

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*The politics of state effectiveness
in Burundi and Rwanda*

Ruling elite legitimacy and the imperative of state performance

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis explores why state effectiveness differs in countries that otherwise share many common characteristics, a question that has been central in recent academic and policy debates, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis presents a comparative study of two such states, Burundi and Rwanda. Although they share many characteristics, their performance has followed diverging paths since the end of the civil war in Burundi (1993-2003) and of the war and the genocide in Rwanda (1990-1994). Through a comparative case study analysis, the research examines why the state is more effective in implementing government policies in the latter than in the former.

Drawing on a year and a half of fieldwork, the thesis explores the effectiveness of the state from two analytical vantage points. First, a functional perspective examines the articulation and implementation of specific policies, taking as sub-case studies the promotion of fertiliser use in agriculture and the promotion of maternal health. Second, state effectiveness is explored through an organisational perspective, examining the incentive, monitoring and disciplining mechanisms of officials in the local-level and national-level bureaucracies. Both countries had formal state institutions ostensibly designed to promote development. However the informal norms and organisational behaviour promoted by ruling political parties undermined developmental efforts in Burundi while supporting them in Rwanda.

The thesis argues that the difference in state effectiveness between the two countries lies ultimately in elites' differing strategies of legitimation, making a well-functioning state less politically imperative in Burundi than in Rwanda. To demonstrate this, the thesis improves on existing typologies of forms of legitimacy and probes the relationship between the elite's legitimation strategies and state effectiveness. Empirically, the research contributes to redressing the relative paucity of the literature on the political economy of the state in Burundi. It engages with the polarised scholarship on Rwanda by revisiting the main debates on the nature of its state. It invites nuancing current analyses on how power is deployed from the centre to the periphery in that country.

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Acronyms

Burundi

ABELO: Association Burundaise des Elus Locaux.

APE: Administration Personnalisée d'Etat

BiF: Burundian Francs

BPS: Bureau Provincial Sanitaire

CAM: Carte d'Assistance Maladie

CEPOP: Comité d'Evaluation des Performances des Organes de l'Administration Publique

CNDD-FDD: Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie

CNFA: Conseil National des Fertilisant et Amendement

CSLP: Cadre Stratégique de Réduction de la Pauvreté

CPSD: Cadre de concertation des Partenaires pour la Santé et le Développement

DAF: Directeur Administratif et Financier

DPAE: Département Provinciaux de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage

EPA: Etablissement Public Administratif

FCFA: Fonds pour les Fertilisants et Amendements

FNL: Forces Nationales de Liberation

FONIC: Fonds d'investissement communal

FRODEBU: Front pour la démocratie du Burundi

GSADR: Groupe Sectoriel Agriculture et Développement Rural

MDC: Ministère du Développement Communal

MFPTSS: Ministère de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale

MINAGRIE: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage

MINISANTE: Ministry of Health

MPDC: Ministère de la Planification et du Développement Communal

MSP: Ministère de la Santé Publique

MSPLS: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Lutte contre le Sida

OBR: Office Burundais des Recettes

PALIPEHUTU: Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu

PCDC: Plan Communal de Développement Communautaire

PDC: Parti Democrate Chrétien

PNIA: Plan National d'Investissement Agricole

PNSEB: Programme National de Subvention des Engrais au Burundi

PNSR: Programme National de Santé Reproductive
RdB: République du Burundi
SAN: Stratégie Nationale Agricole
SNIS: Système National d'Information Sanitaire
SNL: Service National de Législation
SRD: Société Régional de Développement
UPRONA: Union pour le progrès national

Rwanda

APNI: Appui au Programme National d'Intrants
APROSOMA: Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse
ASM: Assistante de Santé Maternelle
CBHI: Community-Based Health Insurance
CCM: Country Coordinating Mechanism
CIP: Crop Intensification Programme
CPAF: Common Performance Assessment Framework
DDP: District Development Plan
DGIE: Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration
DHU: District Health Unit
EDPRS: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EICV: Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des ménages
FDLR: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
GACU: Government Action Coordination Unit
GFATM: Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GoR: Government of Rwanda
HMIS: Health Management Information System
HSSP: Health Sector Strategic Plan
IDP: Integrated Development Programme
JSR: Joint-Sector Review
MCH TWG: Maternal and Child Health Technical Working Group
MIFOTRA: Ministry Public Service and Labour
MINAGRI: Ministry of Agriculture
MINALOC: Ministry of Local Government
MINECOFIN: Ministry of Finance and Economy Planning
MINISANTE: Ministry of Health
MMI: Medical Military Insurance

MoH: Ministry of Health
MRND: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
MSM: Mouvement Social Muhutu
OAG: Office of the Auditor General
PARMEHUTU: Parti pour l'émancipation Hutu
PMO: Prime Minister's Office
PReFER: Privatisation of Rwanda's fertiliser import and distribution system
PSC: Public Service Commission
PSD: Parti Social Démocrate
PSTA: Plan Stratégique pour la Transformation de l'Agriculture
RAB: Rwandan Agriculture Board
RADER: Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais
RALGA: Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities
RAMA: Rwandaise d'Assurance Maladie
RoR: Republic of Rwanda
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTL: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
RwF: Rwandan Francs
SISCom: Système d'Information Sanitaire Communautaire
SPIU: Single Implementation Unit
STWG: Sector Technical Working Group
SWAP: Sector Wide Approach
UNAR: Union Nationale Rwandaise
UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

General

ANC: antenatal care
BTC: Belgium Technical Cooperation
CAADAP: Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
CATALIST: Catalyze Accelerated Agricultural Intensification for Social and Environmental Stability
CHW: Community Health Worker
DAP: Diammonium phosphate
DHS: Demographic Household Survey
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EmOC: emergency obstetric care
EPFL: Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU: European Union
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GIZ: Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI: Gross National Income
HDI: Human Development Index
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFDC: International Fertiliser Development Centre
IHME: Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation
MDG: Millenium Development Goal
MMEIG: Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group
MMR: Maternal Mortality Ratio
MP: Member of Parliament
MT: Metric Ton
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO: Non Governmental Organisation
NPK: nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium
NRA/NRM: National Resistance Army/National Resistance Movement
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC: OECD-Development Assistance Committee
PBF: Performance-Based Financing
PS: Permanent Secretary
TFR: Total Fertility Rate
TPFL: Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
UN: United Nations
UNCDF: United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USD: US Dollar
WHO: World Health Organisation
ZANU: Zimbabwe African National Union

Chapter 1

Introduction


What lies behind the differential effectiveness of states in countries that share otherwise many characteristics? This thesis takes up a comparative study of two such states, Rwanda and Burundi, to suggest both a method that can contribute to explore this question and some answers. Burundi and Rwanda display a high level of resemblance. They have a similar level of economic development, ethnic composition, and are of comparable size in terms of population and area. Burundi and Rwanda both embarked on a state-building process, following civil war in Burundi (1993-2003) and genocide in Rwanda (1994). Since these episodes of mass-violence, the two countries have followed diverging paths. The Rwandan state is an effective state, able to implement the government's bold, equally acclaimed and criticised, development policies. Rwanda has reached most of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and succeeded in maintaining steady economic growth while reducing poverty (NISR 2015). In contrast, the Burundian state is patently ineffective. Corruption and clientelism are endemic (e.g. ICG 2012). Economic indicators have barely improved since the war, while social indicators fare better, but have progressed at a slower pace in comparison to Rwanda (Figure 1.1). This contrast reflects a divergence in state effectiveness between the two, since Rwanda, although arguably in worse shape than neighbouring Burundi after conflict, has improved the effectiveness of its state at a quicker pace. It is also an historical divergence, since both countries were relatively effective African states before conflict and, while Rwanda has recovered this status, Burundi has not.

This thesis contends that the cause of the divergence in state effectiveness between the two countries is mainly political. The argument is that the different *necessities* and *possibilities* of legitimation of the Burundian and Rwandan ruling elites when reaching power produced different strategies of legitimation, which were more, or less, aligned with increasing state effectiveness.¹ A well-functioning state was politically imperative in Rwanda and politically hazardous in Burundi. In the latter, the ruling elite benefited after the war from a large reserve of legitimacy, based on its role in the conflict, its ethnic composition, its link with the rural masses, and its electoral victory. As a consequence, its need to foster new forms of legitimacy

¹ Elite can be defined as people “able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” or “persons with the organised capacity to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed” (Higley 2010: 163). Ruling elite can be defined as the people able to affect political outcomes through their control of the state.

through performance was limited. Furthermore, the conception of the ruling CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy) of its own legitimacy did not only make an effective state non-essential for its maintenance in power. It also worked against it. Its members’ sense of entitlements to the state required the party to systematically favour them in policy implementation. In Rwanda by contrast, the ruling elite after 1994 initially had a small reserve of political legitimacy. In addition, the avenues available for its legitimation, and ultimately its political and physical survival, were mainly limited to forms of legitimacy based on performance delivered in an impartial manner. As a result, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) claim to legitimacy made state effectiveness imperative. By probing into the relationship between the elite’s legitimation strategy and state performance, this research explains not only the difference of state effectiveness, but also *the peculiar form* that state (in)effectiveness took in each country, as observed in the empirical chapters.

Figure 1.1 GDP per capita in Burundi and Rwanda (constant 2005 US\$)



Source: World Bank, (retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org>, 23/01/2016)

The detailed theoretical proposition and its contribution to the literature are presented in further details at the end of the thesis. Instead, the thesis begins with an initial empirical approach to the research question for two reasons. First, this reflects the inductive methods applied in this research project. Second, presentation of empirical material is required before offering a detailed theoretical explanation. As further discussed in the next chapter, detailed empirical material related to the effectiveness of the state is limited in Burundi and contested in Rwanda. For the latter, the scholarship is deeply divided in its analysis of the state, reflecting the discrepancy between Rwanda’s good development indicators and the

pessimistic findings of many qualitative studies. As a consequence, this research project prioritised a deep analysis and discussion of empirical data before elaborating on a theoretical proposition.

This chapter begins with a review of the literature on the causes of state (in)effectiveness to situate the analysis. The second section presents the analytical framework, defining the key concepts on which the research question and its answer are based: the state, state effectiveness, and institutions. The third section presents the research design and methodology, justifying the case selection and introducing the strategy followed for the within-case analysis. The final section presents the structure of the thesis.

1.1 The politics of state effectiveness

The debate on the role of the state in development has shifted from a focus on the scope of state intervention to one on its quality (Grindle 1996: 4-6; World Bank 1997: 23-25). A large consensus now recognises that “development without an effective state is impossible”, though there are differences over what constitutes state effectiveness (World Bank 1997: 25; Grindle 2012: 263-265). Weak state capabilities are said to contribute to poor economic performance (Kaufmann & Kraay 2002), corruption (Shleifer & Vishny 1993), civil wars (de Rouen & Sobek 2004; Fjelde & De Soysa 2009), civil rights abuse (Englehart 2009) and lack of democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan 1996). “Weak” and “failed” states have been labelled “public bads” (Fearon & Laitin 2004: 6) and have kindled an interest in both academic (Putzel & DiJohn 2012) and policy circles (Zoellick 2008). In contrast, effective states have been identified as pivotal in the most dramatic success of late developers (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Kohli 2004).

Theoretically underpinned by New Institutional Economics that posits that a state can support development if it embodies an appropriate set of institutions (North 1990), the “good governance” approach has, since the 1990s, offered a series of “good practices” to establish effective states (World Bank 1997; Kaufman 2003). Yet, the recipe to create an effective state has remained largely elusive. A large body of public management literature has identified organisational, managerial and technical factors to account for variations in state performance (e.g. Israel 1987; Leonard 1991; Grindle 1997a; Grindle 1997b; Owusu 2006), but these analyses have hardly helped to transform the state toward more effectiveness. Donor-led public sector reforms over the past two decades have generally been a failure (World Bank 2008; Scott 2011; Andrews 2013: 12-15; Goldfinch et al.: 2013).

Both the normative approach of the “good governance” mainstream thinking and the organisational focus of the public management literature are hardly helpful to understand under what conditions an effective state can emerge because politics is mainly left outside their scope of analysis. Building an effective state is an eminently political process because it bears deep redistributive consequences in terms of resources and power. At the individual level, the process of bureaucratisation of the state apparatus, the disciplining of civil servants and the fight against corruption mean that some individuals lose discretionary power and opportunity for resource capture, and eventually resist change (Schneider and Heredia 2003; Kjaer 2004; Goetz 2007; Robinson 2007; Turner 2013). Transforming power relationships and the allocation of financial resources can also challenge moral and social norms of reciprocity and solidarity (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006). The literature on neopatrimonialism has pushed this argument to the extreme by linking the weakness of the state in Africa to the importance of the “affective economy” (Hyden 1983), considered by some authors as hindering the rise of legal rational institutions (Bayart 1994; Chabal & Daloz 1999; for a critique see Mkandawire 2015). This moral economy creates “lame leviathans” (Callaghy 1987) at the mercy of their societies, in stark contrast with the autonomous, yet strategically embedded, East Asian developmental states (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995).

At country-level, scholars deploying a “political settlement” perspective have similarly criticised the ahistorical and apolitical analysis of the NIE and good governance approaches, pointing out their ignorance of the redistributive consequences of institutional change (Khan 1995; DiJohn & Putzel 1999; Khan 2010). Any change towards a more effective configuration of state institutions has to be compatible with the polity’s political settlements, i.e. “the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes” (DiJohn & Putzel 1999: 4) because “if powerful groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure, they will strive to change it” (Khan 2010: 4). State transformation jeopardising elites’ interests is likely to stall, or even create violence (DiJohn & Putzel 1999). Conversely, change is possible if institutional transformation supports powerful groups’ survival. Khan proposes to analyse political settlements through horizontal (i.e. between elite factions) and vertical (i.e. between the elite and their supporting coalition) distribution of power. He posits that when power is horizontally and vertically concentrated, the ruling elite sheltered from particularistic demands from their coalition is more likely to adopt a long-term horizon and develop an effective state (Khan 2010: 64-69).

This theoretical understanding of state transformation echoes a large body of literature linking regime survival and the emergence of effective states, especially in relation with the state’s

capacity to kick-start industrialisation (Moon & Prasad 1994; Kang 2002; Doner et al: 2005; Ritchie 2005; Doner 2009). For these authors, the kind of relation between the ruling elite and the wider society, and the kind of redistributive pressure it entails, lie at the heart of the capacity of a state to deliver economic growth. Other authors have used a similar approach to analyse the effectiveness of the state in service provision (Levy & Walton 2013) and social protection (Lavers & Hickey 2015). Still taking elite survival as the main explanatory factor for the variation of state effectiveness, some authors have instead focused on the impact of popular threats in creating elite cohesion and, ultimately, the collective action necessary for institutional change (Vu 2010; Slater 2010).²

The argument of the thesis is situated in this literature on the political determinants of state effectiveness briefly reviewed here. The thesis indeed offers an explanation of the difference in state effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda anchored in the ruling elite's strategy of political survival. The conclusion will further reflect on this literature and show how the comparison between Burundi and Rwanda contributes to it.

1.2 Analytical framework

The state

Many different theoretical approaches have been taken to analyse and define the state, making it a “messy concept” (Mann 1984: 187). Part of the problem is that the state is often defined by what it does (functionalist approach) or by what it looks like (institutional approach) (ibid.). Max Weber's famous definition, predominantly institutional, portrays the state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1991 [1919]: 78). Weber thus considers the state as the organisation capable of ultimately making and enforcing rules but does not specify what these rules might be (ibid.: 77). Definitions that fall in the latter category come from different traditions. For example, the Marxist definition views the state as the tool of the ruling class to reproduce a social order beneficial to them (Miliband 1969; Marx & Engels 1998 [1848]).

Scholars from the historical institutionalist school have criticised functionalist conceptualisations of the state as only “a neutral broker among competing interests” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938), arguing that states have not been considered enough as “organisational

² Waldner (1999) also identifies elite cohesion as the determinant of the emergence of an effective state capable of delivering development, but does not provide an explanation of why such cohesion emerges in the first place.

structures or as potentially autonomous actors” (Evans et al. 1985: vii). They posit that states play a pivotal role in social transformation. The state is not solely a locus of conflict or a tool in the hands of social groups, but “a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). As a consequence, the state should be an important object of analysis in its own right (Krasner 1978; Skocpol 1979; Nordinger 1981; Evans et al. 1985). Furthermore, this literature encourages looking into the “black box” of the state. Skocpol, for example, defines the state as a “set of administrative, policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority” (Skocpol 1979: 29).

While subscribing to the conceptualisation of the state as an entity distinct from society and striving for hegemony, authors have criticised historical institutionalists for their exaggeration of the autonomy of the state (Migdal 1988: 231-264; Shue 1990; Migdal et al. 1994: 1-4), making of it a “myth of unity and omnipotence” (Migdal 2001: 251). Advocating a “state-in-society” approach, they reconceptualise the state by questioning its autonomous and unitary character.

First, the state should not be understood as a monolithic entity. Migdal for example (1994: 16) distinguishes between the “trenches” of the state, i.e. where front line civil servants are in direct contact with society, the “field offices”, i.e. local governments and other regional agencies that coordinate the state’s action and resources locally, the “agencies’ central offices” (e.g. ministries) where policies are formulated and resources dispatched, and “the commanding heights”, i.e. the top leadership of the state (presidency, prime minister’s office etc.). Each level and each branch of the state pursues different missions through different organisational arrangements. Consequently, coordination cannot be assumed and the state can be “a contradictory entity that acts against itself” (Migdal 2001: 22).

Second, although distinct from society, the state is never fully autonomous from it. “States may help mould, but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded.” (Migdal et al. 1994: 2). This point offers strong analytical leverage when taken in conjunction with the previous one. Because the state is a multidimensional entity, the autonomy of each of its parts differs. A different “calculus of pressure” shapes civil servants’ incentives “depending on the particular array of forces in their arenas and their relative weight” (Migdal 2001: 117). Such a conceptualisation of the state has obvious consequences for exploring state effectiveness since “political outcomes may not at all be in line with what seem to be the overall state’s ‘interests,’ but may stem instead from the complex interaction of

the different levels of the state and the particular pressures faced at each level.” (Migdal et al. 1994: 15).

Drawing on the “state-in-society” approach and on Skocpol’s and Weber’s definition, this thesis adopts an ideal type definition of the state. The state is a set of administrative, policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well coordinated, by an executive authority that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence on a given territory. This definition has several analytical and methodological implications. First, in line with the state-in-society approach, it underlines that the state is not a monolithic entity but is multidimensional and must be studied as such. Second, its “more or less coordinated” organisations invite taking seriously the fact that the state is not always a coherent entity. Third, the definition draws attention to the fact that, despite its multidimensional nature, the state remains centralised and is more than the sum of its parts (see also Mann 1984: 188). Fourth, the reference to “organisations” implies that the state is not reducible to individuals. It is also composed of norms, routinised processes, organisational memories and resources. Lastly, by emphasising that the state is led by an executive authority, this definition includes the government and more generally politicians that hold an office through election or appointment.

State effectiveness

To define “state effectiveness”, this section first delineates it from the very close and widely used concept of “state capacity.” Although state capacity is “a concept in search of precise definition” (Hendrix 2010: 273), it is commonly used to account for state strength (e.g. Fukuyama 2004: 6-14). Yet, its analytical value is problematic for the exploration of the Rwandan and Burundian states’ relative strength. First, state capacity is hard to operationalise. It is often referred to in the literature as the set of enabling factors for the state to pursue its goals (e.g. Kjær et al. 2002: 21-23; Morgan 2006: 7-8; vom Hau 2012) and is consequently a latent property of the state. However, because state capacity is difficult to observe directly, it is regularly captured through the outcome of state operation (Delpuech and Poulton 2011: 7; Hanson and Sigman 2011: 14). Yet, by blurring the boundaries between outcome and enabling factors of state activities, theories of state capacity run the risk of being circular and, at worst, non-falsifiable because then “explaining the outcome *just is* explaining the capacity” (Kocher 2010: 139, his italics).

Even when observed as a set of enabling factors, state capacity remains problematic because the distinction between enabling factors and outcome is not clear-cut. For example,

bureaucratic or “institutional quality” are often considered central elements of state capacity (Fukuyama 2004; Hendrix 2010; vom Hau 2012), i.e. enabling factors for the state to implement its policies. But they can arguably be considered as an outcome as well, namely the result of the state’s action to promote professionalisation and put a check on patronage practices. Similarly, taxation, heralded as a typical indicator of state capacity (e.g. Hendrix 2010) is both an enabling factor but also an outcome of state operations. This creates an issue of circularity and endogeneity. Overall, exploration of the causal mechanisms of state capacity is exposed to several problems. First, state capacity is hard to observe because of the challenged of endogeneity and circularity, but also because it is conceptualised as a latent property that may, or may not, translate in successful policies. Second, the concept appears divorced from politics and society. State capacity becomes the technical tool that politicians decide to use or not, supporting the vision that “politics surrounds decision-making activities while implementation is an administrative activity” (Thomas and Grindle 1990: 1170, in Goodfellow 2012: 38). Yet capacity itself can be the results of politics. Furthermore, it is oblivious to the fact that successful implementation of policies does not solely boils down to a political decision and bureaucratic quality. It can be traced to broader political context, nature of state-society relations or to informal rules that a narrow focus on bureaucratic quality will tend to ignore (ibid.).

For these reasons, this research privileges an outcome-based study of state building by taking state effectiveness as the dependant variable. The concept of state effectiveness is borrowed from Tom Goodfellow (2012). As he underlines it, the notion “has gained currency in recent years” (e.g. Unsworth 2005; Rahman & Robinson 2006; Leftwich 2008)³ although he remarks “a distinct absence of conceptual clarity in much of the literature about what exactly constitutes an effective state.” (Goodfellow 2012: 43). He defines state effectiveness as a situation where “the stated aims of government codified in policies, laws and regulations are translated into accomplishment” (ibid. 46). Unlike state capacity, state effectiveness is thus defined only in terms of implementation. Consequently, the objective of this thesis is to explore why the government’s stated goals are generally translated into results to a greater extent in Rwanda than in Burundi. The definition is not normative since it does not specify the perimeter of the state’s action.

Such a definition of state effectiveness “deliberately excludes consideration of questions of responsiveness and the processes through which policies, laws and regulations are decided

³ Its popularity is now obvious. For instance, a major research centre at the university of Manchester funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is called the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre.

upon in the first place” (Goodfellow 2012: 49). The reason is not only to protect the concept’s parsimony in order to make it analytically useful, but also because public deliberation and responsiveness are processes different from, and sometime in tension with, policy implementation (ibid. 49-52; Slater 2008; Booth 2011).

This definition of state effectiveness has a close connection with Michael Mann’s concept of infrastructural power of the state, i.e. “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984: 113). This notion is distinct from coercive power as it refers to the ability to permeate social life, exercise social control and foster acquiescence. Infrastructural power is supported by “logistical techniques” (ibid. 192), i.e. transportation, communication, public education, information gathering systems, that allows orders and information to flow across the territory. Infrastructural power is distinct from state capacity as it is not only a product of bureaucratic capacity but also of historical patterns of state-society relations and channels of information flows (Goodfellow 2012: 59). Infrastructural power is consequently a much more direct antecedent condition to state effectiveness than state capacity as it directly relates to the ability “of the state [...] to implement its actions across its territories” (Mann 2008: 355).

While the definition of state effectiveness has the merit of clearly anchoring the dependent variable in outcomes, this choice comes at a price. Such an outcome-based measurement of state performance may capture as well other effects unrelated to the state itself (Delpuech and Poulton 2011: 7). In this research, this could especially be true for donor support in Rwanda since the country receives more foreign aid than Burundi (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). This has had to be controlled for in the comparison.

This exploration of the effectiveness of the state in Burundi and Rwanda possibly poses a greater challenge. As mentioned, the state is multidimensional and those who control it pursue varied objectives. Performance differs across its function and in the most extreme cases, pockets of effectiveness can form (Crook 2010; Leonard 2010). Consequently, can state effectiveness be studied only in relation to precise functions of the state? The effectiveness of the state *as a whole* cannot be discarded as an object of study for several reasons. First, as underlined in the definition above, the state is unified by an executive authority that coordinates and supervises its different organisations and functions. Second, the state is more than the sum of its parts because of the influence that effectiveness of one function has on the other functions (Carbonetti 2012: 8). For example, an improvement in tax collection or

anticorruption efforts will lead to an improvement in other functions of the state as well.⁴ Third, the different functions of the state are carried out in a common wider political context that plays a significant role in shaping the state trajectory as a whole. For these reasons, this thesis is interested in the exploration of state effectiveness *as a whole*. As underlined by Goodfellow (2012: 46-49), such a research differs from “implementation studies” (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973; Bardach 1977; Barrett and Fudge 1981) or the “administrative effectiveness” literature (Grindle 1997; Tandler 1997; Rainey & Steinbauer 1999; Leonard 2010) although its object of analysis is also policy implementation. Yet, the theory put forward in this thesis operates at a higher level of analysis than these studies since it focusses on the entire state and elite politics. Nonetheless, following Skocpol’s point that “such overall assessments are perhaps best built up from sectorally specific investigations” (1985: 17), the point of departure of the thesis is the study of effectiveness in specific functions and levels of organisation of the state.

Institutions

Institutions are generally defined as “the rules of the game” (North 1990: 3), i.e. “humanly devised constraints” (ibid.) or enabling factors (Putzel 1999: 220) that structure human interactions. As mentioned above, the state comprises “a complex of institutions” that governs politicians and civil servants’ behaviour, but also shapes the wider society.

These institutions can be formal, i.e. enshrined as laws and regulation, or informal, i.e. “created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 725). This distinction has important analytical consequences because, in many instances, state effectiveness is a function of the interaction between formal institutions articulated by the government and informal institutions governing everyday practices. The transformation of the state toward more effectiveness might be undermined by existing informal institutions that “create incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive effects of formal rules, but without directly violating them” (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 729). Such a dynamic is the focus of the literature on the weak “neo-patrimonial” African state mentioned above. More generally, state reforms in poor countries have often been unsuccessful not because they were not formally implemented, but because they failed to produce the expected effects. The reason, Andrews (2013) argues, is that state reforms have often produced “isomorphic mimicry”: bureaucracies have superficially mimicked the best-practices

⁴ This is empirically supported since the different variables commonly associated with state capacity in quantitative studies often covariate (Hendrix 2010).

promoted by the good governance agenda, yet without fundamentally altering civil servants' practices.

However, informal institutions do not always work against formal ones. They can also reinforce them. As remarked by Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 734), informal norms often “do much of the enabling and constraining that we attribute to the formal rules.” Consequently, institutions are a useful concept for analysing state effectiveness. Informal institutions can undermine state effectiveness by conflicting with the formal institutions that are embedded in “the stated aims of government codified in policies, laws and regulations.” Conversely, by reinforcing formal institutions they can support state effectiveness.⁵

1.3 Research methodology

The methodological approach: comparative case study

The objective of this thesis is mainly theory generation, i.e. to focus on the “causes-of-effects” rather than the “effects-of-causes” (Mahoney & Goertz: 2006). It consequently adopts a case study design since it is well-suited for the identification of causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007: 43-48). The divergence of state effectiveness across countries involves long and complex processes difficult to grasp by other means than the intensive qualitative study of a small number of cases (Gerring 2004). This approach does justice to the multiple paths, non-linear causation that such processes can entail. The analysis is done through a “structured, focused comparison” (George & Bennett 2005: 67-72) of two cases, involving a consistent collection of data focussed on the aspects relevant to answer the research question.


The choice of the cases essentially follows John Stuart Mill's (1843) methods of difference, otherwise known as “most similar” system design. It consists in selecting cases as similar as possible except on the key variables of interest to render the causes of the differential outcome conspicuous. Although selecting cases on the independent variable is often advocated to avoid selection bias (King et al. 1994: 128-138; Geddes 2003), this is hardly relevant for this research interested in causal mechanisms. Cases selected on the dependant variable are indeed “ideal for digging into the details of how a phenomenon came about and for developing insights” and “identify[ing] plausible causal variables” (Geddes 1990: 149). They also make the conditions neither necessary nor sufficient to render the outcome easy to spot, especially if enough variation of the dependant variable is ensured (George and Bennett 2005: 23).

⁵ Goodfellow (2012: 65) has termed this process “institutional congruence.”

Case selection

The choice of Burundi and Rwanda as cases follows these rules. As amply demonstrated in the empirical chapters of the thesis, it ensures significant variation on the dependent variable, namely state effectiveness. Suffice it for now to notice that at the aggregate cross-country level, indicators of government effectiveness by the World Bank show a significant difference (Figure 1.2). Although these indicators have shortcomings (Gutiérrez et al. 2011), notably because they are based on perception and aggregate of many underlying disparate indicators, they nonetheless not only point to a higher effectiveness of the state in Rwanda in relation to Burundi, but also in absolute terms given its level of income.

Figure 1.2 Relation between GDP per capita and Government Effectiveness, low-income country category, 2014



Source: author's compilation World Bank, (GDP numbers from <http://data.worldbank.org/>, Government effectiveness from, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx>, accessed 11/02/2016). GDP number for Eritrea and the Gambia are respectively from 2011 and 2013.

This difference is all the more striking as these countries share a tremendous number of similarities. These neighbouring countries are small, poor, landlocked, and densely populated.⁶ They were part of the same administrative unit—the territory of Rwanda-Urundi — during Belgian colonial rule. They both have experienced recurrent ethnic violence since independence that culminated in the civil war in Burundi and the civil war and genocide in

⁶ Burundi and Rwanda have respectively 10.8 and 11.3 million inhabitants, making them the most densely populated countries on the African continent, with respectively 421 and 460 people per km² (source: World Bank, accessed from <http://data.worldbank.org>, 11/02/2016).

Rwanda. Their states are both headed by liberation movements, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, and the RPF in Rwanda, that came to power after a long period of conflict. As further developed in the next chapter, comparing Burundi and Rwanda is particularly advantageous to answer the research question because they share many characteristics associated with state effectiveness such as *longue durée* historical legacies (Gennaioli & Rainer 2007), ethnic fragmentation (Mauro 1995; Easterly & Levine 1997) and population density (Herbst 2000), normally difficult to control for in comparative studies. Burundi and Rwanda are obviously not perfectly similar, as the next chapter on their historical trajectories shows, but they constitute a good approximation in social science of the ideal types of “most similar” system design.

The research is mainly concerned with the causal mechanisms explaining the difference of effectiveness between the contemporary Burundian and Rwandan states, as observed during the fieldwork period (2012-2015). Although the research is not primarily historical, historical analysis is used to shed light on the origins of such mechanisms. A historical perspective is also crucial to distinguish what variation in state effectiveness owes to a mere time lag between the end of the Rwandan genocide (1994) and the Burundian civil war (2003) or to other factors. Yet, it is important to underline here that the 10-year difference between the end of each conflict should not be approached in pure arithmetical terms. As analysed in Chapter 2, the patterns of conflict between Rwanda and Burundi differ, which makes difficult to assume that variation of state effectiveness is linear in time. While Burundi emerged later from the conflict than Rwanda, its state apparatus was in better shape as it never collapsed. In addition, the conflict in Rwanda was not limited to the three months of the genocide compared to ten years in Burundi. The civil war started in 1990 in Rwanda, and the insurgency in the North of the country against the new government continued until late 1998.

Within case research design

As mentioned, exploring state effectiveness is challenging because it is hard to grasp as a whole. The ability of the state to translate the stated aims of the government into accomplishment is not uniform because the state is not a uniform entity, nor has the government uniform goals. Effectiveness varies according to the state’s “parts” (ministries, agencies etc.) in charge of implementation. It also fluctuates depending on the state’s “stated goals.” One policy might be backed by more “political commitment” or may simply be easier to implement than another. State organisations are more likely to perform when their mission is to implement narrowly-defined, technical objectives, yielding quick apparent results, what Israel (1987) has called “specificity” (see also Leonard 2010: 95-97). Overall, the main

sources of variation of state effectiveness can be broadly understood along two dimensions: organisational and functional. Effectiveness can fluctuate depending on the state's organisations involved in implementation (local government, national bureaucracy, a particular ministry or agency, etc.) or on the state's functions (taxation, service provision, regulation, security etc.).

To tackle these difficulties, the research engages in several within-case analyses along organisational and functional lines. This has first the advantage of compensating for the small number of cases by “making many observations from few” (King et al. 1994: 217). It also allows the identification of “common denominators” of effectiveness (or lack thereof) cutting across functions and organisations in each state so that a country-level theory of state effectiveness can be built eventually. This approach permits the identification of variation within the cases, which is useful to provide possible counterfactuals and do justice to the multidimensional nature of the state.

Along the functional dimension, two stated goals of the Burundian and Rwandan state, one in the health sector and one in the agricultural sector, were selected as within-case studies: promotion of the use of chemical fertilisers for subsistence agriculture and reduction of maternal mortality. Several reasons explain these choices. First, both objectives are proclaimed priorities by the Burundian and Rwandan governments. Both governments recognise the promotion of chemical fertiliser as a prime concern (RoR 2000: 17; RdB 2006: 50). With the agricultural sector dominated by subsistence agriculture and representing more than 88% of employment,⁷ a green revolution is considered vital to kick-start the structural transformation of both countries' economies. Furthermore, as Burundi and Rwanda are the two most densely populated countries in continental Africa, gain of agricultural productivity is vital to decrease vulnerability to hunger and mitigate the effects of land scarcity in a context of sustained population growth. Overall, the promotion of agricultural fertilizers is pivotal for the development of both countries and concerns the vast majority of the population. Maternal health is also a priority in both countries because the mortality of women giving birth is very high and the inclusion of maternal health in the MDGs put the spotlight on the issue (MSP 2006: 23; RoR 2000: 14). As for fertilizer, the proportion of the population affected by policies promoting maternal health is arguably significant. This concerns women and children, as maternal mortality put in danger the infant, but also husbands, who lose their wife. In terms of magnitude, a report of the African Development Bank noted that, in the case of Burundi in

⁷ FAO, <http://faostat.fao.org/>, accessed 24/03/2014.

2009, 40% of the total mortality of women in childbearing age was due to maternal mortality.⁸ Women mortality is consequently a massive phenomenon affecting households. The second reason for the selection of promotion of fertiliser use and maternal health as within-case studies is that both goals represent fairly standard functions of any state: support to economic growth and service provision. They more generally epitomise the two faces of development: economic and social. Third, both functions require complex coordination across the different strata of the state –from the minister to what Lipsky (1980) has called “street bureaucrats”– but also with donors. Such dense interactions constitute the opportunity to shed further light on the effectiveness of the state as a whole in a way that other interventions limited to a particular agency or to a narrow goal could not. Fourth, fairly good, comparable data across countries are available for both functions. Fifth, the analysis will provide an empirical contribution to the understanding of development in Burundi and Rwanda. Despite the vital importance of increasing agricultural productivity in both countries, the understanding of the institutional and political obstacles to it remains limited. In Rwanda, research on the Crop Intensification Programme exists (e.g. Ansoms 2009a), but no work has looked at the specific issue of agricultural fertiliser. On maternal health, the literature remains focused on technical and managerial aspects, as well as on impact evaluation, with the notable exception in Rwanda of the study by Chambers and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) that this research complements.

The two other sub-case studies take an organisational angle to the exploration of state effectiveness. The conceptualisation of the state laid out above invites taking seriously two pitfalls on the path to state effectiveness. The first pitfall lies in the resistance from outside the state. It requires exploring the kind of autonomy from society that each level of the state, and each bureaucrat, enjoys when implementing the state’s objectives. Second, hurdles to state effectiveness can come from within the state apparatus, due to lack of coordination or outright resistance. Overall, an organisational approach to the analysis of state effectiveness focusses on “the sources of competing interests of different actors within the state” (Geddes 1994: 7). It thus seeks to understand under what conditions these actors give in to societal demands conflicting with the government’s stated goals and what are the mechanisms in place that prevent them from doing so.

The organisational approach to state effectiveness consequently involves systematically analysing the incentive, monitoring and disciplining mechanisms of civil servants and politicians in the different strata of the state apparatus through two sub-cases. The first

⁸ Based on a maternal mortality ratio of 615 per 100,000 per live birth, but maternal mortality might be higher. See Chapter 4.

(Chapter 5) focusses on the local state, i.e. the “trenches” and “dispersed field offices” to borrow Migdal’s image, which include the decentralised local government and its sub-entities, as well as the local services of the central administration. The second (Chapter 6) focusses on the “agencies’ central offices” and “commanding heights”, i.e. on the central bureaucracy (ministries and central agencies). Although the organisational analysis is directed to the state as a whole, it is primarily guided by the health and agricultural sectors in the state. The reason is pragmatic, as resources and space are limited, but also because such a focus complements the functional sub-case studies on the promotion of fertiliser use and the fight against maternal mortality.

Within case research method

The empirical chapters follow mainly two methods of analysis in the sub-case studies. The first was to determine the level of effectiveness. To do so, statistics were regularly used, especially in the case of the functional approach to state effectiveness since hard data on fertiliser imports or health indicators could be found. For the organisational exploration of the state, the approach was to analyse in a qualitative manner the distance between the formal institution in the state apparatus (laws, regulations, etc.) and the actual every-day practices of officials. This provides a double window on state effectiveness. First, the exploration of the day-to-day functioning of the bureaucracy shed light on the conditions of any policy implementation. Second, it also allowed a further exploration of the ability of the state to successfully implement the government’s stated goals, these goals being the coordination, monitoring and disciplining of civil servants. In other words, organisational analysis is an analysis of what underpins policy implementation, but also an analysis of the implementation itself.

The second method’s objective was to understand how such levels of effectiveness have been achieved. To do so, the thesis relies mainly on process-tracing of different critical policy choices that have influenced the level of effectiveness observed. This allows producing strong causal inference useful to rule out alternative explanations (King et al. 1999: 228).

Data collection strategy

The data were collected through a mix of desk research, collection of documentation during fieldwork, observations and interviews. Fieldwork time was roughly divided equally between the two countries and lasted in total 19 months. It occurred through three trips between March 2012 and March 2015, the main period being a 16-month stay from January 2013 through

April 2014. It is important to emphasise here that the empirical findings presented in the thesis are certain at best until March 2015. As a result, the consequences of the violence triggered by the announcement of Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza that he would run for a third presidential term in April 2015 are not covered by the thesis. They will however be reflected upon in Chapter 7.

Interviews constitute the main source of data. The voices of respondents were weaved in the text through direct quotes when they supported the analysis with more forceful and insightful illustrations and explanations than any paraphrasing could. Interviews appear numbered in the text and are detailed in the appendix. They were conducted invariably in French in Francophone Burundi while English and French were used in Rwanda depending on the language the informant was more comfortable with.⁹ The language interviews were conducted in is indicated in appendix. In-text citations from Francophone informants were translated into English by the author, although particularly idiomatic phrases were also kept in French between brackets. Most interviews were not recorded, given the visible uneasiness and self-censorship of informants in front of a tape recorder. However, when informants explicitly said they accepted, or when the interview was technical in nature, they were recorded. All interviews were semi-structured, which facilitated the consistent gathering of data while retaining flexibility in the interview process.

Most of the interviews have been anonymised in order to decrease the interviewees' self-censorship and not to create difficulties for once the thesis published. When interviews are confidential, the appendix provides as much detail as possible on the position of the interviewee. In the text, "high official" refers to an informant with at least with the rank of director or equivalent in the state. In order to verify the replicability of this research and the quality of data sources, a list providing more information on informants' identity was provided separately to the thesis examiners and destroyed after the thesis defence.

Given the specificity of this research's within case studies, interviewees were selected purposively and through snowballing methods. This obviously poses the question of the representativeness of the interview sample. When possible, efforts were made to reach people across a range of opinions, especially around the most contested issues. Information was routinely triangulated. If this was not possible, this is explicitly stated in the text. As shown in the appendix, interviewees were from different backgrounds, but included mainly national and

⁹ Rwanda added English to French and Kinyarwanda as official languages after the Genocide because the core RPF members were mainly ex-refugees who grew up in anglophone Uganda.

local civil servants and politicians, donor representatives, members of civil society and NGO workers. As the research is interested in understanding the state apparatus, the sample is naturally skewed towards urban educated individuals because it is those who work in, or closely with, the state, or who, because of their jobs (anti-corruption activist, journalist...), are close observers of the state. The issue of how the population experienced and perceived the state, although important, is largely outside the scope of this research.

Research mainly occurred in capital cities, but also in different sites in the countryside. Capital cities are the best vantage point to grasp the functioning of the state as a whole. It is where policies are formulated, rules governing the civil service decided, and where most interactions with donors occur. Research outside of the capital cities was also conducted. This occurred mainly in four sites in the Northern, Eastern and Southern Provinces in Rwanda, and in two sites in the centre and in the south of Burundi. The selection of sites was mainly pragmatic, based on the kind of non-official referral that could be obtained. The reason was that the research locally involved understanding informal structures of power, which are difficult to observe without a referral from a trusted person. Nonetheless, the sites were unlikely to represent outliers in terms of state effectiveness. In Rwanda, the four sites were representative of the local government performance as captured in their performance contract (*imihigo*) with the central government.¹⁰ In Burundi, one site was a provincial administrative centre, whereas the other was a *commune* far from the provincial capital city. Both sites were at least two hour's drive from the capital city. These field visits were the occasion to conduct observations and interview local government officials, hospital and health centre staff and agronomists, and have numerous informal conversations.

Besides interviews, observation was also a source of information. This included passing time in ministries, maternity wards, and local government offices in both countries. Especially useful was participation in the evaluation of local government contracts (*imihigo*) in Rwanda, which included the deliberation in Kigali by high officials on the score to be given to district mayors. Attendance at the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture's meeting for the preparation of the agricultural season was helpful to understand the logistics of fertiliser supply in the country. Participation in the meetings of many technical working groups in the health and agricultural sectors, which bring together donors and officials, helped to explore the interface between donors and the state and its consequences on state effectiveness.

¹⁰ *Imihigo* is the plural of *umuhigo*. *Umuhigo* often refers to one precise target, while the whole performance contract is designated as *imihigo*.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. **Chapter 2** presents the historical trajectories of Burundi and Rwanda focussing on an analysis of the state. Doing so, it provides further justification for the selection of these countries as case studies, highlighting their similarities and differences over time. As the analysis moves to the post-conflict period, it shows that the Rwandan case is the object of a polarised scholarship. The chapter identifies three main debates on the nature of the Rwandan state and shows how this thesis contributes to them.

As mentioned, the relative paucity of scholarship on the effectiveness of the post-conflict Burundian state and the polarisation of the research on Rwanda explain why this thesis privileges an extended empirical analysis, developed in chapters three to six. In accordance with the strategy presented above, Chapters 3 and 4 explore state effectiveness from a functional angle while Chapters 5 and 6 adopt an organisational angle.

Chapter 3 compares the effectiveness of the Burundian and Rwandan state in promoting the use of fertiliser for food crops. It first briefly examines the challenges surrounding the increased use of fertiliser use in Africa. It then discusses the evolution and implementation of the policies aiming to encourage their use in Burundi and Rwanda over time, focussing on the most recent period.

Chapter 4 compares the effectiveness of the Burundian and Rwandan state in promoting maternal health. It first discusses the role of the state in reducing maternal mortality and identifies four main levers deployed to reach this objective: improving financial access to health care for pregnant women, ensuring geographical access to health facilities, developing community healthcare and sensitisation, and promoting family planning. After comparing and discussing the aggregate data on maternal mortality in both countries, the chapter focuses on how each state has used these four levers.

The two following chapters switch to an organisational angle to explore state effectiveness. In line with Migdal's "state-in-society" approach, the state is disaggregated to better understand the type of monitoring and disciplining mechanisms, as well as societal pressure civil servants at different level of the state experience. Although concerned with the state as a whole, the exploration focuses on the agricultural and health sectors as the guiding thread in the analysis.

Chapter 5 is interested in the local state. It first presents the institutional framework of the local state, highlighting the formal rules for civil servants' monitoring and disciplining before analysing the extent to which officials' practices match these formal rules. The second section focuses on the ways informal institutions affect the effectiveness of the local state.

Chapter 6 focusses on the central state. In doing so, it aims to systematically shed more light on factors that the previous chapters identified as crucial in explaining differences in effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda: patronage, coordination and disciplining of officials, and the relationship with donors. The first section explores how civil servants are selected. The second analyses how civil servants are coordinated, evaluated and disciplined at the central level. The last section focusses on the interface between the central bureaucracy and donors, and analyses its impact on state effectiveness.

Chapter 7 presents a theoretical proposition to explain the difference in state effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda. It argues that in each country, the ruling elites faced different necessities to increase their legitimacy and had different avenues available to do so. The CNDD-FDD benefited after the war of an important reserve of legitimacy, which made, from the party's point of view, the pursuit of performance superfluous for political survival. Its conception of its legitimacy also produced an entitlement to the state in contradiction with attempts to increase state effectiveness. In Rwanda, rulers' legitimation strategy was mainly limited to the pursuit of performance delivered in a relative impartial manner. As a result, efforts to build legitimacy in Rwanda came to be aligned with building an effective state, while building an effective state was in tension with the Burundian ruling elite's conception of its legitimacy. The chapter's first section theoretically explores the concept of legitimacy before devising a typology of sources of legitimacy and probing their link with state effectiveness. The second section uses this typology to identify the different sources of legitimacy the ruling elites can exploit in Burundi and Rwanda before drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of their respective state. The third section compares the argument with alternative explanations.

Chapter 8 concludes. It first returns to the theoretical proposition of the thesis by drawing together the evidence presented in all empirical chapters. It then shows how the argument of the thesis contributes to the theoretical literature on state effectiveness and to the empirical scholarship on the cases, and especially to the three debates on the nature of the Rwandan state identified in Chapter 2. Finally, it charts avenues for further research before assessing the implications of the findings for the future of the Burundian and Rwandan states and regimes.

Chapter 2

Historical trajectories of the Burundian and Rwandan states

To understand diverging trajectories of state effectiveness, it is crucial to briefly trace the historical evolution of the state in Burundi and Rwanda. Because of space constraints, the narrative is analytically focussed on historical processes directly relevant to the understanding of the state. It also highlights the commonalities and divergence between the two countries to further account for their selection as cases for this comparative research. The chapter engages with the main academic debates on the nature of the state in Rwanda about which, unlike for Burundi, scholarship is extremely polarised not only in its normative judgements of the RPF rule but also analytically: unlike for Burundi, there is no agreement on what the state looks like in Rwanda.

The chapter is divided in four main sections. The first focusses on the pre-colonial and colonial origins of the state in Burundi and Rwanda. The second section analyses the post-independence period up to the civil war in Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda. The third section provides a rapid overview of the post-conflict state. Reflecting the polarisation of the scholarship on Rwanda, it approaches the Rwandan case through the main academic debates on the nature of its state and suggests the contribution of this thesis to the debates. The final section offers a short conclusion.

2.1 The pre-colonial and colonial origins of the state

The pre-colonial period

Unlike many African states, Burundi and Rwanda are not colonial creations. They are the legacy of well-organised pre-colonial kingdoms. Both the Burundian and Rwandan kingdoms originated from a few chieftaincies that gathered under the leadership of one royal clan. This process occurred probably around the 17th century for both countries (Lemarchand 1970: 19, Vansina 2004: 54-66). The kingdoms expanded following a combination of conquest, assimilation and the quest for new lands for cultivation and pasture (Lemarchand 1970: 18-21; Chrétien 2003: 158-165). By the late 19th century, each kingdom controlled approximately

two million people (Chrétien 2003: 158). Their expansions lasted until the arrival of the Europeans at the end of the 19th century.

These expansions were accompanied by the centralisation of power under monarchic authority and the reinforcement of political, social, and economic control. Social relations were based on complex clientelistic systems (*buhake* in Rwanda and *bugabire* in Burundi) tying together the different strata of society (Malkki 1995:25-26). The king, called in both kingdoms *mwami*, embodied God (*Imana*) and the country as a whole (Lemarchand 1996: 36; Prunier 1998: 9-11). He was at the apex of a pervasive political apparatus reaching deep down into society. Both kingdoms were caste-like societies composed in similar proportions of a majority of agriculturalist Hutu, a minority of Tutsi pastoralists, and smaller third groups of Twa hunter-gatherers and craftsmen.¹¹ Generally, thanks to their cattle, Tutsi were of higher social status (e.g. Strauss 2006: 20). In Rwanda, the king was drawn from the Tutsi group. In Burundi, the royal clan, although possibly of Tutsi origins, was differentiated into a fourth group, the *ganwa*, or princes of blood (Malkki 1995: 22-23).

The significant degree of similarities between pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda should not conceal significant differences in their organisation of power. Power was more centralised in Rwanda than in Burundi (Lemarchand 1970: 13-89). In the former, the king delegated power to regional chiefs (*mutwale*), mostly Tutsi, that he appointed and fired at will. In order to ascertain control over them, the functions of the chiefs were divided between a chief of landholding in charge of attributing land rights and collecting taxes, a chief of men in charge notably of the recruitment of fighters, and a chief of pasture, in charge of the grazing lands (Mworoha 1977: 225-227). In Burundi, regional leaders were *ganwa*, i.e. royal kin, who were relatively autonomous from the king in organising the region they controlled. As succession to the king was not fully institutionalised, it often created conflicts between different *ganwa*. These differences with Rwanda bear two consequences. First, distinctions of class in Burundi were less between Hutu and Tutsi than between the population as a whole and the *ganwa*. During their rivalries, *ganwa* had to appeal to both Hutu and Tutsi to prevail. This contributed to a weaker ethnic consciousness on the eve of independence in Burundi as the ruling class was only partly equated to the Tutsi group (Lemarchand 1970: 24, 493). Second, since the *ganwa* engaged in cyclical feuds, they did not constitute a united group easy to single out and rebel against, unlike the cohesive Rwandan Tutsi monarchy. Overall this explains the slower

¹¹ It is generally estimated that Hutu represent roughly 84% of the population, Tutsi 14% and Twa 1% in both countries although these numbers are disputed (Curtis 2015: 1378).

use of ethnicities for political competition in Burundi at independence, as is further discussed below (ibid. 26-7).

Despite these differences, pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda display a high level of resemblance that, from a *longue durée* perspective, has provided them with a similarly conducive ground for state effectiveness. They are exceptional cases among sub-Saharan African states at least on four counts. First, as mentioned, Burundi and Rwanda were not colonial creations. As noted by Lemarchand (1996: 1) about Burundi, “its existence as a national entity preceded by centuries that of some European states.” The statement also holds true for Rwanda. According to Englebert (2000: 4-9, 155-166), this degree of historical continuity is theoretically conducive to a higher legitimacy of the state at independence compared to the average African state artificially created by colonial rulers. Second, Burundi and Rwanda’s borders largely coincide with those of pre-colonial times. Third, each state is founded on highly organised and stratified pre-colonial polities. Finally, in line with Herbst’s (2000) theory, the historical high density of their populations has made the building of effective political machinery for the broadcasting of power across their territories worthwhile. As an illustration, in 1935 as well as in 1965, Burundi and Rwanda had the second densest road network of colonial Africa (Herbst 2000: 86). Consequently, the Burundian and Rwandan states have historically benefited from important infrastructural power.

The colonial period: emergence of a modern state amidst ethnic polarisation

During colonisation, both kingdoms became part of one entity, the Ruanda-Urundi territory, first ruled by Germany (1889-1916) and then Belgium (1916-1962). As centralised and stratified polities, Burundi and Rwanda were “admirably suited to indirect rule” (Lemarchand 1970: 48). Under Belgian rule, the territory became attached to Congo in 1925. It was governed by a Deputy Governor-General based in Usumbura (former name of Bujumbura) commanding one resident in each kingdom. Although Belgium formally resorted to indirect rule, its constant interference with the local chiefs transformed it into something very different from what could be found in the British Empire. The indigenous chiefs, rather than ruling with a degree of independence, were mere civil servants carrying out the orders of the colonial power (Reyntjens 1987: 73-75).

Belgian rule contributed to the creation of modern states in Burundi and Rwanda through three main processes. The first was the consolidation of the Burundian and Rwandan polities by incorporating into them small peripheral independent kingdoms and chieftaincies (Reyntjens 1987: 76; Lemarchand 1996: 43). Second, the Belgians created the basis of a modern

administration. This materialised by training chiefs and sub chiefs in dedicated schools (Reyntjens 1987: 84; Lemarchand 1996: 43). They also reformed the processes of appointment, evaluation, and payment to create a professionalised administration in Rwanda and to ensure the loyalty of local chiefs while destroying their traditional legitimacy (Reyntjens 1987: 84). In Burundi, traditional chiefs became assisted by indigenous technocrats, which eroded their power (Gahama 1983: 127-134). Third, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Belgian authorities rationalised the administrative structure. In both countries, the number of administrative units was dramatically reduced to streamline colonial rule (Gahama 1983: 71-77; Reyntjens 1987: 78).

Through their rule, the Belgians prompted ethnic antagonism by channelling their unpopular authority through the Tutsi in Rwanda and the Tutsi and *ganwa* in Burundi. It was the consequence of the racist view that Tutsi (which, for the colonial authorities, included the *ganwa* in Burundi (Gahama 1983: 101-102)) were a more evolved race. All Hutu chiefs had been replaced by Tutsi and *ganwa* in Burundi by 1945 (Lemarchand 1996: 43) and by Tutsi in Rwanda by the early 1930s (Reyntjens 1987: 81). Logically, educational opportunities mostly benefited Tutsi in Rwanda (Lemarchand 1970: 133-138) and also, but to a lesser extent, in Burundi (Gahama 1983: 257-260). The role of the chiefs involved the enforcement of the *corvée* (forced labour), the cultivation of mandatory crops and the collection of heavy tax (Gahama 1983: 172-173, 331-345; Mamdani 2001: 93-98). This contributed to the solidification of ethnic identities in both countries, especially in Rwanda since the distinction between *ganwa* and Tutsi made it somewhat less acute in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996: 41). The Tutsi in Rwanda were perceived as the tool of Belgian rule that “the Hutu peasantry experienced [...] as harsher than any previous regime in living memory.” (Mamdani 2001: 94; see also Newbury 1988: 151-179).

As a consequence, while the political struggle on the eve of independence was between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, it was first between *ganwa* families in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996: 47-53). When political parties were authorised in the late 1950s, the two main Burundian parties—the PDC (Christian Democrat Party) and the UPRONA (Union for National Progress)—were identified with two prominent *ganwa* families, the Bezi and the Batare respectively. The Belgian favoured the former, because of their proximity to some Bezi family members and because UPRONA, led by Louis Rwagasore, the son of the *mwami*, was considered anti-Belgian and sympathetic to communist movements. Yet, Rwagasore was better positioned to appeal to the Hutu masses because of his enmity towards the Belgians, and because his physical appearance was close to the Hutu stereotype while also being married to a Hutu woman (Lemarchand 1996: 52-53). While UPRONA lost to PDC the communal elections of

1960 because of Belgian intervention, it won the legislative elections of September 1961 by a landslide and Rwagasore became prime minister. A month later Rwagasore was killed by a PDC hit man, possibly with Belgian complicity (ibid. 53-57).

Only a few years after his death, power struggles became polarised around ethnicity as in neighbouring Rwanda. Three main processes can account for this sudden, deep and enduring transformation (Lemarchand 1996: 58-75). First, the “Hutu revolution” of 1959 in Rwanda and the influx into Burundi of 200,000 Tutsi refugees by 1965 (Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 7) challenged the trust between Hutu and Tutsi elites. It created fear among Burundian Tutsi that their country might follow the Rwandan path. It elicited republican feelings and the fear of possible Tutsi hegemony from some Hutu. Second, following Rwagasore’s death, deep divisions within UPRONA took on an ethnic colouration as the two contenders for the party leadership were of different ethnicities. The divisions in the main party were quickly exported to parliament, with the king trying to strike a balance between ethnic factions and thwart polarisation (Lemarchand 1996: 65). The ultimate factor of polarisation was the weakening of the key safeguard against ethnic antagonisms: the monarchy. In January 1965, the prime minister Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu, was assassinated by a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda (Watt 2008: 31). The king organised new elections, which gave the Hutu a large majority in parliament, but made the error of appointing a Tutsi prime minister. On October, 19, 1965, the prime minister was killed by a group of Hutu officers. They also attempted but failed to murder the king who subsequently fled abroad. In reaction, Tutsi officers killed many Hutu politicians and Hutu army elements. In November 1966, a coup led by the Tutsi Minister of Defence, Captain Michel Micombero of UPRONA, ended the monarchy. Until 1993, Burundi would be a UPRONA party-state, ruled by three Tutsi military officers from the same province of Bururi in the South.

In Rwanda, faced in the late 1950s by the Tutsi elite’s claims for independence, the Belgians shifted their support towards the small Hutu counter-elite that had benefited from the educational opportunities introduced by the Catholic Church after the Second World War. They were organised in two parties created in 1957, the Muhutu Social Movement (MSM), becoming the Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation (PARMEHUTU) in 1959, and the APROSOMA (Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses). The main Tutsi parties were the Rwandan Democratic Assembly (RADER) and the Rwandan National Union (UNAR) created in 1959. They gathered respectively moderate and radical/monarchist Tutsi. Both radical Hutu and Tutsi parties engaged in violence, heightened by the death of the *mwami* in July 1959. Eventually, the beating and rumoured killing of a PARMEHUTU activist by UNAR members in October triggered confrontations that played to the advantage of the Hutu

thanks to the Belgian authorities' support. The dead amounted to several hundreds of Tutsi (Prunier 1998: 49). Many fled the country. These events came to be known as the "Social Revolution" or "Hutu Revolution" as they were interpreted as the rise of Hutu peasants against the Tutsi aristocracy (Mamdani 2001: 104; Chrétien 2003: 305). From then on, the Belgians systematically favoured Hutu in political posts. In 1960, the monarchy was abolished and the first national election gave a landslide victory to PARMEHUTU. At independence in 1962, the PARMEHUTU leader Grégoire Kayibanda became President. Some UNAR members and exiles reorganised abroad and launched a series of attacks from Burundi on Rwandan government forces in 1962-63. The guerrillas, then referred to as *inyenzi* (cockroaches) by the Hutu extremist, gave the government the opportunity to increase repression, which culminated in the reprisal killings of about 10,000 Tutsi following another attack in December 1963 (Prunier 1998: 56). By 1964, these episodes of violence had created about a half million Rwandan refugees (predominantly Tutsi), settled mainly in Burundi and Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 7).

Overall, despite relatively different starting points in terms of ethnic self-consciousness in Burundi and Rwanda, ethnicities eventually crystallised to become the prime vehicle in the competition for power in the post-colonial state. Thanks to the historical role played by the *ganwa* and the monarchy, the elite resisted the temptation to use ethnicity as a tool of mobilisation longer in Burundi, but eventually succumbed. By 1966, the two countries were a mirror image of each other. They were both republican military regimes, ruled by Tutsi in Burundi and Hutu in Rwanda.

2.2 The post-independence state until the war and the genocide

Burundi

In Burundi, the state hardly evolved during the First Republic. Surrounded by men from his native region, Micombero barely reformed the state (Laeley 1997: 709), paying lip service to development through revolutionary rhetoric (Lemarchand 1994: 78). The regime was however preoccupied with building the army. Purged of its Hutu elements, it addressed the Hutu challenges to the regime that occurred through a small revolt in 1969 and a major one in 1972. The latter led to the death of some 3,000 Tutsi. The regime responded in genocidal proportion, killing between 80,000 and 250,000 Hutu (Malkki 1995: 33-4) while 100,000 fled the country mostly to settle in refugee camps in Tanzania (Lemarchand 1996: 104). While the event has been referred to as the Burundian genocide (e.g. Krueger & Krueger 2007), such a description is debatable. The killings were of genocidal proportion, organised and administered by the

state, targeting people because of their ethnicity. However, they more precisely focussed on the educated Hutu. For this reason, Lemarchand (1974) talks about a “selective genocide” while Chrétien and Dupaquier (2007) consider that Burundi was on “the verge of genocides” in 1972. Virtually all Hutu members of the military were killed, as were most Hutu civil servants, teachers and priests. Only one Hutu nurse and a thousand Hutu secondary school students survived (Malkki 1995: 33-34). The goal was less the annihilation than the “decerebration of the Hutu” [*décérébration des Hutus*] as described by an informant to Chrétien and Dupaquier (2007: 285). As a consequence, “for the next fifteen years, only Tutsi were qualified to gain access to power and wealth” while the Hutu, through the elimination of their elite, were “thoroughly reduced to the status of an underclass” (Lemarchand 1996: 103).

Micombero was toppled by Colonel Joachim Bagaza in November 1976. Bagaza wanted the restoration of the unity of Burundi and development would be the instrument. “The Second Republic has corresponded to the systematic establishment of a modern state” (Chrétien & Guichaoua 1988: 91¹²; see also Laeley 1997: 710). Bagaza curbed corruption and instilled strong discipline in the civil service. He surrounded himself with young educated technocrats, who came to be known as the *jeunes cadres dynamique et compétents* (the dynamic and competent young executives). He regularly toured the state’s development projects.¹³ The Bagaza regime also forcefully engaged in reshaping society. It encouraged men to wear modern clothes (Krueger and Krueger 2007: 47), closed bars during work hours, discouraged the traditional lavish betrothals, weddings and funerals (Watt 2008: 40) and attempted to undermine the power of the catholic church (Lemarchand 1996: 112-114). The regime embarked on a series of reforms to modernise the agricultural sector (Mworoha 1986). It encouraged cash-crop cultivation through large parastatals like the *Société Régional de Développement* (SRD), which provided tools, inputs and agricultural extension to farmers. It also forced farmers, sometimes brutally, to abandon subsistence crops for coffee growing (Ndarishikanye 1998: 148). In a similar fashion of the Rwandan Second Republic (see below), in the Burundian Second Republic the modernisation discourse was “conveyed from the top to the bottom of society in a dictatorial manner by administrative authorities that [were] also cadres in the single party” (ibid: 149).¹⁴ The regime’s progress in infrastructure was also evident. It embarked on the electrification of the country and extended the asphalt network from 200 km in 1976 to 1,000 km in 1987. To do so, it successfully mobilised foreign aid (Chrétien & Guichaoua 1988: 8).

¹² Author’s translation from the French.

¹³ “Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, le développement d’abord”, *Iwacu Magazine* n°7, June 2012.

¹⁴ Author’s translation from the French.

The regime also entrenched Tutsi hegemony. Bagaza headed a police state with a pervasive surveillance apparatus. Although reference to ethnicity was officially banned, discrimination in educational opportunities continued. In a context of growing dissatisfaction toward Bagaza's stance towards the church, corruption scandals and the decision to retire a group of officers in 1986, Major Pierre Buyoya seized power in a bloodless coup on September 3, 1987.

Buyoya's Third Republic slowly engaged in political liberalisation. Freedom of expression increased and the regime sought to improve interethnic relations. UPRONA opened its doors wider to Hutu and the regime released Hutu political prisoners. However, in 1988, a revolt in the North of the country provoked the killing of 15,000 Hutu by the army (Lemarchand 1996: 126). Responding partly to external pressure, the reaction of Buyoya was to launch a political transition towards democracy. He constituted a government with an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi, headed by a Hutu prime minister. A charter of unity drafted by a mixed commission was adopted in 1992. That same year, multipartism was authorised in preparation of the 1993 elections. To do so, Buyoya had to manoeuvre between the Tutsi hard-liners, who criticised him for his softness, and emboldened Hutu activists, the most violent of whom were members of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) members. Born in Tanzanian refugee camps in 1980, PALIPEHUTU dreamed of a Hutu republic similar to the Rwandan model. However, the main Hutu party was the moderate Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). Created clandestinely in 1983, it was officially recognised in 1992. To the surprise of many (Watt 2008: 43; Malkki 1995: 281), the FRODEBU won the elections, giving power to a Hutu civilian, Melchior Ndadaye. Only four months after his victory, Ndadaye, along with other top Hutu politicians, was assassinated by Tutsi officers, which started the Burundian civil war.


Rwanda

In Rwanda, the "*inyenzi*" attacks ceased in the mid-1960s, creating a period of relative calm until the end of the First Republic. Prunier (1998: 57) characterised Kayibanda as "the *mwami* of the Hutu." His rule, similar to Micombero's in this respect, was highly patrimonial and remote from the day-to-day reality of state functioning. It drew considerable legitimacy from the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the equation of the Hutu demographic majority with the democratic majority. Rwanda was defined by the regime as a Hutu nation where the Tutsi were tolerated as sub-citizens (Mamdani 2001: 135). Tutsi access to education or the civil service was limited to a quota of 9% (Prunier 1998: 58). The growing dissatisfaction from northern Hutu, who felt excluded from politics by Kayibanda associates from the South, and

the 1972 massacre in Burundi precipitated the fall of the regime. Taking the excuse of sporadic agitations, the Minister of Defence Major Juvénal Habyarimana took power on July, 5 1973.

During the Second Republic the regime promoted a strong and pervasive discourse of national development through its single party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) (Uvin 1998: 23-26; Desrosiers & Thomson 2011: 436-444). Its achievements were impressive. While in 1976 Rwanda had a per capita income lower than any of its neighbours, by 1990 it had the highest. The regime increased infrastructure investment (Mamdani 2001: 145). Agricultural production rose sharply, less thanks to intensification than to the cultivating of new lands. This was notably achieved through a programme of compulsory villagisation on uncultivated lands (*paysannat*) (Mamdani 2001:144-147). The country’s performance was supported by a tremendous influx of foreign aid and aid workers. Rwanda “had one of Africa’s highest density of NGOs” (Uvin 1998: 48) attracted by this safe, functioning, and lowly corrupt country. In terms of aid mobilisation, its performance was quite similar to Burundi’s (Figure 2.1) although Rwanda was likely to have attracted more aid from NGOs and religious organisations (not captured by Figure 2.1) because it did not have Burundi’s anticlerical and anticolonial discourse.

Figure 2.1 Net ODA received per capita



Source: OECD-DAC for ODA and World Bank for population number (retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/>, 23/01/2016)

Rwandan was considered to have an effective state machinery supporting the government’s development project. “Few African countries could claim to be so well organised administratively as was Rwanda under the second Republic” (Mamdani 2001: 144). Directly appointed by the President, almighty local officials governed an administrative structure reaching deep down into society, enabling tremendous mobilisation and surveillance of the

population (Prunier 1998: 76-77; Uvin 1998: 22). The President regularly toured the country to monitor development projects.

No major anti-Tutsi violence occurred until 1990 and the regime promoted an official discourse of ethnic appeasement (Prunier 1998: 76; Mamdani 2001: 140-142). Some Tutsi were allowed to flourish in the business sector (Prunier 1998: 76). Although more relaxed than during the Kayibanda's years, institutional racial discrimination for access to employment and educational opportunities persisted. Ethnicity continued to be used as a major source of legitimacy by the regime (Verwimp 2013: 44-52). Tutsi remained excluded from key positions in the army, government, parastatals (Strauss 2006: 23). Throughout the Second Republic, not a single Tutsi would be *préfets* (province governor) or *bourgmestres* (head of communes), with a single exception, the *préfet* of Butare, appointed in 1992 and killed during the genocide (Prunier 1998: 75). Power was mainly concentrated in the hands of the Hutu from the North. Especially powerful was the group called the *akazu*, composed of the president's wife's family members and their associates (ibid. 85).

Despite this stability, many problems existed. The country suffered from economic fragility. Land scarcity and unabated population growth intensified social tensions (André & Plateau 1997) and increased dramatic food insecurity (Mamdani 2001: 146). Macroeconomic indicators quickly deteriorated in the mid-1980s due to the fall of coffee prices, cutting a significant source of rent for the MRND's elite. Between 1983 and 1990, the GDP per capita fell by 7% on average (Uvin 1998: 54). The budget difficulties increased the fiscal burden on the population and led to the cutback of social services (Prunier 1998: 89), made worse in the early 1990s by the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme (Uvin 1998: 57-59). The regime also never addressed the plight of the refugees. Thousands of Rwandans (mainly Tutsi) had lived abroad for decades, often in harsh conditions. In Uganda, where the majority of them settled, their conditions were made worse by the fall of Idi Amin (Waugh 2004: 20-24). By the late 1980s, many refugees who fought alongside Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA), ignored by the Rwandan government and denied full-rights in Uganda, started to organise for a return to their homeland, by force if necessary. In 1987 they created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).¹⁵ In October 1990, taking advantage of Habyarimana's mounting domestic problems, the RPF attacked from Uganda.

¹⁵ On the history of the RPF, see Reyntjens (1992), Prunier (1993), and Reed (1996).

2.3 Civil war and genocide

Burundi

The death of Ndadaye in 1993 triggered immediate and spontaneous anti-Tutsi violence across Burundi, to which the army and radicalised Tutsi in urban centres responded by the killings of Hutu. The FRODEBU government became increasingly impotent because of its lack of control over the Tutsi-dominated military. Loyal to UPRONA, the army endeavoured to block government activities, what Reyntjens (1993: 582) has dubbed “a creeping coup.” It became a full-fledged coup in August 1996 when Buyoya took power. As a result, the neighbouring countries decided on an economic embargo on Burundi.

Frustrated by the erosion of FRODEBU’s power, the Minister of Interior Leonard Nyangoma created in late 1993 the National Council for Defence and Democracy (CNDD) with the Defence Force for Democracy (FDD) as its armed wing, to challenge directly the Tutsi oligarchy. PALIPEHUTU, through its armed wing the National Liberation Forces (FNL), also started fighting the government. Both rebel groups were also regularly fighting each other for supremacy as defender of the Hutu cause. By 1999, the CNDD-FDD “was the main actor in the majority of provinces” (Watt 2008: 66). Although the CNDD-FDD was created by a FRODEBU minister and supported by many of its members, the Hutu revolt was primarily spontaneous (Interview 202; Nindorera 2012: 14-15). It was a countrywide popular phenomenon, fostered by the shock of Ndadaye’s death and the memories of 1972 and 1988. It is only subsequently that the CNDD-FDD offered a name and an organisation for this revolt.

Peace negotiations started as soon as 1998, which resulted in the lifting of the embargo in January 1999. The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in August 2000 by 19 political parties. It provided for power-sharing where Buyoya would cede the presidency to FRODEBU’s president Domitien Ndayizeye a year and a half later, which was respected. However, the FNL and CNDD-FDD refused the agreement. It was only in 2003 that a ceasefire with the CNDD-FDD was signed and that it joined the peace process.¹⁶ Until the 2005 elections, it was agreed that the CNDD-FDD would get several ministerial portfolios. Overall, the civil war cost about 300,000 lives (Lemarchand 2009: 162).

¹⁶ The PALIPEHUTU-FNL only signed an agreement with the government in 2006. This did not stop the harassment and killings of many PALIPEHUTU-FNL members by the CNDD-FDD (HRW 2012). To erase its ethnic connotation, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL changed its name to FNL in 2008.

Rwanda

The 1990 RPF attack was a disaster. On the second day of the offensive, the charismatic RPF leader Fred Rwigyema was killed. The Rwandan governmental forces, well equipped by the French, quickly took the advantage, forcing the RPF to reorganise in the Virunga Mountains in the North (Prunier 1998: 94-96). The resumption of attacks in 1991 forced the opening of peace talks a year later. The RPF attack triggered a wave of anti-Tutsi violence across the country. The persistent military pressure the RPF put on the government led to the signature of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 1993. It provided for a power sharing deal, the repatriation of refugees and the integration of armed forces. A UN mission, the UNAMIR, was deployed in Rwanda to monitor the implementation of the agreement.

The RPF military pressure, along with the violence in Burundi, accelerated the reconfiguration of the Hutu elite in Rwanda. Elite competition in Rwanda was mainly along regional lines, especially between northern and southern Hutu. It was heightened in the early 1990s by the economic difficulties and the introduction of competitive party politics in response to pressure from France (Prunier 1998: 89). In this context, the “Tutsi threat” gave the upper hand to Hutu radicals, notably in the *akazu*. Along with hard-line members from Hutu parties, they formed the “Hutu power” movement, a group later pivotal in the organisation of the genocide (Uvin 1998: 64-65). More generally, the RPF attack was the occasion to promote anti-Tutsi racist propaganda, championed by the review *Kangura* and the *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), that presented Tutsi living in Rwanda as supporters of the RPF (Scott 2006: 25-26).

The genocide started with Habyarimana’s death. He was killed with his Burundian counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira who was with him when their aeroplane was shot down on 6 April 1994, probably by rogue radical Hutu elements.¹⁷ Killings started immediately, and by 8 April, Hutu hardliners had taken control of the government. The genocide led to the massacre of between 500,000 and a million Tutsi, i.e. about three quarters of this ethnic group, and approximately 10,000 moderate Hutus. It is estimated that between 20,000 and 60,000 Hutu were killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing of the RPF, during its military campaign (Prunier 1998: 264-265; Strauss 2006: 51-52). The state machinery was a crucial tool for the “success” of this genocide orchestrated by the national and local elite and carried out mainly by the population (Des Forges 1999; Strauss 2006; Kimonyo 2008). The genocide stopped

¹⁷ While the identity of those who shot down the aeroplane is the object of a heated debate, the 2012 report of French judges Trévidic and Poux concluded that Hutu hardliners rather than the RPA were likely to be responsible.

when the RPA took Kigali on 4 July. Gisenyi, at the border with Zaire (the name at the time of the Democratic Republic of Congo), was the last town to fall to the RPF on 18 July.

Protected by the French military, the genocidal government and elements of the army escaped to Congo, along with some two million Hutu. It was not only people who settled there but also the Rwandan state to a certain extent. The government fled with the currency reserves of the country (Prunier 1998: 306). It continued to claim that it was the legitimate government of Rwanda. The state structure was almost naturally reproduced in refugee camps as the population was often organised according to their original prefectures, communes and sectors, governed by the same local officials (Prunier 1998: 314-315). NGOs flocked to the region to provide assistance to what represented about a third of the Rwandan population. It however failed to halt the militarisation of the camps by members of the Hutu power, who dreamed of reconquering Rwanda. To address this looming threat, the RPA decided to invade Congo, which eventually led to the overthrow of Mobutu. It forced the repatriation of refugees, creating massive migration back to Rwanda while a significant proportion escaped into Congo. The most extremist eventually formed the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and continued to fight the new regime through incursions in Rwanda and the organisation of an insurgency in the Northwest (African Rights 1998, Orth 2001). By 2000 however, their power and number had considerably decreased (SSRC 2014).

When the new RPF government took office in July 1994, the state had collapsed. Most civil servants had fled or been killed. No paper, chairs, furniture remained in the still standing government buildings. Service provision had stopped. The RPF had to run a country in which many of its members had never lived before the 1990 military campaign. They had to govern a traumatised population and manage the return of approximately 700,000 old caseload refugees who arrived in Rwanda in the wake of the RPF, but also of the two million “new caseload” Hutu refugees from Congo (Newbury 2005: 277), terrified by the idea of living under RPF rule. Furthermore, while rebuilding the country, the RPF waged war in Congo in 1996 and 1997-2000. Until 2000, it also fought an insurgency in the Northwest of the country fostered by Hutu infiltrators from Congo (Orth 2001).

Historical similarities and differences

This historical narrative reveals important similarities between the Burundian and Rwandan states, which further support the choice of most similar system design. First, history has provided the Rwandan and Burundian state with features that buck the trends of “weakness” commonly attached to African states (Callaghy 1987; Herbst 2000; Jackson & Rosberg 1982).

Both states had significant infrastructural power reaching deep down into society through densely stratified administrative structures. Uvin observes that in Burundi, the post-colonial state “impos[ed] its control in all domains of the country’s social, political, and economic life” (Uvin 2009: 10) and similarly that under Habyarimana “[t]he presence of the Rwandese state has expanded into the most remote corners of the territory and of social life.” (Uvin 1998: 21). Interestingly, these state machineries were also the tool of modernist ambitions under the Burundian and Rwandan Second Republics.

Second, both states were ethnically exclusive yet in an opposite manner. The Tutsi minority dominated the state apparatus in Burundi while it was the Hutu majority in Rwanda. After the war and the genocide, a symmetrical shift occurred: Rwanda was now ruled by the Tutsi-led RPF and Burundi by the Hutu-led CNDD-FDD. One consequence of this mirroring pattern of power distribution was that the histories of both countries have been intimately linked. In time of crisis, instability in one country brought radicalisation to the other. As it is commonly said, Burundi and Rwanda are false twins who, when one sneezes, the other catches a cold.

However, these similarities should not conceal important differences. To begin with, while the CNDD-FDD and RPF were both the product of exclusion, the CNDD-FDD was born within Burundi, drawing on a spontaneous popular revolt across the country. It consequently benefited from considerable legitimacy when reaching power. The RPF on the other hand was born in exile and did not manage to cultivate broad-based popular support in Rwanda during the war. On the contrary, it reached power in an extraordinary context of illegitimacy, being viewed more as an invading army than a liberating one by the population (Mamdani 2001:185). A Tutsi-dominated party, the RPF had to rule over a Hutu-majority population exposed to anti-Tutsi discourse for years. As argued in Chapter 7, this crucial difference lies at the heart of the diverging state effectiveness between post-conflict Burundi and Rwanda.

Another difference between Burundi and Rwanda’s trajectories is found in the resolution of their conflicts. Unlike the RPF, the CNDD-FDD did not have a decisive military victory. Its victory was first a negotiated settlement that subsequently opened the road to electoral wins in 2005 and 2010. The CNDD-FDD however very quickly reinforced its position, thanks to constant patrimonial practices (as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6) and to the boycott of the 2010 elections by the opposition (see below).

Conflict also had different impacts on the state in each country. After the death of Habyarimana, the Rwandan state collapsed in a few months as the genocidal government, along with many civil servants, fled to Congo to escape from the RPF. In Burundi, the state

never ceased to function throughout the war. Bujumbura was never captured by a rebel group. In the countryside, the conflict took the form of guerrilla fighting between the army and a “rebel movement [which] was developing within a territory controlled by the government” (Nindorera 2012: 18). Unsurprisingly, the number of interviewees who worked in the state in Burundi before and during the war far exceeded those in Rwanda.

2.4 The post-conflict state

Burundi since the transition

The academic assessment of Burundi’s trajectory since the war is nuanced but not polarised as in the Rwandan case.¹⁸ The political transition in Burundi was generally considered a success. The country held two elections in 2005 and 2010, generally recognised as free and fair (Vandeginste 2011: 316-317). The 2005 elections gave a comfortable majority to the CNDD-FDD. In local governments (the *communes*), the party obtained 62.6% of the seats, against 20.9% for FRODEBU and 5.2% for UPRONA, the two other main parties. In the National Assembly, it secured 54% of the seats, a good score but below the two-thirds majority required to pass ordinary legislation. Finally, Nkurunziza was overwhelmingly elected president by the parliament, as the CNDD-FDD was the only party to present a candidate (Reyntjens 2006).¹⁹ In 2010, the CNDD-FDD reinforced its majority. The opposition, frustrated by the score of the ruling party in the communal elections (64%) and claiming the CNDD-FDD had committed fraud, boycotted the parliamentary and presidential elections. The CNDD-FDD obtained 81.19% of the vote at the parliamentary elections and Nkurunziza was elected president with a score of 91.62% (Vandeginste 2011). The transition was also a success in the military sphere. The Burundian national army successfully reintegrated different ethnic and rebel groups. The Arusha agreement provided that it should be composed of Hutu and Tutsi in equal proportion. This neutralised its peace spoiling capacity it had in 1993 (Sullivan 2005). It was generally considered as a professional army with an *esprit de corps* (Nindorera 2007; Samii 2013; Wilén 2015).


Other encouraging elements of Burundi’s trajectory after the war included the governmental commitment to social programmes, epitomised by the decision to make primary education and

¹⁸ It has not always been the case. The current debates on the Rwandan state are reminiscent of the debate between René Lemarchand (1990) and Jean-Pierre Chrétien (1991), the latter being accused by the former of excessive sympathy for the regime of Bujumbura and of uncritical acceptance of its official discourse.

¹⁹ As part of the transition, the constitution provided that the president would be elected by the national assembly and the senate for the first presidential elections, and directly by the people in the subsequent elections.

healthcare for pregnant mothers and children under-five free (Figure 2.2), although the country is lagging behind Rwanda (Table 2.1)

Figure 2.2 Primary education enrolment in Burundi and Rwanda



Source: UNESCO (retrieved from <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>, 10/03/2016)

More generally, the civil society and media flourished in the post-conflict years in Burundi, despite the government's continuous attempt to restrict their freedom. On the downside, economic performance was dismal. GDP per capital barely increased from the end of the war through 2014 (see Figure 1.1). Agricultural production did not catch up with rapid population growth, making Burundi in 2013 the hungriest country in the world (von Grebmer et al. 2013). In the political sphere, the CNDD-FDD endeavoured to consolidate its power as early as 2005. It regularly resorted to extra-judicial assassination and persecution of the political opposition, (HRW 2006; HRW 2009; HRW 2012) and harassment of civil society organisations (HRW 2010). Clientelism as well as petty and grand corruption thrived under CNDD-FDD rule (ICG 2012).

Table 2.1 Social indicators in Burundi and Rwanda, 2014

	<i>Burundi</i>	<i>Rwanda</i>
HDI	0.400 (Rank: 183)	0.483 (Rank 163)
Life expectancy at birth	56.7	64.2
Infant mortality	56‰	33‰
immunisation to DTP/Measles	94/95%	98/99%

Source: UNDP for HDI, and UN agencies through World Bank (retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/> and <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>, 10/03/2016).

The post-genocide state in Rwanda: three debates

Unlike Burundi, post-conflict Rwanda is the object of a polarised scholarship. Instead of sketching the evolution of the country through a historical narrative, this section focusses on the academic debates on the Rwandan state and shows how this thesis might contribute to them. Three main debates about the nature of the Rwandan state have been identified. They have been called the “developmental state debate”, the “inclusiveness debate” and the “continuity debate.”

The developmental state debate


The RPF forcefully embarked on a developmental project after 1994 embodied in the government’s Vision 2020. It aims at making Rwanda a middle-income country with a knowledge-based economy and a value-added agriculture (RoR 2000). After the genocide, the country’s progress in terms of security were significant. The country has been remarkably stable since the end of the insurgency in the North. No major revolt erupted and, as put by Clark (2014b), “there are few signs of large-scale popular discontentment with the closed nature of Rwanda’s political space.”²⁰ The progress was also impressive in terms of development (Verpoorten 2014). GDP per capita grew steadily between 2003 and 2014 (Figure 1.1) and the country managed, unlike Burundi, to attract investors (Figure 2.3). Yet, Rwanda remained a country with a very high level of inequality that however decreased in subsequent years (Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 430).

Rwanda reached most of its MDGs (NISR 2015). Scholars, even critical of Rwanda, generally acknowledge the country’s positive bureaucratic, economic and social performance (e.g. Ansoms 2009b: 289-290; Reyntjens 2013: xvi). Many of its flagship programmes however have been criticised on the grounds of their results. This was the case for example of the the villagisation programme started in 1997, which intended to improve the population’s access to roads and services, and create off-farm jobs (Newbury 2011) or the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) created in 2006, which aimed at increasing agricultural productivity through land use consolidation and monocropping (Ansoms 2009b: 145-172). The RPF approach to industrialisation, relying on industrial champions owned by the party and the army, was analysed either as pivotal for Rwanda’s nascent developmental state (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012) or harmful to its economy (Gökgür 2012). While the overall positive

²⁰ Rwanda jumped from 14 to 43 percentile rank between 2004 and 2014 on the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator of “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>, accessed 18/06/16).

performance of Rwanda on the economic and social fronts is hardly disputed, its exact magnitude policy by policy is often contested. As already mentioned in the introduction, this is why this thesis engages not only in explaining the difference of state effectiveness between Rwanda and Burundi, but also uncovering the magnitude of such difference through empirical case studies.

Figure 2.3 FDI stocks in Burundi and Rwanda



Source: UNCTAD, (retrieved from <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/>, 10/03/2016)

The debate on the performance of the Rwandan state is however less about its magnitude than the methods it employs. It echoes more generally the discussions on the compatibility of developmental states with open political space. Historically, developmental states tend to be authoritarian (Leftwich 1995). Authoritarian regimes with a narrow ruling coalition have an advantage to spur economic transformation, not least because they can more easily mobilise their populations (Johnson 1999: 52) and channel resources towards the productive sector (Waldner 1999). Yet some scholars argue that historical instances of authoritarian developmental states do not exclude the possibility of democratic forms (Mkandawire 2001). In the Rwandan case, many authors contend that such performance is achieved at an excessive social cost (Newbury 2011; Sommers 2012; Reyntjens 2013; Gaynor 2014a). Many flagship policies of the regime indeed involve harsh, if not brutal implementation. The Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) has been sometimes coercively implemented and has, at least at its beginning, increased households' vulnerability to food prices, climatic conditions and crop disease by promoting mono-cropping (Ansoms 2009a). Newbury (2011) found that the villagisation programme, by its violence, has increased social tension. The ban on traditional brick and tile houses has made housing hardly affordable for the rural poor (Sommers 2012: 115-119). The growth strategy of the country has been questioned for its "bypass of the poor" (Ansoms 2008; Ansoms & Rostagno 2012).

Consequently, the debate is not only about asking “at what price is state building and development justified and legitimate?” (Ingelaere 2014: 225). It is also about the motives behind the elites’ condoning of officials’ excesses. Is it only because Rwanda is “a nation in a hurry” (Gaynor 2014a), because of “a profound mismatch between the Rwandan elite’s ambitions and the rural realities on the ground” (Ansoms 2011: 248) or because of even more cynical motives?²¹ This thesis will not provide a normative judgement about a possible trade-off between effective policy implementation and respect for local livelihoods. By exploring the drivers of state effectiveness, it will rather contribute to illuminating the paradoxical nature of policy implementation in Rwanda, straddled between an objective of betterment of people’s lives and the top-down imposition of sometimes brutal policies that constitute a dangerous source of resentment.

The inclusion debate

The second academic debate on the nature of the Rwandan state concerns its inclusiveness. It relates to the group that controls the state and to the group that benefits from the state. In other words, who runs the state and for whom? On the first aspect, Rwanda is presented as either a “Tutsified” RPF state or as having an inclusive ruling coalition (Reyntjens 2013; cf. Golooba-Mutebi 2013). Formal distribution of power in the state has been relatively inclusive. For example, after the genocide, both the President and the Prime Minister were Hutu, as was the majority of the first post-genocide government. The RPF had less than half of the ministerial portfolios and occupied less than a fifth of the seats in the National Assembly (ibid.: 12-13). Such trends have continued, notably thanks to the current constitutional provisions. For example, the main party cannot have more than 50% of the ministerial portfolios. While Golooba-Mutebi (2013) argues that this reflects the genuine inclusive nature of the Rwandan ruling coalition, many scholars counter that informally, real power remains in the hands of RPF Tutsi. One of the key methods to do so is shadowing non-RPF or non-Hutu political figures with Tutsi or RPF members wielding the real power, both at the national (Reyntjens 2013: 80-83) and local level (Purdeková 2011: 480-482). More generally, the RPF hegemony has been supported by the tight control of civil society, the muzzling of independent media, and the control of the political space to ensure that parties never effectively challenge the RPF

²¹ Susan Thomson (2013: 193) argues that policy implementation in Rwanda reflects “the manifest unwillingness of the government to promote genuine improvement in the quality of life for the vast majority of Rwanda’s poor.”

(Beswick 2010; Reyntjens 2010). Finally, statistics reveal that Tutsi and RPF members are occupying most of the top jobs in the state machinery (e.g. Reyntjens et al. 2015: 415-419).²²

This thesis aims at contributing to the second dimension of the debate: making an assessment of who benefits from the state in Rwanda. RPF rule is regularly described as exclusionary. Reyntjens (2013: 261) argues, for example, that the regime practices “violence and discrimination against Hutu” under the guise of ethnic amnesia, while Thomson (2013: 186) contends that it treats Hutu as “second-class citizens.” This said, many studies show the broad-based and inclusive nature of state interventions in Rwanda, for example in health (Logie et al. 2008; Holmes 2010), education (Williams *forthcoming*; Abbot et al. 2015), or social protection (Chemouni 2016 *forthcoming*). Furthermore, although some authors argue that the regime has strategically promoted Hutu collective guilt while refusing to discuss RPA war crimes (e.g. Thomson 2013), the Gacaca courts have also been shown to be a pragmatic creation to deal with transitional justice and reconciliation that opened some space for popular agency (Clark 2014a). The RPF apparently does not hesitate to discipline its own members when failing in their missions.²³

Overall, it seems that the ruling elite, although narrow, has not been following a “winner-take-all” approach to power. Analysis of power in Rwanda has to be more nuanced than an inclusion/exclusion dichotomy. Clark (2014a: 208) for example observes “that most stark discussions of authoritarianism in Rwanda are inadequate, principally because they tend to state, rather than show, the specific ways in which power is exerted from the centre to the periphery, and the reactions of the populace to the government’s assumed draconian tendencies.” By exploring the determinants of state effectiveness and the way in which policies are implemented, this thesis aims at providing a more nuanced view on how power is exercised in Rwanda.

The continuity debate

The third debate that runs through the scholarship on Rwanda concerns the degree of continuity between the pre and post-genocide state, and its consequences. Many analyses underline that the way power is exercised in today’s Rwanda—in a top down manner through a pervasive state apparatus—echoes the period of the Second Republic (e.g. Ingelaere 2010:

²² For example, as of May 15, 2015, among the 21 Rwandan ministers and their 19 Permanent Secretaries (PS), respectively only eight and one were Hutu. 16 ministers and all the PS were RPF. All the chiefs of staff in the army are RPF Tutsi. (calculated from Reyntjens et al. 2015: 421-2).

²³ On the disciplining of RPF mayors, see for example “How probe uncovered the rot in 'Mutuelle de Sante'”, The New Times, 03/02/15.

291-292; Purdeková 2011: 476; Reyntjens 2013: 260-261). Thomson (2013: 193) even states that the “RPF regime operates no differently from its predecessors.” The widespread conclusion is that such structures of power reproduce dangerous patterns that may result in the resurgence of mass violence in Rwanda (Ingelaere 2010: 291-292; Sommers 2012: 228-229; Ingelaere 2014; Reyntjens 2013; Thomson 2013).

The literature points to two mechanisms through which the continuities with the pre-1994 state could recreate mass violence. First, the maintenance of top-down structures of power may reproduce what Uvin has called “structural violence” (Uvin 1998: 103-8). By denying the population agency while making it the target of patronising interventions from the government and aid industry, power structures would maintain a continuous state of exclusion, humiliation, arbitrariness, inequality and poverty, creating the ground for future mass violence (e.g. Reyntjens 2013; Thomson 2013).

Second, the current Rwandan state replicates the ubiquity, strength and authoritarian character of the pre-1994 Rwandan state that had been identified as central in the conduct of the genocide. As summarised by Ingelaere, “it was precisely a highly top-down, authoritarian, and non-democratic set of institutional structures and exercise of power that was of crucial importance in the administration of genocide. Such forces are still present and destructive” (Ingelaere 2010: 292). Similarly, McDoom (2014) writes that “in form, current president Paul Kagame and his ruling party, the RPF, [...] appear to exercise power in a manner similar to former president Juvenal Habyarimana and his ruling MRND party [...]. The genocide is testament to what unconstrained power over Rwanda’s unusually efficient state machinery can enable.” These traits may even have been amplified in the post-genocide period through “the decentralisation process [that] appears to provide the national government with opportunities to expand, rather than transfer or devolve, its power and influence” (Sommers 2012: 89; see also Ingelaere 2010; Purdeková 2011: 86-7). By exploring the factors underpinning the effectiveness of the state in Rwanda, the thesis will contribute to this debate by calling for a more fine-grained understanding of the state’s nature and interface with society. It argues based on research findings that although still top-down, power is underpinned by a commitment to impartiality and technocratic ruling probably different from the past.

Implications of the continuity debate on the research question

This debate may interrogate the relevance of the research question. Given the existing continuities between the pre- and post-genocide state machinery, what is there to explain about

the current effectiveness of the Rwandan state? Are the drivers of Rwanda's current performance to be found in the pre-genocide period, thus making an analysis focused on the post-conflict period inadequate? Undoubtedly, today's Rwanda has a strong feeling of *déjà vu* (Desrosiers & Thomson 2011). Habyarimana's and Kagame's regime were both "donor darlings", hailed in their respective time as developmental models.

While intra-case historical comparison is not the object of this work, this quick historical sketch poses the question of the role of path-dependency and what there is, if anything, new to be explained about the current Rwandan state. This said, it seems that despite some similarities with the pre-1994 state, a quick look at the evolution of the economy (Figure 1.1 above) seems to indicate that the post-1994 state might be more effective. More importantly, this research does not agree with the "widespread assumption in modern social science that social continuity requires no explanation" (Moore 1966: 485). It is indeed surprising that continuities exist between Habyarimana and Kagame's regime not least because similar continuities are absent in Burundi. Furthermore, given the watershed in Rwandan history that the genocide represents, the disruption of the state it created, and the fundamental changes in the composition of the ruling elite it produced, continuities can be anything but assumed. This is especially true when looking south of the Akanyanru river. As the Habyarimana regime, the Bagaza regime was also modernist and built an effective state apparatus yet such attributes have hardly persisted in today's Burundi. This may even suggest that the existing similarities between the pre- and post-genocide Rwanda have partly different causes.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented, in a necessarily selective manner, the historical dynamics relevant to the understanding of the chapters to come. It has also further illustrated the suitability of post-conflict Burundi and Rwanda as case studies for Mill's methods of difference. They enable a comparative analysis of diverging state effectiveness while controlling for many political, social, and cultural aspects to a point few other country comparisons would allow. This chapter has also showed that while the nature of the current Burundian state is hardly disputed, the Rwandan state is the object of intense academic debates. Through the comparison of Burundi and Rwanda, this thesis will hopefully contribute to these debates, particularly thanks to a better empirical understanding of the functioning of the Rwandan state.

Chapter 3

Promoting fertiliser use: converging effectiveness, different underlying dynamics

3.1 Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the lowest agricultural productivity in the world. One of the major constraints is that the use of modern inputs, especially chemical fertilisers, is lower than any other region (World Bank 2007: 12-13). Burundi and Rwanda represent extreme cases. Their use of fertilisers is historically below the sub-Saharan African average. Prior to 2008 in Rwanda fertiliser use was about 4kg/ha (IFDC 2012a: 9), against 12.6kg/ha on average in sub-Saharan Africa and 126.4 kg/ha in the world. Fertiliser use was estimated at only 6kg/ha in Burundi in 2010 (MINAGRIE 2010: 2).

Increasing food crop productivity in both Burundi and Rwanda is the first step toward poverty reduction, since the majority of the poor live in rural areas and the agricultural sector represents more than 88% of employment in both countries.²⁴ In addition, Burundi and Rwanda are densely populated countries, with no possibility of increasing agricultural production through expansion of cultivated land. The average surface of cultivated land per household is extremely small, below 0.6 ha (NIS 2012: 3; RdB 2013: 10). The situation is even more pressing in Burundi where food production has grown less rapidly than the population (1.8% against 3.45% per year on average from 2005 to 2011²⁵; see also MINAGRIE 2010: 2), driving up inflation and increasing food insecurity. Unsurprisingly, the use of fertiliser is high on each government's agenda. In Burundi, increasing the use of mineral fertiliser for food crops featured in the country's poverty reduction paper (RdB 2006: 50). In Rwanda, the increase of fertiliser is enshrined in Vision 2020 and is central to the government's project to move the country away from subsistence agriculture (RoR 2000: 17).

Interestingly, since a 2013 reform, Burundi's effectiveness in promoting fertiliser use on food crops is converging toward the level of Rwanda. This evolution challenges the general

²⁴ FAO, <http://faostat.fao.org/>, accessed 24/03/2014.

²⁵ Author's analysis based on World Bank, World Development Indicators <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>, accessed 24/03/2014. The average presented here is the compounded annual growth rate.

observation of less state effectiveness in Burundi compared to Rwanda. It should not however obfuscate important differences over time. Between 2005 and 2013, the Rwandan state developed an effective policy to increase fertiliser use through the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP), whereas Burundi had an inefficient and corrupt fertiliser subsidy programme. To explain these variations of state effectiveness over time, this chapter adopts an historical approach to fertiliser policies.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the challenges associated with increasing fertiliser use in sub-Saharan Africa. It is followed by an empirical section for each country, presenting an analysis of their efforts to promote fertiliser use over time. The final section concludes by a comparative discussion of the factors underpinning state effectiveness regarding fertiliser promotion in Burundi and Rwanda.

3.2 The challenges of increasing fertiliser use in sub-Saharan Africa

Only the role of mineral—or chemical—fertilisers will be considered. Like organic fertilisers, mineral fertilisers contain nutrients that crops need, which are also naturally present in soils. The main advantage of mineral over organic fertilisers is that their nutrient content is comparatively higher. Their composition is known accurately, which allows precise dosage according to the crop fertilised. In addition, they release nutrients quickly and steadily, which allows for timely use (Morris et al. 2007: 21-22).

Since independence, African states have tried to emulate the Asian experience of boosting the use of mineral fertiliser. Up to the mid-1980s, fertiliser promotion programmes commonly involved the centralised control of the state over supply. Heavily backed by donors, the state or parastatal enterprises imported and distributed fertilisers at subsidised prices. It followed a model of universal subsidies, i.e. without targeting particular beneficiaries. This policy was often coupled with agricultural credit schemes (Crawford et al. 2003; Kherallah et al. 2002: 34-38). Although this led initially to some tangible results, the fiscal burden of these schemes rendered them unsustainable in many countries. Programmes were also plagued by inefficiencies and rent capture behaviour. In the 1980s, the structural adjustment programmes suppressed many input promotion schemes, liberalising and privatising the fertiliser sector. This caused a decrease in fertiliser use across the continent, deteriorating soil fertility and increasing food insecurity (Bumb and Baanante 1996; Morris et al. 2007: 33; Gordon, 2000: 7).

Since the renewed interest in fertiliser subsidies in the late 1990s, subsidy programmes aim to avoid the mistakes of the past. They are often said to be “market-smart” (Morris et al. 2007: 103-119; Dorward 2009; Tiba 2009). Fertilisers are subsidised but distributed through the private sector in order to stimulate a fertiliser market. Market-smart programmes often involve vouchers to be exchanged by farmers against fertilisers available from private agro-dealers. Programmes normally include an exit strategy aimed at decreasing subsidies without the collapse of fertiliser consumption in the long term. Unlike the past model of universal subsidies, contemporary subsidies are often targeted towards a category of farmers in order to decrease fiscal burdens and maximise the impact of the programmes. This also reflects the fact that market-smart programmes often have additional goals besides promoting fertiliser use. They can target specifically poor farmers to foster “pro-poor growth.” They can also target specific crops to enhance food security.

Despite renewed interest in fertiliser subsidies, their relevance is debated in the literature. Subsidies have regularly been criticised for their excessive fiscal burden, their ineffectiveness if soil acidity imbalances are not addressed in parallel, their potential capture by local or national elites, the inefficiencies of programmes in terms of logistics and targeting, and the failure of exit strategies (e.g. IFDC 2003; Crawford et al. 2006: 26-38; APP-Future Agriculture 2010; Baltzer and Hansen 2011). This chapter will not engage in such a debate. Following the framework presented in the introductory chapter, it will restrict its analysis to the effectiveness of the Burundian and Rwandan states in implementing their stated objectives of increasing fertiliser use.

Implementation of fertiliser subsidy programmes is challenging at many levels, which makes it a good case study to explore state effectiveness. It requires political, logistical, bureaucratic, and policing capacities. From a political perspective, given the importance of the rural population in sub-Saharan Africa, fertiliser subsidies constitute a formidable political tool. Political considerations may interfere with a programme’s distribution principles. For example, it has been claimed that subsidised fertilisers were targeted at government supporters as a reward in Zambia and Malawi (Mason et al. 2013), or conversely at the opposition’s stronghold in Ghana (Banful 2011) and Kenya (Jayne et al. 2013). At the local level, authorities might also interfere with distribution to favour political clients (Pan & Christiaensen 2011). In addition, given the sizeable state and donor funding they involve, subsidy programmes constitute a natural site for corruption.

From a technical perspective, the challenges are for the most part logistical. Vouchers and then fertilisers have to reach rural areas, often with poor infrastructure. This challenge is

compounded by the fact that timing is fundamental. Bags of fertiliser have to be imported and distributed before the beginning of the agricultural season. It is especially true in Burundi and Rwanda, which have two marked agricultural seasons following rainfall cycles: season A from September to January and season B from February to June.²⁶ Delayed distribution has been a recurrent problem in many recent subsidy programmes in Africa (Tiba 2009: 13). Another common challenge for the state is the prevention of smuggling. Subsidies can create a difference of price with fertilisers in neighbouring countries, making smuggling a lucrative activity. The effectiveness of the state in preventing such “leakages” is thus key to ensuring high fertiliser use domestically.

Consequently, the effectiveness of the state in enforcing fertiliser subsidy policies has two main aspects. The first is the ability of the state *to promote fertiliser use at an aggregate level*. It must, for example, fight embezzlement and smuggling, and ensure timely distribution. The second aspect is the state’s ability *to enforce the targeting criteria* of the subsidy programme. It must ensure that fertilisers are not only used, but used by the *targeted* farmers and/or for the *targeted* crops. It is required, for example, to prevent local elites from capturing subsidies intended for the poorest. This chapter will compare the first kind of effectiveness, i.e. the effectiveness of the Burundian and Rwandan state in promoting fertiliser use *at an aggregate level*. It will discuss state effectiveness in enforcing targeting criteria only in the Rwandan case because Burundi, unlike Rwanda, does not target specific farmers or crops through its fertiliser promotion programme.

3.3 Promoting fertiliser use in Burundi

1970 – 2005: slow but steady progress


The use in Burundi of mineral fertilisers started in 1970, when the government asked the FAO to launch a programme for their promotion. From 1972 to 1975, fertiliser trials were carried out and actual distribution started in 1975. At the end of the programme in 1983, this activity became the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRIE)²⁷ (Mpeteye 2011: 12). Until the civil war, fertiliser use increased more rapidly in Burundi than in Rwanda. Although

²⁶ E.g. 2014A is from September 2013 to January 2014.

²⁷ In order to designate the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Burundi uses the abbreviation MINAGRIE, whereas Rwanda uses MINAGRI.

low in comparison to international standards, imports were on average double those of Rwanda in the 1984-1992 period (Figure 3.1).²⁸

Figure 3.1 Imports of fertiliser in Burundi and Rwanda (1970-1994)



*: Fertiliser probably imported for military purposes in 1993 (Desai 2002: 26).

Source: Smith (1992: 2) for Burundi, Byakweli (2004: 20) for Rwanda. No bar indicates missing data.²⁹

The main reason for this difference is that fertiliser imports were constrained by an official ideology of self-sufficiency in Rwanda, as explained below, whereas they benefited from a political commitment to modernise agriculture in Burundi under the Bagaza regime. The setting up in Burundi of the technocratic SRD (Regional Development Companies) from 1979 onwards epitomises this commitment (Chrétien and Le Jeune 1983: 50-53). SRD were large parastatal organisations. They provided tools, research and extension services, as well as fertilisers and seeds for certain crops. They operated in a top-down manner, forcing peasants to adopt unpopular agronomic techniques such as row planting and mono-cropping (Interviews 147, 160, Ndarishikanye 1998: 148).

The subsidy programme in Burundi until 1992 followed the statist model *en vogue* in African countries at the time. The state entirely dominated the fertiliser distribution chain. It

²⁸Because Burundi and Rwanda have never produced mineral fertiliser locally, imports and consumption are assumed to be approximately equal, recognising that there could also be leakage through smuggling. The data presented in this chapter will be, for the most, import data, since consumption data are rarely available.

²⁹ Direct comparison of imports between Rwanda and Burundi are possible because their agricultural land (arable land and land with permanent crops) is approximately the same: 1,320,000 ha in Burundi, 1,470,000 in Rwanda (Source: FAO, FAOSTAT: <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/en/> accessed 02/08/2014.).

subcontracted imports at an agreed price through a call for tender to private actors. Fertilisers were distributed through two channels: by the state through parastatal organisations such as the SRD, and by different international projects. Fertiliser benefited mainly cash crops (Smith 1992: 26).


Progress was significant. Whereas only 2% of farmers used fertiliser in 1979, this was up to 30% in 1992 (Smith 1992: 1). However, in the absence of private sector involvement, the quantity of fertiliser imported depended entirely on the capacity of the state. Imports were hampered by inadequate extension services, the lack of proper demand forecasts, and the lack of experience in distribution and marketing arrangements (World Bank 1988: 39, in Smith 1992: 1). That said, the level of imports culminated in approximately 15,000 tons in 1992, a level not reached again until 2011.

Under the pressure of the World Bank's structural adjustment programme, Burundi liberalised the sector in May 1992, and private actors were authorised to import and distribute fertilisers in parallel to the state. While precise data could not be obtained for the whole civil war period, it seems that imports were affected only slightly by the international community's embargo on the country (1996-1999). Fertiliser imports were generally allowed, at least informally (Interview 139). It was only when the war intensified around 2000 that imports decreased.

2005 – 2013: fertiliser subsidies as institutionalised corruption

Whereas the Burundian state was effective in increasing fertiliser use before the war, it had much more difficulty doing so between 2005 and 2013. Until 2013, the fertiliser distribution system remained at its core the same as that of 1992, when the sector was first liberalised. Two channels, one public and one private, co-existed (Figure 3.2). The state distribution channel worked as follows. Private actors imported fertilisers on behalf of the state and delivered them to the warehouse of the MINAGRIE fertiliser department in Gitega, in the centre of the country. The department then dispatched fertilisers to the Ministry's DPAAE (Livestock and Agriculture Provincial Directorate) in each of Burundi's 17 provinces. The DPAAE were in charge of selling the subsidised fertilisers to farmers directly or through local private retailers.

Figure 3.2 Fertiliser distribution chain before 2013 in Burundi



The system was incapable of increasing fertiliser use (Figure 3.4). Whereas on average, 8,838 tons of fertiliser were imported between 1984 and 1992, only 7,383 tons were imported between 2005 and 2012.³⁰ As summarised by a 2011 IFDC report, “the strategies for availability of agriculture inputs in general, and fertiliser in particular [...] [were] ineffective at the national and intermediary level” (Mpeteye 2011: 8, author’s translation).


The first issue was that the system inherited from the 1992 liberalisation was fundamentally ill-designed. It hindered the private sector because competition with the public sector was unfair, if not impossible. On one hand, the state sold subsidised fertilisers at 60% of market price and exempted them from the 18% VAT. On the other hand, private actors did not benefit from subsidies. They had also to pay the VAT despite the lobbying efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture within the government to exempt them (RdB 2010: 8; Smith 2011) and in contradiction to the Abuja Declaration on Fertiliser for the African Green Revolution, signed by Burundi in 2006. Consequently, as summarised by a former importer, “the [private] distribution chain was screwed [*était foutue*]. This totally killed the private sector” (Interview 139; Mpeteye 2011: 13; Smith 2011). Private actors limited their role mainly to serving as subcontractors, importing fertilisers on behalf of the state (Interviews 54, 139; MINAGRIE 2012: 4).

The hindrance of the private sector was doubled by a dysfunctional state distribution system. Before identifying the immediate causes of such a situation, it is important to analyse the political economy of the sector after the war. From 2005, when the CNDD-FDD reached power, the fertiliser subsidy system was “in short, a corrupt system” (Interview 165). Selection of importers was to a great extent politically motivated: they often had to belong to, or have close ties with the CNDD-FDD and/or be able to pay kickbacks to individuals and the party

³⁰ Source: before 1993, Smith (1992: 2), after 2005, private communication, Ministry of Agriculture. Data were unavailable for 1990, so average imports before 1993 are probably higher.

(Interviews 139, 141, 146, 170, 198). In addition to the evidence gathered through interviews, the political factors in the selection of importers can be observed by the analysis of importers in business over time. In Figure 3.3, each line represents the period a fertiliser importer was in business. Only importers who have been in business for more than one year have been selected. As shown by Figure 3.3, the political transition from the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA to the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU in 2003, and then from FRODEBU to the Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD in 2005 corresponds with the emergence of a “new breed” of importers and the vanishing of the old guard.

Figure 3.3 Main fertiliser importers in business over time in Burundi



Source: author’s analysis based on interviews, data from the Ministry of Agriculture and from Annual Reports from the National Directorate for the Control of Public Procurement (2009-2012), Ministry of Finance.

Change in the national political settlement clearly had an impact on rent distribution. Interviews revealed that this evolution corresponds to the will of the new regime to privilege politically aligned actors in this lucrative industry and/or those ready to pay kickbacks to the party. The idea was to replace an old generation of importers, however experienced and sometimes in business for decades, but seen as sympathetic to UPRONA. Among the Burundian importers, all were Tutsi before 2003, whereas all but one or two were Hutu after 2007 (Interview 196).³¹

³¹ At least until 2013 when the reform of the subsidy programme attracted new importers, notably *One Acre Fund*, an American social enterprise (see below).

This overall situation detrimental to state effectiveness at different levels. Firstly, it resulted in a lack of professionalisation of private actors. As explained by a report of the International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC), “following the dysfunction of the sector due to incoherent policy [...], many [importers] gave up. Those currently in the sector are not regular importers. They often seize business opportunities by bidding to punctual tenders from project, parastatal organisation and NGOs” (Mpeteye 2011: 13, author’s translation). This phenomenon was accentuated by the importance of political criteria in the selection of importers, especially as they benefited from indulgence in terms of quality checks or delays (Interview 146). As stated by a former importer, “the problem is that the importers, who are they? They are the new elite. There is lots of corruption and they are incompetent. They know nothing about the business. They want to get rich quickly and have no training” (Interview 139). Obviously, importers were also likely to be politically aligned before the war. But they had experience. Furthermore, tolerance for corruption seemed lower under the UPRONA. Throughout the research, it was regularly acknowledged that corruption reached an unprecedented level after 2005.

Secondly, the impact of subsidies decreased because of MINAGRIE local officials’ speculation on fertiliser (Interviews 146, 170, 198; RdB 2010:5). Speculation was the result of the state’s inability to satisfy fertiliser demand. A IFDC report found that sales of subsidised fertiliser at the start of the agricultural season did not drive down the price on the parallel (and largely informal) private market (Mpeteye 2011: 17). In contrast, and at the same time, Rwanda had apparently been more effective in curtailing local speculation. As recalled by a Burundian formerly involved in the fertiliser sector: “I went to Rwanda three years ago. We visited several places with the Minister of Agriculture. [...] What I really liked is that prices of [subsidised] fertilisers were the same everywhere” (Interview 139). While speculation probably existed before the war, the sanctions then were apparently swift: “At the time the state was strong. If a director of DPAE speculated, he could be fired or imprisoned. [...] Today they don’t have much to fear” (Interview 146).

Thirdly, rent-seeking behaviour limited funding for fertiliser subsidies. Mechanically, selection of importers based on political criteria rather than on lower bids increased the price of imports. More importantly, the many possibilities for rent capture deterred donors from providing funding (Interview 165). No donors put money in the strategic fertiliser stock of the Ministry of Agriculture. It was only in 2013, when the government accepted donors’ demands to reform the subsidy programme that funding was provided. Furthermore, MINAGRIE seemed uninterested in increasing funding for fertiliser at the time. An audit report from the EU revealed that money from the sales of fertiliser by the state was not re-used to resupply the stock as it was supposed to (UE 2009: 52). Overall, until 2013, the political economy of the system, rather than directed at efficiency, served private interests that captured centralised

rents through import contracts, and decentralised rents through speculation at the local level. This changed dramatically with the redesign of the fertiliser programme in 2013.

2013: the emergence of an effective system?

The 2013 reform resulted in a dramatic increase in Burundi’s effectiveness in promoting fertiliser use and started to bridge the gap with Rwanda in this respect. As shown by Figure 3.4, the progress in season 14A and 14B was significant. Fertiliser use generally, and for food crops particularly, had never been so high.

Figure 3.4 Use of fertiliser for food crops in Burundi and Rwanda



Source: compiled from data from IFDC. No bar means missing data.

Before turning to the determinants of this reform, this section presents the new subsidy programme in Burundi and explains the cause of its effectiveness. Adopted by the Council of Ministers on 6 August 2012 and launched in season 14A (September 2013), the National Subsidised Fertiliser Programme in Burundi (PNSEB) was based on a voucher system and relied exclusively on the private sector for distribution. Unlike Rwanda, subsidised fertilisers could be used on any crop, with no limitation on quantity.

At the central level, new organisations were created to curb rent-seeking behaviour. An independent structure under the tutelage of the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Committee for Fertilisers and Soil Amendments (CNFA) was established as the interface between the different stakeholders of the programme. It was composed of representatives of

the Ministry of Agriculture, donors, importers, distributors, and banks. Its role was to monitor the implementation of the programme, determine the amount of the subsidies and select importers. The second key organisation was the Common Fund for Fertilisers and Soil Amendments (FCFA). Supervised by the CNFA, this basket fund centralised the money from donors and government that financed the programme.

From the demand side, the new system worked as follows. Hill committees³² composed of the elected hill chief, the hill-level agronomist and a farmers' representative, established a list of households desiring to buy subsidised fertilisers. Farmers had to declare the quantity wanted and the surface of their land to ensure that they would not buy more than they could use in order to resell fertilisers later. Once registered, farmers went to the post office at the commune level to pay a 5,000 BIF deposit per bag of fertiliser to secure their future voucher. About a month later, farmers went to the post office to pay the outstanding balance and receive their voucher. They could then retrieve the bags of fertilisers from an agro-dealer by presenting the voucher and an ID.

From the supply side, the CNFA published a call for tender for potential importers. If selected, importer were granted a monopoly of distribution over a given area, normally constituted of one or more provinces. They were then in charge of setting up the network of agro-dealers that distributed their fertilisers. The number of households who paid the deposit determined the quantity they had to import.

After two seasons (14A and 14B), the new fertiliser system was deemed a success. It allowed Burundi to reach an unprecedented level of fertiliser consumption with 18,493 tons used only on food crops. Several factors can explain this rapid improvement. First, the creation of the CNFA and FCFA ensured the limitation of centralised rent capture.³³ Furthermore, those organisations restored trust among donors who, as a result, provided generous funding. Whereas their contribution to fertiliser was non-existent before the reform, donors provided 5.86 million euros, i.e. about two-thirds of the fund, for the seasons 14A and 14B. Second, the use of vouchers limited decentralised rent capture. Farmers in theory only received an amount of fertiliser equal to the area under cultivation. In addition, in 14A and 14B, the demand, and not the supply, was the limiting factor of the quantity distributed, which avoided scarcity. Third, as money was disbursed to importers only on presentation of vouchers, vouchers

³² The hill is an administrative unit (they are 2,908 in the country (Sénat du Burundi 2010: 86)). It is a subdivision of the communes (129 in the country as of 2013), the main local government unit in Burundi.

³³ The transparent selection of importers introduced with the 2013 reform apparently led to an important decrease in import costs according to one MINAGRI high official (Interview 234).

constituted a strong incentive to deliver fertiliser on time as failure to do so meant unsold stocks for importers. On top of the organisational redesign, the system benefited from the strong operational involvement of donors. The National Support Project for the PNSEB (PAN-PNSEB) of IFDC kept a constant eye on the process.

The system was not free from problems, however. Voucher distribution was cumbersome in season 14A and 14B, with farmers sometimes waiting several days at the post office to get their vouchers. Yet, importers were able to deliver fertiliser on time, which was a great improvement over previous practice (Interviews 196, 198). On the demand side, several checks remained. Especially in season 14 B, normally the most productive season, only 5,296 MT were distributed against 13,197 MT in 14A. This could be explained by the lack of access to finance by farmers; by the time they had to pay the deposit for season B, the harvest of season A was not yet sold. In addition, some farmers did not trust the capacity of the state to repeat the subsidy scheme in 14B and consequently bought a lot of fertiliser in 14A (Interviews 196, 230). This is revealing of the general low confidence of the Burundian population in the effectiveness of their state.

The only limitation on demand that results from an actual decision taken by the authorities and donors was the 5,000 BiF per bag deposit farmers had to pay months in advance of the fertiliser's distribution. This choice was debated between donors who supported the arrangement and the government who viewed it as too constraining (Interview 165). It had, however, the significant advantage of forecasting and ensuring a solvent demand, consequently reducing the risk for importers. Against the backdrop of past experience of political interference in the private sector, increasing certainty for private actors was seen as paramount for the success of the reform (Interviews 141, 165).

This reform appeared to give Burundi an advantage over Rwanda in its efforts to increase fertiliser use by not adopting targeting criteria for its subsidies toward certain crops. Would it have been desirable for Burundi to follow a similar targeting model? It is unlikely. First, targeting is hard to achieve, as demonstrated below by the Rwandan case. Second, given the political saturation of the Burundian local state (see Chapter 5), it is likely that tighter targeting mechanisms would have been rapidly twisted for political gains. Cases of local authorities denying fertiliser to individuals for political reasons occurred across the country in 2014, although they were rare (Interview 233). Third, given the alarming level of food production, malnutrition and inflation, a wide targeting was best to ensure in the short term an overall increase in production, especially as long as donors were committed to channel resources to the programme.

The determinants of the 2013 reform

The 2013 reform in Burundi was mainly donor-driven. In 2011, IFDC was increasingly frustrated by the poor access to fertiliser that hampered its project CATALIST that aimed at promote agriculture intensification. In addition, staff of IFDC in Bujumbura had previously worked in Rwanda and witnessed the success of the fertiliser programme there (Interviews 141, 170). At the same time, the Netherlands embassy, which was funding the CATALIST project, consulted farmers' organisations, as it wanted to intensify its activities on food security. Consultations highlighted the pressing issue of access to agricultural inputs. At the Food Security Forum organised in Bujumbura that same year, IFDC and the Netherlands embassy started spreading the idea of revamping the subsidy programme. They quickly managed to win key state organisation to their cause: the Second Vice-Presidency, in charge of economic and social affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, and ultimately the Presidency.

How to understand such a quick support for reform, despite entrenched particularistic interests in the previous fertiliser subsidy system? As recalled by a an international consultant, the challenge was daunting since "fertilisers were an affair of state [*une affaire d'Etat*], in every sense of the phrase. It was a rotten system, corrupt from the bottom up. Corruption was institutionalised. The goal for the donors was to destroy the system" (Interview 170). Three main reasons can be identified for the success of the reform. First, agricultural production in Burundi had been poor. Following the Food Security Forum, there was a generalised understanding that agricultural productivity had to be improved. This was especially true from the Second Vice-President, apparently extremely sensitive to the issue given his background as an agronomist (Interview 165). Secondly, donors proposed the idea of a basket fund that would serve to pay for the fertiliser subsidies. This condition for donor support met a favourable response, as it was a quick source of funding for the Ministry of Agriculture, in the context of shrinking budget-support from donors (Interviews 141, 165, 198).

Thirdly, and most importantly, the government realised the electoral benefits of a working subsidy system in the context of the coming 2015 elections. The capacity to distribute fertiliser countrywide, at a subsidised price, partly thanks to donor money and expertise, ensured timely visibility to the CNDD-FDD in the rural areas, its traditional stronghold. This was well understood by donors. Despite their leading role in the process, they hid behind the government, who has regularly presented the programme as its own on the radio and on the ground (Interviews 165, 198, 172).

This political support at the apex of the Burundian state helped donors to overcome resistance that occurred at different levels of the state apparatus. One anecdotal, albeit glaring, example was when the transfer of farmers' deposits to the FCFA account was delayed by the National Post in season 14A, the presidency itself intervened to speed up the process (Interview 198). Resistance was especially strong in the DPAE and within the office of the minister of agriculture because the new system removed the possibility of rent capture. It took the form of obstruction, delays, and constant criticism of the project. Outside the Ministry of Agriculture, it was communal administrators who were a source of nuisance, notably by reporting alarming news of failure of the programme to higher levels of the state (Interview 172). For this reason, the programme largely bypassed the main local government (the *commune*) as distribution relied on a hill-level elected committee. This is an interesting contrast with Rwanda where local governments were mainly in charge of the fertiliser policy implementation. As Chapter 6 on the local state shows, this difference was not limited to fertiliser. Whereas generally in Rwanda, local governments were the main implementers of policies, in Burundi they were not, either because decentralisation was limited or because they were actively bypassed.

3.4 Promoting fertiliser use in Rwanda

The effectiveness of the state in Rwanda to increase fertiliser use has been less erratic over time than in Burundi. Notwithstanding the genocide, fertiliser use has followed a modest upward trend, before a dramatic acceleration in 2007, when the state rolled-out its ambitious Crop Intensification Programme (CIP).

Late 1970s – 1994: ideological obstacles to increasing fertiliser use


Until the mid-1980s, the government of Rwanda had little interest in increasing fertiliser use. The ideology of the Habyarimana regime centred on self-sufficiency and hampered the promotion of mineral fertiliser. The natural fertility of the soil was considered enough to attain this objective of self-sufficiency, without the need to engage in expensive imports (Kelly et al. 2001: 1). Consequently, under Habyarimana “technological innovation to increase yields [...] was completely absent” (Verwimp 2013: 8) and fertiliser use was among the lowest in the world (Kelly et al. 2001: 1).

However, decrease in agricultural productivity in the 1980s spurred the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) to develop fertiliser imports. In 1984, the Project for the Support of the Input National Programme (APNI), backed by donors, started financing fertiliser imports

in Rwanda. Through the 1980s, however, imports remained low, on average 2,000MT/year. By 1989, the APNI was put in charge of all imports for public companies and development projects (Uwamarya et al. 1990: 5). Each buyer to APNI, whether NGOs, donor projects, or private actors, was free to choose the modalities of distribution, including subsidy amounts. This led only to a small increase in fertiliser imports in 1991 and 1992 (Figure 3.5). The dramatic increase in 1993 was probably due to the fact that imported fertilisers (mainly ammonium and nitrate products) were used for military (i.e. to make explosives) and not for agricultural purposes (Desai 2002: 26).

Figure 3.5 Fertiliser imports in Rwanda (1969-2009)

Importation in MT



Source: Compiled from Byakweli (2004) and private communication from Jean-Marie Byakweli.

1994 - 2006: emergency, trial and errors

Whereas mineral fertilisers were seen by the Rwandan government as unnecessary in the 1970s and received limited attention in the 1980s, they became a priority in post-genocide Rwanda. This is the result of a dramatic change in the government’s approach to agriculture. Rwanda’s Vision 2020 explicitly calls for “move[ing] beyond past delusions of viable subsistence-based agriculture” and advocated a “high-value, market oriented agriculture” (RoR 2000: 17). Modern inputs have a crucial role to play in this project since “contrary to conventional wisdom, the most important issue retarding Rwanda’s agricultural development is not land size, but low productivity associated with traditional peasant-based subsistence farming” (ibid.). As a result, Vision 2020 calls for “intensive input use, especially fertilisers” (ibid.).

Immediately after genocide, however, in an emergency context, the state had a limited role in

fertiliser promotion. From 1995 to 1999, fertilisers were imported into the country mainly by a European Union programme and distributed for free or at a subsidised price (Kelly et al. 2001: 2). The programme led to some limited results, with imports of on average 3,000 MT per year. Because it wanted the private sector to develop, which was expected to boost fertiliser use, the Rwandan Government ended the programme in 1999 (Byakweli 2004: 7). Private distributors and importers were supported by tax exemption and subsidised credit. Use of fertilisers improved, but was below expectation: between 1998 and 2005, imports were on average below 7,000 MT per year, i.e. about 4.2 kg/ha (IFDC 2010: 9). They concerned mainly cash crops (ibid.). This limited performance can be explained by the high price of fertiliser and farmers' difficulties accessing finance.

On the supply side, the 1999 liberalisation occurred in an inimical environment that lacked a market structure, quality control, professional importers, and mechanisms to make fertiliser financially accessible (Cook 2002; Byakweli 2004; IFDC 2010: 9). It seemed to have been "too early" and convinced the state to step in to boost fertiliser use. As a result, the government decided to take over imports of fertiliser in 2006. As explained by a MINAGRI official from the fertiliser programme, "the rationale was that because the private sector cannot do it, the state has to step in and build slowly the private sector" (Interview 87). The Clinton Foundation supported the initiative financially, which explains the increase of imports as early as 2006 (Interview 122; IFDC 2010: 9). The rolling out in 2007 (for season 2008A) of the ambitious CIP confirmed this greater involvement of the state in the fertiliser sector.

The fertiliser programme under the CIP (2007-...)

This section will trace the evolution of the fertiliser programme since the beginning of the CIP. Based on this analysis, the subsequent section will discuss the factors behind its effectiveness.

Pushed by President Kagame himself (Interviews 47, 106), the CIP was the government's main tool to reach the vision of a food-secure Rwanda out of subsistence agriculture. It gave the state a preeminent role in the fertiliser sector. In 2007, Rwanda became the first country to sign NEPAD's Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which aimed to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6% per year.

The CIP relied on four main pillars (Kathiresan 2011). The first was land use consolidation: farmers with plots next to each other had to grow crops in a synchronised manner. The goal was to promote economies of scale, easy allocation and use of inputs, easy provision of

extension services, and better access to markets for producers. Second, farmers in consolidated areas had to grow certain priority crops. Third, special attention was given to agricultural extension services, post-harvest handling and storage. Lastly, farmers in the CIP had access to subsidised inputs: fertilisers and improved seeds. Specifically, the fertiliser policy under the CIP followed a three-part logic. It had first the fundamental goal of increasing fertiliser use on food crops. Secondly, it aimed at promoting certain priority crops over others by directing subsidised fertilisers to them. Thirdly, the programme had a pro-poor concern, whereby quantities of subsidised fertiliser per household were theoretically limited. For example, as of season 14B, subsidised fertiliser per household should cover a maximum 0.5ha for maize and wheat, 1 ha for Irish potatoes, and 1.5 ha for rice (Interviews 106, 121). Even though anyone was eligible to receive fertilisers, the goal was to limit the fiscal burden of the programme while maximising the benefit for the poorest.

The CIP led to impressive results in terms of fertiliser use (Figure 3.5). Since its beginning, fertiliser use increased by 211%, jumping from 9,633 metric tons in 2008 to 30,000 metric tons in 2014. The level of fertiliser consumption in Rwanda has never been so high. For 2013-14 (season 14A and 14B), the import can be estimated at 35,000 MT (30,000 MT through CIP and about 5MT for cash crops³⁴), which corresponds to about 24-27 kg/ha.³⁵ By way of comparison, Uganda used in 2012 only 4 kg/ha.³⁶ This led to a tremendous increase in food crop production and productivity, although it cannot of course be attributed to fertiliser alone. According to the World Bank (2011: 5), Rwanda became food self-sufficient in 2009, to a large extent thanks to the CIP.³⁷

Since its launch in 2007, the fertiliser policy under the CIP has evolved over time (Figure 3.6). After two “pilot” seasons (2008A and 2008B) of fertiliser distributed entirely by the state, the government took a market smart approach accompanied by generous subsidies to boost fertiliser consumption countrywide. This determination to rapidly increase access to fertiliser was reinforced by the food price crises of 2007-8, which gave rise to a fear of food insecurity in Rwanda, and increased fertiliser world prices (ILRI 2011: 136). On the supply side, private actors were put in charge of distribution.

³⁴ Private communication.


³⁵ These numbers are obtained by dividing the quantity imported by the area cultivated. The Rwandan Environment Agency gives an area of 1.44 million ha (REMA/UNEP: 2009), whereas the FAO gives 1.47 million ha (FAOSTAT: <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=rwa>, accessed 02/08/2014).

³⁶ 4kg/ha according to Benson et al. (2013), 5.3/kg if calculated from FAO’s data on arable agricultural land (FAOSTAT: <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=uga> accessed 02/08/2014).

³⁷ This means that food production at an aggregate level can cover the population’s demand under normal climatic condition. However, it does not mean that all of the population has adequate access to food, both in term of quantity and quality.

The government still imported fertilisers in bulk but then organised auctions for private actors to bid for lots, i.e. a quantity of fertiliser with a monopoly of distribution in a given area.

Figure 3.6 Evolution of CIP fertiliser policies over time



The roll-out of this new market-smart system was characterised by a consistent effort to limit rent-seeking behaviour. The contrast with Burundi, where the authorities let imports and distribution be a substantial site of rent capture, is stark. Admittedly, levels of corruption and rent capture are always difficult to measure, but the *commitment* of the Rwandan government to limit them was visible.

To begin with, MINAGRI did not subcontract imports to the private sector as in Burundi, where it was an opportunity for lucrative contracts and kickbacks. It preferred to stay in control of imports in order to buy fertiliser in bulk to ensure a cost-effective supply. In addition, the selection of distributors in Rwanda was done through an auction system and not through a call for tender. The first auctions in 2009A were a success, even “judged by IFDC to have been one of the best first auctions for fertiliser that IFDC had ever witnessed” (IFDC 2010: 13). It was however soon discovered that distributors were colluding with each other when competing to buy MINAGRI’s fertiliser stocks (Interviews 87, 89). This elicited a quick response from the Ministry of Agriculture. It introduced an electronic auction system to prevent such practices, which apparently allowed the government to save a lot of money.³⁸

³⁸ About \$350,000 according to a Ministry of Agriculture’s international consultant (Interview 89).

The Rwandan government's determination to limit undue rents can also be observed through the analysis of private actors' margins. When auctioning fertilisers, MINAGRI set a floor price from which each actor could bid to get a fertiliser lot. It also determined a ceiling price (voucher value included), at which farmers would buy fertilisers. Each bid from a potential distributor to get the lot reduced the margin of the distributor and of its agro-dealers as it approached the ceiling price. From 2008 to 2012, the maximum margin set by the government (i.e. the difference between the floor and ceiling price) stayed the same in absolute terms (65 Rwf/kg for a distributor, which includes a 15 Rwf/kg for an agro-dealer). However, the increase over the years of the floor price meant that the potential maximum gross margin decreased by 8.8% over four years for the distributors and agro-dealers. (IFDC 2012c: 6-7). What is remarkable is not the decrease *per se*, even though it shows that MINAGRI was concerned with controlling costs. It is the fact that those margins were so tight that distributors and agro-dealers could hardly make a profit. From four distributors surveyed in 2011 by IFDC, even though their situations varied and the sample is small, the average net margin on fertiliser sales was close to nil. The situation was worse for agro-dealers: among the 10 visited, all suffered a loss (ibid: 8-9). Agro-dealers were able to "survive" because fertiliser distribution was a marginal activity for them, and often districts lent them premises for their business free of charge.³⁹ In addition, agro-dealers and distributors had only a weak incentive to pay back MINAGRI on time after they sold the fertiliser, as explained below. This means that although they were hardly making profits selling fertiliser, they were enjoying virtually free credit from MINAGRI, which was especially welcome since interest rates were approximately 17% per year in Rwanda.⁴⁰ Overall, fertiliser imports and distribution in Rwanda from 2009 to 2013 did not seem to allow central rent extraction as in Burundi.

On the supply side, the new market-smart approach to fertiliser subsidies introduced the voucher system. One peculiarity of the Rwandan policy, in comparison to Burundi, was the targeting of beneficiaries. Only farmers growing certain priority crops, and following the land use consolidation policy, were eligible to receive a voucher for 50% of the price of the fertiliser bag. Besides vouchers, all farmers benefited until 2013 from a universal and invisible subsidy since the Rwandan government also took charge of the international transport costs (Mombasa-Kigali) for all fertiliser imports. Voucher distribution worked as follows. Sector agronomists, helped by IDPs (Integrated Development Programme officers, i.e. cell-level officials in charge of development) and chief of site (one of the farmers from a CIP


³⁹ Rwandan local government structure is composed of four provinces, 30 districts, which are the main local governments, 450 sectors and 14,744 cells.

⁴⁰ Source: National Bank of Rwanda, monthly interest rate report. <http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=329> (accessed 12/02/16).

consolidated site), drew up the list of farmers who wanted fertilisers. Farmers would get vouchers from a printing team dispatched from Kigali. They then retrieved their bag of fertiliser from local agro-dealers against the voucher and 50% of the price in cash.

As a key measure to ensure financial access to fertiliser before the 2013 reform, farmers could receive free credit for the remaining 50% they had to pay in cash. They were supposed to pay the agro-dealers after the harvest. The agro-dealer in turn would pay back the distributor, who would finally pay MINAGRI. While it undoubtedly increased financial access to fertiliser, it also created a heavy financial burden for MINAGRI, especially as it was quite ineffective in enforcing repayment. As no actor was required to engage collateral for the credits, the incentives to pay back were weak. Since the start of the CIP, this was a recurrent problem (Figure 3.7). As of September 2011 (the latest data), more than 13.14 billion Rwanda Francs (about 22 million USD at the time) worth of fertiliser credit was outstanding to MINAGRI. This represented more than 38% of MINAGRI's internal budget that year.⁴¹

Figure 3.7 Unpaid fertiliser credit to MINAGRI



Source: Private communication, author's compilation and analysis based on each individual distributor outstanding debt with the Ministry of Agriculture.

The importance of the debt is surprising given the usual effectiveness of the Rwandan state in collecting a myriad of financial contributions at the local level. As summarised by a MINAGRI official “the farmers have to pay *mutuelles* [community-based health insurance], security, street cleaning etc. it is a lot of money. The fertilisers are expensive but they have

⁴¹ MINAGRI's internal budget was 34.2 billion RwF for 2011/12 (MINAGRI 2012: 91).

not paid them fully historically” (Interview 108). Why has the state been so ineffective in recovering fertiliser credits?

First, agro-dealers and distributors had an incentive to sell fertilisers with little regard to the solvency of farmers, since MINAGRI would be the ultimate guarantor of farmers’ debt. In addition, it was not uncommon for agro-dealers and distributors to allege not to have been paid by farmers, even though it was not true, to benefit from free credits (Interview 108). From the state’s point of view, local officials had a strong incentive to promote sales of fertilisers because fertiliser use was often part of their *imihigo* (performance contract), explained below. As a result, local officials hinted that the state would not be adamant in forcing farmers to repay their debts. As explained by a former high official in the MINAGRI, on fertilisers, the basic message of some agronomists to farmers was “add some fertiliser, it’s nearly free, so why go without it?” (Interview 109).

Secondly, there were no real sanctions in case of non-payment of credits. This was a somewhat a deliberate policy in order to limit resentment regarding the monocropping promoted by the CIP. Especially in the first years of the CIP, the market structure did not allow the full sale of the surplus, thus limiting its profitability (Interview 11).⁴² In addition, farmers have seen monocropping as extremely risky in case of a bad harvest (Interview 11; Ansoms 2009a; Huggins 2009). Resistance to the programme was important. Sector agronomists sometimes had to be accompanied by the Local Defence Force (LDF)⁴³ when visiting the field to implement CIP regulations (Interview 71). “Encouragements” to practice monocropping on priority crops could be harsh. Local authorities sometimes resorted to uprooting crops not planned by the CIP or not respecting planting guidelines.⁴⁴ Consequently, “from the start, MINAGRI was in a bad position [to recover fertiliser debts]. Farmers said: “why do you want to force a credit on me while I can’t grow the crop I want?” (Interview 109). As a result, the government adopted a lenient stance toward debt recovery. An agent of the Rwandan Agriculture Board (RAB), MINAGRI’s agency in charge of implementing the CIP, working outside Kigali maintained that “sector agronomists and the IDP received instructions from MINALOC [Ministry of Local Government] not to be strict regarding repayment. [...] It was not a written instruction; it was only an oral one. There was no willingness to get the money back” (Interview 112). It appears that the 2010 presidential election also played a role in that stance, as explained by a former staff member of MINAGRI: “[the soft approach to credit recovery] was especially true in 2010 for the elections. The word [passed around among officials] was “no one touch the peasants” (Interview 108, see also 170).

⁴² See also “Crop intensification: Better communication required”, Rwanda Focus, 30/07/2012 and Huggins (2009: 301).

⁴³ LDF were local law enforcement organisations under the district, composed of volunteers, assisting the police.

⁴⁴ “Rwanda: Farmers Decry ‘Overzealous’ Local Leaders.” *Rwanda Focus*, 24/03/2013.

State ineffectiveness in recovering fertiliser credit has thus to be seen against the backdrop of state effectiveness to implement the CIP. Fertiliser subsidies and loose credit recovery was seen by the state as part of a social contract with farmers. In exchange for going along with the unpopular, but government flagship, CIP, farmers could benefit from subsidised fertilisers and free credit with little incentive for repayment on time. This helps to explain why debt on fertiliser kept rising, despite early concerns from international partners (IFDC 2010: 37; 2012b: 8), or even other state agencies such as the Office of the Auditor General (OAG 2010: 30-31; 2012: 22-23). The state did not abandoned the prospect repayment, however. In 2012, a local debt recovery committee, that included the police existed in each district (Interview 109).

The rising debt of MINAGRI was the main factor behind the last evolution of the fertiliser policy in Rwanda: the full-privatisation of the fertiliser sector in 2013. Although contemplated for a long time, government saw privatisation as a slippery process to be handled gradually given the past unsuccessful experience in 1999 and the possible drop in fertiliser consumption if credits were not guaranteed by the state anymore. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) regularly put pressure on MINAGRI about the fertiliser debt. The cutback of international aid in 2012 following the involvement of Rwanda in the DRC triggered the sudden privatisation process in March 2013, which took donors by surprise (Interviews 106, 117, 121). Indeed, even in mid-2012, the government was still contemplating a gradual approach to privatisation, with imports to be privatised only in July 2016 (IFDC 2012b: 10).

In season 14A (September 2013) private actors were put in charge not only of distribution but also of imports. The state stopped paying for international transportation costs, which led to a rise in fertiliser prices. To partially compensate for the rise, a flat rate discount of 105 Rwf/kg of fertiliser for rice and Irish potatoes was introduced. In addition, no credit was provided to farmers anymore. The risk of a decrease in fertiliser demand was consequently important. This uncertainty could lead importers to reduce imports to avoid unsold stock. As a result, nervousness was apparently high in the Ministry of Agriculture (Interviews 106, 121). It adopted exceptional measures to mitigate the risk of a drop in fertiliser consumption. It selected only two importers/distributors for season 14A and B. They were the most financially stable, with a strong credit recovery record, and a good reputation with banks (Interviews 106, 121). In addition, such a small number allowed the importers/distributors to increase their absolute margins. Yet, committed to building a competitive market, and in a context where the demand for fertiliser did not decrease, the government increased the number of importers/distributors to five in season 15A and 15B and eight for the season 16A and

B (Interview 279).⁴⁵ After having traced the evolution of fertiliser policy in Rwanda under the CIP, this last section identifies the factors influencing the CIP effectiveness in promoting fertiliser use.

Explaining the effectiveness under the CIP

As explained, Rwandan state effectiveness regarding fertiliser can be divided into two categories. The first is the capacity of the state to increase fertiliser use countrywide. The second is the effectiveness of the state to ensure that the subsidy targeting criteria are respected

Regarding the first aspect, two main factors impacting effectiveness can be identified. First, the state endeavoured to put a check on rent capture. At the central level, it took the form of the auction system and the tight control of private actors' margins. The fertiliser sector also benefited from more general state efforts to curb corruption and embezzlement. Specifically regarding the fertiliser sector, fieldwork revealed that audits by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) were much feared in the MINAGRI, Rwandan Agriculture Board (RAB) and local governments. These audits led to staff salary deductions, and potentially prosecution, for agricultural input mismanagement (Interview 100).

At the local level, a commitment to curb rent capture was also manifest. It was however more difficult to enforce, given the form taken by rent capture. It was not uncommon for agro-dealers to buy fertilisers back from a farmer in order to sell them out of the official selling period, at a higher price (Interview 108). This concerned mainly NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium) fertiliser because it was used with Irish potatoes, a particularly profitable crop in Rwanda that can be grown year round. The smuggling of fertiliser to neighbouring countries made up the other main form for small-scale embezzlement. In 2010, an IFDC report estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 tons of fertilisers were smuggled into Burundi from Rwanda. The phenomenon was significant and understandable given the price discrepancy across the border.⁴⁶ That said, "fighting smuggling has always been a top priority" (Interview 89) for the MINAGRI. Training sessions were provided to the police to specifically sensitise them to the issue of fertiliser smuggling (Interview 121). Similarly, agronomists were invited to report any suspicious cases. As explained by a RAB staff working outside of Kigali: "if I am on the road and I see a farmer with a bag of fertiliser on his bike, I'll stop him and ask where he is coming from and where he is going. And if I am not satisfied, I will call the police" (Interview

⁴⁵ See also "Private firms underpin Rwanda fertiliser market", East African Business Week, 05/07/2015.

⁴⁶ In 2010, DAP fertiliser (diammonium phosphate), the subsidised fertiliser used for wheat and maize, cost 240 RwF/kg in Rwanda, against 418 RwF when subsidised, and 625 RwF if not in Burundi (Mpetey 2011: 16, author's currency conversion).

76). Smugglers of fertiliser were charged with “economic sabotage” by prosecutors⁴⁷ and fertiliser smuggling cases featured regularly in the press.⁴⁸ Overall, it seems that rent capture in the fertiliser sector was predominantly decentralised, resulting primarily from the difficulty faced by the state in monitoring every fertiliser bag.

Second, in addition to the efforts to limit financial “leakages”, the effectiveness of the state to promote fertiliser use rested on a series of incentives and monitoring mechanisms embedded in the bureaucracy. One of the main tools was performance contracts, which permeated the whole Rwandan state apparatus. In the fertiliser sector, virtually every agent involved in fertiliser distribution had targets related to fertiliser in his/her performance contracts. At the MINAGRI, fertiliser targets were present from the minister of agriculture’s performance contract (Table 3.1) all the way down to the local agronomist from RAB.

Table 3.1 Excerpt from the Ministry of Agriculture performance contract in 2012-2013

Output	Indicator and Baseline	Targets	Activities to deliver the output	Budget (RwF)
Output 1.5 Application of mineral fertiliser increased from 29 to 34 kg/ha	Kg/ha of mineral fertiliser used Baseline: 29 Kg/ha	Q4: 34 Kg/ha	1. Fertiliser purchasing 2. Stock management & distribution 36,500MT; auction 3. Training 500 and accreditation of 256 agro dealers; 4. Supervision, promotion of fertiliser use (400 demonstrations set up) 5. Printing & distribution of 460,000 vouchers 6. 4000 farmers using Lime and other Integrated Soil Fertility Management	21 006 000 000

Source: (RoR n.d.: 8).

As a result of the inclusion of fertiliser targets in *imihigo*, state agents might “go the extra-mile” to ensure that fertiliser reached farmers on time. For example, it was not rare that RAB officials transported fertilisers by truck from agro-dealers to farmers. As explained by a RAB agronomist, even though “it is not normally the role of RAB, all means have to be used [*tous les moyens sont bons*]. We do everything so that farmers can’t have an excuse [not to use fertilisers]” (Interview 76). Civil servants involved in fertiliser also had to follow heavy reporting obligations. At the beginning of the season, a RAB agronomist had to submit weekly reports on paper, and a sector agronomist daily reports by phone. Notably these reports

⁴⁷ “Police nab fertiliser smugglers”, The New Times, 06/11/08.

⁴⁸ Examples include: “14 arrested for economic sabotage”, The New Times 12/10/08; “Police nab fertiliser smugglers”, The New Times, 06/11/08; “Stolen fertilisers recovered in Rusizi”, The New Times, 09/03/11,

included whether the fertiliser had arrived and how distribution was going, which allowed the state to act quickly in case of problems (Interviews 71, 76, 82).

Nevertheless, while the CIP increased fertiliser use dramatically, progress in fertiliser use has since stalled (Figure 3.4). It seems that the main limiting factors included low density of the network of agro-dealers and also the targeting of fertiliser only towards priority crops (Interviews 57, 77, 121). Although this targeting was regularly circumvented as explained below, it might, if lifted, had encouraged further fertiliser demand and help to sustain the new private sector. Interestingly, MINAGRI seemed to realise the contradiction between subsidising fertiliser only for priority, and not always popular, crops, and creating a domestic demand large enough to sustain the young private sector. In March 2014, discussions were held about the possibility of issuing vouchers regardless of the nature of the crop⁴⁹ and for season 14A and B, crop targeting was relaxed to 10 crops, representing 70% of the total food crops (Interview 279).

If the Rwandan state was effective in boosting fertiliser consumption at an aggregate level, was it also effective at enforcing the targeting criteria of its subsidy? Rwanda was not very effective in meeting its own objectives of targeting subsidies. To begin with, the maximum quantity of subsidised fertiliser per household appeared to be largely theoretical. Many informants underlined how easy it was for farmers with large plots to send relatives to obtain additional vouchers, or even to buy subsidised fertilisers from other farmers (Interviews 83, 106, 109, 113). In addition, the strong incentive for local officials to promote fertiliser was likely to make them turn a blind eye to such practices. Second, the state also had difficulty in directing subsidised fertilisers to certain crops. Again, because of *imihigo* targets, officials were not very vigilant about where fertilisers actually ended up. In addition, no real means of sanction existed anyway. Farmers' strategies often involved using only a part of the fertilisers on designated crops, keeping some for non-priority crops, especially vegetables and sorghum (Interview 113). Two informants (a staff member of the Ministry of Agriculture working in the fertiliser programme and an agronomist) estimated that as much as 50% of what was supposed to go to maize ended up elsewhere (Interviews 108, 113). The cases of marshlands were an exception: because they all belonged to the state, non-use of fertiliser could in theory have consequences for farmers, the worst being evicted from marshland cultivation. The state did not have the means (or the will?) to enforce its targeting criteria. State officials seemed to realise this, as demonstrated by their relaxing of targeting criteria for fertilisers in 2014.

⁴⁹ Field notes, Agriculture Sector Technical Working Group, MINAGRI, Kigali, 5th February 2014.

3.5 Discussion

A comparative analysis of state effectiveness to promote fertiliser use in Burundi and Rwanda reveals key differences over time. Before 1994, Burundi was more effective in promoting fertiliser use thanks to the modernist vision of its government. The situation changed dramatically in the post-conflict period. After groping for an effective subsidy model up until 2006, Rwanda embarked on the CIP, which dramatically increased fertiliser use. On the other hand, effectiveness in Burundi was much lower, mainly due to rent seeking behaviour of individuals well connected to the CNDD-FDD party. It was only after the donor-driven reform of the fertiliser programme that Burundi's effectiveness increased dramatically.

Admittedly, the comparison is facing two methodological challenges already evoked in the previous chapter. To begin with, time difference between the end of the genocide in Rwanda and the war in Burundi could explain variation of state effectiveness. Rwanda searched for an effective model before embarking on the CIP and the same could be said of Burundi. Data presented above, however, show that time is an insufficient factor to account for differential of state effectiveness regarding fertiliser. First, the nature of conflict was very different in each country. Unlike in Rwanda, the state and the economy never ceased to function during the war in Burundi. Regarding fertiliser this is best shown by the fact that the level of imports did not drop dramatically during the embargo, and were still on average about 6,500MT between 2001 and 2005, a level that Rwanda reached only in 2000. In addition, the lower Burundian effectiveness is mainly due to causes, notably corruption that did not have much to do with time alone. Corruption since the end of the war may have increased over time, as illustrated in the subsequent chapters, and the fertiliser sector only bucks the trend thanks to the 2013 donor-driven reform.

Another methodological challenge lies in the differences of resources between the Burundian and Rwandan state. It could be argued that fertiliser use was higher in Rwanda simply because the government was richer and "threw a lot of money" at the programme, in the form of generous subsidy and free credit. This challenge, which runs through the whole thesis, often turned out to be secondary. In the case of fertiliser, evidence presented indicates that more immediate factors intervened to explain ineffectiveness in Burundi before 2013. An ill-designed subsidy programme, rent capture, and the resulting unwillingness of donors to provide funding, were the immediate causes that did not make funding become the main limiting factor. The best evidence for this is that when the programme was redesigned in 2013, donors did not hesitate to provide generous funding.

Besides the questions of money, four main factors can be identified that put Rwanda ahead up to 2013. First, while Rwanda had more money, it also showed a constant concern for its effective use. This was demonstrated by the setting up of the electronic auction system, the check put on private actors' margins, the fight against smuggling, the role of the OAG, and, more generally, by the anti-corruption policy of the Rwandan state. Rent-seeking behaviour existed in Rwanda, but rent creation was mainly decentralised, under the form of illegal fertiliser reselling or smuggling. In contrast, rent capture in Burundi until 2013 was not only decentralised through speculation by public and private actors, but also centralised at the level of imports. This means that embezzlement in Rwanda was mainly the result of local private actors profiting from loopholes in the system, and not officials systematically subverting a system they were supposed to enforce, as in Burundi.

Second, many of the differences between Burundi and Rwanda lie in the incentive and monitoring mechanisms that state agents dealing with fertilisers had to face. Such mechanisms will be analysed further in Chapter 5 on the local state.

Third, the relative effectiveness of Rwanda in comparison to Burundi until 2013 rested also in the state's responsiveness. The state reacted continuously to challenges facing its fertiliser policies, such as the inability before 2006 of the private sector to increase quickly fertiliser imports, the dramatic increase of fertiliser world prices in 2008, the collusion of distributors in 2009, the aid-cut coupled with high fertiliser debts in 2012. The inertia of the Burundian state until 2013 in addressing ineffectiveness of its fertiliser system, inherited from the 1992 liberalisation, is in marked contrast. Furthermore, the eventual 2013 reform in Burundi was mainly donor-driven, whereas the adoption of the CIP in 2007 and the 2013 reforms were government-driven in Rwanda.

Consequently, the 2013 reform in Burundi led to a converging level of effectiveness between the two states, with regard to the promotion of fertiliser use. This case of equifinality should not hide the different underlying dynamics however. In Rwanda, effectiveness seems ultimately tied to the vision behind the fertiliser programme. Fertiliser is key to the RPF's grand vision of transforming Rwanda first into a food-secure country, and ultimately into a knowledge-based economy away from subsistence agriculture. As articulated by Vision 2020 (RoR 2000: 9-11), such a goal cannot be attained unless agriculture is transformed into a commercial sector. A crucial tool for this transformation was the CIP, which was directly pushed by President Kagame himself. Fertiliser policies became a serious business for the elite. This is well exemplified by the fact that, although both the Burundian and Rwandan governments stated their will to increase fertiliser use, Rwanda has constantly included

extremely precise quantitative targets in its top policy documents (Vision, Poverty-reduction papers, and general agricultural policies). In comparison, only one quantitative target could be found in all top policies documents Burundi. Furthermore, the target only consisted in increasing fertiliser use by 10% each year, and did not provide a baseline (Table 3.2 below).

Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the major dysfunctions identified in the fertiliser sector in Rwanda remained not only compatible, but to a certain extent useful, in reaching the government's grand vision. Ineffectiveness in enforcing subsidy targeting and recovering credits from farmers did not fundamentally preclude fertiliser consumption at an aggregate level, and might have supported it. Especially, the "ineffectiveness" of the government to recover fertiliser credit was perceived as the condition of another "effectiveness" more crucial than short-term budget equilibrium: the success of the CIP and wide scale adoption of fertiliser. This appeared to be a winning bet, since fertiliser demand maintained itself despite the removal of state credit in 2014 and the decrease of subsidies. This case of poor credit recovery also demonstrates that the Rwandan state is not completely autonomous. It is not indifferent to the popular discontent that can arise from its policies.

In Burundi, the increase in effectiveness happened mainly thanks to donors. Their role was central in initiating, implementing and financing the 2013 reform. However, donors' efforts were not a sufficient condition. Success occurred also because of a window of opportunity created by the recognition of the country's poor agricultural performance, and, most importantly, by the electoral calendar, which donors harnessed to align political and development interests. The very nature of the fertiliser sector supported the process. Fertiliser distribution is a visible act, with a quick impact on the rural population. Consequently, the reproducibility of such successful reform in other sectors is not ensured in Burundi, especially in sectors where reform does not translate quickly into tangible results. In this light, ascribing evidence of state effectiveness to policy implemented mainly thanks to donors, as the 2013 reforms, is debatable. While the Burundian government was not in the driving seat, it nonetheless created the space for the reform to happen and could potentially learn from it for future reform implementations. Consequently, the 2013 reform cannot be dismissed as "donor effectiveness" outright. This point will be further discussed in the conclusion, once empirical evidence beyond the fertiliser case will have been presented.

The comparison with Rwanda also reveals that the autonomy of the Burundian state is much more limited. Before 2013, particularistic interests hindered state effectiveness. After 2013, superior political concern resulting from the coming elections spurred the state to act. These different causes that give rise to converging levels of effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda

have consequences for sustainability. Because the Rwandan effectiveness in the fertiliser sector seems to originate ultimately in the sector's critical role in attaining the RPF's national vision, it is unlikely to suffer major short-term reversal. In contrast, the Burundian government's commitment to effectiveness in Burundi appears more short-term.

Table 3.2 Fertiliser indicators in Burundi and Rwanda’s main policy documents

Category of Country Documents	Document	Fertiliser-related targets	Source	
Country’s vision	Burundi	Vision 2025	• None	MPDC/UNDP 2011
	Rwanda	Vision 2020	• Use of fertiliser: 8kg/ha in 2010 and 15kg/ha in 2020:	RoR 2000
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers	Burundi	CSLP I (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper): 2006-2009	• None	RdB: 2006
		CSLP II: 2012-2015	• None	RdB 2012
	Rwanda	PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper): 2002-2005	• Quantity of imported fertiliser: 63,000MT in 2005	
		EDPRS I (Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy): 2008-2012	• Use of fertilisers: 15 Kg/ha/year in 2020 • Use of chemical or organic fertilisers (% of households): 50% by 2020	RoR 2007
Agriculture Strategy & Agriculture Action Plan	Burundi	National Agricultural Strategy (SAN): 2008-2015	• Inputs increased by 10% per year [inputs not disaggregated and no baseline]	MINAGRIE 2008
		Agricultural Investment National Programme (PNIA): 2012-2017	• Yearly 10% increase of fertiliser use [but no baseline provided] • One agriculture input dealer in each commune	MINAGRIE 2011
	Rwanda	National Agricultural Policy (PAN): 2004	• None	MINAGRI 2004a,
		PSTA I (Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture): 2004-2008	• Use of fertilisers: 15 Kg/ha/year on average	MINAGRI 2004b.
		PSTA II: 2009-2012	• Increase in farms using inorganic fertilisers from 12% to 25% • Increase tonnes of fertiliser imported from 14,000 to 56,000 by 2012 • Increase % of farmers organisations trained in fertilisers: from 20 to 70% • 12 ongoing fertiliser demonstration plots • Construct a fertiliser plant • Expand the CIP to cover a larger percentage of Rwanda’s arable land	MINAGRI 2008
		PSTA III: 2013-2017	• Update fertiliser recommendation • MT of fertiliser imported and used: 59,741 MT by year 2017-8 • Farmers accessing smart subsidies on fertilisers: 720,670 by 2017-8 • Additional fertiliser storage capacity acquired: 8,000MT by 2017-8 • Feasibility study for one fertiliser blending plant by 2017-8 • Kg of inorganic fertiliser used per ha per year: 45 by 2017-8	MINAGRI 2013

Chapter 4

Decreasing maternity mortality: Comparing policy interventions in Burundi and Rwanda

This chapter explores the effectiveness of the Burundian and Rwandan states in decreasing maternal mortality. Decreasing maternal deaths has been a top priority in global health since the late 1980s, following the Safe Motherhood Initiative in Kenya in 1987. This priority has been regularly reaffirmed, for example through the inclusion of safe motherhood in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). MDG 5 aimed to reduce maternal mortality ratios by 75% between 1990 and 2015. Yet, WHO estimated that in 2013, 289,000 women died of pregnancy-related causes, 60% of whom were in sub-Saharan Africa. The risk of maternal mortality for an adult woman in this region was the highest in the world, with a probability of 1 in 36, against 1 in 4,900 in developed countries (WHO et al. 2015: 16).

In 1990, maternal mortality in Burundi and Rwanda was higher than the sub-Saharan African average (WHO et al. 2015: 68-77). After the civil war and the genocide, both countries made significant efforts towards promoting safe motherhood. From 2000, Rwanda experienced the most rapid decreases in the world in maternal mortality, becoming in 2015 one of the rare countries to achieve the MDG 5 (WHO & UNICEF: 2015). Progress in Burundi was also significant albeit slower than in Rwanda and less systematic. The Burundian and Rwandan states had both been effective in promoting access to care for pregnant women. However, Burundi was less effective in promoting family planning and community-based care and sensitisation.

This chapter begins with an introduction to the notion of maternal mortality, and discusses the data available and the strategy used to compare Burundi and Rwanda. The chapter then turns its attention to the main empirical materials, first exploring financial and geographical access to healthcare for pregnant women, then the importance of community-based interventions, and finally the family planning efforts in each country. The conclusion discusses the main factors behind reducing maternal mortality in Burundi and Rwanda.

4.1 Maternal mortality: concepts and challenges

Maternal mortality: definition and measurement

Maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy, but not from accidental or incidental causes (WHO 2010: 156). Maternal deaths are usually categorised according to their causes. Direct maternal deaths result from obstetric causes. The main direct causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa are haemorrhage (34%), infection (10%), hypertensive disorder (9%) and obstructed labour (4%). Indirect causes result from previously existing disease, or disease developed during pregnancy (but not from obstetric causes). They include for example HIV/Aids, anaemia and malaria, and represent 26.6% of the maternal deaths in the region (Khan et al. 2006).

The most commonly used indicator to measure maternal mortality is the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR). It represents the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births during a given time period. Consequently, it does not capture the risk associated with stillbirth or abortion.⁵⁰ Because it requires measuring the number of deaths of pregnant women and correctly classifying their causes, “maternal mortality is one of the most difficult indicators to measure reliably” (WHO et al 2012: 3), especially in developing countries. There are two main ways of measuring maternal mortality (Graham et al. 2008). The first is empirical, and can rely on death registration, population survey, household census, or health facility statistics. The second is analytical and relies on statistical models. In developing countries, given the poor state of civil registration and health information systems, statistical models or household surveys financed by donors, such as the Demographic Household Survey (DHS) are commonly used. These are the two main sources of information in Burundi and Rwanda.

Yet, these methods suffer from a series of limitations. Household surveys can be poorly implemented, or poorly sampled (AbouZahr 2011). They often have a large margin of error because their sample is often small for an event such as maternal death (Stanton, et al. 1997: 43-44). The reliability of statistical models is limited because they are based on a series of empirical variables with large margins of error such as Gross National Income (GNI), fertility rate, or adjusted household survey data, which are also an imperfect proxy for maternal

⁵⁰ It can be captured through another indicator, the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMRate), which represents the number of maternal deaths per 1000 women of reproductive age (15-49 years) in a given period.

mortality (AbouZahr 2011). Discrepancies between the two methods can therefore be important, as demonstrated by the case of Burundi.

Comparison strategy

As shown in Table 4.1 below, there is no agreement on the level of maternal mortality in Burundi and Rwanda. Yet, the data show a consistent trend in the case of Rwanda: a dramatic decrease in maternal mortality since the genocide. The case of Burundi is equivocal. The statistical estimates of the UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group (MMEIG)⁵¹ and of Hill et al. (2007), as well as empirical measures from the national survey in Burundi (Ministère de l'intérieur 2011: 54) point to poor performance. However, the 2010 DHS and the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) statistical model both indicate a performance comparable to Rwanda in 2005 and 2010.

Table 4.1 Various estimates of maternal mortality ratios for Burundi and Rwanda

	UN MMEIG		DHS		IHME		Nat. survey	Hill et al.
	Burundi	Rwanda	Burundi	Rwanda	Burundi	Rwanda	Burundi	Burundi
1990	1300	1400			757.1	656.1		
1995	1300	1400						
2000	1000	1000		1071				
2003					712.3	612.6		
2005	910	610		750				1100
2008				750			866	
2010			500	487				
2013	740	320			370.8	291		
2015	712	290		210				

Source: WHO et al. (2014), DHS different years (2015 refers to the 2014-2015 DHS), Kassebaum et al. (2014), Ministère de l'Intérieur (2011), Hill et al. (2007).

None of the interviewees were able to explain such discrepancies. Given the inconsistency of the data on Burundi regarding MMR, this chapter evaluates state effectiveness based on intermediate factors impacting maternal mortality.

The role of the state in reducing maternal mortality

The public health literature is relatively consensual with regard to the set of immediate interventions in the health sector to reduce maternal mortality. This section identifies these key interventions, which will then guide the analysis of Burundian and Rwandan policies.

⁵¹ These estimates are used to measure MDG 5.

First of all, ensuring skilled attendants at births is maybe “the single most critical intervention for safe motherhood” (Starrs 1997: 29; see also Alvarez et al 2009). For this reason, this was the only process indicator used to track MDG 5 (UNDG 2003: 33) because, since maternal deaths predominantly occur during labour or 48 hours after delivery, having skilled personnel in attendance can dramatically increase the chance of survival.

Second, emergency obstetric care (EmOC) is key in improving safe motherhood (e.g. Paxton et al. 2004). EmOC is a package of interventions developed to treat the main direct obstetric complications. Access to EmOC is all the more important because obstetric complications are often sudden and unpredictable (WHO 2005: 62). Access to EmOC, as well as delivery by skilled attendants, are directly related to delivery in health facilities in Burundi and Rwanda since no programmes of midwife-assisted delivery at home exist.

Third, family planning is crucial for reducing maternal deaths. The influence of family planning on maternal mortality is twofold. A decrease in the absolute number of births mechanically reduces the absolute number of maternal deaths. In addition, family planning reduces risk factors such as small intervals between births, high numbers of pregnancies, and abortion (e.g. Marston & Cleland 2004; Stover & Ross 2010).⁵²

Fourth, antenatal care (ANC) is generally deemed important for safe motherhood (e.g. Alvarez et al. 2009), even though there is no consensus on this (McDonagh 1996; Bulatao & Ross 2003). It seems that the limited effects of ANC observed in some settings are related to the quality of ANC (Campbell & Graham 2006: 1295). Yet WHO recommends at least four ANC visits. These generally consist of visits to health facilities that aim at identifying pregnancy related complications, advising and educating women notably about the importance of skilled attendance delivery, and possibly providing preventive and curative services.

General overview of the maternal health in Burundi and Rwanda

In 2010, the year for which the most recent data for Burundi can be obtained, the DHS painted a picture of close performance of Burundi and Rwanda in promoting antenatal care visits and the utilisation of health facilities for delivery for the period 2005-2010.⁵³ Rwanda was

⁵² Abortions are illegal in Burundi and Rwanda, which increases the risk of maternal mortality as women generally do not go to a health facility to terminate their pregnancy. Death related to illegal abortion are difficult to observe and capture in an indicator.

⁵³ DHS indicators related to pregnancy are generally reported for the five years preceding the survey.

however more effective in reducing fertility (Table 4.2). The 2014-15 DHS also revealed that the country had made steady progress.

Table 4.2 Maternal health indicators in Burundi and Rwanda

	Burundi 2010	Rwanda 2010	Rwanda 2014-15
% birth at health facility*	59.5	68.9	90.7
% birth with skilled attendants*	60.3	69	90.7
Women attending at least one ANC visit*	98.7	98	99
Women attending the four ANC visits*	33.4	35.4	43.9
Total fertility rate (TFR) ⁵⁴	6.4	4.6	4.2
Modern contraceptive prevalence (%)	17.7	45.1	48

*Source: Rwanda and Burundi 2010 DHS, Rwanda 2014-15 DHS. *: Indicators reported by women for the five years preceding the survey.*

Reducing maternal mortality was presented as a top priority in Burundi as in Rwanda. In Burundi, maternal health was mentioned in vision 2025 (MPDC & UNDP 2011) and constituted the object of one of Pierre Nkurunziza's first major political decisions as President: free child delivery in health facilities.⁵⁵ In Rwanda, safe motherhood was an objective clearly spelled out in vision 2020 (RoR 2000: 14) with a target for MMR of 200 by 2020. In both countries, a target of four ANC visits was set in accordance with WHO regulations. Both aimed for delivery at a health facility. Pregnant women were to officially follow the referral system. Along with delivery, all health checks were to occur at health centres (except if the women lived in the immediate catchment area of a hospital). Only in the case of complications could they be referred to a hospital. ANC visits and family planning were free in both countries.

Both countries rolled out a performance-based financing model (PBF) that incentivised health staff to provide quality health services. PBF was uniformly recognised as the backbone of the health system, and as a major driver for improving maternal health (e.g. Interviews 12, 22, 123, 193; see also Bucagu et al. 2012). Following an output-financing model, reimbursement for each medical act is be paid to the health facility retrospectively, linking strong funding with productivity. In addition to this quantitative aspect, a qualitative evaluation was conducted every quarter. Health workers received a bonus on top of their salary depending on the evaluation. The PBF system was quite similar in both countries. It was introduced by pilot programmes from the same NGO, CORDAID, and Rwanda's success facilitated the advocacy

⁵⁴ The TFR represents the number of children that a woman would have during her reproductive age (15-49), bearing children in accordance with a age-specific fertility rates observed in a given year.

⁵⁵ It also includes free curative care for children under 5.

and acceptance of the system in Burundi (Interviews 137, 193). Implemented countrywide in 2010 in Burundi and in 2008 in Rwanda, a large number of the PBF quantitative and qualitative indicators were devoted to maternal health (Basinga et al. 2011. MSPLS 2011a).

The following sections compare the main state strategies to reduce maternal deaths: improving financial and geographical access to health care, ensuring the provision of family planning services, and developing community-level care and sensitisation.

4.2 Improving financial access to health care for pregnant women

Burundi, like Rwanda, was effective in lowering the financial barriers to health care for pregnant women. By increasing delivery at health facilities with skilled attendants, better financial accessibility played a pivotal role in improving maternal health. However, Burundi and Rwanda adopted contrasting strategies. Whereas Burundi chose a free-care policy for pregnant women (and children under 5), Rwanda promoted compulsory health insurance enrolment.

Burundi

At the end of the war, financial access to care for pregnant women was extremely difficult in Burundi. The system relied on a user-fee system, although the country still nominally had a national health insurance system (the Carte d'Assistance Maladie, or CAM). Created in 1984, this system had completely failed by the end of the war. As a consequence, out-of-pocket expenditure was extremely high (Meessen et al. 2011: ii18). Patients unable to pay their hospital bills were regularly detained by hospital staff. This practice dated back to the 1990s but increased dramatically after the war given the general poverty of the population and the failure of the CAM (Kippenberg et al. 2008: 20). The most common cases of detainees were women not able to pay for obstetric care such as C-sections (ibid: 17).

The President's decision of the 1st of May 2006 to provide free healthcare for women giving birth (and children under 5) was probably the single most significant contributor to the improvement of maternal health in Burundi (Interviews 124, 133). The exact origins of the decision to implement *la gratuité* (free healthcare) are unclear. It emanated directly from President Nkurunziza himself, with no consultation or planning. The issue of patient detention may have played a role in the decision (Kippenberg et al. 2008: 19) although this is not certain (Interview 193). One year after the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, this flagship measure aimed to reinforce the image of the CNDD-FDD as a party close to the poor. As summarised by a


former hill chief, “the government carried out a great publicity stunt with the *gratuité*” (Interview 229) while, according to a MoH official, “the *gratuité*, it is a political stock in trade [*fond de commerce*] for the government” (Interview 228, Travagianti 2014: 17-18).

The suddenness of the decision along with the lack of planning and consultation were remarkable. The policy was “formulated in a hasty and incomplete way with little attention to the ultimate objectives [...] the existing situation [...] and the available finance resources” (Nimpagaritse & Bertone 2011: ii64). Some directors of health facilities discovered the measures while listening to the 1st of May Presidential speech on the radio (Interview 178). “It felt like the sky had fallen on us” (Interview 189). At a local level, the lack of preparation created many problems. As recalled by a hospital director, when it was announced, “at 2pm we were submerged. For a week, we had to work non-stop. We did not have enough beds so some women had to deliver on the floor” (Interview 178). The dramatic increase in demand quickly created drug stock outs across the country. Many women, although eligible for free healthcare, had to buy drugs from private pharmacies (Interview 123). Hospitals and health centres were supposed to fill-out about 2500 pages of forms each month in order to be reimbursed by the central level. Reimbursement delays were as long as nine months in 2006, and were still three months in 2009 (Interview 123). In addition, until the scale-up of the PBF in 2010, no real control over invoicing existed, which led to general overbilling. Unsurprisingly, among the six sub-Saharan African countries that abolished user-fees completely or for a significant package of curative services between 2001 and 2010, Burundi appeared to be the worst in terms of the formulation and implementation of the policies (Meessen et al. 2011).

The financial shock of the *gratuité* was absorbed first through the increase in the health budget with a special subsidy for the *gratuité* (ObAG 2009) and later thanks to the rollout of the donor-backed PBF. Free medical services for pregnant women, because they were included as indicators in the PBF, were automatically paid (Interview 137). In addition, the PBF system, with its strong procedure of bill crosschecking, dramatically reduced overbilling. The financial incentives provided to health professionals also increased the quality of care for pregnant women that had dropped after 2006 (Interviews 123, 124 179). In short, although the sustainability of the *gratuité* was doubtful at first, it was to a large extent “saved” by the rollout of the PBF.

The *gratuité* dramatically improved utilisation of health facilities by women delivering. As shown by Figure 4.1, delivery at a health facility jumped from 22.9% just before the reform in 2005, to 64.4% in 2010.

Figure 4.1 Evolution of the proportion of deliveries at health facility in Burundi



Source: PNSR via RdB/UNDP 2013. The 2010 DHS also gives a 59.5% of birth in health facility in 2010.

Nonetheless, some detrimental effects of the free healthcare for pregnant women on the health system were long lasting. First, it widened the budget deficit of hospitals, which was already abysmal by 2014. For example, the compensation of the PBF for a C-section was significantly below the actual cost (Interviews 178, 215).⁵⁶ Secondly, pregnant women showed no indication of being bound to the Burundian referral system. They could directly access hospitals without being referred by a health centre first, thus worsening hospitals' deficit and workload (Interviews 215, 223, 228). Although the referral system appeared to be enforced for other patients in Burundi following the introduction of the PBF (Interview 178), pregnant women benefitted from leniency. In a hospital visited in the centre of the country, about 40% of the pregnant women had never been referred by the health centre (Interview 216). This advantage was apparently understood by the population as naturally included in the *gratuité* and remained unaddressed for political reasons (Interviews 223, 228, 237).

The contribution of the *gratuité* to improving maternal health was evident and was needed given the problem of patient detention and low utilisation of health facilities. The commitment of the leadership behind the policy was undeniable, since it emanated from the President himself, and was quickly translated into an increase in the Ministry of Health budget. In March

⁵⁶ In 2014, a C-Section was paid 120,000 BiF (about 120\$) in hospital by the PBF, whereas its real cost was estimated to be double (Interviews 214, 237).

2010, the free package of services was extended to all pathologies related to pregnancy from the first month of conception.

Rwanda

Despite its commitment to increase financial access to healthcare, the Rwandan government insisted that people must contribute to health expenses. It relied on community based health insurance (CBHI) schemes, also called *mutuelles*, to decrease financial barriers and increase health facility utilisation. The CBHI relied on individuals paying an annual subscription fee that allowed them to access a wide range of medical services, paying only a small user-fee of 10% of the total cost or nothing if they were categorised as indigent. This was a substantial driver in ensuring that pregnant women delivered at health facilities and benefited from emergency obstetric care (Interviews 3, 9, 16).


After the genocide and until 1996, health-care was free in Rwanda. This was an emergency measure to increase utilisation rates. Furthermore, given the poor state of the national health system and the high number of NGOs providing healthcare in parallel, free healthcare appeared then to be a logical decision (Interviews 15, 273). The progressive reintroduction of user-fees in 1997 because of budgetary constraints resulted in a drop in the utilisation of health facilities (Figure 4.4; Interviews 21, 22). Furthermore, external assistance to the health sector was also progressively decreasing as the emergency period in Rwanda was coming to an end. This spurred the MoH in 1998 to ask USAID for help to improve financial access to healthcare through health insurance (Interview 303). USAID readily agreed since this request fitted with their existing global Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR) project, a global five-year project that began in October 1995 to support health sector reform and notably cost recovery and health insurance globally. A pilot was designed and launched in 1999.

Following the good results of the pilot, the government put in place a steering committee in 2003 charged with increasing the number of CBHIs. The provincial governors and district mayors received instructions to create *mutuelles* “as quickly as possible” and were told that “the creation of the *mutuelles* will be a criteria in their future evaluation” (Musango et al. 2009: 6).⁵⁷ In the formal sector, the government instituted the RAMA (*Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie*), a compulsory health insurance scheme for civil servants in 2001, and the MMI (Medical Military Insurance), its equivalent for the military, in 2006.

⁵⁷Author’s translation from the French.

CBHI schemes developed rapidly. There were 54 in 2000, 88 in 2003, 354 in 2005, (Musango et al. 2009: 54; Soors et al. 2010: 42) and approximately 465 (one per health centre) by 2013. Their population coverage rate increased accordingly in this period and the trend of decreasing utilisation of health facilities was reversed (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Proportion of population covered by health insurance and health facility utilisation in Rwanda




Source: compilation from Ministry of Health data. For health insurance enrolment from 2011 on, the years are fiscal and not calendar years (e.g. 2011 is 2011/2012). The cause of the decrease in 2012 is addressed at the end of this section.

Unsurprisingly, “birth at health facilities” and “with a skilled attendant” followed a similar trend (Figure 4.3). In parallel, the CBHI attracted the attention of the top leadership. Presidential advisors regularly consulted the MoH to enquire about the latest developments of the scheme (Interview 304). It became a national priority: CBHI was integrated into the 2002 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and was mentioned in the RPF programme for the 2003 presidential elections (Interview 294).

Nonetheless, the CBHI schemes remained a collection of patchy interventions initiated by different actors (churches, local governments and opinion leaders) with variations in the organisation, the care package and the amount of the subscription and user fees. Interventions at hospitals were not covered (MoH 2004: 7). Recognising both the good results of the CBHI and their limits, the government laid out a series of principles in the 2004 *Mutuelles Development Policy* (MoH 2004). Subscriptions were standardised at 1,000 RwF per person, although some donors argued that this was too high (Interviews 250, 253, 290). At this rate,

however, relying only on population contributions was not sustainable. Furthermore, the scheme remained unaffordable for the poorest, which decreased equity and limited its expansion. Consequently, the 2004 policy stated that “a national solidarity mechanism between the formal public and private salaried sector and the rural world should be put in place” (MoH 2004: 17, author’s translation from the French). The policy also recognised the need for the government to support the CBHI schemes financially and to subsidise them for the poorest.

Figure 4.3 Proportion of delivery at health facility and with skilled attendants in Rwanda



Source: DHS, different years. Indicators are as reported five years preceding the survey.

These commitments, which were apparently difficult to implement in the short term given their cost, materialised in 2006 thanks to funding from the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). In 2005, the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) team for GFATM-funded projects in the MoH, composed of MoH and donor staff, submitted an innovative application to a new kind of GFATM call for proposals. Instead of asking for funding for vertical interventions on particular diseases, the CCM successfully applied for funds to subsidise the CBHI for the poorest through a “Health System Strengthening” project. This became at the time one of only three ‘Health System Strengthening’ projects ever approved by GFATM (Kalk et al. 2010). In January 2006, \$34 million were made available to the CBHI for the next five years (ibid.). The Global Fund accepted this unconventional project because the CCM argued convincingly that to effectively fight the diseases that GFATM focuses on (HIV, tuberculosis and malaria), financial access to health care for the poorest had to be improved (Interviews 250, 290).

In 2006, the Rwandan government took the bold decision to make health insurance enrolment mandatory through a ministerial decree. This was subsequently enshrined in the 2007 CBHI law that states that “every person who resides in Rwanda shall be obliged to join the mutual health insurance scheme.”⁵⁸ The need to justify local officials’ heavy-handed practices of boosting enrolment apparently explains why the mandatory nature of the CBHI was specified in a ministerial order instead of waiting for the law to be passed (Interview 304). Many donors were against compulsory enrolment, which they considered to be too authoritarian (Interviews 107, 250, 290, 291). Yet, the MoH did not change its position.

Mandatory financial participation was not only a policy choice but also a matter of principle. For example, even when a donor could pay for the whole population in a given region, the MoH refused. As explained the Minister of Health of the time, Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo:

If someone did not follow my guidelines, they could leave with their money. It happened with MSF Belgium who was operating in the North, in Burera, where they wanted to pay the *mutuelles* to everyone. I told them that [this] was strange, since all these people were not indigent. One has to pay only for the people in need. It became a big deal [...] I told them they should not take our people hostage, not get them used to being fed, and when they are going to leave, they will let them with nothing (Interview 107).

More generally, donors regularly put the question of lifting user-fees—partially or totally—back on the table, invoking notably the examples of Ghana and Uganda (Interviews 103, 254, 290). By the time of the CBHI scale-up, the global ideological context regarding user-fees had changed. Lifting them became *en vogue* in the wake of the poverty-reduction strategies in the mid-2000s (Ridde et al. 2010, Interviews 104, 304). The Rwandan government categorically refused to consider lifting user-fees partially or totally because it thought that this would increase a hand-out mentality among the population, prove unsustainable and support dependency on foreign aid in the long term (Interview 104). As stated by Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo (Interview 107):

My approach was to say that I don’t want anything for free [...] if there is always somebody to give me things for free, at any time this person can decide to stop. If he/she stops, what happens to me? [...] To me and my government, it is about taking our responsibilities: not always await that you give me something and I take it. Because then, if you don’t give me something, I still need to eat right? That is why we chose the *mutuelles*.

⁵⁸ Article 33, law N° 62/2007 of 30/12/2007. In practice, subscribing to any health insurance was compulsory, not necessarily the CBHI.

The refusal to lift user-fees and the decision to make enrolment mandatory had clear roots in the RPF ideology of *kwigira*, relying only on oneself. As stated by Joseph Karemera, senior RPF member and former minister of health, the RPF “doesn’t believe in people being only recipients” because “free things destroy the mentality of the people” (Interview 261, see also 263, 273). For this reason, the former Minister of Local Government Protais Musoni explained, “free [health]care has never been an option because it makes people subservient.” (Interview 275).


The CBHI suffered a series of problems as they developed, which repeatedly received quick responses over time, as summarised in Figure 4.4. After the 2007 law, the CBHI deficit was under control at district level, but alarming at hospital level (WHO 2009: 71; OAG 2011). Moreover, the scheme’s fairness was questionable. The flat rate premium of 1,000RwF per individual, regardless of their wealth, was a heavy burden for the poorest not classified as “indigent” and thus eligible for subsidised enrolment (WHO 2009: 67). As a consequence, the MoH adopted the principle of stratification of premiums according to beneficiaries’ wealth in the 2010 CBHI policy, implemented in 2011, to make CBHI subscription progressive while maximising resource mobilisation. The MoH decided to rely on a wealth classification exercise regularly carried out since 2001 for the *ubudehe* programme. *Ubudehe* was a social protection programme under the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government, which involved the classification by the community of households according to their wealth, in order to differentiate social interventions. The MoH harnessed this initiative to modulate the enrolment fees of the *mutuelles*. The *Ubudehe* classification was redone in 2011 for the CBHI premium stratification. As a result, 24.8% of the population was classified as indigent (category 1); their *mutuelles* fees of 2000 RwF would be paid by the state and donors. People in category 2 (65.9%) paid 3000 RwF/person, and the richer people in category 3 (0.64%) paid 7000 RwF/person.⁵⁹

The accuracy of this classification process was however doubtful, as evidence indicated that it was neither participatory nor transparent (Gaynor 2014a: S53-54; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015). Especially worrying was the total absence of correspondence between households’ categorisation in *ubudehe* and the results of the Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 3 (EICV 3), which measured household consumption (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2015). This raises serious issues about the *ubudehe* classification. It might also have been an indication that local authorities could decide arbitrarily who received the CBHI subscription for free, along with many other benefits associated with the lowest *ubudehe* category. Yet,

⁵⁹ In addition, subscribers to RAMA, MMI and other private insurance represented 4.7% of the total population.

while elite capture might have occurred at the local level, there was no evidence that it was the result of a systematic, centrally devised strategy of patronage. The central government recognised the problem publicly during the 2014 Leadership Retreat, which resulted in pressure on MINALOC to devise a new classification for ubudehe. This was however done in a hasty manner. The rollout of the new classification was decided before the results of the pilots were known, and without consultation with donors (*Lavers forthcoming*), which cast doubt on the usefulness of the revised classification exercise.

Figure 4.4 The challenges and adjustments of the CBHI system in Rwanda



Source: author's compilation

Ultimately, three main factors account for the rapid expansion of the CBHI in Rwanda. First, it was the result of a systematic and enduring commitment from the Rwandan central government. This was visible in the pressure put on local officials to increase enrolment rates (see also Chapter 5). The commitment was also conspicuous in the constant adaptation of the CBHI schemes: the development of the *mutuelles* was a dense iteration process that readily addressed problems as they emerged. One of the clearest illustrations was that the decrease in the enrolment of CBHI in 2013/2014 prompted the cabinet itself to order an enquiry as early

as April 2014.⁶⁰ Secondly, the expansion of the CBHI benefited greatly from the decision to make it compulsory for the entire Rwandan population. It was not a mere declaration of intent as in Ghana (Witter & Garshong 2009; Jehu-Appiah 2011: 158), the only other African country to have made such a choice. Thirdly, concerns regarding financial sustainability permeated the CBHI policy choices. The government also did not hesitate to contribute to the financing of the CBHI, something viewed as potential best practice for the success of the CBHI in other African countries given their financial difficulties (De Allegri et al. 2009; Soors et al. 2010; Appiah 2012). Overall, this contributed to making Rwanda the country with the highest enrolment in CBHI in Africa (Soors et al. 2010; Lagomarsino et al. 2012).

4.3 Ensuring geographical access to health facilities

Burundi

The effectiveness of Burundi in ensuring access to health facilities for women in labour was guaranteed by its impressive number of health centres. Despite a smaller population, Burundi had 73 hospitals and 955 health centres, dispensaries and private clinics against respectively 47 and 682 in Rwanda (ISTEEBU 2016: 112; MoH 2015: 2). Furthermore, the rate of construction of state-run health centres in Burundi was double that in Rwanda between 2008 and 2014, although their number was already higher in 2008 in Burundi than in Rwanda.⁶¹

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that health centre construction was a top political priority for the Burundian government. It was a key measure to accompany the CNDD-FDD flagship policy of *gratuité* for pregnant women and children under 5. The crucial political character of health centre construction was visible in three ways. First, although communal administrators' responsibilities were limited and little evaluated (see Chapter 5), the construction of health centres was one of the few tasks pushed for and closely monitored by the government and the CNDD-FDD locally (Interviews 207, 210). Second, health centres was one of the few regular

⁶⁰ See also The New Times, "Mutuelle de Santé: What is behind falling subscriptions?", 31/07/14. Although the causes of the decline were not clear, several factors have been raised in interviews to explain this worrying trend. Mobilisation effort might also have been lower than before partly due to the priority given to local economic development as part of the Second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2) adopted in 2013. Without continuous efforts from local officials to ensure yearly renewal of mutuelles subscriptions, the high level of CBHI premiums and the insufficient quality of healthcare hindered spontaneous high voluntary enrolment. Enrolment numbers were inflated by some local officials, as uncovered by an audit (see "How probe uncovered the rot in 'Mutuelle de Santé'", The New Times, 03/02/15.). The number remained fairly reliable; for example, enrolment was officially 86% in 2009-2010 according to MoH, and 78% according to the DHS.

⁶¹ Source: Calculated from Rwandan MoH, and ISTEEBU (2016: 112). The data on Rwandan health centres also include those run by faith-based organisations and private actors. Yet their proportion is constant, around 20%, which makes possible to estimate the evolution of the construction of state-owned health centres over time (cf. MoH 2012b; 2013a; 2014; 2015, "health sector resources" section).

development activities performed during community work (*travaux communautaires*) organised each Saturday by CNDD-FDD members in Burundi.⁶² Third, health centre construction was partly supported by a particular budget line that the Presidency called “support to good initiatives.” Created a year before the 2010 elections, the fund was “used for populist purposes in the countryside” (Interview 238). It was financed by the state budget but also from other sources such as illegal taxation⁶³ and was used at the President’s only discretion with no control over its management. It played a significant role in the construction of health centres (Interviews 123, 229), but also served as a financial reserve for the CNDD-FDD, or could even be used for personal purposes by the president or party-members.⁶⁴

The political character of health centre construction had an impact on their distribution. In theory, local government decided on the construction sites in agreement with the MoH’s health provincial bureaus (BPS) (Interviews 207, 236). However, individuals’ political concerns and electoral logic rather than systematic planning often determined health centre construction and location (Interviews 123, 126, 125, 168, 178, 229). As stated by an NGO director: “planning is weak. An official, to be well respected in his region, will construct their health centres [...] the government does not stop such constructions. These constructions are more the results of individuals than of a system” (Interview 125).

In the face of political imperatives, the capacity of the Ministry of Health to properly staff and equip new health centres could have been secondary. As explained by a MoH official:

The planning of health centres construction is a big flaw [*une grosse tare*]. [...] Some just cover no more than 2000 inhabitants because each politician wants his/her health centre. Health centres are too many, they build them but they are not up to standards. But when the politician decides, we have then to provide staff. For the construction of health centre, it is easy for them since they can tap into an off-budget account [the “support to good initiatives” account]. (Interview 123).

Although the level of equipment in health centres progressed (MSPLS et al. 2014), many


⁶² Weekly collective work in Burundi was officially for “development”, as was the monthly *umuganda* in Rwanda. However, the two differed in many ways. *Umuganda* in Rwanda concerned only with development activities (terracing, school and health centre construction etc.). They were legally regulated and organised by MINALOC. It was also the occasion to diffuse after work messages centrally devised by different ministries. Its attendance was monitored. In contrast, collective works in Burundi were mainly organised and attended by CNDD-FDD party members. Development activities might have occurred, but a large place was devoted to sports as well and political mobilisation.

⁶³ “Communiqué de l’Oluome sur la mauvaise gestion des catastrophes et des fonds”, 14/02/14, available at http://www.liberationafrique.org/imprimersans.php3?id_article=3015&nom_site=Lib%E9ration%20Afrique&url_site=http://www.liberationafrique.org (accessed 11/09/14). Le Figaro “Burundi: malversations présumées”, 28/12/09.

⁶⁴ According to the 2013 budget law, the “support for good initiatives represented, 2,500 million of BiF (\$1.64 million) (law 1/35 of 31/12/2012).

health centres in Burundi were under-staffed and under equipped. In 2013, 23% of health centres did not have an A2 nurse,⁶⁵ the minimum required by the national guidelines. A fifth could not offer antenatal consultations and services related to child delivery (MSPLS et al. 2014: 102-106). Given their huge deficit,⁶⁶ hospitals in Burundi could not buy equipment or maintain their facilities (Interviews 178, 215). Obviously, general financial difficulties were a major cause of such problems. However, an analysis of the MoH budget reveals that, even with limited resources, spending on construction was prioritised over rehabilitation and equipment (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Proportion of MoH budget dedicated to construction and rehabilitation/e quipment of health facilities in Burundi.




Source: Burundian MoH.

Consequently, the apparent effectiveness of the Burundian state in guaranteeing access to health facilities was limited by the quality of care received in those facilities. Besides anecdotal observations during the fieldwork, a striking illustration of the differences in the quality of care between Burundi and Rwanda lies in the content of ANC visits in each country. Behind a comparable proportion of women making ANC visits, the difference in the quality of care received was striking as shown by Figure 4.6.

⁶⁵ An A2 nurse has four years of secondary school training.

⁶⁶ The main reasons for hospital deficit in Burundi is that they received a financial block grant from the MoH too low, barely enough to pay salaries. The PBF indicators are also underfinanced. In addition, the police and military hardly ever pay their fees in hospitals (Interviews 178, 215, 237).

Figure 4.6 Content of ANC visits in Burundi and Rwanda (2007-2010)



Source: DHS2010. The two other indicators included in the Rwandan DHS (height and weight measurement) were not available for Burundi.

The poor construction planning and poor equipment of health centres were confirmed by the fact that, although the number of health facilities was a third higher in Burundi than in Rwanda for a smaller population, 52% of women in Burundi reported that the distance to a health facility was a problem in accessing healthcare, against only 26% in Rwanda, according to the 2010 DHS. This indicator, however telling, may also reflect a difference in road quality or popular perception between Burundi and Rwanda.

Rwanda

Although the number of health centres was smaller in Rwanda, their allocation was mainly done through a technocratic process. Following decentralisation, the responsibility for construction fell to local governments as in Burundi. The MoH monitored health centre allocation when each district submitted an infrastructure plan during the planning and budgeting meetings between district governments and the central government each year. A cast iron rule was that each sector should have at least a health centre (Interviews 69, 74). Even a promise from the president apparently had to comply with technical concerns. During the presidential campaign of 2010, Paul Kagame promised a new hospital in Gicumbi district. However, when the MoH reviewed the project, it appears that the lack of a hospital was not the issue. The problem was that the maternity services of the local health centre could not cope with the number of pregnant women. The project of hospital construction was cancelled, and the maternity ward of the existing health centre was expanded instead (Interview 74). Overall, the transparency of health facility construction was ensured by the publication of a list of constructions completed and underway each year in the MoH annual report. The rational allocation of health facilities was in addition enhanced by the strong enforcement of the referral system in Rwanda, including for pregnant women. In a hospital visited outside Kigali,

the staff did not hesitate to send back a woman referred to them because her case was deemed manageable by the health centre.

4.4 Developing community healthcare and sensitisation

The importance of community-based interventions in maternal health constitutes a major difference between Burundi and Rwanda. Whereas Burundi made limited use of CHWs, Rwanda relied extensively on community health workers (CHWs) to bring health services and sensitisation to pregnant women's doors, and detect non-compliant behaviour.

Burundi

The role of CHWs in maternal health was not spontaneously mentioned in any of the interviews in Burundi. The use of CHWs started in Burundi around 1985 (Interview 193). In 2002, the MoH National Programme for Reproductive Health (PNSR) trained and paid its own CHWs dedicated to reproductive health (HSD Consult 2011: 12), but the system was quickly disorganised by the war. Key health strategic documents such as the National Health Plan 2005-2015 (RdB 2004) or the Health Development National Plan 2011-2015 (MSPLS 2011b) barely mention the role of CHWs. In 2013, the 8,600 CHWs were underutilised (Interview 133). Their activities were not the result of an integrated state policy, but the consequence of patchy interventions by no less than 26 different NGOs (as of 2011) and vertical programmes of the Ministry of Health (Interview 136, HSD Consult 2011). Their incentives, training, packages of care and supervision differed according to their employer. Because CHWs received financial incentives or incentives in kind, clientelism played a major role in CHWs recruitment in the context of the heavy politicisation of the local state (see Chapter 6). The CNDD-FDD regularly tried to get its party members hired as CHWs (Interview 179), which may have affected CHW efficiency. As summarised by a UNICEF report, "there seems to be favouritism [in CHW recruitment] for the people close to local administrative authorities [...] This situation may negatively influence the credibility of CHWs in the eyes of the population" (HSD Consult 2011: 24).⁶⁷

Inspired by the Rwandan example, in 2014 Burundi was developing a health policy for community health workers (Interviews 133, 136). In 2012, two documents offered broad recommendations regarding the role of CHWs (MSPLS 2012a; 2012b). By 2014, it seemed likely that CHWs would soon play a bigger role in Burundi. However, a lack of discipline and

⁶⁷ Author's translation from the French.

clientelism in the local administration, along with the weakness of the supervision in the health sector, may render this development difficult (see Chapter 5).

Rwanda

In Rwanda, CHWs were often mentioned as a key driver in reducing maternal mortality (e.g. Interviews 3, 9, 12, 13, 40). The health sector was supported by three CHWs in each of the 14,744 villages (*umudugudu*), i.e. by about 45,000 CHWs nationwide. Among the three CHWs, one was dedicated in particular to maternal and newborn health. Called an *Animatrice de Santé Maternelle* (ASM—Maternal Health Facilitator), she was necessarily a woman. Her role was not only sensitisation but also provision of services and drugs. ASMs also provided contraceptives and even misoprostol, an oral drug that helps to prevent post-partum haemorrhage if a woman delivers at home (Table 4.3). In 2014, the MoH considered to differentiate the care package of Community Health Workers (CHWs) depending on whether they were in urban or rural settings. The minister however refused as she feared that such a measure could be interpreted as introducing an urban bias (Interview 110).

Table 4.3 Role of ASMs in Rwanda

Period	Identification & Sensitisation	Services
Before pregnancy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and register all women of reproductive age • Sensitisation on family planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of contraceptives
Pregnancy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify pregnant women in the community • Pay three visits for sensitising on ANC and delivery at health facility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of mosquito nets • Accompany the women to health facility for ANC
Around delivery		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accompany the women in labour to health facility for delivery • Provision of misoprostol for post-partum haemorrhage in case of delivery at home
After delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay three visits (five if low birth weight) to identify post-partum dangers and check on the newborn's health • Encourage post-natal checks at health facility • Can refer women to health facility in case of problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of mosquito nets • Provision of contraceptives

Because they were from the village where they worked, the ASM were very efficient in identifying pregnant women, monitoring them and detecting non-compliant behaviour. They acted as a constant reminder to the women to deliver at health facilities and to perform the antenatal care visits. This latter aspect was seen as especially important for cultural reasons.

In Rwanda as in Burundi, a pregnant woman will not say that she is pregnant before it becomes physically visible because it is thought to attract bad luck and spells. This explains the difficulty in both countries in ensuring four ANC visits, as women declare themselves pregnant late (Interviews 72, 216). The role of ASMs was consequently crucial for the effectiveness of the state in promoting maternal health not only by delivering services locally, but more generally as a way of increasing the state infrastructural power by penetrating communities. This was well illustrated by a district government health director: “What we say in the community is that a pregnancy is the problem of everyone. We tell the ASM that she must be let into the secrets [*être dans la confiance*], create friendship with women, and know how to detect pregnancies” (Interview 72).

As with other CHWs, ASMs were elected at the *umudugudu* level, under the supervision of one or several staff from the health centre. The only criteria the population was asked to take into account during the election was for the ASM to be a literate woman between 20 and 50 years old, with a good reputation and time on her hands. Normally, new CHWs received a week of training at the sector level, and additional training when health policies changed. CHW supervision was effective largely thanks to decentralisation: CHWs were embedded in a dense apparatus of supervision and monitoring blending community representative, health staff and local government (see also Chambers & Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Each CHW was in theory visited once a month by the elected CHW leader at cell-level and by a member of Health Centre staff quarterly. In addition, CHWs attended a meeting in the health centre twice a year to report problems and discuss the health situation of the sector (MoH 2007).

Unlike in Burundi, all CHWs in Rwanda had to provide a standardised package of care and follow national regulations, even when they were supported by NGOs. Their incentives may however differ. While NGOs could pay their CHWs, the MoH refused the idea of putting CHWs on the payroll nationwide, even though the idea was pushed by some NGOs, notably Partners in Health (Interviews 13, 96). As for the refusal of free healthcare, the concern with long-term financial sustainability explained this choice (Interview 13).

Given the voluntary character of their work, where did the incentives of CHWs come from? Even though CHWs were not salaried, they received material and symbolic incentives. Material incentives could be ad-hoc gifts from health centres or NGOs such as boots or umbrellas. They also received significant *per diems* during meetings and training sessions (Interview 44). However, to ensure the motivation of CHWs along with their growing responsibility, they were also integrated into a community PBF. CHWs were remunerated quarterly according to a series of indicators (Table 4.4) evaluated by a steering committee

based at the sector-level. Yet, 70% of the money did not go to individuals but to an income-generating cooperative that the CHWs had to form at sector-level (Interview 37). The goal of the MoH was to promote poverty alleviation more generally instead of just transferring money to individuals (Interview 8). However, problems of mismanagement of funds in cooperatives were not rare, and the effectiveness of the measure was uncertain (Interviews 8, 96). The incentives of CHWs were also symbolic. The training they received, the services they provided and the fact that they were elected gave them a respected status. Some CHWs were called by the population *muganga*, i.e. nurse or doctor in Kinyarwanda (Interview 13).

Table 4.4 Indicators related to maternal health in the CHW-PBF

Quantitative Indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ANC: Number of women accompanied/referred to Health Centre for prenatal care within first four months of pregnancy • Deliveries: Number of women accompanied/referred to HC for assisted deliveries • Family Planning: Number of new users referred by CHWs for modern family planning methods • Family Planning: % of regular users using long term methods (IUD, Norplant, Surgical/NSV contraception)
Qualitative Indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeliness of reporting (40% of budget) • Completeness of reporting (40% of budget) • Accuracy of reporting (20% of budget)

The CHW system was initiated in the 1980s, mainly for vaccination and family planning purposes (Chambers and Golooba-Mutebi 2012: 16). The reactivation of the CHW system occurred very early after the genocide, in 1995. The decision by the government to promote CHWs as early as 1995 as a solution to the dire health conditions in the wake of the genocide: “their role was to evacuate the bodies and prevent cholera” (Interview 8). By 1997, elected CHWs were 12,000 across the country.

From 1995, the MoH increasingly relied on CHWs for a wide variety of tasks (Table 4.5). A USAID-funded study found that in 2013 the workload of CHWs’ was significant, on average 20h a week (MoH & FHI 360: 2013). Many informants questioned the sustainability of such a model if CHWs’ activities keep increasing (Interviews 80, 96). As summarised by a MoH official: “Because we saw that the CHW system was working, we increased their tasks while forgetting their status. [...] We have to keep in mind that they have another job, they are farmers and they do that on top of their job” (Interview 8).

Table 4.5 New responsibilities of CHWs over time

Year	Responsibilities
1995	Sensitisation on hygiene and communicable diseases
1996	Sensitisation on nutrition
2004	Home-based management of malaria
2005	Directly observed treatment of tuberculosis
	Integrated case management for childhood illness (malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia)
2009	Training on community maternal and new-born healthcare Distribution of contraceptives
2011	Infant and young child feeding and Community based nutrition programmes.
2013	Training on non communicable diseases

Ultimately, two main reasons can be identified for the success of the CHW system in Rwanda. First, the supervision of CHWs was effective, and much needed given their tasks, some of which were as complicated as injecting contraceptives. This was mainly due to the effective decentralisation of supervision at the cell, sector and district-levels (see Chapter 5). Second, there was a constant political commitment behind building an effective CHW system. This originated first from the commitment of the new government to show its presence on the ground and tackle the dire health situation after the genocide (Interviews 8, 53). Because it was successful, the CHWs' role was gradually expanded and recognised by the government as the pride of the Rwandan health system. For example, in 2009 CHWs all had to undertake *itorero* training, a civic education course provided by MINALOC. The session was closed by an address by President Kagame himself to CHWs in the *Amahoro* stadium of Kigali. The CHW system was also a success put forward internationally by Rwanda. Paul Kagame was presented as a global champion of community-health in Africa. In January 2013, along with Novartis CEO Joseph Jimenez and Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs, he launched the "1 million community health workers campaign" at the World Economic Forum in Davos, with the aim of increasing the number of CHWs in Africa.

4.5 Promoting family planning


The difference in effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda in the field of maternal health was maybe most visible in family planning. As of 2010, Burundi was the country with the fourth highest fertility rate worldwide.⁶⁸ The total fertility rate (TFR) increased in Burundi over 40 years, from 5.9 children per woman in 1970 to 6.4 in 2010 (PNSR 2013: 16).⁶⁹ The

⁶⁸ Comparison of all the latest DHS reports using Statcompiler tool on the DHS website (08/09/14). Only Yemen (DHS 1997), Mali (DHS 2006) and Niger (DHS 2012) had a higher fertility rate than Burundi, but given the lack of recent data for Yemen and Mali, Burundi might even be higher in the ranking.

⁶⁹ A possible explanation for such rise of fertility is that health conditions improved in Burundi (and consequently increased the chance of conception) at a higher pace than the spreading of norms favouring smaller families. This dynamic was at least true in neighbouring Congo (Romaniuk 1980).

use of modern contraceptives progressed after the end of the war but remained low. In contrast, although progress was poor in Rwanda until 2005, the reduction in the total fertility rate was dramatic after that, exceeding 25% in only five years (Figure 4.8). This constituted the fastest decrease in the history of the DHS (Bundervoet 2014: 2). As of 2015, nearly one in two married women in Rwanda were using modern contraceptive methods (Figure 4.7.).

Figure 4.7 Modern contraceptive prevalence among married women aged 15-49 in Burundi and Rwanda




Source: Rwanda: DHS different years (2007 refers to 2007-08 DHS, and 2014 refers to the 2014-15 DHS); Burundi: PNSR (2013:17). The Burundi DHS gives a contraceptive prevalence of 17.6% instead of 18.9% in 2010.

Burundi

Family planning is the component of maternal health where Burundi's performance was the poorest over time (Interviews 124, 179). The supply side did not seem to account for this situation. According to both NGOs and the MoH, the provision of contraceptives was seen as a limiting factor since at least 2008, mainly thanks to the substantial financial support of donors (Interviews 124, 133, 194). As in Rwanda, the provision of contraceptives was free in Burundi. It was also an indicator included in the PBF (Interview 189), which ensured that health staff were motivated to carry out contraceptive distribution. Rather, as one respondent commented, "what is crazy is that family planning is available everywhere in Burundi but demand is weak" (Interview 185). The obstacles on the demand side included a pro-birth mentality and generally poor sexual education (Interviews 124, 189, 194). In addition, the flagship government policies of free-health care for pregnant women and children under five and free education were, although not intentionally, pro-birth and were perceived as such by the population (Interviews 179, 229). Furthermore, sensitisation about family planning was

not as holistic as in Rwanda. For example, family planning information, education and communication (IEC) sessions were not integrated into maternal health services. They were not done systematically during ante-natal care visits, after delivery, or during vaccination campaigns (Interviews 189, 228).

Figure 4.8 Evolution of the total fertility rate in Burundi and Rwanda



Source: Rwanda DHS, different years (2007 refers to 2007-08 DHS, and 2014 refers to the 2014-15 DHS), PNSR (2013: 16). The 2010 Burundi DHS give the same TFR value for that year.

One of the main obstacles to reducing fertility was the opposition of the Catholic Church to modern methods of family planning. Its influence is significant in Burundi. “In the countryside, the saying of even the smallest priest is more important than the saying of the president” (Interview 189). The power of the church was notably visible at Lent, when the number of women going to health centres to have their contraceptive implants removed increased as a result of church sermons. The most extreme cases included priests palpating the arms of women in search of an implant at the entrance to the church and refusing them entry if one was found, or refusing communion to health staff providing modern contraceptives (Interviews 189, 194). Promoting traditional contraceptive methods was as far as the Burundian church was willing to go (Interview 211). This principle was strongly reaffirmed in a letter signed by all bishops of Burundi, and read in all Catholic churches across the country on Christmas day in 2012 (CECB 2012). Two main reasons can be identified to explain the greater power of the church in Burundi in comparison to Rwanda. First, the Catholic Church is viewed in a positive light in Burundi given its conciliatory role during the civil war. In addition, the historical attempts by the state under President Bagaza (1976-1987) to limit the influence of the church in Burundi failed.

The government realised that population growth had become a major problem, given poor economic growth and the numerous conflicts around land use (Interviews 125, 133, 232). Although in 2007, the National Policy for Reproductive Health lamented that “policy-makers and opinion leaders are very little involved in the area of family planning” (PNSR 2007: 13), by 2014 family planning had begun to be seen as a top priority. A “Government declaration regarding national demographic policy” (MPDC: 2011, author’s translation from the French) was issued, advocating family planning to support economic and social development and to fight maternal mortality. The policy included an ambitious target of three children per woman by 2025. Family planning was also becoming a key theme that was regularly mentioned in the president’s and his wife’s speeches (Interviews 125, 133, 194).⁷⁰ However, the evocation of *modern* contraceptive methods was rare, apparently to spare the church (Interview 124). Nonetheless, because of the realisation that galloping fertility would only worsen the economic situation, a political commitment to family planning emerged at the highest level in Burundi.

Rwanda

Although the reduction in fertility was seen as “a huge success story” in Rwanda (Interview 96), the efforts in family planning were initially limited after the genocide. As recalled by the then minister of health “the idea to limit births in Rwanda in 2004, 10 years after the genocide and after having lost one million people [...] was something hard to put forward at the time” (Interview 107; see also Kinzer 2008: 248; Solo 2008).

This changed dramatically in 2005. Family planning became a top priority for the political leadership. In the executive branch, there was a realisation that with no effective reduction in fertility, poverty reduction would be a difficult task to perform. Inspired by the examples of the demographic transitions in South-East Asia, the minister of health convinced the government that only a decrease in fertility could allow for achieving Vision 2020 and increasing the general welfare of the population. These arguments proved persuasive and allowed the policy to emerge as a top priority.

I was convinced that although we made tremendous progress despite a dark past, this progress could never be sustained if we didn’t properly address the issue of demographic growth [...] In addition, the quality of people is key. In the African or Rwandan context, you can make lots of children but are they of good quality? Can you send them to school, can you plan a good future for them? Can they be an actor of development? [...] My

⁷⁰ E.g. Burundi Information: “Planning familial: ‘Oui au choix, non au hasard’”, 30/11/12 <http://www.burundi-info.com/spip.php?article1780&lang=fr> (accessed 08/09/14).

predecessors, when they put the [family planning] policy on the cabinet table, they met resistance because they did not defend it with such arguments (Interview 107).

In the legislative branch, in May 2005 MPs received a presentation of the RAPID computer model developed by Futures Group International with support from USAID. It made a great impression by showing the positive impact on the economic and social sectors of slowing down population growth (Interviews 96, 107; Solo 2008). Of further help to the Minister of Health in his advocacy was the growing understanding that family planning would be instrumental in decreasing maternal mortality, the indicators of which were bad (Interview 107).

The commitment behind family planning was subsequently regularly re-affirmed. It was articulated first in the 2006 National Family Planning Policy. In line with the leadership vision, the Policy stated that

unplanned fertility fuels a rate of population growth that is outpacing economic production, constituting a real hindrance to the achievement of the Vision 2020 to reduce poverty where we hope that all Rwandans will have equal opportunities in a sustainable development.” (MoH 2006b).

In 2007, the government declared family planning a national priority. The same year, an ambitious target of 70% uptake of modern contraceptive use by 2012 was included in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Paper (EDPRS). Building a common understanding of family planning was a theme of the 2008 National Dialogue.⁷¹ In 2012, the prime ministers of Rwanda and Ethiopia published a joint article in the *Lancet* calling for family planning to become a development priority (Habumuremyi & Zenawi 2012).

The strong political support for family planning was translated into an effective strategy. In 2005, the government decided that the main message to be used to promote family planning in the population was that fewer children meant being able to raise them better. As recalled by the then minister of health, “in terms of strategy of communication, this allows to hide the fact that you want to reduce the number of children. If you were to say so, you would attract criticism” (Interview 107). This discourse had to be adopted at all levels, from the president, to the ministers, and to MPs and local leaders. Sensitisation messages became inescapable. From 2008 onwards, local leaders were asked to regularly mention family planning, especially in the monthly discourse after *umuganda* (monthly community work). Secondary school

⁷¹ It brought together officials, representatives of civil society and members of the diaspora to discuss a wide range of issues.

teachers were trained during their *itorero* to speak of family planning. Opinion leaders, health personnel, and even journalists were trained in dealing with family planning issues (MoH 2010).

A striking illustration of the political commitment behind reducing fertility was the process through which Rwanda included vasectomy as a standard contraceptive method countrywide. An American development partner, FHI 360, had a small grant in 2010 to bring a doctor from Canada for two weeks to train three local doctors in no-scalpel vasectomy,⁷² a technique known to reduce surgical complications. However, FHI 360 did not have funds to follow-up on this training. When the initiative happened, the demand from the population was important in the selected districts, and as a consequence the government decided to scale up vasectomy on its own. It used its own funds but also engaged in an advocacy campaign with donors. The following quote from a donor involved in the project demonstrates the level of ownership and commitment:

They [the MoH] were enthusiastic about vasectomy, the minister was, so they made it happen [...] They came to the family planning technical working group⁷³ and said to the partners “listen we want to do this, so you fund this this and this” and so UNFPA bought devices, WHO paid for trainees, FHI paid for some, Interhealth paid for some, and they made it happen. And it was not a partner pushing the Ministry at all, it was them deciding they had to advocate and they really wanted it done [...] I have never seen anything like that. It is phenomenal. (Interview 96).

As of 2013, 64 doctors and 103 nurses from 42 hospitals in all 30 districts were trained in no-scalpel vasectomy.⁷⁴

Sensitisation on family planning is pervasive in Rwanda at the local level. Rwandan women are continuously exposed to sensitisation messages on the radio, by CHWs, by central and local government officials, and during local or national campaigns, such as the bi-annual mother and child week (Interviews 40, 62). Unlike Burundi, family planning is fully integrated in maternal health services: pregnant women are sensitised with their husbands through IEC sessions during antenatal visits and just after childbirth, and during child vaccination (Interview 40). In a hospital visited outside Kigali, the people accompanying pregnant women to the hospital were also systematically sensitised about family planning.

An obstacle to the extension of family planning services was that more than 40% of health centres are faith-based in Rwanda, which could hinder sensitisation and the provision of

⁷² Instead of making an incision with a scalpel to the scrotum that requires sutures, no scalpel vasectomy uses a puncture which heals itself after the procedure.

⁷³ Technical working groups aim at coordinating the actions of donors and the MoH.

⁷⁴ “More men opt for vasectomy for family planning” the News Time, 23/11/14.

modern contraceptives. To circumvent this problem, from 2006 onwards, the government mirrored faith-based health facilities with secondary health posts built just nearby where people could get contraceptives (Interviews 72, 96).⁷⁵ They were 60 in Rwanda as of 2012 (MoH: 2013b: 44). In a faith-based health facility visited during the fieldwork (outside Kigali), the staff did not hesitate to counsel women on modern contraceptives and encouraged them to get them from the nearby health post (Interview 40). More generally, this revealed that the Church in Rwanda had much less power than in Burundi. The government did not hesitate to openly denounce the Church when it hampered its family planning efforts (Interview 107),⁷⁶ a contrast with both the Habyarimana regime and the Burundian government.⁷⁷ This might be explained by the fact that RPF members were historically steeped in a Maoist ideology inherited from the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (Prunier 1998: 96, 152), which was not sympathetic to religious organisations in general.⁷⁸ In addition, following its role in the genocide, the Rwandan Catholic Church lost influence in favour of protestant churches (Longman & Rutagengwa 2006: 146; Bazuin 2013: 222-235), which are generally more flexible regarding modern contraceptive methods.

The Rwandan government also endeavoured to bring contraceptives as close as possible to the people, using its strong infrastructural power underpinned the CHW network. In 2009, going beyond mere sensitisation, CHWs were trained in providing contraceptives. They could even provide injectable contraceptives.

Overall, the strong apparatus of sensitisation and provision of contraceptives in Rwanda allowed a near perfect equity in accessing contraceptives. According to the 2010 DHS, contraceptive prevalence was almost equal among urban and rural areas in Rwanda (47% against 44.9%).⁷⁹

4.6 Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that both Burundi and Rwanda have made significant progress in fighting maternal mortality. Yet, key differences existed in terms of the consistency, pace and methods used. The Rwandan state was effective regardless of the

⁷⁵ Burundi started the same strategy in 2013 (Interview 189).

⁷⁶ See as well “Minister attacks religious leaders over condom use”, the News Time, 27/03/08.

⁷⁷ The Church in Rwanda also accepted the use of condoms in discordant married couples, i.e. if one individual is HIV positive, which can be seen as a quite progressive stance, especially in comparison to Burundi: “700 condom vending machines to be installed”, The New Times, 30/11/2010.

⁷⁸ During Ingando camps, at least in 2008-2009, a lecture on religion promoted “materialism” over “idealism”, creating reprobation among students, with a student even stating that during Ingando, “in the philosophy [lesson], they were telling us God does not exist...” (Purdeková 2011: 33).

⁷⁹ In comparison, in Burundi, prevalence is 28.8% in urban areas, and about 16.7% in rural areas.

components of maternal health considered. The political commitment behind reforms was systematic. The Rwandan government often took the problems into its own hands as they emerged, as shown by the example of the CBHI or family planning. Policies, once decided, were swiftly implemented and adjusted. The government did not hesitate to oppose and discipline donors in order not only to decrease maternal mortality, but also to decrease it in the way it wanted to, namely by requiring the population to contribute financially to health expenditure. This commitment relied on a well-structured decentralised state. It was able for example to supervise CHWs, manage *mutuelles*, and sensitise people to family planning. Burundi's performance was, on the other hand, heterogeneous. It was much less effective than Rwanda regarding family planning and community-level healthcare and sensitisation. It displayed a greater inertia in tackling different issues. However, Burundi made significant progress in promoting financial and geographical access to health care for pregnant women as demonstrated by the 2010 DHS. The indicators of delivery at health facilities, delivery by skilled attendants, and the number of ANC visits point to a performance close to that of Rwanda. However, two caveats are in order. First, given the pace of reforms in Rwanda and the progress reflected in the 2015 DHS, such indicators in Rwanda are likely to have exceeded those in Burundi.⁸⁰ Second, these quantitative indicators should not hide less quantifiable differences such as the quality of care and the role played by clientelism.

The importance of party visibility for the CNDD-FDD seems to be an adequate explanation of the irregular performance across maternal health components. When a policy could produce quick and tangible effects, able to secure the support of the rural population, CNDD-FDD's traditional stronghold, then state performance occurred. The choice of the *gratuité*, which contributed enormously to reducing maternal mortality, epitomised this. The spree of health centre construction was another illustration. Clientelist concerns can also explain some insufficiencies such as the poor planning of health centre construction. When a policy was not a rapid "quick win" as the *gratuité* was, reforms occurred more slowly, as in the case of CHWs and family planning.

The difference between the two countries was also one of methods. Whereas a concern for financial sustainability permeated policy choices and implementation in Rwanda, this was often absent in Burundi. It was again superseded by immediate concerns for the image of the government, as shown by the manner in which the *gratuité* was decided upon and implemented.

⁸⁰ Especially, DHS indicators are usually reported for the 5-year period preceding the survey, so they should not be considered as an instant snapshot of the situation in 2010 in Burundi and Rwanda.

Chapter 5

State effectiveness at the local level: informal with or against formal institutions?

5.1 Introduction

Chapters 3 and 4 analysed how policy choices influenced state effectiveness in the domains of fertiliser subsidies and maternal health. An exploration of state effectiveness cannot however confine its analysis to policy choices made at the national level to and their outcomes. It also requires understanding how a policy, formulated at the top, ultimately gets implemented on the ground. This is because the state is not a monolithic entity as underlined in Chapter 1. As summarised by Migdal, the “implementation of [state] policies are a series of different actions based on the particular calculus of pressures that each engaged component of the state faces in its particular environment of action” (1994: 116).

This chapter⁸¹ is interested in the local state, i.e. the state decentralised local government and the local offices of national ministries and agencies, and its role in supporting state effectiveness. Although the role of local governments has been already alluded to in previous chapters, this chapter takes an organisational vantage point. It explores more systematically how and why local bureaucrats were able, or unable, to implement policies and deliver services locally. Consequently, this chapter’s analysis is not restricted to the cases of fertiliser or maternal health only, although these two domains provide the thread of the analysis. Maternal health receives special attention as its different components (financial and geographical access to healthcare, family planning etc.) offer a wider window on local state functioning than the promotion of fertiliser use.

In order to explore state effectiveness locally, two main questions guide this chapter. First, in the face of resistance from outside the state, what kind of autonomy from society does each level of the state enjoyed in order to implement state objectives? This is a crucial point as it is

⁸¹ The sections of this chapter on Rwanda are partly based on Chemouni (2014).

the local state that interacts the most frequently with society and consequently is particularly prone to give way to social demands (Lipsky 1980; Migdal 1994: 117-119). In short, the first driving question of this chapter is, as put by Migdal (1994: 117): “do supervisors influence decisions of state personnel, or are they outweighed by other social forces?” Given that the state is not monolithic and can work against itself, the second driving question of this chapter is: what kind of incentives and disciplining mechanisms produced by the state do local bureaucrats faced?

The kind of institutional environment that allows local bureaucrats to best implement policies and deliver services has been grappled with at length in the literature on decentralisation (Barhdan 2002; Crook 2003). This literature is relevant to this chapter as both Burundi and Rwanda have engaged in a process of decentralisation. Yet, decentralisation itself is not a guarantee of effectiveness. Decentralisation is sometimes assumed to increase responsiveness of government to local demands by fostering accountability and bringing services closer to people (Shah 1998; Faguet 2004). Yet, evidence of decentralisation as increasing the effectiveness of the state to decrease poverty or improve service delivery in developing countries is ambivalent, if not disappointing (Crook & Sverrisson 2001; Crook 2003; Wunsh 2001; Conyers 2007; Robinson 2007: 11-12).

Central governments are often reluctant to truly decentralise, which leads to an inadequate institutional framework, resources and capacity at the local level (Wunsh 2001; Crook 2003). Furthermore, the political accountability that decentralisation is supposed to foster “is particularly affected by the likelihood of corruption or capture by interest groups” (Barhdan 2002: 192; see also Prud’homme 1995 Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Blair 2000). The success of decentralisation in supporting an effective state appears to boil down to the nature of central-local relations and the political environment in which they take place (Crook 2003). Elite capture often occurs because it is allowed by the centre to broaden its political base or accommodate opposition through patronage (Crook 2003; Boone 2003 Green 2010). Conversely, decentralisation might be effective if democratic practices (and not only democratic formal institutions) already exist locally, if civil society is active and organised (Crook and Manor 1998; Faguet 2008) but also if the centre is strong and committed to decentralisation (Tendler 1997).

Consequently, the link between decentralisation and state effectiveness depends on the kind of political environment in which decentralisation is deployed. In other words, the degree of decentralisation cannot alone foretell state effectiveness. For this reason, the chapter does not intend to compare the degree of decentralisation between the two countries. Rather, it aims at

assessing how local formal institutions (possibly decentralised) as well as informal institutions created differing incentives for local bureaucrats to uphold the effectiveness of the state.

The chapter begins with a presentation of the formal institutional framework of the local state in Rwanda and Burundi and the kind of incentives and disciplining mechanisms it created for local bureaucrats. This is followed by a section analysing the kind of informal “rules of the game” underpinning local governance and how, coupled with the formal institutions identified in the first part, they influenced state effectiveness. The final section of the chapter concludes with a comparative discussion.

5.2 Formal institutions of the local state

Burundi


The institutional framework of the local state

The local government structure in Burundi observed during this research dates back to 1965, although the number of administrative entities evolved over time (Sénat du Burundi 2010: 23-37). Figure 5.1 illustrates how Burundi’s administrative structure looked after 2005. As in Rwanda (World Bank 1987: 7), the communes were historically viewed as the main entity of local government and as the engine of development (Sénat du Burundi 2010: 23-43). Until 1989, the president appointed communal administrators (*administrateur communal*: the executive head of the commune) while commune councils were merely consultative organs. Decentralisation took a first step in 1989 when councils received decision-making power regarding development and communal finances. Yet, the main progress occurred after the war. The Arusha peace agreement called for further decentralisation, considered as a way to prevent conflict, increase transparency, and bring services closer to the people.⁸² The new Burundian constitution of 2005 reaffirmed these principles, insisting that communal and hill councils, as well as their executive heads, should be elected.⁸³ This was later enshrined in Communal Law n°1/16 of 25 April 2005.

⁸² See the Agreement’s protocol IV, article 8; 16, and annex 4, paragraph 3.5.5.3.

⁸³ Articles 262 to 265.

Figure 5.1 The institutional structure of the Burundian local state, with a focus on the agriculture and health sectors



Burundian communes were financially and legally autonomous from central government.⁸⁴ They were in charge locally of economic and social development, as well as service delivery.⁸⁵ Below, the zones were only deconcentrated entities of the commune with no legal or financial autonomy. The administrative hills (*collines*)⁸⁶ were headed by elected councils. Their role was to mediate local conflicts and relay people’s opinions about development activities to the commune.

Despite this apparent commitment to decentralisation, communes’ mandates were in reality limited. The first reason is that the Burundian communal law did not specify the precise activities that fall under the commune’s responsibility. It simply stated that communes were in charge of development, “local interests”, and public services “as far as, [public services] do not fall under the direct responsibility of the State because of their nature, their importance, or because of the law.”⁸⁷ The consequence was that, in the absence of further legal provisions, Burundian ministries such as Health or Agriculture retained most of their prerogatives (Interviews 158, 173; see also ABELO 2013: 6-8).⁸⁸ As summarised by a high official in the Ministry of Communal Development, “agronomist and health staff are accountable to their

⁸⁴ However, as in Rwanda, most of their budget was sourced in a transfer from the central state.

⁸⁵ Law N°1/02 of 25 January 2010, articles 5-7, restated in law n°1/33 of 28 November 2014, same articles.

⁸⁶ Called neighbourhoods (*quartiers*) in Bujumbura.

⁸⁷ Article 6, author’s translation, restated in law n°1/33 of 28/11/2014, article 5.

⁸⁸ The long awaited new law on the commune mandate, in discussion since at least 2009 (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012: 40) was finally passed in 2015 (Law n°1/16 of 25 May 2015). Although it stipulated that communes would be responsible for social infrastructure, its application hinged on implementing texts (presidential and ministerial orders) that were not issued as of February 2016.

ministries. They bypass the administrator: he never gets the information” (Interviews 173, also 210, 223, 228, 235, 239) The administrator’s role was limited to delivering administrative documents, mobilising the population if asked by vertical ministries, supervising the construction of schools and health centres, and coordinating donors’ actions. One interviewee explained, “except that, they don’t do much. They spend their time in meetings with donors to get the *per diem* [...]. They don’t even go to see what a [development] partner is doing” (Interview 207).

In contrast, ministries had an extensive role locally. The Ministry of Agriculture’s (MINAGRIE) local presence was a textbook case of administrative deconcentration.⁸⁹ It was present locally through the DPAE (Provincial Directorates of Agriculture and Livestock). These were full-fledged directorates in the ministry’s organisation chart. Each DPAE was “a mini ministry of agriculture at provincial level” (Interview 135), regrouping the different services of the ministry. Agriculture was consequently “a very verticalised sector” (Interview 171), with few links with the communal administration. It was also a very centralised sector, since DPAE had no budgetary autonomy. Any spending required the approval of Bujumbura (Interviews 147, 161).

The Ministry of Health (MoH) had a different organisation. Often priding itself on being “decentralised” (Interviews 171, 173), it was organised after 2007 along a territorial structure specific to the health sector. Forty-five health districts (*districts sanitaires*) were in charge of the coordination and monitoring of health centres and hospitals. They covered a population of 150-200,000 inhabitants in accordance with WHO regulations. Health districts did not overlap with communes but included on average five communes, which made coordination difficult (Interviews 171, 173, 223, 228, 239). Seventeen health provinces (*provinces sanitaires*), mirroring the administrative provinces, supervised the health districts. They also evaluated the staffing needs and, when funding was available, distributed health staff across the province. The MoH was thus considered “decentralised” compared to other ministries because health provinces and districts enjoyed a certain leeway from the central ministry in their activities and budget spending.

Incentives and disciplining in the territorial administration

What incentives and points of pressure did this institutional framework produce on local bureaucrats in Burundi? Although the communal administrators’ role was limited to health

⁸⁹ This pattern was the same for the Ministry of Education.

and agriculture, the space for their involvement nonetheless existed. First, their role in mobilising the population could be harnessed for the maternal health sensitisation campaign, or for fertiliser distribution. In addition, each commune sent a representative to the hospital steering committees and health district boards, which gave the administrator the role of pushing for the improvement of local services.

Communal administrators' actions were first of all driven by a Community Plan for Communal Development (PCDC). Introduced in 2007 with major support from the World Bank and the German cooperation (GIZ), this five-year plan was the main document guiding the actions of the communes. It took the form of a "logical framework" listing the objectives, activities, and funding needed. The devising of the PCDC was bottom up. A "facilitator" paid by donors would tour the communes, and organise a series of meetings with the population in order to identify the priority to be included in the PCDC. This process was assessed as very successful (Interviews 171, 184, 210).

However, this planning effort appeared to provide a weak incentive for local administrators to act. First of all, the funding available for the activities of the PCDC remained largely unknown, making of the PCDC a "wish list" rather than an operational document. Furthermore, most of the activities listed remained the responsibility of vertical ministries. Yet the PCDCs did not constitute a base for planning for ministries. Ministries were in addition imperfectly associated with the planning of the PCDC (Interviews 171, 173, 184, 235, 210; ABELO 2013: 8-9). Communes' objectives consequently ran the risk of being unrealistic, imprecise and decoupled from ministries' planning (Interview 171).

Nonetheless, the PCDCs were recognised as a precious guide to orient the action of donors locally (Interviews 171, 173, 207). Furthermore, a PCDC could serve as a basis for the communal administrators to lobby ministries' deconcentrated agencies. However, the results of the PCDC evaluation every five years were not linked with any incentives or disciplining mechanisms of bureaucrats and were not widely disclosed to the population (Interview 171). Consequently, the PCDC did not constitute a great source of pressure on local administrations.

Another possible point of pressure on communal administrations could be the commune performance contract put in place in 2012. Idea of the Burundian government, financially supported by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and GIZ, these performance contracts contained only process indicators related to the internal working of the communal administration (Table 5.1). Although this initiative worked well, mainly because it created a competitive dynamic between communes (Interviews 158, 168, 171), it had arguably

a very indirect impact on state effectiveness because the contracts focused only on administrative functioning and not on developmental outcome as was the case with the Rwandan *imihigo*.

Table 5.1 Selected indicators from the Burundian communes' performance contract

Domains of evaluation	N°	Criteria	Weighting (points)
<i>Commune governance</i>	1	Organisation of communal meetings with the population.	4
	6	The recording and sorting of received and sent mail.	2
	11	Attendance rate of members of the communal councils at ordinary sessions.	4
	16	Markings of intra and inter communal roads.	5
	21	Bookkeeping of the authorising officer separated from the bookkeeping of the accountant.	2
	26	Execution rate of the income budget.	3
	31	Display of communal council decisions.	2
<i>Local development</i>	36	Conformity of investments to the content of the PCDC.	5
	41	Presence of signs to orient service users.	2
<i>Social & gender inclusion</i>	46	The commune invested for vulnerable people during the year.	2


Source: The Handbook for the evaluation of commune performance (MDC 2013: 21-22). The commune evaluator selects 20 indicators at random over 47.

The weaknesses of local government institutions in Burundi was also linked with their lack of financial resources (Interviews 173, 184, 210). Salary payment was often delayed (Interview 158; Nihangaza 2012: 12).⁹⁰ Communes in Burundi were regularly in deficit for several reasons. The obvious cause was the central state's lack of resources. However, it appears that there was also a lack of commitment of the central government to transfer resources to the local level despite its public pledge of decentralisation (Table 5.2). Local government spending for example represented 3% of total government spending in Burundi, compared to 25% in Rwanda in 2011-12 (RGB 2013: 42-44).⁹¹

⁹⁰ See also "Des administrateurs communaux non payés se payent eux-mêmes", Syfia Grands Lacs, 26/10/2011: http://www.burunditransparence.org/administrateur_salaire.html Of the normal seven officials in a commune, three (the administrator, the development adviser and the social adviser) are paid by the state, the rest by the communes.

⁹¹ This may change in the future since the new law n°1/33 of November 2014, the State must at least give 500 million BiF to each communes each year. To what extent this rule will be respected remains to be seen.

Table 5.2 Communes revenue in proportion of total government revenue



Source: Author's calculation, from ISTEERU 2012 and 2013, tables 14.01 and 14.11. Includes government transfer.

Except for the payment of the administrator and their two advisors' salaries, the state did not supplement communes' income. The Communal Investment Fund (FONIC) established by the government in 2007 was required by decree to channel 15% of the state budget to the communes. Yet they were provided with less than 1% of the budget as of 2012 (Interviews 158, 184).⁹² Furthermore, the FONIC, instead of channelling money to the communes, managed on their behalf the money for each communal project (Interviews 158, 171; World Bank 2014: 18). The low level of funding of the FONIC was not only due to the low financial capacity of the Burundian state. Donors manifested their interest in financially supporting the communes. However, the FONIC was considered by donors as an important site of embezzlement (Interviews 158, 171).⁹³ The Burundian authorities also refused donors' demand that recruitment of the FONIC agents be based on an exam (Interviews 158). As a result, some donors preferred establishing a parallel structure to the FONIC. For example, donors and the Ministry of Education established a joint fund for education to support schools whereas the FONIC would have been the logical channel for such funding (Interviews 171, 173, 184, 226). This situation began to change however, as of when, in December 2014, a new reform of the FONIC was rolled out, obliging it to channel the money to the communes instead of acting as project manager (interview 226).⁹⁴ As a result, the commitment of donors to the FONIC increased, notably with half a million euros from GIZ (Interviews 171, 226). It allowed the FONIC to have an estimated budget for 2014 of 9.4 billions BiF (USD 5.9 millions) (World Bank 2014: 45).

⁹² See also "Le Fonic au service de la décentralisation" Iwacu, 02/06/13.

⁹³ See also Point de presse du PARCEM sur la mauvaise gestion du FONIC <https://bujanews.wordpress.com/2014/05/14/point-de-presse-du-parcem-sur-la-mauvaise-gestion-du-fonic/> (accessed 10/12/2014)

⁹⁴ "Pourquoi une réforme du FONIC?", 01/11/2013. <http://www.fonic.bi/index.php/10-vision/1-pourquoi-une-reforme-du-fonic> (accessed 10/12/2014).

Finally, another source of the communes' financial difficulties was found in their weak capacity to levy their own resources. Given their small size and weak taxing capacities, communes in Burundi were barely viable financially (Nihangaza 2012). Although a draft bill existed on commune redesign (Ministère de l'intérieur 2012: 77; MDC 2012: 29), it was blocked as of 2014 as being too politically sensitive, especially with the coming of the 2015 elections (Interviews 171, 173). This analysis echoes Uvin's statement that in Burundi, "even lack of capacity and resources are not simply a direct product of the simple fact of being a poor country, but are also, at least in part, a politically created situation" (2008: 115).⁹⁵

Agriculture

The relative weakness of the territorial administration in Burundi could have had limited effects on state effectiveness given the important role of vertical ministries in health and agriculture. Yet, in agriculture, generally speaking, top down pressure on DPAE to implement the ministry's policies was very loose. The first reason was financial, with underpaid personnel. An agronomist was paid approximately 90,000 BIF per month (54 US\$). In addition, the flows of information between DPAE and the Ministry were not only irregular, but of poor quality. As acknowledged about DPAE reports by a high official in the ministry's planning department, "for crop production, data are really problematic. Honestly, I'd rather remain silent on the methodology employed. Don't rely on them" (Interview 147). In addition, "the DPAE sent their reports, or didn't send them, or sent them late" (Interview 142). With little consequences: as observed by a consultant in the MINAGRIE, "there is very little reaction from the Ministry, saying that some deadlines have to be kept, that tables are not filled out, and that data are not correct" (Interview 142; see also 135, 147, 222). A possible source of information sharing could have been the quarterly meeting between DPAE directors and the minister. Yet, "she is not always there because she is very busy" (Interview 147, see also 142). Overall, this meant that the Ministry of Agriculture had "not much hold on the DPAE" (Interview 135). "No one tells the DPAE anything, there is no monitoring of results" (Interview 142).

Against this backdrop, however, pockets of effectiveness emerged in the agricultural sector, as epitomised by the case of fertiliser. This occurred because donors got involved financially and technically in tasks that should normally have been routinely performed by the

⁹⁵ The only redesign that took place was the merger in three communes of the 13 communes of the city of Bujumbura in June 2015.

MINAGRIE. In the case of fertiliser, the main vehicle for that was the National Support Project for the National Subsidised Fertiliser Programme in Burundi (PAN-PNSEB) of the International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC). Donors, through PAN-PNSEB, provided financial backing to the state. They supplied the staff of the MINAGRIE involved in fertilisers with vehicles, fuel, stationary, and, when they travelled, a per diem. They also gave a premium to hill councils for their role in registering beneficiaries of the programme (IFDC 2013). Although fertiliser distribution was officially a government programme, the role of donors was pervasive and went a long way to explain the emergence of an “island of effectiveness” constituted by the fertiliser subsidy programme in the agricultural sector. Livestock distribution, seed distribution, marshlands and hillside development, and some infrastructure such as feeder roads were also governmental projects that received donors’ support. For projects fully funded by donors in agriculture, which were the bulk of agriculture developmental activities in Burundi, the state was bypassed altogether (Interviews 129, 140).

Health

Monitoring the activities of health centres and hospitals, including the ones related to maternal health, came from three main sources. First, the health district team supervised them on a regular basis. The creation of health districts in 2007 was generally deemed an important improvement as it brought supervision close to health facilities. In addition, this reform attracted donors’ money to health districts, especially through capacity building projects.

However, health districts’ capacity to fulfil their missions of supervision was limited. Evaluation of health facilities were not followed up with effective feedback, or, if required, sanctions (Interviews 189, 215, 216, 239). In addition, although districts normally checked hospital annual plans, this was done poorly. In two hospitals visited in 2014, one in Bujumbura in February and one in the centre of the country in March, the hospital’s 2014 annual plan had yet to be completed in the former, and had still not been approved in the latter, (Interviews 215, 239). Furthermore, the main function of action plans seemed the satisfaction of donors, or Performance-Based Financing (PBF) evaluation criteria, rather than guiding hospital activities (Interviews 186, 189, 219). In one hospital visited, the head of the maternal ward indicated that she never got a copy of the action plan (Interview 216). More generally, in health facilities there was “little motivation to follow the recommendations” of health districts (Interview 223). The relative weakness of health districts in monitoring health facilities despite their relatively high financial resources was mainly due to informal political dynamics as explained below.

The second possible source of monitoring health workers was direct and frequent inspections (*descentes*) to health facilities by the Ministry of Health's national staff. The number of such inspections was considerable.⁹⁶ Despite the creation of health districts, and the resources poured into reinforcing their capacity, the "aberration" (Interview 195) of these inspections "that happen[ed] all the time" (Interview 186) had two main causes. First, it was a very lucrative activity for central ministry's staff because of the *per diem* distributed by donors for such inspections. Second, it reflected a concern to satisfy donors' requirements and see what was happening on the ground since it was difficult to pass information back up the state apparatus (Interviews 195, 186, 189). The inspections were particularly important in the case of maternal health. For historical reasons, maternal health was managed by a programme in the ministry, the National Programme for Reproductive Health (PNSR).⁹⁷ Directly attached to the minister's cabinet, it had its own budget, its own board and could deal directly with donors. Because of the priority given by donors to reproductive health, it attracted a great deal of money. As a consequence, the PNSR conducted frequent supervision funded by donors to monitor activities and provide support to health staff on maternal health issues *only*.

The third source of incentives for health staff was the Performance-Based Financing (PBF) system. The PBF constituted a sizeable complement of revenue for health workers, notably because donors supported the PBF financially. It was regularly cited as the main origin of incentives for health centre and hospital staff (Interviews 186, 189, 193, 195, 223). Furthermore, whereas the data from the National Health Information System (SNIS) were generally deemed of poor quality, the PBF constituted a regular source of double-checked good quality data for the MoH because of donor scrutiny (Interviews 152, 186, 217). The impact on maternal health was particularly important since, as underlined in Chapter 4, most indicators of the PBF system were related to maternal and child health. Consequently, the PBF, by providing reliable information to the centre and incentives to local health staff, acted as an important communication channel between the centre and the periphery of the Burundian health system.

⁹⁶ According to an official in the MoH planning department, they amounted on average to a third of the staff working time in this department (private communication).

⁹⁷ The predecessor of the PNSR, the Bureau for the Coordination of Family Planning was already a financially and legally independent organisation (Interview 193) before becoming the PNSR in 1999.

Rwanda

The institutional framework of the local state

Rwanda began a decentralisation process in 2000. As in Burundi, decentralisation was intended as a way to break away from the governance pattern of the past by fostering local participation. For example, the 2004 Rwanda's Five-Year Decentralisation Implementation Programme stated the need to replace "the subculture of passive obedience which left people open to political and sectarian manipulation" (MINALOC 2004: 11; see also Interview 93). After the adoption of the first decentralisation policy in 2000, a series of laws redesigned different tiers of local government (Table 5.3) and instituted the election of local leaders.

Table 5.3 The evolution of the institutional framework of decentralisation in Rwanda

Before 2001		2001-2006		Since 2006	
Entities	Number	Entities	Number	Entities	Number
Prefectures	12	Provinces	11	Provinces	4
		Kigali City	1	Kigali City	1
Sous-prefectures	22	-	-	-	-
Communes	154	Districts	106	Districts	30
Sectors	1531	Sectors	1545	Sectors	450
Cells	8987	Cells	9165	Cells	2148
				Imidugudu	14744

Source: Author's compilation.


Decentralisation in Rwanda was thus a profound and relatively rapid institutional change: it created new entities, suppressed others, and redrew the boundaries of existing ones. The role of the local government was expanded to an unprecedented degree. Although heralded as the engine of development before 1994, Rwandan communes had never had the means to play this role due to the regularly failed and timid attempts of decentralisation since the 1970s (Andrews 2013: 165).

Like the Burundian communes, districts were the main local government entities in Rwanda. Financially and legally independent, they were in charge *inter alia* of implementing government policies, service delivery and maintenance of infrastructure.⁹⁸ The province was mainly in charge of coordinating districts and supporting them in their planning. Below the

⁹⁸ See article 123 of law No 87/2013 of 11/09/2013.

district, the sector was the district’s deconcentrated “implementation agency” (Interview 70). It was also in charge of mobilisation and delivering services to the population. The cell was involved in community mobilisation and data reporting. The 14,744 umudugudu (villages) did not constitute administrative units but were used as a channel of grassroots mobilisation and information diffusion. The delivery of local public services and policy implementation was also sometimes conducted by ministerial agencies that deployed agents at the local level to perform technical tasks (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 The institutional structure of the Rwandan local state



Decentralisation was much more advanced in Rwanda than in Burundi. A district was a small government in itself with more than 60 employees (against 7 in a Burundian commune), overseeing different departments, with significant resources. Local governments were responsible for more than 25% of the domestic budget in 2011–12 (RGB 2013: 42-44) and employed 50% of the Rwandan administration (MIFOTRA 2012: 36).⁹⁹ Although, as in Burundi, the law did not specify all the local governments’ tasks, sectorial ministries’ policies provided specifics on local government mandates. In health for example, according to the Health Sector Strategic Plan 3, districts were “the focal point for delivery of and accountability for health services, being responsible for all their operations” (MoH 2012a: 93). They were in addition in charge of health infrastructure, equipment and personnel. The district health unit

⁹⁹ Also private communication from Ministry of Civil service and Labour. See Chemouni (2014) for an analysis of the financial decentralisation in Rwanda.

(DHU), headed by the district health director, supervised hospitals and health centres. District and sectors were also responsible for the *mutuelles* (Community-Based Health Insurance) and the pharmacy, whose respective directors reported directly to the district vice-mayor in charge of social affairs. The Ministry of Health remained in charge of policy development, technical guidance and clinical supervision (*ibid.*).

Agricultural development also fell to the district, implemented mainly by district and sector agronomists. A sign of the importance of the agricultural sector for the authorities, army officers deployed in the district sat on the agriculture committee, ready to assist terracing or find markets for harvested crops (Interviews 84, 112). Local government agronomists were supported by the implementing agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture which were deconcentrated locally. In the case of fertiliser, the Rwandan Agricultural Board (RAB) in charge of the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) provided technical support to districts and ensured that they followed national policies. Each district had a RAB focal person it could refer to regarding the CIP.¹⁰⁰

How did this institutional framework on paper translated into reality? Unlike in Burundi, roles induced by decentralisation were generally upheld. For example, requests from ministries to health or agricultural staff locally had to be transmitted via the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) or the mayors (Interviews 60, 78, 97). Districts, rather than vertical ministries, supervised services locally and “shook up” officials to ensure performance. In the health sector for example, district officials kept an eye on performance through the monthly coordination meetings which included the district health director, directors of pharmacies, “mutuelles,” and health facilities. And as explained by a district health officer, “in this meeting it is the health director who is the big boss” (Interview 73, see also 72). In addition, the quarterly district health management meeting, presided over by the vice-mayor in charge of social affairs, was about sharing information and, crucially, briefing the vice-mayor on the health indicators (Interview 73, see also 72).

Efforts were also made at the central level to support decentralisation. For example, a decentralisation office was created in 2008 in the Ministry of Health to supervise decentralisation and build capacity at the district level (Interview 78). All district health directors were required to have a master’s degree to avoid an inferiority complex toward hospital directors and to be able to supervise them effectively (Interviews 74, 78, 88). This

¹⁰⁰ Yet the role of RAB compared to local government agronomists was not always clear. Generally, it seems that they simply worked together, with RAB staff “giving a hand” to the much more numerous local government agronomists (Interviews 81 82).

concern contrasts with the absence of reactions of the Burundian central state toward the general lack of legitimacy of health district directors as explained below. The MoH remained in charge of technical supervision of hospitals carried out through regular supervision (Interviews 62, 74, 88).

In addition, the inner functioning of health facilities themselves appeared to match what was planned in health policies. Unlike in Burundi, hospital annual planning was done in a timely and thorough manner. In a hospital visited outside Kigali, planning was the result of a three-day meeting with the different heads of departments (Interview 41). Furthermore, the annual plan was widely circulated to hospital staff. Whereas in Burundi a hospital's head of the maternal ward never received a copy of the action plan, her counterpart in Rwanda did (Interviews 40, cf. 216). More generally, hierarchy seemed respected in the Rwandan hospital. For example, interviewees regularly indicated the key role played by the hospitals' boards in putting pressure on the director (Interviews 73, 105). This is a crucial difference with Burundi where, as explained below, formal hospital hierarchy was superseded by the hierarchy in the CNDD-FDD.

The financial and administrative decentralisation process in Rwanda was not perfect. Interestingly however, the obstacle to decentralisation seems to have originated, not in political blockages as in Burundi, but rather in the centre's fear of losing effectiveness in policy implementation in the short run. As summarised by the head of the decentralisation desk in the Ministry of Health "resistance to decentralisation is not so much because people are afraid to lose their power. There is no choice. Resistance in the MoH is because we are afraid we are going to lose control, capacity to do supervisions, and lose effectiveness" (Interview 78). This tension between decentralisation and control was illustrated by a ministry official's remark: "well decentralisation, in reality: if there is a problem in a hospital or health centre, I take my phone and call them to save time. So sometime districts complain that this should be their role" (Interview 53, see also 88).

A decentralisation providing the space to build an effective state

This analysis reveals that the *de jure* decentralisation corresponded to a great extent to the *actual* decentralisation. As a consequence, Rwanda was able to reap the benefits theoretically associated with administrative decentralisation. Administrative decentralisation kept its promise by enabling the local state to bring services closer to people and delivering them in a more efficient manner. To begin with, because the district was in charge of service delivery, it could react more promptly than the central level to avoid the deterioration of service quality.

In the case of health, as explained by a hospital staff from the outside Kigali “if an indicator is not good, the district will organise some actions [such as] a sensitisation campaign or the re-orienting of its [the district’s] budget to boost an indicator” (Interview 41).

Furthermore, decentralisation allowed the Rwandan state to greatly enhance its infrastructural power through three main mechanisms. First, it supported the dissemination of information. This dissemination was at first bottom-up. In health, districts had access to relatively good quality health information. The Health Management Information System (HMIS), and the Rwanda Community Health Information System (SISCom) helped decision-making by allowing fine-grained analysis. In a district visited, the health director was able to report the exact number of women who had given birth the past month and the date and place of delivery (including if it was at home or in a health facility).¹⁰¹ The director could also indicate the sector, cell, and village where these women lived along with the date of their ante-natal care visits (Interview 72). From this, the health director was able to engage in a useful analysis to push health staff to improve maternal health accordingly:

If a woman did the antenatal care visits but delivered at home, then it is not a problem of sensitisation. It was either an emergency or the CHW [Community Health Workers] did not do her job [of accompanying her to a health facility in advance of delivery]. It can’t be an issue with the *mutuelles* because with all the antenatal care visits, we explained [how useful the *mutuelles* are] to her very well. [...] Also if I see that the first antenatal care visit was not done but the other yes, it is an issue with the CHW who did not do her job [of identifying the woman early enough]. I report it to the health centre that is supervising her (Interview 72).

Similarly, this penetration of the state at the lowest level allowed Rwandan local government to individually identify who did not pay the *mutuelles* and to send the CHWs to do further sensitisation to the relevant household (Interview 69).

Information flowing bottom up did not stop at district level. The central state monitored local government through very heavy reporting obligations (Table 5.4) that were systematically met. In addition, each minister in Rwanda was assigned one or two districts to support in their development. The minister visited “his/her district” to participate in *umuganda* but also to review the *imihigo* with the mayor, identify bottlenecks and provide his/her help (Interviews 53, 68, 66).¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ For example, in one of the sectors of the district, 44 women delivered in a health centre, one at home, four at other health centres outside the sector, and 10 at the hospitals (field notes 13/06/2013).

¹⁰² Although all ministers were equally diligent in helping their district.

Table 5.4 Districts' reporting requirement

Deadline: the 15th of the month following the month/the quarter the report is due		
Reports	Frequency	Recipient
1 Agriculture report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINAGRI
2 Report on Post-harvest, marketing and agro-processing	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Ministry of Trade
3 Land registration report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Ministry of Natural Resources
4 Cooperative report (special details on SACCO Umurenge: micro-finance cooperative)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Rwandan Cooperative Agency
5 Villagisation, trading centre rehabilitation, beautification	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
6 Environment report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Ministry of Natural Resources
7 Report on development projects	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
8 Education report (education indicators, classroom construction, how course is given)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Ministry of Education
9 Health report (health indicators, mutuelles data)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MoH
10 Livestock farming report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINAGRI
11 Thatched house (<i>Nyakatsi</i>) eradication campaign report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
12 District Council report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Province
13 Report on the implementation of the district council decisions	[not mentioned]	Province
14 Activity report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
15 Report on imihigo	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
16 Report on activity monitoring	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Province
17 Security report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Province & MINALOC
18 Financial report (tax collection, finance management)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINECOFIN
19 Procurement report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	Rwanda Public Procurement Authority
20 Audit report	Quarterly, Annually	MINECOFIN
21 Report of the Public Finance Management Committee	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
22 Implementation report of the audit committee	Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
23 Report on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
24 Report on dispute resolution in the population	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
25 Umuganda report	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
26 Report on Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) (including graduation-poverty levels)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC
* Report on MDGs targets ("localising MDGs)	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	MINALOC

*Source: acquired in June 2013 from district office, southern province, translated from Kinyarwanda. *: the report "localising MDGs" was not mentioned on the documents but yet has to be transmitted by district every month (Interviews 62, 67).*

Decentralisation also supported top-down information dissemination within the state apparatus to ultimately reach the population. In health, the importance of the *umuganda*, the monthly community work was crucial in this respect. A meeting with the local government authorities always followed the community work. It was the occasion to pass on messages to the population in a systematic manner. Unlike the Burundian informal and politically loaded

community work, the Rwandan *umuganda* was a legally regulated state policy.¹⁰³ Ministries addressed the message they wanted to transmit to the population for the next *umuganda* to the Ministry of Local Government. An official in the MINALOC department for community development and social welfare centralised the messages, selected no more than three each time “to avoid confusion” (Interview 56), reformulated them so they could be easily understandable and might “call [the relevant ministry] back if the message was not clear” (Interview 8). He/She then transmitted the messages to all local governments across the country that would read them to the population after the community work (Interview 56). This was especially useful for family planning (Interviews 62, 72, 96) and *mutuelle* sensitisation (Interviews 20, 45, 62). *Umuganda* meetings were also the occasion to announce the time and date of local state activities, such as contraceptive distribution (Interview 53). More generally, local governments regularly disseminated messages through community radio, churches, markets, cooperative leaders or women’s associations, something far more difficult to achieve without an advanced decentralisation (Interviews 40, 62, 70). Regarding fertiliser, these local channels were especially useful for indicating to agro-dealers where fertiliser bags could be bought. They were also essential for announcing when crop planting and fertilisation should begin given the rainfall forecasts¹⁰⁴ (Interview 83).

Besides free flow of information, decentralisation further increased the infrastructural power of the Rwandan state by facilitating population mobilisation. Local authorities were not only closer to the population, but this proximity made their message more acceptable. For example, “for the provision of family planning by the community health workers (CHWs), it would have been impossible without the decentralisation. People were suspicious and it is not the ministry or the health facility staff that could have sensitised and removed this distrust” (Interview 53). It was only when local government organised a large “meeting with everyone” attended by local leaders, that the population was ready to accept family planning from CHWs (Interview 53, see also 60, 62).

Finally, decentralisation in Rwanda facilitated coordination. Whereas in Burundi coordination was hindered by the lack of communication between territorial administrations and vertical ministries, it was eased in Rwanda because there was “a conductor that ha[d] authority on everyone” (Interview 45). In health for example, in a district visited, local government used schools to sensitise children about the importance of *mutuelles*. Children were even asked to

¹⁰³ The main texts are the Prime Ministerial Order number 58/03 of August 24, 2004, and the Organic Law Number 53/2007 Governing Community Works.

¹⁰⁴ The communication with local government was eased by a system called *insoga*, a mailing list system used by all local governments. The list of recipients could of course be changed depending on the content of the message and the location concerned (Interviews 28; 53).

bring their *mutuelles* card so that households without *mutuelles* could be identified. Such activity would be difficult in Burundi, as it would have required coordination between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the local government. These findings echo the ones of Chambers and Golooba-Mutebi who attributed the good performance of Rwanda in Maternal Health to “strong vertical coordination of public sector health provision, local authorities and users has also played an important role in ensuring that professional standards are respected, national policy is implemented and that the shift in behaviour necessary to bring about change happens” (2012: 50).

The argument here is not to say that everything was working in Rwanda. It is merely to point out that the reality on the ground tended to correspond to what was spelled out in laws and policy papers. As a consequence, Rwanda, unlike Burundi, was able to reap the benefits theoretically associated with decentralisation. This was, however, only one side of the coin. The other side was the different incentives and disciplining mechanisms that provide the spur for local officials to act in this conducive space.

The incentives and disciplining of local bureaucrats

The first and most obvious of these mechanisms in Rwanda was the performance contracts (*imihigo*) signed between the districts and the President. In these contracts, the district committed to implement the key activities of its annual plan. Implemented in 2006 along with the district restructuring, *imihigo* were presented as the reviving of a precolonial practices whereby leaders and warriors would publicly pledge to accomplish certain deeds (Scher 2010: 1-2). District *imihigo* took the form of a table with approximately 50 targets, and corresponding baselines, indicators and sources of funding (Table 5.5). It constituted the main focus of the planning process between the centre and the districts, as sectoral ministries “don’t go deeply into the district action plan” (Interview 74). District *imihigo* was then disaggregated into sector *imihigo*. Cells, *imidugudu*, and even households each with their own *imihigo* were given standardised targets. For this reason, they are sometime called mobilisation contracts. Although district and sector *imihigo* played an important role, the *imihigo* at the lower levels were largely indicative. Officials would “carefully store it in a closet, like a sacred book, but would never consult it” (Interview 84).

The planning process of district *imihigo* was central to state effectiveness because it ensured that local government activities were closely aligned with national objectives. Guided by a checklist of national priorities, districts wrote a draft *imihigo* while informally consulting relevant line ministries. Although theoretically this process should have been informed by the

aggregation of the population's wishes from the *umudugudu* up to the district council, this process rarely took place in reality. The line ministries and the districts then bargained over the draft through a series of meetings. This exercise allowed sectorial ministries to exert great influence over the choice of objectives to be incorporated in the *imihigo* and also the targets related to these objectives. It ensured that national priority activities were present. It also ensured that districts did not include secondary or easily reachable ones (Interviews 29, 62, 67, 72, 74).

The reason for this involvement of sectorial ministries was ultimately because they had their own targets from their own *imihigo* and other national documents (EDPRS, Vision 2020 etc.) to reach, but were dependent on local governments to attain them. Consequently, target setting by districts for national policy was limited. As summarised by a district vice-mayor, "for important sectors, such as health and agriculture, it all comes from the top" (Interview 84). Enrolment in *mutuelles* always appeared with a target of 100% in the *imihigo*, reflecting its national importance. For indicators such as ante-natal care visits and family planning, indicators changed according to the district situation. Regarding fertiliser, targets were often expressed in crop productivity targets rather than quantity of fertiliser *per se* (Table 5.5). Targets of quantity of fertiliser however featured in the RAB local officials' performance contracts.

Imihigo have regularly been mentioned in the literature as the epitome of the Rwandan state's disciplinary character and its top-down governance style (e.g. Ansoms 2009b; Purdeková 2011: 484-486; Ingelaere 2011.). However, that *imihigo* function by compulsion is often assumed rather than demonstrated. In particular, none of these authors analysed the evaluation mechanisms of *imihigo*.¹⁰⁵ This research does not challenge the assertion that *imihigo* function through compulsion. *All* interviewees with whom *imihigo* were discussed underlined that they provided an important incentive for local bureaucrats. Rather, the objective is to better understand why this was so. Several reasons can be identified.

First, *imihigo* were signed in a very solemn manner with the President during a largely media publicised ceremony at the Parliament. This was broadcast on national television and radio and analysed in newspapers.¹⁰⁶ The population was made aware of the ranking of their district (Interview 69). The involvement of "the big man" himself conferred a special importance to *imihigo* evaluation (Interviews 67, 68, 72, 73, 84). This ceremony was also the occasion to

¹⁰⁵ With the exception of Nicaise (2015) who observed the process the same year as the author.

¹⁰⁶ E.g. "Imihigo: Government sets ambitious targets for 2014/15" the New Times, September 13, 2014, "Local govt leaders to sign innovative Imihigo model" 13/08/2015.

disclose the *imihigo* ranking of the previous year. The best mayors received congratulations and a prize from the President that was then displayed in district offices. Conversely, the situation was generally seen as humiliating for the poorer performers (Interviews 29, 40, 69 73).

Table 5.5 Activities related to fertilisers and maternal health in Huye district *imihigo*

No	Output	Indicator	Baseline (2011-2012)	Target	Cost (RwF)	Source of Funds
PILLAR I: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT						
Objective 1: Increase agriculture and Livestock production, Productivity and value addition.						
1	Land consolidated under CIP increased	Number of ha consolidated	7,336 Ha	7,265 ha of Cassava consolidated	5,598,887	District
			2,564 Ha	3,000 ha of Maize consolidated	12,543,172	District
			2,511 Ha	3,000 ha of Rice consolidated	9,872,322	District
			50 Ha	120 Ha of improved banana consolidated	11,876,086	RAB
			14,796 Ha	15,435 Ha of beans cultivated		District
2	Land Productivity increased	Number of tones/ha produced	3 T/Ha	3.5T/Ha of maize produced		District
			4T/Ha	5T/Ha of rice produced		District
PILLAR II: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT						
Objective 6: Improve access and use of quality health						
20	Population covered under health insurance scheme increased	% of population covered by health insurance	90,7 % of district population have Health Insurance Scheme	100% of District population under Health Insurance Scheme	376,869,860	District/ MoH
21	Health facilities constructed	Health Centre constructed	Contract signed	Health Centre constructed in Mukura Sector	500,000,000	MoH
22	Population using maternal and child health services increased	% of women using modern family planning methods	60% (42,566) of women are using modern contraceptives	70% (49,868) of women using modern contraceptives	10,885,380	District
		% of Women attending 4 antenatal visits	37%	45% of Women attending 4 antenatal visits	2,000,000	District
		Women delivering in health facilities	93%	95% of Women delivering in health facilities	1,000,000	District

Source: Extracted from Huye District *imihigo*, 2012-2013, obtained from MINALOC.

Second, this public ranking created strong dynamics of competition among districts (Interviews 40, 73, 69). Many informants put forward the culture of obedience and the importance given to reputation in Rwandan society as an explanation for the competitive spirit between districts (Interview 84; different informal discussions). Such a cultural explanation is

hard to substantiate. After all, the introduction in 2013 of administrative performance contracts in Burundi created a similar spirit of competition despite a questionable culture of obedience among Burundian civil servants. As explained below, the informal yet important role of performance in the political career of mayors provided a more tangible explanation to their desires to outperform each other.

Thirdly, the government was committed to make *imihigo* evaluation thorough and objective. To begin with, teams of evaluators were composed of high-level bureaucrats (often director-level) from different ministries making them relatively autonomous from potential demands from mayors. Yet, the fact that district mayors were generally quite senior in the RPF meant that they could potentially influence the career of young top RPF civil servants, which overall cast a doubt on the impartiality of evaluation, especially for the most powerful mayors. This may explain why all districts were generally well evaluated. For the 2012/2013 evaluation, the average score of a district was 94% (RoR 2013b:10) Nevertheless, the commitment to counteract these tendencies was visible. In 2013, a team of supervisors, composed of the permanent secretary of MINALOC and officials from the President's and Prime Minister's office toured evaluation teams to enforce "quality assurance" of the evaluation exercise and increase the autonomy of the evaluation team.¹⁰⁷ Following Kagame's criticisms in 2013 saying evaluation was too lenient, the *imihigo* system was revamped in 2014 (after fieldwork) and evaluations became conducted by a Rwandan Think Tank, and not by civil servants (IPAR 2015).

Second, although quick, the evaluation was reasonably thorough given the resources of the state. A district evaluation took two days. The first day was devoted to an audit and the session was highly ritualised. It started with a prayer for the district to have a good score, then all district members shouted their "war cry", i.e. the slogan of the district. The evaluators asked for proof of the activities that the district claimed to have performed. This for example was a delivery note of fertilisers to the district¹⁰⁸ or the invoices for the construction of a health centre. The relevant staff (for example a district agronomist) came forward to hand over the documents and answered the questions posed.¹⁰⁹ When an indicator was approved, the whole room applauded. The whole setting was quite solemn, organised similarly to a jury (Figure 5.3). The meeting was not limited to district staff, as sector and cell staff were present and sat at the back. When there was an issue concerning a precise sector (such as low crop

¹⁰⁷ Author's field notes, 16/07/2013.

¹⁰⁸ Before distribution was fully privatised in 2013.

¹⁰⁹ One common question related to the methodology used to reach a target. During the observation, one of the evaluators, the Director General for crops in the Ministry of Agriculture, asked how productivity was measured. As the answer remained evasive, the district received a low mark on this indicator.

productivity), the executive secretary of the sector was asked to stand up and give further explanations, often appearing visibly stressed.¹¹⁰

Figure 5.3 First day of the evaluation of the *imihigo* of Rulindo district



Source: Author's photo, 16/07/2013, Rulindo district. Two district officials are sitting in the middle to answer the questions of the evaluation team in front of them who are consulting the documents supporting the imihigo indicators. At the tables around sit the top officials of the districts and other evaluators. The quality insurance team sits at the table with the orange cloth on the right-hand side. At the back sit other district and sector officials.

The second day of the evaluation involved the observation on the ground. The evaluators checked with their own eyes if some activities selected in the *imihigo* had been performed, for example field terracing. The evaluation was extremely quick yet sometimes diligent.¹¹¹ At the end of the second day, evaluators gave recommendations to the district officials before gathering in a meeting room of the Ministry of Local Government back in Kigali. In turns,

¹¹⁰ Author's field notes, 16/07/2013.

¹¹¹ In one instance, evaluators went to see if the school toilet room was constructed. Yet, they were partly satisfied because the menstrual hygiene management room of the schoolgirls' toilets was not clean and had neither running water nor a closing bin (field notes, 17/07/14).

evaluators announced the score they gave to each *imihigo* activity. The final mark was the average of evaluators' scores. In case of large differences, the score was further discussed.¹¹²

Undoubtedly, this type of evaluation is not perfect. There was little time accorded for so many activities to be assessed and loopholes were in evidence. In the agriculture sector, the methods followed by the district in sampling sites to determine productivity was unclear. It is likely that district officials probably selected the most productive ones.¹¹³ The observations revealed nonetheless that *imihigo* evaluation was transparent and objective enough so that both the national and local governments took their results and ranking seriously. One vice-mayor remarked that '*imihigo* is the engine of everything', before lamenting that 'it is killing us, no one can escape it.' The phenomenon of local official falsifying data under pressure to reach their objectives has been important enough to gain its own verb in Kinyarwanda: *guteknica* or "to technicate." A glaring example was the resignation and arrest, widely covered by the media in late 2014 and early 2015, of three mayors (and several other officials) over inflating the *mutuelles* enrolment numbers for a better score at the *imihigo* evaluation.¹¹⁴ Generally speaking, non-performing bureaucrats were encouraged to resign rather than being fired because it was a much slower process. They often resigned since a dismissal would prevent them from working in the local administration again (Interview 69, 73). District mayors with regularly bad *imihigo* evaluations also asked to step down.¹¹⁵

The pressure to perform was such that it encouraged local leaders, besides tweaking numbers, to resort to expeditious, sometimes brutal, approaches. In the case of the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) to promote monocropping, local governments sometimes resorted to uprooting crops not planned by the programme even though this was officially forbidden.¹¹⁶ In health, the national target of 100% *mutuelle* enrolment pushed some local governments to use swift methods, such as fining, arresting, confiscating livestock or denying administrative documents to the non-bearers of *mutuelle* cards (Interview 89).¹¹⁷ The pressure for *mutuelle* enrolment was so high that local officials did not hesitate in one instance to steal money from a community health workers' cooperative in order to pay the *mutuelle* for the population (Interview 110).

¹¹² Based on personal observation (field notes, 17/07/2013). Nicaise (2015: 402) states however that the most controversial *imihigo* evaluations are sorted out behind closed doors.

¹¹³ Field notes, 16/07/13.

¹¹⁴ "How probe uncovered the rot in 'Mutuelle de Sante'", The New Times, 03/02/15.

¹¹⁵ "Behind resignation of district mayors", The New Times, 05/01/2015.

¹¹⁶ "Rwanda: Farmers Decry 'Overzealous' Local Leaders." Rwanda Focus, March 24, 2013.

¹¹⁷ See also "Rwanda: No One Should Be Forced to Pay Mutuelle – Premier." Rwanda Focus February 15, 2013.

This top-down pressure meant that local governments had to be responsive to contradictory demands from the centre: taking into account the local context, not necessarily conducive to swift implementation, and meeting ambitious targets. As summarised by a district official complaining about the MoH criticising local government methods to boost *mutuelle* enrolment, “it is their role in Kigali to get concerned by human rights and stuff like this. But it is not them on the ground [doing the work]. They don’t understand that for the peasants, the *mutuelles* are viewed as a tax” (Interview 84). Such pressure also created less expeditious and more creative strategies for *mutuelle* enrolment. Local governments for example encouraged people to create savings associations (*ibimina*) to pay their *mutuelle* cards. They also pushed agricultural cooperatives to pay the *mutuelles* of, or at least lend money to, its members (Interviews 6, 20, 69).¹¹⁸

This analysis of the functioning of the *imihigo* system reveals that the *imihigo* acted as a very powerful transmission belt between the commanding heights of the Rwandan state and its field offices and trenches, to use Migdal’s metaphor.

Although this analysis reveals that the pressure on local officials was mainly top-down, bottom-up pressures were not absent in Rwanda. Especially, the media were often cited as playing a crucial role in putting pressure on mayors (Interviews 29, 67, 69, 72, 73, 88). As explained by a district health officer, “the community calls on the radio to say that something is not working [*que quelque chose ne va pas*] and if I can’t explain to the mayor, there’s going to be trouble [*ça chauffe!*]” (Interview 72). A vice mayor concurred: the media “they are killing us as well [...] we are joking but we say that one should close the journalism schools” (interview 69). This role of the media was facilitated by the fact that a national policy encouraged all local government officials to be easily accessible to the population and media. For example, local officials had to have their photographs along with their phone numbers on the door of their offices so they could be called anytime by anyone.¹¹⁹ Wandering in any local government buildings in Rwanda revealed that this measure was systematically enforced. A popular joke in a district visited was that officials’ phone numbers would soon be found in public toilets (Interview 69). Furthermore, the phone numbers and e-mails of all presidents of district councils, district executive secretaries and district agronomists were public on the website of the Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA).¹²⁰ This reflected a general concern in Rwanda to bring the bureaucracy closer to the people.

¹¹⁸ See also “Rwanda: How *Ibimina* Spurred Health Cover Remittal”, The New Times, January, 3, 2014.

¹¹⁹ The requirement was the same at national level.

¹²⁰ <http://ralgarwanda.org/resources/good-to-know/article/contacts-for-local-government>. Accessed 19 December 2014.

Interviewees regularly underlined the fact that mayors could not be “little gods” anymore as the *bourgmestres* were under Habyarimana (Interviews 6, 67, 77, 92).

This emphasis on accountability of local officials to the people was also reinforced by the tight control over abuse and corruption. For example, in a district visited in the Southern Province, officials from the Ombudsman office visited between two and four times a year to gather the population’s complaints on governance issues, while officials from the Office of the Auditor General came once a year to audit the district.

These findings reveal that, although the Rwandan local state has sometimes been considered as a “highly top-down, authoritarian, and non-democratic set of institutional structure” (Ingelaere 2010), freedom of expression was not totally banned. It was selectively allowed, not to debate politics and national policies, but to support the implementation of these policies. For example, media had a relatively free rein when it was about criticising officials for failing to implement or were undermining national policies. Complaints to the Ombudsman locally were encouraged. Such a dynamic was similar at national level. While political space in Rwanda was restricted, freedom of expression seemed acceptable only as long as it enhanced the effectiveness of the state to implement its stated objectives by denouncing shortcomings in implementation.

Discussion

Overall, the formal institutions of monitoring, incentivising and disciplining local bureaucrats differed between Burundi and Rwanda. In Burundi, these institutions were reinforced after the end of the war but remained relatively weak, with some lack of discipline at the local level. This is not to say, however, that state effectiveness was uniformly poor in Burundi. As demonstrated by the case of PBF in the health sector or fertiliser in agriculture, policy implementation could be successful, especially when donors were heavily involved. The implication for state effectiveness in Burundi will be discussed in Chapter 8. In addition, interviewees regularly quoted cases of “young and brilliant health district chiefs” (Interview 217, see also 207, 231) or “communal councillors very involved and doing an excellent job” (Interview 171, also 223). This reveals that, besides donors’ intervention, state effectiveness could occur because of the *personal traits* of bureaucrats. In Burundi, because of the relative weakness of formal institutions, state effectiveness hinged more on *idiosyncrasy* than on a *system*. In contrast, these formal institutions in Rwanda were stronger. Local officials were embedded in a bureaucracy with multiple monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. Consequently, state effectiveness was more *systematic* than in Burundi and less likely to

depend on personal traits. In other words, state effectiveness was more institutionalised in Rwanda than in Burundi.

While the difference in state performance observed between Burundi and Rwanda was obvious, it could be argued that, from a time perspective, it should not be exaggerated. The formal institutional framework in Burundi was continuously reinforced from the end of the war through the period of fieldwork in 2013-15. Consequently, it is possible to assume that the difference observed is only one of institutional maturation. With time, Burundi will “catch-up.” This interpretation however does not hold in the face of the evidence presented below. The source of the generalised “laissez-faire” attitude in Burundi was not just a weak yet improving formal system. It was also and mainly because formal institutions were competing with informal alternative “rules of the game.” By contrast, the high degree of monitoring, incentivising and disciplining of local bureaucrats in Rwanda was achieved through strong formal mechanisms reinforced by the informal institutions underpinning the local state. The difference of state effectiveness locally in Burundi and Rwanda was consequently not only a difference of formal institutional strength that might waned in the long run. It was also, and crucially, the result of opposite political dynamics underpinning the local state, to which the chapter now turns.

5.3 Informal institutions and the local state

Burundi: politics against the state

Albeit weaker than in Rwanda, the formal rules and procedures of the local state in Burundi were continuously reinforced after the end of the war, especially due to donors’ contributions. However, these formal institutions in Burundi were systematically competing with informal “rules of the game.” It was this competition, rather than the weakness of the formal institutions *per se*, which explained the ineffectiveness of the local state.

First of all, loyalty of a communal administrator was often oriented to his/her party, which was in the overwhelming majority of cases the CNDD-FDD,¹²¹ rather than to the state, or the population that elected them. “Administrators want the audience of the party, not of the population” (Interview 207, see also 171). This tendency was first created by the party-list proportional representation used for communal elections. People voted for closed lists

¹²¹ In 2005, 97 of the 129 communes were controlled by the CNDD-FDD (Reyntjens 2006:124). Following the 2010 elections, only six communes eventually elected administrators from another party (International Crisis Group 2011: 8).

composed by each party, and not for individuals.¹²² The consequence was that “such arrangements leave local candidates more concerned with their promotion and advancement within internal party structures than promoting policies and initiatives that benefit the local community at large” (Gaynor 2014b: 212; see also Interviews 171, 173). Whilst this electoral arrangement can be found in other countries,¹²³ the peculiarity of the Burundian case was that, once elected, the commune council did not necessarily elect as administrator the first individual on the list (Interviews 171, 184, 207). Voters consequently had little influence on the individual that ultimately became the communal administrator. Overall, this meant that “if a person is an administrator, it is thanks to the party rather than the population or his work” (Interview 171).¹²⁴

As a consequence, political militancy was favoured over competence in the selection of communal councillors (Interview 171; Ngabonziza 2011: 55; World Bank 2014: 32). Administrators, as other council members, were generally poorly educated (Interviews 171, 173, 184). This was partly due to the fact that low salaries may not have attracted university graduates to the job (although possibilities for illegal enrichment were plentiful as explained below). Possibly it was difficult to find university graduates for the 129 Burundian communes.¹²⁵ Yet, before the war, administrators were legally required to have a bachelor’s degree (*license*) (Interview 184; Ngabonziza 2011: 55), which was apparently the case for the vast majority of them (Interview 207).¹²⁶ After 2005, a lower secondary school education was sufficient to become administrator (Ngabonziza 2011: 55).

As a consequence, low education may also have reflected the sociology of CNDD-FDD activists, historically young, poorly educated people from rural areas (Interviews 138, 202, 203, 229). The importance of activism in the party was partly supported by an analysis of the background of communal administrators before their election (Figure 5.4). The vast majority were teachers with typically lower secondary school education¹²⁷ (Interviews 173). Several factors can be identified for this overrepresentation. First, as in other African countries, teachers were often respected and popular in villages given their status, which made them

¹²² This was not the case for hill council elections, which were on an individual basis. And maybe for this reason, hill councils enjoyed greater popularity among the population than commune councils (Interview 223).

¹²³ For example, in French communal elections.

¹²⁴ Unsurprisingly, it seems that the population was quite unhappy with this ballot system (Interview 171).


¹²⁵ After a reform in November 2014 (i.e. after fieldwork) which became effective during the communal elections of June 2015, their number was reduced to 119. The 13 communes of the province of urban Bujumbura (“Bujumbura Mairie”) previously ruled by the governor and without financial and legal autonomy from the province became autonomous and were reduced to three.

¹²⁶ In a personal communication, the Ministry of Decentralisation and Communal Development indicated that they would have liked to re-introduce the requirement that administrators must have a university degree in the next communal law. This did not happen when the new 2014 communal law was passed.

¹²⁷ D6 in the Burundian education system, i.e. four years of secondary schooling.

good candidates for local elections (Interview 229). Furthermore, teachers were regularly courted by the CNDD-FDD during the civil war. They were seen as local opinion leaders, who were able to foster support for the rebellion (Interviews 227, 229). Their role as promoter of the CNDD-FDD during the war locally might explain their overrepresentation in local political positions in Burundi.

Figure 5.4 Occupation of the 116 communal administrators before their elections



Source: Ministry of Interior. As of February 2014 and excluding the then 13 non-autonomous communes of Bujumbura, which were merged in three autonomous communes in 2015

Administrators were active politically. They regularly organised political meetings for the CNDD-FDD and were in charge of the communal works each Saturday. Communal works were not governed by any official regulation or laws as in Rwanda. They were mostly attended by local CNDD-FDD officials (often in the party uniform and singing party songs), eager to demonstrate their commitment to the party. Unlike in Rwanda, no formal mechanisms to ensure attendance existed (Interviews 206, 229, 231, 238). Yet, given the political priority of health centre and school construction to accompany the CNDD-FDD's flagship policy of free education and maternal health, the communal works were regularly used, besides political mobilisation, to construct health centres and schools.

The politicisation of the state officials' activities would not have been necessarily a hindrance to state effectiveness if such activities supported state missions. However, this was generally not the case. The informal political "rules of the game" in Burundi directly worked against the state locally through three main mechanisms: undermining of state hierarchy, clientelism and corruption.

First, CNDD-FDD constituted a parallel power structure that consistently undermined state procedures, with the party hierarchy systematically superseding the administrative hierarchy. For example, in communes dominated by the CNDD-FDD (i.e. nearly all of them after 2010) the party leader was stronger than elected officials or bureaucrats. To the question “what is the main point of pressure on communal administrators?”, informants regularly cited the local party leader as number one (Interview 171, 207, 229, 227, 231). This was especially detrimental to state effectiveness because the party chief at the communal level was often different from the communal administrator. The reason lay apparently in clientelist drives to create more posts to be distributed to party members (Interviews 227, 229). In a commune outside Bujumbura, the provincial governor was described as taking orders directly from the CNDD-FDD party chief (Interviews 229, 231). The governor was also politically weaker than the communal administrator, normally his subordinate, because the administrator was a former high-ranking political commissar for the CNDD-FDD during the war (Interview 229).

The most salient example of competition between formal state hierarchy and informal party “rules of the game” encountered during fieldwork was in August 2013. It took the form of a conflict between the governor of Kayanza province and the administrator of Kayanza commune (in the same province) both members of the CNDD-FDD, in the North of the country. As the governor was presiding over a meeting of the provincial motorcycle association on August 22, 2013, the administrator burst into the meeting asking for its cancellation because he was not informed of it. However, regulations had indeed been respected since it was a province-level meeting presided over by his administrative superior and head of the province, the governor. Yet, the administrator asked the three policemen accompanying him to stop the meeting. The governor and administrator nearly came to blows before being separated by other policemen the governor had called. Following this incident, and in accordance with the law, the governor suspended the administrator on 9th September 2013. He was however reinstated in his functions by the communal council. Eventually the conflict between the governor and the administrator was resolved to the benefit of the latter when the President of the Republic removed the governor from office. The reason for the ultimate victory of the administrator was that he was the provincial head of the party CNDD-FDD, i.e. superior to the governor in the party. Consequently, he was able to have his administrative superior removed from his post (Interviews 207, 227).¹²⁸

¹²⁸ See also “Kayanza: une province à deux gouverneurs ?”, Iwacu 01/09/2013; “Gouverneur vs administrateur de Kayanza: un combat des égos” Iwacu 20/09/2013

This logic was also pervasive in vertical ministries. In the health sector for example, a case encountered during fieldwork was the one of a health province director in the North of the country who made a “request for clarifications” [*demande d’explication*, i.e. summoning a civil servant to get explanations on misconduct] to a pharmacy director because she regularly closed the pharmacy during official opening hours, which disrupted drugs provision in the province. Yet instead, the director of the health province was transferred to another province because the pharmacy director had greater influence than him in the party (Interview 219).

Ranking within the CNDD-FDD was not the only example of informal norms competing with the formal institutions of the local state. Rather, it was the most salient one in a complex system of norms involving ethnicity, personal ties, and region of origin. The following quote summarises a viewpoint heard numerous times about the kind of informal norms that could supersede state rules in Burundi:

Interviewer: How is the relation between the commune and the vertical ministries? [...] Does an administrator have influence compared to the head of a health district for example? [...]

Informant: If an administrator is CNDD-FDD, the director of the health district or health province, if he is not from the same party, he has nothing to say. If he is from the same party, unless the administrator is the cousin or the brother in law of the president, the administrator won’t say anything because then, it is the level of education that is talking. Or if the health province director is CNDD-FDD but Tutsi, or from Gitega, if he is in Ngozi, he can’t have more power than a Hutu communal administrator from Ngozi.” (Interview 227).

It is important to understand that Ngozi is the province of President Nkurunziza and thus might have special political weight in clientelist bargain. As shown by this quote, being from the president’s family or having a connection with him trumped any other criteria of power. Then party membership was the strongest criteria, especially being party member, a Hutu, as well as from the President’s native region. Otherwise, formal hierarchy applied. The better educated health district or health province director, which were under the authority of the Ministry of Health did not have to answer to the commune administrator.

The second mechanism through which informal rules undermined state effectiveness in Burundi was clientelism. As summarised by a former hill chief about his own commune, “the party is controlling the labour market” (Interview 229). Party membership was the main way to secure a job in the local administration through political patrons. Participation in the CNDD-FDD rebellion was a first criterion to secure access to jobs or rents. The justification of this preferential treatment was epitomised by the question in Kirundi typically asked by ex-CNDD-FDD combatants to anyone challenging such favouritism: “wamaze iki?”, meaning

“what was your contribution (during the war)?” (Interviews 138, 201, 203). Given the spiralling of clientelism in Burundi, this same phrase was increasingly used as a joke to denounce the privileges enjoyed by some former CNDD-FDD rebels (Interview 138). A good illustration of the enduring importance of “war credentials” as informal criteria of power locally was that the powerful administrator and former political commissar mentioned above was still called by his rank during the war, “Major”, by the population (Interview 229).

Consequently, “for any jobs, even for the smallest agricultural monitor job, you have to be a member of the party” (Interviews 207, see also 229, 231, and additional private communications). The Health sector was particularly marked by clientelism given the donors’ money it attracted: “in the health sector in Burundi, [access to jobs] is locked [*vérouillé*] because regarding salaries, they follow the *bazungu* [the whites]” (Interview 229, see also 216). The relative weakness of the health districts and provinces identified above was a direct consequence of clientelism. Staff turnover was huge in health districts, apparently a consequence of the need to regularly reward loyal party members. Health districts were often headed by young directors “with limited experience, parachuted into the job for political reasons, and who consequently have difficulty imposing their authority” (Interview 223; see also 186, 189, 193, 195, 216, 217, 219). In a hospital visited as part of the fieldwork for this thesis, doctors who were not party members stayed on a temporary contract instead of having a public sector permanent contract (Interview 216). Clientelism was increasing with the approach of the 2015 elections. As explained by a doctor:

normally the governor does not put too much pressure [on the hospital director], except these days with the problem of political parties.¹²⁹ Now the governor intervenes, and the chief of the party [CNDD-FDD] as well. They push the director to hire this one but not that one, or to fire this one. These days, it is becoming serious [*ça devient grave*] (Interview 216).

This party favouritism sometimes elicited passive resistance, as explained by a hospital administrative employee in the south of the country:

The party wants us to hire Mr. so-and-so. The governor will put some pressure on us. We, we are frustrated as soon as they meddle in. We try to shirk and even sometimes we simply don’t recruit [for this reason] (Interview 237).

Sometimes, the practice of clientelism was combined with bypassing the state hierarchy, as reported by a doctor:

¹²⁹ The interviewee was referring to the increasing political violence at the time of the fieldwork as the 2015 elections were approaching.

In fact, if you don't have a strong hospital director, politically neutral, there are always problems. It is not our case here so we are lucky. But still the administrative and finance director [DAF] is from the party and this has negative consequences: it is said that to get hired, if you are not from the party, the DAF won't accept (Interview 216).

The consequences of party favouritism for the monitoring and disciplining of state agents was disastrous as workers came to prioritise party rules instead of the state's formal rules. A former worker in health at the provincial level in the north of the country gave the following illustration: "if someone is head of a health centre and does not do his job, we just can't move him. He will say 'you put me there [in this job]? No, so it is not you that is going to move me from there'" (Interview 223).

Corruption was the third mechanism undermining state effectiveness locally. Party membership was not the only way to get a job. Financial contributions to the party or to its powerful members became increasingly important (Interviews 227, 229, 231). After the landslide electoral victory of the CNDD-FDD in 2010, which ensured near hegemony in local and national organisations, corruption was unbridled (Interviews 138, 231). Money was increasingly taking precedence over party seniority or any political loyalty. With significant financial contributions, it became easy to buy oneself a senior position in the CNDD-FDD or to get a state job without even joining the party (Interviews 227, 229, 231).¹³⁰

Most striking was that these practices were becoming institutionalised in the sense that they were routinely enforced and provided a way to reduce uncertainty to the point where informants were able to give the price of bribes, or a rule to estimate them. For example, in one commune, jobs in education required a month of salary paid upfront to the patron (Interview 229). In another region in the west of the country, bribes to get a schoolteacher position followed market rules: the higher the need for a teacher or the higher the education of the candidate, the lower the bribe.¹³¹

Overall, these findings are consistent with the few academic works that explored local governance in Burundi (Uvin 2008; Gaynor 2014b). Writing in 2008, Uvin characterised governance in Burundi during the war as "an institutionalised system of corruption, social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack of accountability and clientelism. It has gorged itself for decades on aid money" (2008: 109). He was however tentatively hopeful as

¹³⁰ This was also true for success in business. In a commune visited, to get a spot for a market stall, one had to see not the administrators nor the governor but the chief of CNDD-FDD (Interview 231).

¹³¹ Private communication, December 2013.

the 2005 elections “brought to power a new party [the CNDD-FDD] with many new and young faces in it, and, at least rhetorically with a commitment to profoundly change the nature of Burundi’s state” (ibid.). The present findings reveal that this was a false hope.

Formal rules of the state governing the coordination of local officials, their evaluation, or fiscal transfer from the centre, were relatively weak in Burundi although sustained efforts were made, especially by donors, after the end of the war to reinforce them. The main issue was that they were constantly competing with informal rules of the game in the form of clientelism, corruption or efforts to ensure the CNDD-FDD party dominance locally. The latter aspect especially created a parallel power structure, rival to the state, that constantly defied state hierarchy. As a result, informal rules in Burundi created “a system where working well is dangerous” (Interview 229).

Rwanda: politics in support of the state

Informal rules underpinning local governance in Rwanda reinforced, rather than hindered, state effectiveness. They did so through two mechanisms. First, they allowed the centre to preserve its influence locally, influence that it used to push policy implementation. Second, informal rules constituted an additional layer of monitoring mechanisms of local bureaucrats which functioned in line with state goals.

As in Burundi before the war, heads of communes in Rwanda used to be appointed by the president. The decentralisation reform in 2006 established elections at every tier of local government, except the provincial level. Yet, downward accountability to the population was slim, as the electoral system created only a tenuous link between the population and their representatives. Effectiveness of the state was however preserved by the upward accountability of politicians to the centre.

The political system at the local level allowed the national level to preserve its influence locally by depoliticising local politics. What this means is not that local politicians did not have political affiliations or loyalties. On the contrary, all district mayors but one belonged to the RPF (as of March 2015).¹³² Those who were members were all heads of the RPF at the district level. All sector executive secretaries were heads of the RPF at sector-level (Interview 101). Local politics was, however, depoliticised in the sense that it prevented politicians from

¹³² The only non-RPF mayor was from the Socio-Democrat Party (PSD) mayor of Ngoma district, in Eastern Province.

articulating competing political projects and mobilising followers around them. In addition, unlike in Burundi, political loyalty was a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the selection of local politicians. Their technocratic profile and capacity to implement national policies was also central in their selection.

Depoliticisation of the local state was first achieved by the ban on party competition at the local level: candidates were not allowed to claim partisan affiliation and parties were not allowed to campaign.¹³³ Second, elections were hardly determinant in choosing the politicians with executive power. Elected officials formed the cell or sector council that had only a consultative role while power rested in the hands of appointed executive secretaries. At the district level, the elected council played a greater role: it was in charge of, among other things, the approval of annual budgets, five-year district development plans, action plans and the recruitment of personnel. The mayor and the vice-mayors were elected, and could be removed by the council. However, their elections were “depoliticised” since members of sector and district councils were elected indirectly from the level below, with reserved seats for representatives of the interest group organisation of women, youth, disabled and private sector.¹³⁴ Consequently, in the case of the district, councillors were elected after two, and the mayor three, tiers of indirect elections starting from the cell. In addition, the corporatist character of the local political system whereby non-elected representatives of interest group organisations get reserved seats further decreased popular influence on council composition. Overall, these formal arrangements “depoliticised” local politics because the link between voters (and their preferences) and their representatives (and their actions) was tenuous. It made it difficult for the population to hold local representatives accountable or choose between different political propositions (see also Lutz 2005). Overall, this design produced a benign political competition: elections were hardly decisive either in the running of the sectors or the cells. Besides, the local political system, with its many indirect elections and its corporatist flavour, multiplied space for the centre to intervene (Ingelaere 2011: 71-73; Gaynor 2013: 42-43 for some illustrations).

The question is therefore: for what purpose did the centre use this political space at the local level? Was it to engage in rent capture as in Burundi? This research argues that the centre used

¹³³ At the national level, partisan affiliation is authorised but downplayed in parliament. For example, MPs sit in alphabetical orders rather than according to political affiliation.

¹³⁴ Specifically, the district council was composed of a councillor elected at the level of each sector of the district, the member of the Bureau of the National Youth Council at district level and the coordinator of the National Council of Women at district level, the Coordinator of the National Council of Persons with Disabilities at the District level, the Chairperson of the private sector federation at the District level (law N° 87/2013 of 11/09/2013, article 126).

this space to promote a technocratic local elite, loyal to the centre, able to uphold an effective state. This dynamic can be best shown by analysing the final redesign of local governments in 2006. Decentralisation, by creating new political positions, can be a way to increase opportunities of clientelism (e.g. Green 2010). Conversely, reduction of the number local government entities may encounter political resistance as in Burundi. Remarkably, the case of Rwanda was the opposite. The drastic reduction of political entities in 2006 created many losers. Yet, the central government did not shy away from it because leaders were adamant about streamlining local governments. As explained by Protais Musoni, then Minister of Local Government, at the end of the first phase of decentralisation (2001–06), the government realised that the 106 districts were not financially viable unless their size increased. Besides, their high number fragmented the resources for investment projects. Districts were consequently merged. They were also redesigned so that each had ecological uniformity (Interview 94). The drive behind the Rwandan decentralisation was therefore not the creation of clientelist opportunities but the rationalisation public investment and increase the effectiveness of the central state.

This deep institutional reform offered an opportunity to promote a technocratic local political elite. In 2005, before the final institutional redesign, MINALOC engaged in a process of identifying and retaining the best elements in the local bureaucracy. In anticipation of the major reduction of staff, governors were tasked to organise an evaluation of all civil servants at province and district level according to a standardised evaluation framework. The evaluation aimed to determine who to keep and the results were discussed in one-to-one meetings with the affected civil servant. An appeals system was in place, with the local government minister judging litigious cases as a last resort (Interview 94). If not retained, people were offered a reconversion package, often a scholarship to return to studies. (Interviews 92, 94).

The same process was applied to politicians, yet informally. Provincial governors were in charge of identifying talents that could be backed as candidates for mayor. As recalled by one governor:

[Confidential evaluation of politicians] were sent to the Ministry of Local Government who was the ministry in charge. It must have been evaluated within the RPF, that's how it works. And then we suggested them [the selected candidates], encouraged them to run for election. We worked for them. Because with the electoral system, it is not a secret for anyone, often when we designate him [the candidate], and tell him to go and run for election in such district, he has the support of all the resources they [the RPF] have (Interview 92).

As a consequence, those with technocratic profiles, who were knowledgeable about the functioning of local government, were promoted. It is not to say however that the political profile did not matter. As in Burundi, political loyalty remained a criterion of selection. Political loyalty however was a *necessary yet insufficient* condition. As explained by a former governor: “talent is first [in the selection of local politicians], after, he can join the RPF, even if he was not member first. [...] I also know lots of people who were loyal but lost their jobs” (Interview 92).

The goal in Rwanda was not to engage in large-scale clientelism by rewarding party members with state jobs as in Burundi. Rather, joining the party could occur subsequently. The objective was not only to promote party hegemony but also to ensure political control without hindering state effectiveness.

Going back to the territorial administration, the consequence of the local government reforms was that local executives were rarely former military personnel or long-standing RPF members. They were university graduates (which is, unlike in Burundi, legally required) who started their career in the administration:


I think the majority who rose [qui ont monté] after decentralisation [...] were executive secretaries of sectors that distinguished themselves in the organisation and to whom we gave a promotion, and who became mayor (Interview 92).

Being a successful mayor was rewarded by the RPF:

If you are a successful mayor, you know that the party will never abandon you. You will always have the guarantee of a job. They will always put you somewhere (Interview 101).

Such analysis is corroborated by data on mayors' backgrounds from 2013 (Figure 5.5). Former local civil servants were clearly over-represented: 53% of mayors (as of September 2013) were local government civil servants immediately before their election. The proportion reaches 60% if ex-local civil servants who returned from further studies are included.

Figure 5.5 Occupation of the Rwanda district mayors before their election



Source: private communication. As of September 2013.

One could argue that in a developing country, where the state provides most of the jobs for educated people, this is not surprising. However, two aspects indicate that it was knowledge of how local government operated, rather than the mere fact of being highly educated, that was remarkable in the mayors' profiles. First, mayors that were civil servants at national level just before elections represented only 10%. Among the three of them, two were working in the Ministry of Local Government. Second, of the 16 who previously worked in local administration, 13 became mayors in the district they were working in. This shows that highly educated people were not randomly given jobs anywhere in the country. Instead, the picture is one of a local administration producing its own local leaders.

This interpretation of a decentralisation promoting depoliticised and technocratic profiles is further corroborated by the analysis of the first district elections after the genocide, held in 2001. At the time, the relatively fair, yet controlled, elections of non-executive local government councillors have been interpreted by the International Crisis Group (ICG) as an effort to allow "a new generation of 'wise men', fitting the RPF definition of good leadership, [to have] the opportunity to come forward" (ICG 2001: 21). The RPF's vision was constant from the very beginning of decentralisation, through the 2006 reforms. Local performance was to be an essential criterion by which politicians were selected. The ICG further remarked in 2001 that "the decentralisation programme was designed in part to identify these wise men and women and give them a chance to prove themselves, according to the RPF criteria" (ibid: 5). This wholly resonates with the present analysis.

This pattern of selection of local politicians further enhanced the control of the centre at the local level as local politicians (and civil servants), often quite young and after a meteoric rise, were grateful to the central government for facilitating such a trajectory. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that the Rwandan state was completely autonomous from society because capacity and political loyalty to the centre were the sole criteria for the recruitment of local officials. It was not the case. Other criteria also came into play and reveal that the autonomy of the state, if significant, was not total. Ethnicity, although taboo in public discourse, was taken into account for the selection of mayors in order to ensure a minimum representation of Hutu. The origins of Tutsi candidates also mattered. A balance had to be struck between the Anglophone returnees from Uganda, the francophone returnees from Burundi and Congo, and the francophone Tutsi who never left Rwanda.¹³⁵ Finally, religion was also taken into account in selection of mayors to ensure that the Muslim community was represented (Interview 101, different informal conversations).

Finally, the comparison with Burundi emphasises how the informal rules of governance in Rwanda at the local level were not used to engage in large-scale rent-seeking. At the local level, informal financial extractions took the form of financial contributions to national programmes collected by local officials in people's home or workplace. Such programmes included for example financial support to survivors, support to the poor (*indigents*), support to switch from 9 to 12-year basic education, or contributions to the *Agaciro* funds aimed at boosting the financial self-reliance of the state following the aid cuts of 2012 (Interview 40). In the case of the *Agaciro* fund, zealous senior officials even deducted money from their staff's pay to contribute to the fund, a practice that was later officially banned (Interview 110).¹³⁶ This reveals a major difference with Burundi. The money extracted informally was not graft and was not done on behalf of a party but of the state. Although informants complained about these practices, none ever questioned the fact that the money was indeed used for what the government claimed it would be (Interviews 105, 293).

¹³⁵ Each group gained a nickname in the years immediately following the genocide, a sign of the divisions among Tutsi in post-genocide Rwanda. The returnees from Uganda were the *abasajya*, because of their regular use of "umusajya", or "man" to address each other, in a mix of Kiganda and Kinyarwanda. The diaspora from Burundi were called the GP, the acronym of the Habyarimana's Garde Présidentielle, known for its ruthlessness against Tutsi. This term was applied to the Burundian diaspora of Rwandan Tutsi as they were the most extremist regarding ethnicity. The Tutsi from Congo were the Dubai, because of their flamboyant style and as a reference to the amount of fake goods you could find in Congo, comparable to Dubai. The Tutsi who never left Rwanda were the Sopecya. Sopecya (for Société des Pétroliers de Cyangugu) was the name of a petrol station in Kigali that was a point of reference in the city and which, by extension, came to designate the "local" Tutsi (different private communications). Due to the taboo surrounding ethnicity, it was not possible to have a full breakdown of mayors according to their ethnicity in Rwanda.

¹³⁶ "Agaciro Fund: Govt workers allege coercion", *The East African*, October 20 2012; US State Department (2014: 14).

Overall, informal political norms at the local level in Rwanda created opposite consequences on state effectiveness compared to Burundi. First, local politicians and bureaucrats were relatively competent because they were selected not only on political criteria but on their capacity to implement policies. Second, the party and state hierarchy did not conflict with one another as in Burundi. This was ensured by the simple fact that district mayors and sector executive secretaries were respectively the head of the RPF at the district and sector levels.

5.4 Conclusion

Shifting focus from policy design in Chapters 3 and 4 to local state functioning in this chapter gives new insights on state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda. Following Migdal's invitation to engage in an "anthropology of the state" (Migdal 1997), and assessing the different "calculus of pressures" (ibid. 87) along its different levels, this chapter has analysed the drivers, and obstacles, to policy implementation locally.

The findings indicate first that formal institutions were weaker in Burundi than in Rwanda. In Burundi, formal institutions –e.g. rules governing the functioning of the territorial and deconcentrated administrations, the evaluation of local officials, fiscal transfers etc.– were strengthened after the war but remained weak. In contrast, Rwanda built a tight apparatus disciplining and monitoring of local civil servants that ensured state effectiveness. As a consequence, effectiveness in Rwanda depended on a system whereas in Burundi it hinged more on idiosyncratic factors, such as officials' personalities or donors' interventions.

The formal institutional design of the state in Rwanda, which clearly specified the role of each level of the local administration and their relation with line ministries, and instituted the routinized evaluation of local officials through *imihigo*, allowed the centre to retain tight administrative and political control over the local level. This ultimately ensured rapid implementation of national policies. The maintenance of "centralisation" in disguise of decentralisation echoes many African cases (Wunsh 2001; Crook 2003). However, the evidence indicates that the Rwandan pattern was distinct at least in three major respects. First, control, and to a certain extent planning, were very centralised yet policy execution was truly decentralised, which enhanced effectiveness. Second, the level of emphasis on performance that permeated the whole state apparatus (to reach the household level) is unheard of in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Third, decentralisation was not only used to enhance state effectiveness. It was also used, as shown with the example of *imihigo* or the media locally, to advertise the efforts of the government. Fourth, the effect of political decentralisation was also unusual. Decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa is often a way to accommodate local elites,

especially by offering possibilities for resource capture (Boone 2003; Crook 2003; Green 2010). This phenomenon was altogether absent in Rwanda.

Through tight planning and monitoring, the centre was able to retain greater coordination, shift priorities and get information flowing to the bottom to implement its policies. Undoubtedly, this sometimes paved the way for perverse incentives such as “cooking” numbers or harsh implementation at the expense of local ownership. This said, it facilitated diffusion of a culture of delivering results to the lowest level of the state apparatus. As one vice-mayor said, “you see this table [pointing at the *imihigo*], now everyone knows what it is and how to read it. Everyone knows what is an output, a baseline, a target” (Interview 85). Although hard to measure, this educational effect of decentralisation was extremely useful in diffusing a norm of results-oriented work in the Rwandan bureaucracy, which many neighbouring countries such as Burundi would have envied.

In Burundi the decentralisation was less advanced, but this in itself is insufficient to explain lower effectiveness. It could be argued after all that with time and further support from donors, Burundi would eventually “catch-up” with Rwanda. The analysis presented in this chapter reveals that this is unlikely to be the case. Going back to the discussion in the introduction, decentralisation succeeds depending on the kind of political environment in which it takes place. Given the detrimental effects of informal rules in Burundi, one can wonder to what extent further formal decentralisation or further donors’ support would have increased state effectiveness. These informal rules superseded the formal rules of the state. The most significant cases were the informal rules governing access to rent (corruption), access to jobs (favouritism and clientelism), and the informal understanding that an individual’s position in the CNDD-FDD gave them rights to challenge their supervisor in the administrative structure. In other words, a maze of non-written rules was clashing, and superseding, the formal rules of the state as codified in laws and regulations. In Rwanda, decentralisation increased state effectiveness because it was not weakened but reinforced by informal rules at local government level, such as promotion and dismissal of mayors depending, *inter alia*, on their performance.

Overall, analysis of local governance shows that the picture is one of a much more unitary state in Rwanda. The state’s unity was guaranteed by dense flows of information and a compact apparatus for monitoring civil servants. In Burundi, communication was difficult between, but also within, different state organisations. Orders had difficulty travelling down the state apparatus as official channels could be easily overridden by parallel structures of power. The state was less unitary and consequently less effective. While the state is an

“organisation divided’ (Migdal 1997: 231), it was much more divided in Burundi than in Rwanda

Consequently, the understanding of state effectiveness in both countries is largely incomplete without a thorough analysis of the relationship between formal and informal institutions. In both countries, the state was paralleled by informal power structures, mainly found within the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD and the RPF. In both country, accountability of local officials flowed mainly upward as political career was mainly due to the party, not to popular accountability.

As a result, loyalty to the party rather than to the population did not *per se* lead to state ineffectiveness. Yet the influence of the ruling party on local politics was used differently. In Burundi, these criteria for selecting politicians were money and/or track record of involvement in the CNDD-FDD. In Rwanda, besides political loyalty, ability to implement policy was the criteria of selection and disciplining of officials. In other words, recruitment and evaluation of officials in Burundi by the party were not linked, and were even in tension with, their capacity to ensure the effectiveness of the state, whereas they were largely related in Rwanda. What this reveals is that the political project at the heart of the RPF was congruent with state objectives. In contrast, in Burundi, the CNDD-FDD objectives were hard to reconcile with state functioning.

Therefore, it was not the existence of parallel power structures *per se*, nor the degree of accountability to the population that explained the difference in state effectiveness between the two cases. It was the nature of the commitment of each country’s political elite. For this reason, it is the ruling elite’s commitment to state effectiveness that has to be explained, which is the goal of chapter 7.

Chapter 6

State effectiveness at the central-level:

Selecting and monitoring civil servants, disciplining donors

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the causes of state effectiveness at the central-level. It identifies what processes of selection, monitoring, and disciplining of civil servants in central offices may impact their capacity to pursue the government's stated goals. To do so, it adopts an organisational perspective similar to the one used in the previous chapter on the local state. The analysis deals with the central bureaucracy as a whole, although the agricultural and health sectors provide the main guiding threads of the analysis.

By exploring the central bureaucracy, this final empirical chapter offers a more systematic exploration of some of the key factors underpinning state (in)effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda identified in the previous chapters. First, it examines the differences in clientelist practices by comparing the central institutions governing civil service recruitment. Second, it further analyse why, as observed in the previous chapter, the Burundian state was less able to discipline its civil servants. Finally, it explores more systematically the differences in the role played by donors in Burundi and Rwanda since the central bureaucracy is the main interface between donors and the state. The analysis so far has shown that policy implementation in Burundi was more donor-driven than in Rwanda. Furthermore, the Burundian government seemed less concerned with mobilising aid and using it efficiently than in Rwanda.

The chapter begins with an examination of the processes that governed the selection of civil servants in the Burundian and Rwandan states. This is followed by an exploration of the incentive and monitoring mechanisms that influenced civil servants in the central state on a day-to-day basis. The third section turns to the relations between the central state bureaucracy and donors, analysing their impact on state effectiveness. The final section concludes.

6.2 Selecting civil servants

The way in which civil servants are selected is arguably a crucial determinant of state effectiveness and development (e.g. Rauch & Evans 2000). If selection is merit-based, it ensures a better level of qualification and capacity of the bureaucracy. As revealed in the previous chapter in the case of Burundi, patrimonialism can create an informal parallel hierarchy to the state, which undermines policy implementation. Consequently, it is necessary to explore the extent to which these dynamics are reproduced at the central level and what effects they have on central state effectiveness.

Burundi

Institutional framework governing civil service recruitment

The peace talks in Burundi identified fair and transparent civil service recruitment as a necessary condition for the country's unity. This principle featured in the 2000 Arusha peace agreement, which incorporated the principles of "depoliticisation of the public administration to ensure its stability" and of "equal opportunities of access to this sector [the public administration] for all men and women through strict respect for, or the introduction of, laws and regulations[...], as well as through transparency of competitive entrance examinations."¹³⁷ The principle of fair and transparent recruitment was later enshrined in the 2005 constitution, article 51 of which recognises that "any Burundian also has the right to access to public offices." A legal distinction was made between political and technical positions in law n°1/09 of 17 May 2005. For the former, civil servants were recruited through discretionary political appointments. A non-exhaustive list of "political positions" was stipulated in the law. For the rest of the civil service, recruitment and promotion were merit-based, governed by law n°1/28 of 23 August 2006 on the civil service general statute (*statut général de la fonction publique*). The law created the National Recruitment Commission of the Ministry of Civil Service, Labour and Social Security (MFPTSS). This commission's mission was to ascertain the needs of the different state agencies and produce a recruitment plan each year, specifying the number to be recruited, the qualifications required for each one, and the recruitment dates. The Commission was expected to submit the plan before the budget law so that the costs of hiring could be accounted for in the state budget. The Commission then had to advertise the available

¹³⁷ Protocole 1, chapter 2, article 7, paragraphs 8-9.

positions and organise entrance exams. To become a civil servant in Burundi, candidates were legally required to have at least a lower secondary education (*premier cycle des humanités*).¹³⁸

An exception to these rules existed for the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health (MoH) since they were in charge of organising their own recruitment. For teachers and magistrates, recruitment could be based on candidates' diploma (*recrutement sur titre*).¹³⁹ Tests were organised only if there were multiple candidates with the appropriate credentials for the position, which seemed to be invariably the case. A recruitment commission in the Ministry of Health was in charge of the recruitment of MoH agents by organising exams. This commission could also allow recruitment on a diploma only on a case-by-case basis.¹⁴⁰ On top of the general statute of the civil service, the state could also hire people on a contractual basis, either to temporarily replace a civil servant or to perform specific tasks that were limited in time.¹⁴¹ In this case, no minimum education level or entry tests were required.

Bypassing the institutions ensuring fair and transparent recruitment

The principles of transparent recruitment of civil servants were routinely ignored in the central bureaucracy. This was done legally by exploiting the weaknesses of the legal framework governing recruitment and by creating new institutions to bypass this framework. This was also done illegally by simply violating the law.

To begin with, different legal strategies were deployed to bypass the principles of transparent and fair recruitment of civil servants in Burundi. First of all, the distinction between political and technical positions was arbitrary. Article 10 of the 2005 law offered only a “non-exhaustive” list of political positions, which apparently led to the multiplication of sources of patronage (Interviews 161, 188, 201, 302). Second, hiring on a contractual basis was used as a strategy to escape the requirements of the general statute of the civil service. Contractual civil servants did not have to take selection exams or comply with the education requirements of completing lower secondary school, which offered a fertile ground for patronage. In 2012, 34% of the all of the 122,643 civil servants were hired on a contractual basis (MFPTSS 2012a: 57).¹⁴² While the MoH was representative of the national situation, with 39% of its employees (2,365 of 6,057) being contractual staff (MFPTSS 2012a: 57), in the Ministry of Agriculture,

¹³⁸ Article 11-2 of the law n°1/28 of 23 August 2006.

¹³⁹ Article 88 of law n°1/28 of 23/08/2006. For the Ministry of Justice, recruitment processes are based on law n°1/001 of 29 February 2000.

¹⁴⁰ Law n°1/24 of 2/10/2009, article 8 and 9.

¹⁴¹ Law n° 11/8 of 28/04/2011, articles 39 and 40.

¹⁴² This number includes the police and the army.

as many as 88% of the civil servants had been hired on a contractual basis.¹⁴³ They were overrepresented in comparison to the national average. This can be explained by the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture provided useful opportunities for patronage. The Ministry's jobs were mainly composed of rural, low-qualified positions such as agricultural instructors (*moniteurs agricoles*), who were in charge of agriculture extension. Present on the 2,703 administrative hills in rural areas, jobs such as agricultural instructors constituted a convenient reservoir of patronage for uneducated individuals in local areas. Hiring agricultural instructors on a contractual basis allowed for avoiding the cumbersome legal requirements regarding the minimum level of education of lower secondary education, which many potential "clients" were unable to meet (Interviews 155, 164). In 2013, out of all of the 2,769 agricultural instructors in Burundi, 76% (2,103) had been hired between 2006 and 2008 (RdB 2009: 75)¹⁴⁴, i.e. in the years immediately after the CNDD-FDD reached power, and 98% of them (2,712) had not completed lower secondary education. These dynamics were not surprising since the rural areas had always been the CNDD-FDD's stronghold.

More generally, unqualified jobs were abundant in the Burundian state because they were a source of easy patronage. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and its 16 provincial directorates (DPAE) had 32 gardeners, 66 office boys (*plantons*), 90 night guards and even 94 drivers.¹⁴⁵ Analysis of the human resources data of the MoH reveals a similar pattern. In 2012, there were 6,002 non-qualified staff (mostly health auxiliary and cleaners), which represented 38.8% of the total MoH staff (MSPLS 2013: 8). In 2013, a study financed by the Belgium Cooperation assessed the staff needs in the health sector in Burundi. It concluded that only half of the unqualified staff of the MoH were needed.¹⁴⁶

The multiplication of independent public legal entities with their own rules of recruitment was also used to bypass the Civil Service Law. For example, in 2011, there were 31 "legally autonomous public bodies" (APE, *Administration Personnalisée d'Etat*) and at least 19

¹⁴³ There were important disparities across ministries. Most contractual staff in 2013 were in the Ministry of Defence and ex-Combatants (19,441, i.e. 70% of the staff) and in the Ministry of Public Security (12,980, i.e. 78% of the staff), which was surprising since policemen and soldiers were normally hired according to their respective statutes, and not by contract. In contrast, the Ministry of Education had 2,214 contractual staff out of a total of 60,970, representing only 3.6% of its total staff. The likely explanation for this over-representation of statutory staff was that teachers managed by going on strike in 2007 to get exceptional salary conditions compared to the rest of the civil service. The starting salary for a teacher was 50% more than that of other civil servants with similar qualifications (World Bank 2013: 104). They were consequently less likely to seek a departure from their regular statutes.

¹⁴⁴ Many agricultural instructors were retrenched in the early 1990s following the structural adjustment programme in Burundi.

¹⁴⁵ Data from the Ministry of Agriculture, 2013. It was impossible to know the number of cars in the ministry but even by generously counting 5 for the central ministry, and two per DPAE, the total would be 37, which would not justify that many drivers.

¹⁴⁶ Private communication.

“administrative public organisations” (EPA, *Etablissement Public Administratif*) (MFPTSS 2012a: 41) that could freely hire on a contractual basis. APE and EPA, along with 54 autonomous “public projects”¹⁴⁷ also constituted havens for civil servants who were assigned to them from their administration of origins. They enjoyed lucrative positions, since these entities’ salary scale could be set outside the general rules governing civil servants’ pay-scale (Interviews 155, 164). In these autonomous public organisation, salaries after tax and including benefits were respectively 24%, 127% and 297% higher than in the main administrations, depending on whether the civil servant was in the category of execution, collaboration or directions (MFPTSS 2012b: 42). Undoubtedly, such autonomous organisations could be relevant. The Burundian Revenue Authority (OBR) was an EPA so that it could pay its employees more and recruit them independently to bolster its effectiveness and shelter itself from political pressure. Yet, the existence of at least 100 of these exceptional public entities was hard to justify simply on the basis of effectiveness. For example, APE were officially created when the constraint of public accounting prevented public organisations from delivering services on a regular and continuous basis.¹⁴⁸ Yet, as remarked by an evaluation of the public sector reform in Burundi (MFPTSS 2012a: 41), it was difficult to explain why the General Directorate for Correctional Services (DGAP) of the Ministry of Justice was an APE since correctional services are a typical function of any ministry of justice. Similarly, the National Legislation Service (SNL), in charge of helping the government to make laws, was an APE while it fulfilled a core mission of the state.

The importance of contract-based hiring and the creation of exceptional legal public entities reveal a picture of the civil service where the general rule was often bypassed. This contributed to the fragmentation and opacity of civil service management, which increased opportunities for patronage.

Violating the institutions ensuring fair and transparent recruitment

When the principles of transparent and fair recruitment were not legally bypassed, they were routinely disregarded in Burundi. The most conspicuous manifestation was that the entrance exams legally required to join the civil service hardly ever took place (Interviews 161, 164, 296, 302; World Bank 2013: 108). They were routinely organised only for the military officer

¹⁴⁷ Whose questionable raison d’être was “pursuing a specific goal” over a limited period of time (article 35, *law n° 1/08 of 28 April 2011 portant organisation générale de l’administration publique*). They could not however hire civil servants.

¹⁴⁸ Article 1 of *décret-loi du 13 juillet 1989 portant cadre organique des administrations personnalisées de l’État*.

school (ISCAM) and, from 2014, for the Ministry of Justice.¹⁴⁹ As of 2013, the National Recruitment Commission in the Ministry of Civil Service had organised only one entrance exam for recruitment since its creation in 2006 (ObAG 2013:62). Vacant positions in the Burundian state were hardly ever advertised, which gave the minister's office discretionary power over recruitment. As a senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture acknowledged, hiring was "the minister's exclusive domain" (Interview 161). The Ministry of Civil Service argued that organising entrance exams was too expensive in a context where, except in the health and education sectors, only departing civil servants were replaced (Interview 164; ObAG 2013: 63). Yet even in the two expanding administrations of health and education, the principle of transparent and fair recruitment was ignored. The Ministry of Health, which was entitled to organise its own recruitment through a dedicated commission, never instituted such a commission. In education, where massive recruitment had happened following Nkurunziza's policy of free primary education in 2005 (Figure 6.1), the process for guaranteeing fair and transparent recruitment was also largely ignored. Arranging the hiring of a local teacher could cost a cow or 300,000 BiF (about 198 USD) (ObAG 2013: 65; see also Interview 229).¹⁵⁰ On the demand side, entering the civil service generally necessitated belonging to the party and being well-connected or having enough money to "buy" the position. Most of the time, both were required. On the supply side, the people in charge of recruitment in the state regularly received lists of persons to recruit from CNDD-FDD officials (Interviews 201, 296, 295, 301; ObAG 2013: 67).

Patronage in the central state, as in the local state, was not only used to ensure the penetration of people loyal to the CNDD-FDD in the state machinery. It was also an important source of enrichment for CNDD-FDD members, and the party as a whole. Well-paid officials (e.g. directors of parastatals, or ministries' top civil servants) sometimes had to transfer a percentage of their salary to the CNDD-FDD (Interview 30).¹⁵¹ But patronage also followed the rules of a "moral economy." Each patron wanted to allocate a job to a protégé so that he could "eat" (Interview 201) for some time before another was placed (see also Interviews 161, 188). This explained the extremely high turnover at the top of the Burundian bureaucracy—despite the ruling party staying the same—something regularly mentioned as being a crucial source of ineffectiveness (e.g. Interviews 152, 161). The clientelist rotation of cadres sometimes took on ludicrous manifestations. In one case during the fieldwork, a director and a director general in the Ministry of Health swapped positions overnight (Interviews 179,

¹⁴⁹ There existed some ad-hoc exceptions. On the creation of the Burundian Revenue Authority (OBR), a test was organised to recruit the new agents.


¹⁵⁰ This was further triangulated with different informal conversations.

¹⁵¹ Also several informal conversations.

186).¹⁵² Civil servants could be suddenly catapulted to a high-level job, for example a district-level doctor becoming a director general (Interview 179). The dynamics behind this high turnover were not exclusive to the central state. A change of minister often translated into a massive change of cadres at the provincial and district levels (Interview 188). Before the 2015 election, the turnover seemingly increased in the Burundian bureaucracy because patrons wanted to place as many clients as possible before the politically uncertain outcome of the elections (Interviews 137, 179).

This entrenched patrimonial character of the state had several consequences for state effectiveness. An obvious one was that the people hired were simply not the most capable. Another consequence was related to the size and complexity of the Burundian civil service. Clientelism was conducive to an abundance of executive positions. Overall in the state in 2011, there were 51 general directorates, and 131 directorates in 17 out of the 21 ministries that made their organisational information public (MFPTSS 2012a: 41). For example, the Ministry of Agriculture had four general directorates, two independent agencies with the rank of general directorates, and 28 directorates (including the 16 DPAAE)¹⁵³, which decreased its effectiveness (Interview 161). In absolute terms, despite financial difficulties, the state kept hiring throughout and after the war (Figure 6.1). Yet, the hiring concerned mainly teachers, following Nkurunziza's policy of free primary education, and health staff. In the other sectors, hiring was mainly used for the replacement of departing civil servants.

Figure 6.1 Evolution of the size of civil service in Burundi



*Source: Ministry of Civil Service, based on number of civil servants paid per month.*¹⁵⁴ Excludes the police and the army.

¹⁵² The DG learned on a trip abroad that upon his return to Burundi his subordinate would replace him and he would take his former subordinate's position.

¹⁵³ Ministerial order n°100/115 of 30 April 2013.

¹⁵⁴ The decrease in statutory civil servants in 2010 was probably due to the 2010 civil servant census, which led to the identification of ghost workers.

This put a heavy strain on Burundi's limited financial capacity. According to the World Bank, between 2007 and 2012, the state wage bill increased by nearly 20% in real term, quicker than the GDP (World Bank 2013: 98). This notably prevented an increase in the incredibly low salaries: on average in 2011, salaries were 150,000 BiF per month, i.e. 96 USD across the civil service (MFPTSS 2012b: 27).¹⁵⁵ This constituted a great source of demotivation (e.g. Interviews 135, 144, 161). In 2009, one labour union representative told the media: "the state pretends to pay us, and we pretend to work."¹⁵⁶ Many civil servants worked only a few hours a day before doing other jobs in the afternoon (typically running a small business such as a kiosk selling cell phone pre-paid cards) to make ends meet (Interviews 144, 154, 186).

Another effect of pervasive clientelism was that civil servants were more loyal to their patron than to their superior in the bureaucracy, which had disastrous consequences for state effectiveness. This dynamic, already observed at the local level in the previous chapter, is further developed below.

Rwanda

Institutional framework governing civil service recruitment

As in Burundi, the principle of merit-based recruitment in Rwanda had been considered pivotal to the reconstruction of the country and to the promotion of unity. The 1993 Arusha Agreement stated that recruitment should be "based on fair competition giving equal opportunity to all citizens."¹⁵⁷ After the genocide, participants in the Urugwiro dialogue¹⁵⁸ underlined the necessity of transparent and merit-based recruitment. Departing from the practices of favouritism of the Habyarimana era was essential because these were considered to have contributed to violence and to the genocide (Interview 266). Fair and transparent recruitment became a principle enshrined in the 2003 Constitution.¹⁵⁹ Article 181 provided for the creation of the Public Service Commission (PSC). Created in 2007, and initially in charge of recruitment for the whole of central government, the PSC's role was limited in 2010 to

¹⁵⁵ Given that monthly consumption per capita in 2011 was 83,248 BiF, and that a household included on average five individuals, salaries were barely enough to survive (MFPTSS 2012b: 27).

¹⁵⁶ "Burundi: les inégalités de salaires des fonctionnaires, auteurs de grève", Syfia Grands Lacs, 09/04/ 2009 quoted in MFPTSS (2012a: 99), author's translation from the French.

¹⁵⁷ Article 23, annex IV

¹⁵⁸ Urugwiro dialogues were a series of meetings gathering politicians and civil society representatives each Saturday between May 1998 and March 1999 at the Office of the President to debate a range of issues on the reconstruction of Rwanda-

¹⁵⁹ Article 45 and 126.

overseeing recruiting organisations. In its revised role, the PSC checked the validity of all recruitment processes based on the reports it received. It also acted as the ultimate appeal body for unsuccessful candidates. Commissioners were directly appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The Office of the Ombudsman was the other main institution in Rwanda guaranteeing fair and transparent recruitment. The Ombudsman visited different state organisations once a year to identify cases of nepotism. To ensure its independence, the law provided for the PSC and the Ombudsman to have administrative and financial autonomy from the rest of the state apparatus. They also both reported directly to the parliament and the President.

Table 6.1 General recruitment process for civil servants in Rwanda

1	The hiring organisation (HO) publicises the vacant posts on its website, in at least two newspapers and on radio and television if possible.
2	Applicants fill a form available on the PSC website, listing their diploma and professional experience, and return it to the HO with supporting documentation.
3	After reviewing the applications, the HO displays on its notice board the list of candidates invited for the written exam and those rejected, along with the reason for their rejection.
4	Candidates sit a written and oral test (or only one test following the approval of the PSC). Private companies can be hired to organise and mark tests.
5	Written tests are marked blindly.
6	Written test results are displayed on the HO's notice board. Only candidates with a mark of at least 50% are invited to the oral test. They can appeal against these results within three days before the HO, and in last resort before the PSC.
7	The oral test is recorded on video. Its results are displayed on the notice board of the HO. The candidate can appeal these results before the HO within three days and then before the PSC.
8	A candidate passes when he/she has 70% on average in all tests. The candidate with the higher marks gets the post, or if the marks are the same, the person with the highest experience is chosen.
9	The HO submits a report to the PSC within a week including all the answer sheets and video recordings, and the reasons for hiring or rejecting each candidate. The test answer sheets and the video recording should be kept by the HO for three months.
10	The PSC examines the reports and if it finds within a week that the legal procedures were not respected, it may require the process to start again.

Source: summarised from Presidential Order N°46/01 of 29/07/2011.

Immediately after the genocide, recruitment was made without exams in the context of a disorganised state apparatus. Each organisation was free to hire at its own discretion. However, as early as 1994, some state organisations such as the Ministry of Civil Service were already organising written exams and interviews when hiring for top positions (Interview 271). Recruitment based on competition formally started with law n° 22/2002 of 09/07/2002 on General Statutes for Rwanda Public Service. Unlike in Burundi, where the law specified only in general terms that the “recruitment of civil servants is done through *concours* or

tests”,¹⁶⁰ the 2002 law in Rwanda (revised in 2013) was complemented by a Presidential Order¹⁶¹ that gave an extremely detailed description of the recruitment process (Table 6.1). The publication of job advertisements in the media, the displaying of the decisions taken at each stage of the process and also the frequent hiring of private companies to organise and mark recruitment tests were mechanisms used to ensure transparent and fair recruitment.¹⁶²

The practice of civil service recruitment

Formal mechanisms ensuring transparent merit-based recruitment were applied more consistently in Rwanda than in Burundi. Even informants who were doubtful of the fairness of civil service recruitment did not dispute that entrance exams took place in accordance with the law. Anyone visiting the government buildings in Kigali could see job advertisements, lists of candidates who had failed written exams or who had been invited to the job interview stage, along with their respective marks, and lists of successful candidates with their marks. Government organisations displayed similar documents on their website.¹⁶³

Furthermore, in contrast to Burundi, mechanisms were in place to limit the legal workaround of civil service regulations. First, there was a strict check on the number of civil servants that could be hired. State organisations could not recruit more than the number needed to fill the positions identified in their organisational chart specified by prime ministerial order.

Second, compared to Burundi, recourse to contract-based employment was limited. As in Burundi, contractual jobs had been the main “open door to let friends in” (Interview 292). A 2015 ministerial order narrowly circumscribed the hiring of contractual civil servants.¹⁶⁴ Contract-based hiring by the state could be done only for the temporary replacement of a civil servant, to work in a Single Implementation Unit (SPIU), i.e. a unit in a ministry in charge of implementing projects financed by donors, to carry out urgent duties not included in the ministries’ organisational chart, and for a job position requiring rare and specialised skills. To avoid abuse, the two latter cases required authorisation from the Ministry of Civil Service.

¹⁶⁰ Article 12, law n°1/28 of 23 August 2006, author’s translation from the French.

¹⁶¹ Presidential Order N°46/01 of 29/07/2011 governing modalities for the recruitment, appointment, and nomination of Public Servants. Previously, a Presidential order of 2004 and then of 2010 described the recruitment process of civil servants.

¹⁶² Recruitment at the local level followed a similar process as at the central level. Since 2012, they were all done by the Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) in order to curtail patronage, apparently more pervasive than at the central level (Interview 120).

¹⁶³ E.g.: <http://www.moh.gov.rw/index.php?id=41>, <http://www.minagri.gov.rw/index.php?id=617> (accessed 16/02/16).

¹⁶⁴ Ministerial order n° 03/Mifotra/15 of 9/06/2015 determining the modalities for recruiting contractual staff in public service.

Furthermore, the Rwandan government endeavoured to bridge the gap between the statutory and contractual staff in the state. The hiring and payment of contractual staff were done under the same conditions as for statutory civil servants.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the civil service reforms of 2014 aimed at eliminating many of the existing contractual jobs in the state. Contractual employees in a position specified in the organisational chart of a public organisation had to be dismissed so that the position could be filled with a statutory civil servant.¹⁶⁶ The dynamics were consequently different from Burundi where contractual jobs were a method to bypass legal regulations on civil service recruitment and salaries. In Rwanda, not only were contract-based positions increasingly limited in numbers, they were also becoming less differentiated from statute-based civil service jobs.

Third, bypassing legal regulation regarding merit-based recruitment was limited in Rwanda by a clearer separation between political and technical jobs. Unlike in Burundi, the law provided exhaustive lists of political jobs.¹⁶⁷ High-level civil service jobs, defined as “managerial jobs” in the law, required an appointment by the cabinet. However, the cabinet could choose only from the successful candidates that had followed the recruitment process described above. For example, for the appointment of a director-level position in Rwanda, the cabinet could only choose from the pool of successful candidates that had obtained, in accordance with the law, a score of more than 70% in the exam.¹⁶⁸ Often, only one candidate was submitted for choice to the cabinet because he was the only one who had obtained more than 70% (Interview 95). Furthermore, as of 2015, there were ongoing discussions regarding removing altogether appointments to director-level positions by the cabinet because this process was too burdensome (Interview 292). In the health sector, the lists of jobs requiring presidential appointment were shorter in Rwanda than in Burundi. Hospital directors and deputy directors were appointed only by ministerial order whereas in Burundi they were presidential appointees.¹⁶⁹ Turnover due to political reasons, which was so harmful to state effectiveness in Burundi, was more tightly regulated in Rwanda. When ministers were appointed to head another ministry, there were restrictions on the number of staff that could accompany them (Interviews 110, 292). For example, when the Minister for Public Service and Labour, Anastase Murekezi, was appointed Prime Minister on July 23, 2014, his office

¹⁶⁵ For specialised jobs, the Ministry of Civil service determined the level of salaries.

¹⁶⁶ Ministerial instruction N° 01/19.23 of 01/08/2014 on placement of public servants after 2014 restructuring of public institutions, article 3.

¹⁶⁷ Presidential Order No 17/01 of 23/01/2013 establishing the job classification in Rwanda Public Service

¹⁶⁸ Article 23, Presidential Order N°46/01 of 29/07/2011.

¹⁶⁹ Yet, as of 2015, there were discussions in the MoH regarding trying to get hospital directors appointed by the president. The rationale for this was to limit turnover by granting the level of Director General in the civil service (which required presidential appointment) to hospital directors so that they could benefit from better pay and benefits. It is consequently interesting that this plan was not to increase possibilities of patronage at the apex of the state but to ensure effectiveness in the health sector’s objectives (Interview 110).

manager, advisor and speech writer were not allowed to follow him (Interview 292). Transferring civil servants in Rwanda was complicated and required heavy procedures. The rationale for this was that “everything is precisely done so that everything is locked down [*vérouillé*] and the minister cannot move people around as she would like” (Interview 110). Overall, the scope for politically-motivated civil servant selection and transfer was more limited and better defined in Rwanda than in Burundi. Anecdotal information indicated that clientelistic or nepotistic hiring had become more difficult over time. The patron had to be discreet if punishment was to be avoided (Interviews 242, 256, 292).

Yet, in informal conversations, many informants, especially those who were young and not employed by the state, asserted that recruitment was not fair in Rwanda. This anecdotal information was corroborated by two facts. First, officials interviewed readily recognised that this perception of favouritism in hiring was “a great problem” (Interview 292, see also 266). Second, a 2013 study by the Public Sector Commission (PSC) covering 10 districts (including Kigali) based on a sample of 800 respondents, 50% of whom were job-seekers, reported that the vast majority of respondents believed that favouritism was taking place, either sometimes or always, in the recruitment process. Less than 10% of the respondents believed that recruitment was always fair.¹⁷⁰ In Kigali specifically, about a quarter of the respondents stated that favouritism was systematic, while nearly 50% believed that favouritism was taking place from time to time (PSC 2013). Unfortunately, the data were not disaggregated enough to compare the answers of job-seekers from the answers of those who were already in state employment. Given the self-censorship of officials talking to researchers and of respondents when answering government surveys in Rwanda, these results are significant.

How can the different findings from strong institutions regarding merit-based recruitment be reconciled with the widespread perception that recruitment was not fair and transparent? First of all, the perception of favouritism in the central state was often associated with preferential treatment of Tutsi, especially anglophone Tutsi, who, or whose parents, had returned from Uganda after the genocide (Interviews 242, 254, 277, 292). Although this study cannot assess the extent to which this situation was a reality, this would not be surprising. To begin with, anglophone Tutsi had an advantage simply because they spoke English. In Rwanda, to ensure impartiality, English or French could be officially used for civil service job interviews.¹⁷¹ Yet, since English was increasingly used as the working language notably in policy documents, a candidate whose interviewers realised his English was poor had less chance of being hired

¹⁷⁰ About 20% declared that they had no idea or they did not know.

¹⁷¹ Except in some organisations requiring compulsory English such as the Ministry of East African Community.

than an anglophone. On the other hand, a civil servant who could not speak French would not hinder the functioning of an administrative organisation in Rwanda (Interview 292).¹⁷²

Second, the interview stage was also about sympathies between the interviewer and interviewee or at least, the belief of the former that the latter would fit into the team. Given the history of ethnic antagonism or simply the cultural differences among Rwandans born in Rwanda, and ex-refugees from Uganda, Burundi or the DRC, an interviewer might have naturally selected someone with a similar background. Since the top of the executive branch in Rwanda was predominantly Tutsi,¹⁷³ it would have been unsurprising to find in the top appointments an over-representation of Tutsi, who, when in charge of hiring technical staff, would have been drawn more towards choosing candidates at the interview stage with a similar background or even similar family connections. The same logic might have applied to other lines of division, such as language, which would explain why some organisations in Rwanda were perceived as the bastion of Francophones (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health), while others were seen as the strongholds of Anglophones (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance) (e.g. Interviews 256, 284).

Third, regardless of the criteria of origins, language or ethnicity, the perception of unfair recruitment existed because clientelism existed in the Rwandan state. For example, for donor-funded agricultural projects managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, donors often relied on the Ministry's officials for guidance regarding hiring project managers. When a patron in MINAGRI provided a favourable recommendation, the newly hired employee offered him/her a "gift." At lower levels, a monetary bribe could be asked for in exchange for reaching the job interview stage. If the job was obtained, between one or two months of salary could be given to the patron. For example, an international consultant that worked regularly in Rwanda was seeking to hire a driver for a donor-funded project. He was surprised not to find in the shortlist for the interview stage a driver he had previously encouraged to apply. The driver later revealed that he had not been shortlisted because he had refused to bribe a ministry's secretary ahead of the written and driving tests.¹⁷⁴

Fourth, the contrast between the perception of biased recruitment should also be analysed against the backdrop of significant unemployment in Rwanda. It produced insecurity and frustration arising from the mismatch between, on the one hand, the pervasive discourse

¹⁷² A joke told among francophone Rwandans was that the preferential treatment of Anglophones was also visible on the new banknotes issued from 2013 because they no longer displayed a French text (private communication)

¹⁷³ See Chapter 2, section 2.4.

¹⁷⁴ Private conversation with consultant.

celebrating development and the fast-expanding access to education since 1994 and on the other, the difficulty for young people of finding a job.¹⁷⁵ Given the high unemployment, state job advertisements attracted a lot of applications, regularly more than a hundred for a single job (Interviews 286, 292).¹⁷⁶ In this extremely competitive context where failure was frequent, unsuccessful educated candidates could naturally attribute their failure to unfairness in the recruitment process. As explained by a high level official in the Ministry of Civil Service, high unemployment put the Ministry “in the cross-hairs of everyone” (Interview 292).

This situation is not exclusive to Rwanda but typical of developing countries with growing inequalities and youth unemployment. Yet these dynamics were likely to be reinforced in Rwanda by the level of distrust in society inherited from its history of ethnic and regional favouritism and the mass violence that destroyed the social fabric. In this context, commitment to impartiality in recruitment was viewed with scepticism. As explained by the head of the PSC, “when you have a history of [pre-1994] government that divided people, that is how you think” (Interview 266). Such suspicion regarding government policies was not limited to civil-service recruitment. Policy initiatives often led to reactions like “what is this new trick of the RPF?”¹⁷⁷ This doubt regarding the “real” intentions of the government was for example strong regarding initiatives such as the civil service health insurance (RAMA), the development of cooperatives and the One Cow per Poor Family Programme *Girinka* (Interview 266). *Girinka* was especially revealing of how the history of divisions in Rwandan society could impact perceptions of benevolent policies. Introduced in 2006, the *Girinka* (*have a cow*) programme aimed at fighting poverty and malnutrition by giving inseminated cows to poor households, who were then obliged to give the first calf to a needy neighbour. This initiative, although not without its problems, generally resulted in economic improvement for the 130,000 households that benefited it (Argent et al. 2014). Yet, a discourse questioning the RPF’s “real intentions” regarding *Girinka* emerged. As explained by an NGO director working on reconciliation in rural settings, “the chasm [in Rwandan society] is such that whatever they [the government] do, anyone can have his own interpretation of reality. [For *Girinka*], there are people who said that they [the Tutsi] were bringing back their *ubuhake* [saying] ‘For what reasons [did they create *girinka*]? To make us Tutsi?’” (Interview 293).¹⁷⁸ *Ubughake* was a patron-client system

¹⁷⁵ For example, between 2009 and 2013, the number of students in tertiary education increased from 55,213 to 84,448 (NISR 2014: 33). In 2012, the African Development Bank estimated that over 42% of the youth were either unemployed or underemployed in subsistence agriculture (AfDB 2012: 216). This general observation was backed by qualitative analysis (see Sommers 2012).

¹⁷⁶ For example, when the Ministry of Justice recruited 30 people for the “access to justice bureaus” (Maison d’accès à la justice), the tests had to be organised in a stadium due to the number of applicants (Interview 292).

¹⁷⁷ Private communication Rwandan high official.

¹⁷⁸ See also <https://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20110706-la-banque-populaire-du-rwanda-offre-des-vaches-aux-pauvres/> (accessed 21/10/15).

in pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda whereby a patron gave one or several cows to a client who, in exchange, cultivated the land and cared for the cows belonging to the patron. In the political discourse around independence, the *ubuhake* became the symbol of the Tutsi domination over the Hutu (Prunier 1998: 13-14). Comparing *girinka* to *ubuhake* is consequently far from innocent. Benevolent intentions, such as *girinka* or policies for fair and transparent recruitment, could simply not be perceived as credible by many in the Rwandan context. The government was aware of the challenge represented by the perception of favouritism. For example, the presentation of the PSC report to parliament on February 5, 2015, which highlighted this issue, sparked a parliamentary debate on how to tackle this perception of favouritism. The creation of a unique recruitment centre for all public jobs was mentioned but dismissed. It was thought that it would risk being inefficient, as a centralised structure might not understand the needs of the very different government bodies (Interviews 266, 292).

It is difficult to assess whether recruitment was systematically merit-based in the Rwandan central bureaucracy. Yet, there is no denying that the contrast with Burundi was stark. Senior Rwandan government officials were committed to promoting merit-based recruitment. They placed a check on clientelism by creating tight rules governing the hiring of civil servants. These rules for merit-based recruitment probably led to an over-representation of anglophone Tutsi in the civil service because English was a necessary skill and because the dominance of the anglophone Tutsi in the political sphere led to preferences at the interview stage when politicians were hiring civil servants. Nonetheless, when unfair recruitment existed, it was not centrally condoned as in Burundi. The top leadership did not use the civil service as a systematic site of patronage. Clientelism resulted more from individual actions than from a system. This analysis reveals that the argument of the voluntarist Tutsification of the Rwandan state (e.g. Uvin 2001: 179; Reyntjens 2013: 18-21) has to be nuanced. The pre-eminence of Tutsi in political position was, as underlined in Chapter 2, undeniable, and could be attributed to conscious choice given the role of the RPF in the career of politicians. However, for civil service technical jobs, the situation was more complex. The possible over-representation of Tutsi in technical positions might have been the consequence of the requirement to speak English and some individual preferences at the interview stage difficult to suppress. This consequently interrogates the argument that the possible Tutsi over-representation in technical jobs was the result of a systematic and conscious choice by the political leadership.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ No statistics exist on the ethnic composition of the Rwandan civil service. However, personal observations suggest a significant proportion of Tutsi in the central-level bureaucracy, but not in the local-level bureaucracy.

The commitment to a leaner and better educated civil service.

The argument that the civil service was not systematically used for patronage is further supported by looking at the management of the civil service since 1994. This reveals the high autonomy of the state vis-à-vis societal demands through a constant commitment to a leaner, better educated and better paid civil service. Retrenchment of civil servants and the parallel hiring of more qualified staff punctuated the history of civil service reforms in Rwanda.

As already mentioned, after 1994, each ministry could hire at will, which increased the civil service from 25,389 employees in 1994 to 40,622 by the end of 1997, close to the pre-war level (IMF 2000: 31). Yet, the general qualification of the civil service deteriorated because of the scarcity of educated candidates and the lack of control in hiring. As early as 1995, the government, encouraged by the World Bank, engaged in a civil service reform programme, which aimed at making it more efficient and identifying ghost workers (Interview 271). This paved the way for the retrenchment from 1998-1999 of 5,500 unqualified civil servants, the identification of 7,000 ghost workers, and the re-hiring of qualified staff,¹⁸⁰ putting the total number of civil servants at 38,000 by the end of 1999 (IMF 2000: 33-5). Pay was rationalised and wages across the civil service increased thanks to the removal of top-civil servants' fringe benefits (ibid: 36). Another retrenchment occurred in 2004 with the dismissal of 3,000 civil servants (Hausman 2011: 5). In 2006, as part of the decentralisation process 5,000 civil servants were retrenched at the central level. while 4,000 were hired by local governments (Hausman 2011: 6) on a merit-basis as explained in the previous chapter. The pay scale was reformed, to raise the lower salaries, thus "giving a remarkably highly compressed pay structure, by comparison with many other countries in Africa" (Wyatt et al. 2008: 6). These reforms contributed to reducing the proportion of salary expenditure out of the total government expenditure from 73.6% in 1995 to only 32.8% in 2005 (Hausman 2011: 3, 8).¹⁸¹ The reforms also aimed at providing decent salaries to civil servants, especially at the lower levels. Despite regular pay rises since 1995, salaries had been constantly eroded by inflation. For example, between 2006 and 2011, the real pay of civil servants declined by 37% (MIFOTRA 2011: 14). Yet, in 2008, salaries were not much lower than in the private sector (although the benefits provided in the private sector were significantly higher). A 2008 study concluded that, "salary differences between public and private are not subject to generalised concern" and recommended that "no general—and blindly applied— increase of salaries

¹⁸⁰ 7000 teachers with no contracts were put on the payroll and 9000 qualified workers, mainly teachers and health staff, were hired or reinstated.

¹⁸¹ Although of course the increase in the state budget in absolute terms also contributed to this trend.

should occur” (Ramboll Management 2008: 29). In Rwanda, unlike in Burundi, there was no issue of absenteeism due to the necessity to have a second job to make ends meet.

The zeal of the government in pursuing the creation of an educated and lean civil service was such that a 2008 evaluation of the public sector reforms stated that the reform “went too fast and too far” (Wyatt et al. 2008: 15). It left central ministries with only 500 employees, which was too few to carry out their work effectively. The number of lay-offs was deemed too great, with a hasty evaluation based primarily on staff qualification, not experience. The requirements for ministries to limit their structure to three general-directorates were inefficient because they were too rigid.¹⁸² The 2008 review consequently recommended increasing the number of central staff (Wyatt et al. 2008: 41). However, the 2008 evaluation noted that the selected staff that remained after the reform generally had the appropriate skills and qualifications (ibid.: 40). In 2014, civil service reform was still ongoing: following a 2013 evaluation, the restructuring of government institutions led to the further retrenchment of about 500 civil servants.

This cursory history of civil service reforms in Rwanda reveals important points. First, it shows the remarkable autonomy of the state when it comes to the civil service. Retrenchments were frequent, massive, and at times excessive. It supports the argument that the state was not envisioned as a reservoir of patronage. Second, it reveals a concern for a capable civil service. The retrenchments were mainly aimed at the unqualified staff, with better-educated people being hired in parallel. This stood in sharp contrast to Burundi where the large scale hiring of unqualified staff was an instrument of patronage. Third, the reforms aimed at more efficient use of the scarce resources of the state by keeping the wage expenditure under control while trying to provide a decent salary to civil servants. This shows that the capacity to pay civil servants adequately in Rwanda compared to Burundi was not only a consequence of the difference in resources in absolute terms but also a politically created situation. Rwanda endeavoured to limit the size of its civil service. Despite higher resources, as of 2010 (as no more recent data are available), Rwanda had a marginally lower proportion of contractual and statutory civil servants per capita than Burundi (7.86 vs. 7.95 civil servants/1000 hab.).¹⁸³

¹⁸² Although flawed, these instructions stood in stark contrast to the proliferation of *directions générales* in Burundi.

¹⁸³ The numbers of civil servants for Rwanda (81,858) are drawn from MIFOTRA/INSR (2010) and for Burundi (74,383) from the Ministry of Civil Service. The population data for 2010 are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

6.3 Monitoring civil servants

This section analyses how civil servants' work was coordinated, monitored and evaluated. This is done through the macro-analysis of state organisations' planning and evaluation using the case of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Health, and through the micro-analysis of the daily monitoring and disciplining of civil servants.

Burundi


Incentivising and monitoring daily work in the central bureaucracy

Pressure on the central bureaucracy in Burundi to implement the stated goals of the government was generally weaker than in Rwanda. The Burundian bureaucracy was hindered first by a limited planning and evaluation in the ministries. Overall, planning continuously improved in Burundi after the end of the war. Ministries had an annual plan, which was theoretically aligned with 5-year sectorial policies, such as the National Agricultural Strategy or the Health National Development Plan, and also aligned with the Burundian Poverty Reduction Paper (CSLP). Yet there was no external control over ministry planning. No government body such as the Ministry of Finance or the Vice-presidencies ensured the alignment of ministries' planning with the CSLP or Vision 2025. In the Ministry of Health, the sections of its yearly action plan were of variable quality. The Ministry's programmes demonstrated more detailed planning than the ministry as a whole. The programmes were semi-autonomous departments in the Ministry of Health, focusing on vertical intervention such as family planning and maternal health in the case of the National Programme of Reproductive Health (PNSR). Their better planning resulted from the pressure of donors, who provided them with more abundant funding than directorates (Interview 195). In the Ministry of Agriculture, planning existed but was much less effective than in the health sector. The Ministry's yearly plan was written by the General Directorate of Planning without consultation with the relevant departments. Furthermore, the document was not aligned with the 5-year National Plan of Agricultural Investment (PNIA), which listed the donors' actions and financial contributions on a yearly basis, set against the objectives of the Agricultural 5-year National Agricultural Strategy (Interview 180). The targets of the Annual Plan were consequently unrealistic because they were decoupled from the main source of funding of the ministry: donors.

The kind of pressure on a ministry and its agents can be illustrated, as in Figure 6.2 below. Whatever the quality of planning, it was unlikely to provide the basis for holding ministers

accountable. The reason was that the routine evaluation of ministry performance barely took place. This role should have been undertaken by the Committee for the evaluation of performance in the public administration (CEPOP) created in 2013 in the Office of the President. Its mission was to track the progress of ministries against the targets of the CSLP. This was done through selected indicators called “concrete actions” (*actions concrètes*) selected from ministries’ annual plans. The concrete actions were the only instances recognised by informants as producing some kind of routinised pressure on ministries from the top (Interviews 147, 188, 195, 219). Yet the pressure was far from systematic because the actions were self-reported. Furthermore, bad results were systematically not acted upon (Interviews 144, 164) and their evaluation was sometimes undermined by the politicisation of the civil service, with the evaluation hinging upon a civil servant’s connections (Interviews 188, 219).

Figure 6.2 Stylised mapping of the main pressures on a Burundian ministry



NB: Arrows symbolise the relative importance of each factor.

Except for the “concrete actions” that were ongoing, other attempts to evaluate the work of the central bureaucracy were short-lived. For example, in 2007, the World Bank introduced the Rapid Result Initiatives, which aimed at identifying projects in different ministries that could be completed in 100 days. As of 2013, these initiatives had disappeared in the health sector (Interview 195). They were still ongoing in the agricultural sector and consisted of two actions per year proposed by the DPAAE, such as ensuring that certain numbers of households had a compost pit or a number of anti-erosion ditches were built (Interviews 147, 161). While they were recognised as useful, the targets were not demanding because they were set by the DPAAE themselves. Finally, performance contracts for top-civil servants, i.e. a list of actions they had to perform during the year, which were evaluated by their superiors, were initiated in 2012 but simply abandoned a year later with no reason given (Interviews 150, 159, 219).

If routinised pressure was weak, temporary pressure could occur in a ministry, deriving from a few precise policies considered by the top leadership as of high priority, often due to electoral concerns. In agriculture, the fertiliser subsidy programme presented in Chapter 3 is a good example.

Unsurprisingly, given the low pressure put on ministries as a whole, individual pressure on civil servants was also limited. The yearly evaluation of civil servants by their superiors, as provided by the civil service statutes, was only “a formality” (Interview 135). In practice, all civil servants received more or less the same scores in their evaluation. Managers in ministries were reluctant to create inequality in salary increases. Such reluctance was also related to the importance of clientelism in the Burundian state as explained below. Depending on whether the civil servant had political connections, it was still possible to overturn a poor evaluation. Furthermore, the criteria used for the evaluation only pertained to the behaviour of civil servants, rather than the activities that they had to undertake (Table 6.2). This limited the direct impact of evaluations.

Table 6.2 Example of civil servant’s evaluation criteria (Director level) in Burundi

<i>Factors of Performance</i>	<i>Mediocre (10-29)</i>	<i>Insufficient (30-49)</i>	<i>Good (50-69)</i>	<i>Very good (70-89)</i>	<i>Elite (90-100)</i>
Punctuality and assiduousness					
Professional relationships					
Sense of responsibility					
Organisational skills					
Sense of initiative					
Decision-making skills					
Professional knowledge					
Productivity					
Management skills					
Ability to evaluate subordinates					

Source: Author’s translation from a Director’s evaluation report in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Staff meetings were a limited source of pressure on the daily work of staff. From 2011, quarterly meetings were scheduled in the MoH. The minister and all of the directors (including all of the Provincial Chief Medical Officers) had to attend these meetings. While these meetings were useful to discuss important issues (Interview 144), they did not constitute a systematic source of pressure on the staff (Interviews 195s 217). In the Ministry of Agriculture, a similar meeting occurred, yet the minister was not always present (Interview 147). No weekly staff meetings occurred in the Ministry of Health or Agriculture. Depending

on the director, these meetings could occur at the level of the Ministry's directorates (Interview 150).

Donors could be an important source of pressure when civil servants worked on a donor-sponsored project. For a former MoH high official, donors were the number one pressure since they engaged in the continuous follow-up of staff involved in their projects (Interview 195). In addition, donors provided financial incentives to civil servants such as *per diem* for supervision or workshops. This could also involve more systematic financial incentives. For example, as further explained below, the Belgium Cooperation in Burundi offered a salary complement in the Ministry of Agriculture through a pay for performance system.

Lastly, and in line with the findings of the previous chapter, the lack of routinised processes for monitoring and incentivising civil servants meant that effectiveness in the Burundian state was idiosyncratic, depending on the personality and professional ethos of individuals (Interviews 130, 135, 137). While the formal institutions governing the coordination and incentives of civil servants were not systematic, they were further undermined by the importance of clientelism in the Burundian civil service.

Clientelism as the main obstacle to state effectiveness.

The pervasiveness of clientelism had detrimental effects on state effectiveness in the central bureaucracy, not simply because of the lack of merit-based practices or the strain it put on the public finance, but also because it undermined state effectiveness through two additional mechanisms. Akin to what happened in the local state (Chapter 5), clientelism first created a parallel loyalty structure in the civil service: accountability flowed towards the patron rather than the manager. In addition, and more importantly, the uncertainty surrounding the nature of the political connections of civil servants created an atmosphere of suspicion in the bureaucracy that prevented its effective management.

Clientelism made it very hard for managers to make the individuals they supervised accountable. The patron who gave the civil servant a job was also often the one who had the power to discipline him/her (Interviews 161, 213). As a consequence, a manager did not have the clout to demand much from an employee who had attained his job through political connections. This translated into the creation of an informal hierarchy that superseded the formal one. As an illustration, according to a donor, some directors in the Ministry of Health were more powerful than the Permanent Secretary because they were better connected (Interview 217, see also 238). Among the many examples encountered during the fieldwork,

three epitomised how the informal power of civil servants subverted formal hierarchies and ultimately undermined state effectiveness. The first case involved an officer in charge of evaluating the action plans of a ministry's provincial offices in 2013. He did not dare to sign his report, stating that the planning was poor as he had family in the evaluated province and feared that they might suffer from the anger of the poorly performing yet powerfully connected provincial cadres. The second example concerned a health centre director who was hiring staff at his own discretion. The minister of health wanted to cancel the hiring but was forced to backtrack, as the health centre director was the protégé of a powerful party official. In a third instance, the minister of health opposed the decision of a provincial chief medical officer to fire nurses judged not sympathetic enough to the CNDD-FDD. As a result, the provincial chief medical officer refused to organise an event at which the Ministers and donors were to gather in June 2013. Another provincial-level officer stepped in to organise the event but he then had to be transferred to another province to avoid the anger of the provincial chief medical officer.

The extent of clientelism in Burundi created a second and more insidious obstacle to state effectiveness in the form of a pervasive uncertainty about the political weight of individuals. Civil servants generally did not dare to discipline their subordinates, as they “[didn’t] know whom they were connected to” (Interview 144). Consequently, superiors simply feared their subordinates (Interviews 144, 152, 217, 238) since “only the Minister knows through which door you entered [*par où tu es passé*] to get where you are, not the others. So you always assume that someone is well connected” (Interview 219). Subordinates could be suddenly catapulted to higher positions than their boss, which reinforced the disincentive to discipline civil servants (Interview 144). People also did not dare to freely discuss implementation issues for fear of singling out the people responsible (Interview 188). Overall, this situation nurtured a culture of passivity in the bureaucracy. As explained by an informant, “we are not afraid of not doing our job” (Interview 188). The extent of uncertainty regarding the political connections of each employee created a fertile ground for imagination. In one instance, a respondent stated that an office boy or a cleaner might well get a director into trouble because they might be better connected, perhaps even to the President (Interview 188).

The impact of clientelism on state effectiveness was consequently as much about a tangible informal hierarchy superseding the formal one as about the suspicion that it introduced into the state machinery. It produced “negative” self-discipline since getting things moving could be dangerous. Unsurprisingly, informants reported being exasperated by their bosses, who had failed to take action on reports they had worked hard on, or simply not acknowledged that the job had been done (Interviews 144, 153). When pressure occurred, it was on an ad-hoc basis (Interview 186).

This demonstrates that the differences in state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda were not just a natural difference due to institutional maturity, Burundi having emerged from the war more recently than Rwanda. Undoubtedly, planning in the ministries of health and agriculture in Burundi had improved after the end of the war. Yet an analysis of the informal institutions governing civil servants' daily work reveals that ineffectiveness was politically created. Consequently, improving formal institutions alone was unlikely to yield tangible results.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, three main mechanisms ensured greater effectiveness of the central bureaucracy than in Burundi. First, ministries' work was routinely monitored and evaluated. Second, and as a consequence, civil servants were pressured in their daily work, although this pressure was not uniform across the bureaucracy. Third, mechanisms ensured coordination between governmental agencies.

A goal-oriented state machinery

The pressure that ministries were subject to derived first from the planning, monitoring and evaluation of ministerial activities, which differed from Burundi in two main respects. To begin with, Rwandan ministries were embedded in a larger and coherent planning strategy against which they could be evaluated (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 National planning framework in Rwanda




The overarching national planning documents comprised tangible objectives that had to be taken seriously by the bureaucracy. This was because the status of these documents was different than in Burundi. The Rwandan Vision 2020 and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) were not only technical documents. They were symbols of the new Rwanda that were advertised on a large scale to the population. Vision 2020 was also “the only hymn sheet to which everyone needs to abide” (Campioni and Noack 2012: 5). According to Kagame, Vision 2020 is “not only for government. Vision 2020 is a shared purpose for all Rwandans” (RoR 2000: 2). Consequently, reference to Vision 2020 was omnipresent in Rwanda, from official speeches to shops’ names in Kigali.¹⁸⁴ The government also communicated to a large extent about the second main national planning document: the EDPRS. As an illustration, for the elaboration of its second version in 2012, the government launched a massive communication campaign, with a toll-free number for people to “have their say” in the planning process. EDPRS 2 stickers were available in gas stations to be put on cars and taxi motorcycles. EDPRS 2 t-shirts were distributed. Radio and television broadcast songs and movie clips on the importance of EDPRS featuring the Rwandan pop singer Butera Knowless. In contrast, knowledge of Burundian planning documents seemed extremely limited (Interview 161). Signs referring to Vision 2025 in Bujumbura were rare. A UN agency, UNDP, had its logo on the Burundian Vision 2025, a contrast with the “ownership” of Vision 2020 by the Republic of Rwanda, the sole author of the document. The symbolic importance given to the Rwandan Vision was also visible in the fact that the document reflected on the cause of division in Rwandan society (RoR 2000: 5-6 & annex 2), whereas the Burundian document remained silent on these aspects.

In Rwanda, each sector had a five-year strategy plan. The objectives of each sector’s strategy were aligned with the EDPRS 2, which, in turn, was aligned with Vision 2020. Drawn for sector strategies, ministerial annual action plans were devised every year. Priority targets extracted from the action plan constituted ministries’ performance contracts or *imihigo*. The main difference between this and the Burundian planning was one of quality. The annual planning in Rwanda was fully budgeted whereas in Burundi it often comprised a list of actions that ministries hoped donors would eventually fund. Furthermore, mechanisms in Rwanda existed to ensure that ministerial planning was in line with the overarching government strategy. Each year, the directorate of planning in the Ministry of Finance checked the action plan against the EDPRS targets. It also ensured that the targets were not too easily reachable, or conversely too ambitious. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) also reviewed the ministerial annual plans to check their alignment with other main political planning documents: Vision

¹⁸⁴ During the fieldwork, at least three shops in Kigali using Vision 2020 as a name were noticed.

2020 and the Seven Year Government Programme based on the RPF manifesto and Kagame's promises made during the presidential electoral campaign. The ministerial yearly planning was also submitted to cabinet for approval after the 2013 reform of the budgeting cycle. Yet, planning was obviously not perfect in Rwanda. For example, the planning requirements from the Ministry of Finance were considered too heavy and complex (Interview 119). A lack of capacity in ministries along with tight deadlines sometimes produced unrealistic targets and ministerial planning was not always aligned with donors' planning (Interview 91). Nevertheless, the government regularly improved it over time, along with monitoring and coordination (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 Planning, coordination and evaluation reforms in Rwanda since 2004



Source: author's compilation

The second main difference with Burundi lay in the regular monitoring and evaluation of Rwandan ministries by external governmental bodies and donors. From 2011, the PMO was the main body in charge of the follow-up of ministerial plans. While before 2013, its role was limited to monitoring (Interviews 119, 280) the PMO supervised the evaluation of ministerial *imihigo*.¹⁸⁵ It produced an analysis to be discussed in cabinet, which ensured the systematic follow-up of the evaluation results (Interview 280). Unsurprisingly, *imihigo* were recognised

¹⁸⁵ Initially a team composed of officials from the PMO, the Presidency and MINECOFIN toured ministries to check the results reported. After a 2014 reform, this was done by an independent think tank.

in the interviews as one of the main points of pressure on a ministry (Interviews 46, 57, 62, 122). The *Imihigo* progress reports were systematically issued every quarter (Interview 74, see also 46). In the Ministry of Health, the PMO and the MoH Permanent Secretary met after each report to discuss the evolution of the indicators (Interview 74). These processes were very different to Burundi where formal mechanisms for ministries' accountability barely existed.

Another source of routine incentives for ministries in Rwanda lay in the monitoring of government performance by donors. Because Rwanda benefited from generous general and sectoral budget support, ministries had important reporting obligations to donors. For general budget support, the Common Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF) assessed Rwandan budget execution and performance across different sectors, based on indicators drawn from the EDPRS. Its results were critical for the government since the scores achieved conditioned aid disbursement. The CPAF relied on different Joint-Sector Reviews (JSRs). Negotiated between the government and donors, they were used in each sector (health, agriculture etc.) to evaluate budget execution and progress against targets. They also determined disbursement for donors involved in sectoral budget support. Consequently, ministers were under pressure to meet these targets because they were aligned with the EDPRS and bad performance meant less external financial support to the government. Overall, both the routinised evaluation by donors and that by the Rwandan government ensured pressure on the central bureaucracy. As explained by an informant in the MoH, when an indicator is not good, "our first reaction is 'is [this indicator] in the CPAF? Is this in the *imihigo*?' (Interview 74).

Pressure on ministries also resulted from less continuous mechanisms: the Leadership Retreat and the National Dialogue. These two important governmental events were enshrined in the constitution and were occasions on which to spur ministries into action. Started in 2006, the Leadership Retreat gathered 250 top officials from central and local government and parastatals in a meeting lasting several days to discuss governmental priorities. The Retreat was an occasion for top-officials to reflect on "where they [were] performing well and where they [were] not performing well" (Interview 31). At the end of the Retreat, a series of resolutions were adopted, i.e. actions to be implemented and assessed in the next retreat. This put pressure on ministries, especially to ensure that "all the boxes were ticked" (Interview 46) regarding the previous year's resolutions. The National Dialogue was the other main governmental public event. It brought together officials, representatives of civil society and members of the diaspora to discuss a wide range of issues. Theoretically anyone could ask questions about the running of the country to the President and ministers via e-mail, a toll-free

number and Twitter. Consequently, as explained by a consultant working in the Ministry of Agriculture, “everyone gets stressed before that. The minister hopes that some questions will not be raised” (Interview 36, see also 31, 32). For both the Leadership Retreat and the National Dialogue, the PMO was in charge of ensuring that the resolutions adopted were integrated into the Ministries’ planning for the next year.

These two events were not only occasions to put pressure on the central bureaucracy, a process that occurred on a regular basis anyway. Their function was also to publicise such pressure through the extensive media coverage that these government rituals benefited from. Many of their sessions were broadcast live on radio and TV, especially the President’s opening and closing speeches. The Retreat was also an occasion to publicise the asceticism and commitment of the government. Previously organised in comfortable hotels, from 2012 the Retreat took place in military camps and the participants arrived not in their official cars but in buses. They had to do morning exercise, pictures of which appeared in the media and on governmental websites. As stated by an advisor to the President, “people were getting too comfortable [in the previous leadership retreats]. We need to keep people on their feet, on their toes [...]. You wake up at 6, go for a run, run to the shower. By eight, you are at breakfast. It is very regimented, people sleep in dorms.” (Interview 31). Pressure on ministers and high civil servants during these rituals was also publicised through the President’s frequent public criticisms of officials, and officials’ public apologies when they failed to “deliver”.¹⁸⁶ The 2015 retreat epitomised this process as Kagame individually named bad performers and challenged them on specific failures.¹⁸⁷

Pressure on a ministry could also be impromptu. A surprising finding from the fieldwork, already observed at the local level, was that informants regularly identified the media as a source of pressure on their ministries (Interviews 22, 36, 58, 74). For example, in January 2013, the media reported a drugs stock out in some hospitals in Kigali. This resulted in the convocation of the Ministry of Health for a hearing in parliament.¹⁸⁸ The importance of the media was such that hospital directors received training on how to interact with the media during which they were advised, *inter alia*, not to conceal anything and never to talk about data not previously analysed (Interview 74). As at the local level, while criticism of the

¹⁸⁶ E.g. criticism to district mayor: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2010-01-18/15785/>. In the 2011 retreat, Kagame recalled the ambassador in South Africa in front of the whole audience for a lack of discipline (Iyer 2012: 13). In March 1, 2015 Kagame publicly lashed out at leaders in angry terms, denouncing their passivity and their lack of self-criticism.


¹⁸⁷ See video on <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-03-02/186496/> (accessed 08/11/2015).

¹⁸⁸ “Drug shortage hits Kigali hospitals” The New Times, 08/01/2015; “No shortage of drugs in hospitals – MoH” – The New Times, 09/01/2015. Other topics in the health media that were regularly picked up on included poor hygiene in hospitals, healthcare quality, or a death that could have been avoided (Interview 74).

government by the press was limited in Rwanda, it was strategically allowed when fostering the implementation of government policies and supporting service delivery.

The incentives for the civil service to implement policies can be summarised in Figure 6.5 below.

Figure 6.5 Simplified mapping of the main pressures on a Rwandan ministry



NB: Arrows symbolise the relative importance of each factor.

Overall, tight planning and evaluation at the local (see previous chapter) and central levels, enshrined in a series of performance contracts, meant that a contractual culture permeated the Rwandan state. From the presidency to the cells, no Rwandan civil servant could ignore the format of the *imihigo*, its objectives, indicators, baselines and targets. This contractual culture was reinforced by “sacred” planning documents (Vision 2020, EDPRS) and political rituals (Leadership Retreat and National Dialogue), which added symbolic significance to these technocratic processes. These documents and rituals were also especially important since they were the occasions on which to stage the top-down “accountability” of the government to its people, while monitoring and evaluation generally fostered a genuine bottom-up accountability in the state apparatus. This created a “contractual state” in Rwanda that provided an ethos of obligations of results that was absent from the Burundian state.

Pressure within the central bureaucracy: a two tiered system?

The pressure on central governmental agencies naturally translated into pressure within agencies. However, this pressure was not uniform. While top civil servants and some of their trusted subordinates worked hard, this was not necessarily true in the lower tiers of the

bureaucracy. Top civil servants worked a lot in Rwanda. This assertion is based firstly on observations. The appointment times for the interviews with officials spanned from 7am in the morning to 8pm in the evening. This never happened in Burundi. More tangibly, a good source of information lay in donors and international consultants who regularly interacted with or were embedded in the Rwandan bureaucracy. Their statements were often full of superlatives (Interviews 5, 16, 22, 27, 36, 57, 80, 96, 114). The general opinion was that “in terms of getting stuff done, this government is phenomenal” (Interview 96). The bureaucracy was viewed as “very committed” (Interviews 22, 80), “determined to get results” (Interview 36) and “over-worked” (Interview 22). It had a strong “work ethic” (Interview 27), a “willingness to always improve” (Interview 16), and to “do things quickly” (Interview 27), “faster than anybody else” (Interview 36).

Pressure was maintained in the bureaucracy through a series of formalised mechanisms. Office hours in Rwanda were officially 7a.m. to 5p.m., compared to 7a.m. to 3p.m. in Burundi. Unlike in Burundi, managers and subordinates regularly held meetings in ministries, which allowed them to set clear objectives. Especially pivotal to the life of a Rwandan Ministry was the senior management meeting. This was a meeting of the minister, the permanent secretary, director generals, directors and some heads of desks, which invariably took place on a Monday morning. These meetings were described in the Ministry of Agriculture as the occasion to set the tone on a weekly basis of what the governmental priorities were (Interview 57), while an informant in the MoH considered them as a window on what was discussed in the cabinet (Interview 8). Departmental management meetings were also common: in the MoH, for example, the staff meeting of the maternal and child health department was held on Tuesdays, and the one of the community health desk on Fridays.

Different techniques of individual disciplining and incentivising were used in the bureaucracy. Civil servants had evaluations called individual *imihigo*. Theoretically, if a civil servant received less than 60% in his/her evaluation, he/she would be dismissed. Conversely, a score above 70% translated into a pay bonus.¹⁸⁹ For high and mid-ranking civil servants, 70% of the score was composed of the results attained for a list of actions to be done during the year, and 30% of the score was related to conduct at work.¹⁹⁰ Consequently, unlike in Burundi, an individual evaluation was composed mostly of outcome rather than process targets. Despite this difference, the impact of civil servants’ individual evaluations was actually similar in both

¹⁸⁹ Public servants who scored above 80% received a bonus of 5% of their salary, while those who obtained marks of between 70% and 80% received a bonus of 3%.

¹⁹⁰ The criteria for the civil servant’s conduct included ability to plan, decision-making capacity, sense of motivation, and ability to communicate. For public servants who were support staff, 80% was based on results.

countries. Informants in Rwanda generally reported that, while they faced significant pressures, their individual performance targets were not part of that pressure, as the salary increase they produced was marginal and the evaluator often gave uniform scores. Yet, informants underlined that individual *imihigo* were useful to them as they gave a clear working plan, which the Burundian evaluations could not do since they were only about indicators of behaviour. Besides individual evaluations, another technique put in place in some ministries such as the Ministry of Local Government or the MoH was a clock-in system based on a fingerprint reader at the ministries' entrance. Although spectacular, this system was unused because many officials were regularly working outside of the building, attending meeting or on supervision trips locally.

The management style was fundamentally different in Rwanda from Burundi. Top-managers were not passive towards their subordinates but could pressure them into working long hours that could span over the weekend if necessary (Interviews 8, 11, 27, 57, 62, 80, 114). Some informants stated that they would like to work in the private sector to spend more time with their families. This tendency was reinforced by the relatively small size of the Rwandan central government mentioned above. This requirement to work long hours did not stop at Rwandan staff but also applied to international consultants. An international consultant reported that the Minister of Health had once called him on a Sunday at 10 p.m. while he was on holiday abroad in order to double check a data analysis (Interview 27; see also 5). At the top and mid levels, the management style was direct, with ministries summoning civil servants to "request explanations" (*demande d'explication*), which the minister of health was especially famous for (Interview 27). Publicly, naming and shaming subordinates sometimes happened as well (Interview 36). It seemed that Kagame's style of "straight talk" and energetic and public condemnation of failure trickled down the state apparatus (Interviews 27, 96). This management style was the opposite of the Burundian situation where managers hardly dared to hold their subordinates accountable.

Although impressive in comparison to Burundi, the Rwandan bureaucracy was far from being a paragon of effectiveness. The interaction with low-ranking bureaucrats in Rwanda demonstrated that the effectiveness of the civil service was not homogenous. "The people at the top are very professional. Go down a couple of layer, not so much" (Interview 96, see also 80) or, as bluntly by a foreign informant, "half [of officials] work extremely hard, half just wait for their [pay] cheque" (Interview 65). Personal observations revealed that going on Facebook or using the ministry's decent Internet connection to download movies represented an important part of the working day of lower tier civil servants. This inconsistent situation was partly a perverse effect created by strong top-down pressure on ministries. High-level

officials did not tend to delegate work (Interviews 22, 57, 96, 119). Because of the low capacity of the civil service at the lower tiers, managers often did the work themselves or relied on a handful of trusted and capable subordinates rather than pressuring staff of a lower capacity. Furthermore, “delegation is about risk” (Interview 119) and centralised work allowed the top-officials to keep control of the work done and avoid mistakes in a context of high pressure (Interview 36).

While the substantial top-down pressure on the Rwandan bureaucracy was a general driver of its effectiveness, it also created other perverse effects. The generalised hurry that characterised Rwandan policy implementation was hardly compatible with the questioning of decisions within the bureaucracy (Interviews 8, 27, 36, 109). Any decision, even a bad one, “[went] down with not much controversy” (Interview 27). Accountability to the top was so dominant that people were often afraid of making decisions (Interview 36). Pressure could also quickly translate into poor planning (Interviews 8, 34, 109). A civil servant in the Ministry of Health lamented that, “we run after numbers, we never stop to think” (Interview 8, see also 109). This echoes the situation mentioned at the local level where requests for quick performance induced harsh policy implementation and sometimes “cooking the books.”

Coordination of top state agencies

Finally, another crucial driver of state effectiveness in Rwanda was the effort put in by the government to solve collective action problems. The PMO was central to this task. Through its Government Action Coordination Unit (GACU) it ensured the smooth functioning of the cabinet by filtering the kind of policies that were worth discussing so that the cabinet was not over-burdened with lower-level decision-making or ill-prepared documents (Interview 269; Friedman 2011). Second, it had a role in coordinating state agencies with regard to issues involving more than one ministry. During *imihigo* planning, it made sure that planned actions were not redundant across ministries and that actions requiring two ministries to work together were planned in both of the ministries concerned. For example, if a target was the building of an agro-processing plant in the Ministry of Agriculture *imihigo*, the PMO would make sure that the Ministry of infrastructure had also planned the required road and electricity supply. From 2010, it also organised a Permanent Secretary (PS) forum every month. The PS forum was a meeting for all permanent secretaries across government ministries to discuss multi-sectoral policy issues. Similar meetings could also be organised on an ad-hoc basis (Interviews 79, 269). In comparison, the coordination of different ministries in relation to cross-sectoral matters was limited in Burundi. For example, no regular inter-ministerial meetings took place below the level of ministers. Permanent secretaries apparently did not know their counterparts

in other ministries (MFPTSS 2012a: 20). Furthermore, the government secretariat in Burundi, which in theory was in charge of ensuring the coordination of different ministries at the level of the presidency, simply did not perform this task in practice according to a governmental report (ibid.).

6.4 The relationship between the central bureaucracy and donors

The objective of this section is to explore the role of the central bureaucracy in harnessing the financial and technical support of donors to enhance state effectiveness. Because aid grants accounted respectively for 39.5% and 30.1% of the state revenue in Burundi and Rwanda, analysing how each bureaucracy dealt on a day-to-day basis with such financial windfalls is inescapable.¹⁹¹ However, this section does not seek to compare the quantity, allocation and use of aid. These aspects have been mentioned when relevant in the case studies presented in the previous chapters. Instead, the objective of this section is to explore the relationship between the central bureaucracy and donors and the impact this had on state effectiveness.

Burundi

Although aid in Burundi was important and donors undoubtedly participated in policy implementation its role in state effectiveness was hindered by three main obstacles: a lack of donor coordination, passivity regarding resource mobilisation, and bypassing of the state by donors.

Lack of coordination

The relationship between the bureaucracy and donors was characterised by a general lack of coordination. In theory, in the agriculture and health sectors, technical working groups ensured coordination. In the agricultural sector, a working group, the GSADR (Rural Development and Agricultural Sectoral Group), was the main mechanism of donor coordination. GSADR meetings were held regularly—there were 13 meetings in 2013. Officially, there were 11 working groups in place in the GSADR. In reality, the quality of their work varied. Some worked well, an example being the fertiliser working group. However others only existed on

¹⁹¹ Rwanda: calculation based on MINECOFIN (2014) for the 2013/2014 revenues. Burundi: calculation for the 2012 revenues based on the 2014 budget execution law (*loi 1/01 du 7 janvier 2014 portant règlement et compte rendu budgétaire pour l'exercice 2012*).

paper.¹⁹² The minister herself sometimes participated in the GSADR, which raised its standing. However, the two biggest donors in the agricultural sector, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank, did not attend. In the Ministry of Health, from 2008, donors were organised in the CPSD (Framework for a Partnership in Health and Development), which supervised four technical working groups. Yet, as they operated poorly, “everyone hate[d] them” (Interview 133, see also 152). For example, in the group on maternal health, the PNSR, i.e. the MoH programme in charge of maternal health, was not always present at the meetings. Consequently, in the health sector, as in the agricultural sector, coordination generally stopped at ministry-level and was often confined to broad dialogue, with few practical discussions (Interviews 133, 152, 217).

One of the main consequences of the lack of donor coordination by the central state in Burundi was that information about the activity of each donor was fragmented. This was especially true in the health sector, which attracted many actors compared to the agricultural sector where project required comparatively larger funding. The central bureaucracy had difficulty knowing who was doing what in the country. No mapping of donors existed either in agriculture or in the health sector. As a consequence, preventing duplication of activities or conversely, identifying resource gaps was difficult. In the health sector, this also hindered the equitable distribution of resources across the country, with some provinces concentrating donors’ and NGOs’ projects while others were neglected (Interviews 144, 152). In the agricultural sector, efforts to monitor the allocation of donors’ resources were visible through the National Programme of Agricultural Investment (PNIA) initiated by the Belgium Cooperation (BTC). Its role was to track the disbursement of donors against the financial needs of the different sub-programmes of the National Agricultural Strategy (SNA). It is nonetheless significant that these efforts were initiated and led by a donor and the BTC, and not by the government.

Yet, the success of these initiatives was ultimately down to the willingness of the central bureaucracy to act upon their results. However, its attitude towards donors was generally characterised by passivity. Burundian officials did not discipline donors, who had an enormous leeway to follow their own objectives. The general feeling in the Burundian bureaucracy was that donors “do whatever they want” (Interview 144). Donors and NGOs in health and agriculture were virtually free to operate anywhere in the country or to fund a policy outside of governmental plans (Interviews 144, 155, 159, 161, 180, 193, 195). For example, in 2014 in the health sector, donors wanted to promote youth sensitisation on reproductive

¹⁹² Minutes of the GDADR of 05/12/2013. For this reason, the GSADR suggested that in the future some working groups should only use e-mail to communicate instead of holding regular meetings.

health even if the action was not planned in the governmental Reproductive Health Strategic Plan. Although some officials in the PNSR felt that this was not the priority, the strategic plan was adjusted as a result of donors' support, not the other way around (Interviews 193, 194, 195).

Lack of aid mobilisation.

Besides coordination, the lack of maximisation of donors' financial and technical support was another factor limiting state effectiveness. This finding was crucial as it showed that the relative deficit of aid in Burundi compared to Rwanda was not solely an exogenous factor to state effectiveness. It was also a situation created by the Burundian government itself through two main mechanisms. The interaction between the central bureaucracy and donors did not maximise the amount of support the state could get. Burundian officials appeared generally passive on this issue (Interviews 142, 144, 152, 155, 156, 179, 180, 232). Two instances among the many reported were particularly illustrative. In the agricultural sector, as already mentioned, the BTC had put in place a performance-based payment system to complement some Ministry of Agriculture civil servants' salaries at the local level. Since 2012, the BTC had been attempting to roll out this performance-based bonus in the Ministry's central bureaucracy. This necessitated the creation of performance indicators. Despite the BTC's repeated demands for the ministry's Permanent Secretary and the concerned DGs to suggest indicators, it had been waiting for these for a year, as of July 2013 (Interview 142). Yet, given the low level of salaries in Burundi, as an international consultant lamented, "when there is money to be gained, people should find the time for that" (Interview 142). This passivity resulted from the low capacity of the civil service, from a lack "of a culture of results achievement" (Interview 142) in the Ministry, but also from the high turnover due to the political reasons mentioned above. DGs were not in place for a substantial period of time and they had little incentive to engage in the demanding projects of devising performance indicators for their department.

Another illustrative case was the demand for funding in the health sector. UN agency officials working on maternal health indicated that the MoH could do much more to mobilise resources. In one instance, a UN agency working in maternal health still had some remaining budget at the end of the year because the PNSR had put in too few requests for funding. While lack of capacity (Interviews 144, 152, 179, 232) was an explanation regularly put forward to explain this situation, in the case of the requests for UN funding, passivity of the bureaucracy was to blame since such requests were relatively simple and short documents (Interview 179). Consequently, many of the grant requests to UN agencies that the MoH should have been

writing were often shadow-written by UN agents themselves (Interviews 179, 232). This practice was also common in embassies (Interview 190) and at the World Bank (Interview 186). This ensured reasonable donors' budget execution (Interviews 190, 232).

Overall, because of the lack of capacity and passivity, even when money was available the bureaucracy had a hard time formulating what it could be used for (Interviews 147, 180). If Burundi could have absorbed aid quicker, a diplomat of one of the major embassies in Bujumbura asserted, his "politicians" would have been happy to give him more money to manage (Interview 191, see also 186). The demand side was also a limiting factor because of corruption. It prevented donors from increasing sectoral and general budget support as in Rwanda, which would have been likely to bring more aid to the country (Interviews 180, 191) by avoiding problems related to aid absorption. More generally, high-level officials did not lobby enough donors to get funding in Burundi (Interviews 152, 179, 186).

Donors, and even some Burundian officials, considered that the issue of increasing donors' funding rested more on the demand side than on the supply side (Interviews 144, 148, 179, 156, 186, 190). As put by a UN employee, "the problem [of getting funding from donors] is to show that there is a problem. And in the case of Burundi, that should not be too difficult." (Interview 179).

Donors: building the state or bypassing the state?

Overall, central bureaucracy passivity produced a situation in which donors "push[ed] for everything, [led] for everything" (Interview 135). Consequently, Burundi "for donors, is quite exciting because they have huge leeway. You can create a policy if you fancy it!" (Interview 131). However, this led to a situation where donors substituted themselves for the state, giving rise to what Boyce (2008) called a dual public sector, i.e. a public sector funded and managed by the state coexisting with one funded and managed by donors. For example, the importance of BTC support to the Ministry of Agriculture made it "a second ministry of agriculture" (Interview 156). The contrast between the few cars parked in front of the Ministry of Agriculture and the large fleet of gleaming white four-wheel drives in front of the BTC agricultural programme headquarters across the street symbolised this situation. The BTC's payment for performance of civil servants, who received extra-money for carrying out their

daily tasks, meant that donors took over a fundamental role of the state: supplementing the pay of central state civil servants for them to carry out their normal duties.¹⁹³

Corruption also led donors to implement projects themselves, bypassing the state altogether. In agriculture, projects not directly involved in institutional and operational support to the state were directly managed and implemented by donors, only keeping the Ministry of Agriculture informed out of courtesy (e.g. Interview 129). It was also common practice for donors to contract the otherwise idle Ministry of Agriculture's civil servants at the local level to implement projects (Interviews 129, 140). In the meantime, "the state closes its eyes [...] if a project comes and keeps busy the people of the Ministry while giving them bonuses, people are happy, it smooths out everything" (Interview 142). This situation was a stark contrast not only with Rwanda (see below) but also with the pre-war situation in Burundi when many agricultural projects occurred through the SRDs, which were run by government officials (Interviews 160, 163).

This analysis of the relationship between the central bureaucracy and donors is not to say that donors systematically undermined state effectiveness in Burundi. They were undoubtedly crucial in helping the government to implement its stated goals given the tremendous financial and technical support they provided. But this section demonstrates that the relationship between the central bureaucracy and donors did not allow the maximisation of the contribution of foreign aid to state effectiveness. It hindered resource mobilisation and also encouraged donors to bypass the state, or more simply, it gave donors leeway to pursue their own interests, which were not necessarily aligned with maximising state effectiveness. While this situation is far from exceptional in sub-Saharan Africa, it stood in stark contrast to Rwanda.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, the relationship between the central bureaucracy and donors was markedly different from that in Burundi. The bureaucracy monitored and coordinated donors more effectively, but was also more committed to resource mobilisation.

¹⁹³ This is a difference with the PBF in the health sector, which was presented as a state policy to pay local state service providers based on performance (although donors largely participated in funding the PBF).

Coordinating and disciplining donors

At the sectoral level in Rwanda, the Sector Technical Working Group (STWG) was the main mechanism for donor coordination. Chaired normally by the Ministry's Permanent Secretary and co-chaired by one of the main donors in the sector, STWGs brought all of the relevant stakeholders (the ministry, NGOs, and bi- and multi-lateral organisations) together on a regular basis. They ensured the transparency of donors' activities in the sector. They also reviewed action plans devised by sub-technical working groups (Sub-STWGs), often recommending some modifications to be integrated. Sub-STWGs were centred around more practical concerns. For example, the Maternal and Child Health Technical Working Group (MCH TWG) was an occasion to present all of the new projects being rolled out in this sub-sector, coordinate donors around them, and seek comments from donors on MoH reports, policies and strategies.

Overall, technical working groups were more dynamic in Rwanda than in Burundi. For example, the organisation of the MCH TWG ran like "clockwork" (Interview 96), it was always chaired by the relevant state officials, gathering between 20 and 40 participants on average,¹⁹⁴ while its equivalent in Burundi was not always attended by relevant MoH officials. Furthermore, while in Burundi no working group existed below the one on reproductive health, a range of active sub-groups existed under the MCH TWG.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, in agriculture, IFAD and the World Bank both attended the Agriculture SWG, with the latter acting as co-chair of the group, while in Burundi, as mentioned, neither attended the GSADR although they were the most important donors in the sector.

Besides this institutional framework ensuring coordination, bureaucratic rules and practices limited the possibilities of donors and NGOs of working completely outside the purview of the Rwandan state. First, in terms of aid modalities, the Rwandan government, contrary to its Burundian counterpart, had clearly stated that its "preferred modality for external assistance is unearmarked budget support" since "project support is often poorly aligned to government priorities, and [...] too often bypasses—and therefore undermines—government systems rather than strengthening them." (RoR 2006: 7). In the absence of general (unearmarked) budget support, sectoral budget support was preferred by the government (ibid: 8).

¹⁹⁴ Minutes from the MCH TWG of 09/02/2013, 21/10/2013, 23/10/2014.

¹⁹⁵ The MCH TWG sub groups were Family Planning, Safe Motherhood and Child Health, Nutrition, and Community Health. Yet, their quality was not uniform. For example, the Family planning sub-group meetings were not held regularly, mainly because of the lack of diligence of its chairman (Interview 80, see also Interview 36 in the case of the agricultural sector).

Second, even when international support took the form of projects, i.e. it was not channelled through the state, a range of regulations and practices ensured that, at the very least, such support was aligned with state objectives. Regarding bilateral and multilateral donor-funded projects, the Rwandan government pushed for a Sector Wide Approach (SWAP), according to which funding should be made towards a unique sector strategy, following a unique expenditure framework. In trying to approach this ideal, the implementation of bi- and multi-lateral organisations' funded projects followed two patterns in Rwanda. The first was that the projects were directly implemented by the Rwandan bureaucracy through Single Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). Encouraged by the Rwandan government since 2010, SPIUs were structures attached to a Ministry in charge of managing a range of donor projects.¹⁹⁶ In Agriculture, four project implementation units were in place while the MoH had managed to regroup projects in one SPIU.¹⁹⁷ While these units were vehicles for donors' projects, they were under the command of the Rwandan ministry (Interviews 81, 30, 117). Donors had a complete hands-off approach, agreeing with the government only on the objectives of the projects (Interview 30). In this regard, projects were quite close to budget support since they were managed by the Rwandan government and sometimes, for some donors like IFAD, audited by the Rwandan Auditor General, although funding was not channelled through state coffers.

The second pattern of donors' projects resided in implementation by INGOs. Although the involvement of the state was weaker under this pattern, daily practices ensured some degree of state management. The maternal health and fertiliser sectors provide telling examples. In the former, the most important project was the Family Health Project (FHP), funded by USAID from 2012 to 2016 for \$55 million. Although implemented by a range of mostly American NGOs, the head of this consortium was, according to the FHP staff, clearly "working for the MoH" since the "ownership" of the project is so high in the Ministry (Interview 80). In the fertiliser sector, IFDC, the implementer of USAID Privatisation of Rwanda's Fertiliser Import and Distribution System (PReFER), while not working for the Ministry of Agriculture, nonetheless had to deal with the strong "ownership" of the ministry as mentioned in Chapter 3. For example, it was not consulted when the minister suddenly decided to privatise fertiliser imports. USAID also changed its Chief of Party in 2014

¹⁹⁶ The government also encouraged donors to follow a division of labour, whereby donors should actively participate in no more than three sectors in Rwanda. They were however free to be silent donors for as many projects as they wanted.

¹⁹⁷ The existence of four project implementation units in the agriculture sector was mainly due to the different fiduciary requirements of the different leading donors (World Bank, IFAD, Belgium Cooperation and African Development Bank). New projects were encouraged to integrate into existing SPIUs (Interview 26). In Health, the single SPIU.

following an incompatibility of views with the Minister. These examples, taken from the health and agriculture sectors, clearly show that the central bureaucracy in Rwanda had a significant influence even on the implementation of externally funded projects, either through formal mechanisms such as the SPIU or through everyday practices. As explained by one donor, even when the funding was solely for a donor project, “here they [the Rwandan officials] have the impression that it is their own money” (Interview 58).

Even in the case of work of INGOs not funded by Rwanda-based donors, arguably the case where international support was the most independent from the state, the Rwandan bureaucracy was able to ensure that the INGOs’ activities were in line with state objectives. NGOs seeking to get registration to work in Rwanda had to provide the state’s Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration (DGIE) with their “Annual action plan for the fiscal year (July-June) *aligned with the vision 2020/EDPRS II and DDP (District Development Plan)*” (emphasis added).¹⁹⁸ In other words, INGOs had to demonstrate that their actions were in line with the national and local governments’ key planning documents. INGOs also had to sign with the relevant line ministry a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which allowed the ministries to ensure that the INGO would work towards the ministry’s objectives (Interview 22).¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, to maximise the use of INGO resources to achieve the state’s goals, each NGO was required by law “not to exceed twenty percent (20%) of its budget on overhead costs in programmes that are not in the interest of its beneficiaries”,²⁰⁰ or else provide written explanations to the DGIE. To ensure that these principles were enforced, INGOs in Rwanda were asked to regularly report on their activities and the execution of their budget. Joint visits by ministry and DGIE officials also took place (Interview 23).²⁰¹

The process of monitoring INGOs was remarkably institutionalised. As reported by an INGO worker operating in the fertiliser sector, the enthusiasm of the Ministry of Agriculture about his organisation’s activity did not buy the automatic support of the DGIE, which had to be convinced independently (Interview 57). Finally, it was also significant that, at least in the health sector, the MoH was vigilant regarding the fact that NGOs should not promote systems that were parallel to the national ones. For example, in February 2013, when it was found that

¹⁹⁸ INGO online service, DGIE website, <https://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=209> (accessed on 06/10/2015).

¹⁹⁹ For example, an NGO requesting to operate in the health sector had to demonstrate that its actions were aligned with the EPRS 2 and the HSSP in its request for a MoU with the MoH.

²⁰⁰ Article 18 of law N°05/2012 of 17/02/2012 governing the organisation and functioning of international nongovernmental organisations.

²⁰¹ Audits did take place (e.g. see *The East African*, “Audit seeks to out rogue NGOs that use the needy” 22/02/2013). In the health sector, the Ministry also tracked the budget of all NGOs on a quarterly basis through a resource tracking tool, notably to ensure that the overheads were not excessive (Interviews 16, 23).

an INGO (Millennium Promise) had its own Performance Based Financing incentive system for Community Health Workers (CHWs) and its own SMS surveillance and alert system about maternal and child health for the CHWs, the NGO was asked to stop using these tools and instead use the state's tools (Interview 8).

“Owning” aid

These mechanisms and practices are a reflection of a broader government control of donor support. Many of the expatriates interviewed, who often had extensive experience in developing countries, found such sense of “ownership” unique to Rwanda (Interviews 58, 80, 96, 117). Fears of being expelled from the country if they did not embrace the government policy were mentioned in individual interviews with aid workers working in the health and agriculture sector. “You always feel you are here for a determined period of time” (Interview 36). “One mistake and you are out” (Interview 57). “Don’t conform to the government and you are gone. And I think you would have to do things really badly in other countries for that to happen” (Interview 96).²⁰² While this might have been true for smaller organisations and aid workers on an individual basis, it was likely to be different for important bi- and multi-lateral organisations given the diplomatic repercussions it would have had created and the tremendous dependency of Rwanda on external financial support. In any case, this perception created self-censorship and compliance among donors. Some donors also reported that they were sometimes treated with arrogance (Interviews 87, 91, 96) by a bureaucracy that considered that “they are only here for money” (Interview 91).

The general power of the Rwandan central state to discipline donors was used by the bureaucracy to avoid duplication of activities, and more importantly to push donors to fill funding gaps in the ministries’ action plans (Interviews 8, 60, 91, 96). This dynamic was especially conspicuous in the maternal health sector. Depending on the needs of the MoH, donors were not free to choose the district in which they would operate. As reported by an NGO working for the FHP project on the training of Maternal Health Workers (ASMs), the head of the community health desk “tells you what district to take [operate in]. She says either you take all of the districts [assigned to you] or none. They don’t want sprinkling” (Interview 60, see also 8).²⁰³ The central bureaucracy sometimes even actively lobbied donors to avoid

²⁰² The example to which the interviewee was referring was one of an NGO that sought the support of the MoH to bid for a project on epidemiological surveillance of HIV. Yet, when they presented what they had done over the past 5 years to the Permanent Secretary, their results were judged to be so insignificant that the PS refused to sign the letter supporting this NGO’s bid for the project.

²⁰³ The diligence of the community health desk might not however be representative, as some desks in the MoH were apparently less concerned with donors’ distribution (Interview 91).

financial gaps. For example, in 2012, the budget from the NGO in charge of the implementation of the Mobile for Reproductive Health (m4RH) project, an automated text message service to answer questions on reproductive health, was exhausted. The MoH asked different donors to release resources for the continuation of the project. As recalled by an NGO worker, “I have never seen this in other countries” (Interview 96, see also 80). In another instance, the MoH asked donors operating in one district to support the scale-up of a family planning distribution programme although this was not part of the donor’s activity (Interview 96). Furthermore, to avoid the sprinkling of aid and to incentivise donors to fund important projects and not just pilots, the informal policy in Ministry of Health was to discourage pilot studies (Interviews 8, 27, 96).²⁰⁴ The Ministry was not always against pilots but strongly objected to pilots of what looked to be viable projects from the outset .

The “ownership” of the Rwandan government over aid was also deployed in the symbolic field. Rwandan officials wanted to make sure that the Rwandan state was identified as much as possible as the one in charge of policy implementation, not the donors. This was visible in the officials’ stance towards donors’ logos in Rwanda, something that was unexpectedly underlined in the interviews. Donors’ logos should feature less conspicuously than the ministry’s logo. Although in other developing countries, this practice could develop partly because of donors’ self-discipline to do so. Many interviewees were surprised by the importance of logos for government officials (Interviews 16, 22, 27, 96). In the MoH, although no formal guidelines existed, it was expected that “no logo can be larger than the Ministry of Health’s logo. And the MoH logo should be at the top” (Interview 96) “or even at the back” (Interview 22). In one instance, a consultant designed and printed an unofficial certificate for MoH officials he had trained, with the MoH logo in the top right hand corner, and distributed it. Yet, despite the certificates’ lack of any official value, “the ministry sent them back, saying that the logo had to be on the left side” (Interview 27).

Similarly, in the health sector, donors publishing scientific articles based on their work in Rwanda were pressured to include Rwandans as co-authors, and often even as first authors. This was the result of the MoH research policy that aims at building its staff research capacity. Consequently, “if you don’t have a Rwandan researcher in your team, especially in health, you might have trouble getting approval. And don’t expect the Rwandan researcher to do much” (Interview 27, see also 96). Similarly, the MoH often refused to allow foreigners working with the MoH to give international presentations on projects being implemented in

²⁰⁴ A joke regularly told by the minister was that in Rwanda, the only pilots should be at Rwandair, the national airline company.

Rwanda and instead requested that a Rwandan present them. As summarised by an NGO worker who had prepared many of these presentations, “they don’t want white faces speaking for the country” (Interview 96, see also 27).

These findings, although restricted to the agriculture and health sectors, appeared valid for the whole bureaucracy, and echo Hayman’s findings that, despite its dependence on aid, “the Rwandan government does retain considerable power over policy and its implementation” (Hayman 2008: 168). Donors in Rwanda were not only disciplined to enhance state effectiveness in practice, but were also disciplined to enhance it symbolically. The state should not merely be the main channel for aid. It should be viewed as the ultimate agent “in charge” of development in Rwanda.

Aid mobilisation.

Another remarkable contrast with the Burundian bureaucracy was in terms of the effort of the Rwandan central state to maximise donors’ resources. At the macro-level, this was done in three ways. First, the low level of corruption inspired confidence among donors (Interviews 12, 30). It fostered aid absorption since donors did not shy away from providing direct budget support or using the country’s systems to implement their projects (e.g. US Government 2011: 8). An increasing number of donors, such as IFAD in the agricultural sector, used Rwanda’s Auditor General’s reports to audit their projects.

Second, the government’s apparent strong commitment to development was appealing to donors who believed that their money would be put to good use. The importance of USAID’s support to the agricultural sector was a case in point. Most of the funding was allocated because Rwanda was one of 12 African countries selected for the US Presidential Programme *Feed the Future*. The selection of Rwanda was, according to a USAID official “in large part because Rwanda has demonstrated its commitment” to agricultural development, visible for example through being the first country to sign the NEPAD Agency’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) (Interviews 26, 117; US Government 2011: 6). The *Feed the Future* programme website stated that, “Rwanda’s sound policy environment, solid growth record and macroeconomic stability provide a strong foundation for Feed the Future implementation. Rwanda has committed itself to generating sustained agricultural growth.”²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/rwanda>. Accessed 12/10/2015.

Third, and as a consequence, Rwanda constituted a useful ‘best practice’ case for donors, for whom “to be part of [the Rwandan success story] is like touching gold” (Interview 96). The government’s ability to rollout projects quickly and successfully could be used by international development organisations to increase their funding. While Rwandan officials might have been “milking the cow” (Hayman 2008) by courting donors, donors also strategically used the Rwandan case internationally “to have more leverage, to have more money” (Interview 96).

Overall, the Rwandan bureaucracy was far from passive when interacting with donors. As a consequence, aid rarely totally bypassed the state. Even when aid took the form of project-support, a series of mechanisms and practices ensured that this aid was used for government plans. As a consequence, aid was more likely to enhance state effectiveness simply because even when it was not channelled through the state budget or managed by the state, it was still used to pursue the government’s “stated goals.”

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the causes of state effectiveness focusing on the central state from an organisational angle. The image of the Burundian and Rwandan states that emerged from the material presented above is markedly distinct. The Burundian state appeared fragmented in the sense that its apparatus was hardly oriented towards the implementation of the state’s stated goals. Few mechanisms systematically monitored civil servants’ daily work and linked it with the overarching planning documents, the CSLP and Vision 2025. The norms governing civil servants’ recruitment were themselves fragmented through the multiplication of statutes and pay scales, and the disregard for general rules of recruitment. The nature of the interaction of the Burundian bureaucracy with donors did not ensure the optimal mobilisation and use of foreign aid towards the government’s goals. In contrast, the image of the Rwandan state was one of a goal-oriented apparatus, resulting from the strong planning and evaluation of ministerial work, the absence of competing norms of accountability in the civil service, and institutions supporting merit-based recruitment. Furthermore, the state developed a range of rules and practices to ensure that international support was harnessed efficiently towards the achievement of the government’s objectives.

Overall, these findings corroborate the dynamics identified in the previous chapters. First, patterns of clientelism in Burundi and an emphasis on technocracy and ownership in Rwanda, visible in the fertiliser and maternal health sectors, and in the local-level bureaucracy, were reproduced in the central bureaucracy. Second, this chapter confirms that differences in

resources and time since the end of the war between Burundi and Rwanda are elements that can be accounted for in this research. The evidence presented revealed that the amount of foreign aid was, to a certain extent, the result of internal dynamics in both countries. Burundi was not a donor darling, but little effort was made by politicians and civil servants to alter the perception of the country among donors. Burundi had less resources than Rwanda, but clientelism prevented it from using its resources as efficiently. Burundi may have had only a decade of peace to re-build its state, but formal state rules were undermined by political factors unrelated to the time difference with Rwanda since the end of the war.

Finally, this chapter also drew attention to a crucial fact. Institutions for effectiveness in Rwanda, such as merit-based recruitment, effective planning and evaluation, or the disciplining of donors were not only present, but were also widely advertised. In Burundi, obstacles to effectiveness such as clientelism were barely hidden. The theoretical proposition put forward in the next chapter will explain these differences.

Chapter 7

Elite legitimacy and state effectiveness

The objective of this chapter is to offer a theoretical proposition to explain the divergence of state effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda as observed empirically in the previous chapters. The overarching argument is that the differing necessities for each ruling elite after conflict to increase its political legitimacy, and the different avenues available for it to do so, made state effectiveness politically imperative or not. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section examines the concept of legitimacy before devising a typology of sources of legitimacy. The second part uses this typology to identify the different sources of legitimacy that the ruling elite could exploit in Burundi and Rwanda and examines their impact on state effectiveness. The third section concludes by summarising the argument and addressing potential limitations and alternative explanation.

7.1 Conceptualising legitimacy

Definition

Political legitimacy is essential for rulers' political survival because it increases popular compliance and improves resilience to challenges (Easton 1965; Alagappa 1995: 4). Without legitimacy, repression remains the only tool for power maintenance (Wintrobe 1988; Alagappa 1995: 43). It is consequently unsurprising that "every [...] system [of domination] attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy" (Weber [1922] 1978: 213) and that claims to legitimacy are "made by every state in the modern era" (Gilley 2009: 10).

Political legitimacy can be defined as the right to rule (e.g. Gilley 2009; OECD 2010: 47; Lara 2014). Legitimacy is related to the degree with which power is considered valid or appropriate according to people's beliefs (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212ff; cf. Beetham 1991). As stated by Weber, "the basis of every system of authority, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige" (ibid. 263). Similarly, Lipset defines legitimacy as "the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset 1959: 77; see also Linz 1988: 65). Putzel (1999: 201) moves away from a

definition based on claims about people's "beliefs", distinguishing "active legitimacy", i.e. manifestations of positive support for rulers' right to rule, from "passive legitimacy", where people do not challenge rulers' claims to the right to rule.

This distinction draws attention to the fact that legitimacy cannot be considered an "all or nothing" phenomenon (Weber 1978[1922]: 213; Linz 1988: 66; Gilley 2009: 10). It has to be viewed as a continuous, rather than dichotomous, variable. This is obvious as legitimacy draws on a multiplicity of sources (see below), emanates from an aggregation of individual beliefs, and can differ depending on the audience.

The literature has generally approached the concept of legitimacy either normatively or empirically (Barker 1990: 11-12; Buchanan & Keohane 2006: 405; Hinsch 2008; Andersen 2012). On the one hand, some authors have put forward a normative definition of legitimacy, holding that some sources of legitimacy are intrinsically "right" and universal, and therefore should be promoted. In the state-building literature, drawing on the good governance agenda, legitimacy has regularly been equated with liberal democracy, human rights and rule of law (e.g. Rotberg 2004; Fukuyama 2004; cf. Eriksen 2009; Autesserre 2010). Consequently, authoritarian regimes, which do not follow the good governance agenda, inherently have little legitimacy. Dogan (1992: 117) for example contends that, in authoritarian context, "legitimacy is not of ultimate importance since authority is based on force." On the other hand, other authors have refused to anchor the concept of legitimacy in universal criteria and have instead approached it empirically (e.g. OECD 2010a; 2010b; Lara 2014). From this perspective, "there is no consensus around its origins, other than that these are multiple, interconnected, and context specific" (McLoughlin 2015: 342). Without entering into the debate, this chapter uses the concept of legitimacy in a non-normative manner, treating as an empirical phenomenon specific to the context and history of a given country. While the normative and empirical approaches have been counterposed in some policy debates, such as the one on state building (Andersen 2012), they are not necessarily mutually exclusive as they often serve different purposes. Normative approaches are often used in a deductive manner, to measure the legitimacy of a regime against some norms, or as a starting point for policy recommendations. Empirical approaches are used inductively, to understand the sources of legitimacy in a given context (ibid.: 207), which is precisely what is required for this chapter's purpose.

Whether based on context-specific or universal sources, legitimacy ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder; yet it is a product of a double dynamic. For example, Weigand (2015: 4) distinguishes between the perceptions of legitimacy held by subjects and the claim of

legitimacy made by an authority. Consequently, legitimacy is not only “granted” by subjects, but also “constructed” by rulers. First, rulers can engage in the legitimation of their power by “educating” the citizenry regarding conceptions of legitimacy that are more in line with the maintenance of their power. Second, rulers can manipulate the citizenry’s perception of their actions or more generally of the political environment. This can be done thanks to brazen propaganda or more subtly by resorting to a “framing effect”, i.e. using the fact that “opinions are vulnerable to being shaped arbitrarily by how the issue is represented” (Chong & Druckman 2007: 104 in Schlumberger 2010: 235).

This chapter is only concerned with the legitimacy of the ruling elite, not of the state apparatus itself. In other words, it is the rulers, not the state, that are what the literature calls the “referent object of legitimacy” (e.g. Alagappa 1995: 26-28). The two are distinct because the state is composed of structures that are more enduring than regimes and governments (ibid.). Englebert for example conceptualises state legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa without any reference to those controlling the state apparatus. For him, a state is legitimate when “its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions” (Englebert 2000: 4). The legitimacy of the state refers here to the general historical acceptance of the role of state institutions in shaping people’s daily lives. For Englebert, Burundi and Rwanda have very legitimate states given the pre-colonial tradition of stateness in both countries (ibid.: 4-9; 155-166). Consequently, Burundians and Rwandans may recognise state institutions as legitimate while not recognising the right to rule claimed by the elite at the apex of the state. In other words, the obedience of the average Burundians and Rwandans to local state institutions, whether due to habit, tradition, or recognition of their usefulness, constitutes a daily relation to the state that can be decoupled from any opinion about the remote ruling elite in Bujumbura or Kigali. The theoretical proposition of this chapter will not be based on the legitimacy of the state but only on the legitimacy of the ruling elite.

Towards a typology of sources of legitimacy

Although legitimacy can take many forms, a typology of sources of legitimacies can be created in order to more easily explore their relationship with state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda. Drawing on Easton’s (1965) formalisation of the political system, the scholarship on legitimacy regularly differentiates between input and output legitimacy (e.g. Scharpf 1999; OECD 2010a; Krasner & Risse 2014). Input legitimacy generally refers to political representation. In democratic settings, it rests on the belief that rulers’ actions are legitimate “if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of the community”

(Scharpf 2009: 6). While in democratic theory, input legitimacy presupposes consultation with citizens and the accountability of power-holders through checks and balances, for many authors it mainly “relates to the access to public authority” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 169) because the choice of leaders is arguably the strongest mechanism to ensure that political representation is aligned with people’s preferences (see also Teskey et al. 2012: 11; McLoughlin 2014: 2).

Output legitimacy, also labelled performance legitimacy, relates to the ability of rulers to improve people’s lives. Output legitimacy is typically “defined in relation to the performance, effectiveness and quality of services and goods that the state delivers” (OECD 2010a: 23). This category is widely used in the scholarship but remains, from a theoretical vantage point, debated. Some authors reject material self-interest as a basis of legitimacy (Barker 1990, Hurd 1999). Barker for example argues that legitimacy is not “the belief that it is in one’s interests to obey, though that may be an associated claim, but that it is right to obey, that one ought to”, otherwise legitimacy “is no different from the decision to choose a particular dentist or grocer” (Barker 1990: 24). Alagappa (1995: 22) argues that performance is a source of legitimacy only in so far as it generates *moral* authority. This appears however to be a false debate. Whether performance is mediated by a moral discourse as a source of legitimacy or not does not contradict the fact that it remains a source of legitimacy. Self-interest cannot be decoupled from legitimacy since “an abandonment [of someone’s autonomy] has meaning only when it has another side to it that occurs for the benefit of the governed and for which the governors are responsible” (Coicaud 2004: 71), this benefit being material or symbolic, and possibly mediated through bounded rationality. In other words, “what is mistaken, it could be said, is to divorce people’s beliefs about legitimacy from their *grounds* or *reasons* for holding them” (Beetham 1991: 10). Arguably, a one-off benefit would not necessarily be a source of legitimacy, but the cumulative influence of continuous exposure to performance can create legitimacy. For example, as further elaborated below, when people have no expectation or trust in the state, performance can be perceived as a one-off phenomenon and consequently does not produce legitimacy. Overall, the relevance of the analytical category of output legitimacy has been empirically demonstrated by a large amount of literature (e.g. Chen 1997; Zheng & Lye 2005; Gilley 2006; Levi et al. 2009).

In addition to political representation (input) and performance (output), the scholarship also points out that *how* such “performance” is delivered can be a source of legitimacy. Sometimes included under the category of “process legitimacy” (OECD 2010b: 159), it emphasises the importance of accountability and action according to rules. For example, a sizeable part of literature shows that “when governments exercise their authority through procedures that

people perceive as fair, they are more likely to be seen as legitimate and as deserving of deference” (Levi et al. 2009: 359; Tyler 2001; Tyler 2006). In liberal democracies, Rothstein (2009) argues that a key source of legitimacy lies in impartiality in the exercise of public authority, what he and Teorell (2008) label Quality of Government (QoG). This helps us to understand the contrast between, on the one hand, the growing disaffection with the functioning of western democracies, their inability to sustain economic growth, and the falling voter-turnout, and, on the other hand, their enduring stability and normative success (ibid.). Service delivery has been shown to improve the legitimacy of the state provided that it produces perceptions of impartiality and distributive justice (McLoughlin 2015). In other contexts, policy implementation and service delivery channelled through clientelist arrangements or involving bribery constitute sources of legitimacy (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006; OECD 2010a 25-26).

The following section improves on this typology of sources of legitimacy to increase its parsimony and explores its relationship with state effectiveness.

A typology of ruler’s legitimacy and its relations with state effectiveness

Input legitimacy

To explore the Burundian and Rwandan cases, this research proposes the following typology of ruling elites’ legitimacy (Table 7.1). The first category is input legitimacy. As mentioned above, this concept is tied to political representation. Deployed in democratic settings or used normatively, input legitimacy is closely tied with electoral procedures. Yet it is important to recognise that authoritarian elites do not rule only through fear and violence. They can also be considered as the legitimate representation of the polity when they are in power in accordance with people’s beliefs, even if these beliefs are not in the electoral process, but instead in traditions, heredity, charisma etc. (Alagappa 1995: 43-48; OECD 2010a; 2010b). In order to make input legitimacy applicable in non-democratic settings, it is redefined as being the right to access power. Input legitimacy can consequently be linked not only to elections but also to non-democratic criteria for accessing power, such as charisma, heredity or rulers’ roles in crucial past events.

It is important to point out that different sources of legitimacy, although they can be distinguished analytically, are related. Legitimacy on the output side of the political system will influence the input side, and vice-versa (Easton 1965). For example, in a liberal democracy, rulers’ performance can be translated into electoral victories.

Input legitimacy arguably has an unclear relation with state effectiveness since many factors in addition to the way in which rulers access power are likely to explain the ability of a state to implement policies.

Table 7.1 Typology of ruling elite's sources of legitimacy

	Input	Throughput	Output
The ruling elite is legitimate because...	... its access to power is justified according to people's beliefs.	... the procedures it follows when governing are considered acceptable.	..it is able to improve people's lives.
Other names		Quality of government (Rothstein & Teorell 2008), procedural justice (when impartiality is considered the source of legitimacy).	Performance legitimacy, eudaemonic legitimacy (e.g. Chen 1997).

Throughput legitimacy

The second category designates the form of legitimacy based on *how* power is exercised, i.e. how decisions are made and what procedures of policy implementation are followed. In this perspective, rulers are legitimate if their manner of governing/exercising power is considered acceptable by the citizenry. To designate this category, this research rejects the labels of "process" or "procedural" legitimacy because these are regularly equated to "input legitimacy" and consequently fail to distinguish procedures related to political representation (e.g. free and fair elections) from those concerning policy implementation or service delivery (e.g. impartiality). For example, the OECD (2010b: 48) defines input/process legitimacy as "based on [a state's] processes, how it operates (though democratic or authoritarian methods, permitting or fighting corruption, consultation or dictatorial methods, etc.)." As a result, the parsimony of the classification of sources of legitimacy is greatly reduced.

To address this issue, drawing on works in EU studies (Papadopoulos 2003; Wolf 2006; Risse & Kleine 2007; Schmidt 2013), this category of legitimacy, based on the manner in which power is exercised, is labelled throughput legitimacy.²⁰⁶ This label also clearly delineates this form of legitimacy from output legitimacy.

²⁰⁶ In European Union studies, throughput legitimacy is linked to the quality of the decision-making process in the EU, which includes legality, transparency and quality of deliberation (Risse & Kleine 2007: 73). Wolf (2006) and Schmidt (2013) also add people's consultation during policy-making (inclusiveness).

It could however be argued that performance, as a foundation of output legitimacy, can be considered not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms. For example, performance, experienced impartially, would be a peculiar form of output legitimacy in a democracy (Rothstein and Theorell 2008: 170). Nonetheless, the distinction between throughput and output preserves an essential analytical perspective. It helps to understand why, for example, many European countries have had poor economic performance over the past decades, as well as low voter turnout and yet enjoy stability. Conversely, lumping together throughput and output would lead to ignoring the fact that, as illustrated by the Rwandan case, some sources of performance legitimacy are in direct tension with throughput legitimacy. For example, non-deliberative decision-making and harsh policy implementation may help to accelerate the delivery of public goods while undermining throughput legitimacy.

Throughput legitimacy has a strong relation with state effectiveness since it relates to how rulers govern, an antecedent condition to the successful implementation of policies. However, their relationship; although tangible, can be positive or negative. As mentioned, corruption, clientelism and nepotism can constitute a legitimate way to provide services. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) show that corruption is not necessarily illegitimate since it must also be understood as a form of sociability and a moral economy of redistribution of public resources. Yet the absence of merit-based recruitment and the presence of a high-level of corruption, even when legitimate, often have a detrimental effect on state effectiveness (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999; Rauch & Evans 2000). Although they argue that it can be considered a legitimate practice, Blundo and de Sardan recognise that corruption “well and truly indicates an increase in the private profits of the agents of the state, and at the same time a deterioration in the supply of public goods and services from the perspective of the user” (2006: 109).

Although clientelism and corruption can be sources of legitimacy, this does not mean that they are always equally regarded as being as good as the absence of clientelism and corruption. Patron-client relations seldom occur as a result of choice. Clients often cannot switch patrons whenever they want. Such systems endure ultimately because of domination and a lack of alternatives for clients. Furthermore, nepotism or clientelism often put aside a part of the population that does not have access to the patron. In other words, they are as much a source of legitimacy for some (the patron’s family or client) as a source of frustration for others, as proved by the link between violence and horizontal inequality (Stewart 2010). Unsurprisingly, at country-level, corruption is regularly identified as a cause of a regime’s loss of legitimacy (Seligson 2002; Anderson & Tverdova 2003).

Output

The third category is output legitimacy. It is related to the capacity of the ruling elite to increase citizen welfare. The relationship between output legitimacy and state effectiveness is the strongest as both are based on the successful implementation of policies and delivery of services. Output legitimacy from the citizenry is hard to elicit without a functioning state.

Yet, it would be misleading to consider a straightforward causal relation between increased living standards and output legitimacy. Legitimacy is about perception. For this reason, performance is likely to be mediated by a range of factors before constituting a source of legitimacy. McLoughlin's review of the link between legitimacy and service delivery in fragile states shows that "no straightforward alignment between objective service outputs and legitimacy gains" exists (2015: 352). First, such gains are dependent on citizens' expectations about the role of the state. Consistently poor quality services along with a history of distrust in the state might render the link between performance and legitimacy weak (see also OECD 2010b: 52). Second, there exists a gap between actual government performance and people's perceptions. For example, government may gain output legitimacy if people perceive *its effort towards performance*, rather than performance itself, as positive (McLoughlin 2015). Moreover, output legitimacy also depends on the visibility of state intervention and the ability to attribute performance to the state, something that is not always easy in an NGO-saturated environment (ibid.). If one posits, as this research does, that in Rwanda, the claim to output legitimacy is a driving force behind the elite's commitment to state effectiveness, concerns regarding performance expectation, perception and attribution should feature in the government's action.

It is also important to underline that corruption and clientelism can be a source of output legitimacy. However, as mentioned, this legitimacy will be recognised by those included in the patronage networks that benefit from the pork barrel, not by those that are excluded. Consequently, in poor countries, patronage and corruption are unlikely to constitute a source of output legitimacy for the citizenry as a whole, only for a segment of it.

In summary, the three categories of legitimacy relate to how rulers access power (input), what they do (output) and how they do it (throughput). In outlining this typology, this section has sought to identify and articulate clear and distinct categories of legitimacy that are not based on normative judgements and are applicable in any political context. This typology does not presuppose any specific connection with state effectiveness. Sources of legitimacy are multiple and context-specific, and therefore their link with state effectiveness is not

straightforward and must be explored on a case-by-case basis. Yet, the closer the legitimacy category is to the output side, the more tied to state effectiveness it is since legitimacy becomes more directly determined by results.


Finally, it is important to underline that potential sources of legitimacy for rulers can be many, shifting, and sometimes compete with one another (OECD 2010b: 47-48). To maintain power rulers may strategically rely on some claims of legitimacy when others are absent or less likely to support political survival. This of course has direct consequences for state effectiveness. As Max Weber ([1922]1978: 213) argues, “according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally.”

This is precisely what this research demonstrates in the cases of Burundi and Rwanda. It argues that the kind of legitimacy claimed by rulers deeply influenced the type of obedience, the type of civil service and the way in which power was exercised, to ultimately create different levels of state effectiveness.

7.2 Legitimacy and state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda

Using the typology developed above, this section examines the link between the elites’ legitimation strategies and state effectiveness. The argument is that the different *necessities* and *possibilities* of legitimation of the Burundian and Rwandan ruling elites when reaching power produced different strategies of legitimation, which were more, or less, aligned with increasing state effectiveness (Figure 7.1). It contends that the Burundian elite benefited after the war from a large reserve of input legitimacy, based on its role in the civil war, its ethnic composition, its link with the rural masses, and its electoral victory. As a consequence, its need to foster throughput and output legitimacy conducive to building an effective state has been limited, and even at odds with its maintenance of power. In Rwanda by contrast, the ruling elite that assumed control of the state after the 1994 genocide initially had only a small reserve of legitimacy, concentrated mostly, though not exclusively, among the Tutsi population. Its need to increase its legitimacy was mainly limited to throughput and output forms of legitimacy because the history of violence and ethnic antagonism limited its recourse to input legitimacy, especially its recourse to free elections or identity-based discourses. As a result, the RPF strategy of legitimation based on throughput and output legitimacy made state effectiveness politically imperative (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1 Link between legitimacy and state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda



Whether or not the ruling elite’s strategy of legitimation was effective in supporting their political survival is not the point of this analysis. Assessing the actual level of legitimacy of the rulers in each country is not its goal either. The argument is merely that each elite, based on *their perception of their environment*, engaged in a strategy of legitimation that made building state effectiveness more, or less, important for the maintenance of their political power. In other words, the analysis is only interested in demonstrating how *the rulers’ claim to legitimacy* impacted their commitment to build an effective state.

Input legitimacy: abundance and scarcity

Burundi

At the end of the civil war, the CNDD-FDD benefited from a significant amount of legitimacy that supported its access to power.²⁰⁷ Four main sources of input legitimacy can be identified. First of all, the CNDD-FDD legitimacy was founded in the role it played during the civil war. It quickly emerged as the main defender of the Hutu during the conflict, at the expense of the FRODEBU, which was historically the main Hutu-dominated party. FRODEBU’s loss of popularity and the simultaneous rise of the CNDD-FDD can be traced to the ambiguous role

²⁰⁷ As already mentioned, the thesis covers the situation in Burundi and Rwanda up until March 2015. The consequences of the violence surrounding the 2015 elections in Burundi is not included in the analysis. They are however reflected upon at the end of this chapter in the next one.

of the former during the conflict. It took a contradictory stance during the war between opposing the putschist government and still engaging with it. Such an attitude was justified by the FRODEBU Burundian president before the coup, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, on the grounds that this was the best way to limit the extremist tendencies of the Tutsi-dominated army while calling for calm among the population (Interview 197). However, many Burundians perceived this stance as an unacceptable compromise. They also viewed it as a way for the FRODEBU to enjoy the comfort of (largely symbolic) power, while the population was suffering (Interviews 197, 201, 203, 221, Watt 2008: 83). In contrast, the CNDD-FDD's uncompromising armed opposition to the army and the government gathered support across the country. By 1999, it "was the main actor in the majority of provinces" (Watt 2008: 66). From the time the CNDD-FDD accessed power, the continuous reminder of its "war credentials" underpinned its legitimization strategy. The ordeal of the war was constantly referenced in Presidential speeches (Interviews 138, 203, different private conversations).

The second, and closely related, source of input legitimacy for the CNDD-FDD was its ethnic composition. The origin of the party, as explained in Chapter 2, is linked to the Hutu cause. The CNDD-FDD together with the FNL "are heirs of the Palipehutist ideology in their uncompromising rejection of Tutsi hegemony" (Lemarchand 2009: 145). Beyond the immediate reaction to Ndadaye's assassination in 1993 and the ensuing anti-Hutu violence,²⁰⁸ the CNDD-FDD armed struggle was "deeply rooted in the Hutus' frustration over the discrimination, exclusion and repeated cycles of aggression to which they had been subjected" (Nindorera 2012; see also Interviews 202, 218, 221, 302). In particular, the memory of the 1972 Hutu massacre, in which many CNDD-FDD senior members lost relatives, was central to this dynamic (Interviews 218, 302).²⁰⁹

It would however be inexact to consider the CNDD-FDD an extremist party. As Nindorera (2012: 18) argues, "although the movement initially used a clearly ethnic form of mobilisation with propaganda songs and anti-Tutsi slogans, after 2000, hatred of Tutsis was progressively replaced with slogans promoting fraternity and democracy for all Burundians." In order to reach power, it was necessary for the CNDD-FDD to portray itself as a multi-ethnic party fighting for all Burundians, in line with the Arusha peace agreement and the desires of the international community (Interviews 221, 302). Nonetheless, the CNDD-FDD's legitimacy remained largely based on its ethnic composition and its fight for the Hutu masses. Nkurunziza

²⁰⁸ Nkurunziza with some of its closest allies in CNDD-FDD took up arms after escaping the killing of Hutu by extremist Tutsi students at the National University in June 1995.

²⁰⁹ Nkurunziza lost his father during the 1972 massacre, two brothers in the killings following the Ndadaye assassination, and three brothers during the war. Only one sibling, his sister, survived.

remained the one “who fought tooth and nail to wrest power from the Tutsi oligarchs” (Lemarchand 2009: 171). As stated by one informant:

The CNDD-FDD is first born [...] to fight the confiscation of the [1993 electoral] victory of the Hutu, not for democracy. They followed one logic [in 1993]: ‘we won and the Tutsi take power from us again’. You have to know that the CNDD-FDD is the orphan of 1972, and all that came back... ‘the Tutsi again... we have to finish once and for all with those people and take up arms’ (Interview 302).

The party did not hesitate to selectively claim legitimacy based on ethnicity for political gain. For example, in the run-up to the 2015 elections, party members in the countryside regularly highlighted the possibility of “the return of the Tutsi” to power to induce the population to vote for the CNDD-FDD (Interview 297). Responding to the criticisms of civil society organisations to its unconstitutional third term candidacy, Nkurunziza highlighted their lack of “representativeness” in a veiled reference to the presence of many Tutsi in their ranks.²¹⁰ In the same month, a CNDD-FDD cadre said that the alliance of the Hutu-dominated FNL and Tutsi-dominated UPRONA to contest elections was “against nature.”

The importance of the ethnic character of the CNDD-FDD for its legitimacy was not only demographic and historical, but also symbolic. It was the first Hutu-dominated party that reached power without being ousted by a Tutsi-led coup. In doing so, it put an end to the southern Tutsi rule that had been almost uninterrupted since independence. The rupture had deep symbolic significance in the cosmology of the Hutu population. It suddenly bucked the trend of the widespread narratives of domination of the Bahutu people by the “cunning and exploitative” Tutsi pervasive in Burundi,²¹¹ and also, as documented by Malkki (1995), in the Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania from which the CNDD-FDD recruited abundantly. By accessing power, the CNDD-FDD corrected this injustice of history.²¹²

The third source of input legitimacy for the CNDD-FDD was its rural character and general populist, anti-elitist image (Interviews 138, 197, 218, 297). This was a product of the sociology of the CNDD-FDD, which recruited mainly young people from the countryside (Interviews 203, 302). In addition, the CNDD-FDD was embedded in the rural areas for ten years where it gradually developed a parallel administration and engaged with the population

²¹⁰ Speech made on February 5, 2015 during the celebration of the adoption of the Charter for National Unity. More generally, civil society was accused of being the vehicle for the Tutsi return to the political arena. When demonstrations were organised against the cost of living, the organisers were accused of being the same as those who organised the “ville morte” (dead city) days—the informal curfew targeting Hutu organised by radical young Tutsi during the civil war (Interview 297).

²¹¹ As in Rwanda as well. On the imaginary view of the eternal Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi see Lemarchand (2009; chap. 3), and in Rwanda, Chrétien and Kabanda (2013).

²¹² The same dynamic can be observed in Rwanda with the 1959 “Hutu Revolution.”

in contrast to the other main Hutu party in 2005. The FRODEBU had indeed “become gentrified and disconnected from the masses [...] – while the CNDD-FDD was closer to the Hutu population, having endured the same living conditions” (Nindorera 2012: 27; see also Watt 2008: 83). After its victory, the CNDD-FDD endeavoured to cultivate this claim to legitimacy. President Nkurunziza “play[ed] his ‘man of the people’ role convincingly” (Watt 2008: 292). The staging of Nkurunziza’s return to join the transitional government after the peace agreement with the CNDD-FDD in 2003 was an early illustration of his will to appear close to the rural population. Returning from Tanzania on 5 December 2003, Nkurunziza, instead of landing in Bujumbura, secretly entered the country to appear in Gitega, at the centre of Burundi, on a bicycle wearing in tracksuit. A Burundian commentator interpreted the gesture as Nkurunziza

reaching the city from the depth of the country where he has always been close to the population. He is simply in the eyes of the ones who saw him triumph ‘the man of the people’ as he then presents himself before going down to the capital city to defy the aristocrats disconnected from the grassroots realities.²¹³

From 2005, almost every week, he went to the countryside to participate in community works, play football with the population and attend prayer sessions. Such appearances sometimes took brazen populist turns, through the distribution of beer or envelopes of cash to the population (Interviews 138, 171, 229, 181).

The last source of legitimacy for the CNDD-FDD was the input legitimacy *par excellence*: elections. In 2005 and 2010, local, parliamentary and presidential elections, generally deemed free and fair (Vandeginste 2011: 316-317), gave a large victory to the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza.

In summary, the CNDD-FDD’s “war credentials”, ethnic composition, closeness to the rural masses, and electoral victories justified its access to power. Its input legitimacy in 2005 was tremendous. As stated by Lemarchand (2009: 171), “few African heads of state have come to power with a more impressive fund of good will and popular sympathy than Pierre Nkurunziza.” Such a high level of legitimacy had two main consequences for state effectiveness. First, it did not provide incentives for the elite to increase their reliance on alternative sources of legitimacy (throughput and output) conducive to state effectiveness. As stated by an informant, the CNDD-FDD “doesn’t have a programme, they only have the

²¹³ “Opinion: Du populisme à l’intimidation: Nkurunziza à travers sa communication” *Iwacu*, 05/04/2015. Author’s translation.

legitimacy of their numbers” (Interview 162). Second, as explained below, the nature of this input legitimacy was even in tension with the political actions required to build an effective state.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, the situation could not be more different. The RPF’s input legitimacy was always extremely limited. To begin with, ethnicity could not be a source of input legitimacy. The Tutsi-led RPF governed from 1994 onwards although the majority of the population was Hutu. Such ethnic discrepancy was magnified by decades of anti-Tutsi ideology that had constituted the central basis of the legitimacy of the Hutu-dominated regime since independence. Already, on the eve of independence, the ideology underpinning the 1959 revolution was that “Rwanda belongs to the Hutu, who are its true inhabitants but were subjugated brutally for centuries by the foreign exploiters, the Tutsi” (Uvin 1998: 26). With the establishment of a Hutu government, many believed that “Rwanda was back to its real owner” (Interview 293). Crucially, this ideology took the form of a legitimisation discourse in line with the zeitgeist of decolonisation and with the discourse of western powers: democracy. The ruling elite emphasised not only “the intrinsic worth of being Hutu” but also “the total congruence between ethnic majority and democracy” (Prunier 1998: 58). It constantly raised the spectre of a reversal of the 1959 Revolution, a fear that would prove crucial in the triggering of violence in 1994. Overall, from independence until 1994, the “notion that the government was the legitimate representative of the majority Hutu, and the sole defence against the Tutsi’s evil attempts to enslave the people again, formed the powerful core of the legitimisation of the ruling clique’s hold on power” (Uvin 1998: 26).²¹⁴ The RPF’s deficit of input legitimacy has to be understood in the context of the legitimacy claims advanced by the successive Hutu regimes since independence. The Tutsi were illegitimate as power-holders not just because they were Tutsi, but also because they were the enemies of the Hutu, of democracy and, for the most extremist subscribing to the Hamitic myth, of the Rwandan nation.

A direct consequence is that the RPF’s “war credentials” were another problematic source of legitimacy. The CNDD-FDD fought a widely illegitimate government. This was not the case for the RPF. Although presiding over an undemocratic and discriminatory regime divided along regional lines, “Habyarimana would probably have won an honest democratic election

²¹⁴ Although this ideology persisted over time, successive Hutu governments’ stance towards the Tutsi was not homogenous. Compared to the First Republic, the Second Republic regime formally advocated greater tolerance towards Tutsi in the beginning, although this was not always matched in practice (Prunier 1998: 75-76, Verwimp 2013: 44-4 cf. Mamdani 2001: 138-142.)

without too much trouble as late as early 1991” (Prunier 1998:155). To what extent such feelings endured in Rwanda in 2015 remained an open question. As stated by a Tutsi who lived in Rwanda before 1994, “I am certain that if you look into people’s hearts, there are many that are still attached to him. There is no way to prevent that” (Interview 293).²¹⁵ Furthermore, unlike the CNDD-FDD (or the Ugandan NRM), the RPF was not embedded in the population during the war and thus could not build legitimacy, or even trust. The intensity of the fear that the RPF inspired came as a “terrible cold shower” (Interview 293) in 1990, as the RPF “underestimate[d] the depth of the irrational myths, fears, and hatred they were about to confront” (Prunier 1998:157). The terror it inspired made peasants flee *en masse* the otherwise small RPF “liberated zone” (Prunier 1998:175, Interview 293). There were cases where RPF soldiers interacting with Hutu peasants had to show them that, contrary to what they believed, they had no tail or cloven hooves (Interviews 293, 303; Prunier 1998:143). The input legitimacy that the CNDD-FDD enjoyed through the perception that it fought for a noble cause was consequently not operational for the RPF during the war, except among the minority Tutsi and few moderate Hutus.²¹⁶ The RPF “went into [the civil war] as an army of liberation and came out of it [in the eyes of most Rwandans] as an army of occupation” (Mamdani 2001:185, see also 7).

On the other hand, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the role of the RPF in stopping the genocide was a source of input legitimacy. The argument of the “genocide credit” was relevant for survivors, moderate Hutu, the international community, and possibly some perpetrators consumed by guilt. Yet, given the hardships endured by many Hutu in the wake of the RPF victory (notably forced repatriation from Congo) along with the belief that by waging war, the RPF pushed people to kill at least for self-defence,²¹⁷ it is difficult to draw any conclusion. Prunier stated in 1998 that the “Hutu who do not actively oppose the [RPF] regime (in fact the vast majority) do so not because it is either fair or legitimate, but out of a mixture of fear, resignation and disgust at their former leadership” (Prunier 1998: 389).

²¹⁵ Among 196 convicted perpetrators interrogated by Scott Strauss (2006: 125), nearly half stated that they supported the Habyarimana government and a third that they had no particular opinion. The results are striking given the incentives in post-1994 Rwanda for self-censorship on such a topic. Only 17.9% declared that they were opposed to or unhappy with it. More than two-thirds of 176 respondents identified Habyarimana’s death (which they attributed to the RPF) as the most important reason for the genocide. In the interviews, “they describe an affectionate relationship with the president. Habyarimana was their ‘father’ or ‘parent’” (ibid.: 156-7).

²¹⁶ The attitude of the Hutu moderates before the genocide was far from pro-RPF. As noted by Prunier (1998:154) “the fact that a group of Tutsi could organise and later sustain military operations against the government of the Republic of Rwanda, the very government of the ‘democratic majority’, seemed to stupefy and silence the establishment Hutu moderates.”

²¹⁷ For example, 47.9% of the 171 people convicted as perpetrators interrogated by Strauss (2006: 155) declared that the main reason for killing in war and killing the Tutsi before they kill the Hutu. See also McDoom (2012) on the role of security threats created by the RPF attacks on ethnic polarization in the Rwandan genocide.

The third source of input legitimacy for the CNDD-FDD, its proximity to the rural masses, was also another dead-end for the RPF. The RPF was originally composed mainly of ex-refugees who grew up abroad and whose links with rural Rwanda were tenuous or non-existent. As summarised by Ansoms:

Following the RPF's military victory, the new elite installed themselves in the capital. While this was partly for security reasons (the countryside was still unstable in the immediate post-1994 period), it also reflected the fact that a considerable number of the returnees had lost their ties with the 'hill of origin' and had little incentive to go to the rural areas (Ansons 2009b: 295).

As for ethnicity, this situation stood in sharp contrast with the discourses of the Habyarimana regime that celebrated the Rwandan people as being intrinsically a people of farmers, a barely veiled criticism of the Tutsi seen as the eternal pastoralists (Verwimp 2013: 41-44). Beyond the fact that "current elites have very few ties with Rwandan rural life" (Ansons 2009b: 27), many in the RPF arrived in a country they simply did not know, which arguably did nothing to build up the input legitimacy of the new rulers.

Lastly, and as a result, the key source of input legitimacy that elections constitute remained largely unavailable to the RPF. This was not only because the RPF might have been reluctant to organise fair and meaningful elections in order to remain in power,²¹⁸ but also because the RPF understandably "equate[d] the existential survival of the Tutsi minority with the political survival of the regime and its ruling elite" (McDoom 2011: 5). Furthermore, open elections might have revived hate politics, as they did with the introduction of multi-party politics before the genocide.

Unsurprisingly, the RPF downplayed the salience of ethnicity, elections, and even its military victory since these could not constitute sources of input legitimacy, and were even sources of *illegitimacy*. As discussed below, after 1994, the RPF's clear military victory did not translate formally into a winner-takes-all victory. The RPF was careful to install a Hutu (Pasteur Bizimungu) as President of the Republic. It formed a government with a majority of Hutu, who held 16 out of 20 ministerial posts (Prunier 1998: 300). Although both the RPF and CNDD-FDD dominated the post-conflict political arena, the RPF endeavoured not to appear as the overwhelming decision-maker it was in reality by downplaying politics whilst the CNDD-FDD politicised all decision-making in the state as amply demonstrated in the empirical chapters. This was conspicuous in the way MPs were seated: in alphabetical order

²¹⁸ Rwandan elections are not free and fair given the restriction put on the creation and functioning of opposition parties and opaque vote-counting. See for example US Department of State (2015).

in Rwanda, and more classically according to their party in Burundi. This was also visible in the attempt to depoliticise local politics in Rwanda whilst the CNDD-FDD politicised even the lowest civil service position. Even community works in Burundi, unlike *umuganda* in Rwanda, took the form of a political rally (see Chapter 5).

More generally, despite its hegemony, the RPF paid attention to balancing access to power according to religion, gender and, crucially, ethnicity.²¹⁹ “This is to reassure the Hutu [...] and to tell them it is not a Tutsi block against the Hutus and to say ‘be careful! There is a rupture, we don’t do as they do [politicians of the Habyarimana regime]’” (Interview 293). While downplaying some potential sources of input legitimacy that were adverse to its rule, the RPF endeavoured to promote new ones under the form of a common identity of “Rwandanness²²⁰ or its own version of non-confrontational, consensual and participatory “democracy” (Rafti 2008: 20-21). Formally based on co-optation and corporatism, this led in reality to benign political competition that was unlikely to jeopardise RPF rule, as illustrated at the local level in Chapter 5.

Throughput legitimacy: explaining greed and restraint

Burundi

In Burundi, empirical analysis revealed that corruption, clientelism and cronyism were pivotal in explaining the relative ineffectiveness of the state compared to in Rwanda. Power was exercised in a partial manner. It benefited mainly those well-connected to the party.

The first reason behind such little concern for building throughput legitimacy based on impartiality and the adherence to formal rules lay in the fact that the CNDD-FDD could rely on a tremendous amount of input legitimacy. Partiality in job and rent distribution, which is so harmful to state effectiveness, was acceptable because the CNDD-FDD, representative of the rural masses, shed its blood, removed the Tutsi from power, and won the elections. In other words, it considered that it was not required to prove itself beyond the criteria that made

²¹⁹ To what extent this was successful was open to question, especially as Hutu politicians were informally selected by the RPF and closely watched (and sometimes cruelly labelled “condoms of the RPF” by critics of the government (personal conversation)).

²²⁰ The term *Rwandanness* was regularly used by officials in public meetings. The Minister of Justice in March 2015 stated that “embracing *Rwandanness* instead of Hutu, Twa and Tutsi ideology will end all the wars and crimes among Rwandans” (http://www.minijust.gov.rw/media-centre/news/news-details/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=347&cHash=cbae5e350394d9e78c1721be988699f8; see also http://www.police.gov.rw/newsdetail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=2671&cHash=2a7d79c56b4e89919474e100e7e83c5b; http://www.minagri.gov.rw/index.php?id=469&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=488&cHash=a3a6cde40c97a8259ed506f085f9a2ee; accessed on 14/07/2015).

it legitimate in accessing power. This was exemplified by the reaction in 2006 of the Government spokesman and Minister of Communication regarding one of the main corruption scandals in Nkurunziza's first term—the illegal sale of the presidential Falcon 50 aeroplane. When questioned by a journalist about why the aeroplane was sold to the lowest bidder, he declared, “it was the decision of the government. The government could even decide to give [the aeroplane] away for free. It is a legitimate government!”²²¹

The CNDD-FDD's consistent claim to its input legitimacy to deflect criticisms of its predatory practices was also epitomised by the phrase in Kirundi mentioned in Chapter 5, “wamaze iki?” (“what was your contribution?” [during the war]), that ex-combatants put forward when criticised for their corruption and the preferential treatment they benefitted from.²²² The extent of use of this phrase even made it a “running joke” among the critics of the CNDD-FDD (Interview 138).

The CNDD-FDD also appealed to its rural identity to discredit, through anti-urban, the anti-elitist discourse, “the people of Bujumbura” (Interviews 138, 203, 297), i.e. the civil society organisations and opposition parties who highlighted its corruption, clientelism and incapacity to implement policies. This quote from a Burundian journalist, regarding how some scandals were framed by the CNDD-FDD cadres in the countryside, is illuminating:

[When the scandal on the sugar-producing SOSUMO company broke]²²³ the CNDD-FDD went to tell the farmers, ‘don't bother our president. Sugar, ultimately, we don't even eat it. That is for the people of Bujumbura. Sugar is embezzled so what? [...] That's how city people, the opposition are. Do you drink tea? Have you ever consumed half a kilo of sugar per year?’ For the scandal of the Falcon aeroplane [they would tell them] ‘these journalist, civil society have to stop! Have you ever been in an aeroplane? [...] let them say!’ They say all that in a very simple, simplistic language, easy to understand. They are clever, they disconnect rural life from the rest of the world. [...] The city, it is the Tutsi. There is this whole rhetoric (Interview 138).

However, the CNDD-FDD's lack of commitment to exercising power by sticking to the formal rules originated not only from the importance of its input legitimacy, which allowed it to rest

²²¹ *Burundi News*, 6 September 2006, <http://burundinews.fr/actualites/articlebidada.html> (accessed on 14/07/2015). See also OAG (2009: 24).

²²² This sense of entitlement to rent capture was visible among the old CNDD-FDD vis-à-vis new party recruits. For example, worried about the increasing enrolment in the CNDD-FDD of individuals who used to belong to other parties, the Belgian section of the CNDD-FDD wrote in a letter to the CNDD-FDD chairman: “some of them fought us very fiercely and participated to several massacres in the past. Worst, they have lucrative positions in the administration or the diplomacy! What do the victims think of this? And the real militants from the outset, what becomes of them? Is this the policy of ‘Wamaze iki?’” (author's translation from the French). *Letter to the president of the CNDD-FDD section in Belgium to the CNDD-FDD president Hussein Radjabu*. November 2006. <http://www.burundinews.fr/actualites/lettrebelgiqueradjabu.html> (accessed on 14/07/2015).

²²³ The parastatal Sosumo had been at the centre of numerous corruption scandals involving embezzlement during the first mandate of Nkurunziza.

on its laurels. The CNDD-FDD's own conception of its input legitimacy made the systematic favouring of certain members of the polity over others not only possible but also imperative.

Having fought for the "Hutu cause" reinforced a sense of social revenge against the previous Tutsi regimes, which were associated with the accumulation of unjustified wealth and privilege. Gaining power meant ending the Tutsi domination and finally enjoying the "national cake" that the Tutsi had kept for themselves for years (Interviews 138, 167, 191, 218, 302). The extremely quick replacement of Tutsi fertiliser importers by inexperienced Hutu ones aligned with the party shown in Chapter 3 exemplified this logic. Overall, in the CNDD-FDD, "there is this mentality: we are going to eat the cake. You Tutsis had your share for 40 years, it is our turn" (Interview 138). A former top Hutu CNDD-FDD cadre concurred: "'give to the former combatants!' It is always the same thing. They say we fought for the country so we have the right to that" (Interview 191, see also 167).²²⁴ This cadre recalled that, in the bush, CNDD-FDD fighters were dreaming of settling in the affluent and Tutsi-dominated neighbourhood of *Kiriri* at the end of the war, which again reveals the sense of social revenge and entitlement felt by many CNDD-FDD combatants to compensate for their sacrifice.

While this hindered the emergence of throughput legitimacy through impartiality, it was conducive to the creation of throughput legitimacy favouring one only segment of the population: the ex-combatant and party members. This approach to the exercise of power in Burundi explains the gap between formal rules and informal rules observed throughout the empirical chapter that was so harmful to state effectiveness.

The contradiction between the CNDD-FDD's conception of its own legitimacy, based on how it reached power and how it used this power to reward its own, and the exigencies of building an effective state, was epitomised in the weak capacity of the government to use the diaspora. Educated returnees were powerless because they were devoid of the legitimacy of the bush. Power was "the matter of those who fought" (Interview 297). The discourse opposed to the diaspora returnees was: "you have no right to steal our victory, we are the ones who shed blood" (Interview 297). Consequently, the foreign-educated individuals had great difficulty imposing their authority and deploying their expertise (Interviews 138, 177, 218, 297, 301, 302). As explained by a Burundian journalist:

²²⁴ The theme of "eating" to designate corruption was pervasive in interviews. While the former Tutsi regime was corrupt, the level of corruption was apparently lower than under the CNDD-FDD. A running joke heard many times during the fieldwork was that the Tutsi used to "eat" with a fork, because with a fork some crumbs fell down, whereas the Hutu use a spoon. Nothing fell down (Interviews 138, 191, 302).

Contrary to Kagame, who knows how to use the diaspora, [the CNDD-FDD] did not do that. I can give you an example. They gave to a member of the diaspora, an ace in his sector, the direction of [name removed], a big public company in the sector of [name removed]. The right man in the right place. Well, it lasted a year. He went back to Europe. What is a pity is that he quit a good job in Europe to come here. There are tens of cases like his. [...] You come with international standards [...] a great vision, [intending to engage in] international procurements but it does not happen like this. They [the CNDD-FDD] want to scoop out any public tenders. There is like a rift between those who stayed and went to the bush and those who have an international curriculum. [...]. “Wamaze iki” [is a way of saying to the diaspora:] ‘What did you do? I was eating bananas fighting while you were in Europe eating *pains au chocolat*. Where were you when I was dying? Where were you when I was being shot?’ This means that the one coming back with technocrat ideas, he found himself quickly in a difficult position. This explains the amateurism and corruption (Interview 138).²²⁵

Overall, it was not only the amount of input legitimacy of the CNDD-FDD that provided it with weak incentives to promote forms of throughput and output forms legitimacies, and, ultimately, an effective state. The very nature of CNDD-FDD’s conception of its own legitimacy, based on an entitlement to the state, was also *in tension* with what was needed to create an effective state. It made the party favour its own before the population as a whole. This finding echoes Clapham’s analysis of liberation movements reaching power, in which “for the movement as a whole its record in the struggle confers—in the minds of former fighters—a virtually permanent claim on state power [...] This claim may readily trump alternative legitimation for rule, and notably those derived from actual performance in government” (2012: 6). The CNDD-FDD’s right to power did not just make an effective state non-essential; it actually worked against it.

Rwanda

A commitment to implementing policy in a transparent and inclusive manner, limiting corruption, and promoting merit-based recruitment,²²⁶ accountability of civil servants and equal treatment of citizens were conspicuous in the empirical analysis of policy implementation in Rwanda. Simultaneously, the Rwandan government remained undoubtedly authoritarian. Rwanda was virtually a one party state where “a small inner circle of RPF leaders takes the important decisions” (Reyntjens 2004: 208).²²⁷ The distinction between sources of input and throughput legitimacy allows for reconciling the two images. While the

²²⁵ Along a similar line, in the run-up to the 2015 election, Nkurunziza mentioned to his supporters that he was fighting during the war, not like others who were eating fries, a thinly veiled allusion to the then 2nd vice-president Gervais Ruyikiri who lived in Belgium during that war but was quite popular among some in the party and among donors due to his technocratic profile (Interview 297). See Chapter 8 for a discussion of similar dynamics in other countries.

²²⁶ Even in political roles, as shown by the analysis of the 2006 decentralisation reforms.

²²⁷ It is however true that other parties’ members held high positions in the state (Golooba-Mutebi & Booth 2013: 11-16). Yet they were able to do so as long as their actions did not contradict the RPF vision.

ruling elite were far from inclusive in Rwanda, and consequently could not claim much input legitimacy, they nonetheless used the state apparatus in a relatively inclusive and impartial manner to claim throughput legitimacy.

Rwanda was far from being corruption and clientelism free. Yet, the empirical analysis showed that the efforts towards impartial policy implementation, although imperfect, were significant. They were all the more so as the RPF was virtually unchallenged in Rwanda. Given its hegemony, it would have been easy for the party to engage in large-scale corruption and cronyism, arguably more so than the CNDD-FDD, which was still dependent on electoral procedures and had to deal with genuine political opposition. Yet, this was not the case. The question is then: why did an elite with such control of the political space manage to discipline itself enough not to engage more forcefully in predatory practices that would have undermined state effectiveness? What mechanisms prevented such a cohesive, and virtually unopposed, elite from capturing resources (money and jobs) to a much greater extent? In brief, why did so much power come with so much restraint in Rwanda?

The first reason stemmed from a concern for performance in Rwanda, which will be further analysed below. Yet, impartiality was also pursued for its own sake. The best proof was that in some instances concern for impartiality overrode concern for performance. This was visible in the refusal mentioned in Chapter 4 to differentiate the CHWs' care package between urban and rural areas because the ministry was afraid of this being interpreted as unequal treatment of the population. Even when not formally required, impartiality was at play, such as in the effort of the RPF to keep a minimal ethnic, religious and gender balance in political nominations in the local and national state (Chapters 5 – 6). Consequently, a desire to build throughput legitimacy independent of concerns about performance existed. This generally contributed to an increase in state effectiveness, but not always.

Throughput legitimacy was important for the RPF to solve the legitimacy issues that output legitimacy could not. First, it was a way to build trust by giving guarantees to the Hutu population. After the genocide in Rwanda, the level of distrust between the Hutu and the new rulers was abysmal. It was not rare for ex-FAR soldiers, when being reintegrated into the RPA, to change their names for fear of reprisals on their families. Many returnees from Congo expected death (Interview 293).²²⁸

People were so shaped by fear but also by the fact that they had killed, and they 'voted with their feet' by choosing to leave everything and go into camps in Congo, so they did

²²⁸ Also, conversation with Frank Rusagara, 27/11/2012.

not come back by themselves. They were obliged, forced to come back. And consequently, the RPF had to give guarantees (Interview 293).

This need “to give guarantees”, to show restraint, explained the search for throughput legitimacy. Already at a political level, by including the opposition in the government of national unity, the RPF “chose not to press home all of its advantages. It was not ‘winner-takes-all’. [...] Instead the RPF undertook several, important confidence-building measures designed to reassure Rwanda’s Hutu majority” (McDoom 2011: 11).²²⁹

This research argues that claims to throughput legitimacy through impartial policy implementation, as observed in the empirical analysis, followed the same logic. This was a method for the RPF to give guarantees. Restraint demonstrated in the check put on nepotism, bribes and rent capture was an attempt to prove to the population the RPF’s good faith. It was a strategy to fight the perception that the RPF’s rule was not the “*ingoma y’aba Batutsi*”, “reign of the Tutsi”, as the victory of the RPF was sometimes referred to among the Hutu just after the genocide. It aimed at fostering the belief that the RPF’s rule was for all Rwandans. In the context of an abysmal lack of input legitimacy, extreme violence and distrust, impartiality was a choice of political and physical survival for the new rulers. As summarised by a Tutsi informant, the way in which the RPF governed had been like saying “we don’t do that on behalf of the Tutsi, we do it for the public interest.” She added, “it is nearly like a disease here. But it is the only way to ward off the dread of disappearance” (Interview 293).

Besides gaining trust, impartiality in policy implementation was also a way to provide the Hutu with a stake in the state and remove potential sources of contestation around which mobilisation against the government could crystallise. It was also an opportunity for the RPF to gain legitimacy by distinguishing itself from the previous regimes, where ethnic discrimination took the form of institutionalised reservation of jobs and educational opportunity for an ethnic or regional group. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, it remained uncertain as to whether the RPF was successful in achieving such an image of impartiality. What was certain, however, was that this was the strategy it was embracing.

The promotion of impartiality was also made necessary by deep psychological drives. Involving the defeated of yesterday in the state apparatus and treating them impartially was also useful in order not to foster resentment and grievances. Impartiality then became “the

²²⁹ Power however rested with the RPF with regard to crucial decisions. However, “it was nonetheless the first time in Rwanda’s post-colonial history that power had been shared even nominally - across ethnic lines.” (McDoom 2011: 13).

only way to attempt to contain the idea that the Hutu perceive themselves as the losers. And even those who had never massacred felt like that [in 1994]. It was the defeat of the Hutu and the victory of the Tutsi” (Interview 293).²³⁰ Overall, increasing throughput legitimacy by sticking to formal rules was crucial for the RPF because it was the tool for its survival by convincing people that the spoils did not belong to the victors but to all Rwandans. Because it was conscious that it might not be representative according to people’s perceptions, the RPF endeavoured to promote the view that, at least, it governed for the general interest. This in turn created the conditions for an effective state.

The Rwandan government was however not consistent in its effort to increase throughput legitimacy. Policy implementation in Rwanda was swift, when not harsh, which created resentment and arguably weakened attempts to build throughput legitimacy. How does this aspect of policy implementation in Rwanda can be reconciled with this research’s general hypothesis that the search for legitimacy was the drive behind the ruling elite’s efforts to create and effective state?

The reason is that claims to throughput legitimacy could be in tension with future output legitimacy. Being swift and sometimes brutal, policy implementation created resentment, suffering and might have undermined the government’s legitimacy. However, it nonetheless was crucial for rapidly increasing the government’s performance and, in the mind of the RPF, its output legitimacy eventually. A good example was the *mutuelles* whose extraordinary progress in enrolment numbers was achieved through harsh methods, such as fining, arresting, confiscating livestock from, or denying administrative documents to the non-bearers of *mutuelles* cards. The same was true of the Crop Intensification Programme. The authorities did not hesitate in banning farmers from growing some crops, and uprooting unauthorised crops (Interview 71). Although not directly related to the present research, the same goes for the heavy fiscal pressure in Rwanda, accentuated by the arbitrary nature of local taxation (Interview 293; Gaynor 2014a). This created a lot of resentment but increased state effectiveness, the condition of sustainable development and, possibly, output legitimacy. The bet was to sacrifice some throughput legitimacy in the short term to gain output legitimacy in the long term.

The importance to preserve throughput and output legitimacy was visible in the pattern of elite rent capture. Although rent capture existed in Rwanda, the vital importance of building

²³⁰ Prunier writes that after the genocide Rwanda was full of “traumatised Hutu survivors who could not believe what had been done to them, they were the ‘natural’ inhabitants, the *rubanda nyamwinshi*, yet they had been hunted down like any Tutsi in spite of their being ‘true citizens’” (Prunier 1998: 327).

legitimacy can explain its level and pattern. Petty corruption was fought against because it hindered development, and especially inclusive development, by adding extra costs to service delivery and policy implementation. In addition, it was a highly visible form of rent capture that would damage the government's legitimacy. In contrast, centralised rent capture through the party companies was tolerated on the basis that it could facilitate development (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012) and it remained not too visible (see also Green 2011). The difference with the situation in Burundi where rent-capture was decentralised and visible is obvious.

Output legitimacy: the imperative of state (in)effectiveness

Burundi

The Burundian elite had little incentive to increase output legitimacy towards the whole population because of the comfortable amount of input legitimacy it benefited from after the war and the obligation it had to favour first its own members. Yet, how does this framework explain the pockets of effectiveness regularly observed in the Burundian state?

The most conspicuous of these were the 2013 fertiliser reform (Chapter 3) and the increase in antenatal care visits and delivery at health facilities induced by free maternal care (Chapter 4). Such pockets of effectiveness were only partially related to building output legitimacy. First, while they aimed to support a claim to performance, they were strongly related to input legitimacy concerns. Both free maternal care and the 2013 fertiliser reform were a direct consequence of the CNDD-FDD's desire to reinforce its image as the party of the rural masses. They also both stemmed from obvious electoral considerations. Second, reforms in Burundi were often undertaken with little concern for their long-term sustainability. In the case of maternal health, the reform of *gratuité* jeopardised the whole health system.²³¹ The case was however different in the fertiliser sector due to the support of donors. Third, the pockets of state effectiveness were often the result of easy "quick-wins." Free maternal care for example, although easily implemented (a presidential speech sufficed), did not tackle the roots of ineffectiveness constituted by corruption, clientelism and the existence of a power structure that was parallel to the state. When pockets of effectiveness involved bold reforms, as in the case of the fertiliser sector reform or performance-based financing in the health sector, they were isolated in their functioning from the rest of the state apparatus by donors, with

²³¹ This is observable in other sectors beyond the scope of the thesis. Examples include the Medical Assistance Cards, whose pricing was already very low because eroded y years of inflation but was barely increased due to electoral concerns. The great strain it put on the health system, which was already almost bankrupt, led donors to refuse to financially support the scheme in 2014 (Interviews 123; 179; 190).

consequently little hope seeing corruption and clientelist practices being systematically challenged and seeing effectiveness “trickling down.” Civil servants working in these pockets of effectiveness were for example submitted to alternative monitoring and incentive mechanisms designed and financed by donors. In both cases, civil servants received extra-pay for rolling out what was in fact a regular state programme.²³² As discussed, performance has to be sustained and reasonably systematic to create performance legitimacy in the long run. In Burundi, pockets of effectiveness were unlikely to play such a role.

The lack of systematic efforts to enhance state effectiveness in Burundi, along with the little interest in the sustainability of performance when performance occurred, indicated limited concern for output legitimacy. This is not to claim however that performance did not matter for the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Several demonstrations against the high cost of living in Bujumbura over the years²³³ or the opposition to Nkurunziza’s third mandate point to the contrary. Yet, this research argues that the CNDD-FDD *perceived* (probably wrongly) that output legitimacy was not a priority for its staying in power.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, claims to output legitimacy were especially vital because other avenues for legitimacy had been largely unavailable. Gaining legitimacy through performance seemed operational even at the individual level. A mid-ranking official in the Ministry of Agriculture, when asked the reason behind the relatively high level of discipline of civil servants, answered that it is “to show that we are not here for no reason, that we are not here just because we came with our boss from Uganda, that we are here because we are capable” (Interview 55). Confronted by claims of illegitimacy about access to power, even at the level of mid-ranking civil servants, performance became a way to get oneself accepted.

The first source of output legitimacy the RPF successfully tapped into was security. Security is the output legitimacy *par excellence* for any elite controlling the state, especially in a period following extreme violence, as security is the primary *raison d’être* of the state. Although the RPF’s war credentials and its stopping of the genocide were not a source of *input legitimacy* for a large proportion of the population as discussed above, they were a source of *output legitimacy* for the whole population, which enjoyed stability.

²³² The state agents involved in fertiliser promotion received extra-pay in the form of per diem paid by donors. The unit in the MoH in charge of managing the PBF had performance based bonuses and consequently a higher salary for an equivalent level of responsibility than other staff in the ministry, which created envy and resentment (different private conversations).

²³³ “Burundi: un collectif contre la vie chère se monte pour dénoncer de nouvelles taxes”, *RFI*, 23/07/2013.

The second way for the RPF to claim output legitimacy was to enhance the welfare of the population. This research does not argue that performance necessarily translated to legitimacy in Rwanda. It merely contends that this was the bet made by the Rwandan ruling elite, which, as a result, explains why state effectiveness was systematic, relying on routinised procedures of monitoring and evaluation of civil servants. This also explains the constant concerns regarding the durability of state effectiveness in Rwanda. Performance does not produce legitimacy overnight. Performance had to be sustained in the long run in Rwanda, even though it might have necessitated unpopular or risky policy choices, for it to create legitimacy. The decisions to adopt the *mutuelles* instead of free healthcare, to promote family planning despite the social taboos, to rapidly privatize the fertiliser distribution chains to address fiscal difficulties, to target fertiliser to precise crops to enhance the efficiency of subsidies (although it largely failed) all pointed to the desire to promote not only performance, but sustainable performance capable of building future legitimacy and ensuring political survival.

Educating citizens to legitimacy claims in Rwanda

As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, output legitimacy is dependent on the perception of performance by citizens, their attribution of performance to the government, and their expectation of what should be the mission of the state. If the hypothesis of this research that commitment to state effectiveness was ultimately a strategy of legitimation, efforts of the Rwandan elite not only to build state effectiveness, but also to shape citizen's perceptions, attribution and expectations of state effectiveness should have been observed.

Throughout the empirical analysis, it was evident that the Rwandan government displayed great energy in building not only an effective state, but also the *perception* of an effective state. Everyone in Rwanda was exposed *ad nauseam* to the official discourse on the importance of development and how the government was good at it. The main Rwanda newspaper, *The New Times*, was convincing in this respect. Acclamation of Rwandan performance in its pages were sometimes preposterous.²³⁴ The efforts of the Rwandan government in putting forward its narrative of success had long been interpreted as a way of

²³⁴ A case in point during the fieldwork was the celebration in its pages that, according to a Gallup survey, Rwanda was among the happiest countries in the world ("Rwandans among happiest people worldwide – survey" *The New Times*, 25/03/2015) something that Rwandan political commentators repeatedly used, to dispel criticism of the country's human right records e.g.: "The 'Police State' is home to Africa's happiest people" *The New Times*, 25/03/2015, "Smart apps, not witchcraft for 21st century" *The New Times*, 31/03/2015. In the latter, the author concluded that Rwandans being among the happiest in the world was a "vindication on some false rumours constantly perpetuated by rights groups about democracy and freedoms in this country": a way of depreciating sources of input legitimacy by relying on the ultimate source of performance legitimacy: happiness.


gaining support from the international community (e.g. Hayman 2009; Reyntjens 2011). Yet, this should not obscure the fact that such efforts were first and foremost directed to Rwanda's own population.²³⁵ Impartiality and performance were widely "publicised" to the domestic audience. Among the striking instances noticed during the fieldwork, some were especially spectacular, and sometimes unmatched in developed countries, such as the *imihigo* ceremony (Chapter 5), the video-recording of job interviews, or the National Dialogue (Chapter 6) where questions and remarks could be sent to the President and other top officials by phone, SMS, Twitter, Facebook and online forums. Extremely telling of the determination of the government to project an image of performance was for example the way in which the website of the Rwandan president displayed its track record through a modern and didactic infographic (Figure 7.2).

In parallel, the authorities made sure that performance, even when delivered by donors, was attributable to the Rwandan government. As discussed in Chapter 6, the government always wanted to appear to be the driving force for reforms. Many foreign informants working for donor organisations stated that they had never encountered such a level of governmental involvement in development projects in their often long careers in Africa.

Furthermore, the Rwandan government made great efforts to build expectations of performance. The link between performance and legitimacy is not necessarily automatic, especially in settings where historically "citizens' expectations may be low, or non-existent." (McLoughlin 2015: 347). For example, Stel et al. (2011: 61), analysing the water and sanitation sector in Burundi, noted that informants' "appreciation of the state does not appear to significantly depend on the state's concrete delivery performance." Consequently, "good performance would increase the performance legitimacy of state institutions if they raised expectations" (ibid.).

²³⁵ For this reason, some actions of the government detrimental to its legitimacy abroad, such as its interventions in DRC, are compatible with the argument put forward in this research because the thesis argues that it is *domestic* legitimacy, and not international legitimacy, that matters most to the RPF.

Figure 7.2 The GoR's achievements as presented on Paul Kagame's website



Source: <http://www.paulkagame.com/index.php/achievements> (accessed 15/03/2016)

This seemed to be understood in Rwanda as the government tried to foster not only the supply but also the demand side of performance and impartiality. In doing so, it tried to redefine what legitimacy sources *should* look like for the population. The political rhetoric regularly presented a normative description of the role of political leaders. It encouraged citizens to ask for more impartiality and performance from them. As stated by Kagame “you should demand accountability when you think we are not doing our job right.”²³⁶ More generally, top officials regularly emphasised that people should request better “customer care” and “service delivery” and the development they “deserved” (see also OECD 2010b: 52). A manifestation of that recounted in Chapter 5 was the obligation, largely respected, for name and phone numbers of

²³⁶ Speech in Nyamasheke on 16 January 2013 www.paulkagame.com/index.php/news/929-no-rwandan-should-remain-dependent-on-other-nations (accessed 16/07/2015).

local and national-level officials be displayed on the door of their office so that citizens could call them if they could not find them. As showed in Chapter 5 and 6, criticism of service delivery was encouraged in the media. Overall, the goal was for the rulers to “educate” the population regarding the sources of legitimacy they wanted to promote.

Official discourse also resorted to the “framing effect” by depoliticising politics and presenting issues in purely technical and normative terms, which consequently were not open to question. Potential legitimacy claims such as western-style human rights and democracy, deemed unfit for the Rwandan context, were downplayed. The title of an article written by an advisor to the Rwandan President, Richard Karugarama, perfectly epitomises this: “in Rwanda it is economic development that demonstrates government’s respect for human rights.”²³⁷

7.3 Potential challenges and alternative explanations

The remaining part of this chapter addresses several potential limits to this theoretical proposition. First, it considers potential challenges to the argument before addressing alternative explanations of state effectiveness.

Challenges to the argument

The first potential challenge to the argument is that the RPF seems to have done more than what was required for it to maintain its power. Given the effectiveness of its military and intelligence apparatus and the hegemony of the party, the efforts put in development and the disciplining of RPF members it required can be difficult to understand. In other words, why engage as forcefully as the RPF in fostering throughput and output legitimacy when it has managed to reach political and military hegemony?

It is important to reiterate three remarkable aspects of the Rwandan case to explain why the pursuit of throughput and output legitimacy was exceptionally powerful. First, when reaching power, the RPF did not simply have a lack of legitimacy. It had a tremendous amount of *illegitimacy* hard to find a match for if one keeps in mind the decades of anti-Tutsi ideology, the fear the RPF inspired, and the perception of them as aggressors “against” Rwanda and as murderers of Habyarimana. Second, gaining legitimacy was not only a question of political survival but also of physical survival. Third, this physical survival was not only the one of the

²³⁷ African Arguments, 14/03/2014: <http://africanarguments.org/2014/03/14/in-rwanda-it-is-economic-development-that-demonstrates-governments-respect-for-human-rights-by-dr-richard-karugarama-lebero/> (accessed on 18/07/2015).

elite, but also the one of the Tutsi minority as a whole. Any strategy of legitimation was consequently likely to be powerfully embraced.

A second challenge to the thesis' argument is that the initial amount of legitimacy of the CNDD-FDD and the scarcity thereof for the RPF were hard to reconcile with the violence surrounding the 2015 elections in Burundi and the enduring stability of the Rwandan regime. Although, as mentioned, the period of violence surrounding the 2015 elections in Burundi is not in the scope of the research since data gathering occurred before this period, it can however be reflected upon using the theoretical proposition developed in the thesis. In Burundi, the main reason for violence seemed to be that the initial input legitimacy of the CNDD-FDD was becoming insufficient, at least in urban centres, in the context of the continuing dismal government performance. In short, ten years of CNDD-FDD rule had led to the realisation (at least in some segments of the population) that Hutu could also exploit Hutu, that "liberators" could also exploit the liberated. In this case however, why did the Burundian regime not recognise earlier the necessity to build more throughput and input legitimacy?

With the major caveat that the CNDD-FDD's degree of legitimacy in the countryside (unlike in the cities) remained largely unknown, different reasons can be identified. First, elites' actions depend on their perception of the political environment. The CNDD-FDD's confidence in its right to rule led it to underestimate the amount of resentment it could incur related to the poor economic performance.²³⁸ In this respect, the CNDD-FDD is not different from many liberation movements as described by Clapham (2012: 10):

in their own minds, [liberation movements] are permanently entitled to govern and – far from recognising internal splits and domestic opposition as signals that they have outlived their welcome – treat them instead as challenges to the rightful order that they themselves represent. [...] Yet the liberation credit is a finite one, and is characteristically exhausted in the minds of much of the population much sooner than leaders recognise. The moment soon arrives when the regime is judged not by its promises but by its performance.

Furthermore, unlike in Rwanda, losing power had never been a matter of life and death for the CNDD-FDD. The incentive to recognise a decrease in its legitimacy and adjust accordingly, especially if this required self-restraint regarding resource capture, was arguably weaker. Furthermore, the CNDD-FDD predatory practices formed the base of its legitimacy if not

²³⁸ However, some precursory signs existed, such as the mobilisation against the cost of living. It is consequently not surprising that Nkurunziza, during the electoral campaign, declared that if elected, he would "do one hundred times better" than he had done over the past 10 years (declaration on 25 June 2015, commune of Busoni, province Kirundo, reported by Voice of America).

towards the population at least towards the Hutu CNDD-FDD elites, and were consequently difficult to suppress.

In Rwanda, how can the enduring stability despite an initial (and possibly lasting) lack of legitimacy be understood? First, legitimacy is not the only driver of stability. Compliance does not necessarily mean consent. The RPF-controlled Rwandan state included an effective police, army and intelligence services. Coercion, or at least the expectation that the government could readily resort to it, also explained the stability. This phenomenon was reinforced by the belief (justified or not) in the ubiquity of the surveillance apparatus (Purdeková 2011). Second, the legitimisation strategy of the RPF might have started to pay off as well. Scholars are polarised as to whether the RPF rule has been fostering resentment, or on the contrary whether it enjoyed some kind of legitimacy (see Chapter 2). The present work does not make any claim in this regard. Yet, it reveals that performance underpinned by an effective state was indeed increasing in Rwanda.

A third challenge to this thesis' argument lies in the more hegemonic position of the RPF compared to the CNDD-FDD after the war. Undoubtedly, the RPF's clear victory gave it the space to implement reforms while the CNDD-FDD had to compromise with a political opposition. It could be argued that rent capture and clientelism were necessary to the CNDD-FDD to bribe and co-opt the opposition, while clientelism was not necessary to the RPF political survival. While this argument is valid, it remains insufficient to account for the difference of state effectiveness between the two countries. To begin with, other movements have achieved a hegemonic position, yet without embracing as forcefully the agenda of an effective state (see section 8.3 for examples). In other words, while the RPF hegemony can give the space for reform, it does not necessarily provide the spur to reform. Such space could equally be used for unconstrained clientelism and rent capture.

In Burundi, while the CNDD-FDD's victory was negotiated rather than militarily won, its domination on the political front has been however quickly reinforced. As already mentioned, in 2010, aided by the opposition's boycott of the elections, the CNDD-FDD obtained 81.19% of the vote at the parliamentary elections and Nkurunziza was elected president with a score of 91.62% (Vandeginste 2011). In 2005, 97 of the 129 communes were controlled by the CNDD-FDD (Reyntjens 2006:124) and following the 2010 elections, only six communes eventually elected administrators from another party (International Crisis Group 2011: 8). Furthermore, the evidence presented in this thesis shows that predatory practices were used mainly to the benefit of the CNDD-FDD's own members rather than to co-opt the opposition. Although smaller than the RPF's, the political space of the CNDD-FDD could have been

better used to build an effective state but it was not. This reveals that ruling party dominance alone is an unsatisfactory explanation to account for the difference of effectiveness between the two states.

Alternative explanations

The explanation for the divergence of state effectiveness presented here faces two powerful alternative explanations. The first, regularly raised by informants, focused on the difference in discipline and ideology between the CNDD-FDD and the RPF to explain the variation in state effectiveness (e.g. Interviews 138, 177, 221, 302). The second explanation concerns the personality of each country's leader. The third one originates in the application to Rwanda of theories explaining the emergence of the developmental state in Asia, which emphasise the role of internal and external threats in increasing state effectiveness. This section examines them in turn.

Ideology and organisational culture of ruling parties

The divergence of effectiveness between the Burundian and Rwandan states might have been due to the kind of ideology and organisational capacity of each ruling party. Arguably, traits that explained the state effectiveness in Rwanda could already be observed in the RPF before 1994. The RPF was historically an extremely cohesive and disciplined party, although this cohesion has been punctually challenged by defection of high level individuals, especially since 2005.²³⁹ The RPF always had low levels of corruption, always relied on an ideology of self-reliance and always rejected ethnic identities.²⁴⁰ In contrast, the much younger CNDD-FDD underwent many splits (Nindorera 2012) and never had a coherent ideology beyond its rebellion against the confiscation of the Hutu political victory of 1993. Consequently, state effectiveness could be explained by the nature of the political organisation that captured the state.

This thesis' findings do not reject this explanation. Yet, the ideology and organisational capacity of the ruling parties did not emerge in a vacuum. The need for legitimacy plays a role in shaping them. The CNDD-FDD's lack of discipline and ideology could be partly explained by the fact that it benefited from the beginning of a significant amount of legitimacy. As it

²³⁹ High level defectors include Patrick Karegeya, the former head of intelligence, and Kayumba Nyamwasa, former chief of staff, who fled Rwanda respectively in 2008 and 2010.

²⁴⁰ Prunier (1998: 118) writes that "contrary to what happened in several African guerrilla organisations where leaders routinely used the movement's money for their private ends, there were never any rumours of misappropriation in the RPF."

was supported by the majority of Burundians, it was not compelled to build greater cohesion and discipline. In the bush, it was for example relatively easy for the party to get support from the population (Interviews 218, 229). Under these conditions, the incentive to build internal discipline is generally weaker in rebel movement (Weinstein 2006). Discipline could even undermine the reward structure that was crucial to sustain the CNDD-FDD's type of legitimacy among its members.

There is no denying that the RPF had an idiosyncratic culture of inclusiveness, discipline and low corruption that predated the genocide and that was subsequently translated into how the country was run. The RPF always rejected being identified as a Tutsi movement and constantly professed the irrelevance of ethnic distinctions (Des Forges 1999: 535-7). From its creation, it engaged in a strategy of Hutu recruitment (ibid.). Such an ideology was however not incompatible with the instrumentalist logic presented in the theory above, and the two probably reinforced each other. The RPF was aware long before the genocide that its "Tutsi label" undermined its image. For example, it pretended, falsely at its creation, that its executive committee was predominantly Hutu (Reyntjens 1992: 176-177). The RPF even made the former head of Habyarimana's secret service, Alexis Kanyarengwe, head of the RPF in October 1990.

Ideology and organisational culture alone may also provide an insufficient explanation of state effectiveness since it would then be hard to understand how the RPF remained so cohesive and self-disciplined for two decades despite mounting pressures. Its cohesion was tested through the replacement and side-lining (if not killing) of historical and respected RPF cadres. Furthermore, the check put on resource capture (jobs or rents) by individuals might have caused frustration. Resource capture could have been easy given the hegemonic position of the RPF and possibly a sense of entitlement of ex-combatants as in Burundi. Consequently, the continuity of the RPF's organisational culture for two decades cannot simply be assumed. The necessity to build legitimacy as a condition of collective political and physical survival provides a more powerful explanation for the endurance of the RPF's organisational culture than simply path dependency.

Personalities of each country's leader

Another alternative explanation to the puzzle of the difference of state effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda could lie in the personality of each country leader, Pierre Nkurunziza and Paul Kagame. Kagame was often presented as a strong, disciplined and ascetic leader (e.g. Kinzer 2008, Gettleman 2013), while Nkurunziza was portrayed as a savvy politician who

however spent lots of time enjoying himself in his native region or on the football pitch.²⁴¹ Undoubtedly, these differences played a role on how the state was run. Yet, the argument on the personality of presidents, while valid, should not be exaggerated. First of all, each leader was also the product of his party and its vision of its political legitimacy. The hedonist traits of Nkurunziza were in line with the mentality of many CNDD-FDD members of enjoying life after a decade of hardships in the bush. Furthermore, its lack of strong leadership could also be interpreted as the result, rather than the cause, of the CNDD-FDD organisational culture. The sense of entitlement of CNDD-FDD members created by the victory made it harder for the leader to discipline its followers. Conversely, Kagame's asceticism and discipline echoed more generally those of the RPF. While Kagame might have been an exceptional leader, he was also a member of an exceptional military and political machine.

The best support for these arguments is to look at the parties when Nkurunziza or Kagame were not leading them. Nkurunziza remained subordinated to the party chairman, Hussein Radjabu, until he organised Radjabu's destitution in 2008. Under Radjabu, and even before the CNDD-FDD came to power, corruption and clientelism were already significant (Interviews 202, 218, 297). Conversely, Kagame became the de-facto leader of the RPF only in 1990, after the death of Fred Rwigyema. Before that, the party was already a disciplined one with a coherent vision. Overall, while the agency of each leader arguably impacted the level of effectiveness of the state, its significance should not be over-stated in light of the importance of ruling parties' organisational culture and, more generally, of structural causes. They explain why Nkurunziza's authority tended to be challenged and why Kagame's authority tended to be respected. In other words, legitimacy of the ruling elite, or lack thereof, goes a long way to understand why, irrespective of their personality, the Burundian leader was less able than the Rwandan leader to discipline his followers.

The role of external threats in state effectiveness

The argument presented in this chapter focuses on the role of domestic legitimacy as a (dis)incentive for the ruling elite to build an effective state. The argument belongs to a larger body of literature presented in Chapter 1, which considers the ruling elite's political survival on the domestic scene as the pivotal mechanism for the emergence of an effective state. The contribution of this argument to the literature is further discussed in the next chapter. Another strand in the literature identifies external threats as a cause of state effectiveness (Campos &

²⁴¹ "Pierre Nkurunziza : au Burundi, la naissance d'un dictateur", Liberation, 31/05/2015 (http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2015/05/31/nkurunziza-au-burundi-la-naissance-d-un-dictateur_1320350, accessed 19/06/2016), "Burundi's Nkurunziza, the 'Avocado President'", The East African, 17/07/2011.

Root 1996; Woo-Cumings 1998; Zhu 2001; Doner et al. 2005).²⁴² In a Tillyan vein and in reference to Asian developmental states, these authors argue that external dangers in the context of the Cold War provided the incentive for the ruling elite to build an effective state capable of sustaining economic growth in order to meet the “heightened need for foreign exchange and war material induced by national insecurity” (Doner et al. 2005: 328).

So far, this research’s theoretical proposition does not account for the severe external security threats in explaining the difference in state effectiveness between Burundi and Rwanda. The threats of the FDLR in Rwanda, and the apparent absence of serious external threats in Burundi, can constitute an alternative or additional explanation to the one presented in this chapter. The theory presented does not reject this hypothesis. However, by focussing on legitimacy, it questions the exact mechanism through which vulnerability operated in Rwanda.

First of all, the severity of external threats to Rwanda dramatically decreased over the years. They were arguably less intense and enduring than those faced by Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore during the several decades-long risk of war with Mainland China, North Korea, or Malaysia. In Rwanda, the military threats posed by the FDLR lasted until 2002, with the end of the second Congo war (SSRC 2014: 2). The FDLR amounted, as of 2014, to no more than 3,000 troops scattered in Eastern Congo (ibid.: 4). The Rwandan government exaggerated the danger they represented probably to underline the risk of Tutsi ethnic cleansing in Eastern Congo, to point out international failures to pacify the region, and possibly to intervene in Congo to access minerals. Moreover, upgrading an economy, especially the Rwandan one, is a long process not adapted to mitigate such decreasing threats.

This research argues however that external security threats did matter for state effectiveness, but their influence can be better understood through the lens of legitimacy. External threats, under the form of the FDLR, were problematic less from a military point of view than because they were symbolically challenging the legitimacy of the RPF. Before the massive return of Hutu refugees from Congo, the genocidal regime promoted the idea that “the country was in Congo” (Interview 304). The FDLR were the remnant of an alternative Rwandan regime, a reminder of the RPF’s input legitimacy problem as perceived in 1994. As stated by a report on the FDLR:

²⁴² Doner et al.’s argue specifically that external threats coupled with internal ones creates systematic vulnerability of the elite that had no choice but to build developmental states to mitigate those threats. Their framework has been used by the few theories mentioned in Chapter 1 looking to explain the effectiveness of the Rwandan state at local (Chemouni 2014) and national (Mann & Berry 2016) levels. The analysis below downplays the importance of external threats in explaining state effectiveness in Rwanda and consequently shows that a focus on legitimacy alone can explain the Rwandan case with more parsimony.

While [the FDLR] is not a strategic threat, it is seen as the embodiment of the legacy of the genocide in Rwandan press and official government discourse. Given the importance of the genocide in Rwandan memory and society, the FDLR is seen as much more than just a military challenge by many Rwandans. In addition, the strict limits on political freedom in Rwanda, and the silencing of opponents and critics, have led the FDLR to be seen as legitimate by some opponents of the government. The most prominent example of this is the recent alliance announced by former Rwandan Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and the FDLR (SSRC 2014: 5).

Consequently, the FDLR attacks were less dangerous for what they were than for what they were a reminder of, namely that not everyone recognised the RPF's right to rule. The FDLR were contenders for state power, with a social base potentially still present inside the country. Consequently, external threats did influence state effectiveness, but less through the "heightened need for foreign exchange and war material induced by national insecurity" (Doner et al. 2005: 328) than through the need to crush alternative claims to legitimacy. The long-term answer to the vulnerability posed by the much-debilitated FDLR was less military build-up than legitimisation of the RPF's rule.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter offered a theoretical proposition of the difference in the effectiveness of the state between Burundi and Rwanda anchored in the political survival of the ruling elite. It argued that the divergence of state effectiveness was founded in the ruling elites' differing needs for legitimisation, and the different avenues open to them to achieve it. In Burundi, the importance of input legitimacy meant that throughput and output legitimacy vis-à-vis the whole population was not perceived as a condition for political survival. Moreover, the elite's conception of their own legitimacy created a *conducive environment* to state ineffectiveness by creating an entitlement to the state justifying corruption and cronyism. From this perspective, state effectiveness was not only unnecessary for the CNDD-FDD but also problematic.

In Rwanda, the RPF had a deficit of input legitimacy when it reached power and little possibility to foster it subsequently. Consequently, it based its legitimisation strategy on delivering performance as well as on *how* performance was achieved. Because the RPF had to guarantee that its rule was not a victor's rule, it showed significant restraint and impartiality. The necessity for throughput and output legitimacy was the mechanism preventing large-scale predatory practices in Rwanda that was missing in Burundi.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The objective of this research was to explain greater state effectiveness in Rwanda compared to Burundi. Acknowledging the non-monolithic character of the state, this work has used several within-case analyses to address this question. In this way the research was able to do justice to the fact that state effectiveness can vary depending on the task performed and on the array of social forces that impact different parts of the state. Consequently, the thesis has examined state effectiveness from a functional perspective, i.e. through precise policies, taking the examples of the promotion of fertiliser use (Chapter 3) and the promotion of maternal health (Chapter 4), and from an organisational perspective, focussing on the local (Chapter 5) and national state machinery (Chapter 6). Besides gaining new empirical insights on the Burundian and Rwandan cases, the research offers a theoretical perspective to understand the processes that lead to state effectiveness in some countries and not others (Chapter 7).

This final chapter is arranged as follows. Its first section revisits the theoretical proposition of the thesis by bringing together the key empirical finding of this research. The second section highlights the theoretical contribution of this work to the literature linking ruling elite political survival and emergence of effective states, as well its empirical contribution to the scholarship on Burundi and Rwanda. The third section charts avenues for future research and possibilities to apply the legitimacy framework to cases beyond Burundi and Rwanda. The final section examines the implications of this work for the future of the Burundian and Rwandan states.

8.1 Answering the research question

Four buildings

On entering Bujumbura by the *Route Nationale 1* from Rwanda, it was impossible to miss the imposing national headquarters of the CNDD-FDD on the right-hand side of the road. On the wall surrounding the modern building covered with gleaming blue windows, the name of the party was displayed in grandiose letters that lit-up at night. At the end of the alleyway of trees leading to the building entrance, a carved stone reads “A promise that will never change in

our party is that we have given a place of choice to God.”²⁴³ The party owned this new and well equipped building, whose main conference room was big enough to host the party national congresses (OLUCOME 2015: 31).

A few meters away on the same road as the CNDD-FDD headquarters, the passer-by might have noticed a smaller building, Burundi’s Ministry of Agriculture. That was, provided that his eyes were not distracted by the impressive fleet of white SUVs of the Belgian cooperation agricultural project across the road. Inside the austere building, the only traces of luxury were the many air-conditioning units on the top-floor meeting room. It was the only room large enough to install the excessive number of AC units given by China to the Ministry of Agriculture to support the development of the country (Interview 156). The general state of the building could not be blamed on the Ministry of Agriculture. It was only the tenant of the building, not its owner.

Six hours away by bus, the difference was stark. Finding the headquarters of the RPF in Kigali was not easy. It was one of the many nice houses sitting at the bottom of the Kimihurura hill. No signs could be seen from the street. The traditional RPF flag found in front of all RPF offices across the country was partly hidden by a tree. The building, the size of a residence, was too small by far to host the national congresses of the RPF. When entering the house, the indications revealing that this was the RPF national headquarters were not obvious, aside from a clock with Paul Kagame’s face as its background. This was perhaps because the party was only renting the place (Interview 275). A new RPF headquarters had been under construction since 2012. President Kagame declared that the building will not only be used by RPF supporters but by all Rwandans. However, they would have to pay a fee “because it’s going to be fully equipped with ICT and many other useful things.”²⁴⁴

In Kacyiru, the next hill over from the RPF headquarters, on a street parallel to the boulevard leading to the President’s Office, a passer-by could not miss the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture. The sign on the road was big and the building was the nicest in the area. It offered a pleasant view over a manicured garden with rolling hills in the distance. On either side of the building’s entrance, a visitor could notice lists of the candidates interviewed, rejected or hired by the Ministry.

²⁴³ In Kirundi: “Isezerano ritazohinduka Imana twayihaye ikibanza cambere mu Mugambwe Wacu.”

²⁴⁴ “Kagame lays foundation stone for RPF headquarters”, *The New Times*, 18/12/2012.

The description of the premises of the ruling parties and the ministries of agriculture of Burundi and Rwanda epitomises the theory this research has offered on the difference in state effectiveness between the two countries. In Burundi, sure of its input legitimacy, the CNDD-FDD proudly displayed its victory in a *nouveau riche* fashion through an imposing building erected on one of the main roads of Bujumbura soon after its victory. The bush fighters had made it to the top. Their suffering through decades of Tutsi minority rule and years of war legitimised their power. Even God was on their side as the carved stone at the entrance of the party's headquarters reminded visitors. This may have excused the little attention given to state effectiveness in general and to the building of the Ministry of Agriculture in particular. Despite the importance of the agricultural sector for the country, resources were available to build a lavish party headquarters, but not for the Ministry of Agriculture to own its premises. The sense of legitimacy of CNDD-FDD members might even have justified, if the rumour was true, that a senior politician was making money by renting the Ministry's building to the state.²⁴⁵ The legitimacy of the party could also excuse the lack of coordination of donors' support, symbolised by the discrepancy between the number of vehicles of the Belgian Cooperation and the small resources of the Ministry, or by the inefficiencies of the Chinese aid that supported the agricultural sector by giving too many AC units to the Ministry.

In Rwanda, looking at the RPF headquarters, it seemed that the importance of politics was downplayed. The RPF flag was hidden by a tree and the party did not even own the premises despite being in power for two decades. It was almost as though the party was apologising for being there. Even the new party building under construction was not intended as a classic party headquarters, since it would be open to all Rwandans. However, access to the premises was not to be free. People would have to pay to access the services offered. Even for a party that sought to expand its membership and increase its popularity, it was out of the question to provide services (as development more generally) in a manner that was not financially sustainable or that would go against the general narrative that free things, such as healthcare, destroy the mentality of the population. While the resources invested in the RPF headquarters were, for most of the period considered, limited, resources were mobilised to provide the Ministry of Agriculture a high quality building, a reflection of the importance given by the government to the development of the agricultural sector. The display of the lists of candidates selected or rejected to work in the ministry was a public reminder that the government was committed to impartiality when selecting its agents. Overall, it seemed that the government

²⁴⁵ <https://wazaonline.com/fr/gouvernance/letat-burundais-est-il-locataire-par-interet-pour-ses-amis> (accessed 27/02/2016).

was doing everything to downplay the importance of politics and publicise its efforts to impartially deliver development.

Solving the puzzle

Two images of the state

These four buildings are an allegory for the theoretical proposition this thesis has offered. The vital need for the Rwandan ruling elite to gain legitimacy, and the general impossibility to do so based on its identity and the way in which it reached power, made it embrace a strategy of legitimation based on the delivering of welfare to citizens in a visible and impartial manner. As a consequence, building an effective state capable of supporting development was imperative. By contrast, in Burundi, the CNDD-FDD's need to increase its legitimacy was comparatively lower because it reached power with a tremendous reserve of legitimacy based on its war credentials, ethnic composition and rural character. Furthermore, the party's legitimacy among its members was supported by the CNDD-FDD's capacity to increase their access to resources. Consequently, the party's own conception of its legitimacy, and the entitlement to the state it implied, was in tension with the efforts required to increase state effectiveness. Overall, this created between the two countries a difference in the commitment of rulers to a well-functioning state, shown in the empirical analysis presented in previous chapters.

This was conspicuous in the fact that, in Rwanda, issues of policy implementation were quickly identified and addressed by the government. The process was visible in all of the sub-case studies. Policies, whether they concerned the fertiliser subsidy system, maternal health in general and community-based health insurance (CBHI) in particular, decentralisation, or the coordination and evaluation of the central bureaucracy, were the results of dense iterative processes addressing problems as they emerged.²⁴⁶ In the thesis, these processes were often best captured on graphic timelines. In contrast in Burundi, issues of policy design and implementation were met with inertia. It took a decade after the war to start reforming the fertiliser subsidy system. Decentralisation, although enshrined in the Arusha Peace Agreement, was a sluggish process. Public sector reform remained elusive, unable to thwart clientelism, corruption and the fragmentation of the civil service.

²⁴⁶ This is also observed by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2014) in the case of agriculture and horticulture. See also Booth (2015).

This difference in commitment to development was also visible in the fact that reforms increasing state effectiveness were for the most part government-initiated in Rwanda and donor-initiated in Burundi. For example, the key mechanism for the monitoring and evaluation of local authorities in Rwanda, the *imihigo*, was put in place by the government and coated with a neo-traditional discourse presenting *imihigo* as a home-grown solution drawing on pre-colonial traditions. In Burundi, despite the importance of planning and evaluation mechanisms for local governments to push them to deliver development, the Communal Plans for Community Development (PCDC) were initiated by donors. Overall, the relationship between donors and the central bureaucracy regularly constituted in Burundi what Boyce (2008) calls a dual public sector.

Incidentally, this raises the question, outlined in Chapter 3, of the extent to which performance delivered mainly thanks to donors could be equated to state effectiveness or merely to “donor effectiveness.” As showed by the 2013 reform of the fertiliser subsidy programme, while the Burundian government was not always in the driving seat of reforms, its role was nonetheless crucial in disciplining bureaucrats to create the space for the donor-driven reforms to occur. Furthermore, as in many low-capacity countries, the Burundian state could potentially learn from projects designed and implemented by donors, especially because they were likely to involve some Burundian officials. Consequently, governments’ policies mainly implemented thanks to donors could also reflect some state effectiveness. On the other hand, by creating a potentially enduring dual public sector, donors might support state effectiveness in the short run but jeopardize it in the long term. Consequently, this research has two important implications about the relationship between donors and state effectiveness. It demonstrates that looking at performance data alone can miss the most important points, such as the contrast between Burundi’s and Rwanda’s management of donor aid. Furthermore, it shows that aid dependence data alone cannot shed much light on levels of dependency unless detailed qualitative analysis on how governments manage it is conducted.

Rulers’ commitments to development were also more visible in Rwanda than in Burundi in the systematic concern for performance but also for *sustainable* performance. The rejection of free healthcare for pregnant women along with the adoption of a compulsory health insurance, the use of auctions to sell government’s subsidised fertiliser to distributors before 2013, the privatisation of the fertiliser distribution system in 2013 to reduce its fiscal burden, and the controlled growth of the civil service, to name a few, were reforms often complex and unpopular but all driven by a concern for sustainability. Similar concerns were hardly visible in Burundi. In health, the adoption of the *gratuité* jeopardised the health sector’s financial sustainability. Health centres kept being built for political gains even though the funding to

equip them was scarce. The civil service was never scaled down despite the need to better pay civil servants.

More generally, the ruling elite's commitment to effectiveness in Rwanda manifested itself in the enforcement of formal rules. In an instance reported in Chapter 4, even the president submitted himself to formal regulations when his promise to build a hospital was abandoned in favour of extending an existing health centre in accordance with technical guidelines. Furthermore, formal rules were backed by informal ones. In health, CBHI enrolment was supported by informal practices of local officials confiscating livestock, banning access to markets and denying official documents. In the local bureaucracy, the renewal of politicians hinged in part on informal considerations of expertise and performance. Overall, and in line with Goodfellow's (2012) findings on urban policies in Rwanda, informal institutions supported and amplified the role of formal rules in enabling the government to implement its stated goals. In contrast, informal institutions in Burundi consistently clashed with formal ones. The diploma and the job title were replaced as criteria of power in the state apparatus by ethnicity, party connections, ex-combatant status, and sometimes region of origin. As a result, the chain of command in the state was constantly overridden by competing power structures. The result was not only a dysfunctional state, but also uncertainty and mistrust that permeated the professional lives of civil servants. This comparison revealed that the difference in effectiveness was not to be found in the influence of the ruling party on the state apparatus, which existed in both countries. Rather, it was to be found in what each ruling party made of this influence.

Overall, two different images of the state emerged. In Rwanda, the state was a contractual, goal-oriented entity, underpinned by a web of performance contracts and dense, mainly top-down, flows of information. As a result, effectiveness was the result of a *system*. In Burundi, the state appeared as a much looser entity, fragmented and overridden by informal rules. As a result, its effectiveness was greatly reduced and, when it occurred, was the result less of a system than of *idiosyncrasies*. This reveals that the concept of state effectiveness implies a certain degree of institutionalisation that "implementation studies" alone cannot grasp. It also demonstrates the relevance of the approach followed in this thesis of complementing a functional exploration of state effectiveness with an organisational analysis. There are talented and devoted officials in every bureaucracy. What makes the difference between an effective and a less effective state is the organisational framework in which they operate.

Why legitimacy?

This overall situation reflected rulers' greater commitments to building an effective state in Rwanda since it was a central tool of their legitimisation strategy, where it was not in Burundi. While perhaps convincing, this explanation could potentially be one among many. Any of the theories presented in Chapter 1 showing how an effective state can mitigate ruling elite vulnerability could *a priori* have fitted. Yet, in light of the empirical findings, the legitimacy framework is especially powerful because it does not only explain the difference of state effectiveness but also *the specific form* that state (in)effectiveness took in each country.

The legitimacy theory first helps to understand why the Rwandan government appeared just as interested in delivering performance as advertising its efforts in doing so. This was because performance itself does not automatically translate into legitimacy as explained in the previous chapter. The perception of performance by the population and its attribution to the government of Rwanda were needed for such a process to take place. With this in mind, it is then possible to understand the significant efforts put in publicising and ritualising activities of development such as the *imihigo*, the National Dialogue or the Leadership Retreat, all broadcast live on TV and on the radio. The Rwandan government, unlike its Burundian counterpart, also ensured that it was associated with donors' efforts in supporting the development of the country. This was epitomised by the officials' insistence that Rwandan state logos be more prominent than donors' logos on policy documents. The goal was to make sure that performance, even delivered by donors, could still produce some output legitimacy for the ruling elite.

The legitimacy theory also helps to appreciate why in Rwanda state effectiveness was accompanied by attempts to raise citizens' expectations towards the state. This can be interpreted as a way to "educate" the citizenry to the importance of performance as a source of legitimacy. This was observable for example in the publicity given to national planning documents such as Vision 2020 or the poverty reduction paper (EDPRS 2). It was also conspicuous in the surprising leeway given to local media to report bad service delivery, as identified in Chapters 5 and 6. Given the authoritarian nature of the Rwandan government, such space for criticism was unexpected but becomes intelligible if a legitimacy lens is applied to it.

The attempt to "educate" the population to embrace "appropriate" sources of legitimacy was not restricted to Rwanda. It was apparent in both countries in the way in which the elite framed the image of the state. In Rwanda, the state was portrayed as a depoliticised arena. Politicians appeared as mere technocrats, evaluated like managers. At the national level, as mentioned in

Chapter 5, MPs were seated in alphabetical order in parliament as if to give no salience to political parties and political identities. In Burundi, the state was unapologetically anchored in the political arena. In other words, potential sources of what this research labelled “input” legitimacy, such as elections and political identities, were downplayed in Rwanda whereas potential sources of what has been designated as “throughput” and “output” legitimacy were emphasised. In Burundi, concerns for what could constitute for the population sources of throughput and output legitimacy were secondary and at times downplayed, for example through the government’s portrayal of critics as urban intellectuals that did not shed their blood during the war. In parallel, illegal access to power and resources was justified by putting forward the CNDD-FDD’s sources of input legitimacy: being an ex-combatant and/or a member of the party that liberated the people.

Finally, the empirical within-case analysis provided several counterfactuals to the general narrative of state ineffectiveness in Burundi and state effectiveness in Rwanda that further support the relevance of the legitimacy framework.

In Burundi, conspicuous occurrences of state effectiveness existed. Yet, as epitomised by free healthcare for pregnant women, they were often “low hanging fruits” for the government. As shown by the 2013 fertiliser reform, although supported by the Burundian government, they were often donor-initiated. Finally, they were limited in scope and did not tackle systematically the underlying causes of the ineffectiveness of the state as a whole such corruption and cronyism. While the Burundian ruling elite was not always reluctant to increase state performance, such attempts did not seek to create long-term, sustainable state effectiveness, able to generate durable output legitimacy as in Rwanda. This is because they would hinder resource capture justified by the “entitlement to the state” of the Burundian ruling elite.

In Rwanda, the occurrences of state ineffectiveness were not incompatible with the legitimacy theory. They even supported it. Ineffectiveness was generally allowed when it did not jeopardise the ruling elite’s legitimacy that could stem from performance. In agriculture, the inability of the government to get fertiliser loans paid back on time and to target subsidised fertiliser to priority crops was unlikely to discourage the aggregate demand for fertiliser. On the contrary, such leniency actually lifted some constraints put on demand, which supported the output legitimacy of the government through expanding fertiliser use.

Another instance where the state in Rwanda was ineffective was in its weak capacity to improve working performance of some low-ranking civil servants. One of the reasons

identified was that the top layer of the bureaucracy, pressurised to reach ambitious targets, did not feel comfortable delegating tasks. In this case, ineffectiveness was a perverse effect of the pursuit of performance.

State ineffectiveness in Rwanda also occurred in order to protect any political legitimacy attached to the way in which policies were implemented in Rwanda. This was visible in Chapter 4 in the refusal of the minister of health to differentiate the care package of community health workers depending on whether they were in an urban or rural setting. Although this measure would have increased the effectiveness of the state, it was not implemented because the minister feared that such a measure would be interpreted as introducing an urban bias. In other words, using the legitimacy prism, the reform was not adopted to avoid that an increase in output legitimacy would undermine throughput legitimacy.

Overall, the empirical analysis of state ineffectiveness in Burundi and state effectiveness in Rwanda, as well as the few exceptions to these general narratives, support legitimacy as an appropriate framework to answer the research question.

8.2 Research contribution

Theoretical contribution

Drawn inductively from comparative case analysis, this research improved on existing typologies of legitimacy to probe the relationship between elite's implicit claims for their "right to rule" and state effectiveness. Doing so, it first increased the parsimony of the concept of input legitimacy by anchoring it in the right to access power, thus making the concept easily applicable in non-democratic contexts. Second, it emphasised that "how power is exercised" is an important source of legitimacy that requires examination in its own right even in non-democratic settings. This is especially true in development studies where such a form of legitimacy is often conflated with concepts of input or output legitimacy, which may obscure analysis. Overall, this thesis' theoretical proposition showed that rulers' behaviour, even in authoritarian contexts, can be profoundly shaped by the incentives and constraints created by the necessarily limited repertoire of legitimising strategies available to them.

This theory also contributes to the literature linking political survival and state strength already discussed in Chapter 1. It identified new channels through which elite bargains can be shaped and rulers prompted to build an effective state apparatus.

One benefit of the legitimacy theory is that it provides a finer understanding than a political settlement perspective of cases such as Burundi and Rwanda. Focussing on distribution of power in the polity, political settlement theory is helpful in understanding the leeway that rulers' benefit from in their attempts to build an effective state. In Khan's (2010) framework, Rwanda could be considered a dominant party settlement where the ruling elite concentrates power both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the Rwandan settlement was characterised by the virtual inexistence of elites excluded from the ruling coalition domestically.²⁴⁷ Vertically, the leadership was relatively autonomous from its coalition and the population in general, which sheltered it from particularistic demands. This provided space for the government to implement reforms by providing it with a long-term horizon. In Burundi, the more fragmented settlement, with an elite that was less able to discipline its coalition, could explain the high levels of clientelism and corruption.

While this thesis does not reject such an explanation, it shows that a political settlement approach may be under-explaining the Burundian and Rwandan cases. It explains in Rwanda the *space* for the ruling elite to reform the state. Yet, it is less useful in understanding the *incentives* that pushed rulers to use this space to embrace reforms in the first place. Given the extended possibilities of rent capture and patronage provided by the hegemonic position of the RPF, why did it engage in building an effective state even if the space to do so existed, given the difficulty and unpopularity of some reforms it required? In other words, if virtually unchallenged domestically, why would a ruling elite display so much self-discipline while engaging so forcefully on the difficult path to development? By focussing on the legitimation challenges of the RPF, this research provides a better understanding of the motives that prompted the ruling elite to act, and not solely of the space it had to do so.

In Burundi, clientelism could be considered as originating in a more fragmented political settlement than in Rwanda. The CNDD-FDD, since the war was increasingly dominant on the political scene, yet never as hegemonic as the RPF was in Rwanda. It could be argued that the predatory practices over which it presided were necessary to co-opt the political opposition. Evidence shows however that, while the opposition, and especially the FNL, were regularly repressed, predatory practices were used mainly to the benefit of the CNDD-FDD's own members. From Khan's (2010) perspective, this would be seen as the consequence of a weak concentration of vertical power, i.e. of limited autonomy of rulers vis-à-vis their broader supporting coalition. The legitimacy framework goes further than a political settlement

²⁴⁷ However, there were excluded elites from the coalition living abroad.

perspective by tracing the origin of such a lack of autonomy to the CNDD-FDD supporters' conception of their party's legitimacy.

The legitimacy framework also contributes to the literature that focuses on the link between elite cohesiveness and state strength presented in Chapter 1. Different authors have underlined that elite cohesion fosters the collective action necessary to build an effective state (Waldner 1999; Vu 2010; Slater 2010). While Waldner (1999) takes elite cohesion (or what he calls "low level of conflict") as the starting point of his demonstration, others have focussed on identifying the different mechanisms through which elite cohesion can emerge. Vu (2010) argues that elite cohesion derives from intra-elite conflict and elite-mass engagement. The higher the intensity of intra-elite conflict (what he calls elite polarisation), the higher will be the cohesion of rulers. Furthermore, if the elite manages to mobilise or suppress social groups, its capacity to develop the state will be higher than if it simply accommodates them. However, Vu's theory does not explain theoretically the origins of the patterns of elite/mass interaction, only positing that it is idiosyncratic to countries' histories. This research argues that elite cohesion and the patterns of engagement between the elite and the masses stem from the degree and nature of the ruling elite's legitimacy. Contrary to Vu's argument, elite cohesion and elite/mass engagement are considered two sides of the same coin and not separate variables.

This argument has close affinity with the work of Dan Slater (2010). With regard to Southeast Asia, he argues that effective states emerged when the elite perceived class conflict as posing endemic and unmanageable threats. Elites built effective states to protect themselves from these threats. Focussing on legitimacy, this thesis specified another channel aside from class politics through which elite collective action can be fostered. Doing so, this research helped not only to shed further lights on the causal mechanism making states (in)effective, but also helps to understand what exact forms state (in)effectiveness took in each country. It explains why ineffectiveness in Burundi was the result of the systematic favouring of ex-combatants and CNDD-FDD members and why in Rwanda effectiveness was accompanied by specific concerns to make it sustainable and to publicise performance and impartiality in the exercise of power.

Empirical contribution: the nature of the Burundian and Rwandan states

The empirical contribution of the thesis lies in the original material presented in Chapters 3 to 6. It includes not only the political economy analysis of some specific sectors (agricultural

fertiliser and maternal health) but also a systematic exploration of the “black box” of the Burundian and Rwandan states locally and centrally.

Burundi: ineffectiveness as politics

In Burundi, the research contributed to redressing the relative paucity of scholarship on the political economy of the state. It revealed that, ultimately, state ineffectiveness stemmed from a politically-created situation. Contextual factors such as state capacity or donor funding could be proximate causes of ineffectiveness, but were ultimately the results of politics. Burundi was not solely a “donor orphan” suffering from preferential treatment compared to the Rwandan “donor darling” (cf. Marysse et al. 2007). The Burundian government often missed opportunities to access more aid for its development. Examples included donors’ refusal to fund the fertiliser subsidy system before 2013 because of the extent of corruption (Chapter 3), the limited level of aid available for decentralisation before 2014 and the mismanagement of funds dedicated to the communes (Chapter 5) and, more generally, the inability of the central bureaucracy to maximise aid mobilisation (Chapter 6). Notably, missing out on these opportunities because of corruption and patronage was essential to the logic of legitimation in the years following the war. These findings echo Booth’s (2012) point that aid ownership is more often assumed than real, and that effective aid might suppose first the consideration of non-aid factors.

The importance of political factors over technical and financial ones also demonstrated that the difference in state effectiveness between the two cases had little to do with time. The obstacles to state performance in Burundi were not observable in Rwanda after the genocide, which indicates that they were largely unrelated to the fact that peace was more recent in Burundi than in Rwanda.

Rwanda: three debates on the state.

This research provided empirical material that prompts a revisiting of the main academic debates identified in Chapter 1 on the nature of the Rwandan state.

The developmental state debate

The first debate, termed in Chapter 2 the “developmental state debate”, concerns the tension between rapid development and people’s rights. It asked why Rwandan rulers resort to sometimes brutal methods to deliver development and whether this is justified.

While this research cannot contribute to the second aspect of the debate, the theory it puts forward is useful to understand why Rwandan rulers sometimes resorted to brutal policy implementation. Since the thesis argued that development was conceived by the ruling elite as a condition for its survival, the violence with which it sometimes implemented policies becomes intelligible.

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Yet, if gaining legitimacy was the driving force behind the government's actions, why did it not implement policies with fewer rigors in order not to create resentment? The reason is that legitimacy based on performance cannot happen overnight. It requires deep transformation and sustained performance, not short-term unsustainable redistribution and "fixes" exposed to potential reversals. The RPF, comforted by its hegemony, was ready to adopt policies not immediately popular, which might have undermined its legitimacy in the short run, but which allowed the creation of performance legitimacy in the long run. In other words, the RPF was ready to sacrifice some popularity for legitimacy in the long term. This explains the government's concerns, if not obsession, with the sustainability of the policies it designed. This research did not seek to justify the heavy-handed approach of the Rwandan government nor the lack of popular participation in policy design and planning. It provided, however, a powerful theoretical lens through which to understand why the state operated in this paradoxical and controversial manner, straddled between a genuine commitment to the betterment of people's lives and draconian policy implementation.

The inclusion debate

The "inclusion debate" related to the question of who controls the state and which group benefits from the state. As argued in Chapter 2, who controls the state is hardly disputable. The Rwandan state was authoritarian and real power lay in the hands of the RPF. The main value of this research can be seen in the demonstration that power was exercised in a more nuanced manner than generally portrayed in the literature. While power was indeed deployed in an authoritarian, top down fashion, it was exerted with a relatively high level of impartiality and inclusiveness. At the national level for example, commitment to impersonal rule was

visible in the efforts deployed to ensure merit-based recruitment. It was unclear whether these efforts were successful in curbing favouritism. They may have been doomed from the start given the bias toward Anglophone Tutsi among politicians and top appointed civil servants, who could have been naturally drawn to hire people who resembled them. In addition, horizontal inequalities in education and language skills probably gave an advantage to Anglophone Tutsi during merit-based recruitment processes. Nonetheless, empirical data showed that at least a concern for impartiality and inclusivity existed and permeated policy designs, along with a concern for curbing corruption and rent capture.

The continuity debate

The “continuity debate” interrogated the degree of continuity between the pre- and post-genocide Rwandan state, and whether such a continuity could create the conditions for a return to violence. This research cannot comment on the risk of violence erupting again. Furthermore, regarding the degree of continuity between the pre and post-1994 state, it can only suggest some hypotheses because historical comparison was beyond the scope of the thesis.

To begin with, the research further confirmed that parallels exist between the pre- and post-genocide state. Both states were effective, reaching deep into society, and supported bottom-up accountability and top-down policy implementation. This research suggested differences as well. The degree of inclusiveness and impartiality of policy implementation in the post-1994 state was higher than in the Habyarimana period, where ethnic and regional discrimination were systematic. Furthermore, the nature of power might have differ as well between the pre- and post-1994 period. This research questions whether local officials in the post-genocide state were as free as their counterparts of the Second Republic era given the requirements of impartiality and performance they had to meet. In other words, the local officials under the RPF, subject to a dense web of formal monitoring and evaluation of their performance, were probably less of the “little gods” than Habyarimana’s prefects and *bourgmestres* were.

The evidence presented also interrogates the extent to which the current Rwandan state can be considered a *continuity* with the pre-1994 state. Continuity supposes a direct link between the two states. Yet, given the historical rupture that the genocide represents, the disruption of the state it created, and the changes in the composition of the ruling elite it produced, continuity cannot be assumed. This is especially true if one accepts that the cause behind the current effectiveness of the state is to be found in the legitimization strategy of the ruling elite. The

Habyarimana regime not only had more popular support than the RPF regime from the start, it also drew its legitimacy from very different sources. Consequently, it is possible that the effectiveness of both states is the result of equifinality, likely to be the result of mere resemblance rather than of continuity. This is only a suggestion that would require a deeper analysis of the state during the Second Republic.

8.3 Avenues for future research.

Legitimacy in Burundi and Rwanda over time

A first possible way to expand this research is to increase its external validity. This could be done first across time, by historical comparison within the same cases. Such an analysis over time has the potential to yield a valuable understanding of the Burundian state under the Second Republic (1976-1987). The Bagaza regime increased the effectiveness of the state (see Chapter 2). The government was Tutsi-dominated with limited legitimacy in the eyes of the Hutu population, especially as the trauma of the 1972 massacres was so recent. The incentive to build an effective state under Bagaza can be interpreted using the legitimacy lens, as an attempt to mitigate the regime's illegitimacy through development. Interestingly, as under Kagame, reference to ethnicities were banned under Bagaza in order to avoid giving salience to rival forms of legitimacy based on ethnicity.

The legitimacy framework applied to the Rwandan case over time may advance the "continuity debate" mentioned above by questioning the comparability of the effectiveness of the pre- and post-genocide state. It could be useful to contrast the sources of legitimacy of the Habyarimana's regime with the ones of the First Republic and assess to what extent performance under Habyarimana was an attempt to legitimise his rule after the 1972 coup.

Beyond Burundi and Rwanda

This research could also be taken forward by applying the legitimacy framework to other cases in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy lens could be tested in other post-liberation states. While a small yet growing literature examines the similarities of African post-liberation states (Dorman 2006; Clapham 2012; Southall 2013), it has not yet provided a theoretical explanation of their stark divergence in terms of effectiveness and of development track record. The legitimacy prism potentially offers a fruitful approach to make sense of these divergences.

Many liberation movements, such as the Burundian CNDD-FDD, could rest their claim to rule on input legitimacy when taking power. Yet, in line with the theoretical proposition of the thesis, comfortable input legitimacy seems to have hindered rulers' commitments to build effective states capable of delivering development, not only because it was not vital for their political survival, but also because it went against ex-combatants' sense of entitlements.

Zimbabwe probably provides the clearest example. In Zimbabwe, "political discourse of struggle credentials [are used] to legitimate and de-legitimate access to power and resource" (Kriger 2006: 1167). As in Burundi, development has been obstructed by patronage and corruption stemming from a peculiar form of throughput and output legitimacy oriented towards the party and the former combatants, rather than the whole population. This, according to Kriger, "demonstrates the dangers of building government legitimacy on a national liberation war and simultaneously recognising the contribution of some participants as superior to those of others" (ibid. 1152). As in Burundi, the ruling party in Zimbabwe has been increasingly challenged due its poor economic record. As explained by Dorman (2006: 1098), "under the pressure of structural adjustment and an economic crisis catalysed by payments to war veterans, ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union] experienced its first major electoral challenge [in 2008]. During this economic crisis, attempts to reinvigorate the 'liberation discourse' proved effective in some constituencies, but not in others."²⁴⁸

The legitimacy lens could also be useful in shedding light on the South African case. The ANC's right to rule is based primarily on input legitimacy sources: in its image of "the symbolic figurehead of the liberation struggle" (Beresford 2012: 867). Corruption scandals and persisting inequalities have been eroding its legitimacy, showing that, as for the CNDD-FDD, "there are however limits on the extent to which the ANC can 'cash in' on its own history" (Beresford 2012: 884).

The framework introduced in this thesis also provides some insights on the Eritrean case. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) had a tremendous input legitimacy after successfully leading the war of independence, to the point that "it is difficult to convey how deeply the ethos of the liberation struggle and the EPLF appears to have penetrated Eritrean society" (Dorman 2005: 205). This secured, at least until the defeat by Ethiopia, a tremendous level of compliance nationally and among the diaspora. Until the Eritrean–Ethiopian War, input legitimacy was coupled with a high amount of output legitimacy, underpinned by good economic and service delivery performance. Yet, "for the ruling elite, those achievements

²⁴⁸ The ruling party did better at the 2013 elections, obtaining more than two thirds of seats in parliament. The reasons seem to be electoral fraud, fear of the return of electoral violence, and the lack of trust in the capacity of the opposition to rule (Gallagher 2013).

were less important than the paramount ideal of national unity combined with self-reliance and self-sacrifice” (Müller 2012: 296). After the war, obsessed by the myth of the struggle and by the military defeat, the EPLF lost considerable output legitimacy due to its inability to deliver development and address external threats, as manifested by the massive emigration of young people escaping the difficult living conditions and the compulsory, indefinite military service (ibid.).

As in Burundi, in all those cases, the input legitimacy attached to war credentials could create tensions with the educated diaspora. In the case of Zimbabwe, Kriger (2006: 1156) quotes an informant that “contrasted the weak struggle credentials of many leaders who had been living in ‘London, America et cetera’ [...] with political prisoners like herself.” In the Eritrean case, Müller explains that the legitimacy of EPFL fighters in Eritrea over the diaspora returnees derives from the fact that “instead of enjoying the distant comfort of exile [they] were actually those who fought for [independence] in the battle zones” (Müller 2012: 795).

As in Burundi, the creation of output legitimacy was not regarded as superfluous by liberation movements given the reserve of input legitimacy they had. It was also in direct tension with a feeling of entitlement of its members that justified their predatory practices. This created output and throughput legitimacy for some segments of society, mainly ex-combatants, while any attempt to curb those practices could become problematic for the ruling party. As noted by Dorman (2006: 1094), post-liberation is a period where “potent conflicts emerge from within these formal party structures surrounding questions of entitlement, rewards and compensation.”

At the other end of the spectrum, an analysis of the Rwandan case through the legitimacy lens provides an understanding of the capacity of the Ethiopian state to deliver development. As in Rwanda, the government is dominated by an ethnic minority. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) emerged from the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Key positions in the EPRDF remain dominated by the Tigrayan ethnic group from the North, which represents only 6% of the population. This creates “problems of legitimacy” (Tadesse & Young 2003: 398) for the EPRDF. Indeed, “although the TPLF established the EPRDF in order to gain a national base and legitimacy in Ethiopia, it never lost its minority identification, and this has always been a source of insecurity (ibid.).

As with the RPF, the EPRDF has “long viewed the delivery of tangible socioeconomic progress [...] as a key means of securing political support and build its legitimacy” (Lavers 2016: 6). This was especially visible when the party was challenged in 2000 and 2005. In 2001, criticism over its management of the war with Eritrea (1998-2001) by veterans from

Tigray but also members of the parties from other regions, led to the *tehadso* (renewal) of the party to put an end to dissidence (Vaughan 2011: 629). The party also embraced development even more strongly than before as a source of legitimacy. It led to state reforms and the reconfiguration of state/society relations in order to support the delivery of development (Vaughan 2011: 629-632; Lavers 2016: 4-5). The challenge of 2005, when the relative free elections gave only a reduced majority to the EPRDF in parliament, similarly spurred the party, besides engaging in heavy repression, to reinforce the local state to “win back the population” (Vaughan 2011: 632-3).²⁴⁹

Overall, this cursory analysis of other African cases reveals that the legitimacy theory can potentially shed light on development dynamics across the African continent. Post-liberation states, whether embracing a strategy of legitimation leaning toward the input or output side, share a similar situation: “promises made to fighters and civilians during the struggle need to be met, but it is the state, controlled by the liberation elite, which prioritises and accommodates the demands for meeting developmental goals” (Dorman 2006: 1097). In the case of Burundi and Rwanda, as potentially in other cases, this thesis argues that a central mechanism determining such prioritisation of resource allocation was the ruling party’s conception of its own legitimacy, coupled with what kind of avenues were open to it to lay claims to new forms of legitimacy. This could tilt the balance towards prioritising restraints on resource capture by rulers in order to build an effective state or towards allowing the development of predatory practices.

Outside Africa, one obvious study would be the case of China, where the sources of legitimacy of the communist party have varied over time and impacted the state in different manners. In the Maoist years, the regime’s right to rule was based on the input legitimacy of Mao’s charisma, on the fight against the Japanese and the Nationalists, and on the Communist revolution. Furthermore, its communist ideology produced throughput legitimacy, through the strong egalitarian drive it created. It also produced a tangible, yet limited in scope, output legitimacy in the social sectors, such as health and education. It could be argued that the exhaustion of its input legitimacy after the excess of the Cultural Revolution spurred the Communist Party to reconfigure the state in order to increase its output legitimacy through capitalist development from the 1980s onwards (Chen 1997; Holbig & Gilley 2010).

²⁴⁹ The protests across the country against the regime beginning of 2016 seemed to indicate that such strategy failed.

8.4 The future of state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda

This research has important implications for assessing the future of state effectiveness in Burundi and Rwanda. In Burundi, the violence surrounding the 2015 elections, still ongoing at the time of writing in February 2016, makes it hard to see how state effectiveness can increase in the short or medium term. If, as argued in Chapter 7, violence is interpreted as the exhaustion, at least in urban centres, of the CNDD-FDD's input legitimacy, it could theoretically spur the elite to engage in an alternative legitimization strategy based on performance and impartiality. This seems however hardly possible. First, gaining output legitimacy is a long-term process, and challenges to Nkurunziza's rule call for short-term answers. Second, it is unclear whether the current crisis is altering the ruling elite's conception of its right to rule. Third, state effectiveness is possible if the elite can solve collective action problems. In Rwanda, the initial lack of legitimacy experienced by the RPF provided the basis for such collective action. In Burundi, such a powerful glue was absent, which explains the ruling elite's splits during the crisis. The political opposition is now also composed of Hutu ex-combatants from the CNDD-FDD who can also claim war credentials as a sources of legitimacy. In this context, resorting to violence is a more rational tool for the ruling elite to stay in power than engaging in the difficult and long process of building state effectiveness.

Can state effectiveness endure in Rwanda? In accordance with the framework presented, a first variable to consider is how the RPF's perception of its legitimacy (or lack thereof) will evolve. One of the main drivers of such an evolution is the generational renewal of the RPF leadership. The awareness of a legitimacy deficit was powerful among the historical RPF cadres who went through the genocide. Yet, this awareness is not automatic for the new generation that do not have a first-hand experience of the devastation and trauma of the genocide. Consequently, the need to build an effective state might be for them less pressing.

An additional obstacle lies paradoxically in what so far has made it possible: the quick, top down policy implementation. This prevents the Rwandan government to take into account information on the ground, undermining in the long run its capacity to design proper policies and identify failures. As the Rwandan economy and society are becoming more complex and differentiated, the lack of a feedback loop on how policies are implemented will increasingly make policy design and implementation challenging. Furthermore, quick, ambitious, top-down policy implementation creates substantial principal-agent problems, visible for example in the disincentives for officials to honestly report failure. A consequence is the practice of "cooking the books", which has expanded in Rwanda to the point of gaining its own word in Kinyarwanda *guteknica* or to "technicate." If these negative trends are not addressed, the risk

in the long run is that efforts to build an effective state become gradually irrelevant or replaced by mere window-dressing.

On the other hand, state effectiveness acquires inertia of its own. It can survive leadership turnovers provided that the practices underpinning state effectiveness become institutionalised enough. In addition, inertia is also supported by the fact that gains in legitimacy decrease the costs of policy implementation by increasing compliance. Furthermore, if attempts to foster a demand for performance among the population are successful, state effectiveness may become increasingly demand rather than supply-driven, and independent from who is in power.

Finally, this framework is helpful to assess the potential for future political instability in Rwanda by drawing attention to the merits and risks of the RPF legitimisation strategy. It is unclear whether the bet of the RPF to base legitimacy on performance can work. As already emphasised, performance does not automatically translate into legitimacy. No deterministic relation between the two can be assumed, especially when distrust towards the rulers is initially high. Furthermore, the strategy is inherently risky. It may increase the material expectation of the population more quickly than the ability of the regime to deliver performance. It also makes legitimacy extremely dependent on the constant delivery of performance, although a long enough record of performance enables a better resilience to challenges. A consequence is that a diversification of the sources of legitimacy is crucial in Rwanda, as it would have been for the CNDD-FDD in Burundi before the 2015 elections. Increasing input legitimacy, for example by gradually opening the political space, is essential not only to ensure the resilience of the Rwandan state but also to increase its capacity to deliver development by enhancing its responsiveness to evolving local needs and expectations.

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Appendix

List of interviews

Interviews have been anonymised except for the individuals that accepted for their name to be mentioned. A list with interviewees' name were provided to the examiners for verification before being destroyed. Interviews are chronologically and by country for a short trip in 2012 and for the main research fieldwork in 2013/2014 and then again for a follow-up trip in 2015. Interview entries on Rwanda are in white, on Burundi in light grey. "High official" refers to an interviewee with a director-level job (or above) in the bureaucracy. All quotes from interviews in French have been translated in English by the author. The list includes re-interviews as well.

N°	Interviewee description	Date	Country	Venue	Language
1	Foreign advisor in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)	05/04/2012	Rwanda	Kigali	English
2	Léonard Rugwabiza, Director General of National Development Planning and Research, MINECOFIN	18/04/2012	Rwanda	Kigali	English
3	Delanyo Dovlo, Country representative, WHO	19/01/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
4	Maternal Health Officer, WHO	29/01/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
5	Foreign advisor in the Ministry of Health	30/01/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
6	High official, Ministry of Local Government	04/02/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
7	National programme manager, UN agency	14/02/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
8	Official in the Ministry of Health	20/02/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
9	Fidèle Ngabo, Director of Maternal and Child Health, Ministry of Health	26/02/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
10	Gerald Gahima, former chief of staff in the Ministry of Civil service (1994-1996), former Prosecutor General (1999-2003)	11/03/2013	Rwanda	Skype	English
11	High official, Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB)	19/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
12	UNICEF official	19/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
13	WHO official	20/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
14	WHO official	26/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
15	High official, Ministry of Health	27/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
16	Country Director, INGO in the health sector	27/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
17	Official, Ministry of Agriculture	28/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
18	Researcher	30/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
19	Researcher	31/03/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
20	Official, health financing department, Ministry of Health	03/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
21	Official, health financing department, Ministry of Health	03/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
22	Foreign technical advisor, bilateral donor agency	03/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
23	Official, Ministry of Health	03/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
24	Official, health financing department, Ministry of Health	05/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French

25	UNICEF official	05/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
26	World Bank official	17/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
27	Foreign technical advisor, Ministry of Health	17/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
28	Official, Ministry of Local Government	17/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
29	Official, General Directorate of Local Government Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, MINALOC	17/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
30	Country programme officer, UN Agency	19/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
31	Advisor at the Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU), Office of the President	19/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
32	Official, General Directorate of Social Affairs And Community Development, Ministry of Local Government	19/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
33	Former official, Ministry of Health	21/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
34	National programme manager, UN agency	22/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
35	Official, Itorero Commission, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission	22/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
36	Programme coordinator, bilateral donor agency	23/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
37	Official, Ministry of Health	23/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
38	Official, Rwanda Governance Board (RGB)	23/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
39	Director General, Rwandan Parliament	26/04/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
40	Head of maternity department in a hospital	03/05/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
41	Official in charge of Performance Based Financing (PBF) in a hospital	10/05/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
42	Director, Rwandan NGO working in the health sector	13/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
43	High official, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	15/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
44	Official, Ministry of Health	22/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
45	Family planning/maternal health specialist, INGO	23/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
46	Foreign advisor, Ministry of Agriculture	24/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
47	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	25/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
48	Official, African Development Bank	25/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
49	Official, Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat	27/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
50	Official, Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat	28/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
51	High official, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	28/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
52	Official, Rwanda Agriculture Board	29/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
53	Official, Ministry of Health	29/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
54	Foreign advisor in the agricultural sector	30/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
55	Official, Rwanda Agriculture Board	30/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
56	Official, General Directorate of Social Affairs And Community Development, Ministry of Local Government	30/05/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
57	INGO worker	01/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
58	Programme coordinator in the agricultural sector, bilateral donor agency	04/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
59	INGO worker	05/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
60	INGO country director	06/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
61	Policy analyst, Prime Minister's Office	06/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
62	Official, Ministry of Health	07/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
63	Agriculture extension officer, Outside Kigali	10/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
64	Agriculture extension officer	11/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside	French

				Kigali	
65	INGO worker	11/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	English
66	Vice-mayor in charge of economic development	12/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
67	Director of Planning in a District	12/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
68	District mayor	12/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
69	District vice-mayor in charge of social affairs	12/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
70	Sector executive secretary	12/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
71	Sector agronomist	13/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
72	District Health Director	13/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
73	District monitoring and evaluation officer	13/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
74	Official, General Directorate of Planning and Monitoring & Evaluation, Ministry of Health	13/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
75	Sector official	13/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
76	Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) focal person, Rwanda Agriculture Board	15/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
77	District vice mayor in charge of economic development	17/06/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	English
78	Official, Ministry of Health	19/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
79	Official in the Government Action Coordination Unit (GACU), Prime Minister's Office	20/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
80	INGO worker in the health sector	20/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
81	Agriculture programme manager, bilateral donor agency	24/06/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
82	District agronomist	01/08/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
83	Agriculture extension officer working outside Kigali	08/08/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
84	Vice-mayor in charge of social affairs	08/08/2013	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
85	Former minister and RPF senior member	10/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
86	Tito Rutaremwa, Senator, Former RPF General Secretary (1987-1993) and former Ombudsman (2003-2012)	10/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
87	Official, fertiliser programme, Ministry of Agriculture	11/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
88	Technical assistant in the health sector, bilateral aid cooperation	11/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
89	Foreign advisor, Ministry of Agriculture	12/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
90	Project director, international organisation in the agricultural sector	13/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
91	Former foreign advisor, Ministry of Health	13/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
92	Former prefect (<i>préfet</i>)	16/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
93	High official, Ministry of Local Government	18/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
94	Protais Musoni, former Minister of Local Government (2005-2009), former Minister of Cabinet Affairs (2009-2013)	18/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
95	High official, Ministry of Public Service and Labour	19/09/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
96	INGO worker in the health sector	02/11/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
97	High official, Ministry of Local Government	12/11/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	English
98	Former minister and RPF senior member	18/12/2013	Rwanda	Kigali	French
99	Official, Rwanda Agriculture Board	07/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French

100	Official, Rwanda Agriculture Board	08/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
101	Senior advisor, Rwandan NGO	08/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
102	Programme officer, multilateral donor agency	09/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
103	Former official, Ministry of Health	09/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
104	INGO worker	11/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
105	Head of maternity department in a hospital, Outside Kigali	13/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
106	Project director in a public international organisation in the agriculture sector	14/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
107	Jean Damascène Ntawukuriyayo, former President of the Senate (2010-2014) and former Minister of Health (2004 - 2008)	14/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
108	Former official in the fertiliser programme, Ministry of Agriculture	15/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
109	Former high official in the Ministry of Agriculture	16/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
110	Official, Ministry of Health	16/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
111	Official, Ministry of Health	16/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
112	High official, Rwanda Agriculture Board	17/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
113	Agriculture extension officer	17/01/2014	Rwanda	Outside Kigali	French
114	Project Manager, bilateral aid agency	23/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
115	Obadiah Obiraro, Auditor General	27/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
116	Former civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	28/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
117	Official, bilateral donor agency	29/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
118	Official, multilateral donor agency	30/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
119	Foreign advisor in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	30/01/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
120	Angelina Muganza, Executive Secretary, Public Sector Commission	03/02/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
121	Official, fertiliser programme Ministry of Agriculture	08/02/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	English
122	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	09/02/2014	Rwanda	Kigali	French
123	Official, Ministry of Health	27/02/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
124	High official, Ministry of Health	27/02/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
125	Country director, INGO in the health sector	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
126	Coordinator of a project in the health sector in multi-lateral organisation	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
127	Coordinator of a project in the agricultural sector of a bi-lateral aid agency	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
128	Coordinator of a project in the agricultural sector of a bi-lateral aid agency	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
129	National project manager, multilateral agency in the agricultural sector	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
130	Official, Bureau of Strategic Studies and Development (BESD), Office of the President	30/04/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
131	Researcher, INGO in the health sector	01/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
132	Technical assistant in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	01/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
133	Country director, INGO in the health sector	02/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	English
134	Official, bi-lateral aid agency in the health sector	02/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	English
135	Technical assistant in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	02/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
136	Director of Health, Hygiene and Sanitation Promotion, Ministry of Health	03/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French

137	Country Director, INGO in the health sector	03/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
138	Journalist	12/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
139	Former fertiliser importer	24/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
140	Former INGO worker in the agriculture sector	24/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
141	Official in a public international organisation in the agriculture sector	24/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
142	Technical assistant in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	25/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
143	Consultant for the agriculture sector, UN agency	25/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
144	High official, Ministry of Health	26/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
145	Programme manager in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	27/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
146	Fertiliser importer	30/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
147	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	31/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
148	President of a NGO in the governance sector	31/07/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
149	Fertiliser importer	01/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
150	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	01/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
151	Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture	01/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
152	Technical assistant, WHO	02/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
153	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	02/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
154	Technical assistant in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	02/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
155	Foreign consultant, Ministry of Agriculture	02/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
156	Foreign consultant, Ministry of Agriculture	05/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
157	Fertiliser importer	05/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
158	Technical advisor, bi-lateral aid agency	05/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
159	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	06/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
160	Former Director General in charge of Agriculture extension in the Ministry of Agriculture	19/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
161	Advisors to the Minister of Agriculture	20/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
162	Burundian advisor to a bi-lateral aid agency	20/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
163	Former Director of a Société Régionale de Développement (SRD)	21/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
164	High official, Ministry of Public Service	21/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
165	Diplomat, embassy in Burundi of a European country	23/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
166	Advisor to the Minister of Agriculture	27/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
167	Member of the Regulation Council of the Public Procurement Authority	27/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
168	Executive Secretary, Burundian NGO in the governance sector	30/08/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
169	Country director, multilateral aid project	06/09/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
170	External consultant in a public international organisation in the agriculture sector	31/10/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
171	Burundian advisor to a bi-lateral aid agency	08/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
172	External consultant for in a public international organisation in the agriculture sector	09/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
173	High official, Ministry of Communal Development	12/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
174	High official working on aid coordination project, EU representation in Burundi	14/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
175	Official working on aid coordination project, EU representation in Burundi	15/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French

176	Official, EU representation in Burundi	15/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
177	Former director of the National University of Burundi	18/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
178	Hospital director, Bujumbura	22/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
179	Official, UN agency in the health sector	22/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
180	Programme coordinator in the agricultural sector, bilateral donor agency	22/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
181	Diplomat, embassy of a European country in Burundi	22/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
182	High official, multi-lateral agency	22/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
183	Programme manager in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	23/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
184	Official of the local governments' association (ABELO)	25/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
185	Medical coordinator, INGO working in the health sector	26/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
186	Foreign advisor in the Ministry of Health	27/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
187	Officer in a multi-lateral agency and former minister of health	27/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
188	High official, Ministry of Health	28/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
189	Programme manager in the health sector, UN agency	28/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
190	Diplomat, embassy of a European country in Burundi	29/11/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
191	Former high court judge	02/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
192	Market specialist, Burundian farmer association	02/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
193	Deputy representative, UN agency	03/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
194	High official, National Programme for Reproductive Health (PNSR), Ministry of Health	03/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
195	Former high official, Ministry of Health	05/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
196	Fertiliser importer	05/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
197	Sylvester Ntibantunganya, former President of the Republic of Burundi (1994-1996)	09/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
198	Official in a public international organisation in the agriculture sector	11/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
199	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	11/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
200	Technical assistant in the agriculture sector, bi-lateral aid organisation	11/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
201	High official in a Burundian Ministry and former active CNDD-FDD member in the diaspora	11/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
202	Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, former Minister of Interior, former CNDD-FDD member	12/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
203	Professor, National University of Burundi	14/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
204	President of a farmer association	17/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
205	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	17/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
206	Journalist	17/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
207	Former province governor (FRODEBU party)	17/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
208	Province governor	17/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
209	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	18/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
210	Commune administrator	18/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
211	Simon Ntamwana, Archbishop of Burundi	18/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
212	Official, Ministry of Agriculture, working on agricultural input	19/12/2013	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French

213	Official, Ministry of Agriculture, working on agricultural input	21/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
214	Official, National Programme for Reproductive Health (PNSR), Ministry of Health	30/12/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
215	Hospital director (outside Bujumbura)	06/02/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
216	Head of maternity ward in a hospital outside Bujumbura	07/02/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
217	Director of a programme in the health sector, bi-lateral aid agency	13/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
218	Former top figure in the CNDD-FDD	14/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
219	High official, Ministry of Health	17/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
220	Country director, INGO in the health sector	18/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
221	Former CNDD-FDD combatant	19/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
222	Programme coordinator in the agricultural sector, bilateral donor agency	21/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
223	Technical advisor in the agricultural sector, bilateral donor agency	25/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
224	Provincial health director (directeur de province sanitaire)	25/02/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
225	Health district director (directeur de district sanitaire)	25/02/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
226	High official, National Fund for Communal Investment (FONIC)	25/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
227	Journalist	28/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
228	Official, Ministry of Health	04/03/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
229	Former hill chief (chef collinaire)	05/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
230	Director of a Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Livestock (DPAE), Ministry of Agriculture	06/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
231	Journalist	07/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
232	Programme advisor, UN agency in the health sector	12/03/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
233	Fertiliser importer	13/03/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
234	High official, Ministry of Agriculture	17/03/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
235	Executive secretary of a health district	18/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
236	Maternity ward staff in a hospital outside Bujumbura	18/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
237	Administrator of a hospital outside Bujumbura	18/03/2014	Burundi	Outside Bujumbura	French
238	Governance officer, bi-lateral aid agency	03/05/2013	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
239	Hospital director (in Bujumbura)	27/02/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
240	Official, bi-lateral aid agency	08/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
241	Tito Rutaremara, senator, former RPF General Secretary and former Ombudsman	12/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
242	Official in the governance sector, bi-lateral aid agency	13/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
243	Economist, World Bank	14/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
244	Ex-Director General of the National Tender Board	15/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
245	Official, bi-lateral aid agency	15/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
246	Official, General Directorate of Planning and Monitoring & Evaluation, Ministry of Health	16/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
247	High official, Rwandan Public Procurement Agency (RPPA)	19/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
248	Advisor, Ministry of Local Government	20/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
249	Managing Director, consulting company	20/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English

250	High official, Ministry of Health	20/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
251	INGO country director	22/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
252	High official, Rwandan Public Procurement Agency (RPPA)	22/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
253	Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo, former Minister of Health (2004 - 2008)	22/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
254	Project coordinator, INGO	24/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
255	Managing director, construction company	26/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
256	Official, General Directorate of Planning and Monitoring & Evaluation, Ministry of Health	27/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
257	HR Manager, governmental agency	27/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
258	MP, member of the Public Account Committee (PAC)	28/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
259	Executive secretary, Rwandan NGO working on governance	28/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
260	Policy analyst – National Development Planning & Research Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	28/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
261	Joseph Karameros, former Minister of Health (1994-1998)	28/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
262	Country Director, bi-lateral aid agency	29/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
263	Former Minister of Health	29/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
264	Foreign advisor in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	30/01/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
265	General manager, construction company	10/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
266	Angelina Muganza, Executive Secretary, Public Sector Commission	11/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
267	High official, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	11/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
268	High official, Office of the Ombudsman	12/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
269	Official in the Government Coordination Unit (GACU), Prime Minister's Office	13/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
270	Official, Office of the Auditor General	17/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
271	Former director of the National Tender Board	18/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
272	Former director general of the Ministry of Health	19/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
273	Vincent Biruta, Former Minister of Health (1997-1999)	19/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
274	Former Director of health district (outside Kigali)	19/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
275	Protais Musoni, former Minister of Local Government (2005-2009), former Minister of Cabinet Affairs (2009-2013)	20/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
276	Former country director, bi-lateral aid agency	26/02/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
277	Journalist	01/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
278	Former Auditor General	02/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
279	Official, Ministry of Agriculture	03/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
280	Léonard Rugwabiza, Director General of National Development Planning and Research, MINECOFIN	03/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
281	Journalist	04/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
282	Former Auditor General	06/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
283	Project director, international organisation in the agricultural sector	11/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
284	Former civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
285	High official, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	12/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
286	Investigator, Office of the Ombudsman	13/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
287	Foreign specialist on public procurement	13/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English

288	High official, Office of the Ombudsman	17/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
289	Obadiah Obiraro, Auditor General	18/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
290	Programme director, bi-lateral aid agency	20/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali (Skype)	English
291	Former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health	23/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
292	High official, Ministry of Public Service and Labour	26/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	English
293	Director, Rwandan NGO working on violence prevention and reconciliation	29/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
294	Hospital director and former member of the the Presidential Advisory Committee	30/03/2015	Rwanda	Kigali	French
295	Economic journalist	02/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
296	High official, Ministry of Health	03/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
297	Former researcher for a INGO	03/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
298	Student	03/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
299	Former CNDD-FDD combatant	03/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
300	President of a local NGO working on governance	04/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
301	President of a local NGO working on governance	04/02/2015	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
302	Former researcher for a INGO	13/12/2014	Burundi	Bujumbura	French
303	Pia Schneider, former ABT associate consultant working on CBHI, World Bank official	17/07/2015	UK	London (Skype)	English
304	Foreign consultant in health financing	28/07/2015	UK	London (Skype)	French