradation on estates, and the more social dimension of community life there (see Dupuy (1983)). It was also intended that improvement works should be carried out in 50 sites which presented signs of degradation, and social and cultural poverty. These operations were also to develop measures, primarily through economic development, to prevent the continuing development of problems.



Selection of sites (see Toubon & Renaudin (1987)) was on the basis of:

- physical degradation
- absence of social infrastructure and communal facilities
- poverty of social life

and the indicators to be used were:

- absence of community life
- unemployment
- families receiving social security benefits
- scholastic underachievement
- levels of working class immigrants (which was thus seen as a symptom of - social degradation and lack of qualifications)

The principles of the operations were:

- coordinated decentralised programmes with new administrative structures
- active collaboration with local councils
- resident participation.

Operations proceeded by:

- an initial study to identify the problems
- a detailed set of costed proposals
- carrying out of the works (though no specification was made over who was to be responsible for this coordination, or who was to be project manager ["maitre d'oeuvre"])

The first of these projects were pilot schemes in Lille, Marseilles, Nantes, Rouen, and Lorient. There were also projects in two of my case study estates - Stains and Meaux. In all about 70 operations were started between 1977 and 1981.

There are difficulties in trying to evaluate the HVSprogramme. Many projects were started, but because of delays preparing dossiers, or getting works under way, many fewer programmes were eventually achieved. There was no central coordination of schemes or information; no systematic evaluation or criteria set out; and many different types and sizes of scheme, from 500 units to 10,000. Some evaluations



were undertaken despite the difficulties, particularly by the *Commissariat General du Plan*, who produced a comprehensive report in 1981 (Figeat (1981)), and an evaluation of the programme was the basis for certain of the proposals for the DSQ (see Doubedout (1983)). Other researchers have compared HVS and the initial DSQ programme (Toubon & Renaudin (1987)), or looked at certain estates (e.g. Dupuy (1983)), or at the HVS projects in the Ile de France region (e.g. Toubon & Tanter (1980), *Préfecture de la Région Ile de France* (1988)).

The first phase of 42 projects between 1977 and 1981 led to works on 65,000 homes at a cost of F1,900 million. Although the overall average unit cost was F30,000, Figeat notes that due to the low average costs in the first years (about F12,000), and the need to account for inflation, this is better estimated at an average of F60,000 in 1981 prices. Central government contributed F525 million, of which over three quarters was in the form of the housing subsidy PALULOS. The rest of the state expenditure was on external spaces (13%), sports and cultural facilities (4%) and social facilities (6%), this money coming from the other ministries involved in the project (such as Health, Youth and sports, Culture, Education, and the Interior). These ministries usually contributed 40% of the running costs of facilities.

Other non governmental participants in the programme contributed funds. Of these, the cities contributed about 50% of the non housing costs, the Family Allowance Board (CAF) contributed 50% of the costs of social facilities; the 1% associations contributed 10% of the housing expenditure; and the HLMs, either directly from their own funds or via loans, contributed 10% of the housing costs. It should be noted, however, that the proportion of costs covered by the various partners varied greatly from project to project.

An evaluation seminar was held on 28 October 1981 in Paris, in the presence of the then Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy (documented in UNFOHLM1981). This meeting was organised by the UNFOHLM and involved the national association of Mayors, the CAF, and the *Commissariat General du Plan*, amongst others. It presented the results of Figeat's evaluation, and announced the beginnings of the new programme, with



a showing of a film on improving life on the estates called "Vivre ensemble dans la cité".

Overall, Figeat report was critical of the programme. He concluded that often there was insufficient consultation with either local residents or with the local council before starting works. In relation to housing management, he notes that "the urgency to develop an allocations strategy and decentralised management of the buildings has been well noted"(section 2.1), although this often met with resistance from local council members or local residents and managers. Often good works were conceived and planned, but due to lack of local organisation were not executed fully. Later operations, he notes, moved to the realisation that a complete change of image of the neighbourhood is needed, and working towards this wider objective is partly responsible for the higher costs. But this should not mean that "an HVS development becomes a catalogue of building works to do where the wider objectives set out disappear behind the work programme" (section 2.2). Social programmes were harder to measure, so local councils tended to concentrate on the measurable building works. Social worker intervention still tended to be parcelled up into specialisms rather than being coordinated.

Fineat believes there was an underlying problem: the HLMs and the local council members wished to reverse the marginalisation of the Grands Ensembles, and to have a more "balanced" population of skilled workers and middle class tenants on the estates, such as existed when they were first built - a theme which will be seen in the case studies. This was unlikely, however, as there was now a much wider market for these groups to choose from, particularly HLM build for sale. Thus

"this divides the traditional HLM population between the part who are mobile thanks to disposable resources, and the other part captive in the cheaper houses. The arrival of each new product on the housing market, each new strategy for providing homes for certain groups of families, creates in effect a further demotion of the zones which are most affected by their peripheral location and excessive density" (section 2.3).

It is therefore wrong to look exclusively at the problems in the estates without looking also at the wider housing market in the region - which would lead, often, to



radical solutions such as demolition, selling off homes to residents, or fundamental changes in local housing strategy.

He also noted that there are long delays in getting works under way: two years of preparatory studies, on average, plus many years further before works start. The whole process needed to be "unblocked" - an expression which was to reappear with the appointment of the first Minister for the Cities in 1980, with the job of "unblocking" the processes of the DIV, the programme which followed the DSQ itself. He also notes that tenant participation, which has been of mixed success, requires more than just putting out a leaflet, or inviting tenants to a meeting. There needs to be a complete change of attitude in the relations of the HLMs to their tenants. He also notes that the main problem on estates is actually unemployment, and that the success of the programmes would be influenced by this key factor. Nevertheless he concludes there was scope to improve and carry forward the HVS type approach, but with less red tape, more integrated programmes decided locally, on a smaller scale, and the development of a more radical approach to the buildings (reducing the density and changing uses).

Many of these problems were echoed by Dubedout (1983) in his introductory text on the DSQ. He set out the drawbacks with the HVS programme: the process concentrated too much on the internal comfort of flats, while neglecting the wider environment; it did not link into employment training, and education facilities; insufficient attention had been paid to resident involvement; there was too little involvement by local elected representatives; and the administrative procedure was too complex.

Out of this evaluation came the DSQ. There were other reasons to develop a new programme. The election of a Socialist Presidential administration in 1981 with the commitment to radical decentralisation meant that the centralised HVS programme would need to be replaced by a more decentralised and locally based organisation. More importantly, however, economic and social problems in the neighbourhoods in difficulty were seen as growing worse. This was particularly highlighted by the



disturbances on the worst estates in the summer of 1981, which started at les Minguettes near Lyons, spread to Roubaix, Nancy, and La Corneuve in Paris, and received considerable media attention. These "riots" had a major public impact, and forced the Prime Minister to act quickly to be seen to put in place an immediate programme to tackle the underlying problems. The HVS programme was therefore superseded by the new procedure of Développement Social des Quartiers in November 1981, on the instructions of the Prime Minister, fresh from his visit to the UNFOHLM conference on the evaluation of HVS the previous month.

#### UK: Priority Estates Programme (PEP)

The first programme to set out to deliberately adopt the approach suggested in the DOE (1981) report was the Priority Estates Project. Unlike the HVS programme, however, the PEP organisation still exists, and works along side the Estates Action programme.

It grew not only out of the DOE report but also out of a variety of initiatives promoting cooperative housing, including the DOE's own investigations (see DOE (1981), DOE (1979)), and the cooperative housing movement seen to be growing in the USA, as well as the publication of the NACRO crime prevention study in 1977 (NACRO 1977). Its initial aims were to work together with the Department, the Local Authorities, and tenants to develop a new style of housing management. Although an independent company, it was funded and supervised by the Department of the Environment, initially on a three year contract supervised by Departmental officials, and thereafter renewed continually until the decision in 1991 that this type of work should be put out to tender.

The initial projects were on three estates - in Bolton, Hackney, and Lambeth. Early on, PEP introduced a notion which had not been emphasised in the original DOE approach - that of the local management base on the estate, an approach which self consciously harked back to the 19th century idea of housing management pioneered by the original housing management pioneers such as Octavia Hill.



The aims, and a brief history of the project and its development are set out in the review report of progress (Power (1991)). The three initial projects had varying degrees of success, and an account of their activity was set out in one of the first reports (Power 1982). The general approach promoted by PEP was being increasingly adopted by local authorities, however, and Power (1991) notes that by the end of 1980, of the 20 initiatives on run down estates were in place, only three of them PEP initiatives. The most successful of these seemed to be where there was a local estate-based office with full time staff. By 1982 the then Minister of Housing, John Stanley, had been sufficiently persuaded of the importance of the programme's approach to launch a film and publicity pack promoting the aims and approach of PEP (DOE 1982).

PEP then developed and diversified, leading to the development of the "PEP model" - this model being set out in a three volume guide "The PEP Guide to Local Housing Management" (Power 1987). The guiding principles of the "PEP Model" are that local management and tenant participation are necessary to create not only a better, more flexible, and responsive service to tenants, but also a more cost effective organisation, where reduced voids, lower levels of crime and vandalism, and reduced rent arrears will offset the additional costs of more intensive management.

There was a widespread training programme; and a regular bulletin ("PEP Talk") promoting projects and ideas. National conferences were organised, involving not only UK participants but also forging links with practitioners abroad (including the DSQ who attended the 1988 conference (See Saunders 1989)). By 1987 new projects involving other forms of local management organisation had developed. This grew (according to Zipfel's account set out in the introductory booklet on Estate Management Boards (Zipfel (1989))) from problems in implementing the PEP model: decisions devolved to tenants' organisations were limited; few projects managed to identify and establish an estate budget, one of the keys to control; control over non housing services was limited; it was difficult to maintain the commitment of the authority to the continuing investment in the estate; and the model was still vulnerable to changes from the centre, for reasons unrelated to the needs of the



estate. These problems indicated to PEP that there was a need for a new, more radical model, which was set out as a more fundamental devolution of management powers, responsibilities, and budgets, as an EMB. This EMB model was clearly a development from the earlier PEP model, and Zipfel (1989, p14) sets out a useful chart of the development of the various PEP models.

In fact the development of these models and the approach to the problems of difficult to let estates was echoed both in the Estates Action programme, in other more general developments in local authority housing management practice, and local authority organisation generally. The move away from centralised structures to decentralised, semi autonomous units was widespread during the 80s and is now reflected in the changes in local authority management, where decentralisation to local management units is now widely accepted and implemented. This has also become a widely used model in many corporate business structures, the most notable example being the total decentralisation of IBM into autonomous decentralised units. The application of this process to difficult estates by PEP was thus part of a wider change in organisation and financial planning. The contribution of PEP was to define and apply this model to housing management.

### **Relation to other Government Programmes**

The Estates Action and DSQ programmes are part of wider governmental strategies for dealing with problems on difficult estates. Governmental action is normally in specific programmes, each with its own boundaries, funding mechanisms, and territorial competence. The programmes often show a certain possessiveness about their own interests, being rooted in certain specific departments, or organisations. This is sometimes tempered by wider attempts to integrate or coordinate the programmes.

### **France**

In parallel with the creation of the HVS programme, the VIIth plan created the "Fonds d'Aménagement Urbain" in 1976, which was mainly concerned with the problems of older private housing. It ran the programme of housing improvements



called OPAH [Opérations Programmées d'Amélioration de l'Habitat], aimed at the improvement of private housing in specified zones. A further interministerial group, the Groupe Interministériel pour l'Aménagement des Banlieues was created in 1980, with the specific task of proposing measures specific designed to improve "life in the suburbs", by means of experiments on 13 pilot suburbs.

1981 saw a new approach (Levy 1989). Initiatives were taken to deal with the problems of the integration of problem adolescents, the prevention of delinquency, combatting illiteracy, anti poverty measures and measures for the most vulnerable. The aim was to treat problems in relation to the client groups, unifying the actions of the different partners, rather than having a set of independent measures attempted by different uncoordinated agents. Decentralisation of programmes was also introduced to tailor programmes to local needs.

The programmes which were introduced included:

Zones d'Education Prioritaires (ZEPs), created in 1982, for children with educational problems. In 1986, 3/4 of schools in DSQ estates were also ZEP schools.

Missions Locales pour l'insertion sociale et professionnelle des jeunes en difficultés, started in 1982, to assist with young people finding employment. By 1985 there were over 100 of these

le Conseil National de Prévention de la Délinquance (CNDP) set up in 1982 by a grouping of Mayors. It seeks to prevent delinquency by organising, for example, summer activity schemes, designed to assist disadvantaged young people to make more creative and productive use of their leisure time.

Contrats d'Agglomération under the Ministry of Social Affaires in 1982, to assist immigrant families to integrate into society.

Banlieue 89 developed in 1983, to pioneer architectural and planning solutions to urban problems



## UK

I have already outlined the longer history of attention to the "inner city problem" in the UK. Amongst programmes which predated the Estate Action programme are:

Educational Priority Areas launched in 1967-8 to provide special building programmes and special allowances for teachers in deprived areas, defined in relation to social indicators.

Community Development Projects launched by the Home Office in 1969, created 12 local teams, similar to those created in the United States under the 1964 Equal Opportunities Act, to work closely with deprived communities, monitored by an action research team. The programme was abruptly halted in 1976, following conflicts between the teams and both local authorities and local communities, partly due to many teams embracing Marxist explanations of the plight of the people in the areas.

Housing Action Areas, introduced in 1974, targeted grant aid to clearly defined areas of older housing; and in fact were the proving grounds for the new Housing Associations.

The Urban Programme launched in 1968 by the Home Office in response to Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" speech in April 1968. The programme was expanded in 1975, when it was also taken over by the DOE, and occupied an important place in relation to estates action schemes until its virtual abolition in 1992. In its early years the spending - 75:25 central and local government, - went mainly on day nurseries, nursery education, and child care, distributed on the basis of various social indicators.

An important shift in direction came with the publication of the 1977 White Paper "Policy for the Inner Cities" (DOE 1977a) following the results of a series of studies of Inner City areas (DOE 1977b). This was followed by the Inner Urban Areas Act in 1978, and represented "the biggest single policy shift since inner urban policies were introduced" (Hall 1981 p95). The emphasis moved to economic revival; increased financial assistance was given to inner city areas; central/local



partnerships were to be set up for the larger cities, with smaller programmes of specific aid for smaller cities.

One main beneficiary of the new approach was the Urban Programme, which was transferred to the DOE from the Home Office, and received increased funding, going from £30 million in 1977/78 to £100 million in 1978/79. Resources were concentrated on 32 Partnership and Programme authorities and 155 other authorities which were given Other Designated District or Traditional Urban Programme status.

The election of a Conservative government in 1980 added quite new initiatives: Urban Development Corporations, which (like new town corporations) were run by Government appointed boards, with the task of taking over the traditional functions of local government in their areas, and carrying out large scale redevelopment - initially in the Liverpool and London docklands areas, then in 9 other areas. Enterprise zones were also announced in 1980, where planning controls were lifted, and local taxes waived, to promote the creation of new industries. There were 26 in all of these created in the UK.

In 1985 clearer Ministerial guidelines were set out for the Urban Programme, and 57 authorities were invited to bid to become the new Inner Area Programme authorities. Urban programme expenditure was to fit into an overall strategy for tackling economic, environmental, social and housing problems.

Its objectives were to:

- encourage enterprise and new business
- improve people's job prospects, motivation and skills
- make inner cities more attractive to residents and business, for example by tackling dereliction, bringing buildings in to use, improving transport links, and improving housing
- make inner city areas safe and attractive places to live and work, for example by reducing crime, improving education, and developing better facilities for arts, recreation and sport.



The programme must demonstrate value for money, and be additional to the local authorities main programmes. The criterion of additionality, that is to be something which would not otherwise be done, was one which was developed during the 80's in response to Treasury's (generally accurate) concern that Urban Programme funds were simply being used to substitute for investment the Local Authorities would otherwise have done themselves anyway. The programme guidelines are now set out annually for local authorities, and it is assessed in regular reports (e.g. DOE 1986a, DOE 1987a). The funds come from several Departments: for example in 1987-88 from Environment (67%), Education and Science (15%), Health and Social Security (15%), and Transport (3%), reflecting the variety of initiatives.

Coordinated control over the variety of programmes which were springing up, including Estates Action, became a priority for Government during the 1980s. City Action Teams, involving the Departments of Employment, Environment, Trade and Industry, and the Training Agency, were launched in 1985 to coordinate government and private programmes at the "city" level; there are currently 8 of them, plus a rolling programme of smaller and temporary Task Forces (16 at the end of 1991), with the job of stimulating local enterprise and preparing people for jobs in a smaller local area.

A new coordination mechanism was launched in 1988. Mrs Thatcher's celebrated ad lib on the night of the 87 Conservative election victory, to the effect that the inner cities remained to be conquered, led to a highly publicised launch of an apparently £3 billion new drive to coordinate all the inner cities programmes, under a new Minister for the Inner Cities, and with the name "Action for Cities". Much of the funding was from already existing programmes, but the coordination element was new. The overall objectives remained similar to the Urban Programme objectives, to enhance job opportunities, bring buildings and land back into use, encourage private investment in the inner cities, improve housing conditions by widening choice and reducing housing stress, and to encourage self help and improve social fabric in the areas (DOE 1988a).



The final coordinated development, and one of direct relevance to this thesis as it incorporates parts of the Estates Action programme, was the launch in 1991 of "City Challenge". This was a competition for limited resources between local authorities (15 in 1991, with 6 uninvited bids, and 11 successful; all 57 UP authorities in 1992 with 20 successful). The bids had to demonstrate programmes of partnership with local business and voluntary sector interests to tackle local economic, social and environmental problems. The resources were topsliced from existing inner city and housing programmes, including Estates Action.

The Action for Cities programmes therefore carries out many of the activities which are done by the DSQ programme in France. It is different in that it is much less tightly structured: - there is no overall coordination in the form of a permanent administration and Director, and no permanent publicly accountable interministerial committee. It also has a much wider scope, covering many areas of planning, economic and land development which are not part of the DSQ remit.

The most important difference, however, is that the Action for Cities programme does not provide a coordinated, locally based, social programme focused on an estate. Its geographical remit is wider, focusing on cities or areas of cities, partly because there are fewer sufficiently large and distinct estates in the UK of sufficient size to merit a programme of their own. This has changed recently in City Challenge, but up to that point the links between the Urban Programme and Estate Action were not systematic or necessarily coordinated.

## **Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter has outlined the background to the emergence of the Estate Action and DSQ programmes. Together with the previous chapters this has shown that in both countries:

- there was an early realisation that certain estates were being abandoned by all but the most disadvantaged groups. The expectation that new, utopian, communities of mixed income groups would establish themselves had thus



been frustrated. This was partly due to promotion of other more attractive home ownership opportunities for better off households, and the residualisation of the unpopular estates for those with no other choice, as noted in the previous chapter.

- this was exacerbated by "dumping" of "problem" tenants on estates by the landlord agencies, identified by the DOE and, as the case studies will show, clearly a factor in France.

- the original HVS evaluation recognised many of the difficulties with that type of programme: the administrative difficulty of running integrated cross departmental programmes; the wider problem of the housing market as a whole; the key role of unemployment on estates; and the difficulties in involving residents. These are themes which will recur.

- it was recognised that the estates had severe design problems. The high rise flats were unpopular; there were major repair problems needing urgent attention including noise penetration, insulation, and heating systems. The estates were also monotonous, poorly laid out, badly maintained, and lacked adequate infrastructure and facilities

- more importantly, there was a growing awareness of management problems, which had been unexpected and which required a new approach from the landlord organisations.

In the UK the programmes to tackle the problems had started much earlier, in the 60s, as part of a general "inner city" programme; in France they were more linked to action by local authority mayors creating pressure on the government.

The HVS/PEP programmes:

- stressed the need for local, decentralised action



- stressed the need for resident participation
- involved an overall, strategic approach, which could short circuit bureaucratic delays
- included works of physical improvement

There are further differences between the approaches:

- the explicit UK attention to housing management issues, only implicit in France
- the HVS attention to social problems, including the education, leisure, and health issues, as a local HVS package. Despite the presence of a range of other inner city initiatives in the UK, they were not focused on one estate in this way.

There is therefore the curious picture of the French model, whose social and housing programmes were focused on the estate, but did not have a clear element of housing management measures. On the other hand the UK measures emphasised housing management issues, but was not necessarily accompanied by estate based social measures, which were often unrelated and directed at a wider area.

The next chapter will provide details of the Estate Action and DSQ programmes themselves, as an introduction to the case studies.



## Chapter Five: Estate Action and the DSQ

### **Summary**

This chapter presents a comparative account of the Estate Action and the DSQ programme, looking at their creation, aims, organisation, activity, and evaluation. It proceeds by dealing systematically with the same aspects of both programmes, bringing out the similarities and differences. The chapter is based on published and unpublished written sources, including those collected as part of the case studies; and on interviews including those conducted in the context of the case studies, and those with officials in both countries as listed in the first chapter.

### **Creation**

#### DSQ

The creation of the DSQ announced by the Prime Minister following the Assises of Social Housing, noted in the previous chapter, was confirmed by the Council of Ministers on 23 December 1981. The Commission was charged with three main objectives, set out in the letter of 25 November from the Prime Minister to the first chairman of the Commission, Hubert Doubédout, (reproduced in Doubédout (1983)):

- to initiate, on an experimental basis, social and economic development plans on a small number of neighbourhoods of national significance
- to examine how to initiate a national decentralised policy based on these initial projects, to treat all of the difficult neighbourhoods needing such global and diversified action
- to create a forum for the exchange of experiences, and for discussion and consideration of the action taken

The Commission which was set up reflected these objectives, included not only representatives of the Ministries with an interest, but also representatives of local councils, unions, residents, professional urbanists, and social work professionals. Its organisational structure and its budget were not formalised until its integration into



the 9th Economic Plan in 1983 as Programme 10, "Mieux Vivre en Ville" which gave priority to social housing neighbourhoods. It was clearly from the start, however, a project which had the objective of initiating new ways of working across departments, which had the full backing of the Prime Minister. On this basis, the DSQ made a tentative start in 1982-83 with 23 pilot projects (including one of the case study estates, Grande Synthe).

In addition to being the development of the HVS programme Levy (1989) also identifies the DSQ as a growing out of difficulties being experienced in social work, where it was becoming clear that certain social problems could no longer be treated by traditional client based social work solutions: individual clients were now having to cope with a "situation of the progressive breakup of the social fabric" (p17) in addition to their own individual problems. He also notes that one of the main objectives was to "avoid the phenomenon of ghettos and the risk of social explosion which they induce" (Levy (1989) p 31).

The programme was founded on two guiding principles (DIV 1989): inter-ministerial working, involving 11 Ministries, and partnership [partenariat], which involved the associations, the unions, the local organisations, the HLMs, researchers, and other experts. The policies built round these principles involved:

- a national commitment to assist the neighbourhoods in difficulty, involving all local and state agencies contributing to the effort
- ensuring that primary responsibility for the programmes lay at the level of the local authority - both in terms of developing the policy and its day to day implementation
- treating the underlying causes as well as the symptoms of the problems: a comprehensive approach to problems



- ensuring that residents and their associations were fully involved in the programme

These objectives remained stable through the life of the programme, extending beyond the review in 1989, which led to the creation of a new body, the Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville (DIV) which dealt with for the new round of projects in the 1989-93 programme. The programmes were seen from the start as long term, and "global", involving many different agencies and ministries.

**Partenariat:** partnership of the city, state, and voluntary sectors

**Globalité:** a programme to treat problems as a whole; this involved inter-ministerial working and horizontal management.

**Participation:** involvement of local residents

**Désenclavement:** reducing physical and social isolation

#### Box 5.1: Key DSQ Concepts

The DSQ "approach" was first spelled out in Dubedout's (1983) classic statement of the DSQ method. The book covers many aspects of the programme, from the key underlying principles to the details of administrative organisation. It includes discussions of how to have dynamic local organisations; evaluation; allocations policy and avoiding social segregation in neighbourhoods; educational and social

development of adolescents to prevent delinquency; economic actions; crime prevention; and how the programme was to fit into the new decentralised structures. Its production, as an initial report on the progress after a year of the Commission's work, was required in the Prime Minister's original letter of appointment.

This approach was intended to bring a new dimension to the revitalisation of the difficult neighbourhoods. The projects were to be organised around the neighbourhoods, involving local people in the planning, as well as all voluntary and state organisations - this was the partnership idea. The role of the local commission, and more particularly the DSQ team under its project manager (of whom more below) was to cut through the red tape of departmental bureaucracy in order to put



the needs of the neighbourhood and its residents first - the interdepartmental idea. Previously there had been a history of programmes making plans and decisions in isolation from each other, a phenomenon known as "saucissonnement" - cutting up the expenditure as if it were thin, discreet slices of cold sausage. In total contrast there was to be a "horizontal" ["transversal"] structuring of the programme on the ground, with this DSQ team in a position to make the links between different types of social or improvement programmes, directing them all towards a common set of aims which guided the whole project.

The type of works carried out by the programme will be fully illustrated in the case studies. The original intentions are set out in Doubédout (1983) and in Pesce (1984). There were several elements, the physical works to the housing and environment; improved management of the stock; and a wide range of social measures

physical works had a range of objectives:

- urgent remedial action was often required to remedy the building defects. This included heating and insulation works, in line with the national programme of thermal insulation following the oil crisis of 1974
- treating the extensive disrepair and deterioration, due partly to vandalism
- finding means to combat the monotony of the estates, and their physical isolation. This was partly by the provision of better shops and facilities, or better transport links, although this was the responsibility of the city and not the HLM.
- better management and maintenance of the common parts and green areas
- where appropriate providing a better housing mix by demolition, newbuild, or changes of use



better management of the stock included

- better and local management, including introducing a social dimension to housing management
- "re-establishing a social balance in the neighbourhood" (Doubedout (1983) Chapter 4). This was to be done both by stopping further allocations to disadvantaged and immigrant households on estates, and by opening up the housing market elsewhere to these households. The allocations on difficult estates were to be done by local committees making sensitive allocations, and new tenants were to be welcomed and integrated

social measures included

- the general objective of "social integration [insertion]", which is the central concept in the French approach to the social problems on estates. This term is, roughly, the opposite of "social exclusion", and refers to the general objective of assisting residents with not only with the more obvious problems of finding a job, or claiming benefits but also with more basic issues such as health care, eating well, and looking after children. The approach to "insertion" is often via clubs, associations, drop in centres, child care facilities, or in the case of young people via sports and leisure activities.
- focusing on the problems of young people. These dealt with a range of educational and training issues, including scholastic underachievement; providing after school and holiday clubs and sporting activities; and dealing with the more serious problems of drug abuse, and delinquency.
- special provisions for immigrant residents (such as language clubs), including dealing with what were often special problems of isolated moslem women.



- developing the underlying aim to achieve a sense of citizenship [citoyennité], that is to say an integration not only to the social life of society, but to its political life as well.
- an emphasis on encouraging "cultural" activities
- making links into employment opportunities, including stimulating work experience programmes and engaging the support of local employers in taking on estate residents

The overall objective was the reintegration [désenclavement] of the estates, and their residents, into the city and society as a whole.

The way that the DSQ programmes are presented, for example in discussion with DSQ officials or with Prefectural officials, is that it is a methodology as much as a programme. The aim was to make cities, regions, and local people approach the problems in a new, more imaginative and wide reaching manner, and to enable programmes to be planned and executed which would avoid the worst excesses of bureaucratic delay and departmentalisation. The approach was the key idea to get over: the programmes would follow once the right attitudes had been achieved.

### Estate Action

This was started later, its creation (as the Urban Housing Renewal Unit) being announced by the Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment, then Patrick Jenkin, on 26 February 1985, and launched on 19 June 1985 by Sir George Young, then a junior DOE Minister. The original impulse was almost entirely political: Ministers wished to push forward the progress of privatisation of council housing which had been started by the successful Right to Buy legislation. The key political objective was diversification of tenure and ownership on council estates. The desire to break up the large tracts of council estates lead to a wish to involve the private sector in the redevelopment of land and buildings on these estates. The original promotional brochure "New Homes from Old" (DOE 1985) provided 11



examples of the type of scheme which were to be promoted. This included the example of the Stockbridge Trust in Liverpool which had been one of the major projects launched by the previous Secretary of State, Michael Hestletine, as part of his highly publicised 1981 Merseyside initiative. The programme was therefore partly a continuation of the initiatives which had followed the Brixton and Toxteth riots in 1981. Unlike the 1981 launch of the DSQ in France, however, the distance of the start of the programme from these events made it much less of a direct response to civil disturbances.

The priorities of the initiative were clearly set out in DOE (1985):

"Often a rundown estate can be transformed by the injection of improved locally based management, supported by physical and environmental improvements. But in some cases.... more radical solutions may be necessary. In these circumstances disposal of a part, or the whole, of an estate, to the private sector for redevelopment may prove an attractive solution."

The earliest development of Estate Action was independent of the PEP programme, and did not grow out of any evaluation of PEP, or direct intention to extend or change it. Nor was the original development of ideas based on contributions from the officials who had been responsible for the programmes to improve hard to let estates, or on any evidence requested from them (this view expressed by Mike Burbidge, and supported by Pinto's other interviews (Pinto (1991) p103). PEP directors, primarily Anne Power, were invited to many of the meetings at the start of the programme, but were not formal members of the Advisory Group which was set up. It was only after the initial planning of Estate Action had been undertaken that members of the advisory group decided that management improvements would be an essential part of the programme. By the time the programme became public, however, PEP was a central element. The programme was also clearly rooted in the Department of the Environment, and the links which were made to other programmes were very weak and unstructured, even to the Urban Programme which was part of the same Department.



The general objectives of Estate Action (as it became in 1986), at the start of the project (see DOE 1988b), were to target resources on estates which go furthest towards achieving:

- estate based management giving residents greater say and control
- diversification of tenure
- attracting private investment
- estate based enterprise initiatives
- new ways of running estates such as tenant coops and trusts
- bringing empty properties on estates quickly back into use particularly for homeless people

These aims will be illustrated in the case studies. A further aim, which quickly became central, was crime prevention and the increasing of estate security.

Pinto (1991) presents an account of the development of Estate Action, and its approval by the Government, based on interviews with contemporary agents. In my own interviews, many of the original agents suggested that the UHRU programme was in fact "cobbled together" in response to urgent Ministerial demands. These included the need to attract private money to invest in difficult estates, and divesting local authorities of control if at all possible (this approach being in line with wider governmental policies), as well as making the package more attractive to Treasury officials. What emerged, and was subsequently developed and changed over the following seven years, was a reasonable set of changing attempts to turn these political objectives to some form of programme. The programme reflected year by year the various inclinations of the Housing Minister in office at the time, and this particular bias was laid out in each year's Ministerial Guidelines which



accompanied invitations to bid (compare, for example, the 1991 Ministerial guidance (DOE 1991a) to the 1988 guidance (DOE 1988b)). Unlike the extensive and public consultation through a national committee seen in the DSQ programme, the Estate Action programme seems a typical example of UK government policy development - short term changes to respond to immediate political requirements, and a very pragmatic approach.

"Partnership", key value in DSQ, was not an issue at this planning stage. There was certainly little prior consultation with local authorities as a whole, and

"as far as the authorities and their associations were concerned, the reaction to the launch of EA was of privatisation under another guise" (Pinto (1991) p106)

Authorities read into the programme a hidden agenda:

"We have been very suspicious of the privatisation element of Estate Action ever since a gaffe by Ken(neth) Baker regarding its true motive, namely that of priming estates for sales and privatisation" (Ibid. p106, from an interview with an AMA spokesman)

They also often rightly regarded the money as simply "topliced", i.e. money they would have received in general capital spending consents if EA had not existed, and therefore available to spend as they saw fit. The express purpose of the programme was to force authorities to spend money in a way the government regarded as more effective in tackling the problems. Two related complaints - that the money provided was small and inadequate in relation to the housing disrepair problem on these estates, and that it was redirecting essential resources towards the essentially political objectives of disposal and tenure change - were to be frequently repeated during the initial years of the programme (Pinto (1991)).

Estate Action increasingly stressed changes in management structures and control, in parallel with the PEP development of cooperative (and later Estate Management Board) models. This increasing attention to diversifying tenure was developed in the Tenants Transfer provisions of the 1988 Housing Act, along with the development of Housing Action Trusts which were, like Urban Development Corporations, intended to transfer control of estates from local authorities to appointed boards.



The overall aim of Government policy was to reduce the role of local authorities as landlords - a trend most recently seen in the announcement of compulsory competitive tendering for housing management functions. Estate Action was only one step in this explicit general direction.

The programme was also presented partly as a demonstration programme, to show authorities what could be done, and establish new approaches to management, stock transfer, and estates renovation. In many cases it was in fact used by authorities as supplementary funding to bolster their reduced capital programme, as will be seen in the case studies. Nonetheless the commitment to additionality, that is encouraging authorities to undertake works which they would not otherwise fund, and the wish to providing exemplary approaches to emulate, was (according to one of the central Estate Action controllers in the period to 1990) amongst the main aims.

Despite its lack of formal links to other programmes, at the local level authorities were in fact expected to try to attract funds from other government programmes - as well as private funds - all of which would go to improving the estate. Thus authorities would frequently link Urban Programme bids to estates bidding for Estate Action funds - although the decisions on these bids were made entirely independently. Community Refurbishment Programmes were also sometime linked, for example in the Wigan case study. These were partly funded by Estate Action Urban Programme (a separately identified element of Estate Action funding), partly by Community Programme resources (later to become Employment Training), and partly by the Local Authority. The scheme aimed to enable unemployed people to undertake work programmes, mainly for environmental improvements. It was intended that as many local estate residents as possible would be included in the programme, and that on the job training would be part of the employment. The later development of this was the formal inclusion of partnership packages in the City Challenge bidding process.



## Organisation

### DSQ

At the start the DSQ set out several principles of its administrative structures (Doubedout (1983) p14):

- the local mayor must preside over the local commission which oversees the project
- all the local agencies must be involved in a local partnership ([partenariat] as well as having a permanent link with the local residents
- very tight administrative coordination, supervised by an administrator in the Prefecture
- a pragmatic approach to problems and solutions

The overall structure of the programme was put in place in 1984, absorbing both the 23 initial pilot "national sites" and the sites in the "ilots sensibles" programme which had already been initiated by the Ile de France region.

There were several levels of organisation. At the national level was the National Commission itself, which met two or three times a year to maintain an overall watching brief on the programme, and set the main direction of policy. This committee involved elected local and national politicians, civil servants from the Ministries concerned, the National Union of HLMs, trades union representatives, resident association representatives, and other experts. There was also an interministerial executive, which met monthly. In parallel there was a permanent administration operating at the national level, coordinating, advising, and monitoring the progress of the schemes. The General Secretary was the chief officer, supported by ten or so (the number varied) principal officers [Chargés de Mission] who had both territorial and a functional responsibilities. Their role was to "fix" things (according to Levy's (1989) report), and through their links with the several projects in their region, they were able to resolve problems, provide advice and contacts, and knock heads together. It also publishes a quarterly journal "Ensemble" ("together"), the first



word of the title of the original definition of the DSQ programme in Doubedout's (1983) "Ensemble, Refaire la Ville". This magazine provides messages and information from the national office; updates readers on policy initiatives and developments; presents examples of good practice or original ideas which seem to be working; and provides a kind of bulletin board for exchanges of information and thereby partially fulfilling the Commission's third general objective of providing an exchange of experience, and focus for discussion. It appears an excellent medium to link projects and to enable sharing of skills and ideas on a practical level, as well as having more reflective articles on the underlying principles.

At the regional level, the Prefect coordinates the contributions of Central government, and the elected President of the Regional council jointly directs the DSQ policies in each site, along with the local mayor. This is done by means of a Regional DSQ committee, based on a contract between the region and central government. Contracts are very important to the structure of the DSQ programme, being the agreed documents at both the regional and the local level which structure the financing and objectives of the projects. They were normally for a period of four years, and were comprehensive descriptions of the long term goals as well as the means by which they are to be undertaken; an aspect of the programme not present in the UK. The agreement on the sites in the region takes place at this level of regional contract, as well as coordination of training for staff working on the projects. 17 of the Regions signed such a contract, setting out the responsibilities, particularly the financial commitments, of each party. The Rhône-Alpes region, however, refused to sign such a contract, deeming the treatment of these problems to be a matter which had been fully decentralised to its own competence. In fact as the programme proceeded certain sites in the region were directly linked to the DSQ programme.

At the local level, the Mayor of the commune where the project is situated chairs a Local DSQ Committee, which takes the lead in defining the programme and assuring its execution by the appointment of staff and the engagement of organisations to undertake the projects. The main interested parties are represented



on this local committee, which also appoints and supervises the local DSQ team, under the control of the Project Manager [Chef de Projet]. Levy notes that "although sometimes very dynamic, these local committees could also sometimes be formalities to the point of being non-existent" (Levy 1989 p22).

The project manager role is key to the progress of the scheme. This role is to ensure that the project works properly:

"commissioned, under the authority of the local community, to identify the actions to undertake and their feasibility, to coordinate the activities of the organisations involved, to keep an eye on the bidding files submitted and the processing of them, to ensure the compatibility of the means of carrying out the programmes, their linkages, their coming to fruition, to organise the local team and its motivation, and to evaluate the actions undertaken, and their suitability" (Pesce (1984) p 9).

Delarue (1991) lists their duties as first to listen to the residents, so that they can present their point of view to the planners and funders of the project; second to give direction and impetus to the actions being undertaken by the technical teams; and third to be the "centre of gravity" between these two groups and the elected members, officials, and managing agents (including the HLM) who are in charge of the project as a whole.

The role is a pivotal one, needing skills of project management and administration; technical skills in overseeing the projects; and considerable political skills in negotiating with the many different agencies and representatives. A wide range of backgrounds is represented by this group as a whole (see article in "La Gazette" 12.11.90), including architects, urbanists, trades unionists, community workers, educationalist, and those with a technical scientific training. However Delarue (1991, p209f) notes that the Mayors, who appointed them, tended to seek people with more "technical" competencies, and in preference to either those with local knowledge, or with social work or educational skills.

Not unnaturally this is a difficult role to fulfil; discussion with Toubon indicated that the failure to ensure that the Chef de Projet was sufficiently distanced from the



Town Hall lead to problems in many projects. The Town Hall was the locus of the formal approvals for most of the schemes, and for much of the funding; if the Chef de Projet was totally integrated in the Town Hall, perhaps with an office there, perhaps being formally integrated into the administration, there was the danger that the necessary distance to provide pressure against the delays and bureaucracy of the town hall would not exist; and their role as champion of the neighbourhood project against all opposition would be compromised. The mayors would also tend to appoint people they felt they could control, rather than having experienced troubleshooters. It was certainly clear from my case studies that some Chefs de Project (for example at Chanteloup les Vignes or at Béthune) operated from offices in the Town Hall and, as far as I could determine, as part of the municipal administration, although this did not seem to have compromised their effectiveness in those cases.

### Estate Action

Estate Action was structured much less formally, in that the programme formed part of a wider Department of the Environment structure of support for housing, and was managed in most cases as part of a wider housing programme in the authorities. Pinto (1991) illustrates that in the majority of authorities no special project manager or team was appointed to oversee the work: with only 17% having an EA team. That is, there is not such a distinct identity to the programme, with its own National committee overseeing its policies and development, as with the DSQ.

The first year of UHRU/EA saw members of the team writing to authorities offering the services of the team, and conducting over 200 estates in over 100 authorities, many visits being in conjunction with the officers from the DOE Regional Office. These visits were aimed at presenting the opportunities of the programme and its approach to local authorities. Many of these visits were done by Mike Burbidge, the coordinator of the original hard to let report, by Peter Emms, the Head of Unit, and by Bill Woolf, then Chief Executive of the Northern Counties Housing Association. They discovered, according to Emms, that there was in many cases an open door, and authorities were keen to target the new resources and approach where it was agreed it would do most good. It is, however, worth noting that Pinto found that the main



reason most authorities gave for being involved in the project was that it provided additional resources - almost half his sample identifying this as the most important reason.

The structure now has a central team dealing with policy issues, guidelines for the scheme's administration, bidding for resources, and Ministerial business. The last two years have seen this team also involved in central bids, a development which started in 1990-91 with certain "national" schemes, which were to have higher levels of Estate Action funding (normally the authority had to contribute 50% from mainstream HIP), and larger schemes. This was developed in the following year, when the first City Challenge schemes were also developed.

The regional offices of the DOE were the main administrators of the schemes after 1987. These offices were responsible for arranging the bidding process in their own region, for approving bids within their resources, for monitoring the programme, and for providing day to day advice. There was no contractual relationship between the office and the authority, unlike the DSQ; spending approval up to a specified limit was agreed for one year of a project, and a new application for continuation funding would be made in the following year in the event that the project extended that far. The regional office could assist by providing access to the consultants EA has on offer; and would ensure that the appropriate paperwork was completed.

There is also promotional material on offer, though this is limited. A video was produced, showing some of the schemes in progress; and in 1991 the first part of the three part "Estate Action Handbook" was produced. This handbook is designed to assist authorities in learning the lessons of the programme, by a series of checklists and advice notes on how to approach similar projects.

## **Choice and Approval of Schemes**

### **DSQ**

The first 23 "national" sites were chosen centrally, with the advice of the Prefects in the Regions where they were located; thereafter in the context of the



decentralised structure introduced in the 9th plan (1984-8), the choice rested mainly at the Regional level, with the advice of the national DSQ office.

Cities interested in being included in the programme were required to submit full application files setting out the characteristics of the neighbourhood which made it suitable for treatment under the DSQ procedure. This followed Doubedout's statement that there are two main types of problem neighbourhood which can be identified:

"those whose essential need is for the rehabilitation of the buildings, and who are amenable to procedures and financing currently addressing that objective; [and] those who require a treatment indissolubly linked to economic, social, and cultural problems, and deterioration of the quality of life." (Doubedout 1983, p87)

These files [dossiers de candidature] were to contain details of the social, educational, housing, environmental, and employment problems which justified the neighbourhood's inclusion in the programme. They presented a comprehensive description of the neighbourhood, demographic details of the population, skills and educational information, details of environmental issues, and summarised the main problems on the estate. The bid would also present outline proposals as to how the problems were to be remedied. These documents were a key source of information in preparing the case study background descriptions, and were often prepared by independent consultants (teams of sociologists or urbanists) commissioned by the city. It was essential that the local mayor was willing to put forward a bid: the DSQ team did not have the authority at either a national or a regional level to force any city to bid.

The Regional DSQ council would then consider the proposal, and prepare the contract. Generally speaking most of the bids put forward were accepted, partly because of the contacts made during the extensive preparatory work. Once the contract was signed, funding for the projects set out in the contract would be made available during the 4 year period of the programme - although in fact there were often many changes and variations negotiated.



Although HLMs were closely involved in the development of schemes, they were not innovative partners, by and large. Discussion with one regional (Préfectural) official in Nord Pas de Calais, and another in Ile de France, lead to indications from both that the HLMs were often unwilling or tardy partners in developing the new types of scheme; and only slowly became involved in the "DSQ method". The stimulation for the development of projects tended to come from the city, or sometimes indeed from residents.

The original selection of sites was regarded, in Levy's (1989) report, as one of the weak points of the programme. The report team considered that certain of the sites would have been just as well dealt with by traditional measures. Nonetheless the DSQ communes in which the DSQ sites were situated showed similar general characteristics: high proportions of manual workers; of single parents; of unemployment; of large families; and of immigrant households, particularly Maghrebin.

Levy recommended a much tighter definition of the criteria for DSQ sites, and a reduction in the number of sites to no more than 150. For the next programme (the DIV), however, this advice was entirely disregarded, and a 400 site national list was prepared. This was partly (according to Nicole Smadja, one of the authors of the Levy report, who was an Ile de France Prefectural official) because the mayors realised that not only was the programme a source of funds, it also represented prestige and national prominence, visits from Ministers and national officials, and generally was a good idea for promotion of both the city and themselves.

### Estate Action

The annual invitation to bid for Estate Action funds was accompanied by the Ministerial Guidance on the types of project which are likely to be favourably received, as has been noted above. In fact many of the Regional Offices are in regular contact with their local authorities to discuss possible bids. Discussion with the officials in regional offices indicated clearly that they had a good rapport with the authorities, and would guide them in preparing bids, although no bid could be



guaranteed funding until all the bids had been received. All bids received by regional offices are ranked and annotated, in line with a provisional allocation for each region.

Bids are made on Form A and Form B, as they are called. These forms ask for summary details of the estate:- the type of properties, construction type, levels of unemployment, voids, arrears on the estate, management and maintenance arrangements, and an outline of the proposed programme. The key instruction on the forms appears on the front page: "Please give best estimates where actual figures are not available." Since accurate data about estates is frequently not available (as explored in Chapter 1) and as the DOE do not appear to question the figures very closely, the likelihood of inaccurate estimates is high (as I can confirm from personal experience having once been directly responsible for completing a (successful) Form A and B application).

Recommendations will be made by Regional officials to support those proposals which seem to fit the most number of the current criteria set out in the guidelines. They also need to assess the real level of need on the estate (using "gut feeling" and local knowledge, I was informed). Regional officers are well aware of the need to distinguish between authorities who "genuinely" wish to pursue the types of initiative promoted by EA, and in contrast those authorities who will say anything to get the money, of which there are certainly many. They need to ensure that not all the estates are in Labour run authorities; they also need to spread the resources round a bit - one regional official noted the difficulty of not repeatedly choosing the large, difficult estate, but of at the same time not turning the tap off too soon, before the benefits of the Estate Action funding have taken root. They also seek to pick projects which they are confident will spend all the allocation which is given to them. The final decisions are taken centrally, however, once all the regional bids are received.

The process of decision making at the centre between regional bids is rather complex. The centre makes a bid for money as part of the Public Expenditure Survey



process, based on (according to one official) basically poor information about the scale of the problem, using many sources of information including feedback from regions. The total pot is divided between the regions, partly according to the Generalised Needs Index score (50%), partly according to actual bids, and partly according to performance the previous year. When the actual annual lists come in, the approvals are given generally in line with the recommendations of the region, although this is not guaranteed. Any bids of over £5 million (1991) go for direct Ministerial approval. Some years certain regions will do better than others, due to a higher "quality" of bid - for example in the first and second years of the scheme the London region got a smaller proportion to the resources that would have been expected from the proportion of poor stock. However this whole process is not transparent: it was described to me by a regional official as a "black box". Pinto (1991) notes there is no systematic relation between levels of housing deprivation (in so far as they can be established) and EA awards - partly because some authorities did not bid.

Despite the intention that "additionality" criteria should be met, in fact some authorities will already have planned to do the types of work on the estate for which funding is sought. This was the case in a number of my case studies, and Pinto notes that many authorities bid because they had already formulated plans to introduce local management, or try improved management arrangements, both of which were key EA bidding points.

There is a problem with the focusing of resources in this way. Estate Action sets out to be experimental and to show authorities how to improve estates. However it does this by investing large sums in small pockets of housing, at a level which is totally unsustainable over the totality of stock with comparable difficulties. For example many schemes were provided with highly sophisticated surveillance equipment and concierge lodges (as in, for example the Manchester or Brent case studies); and others were provided with extensive improvements, including community rooms, as part of a package to promote Estate Management Boards (for example in Bloomsbury



Estate in Birmingham, not a case study). There are not sufficient funds for other authorities to follow the "example" however.

This is recognised by officials at the DOE. Shortly after the introduction of the programme they, and Ministers, became aware that with an estimated 2,000 plus run down estates in England and Wales, the EA programme was only scratching the surface. Worse, bids from the larger and more difficult estates tended to get rejected in the early years as they would, rightly, need a large proportion of the small available resources. A number of initiatives were devised, not all related directly to Estate Action, to do this, including Housing Action Trusts and City Challenge.

### **Funding Mechanisms and Expenditure Details**

#### **DSQ**

The financing of the DSQ projects is much more complex than Estate Action, and a point of weakness of the system (see Levy 1989). This is partly because the funding for projects was normally via a number of different sources, principally central government, the Regions, and the HLMs themselves. It was not at all certain, however, that the partners whose contribution were needed would all be willing to put up the funds at the time the project was ready to spend them.

This was particularly so with central government funding (the DSQ funding, or "state contribution"). However,

"All the state funding is specific. Each budget approval is controlled by each ministry, according to clear regulations and in line with directives given by each one of them" (Levy (1989) p22)

It came from a total of 17 different Ministries, whose individual commitments to the programme made up the total "DSQ budget" - although this budget in fact was created by earmarking a specific amount in principle for priority spending in DSQ sites, to be released when proposed projects came up for approval. These approvals for individual schemes within the overall local programme had to be obtained in



every case, which involved including meeting the expenditure guidelines for each Ministry.

This approval work was mainly done at the regional (or sometimes Départemental) level, where there were technical teams to vet all spending proposals and authorise the release of funds. These approvals could take a considerable time to achieve, however, and Smadja, in conversation, indicated that in certain (not infrequent) cases, the local groups who had organised to propose a project, and bid for funding, had already collapsed and disbanded by the time the approvals were received.

Funds were divided generally into two main categories: housing funds, and funds for "complementary" activities [accompagnement]. The latter covered all the actions of social, educational, employment, and other initiatives, and were for both capital and revenue purposes. They were often paid to the organisations who were involved in the running of the local programme. The housing funds came from one ministry, (the Ministère de l'Équipement, du Logement, des Transports, et de la Mer,) and was mainly in the form of the housing grant PALULOS (paid for rehabilitation of HLM stock), which provided between 20% and 30% of the costs in the form of grant aid, to a limit of £70,000 average per dwelling. The other main aides were PAH [Primes à l'Amélioration de l'Habitat], grants paid to private owner occupiers in areas of older housing; and grants paid by ANAH [Agence Nationale pour l'Amélioration de l'Habitat] to private landlords in OPAH programmes [Opérations Programmées d'Amélioration de l'Habitat] (improvement programmes for older private housing as part of a DSQ neighbourhood). A large part of the total budget of these grants was paid in DSQ sites: growing from 20% in 1984 to 36.9% of the total expenditure of PALULOS and PAH in 1987 (Levy (1989) p35).

The total funding for the 5 years (1983-88) of the first DSQ programme of 148 programme sites was set out in DIV 1990. Note that in the table below the totals include expenditure on private housing in DSQ sites - either because the site included some older housing or because the site was an inner city rehabilitation area.



Type of Housing	Units affected	Type of Aid	Amount (Fm)	Average per unit
HLM Rented	170,037	see below	8,965.4	52,726
Owner Occupied	2,043	PAH	18.8	9,202
Private Rented	1,710	ANAH	76.8	44,918

**Table 5.1: DSQ Total Housing Expenditure.** Source: 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990)

The HLM figures must be further disaggregated into the contribution from the various partners. The figures are:

Source of Finance	Amount (F million)	%
Central State (DSQ) Grants	2,277.48	25.4
HLM and others <sup>1</sup> (mainly loans)	5,962.84	66.5
Region (mainly grants)	725.07	8.1

**Table 5.2: Breakdown of Expenditure Sources for Social Housing** Source: 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990)

**Notes:** 1. "Others" will include investment by social partners in housing projects to benefit specific groups, such as investment by the Caisse d'Allocations Familiales, as well as the 1% employers tax of which 0.1% was devoted to projects for immigrant households. This may often be grant aid.

In terms of regional variation, a third of the investment went to the Ile de France region; and three quarters of the investment went to the four most urbanised regions, Ile de France, Provence-Alpes Cote D'Azur, Nord/Pas de Calais, and Rhone-Alpes. On average each region received F2,380 per dwelling; but the average for four regions was much higher, with Ile de France highest at F4,260, Picardie at F3,440, Auvergne at F3,220 and Lorraine at F3,040.

### Estate Action

The funding here is more straightforward, and has been partly set out already. Generally speaking the EA programme contributed 50% of the borrowing approval for the scheme, although this could be increased to up to 90% for the larger "national" schemes. The balance had to come from the authority's mainstream HIP, or other sources primarily the proceeds of council house sales. This meant that the choice of the estate, and the works to be done on it, must be of sufficient importance to merit the authority devoting the HIP to meeting the balance.



The expenditure pattern is set out in the table below, for the first 4 years of the programme (this has been chosen as a comparative period for the DSQ, as they were, except for the pilot schemes, 4 year contracts):

	Total Spend (£million)	New Sites	Units Affected	Unit Cost (£s)
1986-7	45	123	55,349	813
1987-8	75	106	47,205	1,588
1988-9	140	188	83,389	1,678
1989-90	190	162	74,795	2,540
Total	450	579	260,738	1,726

**Table 5.3: Estate Action Expenditure:** Source: Estate Action data, supplied direct to me from the DOE.

As is the case with the DSQ, the unit cost figure is actually a little misleading as the expenditure in most cases, and in both programmes, was on the exterior of the buildings or on the common parts rather than on the individual units. It provides an indication of the level of spending, however. This can be seen from examination of the use to which the money was put, which can be seen from the following table:

Type of Improvement	%
Security works	22
Improvements to fabric	23
Heating and insulation	22
Management facilities	6
Homelessness initiatives	2
Environmental works/remodelling	25

**Table 5.4: Breakdown of Purpose of Expenditure, Estate Action** Source: Estate Action Annual Reports. Percentages of total values devoted to types of activity, summed for all four years; inconsistent categories have been amalgamated where appropriate.

Unfortunately this type of breakdown is not available for the DSQ programme.



Comparisons of Expenditure

The comparative problem is well illustrated by any attempt to compare these total and average expenditure costs. The DSQ contribution in the form of PALULOS (mainly) is a grant contribution. Equally the small contribution by the Region is mainly in the form of grant aid, not loan sanction. There is no equivalent to this spending in the Estate Action programme as it consists entirely in supplementary approval for borrowing by the local authority. Some supplementary UK expenditure comes from the proceeds of council house sales, however, as will be seen in the case studies, for which there is no French equivalent. Other problems occur in comparing expenditure in terms of the total investment in the building structure. This would involve an additional adjustment for the comparative costs of housing construction and maintenance for similar type so building work in each country, in addition to simple comparison of the money values using exchange rates.

This said, the tables indicate that there were more sites in the UK (579, cf 148); and more units were affected (260,738 cf 170,039 units); but that more units per site were affected in France, reflecting the larger estate size. The pattern of build up of sites in the UK was not in fact reflected in France (not shown in the tables) as most sites were initiated at the start of the programme, and continued for the full period.

Comparison of central investment is best be done by comparing the Estate Action total of £450 million with the total DSQ Central State contribution of F2,277 million (say £230 million), as the matching HLM and regional funds in France equate roughly to the local authority's own HIP contribution. A further comparison can also be made of the total investment per unit by all sources, on the assumption that Estate Action contributes 50% of the total cost. The details are set out below.

	France (£)	UK (£)
All investment/unit	5,273	3,452
Central investment/unit	1,340	1,726

**Table 5.5:** Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France  
Sources: EA figures; 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990)



This would suggest a higher level of investment per unit by central funding in the UK, but a lower total investment. In fact the UK figure for total investment may well be an underestimate, since the case studies will show that in some cases there is considerable additional investment of HIP resources (and, in one case, council house sales income), rather than just being 50% on top of the Estate Action funding. The next chapter provides more detailed discussion of these figures, in the light of the useful additional evidence about patterns of spending derived from the case studies. This will also show that the average expenditure on the case study estates is very similar to these national averages.

The general point can be made here, however, that the levels of unit cost investment of central funds are very similar, at about £1,500 per unit in both countries; and that there is a considerable level of additional investment in addition to these central funds.

## **Monitoring**

### **DSQ**

At a local level, it was common (for example in most of my case studies) for a monitoring and evaluation report to be completed at the end of the programme. Often this also served as the basis for the bid for the site to be included in the 1989-93 programme, and it often contained useful comparative data on the changes in the neighbourhood since the start of the programme. These could take several shapes, however, as is brought out in the case studies, with certain evaluation reports being much less empirical and objective than others.

The main regular monitoring was by the local DSQ committee (where it existed), who received reports, including often annual summary reports, from the Project Manager, covering the technical and financial issues for each part of the programme, as well as details of expenditure, programming, and completions of projects. It was not common for the HLM to produce reports, however - only in one case study had this happened, and Prefectural interviews confirmed that this was unusual.



The other important monitoring took place at the regional level. The regions needed to plan expenditure on an annual basis, and therefore required the DSQ projects to submit estimates of the expenditure programme for the following year. This was also prepared by the Project Manager. The region would also intervene if the programme seemed to be moving away from its original intentions, or emphasising one element at the expense of another: this was the case for example in Nord Pas de Calais, where the Region intervened in my case study sites when the emphasis on the cultural aspects seemed to be excessive. This was a last resort type of intervention, however.

In relation to national monitoring of the programme, Levy (1989, p52) notes that the absence of a systematic grass roots monitoring was one of the weaknesses of the programme. The general concern was the attainment of specific objectives, but without much common assessment of how they were achieved, and the success of the outcome. The national DSQ office maintained details of spending, but there was no running assessment of the impact of the programme.

### Estate Action

The key issue for Regional Offices was to ensure that the money allocated was being spent on programme, without slippage. To this end regular financial reports were prepared, mainly to show progress of spending. In addition a review form, Form D, was completed at the end of each year by the Regional Offices. This gave details of the management arrangements then in place, details of voids, arrears, repairs, right to buys achieved or other sales to private owners, as well as asking for indications as to whether the state of repairs, cleanliness, vandalism, and crime had improved or worsened. This was not a comprehensive or in depth monitoring, but rather a cursory indication of progress.

In addition, annual reports were produced by EA centrally, covering the national programme as a whole. These, however, were short, glossy promotional reports, with some limited figures, and intended to promote the programme and its progress rather than objectively evaluate its activities.



## Evaluation

### DSQ

The annual reports produced by the DSQ teams did not include common evaluation statistics, by which a systematic evaluation could be carried out (Rosenberg & Béhar (1990)). The main general evaluation of the programme is the Levy (1989) report, although there was a supplementary report commissioned by the Minister for the City, Michael Delabarre, published as Delarue (1991). The Levy report was commissioned in 1987 in response to threats to axe the programme by the Chirac government during the period of "cohabitation". The report was put together fairly hurriedly (six months only was permitted), and is based on a variety of interviews, case study sites, and additional papers and reports which had been commissioned.

The general conclusion of the report (not surprisingly) is in favour of the DSQ, although it puts forward a wide range of points, positive and negative, about the programme. The key important positive aspects are considered to be:

- generally the programme represents value for money. For a fairly small investment, many people appear to have been assisted;
- there was a generally high level of achievement of programmed spending and achievement of objectives;
- there appeared to be many innovative examples of positive results. This was particularly in relation to housing conditions, education, resident participation, and employment measures.
- there was evidence of effective partnerships in the projects: the elected local officials were taking an effective part, the local commissions were working reasonably well, and the HLMs surveyed indicated that in 80% of the cases they had adopted a new and more participative approach in the DSQ neighbourhoods.



In relation to housing, certain sites had apparently opted to develop the social dimension in advance of the rehabilitation, but this seemed a reasonable choice. The quality of the rehabilitation works was not always high or particularly distinguished, however. Voids seemed to be going down in many sites, but this was not the case everywhere (only examples are given, however, no total trends). Certain sites had invested heavily in those parts of the estate which seemed to have the worst problems. Often HLMs were hesitant to invest in DSQ sites as they expected the residents to destroy and vandalise the improvements; and the residents were unwilling to participate as they feared that improvements would lead to higher rents and evictions. These fears had frequently been overcome. There were also now many more local offices on estates. New management approaches had been adopted, including new allocations policies, training and a more tenant oriented role for caretakers; residents have been involved as employees in carrying out the works; *régies de quartier* have been formed to improve day to day maintenance and upkeep of the estate (see Meaux case study for details); funds to assist with rent arrears problems have been set up; buildings have been demolished or used for different purposes than mainstream letting. (Many of these improvements will be illustrated in my case studies set out later).

Rather rashly, Levy states that

"since the start of the DSQ, none of the phenomenons of explosions which might have been feared have taken been generated. This may well be attributed to the actions of this policy" (p39).

The riots of 1991 and 1992 were to show that this view was unfortunately too optimistic.

There are also certain weaknesses set out in the report. The weak selection criteria and absence of systematic monitoring have already been mentioned. The *Départements* were not really involved in the process, despite their general planning role in social affairs. The most pressing problem, however, was the complexity and inefficiency of the financial mechanisms, also noted above.



The report also notes aspects of the programme which are "uncertain". One main objective of many DSQ neighbourhoods was "social balance". This meant both improving the quality of life for the residents, and trying to rehouse fewer new tenants with social problems and more "average", socially integrated new tenants. Many cities emphasised this latter aspect, by refusing to allocate to households who seemed too "difficult" [lourd] such as unemployed single parents or immigrant households; they sometimes also attempted to evict the most difficult households, particularly in the inner city DSQ sites of older housing; or finally certain DSQ sites left part of the neighbourhood unimproved, a sort of internal mini ghetto. In fact these practices simply moved the problem of the most "difficult" families elsewhere in the commune; and the problem remained unresolved, in Levy's view. He notes, however, that the requirement to draw up local housing plans [Plans Locaux de l'Habitat or PLH], were designed to counter this problem by setting out plans for rehousing all people in need on a commune or départemental basis. The recent legislative developments are briefly noted below, for information. Levy also notes that many of the improvements seem to be "fragile": certain improvements may be evident when there is an active DSQ team making the running and supporting all the initiatives, but when they leave, will the impetus remain, or will the neighbourhood sink back into its previous state? A planned withdrawal programme of the team seems to be necessary in many cases, rather than a quick withdrawal of support.

The second part of the report is a series of recommendations covering many aspects of the programme. These followed by and large the findings of the study, including recommendations on choice of sites, simplifying the finance, and reducing the detail in the regional contracts. In fact the DSQ was overtaken and absorbed into a new body, the Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville (DIV), and although some of the recommendations were incorporated into the new structure, many were overtaken by events.

The main technical report was produced by the (by then) DIV, in the form of a summary report of the "148 Neighbourhoods" (DIV 1990). This is an excellent collation of information on all the sites, one per page, giving outline details of the



problem, the programme, expenditure, and a brief commentary, as well as collating the information by region and nationally. It contains little by the way of analysis or evaluation, however, being mainly a source document for figures, and a promotional document for the DSQ to demonstrate the extent of its activities.

The author of the second commissioned report (Jean-Marie Delarue) became the second Director of the DIV (after Yves Dauge). It offers one of the most articulate and comprehensive overviews of the development of the programme. The report is, however, is written more in the context of setting out the development of the new programme, which is briefly dealt with in the next section.

### Estate Action

The Estate Action programme has been closely linked to the PEP programme, as already set out, and both have had a number of evaluation studies initiated, though independent research findings have generally not yet been published.

Evaluation of the PEP approach has been in two main ways. First, PEP themselves have revisited the "20 Estates" which were the subject of the 1982 report (Power 1984), and presented the evidence for the continuing progress (Power (1991)). A more formal independent evaluation has been carried out by the Department of the Environment, who in 1987 decided to carry out a thorough assessment of the achievements of the project. Three separate, but linked, projects together aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of the outcome of the PEP approach. These were:

The LSE Housing Impact Study: This aimed to evaluate the impact of PEP on the housing service and the environment. It used two "experimental" estates where PEP was working, and two matched control estates. The elements of the study were:

first, to monitor the management changes;



second to monitor housing management performance, in relation to matters such as lettings turn around time, repairs completion time, rent arrears, and voids; and

thirdly environmental standard indicators.

The Home Office Crime Study: Using the same estates as in the study above, comparison was made by:

before and after surveys looking at levels of victimisation, fear of crime, and tenants perceptions of the estate

crime figures from police records

detailed "ethnographic" observations and interviews with tenants

monitoring of management changes

development and analysis of performance indicators on standards of housing management

measurement of environmental standards

evaluation of the changes in housing management from discussion with staff and others

The CAPITA Cost Effectiveness Study: This was to study management performance and costs in local authority priority estates where initiatives were underway to introduce locally based services, devolved budgets and tenant participation on the lines of the PEP model. The work involved developing a model for establishing estate budgets, implementing this model across the PEP estates, then monitoring the costs and performance of the ten



estates in five authorities over a two year period to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the PEP model. The model groups housing management functions into 6 main areas: lettings activity, maintenance, voids, debt management, tenant satisfaction, and estate cleanliness. It aims to record improvements in the key variables, and introduces an elaborate system of weighting them in terms of the difficulty to achieve change. The weighting was devised by the researchers in consultation with the participants in the study.

The results of these studies have not yet been published.

Independent evaluation of the Estate Action programme as a whole was commissioned in 1989 from a major firm of management consultants (Coopers Lybrand), although the contract was subsequently transferred to Capita, who did the one of the PEP studies. The research involves looking at 6 estates at various points in the programme, as well as 6 comparative estates (though the idea of control estates is not considered possible). This has not been published yet either.

Finally the Government sets out to monitor and evaluate the overall Action for Cities programmes in various ways, some set out in the 1990 Action For Cities report (DOE 1990a). Independent assessment of the programmes was also recently published by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI 1992), making comparisons to the state of major indicators at the time of the 1977 White Paper. They produce some heavily qualified conclusions, but are unable to be more positive than to state that

"surprisingly little has been achieved.....the gap that the government's 1977 White Paper sought to narrow [between inner city and other areas]..remains as wide as ever" (p82).

## **Development**

This thesis deals with the DSQ and Estate Action programmes, so only passing reference can be made to the developments after the programmes. The subject is too fast moving to make this summary comprehensive, or even contemporary, but its rapid development gives interest to this section. Both programmes have been



developed, in whole or in part; and both countries have experienced further riots of a similar nature to the early 80s.

### DSQ

In 1988 the DSQ programme became the DIV [Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville] was documented by the publication of a report setting out various views which had been aired on the idea, and the main new objectives (DIV 1989). The DSQ was essentially merged with another organisation, the National Commission for the Prevention of Delinquency; the DSQ programme was expanded greatly to cover 400 projects; these were divided into different types of contract, depending on the nature and size of the problem, including DSQ contracts, but also initiating "conventions du quartier", "contrats de ville" and "conventions villes-habitat".

In 1990 further riots occurred. President Mitterant appointed the mayor of Dunkerque, Michael Delebarre, to be a new troubleshooting "Minister for the Cities" although in fact he did not have a ministry. The riots continued, however, including several deaths, and the summer of 1991 saw desperate attempts to prevent further rioting by an emergency programme of increased aid for holidays and sporting diversions for young people during the summer. During 1991 the problem of the grands ensembles, and of urban disturbances, became a national issue - though it was very much linked to the immigration issue, as many of the rioters were perceived to be young Mahgrebins. The press ran extensive reports and articles on the issue - see for example the 20 - 26 July 1991 issue of Nouvelle Observateur "Special: The Suburbs - before they go up in flames"; or L'Evenement de Jeudi of 3 -9 October 1991 "Sickness in the suburbs: Who is responsible?".

Delarue set out certain differences between the situation in 1990 and that in 1980:

- the economic difficulties, which produce unemployment, have increased, and the estates now have many more people who are long term unemployed, and increasingly unemployable. The economic growth of the period 1986-9189



hardly touched the estates as the residents lacked the skills to take advantage.

- there is an increasing problem of migration of unemployed rural workers to the estates, particularly in West France, providing a constant flow of disadvantages residents to replace those who manage to get a job and move out.
- there has also been the cumulative impact of the housing benefit (APL/conventionnement) problem, which continues to trap many households.
- the eventual flight of the remaining "militant" manual workers who originally formed the basis for estate associations and community life has lead to a vacuum, which is not being filled by the new arrivals. The levels of resident participation in the programmes is therefore going down.
- there is a corresponding decline in participation in political and civic life and institutions.

" the powerlessness of young people to find jobs, that of the police to end the drug traffic, or of the landlord to make his homes more sound, the powerlessness, as a consequence, to provide satisfactory basic rights, translates itself into political decline" (p44)

There had been movement on the legislative front also. Three important new laws gave a wider impetus to the policy to combat the increasing residualisation of the large estates. The 31 May 1990 (Bresson) law created a range of new duties for local government, HLMs and support organisations designed to tackle the housing problems of the most vulnerable people; the "anti ghetto" law of 31 May 1991 [loi d'orientation pour la ville] obliged all communes over 200,000 to provide a fifth of their new housing in the form of social housing (or pay a penalty to central government). This is aimed at distributing social housing away from the traditional concentrations, and from the poorer cities. A third law, less oriented to housing, provided for the provision of £90 million of local tax revenue from the 130 richest



communes to the 300 poorest in 1992, rising to £150 million in 1993, as part of an exercise in directly transferring resources to support poorer communities.

The development continues. Bernard Tapie, the maveric entrepreneur and socialist owner of Marseilles Football Club, was appointed Minister for the Cities for a few weeks following the 1992 Regional elections, until forced to resign on charges of irregularities in his business dealings. Further riots occurred in 1992; a young Maghrebin youth was shot dead shortly after the election of the new government in March 1993, leading to new riots and the reemergence of the urban issue at the heart of the new government's programme - and a statement is expected in late April 1993.

### Estate Action

The programme was "relaunched" on 11 February 1991 with tighter criteria. It was also to form part of the new, competitive, City Challenge initiative. The programme was to be targeted on the larger and more run down areas. This was matched with increased resources, which for 1991/92 were £270 million, and for 1992/93 were £364 million. The autumn statement of 1992 indicated, however, that there would be no further new City Challenge funding after the current round, as there would be no further new Urban Programme funding. The position of the programme is therefore in doubt.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter has outlined the basic features of both programmes. The DSQ programme has emerged as a complex interministerial process with a complex of committees, commissions, contracts, and reports, with its own semi technical vocabulary of "transversal" working, "partenariat", "insertion", "désenclavement" and so on. It is highly structured and several levels of administration, and seeks to manage a comprehensive coordinated social and housing programme in the estate neighbourhood.



Estate Action, on the other hand, is a predominantly housing programme which has only recently moved to being part of an integrated package of measures. Prior to that, and during the study period, it had loose and informal links with related social and economic programmes, particularly at a local level. It has no special supervising commission, seldom has any dedicated team on the ground (rather being integrated into the wider housing activities of the authority), and is administered as one of many inner cities programmes.

There are many points of similarity. Many of the guiding principles are shared, particularly:

- resident involvement
- local housing management
- concern about residualisation
- emphasis on a large element of physical rehabilitation
- consideration of demolition, change of use, and newbuild

Both programmes were also

- seen as experimental or demonstration programmes;
- targeted on very similar types of estate, that is unpopular estates with many disadvantaged tenants and poor management
- subsequently developed into wider programmes (although the future of Estate Action is now in doubt)

There are also differences:

- the wish to reduce residualisation was expressed in France through a policy of trying to manage allocations, a process likely to be seen as discriminatory and illegal in the UK
- the UK emphasis on tenure change and tenant management is not reflected in France
- there is no attempt to involve the private sector in estate housing development schemes in France (although the case studies will show their involvement in commercial developments)



- the DSQ is a four year contractual programme; Estate Action funding is allocated annually
- the funding mechanisms for the DSQ were complex and cumbersome; unlike the straightforward allocation process for Estate Action

This chapter has, however, mainly presented the formal objectives and structures of the programmes, rather than looking at how they in fact operated on the ground. Their real impact, and the actual nature of the similarities and differences, will be examined next in the case studies.



## Chapter Six

### Chapter Six: Analysis of The Case Studies

This chapter sets out the consolidated information from the case studies, illustrating the themes which have been set out in the preceding chapters by reference to the case study estates. The aim is to illustrate how the policy intentions of the DSQ and EA programmes operate on the ground; and to comment on the comparative successes and failures of various approaches.

As noted in the first chapter, the figures and tables presented here are not subsequently used to test a formal statistical hypothesis. Some figures in the case studies were not available, and indications of trends are given instead. Other figures have had to be constructed on slightly different bases from estate to estate, explained in the case study annex. My aim has been to indicate the presence or absence of certain problems or phenomena, and the scale of the problem. Note also that the estates are all in a state of flux. The outcomes of the programmes set out below and in the detailed case studies are therefore as of the date of the fieldwork. Since then things may have changed, either for good or ill, and my descriptions are clearly not of definitive results. In many cases the programmes are continuing on the estate; in other cases some of the achievements evident today are already being undermined and degraded, and the estate may slip back to its previous problems.

Most of the tables are in the form of providing short comments under general headings. I chose this method, rather than simply using a tick (✓), as more information can be provided about similarities and difference in a short note. These notes may appear somewhat cryptic at times, but (I hope) comprehensible, and fuller explanations are of course in the case studies themselves.

Many of the descriptions will echo the problems set out in the preceding chapters. This is to be expected, if the case studies are indeed representative. The difference here is that the descriptions are drawn entirely from my findings on the case study estates.



## Individual Case Studies

While the main aim of this chapter is to set out the links between the case study estates, and draw together the common issues, nevertheless the estates have unique characteristics which mark each out from the other. Although these individual aspects are only seen from a reading of the case study annex, a flavour can be gleaned below:

Chanteloup: is an estate built in the countryside without a rail link, three times the size of the village where it was implanted. The HLM is run by an ex-army officer with his regimental flag prominent in his room. The village is run by a vigorous local politician who recently toppled a Socialist government minister to win a seat in the national parliament. Together they have made reasonable improvements, despite recent civil disturbances.

Meaux: is a large estate where innovative new management practices are probably only succeeding in holding back the tide of decay.

Stains: had a visionary architect committed to consultation, who transformed the facades to imitate a varied street frontage; but where the social problems are only now being tackled.

Calais: has failed to produce any housing improvements, despite a good social programme. Progress was undirected, commitment was low, and conflicts prominent.

Béthune: suffered from stock surplus and isolation, but political commitment ensured new links to the wider town.

Grande Synthe: is an estate which is most of the town, dominated by the declining adjacent steelworks which used to provide all its income and tenants. The whole city administration is therefore involved in the programme.



Brent: has not yet found any solution which begins to tackle its problems, and now seeks HAT status. The EA programme, based on security measures, failed.

Islington: only had the problems of security. It provides a valuable in-depth external evaluation of concierge schemes, although my own investigations were hampered by trades union suspicion.

Wandsworth: invested massively from stock sales, and provided a successful transformation of image based on external remodelling and population manipulations unconsciously reflecting the French approach.

Manchester: provided striking conversions by "decapitation" in a well executed large programme; but had less success with concierge based tower block works.

Salford: achieved patchwork improvements in a wide ranging programme. The unexplained withdrawal of new EA funds leaves its development open.

Wigan: solved its problem of excess unpopular stock by so extensively remodelling the remaining housing, with the assistance of housing associations and the private sector, that it no longer physically resembles a problem estate.

The individual differences between estates are important, and provide the essential context to understanding whether and why certain measures worked. I have tried to bring out many of these details in this summary chapter, but the annex provides the full basis for these selective judgements.

### **Basic Site Details**

Table 6.1 sets out the estates in the order in which they will appear in subsequent tables - listing first the Ile de France schemes, alphabetically, then the Nord Pas de Calais, London, and North West.



The largest estate was in fact in Salford, in the North West. Two of the French estates illustrate, however, a phenomenon not seen in the UK, which is that in Chanteloup and Grande Synthe (and, to a lesser extent, in Béthune) the estate forms a major part of the total community, illustrated by the "city population" column. This is never the case in the UK, as already discussed, and table 6.2 similarly illustrates that only one of the French estates is in the inner city, with in contrast only one of the UK estates on the periphery. The case studies also illustrate in more detail that the French estates are often designed and constructed in such a way as to be enclosed, and turned in on themselves by virtue of the construction pattern and traffic layouts. UK estates are much more likely to be accessible and navigable in the manner of other, adjacent, streets and estates. The French design and location leads to additional problems of segregation and isolation from the rest of the community, as well as special environmental problems.

Analysis of table 6.1 population figures, comparing the original population to the original units, indicates another difference - in France there tends to be a higher level of large families on the estates, particularly immigrant households (an average of 3.2 people per unit in France c.f 2 in UK). In the UK the estates in the North West, and in Brent, have been let to high numbers of single people.

The table also shows that 8 of the estates have experienced stock losses - 15% average for all estates, though 6 lost 26% on average (25% for 3 in France, 28% UK). This has been due to many different factors: in the case of Wandsworth it has been due to a vigorous programme of right to buy sales resulting in large scale change of tenure. In Béthune, and in Meaux there have been programmes of both demolition and change of use of stock, mainly for office development. Grande Synthe pursued a large scale demolition programme; Calais demolition and new build. Manchester has pursued a vigorous programme of removing some upper stories in maisonettes ("decapitation"); and Wigan, finally, pursued demolition and disposal to housing associations and private developers. These reductions in stock have been the result of three main factors (with the exception of Wandsworth): the unpopularity of the estate leading to difficulties in lettings; in the peripheral regions, a decline



in the overall demand for rented housing; and in all cases a wish to reduce the overall population density, and more particularly the density of disadvantaged households. These reasons will be explored in more detail below.

Table 6.2 illustrates further basic details of the estates. They were predominantly constructed in the 60s, only one being started in the 70s. The "block types" represented on the estates often include tower blocks of up to 20 storeys. In France these are complemented by long, five to eight storey slab blocks ("barres"), whereas in the UK blocks of maisonettes are more common. There is also the phenomenon shared in estates in both countries that certain towers are entirely or predominantly of one flat type - which lead to problems in every case. Where the towers were entirely family flats, the density of children, and of use of the entrances, lifts, and stairs, lead to a rapid and extensive degradation of the blocks, as well as difficult neighbour problems. On the other hand where blocks were entirely single person dwellings, or used as such, there were problems of high turnover, noise, abuse of the common parts, and often drugs or criminality.

This table also shows the political complexion of the city council in power during the works. Surprisingly only 2 councils had changing administrations; but less surprising is that two thirds were administrations of the left - although this ranged from a highly pragmatic Labour council in Wigan to a Communist council in Stains.

### **Population**

Table 6.3 provides brief population details, using data at the start of the programmes. These show that populations are generally poor, many existing on benefit payments, generally unskilled or semi skilled workers, suffering from high levels of unemployment. Not shown in the table is the corresponding absence of white collar and professional workers on estates. The households are predominantly young families, and in many cases large families. In certain of the UK estates there are high numbers of single parents. There are disproportionate numbers of young single people, particularly in some of the UK estates, as previously noted.



City	Region	Estate Name	Rented Units at Start	Rented Units at End	Estate Population at Start	City Popul- ation
Chanteloup	Ile de France	Zac de la Nöe	2,224	2,224	8,278	10,192
Meaux	Ile de France	La Pierre Collinet	1,850	1,399	4,500	50,000
Stains	Ile de France	Le Clos Saint-Lazare	2,213	2,213	8,500	35,000
Calais	Nord P de Cal	Fort Nieulay	1,031	936	3,500	77,000
Béthune	Nord P de Cal	Mont Liébaut	1,374	980	4,000	26,000
Grande Synthe	Nord P de Cal	Nouvelles Synthe	3,650	2,800	11,000	26,000
Brent	London	Stonebridge	1,700	1,700	2,500	255,000
Islington	London	St Lukes	357	357	950	166,100
Wandsworth	London	Doddington	964	621	2,200	256,000
Manchester	N West	Miles Platting	3,500	2,800	9,000	446,700
Salford	N West	Precinct	3,705	3,640	6,000	234,600
Wigan	N West	Worsley Mesnes	1,573	950	3,200	308,000

Table 6.1: Scheme and Population Sizes



	Location	Politics	Built	Block Types	Flat Type & Mix
Chanteloup	Edge of smaller village	Right	71-74	70 long blocks of 3-5 storey (s)	Mixed throughout; 68% 2 or 3 bed
Meaux	Edge of town	Left coalition	58-63	6x 15 s; 3x 22 s	4 beds in 22s; 68% 3/5 bed in 15s
Stains	Inner city	Communist	66-70	11 x 5 s long; 17 towers	Some towers all 1bed; others all 4b
Calais	Edge of town	Shifting	62-67	8 x 4/5 s long; 5 x 11 s towers	Mixed throughout
Béthune	Edge of town	Socialist	62-69	Mix 5s long & 9 s towers	Mixed throughout
Grande Synthe	Replaced previous small village	Socialist	61-65	62 blocks; mix 5 s long & 7-10 s	Mixed throughout
Brent	Inner city isolated	Shifting	68-72	5 x 15/16s; 1 x 21s; 8 long 6-8s	Towers bedsit, 1b, 2b; long 2b, 3b, 4b
Islington	Inner city central	Labour	69-71	1 x 21 s; 2 x 9s long	Mixed throughout
Wandsworth	Inner city central	Tory	69-71	6 x 14 s; plus low rise	Mixed throughout
Manchester	Inner city isolated	Labour	60-65	13 x 13s; 126 4 s maisonette blocks	Towers all 1b, 2b. maisonettes family
Salford	Inner city central	Labour	64-73	30 towers up to 20s; & low rise	Towers all 1b, 2b. mix in low rise
Wigan	Edge of town	Labour	65-68	3x 16s & 5s flats	Mixed throughout

Table 6.2: Estate Details: Flat and Block Types; and City Politics



	Employment & Income	Households	Ethnic Pop.	Comments
Chanteloup	17% UE (UnEmployed) 55% US (UnSkilled)	53% under 20; 70% with kids	40% - from 35 nationalities	Ethnic mainly SE Asia, Maghreb, Africa
Meaux	20% benefits only; 60% US/semi S	62% under 40	36%	Ethnic esp. Portugal, Maghreb, Africa
Stains	Incomes low; 47% US	50% under 20; 37% 5+ people	34%	Ethnic = 20% Africa/ SE Asia, 14% DOM-TOM
Calais	45% estimated UE; 75% US/semi S	51% under 25; 24% 3+ kids	0.5%	Many residents from Cité Provisoire
Béthune	35% benefits only; 85% US/semi S	30% 1 parent; 44% 3+ kids	Very low (no figures)	70% adults under 40
Grande Synthe	UE up (12% to 24%) 75% US/semi S	84% under 40; 15% 4+ kids	30%, mainly Maghreb	Wages OK as work in steelworks
Brent	Incomes low; mainly unskilled workers	Many 1 parent; + young single	14% Asian; 36% Afro-Caribbean	Data scarce
Islington	44% Housing Benefit 21% UE; 62% US/semi	30% OAP; 10% + adult child	23% - high Asian + African	21% had "other relative" in household
Wandsworth	25% UE; 64% Housing Benefit (HB)	14% 1 parent; 41% under 19	41% - Asian and Afro Caribbean	Population changed by "dumping" of homeless
Manchester	36% UE	High 1 parent; High density	4% SE Asian, Afro Caribbean	Many lone OAP;
Salford	24% UE; 75% HB	25% elderly; few families	Few	Predominantly single people in towers
Wigan	26% UE; 57% Supp. Ben.	23% single non OAP	Few	Estate unpopular with families

Table 6.3: Population: normally details dating from the start of the programme



The detailed evidence from Chanteloup, Stains and Calais clearly indicates that HLMs historically used the estates to dump its worst tenants, and thereby keep them off the better estates. Although HLMs had generally "quotas" of immigrant or difficult households to rehouse, in many cases the entire quota would be allocated to the "dump" estate. In Calais the people who had lived in the shanty town outside the city were directly housed on the estate. The evidence from Meaux shows that residualisation occurred with the construction of an adjacent, better estate to which the better tenants were transferred. In Wandsworth and Brent there had been a similar problem with large numbers of homeless households being consigned to the estate as no one else could be forced to take it. Wigan and Salford had a different problem, where there was such a stock surplus that no one at all could be found to take the units, leading to indiscriminate letting, often to transient young people who caused considerable disturbance and damage.

In France, though not so much in the UK, there were problems of high levels of alcoholism, including teenage alcoholism, on certain estates (for example Calais), as well as a growing drugs problem (for example in Stains). Drugs were also an issue in Brent and Manchester.

The residents' difficulties were also clearly reflected in the comments and assessment of many of the main agents on the estates, who quickly identified this as the underlying issue which was not tackled by the physical works. This was most pronounced in France, where in many cases staff on estates would make direct reference to the difficulties of management and improvement while there were so many tenants with multiple problems. This sometimes led to positive hostility to the residents, who were seen as incapable of responding adequately to the physical improvements made. The frequent rapid degradation of the improvements was seen as evidence that the main problem was the people themselves, rather than any other external factors.



## **Ethnic Minority Population**

There are high ethnic minority populations on seven of the estates, while on four of the others it is very low. This contrast partly reflects the regional differences - the high levels being in the Paris and London areas, with the exception of Grande Synthe where there was a specific recruitment of immigrant labour to the steelworks. There is also some suggestion of exclusion of ethnic minorities from the other estates, explicitly seen in Salford where racial harassment of any black families venturing on the estate was described, also to an extent a factor in Calais. There is no estate where the ethnic minority population reflects the proportions in the city as a whole - it is either very much bigger, or smaller.

Some problems in certain of the French estates stem from difficulties in integration by immigrant groups. The Meaux study, for example, sets out particular problems with Malian families, both due to polygamy, to language difficulties, and to the tradition of putting up relatives in the family home. In other estates, such as Grande Synthe, the presence of large immigrant families produced special problems, dealt with there by creating specially large units. In many of the estates the immigrants were from North African (Maghreb) Moslem backgrounds, as has been set out previously. This was not at all the case in the UK, where there were few of the real problems of language, religion, and cultural integration which were evident in France. UK ethnic minorities on estates, with the exception of small groups of South East Asian families, were primarily English speaking Christians.

There was also a stark difference in the range of comments and assessment by agents on the subject of "problems" caused by immigrant households, set out in more detail in the studies. It proved fairly common in the French estates for HLM staff at all levels - from caretakers to the manager of the local office - to espouse attitudes which in the UK would be immediately seen as racist. There was little self consciousness about this, rather it was presented in a quasi factual manner. The remarks would be about the attitudes, habits, and behaviour of certain ethnic groups, expressing hostile and negative feelings, including the traditional remarks about their smell, eating, and social habits. These attitudes were not present amongst the



DSQ team staff (who would sometimes refer unhappily to the HLM staff attitudes). In the UK, on the contrary, there was no such overt racism, and evidence in certain of the estates - primarily Brent, Wadsworth, Islington, and Manchester - of positive programmes aimed at equal treatment of ethnic minority tenants and staff, or sometimes racism awareness training programmes, introduced following the recommendations of the 1982 Scarman report on the Brixton civil disturbances.

Many French interviews raised points concerning immigrants, ghettos, and rioting, which are taken up in Jelen (1991). He rejects the notion of large HLM estates as "ghettos". This is a view strongly argued by Viellard-Baron (1990) who maintains first that the widely used term is factually inaccurate, in relation to either its historical meaning or its contemporary American sense, and second that its use serves to further isolate and disempower the populations on the large HLM estates. Jelen documents a specific viewpoint put to me in a number of the interviews, that the main problems are caused in families where parental control and authority have failed to be exercised over the male adolescent children. Female adolescents are seldom associated with problems on estates, a point also made repeatedly to me. The problem appears worst in households of young North African families, where the role model of the illiterate, docile, parent, willing to work long hours in a factory for low wages, but now unemployed, is totally rejected by the French educated son. Generally these children, according to Jelen, have been brought up under little supervision, and learned from the streets that it is more profitable to make money from crime, particularly from drugs, than to "slave for F5,000 a month" (p205). There are, he estimates, perhaps numerically few hard core problem youths on large estates, but they create a media image, however, which comes to represent the estate. Jelens conclusion, which was not inconsistent with the case studies, is that

"..the critical problem is of parental authority....and the weak perception by the parents of the role of education in socialisation. From this insufficient schooling comes unemployment, delinquency, drugs, and exclusion in the true sense of the term." (p216)



## **The Problems on the Estates**

Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 set out the main problems on the estates. In 6.4 I have set out concisely the key problem on each estate. The two subsequent tables provide additional details under general headings.

### Unpopular Estates with High Voids:

One of the main difficulties linked to the unpopularity of the estates was that of void units, a major problem in eight of the estates and the main problem in Grande Synthe, Béthune, Wigan, Manchester, and Salford - that is in the provincial regions. There were both financial and management problems caused on the estates which had become unlettable. Financially in France the loss of rent income led to further problems in being able to maintain the blocks. The attempt to fill the voids sometimes led to compounding the problems of social isolation and unbalanced population mix - in Brent, Salford and Manchester, the lack of demand for tower blocks lay behind the creation of severe problems in these blocks, due to indiscriminate lettings to young single people; in Meaux and Béthune and Grande Synthe, the absence of demand generally led to the acceptance of any household who was willing to take a flat, often poor or immigrant households with multiple problems.

This problem of voids was often compounded by that of high turnover of tenants. In the main those moving off were those who had access to a better standard of accommodation, usually the better off tenants. This left the poorest trapped on the estate. In most of the estates, however, there tended to be a high differential turnover between different blocks, some having an essentially stable and integrated population. In Stains, Manchester, Brent, and Salford, turnover was concentrated in the towers which had unstable, young single tenants. The consequence of high turnover was to reduce the likelihood of the development of a stable self supporting neighbourhood.



	General Statement of Key Original Problems
Chanteloup	Dumping ground poor design estate imposed on small village unable to provide facilities; bad management, esp from original HLM, tho still problems
Meaux	Unpopular vast estate quickly drained of stable tenants by adjacent better estate, leaving poorest + immigrant households; shunned by rest of city
Stains	Badly built estate with immediate repair problems, then crime, isolated from city, with bad management
Calais	Cold, derelict estate - some v. bad blocks; high unemployment & alcoholism; indifferent management
Béthune	Collapsing demand for units → serious voids (30%); estate isolated from city, & with poorest tenants; poor repair and management
Grande Synthe	Steel town with declining steelworks → collapsing demand & increasing voids (34%); high unskilled unemployed immigrant population
Brent	Unpopular estate, only homeless would accept; high turnover of young singles in towers; high crime, many unauthorised occupants; failed security measures
Islington	Reasonable, stable estate, but fear of crime/insecurity
Wandsworth	Unpopular estate, only homeless would accept; high crime/violence; major repairs problems; vast unused garages & spaces
Manchester	Unpopular estate, esp towers - high turnover of singles in towers; increasing disrepair and crime; community disintegrating
Salford	Collapsing demand → turnover of singles, conflicts; poor environment & management; high crime
Wigan	Collapsing demand; disrepair and crime increasing

**Table 6.4:** General Statement of Key Original Problems, as set out in programme documentation, and as stated by key agents.



	Voids	Arears <sup>1</sup>	Turnover	Image	Physical
Chanteloup	20%	60% had 24% big	Not a problem	Peripheral locus of crime and delinquency	In disrepair; cellars bad, environmentally barren
Meaux	18%	42% had 60% big	11%	Unpopular, isolated, "Africa"; avoided	Noisy; poor refuse disposal Dead open space
Stains	OK	High	Towers 38%	Cold; crime ridden; cut off; sameness	In disrepair; basements bad, halls & lifts poor
Calais	OK, bar 1	26% +3 months	16.5% One 47%	Poor; little contact with city	Heating, basements, refuse, open space problems
Béthune	30% + long	67% had	30%	Badly cut off; <u>incr.</u> <u>voids</u> & decline	Cold, noisy, heating, hot water, disrepair problems
Grande Synthe	34% & incr.	46% had 25% big	41%	Drab & degraded; <u>incr. voids.</u>	In disrepair; entrances bad Estate grey & no greens
Brent	High	High	High	Unpopular; crime & drugs; uncontrolled	Long connecting walkways; poor lighting
Islington	OK	OK	Mainly internal	Security seen as main problem	Long corridors; otherwise OK
Wandsworth	21%	59% had	12%	Unpopular; drab; vast disused bits/garages	Linking corridors; bad halls rubbish, windows, corridors
Manchester	18%	High	Towers high	Unpopular; crime; disintegrating	Bad leaks, heating, fittings refuse, open spaces
Salford	19%	OK	High	Oppressive blocks; unpopular	Heating problems; environment poor
Wigan	4%	32% had	23%	Unpopular	Poor heating, roofs, greens

Table 6.5: Original Problems (part 1)

1. "Had" means % of tenants in arrears; "Big" indicates they were classed as "seriously high"



	Management	Infrastructure	Crime/Security	Tenant Partn
Chanteloup	Poor, no local office Previous HLM closed	V poor: comune lacked funds	High delinquency & crime	No Participation
Meaux	On site, but little focused practices	No employment; poor shops	Not a problem	None
Stains	Poor; no local office Previous HLM closed	Poor transport	Drugs problems; delinquency	None
Calais	Indifferent and remote	Reasonable access to city	High vandalism	None - high alcoholism
Béthune	Remote, finance oriented, poor	Poor; cut off from city facilities	Neighbour disputes	None; shame & despair
Grande Synthe	Remote, poor, indiscriminate allocs	Poor; lacking centre	Not a major problem	None; groups isolated
Brent	Local office, poor general services	Isolated from shops; rest OK	Major issue. E/phones destroyed.	Indifferent to hostile
Islington	Neighbourhood decentralisation	Adequate	Main problem. Vandalism & fear	Some; close community
Wandsworth	Remote except for works	Adequate	Vandalism & serious crime: tenants flee	None
Manchester	Local office; reasonable	Poor shopping; few facilities	High burglary and drugs problems	Community breaking up
Salford	Remote split function offices	Excellent	High burglary, car theft; "bad area"	Conflicts of old & new
Wigan	Remote bar one officer	Adequate	Vandalism; home to criminals	Apathetic community

Table 6.6: Original Problems (part 2)



Sometimes external factors compounded the problem. In Meaux, as noted, the new adjacent estate increased the turnover problem. In Béthune the general development of low cost owner occupation in the surrounding rural areas lead to a high migration out of the town as a whole. In Grande Synthe the massive reduction in employment in the steelworks, which was the estate's rationale, lead to the high voids. In Wigan and Salford the existence of a gross housing surplus lead to the most unpopular estates becoming that surplus.

#### Arrears:

The economic difficulties of tenants are reflected in the levels of arrears, which surfaced in ten of the estates. In many cases, however, tenants were living on benefits and a substantial part of the rent was paid, although meeting the residual element was often a problem.

#### Poor image:

The main problems outlined above result in one problem which is shared by all of the estates - that of the estate's image. This is due to physical isolation, to poor facilities, to the effect of large numbers of voids, to disrepair and design problems, to the general awareness on and off the estate that many residents are in difficulties and socially excluded, and to the problems of high crime rates. This is compounded in many cases by physical ugliness or drabness, particularly due to the presence of several large, grey, slab blocks presenting an image of repetition and sameness. The image problem is social also, however, with problems of drugs, crime, and poverty making the estate a "no-go" area in the eyes of many of the residents of other parts of the town - such as was the case in Meaux and Calais, or in Brent and Manchester. Employment opportunities and the provision of services and goods were explicitly reported to be prejudiced by an address on the Meaux or Brent estates. In Chanteloup one of the main underlying issues was the fact that the village onto which the estate had been grafted (without consultation) had a totally different type of population - leading to the estate becoming an isolated imposition on the village. The image problem manifested itself in very similar ways in both countries.



### Environmentally barren:

All the estates suffered from poor use of external space around the blocks, and inadequate management of the open spaces, sometimes, particularly in the UK, leading to problems of personal security in moving about the estate. In other cases, for example Manchester and Wigan, the absence of private space around the blocks had led to a high rate of burglary in the blocks. In many of the French estates there were problems with the circulation of traffic, for example in Stains where the cars were not separated from the pedestrians and front doors opened onto garage entrances. Chanteloup suffered from the deliberate design of an environment denuded of green areas: this was the result of an architectural idea to create a "prairie" of sand and stones.

### Design and repair problems:

Disrepair and problems due to design defects were common. Heating systems difficulties were shared by estates in both countries, as were problems of degraded entrances and stairwells. French estates tended to suffer more from problems of lack of noise insulation; and the frequent presence of basement areas which had become disused, vandalised, and the locus of adolescent criminal or antisocial gatherings. In the UK the spaces under blocks were often used for garages, in all cases disused, vandalised, and often the locus of illegal gatherings. Both countries had problems of drugs dealing and use, often in isolated areas of the estate. Refuse disposal was a common difficulty, as was lift breakdown.

It is also striking that internal problems with the basic equipment in the flats was seldom presented as a problem. Traditionally problems of inadequate housing have been linked to the absence of standard amenities: hot water, toilets and so on. On these estates, however, the flats were provided with adequate space and full modern amenities, and would have been perfectly adequate had the common parts of the estate been in similar condition.



### Indifferent housing management

Remote, unresponsive management was a feature of the majority of estates. In four cases there was already a local office, but in two of these cases the office had little in the way of special management adapted to the needs of the estate. The management arrangements tended to be identical to those for other homes managed by the organisation, despite the obvious differences due to the problems on the estates. In Chanteloup and Stains, the management had been by an Interdepartmental HLM for Paris (OIRP). This organisation eventually saw its stock transferred to other HLMs in 1981 due to total mismanagement - this was seen in the form of high voids, uncontrolled arrears and inadequate rent accounting, untrained and very poor staff, indifferent repairs and general neglect of the estate.

The problem of a serious lack of an adequate repairs service was reflected in Brent, Calais, Grande Synthe, and Manchester. In France this was a general problem for many of the difficult estates:

"Examples are known, for example, that in certain neighbourhoods it takes two months to replace a broken electric light fitting, although in one of the better neighbourhoods it is done in 24 hours" (UNFOHLM(1992) p40)

### Absence of infrastructure:

The absence of adequate infrastructure in the form of schools, leisure facilities, shopping facilities, and local jobs, was often cited as a problem, particularly in France where the new greenfield sites required to provision of these other facilities from scratch. It was not so much of a problem in the inner city estates, like Salford, Islington, Wandsworth, and to an extent Calais and Stains. The problem was generally that intended or promised facilities had not been built, often because of a lack of resources. Chanteloup suffered most from this, as the village was totally unable to provide the infrastructure necessary to make the estate work, and the rail link with Paris was not built until almost ten years after the completion of the estate. Schools and educational provision were areas of concern, leading to many of the French estates being granted Educational Priority Zone status as the accompaniment to the



DSQ programme. The absence of jobs was due in some cases to the decline of local industry: extensive cutbacks occurred in the giant steelworks adjacent to the Grande Synthe estate, and in the car factories near to Chanteloup.

### Security:

Some UK estates (Islington, Brent, Wandsworth, Manchester) had problems with long interconnecting walkways, or long isolated pathways through the estate, leading to problems of personal security, compounded by absence of adequate lighting and unimpeded access to all blocks. There were also problems with crime in the form of burglaries and personal assaults in lifts or dark corners of the estate. This was not so much seen as an issue in France, despite in some cases high levels of criminality on the estates. In the UK, however, this issue of security and crime prevention became one of the key problems for Estate Action attention.

### Absence of community life and resident participation:

One consequence of these problems set out above was that the population, already suffering from various social and economic disadvantages, was confirmed in its negative self image and passivity. There was a very low level of participation in estate associations or organisations. This was compounded by problems of illiteracy and language difficulties. In Wigan, Brent, Grande Synthe, and Chanteloup there were frequent conflicts between neighbours or groups of tenants. The isolation was compounded by the problem of drug and alcoholism abuse. Many people preferred to stay indoors drinking than to go to a meeting. There was an absence of participation not only in estate life, but also the wider life of the community and city.



## Summary

The case study estates have problems similar to those described in the preceding chapters. There is one exception to this, Islington, where crime and fear of crime appears to be the main rationale for its inclusion in the programme. For the other estates, however, the clear picture is that of problems of design, infrastructure, and disrepair leading to the estate being difficult to let, which in turn lead to the concentration of unemployed and disadvantaged tenants on the estates in an attempt to reduce the central problem of voids. This was compounded by poor management, including neglect, remote and indifferent management, and sometimes the deliberate decision to dump problems there. All these factors compounded the problem of the poor image of the estate, and the problem of lettability and voids, with the growing high crime rates and problems of drugs and alcohol lead to increasing social isolation from the general life of the community, on top of the already existing physical isolation.

There are also contrasts: the metropolitan estates have higher proportions of ethnic minority households, who are absent from many of the provincial estates. The voids problem in the provincial estates is due to a gross surplus of stock. The problem of crime and fear of crime appears much more prominently in the UK estates.

There are also factors not discussed in the background chapters. There were problems of young males, often from immigrant households, who seemed to lack a family structure which would control their behaviour. There was a stronger relation of crime and fear of crime to certain design aspects of UK estates, particularly walkways and the overall estate layout of open spaces between blocks; and in France the management problems were compounded by a personal hostility and lack of sympathy with the disadvantaged tenants on the part of HLM staff, exhibiting itself on certain occasions as blatant racism.

The next section deals with the proposals which were made to deal with these problems.



## **Housing Management Objectives**

Tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 set out the original housing management objectives.

### **Voids:**

The priority given to dealing with voids reflected their prominence as a problem. The exact solution varied, partly according to stock type.

Stock reduction by demolitions were common where there were high void tower blocks (e.g. Salford, Wigan, Meaux, Grande Synthe). In Manchester and Wigan there were also programmes to remove upper stories of blocks (decapitation). Change of use for offices was common in France (Meaux, Béthune) though not in the UK. Wigan also disposed for improvement for rent and sale, and Chanteloup sought to improve for disposal to a high rent HLM.

Strategies to fill the empties were also common. Some offered blocks or parts of blocks for institutional or special lettings (for example for students, or young people - Meaux, Salford). Salford operated a policy of open advertising, as did Manchester for a short period, whereby anyone who was willing to move onto the estate could do so, subject to certain minimum checks designed to try to root out the worst of the antisocial tenants who might apply.

### **Arrears:**

Arrears, surprisingly, are not always a stated priority of the written programme proposals, even when they are a problem - perhaps because it was generally accepted that tackling them was important. They were often mentioned as key aspects of better management by the estate managers, however, due to their income generation aspect. The French approach on half of the estates was to propose a special aid commission, which had the power to make special grants or loans to tenants in difficulty, with conditions about continuing repayments. These commissions would be made up of both housing and social work officers. Only Brent shared this type of approach in the UK.



### Allocations:

In all the French estates there were proposals to restore social balance by selective allocations - some form of local allocations policy was to be devised to try to socially engineer changes in the population structure. This was often expressed in terms of restricting the numbers of unemployed people, and encouraging employed tenants to move in. Equally it was often put to me in terms of "no more blacks" to be admitted until the proportion was reduced to what was seen as a more balanced level. There are a number of HLMs also believed to operate a "one for one" policy of not admitting more black families unless another black household moves out. There was a proposal to combatting this type of activity in the recent Besson law, by forcing HLMs to give reasons for their refusals - but in the end the clause was dropped (see Blanc 1990).

In contrast in the UK only Wandsworth espoused any similar objective, but couched it much more in terms of a balance of owners and renters, which was expected naturally to produce a more even social mix. This was based on sons and daughters of existing tenants, and since many of the existing tenants who were black had relatives who wished to move onto the estate, in this case the type of bias to white families which is often the result of those policies did not occur. The key notion in Wandsworth was that those who moved onto the estate should positively wish to live there, rather than finding themselves there as a last resort. It was hoped that the commitment of those who had chosen to move on would act as a stimulus to improve the estate.

Elsewhere Manchester aimed to retain existing communities in blocks by operating certain sensitive decanting choices; - but this did not affect new tenancies. Otherwise the standard computerised allocations systems which operated for all estates were the most prevalent in the UK.

Additionally solutions were proposed to reduce the social rented stock: Wandsworth promoted leasehold ownership. There were also frequent attempts to produce a



better housing (and tenant) mix by the construction of new homes on the estate (Meaux, Béthune, Calais, Wigan, plans in Brent). It is noticeable that in the UK only Wigan and Wandsworth actively planned any significant changes of ownership of estate flats, despite one of the key Estate Action aims being to encourage tenure diversity and the involvement of the private sector. Many more proposals of this type were made on the French estates (Meaux, Chanteloup, Béthune, and Grande Synthe).

#### Local Offices:

Proposals to develop a new office and new local services were very common - unsurprisingly as there were major planks of the overall national programmes. Proposed improvements to management included a new local office in eight of the estates, sometimes replacing a previous partial service. In three of the other cases (Islington, Manchester and Grande Synthe) there was already a local presence, and in the final case (Calais) a local office was planned (but did not materialise). Equally many planned management improvements, mainly related to providing a local service adapted to the needs of the estate population.

#### New Staff Roles, including Caretaking:

Planned changes in local staff roles were particularly noticeable in France which often gave a much enhanced role to caretakers, including in some cases proposing to provide them with their own improved offices from which they, and often their wives, would undertake basic housing management functions like logging repairs, taking rents, or managing contract cleaning staff. This was sometimes (Chanteloup, Stains, Meaux) backed up by new training packages highlighting the social role they were expected to play. In contrast in the UK only in Manchester were caretakers seen as part of the package of estate improvement strategies; and indeed the caretaking role was being planned to be reduced in Brent and Islington.



Plans were also made on all French estates bar Chanteloup for other staff to be trained into the more sensitive management needed. This element of planning to develop a new staff awareness through training was not seen in the UK, except in Islington as part of a wider programme.

#### Participation and partnership:

The aims of participation of residents in the improvement process, and of partnership with other agencies and groups can be treated together, as they often overlap. Joint working with other partners was a key aim in all cases: in France this involved the HLM working with the DSQ team; in the UK this involved a commitment to some form of inter departmental working to provide an integrated package of improvements on the estate. A considerable number of good intentions were expressed on this subject in many of the planning documents, and as listed in table 6.9.

UK moves towards corporate working involved the various local authority departments responsible for aspects of the estate: such as coordination of the environmental, refuse, and other services (Manchester, Salford), often by the local office (Wigan); or some form of local committee or forum (Brent, Islington). The context would be that these other departments had their own programmes and priorities, and attempts would be made to bend these programmes to the benefit of the estate, or to fit in some way with the predominantly housing programme.

Partnership and participation also focused on the creation or support of resident groups on estates. All estates planned consultation with tenants during the improvement works, seeing this as a key element of the approach, no doubt partly because this was required by the structure of the national programmes, but also because they recognised this as a problem. Here there was another difference reflecting the programme structures: in the UK the emphasis was on tenants associations, and tenants halls; in France there was a wider aim to promote groups which would assist the tenants in the wider process of "insertion". This meant that



there were a wider range of associations planned to assist tenants as part of the wider DSQ process, primarily organised around specific interests. These covered mainly ethnic groupings (particularly for Mahgrebin households, for example in Grande Synthe or Chanteloup); groups for women tenants (for example in Meaux); and in many places for adolescents (for example the attempt to create a youth committee in Grande Synthe and Meaux). The emergence of the Régie de Quartier movement also made a key link between the DSQ, the HLM, and the tenants. This movement aims to give employment and training opportunities via a maintenance organisation set up on the estate; see Meaux case study for more details.

The aims of participation in France were generally linked closely to the wider objective of tenants reclaiming "citizenship" [citoyennité] or their rightful place in society (along with the "insertion" objective which was very commonly documented in the plans). This citizenship was wider than simply an economic role, through employment; not simply tied to participation in estate management issues, but also related to civic notions of being an active participant in local issues and voting in local elections, to being a participant in local democracy in the widest, commune wide, sense, and in enjoying the general benefits of French life in the way the majority of other citizens did.

More traditional methods were evident in the UK, with the construction of a new tenants hall in Wandsworth, or the stimulation of a tenants forum in Brent. The main focus in other estates was to provide consultation mechanisms for the works and try to promote tenants associations from that. Tenants associations were also promoted in France, not least because the HLM structure, set out in Chapter 2, meant that there was a requirement to have tenants representatives on the main



**PAGE  
MISSING  
IN  
ORIGINAL**



	Voids	Arrears	Allocations
Chanteloup	Worst blocks emptied, for eventual rehab	New procedures; advice and special aid scheme	Children of tenants; city residents; no more blacks
Meaux	Reduce stock; newbuild houses; special lets	New training; many exemplary evictions	Attracting outsiders in; dispersal; no more excluded
Stains	Not a problem	Rent & benefit advice; c/takers do small debts	"restoration of social and ethnic balance". Allocs sub
Calais	Worst blocks emptied; newbuild for rent	Special officers to assist	Lettings panel planned, to produce better social mix
Béthune	Key aim; reduce stock; newbuild; offices	Arrears commission; new controls	Local cttee;"social balance" visits; no bad tenants;
Grande Synthe	Key objective: reduce stock; sales	Arrears commission; local drive against A.	Local Commsn; more employed; less blacks; less problems
Brent	No major plans	Reduce + move to smaller flat scheme	All central allocations
Islington	Not a problem	Better advice on rents and benefits	Central allocations system
Wandsworth	Improved for sale	No major proposals; general issue	Local A.; no homeless; must want este; "balance"; sales
Manchester	Stock reduction	No major proposals; general issue	Careful placing of decanted ten to maintain community
Salford	Stock redctn; disposal; dem.; change of use	No major proposals; general issue	Open advertising: "Join the high life"
Wigan	Demolition; change of use; disposals	No special measures; general issue	No special measures

Table 6.7: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (part 1)



	Management	Caretaking	Training
Chanteloup	Localised management; adapted to local needs	New offices; first line of contact for all issues	Special caretaker training
Meaux	Better local services; new office;	New social role; office as first point of contact	Stressed - all staff +caretaking
Stains	New local office; some functions still at HQ	Emphasis on new social role; couples, offices, computers	All staff, esp. caretakers
Calais	New office planned, and adapted management	Development of the local caretaking office	Planned for all staff
Béthune	New local office; better repairs; better services	New proactive social role;	Some: caretakers & other staff
Grande Synthe	New local office; social officers; HQ retains fnctns.	No major changes proposed	Local office staff mainly
Brent	New local office for half of estate	Service reduced; further reductions planned	No special initiative
Islington	General borough decentralisation	Proposed reduction; concierge introduced	Initiatives in borough wide prog
Wandsworth	New local office; volunteer staff only	No major initiatives except tendered cleaning	No special initiatives
Manchester	Already local office; no change	Improved residential role	No major initiatives
Salford	New local office, intensive comprehensive management	Increased social role; less cleaning more maintenance	No special measures
Wigan	New Neighbourhood Services Centre	Minor aspect of management	No special measures

Table 6.8: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (part 2)



	Participation	Partnerships	Comments/Other
Chanteloup	Extensive consultation on works	Joint working with DSQ	City sought increased tenure mix; HLM to retain rent income
Meaux	Womens/youth groups; Régie; consultation	Joint with DSQ; HLM project officer	HLM clear DSQ programme central to improvements, & supports
Stains	450 prog. meetings, incl. for kids;	With DSQ; but HLM approach "narrow"	Also improvements to repairs
Calais	Aimed to follow DSQ guidelines	No specific plans (and no outcomes)	Most of the planned housing management aims not fulfilled
Béthune	"encourage tenants as responsible residents"	Close working as key aim	New complaints procedure established
Grande Synthe	Objective of local and topic committees	Close working with DSQ key aim	Also some change of use for offices
Brent	Estate Forum planned	Middle management coordination group	Key problems of illegal occ. & repairs not targeted
Islington	Key aim; many meetings	Boroughwide integrated servcs	Estate benefited from gen. decentralisation ethos
Wandsworth	Key objective; new T. hall; assns encouraged	Commitment to multi agency apprch	Plans drawn up as total long term package, for all deptmts
Manchester	Key objective; aim to restore/retain commnty	Multidisciplinary project team	Mainly physical, not management, programme
Salford	Key aim; meetings, w. parties, questionnaires	Interdeprmntal gp; commnty;envir; phys	Comprehensive 3 year strategy
Wigan	Extensive consultation	Multi service office - priority	Aim that local office should coordinate other servcies

**Table 6.9: Key Housing Management Objectives of Programme (part 3)**



committees. It was in fact hoped that the work of the other associations would assist in promoting representatives. The general aim of participation was also to move to a point where tenants took more responsibility for their estate - via the local neighbourhood committees set up in Grande Synthe or the resident associations in Béthune.

Surprisingly, given the Estate Action later emphasis, in none of the UK estates was the concept of tenant management or cooperative management prominent. Questioning of agents on this point indicated that on none of the estates was it part of the programme objectives, nor was it part of the expectation or demand from tenants. Indeed in Wigan, one of the most successful case study estates, it was suggested clearly to me that if the condition of resident interest in alternative management or tenure had been a condition of EA funding at the time of their application, they would not have been able to comply, and possibly would not have been in the programme.

### **Summary**

In line with earlier chapters, the estates show a commitment to improved management, most usually a new local office. In France, new management strategies included introducing a new social role for caretakers. Partnerships are also prominent, including both promoting associations for residents to participate in the process of improvements. In France more broadly based associations were developed to assist in achieving a wider social integration and citizenship, as would be expected.

The effective treatment of voids is a more prominent housing objective than expected, involving two main strategies: reduction of the available social rented stock by demolition or change of use, and strategies to fill the voids such as institutional lettings or open advertisement of vacancies.



## **Rehabilitation Objectives**

Considerable rehabilitation works were planned, with a variety of programme objectives. This section, and tables 6.10, and 6.11. also presents some details of what was achieved, rather than leaving them to the later "What Happened" section. This is partly because the details of plans and proposals developed in consultation with residents as the programme progressed. It is also because to include all details here will save on the need to repeat the description of the physical works later.

### Major Restructuring or Changes of Use

Considerable remodelling works were proposed. The most spectacular changes were in Manchester, Wigan, and Salford where there were "decapitation" works - maisonette blocks were changed to terraced family houses by the removal of the upper floors to leave two storey dwellings. These were then provided with conventional pitched roofs. Wigan combined this with a programme of rebuilding of certain blocks, which involved effectively demolition (except for foundations and internal ground floor walls) then complete rebuilding. Grande Synthe also did considerable remodelling, mainly the creation of large family units for households with 5 or more children. These were created at the ends of blocks by integrating all the floors into two units, each with its own entrance, the upper large unit accessed by an external stair. This was done to cater specifically for the large, mainly Mahgrebin, families who were already on the estate.

Some programmes planned remodelled flats in relation to special lettings or allocations initiatives: Salford rehabilitated the interiors of flats prior to its "Join the High Life" advertising campaign designed to attract new tenants. It also transformed one block onto a singles block with furnishing, repairs and redecoration, and the provision of communal facilities. Wandsworth did some minor remodelling of internal flat layouts and sizes to deal with a fire exit problem.

Béthune, Grande Synthe, and Meaux also provided extensive office space by change of use of flats. This was part of the drive to attract people to have a better image of the estate, through contact with it, as well as a measure against voids.



### Transformation of the Appearance of the Estate:

Treatment of the external appearance of the blocks was a major strategy to achieve the aim of changed image in certain estates: - mainly in France, but also in Wandsworth and to an extent Wigan. The most striking plan was in Stains where the architectural team started with a vision of making what were previously monotonous blocks into individual buildings with the diverse characteristics of a city street. This was achieved by the addition not only of external wall colours and coverings, but also embellishments to the roofline and gable walls to alter the look of the buildings. These changes were all extensively discussed with tenants prior to introduction, as noted above. The effect was combined with the opening up of two new entrances from the estate to the town - done in one case by the partial demolition of some lower floors of a block to form a virtual arch through which a passage and bridge was constructed. The effect is very striking (see photos at case study).

Similar external decoration was carried out in Chanteloup, including the construction of enormous mural mosaics of the faces of famous French authors on the gable ends of the blocks which surround a central open space. The improved blocks in Béthune and Grande Synthe were provided with a colourful, substantial cladding, and the external insulation panels in Calais were brightly painted. It should be noted, however, that many HLM estates are constructed from coloured panels, and indeed that the identification of an HLM estate on the landscape is often made easy by the sight of garish high rise blocks. Calais also had a large scale mosaic on the ground depicting Blériot in an aeroplane, covering a very large area of the centre of the estate including interruptions where blocks of flats occurred.

This type of external fabric improvement was not so common in the UK. Wandsworth was the only estate to have a similar programme of decoration - transforming the previous grey blocks to very brightly coloured facades, including windows in primary colours and new bay windows at irregular intervals (wherever the tenants requested them). In addition the walkways which remained were covered over with bright roofs which had the appearance of pantomime oriental bridges. The effect of these



changes was also startling. The North West estates were mostly affected by the changes due to decapitation set out above, rather than external cladding.

### Heating and Insulation

French programmes frequently had the objective of providing better heating and insulation, including both thermal and sound insulation. Thermal insulation would be mainly by new insulated cladding panels, but also by reducing the sizes of windows. The objective of thermal insulation was partly tied to a wish to reduce service charges for heating (as in Stains, which in fact achieved a 50% total reduction in heating charges). It was also linked to a wider government programme to improve insulation in buildings, following the 1973 oil crisis and fuel cost rises. Sound insulation improvements were to reduce noise transmission in blocks, due to design faults in the original construction.

Insulation work was not commonly an objective of the UK programmes. The new roofs in Manchester, Wigan, and Salford decapitated blocks were fully thermally insulated, in line with guidelines for new construction - but none of the UK estates identified insulation as a main objective, despite its clear benefits to tenants. Heating improvements were made in Salford and Wigan

### Refuse Disposal and Lifts

The problem of refuse disposal was a shared objective. Meaux, Calais, and Wandsworth all sought to improve the methods of refuse disposal. Equally lift replacement was also an objective in estates in both countries, but the high capital cost kept the numbers of replacements it was to achieve low.

### Internal Flat Improvements:

As noted above, problems with the insides of flats were not common, and this was reflected in the proposed improvements. Some estates had small internal improvements packages, which tended to be some minor works within an overall budget limit (Meaux, Béthune, Manchester). Brent provided new front doors, but



mainly as part of a crime prevention initiative; likewise the improvements to heating or insulation were driven by other concerns than internal flat rehabilitation, although they were clearly of benefit to individual tenants.

### Staircase Works:

Considerable attention was paid in all estates to proposals to improve the common entrances and stairwells to blocks. Most introduced plans to redecorate, and often restructure, the entrances. The general aim was to make the entrance more pleasant and welcoming; to eradicate graffiti and disrepair which was commonly present, by hiding it under stronger, vandal resistant materials; and frequently to provide a differentiation between blocks by having different colours or patterns in each block. In France there was also often a plan to provide stronger letterboxes to deter theft of mail - letter boxes were sited in the entrances, as the post delivery service stopped there.

### Security Works:

Here there was a marked contrast of approach between countries. The concern with crime, which was to an extent shared in both countries, was expressed in the UK by the extensive provision of entryphone schemes (3 estates) and concierge schemes (3 estates), in contrast with only two estates in France (Grande Synthe and Chanteloup) which installed entryphones, and no instances of concierges (that is people primarily to control entry to blocks).

There was also much more attention paid in the UK objectives to planning specific crime prevention or personal security measures. These were translated into programmes to reroute paths into less secluded parts of the estate; improve lighting; provide defensible garden spaces around blocks; and particularly the demolition of walkways linking blocks. Every UK estate had objectives and works of this type. In contrast, crime and fear of crime was dealt in France by anti delinquency programmes aimed at involving young people in purposeful training and sports; by bricking up basement areas where they gathered and drugs and alcohol were consumed; and by the staircase measures.



**PAGE  
MISSING  
IN  
ORIGINAL**



	Structure	Stairwells	Security
Chanteloup	Insulation; windows; roof and gable embellishments	Renewed and redecorated; heavier doors	Some entryphones in stairs; basement sealed
Meaux	Sound insulation; internal works; refuse system	Entryhalls remodelled; corridors refurbished	No special measures
Stains	Remodelled exteriors; insulation; flat sizes	Individually improved and decorated; new doors	No special measures
Calais	External insulation; refuse disposal system	New entrances for high rise + new doors	No special measures
Béthune	Heat and sound insulation ext. paint; minor internal	Reconditioned; new letter boxes	No special measures except basements sealed
Grande Synthe	Very extensive internal & external;	Reconditioned; new entrances;	Some entryphones in stairs
Brent	Walkway demolition; new front doors	New entrances and doors	Better entryphones; concierge; lighting
Islington	Walkway demolition; new estate layouts	Extensive remodelling to make secure and homely	Concierge as basis for entry to estate; lights
Wandsworth	Much: walkws dem; refuse lifts; ext. paint; windows	Remodelled; bigger but number reduced;	Entryphones; new layout for access
Manchester	Decapitaion; + internal and external improvements	Tower entrances improved	Security guard/camera system
Salford	Decapitation; roofs; paint; heating; internal in towers	Minor improvements in towers	Extensive: concierge /cameras; entryphones
Wigan	Decapitation; insulation; new roofs; heating	Enclosed and remodelled	Entryphones in blocks

Table 6.10: Key Rehabilitation Objectives of Programme (part 1)



	Environment	Change of Use	Comments/Other
Chanteloup	Large murals; some tree & shrub planting	None, despite city pressure	Heat cost ↓50% Disputed worst blocks; HLM won.
Meaux	Paths & greeneen areas work; play areas improved	One barre demolished; one part use as offices	Demo/newbuild/offices is main change
Stains	Vivid building colours; murals; trees; play area	None, as voids not a problem	Heat/insul. costs ↓ 50% New circulation plan
Calais	Large ground mosaic; patchy tree and shrub planting	Two blocks demolished, and newbuild replacement	No consultation in the limited works;
Béthune	Landscaping; road/paths layout; sleeping policemen	3 blocks demolished; 3 change to offices	Limited involvement in programme
Grande Synthe	Extensive planting; now award winning town	1132 homes demolished; also some offices	Also remodelling to provide bigger flats
Brent	Little planned	None planned	Now new plans for total transformation
Islington	Landscaping; street furniture; play equip	None planned	Works oriented to security problem
Wandsworth	Extensive; trees; grassed areas; sole/joint gardens	Massive sales drive launched	Programme partly funded from sales
Manchester	Extensive: private gardens; fences & paths; adjcnt land	None	Central security system control; c/t assist
Salford	Individ. gardens; trees, green areas improved	Demolition; disposal to institution; singls blk	Concentrate tenants in viable blocks
Wigan	Sole & shared gardens; trees; paths; dem. sheds	Disposal for conversion and rent/sale	Tower blocks demol: land sold for O/occ

**Table 6.11: Key Rehabilitation Objectives of Programme (part 2)**



### Environmental:

With the exception of Brent, improvements to the green areas and open spaces were also part of the objectives of all estates. There were a large variety of types of improvement. Layouts of paths and circulation areas were common in French estates, to create more secure pedestrian areas away from traffic; changed layouts to provide additional security were more common in the UK. The creation of identified garden areas was common in the UK; and the creation of more communal areas for sitting, or for children to play more common in France. Tree and shrub planting was universal, and the removal of unsightly external buildings (sheds, garages, and so on) occurred in both countries. There were also estates (Wigan, Meaux) where the provision of these environmental improvements was used as an opportunity to create some local jobs and training.

### **Summary**

The specific rehabilitation solutions to be adopted were not specified in the original national programmes, but in fact common solutions were adopted on many estates, reflecting common problems (and also reflecting the choice of sites). Shared approaches aimed at improving the image of the estate included staircase and entrance improvements, and environmental works to the green and open spaces. Improvements to heating, refuse systems, and lifts were common.

There were also clear differences of emphasis reflecting national perceptions of the problems. French estates focused more on thermal and sound insulation, and planning significant changes to the external appearance of the estate. UK estates emphasised crime prevention measures in the form of entryphones and concierge schemes, seldom seen in France.



## **Non Housing Objectives**

Brief mention of these provides useful background to the housing strategy, and its evaluation, set out in Tables 12 and 13.

### Image, and Isolation

Most of the estates had a general aim of transforming the image of the estate. In France this was usually more explicit stated in these terms; in the UK it was implicit in other actions. This objective was to be attained through the other parts of the programme: the rehab programme, the attempts to establish a more mixed population.

Physical isolation was also stated as being important in the French estates. This was partly because of the real physical isolation of the French estates - although the definition of the problem was wide, and included isolation from the employment, cultural, and other general benefits which were available elsewhere in the city.

There is also a more general problem of the quality of general services on estates. In Brent, Chanteloup, Stains, Manchester, and other estates, local services were denied, including deliveries or credit agreements. There was also a tendency for criminal activity to be drawn to the estate, latterly particularly drugs.

Amongst the strategies attempted to combat image and isolation problems, one involved attracting business to the estate (tried by Meaux, Grande Synthe, and Béthune). The idea here was that if an individual from outside worked on the estate, they would see that it was not as bad as its reputation, and improving. This worker would then talk to friends about the estate, and through this better message being spread some of those friends might be inclined to put down the estate on an application for housing. By this roundabout route a wider group of applicants and tenants might be attracted to the estate. The second aspect of this was that when businesses saw that there were other successful businesses operating on the estate they might be less hostile to employing estate residents, or providing services. For example in Meaux the successful persuasion of a major savings bank to open a branch



in one of the office conversions in a block was seen as a breakthrough, as it was felt that it was a major selling point to attract other firms.

### Insertion

The different approach of the DSQ and EA programmes to "insertion" of "excluded" tenants has already been set out. The case studies confirmed that the French estates all included this in their overall programmes as a key aim; but it was an incidental extra in the UK. A further issue worth noting here is the attention paid to sports facilities and programmes in the DSQ. The provision of sports halls or grounds was an important part of trying to integrate the adolescents in many estates (Chanteloup, Meaux, Stains, Béthune); this was complemented by major programmes of sports activities during the long summer holidays, which complemented the programmes of camping and country holidays which has been a feature of French Social Security for some time (for example "colonies", or childrens camps, paid for by the Family Allowances Board [CAF])

### Economic

Economic objectives were present in both countries, as expected. There were often problems encouraging businesses to set up on or near the estates, because of their image of crime, of poverty, of ill trained and inadequate residents. Explicit strategies were devised to combat this. A *régie de quartier* was created in Meaux, and one planned in Calais. These represented means to involve the residents in the estate, as well as provide training and employment opportunities. This was reflected in the CRS scheme in Wigan. In Chanteloup the expansion of the industrial and commercial base of the village was one of the most important measures being pursued by the town hall, and the construction of a new industrial estate and several hundred jobs was a key achievement. Grande Synthe and Béthune aimed to create new job opportunities with aid to business and tenants; Calais had a job club to help with locating and applying for jobs.



In the UK the involvement of business was generally restricted to initiatives for small scale local enterprise, for example in converted garages (Wandsworth), or the encouragement of better shops on the estate. The links to employment and retraining actions was stressed much more in the later Estate Action guidelines and programmes, and most estates making applications recently have had to demonstrate initiatives in this area, including programmes designed to assist tenants prepare for and find jobs. The overall responsibilities for stimulating jobs, and for assisting unemployed people to find and fill them are, however, within the remit of the departments of Trade and of Employment, not of Environment (e.g. DTI Task Forces, or DE Employment Action, Youth Training, or Enterprise programmes). This distinction was more clearly marked during the case study years, prior to the Action for Cities programme.

### **Summary**

Evidence from the French estates reflects the DSQ national focus on the physical and social isolation of estates. Equally, as anticipated, the DSQ estates involved a more comprehensive programme than EA, with sports, employment, and other initiatives. Comparisons are most difficult in relation to these wider non housing issues, however, due to the very different contexts and national programme objectives.



	Image	Isolation	Insertion
Chanteloup	To be changed through rehab	Better integration to village	Social and cultural programmes; reduce density
Meaux	Key aim; attract different residents	Offices to make people come - then say "better"	Régie; many groups inc. for Malian women; Social centre
Stains	Total transformation and individualisation	Key objective; 2 new entrances to city;	Key objective; new support services esp. youth/ethnic
Calais	One of key aims, but few concrete plans	Anti exclusion measures mainly social/health	Educational/training, womens & health centres, et al
Béthune	Key aim; also change resident stucture	City aim: offices to mix people; new link to town	Now a Régie; sports; infants medical & food; elderly
Grande Synthe	Key objective; also change social mix	New city centre; environmental works	Extensive: health, kids, culture, social, education
Brent	No clear plans	No plans	New plans being prepared
Islington	Not a problem	Not a problem	No plans; not a problem
Wandsworth	Key objective; via sales and environment	Not a problem, except socially	Leisure, health, family, police, economic plans
Manchester	Extensive remodelling, landscaping	Regenerate existing comm & attract new tenants	No extensive plans
Salford	Key aim: to be tackled corporately	Not a problem	No specific measures; improved services and social services
Wigan	Aim of transformation incl. by tenure mix	No initiatives - not major problem	Credit union; wlfare rights advice

Table 6.12: Key Non Housing Objectives of Programme (part 1)



	Economic	Comments/Other
Chanteloup	New industrial estate built opposite estate	Also new sports centre and educational measures
Meaux	Régie for local residents; econ. initiative centre	Fully integrated programme with DSQ/HLM sharing initiatives; followed poor HVS programme
Stains	Limited action	Continued commitment from architect team throughout.
Calais	Youth training; job clubs	Programme changed direction - reassessment after first year. Main programmes were non housing
Béthune	Youth ed. in new tech; job creation; new comerc. cntr	City clear that social/economic isolation from rest of city to be changed; citywide programme
Grande Synthe	Action committee; new units & aid to business	Estate part of wider city initiative of total change; tenure diversity also an aim
Brent	Some local off estate initiatives	Main focus of programme has been on security (concierge) and on new local office
Islington	No plans	Estate security problems main issue
Wandsworth	Local workshops built; new commerce attracted	Also provided bay windows on request Exterior of blocks/wlkws colourful
Manchester	Economic projects on estate	Reducing density also objective; special works in towers (for rain pen.). Long programme
Salford	No special plans, tho development area near	Community development and expanded commercial centre part of corporate approach
Wigan	CRS for local training /jobs on estate	Many thriving local groups operate from local office

Table 6.13: Key Non Housing Objectives of Programme (part 2)



## What happened?

Tables 6.19 - 6.21 set out a summary of the main outcomes of the programmes. A summary of changes to the key indicators of voids, arrears, stock changes and so on is provided at table 6.22.

One key underlying factor to the outcomes was the political support offered by the French city councils in relation to the programmes. This is seen most prominently in Chanteloup, Meaux, Béthune, and Grande Synthe in France, where the commitment of the mayor and the city council was instrumental in ensuring that the programme continued to make progress. This was important for two reasons. First, the support of the elected mayor could assist the project manager considerably in ensuring that the programme was kept moving. More importantly, however, the commitment of the mayor ensured that resources could continue to be diverted from other parts of the city to the estate in difficulty. One of the main underlying problems for these estates, as noted already, was underinvestment. The need for the city to pay its share of the costs of the DSQ programme could be politically difficult. Residents of more affluent areas of town could easily consider that any money spent on difficult estates was simply wasted. Furthermore the votes to be gathered on difficult estates were disproportionately low, as few residents voted, compared to the more participative middle classes. The ruling party therefore took a risk by supporting the DSQ works. This was particularly evident in Béthune, where there was an explicit campaign of public persuasion to explain why resources were being diverted to the estate. The contrast can be made with the support for housing works in Calais. There the absence of such continuity of support led to a failure to carry out many of the necessary works, and a general underachievement of the housing programme (despite a more successful social programme).

This is not so much an issue in the UK. Wandsworth benefited from the borough administration supporting estate transformation for disposal as leasehold; and Wigan had a similar commitment to stock reduction. All authorities had to provide matching HIP funds for the EA works (normally 50%), and to that extent had to deny resources to other estates - but this appeared to be less of a problem than in France,



as decisions were hidden in housing department overall programmes which excited less public interest.

### Physical and Environmental Works

With two exceptions (Brent and Calais) extensive physical changes were implemented to the buildings and estates. Some estates were transformed in their outward appearance, or were remodelled, as noted above (Wigan and Manchester with decapitation; Wandsworth, Stains, Chanteloup, and Béthune, with external changes). These changes were clearly permanent. Meaux also achieved some changes with the demolition of one "barre", and the construction of new family homes in the centre of the estate, although the massive presence of the remaining blocks still dominates the site. Equally Salford achieved some changes with limited decapitation, but remains dominated by the overwhelming presence of the other towers and blocks. In this respect Wigan was fortunate that the need to demolish its towers for technical reasons provided the opportunity to alter the balance of the estate, and following the decapitation and demolition works, the estate is utterly different in appearance from its former self. Most estates had also done works to the stairwells and common parts.

The extent of the demolition or reduction of available stock for social renting (by sales or change of use) is one of the most striking overall outcomes, already noted above, with half losing over 25%.

Improvements in the greens and general environment have had a more limited impact. The difficulties of designing and managing internal and peripheral open space on estates is evident from the case studies. Dealing with land adjacent to blocks presented least problems: extensive enclosing of gardens for individual flats in blocks, or as communal garden space, has had a marked effect on those areas of the site - and some of the work here was very imaginative and visually striking (such as in Salford, and Wandsworth).



The large open spaces between blocks present an altogether more intractable problem, however. Generally new paths, play areas, planting boxes and trees, and seats have been provided. These are very vulnerable to vandalism and disfigurement by graffiti, and damage to young trees and shrubs is common. They also require high investment in maintenance which is not always forthcoming.

Even more of a problem is that of the peripheral spaces, leading in some cases to extended derelict land from old industrial sites or intended but unbuilt housing developments. Surrounding land problems are present in Calais, which is surrounded by the cleared sites of previous temporary housing, Stains which has an unused building site, and Manchester, which has derelict former industrial sites. Meaux, Chanteloup, Béthune and Wigan have sites which are bounded only by fences, leading on to farm land or scrub land outside the estate. This problem has not been resolved satisfactorily on any of the case study estates.

The overall problem with these physical and environmental improvements is their "fragile" nature, an expression much used in France, indicating that they improvement can quickly and easily be reversed by vandalism or lack of maintenance. Improvements such as new heating systems are lasting in their benefit. Many others, however, involve changes to the appearance or presentation of the estate, and are open to deterioration, which can be very rapid if fast and effective maintenance and repair works are not carried out. In both countries, however, there appeared, and was reported, to be an insufficient level of investment in the maintenance needed to ensure that the rehabilitation works remain in good condition on many of the estates. This was a theme which was returned to again and again in discussion on the French estates. This was particularly true in relation to improvement to entrances and staircases.

In certain cases the maltreatment of the improvements has begun in the stairs and moved out into the estate as a whole, part of a creeping destruction of the improvements made. In Calais, the improvements to the external cladding panels, and installation of insulation, had to be supplemented by additional strengthening



brickwork at the lower floor levels -basically to the height beyond which adolescents could not throw panel cracking large stones. In Stains the DSQ team counted 2 years of maintained good treatment as a success, but were finding that after that, the initial petty vandalism tended to deteriorate to more destructive degradation. In Salford and Manchester the problem of degradation was almost immediately apparent in certain blocks, although in others (mainly those with particularly good caretakers and stable populations) there was an opposite trend, that of increased personalisation of the block by mats, notice boards, pictures, and the like. In many estates, particularly in the UK, there was an immediate problem with the security systems, which were often subjected to deliberate destruction fairly soon after installation.

### Management Changes

At the conclusion of the case study visits, all estates except Calais had local offices operating. There was evidence (from both improvements in the key indicators and from consistent comments of key agents) of distinct improvements in Chanteloup and Stains (which could not have got much worse), and in Meaux, Wandsworth, Salford, and Wigan. There were also limited improvements in Islington, mainly in relation to the wider borough programmes of service improvements, and in Manchester.

In relation to staff training and attitudes, the intention to provide better training and a better understanding of problems has had varying success. In some estates (for example Meaux, Wandsworth, Wigan, and Stains) there was a team commitment to the improved management of the estate, and to working together with the wider programme of assistance and improvement. Elsewhere, however, it was less clear that this intended attitude change had not taken root. This was particularly so on some French estates (Béthune, Grande Synthe, Calais)., where certain prejudiced attitudes seemed little changed.

In two cases (Chanteloup and Stains) a change of ownership just prior to the programme starting, from a totally mismanaged and incompetent previous HLM,



enabled the introduction of more effective systems for monitoring of rents, arrears, voids, and repairs. In one other case (Brent) there was a continuing failure to establish basic information about the occupancy of the estate, and to provide basic services, which made the job of the estate staff extremely difficult. It was clear that the effective operation of basic administrative and physical services was essential before the intended changes in staff attitudes and performance could take effect. In addition, sometimes the attempts to provide a better service were frustrated by poor delivery of basic services, such as estate and street cleaning, housing benefit, and repairs.

There were sometimes conflicts between the housing staff and other participants in the wider programme over the relative importance of various of the key financial indicators. DSQ project managers or staff often accused the HLMs of being too obsessed with the achievement of financial targets for voids and arrears, suggesting that policy decisions about improvements were often too influenced by financial considerations. This was so in Stains, where changes in the improvement package followed the HLM revising its willingness to invest so heavily in the estate; and in Chanteloup and Béthune where the need to keep expenditure down had severely reduced the available budget to maintain the improvements, to the concern of the DSQ team. There was little doubt that many of the improvements in staffing and training in France had also aimed, as in the UK, to ensure better income generation on the estate.

The emphasis on the new caretaking training and role was welcomed in most estates in France, and on most of the estates discussion with the caretakers provided a wealth of information about the estate, its residents, and the HLM, indicating their involvement in the job and estate. It appeared that the new "social" role, including intervening in neighbour disputes or handling some low level arrears cases, was being managed on the basis of the intimate day to day knowledge of the blocks which the caretakers had built up from being resident and always present inspecting the blocks. These changes appeared in most cases to have produced a high level of commitment from the caretakers involved, and a reasonable level of service to tenants. This was



the case in only 2 of the UK estates; on two of the other estates the role of caretakers was being reduced; and on the final two it was left as a minor aspect of management.

The use in the UK of concierge staff, and their relation to caretakers, was the one of the least successful aspect of management changes. In none of the four estates which had concierge schemes was the system being run successfully, although Islington had many fewer problems than the others. Apart from a variety of technical problems, the management arrangements appeared generally unsatisfactory, with changes in staff frequent, disputes between caretaking and concierge staff frequent, and a belief in the worth of the systems noticeably absent from almost all agents involved, except sometimes in Islington. This is not to say that the other systems could not be made to work. It was clearly the case, however, that the improvement brought to the estates were very limited at the time of my visits.

Brent (where there had been several attempts to provide different types of security system, all of which had failed on the estate) illustrates best a further underlying problem. The systems relied on the cooperation of the vast majority of the tenants in the block before it would work. Where there was a minority, even a small minority, who did not wish the scheme to work, then it could not be made to work. Only Wandsworth had a system of entryphones which seemed sufficiently robust to have withstood any period of use. The French estates with entryphones seemed to have fewer problems with them. Some of them were out of use, but generally they seemed to be less vandalised than in the UK.

### Participation

Tenant consultation was realised most fully in Stains, where the local architectural practice devised many different approaches including events for children - who would report back to their parents - building of models and exhibitions, and stair by stair evaluations of improvements already made in other blocks. Despite this, the continuing participation of residents in local groups was low. Chanteloup and Meaux



also achieved reasonable participation, and have continued this into various associations and groups. Elsewhere in France the participation of residents was not fully achieved as intended.

Manchester achieved the most participation in the UK, where each tenant was sent a set of plans, and both block and individual discussions were held. Here again, however, as in Stains, the level of continuing participation was very low. Wandsworth, Wigan, and Salford appear to have achieved reasonable levels of participation in local groups, while Islington and Brent remain with less than intended.

The general picture, then, is of limited participation in about half of the estates, despite the national intention to make this central to the programmes. Participation and citizenship is explored in Delarue (1991) who notes that the weak presence of residents associations in France can perhaps be explained by the fact that the previous community leaders were the often the more organised and unionised working class tenants, sometimes militant organisers; but these households have now fled the estates. The associations have therefore become less and less able to present the case for the residents, and have increasingly become groups to provide support and aid to specific disadvantaged groups. This failure of associations extends to a general failure to participate in the local political life, and press the case for the estate residents at that level. This is a problem as in many cities the local political structures have not responded adequately to the needs of these estates.

### Wider Programme

As expected, the coordinated achievements which could be identified here are mainly in France. In Calais the achievements of the wider social programme are the main positive aspects of the programme, in contrast to a much more limited housing changes. In several cases there were very strong links between the Town Hall, DSQ team, and HLM (particularly Stains, Grande Synthe, Meaux, and Béthune). The benefits of these partnerships were frequently mentioned by agents as positive and novel aspects of the DSQ programme and process. Much was achieved on these



estates - extensive economic stimulation aimed at jobs on the estate in Chanteloup and Meaux, a very comprehensive training, employment, and cultural programme in Grande Synthe, extensive assistance to immigrant tenants in Meaux. There were major proposals and plans in Stains, although they have yet to be achieved. Indeed the physical improvement works in Stains and Béthune were recognised at the end of the first DSQ programme period to have been achieved at the cost of not paying sufficient attention to the more social aspects of the overall programme.

In the UK, by contrast, there were generally indifferent achievements of the interdepartmental working plans. Most was achieved in Wandsworth and Salford, although in both cases there remained tensions. Islington has a formal programme of integrated neighbourhood services, which coordinated action relating to the estate. Brent and Manchester had limited success in introducing new practices. It is, however, much harder to make a reasonably based judgement in relation to this issue, as it would have required reviewing the programmes of other council departments, and looking at the comparative achievements in their fields, which was not done.

### Population Strategies

Contrary to the national and local intentions, only two estates had achieved a significant change in the population which lived there at the end of the programme. Wandsworth had introduced two key changes already mentioned: first that only people who actively wished to move onto the estate could join the waiting list - including and particularly friends and relatives of existing residents; and second that this would be supplemented by extensive sales of flats on the estate, providing (it was believed) a wider pool of people who would be committed to improving the estate. Wigan had adopted a programme of redevelopment by housing associations and private sector builders which had led to a large influx of owners and housing association tenants - although there were some problems with the new owner occupiers building a "Berlin Wall" round their part of the estate.

In contrast, most of the French programmes to socially engineer a change in population of the estates appeared to have failed. The attempts to attract other



tenants of a more "desirable" character were generally unsuccessful, as only the poorest remained willing to take the flats. This is a very significant failure, as it reflects the views of Figeat at the end of the HVS programme, as well as the views of Delarue (set out in Chapter 3): - there is no evidence that a mix of tenants can be in fact attracted to live on these estates as they are at present. This is reflected in the UNFOHLM report on population strategies (UNFOHLM(1992)), which also concludes that the focus should be to improving services for existing residents, not simply seeking to "dilute" their presence with new, more stable, households, who will not come.

The Wandsworth/Wigan approach is beginning to be implemented on some of the other estates. In Meaux there was still the hope that "better" tenants could be attracted to the estate, with the demolition of one long block and construction of new HLM family homes being seen as a new opportunity. Equally in Béthune there is a continuing hope that the continuing popularity of the better part of the estate may move over to the neglected section following the extension of some new building. Similar hopes were behind the proposals for large scale redevelopment in Brent through a HAT, to import middle income households, although this has not been agreed for implementation.

### **Expenditure**

The table over indicates summary information on the levels of capital expenditure. The "cost per home" figures here and in the case studies refer to the cost per remaining total number of original social rented homes on the estate at the programme end.

The France/UK comparison is not straightforward. There is a general problem of what to count as part of the DSQ/EA programme, and what to count as part of the regular capital investment in the estate. Salford, Wandsworth, and Manchester, for example, are cases where all related capital expenditure on the estate, which was part of the programme, has been included, as the choice to make that investment was presented to me as being part total integrated improvement programme. Time



is another problem - Wandsworth, Manchester, and Stains had sustained programmes lasting over 7 years, which increased their totals. There are also the wider problems of comparability of exchange rate values and building costs. In the figures below, all costs are in £UK.

The overall comparisons are:

	France	UK
Unit Cost: all expenditure	5,217	9,923
Unit cost: EA/DSQ expenditure	1,374	1,798

**Table 6.14** Comparative Unit Costs, UK/France, all case study schemes

It is worth repeating here the national table set out in Chapter 5 for all Estate Action/DSQ expenditure:

	France (£)	UK (£)
All investment/unit	5,273	(3,452) <sup>1</sup>
Central investment/unit	1,340	1,726

**Table 6.15:** Comparison of Unit Cost Expenditure, UK/France

Sources: EA figures; 148 Quartiers (DIV 1990)

Note 1.: This figure is an crude estimate, assuming simply 50% on top of EA funds.

These tables show that the average expenditures nationally are very similar to the case study averages, suggesting the case studies are not unrepresentative.

The figures suggest a similar level of government investment through the programmes; and a high level of additional investment from other sources. The total investment in certain of the UK estates is considerably higher than my original estimate, reflecting investment of additional HIP and proceeds of sales. This shows that my crude estimate of 50% on top of EA funding is too low, and that the average total investment from all sources is probably nearer to the French figure.



The Wandsworth investment of sales receipts, and the Salford and Manchester long term HIP programmes, are similarly to the large scale city investment in Béthune and Grande Synthe. The considerable variations between these high spending schemes and the others can be seen by comparing first these 2 highest spending French estates with the in the UK, then comparing these high spending schemes with the rest:

	France	UK
Unit Cost: all expenditure	6,208	12,080
Unit cost: EA/DSQ expenditure	1,467	2,022

**Table 6.16:** Comparative Unit Costs: UK/France, highest spending case study schemes

The comparative figures for the other 7 estates are:

	France	UK
Unit Cost: all expenditure	3,978	2,527
Unit cost: EA/DSQ expenditure	1,258	1,270

**Table 6.17:** Comparative Unit Costs: UK/France, rest of case study schemes

This illustrates that the levels of DSQ investment are not greatly dissimilar between the highest and the lower cost schemes, but that there is a greater variation in EA spend. This in fact is reflected in the national figures (not quoted here), which show major variations between some very high spending schemes and other small scale low spend estates. The different levels of top up funding leads to a further difference, almost double the total investment in the higher spend French schemes, and four times more in the UK. I would not claim that this pattern would be repeated nationally in exactly these proportions; but the figures clearly indicate that there is a wider range of additional funding contributed by other agencies in the course of some of these schemes.



	Housing Cost	Cost/home	EA/DSQ paid	Comments
Chanteloup	5.2m	2,340	2.4m	1.9m from Region; 800 voids untouched pending decision
Meaux	5m	3,570	1.3m	
Stains	22m	10,000	5.2m	Cost reflects priority given to rehabilitation
Calais	2.8m	3,000	0.8m	Non housing programme higher investment at 3.3m
Béthune	5.85m	5,960	1.42m	
Grande Synthe	14.2m	5,000	3.4m	Represents investment and changes on ZUP
Brent	2.2m	1,300	1.1m	
Islington	2.4m	6,700	1.2m	
Wandsworth	23m	23,900	3.3m	Costs divided amongst leasehold flats also; large contribution from proceeds of sales
Manchester	48m	17,100	7.4m	Remaining funds from HIP, over 10 years
Salford	14.3m	4,746	3.58	Remaining funding from HIP
Wigan	3m	3,160	1.5m	

Table 6.18: Summary of Expenditure

Notes: 1."Cost/home" means total cost per remaining social rented home at the end of the programme.



## Summary

The main general conclusions above could not generally be anticipated from expectations based on the national programme set out in previous chapters, and are that:

- physical works programmes were generally achieved as planned, and represented general successes. Spend had been closely monitored by the funding bodies. Many improvements on estates were to entrances and stairwells.
- the prevalence of demolition and change of use as a solution was more than might have been expected. The dramatic loss of stock, and the root and branch solutions like decapitation, provided a radical approach which served to remove the underlying problem of unpopular stock.
- the most prominent changes to the remaining stock were those involving fundamental transformation of the appearance of the estate, such as in Chanteloup or Stains, or those involving extensive remodelling, such as Wigan or the decapitation works.
- many of the physical improvements, particularly to common parts such as stairwells, are already subject to vandalism and disrepair
- there was a clear concentration by landlord organisations on income generation and key financial indicators such as voids and arrears. These benefits were a major motivation for cooperation with the programme.
- there was an emphasis on crime and crime prevention measures on the UK estates which was not present in the original statement of the EA programme, although it appeared in later guidelines. This was reflected not only in Islington, but also in the concierge and entryphone schemes. These improvements were not common in France, which had anti delinquency programmes instead. The UK measures seemed to be marked by unresolved problems in management of the concierge schemes; and general lack of success including deliberate damage by residents. Much of the money seemed to have been wasted, as the schemes depended critically on a level of commitment to the schemes by the residents which was not forthcoming. It



may well be that on other estates these types of scheme work well - but not on these ones.

- many estates still have problems with open spaces around estates; although the land near blocks in many UK estates has been made into private or restricted access space. This was not identified as a priority in the original programmes, but emerged as a continuing issue.

- the general programme commitment to decentralised management and local control indicated that this was an accepted strategy, rather than an innovative approach. All estates except one now have a local management office. The continuing to promotion of the decentralised model did not present landlord organisations with a new approach, but one they would have most likely adopted in any case.

- there is commonly a more socially oriented role promoted for caretakers in France; and this is seen as central to the new management approach. However the continuing level of antagonism and prejudice against tenants on the part of French estate staff was surprising. There were more specific programmes of training for these staff than in the UK, and this seemed to reflect a need.

- the French estates all exhibited the programmes for provoking changes in the population structure which the DSQ method had suggested; and none of them had worked. These programmes were absent in the UK, except in Wandsworth and Wigan, which had initiated considerable tenure changes. This approach appeared to emerge as the only successful method of producing tenure mix.

- the difficulties encouraging tenant participation were greater than would be suggested by the emphasis on this in the original programme structure. There was some evidence that concerted efforts would bring about some participation in discussions about improvements - though only where this was done by imaginative and flexible initiatives. The general participation levels in tenants associations following completion of works appeared to be either limited or declining, however.



- there is a high level of additional investment on certain estates, supplementing the main programme contributions; this results in some estates having considerably higher overall expenditure, sometimes due to longer term investment programmes.

As a further summary measure, table 6.22 provides a summary of the main indicators at the end of the programmes. It is constructed on the basis of indicating whether there has been an improvement, or a deterioration, in the indicators. Again I have not tried to put a quantitative value on the change - rather to provide a general indication. This is based both on available figures and on my analysis of agent's views. Judgements on the indicators of image, crime, management, and participation are based on information from, and views of, key agents, and in some cases certain published reports. Some brief comments on each of the columns are below. Detailed figures to support the estimation of trends is to be found in the case studies themselves.

Voids: generally this was a success area, with either improvements or significant improvements in 7 out of the 8 estates where this was a problem.

Arrears: was also generally an area of success, with only 2 estates showing declines.

Turnover: is a measure which partly represents the popularity of estates, partly the opportunities for mobility, and partly the development of a more stable community. Generally there were reductions in the rate of turnover, which many agents indicated had indeed lead to more stable communities.

Image: in some cases appeared to be better - in the two UK cases the greatest changes in image were associated with the massive restructuring of tenure (Wandsworth) or of buildings (Wigan) on the estate; and in the French estates with extensive physical restructuring and the introduction of various changes of use.



Crime: The crime problems perceived to exist on estates were seldom much improved. Wandsworth and Wigan benefited from a change of image which extended to a reduced crime rate; equally Islington had concentrated entirely on this issues, and its improvement here is not surprising. Meaux did not start with much of a crime problem. Elsewhere the changes are not very positive, and the increasing crime on some of the estates is compounding the difficulties in making lasting improvements.

Tenure: The changes here are mainly a reflection of the right to buy policy in the UK, although Grande Synthe encouraged some improvement for sale.

Stock size: This column sets out the other most marked similarity of approach. The sizable reductions in stock - 25% and over in half of the estates - represents a concerted effort to reduce the density of population and the concentration of unpopular flats.

Management: This columns presents a summary of whether effective changes to the general housing management arrangements have been made. The changes have been discussed already above.

Participation: This represents an indication of whether there has been more or been less active participation in tenants associations or other community associations. It will be seen that, as discussed above, there are few estates where improvements have occurred.

Overall: This is the least precise and well founded collum, representing an overall judgement and assessment on my part. It is intended to indicate whether most of the major aims of the programme have been achieved, and the general overall assessment of agents, although I have not resorted to any weighted formula to arrive at the judgement, so it should be treated with caution.



	Physical Works	Environment
Chanteloup	Extensive rehab, 1,400 homes extern; but extensive degradations; worst block left	General improvements achieved; but blighted block still detracts
Meaux	Extensive external achieved; also good repairs service established; "fragile"	Gen. improvement; + implantation of newbuild & offices; still massive
Stains	7 tranche of rehab achieved; still fair condition, but fragile after 2 years	Transformation of appearance and look; lasting effect
Calais	Limited impact of works; much degradation quickly followed	Little general improvement, though pockets; unwanted mosaic
Béthune	Extensive works achieved on estate and linking to city; but rapid deterioration	General improvement including layout
Grande Synthe	Extensive works achieved, including newbuild; remain popular/good condition	Lasting transformation of town into prize winning "flower city"
Brent	Very limited, mainly security; soon degraded.	Very limited works; little improvement
Islington	Security works mainly; achieved to high standard and maintained	Generally achieved proposals, though limited improvement
Wandsworth	Extensive works achieved; mainly lasting improvements	Considerable, varied, and imaginative improvements
Manchester	Considerable achievement of works; pockets deteriorating	Improvements around blocks; peripheries remain poor
Salford	Extensive improvements achieved; pockets deteriorating	Improvements, particularly creating gardens; large spaces unchanged
Wigan	Extensive changes and improvements; lasting	Considerable and imaginative improvements

Table 6.19: Outcomes of Programme (part 1)



	Management Changes	Continuing Participation
Chanteloup	Much improved; but HLM still suspected of lack of commitment; repairs still poor	Despite recent riots, 20 flourishing local organisations
Meaux	Now excellent local service with varied response; excellent DSQ cooperation	Many local associations catering for diverse groups
Stains	Much improved; caretaking-social service excellent; commitment to improvements	Remains low; particular problems with adolescents
Calais	No improvements; most plans for new management not done; poor caretaking	Remains low; better participation in DSQ special health/other groups
Béthune	Some improvements introduced, but many not fully taken root	Low throughout, and continues low; clear failure of programme
Grande Synthe	Despite changes basic attitudes remain often unsympathetic; repairs poor	Low throughout; new methods being tried
Brent	Limited improvement despite additional local office; concierge failed	Low; unrepresentative
Islington	Limited changes; but unresolved conflicts of concierge/caretaking/housing	Remains low
Wandsworth	Much improved local service with keen staff	Good response to consultation, continued in associations
Manchester	Same local service remains; better caretaking, but problems with concierge	Remains low
Salford	Improved team in local office; better caretaking; problems with concierge	Improved, particularly in relation to future developments
Wigan	Much improved; coordinated service	Reasonable - improved

Table 6.20: Outcomes of Programme (part 2)



	Wider Programme	Population
Chanteloup	Extensive economic stimulation; provision of new facilities; much achieved actively	Remains unchanged - poor, excluded - but stable
Meaux	Economic initiatives generally working; continuing social/education programme	Remains unchanged; attempts to export poor/ import new failed
Stains	Slower progress than physical works; now new programme;	Remains main problem as seen by agents; now drugs increasing
Calais	Main success of programme, following revised priorities (c.f. with HLM progme)	Unchanged; remains poor and unemployed
Béthune	Slower progress than physical works; now recognised as important for next progrme.	Remains poor and unemployed; little change
Grande Synthe	Totally integrated to town hall; econ, culture, education, etc., all achieved	Unchanged; increasing poverty
Brent	Little coordinated action	Unchanged; worse in some towers due to disruptive illegal occs
Islington	Coordination of all services achieved from neighbourhood office - not EA prog	Unchanged, but not seen as problematic
Wandsworth	Patchy interdepartmental working	Now mainly those who wish to live on the estate
Manchester	Limited programme; minor improvements	Now stabilised and retained; but no changes overall to new tenants
Salford	Commitment to multi disciplinary/ inter departmental approach; but limited action	Generally similar; continuing problems with unstable tower ten
Wigan	Limited, mainly via local office and CRS	Rump of estate population; plus new renters and owners

Table 6.21: Outcomes of Programme (part 3)



	Voids	Arears	Turn-over	Image	Crime	Ten-ure	Stock size	Mana-gement	Partic-pation	Over-all
Chanteloup	+	+	=	=/-	=/-	=	=	+	++	+
Meaux	=	++	+	+	++	=	-24%	++	+	++
Stains	n/a	++	+	+	-	=	=	++	-	+
Calais	n/a	--	+	-	=/-	=	-9%	--	-	-
Béthune	++	+	+	+	=	=	-29%	+	--	+
Grande Synthe	-	+	+	+	n\a	+ o/o	-23%	+/=	-	+
Brent	+/=	=/-	-	-	-	=	=	=/-	-	-
Islington	n/a	n/a	n/a	=	+	RTB↑	=	=	=/-	+
Wandsworth	++	+	+	+	+	RTB35%	-36% <sup>a</sup>	+	+	++
Manchester	+	=	=	=	-	=	-20%	=	=/-	=
Salford	++	n/a	=	+	=	=	-2%	+	+	=
Wigan	++	+	++	+	+	RTB↑	-40%	+	+	++

**Table 6.22:** Outcomes of Programme (part 4): Summary and Main Indicators at End

**Notes:** In this table, improvements are indicated by +, deteriorations by -, no change by =. Where there is, for example a limited improvement, this is indicated by +/=, and a very slight improvement by =/+. RTB means sales under right to buy; n/a means the indicator was not a problem; o/o = owner occupation increased.

a. This reduction is mainly due to sales for leasehold, not demolition.



## Concluding Discussion

The case study estates illustrate how the Estate Action and DSQ programmes operated in practice; and the similarities and differences between countries.

Some objectives were shared between countries, and generally achieved

- focusing on estates with high levels of disadvantaged tenants
- focusing on estates with physical problems.
- planning and executing large programmes of physical works
- providing a local management office
- reducing voids
- reducing arrears
- reducing turnover

Others were both shared and generally not achieved:

- changing the population to produce social mix
- continuing participation
- environmental improvements in external peripheral areas
- maintaining the improvements intact
- reducing crime

Certain shared objectives emerged as important and successful, which would not have been expected from the description of the national programmes. These included:

- the unexpectedly high level of stock reductions
- the large scale estate remodelling works
- the attention to staircase and corridor improvements
- certain small scale environmental works close to blocks

There was also a striking similarity in the average expenditure patterns, and levels of additional contribution evident in some cases.



Certain measures were particular to one country, and in keeping with the different national objectives. In France the emphasis on partnership and comprehensive programmes was certainly evident and generally successful. The development of the caretaking role, fostering of associations for specific groups, and the introduction of offices and businesses to estates were also prominent and generally successful - despite the continuing hostile attitudes of some staff.

Similarly in the UK the additional emphasis on crime prevention was evident, as were the unresolved problems with concierge schemes. The absence of successful joint working reflected the low priority accorded this in the programme.

Overall, the underlying similarity of actions and approaches at the estate level was striking. Despite differing national programmes and contexts, the actions taken and priorities of agents were more often similar and parallel than they were contrasting.



## Chapter Seven: Synthesis and Concluding Discussion

This chapter draws together the material set out so far, in order to consider possible explanations for the various outcomes of the EA and DSQ programmes on difficult estates which have been set out in the preceding chapters; and to set out the overall conclusions of this thesis.

### **Origins of problem**

There are considerable differences between the organisations which provide social housing in the UK and France: the HLMs make provision for a much wider section of the housing market; and are not subject to the same legal obligations to provide for slum dwellers or homeless people. They are also differently structured and financed, lacking rent pooling, direct cash subsidies, universal means tested housing benefits, and direct political control. My concern has not been with the general structure of provision, however, but rather with the phenomenon of the difficult estate; and in fact these general differences provide an essential context within which is located a more similar set of problems than the differences of context might suggest.

The post war difficult estate is not really a product of the long and different traditions of social housing in France and the UK. Rather it is a product of the shared post war imperative to build quickly, cheaply, and in high numbers. Nonetheless the problems of difficult estates are not deterministically linked to estates of these types. In the UK there are inter war difficult estates, which share the general problem characteristics of the case study; equally there are many post war industrial construction estates which do not share the same difficulties. It is rather that there needs to be a combination of factors which come together to generate the problems of unpopularity, residualisation, and progressive decline which is seen in the case studies. These factors are similar in both countries.

The first of these factors is the physical state of the estate itself, as has been identified by many commentators. These include estate layout, with corridors and walkways; disrepair and repair problems which are difficult to remedy; problems



with services such as rubbish collection; heating services which are expensive and inadequate - frequently aggravated by poor heating (and sound) insulation. Sometimes there are problems with concentrations of flat types in individual blocks; often there are problems with the entrance halls or basement areas; usually there are problems with land in and around the blocks. These problems are normally expensive to remedy.

The second factor is the management of the estate. The post war building boom was not accompanied by an awareness of the need to manage the repair, maintenance, and social problems which were being created on the estates. This is not very surprising. In the UK the previous experience of slum clearance had not lead, in most cases, to major problems of housing management on new estates; equally in France there was little experience of management of mass housing of the scale being generated, and little anticipation of the problems. The new construction methods were generally untried, and the design and disrepair issues thrown up were not anticipated. This meant that the type of intensive management which was promoted in the DSQ/EA programmes was lacking, and problems were allowed to build up due to an initial lack of sensitivity to their presence. More than this, however, the case studies have shown that in many cases there was little effort made to take stock of the problems which arose, or to divert the necessary resources to tackle the problems. Rather it appeared that many HLMs, particularly, were content to leave the problems unattended.

This insensitivity was reflected in the third factor, the failure to carry out the necessary infrastructural works to accompany the construction of the homes themselves. This is particularly so in France, as the UK case study estates are mainly inner city; although the experience of the Glasgow overspill estates indicates that the problem was not confined to France. The isolation of estates from the mainstream of city opportunities for mobility, leisure activities, and indeed of travel to work or to shops, compounded the problems of estate unpopularity.



Equally important was a parallel policy initiative, the encouragement of low cost home ownership as the natural and desired tenure. In France this would often be done by some of the same personnel on HLM committees or staff, who were simultaneously promoting home ownership societies. In some cases they also moved certain of their more stable and better off households onto these new developments. In the UK there was the further impetus, in the 80s, of the right to buy, and although the problems of the difficult estates predate this policy, they were not made any easier by the reduction in choice of good council housing.

This positive pull of better off households to owner occupation was paralleled by a tendency, undoubtedly deliberate in some cases, to "dump" certain types of households on the difficult estates. Sometimes this was explicit, as in Chanteloup; sometimes an inevitable consequence of other policies, as with homeless households in the UK, or due to the housing benefit [APL] problem in France; sometimes it reflected indirect racial discrimination as has been shown in certain UK estates. The consequence was the same, to build up high densities of households with certain specific needs or difficulties, but then fail to take action to resolve the difficulties or meet the needs.

The final issue in many cases was the need to fill the empty properties with anyone who would pay rent. This is particularly so where there was a net surplus of housing in the area, such as in the provincial case study areas. It included the APL families in France, but also the same type of mobile young tenants as were frequently allocated homes in the UK.

Together, then, these factors lead to an estate which was unpopular with tenants, and was therefore difficult to let to anyone who had the choice of better accommodation in another estate or tenure. The need to provide rental income lead to the letting to high concentrations of households who had little other choice, but who did not like living there any more than the households who had managed to avoid it. This lack of choice was usually economically based, with the majority of



tenants unemployed or in low paid unskilled jobs. It was also based on racial and cultural prejudice against recent immigrants.

The presence of pockets of poor housing where there are high concentrations of low skilled households, and immigrants, is not new. The inner city areas of many older towns have always played this role, and the outer rings of third world cities continue to play this role in an explosive way. Neither is it a new phenomenon for landlord organisations to try to concentrate their problems in one place by "dumping" problems there. Why, then, was it considered necessary to take action to improve these estates? Why did the problems achieve the prominence they did?

### **The Need to Respond**

The governmental response to pockets of housing deprivation in the UK has been through the inner cities programme, which is not restricted to council estates, and of which EA is a part. Equally the DSQ programme aims to treat problems as a whole in a defined neighbourhood, which mainly, but not exclusively, comprises HLM accommodation. This suggests, rightly, that the underlying impetus which prompts the housing organisations to seek additional support lies beyond the housing management issues of arrears, voids, and disrepair.

This impetus reflected the underlying problems on estates. Whereas previously poor inner city areas could be treated by clearance, and in any case could be expected to provide a level of mobility for their residents to move out to regular employment and housing after a period, this was not so with the new estates. They were not candidates for slum clearance; but the level of investment by their landlords could make was insufficient to make them generally acceptable to a range of tenants. More importantly the tenants on the estates were increasingly "excluded": the changing labour market meant that they very often did not have the type of skills necessary to take up job opportunities which presented themselves even in periods of economic growth; the changing housing market, with its reduced emphasis on providing social housing (particularly in the UK with right to buy) meant that there was more limited mobility opportunities unless they had a job which would enable



them to move to owner occupation; and the increasing heterogeneity of the population, and its increasing level of social problems, meant that the opportunities for a supportive community declined, further undermined by the mobility of those employed militant blue collar workers who previously provided community leadership, since they had now also moved to owner occupation. In France this was complemented by a cultural and generational gap between immigrant households and their adolescent boys, in a stark manner not similarly seen in the UK. In both countries the drugs problem was also an increasing factor during the 80s. The cumulative effect was to produce estates where the main impression was of people being trapped, economically and in housing terms, as well as being politically, educationally, and socially disenfranchised. The problem was also progressively worsening from the early 80s.

Even this might not have been sufficient to divert resources from national and local budgets had it not been for the problems of crime and social unrest which drew attention to the estates. This was seen in the civil disturbances of the early 80s, and again in recent years, particularly in France where the urban problem has become one of the most pressing political issues. Equally in the UK there was the added dimension of reports suggesting that racial discrimination underlay certain of the allocations practices. The threat that the crime and disturbances on the difficult estates might spill over into other areas provoked action in the way the threat of cholera had stimulated a previous generation. The scale of the problems, and its depth and complexity, began to be understood<sup>1</sup>.

### **The Programmes**

The longer history of the UK programmes has lead to a much wider variety of programmes and objectives compared to the multi-agency DSQ/DIV programmes. This is reflected also in the fact that a large part of the DSQ activity involves the

---

<sup>1</sup>. Note in the UK during the 80s there was always a parallel high level governmental public presentation that the problems were not social and economic, but rather aspects of individual moral weakness, an attitude not presented in France.



coordination and unblocking of other programmes and funds; this role would naturally be played by the Local Authority itself in the UK, but frequently is not.

The programmes set out to tackle the key housing issues which have been set out above: estate condition were improved by substantial investment in physical rehabilitation, particularly in the common parts; new devolved management arrangements with better trained staff were introduced; better infrastructural provision and services were provided; attempts were made to tackle residualisation of the population by encouraging tenure mix or social engineering of allocations, as well as attempts to involve residents in the improvement works by participation exercises; and voids were tackled by a variety of imaginative solutions. These initiatives were increasingly linked to the underlying problems of crime and economic marginalisation: by security works in the UK, anti delinquency and youth work in France; and training and job linking initiatives in both countries. The underlying aims were to change the image of the estate (crucial if other residents were to be attracted to live there); animate the tenants (crucial if exclusion/marginalisation was to be overcome); and effectively channel resources and support to the estate, combatting the contrary pull of resources away from the "sink" areas (where they would be "wasted"), and combatting the natural bureaucratic departmentalism that worked against a coordinated approach. But which of these initiatives worked, and why?

### **The Positive Outcomes**

The physical works produced marked improvements in many cases. These improvements were very vulnerable to deterioration, however, particularly those made to entrances, stairwells, and corridors. The high levels of crime and vandalism meant that there needed to be a constant investment in high levels of maintenance if the standard of works achieved immediately post improvements were to be maintained - and this was frequently not budgeted for, or done. Equally although the physical image of the estate could be transformed, and often was, it proved much harder to change the social image unless more radical steps of estate and tenure restructuring were also undertaken, as is seen below.



Management changes were almost without exception successful. This is not surprising: the levels of management and commitment to quality management were almost totally lacking in most case studies, and so any kind of attention to management would be an improvement. The general recognition of the need for sensitive management of social housing was also a general phenomenon affecting most housing management, not just the difficult estates. Moreover the improvements made reflected the widespread move in the public services to both decentralisation and to a much greater level of consumer orientation. That these improvements were made owes as much to the change of general approach to public services and management as it does to the EA/DSQ processes. They brought considerable benefits, not least in making the estate more popular in that the level of services was improved. This particularly applied to improvements in the caretaking service made in France, where problems could be identified and resolved at the level of the block; and to improvements in the social services offered to tenants in dealing with their benefits and arrears problems. However the underlying problems of exclusion and residualisation could not be fundamentally changed by this new management approach.

Infrastructural improvements were particularly important in France, where the problems had been most acute. These, like the physical improvements, have in many cases been achieved, and brought benefits in the form of new libraries, play areas, leisure facilities, social centres, health centres and so on. These have again gone a long way to reducing the difficulties in making the estate attractive to outsiders - although in themselves they are not sufficient either. Although provided, they have also had difficulties in operating successfully, due to a combination of vandalism, apathy, and sometimes underresourcing.

These three aspects have been partial successes. They have, in both countries, tackled the starkest failings of management neglect. The solutions brought have not, however, been able to tackle the underlying problem of residualisation which has itself served to threaten the permanence of the solutions brought. This more



difficult area is therefore central to understanding the successes and failings of the programmes.

### **The Heart of the Problem**

Central to the programmes were attempts to reduce the exclusion of the residents on estates, and the parallel attempts to make the estate more popular to a more mixed group of residents - and thereby reduce both voids and the density of problem households. There were clear links between the various activities of improvement of the image of the estate, reducing crime and vandalism, promoting various schemes to combat voids, the manipulation of allocations, the programmes of support for tenants and stimulation of their participation in the life of the estate. These initiatives were all directed at returning the estates to a less residualised place in the housing market, by making it acceptable to people who had a choice, and who would positively choose to live there.

Several variations can be identified. The least successful were the simple attempts to restrict access to disadvantaged households, as practised in France. There was no evidence that this approach succeeded at all: unless the estate was made attractive in itself, this policy would not succeed - and if the estate was attractive, there was no need for this policy. The reason for this, I would suggest, is that unless there is a fundamental change in the attractiveness of the estates, then there is always sufficient flexibility and other opportunity in the housing market for more stable and better off households to have another option, which they will take up. Restriction of access simply produced voids, which had eventually to be filled by whoever would accept an offer.

Equally unsuccessful were attempts to control the crime on estates by various controlled entry schemes. The various measures to improve estate layout by creating individual gardens, or additional landscaping and provision of well lit paths were generally successful. The concierge and entryphones schemes were not, partly due



to inadequacies in the management arrangements, but mainly due to a disinclination on the part of some tenants to cooperate, sufficient to make the scheme inoperable. As has clearly come out in the case studies, the estates are not being besieged by problems from outside their blocks and stairwells; they are besieged by problems from within. The second problem is prohibitive capital and revenue cost. Even if adequate management arrangements were in place, the prohibitive cost of revenue funding of the staff needed, plus the capital cost of installing and maintaining sufficient surveillance equipment, would restrict this solution to a very few blocks; and in the context of increasing pressure on the budgets of housing organisations, and the failure to demonstrate clear benefits, would suggest that this was a highly questionable investment compared to alternative programmes of basic maintenance and repair. There is nothing in my research which would tend to counter that view.

Participation in various residents associations and in the life of the estate was also generally disappointing. Some of the initiatives seemed to be more successful, particularly the *régie de quartiers* in France, which had direct paybacks for tenants in the form of skills and low cost improvements to their own properties. Certain participation exercised linked to the physical works seemed also to have been successful, generally directly linked to the amount of effort put in. These episodes of participation were seldom long lasting, however. The reasons for this have been discussed already: the reducing presence of community organisers; the increasing levels of isolation and exclusion, which cannot be simply reversed by calling tenants association meetings. The DSQ attempts to stimulate aid and assistance groups for specific needs on the estate were much more successful in providing focal points for community life, as they started from the assumption that the tenants needed basic assistance before they could identify their needs and capabilities, prior to organising themselves to make their voice heard, rather than thinking that they could voice their needs in an organised fashion at the start.

The successful tenant diversity initiatives were those which undertook a fundamental restructuring of buildings and tenures on the estates. The only estates where a changed social mix was achieved, and the image changed, were those (like Wigan,



Wandsworth, Manchester, Grande Synthe or Meaux) where there was substantial demolition, newbuild, or tenure change. Wandsworth was able to attract new leaseholders due partly to the very high level of investment in the estate; Wigan attracted owners and housing association tenants by substantial demolition and new build; those parts of Manchester which were most successful (as was also the case with Salford) were the parts which were subject to decapitation.

The parallel process of demolition was surprisingly common, and seemingly effective, and must be considered in parallel. The alternatives, keeping blocks void or filling them with anyone who was willing, sometimes by open advertising or flat sharing, each brought their own problems. Demolition removed the surplus stock, as well as reducing densities of difficult housing.

This suggests, then, that the most effective way to reverse residualisation is to reduce the density of problem dwellings by substantial demolition, and introduce a higher quality product in the form of desirable rented or low cost ownership housing which will be sufficiently attractive to other stable, employed households to begin to recreate a mixed community. None of the other remedies appear to be sufficient without this, (although this is not to deny that each is valuable and essential).

The question may be asked of where the tenants go who would otherwise have been housed in the demolished units. Part of the answer is that there is in fact no need for these units. They represent a surplus housing stock for which there is no need, in their current form. This is particularly true in the provincial towns, although in London and Paris it may be held that there are high levels of homelessness, and therefore this suggestion cannot be true. The answer is that although the flats represent housing units, they are generally unsuitable for homeless families or other homeless people; and that the problem of homelessness (which cannot be dealt with here) would not be resolved by simply putting all the homeless households in void tower blocks - this would be the type of "dumping" which has been shown to be at the root of some of the problems of the difficult estates.



The homeless problem illustrates a very relevant point, however, and one which is currently being put to the test with the new French housing legislation, described in Chapter 5. If there is to be a reduction in the proportions of excluded households on difficult estates, there will need to be a corresponding increase in their dispersal to other estates and to different parts of the housing market. Again I have shown that the growth of the low cost owner occupied sector which excluded these households was a contributory factor to the residualisation of the estates. To combat this would require that new (and existing) housing developments would need to be designed and allocated so that there was a fair dispersal of the excluded households throughout the community. It is exactly this which is proposed at present in France.

It may also be objected that this solution does nothing to combat the exclusion, economic disadvantage, and cultural isolation of these households. Indeed it may be held that by dispersing them their problems will be compounded by removing them from the solidarity of their peers, and the concentrated assistance of the support services. I will not comment on this argument, except to note that the situation of household concentration it appears to propose in opposition seems to be exactly the problem which is being combatted by the EA and DSQ programmes. That is not, however, meant to represent a considered response to the argument.

### **Relation to Programmes**

The main objectives of the EA/DSQ programmes were, in outline, to stimulate physical and social improvements on estates, with the close involvement of residents. The conclusion of this thesis suggests that a more radical approach is necessary - an approach which effectively destroys the present character of the estates as single tenure areas, and at the same time disperses the excluded households to other parts of the housing market, which must therefore be opened up to them. Again this does not mean that the approach adopted by the EA/DSQ is entirely ineffective; on the contrary there are many considerable benefits from the approach to management and improvements which have been introduced under these programmes. It is argued, however, that the solution is not sufficient in itself to deal



with the worst estates, which must be physically broken up, and the problems dispersed.

### **Comparative Issues**

It only remains to consider briefly the benefits which have been shown by use of the France/UK comparisons. The principal advantage is in permitting a much wider range of estates and contexts to be examined, which has revealed underlying similarities. The fact that there has been a similar approach to voids and demolition, to rehabilitation of the common parts, to decentralised estate management, and to schemes for the institutional letting of voids, to take only some examples, has shown that not only are the problems similar, but also the solutions are on a similar range. The examination of the various different outcomes has made it possible to be more positive about the likely consequences of these policy initiatives. The fact that resident participation is very difficult in both countries, with a range of different strategies to stimulate it, is very useful. Equally however the differences have been useful in suggesting likely outcomes of policy options which have not been considered in the UK. The use of caretakers, while being based in a different tradition in France, is one; the development of *regie de quariters* another; and most importantly the failure of social engineering of allocations provides an important illustration of a policy which should not be followed. These are only examples; but they illustrate the benefits of the approach.



## Case Studies Annex

### **The Full Case Studies**

Zac de la Noe, Chanteloup les Vignes

La Pierre Collinet, Meaux

Mont Liébaut, Béthune

Doddington Estate, Wandsworth

Miles Platting, Manchester

Precinct Estate, Salford

### **Contracted Case Studies**

Le Clos Saint-Lazare, Stains

Fort Nieulay, Calais

Nouvelles Synthe, Grande Synthe

Stonebridge Estate, Brent

St Lukes, Islington

Worsley Mesnes, Wigan



Zac de la Noe, Chanteloup les Vignes





## Zac de la Noë: Chanteloup les Vignes

### Background and History

Chanteloup les Vignes is in the Département of Yvelines, in the outer ring of the Paris suburbs, and about 30 km west of Central Paris - which is 20 minutes by train

**Estate Name:** Zac de la Noë

**Region:** Ile de France

**Community:** Chanteloup les Vignes

**Community pop.:** 10,192 (1990)

**Estate pop.:** 8,278

**Politics:** UDF (right) since 1983. Previously frequent changes. Very supportive Mayor.

**Location aspects:** Rural setting; at edge of village, surrounded by fields. SNCF station at edge of estate

**External Reports:** Vieillard-Baron (1989), & (1990); Roussel (1988); Calogirou & Eyzat (1991);

from the station at the edge of the estate. It is on land surrounded by the large ox bow of the Seine known as the "Boucle de Chanteloup".

The commune is a mix of agricultural and housing land, with a small industrial sector.

The rural aspect of the village continues today: 20% of the land is still commercially cultivated; a further

### Box 1: Location

20% is natural parkland. The village is of traditional construction, built on a North South axis around the 15th Century church and 1893 town hall in the central square. In 1968 the population of the village of Chanteloup was 2,082. Its population had doubled between 1945 and 1968, due to the construction of new individual homes. In 1969 it was identified as one of the projects of the (then) Ile de France Départemental HLM building projects, and Emile Ailland, the official architect to President Pompidou, was put in charge of its construction (along with the estates of Courtillières at Pantin (1,700 units) and Gringy la Grande Borne in Essone (3,900 units)).

"Today these three great housing estates bringing innovation through their architectural aesthetics are becoming the three great ghettos in the Paris region (Veillard-Baron 1989) p92.

By 1975 the population had risen to 4,720, and by 1982 to 10,360 - due to the



**Incomes:** F4,700 av/month;  
unemployed = F35 per person  
per day (after rent) (V-B  
(1989) p93)

**Employment:** 55% unskilled;  
19% white collar; 17%  
unemployed (c.f. 6% Dépt)

**Households:** (1982)  
53% under age 20;  
1% over 64;  
70% households with children  
28% households with 3 or more  
children

**Qualifications:** 62% no Bac  
(c.f. 55% average in all  
"ilots sensible")

**Ethnic:** (1987) 40%. 35  
nationalities, main groups  
Maghreb, S-E Asia, Africa;  
Portuguese now gone

## **Box 2: Population**

**Sources:** Roussel 1988;  
Veillard-Baron 1989

implantation of the 2,223 units of the ZAC de la Noë during the period 1971-74. Following the construction of the ZAC, the commune became known not as Chateloup les Vignes but as the "grapes of despair"

The construction of the ZAC was surrounded by scandal (Aranda (1975)). Construction was started before the ZAC was legally constituted, and before all the land had been acquired. The original plan was for buildings of 10 to 15 stories and for a total of 4,700 units, including 1,600 homes of a higher standard for higher income households. The local council refused consent for the construction to take

place, but the Prefect overruled this decision, and work started immediately in July 1971. A local pressure group of residents and local council members was set up to try to stop the construction works. Meantime, in September 1972, the revelations of Gabriel Aranda were first published, alleging that the construction companies who were building in Chanteloup and elsewhere were being given free reign because of their substantial contributions (one tenth of the contract value) to the presidential campaign funds of President Pompidou. Eventually, after protracted legal battles, the construction was limited to mainly 3 to 5 storey buildings, and the maximum size restricted to 3,100 units. There were numerous infringements of the building and planning regulations during construction, and many safety regulations covering construction were ignored. Complementary construction projects such as a school, a post office, links with the village, and the railway station were not completed due to the lack of funds. The original allocations were done in a manner more related to political pressures than to good management (Veillard-Baron (1989) Annex 2).



**Constructed:** 1971-74

**Total Units:** 2,224

**Block types:** 70 buildings;  
2 x 7 stories  
68 x 3 to 5 stories, mixed heights  
All entered by common stair wells,  
2-4 flats per landing

**Flat types:**

Bed S: 52  
1 bed: 173  
2 bed: 565  
3 bed: 942  
4 bed: 221  
5 bed: 3

**Block Mix:** Mixed throughout

**Layout:** Crescents and squares; one part, the Hippodrome, of lower quality flats, is an oval at one end (now totally empty)

## Population

The implanted population was mainly from the inner city Paris areas, and immigrants from abroad or the DOM-TOM. This was not entirely new to the village as in 1968 10% of the population had been non French, mainly from Portugal - although by 1982 many of them had moved on to home ownership in other communes. At the start many of the immigrants were single men, the proportion of female immigrant residents in 1975 being only 27%. Between 1975 and 1982, many of the immigrant workers were Moroccans, recruited directly to work in the Simca-Talbot-Peugot car factory at Poissy. By 1982, 47% of immigrant households were of North

### Box 3: Estate Details

African origin, half of these from Morocco. The table below illustrates an aspect of the life on the estate: the decline in employment in the car industry meant that many immigrant males became unemployed; and at the same time there was a strong tendency for immigrant women to stay at home.

	1975	1982
French males	55	49
Immigrant males	85	47
French females	30	35
Immigrant females	19	13

(Source: Roussel (1988) p20)

Employment opportunities for immigrant households were more limited, tending to be in the construction industries of factories: 70% on the employed immigrant population in 1982, (compared with a national employed average of 38%). Pay in



these industries was low, and job security limited.

### Original Problems

The profile of the estate has set out some of the difficulties: a young population with a high degree of immigrant households of different ethnic backgrounds; high unemployment with low income from unskilled work. Part of this problem of population mix was due to what was seen to be the use of the estate as a dump estate for some of the worst families from the areas of inner Paris cleared for commercial development, including those cleared to make the new town centre at

---

**Voids:** (1987) 20% (30% in poorest quality homes, 20% in standard HLMs and 10% in higher quality)

**Arrears:** (1983) 60% of tenants in arrears; one in seven "unmanageable" (Roussel 1988); uncertainty about true balances in 1892.

**Turnover:** Not a major problem: no reliable data

**Image:** "Ilot Sensible", few links with village - seen as centre for delinquency

**Isolation:** At edge of village, an isolated pocket of problems in the countryside. Station opened several years after completion of estate

**Construction:** Original plans for high blocks frustrated; curved blocks of 3-5 stories; no grass, but "prairies" of rock

**Repairs:** Pre 1982, virtually none (previous HLM)

**Services:** Serious lack of local facilities, due to inability of commune to raise money to provide them

**Security:** No systems. Delinquency big problem

**Management:** Pre 1983, no site office. Little commitment to the estate at all

**Tenant attitudes:** No participation

---

### Box 4: Major Problems at Start

nearby Nanterre. Roussel (1988) considers that there was a pecking order for estates when decisions were made about where to put the best and worst tenants; and that



three estates, the Zac de la Noë at Chanteloup, La Val Fourée at Mantes, and Vallibou at Plaisir, were at the bottom of the list. Equally although there was an unofficial "quota" system for immigrant households accepted by HLMs, certain of the larger interdépartemental HLMs operated by taking their total quota, but concentrating its "better" and non immigrant families in certain estates (such as Versailles, Saint Germain, or La Cele Saint Cloud) and putting other tenants, including immigrant households, elsewhere. On the ZAC, residents complained (at the start of the DSQ process) of poor schools, lack of sports centres, of facilities for children, of local organisations or social activities. There were also tensions (though often covert) on the part of the white French residents that many of the problems were due to the black immigrant families. Vieillard Baron (1989) also provides useful information about the contrast between the tenure which movers off the estate end up in: one quarter of all movers in 1985-86 were immigrant households; and they moved almost exclusively to other HLM estates; but of the remaining 3/4 white French households, two thirds moved to owner occupation.

The second main problem was in part responsible for the lack of facilities which made the estate unpopular. The commune was unable to adequately finance the necessary estate services, and by 1981 there was a deficit to the value of 43% of the total budget, one of the per capita highest in France (as reported in *Le Courrier des Yvelines*, 29 September 1983). There was an almost complete lack of any industrial base from which to raise local revenues, several adjacent industries had closed during the late 70s; despite this there was a pressing need to complete certain works irrespective of the lack of funds.

The third main problem had been the management by the original HLM, the Office Interdépartemental de la Région Parisienne (OIRP). There had been an almost total lack of management in the first two years of the estate's life, and very limited management thereafter until the transfer of the stock in 1982 to the HLM Interdépartemental de l'Essone, Val d'Oise, Yvelines (OPEVOY). It should also be noted that one small part of the estate, comprising 268 homes of a higher quality, is managed by another HLM, the Société la Lucete, which is a Société Anonyme.



Few repairs had been done by OIRP, and there was no local management office. The arrears had been allowed to build up in an uncontrolled way, and the lack of proper rent accounting meant that on transfer it was difficult to establish the true state of many of the rent accounts - although the total arrears debt appeared to be in excess of F10 million, of which in only a quarter of the cases had any action been taken for recovery. 1986 figures showed some improvement, although 30% of families still were in arrears, with 9% owing over F30,000, and 50% less than F10,000. 75% of these debts, however, were owed by families of metropolitan French origin, the percentage of DOM-TOM or immigrant households in arrears being disproportionately lower.

Fourth, the main employers, who had been the magnet for the immigration, underwent sharp reductions in their labour requirements. Peugeot reduced its staff from 28,000 in 1970 to 15,800 in 1983, then to 8,000 in 1990. Equally Renault reduced its staff from 18,000 in 1982 to 13,400 in 1986. In each of both cases the reductions have been mainly of unskilled staff, the skilled workers being retained to run the new automated machinery.

Finally the estate itself had physical problems. The stairwells were in a state of complete disrepair (there are stairwells for about each 10 dwellings). The part of the estate which had been built to the lowest standards, the PLR [Programme de Loyer Réduit] or reduced rent programme) homes, were particularly unpopular, and developed a serious voids problem very quickly. The estate had been designed to be vehicle free, with parking more than 200 meters from the flats - but this proved impractical. Limited circulation was then permitted, but this was difficult to manage safely. There were many places where emergency vehicles could not reach; and the absence of ramps made access by prams very difficult. The large areas of open space were not grassed, as Aillaud's plans had called for stone and rock "prairies" - Marie de Chanteloup (1983) quotes Aillaud, in reference to Chanteloup, as declaring that there are to be no "green spaces, because Le Corbousier one day invented the prairie, and prairies will be everywhere" (p16).



Original Proposals and Objectives

The estate was established as an "Ilot Sensible" in 1983. There has been a constant pattern of difference of emphasis and priorities between the HLM and the City on what should be done, although both have been active in promoting improvement. The key objectives of the original programme are set out in the tables below.

HLM Priorities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- arrears</li><li>- improved management</li><li>- voids</li><li>- allocations</li><li>- external image of the estate</li><li>- environmental problems</li></ul>

Box 5: Objectives of Programme

1. Arrears The new HLM introduced new accounting procedures and records. In addition an experimental association was set up by the HLM, the Region, the Département, and the CAF, to

assist households with arrears under F10,000: the aim was to provide both advice and practical aid in the form of loans to tenants, over periods tailored to their individual needs.

2. Improved Management The new HLM set up an office on the estate shortly after taking over, in 1983. This was to provide all local services of repairs, rent collection, arrears control, allocations requests, and general management. Additional training was provided to caretakers, who were all installed in new offices throughout the estate. They are the first line of contact with the HLM for repairs, rent payments, and day to day problems; and are responsible for the supervision of a team of cleaners, who are employed on a contract basis to clean the stairs and common parts.

3. Voids One key priority was to take action to reduce voids. There was a dispute between the HLM and the City on the question of the low quality (PLR) homes, in the Hippodrome crescents, where the major voids problems were concentrated. The city wished to demolish them all in order to construct owner occupied homes to change the tenure and population balance on the estate. The HLM wished to rehabilitate, in order to avoid the burden of debt charges remaining on demolished



properties. The final decision was to rehabilitate, although with some of the units for sale. The City in fact aimed to have 50% social housing only in the commune if possible - though the proportion remains at 84%.

4. Allocations Although the new HLM is itself an interdépartemental HLM, and has taken a much greater interest in management on the estate, and has delegated most of the control of allocations to the local joint committee. As a result, the City has a large say in allocations. Vieillard Baron (1989) sets out the main criteria used: rent plus charges must be less than 25% of applicant's income before the addition of housing benefits - but there is no upper income limit; no foreign applicants are accepted, and the number of DOM-TOM residents is limited (which effectively means there is a racial barrier). This policy is not, however, having much effect: - certain applications are made by young white French males who then sublet to Mahgrebin households; and many of the white households who move in become quickly behind with the rent. In fact, as noted above, immigrant households on the estate have a much better rent payment record.

This bias is reflected in the new allocations strategy adopted as part of the 1989-93 programme (Marie de Chanteloup (1991)). The priorities set out there were first, children of families presently living on the estate (though it was recognised that they were primarily households of people under 25, and that there was a lack of both units of the right size and of social support for these new forming households); second, other residents of the commune (excluding lodgers, to avoid accepting immigrant households lodging with relatives, of which there were many); third people who had been lodging for over 5 years; and finally people whose access to the new Social Security benefit RMI had been conditional on their gaining a tenancy. There was, however, a continuing dispute about this policy, reported to me by the current DSQ project manager. The HLM was against it because the acceptance of children of current tenants meant that there was still a tenancy to accept black households, and the HLM wished to have a reduction in the number of black tenants as a whole.

5. External image of the estate Extensive consultation was held on the programme



of rehabilitation and improvement works, resulting in animated and well attended meetings - over half of all households participating at some point. The estate has not suffered the major structural problems of certain similar estates, such as water penetration. Nonetheless it was decided to provide complete new outer shells to the buildings, to install thermal insulation and new, double glazed, PVC windows. The new panels were of varied colours, and included several features designed to transform the image of the estate such as the addition of several gable end roof lines - the idea being to "give, in total, the image of a large individual house to a communal block" (Vieillard-Baron 1989, p 103). The new panels were of different colours to break up and individually identify the buildings. In addition, the gable ends of the buildings which front one of the central open spaces, were decorated with enormous (5 storey) mosaic portraits of Victor Hugo, Nerval, Mallarme, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and Valéry.

Works were also done to the entrances and stairwells, to renew and redecorate them, and to improve security of the entrances with new and heavier doors. In certain stairs, entryphones were also installed. The communal heating system had also been causing problems, being noisy, expensive, and ineffective, particularly in its delivery to each home. It was therefore improved. The basement areas had also proved to be little used, and the focus of rubbish and delinquency, and they were repaired and made secure, as well as being thermally insulated from the buildings above.

No works were done to the Hippodrome buildings, pending the further decisions about whether to demolish or full rehabilitate them.

6. Environmental problems A small number of works were done to improve the external spaces, mainly tree and shrub planting.

7. Non Housing Programme It is also worth noting the following aspects of the non HLM programme:

Economic Development This was a key issue for the city, both to provide employment for local residents and to expand its tax base. An industrial park was



- \* economic development
- \* community development
- \* educational improvement measures
- \* integration of immigrants
- \* social and cultural action on the estate

set up on the other side of the railway line from the estate, and began operation in 1989; in addition an expected new exit from the nearby motorway (A14) is hoped to stimulate interest in the new units.

#### **Box 6: Non Housing Elements**

Community development a new sports centre was opened, and attempts were made to stimulate community associations.

Integration of immigrants This was partly to be achieved by the social and cultural programmes, but also by the new allocations programme (set out above) which was aimed at preventing the arrival of any further new immigrant households.

#### **What Happened?**

Inroads were made to certain of the main problems. In particular the new HLM and its local office provided a major improvement to the management services

Rehabilitation: The extensive external rehabilitation was centred on 1,400 homes. The effect of the new central heating and insulation works was a reduction of heating charges of some 50% between 1983 and 1988. The works to the basement areas were soon vandalised, however, and the stair repairs have not been a particular success: many of the entryphone systems were vandalised, and graffiti remains a problem.

Improved Management: The new local office has tried to develop local policies and practices tailored to the needs of the estate, by working closely with many of the local organisations which have been set up. The extensive concentration on arrears has involved both considerable legal action against tenants, but also extensive counselling, mainly by specially appointed "tenant counsellors", whose job is to do individual casework and seek individual solutions for tenants who may have difficulties with claiming benefits or budgeting. This has produced considerable



Rehabilitation: Extensive external rehabilitation involving 1,400 homes

Improved Management: New local office, local staff, retrained caretakers, extensive arrears counselling, involvement in local associations

Improved arrears: Reduction of arrears to 12% compared to 60% at start

Population stability: Turnover is about 3%, mainly decanting from the Hippodrome block. The new allocations policies give priority to local residents and tenants' dependents

Local commitment to improvement: The local Mayor has been one of the main agents driving the rehabilitation and other improvements. There has been a creative, if sometimes stormy relationship between City and HLM

Economic Stimulation: Reduction in unemployment on estate, and increase in number of local jobs and businesses

Community Involvement: Over 20 active associations

---

#### **Box 7: Summary of Outcomes**

success, with a considerable reduction in arrears.

Population Stability: Although there was never a great problem with turnover, it is now quite stable at about 3%. Many of those moving are the residual moves from the abandoned blocks at the Hippodrome. The new allocations policies are designed to continue with the process of stabilising the population. The City see the problem as one of preventing any new large scale waves of immigration, and of concentrating on consolidating the family networks which are beginning to develop. The HLM, in contrast, has a fairly clearly racial view, seeking to reduce the number of black households, in simple numbers terms, and is therefore opposed to much of the thrust of allowing sons and daughters to remain in new tenancies.

Local commitment to improvement: One key to the successes of parts of the project is the constant and continuing commitment of the local Mayor (who was the subject of a long profile in Le Quotidien de Paris on 28 May 1991, setting out his



achievements, and was elected to the National Assembly in March 1993, defeating a prominent Government minister). The Mayor has been very active in trying to take a global approach to the problems, and provide the industrial and infrastructural bases needed to make lasting improvements in estate life.

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>				£5.2
million				
<b>Cost</b>	<b>per</b>	<b>estate</b>	<b>home</b>	
<b>affected:</b>				£7,000
<b>DSQ</b>	<b>Contribution:</b>			£2.4
million				
<b>Other</b>	<b>Contributions:</b>			£1.9
million from Region				
<b>Non Housing Programme Costs:</b>				
£2.5 million				

Economic Stimulation: This

**Box 8: Summary of Expenditure**

commitment to reduction in unemployment on estate, and increase in number of local jobs and businesses has resulted in 44 firms opening up locally, creating 200 new jobs and helping to slightly reduce the unemployment level on the estate. In addition, 700 people went through employment training and job counselling, resulting in 500 of them finding work. Partly as a result of all of these actions, the budget deficit was substantially reduced, to 25% of its former level by 1988.

Community Involvement: Over 20 active associations have been created. These are set out in some detail in an evaluation of the DSQ programme carried out by the Interdisciplinary Research Centre of Vaucresson (Calogirou & Eyzat (1991)). This is a curious report: the first part sets out some of the context and the comments of the professionals working on the estate about the difficulties of their job; and the second part presents some details about a resident survey of their involvement in various activities and associations, but with no empirical drawing together of the data, or subsequent systematic conclusions. Nonetheless the report shows that there are now a wide variety of associations, particularly for immigrant households, set up and used on the estate.

**Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Range of Interviews: Interviews were held with all the main sections of housing staff (Director, Maintenance and Caretaking manager, Tenant Arrears and Support



counsellor, Caretaker, Allocations and Voids officer), and with the DSQ Project Manager, her Community Development Officer (with eight years experience on the estate) and the independent researcher from the Interdisciplinary Research Centre of Vaucresson. Themes which emerged are set out below.

City/HLM disagreement There were clearly tensions between the HLM and the DSQ team, based mainly on the fact that the DSQ was located firmly in the Town Hall, both physically and in terms of policies, whereas the HLM suffered from being part of a much larger Interdépartemental HLM. Much joint working was undertaken, but it was made clear to me, by both sides, that the HLM was guided to a large extent by the needs of the larger organisation. The (somewhat cynical) community development officer in the DSQ team was of the view that in the eyes of the HLM, this was a "lost estate", and it was not prepared to put major resources into the estate. The DSQ general view was that certain of the works which had been done had not, despite consultation, been done with the needs of the residents fully taken into account - for example the works to install entryphones were done for a population who often could not read, and certainly forgot the combination to punch in to open the door - so no wonder they were vandalised. Equally the emphasis on rent arrears has been good for the HLM funds, but not central to the needs of the estate (in their view); and the HLM would do well to reinvest some of the funds in a better repairs service, or more environmental improvements.

This difference spilled into the works which had been (or not been) done: the DSQ would have preferred more works to the common parts, and less expense on the architectural and external aspects; they would have preferred the creation of some larger units for the very large families; they wished the demolition of the Hippodrome blocks to provide a better tenure mix on the estate; - but the local HLM was bound by the decisions made in Versailles, where the HQ was. All of the major works planning and administration was done from HQ, with perhaps a seconded officer for a period if necessary.

Nonetheless the DSQ staff felt that the local office worked well, and was a vast improvement. Generally the staff were well trained and carrying out a good job.



**City/HLM disagreement** (despite attempts at partnership)

**Resident difficulties:** the main problems stem from the people

**Delinquency and police problems:** poor relations between youth, police, and HLM/city

**Transformed local management:** several excellent new services including caretaking and advice

**Continuing image problem:** particularly after riots

#### **Box 9: Main Issues from Interviews**

The last visit found him "tired and emotional" at 9 a.m., which continued during both top ups from his whisky bottle under the desk into a paper cup, and at the rather lavish lunch to which I was treated, in the company of his son, who had been co-opted to drive him around (or mind him - it was not clear which). Previous visits had found him more lucid, but it was clear that he felt the problems of the estate were overwhelming, due to the problems of the people who lived there. Previous discussions had indicated that he felt that relations with the DSQ were fairly good, but complained also that one of the main problems was his being constrained by HQ.

Resident difficulties: Almost everyone agreed that the main problem was the nature of the poor, unskilled, population. The HLM staff tended to add that the fact that they were immigrants was also a problem, expressed with more understanding by the DSQ staff who pointed to the difficulties in language, and cultural differences, as providing further barriers to their achieving jobs and good education. The Director was alarmist in his analysis, but some of it should be set out here. His view was that many of the tenants were armed; and that riots were inevitable when Caribbean tenants slept by day and kept everyone awake by night. Again this may have been influenced by his military background (his regimental flag and hat were in the corner), and his proclaimed respect for General de Gaulle. The reporting of this material is important, since it indicates that the HLM was prepared to permit a

There was, however, a certain amount of difficulty with the Director, mainly because of his ambivalent attitude to his black tenants. This was evident in discussion with him. He was, on my last visit, on the point of being moved sideways in the organisation, on account, it was said, of his five long years in the ZAC. This had clearly taken its toll.



person with these views to be in charge of the organisation in such a sensitive estate; although it is also fair to note his impending transfer.

Of his staff, the caretakers tended to share his views, but both the allocations and tenant counselling staff had a much more informed and sympathetic view, setting out in some detail the difficulties which they had to deal with in welcoming new tenants, or in assisting them in claiming benefits. The maintenance staff were firmly of the view that with less destruction of the buildings and property by residents, the funds would go much further.

The DSQ shared the view of the City that the problems with the residents required that the population be stabilised, hence the allocations policy set out above. They were aware that many of the people on the estate had had little choice but to accept a flat there, and that they were effectively trapped. They were also concerned that in many cases the immigrant households were housed next to white French households from the Paris inner city clearance areas, who were often virulent racists.

**Delinquency and police problems:** All reported poor relations between the policy and residents, as well as difficult relations with both the DSQ and HLM. The DSQ felt the police had given up trying to create good relations or be constructive - this was one of the worst aspects of the developing programme. A policy of fairly lenient sentences 6 years ago had been followed by a policy of stiff sentences for estate residents, but neither approach had succeeded in stemming the growing crime. Recently the drugs problem had begun to grow also.

Crime continues to be a problem. Firstly, the estate has seen an increase in crime rates recently, despite an initial decline in 1987-88. 1989 saw a 33% increase in the number of arrests on the estate for petty crimes, and an explosion in the number of burglaries. Vandalism was a particular problem, carried out by groups of youths aged between 8 and 14, who destroyed and defaced the interior common parts, the exteriors of buildings, plants, and open spaces. Dealing with these problems was



identified as one of the major issues for the 1989-93 programme (Marie de Chanteloup (1991)). In addition, the estate has experienced minor riots in recent years. In the spring of 1990 nocturnal gatherings of gangs of Maghrebin youths lead to several disturbances, as a result of which the North African Association [Centre Culturel Maghrebin de Chanteloup] undertook to try to prevent this. More serious incidents occurred in 1991, as part of the national wave of estate rioting, however. On 12 June a gang of youths stoned the local police station, and any vehicles visiting it; and on 20 June there was a further incident where two Maghrebin youths were arrested trying to rob the estate supermarket, and a group of 30 youths clashed with police trying to carry out the arrest. Two nights later an incident involving a Turkish family and a Portuguese family, which lead to the police being called, escalated with the arrival of other members of the family armed with guns and knives, and lead to general rioting and stoning of the police on the part of local youth who had gathered observe and to participate. Order was eventually restored with the use of tear gas, and with a toll of two serious injuries and 15 arrests (most details from the report in Le Parisien, 24.6.91). All of this contributes to the continuing image of the estate as of a desolate, crime ridden environment.

Transformed local management: Most of the HLM staff were proud of the new services which were offered on the estate, based in the local office. The least happy was the Maintenance and Caretaking Manager who felt that his budgets were inadequate, although the service was responsive within its limits. partly for this reason he refused to meet tenants, referring all enquiries through the caretakers. The caretakers tended to be long serving - they had originally been husband and wife teams, though now only one of them was employed as a sole caretaker (about half and half women and men). They were in the process of having computer terminals fitted in their offices, to provide better information to tenants on their rent accounts, and although they had no explicit social role, and no training in this, it was clear that many knew their blocks very well, and had excellent relations with tenants - this was seen in the way they dealt with callers to the office. The Director described that much of his time had been involved with trying to assist the DSQ in setting up the local associations, and that he had tried to represent their views at



HQ, even if sometimes this was not accepted.

However the long term uncertainty about the fate of the Hippodrome crescents has contributed to the difficulties on the estate. These blocks are now completely empty and boarded, waiting for final decisions on works. The presence of this large expanse of desolation, frequently broken into for various criminal gatherings, drug taking and dealing, and so on, is a major problem, shortly to be dealt with.

**Continuing image problem:** The early years of the estate had been marked by a political instability which lead to a series of short term mayors, and administrations of different parties, between 1974 and 1983. None of them had got to grips with the problems, and as a consequence little progress had been made. The arrival of the present mayor and administration in 1983 had marked the beginning of a systematic assault on the problems, but there had been a lot of ground to make up. The mayor had taken a global view, using all the resources of the DSQ and HLM, with the primary aims of creating new employment opportunities for estate residents, and of involving residents in estate and civil life. Some progress had been made, but the long term problems of the population, and the recent riots, had meant that the image of the estate remained poor, and that the self image of the residents remained low. This was a fairly shared view, with many agents feeling that despite the progress made, and the many aspects of the programmes, the estate remained a dense concentration of poverty and isolation.

### **Summary and Evaluation**

This estate is one of the most difficult to deal with amongst the case studies for a number of reasons:

- the HLM not fully local: its policies and procedures are determined from outside the Département
- it is physically isolated, and removed from jobs and leisure opportunities
- the original infrastructural accompaniments were not provided because of the financial problems
- the early years were marked by political instability and lack of political will



**Voids:** 8%

**Arrears:** Down from 60% to 12%

**Turnover:** 3% p.a.

**Condition of Improvements:** Poor; extensive vandalism

**Image:** Extremely poor following riots and increased crime

**Appearance:** Generally improved, apart from growing vandalised parts

**Tenure and Ownership:** Presently unchanged, but plans to sell some of rehabilitated block eventually

**Population:** Some improvements (reduction of number of unemployed from 780 to 500), but remain poor, in comparison to Département

**Crime and Vandalism:** Up considerably; riots in 1991.

**Local Management:** Considerable improvements; local office

**Participation:** Several flourishing associations

**Continuing problems:**

- the population remains poor (about 2/3 of Départemental household income);
- continuing crime problems: after an initial fall, crime rose again in 1989 and 1990, with minor riots recorded in 1991; particular problem with 8-14 year olds
- rehabilitation of Hippodrome block to be done

---

**Box 10: State of Main Indicators Now**

to make improvements

- it was used as a sink estate for a mix of the most deprived inner city residents and immigrants recruited to work in the car factories
- continuing problems of crime and vandalism mean that there is a continuing image problem

Many successes can be noted: there was extensive rehabilitation work; the arrears were reduced considerably; there is now a functioning local management unit providing a range of services; plans are in hand to rehabilitate the worst part of the estate; and there are now a number of thriving local associations. But the improvement have been quite long in coming to fruition, particularly the




improvements to the worst Hippodrome block; there has been a continuing conflict of priorities between the city and the HLM over priorities; and the allocations policies, while attempting to stabilise the population, will be a few years in bearing fruit.

The programme continues on the estate, as noted above. The Priorities continue to be employment and training, combatting stigmatisation and isolation, housing rehabilitation, and encouraging social life. But there seems a long way to go before the fundamental problems of the estate will be reasonably dealt with.



La Pierre Collinet, Meaux





La Pierre Collinet at Meaux

**Background and History**

The ZUP of which the estate of La Pierre Collinet is part lies to the south west of the small historic town of Meaux (population 50,000), in the Département of Seine-et-Marne, and to the west of central Paris. Meaux has been the see of a bishop since the 4th century, and has a magnificent mainly 13th century cathedral.

<b>Estate Name:</b>	La Pierre Collinet
<b>Region:</b>	Ile de France
<b>Community:</b>	Meaux
<b>Community pop.:</b>	50,000
<b>Estate pop.:</b>	4,500
<b>Politics:</b>	Left coalition since 1978, strongly supportive of redevelopment
<b>Location aspects:</b>	On edge of town; most roads circular or dead ends; fields around, over canal de l'Ourcq and a bend of River Marne; higher grade estate (Beauval) adjacent
<b>External Reports:</b>	2 ACADIE (Urbanists) reports; plus promotional video

The estate was constructed between 1958 and 1963, using totally industrialised means (including cranes on rails around the estate). It was built as a "Ville d'Accueil" to cater both for the growing urban influx from surrounding rural areas, Paris overspill, and to cater for the repatriated families from Algeria. The flats all face south west, for maximum light. The corridors are designed as if they could become internal streets, and encourage good neighbour relations. Unfortunately, however, each corridor contained only one small refuse chute for 30 - 40 families, which tended to undermine neighbour relations. During the 1970s,

**Box 11: Location**

land adjacent to the estate was purchased by the HLM, and an estate (Beauval) of 8,000 further homes constructed - but of a mix of tenures, and of a much greater variety of house type (including houses with gardens and low rise blocks), which provided a stark contrast to the monolithic blocks of La Pierre Collinet.

**Population**

The estate was the subject of a social survey, as part of the 1985 evaluation of the original (HVS) improvement programme on the estate (Acadie 1984, 1985). The



population profile led Acadie (1985, p30) to identify one of the main problems as "the existence, at the level of a city, of a neighbourhood populated by this type of person, socially marked out as deprived ["défavorisé"]". This confirmed the conclusion of Toubon (Toubon 1980a) that "La Pierre Collinet has become a proletarian zone...marked by..a population who are very mobile, very young, with a very high proportion of immigrants". Most households had only one income, often family benefits (see Table 2). Very few elderly people lived on the estate (5% in 1984; in 1980 over half the total population had been under 19 years).

<b>Incomes:</b> 20% benefits only; 37% under 4,00F/month (1985)	
<b>Employment:</b> 60% unskilled or semi skilled; much part time and homeworking (e.g. making confectionary).	
<b>Households:</b> 5% over 65 yrs 62% under 40 Average 4 people per flat	
<b>Qualifications:</b> 23% holding any sort of work or educational qualification	
<b>Ethnic:</b> 36% ethnic households; Portuguese, Mahgrebin, African	

**Box 12: Population**  
1983 Details. Source: Acadie, 1984, 1985

There were three main groups of immigrant households, all different from each other. The Portuguese had been arriving for 20 years, but in many cases quickly moved over to the higher quality flats at Beauval. Maghrebin households started arriving about 1976, and were originally single male workers, who increasingly brought their families to live with them (in 1984 16% of one bedroom flats were occupied by single North African males). Since 1981 there had been an increased flow of African families, in two main groups. First

families from rural Mali had large, polygamous, households, which also provided long term temporary accommodation ["hébergement"] to relatives arriving in France. Often wives and children of these households would travel to and from Mali, the older wife returning with children when they reached teenage, to be replaced by a new younger wife <sup>1</sup>. In contrast there were groups of rich urbanised African

<sup>1</sup> Information mainly from interview with the DSQ staff member who spent about half her time working with these families, particularly with the women and children. The families tended to be the focus of many complaints and have many problems because of their large households, and because in many case there were severe language and cultural problems.



students from other countries who did not mix with the Malian households with whom they had little in common. The pattern of immigration can be seen from the following table:

Arrival date	Portuguese	Maghrebin	African
Pre 1972	11%	5%	0
1972-75	36%	5%	0
1976-1980	30%	36%	11%
1980-83	23%	54%	88%

Table 2a: Pattern of Arrival of Immigrant Populations

Notes: Figures show % of the December 1983 population surveyed who arrived in the period stated. Source: Acadie 1985 p7.

**Constructed:** 1958-63

**Total Units:** 1850

**Block types:** 6 x 15 storey blocks, each 265 flats/maisonettes served by 5 corridors;  
plus: 3 x 22 storey towers, each 84 flats

**Flat types:**

<u>15 storey:</u>	<u>22 storey:</u>
31 1 bed	4 x 4 bed per landing
54 2 bed	
108 3 bed	
72 5 bed	

**Block mix:** blocks mixed, towers exclusively 4 bed for family use

**Layout:** No through road on estate. Circulation by interior ring road.

Box 13: Estate Details

Original Problems

The problems facing the estate had been apparent since the mid 70s, and Meaux had successfully bid to be part of the original Habitat et Vie Sociale programme (participation lasting between 1978 and 1983). Much useful information on the history of intervention is contained in the evaluation of the original DSQ programme and 89-93 bid published by Meaux council (Meaux 1989).

By 1980 the estate had a high turnover of tenancies - between 1978-84, 65% of the total population had moved away - the estate was functioning almost like a temporary

housing estate [cité de transit] (Toubon 1980a). One room flats were most affected, with in 1983 29% changing tenancy (43% in one of the low rise blocks). The image of the estate was extremely poor, particularly since the HLM had scored an own goal



by constructing Beauval alongside, leading all who could afford to to move over, leaving increasing numbers of deprived households. This was compounded by the fact that improvement works generated the housing benefit (APL) problem already described in the main text.

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

The HVS programme: This had three main objectives: to improve the image of the estate, and reduce its isolation from the city; physical rehabilitation; and creating better relations between the residents. Extensive internal and external works were done -one week was spent in each flat doing works "aimed primarily at a

---

**Voids:** 18% (25% of 5 bedroom; 17% of 4 bedroom. 315 empty over 2 years, 5% over 5 years. Note Beauval also had voids)

**Arrears:** 42% in arrears; 60% owing over F10,000

**Turnover:** 65% in 6 years

**Image:** Estate very unpopular. Only poorest would accept. Contractors/service providers refuse to visit "Africa"

**Isolation:** On city periphery, surrounded by river and canal

**Construction:** System built, by disciples of le Corbousier. Gigantic scale, high towers and long high blocks, with dead space between.

**Repairs:** HVS internal works esp. noise insulation; external works to resurface corridors, improve entrances, environment

**Security:** No systems in place; crime not major problem

**Services:** 1 rubbish chute for 30-50 families per landing

**Management:** HLM Office on site, at edge of estate; little commitment to participation or regard for social problems

**Tenant Attitudes:** Total absence of participation

---

### **Box 14: Major Problems at Start**

Sources: Acadie 1984,1985; Meaux 1989; Toubon 1980a

general increase in the level of comfort" (Acadie 1985 p17), including minor plumbing and electrical work, security doors, ventilation, and considerable sound



insulation. In addition, the corridors were improved with sound insulating and easily cleaned surfaces, and anti graffiti painted walls. There were also environmental works, improvements to the entrances, and a social programme aimed at setting up clubs and associations for groups of residents. The main achievement here was the creation of a Womans Association which played a significant part in later consultations.

Only a qualified success was claimed for this programme. The main progress seems to have been (according to Acadie's evaluation (Acadie 1985)) the physical works which were done. These stopped the disrepair on the estate reaching "catastrophic" levels (Ville de Meaux 1989). One main difficulty was that the HLM was not fully engaged in the programme (OPAC de Meaux 1990) at this point, and pursued a continuing programme of promoting the adjacent Beauval estate, onto which it continued to move its best tenants. The longer term problems of long term maintenance, of management, of image, of voids (which continues to rise), and of social isolation, remained (Ville de Meaux 1989 p3).

DSQ Programme: The HLM (Office Public until 1987, then OAPC de Meaux) became fully engaged in the process of estate renewal with the development of the DSQ programme in 1984 (initially as an "Illot Sensible"). The main objectives can be grouped together in relation to two main underlying themes: first, improving the everyday life for residents by better quality of services, and involving them in the management of the estate; and second combatting estate stigmatisation by integrating the estate into the wider city community, by a change of image and attitude [désenclavement de la cité].

Better Services: 1. The HLM This started at the level of the HLM who appointed an officer in 1985 with the responsibility to stimulate and manage the new programme. Her responsibility ranged from management of the local team on the estate to the primary responsibility for ensuring the HLM integrated its efforts into the wider DSQ programme. This was the first of such appointments to HLMs in France, and indicated a recognition of the new social role which would be necessary to deal with



### **HLM Project Objectives:**

#### Improved Tenant Services

- improved management
- better maintenance services
- reduced degradation to common parts
- tenant involvement in the estate
- making the estate clean and tidy
- reducing rent arrears

#### Combatting Stigmatisation

- changing the image of the estate
- supporting the wider DSQ objectives

### **Box 15: Objectives of Programme**

Sources: Acadie 1984,85; Ville de Meaux 1989; Collinet Services 1989; discussion with local agents

the types of problems on difficult estates. An extensive staff training programme was introduced; resident associations were stimulated; there was a purge of rent arrears cases, with the introduction of new procedures and well publicised and widespread evictions carried out; allocations policies were reviewed.

### 2. Estate Cleanliness One

main approach to this was by the establishment in 1985 of a "régie de quartier". This

idea grew from an initial experiment in the Alma-Gare neighbourhood in Roubaix (near Lille). The Regie at Meaux was one of the earliest of the "second wave" of these organisations. Their general purpose is to set up an independent organisation, closely linked to the local statutory agencies (including HLMs) with the triple objectives of carrying out works of maintenance and cleaning; involving the residents in this work, thereby giving them income, work experience, and a sense of ownership of the conditions on the estate; and finally providing an intermediary organisation to develop better relations and communication between the various agents on the estate, and the residents (see Behar, D. (1987) and Behar, D. (1988) for additional details of history, purpose, and evaluation).

In Meaux, its basis (set out in Collinet Services 1989) was

- to mobilise the estate residents around the cleanliness and general appearance of their estate, by employing them on cleaning and repair work.



- thereby to increase incomes in those households through this part time work
- to work with young people on a work experience project which would equip them for eventual employment
- become one of the key estate organisations, capable of developing other projects as well

### Combatting Stigmatisation

The change of image required was not only to the external image held by people off the estate, but also to the image held by residents themselves. For this reason the plans involved a mixture of attracting outsiders onto the estate, and in parallel devising programmes for tackling the skills deficiencies, and poor self image, of residents. All this was done in concert with the main DSQ programme, and details are set out below.

### **What Happened?**

A considerable amount of coordinated work took place during the programme, (and still continues within the context of the 1989 -93 programme).

### **Improved Tenant Services**

Improved management: The local office is now in the centre of the estate, with better trained staff providing increased services to tenants, including assistance with arrears problems and tenants associations.

Allocations: There is also a new approach to allocations - essentially both the city and the HLM have decided that no further immigrant households will be placed on the estate, and any new tenancies of people with social or economic problems will be avoided if possible. This is hard to sustain, for two main reasons. First, the level of voids remains high, despite the reduction in the number of available units by 300. A sustained campaign of communication of the benefits of the estate, and its changed image, is intended to combat this. Second, however, the HLM has difficulty placing black households in its more desirable estates, mainly in the city centre. Several attempts have been made to mix tenants on these estates, but the problem



of semi explicit racial prejudice has in several instances resulted in the black households demanding a transfer to La Pierre Collinet. The allocations coordinator found this one of the most difficult and intractable problems in her work.

**Economic:** Economic and Social Initiatives Centre set up to attract businesses; conversion of part of Block B to offices

**Commercial:** Development proposed 1989-93 programme

**Educational:** "School and Neighbourhood" project

**Family:** Social Centre (CSE) plus creche

**Leisure:** Clubs organised via social centre

**Box 16: Non Housing Elements**

Better Caretaking: An increased importance was given to the role of caretakers. Additional training was given, and they were now expected to carry out a social role in relation to the tenants - helping them with day to day problems, and intervening to sort out disputes - as well as the more day to day duties of cleaning and minor repairs. There were 5 caretaking staff in the long blocks, and a caretakers office which had regular hours, and

which was the first point of contact for tenants with any type of problem.

Better maintenance: The establishment of Régie de Quartier had lead to a greatly improved service; tenants could call in and request minor works to be done; but more usefully they could borrow tools, and buy materials at virtually cost price, to do improvement of their own to their flats (such as install a new shower or heater). Advice and assistance was also available. This was helped by the extensive works which had been done to the interiors of the flats as part of the original HVS programme, which had dealt with the major plumbing and electrical problems.

Improvements to common parts: Extensive works were carried out to stairs and entrances including remodelling all the entrance halls (entryphones were not installed). One major problem was dealt with by the creation of a new refuse disposal system, providing sufficient and accessible bins in remodelled bin rooms on all the landings. In addition, environmental works were carried out to the paths and green areas of the estate, including the play areas.



## **Improved Tenant Services**

Improved management: Retrained Staff; local office now in centre of estate; increased services to tenants including assistance with arrears problems and tenants associations;

Better caretaking: trained caretakers with a social role

Better maintenance: extensive works to interiors of flats; establishment of Régie de Quartier, greatly improved service

Reduced degradation to common parts: works to stairs and entrances including remodelling entrance halls; creation of new refuse disposal system; environmental improvements to paths and green spaces.

Tenant involvement in the estate: several associations and tenants groups established, including Régie de Quartier

Reducing rent arrears: Extensive action taken (but arrears remain problem)

New allocations policy: to exclude immigrant and difficult tenants.

## **Combatting Stigmatisation**

Changing the image of the estate: change of use of part of one building to offices; demolition of one long block (265 flats) for construction of individual and low rise houses/flats; use of some flats as student hostel/temporary employee flats (e.g. for use by Eurodisney employees)

Supporting the wider DSQ objectives: cooperation with many projects achieved

## **Box 17: Summary of Outcomes**

Tenant involvement in the estate: The level of participation was raised through not only the Régie de Quartier but also the active support by the HLM of the Social Centre and its many projects (see below).

Reducing rent arrears: Following the purge which took place from 1986-7 a series of measures, both preventative and of enforcement, were taken. Despite this, arrears remain a problem.



**Combatting Stigmatisation**

Changing the image of the estate: There are three main areas of development: first, the problem of voids was partly tackled by reducing the number of housing units. This was partly achieved by the change of use of part of one building to create 2,400 m<sup>2</sup> of offices - a business centre into which the HLM office moved, as well as attracting several important businesses (such as the Caisse d'Epargne, one of the main banks). Half of the space was intended for use by off estate businesses in the Meaux area -It was hoped that by forcing people from off the estate to come to work there, they would spread the word that the place was not as bad as its reputation suggested.

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>		£5
		(£4.6 million on homes, £0.4 million on environ. & Régie)
<b>Cost per estate home:</b>		£2,700
<b>DSQ Contribution:</b>		£1.3
Million		
<b>Other Contributions:</b>		£0.35
million from Region		
<b>Non Housing Programme Cost:</b>		£1.5 million

**Box 18: Summary of Expenditure**

Second, following much planning and a day festival of fairwell, one of the long blocks of 265 flats was demolished, and the land used for the construction of individual and low rise houses/flats. A video of this day was made, and is available from Collinet Services, which contains fascinating interviews - with not only the HLM and city representatives who explain the objectives of the demolition, but also with many local residents (who, it emerges from the film, have little clue what is going on or why). There is a certain amount of resentment and confusion on the estate about who these flats are for. Some will be used for estate residents, but the idea for most of them is to attract a different, more economically and socially stable population.

Finally some of the flats are being used for special lets, as student hostels, or as business lets for firms who need immediate accommodation for new or transitory employee flats - workers on the nearby EuroDisney site were one group it was hoped to attract.



Supporting the wider DSQ objectives: From 1988 a special "Neighbourhood Committee" was set up to involve all of the local residents associations and the main statutory and other agencies in creating a coordinated approach to the improvement of life on the estate. The HLM cooperated with many projects, particularly by making available some of the housing accommodation for offices or other housing uses, and making available 60m<sup>2</sup> of space in every building for youth centres. It is also heavily involved in the Social Centre. This centre provides a range of activities including youth clubs, "Third Age" clubs for elderly residents, a Portuguese school, literacy classes, and so on. It has several special projects (such as a linguist who works with the African families, and a youth sports worker). In addition a special "School and Neighbourhood" project was created around the three objectives of improving school achievement rates, improving communication between parents, children and schools, and involving parents and children together in projects of improvements to open spaces and play spaces on the estate.

Little progress has been made in improving the shopping facilities, but it is proposed to tackle this as part of the DSQ 1989-93 programme

### **Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

#### Range of Interviews

Interviews were held with all the main sections of housing staff (caretaking, allocations, communication, arrears and tenant welfare); with the HLM project supervisor (who had been appointed in 1985 and had an encyclopedic knowledge of the estate and its history); with three members of the DSQ team; and a Régie de Quartier manager. Themes which emerged are set out below.

Slow progress: None of the agents (particularly the caretakers) had any illusions that the estate was yet transformed. It was certainly better than before, and there remained lots of hope, but changes were painfully slow to take root, and could be quickly reversed (e.g. the position on graffiti and vandalism). The Régie de Quartier was one of the stable improvements which had engaged the interest of tenants, and apparently there were no conflicts with caretaking staff who also were very



supportive.

**Slow progress:** improvements were incremental and fragile

**Resident difficulties:** many of the problems stemmed from disadvantaged tenants

**Transformed local management:** trained, committed staff, particularly caretakers

**Diversification:** of buildings, of tenants, of uses, was key to change

**Repairs and improvements:** much improved services, particularly the Régie

**DSQ/City/HLM teamwork:** including the support throughout of the city

**Box 19: Main Issues from Interviews**

Resident difficulties: It was clear to all that many of the problems stemmed from the background, poverty, and general disadvantage of residents. Some, such as the Malian women who spoke no French, and were in constant danger of being shipped back to Mali if they caused trouble in their households, were almost entirely excluded from the social life of the estate. Others, such as the adolescent "beurs" (those born of immigrant Magherabin families), had difficulties establishing their identity. Often people seeking assistance with rent arrears problems

would not be truthful - the caretaking staff provided additional information to the office, and stories given to arrears staff about household composition would often turn out to be "misleading". There was, however, little antagonism between the various groups - certainly there were problems, but specific or individual problems in general. Changing the mix on the estate, difficult as it was to enforce, was seen as one of the key ways to try to break out of this problem.

Transformed local management: The HLM had since 1985 taken seriously that there needed to be a different type of management on the estate, and the commitment to training, particularly caretaker training, showed this approach. The different local teams - DSQ, Régie, HLM now worked well together, complementing the services offered, and agents spoke supportively of their colleagues in other agencies. Again, the willingness to take a wider view on the allocations question was mentioned several times as an indication that the HLM now looked at management in the round, rather than simply filling empties.



Diversification: Most agents mentioned the benefits of the changes of use of buildings, and the demolition and newbuild proposals. Destroying the monotonous density of concrete was a very positive step. The initiatives to bring transitory workers to the estate were also seen as bringing variety and on outside view, as were the proposals to use blocks for hostel accommodation for students and other young people.

Repairs and improvements: Generally the services to tenants on repairs were good. The key here was the Régie - although the HLM had a typically tight control over its maintenance budget, the availability of parts, tools, and assistance at a very cheap rate meant that many tenants felt that the repairs and improvements issue was taken seriously, and that the HLM was making positive steps to help them.

DSQ/City/HLM teamwork: There was little awareness of the totality of the programme except at the level of the Chef de Projet or the HLM project supervisor. Other staff had little formal contact with the DSQ. There was a clear feeling amongst the HLM staff, however, that the HLM itself was the driving force behind the programme. The fact that the Mayor was also the HLM president had quite a lot to do with this, for the continuing support of the city was clearly seen as a key to the steady progress.

### **Summary and Evaluation**

Many changes were evident in the way the estate now operated. Despite this, considerable problems remained. This is indicated in the table below showing the main indicators.

There has been little change in the general characteristics of the population: the estate retains the highest concentration of poverty, unemployment, and immigrant groups in Meaux. Little can be done to change the basic monotony of the estate without further large scale demolition. Voids remain a problem, as the allocations strategy of not filling vacancies with low income or immigrant households contributes to the difficulties of letting vacant units.



**Voids:** 15%

**Arrears:** Down significantly, to 8% (although estate still remained worst estate of HLM stock)

**Turnover:** Reduced from 18.3 to 10.5 p.a.

**Condition of Improvements:** Generally well maintained, though improvements "fragile"

**Image:** Evidence of some slow improvement, from business and commercial activity returning to estate, and new tenants

**Appearance:** Demolition, newbuild, and environmental works transforming monotony of estate

**Tenure and Ownership:** Now only 1399 out of original 1851 units (24% decline); others offices, hostel, business lets

**Population:** Remains poor (34% under 4500F/month cf 21% total HLM stock), many single parents, many immigrants (46%). 24% of Meaux RMI claimants on estate, with 12% of population

**Crime and Vandalism:** Significant reduction; no riots 1990

**Local Management:** Strengthened local team; Régie for repairs

**Participation:** Thriving community groups and Estate Committee

---

#### **Box 20: State of Main Indicators Now**

Despite this apparent limited change in indicator, nonetheless major programmes have been implemented. There is every sign from the achievement of works and the opinions of the local agents that the partners to the improvement programme are working together to put in place some impressive improvements. The programme of demolition, new build, and changes of use is a long term, coordinated strategy, complemented by the new allocations strategy. The emphasis on tenant participation has made real inroads into the apathy and isolation of residents through the associations and Régie. The services offered by the DSQ sponsored groups, and the HLM, are clearly now better tailored to the needs of estate residents.

The continuing will to improve the estate, and the continuing need for major




investment of resources, is also evident in the fact that the estate remains in the DSQ (DIV) programme for 1989 - 93. The main objectives of this new programme were :

- \* building on the success of existing social projects
- \* change of use of buildings
- \* continuing integration with the city by attracting business and leisure, and insisting that problem families be integrated elsewhere in the city
- \* public relations and publicity
- \* creation of more formal management and monitoring of the programme

With the continuing involvement of the DSQ (DIV) and HLM commitment, more progress will be made - but even then, lasting improvements are not guaranteed.



Mont Liébaut, Béthune





Mont Liébaut, Béthune

Béthune is a mining city of 26,000 residents, but the centre of an urban area of some 260,000 people in smaller towns and villages, and as a consequence is ranked by INSEE as amongst the 20 most important French agglomerations of over 250,000 people. It has a medieval centre, with a historic belfry.

<b>Estate Name:</b>	Mont Liébaut
<b>Region:</b>	Nord Pas de Calais
<b>Community:</b>	Béthune
<b>Community population:</b>	26,000
<b>Estate population:</b>	4,000
<b>Politics:</b>	Stable PS (Socialist)
<b>Location Aspects:</b>	Clearly separated from city by railway and marshalling yard; open land on other sides
<b>External Reports:</b>	None

The population of Béthune traditionally engaged in agriculturally based activities, then from the end of the 19th century developed as a mining community. The decline in mining began in the 50s and 60s. Attempts were made to replace it with other industries, most noticeably the Firestone tyre factory which created 2,000 jobs. The de-industrialisation of the area continued, however, compounded by a the trend to build new homes in

**Box 21: Location**

smaller villages and surrounding suburban areas, leading to a net decline in the population of Béthune since 1975. The first blocks were constructed on the estate in 1962, with most of the large blocks completed in the south sector of the estate prior to 1969. A second programme of 202 smaller blocks was completed between 1974 and 1976. Its 41 blocks are built round a commercial and administrative centre. The older, southern part of the estate is the most problematic, with the largest and worst blocks and a high concentration of the social problems, and it is this section of the estate which has been the focus of most attention. The itself town developed into three distinct zones in the 70's - the industrial sector in the north; the commercial and administrative sector, with the traditional housing stock, in the middle and three fifth of the population, and the clearly separated new ZUP estate in the south, housing the rest of the Béthune residents.



Population

The original population was drawn from workers who were attracted by the programmes of retraining and industrial reinvestment which were instigated to replace the declining mining industry in the 60s (details drawn from Mairie de Béthune (1984),(1987);(1989);and Van Acker (1988)). These included very few ethnic minority households, who still make up a negligible proportion of the estate population. By the mid to late 70's, however, the increasing availability of suburban or village homes, and the declining overall population, meant that the ZUP homes were less and less attractive, and the major and continuing problems of voids began to emerge. By 1980 over 30% of new tenants were unemployed; many of these were single parent families, and in the south sector in 1983, 85 % of working heads of households were in skilled or unskilled manual jobs.

**Incomes:** 35% benefits only

**Employment:** 85% of employed are skilled or unskilled workers; 20% unemployment

**Households:** 30% single parents; 44% 3+ kids; 70% adults under 40

**Qualifications:** Low levels of skills (no figures)

**Ethnic:** Very small ethnic population (no figures)

Box 22: Population

Figures for the same year (Ville de Béthune 1984) show that about half the residents were children, and in the south sector 44% of households had more than 3 children. There was a polarisation of adult ages also: 70% of them were under 40; and 15% over 60. The estate itself was split into zones: in the north part, with the more recent and smaller blocks, there was a high concentration of small families

of employed, better off tenants, who tended to stay on the estate for a few years only before moving on to subsidised suburban owner occupation. In the south sector, there were buildings with high concentrations of large families without incomes from employment, (who were reported to be in frequent conflict with their elderly neighbours, and who were stuck on the estate).

Original Problems

The problems facing the estate are set out in Ville de Béthune



**Constructed:** 1962-69; small sector 1974-76

**Total Units:** 1374

**Block Types:** Mix of 5 storey long blocks and 9 storey towers

**Flat types:**

18 bedsit

221 1 bed

690 2 bed

353 3 bed

92 4 bed

**Block Mix:** Mixed throughout

**Layout:** Central avenue leading to blocks, plus peripheral roads

#### **Box 23: Estate Details**

1984. They began to develop during the 70's, when the estate found increasing difficulty attracting a mix of tenants, and began to develop problems of turnover, voids, and degradation. In 1980 the City made the first approach to the HLM with a request that it draw up plans for dealing with 2 of the worst blocks, which had become notorious due to their dereliction, and state of abandonment. Voids was the main problem: by the end of 1982 there were 300; by 1983, 365; and by 1984, 417, of which 217 were demolished

during the year. The problem was greatest in the larger units: at the end of 1984, 28% of the 4 beds were vacant. The flats were also difficult to relet until major works had been carried out, and relet periods were long: 14 months in 1982, rising to 18 months in 1984. By the end of 1984, 22% of the voids had been empty for over 3 years. The annual turnover of tenants was high at 30%, although the highest turnover on the estate was in the North sector, where people moved off to enter owner occupation.

There was a clear acceptance that the management of the estate was inadequate: the 1984 report (Ville de Béthune 1984) sets out clearly that the HLM has not delivered a service which is tailored to meet the needs of the estate, but has up to that point simply been concerned to collect rents and do minimal repairs.

The problems were summarised as being of two types: first the external problem of the unbalancing of the local housing market -a net surplus of housing due to population decline and shifting pattern of housing concentrated in the countryside. Second an internal problem of unbalancing of the estate population, and the



**Voids:** This was most serious problem with 30% void, with 22% of voids empty over 3 years

**Arrears:** 67% of households in arrears

**Turnover:** 30% overall, 28% in south sector

**Image:** Estate very unpopular; excess of voids over demand; increasing image of degradation

**Isolation:** Estate physically separated from city by disused railway sidings, creating clear barrier

**Construction:** System built; problems of insulation, noise, heating and hot water systems

**Repairs:** Poor service, managed from remote office

**Security:** No systems in place

**Management:** No office on site; orientation only to financial aspects of estate (rent receipts, budgets), with little knowledge of tenant problems or estate ["Une gestion courante et un service rendu mal adaptés"- Ville de Béthune p9]

**Tenant Attitudes:** Little social or associative life; rising levels of complaint about HLM service

---

#### **Box 24: Major Problems at Start**

(All figures 1984, from Ville de Béthune 1984)

management of the tenants and stock - due partly to the malfunctioning of the HLM, and partly to the social and other problems of the residents.

There were physical problems with the stock, mainly in terms of the thermal and acoustic insulation of the dwellings; the basements were derelict and disused; lack of proper maintenance had lead to general degradations, particularly in the entrances halls and stairwells. The spaces between blocks caused problems also, again mainly due to neglect and absence of proper maintenance and care programmes.

There was, in addition, a wider problem which was being tackled by the City, that of the physical and social separation of the estate from the rest of Béthune. The



estate had become seen as a dumping ground for problem families, and due to the physical separation and isolation from the rest of the city, they were in fact cut off from many of the City's services and opportunities. This led to feelings of isolation, helplessness, shame of living on the estate, and entrapment, which were expressed clearly in the first series of meetings held in 1983 following the initiation of improvement proposals. This was reflected not only in the high levels of unemployment, but also in high levels of scholastic failure, low levels of skill training amongst the young people, and increasing incidents of serious neighbour disputes. There was also an almost total absence of any organised social life of estate associations. The City regarded this polarisation of the estate as a major city wide problem to be tackled and overcome - the estate was to be reintegrated to the life of Béthune (the problem and proposal on a city wide basis are set out in detail in Van Acker 1988).

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

The initial planning to tackle the problems of the city (conceived at the start in terms of the polarisation of the three sectors) started in 1979, leading to the publication of a planning and renewal strategy in 1981. This plan aimed to revitalise the city centre; to create a means of linking the estate to this centre, to rehabilitate the estate, and to restore a coherence and quality of life to the city as a whole. This was to be achieved partly by the rehabilitation of a large old railway shed, and the construction of a large commercial centre on the land previously occupied by sidings. There was also a programme to carry out rehabilitation of certain of the blocks, to build some new, individual homes on the estate, to create jobs on or near the estate, and to provide better public facilities, particularly sporting and leisure facilities.

The DSQ programme itself was initiated in 1984, and followed on from these original objectives. It was coordinated by the mandatory local commission, but in addition was administered by a local team consisting of the DSQ project manager, the HLM manager, the Béthune city architect, a local official from the Health and Social Affairs ministry, and an official of Développement Culturel. Four working groups



were developed, on housing and urban development, on youth training and development, on families and work, and on the development of social relations. The programme was driven and coordinated by the Deputy Mayor, who was a moving force throughout.

The key objectives of the programme were:

- changing the image of the estate, its physical isolation, and a diversification of its functions
- improvement of the living conditions, the infrastructure and services, and an improvement in the social, management, and technical services
- as better social dynamic

The HLM objectives were divided into the categories of physical and management changes.

---

#### Physical Improvements:

(aimed at tackling voids and disrepair)

- external and stairwell improvements
- demolitions and change of use
- newbuild construction to diversify stock
- environmental improvements
- better maintenance

#### Management Actions

- try to stabilise the population
  - try to produce a balanced population
  - provide high quality, appropriate services
  - engage the tenants as responsible residents
  - contribute to DSQ aims of social improvements
- 

#### **Box 25: Housing Objectives of Programme**



Physical Improvements: These were aimed at the twin problems of vacancies, and of disrepair. The main method was by means of an extensive programme of improvements, changes of use, and demolitions, which had started prior to the DSQ programme. The initial work was brought forward in 1983, apparently, by the accidental death of two young children in one of the worst void blocks (though I was unable to establish the exact details). This led to the decanting and demolition of two blocks on the periphery of the estate, 217 homes in all, as a mark of the City's commitment to initiate a programme of works.

The subsequent DSQ programme set out to reduce the density of residential accommodation, by the subsequent demolition of 60 further homes of the same type. In addition, there was a change of use of one entire street of three blocks (177 homes) into offices, including a local office for the HLM, and several offices of the city administration and other public bodies. This was intended not only to deal with voids, but to lead to a much more mixed and less densely residential estate, to provide local jobs, and to provide local services. Finally, 70 new houses were constructed, of which 59 were for rent, with a view to providing a better mix of accommodation types.

The remaining homes were also targeted for improvements, with a view to trying to make life more tolerable for residents and encourage them to stay on the estate. This work included thermal and acoustic insulation, improvements in the heating and hot water system, external painting and decoration to change the appearance of the estate, renovation of the stairwells, new letter boxes in the entrance halls, new electricity supplies, and a small amount of work to be done in the interiors of the flats, at the discretion of the residents. In addition the basement areas were sealed off. The final element to this was a commitment to the better maintenance of the stock following the improvements. Lack of attention to disrepair and degradations had been identified as one of the contributory factors in the poor image of the estate leading to the voids problem, and a commitment was made to maintaining the new standards to be achieved.



---

**Actions for young people:** including training and educational measures, sports programmes for after school and holidays, a "Maison de Communication" for new technology training, and job creation

**Action for infants:** including a specialist medical service, creche, and nutrition advice centre

**Action for elderly people:** including home alarms and meals on wheels services

**Encouragement of participation in Associations:** to overcome isolation, through provision of meeting facilities and support to groups

**Redevelopment of the Central Commercial Area:** to provide a focus for the estate, and better shopping and other amenities

---

#### **Box 26: Non Housing Elements**

The environmental and traffic arrangements were also to be improved, providing a set of pedestrian routes, road closures and sleeping policemen, the improvement and landscaping of large open spaces, and the provision of sports and play areas under that part of the main programme.

#### Management Improvements

There was also a very clearly set out programme of objectives for housing management improvements, stated at the start and in detail, unusually for a French case study. Measures included

- better allocations procedures: this included setting up a local allocations committee, whose first job was to define the objectives of a different approach to new tenancies. The underlying objectives were firstly to try to stabilise the population, and secondly to try to produce a more balanced population, with fewer poor and at risk households. This was partly to be done by means of computerisation of the waiting lists; partly by better information on applicants; and partly by better trained allocations staff.
- stabilising housing costs for tenants. This was to be partly achieved by investment of management time in assisting them to claim benefits; and partly by trying to keep rent and service charges to a minimum, by better



servicing and control of heating, hot water, and other installations.

- reducing problems of arrears and other income losses, by better control of arrears and former tenants accounts, a commission for rent arrears, better control of transfers, and more inspections prior to tenants leaving flats (to ensure the flat was left in good condition and reduce relet times and costs)
- providing a local service from an estate office, whose response would be fast and excellent. This included clarifying the role of the caretakers, giving them a more interventionist and more social role; providing a better complaints procedure, and a more responsive and proactive repairs service
- providing a wider range of services to tenants; including a handbook for new tenants; assisting to resolve, and monitoring, neighbour disputes; a series of investigations to get a better knowledge of tenants and their problems.
- trying to promote tenant participation
- contributing to DSQ aims of social improvements

### **What Happened?**

The overall general plan of linking the estate to the city has been achieved with the construction of a large and attractive commercial centre on the site of the old railway sidings. In addition, most of the major programme of physical improvements and new building projects were achieved on site. The demolition and change of use programme was vigorously pursued, and is now being supplemented by a programme of specialist lets of certain parts of blocks to students and other groups. The environmental and traffic management schemes were also put into place.

Despite these extensive works, however, there remains considerable degradation and disrepair on the estate. Many of the entrance halls which were renewed became quickly vandalised; and although the commercial centre was improved, there remain many empty shops, and it continues to have an atmosphere of desolation. Certain aspects of the improvements are flourishing: the new Maison de Communication, providing employment and training, is a conspicuous success, buzzing with activity. The new offices, in the converted blocks, are mainly let and well maintained, also giving a feel of progress and stability.



---

## Physical Improvements

Rehabilitation: extensive works to exterior and interior of blocks, including stairwells and basement areas; but common areas quickly suffered damage

Demolition and change of use: 394 units converted or demolished; further units used for special lets schemes

Environmental: extensive works including road and pathways

## Management Improvements

Local office established on site in converted unit

Emphasis on caretaking: including social role

Removal of voids problem: by change of use, and careful allocations policies; though new population still poor

## General Image and Isolation

Creation of commercial centre: adjacent to estate to link it to the city; creating jobs and providing new services

---

### Box 27: Summary of Outcomes

The intended involvement of the population in the programme of works, and in associations on the estate, was not, however, achieved. Latterly a Régie de Quartier was started (for more details on this see the Meaux case study), which involved the tenants in minor repairs, and painting works, mainly in the entrance halls and common parts. This was often linked to the new RMI minimum income benefit (which required a programme of work or training to qualify).

The intended stabilising of the population and balancing of its mix had also not been achieved. Allocations were carefully vetted: although there was a functioning allocations committee, the main recommendations were made locally by the staff, and tended to be accepted. Contrary to what has been intended, the new tenants tended to be low income, and by 1989 25% of heads of households were unemployed unskilled workers - the pool of applicants left few "middle income" households to fill the voids. Nevertheless there were strenuous efforts made to weed out "problem"



households, on the part of the allocations officers. Extensive checking was done, including visiting all possible new tenants. This visit looked for evidence of problems, such as neighbour problems, and tenants who had dirty homes, or who were found to be in bed in the morning at the time the officer called, were likely to be marked down and recommended for refusal. The allocations visiting officer clearly identified the need for tenants who had the motivation to keep clean and out looking for work as evidence of suitability to assist in improving the estate, in contrast to the previous policy of housing anyone who would take a flat. There was in fact no written allocations priorities or policy to guide her in determining housing need priorities. (I was rather surprised to find this attitude, reminiscent of local authority attitudes in the UK 30 years ago.)

The measures to deal with what was one of the main problems at the start, the voids, were successful, however. This was, it is clear, mainly by virtue of demolition and change of use reducing the available units to a more manageable level in relation to the real level of demand; although considerable management effort had also gone into the task of achieving full occupation.

The other management changes were also mainly put in place, though some of them are still being fully implemented. The caretaking staff were retrained and given a more social role - but many of them still regarded their new role with some suspicion. Local caretaking offices were now open on a regular basis, though, unlike on other case study

estates, the opening hours were in the evening, and the offices were not very welcoming. Extensive computerisation had taken place; and extensive retraining of staff to understand their new roles in the decentralised, local structure. All this was to produce the new, appropriate, services. This was being slowly done, although at the time of the case study it was clear that many of the staff were old hands at

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>	£5.85
million	
<b>Cost per estate home:</b>	£5,969
<b>DSQ Contribution:</b>	£1.42
million	
<b>Other Contributions:</b>	£0.14
million from Region	
<b>Other Programme Cost:</b>	£4.98
million	

**Box 28: Summary of Expenditure**



their jobs, and that the change to a new way of regarding tenants was proving difficult.

**Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Interviews were held with all the main sections of the housing staff (arrears officer, allocations officer and visiting officer, improvements officer, caretaking supervisor, caretaker, and female cleaner [femme de ménage], tenant advisor on debt and social issues, and local manager); and with the DSQ project manager. The themes which emerged are set out below.

Cooperation and reflection
Changed image and reduced isolation
Failure of resident involvement
Importance of social dimension
Rapid degradation of improvements
Improved housing management

**Box 29: Main Issues From Interviews**

Cooperation and reflection

The key coordinators and managers of the project were clear that one of the main positive aspects of the programme had been the coordinated and thought out programmes which had formed the basis for the action taken. Starting with the original City programme in 1981, the Mayor and deputy Mayor had been insistent that working groups of all partners should

take careful stock of the problems prior to making full plans for the improvements. The continuity of support by the Mayor, and his insistence that he and his deputies be fully involved in the programme had been one of the key factors in the success of the programme. Since a large part of the city revenues was being invested in the estate, this had to be explained and justified to electors in the north and centre of Béthune; but this had been done. All these aspects had lead to cooperation and good working relations between the HLM, City, and other agents

Changed image and reduced isolation

Although the programme still had some way to go, it was generally agreed, amongst all the different people I spoke to, that the estate was now clearly seen as an



integral part of the city, to which a commitment had been made and was being fulfilled. It no longer carried the stigma of the forgotten part of the city.

### Failure of resident involvement

Although much had been achieved, particularly in the way of physical works, there had been a marked lack of resident participation in the programme. Even now there was not any properly operating residents association, despite some effort by the HLM. The problems this had caused had become apparent over the life of the programme, however, and the HLM was now fully committed to a series of social measures envisaged in the 1989-93 programme.

### The importance of the social dimension

Many of the agents stressed that although the physical works had been done, it was more and more realised that the problems were with the tenants social isolation, and lack of training and education. The need to provide places where they could meet, and programmes to assist in training tenants and preparing them for work, were now better realised. This was being tackled by the next (89-93) programme, which was almost entirely concentrating on social and economic actions, to assist the residents to integrate and become full members of the estate, town, and society. It was also part of the reason for the establishment of a Régie de Quartiers.

### Rapid degradation of improvements

Perhaps partly as a result of the failure to involve residents, the common parts of the estate had suffered a rapid decline following the improvements. There was a failure to involve the residents in any sense of ownership or pride in the estate, even although the feelings of general isolation from the City appeared to be lessening.

### Improved housing management

The HLM staff were clearly better trained than at the start of the programme, judging from the accounts of retraining given by many of them. The administrative procedures were also clearly better: new procedures for arrears recovery, new advisory and assistance services to help with problems of benefits and arrears.



extensive interviewing and vetting of allocations (instead of the prior system of taking anyone who applied), and a general commitment to providing services to tenants.

Amongst the front line staff - caretakers, arrears officers, allocations staff, there was a greater general level of awareness of the DSQ than was generally present in other French case study estates, many of them noting that it had led to better working relations with other agencies, and an injection of welcome funds. They tended to be very experienced staff, who had worked with the HLM for some time. This meant, however, that many of them had attitudes about the tenants which were difficult to change - for example the caretaking supervisor spent time discussing with me the problems of people from mining communities who did not know how to live in modern houses: they needed educating on how to use the bath, and other facilities. He described as his burden of responsibility the task of educating them, from a practical and moral perspective, on how to live together in flats. This may indeed reflect aspects of problems experienced by tenants, but its presentation seemed, as with the allocations supervisor described above, curiously out dated in its paternalism.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

This is a programme which has already achieved many of its original aims, mainly in terms of physical works being carried out and management changes being put into place. The more people oriented aspects - tenant involvement, change of social mix on the estate - have not yet been achieved. There is now a greater realisation that these problems will have to be directly tackled with the tenants themselves. This is shown, for example, in the allocations policy. It was hoped at the start to attract more middle income employed households. This has now changed to a decision that the best that can be hoped is to weed out some of the more troublesome of the traditional tenant population of the estate - poor, large families. More importantly, the HLM and DSQ have realised that it is necessary to work with the existing residents in order to provide a less socially isolated population.



---

**Voids:** Negligible (considerably reduced)

**Arrears:** Reduced and declining (figures not available)

**Turnover:** 19%, considerably reduced, although 90% of present population been on estate under 5 years

**Condition of Improvements:** Poor; much damage already caused

**Image:** Considerably improved; now seen as integrated to city, and an important development area

**Appearance:** Extensive improvements from demolition, newbuilding, traffic and environmental works

**Tenure and Ownership:** Now only 980 out of original 1374 units (29% decline). Sales programme now also being promoted for one of empty blocks, following rehabilitation

**Population:** Remains poor (25% household heads unemployed)

**Crime and vandalism:** Remains persistent on small scale

**Local Management:** Considerable improvements from local office; one of key successes of project

**Participation:** very weak; one of key weaknesses

---

#### **Box 30: State of Main Indicators Now**

Certain aspects have been particularly successful. The eradication of voids was done by both better management and by an imaginative use of disposal, change of use, and now sales. Arrears have been successfully controlled; staff have been well trained, and are committed to the programme. The HLM is well organised, using good procedures backed up by extensive computerisation.

The importance of the previous programme, which was already in place in the city, is an aspect not often so clear in France as in the UK. The city had decided to carry out certain physical and social work on the estate, and at that point the DSQ come along and provided both the framework and the money. It does not seem likely that the DSQ was the inspiration for the programme, and indeed the fact that one of the DSQ main objectives was not attained - resident involvement - suggests that it may have been incidental except for the provision of resources.



The additional important aspect of this is to note that in fact the problem was manageable in a town the size of Béthune. The estate was not so disproportionately large in relation to the surrounding urban area as to swamp it (as for example in Chanteloup) and the resources of the city, both monetary, political, and skills, could be successfully brought to bear to bring about successful improvements.

Finally the programme continues into the next programme. The Mayor and programme team have attempted to learn from the successes and failures of the 84-88 programme, and to launch a new, adapted, and imaginative programme for the continuing improvement of the estate, which shows every sign of slowly and steadily responding.



Doddington Estate, Wandsworth





Doddington Estate, Wandsworth

**Background and History**

Doddington Estate lies in the London Borough of Wandsworth, one of the inner London boroughs. The location of the estate was described in a French urbanism text (Chalaine 1972) as an example of a typical English inner city estate whose infill

<b>Estate Name:</b> Doddington
<b>Region:</b> London
<b>Community:</b> Wandsworth
<b>Community pop.:</b> 256,000
<b>Estate pop.:</b> 2,200
<b>Politics:</b> "Flagship" Conservative throughout
<b>Location aspects:</b> Railway on two sides; arterial road on third, estate on west. Very near Central London.
<b>External Reports:</b> Committee papers, plus promotional material only

location causes problems:

"between a major circulation route and a railway axis, as well as beneath the line of the main take off path for Heathrow Airport - despite the wish to avoid the lack of open space, doubt is thrown on the possibility of creating truly communal space" (p122).

Wandsworth Council itself has been for some years a "flagship" borough for conservative local government practices, and has promoted privatisation, the sale of council homes and estates, and other radical developments. This is reflected also in the housing management and

**Box 31: Location**

development policies also.

The estate was completed in 1969 and built to the Jespersen system of mass construction, with concrete frames and factory made cladding panels. There is a commercial centre in the middle of the estate, which was also built with two large areas of underground garages.

**Population**

Unemployment levels were high at the start of the project, and continue to be high. No details were available on the population breakdown on the estate, nor of the educational and training profile of the residents. There had, for example, been no skills survey completed as part of the project. The impression of the main housing



**Incomes:** 64% Housing Benefit

**Employment:** 25% unemployed  
(1988) c.f. 9.6% borough

**Households:** 14% single  
parents, c.f. 3.6% boro; 15%  
pensioners; 41% under 19 c.f.  
25% boro

**Qualifications:** n/k

**Ethnic:** High Afro-caribbean &  
Asian Indian population (41%)

### Box 32: Population

Source: Wandsworth 1988

**Constructed:** 1969 - 71

**Total Units:** 964

**Block types:** 6 x 14 floor  
towers  
9 x low rise

**Flat types:** 621 maisonettes  
343 flats

**Block mix:** mixed throughout

**Layout:** No through road on  
estate. Circulation by  
interior ring road.

### Box 33: Estate Details

unless there was no choice, meaning that primarily homeless households were being forced to accept homes.

Despite this, voids remained high; there were also high levels of crime and vandalism. There were numerous problems of repair, particularly to rotting wooden bedroom windows and unsafe and uncleanable metal living room windows, which had been tackled by a programme prior to 1984. Some corridor refurbishment had also been carried out with the aid of IAP funding. The major problems remained, however, of the image and general conditions of life on the estate, which the council

manager, however, who had been on the estate for over 7 years, was that there was a high proportion of single parents, many West Indian, at the start of the scheme. This had been because the estate had been a "dumping ground" for homeless families, (up to 90% of allocations at one stage) who were in many instances from these groups.

### Original Problems

The estate had declined since it was built, and by the late 70s was subject to many incidents of flat wrecking, widespread vandalism and crime, including on one occasion the impounding of a cache of arms, and tenants being forced to leave. The first report setting out the difficulties on the estate was produced for the Housing Committee in 1984 (Wandsworth 1984). Few people were willing to accept homes on the estate



decided to tackle in 1984.

---

**Voids:** 21%<sup>1</sup>

**Arrears:** 59% in arrears. Av. £415 cf. boro av. of £194<sup>1</sup>

**Turnover:** 58% in 5 years

**Image:** Estate very unpopular. Only homeless would "accept"

**Isolation:** Natural barriers, but not otherwise isolated

**Construction:** Linking overhead walkways; disused vast underground garages; large unused open spaces around blocks

**Repairs:** Major windows problems already tackled. Fire exit problems in top floors; entrances and stairs in very poor state

**Security:** Entryphone system disused; high crime rate; high vandalism rate

**Services:** inadequate rubbish disposal

**Management:** Small site office for improvement works; main admin from Town Hall (3 miles) or District Office (2 mile)

**Tenant Attitudes:** No active tenants associations;

---

#### **Box 34: Major Problems at Start**

Sources: Wandsworth 1984, 1985, 1985a, 1988

<sup>1</sup>1988 Form A figures

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

The original proposal for the estate was demolition. This was subsequently considered too costly, and a Special Estates Policy was created, with clear objectives, as set out below.

#### Diversifying Tenure:

This was seen as the first priority. Several initiatives were instituted to promote sales: targets were set for specific parts of the estate, and tenants were offered transfers in order to create additional voids for sale; all casual vacancies were sold; a show flat was opened, and publicly advertised; the flats which needed major work due to fire escape problems were sold following completion of the works.

This policy complemented the homeless initiatives, as sales priority is given in



---

**Project Objectives:**

- tenure diversification
  - more balanced community
  - full local management
  - changed "image"
  - tenant consultation/activity
  - creating 4 estate "zones"
  - environmental improvements
  - secure entrances & corridors
  - a multi agency approach
  - additional refurbishment
- 

**Box 35: Objectives of Programme**

Sources: Wandsworth 1985, 1985a, and discussion with local agents

Wandsworth to those tenants who will release a large family unit (for homeless use) and move into a smaller flat.

**Balanced Community:**

Lettings to homeless households were halted completely, and a local lettings scheme with priority for local estate residents, such as family members of existing tenants, was introduced. Priority was also given to people who

expressed a positive desire to live on the estate (sometimes friends of existing residents). A local transfer system was also created, to assist both in decanting and in permanent moves of people who needed different sizes of flat. These schemes were run on a strictly date order basis, and controlled from the local office.

**Local Management:** Part of an unused commercial property on the estate was changed into a local office, which opened in September 1985. It was staffed by one Special Estates Officer, who had overall responsibility for the estate, two housing management assistants, two technical assistants, and a technical clerk, with a housing sales officer and an arrears officer on the estate part time. The duties covered in the local office included rent arrears and control (though not Housing Benefit administration which in Wandsworth is handled by the Treasurers Department), repairs, registration of transfer requests, local lettings, monitoring of (contracted out) caretaking and cleaning, advice on purchase, tenant involvement, and general tenancy matters.



Improved Image: Explicit attention was paid to the public relations aspect of the works on the estate, with a view to combatting the previous bad press. Frequent public relations events were held, to which the local and ethnic press were invited, to mark various stages in the completion of works. A tenants newsletter was created, and a community broadsheet distributed by the housing department.

Tenant Consultation and Involvement: There were many problems to overcome, as prior to the new initiative there had been many promises made to tenants, but little improvement work, and tenants were generally disillusioned. Creating a good level of involvement in the plans was considered essential, however, and positive attempts were made to stimulate neighbourhood tenants associations, with the assistance of community workers based at the community association on the estate. The architects commissioned to develop plans for the estate were also given a clear brief to have extensive consultation, and a practice with considerable experience in working with local communities was chosen. A tenants hall was provided as part of the new office, as a means to promote tenants associations.

Creating 4 Estate Zones ("Neighbourhoods"): The overall plan developed involved splitting up the estate into four distinct parts, not only by demolishing certain of the walkways that linked the estate blocks to each other, but also by the creation of a completely new circulation route for cars and pedestrians - there was a new central access road, then cul de sacs to each neighbourhood. The environmental improvements were also planned to reinforce this local neighbourhood identity.

Environmental Works: A large landscaped grassed area was created in the centre of the estate. Low rise blocks had the surrounding land turned into a mix of individual gardens for ground floor flats and a locked communal garden, with children's play equipment, for the other flats. This provided a series of clearly identifiable and secure garden areas for small numbers of residents. For residents of high rise blocks, where they overlooked car parking roofs which were being retained, these areas were turned into patio gardens for the ground floor flats. An extensive programme of tree planting was undertaken throughout the estate.



Entrances and Corridors: Many of the walkways were demolished to create individual secure blocks. All of the entrance halls were refurbished and a number had major refurbishment undertaken, increasing their size and improving their orientation. A number of new lifts were provided. New entryphone systems were provided, including internal systems for each corridor. Walkways which remained were extensively improved by being roofed over with attractive pitched roofs painted in bright primary colours.

New refuse facilities were also provided, and because many tenants used larger bags than would fit in chute hoppers, additional facilities for large bags were provided close to each entrance.

**Leisure:** New sports and play facilities

**Economic:** Workshops created for small businesses

**Commercial:** Improvements to shopping and shopping areas

**Health:** plans for new family health centre and nursery

**Family:** Extension to nursery places

**Security:** New Policy surgery and better local contacts

**Box 36: Non Housing Elements**

Multi Agency Approach: Developing a plan which went beyond housing issues was seen as an essential element of the strategy. Improved services to the estate were encouraged from a number of local agencies and services. The police set up a weekly evening surgery; the Area Health Authority developed plans for a drop in centre, a nursery, and a Family Centre, British Rail developed plans for the arches and viaducts adjoining the

estate; a local traders association was set up to provide their input to the improvements; and a brewery agreed to provided a new pub garden for its premises as part of the environmental works. The Economic Development Department was charged with the task of attracting a major supermarket to the estate (as this was one of the key wishes of tenants). The Leisure and Amenities Department aimed to provide a purpose youth and sports centre with a one o'clock club, and sports organiser for the school holidays, plus specialist equipment for the under fives.

Physical Refurbishment Works: The main works done were to the external



appearance of the estate, including the walkways, and to the entrances described above. No internal works were done except for the top floor maisonettes of the low rise blocks. These all had problems of fire escape access - that this was through the next door flat, which made either personal security and fire escape access impossible, depending on whether the resident decided to lock this fire door. These flats were extensively remodelled to make flats on one level.

The programme of window renewal continued throughout the programme. This included the option, put to all residents and available free to tenants (charged to leaseholders), to have a bay window constructed on the front elevation - resulting in the totally random pattern of bays on the blocks. The facades of the blocks were also recovered and repainted.

### **What Happened?**

Tenure Diversification: This estate achieved a pronounced transformation of its tenure pattern from totally council owned to a current level of 35% leasehold, and rising. The vigorous programme of promoting sales has been very successful, at least up to the point of the collapse of the housing market in 1990/91, with many sales going to local or estate residents. The main plank of the programme of both sales and local lettings has been that only those who positively wish to live on the estate should be allocated or sold flats - and this policy has generated sufficient demand to leave the estate with currently an effective nil void rate, with only relet voids remaining. The transfers notice board in the local office shows that even some elderly tenants with houses and gardens are now willing to move onto the estate. No tenant cooperatives or management boards have emerged, partly because Wandsworth have concentrated on sales as a means of tenure diversification on this estate.

Image, Layout, and Environmental Works: The change to being a high demand estate from a hard to let estate indicates that at one level the image has changed considerably. The physical image has certainly changed, with the multi coloured building features and diverse new layout, including a spectacular new entrance arch,



**Tenure and Community Diversification:** 35% now sold; local lettings and sales waiting lists oversubscribed; new intake of homeless families banned; only those wishing Doddington admitted.

**Local Management:** On estate management office with full range of services

**Changed "image":** Demand for estate accommodation now outstrips supply; crime levels down and estate off police list of "problem" estates

**Tenant Consultation/activity:** 32% involved in consultations; Thriving community association; 3 residents associations; well attended public meetings

**Environmental Improvements:** New individual and secure communal gardens; new estate layout and roads; change of use of underground garages;

**Secure Entrances & Corridors:** New entrances constructed, entryphones fitted and accepted by residents.

**Multi Agency Approach:** Extensive cooperation of several council departments and other agencies; new supermarket

**Refurbishment:** Extensive works programme achieved, including corridors and entrances

---

#### **Box 37: Summary of Outcomes**

presenting a very positive and striking image to visitors, as well as to residents. One of the most striking features is the use of the previous communal space for the gardens, both the private gardens at the rear of blocks and the patio gardens in the centre of the estate.

The sharp reduction in crime, resulting partly from the increased security measures, partly from the increased sense of community, partly from the removal of the underground garages as a haven for criminal activity and gathering of young vandals, has also improved the image. These garages were either demolished, turned in to secure individual lock up garages, or transformed for use as workshops or in one case as resident clubrooms.

Consultation and Resident Involvement: Following a vigorous programme of meetings, leaflets, day festivals, and surgeries, 32% of tenants participated in the



discussion of proposals. There are now three residents associations and a community association, and apparently a high degree of participation in estate life.

Entrances and Corridors: The creation of new entrances seems to have been successful. They are well maintained and generally in good working order.

Multi Agency Approach: Generally the services on the estate (caretaking, cleaning, repairs, green services) have been privatised, and are carried out by contractors whose work is inspected by the estate staff. Other council departments seem to work well with the estate staff.

Rehabilitation: Original discussions on improving the estate had been started in 1980. It was therefore felt important that at the point that the full new Special Estate Initiative took off, works should start with a bang.

The initial works were therefore of demolition of some of the walkways, and of one set of underground garages, to show that the council now meant business. In due course extensive works were carried out, at costs set out in the table below. It should be noted that income from the sales programme accounts for a large part of the capital investment

<b>Total Housing Cost:</b>		£23 million (to completion)
<b>Cost per estate home:</b>		£23,900
<b>EA Contribution:</b>	£3.309 Million (1986 -89)	
<b>Other Contributions:</b>		Significant funds were from sales of homes on the estate

resources available to Wandsworth. The extensive borough wide sales programme has resulted in the generation of sufficient capital resources not only to do major renovation works on certain estates (sometimes prior to disposal) but also to reach a position where within about 2 years all housing debt will be paid off. The investment in Doddington represented a major part of the total capital investment of the Housing Department, with in 1988 the Doddington investment making up by itself 25% of the total housing capital programme.

**Box 38: Summary of Expenditure**



**Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Range of Interviews In all seven local agents were interviewed in depth, representing all the main management functions, including the project manager, allocations officer, estate manager, arrears and benefits officer, and district manager. I decided not to interview any of the contract staff, however (as they were not directly employed by the estate management team, and were liable to change at any point) so no caretakers of cleaners are represented in the discussion. It was both unusual and useful that two of the main players had been between them working on the estate for in total eighteen years.

**Stability:** estate now had a balanced community who wished to stay

**Managed population:** local lettings and "Doddington seekers only" policy was a key to the success

**Significant Physical Changes:** "neighbourhood" creation, the environmental and security works had been successful

**Multi Agency Approach:** the involvement of commerce and other services worked well

**Local Management:** the estate office was a well established focus for residents

**Box 39: Main Issues from Interviews**

Local Office and Management

The atmosphere in the local office is very relaxed and friendly. it is clear that the local staff are well known and respected, and trips around the estate inevitably involve stopping frequently to exchange information or greetings tenants. The repairs service appears responsive, and despite the absence of a dedicated repairs team, the contractor has ceratin operatives virtually full time on the estate, who as a consequence know the buildings and the tenants well.

The local team is stable, and are all experienced officers. One key to this had been at the start of the project, and since, only experienced volunteers who wished to take up the challenge of Doddington had been transferred onto the estate. The main local manager appears content to be on the estate, and takes a pride in the changes which have taken place over the last few years. The estate receives many visitors whom the Borough seeks to impress with the success of its approach. The District Manager, who works in the District Office one mile away, is also clear that the estate has improved. Both long serving



officers attribute the changes to a combination of altering the population, and effective physical and environmental works. Relations with other agencies - for example police and health visitors - were generally good, with many regular contacts over tenants. There was a certain dissatisfaction over the perceived limited control over the privatised services, but even here the staff worked hard to generate good relations. In particular, caretaking is felt to be a problem by the local staff - more in terms of the fact that there is not really enough cleaning in the contract, and despite a reasonable performance from the contractor it is not really enough to maintain a high standard (although the estate is by no means dirty or litter strewn).

### Physical Works

One key element of the programme was felt to be the involvement of residents and willingness to change as the programme proceeded. For example it had become clear after the first set of improvements to entrances that a double set of security doors would be necessary, which was the model for subsequent installations. Equally the need for communal meeting space and provision for play schemes and nurseries had been recognised and catered for following consultation. Local staff now know the buildings well and are able to order repairs, and determine priorities of jobs, quickly and effectively.

### Allocations and Residents

All interviewed were clear that one key to the success of the project had been the policy of only allowing onto the estate those people who positively wished to live there. There were plenty of them - children or relations of existing residents, or others who wished to buy in the revitalised and conveniently located estate.

### Impact of EA Programme

Generally it was felt that the programme of improvements, and the direction of policy on the estate, had been initiated by the Borough itself; and that the main input of Estates Action had been to provide some cash (but by no means most of it). No advice was received from the associated agencies (e.g. PEP), although the City



---

**Voids:** Minimal (though all voids go to sales prog.)

**Arrears:** Down significantly; now few evictions

**Turnover:** Down, and extensive movement within estate

**Condition of Improvements:** Generally well maintained

**Image:** High demand estate

**Appearance:** Estate restructured and tidy

**Tenure and Ownership:** Now over 1/3 leasehold; no other disposals

**Crime and Vandalism:** Significant reduction

**Local Management:** Stable team, good service

**Participation:** Thriving tenants associations and other groups

---

#### **Box 40: State of Main Indicators Now**

Action Team had visited at one point in connection with the workshop and employment initiatives. The Estates Action personnel had "tagged along behind Wandsworth", and their main activity now was sending delegations to look at the estate and claim it was a success for the EA programme.

#### **Summary and Evaluation**

Generally it is clear that the estate is now much more successful, popular, and well managed than previously. This appears due to the significant expenditure on the estate, made possible more by virtue of the general sales policy than by the presence of Estates Action funding, which accounts for a small part of the total investment. Equally the development of the initiatives on the estate appears to have been based on the general policy lines of the borough as a whole, which helpfully coincided with the line advocated by Estates Action. All the major indicators suggest improvements, and the estate appears now to be in a fairly good state of repair and "habitability". The local office also has a positive and busy atmosphere. The main difference from other case studies, however, is the importance given to individual ownership of leaseholds, and the success of that policy.



Miles Platting, Manchester





Miles Platting Estate in Manchester

Miles Platting estate is part of inner city Manchester, to the north east of the city centre. The estate is a mix of maisonettes, terraced houses, and high rise flats,

<b>Estate Name:</b> Miles Platting
<b>Region:</b> North West
<b>Community:</b> Manchester
<b>Community Population:</b> 446,700
<b>Estate Population:</b> 9,000
<b>Politics:</b> Labour throughout
<b>Locational Aspects:</b> Estate divided by canal and waste ground surrounding abandoned factory; major arterial road to north.
<b>External Reports:</b> None

constructed in the early 1960s, comprising some 3,500 homes in all, plus an area of 800 older terraced homes in the adjacent streets which form a separate renewal area. The estate is built around the site of a now abandoned factory, which dominates the centre of the estate, together with part of the Rochdale Canal and the entrances to a number of abandoned small mines. There are good connections to the city centre by bus and rail, but the general facilities on the estate are restricted to a small

**Box 41: Location**

shopping centre, a public baths and washouse, and a branch library, as well as the housing office and branch office (apparently appropriately) of the probation service. The original problems have been evident on the estate since the late 1970s, and the programme for improvements began in 1982

**Population**

The estate was originally studied in 1981 as part of the preparation for the original Community Refurbishment Programme. Later information from the 1981 census indicated that the estate suffered from a range of social and economic deprivations. The unemployment rate was high, and there was a high proportion of semi skilled and unskilled workers. There was a high proportion of single parents, and young children. The total density on the estate was double the city average. There was also a high proportion of lone pensioners. The main problem, however, was that the population was becoming severely eroded, with very high levels of voids. There was a fear at



**Incomes:** High proportion (details not supplied) on benefits only

**Employment:** Male unemployment of 36%; higher than average semi-skilled and unskilled

**Households:** Twice city average of single parents; higher than average 0-4 year olds; higher than average lone pensioners; twice city average density of population

**Ethnic:** Vietnamese population (2%); and Afro-caribbean community (2%)

**Box 42: Population (1981 Census and other local information)**

set of physical problems. The double decker maisonettes suffered from water penetration through the flat

**Constructed:** 1960-65

**Total Units:** 3,500

**Block Types:** 126 x double decker maisonettes or maisonettes under flats or over shops; 13 x 13 storey towers; 900 low rise flats or houses

**Block and Flat Mix:** Towers all 1 and 2 bed flats; maisonettes mixed family units

**Layout:** Estate divided by canal; bounded by disused land

**Box 43: Estate Details**

The houses had underfloor heating and suffered from dampness and condensation, some to a severe extent. They were extremely cold and damp, and in a state of

the start of the project that the community was on the brink of total disintegration as it was becoming so isolated and fragmented, with the only new residents willing to move on being transient young homeless people.

**Original Problems**

The disintegration of the community had been mainly caused by the unpopularity of the estate due to its poor conditions. There were a variety of housing types, each with its own

roofs and via balconies, combining with inadequate and expensive heating and lack of insulation to cause dampness, condensation and mould growth. There were outdated fixtures and fittings, 20 year old wiring and lack of storage space; the communal entrances and stairs were vandalised and dilapidated; refuse chutes were frequently blocked or burned out. Two flights of stairs had to be negotiated to reach the upper maisonettes, often with prams or shopping, or in some cases with coal for the fires.



disrepair.

---

**Voids:** 18%

**Arrears:** No individual details available for estate, but high

**Turnover:** Particularly high in towers which were let to young single people

**Image:** Extremely poor; few willing to take flat

**Isolation:** Lack of shopping and employment opportunities

**Construction:** Towers Laings and 13/5/F8 type; Maisonettes brick and panel construction

**Repairs:** Considerable general disrepair; towers suffered from extensive penetration; all communal entrances vandalised

**Security:** No security systems

**Services:** General problems with rubbish chutes and disposal

**Management:** Local housing office already in existence

**Tenant Attitudes:** Community dispirited and disintegrating

---

#### **Box 44: Original Problems at Start**

The high rise flats formed a separate problem. Of the thirteen, one had been already turned into a block entirely for elderly people, with its own warden. Many structural problems affected the blocks: the windows suffered from rotting wood and draughty gaps; roofs were flat and suffered from rain penetration and high maintenance costs; the ground floor suffered from problems of dampness due to defective soil stacks, as well as some rain penetration and rising damp. Heating was mainly by expensive and inefficient electric underfloor heating, much of which was also failing; there was water penetration to the cavity walls throughout the building, and through the balconies and cladding due to inadequate or failed cavity trays, poor drainage, shoddy initial workmanship in fixing the walls, and high wind pressure; the lifts were subject to frequent breakdown; and there were problems with the refuse chutes.

There were other issues about the towers: there was a very high rate of turnover,



which itself lead to the creation of a bad reputation for certain of the blocks. In fact there was a hierarchy of quality of blocks, with certain having reasonably stable populations and fewer problems, but a hard core of four which were notorious in the city as problems. Security was also a problem, with a high crime and burglary rate in the towers, with in certain cases during the later 80s an increasing incidence of drug use and dealing.

The problem of the general environment of the estate was also recognised as being central to the difficulties. The main problem was the lack of private space around buildings, which lead in turn to a problems of large areas of unkept open space. This problem extended to the disused adjacent industrial land as well.

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

The original programme, to which Estates Action eventually contributed, was launched on 12 October 1981 by the City council. The aims were to:

- establish a stable inner city community in Miles Platting
- establish a dwelling density and dwelling quality comparable to the most successful low rise estates, surrounded by a high quality external environment which is both practical and economical to maintain
- encourage the maximum number of existing original tenants to remain in the new environment to act as a nucleus for the new community by enlisting their help in planning the improved estate.

The scheme was launched by a public meeting, and the opening of a multi disciplinary Project Team office and information centre on the estate. The project was managed by the Chief Executives Office.

The problems required a radical approach, and this was taken. There were two main phases of the development, first dealing with the flats and maisonettes; and subsequently (via Estate Action) dealing with the Towers. The maisonettes were to be dealt with by the radical process of "decapitation": the entire two upper floors, which previously constituted the upper maisonette, were to be removed, leaving only the lower two floors. These were then to be reroofed and rehabilitated forming



individual terraced houses in small blocks. The space left by what was originally the stairwell was incorporated into the adjacent homes as additional rooms, or in some cases made into a small one bedroom, two storey, house. This was an ambitious programme, as there were 101 blocks of maisonettes on the estate.

<b>Maisonettes:</b>	- Radical restructuring by decapitation
	- Internal rehabilitation
<b>Towers:</b>	- Remedial work against penetration
	- Security works with CCTV
<b>Resident Stability:</b>	Encouragement of community to move and stay together
<b>Management:</b>	- Additional training
	- New caretaking arrangements
<b>Environmental:</b>	- Creation of private gardens
	- New footpaths
	- Extensive planting

**Box 45: Housing Objectives of Programme**

The problems of the towers were resolved differently. Their problems of water penetration were tackled by a programme of remedial works. The main initiative however, under Estate Action, was a security programme. This involved the installation of a series of linked closed circuit TV cameras in blocks, linked to a central control centre. The accommodation for caretakers was also improved, and their position as managers of the blocks strengthened.

The environment was the third area for planning. The project team realised at an early stage that the poor environment was one of the main contributors to the discontent and dissatisfaction of local residents, particularly in terms of their lack of security and privacy. Tenant consultation reinforced this view, with the lack of private space immediately outside the dwelling a particular cause of complaint. There were numerous walkways and pathways which often ran very close to windows. Fencing was also low, and provided a poor physical and psychological barrier. The need to improve the environment was extended to the industrial and other adjacent land. This was included in a wider programme called the East Manchester Initiative, which involved both the purchase and demolition of derelict buildings and the implementation of environmental schemes.

Community involvement was also seen as a key part of the programme. It was



<b>P o l i c i n g :</b>	L o c a l
police/community panel	liaison
<b>Economic:</b>	Various projects
sponsored by	economic
development unit	
<b>H e a l t h :</b>	C o n t i n u i n g
development of local health centre	
<b>Commercial:</b>	New supermarket
development	

**Box 46: Non Housing Elements**

care and protection of the improvements. The consultation process was also seen as bringing the tenants together in a positive situation, sharing experiences and activities - this could be a basis for further community development and tenant involvement in their area.

**What Happened**

The full programme of conversion of maisonettes, which was the largest element of the scheme, continued for nine years in all, closing in 1991 after the decapitation of blocks to create 769 new terraced homes. In addition, further modernisation work was completed in the terraced houses, and in the multi storey flats, affecting in all 2,259 homes at a total cost of some £48 million.

The decapitation works were carried out on a rolling programme basis, starting with the worst blocks first. At the start a considerable number of tenants indicated they wished to move off the estate. As the programme developed, however, increasing numbers of residents decided to stay, reaching levels of 85% in some blocks (which lead to some problems in accommodating everyone together). Efforts were made wherever possible to move neighbours together, where this had been requested, and to preserve local communities already living together in blocks. Equally the opportunity was taken to move, for example, elderly tenants nearer to their families where this was useful and requested. The whole process proceeded by a labour intensive process of consultation in detail about the plans and proposals, and meeting

considered that the tenants lived with the problems and were the best placed to suggest or comment on possible solutions. Involvement in planning and design was to demonstrate the Council's willingness to listen and act on what it heard. Involvement in planning was considered to increase the tenants sense of interest and stake in their home and area, encouraging a long term attitude of



of block representatives and individual blocks, as well as individual visits. This part of the programme worked extremely well. There was a process of continual feedback from people who had just gone through the removal and improvement process, and as a result improvements were constantly made to how the process was managed. These surveys showed high satisfaction levels.

Modernisation works were also carried out to many of the houses. This involved modernisation of the heating and wiring, provision of new damp courses, and repairs to windows, roofs, and doors.

The provision of the security system in the towers is probably the least effective element of the improvements. The system is managed from a central control room which monitors all the TV screens. There have been several attempts to engage firms of private security guards to staff the system, but at the point of my visit of the four who had been employed all had been subsequently removed. The system had been kept going for the two years of its operation by the goodwill of the caretaking staff who provided occasional cover for evenings and weekends, and in fact provided total cover in periods where there was no security firm in place.

I spent about two hours in this control room, viewing the system and discussing the problems and advantages with the various caretaking staff who passed through in that time. It was clear that there were many problems, both technical and management, with the system. Certain of the cameras are badly placed. The system was elaborately set up with a series of screens and optional enlargement screens for any of the small pictures on display. It demanded that there was at least one person on duty at all times, but often there was only one and that person was unable to go out to patrol where there appeared to be an incident brewing.

The caretakers knew people in the blocks very well, in many cases. This included certain drug dealers, and it was clearly put to me that where there was the possibility of trouble for the caretakers or their families if they took preventative action to deny access to these people or their contacts, this was not done. The



---

**Physical Improvements:**

Maisonette Blocks: 9 year programme producing 769 new homes in terraced units with gardens

Houses: Extensive renovation programme

Towers: Water penetration and roofing works; extensive CCTV security system installed

Security: new locks on windows and doors in many homes; entryphones in blocks

**Environmental:**

Provision of individual gardens

New footpaths and parking

Change of use of unused land for garden or play area space

Minimal maintenance landscaping

---

**Box 47: Summary of Outcomes**

caretakers had to survive on the estate on a day to day basis, and personal security came first. The local housing office had an elaborate security checking system by which they could check whether the key fobs had been used for any of the flats - this was designed to identify those flats where the residents only used them as giro drops, or where there were unauthorised occupants. The caretakers knew, however, of households who had lost their fobs and who could not reasonably afford the £15 replacement charge per unit for each member of the family, and who they regularly let through the door. There was also apparently a considerable amount of crime (such as burglary) which took place within the blocks, and which was not monitored at all.

My conclusion was that it was not so much that the system was fundamentally flawed, although it seemed rather centralised, patchy, and remote. Rather it was clear that there was little in the way of adequate and organised management of the facility, and that for this reason it was rather wasted.



Few general management changes took place. The local office continued as usual, operating from a dingy office at the edge of the commercial centre. The office is very unwelcoming, with a small glazed enquiry hatch, surrounded by an uncomfortable and cold waiting area offering few concessions to customer service. No major management initiatives had been taken. The whole of the organisation of services in Manchester was decentralised, and the local office which covered Miles Platting also covered some other adjacent estates - 6,000 homes in all. There was no special initiative for the estate, or dedicated estate office, though the services were locally available on the estate (a model which is common in many decentralised UK housing departments). There were no local allocations schemes or initiatives for selecting tenants or allowing local moves. There is, however, a scheme whereby any property which has been lettable for over 6 weeks and refused twice is put on an "instant let" programme, whereby it can be let to anyone willing to take it. This originally operated in 1988 on the basis of advertising in the local press. Several bad experiences with anti social tenants who came from this route, particularly in the towers, lead to the suspension of open advertising, however. It is now mainly people known to estate residents who apply through the scheme.

Considerable environmental improvements also took place. These were partly security works, where new front and back door locks, and new window locks were provided to vulnerable flats; and secure garden areas were provided around ground floor flats to prevent intruders coming right up to the blocks. The footpaths and walkways through the estate were also rearranged, to avoid approaches to the rear or insecure areas of blocks and discourage possible burglary. Fences were provided to break up the open areas, where possible providing a use for any open space with either clear landscaping or provision of play equipment. Additional landscaping of the more industrial peripheral areas was also undertaken, with the provision of a town park in the site of some demolished industrial buildings, the creation of a BMX track for children, following requests for one, and the demolition and landscaping of further buildings along the canal bank.

Other special initiatives were set up on the estate. A special cleansing team (eight operatives and a supervisor) works within the estate and surrounding area, clearing



land, dealing with litter, collecting bulk refuse, and ensuring that the place is clean and tidy. This is seen as a major improvement, and tenants can report problems to the local office, which are promptly dealt with. A dog warden service which operates widely throughout the city has been given a special brief to deal promptly with

problems on the estate. During the period of works, a special voids team operated, which stripped out flats immediately a development void was created by the decanting of a tenant to a new flat - this was widely recognised as having prevented extensive vandalism. There were also special steps taken to enable better grounds maintenance to be achieved easily, such as the removal of low fencing and other barriers to cutting and other grounds maintenance.

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>		£48 million
<b>Cost per estate home:</b>		£17,100
<b>Estate Action Contribution:</b>		£7.4 million
<b>Other Programme Cost:</b>		£2 million Urban Programme

**Box 48: Summary of Expenditure**

The question remains about the extent to which the estate has improved. There remain problems: crime on the estate remains high. The newly opened supermarket experienced a devastating spate of breakins on its opening, and only remained in business due to high security measures which had to be introduced. Certain streets on the estate remain derelict, despite the improvements. Now that the special voids team has gone, any new void flats are almost immediately stripped out, and in certain blocks the presence of several such voids has lead to a general deterioration of the block and area. Equally in the houses there is at least one street which is, apparently, the notorious locus of many types of crime both on and off the estate. Much of the on estate crime consist of crimes against vehicles, which are extremely common. The tower blocks retain their mixed reputation, with certain of them now fairly stable and well maintained while a hard core of two or three remain plagued with high turnover and poor reputations. Generally the reputation of the estate, although better locally amongst those who remain on the estate, is not markedly better in the city as a whole, where it is still seen as a sink estate.



Comments and Assessment by Main Agents

Interviews were held with the main housing staff, and members of the project team responsible for the decanting and improvement programme. These included the Local Housing Manager, Deputy Housing Manager, two local Housing Officers, a Lettings Officer, a Repairs supervisor, a Project coordinator and administrator. a the Caretaking supervisor, several local caretakers, and an arrears supervisor.

Excellent physical improvements: There was no doubt that there had been a considerable improvement to the physical structure of the estate, and the homes that had been created were much better and more desirable for tenants. The impact of the works was significant although given the total expense this was hardly surprising. Nonetheless the estate had been changed from one of poor, uncomfortable dwellings to one of modern quality homes.

Continuing Problems: crime, vandalism, drugs and squatters:

Despite these physical changes, the main issues raised by almost all of the agents concerned the levels of crime and social problems on the estate. The caretaking staff particularly noted the growing problems of anti social tenants; and problems of physical violence and intimidation. They are possibly most aware of this because they are resident, with their families; and also because they have a responsibility for the video security system which gives them a 24 hour awareness of what is really going on the estate. The last year had seem many incidents of attacks against the security system - mainly by people painting out the camera vision points. It had also seen the stabbing of one of the private security guards.

Excellent physical improvements
Continuing Problems: crime, vandalism, drugs and squatters:
Patchwork estate
Stabilisation of the community
Important role of caretaking
Problems with management of concierge

Box 49 Main Issues From Interviews



Patchwork estate: Many agents recounted stories about the more notorious parts of the estate, and indeed took me on tours of some of the more garish burn out sites. These problems were not spread evenly around the estate. Certain of the streets of houses were, apparently no go areas. Other streets were models of harmony and respectability. Certain towers were "little palaces". Others had a city wide reputation for crime and drugs.

Stabilisation of the community: This issue had two facets. Many of the agents described and illustrated how the improvement programme had worked hard to involve the remaining tenants on the estate, and to preserve and enhance the community life by planning moves in line with their wishes. This was clearly a very positive element, and had worked well. On the other hand the poor parts of the estate suffered from the exact opposite problem: they were undesirable parts of the estate and the city's housing stock which nonetheless had to be let, to keep down void levels and to keep up rent income. This was a major sources of problems in turnover of tenancies and the arrival of often young transient populations with little commitment to the estate. There was no way, however, to avoid this problem - for example simply by removing the excess unstable housing stock from the estate. The levels of housing demand in Manchester, and the already high decline in available units following decapitation, precluded any such radical steps, or any fundamental changes of use. The problem had to remain a housing management problem to be dealt with.

Important role of caretaking: There was a general acceptance of the importance of the role of caretakers in the improvement of the management of the towers. At the point of my visit this role was about to be enhanced with an increasing role being given to the social dimension of their job, with additional training to be introduced. One of the caretakers to whom I spoke already had a very clear idea of his social role, recounting how he regularly did shopping for elderly tenants if they were unwell, or assisted others with minor problems.

Problems with management of concierge: As with other UK case studies, there were



clear problems with the management of the concierge system. These were not universally felt - for example the deputy housing manager felt that by and large the system worked to achieve its main deterrent and stabilising goals, despite the undoubted problems. Nonetheless it seemed clear to most that the perfect solution had not yet been found, either in terms of the technical specification of the system or in terms of the management arrangements.

### **Summary and Evaluation**

Considerable improvements have been made to this estate, which has experienced a profound physical transformation from unpopular double decker maisonette blocks to modern terraced homes. The persistence of the programme, its humane and consultative progression by stages of preserving and nurturing local communities seems to have been a model of sensitive management. There are a wide range of problems on the estate, and imaginative solutions have been sought to each of them, including concierges in the towers, and substantive environmental improvements.

Despite this considerable work there remain clear problems on the estate. The underlying difficulties of crime, unemployment, and the estate's poor image have not been resolved, and indeed have worsened throughout the progress of the project. These continue to blight certain parts of the estate. The possible solution adopted in many other of the case study estates - widespread demolition and change of use - has not been pursued with the towers. They remain pockets of instability, welcoming mainly young and poor households who are new to the estate and in many cases may be new householders.

The improvements to the towers, as in a number of other case study estates, have suffered from an absence of a coherent programme for the management of the high technology concierge system, which seems only partially effective.

The general management arrangements are also not specifically directed at the problems of the estate. This is not to say that they are inappropriate; however it is noticeable that the general Manchester approach has been applied to the estate with



**Voids:** 3.5%

**Arrears:** 19.3% (56% of tenants are in arrears)

**Turnover:** High in towers; low in decapitated blocks

**Condition of Improvements:** Decapitated blocks generally good; houses patchy; towers very patchy and generally poor

**Image:** Little change of image city wide; seen as centre of crime

**Appearance:** Considerably improved both because of decapitation and environmental improvements; however pockets of burnout remain

**Tenure and Ownership:** No major changes; 2,800 units left at end

**Population:** Now stabilised in decapitated blocks. Otherwise remains partly transient in towers

**Crime and Vandalism:** Significant increases, particularly in vehicle crimes, drugs, and burglaries. Growing problem

**Local Management:** Generally unchanged in local office; more emphasis to be placed on caretaking social duties

**Participation:** Remains low

---

#### **Box 50: State of Main Indicators Now**

no apparent concession to its specific problems and issues. There also is not much evidence of any more corporate approach to the problems and issues.

In conclusion, a project which has achieved much, but which still is struggling to cope with the weight of problems produced by the concentration of residents in difficulty on the estate.



Precinct Estate, Salford





## Precinct Estate, Salford

### Background and History

**Estate Name:** Precinct Estate

**Region:** North West

**Community:** Salford

**Community Population:** 234,600  
(1989)

**Estate Population:** 6,000

**Politics:** Moderate Left,  
consistent support for programme

**Location aspects:** Bounded by  
major roads on three sides, and  
shopping centre on fourth. Built  
on slum clearance land

**External Reports:** None

#### Box 51: Location

was built during the 1960s and early 70s using non traditional large panel

**Incomes:** 75% of tenants on  
housing benefit

**Employment:** 24% unemployed,  
double city average

**Households:** High elderly (25%, cf  
city average 19%); slightly  
higher 16-24.  
Predominantly single people, with  
families moved out.

**Qualifications:** Not known

**Ethnic:** Almost totally white

#### Box 52: Population

There is a polarised age structure, with (in 1989) 35% pensioners (compared to a city

The Precinct (High Street) Estate is an concentrated area of high rise tower blocks and a small number of long low rise blocks, bounded at one end by a shopping centre and market, and on the other three sides by major arterial roads including the M602 and the A6. To the south east lies the hard to let estate of Ordsall. Manchester City Centre is only about a mile away to the east, and the estate is in effect part of the Central Manchester Area. The estate replaced an area of cramped 19th century terraced houses which were closely packed amongst factory and commercial premises. It is slightly unusual, in UK terms, in being a very large estate of high towers and low rise blocks, much along the French lines, although in an inner city slum clearance site.

#### Population



wide average of 19%), and a slightly higher percentage of 16-24 year olds (16.2% compared to 14.9%). Although the estate was originally constructed for slum clearance homes for families, several years of a rehousing policy which gave preference to families wishing to move off high rise estates to low rise blocks has resulted in a predominately single population, and very low percentage of families (though this is not quantified in any of the reports). Other aspects of the residents cited in City of Salford 1989 include high unemployment (23.1%, double the city average), and low car ownership (14%, lowest for any area in the city).

**Constructed:** 1964-73  
**Total Units:** 3,705  
**Block Types:** (1989) 186 houses  
499 low rise maisonettes  
2,994 high rise flats in 30 towers of up to 20 stories  
**Flat Types:** Mix of one and two bed flats in towers; two and three beds in houses.  
**Layout:** Self contained estate bounded by major roads and commercial area; inner city

**Box 53: Estate Details**

For historical reasons, there is a very low proportion of ethnic minority households on the estate - virtually the only ones being foreign students in flats rented to Salford University. This was explained as being due to the tradition of immigration to nearby Manchester, including Moss Side, which concentrated black households there. Salford concentrated on rehousing traditional white families from slum clearance sites, and had

little immigration - the 1981 census shows 3.1% of heads of households born outside the UK or Eire, with 1.3% from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan. This has continued, apparently, even despite the open access to the stock which will be set out below. It is possible that there is in fact a high level of racial intolerance on the estate also partly responsible: I was told of a recent incident where a black family had moved onto the estate, but had to be moved off about a month later due to intolerable harassment.

Looking at Salford more generally, in comparison to the Greater Manchester area as a whole, there are many problems: 39% of the housing stock is local authority, with 44% social renting when Housing Associations are included; 40% of economically active households are in partially or unskilled occupations; 33.5% are



in manual skilled occupations, with only 1.2% in professional occupations; five of the Regions top ten wards for long term unemployment are in Salford; perinatal mortality 1984-86 was 11.7, compared with the North West average of 10.0 and the national average of 9.5; and 1991 figures show Salford has the second highest rate of people out of work for more than one year compared with other authorities in the Region, at 32.6%, of whom 19% have been out of work for over 2 years (details in City of Salford 1991).

### **Original Problems**

Salford's general housing problems stemmed from a post war legacy of slum housing, which lead to massive clearance and rebuilding programmes, of which the Precinct estate is one example. The slums of Salford, according to the current Deputy Director of Housing, were famed as the worst in the region. The process of clearance and rebuilding has been so successful, however, that there is now a surplus of accommodation, and as will be illustrated below filling the voids in the less popular properties is a major problem. This is reflected on the Precinct estate, whose key problems are listed below. They are:



**Voids:** 19% (1989) (c.f. 4.7% city average) 22% in towers

**Turnover:** 19% (double city average)

**Crime:** Identified by police as one of worst two areas in city

**Lack of Security:** No external security doors to prevent access to blocks

**Tenant Attitudes:** Polarisation between the old and young tenants; little participation

**Local Management:** Split between two offices dealing with different functions for large areas

**Environment:** Oppressive domination by high blocks and large open spaces

**Image:** Poor; seen as sink estate

---

#### **Box 54: Major Problems at Start**

Voids: In 1989, prior to the "High Rise Initiative", 19% of the Precinct stock was void, compared with 4.7% in the city as a whole. Of high rise flats, 22% were vacant. Certain blocks were particular problems: for example 74% of low rise voids were concentrated in one of the blocks (Rowan Close, subsequently recommended for structural alteration). The general problem is explained in the City of Salford (1989) report as follows:

"For quite some time now it has been generally accepted that high-rise blocks are unsuitable for a family lifestyle. The City Council's own transfer policy has recognised this and a good many families have moved to traditional houses as a result. Unfortunately there has not been a ready demand from other client groups to move in and take the place the families have left behind..... Apart from the traditional problems of impersonality, lack of defensible space, and the general common aversion to lifts, high rise living has many associated social problems; fear of crime, vandalism, graffiti, lack of security. These all contribute to making multi-storeys low on the list of preferred options for most currently registered applicants" (p 3)

Turnover: High turnover was an associated problem. Often the only people who were willing to take homes on the estate were young people, or groups of young people, who had little commitment to the estate, and quickly moved on, sometimes letting the flat to friends. Equally some families moved on to the estate as a last resort



option, moving off as soon as something better came up.

Crime: The Police judged the estate to be one of the two worst areas of the city, with a very high crime rate, particularly for burglary, shoplifting, car theft, and criminal damage.

Lack of Security: The high rates of crime and theft served to increase the difficulties of letting properties which were completely lacking in any type of security or surveillance system.

Tenant Attitudes: The mix of new, younger, transient tenants on the one hand, and older (often original) tenants on the other meant that "the polarisation of age ranges [lead] to clashes of lifestyles in the particular blocks where the old and they very young [had] mixed" (City of Salford (1989) p). Certain other tenants of blocks with high voids had problems of the oppressive atmosphere of a half empty block. There was little participation in associations.

Local Management: The management of the estate was done originally (pre 1989) from two offices, both of which dealt with a wider area than the estate itself, and both of which dealt with different services - one with voids, allocations and estate management, the other with repairs and housing benefit.

Environment: The estate is dominated by the scale and visual appearance of the high rise towers. There were large areas of unused green space, and the a system of separation of vehicles and pedestrians was unpopular with residents as it increased the risk of personal attack.

Image: The conjunction of all of these factors had lead to a very poor image for the estate, with a reputation for crime and as a sink estate.

### **Positive Aspects:**

It should be noted on a more positive note that certain things were not problems: the



estate had excellent transportation links with the rest of the area; the shopping centre and market provided good access to commercial services, and many amenities and services were within easy walking distance, including schools, pubs, churches, a library, a health centre, a police station, a park, and a theatre; in addition it was a short bus ride to the full facilities of Central Manchester.

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

Improvement works have been underway on the estate since 1986, when the first successful estates action bid was made. Continuing major improvement works were part of the city's 3 year strategic plan 1989-91 (set out in City of Salford (1989)). This is an impressive document which goes through the estate block by block, setting out the specific management and physical problems of the block, and proposing options for change. It is followed up by a further progress report considering further options (City of Salford (1990)). The main aspects of this plan, which provided details of both work undertaken since 1986 and planned work for the future, are set out below.

Local Management Office: This opened in June 1989, in a former church at the centre of the estate. The office was funded by Estate Action, at a capital cost of £275,900, plus a contribution to the running costs. These costs were estimated at an extra £84,000 a year. The additional cost is due to the need for more intensive management in the high rise dwellings, and other parts of the estate. There was also lower income due to high voids, arrears, and former tenants arrears. A comprehensive housing service is provided from the office, including caretaking, arrears, allocations, void control, rent collection, housing benefits, and day to day repairs. The office manages in total 4,726 properties (including a few off the estate itself). The office comprises an Area Housing Manager, supported by an assistant, three housing officer teams, a maintenance team, a caretaking team, and two wardens.

Increased Security for the Blocks: The bulk of the Estates Action expenditure was on security works. The first to be done were two towers of 23 stories, completed in



a local management office  
increased security  
changes of use, including  
demolition  
allocations marketing  
physical regeneration  
corporate service delivery

**Box 55: Housing Objectives of Programme**

1986, at a cost of £77,500, but without any assistance from Estates Action. This provided a 24 hour cover concierge system.

Further security works were provided in 3 more towers, where a group security system was provided: this involved a team of security guards based in one block, but maintaining a watch on all three by means of video

cameras and a patrol. 9 further blocks were provided with similar security systems based on the three block shared security system. This was in conjunction with an intercom system, a key fob entry system, secure car parking, and new high quality front entrance doors. 7 further low blocks were provided with an entryphone system with video surveillance and a key fob system with new communal entrance doors - though no security guards. Finally a group of 17 blocks of 3 storey flats were also provided with new entrance doors, intercom and access control systems, and key fobs.

Changes of use and demolition many attempts were made to make other use of the void stock. One 14 storey 112 unit block was transformed for use as a "young singles" block, with fitted furniture in each flat, communal facilities including television, laundry, lounge, gymnasium and a games room, a walk in hostel for homeless people, and on site management. This was provided partly from Estates Action funding, and partly from a special Central Government allocation to alleviate homelessness.

Leasing to University students was also tried in two blocks, as well as attempts to lease units through the Health authority. Two further blocks originally used for student lets were eventually demolished, and the land used for extending the commercial centre at the north edge of the estate. Two blocks, empty at the time



of my fieldwork on the estate, were being proposed for demolition. Two further blocks were sold off to Salford College of Technology.

The policy pursued by the City was to try to concentrate its tenants in certain viable blocks; then to seek offers from any other appropriate source to use the remaining blocks; and where the state of the property, or reputation of the block became too difficult to manage, to try to dispose of either the block or the land.

Intensive Allocations Marketing The voids problem, which increased steadily during late 1988 and early 1989, was finally tackled by developing a "High Rise Initiative", launched in June 1989. This followed the realisation that in January 1989 there were 999 vacancies in high rise Precinct flats, but only a total of 306 applicants on the waiting list prepared to even consider a high rise offer - and of the 193 applicants registered for the Precinct area, only 32 indicated they were prepared to consider high rise.

To tackle these problems, the Initiative opened a show flat in one of the blocks, with a view to tenanting both that block and its neighbour. Individual flats were refurbished with new kitchens, bathrooms, and full redecoration. Advertisements were placed in the local press, and a brochure was produced ("Joint the High Life"). The initiative was generally successful; for example in relation to one advertisement placed in the Manchester Evening News, there were 156 replies, resulting in 28 lets and a further 28 offers. Between June 1989 and May 1990 a total of 155 lets were made, with a further 49 people accepted and awaiting completed flats. Of these 155 lets, 125 were from the Manchester/Salford area, but some were from as far afield as London or Scotland. The policy also allowed an offer to be made there and then to a casual enquirer at the office - subject to checks.

The allocations criteria were implemented by local officers who also did the interviewing and made decisions about lettings. The criteria were not written down, and the interviewing officers were generally looking for potential tenants who would pay the rent regularly and would not be problems. No distinction was made between



employed or unemployed applicants, but previous tenancies would be checked for any record of arrears of tenancy problems. A key element, according to one officer interviewed, who was responsible for making these allocations, was the "gut feeling" when talking to these applicants.

Physical regeneration Extensive rehabilitation has also been carried out on the estate. A programme of works totalling 14.3 million was planned and undertaken, whose details are set out briefly below.

It is evident from the list below that some of the works were not specifically related to the Estate Action programme (particularly, for example, the pre-painting repairs), but it is difficult to make a precise division between those works which are part of the special initiative and those which are related to regular maintenance of the estate.

Works	Cost (000s)
Security	2,220
Conversion to singles block	1,287
Environmental	2,224
Local management office	276
Podium demolition	17
Heating replacement	766
Structural repairs	93
Maisonette conversion	5,136
Pre paint repairs	1,956
Roofing	89
Other miscellaneous	276
<b><u>TOTAL</u></b>	<b><u>14,340</u></b>

**Total Estate Expenditure Programme:** Source: City of Salford (1989)

The very first improvements to the estate were concentrated on a group of 186 low rise four storey maisonette blocks at the edge of the estate. These flats were transformed into terraced houses by a process of conversion known as "decapitation"



whereby the top stories were removed, leaving the bottom two stories to be turned into a house by the addition of a pitched roof. Following further landscaping and environmental works, this pocket of previously unlettable units was changed into a sought after pocket of homes with gardens. The table illustrates, however, that this was, at over £5 million, a very expensive process, which when added to the environmental cost of £862,000 lead to a cost of about £32,000 per unit provided.

The second wave of works was the security and environmental works, which it can be seen from the table account for over £2 million each.

**Corporate Service Delivery:** This initiative involved environmental, planning, refuse collection and street cleaning, grounds maintenance, and arrangements to fund the

**Corporate working party:** To coordinate initiatives on estate, and improve "image"

**Commercial:** Expanded shopping centre

**Social Services:** Development of coordinated approach to mutual clients

**Community development:** Social strategy to be devised

### Box 56: Non Housing Elements

work.it had been decided that a corporate planning approach was needed to the design of the landscaped areas, so that it could be adequately and affordable maintained in future and contribute to residents safety and enjoyment of the estate. On refuse, the problem was that the Housing Department cleaned the internal areas; the environmental health department cleared away the rubbish and swept the roads; while the

recreation department cleared rubbish from the grasses areas and cut and maintained them. To tackle these problems an interdepartmental group was set up to provide a corporate response, and take a wide view of the needs of the area, and to "develop the "image" of the Precinct" (City of Salford (1991a)). This has three main subgroups, dealing with community development and support, with the funding and implementation of environmental maintenance including the problems set out above, and with the general physical redevelopment of the area. In addition, there is continuing work to coordinate services provided to tenants who are also social



services clients. Beyond these, however, there were no special employment or training initiatives.

### **What Happened?**

Local Area Office: The move to a new area office, and the introduction of a system of generic management appears to have been successful, in the view of all of the agents interviewed. Staff recruitment was good, many housing officers wishing to spend time on the estate due to the good teamwork, better training, and experience of difficult problems which it offered. Housing officers have on average 400 properties. There were also residential caretakers, with about 100 units each. They are encouraged to get to know their tenants, and to provide a link with the local office. Their job had moved away from cleaning, and more to minor maintenance duties such as changing bulbs and checking lifts. There has been extensive promotion of tenants associations as well, and they continue to thrive, with an estate wide forum linking them together. There has been a high degree of involvement in the discussion of the improvement works, including public meetings, open days, a tenant questionnaire, and representatives on working parties.

Voids: The total void rate on the estate, including development voids, was still at 14.5% in January 1991; but the true void rate of properties available for reletting was down to 3.2%. Officers reported that the estate was now reasonable in demand for allocations. **Turnover** remained high, however, at a rate of 21% of the stock annually.

Arrears: The position here was less promising. Details for December 1990 (City of Salford 1991a) indicated that arrears had climbed significantly in the previous 9 months, reaching £1.2 million, or about £400 for every tenant. Recovery action was being taken promptly, but the problem was reported to be continuing because of high levels of tenants absconding - 93 in the period April to November 1990; because of residual problems prior to the establishment of the local office; because of the high turnover, leading to many former tenant arrears; and because many tenants continue to think of the estate as their last and worst option, and that there was nowhere



---

**Local Office:** Creation of dedicated office in centre of estate providing all housing services

**Improved management:** New team of trained, motivated, generic staff; competition to work on estate to get good experience

**Extensive Improvement Works:** £14 million of works, including £2 million of environmental works achieved

**Changes of Use:** Extensive experimentation in changes of use, and demolition

**Innovative Allocations:** "High Rise Initiative" - open access via publicity) lead to creation of waiting list for high rise

**Increased Security:** Extensive works achieved, with video surveillance; but continuing serious problems with management of security staff

**Corporate Approach:** Interdepartmental group to coordinate development and maintenance, working for an improved "image"

**Development Plan:** Continuing plans for future

---

#### **Box 57: Summary of Outcomes**

worse they could be moved to.

Allocations: The "High Rise Initiative" has been generally very successful. There is now a waiting list for high rise properties, and the voids level is down to 3.2% for these properties, a complete turnaround. The main problem continues to the instability of the population, however, since the type of people attracted by the adverts, and by the properties, tend to be young and mobile, seldom staying more than a year or so. They also tend to bring many management problems (of noise and disruption).

Security and Security Guards: One of the main problems was that of the management of the security guards. There were continual complaints about their performance, concerning guards being rude and abusive to tenants, asleep on duty, failing to prevent access of unauthorised visitors, and failing to prevent continuing



problems of burglaries. These problems were set out in various committee reports (City of Salford (1991a) (1990a)). The guards themselves were located in locked rooms, out of sight of tenants, and spent their time either looking at video screens, or perhaps going on a patrol of the patch.

The problem arose partly because there are 15 guards from a total of three separate companies (at January 1991). The companies were apparently responsive to complaints about replacing certain guards who caused particular problems, but the same problems seemed to continue with the new staff. The guards were untrained, being used to guarding commercial premises; had little commitment to the estate, or to the job; viewed the prospect of courting trouble by challenging "difficult" looking callers without enthusiasm, and generally felt that it was a low paid, low status job which they would just as soon be moved off to a quieter, safer, site. Only in two of the blocks is there a "concierge" type arrangement, with a permanent member of staff behind a counter permanently. This worked much better. The option of either in house staff running the other systems, or of a Precinct wide contract being tendered were under examination at the time of fieldwork, as this was seen as one of the major unsolved difficulties.

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b> £14.3 million
<b>Cost per Estate Home:</b> £4,746 (using 3013 remaining units of council let)
<b>BUT:</b> unit expenditure excluding decapitated homes = £3,254
<b>Estates Action contribution:</b> £3.58 million
<b>Other contributions:</b> Salford HIP; tenant rent increase for security guards

**Box 58: Summary of Expenditure**

**Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Range of Interviews Interviews were held with all the main sections of staff on the estate, including the assistant district manager, a senior housing officer who had been on or around the estate for 20 years, the caretaking supervisor and a caretaker, a security guard, housing officers and an arrears officer, as well as the Assistant Director of Housing who provided an overview and full details of the corporate issues.



Rapid Pace of Improvement Those who had been on the estate a long time - including the caretaking staff I talked to - all remarked on the extensive changes which had taken place; these involved mainly the environmental improvements, the decapitation works, the demolition and disposal of blocks, and the filling of the voids. It was clear that the improvement initiatives were having a beneficial effect. The estate still retained many problems, but the general view was that effective coordinated action was visible.

Turnover One key difficulty remaining was that there still was not a stable population on the estate. The Assistant Director particularly identified this as one

**Rapid pace of Improvements:**  
including environmental

**Continuing high turnover**  
leading to population  
instability

**Management problems of**  
**security systems:** which was a  
major source of complaint

**Improved Management** agreed by  
all staff

**Failure of EA commitment:**  
last 2 bids turned down

**Unusual problems:** need to  
dispose of stock, or convert;  
no homelessness or race  
issues

**Box 59: Main issues from interviews**

of the key aims over the next few years. The initiatives to fill voids had done that, but had not achieved the type of stability that was really needed to make the estate work properly. Other staff, particularly caretaking staff, were very much in agreement, although they tended to put the point more negatively in complaining about the problems of managing, and living beside, some of the transient young people who had been housed.

Improved Management Most staff now felt that the management of the estate was under control, and the

training, approach, and organisation structures were beginning to bear fruit. Caretakers felt that they were undervalued, and that much of the information they had about tenants, as well as about problems and issues on the estate, was not sought or attended to by housing officers; and that they did not really have enough training to deal with the more complex and sympathetic role they were expected to



carry. The housing officers, in contrast, felt the caretakers were given an appropriate role and were adequately trained.

Problems of Security Staff It was clear that this was a serious unsolved problem. There was antagonism between the caretakers and the security guards, the former resenting the idleness and intrusion of the latter. The security guards whom I met were totally unmotivated, drinking beer and reading the paper in the video rooms, and refusing to patrol certain blocks because of threats from intruders. Their view was quite clearly that they were not interested. Housing officers, who had to try to both manage the problem and provide a good service for the tenants, were very frustrated at the lack of investment in the key management structures needed to make the physical improvements, and all the technology, work. The overwhelming view was that more thought and resources should have been devoted to the management issues of the security improvements, in addition to the technical and technological aspects.

Failure of Estates Action Commitment: The Estates Action Bid for 1989-90 had failed, due to lack of consultation with tenants, the authority were apparently told. The 1990-91 bid had been carefully researched and prepared; extensive consultation had been undertaken with residents, who had approved and amended the plans for the conversion of further flats in maisonette blocks to houses. The bid was important because the need for houses was the highest priority in Salford, which had a surplus of flats. This second bid was, however, also turned down, this time because there was not sufficient commitment to diversifying tenure on the estate, or encouragement of home ownership. It was widely felt that the approach of estates action was inconsistent and fairly impenetrable; and that different reasons seemed to be being found to justify refusals for money which were based on the increasing popularity of the programme amongst other authorities in the region (particularly Manchester); and that this see-saw of encouragement to bid then refusal was very difficult for the estates staff to manage, in their attempt to create an involved, committed, and stable community on the basis of long term planning. This feeling was shared from the Assistant Director level (though he was more circumspect and



sanguine) to the housing officers and, to some extent, the caretakers. However the approach was to be, now, to invite housing associations and private developers to contribute a bit to the bid.

Unusual problems: Unlike many similar estates, there was no particular problem of homelessness, or of housing homeless people on the estate. Nor was there any high concentration of black or immigrant households who may have special needs or problems. Rather, there was too much stock, and the disposal or conversion of it was the main problem.

**Summary and Evaluation**

This is an estate which has major management problems relating mainly to void and undesirable stock. It has adopted a range of

<b>Voids:</b> 3.2%, well down; though total voids including planned and management voids = 14.5% (1991)
<b>Turnover:</b> 21%, still high (1990)
<b>Arrears:</b> Sharply increased; high rate of absconding tenants, and high former tenants arrears due to turnover
<b>Allocations:</b> Continuation of "High Rise Initiative", now with waiting list; also better rate of demand for Precinct from waiting list & homeless
<b>Condition of Improvements:</b> Generally well maintained, except for security works
<b>Image:</b> Some slow improvement
<b>Appearance:</b> Extensive environmental works and selective demolition and decapitation transforming parts of estate
<b>Tenure and Ownership:</b> Little owner occupation achieved; 3640 council rented left
<b>Participation:</b> Several thriving tenants groups now exist
<b>Population:</b> Remains unchanged

**Box 60: State of Main Indicators Now**

initiatives to combat there problems, including attention to both housing



management, allocations, staff training, and environmental issues. Some of the physical transformations have had a significant effect on the image and appearance of the estate. It has also shown a commitment to taking a corporate approach to its problems.

The main difficulties relate to some of the solutions which have been brought to bear. The security solution of video surveillance has clearly not worked, as insufficient attention was paid to its management aspects. The allocations initiatives have worked in that they have filled the voids, by and large, but the instability of population consequent on permitting all and any transient person seeking shelter have lead to difficulties in managing the blocks and continuing problems with rent arrears. Neither tenure and ownership diversification, nor employment related projects have been prominent in the forward plans, and this has resulted in withdrawal of estates action support. This lack of continuity of support has had a significant negative effect on the attempts to construct networks of tenant involvement, although these continue despite this.

The flexibility of the authority in responding to changing problems, however, and its willingness to try new and radical solutions, suggest that steady progress will continue to be made on the estate.



Le Clos Saint-Lazare, Stains





Le Clos Saint-Lazare at Stains

Constructed by Office Interdépartemental de la Région Parisienne (ORIP), in Stains (Paris "outer ring") in Département of Seine Saint-Denis, the estate is now owned by Office HLM de la Seine. 72% Stains population in rented homes - primarily HLM. Le Clos provides about 25%. Remarkable English style garden city adjacent, built 1921- 1933 by Gonnot & Albenque, comprising 1,700 detached brick houses with gardens, plus schools, baths, etc. (origins and development: see Baty-Tornikian 1972.)

<b>Estate name:</b> Le Clos Saint-Lazare
<b>Region:</b> Ile de France
<b>Community:</b> Stains
<b>Community pop.:</b> 35,000 (1980)
<b>Estate Pop.:</b> 8,500 (1980)
<b>Politics:</b> Stable Communist; very supportive
<b>Location Aspects</b> Adjacent to garden city; town centre near; bounded by major road and industrial site on two sides
<b>External Reports:</b> ORGECO (Urbanists) original report.

**Box 61: Location**

Estate construction halted half way through, and central commercial centre left on estate edge. Built on architectural model developed by Emile Aillaud (similar to Chanteloup les Vignes), using industrially prefabricated walls and floors assembled on site. Many of the original management problems stemmed from failures of the O.P.I.R..

**Population**

Issues in ORGECO (1980), ORGECO (1983), and Tanter & Toubon (1983). Original residents from inner Paris

slums and Algerian repatriates; then many from DOM TOM, and SE Asia. Many households had problems adapting, seen in school absenteeism.

**Original Problems**

By 1974, 4 years after last block built, major problems recognised. Mainly water penetration, heat loss in external cladding panels, leaking woodwork, poor sound insulation; few social activities to develop local networks for families and young people. Basements delinquent meeting places; prostitution and alcoholism; ether inhalation (70s) becoming 80s drug abuse. Estate has large windswept open spaces,



**Incomes:** generally below minimum wage level; 37% population economically active (c.f. 45% for commune)

**Employment:** 47% unskilled; 15% commune unemployment, concentrated on estate (details n/a)

**Households:** Young: 50% under 20 years; 80% under 40 (1975)  
Large families (37% over 5 people)

**Qualifications:** "low levels" of qualifications

**Ethnic Details:** 20% non French (African/ SE Asia), plus 14% DOM-TOM:

---

### **Box 62: Population**

Sources: ORGECO 1977, 1980

but little greenery or play areas. Cars circulated at high speed, into garages adjacent to entrances. Problems often focused in towers (BET BERIM 1990). Estate cold, unwelcoming, monotonous. Stairwells dirty, rubbish strewn, with minor fires

---

**Constructed:** 1966-70

**Total units:** 2,213

**Block Types:** 11 long blocks  
(5 curved) x 5 storey;  
9 towers x 9 storey;  
8 towers x 16 storey.

**Flat Types:**

534 1 bed  
460 3 bed  
763 3 bed  
373 4 bed  
plus 66 student flats,  
54 elderly homes

**Block mix:**

16 storey towers all 1 bed  
4 bed in 9 storey towers and  
5 storey curved blocks  
3/2 mix in straight blocks

**Layout:**

Outer circulation route;  
blocks surround greens.

common. Insufficient lifts. Interiors had small rooms, particularly some bathrooms. Despite this, rents high - third to half of incomes (Tanter and Toubon 1983), partly due to high service charges. OIRP management and maintenance inadequate. Stains council equally uncoordinated and uncommitted to tackle problems.

### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

In both HVS and DSQ programmes; now DIV site. 1974 initial agreements; then 1977 HVS "pre-dossier" study ORGECO (1980), assisted by architect, J. M. Lyonet (who continued as architect throughout the project, and was

---

### **Box 63: Estate Details**



interviewed). HVS dossier 1983; ZEP 1982; "Illot Sensible" 1983.

**Voids:** not a problem.

**Arrears:** High: 29% in 1976; though had reduced to 17% in 1979. Rents high.

**Turnover:** High for 16 storey (38%); lower for larger flats (25%) ; longest residents are non SE Asian ethnic groups (1977/78 figures)

**Image:** Daunting, cold presentation due to uniform blocks; reputation for crime and delinquency

**Isolation:** Poor bus links with town; estate enclosed by long blocks with few entrances, and thus isolated

**Construction:** "heavy prefabrication" of floors, walls and panels, put together by on site factory unit.

**Repairs:** Insufficient to deal with major problems

**Security:** No stair security; basements centres for petty delinquency

**Services:** Adequate

**Management:** Original HLM extremely poor, and no on site management

**Tenant Attitudes:** No associations or groups

#### **Box 64: Major Problems at Start**

General Objectives: These reports (and Ville de Stains 1991) list:

- social restructuring including allocations policy and physically restructuring some family flats to smaller units
- "désenclavement": better links with city
- dealing with technical problems, including lowering heating charges by insulation
- "insertion" of specific populations, particularly adolescents and immigrants
- development of social relations amongst tenants,
- improvement of open spaces and layout

HLM Objectives: New HLM 1983. First objective was local office under manager



responsible for finance, repairs, housing management, and rent collection (but not

---

#### Improved Tenant Services

local management office  
new allocations policy  
rent and benefit advice  
improved caretaking  
major consultation exercise

#### Major Improvements Programme

transformed image  
environmental improvements  
new flat layouts  
external thermal insulation  
improved entrances and stairs  
internal insulation

---

#### **Box 65: Housing Objectives of Programme**

allocations). Considerable effort to establish better tenant relations and tenant services - based on new caretaking services: new responsibilities in relation to graffiti and small repairs. More importantly given special training in tenant relations and service delivery, personnel skills, dealing with drugs, and minor repairs. Residential caretakers encouraged to visit tenants, establish good relations, be proactive when problems arise. They have own local office, open each weekday: repairs reported, rents collected. Also deliver arrears reminders, and deal with

arrangements to repay low level arrears. Also supervise privatised cleaning teams.

Tenants encouraged to have respect for common parts; regular campaigns were organised: key words were "environment" and "cleanliness [propreté]". New tenants visited by HLM staff to establish housing benefit (APL) entitlement rent payment explained.

New allocations policy was important objective. Considerable HLM/city discussion, and local allocations sub-committee established (1982). Aim was restoration of social and ethnic balance, by selective allocations of voids seeking balanced family sizes, and ethnic groups. Policy decreed average 35% 1 or 2 person households; 40% 3 or 4 person, only 10% over 6 people, in each building. Priority to local (Stains)



residents, or those with job locally.

Major improvement works planned in 450 consultative meetings over ten years, including large tent with major exhibition of models and plans, and meeting with children as emissaries to parents. Also evaluative and retrospective meetings once initial stairs done.

<b>Health:</b>	Dental health programme
<b>Educational:</b>	action under ZEP programme
<b>Social/Cultural:</b>	5 "maisons de quartier"; 1 cultural action centre; meeting place for women; social programmes
<b>Leisure:</b>	several sports facilities and pitches

**Box 66: Non Housing elements**

(50% reduction in heat loss).

**What Happened?**

Rehabilitation Works

Seven tranches of rehabilitation. Two new links to outside, one through spectacular arch formed by demolition of some lower floors of circular block. Radical changes in external contours of low blocks, each now different in colour, cladding material, windows, and with added roofline gable features (see photos). Also thermal insulation



---

**Extensive Physical Improvements including:**

- changed external appearance
- thermal cladding
- environmental works
- new traffic management
- internal improvements

**Improved Management including:**

- purpose built local office
- trained caretakers playing central role
- regular consultation with tenants
- new allocations priorities

---

**Box 67: Summary of Outcomes**

Key idea to identify each building, each stairwell, as being different - diversity, colour, and varied and more traditional architectural style (see Lyonet interviewed in "Stains Information October 1985"). Each entrance made distinctive, improved, and protected. Easy to clean and maintain materials were used, and solid security doors. Basements divided made secure, managed by tenants themselves.

Internal works included double glazed PVC windows, providing heat and noise insulation; mechanical ventilation; treatment of water penetration damage. Externally parking areas, roads and pavements improved; new circulation routes; some roads closed: trees and bushes planted; play areas and sports areas created; murals created by local children, and sculptures erected.

Improved Management

Improved management securely established; many new staff; much staff training, particularly for caretakers. Estate cleaner although graffiti and minor vandalism remained growing problem. Rent increases tempered by reduced service charges due



to the lower heating bills.

Turnover down, (perhaps due to difficulties moving out) Allocations policy unsuccessful, with little change in the ethnic or social make up; young unemployed and unemployed single parents continued to arrive: "The p e r v e r s e e f f e c t s o f 'conventionnement' providing access to APL [Housing Benefit] are clearly shown on the estate" (Ville de Stains 1991, p7).

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>		£22 million
<b>Cost per estate home:</b>		£10,000
<b>DSQ</b>	<b>Contribution:</b>	£5.2 million
<b>Other Contributions:</b>		£3.5 million from Region
<b>Other programme cost:</b>		£1.4 million

**Box 68: Summary of Expenditure**

Tenant problems and problems between tenants, rising, and increasing demands on social services and HLM. Drugs problem; alcoholism rife.

Wider Programme

Wider programme of DSQ initiatives saw less progress. Fewer shops; scholastic underachievement particularly for non-Francophones. Lack of participation. Estate in 89-93 DIV.

**Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Slow progress Disillusion amongst tenants prior to the work starting meant participation slow.

Extensive physical works: Estate physically transformed. Consultation process had helped. Architect had commitment to participation and highest architectural standards - visionary, open, professional approach.

Improved Management Estate management now better. HLM Director fired with a mission, of trained, aware, staff. Caretaker training one aspect, and caretakers enthusiastic, uncynical - thought that despite social problems their efforts were important.



Fundamental problem social Overwhelming view was problems were social; partly due to all large dwellings for social renting in Stains on estate; also HLM felt obliged, for financial reasons, to accept poorer tenants receiving APL, to reduce voids.

Long slow progress before works started
Extensiveness of the physical works
Improved Management
The fundamental problem was social
Problems of adolescents
Commitment of the City, and partners
Fragile Improvements
Absence of voids and squatters

**Box 69: Main Issues from Interviews**

Problems of adolescents Specific problem of adolescent boys (not girls). Not gangs, or inter-ethnic rivalries or conflicts. The problem, particularly second generation immigrants, was youth could not identify with parents values and attitudes. Parents had lead lives of docile factory labour, now unemployed, lacked means and ability to control adolescent children. Main problem now drugs - estimated 500g of heroin arrived on estate daily, for dealers. Marketing of drugs seen as better than low paid work. Police and judicial response seen as

ineffectual.

Commitment of the City, and partners Constant commitment city and HLM. Mayor or deputies chair consultation meetings, to show tenants city backing programme. HLM had cold feet about costs; criticisms of HLM by DSQ team who felt they were too absorbed with their need to fulfil targets for arrears and voids (confirmed by HLM) Nonetheless generally good partnership.

Fragile Improvements Despite improvements, little change overall in problems. Physical isolation and desolation gone, but not social isolation and desolation. considerable assistance still needed. Many noted improvements to entrances and stairs in good condition for one to two years, then degraded. Associations lasted a year or so, then collapsed. Slide halted, but little forward progress.



Absence of voids and squatters New tenants still disadvantaged, but no lack of them.

## Summary and Evaluation

Physical transformations impressively carried out; architect's vision of participative design made to work by hard work and repeated meetings and discussions.

---

**Voids:** Negligible

**Arrears:** Down significantly

**Turnover:** Reduced to 4.5%

**Condition of Improvements:** Generally good; though complaints of poor maintenance leading to creeping degradation

**Image:** Physical image transformed; 2 new entrances to city; social image, and image of crime and drugs, worse

**Appearance:** New road layouts and well as total change of colours and skylines; also environmental improvements

**Tenure and ownership:** No change: HLM intent on filling existing voids

**Population:** Remains poor, immigrant, increasing proportion of single parents, still high proportion of large families

**Crime and Vandalism:** Increasing problems of drugs and petty vandalism amongst adolescents

**Local Management:** New local office, new training, new central role for caretakers, generally very much improved

**Participation:** Remains low

---

### Box 70: State of Main Indicators Now

But progress fragile: social exclusion remains; and financial necessities of HLM policy undermined the improvements. Allocations initiative not achieved as HLM had to fill voids; initiatives envisaged at the start to provide changes of use to create offices, or flat type mixes didn't take place. Small repairs budget meant insufficient fast maintenance of creeping degradation. Training and new management not enough. Good tenant relations; good caretaking, including use of new technology.



Fort Nieulay, Calais





### Fort Nieulay at Calais

Calais was lace-making town, (25,000 employed in 1954, 2,000 in 1975). Now temporary employment from Chunnel, but high unemployment - 20% in 1990.

**Estate name:** Fort Nieulay

**Region:** Nord Pas de Calais

**Community:** Calais

**Community Pop:** 77,000

**Estate Pop:** 3,500

**Politics:** Constant shift; lack of political will and direction on DSQ

**Location Aspects:** At edge of town, surrounded by canal and vast expanses of waste land

**External Reports:** Included in Jacquier (1991)

Fort Nieulay neighbourhood: 2,041 homes, 1,031 HLM; isolated from Calais (railway line, Canal des Crabes, main road) Surrounded by overgrown scrub land, old ditches; scarred by remains of two temporary estates [Cités provisoires]; also squatters in disused BP factory; caravans parked on the disused land. Image of highly undesirable dumping ground. Run down commercial centre.

HLM stock: sheltered block, 173 individual homes, 858 flats. 200 flats constructed 1958, rest 1962-1967. Remainder of neighbourhood poor

#### **Box 71: Location**

**Incomes:** Low, due to unemployment

**Employment:** 32% official unemployed, 45% estimated (Jaquier (1991); 70% "working class"

**Households:** over half population under 25; 24% of families have 3 or more kids

**Qualifications:** 60% of over 17 years have no bac

**Ethnic:** 0.5% (c.f. 1.5% for Calais)

#### **Box 72: Population**

1989 figures. Sources: Ville de Calais 1989; Jacquier 1991.

quality owner occupied terraced housing - also in DSQ (some data is for "neighbourhood" not "estate")



Population

Over half adults have alcohol problem (including underage drinkers). Many residents previously in cités provisoires - problems settling in. Malnutrition amongst children under 3 (Medical Centre/1985); poor eating habits continue.

Original Problems

<b>Constructed:</b> 1962 - 1967
<b>Total Units:</b> 1,031 HLM units
<b>Block types:</b> 8 x 4/5 storey long blocks 5 x 11 storey towers 173 individual homes
<b>Flat types:</b> 122 x 1 bed 425 x 2 bed 279 x 3 bed 205 x 4/5 bed
<b>Block Mix:</b> mixed throughout
<b>Layout:</b> no through road on main part of estate.

Ville de Calais (1985), is original statement of problems; consultation document (Ville de Calais (1986)) - both followed local working parties (1984/1985).

Problem areas: children and adolescents; housing and quality of life; health and social life; sports and cultural development. Buildings problems: rubbish disposal, basements used as tips and by delinquents and under-age drinkers. Estate layout in state of disrepair and degradation.

Box 73: Estate Details

Thermal insulation cladding works, and window replacements, already done to 450 units (Constantine blocks, 1983). Repairs seldom done; sound insulation. Four blocks (the Orleans blocks) were particularly unpopular -lower construction standards - high turnover and high voids rate (60%). Otherwise population relatively stable. No local management except demoralised caretakers. Arrears high, particularly in unpopular block; poor arrears service. Little participation; youth most disaffected.

Original Proposals and Objectives

Convention de Plan (Region Nord Pas de Calais (1986)), and HLM coordinator's report (OPHLMde Calais 1986) list:

Reducing isolation, improving image: including reducing isolation from City, and



**Voids:** Only in Orleans blocks (200 homes): 60%; otherwise no big voids problem

**Arrears:** 26% in arrears of over 3 months; 47% in Orleans blocks.

**Turnover:** 32% in Orleans block; 16.5% overall

**Image:** Very poor ; little contact between closed estate community and city, or vice versa.

**Isolation:** On city periphery, surrounded by canal, railway, and waste ground

**Layout:** Large unused spaces between blocks and houses, derelict and rubbish strewn; roads in extensive disrepair

**Repairs:** Generally poor condition; basements totally derelict and abandoned; heating system problematic

**Security:** No systems in place; extensive vandalism

**Services:** Inadequate chutes to small bins; consequently basements used as tips

**Management:** No local management office; little attention to particular problems of estate

**Tenant Attitudes:** High alcoholism rates (52%) and little participation

---

#### Box 74: Major Problems at Start

environmental improvements; general theme in Jacquier (1991):

"the struggle against exclusion of all kinds. Struggle against exclusion from the City in weaving links between the neighbourhood and the city and in improving the quality of its image (organisation of shows and exhibitions), struggle against exclusion in economic life and the labour market by the setting up of training tailored to the low level of qualification of the residents, struggle against exclusion from social and healthy well-being in developing an active preventative programme" (p36)

Environmental works: Extensive works to estate and surrounding areas; design and construction by celebrated Francois Morellet, of huge mosaic of airborne Blériot based on early C20th lace handkerchief; children's play space, planting beds, trees.

Resident Involvement/ adoption of DSQ method: To follow original DSQ model; HLM



- Improving the image of the neighbourhood
- Environmental works
- Adopting the participative DSQ method
- Extensive rehabilitation
- Opening a local office
- Improved and adapted management arrangements
- Better allocations

**Box 75: Housing Objectives of Programme**

clubrooms /drinking dens. No internal works.

to set up residents associations.

Rehabilitation works: Immediate problems was unpopular Orleans blocks: participative study produced demolition, plus newbuild - 27 houses, 78 flats, on estate edge. High rise entrances and refuse disposal systems improved - new front doors, better bin storage - but not interior stairwells, nor external security system. Basements boarded, though adolescents still used as informal

Local office: Planned; DSQ team, unusually, had office on site, next to caretaking team (though teams seldom spoke). Little planning to achieve management office, and none opened.

Improved management arrangements: HLM planned "tailored management" [gestion adapté]. Specifically to include two local housing welfare officers [agents sociaux] for assistance with coping on low incomes/ rent arrears; developing local caretaking office; training for estate staff.

Better allocations: Local lettings panel planned, for better estate social mix.

Wider Non Housing Programme: Included reducing social exclusion by work experience and cultural activities; health issues; training and educational facilities and performance; development of commercial and economic opportunities.

**What Happened?**

Generally agreed by local DSQ team and HLM team to have failed to achieve most



**Economic:** Youth training programmes; job club leading to channel tunnel work

**Educational:** Establishment of education centre; photo lab and training; mural painting

**Leisure:** Boules area; improved children play equipment; youth holiday programme

**Health:** Health centre opened; advice and counselling given

**Environmental:** Extensive road and pavement improvement works

**Box 76: Non Housing Elements**

housing objectives; but wider DSQ programme, particularly health and educational programme, presented by DIV as examples of good practice, despite continuing problems (see e.g. DIV (1989)). Note non-housing spending 150% housing spend. Impetus (Ville de Calais (1989)) was interim reassessment focusing on social issues. Little change apparent from visiting estate: problems of disrepair, physical degradation, environmental desolation remain prominent. Reassessment did not extend to housing management

programme.

Rehabilitation: Original cladding works brittle panels replaced with brick cladding

**Improved Management:** No planned improvements achieved

**Local Office and Retrained Specialist Staff:** Not achieved

**Adopting the DSQ Method:** Not achieved

**Rehabilitation works:** External cladding done pre DSQ; entrances and rubbish disposal system renewed

**Environmental Works:** Incongruous mosaic; some flower beds; periphery of estate remains waste land

**Coordination of Actions:** Lack of impetus from City; DSQ and HLM limited contact; hostility and mistrust common

**Changing Image of the Estate:** Not achieved

**Wider DSQ Programme:** Considerable progress and success in Health and social programmes

**Box 77: Summary of Outcomes**

to above stone throwing height. Evidence of vandalism prevalent. New entrances and



doors adequate, but continuing open access meant problems of rubbish dumping and vandalism remained. Little physical impact from rehabilitation transformation common on other case study estates missing. Little resident participation, in planning or execution of works - little organised by HLM, and no pressure from tenants.

Reduced Isolation and Improved Image: Mosaic appears incongruous, DSQ say wanted by no-one. Tree planting and pavement flowers present pockets of improvement, but windy spaces and overgrown surrounding waste lands remain. Estate feel is of despair and violence (only estate where I have been physically pursued by aggressive residents intent on violence). Commercial centre remains poor; bus service sporadic.

Local Office and Improved Management: Few planned changes effected: no local office, specialist arrears staff, local allocations policy, or special training for estate team. Initial plans, and gradual retreat to failure, set out in frank series HLM coordinator reports (OPHLM de Calais (1986, 1987, 1988, 1989)). New homes built too close together, without regard for tenants needs.

"Errors" set out in 1989 final project report (OPHLM 1989), confirmed in discussion: rehabilitation had been considered "finished" though main problems of common parts and environment not been addressed; no integrated plan to coordinate the different aspects of works; various times during programme where HLM realised things going wrong not matched by understanding or financial

<b>Housing Related Cost:</b>	£2.8 million
<b>Cost per Estate Home:</b>	£3,000
<b>DSQ Contribution:</b>	£0.8 million
<b>Other Contributions:</b>	£0.1 million (Region)
<b>Non Housing Programme:</b>	£3.3 million

**Box 78: Summary of Expenditure**

support from the city to correct them - leading to meeting of all parties in 1988 which, lead to semi-complete breakdown of relations. HLM Management Committee not interested in the estate (still dumping ground), and had not intervened to restore relations. As no proper consultation, many projects met with apathy or opposition;



and often changed because of lack of commitment to funding. Repairs service regarded the estate as sink, leading to worst service continuing unchecked.

### **Comments and Assessment of Main Agents**

Inadequate Analysis at Start: DSQ and HLM coordinators felt inadequate consultation and consideration residents needs. Scale of malnourishment and social isolation quickly become apparent, provoking reassessment. External thermal cladding meant HLM had almost exhausted resources for new rehabilitation spending - but tenants had derived little positive benefit.

Failure of City to Provide Leadership: Frequently identified as key problem. HLM committee Presidency changed roughly every 18 months during programme, echoing changes in political balance of PS/PC coalition. City had taken little interest; and frequently changed project management arrangements.

Absence of Coordination and Commitment: City and HLM both retained compartmentalised inflexible working practices - seen from discussing how HLM staff tackled their jobs. Only Project Coordinator, had clear notion of DSQ programme; estate procedures in relation repairs, allocations, arrears control, or caretaking, were identical to HLM wide approach; no evidence of attempt to educate staff into estate needs; nor of team working, or development of special and specialist approaches. Rather, very negative, hostile, dismissive attitudes to estate were evident. Remained universally perceived as sink estate.

Only case study where antagonisms between partners, and within HLM, openly presented as elements contributing to failure. Caretakers blamed DSQ staff, management committee, and tenants; DSQ blamed city politicians and HLM team; HLM staff blamed tenants and Region; HLM coordinator, if he blamed anyone, tended to blame himself, which was sad.

This antagonism evident between DSQ and caretakers, who seldom spoke despite adjacent offices. Caretakers felt contrast between white collar thinkers and blue



collar doers.

Inadequate Analysis at Start
Failure of City to Provide Leadership
Absence of Coordination and Commitment
Poor Allocations and Management of Transfers
Tenant problems: alcoholism, and apathy
Inadequate facilities for adolescents

**Box 79: Main Issues from Interviews**

Poor Allocations and Management of Transfers: Use of estate by city as dumping ground keenly impressed on me by several caretaking and repairs staff - especially removal of tenants to newbuild ownership. Neighbour problems developed, encouraging more tenants to leave. Allocations procedure still on date order basis for next available property, and no regard paid to suitability of these lettings, or type of tenant on estate list (only poorest will apply).

Tenant problems: alcoholism, and apathy: Most suggested social problems were key to strategy for development and transformation. Participation was difficult: one DSQ view was people preferred to remain indoors drinking than come to a meeting. Many original meetings not followed up by quick action disillusionment had quickly set in.

Inadequate facilities for adolescents: Little done for youth was frequent view. Adolescents problems were often not immediately apparent due to teenage alcoholism hidden behind closed doors.

**Summary and Evaluation**

Case study pervaded by inadequate response and failure, aggravated by underlying hostility and intolerance between partners. The problems in fact not great, compared to other case studies; and clear opportunities for changes. Social aspects revitalised during 1987 by new project manager assessment of underlying social problems. The fundamental lack of will by city and HLM, lead to failure to execute coordinated action to improve estate management.



---

**Voids:** Minimal; turnover only (3%)

**Arrears:** Continues to grow 43% owe over 3 months (Ville de Calais 1989 p31)

**Turnover:** Low, though no figures

**Condition of Improvements:** Poor; external works damaged; extensive vandalism throughout

**Image:** Unchanged; certain blocks are known as areas of more concentrated problems

**Appearance:** Environmental improvements on estate; but surrounding area remains desolate

**Crime and Vandalism:** Little change

**Local Management:** No change

**Participation:** Little tenant participation in HLM or tenancy matters

**Tenure and ownership:** No change

**Population:** No special allocations policy; no conscious attempt to change population

---

#### **Box 80: State of Main Indicators Now**

This seen in: actions not coordinated, but proceeded independently; funding not been provided timeously; little pressure exerted by DSQ/city to make HLM take real steps to improve management. "DSQ Method" had not touched HLM; well intentioned plans to improve training and management not come about, so type and quality of management on estate remained poor. Throughout, residents lacked any effective voice to put pressure on agents.

The HLM claimed to have learned lessons, and was intending to apply them in the new DSQ project. Also intended to continue with improvements in quality of service on estate, particularly repairs. New HLM director had already introduced training programme.



Nouvelles Synthe, Grande Synthe





### Nouvelle Synthe at Grande Synthe

Grande Synthe is in Dunkerque conurbation which houses 260,000 people. 500 homes

**Estate Name:** Nouvelles Synthe

**Region:** Nord Pas de Calais

**Community:** Grande Synthe

**Community Population:** 26,000

**Estate Population:** 11,000

**Politics:** Socialist (PS) throughout; very supportive

**Location Aspects:** forms a large section of the city

**External Reports:** OMINOR (urban research group); also chapter in "Banlieues Fragile" (Grimaud (1984))

#### **Box 81: Location**

**Incomes:** Reasonable wages for those working in steelworks

**Employment:** Unemployment rose from 12% in 1982 to 24% in 1988; 75% blue collar; few part time jobs

**Households:** Young - 84% of population under 40, 2% over 65 (1988). 15% of households 4 or more children

**Qualifications:** 20% Bac level

**Ethnic:** 30% immigrant, mainly North African

#### **Box 82: Population** Figures for Grande Synthe

in original village destroyed to build new town - ZUP of 6,000 homes, 3,650 HLM rented, including part of ZUP originally administratively part of Dunkerque, Quartier Albeck - ceded to Grande Synthe in 1981, following referendum. Third estate built in mid 70's, ZAC of Courghain (2,000 homes). In total 5,000 HLM of 8,000 homes in city, 4,000 are in blocks. 3,745 owned by Office Départemental du Nord (ODN), based in Lille and one of largest in France (35,000+homes). 9 other small HLMs.

Huge USINOR steelworks constructed 1958 provided rationale for ZUP, and employment - still provides bulk of municipal revenue. ZUP was blocks on wide boulevards plus commercial sectors but no shops or local facilities in housing areas, and few leisure facilities.

Although DSQ was for Nouvelle Synthe, citywide programme developed. Some data only available for city. DSQ one of first national sites, launched March 1992 at meeting

which sprang from previous HVS programme, which had resulted in initial



rehabilitation of 300 properties. First DSQ commission attended by founding DSQ chairman Henri Doubédout.

**Constructed:** 1961-65

**Total Units:** 3,650

**Block Types:** 62 blocks; mixed 5 storey blocks and 7-10 storey towers

**Flat Types:** Full details lacking

**Block Mix:** mixed throughout; but lack of very large units

**Layout:** forms complete section of city

#### **Box 83: Estate Details**

through 80s.

#### **Original Problems**

See OMINOR (1988b) (p12):

"In 1981, the community was confronted with two specific problems. First, the integration of the Albeck neighbourhood, ....9,000 residents, being more than a third of the population: .....it strongly accentuated the working class character of the population and the weight of the ZUP in relation to the total housing stock. Then, a brutal increase in the vacancies in the ZUP, essentially a result of the rapid decline in reservations of homes by USINOR its preference for the new HLM homes in the area which had been offered for rent: the voids grew rapidly to over a thousand homes, ....and the development of voids was accompanied by a pauperization of the population housed."

Voids problem shown in minutes of 20/9/82 local DSQ committee:

2% (80 flats) 1977

11% (642 flats) 1980

29% (1093 flats) January 1982

34% (1294 flats) July 1982.

#### **Population**

Originally predominantly steelworkers; 1975 influx from closed steelworks in Lorraine and Denain; new immigrant labour between 1975 and 1982, mainly from North Africa. Population mobile - in 1982 41% moved. Steelworks nominations prominent - 1,600 reserved flats in 1982, some empty if no employees to fill. Decline in steel made major impact on employment. 1977-1982 3,000 jobs lost; trend continued



**Voids:** This was the most critical problem, with 34% (1294) flats void in 1982

**Arrears:** 46% in arrears, of whom 25% owed over 3 months

**Turnover:** 41% in 1982

**image:** Estate very unpopular locally; complete lack of demand

**Isolation:** Not a problem; more a problem of vastness of the estate

**Construction:** Prefabricated grey slabs in long blocks (up to 16 stairwells to each long block) and towers

**Repairs:** Widespread degradation of common parts, windows, paintwork

**Security:** No systems in place

**Services:** No particular problems

**Management:** Head office in Lille; no on site office; generally poor service, not geared to estate

**Tenant attitudes:** Lack of participation and association

---

#### **Box 84: Main Problems at Start**

Turnover high, paralleled by indiscriminate allocations: HLM desperate for anyone willing. Few locals willing, 15/12/82 local DSQ minutes show 3,000 transfer requests in city, 13% willing to take ZUP.

Arrears also problem. Education problems (ZEP 1984); ill health and alcoholism; integration of various populations living on estate: many were isolated and devoid of contacts with city's social services or social activities on estate - sometimes because of their North African traditions and religion.

#### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

See "40 Mesures Pour Mieux Vivre à Grande Synthe" (Commune de Grande Synthe 1982)) - product of resident/officer working groups around Housing and Living Conditions; Children; Adolescents; and Social, Cultural, and Health Action for



Families. DSQ Local Programme published February 1985 (Commission Locale de DSQ de Grande Synthe (1985)).

Context for actions was city decentralisation to three neighbourhoods, each with local committee and priorities. Two neighbourhoods covered ZUP, (one was Albeck).

General objectives:

- urban reconstruction, including new city centre
- social programme
- health programme
- programme for young people covering schools
- cultural programme
- economic programme.

Also extensive evaluation built in, by independent agency OMINOR. Considerable attention to environment. Administration by large DSQ team in town hall.

HLM programme based on rolling programme of demolitions, rehabilitations, and new building of individual homes to create more balanced community. Objectives:

- reduce voids
- integrate ZUP into general rented market, not just as USINOR dormitory
- create more variety in relation to housing stock, allocations, and social mix

To be achieved by physical programme and socially oriented programme of changed allocations priorities and social assistance General plan for better management, more adapted to estate problems. Included decentralised management, and vigorous pursuit of arrears.

New city centre built breaking divisions between neighbourhoods; changes of use, mainly creating offices in some housing units; some blocks were rehabilitated for home ownership.

### **What Happened?**

Major changes in layout and appearance of ZUP, and town. OMINOR reports (1988a, 1988b) set out to answer:



**PAGE  
NUMBERING  
AS ORIGINAL**



problem alcoholism. Increasing decentralisation to locally administered arrears as successful.

### Comments and Assessment by Main Agents

Details also from records of local DSQ committee meetings.

#### HLM Programme

Extensive works have transformed image

Importance of demolition

Importance of allocations policy

Quality of management & maintenance remains poor

#### DSQ Programme

Importance of the wide range of DSQ projects, esp sports

Good city support and general partnerships

Need for better evaluation

Work planned anyway

#### General issues

Previous and continuing dominance of USINOR

Population "in difficulty"

Problems to involve residents

Remaining "Illots sensible"

#### **Box 89: Main Issues from Interviews**

#### **HLM programme issues:**

Extensive works have transformed image: works had transformed city for the better; for outsiders it was eyeopener.

The importance of the demolition in this transformation - reduced voids, opened city up by reducing density, space for environmental and leisure facilities and new houses.

The allocations policy Refusal to accept additional large or problem families welcomed by staff and residents - problem has been prevented from growing.

Quality of management & maintenance remains poor

Main poor point: quality of HLM service. Both caretaking staff and Assistant Mayor (who is HLM tenant)

spoke of long delays in repair works, creeping degradation of improvements, and quality of improvement works. Also some DSQ indicated problems with attitudes of some caretakers - no training programme and sometimes hostile to tenants. I



indicating greater stability. Estate now has feel of enormous garden lego set.

Allocations committee aimed to limit additional problem household, mainly by restricting North African families, a fact clearly stated in discussion with HLM. Also aimed to provide better and larger homes for Maghrebin families already present. Equally emphasis offers to employed households to reduce percentage of unemployed households. Nonetheless social mix (city wide) remained fairly stable, with no marked increase in of employed middle class households moving in (partly because of continuing absence of suitable employment opportunities).

Voids and other Housing Management Issues

Decentralised office 1981, part of general HLM restructuring - highly computerised. Caretakers managing teams of cleaners provide front line tenant service.

Voids reduced to 13% city wide in 1988. OMINOR show this closely

linked to rehabilitation, where new popular and voids 7%. Also due to demolition which reduced stock by 1/4. Pockets of high voids remain in unimproved blocks - mainly owned by other HLMs. Concern that some original rehabilitated blocks now becoming dilapidated and void levels there creeping up. To combat this, local advertising launched to attract applications from employed and stable households.

Arrears improved, particularly those administered locally - followed considerable attention and training. Arrears Commission jointly with City, HLM and CAF: considers cases of very high arrears where risk of eviction. Where hardship caused by factors such as unemployment or illness, can provide loans or grants conditional on repayment package. Also can offer smaller or cheaper home as alternative. Intensive work to assist sticking to arrangements. 30 evictions only in 1989-90 - root

**Housing Related Cost:** £14.2 million

**Cost per estate home:** £5,000

**DSQ Contribution:** £3.37m

**Other contributions:** £0.87 million from Region

**Other Programme cost:** £7.9 million

**Box 88: Summary of Expenditure**  
Note: Total city wide expenditure included



bedroom flats into five bedroom flat, with own entrance. Works mainly with tenants in residence, although some moved to rehabilitated units first.

Tenant reaction positive (OMINOR studies). Concerns about lack of consultation and breakup of communities in blocks demolished. High demand for local transfers to rehabilitated blocks.

---

### **Physical Works**

Extensive rehabilitation internally and externally

Considerable demolition, flat remodelling, and change of use

Voids problem resolved (partly by reduction of size of stock)

Extensive construction of newbuild houses

### **Image**

Improved image and appearance by cladding, painting, and extensive flower planting and environmental works

### **Housing Management**

Allocations committee filters out unemployed, and other undesirables; but social mix little changed

New decentralised office created with new training for staff

Arrears problem much diminished

Pockets of problem blocks remain (many not owned by ODN)

---

## **Box 87: Summary of Outcomes**

### Transformation of Image and Social Mix

Decentralisation, redevelopment, demolition, rehabilitation, newbuilding, and environmental works made noticeable change. Some new businesses although unemployment problem not removed: wider diversity of opportunities - although still mainly blue collar. Flats easier to let. Proportion of owner occupation 1988, increased to 34%; and city wide mobility reduced to 17% turnover annually,



---

**Aims:**

Reverse the build up of voids

Cease to be simply a dormitory for the USINOR steelworks

Diversify the type of housing, and social mix

**Means:**

Rehabilitation

Demolition

Change of use

Sales

New allocations policy

Improved social management

---

**Box 85: Housing Objectives of Programme**

were demolished; also 1056 new homes constructed in city, 645 rented. By November 1989, 1979 homes rehabilitated, in 32 blocks, Internally flats fitted with new windows, new sinks, WC, fuse box, doors, and ventilation.

New individual heating systems. Externally new facings, many in different colours to destroy drab uniformity. New entrances with entryphones and considerable work to entrance halls and stairs. Environmental works all over town, leading to national award. of flowers and plants ("Ville Fleurie" 3 star). Also structural works to create larger family flats at the ends of blocks, by converting two

- has rehabilitation been successful?

- has ZUP become mixed estate with better image?

- has voids problem been solved?

Their answer is a qualified yes to all three.

Rehabilitation

Between 1982 and 1988, 1132 homes

---

**Town Planning:** reconstruction of city centre

**Economic:** action committee with aid to new business and rented commercial units

**Educational:** ZEP set up; new libraries; special projects

**Health:** action on drugs, alcoholism, diet, and for disabled people

**Culture and Sport:** mediatheque; local TV; theatre; festivals; poetry workshops;

**Social:** committees for rent assistance and assistance with children; nurseries; womens and consumer rights associations; youth work

---

**Box 86: Non Housing Elements**



encountered hostile and overtly racist attitudes about the North African and other tenants.

**DSQ Programme issues:**

Importance of the wide range of DSQ projects: new commercial centre; employment and commercial initiatives; sporting facilities; clubs and advice services

Good city support and general partnerships: DSQ functioned as part of town hall administration, like a department there. Committees for allocations and rent arrears worked well; regular and constructive meetings of local DSQ committee; relations DSQ/HLM frank, cooperative, and productive. City appreciated HLM had invested considerable resources on improvement and demolition: continuing cost of mortgages and lost rents on demolished flats led to annual deficit of £1.7 million which had to be met by ODN from more profitable parts of stock.

Need for better evaluation: OMINOR studies were backed up by local observatories on housing and population; but intention in next programme (1989-93) was to provide better regular statistics.

The work was planned to take place anyway: DSQ and HLM indicated work would have been done in any case, although on slower timescale.

**Other general issues:**

Previous and continuing dominance of USINOR: Factory dominated the town and estate - conditions in town had risen and fallen with factory.

Population "in difficulty": Main problem remaining seen as unemployment and lack of skills - emphasis on education and training in DSQ regarded as very important. Recent closure of naval dockyard in Dunkerque made problem even worse.

Problems to involve residents: Partly as result of social isolation, partly due to language and cultural differences, partly alcoholism and growing drug abuse, great



problems with involving residents in programmes or associations. HLM trying to approach through youth groups, and youth committees.

Remaining "Illots sensible" Still major problems to tackle.

### Summary and Evaluation

Differences from other case studies: estate forms two thirds of a city; dominated by steel works.

---

**Voids:** 7% in blocks part of DSQ; 13% overall

**Arrears:** Number under 3 month halved to 471; those over 3 months declined by 11% (1988)

**Turnover:** 17% in 1988 (11% in 1987)

**Image:** Better, though still difficulties in attracting tenants

**Appearance:** Generally transformed: estate opened up by demolition; changed use and newbuild provided variety; and extensive flowers and shrubs a special attribute of environment

**Condition of Improvements:** General feeling that HLM not maintaining them in good condition, particularly early works; estate appearance fair, but disrepair evident in places

**Population:** Still poor, unemployed, high North African population

**Crime and Vandalism:** Not a particular problem

**Local Management:** New estate office, and new services, but basic attitude and training unchanged

**Participation:** Remains low; new initiatives in next programme

---

### Box 90: State of Main Indicators Now

Extensive physical rehabilitation achieved, and many major housing management objectives attained - particularly the reductions in voids and arrears. Doubt about lasting impact - disquiet about continuing maintenance; voids levels and turnover



vulnerable, already started to fluctuate up and down from best achievements in 1987; popularity with new tenants not yet fully established. Of concern is general attitude of HLM. Although provided local services, little attention to changing attitudes and approaches to tenant services, with little new training. Social dimension of HLM programme mainly collecting arrears and keeping out any further problem families.

Emphasis on economic and commercial progress; new programme 89-93 includes a Régie de Quartier aimed at young people particularly, and other training and "insertion" programmes.



Stonebridge Estate, Brent





## Stonebridge Estate in Brent

### **Background and History**

Estate is in outer London Borough of Brent, some distance from commercial and social heart. Borough suffers major unemployment and deprivation, concentrated in

---

**Estate Name:** Stonebridge

**Region:** London

**Community:** Brent

**Community Population:** 255,000

**Estate Population:** 2,500

**Politics:** Shifting: Labour, then hung, then Conservative; traditionally seen as Loony (whichever party in power)

**Location Aspects:** Estate split by main road; parkland on one side, isolated from shops; poor transport

**External Reports:** On security (SNU (1899)) and Racial Harassment (PSI (1988))

---

### **Box 91: Location**

southern half.

One of three large, notorious, system built estates in the Borough. Deck access prefabricated wall frame buildings; also 171 town houses (original Stonebridge Park estate). Overhead walkway spans Harrow Road to link two parts of estate. When built, estate accessible by external walkways linking flats, giving complete unimpeded access. Large windswept grass areas separate blocks; little landscaping except criss-crossing paths.

Small commercial centre and pub; abandoned underground garages - central pedestrian entrance to them locked off, but used as rubbish dump, with plague of rats infesting garages. Only UK case study where I was denied access to original Form A and Form B applications; on grounds that since there had been few improvements on the estate, to disclose details of original problems would simply provide evidence



---

**Incomes:** Low

**Employment:** High unemployment; high levels of manual workers; extensive criminal activity and drugs dealing

**Households:** High concentrations of single parents; of children under 5; and of young single people.

**Qualifications:** no information

**Ethnic:** 36% Black Afro-Caribbean; 14% Asian

---

#### **Box 92: Population**

Note: No reliable data as Council unsure of occupancy

that project had not succeeded as intended, and further funding would be prejudiced. No external general reports; reports on security (SNU(1988) and racial harassment (PSI(1988)). Committee reports and cooperative staff available.

#### **Population**

Estate never been popular, because of size, structure, and location. Also council's

---

**Constructed:** 1968-72

**Total Units:** 1700

**Block Types:**

8 long blocks of 6-8 storeys  
2 towers of 15 storeys  
3 towers of 16 stories  
1 tower of 21 stories  
171 town houses

**Flat types & Block Mix:**

Long blocks mixed 2, 3, 4  
bedroom maisonettes;  
Towers mixed bedsits, 1, & 2  
bedroom flats

**Layout:**

On 2 sides of busy road;  
large green spaces between  
blocks, with paths; external  
walkway access to whole  
estate

---

#### **Box 93: Estate Details**

previous policy of not rehousing families with children above 5th floor (10th from August 1989) meant many lets to single people and flat shares. Council admit flats have passed on to unknown others, and no audit done to establish residence. SNU(SNU(1988)) survey indicated population structure. Cluster analysis of 1981 census indicates high levels of deprivation. Also sizable population ex-patients from closing Shenley Mental Hospital. Allegedly sizable population of drugs dealers moved from Broadwater Farm following riot there, especially in one now unmanageable block - part of



severe problem of presence of drugs dealers and other criminals.

### **Original Problems**

Unpopularity compounded by problems of crime and security, latterly drugs problem. Originally badly lit, residents vulnerable, many muggings and sexual attacks in lifts, and dark corners of walkways. Now no deliveries of DSS giro, or commercial

---

**Voids:** High; extensive unauthorised occupancy; no clear details of figures available

**Arrears:** High. Details unavailable

**Turnover:** High, as many young single people passing on flats. Details unavailable

**Image:** Estate very unpopular; few would accept unless desperate, no choice, or uncommitted young singles. Employment prospects lowered by revealing estate address

**Isolation:** Far from jobs, shops, and amenities

**Construction:** Large prefabricated wall panels on frame; external walkways connecting all flats

**Security:** This was the major problem; extensive crime, personal attacks, drugs dealing, and personal insecurity

**Management:** Local office on one half of estate; poor services

**Tenant Attitudes:** General hostility to improvements on part of small minority, as it aimed to reduce crime; otherwise passivity

---

### **Box 94: Major Problems at Start**

deliveries. Indiscriminate allocations at start, to flat shares and single people, lead to high turnover, and loss of control; high persistent voids; high arrears; difficulties for tenants seeking employment due to immediate bias because of address.

Lighting and walkway problems have identified by tenants as one of key issues. Towers heating system also unsatisfactory - expensive storage heaters, prone to breakdown, asbestos lined. Flats themselves spacious, well laid out, generally comfortable.



General sense of isolation and despair on the estate. Only new tenants were homeless households with young children who had no choice, or young single people, many of whom made a minimal or negative contribution to estate life.

**Original Proposals and Objectives**

Initial objectives focused on security issues: lighting and crime issues thoroughly explored by SNU - based on sample survey of tenants on Stonebridge. Found high dissatisfaction with internal and external lighting; consequently many tenants avoided the most direct routes home, making long detours. Also examined fear and experience of crime, and link to lighting. Recommended lighting improvements in line with tenants priorities, in combined package to combat crime and improve

**Lighting:**

internal and external improvements to

- increase intensity
- remove dark corners
- reduce crime

**Security:**

New entrance doors

Entryphones

Concierge scheme

Walkway demolition

**Management:**

New estate office

security; higher home beat police presence; better systems for maintenance and replacement of defective lighting; trees should be pruned to prevent dark hiding places; new internal lighting; lighting intensity should be increased.

Additional security measures also planned: connecting walkways demolished, permitting block isolation. New, stronger, flat front doors, with high security multi-locks. New entryphone systems following failure of original systems; experimental concierge towers.

**Box 95: Housing Objectives of Programme**

Hoped that by combatting crime, estate become more attractive, then voids problem and illegal occupancy reduced - although there were no specific initiatives to tackle those problems. General management improvements including additional estate office to north half of estate, to



cover all housing management aspects of North.

### **What Happened?**

Lighting improvements installed, and highly successful and popular; new front doors also well received. Entryphones on low rise blocks worked reasonably, but failed on high rise - due to presence of many illegal occupants opposed to controlled access.

---

Interdepartmental middle management group  
Stonebridge Forum to coordinate resident groups  
Youth club and workers  
Specialist support eg for Asian women  
Health centre improvements

---

### **Box 96: Non Housing Elements**

First concierge scheme tried in worst block - failed, partly for technical reasons  
Second concierge scheme designed and installed; worked better, although there remain considerable problems in making them fully effective. New schemes designed with much more input from tenants, and involving higher level of management input

---

#### **Housing Management**

No improvement in voids, or arrears  
New estate office on south side  
Reduced caretaking, with further reductions planned  
Major restructuring of repairs borough wide due to problems  
No clear audit of occupancy

#### **General Improvements**

Image remains poor  
New initiatives proposed for fundamental changes

---

### **Box 97 Summary of Outcomes**

(concierge from 7am to 11pm, and security guards at the other times). Served



partly to divert crime to the commercial centre and neighbouring pub, and reduced worst personal crime in estate interior. Tenant participation extremely patchy throughout; various associations, but generally unrepresentative, with active members mainly elderly white tenants. Umbrella community organisation coordinated by full time Community Services worker, set up 1979. Forum was to stimulate tenant involvement, and facilitate effective coordinated service delivery. Latter objective to be via interdepartmental middle management group - but not regarded seriously by departments.

Both estate offices now fully functioning. Estate officers manage arrears  $\leq$  £1,000 (specialist arrears staff in District office for £1,000-£3,000, then HQ). Estate officers also deal with most housing management duties, except repairs (central number for all repairs). Allocations and transfers also dealt centrally a computerised system - except transfers between blocks, particularly if large flat released. Initiative tied to arrears where if tenant kept to agreement to reduce, and agree to move to non-family flat, £1,000 reduction in arrear. Housing benefit administered centrally.

No inroads into voids and illegal occupancy. Caretaking service ceased to be residential in 1989 - new system of six resident Area Officers supervising teams of "chargehands" and specialist cleaners. Chargehands

jobs predominantly cleaning and rubbish removal, with little contact with the tenants. Further changes removing residential area officers imminent.

Failure of programme clearly indicated by development of new plans to totally revitalise estate. These involved long term plan with complete redesign, and wide objectives:

- to redesign and improve the quality of housing
- to improve employment and training prospects

**Housing Related Cost: £2.2**

**Cost per estate home: £1,294**

**Estate Action contribution:  
£1.1 million**

**Box 98: Summary of Expenditure**



- to give a greater say to tenants in running the estate
- to revive the local economy around the estate

Proposals included demolition of 6 medium rise blocks and 636 newbuild for sale and rent, in open spaces. Development to be coordinated by specially created company; Estates Action participation in funding improvements to existing homes -improved lighting, improved concierge and security measures, sound proofing and new lifts. Low rise blocks to get cladding for heating insulation, new windows and new doors. External lighting also to be improved. Housing management changes encouraged by Estate Management Board. Also improvements to commercial centre, and conversion of underground garages to small business units; linked employment initiatives, jobs surveys and skills audits. Tenants initiative manager claimed that part of the push for this large scale programme was from the Home Office, concerned about the extent of drugs and other estate crime, following police failures and high level meetings with Borough's councillors. Extensive consultation lead, however, to rejection of proposals. Now planned to introduce Housing Action Trust, with similar radical redevelopment (ballot pending)

### **Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Little improvement Although new local office generally viewed positively, this was only real improvement. General feeling of continuing decline recently; increasing levels of criminal activity; image unchanged, unpopular.

Tenant apathy and distrust General agreement on difficulty to involve tenants; recent plans for complete revitalisation provoked more interest than for several years, but prior to that involvement in tenant associations, or in Stonebridge Forum, was very low.

Overwhelming physical problems Noted that improvement works had done little to improve disrepair, or make major improvements to dwellings. Demolition of walkways generally welcome; and lighting improvements were successful. Beyond



Little improvement	
Tenant apathy and distrust	
Overwhelming physical problems	
Wasted money on security systems	
Poor general services	
Continuing image of crime	

**Box 99: Main Issues from Interviews**

that few positive improvements, as most of other works security related.

Wasted money on security systems

Considerable comment on money spent on security measures; originally considered installation would have marked effect, but soon shown they needed support and participation of tenants, which was difficult to get.

More, would not work without the

ability to control or evict the criminal minority who wished to frustrate the security systems. Often stated that lessons not learned, and same mistakes repeated. New concierge schemes (which reflected models pioneered in Brent amongst other places) seemed to be working better.

Poor general services General borough services poor. Repairs service being overhauled, due to complaints; caretaking service restructured, although many agents felt quality of service had declined since abolition of resident caretaker posts. Housing benefit service poor; little sense of interdepartmental working. Problems were therefore compounded by being placed in context of generally poor level of Borough services.

Continuing image of crime Despite success of walkways removal and new front doors in reducing burglaries, alleged presence of criminals and drug dealers on the estate, and problems from commercial centre and adjacent pub, had led to an increasing image of criminality.

**Summary and Evaluation**

Main work of improvement is still to be done, if HAT happens. To date concentration on security works at expense of most other aspects of improvement. Management changes introduced, and general level of housing management services given higher



---

**Voids:** Not high, though high levels of unauthorised occupancy.

**Arrears:** Figures not revealed, but believed to remain high

**Turnover:** High turnover in tower blocks, mainly uncontrolled

**Condition of Improvements:** Generally poor - security systems in many cases destroyed

**Image:** Worsening; perceived as haven for unemployable and criminal households

**Appearance:** Walkways demolished; otherwise unchanged

**Tenure and Ownership:** Unchanged

**Population:** Unchanged

**Crime and Vandalism:** Lower levels of burglary due to new security doors; less personal crime due to better lighting; but apparently much peripheral crime, and in central area

**Local Management:** New local office, but provides limited services

**Participation:** Extremely limited, though new comprehensive proposals have excited more interest

---

#### **Box 100: State of Main Indicators Now**

profile. Despite this, general level of indicators of voids, arrears, and unauthorised occupancy remain high, repairs, caretaking, and housing benefit services remain poor, and coordination of regular services and improvements remains limited. Generally mood of agents is that some major initiative will be needed to make any significant improvements.



St Lukes, Islington





### St Lukes, Islington

On southern edge of London Borough of Islington, a mile from City of London. Built

**Estate name:** St Lukes

**Region:** London

**Community:** Islington

**Community pop.:** 166,100  
(1981)

**Estate Pop:** 950

**Politics:** Long term left rule; "progressive" authority; supportive of participation inc. coops; often rate capped

**Location aspects:** Inner city, between main road at south and east; other estates surround.

**External Reports:** Safe Neighbourhoods Unit; Accent/Islington Safer Cities

by GLC, transferred April 1982. Small estate of homogeneous slab block construction, interconnected maisonette blocks, forming Z shape. Access via half mile corridors on 4 levels and interconnecting walkways. 50% (39,089 units in 1990/91) of the borough's housing stock is council owned, and a further 10% owned by housing associations. 90% of the council stock is flats and maisonettes, and over 80% is on estates. Also pioneer of decentralised services, including housing, social services, environmental health, building works, welfare rights, and community development. The neighbourhood

#### **Box 101: Location**

office for St Lukes (Finsbury) opened 1985.

**Incomes:** 44% on Housing Benefit

**Employment:** 21% unemployed; 32% unskilled manual, 30% skilled manual; 10% p/t.

**Households:** 30% tenants pensioners; many extended families; 21% households with "other relative"; 10% households with adult children

**Qualifications:** high proportion (30%) skilled manual; otherwise not known

**Ethnic:** 4% Afro Carib.; 8% Asian; 4% SE Asian; 7% African.

#### **Box 102: Population**



## Population

Estate constructed for slum clearance families; "white stronghold";

"community traditionally "close knit", "working class" and comparatively affluent" (Accent 1991, p79).

This gradually changed during 1970-80s, with local economic decline and decline of immediate environment.

**Constructed:** 1969 - 1971

**Total units:** 357

**Block types:** 1x 21 storey tower; 2 x 9 storey blocks, served by internal corridors

**Flat types:**

31 b/s

71 1 bed

125 2 bed

111 3 bed

17 4 bed

**Block mix:** Mixed throughout; but no 4 bed in tower

**Layout:** Built round central courtyard; long blocks interconnected; underground garages at back of blocks

## Original Problems

Unusual case study: one key problem - combatting estate unpopularity by increased security. Other problems (voids or disrepair) not present. However, typical of many estate action schemes in its attention to security. 1989 Safe Neighbourhood Unit survey identified high degree of anxiety. Accent (1991) cite: young people attracted to estate because of corridors, and stairs of complex and anonymous block; easy access and numerous routes provided opportunities for disruptive and

## Box 103: Estate Details

criminal behaviour; poor lighting and unreliable lifts. Several solutions recommended; preferred option installed was 2 stage block entryphone system. This never worked satisfactorily (evaluation in SNU 1985), due to failure to provide prompt and effective repairs to minor faults, extensive vandalism, and misuse by tenants. Also due to transfer of the estate from the GLC, resulting in confused responsibility for funding, design, contract management and scheduling.

Further extensive consultation and review of options (L B Islington 1986a) accepted SNU (1985) report which stressed need for technical solutions, intensive management strategy (concierges), and prompt maintenance. Borough intended



---

**Voids:** No problems (2%)

**Arrears:** Not major problem

**Turnover:** High levels of internal transfer; high demand to move (33% registered)

**Image:** Security problem main difficulty; majority of tenants afraid of vandalism and crime; poorly laid out grounds and pathways; but flats liked internally

**Isolation:** No problem; close to bus/tube/shops

**Construction:** Long corridors interconnecting blocks

**Repairs:** No major problem

**Security:** The main issue; gatherings of young people on estate; drugs problems

**Services:** Generally adequate

**Management:** Neighbourhood office very close, serving estate and others, with full range of services

**Tenant attitudes:** Some participation; weak Tenants Association

---

#### **Box 104: Major Problems at Start**

upgrading security in 1985/6 capital programme, and had set aside money. Decided this be insufficient, and became early UHRU applicant. 1985 application rejected. Reasons given understood to relate to management arrangements (lack of dedicated estate office, despite Neighbourhood Office), and inadequate consultation (LB Islington 1987). Scheme repackaged and accepted following year. (This, like the Salford illustrates uncertainties and changing priorities regional offices in choosing schemes, and explaining refusals coherently).

#### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

New scheme based on "reception" not security: aimed to provide friendly, welcoming service at entrance. They operate door entry monitor surveillance equipment and carry out housing management functions such as taking repair requests and responding to emergencies. Idea was to present image of helping, not policing.



Entrances carpeted and soft furnished; entrance lobby ceiling dropped to provide more human and friendlier atmosphere. Blocks isolated from each other, and all access via reception areas.

---

Improved security

Reduced crime

Experimental system for evaluation

Environmental improvements

Minor physical improvements

Note: Extensive local management arrangements already in place as part of total decentralisation

Further works: landscaping, improvements to the play areas, blocking up unused doors, new boundary wall, new street furniture, new lighting. Improvements made to fire escapes; additional car parking; new bin stores. Extensive tenant consultation - 40% participation estimated.

---

**Box 105: Housing Objectives of Programme**

Little management initiatives to create a local housing office: Islington

a pioneer of fully decentralised local authority services - not following not PEP model but more radical, not incompatible, model of local service delivery of most services from integrated local Neighbourhood Office.

---

Better Police Liaison

Note: Decentralised neighbourhood structure is intended to provide corporate improvements

One neighbourhood housing officer covered the St Lukes estate. Allocations centralised.

**What Happened?**

---

**Box 106: non Housing Elements**

Works were carried out as planned, at a total cost of £2.38 million. The

security system was provided as designed.

Evaluation in Home Office funded Accent 1991. Objectives to establish views and satisfaction levels of tenants with the system, identify remaining problems, and assess the effect on other housing management costs - vandalism, major repairs, voids, squatting, arrears, right to buy. New system considerably reduced residents fear of crime; and 75% of respondents felt had improved quality of life. Many also



**PAGE  
MISSING  
IN  
ORIGINAL**



---

**Improved Security:**

Complete CCTV surveillance: covering entrances and common areas

Receptionist team: also carrying out basic reception and housing duties

Better management: Within the general context of decentralisation

Environmental Improvements: to the parking and grassed areas

---

**Box 107: Summary of Outcomes**

anticipated that scheme be wound down due to financial pressures, and expected Neighbourhood Office be unable to sustain good management of project. Also believed other tenants were responsible for significant proportion of crime. Many not sure of receptionists role.

Definite conclusions on volume of crime not possible due to absence of consistent and comparative data; also more crime reported after improvements. Indications were levels of burglary had increased, but of vandalism, drug abuse, decreased. Better communication needed between Neighbourhood office and receptionists; problem of receptionist

hours was particularly acute: tenants survey indicated they unwilling but prepared to contribute additional rent for this. One problem for tenants was felt social embarrassment of closing the doors on people waiting outside - even to strangers; also problem for receptionists.

General improvements welcomed: as were reception facilities and controlled access, lighting, landscaping, and changed layout. Levels of tenant satisfaction: over 75%

---

**Housing Related Cost:** £2.38 million

**Cost per Estate Home:** £6,670

**Estate Action Contribution:** 1.2m

**Other Contributions:** £1 p.w. revenue contribution from tenants

---

**Box 108 Summary of Expenditure**



happy living on estate; fewer transfer requests (though this perhaps related to tighter transfer criteria); increased right to buy (though evidence for this unreliable). Residents felt repairs improved; but negative attitude neighbourhood office.

Few conclusions drawn on main housing management indicators: voids remained good, at 2.8%; arrears information not made available to survey; no major repairs expenditure information was available; repairs to communal areas reduced by 16%. The most important aspect of evaluation is of use of the concierge system. Noted that solution cannot readily be transferred to other estates, as the layout and size of the estate is critical in determining design and staffing issues. The greatest benefits appeared to accrue to tower block residents. Surveillance problems continue: citing of cameras, and their performance; reception staff unskilled in use of equipment. Some benefits due to population of the estate being homogeneous, and stable extended households. Even so, scheme attracted adolescents to its comfortable attractive. Noted consultation essential as scheme unworkable without their cooperation - but they continued to undermine it by using fire escapes.

Reception staff management, and their relation to neighbourhood office were unresolved problems. Staff changes resulted in communication failures; monitoring arrangements ineffective unsatisfactory information on key indicators prior to system installation, so savings not demonstrable.

Note scheme is "hybrid" between high technology security system and friendly reception system (based on Skilton's ideal types of "security based", which emphasise surveillance and patrolling, and an overriding security objective, often involving uniformed staff; as against "reception based" schemes which give a high emphasis to service delivery and community development (Skilton 1987)). Accent note original security guards, in place for four months before the council receptionists, were better received by many tenants: apparently unclarity amongst tenants and receptionists about patrolling, and what to do when incidents blew up. Often success relied on certain receptionists developing better approaches to the job and relations with tenants.



## Comments and Assessment by Main Agents

I was denied consent to speak to caretakers (the only case study estate where I had this problem) as gatekeeper Union rep believed I would report back to "management", who would use this to attack caretakers further.

**Lack of team working:** constant disputes between reception/ caretaking/ neighbourhood staff

**Concern over continuing revenue funding:** not clear what to do after DOE subsidy ends

**Criticism of reception staff:** role unclear, overpaid and undertrained

**Estate stability:** not clear system needed on St lukes, as many are worse

**Low level participation:** unrepresentative TA reps

### Box 109: Main issues from Interviews

Lack of team working: and lack of clear roles for local agents. Receptionists and caretakers at odds; reception staff seen as usurping many caretaking roles, and paid more for "sitting on their bums all day long". Emergency procedures confused. Confused management arrangements compounded problems.

Concern over continuing revenue funding: widespread concern about impact of withdrawal of DOE revenue funding. Not likely to be HRA priority c.f. roofing repairs in other estates,

especially as no hard evidence of benefits.

Criticism of reception staff: Weak identification with neighbourhood office - blaming "the office" or "them in the council" for problems; partly because original equipment inadequate - e.g. no telephone, no lists of tenants. Job was clearly completely tedious, and the motivation low: better to enjoy a quiet life than become embroiled in disputes. This a disappointment to tenants.

Estate stability: Estate population remained stable. Several agents therefore questioned whether investment was best use of resources, given the other pressing problems in neighbouring estates.

Low level participation: Frustration on the part of the tenants representatives over



---

**Voids:** Minimal (1%)

**Arrears:** Stable

**Turnover:** Transfer requests reduced

**Condition of Improvements:** Good, no damage or deterioration

**Image:** Improved; generally more positive attitude by tenants

**Appearance:** Environmental improvements, as to entrances

**Tenure and Ownership:** Unconfirmed suggestion of increased right to buy applications: total now 10%

**Population:** no change

**Crime and Vandalism:** Generally reduced

**Local Management:** Decentralisation previously in place; new arrangements seem confused

**Participation:** Indifferent

---

#### **Box 110: State of Main Indicators Now**


failures of neighbourhood office to respond.

#### **Summary and Evaluation**

In depth illustration of concierge programme - contrasts with Manchester, and Salford. Additional element is recent detailed evaluation of the scheme - one of few full scale evaluations of such projects. Its conclusions give a very mixed assessment of the investment - some improvements noted, but general standards of management unchanged, the expectations of tenants remain low, and continuing problems of managing reception staffing unresolved. Accent also note very limited general conclusions can be drawn about the usefulness of study for other schemes. They also note the general lack of hard information, and of proper systems to monitor the scheme. Clear uncertainty about the value of the scheme amongst main agents.



Worsley Mesnes, Wigan





### Worsley Mesnes, Wigan

Wigan is in Greater Manchester, built on now declined cotton and coal. Estate two miles south of centre, built using

**Estate Name:** Worsley Mesnes

**Region:** North West

**Community:** Wigan

**Community Population:** 308,000

**Estate Population:** 3,200

**Politics:** Solid moderate Labour

**Location Aspects:** No major problems

**External Reports:** None

system building techniques which have produced unpopular and problematic dwellings - three towers using Bison Wallframe method. 1982-1986 (pre EA) spent £1.3 million on maintenance and improvement projects including painting; tall block heating, security with new front doors, entryphones, communal lighting; reroofing, and environmental works. Rent office and full time Estate Management Officer established since 1978. Despite these measures, estate continued to decline.

#### **Box 111: Location**

#### **Population**

Details in Wigan Metropolitan Borough (1985) & (1987), based on 1981 census and Housing Management information, compare Borough's estates. Comparative unemployment and low income very high, with double unemployment c.f. Borough, and fourth highest of all estates; 1981 information, and likely that increased since. 4% single parenthood, high compared to Wigan's 2%, though low compared to elsewhere. 23% single non pensioner reflects unpopularity for families, and fact flats only lettable to single people. Low black and ethnic minority reflects curiosity that some NE towns historically did not attract black immigration, despite high presence in neighbouring towns.

#### **Original Problems**

Poverty; stresses also showed in other ways:

"Whilst there is a lack of hard data available, the experience of both Housing and Social Workers involved on the estate confirms that the incidence of anti-social behaviour, vandalism and neighbour disputes, are much higher on this estate than elsewhere in the Borough" (Wigan Metropolitan Borough



**Constructed:** 1965-68

**Total Units:** 1573

**Block Types:** 3x 16 storey towers;  
700 flats and maisonettes in 5 storey blocks;  
629 houses and bungalows

**Flat and block types:** mixed bedsit to 4 bedroom throughout

**Layout:** Conventional estate of roads; towers dotted in middle.

#### **Box 112: Estate Details**

systems; insulation poor; some windows extended to full elevation height. Flat roofs on flats had rain penetration and costly maintenance. Considerable vandalism and

**Incomes:** 57% on Supplementary Benefit; 76% on Housing Benefit (1985)

**Employment:** 26% households unemployed (cf 11% borough, 1981)

**Households:** 23% single non pensioners, reflecting unpopularity with families (1981)

**Qualifications:** No information available

**Ethnic:** Very low ethnic population

#### **Box 113: Population**

Public services and facilities are in shortest supply, and deprivation affects availability of private sector services. Also affects health and general welfare. Report advocated better understanding by extensive consultation; clear local

(1987), p1)

Crime rates high, Wigan Probation Office indicating 12% of all its clients on estate; 88% of breakins in the Ashton area (of which it made up 27% of the properties), and 16% of Wigan area, (estate is 5% of properties). Turnover, transfer requests, weeks lost through voids, arrears, all high c.f. boroughwide; voids empty longer; fourth lowest house sales.

Expensive and inefficient heating systems; insulation poor; some windows extended to full elevation height. Flat roofs on flats had rain penetration and costly maintenance. Considerable vandalism and burglaries aggravated by poor locks and front doors. Flats communal areas very poor. Dilapidated shopping area; disused and derelict play areas; poor paved areas and fencing throughout. Problems summarised in Wigan Metropolitan Borough (1985): strong connection between housing stress and social hardship; effects of poverty go beyond financial hardship; deprivation; housing stress and hardship take on a momentum of their own, and fuel environmental decay; these change how residents feel about their area.



---

**Voids:** 4% (c.f. 1.8% Boroughwide). Long relet times.

**Arrears:** 32% of tenants in arrears (c.f. 18% boroughwide)

**Turnover:** 23% (c.f. 8% boroughwide)

**Image:** Poor - estate very difficult to let. Households also believed more prone to neighbour disputes and vandalism.

**Isolation:** On edge of Wigan, but not a particular problem

**Construction:** Unpopular Bison Wall Frame towers; unpopular 5 storey maisonette blocks

**Repairs:** Considerable investment in repairs since 1978

**Security:** No systems in place; very high burglary levels

**Services:** No specific problems

**Management:** One management officer for estate, since 1978

**Tenant Attitudes:** Apathetic

---

#### **Box 4: Major Problems at Start**

authority interdepartmental services; willingness to provide responsive services; and investment in physical structure.

Note these problems although comparatively severe c.f. Boroughwide were not particularly severe c.f. similar estates elsewhere. Nonetheless EA programme executed.

#### **Original Proposals and Objectives**

Resident involvement and a Community Refurbishment Scheme: Previous Priority Estates Project used as model. Also Community Refurbishment Scheme - common in EA projects, involves using Urban Programme funding, Community Programme labour (scheme for unemployed people providing temporary work and training); Housing Investment Programme allocations. Aims to use local unemployed people to do mainly environmental improvements and internal insulation works, as part of comprehensive redevelopment.

Works included private garden spaces to combat burglaries; shrubs and trees; disused garages and store sheds demolished; footpaths diverted and improved; improved



Tenant Involvement and Community Refurbishment Scheme: involving local residents in job creating environmental, security, and insulation works.

Neighbourhood Service Centre: offering all local housing management services by local team, and coordination of other services

Physical and Environmental Improvements: Heating and insulation works; reroofing; study of options for towers; improvement of block entrances;

Tenure diversity: sale of parts of estate and buildings for private development

#### **Box 115: Housing Objectives of Programme**

##### Physical improvements:

Additional insulation and replacement of windows and window frame panels particularly where extensive heat loss.

Changed Image: involvement of private sector in building

Employment and Training: via Community Refurbishment

Coordinated Local Services: from local office

Credit Union: and welfare right advice at local office

#### **Box 116: Non Housing Elements**

proposals to improve; then discovered asbestiform substance in external facings. Finally decided on demolition.

security locks to flats; insulation and energy conservation measures. Original aim a £0.86 million programme throughout 30 months, employing 45 f/t 66 p/t and 10 supervisors.

Neighbourhood service: Locally based team essential; proposed to convert unpopular maisonettes into Neighbourhood Service Centre, with full range of housing services; team also responsible for ensuring close cooperation with statutory and non statutory agencies. Neighbourhood Manager had role of developing and coordinating local services.

Inadequate heating systems, to be replaced with individual central heating systems. Over roofing with pitched aluminium/zinc alloy decking system over existing roof, incorporating insulation; blocks of flats to have new enclosed entrances and staircases. Tower blocks presented bigger problem. Original



Tenure Diversity: Estate unpopularity and low housing demand in Wigan meant tenure diversity could dispose of unneeded stock and provide different image and population. Programme devised for disposal and conversion of an additional group of unpopular maisonettes, supplemented by developments on land freed up by towers.

### **What Happened?**

Main difference from original proposals is extent of private sector involvement. Local firm in conjunction with a local housing association did "renovation" of flats; in fact involved complete rebuilding except for foundations and ground floor internal walls (had to remain to fulfil terms of renovation package). These converted, resulting in 35 owner occupied and 88 housing association homes.

---

**Physical Improvements:** Total transformation of estate, with mix of tenures, housing type and design; extensive improvements to heating and insulation, roofs, security and entrances.

**Demolitions:** Three towers (276 units) and 412 maisonettes demolished; council estate now reduced to 1050 units (40% reduction in social housing)

**New Build:** 95 owner occupied; 88 housing association

**Environmental:** Extensive works leading to major improvement to green areas, paths, fences, and gardens.

**Improved Management:** New local team in purpose built office offering full range of housing services and coordination of other local services.

**Community Involvement:** Successful scheme employing up to 60 local unemployed people.

---

### **Box 117: Summary of Outcomes**

Towers presented difficulties, as cost of demolition was high because of asbestos problems. Following discussions with then Junior DOE Minister (David Trippier) package agreed including use of City Grant and adjacent land, by which developer used cleared land for 60 new semi-detached owner occupied homes. There immediately started problem of demarkation: residents of new properties insisted on construction of large wall to separate them from rest of estate, causing much



annoyance.

Impact was reduction of council stock by 40%, to 950, and production of mixed council, housing association and private homes, at lower density, with extensive environmental works including demolition of 120 garages, and 50 store sheds. Right to buy applications up.

Landscaping by Community Refurbishment Scheme, as planned, although became Employment Training. Difficulty recruiting labour from estate - rates of pay (benefit +

£10) not attractive. New entrances to flats worked well; now clear sense of owned space, with carpets and plants on landings, and all clean and well maintained. Rear garden areas successful, with extensive planting and tending of flowers and shrubs.

- Happy coincidence of Wigan's and Estate Action Aims
- Scope offered by excess housing stock
- Comprehensive approach
- Good relations with tenants
- Stable community
- Total improvement and transformation of estate

#### **Box 119: Main Issues from Interviews**

moves being made. Those who wished could move off but a significant proportion of residents opted to stay resulting in a new commitment and stability. Aided with new

---

**Housing Related Cost:** £2.98 million

**Cost per estate home:** £3,160

**Estate Action Contribution:** £1.49 million

**Other Contributions:** Newbuilding carried out by consortium of private developer and housing association; demolition of towers and rebuilding of new homes carried out by private developer with City Grant

**Community Refurbishment Scheme:** £1.3 million

---

#### **Box 118: Summary of Expenditure**

Local office functions well, with involvement from many local groups and regular meetings. Staff are stable and long standing group - good relations with many tenants. Council had 50% nomination to Housing Association stock; some residents opted to stay, in new homes. Tenant liaison officer worked with all tenants - plans sent to all and individual requirements were discussed where



allocations rule that only over 25 year olds allocated flats in maisonettes: high turnover been halted. Demolition activity, and repairs restored attractiveness: at the point of one visit there were no voids at all. Turnover rate now very low, people were content with improvements. Arrears also reducing. Local repairs depot operates well.

### **Comments and Assessment by Main Agents**

Happy Coincidence of Wigan's and Estate Action Aims: Council had found after had formulated plans, Estate Action arrived with similar aims. Worsley Mesnes was excess stock, unpopular dwellings, and opportunities presented by attracting private sector provided an ideal vehicle to carry out a programme. This would not be possible with current Estate Action priorities - e.g. EMBs. Estate Action not stimulus to authority; rather provided means to execute plans.

Scope offered by excess housing stock: Solutions adopted possible because of excess of stock in Wigan at time of improvements. This would not be possible now as housing stress greater. Estate problems resolved by fundamental restructuring and massive reduction in accommodation.

Comprehensive approach: Importance given to comprehensive approach. excellent relations with the many users of local office. Tenants encouraged to come to office to discuss any type of problem.

Good relations with tenants: Atmosphere in office excellent, with welcoming reception area and courteous staff. Local staff members, when on estate, had excellent rapport with tenants.

Stable Community: Large changes due to works and demolitions, with influx of housing association tenants and owner occupiers produced new spirit of stability. The remaining residents were, almost totally, now people who had opted positively to stay. Lead to new community spirit though sometimes stated negatively as having got rid of trouble-makers.



**Voids:** 0.1% (Nil on one of the days I visited)

**Arrears:** 42% reduction in numbers in arrears in last 2 years

**Turnover:** 2%

**Image:** Totally transformed; now growing, popular, mixed tenure estate

**Appearance:** Extensive new building and environmental work, together with demolition of towers and unsightly garages and sheds, leading to varied dwelling type and appearance

**Tenure and Ownership:** Now 90 council right to buy; and 95 owner occupied; plus 88 housing association; 950 council rented left

**Population:** Generally only those actively wishing to stay remain

**Crime and Vandalism:** considerably reduced by security works and change in population

**Local Management:** Thriving local office offering full housing services and range of other council and voluntary services

**Participation:** Good in local groups

---

#### **Box 120: State of Main Indicators Now**

Total improvement and transformation - from abandoned declining area to vibrant and growing neighbourhood. Improvements excellent, quality of local service good, and feeling of residents was positive.

#### **Summary and Evaluation**

Problems at start severe for Wigan, but not c.f. elsewhere. Significant problems of voids, crime, image, letablility, arrears.

Transformation from unpopular backwater to growing community of mixed tenures, achieved by 40% reduction in stock; by actively retain only tenants who wish to live on the estate; and by active intervention of the private sector. The improvement in management also significant, and have considerably contributed to success.



- Acadie 1984, Annuaire de Données, (Meaux), Acadie, Joinville le Pont
- Acadie 1985, Bilan at Perspective de l'Operation Habitat et Vie Sociale, (Meaux), Acadie, Joinville le Pont
- Accent 1991, An Evaluation of St Lukes Concierge Scheme, Accent, London
- Afpols 1987, HLM Histoire et Status, Afpols, Paris
- AMA 1983, Defects in Housing (Part 1), Association of Metropolitan Authorities, London
- AMA 1984, Defects in Housing (Part 2), AMA, London
- Anson, B. 1986, Don't Shoot the Graffiti Man, in Architects Journal, 2 July 1986,
- Armer M. 1973, Methodological Problems and Possibilities in Comparative Research, in Armer, M., & Grimshaw A.D., Eds, Comparative Social Reserach: Methodological Problems and Strategies, John Wiley & Sons, London
- Atkinson A.B., 1969, Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Audit Commission 1986b, Improving Council Housing Maintenance, HMSO London
- Audit Commission 1986a, Managing the Crisis in Council Husing, HMSO, London
- Audit Commission 1984, Bringing Council Tenants Arrears Under Control, HMSO, London
- Badet, E, 1982, Rapport sur la Réform des Aides Personnelles au Logement, La Documentaion Francaise, Paris



- Balchin, P. N., 1985, Housing Policy - An Introduction, Croom Helm, Beckenham
- Barre, R., 1976, Réform du Financement du Logement, La Documentation Française, Paris
- Baty-Tornikian G., 1972, Un Projet Urban Ideal Typique: Agglomération Parisienne 1991-1939, IERUA, Paris
- Béhar, D & Estèbe, P 1990, Guide Methodologique des Régies de Quartiers, SITE-CERFISE, Paris
- Béhar, D. 1988, Les Régie de Quartiers, Plan Urbain, Paris
- Béhar, D. 1987, Les Régie de Quartiers, Plan Urbain / CNDSQ, Paris
- Berting, R., 1982, Why compare in International Research?, in: Neissen & Peschar (eds) International Comparative Research , Pergamon Press, Oxford
- BET BERIM 1990 (Bureau d'Etudes Techniques), Le Clos St Lazare, BET BERIM, Montreuil
- Blanc, M., 1990, Du Logement Insalubre à Habitat Social Dévalorisé, in "Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine" No 49, December 1990,
- Boubil, A., 1980, Construction, Cadre de Vie, et Croissance, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
- Boublil, A., 1980, Construction, Cadre de Vie, et Croissance, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
- Bowley , M., 1944, Housing and the State, Allen and Unwin, London



- Brenner, M., 1986, Intensive Interviewing, in "The Research Interview" ed Brenner, M., Brown, J., & Canter, D., Academic Press, London
- Bulos, M. & Walker, S., (eds.) 1987, The Legacy and Opportunity for High Rise Housing in Europe, Housing Studies Group, London
- Burnett, John, 1986, The Social History of Housing 1815 - 1985, Methuen, London
- Burnett, J., 1980, A Social History of Housing 1815-1970, Methuen, London
- Butler, R. and Noisette P. 1983, Le Logement Social en France, La Découverte/Maspero, Paris
- Calogirou C., & Eyzat A., 1990, Evaluation du Programme Local de Développement Social à Chanteloup les Vignes, Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire de Vaucresson, Vaucresson
- Cancellieri, A., Foscoso, J., Lemoine, J., and Mahut, M., 1990, Urban Public Housing Management, (originally Maitrise d'Ouvrage du Logement Social en France), Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. PVT, New Delhi
- Cantle, E., 1986, The Deterioration of Public Sector Housing, in Malpass, P., (ed) The Housing Crisis, Croom Helm, Beckenham
- Capita 1988, PEP Cost Effectiveness Study, DOE, London
- Castells, M., 1977, The Urban Question, Edward Arnold, London
- CHAC 1959, Councils and Their Homes, Eighth Report, HMSO, London
- CHAC 1969, Council Housing, Purposes, Procedures, and Priorities, HMSO, London



Chalaine 1972, L'Urbanisme en Grande Bretagne, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris

Chamboredon, J-C., & Lemaire, M., 1970, Proximité Spatiale et Distance Sociale: Les Grandes Ensembles et leur Peuplement, Revue Francaise de Sociologie, XI, 1970, p3-33,

Cherry, G., 1974, The Evolution of British Town Planning, Leonard Hill Boks, Leighton Buzzard

City University 1981, Could Local Authorities be Better Landlords?, City University, London

City of Salford 1989, Salford Precinct: Planning for the Future, (Housing Department discussion document), City of Salford , Salford

City of Salford 1990a, Area Report: The Precinct, Housing Management Sub Committee, August 1990,

City of Salford 1991a, Area Report: The Precinct, Housing Management Sub Committee, January 1991,

City of Salford 1990, Salford Precinct: A Housing Department Assesment of Achievements and Future Needs, City of Salford , Salford

City of Salford 1991, HIP Bid 1992-93, City of Salford , Salford

Clapham, D., and Kintrea, K., 1991, Housing Allocation: The Public Rented Sector, in Donnison & MacLennan "The Housing Service of the Future", Longman/ Institute of Housing, Harlow/ Coventry

Clatin, J., 1990, Le Comité Interministériel pour les Villes est-il Evaluable?, in Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine No. 47, June-July 1990,



Clerc, P., 1967, Grandes Ensembles, Banlieues Nouvelles, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris

Coleman A., 1985, Utopia on Trial, Hilary Shipman, London

Collinet Services 1989, Régie de Quartier La Pierre Collinet, (Descriptive booklet), Collinet Services, Meaux

Commissariat General du Plan 1971, Rapport de la Commission "Villes", La Documentation Francaise, Paris

Commissariat General du Plan 1988, Immigrations: Le Devoir d'Insertion, La Documentation Francaise, Paris

Commission Locale pour le DSQ de Grande Synthe 1985, PLDS Grande Synthe, Commission Locale de DSQ, Grande Synthe

Comune de Grande Synthe 1982, 40 mesures pour Mieux Vivre à Grande Synthe, Comune de Grande Synthe, Grande Synthe

Cooney, E.W., 1974, High Rise Flats in Local Authority Housing in England and Wales since 1945, in Sutcliffe, A (ed) "Multi- Storey Living", Croom Helm, London

CRE 1984b

, Race and Council Houing in Hackney, CRE, London

CRE 1984a , Race and Housing in Liverpool, CRE, London

Cullingworth, B., 1966, Housing and Local Government, Allen and Unwin, London

Curci, G., 1988, Les HLM: Une Vocation Sociale Qui S'accentue, "Economie et



Statistiques" January 1988, INSEE,

Daniel, W.W.,1968, Racial Discrimination in England, Penguin , London

Delarue, J-M., 1991, Banlieues en Difficultés, Syros/ Alternatives, Paris

Deleau, M., 1986 , Evaluer les Politiques Publiques, méthodes, Dénotologie, Organisation, Plan Construction , Paris

Direction de la Construction 1989, Situation Financière des Offices et Sociétés HLM de 1981 à 1987, Ministère de l'Equipement, du Logement, des Transports et de la Mer, Paris

DIV 1990, 148 Quartiers, DATAR, Paris

DIV 1989, Ville, DIV, Paris

DIV (Délégation Interministerielle à La Ville 1989 , Demain La Ville, DIV, Paris

DOE 1988b, Estate Action: Ministerial Guidelines for Local Housing Authorities, DOE, London

DOE 1991a, New Life for Local Authority Estates, DOE, London

DOE 1979, Tenants and Town Hall, HMSO , London

DOE 1986a, The Urban Programme 1985, DOE, London

DOE 1987a, The Urban Programme 1986/87, DOE, London

DOE 1990a, Renewing the Cities, DOE, London



DOE 1988a, DOE Inner City Programmes 1987-88, DOE, London

DOE 1982, Tackling Priority Estates, (Information Package on PEP, HMSO, London

DOE 1981, Management Coops, HMSO, London

DOE 1980, An Investigation of Difficult to Let Housing, (HDD Occasional Paper 3/80), HMSO, London

DOE 1977a, Policy for the Inner Cities, (White Paper), DOE, London

DOE 1985a, New Homes From Old, DOE, London

DOE 1977b, Inner Area Studies: Liverpool, Birmingham, and Lambeth: Summary of Consultants' Final Reports, DOE, London

Doig, B., & Littlewood, J., 1992, Policy Evaluation, DOE, London

Donnison, D. 1967, The Government of Housing, Penguin, Harmondsworth

Doubedout, H., 1983, Ensemble, Refaire la Ville, La Documentation Française, Paris

Duclaud-Williams, Roger H., 1978, The Politics of Housing in Britain and France, Heineman, London

Duncan, D.D., 1991, The Uses and Abuses of Comparative Analysis: The Case of Housing Research, unpublished paper to the Housing Studies Association Conference, Sept 23-34 1991,

Duncan, S., 1988, Public Problems Private Solutions, HMSO, London

Dunleavy, P. 1981, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975, Clarendon



Press, Oxford

Dunleavy, P., 1981, Perspectives on Urban Studies, in Blowers, A., Brook, C., Dunleavy, P., & McDowell, L. (ed) Urban Change and Conflict, p 1-16, Open University Press, London

Dupuy, S., 1983, Modes d'Adaption et Relations Sociales, (Unpublished Thesis), University de Paris,

Emms, P., 1990, Social Housing - A European Dilema?, SAUS, Bristol

English, J. 1982, Must Council Housing Become Welfare Housing, Housing Review No 31, 154-7, 212-13,

Evans, D., 1980, Geographical Perspectives on Juvenile Delinquency, Gower, Aldershot

Figeat, D., 1981, Bilan des Operations HVS, Commissariat General du Plan, Paris

Flockton, C., & Kofman, E., 1989, France, Paul Chapman Publishing, London

FNOPHLM 1989, Les Offices d'HLM, UNFOHLM, Paris

Forrest R., & Murie, A., 1988, Selling the Welfare State, The Privatisation of Public Housing, Routledge, London

Gauldie, E., 1974, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working Class Housing 1780-1918, Allen & Unwin, London

Gaulejac, V. de 1990, De la Mesure en Tout! Evaluation et Développement Social, in Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine No. 47, June-July 1990,



GLC 1976, Research Report 21: Colour and the Allocation of Council Housing: The Report of the GLC Lettings Survey

GLC, London

Grimaud, V., 1984, Banlieues Fragiles, Centre National d'Art et de Culture Georges Pompidou, Paris

Guerrand, R., 1987, Propriétaires et Locataires, Editions Quintette, Paris

Guerrand, R. 1967, Les Origines du Logement Social en France, Editions Ouvrières, Paris

Guglielmo R., & Moulin B., 1986, Les Grandes Ensembles et La Politique, in Hérodote 4th trimestre 1986, No43 ("Après les Banlieues Rouges")

Guinchat, P., Chaulet, M-P., Gaillardot, L., Il Etait une Fois l'Habitat, Editions du Moniteur, Paris

Hall, Peter., 1988, Cities of Tomorrow, An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the 20th Century, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Harlowe, M., 1991, Towards a Theorised Comparative Housing Research, in Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 8: 129-132, 1991,

Henderson, J., & Karn, V., 1987, Race, Class, and State Housing Gower, Aldershot

Henderson, J., & Karn, V., 1984, Race, Class and the Allocation of Public Housing in Britain, Urban Studies 21, 115-128,

Herbert, D., 1982, The Geography of Urban Crime, Longman, London

Hessel, S., 1988 , Immigrations: le devoir d'insertion, Commissariat Général du



Plan, Paris

Heugas-Darraspen, H., 1985, Le Logement en France et son Financement, La Documentation Française, Paris

Hillier, W., The City of Alice's Dreams, in Architects Journal, 2 July 1986.

HLM Aujourd'hui, 1989, Un Siècle d'Habitat Social: 100 Ans de Progrès, (Numero Hors Serie:Supplément au No. 13), UNFOHLM, Paris

Hogget, P., & Hambleton, R., 1987, Decentralisation and Democracy, University of Bristol, Bristol

Housing Services Advisory Group 1978, The Allocation of Council Housing, Department of the Environment, London

Institut Français d'architecture 1985, Le Logement Social 1950-80, Bulletin d'Informations Architecturales: Supplément au No.95, Mai 1985, Paris

Jacquier, C., 1991, Voyage dans Dix Quartiers Européens en Crise, Editions l'Harmattan, Paris

Jacquier, C. 1990, Les Communautés Issues de l'Immigration et leur Insertion par le Logement, in "Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine" No 49, December 1990,

Jelen, C. 1991, Ils Feront de Bons Français, Robert Laffont, Paris

Joel M-E. 1990, Eavluation Economique et Développement Social, in Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine No. 47, June-July 1990,

Journal Officiel 1989, Le Bilan et les Perspectives d'Evolution du Logement en France, No. 11, Mardi 23 Mai 1989,



Kaës, R., 1963, Vivre Dans les Grandes Ensembles, Editions Ouvrieres, Paris

Kearns, A., & MacLennan, D., 1991 , Public Finance for Housing in Britain, in Donnison & MacLennan "The Housing Service of the Future", Longman/ Institute of Housing, Harlow/ Coventry

Kemp, P., 1990, income Related Assistance with Housing Costs: a Cross National Comparison, Urban Studies Vol 27, no.6, 1990.,

Kepel, G. 1991, Les Banlieues de l'Islam, Editions du Seuil, Paris

Kirby, K., Finch, H., & Wood, D., 1988 , The Organisation of Housing Management in English Local Authorities, HMSO, London

L B Islington 1987, Housing Finance and Design Sub Committee Papers, 30.11.87, "Estate Action (UHRU)",

L B Islington 1986b, Going Local, Islington Council Report,

L B Islington 1986a, Housing Committee Papers, 25.9.86, "St Lukes Estate Staffed Security System",

Laboratoire Logement 1989, Le Role Social du Parc HLM et l'Habitat des Populations Défavorisées ou Modestes, Laboratoire Logement, Nancy

Lacoste, Y., 1959, Aspects Géographiques des industries de la construction, in "Annales de géographie", mars-avril 1959,

Lambert J., Paris C, Blackaby B. 1978, Housing Policy & the State, Macmillan, London

Lanco, P., 1989, Rapport de la Commission de Réflexion sur les aides publiques au



Logement, La Documentation Française, Paris

Le Corbousier 1957 , La Charte d'Athènes, Editions de Minuit, Paris

Leather, P., & Murie, A., 1986, The Decline in Public Expenditure, in Malpass (ed)  
The Housing Crisis, Croom Helm, Beckenham

Lees, R., & Smith, G., 1975, Action Research in community Development, Routledge  
and Kegan Paul, London

Levy, F., 1989, Bilan/Perspectives des Contrats de Plan de Développement Social des  
Quartiers, La Documentation Française, Paris

Lunel, P. 1989, L'Abbé Pierre, Livre de Poche, Paris

Macey, J., and Baker C.V., 1965, 1978, & 1982, Housing Management, Estates  
Gazette, London

MacLennan, D., 1989, The Nature and Effectiveness of Housing Management in  
England, HMSO, London

Macy, J.P., & Baker C. V., 1965 & 1973, Housing Management, The Estates Gazette,  
London

Mairie de Béthune 1989, , Le Mont Liébaut, , Mairie de Béthune, Béthune

Mairie de Béthune 1984, Le Mont Liébaut, Mairie de Béthune, Béthune

Mairie de Béthune 19864, , Le Mont Liébaut, , Mairie de Béthune, Béthune

Malpass, P (ed) 1986, The Housing Crisis, Croom Helm, Beckenham



- Marie de Chanteloup 1983, Ilot Sensible, Marie de Chanteloup, Chanteloup les Vignes
- Marie de Grande Synthe 1988, Etat des Realisations du DSQ à Grande Synthe, Marie de Grande Synthe, Grande Synthe
- Marie de Chanteloup 1991, Priorities DSU 1991, Marie de Chanteloup, Chanteloup les Vignes
- McNaughton, R., 1991, Repairs and Maintenance in the Public Sector, in Donnison & MacLennan (eds) The Housing Service of the Future, Longmans /Institute of Housing,
- Meaux 1989, Developpement Social et Urbain du Quartier de La Pierre Collinet, (Bilan 1984-88, Orientations 1989-93), Ville de Meaux Report, Meaux
- Merlin, P., 1990, La Famille Eclate, le Logement s'adapte, Syros-Alternatives, Paris
- Merrett, S., 1979, State Housing in Britain, RKP, London
- MHLG Circular 40/52, Expansion of the Housing programme, ,
- MHLG Circular 76/65, Industrialised Building, ,
- MHLG Circular 21/65 , Housing, ,
- MHLG 1945, Housing, Cmnd 6609, HMSO, London
- MHLG 1953, Houses: The Next Steps, Cmnd 8996, HMSO, London
- MHLG 1965, The Housing Programme 1965-70, Cmnd2838, HMSO, London
- MHLG 1968, Old Homes into New Houses, Cmnd 3602, HMSO , London



Middleton, M., 1991, Cities in Transition, Michael Joseph, London

Murie, A., 1991, Government and the Social Rented Sector, Housing Review 41 6, p115 -118,

Newton J., 1991, All in One Place, CHAS, London

Niessen, P., 1982, Qualitative Aspects in Cross National Comparative Research and the Problem of Functional Equivalence, in: Neissen & Peschar (eds) International Comparative Research , Pergamon Press, Oxford

Niner, P.,, Homelessness in Nine Local Authorities: Case Studies of Policy and Practice, HMSO, London

Nora-Eveno, P., 1976, Raport sur l'Amélioration de l'Habitat Ancien, La Documentation Francaise, paris

Nouyou, B., 1987, Le Financement du Logement Locatif Social, (HLM Report), OPHLM de Rennes, Rennes

OGRECO 1983, Le Clos Saint-lazare, OGRECO, Paris

OMINOR 1988b , Evaluation de l'Operation DSQ à Grande Synthe, OMINOR, Lille

OMINOR 1988a, Autoevaluation de l'Operation DSQ à Grande Synthe, OMINOR , Lille

OPHLM de Calais 1988, Quartier Dégradé: Le Fort Neiulay à Calais, (OPHLM Internal Report),

OPHLM de Calais 1987, Rapport D'Activité de l'Animateur HLM, (OPHLM Internal Report)



OPHLM de Calais 1986, Rapport d'Activité de l'Animateur HLM, Année 1986. (OPHLM Internal Report),

OPHLM de Calais 1989, Bilan de la Politique Menée dans la Domain de l'Habitat. (OPHLM Internal Report),

OPOAC de Meaux 1990, Adieu Eglantine, (Booklet produced on demolition of this block), OPAC de Meaux publication, Meaux

ORGECO 1980, Pre Dossier HVS: Le Clos Saint-Lazare, OGRECO, Paris

Oxley M., 1991, The Aims and Methods of Comparative Housing Research, in Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 8: 67-77, 1991,

Peach, C. 1981, The Growth and Distribution of the Black Population in Britain 1945-1980, in: Demography of Immigrants and Minority Groups in the UK ed Coleman D.A., Academic Press, London

Pearce, D., 1990, The French Low-cost Rented Housing System, (Unpublished report), DOE,

Péju, S., 1985, Scènes de la Grande Pauvreté, Editions de Seuil, Paris

Pesce, R. 1984, Développement Social des Quartiers, La Documentation Française, Paris

Pinto, R.R. 1991, The Impact of Estates Action on Developments in Council House Management and Effectiveness, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, LSE; publication forthcoming),

Power, A., 1986, The PEP Guide to Local Housing Management, Priority Estates Project, London



Power, A., 1982, Priority Estates Project 1981: Improving Problem Council Estates, HMSO, London

Power, A., 1987, The PEP Guide to Local Housing Management (in 3 volumes), PEP, London

Power, A., 1984, Local Housing Management, DOE, London

Power, A., 1991, Running to Stand Still, Priority Estates Project, London

Power, A., 1993, Hovels to Highrise: State Housing in Europe Since 1850, Routledge, London

Power, A. 1987, Property Before People, The Management of 20th Century Council Housing, Allen & Unwin, London

Préfecture de la Région Ile de France, 1985, Bilan des Operations HVS en Ile de France, Direction Régional de l'Equipement, Paris

Prescott-Clarke, P., Allen, P., & Morrissey, C. 1988, Queuing for Housing: A Study of Council housing Waiting Lists, HMSO, London

PSI 1992, Urban Trends 1, PSI, London

PSI 1988, No Racial Harassment This Week, PSI, London

Quilliot, R, and Guerrand, R-H 1989, Cent Ans d'Habitat Social, (Une Utopie Réaliste), Editions Albin Michel, Paris

Ragin C.C., 1987, Comparative Social Science, University of California Press, Berkeley



- Rambert, C. 1956, L'Habitat Collectif, Problème Urbain, Paris
- Rees G., & Lambert J., 1985, Cities in Crisis, Edward Arnold, London
- Region Nord Pas de Calais 1986, Convention de Plan Etat /Region Nord Pas de Calais /Commune: Site de Calais, Region Nord Pas de Calais, Lille
- Rex J & Moore R 1967, Race Community and Conflict: A Study of Sparkbrook. Oxford University Press , Oxford
- Reynard, V., & Comby J., 1991, Land Policy in France, ADEF, Paris
- Reynolds, F., 1986, The Problem Housing Estate, Gower, Aldershot
- Room G., 1991, National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion, (First Annual Report of the European Community Observatory), Commission of the European Communities, Brussels
- Roussel, H., 1988, Chanteloup les Vignes, Univ. of Paris 7/DESS, Paris
- Saunders, R., (ed) 1989, PEP National Conference 1988, PEP , London
- Schaefer, J.-P., 1989, Housing Finance and Subsidy System in France, Paper presented at Joseph Rowntree memorial Trust International Colloquium on Housing Finance, York
- Scherrer, F., 1992, L'Agence Foncière et Technique de la Région Parisienne, in "Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine" No 51, March 1992,
- Short, J.R., 1982, Housing in Britain, Methuen, London
- Skilton, M., 1988, A Better Reception: The Development of Concierge Schemes,



DOE, London

Smith, D., & Whalley, P., 1975, Racial Minorities and Council Housing, Policy and Economic Planning , London

SNU 1985, After Entryphones, SNU, London

SNU 1988 , Lighting Up Brent, SNU, London

Spicker, P., 1983, The Allocation of Council Housing , Shelter, London

Tanter, A., & Toubon, J-C. 1983, Stratégies de Transformation Sociale des Secteurs Dévalorisés, IAURIF, Paris

Topalov, C., 1987, Le Logement en France, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris

Toubon, J-C., 1992, Voyage d'Etude en Grande-Bratagne du Groupe "Politiques de Peuplement" du Conseil Social, UNFOHLM, Paris

Toubon, J.-C., & Tanter A., 1980, Operations Habitat et Vie Sociale en Région Ile de France, IAURIF, Paris

Toubon, J.C., & Renaudin, R., 1987, Les Politiques de Réqualification du Logement Social en France, UNFOHLM, Paris

Toubon, J-C., 1980a, Operations "Habitat et Vie Sociale" en Ile de France, IAURIF, Paris

Toubon, J. C., 1983, Les "Model Cities", in Les Cahiers de IAURP, no 69, Sept. 1983 p83 - 95,



Townsend, P., 1979, Poverty in the United Kingdom, Penguin. Harmondsworth

UNFOHLM1992, Les Politiques de Peuplement, Contribution du Conseil Social au Congrès de 1992, UNGOHLM, Paris

UNFOHLM1975, Livre Blanc, UNFOHLM, Paris

UNFOHLM1989, Les Chifres Cles du Movement HLM, UNFOHLM, Paris

UNFOHLM1981, Habitat et Vie Sociale, une Procédure Utile qu'il Faut Aujourd'hui Dépasser, (Dossier des Assises sur l'Habitat Social), UNFOHLM, Paris

Van Acker, P., 1988, 10 Ans d'Aménagement, Unpublished report,

Vieillard-Baron H., 1990, Attribution de Logement et Strategies de Peuplement, in "Villes en Parallèle", No 16, 3rd Trimestre, 1990,

Viellard-Baron H., 1989, Chanteloup Les Vignes, in "Espaces et Sociétés": Logiques de l'habitat No 52-53, Sept. 1989,

Viellard-Baron, H., 1990, Le Ghetto, un Lieu Commun, Impropre et Banal, in "Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine" No 49, December 1990,

Ville de Calais 1989, Fort Nieulay: Bilan de l'Operation, Ville de Calais , Calais

Ville de Stains 1991, Le Clos St Lazare, Ville de Stains, Stains

Ville de Calais 1986, Le Fort Nieulay: Un Quartier qui Change, Ville de Calais, Calais

Ville de Calais 1985, Plan Local de Développement Social, Ville de Calais, Calais



Wandsworth 1985, Report by Director of Housing on Special Estate Scheme for Doddington Estate, (4.6.85),

Wandsworth 1984, Report to Housing Committee, (Doddington Estate)

Wandsworth 1985a, Further Report by Director of Housing on Special Estate Scheme for Doddington Estate, (29.10.85),

Wandsworth 1988, Estates Action Bid Forms A and B, (Doddington Estate),

Warwick, D.P. & Osherson, S., 1973, Comparative Analysis in the Social Sciences, in "Comparative Research Methods" ed. Warwick D.P & Osherson S., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs

Wigan Metropolitan Borough 1987, Wigan's Council Estates, Wigan Metropolitan Borough, Wigan

Wigan Metropolitan Borough 1987, Worsley Mesnes, Wigan Metropolitan Borough, Wigan

Willmott, P., & Murie, A., 1988, Polarisation and Social Housing, Policy Studies Institute, London

Zipfel, T., 1989, Estate Management Boards, PEP, London