The London School of Economics and Political Science

How intractable is intractable?

A social psychological study of the permeability of imagined boundaries across groups in conflict

Cathryn Nicholson

A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Psychology of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2016

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 71,363 words (plus Appendix of 20,629 and Bibliography of 5.580 words).

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine the social psychological significance of intractability across groups in conflict using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The permeability of group boundaries that are assumed to separate and divide is examined through the exploration of the groups' dialogical relationships with each other in three different studies. Using an ideographic approach, a total of fifty two depth interviews were carried out in London and Israel, to capture meaningful perspectives of the conflict by those enmeshed within it. The first study set in London, explored the perceptions of Jewish participants with a lived experience of Israel and of Palestinian participants living in the UK, as to the intractability of the conflict. Results showed a diverse set of social representations where imagined boundaries between the groups remained closed due to their different historical interpretations leading to present day perceptions, yet at the same time the boundaries were softened by a vision of an imagined future where both groups talked of the sharing of their commonalities rather than differences. The second study was set in northern Israel, exploring how a sample of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, the latter group making up 20% of the population, worked together as medics. A contrast was found between their flourishing relationships inside the work space, protected by Israeli medical ethics and that outside, where inequality, with a sense of non-recognition by the Palestinian citizens, and a sense of threat by the Jewish citizens reflected the latter groups' dialogical relationship with the Palestinian population in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The final investigation, explored how the concepts of semantic barriers and bridges were useful in exploring boundary permeability further to discuss how intractability is not necessarily a given, but a symptom of asymmetrical relationships in tension. As a whole, this thesis makes contributions to the study of conflict in Israel, to the intractability of conflict in general and to possibilities for dialogue.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my appreciation for all those who have supported me throughout my doctoral journey. First, my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Caroline Howarth, who from the time of our first meeting, has never wavered in her enthusiasm for my theoretical and empirical explorations, watching me wander down paths to find my own voice, without a hint of exasperation when I have marched back up the path with another set of questions. To other members of faculty, I thank them, as a source of knowledge, learning and inspiration: Alex Gillespie, Sandra Jovchelovitch, Saadi Lahlou, Ivana Marková, and the late Rob Farr. Many thanks also to Daniel Linehan, Jacq Crane and Terri-Anne Fairclough for running the Dept with kindness and humour alongside their meticulous efficiency. To my PhD colleagues too who have shared umpteen PS950 sessions with a fresh, stimulating and supportive approach each week, and fun times outside of it; in particular, Helen Green, for her calm support and also to Simon Evans, Bankole Falade, Mi Zhao, Teresa Whitney, Kevin Corti, Jane Roberts, Natalia Concha, Claire Coultas, Liora Moscovitz, Jacob Metze and to newcomer Sandra Obradovic for generously sharing the same desk in the best spot in the PhD room. Special thanks to Vlad Glăvenau who was finishing his thesis, just as I was starting mine, but has continued to take an active interest in my work. To Constance de Saint Laurent for finding ways of communicating her innovative ideas to the ether through symposiums and workshops and inviting me along for the ride. Thanks too, to CUPSYNET, bringing PhD students across Europe together, with a particular thanks to the Universities of Neuchâtel and Aalborg for providing a supportive and enriching environment from which to develop new ideas and thinking.

The seeds of my PhD were thrown around during a conversation with the late James Merchant during a trek high in the Canadian Rockies in 2004 and I shall always be thankful for that chance and inspiring opportunity. My late parents, Myrna and John Nicholson would have been rather bemused by this journey, although probably not surprised. My mother's favourite saying was 'there's no such thing as can't' and my father instilled in me a deep sense of responsibility for thinking about the Other. I am forever indebted to them. My close and wider family have supported me throughout: Hannah, Tom, Harriet and Richard, have all enriched and added to this journey in ways they can hardly imagine. To my partner John, without whom I would never have had the courage to start, nor the stamina to finish, I am and always will be, enormously grateful.

With many thanks to Rania, Liora, Shira and Hani for their support in Israel; their generosity in welcoming me and finding time to assist, when needed, was very much appreciated. And countless others too, from all walks of life and all denominations, who took the time to show me around, talk about their lives and placed this thesis in its context. And finally, to the fifty two people who gave up their time to tell me about their lived experiences, their perceptions and ideas that make up this piece of work. I hope that I have used their words wisely and I dedicate this thesis to them.

DECLARATION **2**

ABSTRACT **4**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS **5**

1. INTRODUCTION **12**

1.2. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 12

1.2.1. Aspirations of statehood and its consequences *13*

1.3. CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT 13

Figure 1: Israel and the Palestinian Territories 14

1.3.1. The birth of a nation state: Israel: 14th May 1948 ..... *14*

1.3.2. Losses and gains: Aliyah and refugees *15*

1.3.3. Occupation and settlements *16*

1.3.4. A time for peace: the Oslo Accords. *18*

1.3.5. Disengagement from Gaza *19*

1.3.6. Palestinian Resistance *20*

1.3.7. Economic development in a global world *21*

Table 1: Economic status of Israel and the Palestinian Territories 22

Table 2. Population in Israel and the Palestinian Territories 23

1.4. RESEARCHER POSITIONING 23

1.5. PILOT STUDY IN ISRAEL 24

Table 3: Informal pilot study interviews in Israel, June 2012 24

1.5.1. Results: Negotiating identities within an ideological minefield *25*

1.6. CONCLUSION 27

2. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEDDED CONFLICT **28**

2.1. INTRODUCTION 28

2.2 CONFLICT AS EMBEDDED UNRESOLVED DISCORD 29

2.2.1 Intergroup relations: defining the role of the group *29*

2.2.2. Intergroup conflict: intractability across group boundaries *31*

2.3. THE FORMATION OF GROUP CONFLICT: CONNECTIONS TO IDEOLOGY 33

2.3.1. Ideology in development: ethos of conflict and resistance *35*

2.3.2. Boundary formation *37*

2.4. CONTACT ACROSS IMAGINED BOUNDARIES 39

2.5. NARRATIVES AS A MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION 42

2.5.1. Narratives as mediators across ideological group boundaries *43*

2.6 INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICT THROUGH SOCIAL REPRESENTATION THEORY 44

2.6.1. The role of themata and social representations *47*

2.6.2. Narratives as social representations *49*
2.6.3. Ideology as representations of societal markers *50*
2.7. CONCLUSION 52
3. EMPIRICAL FOCUS: RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 54
3.1. INTRODUCTION 54
3.2. THEORETICAL POSITIONING UNDERPINNING RESEARCH STRATEGY 54
3.2.1. Social representation theory as a foundation to methodology *57*
3.2.2. Grounded theory *58*
3.2.3. The use of the term 'Other' *59*
3.2.4. Researcher positioning in the chosen representational fields *59*
3.2.5. Depth interviews *60*
Corpus construction 61
Ethics and consent 62
Discussion guide 63
Coding of data 64
Analysis and interpretation 64
Naming of participants 65
3.3. EMPIRICAL STUDY ONE: REFLECTIONS FROM AFAR OF LIVING IN A CONFLICT ZONE 66
3.3.1. Research strategy *66*
3.3.2. Sample *67*
Table 4: Jewish Israeli participants (Study 1) 68
Table 5: Palestinian participants (Study 1) 69
Table 6: Age ranges across all groups (Study 1) 69
Recruitment: Jewish Israeli participants 70
Recruitment: Palestinian participants 70
Discussion guide 72
3.3.3. Analysis and interpretation *72*
Figure2: Sets of global, organising and base themes 73
3.4. EMPIRICAL STUDY TWO: LIVING AND WORKING SIDE BY SIDE IN ISRAEL 74
3.4.1. Research strategy *74*
3.4.2. Sample and recruitment *76*
Table 7: Palestinian Israeli medical professionals (Study 2) 77
Table 8: Jewish Israeli medical professionals (Study 2) 77
Discussion Guide 78
3.4.3. Analysis and interpretation of themata *79*
Dialogical analysis 80
3.5. EMPIRICAL STUDY THREE: SEMANTIC BARRIERS AND BRIDGES ACROSS IMAGINED BOUNDARIES 81
3.5.1. Research strategy *82*
3.5.2. Sample *82*

Table 9: Palestinians by place, gender and age 83
Table 10: Jewish Israelis by place, gender and age 83
3.5.3. Analysis and interpretation *84*
3.6. LIMITATIONS 85
3.6.1. Samples *85*
3.6.2. Robust analysis and interpretation *86*
3.7. CONCLUSION 87
4. CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AS REFLECTED EXPERIENCE 89
4.1. INTRODUCTION 89
4.1.1 Imagined boundaries of consensus and conflict *89*
4.2. BASE AND ORGANISING THEMES ACROSS GROUP BOUNDARIES 90
Figure 3: Global, organising and base themes 91
4.2.1. Base themes surrounding themes of conflict and consensus *93*
a) Themes of ideology 93
b) Themes of security 97
c) Themes of collective positioning 98
4.2.2. Asymmetry and power relationships *102*
4.2.3. The role of themes in conflict research *103*
4.3. FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE VIA THE PRESENT 105
4.3.1. The significance of interpreting the past: what did or didn't happen *106*
4.4. DISCUSSION: THE REIFIED WORLD OF HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 112
4.4.1. Kernels and meta narratives *113*
4.5. CONCLUSION 115
5. CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AS LIVED EXPERIENCE: JEWISH AND PALESTINIAN ISRAELI MEDICS SHARING THEIR WORKING LIVES 117
5.1. INTRODUCTION 117
5.2. CONTACT AS A HARBINGER OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE OTHER 118
5.2.1. Exploring themata across imagined boundaries *119*
5.3. SHIFTING THEMATA ACROSS GROUP BOUNDARIES 120
Figure 4: Unresolved tensions in national conflic 121
5.3.1. They are people exactly like me *122*
5.3.2. They are people not exactly like me *123*
5.3.3. Themata of exclusivity - inclusivity: A national home for Jewish people *124*
5.3.4. Themata of non-recognition – recognition: The Palestinian Israeli minority *130*
5.3.5. Themata of inequality - equality: A clash of rights for the Palestinian Israelis *132*
5.3.6. Themata of threat – security: War and its widening legacy for Jewish Israelis *137*
5.4. SUMMARY OF DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS 142

5.5. Discussion: crossing imagined boundaries 143
5.6. Conclusion 147

6: SEMANTIC BARRIERS AND BRIDGES ACROSS IMAGINED BOUNDARIES 149

6.1. Introduction 149
6.2. Conflict and consensus across Israeli –Palestinian relationships 150
6.2.1. The role of themata across dialogical divides 151
Figure 5: Themata across a Jewish Israeli and Palestinian sample 152
6.3. Barriers and bridges across Israeli-Palestinian relations 154
6.3.1. Semantic barriers: blocking paths across boundaries of difference 154
6.3.2. Semantic bridges: opening paths across boundaries of difference 156
6.3.3. Identifying barriers and bridges 157
6.3.4. What separates and what binds 157
6.3.5. Exclusivity/inclusivity and threat/security related to non-recognition /recognition 158
6.3.6. Threat/security related to oppression/freedom 162
6.3.7. Group loyalty: You're either with us or against us 168
6.4. Discussion 171
6.5. Conclusion 177

7: CONCLUSIONS: DIALOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 178

7.1. Introduction 178
7.2. Thematic foundations of the conflict 179
7.3. Contact in context 182
7.4. Crossing imagined boundaries 183
7.5. Empirical and theoretical development across the thesis 184
7.6. Towards a process based social psychology of conflict 185
7.6.1. How intractable is intractable conflict? 186
7.6.2. Dialogical relationship across imagined boundaries 188
7.6.3. Intractability: Semantic barriers and bridges developing from themata 191
7.6.4. Acknowledging the Other: Transformation and change 192
7.6.5. Applications and future research 194
7.7. Limitations of the research 195
7.8. Contributions to social psychology 196
7.9. Conclusion 197

8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 199

9. APPENDIX 217

9.1. Study one overview (Chapter 4) 217
9.1.1. Discussion guides 217

9.1.2. Informed consent *220*
9.1.3. Nvivo categories *223*
Table 11: NVivo summary Jewish Israelis in London (Study 1) 223
Table 12: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in London 223
Table 13: NVivo summary Palestinians in London (Study 1) 225
Table 14: NVivo categories Palestinians in London 226
9.1.4. Organising and base themes framework *229*
9.1.5. Organising and base themes coding book *230*
9.2. STUDY TWO OVERVIEW (CHAPTER 5) 236
9.2.1. Discussion guides *236*
9.2.2. Nvivo categories *238*
Table 15: NVivo summary Palestinian Israelis in Israel (Study2) 238
Table 16: NVivo categories Palestinian Israelis in Israel 238
Table 17: Nvivo summary Jewish Israelis in Israel (Study 2) 239
Table 18: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in Israel 240
Themata of exclusivity-inclusivity and quoted examples 242
Themata of threat-security and quoted examples 247
Themata of recognition – non recognition and quoted examples 251
Themata of equality – inequality and quoted examples 256
9.2.3. Dialogical analysis full quotes *260*
9.3. STUDY THREE OVERVIEW (CHAPTER 6) 263
9.3.1. Sample details *263*
Themata of exclusivity-inclusivity / semantic barriers and bridges 265
Themata of threat – security / semantic barriers and bridges 270
..... 270
Themata of non recognition-recognition / semantic barriers and bridges 274
Themata of oppression - freedom / semantic barriers and bridges 279

1. Introduction

> *'Sometimes it's hard if you saw a group of them together you'd be hard pressed to find out who was Israeli and who was Palestinian because they are so similar. They are both very outgoing and vibrant personalities. And you know, there is no reason that they shouldn't be part of a more equal society.'* (Jewish Israeli participant)

1.2. Introduction to the thesis

This chapter sets out the geopolitical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to provide a brief overview of the two groups' positionings to acknowledge how they each stem from the foundations of their geopolitical and historical milieu. Although this discussion is not directly focussed on the social psychological processes that are examined in the rest of the thesis, this is necessary to familiarise readers with the roots of the conflict. Indeed, one key insight from social psychology is to acknowledge the centrality of context as key to analysing human behaviour (Howarth, Campbell, et al, 2013). And it is from this base that I shall begin the research journey.

I will introduce the aspirations held by both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli groups as they navigated their projects that were set within a web of a wider global infrastructure which remains integral to the continuation of the conflict. From the inception of the state of Israel in 1948 to the present day, the losses and gains for both groups are briefly summarised to set out the context from which their social representations have been developed. This includes the attempts by both groups to find a peaceful resolution leading to structural changes as well as the periodic violent incursions by the Israeli military and Palestinian resistance groups. My position as a researcher, as an outsider not having any attachment to either group, is discussed. Finally, I briefly describe a pilot study undertaken in Israel at the beginning of my empirical journey. The study was useful in both asserting the complexities of my positioning as well as exploring how the initial theoretical trajectory needed to be carefully thought through before embarking on empirical

work. What was learnt from that exercise has formed the base of my theoretical and empirical positioning regarding this thesis.

1.2.1. Aspirations of statehood and its consequences

Conflict has become entrenched in Israel's development as a nation state. The history of Israel and Palestine is a parallel history, each with its own narratives and yet at the same time their histories are also intertwined. Each can be defined, both by the Other and by themselves, through their ideological narratives of past and future aspirations, which for the most part, have followed divergent paths. The consequences of one group's actions of those aspirations onto the Other activates a response, which activates yet another, as both groups continue to be locked in a painful duet of mutual suffering and perceived sense of victimhood.

1.3. Context of the conflict

The context of the conflict is partly set 3,000 years ago when the land, now the State of Israel, was said to be promised to descendants of Jacob after Moses led the Exodus out of Egypt. Evidence for this is given in the Torah, as rabbinical authoritative Jewish religious teachings. Mainstream Jewish tradition looks on this promise as being given to all Jews and their descendants. This land was described as being from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates River, an area much larger than present day Israel which would now include the Palestinian Territories (West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza) and parts of present day Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories lies to the east of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered to the south by Egypt, the north by Lebanon and Syria and the west by Jordan, between 29 and 33 degrees north of the equator. It is a small geographical area, 20,777 square kilometres almost identical to the size of Wales in the UK, and is populated by approximately eleven million people, similar to the population of London. Two geographical maps are shown in Figure 1, one to display the area as it lies in modern-day times in relation to other nations and another larger scale map showing the modern State of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, although the borders between the West Bank and Israel are geo-politically not so clearly defined as shown overleaf. Maps of Israel/ Palestine have often been used for political purposes (Wallach, 2011) to show territorial entities that will differ from one to another; the maps chosen reflect the geographical context rather than a geopolitical one.

Figure 1: Israel and the Palestinian Territories



The key driver of the conflict was, and remains, the sovereign competition for the same area of land by two groups; one that declared the State of Israel in 1948 and the other, the indigenous people who had lived there prior to 1948. Neither group to date has been successful in reaching a compromise to share this land that does not conflict with their own ideological aspirations and goals.

1.3.1. The birth of a nation state: Israel: 14th May 1948

Israel was declared a nation state following the failure of a UN partition agreement to find an equitable solution to the growing conflict between Jews and Arabs over land and immigration rights since the beginning of the century. British Mandate Palestine had governed the area after the division of the defeated Ottoman Empire between Britain, France and Arab tribes against Germany and its allies during WW1 (1914-1918). Britain, influenced by Zionist idealism with its appeal to assist the Jews in returning to their biblical homeland following anti-Semitism and pogroms in Europe, gave permission to establish "a national home in Palestine" under the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Smith, 2013) as long as the rights of the indigenous Arab population were upheld. At that time it was not clear that the area would become a Jewish hegemonic national state. It was placed under the protectorate of the British as defined by the League of Nations in 1922. This contradictory narrative sowed the seeds for later disharmony. Jewish immigration continued to rise, during and after WW2 (1939-1945), following the genocide of the Holocaust, when six million Jews, nearly half of the world's Jewry, were killed by the German Nazi

regime. With this rise in the number of immigrants to Palestine, outnumbering the quota set by the British to appease the indigenous population, there followed a deterioration in the already tense relationship between the Jews, the indigenous Arab population (Muslim, Christian, Druze and Bedouin) and the British, leading to sporadic and deadly conflict and competition over the territory that both the Jews and the Arabs claimed as their own (Barr, 2011).

Britain appealed to the United Nations for assistance. The United Nations recommended the partitioning of the land between the Jewish and the Arab populations with Jerusalem placed under an international protectorate. Although the subsequent international vote accepted the resolution (33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions) the Arab contingencies were among those who voted against. A request to the International Court of Justice to revoke the vote failed, leaving the plan to proceed formally towards partition the following year when the terms of the British Mandate of Palestine was due to expire. Although Britain accepted the result of the vote, it refused to enforce it, stating it was unacceptable to both sides (Barr, 2011). As Britain formally left Palestine on 14th May 1948, Israel declared itself a State. The Palestinians mark this day as the 'Nakba' translated as the 'catastrophe'.

1.3.2. Losses and gains: Aliyah and refugees

The immediate gain for Israel was the freedom for Jewish immigrants from Western Europe after the devastating effects of the Holocaust to live in a safe and secure self-determined State. Jews from the Arab Middle East who faced persecution and discrimination during and after the conflict, also immigrated to Israel, ending hundreds of years of co-existence under Muslim rule (Harkabi, 1977). The population of Jewish Israelis almost doubled from 1948 to 1951, from 650,000 to over a million. Immigration has been constant from many parts of the world since 1948. All Jews, as defined by law can immigrate under the Law of Return (Aliyah), with their children and grandchildren; this was extended in 1970 to include non-Jewish spouses, as well as non-Jewish spouses of Jewish children and grandchildren (www.jewishagency.org). Benefits to immigrants include free travel to Israel, Hebrew tuition, health insurance and financial benefits to help in the well-organised absorption process. The largest influx came from the former USSR after the end of the Cold War with a total of 1.2 million immigrants. Of the 14.2 million global Jewry, 43% now reside in Israel, (2015, Jewish Virtual Library) with the remainder

mostly living in the USA, but with sizeable communities in S America and the EU, including the UK and Australia. There are few remaining elsewhere.

At the time of the birth of the State of Israel in 1948 there were losses for the Palestinian population. Over 80% of the Palestinian Arab population, 727,000 from a previous population of 860,000 were forced to leave, either through fear of death from the Jewish military or left temporarily, planning to return once peace had returned to the region (Smith, 2013, p.203). Refugees travelled to surrounding Arab countries of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Most still remain sixty years later in refugee camps run by UNWRA (United Nations Works and Reliefs Agency for Palestine refugees) as numbers have since swollen to five million (www.unwra.org). Refugees were not fully accepted by their host country (although the situation in Jordan differs as before 1967 it controlled the West Bank), nor were they allowed to return home to the villages of their birth due to Israeli enacted laws of residency. The UN resolution 194 in December 1948 (www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194) to allow Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and villages or to be compensated, has had little effect on any change of strategy.

Of the 133,000 Arab Palestinians who survived the hostilities in 1948 by remaining in the new nation state, or for some returning under local agreements, their status led to the entitlement of Israeli citizenship. The Israeli Arabs, as they became known, were mostly made of Muslim (Sunni) Arabs but also included minorities from Christian, Bedouin and Druze communities. Their numbers have since increased to 1.7 million, 20.7% of the Israeli population (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2011). Their stigmatisation of being the minority and unwanted out group has been well documented (Rouhana, 2007, Kalhidi 2010) which has illustrated the early segregation amidst different administrative and civil conditions to the Jewish Israeli citizens (Smooha, 1993, Pappé, 2011,Yaftel, 2000).

1.3.3. Occupation and settlements

Gains of further expansion of territory by Israel were made less than twenty years following 1948. In a pre-emptive strike in 1967 Israel captured the Sinai, including the Suez Canal, resulting in Syrian and Jordan forces joining an Arab front against Israel. Within six days Israel defeated the Arab front and captured the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank / East Jerusalem from Jordan and Gaza from Egypt.

Inhabitants from the Golan Heights were of Syrian descent, mostly from the Druze community and do not form part of my research.

The West Bank, with a land area of 2,180 square miles shares its north, south and west borders, as defined by the 'green line' border of 1948, with Israel and its eastern border with Jordan divided by the River Jordan. Although the West Bank was not annexed by Israel, it remained under Israeli military control as an occupying force; its legal standing as occupied territory is disputed by Israel but not by the international community, including the US, nor the United Nations (http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136).

Israelis commonly name the area of the West Bank as 'Judea and Samaria', from biblical interpretations. From the beginning, land was acquired for the building of Israeli settlements that further exacerbated tensions between the two conflicting groups. Although such developments were and are considered to be illegal by the international community and the United Nations (UN Resolution 465), its basis developed from the Allon Plan (Smith, 2013, p.303) that implied annexation over many parts of the occupied territories was planned for many years. The number of settlements built from 1967 has increased steadily and is now home to 400,000 Jewish Israelis.

East Jerusalem, geographically part of the West Bank was annexed by Israel in 1967. It is here in the ancient walled 'old city' that is depicted as the holy centre of the three monolithic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Suburbs continue from this site eastwards towards the West Bank, and westwards towards Israel. UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) remains one of seven, which condemns the annexation, and Israel's Jerusalem Law which declares the city to be Israel's 'complete and united' capital. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have a status of 'permanent residency' and are allowed the right to live and work in Israel with access to benefits such as health and social security but with strict limitations as to the right to keep this status. Israeli settlement building has continued apace in East Jerusalem, now almost equal to those of those in the West Bank with between 300,000 to 375,000 Israeli Jewish settlers now outnumbering the 250,000 East Jerusalemites.

The building of the security fence (Israeli naming) or the separation wall (Palestinian naming) begun in 2002, threads its way around the West Bank and East Jerusalem, built to deter Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel (Barak-Erez 2006). Its route has been criticised for its presence over the 1967 'green line', the mark of which is discussed as forming the official national border between Israel and an intended independent Palestinian state.

1.3.4. A time for peace: the Oslo Accords.

During the early 1990s international efforts to bring a peaceful resolution between the two groups culminated in the Oslo Accords in 1995, with both sides declaring their intention to end the conflict. Israel accepted the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as representing the Palestinian people and would negotiate with them. In return, the PLO overturned their previous charter of 1968 'that had denied Israel's existence and called for her overthrow by armed struggle, were now inoperative and no longer valid' (Smith, 2013, p.439). A new political body the Palestinian Authority (PA) replaced the PLO as part of these negotiations. Various stages were set that would work towards final status negotiations, that included discussions on state borders, Palestinian self-determination and Jewish Israeli settlement blocs. The final negotiations remain in 2015, a distant vision. All subsequent peace negotiations have either ended in failure or impasse.

One of the outcomes of the Oslo accords was the division of the West Bank into three areas - Area A, B and C, set up as initial stages in the on-going negotiation process. Area A, is under civil and security control by the PA and includes eight Palestinian cities and surrounding areas. In 2013 this area comprised about 18% of the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2013). The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) can enter the area to follow military raids in search for suspected militants, yet Israeli citizens are officially forbidden to enter. Area B remains under Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli – Palestinian security control and includes over 400 Palestinian villages and their lands with no Jewish Israeli settlements. This area comprises about 22% of the West Bank (B'Tselem, 2013). Area C remains under full Israeli civil and security control, comprising approximately 63% of the West Bank including settlements, outposts and declared state land (B'Tselem, 2013). This area includes annexed East Jerusalem and the Palestinian area of the Dead Sea.

From the outset, the regional and international agencies have been central to peace negotiations, which in the post Oslo years included the planning of a separate Palestinian state alongside a secure Israeli state (the two state solution). Subsequent to the ongoing failure of the Oslo Accords, all negotiations have been ultimately unsuccessful: Camp David 2000, Roadmap 2002, Annapolis 2007, and more recently Kerry 2012/14 (USA) when no peace deal came close to being accepted by either side leading to a break down in further talks. Their ultimate failure in finding a workable solution to end the conflict reflects the lack of common ground not only by the protagonists, but by the political and ideological interests of other nation states and agencies that have become part of the on-going conflict. This includes the Jewish communities outside Israel, most notable as strong lobby groups to the US government bodies, the Quartet (US, EU Russia, UN) recruited in 2000 to act as mediators in peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, the wider Arab community, the United Nations and other international legal bodies.

1.3.5. Disengagement from Gaza

Gaza, a small piece of land in south west Israel adjoining Egypt on is southern borders, was occupied during the 1967 offensive against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Disengagement by Israel in 2005 led to the Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control of Gaza but with restrictions of movement and goods between Gaza and Israel placing a humanitarian challenge on the territory, resulting in further growing political resistance. Parliamentary Palestinian elections held in 2006 for the first time, as part of a strategy for building statehood institutions, was fought between the two main rival political parties in the Palestinian Territories, Hamas and Fatah. Hamas won popular support in Gaza helping the party to an overall election win and unexpected victory. Hamas, listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, backed a more military role in its resistance to Israel with a strong Islamic ethos, at odds with the more moderate Fatah party. Fatah had formally renounced violence against Israel within a context of on-going peace negotiations. The Quartet made any future financial assistance to the PA dependent on nonviolent strategy, recognition of the state of Israel, plus accepting all previous peace agreements. Hamas rejected these terms at that time leading to the suspension of some international assistance with economic sanctions imposed by Israel. By 2007 tensions between Hamas and Fatah erupted into hostilities leaving over two hundred Palestinians dead in this intragroup

violent struggle. Hamas finally took control of Gaza. Various agreements between the two Palestinian political parties led to a unity government agreement in April 2014 which remains in place at the time of writing.

As the humanitarian situation worsened, with an economic blockade and Israeli control of goods and peoples entering and exiting Gaza, a loss of essential public services ensued, for example, reduced access to electricity and petrol supplies. Gaza militancy was strengthened in response, heightening already ideological tensions. Between 2004 and 2014 Qassam rockets, from Palestinian militant groups, were fired into southern Israel killing 44 Israelis, injuring many more and spreading fear amongst the inhabitants living in areas close to the Gaza / Israeli border where the majority of the rockets fell. Israel has attacked Gaza three times in response. The first attack, Operation Cast Lead in 2008 / 2009, followed by a further incursion, Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012, left nearly four thousand Gazans dead, the majority of whom were civilians including women and children. Many more were injured and the area's infrastructure destroyed. The number of Israeli defence forces killed amounted to less than a hundred. A further offensive during six weeks in the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective Edge) resulted in a further 2,000 Gazan deaths, comprising 1,500 civilians including 539 children. An estimated 10,000 were injured, including 3,374 children of whom 1,000 were left permanently disabled (www.amnesty.org). 66 Israeli IDF soldiers were killed and six Israeli civilians, including one child. 30% of the Gazan population were displaced during the conflict. The differences between the numbers killed and injured across the groups demonstrate the disparity of power and military capability between the two conflicting groups.

1.3.6. Palestinian Resistance

The first Intifada (1987-1993) represented the Palestinian uprising as a protest and resistance to Israel's continued hegemony and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Actions included boycotts of institutions of the Israeli civil administration, economic boycotts, general strikes, the use of graffiti and the widespread use of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and Israeli infrastructure within the Palestinian Territories. In response, the Israeli military were involved in a strategy to control the rising violence. During these six years, the IDF killed between 1,162 and 1,204 Palestinians who in turn killed 100 Israeli citizens

and 60 soldiers. In the first two years of the uprising, between 23,600 and 29,900 Palestinian children, injured by IDF beatings, needed medical treatment; it was estimated that 7% of all Palestinians under the age of 18 required medical attention because of injuries from shootings, beatings and teargas. According to Amnesty International approximately 80% of the Palestinians killed during the first month were in demonstrations where Israeli security services lives were not in danger ("Israel and the Occupied Territories: Broken Lives – A Year of Intifada". Amnesty International (Retrieved November 4, 2012). Not only was there intergroup violence, but intra-Palestinian violence became prominent following the recruitment of Israeli collaborators which carried a death sentence for those found guilty, 822 of whom were killed during this time.

The Second Intifada uprising, or more commonly known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada from 2000-2005 that followed the failure of the Camp David peace negotiations, was an even more violent period for both groups. Three thousand Palestinians were killed by the IDF, many thousands more injured and the destruction of areas of infrastructure, with the use of strict curfews and control of movement through checkpoints are well documented (www.peacenow.org). Palestinian tactics included mass protests, general strikes, intensified suicide bombings and mortar attacks in Israel by Palestinian militant groups waging guerrilla warfare accounting for 566 Israeli deaths. Most of the deaths were civilians as attacks often took place in Israeli cities in restaurants and markets or on public transport systems.

1.3.7. Economic development in a global world

In terms of development and economic success, Israel has established itself, in just over sixty five years, as a technically advanced market economy, ranked 19th out of 187 nations in 2013 on the UN's Human Development Index (www.hdr.undp.org). Not abundant in natural resources, Israel has been particularly successful in the High Tech and Telecommunications field, backed by a strong venture capital industry. Israel was invited to join the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 2010 and has signed Free Trade Agreements with the USA and the EU.

The Palestinians have not had the same opportunities to thrive economically due to the restrictions as imposed by the conflict. As can be illustrated in the table below, the differences between the two groups are wide in terms of economic development which has affected employment, education and life expectancy. The Israeli people enjoy a much higher standard of living with better access to these life realities. As Palestine is not a state, it is not included in the global market economy nor has access to full UN status. However since the Oslo Accords of 1993 agreed by both groups with international support, the first stage of a peace process to fulfil the 'right of the Palestinian people to self-determination' (Knesset 1993) where each side recognised the legitimate right of the other, opportunities arose for the Palestinian people under the Palestinian Authority (PA) to gain more economic independence. Although the agreements for self-determination never materialised there was a window of economic opportunity. But aid is still a factor in the economy, relying heavily on aid ($1.1 billion in 2010, www.unicef.org) as well as receiving support by UNRWA (United Relief and Works Agency) on behalf of the Palestinian refugees with an annual budget of $600 million (www.unwra.org). The economic status of both Israel and the Palestinian territories are shown below:

Table 1: Economic status of Israel and the Palestinian Territories

	Israel	Palestinian Territories
	OECD 2013 (www.oecd.org)	2013 (www.unicef .org)
Life expectancy	81.7 yrs	73 yrs (2012)
Gross Domestic Product GDP	$258.1. (billion)	$8.1. (billion) (2011)
Per capita (GDP)	$32,000	$1,609
% yr average growth	3.8%	2.2%
Long term unemployed	0.8%	23.4%
Tertiary education	46.4%	25.8% (EU data) eacea.ac.europea.eu

The total population for both groups now stands at approximately 11.25 million and divided as shown below

Table 2. Population in Israel and the Palestinian Territories

	Israel	**West Bank**	**East Jerusalem**	**Gaza**	**Total**
Israeli Jews	6 million	310,000 Jewish settlers	195,000 Jewish settlers	0	6.5 million
Palestinian	1.1 Million Israeli Arabs	1.75 million (30% refugee status)	260,000	1.6 million (75% refugee status)	4.8 million
Total	7.2 million	2 million	455,000	1.6 million	11.25 million

CIA Statistics 2011: population statistics to nearest 50,000

1.4. Researcher positioning

To give such an introduction to the context of the geopolitical area is a challenging task, not only because the amount of literature is vast, but also because of the difficulty of bringing together this literature in a way that is representative of both groups' past and future aspirations. There is only so much an account as described here could attempt to do. First, I would like to establish what the thesis is not about and second I should like to address my positioning as a social psychologist. I have no blood tie with either a Jewish or Arab ancestry. I am a white British woman, well-travelled and with a life-long interest in conflict resolution. I am perceived as an outsider in Israel and so connected to international perspectives on the conflict. My thesis is not intended to support any political perspective as my focus is social psychological and not political (although, as we shall see, we cannot divorce the two). Neither will it represent, nor make any claims to represent, any religious or cultural positioning that might be perceived as being related to the conflict. I am committed to understanding why groups remain locked in forms of protracted

conflict and the social psychological processes through which these conflicts can become so enduring.

1.5. Pilot study in Israel

Before embarking on the first empirical study, I carried out a small pilot study in the summer of 2012 in Israel. This was intended to explore collective identity amongst Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. The research objective was to examine social representations surrounding processes of identity by meeting and interviewing a small sample to discuss the meaning of their identity, whether on a national, cultural or social level. The pilot research was carried out in four different cities in order to gain a feel for the different levels of segregation and coexistence in Israel: Jerusalem, Haifa, Nazareth and Tel Aviv as follows:

Table 3: Informal pilot study interviews in Israel, June 2012

	Jewish Israeli	**Palestinian Israeli**
Jerusalem	x 3	
Haifa		x 3
Nazareth		x 1
Tel Aviv	x 1	

Recruiting Palestinian Israelis to talk on an individual and informal basis proved difficult. I needed introductions through third parties before people were willing to be interviewed, with many refusals along the way. The Jewish Israelis on the other hand, were much easier to recruit and clearly not so hesitant. Interviews were held informally, and some were recorded when permission was given, as follows: Jewish Israeli x 3 and Palestinian Israeli x 2. Of those who were unwilling to have the interviews recorded, notes were taken. The interview sample was recruited through contacts I had from UK universities and institutions, so it is not a random or representative sample. They were representatives of their communities who spoke fluent English and were educated to degree standard and above. Their input was invaluable in providing a background and baseline from which to explore further an array of self-described identities as perceived by the two groups of people.

The interviews lasted approximately one hour, with questions surrounding themes of personal identity in relation to their nation, culture, and ethnic group. My questioning was explorative in nature to allow the participants to feel free to offer their narratives in their own words. It was during these first interviews that I began to understand about the complex relationship between identity as a construct of one's cultural and national heritage and how that impinged on their personal identity. The significance of the term 'identity' became a source of misinterpretation, mistrust and anxiety. Identity seemed to hold a different connotation than is assumed in the UK. By introducing the term in a direct manner there appeared to be an assumption that I was discussing either something very private or that I had a prior view on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and so there was a hesitancy to broach this subject. For the Palestinian Israelis there appeared to be a genuine fear that I may discuss details of their identity with third-party institutions that might lead to a compromising situation with their Israeli civic identity. I had naïvely assumed that by directly asking about their identity I would receive an array of answers that would be useful in my research journey. I learned that asking direct questions such as these was not a strategy that proved useful. I was also advised that I would have to build up trust within this community before discussing such topics. As a researcher from the United Kingdom I became increasingly aware that the path to recruiting local residents in Israel needed much sensitivity, patience and, most significantly, time. Keen to establish trust and genuine reflections, I dropped using the term 'identity' and instead asked more open questions that allowed them to tell me in their own words their representations of how their life was shaped in and by their surrounding communities. This strategy proved much more fruitful for the future empirical studies.

1.5.1. Results: Negotiating identities within an ideological minefield

It soon became apparent that any conversation surrounding aspects of identity was masked by themes of ideology. Not only did I find segregation at the physical level, it was clear that segregation was also abundant in the reflective level, with each subject defining their own existence according to this physical and ideological segregation. The boundaries between them, as discussed in these few interviews, were tight and seemingly unbreakable on some level, yet the crossing of these

boundaries at an institutional level, in this instance, in the workplace and across NGO's was also evident.

The role of ideology was made clear during this pilot study. The Jewish Israelis had embraced Zionism (to a greater or lesser degree in different communities and political outlook), with political developments leading from that since its inception. This included the search for a national identity that reflected these aims. Whilst for the Palestinian Israelis it was their identity, both as a positioning tool with an Israeli society, and a link to the past that was more prominent. It appears that constructing a national identity for both communities was reliant on not only the relationship between them, but in relationship to their own past and perceived future. This exemplifies how theoretical constructs such as social identity theory (Tajfel 1981) has been useful in demonstrating the significance of belonging to a community where ingroups and outgroups form part of the political landscape, but does not adequately encompass a cultural context that implies ideological frameworks that holds possibilities of change in the future. Ideologies are discursive (Billig, 1991) and so together with shared social explanations, ideologies are thus framed in language, which can be investigated through discursive interaction, and so categorising entities from a cognitive perspective would appear redundant. Van Dijk (2006) argued that ideology can be understood as a system of ideas within and between social groups. Social representations and shared axiomatic beliefs about a particular ideology have the power to organise socially shared entities. It is these shared social beliefs that will be explored in the next empirical stages to build a picture that encompasses how different social groups come to readily accept intractable conflict and/or explore ways where commonality might exist. Or indeed, to explore a plethora of social representations that combines both common and conflictual entities within the same representational field. The pilot fieldwork highlighted the particularities of the local context, which was not evident beforehand. Most centrally, the pilot revealed that what was of most relevance would be an exploration of how these representations of ideology within a political context of asymmetry play a part in sustaining conflict and a barrier to commonality across the boundaries. Hence the pilot study was a valuable experience in terms of refining my conceptual framework, deepening my understanding of the local context

and the psychological politics that became evident, as well as highlighting the importance of trust and rapport in how I designed the next stages of the research.

1.6. Conclusion

This introductory chapter has briefly surveyed the geopolitical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The intention of this inclusion was to familiarise the reader of the thesis with the basis of their intergroup conflict. Both groups have followed parallel trajectories and yet remain intertwined with one another as their contradictory national aspirations remain to be reconciled. I have also outlined my positioning as a researcher, stating that I represent neither group and as a social psychologist my interest lies in protracted conflict and what may lie at intergroup imagined boundaries.

I also described a pilot study that was undertaken in my first year of the research journey when I had visited Israel in preparation for the empirical focus of the thesis. The experience enabled me to examine the lived reality of the conflict first hand and in so doing, I came to understand that some theoretical assumptions were not completely compatible with the social reality I found in the field. The lessons learned were valuable in developing the theoretical and empirical base to the thesis. The following chapter will survey the research literature surrounding the social psychology of imagined group boundaries and how the idea of intractability in this context has been discussed.

2. Social psychology of embedded conflict

> *'What are we doing in the villages that were abandoned … Are we ready to protect these villages so that the residents may return, or do we want to erase all evidence that a village ever existed at the site?'* (Golda Meir, to Land of Israel Workers Party, 11th May 1948).

> 'We *also got on the trucks. The glow of emeralds spoke to us through the night of our olive tree. The barking of dogs at a fleeting moon over the church tower. But we weren't afraid. Because our childhood didn't come with us. A song was enough for us: We'll return in a little while, to our house.'* (Mahmoud Darwish, 1995: 'Innocent Villagers 1948' (Quoted from Sand, 2012, p.59).

2.1. Introduction

These two quotes represent the beginnings of the potency of the intractability in 1948 that remains unresolved today, over 70 years later. This chapter surveys the social psychological literature surrounding intractable conflict that serves as the foundation to both the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the ways in which intractable conflict has been examined in relation to intergroup relations. This includes the themes of ideology, nationalism and history that serve to power a group's ability to become a collective entity amongst other collective entities. The role of contact with the Other has been a significant contribution to conflict research, particularly in terms of finding ways of decreasing intergroup prejudice. This will be discussed in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As we move towards thinking of empirical ways of exploring conflict, the role of narratives is introduced. What people talk about and say about intergroup conflict in relation to their lived experiences is integral to conflict research. The way in which we interpret their narratives is as important. And so the second part of this chapter discusses the ways in which this can be explored theoretically. A subjective description from a participant, although helpful, will not by itself develop our understanding of the processes of intergroup conflict. The processes of intergroup phenomena need to be explored within a theoretical framework that offers ways of developing these ideas. My chosen framework, the theory of social representations, provides this opportunity. The dialogical nature of social representations, in particular, allows us to explore how each group is dependent on the other for the continued conflicting relationship; and further, the

theory suggests a thematic means by which to explore empirical findings within this dialogical framework.

2.2 Conflict as embedded unresolved discord

Conflict has been defined as, 'situations in which two or more parties perceive that their goals and/or interests are in direct contradiction with one another and decide to act on the basis of this perception' (Bar-Tal, 2011, p.1). Conflict is endemic throughout all human interactions, from personal conflict across personal relationships to intergroup conflict across communities and to nation states within a global setting. Without conflict, any underlying tensions between individuals and groups would remain unresolved and so unchallenged, paving the way for exploitation, an oppressed status quo and stagnant relationships (Kriesberg, 2012). Conflict can thus be understood as a necessary aspect of social change, particularly structural change, as disputes are resolved and new relationships can begin to flourish. Galtung (1969) discussed how the search for a discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stressed a potential, rather than an empirical, reality in its formulation -highlighting the possibility of on-going, multiple and possibly contradictory interpretations of the construction of the conflict. With this in mind I discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an embedded state of unresolved territorial differences over an extensive period of time, interrupted by periods of intense warfare, violent and non-violent resistance, and failed peace negotiations.

2.2.1 Intergroup relations: defining the role of the group

Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) argued that the meaning of intergroup relations can be misleading as it tends to focus on small and closed groups rather than societal and more open based groups. They suggested that the lack of definition of these key concepts can cause confusion within the discipline. Sherif and Sherif (1969) embarked on an exploration of group behaviour defining it as 'the actions of individuals belonging to one group when they interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group membership' (p.223). The authors further suggested that a functional relationship between groups denotes how the action of one group has an impact on the other, regardless of any direct interaction between them. This broad definition allows a variety of interpretations when discussing intergroup membership and behaviour. It does not assume there is an emotional involvement with a particular social category, as suggested by Tajfel

and Turner (1979), nor does it assume any integral group cohesion as a requirement (Lott and Lott 1965) for membership and/or identification to a particular group. The study of intergroup relations tends to be focussed on intergroup conflict (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). How this is measured or interpreted is somewhat dependent on the theoretical approach taken by the researcher. For example, from the beginnings of the discipline of social psychology there has been a tendency for an individualist approach to the examination of intergroup relations and that has influenced later work (Farr, 1996).

The level of analysis, from that of the individual to that of group behaviour, has become significant when discussing social psychological explorations. Lewin, (1936) influenced by Gestalt theories of the time, scrutinised the connection between theory and practice and that of an individualist and social approach, in an attempt to integrate both the whole and the different elements that make up the whole. His propositions relate to Doise's (1982) assertion that the individual is not the only level of analysis and that a wider exploration is considered significant when exploring a given social reality. Doise proposed four levels of analysis within the field in order to capture these differing aspects of reality. There was no claim that reality is clearly structured within these levels, but being aware of them is useful for a thorough analysis. The first level (I), is the intrapersonal level, that of the individual; and the ways in which perceptions are organised within a social context, remains at the base of much of social psychology work. The second level (II), the inter-personal and situational level, follows the dynamics of any given individual in any given situation although it is the individuals who remain as the focus of analysis. The third level (III), the positional level, explores the effects of differences in social positions between different categories that are represented within group behaviour. And finally, the fourth level (IV), the ideological level, represents how society develops its own systems of representations, beliefs, values and norms. It is through groups' ideologies which serve to validate and maintain a particular social order that is reflected at this level. This thesis focuses on this ideological level IV, although it will also include instances of I, II and III through interaction with individuals to gain access to thinking about and exploring group behaviour.

2.2.2. Intergroup conflict: intractability across group boundaries

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often labelled 'intractable', (Kriesberg, 1998, Bar-Tal, 2011, Bar-Tal, 2013), as a state of enduring rivalries (Maoz and McCauley, 2005) and as protracted (Azar, 1990). The pioneering work of sociologist Louis Kriesberg in the 1990's suggested conflicts such as these can continue unabated for lengthy periods, that they involves a cycle of violence between the two protractors with neither party willing to compromise as the economic and psychological investment becomes more significant as the parties remain locked in opposition. Kriesberg (1998) suggested further that some parties in an intractable situation may feel they are unable to extricate themselves because they may perceive that the cost of retracting is greater than the cost of remaining in the situation and so a stalemate position can prolong the conflict ad infinitum. However, it was the work of Bar-Tal (e.g., 2011, 2013) who took the concept further and framed it within a more psychological arena through the exploration of conflict supporting narratives and adding a further three processes to the ones described by Kriesberg (1998). First, the conflict is deemed to be total, that is, it is deemed existential to the goals and needs of each group; second, a zero-sum perspective takes root where compromise and concessions play no part in the drive for the adherence to the original goals that beset the conflict; and finally, the conflict remains central to the lives when the media, political leadership and other social institutions play a significant role. So it becomes indispensable to individuals and collective life as 'routinisation contributes to the intractability of the conflict because participants do not feel an urgency to terminate it' (Bar-Tal 2014, p.46). One of the consequences of the role of intractability in the conflict is its dead end road approach, where social and political change remains out of view. Galtung (1972) used the language of compatibility versus incompatibility in a study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting intractability would ensue unless a resolving tactic was included in the discussion. Galtung argued that for any change to take place one would have to take into account the challenges of the two parties and their international allies, locked within a never ending tragedy of territorial sharing. This analysis of intractability focusses on the more societal level (Doise, 1982); an approach that includes the social psychology of those directly involved may open the opportunity to discuss further intergroup relationships, and what may lie at their imagined boundaries.

Mazur (2014) argued that intractable conflict stems from normal mundane processes that underlie many intergroup dynamics which is often ignored by conflict psychologists. He suggested that Sherif (1962) took this approach over fifty years ago when arguing for a relative normality of both psychological and societal processes underlying intergroup conflict rather than pathologising it. And so, rather than taking a pessimistic view of the inevitability of violence Mazur (2014) suggested that, 'normalising the cause of mass violence asserts their intelligibility, and precisely in this intelligibility lies the hope of finding ways to deescalate, end and even prevent such cruelty' (p.277). Mazur proposed that intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2014) can become a categorised entity rather than a process of intractability, where the spectrum of conflict across different characteristics can be explored further, as not all conflicts exhibits the mechanisms associated with intractability. And further, by suggesting mechanisms that become ingrained within the individual and collective consciousness, change may appear to be difficult if not impossible, leading to a state of 'freezing' that can act as an inhibitor against future change.

Social psychology can play a significant role in conflict studies (Hewstone and Greenland, 2000) where the processes of prejudice, discrimination and identity remain at the forefront. Realistic group conflict theory (Jackson, 1993) suggests that intergroup conflict can be interpreted through a prism of rational, but incompatible, goals and of competition for resources which would continue until a winner is declared and subordinate goals reached. The Robber's Cave experiments (Sherif, 1967) explored this model by examining how groups of boys reacted to different group conditions at a summer camp in America. Different games and activities led to different outcomes of in/out group behaviour, with hostile behaviour resulting from a competitive context and a more cooperative outcome through sharing a mutual responsibility.

Kriesberg (2012) suggested that the world is increasingly integrated, but that those involved within a conflict zone are not represented in neatly bounded entities; they remain in open systems of porously bounded groupings, and it is this very fluidity that allows the possibility of transformation. The groups do not have to remain as fixed entities locked into conflict, as they are a part of a larger whole and in a larger context there might be the possibilities of exploring mutually beneficial

avenues of cooperation. Allies can be found throughout the world, and that allows possibilities of change in intergroup relations. Importantly, Kriesberg (2012) concluded that rather than perceiving a particular conflict as one entity, it can be viewed as containing a number of conflicts that are both internal and external to it, which leads to the possibility of a redefinition where an alternative perspective can be explored.

2.3. The formation of group conflict: connections to ideology

The concept of ideology is pertinent to the discussion on conflict as it acts as a base from which to explore its antecedents, leading to social representations of intergroup hostility. The roots of war and conflict often lie deeply within the social fabric (Guilmartin, 1988), with ideological factors coming to the fore when religious and cultural differences between opposing parties are played out within a context of wider difficulties. Guilmartin also argued that Western analysis of conflict tends to be based on an anomalous and recent past, rather than on an examination of conflict from the longer past leading to the possibility of illuminating drivers that can remain hidden when viewed closer to the present.

Van Dijk (2006) argued that knowledge is defined by shared beliefs within a knowledge community; knowledge is not justified true belief but accepted consensual belief resulting in knowledge as both relative and intersubjective within the community. This does not imply that all knowledge is ideology (Jovlechovitch, 2007) but that knowledge and belief systems are central to ideological claims and to the manner of communication of those claims. Ideology can thus be understood as a system of ideas (Van Dijk, 2006) whose defining entities include its, norms, values, aims, actions and resources and significantly, its relations to other groups. Crucial to group development is a shared set of beliefs about the core fundamental conditions under which it exists and will exist in the future. Different types of ideologies are defined by:

> the kinds of groups that have an ideology such as social movements, political parties, professions or churches among others. These are not any kind of socially shared beliefs such as sociocultural knowledge or attitudes but more fundamentally axiomatic as they control and other socially shared beliefs. (Van Dijk, 2006, p.115)

Belief systems can act as motivational processes. They are ways in which individuals need to understand their worlds and maintain significant interpersonal and group relationships, and result in the acquisition of worldviews that can become self-justifying (Jost, Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008). Such belief systems can lead to the acquisition of ideas that may appear as false to an outside group, but are believed to be an indispensable medium to legitimate a dominant political power for an ingroup (Eagleton, 1991). The establishment structures of dominant political power can thus be sustained, often through symbolic forms that bring together individuals in a particular collective identity, irrespective of differences that might lie between them (Thompson, 1990).

Nationalism, as an ideological construct, serves to illustrate how social groups evolve to reflect the national aspirations, which reflect their historical experience as they observe the present and plan the future. 'We acquire memory in society' (Halbwachs, 1952 / 1992, p.38,) where memory is perceived as a natural order of happenings, accepted by society according to the social order of the day. Nations create their own histories and interpret them in society as interpretive communities (Billig, 1995) that continually narrate their past, present and future to reproduce themselves within a globalised world. These interpretations can be developed to bolster a collective national ethos regardless of that outcome for others (Nietzche, 1980). Nationalism reflects the 'us' and, based on 'we' and 'them', outsiders remain foreigners, 'who do not belong to the state in which we are' (Kristeva, 1991, p. 96). The world is represented by nations and its peoples, bound together in some form of semantic unity, presented as a vision that appears a natural and metaphysical entity (Andersen, 2006, Billig, 1995). The expansion of pan Arab nationalism between World War 1 and World War 2, a mix of Arab history and culture with nationalistic tendencies, found in literary works such as the 'Wathbat al-Arab' translated as the 'The rise of the Arabs to power' (Abu-Ghazaleh, 1972), reflected a growing pride for both Christians and Muslims alike, under the banner of Islam, to recognise Palestinian Arab status as a possible unfolding world power.

The history of Jewish nationalism goes back much further. The seeds of Zionism began almost two hundred years before the nation state which it envisaged, became a reality. Nationalist ideology is evident in the discussions and debates surrounding the planning of a proposed state in Israel. This planning included the

prominence of a homogeneous ethnic group, whose attributes and beliefs were developed to follow a dominant political agenda, resulting in the desire for the creation of a homeland (Sand, 2012). The seeds of conflict can be traced back to a time many years before the creation of the state of Israel, reflecting how discussion within a dilemmatic quality, as suggested by Billig (1991), remained central to the themes and representations of ideology.

This role of ideology will be explored in this thesis in order to show how these themes have played a part in the ontology of group development within a specific ideological context, and the social institutions it has created. One of the basic tenets of social psychology rests on the relationship between the individual and group membership, and how groups, once formed, develop as they do in different social and cultural contexts.

2.3.1. Ideology in development: ethos of conflict and resistance

Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) described how representations of Jewish beliefs about their own community reflect a siege mentality that has been circulating for so long that it has become part of a knowledge system that permeates from individual identity to cultural acknowledgement. From biblical times, the Sons of Israel felt in some way 'different' from others in a hostile world (Mirsky, 1982), and that led to the belief for some that Israel would remain a State which other nations would forever intend to hurt. The ethos of conflict is a term given to reflect a worldview, a specific societal complex belief system that forms an ideological umbrella (Bar Tal 2000) that can guide behaviours within a context of intractable conflict. The themes that underlie this ethos, outlined by Bar Tal (2013), include the justness of one's goals, the delegitimisation of the opponent, the significance of perceiving oneself as the victim while having a strong positive self- image, the importance of security, the value of patriotism and the on-going societal questions concerning unity and peace. These themes become

> a part of the epistemic base for hegemonic social consciousness of the society and for the future direction. It gives meaning and predictability to societal life and provides a coherent view of social institutions – the structure, history, visions, concerns and courses of actions. (Bar-Tal, 2013, p.175).

Moreover Bar-Tal (2014) confirmed that the ethos is so well established within Israeli society and has become so embedded through socialisation and education, public and political debate, rituals and ceremonies, that it has become a driving force within society. Its functions can serve both as an engine that fuels conflict and also act as an empowerment for alleviating the suffering of the psychological burden (Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal and Hobfoll, 2014). The higher the ethos measured on the ethos of conflict scale (Bar- Tal, 2012), the higher the effect of distress management and the more the barriers to ending the conflict became apparent. Jost and Hunyady (2005) extended the concept by suggesting that the ethos can come to justify a conservative ideology, and so the conflict can be maintained, as one group portrays their positioning over and above the other in terms of legitimacy and humaneness.

By constructing a model of the ethos, Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, et al, (2014) suggested that ideology, 'constitutes a coherent worldview often prevalent in one's culture which can provide a sense of meaning in the face of individual and collective threats' (p. 70). The ethos of conflict has been measured across both Israeli Jewish citizens and Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit et al, 2014). These measures centred on items that represented narratives of the justness of goals, peace, security, victimisation and delegitimisation of the opponent. Results showed similarity of an ethos of conflict belief system across both groups, of varying degrees of weakness/strength. The same measures were subsequently used as a basis for exploring a number of further factors such as psychological distress, hatred towards the other group, fear, perceptions of personal / national threat and exposure to violence. Several differences with the Palestinian group were highlighted showing higher levels of exposure to violence, psychological distress, perceptions of personal threat and fear and hatred towards the conflicting group. When examining the interaction between these findings and the ethos of conflict, it was suggested that adhering to a conflict of ethos belief system could, to some extent, limit the more harmful effects of intergroup conflict. This is useful research that demonstrates that the ethos of

conflict is one that demonstrates an ideological construct to a collective belief system that requires further exploration.[1]

Ideological development in the Palestinian community in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem has tended to be constructed through an ethos of resistance to Israeli control and hegemony (Moughrabu, 1992). This position has developed by and through the polarisation of the two main political movements, that of Fatah, with origins in the secular PLO, and that of Hamas, with ideological leanings towards political Islam (Hilal, 2010). Within this vacuum, an ideology of constructing a united Palestinian ethos as a collective identity system has taken precedence, constructed around traditional values, memories of a homeland stolen by stealth with a longing for a return for all those who are connected to this territory, wherever they reside in the present day (Khalidi, 1997). Within this discourse, there persists a pragmatic unity where Palestinians of divergent and diverse ideological persuasions, backgrounds and geographical places, have come together to work in solidarity against the occupation and to find an independent voice and to develop ideological narrative for an independent future, (Moughrabu, 1992).

2.3.2. Boundary formation

The in/out group identification has been at the base of many conceptual explorations into conflict and describes boundaries between groups as entities that can be discussed at the psychological and/or cultural level. When groups are in direct competition, leading to conflict, the groups' aims will necessarily include an in/out group motivation to achieve those aims. Brewer (1997), for example, used this concept as a scheme for intergroup accentuation, concluding that first, all members of a group are perceived as more similar to the self than to members of another group; second, an intergroup favouritism principle suggests that trust and positive evaluations towards the ingroup, but not towards the outgroup, are prevalent; and third, the social competition principle rests on the outgroup as being competitive rather than cooperative. In times of many seemingly 'entrenched' conflicts a 'them'

[1] A critique of this form of quantitative research, measuring relationships between different aspects of psychological functioning, would include the questioning of using a minimal of prepared statements to reflect something that may have multiple connotations and perceptions and may not be measuring what it purports to do. However, they can serve as a base for discussing further how different contexts and experiences can produce differing outcomes as a base for further exploration.

and ‘us’ dichotomy prevails, leading to the formation of collective identities that can be developed as a reaction to the opponent in conflict, or from previous historical conflicts with other groups. A binary in/out group distinction can suggest that boundaries tend towards the impermeable and become an unintended self-fulfilling prophecy. However, as I hope to portray in the thesis, even in these entrenched contexts, there is still room to challenge ‘us’ and ‘them’ binaries and to find possibilities for different forms of intergroup relations and for other collective and social identities to emerge. Indeed, a major aspect of Tajfel’s work on identity (1981) was to look at the ways in which identities change in context, particularly in response to different forms of prejudice (Billig, 2002).

Brewer (2001) alluded to this role of context by suggesting that outgroup discrimination is not necessarily an automatic function of ingroup solidarity, and that discrimination and hostility towards the outgroup requires other conditions, both structural and motivational that may not be inherent in any process of social group formation. Thus, although imagined boundaries recreate the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, other groups may find the possibility of creating a more permeable boundary that allows some sharing of a collective reality. For example, peace groups, and those who recognise the Other on some meaningful level, can reflect a situation that represent an alternative positioning where solidarity with others has the propensity to develop a reality that holds the possibility of change and transformation. And not all social groups are defined by an in/out group reality, as different groups take on different roles at different times in different contexts. All identities are social, as the individual develops and relates to others in forming any relationship with groups of other individuals (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012), whether it be through positioning oneself (Harré and Moghaddam, 2003), representing a role in life and taking a political stand (Gergen, 2007), or exploring the essence of part of the self that is expressed with others on a similar platform. The naming of an identity construct, whether it be social, collective, national, religious, or ethnic, can denote a descriptive component, but it is the dialectical relationship between and across individuals that form the group, and how they react to the perceptions of other groups, that is of interest.

Gergen (2000) further suggested there is no winning factor in victory, as in doing so the Other is eradicated. So, waging a war against a constructed Other can become futile and self-destructive as fundamentally we are all the Other. Social change becomes possible when a relational process is deemed to have a positive potential, rather than any attempt to change hearts, minds and political values, as suggested here:

> We may move toward practices that replace conflict of competing moralities with collaborative processes in which new orders of the good may continue to be generated. The alternative is more talk about us versus them, or truth versus their falsehood. (Gergen,2007, p. 377).

It is the permeability of the boundaries across both groups that I would like to explore in order to shed light on what may lie between them, rather than on any impermeable boundaries that can form the basis of intractability.

An area that remains central to conflict research is that of the contact hypothesis. This approach suggests that by spending meaningful time together individuals representing groups in conflict can possibly go beyond their differences to explore commonality, leading to the softening or even crossing the imagined boundaries between them.

2.4. Contact across imagined boundaries

Allport (1954) pioneered contact research, exploring how prejudice between majority and minority groups in America might be lessened, by establishing more positive attitudes and prejudice reduction, in order to improve relationships across these ethnic divides. Its core propositions have been well established in numerous empirical studies (Brown & Hewstone, 2005, Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux, 2005, Minard, 1956). Pettigrew and Troop (2006) carried out a meta-analysis of 515 studies involving more than 250,000 participants across many nationalities and reported a significant reduction in prejudice following contact initiatives. This was even more pronounced when contact situations were made through group friendships under a cloak of equality. There were however, marked differences between the perceptions of minority and majority groups, suggesting that these different groups might construe interaction differently (Swart, Hewstone and Christ, et al, 2011). For example, those from minority and disadvantaged groups were found to anticipate more prejudice against them than from those members of the majority group (Sellers and Shelton, 2003). The challenge for intergroup contact work would be to

find a path where intervention can produce a more equal result across opposing groups. Work of this nature has been prominent within the context of a long-standing antagonism between ethnic groups. In Northern Ireland, for example, following the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement, intergroup contact programmes began to flourish to tackle sectarian divisions. What was found to be helpful, following the work of Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy (2009), was using a theoretical base of common identities, leading to optimum mediation processes that would provide a more positive and long-term outcome (Hughes, Campbell and Jenkins, (2011). One of the most successful programmes occurred within mixed environments where friendships were given the opportunity to develop, either through community groups or through identification with the neighbourhood. For example, a Protestant woman discussing her relationship with a Catholic woman in her neighbourhood described how norms of avoidance were present during the early stages of contact, which receded as time developed:

> *'When you get comfortable with people after you know them for a while, you can start to talk about politics and religion and stuff. It wouldn't be appropriate to talk about religious beliefs or how you think about things when you meet someone for the first time.' (p.981)*

Contact studies following the Allport (1954) model have been integral to research in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They were first initiated following a 1980 survey assessing attitudes of Jewish Israeli youth towards Palestinian Israelis that uncovered not only extensive prejudiced views towards them, but also showed support for the curbing of freedom, and as ultra-right wing parties came to power representations of possible expulsion began to circulate (Rabinowitz, 2001). The establishment of a national coexistence movement was set up in 1986 to organise encounter type programmes, mostly at the grassroots level. However, changes in the political climate led to a decrease in funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s as right-wing parties became prominent. However, with the international negotiation of the Oslo Accords of 1993, heralding a change in the political climate and the possibility of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, more projects began to be developed.

Suileman (2004) ran encounter groups for many years between Jewish and Palestinian Israeli students at Haifa University and found that any attempt to play

down political components wasn't successful in eliminating prejudice during group work. He concluded that these sessions can reflect:

> a 'microcosm' of life outside the group where salient intergroup processes can dominate as, 'a basic contradiction exists between the structure of the encounter group and its potentiality to advance intergroup contents and processes' (Suileman, 2004, p.325).

The tendency of Palestinian Israeli participants to focus on political elements with Jewish Israeli students preferring to discuss neutral and non-political issues has been a common theme (Katz and Kahanov, 1990; Maoz, 2011). The asymmetry of power of between the two groups has often been ignored with Jewish Israeli students holding on to a more powerful position, allowing discrimination towards the Palestinian Israeli group members. At the same time, the Palestinian Israeli students felt obliged to hold a greater degree of involvement in topics that surrounded intergroup conflict. Interestingly, it was found that an interpretation of such encounters might signify that Palestinian Israelis might lead to a softening of the boundaries and even possibilities of crossing them. However, in reality, it was found that they had often led to a pride in the richness of their Palestinian language and traditions, and paradoxically to a possible increase in intergroup tensions (Suileman, 2004) due to the dominance of the Jewish Israelis wanting to focus on the interpersonal level, whilst avoiding confrontation about the conflict.

The contact hypothesis has been a central core of the encounter group concept within Israel and will be discussed further in Chapter 5, when the findings pertaining to contact between medical professionals in Israel are discussed.

The first half of this chapter has introduced how intergroup conflict has been discussed in the research literature in terms of intergroup relations, ideology, history and nationalism. The role of intergroup contact has been influential when exploring ways of softening imagined boundaries, especially in Israel, where the idea of encounter groups has been developed. The role of narrative is considered to be significant in conflict research, as we ask those entrenched within a conflict to tell us about it from their perspective.

2.5. Narratives as a medium of communication

Narratives can be defined as a primary form of communication that can be used to make sense of social realities and behaviour by organising human memory and experience (Mink, 1987, p185). Narratives can be viewed as representing events, whether real or fictitious, and captured to denote temporality (Prince, 1980) interpreted according to an individual's or a group's positioning. Narratives are constructed, not as a record of what happened but as an interpretation of what has happened, and interpretation continues as other events come into play. Narratives can be perceived as historical works, as literary creations, where explanations of their reality differ depending on the motivations for their telling, the ways in which they are presented (White, 1978), and the voice behind their telling (Roth, 1988). The exploration of narratives thus holds the ability, 'to transcend the simplistic account of structure versus agency that plagues the social sciences' (Hammack and Pilecki, 2014).

Historical narratives can be viewed as extensions of actual events, but the telling of them cannot re-produce these events; rather they hold the capacity to create new structures of these events (Carr, 2008). Master narratives are integral to any particular culture at any particular time, with assumptions of their content as a natural phenomenon, rather than being understood as cultural and social artefacts of communication. Narratives might be felt to be resistant to change while others are open to transformation, but nevertheless, master narratives can form the bedrock of a culture's very existence, and can be inherited, reproduced and /or resisted and rejected.

The narrative approach has been useful within social psychology to explore acts of meaning (Bruner, 1990) through description of an interpreted lived time that is deemed relevant and significant to a particular individual and/or group, where 'narrative imitates life and life imitates narrative' (Bruner, 2004, p. 692) and thus, 'we become the autobiographical narratives by which we tell about our lives' (p. 694). The individual continually constructs stories and so externalises dialectic with a shared developing group construction. This approach, like others where qualitative data becomes the source of exploration, rejects methods that emphasise a casual trajectory that relies on essentialist and individualist approaches (Monteagudo, 2011). Narratives, by the nature of their telling, can embrace

complexity as a forum for discussion and development rather than being objective analysis. Individuals' narratives can be explored from within their own, 'meaningful and heterogeneous life worlds' (Wagoner, 2012, p.6.1), where meaning is contextualised in everyday communication. Narratives reflect how thought is organised in language that serves to connect a sense of personal meaning with collective solidarity, in order to legitimise collective beliefs and actions (Hammack, 2011b).

2.5.1. Narratives as mediators across ideological group boundaries

The research work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the discipline of social psychology in Israel has tended to follow a quantitative Cartesian methodology through survey research or experimental work (Halperin, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2007). Qualitative work, to reflect personal trajectories, has tended to be positioned outside the discipline, often as journalistic pieces. For example, Shehadeh (2012), a Palestinian lawyer, has described his personal life under occupation. An account of two Jewish Israeli women described their lives with Palestinian Israeli communities (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, 2005) and recorded personal accounts of Jewish Israelis concerning their lives and their relationships with the Other in Israel and the Occupied Territories has been discussed (Neslen, 2006). Kanaaneh & Nusair (2010) presented essays and narratives of Palestinian Israeli women describing their positioning as a minority in a land of their forbears. These works have provided a detailed, rich and informative description of the landscape. But a more theoretical perspective is also required to understand the social psychological processes involved in intergroup conflict. Hammack (2011b) pioneered the way for a qualitative and cultural approach to this subject by asking a sample of Israeli and Palestinian youth about their perspectives on how they were affected by the conflict. Through a thematic analysis it was found they engaged with a tragic master narrative that centred on dispossession and loss, supported by contemporary social structures of an on-going intractable conflict through Israeli military occupation. In contrast, narratives of Jewish Israeli students were based on perceived, rather than realistic threats from the Palestinian population, centred on the representations of the Holocaust as an eternal threat from all those around them (Sonnenschein, Bekerman and Horencysyk, 2010). Hammack (2011b) based his research within a context of

transformative voice, (Sampson, 1993) that gave the opportunity for young people to talk about the tragedies and triumphs surrounding the murky contexts of war.

Hammack (2011a) argued that narratives offer an, 'integrative prism through which to interpret lives in their social and political complexity' (p. 312), and so for those enmeshed in conflict, narratives can provide a means of exploring how groups develop through a transformative processes of stasis and change, unveiling social structures that reflect inequality and injustice. Hammack and Pilecki (2012) reflected on the political significance of narratives, suggesting, 'narrative provides an ideal paradigmatic lens through which to consider thought, feeling and action in a political context' (p.76). Hence narrative research often highlights the connections between 'everyday' narratives from ordinary people and dominant narratives in political debate, in a similar way to the connections between consensual and reified universes in social representations theory (Jovchelovitch, 2012).

2.6 Interpretation of conflict through social representation theory

Social representation theory (SRT) has provided both the theoretical and pragmatic framework to the thesis. SRT encompasses ways in which we can begin to describe our sociocultural worlds within a particular context in order to portray and understand these worlds. SRT is simultaneously an empirical and a theoretical concept (Moscovici, 2001) and neither simply a cognitive nor a social process, but simultaneously both, where a social object is not simply reproduced in the mind of an individual, but is embedded within a social construction of knowledge systems within the public sphere (Moscovici, 2000). Thus SRT represents both a process and a medium of social knowledge that provides a means to theorise the ontology of human knowledge systems.

The theory was devised and developed through the exploration of how a scientific theory, in this case, psychoanalysis, was diffused through different communication systems applicable to different social groups in French society in the 1950's (Moscovici, 1961/2008). Moscovici wanted to explore a natural way of thinking, rather than a form of logical or syllogistic thinking. Instead, common sense thinking can capture shared knowledge across social groups. It is this thinking that judges, evaluates, criticises, and makes proposals for action. Common sense thinking uses knowledge and beliefs generated by established cultural and historical

> experiences, making inferences from them; thus social representations can be described as modalities of knowledge that functions to shape activities, communications and creating social realities. Human thinking is full of contradictions and is influenced by the thoughts of others as well as by historical and cultural ideas transmitted over generations Moscovici, 1961/2008). By using this approach it is possible to explore complex social phenomena, for example, HIV (Marková, 2008), human rights, (Doise, 2013), disability (Farr and Marková, 1995), race (Howarth, 2009) and other socially significant issues.

Marková (2003) argued that the concepts of Ego, Alter and Object are key to SRT in order to describe and define interacting components whether they represent an individual, a group or even a nation, and where the relationships between them become the focus of attention rather than the object under scrutiny. By adding a temporal dimension to this interactional model (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999), social representations over time can be explored as a way of exploring the present. Central to SRT is the dialectical relationship between the self and Other, where Other's worlds, 'become part of our own consciousness and all aspects of culture fill our own life and orientate our existence towards others' (Marková, 2003, p. 256). Social representations are thus embedded within a given culture, are co-constructed by its members within a given context and are not only understood by them, but act as catalysts for both reflection and action. The relationship remains dialogical as each subject under investigation cannot be separated from the relationship with the Other, as they each act on the positioning of the Other.

Social representations can provide the structure of knowledge systems within a community that can be perceived as two-way processes of constructing reality between top-down and bottom-up institutions (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995). Social objects can be created that motivate behaviour through its diverse streams of communication (Moscovici, 1961/2008). By constituting knowledge systems, social representations reflect common sense through language embedded within a particular community, 'Representation, communication and language are the only path to knowledge that we have' (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 99), and so act as containers of the complexities and contradictions of social life. Representations can work to continually maintain social structures and institutions through different communication systems, or to reflect

resistance to the status quo. Hence representations can be hegemonic and support systems of ideology, or be emancipatory and provoke systems of change (Howarth, 2014).

SRT provides the opportunity to explore how different knowledge systems are produced, defended, contested and transformed in everyday encounters and social spaces. At the same time some representations, once constructed, can reflect certain patterns of thinking and action, which collectively holds the capacity to create new constructions of a social object (Wagner and Elejarrieta, 1996). By following these relationships we can reflect the fundamentally dynamic and collective on-going re-productions of meaning and social relations in daily life. Through a dialectical understanding of the connections between the psychological and the political embedded in our collective and competing histories, analysis of representations can explore how they are simultaneously reworked, resisted and transformed to discover new ways of mastering constantly changing realities. Social representations can be described as,

> Systems for the interpretation of the world and of events, they are in this way the essential vectors of opinions, judgements and beliefs, directed at ensuring the relevance and regularity of our bonds and of our conduct as a community. (Moscovici and Vignaux, 2000, p.157).

Social representations can further be imagined as receptacles of knowledge containing heterogeneities and complexities, ambivalences and scepticisms, contradictions and tensions, building on common cultural assumptions that can be grouped into 'big themes', deep-seated cultural belief systems that we think and talk from, rather than about (Marková, 2008). By exploring these knowledge systems within zones of conflict it is possible to explore how representations are produced, defended and/or contested in everyday encounters within social spaces, intergroup relationships and positioning. This leads to presenting possibilities of how the psychological is framed, but not completely determined by the historical and the material, and so allows space for possibility, for participation and change (Howarth, Andreouli and Kessi, 2015).

The intermediary between the individual and the collective is explained through different communication systems, which Gaskell and Bauer (1999) describe as being a significant contribution to SRT. First, the contents of communication through the processes of anchoring and objectification give rise to both the filtering of new

information to existing structures and how they might be so defined. Within representations of conflict, this is of interest. There might be resistance to new suggestions of resolving conflict at a point in time when it appears to be intractable, but it might have the capacity for change and transformation over a longer period of time, as representations shift reflecting the changing external world. Second, the types of communications suggested by Moscovici (1961/2008), that of propaganda, propagation and diffusion, play a significant role within conflict research. There will be little transformation of social representations of conflict if societal communication follows a line of propaganda, allowing no alternative viewpoints to be taken or communicated by modes of propagation and diffusion. Third, the consequences of a particular communication that give rise to stereotyping, opinions and attitudes, will rely on both the content and process of communication. It is this point that can be explored empirically to examine social representations of conflict, to see how they might be resistant to change or open to change and look for possible avenues of explanation as to why this may or not be so. On-going transformation through multi interactions, developed through available communication structures, exemplifies the changing nature of understanding and positioning on a given topic as it embeds itself into particular life worlds. Communication structures are modified to suit a particular medium between the giver or source of the information and the receiver, set within a particular cultural background. Thus hegemonic representations reflect a more authoritarian stance than emancipated representation, where alternative viewpoints are respected with polemic representations confined to arguments and discussion of disputes. Duveen (2008) notes that differing forms of social-psychological groups might be related to particular forms of communication.

2.6.1. The role of themata and social representations

This significance of creating new systems of knowledge shared across a community is useful if prior social representations that have motivated events of the past can be identified in order to understand a present social reality. This understanding is particularly significant in conflict research if both groups reach a point where negotiation of their relationship is based on aspirations of a more peaceful future. Identifying foundational themes of groups in conflict that have developed and flourish in the present foundational field would be a useful exercise to follow. The figurative, or semantic kernel, identified thematically using the concept of themata (Moscovici and Vignaux,

2000), acts as a foundational base where actions and events are mediated through language and linguistic traces as ideas and representations. Themata are created through the community, filtered through social discourse and preserved in some way, the meaning of which extends beyond any particular individual. Themata can be said to lie at the centre of some form of consciousness, where both knowledge and experience constitute a particular foundation; this differs from other thematic constructions such as themes, due to the centrality and significance of the kernel related to the construct under observation. Themes can be described as recurrent topics (Marková, 2000) used as steeping stones to explore larger themes and clusters, whilst themata are posited by the researcher to underlie the discourse and reflect unquestioned forms of social knowledge. Central to the concept of themata is the significance of antinomies reflecting tensions between and across oppositions, for example, what might be considered moral versus immoral (Marková, 2000). Themata both generate and activate the formation of social representations reflecting antinomies that stand in opposition and yet at the same time take into account a continuum of polarising positions between each thema. For example, when discussing social representations of democracy, themata such as justice/ injustice, free/ not free, would be salient, (Marková,1998). This would differ further according to local historical and political trajectories, and so democracy in one nation state or group will mean something quite different in another. The construct of themata has also been described as a conceptual coat hangers that give form to socially generated ways of understanding phenomenon (Moscovici 1993), latent drivers of action, (Smith and Joffe. 2013), central notions of knowledge, (Moscovoci and Vignaux, 1994), and focal points from which nascent representations emerge and keep re-emerging within a particular prevailing social context, (Marková, 2000).

The interplay between base structures that remains conceptually central to existing sets of social representations and the addition of relating this to antinomies is pertinent to my research. For example, the antinomies of conflict and consensus can begin a discussion based on a line of positions along a continuum rather than reflecting conflict as one particular entity and peace as another within an 'either/ or' polarising relationship. By interpreting data from conversations with those who directly experience representations of conflict across their personal and professional lives, underlying themata can be identified that that play a central role within these contexts. Marková (2000) suggested that all social thinking is embedded with their respective antinomies,

between which lies mutual independence and tension of thinking in oppositional ways as part of any given culture. In times of crisis, taxonomies that remain close to the issue can become a subject for debate, dialogue and negotiation. Maloney, Gamble, et al (2015), for example, in a study exploring themata and blood donation in Australia, explored the paradox that the majority of Australians agree that blood donation is a worthwhile exercise yet just 3% of those eligible actually donate. This tension was examined as the researchers identified the meaningful themata as 'self' and 'other'. Social representations of the 'self' were manifested in needles, pain and anxiety, whilst those of 'other' manifested in saving lives. This contradiction along a heterogeneous trajectory was dependent on the salience of the social context, activating different components within it. Liu (2006) suggested that the notion of themata is 'eternally resided in human thought. The antithetical dyad of yin / yang for instance is taken for granted in explaining the dynamics of the universe in Chinese common thinking.' (Liu, 2006, p.253). Both yin/ yang are perceived as being mutually interdependent, yet also in a state of continual flux and change, reflecting how a dialectical unity of opposites generates and transforms social representations. The inclusion of themata as a theoretical concept became more significant to my thesis as the research developed and progressed through the three empirical studies.

The theory of social representations underpins both the theoretical and empirical journey of the thesis. The next section observes how narratives can be combined with a SRT approach, to develop the significance of social representations within a community.

2.6.2. Narratives as social representations

Jovchelovitch (2012) discussed how narratives can be viewed as being part of the architecture of social representations, told and retold as experiences that can tell many versions of stories that become embedded within cultural life. These stories can shape the internal organisation of social representations as they develop within the public spheres and survive, or not, dependant on which narratives the communities choose to remember and which to put aside. Jovchelovitch borrows from Bartlett (1923) who defined narrative, not as straight stories from one individual, but as containing a slice of social and historical life that produces and re-produces mythologies and traditional practices; collective memories that remain embedded within institutionalised rituals. Jovchelovitch (2012) explored how specific narratives in the Brazilian public sphere were reinvented within a mythological framework to build intergroup solidarity for the purpose of

maintaining social cohesion. Lázló (2008) also discussed the link between the concepts of narratives and social representations by suggesting that retrieving narratives which portraying the process of storytelling is central to the making of social representations and social life. Storytellers are intersubjectively bound to a community of other storytellers that shares sets of values and representations of a specific vision of their world (Liu and Lázló, 2007) where complexity and contradictions generate states of cognitive polyphasia in the representational field.

The theoretical construct of a master narrative has been applied to denote a dominant discourse that represents cultural belief systems. For example, Bar-Tal (2014) suggested that the key to social representations of intractable conflict is a collective master narrative that, 'focuses on its entirety ... provides a complete and meaningful picture of the conflict' (p. 5.4). And further, that these master narratives characterise a group in a particular way and can regulate collective thinking through the significance of moral codes that remain implicit within them. Lázló (1997) used the term 'frozen historical stories' where the culture communicates to its members the possible set of story skeletons' (p. 70) whilst Wertsch (2008) referred to a 'cognitive narrative template' that emerged from different interpretations of history and that became conductors of a collective communication affecting individual and group public discourse and dialogue. Hammack (2010) described how Palestinian youth engaged in a tragic master narrative around loss and dispossession that was entrenched in the cultural interpretation of intractable conflict led by Israeli military occupation. These examples demonstrate the close conceptual relationship between narratives, master narratives and social representations in areas of conflict that I would like to explore.

Ideology was discussed earlier in this chapter to denote the belief systems that different groups develop over time and which become part of their evolving knowledge system. The role of ideology, as discussed through a SRT approach, is explored as to how each might complement the other when discussing intractable conflict.

2.6.3. Ideology as representations of societal markers

SRT offers a way of exploring and understanding how these different systems are represented within society and how society can accept, deny and continue to develop these systems/ideologies within the evolving public sphere. One of the functions of SRT lies in its relationship with ideological systems that abound in political, cultural and

social life (Jovchelovitch 2001). Social representations become part of the social fabric of a shared reality where historical myths and beliefs are continually re-worked, re-evaluated and communicated as present day reality. Corbetta, Cavezza and Roccato, (2009) considered the differences between ideologies and social representations by asking, 'why are ideologies no longer able to render political conflict intelligible, whereas social representations can?'(Corbetta, Cavezza and Roccato, 2009, p.639). Thus, social representations can be seen as ideological tools that can provide a critique of social and cultural relationships where inequality and stigma can be explored (Howarth 2009); furthermore, they can act as an intermediary between the individual and all other individuals to make sense of their worlds as a reflective tool, as a shared understanding and as a motivator for social action and social change.

It is suggested that ideology follows a more reified universe, a development incorporated by political and intellectual elites that defends its orthodoxy and so makes it prone to inflexibility. Social representations on the other hand, are developed within a consensual universe that shapes them in such a manner that they are understood by those involved. Ideologies become directly part of an institutional network, while social representations, although indirectly related to institutions, remain free from this relationship:

> We need to turn to the role of social representations and the ideological construction of social reality, for we cannot present a comprehensive understanding of social reality without the recognition of the political … we need to put the theory of social representations into an ideological framework. (Howarth, 2006, p.78).

Both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups might consider the Other as holding biased perceptions and thus holding false views of a given reality. However the anchoring of core processes of developing social representations into classifying social objects on a position based on consensus:

> It's impossible to have a general unbiased system any more than there exists a primary meaning for any particular object. The biases that are often described do not express, as they say, a social or cognitive deficit or limitation on the part of the individual but a normal difference in perspective between heterogeneous individuals or groups within a society. (Moscovici, 2000, p.48).

Whether these groups are localised in the Middle East, as here, or related to the wider global community is pertinent to the thesis.

2.7. Conclusion

During this chapter I have examined the research literature that relates to intractable conflict and in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The text was loosely divided into two parts with the first discussing how conflict and intergroup boundaries have been contextualised in social psychology and the second, the theoretical approach that I propose to follow throughout the thesis. The Israeli-Palestinian context is an interesting example of an intractable conflict which has its roots starting many years before the state of Israel was founded in 1948, when two nascent nations made claims to the same territory. The winner and the loser represent an unresolved status, unable to find a compromise that is acceptable to both groups. Themes of history, nationalism and ideology have all played a part in the research literature to account for intergroup tensions and on-going conflict. The role of interpersonal contact within a context of improving relations across groups, was discussed; with mixed results, as the structural asymmetry evident in Israel has tended to seep into the situations. The in group and out group dichotomy has been central to the work with conflicting groups suggesting impermeable imagined group boundaries. I argued that alternatives can be discussed through framing the conflict from a different perspective, using the theory of social representations as my empirical and theoretical framework. By gaining common sense knowledge from those embedded within the conflict, through their narratives, it becomes possible to explore how group boundaries might be softened, or even crossed, depending on the context of the research enquiry. The concept of themata was noted for its promising approach in exploring antinomies that serve to contextualise the perspectival foundations both within and across the groups. The dialogical relationship across group boundaries remains central to this thesis and will be explored during each of the three empirical studies

The main focus of the thesis concerns the exploration of imagined group boundaries that result in the intractable conflict. I propose to examine these boundaries across three empirical studies. The first study explores how Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living in London think about the conflict from afar, as they reflect on their perceptions of their own positioning and that of the Other. From this

baseline, the second study explores how Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics navigate their working and social relationships with each other in Israel. The third study explores imagined boundaries between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians further by examining the semantic barriers and bridges that serve to harden and soften, or even cross these boundaries. The next chapter gives a detailed account of the rationale for choosing to explore these empirical contexts and the ways in which the explorations were carried out.

3. Empirical focus: research strategy and methodology

3.1. Introduction

The aim of my research is to explore social representations of consensus and conflict across two groups embedded in protracted conflict. In particular I am interested in exploring their group boundaries that both separate and bind within an inescapable dialogical relationship. This chapter reports on my research journey, the chosen methodology and the theoretical base behind it. Each of the three empirical studies that form my thesis is discussed in terms of its strategy for following a particular course, the sample chosen and the framework for data collection, analysis and interpretation.

3.2. Theoretical positioning underpinning research strategy

To research such a complex topic as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I wanted to feel confident that the theoretical approach underpinning my research strategy could reflect this complexity as far as possible. My research was exploratory in nature, starting from the premise that the memories, perceptions and experiences of those who have lived within the conflict could provide important insights for a social psychology of conflict. In particular, the research participants could reveal how they saw both their group and the other group. Would I find a mirror image where each thought about and discussed the Other in similar terms? Or would their worlds and representations of each other be completely different? What might be found on the edges of their group boundaries? Could there be any connections or similarities that demanded further exploration? These questions guided me towards finding a research strategy and methodology that allowed an opportunity to think about these issues in their complexity and help me to keep an open mind for further strategies that might arise throughout my PhD journey.

The discipline of social psychology is one that allows an exploration of intergroup imagined boundaries as a starting point in an unknown representational field. The positioning of the individual as a representative of a particular community is central to this exploration. I was not directly interested in developing a political discourse, nor an international relations analysis, nor the part played by national and international media, even though they remain integral to the on-going study of the conflict. I was more interested in what the people who were directly affected by the

conflict had to say about it, how their common sense reflections were paramount to their understanding of both themselves as a group entity and that of the Other. I wanted each individual to tell me about his or her experiences, in his or her own words, without agreeing or disagreeing with any preformed statement suggested by a third party (such as a researcher).

A Cartesian paradigm approach appeared to be unsuitable for three reasons. First, the philosophical foundation of such an approach within the discipline is based on propositions surrounding the significance of casual mechanisms to explain behaviour. A rigid adherence to a cause-effect theoretical base can lead to a discussion about the laws of universality from a particular Western cultural base. The resulting implication of 'what causes what', can lead to a certain reductionism, that is, the tendency to reduce matter to the smallest units possible (Harré and Moghaddam, 2003). Second, by following a Cartesian framework, the search for categories in which events and processes could be placed (Harré and Secord, 1972) can lead to the institutionalising of an established order which in turn, can become a constructed reality that might differ from alternative perceptions of that same social reality. And third, the Cartesian trajectory is centred on the individual in a culture where individualism has become culturally embedded (Farr, 1996). This can ignore the individual's collaboration with his or her construction of social reality with the many facets of differing interpretations of the world. To follow a truly *social* psychology I needed to look beyond the individual (Moscovici, 2000).

Mead (1934) took up the discarded reins of Wundt's Völkerpsychologie written as a ten volume treatise towards the end of the 19th century as an alternative branch of psychology, where the exploration of language, religion, magic, myth and customs was thought to be more fruitful than a Cartesian approach to the study of human behaviour (Farr 1996). Mead proposed that the self emerges from social interaction, 'by assuming the role of the other with regard to ourselves, we become an object to ourselves … the nature of consciousness in humans is an awareness of self in relation to others, thus consciousness is inherently social' (Farr, p.67). The seeds of dialogism were sown by Mead when discussing the relationships between others, through the significance of meaning processes:

> Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture of a given organism and the subsequent behaviour of the organism by that gesture. If that gesture does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or resultant) behaviour of the given organism, then it has meaning (Mead, 1934, p.1063).

The acceptance of the Other in the meaning-making process reflects a significant move away from the Cartesian philosophy. Farr (1996) suggested Marková's (1982) approach to the divergence of philosophical approaches from a Cartesian to a Hegelian one, by positioning them as distinct paradigms, was a fruitful one. It is this latter approach that I have followed. In particular, the two Hegelian themes in his analysis of human consciousness, which are relevant to my research, are significant. First, the 'importance of recognition for human beings, and secondly, the importance of activity and creativity in the acquisition of knowledge' (Marková, 1982, p.132). To recognise and be recognised by the Other is perceived as fundamental to human activity. This was developed further by Buber (1962), as suggested by Marková (1982), who maintained that 'actual humanity exists only insofar as the capacity to confirm or be confirmed is exercised' (Marková (1982, p.133). A lack of confirmation of the Other can only lead to misunderstanding and conflict of mutual interests where stigma and prejudice stand at the intersection between recognition and non-recognition. In zones of conflict stigma can become institutionalised (Echebarría and Echabe, 1997); 'the tribal stigma of race, nation and religion … can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family' (Goffman, 1963, p.14). Stigma is collectively constructed and maintained but can also be contested, with the possibility of transformation as each knowledge system remains contextually and historically specific (Howarth, Nicholson and Whitney, 2013).

To explore these intersections, a Hegelian approach seemed beneficial to acknowledge divergent perspectives in seeking a version of a reality that can be encapsulated into a theoretical entity. Versions of truth might not be made immediately available (Marková, 1982) as truth can only be defined as a process 'and can be reached only by penetrating under the surface of things, behind their appearances' (p.163). Reality is not expressed in abstract forms, but more in concrete ones, where the relationship between the immediate and the essential is expressed within the opposing contradiction. Marková (1982) suggested that within

a Cartesian paradigm a law of non-contradiction remains at the essence of activity where an entity cannot be both one thing and not at the same time, and so becomes an abstraction; yet 'if anything is to develop it *must* have internal contradiction ... if a thing is unable to withstand contradiction within itself, it dies,' (p. 164/5). At the core of intergroup conflict is the bipolarity between the groups, where layers of contradiction can obscure the foundational themes that might serve to stand as markers for resolving the conflict. Hence it is vital to explore these contradictions, which may help us understand the social psychology of intractable conflict through the imagined boundaries that divide them.

3.2.1. Social representation theory as a foundation to methodology

The theory of social representations implies an alternative approach to mainstream positivistic psychology and methodological individualism, where the subject and object remain separated from the social context from which they arise (Farr, 1996).

> It seemed to me that we are concerned with symbols, social reality and knowledge, communicating about objects not as they are but also all to be, so what comes to the fore is representation. In other words I thought that psychology of knowledge implies the primacy of representations. This is what fixed this notion in my mind, how it was associated with certain ideas on the relationship between communication and knowledge and the transformation of content of knowledge. (Moscovoci, 1961/2008, p.233).

Moscovici (2001) argued that SRT is neither an empirical nor a theoretical concept but both. Thus it can provide an instrument for conceptualising the gap between the individual and the social group. A social object is not simply reproduced in the mind of an individual, but is embedded within a social construction of knowledge systems within the public sphere (Moscovici, 2000). Marková (2012) interpreted this epistemological significance as central to SRT, developing a methodological base from which researchers could move away from a Cartesian to a Hegelian approach, one which focuses on dynamic processes, rather than single entities. This trajectory takes on a dialogical rather than monological approach and reflects 'natural thinking and communication is multifaceted and heterogeneous' (Marková, p.470). For this thesis, I have found that there are various synergies between a SRT approach and grounded theory.

3.2.2. Grounded theory

SRT research uses many different types of methodologies (Breakwell and Canter, 1993; Gaskell & Bauer, 2000) that are designed to answer particular research questions. My chosen methodology was a qualitative one using depth interviews and thematic and dialogical analysis. This gave me the opportunity to explore and understand a multiplicity of perspectives within the social context of those who had experienced the conflict. Miller and Glassner (2011) suggested that depth qualitative interviews provide a medium to explore the phenomenon of interest within its cultural context, and how people make sense of their social worlds and experiences. The strength of qualitative interviewing is 'its capacity to access self-reflexivity among interview subjects leading to the telling of stories that allow us to understand and theorize the social world' (Miller and Glassner, p.137.) The opportunity to listen to the participants' beliefs and private doubts allows the interviewer to explore their ambivalences and resistances towards different groups' positions (Kleinman, Stenross and McMahon, 1994). This qualitative approach opens up a space to consider the multiplicity of factors that underlie social understanding and social life (Flick & Foster, 2008).

My research was exploratory in nature; I attempted to begin the research with no preconceived assumptions as to the content of the answers to my questions. As far as was possible. I followed a grounded theory trajectory (Glaser, 2010) in order to produce my own empirical and theoretical story emanating from the qualitative data collected over a period of nearly three years. This gave me the opportunity to, 'find out directly what is going on and how we can account for it ... to explore what is, not what should be, could, or ought to be' (Glaser, p.6). My research journey was not predicted at the outset, but developed over time as new empirical and theoretical vistas came into view. This inductive approach reflected the fact that my research data was derived from qualitative interviews that neither attempted to explain the causative nature of their content, nor reach a conclusion based on the data alone. One of the lessons learned from the pilot study was that using a concept such as 'identity' as a foundation for the research questions, without taking into account the complex social and cultural reality was unhelpful. A more open stance was required to go beyond this as, 'advances in knowledge that are too strongly rooted in what we already know delimit what we can know' (Gioia, Corley

and Hamilton, 2013, p.16). In trying to make sense of this complexity, an inductive approach was necessary where the perceived realities of the participants, and the relationships between them as individuals and members of competing groups, became the object of study.

We live in a conversational reality (Shotter 1993) whereby language provides the basis on which to understand aspects of social knowledge. By exploring dialogical knowledge systems through the narratives of those embedded in conflict, I could explore imagined boundaries, and so build a sense of the significance of the processes of the relationship that lies 'between' them, rather than solely examining the groups as single entities. It was the dialogical relationship between them that was of interest, as each group remained dependent on the Other for their positioning and action, based on their co- representational fields. I was also aware of the ease within which one can too easily categorise others through membership of certain cultural groups where cultural norms might be understood to follow patterns that do not actually adequately reflect lived or perceived realities. All groups undergo change, and they move between categories as each culture remains a hybrid where differences within groups can be as profound as differences between them (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012). All social categories are understood from particular (and changing) perspectives, so, 'to say that categories are perspectival means there is no independent way of assigning a person to a 'true' category, but the processes of categorisation always stems from a social position, the historical way of seeing and particular interests (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012, p.2).

3.2.3. The use of the term 'Other'

When using the term 'Other' it is intended to be understood as a reference to the other being, that is being discussed, or as a generalised third party, depending on the meaning of this is made clear in the context.

3.2.4. Researcher positioning in the chosen representational fields

I was aware that my positioning could not that be that of objective researcher, but rather that of an interested researcher, and that would affect the participants' own positioning in the research context. The participant – researcher relationship is also a dialogical one where meaning is not an individual outcome but influenced by the Other. The research interview is a social event in itself, it remains, 'an exchange of

ideas and meanings, in which various meanings and perceptions are explored and developed (Gaskell, 2000, p.45. As Reisman suggested, 'the story is told to a particular people; it might have taken a different form if someone else was the listener' (Reisman 1993, p.11). By not being a member of either group, nor showing any allegiance to one or another, I hoped that my positioning was that of a bystander who wanted to know more about their story of the conflict. A Jewish Israeli PhD colleague suggested that I represented the international community, to whom both groups could give their views as a way of justifying their positioning based on any preconceived ideas that they thought I might have. My positioning reflected that of Berger and Luckmann (1966) where the construction of a lived reality through social relationships with others remains paramount. I am a social product of British liberal socialisation and I am aware that this socialisation is set within a cultural milieu that has incorporated some Judeo-Christian thought. Because I appeared to represent an internationally renowned university, participants may have felt they wanted to discuss their narratives as a way of making a contribution to international academic research. Many commented positively on the fact that I was interviewing both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians to see how each viewed the Other, and they saw their input as representative of their own group. There was a veiled acceptance of the intractability of the conflict. There was also a certain eagerness to 'tell it is how it is' rather than accept the positions of the British media. Participants from both groups, for example, felt that the BBC was biased in its reporting, each giving their own preferences of media channels. Thus, my positioning was not one of objectivity but that of a subject in partnership with the participants, reflecting the two basic elements of interviewing as suggested by Farr (1982). First, language as a medium of exchange cannot be neutral as it contains a particular world view; and second, language contrasts different perspectives.

3.2.5. Depth interviews

Depth interviews were chosen over focus groups, partly due to the sensitive nature of the subject. I was not sure how a group might react when discussing group boundaries where group loyalties might have inhibited discussion. With depth interviews, individual participants would have the opportunity to discuss their own perspectives without concern for other group members' perspectives. But there remained the possibility that their narratives would remain guarded, self-conscious

or defensive; telling me what they thought I might like to hear. My main motivation was to allow the participant to feel comfortable, by being empathic, to their positioning as a stranger participant (Gaskell, 2000). Creating a rapport with the participants was crucial to building trust, which allowed more sensitive topics to be tackled. I have had ten years' experience as an interviewer of depth interviews in social (non-academic) research for charities and organisations such as The Wellcome Trust, Macmillan, the NHS and associated agencies, interviewing people in areas where sensitivity was an issue, for example, chronically ill patients, medics, teachers, charity workers, parents and government officials. This experience was significant in helping to build a rapport with the participants in this research. However, not all interviews went as smoothly as others, each differed according to the relationship between us. But as the hour, or hours, passed, the developing relationship allowed a softening of boundaries; that allowed the participants to drop their defences and to acknowledge their social reality of the conflict. A handful remained guarded throughout, perhaps deliberately.

Corpus construction

I chose a corpus construction methodology as suggested by Bauer and Aarts (2000) to develop a valid sample that would represent the two groups in some meaningful way. To choose a method, when using so few participants to represent national groups, even in some minimal sense, required certain parameters to be drawn. Without any criteria for choosing participants there would be little accountability; the strategy of corpus construction can help with this. Barthes defined a corpus as, 'a finite collection of materials which is determined in advance by the analyst with (inevitable) arbitrariness, and with which he is going to work' (Barthes, 1967, p.96, taken from Bauer and Aarts (2000). This rather loose definition tended to apply to linguistic studies and yet can also be applied to choosing a sample for a research project, by applying a method where transparency is uppermost. A suggested way forward was to choose a sample that was relevant to the aims of the study, and homogenous in its overall thematic trajectory. Central is to reach a saturation point of the subject under discussion. However, one does not know at the outset when that might occur with the chosen sample. My rationale was to start with a set of criteria and follow the guidelines as suggested by Bauer and Aarts (2000) to,

'proceed stepwise, select, analyse, select again' (p.35) until a saturation point had been reached.

Fifty two interviews in total were carried out: thirty two in London followed by twenty in Israel. Details of these, and the strategy for each empirical study, are outlined under the heading of each subsection.

Ethics and consent

Prior to the field research I explained my research strategy to the Ethics Committee at LSE and it was approved both by them and by my supervisor. It was based on guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society (BPS) of which I am a member.

My protocol at the beginning of each interview explained the following.

- A brief outline of my PhD - exploring perceptions across Israeli Jewish and Palestinian relationships;
- My positioning of having no political interests and following an academic journey in the field of social psychology;
- That the session would be recorded for my own analysis for transcription and recordings would not be passed on to any third party at any point;
- That anonymous quotes from the session might be given in my thesis and subsequent work;
- LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed. Confidentiality is central to this.

Each participant was asked if there were any other questions before being asked to read through and sign the consent form. A copy of the consent form is found in the Appendix. It set out the conditions under which the interviews were conducted:

- The interview was confidential and anonymous:
- Making sure that the interviewee understood the nature of the interview;
- Permission to have the interview recorded for transcription and analysis:
- Permission to allow anonymous quotes to be used in the thesis and any further publications in the future;

- That the interview could be stopped at any time if the participant so wished; and
- Any question could be ignored.

My name and contact details were given to enable the participant to get back in touch if it was felt to be necessary. No one did so. The interviews lasted approximately one hour, with a few shorter and a few taking longer. The interview ended when I felt the topic had been saturated. Interviews were held in the Social Psychology Department at LSE, local café's, participant's homes or their workplaces, with two using Skype.

Discussion guide

A semi-structured approach was taken in the designing the discussion guide, (Gaskell, 2000). It gave participants the opportunity to answer a set of particular questions as well as allowing the exploration of individual narratives (Wengraf, 2001). The aim was to explore as widely as possible, not only their thoughts on how each reacted to each other's groups, but also why they had come to these narratives, probing further as to any facet or future aspiration that was deemed to be useful (Malinowski,1989). The qualitative depth interview is often seen as a critique of a question-response interview (Jovchelovich and Bauer, 2000) as with the latter it is easy to impose an unintended structure, for example pre-selecting themes and framing questions that reflected my own positioning. I wanted the interviews to flow without me having to ask too many questions, thereby enabling the participants to explore the boundaries they felt to be inherent in their perspectives, and any commonalities between them and the Other. The participants were in the spotlight, expressing themselves - not only what they knew, but what they might be thinking, as if for the first time, and hence being reflective and open to new interpretations.

The discussion guide did not represent a strict set of questions; an approximation of the discussion guides for all studies can be found in the Appendix. The areas of questioning applicable to each stage of the research are discussed under the relevant sections in this chapter.

Constructs of identity were discussed with the participants in both groups when the participants directly mentioned it, but the actual word 'identity' was rarely used in the question format. I learned from my pilot study that the participants

discussed identity in terms of ideological positioning or social and knowledge positioning. Condor (2006) probed English participants about their own representations of nationality, not by direct questioning, but by asking questions about general social attitudes; once the participant opened up a topic that included nationality this was probed further. It was found that just 25% of these responses concerning identity were attributed to people, with the majority talking of places, activities and events, and just 8% alluding to displays of in-group favouritism and pride. In my research, representations of belonging and identification to institutions and other people were commonplace. But the heterogeneity observed in their many different positionings might have been impeded had I used the term identity as a starting point. Further research to clarify this would be interesting.

Coding of data

All recordings (N=52) were transcribed by myself, apart from four, from the second study, which were transcribed by a known and reputable professional agency. The first stage of analysis was to read through the transcripts to note any possible emerging themes (Fereday and Cochrane, 2006) before using the qualitative software system, NVivo. The strength of such a system lay in the opportunity to build knowledge through the coding of categories (Bazeley, 2007, Strauss, 1987) when handing large amounts of data. A code is defined as an abstract representation of a given phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), either as a description of an utterance or as a more thematic connotation. At the beginning of each analysis of a new study, and for each group, I would begin by categorising the more descriptive aspects of each transcription into a variety of 'nodes', often linking them with other nodes that contained similarities. From that base I would code a more thematic category into further 'nodes', so nodal relationships could be built. This linking of data to possible themes and back to support the data was useful for identifying interesting ideas from the participants that could be then linked with the ideas of others. By starting with a general outline and developing it into more specific categories, a knowledge system was built that acknowledged the participants' perceptions. A list of all categories for each sample (x4) is listed in the Appendix.

Analysis and interpretation

The subsequent stage of the analysis was the interpretation of the data. This was based on suggestions by Attride-Stirling (2001) for analysing and interpreting

qualitative data, following a procedure of steps to follow in order to arrive at a thematic interpretation from a host of concrete categories. This method will be described more fully as it pertains to each chapter in the following sections, as they differed slightly in their approach. It can be argued that this stage of the analysis presented a thematic descriptive overview of the findings. It was useful to have such a body of knowledge to discuss representations around a chosen cluster that could be mapped diagrammatically for further interpretation, as shown in the results section in the appropriate empirical chapter. Further interpretation from this basis of organising and base themes could subsequently be followed in order to explore further areas of interest. For example, the highlighting of historical representations (Chapter 4) became evident during this analytical / interpretive stage of the research and it might not have been so obvious had I not followed this procedure. It was possible to think about how other conceptual journeys might be conceived from the original thematic foundation. A dialogical analysis (Chapter 5) was made possible by sifting through original thematic content and subsequently reverting back to NVivo for possible inclusions of further examples. The exploration of semantic barriers and bridges (Chapter 6) was another example of using data from the original thematic organisation. Finally, exploring examples of themata was possible through having a strong thematic foundation from which to work. These examples will be discussed in more detail under the analysis section in the appropriate chapter headings.

Naming of participants

Finding a way of naming the participants was a challenge because of the differences between the groups when positioning both themselves and the Other in a world of different interpretations of citizenship. 'Israeli', for example, would apply both to Jewish citizens of Israel regardless of their birth place and also those of Palestinian descent who remained in Israel post 1948. After much thought, the following criterion was used throughout: I refer to those from a Jewish heritage with lived experience of Israel as 'Jewish Israeli'. Not all of the participants in the sample would consider themselves as Israeli and not all Jewish people have experience of living in Israel; by naming them as 'Jewish Israeli' I refer to both their Jewishness and their lived experience in Israel. Palestinian participants born in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or Gaza, are generally referred to as Palestinian by both themselves

and others. However, in Israel it is more complex as they are generally named by Jewish Israelis as 'Arabs' (Muslims) or 'Christians' with no recognition of their Palestinian roots. Left wing Jewish Israelis often name them 'Palestinian citizens of Israel'. Some Jewish Israelis name them as 'Israeli Arabs'. However, this can also cause confusion as it might also refer to Jewish people who were born in Arab counties such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Morocco, for example, and known officially as Mizrachi Jews who immigrated to Israel. Therefore, I shall refer to those who are of Palestinian descent and have Israeli citizenship as 'Palestinian Israelis'. When quotes are given they are identified by gender, age and national status as follows: Jewish Israeli; Palestinian Israeli; West Bank, Palestinian; Gaza, Palestinian or East Jerusalem, Palestinian. I am aware of the sensitivity surrounding labelling. I have named them to correspond with the groups as stated, for identification purposes only and not intended to represent or deny any other positioning or cause any offence.

When there are full stops positioned within the quotes (…) it refers to a short gap in the conversation when the deleted words are not relevant to the meaning that is being conveyed.

Each of the three studies will be discussed in turn, in terms of the research strategy chosen, sampling, analysis and interpretation. As each study progressed, I developed my thinking across the empirical / theoretical dimensions and how I might make a contribution to the discipline based on these. They are explained and discussed in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), moving to a discussion of the theoretical contributions of the thesis more generally.

3.3. Empirical study ONE: reflections from afar of living in a conflict zone

This section describes the methodological journey taken in my first empirical study; the strategy taken, the recruitment of the sample, and finally how I approached the analysis and interpretation.

3.3.1. Research strategy

The strategy chosen was one of exploration starting with a blank canvas on which to draw provisional ideas before embarking on further exploration. This followed the experience I gained in the pilot study in Israel, when thinking carefully about who might constitute my empirical base in this first study. One of the lessons I learned

was the possibility that that those living within the reality of the conflict were somewhat suspicious of a (somewhat naïve) Western researcher with little first-hand knowledge of those whose lived reality was embedded in an unfamiliar culture. It seemed sensible to pull back from the immediate context and explore the relationships from a distance, with those who had a lived experience of the conflict but were now living outside of it. In this way, I hoped to gain insight into the imagined boundaries between the two groups through a detailed examination of their social representations of the conflict taken from their lived experience, but with a reflection of living away from it. Once this was completed, I could then use this knowledge to return to Israel for further theoretical and empirical exploration.

3.3.2. Sample

This first study consisted of Jewish participants who had lived in Israel though not necessarily born there (N=17), and Palestinian people who were born and lived their formative years in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza or East Jerusalem (N = 15).

There were differences between the groups that I considered when developed a sample. For example, there were differences in terms of national status, and freedom of travel to and from the UK. Jews worldwide have the right to live in Israel on a temporary or permanent basis, so those representing the sample may have been born elsewhere but immigrated at some point and subsequently chosen to live in the UK, either temporarily or permanently. The majority had dual nationality with a European country, including the UK, and so free to travel between there and Israel. For the Palestinian sample it was more complex. Palestinians born in Israel (20% of the total population), and direct descendants of those who had remained following 1948 Israeli statehood, carried Israeli citizenship with full passport travel documents. However, for those Palestinians who lived in the Occupied Territories and Gaza their continued statelessness led to having no access to a national passport. Their travel to Europe was more restricted as travel documents and visas were required by Israel to exit the country and by the visiting country to enter it. These could be refused. For the Palestinians born and living in East Jerusalem there was a further difference as access to travel documents was dependent on a variety of factors, for example, some Palestinians have chosen to opt for an Israeli citizenship document that is available to some residents. Five of the Palestinian participants had UK nationality or permission to stay as a resident, one with refugee status, with the

remainder in the UK on a more temporary basis with study or work visas, either planning to return home or hoping to remain in the EU on a more permanent basis.

The consequences of these differences led to the challenge of matching the sample in terms of time spent in the UK and place of birth. For example, the Jewish Israeli participants may have been born in Europe and immigrated or born in Israel, whilst all the Palestinians were born there as at the present time it is not possible for a Palestinian to have been born in Europe and immigrated there. I set criteria as follows: for the Jewish Israeli group they would have to have had spent at least five years living in Israel with the majority continuing to travel to Israel to be with families for extended holidays. I did not talk to any Jewish Israeli participant who had lived or presently live in settlements in the West Bank. For the Palestinian sample I wanted to interview a cross section from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza and within Israel itself. The majority were living in the UK on a temporary basis, with post grad study or travel permits. Tables summarising both groups is shown below:

Table 4: Jewish Israeli participants (Study 1)

Participants	**Female**	**Male**	**Total**
Israeli born	x 6	x 4	**10**
Israeli immigrants	x 4	x 3	**7**
Total	**10**	**7**	**17**

Table 5: Palestinian participants (Study 1)

Participants	Female	Male	Total
Gaza	x 2	x 4	**6**
West Bank	x 1	x 4	**5**
East Jerusalem	x 1	x 1	**2**
Palestinian Israeli	x 1	x 1	**2**
Total	**5**	**10**	**15**

Table 6: Age ranges across all groups (Study 1)

Participants	20's	30's	40's	50's	Total
Jewish Israeli	x 3	x 6	x 5	x 3	**17**
Palestinian Israeli	-	x 2	-	-	**2**
Palestinian	x 6	x 4	x 3	-	**13**
Total	**9**	**12**	**8**	**3**	**32**

I attempted to match for age and gender but as illustrated this was not entirely successful. There were more females in the Jewish Israeli group (10:7) and more males in the Palestinian group (5:10). This might be because more Palestinian men than women leave their families in their home country to study or make an independent life elsewhere, but this could not be substantiated. The Jewish Israeli

group tended to be younger, as illustrated in Table 3, which may be accounted for by the higher number of Palestinian participants coming to the UK for post graduate study and returning home later. Participants from both groups were highly educated, with most having a Bachelor's degree, and many from both groups also had a post graduate degree or post graduate qualification. All spoke fluent English and could express themselves clearly. None from either group would consider themselves as being part of a fundamental religious group, where their religion was the main focus of direction in their lives. Most would describe themselves as secular, with an ethnic or cultural attachment to Judaism, Islam or Christianity which varied by degree from absolute atheism to recognition of the religious values as part of their socialisation.

Their political leanings were more difficult to compare. All the Jewish Israelis identified with the left-right continuum. In Israel this left-right continuum has tended to signify a 'dove' and 'hawk' positioning, where the former stands for those who seek a more peaceful agreement with a future Palestinian state, with the latter taking a more ambivalent position and often an anti-Palestinian position. In this Jewish Israeli sample there was a good mix of self-identified left and right wing. There appeared to be no such left/right continuum equivalent positioning within the Palestinian group, reflecting a more homogenous positioning. However, participants talked about a Fatah-Hamas divide, with the former perceived as the more moderate political party, while Hamas, an Islamist party, was seen as being more extreme. This does not easily translate to a left-right wing orientation, possibly due to the complications of the Palestinian's lack of self-determination as a nation state.

Recruitment: Jewish Israeli participants

Participants were initially found through contacts and snowballed to include contacts of contacts, members from Jewish Israeli organisations and LSE student groups. I needed to employ a recruitment agency to find three right wing participants, as until that point, there had been a tendency towards an imbalance of political orientation. The Jewish Israeli interviews were the first to take place, from December, 2012 and May 2013 before embarking on the Palestinian recruitment.

Recruitment: Palestinian participants

Finding participants for the Palestinian sample proved a lot more challenging than the Jewish Israel sample, taking from June 2013 to April 2015 to complete. Overall

there were fewer interviews (15 compared to 17) due to the difficulty in recruiting within a specified time frame. I started to recruit participants with known contacts, and snowballed to find more through contacts of contacts, local organisations and London universities. Many potential participants ignored my communication, or having made contact would then ignore further communication, or they would delay fixing a time to meet, or preferred not to be part of the study. Participants had to fit my criteria of being born in the designated areas, so no one born in a refugee camp in surrounding countries to Israel, nor the offspring of a Palestinian and born in the UK, could be part of the study. This may have been a factor as to the few who would fit these criteria. A professional recruitment agency was unwilling to take this on at a reasonable cost.

There also appeared to be a lack of trust in my positioning as a British student from London, and it took some time to build a sense of trust through the contacts I had made. When I questioned some participants as to the possible reasons why it was so difficult to recruit the sample, it was evident that there was some hesitancy in discussing Israeli-Palestinian relationships. This was partly because they were not used to discussing these topics with a stranger; but it also appeared to be due to a concern that details of their inclusion might be passed on to a third party at some point. The following quote exemplifies this.

> *'Most of us are afraid about talking. I think the Palestinians are the most frightened about speaking because I think that as we are outside we don't want any trouble and usually we become afraid of intelligence services, the secret services. Because most of us usually, they keep a close eye on us. I think also that things are exaggerated … At the beginning when I was told about this (research), I thought, well, I'm happy to do it, but I need to know more.'* (Male, 20's, Palestinian, West Bank)

I had to stress the importance of anonymity to the possible Palestinian participants, that their identity would always remain anonymous before some would agree to the interview. However, once the timing of the interview had been agreed and begun, and my positioning explained as a doctoral student exploring conflict across both groups with no allegiance to either (apart from a willingness to learn), the participants were open and candid about their experiences.

Discussion guide

This first empirical study included the following areas of questions and discussion:

- How each defines his or her own nation or homeland, in terms of what is significant for the group and the individual;
- How the Other is defined both by them and the wider society; personal experiences with the other community;
- Their perspective of how the Other might perceive them and their positioning;
- The significance of being Jewish Israeli or Palestinian Israeli in the UK;
- The influences that have formed and sustained their present narrative;
- Any perceived segregation as a result of conflict / group preference;
- A vision of the future that may include both communities living together or further conflict; and
- Concluding thoughts.

I was confident that I had reached a saturation point with both groups where no new information was being given that would have any overall effect on the findings.

3.3.3. Analysis and interpretation

The protocol for the analysis followed that as described in section in 3.2.5. The original coding nodes as identified in NVivo were used as a base from which to explore the large amount of data to analyse it into a meaningful way to discuss the findings within a theoretical framework. For example, NVivo node categories (as listed in the Appendix) that were identified for over 75% of the sample were given particular attention. These category nodes in the Jewish Israeli sample in London, included statements around issues of belonging, fear, threat, memories of the Holocaust and historical themes, Jewish identification, loyalty, the military, Zionism, co-existence, transformation, politics, intractability, relationship with Palestinians, righteousness, stigma, and barriers to consensus. For the Palestinian sample in London, category nodes with at least 75% of the sample discussing them included barriers to consensus, co-existence, contact with the Other, emotions (for example, of anger, frustration, sadness), the future, the role of history, the Holocaust, identity, injustice, intersubjectivity (i.e. the relationship with Jewish Israelis), the occupation, peace hopes and politics. From these coding nodes base

themes were identified to reflect either a consensus or conflict positioning. Following this, a thematic analysis, following the suggestions by Attride-Stirling (2001), was carried out to identify base themes to reflect the different categories that participants had talked about as being central to the conversation. From these base themes, a set of organising themes were deduced as representing these base themes, set out across two global themes signifying the context of the study, as illustrated here:

Figure2: Sets of global, organising and base themes



This form of implementing an analysis from the NVivo coding system was useful to explore themes interpreted at their most basic levels, within a framework of a hierarchy of themes to implement a discussion about a meaningful set of inferred social representations, as suggested by the conversations with participants. The global themes represent the main claims and arguments as distinct entities; the organising themes summarise the abstract principles taken from the base themes, the lowest order, which in turn summarises the identified themes from the codes taken from the original coding frame. A coding frame, with quoted examples for each set of base and organising themes, can be found in the Appendix. The resulting matrix of themes is found in the results section of chapter 4.

Further analysis and interpretation was carried out exploring historical representations. This was followed due to the significance of this subject area in the data. This was not a subject on which I had directly questioned the participants and yet it was prominent enough to be a source of interest both empirically and theoretically. NVivo was useful here for linking this theme with the nodes that had been implemented as categories when inputting the original data.

3.4. Empirical study TWO: living and working side by side in Israel

This section describes the methodological approach taken in the second empirical study when I returned to Israel for further exploration into imagined intergroup boundaries across Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis.

3.4.1. Research strategy

The experience of the pilot study in Israel in the summer of 2012 was not only useful for my theoretical journey. It also gave me the opportunity to meet academics at Haifa and Tel Aviv University to hear of their perceptions of intergroup relationships between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis and to attend a conference in Haifa on this topic. I returned the following summer, in 2013, to familiarise myself more with the area and to make contacts for the second study in 2014. My intention was to study people who represented a way of co-existing together in the same geographic area, that is in Haifa, a city in northern Israel which was said to be a place of co-existence between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered intractable, and both groups were perceived as enemies to each other, how do Jewish and Palestinian Israelis manage to co-exist in daily life? Or were their lives too segregated for relationships to form? What might contact with each other mean for their perceptions of the Other? I wanted to explore cross group relationships within a social, intellectual and physical context.

The answer came during an interview in London with a Jewish Israeli participant whom I interviewed in the UK. After discussing his ambivalence, bordering on loathing, towards the Palestinian population as his enemy, he contradicted himself quite openly and without irony by suggesting that he would trust his life with a Palestinian doctor. The quote is reproduced here:

> *"If I was to live or move into an apartment block I can't imagine myself moving into an apartment block where there are Palestinians. I wonder why - for me from day one they are the enemy they are the enemy they are the enemy. They killed my uncle they killed my father whatever, everyone knows someone who is affected. It's really deep. It's really deep …*
>
> (15 mins later*) …. I will trust my life with an Arab doctor.*
>
> ***Why?***
>
> *Because there is a shortage of doctors so of course we compromise. When blokes like me go into the Army, and as there's a loyalty issue with the Arabs*

most of them don't go into the Army, they go to Italy or the Czech Republic to study medicine. So a large percentage of the population of Arabs are doctors. And for that there is no issue. Jews are happy with that. No problem at all." (Male, 30's, Jewish Israeli)

This contradiction allowed me to think about its significance. I was particularly interested in his narrative about Palestinians as the enemy and assumed he was referring to Palestinians outside Israel; and yet he discussed the possibility of sharing an apartment block with a Palestinian which would have referred to a Palestinian in Israel, a Palestinian Israeli. The trust in an 'Arab' doctor was key. Was this due to medical ethics playing a significant role? Or was it a more pragmatic solution for finding the relevant manpower when Jewish Israelis were doing their mandatory military service, giving opportunities for Palestinian Israelis who do not have to sign up. It was this quote that led to the planning of the second study. I had been looking for a context where Jewish and Palestinian Israelis worked together on an equal professional footing and this example gave me the opportunity to explore further.

Narratives concerning a national ideology had been prominent in the first study and will be discussed further in the empirical chapter; I was interested in how boundaries between the groups, identified through the individual, might differ when national ideology played a role in forming social representations of, and relationships with, the Other. If an overriding ideology can act as a mediating force between groups in conflict, how might the ethics of medicine have an impact on these relationships? Desivilya (1998) studied this very phenomenon by examining Arab / Jewish professional medical relationships. Most of those involved in the study felt that they were satisfied with their professional communication across boundaries, 'that no barriers were posed on interpersonal communication, because this would be considered a violation of professional ethics standards' (Desivilya, 1998 p.435). If this ideology of ethics was considered to be significant with their cross boundary relationships, a discussion about the role of ideology in a wider context could be explored further. Moreover, if professional co-existence was found to be successful we can ask if this was carried further into social and personal friendships where the boundaries between them may become more diffused and permeable across a variety of contexts.

Exploratory depth qualitative interviews formed the base of the fieldwork, as had been the case in the first study. Ethics, confidentiality and consent followed the same practice. Interviews were held in hospital departments, clinics, local café's and one in a private home. All interviews were recorded and transcribed personally.

3.4.2. Sample and recruitment

My trip was delayed for two months due to the conflict 'Operation Protection Edge' in Gaza (8th July to 26th August 2014). I was advised by the LSE Research Degrees Unit not to venture into Israel because of security concerns at that time. And further, my contacts in Israel suggested that during these times of conflict, relationships across the Jewish and Palestinian Israeli divide can become intensified with a possible escalation of violence within Israel itself, leaving the local population more prone to negativity about the Other. As my topic of interest was of co-existence as well as conflict, this bias would affect my findings and the thesis as a whole. It was hoped that the delay would alleviate this. However, the conflict was still very much part of the local narrative two months later, and so played a role in the life worlds of some of those interviewed - as will be discussed in the empirical chapter (Chapter5).

I followed the same strategy in finding a corpus (Bauer & Gaskell 2000) as I did in the first stage of the research. Through contacts I had made in previous visits and though London based Jewish Israelis, initial communication was made with medical professionals in the area before my arrival in October 2014. I also enlisted the help of a local organisation that had held a conference in 2013, where medical professionals from both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli backgrounds had come together to discuss their future working relationships. From this starting point, those contacted and willing to be part of my research would often pass on contacts to form a snowball effect. I wanted to talk to mostly doctors, but also a minority of senior nursing staff whose narratives may have differed slightly in their approach to working with the Other. The doctors who made up the sample ranged from junior doctors to senior consultants, both medical and surgical, and there was one Jewish Israeli, and one Palestinian Israeli, senior clinical psychologist. The difficulty of recruiting Palestinians in London was not repeated in Israel, although I was aware that confidentiality appeared to be particularly important for some participants in the Palestinian Israeli group. Loyalty to the state was considered to be significant and

any deviation from that could have been misconstrued as being critical, with possible consequences to one's career.

I planned on completing twenty interviews that represented heterogeneous views across the sample pertaining to the permeability of boundary crossing, both professionally and personally. This number was reached during my field visit and I was confident that I had found a point of saturation across both samples that reflected their narratives taken from their positioning and perspective about both themselves and each other. Tables showing details of both samples are shown below:

Table 7: Palestinian Israeli medical professionals (Study 2)

Participants	**20's**	**30's**	**40's**	**50's**	**Total**	
Doctor	F x 1	F x 1	F x 1 M x 4	- M x 1	F x 3 M x 5	**8**
Senior Nurse	F x 1	-	F x 1	-	F x 2	**2**
Total	**1**	**2**	**6**	**1**	**F x 5** **M x 5**	**10**

Table 8: Jewish Israeli medical professionals (Study 2)

Participants	**20's**	**30's**	**40's**	**50's**	**Total**	
Doctor	F x 1	F x 2	F x 3 M x 3	-		**9**
Senior Nurse	-	-	F x 1	-		**1**
Total		**3**	**7**	**-**	**F x 7** **M x 3**	**10**

There were more women than men in the Jewish Israeli sample which may reflect cultural differences across gender from the two communities. The doctors were employed as hospital physicians, clinicians or surgeons, with those aged in their 40's and above, holding senior consultant positions, whilst the younger ones were more junior and still practising in a training capacity. The inclusion of three senior nurses was felt to be important to gain access into a more patient-related discussion, and two were matched in terms of age and seniority while the third, a younger Palestinian Israeli, was working as a midwife as well as a nurse. The Jewish Israeli sample mostly had a secular lifestyle, with just one describing herself as an Orthodox Jew, although personal details were not discussed in any detail. The Palestinian Israeli sample was made up of mostly Muslim medical professionals although none describing themselves as being overtly religious. There were also two Christian and one Druze participants as part of the sample. The political orientation of the Jewish Israelis was, a good mix from left to right to wing, but as in the first study there was no comparable positioning for the Palestinian Israelis; this does not assume that no such orientation exists, but they did not feel it necessary to include it in the conversation. The sample was not intended to be representative of all Jewish and Palestinian Israeli hospital medical professionals in Israel but their in-depth views of their hospital experiences represented a plethora of perspectives that constitutes a robust contribution to my thesis. The sample represented a group of Israeli nationals who were highly educated, spoke fluent English, were most bi-lingual in Arabic and Hebrew - certainly enough to converse with their patients. All participants spent their professional working life with the Other and so had much to offer in terms of their life world being embedded together, leading to rich and interesting data from which to explore the boundaries between them. Their contribution cannot be said to be generalisable to other groups within Israel, but it can act as a base line from which to draw possible conclusions and from which further research can be undertaken.

Discussion Guide

The second empirical study in Haifa, included the following areas of questioning and discussion:

- The motivations for following a career in medicine and the route that was taken to achieve this;
- Their perspective of the area in which they lived / came from, in terms of co-existence / segregation across both groups;
- Their working relationships with those from the other group and how that may have developed / changed over time;
- Their relationships with patients from both groups and how they have found that may have changed as their training and experience developed;
- Their perspectives on how their values and beliefs have been formed and sustained through their significant relationships, education and institutions, linking this back to their professional life world;
- A vision of the future that may include both communities living together or further conflict; and
- Concluding thoughts picked up from the interview.

3.4.3. Analysis and interpretation of themata

The identification of relevant themata was a process that needed careful consideration. Not only did I want to uncover themata that was felt to represent foundational themes of the conflict, but I also needed to observe how they might differ across the dialogical relationship between and within the groups. By exploring the thematic content of the data, and noting possible themata, I arrived at a point where I felt the identification of a proposed set of themata would sit comfortably with the data. However, this was not a simple process and needed reformulating on a number of occasions until I was satisfied that the chosen themata fitted the data better than any alternative. NVivo was central to the placing of categories taken from the transcriptions in a similar fashion as I had followed in the first study. Again I followed the approach as suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) by paying attention to base themes gathered from Nvivo nodes, then further interpreting these into organising themes that encompassed these more base entities. The organising themes fed into the global themes that reflected the antinomy inter-relationship across the experiences of two groups working alongside one another, compared to the one outside, where other thematic content was evident. However, the inside / outside work status is not so clear cut as to provide a descriptive element, but more of a deep thematic reflection that appeared to stand for deep seated differences

across the groups. And so although the context of work is significant, by identifying the thematic content discussed as themata we can discuss a further level of representation that may lie deeply in the epistemology of the knowledge systems of the participants.

From the nodes that were classified at the first stage of coding those that were relevant in more than 75% of the participants responses to be included in further thematic interpretation - for the Jewish Israeli sample this included details of personal biography (including identities and Jewish identification both in the present and the past), the recent Gaza war, imagined futures, feelings of threat, relationships with their Arab Israeli colleagues, the media and the IDF (Israeli Defence Force). Included in more than 75% of the Israeli Arab sample were classifying nodes that represented the Gaza war, identities (both present and past), Israeli discrimination, and land rights, relationships with their Jewish Israeli colleagues, barriers to consensus and bridges as a way of crossing a divide. From these categories, base themes were interpreted to take into account the dialogical relationship across the groups that fed into my interpretation of organising themes leading to the identification of four antinomy pairs of global themes, two for each group: exclusivity-inclusivity and threat-security for the Jewish Israeli group and recognition-non recognition and equality-inequality for the Arab Israeli group. This process of identification was not one that was as simple as it might suggest but required examination and re-examination over time and discussion with colleagues (through presentation seminars and lab work). Mapping of the levels of thematic content resulting in the identification of themata showing each antinomy pair and how they related to organising and base themes, can be found in the Appendix. A coding book showing examples of quotes for each thematic category is also given.

By incorporating themata in my methodological approach, I hoped to explore how two groups perceived both themselves and each other across their dialogical relationship in the context of their professional working lives and their lives outside it. The discussion of the theoretical aspects of themata can be found in Chapter 2.

Dialogical analysis

After identifying relevant themata within the data, I also carried out a dialogical analysis with chosen texts to exemplify the dialogical relationship across the two

groups. There have been a few methodological studies that have succinctly set out how to carry out a dialogical analysis. For example, Wagoner et al (2011) demonstrated how a group of six dialogical scholars each analysed a piece of text taken from a short story *The Guerrillero* Each used their own approach to explore the relationship between the self and the other, concluding that a dialogical analysis of the six analyses showed the possibility of a multiplicity of different approaches. Gillespie et al (2008) used a dialogical analysis approach to discuss a set of diaries written by a woman in World War II reflecting her relationship with her local community during a time of tension and change. The advantage of such an approach highlighted the different layers of her thinking as she attempted to resolve her inner dialogue during such times. Gillespie & Cornish (2014) suggest a possible step by step approach for a dialogical analysis when interpreting multi voiced dialogue, which I have used as a base for my analysis. This included coding pronoun utterances as follows: those that represented the subject, 'I', 'we' and 'us', and subsequently those that represented the Other, 'them' and 'they'. All sets of pronouns encapsulated the 'ego-alter' dialogical relationship (Marková, 2003) and highlighted in the so-called Toblerone model of SRT (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). The third coding represented the 'you' pronoun that tended to represent either a neutral subject or, depending on the context, used to denote a 'third party judge' - either as a direct or indirect invitation for my inclusion as the interviewer within the dialogue. By following this methodological approach I hoped to gain insight into the relationship across the groups held in intractable conflict, including the contradictions and ambiguities that might enfold in such a process. The imagined boundaries between them can then be discussed in terms of impermeability, juxtaposed with the possibilities of permeability. My third study explores the semantic bridges and barriers that might serve to harden or soften such imagined boundaries.

3.5. Empirical study THREE: semantic barriers and bridges across imagined boundaries

This final study takes the empirical and theoretical journey further by considering how imagined boundaries can be both impermeable and permeable. This study aims to explore these boundaries arising out of local and societal contexts as discussed by the participants.

3.5.1. Research strategy

The findings from my first empirical study served as a base from which to explore intractable conflict further by returning to Israel to explore a context of co-existence. Findings from this study revealed how deep seated themata remain active in the co-representational field. However, not all social representations discussed could be described as belonging to an intractable paradigm. Narratives of hope and optimism were also present in the field. I wanted to explore how these positions suggested within the prevailing themata, could be voiced. By re-introducing semantic barriers as originally noted by Moscovici (1961/2008) and further developed by Gillespie (2008) I hoped to add to this development by exploring the concept in my study. Further, by introducing the concept of semantic bridges, I hoped to include more hopeful positionings that were also present in the representational field, where imagined boundaries fluctuated in response to the Other, as they remained bounded by their dialogical relationship.

3.5.2. Sample

The sample for this study was created from the previous two studies to form two new groups from which to base my exploration. I wanted to use a sample that represented the two groups in conflict, one Israeli Jewish and one Palestinian, who, under the present geo-political reality, would not meet, yet still remain dialogically bound together. Transcripts from twenty participants were chosen to match each other approximately in terms of age, political orientation for the Jewish Israeli group, and heterogeneity of perceptions in the Palestinian group. I chose ten Palestinians from the London group rather than include Palestinian Israelis, as I wanted to make a direct comparison with those separated by intractable conflict, that is, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza an East Jerusalem. I included ten Jewish Israeli transcripts: five from the Haifa group and five from the London group to form a new Jewish Israeli group to reflect my criterion of matching across the groups. By using a data set that had already been part of a previous study (Chapters 4 and 5) I followed a triangulation methodology as suggested by Flick (2007). Data triangulation refers to using different sources of data to maximise a particular methodology through ‘a purposeful and systematic selection and integration of persons, populations and temporal local settings is used’ (Flick, 2007, p.10). By using this newly formed data set I could directly contrast the groups and

match them accordingly. These samples are illustrated in Tables 6 and 7 below. There remained an imbalance of gender that was evident in the original samples with more men in the Palestinian grouping and more women in the Jewish Israeli group. This was difficult to eradicate, bearing in mind that an approximation of age and place across the groups was considered significant. All of the Jewish Israeli group had lived most of their life in Israel and had experienced military service in the IDF.

Table 9: Palestinians by place, gender and age

Participants	**20's**	**30's**	**40's**	**50's**	**Total**
West Bank	- M x 1	- M x 2	F x 1 -	-	**1** **3**
Gaza	F x 1 M x 1	- M x 1	F x 1 -	- -	**2** **2**
East Jerusalem	 M x 1	F x 1 -	- -	- -	**1** **1**
Total	**4**	**4**	**2**	**-**	**10**

Table 10: Jewish Israelis by place, gender and age

Participants	**20's**	**30's**	**40's**	**50's**	**Total**
Jewish Israelis London	F x 2 -	F x 1 M x 2	- -	- -	**3** **2**
Jewish Israelis Haifa	F x 1 -	F x 1 -	F x 2 M x 1	- -	**4** **1**
Total	**3**	**4**	**3**	**-**	**10**

Half of the Jewish Israeli sample suggested they were left wing and half right. As suggested in the section above, there was no direct comparison with the Palestinian group as to their political orientation, with the Palestinian groups in general reflecting more homogenous perceptions. Bearing this in mind I included those whose perceptions tended to follow a more heterogeneous positioning. Most of the Palestinian group were living temporarily outside the conflict zone and at the present time will have returned home, or they will have close links with frequent travel to the area.

3.5.3. Analysis and interpretation

For the analysis of this empirical study I returned to NVivo to examine those transcripts I had chosen to form the new sample group to explore what might be perceived as being a barrier that stood between the groups to inhibit intergroup understanding and bridges that might stimulate understanding. The identified barriers and bridges were listed in tables and used as a base to begin a thematic interpretation. These tables amounted to 5,000 of text and so too large for the Appendix but can be seen on request. As in the previous study I followed the approach suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) in finding base and organising themes that would demonstrate the identification of themata that related to these perceived descriptive semantic barriers and bridges. Through a process of applying this data to base themes which were then structured as organising themes and ultimately into themata of global themes that reflected the underlying base and organising themes. This final chosen themata were felt to be a satisfactory reflection of the foundational representations of both groups' perceptions of their imagined boundaries. Not only did I need to consider relevant themata for each group but I also needed to check that these reflected the dialogical relationship across the groups. Four antinomy pairs of themata were identified: exclusivity-inclusivity and threat-security for the Jewish Israeli group and recognition-non recognition and oppression-freedom for the Palestinian group. As can be noted, themata for both the second and third study of Jewish Israelis remained the same, whilst for the Palestinian group, themata of recognition and non recognition was found to be the same as identified in the second study, but the second themata pair, of oppression-freedom reflected the difference in status between the Arab Israeli participants as citizens of the State of Israel and the Palestinian group whose national status was less defined. The antinomy relationship

of global themes as themata reflected an approximation of semantic barriers on the one hand and semantic bridges on the other. For example, the thema of 'exclusivity' represented a discussion around semantic barriers to consensus and 'inclusivity as a semantic bridge to begin a dialogue away from conflict. Likewise, 'oppression' reflected a thema of semantic barriers to consensus and 'freedom' towards a reality that steered away from conflict. However, it must be noted that this form of thematic analysis is not exact as such, as the data represents a complex set of social representations with inbuilt contradictions and paradoxes, with no clear pattern to observe. However, the identification of themata and its organising and base themes opens up a discussion that reflects a social reality as perceived by the participants. It is the dialogical relationship across the groups that was felt to be of significance in the study that demonstrated the different sets of semantic barriers and bridges that each represented, related to their own experiences and set within an asymmetric context of intergroup conflict. .

Tables showing the mapping of each set of themata, with the base and organising themes as identified, with quoted examples of each category can be found in the Appendix under the relevant chapter headings.

3.6. Limitations

A thesis using qualitative data throughout is not without its limitations. It was never my intention to produce a research study that could be said to reflect a given social reality that might be applicable to any universal theme, or used to predict any future phenomenon. I was influenced by a Hegelian approach and in particular, by the significance of social recognition in social relationships and the importance of creativity in the acquisition of knowledge. By following a grounded approach I explored what was felt to be necessary at any particular point in time. Robustness and transparency remained central to my thesis. This is discussed in terms of the samples chosen and the interpretation of data.

3.6.1. Samples

Trying to match groups divided by conflict was always going to be problematic due to the large differences of life experiences between them. A total of fifty two depth interviews that formed the bases of the thesis cannot be said to be representative of those who live within the conflict. They represent a select group that can be

described as being highly educated, many of them having the opportunity to live and work away from the conflict. None of the participants belonged to any fundamental religious or militant group. However, they were matched in ways that I believed would provide an interesting opportunity to discuss the boundaries between them that would contribute to conflict research in social psychology. By following a corpus construction methodology (Bauer and Aarts, 2000) in sample choice, I felt confident in reaching a point of saturation from my discussions with the participants. From this base, further research can be explored with additional samples representing different contexts. It would be of particular interest to examine with a wider population range further evidence of similar thematic trajectories and the salience of themata that were found to be significant in this thesis.

3.6.2. Robust analysis and interpretation

Robust analysis and interpretation were important in my research strategies and data collection, where the need for accountability and transparency was paramount (Flick, 1998, Seale, 1999). By noting my entire research journey in this chapter, the methodological basis of the thesis has been discussed and remains open to scrutiny. The inclusion of carefully chosen quotes, of which there are many, demonstrated particular instances of a conceptual point or descriptive entity. My thesis was entirely reliant on the discussed perspectives of all of those whose experiences and reflections resulted in social representations of intractable conflict that forms the basis of my thesis. The Appendix shows examples of the way in which the data was analysed and interpreted. Any further clarification can be requested.

The passage of time was considered significant in re-visiting coding frames in NVivo. This was recommended during Methodology classes held at LSE as a way of checking the original coding frame. I found there were few changes to alternative categories, but the number of categories increased as other perspectives came into view. My PhD colleagues at LSE were helpful and constructive in the interpretation process during workshops, social labs and seminars within the Social Psychology department. By discussing examples of texts it was possible to verify a chosen methodological / theoretical journey as well as receiving a creative input concerning new ways of thinking about the data. This was also developed during meetings in Europe (Neuchâtel, Aalborg and London) for invited doctoral students to come together to discuss their qualitative data in a collaborative manner.

Finally, my positioning as a researcher cannot be judged to be objective either as a social researcher or as a person who represents the international community from a liberal perspective. My aim was to act as an interpreter to those who spoke of their direct experience of the conflict, to hear their stories through their eyes in a way that encompassed a robust methodology in setting these stories in a constructive theoretical framework.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter reports on the methodological journey of my thesis from its theoretical base to the chosen strategies, which were followed to explore the dialogical intergroup relationships of concord and conflict in Israel-Palestine. I chose a Hegelian approach that widened my scope to think about two particular aspects of human consciousness that Hegel considered significant in the study of human behaviour: the importance of social recognition and the premise that activity and creativity lies at the base of the acquisition of knowledge. This theoretical avenue set the scene for a reflexive approach where internal contradictions remain central to human thinking. The significance of the social within the individual, as argued by Mead, contains the seeds of dialogism which was developed by Marková later in the 20th and which contributed to this theoretical journey. Social representation theory, particularly the construct of themata, formed the foundation of my second and third empirical studies. The choice of using depth interviews to produce qualitative data was discussed to demonstrate the significance of following a grounded theory approach. The methodology for each of the three empirical studies was discussed in turn. This included the research strategy for each, followed by the reporting of the chosen samples and how they were recruited; the importance of research ethics and consent and finally, the outlines of the discussion guides that formed the groundwork of the research. The way in which the data was analysed and interpreted was explained with emphasis on robustness and transparency. Finally, the limitations of the research were discussed in terms of the relative narrowness of the samples, indicating that these findings are not applicable to wider or alternative communities. However, it is hoped that the findings can be useful as a starting point for further theoretical and empirical research.

The following three chapters introduce, describe and discuss the empirical studies. We turn first to look at the lived realities of both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living in London.

4. Conflict and consensus as reflected experience

4.1. Introduction

This first empirical chapter examines the reflections of conflict and consensus of those who have experience of living within a conflict zone in Israel / Palestine, yet at the time of their interview were living either temporarily or permanently outside of it. The participants had experienced an alternative life world within Europe that allowed a space for reflection, distanced from the conflict. It is not assumed that their perceptions will echo those of people who remain embedded within the conflict, not least because the participants left of their own volition, either temporarily or permanently. However, their narrated experiences have been central in exploring relevant themes related to living within a conflict zone, where the identification of social knowledge systems affecting the permeability of imagined intergroup boundaries can be discussed. The chapter will be divided as follows. First, the idea of imagined boundaries is introduced. Second, base and organising themes that were interpreted from the categories identified when coding data in Nvivo, are presented and discussed. Third, historical narratives, taken directly from the data are explored to reflect the significance of past and /or mythical constructs that remain omnipresent in the current representational field. Fourth, by contrasting these intergroup group narratives through the processes of objectification and anchoring, we can discuss how each of their trajectories has developed over time. Finally, a theoretical argument is developed that examines how a narrative approach in conflict research has been useful to highlight particular meta narratives as a way of understanding intra and intergroup perspectives in relation to a SRT approach.

4.1.1 Imagined boundaries of consensus and conflict

The boundary line between two groups in conflict is one that can be imagined symbolically. First, one where a closed border predominates, where a 'them and us' typology becomes essentialised, leading to ingroup / outgroup present and future orientations, or second, one where cross border relationships give rise to possibilities of acknowledging the Other. There has been a tendency for the former to take precedence, both in the historical and political literature about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Sharkansky, 1996; Khaladi, 2006) and also in terms of theoretical discussions concerning nationality, social identity and contact (Reicher and

Hopkins, 2001; Kelman, 1994, 1999; Billig, 2002; Brewer, 2011). There are two possible ways in which this dilemma can be dissected to uncover an alternative approach where an imagined crossing of imagined borders can be discussed. First, by shifting the concept of boundary to one of a membrane (Joffe and Staerklé, 2007) where a boundary zone can be crossed or blocked under certain conditions as human activity continually creates new boundaries. Discussing boundaries as a membrane is explored further in Chapter 6 when I consider how semantic barriers and bridges can inhibit or aid conflictual group relationships. Second, using a thematic approach in this chapter and the concept of themata in Chapter 5 open a dialogical framework to explore cross group relationships without assuming division and difference is the only stance from which study the social representations of conflict.

4.2. Base and organising themes across group boundaries

A summary of the base and organising themes, encompassing the two global themes of conflict and consensus across both sets of participants, is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 on the following page. These themes were deduced from the categories coded in NVivo from individual transcriptions, following a thematic framework as suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) and discussed in chapter three. Stemming from the global themes of conflict and consensus, organising themes served to indicate subject areas from which to consider base themes that were directly related to the participants' ideas, judgements and reflections discussed during the interviews. Subject areas included ideological themes, collective positioning, themes around collective agency and security themes. By setting out these themes in a diagrammatic format it is possible to view base themes within each organising structure across both groups. A comparison can then be made within and across group boundaries to explore points of similarity, difference and polyphonic expressions.

The organising and base themes can be said to depict an overall summary description of the data that represented the participants' own narrated descriptions of the conflict. Each of these thematic constructs remains significant and represents complex subject areas in their own right. Discussing them at this stage of the research journey demonstrates the different positionings of both groups and does not imply a social psychological reading of their significance. This mapping of what was considered to be relevant by the participants was a useful part of the research

Figure 3: Global, organising and base themes



Jewish participants with lived experience in Israel

C O N F I C T



Palestinian participants born in W Bank, Gaza, E.Jerusalem& Israel

C O N S E N S U S





journey, following a grounded theory approach. I subsequently chose to explore the role of the past in researching the present due to the way in which its role was depicted in developing perspectives. Without this first summary description, its significance as a subject to explore may not have been noted.

The two global themes, 'Consensus' and 'Conflict' are set out as antinomies where each can be observed through their dialogical relationship with each other that represent both polarising positions and those that remain more complex where a more polyphasic positioning is observed. The term conflict is given to represents difference and opposition, as exemplified here:

> *'In 1948 if they had accepted Israel they would have more land than there would ever have got in any peace agreement. I don't see any solution to the problem because the Arabs can't get rid of their resolution of destroying Israel and from the other side you don't see Israelis thinking that this land belongs to the Arabs. And therefore they should occupy it. And as long as we have the two groups holding that kind of things for years, we have a conflict.'* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The term consensus is applied to loosely signify a sharing of common attributes, as exemplified below:

> *'I would make this into a state of its citizens not just a Jewish state. That is what I would do and give the Arabs equal rights as citizens and dismantle those privileges that are given at the moment only to Jews.'* Male, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

These two quotes underlie the bipolarity of the Jewish Israeli participants who tended to take an either / or position. This bi-polarity tended to follow group positions of right /left or hawk/dove as discussed by Helman (2002), with exceptions surrounding themes of security where more homogeneity was observed. The social representations of the Palestinian participants did not reflect any left/right polarity and were more homogenous. The examples below represent a general framing of conflict, as in the first quote, and that of consensus, in the second:

> *'They have all this power and they are destroying our lives, and women and children. You want to stop them but you cannot do anything. So that's why you don't accept what they're doing and you really hate them because, I mean, they're doing so many unacceptable things and that makes you think*

that we will never forget. We will never forgive them. It adds to the history of hatred and the conflict with them. It doesn't help. It widens the space.' Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

'There would be a general law for all people and there would be no division between the people, whether he's Jewish or Muslim or a Catholic or Christian under a universal law. If we all under the law we would be treated the same and have our rights. We could achieve this because that's what I grew up to believe.' Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

4.2.1. Base themes surrounding themes of conflict and consensus

The reporting and discussion of these themes are based on the organising and base themes as shown in Figure 1, under the subject headings as described. The base themes that stem from the organised themes are presented to explore the positionings of both groups, both within and between them. Quotes are given as examples that reflect social representations of conflict and consensus to demonstrate the rich array of data taken from the transcriptions of interviews. However, this does not assume that my interpretation of allying base themes under organising themes headings is the only one possible. For example, 'resistance' placed under an organising theme of 'ideology' could well have been placed under 'collective agency' as a form of collective action, yet by placing it under an overarching theme of 'ideology' this reflects the significance of resistance against Israeli hegemony that impacts an ideological thrust to counter balance this. The choice of placing base themes into an organising thematic structure allows a discussion to develop where classification within a thematic structure is a useful starting point, but this does not necessarily assume that a particular choice is the only one possible.

a) Themes of ideology

Social representation of both conflict and consensus contained themes of ideological positioning across both groups. Representations of nationhood and self-determination played a dominant role within the realms of conflict. Jewish Israeli nationalist representations centred on Zionism as a reason for the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 as a haven of peace and security for the Jewish people, as exemplified here:

'I think that 2000 years of exile has created a sort of deep structure leading to Zionism that was bubbling for years and years. All those messianic

hopes, hopes for a different life, different realities. They are so deeply embedded.' Male, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

'I think it was during my youth groups when I bought into the Zionist myth. I think being aware and being born into the shadow of the Holocaust and it made some kind of difference that we needed a homeland. The whole Israeli was sold to me as a refuge for Jews against anti-Semitism and this was the place that we needed for own survival.' Female, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

The embeddedness of Zionist ideology is portrayed above as a necessary and valued factor in attachment to the national cause. A safe and secure homeland stood at the root of many Jewish narratives about Israel, yet at the same time, for those who suggested that the root of the conflict lay in the occupation of the Other, a pursuit of the Zionist dream without this recognition would leave the conflict intractable.

'We were very very Zionist. Very much 'love your country, love your land'. We thought we were going to be driven into the sea.' Female, 50's. Jewish Israeli.

'It's a racist colonialist ideology. At the period it was set up, at the time when the British Empire and colonialism was rife across the world, and Herzl saw that because of anti-Semitism the Jews needed a homeland, and he wasn't even a religious person … 'Israel really wants to be part of the western world. It's like, this tiny country and it's really trying to be part of the Western world and in contradiction to the neighbourhood that they are located in. One way to separate from the neighbours is to reject them so much. To hate.' Male, 40's Jewish Israeli.

The trajectory for the Jewish Israeli participants, who positioned themselves along a more consensus positioning, included social representations of Jewish responsibility for changing the course of the conflict by accepting the asymmetry and the need to end the occupation. Some talked of how they had transformed their thinking after they had found that their initial Zionist beliefs contradicted their own Jewish values.

'For me being an Israeli means responsibility, it means having privileges at the expense of non Jewish people, both in Israel and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. It means that if I don't have responsibility, then I am passive, then I am part of the on going problem that will not have its own solution until people are active. And so for me it's a responsibility.' Female, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

These participants who followed such a trajectory also talked of universal justice and human rights through legal channels such as the United Nations and other official bodies. This mirrored the Palestinians whose positioning towards consensus also centred on the importance of human rights through an international legal framework. For them, any entry into the global human rights arena would require international assistance, due to Palestine being barred from a seat and a voice at the United Nations. The UN General Assembly resolution 67/19 was passed in November 2012 accepting Palestine as a non-member observer state after failing to win enough votes to become a full member. This route was one that was discussed by many of the Palestinian participants who reflected a non-violent resistance strategy.

> *'I don't believe that violence is the solution. Even at a certain age I thought we could coexist, which is why I took the human rights path... the language of human rights that everyone is using now is within the NGOs. Documenting what the Israelis are doing, what's going on, and we call it non-violent resistance. It would be like more acceptable to people in the West because nobody likes the language of violence. I don't think it's something that gives a good image for us, so hopefully following this line, as non-violent resistance I can do something with that.'* Male, 20's West Bank, Palestinian.

The Palestinian ideological themes were set within a nationalist agenda centred on the loss of their homeland for the advantage of the Other as exemplified here:

> *'I can't deny their right to live in this piece of land. The only problem we have, the Palestinians have with Israeli government is the state politicians who represent the brutal policies of controlling of Palestinians, not only land but to the right to live in peace, the right to have their own state.'* Male, 20's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The sense of injustice was particularly felt.

> *'There should be a reason that justifies Israel to continue their, settlement expansion, to continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue with all its policies against Palestinians. What is the reason? What is the facts for them that justifies them to go on with their colonial policies?'* Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

Although none of the Palestinian participants expressed a personal religious perspective, there was some discussion of the role of religion. Some felt that Islam was becoming an increasingly significant force of political strength, particularly in Gaza, as a result of oppression and hardship, changing the meaning of religious faith from one of spirituality to one that played an increasingly important part of their lives within some communities.

> *'When the Israelis attack more and more, and so people begin to think that the West is not responding to it by any reaction to the occupation. Suddenly everybody became religious and especially in the first intifada. If you look at the images you would hardly see any women wearing a hijab or anything, but suddenly everyone became religious. I don't know why, maybe they felt it was really hopeless. Maybe because Hamas was created in 1991, and that has had a lot of influence on people as well. And they convince them that that we should be more religious, we should stick to our religion, this is like a crusade war and so people think more about religion. It's like a kind of reaction. And it's become like a phobia and people think they should defend their religion. And so it changes from everyone is attacking me to everyone is attacking religion.'* Male, 20's, E. Jerusalem, Palestinian.

Ideological themes remained central to representations of consensus for both groups where a sense of universal justice, within a framework of human rights, took centre stage. A difference of their trajectories is significant, as the power asymmetry remained inherent within their representational fields.

The boundaries between the groups tightened and hardened when themes of nationhood, leading to the taking of 'sides' in an ingroup / outgroup dimension, were discussed; and loosened when both groups discussed looking beyond the present impasse. Both groups suffered through the impasse of intractability and yet at the same time, the positioning was not held to be finite, but open to possibility and change. However, within the Jewish Israeli group, heterogeneity was visible across a diverse representational field, whilst for the Palestinians this was much less evident. A more homogenous stance, with representation reflecting their asymmetric status that had the effect of tightening boundaries between the groups further was noted. The role of asymmetry is discussed later in this chapter.

b) Themes of security

The most impermeable boundary between the groups was around themes of security. Fear, through memories of the Holocaust and thousands of years of stigma and anti-Semitism as well as suicide and rocket on civilians in Israel by Palestinian militants, was never far from any conversation with Jewish Israeli's from all political persuasions. Their deepest fear was expressed in social representations of the annihilation of the state of Israel, as in the following quotes:

> *'Things like suicide bombings in Israel they are fading now but nonetheless they were pretty horrendous I would never say they weren't. A kind a hardening of, it's hard to explain. It's the fear barrier ... I am frightened that you are taking my land away from me.'* Female, 40's Jewish Israeli.

> *'The name of the game is fear. If you go to Nazareth you are going to be killed. if you go to Bethlehem you're going to be killed and therefore you don't go there. It's nothing to do with reality'* Male, 30's Jewish Israeli.

The Palestinian participants described social representations of fear of aggression by Israeli soldiers, narratives of being personally abused by them, and witnessing violence during armed conflict in the Gaza wars (2008/9, 2014) and the second intifada in the West Bank (2001-2005) when the death and injured toll was high within the Palestinian population. Again, it was the asymmetric relationship that was felt be responsible for the disparity in experiences of direct conflict. These actions appeared to increase social representations of hostility and hatred in the Palestinian group reflecting their weakened status.

> *'I cannot say whether it's fear or something else that comes from their history in Europe - resentment, anger with Europe or that dislike and hatred of people who are not Jewish. Fear is something that you feel when you have immediate threat somehow to you, to your security or something. And they do perceive threat coming from the Palestinians. Well, if you go and kill somebody's children, you might be scared of them, that they'll come back to you and take revenge or something. So they put themselves in this relationship with Palestinians taking their land, destroying their homes, put them in jail and so obviously they know what they are doing. So they know that these people have it in for them because they are angry with them. And I think that's more of the fear defining their fear. Because it's a projection it's imagining that this person will want revenge, will want to come back because of all the nasty stuff you did to them. So I think maybe*

more, I believe that is more about the genuine source of fear.' Female, 40's, West Bank, Palestinian.

This long quote can be interpreted in many ways but as a concrete example of a rejoinder to the Jewish Israeli sense of fear, it encapsulates the gaps across the groups in terms of positioning of the Other. The quote also demonstrates the significance of the dialogical relationship with the Other, exemplifying what can be described as a co-constructed reality that serves to develop a narrative based on their intersubjectivity. The dialogical relationship across the groups is the focus of the next empirical chapter and will be explored further then.

The descriptions of social representations of security were homogenous within each group. All the Palestinians and the left wing Jewish [Israeli's] talked of an end to violence as it appeared to them to haves served no useful purpose, as discussed previously. However, those right wing Jewish [Israelis's] from a right wing stance were more inclined to discuss representations that reflected justification of violence as a way of keeping Israel safe from her perceived enemies.

c) Themes of collective positioning

The contrast between both groups' social representations of collective positioning highlights both impermeable boundaries and those where a softening of boundaries, and even a crossing of them, becomes within the realms of possibility. When discussing conflict, the Palestinians' representations centred on oppression and non-recognition leading to a loss of their individual and collective dignity, as they perceived the relationship across the boundary as one where they had been dehumanised. By holding on to their historic Arab traditions through stories of their homeland pre 1948, their positioning as a people without a homeland was perceived as temporary, and that one day they would be free to follow their own destiny through self-determination or in a bi-national state for both peoples, as described here:

'My opinion is that two states is a little bit hard to achieve for different reasons and maybe one state is easier to achieve. There are many reasons, for example, I believe if we have a justice and everybody gets his right we will be able to live together since we don't have a divided country by

geographic or mountains or something to isolate us that would be Israel or Palestine. it doesn't matter where you go, as long as we have our security for everybody and the law.' Male, 20's West Bank, Palestinian.

For the Jewish Israelis, social representations of Jewishness within a Jewish state were central to their existence in Israel, in a safe homeland free from tyranny and persecution, where their victim status following the atrocities of the Holocaust could be laid to rest. The boundary admitted of no softening as non-Jews were not welcome in such an enclosed secure environment, and so their presence would forever remain a threat.

'So the minute you're going to insist on the law of return there's no way, as you'll get them all back in the Arab villages and the Jewish state will evaporate in thirty or fifty years. And this is why Netanyahu has said that they have to accept the Jewish state or that's the end of Zionism. The old movement of Zionism was to create a Jewish state. And if you come and say that it's not important that it's not categorised as Jewish or that the majority are not Jewish people, That's the end of Zionism.' Male, 50's Jewish Israeli

However, representations that reflected a collective positioning towards consensus, demonstrated not only a looser boundary but also one in which the boundary could be crossed. Some Jewish Israeli participants also talked about their shared past as a conduit for future relationships, co-existence and even a bi-national state, where Jewishness would no longer be considered a requisite for nationality. This approach was felt to be the only viable alternative to a conflict that would provide a just and equitable solution as exemplified below:

'I think a lot of Arabs feel, they want to stay put, they want peace. My dream would be that it would be one country for Israel and Palestinians and the West Bank. It would all be one and that's my dream. And those who live outside would have to apply to come. It wouldn't have to be automatic right of return. It's a lot to me, from my background, from the Holocaust. I love the feeling that I have Israeli nationality and I would never give it up ... The word bi-national state is something I would never state in front of my family. But for me that would be great.' Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

Further, a shared cultural heritage across entities such as cuisine and music was already felt to be anchored across both groups. The Palestinian participants who discussed representations of collective positioning towards consensus similarly talked of a bi-national state, again giving the example of a

shared past over centuries of living peacefully together that would lay the foundations of a future relationship based on co-existence. However, the balance within the representational field of collective positioning for both sides, and particularly the Palestinian participants, was more towards representations of conflict rather than consensus. A participant from Gaza and another from East Jerusalem demonstrate their sense of being stigmatised in a no win situation.

> *'Most people in Gaza have been treated as some sort of contagion that needs to be contained. They have been deprived of anything related to just being humans. They have been deprived of their rights, they have been deprived of their humanity. So how are you going to make people like that interact with people who are supposedly normal, who have lived in a very stable society?' Female, 40's, Gaza, [Palestinian]*

> *'They don't trust us, they just think that were going to do something bad. I think they think we're violent, but at the same time you see Israelis when they don't differentiate between you and other people, and so you are seen as a radical Palestinian. I think if you are treated the same and they humiliate you and treat you like an animal than of course you're going to say 'Fuck this, who cares? That's why I'm sort of like I am where I am.'* Male, 20's East Jerusalem, Palestinian.

Some Jewish Israeli participants felt the sense of intractability across closed boundaries strongly, as illustrated here:

> *'Collective identities are constructed around opposition to the other. We have to define ourselves by the enemies and everyone who doesn't think so is weak.'* Male, 30's Jewish Israeli.

And yet others demonstrated an alternative path where the softening the boundaries between the groups was more than imagined.

> *'Living reciprocally is the way. It means living shoulder to shoulder. Not just co-existence but really living together and looking in the same direction.'* Female, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

d) Themes of collective agency

Finally, themes of collective agency demonstrated the intergroup asymmetric relationship. Racist overtones were discussed by some Jewish Israeli

participants, whose preference for a Jewish only state was referred to, as exemplified here:

> *'They treat us like animals. And they treat themselves like animals and their own kids. And there is a saying that we will have peace with them when they start loving their children more than they hate us ... the way they behave I don't think of them as people. Because people don't behave like that. And I know they see us as probably the same, but like I said I wish everyone would let others live and leave them alone. I of course, I don't have to like them but I'd much rather hate them and have them out of our lives, you know.'* Female, 20's, Jewish Israeli.

The Palestinian participants discussed representations that demonstrated their lack of agency whilst living under an occupied more powerful Other:

> *'I feel that they are occupiers, they are oppressors and they also lie. They are all from different countries and now they have more rights than me. I feel that they don't belong to the country. That's the general idea they are occupiers. I do know some Israeli people and they are really nice but that's en masse what it feels like.'* Female 20's, E Jerusalem, Palestinian.

However, a positioning that also generated representations of consensus was evident in the data with both groups acknowledging the Other, and the Jewish Israeli group showing signs of empathy and identification that portrayed a willingness to be open to facilitate change.

> *'When I lived in Israel it was different. Here I can see it in a different way because I have met Palestinians, can see what's going on, hear their own personal stories. And I can identify with that.'* Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The Palestinian group further discussed representations surrounding the need for the input from international agencies, as they remained powerless without such an intervention. Some spoke of the need for a 'normal' life free from the strains of occupation and conflict. The experience of life in a liberal western democracy had been welcomed, not only as an escape from conflict but also as an opportunity to reflect on it. Certainly by leaving the specific geo-political space of the conflict, different representational fields had been opened for both groups to consider.

'I've always had to kind of think that we do have a right to the land, and the Jewish people claim they have a right to be there and in a way I've always chosen to stick with the international law, and perspective ... As long as you respect other people's rights, and I'm talking about basic human rights, and you are not infringing that, then you can practice your own religion, atheism or whatever you want to do. Nobody will come bashing that and tell you why you are doing that.' Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The framework of the organising and base themes was a useful exercise in this first stage of the research journey in order to explore imagined boundaries. By setting them out in the way recommended by Attride-Stirling (2001) I was able to become familiar with the data and acknowledge the inter and intra groups' differences and commonalities. Exploring the themes gave the opportunity to describe the conflict as perceived by the participants in general terms, initially as a sketch waiting for more detail to portray more depth and allow a more focused and explanatory picture to emerge. I was able to understanding the perceived asymmetry, which will be discussed further in the next section. I then consider how a thematic approach relates to the literature of conflict, before highlighting the role of the past in understanding the present.

4.2.2. Asymmetry and power relationships

The social representations that were discussed throughout the interviews demonstrated an asymmetrical relationship of control and power affecting group boundary formation and development. The presence of asymmetry across the groups is central to the Palestinians' narratives and resulting thematic constructs. Although violent conflict has led both groups to perceive the Other as the enemy, with representations around themes of mutual destruction, this does not assume military or political equality. Israel's military capacity is far superior to that of Palestinian resistance or militant groups. There is no formal military capability in place to protect the Palestinian people due to their occupied and / or controlled status. Powell and Maoz (2014) argued that greater military power and greater political authority does not necessarily lead to an empowered status; rather, it may lead to an even greater drive to suppress any potential risk, even from relatively weak parties. Each group assesses their weak/strong antinomy in different ways. The weaker group might fear total domination and so act on that by contesting and resisting it (Maoz, 2010, 2011), whilst stronger parties,

although less fearful of domination, can become more sensitive to levels of threat and so become motivated to act before any potentiality can be realised (Powell and Maoz, 2014). The Palestinian participants discussed their relationship with the Other in terms of a sense of powerlessness, not only when under military attack, but also in their lived experience of subordination, humiliation and loss of collective and personal dignity. The Palestinians' descriptions were often based on the consequences of the asymmetry and its effect on their lives, whilst the Jewish Israeli participants described ways of justifying the asymmetry, for example through themes of threat and security. This does not suggest that a comparison is not feasible because of the said asymmetry. It is the space that stands between the groups' sets of perceptions that will be highlighted and discussed, so as to explore the permeability of their imagined intergroup boundaries.

4.2.3. The role of themes in conflict research

The discussion of themes evident in these interviews with those with a lived experience of conflict has been a useful exercise. It has provided an overall summary of where the two groups position themselves, both in relation to their own group and that of the Other. It has provided a base from which to explore the conflict further by the identification of thematic subject areas that were deemed to be central to the conflict. Themes of ideology, security, collective positioning and agency, set within the conflict context of asymmetry, affected each set of organising and base themes.

The social psychology of intractable conflict has been discussed along the lines of an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013), where the justness of ones' own goals, the delegitimisation of the Other, and the influence of self-imposed victimhood, all play a significant role. I found examples of this in my data. The rules of behaviour that reflect a national societal belief system can guide behaviour and actions that are intrinsically value laden (Kohlberg, 1984) and where collective emotional orientations remain paramount (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Bizumic et al (2013) surveying over 4,000 Americans and Danes, reported that ideological beliefs were a significant factor when exploring attitudes towards peace and war following a similar thread found in my study.

Attitudes towards peace centred on ideological themes such as egalitarianism and empathy, international harmony and equality. Conversely attitudes towards war were influenced by right-wing tendencies, national loyalties, national security and defence against threats, right-wing tendencies, national loyalties, national security and defence against threats influenced attitudes towards war. These results support the importance of ideological beliefs and values in a war / peace continuum, (Braithwaite, 2009). The concept of a 'lived ideology' and 'intellectual ideology' (Billig et al, 1988) is useful in interpreting the data, as each participant's narrative reflected his or her own experience of living within an ideological framework - in whatever form it was perceived by the individual. Billig (1987) argues further that individuals within a 'lived ideology' engage in a narrative that takes on counter positions in order to arrive at a particular point of view. By using open ended interviewing, where my participants were encouraged to reflect on their own and the Other's positionings, I have been able to map out these themes that appeared central to the conflict. Themes of ideology intersected with those that reflected these positions in terms of agency and security in a framework of intergroup asymmetry. This has enabled me to consider multiplicity across the social constructs of conflict, as reflected by the by the participants, where *a priori* categorisation might inhibit such an approach.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often discussed in terms of essentialised constructs based on religion, ethnicity and culture and yet the boundaries across the groups remain murky and unclear (Hallward, 2007). By exploring boundaries between Israeli and Palestinian peace activists it was found that there were some common trajectories based on a just peace:

> 'Boundaries are differentially permeable to different groups of people … members challenge official boundaries imposed by the state and seek to reconstruct boundaries of belonging, one that allows for membership of multiple categories.' (Hallward, 2007, p.99).

Although peace activists form a small minority in Israel and Palestine, the example of these groups show that impermeable boundaries that separate and homogenise their societies into perceived monolithic categories of Other and Self are being resisted. Social categorisation works to simplify the social world, and so can also inhibit further exploration through the reification and essentialisation

of social groups (Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012). This is particularly significant where conflict is often represented by the 'good guys' against the 'bad guys' (Moghaddam, Harré and Lee, 2008) and yet as this chapter has shown, a variety of thematic positions have been discussed that widen the discussion of conflict to include how boundaries are imagined by both groups, often in quite complex ways. One way, which heralded further interpretation, was the role of the past in the coming to terms with the present. All participants spontaneously talked of the past in justifying a present positioning. The following section explores this in greater depth to take into account the theoretical journey of the thesis.

4.3. From the past to the future via the present

Narratives about a collective past were often spoken of spontaneously across both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian participants. This appeared to serve the purpose of placing a participant in a particular position within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - often as a means of justifying that positioning.

> *'They claim the land because they were the generation who was born on the land. You know nobody actually promised them on their Bible - the Koran obviously doesn't say anything about Israel. The Palestinian generation was born there so they have the same claim as I have, but we historically and biblically have a claim.'* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

> *'I went to Jaffa, which is very beautiful, and there you see the parks. And I think 'Oh my people - what they used to have.' It's kind of sad. There is a sort of evidence there, we used to... we used to live there you know... and it's part of, that's the reason, like most of the people do not have to go to the past. But in our case we don't have this. And that's a problem. We know that. That we see the past and what happened in the past and we go back there."* Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The above quotes contain themes of 'what they used to have'; unresolved loss for the Palestinian participant and a justification for the claim of the land through historical biblical myths for the Jewish Israeli participant. The number of references to the past was such that it merited further exploration to discover the relevance of these narratives in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. This can show how historical representations continue to develop group relationships, build or undermine intergroup and intragroup solidarity, cohesion

and identification. This section explores first, the significant role of perceived past events in the public consciousness and second, on a more theoretical level, the relationship between the role of narratives and social psychology - with particular reference to the conceptual ties with SRT when exploring a representational field. This is discussed in relation to how the roots and history of this conflict not only remain in the present representational field, but also act as a mediator for future action.

4.3.1. The significance of interpreting the past: what did or didn't happen

The significance of the past in studying the present was introduced in Chapter two to review the literature related to conflict research and will be further discussed after I report on the empirical findings concerning historical representations. The motivation for the constructions of perspectives of the past includes building and rebuilding political legitimacy, resisting criticism to authorise the preferred version of specific points of history, and demonstrating a political reality (Misztal, 2003). Political events hold the capacity to acquire the simplicity of essences and myths that can organise the world as 'it establishes a blissful clarity' (Barthes, 1957 / 1993 p. 143). War can be glorified within the collective memory of victorious nations (Olick, 2003) opening up the willingness to fight in the future where the interpretation of history can be indistinguishable from the propaganda of the victors (Shlaim, 2009). The connection between the significance of the past when discussing the present can be explored further through the processes of objectification and anchoring, to demonstrate developing social representations over time.

4.3.2. Objectification and anchoring, from experience to collective memory

The concepts of objectification and anchoring, introduced in Chapter 3, demonstrates how new phenomenon can be incorporated, constructed and reconstructed into developing social representations in order to denote new justifications or ideas within a prevailing cultural tradition. The significance of creating new systems of knowledge shared across a community is only useful if preceding social representations, that have motivated events of the past, can be identified in order to understand a present perception of reality. This understanding is particularly significant in conflict research if both groups reach

a point where negotiation of their relationship is based on the hope of a more peaceful future.

'Objectification saturates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, turns it into the very essence of reality' (Moscovici, 2000, p. 49) and so transforms the abstract social object into one that is considered to be a more concrete. As these newly objectified representations become more familiar, they become reified within the community as they swirl into a developing conversation within the representational field. From this objectified reified base, further related perceptions, ideas and other social objects can be anchored. As time passes, these representations can become embedded within the particular cultural domain and become potentially resistant to change. As semantic barriers (Gillespie 2008) they serve to inhibit alternative representations from entering the field. This fashioning of a perceived reality is significant in the study of conflict research as it enables the researcher to explore a kernel of present reality located in the past and then show how representations relate to key themata. An understanding of these processes and knowledge of their contents would be required if both parties wished to negotiate a path from less conflict to more consensus. At the same time, these developing representations can also serve to establish and extend a positional ideological and political rhetoric leading to a hegemonic positioning by the more powerful group (Nicholson, 2016). However, representational fields also hold the possibility of being contested when competing constructions can lead to splintering, where some representations are recognised as being more legitimate than others (Jovchelovitch, 2012). Nations, as any other social community, continually create their own histories and interpret them to reflect a desired positioning (Billig, 1995).

For the Jewish Israeli participants, the collective memory of the Holocaust, when half the world's Jewry was exterminated, remains in the present day collective consciousness. The narratives of the present contained these narratives of the past. In this following example, a reference to the Holocaust positions the speaker as one who believed that Israel stands for a 'homeland' or safe haven, free from the fear of further ethnic cleansing in the future:

'I was about ten and in primary school and we had a questionnaire leading up to 'What do you think is the consequence of the Holocaust?' And they didn't give you an answer and through a series of questions it led to a narrowing down to: 'An establishment of the state of Israel.' That's your answer. A homeland for the Jewish people. And everybody saw it and the turning point was the Holocaust.' Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

This narrative reflects how the Holocaust was objectified as an everlasting memorial to those who lost their lives so tragically into one of 'security in statehood', representing a perceived fundamental need for a secure homeland within one's own nation state. And further, that it was anchored across domains of suffering and solidarity of the Jewish cultural community throughout the centuries of living in the diaspora.

'My family's origin is Yemen... they believe that Israel is the only place that people can live. They suffered from hostility, not on a daily basis but, they always dreamt about coming to Israel, to the Holy Land, not so much about being extreme about it, but it's about yearning. Every aspect of their lives basically was directed to that point.' Female, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

Over time, the social representations surrounding the Holocaust have evolved, demonstrating this original objectification and anchoring. Sonnenschein et al (2010) explored identity in terms of an existential threat, between Jewish and Arab university students in Israel during an encounter group. The Israeli Jewish students discussed identity in terms of their perceived threat to Jewish hegemony, and the threat to the moral worth of Israeli Jews' national identity, rather than the real threat from the Palestinians. In Sonnenschein's study, the Holocaust was seen as an eternal experience leading to the perception of the conflict with the Palestinians as a continuation of that.

'I am a Jew, meaning that my family went through the Holocaust and we are a persecuted people everywhere and we have to have somewhere to be. The Holocaust for me is my identity; it is almost the identity of a Holocaust survivor… I was born into a reality where all kinds of nations hate me… the whole world hates us… I need a strong, strong place to have as a home.' (Sonnenschein et al 2010, p. 51)

These objectified representations anchored in the need for security in a safe homeland have continued to flourish. They can be discussed in terms of the organising themes of security where the insecurity of the past remains firmly

based in the present representational field. The question of uncertainty in the future relates to the perceived continued need for a secure and protective state.

> *'I was living in Miami and there were lots of people with tattoos from the concentration camps. My grandparents were there. And these people are dying. Most of them will be gone in the next ten or twenty years. Once they have gone then what? So what you do? Because that's why you need a strong state of Israel, so it never happens again.'* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The degree of reification of representations within this thematic framework reflects the on going fear of extinction that has not only remained embedded within the community but has been transferred to another community who had no involvement in the Holocaust:

> *'We are encouraged to believe that the Arabs are the new Nazis, that the same teachings of the third Reich that they really do constitute both a security threat and ideological threat.'* Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

In contrast, the Palestinian participants' narratives describe their own version of events surrounding 1948 signifying their own displacement elsewhere. This has been objectified as a tragedy, and referred to by Palestinians as 'The Nakba', perceived as their homeland being taken by the Other's ethnic cleansing strategy. Those displaced, along with their dependents, described how they their fate remains inconclusive as they remain in waiting sixty years later. These social representations have led to narratives anchored in terms of their collective positioning, where they remain politically and structurally unrecognised, oppressed and lacking in dignity.

> *'The thing is, and I know many other Palestinians feel so bad about what happened to them. But what makes us, makes this whole connection, that ever since they came to occupy Palestine, that every time you hear anything, they always bring the Holocaust card. That has made us a little fed up. Not that we don't feel sorry for them, or we didn't feel sympathy for what happened. Ok. But the fact that we have been paying the price for them since then is not fair.'* Female, 40's, West Bank, Palestinian.

Representations are further anchored in the Palestinians' sense of victimhood and powerlessness, reflected in their present geo-political status of

being stateless through the actions of the Other with a loss of any national identification and positioning.

> *'So most people, all Arab people, they understand the Holocaust. They understand the consequences of that, right? The thing is, no-one will understand the Nakba. They say it's just because you want to revolt against the Israelis. But they don't understand ... they have Independence Day. So not only do you have to take that. That's like a rape, that they also accept the rape... It's in our psyche this whole Palestinian thing. And it goes from one generation to the next. Even if you're living as a second generation. I have friends who have been brought up and never visited Palestine in their lives, but they know everything'.* Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

References to the Bible, as in the quote at the beginning of this section, were often used to justify Israel's claim to the land. These representations were objectified as a form of unquestioned divine right, and anchored to beliefs that justify the right of a deity to define a legal status. As a further justification, the sale of land from the indigenous Palestinians to newly arrived Jewish immigrants in the years leading up to 1948, was anchored within a similar hegemonic framework but then related to a more modern concept of land ownership – that is, buying it from willing vendor through a legal process.

> *'It's the history behind it all. If you want to go back to that, we were there two to three thousand years before anyone else. It's a moot point but we were there first . It's really complicated. Because there was no Palestine, there was just a mandate given to the British to look after it.'* Female, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

> *'We were there 2000 years before them ... They lived on our land quite frankly and if you really want to go on about it we bought it back again two hundred years ago.'* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The acknowledgement of these justification representations is illustrated here as a narrative anchored in resignation of the positioning of the Other embedded and reified within their representational field:

> *'I remember a reporter coming to this guy, a Haredim Jew. And he asked him, he said to him - you know you're in Hebron (*a town in the West Bank*) with 120,000 Palestinians and 400 settlers, what are you doing here? And he goes to him - Abraham promised this to Hebron 3000 years ago. And that was his answer. I'm always talking about these arguments, they keep*

coming up and I can tell you with my eyes closed.' Female, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The boundary between the groups in the example above is both a collective and a security thematic positioning, beginning over two thousand years ago. It began in a loss of dignity to the Jewish people who were 'sent into exile' and then returned in order to flee persecution and destruction after the Holocaust. This is mirrored in the Palestinian indigenous population being forced to flee from their homeland. For the ancestors of Palestinians displaced during the conflict in 1948, their refugee status remains objectified as a people without nationhood, and is anchored in a loss of dignity at their perceived loss at the hands of a powerful Other. These narratives, embedded with the base themes of loss of collective agency, reflect further the anchoring of family traditions of collective songs of mourning as a way of keeping a possible future narrative alive.

'I am a refugee actually. I remember my grandfather talking about his village - it´s called Shafiar – it's like 30 km north of Gaza. There are three small villages next to each other. So he kept telling me the stories and singing the songs and the day they left, when they left the village. And my father as well. And they encountered different refugees in different countries.' Female, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

The Palestinian participants narrate their representations based on themes of oppression and asymmetry.

'Most people in Gaza have been treated as some sort of contagion that needs to be contained. They have been deprived of anything related to just being humans. They have been deprived of their rights, they have been deprived of their humanity. So how do you like going to make people like that interact with people who are supposedly normal who have lived in a very stable society?' Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

Social representations surrounding themes of oppression, with a strong desire for both an individual and collective dignity, were central to this representational field. Although these narratives were born of the past they are still instilled within present day life. These historical representations of loss continue to be anchored within the individual and the community's memories of

their displacement and statelessness, permeating the present and future - as illustrated here by a young man not born until many years after 1948.

> *'And we are thinking that being Palestinian is one part that came before '48, to keep and protect your personhood as you are Palestinian. Of course, the conflict makes it more important for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as Palestinians. It means a lot for me. I'm sure if I, for example, was born in some double nationality, or another, that is not so important that I am from where or I belong to, but not so important as when I am saying that for me, my identity is Palestinian.'* Male, 30's West Bank, Palestinian.

This young man's assertion demonstrates a direct relationship between the need for a continued sense of belonging to his past roots, as part of his present positioning, and the significance of the conflict on that challenge, both as an individual and a community. This suggests a denial of an identity born of the conflict lying within these themes of oppression under the guise of loss and gain for the Other. The events leading up 1948, their consequences, and their subsequent interpretations by both groups, show clearly the difficulties of crossing group boundaries without some recourse to these historical representations.

4.4. Discussion: The reified world of historical narratives

The narratives quoted in this chapter have been chosen to illustrate how objectification and anchoring of social representations have developed across the groups. They reflect reified narratives that have become part of their common sense knowledge systems, where imaginary boundary positions are explored. This relates to the concept of narratives, as suggested by Jovchelovitch (2012), which cannot be attributed to the stories of one individual. Instead narratives contain slices of social and historical life; they produce and re-produces mythologies and traditional practices as collective memories that remain embedded within institutionalised rituals. Bar-Tal (2014) argued that constructions of the past feed into societal beliefs during intractable conflicts; they then take their cue from the social representations that are anchored and communicated within the informal and social narratives of the individual, and by formal discourse through the media, education, and governing bodies. The perspective of the past builds and rebuilds a political legitimacy (Misztal 2003) in

order to resist criticism, to authorise a preferred version of specific points of history and to institute a particular political reality.

4.4.1. Kernels and meta narratives

The fashioning of representational field where objectification and anchoring of representations of conflict have become central to representational themes between the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups, as illustrated in this chapter. Their development has served to strengthen a positional rhetoric, narrated from the past to justify the present and culturally embedded reflecting how "nations continually reproduce themselves as nation states in an international world of nations" (Tileageă 2014, p.113). The notion of a kernel [2] refers to the original development of the social representations forming foundational themes is suggested as being interesting to conflict research. By exploring and identifying the intersecting kernels of both groups to understanding the core of the divisions, a way forward towards consensus and away from conflict can at least be imagined. The idea of a kernel was first mooted by Moscovici and Vignaux (2000) to reflect an underpinning that stems from language and linguistic traces, perceived as ideas and representations. These traces can be filtered through the discourse of others, and are created and preserved within the community; hence the contextual meaning extends beyond any particular individual. The kernel is set within the relevant themata, where both knowledge and experience constitute a particular foundation. The concept of themata as a development from discussing a more general thematic background will be discussed in the following empirical chapter, Chapter 5.

The idea of a foundational base has also been suggested by others when discussing historical narratives. Lázló (1997), for example, used the term 'frozen historical stories' where, 'the culture communicates to its members the possible set of story skeletons" (p. 70) whilst Wertsch (2008) referred to a cognitive narrative template that emerges from different interpretations of history that become conductors of collective communication affecting individual and group public discourse and dialogue. Bruner (1990) referred to this similarly with the

[2] [2]Mosovici and Vignaux (2000) name this as both a figurative kernel and a semantic kernel. For simplicity I have used the term kernel without any prefix.

concept of a shared cultural toolkit made up from inferences from such sources as the media, formal education, public holidays and family communications collected over time. At the same time other scholars have used the term 'master narrative' to denote base themes that stand as a positioning device for a particular purpose. Bar-Tal (2014) defined a master narrative as a cluster of beliefs that is applicable in the context of intractable conflict, and which superimpose and support sets of positions. Hammack (2010) used the term tragic master narrative to represent the positioning of loss and displacement of Palestinian youth living under occupation. Tileageă (2008) also used the term when discussing the Romanian revolution in 1989 to denote political strategies related to category membership. Wertsch (2002) suggested that these templates become cultural tools that continue to be shaped as people continually reflect on past representations mediated by present day events. Olick (1999) added that cultural tools don't only reflect group solidarity, but are instrumental in developing group formation. Collective memories can attempt to establish an essential truth (Novick, 1999) by detaching from it any historical complexity that would require multiple perspectives as, 'it is impatient with ambiguities of any kind that reduce events to mythic archetypes' (p.4). These truths can then become resistant to change as those with political power may want to preserve these underlying narrative templates for their own ambitions. Where prevailing memories become an active reconstruction of the past (Tileageă, 2008) they lead to developing social representations where individuals are, 'saturated by the implicit and explicit presence of others relations' discursive and dialogical resources, narrative tools and wider social frameworks of meaning making' (p.111). Using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example, Bar-Tal (2000) suggested that a societal ethos continually re-constructs historical patterns through a selective interpretive manner, in order to provide legitimacy. This is similar to Liu and Lázló (2007) who use the term 'charter', borrowed from dynamic systems theory, to explain a dependence on certain conditions for collective actions; and also refers to the significance of historical representations in justifying societal positioning.

These theoretical positions can be understood in relation to my own data from those who have had a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The participants' historical narratives have provided a rich source of material to demonstrate a plethora of different positions between the groups. Both groups were familiar with these narrative templates and used them as a positioning tool for their own perspective or as an alternative one that strays away from a particular template, for example:

> *'Many many Israelis will argue that there is no occupation, that we didn't occupy anything. It's written in the Bible, yes. It's written in the Bible or because when Israelis bought land from the Arabs in Jaffa and Tel Aviv. They are saying they wanted to sell and if you decided in 47 then it's their problem. And people will find thousands of reasons that there is no occupation. There is a problem. There is a conflict. If you're not going to listen to the other side, if you're not going to think, it's not going to change anything*.' Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The concept of a kernel has been useful when discussing historical narratives. First, conceptually it adds to the research that uses terms such as a master narrative, frozen stories, cultural tools and templates. Through these prisms, collective belief systems can be explored and described, not only within the groups but through a dialogical relationship with the Other. By defining how these kernels have developed through objectification and anchoring, becoming culturally embedded, can show how imagined boundaries between the groups can harden. Conversely, kernels that reflect contesting social representations and highlight the possible permeability of boundaries that may result in an alternative positioning, can be explored.

4.5. Conclusion

This first empirical chapter outlined the foundation of the thesis by exploring the significance of the conflict on the lives of those who had a lived experience of it. By using an open interview style that allowed each participant to narrate their own perceptions of themselves and the Other, a rich and substantive data set was created. With the assistance of NVivo, an array of categories was established in order to start the process of coding the data into global, organising and base themes. The results of this were shown diagrammatically to demonstrate how each group positioned itself in relation to itself and the Other. Quotes taken from the data exemplified the meaning and standing of these portrayals and accounts of their experiences. Many were discussed as social representations that had been

communicated within the communities and that also related to their dialogical relationship with the Other. Of particular interest were the significant social representations about the past that affected their present positioning. This was explored further through the processes of objectification and anchoring to help understand how historical representations developed over time; representations that both presented a particular collective positioning and / or justified it in relation to the Other. The idea of a foundational kernel that stood at the base of the participants' understanding of the conflict was discussed, both as a descriptor and as a theoretical concept. It can serve to start a conversation about how each side remains trapped by the foundations of the past and also how they might be open to alternative trajectories once the systems underlying these foundations have begun to shift. The asymmetry across the groups was demonstrated through these thematic pathways and was discussed in relation to the conflict.

From this base, my research journey returns to Israel to explore the dialogical relationship between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis who have co-existed along segregated trajectories since the birth of Israel in 1948. By examining how they work together as professional medics it will be possible to assess their working and social relationships, intersected with their foundational relationships, and explore further the imagined boundaries that may lie between them

5. Conflict and consensus as lived experience: Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics sharing their working lives

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter explored the social representations of those who had a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet at the time of the interview were far from it. An array of themes in the data was deemed to be significant to reflect both consensus and conflict across their representational fields. A notable finding was the role of the past when discussing the present as a prerequisite to looking to the future. Historical narratives from both groups, served as kernels of social knowledge that acted as justifications to verify a variety of group positions. This empirical chapter explores the experiences of group members (Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel) who trained and worked together as professional medics in Northern Israel where their lived experience was based on the structural segregation of the two communities closely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The concept of a kernel as a foundational entity is taken further to encompass the role of themata as a base from which to explore the social representations of a shared professional life amidst a conflicted relationship.

The seed of this research journey was planted during an interview with a Jewish Israeli young man living in the UK as part of the first study. He had commented that he would never live in the same block of flats where a Palestinian Israeli was known to be a resident and later commented that he would trust his life with a Palestinian Israeli doctor. When questioned on this anomaly he reported that although it appeared to be a contradiction, there was a shortage of doctors in Israel with Palestinian Israelis willing to fill the gap having been denied access to 'High Tech' professions due to the close relationship with the Israeli military and he suggested most Jewish Israelis felt this was a satisfactory compromise. By exploring these relationships, I wanted to consider the following questions:

- Do Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics satisfactorily work together on an equal footing in an environment that welcomes both groups to share a professional career path?

- How might this relationship differ outside this 'protected' professional environment in terms of mixed social friendships and perceived structural differences?
- What, if anything, had the effects of professional contact with the Other had on their social representations of the conflict?

The chapter is organised as follows: first, the sample and the research field is introduced. Second, the role of imagined boundaries is considered followed by a brief revisit of the contact research literature as discussed in Chapter 2. Third, the theoretical concept of themata is discussed as a development from the previous chapter where foundational myths were discussed alongside thematic processes. Fourth, the significance of intergroup relationships within the framework of themata is explored through a dialogical analysis to reflect on the social positionings of the polyphasic nature of communities in conflict. Finally, a discussion on how these findings relate to the research literature on contact is considered.

The sample consisted of twenty medics: seventeen doctors and three senior nurses divided between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis, as described in the methodology chapter, Chapter 3. Individual semi-structured interviews took place in northern Israel during October 2014. Recordings were all transcribed by me, apart from four that were transcribed by a professional transcription agency. Data was categorised with NVivo as a base from which to explore further analysis. Relevant themata were identified to broach the dialogical relationship in the contrasting environments of work and outside work.

5.2. Contact as a harbinger of acknowledging the Other

As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on contact has been central to any social psychological discussion about intergroup conflict. The core propositions have been well established in numerous empirical studies, (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux, 2005). Pettigrew and Troop (2006) carried out a meta-analysis of 515 studies involving more than 250,000 participants across many nationalities, reporting a significant reduction in prejudice following contact initiatives. This was even more pronounced when contact situations were made through group friendships in a context of equality. There were however,

marked differences between the perceptions of minority and majority groups suggesting that these groups might construe interaction between groups differently (Swart et al, 2011). For example, those from minority and disadvantaged groups were found to anticipate more prejudice against them than from those members of the majority group (Sellers and Shelton, 2003). Maoz (2011) addressed contact work over a period of twenty years between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis and found that particular ways of approaching encounter groups was key to more positive outcomes of reaching across group boundaries. Encounter groups that followed programmes based on the sharing of narratives, as well as those that offered possibilities of confrontation, were found to be more successful in softening boundaries. There has been very little research into exploring the effects of contact between Jewish and Palestinian professionals working together. However, Desivila (1998) explored professional relationships within a medical setting on levels of coexistence amongst Jewish and Palestinian Israeli physicians and nurses in Northern Israel and found that in their work setting, contact had resulted in satisfactory professional relationships with both colleagues and patients. At the same time, there were no perceived changes in any individual sense of national identity across the groups. The softening of boundaries where groups in conflict may reach a position of sharing a socio-cultural entity has been a major interest and concern of the contact hypothesis research.

5.2.1. Exploring themata across imagined boundaries

The concept of themata is particularly useful in conflict research as a tool for exploring intergroup imagined boundary lines, as discussed in Chapter 2. The significance of themata became evident in Chapter 4 after using a thematic structure as a base for analysis as suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001). The organising and base themes fell into opposing antinomies that reflected polarising consensus / conflict developments both within and between the groups. Not only did this reveal a continuum of positions but it also pointed to the underlying essences that were argued to be of significance to the conflict. This finding led to the exploration of finding a theoretical journey that echoed this. It was found in

the concept of themata, [3]both as a foundational process and as a starting point for a discussion of polarity. Moscovici (1993) coined the term themata as a way of identifying a kernel of knowledge to denote the structural components of a social representation that exists in the collective memory of society and through discourse, using oppositions as a way of generating meaning. Not only can we begin to trace the foundational myths of groups in conflict that may serve to encapsulate particular positions, but we can also use a continuum of positionings that represents knowledge systems that refer to 'culturally shared assumptions that underlie dialogue … where they rise from an un-reflected common sense thinking to the level of active consciousness,' (Marková et al 2007, p.135). The role of objectification and anchoring (see Chapter 3) demonstrated how new phenomenon can be incorporated, constructed and reconstructed into developing social representations to denote new justifications and ideas based on previous culturally shared phenomenon.

5.3. Shifting themata across group boundaries

Four themata were identified from this data base, two each for Jewish and Palestinian Israelis to encapsulate their positioning of self and Other in the context of their professional relationships with each other and their lives outside of it. The self / Other pairing is discussed in the same way as Marková (2003) discusses ego / Alter. There is no intention to change this from the original pairing as suggested by Marková (2003 but the self / Other combination matches the many other occasions throughout the thesis when the Other is cited. The contrast between an integrated community within their place of work (hospitals and clinics) and a more segregated one outside was found to be indicative of a relationship in tension. The four themata, as illustrated below, can be said to represent the tensions of their unresolved national aspirations that have been swirling in the representational field since 1948:

[3] Themata, as discussed, is presented in the plural as the minimum of a pair denoting more than one thema (singular) antinomy.

*Figure 4: Unresolved tensions in national conflic*t



The second themata (on the right above) approximately reflects their working relationships where inclusivity, recognition and equality reflect mutual respect for one another in a secure and professional environment. However, once outside this space, the opposing antinomy for each pair comes to the surface. A discussion around exclusivity in terms of a preferred Jewish space leading to a perceived non recognition by Palestinian Israelis where structural inequality becomes more prominent was manifest. At the same time, the Jewish Israeli vulnerability of threat of the Other was never far from the conversation. However, this does not suggest that the themata interpreted from that data reflected only polarising positions neatly divided as described above; it reflected a much more complex reality as the dialogicality of their perceived positionings was probed in more depth. It is within this boundary space between the two groups and across individuals' social representations that I can begin to interpret and discuss their relationships with the Other as a dialogical process that is related to its contextual phenomenon.

The section will be organised as follows: first, examples are given that illustrate imagined boundaries of similarity and difference across the groups. Data is then further examined within the themata constructs across the contexts of the professional medical environment versus the external one that reflects these dialogical relationships. A dialogical analysis within each set of themata is then carried out to explore the array of positionings across the representational

field. Each one is analysed in a slightly different manner to highlight possible ways of exploring the data that was of interest. Each example of text that was used in the analysis is quoted in full before the subsequent analysis, where parts of the same text are repeated to exemplify the point discussed.

5.3.1. They are people exactly like me

Interviews with participants reflected a positive and enriching working environment within their medical setting that appeared to cross imagined boundaries through professional contact and working alongside one another. In this context, themata that mirrored social representations of integration and mutual recognition, rather than segregation was evidenced:

> *'My colleagues, I think they are people exactly like me, and they are better than me because they have much more medical knowledge. The head of X is an Arab and is amazing, he's smart and clever and good and I never for a second think he treats me differently because I'm Jewish, or any of that. Never never, not even for second.'* Male medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

The satisfaction of being part of a highly trained team reaching senior positions was expressed, showing further the permeability of boundaries between them, reflecting a sense of acceptance and inclusiveness of the Other. This was often discussed as a working environment that emanated from an institutional base of an ethos of ethical governance in the Israeli medical world, where equal integration of staff across all cultural groupings was prominent.

> *'I think it was a difficult journey, not because I'm an Arab. It was a difficult journey because the journey I chose was difficult … I worked in this hospital which is doing its best to choose the best people, no matter where they came from – Arabs, Jews, new immigrants, everybody is nominated and appointed on their qualifications and of course to the best of the hospital and to the best of the Department. So my journey was difficult because I believe in science. We work together, we like each other on the level of the person and the family levels. We interact nicely and are very friendly.' Male medic, 50's,* Palestinian Israeli.

A sense of valued equality of the working relationships across the boundaries was evident throughout the interviews:

> *'It's very good. Because we are doctors, and we are mature and our main activity is to help people so we work together and do the best from patients.*

I think we are equal, and it's very very good.' Female medic, 30's, Palestinian Israeli.

However, the presence of a 'bubble' of an inside / outside environment was made during some interviews suggesting that imagined boundaries represented two distinct social knowledge systems, one of equality, acceptance, inclusiveness and security within an integrated community and one where the antinomy was hinted at:

'The hospital is kind of a bubble. Everyone is equal. You don't look at Arab, Muslim or Christian Arab or Jewish. It's not something you look at.' Female medic, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

'We get along at work we get along in this environment in the secure place, in the Department that we work together and that's it. But when you go outside it's different.' Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

5.3.2. They are people not exactly like me

Although some reciprocity or semantic bridges (a concept developed in Chapter 6 which conveys the ways in which boundaries are sometimes hardened or softened) were evident, the overall picture suggested that significant divisions remained embedded across the groups. Outside the more 'protected' professional environment, the boundaries began to shift to its opposing thema. For both groups, the environment of inclusivity within the ethos of an ethical working context shifted outside of that to one of exclusivity where boundaries tightened and the groups diverged into a more segregated pattern of existing. Instead of equality for all at work, themes relating to inequality were evident in interviews with the Palestinian Israelis. Finally, instead of a sense of safety and security within the hospital environment for the Jewish Israelis themes of threat became more dominant, expressed through the experiences of the Gaza war two months previously:

'First of all in my private life, I have nothing to do with Arabs. We live totally segregated. But as opposed to most of my friends, or certainly with most of the people I live with, or certainly in the way my children are brought up or whatever, I have a lot to do with Arabs during my day to day.' Female medic, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

5.3.3. Themata of exclusivity - inclusivity: A national home for Jewish people

The themata of exclusivity - inclusivity was evident where exclusivity represented the foundational premise of the State as a Jewish entity. Social representations of loyalty to Zionism and a continued need for a secure and safe nation, was never far from the discussion. Examples of these positions are given, demonstrating the dialogical relationship across the groups between these two contexts where organising themes of ideology, segregation and cultural differences were found to be pertinent to the discussion. This is followed by a dialogical analysis of two narratives about the rights to exclusivity through land ownership. One was quoted by a Jewish Israeli medic exemplifying the justification of her positioning and the Other, in relation to this, from a Palestinian Israeli perspective.

In the professional working environment, themes of inclusivity were freely given where all medics worked together to provide the best possible care for their patients regardless of their ethnicity:

> *'There are a lot of Arab nurses and doctors and there is lot of respect between us and we work as a team. There is never a feeling of 'oh he's an Arab I don't want to work with him'. Never. They are colleagues first of all.'* Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

> *'Inside the hospitals you can see a very nice interaction and relationships. We work together, we like each other on the level of the person and the family levels. We interact nicely and very friendly*.' Male medic, 50's, Palestinian Israeli.

Outside this working environment conversations that included themes pertaining to the importance of Israel as a national entity for the Jewish people were frequent across both groups. It is from these foundations of the inclusivity – exclusivity pair that relationships have been built and knowledge systems developed across Israeli society. Right wing Jewish Israelis were clear about Israel as a land for the Jewish people. This was described as a haven of safety within a Zionist cultural and political ethos requiring its own knowledge system set within a bubble of segregation. The boundary between work and home, between a life centred on a Jewish, rather than a more inclusive community, was evident. The Other was positioned as an entity that had no name nor identity, but considered as a threatening presence:

'The one thing I never ever talk about, and I would never ever want to talk about with any of them is politics ... if I don't know what they think or what they think about me, or what they want to do with me and my people, then I'm perfectly okay with it. I came here because I was Zionistic and I felt that the place for the Jewish people to live is in Israel, and I still believe that. We want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our children to be Jewish and our grandchildren to be Jewish. If we start intermarrying with Arabs then that's not going to be .... and don't forget that Israel was founded because of what had been going on in Europe at the time. The people then felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on our own. We've got to show the world that we'll do whatever we want, whatever you say. I don't see any problem with working together, because you know where you come from and where you're going. I want us just to be able to work together and get on, and help each other but I think it's very important for the Jewish race to keep ourselves separate.' Female medic, 50's, Jewish Israeli.

The quote above illustrates the importance and significance of exclusivity as a way of keeping the threat at bay and living within a closed community and yet under a particular context of work can live with the Other. This is contrasted with a left wing medic who asserted that integration was a crucial step for the two peoples to explore a more common place of nationhood:

'My husband and I right at the beginning wanted the kids to start off learning with each other. So we learned that Arabs had their own way. And how they had to see the Israeli flag every day. And we found that there is a very strong education here without including the other and I didn't really want my kids to follow that. I'm very unusual… most people wouldn't acknowledge this and it's difficult to get everything out into the open. Like on Independence Day we have flags. It's a flag. It's a country, and it's also a law to have a flag in some places. It's just hearing an Arab person saying, 'I don't feel very good about this flag, it's your flag, it's not our flag'. Yet we are all part of the state. Is it my flag? Do you have to choose?' Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

The Other was acknowledged, that of the Palestinian Israeli community, by accepting that another dialogue apart from a Zionist positioning, was part of an Israeli collective sense of nationhood. The symbolic use of the flag epitomises this relationship. These two positions, one of total segregation in one's personal life in the first quote and one of forging integration across many areas of life in the second, reflects how ideological knowledge systems of Zionism and

liberalism have developed side by side, independently of the professional working environment. They were both developed from a base of exclusivity - inclusivity. Within the working context, inclusivity was supported by institutional medical ethics as discussed by all medics and yet outside of this environment, the thema of exclusivity represented a Zionist national positioning for some but not all, as exemplified.

Other discussions reflected a more complex positioning, where there was no clear division between the two exemplified positions. To explore this further, a dialogical analysis was carried out using the texts from a young Palestinian and Jewish Israeli medic about social representations about the land ownership before 1948 and since.

The subject of land rights was brought up frequently by many participants, spontaneously standing as a symbol of Israeli nationhood based on exclusive rights for one ethnic group over another. The topic of land was often described as the symbol of the conflict. The two following quotes represented how each group presented a position about the contested land; this does not suggest that these are the only perspectives by Israelis, but they represented a common trajectory. They are both quoted in full below. Following this, I have used sections of them to offer their particular positioning in relation to the Other:

> *'We get along at work, we get along in this environment in the secure place, in the department where we work together. But when you go outside it's different. I think the conflict here is based on land. No one wants to give up their land, you know. My father has inherited land from my grandfather who inherited from his and his and his and it's been hundreds of years our land... and when I go to pick olives I completely feel that it's my land. And I think to myself if someone has come to take my land I don't know what would be possible and what I'd be capable of doing because we are very much connected to the land. That's the only things important in life is the land and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you(r) respect. That's why you can see that in '48 when the state of Israel, that a lot of Arab villagers were, what you say, they left or were forced to leave, it doesn't matter how they left it's the fact that the villages were empty.'*
> Female medic, 20's, Palestinian Israeli.

> *'I think for years they have been educated that they have been robbed, that we took the land, we are horrible and the enemy and you know. I don't*

know what (to) tell you because I'm an Israeli and I have been in Israel all my life … Since I was born they keep telling you how Jerusalem is important, how Israel is important. But if I wasn't living here I probably wouldn't have heard that and if someone else lived there I would hate it. I'm telling you honestly I don't think Israel thinks they took the land, the land was ours ... You see this is where the problems lie. Because if you look, and if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don't see it as ... And if you look at the history, the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved and came back and moved and came back. So we don't see it as land being taken from other people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly the problem, you see because it wasn't neutral, it wasn't nothing, it wasn't an island that we found and now we're fighting about it, it's a land that has been here for thousands of years and everybody thinks it belongs to them. So we are pretty much … I don't know, I don't like to say that we take it. There was a war, the UN in '48 said to countries for two people. They didn't like that. They wanted to fight. And we won the fight. And they wanted to fight again. And we won again. And they wanted to fight again and again we won. What can I tell you? I don't see it as taking the land. There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…'. Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

Embedded within the first quote is a positioning that directly appeals to the base of the land ownership issue: '*The only things important in life is the land and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you respect.'* (Palestinian Israeli) and *'It's a land that has been here for thousands of years and everybody thinks it belongs to them.'* (Jewish Israeli). The rest of the quotes support their arguments: the Palestinian Israeli's as uncompromising in the significance of the land to their collective self and the Jewish Israeli's setting out why the land belongs to the Jewish people. The leads into the discussion about the framing of the land, as to how each quote introduced the unprompted issue surrounding it. The Palestinian Israeli began by suggesting that at work '***we*** *get along'* (emphasised by saying it twice using the collective 'we'), in a protected work environment compared to the external environment where the conflict continues. The Jewish Israeli framed her narrative with a projection of a degree of inner confusion and conflict about the issue by suggesting that her collective 'we' are the enemy due to the fact that the Palestinians had been educated that '*they have been robbed'* (of the land). She could have used the past tense, rather than the perfect i.e. 'they were robbed' rather than 'they have been' suggesting

that the robbing is perceived as continuing until the present day. She further suggested that she was not quite sure of her own personal positioning because '*they keep telling you how Jerusalem is important'*, that is some undefined Jewish collective that appears to convey a hegemonic perspective that she accepts because she was born there and subject to that. And yet if she were born elsewhere, her perspective might oppose that as '*if someone else lived there I would hate it'*. Her claim to truth in telling this narrative *'I'm telling you honestly'* is interesting; the use of the pronoun 'I' as subject, suggests her own personal narrative and not that of the collective. It appears there might be some confusion surrounding what she really thinks is the truth as she quickly moves on to setting out exactly why the land was *'ours'*. This included, first through the Bible and *'every other document'* setting out grounds for ownership; second, that the land was always contested '*because it wasn't neutral'* and third, that they were forced to fight because '*they* (the enemy) *wanted to fight',* not once, but three times, with Israel winning each time. The 'I' position can be further explored within the context of ownership. The quote begins with *'I think'* as her perspective on Palestinian education telling facts that may or may not have validity. This is followed by stating her national identity as *'I'm an Israeli'* and how that may have developed her own perspective, finishing the first section of the narrative with *'I don't think Israel thinks they took the land'.* Her own voice is replaced by that of the state in its justification of ownership strengthened by bringing in a third party 'you' inviting a mediator presence to see the evidence that backed up her argument: *'Because if you look ... if you go and look in the Bible ... if you look at history.'* Her apparent confusion is interrogated further by suggesting that she was not quite sure about the justifications by reverting back to her 'I' position by saying *'I don't know, I don't like to say that we take it.'* And she continued with the justification discourse by bringing in a conquest theme where two equal parties fight over goods repeatedly and the declared winner is entitled to them. It is only then that she gave her own positioning as being in line with that of the state by declaring *'What can I tell you? I don't see it as taking the land. There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…'* The polyphony of voices - that of her subjective self, the state and a mediator to support her case, demonstrated her positioning that acknowledged these different knowledge systems.

These are not only dialogical 'I' positions following Hermans (2002) reflecting different subjective perspectives, but they are also dialogical ego / Alter positions that she used to clarify her thinking from confusion to more certainty. There was a discussion, a co-authorship (Marková, 2003) between these perspectives leading to her final more powerful position of an innocent, but informed citizen, yet also being apologetic for her stance.

The Palestinian Israeli narrative also took on the dialogical voice but there was no inner debate. Instead, there was confidence about her relationship with the land '*I completely feel that it's my land'* which connected herself to the land through a visible line of ancestry - '*my father has inherited from my grandfather who inherited from his and his and his and it's been hundreds of years our land.'* This justification of ownership was perceived as being evident enough without recourse to going outside the self-positioning through references to more contested possibilities like the Bible, significant documents or conquests as we saw in the Jewish Israeli quote. Her positioning that '*no-one takes your land'* reflects that any conquistador would face strong resistance because *'I don't know what I'd be capable of doing'* if the land was taken, hinting implicitly at conflict. She positioned herself as belonging to the land, rather than through other institutions, for example, the state, religious myths, winning conquests etc. This ultimately reflected the intractability of this issue as a stalemate position persisted. Any change would require a shift in these positions.

The Jewish Israeli medic later suggested a possibility of change at some point: '*In my dream there will be no two states, we would be together. If we had nothing to be defended, they would be friends.'* A glimpse of an imagined future of a dialogue of mutual acknowledgement remained a distant possibility, albeit a fleeting one. Yet her previous positioning on protracted warfare possibly remained the prominent one, due to the defence of her stated exclusivity to the land.

The example of the Palestinian Israeli narrative concerning the land issue acted as a marker for their perceived powerless as a member of the minority, demonstrating an asymmetry between the two groups. The themata of non recognition – recognition attributed to the Palestinian Israeli group as a

consequence of the Israeli hegemonic exclusive – inclusive themata, played out in some interesting ways and will be discussed in the next section.

5.3.4. Themata of non-recognition – recognition: The Palestinian Israeli minority

As a minority group, the Palestinian Israelis were aware of their lack of recognition, both by the State and their fellow citizens as described in the last section and identified through organising themes of feeling misunderstood, asymmetry and feeling that an impasse across the relationship inhibited further reconition. The following quote demonstrates how the Jewish Israeli's sense of victimhood overrode that of the Palestinian Israeli one, even though a measure of sympathy was apparent. This narrative told a story of when a Palestinian Israeli medic visited the village where his family had lived pre 1948. The village had been demolished, apart from a few remnants, one of which was the remains of a church where Christian families would visit to commemorate special events. The doctor told me the story as an example of his sense of non-recognition:

> *'I remember one day that me and a paediatrician saw two of our female colleagues, standing in the church wondering about this place. And we approached them by name. And they were surprised to hear that someone was calling them by name. So from time to time they know about us, and from time to time some people mention that we are from the village and some of them ask 'What is your story? Do you still have a desire to go back and rebuild your village?' Some try you know, some don't say anything. The most painful thing for me, is that you start telling a narrative and within a second, they turn over to their story, to their story about being a victim and having to defend, and saying 'We were expelled from Europe and we were killed and all our properties were taken.' And your story is not that striking, not that prominent any more. It's ignored. And this is something that happens from time to time. And it makes you feel upset'.* Male medic, 40's, Palestinian Israeli.

The showing of some acknowledgement of the Palestinian positioning by Jewish Israelis was perceived as both an acceptance of Palestinian Israeli recognition and at the same time, a denial of it through competing victimhood. Meeting as colleagues at a significant place for a member of the minority group, highlighted the recognition – non recognition themata. Rather than recognise the Other's (Palestinian Israeli) positioning, there was a move toward it, before the

Jewish Israeli hegemonic narrative became prominent. No transformation of ideas could occur for the hegemonic group as the asymmetry was played out. The less powerful is left wanting, needing to be acknowledged at a more personal level. The same doctor later discussed the importance of being recognised by his Jewish patients as a good doctor, one that was trusted, one that was considered 'human':

> *'And we try to survive. Not in the material sense of things but not to lose your mind or lose your spirit. We are committed to treating people regardless of their religion, their background, their gender. And from time to time the patients reward you. They come and tell you they are given a list of specialists in Haifa and Natanya but we choose to come to you. Why? The majority of the cases they say 'Because you are an advantage. We trust you more. You are more sensitive. You are more human.*
>
> ***And the Jewish patients are saying this?***
>
> *Yes. Not the Arabs but the Jews. Yes it's surprising. And it lifts your spirits. The fact that a patient can somehow reward you, it goes very highly if they are a Jew'.* Male medic, 40's, Palestinian Israeli.

In the working environment the contact with Jewish Israeli patients and colleagues was also one that was considered important and valued, as exemplified here:

> *'I have a lot of connections and we work together with close ties. So there are senior doctors who are Arabs who guide me and direct me and teach me and I learn a lot from them. Some of the doctors here are at the same level as me and they are more like friends and of course because we work together we do a lot of talking, professional but also some personal. On Friday I'm going to a wedding, a guy I work with, he's a Muslim, and he invited me and I'm going there.'* Male medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

The motivation for recognition wasn't limited to patients and colleagues but also to more personal relationships. The same doctor recalled his budding friendship with a Jewish Israeli medical student as he searched for a common theme to cross intergroup boundaries by bypassing victimhood:

> *'It's defensive if we both talk of being a victim. I tried to tell a Jewish colleague (at medical school), that if you want to approach me as an Arab, this is not correct. I prefer for us to talk as human beings. And as human beings we can open the horizons ... And because I used this argument in*

order to build rather than destroy, it was interesting for him. And once I could approach him and try to open this closed door to tell him that if you see me as an Arab, don't react in the way that I might only have the dreams of Syrian tanks coming into Tel Aviv. And he was convinced I was genuine. And I was not manipulating him. And that was the whole political talk with him. Now my friend from Tel Aviv, we continued with this sort of relationship after we graduated.' Male medic, 40's, Palestinian Israeli.

The significance of being recognised as a human being rather than being labelled as a subordinate fellow citizen with possible threatening intentions, opened the dialogue between the two individuals to meet on a more equal footing. The Palestinian Israeli's acknowledging of the Other's social representations of threat demonstrated the dialogical relationship unfolding. At the personal level and professional level, recognition became a possibility as reflected in their organising themes of their working and social relationships and an imagined future where they would be recognised across the community. Related to this themata was one of inequality – equality that reflected a more structural factor within the dialogical relationships across the groups which is explored in the following section.

5.3.5. Themata of inequality - equality: A clash of rights for the Palestinian Israelis

Both Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics conveyed their professional relationships in the work environment through an ethos of medical ethics prevailing, where equality across all staff, regardless of ethnic or religious background, was prevalent:

'Our relationship is very good because we are doctors and we are mature. Our main activity is to help people so we work together and do the best from patients. I think we are equal, and it's very very good.' Female medic, 30's, Palestinian Israeli.

'The hospital is kind of a bubble. It's very distinct from what's going outside. Everyone is equal. You don't look at Arab, Muslim or Christian Arab or Jewish. It's not something you look at.' Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

However, a different social reality emerged when discussing their external environments. The themata of equality – inequality was evident across the Palestinian Israeli participants' discussions concerning perceived discrimination

across the state machinery where their minority status equated to a confused national status. Descriptions of the difficulties of finding suitable accommodation based on differences in land rights between the two groups were recurrent. The following example from an interview with a Palestinian Israeli medic highlighted this issue. The discourse explored the dialogical relationship between the participant and the state machinery in terms of the conflict between the perceived inequality due to housing segregation, where he faced stigma from Jewish neighbours and yet denied access to alternative accommodation to fulfil his needs. Ironically, this conversation reflected the conversation I had with the Jewish Israeli young man in London, which acted as a catalyst for this empirical study.

The full narrative is printed here for an overview. For the analysis, the relevant parts are reproduced where relevant:

> *'I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of my neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I'm a doctor and a physician and have children. They ignore me. They just look at me… and I think I am one of the successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab young, the new generation, they don't have the jobs that they can offer to rent a flat. I am very frustrated because I cannot find a place to live here ... we cannot find a place. If I want to live in the village (I came from) there is no place, I cannot live there I cannot buy land to build my house. If I was a Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia, they can buy land and build a house with the support of the government next to my village. But I can't. All the people who studied with me, the Jewish doctors, all of them now they have the houses, they build their own. All of them have the gardens and a big house and lawns and they don't have to pay back ... They have everything they want and it was so easy for them. I would be glad if you could come to see some of the villages and you would see an Arab village and you can see that there is no place to build any house and on the other side you can see that they are all the time advertising (to Jewish Israelis to buy land / properties)… The problem is not from between me and the other doctors, my friends. The problem is from the government. It's from the laws and there are many laws that are discriminating. I have very good relationships with all the people I treat. All the people. All of the religions. All of the colours. And I am happy when I'm working here. As I said the problem is not the personal problem, I don't see in my Jewish friends as irresponsible people. And that is why we are optimistic. We can live and work with each other as humans without problems.'*

'I think that much of our happiness … we lose it because of that. We could be much happier with our lives with our success because, but because of the political situation ... Who can ignore it Maybe you can be happy and not think about it but most of the people can't ignore it.' Male medic, 40's Palestinian Israeli.

For this dialogical analysis I used pronouns as a means to understand the text to exemplify the equality-inequality trajectory around the subject of housing. A total of 35 positional pronouns were spoken on this subject, with 12 (34%) stating his 'self' position as being discriminated against, 12 (34%) bringing in the Other as the antagonist, with 4 (11%) directed at a third party judge, a further 7 (20%) as a reflection of his positions as being valid or not and 2 (5%) that adds others, in this case younger Palestinian Israelis who had less chances than him. The subjective positioning reflected first, an identity marker as a successful consultant physician, which was hoped would carry an increased status for neighbourly Jewish relationships and ease of finding accommodation. His disappointment in finding this wasn't the case was keenly felt:

'I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of my neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I'm a doctor and a physician and have children. They ignore me. They just look at me… and I think I am one of the successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab young, the new generation, they don't have the jobs that they can offer to rent a flat…'

The second positioning as a frustrated citizen highlighted the impossibility of finding appropriate housing or purchasing of land with the use of the word *'can't'* or *'cannot'* frequently to exemplify the frustrations of the housing issue, both as being unwanted tenant neighbours in a Jewish area and the impossibilities of purchasing land, perceived as rights being denied:

'I am very frustrated because I cannot find a place to live here ... we cannot find a place. If I want to live in the village there is no place, I cannot live there I cannot buy land to build my house.'

The Other is defined as one that described opportunities including immigrant Jews from Russia who have such rights and Jewish colleagues who have the opportunity to purchase housing leading to a victim status that was not welcomed:

'If I was a Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia … they can buy land and build a house with the support of the government next to my village but I can't. All the people who studied with me, the Jewish doctors, all of them now they have the houses, they build their own. All of them have the gardens and a big house and lawns and they don't have to pay back ... they have everything they want and it was so easy for them.'

And the conversation was set within a plea to be listened to further, by inviting me as a 'third party judge' to probe further, to judge for myself a reality that was being described:

'I would be glad if you could come to see some of the villages and you would see an Arab village and you can see that there is no place to build any house and on the other side you can see that they are all the time advertising (to Jewish Israelis to buy land / properties).'

The same doctor is quick to recall his sense of equality within his professional setting, as shown below and his sense of inequality outside as described above. This served to highlight how different positions can serve to soften or harden imagined boundaries across the groups. This gives us an indication as to what lay at the space between them at the structural and personal level:

'The problem is not from between me and the other doctors, my friends, the problem is from the government. It's from the laws and there are many laws that are discriminating. I have very good relationships with all the people I treat. All the people. All of the religions. All of the colours. And I am happy when I'm working here. As I said the problem is not the personal problem, I don't see in my Jewish friends as irresponsible people. And that is why we are optimistic. We can live and work with each other as humans without problems.'

The positions described above, as respected physician within the community versus frustrated citizen with a denial of equal citizenship rights, intersected with his own reflections of this dilemma. The reflection that he could be happier if the balance of equality and inequality was less polarised, was immediately followed by a phrase that questioned his own frustration and victimhood:

'I think that much of our happiness … we lose it because of that. We could be much happier with our lives with our success because, but because of the political situation ... Who can ignore it? Maybe you can be happy and not think about it but most of the people can't ignore it.'

The phrase '*Who can ignore it? Maybe you can be happy and not think about it'* is open to interpretation: is this directed at the third party judge or other Palestinian Israeli people in general? It was not clear and this ambiguity opened up a doubt about his victim status. When the conversation with the Other about his perceived discrimination was explored we could understand at what point there was a position that reflected the environmental context or immunity to it. The following quote tracked a Jewish Israeli positioning re the equality / inequality themata:

> *'For example, at my work, I don't see any discrimination at all, at all, many of them are very very successful at work, they are running departments as managers and they, they can do whatever they want. No-one is keeping them from going forward at work.'* Female medic, 30's Jewish Israeli.

The equality perceived across the relationships within the work environment was made clear in the above quote as she talked of her Palestinian Israeli colleagues. And there was some acknowledgement of the difficulties with housing:

> *'I know that it's hard for them to find accommodation anyway, because they all focus on this area, because the schools are here and all the community is here, so everyone wants to be here ... generally the real estate in Israel is very expensive because we don't have much land. It's generally expensive, but for them I think, especially new apartments are even more expensive, because you want to be in a certain area. So I think it's harder for them ... it's harder for them to rent near the university, because most of the population is Jewish. Some of them will rent to Arabs and some of them won't.'* Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

However, this understanding was expressed implicitly in terms of segregated residential areas. First, that one area favoured by the Palestinian Israelis was '*very expensive'* because of lack of land being available '*because we don't have much land'* ignoring any historical difficulties for land being not being available for sale to Palestinian Israelis as evident in the previous quote and acknowledged at the institutional level (Yaftel, 2000). And second, there was an implication that some Jews (but not all) preferred segregation as '*some of them will rent to Arabs and some of them won't'* implying further the segregation and discrimination. This was underlined by suggesting '*you want to be in a*

certain area' which suggested the subject 'you' remained ambiguous which may mean people in general or either / both Jewish / Palestinian Israeli.

In summary, the positioning of this Jewish Israeli participant supported the Palestinian Israeli themata of equality / inequality in terms of equality within the professional environment and signs of inequality outside of it. Her positioning regarding Palestinian Israeli inequality took two forms: first one of sympathiser in partial understanding that agreed there were forms of discrimination which included residential segregation and Jewish Israeli resistance to more mixing; second, as a neutral position of the status of land availability. The dialogical relationship across the two perspectives illustrated how these positionings affected boundary permeability between the professional and private domains of equality and inequality. The imagined boundaries between the groups shifted when threat entered the field, as a marker of division, as discussed in the following section.

5.3.6. Themata of threat – security: War and its widening legacy for Jewish Israelis

The security–threat themata was highlighted in discussions about the role of the Gaza war (Operation Protective Edge) in changing the status quo of the professional working relationship across the groups. The conflict was launched in July 2014 and lasted six weeks. It was initiated by Israel to stop persistent rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel by Hamas militants, although other factors regarding mutual antagonism were also present. Approximately 2,300 Gazans were killed and over 10,000 injured, including 3,374 children of whom 1,000 were left permanently disabled. 66 Israeli IDF soldiers were killed and six civilians, including one child. 30% of the Gazan population were displaced during the conflict. The discrepancy in the numbers killed i.e. 35:1 ratio of Palestinian / Israeli reflected the asymmetry of the conflict as a whole with modern and superior Israeli military force, attacking from air, land and sea against militants with much inferior military capability. The resulting social representations of the conflict two months later reflected the flaring of vulnerabilities that had leaked into the professional working relationship in Israel serving as a rupture to 'normal' relations. The conflict was recent enough in time (two months before the interviews) to recollect those representations before what

would be described as 'normal life returning' leaving the underlying tensions remaining. The social representations that swirled in the interviews from the Jewish Israeli positioning centred on the defence of a state against an enemy whose perceived intention was to destroy the state of Israel. The Palestinian positioning centred on the defence of a population in Gaza who had suffered at the hands of an oppressor.

Participants talked of the tensions in their working environment felt during those six weeks and the attempts by the management of a hospital to put them aside in the professional environment, where equality across patients and staff was highlighted:

> *'In the hospital we had an order from the management that we can't engage in any political discussion in the hospital, and we have to keep the current practice where we treat everyone and we work with everyone equally. But you could feel tension. You could feel the tension. But still we worked the same way and we treated the Arab patients the same. We didn't speak about the war*.' Female medic 30's, Jewish Israeli.

But the tensions were there nonetheless. This is evident in the above comment in the repeated phrase '*you could feel the tension'* followed by her emphasis of the more neutral working relationship ('*treating the Arab patients the same'*). The following two quotes convey the stark differences and gaps between the two groups during this time of armed conflict:

> *'The most difficult thing is when you are in the war and they make this voice that you have to stand shoulder to shoulder to support the soldiers. But I can't do this because they kill my people. I don't want to stand for them. You can hear the loud speaker telling you. It's not real. They make us do things that we don't believe in. And it's not real for us. And you see all the people, all the Jewish, all your friends are standing and you're looking for a place to hide'*. Female medic, 40's, Palestinian Israeli.

The Palestinian Israeli medic suggested being forced to show loyalty to the armed force though *'they kill my people'*, i.e. those of Palestinian descent living in Gaza that would have included refugees from present day Israel. By being forced to take a stand that is '*not real for us'* taking oneself out of the situation appeared to be the only option.

A second quote from a Jewish Israeli medic demonstrated her disappointment with her Arab medic friends who showed disloyalty to the nation in Facebook postings reflecting solidarity with the Gazan victims:

> *'I have two Arab friends on Facebook that put up a prophet picture, it was like a black square that was like a symbol that they identify with the Gaza people, with the victims there and I was quite surprised because I thought that they are more like pro-Israeli and I was a bit surprised. I didn't feel very comfortable to see this. I didn't feel very comfortable, like something wasn't real in our friendship, face to face and maybe, when we are not together, behind my back they are saying something else or… but when I came back to work I talked to them normally as usual and it was like nothing happened and we are good friends now.'* Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

And yet, these disappointments were put aside post war, reflecting that once hostilities had ended relationships could flourish once again even though no dialogue had taken place between them about their positionings. Both of these participants used the phrase *'not real'* when explaining their positioning: '*They make us do things that we don't believe in. And it's not* ***real*** *for us.'* (Palestinian Israeli) and '*I didn't feel very comfortable, like something wasn't* ***real*** *in our friendship, face to face and maybe, when we are not together, behind my back they are saying something else*.' (Jewish Israeli).

The significance of *'it's not real'* for both is significant. A life that is real and yet not real supposes boundaries of realities of authenticity and falsity where the former is denied due to the perceived reality of the conflict. The desire for the real as a state of meaning of truth reflected the intractability of their positionings and yet at the same time was the desire for crossing imagined boundaries of connection through their work context.

The discarding of some tensions following the war epitomised the changing reality of resuming normal life. On the surface, the realities and tensions it produced in the community appeared to have been quietly put aside. However, a dialogical analysis of a Jewish Israeli medic showed the changing complexity of her positioning throughout the war. Her narrative centred on the reaction to the experiences of her son, an IDF soldier serving and injured in Gaza, though physically not seriously. Her role as a mother affected her

subjective perceptions that contrasted with her constructs of threat that juxtaposed with the relationships with her Palestinian Israeli colleagues and friends. The resulting inner conflict of her multi-voiced inner dialogue mirrored that of the external conflict. The full text is shown here which will be subject to further interpretation and discussion below:

> '*If you were here during the war you would get probably quite different views and opinions and even I would talk to you differently. Even me and my Arab colleagues over the war it was very hard to communicate, because of my kid, you know, because he is in the army and he was fighting, I needed to reach out to my Arab colleagues and write a message telling them I wanted to continue to be in contact …*
>
> *… If you were here in this war time, if you are coming here and visiting and you go down to the south and you see a big piece of land or whatever with civilian populations who are being threatened for years, day after day. We call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It's been like this for years and years. No country in the world would <u>ever</u> allow this to happen. If it would happen to Britain they would kill 10,000 of whoever is across the border. No-one will say anything because someone dared to drop bombs on our population. Now Israel is under you know, under a magnifying glass all the time because of our history, because of … now I'm not saying this just to justify, I'm saying that there is hard evidence that Hamas, for example, the terrorists, go into the population … I know because my son was just there. It's not like if there is a war here, then you would see that soldiers shooting from this building and this building. No. There it is a population area. You don't draw the fire, you know, you bring them where the citizens are, but they do that unfortunately ...*
>
> *… Our leaders and their leaders, that's the problem. Because people can connect you know. Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being able to provide for their families. That's what people want. They should have given the keys to women and a woman who gave birth and she had kids. If more people went through what I went through this summer you should be like crazy to think about war being an option. When I heard the stories when my son came back I called him and said 'What was the idea of all of this?… What was it? Taking a life? For what? I mean it's ridiculous, it's ridiculous and it's such a mess... It's crazy and it's crazy and it's crazy. And I sit here and I allow, I allow this to happen to my kid.'* Female medic, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The Jewish Israeli medic's final positioning was one of confusion and despair. Its significance reflected her earlier careful narrative emphasising the

state's justification of war which, when intersected with her experience as a mother, ruptured, leaving her with a sense of imbued responsibility for her son's predicament and the contradictions of war. As the listener, I was invited to listen to her experiences as a third party witness as she tracked her different positions across her life world landscape. This also acted as a way of her thinking through her own perspectives. In the first half of the quote, she positioned herself as an Israeli under constant threat: *'the civilian populations who are being threatened for years, day after day. We call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It's been like this for years and years'.* The accent on volume of threat is clearly defined – for *'years', 'day after day', '5,6,10 drops a day', 'for years and years',* as a justification to retaliate. It was inferred that other nations like the UK would go further and kill many more as *'no country in the world would <u>ever</u> allow this to happen'* offering further justification for what is perceived as self-defence. A further justification was the reported action of Hamas (militants in Gaza) who, on hard evidence had purposely brought civilians into the war zone to act as human shields and so increasing the death toll of women and children. Finally it was suggested that Israel was under scrutiny from abroad: '*under a magnifying glass all the time because of our history, because of...'* without defining what it was that might have given rise to such scrutiny. This voice within her narrating these events can be described as 'ready-made' discourses of justification, reflecting dominant social representations in the media that represented a common national hegemonic position.

The second part of the text changed to a more personal conciliatory voice, that of peacemaker: '*Our leaders and their leaders. That's the problem. Because people can connect you know. Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being able to provide to their families that's what people want'.* Her perspective has now shifted to her own reflected positioning, that of her relationship and experiences with her Palestinian Israeli colleagues showing that human connections were possible. This was of significance for her as she talked of how she needed to stay in touch throughout the war: 'I *needed to reach out to my Arab colleagues and write a message telling them that I wanted to continue to be in contact.'* There was no indication as to why but the relationships were considered strong enough not to be severed by the conflict. Her next positioning was one of

negotiator, as a woman who had borne a child, and her soldier offspring returns from fighting injured leading to her motivation to find a path to stop further conflict. However, as her positioning changed again to that of seeker of reality where her son was connected with the killing of others, whether justified or not, the tension cannot be denied. Her resulting positioning of despair may have invalidated her previous positionings and yet they remained within her as themata of security and threat pervaded her life world.

The last quote from this medic returns to the topic of land as discussed in the first dialogical analysis surrounding exclusivity – inclusivity, that epitomises the conflict as one of intractability where one group has *de facto* made a decision based on their narrative that excludes the Other:

> *'In my view it's about land conflict. After all when you go to the bottom of things you are still divided on the land, so for me to be very pro-Palestinian is really going against my people and I don't know what exactly I am. I am left of course. I think. But I know I can tell M and my other Palestinian Israeli friends that if it comes to my house or my home or your home, then I'm defending mine, you know. It's a very simple thing, a reality that is complicated and simple.'* Female medic, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The state of confusion of her personal positioning of being disloyal or loyal to the State, transforming to a position of more certainty that finally rejects the Other, mirrored the 'complicated and simple' reality where polyphasic representations scattered the landscape and yet the group with the greater access to power held the ability to accommodate their confusion.

5.4. Summary of dialogical analysis

The four themata, *exclusivity* - *inclusivity* and *threat* - *security* representing the Jewish Israeli positioning and *non-recognition* - *recognition* and *inequality* - *equality* representing the Palestinian Israeli group, served to act as a foundation that reflected their positionings across their landscapes of intergroup conflict. The second thema in each pair denoted an approximation to their social reality within their professional roles of working together and the first to the one outside of it, The medical environment was discussed as a secure institutional base where inclusivity, equality and recognition of the Other was paramount. The reality outside this environment reflected more polarised positionings across the groups.

Perceptions of exclusivity for Jewish Israelis in a Jewish homeland that remained dialogically related to the non recognition of Palestinian Israelis leading to structural inequalities was discussed against a backdrop of continued threat for the majority group, that mirrored their perceived cultural and societal vulnerability.

5.5. Discussion: crossing imagined boundaries

The field research in Israel demonstrated the significance of context for crossing imagined boundaries. The professional medical context, where recognition and equality for all medics was both institutionally and socially accepted, contrasted to the one outside the hospital gates where social and institutional divisions between the majority and minority groups were evident. This dichotomy is discussed in terms of theories around contact as a medium for transformation of intergroup relationships and the significance of using themata as a conceptual approach within this sphere.

The contact hypothesis as originally suggested by Allport (1954) and taken up by numerous social psychologists, for example, Brown & Hewstone, 2005, Hewstone and Swart, 2011, Pettigrew and Troop, 2006, was based on the idea that reducing prejudice between groups in conflict by bringing them together under different guises would lead to improved relations. More pertinent to my research is the study by Desivila (1988) where Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics were found to enjoy positive working relationships together in a similar manner to my findings. The analysis of data from a semi-structured survey examining levels of cooperation, cohesiveness, competence and interpersonal communication suggested a high level of co-existence and positive relationships across these 'mixed' teams. Rather than compare these professional experiences with their lives in the external environment, Desivila explored possible 'cross over effects' between these environments in terms of mutual national perceptions of the Other through their national identity formation. It was found that Jewish Israelis described their self-identity as being 'rooted in their Israeli citizenship,' (p.440) whilst the Palestinian Israelis using a plethora of different identities to reflect their positioning, revealing a 'wider range of definitions, with no single category dominant' (p.440). This finding was interpreted as being a failure of contact in their professional context to change these identity positionings. Any

transformation in cross group relationships that had occurred in the Desivila study, where mutual national perception correlated with overall support for equal opportunities for both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis and a motivation for mutual reconciliation across the groups, was thought not to be due to their working relationship, but to their political positioning as being either 'dovish' rather than 'hawkish', an Israeli way of identifying a left-right continuum. There was no discussion as to the motivations of those who positioned themselves as such, or how their work environment had impacted their perceptions. Overall however, Desivila (1998) concluded that the contact hypothesis had been useful in illustrating how people from conflicted groups might find boundary crossing a possibility within particular contexts, in this case a medical professional working environment, yet not continuing outside of it, reflecting my own findings.

These positionings have been reported in other studies showing how different contexts can produce different realities that might appear to be contradictory and yet demonstrate the significance of both polyphasic representations within them. Minard (1956) found that American coal miners worked equally across racial boundaries underground, yet once away from the workplace, segregated relationships dominated that matched the external material environment. The entrance and exit from the mine literally stood as the physical and ethnic boundary; after working together as equals the miners would finish their working day in separate showers and transport home: 'The colour line becomes immediately visible as the miners' eyes accustomed to the inner darkness of the mine have accommodated themselves to the light of the outside world' (Minard 1956, p. 30). The segregation – integration theme is similar to my findings and demonstrates how a political context of division and difference can remain embedded within a culture, whilst at the same time boundaries are softened to serve other institutional requirements.

Hammack (2011b) followed a group of young Jewish Israeli and Palestinians (from the West Bank and Gaza) who spent some weeks at summer camps in the USA as part of an encounter group contact exercise. The participants were encouraged to think about their own and the Other social identities juxtaposed with those of young Americans who acted as third party mediators across the groups. By working on what was described as their own and

others individual identity structures through group exercises, social events and the writing of individual diaries, it was explored whether their group boundaries might be softened as new identity structures took hold. The camp was thought to be successful in achieving these aims. By opening up new identity boundaries (Doviedo, Gaertner & Saguy 2009) it was hoped that once they returned to their respective homes in the conflict zone, they would be transformed by the experience and begin a more co-existence path than previously. But a year later, the picture was not quite so clear as their previous identity structure had begun to take hold. The changing contexts from one of being encouraged to explore new identities in the USA to a place still entrenched in political and structural conflict was a factor (Hammack, Piliecki and Merrilees (2014). As the teenagers no longer had the context of a supporting group promoting more consensus than conflict and instead were embedded in their communities where there was a pressure to remain loyal to their group, the effects had faded. I had heard similar stories in my research when talking to young people in London. This aspect will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6 under the topic of semantic barriers, where loyalty and identification with significant members of their group is suggested as a factor that can diminish cross group friendships. However, the longer term effects of the teenagers' experiences are yet to be reported. Latent effects (Markova 2000) that cannot be directly measured, or in this case, not discussed, could play out in interesting ways in the future.

Encounter group work with young Palestinian and Jewish Israelis has been scrupulously followed in Israel to explore what might work to adopt a more positive positioning towards the Other. These are groups that are explored who follow a programme where transformation of ideas of the Other are actively encouraged by bringing members together to explore their experiences in a supported environment. The asymmetry in the external environment was found to affect progress in the groups with a tendency for the Jewish Israeli narrative to dominate (Maoz, 2011). Attempts to focus on equalising the groups (Maoz, 2001) and trying different strategies of either a co-existence or confrontational models (Maoz, 2004) were followed in an attempt to achieve more symmetry across the groups. Co-existent education has also been examined (Bekerman Habib and Shhadi, 2011) where Palestinian and Jewish Israeli children have

found to be more open to the Other, forming close friendships that reflected the positive school environment. This setting was considered to be an excellent example of contact implementation with the 'emphasis on status equality, mutuality and cooperative independence might very well be the condition which enables and strengthens our findings' (p.401). It was also thought difficult to assess its overall success due to the complexity of the context of future developments, for example, the Jewish Israeli children having to later enlist in the armed forces acting as closing down of former softening of boundaries, or the precarious peace negotiations that might have a knock on effect. Most interestingly was the opportunity to open a space where the 'unsaids of Israeli society could be openly stated in a sphere of trust' (p.402). This alone was felt to reflect the success of such an educational initiative.

These examples demonstrate how programmes to enact social change to promote the softening and crossing of intergroup imagined boundaries reflects a motivation towards consensus rather than conflict across both groups. My findings reflect the complexity of contact research, as described above, where different contexts can begin to describe the heterogeneity of segregated societies. The clear demarcation of a place of work and a place of living has been interesting to demonstrate the differences across this boundary. Dixon et al (2008) discussed segregated boundaries of residence, education and employment as perpetuating inequality and negative stereotyping of the Other. The observation of territorial grouping in public places in post-apartheid South Africa (Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux, 2005) that not only created, but signified racial separation, exemplifies further the developing dialogical relationships across the groups in particular contexts.

By identifying themata that resonates with the work-life context, the array of underlying tensions between the groups in my study were uncovered enough to discuss what was deemed to be significant to each group. The structural inequality and non-recognition of Palestinian Israelis within the State machinery, where exclusivity for a Jewish only state is promoted, contrasted with the structural equality, recognition and inclusivity in the medical field, under a different arm of State machinery. Each of these contexts represented different systems that on some level appeared to be quite independent of each other. The

external environment is set within the spilling of an ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2014) from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into the internal relationship between Israeli and Palestinian group with their relevant institutions, cultural and social trajectories. The ethos reflects a world view of the justness of each groups' positioning to delegitimise the Other through their own sense of victimhood that required high levels of patriotism to defend their positions. At its core is intractability leading to human suffering. The internal medical world is represented by a set of universal medical ethics where life, all life regardless of positioning, is considered precious and so set within an alternative ethos. At its core is the universal value of saving lives and promoting health.

These two contrasting worlds were inhabited by the participants where each context represented 'sharing a world view in the form of collective and social representations as a characteristic of groups. It is this epistemological means enabling communication' (Wagner and Hayes, 2005, p.277). The dialogical analyses demonstrated the multiplicity of the participants' life worlds across the work / life divide where their heterogeneity of positioning was uncovered to reveal a complex web of representational fields. The dialogical relationships across and within these fields have shown to reflect how these two groups remain related to one another, both as a source of tension and consensus as they chart a trajectory to the future based on their culturally embedded past. This point will be developed in Chapter 7 when all three studies will be discussed further.

In the next chapter, the last of my empirical chapters, I pursue the permeability of imagined boundaries by discussing the role of semantic barriers and bridges. Semantic barriers suggest a hardening of boundaries where the lack of shared social representations inhibit a positioning that may lead to one based more on consensus than conflict, whereas semantic bridges reflect the possibilities of the softening and crossing of boundaries through some degree of mutual understanding across the groups.

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the permeability of imagined boundaries between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel who worked together as medics

in Northern Israel. It was suggested that the work environment based on medical ethics of life enhancement and care of health, based institutionally on equality and inclusiveness of all staff and patients, was effective in providing a safe and satisfactory work environment. Professional respect and friendships flourished across all groups. This contrasted with their external environment where inequality between the groups was evident where structural asymmetry placed the minority group in a position of structural inequality and state / social non recognition of their Palestinian status. A sense of threat related to many of the Jewish Israeli's narratives dominated their representational field. This was highlighted by a recent war in Gaza leading to the rising to the surface intergroup tensions that had been a part of Israeli's lifeworld since 1948. This took the form of a justification of the state machinery to deal with conflict juxtaposed with the Palestinian Israelis conflicted loyalties. The role of the contact hypothesis was discussed to highlight how the discipline has explored these intergroup tensions with some interesting observations and some superficial similarity in the findings. It was the framework of themata, however, that was integral to mapping out a foundation from which both groups' positioning could be explored. The themata of *exclusivity – inclusivity, threat – security* reflecting the Jewish Israeli's positioning and *non-recognition - recognition* and *inequality – equality* the Palestinian Israelis', suggested the deep fissures dialogically developed over time as a kernel of social knowledge, where unresolved conflict remains embedded in their socio-cultural sphere. At the same time, however, the antinomy structure of the themata opens the discussion to embrace environments where its opposite can be explored. In this case, the particular professional environment can be discussed in terms of these oppositions to reflect a more consensual sphere that would have been unthinkable in 1948.

6: Semantic barriers and bridges across imagined boundaries

> *'They have all this power and they are destroying our lives, women and children. You want to stop them but you cannot do anything. You don't accept what they're doing and you really hate them because, I mean, they're doing so many unacceptable things and that makes you think that we will never forget. We will never forgive them. It adds to the history of hatred and the conflict with them.' F*emale, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

> *If you want a true peace, even the most right wing person will tell you 'Okay, I'll sign that paper, and they're not going to shoot me, they're not going to bomb me, they're going to leave me alone, that's fine!' When will we believe they will do that? And they say too, they say they will never stop until they have all the land and all the Jews are in the sea. They always say that.'* Female, 20's Jewish Israeli.

6.1. Introduction

The above quotes illustrate two perspectives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: one from a Palestinian and one from a Jewish Israeli symbolising barriers across their imagined closed boundaries. Participants across both groups appeared to be barred to the knowledge systems of the Other. Yet elsewhere in the data there was evidence of bridging barriers that expanded the participants' representational field to acknowledge the Other's positioning:

> *'What you see on TV, those are the fanatics and they are the small number of people. But if you grab any person on the street here and ask them and tell him if you sign this piece of paper and peace will happen tomorrow, he will say yes. I'm sure. I'm sure people want peace.'* Female, 20's, Jewish Israeli.

> *I met Jewish people and listened to them more closely after I came here. You take more interest and you listen more carefully. You meet more people. So I have changed. And suppose may be, that it does take a long time to listen to the other person. And it takes both time, maturity, interest and understanding of the person, for whatever reason, to understand and think how is this resolvable. And so you take an interest in what the other person is saying.'* Female, 40's, West Bank, Palestinian,

This chapter focuses on the social representations that underlie barriers that serve to inhibit acknowledging the Other and to consider the role of semantic bridges that demonstrates a conceptual softening of imagined intergroup

boundaries. The chapter is organised as follows: first, a brief recap of the previous two empirical chapters is given to place this chapter in context; second, the literature that connects socio-psychological barriers to intractable conflict, introduced in Chapter 2, is revisited; third, the concept of Moscovici's (1961/2008) semantic barriers is discussed from its original conception and its development over the intervening years; fourth, the significance of the relationship between themata and semantic barriers is discussed that takes into account different inter and intra group positions. The concept of semantic bridges is introduced to portray an intrinsic role in the juxtaposition with semantic barriers as alternative representations. Examples from the data are explored within this theoretical framework.

6.2. Conflict and consensus across Israeli –Palestinian relationships

In Chapter 4 I explored how Jewish Israeli and Palestinian participants living in London discussed perspectives that were felt to be pertinent to their reflexive relationship. By identifying base and organising themes, within and across the groups, it was possible to map out and highlight areas for further exploration. Of particular interest was the role of historical representations justifying asymmetric group positions in terms of land rights and self-determination and the on-going consequences resulting from that. From this knowledge base, my fieldwork in Israel gave me the opportunity to explore how Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, that is Palestinians and their descendants who had remained in Israel since 1948, related to one another. By inviting a small cohort of medics from both of these populations to discuss their perspectives about the Other, I learned how the context of medical ethics created flourishing professional relationships. However, a different reality emerged when discussing these same relationships outside of this environment where structural, cultural and social differences were found to be evident. By identifying themata across and between these two groups, both in and out of the working relationship, it was possible to map out areas across imagined intergroup boundaries. In this chapter I use a further sample, one made up from Jewish Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, to explore possible barriers that may serve to harden imagined boundaries across the groups, as well as possible bridges that may serve to soften them.

The sample that forms the basis of this third study is taken from the samples from the previous two empirical chapters, as discussed in Chapter 3. To briefly recap, the sample was made up of ten Jewish Israelis, some living in London and some in Israel (either born in Israel or immigrated through the process of Aliyah as when young) to produce a sample that matched ten Palestinians (born in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem) who were all interviewed in London. The participants in this newly formed sample were approximately matched by age, gender and left/right wing or more/less moderate positionings. I wanted to explore how common sense representations of this sample could possibly highlight areas that both fostered and discouraged intergroup conflict. The following questions were considered:

1. What are the types of barriers that serve to inhibit conciliatory relations across group boundaries?
2. Does the notion of intractable conflict imply that intergroup barriers reflect a resistance to any softening of imagined boundaries?
3. If imagined boundaries hold the possibility of more, rather than less permeability, what contexts might stimulate or hinder this process?

6.2.1. The role of themata across dialogical divides

Before discussing potential barriers it was necessary to consider what lies at the base of the dialogical relationship between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians that takes into account their positionings of the conflict, both inwards towards their own group and outwards to the Other. By identifying relevant themata it would then be possible to explore the tensions that can give rise to the formation of barriers that inhibit a more consensual relationship. The exploration of relevant themata was found to be useful in Chapter 5, as a foundation from which to explore dialogical relationships amongst Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics. The process of identifying themata was repeated in this study to address the relationship across Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups who are separated geo-politically by conflict.

The resulting asymmetry across the groups was clearly evident from the participants' interviews. For the Jewish Israeli sample, themata of security/insecurity and exclusivity/inclusivity reflected their positionings, whilst

non-recognition/recognition and oppression/freedom resonated with the Palestinian data, as shown in Figure 4 overleaf.

Each set of themata framed the core social positioning of each group from where social representations could be explored. Within these frameworks, the groups' norms and values, group dynamics and processes of identification had developed in response to their lived environment and representational field. The dialogical nature of the relationships within each themata framework can provide an insight into how social representations have developed over time and become central to the groups' positionings of the conflict.

Figure 5: Themata across a Jewish Israeli and Palestinian sample



The following quote demonstrates how the theme of power asymmetry was significant to both groups. Not only does the speaker take the position of one in a less powerful context, she also acknowledges that the Other is aware of their more powerful status and had developed ways of masking it:

'*Fundamentally, there is an imbalance of power. And Israel thinks they can get away with it. The party that has the project has more power and that's about it. Israelis I think, by and large understand this, and have developed a variety of tools and arguments that alleviate the problems related to that understanding. One is 'the world is a jungle, look at us – we have been destroyed and so if we don't fight for ourselves who will fight for us? Tough luck for Palestinians. Nothing can be done about that.' And another one is, 'Well nobody likes us any way.' And so it's kind of 'Well they don't like us, and they wanted us out, so we'll kick them out instead.'* Female, 40's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The asymmetry of power relations is acknowledged by the Other as illustrated below:

'Look, there's the West Bank which is like a big prison. It's not very nice. Or Gaza which is horrible. It's the truth. A Palestinian would say - 'I can't find a job. My cousins are stuck in Ramallah or Gaza or whatever and I can't move anywhere. And I'm looking around and seeing all this prosperity and it's not equal in any way. And yes, I'm being educated constantly as an Arab that they came in 1948 and took what was ours in 1967 they took more.' What do you expect? But on their side they do acknowledge that Israel is extremely strong and extremely defensive. That's how I see it. Having said that, why not try and get along together still?' Male, 30's, Israeli Jewish.

The ability to acknowledge the perceived perspective of the Other reflects the dialogical nature of the relationship where each can recognise and be recognised by the Other, juxtaposed with their own groups' interests and positioning. By questioning *'what do you expect?'* there is an implicit acceptance that forms of resistance to Israeli hegemony is a path that Palestinians, or indeed any other group in a similar context, might follow in such a context of asymmetry. However, by suggesting that the Palestinians acknowledge the strength of Israeli hegemony and resist it, demonstrates the power struggle across the groups. And further, by suggesting that some form of co-existence would be preferable to resistance, this positioning served to embed the power/powerless theme firmly in the context of this asymmetric conflict.

By identifying further themata relevant to each group stemming from the overriding power/powerless foundation opens up a space for further investigation into how each groups' positioning had developed. In Chapter 4, I discussed the

significance of historical representations as a positioning tool that served to justify this asymmetry, and the response to that, from the less powerful group. By exploring further themata applicable to each group, I can begin to examine the permeability of the imagined boundary lines between the groups, to understand the nature of the barriers that uphold the asymmetry as perceived by those who directly experience the conflict.

6.3. Barriers and bridges across Israeli-Palestinian relations

'It is well established that socio-psychological barriers hinder the resolution of harsh and lasting conflicts' (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011, p.637). These different categories of barriers have been discussed in the literature (see Chapter 2) to shed light on how their prominence in the contextual representational field hinders the formation of intergroup relationships steered by consensus rather than conflict. These studies have focused on cognitive processes (Ross & Ward, 1995, emotional factors (Halperin, 2008; Halperin and Gross, 2011) and societal beliefs (Maoz and McCauley, 2005). Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011) introduced a process model that suggested such barriers can lead to a closed-mindedness that gives way to biased processing resulting in denying any new information that might support a more non-conflict positioning. A number of barriers were identified within my data that appeared to inhibit any softening of boundaries that might lead to a more consensus positioning. These barriers reflected similar findings to Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) where 'rigid conflict supporting beliefs, world views and emotions' (p.637) played a dominant role in the communication of social representations of conflict. The identified barriers in this study will be explored using the concept of semantic barriers as discussed in the next section.

6.3.1. Semantic barriers: blocking paths across boundaries of difference

Moscovici (1961/2008) introduced the concept of a semantic barrier to describe how social representations, constructed to portray a group's positioning, remain intact within a defined boundary that denies representations held by the Other. Representations held by the Other remain barred from the subject's representational field, due in part to a specific propaganda langue structure, held in place by semantic barriers. The use of propaganda in the context of asymmetrical conflict is central to communication, as its 'regulatory function takes the form of an assertion of the group's identity and an attempt to re-

establish its status as a subject that has been freed from contradictions that threatened its equilibrium and action' (p. 311). By externalising these contradictions, the group comes to define itself in terms of the enemy leading to tighter and more impermeable group boundaries. Moscovici (1961/2008) suggested two types of semantic barriers; first, 'rigid oppositions' that bar open communication of consensus across boundaries as whatever is said by one group is immediately negated by the other. Second, the 'transfer of meaning' occurs when a statement is given, but its meaning is manipulated to signify one that is more in line with the positioning of the speaker.

Gillespie (2008) developed the concept of semantic barriers further by defining alternative representations as 'the ideas and images the group has about how other groups represent the given object. Alternative representations are thus representations of other people's representations.' (p.2). Five further semantic barriers were suggested to exemplify the blocking of communication that stands to inhibit a fertilisation of mutual and consensual understanding between parties held in tension and conflict. These included:

- stigmatising the Other in order to dismiss their positioning by alluding to their lesser status as unworthy of inclusion in any intergroup consensus;
- separating what is acceptable and not acceptable by accepting part of the Other's representation and ignoring an integral aspect of it;
- prohibiting thoughts through the collective status quo and so any alternative representation is denied through pressure to conform;
- the motive of the Other is undermined and so alternative representations can be rejected; and
- a process of 'bracketing' that allows the speaker to judge certain parts of an alternative representation as being disassociated from the reality and so in effect, polices the boundary of what is considered acceptable and rejecting the rest.

These semantic barriers clearly hinder the developmental of mutual trust and respect in intergroup relations. Gillespie, Kadianaki and O'Sullivan-Lago (2011) found how these semantic barriers affected relationships between

nationals and migrants in both Greece and Ireland where the threat of alterity played a role in inhibiting more open relationships with the Other. Semantic barriers as suggested by Moscovici (1961/2008) and Gillespie (2008) were evident from discussions with both groups. Rather than list the similarities to those suggested semantic barriers as described above, I intended to explore semantic barriers that reflected how the participants made sense of their experiences when discussing a particular context of the conflict. The nature of the dialogical relationship across the two groups serves to identify barriers, not only between them, but also within the groups.

6.3.2. Semantic bridges: opening paths across boundaries of difference

The representational field under investigation was not only dominated by social representations of the intractability of the conflict. Representations that highlighted empathy, for example, through acknowledging of the Other's powerless positioning, where a motivation to explore possibilities of relationships based on consensus rather than conflict, was also present. This quote exemplifies a position that strayed from the Israeli hegemonic narrative:

> *'For me, I feel like the Israelis, the Jewish people are missing the point when they are insisting on calling the land as their own land and not seeing the Palestinian side of how they also have the right to the land. I think the Israelis need to recognise that the Palestinian's predicament, that their victimhood is caused by Israel'.* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

And from the Palestinian one:

> *I met some Israelis at a special meeting. They came from Tel Aviv, from the settlements from the north and we sat there and we discussed stuff. Most of them want peace and they want to live together with us and they don't want to have conflict because we all suffer … and they were happy to be with Palestinians and the Palestinians were the same and so we were around together. And at the end it was really quite good to know how they think. Some of them would really like to do some more work on this and to be more friendly with us.'* Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

Both these quotes suggest a motivation to acknowledge the Other. The Jewish Israeli participant in showing empathy for the Palestinian narrative by resisting his own hegemonic group narrative and the Palestinian quote showing a

desire to listen to the Other's perspective that included the desire for more contact.

Although the groups were bounded by their own life worlds, separated from each other by continued conflict where group members tended only to meet, if at all, in the context of conflict, the relationship remained a dialogical one. Each action of conflict affected the other's perceptions as the groups remained intertwined, separated and yet bound together through conflict. Even by dismissing the Other, the relational act remained a dialogical one, (Linell 2009). By juxtaposing semantic barriers with semantic bridges associated with each group, we can ask what are the barriers separating and what are the bridges bridging? By keeping the identified themata as the figurative kernel of how the groups' knowledge systems have developed around the conflict, semantic barriers and bridges can be explored further.

6.3.3. Identifying barriers and bridges

Analysis to identify barriers and bridges was undertaken by compiling the transcriptions from the newly formed sample of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. Data that related to either a barrier or a bridge was assembled in separate tables that were used as a starting point for the analysis.

6.3.4. What separates and what binds

As discussed above, the power asymmetry played a central role across both groups in forming and developing social representations around conflict. The Israeli Jewish sample reflected this power status through their descriptions of the geo-political positioning, state institutions, global allies and military strength. The prevailing asymmetry had a knock on effect, both within their themata of threat/security and exclusivity/inclusivity pertaining to the barriers that stood to prevent acknowledgement of their positioning in relation to their own more powerful status. The Palestinian group represented their less powerful positioning by describing their representations in relation to the powerful Other, as one of an unwanted minority. These representations were evident within the themata of non-recognition/recognition and oppression/freedom. The themata across both groups reflected the dialogical nature of the relationship where each position affected the Other's positioning. Any semantic barrier that was identified in one

group affected the other group, which in turn, affected the original. This cyclical and reactive nature of this relationship appears to be a significant factor at the base of the conflict. Any move towards a position of consensus would require an exploration of the barriers identified within these sets of themata across the groups. The identified barriers and bridges will be discussed in relation to the relevant themata to contextualise their meaning.

6.3.5. Exclusivity/inclusivity and threat/security related to non-recognition /recognition

Social representations embedded within the themata of exclusivity/inclusivity discussed by the Jewish Israeli participants, were also closely related to that of threat/security. This was centred on the paramount importance for the safety of the Jewish people in forming and developing a secure self-determined nation. This was judged by the participants to be a direct consequence of the Holocaust in the mid twentieth century and preceding centuries of anti-Semitism. The next section (6.3.6.) will discuss themata of threat/security whilst this section explores the relationship between exclusivity /inclusivity and how that has impacted on the tensions within the Palestinian themata of non-recognition/recognition.

Identifying semantic barriers and bridges across these themata has provided the opportunity to explore the consequences of this reflexive relationship as spoken by those with first-hand experience of the conflict. For the Jewish Israeli group this representational field was discussed in terms of the flourishing of a collective identity of a particular ethnic group in a developing nation state based on an ideology that had encompassed a history of suffering and loss. The need for solidarity and belonging was keenly felt:

> *'One wants to be one common entity. It means that I am part of this network of people and I feel that I naturally feel a bond with people when they associate me with being Jewish and I associate them with being Jewish. It's a cultural evenness. It's just a desire to be part of something that is bigger than you and the feeling that you're not alone.'* Female, 20's, Jewish Israeli.

> *'It is very attractive. I feel special. I thought I'd hide it here in the UK but I don't. I'm very open about it, I'm talking about a special culture.*' Male, 30's. Jewish Israeli.

The desire to segregate with others of the same ethnic background had acted as a semantic bridge to develop solidarity within a framework of the ideology of Zionism, creating a nation state for the protection and proliferation of the Jewish people. However, the tension between exclusivity and inclusivity held the seeds of a semantic barrier of exclusion, for the Palestinian group:

> *'We want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our children to be Jewish and our grandchildren to be Jewish. If we start intermarrying with Arabs then that's not going to be'.* Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The threads of threat and safety remain firmly embedded in the development of the national collective identity, resulting in a particular narrative that played a significant role in the embryonic dialogical relationship with the Palestinian inhabitants of the land they conquered:

> *'Collective identities are structured around opposition to the other ... In Europe the Jews have no choice to be Jews because everyone else will call them Jews whether they want to be or not but in the new country we have to define ourselves by enemies and everyone else who doesn't think so are weak'.* Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The Palestinian group discussed their narrative in terms of semantic barriers of injustice and loss of dignity, as the creation of the Israeli state occurred at the expense of their status as the indigenous people. These barriers were echoed in Chapter 4 when discussing historical representations. Barriers were further discussed in terms of the Palestinian perspective of a denial of the Israeli people to acknowledge this positioning:

> *'The Israelis always try and claim things. Like this is our land. This is our army. And people are convinced by it. It all comes from the same ideology, that they were the chosen people, and they have to protect it, the land ... I feel the Israelis have these false ideas, because they feel insecure. I think what happened to the Jews in the Holocaust was tragic, and I don't know why, but they are doing just the same thing to us. They built a wall around us just like there was in Germany and they are promoting really racist ideology, that they want everyone to recognise Israel as a Jewish only state.'* Male, 20's, West Bank. Palestinian.

This quote demonstrated a barrier of perceived injustice that prevented the speaker from acknowledging the Other's need for a nation state exclusively for the Jewish people. By positioning himself as a victim due to claims of the Other,

he cannot bridge this represented perspective. But a bridge is nevertheless created by formally and informally recognising Israel as a sovereign state:

> '*I'm one of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees who left throughout our history. We lived in the land what is now called Israel. That's Israel as a state that was established in 1948 as a result of a war, the Israeli Arab war. I can't deny their right to live in this piece of land. All Palestinians recognise the state of Israel. No-one talks about destroying Israel. The only problem we have is the Israeli state politicians who represent the brutal policies of controlling the Palestinians, not only the land, but to the right to live in peace, the right to have a state.'* Female, 40's, Gaza, Palestinian.

But the desire to be acknowledged as a people for their suffering of their loss, to be socially recognised as a people, stood as a barrier representing stigma for not being heard:

> *'They don't understand the resentment and the suffering that the Palestinians have been going through. They didn't know about Palestinian house demolitions, particularly in the punitive sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. And they would question me and they would think that I'm lying, that I am deluded. I remember there was one Jewish guy from America I met at University and was now living in Israel. I was so trying to convince him what was really going on. I took him around the West Bank. And after one of many discussions he said to me. 'Finally, you know what? Maybe you're right. Maybe some of what is going on is unethical. But if that is what has to happen for Israel to exist, so be it.'* Female, 20's, East Jerusalem, Palestinian.

This more powerless positioning, as inferred above, was never far from the Palestinian narrative. The suggestion by an American Jewish visitor finally agreeing that maybe the Palestinian people had suffered and continue to suffer was met with the acceptance of this for the continued existence of Israel, as quoted above. This exemplified the semantic barriers that drew a veil over injustice and in the following quote accentuated the Palestinians' positioning of powerlessness:

> *'I try to see them as people, and many Palestinians do the same. But to be honest with you, the conflict makes you feel terrible. You just want someone to make them feel what we feel.*' Male, 20's, West Bank, Palestinian.

One of the overriding consequences of the conflict frequently referred to was continued access to the land by Jewry from any part of the world with no immediate ancestral link with the land, whilst Palestinians with these connections were denied entry. Moreover, the continued settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, for Jewish only citizens, stood for the continued taking of contested land. The Palestinian narrative had stressed that the international community had continued to discuss the illegality of these settlements built on occupied land through the UN and EU legislation. It was along this route that some Palestinian participants followed, symbolising a bridge that steered a course away from conflict to a narrative where their positioning might be recognised:

> *'We do have a right to the land, and the Jewish people claim they have a right to be there too. I've always chosen to stick with the international law, and perspective. That just defines the conflict within the UN resolutions, conventions and treaties.'* Male, 20's, West Bank, Palestinian.

However, the sense of injustice standing as a barrier between conflict and consensus and set within the themata of non-recognition/recognition and exclusivity/inclusivity, remained dominant:

> *'There should be a reason that justifies Israel to continue the settlement expansion, to continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue with all its policies against Palestinians. What is the reason? What are the facts for them that justify them to go on with their colonial policies?'* Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

And the asymmetry continued to be relevant, as any sense of reciprocity further barred any relationship based on mutual understanding of each other's positioning:

> *'I told him (the Israeli guy) 'You know, it comes down to me recognising you as an Israeli, but I see that you are not even seeing me'. I don't understand why they would insist on having the whole land for themselves and not even seeing any claims and rights for the other side.*' Male, 20's Gaza, Palestinian.

Israeli Jewish themata of exclusivity/inclusivity related to threat/security has been discussed in relation to the less powerful Palestinian thema of non-recognition/recognition through the dialogical relationships across the groups. At

the intersection of the intergroup imagined boundaries, semantic barriers are seen to close down acknowledgement of the Other's positioning, and yet semantic bridges have played a role in increasing intragroup solidarity and belonging and some hint of intergroup bridging. The following section explores further these concepts through different sets of themata.

6.3.6. Threat/security related to oppression/freedom

I began this third study interested in how themata from each group was related to the Other in terms of semantic barriers that inhibited acknowledging intergroup positionings. Once a positioning had been acknowledged, the representations formed can be described as a bridge to opening a dialogue across group boundaries. The tension across each thema stood as an integral and ontological aspect of the representations of conflict for the particular group. For the Jewish Israeli group, threat/security hovered above all representations of Israeli nationhood. The tragic Jewish collective experience of ethnic genocide during the Holocaust was symbolised, amongst many things, as an endowment of vulnerability that had affected many aspects of Israeli life. The national homeland of Israel, built upon the ideology of Zionism, placed at its centre, the exclusive right to self-determination for the Jewish people, residing in a place of security, free from the threat of the Other. Within the thema of threat/security, semantic barriers around the concept of threat, through fear of the Other, demonstrated this continued potency through all levels of society:

> *'I am very open minded and left wing, but if you challenge me and start pushing you know, yeah my God I have to defend, or I will lose my security very easily.'*

To the institutional level:

> *'A friend is a veteran of an intelligence organisation and he is convinced that the Palestinians are not trustworthy and the bottom line is that they want to destroy us.'*

To the societal level:

> *'When we have the fear inside us then you are looking to validate it in all kinds of examples .. so it only takes one terrorist who goes on a tractor and runs some people over for people to say 'You see?' They don't really want*

us to be here. They are dangerous and we have to protect ourselves.' Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

Responsibility for the continued semantic barrier of threat is handed to the Other for the continuation of the conflict through terrorist activities that Jewish Israelis believed to include plans, in the unforeseen future, to annihilate Israel and all its people:

'It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to wipe out Israel. And don't forget that Israel was founded because of what had been going on in Europe at the time. The people then felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on our own. We've got to show the world that we'll do whatever we want, whatever you say.' Female, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

Over sixty years of conflict had not appeared to lessen the sense of threat that originally brought many Jewish people to what was believed and hoped to be a safe and secure homeland. The semantic barrier of threat had resulted in a stalemate positioning where the relationship between threat and security was continually being played out. Threat of the Other, not only Palestinians, but also for other perceived groups that represented threat was reflected within the threat/security thema foundation. The tension across the antinomies had led to the urgent need for a sense of security to offset any perceived threat. Security remains a central tenet of Israeli nationhood. The role of the military is a significant factor in dealing with the threat of the Other to provide a strong security force to safeguard its people. Israel is home to one of the strongest military machines globally in terms of equipment and trained manpower. Military service remains an enforced duty for all young Jewish Israelis, apart from some groups of orthodox religious Jews. In addition to this, annual reserve duty is required of active men until approximately the age of retirement. The experience of serving in the military can stand as a mark of national pride, where future careers and life-long friendships are formed:

'For me being an Israeli is about the army. If you haven't done the army you're not really an Israeli … I made my best friends in the army and it's an experience that I think makes us mature really fast. And also it makes you bond for life.' Female, 20's, Jewish Israeli.

The consequences of the Jewish Israeli themata of threat/security on the Palestinian group related to representations embedded within that of oppression/freedom. As discussed in Chapter 4, historical representations across both groups reflected different interpretations of the events surrounding the birth of the state of Israel in 1948. The more powerful group celebrated their victory at the expense of the other group, who remain in mourning for the 'Nakba' (tragedy) over sixty years later. The continuing conflict demonstrated the temporal tensions around the themata of threat/security and oppression/freedom. For the Palestinian group, their face to face relationships with Jewish Israelis tended to be based on contact with soldiers at checkpoints, patrols, house raids, or, for the Gazans, as soldiers in combat at war with their people. The exception was the Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem who share a city with the Jewish Israeli population, although separated physically by highly segregated areas including military checkpoints and culturally, by the consequences of the division of ethnic groups by continued intergroup conflict.

The experience of meeting Israeli Jewish soldiers within the confines of the conflict emphasised the power/powerless positioning:

> *'When I went to school I had to go through the checkpoints and sometimes the Israelis would beat us really badly. They wouldn't sexually harass you but I remember a soldier, he would say 'Now go across the checkpoint naked,' even though I was 13 years old. The journey should take no more than fifteen minutes by car but we had to go a long way around just to avoid the checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck at it for two hours probably. There were some horrible stories especially during a second intifada. I was very young then. That was when everything was really bad.*' Male, 20's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The themata of oppression/freedom framed the ontology of social representations that reflected these realities. The loss of one's dignity, both personally and within the group, at the hand of a powerful Other, stood as a semantic barrier to contemplating consensus. The following quote reflected the representations around humiliation, fear and anger that formed a foundation from which a subjective barrier of oppression was built, that inhibited an acknowledgement of the Other's positioning within the themata of threat/security:

'They used to come into our house at three in the morning … they were knocking at the door with their guns looking for my cousin. And they told us to leave the house because they had to search for him. My father said to them in Hebrew 'My children are really young, and they have to go to school tomorrow'. But they were just saying 'Shut up and go outside'. And I think that they knew he wasn't there but they still had to do it. I was about 14 or so then but it started when I was about nine. . it was really scary. It was terrifying. I had a younger brother and he used to get really really scared that something was going to happen to him.' Male, 20's, East Jerusalem, Palestinian.

The lived experiences of a powerless positioning as exemplified above, was juxtaposed with the barriers of the Other, where threat had played a role as discussed earlier. The resulting representational field shows one dogged by intractability where both groups remain imprisoned by their positionings of threat and oppression. Despite this, bridges that represented a shift that held the possibility of transformative change to acknowledge the predicament of the Other and identify with part of their experience, was also present in this representational field. The quote below illustrates how an Israeli Jewish soldier reacted to a scenario, not dissimilar to the one described above that described the reality of military service that carried a burden of its own. In this particular case, it led to the seeds of resistance to Israeli hegemony that acted as a bridge to acknowledging the Other. Even though the two participants had never met and were unaware of each other's personal existence, they remained in a dialogical symbolic relationship with each other:

'I met the Palestinians as kind of, as an enemy. I only knew them as a soldier, as a combat soldier. I was a combat soldier. When we got into houses into their homes we had to take people out from their parents. And seeing the children crying I just didn't know what to do. I was told to do that. I thought that I was keeping my country safe, but when I grew up and then went on to meet Arab people as normal citizen in my work, I was shocked. When I see that they are just like you and me. They have their rights and they should have their rights, as you have them. In Israel we can't really be so backward …. it's very difficult for me to see a child crying. So I think it's a deep psychological issue that is quite personal, to see the suffering of the other. Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

The participant discussed a personal reaction to an act of perceived unjust aggression that began a chain of events that transformed his thinking of the

Other. The bridge of empathy led to the building of a barrier against Israeli hegemony, representing further tension within the themata of threat/security and the positioning within it:

> *'We're talking about a different world in the IDF … being a soldier is like a way of putting your violence somewhere. And it makes you feel strong, capable, as you are when you're a teenager. It's very sad also, because they can become violent when in a group of soldiers. But it's very difficult because your friends go to the army, your parents went to the army, your family, everybody went to the army. It's like a national mission or something like that. It's very difficult. It's very difficult to come to terms with.'* Male, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

For the Palestinian young man from East Jerusalem, discussed earlier, he was aware of the way in which young Israeli Jewish people changed during active military service to accept Israeli hegemony that appeared to close any possible bridge from forming across the groups:

> *'I wouldn't say they are brainwashed but the fact that they have to serve in the military. To be honest I met some really nice Israelis before they had to serve in the army. They become radical, they become more like patriotic, nationalistic, more proud of being Israeli and also less acceptable towards Arabs. I don't know what they teach them in the military.'* Male, 20's, East Jerusalem, Palestinian.

And yet he never felt that violent retaliation was a solution, given the asymmetry in military capability within the power/powerless domain which would differ from the Israeli Jewish positioning that Palestinians were violent and seeking their destruction:

> '*I think to be honest I never believed that violence is the solution with the conflict. Even if you try and stop an Israeli it makes no difference because they will demolish a house or hurt you in some way and you get nothing out of it. You're just going to cause more harm to yourself and your parents. And if you hurt someone they will come back to hurt your family and you will spend the rest of your life in jail. So I don't think that violence is the solution. Even at a certain age I thought we could coexist, which is why I took the human rights path.'* Male, 20's, East Jerusalem, Palestinian.

The bridge to a human rights path away from a path of violent retaliation held the possibility of a future based less on conflict through the possible inclusion and assistance of Israeli pro peace agencies and international agencies,

such as the United Nations to mediate on their behalf. This action did not however act as a bridge that acknowledged the positioning of the Other. The loss of personal and collective dignity, felt to be due to the oppressive nature of the threat/security tension of the Israeli hegemonic dynamic, appeared to be too much of a bridge to contemplate. The loss of dignity and collective history that denied a nationality appeared to have led them to a positioning of helplessness and despair reflecting the closing of boundaries and intractability. The following two quotes summarise these positions:

> *'There is anger … anger, vulnerability, all these things, I feel it because I had this experience myself. And I remember. The anger feels like a furnace. I remember maybe thirty to forty times I was humiliated at checkpoints. They want to humiliate us forever … some people accept being humiliated to secure their physical survival, but not the spirit and their soul and their self-respect.'* Female, 40's, Palestinian, Gaza.

> *'It is so important not to lose your sense of nationality when Israel declared itself a state. To keep and protect it. The conflict makes it more important for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as Palestinians.'* Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

It was the more powerful party who was in the position to access the power asymmetry dynamic that might hold the possibility of bridging the divide to acknowledge the Other's more powerless positioning:

> *'We need to understand that they (Palestinians) have a right to define themselves. They don't have a land, an identity, or a nation.'* Female, 20's, Jewish Israel.

The focus on a *'need to understand'* demonstrates the acknowledgement of the positioning of the Palestinian and so forming a bridge to opening a transformative dialogue that includes the significance of adopting universal values of human rights. The following quote goes further in acknowledging the violence perpetrated by the Palestinian people in the past that could stand as a barrier within the threat/security thema. Yet it is dissolved into a bridge by stressing the significance of her own nation's approach to the conflict in concert to her own polarised positioning:

> *'The Arabs have had their struggles and they were always violent against Israel, right? They have always been. But we are a state, we are*

democratic. We have our values of democracy, of rights, of free speech. There is, like, a few kilometres from us we have a regime. We are controlling it, another nation, and we don't give them their rights, no freedom of speech. Our husbands and sons are serving there and oppressing these people. But it comes back to us. You cannot have a democracy here and a dictatorship there. It doesn't work you know. It just leaks inside. And slowly, slowly, each year it becomes worse.' Female, 40's Jewish Israeli.

Her positioning, where the values of democracy were questioned, lies at the centre of her argument, demonstrated the intractability of such a system in this geo-political context. She acknowledged the dialogical relationship across the groups through the reflection of the '*leak inside'* of the effects of conflict and its role in the trajectory of the conflict. The pivoting of saying *'our husbands and sons'* as both protectors of her group and oppressors of another group, is significant. By referring to the collective rather than a personal relationship with her family as oppressors, she was accepting a position that reflected an ability to move away from the hegemonic national identification with the military and all that represent as discussed earlier, in terms of a national ethos. However, her alternative positioning opens up a dilemma of being identified as disloyal to the state, as discussed in the following section.

6.3.7. Group loyalty: You're either with us or against us

Semantic barriers were not only identified across the groups but also within them. Straying from the group positioning was considered taboo, giving rise to threat, stigma and isolation. Non conformists were made to feel as traitors to their national, cultural, religious or ethnic background. For Jewish Israelis, the democratic ideal within the state had led to an openness of positions, whether in the cultural or religious domain. However, when connected to a supportive role to the Palestinian question, the pressure to conform was strong:

'For us, it is becoming frightening to be here, because we would be considered a traitor. Not everyone considers you like that but, the media is always present. I can't hear the news. I can't bear it. The few times I did, it was horrible. It's completely unbalanced. Whoever is saying it, the way they talk. They don't say a traitor but the way they talk, the music of their words, they imply you are a traitor. You are not patriotic.' Female, 40's Jewish Israeli.

The role of the media in presenting material about the conflict highlighted the importance and power of the national and political narrative to be heard and understood. The essentialising of group positions into two opposing groups, where no compromise was considered and all complexities were ignored to present a simplified version of events, gave rise to a communication based on propaganda. Any alternative knowledge was subdued to the point of extinction. The quote above reflected this positioning. Another participant described the challenges in finding alternative information that opposed the national narrative of the conflict:

> *'If you want to find alternative information you can, but you need to look for it, as it's not obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper, a certain journalist, so people don't and if you do, they say they source is probably Palestinian. So it's easier for them to tell me that I am not telling the truth, than to face the psychological consequences of admitting it might be true, because they want to be patriotic and humanist at the same time.'* Female, 30's, Jewish Israeli.

Loyalty was as significant for the Palestinian group. The group boundaries within Palestine appeared to be clearly defined across two knowledge systems representing different narratives surrounding the conflict, one of a more religious positioning and one of more a secular one. Although there were no Islamists within the Palestinian sample, there was an awareness of their contribution to the national narrative. The ensuing barrier to acknowledging the Other, by resisting the resistance to Israeli hegemony was referred to by a young Palestinian man:

> *'Back home, I wouldn't speak about my opinions because I know how my people think. And that will fire back at me. The problem with extremists is they play with the religion to suit what they want. Back home in Palestine whatever I said about others, [about Israelis] no-one would believe me, but if I said 'God said that' and I would use a few words from the Koran, they all go emotional and therefore accept it.'* Male, 20's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The acknowledgement of different positionings within Palestinian society demonstrated how group solidarity can be splintered into different sub groups, some of which were felt to be extreme and unacceptable:

'There are some problems with Hamas, with Islamic Jihad, where they want to fight, to react when Israelis do something. Others live by that. But this is not the norm. I want to talk about normal people like me, who go to work, work in a bank, work in social media. These people who if they have more chance, that trust will be a little bit higher and more normal.' Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

The bridge to acknowledging the Other through contact was made more complex by a more generalised aversion to mix with Jewish Israelis on a personal basis. This was the reverse context as the Jewish participant quoted above. Both would be considered traitors to their national cause with an assumption of siding with the Other's positioning, which would be judged unacceptable.

For the Palestinian group there was the added complication of collaboration with the Israelis. This sensitive topic was one that wasn't generally discussed, but was touched upon lightly by a minority of Palestinian participants. They suggested that collaboration was possibly wide spread at a low level. Some people may not have applied the term of collaboration to the act of passing on information to an Israeli accomplice. Within the Occupied Territories and Gaza, collaboration is punishable by death. These quotes exemplified the anxiety surrounding collaboration demonstrating the extent to which group conformity remained strong:

'When I go back home there is this incredible paranoia about how I might be an Israeli collaborator. Because I might be meeting Israelis and I studied Hebrew and they have some sort of paranoia about that'. Male, 20's, Gaza, Palestinian.

'It's not easy to have an Israeli as a friend because the situation makes it difficult. You have a situation that will be risky for both of us, because others might think that you are a collaborator'. Male, 30's, West Bank, Palestinian.

Group loyalty was a significant factor in forming barriers to the Other both within and across groups through processes of identification with the group's collective value system. Those who bridged the hegemonic boundaries had sometimes sought solidarity with others to develop an alternative base from which to develop a strategy. Those in Israel who followed such a course would, for example, become part of an Israeli peace movement or an organisation that

had acknowledged the Other in some way. One example was to discuss forming some sort of joint Israeli –Palestinian project, for example, a Jewish-Arab school where children would be educated with each other. Those in Palestine followed a different trajectory due their more powerless status as the weaker party within the asymmetrical dialogical partnership. Any form of resistance to Israeli hegemony, for example, becoming a member of a non-violent resistance group, was met with a strong rebuff from Israeli authorities and so more of a challenge to develop and maintain.

6.4. Discussion

The identification of semantic barriers and bridges deriving from a framework of themata has been a productive exercise in exploring how two groups in conflict framed their experiences through the generation and maintenance of social representations. Barriers to resolution played a distinctive role in determining the course of the conflict as each group attempted to maximise their position in relation to the Other. In this chapter I have identified a range of semantic barriers and bridges and discussed their relevance to the conflict through the voices of the participants. This exploration of the context of the conflict through their eyes has enabled me to access the space between their imagined boundaries to explore what may lie between them to gain further knowledge about the dynamics of the conflict.

Semantic barriers as introduced by Moscovici (1961/2008) and developed by Gillespie (2008, 2012) and Gillespie, Kadianaki and O'Sullivan-Lago (2011) proposed an ontological explanation as to how a group's positioning can deny the communication of social representations held by the Other. More recent work has reflected how semantic barriers remain significant to group differentiation where opposition played a major role (Sammut and Sartawi, 2012, Sammut, Clark and Kissaun, 2013). The semantic barriers that were thought to be significant in this study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflected positionings through a range of themata that was judged to be connected to the imagined roots of the conflict. The asymmetric nature of the conflict reflected different sets of themata across the groups, resulting in differences in the surfacing of semantic barriers.

The context of the dialogical relationship gave the opportunity to probe into the subjective positioning of semantic barriers within and across the groups. Were they self projected or as a response to the Other's positioning? The intersubjective base of a dialogical relationship (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) reflected the mutual group awareness of the conflict as each group competed with each other through a domain of power relations and states of tension (Jovchelovitch, 2007). This co-dependency of one to the Other for reifying their own group positions in relation to the Other can be reflected in the construction of semantic barriers to strengthen groups boundaries, not only with the Other but within the groups to protect group conformity and loyalty. The concept of semantic bridges is an idea to explore how these boundaries could be weakened, or even crossed under certain contexts. Gillespie (2008) suggested the concept of semantic promoters to denote the absence of semantic barriers which would reflect a softening of imagined boundaries where barriers would cease to be active by losing its semantic power. I introduced the term of semantic bridges to reflect how each group held the possibility to build a meaningful conceptual bridge to counteract the effects of the semantic barriers.

Socio-psychological barriers for Jewish Israelis that inhibit a path to peace by resisting alternative information (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011 and Porat, Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2015) have been recognised to include factors such as societal beliefs and world views. Societal beliefs were described as ideological conflict-supporting beliefs that included themes of security, victimhood, patriotism, justness of own goals, and delegitimising the opponent by glorifying their own group. These beliefs 'and sentiments provide a prism through which individuals perceive and interpret the reality of conflict' (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 639). These themes were similar to my findings. However, the results also differed to my findings, quite possibly due to the difference in methodology used. In the Halperin & Bar-Tal's study, data was collected through a survey based on measures designed to emit a positive/negative scaled response. It was concluded that such barriers led to cognitive closure and a tunnel vision that would preclude any consideration of alternative approaches. It was suggested that 'if we take the consideration the fact that same type of socio-psychological barriers work on both sides, it is possible to understand why conflicts are not

resolved easily' (p.647). This approach parallels with one that determines intergroup conflict through essentialising the Other by objectifying them as homogenous entities. Each group would be perceived as stable and mutually exclusive, set within a particular ideological foundation that reflected a single sided conception of history and a belief in the group's infallibility (Raudsepp & Wagner, 2012). Although there were aspects of this approach that resonated with my own research, my findings explored an alternative story by presenting the positionings of both groups and how their relationship reflexively affected the Other. By exploring semantic barriers that denoted meaningful themes and structures to individuals from their own interpretation of the conflict and how each group relates to the Other, we can learn more about what lies at their imagined boundaries.

The presence of semantic bridges with those directly experiencing conflict confirms the presence of heterogeneity across the groups. It is the perceived relationship between the two groups that remains significant. They will each differ through their own positionings about their perceived past and present status which would dictate how they imagined their joint futures. It is through the interplay between semantic barriers and bridges that a perceived reality of the conflict can be described that can shed light on the possibilities of transformation within the dialogical relationship where bridges hold the possibility of transcending barriers.

The concept of themata has been fruitful in this study as it has given the opportunity to explore the foundational kernels from which to begin an analysis and discussion of the dynamics of the conflict. Themata can capture the origins and structure of social representations within a given context without having to attach them to a structure of elements, as suggested by the core-peripheral approach (Abric, 2001). Each context will differ according to its social reality. The relationship between the core and the periphery cannot easily be drawn as distinctive elements (Liu, 2006) that ignore any underlying atomistic assumptions. A multifaceted approach to social psychology embedded in a cultural and social reality with its own discrete histories is one that holds the opportunity to reflect a particular rather than a universal reality (Billig, 1985). By not taking an element atomistic approach to the explorations of a social

reality, themata can search for the deep structures that are socio-historically constructed embedded within a society. It is the social interaction between the groups rather than their similarity or dissimilarity between them that reflects a dynamic whole that remain interdependent The relational categories discussed in this chapter, as themata, has enabled an exploration suggested by Marková (2007) to

> 'identify such relational categories of the basic nature that activate more complex forms of socially shared knowledge, this would in turn enable us to explore the dynamic structures of social representations, as well as to understand reasons for the prevalence of specific opinions, beliefs, collective actions and so on.' (p. 170).

By identifying themata congruent to each group's positioning, the juxtaposition of semantic barriers and bridges associated with each group, has given the opportunity to reflect on the intrinsic nature of the contextual thematic content. By establishing the proposed themata of each group (threat/security and exclusivity/inclusivity for the Jewish Israeli group and oppression/freedom and non-recognition/recognition for the Palestinian group), interpreted from the participants own experience of the conflict, I was able to explore how semantic barriers and bridges had opened up an opportunity to go beyond an essentialising approach in conflict research.

The semantic barriers that were identified in this chapter were clustered around three modes of operation. First, as a protector of a group's positioning that reflected a justification for taking such a position and in doing so, would result in the dismissal of the Other's alternative representations. This was exemplified by the semantic barrier of fear and threat with a Jewish Israeli positioning as a victim to Palestinian terrorism and so barring any alternative representations towards a more consensual relationship. In the same way, semantic barriers of injustice, oppression and loss with the Palestinian group protecting their positioning as a victim to Israeli hegemony.

Second, by exploring these protected semantic barriers in the representational field solely in terms of victimhood, it may result in a stalemate positioning across the groups. For example, the semantic barrier of fear through threat (Jewish Israeli) has resulted in a stalemate position where no amount of

protection and security has been found to ease their collective positioning. And for the Palestinian group, their status as oppressed and stigmatised living in an unjust reality will remain in a stalemate position, unless there is an internal or external shift of thinking and strategy. This stalemate positioning relates to that of intractability where conflicts become resistant to a peaceful resolution because neither side is willing to compromise (Bar-Tal, 2013). The living reality of the conflict becomes normalised and institutionalised and become part of a society's political and cultural reality. Through justifying (Jost & Banaji 1994) their positionings, meaningful structures can become legitimised and protected as semantic barriers become reified.

Third, the role of intergroup loyalty has demonstrated that semantic barriers played a role in reinforcing group boundaries, both at the social and institutional level. Stepping outside and resisting the Israeli hegemonic group boundary was challenging and uncomfortable, but occurred when a significant part of oneself refused to be influenced by an event that was incompatible with one's value or belief system (Duveen, 2001). Transformation that dismissed the semantic barriers by dialoguing with alternative representations cannot occur in isolation but mediated through others (Gillespie, 2008). These three modes of operation of semantic barriers as discussed, served to tighten imagined boundaries. But as the empirical research has shown, semantic barriers did not totally dominate the representational field of the participants. Semantic bridges were evident in the talk of many participants. These held the possibility of shifting the landscape enough to allow the dialogical relationship to be discussed from an alternative vantage point.

Semantic bridges were affected by the asymmetry of power between the groups and affected both within and across groups. For the Palestinian group, semantic bridges centred on recognising Israel as a sovereign state to counteract the semantic barrier of threat as positioned by the Israeli Jewish group. The motivation for the Palestinian group to follow a non-violent path by appealing to international agencies such as the United Nations as an impartial judge in being recognised, acted as a semantic bridge for left wing Jewish Israelis but not right wing group members; for this latter group such a move was perceived as a semantic barrier of threat to Israeli hegemony. The need to understand the

Palestinian positioning, and in so doing resisting Israeli hegemony, would require a measure of identification with the Palestinian group in the form of empathising with their position of suffering. Empathy arose from a human rights ethos, embedded from a Jewish sense of responsibility.

The Israeli group represented a more heterogeneous positioning than the Palestinian group. The difference in their positions reflected different systems approximately along a right / left wing continuum with a centre ground where representations crossed these lines. The Palestinian group's more homogenous positioning reflected some difference of degree but not difference in content towards the Other. They were united in their contestation of Israeli hegemony by reflecting on social representations of resistance to their perceived oppression and non-recognition. The tone of the semantic bridges across the groups showed it was the Israeli Jewish group who held the possibility of transformation to identify with the Palestinian group through empathy. The two groups do not communicate on equal terms. By exploring these public spheres there is a 'power differential at the level of production, distribution and reception of representations' (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p.24). The recognition of the Other remains central to consensus. This is especially significant as the marginalised group can perceive their positionings as 'being unjustly neglected, excluded and discriminated against and demand recognition of their basic rights' (Maoz & Powell, 2014, p.117).

The asymmetry between the groups is often not recognised in conflict research in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Rouhana, 2004). The reality of the dominant/dominated context is often ignored and it is within this reality that the determining effects of the conflict can be explored. This would require recognition 'to identify different meanings for parties who have unequal power, because they emanate from drastically different collective experiences' (p.42) This, I hope to have achieved by exploring meaning structures across the groups as to what may lie at their imaginary boundaries between them. In the next chapter I will discuss how these boundaries have come to represent inter and intra group positionings and how social representations operate within this dialogue.

6.5. Conclusion

I hoped to convey in this chapter the foundational base of the imagined boundaries that sit between Israeli-Palestinian relationships. Their perceptions demonstrated the asymmetrical nature of the conflict leading to their present stalemate positioning in relation to each other. By exploring themata from each group it was possible to examine their dialogical relationship as how one group's positioning affected the other in a continual cyclical movement. The presence of semantic barriers served to protect their positionings, both within the groups and across them. For the Jewish Israeli group, the themata of threat/security and exclusivity/ inclusivity remained significant in erecting semantic barriers to protect their power base in their continued hegemonic status in relation to the Palestinian group. The themata of non- recognition/recognition and oppression/freedom represented the Palestinian group's positioning, where semantic barriers protected their sense of their weakened status in relation to the Other. To counteract these barriers, semantic bridges were explored to acknowledge that consensus to the Other was also located in the representational field. By empathising and identifying with Palestinian oppression and non-recognition, Israeli Jewish participants exemplified the softening of imagined boundaries by bridging semantic barriers to change the dialogical nature of the relationship to one of recognition. The Palestinian group in turn recognised the Israeli's need for a safe homeland in Israel yet, in their resistance to Israeli hegemony, remained barred from a more transformative relationship of equality due to the continued asymmetrical context. The concluding chapter will explore how all three empirical studies have developed to discuss ways in which intractability can be understood in this particular conflict, by addressing the asymmetrical dialogical relationship that stands between them.

7: Conclusions: Dialogical relationships across intractable conflict

7.1. Introduction

My research journey of this thesis began with an exploration in answer to the question, what does the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mean to the people entrenched within it? On a global level the conflict has dominated Middle East politics for nearly seventy years. A plethora of internationally brokered peace negotiations has risen hopes for a lasting peace between the two peoples, only for them to be undone as a complex weave of differences have blocked a way forward. Collective hopes have been raised and dashed leading to a state of intractability (Bar-Tal, 2013) where possibilities of workable political solution remain elusive and out of sight. Yet not out of mind. Both the Israeli and Palestinian participants, who discussed their representations of the conflict, suggested they held on to the idea that peace may come one day. The findings suggest two rival communities divided by nationalist strivings embedded in an ethos of conflict, where group differences amidst a context of Israeli hegemonic power asymmetry has led to the difficulty in alleviating intractability. Paradoxically, this stronger group is simultaneously the weaker group due to its vulnerability to a perceived threat from the Other, not only from those of Palestinian descent, but a generalised Other. This group master narrative of intractability was evident in interviews with Jewish Israelis. The less powerful group, competing with their own victimhood of perceived injustice, non-recognition and oppression, have become more desperate in wanting a nation of their own on some of the land of their forefathers. This Palestinian master narrative also involves intractability. The continually internationally brokered geographical boundaries that divide the two groups remain imagined.

This final chapter concludes the thesis with a discussion of how each empirical study has complemented one other to both describe the processes of experiences of the conflict from three different vantage points and to offer some theoretical insight to the studies to enable a social psychological study of imagined boundaries across groups in conflict to be interpreted and discussed. The chapter is set out as follows. First, the research direction, to position the

research within the discipline, is discussed before turning to the three empirical studies. Second, the role of intractability of the conflict is discussed using the findings from all three studies to assess the complexity of power relationships across the groups through their dialogical relationships with each other. Third, the empirical and theoretical development that links the three studies is considered before suggesting how a process based social psychology of conflict might be envisaged. Fifth, the possibilities of applying the research findings and future research directions are discussed before discussing the limitations of the thesis. Finally, my modest contributions to social psychology, both in the empirical and theoretical domain, are considered.

7.2. Thematic foundations of the conflict

The first empirical study as discussed in Chapter 4, gathered qualitative data from those who had a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet at the time of the interview were living in London. Their narratives that encapsulated their understanding of the conflict were crucial for my understanding of it. Organising and base themes from the data taken from the transcripts of the interviews provided both a helpful descriptive overview of the conflict as well as the opportunity to think about further interpretation of the thematic content. The reference to historical events was notable for the frequency of their inclusion when there had been no questions about the relevance of the past conflict.

The described base themes set out to give an overview of the two group's positions, both those towards consensus and those towards conflict. Organised under themes of security and ideology, collective agency and collective positioning, I was interested as to how these were mirrored across the groups. In a symmetrical conflict some mirroring would be inevitable. There was a mirror effect in terms of rejection of the Other and nationalistic overtones in themes of conflict across both groups. However, the remaining themes related to power and asymmetry where no mirroring was observed. For the Jewish Israeli group, this was set within themes relating to threat of terrorist attacks, existential fear relating to a generalised Other, victimhood and distrust of the Other. For the Palestinian group, the effects of their more powerless positioning was reflected in themes of dehumanisation, unrecognised, loss of dignity, fear of aggression by

the Israeli military, oppression, hatred of the Other, lack of agency and a deep sense of injustice. The lack of mirroring, points to the conflict as described by those embedded within in it, as asymmetric where one side is all powerful and the other side as having a lack of agency to contribute to future conciliation.

The themes that represented consensus were more symmetrical than those of conflict as they demonstrated more intergroup mirroring. For both groups, themes that related to acknowledgement of the Other, the significance of universal justice through human rights legislation, the significance of a shared past as a base for a shared co-existent future in a possible bi-national state was discussed across both group. Some differences were highlighted that reflected the asymmetry discussed above, such as Jewish responsibility to show empathy for the less powerful group, the importance of recognising the Israeli occupation in the Occupied Territories and an aim to be open to change. For the Palestinian group there was a tendency to discuss the need to involve outside agencies such as the UN and support groups to voice their more powerless positioning. The tendency to present the two groups as roughly equal partners in conflict has generally taken precedence in the research literature, and particularly in western media. The asymmetrical relationship that was evident in the data, is generally not reflected in the research literature and only recently discussed (Rouhana, 2004, Adwan and Bar-On, 2004) to be of significance.

The framing of past events to justify claims and positions was further explored. For Jewish Israelis this tended to claim rights of state and land ownership due to the promises set down in religious documents of thousands of years ago and the legal purchase of land from Palestinians during the early part of the 20th century. The Palestinians, in their defence, gave narratives of their ancestors being forced to leave their homes through Israeli military force in 1948 and subsequently given to Jewish immigrants or demolished, leaving them stranded as refugees in other nations or remaining in their land under Israeli occupation, or as a disadvantaged minority in the modern State of Israel. Their cultural traditions of their lost nationhood were perceived as crucial to their positioning as being Palestinian. The rupture to this national positioning remained foundational to their sense of victimhood, juxtaposed with the triumph of the Jewish Israelis finding a safe haven post Holocaust. However, the safe

haven as envisaged remained in part illusory, as the dialogical relationships across the imaginary borders led to increased conflict with the indigenous and mostly exiled population.

These frozen historical stories (Lázló, 1997) and templates (Wertsch, 2002) that had become an 'essential truth' (Novik 1999) to charter a path based on collective remembering (Lui & Lázló, 2007), continued to be developed by reconstructing the past to understanding present meaning (Tileaga, 2014). The future can be discussed as being mapped by representations of the past (Liu & Hilton, 2005) which is close to Bartlett's thinking (1932) where these representations and memories of the past are actively worked into the present to create new version embedded in the cultural life of the community. Through the objectification and anchoring of these crucial events surrounding events in 1948, as suggested by the narratives of the participants, the dialogical relationship across the groups continued to invade their own nationalist aspirations that continue to develop along their conflicting parameters. The conflict of memories 'between different social groups reminds us that there is no neutral way of representing the past; remembering is always done *from* a social position and *with* cultural tool, such as languages, images and narratives' (Wagoner, 2015, p.161). This has particular resonance in conflicts described as intractable as these constructions of the past feed into societal belief systems (Bar-Tal, 2013). These belief systems can be reformulated as tools of communication in propaganda material (Shlaim, 2009) based on particular historical interpretations that fit a desired political positioning. At the same time, these constructions appeared to be foundational to the participant's narratives about the conflict, as kernels of social knowledge, from where present social representations would have some degree of connection to, that links both the short and the long past to the present (Moscovici & Vignaux, 2000).

The thematic content from this first study in London set out a foundation from which to pursue the social psychological construct of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954). I chose to explore the accounts of Jewish and Palestinian Israeli professional medics who work together under a mutual code of medical ethics, to explore their work and social relationships with the Other. I was interested as to how any kernels of social knowledge that were evident in the first study in the

context of historical representations might be prevalent under different guises in this particular representational field.

7.3. Contact in context

The lived experience of the medics crossing intergroup imagined boundaries in the context of their professional and home environments was discussed in Chapter 5. The significance of context was found to be paramount, as though two distinct different life worlds operated in the same social space, sometimes connected, sometimes apart. If the two groups can co-habit in one context and not in another then it is the context that requires examination as well as the social representations of those who inhabit them. The two contexts can be said to represent two systems, that of an ethos of cooperation and medical ethics in one environment and an ethos of conflict outside of it. Bar-Tal (2013) suggested that an ethos of conflict remains embedded within Israeli society through socialisation, education and public debate. It was further suggested that it was established as a driving force that served as an engine that fuels conflict, and at the same time, as an empowerment to help alleviate the psychological suffering of it. This is contrasted with an ethos of medical ethics that stipulates the prolonging of life for all individuals under a physicians care. A code of medical ethics in Israel through the Israeli Medical Association (IMA) is based on the Hippocrates Oath where the preservation of life remains central to the code as shown in:

(www.ima.org.il/ENG/ViewCategory.aspx?CategoryId=4138)

Valsiner (2008) suggested that the dynamics of peace and war can be culturally regulated through social representations and polemic dialogue to preserve stability, or the opposite, through essentialising the necessary components required for its efficacy. In this case, the ethos of conflict is preserved within Israeli whilst in the medical institution, an alternative set of values dominated the representational field.

It could be argued that the role of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 2000) can explain these separated worlds where individuals operate in different social environments where their social knowledge systems and actions intertwine with a

particular context (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Duveen and de Rosa (1992) suggested that it is the adoption of multiple social identities that can connect to different contexts with specific goals and tasks that gives rise to polyphasia to denote how a variety of social representations can develop, depending on the communicative contexts arising from them. The medics in this second study appeared to cross these two contradistinctive representational fields with apparent ease. I wanted to explore a theoretical path that would enable me to go beyond a thematic description, as I did in the first study, which would relate the data to a foundational base and stretch across different contexts. An analysis based on the identification of themata in the data would allow an uncovering of cultural assumptions (Marková, 2007), both across the groups and between the two contexts. The identified themata, developed through objectification and anchoring would allow common themes across representations that are established over time (Maloney & Walker, 2007). The kernel of social knowledge (Moscovici and Vignaux, 2000) that underpins representations, remain preserved within the community is set within relevant themata. By identifying themata in this population it was possible to discuss their different work / non work contexts as they dialogically related to one another. Each context referred to an alternative bank of social representations connected to each social knowledge systems where each represented polyphasic positionings. The dialectical unity of exploring antinomies within these social representations implicated social knowledge as a dynamic process inbuilt within history and culture, that is both maintained and transformed through communication (Moscovici and Marková, 1998). The identified themata of e*xclusivity/inclusivity* and *threat-security* representing the Jewish Israeli participants and *non-recognition/recognition* and *inequality/equality,* the Palestinian Israelis group, reflected their relationships with the Other in both their professional working life and that outside it. Through a dialogical analysis of each pair of thema it was possible to map how each affected their positioning in relation to the Other, to demonstrate the polyphasic nature of these complex contexts.

7.4. Crossing imagined boundaries

The exploration of semantic barriers and bridges across Jewish Israeli and Palestinian participants as discussed in Chapter 6 reflected their dialogical

relationship that had resulted in a state of stalemate over the preceding seventy years. Themata, interpreted from the narratives of those with direct experience of the conflict was a necessary component to explore the hardening and softening of imagined boundaries between embedded conflict and any possibilities of consensus. Not only did the themata reflect the powerful-powerless reality of the two groups, but they opened the opportunity to explore further the relationship between their concrete experiences and the social representations that had developed over time. By directly exploring related thema pairs across the groups, identified semantic barriers could be discussed to demonstrate how positionings had become structurally and culturally embedded. I discussed how semantic barriers were clustered around three processes of operation. First, as a protector of a group's particular positioning through justification and so dismissing any alternative positioning. Second, as a stalemated positioning leading to no possible alternative outcome and third, as a closed system where loyalty to the group's positioning was considered vital and any deviation from that to seek an alternative understanding was met with strong institutional and social resistance.

However, alternative representations not only entered the representational field of the Other, but also enabled transformation through semantic bridges, leading to the softening of imagined boundaries. I have defined semantic bridges as a conceptual process that holds the possibility of counteracting the effects of semantic barriers within their dialogical relationships, both within and across the groups. Because the data highlighted the dialogical relationships across the groups, based within themata of power-powerless, semantic bridges were thus connected to this and so differed across the groups. For example, semantic bridges may require a shift in the loyalty to one's group to explore and (partially) accept a positioning of the Other. This will be discussed further in relation to transformation and cultural change below.

7.5. Empirical and theoretical development across the thesis

As Marková (2003) suggested, one of the prime aims of social psychology is to identify, describe and analyse the contents of common sense to extract meaning of social knowledge systems in real life situations. The opportunity to explore three vantage points of the representational fields of those with a lived experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was rewarded by the

freedom to follow an empirical and theoretical journey through a grounded theory and ideographic approach. By exploring social representations in the first empirical study, a foundation was set to plan subsequent stages, both in terms of choosing relevant samples and a theoretical stance that would remain exploratory in nature, yet open a discussion about intractable conflict. This trajectory opened up interesting possibilities to follow that would add to each study from the previous knowledge base and so building up a framework from which to understand the social psychology of imagined boundaries that may lie between groups locked in conflict.

The thematic analysis provided a thorough and useful mapping of the groups' positionings from which to develop in subsequent studies. It was within these themes that an array of positionings was found that reflected both their differences and their commonalities to each other. Some of these themes can be described as forms of proto themata reflecting cultural assumptions that had been communicated and developed over time (Markova et al, 2007) to be replaced by themata that contain within them, the problematised issues that related to the perceived kernel of the conflict. The subsequent identification of themata in the study of professional contact in Israel and those between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians representing groups in intractable conflict, served to link together the three empirical chapters with a theoretical connection, each developing one to another.

7.6. Towards a process based social psychology of conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its own characteristics that may differ from other conflicts around the world. We can ask what is the role of social psychology in these areas of intractable conflict? Are there processes that are common to the context of conflict per se and by identifying them this knowledge would be useful as a humanitarian exercise in social change? Wagoner (2014) suggested the significance of processes over entities when exploring a sociocultural approach to peace and conflict. This interest lies in 'dynamic and transformative processes, rather than abstract, universal and de-contextualised entities that are often presumed to exist in individual minds and explain their behaviour (p.187). The importance of the past as a cultural tool to imagine the future through change and stability becomes a necessary trajectory to reflect on

group positioning that guides possible action. The documentation of relevant themata can assist this approach by demonstrating the array of positionings within dialogical relationships both within and across groups, not only in the present, but as a conduit for the future. A structural approach, where an unshakable and stable core and a more malleable periphery relating to contextual entities (Abric, 1993) would suggest the difficulty of significant social change. Yet transformation can occur when core elements such as a persistent belief are contradicted over time and at some point overthrown through tension, fragmentation, negotiation and debate (Maloney & Walker, 2000). Rather than discussing elements of a representation, as in a structural approach, it is the process of the dynamic and dialogical nature of social representations through communication (Liu, 2006) that is significant. The dialectical unity of exploring opposites within social representations implicate social knowledge as a dynamic process inbuilt within history and culture, that is both maintained and transformed through communication (Moscovici and Marková, 1998).

7.6.1. How intractable is intractable conflict?

Intractable conflict has been described by Bar-Tal (2013) as having several contextual characteristics that has a determinative influence on those who are trapped within it. This includes the observation that neither side is willing to compromise as to do so, would mean giving up something essential to the groups' survival as an entity. And so the conflict continues as it remain knowingly unsolvable, leaving violence to call the shots, requiring huge economic resources to run it, immense suffering for both groups and a bleak future as each generation is filled with a desire for power, or to resist a power or to call for revenge for group loss and suffering. As a conflict continues these characteristics become more hardened, more reified and more difficult to break out of the cycle of violence as the ethos of conflict becomes culturally entrenched in daily life.

My question at the beginning of the thesis was an exploratory one, to explore the intractability of a conflict where imagined intergroup boundaries were closed allowing no or little meaningful relationship to develop as each group followed its own and separate trajectory. The structural and political entities in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem do not have total

agency over their future as the conflict is situated within a global arena. The national interests of other states, seeped in their own historical foundations, remain influential partners in the conflict. The shaping of the modern Middle East (Barr 2011) was largely a project by the UK and France as a response to German threat during World War 1 (1914-1918) and their then imperialist aims, with the USA playing a defining role with the UK in Palestine following World War 2 (1939-1945). The USA-Israeli relationship now appears to dominate Israeli foreign policy with the EU as an interested, but less powerful broker, as other players have joined the global arena following the end of the Cold War between USA and NATO allies and the former USSR (1947-1991). The resulting web of complexity playing out in the present day Middle East demonstrates the dialogical relationships across global players since the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, at this international level, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains intractable as global players have been drawn into its internal complexities. Neither did I explore the national contexts as described by Bar-Tal (2013) above, not having the expertise to reflect on this local observation in Israel. Instead, I explored the social representations of those who had a lived experience of the conflict. A challenge was to bring together these different levels of examination, from global, to national, to personal without losing the essence of the notion of intractable conflict.

Doise (1982) as reported in Chapter 2, suggested four levels of social psychological explanation ranging from the individual at level 1, the inter personal and situated context at level II, the positioning of different category membership at level III, and the ideological, at level IV. Doise (1982) did not assume that reality is structured around these four levels, but through analysis of them we can assess them, particularly in the case of conflict where the reality of the perceived social relationships about the Other combines all levels of processes. Stephenson (1981) notes that in any negotiations across groups in conflict it is the discussion of each level of positioning that is significant and needs to be established to interpret opposing points of view and to integrate these when negotiating between them. Doise (1982) suggested that any interactions in negotiations would require the discussion of analysis at levels II (inter personal and situated) and level and III (group membership). Any mediator would need to

take into account the ideological aspects of the conflict, so the analysis of these levels II and III should be added at level IV (ideological) for a complete study of intergroup negotiations and relationships. This observation is relevant in the discussion on intractability and how different levels discuss the phenomenon, each having its own trajectory.

My findings suggest that for the people entrenched within the conflict, those from levels 1 (individual) and II (inter personal and situated), it is not intractable. The imagined boundaries can harden and soften, depending on the situated context juxtaposed with the groups' deep cultural processes that relate to semantic barriers that can close down authentic consensus, or relate to semantic bridges that serve to open them. I will discuss this across five key areas: the dialogical relationship across imagined boundaries that can be discussed in terms of identified themata that acts as a framework for the continuation of the conflict; the semantic barriers that can form from these themata and the bridges that counteract them; the significance of the situated context and contact and finally, the ability individuals and groups to transform over time.

7.6.2. Dialogical relationship across imagined boundaries

There are assumptions that the boundaries between the groups are separate and individualised according to social identities and become closed as the categories that describe them become reified entities (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001; Brewer, 201; Reicher, 2004). Following this avenue, groups are often researched and discussed as separate entities as to how they may relate to others based on their own trajectories, identities, and ideologies. There is also an assumption that the contents of social representations are structural (Marková 2003) and the 'aim of the theory is to identify, describe and analyse these structured contents and meanings' (p.177). The idea that social representations are dialogical processes was a later development of the theory of social representations, developed particularly by Marková (2003) based on the premise that

> 'Dialogicality, it is hypothesised, is the *sine qua non* of the human mind. Dialogicality is the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of the 'Alter.' (Marková, 2003, p.xiii)

Moscovici elaborated his theory in the early 1990's to account for the significance of themata as 'they are dialogical concepts that significantly contribute to the theoretical development of the theory of social representations as a theory of social knowledge' (Marková, 2003, p.181). The focus on antinomies transformed the way in which social knowledge might be observed; the basic unit of 'ego / alter' stands at the base of all relationships, both in the Meadian sense as a 'self / other' pairing with the Other and as a way of relating with other 'self / other' processes. The dialogical self (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2012) acknowledges the variety of a multitude of selves within the individual, both conceptually serving different processes, for example, self-esteem and through self/other ontological experiences that make up the individual's sense of self. The dialogical nature of social representations through the concept of themata not only takes account of the Other, but can develop further Mead's 'self / other' integration to accommodate intergroup dialogical relations. The work of Bakhtin (1895-1975), a Russian critic and theorist, formulated the idea of dialogicality as being fundamental to all human activity. The following quote expresses his interpretation of the dialogical nature of cultural processes, as follows:

> In the realm of culture, outsideness is the most powerful factor in understanding. It is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly … Meaning only reveals its steps once it has encountered and come into contact with another, foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures. We raise new questions for a foreign culture, one that it did not raise itself; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the foreign culture response to us by really revealing to us new aspects and new semantic depths. Such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in managing or mixing, each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched. (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 332/4)

What was evident in my research was first, the identifying of themata that acted as meaningful processes to give an explanatory focus to people's perceptions of their particular positioning in relation to the Other and second, to illustrate how each group was continually effected by the Other. The co-authoring of their relationship was based on a power based asymmetrical

majority/ minority ethos and remained dialogical even though it was based on conflict. However, there appears to be different understandings of the concept of dialogicality within the discipline where the co-authoring of a relationship is dependent on perspectives about the Other but not necessarily in direct communication. Or it can be understood as an exchange where the Other is acknowledged in some meaningful way and when such an exchange is not thought to be present, the relationship is termed as non dialogical where 'dialogical involving co-existence and inclusion … and non-dialogical, involving displacement and exclusion with potential for segregation and even destruction' (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p.143). This contradiction needed clarifying for the interpretation of my data when discussing the intractability across groups.

The closeness of the terms dialogic and dialogue was one that affected my understanding of how these terms might be interpreted. In encounter groups in Israel, contact with the Other was often said to be based on positive dialogue, with the interpretation of dialogue as being a force for good, where through talking and engaging in dialogue, differences of perspectives could be bridged. However, the term dialogue can have different meanings for different contexts. Linell (2009) described three different meanings of the term. The first as an interactive encounter between two or more mutually co-present individuals; second as a 'benevolent communication between equals' (p.5) characterised by symmetry and co-operation as a form of ideal way of communicating (Habermas, 1999). And third, through a dialogical reading, dialogue would be more of an abstract process that would refer to 'any kind of human sense-making, semiotic practice, action, interaction, thinking or communication, as long as the phenomena are "dialogically" understood' (Linell, 2000. p.5/6). It is this latter approach that best fits my positioning. My aim, to explore the space between two groups in conflict, as to what may sit at the imagined boundaries between them can best be described within a dialogical framework where each narrative had been developed through the relationship with the Other, regardless of whether there was direct dialogue or not. Their positionings had been developed over many years of their lived experience and immersion in their cultural representational field where the Other had also lived in their imagination. This relates to one of Bakhtin interpretation suggesting that we are always in dialogue

with other people and everything in the world because everything addresses us in a certain sense (Robinson, 2011).

The dialogical analysis in Chapter 5 was particularly revealing to reflect the power positioning between both groups. This appears to coincide with the majority group having the advantage of heterogeneity for the variety of positionings held, compared with less powerful group, either as Palestinian Israelis as the minority group in a majority Jewish state or as a stateless entity in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The identified themata that reflected the groups' interpreted positions dialogically related to the Other reflected a suggested framework of their perceived sense of understanding and reality towards the Other. From this positioning, the imagined boundaries fluctuated as semantic barriers and bridges hedged the representational landscape.

7.6.3. Intractability: Semantic barriers and bridges developing from themata

The semantic barriers that were identified in Chapter 6 and discussed briefly earlier in the chapter, were grouped around three processes, each fulfilling a different role that affected the intractability across the groups. First, they protected the groups positioning to inhibit any shift from the group's social knowledge system. This was exemplified by the Jewish Israeli semantic barrier of fear and threat and so positioning themselves as victims of Palestinian terrorism to prevent an alternative dialogue that could change the course of the conflict. The themata surrounding oppression/freedom reflected in the Palestinian positioning against Israeli hegemony, can become reified and so entrenched in resistance movements within society and so can also be described as semantic barriers that can enable intractability to continue indefinitely. Second, victimhood for both partners in the conflict can lead to an ethos of intractability itself that can become a semantic barrier as group positions become deeply embedded within the cultural sphere, where each side blames the other for their lack of willingness to pursue consensus rather than conflict. Finally, loyalty to the group's aims was also suggested as a semantic barrier that has the effect of hardening group boundaries, to close, rather than open possibilities of being aware of alternative representations.

The need for a process to counteract these barriers can be discussed at the institutional and the individual level. At the institutional level, intractability can be replaced by a context that promotes consensus, as was shown by the medical sector in Israel where Jewish and Palestinian Israelis work together to promote good health across both groups. The underlying themata between Jewish and Palestinian Israeli medics illustrated their dialogical relationship that shifted from the work context to the one outside of it. The social reality of a shared context had shown how boundaries had been crossed where a positive work environment was appreciated across the groups. The long term effects of meeting in such a context cannot be predicted but deepening relationships across the groups may result in transformation and social change as alternative social representations enter the field. Some of the younger participants had recalled how they had never considered the Palestinian context until they reached medical school when they met and worked with Palestinian Israelis and over time boundaries began to shift towards recognising the Other. The recognition of the Other across both groups acted as a semantic bridge across their imagined boundaries, as was demonstrated by the flourishing medic relationships within the medical context. The latent effects (Marková 2000) remain a factor within the representational field, not only as a positive force as in the case of close contact under conditions of less tension and more negative when the context can change. For example, during the war in Gaza, the once close professional relationship changed into one of more tension, as the Jewish Israeli themata of threat/security became more active and then subsided into less tension related to the ending of hostilities. In the future, these relationships may change yet again as other contexts that cannot be foretold become more salient.

7.6.4. Acknowledging the Other: Transformation and change

At the social individual level, recognition of the Other for both groups was found to be central to boundary formation. The Israeli soldier who recognised the suffering of the Other when experiencing a young Palestinian child crying through terror, juxtaposed with the young Palestinian man who recalled his own suffering as a child in similar circumstances, is one example. This dialogical relationship between them had transformed the Israeli soldier to reconsider his positioning resulting in adopting a more left-wing or ‘doveish’ one that

represented a semantic bridge to cross the imagined boundary to acknowledge the Others' suffering. Whilst for the Palestinian young man the experience had the opposite effect by closing any imagined boundary between them.

Encounter groups to bring young Israeli and Palestinian people together were discussed in Chapter 5 with mixed results, dependent on the context and power asymmetry (Hammack, Piliecki and Merrilees, 2014; Maoz, 2001, 2004, 2011). To acknowledge the Other, by laying quiet previous social representations and activating with alternative representations to transform a positioning within relevant themata, needs an approach that touches a social knowledge system enough to have an effect. The Robber's Cave experiments set up by Sherif (1967) remain as interesting now as they did nearly fifty years ago, demonstrating how competitive and cooperative games and activities led to different outcomes of behaviour that can give rise to hostility, solidarity or cooperativeness through different contexts. A more recent example in Israel involved Jewish and Palestinian Israeli university students meeting weekly over the course of a year to take on the role of activists to promote co-existence across the group (Hager, Saba and Shay, 2011). By jointly examining power structures between the groups, the students attempted to reduce the structural inequality that was felt to be a reality. By motivating students to transform their own existing social knowledge systems they formed united groups to effect social-political change with greater equality and opportunities for meaningful dialogue across the groups.

Peace organisations in Israel and Palestine have developed since the 1960's in an attempt to go beyond social knowledge systems of conflict to those towards consensus. Some one hundred and fifty groups are active (Hermann, 2009) in Israel to promote acknowledgment of the Other to resist Israeli hegemony and to promote a more hopeful future. For example, Breaking the Silence (2012) is one such organisation where Israeli soldiers have documented their experiences that have affected them in some meaningful way, be it through seeing the suffering of others or ordered to carry out a procedure that was felt to go against their own personal social knowledge system. The Parents Circle, established in 1995 is a joint Palestinian and Israeli organisation consisting of 600 families who have all suffered from the loss of a close family member as a

result of the conflict. It was begun when several bereaved Israeli families contacted Palestinian families to acknowledge their joint suffering. It developed into an organisation where members identified with the call to prevent further loss of life through tolerance, dialogue, peace and reconciliation, (www.theparentscircle.com). These and many other groups exemplify how groups in conflict can also transform to groups in consensus by reacting to experiences that have allowed a semantic bridge to be opened where recognition of the Other remains paramount on some meaningful cultural level. However, asymmetric power struggles and diverse social knowledge systems that mirror those within Israel and across the geopolitical borders in the West Bank. Gaza and East Jerusalem have, over time, become less politically successful then was first envisaged (Hermann, 2009).

7.6.5. Applications and future research

All the participants talked of their future hopes for consensus rather than conflict, and yet aware of the difficulties of achieving that in their lifetime. Social representations of both consensus and conflict were narrated through the medium of particular themata that reflected the kernels related to its development. Any future programme that explores the ways in which these conflicting groups, whether Jewish with Palestinian Israeli or Jewish Israeli with Palestinian might acknowledge the Other, should find a process approach useful. By taking note of significant themata for each group, dialogically related to the other, yet set within the power asymmetry that was evident, research programmes could be designed to include these insights. The role of the past was established in this thesis pointing to particular events that had become meaningful as reified constructs within the representational field that remained active in the present. It would be advantageous if a top down reconciliation programme based on fairness and legitimacy included the significance of the past when planning the future in the form of relevant themata. This approach would take into account the symbolic value of such a process as well as the role of including the voices of those integral to the conflict being heard (Obradovic and Howarth, 2015). The inclusion of semantic barriers and bridges would also be of benefit in any bottom up reconciliation process to allow people to politically engage in both the

construction and the shaping of representations that reflect their present and future reality (Howarth, Andreouli and Kessi, 2014).

For further research programmes, it would be interesting to first, compare these findings with other global conflicts, to explore the differences across local socio-cultural contexts. Second, it would be useful to widen the sample base to explore how other groups within the same conflict perceive group relationships, for example, orthodox and religious groups across both groups. Opinion polls in Israel show that Jewish Israeli public support for the Oslo Peace Process (1994) waned between 1994 and 2008 from a high of 60% in 1994 to a low of 35% in 2008. However the graph changed when a secular background was compared with a religious one, resulting in a secular result of 68% in 1995 to 48% in 2008; orthodox results as 38% in 1994 to 12% in 2008 and an ultra-orthodox result of 8% to 1% (Hermann 2009, p.276). Themata from these groups might show a different foundation to their perceptions of the conflict which would be interesting to examine when discussing the ontology of conflict relationships. Finally, it would be interesting to explore post conflict groups along a similar trajectory, for example, samples from Northern Ireland, and the Baltics to examine contextual themata to demonstrate the effects of transformation over time.

7.7. Limitations of the research

As discussed in Chapter 3, the samples chosen for my empirical studies, were from a small and select population with experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the findings can be described as being robust as a reflection of this particular population, they cannot be used as an example of an overall insight into the conflict. However, it is within these population groups that the next generation will come of age and contribute to their relevant societies. Further research would be needed to clarify other positionings from a wider population. My positioning as a researcher is also significant. My subjective experience as well as belonging to different social knowledge systems can be perceived as being both an advantage and disadvantage. I may have been perceived as a member of the international community and therefore one that is open to diverse set of views, but on the other hand there is the possibility the participants told me what they thought I wanted to hear and what they would like the international

community to know, rather than a reality that more closely matches their own subjectivity.

The theory of social representations has been my theoretical partner throughout this thesis. However, a crucial component of social representations theory is the way in which social representations are communicated throughout society. I have not included these processes even though it would have greatly added to my findings. Although I have argued that intergroup relationships remain dialogical, I have not discussed how communication can be monological in some particular contexts, for example in the dissemination of information through propaganda. The role of communication, particularly through the media is a significant component of conflict.

Finally, I am also aware of the political sensitivity of the conflict and how I might be judged as taking or developing a biased positioning from those who might follow an overt political trajectory. I have used the voices of the participants to inform my knowledge base and it is their voices and their perspectives that tell the story that I have narrated on their behalf.

7.8. Contributions to social psychology

My modest empirical contribution includes the capturing and discussion of the social representations that lie at the imagined boundaries of two groups in conflict, rather than looking at two groups in isolation, operating as separate processes. By exploring their joint experiences it was possible to deduce the kernels of social knowledge that may lie at the base of their dialogical perceptions of each other. By repeating this strategy in two environments, one between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living in London and one between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis in Israel, it was possible to compare how each perceived the Other across these contextualised relationships. The third sample using both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians gave the opportunity to further discuss the two groups in conflict that replicated the reality of the conflict. Finally, the inclusion of the past through historical narratives that formed the framework for the objectification and anchoring of social representations of the present was an empirical finding that will add to the literature on intractable conflict.

My theoretical contribution focuses on the development of the concept of themata between the groups as described above and how that has been useful in exploring the perceived kernels of the conflict for these populations. Further, by using themata as a base for the medics in Israel it was possible to compare their dialogical relationships both in and out of the working environment to highlight group differences along these trajectories. By doing so, it was possible to chart these differences and discuss this in terms of key social psychological theory, such as the contact hypothesis. Further, the development of the concept of semantic barriers within a framework of relevant themata was a novel and revealing way to explore how imagined boundaries between conflicted groups can be hardened under particular contexts. The introduction of the concept of semantic bridges to counter the effects of semantic barriers opens the opportunity to examine how groups hold the possibility of transformation and change even when embedded in conflict. Both the concepts of semantic barriers and bridges require further development and I hope their inclusion here can be part of that empirical and theoretical journey.

7.9. Conclusion

This concluding chapter summarised the three empirical studies, demonstrating how one study influenced the preparation of the following one both empirically and theoretically. The overall motivation for the thesis remained an exploratory one using a grounded theory approach to build a framework based on the meaningful perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from those entrenched within it. The first study provided a descriptive overview and a thematic baseline from which to draw preparatory conclusions. The antinomy of conflict and consensus exemplified both the polarity and the presence of polyphasic positionings across the representational field. Collective memory played a crucial part in the perceptions of those with experience of the conflict demonstrating how events had been objectified and anchored within the development of social representations surrounding perceptions of the conflict. The second study developed a theoretical argument around the plausibility of themata as an instrument in exploring two different contexts where conflicting groups work together on an equal basis yet live apart in an unequal alternative reality. The processes uncovered by using themata were particularly useful in exploring these

alternative realities that allowed an opportunity to explore their intergroup dialogical relationships. The third study developed this further by the identification of semantic barriers and bridges that stood at the imagined boundaries of the groups, demonstrating how they could be hardened, softened or even crossed under particular sociocultural contexts.

The three studies were linked by these theoretical developments that demonstrated both the intractability of the conflict and the areas in which transformation away from conflict and towards consensus remains a possibility. By following a process approach rather than one that remains at the level of examining entities, it is suggested that by taking note of relevant themata across and between groups, we can develop a social psychology of conflict based on the dialogical nature of its foundations.

8 Bibliography

Abric, J. C. (1993) Central system, peripheral system: the functions and roles in the dynamics of social representations. *Papers on Social Representations,* 2, 75-78.

Abu-Ghazaleh, A. (1972) Arab cultural nationalism in Palestine during the British mandate. *Journal of Palestine studies*, 1 (3), 37-63.

Adwan, S., & Bar-On, D. (2004). Shared History Project: a PRIME example of peace-building under fire. *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society.* 17 (3), 513-521.

Ali, N., & Inbar, S. (2011). *Who is in favour of equality? Equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel.* Summary of an opinion survey. Sikkuy Association for the advancement of civic equality in Israel.www.sikkuy.org.il

Allport,, G.W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice.* Cambridge,M.A: Addison-Wesley.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities*. London: Verso.

Atif Imtiaz, S.M. (2011). *Wandering lonely in a crowd: reflections on the Muslim condition in the West.* London: Kube.

Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: An analytical tool for qualitative research, *Qualitative Research,* 1 (3), 385-405.

Augoustinos, M., & Walker, I. (1995). *Social Cognition. An integrated Introduction.* London: Sage.

Azar, E.E. (1990). *The management of protracted conflict*. Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing.

Bakhtin, M.M. (1986*). Speech genres and other late essays.* (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, (Ed.); V.W. McGee, (Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Barak-Erez. D. (2006). Israel: The security barrier between international law, constitutional law, and domestic judicial review. *International Journal of Constitutional Law.* 4 (3), 540-552.

Barr, J. (2011). *A line in the sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East.* London: Simon & Schuster.

Bar-Tal, D. (1990.) Israel-Palestinian Conflict: A cognitive analysis. *International Journal of intercultural relations,* 14, 7-29.

Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From Intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. *Political Psychology.* 21, 351-365.

Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflicts. *American Behavioural Scientist,* 50 (11), 1430-1453.

Bar-Tal, D. (2011*). Intergroup conflicts and their resolution.* London & New York: Psychology Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2013) *Intractable conflicts: Socio-Psychological foundations and dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2014). Collective memory as social representations. *Papers on Social Representations, 23, 5.1-5.26.*

Bar-Tal, D., & Antebi, D. (1992) Siege mentality in Israel, *Papers on Social Representations,* 1 (1), 49-67.

Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001, The effects of major event on stereotyping: Terrorist attacks in Israel and Israeli adolescents perceptions of Palestinians, Jordanians and Arabs. *European Journal of Social Psychology.* 31, 265-280.

Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution.* London & New York: Psychology Press.

Barthes, R. (1967). *Elements of Semiology.* New York: Hill and Wang.

Barthes, R. (1957). *Mythologies.* (Trans.), A. Lavers. *Mythologies:* The complete edition, (2013), New York: Hill and Wang

Bartlett, F.C. (1932/1995). *Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bauer, M.W & Aarts, B. (2000). Corpus construction: a principle for qualitative data collection. In M.W. Bauer & G. Gaskell. *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook.* London: Sage.

Bauer, M.W., and Gaskell, G. (1999). Towards a paradigm for research on social representations. *Journal for Theory of Social Behaviour. 29* , 163-186.

Bauer, M.W., and Gaskell, G. (2000). *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook.* London: Sage.

Bazeley, P (2007). *Qualitative data analysis with NVivo.* London: Sage.

Bekerman, Z. (2007.) Freethinking intergroup encounters: Rescuing Praxis from theory, activity from education, and peace/coexistence identity and culture. *Peace education* 4 (1), 29-41.

Bekerman, Z., Habib, A., & Shhadi, N. (2011). Jewish-Palestinian integrated education in Israel and its potential influence on national and /or ethnic identities and ingroup relations. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 37 (3), 389-405.

Berger, P.L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Bhatia, S. (2002). Acculturation, dialogical voices in the construction of the diasporic self. *Theory and Psychology,* 12, 55-77.

Billig, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorization and particularisation: from a perceptual to a rhetorical approach. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 15, 70-103.

Billig, M. (1987). *Arguing and thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Billig, M. (1988). Social representation, objectification and anchoring: A rhetorical analysis, *Social Behaviour.* 3,1-16.

Billig, M. (1991). Ideology & opinions: Studies in rhetorical psychology. London. Sage.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism: Theory, culture and society*. London: Sage.

Billig, M. (2002). Henri Tajfel's 'Cognitive aspects of prejudice' and the psychology of bigotry. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 41 (2),171-188.

Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M. Middleton, D., & Ridley, A. (1988*) Ideological Dilemmas: A Social psychology of everyday thinking.* Sage: London.

Boyatziz, R. (1998). *Transforming quantitative information: thematic analysis and code development.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Braithwaite, V. (2009). Security and harmony value orientations and their roles in attitude formation and change, *Psychological Inquiry,* 20, 87-97.

Breaking the Silence, (2012). *Our harsh logic. Israeli's soldiers' testimonies from the Occupied Territories, 2000-2010.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Breakwell G. & Canter, D (Eds.). *Empirical approaches to social representations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Brewer, M. (2001). Intergroup Identification and Intergroup conflict. In R. Asmore, L.Jussim, and D.Wilder (Eds). *Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict Reduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brewer, M. (2011). Identity and Conflict. In D. Bar-Ta.l (Ed). *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: A social psychological perspective.* New York, London: Psychology Press.

Brislin, R.W. (1981). *Cross cultural encounters*. New York: Pergamon.

Brown R., & Hewstone, M. (2005). An integrative theory of intergroup contact. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology.* 37, 255-34.

Bizmumic, B.,Stubager, R., Mellon, S., Iyer, R., & Jones, B.M. (2013). On the (in)compatibility of attitudes toward peace and war. *Political Psychology*, 34 (5). 673-693.

Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (2004). Life as narrative. *Social Research.* 71 (3), 691-710

Buber , M. (1965). *The knowledge of man.* M. Friedman (Ed.), London: George Allen & Unwin.

Carr, D. (2008). Narrative explanation and its malcontents. *History and Theory,* 47 (1), 19-30.

Cash, J.D. (1996). *Identity, ideology and conflict. The structuration of politics in Northern Ireland.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapais, B. The Deep Structure of Human Society: Primate Origins and Evolution. In S Sturmer & M.Snyder (Eds.), *Psychology of helping: New directions in group prosocial behaviour.* London: Blackwell.

Condor, S. (2006). Temporality and collectivity: Diversity, history and the rhetorical construction of national entitativity. *British Journal of Social Psychology.* 45 (4), 657-682.

Corbetta, P., Cavezza, N. & Roccato, M. (2009). Between ideology and social representations: Four theses plus (a new) one on the relevance and the meaning of the political left and right. *European Journal of Political Research.* 48, 622-641.

Cornish,F.,Zittoun,T & Gillespie,A (2007). A cultural psychological reflection on collaborative research. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research,* 8 (3), Art 21.

Desivilya, H. A, (1998). Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel: The role of joint professional teams. *Journal of Peace Research.* 35 (4), 429-452.

Dixon, J., & Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2005). Beyond the optimal strategy: A 'reality check' for the contact hypothesis. *American Psychologist.* 60, 697-711.

Dixon, J., Levine, M., Reicher, S., & Durrheim, K. (2012). Beyond Prejudice: Are negative evaluations the problem and is getting us to like one another more the solution? *Behavioural and Brain Sciences,* 35 (6) 411-466.

Doise, W. (1982). *Levels of explanation in social psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Doise. W. (2013), *Human rights as social representations.* Hogboken: Taylor & Francis.

Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., & Saguy, T. (2009). Commonality and the complexity of 'we': Social attitudes and social change. *Personality and Social Psychology Review.* 13, 3-20.

Duveen, G. (2001). Representations, identities, resistance. In K.Deaux and G.Philogène (Eds). *Social representation: Introduction and explorations.* Oxford: Blackewell.

Duveen, G. (2008). Social Actors and Social Groups: A Return to Heterogeneity in Social Psychology. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 38 (4), 369 – 374.

Duveen, G. & Lloyd, B. (1986). The significance of social identities. British Journal of Social Psychology,25, pp. 219-230.

Duveen, G., & de Rosa, A.S. (1992). Social representations and the genesis of social knowledge. Papers on Social Representations. 1 (2), 94-108.

Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology: an introduction.* London: Verso.

Echebarría Echabe, A. (1997). Socio-psychological approaches to racism: A critical review. *Papers in Social Representations*, 6:1-12.

Fereday, J., & Cochrane, E.M. (2006). Demonstrating rigour using thematic analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive deductive coding and theme development. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods,* 5 (1), 80-92.

Farr, R. M. (1982). Interviewing: The social psychology of the interviews. In F. Fransella. (Ed.), *Psychology for occupational therapists.* London: Macmillan.

Farr, R.M. (1996) *The Roots of Modern Psychology.* Oxford: Blackwell

Farr, R.M., & Marková, I. (1995). *Representations of health, illness and handicap*. Chur: Harwood Academic.

Federico, C.M., & Weber, C.R. (2013) Moral foundations and heterogeneity in ideological preferences. *Political psychology.* 34 (1) pp.107-126

Flick, U. (2007). *Managing quality in qualitative research: Concepts of triangulation*. London: Sage.

Flick, U. & Foster, J. (2008). Social representations. *The Sage handbook of qualitative research in Psychology*. (Eds.). C.Willig & W. Staintin-Rogers. London: Sage.

Gadamer, H.G. (1987). The problem of historical consciousness. In P.Rainbow and W.M.Sulllivan (Eds.). *Interpretive Social Science: A second look*. Berkley:University of California Press.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace and peace reseach. *Journal of Peace Research.* 3, 176-191.

Gaskell, G. (2000). Individual and group interviewing. In M.Bauer and G. Gaskell (Eds.), *Qualitative researching: Text, Image and Sound*. London: Sage, 38-56.

Gaskell, G., & Bauer, M.W. (Eds.). (2000). *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook.* London: Sage.

Gaskell, G., & Bauer, M.W. (1999). Towards a Paradigm for the Research on Social Representations. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.* 29 (2) pp. 163-186.

Gergen, K.J. (2000). From Identity to Relational Politics. In L. Holzman and J. Morss (Eds.), *To Postmodern Psychologies, Societal Practice, and Political Life.* New York and London: Routledge.

Gergen, K. J. (2007). Relativism, Religion, and Relational Being. *Common Knowledge*. 13, 362-378.

Gillespie, A. (2008). Social representations, alternative representations and semantic barriers. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.* 38 (4), 375-391.

Gillespie, A., Cornish, F., Aveling, E.A., & Zittoun, T. (2008). Conflicting community commitments: A dialogical analysis of a British woman's World War II diaries. *Journal of Community Psychology*. 36 (1), 35-52.

Gillespie,A., & Cornish, F. (2010). Intersubjectivity: Towards a dialogical analysis. *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour,* 40 (1), 19-46.

Gillespie, A., Kadianaki, I., & O'Sullivan-Lago, R. (2011). *Encountering Alterity: Geographic and Semantic Movements.* In J.Valsiner (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gillespie, A., Howarth, C., & Cornish, F. (2012). Four problems for researchers using social categories. *Culture and Psychology,* 18 (3), 391-402.

Gillespie, A., & Cornish, F. (2014). Sensitizing questions: A method to facilitate analysing the meaning of an utterance. *Integrated Psychology Behaviour.* Published online, 2014.

Gioia, D.A., Corley, K.G., & Hamilton, A.L. (2013). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research. *Organizational Research Methods.* 16 (1), 15-31.

Glaser, B.G. (2010). The future of grounded theory. *The Grounded Theory Review.* 9 (2), 1-14.

Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Goldberg, D.J. (1996) *To the Promised Land: a history of Zionist Thought*. London: Penguin.

Goldberg, D.J. (2012). *This is not the way: Jews, Judaism and Israel*. London: Faber and Faber.

Gorni, Y. (1996). The historical reality of constructive socialism. *Israel Studies Vol 1, (1). 295-305.*

Guilmartin, J.F. (1998). Ideology and conflict: the walls of the Ottoman Empire, 1453 to 1606. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History,*18(4), 721-747.

Halbwachs, M. (1952/1992). *On collective memory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Habermas, J. (1999). *On the pragmatics of communication.* (Ed.), M. Cooke. Cambridge:Polity Press

Hager, T., Saba, T., & Shay, N. (2011). Jewish Arab activism through dialogical encounters: Changing an Israeli campus. *Journal of Peace Education. 8 (2), 193-211*

Hallward,M.C. (2007). Bounding societi(es). Belonging and categories of identification n Israel / Palestine. *Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities.* 7 (2), 85-104.

Hallward, M.C. (2009). Creative Responses to Separation: Israeli and Palestinian Joint Activism in Bi'in. *Journal of Peace Research,* 46 (4), pp 541-558.

Halperin, E. (2008). Group-based hatred in intractable conflict in Israel. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 52, 713-736.

Halperin, E., & & Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to peace making: An empirical examination within Israeli Jewish society. *Journal of Peace Research. 48 (5), 637-651.*

Halperin, E., & Gross, J. Intergroup anger in intractable conflict: Long term sentiments predict anger responses during Gaza War. *Group Processes & Intergroup relations.* 14 (4). 477-488.

Hammack, P.L. (2010). The cultural psychology of Palestinian youth: a narrative approach. *Cultural Psychology* 16, 507-512.

Hammack, P.L. (2011a). Narratives and politics of meaning, *Narrative Inquiry,* 21 (2) 311-318.

Hammack, P.L (2011b) *Narrative and the politics of identity: The cultural psychology of Israeli and Palestinian youth, culture and identity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hammack, P., & Pilecki, A. (2012). Narrative as a root metaphor for Political Psychology. *Political Psychology*. 33 (1), 75-103.

Hammack, P.L., Pilecki, A., & Merrilees, C. (2014). Interrogating the process and meaning of intergroup contact: Contrasting theoretical approaches. Journal of *Community and Applied Social Psychology*. 24, 296-324.

Hanafi, S. (2005). Reshaping geography: Palestinian community networks in Europe and the new media. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 31 (3), 581-598.*

Harkabi, Y. (1977). *Arab strategies and Israel's response.* New York: Free Press.

Harré, R., & Secord, P.F. (1972). *The explanation of social behaviour. Oxford: Blackwell.*

Harre, R., & Moghaddam, F. (2003). *The self and other.* London: Praeger.

Helman, S. (2002). Monologic results of dialogue: Jewish-Palestinian encounter groups as sites of essentialization. *Identities.* 9 (3), 327-354.

Hermann, T.S. (2009). *The Israeli peace movement. A shattered dream.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hermans, H.J.M. (2002). The dialogical self as society of mind: Introduction. *Theory and Psychology.* 12, 147-160.

Hermans, H.J.M., & Hermans-Konopka, A. (*2012*). *Dialogical Self Theory: positioning and counter positioning in a globalising society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hewstone, M., & Greenland, K. (2000). Intergroup Conflict. *International Journal of Psychology.* 35 (2), 136-144.

Hewstone, M., & Swart, H., (2011). Fifty-odd years of intergroup contact: From hypothesis to integrated theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology.* 50, 374-386.

Hilal, J. (2010). The polarization of the Palestinian political field. *Journal of Palestine Studies.* 39 (3). 24-39.

Howarth, C.S. (2006). A Social representation is not a quiet thing: Exploring the critical potential of social representations theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology. 45 (1), 65-86.*

Howarth. C. (2009). 'I hope we don't have to understand racism one day'. Researching or reproducing 'race' in social psychological research? *British Journal of Social Psychology,* 48 (3), 407-426.

Howarth, C.S. (2011). Identity and resistance in communication. In D. Hook, B. Franks, and M. Bauer (Eds.). *Communication and culture: The social psychology perspective.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Howarth, C., Nicholson, C., & Whitney, T., (2013). Stigma. In L.Mason (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Race and Racism,* (4),140-145. Detroit: Gale.

Howarth, C., Campbell, C., Cornish, F., Franks, B., Garcia-Lorenzo, L., Gillespie, A., Gleibs, I., Goncalves-Portelinha, I., Jovchelovitch, S., Lahlou, S., Mannell, J., Reader, T., & Tennant, C. (2013) Insights from Societal Psychology: A contextual politics of societal change. *Journal of*

Social and Political Psychology. 1 (1), 364-384.

Howarth, C., Andreouli, C., & Kessi, S. (2015). Social Representations and the politics of participation. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Political Psychology*. (Ed.), P.Nesbitt-Larking, C.Kinnvall & T. Capelos. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hughes, J., Campbell, A., & Jenkins, R. (2011). Contact, trust and social capital in Northern Ireland: a qualitative study of three mixed communities. *Ethnic and racial studies* 34, (6), 967-985.

Jackson, J.W. (1993). Realistic group conflict theory: A review and evaluation of the theoretical and empirical literature. *Psychological Record.* 43 (3), 395-495.

Jackson, M. (2002). *The Politics of Storytelling: Violence, transgression and intersubjectivity*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.

Jodelet, D. (1991). *Madness and social representations* (G. Duveen, Ed., & T. Pownall, Trans.). London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Joffe, H. & Staerklé, C. (2007). The centrality of the self-control ethos in Western aspersions regarding outgroups: A social representational approach to stereotype content. *Culture & Psychology.* 13 (4), 395-418.

Jost, J.T., & Banaji, M.R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*. 33, 1-27.

Jost, J.T., Glaser,J., Kruglanski, A.W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism is motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin.* 129. pp.339-375.

Jost, J. T., Ledgerwood, A., & Hardin, C.D. (2008). Shared reality, system justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2, 171-186.

Jost, J.T, Federico, C.M., & Napier, J.L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60. pp 307-337.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). *Knowledge in Context: Representations, community and culture.* London and New York: Routledge.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2012). Narrative, memory and social representations: A conversation between history and social psychology. *Integrative Psychological and Behavioural Science,* 46 (4), 440-456.

Jovchelovitch, S. (2001). Social representations, public life and social construction. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene, *Representations of the social*. London, England: Blackwell.

Jovchelovitch, S. & Bauer, M.W. (2000). Narrative interviewing. In M.W. Bauer, & G. Gaskell, (Eds.), *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook.* London: Sage.

Khalidi, R. (2010). *Palestinian identity: The construction of modern national consciousness.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Kanaaaneh, R.A., & Nusair, I. (2010*). Displaced at Home: Ethnicity and Gender among Palestinians in Israel.* New York: State University of New York Press.

Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies. *History and Theory*, 41, 179-197.

Katz,Y., & Kahanov, Y. (1990) A review of dilemmas in facilitating it encounter groups between Jews and Arabs in Israel. *Megamot*, 33 (1), 29-47.

Kelman, H.C. (1998). The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: the role of the other in existential conflicts. *Journal of Social Issues, 55,* pp.581-600.

Kelamn, H.C. (1999). The interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: The role of the other in existential conflicts. *Journal of Social Issues,* 55, 581-600.

Kelman, H.C. (2004). *Comparing Reconciliation actions within and between countries*. In Y. Bar-Simon-Tov (Ed.), From conflict resolution to reconciliation (pp.111-124). Oxford,N.Y: Oxford University Press.

Khalidi, R. 2006. *The Iron Cage: The story of the Palestinian struggle for Statehood*. Oxford: Oneoworld.

Kleinman, S., Stenross, B., & McMahon, M. (1994). Privileged fieldwork over interviews: consequences for identity and practices. *Symbolic Interaction,* 17(1), 37-50.

Kohlberg , L. (1984). *The psychology of moral development: Essays in moral development. (Vol. 2).* San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kriesberg, L. (1998) *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution.* Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kriesberg, L. (2012). Mediation in Conflict Systems. *Systems Research and Behavioural Science.* 29 (2), 149-162.

Kristeva, J. (1993). *Nations without nationalism.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Lakin, M. (1969). Some ethical issues in sensitivity training. *American Psychologist,*24 (10) pp. 923-928.

Lavi, R., Canetti, D., Sharvit, K., Bar-Tal, D., & Hobfoll, S. (2014). Protected by ethos in a protracted conflict: A comparative study among Israelis and

Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58, (1), 68-92.

Lázló, J. (1997). Narrative organisations of social representations. *Papers on Social Representations, 6 (2), 155-172.*

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1970). *The raw and the cooked*. New York: Harper and Row

Lewin, K. (1936). *Principles of topological psychology.* London: McGraw-Hill.

Lui, L. (2006). Sensitising concept, themata and sharedness: A diaological perspective of social representations. *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour* 34 (3) 249-264.

Liu, J.H. & Hilton, D.J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their role in identity politics. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44 (4), 537-556.

Liu J.H & Lázló J (2007*).* A narrative theory of history and identity: Social identity, social representations, society and the individual. In G. Maloney and I Walker (Eds.). *Social representations and identity: Content process and power*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Linell, P. (2009). *Rethinking language, mind and world dialogically: Interactional and contextual theories of human sense-making.* Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.

Lott, A.J. & Lott, B.E. (1965). Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: Review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. *Psychological Bulletin, 64, 259 – 309.*

Lyotard, J.F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Makkawi, I.A. (1999) Collective identity development and related social psychological factors and Palestinian student activists in Israeli universities. Doctoral thesis; Kent State University, Ohio.

Malinowski, B. (1989*). A diary in the strict sense of the term*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Maloney, G., Gamble, M., Hayman, J., & Smith, G. (2015). Without anchor: Themata and blood donation. *Papers on Social Representations 2015, in press.*

Maloney, G. & Walker, I. (2000). Messiahs, Pariahs and Donors: The development of social representations of organ transplants. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (2) 203 – 227.*

Mana, A., Orr, E. & Mana, Y. (2009). And Integrated Acculturation Model of the Immigrants'Social Identity. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 149 (4) pp.450-473.*

Maoz, I. (2001). Participation, Control, and Dominance in Communication Between Groups in Conflict: Analysis of Dialogues Between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. *Social Justice Research.* 14 (2) pp. 189-208.

Maoz, I. (2004). Coexistence is in the eye of the beholder: Evaluating intergroup encounter interventions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. *Journal of Social Issues. 60 (2), 437-452.*

Maoz, I. (2010). Asymmetric struggle for the hearts and minds of viewers: Can the media trigger sympathy towards terrorists. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict.* 3 (2), 99-110.

Maoz, I. (2011). Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. *Journal of Peace Research, 48, (1), 115-125.*

Maoz, I., & McCauley, C. (2005). Psychological correlates of support for compromise: A polling study of Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Political Psychology.* 26 (5). 791-808.

Maoz, I.M., & Powell, B.M. (2014). Revisiting barriers to conflict resolution: Perspectives in power, relationships and application to practice. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways towards terrorism and genocide.*7:2-3, 115-119,

Marková, I, (1982). *Paradigms, thought and language.* Chichester: John Wiley & Sins

Marková, I. (2000). Amédéé or how to get rid of it: Social representations from a dialogical perspective. *Culture & Psychology*, 6 (4) 419-460.

Marková, I. (2003). *Dialogicality and social representations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marková, I. (2007). *Themata in dialogue.* In Dialogue in focus Groups: Exploring socially shared knowledge. (Eds.), I. Marková, P.Linell, M.Grossen, & A.S. Orvig. London: Equinox.

Marková, I. (2008). The epistemological significance of the theory of social representations. *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 38 (4), 461-487.*

Marková, I. (2012). Objectification in common sense thinking. *Mind, Culture, and Activity,* 19, 207–221.

Mazur , L. (2014). The social psychology of intractable conflicts. *Culture & Psychology.* 20 (2), 276-281.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Miller, D.R. (1961). *Personality and social interaction*. In B. Kaplan ,(Ed) Studying personality cross culturally. Evanston: Row and Peterson.

Miller, J. & Glassner, B. (2011) *The "inside" and the "outside": Finding realities in interviews*. In D.Silverman (Ed.) Qualitative Research. London: Sage

Minard , R.D. (1956). Race relations in the Pocohontas coal field. *Journal of Social Issues,* 29-44.

Mink, L. (1987). Narrative from as cognitive instruments. In B. Fay, E.O. Golob and R.T. Vann, (Eds.), *Historical Understanding.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Mirsky, Y (1982). Israel's hatred and its lesson. March 5th. Hatzofe. P8 Ch 2 (Israel history)

Mitrani, M. (2013). (Re-) telling societal beliefs. Changing narratives in Israel's political discourse regarding transitions to peace. International Journal of Conflict Management. 24 (3), 245-264.

Monteagudo, J.G. (2011). Jerome Bruner and the challenges of the narrative turn. *Narrative Inquiry,* 21 (2), 295-302.

Moghaddam, F., Harré, R., & Lee, N. (Eds.). (2008). *Global conflict resolution through positioning analysis*. New York: Springer.

Moscovici, S. (1961/2008). *Psychoanalysis:Its image and its public.* (Trans.), by D. Macey. Cambridge: Polity Press. *La psychoanalyse, son image et son public.* Paris: PUF, 2nd revised edition, (first edition 1961).

Moscovici, S. (1976). Social Influence and Social Change. *European Monologues in Social Psychology (10), Academic Press.*

Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of Social Representations. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 18, pp. 211-250.

Moscovici,S (1992). La Nouvelle Pensee Magique. *Bulletin de Psychologie*, 45 (405). Pp. 301-323

Moscovici, S. (1993). *The invention of society: Psychological explanations for social phenomena.* Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.

Moscovici, S. (2000). *Social Representations: Explorations in social psychology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moscovici, S. (2001). Why a theory of social representations? In K. Deaux and G. Philogène (Eds.), *Representations of the social.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Moscovici, S., & Perez, J.A. (1997). Representations of Society and Prejudices. *Papers on Social Representations.* 6 (1) pp.27-36.

Moscovici, S. & Marková, I.(1998). Presenting social representations: A conversation. *Culture and Psychology,* 4 (3), 371–410.

Moscovici, S & Vignaux , G. (2000). The concept of themata. In S. Moscovici, *Social Representations: Explorations in social psychology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moughrabi, F. (1992). *Israeli control and Palestinian resistance. Social Justice.* 19 (3), 46-62.

Newman, D (2008) *The formation of National Identity in Israel/Palestine: The Construction of Spatial Knowledge and Contested Territorial Narratives.* In (Ed), N.Slocum-Bradley. Promoting conflict or peace through identity.. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Neslen, A. (2006). *Occupied Minds: A journey through the Israeli psyche.* London: Pluto Press.

Nietzche, F. (1980). *On the advantages and disadvantages of history for life.* P. Preiss (Trans.), Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company.

Nicholson, C. (2016). The role of historical representations in Israeli-Palestinian relation: Narratives from abroad. *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology*. 22, (1), 5-11.

Northrup, T.A. (1989) *The Dynamic of the Identity in Personal and Social Conflict*. In (Eds) L. Kiesburg, T.A. Northrup, and S.J. Thorson: Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation. Syracuse N.Y: Syracuse University Press.

Novick, P. (1999). *The Holocaust in America life*. Boston: Houghton Miffin.

Obradovic, S., & Howarth, C. (in press) Everyday reconciliation. In C. Howarth & E. Andreouli. (Eds.), *Everyday Politics.* London: Routledge.

Oktar, L. (2001). The ideological organization of representational processes in the presentation of us and them. *Discourse & Society*, 12 (4) pp.313 – 346. .

Oilick, J.K. (1999). Collective Memory: The two cultures. *Sociological theory.* 17 (3), 333-348.

Olick, J.F. (2003). The guilt of nations. *Ethics and International Affairs. 17 (2), 109-117.*

Papp**é**, I. (2011). The forgotten Palestinians: A history of the Palestinians in Israel. London: Yale University Press.

Porat, R., Halperin, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (2015). The effect of psychological barriers on the processing of new information about peace opportunities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 59, (1), 93-119*Porat et al (ch 6)*

Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L.R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 90 (5), 751-783.

Phelps, J.M., & Nadim, M. (2010. Ideology and agency in ethnic identity negotiation of immigrant youth. *Papers on Social Representations,* 19, pp. 13.1-13.27.

Powell, B.M., & Maoz, I. (2014). Barriers to conflict resolution in landscapes of asymmetric conflict: Current issues and future directions. 7 (2), 226-235.

Prince, G. (1980). Aspects of a grammar narrative. *Poetics Today*, 1 (3), 49-63.

Rabinowitz, D. (2001). Natives with jackets and degrees. Othering, objectification and the role of Palestinians in the coexistence field in Israel. *Social Anthropology*, 9 (1), 65-80.

Rabinowitz, D., & Abu-Baker, K. (2005). *Coffins in our shoulders: The experience of Palestinain citizens of Israel.* London: University of California Press.

Raudsepp, M. & & Wagner, W. (2012). *The essentially other: Representational processes that divide groups.* Trust and Conflict: Representation, Culture & Dialogue.. (Eds.) I. Marková & A. Gillespie. Hove: Routledge.

Reicher, S. (2004). The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change. *Political Psychology* 25 (6) pp. 921-945.

Reicher,S. & Hopkins, N. (2001). *Self and Nation.* London: Sage.

Reisman, C.K. (1993) Narrative analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Rejwan, N. (1999). *Israel in Search of Identity Reading the formative years.* University Press of Florida.

Robinson, A. (2011). In theory Bakhtin: Dialogism, Polyphony and Heteroglossia: ceasefiremagazine.co.uk (July 2011).

Rose, J. (2006). *The Question of Zion*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Rotberg, R.I. (2006*).* Building legitimacy through narrative. In R.I.Rotberg. (Ed.). *Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History's double helix.* Indiana, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Rouhana, N. (2004). Group identity and power symmetry in reconciliation processes: The Israeli-Palestinian case. *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology*, 10:1, 33-52.

Rouhana, N.M. (2007). Palestinian citizens in an ethnic Jewish State: Identities in conflict. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Roth, P.A. (1988). Narrative explanations. *History & Theory.* 27, 1-13.

Ruppin, A. (1924.) Quoted in D.J. Goldberg, 1996 (page 169) *To the Promised land: a history of Zionist thought.* London: Penguin.

Rutherford, J. (1990). *Identity: community, culture, difference.* London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Ryan, J. (1999). *Race and Ethnicity in Multi-Ethnic Schools.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Sa'di, A. (1992) Between state ideology and minority national identity: Palestinians in Israel and an Israeli social science research. *Review of Middle East Studies* 5, pp. 110-130.

Sammut, G & Sartawi, M. (2012). Perspective-taking and the attribution of ignorance. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 42:2, pp.181-200.

Sammut, G., Clark, M., & Kissaun, G.T. (2013). Dialogue, Linguistic hinges and semantic barriers: Social psychological uses and functions of a vulgar term. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 44:3. pp.326-346.

Sampson, E.E. (1993). Identity politics: Challengers to psychology is understanding. *American psychologist*, 48 (12), 1219-1230.

Sand, S. (2012). *The invention of the land of Israel: From Holy land to Homeland.* London: Verso.

Sellers, R.M., & Shelton, J.N. (2003). The role of racial identity in perceived racial discrimination. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 84 (5), 1079-1092.

Sen, R., & Wagner, W. (2005). History, emotions and hetero-referential representations in Inter-group conflict: the example of Hindu – Muslim relations in India. *Papers on Social Representations*, 14 pp. 2.1-2.23.

Sharkansky, I. (1996). *Rituals of Conflict: Religion, Politics & Public Policy in Israel.* London: Boulder.

Shehadeh, R. (2012). *Occupation Diaries*. London: Profile.

Sherif, M. (1967). *Group conflict and co-operation: The Robber's Cave experiments.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Sherif, M. & Sherif, C.W. (1969). *Social Psychology.* New York: Harper & Row.

Shlaim, A. (2009*). Israel and Palestine: Re-appraisals, revisions, refutations.* Verso: London.

Shotter, J. (1993). *Conversational realities: Constructing life through language.* London: Sage.

Sibley, C.G., & Liu, J.H. (2012. Social representations of history and the legitimation of social inequality: the causes and consequences of historical negation. *Journal of .Applied Social Psychology* 42,3 pp. 598-623.

Smith, C.D., (2013). *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A history with documents.* Boston: Bedford/ St. Martins.

Smith, N., & Joffe, H. (2012). Hoe the public engages with global warning: A social representations approach. *Public understanding of Science.* 22, 16-32.

Smooha, S. (1993). Minority status in an ethnic democracy: The status of the Arab minority in Israel. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13, pp.389-413.

Sonnenschein, N., Bekerman, Z., & Horencysyk, G. (2010). Threat and the majority identity. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research & Practice.* 14 (1), 47-65.

Stephenson, G.M. (1981). Intergroup bargaining and negotiation. In J.C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), *Intergroup behaviour.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Strauss, A. (1987). *Qualitative analysis for social scientists.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strauss, A. & Corbin,J, (1998). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques.* Thousand Oakes: Sage.

Suileman, R. (2004). Planned encounters between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis: A social psychological perspective. *Journal of Social Issues.* 60 (2), 323-337

Swart, H., Hewstone, M., Christ, O., & Voci, A. (2011). Affective mediators of intergroup contact: a three-wavw longitudinal study in South Africa. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 101 (6), 1221-1238.

Tajfel, H, (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worschel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations.* Monterey: Brooks/Cole.

Taylor, D.M., & Moghaddam, F.M. (1994). *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives*. Westport: Praeger.

Thompson, J.B. (1990). *Ideology and modern culture: Critical social theory in the era of mass communications.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Tileagă, C. (2014). *Political psychology: Critical perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2003). Beyond social representations: A theory of enablement. *Papers on Social Representations,* 12, 7.1 – 7.16. [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]

Valsiner , C. (2008). War in Peace: Cultural regulation of the destruction-dynamic. In J.de Rivera (Ed.), *Handbook in building cultures of peace.* New York: Springer.

Van Dijk, T.A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies.* 11 (2), 115-140.

Wagner, W. & Hayes, N. (2005). Every day discourse and common sense. The theory of social representations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wagner, W., & Elejarrieta, F. (1996). Relevance, discourse and the 'hot' stable core of social representations. A structural analysis of word association. *British Journal of Social Psychology.* 35, 331-351.

Wagoner, B., Gillespie, A., Valsiner, J., Zittoun, T., Salgado, J., & Simao, L. (2011). In M. Mariann, B. Wagoner, E.L. Aveling, I. Kadianaki, & L. Whittaker. (Eds.), Dialogicality in Focus:Challenges to theiort, method and application. Nova Press.

Wagoner, B. (2012). Notes on a social psychology of thinking: A comparison of Bartlett and Moscovoci. *Papers on Social Representations,* 21, 6.1- 6.14.

Wagoner, B. (2014). A sociocultural approach to peace and conflict. *Peace and conflict: Journal of peace psychology.* 20, 2: 187-190.

Wagoner, B, (2015) Collective remembering as a process of social representation. In G.Sammut, E.Andreouli, G. Gaskell & J. Valsiner (Eds.) *The Cambridge handbook of social representations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 143-162.

Wallach (Y.) Trapped in mirror-images: The rhetoric of maps in Israel/Palestine. *Political Geography. 30, 358.369.*

Wengraf, T. (2001). *Qualitative research interviewing: Biographic narrative and semi-structured methods.* London: Sage.

Wertsch, J.V. (2002). *Voices of collective remembering.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wertsch, J.V. (2007). National narratives and the conservative nature of collective memory. *Neochelicon,* 34 (2), 23-33.

Wertsch, J.V. (2008). Blank spots in collective memory: a case study of Russia. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 617, 58-71.

White, H. (1978). Topics of discourse: Essays in cultural criticism. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Yaftel, O. (2000). *Ethnocracy and its discontents: Minorities, protests and the Israeli polity.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

9. Appendix

9.1. Study one overview (Chapter 4)

Included in this first part of the Appendix is the discussion guides for the first study in London followed by a copy of the consent form that each participant read and signed. The NVivo categories are given as tables for both samples Jewish Israeli and Palestinian living in London at the time of the interview. A table showing the base and organising themes from Chapter 4 is reproduced which gives an overview of the relevant themes, followed by quoted examples.

9.1.1. Discussion guides

A) Discussion guide for Jewish Israeli living in London

Introduction to the project *(guidelines for introductory chat)*

Thanks for coming.

- PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian citizens in Israel and Palestinians in OCT;
- I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is academic;
- I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social psychology of enduring conflict;
- I am interested in how those who live within a conflict zone can begin to understand the perspective of 'the other' in order to think about their own perspective.

Recording and confidentiality

- The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed on to any third party.
- I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no-one can be identified as no names will ever be given.
- LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed.
- Consent form to be completed, and leave my contact details.

- Any questions?

Interview as a guide not as a Q and A session.

1. How might you define and talk about Jewish Israeli people generally?

- Explore this in terms of prominence to: State / nationality / Aliyah / Jewishness / fear / etc.

2. Can we talk about what you think might lie at the base of the conflict?

- Explore how these definitions are discussed and explore further under the topics addressed above.
- What understanding / misunderstanding stands between them?
- What form does this take?
- What does it personally feel like to be part of this reality?

3. How might you define and talk about the Palestinian people ?

- Explore in terms of their experiences and contact / in Israel and in the OCT.

4. What do you think the Palestinian people think of the Jewish Israeli people?

- Explore in terms of how they might distinguish between Palestinian individuals that you might know and the society they represent? Explore this divide from the general to the personal .

5. How do you think your views have been formed and sustained?

- Explore the roles of ethnic background / ideology / significant relationships / education / institutions (inc military of mentioned)/ media (TV and Newspaper).

6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Jewish and Palestinian people, regardless of race, may consider living together in one state?

- Probe how this society might feel like

- What might the commonalities be / Explore any barriers that may inhibit this process.

7. Conclusion

Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent.

B) Discussion guide for Palestinians living in London

Introduction to the project (guidelines for introductory chat)

Thanks for coming.

- PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian citizens in Israel and Palestinians in OCT.
- I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is academic.
- I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social psychology of enduring conflict
- I am interested in how those who live within a conflict zone can begin to understand the perspective of 'the other' in order to think about their own perspective

Recording and confidentiality

- The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed on to any third party.
- I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no-one can be identified as no names will ever be given.
- LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed.
- Consent form to be completed, and leave my contact details.
- Any questions?

Interview as a guide not as a Q and A session.

1. How might you define and talk about Palestinian people generally?

- Explore this in terms of prominence to: State / nationality / conflict / tradition / etc.

2. Can we talk about what you think might lie at the base of the conflict?

- Explore how these definitions are discussed and explore further under the topics addressed above.
- What understanding / misunderstanding stands between them?
- What form does this take?
- What does it personally feel like to be part of this reality?

3. How might you define and talk about Jewish people in Israel ?

- Explore in terms of their experiences and contact.

4. What do you think the Jewish Israeli people think about the Palestinian people?

- Explore in terms of how they might distinguish between Palestinian individuals that you might know and the society they represent? Explore this divide from the general to the personal .

5. How do you think your views have been formed and sustained?

- Explore the role of ethnic background / ideology / significant relationships / education / institutions / the occupation / media (TV and Newspaper).

6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Palestinian and Jewish people, regardless of race, may consider living together in one state?

- Probe how this society might feel like, What might the commonalities be / Explore any barriers that may inhibit this process.

7. Conclusion: Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent.

Close and thanks

9.1.2. Informed consent

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Institute of Social Psychology

St. Clements Building

Houghton Street

London WC2A 2AE

Tel: 020 7955 7712

Date .....

Informed Consent

Project: Representations of conflict and co-existence between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel / Occupied territories.

Researcher: Cathy Nicholson, PhD Candidate, Institute of Social Psychology, London School of Economics. c.g.nicholson@lse.ac.uk

Supervisor: Dr Caroline Howarth, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Social Psychology, London School of Economics, c.s.howarth@lse.ac.uk

---

To be completed by the Research Participant

Please answer each of the following questions:

Do you feel you have been given sufficient information about the research to enable you to decide whether or not to participate in the research?	**Yes**	**No**
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the research?	**Yes**	**No**
Do you understand that your participation is voluntary, and that you are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason, and without penalty?	**Yes**	**No**

Are you are willing to take part in the research?	**Yes**	**No**
Will you allow the research team to use anonymized quotes in presentations and publications	**Yes**	**No**

Participants Name:_____

Participant's Signature: _____ Date:_____

To be completed by Researcher (*NB/for mostly Palestinian participants who had shown hesitation in being interviewed because of confidentiality).*

I agree to keep any identifying information given to me as confidential between me and the participant. The tapes will be personally transcribed by me with no name attached to either. Small sections of quotes maybe given in academic journals or power point presentations, but never with any form of identification. I am a member British Psychological Society whose ethical guidelines I agree to follow.

Signed _____ Date _____

9.1.3. Nvivo categories

Table 11: NVivo summary Jewish Israelis in London (Study 1)

Name		Nodes	References
JD 17		37	139
JD 01		34	125
JD 10		32	97
JD 11		29	70
JD 12		35	101
JD13		22	55
JD14		25	73
JD 15		30	85
JD 16		43	135
JD 02		37	89
JD 03		46	199
JD 04		41	131
JD 05		32	92
JD 06		38	172
JD 07		37	116
JD 08		23	82
JD 09		24	86

Table 12: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in London

Name	Sources	References
Anti-semitism	10	16
Arab Jews	8	9
Asymmetry	3	4
Barriers	13	48
Belonging	12	23
Biblical myths	9	12
Boundaries	4	5
Co-existence	17	62
Cognitive polyphasia	8	18
Contact	6	20
Critical of Israel	8	16
Denial	4	12

Differences	9	17
Distrust	8	12
Empathy	8	18
Fear	15	35
Food and music	6	10
Holocaust related	12	22
Humanity	4	7
Identity national and personal	15	68
IDENTITY neutral	10	29
Ideology constructs	6	11
Injustice	7	12
International opinion	5	7
Intractable	17	61
Islamic fundamentalism	9	21
Israeli Palestinian and Palestinian	17	171
Jewish Responsibility	6	18
Jewishness	14	33
Loyalty	15	26
Medics	2	2
Meta perspective	10	87
Military	13	26
Nationalism	9	17
Open to possibilities	7	18
P Modernism	1	1
Paradox	10	23
Peace hopes	9	20
Politics	13	42
Post Modernism	7	20
Promised land	7	13
Racism	8	19
Realism	2	2
Rejection of other	6	17
Relating IPs to Pals in WB	9	19
Religion	9	28
Resistent to change	5	6

Righteousness	12	60
Security	3	3
Segregation	10	38
Semantic barriers new	11	37
Semantic resisters	10	128
Shared Future	9	19
Socialisation and education	6	19
Special people	1	1
Stigmatisation	12	29
Taboo	2	5
Terrorism and S bombers	8	13
Threat	17	54
Transformation	12	38
Universal Rights	9	29
Victimhood	4	5
Zionism	14	68

Table 13: NVivo summary Palestinians in London (Study 1)

Name		Nodes	References
PD015		24	39
PD01		63	148
PD 09		35	104
PD 08		33	69
PD 07		37	78
PD 06		30	58
PD 05		36	79
PD 04		28	80
PD 03		37	92
PD 02		34	77
PD 014		17	35
PD 013		29	67
PD 012		24	44
PD 011		20	33
PD 010		36	74

Table 14: NVivo categories Palestinians in London

Arabs and Pals in Israel	4	7
Asymmetry	7	16
Barriers	14	53
Belonging	3	4
Biblical myths	2	2
Boundaries	0	0
Checkpoints and crossings	6	9
Co-existence	12	23
Cognitive Polyphasia	3	4
Collaboration	4	12
Conflict	7	15
Contact	10	33
Critical of Israel	2	3
Denial	2	5
Despair	7	13
Diaspora	2	2
Differences	7	10
Distrust	4	9
Emotions	10	22
Empathy	2	2
Fear	7	11
Feelings for Israel	0	0
Food Music Temperament	0	0
Future	14	40
Gaza WB distinction	3	6
History	10	30
Holocaust	12	20
Humanity	1	2
Identity national	10	38
Ideological constructs	7	13
Injustice	12	26
International opinion	8	23
Intersubjectivity	11	36
Intifada	1	3

Intractability	5	9
Irony	3	4
Jewish	4	10
Land	7	14
Language	2	3
Loyalty	3	3
Media	3	8
Medics	1	1
Memory collective	2	2
Metaperspectives	11	62
Militancy	2	4
Military and IDF	6	8
Myths	1	1
Normalisation	4	4
Occupation	10	22
Opportunities	4	6
Paradox	2	2
Peace	9	16
Personal consequence	5	10
Perspective from afar	3	5
Politics	10	48
Positioning	5	6
Post Modernism	0	0
Racism	7	17
Realism and Pragmatism	2	4
Refugees	7	13
Rejection of other	0	0
Religion	6	21
Resistance to change	2	3
Righteousness	1	1
Security	3	3
Segregation	3	4
Semantic barriers	6	23
Settlers	5	7
Socialisation	3	15

Suffering	4	10
Taboo	0	0
Terrorism	1	1
Universal Rights	4	6
Victimhood	6	11
Zionsim	8	15

9.1.4. Organising and base themes framework



Jewish participants with lived experience in Israel

C O N F I C T



Palestinian participants born in W Bank, Gaza, E.Jerusalem & Israel



C O N S E N S U S



9.1.5. Organising and base themes coding book

A) Jewish (Israelis) living in London base and organising themes (Conflict)

Organising themes	Base themes	Example
Collective agency	All powerful	*And it's not only in terms of territory its in terms of the economy, in terms of one group of people always dominating another in terms of power and exploitation. And that picture is never going to change.*
	Rejection of other	*There's an Arab section in Israel where all of them live there. I don't really go there obviously. I just find it difficult to accept that there are Arab people there.*
	Segregation	*It means that I am part of this network of people and I feel, I feel it's funny that I naturally feel a bond with people when they associate me with being Jewish. For some it's religious, some say its mysticism. It's just a desire to be part of something that is bigger than you.*
	Racism	*The way they behave I don't think of them as people, because people don't behave like that. And I know they see us as probably the same thing, like I said I wish everyone would let others live and leave them alone. I of course, I don't have to like them but I'd much rather hate them and have them out of our lives you know/*
Collective positioning	Jewishness in a Jewish state	*There aren't a lot of Jewish people in the world. So I think that there is this desire that we want to keep ourselves to ourselves.*
	Military service	*The Army is a sort of melting pot where they all become Israelified in the positive sense.*
	Save haven	*I don't agree with the settlements but you need them there. You need them there. It's not a question of should we do it, shouldn't we, you need them there. It's a security buffer. The only reason.*
	Victim	*I think we see ourselves as the victims and always portraying ourselves as the victims. And even in Israel where they are the majority and the law is geared around them and they are the nation's citizens they still see themselves as the victims.*
Security	Existential fear	*You only need to lose once in Israel. if you lose the war in in Israel you've had it. You can't*

		afford to lose one war because then that's the end of Israel.
	Terrorist attacks	*But when Arab Israelis from Haifa, from the villagers from wherever are driving, driving a suicide bomber into the centre of town to explode on a bus of children, this is mistrust that you would be very very difficult to overcome.*
	Holocaust memory	*I have family that lost everything in the Holocaust and they go back to Poland and they see the building where the kids were running around.*
	Distrust	*They are not trusted. I don't want it to sound.. ok it's not a blame game. We have our fair share but the fact that it's about what is the point of all of this? How are we ever going to get along together? The fact is they are not integrated.*
Ideology	Zionism	*You can't not be influenced by Zionism. From a very young age in every school in every kindergarten.*
	Nationalism	*I do feel that if Israel as a state didn't exist I wouldn't feel so secure .. when L. talks of a two state solution he means a Jewish state without non Jews and some kind of Palestinian entity that the Palestinian citizens of Israel would be, they wouldn't shifted there physically but the border would be altered.*
	Historical myths	*It's the history behind it all .. if you want to go back to that we were there two to three thousand years before anyone else. It's a moot point. We were there first.*
	Religion	*And now its started in a way as religious, Jewish Zionism with the complication of the '67 war for all these stages that allows the settlers sort of closer to fulfilling their vision. I don't know exactly how to explain it. Now that the messianic energies on the one hand are so strong.*

B) Jewish (Israelis) living in London base and organising themes (Consensus)

Organising themes	**Base themes**	**Example**
Collective agency	Acknowledgement of the Other	*For me, I have actually Arab friends, they are perfectly fine. They are perfectly normal and exactly the same as me. And the fact that there Arabs is no difference.*
	Empathy	*Their feeling is that we were robbed of our country, we were robbed of our freedom. We are living in shanty towns and refugee camps and so*

		on and so forth. No wonder they are as they are and there is hatred which is fanned by the Imans and everything.
	Open to change	*I had a kind of sense that people were being punished for being occupied. And it grew from there. You start reading and start looking more carefully at what happens in the news. It was very painful. It was awful. It was horrible. I have been earnest in the past. But I had to start questioning the whole basis of Israel and what Israel was doing, it was very difficult.*
	Cultural artefacts	*We are very similar … everything I said about Israelis can be applied to them as well. And the culture. We adopted many things from their culture. Words, language, slang.. The pronunciation, the accent of the Hebrew language is now a mixture of German and Arabic. A range of aspirations, passions, food.*
	Co-existence	*I was always very open, if you want to call it the left wing, you know that's how you are more or less classify the Israelis who were more open, but when I came here I met a lot of Palestinians that I couldn't meet when I was in Israel. It changed my perspective of the situation.*
	Bi-national state	*My dream would be that it would be one country for Israelis and Palestinians, And the West Bank. It would all be one and that's my dream. And those who live outside would have to apply to come, It wouldn't have to be automatic right of return.*
Ideology	Jewish responsibility	*For me Israeli means responsibility, means having privileges at the expense of non Jewish people. Israel and Palestinians in the OCT it means that if I don't that if I am passive then I am part of the ongoing problem that will not have its own solution until people are active and so for me it's a responsibility.*
	Recognition of the occupation	*That the occupation is awful, its terrible it should have ended a long time ago. What it has done has hatched a completely different country from the liberals involved in Israel's founding vision. Israeli critics might say that its built into Zionism that it is evolving into a neo fascist ethnocracy*
	Universal justice	*It should be one person one vote. People should be the same in their opportunities. Like have equal opportunities. There's no intrinsic difference between Jews and Arabs. Its no more intrinsic between the difference between a Jew from the UK and a Jew from Yemen. If that can be - its not completely bridged, it is different but if that can be embraced.*
	Human rights law	*It all came down to human rights, individual*

		human rights which we can go and fight in the court of law. So I think that we are in a world which has become all rights and no responsibilities but of course not everyone has right.

C) Palestinians in London base and organising themes (Conflict)

Organising themes	**Base themes**	**Example**
Collective agency	Lack of agency	*It's a lack of freedom, a lack of self autonomy. Most of the people I've met abroad don't know anything about it. They know it's about conflict that but they don't know why.*
	Stateless	*But I say to people can you imagine what it's like living in a place where you don't have your army where you don't have the freedom to go where you want.*
	Occupied	*I feel that they are occupiers, they are oppressors and also they are outsiders, they are all from different countries and now they have more rights than me. I feel that they don't belong to the country. That's the general idea they are occupiers.*
Collective positioning	Unrecognised / victim	*Well, I can't say that I'm not a victim. But I have managed to keep away from the stigma of being a victim. Because, we were poor and I cannot travel of my own. If I wanted to go to university in Ramallah and I applied for that and I got an acceptance. And I knew that I couldn't go there. Because you need a permit.*
	Lack of dignity	*But it is so important not to lose your nationality when Israel declared itself a state. To keep and protect yourself as a Palestinian. Of course as I said again the conflict makes it more important for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as Palestinians.*
	Dehumanised	*When I went to school at go through checkpoint and sometimes the Israelis like would beat us really badly. They wouldn't sexually harass you but like like I remember a soldier they would say now go across the checkpoint naked even though I was 13 years old.*
	Oppressed	*One thing I realised … was that a lot of Israeli Jewish people didn't know about Palestinian house demolitions, particularly in the punitive sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. And when I would actually tell them the story of*

		how they demolish them, and the number that went on in the thousands, it was the first time that they would hear it. And they would question me and they would think that I'm lying. They would think that at worst, I'm lying on at best, I am deluded.
Security	Harmful experiences	*When I was back at some point there was a bombardment at a place about 3 km away from our house and the sound of the missiles hitting the place and exploding. I almost had like a nervous breakdown because it was so loud, my eardrums were going to explode.*
	Fear of aggression	*It was terrifying. Especially when you are so young would also like I had a younger brother and he used to get really really scared that something is going to happen to them and erm when they had arrested my cousin they even like beat up in front of everyone. Even in front of his mother. And the Israeli soldiers said this is what's going to happen to you, and they arrested him and took away.*
	Hatred	*It's not that we hate them, it's like we are born with that. And we actually suffered because of that.*
Ideology	Palestinian nationalism	*I think that Palestinians have been, in a small country that has huge significance in history, the holy land. And that significance has created a lot of bridges with the outside world. So I think Palestine enjoys a strange blend of openness with the outside world and a kind of knack as to how to deal with the world, exposure and also a lot of kind of, you know, occupiers. The Palestinians always have to fight yet another occupier, but also have exposure to the world.*
	Injustice	*And we are still being colonised by Israel. And this is depriving us of our rights, of having an army, living in security, having the freedom to go back home, going out of your city, getting into your city. When you are there are not sure about your safety, the Israeli army might come to your property. That is a very hard thing.*
	Resistance	*So the resistance is very important for the Palestinian people, an important way of living and a source of hope.*
	Religion	*I think even in my country, suddenly everybody became religious and especially in the first intifada if you look at the images you would hardly see any women wearing hijab or*

		anything but suddenly everyone became religious. I don't know why, maybe they felt it was really hopeless.

D) Palestinians in London organising and base themes (Consensus)

Organising themes	**Base themes**	**Example**
Collective agency	Acknowledgement of the Other	*I recognise you as an Israeli and there is no doubt that this is the case in terms of political representation, recognition as well, that we have recognised Israel. Israel accepted the terms of the PLO agreement.*
	Universal injustice	*To control the injustice is important. Justice is a basic right. It will take many years reconciliation process whatever you want called. It will be a very long healing process. It's not an easy reconciliation process but if we start it now it will be quicker than starting it later.*
	Pragmatism	*I want to talk about normal people who'll for example like me who go to work, work in a bank work in social media. We want to dance and see our friends, we want a normal life.*
Collective positioning	Shared past to future	*I heard that my grand father, my grandmother speak about what happened in the past and how they used to live and how it was their life. They all lived together, and how it suddenly changed.*
	Co-existence	*You can't be hypocritical. It's developing, the understanding, about the other side. And that's what will make the difference convergence. I always felt like I believe we could coexist.*
	Bi-national state	*I believe if we have a justice and everybody gets his rights we will be able to live together since we don't have like a divided country by geographic or mountains or something to isolate us that would be Israel or Palestine.*
Ideology	Universal justice	*And talking about the right to be free the right of dignity, the right of claiming and reclaiming the land, the right for a prosperous economy the right to have your own natural resources for political sovereignty. And talking about very basic human rights. And the right to live a normal life.*
	Human rights law	*Conflict will carry on if they just talk about the competition of land. Yet we need to talk about the human rights law and then there is a way*

		through.
	Defining Palestinian consciousness	*In the end you know we are always in flux, forming new entities and so keep saying you are a nation, it you're not a nation you are a nation. Well I mean of a nation is formed and emerges and says we are a nation then there is a reason that they want to feel one, an entity that claims nationhood.*

9.2. Study two overview (Chapter 5)

Included in this second part of the Appendix is the discussion guide for the second study in Israel. The consent form used was the same on used in the first study. The NVivo categories are given as tables for both samples, Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. Examples of quotes used in the development of relevant themata are given, followed by the full quotes from the four examples used in the dialogical analysis.

9.2.1. Discussion guides

Introduction to the project

Thanks for coming.

- PhD thesis on exploring commonalities between Jewish and Palestinian citizens in Israel.
- I have no political ties with Israel or within the UK. My background is academic.
- I take no particular perspective apart from the interest within social psychology about the process of dialogue in places where conflict is present.

Recording and confidentiality

- The session is recorded for my own analysis and recordings will not be passed on to any third party.
- I may use a quote from the session in my reporting but no person will be identifiable.
- LSE has strict ethical guidelines and these have to be followed (sign forms).

1. Introduction

Would you like to tell me about your journey in becoming a doctor (medic) here?

- Explore motivation to be a medic / location and timing of training in terms of IDF (or non IDF) / ease of employment / work satisfaction/

2. This part of Israel is considered to be the most co-existent part Israel, as perceived in Europe, where both Palestinian and Jewish population live side by side peacefully. How far would you agree with that?

- Explore in general terms about the local population in terms of segregation / perceived prejudice and perceptions before discussing this in more personal terms, such as their own social mixing, probing both positive and negative contexts.
- Explore why this area might be more open to multiculturalism than other places / historical roots of the area etc.
- Discuss any organisations that may or stimulate or hinder this process.

3. In terms of your experience and observations, in general, how do you find your working relationship with your Jewish (Arab Israeli) colleagues?

- Explore what any commonalities or differences might be salient / personal vs professional / pragmatism vs political.
- Probe how that has happened and changed over time and consequences of that.

4. Does this also extend to patient relationships?

- Explore this in terms of cultural familiarity / contextual affinity / professional experience.

5. How do you think your values and beliefs have been formed and sustained?

- Explore in terms of societal beliefs / significant relationships/ education / institutions (inc military of mentioned) / media /etc.
- Link back to their professional context.

6. Can you envisage a time in the future when the Jewish and Palestinian people, regardless of race, will form one state?

- Explore how this society might feel like / look like.
- What might the commonalities be? What might the enduring differences be?
- Would it be based on multiculturalism as it is represented in the West.
- Explore perceived hardened barriers between different communities.

7 Conclusion

- Pick up on the main themes that have become apparent and probe for those topics that highlight a point of interest, particularly the positive, softening and hardening of boundaries.

Close and thanks

9.2.2. Nvivo categories

Table 15: NVivo summary Palestinian Israelis in Israel (Study2)

Name		Nodes	References
LSE Haifa 14 PD 10		30	96
LSE Haifa 14 PD 09		22	66
LSE Haifa 14 PD 08		20	51
LSE Haifa 14 PD 07		24	47
LSE Haifa 14 PD 05		26	72
LSE Haifa 14 PD 03 and 04		32	71
LSE Haifa 14 PD 02		19	47
LSE Haifa 14 PD 01		34	89
LSE Haifa 14 PD 06		21	40

Table 16: NVivo categories Palestinian Israelis in Israel

Borders		7	20
Co-existence		4	11
Cognitive polyphasia		9	35
Commonality		4	5
Conflict		3	5
Culture in Israel		3	4
Dialogical analysis		8	18
Education		3	5
Ethnic purity		3	3
Friendship		2	2
Future imagined		8	35
Gaza war		8	17
Hate hating		2	3
Holocaust		2	3

Identity constructs		8	18
IDF		5	6
Israeli discrimination		7	18
Jewish hegemony		2	2
Lancet		3	5
Land		8	18
Language		3	3
Media		4	4
Metaperspectives		8	58
Narratives		8	36
Occupation		0	0
Peace people not politicians		4	5
Politics		5	7
Prologue my thoughts		1	1
Racism		1	2
Relationship J with A		10	74
Religion		1	1
Russian community		1	3
Segregation		0	0
Semantic barriers		9	76
Semantic bridges		9	40
Socialisation		1	1
Terrorist attacks		0	0
Threat		3	3

Table 17: Nvivo summary Jewish Israelis in Israel (Study 2)

Name		Nodes	References
LSE Haifa 14 JD 10		26	73
LSE Haifa 14 JD 09		23	75
LSE Haifa 14 JD 08 (2)		25	46
LSE Haifa 14 JD 07		27	63
LSE Haifa 14 JD 06		17	32
LSE Haifa 14 JD 05		15	28
LSE Haifa 14 JD 04		29	39
LSE Haifa 14 JD 03		18	48

LSE Haifa 14 JD 02		26	67
LSE Haifa 14 JD 01		27	58

Table 18: NVivo categories Jewish Israelis in Israel

Name		Sources	References
Activism		1	2
Biograph career		9	22
Borders		4	13
Co-existence		5	12
Cognitive polyphasia		6	8
Commonality		3	6
Conflict		2	3
Culture in Israel		5	14
Dialogical analysis		2	4
Education		3	8
Ethnic purity		4	1
Friendship		1	1
Future imagined		7	23
Gaza war		7	17
Hate hating		3	3
Holocaust		5	6
Identity constructs		5	20
IDF		4	15
Israeli discrimination		5	8
Jewish hegemony		1	1
Lancet		1	2
Land		1	5
Language		2	2
Media		7	10
Metaperspectives		8	56
Narratives		5	15
Occupation		1	1
One state or two states		1	1
Peace people not politicians		5	10
Politics		2	4
Prologue my thoughts		4	4

Racism		3	6
Relationship J with A		10	95
Russian community		2	3
Semantic barriers		2	12
Semantic bridges		1	6
Socialisation		5	9
Terrorist attacks		4	5
Threat		6	15

Themata of exclusivity-inclusivity and quoted examples



Thema: EXCLUSIVITY		
PERCEPTIONS OF A NATIONAL HOMELAND		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Socialisation	*My kids go to school and you have to deal with that when you send them to school you have to put them through the system that educates them differently. And it is also difficult because you know that they will be soldiers fighting for things that you don't believe in and you know it's very hard to control it because however you educate them and I know that when most of the boys go into the army it's hard. J8*	CULTURE
Perceived differences	*There are a lot of cultural differences and there is no way around it. A lot of Israelis have come from Europe. And there are some from North Africa and so it's a very different culture from the Arabs. The European culture is open to change. I don't think its brain power, its more ideas and thoughts, like the women don't work and people don't aspire to work. The women have fixed marriages and the woman belongs to the man and she stays at home and takes care of the children.* *They are collective yes, a collective culture. As far as the Israeli society it is more of an individual society, a society for individuals. 32.58. The family or the community is less than it is in the Arab culture you know to the extreme were they can kill you know, a girl were destroying the name of the family. The honour .. I can take you to a forest minutes from here. My mother's housekeeper, she was burned in her car because she had put disgrace on her family. It happens all the time. It really does.. That happened two years ago, it happens, they do.*	CULTURE
Christian / Muslim / Druze	*I have to tell you that, first of all I have to tell you that there is a difference between the Christians the Muslims. There is a big difference. The Christians I think sometimes, I was born in Haifa and raised here so, so I know, the rumour is that I mean I know that the Christian Arabs hate the Muslim Arabs. I mean they like us better than the Muslims. Yeah. And they really see themselves above them, for example I can't believe that a Christian girl would marry a Muslim boy. It would be a no-no. Especially in Haifa the Christian Arabs they are very aristocratic here and very like I society. So I don't really know about, I have a good friend, she is Christian and she has talked to me.* *Some Druze groups are the worst. They have this respect which is about morals, which is very good but they are*	CULTURE

	very loyal but mainly they are …it is the most closed community in Israel. And they are actually loyal to the country, they serve in the army. They are in a very difficult situation. They go to the army but they are Arabs actually, but they are not really Arabs they don't look on themselves as being pure Arabs but they are.	
Living / city space	*I know that it's hard for them (Arabs) to find accommodation anyway, because they all focus on this area, because the schools are here and all the community is here, so everyone wants to be here.* *And the prices for apartments are very high.*	SEGREGATION
Discrimination	*I do have a worry of a certain thing that the hospital will become over populated with Arab staff. I would still like to see the Jewish staff be the majority.* *What are you going to do with them? Are they going to say what about us, this is not country, this is our land. And you know they are right, because the villagers are not like our cities, there being discriminated. I don't like to say it but it's true. They are being discriminated, they are not been treated the same. They don't have the same opportunities .. .around the Technion and the university, I think it's harder for them to rent, because most of the population is Jewish. Some of them will rent to Arab students and some of them won't.*	SEGREGATION
Training space	*Then here you enter a classroom there is a big hole and on the right side or the Arabs the sitting and on the left the Jews were sitting and I was stunned by that. It was terrible. I was crying because it was so terrible. And then it's not as bad as it looks because we are friends, I have been to weddings and some of our friends are Arabs, but it's easier to sit next to someone who is more of your culture. I think it's very, em how do you say? It's very natural to look for the people who are your kind. That's what I think. But at first I was shocked. But then I came to understand it and it wasn't as hard as I thought.*	SEGREGATION
Collective history	*And also in Israel it was built as a Jewish home after the Holocaust and my grandparents family all died in the Holocaust. I come from that. I can't see, I can't see it being anything but a Jewish country.* *Then the (1948) war erupted and they (Arabs) were excluded. Or thrown away or never mind … Out of their houses. And they became refugees in refugee camps and stuff and they multiplied. There were a few here, you know, few Jews, but historically what happened was the Jews what happened in Europe and they needed a land. Of course they went back to the Bible.*	IDEOLOGY
Land Rights	*I don't think Israel thinks they took the land, the land was ours.. You see this is where the problems lie. Because if you look, and if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don't see it as.. And if you look at the history, the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved and came back and moved*	IDEOLOGY

	and came back. So we don't see it as land being taken from other people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly the problem. *But now the situation is very much more complicated. Because you give the Palestinians a country and what to do with all the Arabs in Israel? You know we are 1.5 million Israeli Arabs. What are you going to do with them? Are they going to say what about us, this is not country, this is our land?*	
Exclusion	*As I said I have to totally segregate my private life from my professional life. I can say perfectly and truly that at work I don't feel like I have any conflict, on a day to day basis with them no. But as I say I completely divide between my private life and my professional life.*	IDEOLOGY
Threat	*Fear, that goes way back to the fears, the deep fears that someone can come and just push me away just because I don't belong. Because I don't have my mark. And here? My grandparents they built it you know. So you feel connected. Not because of the Bible because it's something, somehow I belong to the town where I live, it was built so you feel connected.*	IDEOLOGY
Thema: INCLUSIVITY		
PERCEPTIONS OF DIVERSITY		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Medical ethics	*The ethics, the way you approach a patient, as another human being, the care for another human being so it feels a bit more normal. We come with a lot of prejudice but when you work with people to be exactly the same to everyone, whether they are nice, you have to treat them exactly the same. It has nothing to do with what I think or believe, it has nothing to do with that.. You do the best you can to try and help.*	WORKPLACE PROTECTED
Work equality	*For example, at my work, I don't see any discrimination at all, at all, many of succeeding at work, they running departments as managers and they can do whatever they want, no-one keeping them from going forward at work because they are Arab.* *The hospital is kind of a bubble. It's very distinct from what's going outside. Everyone is equal. You don't look at Arab, Muslim or Christian Arab or Jewish. It's not something you look at. You look at it when I [accent 12:41] a resident that's in charge of the work schedule. I put [accent 12:50] certain shift, so I have to know all the holidays, the Jewish, the Christian and the Muslim, and we're trying to keep everyone at home in his holiday and not to schedule doctors for the holidays.*	WORKPLACE PROTECTED
Positive	*We work shoulder to shoulder. It's very nice, it's very*	WORKPLACE

relationships	*pleasant. It shows that two groups can coexist because the nurses there are a lot of Arabs and there is lot of respect between us and we work as a team. There is never a feeling of 'oh he's an Arab I don't want to work with him,'. Never. They are colleagues first of all.* *I feel more comfortable when there is a mixed, Jewish and Arab doctors. So we have mixed opinions and ways of seeing things and ways of living.*	PROTECTED
Social mixing	*I consider A to be a very good friend of mine. For me he is a very good friend, a close friend. I feel confident and comfortable in sharing with him my private life, we really are connected. We're friends.*	OPPORTUNITIES
Experiencing the other	*I think my work helped me a lot, because it did broaden my horizons, because it made me not to think about Arabs as they are not as they are in the papers. But my colleague, don't think the patient, they are people exactly like me, and they are better than me because they have much all medical knowledge. The head of ER is an Arab and is amazing he's smart and clever and good and I never for a second think he treats me differently because I'm Jewish, or any of that. Never never, not even for second. So it has changed me a little bit.* *I got to know them because I was new in the group, as I'd stayed back a year. I heard a lot of stories about their families from 48 who had been deported and some of them had stayed at lived under the regime. And they're struggling. So for me it was an interesting time in that sense, but it only made me feel more empathic. I was always empathic, but I understood more, like deep, a deeper understanding of the conflict inside Israel not in the territories.*	OPPORTUNITIES
Education / Language	*It just makes sense to grow up together because the language can separate us, and especially with children. I think it's the education, to teach children right at the beginning that the other person is exactly like you, but just speaks another language. They can coexist. I hope that my children will be different in the sense they will have Muhammad in the class and it will be completely normal.*	FUTURE IMAGINED
Rights for all	*They don't have a land, they don't have borders they don't have identity, nationality, the problem, the biggest problem I know, and I think this needs to be, this is the place where it needs to start. They need to, we need to understand they have a right to define themselves as a nation.*	FUTURE IMAGINED
National equality	*In my dream there will be no two states, we would be together. If we had nothing to be defended, they would be friends.*	FUTURE IMAGINED

Themata of threat-security and quoted examples



Thema: THREAT		
Based on premise that the other as enemy is intent on destroying Israel *2*		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
No partner for peace	*I have one friend .. He is 65, very intelligent person but he worked in the FBI … He is a veteran of this organisation and he can't see, he's just you know, he is convinced that they are not trustworthy the Arabs, Arab Palestinians and the bottom line is that they want to*	MISTRUST OF THE OTHER

	destroy us. How can you even argue with someone who has these arguments? *It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to wipe out Israel. Well you hear their leaders declaring it very often, that's what they really want.*	
Lack of belief	*There is a problem, we don't really think that the peace will hold and that's a problem. If you want a true peace, even the most right wing to person will tell you okay I'll sign that paper, but they're not going to shoot me, they're not going to bomb me, they going to leave me alone, that's fine. When will we believe they do that? We feel that we can't trust them, that their leaders are not doing what they should.*	MISTRUST OF THE OTHER
Collective memory	*And don't forget that Israel was founded because of what had been going on in Europe at the time. The people then felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on our own. We've got to show the world that we'll do whatever we want, whatever you say.* *The Israeli population, most of them have come from difficult places, from terror places and the Holocaust, and there was something like eight wars we've had. And people, they hold on to like family suffering. It will never end.*	FEAR
Terror	*Peace would never come because, when you have the fear inside of you then you are looking to validate it in all kinds of examples or situations in the outside. So it takes only one terrorist who goes on a tractor, runs and goes over the pavement and runs some people off, for someone like my friend to say 'You see? They don't really want to be here you see. They are dangerous, we have to protect ourselves. That's what happens*	FEAR
	I find it very hard to look them in the face. Certainly the Palestinian, not so much the Israeli Arabs, because I don't know where they stand. I don't know, I've never spoken to them, I'd rather not know. But when there's a terrorist attack, it's very hard.	
Identity Construction	*Fear. It's genetic. It's a Jewish thing.* *When we were in Florida I remember once driving the car and just stopped and there was car next to us and there was a saying on the dashboard with a big flag with a cross, with the Nazi cross. I was looking at my husband and I said oh my god I hope they don't recognise us as Jewish you know. Do we look Jewish? We were scared. It is rather as a law against it you know. But in America there is the KKK there are places there that have that and you don't feel secure. Or maybe it's all an illusion, of being secure or insecure…. because here people are exploding bombs.*	FEAR
Gaza War	*Now I'm not saying this just to justify, I'm saying that there is hard evidence that Hamas, for example of*	CONFLICT

	terrorists, go into the population … I know because my two sons were just there. It's inside, it's not like if there is a war here then you would see that soldiers shooting from this building and this building. No. This is a population area/ No, you don't draw the fire, you know, you bring them where the citizens are, but they do that unfortunately. *You go down to the south and you see a big piece of land or whatever with civilian populations who are being threatened for years, day after day, we call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It's been like this for years and years. No country in the world would ever allow this to happen. If it would happen to Britain they would kill 10,000 of whoever is across the border, no one will say anything because someone dared to drop bombs on our population.*	
Ethos of conflict	*We live on our sword There is a saying in Israel . 'For ever you live on your sword. It's from the Bible. I don't know who gave this kind of, God gave this punishment to who? to Adam. For ever you live on your sword.*	CONFLICT
Imagined future	*I'm not talking about outside Israel but inside Israel, by the Palestinian Authority and the way they insist on not understanding that we still have to be here in 50 years, this way or another.* *And they say too, they say that they will never stop until they have all the land in the Jews in the sea. They always say that.* *I think by the next war we will build machines that can detect tunnels. That's what they will do. It's amazing what people are putting their money and brains to, just making the war more sophisticated, instead of putting your mind into resolving this problem.*	CONFLICT
Land rights	*So the threat, the immediate threat Israelis feel about going into peace talks is that they want not just the '67 borders and the land with it, but they also want everything that was, years ago.*	CONFLICT
Thema: SECURITY		
Security to combat threat		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
Jewish majority	*It should be mainly Jewish. It's not a political point of view it's an emotional point of view.*	EXCLUSIVITY
Loyalty	*After all when you go to the bottom of things you are still divided on the land, so for me to be very pro Palestinian it's really going against my people and I don't know what exactly I am. I am left of course, I think. But I know I can tell A and I can tell my other friends that if it comes to my house or my home or your home, then I'm defending mine, you know . It's a very simple thing, a reality that is*	EXCLUSIVITY

	complicated and simple	
Safety	*For me, Israel is to me a safe place for my family and for my feelings not a political view. The feeling is that you can be safe only if there is a Jewish majority.*	DEFENCE
IDF	*But for most of them it's very difficult because your friends go to the army, your parents went to the army, your family, everybody went to the army, it's like a national mission or something like that. It's very difficult.*	DEFENCE
Legitimate violence	*It's easier to be violent and partake in that. It's easier. You feel strong, you feel in control.* *Violence become something that is legitimate, it's legitimate. The violence that's against Palestinians*	DEFENCE
Medical ethics	*In the hospital we had an order from the management that we can't engage in any political discussion in the hospital, and we have to keep the current practice where we treat everyone and we work with everyone equally. But you could feel tension. You could feel the tension.* *But still we worked the same way and we treated the Arab patients the same. We didn't speak about the war.*	WORKPLACE PROTECTED

Themata of recognition – non recognition and quoted examples



Thema: RECOGNITION
TO BE RECOGNISED AS A VALUED MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY

Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
Rise above differences	*Somehow you hide behind the profession. Somehow you invent ways of not getting involved by committing to the profession, to the professional standards. I am a public health person and I'm interested in keeping everybody healthy, Arabs and Jews. Life has a sacred value to me above a level of understanding. There are tricks of the trade to sort of convince yourself.P4*	WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Compassion	*I remember once three soldiers, a bomb had blown up and when we saw them, I think I gave him treatment. It's not easy for me. He must take every day and injection for his pain and another injection and he refused all the nurses to give him his injection. He wanted just me. And I said you know I am Arabic, and he had been shot at by Arabs, attacked by them. And he just wanted an Arabic nurse to treat him, and when he saw me, he was in a lot of pain, in a very bad way. And was taken on to recover and rehabilitation and survived. And he saw me and was waiting for me to come from my shift to give him the injection. Because he said, and his mother said to me, that when you give him the injection he doesn't feel pain. But all the others did. He smiled when he saw me I never forget that smile. And he would say 'you've arrived' and smile. He was just 19. You have this dilemma. He is also a human being. He was in Lebanon on and he killed there he killed my people. On the other hand you give him treatment, and the smile was just for me. It's not easy.* ***And how did you feel?*** *Happy. I made him happy. I love my job. I have been a nurse for 19 years. I still have the same energy for it. D7*	WORKING RELATIONSHIP
We are needed	*Look I'm a nurse. I am in a place that they come and they need me. They come to me and they need me so they will not attack me, even if I am Arab because they need me*	WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Medical ethics	*And, is it that values that we are educated on as physicians no matter where we studied, whether in Israel or outside, to see the human aspect of the subject, so we have to treat every patient, no matter what the gender, nation, religion. Or is it the character of the person? He went to study medicine because he was like that? He has this kind of motivation. Anyhow, inside the hospitals you can see a very nice interaction and relationships p9*	WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Social time	*And we were together and we go to drink beer together, we have a social life together. And I think it was sincere when a visitor said, and some of the Jewish colleagues also agreed totally with him. And me as an Arab, the chief of the Department I like the atmosphere here. P9*	SOCIAL REATIONSHIPS
Building through work	*Up until my fourth year, we were grouped with eight or nine students and we started having our practice and I*	SOCIAL REATIONSHIPS

	was in a group where there were only Jews. So that was a switch when I started having real Jewish friends, not only people where you say hi, but having friends and going out with friends. And I think that happened only because we were everyday together. And that's carried on..P10	
Explore commonality	*We do have some Jewish friends and we have met together, sometimes we meet and go to a restaurant and eat something else and I like that. I don't hate them. You eat with them. You live with them. You talk with them. You have a lot of common things together. And I believe and I still believe we can live together. I can live with part of them more than without them. I find common things with part of them, I believe that we have to find common things to live together*	FUTURE IMAGINED
Co-existence	*But you know if I take the Arab Palestinian community inside Israel which is composed of Muslims, Christians, Jews I think mostly I can say the vast majority is tolerant, is accepting the other, is calling for coexistence, coexistence between Arabs and Jews with mutual respect inside. And I'm coming from a town called S 40,000 people, which is mixed, Muslims, Christian and Jews, and they live in harmony, yes, they live very well in harmony with mutual respect visiting each other, and participating in the joy and sadness of each other, on the personal level and within the community. And until almost 100 years ago we used to have a Jewish community in my town which actually left in 1918 when the British mandate came over and some of them you know, of the people, the farmers, didn't matter whether it were Christians Muslims or Jews, they left for Haifa during the British mandate so it was a natural outgrowth of the mandate at that time. So actually until then we had a nice Jewish community. Now, now it's sad we are three communities. We still have the synagogue that is maintained. No Jews living there are now. P9*	FUTURE IMAGINED

Thema: NON RECOGNITION

NOT TO FEEL RECOGNISED AS A VALUED MEMBER OF A COMMUNITY

Base theme	*Quoted examples*	**Organising theme**
Perceived as the enemy	*And Giddi,(Jewish Israeli friend) was very calm, very silent. He didn't shed any political talk. Because we were neighbours in Tel Aviv. And once I could approach him and try to open this closed door to tell him 'Giddi if you see me as an Arab do not react in the way that I might only have the dreams of Syrian tanks coming into Tel Aviv'. And he was convinced I was genuine. And I was not manipulating him.. P5*	MISUNDERSTOOD
Fear of the other maintained	*I think it is a fear that is artificially maintained intentionally by the state, by the official line of Hasbro, by the official line of government policy. And*	MISUNDERSTOOD

	if you lose that then you don't have a case and demanding greater Israel. So that. Erm. .. no you consecrate this holy cow for defence because we (they) are going to kill us because we are afraid for our lives and safety and so on. It is maintained by the state intentionally to keep the level of animosity and the level of of … otherwise why would kids enlist in the Armed Forces?	
Media portrayal	*Sometimes you need to explain that it's not true what you are talking about and then it's finished. And some of them say we don't know that, because they hear the Israeli media. For example, one of the radiographers said that the difference between us and them is we have 'zihab' (the iron dome) and still they (Hamas) put their children there as 'protectors'. There is a lot in the Israeli media. They are always saying that Palestinians protect Hamas buildings or something by putting their children there at the front. Saying that the Palestinians use human shields that they like to kill their children.*	ASYMMETRY
Fear of state disloyalty	*With my work or something like that I have to be careful. My opinion is that peace is the best thing for all the people for all of us. I know a friend of mine who is also a doctor and she had her registration, they did an interview, because when she went on a (peace) demonstration she put down that she was a Dr. And she was told that she would be in trouble if she participated in another demonstration that she might be fired. You can't continue working in the hospital. So I don't tell my opinion. I have but I don't participate in demonstrations. I don't tell my opinion at all. I think that my opinion will not change anything and Palestinians and the Jews*	ASYMMETRY
Victimhood	*And sometimes they want to talk about coexistence, I start to define what is the meaning of coexistence. So my existence is totally different from theirs, it is a totally different existence to my Jewish colleagues. He has the hope, he has the promise. I am living on the shoulders. I do not have enough economic power to become independent. I am all of the time in relation of the horse in the nights. This horse, from time to time, somebody must be able to break through. It does not represent the whole picture. It is the interest of the system to have them, as the director deputy of the …. And some professor who invented the electronic nose and other things and it is in the interests of the system to have our minds advanced. But it all serves to fortify the Israeli economy, the state. Which is something I'm not complaining of, especially if the alternative is to go and live in Ramallah.*	ASYMMETRY
Divided loyalties	*f course I'm worried about my job. I have children and of course I'm worried. I studied a lot to keep my job. But at 11 o'clock (during Gaza war when staff*	IMPASSE

	*were asked to stand in silence to support the IDF) I will not stand with them. And sometimes I forget and I'm in the middle of a treatment and have to think what I can do. You can hear the loud speaker telling you. It's not real. They make us two things that we don't believe in. And it's not real for us. And you see all the people all the Jewish all your friends are standing and you're looking for a place to hide ** P7*	
Seeker of truth	*You can't be silent and not crying and if somebody is crying the other will look at him. When the war was on in Gaza I was in Jerusalem at a conference for a DIR system, how to treat autism. And I met my friends who I meet every year. I was the only Arab in my group. And we are working very nice together and very professional and humanity but it started there, I was there when it started. And it was a very bad feeling to meet people and I think I look around and I think 'where is her son? Is he killing the Gaza children now? And I feel pity for her and her child and for my child. So I feel pity for all the people and I feel angry at the same time, why they don't seek for the real truth, and they listen to the Israel news. So why I blame people is because they don't seek the truth. P5*	IMPASSE
Collective memory	*When you go shopping for instance in the supermarket or in the big city, like Carmel you see everybody shopping and actually the Palestinians from the villages are the the greater number shopping in these places. They do more shopping and there are even figures to show that they buy more. And you see a lot of Palestinian kids working in the shops and selling. And so you seem to find coexistence in a very high plane you know. But that's only in the marketplace. Once you leave everyone goes to their separate communities, there is no interaction. They don't realise this abroad. .... when I came back I remember so many times our neighbours would be having friends to parties, Jewish friends coming and coming to weddings and other social events. But not any more. I can't remember the last time it happened. P4#, I feel much more bitterness because, how come that you memories the spirits of these innocent people on my land. And exactly on my land of our village where people used to grow that their figs. And the fig tree is a symbol for life. The fruit. It is free for everybody who passes by. If you are hungry you can come in and eat. The bulldozers they destroyed these trees in the 1950s. The forest there that stands there today to memorise the spirits of the children is of pine ... which is a symbol of death.*	IMPASSE

Themata of equality – inequality and quoted examples



Thema: EQUALITY		
TO EXPERIENCE EQUAL STATUS		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
Positive experiences	*I can confirm now because I worked for a hospital with Jewish doctors and it was very nice. It was very good*	WORK OPPORTUNITIES
Politics ignored	*And I'm working in a department where there are Arab doctors. It's more difficult for me to get started (with Jewish doctors) and I need to have relationships and it will take more time. We don't talk about the political situation because I think all the academics not just doctors, all of us the Jews and the Arabs understand the situation so there is no need to talk about it. I know why they do their thing and they know why I do mine. And so we're not talking because everyone knows what the other is thinking. Maybe this is a mistake but now it's accept it and that's what everyone is doing.*	NEUTRAL SPACE
Nurturing relationships	*And, is it that values that we are educated on as physicians no matter where we studied, whether in Israel or outside, to see the human aspect of the subject, so we have to treat every patient, no matter what the gender, nation, religion. Or is it the character of the person?. Anyhow, inside the hospitals you can see a very nice interaction and relationships*	NEUTRAL SPACE
Work/life separation	*I keep calm with the years, with the experiences, for me, I learn that it is not easy to express myself or many times I have just to deal with myself by saying 'his is the reality, you have to deal with this. This is the reality, I can't change it.' I can't change in the small area, in a small circle, my thoughts from the past that I want to change the world, it's not real, its not rationale. I can influence my family and my friends and from here we have the staff, our staff is Jewish and Arabs. My friend, she is Jewish and after the holidays she came here and we sat to talk about the family, about her parents, about what happened in Gaza. I never opened the*	RECOGNITION

	subject about the political situation with her. I don't know, I don't want to know what is her opinion really because I want to find the common that we are together. Really there is a lot of things that we are the same. So we keep it separate.	
Thema: INEQUALITY		
WE ARE NOT EQUAL CITIZENS		
Base theme	*Quoted examples*	**Organising theme**
Housing opportunities	*Now we are struggling about the city plan for the future that they did not consider the Arabs and their plans. So there is a high population in the city in the Arab neighbourhoods and if you travel in the city you will see them. And the Arabs can't find places to live, for us to have our schools and places where we can live and when we go far, when we want to go to the neighbourhood that is much more improved and better place to live it's not easy. P1*	STRUCTURAL
Segregation	*I am leaving (my home) but I can't find another place. I am very frustrated because I cannot place to live and this is a problem for the Arab young, we cannot find a place.*	STRUCTURAL
Land rights	*I am not originally from Haifa, I came from the Galilee, a small village and the village is also a problem because if I want to live in the village there is no place, I cannot live there. There is no land to build a house because it is full, the capacity is over crowded. And they don't let us buy land and so I cannot buy land to build my house. If I am a Jew, or if I was Russian from Russia and not even Jewish. It's a formal statistics something like 50% are Jewish but they can buy land and build a house with the support of the government next to my village but I can't.*	STRUCTURAL
Consequences of Aliyah	*I don't know how much my generation how long will be, you know, it's like boiling inside, everyone is talking about that that it's not possible that that I was born here and my parents*	STRUCTURAL

	and grandfathers were here and this is the land that we have and I cannot live on my land and someone who came from I don't know from another place will take the land and build a large house. And have a large space and garden. And I can see how they are.	
Ethnicity	*We feel that they don't accept us. They are thinking about taking all the villages near the West Bank from Israel. So this is what I say, we don't feel the country accepts the minority the Arab minority and all the time they are talking about the demographic danger. All the time planning on how the Arabs don't have more and more children.*	DISCRIMINATION
Racial bias	*The two cultures are changing all the time. Our culture has been changing in the last years because of globalisation, and because of it, it's now harder to live and to an enough salaries and to work hard. So people are not sharing so much as they did before. We live now everyone alone and there are lonely people now. The Jewish culture is more, there are many cultures. That's the Arab Jews who came from Morocco and Iraq and they are like the same as the Arabs with the same culture. And those who came from Europe from Eastern and Western Europe they have a different culture. And also between the Jewish communities that are differences and they don't accept each other. There is a discrimination between the communities from the West and the East.*	DISCRIMINATION
Dependent on geopolitics	*They choose the Arab doctors that are the best. But sometimes they choose the Jewish doctors, like the Russians that aren't very clever. They try to keep the numbers equal. (But there is discrimination as to who might be picked - they have two Arabs example and they need four, so they would choose one Jewish and the fourth one they will also choose Jewish even though they may not be the best qualified compared to another Arab). They don't say it in public, but I feel that it does happen. Misraqi Jews tend not to be doctors - they don't study*	LACK OF OPPORTUNITY

	like others. It's not as though they are less clever it's that they are not interested. It's my opinion that I see that, but they don't say that in public.	

9.2.3. Dialogical analysis full quotes

A) Exclusivity / inclusivity

"We get along at work, we get along in this environment in the secure place, in the department where we work together. But when you go outside .. it's different. . I think the conflict here is based on land. No one wants to give up their land, you know. My father has inherited land from my grandfather who inherited from his and his and his and it's been hundreds of years our land . . and when I go to pick olives I completely feel that it's my land. And I think to myself if someone has come to take my land I don't know what would be possible and what I'd be capable of doing because we are very much connected to the land. That's the only things important in life is the land and respect. So no one takes your land and no one takes you(r) respect. That's why you can see that in 48 when the state of Israel, that a lot of Arab villagers were, what you say, they left or were forced to leave, it doesn't matter how they left it's the fact that the villages were empty." Female medic, 20's, Palestinian Israeli

"I think for years they have been educated that they have been robbed, that we took the land we are horrible and the enemy and you know. I don't know what tell you because I'm an Israeli and I have been in Israel all my life … . Since I was born they keep telling you how Jerusalem is important, how Israel is important. But if I wasn't living here I probably wouldn't have heard that and if someone else lived there I would hate it. I'm telling you honestly I don't think Israel thinks they took the land, the land was ours.. You see this is where the problems lie. Because if you look, and if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don't see it as.. And if you look at the history, the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved and came back and moved and came back. So we don't see it as land being taken from other people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly the problem, you see because it wasn't neutral, it wasn't nothing, it wasn't an island that we found and now we're fighting about it, it's a land that has been here for thousands of years and everybody thinks it belongs to them. So we are pretty much.. I don't know, I don't like to say that we take it. There was a war, the UN in 48 said to countries for two people. They didn't like that. They wanted to fight. And we won the fight. And they wanted to fight again. And we won again. And they wanted to fight again and again we won .. What can I tell you? I don't see it as taking the land. There was a war and they lost. Sorry. I feel bad for them but…" Female medic, 30's, Jewish Israeli

B) Non-recognition-recognition

> *"I remember one day that me and a paediatrician, we saw two of our female colleagues were there, standing in the church wondering about this place. And we approached them by name. And they were surprised to hear that someone was calling them by name. So*

from time to time they know about us, and from time to time some people mention that we are from the village and some of them ask 'What is your story? Do you still have a desire to go back and rebuild your village?' Some try you know, some don't say anything. The most painful thing for me, is that you start telling a narrative and within a second they turn over to their story, to their story about being a victim and having to defend, and saying 'We were expelled from Europe and we were killed and all our properties were taken.' And your story is not that striking, not that prominent any more. It's ignored. And this is something that happens from time to time. And it makes you feel upset' Male, 40's, Palestinian Israeli

lose your spirit. We are committed to treating people regardless of their religion, their background, their gender. And from time to time the patients reward you. They come and tell you they are given a list of specialists in Haifa and Natanya but we choose to come to you. Why? The majority of the cases they say 'Because you are an advantage. We trust you more. You are more sensitive. You are more human.

And Jewish people say this?

Yes. Not the Arabs but the Jews.

It's real paradox.

Yes it's surprising. And it lifts your spirit. The fact that a patient can somehow reward you, it goes very highly if they are a Jew. Male, 40's, Palestinian Israeli

'I have a lot of connections and we work together with close ties. So there are senior doctors who are Arabs who guide me and direct me and teach me and I learn a lot from them. Some of the doctors here are at the same level as me and they are more like friends and of course because we work together we do a lot of talking, professional but also some personal. On Friday I'm going to a wedding, a guy I work with, he's a Muslim, and he invited me and I'm going there.' Male, 30's, Jewish Israeli

'It's defensive if we both talk of being a victim. I tried to tell a Jewish colleague (at medical school), that if you want to approach me as an Arab, this is not correct. I prefer for us to talk as human beings. And as human beings we can open the horizons … And because I used this argument in order to build rather than destroy, it was interesting for him. And once I could approach him and try to open this closed door to tell him that if you see me as an Arab, don't react in the way that I might only have the dreams of Syrian tanks coming into Tel Aviv. And he was convinced I was genuine. And I was not manipulating him. And that was the whole political talk with him. Now my friend from Tel Aviv, we continued with this sort of relationship after we graduate.' Male, 40's, Palestinian Israeli

C) Equality-inequality

'I rent a house and after five months I decided I will leave it because all of my neighbours are Jews and they never contact me. And I'm a doctor and a physician and

have children. They ignore me. They just look at me…. and I think I am one of the successful Arabs in Israel because most of the Arab young, the new generation, they don't have the jobs that they can offer to rent a flat. I am very frustrated because I cannot find a place to live here ... we cannot find a place. If I want to live in the village (I came from) there is no place, I cannot live there I cannot buy land to build my house. If I was a Jew, or if I was Russian Jew from Russia, they can buy land and build a house with the support of the government next to my village. But I can't. All the people who studied with me, the Jewish doctors, all of them now they have the houses, they build their own. All of them have the gardens and a big house and lawns and they don't have to pay back ... They have everything they want and it was so easy for them. I would be glad if you could come to see some of the villages and you would see an Arab village and you can see that there is no place to build any house and on the other side you can see that they are all the time advertising (to Jewish Israelis to buy land / properties)… The problem is not from between me and the other doctors, my friends. The problem is from the government. It's from the laws and there are many laws that are discriminating. I have very good relationships with all the people I treat. All the people. All of the religions. All of the colours. And I am happy when I'm working here. As I said the problem of is not the personal problem, I don't see in my Jewish friends as irresponsible people. And that is why we are optimistic. We can live and work with each other as humans without problem …

I think that much of our happiness .. we lose it because of that. We could be much with our lives with our success because, but because of the political situation .. Who can ignore it? Maybe you can be happy and not think about it but most of the people can't ignore it.' Male, 40's Palestinian Israeli

D) Threat – security

'*If you were here during the war you would get probably quite different views and opinions and even I would talk to you differently. Even me and my Arab colleague over the war it was very hard to communicate, because of my kid, you know, because he is in the army and he was fighting, I needed to reach out to my Arab colleague and write a message telling him that I wanted to continue to be in contact …*

… If you were here in this war time, if you are coming here and visiting and you go down to the south and you see a big piece of land or whatever with civilian populations who are being threatened for years, day after day. We call it like rain dropping, you know drops, five, six, ten bombs a day. It's been like this for years and years. No country in the world would <u>ever</u> allow this to happen. If it would happen to Britain they would kill 10,000 of whoever is across the border. No-one will say anything because someone dared to drop bombs on our population. Now Israel is under you know, under a magnifying glass all the time because of our history, because of … now I'm not saying this just to justify, I'm saying that there is hard evidence that Hamas, for example, the terrorists, go into the population … I know because my son was just there. It's not like if there is a war here, then you would see that soldiers shooting from this building and this building. No.

There it is a population area. You don't draw the fire, you know, you bring them where the citizens are, but they do that unfortunately.

Our leaders and their leaders, that's the problem. Because people can connect you know. Mostly they want a quiet life and you know being able to provide for their families. That's what people want. They should have given the keys to women and a woman who gave birth and she had kids. If more people went through what I went through this summer you should be like crazy to think about war being an option. When I heard the stories when he came back I called him and said 'What was the idea of all of this? … What was it? Taking a life? For what? I mean it's ridiculous, it's ridiculous and it's such a mess … It's crazy and it's crazy and it's crazy. And I sit here and I allow, I allow this to happen to my kid.' Female medic, 40's, Jewish Israeli.

9.3. Study three overview (Chapter 6)

This study used a mix of participants as discussed in Chapter 3. A more detailed table of their background is shown below, followed by the quotes taken from this cohort that made up the data for the study.

9.3.1. Sample details

New	Orig.	**Palestinian**		
01	D3	Bethlehem: UK national for 15 yrs still returns	F	40's
02	D4	Ramallah; refugee in Europe for three yrs	M	30's
03	D5	Gaza: post grad in London	M	20's
04	D6	Gaza: post grad in London	F	20's
05	D7	West Bank: post grad in London	M	20's
06	D9	Gaza: working in London	F	40's
07	D10	East Jerusalem: Studied in London, now working	F	40's
08	D11	Bethlehem: Working in UK MSc from LSE	F	20's
09	D12	Gaza: post grad London	M	30's
10	D13	East Jerusalem	M	20's

Gender: 4F and 6M; **Ages:** 20's x 6, 30's x 2, 40's x 2. **Education:** All grads / 5 post grads **Location**: WB x 4; EJ x 2; Gaza x4

New	Orig	**Jewish Israeli**		
01	D3 L	Born and lived in Israel until 2 years ago: G	F	30's
02	D10 L	Born and lived in Israel until 1 year ago: G	M	30's
03	D11 L	Born and lived in Israel until 1 year ago: post grad	M	30's
04	D16 L	Born and lived in Israel, studying in L: post grad	F	20's
05	D17 L	Born and lived in Israel, studying in L:post grad	F	20's
06	D1 Is	Junior doctor: post grad	F	20's
07	D11 Is	Consultant: post grad	M	40's
08	D7 Is	Radiographer: post grad	F	40's
09	D8 Is	Junior doc: post grad	F	20's
10	D9 Is	Senior Psychologist: post grad	F	40's

Gender: 7F and 3M; **Ages:** 20's x 4, 30's x 3, 40's x 3; **Education:** All grads / 8 post grads: **Location**: London x 5 (Israeli nationals, lived and educated in Israel plus IDF) and here for 1-2 yrs with frequent visits back home): N Israel x 5.**R/W** x 5, **LW** x5. L=London, Is = Israel


CLOSED TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER
Media projection
Jewish identification
Fear
Special people
Ethnic exclusivity
Denial of alternative reality
Collective history
Loyalty
Collective identity
Power asymmetry
Ideology
Majority rights
Biblical interpretations
Exclusivity
Inclusivity
Co-existence
Ideology
Education & language
Equal opportunities
Recognition
Rights of the Other
Zionism vs liberalism
Mutual suffering
Understanding the Other
Recognising victimhood
Inequality
Democracy vs dictatorship
MORE OPEN TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER

Thema: EXCLUSIVITY (in relation to semantic barriers)		
CLOSED TO PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Majority rights	*Look, there's the West Bank which is like a big prison. It's not very nice. Or Gaza which is horrible. It's the truth. A Palestinian would say - 'I can't find a job. My cousins are stuck in Ramallah or Gaza or whatever and I can't move anywhere. And I'm looking around and seeing all this prosperity and it's not equal in any way. And yes, I'm being educated constantly as an Arab that they came in 1948 and took what was ours in 1967 they took more.' What do you expect? But on their side they do acknowledge that Israel is extremely strong and extremely defensive. That's how I see it. Having said that, why not try and get along together still?*	POWER ASYMMETRY
Denial of alternative reality	*If you want to find alternative information you can, but you need to look for it, as it's not obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper a certain journalist so people don't and if you do they say they source is probably Palestinian. So it's easier for them to tell me that I am not telling the truth, than to face the psychological consequences of admitting it might be true, because they want to be patriotic and humanist at the same time.*	POWER ASMMETRY
Denial of alternative reality	*If you want to find alternative information you can, but you need to look for it, as it's not obvious. You need to read a certain newspaper a certain journalist so people don't and if you do they say they source is probably Palestinian. So it's easier for them to tell me that I am not telling the truth, than to face the psychological consequences of admitting it might be true, because they want to be patriotic and humanist at the same time.*	POWER ASMMETRY
Media projection	*It's awful. It's really bad. And there is a war and people are dying but it's just not written about in the papers. The whole front page, and underneath about an Israeli soldier. It's really sad. You don't see that 20 Palestinian people were killed.*	POWER ASYMMETRY
Jewish identification	*'One wants to be one common entity. It means that I am part of this network of people and I feel*	COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

	that I naturally feel a bond with people when they associate me with being Jewish and I associate them with being Jewish. It's a cultural evenness. It's just a desire to be part of something that is bigger than you and the feeling that you're not alone.	
Special people	*It is very attractive. I feel special. I thought I'd hide it here in the UK but I don't. I'm very open about it, I'm talking about a special culture.*	COLLECTIVE IDENITY
Fear	*In this conflict it's just , it's so easy to, to transmit fear to people on this level you know. 'Oh they are so scary they just want to kill you, I want to destroy you'. And you know we are doing it both ways. The Arabs do brainwashing on my kids when they are little telling them horrible things about the Jewish country, you know, mostly bullshit. I don't know how we are ever going to get out of it.*	COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Ethnic exclusivity	*We want the Jewish race to carry on. I want our children to be Jewish and our grandchildren to be Jewish. If we start intermarrying with Arabs then that's not going to be.* *I was saying about the Palestinians they don't have recognition as a nation that's one thing. And no one wants them honestly. None of the Arab countries around, they see them as refugees. They have all the Arab countries around us, pushing the Palestinians into these … Because you know they are spread a little bit to Syria and Lebanon, Egypt, they would have more space to breathe but nobody really wants them.*	IDEOLOGY
Loyalty	*For us, it is becoming frightening to be here, because we would be considered a traitor. Not everyone considers you like that but, the media is always present. I can't hear the news. I can't bear it. The few times I did, it was horrible. It's completely unbalanced. Whoever is saying it, the way they talk. They don't say a traitor but the way they talk, the music of their words, they imply you are a traitor. You are not patriotic*	IDEOLOGY
Biblical interpretation	*I don't think Israel thinks they took the land, the land was ours.. You see this is where the problems lie. Because if you look, and if you go and you look at the Bible and every document, the history, tells it that Israel belongs to the Jewish people. So we don't see it as.. And if you look at the history, the Jewish people did live in Israel, and they were moved and came back and moved and came back. So we don't see it as land being taken from other*	IDEOLOGY

	people, it was our land. You see and this is exactly the problem	
Collective history	*In 1948 .. When the war erupted and they were … excluded, or thrown away or never mind, out of their houses. And they became refugees in refugee camps and stuff and they multiplied. There were a few here, you know, few Jews, but historically what happened was the Jews, after what happened in Europe and they needed a land. Of course they went back to the Bible.*	IDEOLOGY
Thema: INCLUSIVITY in relation to semantic bridges		
MORE OPEN TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Victimhood	*For me, I feel like the Israelis, the Jewish people are missing the point when they are insisting on calling the land as their own land and not seeing the Palestinian side of how they also have the right to the land. I think the Israelis need to recognise that the Palestinian's predicament, that their victimhood is caused by Israel.*	RECOGNITION
Rights of the Other	*I met the Palestinians as kind of, as an enemy. I only knew them as a soldier, as a combat soldier. I was a combat soldier. When we got into houses into their homes we had to take people out from their parents. And seeing the children crying I just didn't know what to do. I was told to do that. I thought that I was keeping my country safe, but when I grew up and then went on to meet Arab people as normal citizen in my work, I was shocked. When I see that they are just like you and me. They have their rights and they should have their rights, as you have them. In Israel we can't really be so backward …. it's very difficult for me to see a child crying. So I think it's a deep psychological issue that is quite personal, to see the suffering of the other.*	RECOGNITION
Understanding of the other	*We need to understand that they (Palestinians) have a right to define themselves. They don't have a land, an identity, or a nation.*	RECOGNITION
Inequality	*You can paint whatever you want. So it has become much deeper and the inequality of each confrontation in the Occupied Territories has been more pronounced each time. The rate of those killed - so that in order to sustain their own perception of themselves Jews see themselves as humanists they have to sort of ignore or not know a lot of things.*	RECOGNITION

Dictatorship vs democracy	*The Arabs have had their struggles and they were always violent against Israel, right? They have always been. But we are a state, we are democratic. We have our values of democracy, of rights, of free speech. There is a few kilometers from us we have a regime. We are controlling it, another nation, and we don't give them their rights, no freedom of speech. Our husbands and sons are serving there and oppressing these people. But it comes back to us. You cannot have a democracy here and a dictatorship there. It doesn't work you know. It just leaks inside. And slowly, slowly, each year it becomes worse.*	IDEOLOGY
Zionism versus liberalism	*And they're not going to go all the way to say that ok actually Zionism in itself is a problem or the whole structure of the state needs re thinking. Our identity in the state is a problem or you know the immigration is a problem based on ethnic identity is a problem. They can't touch all of those things because in the end if you ask them what are you willing to do for a Jewish majority, that it should be secure always .. they don't like those questions as its admitting to be racist right? That actually you're willing to do loads of things in order for there to be a Jewish majority. It's the Jewish and democratic paradox thing. But they don't want that - the liberals and Zionists have lived with that paradox.*	IDEOLOGY
Education / language	*It just makes sense to grow up together because the language can separate us, and especially with children and I'm thinking about my baby here that in 17 years' time he will go to the army and then what? I had a few teachers who were very much into human rights. To me it seemed obvious then, but now that I think of them, it was pretty special. I'm very unusual. Most people wouldn't acknowledge this and it's difficult to get everything out into the open.*	CO-EXISTENCE
Equal opportunities	*People should be the same in their opportunities. Like have equal opportunities. There's no intrinsic difference between Jews and Arabs. Its no more intrinsic between the difference between a Jew from the UK and a Jew from Yemen. If that can be completely bridged, it is different, but if that can be embraced then there is a chance.*	CO-EXISTENCE
Mutual suffering	*The problem is you can see the suffering on both sides so that causes you not to say that I'm right,*	CO-EXISTENCE

	you're wrong. It shouldn't be like this, that you're the bad guy because you also see the other side having problems. So it doesn't make you say the Arabs are wrong and so I'll do this and to hell with you and we should have this land and you should be out of the land There is another view which says that both of us live here and we have to coexist somehow.	

Themata of threat – security / semantic barriers and bridges



Thema: THREAT in relation to semantic barriers		
THREAT AS A BARRIER TO CONSENSUS		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Ethos of conflict	*If you want a true peace, even the most right wing person will tell you 'Okay, I'll sign that paper, and they're not going to shoot me, they're not going to bomb me, they're going to leave me alone, that's fine!' When will we believe they will do that? And they say too, they say they will never stop until they have all the land and all the Jews are in the sea. They always say that.*	MISTRUST
Institutional belief	*A friend is a veteran of an intelligence organisation and he is convinced that the Palestinians are not trustworthy and the bottom line is that they want to destroy us'*	MISTRUST
Defined by enemy	*Collective identities are structured around opposition to the other so the way that the Jewish entity .. In Europe the Jews have no choice to be Jews because everyone else will call them Jews whether they want to be or not but in the new country .. we have to define ourselves by enemies and everyone else who doesn't think so are weak.*	COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Holocaust memories	*There is the Jewish history and the Holocaust and the traumas that we carry and we are very anxious people and an anxious nation.*	COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Need to defend	*I am very open minded and left wing, but if you challenge me and start pushing you know, yeah my God I have to defend, or I will lose my security very easily.*	FEAR
Motivator to defend	*When we have the fear inside us then you are looking to validate it in all kinds of examples, so it only takes one terrorist who goes on a tractor and runs some people over for people to say 'You see?' They don't really want us to be here. They are dangerous and we have to protect ourselves.*	FEAR
Existential fear	*Because most people are being moved, moved by fear, or managed I would say, by fear. Actually my psychological view of all humankind, all people, not just in this conflict. I think most people who come for treatment they battle with fears, deep deep fears. Some you know like death fears In this conflict it's just , it's so easy to, to transmit to people on this level you know. Like 'Oh they are so scary they just want to kill you, I want to destroy you. Oh they are so scary they just want to kill you, I want to destroy you'. And you know we are doing it both ways. The Arabs do brainwashing on my*	FEAR

	kids when they are little telling them horrible things about the Jewish country, you know, mostly bullshit. I don't know how we are ever going to get out of it.	
Thema: SECURITY as both a barrier and a bridge to dialogue		
Base theme	***Quote example***	**Organising theme**
Defence against perceived enemy	*It stems from the fact that the Muslims want to wipe out Israel. And don't forget that Israel was founded because of what had been going on in Europe at the time. The people then felt nobody wants us, everybody's thrown us out and killed us and slaughtered us, and we've got to survive on our own. We've got to show the world that we'll do whatever we want, whatever you say.*	SURVIVAL
Legitimate violence	*The Israeli Arabs are becoming more educated, integrated in medicine, although there were integrated in medicine a long time ago. But another aspect feels there is a judgmental side. So I guess there are processes that go on but about violence and demonstrations, violence becomes something that is legitimate. It's legitimate. The violence that's against Palestinians*	SURVIVAL
Belonging land	*I'm sure they feel the same, I'm sure without a doubt. I had a friend from school who was an Arab, he lives in the north and we were friends, and we never talked about politics just friends. I helped him in school, we were good friends and he told me, we were talking after school, we were studying for a test together. And there was another guy there, his friend and he told us he said something and the guy said 'You know because you stole land, you took my grandfather's house then you live in it' he said it was the notion of it, that you took our land and now you expect me to be okay about it. No. Of course I'm not.*	SURVIVAL
Education	*My personal friends, not from work, but the general population and where my kids go to school and you have to deal with that when you send them to school. You have to put them through the system that educates them differently. And it's also difficult because you know that they will be soldiers fighting for things that you don't believe in and you know it's very hard to control it because however you educate them I know that when most of the boys go into the army it's hard.*	IDF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
National	*We're talking about a different world in the IDF.*	IDF COLLECTIVE

mission	*Being a soldier is like a way of putting your violence somewhere. And it makes you feel strong, capable, as you are when you're a teenager. It's very sad also, because they can become violent when in a group of soldiers. But it's very difficult because your friends go to the army, your parents went to the army, your family, everybody went to the army. It's like a national mission or something like that. It's very difficult. It's very difficult to come to terms with.*	IDENTITY
Power asymmetry	*If I were a Palestinian, if I were.. I have to really try to understand how it is for the other side, I've tried to imagine how it would be .. if let's say if all my family … And I'm an eight-year-old girl and I don't understand anything about terror and then someone gets into my house in the middle of the night to get my father or my brother or arrest someone. The chance of me not hating who does that is very very low. So I think it's a very very big problem, but I don't need to do anything. I hope that the Palestinians or Israeli Arabs feel good about themselves and they have a good quality of life so there is a greater chance that they would like to say stop this war and they would have more to lose and the pain will be more painful to lose their house or their way of life, so they will think twice about terrorism or try more to get in touch and strive for peace. But I don't see that coming.*	INTRACTABLE
Occupation	*First of all I am very left-wing in my political views. Since I can remember I have thought that the occupation is the worst thing that has happened in Israel. And I remember, I grew up in a left-wing environment and we were always afraid as to what would happen in Israel because of the occupation. And everything that we feared has come true I think.. I am very worried about Israel.*	INTRACTABLE

Themata of non recognition-recognition / semantic barriers and bridges



Thema: NON RECOGNITION in relation to semantic barriers		
CLOSING BOUNDARIES OF CONSENSUS		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
Jewish victimhood	*Fundamentally, there is an imbalance of power. And Israel thinks they can get away with it. The party that has the project has more power and that's about it. Israelis I think, by and large understand this, and have developed a variety of tools and arguments that alleviate the problems related to that understanding. One is 'the world is a jungle, look at us – we have been destroyed and so if we don't fight for ourselves who will fight for us? Tough luck for Palestinians. Nothing can be done about that.' And another one is, 'Well nobody likes us any way.' And so it's kind of 'Well they don't like us, and they wanted us out, so we'll kick them out instead.*	DENIAL
Status quo in politics/ media	*But when you're in a place where your controlled by everything, like in the media then you kill the peace process. You need to get people to communicate together. If we communicate more, it will be much easier to have peace. Life will be so much easier because you can try and understand the other point of view. And he really wants to live a life like you. But you become separated and it's all fuelled by politics. . And if you want to fuelled with the agenda of the politics there s nothing else. No opportunities.. This is what we have been seeing in the last 10 years.* . *And I told an American Jewish visitor, that in our class, in this University there was a Palestinian girl who doesn't even hold a passport, who doesn't even hold papers, no choice whatsoever.. It's uncomfortable. Imagine a Jewish person going to live there and then discovers the locals are being expelled, you don't want to know it. I try and explain things like that*	DENIAL
Stalemate	*There is no one in Israel who think that they need to change. Why should they? There is nothing that forces them. Nobody uses any stick. Nobody. Why bother?*	DENIAL
Physical barrier	*Of course you get frustrated and to get angry. For example, I'll give you a personal example. When I see the wall started where it started in some places, I really felt it. Really. And the most thing I could carry in my life when it came closer to my home to my village. And when they started to divide things that used to be when I was young, like the school,*	ASYMMETRY

	that will always the same, suddenly, its high buildings and you can't see anything and its not the same as what it used to be when you were young. I used to go to my school, which is near a road to the settlement, but they never did any violent things against us. So we are living peacefully and then suddenly the wall comes and everything is cut and you feel that you have cut your past from your future. So what it feels like, is like pushing very hard into my neck. Physically it was just like that. It's not daily life, and so that's why they're tired now. *They built a wall around us just like there was in Germany and they are promoting really racist ideology, that they want everyone to recognise Israel as a Jewish only state.*	
IDF military capability	*Like when I went to school I had to go through checkpoint and sometimes the Israelis would beat us really badly. They wouldn't sexually harass you but I remember a soldier they would say 'Now go across the checkpoint naked' even though I was 13 years old. The journey should take no more than 15 minutes by car but we had to go all the way around and we had to go long way around just to avoid the checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck at it two hours probably*	ASYMMETRY
Ideology as justification	*The Israelis always try and claim things. Like this is our land this is our army. And people are convinced by it. It all comes from the same ideology, that they were the chosen people, and they have to protect it, the land … I feel the Israelis have these false ideas, because they feel insecure. I think what happened to the Jews in the Holocaust was tragic, and I don't know why, but they are doing just the same thing to us.*	ASYMMETRY
Jewish exclusivity	*I told him (the Israeli guy) 'You know, it comes down to recognising you as an Israeli, but I see that you are not even seeing me'. I don't understand why they would insist on having the whole land for themselves and not even seeing any claim s and rights for the other side.*	ASYMMETRY
Lack of respect	*They don't understand the resentment and the suffering that the Palestinians have been going through.*	STIGMA
Ignored	*There has been no real intention for peace from the Israelis. Why is that? Because since 1994 they said they would stop settlements and yet they are growing all the time.*	STIGMA
Misunderstood	*My Jewish Israeli classmates at uni didn't know about Palestinian house demolitions, particularly in the punitive sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. And they would question me and they would think that I was lying, that I am deluded. I*	STIGMA

	remember there was one Jewish guy from America I met at University and was now living in Israel. I was so trying to convince him what was really going on. I took him around the West Bank. And after one of many discussions he said to me. 'Finally, you know what? Maybe you're right. Maybe some of what is going on is unethical. But if that is what has to happen for Israel to exist, so be it. *Even though we did some projects in Bethlehem together and I think there were really nice, I feel like this is not reality. I feel like that they don't know what it's like when you go through a checkpoint. They can't do anything about it and they criticize their government but then they don't do anything about it. Sort of like I feel like they might think they are pro-Palestinian but like nothing happens…. Most of them are liberal or left-wing, and for them the two state solution would be the best option but they're not taking our position. I feel like they believe in coexistence but I know sometimes you have to be like you have to say that, but for them they are sort of neutral and if they criticize Israel it makes them look bad.*	
Oppression	*And this is depriving us of our rights, of having an army, living in security, having the freedom to go back home, going out of your city, getting into your city. When you are there are not sure about your safety, the Israeli army might come to your property. That is a very hard thing. But I say to people can you imagine what it's like living in a place where you don't have your army where you don't have the freedom to go where you want.*	*STIGMA*
Collective experience	*Probably more of a collective human experience than many others from other nations having to live through. We all have similar stories. We all relate to each other through our struggles and lives, when we go in and out of Palestine, securing our documentation, getting habits and passports, not getting one, try to get visas abroad to study, to come to Britain. So that is quite a collective experience*	STIGMA
Thema: RECOGNITION in relation to bridges		
OPENING BOUNDARIES OF CONFLICT		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
Exploring justice	*I always say to Palestinians try to think beyond Palestine, beyond the National conflict, the Palestinian rights will not be met without having alliances with other actors. Who will give Palestinians rights in a free way? No-one.*	INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Human rights	*And because already the Palestinians don't have*	INTERNATIONAL

	the same strength to project their story and to claim their rights legally and to present their story internationally, or to present themselves as well as the Israelis can do. We need resources, contacts and networks all sorts of things.	COMMUNITY
End of suffering	*If we all under the law we treat the same and have our rights. We could achieve this because that's what I grew up to believe. But of course what has happened within the conflict . It will be hard to accept on both sides, for the Israelis to accept a Palestinian and how I can live with him under these conditions. I think that we have furthermore to forgive, live together to end our suffering.*	FUTURE IMAGINED
Co-existence	*For this conflict the only resolution that I really see the one state solution. This is my belief. Two state solution is not going to work because, it may give bring calm for a few years but then it will explode again.* *When the peace process from Oslo was serious that it would lead to a Palestinian state. I was so excited about having peace and live side-by-side with Israel as neighbours, to live in peace and to have coexistence and all that stuff. Which I still believe in.*	FUTURE IMAGINED
Accepting State	*I'm one of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians refugees who left throughout our history. We lived in the land what is now called Israel. That's Israel as a state that was established in 1948 as a result of a war, the Israeli Arab war. I can't deny their right to live in this piece of land. All Palestinians recognise the state of Israel. No-one talks about destroying Israel. The only problem we have is the Israeli state politicians who represent the brutal policies of controlling the Palestinians, not only the land, but to the right to live in peace, the right to have a state.'*	PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF STATE OF ISRAEL

Themata of oppression - freedom / semantic barriers and bridges



Thema: OPPRESSION in relation to semantic barriers		
Perceived as the oppressed partner in the conflict		
Base theme	***Quoted examples***	**Organising theme**
State Policy	*There should be a reason that justifies Israel to continue they first of all, settlement expansion, to continue with the enclosure of Gaza, to continue with all its policies against Palestinians. What is the reason? What are the facts for them that justify them to go on with their colonial policies?* *Most people in Gaza have been treated as some sort of contagion that needs to be contained. They have been deprived of anything related to just being humans. They have been deprived of their rights, they have been deprived of their humanity. So how do you like going to make people like that interact with people who are supposedly normal who have lived in a very stable society*? *I feel that they are occupiers, they are oppressors and also lie. They are all from different countries and now they have more rights than me. I feel that they don't belong to the country.. I do know some Israeli people and they are really nice but that's en masse what it feels like.*	INJUSTUCE
Non recognition	*They don't understand the resentment and the suffering that the Palestinians have been going through. They didn't know about Palestinian house demolitions, particularly in the punitive sentence as a punishment for terrorist activities. And they would question me and they would think that I'm lying, that I am deluded. I remember there was one Jewish guy from America I met at University and was now living in Israel. I was so trying to convince him what was really going on. I took him around the West Bank. And after one of many discussions he said to me. 'Finally, you know what? Maybe you're right. Maybe some of what is going on is unethical. But if that is what has to happen for Israel to exist, so be it.'*	INJUSTUCE
Refugee status	*I have to give you this story which is really important. When we were in an (encounter) group one guy said, 'Yes, we are Jewish, we have suffered in Germany and what happened with us make us like. And after that we had our own state to forgive and to continue our lives'. So he said the Palestinians have to do the same to forgive*	INJUSTUCE

	and to continue. And I said 'Wait a minute the refugee rights'. Because if I want to forgive, I can't forgive because of the refugees. If you said yes that they have the right to go back to Palestine. There are now 5 million refugees or more in all the world. So I can forgive but I can't forget because it's something different. I forgive the pain may be that you give to me, maybe I forgive that you kill my brothers, my sons. But I can't forgive and say no rights to the 48. The Palestinians who left and live in some other place. I can't. That is different.	
Forced degradation	*'They used to come into our house at three in the morning … they were knocking at the door with their guns looking for my cousin. And they told us to leave the house because they had to search for him. My father said to them in Hebrew 'My children are really young, and they have to go to school tomorrow'. But they were just saying 'Shut up and go outside'. And I think that they knew he wasn't there but they still had to do it. I was about 14 or so then but it started when I was about nine. . it was really scary. It was terrifying. I had a younger brother and he used to get really really scared that something was going to happen to him.* *Like when I went to school and had to go through checkpoint and sometimes the Israelis would beat us really badly. They wouldn't sexually harass you but I remember a soldier they would say now go across the checkpoint naked even though I was 13 years old. The journey should take no more than 15 minutes by car but we had to go all the way around and we had to go long way around just to avoid the checkpoint, otherwise you might be stuck at it two hours probably.*	HUMILIATION
Anger and frustration	*There is anger. It's not religion. Religion comes after. It comes as a consequence of anger. Anger, vulnerability, all these things, I feel it because I had this experience myself. And I remember. The anger feels like a furnace. I remember maybe thirty to forty times I was humiliated at checkpoints. They want to humiliate us forever … some people accept being humiliated to secure their physical survival, but not the spirit and their soul and their self-respect.*	HUMILIATION
Helplessness	*I try to see them as people, and many Palestinians do the same. But to be honest with you, the conflict makes you feel terrible. You just want someone to make them feel what we feel.*'	LACK OF AGENCY

Stalemate	*They are terrified about losing the nature of the Jewish state. They have words for it. Like the demographic threat. And they have big group discussions about what it means to have a Jewish state. And they are right you know. If everyone in that land. It was one person for one vote, it wouldn't be Jewish anymore. And what I think is that the way they're trying to do social engineering, it doesn't work. You can't force things. They even had in the Jerusalem master plan in 2000, the stated aim of what percentage of Palestinians they wanted in the city. And they tried to implement it. We have no control in anything. We can do nothing.*	LACK OF AGENCY
Victimhood	*They have all this power and they are destroying our lives, women and children. You want to stop them but you cannot do anything. You don't accept what they're doing and you really hate them because, I mean, they're doing so many unacceptable things and that makes you think that we will never forget. We will never forgive them. It adds to the history of hatred and the conflict with them.* *I can't personally contact the settlers who are aggressive. Maybe they are crazy. In my mind so they are so aggressive and I can't deal with that. If you go to Hebron and they are super aggressive, somehow in that place. And they have different arms and weapons, guns and things. Its really hard. These people I have never been in touch with them. I have never talked them. Because I don't know, they are really super super aggressive.*	LACK OF AGENCY
Thema: FREEDOM in relation to bridges		
Combating effects of oppression		
Base theme	*Quoted examples*	**Organising theme**
Keeping traditions	*'It is so important not to lose your sense of nationality when Israel declared itself a state. To keep and protect it. The conflict makes it more important for us to keep our roots, to keep our dignity as Palestinians.*	DIGNITY
Imagined futures	*I met Jewish people and listened to them more closely after I came here. You take more interest in you listen more carefully. You meet more people. So I have changed. And suppose may be, that it does take a long time to listen to the other person. And it takes both time, maturity, interest and understanding of the person, for whatever*	DIGNITY

	reason, to understand and think how is this resolvable. And so you take an interest in what the other person is saying.'	
Non violent resistance	'*I think to be honest I never believed that violence is the solution with the conflict. Even if you try and stop an Israeli it makes no difference because they will demolish a house or hurt you in some way and you get nothing out of it. You're just going to cause more harm to yourself and your parents. And if you hurt someone they will come back to hurt your family and you will spend the rest of your life in jail. So I don't think that violence is the solution. Even at a certain age I thought we could coexist, which is why I took the human rights path.*	RESISTANCE
Loyalty	*'When I go back home there is this incredible paranoia about how I might be an Israeli collaborator. Because I might be meeting Israelie and I studied Hebrew and they have some sort of paranoia about that'.*	RESISTANCE
Collective history of violent resistance	*Back home, I wouldn't speak about my opinions because I know how my people think. And that will fire back at me. The problem with extremists is they play with the religion to suit what they want. Back home in Palestine whatever I said about others, [about Israelis] no-one would believe me, but if I said 'God said that' and I would use a few words from the Koran, they all go emotional and therefore accept it.'* *There are some problems with Hamas, with Islamic Jihad, where they want to fight, to react when Israelis do something. Others live by that. But this is not the norm. I want to talk about normal people like me, who go to work, work in a bank, work in social media. These people who if they have more chance, that trust will be a little bit higher and more normal.*	RESISTANCE
Human rights	*We do have a right to the land, and the Jewish people claim they have a right to be there too. I've always chosen to stick with the international law, and perspective. That just defines the conflict within the UN resolutions, conventions and treaties*	NON RETALIATION
International support	*I think basically you need some external weighty broker that is capable of putting pressure on Israel and sit down and sign a peace deal. There is no other way. The main barrier again I go back to the point that I mentioned in the beginning, that there is no powerful references for Israel to commit with these negotiations. No one can force Israel to do*	NON RETALIATION

	anything if it doesn't represent the interest of power, not only in Israel, but strategically also for the United States. And again, as long as the international security council and the international community lose their credibility, so no actor in the world could force Israel to meet its obligations towards peace. And so Palestinians can either continue resistance or provide more and more concessions and hopefully the second option will not happen. But again, it seems a question of power.	