A HOME AWAY FROM HOME
The Drivers Behind Croatian Diaspora Mobilisation

Anita E. Brkanić

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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Abstract

The aim of this study is to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics and motivations behind the mobilisation of diasporas. What shapes diaspora mobilisation? And when they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of diaspora efforts? How is diaspora mobilisation shaped through human agency? The study will look at the Croatian diaspora in North America which, with a long history of active involvement in the politics of its homeland, brings forth a compelling case for the study of diaspora mobilisation. Are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora mobilisation? Are there complementary, but potentially more covert, driving factors behind it?

Other studies have identified homeland conflict as important for diaspora mobilisation, but have not shown yet in depth how framing processes work in the presence of charismatic leadership and their framing strategies. Aiming at filling this gap in the literature, this study provides a complementary argument to conflict–based arguments; it focuses on the role of collective action frames (CAF) used by goal–seeking elites in diaspora mobilisation and brings out the effects of agency. It states that while conflict provides important opportunities to mobilise, agents play a crucial role in framing and reframing these opportunities to advance their political goals. This thesis is the first one to give an in depth discussion of specific framing mechanism and how they interconnect with charismatic leadership.

By employing the frame analysis approach this study intends to link the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies. In doing so, it will make use of the framing literature in relation to social
movement processes that it tries to illuminate. The study identifies effective framing processes, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational, as crucial for understanding the character, the course and the outcome of diaspora mobilisation and its consequent political influence.

The study aims to expand framing theory by contributing to our understanding of how leaders motivate and mobilise resources, generate and identify opportunities, frame issues, plan and develop strategies, recruit support and create change. Human agency has been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity and this study is a response to the growing demand for the examination of the numerous ways in which leaders generate social change and create the conditions for the agency of others.

However favourable the ‘breeding ground’ presented by the opportunity structure, it only provides potential actors with options. It is ultimately always the parties themselves who must make the best of them. This study shall therefore focus on the leader in charge of the framing processes and his characteristics as one of the key factors explaining his success. In doing so, the study will address an existing gap in the framing literature and divert attention to the role of Franjo Tuđman, the first President of independent Croatia, in constructing diaspora collective action frames. In placing the focus on the leader, the study does not intend to minimise the role of other explanatory factors, e.g. effective resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures (POS), the right configuration of which is essential for the framing processes to be effective. Instead, when addressing these elements of diaspora mobilisation, the study does so through the lens of leadership.
Abbreviations

AAASS: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies

AIC: American Initiative for Croatia

AMCA: Canadian Association of Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities

BiH: Bosnia and Herzegovina

CAA: Croatian American Association

CAF: Collective Action Frames

CCU: Croatian Catholic Union

CFU: Croatian Fraternal Union

CROWN: Croatian World Network

CSAC: Croatian Schools of America and Canada

CWA: Croatian Worldwide Association

EU: European Union

HDZ: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)

HDZ BIH: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

HNO: Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National Resistance)

HNS: Hrvatska Narodna Stranka (Croatian People’s Party)
HNV: Hrvatsko Narodno Vijeće (Croatian National Council)

HRT: Hrvatska Radio–Televizija (Croatian Radio Television)

HSP: Hrvatska Stranka Prava (Croatian Party of Rights)

HSS: Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka (Croatian Peasant Party)

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IRA: Individual Retirement Account

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KNOJ: Korpus Narodne Obrambe Jugoslavije (People’s Defence Corps of Yugoslavia)

NDH: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia), established in parts of Axis–occupied Yugoslavia

NFCA: National Federation of Croatian Americans

OSCE: Organisation for Co–operation and Security in Europe

POS: Political Opportunity Structures

SDP: Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske (Social Democratic Party of Croatia)

SFRY: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SKH–SDP: League of Communists of Croatia–Party of Democratic Reform

SMO: Social Movement Organisation

SMTs: Social Movement Theorists

UDBA: Uprava Državne Bezbednosti (State Security Administration)
USA/US: United States of America

VOA: Voice of America
Figure 1 Ethnic Distribution in the Balkans

Ethnic groups that constitute the largest percentage of the population are shown as the background colour. Minorities that constitute one-fourth or more of the population are shown with diagonal cross-hatching in their respective colours.

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Acknowledgements

My original interest in the subject of diasporas was triggered two decades ago during a trip to the Croatian island of Korčula where, to my bemusement, one local family used Australian dollars in their everyday conversations, including when discussing the value of their family house. It turned out most of their extended family lived overseas, many of them in Australia. They mystically referred to them as ‘in the Diaspora’. Captivated by their example, I immersed myself in the world of diasporas, hoping to demystify some of that experience, but failed to envisage that one day I too will find myself ‘in the Diaspora’, longing for my homeland – multiple homelands, in my case.

The completion of this doctoral thesis was a long and, at times, testing ride. It was also a truly rewarding process and it is now a wonderful feeling to be writing these words of acknowledgment, particularly so as I am writing them from the most remote destination Croatian emigrants ever set foot on – New Zealand.

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CHAPTER I: Introduction

*From the economic and political point of view, emigration presents a loss for the future development of Croatian life and should it continue in its present direction and numbers it will bring about the suicide of our nation.*

These were the words of warning published by a Croatian newspaper at the turn of the 19th century. The harsh reality that marked that period in Croatia could not have produced any milder choice of words. However, rather than ending with a “suicide of the nation”, the 20th century ended on a slightly less destructive note. Although it concluded with a decade heavily marred by conflict and violence, it also ended the centuries-long struggle for Croatian statehood. The descendants of those who left Croatia at the turn of the century, through their financial and political networks of influence, heavily contributed to what has been referred to in the Croatian Diaspora as the “rebirth of the nation”.

This is a study of the Croatian Diaspora, which with a long history of active involvement in the politics of its homeland, brings forth a compelling case for the study of diaspora mobilisation. Croatia has played an important role in all forms of emigration flows in almost all periods of the last few centuries. It is often stressed that Croatia had the

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N.B. I use the APA style consistently for my references. In consultation with the APA editor, I use footnotes for all my references. When referring to specific page numbers of a publication, these are inserted in brackets as in the example above to avoid in-text referencing.

3 In this study, ‘Diaspora’ is used to refer to the Croatian Diaspora, while ‘diaspora’ is used to refer to diasporas in general.

4 Interview with a member of the Croatian Diaspora conducted for the purposes of this study.

greatest emigration rate in the world, after Ireland. Together with Ireland, Greece, and Israel, Croatia serves as a revealing example of the role that diasporas play in the process of struggle for a separate nation–state. The importance of the Croatian Diaspora is also marked by its size, and it was the scale of its potential that enticed political leaders into embarking on a diaspora project. According to a number of demographic estimates, more than one third of Croatians live abroad – the majority of them having settled in North America. The total population of Croatia is not more than 4.29 million (90.4 per cent of whom identify themselves as Croatian), with estimates of more than three million living abroad. The majority of Croatian emigrants live in the United States of America (US). In 2012, there were 419,647 American citizens of Croatian ancestry living in the US as per the revised 2010 United States Census (compared to 544,270 in 1990). Due to frequent enumeration mistakes, missing records, and transcription or indexing errors, the number is likely to be much higher, with some demographic analysts estimating a figure of over two million people of Croatian descent in the US alone. In Canada, there were approximately 114,880

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6 ibid
Canadians of Croatian descent as reported in the 2011 National Household Survey.\textsuperscript{14} This is not to claim that all people of Croatian descent living outside of Croatia are members of the Croatian Diaspora. As we shall see, one of the concerns arising from definitional inconsistencies among scholars, and also governments and diaspora organisations, are the irreconcilable statistical differences regarding diaspora membership.

Transnational engagement of these communities has played an important political role in the creation of independent Croatia – their engagement significantly helped the electoral campaign of Franjo Tuđman, the late founder and first president of the Republic of Croatia\textsuperscript{15} Both the conception and the formation of the new Croatian state have involved Croats operating from within the Croatian Diaspora in North America and, as we shall see, they proved instrumental in bringing that idea to life. For their efforts, they were awarded an unparalleled position of privilege, including unique voting rights and leading political positions.

For more than a century there have been ‘two Croatias’ – one in the Balkans, now a part of the European Union (EU), for a long time trapped between the East and the West, battling regional tensions and struggling against foreign domination – and one developing outside the borders of Croatia. In spite of the initial animus revertendi of these migrants, most of them never returned home. Without denying the ever–present


links between the two entities, we can say that the relationship between the Diaspora and its homeland has always been complex and a rather eclectic one. Diasporas in general commonly undergo important structural changes and, as emphasised by Sheffer, often modify their previous assimilationist, integrationist, or acculturationist tendencies. The Croatian Diaspora members today openly and proudly maintain their ethno–national identity, belong to a number of diasporic organisations, and do not hesitate to act publicly on behalf of their home country. Most Croatian commentators agree that Diaspora identity was shaped by the Croatian historical narrative, focusing on a shared history of the Croatian people and occupancy of a common state, but always emphasising the tradition of statehood that Croatia ostensibly enjoyed throughout its history. Nonetheless, there are examples of competing notions of national identity that existed both in Croatia proper and in the Diaspora. We will see in later chapters how the notion of Croatian statehood was re–emphasised by Franjo Tuđman in the 1990s, who in his well–structured and carefully designed speeches stressed that Croats shared a ‘centuries–old dream’ of statehood, a claim that resonated throughout the decade. Carefully thought–out interpretations of Croatian identity served to stabilise the relationships between different members of the Diaspora, but also between the Diaspora and its homeland. These were articulated to a wide audience at home and abroad by Tuđman and his political supporters in the 1990s. What Croats experienced as two separate, internally fragmented entities, were merged into one Croatian nation, now including Croats in both the Diaspora and in Croatia proper. This unifying discourse, as

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we shall see, aimed to rise above national cleavages, legitimise political programmes in Croatia and serve as a mobilisation tool abroad. This led to an unprecedented Diaspora support for its homeland and a relationship built on networks of political, financial, humanitarian and cultural influence.

The purpose of this introduction is not to provide a comprehensive history of Croatia and its Diaspora, nor to explain the intricate political environment in the Balkans and offer reasons for the military conflict in former Yugoslavia. Instead, the following pages will first briefly present key debates in the field of Diaspora Studies and address the growing definitional and conceptual inconsistencies attached to the term ‘diaspora’. The chapter will then present a focused history of the Croatian Diaspora meant to serve as contextual information for arguments presented later in the thesis, and also explain the use of the term in the Croatian context. The last section will briefly introduce the research problem and outline the structure of the thesis.

**Diaspora: The Conceptual Debate**

*Debate in the Field of Diaspora Studies*

*An unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative terms now jostle and converse in an effort to characterise the contact zones of nations, cultures and regions.*

We have witnessed a rapid increase in interest in diasporas since the late 1980s. Brubaker\(^\text{19}\) counts 'diaspora' and its cognates as keywords only once or twice a year in dissertations from the 1970s, about 13 times a year in the late 1980s, and nearly 130 times in 2001 alone. Brubaker also points out that 'diaspora' explosion is not limited to


academic writing, evidenced by a million google hits in 2005. A few years ago this number reached 50 million. Today it is around 130 million.

One of the battles fought within the field of Diaspora Studies, still a relatively new field, is the conceptual debate of the term that finds its roots in Greek and is based on a translation of the Hebrew word galut. Based on speiro (to sow) and the preposition dia (over), in Ancient Greek, the term referred to migration and colonisation. In Hebrew, the word originally referred to “the setting of colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile” and has assumed a more general meaning to refer to people settled away from their original homelands. The difficulty lies in determining diaspora membership. Definitions range from broader concepts such as ‘imagined communities’ and ‘categories of practice’, to narrow checklists. Today we talk about ‘cultural diasporas’, of ‘fear Diasporas’, and ‘virtual diasporas’. Francophone and Anglophone communities and other linguistic groups: Buddhist, Catholic, Muslim and other religious communities are also often labelled as diasporas. Immigrants,

expatriates, émigrés, refugees, overseas communities, ethnic communities, and guest workers are all diasporas – or are they? Within academia, the term is now used throughout the humanities and social sciences, but the dispersion is even more striking outside academia, in media and popular culture where adjectives, verbs and other diaspora-derived nouns have been created, further dispersing the term both semantically and conceptually.

The relatively scarce use of the term before the late 1970s, as Shuval points out, was because before the 1960s, immigrant groups were generally expected to gradually lose their ethnic identity and assimilate to norms of the host country. Immigrant groups that were thought incapable of this were not admitted, e.g. non–Whites to Australia. With assimilation theory and other theories based on the integration model during the 1970s revealing their shortcomings, we start seeing an increase in the use of the term ‘diaspora’ referring to migrants with a strong sense of ethnic identity. With Sheffer, Shepperson, Cohen and Armstrong, discussions of diasporas moved beyond the paradigmatic case, the Jewish Diaspora, to include other cases. In doing so, they continued to engage the Jewish experience and that of other 'classical' diasporas,

Armenian and Greek. Although still present in discussions by Safran in 1991 and Clifford in 1994, references to the Jewish case have gradually decreased.

Armstrong’s “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas” was a first attempt at theorising diaspora, followed by Gabriel Sheffer in 1986 arguing for a separation of the concept of diaspora from the Jewish experience, as it defines just as accurately the experience of Assyrians, Phenicians and Nabatheans as well as some later European diasporas. With that in view, Sheffer describes three main criteria vital for any definition of a diaspora: a preserved collective identity, a distinct internal structure to that of both the host and homeland, and real or symbolic links with the home country. Less than a decade later, Sheffer introduced the political dimension of diasporas and a distinction between stateless and state–based diasporas. Cohen’s typology, based on rich empirical observations, made a distinction between labour, imperial, trade, and cultural diasporas.

The 1990s saw the development of a number of diaspora typologies. Safran suggests diaspora could be considered as a ‘metaphoric designation’ that could refer to various populations including expatriates or political refugees. In his essays, Safran narrowly

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38 ibid
defines diasporas as ‘expatriate minority communities’ while Alain Medam’s\textsuperscript{42} typology, taking into account the degree of diaspora cohesiveness and dynamism, differentiates between ‘crystallised diasporas’ and ‘fluid diasporas.’ Michel Bruneau’s\textsuperscript{43} typology, on the other hand, is based on the degree of organisation, differentiating between the entrepreneurial diasporas, the religious diasporas, and the political diasporas.

With the appearance of the notions of transnational space and transnational communities, notably with the work produced by Basch, Glick–Schiller and Szanton Blanc,\textsuperscript{44} diasporas are redefined as ‘nation unbound’ that ‘reinscribe’ space in a new way. The difficulty of distinguishing diaspora and transnational communities was confirmed in the works of Robin Cohen,\textsuperscript{45} Nicholas Van Hear,\textsuperscript{46} and Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof,\textsuperscript{47} who acknowledge that despite the important contributions of the last 10 years, the theorisation of the transnational experience, with its links to globalisation, remains incomplete.

In view of the diverse and often conflicting uses of the term ‘diaspora’, the discussion in this study will be limited to the definition offered by Sheffer,\textsuperscript{48} which identifies diasporas as 1) ethno–national social and political formations, that 2) emerged out of


either voluntary or forced migration and are now permanently settled as minorities in one or several host countries. They 3) maintain links with their homelands and other diasporants residing in other host countries and 4) show solidarity with their group and their entire nation. These diasporas 5) organise and are active in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. Members of ethno–national diasporas also 6) establish trans–state networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host countries, their homelands, and international actors.

**Diaspora: The Croatian Debate**

Diaspora is not simply a theoretical concept or heuristic tool, but rather a meaningful category of self–representation and political discourse, not just for diaspora Croats but also for those homeland Croats who have inhabited that space and been drawn into diaspora spheres of influence – symbolic, political or otherwise. ⁴⁹

Even when the term ‘diaspora’ is appropriate, the fact that it is used to describe largely dissimilar concepts can render it vacuous. For the purpose of this study, the term ‘diaspora’ is used to refer to people of Croatian origin living outside the Republic of Croatia, including those settled overseas (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Latin America) and Croatian immigrants in other European countries (Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary, etc.) and their descendants, with the focus being on Croats living in North America. A common denominator shared by these groups of immigrants, apart from their Croatian background, is an active engagement in activities between their home and host country. Members of the Croatian Diaspora not only mark their ethnic origin as Croatian but have a strong sense of Croatian identity that is visible in areas of their everyday life. It is evident in their preservation of Croatian language and traditions.

⁴⁹ Winland, D. N. (2007). We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
and/or via educational, political or cultural ties with Croatia. Many of them manage to maintain a strong dual identity – being a well-integrated and active member of both the host society and the Croatian Diaspora, thus embodying the concepts of multiplicity, transformation, and development.

The difference between dissidents, political, and other emigrants was frequently blurred by the communist regime in Yugoslavia. Although ‘co–ethnics’, Croatian emigrants have traditionally been deeply divided between themselves. Before the 1990s conflict, the Diaspora was heavily fragmented along both generational and political lines. It included third generation Croats who, because of assimilationist and integrationist efforts of their ancestors, had weak and irregular links with their homeland. The second generation Croats represented the relatively small number of radical activists involved in military operations and extremist activities. The first generation Croats consisted mainly of those that fled Yugoslavia after 1945, some of whom were still politically active. Organisations representing Croats overseas mirrored the fragmentation of their political views. The oldest and largest Croatian organisation in North America, in existence since 1894, the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), maintained its apolitical position and its good relations with Belgrade during Yugoslavia. A later organisation, the Croatian National Council, which included political emigrants from the 1970s, functioned as a representative body of Croatian emigrant groups and operated from 1974 to the nation's independence in 1991, avoiding violence. A distinctly anti–Yugoslav and more radical Croatian National Resistance (HNO), with its links to the Ustaše movement, sought to establish an independent Croatia during its time in Yugoslavia. The Croatian Academy

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50 Sadkovich, J. J. (2010). 

Tuđman – Prva politička biografija [First political biography]. Zagreb: Večernji list

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of America, on the other hand, with its lectures on the subjects of Croatia’s history, literature and culture, and its *Journal of Croatian Studies*, encourages open debate and discussion\(^5\). A number of Diaspora organisations operate under the umbrella of the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA), with objectives focused on the protection of human rights, the inviolability of borders of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the promotion of cooperation between Croatia and the US.\(^6\) In its mission statement NFCA also promises to protect Croatia when unfairly attacked, a topic explored in more detail in Chapter VI, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’.

At home, Diaspora discourse was inconsistent prior to the 1990s, dominated by categories of at least four different types of emigrants, all labelled by different synonyms of the term ‘diaspora’. Political emigrants were usually referred to as ‘Croatia in exile’ (‘Iseljena Hrvatska’). During communism, the ‘gastarbeiter’ (German for ‘guest workers’, referring to Croatian citizens working in mainly Austria and Germany) were also described as ‘our citizens temporarily employed abroad’, although the temporary nature of their stay was disputable, to say the least. Many of them settled abroad permanently, significantly reducing the number and the duration of their visits to Croatia. Terms such as ‘our emigrants’ and ‘our people abroad’ were also used but equally failed to clearly and thoroughly define the concept. The Croatian World Congress today uses terms such as ‘Croatia outside the homeland’ interchangeably with the term ‘diaspora’. Chapter VI analyses post–Yugoslavian Diaspora–related debates and elaborates on the current homeland–Diaspora relationship, addressing unfavourable


portrayals of Diaspora Croats at home that refer to them as hard–core nationalists, ‘political/economic opportunists’ or ‘high–minded idealists’ not able to escape the legacy of the past.53

There is a general consensus in the Diaspora Studies literature that over the span of its existence and as a reflection of events taking place in both home and host countries, a diaspora goes through a number of transformations, resulting in altered relationships with the homeland. My research on the Croatian Diaspora also confirms that the strength of the central force keeping the relationship between the homeland and the diaspora alive is constantly susceptible to change and is heavily dependent on both internal and external circumstances. The force that has kept Croatian emigrants close to their homeland since they left it behind has varied and shifted through time, with the early 1990s witnessing an immense increase in its presence. A similar argument can be applied to the term ‘diaspora’ itself and the inconsistency of its connotations in the Croatian political discourse through history. Its meaning, including the message that it was meant to convey, has evolved through and in the words of Franjo Tuđman, a former partisan turned Croatian nationalist and ‘unifier of everything Croatian’. He used it as a tool to bury the past and, as we shall see, create a sense of unity among Croats outside their homeland.

53Winland, D. N. (2007). We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
A Brief History of the Croatian Diaspora

What is happening to the Croatian nation today is not just emigration; this is decay, its disembowelment. Almost everyone runs away from here....54

Croatia has, at different times, existed as part of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Napoleonic French, Nazi German, and Yugoslav states; therefore, many of the immigrants arriving in other lands have been mistakenly recorded as Italian, Austrian, German, Yugoslav, or whatever else the immigration officers presumed them to be.55 North America was one of the most frequent destinations for Croatian emigrants. It is difficult to determine when the first Croatian emigrant arrived on the North American continent, but one of many legends says that Croatian sailors were among those on Columbus's historic voyage in 1492.56 The general consensus among historians is that the very first Croatians who left their homeland for the New World were from towns along the Adriatic Sea, predominantly from the city of Dubrovnik. In 1494 Dubrovnik signed a significant trade agreement with Spain, and as a result started sending ships on the new trading routes to American Spanish colonies. According to the archival records in Dubrovnik, the first emigrants left Dubrovnik for North America in 1526. In May 1783 a letter was sent from the Dubrovnik Senate to its diplomat in Paris, Francesco Favi, in which he was asked to visit the ministers of the American Colonies and

“exchange courtesies with them on our behalf, recommend our shipping and our Flag to them, and ask if access to their harbours would be open for our ships.”  

In his answer two months later, Favi explained that he had paid the visits, and that the Americans had replied that Dubrovnik ships were welcome in their ports. 

Works on Croatian Diaspora retell the story of Croatian sailors shipwrecked off Cape Hatteras in 1498 who, after settling down in the area, gradually assimilated with the Native Americans, the Croatan Indians. In 1593, an English expedition discovered a tree carving in what was at the time the Roanoke Colony. The tree had the inscription ‘Croatoan,’ which is recognised among American historians as an Algonquin Indian name. These and many other legends, however contested, have “contributed to the Croatian people's proclivity to look to the US as a traditional friend, ally and leader to this day.”

The first notable emigration of Croats occurred in the 15th and 16th centuries, at the beginning of the Ottoman occupation in today's Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, forcing people to settle in the neighbouring Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and small parts of Italy, Germany and Ukraine. There are still large Croat communities in Austria and Hungary today. The Illyrian Provinces, referring to the greater Croatian area at the time, were turned over to the Austro–Hungarian Empire from Napoleonic France in 1815. Adverse political circumstances forced a great number of Croats to migrate overseas, deserting mostly the regions of Dalmatia and

57 ibid  
58 ibid  
59 ibid  
Istria because of their close proximity to the Adriatic Sea. Harsh living conditions took over when in 1870 a bitter depression hit Croatia as a result of a serious crop disease, and also as a result of the industrial development calling for considerably fewer workers. Typically, under-employed young Croatian men were sent abroad to earn money in order to repay debts or pay for the family house. In the beginning, even during the period of mass immigration before World War I, only a small number of women emigrated with the men. However, in the post-war years, and during the economic crisis of the 1930s, the percentage of women emigrants grew considerably, reaching more than 40 per cent.

Croatian emigration gained significance in the 1880s when Croats begin joining the great migration wave in the first decades of the 19th century, starting from Central and Southern Europe. By 1880, the source of the migration was for the most part mainland Croatia with roughly 10,000 people emigrating between 1870 and 1880, and approximately 74,000 in the period between 1880 and 1890. Many of them went to overseas destinations, including North America, South America (particularly Chile and Argentina, with smaller communities in Bolivia and Peru), South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. In the 2011 Australian Census, of the total ancestry responses, 126,270 responses were towards Croatian ancestry. Many of them also settled after World War

61 ibid
62 ibid
63 ibid
II, with more than 20,000 Croatian refugees moving to Australia after 1950s, after previously living in the refugee camps in Europe, mainly Italy, Austria and Germany. The period stretching from the 1960s to 1973 marked the largest increase in Croatian immigration to Australia. 67

It is estimated that roughly half a million Croats immigrated to the US alone before World War I. Their reasons were mutually intertwined, caused by both political and economic factors as economic underdevelopment of Croatia at the time was directly linked to its political situation in the Austro–Hungarian monarchy. 68

Deprivation of political rights in the first Yugoslavian state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, created the first real political emigrants and only the American restrictive immigration policy slowed down the massive exodus that started before World War I. A large number of roughly half a million people left the Croatian lands prior to World War II. 69 According to the documentation of the Emigration Department in Zagreb for the period from January 1921 to the end of December 1939, a span of 19 years, some 195,937 persons emigrated overseas. If the number of those who moved to European countries (88,642) between 1927 and 1934 is added to the above figure, the total number of emigrants is about a quarter of a million. 70 Some of these people

emigrated overseas, but most of them stayed within Europe⁷¹. The majority of Croatian emigrants that went to Europe settled in Germany, Belgium and France. With a gradual decrease of emigration from the interwar Yugoslavia to overseas destinations, emigration to European countries increased.⁷² From 1946 until 1963/4 a large number of illegal emigrants, following the abolition of travel restrictions on labour migrants illegally crossed Yugoslav borders, mostly to Italy or Austria. The period after 1964 was marked by state-tolerated and even facilitated mass migration of workers known as “workers on temporary work abroad” (known also as Gastarbeiers). The most attractive destinations were Western European countries, especially the FR Germany.⁷³ Today, Croats, roughly 350,00 of them, form the 6th largest ethnic minority in Germany.⁷⁴

The journey of the Croatian Diaspora has been rocky from the start, with the period from 1941 to 1945, when the Croatian Government at the time was openly pro–German and pro–Italian, most likely having been the most difficult. The declaration of war in 1941 on the US by the government of Ante Pavelić in Zagreb, the head of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the World War II puppet state of Nazi Germany, further aggravated the already delicate political situation of the Diaspora, particularly that of Croatian–Americans. When the US entered World War II, all major Croatian organisations in the US firmly supported the American government in its decision to join

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⁷³ ibid
the war. The second larger emigration wave of Croats, this time largely for political reasons, took place immediately after the end of World War II. These political emigrants were either supporters of the Ustaša regime in NDH or those opposing the communist regime in the second Yugoslavia. Those who survived the Bleiburg massacre of 1945\textsuperscript{75} occupy the greatest majority of political immigrants in North America.\textsuperscript{76} Bleiburg continues to play an important role in Croatia’s collective memory and, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, was brought to the foreground again during the 1990s.

The second Yugoslavia, first called the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and proclaimed in 1943 by the Yugoslav Partisans’ resistance movement during World War II, was renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946, when a communist government was established. In 1963, it was renamed again to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)\textsuperscript{77}. The emigration policy of the second Yugoslavian state persistently drove Croats out of the country, thus “emptying entire regions, especially those where the Croatian element was most vital”\textsuperscript{78}. Nonetheless, the years after World War II saw a reduced and more dispersed emigration over time. For instance, approximately 45,000 Croats left Croatia for the US after 1945, typically to

\textsuperscript{75} The Bleiburg massacre (Bleiburg tragedy, or simply Bleiburg), named for the Carinthian border town of Bleiburg, is a term encompassing events that took place after the end of World War II in Europe, when tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians associated with the Axis fleeing Yugoslavia were repatriated to that country. Thousands were murdered or subjected to forced labor camps.


\textsuperscript{77} The start of the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s began the disintegration of SFRY following the secession of most of the country's constituent entities. The next (third) Yugoslavia, known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, existed until 2003, when it was renamed Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro declared independence in 2006.

break away from the Yugoslav regime. The political migration wave continued and significantly accelerated after mass political cleansings during 1971/72. The 1970s, characterised by a political movement in Croatia, the Croatian Spring, which called for greater rights for Croatia as well as democratic and economic reforms, brought hard times for Croats in the Diaspora where it was politically unpopular to be a Croat when Washington ignored the Croatian movement in Yugoslavia and supported the Belgrade regime.\footnote{Prpić, J. (1997). Hrvati u Americi [Croatians in America] (p. 358-361). Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika.} The United States Census of 1990 recorded 141,516 foreign–born Yugoslavs.\footnote{Barkan, E. R. (ed.). (2013). Immigrants in American History: Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.}

**Geographies of Interest**

The Croatian Fraternal Union, mentioned earlier, is the oldest, largest and most influential Croatian Diaspora organisation, with its membership traditionally strongest across the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, and the Canadian province of Ontario. In Croatian Diaspora’s recent history, major hubs have been located in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles and Toronto, Canada. This section will provide more information on diaspora Croats in Toronto, Canada, Cleveland, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the home office of the CFU, where the bulk of this study’s empirical data derives from.

In Ohio there are over 70,000 Croatian–Americans, roughly 10,000 of whom arrived in the US between 1945 and 1970. Cleveland itself has around 25,000 Croats, with around 500 diaspora organisations, making it one of the most famous Croatian Diaspora...
Around 200,000 Croatians live in Pittsburgh today, the headquarters of the CFU and the home of the Fraternalist (Zajedničar), the most influential Diaspora publication averaging 20 pages in both Croatian and English. Pittsburgh is also the home of many cultural societies, parishes, clubs and Croatian schools.

From humble beginnings and a membership of less than 300 in 1894, the CFU has grown into a modern organisation and one of the leading fraternal benefit societies. Today it has approximately 60,000 members worldwide and its assets in 120 years have grown from $43 to approaching $400 million. In 1994, the CFU celebrated its 100th anniversary and the office in Pittsburgh now includes libraries, an extensive museum, a classroom, an editorial department, a recording studio and office space for its executive boards and employees. It also publishes the Fraternalist.

The CFU survived the 1930s Great Depression and the turbulent years of the great wars, particularly the entry of the US into the war in 1917, when Croatians were seen as war aliens having arrived in the US from Austro–Hungary, an enemy nation at the time. In Canada, for example, Josip Marohnić, the President of the CFU, pled the case for a number of imprisoned Croatians, most of whom were subsequently released by the Canadian government. On July 16, 1941, another difficult year for diaspora Croats, the CFU sent a note to President Roosevelt “stressing that Croats are loyal citizens of the USA and were convinced that victory of the Allies will be the victory of the old country. They fully supported the politics of the USA and its Allies”.

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81 Prpić, Croatian Ethnic Institute.
83 ibid
Since its early days, the basic purpose of the CFU has been to provide members with life insurance programmes and annuity/individual retirement account (IRA) products. Other notable CFU activities include the CFU Scholarship Foundation, which has awarded 8,832 scholarship grants, totalling $2,880,355, to students since its inception in 1958. The CFU also has a strong sports promotion programme, with tournaments held at the national, regional and local levels in skiing, basketball, golf and bowling. CFU’s cultural activities focus on the promotion of Croatian national folklore, with both juniors and adults performing in over 30 ensembles at an annual festival held in a different city each time. Radio programmes operated by CFU members “can be heard, particularly on Saturdays and Sundays, in many cities in the US and Canada”. The CFU also takes great pride in working with the younger generations. In 1915 the CFU established the Junior Order Department, stating:

We should always keep in mind that by organizing our young generation we will make the Croatian national conscience enter the hearts of all young people and remain there, that we will protect our children, educate them and make them become the future members of the National Croatian Society. We who are older shall go one after the other, and it is our duty to take care of the descendants who will fill our ranks in the future and represent honourably our Croatian cause.

Currently there are 213 junior Nest lodges across Canada, the US and Croatia.

The period after World War I was characterised by a noticeable development in the social status of diaspora Croats and by an increased Americanisation of Croatian communities. Every Croatian community by now had its doctors, lawyers, teachers and business people. Croats in the US now lived in nicer homes and better

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84 ibid
85 ibid
neighbourhoods. During this period, many of them worked in business, education or politics, but thousands of them were still employed in steel mills and coal mines. The 45,000 people who arrived in the US after World War II differed significantly from those that emigrated earlier. They were mainly political immigrants. They were also better educated, many of them intellectuals and professionals. They adjusted relatively quickly to life on the new continent and integrated more easily. Many of them started off doing manual labour, but they quickly learned English and were able to move on to higher paid positions, continue their education at North American Universities, and work in their chosen fields. George (Jure) Prpić, a celebrated Croatian writer and the author of many works on the Croatian Diaspora, is one of many examples. They were able to, in a relatively short time, accumulate enough wealth to start their own businesses, buy cars and properties and, unlike their co–ethnics at home, ‘live the life of the west’. With their wealth, observes Prpić, “they enriched the everyday life of America”\textsuperscript{86}. But, more importantly, they were a vital resource in the 1990s, one that significantly contributed to the creation of independent Croatia.

From the end of World War II until 1975 approximately 65,000 Croats settled in Canada, with the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area having the highest concentration of Croatian Canadians. Roughly 35,000 Croatian Canadians have settled there. Similar to other regions, those who came from socialist Yugoslavia in the years immediately after World War II have always had a strong Croatian identity and maintained a community through churches and cultural associations. Before and during World War II, Western Herzegovina was the most prominent stronghold of radical Croatian nationalism where a

number of Franciscans also became notorious for being open supporters of the far–right regime. After World War II, they established communities in Chicago and also in Norval, a town on the Credit River, approximately 55 km west of Toronto. These functioned as epicentres of the far–right political activity. However, the community was very much divided between the supporters of Tito and those with links to the World War II fascist regime, but as many had relatives at home, their political activity was limited due to fears of retribution.

Many of these post 1945 migrants also settled in Cleveland, Ohio, where they re–joined earlier Croatian and Slovenian immigrants. Given that a lot of them fled from the communist regime, they were ardent anti–communists and often much more radical in their political views, regularly clashing with the earlier Croatian settlers. Having escaped from communism, they disliked being referred to as ‘immigrants’ and called themselves political refugees. In Cleveland, a similar political divide separated them from the supporters of Tito’s partisans, whom they referred to as communists. These newly arrived radicals were vocal in their support of Croatian independence, and were labelled as Ustaša or fascists by the earlier Croatian settlers. The early 1970s, the days of the Croatian Spring, triggered a new wave of political immigrants from Croatia. Thousands of people were drawn to North America by letters written by their Croatian relatives already settled in the US and Canada, promising jobs and high salaries. Cleveland was one of the examples, where an American Society for Croatian Migration was formed, tasked with supporting all newly arrived Croatians.

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Throughout the years, the Cleveland community was exceptionally active in commemorating Croatia’s past, the Bleiburg tragedy in particular. On 2 June 1960, for example, the Congressional Record reports on the commemoration held at the Statler–Hilton Hotel in Cleveland on 30 May 1960, celebrating Croatian victims of 1945. The report was followed by an article entitled “The Bleiburg Maribor Tragedy – Croatian Golgotha” written by Stephen W. Skertich, an American of Croatian origins. Earlier that year Cleveland Croats also celebrated Croatian Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac with similar celebrations, many triggered by the Cardinal’s death in 1960, also held in other Croatian communities in North America. After World War II Stepinac was found guilty by the Yugoslav authorities of a charge of high treason for his collaboration with the Ustaša regime and sentenced to 16 years in the notorious Lepoglava prison, a frequent home for unwanted political prisoners, including Franjo Tuđman. Five years later, he was released to house arrest and was appointed Cardinal in 1952. He was later declared a martyr and beatified by Pope John II in front of an audience of half a million Croatians. He was, and still is, frequently used as a symbol of Croatian national pride, including by President Tuđman.

According to Prpić, a prominent member of the Cleveland community, Tuđman was relatively unknown in the Diaspora at the time. This changed in the summer of 1966, when he first came to the North American continent, visiting Cleveland and other North American communities. He appeared at the right time, with the dialogue on Croatian

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reconciliation having begun. Six years later, he was imprisoned for participating in the Croatian Spring movement, which advocated Croatian independence, and again in 1981 for spreading national hatred, including by maintaining links with the members of the ‘fascist’ Croatian Diaspora. Following his release, he obtained a passport for the first time in 17 years and travelled to North America in 1987. By 1987 Tuđman was already well known in the Diaspora, both as a historian and a fighter for Croatian sovereignty. His articles and books were read in the Diaspora, including Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, translated into English by Meštrović. Still, when Tuđman first visited Canada in 1987 many were suspicious of his communist views. However, by the time he ran for president in 1990, “nationalism had superseded factionalism, and Canadian Croats say their money helped elect him”.

“But the fledgling Croatian Government got more than money from Canada; it got people”. Some of the most prominent figures included Defence Minister Šušak from Ottawa, Minister of Transport and Communications Ivica Mudrinić of Mississauga, Ante Beljo of Sudbury, who became a leader of Tuđman’s party, and Drago Hlad of Mississauga, who became an official in the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. It is this period between 1987, the beginning of Tuđman’s strong ties with the Diaspora, and

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95 Swardson, A. (1993, March 8). The Croats of Canada prove their hearts are in the homeland.
96 ibid
97 Swardson, A. (1993, March 8). The Croats of Canada prove their hearts are in the homeland.
1995, which marked the end of the Croatian Homeland War, that this study is focused on. More specifically, it focuses on how the Croatian Diaspora bridged the political divide and united during that period to support the homeland, with special attention paid to the drivers behind their mobilisation. But let us briefly examine some key events of the period, before delving deeper into the research problem.

“What is going to happen when Tito dies...?”
*Mohácsi Dezső, my grandfather*

The start of the Balkans conflict in the early 1990s started the disintegration of SFRY following the secession of most of the country's constituent entities. ‘Like Rome,’ as the saying goes, ‘it wasn’t built in a day.’ Indeed, the 10–year–long series of bitter ethnic conflicts that started in 1991 in the territory of former Yugoslavia have centuries–deep roots. The long–standing ethnic and religious tensions, buttressed by chronic political, economic and cultural crises, escalated into the bloodiest conflict on European soil since World War II. It will take generations to repair the damage caused by the fighting between mostly Serbs on one side and Croats, Bosnian and Albanians on the other; but also between Croats and Bosniaks\(^98\) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonians and Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. While some perpetrators were prosecuted at the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, reconciliation on the ground in many parts of former Yugoslavia is still far from achieved. Let us briefly go through some of the key events of the 199–1995 war in Croatia, as these will be referenced in later chapters.

*Key Events from 1990 to 1995: From Socialism to Independence*

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\(^98\)Bosnian Muslim
The year 1990 saw the first free, multi–party elections in Croatia since 1938, and the first such elections for the Croatian Parliament since 1913. The parliamentary elections in the then Socialist Republic of Croatia were held in April 1990, with the Croatian Democratic Union, known by its Croatian initials HDZ, winning 205 out of 356 seats, overthrowing the League of Communists of Croatia–Party of Democratic Reform (SKH–SDP) from power and ending more than four decades of communist rule in Croatia. The new Parliament convened for the first time on 30 May 1990, electing Franjo Tuđman as President. On 19 May 1991, Croatia held an independence referendum, with 93 per cent of voters opting in favour of independence. On 25 June 1991, Croatia declared its independence but was urged to introduce a three–month moratorium on the decision. Two months later, the war broke out with the Croatian Parliament severing all remaining ties with Yugoslavia in October 1991. Members of Croatia's Serb minority in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav National Army and the regime of Slobodan Milošević, the Yugoslav President the time, seized large areas of the country, with only two thirds of its territory remaining under Croatian control. Pro–Serb forces bombed Croatian cities, including Osijek, Zagreb and Dubrovnik, and destroying the town of Vukovar in the East of the country. By the end of 1991, more than a quarter of the country was under Serb occupation, with Croatian and other non–Serbs expelled from these areas. The January 1992 ceasefire left Croatia partitioned until 1995 when Croatia's army carried out two military operations: operation ‘Flash’ in spring, and operation ‘Storm’ in the summer of 1995, reconquering most Serb–held territory. In January 1992, Croatia gained diplomatic recognition from the members of the European Economic Community and subsequently the United Nations. The remaining occupied
areas of Croatia were restored in November 1995, with the process concluded in January 1998.99

**The 1990s and the Diaspora**

When Josip Broz Tito died in May 1980, the Croatian Diaspora saw it as the beginning of the end of Yugoslavian ‘brotherhood and unity’. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the Communist domination of Eastern and Southeast Europe marked the start of a new and very important period of the Croatian Diaspora’s history. Before the final dissolution of Yugoslavia and the initiation of the democratic processes in Croatia, most Croatian Diaspora organisations approved of separation from Yugoslavia. The deaths of two significant Diaspora leaders also symbolically marked the start of a new period of Croatian Diaspora’s history.100 These were Juraj Krnjević, one of the principal leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), wholly committed to achieving Croatian democracy and freedom, and Andrija Artuković, Croatian ultra–right–wing politician and Pavelić’s right–hand man during the Nazi puppet state of Croatia. Artuković was an outspoken supporter of Croatian independence, later extradited by the US government to Yugoslavia. In May 1988, the Croatian National Congress, a North American umbrella association, openly demanded Croatian independence.

Following Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, organised Diaspora rallies urged the recognition of Croatia. In April 1992, approximately one year after Croatia declared independence, the US Government formally recognised the independence of Croatia, with President Bush establishing diplomatic relations with the newly formed

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Croatian state. The establishment of the Croatian state and its recognition by the US Government brought about changes in the presence of Croatian immigrants in North America. For the first time in their history, the long-awaited Croatian independence put an end to their existence as a nation without a state. Diaspora members interviewed for the purposes of this study observed that Diaspora Croats “no longer felt as orphans”. The centuries-long drive for statehood had finally materialised and, as emphasised by the Croatian Heritage Foundation\(^\text{101}\), the Diaspora was finally given the chance to lay emphasis on their national identity, Croatian language, history and culture.

The early 1990s ended Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity but they also marked the beginning of a new era for Croatia and its Diaspora. The Croatian struggle for independence was highly internalised by the Diaspora from the start and paved the way for an unprecedented political movement, the most widespread and powerful in the history of its existence. It was Tuđman who on many occasions identified his party as a national movement, rather than simply a political party. He owed the success of his party to the Diaspora, a debt he repaid. Following the 1995 parliamentary elections, 12 diaspora Croats, from Canada, Ohio (two from Cleveland and one from Eastlake), and other parts of the world became prominent figures in the new Croatian Parliament.

\(^{101}\)The mission of the Croatian Heritage Foundation, based in Zagreb, Croatia, is to preserve and develop Croatian cultural identity, the Croatian language and the customs of Croatians living outside their country of origin. The Foundation supports cultural and social activities that contribute to affirming the Croatian name around the world.
Research Problem and Thesis Structure

Research Problem

The Croatian Diaspora is a compelling example of strong diaspora networks and their influence on homeland affairs. The importance of these networks is growing globally. However, aside from a few notable exceptions, within the study of Diaspora Politics the context in which transnational diaspora mobilisation operates is paid very little attention. What drives diaspora mobilisation? What shapes it? Diaspora mobilisation is defined as bringing the diaspora resources together, organising them and preparing the diaspora for action. The focus here is on how the diaspora is galvanised to participate in homeland affairs, through their political activity as well as direct and indirect influence, through voting, campaigning, financing, and lobbying.

Many studies identify conflict as a key mobilising force and point to a large number of conflict–generated diasporas, with their identities closely linked to military conflict at home. These diasporas are often characterised as maintaining important symbolic ties to the homeland and harbour traumatic memories, which they either experienced first–hand or from afar, strongly empathising and identifying with their fellow co–ethnics at home and abroad. Indeed, the conflict of the 1990s was a powerful mobilising factor for the Croatian Diaspora across the globe. But is conflict the sine qua non for galvanising diaspora support? Are there other, complementary explanations? It is towards answering these questions that this study is directed.

Drawing on the Croatian example, this study will extend the frontiers of our understanding of the intricate diaspora–homeland relationship and provide a framework for understanding the dynamics behind Diaspora mobilisation. Drawing on some recent
theoretical literature, the following chapter will introduce the research question in full and summarise the relevant research done to date. It will also present the reader with a hypothesis guiding this study, suggesting that collective action frames designed by homeland leaders play an important role in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora. The following chapters will then examine the role of Franjo Tudman and his supporters in galvanising Diaspora support. Through the lens of leadership, the study will employ a frame analysis approach and thus link the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies.

**Thesis Structure**

**CHAPTER II
Theoretical Framework and Research Design**

Drawing on some recent theoretical literature, this chapter will introduce the research question in full and summarise the relevant research done to date.

Overarching research question: *What shapes diaspora mobilisation?*

Complementary questions: *Are conflict-based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora mobilisation? Are there complementary, yet more covert, driving factors behind it? What is the role of human agency? When they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of diaspora efforts?*

To answer these questions, the study looks at the Croatian Diaspora in North America which, with a long history of active involvement in the politics of its homeland, brings forth a captivating case for the study of diaspora mobilisation. What were the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation? What roles are played by political leaders? Why/how did Tuđman and his party (HDZ) succeed in galvanising Diaspora support for their homeland?
This chapter will present the reader with the hypothesis guiding this study, suggesting that, in light of earlier studies that have identified homeland conflict as a key force behind diaspora network formation, conflict is not the only explanatory force behind a focused and sustained diaspora undertaking. The chapter presents a framework for understanding Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, suggesting that conflict has been instrumentalised by homeland leadership and that collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational), framed by political elites, play a key role in successful mobilisation of the Diaspora. The political elites, with their leadership skills, succeeded in using a particular feature of the conflict for effective CAF in mobilising the Diaspora. They made words their main tools in attracting receptive audiences at home and abroad and succeeded in implementing their ideas through the creation of diaspora CAF, a discourse which elevated a collective diaspora identity, and a promise of an independent Croatia, with which many identified. In linking the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies, the framework presents a novel way of conceptualising diaspora mobilisation. It also foregrounds the element of human agency, which has been neglected by previous studies. It highlights the central role that leaders play (Franjo Tuđman, the first President of independent Croatia) in the processes of framing.

**CHAPTER III**

**The Man behind the Frame: Tuđman’s Path to Power – from Prisoner to President**

Chapter III discusses characteristics of Franjo Tuđman, the first President of independent Croatia, as a leader and a politician. Given the context of a growing sense of crisis around the disintegration of Yugoslavia, his leadership is analysed through a Weberian lens of charismatic authority. The chapter looks at Tuđman’s specific traits
and experiences from his past that contributed to his ‘charismatic personality’, including his cultural and symbolic capital. Furthermore, the chapter explains the shifting trajectory of Tuđman and examines the conditions that led to his rise to power, including the changes in the Croatian political arena in the late 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the creation of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) led by Franjo Tuđman.

Human agency has been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity in social movements, hence the focus in this study on the role leaders play in generating social change and in creating the conditions for the agency of others. This chapter sets the scene for the analyses of what the literature calls collective action frames, focusing on Diaspora meta–frames and Tuđman as the main Diaspora frame–master.

CHAPTER IV
The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis: Interpreting Injustices and Naming Enemies

The focus of Chapter IV is to look at the first component of the framing process – the diagnosis. The goal of diagnostic framing is to identify, and appropriately frame a burning national issue as well as attribute blame. This chapter will look at the ‘national problem’ of the early 1990s Croatia, as identified by the framers, and show how they sought to identify the problem and attribute it to a specific source that was then transformed into an object of blame and/or responsibility. The chapter will analyse how the framers reduced a series of disparate social phenomena to a few principal themes. It will present findings obtained through discourse analysis of primary sources that identify central themes used by Tuđman in his diagnostic framing. In doing so, the chapter will identify three fundamental elements of the diagnostic framing process: the first being ‘problem diagnoses’, followed by the formation of ‘injustice frames’ and the closely
linked ‘adversarial’ or ‘boundary’ frames. The chapter examines how the frames promoted a particular ‘causal interpretation’ and ‘moral evaluation’, which then enabled the framers to suggest a suitable ‘treatment recommendation’\(^{102}\). The chapter will also look at how these were received in the Diaspora.

**CHAPTER V**  
**From Victim to Victory: Framing Solutions and Attracting Support**

Prognostic frames look at the problem and ask, “What can be done?” The main purpose of these frames is to offer solutions to collective problems identified through diagnostic frames. As we shall see, diagnostic frames, discussed in the previous Chapter, are very closely linked to prognostic frames, framing the ‘national problem’ in such a way that limits the number of appropriate, logical, solutions. Together with motivational frames, diagnostic and prognostic frames form collective action frames.

Chapter V will present the findings obtained through discourse analysis, which identified two central themes or preconditions necessary for achieving the proposed solution: national reconciliation and a unified Croatian Diaspora. These actions were framed as *sine qua non* for changing the *status quo*. They were also the ones most likely to resonate with Tuđman’s key sponsor – the Diaspora. This was important, as Croats abroad were a vital resource for bringing the proposed solution to reality. Frame resonance will also be discussed, including how some of Tuđman’s ideological visions were received and dropped, or adjusted, in comparison with other frames and in response to the audience (frame modification, i.e. the frames that did not resonate).

The chapter will also look at mobilising resources and structures, both formal and informal (Diaspora week and strong ties), used as tools to collect and transfer information and transform individual claims into group demands.

CHAPTER VI
Diaspora after Tudman

Chapter VI will discuss the modern–day Croatian Diaspora with an aim to examine how and why active Diaspora organisations continue to internalise and reproduce the ideas framed by Tudman in the 1990s. In doing so, the chapter will focus on the current status of the Diaspora and its disenchantment with the current political settlement. More specifically, the chapter will examine the controversies that accompany Croatian Diaspora electoral participation; namely, the unique voting rights that Croatian Diaspora enjoyed in the 1990s, the reasons behind that unparalleled position of privilege, and the ‘disenfranchisement’ that followed. The chapter will highlight main concerns coming from the Diaspora as well as those voiced by the Croatian Government. I will analyse how the modern–day Diaspora’s political activity in Croatia – as well as direct and indirect influence, through voting, campaigning, financing and lobbying – is still very much guided by the events of the 1990s. The discussion will be framed around justice and accountability in the context of Croatia’s path towards the EU, as some of the most notable activities organised by the Diaspora were around those themes. The final section will continue to focus on the recent history of the Croatian Diaspora in North America and discuss views of Croatian Diasporic communities after independence,
exploring major existential questions, including the question of return. Some of this content was published in Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans.\textsuperscript{103}

CHAPTER VII
Conclusions

In the final chapter, I summarise my findings, discuss their significance and identify policy implications and areas in need of further research.

CHAPTER II: Theoretical Framework and Research Design

Diasporas are not the only actors to “think locally and act globally” but a homeland-based secessionist elites do so as well.104

Diasporas and their political roles are growing in number, size and influence around the world. However, aside from a few notable exceptions105, the study of Diaspora Politics, specifically its mobilisation dimension, remains largely neglected in political science. Recently, diaspora mobilisation has gained increasing interest, particularly in studies of civil war and terrorism, but conditions, causal mechanisms and modes of diaspora mobilisation, particularly vis-a-vis emerging states, remain under-researched.106 Very little attention is paid to the strategies behind political mobilisation of diasporas and the causes and motivations behind their participation in the political life of their homelands.

What is the driving force of their political agendas? What shapes their mobilisation? What causes it? A plethora of studies look at homeland crisis, and conflict in particular,


105Ibid., also see

as a key force behind diaspora mobilisation and network formation and argue that some of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are those whose identities are linked to homeland conflict. But are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora mobilisation? Are there alternative or complementary explanations? Is it the conflict itself, or is it also the politics at home that strengthen networks abroad? Empirical material used in the study of these questions is drawn from the Croatian Diaspora in North America. The research problem is summarised below.

**Overarching question:** What shapes diaspora mobilisation?

- Are conflict–based arguments sufficient to explain diaspora mobilisation? Are there complementary, yet more covert, driving factors behind it?
- How is diaspora mobilisation shaped through human agency?
- When they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of diaspora efforts?

**Case study specific question:** What were the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation in the early 1990s and during the Croatian ‘Homeland War’?

- What roles were played by political leaders?
- Why/how did Tuđman and his party (HDZ) succeed in cementing and augmenting the mobilisation and political influence of the Croatian Diaspora in their homeland?

**Hypothesis:** While homeland conflict provides important opportunities to mobilise, agents play a crucial role in framing and reframing these opportunities to advance their political goals. Collective action frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational),
purposefully developed and communicated by home country leaders, play a crucial role in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora.

This study will extend the frontiers of our understanding of diaspora mobilisation and cross-border practices in light of the increasing visibility and growing significance of the phenomenon. This research will examine the phenomenon of diaspora mobilisation and the political and institutional influence of diasporas in the development of their home countries in times of war. Drawing on some recent theoretical literature, this study will provide a framework for understanding the dynamics and motivations behind the political activation and mobilisation of diasporas and examine how this process is triggered by homeland leaders’ efforts to galvanise diaspora action in order to advance their own political interests. Specifically, the aim of the study is to demonstrate how Croatian political elites made words their chief tools in spurring vigorous involvement of receptive audiences at home and abroad. The study will show how they achieved success in implementing their ideas locally, nationally and internationally by generating collective action frames and a discourse of a mystical elevation of a collective Diaspora identity, with which many identified. Success, used in reference to diaspora mobilisation, is defined here as effective strategies used by political elites in the home country, including their aides abroad, that enabled them to leverage the diaspora for the realisation of their own political goals.

The study of diasporas can greatly benefit from ideas developed in social movement theory. This study will argue that framing processes, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures, are crucial for understanding the nature, the underlying forces and the scope of diaspora mobilisation and its consequent political
influence. By employing the frame analysis approach this study intends to link the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies. In doing so, it will make use of the framing literature in relation to social movement processes that it tries to illuminate.\textsuperscript{107}

While focusing on diaspora mobilisation, this study also aims to address an existing gap in framing theory. Morris and Staggenborg argue that social movements theory would benefit greatly from additional research into how leaders generate social change as well as the conditions for the agency of other participants.\textsuperscript{108} In their analysis of leadership in social movements, they argue that human agency has been largely ignored by the recent weight put on opportunity structures. Morris and Staggenborg note that social structures alone:

> Cannot deliberate, imagine, strategize or engage in decision–making; human actors, navigating a matrix of social structures, initiate these activities. Strategic decisions feature prominently in determining movement outcomes, and social movement leaders are the primary decision–makers within social movements. Social movement leaders carry out a complex set of activities that are crucial to outcomes because, regardless of structural conditions, there exist a variety of choices to be made regarding these tasks.

Similarly, Ganz observes that, despite the deep roots of leadership in sociology, social movement scholars have, with few exceptions, eschewed the topic. He argues that a structural bias present in social movements studies seems to have made it more productive for scholars to focus on the constraining conditions that make certain outcomes more probably than to identify enabling conditions that make many outcomes


possible. He observes that agency is more about grasping at possibility than conforming to probability.\textsuperscript{109}

A number of other scholars have noted that leadership in social movements has yet to be adequately theorised (Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry\textsuperscript{110}; Barker, Johnson & Lavalette\textsuperscript{111}; Klandermans\textsuperscript{112}; Melucci\textsuperscript{113}; Morris\textsuperscript{114}; Zurcher & Snow\textsuperscript{115}, to name only a few). As vital as leadership is to understanding social movements, it is woefully undertheorised, De Cesare observes. We don’t understand fully how leaders rise, the ways in which they interact with one another, and how they influence the emergence, existence, and decline of movements.\textsuperscript{116} Jan Willem Stutje further observes that the study of leadership and its relevance to the study of social movements has not moved beyond generalisations. His work emphasizes that much of the writing on leadership and charisma focuses on specific traits associated with exceptional leaders, a practice that has widened the concept of charisma to such an extent that it loses its uniqueness – and therefore its

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utility. The contributors to Stutje’s volume reintroduce the debate on charismatic leadership from a historical perspective and seek to expand our understanding of the concept’s relevance to the study of social movements. Very few studies have focused on how leaders sustain a powerful symbiotic relationship with their followers, one that encourages devotion to the leader and shapes a real group identity.¹¹⁷

Similarly, the framing perspective, despite its important role in explaining social movements, also favours structural and organisational factors. The framing theory¹¹⁸ depicts social movement organisation (SMO) as the major actor in the framing process while neglecting the importance of leaders. The aim of the next chapter is to address this gap and divert attention to the central role that leaders play in the processes of framing. The focus will be on Franjo Tuđman, the first president of independent Croatia.

But let us first turn to the current debate in the field and address some of the key discussions relevant to this study’s field of enquiry. The next few pages will define in more detail how the concept of diaspora is employed in the project and highlight some of the more prominent elements of the diaspora debate. I will then address conflict as a potential driver of diaspora mobilisation before expanding this conflict–centred view.


Current Debate in the Field

Diaspora: Actors of Change

Who is and who is not part of a diaspora? The previous chapter provided an overview of existing diaspora definitions, ranging from broader concepts to narrow checklists. To remind the reader, the discussion in this study is limited to Sheffer’s definition of diasporas as ethno–national social and political formations, with the key focus being on their active effort to maintain links with their homelands and other diasporants residing in other host countries, in order to show solidarity with their group and their entire nation.

Diaspora Consciousness

Sheffer’s definition will be extended in this study to include the observation that diaspora formations are not completely homogeneous entities. They are also not static; they transform and evolve over time. This will become evident as different stages of the Croatian Diaspora framing process are analysed.

The diaspora debate has been largely based on the assumption that there is a natural and uncomplicated organic group of people without division or difference, dedicated to the same political interests”.119 This definition assumes a high level of ‘commonness’, with common group aims and objectives. Furthermore, it has been emphasised that the notion of a politicised ethnic identity prioritises homeland concerns120 and develops when diaspora members “perceive the socio–political landscape from the vantage point

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of the ethnic group”. For a group of people to be categorized as a diaspora, they need to be “willing to identify themselves at least partly with a common imagination of identity or difference from others”. However, mere membership of a diaspora does not presuppose the existence of this type of consciousness; an essentialist assumption is entirely unwarranted. As we will see in the Croatian case, diaspora consciousness is continuously susceptible to change, making diasporas neither homogeneous nor static entities. Over the span of its existence, a diaspora, with both its core and periphery members, goes through a number of transformations, resulting in an altered relationship with the homeland. To explore how the common diaspora imagination is shaped and disseminated, we need to look more closely at the driving force behind this process – the actors that play a key role in both the construction and reconstruction of diaspora consciousness, as well as in putting that consciousness into action. This is crucial in order to explore how diaspora mobilisation takes place and how it develops into a more vigorous political participation.

Diasporas and Transnational Engagement

Diaspora and transnationalism, often placed within the same theoretical frame, have come to occupy a position of increasing significance in national and global life. Cross-border linkages between diasporas and their homelands can carry substantial quantities of various resources – money, information, knowledge, political and diplomatic exchange. The question of separating the political from the non-political is complex, as many of these practices are political in nature and generally it is difficult to distinguish between different economic, religious or socio-cultural activities.

The new transnational connections brought about by globalisation have come to occupy a prominent role in the field. Previous research has revealed that most transnational and global communities have a potential to shape nation-states and local economies as well as global political, social and economic life.\textsuperscript{126} Recent empirical studies of diasporas put emphasis on NGOs and the civil society, economic associations, religious institutions, and political parties. Ulrich Beck observes that the most interesting questions surrounding globalisation involve processes through which “sovereign national states are criss–crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks”\textsuperscript{127}. This refers to the emergence of new actors in addition to nation states. These global institutional structures, such as large international


organisations, development organisations and NGOs, may play key roles in facilitating transnational political practices.  

Research on these transnational connections is on the rise as are, due to new forms of communication technology, the opportunities for the “de–localised and de–territorialized migrants of the Global Age” to be a part of transnational linkages between home and host countries. Kennedy observes that “locality is no longer the only or even the primary vehicle for sustaining a community. The subversion of physical locality and its re–constitution in a de–territorialized fashion is a task carried out by the migration of people and cultures across the borders”. However, the delocalisation of many diasporas does not suggest a loss of importance for territory. Diasporas continue to be predominantly defined and organised around ethnic or national 

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affiliations and maintain strong links to their home countries. The histories of these diaspora groups are strongly grounded in particular territories. Locality, although frequently experienced symbolically as an “imagined homeland or a place understood through nostalgia, memory, history or constructed cultural sites” has not lost significance in the diasporic sphere.

In some cases, as Lyons argues, transnational politics remains intensely territorial in its focus and goals even if deterritorialised in terms of actors. Many conflict–generated diaspora groups such as the Tamils, Irish, Armenians and Eritreans, conceptualise politics in territorial terms – the liberation of a symbolically important piece of specific land. Rather than attempting to create a deterritorialised transnational community, some diaspora groups preserve and intensify attachment to their identity’s territorial element even if they are physically detached or unlikely to visit or move to that territory. One of the key tasks of this study is to identify diaspora actors that influence or manipulate this process with the aim of stimulating diaspora mobilisation.

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In line with the more recent literature focusing on the role of ‘sending countries’ in constructing diaspora transnational networks of influence, this study puts focus on the seminal role homelands play in mobilising diasporas. Homeland interests are manifested through either ‘homeland policies’, the goal of the sending states being to encourage diasporants to return, or ‘global nation policies/diaspora policies’, where they are encouraged to “stay abroad but stay in touch”. The literature gives interesting examples of how political elites in the homelands tap into financial and political resources abroad. States with particularly high rates of emigration, (e.g., Philippines or Vietnam) instead of labelling them ‘traitors’, now honour their citizens abroad as ‘our heroes’ whose remittances, investment and various altruistic ventures are seen as vital for the economic development of their home countries. Others, such as Turkey and Mexico have even supported the naturalisation of their citizens abroad. ‘Alman ol, Turk Kal’ (Become German, remain Turkish) was among the slogans used by the Turkish government to urge the diaspora to integrate and become law–abiding citizens of their host countries, while retaining their Turkish identity.


The Drivers of Diaspora Mobilisation: Homeland Conflict

“Exile is the nursery of nationality”, Lord Acton observed as early as 1860\textsuperscript{144}. In some cases, these new realities allow for the expression and celebration of nationalist sentiments,\textsuperscript{145} making ‘long–distance nationalism’\textsuperscript{146} a significant force in today’s world. Examples of politically involved diasporas playing an active role in contemporary conflict are readily available. A range of political activities, from international lobbying, spreading propaganda, staging demonstrations, fundraising, overseas voting, party campaigning and diasporic representations in homeland governments, to recruiting fighters, supporting war efforts, and terrorism is evident among numerous diaspora groups\textsuperscript{147}. A number of recent studies focus on the role of diasporas in securing funding for homeland insurgencies. For instance, much of Eritrea’s military efforts in the recent war with Ethiopia were financed by an informal 2 per cent ‘tax’ levied through the Eritrean refugee diaspora.\textsuperscript{148} Similarly, it is estimated that at least 80 per cent of money spent by political parties in the 1990s Croatian elections came from the Croatian

Connections between diaspora fundraising and conflict have also been noted with regard to the Tamil diaspora (to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the Kurdish Workers Party, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The significant upsurge in strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the summer of 1998 was at least partly the result of the fundraising efforts by the Albanian diaspora. Other politically active diasporas are the Oromo, Eritreans, Jews, Armenians, Palestinians and Chechens, Algerians, Philippinos, Mexicans, and Columbians. Diasporas also play an important role in lobbying host governments for increased support for states engaged in conflict, as exemplified by the Croatian and Armenian efforts. The Croatian Diaspora, for instance, was successful in helping swing the international community behind the Croats in the 1990s conflict.

In an age when diasporas are playing an important role in transnational politics, why do some ethno–national groups participate in homeland politics more than others? And when they do get involved in homeland politics, what determines the success of their efforts? Despite its relevance, the question has been somewhat neglected by the available literature on Diaspora Politics. Shain and Barth categorize diaspora members...
as silent, core and passive\textsuperscript{156}, also defined by Shain as “rear guard” or “occasional recruits”\textsuperscript{157}, “indicating the level of homeland salience across communities but not attempting to account for it”\textsuperscript{158}. Gabriel Sheffer, in his attempt to formulate “a more comprehensive theory of current diasporism”\textsuperscript{159} makes an important distinction between stateless and state–linked diasporas. Robin Cohen observes that this categorisation immediately implies the possibility that stateless diasporas will become more politically active and “establish organisations to collect money and weapons to help armed struggle at home and mount campaigns for the recognition of irredentist states”\textsuperscript{160}. Sheffer emphasised that these migrants are highly mobilised into strong diaspora networks in part because their identities are linked to stateless and marginalised groups. These stateless diasporas are particularly prone to maintaining links with the homeland and are more likely to stay involved with homeland politics. As long as the fight for independence continues, the diasporants:

Will be particularly torn between memories of their homeland and wishes to recapture the past, and the need to comply with the norms of their host country. Tendencies to assimilate and integrate into the host society are counterbalanced by their strong sentiments for the homeland\textsuperscript{161}.

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Previous studies define conflict and trauma associated with the original dispersal as generators of “a vision and memory of a lost or an imagined homeland still to be established”. Lyons emphasises that “homeland conflict is often the touchstone of identity and diaspora social organisations often mobilise around providing support for actors engaged in the conflict back home”. Diasporas that are “born from a forced dispersion”, according to Chaliland, often “conscientiously strive to keep the memory of the past alive”. Lyons further observes that “some of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are groups whose identities are linked to stateless and marginalized groups”. Pnina Werbner shares this view, noting that these diasporas often “feel free to endorse and actively support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements.” Koinova lists the Albanian, Armenian, Bosnian, Chechen, Croat, Palestinian, Serb, Somali, and the Tamil diaspora as examples of this behaviour. Lyons also identifies the Oromo and (pre–1991) Eritreans from Ethiopia, the Kurds from Turkey in their continuous efforts to establish a Kurdish state, and the success of the Croatian Diaspora in playing a major role in establishing an independent Croatian state. Other diasporas motivated by conflict include the Iranian and Iraqi diaspora, as well as the Irish. These

166 Werbner, P. (2002). The place which is diaspora: Citizenship, religion, and gender in the making of chordic transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 (1) (see p. 120).
diasporas belong to the conflict–generated diaspora group whose identities put emphasis on their position as “national groups denied their rightful homeland”\textsuperscript{169}. Koinova stresses that conflict–generated diasporas “formed based on forced rather than voluntary migration are particularly prone to participating in domestic conflict due to a pervasive myth of return and attachment to territory”.\textsuperscript{170} Territorially defined homeland is often seen as playing a central role in conflict–generated diasporas making their homeland a “crucial place of emotional attachment”, and one that decisively defines their strategies of identification.\textsuperscript{171} “Without a state to champion their rights, they compensate with strong diaspora networks”.\textsuperscript{172}

A Complementary Argument to Conflict–Based Diaspora Mobilisation Explanations

As emphasised earlier, a number of studies have looked at homeland conflict as a key force behind diaspora network formation and argued that some of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are those whose identities are linked to conflict and statelessness. This study takes into consideration that certain periods of hardship in the home country, such as conflict, can bring into existence elevated feelings of anxiety or

\textsuperscript{169} ibid, p. 9.
concern among diaspora groups, which can in turn affect the level of their mobilisation. However, it is often the case that without a collective validation, reasoning, and confirmation to give these feelings direction, there will be no significant action, no substantial movement. In order for these feelings to develop into collective action, they need to be buttressed by a strategy that will give them greater value and meaning that then creates the ability to stimulate people into significant activity.

Fiona Adamson points out that “diasporas, ultimately, are political constituencies. As such, they are open to political mobilisation by a variety of actors, both state and non-state”\textsuperscript{173} The existence of diaspora networks scattered across the globe linking a diaspora with its homeland is a remarkable asset for the nation, making “long–distance nationalists an easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in [the] Heimat”.\textsuperscript{174} We witness successful diaspora mobilisations when homelands recognise this power of their diaspora as a unique and precious resource.

However, in order to mobilise, it is crucial that the people identify themselves with a common imagination of identity, as noted earlier, or difference from others\textsuperscript{175} This study follows Brubaker’s criticism of imagining bounded communities and shares his suggestion that one needs to focus on how this imagination is created, who is behind it and which purposes it fulfils. Rather than breaking down and analysing this shared identity, Brubaker suggests looking at practices and processes, in which these are


made.\textsuperscript{176} In the case of ‘diaspora’, he suggests conceptualising diaspora “not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as a stance, a claim”.\textsuperscript{177}

While recognising that the presence of war can be a powerful source of diaspora cohesion and unity, this study will provide a complementary view of diaspora mobilisation, claiming that homeland conflict on its own is important, but insufficient to generate a focused effort aimed at a common goal, and to sustain that effort. This study will examine forces of diaspora mobilisation enabled by framing processes on the part of goal–pursuing homeland elites and their supporters in the diaspora. Their framing strategies often used existing or previous conflicts as vehicles to reinforce, and also legitimise and justify diaspora support for the homeland. The war itself, without a narrative to accompany it, is not enough to supply the much–needed symbolic and emotional resources to sustain diaspora mobilisation.

The pages that follow outline how this study employs the frame analysis approach and bridges the literature on collective action frames and framing processes with the research done in Diaspora Studies. In doing so, it uses the pronounced proliferation of scholarship on framing literature in relation to diaspora mobilisation.\textsuperscript{178} The study argues that framing processes, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures, are central for understanding the character, course and success of diaspora mobilisation and its consequent political influence. The study also highlights the role


played by the leader (and his aids) as a primary decision maker and a ‘frame master’, addressed in the next chapter.

**From Framing to Engaging**

What determines the success of diaspora mobilisation? As shown in the previous section, earlier studies put emphasis on the role of homeland conflicts in activating diaspora involvement in the political sphere of the homeland. But is war the only mobilising factor, or are there other, more covert, driving factors behind it? Are the common ethnic matrix and common socio-economic interests alone, even when amplified by conflict, sufficient for effective and sustained diaspora mobilisation? The following sections examine the use of framing in ‘diaspora movement’ to show the extent to which effective framing techniques and successful mobilisation tactics advance the movement toward its stated goals. Diaspora participation in homeland politics will be explained from a framing perspective, involving diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tools used for the purposes of mobilisation.

Diasporas, like nations, are not only “imagined communities”\(^{179}\) but “phenomena of the masses”\(^{180}\) and therefore in order to fully understand the concept of the diaspora and its collective consciousness, we cannot disregard the discourse that was instrumental in producing this shared awareness, broadcast out to the masses by elites or parties. Ideology, an effective combination of interests and affective ties is a particular way of creating an identity for collective subjects, linking identity and interests. \(^{181}\) I will look at

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how, in order to define common interests, leaders engage in a process of redefining some key concepts.

In order to analyse the process where leaders generate new political significance of ethnic differentiae for the purposes of mobilisation, we have to look at the manner in which this was done; in this case the formation of external relationships, in the diaspora, using political ideologies and values.  

This will be analysed through the concept of the ‘frame’, a set of schematic collective assumptions and beliefs about a particular object or situation that gives meaning and motivation to collective action.  

The process of framing is a process of generating meaning – “either passively and unconsciously or actively and consciously”  

This study, illustrative of the power of cognitive frames, looks at the intentionally generated frames and their core framing tasks. By purposefully supplying emotional triggers, the political discourse and its rhetorical strategies can fuel mobilisation by stimulating altruism and self-sacrifice.  

People construe reality through a lens moulded by their personal history and their current social context; however, important players are also external actors such as leaders, elite groups and nationalist movements or parties. This study will demonstrate the role Diaspora movement actors play as signifying agents actively involved in the

creation and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists and observers. These actors are “deeply embroiled, along with the media, local government, and the state” in what has been referred to as “the politics of signification”. I will look at how the framing process, structured by the leaders, captures the truth from a particular perspective and presents a subjective ‘map’ of the circumstances at the time; how through their discourse the leaders generate a new reality, a mobilisation frame. The study will pay special attention to how this discourse provides the audience with of a sense of historical injustice or oppression, and how, through a uniform structure, it provides diasporants with motivation for political engagement.

The following pages will first explore the concept of the frame and collective action frames before delving into the different stages of the framing process and applying each of these to the study of diasporas.

**Diaspora Collective Action Frames**

The concept of frames goes back to Erving Goffman, who referred to them as “cognitive organisation of situations”. In Goffman’s view, daily, raw experience was understood through frames, which, for him, denoted ‘schemata of interpretation’. The role of the

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frame is to transform meaningless information into meaningful material, and thus enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” experience.\textsuperscript{192} These frames, Goffman argued, are key for successful construction of what he called ‘guided doings’.

Individuals constantly project around them interpretative frames that allow them to make sense of their reality. The shifting of a frame or its transformation to something else happens at a time when it no longer fits into the current context. The question to consider here is how political elites frame some of the key elements of the diaspora discourse in such a way as to encourage certain interpretations and discourage others. How do they succeed in monopolising the perception of a whole range of issues? How do they control the discussion within the diaspora in order to spur mobilisation and attract financial and political support?

One of the main mobilising factors is the language chosen by the framers to define the debate and, equally important, ensure that individual diasporants’ issues fit into the context of their dialogue. The language that frames the discussion also limits it by setting the vocabulary, metaphors and metonymies through which potential movement adherents can understand and debate the issue. This is often made possible through public discourse and persuasive communication during mobilisation campaigns. An important element in the construction of frames is also the consciousness–raising during episodes of collective action, such as participation at cultural and political events, speeches and public addresses. As we will see in later chapters, the language chosen by Tuđman and his aids developed into a new Croatian ‘diaspora lexicon’, carefully defining the debate at home and abroad.

The products of the framing activity are collective action frames. The focus of this study will be on the interpretive function of these frames; that is, how the concept of the diaspora was reframed and its role and status redefined in order to “mobilise potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilise antagonists”. The study will also put emphasis on the interactive character of the framing process in the context of diaspora such as negotiating shared meaning. Most importantly, the study will look at framers themselves and the role they play in the framing process.

The following pages are an overview of diaspora collective action frames, grouped according to their ‘core framing tasks’ – diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. These have two sets of characteristic features: they are action–oriented but also interactive, discursive processes, thus able to generate collective action frames.

**Framing the National Problem: The Diagnosis**

Studies of diagnostic framing have placed significant attention on ‘injustice frames’, as an important element of diagnosis. This study will explore how political parties and

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their representatives highlight the ‘victim’ aspect of the diaspora frame and how that is linked to already existing or previously used ‘victim’ references in relation to the nation. How are certain traumatic aspects of the nation’s history foregrounded by the framers? Which examples are used and why? What role do these events play in the lives of the Croatian Diaspora? Are injustices defined by the leaders as ‘twofold’? i.e. are they portrayed as imposed both on the people residing in the homeland and those settled overseas?

To what extent is the ‘injustice frame’ essential for the success of the framing of a particular diaspora? In the Croatian case, I will examine how these frames amplified the desire for a ‘centuries–old dream’ and introduced the ‘diaspora as an organic part of the nation’ sub–frame. The attribution component of diagnostic framing, i.e., identifying the source of blame and naming the culpable agents\(^{197}\) will also be examined as it can lead to what Gamson referred to as ‘adversarial framing’, an attribution process that

political elites and their parties engage in in an effort to delineate the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 198

I will look at injustice frames in Chapter IV but the focus will be on how leaders identify and frame a question of urgency, portraying it as intrinsically problematic, pointing at the same time to causes of this ‘national distress’ as well as those responsible for it. This particular framework has a high mobilisation potential because it clearly identifies ‘the Other’, ‘the Aggressor’, to which it “assigns the role of antagonists, thereby simplifying rejection of the status quo by personifying the causes of the nation’s ills”. 199 My analysis will highlight the role of the leader as a legitimate identifier of a ‘national problem’.

**Framing the Solution: The Prognosis**

Snow & Benford identify prognostic framing as one of the core framing tasks. When applied to the study of diaspora mobilisation, I will look at the role it played in providing the audience with a sense of direction. To what extent was the task of identifying a solution, together with articulating and disseminating that solution, act as a key enabler of diaspora mobilisation. In the Croatian case, I will examine the ‘centuries–long dream of Croatian statehood’ as a potential compelling prognosis, one that resonated across multiple generations of Diaspora Croats.

The plan to change the status quo generally includes suggesting an alternative method of successfully dealing with existing worries in the home country. I will look at the extent


to which this plan identified leading figures – political leaders, intellectuals and religious representatives from the homeland, but also leaders from within the Diaspora – as capable of putting that plan into action, and to what extent these Diaspora representatives acted as self-legitimated spokesmen of the whole collective Diaspora identity. The study will also look at possible evidence of “counterframing”\textsuperscript{200} i.e., the counter solutions offered by movement opponents and Diaspora communities with less radical views. Chapter V will look at how those counterframings were deflected and what tactics were used to ward them off relatively early on.

An important element of my analysis of the framing process is the one looking at the vocabulary used to justify ‘the big idea’ expressed through frames and introduce the element of agency.\textsuperscript{201} To do this, the study will focus on the language used by the diaspora entrepreneurs. Benford\textsuperscript{202} identifies four generic vocabularies of motive: vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety. These provide followers of the movement with “compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and for sustaining their participation”\textsuperscript{203}. The analyses of the Croatian Diaspora activists, elites, politicians and significant others’ speeches, interviews, slogans and statements will be examined to see whether there is evidence that points to the existence of the four previously identified vocabularies, and whether Benford’s list lacks any important

\textsuperscript{200} Benford, (1987, p. 75; as cited in Benford & Snow, 2000).


components. Later chapters will look at a vocabulary of particular salience in the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, one which we can define as the ‘perceived justness of the cause’, referring to the feeling of duty and a sense of obligation to do what is perceived as right. This vocabulary will be further analysed in Chapter IV, ‘The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis: Interpreting Injustices and Naming Enemies’.

This motivational framework provides a repertoire of stimuli that encourages diaspora mobilisation, facilitating its early stages, its increase, and development, continually provoking interest, enthusiasm, and excitement among its supporters. I will examine the extent to which this framework relied on the power of emotion, and the role it played in the sustainability of the framing strategy. Later chapters will look at to what extent the embellished internal Diaspora homogeneity, despite its diverse composition, increased the effectiveness of the framing strategy and enabled the achievement of its desired results.

Gerhards and Rucht\(^{204}\) hypothesise that the larger the range of problems covered by the frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be drawn into the process of mobilisation. This direct correspondence of the number of issues encompassed by the frame to the mobilisation capacity of it is relevant in the process of diaspora mobilisation as well. The master frame, broad in scope with magnet–like attributes, functions “as a kind of master algorithm that colours and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements”\(^{205}\). The flexibility of the Croatian Diaspora master frame

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will be examined to assess whether it had the capacity to include a wide range of related problems.

**Diaspora Frame Resonance**

The frame is successful for two different reasons: for its verisimilitude and its pertinence. Snow and Benford refer to this as resonance.\(^{206}\) For frames to be “culturally resonant to their historical milieu”,\(^ {207}\) they have to have a high degree of credibility as well as logical and precise relevance to potential followers’ lives. I will examine the credibility of the frame creators, Franjo Tuđman and his party, to see what role the credibility of the leader plays in defining the degree of credibility of the frame. Chapter III will take a closer look at Tuđman’s credibility as the guardian of Croatian values, which goes back to the Croatian Spring in the 1970s and later in 1981 when he was imprisoned for clashing with the Communist elites. This chapter will also examine how Tuđman’s brand of nationalism, pushing for Croatian statehood and independence, particularly appealed to the Croatian Diaspora, many of whom became instrumental in funding his party. The following chapter will also look at how Tuđman engaged in the so–called ‘credentialing process’\(^ {208}\) during his visits to the Diaspora.

Chapter IV and V will look at to what extent Tuđman’s frames were examples of pertinence. The ‘Homeland War’ will be analysed as the key leitmotif as well as the underlying blame that was assigned to ‘the Aggressor’. Chapter V will look at political


and personal salience and how it led to Diaspora political engagement. Tuđman’s discourse will also be analysed to uncover additional motivational elements, such as ‘the justness of the cause’ principle.

Existing literature in Diasporas Studies observes that periods of hardship in the homeland can cause immigrants to form new diasporic formations or join existing ones. As they become inspired to be a part of the complex diaspora reality, certain individuals shift from one category to another, from migrants to diasporants, and start voicing their views in the political arena. Homeland conflict shakes and rearranges all previously established diaspora strategies, tactics and types of organisation, with a potential to unify split, ‘dormant’, and dispersed entities. However, the following chapters will look at the covert factors that, alongside homeland conflict, can lead to Diaspora mobilisation. Specifically, I will examine how the collective Diaspora identity, as framed by the nationalist elites, was put into effect and stimulated action in the name of the Diaspora and the nation at the time of a conflict.

Frames also need to show cultural resonance. The framing discourse needs to achieve resonance with a pre–existing narrative of popular beliefs concerning a nation’s ethnicity, such as common ancestry, history, culture, and association with a particular territory. To what extent did the concepts covered by the frames resonate with the Diaspora’s cultural chronicle and its ‘myths’? Fisher refers to this narrative accuracy as ‘narrative fidelity’: its objective being to shape and often simplify intricate

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values, histories, and political objectives, forming a mobilisation toolkit. Chapters IV and V will look at Tuđman’s discourse to determine how effectively it uses factual, moral and aesthetic framing devices through prognostic, diagnostic and motivational interpretations: key for the success of political mobilisation.

**How the Frame is Developed**

A number of works highlight the importance of a series of actions that need to take place for a frame to emerge\(^{212}\). The framing literature defines these processes as discursive and strategic processes.

**The Diaspora Discourse**

**The Role of Homeland Conflict in the Discourse**

The echoes of the war were deafening in early 1990s Croatia. Any dialogue not mentioning the war could easily go unnoticed; therefore, it could not have been ignored by the Diaspora collective action framers. Chapter IV will examine how the ‘Homeland War’ was used by the framers to magnify its resonance. How did the framers further amplify the gravity of its effects? How did they frame the discourse of war to use it as a mobilising force? The chapter will examine the discourse used to invariably accentuate


the ongoing devastation. It will look at how the conflict became a recurring point of discussion throughout the 1990s – the repercussions of war and its destructions, both physical and emotional. Furthermore, focusing on previous Croatian Diaspora injustices, I will examine how the framing discourse was used to *connote, prompt and allude* all at the same time, examining how references to the war – referring to other injustices in the past – provided a “conceptual handle or peg for linking together various events and issues”.

To what extent did various issues and events, relevant to either past or present Diaspora experience, when coupled together function “much like synecdoches, bringing into sharp relief and symbolising the larger frame or movement of which it is a part?”

For example, did HDZ’s slogans that appeared during the campaign function as frame amplifiers? How did promises of sovereignty and independence help equate the Croatian nation with the HDZ?

**Diaspora Identity in the Discourse**

Diasporas are typically fragmented entities, divided not only by generations, background, and the reasons behind their emigration, but politically as well. It is the political divide that is much harder to bridge. By focusing the discourse on the common aspects of the diaspora, framing strategies can overpass those differences. Hunt et al. have noted that “not only do framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically but they proffer, buttress, and embellish identities that range from collaborative to conflictual.”

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discourse, but the following chapters will further look at the shift in discourse that occurred on the eve of the 20th century. More specifically, I will look at how the HDZ constructed a collective Diaspora identity by referring to the Diaspora as a single unit, and, more importantly, as an organic part of the Croatian nation. How did the Diaspora framing process facilitate the alignment of personal and collective identities and thus the amplification of personal identity of mobilised Croatian Diaspora members? The study will look at how, because of the deliberate and well thought-out discourse by the political elites, mainly HDZ and its supporters in the Diaspora, the concept of the Croatian Diaspora underwent a deliberate process of expansion, resulting in a significant change in its conceptual domain. This will be examined as one of the key elements of the collective action framing process, constructed for the purposes of Croatian Diaspora mobilisation.

The following chapters will further explore to what extent the Diaspora identity dialogue, steered by the elites, resulted in something we can refer to as ‘embroidered identity’ – a collective Diaspora identity, a common ‘we’ that gave Diaspora direction and succeeded in bridging the most dividing differences. This collective identity is ‘embroidered’ as it carries a set of embellished and slightly moulded meanings, values, and traditions; i.e., cultural narratives, or what Swidler216 referred to as a ‘tool kit’, an abundant source of new cultural ingredients. Snow & Benford refer to it as a “cultural resource base (...) as well as the lens through which framings are interpreted and

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evaluated”217, leading to a conclusion that movements are “both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings”.218 Tarrow notes that new meanings are “woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibres into collective action frames”.219 I will examine how political elites crafted a new meaning of Diaspora by rekindling a hyperbolised myth of national pride, ideologies, and practices, highlighting particular details to make the narrative more compelling. The study will look at how the HDZ created a new concept out of old ideas and by painting a new pattern on an old fabric, practically embroidering its initials onto the Diaspora sphere. As we shall see, this was later embodied in one of HDZ’s most famous slogans, “Naturally, HDZ!” (“HDZ zna se!”), or “HDZ, it is so!”220

Walsh et al.221 note that “early framing of protest ideology to appeal to wider publics may be more important factors in determining the outcome of grass–roots protests (...) [than] static variables such as a host community’s socioeconomic status, its degree of organisation, its level of discontent (...) and the proposed facility’s size”. Was the Croatian Diaspora framing strategy constructed in a way to appeal to a wide public – to


the Diaspora as a whole, both “strangers and friends”? This question will also be included in my analysis of Diaspora collective action frames.

**The Strategy behind the Frame**

The study will examine how the Diaspora frame was developed with a specific purpose in mind, aimed at activating the somewhat inert members of the Diaspora, and further mobilising the already active members of the community. The analyses of Diaspora mobilisation on behalf of homeland leaders will be focused on their efforts to influence Diaspora financial and electoral contributions, e.g. Diaspora as a source of financial resources and a source of political power, including how their mobilisation techniques were structured, what they promised and whom they targeted.

The framing literature refers to the framing strategy as a ‘frame alignment process’ and identifies four basic types of alignments: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. The Croatian case will be analysed to see how a strategy aimed at revitalisation and amplification of a nation’s ‘true’ values and beliefs proved effective in not only mobilising potential beneficiaries but also ‘conscience constituents’. Snow et al. observe that, in their strategies, frame designers rely even more heavily on the ‘frame transformation’ approach whereby concepts are rethought and given new defining characteristics. Furthermore, frame transformation becomes necessary when the already existing frames “may not resonate with, and on occasion

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may even appear antithetical to conventional lifestyles or rituals and interpretative frames”. Apart from some notable exceptions, this alignment approach has not received much attention in movement studies. In view of this, I will examine the Croatian Diaspora collective action frames to uncover potential examples of frame transformation.

**Diaspora and Context**

The existing literature on framing points out three major factors that, by either constraining or facilitating, affect framing processes: political opportunity structures, cultural opportunities and constraints, and the targeted audiences. The next chapter will look at the political opportunity structures, identified as changes in the configuration of political opportunities, especially shifts in the institutional structures or informal relations within a political system. These will be incorporated into a wider analysis focused on Franjo Tuđman, the leader of Diaspora mobilisation, which aims to highlight the importance of the leader alongside political opportunity structures and cultural opportunities and constraints.

There is a plethora of definitions of political opportunity. Meyer highlights that used by Tarrow: “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics”. Political

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227 e.g. White (1999), who conducted a participant observation study of frame transformation of sexual assault within African American community in the US.


opportunity structures are rarely clear and unambiguous structural entities and are open to debate and subject to interpretation.\textsuperscript{230} In fact, “framing of political opportunity is (...) [a] central component of collection action frames”.\textsuperscript{231} They suggest that collective action frames imply the presence of an opportunity, thus making people “potential agents of their own history (...) [and] making their opportunity frame a self–fulfilling prophecy”.\textsuperscript{232} Others also suggest that the role of political opportunity structures in affecting the outcome of the movement is heavily dependent on how they are framed by movement actors.\textsuperscript{233}

When political opportunity is on the rise, as it was in 1990 Croatia, the existing political system is receptive and vulnerable to change. This weakness is the result of a combination of factors, mainly influenced by the growth of political pluralism and elite cleavages and disunity. Political leaders, if resourceful enough, can take advantage of those political opportunities. In the Croatian context, it would have been difficult for HDZ to take full advantage of the political opportunities in the 1990s, and achieve the success it did, without the help of the Croatian Diaspora. This opportunity to create change illustrates the self–fulfilling aspect of political opportunity structures ‘publicised’

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by movement actors. Did Croatian Diaspora involvement, bringing with it much-needed financial resources, create part of that opportunity?

**Research Design**

**Research Strategy**

This research is explanatory by nature and focuses on *why* questions. Answering the *why* questions inevitably involves developing causal explanations between the dependent variable (diaspora mobilisation) and the independent or explanatory variable (diaspora discourse, as a result of framing processes). The study will also look at other possible mechanisms that connect the presumed cause to the presumed effects (intervening variables). The objective of the study is to explain why diasporas mobilise: to discover “under what conditions (and through what paths)”\(^{234}\) a successful mobilisation of a Diaspora occurs. The Croatian Diaspora is used as a case study to explain the drivers and outcomes of the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation. It does so by employing the frame analysis approach and linking the literature of collective action frames with the research done in Diaspora Studies. This research objective is a theory-building objective and fits under the disciplined configurative case study model;\(^{235}\) it uses an established theory (framing theory) to explain a case.

**Why Croatian Diaspora?**

Apart from its political, financial, cultural, humanitarian and military contributions, the importance of the Croatian Diaspora is marked by its size. The presence of the

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\(^{235}\) ibid
phenomena of interest, diaspora mobilisation and the unique status of the Croatian Diaspora, makes this study an ideal testing ground for my hypothesis and an interesting arena for exploring the drivers behind diaspora mobilisation. The Croatian case will provide the strongest possible inferences on theory as it represents a case where the variables are at extreme values and the causal mechanisms are unambiguously evident.

The Croatian Diaspora was critical to the unfolding of events in Croatia during the early 1990s and played a crucial role in influencing US policy toward the region. Without the absolute and unreserved support of the Croatian Diaspora, the independent Croatian state would never have been established. The Croatian Diaspora played a key role in Croatian politics in the 1990s and enjoyed an unparalleled position of privilege, i.e. unique voting rights, prominent political positions, and an unprecedented representation in the Croatian Parliament, with as many as 12 parliamentary seats (out of 127), more than were given to Croatia’s own ethnic minorities. The number has since been reduced to three, but the voice of the Croatian Diaspora, albeit controversial, remains influential.

**The Case Study Method**

This study will make use of the value of case methods in testing hypotheses as well as for theory development. Most of all, it will make use of their potential for achieving high conceptual validity, their strong procedures for developing new hypotheses, their significance as a useful channel for analysing the hypothesised role of causal mechanisms in the context of specific cases, as well as their relevance and aptness for addressing causal complexity. Of special interest for this study is the ability of case studies to accommodate complex causal relations. Context is of key importance for causal mechanisms. Case studies enable us to analyse the process of causal mechanisms
by delving into one particular case and examining it in great detail. This provides the opportunity to take into consideration multiple intervening variables and induce any unanticipated elements of the causal mechanism process as well as detect and categorise conditions or prerequisites needed for the activation of that particular causal mechanism.

This study focuses on the importance of the independent variable (diaspora discourse), as developed by political elites, in shaping outcomes. The study will look for different elements of the independent variable (diagnostic, prognostic and motivation framing) in order to develop a more discriminating analysis of the effectiveness of framing and to identify some of the factors that favour the success of a particular variant.

Theory development via case studies is primarily an inductive process. This research highlights the usefulness of deviant cases, such as the Croatian Diaspora, where a variable (diaspora mobilisation) is at an extreme value, for inductively identifying new theoretical variables or postulating new causal mechanisms. This study of the Croatian Diaspora will show how the outcome in a deviant case such as this one is caused by a variable (collective action frames) that had been previously overlooked but whose effects are well known from other research. This research, being a single case study, will shed more light on the role of framing in shaping diaspora mobilisation as well as other conjunctural factors operating together with the framing mechanisms, such as “first mover advantage” with Tudman travelling overseas and engaging the Diaspora early on. This will lead to an improved historical explanation of the case and will refine some middle–range contingent generalisations.
A fundamental strategy of social research involves evaluating ‘plausible rival hypotheses’,\textsuperscript{236} i.e. examining alternative ways of explaining a particular phenomenon to avoid the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.\textsuperscript{237} To do this we also need to evaluate our own theories (falsification), ask what data would contradict and disprove our preferred explanation, and collect data to evaluate our theory from this more challenging perspective. This theory, used in this study, will be tested against additional evidence from the case that was not used to derive the theory. In doing so, it will make the theory falsifiable as an explanation for the case, and circumvent confirmation bias.

\textit{Comparative Methods and Within–Case Methods}

\textit{Comparative Methods}

Part of this study will briefly rely on comparative methods. However, instead of trying to find two different cases that are comparable in all ways but one, as a controlled comparison requires, this study will achieve ‘control’ by dividing a single longitudinal case into sub–cases (pre, during and post war – the peak of Diaspora activity) to analyse the extent to which Tuđman’s frames influence Diaspora involvement in homeland affairs. To do this the study will also analyse the discourse of the modern–day Croatian Diaspora. This will be the focus of my last empirical chapter, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’.


Within–Case Methods

“Within–case comparisons are critical to the viability of small–n analysis”.238 The main part of the study will focus not on the analyses of variables across cases, but on the causal path in a single case. In conjunction with cross–case comparison explained above, the bulk of the study will employ within–case methods of casual interpretation, including both congruence and process–tracing that will serve as a supplement to comparative methods. The aim of using these tools is to increase confidence in the theory, with the congruence method seeking to show that a theory is congruent (or not) with the outcome in a case. Process–tracing, as a tool for causal inference, will be used to uncover a causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent variables, and evidence of the casual mechanisms posited by the theory used. In the context of this study, process–tracing is understood as the unfolding of events or situations over time, both in Croatia and within the Diaspora.

By employing congruence this study aims to contribute to theory development by using the ‘disciplined–configurative’ type of case study.239 It uses established theories to explain the case. It interprets the phenomenon under study by putting into operation a known theory to explore new territory. It looks at a particular event from a unique perspective. Although this method may not directly test a particular theory, one of the aims of case study is to demonstrate that the scope of one or more known theories can be broadened to account for a new event. As Harry Eckstein notes, “aiming at the disciplined application of theories to cases forces one to state theories more rigorously

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than might otherwise be done”. Odell observes that, “as a result of this conceptual work, the author may often be able to generate an additional type of contribution: new suggestions for improving the theory”. Odell observes that, “as a result of this conceptual work, the author may often be able to generate an additional type of contribution: new suggestions for improving the theory”.

The key for employing the congruence method is the ‘congruity’ standard, i.e. the similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesised causes and observed effects. The theory employed in the congruence method used in this study is well-established and highly regarded framing theory. The congruence method will thus also contribute to the refinement and development of the framing theory, its scope and applicability to Diaspora Studies, hence advancing the theory on Diaspora Studies in general, and diaspora mobilisation in particular. A number of key questions are to be asked in order to evaluate the possible casual significance of congruity in a case: Is the consistency spurious or of possible casual significance? Is the process of successful diaspora framing a necessary condition for a successful diaspora mobilisation, and how much explanatory or predictive power does it have? Is the independent variable a necessary condition for the outcome of the dependent variable?

**Data Collection Methods**

As explained earlier, the aim of this study is to explain diaspora mobilisation through the creation of collective action frames. Framing is the manner in which we as human beings package our messages in order to generate a desired ‘reading’ in the receiver. To gain more understanding about these frames, I look at discourse. The word ‘discourse’

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was first used in the 1950s by Zelling Harris but became scientifically accepted in Europe through the work of Michel Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1969.\footnote{Foucault, M. (1969): The archaeology of knowledge (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans). New York: Pantheon Books.} Discourse is seen as closely linked to framing, where discourse is actually the way of framing and framing refers to the process of creating the discourse. I interpret frames as discursive cues that we use to induce or align the message with certain pre-existing interpretations of reality. In social movement theory, collective action frames are “discursive matrixes constructed by movement actors to make sense of social relations and endow them with meaning with a purpose of guiding action.” They are discursive procedures or strategies that use language creatively to shape how something is to be interpreted and understood.\footnote{Masson, D. (2006). Women’s movements and transnationalization: Developing a scalar approach. (See p. 11). Retrieved from http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/pdf/dominique%20masson_en.pdf}

The main method I use in this study is discourse analysis, a valuable tool used to study the political meanings that inform naturally occurring written and spoken text. It enables us to reveal the hidden motivation behind a text and view it from a higher stance, providing us with a more comprehensive perspective. By employing this type of analysis, this study binds itself to the tradition of social constructionism, which claims that reality does not exist on its own but is instead constructed by its subjects: in my case political elites, specifically Tuđman and his supporters. Discourse analysis “concerns itself with the use of language in a running discourse, continued over a number of sentences and involving the interaction of speaker (or writer) and auditor (or reader) in a specific situational context, and within a framework of social and cultural
We can narrowly define discourse as practices of talking and writing, a counterpart to rhetoric, where text is the basic unit of data. Texts in this study are either spoken words in speeches and public addresses or written articles, public statements, other political announcements and written comments in a survey.

What we can learn from discourse analysis is:

> How specific actors construct an argument, and how this argument fits into the wider social practices. More importantly, we can demonstrate with confidence what kind of statements actors try to establish as self-evident and true. We can also reveal how their statements and the frameworks of meaning they draw from proliferate through communication practices.

In contrast to simple content analysis, and given that I focus on how discourse is framed, in my analysis I am agnostic about the authors’ ‘real’ views, thoughts, feelings or beliefs as represented in their words, both written and spoken. In my analysis I look at verbal and written communication as a vehicle for action, where the action being studied is the representation of reality. What sets this type of analysis apart from content analysis is the scientific attention to the historical, cultural or political context in which the communication arises, as well as the possible effect that discourse has on the minds and actions of people. Texts are not meaningful on their own; they gain meaning through their interaction with others. This is a major contribution of discourse analysis, as many other approaches (e.g. interviews) are unable to provide such “subtle forms of

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evidence”. This type of integrated analysis offers a richer insight into the complexity of diaspora politics.

In my discourse analysis I follow the ‘Toolbox for Analysing Political Texts’ written by Florian Schneider, social science and area studies scholar and lecturer at Leiden University. For every source material, I look at the social and historical context in which it was produced, who wrote it, who published it and when. Only texts that were available to the Diaspora were examined. These are either speeches delivered in person in front of diaspora Croats, speeches broadcast to the Diaspora on the radio, or texts published by Croatian Diaspora organisations. In my analysis I also look at whether particular sources were responses to any major event, whether and how they tie into broader discussions and, when possible, how they were received by the Diaspora at the time of publication.

I also take into account the medium of the publication and the genre that I am working with. Scholars go as far as to argue “the medium is the message” as “the medium in which the information is presented is the crucial element that shapes meaning”. For example, most Tuđman’s speeches were delivered to the Diaspora in a highly emotional setting, in front of large crowds. These were also not every day occurrences, which made them memorable, with the audience attaching more meaning to such events, making the effect more durable and potentially more powerful. Other speeches were

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broadcast via radio, in between reports of political and military tensions during the ‘Homeland War’, making them equally emotionally charged. I limit the institutional background of my sources to a number of primary sources such as speeches, public addresses, and articles by President Tuđman and publications by the HDZ, as well as Diaspora publications.

In my analysis of Diaspora publications, my main focus is on the publications of the CFU, the most influential Croatian diasporic organisation in North America.²⁵³ The thesis also draws insights from other Diaspora publications, such as the Croatian American Association (CAA), the Croatian World Network (CROWN), the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), the American Initiative for Croatia (AIC), the Canadian Association of Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities (AMCA), and the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA), an umbrella organisation which links major Croatian American organisations, including the CFU, the Croatian World Congress (CWC) and the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU). In addition to these, the last empirical chapter, ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’, also draws insights from the Croatian Worldwide Association (CWA).

However, the CFU is the oldest and largest organisation in North America, boasting around 100,000 members. Its publication, the Fraternalist, commonly referred to as the ‘Z’ (Zajedničar in Croatian) is published in both the English and Croatian languages, since 1909, and averages 20 pages per bi–weekly edition. It enjoys a certain influence on the host country and is widely accepted as legitimate representative of the Croatian Diaspora in North America, with a readership of around 40,000. Thanks to its ‘middle

of the road’ editorial policy, the Fraternalist escaped censorship by the Yugoslav regime.254

The CFU membership has traditionally been strongest across Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, California and the Canadian province of Ontario. The current hubs of fraternalism are Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles and Toronto, Canada. My research focuses on locations that Tuđman visited the most often and examines significant Diaspora activities that took place in Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Toronto during the relevant period. The activities of the CFU were, “to a large extent, determined by the interests of the majority of its members, Croatian immigrants in both the US and Canada”, and the same is true of the organisation's attitudes toward the changes that took place in Croatia255. The Fraternalist remains the most important means of communication between the CFU Home Office, lodges, and the general membership. The newspaper has been a tool by which the management of the organisation could express their own political views.”256 The CFU encourages all members to become involved and attend meetings as well as participate in the fraternal activities sponsored by the local Lodges and Nests, which serve as the channel with the most direct interaction with members. A number of CFU Lodges and Nests maintain their own Croatian Homes to serve as a central meeting place for their members and friends of members.257 Lodge activities range from “picnics, holiday parties, celebratory

254 ibid
256 ibid
saint days, banquets, and dances. In some instances, numerous local lodges combine their efforts to hold regional events where fraternalism is shared amongst all.\textsuperscript{258} Events, including significant meetings with Croatian leaders, are then often reported in the \textit{Fraternalist}. Meetings with President Tuđman were often held in these Croatian Homes that “foster a feeling of community and fraternalism”.\textsuperscript{259}

I also look at relevant international daily and weekly publications available to the North American Diaspora at the time, such as \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{Washington Post}, as well as Canadian sources. I use mainly primary sources (Tuđman’s speeches, public addresses and articles), secondary sources (selected literature) and interviews (with persons chosen for their direct involvement in the events, or for their indirect involvement – mainly diplomats and professors). A few dozen semi–structured interviews and questionnaires that I conducted with diaspora Croats have also been coded and are used in my study as anecdotal evidence, to add liveliness to the research and highlight areas of data, without overstating its relevance. Seven of these were conducted in person, while the rest of the answers were collected via semi–structured questionnaires between 2008 and 2012. Open ended questions were used to allow interviewees the freedom to express their views in their own terms providing the opportunity for identifying new ways of seeing and understanding the topic at hand.

While coding my material, I worked with only a small number of theoretically pre–determined coding categories, informed by my theoretical framework, while, for the most part, I allowed for patterns, themes and topics to emerge in the course of the


\textsuperscript{259}ibid
analysis. Mayring\textsuperscript{260} refers to this as ‘evolutionary coding’, where coding categories evolve from theoretical considerations into an operational list informed by empirical data. I then proceeded to collect and examine discursive statements, including any cultural, historical or political references that informed the message communicated by the source material. I subsequently looked at linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms, including relevant word groups, grammar features, modalities, evidentialities, and literary figures that shape the meaning of the source material. This is particularly relevant in the context of framing. To identify frames, I looked for reoccurring arguments, themes and messages. I kept in mind the core framing tasks, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational, discussed in more detail in my next chapter.

With all the elements of my analysis completed, I then proceeded to interpret my data, keeping the following questions in mind: Who is the author of the material? When was it produced? Who was the intended audience? Who might benefit from the discourse constructed by the sources?\textsuperscript{261} In my findings I focus on the most relevant results, moving through the analysis based on my theoretical framework. I add evidence from my work as needed, by adding original or translated examples to illustrate my point.

I do not claim that all of politics is discourse, nor that all political analysis can or should be reduced to discourse analysis. However, if we get down to the “nitty gritty of how politics is actually ‘done’ in everyday life, we usually end up studying what some


political actors were saying or writing”. Given my study focuses on events that took place 25 years ago, I am also limited in terms of methods suitable for this type of enquiry, hence the focus on written texts or transcribed speeches and public addresses.

As mentioned earlier, I have chosen the period from 1987 to 1995 in order to trace the process of Diaspora mobilisation. Although one can trace earlier attempts by the Croatian Diaspora to exert influence on the politics at home, I look at 1987 as a starting point for my research to mark Tuđman’s first visit to the Diaspora. The late 1980s are characterised by the weakening of the Yugoslav Communist regime and the beginning of a new, albeit long and painful, journey for Croatia and the rest of former Yugoslav republics. This is also the period in which Tuđman developed and solidified his relationships with his core supporters and later allies in the Diaspora. What follows is the creation of the HDZ in February 1989, and its programme published in the Fraternalist. Later that year the HDZ established branches around the world, including in Canada and the US. As briefly summarised in the introductory chapter, the most significant events in early 1990s are the first Croatian democratic elections in May 1990, Tuđman’s victory and the proclamation of Croatian independence in 1991, as well as the period of war. I also look at earlier periods to contextualise the discussion and focus on the modern history of the Croatian Diaspora in my last empirical chapter, to establish the extent to which frames can be seen as institutionalised in the Diaspora and the leader still ‘alive’ through his discourse that continues to be traceable in the Diaspora and mirrors that of the 1990s.


Potential Limitations

According to the conventional case–study wisdom, one cannot generalise based on a single case study. Contrary to that, Bent Flyvbjerg\textsuperscript{264} observes that carefully chosen cases were critical to the development of the physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr, just as the case study played a key role in the works of Darwin, Marx and Freud. Ragin explains that defining single case studies as inferior to multiple case studies is misguided, since even single case studies “are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways”.\textsuperscript{265} “In social science, too,” Flyvbjerg argues, “the strategic choice of case study may greatly add to the generalizability of a case study”\textsuperscript{266}. He goes on to say that:

Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied (...). Cases of the “most likely” type are especially well suited to falsifying hypotheses. Random samples emphasising representativeness will seldom be able to produce this kind of insight; it is more appropriate to select some few cases chosen for the validity”.\textsuperscript{267}

Hence the focus in this study on strategically selected Croatian Diaspora locations in Ontario, Canada, and Cleveland and Pittsburgh in the US, and on the CFU as the oldest, largest and most influential Croatian Diaspora organisation.

Another commonly listed limitation of case studies is the potential bias toward verification, interpreted as a tendency of the case study to confirm the researcher’s


\textsuperscript{266} Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. \textit{Qualitative Inquiry, 12} (2), 219-245 (See p. 9).

predetermined views. Francis Bacon goes even further in stating that bias is a fundamental human characteristic, applicable to other methods beyond the case study. I was particularly enlightened by the strategy Charles Darwin developed to avoid verification bias:

I had (...) during many years followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came cross me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from memory than favourable ones. Owing to this habit, very few objections were raised against my views, which I had not at least noticed and attempted to answer.

The case study, however, has its own rigour, different to quantitative methods, and its advantage is that it can ‘close in’ on real–life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice”.

A potential disadvantage of the discourse analysis method is that it does not provide absolute answers, given that no amount of discourse analysis can provide adequate evidence of what goes on in people’s heads. To a certain degree discourse analysis also involves personal interpretation and instinct. However, advocates of this type of analysis argue that meaning is never fixed, leaving everything open to interpretation and negotiation.

Clarification of Terms

268 ibid
Different definitions generate different findings\textsuperscript{273}. In order to make meaningful observations in the course of this study, the concepts used need defining. I have previously defined the concept of diaspora, linking it to the definition used by Gabriel Sheffer. The definition, as emphasized earlier, refers to ethno–national social and political formations that maintain links with their homelands (e.g. Croatian political émigrés), but excludes wider transnational groups of different nationalities gathered around shared political and religious views, or moral and/or ethical perception of injustices. Communities with shared lifestyle orientations, such as music, art or sport, will also be excluded from the definition of diaspora in this study.

An additional conceptual word of caution is also in order. The term ‘Croatian–American’ or ‘Canadian–American’ will be used interchangeably with ‘Diaspora’. The term ‘Croatian–American’, for instance, may perhaps inadequately mirror the strength of the relationship some Diaspora groups, as fully integrated citizens of the US, share with their country of origin. The use of ‘hyphenated’ identities does not imply that the two identities are at odds. In fact, this study will argue that Diaspora homeland and hostland identities are undeniably concurrent. The above terms are also contrasted to ‘exile’, or ‘émigré’ which, when used in this study, will refer to emigrant groups that fled their countries because of their political beliefs.

**Conclusion**

Diasporas are often fragmented, both geographically and politically. It has been emphasised that wars can bridge split and dispersed diaspora entities and prompt decisions among the diaspora to organise and launch massive political campaigns on

behalf of the homeland. “Dormant diasporas face serious dilemmas during periods of dramatic change in their homelands.”

Although conflicts have the power to ‘awaken’ and bridge identities, this study argues that the mere presence of homeland conflict is not enough for a sustained diaspora participation in homeland affairs.

The study examines Croatian Diaspora as a case study for identifying the drivers behind diaspora mobilisation. It aims to show how the mobilisation of Croatian Diaspora was the result of a successful framing strategy designed by homeland leaders and their supporters in the Diaspora. Acting as a centripetal force that pulls the Diaspora toward the homeland, its centre, the leaders’ discourse will be analysed as the voice behind the strategy that mobilises Diaspora supporters around a cause. How do leaders of the movement obtain authority and legitimacy? To what extent do they employ ‘injustice frames’ referring to previous and present grievances and use references to national history to entice Diaspora support? The study aims to show how leaders diagnosed the national problem and proposed solutions in the form of Croatian statehood, freedom and prosperity. The study also intends to demonstrate how the political elites, through their discourse, represent themselves as visionaries and advocates of positive change.

The study argues that framing, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures, are critical for understanding the processes of diaspora mobilisation. The frames resonate with the diaspora population and have credibility and legitimacy in the cultural repertoire. In the Croatian case, I examine how these prognostic and diagnostic frames were constructed to promise security, stability and relief from foreign oppression.

To what extent was Diaspora support framed as a struggle for these values and how much resonance was achieved among Croats abroad? The study will also look at the collective identity discourse, focusing on shared meanings and cultural narratives, to see how it echoed within the fragmented groups of the Croatian Diaspora and spurred them into action. The last empirical chapter ‘Diaspora after Tudman’ will look at the modern–day Croatian Diaspora, to analyse the extent to which Tudman’s frames are still present in today’s discourse and can be seen as entrenched in the Diaspora, with a discourse that mirrors that of the 1990s.

The main protagonist of the framing process, the leader, will be given much–deserved attention in the next chapter, ‘The Man Behind the Frame: Tudman’s Path to Power – from Prisoner to President’. This chapter will discuss characteristics of Tudman as a leader through a Weberian lens of charismatic authority, also touching on his capacity to attract allies and highly talented aides. The chapter will also examine the conditions that led to his rise to power, including the changes in the Croatian political arena in the late 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the creation of the HDZ\textsuperscript{275} and setting the scene for a new era of the Croatian Diaspora.

\textsuperscript{275} From 1990 to 2000 and, in coalition, from 2003 to 2011.
CHAPTER III: The Man behind the Frame – Tuđman’s Path to Power – from Prisoner to President

There is (...) a great deal of the creative artist in the political leader who, through his rhetoric, slogans and tactics, manipulates existing symbols and creates new ones.²⁷⁶

How did the defeat of the South Slav brotherhood result in a joint effort by Croats at home and those abroad towards the realisation of the old separatist drive for independence? The previous chapter provided a theoretical framework for understanding the drive behind the mobilisation of diasporas. It offered a complementary view to conflict–based arguments, linking diaspora mobilisation to framing theory. This will help examine how the process of diaspora mobilisation is triggered by homeland leaders’ efforts to galvanise diaspora action in order to advance their political goals.

As explained in detail in the previous chapter, this study will argue that a successful diaspora mobilisation is primarily a product of collective action frames (CAF) used by goal–seeking elites, bridging the literature on framing processes with Diaspora Studies. These framing processes are supported by the presence of a strong charismatic leader, effective resource mobilisation and existing political opportunity structures (POS). In their analysis of leadership in social movements, Morris and Staggenborg argue that human agency has been neglected by the recent emphasis on structures of opportunity in social movements and that the theory would benefit from an examination of the numerous ways in which leaders generate social change and create the conditions for the

agency of others. They identify leaders as being critical to social movements as “they inspire commitment, mobilise resources, create and recognise opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes.”277 As mentioned earlier, a number of scholars have noted that leadership in social movements has yet to be adequately theorised.

Morris and Staggenborg argue that the framing perspective has been an important factor in explaining social movements by revealing how meaning–generating processes set in cultural frameworks boost collective action. Yet, this approach is, they observe, “limited by its own blind spots”. Similar to resource mobilisation and political opportunity/process theory, the focus of social movements “is slanted toward structural and organizational factors”.278 Framing theory depicts SMO as the major actor in the framing process while the importance of leaders is not sufficiently highlighted. “The few times they refer to framers as leaders they fail to examine how movement leaders drive the framing process.”279

However favourable the ‘breeding ground’ presented by the opportunity structure, it only provides potential actors with options. It is ultimately always the parties themselves who must make the best of them.280 The focus of this chapter will be on the leader in charge of the framing processes and his characteristics as one of the key factors

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278 ibid

279 ibid

explaining his success. In doing so, the study will address the existing gap in the framing literature and focus attention on the central role that leaders play as the main actors in charge of framing. In placing the focus on the leader, the study does not intend to minimise the role of other factors, the right configuration of which is essential for the framing processes to be effective.

With the above in mind, the focus of this chapter is Franjo Tuđman, the frame–master in charge of framing processes aimed at securing Diaspora support in 1990s Croatia. Often referred to as the ‘Founding Father’ of the modern Croatian state, Tuđman led Croatia into independence with the help of the Croatian Diaspora. This chapter will discuss characteristics of Tuđman as a leader and a politician. Given the context of a growing sense of crisis around the disintegration of Yugoslavia, his leadership will be analysed through a Weberian lens of charismatic authority. The chapter will look at Tuđman’s specific traits and experiences from his past that contributed to his ‘charismatic personality’. Given that Tuđman seemed to combine both intellectual and political leadership roles, the chapter also touches on his capacity to attract allies and highly talented subordinates. Furthermore, the chapter provides more context to explain the shifting trajectory of Tuđman and unpacks the conditions that led to his rise to power and opened doorways to a successful Diaspora mobilisation. This includes the transformation of the Croatian political arena in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the creation of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), a party that continued to dominate the Croatian political scene for decades after Tuđman’s death. The discussion will also touch on Tuđman’s bond with the Diaspora and the enabling factors that contributed to

the development of that bond. In doing this, the chapter will further expand upon the complexity of causal relationships between the various explanatory factors linked to the processes of framing and the success of diaspora mobilisation. This will set the scene for a discussion of Tuđman’s formulation and articulation of frames and their projection to the Diaspora, as the central focus of this thesis.

**Tuđman as a Charismatic Leader – “the Good Shepherd of the Croatian Flock”**

10 December 2015 was the 15th anniversary of President Tuđman’s death. He was born in 1922 in Croatia, at that time part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and died in 1999 in the Republic of Croatia, as its first president. A historian, writer and politician, Tuđman was, to borrow a term from Sidney Hook, an “event–making” person who shaped events; he did not merely ride the waves of history. While Tuđman continues to remain present in political discussions decades after his presidency, his image today is mixed in the wider population. It ranges from his being seen as an ignoble political figure and the epitome of stern nationalism to being a heroic leader and the father of his nation. Often criticised for his lack of appreciation for democracy, his ethnocentric views, his mythomania, narcissism and excessive nepotism, Tuđman also had positive qualities. He was a man of many talents: a determined activist, an army

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general, a historian, a publisher, and a strong, charismatic leader. He was also the only active antifascist combatant among all post–communist statesmen.  

In my analysis of Tuđman as a leader, I will begin by adopting a Weberian ‘ideal–typical’ approach to classifications of legitimacy and power and identify leadership traits in Tuđman that can be viewed as ‘charismatic’. Weber defines charismatic authority as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”. Tuđman, the first democratically elected President of Croatia, portrayed himself as the creator of a new movement, driven by a mission to achieve great things for the Croatian nation. Tuđman often stressed that it was his burning desire and the drive to change things for the better that kept him going. He promised to offer national reconciliation and unity to all Croats and bring to life the ‘thousands–year–old Croatian dream of statehood’. This appealed to the Croatian nation at the time and although

285 ibid


288 The term was scarcely off Tuđman lips in the early 1990s, alluding to a continuity of Croatian statehood, and a nation that endured and withstood all past injustices. As we shall see in later chapters, it is a phrase that constituted an important part of the collective action frames used to galvanise Diaspora support. It is a phrase often repeated by the Diaspora in official publications as well as in interviews conducted with members of the Croatian Diaspora for the purposes of this study. A number of studies have researched its origins and significance, including a paper by Hrvoje Gračanin “The Croatian Early Middle Ages in Service of Politics in the Beginnings of Independent Croatia” which endeavours to detect thematic circles and patterns that are closely related to the history of Croatian Early Middle Ages and were used by the Croatian political elite in strengthening and maintaining of Croatian national pathos and in affirmation of national historical right during the 1990s. The paper explains how the interpretations of politicians concerning certain aspects of Croatian early medieval history influenced media and popular notions in general, especially in regard to the idea of the thousand-year-old dream of Croatian people. The paper notes that a fair share of such interpretations has also found their place in fundamental documents of Croatian statehood. The paper also states that the strengthening of national imaginary in the time of struggle for the preservation of state is usually perceived, not entirely unfounded, as a legitimate political tactics that was used in the past and is still used by nations and states.
there was much truth in these claims, the reality is much more complicated. Tuđman’s early unifying claims and pledges are not to be disparaged but one must remember that first and foremost they were carefully constructed and deeply tendentious statements.

Tuđman was a man of contradictions. These contradictions are evident in the complexity of his political views but also in many of his personal beliefs. As a young man, he was recruited into the Yugoslav Partisans in 1942, led by Yugoslav revolutionary communists during World War II and under the command of Marshal Josip Broz Tito.\textsuperscript{289} He was promoted to the position of colonel in 1953, and in 1959, at the age of 38, became the youngest general in Tito’s army.\textsuperscript{290} From a passionate Yugoslav patriot, Tuđman transformed into an equally, if not more, enthusiastic Croatian nationalist. After being known as a devoted communist, he became an ardent anti-communist. He was a determined atheist who gained the support of the Catholic Church hierarchy in Zagreb and later in Rome.\textsuperscript{291} An immediate question that poses itself is how firmly established were the political convictions he is known for today? Hard–core nationalism and separatism are synonymous with his name today; however, neither were his original political convictions. Sadkovic observes that Tuđman’s words, as well as his actions, always reflect a given phase of his evolution and reflect not just his own mentality in a particular period, but also the mentality of Yugoslavia.


and Croatia. His political convictions and his ideas cannot be taken out of context. They developed as a result of unusual experience and permanent learning by trial and error, and were influenced by life-changing events and extraordinary experience. These events, including political persecutions, dismissals, arrests and imprisonment, were numerous and dramatic. Interestingly, although discussed in relatively closed circles between Tuđman and small groups of émigrés in the Diaspora in late 1980s, these contradictions were never the cause of public astonishment or surprise. In spite of being publicly well-known facts, when Tuđman came to power there was no sign of vociferous public disapproval, condemnation or judgment of his past. This is indicative of his skill in not only framing ideas, but also his own persona, in a way that a large number of people will find satisfying, and most of all, compelling. Successful leaders of any era, and regardless of whether they are later praised or condemned by history, can endure by being able to not only remain relevant, but build on that, weaving in new and multiple generations. Tuđman was well attuned to the needs of his audience and an innovator in the sense that he was well skilled in reworking pre-existing ideas of the Croatian predicament and projecting them in fresh rhetoric. Tuđman’s chameleon-like qualities in being the right person at the right time and saying the right thing to the right people meant he continued to reach, and impact, a mass audience – earning himself the title of “the good shepherd of the Croatian flock”. Indeed, one of the most important

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characteristics of a charismatic leader is his ability to gather supporters attracted by different motivations.295

The changing trajectory of Tuđman from being a former dedicated Yugoslav partisan to becoming a Croatian nationalist is explicable in the context of the 1970s Croatian Spring of which Tuđman was one of the leaders. It was a mass nationalist–based demonstration of discontent with the position of Croatia within Yugoslavia, crushed by the Communist government on Serbia's National Day in December 1971. It created waves of emigrants from Croatia and formed a Diaspora that would later become an important resource in Tuđman’s pursuit of power. A gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia after the death of Tito, coupled with a renewed interest in the Croatian historical narrative, and an increased mood for separatism, were important events that framed his transformation into the leader many thought he was destined to be. Let us examine Tuđman’s characteristics as a charismatic leader and in doing so touch on some of the points raised above.

Tuđman had a great personal presence and his charisma can largely be explained by the power of his personality. Also, his public displays of self–confidence inspired confidence in others that he indeed was a mastermind capable of extraordinary things. His strength lay in putting forward his strong views to others with composure and conviction. His military career instilled him with a deep sense of discipline. There are many depictions of him dressed as the military commander in chief or wearing a brilliant

white uniform\textsuperscript{296} with outsized epaulettes.\textsuperscript{297} Former Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitsky “chided the Croatian leader for prancing around in the sort of fantasy uniform not even seen in the Vienna opera these days.”\textsuperscript{298} This style was typical of Tito, who was said to be a charismarch,\textsuperscript{299} a ruler staying in power by charisma, often emulated by Tuđman. Tuđman mesmerised his followers with his presence but also with his power of oratory and exemplary rhetorical skills, including his timely and well–placed use of metaphors, metonymies and other figures of speech. One can also trace numerous conceptual metaphors in his speeches, particularly those depicting the nation and the war. Tuđman acted as a creative political entrepreneur\textsuperscript{300} and, as we shall see, used frames as tools for political engineering\textsuperscript{301}, ensuring Diaspora loyalty, support and long–term commitment. He is known for his longwinded speeches, introducing patterns of repetition that created strong rhythm and reinforced his messages. His complex sentences with constant references to carefully picked historical events evoked strong emotional responses. This is exemplified in the excerpt below from a speech Tuđman gave in 1995, stressing the importance to

\begin{quote}
value what we conquered at the price of Croatian blood and we shall never allow anyone to jeopardize our freedom, our democracy, our
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{ibid} ibid
\end{thebibliography}
beautiful Croatian land in which there must be room not only for all Croatian people here, but also for all those expelled Croats whom I invited to return when I was speaking in Gospić.  

My next chapter, ‘The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis’, looks at Tuđman’s oratory skills in more detail, demonstrating that “there is thus a great deal of the creative artist in the political leader who, through his rhetoric, slogans and tactics, manipulates existing symbols and creates new ones.”

Tuđman’s confidently held, well–informed and articulately expressed opinions further contributed to his sense of charisma. Described as a “Prometheus of Croatia, igniter of the drowsing spirit of patriotism for the fatherland”, Tuđman was indeed seen as a ‘forethinker’. He was educated, well–read and travelled, and one of the few post–communist leaders with a PhD. He was a well–known academic, a title he earned following his military career when he decided to focus on his academic research. It was as a historian that he began his dissident path. As the director of the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement and as an associate professor of history at the University of Zagreb from 1963 to 1967, he wrote articles on history, military history and international relations. His writings soon became the source of alternative interpretations of Yugoslav history, directly criticising the Yugoslav socialist

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establishment and causing much conflict with official Yugoslav historiography. His best–known work, clashing with the Yugoslav communist elite and the central Yugoslav dogma, was *Great Ideas and Small Nations*, a monograph on political history. Outspoken on nationalist issues, Tuđman publicly supported the goals of the Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language, garnering a substantial following through his publications, a gain that proved tremendously useful a few decades later. He also accused the Yugoslav authorities of exaggerating the crimes committed by the Ustaše during World War II, one of his many criticisms of the government that eventually led to his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1967 and removal from all offices and duties. He went from promotion to prosecution and was deprived of his human rights for nearly 20 years because of his political convictions. In 1971 he was sentenced to two years in prison for participating in the activities of the Croatian Spring. His daring side led him to Sweden on a forged Swedish passport in 1977, where he was interviewed by Swedish TV about the situation of Croats in Yugoslavia, for which he was put on trial in 1981 and accused of having spread enemy propaganda. Neither an international outcry nor an Amnesty International’s ‘Prisoner of Conscience’ badge managed to save him from being sent to the notorious Lepoglava prison in 1982, where he suffered a series of four heart attacks. Years later, Tuđman often referred to Croatia’s troubled past and injustices suffered by its people, including political prosecutions similar to his own. We can identify other elements of his own life

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306 Amnesty International records
used within a wider narrative he developed around his mission. These are explained below.

**A Unified Diaspora**

Multiple divisions in the Tuđman family,\(^{309}\) divided religious identities and political allegiances between ‘Yugoslavhood’ and ‘Croathood’,\(^{310}\) including Tuđman’s own mercurial political views, are divisions that were also present in the Croatian Diaspora at the time and some are still visible today. We shall see how these themes from Tuđman’s own life became interwoven with some of the central themes of Diaspora Collective Action Frames (CAF) designed by him later. Some of the key themes of CAF addressed divisions within the Diaspora itself. They advocated for a Croatian national unity of Croats within and outside the homeland and the full national reconciliation of the supporters of former Croatian Domobrans (the NDH home guard), Partisans, as well as Ustaše.\(^{311}\) In a speech celebrating Croatia’s first Independence Day,\(^{312}\) Tuđman stressed that “in order to achieve [Croatian independence] (...) we had to unite the disunited Croathood.”\(^{313}\) He emphasised the fact that all members of the Croatian Diaspora, as an organic part of the Croatian nation, had the right to return home. They “no longer have

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\(^{309}\) Tuđman’s father was arrested by the Ustaše and his older brother taken to a concentration camp. They both survived, unlike the youngest brother Stjepan who was killed by the Gestapo fighting for the Partisans in 1943; Tuđman’s mother was deeply religious, while both his father and stepmother held anti-clerical views. (Sadkovich 2010).


\(^{313}\) Croatian President Franjo Tuđman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Retrieved from http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm
to hide in exile – today they can proudly say they are Croats”. 314 Divided identities, prosecutions and perceived past injustices all form leitmotifs in Tuđman’s life story but also in the story he told the Diaspora.

Collective Grievances

This brings us to another event from Tuđman’s past. We are seldom reminded of his father’s and stepmother’s fate. They were found dead at their home in their native village of Veliko Trgovišće in 1946 where, according to the official police investigation, they took their own lives. However, multiple theories emerged providing alternative explanations of the events that took place that day. One of the explanations was that they were killed by Ustaše terrorists, while another theory, and the one favoured by Tuđman in his later years, claimed that they were killed by members of KNOJ (later UDBA, the secret police in communist Yugoslavia). In his personal diary in 1986,315 Tuđman describes the latter theory as a more plausible explanation for what happened to his parents, given their democratic, nationalist, and religious views. Regardless of which theory one chooses to subscribe to, the tragic and/or mysterious fate of his parents is, together with Tuđman’s later political persecution and imprisonment,316 an important ingredient in the development of Tuđman’s ideas as a person and a politician. These events also become important in the development of his image, as they cast him as a martyr in the eyes of Croats both at home and abroad. If his parents were indeed killed

by the Yugoslav secret police, then they shared the fate of thousands of Croats from Bleiburg, killed by partisans after being handed over to Tito’s forces by the British in 1945 near the Austrian border. Bleiburg, too, as we shall see, will become an important theme in Tuđman’s wider narrative, also featuring in some of the CAF constructed by him in the early 1990s.

The Bleiburg tragedy has been an important theme in the Diaspora and one of the main sources of collective resentment. For many it became the metaphor for the Croatian holocaust. Tuđman relied heavily on this and similar examples from the Croatian past already present in the Diaspora discourse. His mottos and slogans portray him as a leader aware of his people’s plight, having lived through it, and equipped to work toward a brighter future in the interests of his people. As a leader ‘merely obeying the wishes of his people’, he was able to enter into a symbiotic relationship with his followers. His frequent use of collective pronouns, such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ours’, implies collaboration and stresses that the people have a clear say in their own future. Similarly, the use of ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘theirs’, targeting the enemy, was sufficient for engendering antagonism and demonising the ‘Other’. A collective enemy – the ‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ – was identified, creating clear ethnic, confessional and national boundaries between Croats and Serbs. Boundaries were time and time again confirmed through the glorification of the leader and his followers, and ‘ostracizing the undesirables’. As we shall see later, the use of diagnostic and ‘boundary framing’ highlighted all existing differences, including the claim that Croatia was and always has

317 Chapter IV focuses on these in more detail.
been a part of Western European tradition, while Serbs belonged to the other side, the East, having more in common with the Byzantine culture. Tuđman stressed that Croatia was a European nation, both traditionally and culturally. His message focused on ‘us’ against ‘them’; it was a joint venture between him and the Croats, both at home and in the Diaspora, in fighting the enemy. It showed that “political faith needs an anti-hero”, one that can be overcome collectively.

There were two main battles to be fought (collectively) – one Tuđman defined as a battle for democracy and the other one, under the motto of “Always and everything for Croatia, our sole and eternal Croatia under no circumstances” (Croatian: “Uvijek i sve za Hrvatsku, a našu jedinu i vječnu Hrvatsku ni za što!”), as the battle for Croatia. The fetishisation of the state was part of the HDZ’s platform as well, as evidenced by the engraving on Tuđman’s monolithic grave in Mirogoj Cemetery: “Always and everything for Croatia; our sole and eternal Croatia under no circumstances.”

We can take the argument of a symbiotic relationship one step further and also include the Diaspora. The Croatian example has shown that the multiplicity of close and often long-term interactions between the Diaspora and its homeland, including the nature of the relationships they spawn, can in some measure be understood through the idea of a symbiotic relationship. The creation of a symbiotic relationship ties in with Madsen and Snow’s argument based on efficacy theory. They observe that, at a time of crisis

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322 i.e. one is prepared to sacrifice anything for one’s country; but not prepared to sacrifice one’s country for anything.
when fundamental beliefs are being challenged and general understanding limited, with
the emergence of a leader and the establishment of the charismatic bond the followers
regain a sense of hope, meaning and efficacy. Also, Tuđman’s personal history helped
others identify with him and “come to terms with complexity through the image of a
single person who is held to be special, but in some way accountable”. 324 This
identification was a strong feature among core activists, many of whom spent most of
their lives in exile after being persecuted for their political convictions, much like
Tuđman.

**The Charisma of Religion**

More recently, the writings on charisma concentrate on the nature and the causes of what
constitutes a ‘charismatic bond’, i.e. the relationship between the leader and the
followers, which is often seen in quasi–religious terms.325 In Tuđman’s case, there was a
“compulsive, inexplicable emotional tie linking a group of followers together in
adulation of their leader”326 This tie is still evident today, as, at the time this is being
written, and more than two decades after he addressed the Croatian nation as its first
president, a statue of Tuđman is being erected in the eastern city of Osijek ahead of local
elections there. During the 1990s, though, the tie was not just between the leader and
the followers, but also between the followers themselves. This bond linked Tuđman’s
supporters in Croatia with the ones in the Diaspora, but also broke bonds with the
‘Other’, as we shall see in later chapters.

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S.U. Larsen (Eds.), *Charisma and fascism in inter-war Europe*. London: Routledge.
University Press.
The term ‘charisma’ was first used by St. Paul, who defined it as the gifts of divine grace that manifest themselves in forms such as wisdom, knowledge, faith and the grace of healing and prophecy. Tuđman never explicitly exemplified elements of cultic charisma. He never deliberately tried to adopt the role of a prophet and never openly referred to his mission as a leader as being the will of God. However, he relied heavily on the Catholic faith to attract and gather followers and, despite his previous (non)religious beliefs, many vested him with a religious aura.

Tuđman was known as a firm supporter of communism and anticlericalism in his earlier days. In fact, he and Ankica Žumbar were married in 1945 at the Belgrade city council, openly demonstrating their loyalty to the communist movement and the importance of civil rituals over religious ones. This was shortly after the Yugoslav government introduced a law allowing civil weddings, limiting the jurisdiction of the Church. Nevertheless, he later identified Catholic religion to be important for the modern Croatian nation and was the main instigator of the era of Catholic revival in Croatia. As a historian and later as a politician, he often highlighted the dichotomy between Croatia's Habsburg and Serbia's Ottoman past, exploiting it as a tool for asserting the cultural superiority of the Croatian nation over its Balkan neighbours. This dichotomy appealed to Croats at home and to those in the Diaspora and was used by Tuđman in the construction of his CAF as a device for attracting Diaspora support. When Tuđman took his presidential oath in 1992 he added “So help me God!” (Croatian: “Tako mi Bog

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327 1 Corinthians 12:8-10
pomogao!”), a sentence that was not in the official text of the oath until 1997 when Tuđman officially included it. The Catholic Church, with its values and principles, was portrayed by Tuđman as a preserver of Croatian identity. This was mirrored not only in his speeches but was also present in the HDZ anthem “God Protect Croatia” (Croatian: “Boze Čuvaj Hrvatsku”), still sung widely in the Diaspora today.

There are uncertainties regarding Tuđman’s religious convictions. According to Tuđman’s wife Ankica, he lost his faith and adopted his father’s anticlerical attitudes when his mother Justina (nee Gmaz) died bearing her fifth child, leaving Franjo and his two younger brothers in the care of their father, and Olga, their stepmother. Živko Kustić, Croatian Eastern Catholic priest and journalist in Jutarnji List also expressed doubt that Tuđman had ever been truly religious. According to Vjekoslav Perica, Tuđman was sufficiently nationalistic as well as ethnocentric to earn the sympathies of the Croatian Catholic Church. He further suggests that “a strong and rigid man, and a former general, Tuđman made the bishops feel less afraid of the Serbian menace”.

Tuđman and the Catholic Church, once on opposing sides, now joined forces promising the Croatian people a national renaissance. These and other promises were expressed in Tuđman’s CAF, the church being one of the main messengers. Whether Tuđman was genuine in expressing his religious convictions or whether these were manufactured and

331 Biographer Darko Hudelist suggests that Tuđman did get married in Church before his death (either voluntarily or upon the pressure of Zagreb’s Cardinal Franjo Kuharić). However, he admits that there is no evidence to support that claim.
333 ibid
put together in a way to make him more attractive to a broad spectrum of potential supporters, remains unknown.

Even though Tuđman never referred to his mission in messianic terms, there was a very strong charismatic bond between him and his followers. His charisma was not a manufactured ‘pseudo–charisma’. However, the notion of ‘pseudo–charisma’ is of little value unless it is used to demonstrate “that the created charismatic in some way lacks the range of manipulative tools open to the true charismatic” 334, which is not the case with Tuđman. Marin Sopta, a former émigré politician, observes that “somehow we knew he was the man, that he would be the leader to finally pull the Croats together”. 335 “He had the charisma of a great leader”, says Sopta, referring to Tuđman, “Like Churchill or De Gaulle” 336. In his observations, Hockenos explains that the political émigrés were most impressed by “his potential to take change and lead the nation toward its rightful destiny”. Tuđman “was prepared to lead, and this group of émigrés was ready to follow.” 337

**Political Opportunities**

It is most doubtful that even the most charismatic of leaders could mobilise a Diaspora in the absence of at least some conducing factors. Tuđman had an ability to turn past ideas into ideas relevant in the present, giving them an appropriate framework, but the mere existence of these ideas was not enough to create change. It was the combination

336 ibid
337 ibid
of a successfully planned design of well–articulated ideas and his leadership skills, in conjunction with several favourable conditions that made change happen.

Apart from CAF, previous research has identified key ingredients for the emergence of social movements, including political and cultural opportunities, organisational bases, material and human resources, sudden and unanticipated events, and grievances. Oberschall\textsuperscript{338} suggests that potential leaders are almost always available, but their emergence depends on political opportunities. However, political opportunities are often missed, and leaders play an important role in recognising and acting on opportunities. \textsuperscript{339} Studies of charisma dating back to Weber focus on the need for a structural crisis as an essential starting point. The socio–political and economic reality of the late 1980s spurred demands for change in the country. Domestic political instability and the increasing economic turmoil spurred the Croatian people into a quest for a national solution and the person able to deliver it. The level of dissatisfaction with the establishment and the disillusionment with the government in power, seen only as capable of advancing the needs of certain groups without benefiting the Croatian nation, awakened a desire to overthrow existing problems and create an environment that would lead to political stability and economic prosperity. As a confident man with strong leadership qualities stemming from his army days, Tuđman rose to the opportunity to attend to these problems as a leader of the Croatian nation and as its trusted guardian. In an environment marred by political instability, tension and uncertainty, Tuđman set out on his mission equipped with an unwavering faith in his abilities to realise the


‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’. But “few dreams have been fulfilled in such unpromising circumstances”\textsuperscript{340} and the price was high.

Charismatic leaders can make a grim objective reality seem even worse by further dramatising the events to add tension, leading to an apocalyptic portrayal of the future. Once formulated, these figurative constructions spread around as objective reality.\textsuperscript{341} In times of duress, political ambiguity or economic chaos, observes Cohen, “[s]ome individuals may prove to be more perceptive, more creative, and more articulate than others, and their formulations may appeal more than those of others to a wide collectivity of people who are in the throes of the same problem”.\textsuperscript{342} Progressively, these symbolic ideas become simplified as they “shed the irrelevant details created by circumstances of time and space and as their central theme is dramatised”.\textsuperscript{343} Through repetition, they develop into routinised forms.\textsuperscript{344} Past collective grievances are brought back into the present and further contextualised in the current political climate to serve their mobilising purpose. An important element of Tuđman’s Diaspora CAF was the need to escape from “national slavery and Bolshevik darkness.”\textsuperscript{345} To dramatise the issue, traumatic events from Croatian history were brought to the surface, with past injustices emphasised and Croatia portrayed as a perpetual victim.


\textsuperscript{342}ibid

\textsuperscript{344}ibid.

\textsuperscript{345}Franjo Tuđman’s wartime speech, delivered on 5 November 1991 in Zagreb. Retrieved from http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-08.htm
A number of studies have looked at times of distress, including conflict, as a key force behind Diaspora mobilisation. The presence of a crisis can be a powerful tool for leaders wanting to generate Diaspora support, but it is not sufficient to produce and sustain a focused movement. For collective action to emerge a strategy giving meaning to the movement and creating value is needed. This will be examined in later chapters that focus on framing processes and the resulting CAF constructed by Tuđman and disseminated by his supporters at home and in the Diaspora.

**From Humble Beginnings to History – the Rise of Tuđman’s Party**

By the end of the 1980s it was clear that the communist regime in Yugoslavia was slowly disintegrating. The same decade saw the collapse of the historical truth dictated by the communist regime in Yugoslavia for nearly half a century. The transformation of the political arena in the late 1980s brought attacks on the ideology and founding myths of communist Yugoslavia and initiated a debate about the country’s recent past (and future) and culminated in a review of history\(^{346}\) that manifested itself not only verbally, but also through legislation, and later education and also symbolically. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the dire political situation in Croatia will be a major part of the diagnostic frames and is discussed in the following chapter, ‘The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis’.

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Tudman’s emergence as a charismatic leader was also aided by the political climate at the time where “political parties are weak, or held in contempt”\textsuperscript{347}. In late February 1989, a few months before HDZ was officially founded at a secret gathering in Zagreb, at a time when the multi–party system in Croatia was only just sprouting and open manifestations of nationalism were unwelcome, Tudman spoke openly in front a group of Croatian writers. In his words, the emergence of HDZ clearly marked the end of Croatia’s long and imposed silence. Some are clearly against this, stated Tudman, and would like to “divert or murk the waters even before it emerges from the springs”\textsuperscript{348}. Vladimir Šeks, a member of HDZ and a representative in the Croatian Parliament since the nation's independence, explains that HDZ was founded as a “response and kind of self–defence against the imperialist Greater Serbian policy, because the Croatian elites had a policy of silence”\textsuperscript{349}. Tudman, as a charismatic leader, cannot be separated from the development of his party. As Yugoslavia began to fragment, Tudman offered Croats a new organisation and a political alternative, a ‘solution’. In May 1989, together with his supporters, he founded the HDZ, a party that explicitly called for self–determination for Croatia, including the right to secession and a revival of Croatian values primarily based on Catholicism and combined with Croatian historical and cultural traditions censored during communism. Tudman stressed that HDZ, when it was formed, had a unique position on the Croatian political scene. It claimed to represent no particular class or previous ideology (middle


class, peasant, workers, Christian, liberal, socialist). It identified nation-building as its focus nation-wide, with an aim to bring together “all nation-building forces in all layers and classes of society, from the radical right through the moderate position to the revolutionary left”. The HDZ emphasised the agency of the Croatian people with the slogan “Let us decide on the fate of Croatia” (Croatian: “Odlučimo sami o sudbini Hrvatske”) while the later, more popular slogan “HDZ zna se”, meaning ‘of course’ or ‘it is so’ equated the Croatian nation with the HDZ as a matter of course. In presenting “a unified front, epitomised by a single leader”, Tuđman became appealing to a large number of people, allowing support to come from a variety of sources. Eatwell refers to this type of charisma as centripetal, where the leader operates in confident yet abstract and general terms, thus managing to attract a wider audience.

The party was founded with substantial finance from the Croatian Diaspora where nationalism remained strong during the years of Yugoslav Communism. With this resource in mind, in his speech at the founding assembly of HDZ, Tuđman expressed his concerns over the number of Croatians living abroad. Historical injustices, he asserted, had scattered around one third of the Croatian nation around different continents of the world. And for that reason, he added, the HDZ will put out a request whereby a legal postulation will allow all Croatian emigrants, regardless of their past or present political affiliations, to return, either permanently or temporarily, to their homeland.

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socialist Yugoslavia collapsing, the HDZ issued a statement to its citizens and the
Croatian Sabor\textsuperscript{354} promising a legal and political guarantee of a safe return home for all
Croatian emigrants, regardless of their political affiliation. Tuđman also announced the
establishing of ‘Homeland’ (Croatian: ‘Domovina d.d.’), a shareholding company aimed
at stimulating entrepreneurship in all fields of economic and cultural life and thus acting
as a tool in strengthening Diaspora and homeland links. Domovina d.d. would also help
finance an independent HDZ weekly that would address different socio-economic and
cultural issues.\textsuperscript{355} The company later developed a reputation for corruption and
mismanagement.

Through his party Tuđman was able to organise support and get access to new recruits.\textsuperscript{356}
The network of future HDZ members gradually expanded as party representatives
travelled around Croatia and all over the world gathering sympathisers. In an interview,
Šeks tells about his visits to places around Slavonia as well as Germany, Sweden and
Australia, looking for like-minded supporters. Meanwhile, Tuđman went to the US and
Canada.\textsuperscript{357} By January 1990, dozens of HDZ branches emerged in the US and Canada
with several more dozen in Australia, Latin America, and Europe. Germany alone had
more than 20 branches. Despite humble beginnings, the party very soon grew to
enormous proportions. HDZ supporters from the Diaspora were united in February

\textsuperscript{354} The Croatian Parliament.

\textsuperscript{355} Smilov and Toplak point out that the legal functioning of Domovina d.d, soon became problematic. It
has been seen by some as a “symbol of misuse of political power, corruption, and illegal financing”.

Smilov, F. & Toplak, J. (Eds.) (2007). Political finance and corruption in Eastern Europe: the
transition period (p.56). Ashgate: Hampshire.

\textsuperscript{356} More on Diaspora strong and weak ties in Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{357} Prenc, M. (2009, June 18.). Secret Meeting Twenty years Ago: If Militia Burst, We Consider HDZ
burst-in-we-consider-hdz-founded/266163
1990, jointly demonstrating their support at the HDZ’s first party congress in Zagreb. By that time, Tuđman’s party reportedly had 250,000 followers in former Yugoslavia and another 30,000 overseas. “Like fire or wind on the savannah, the HDZ spread throughout the world”. Chapter V, ‘From Victim to Victory – Framing Solutions and Attracting Support’, will focus in more detail on how Tudman attracted capable lieutenants and political allies.

Silencing Competition

At a time when domestic resources for party–building were extremely scarce, and competition over these resources high, the incentives to court the Croatian Diaspora were significant. Tuđman very quickly recognised this important potential source of political and financial support and the prominence of Diaspora’s role in Tuđman’s political agenda becomes evident as early as the late 1980s.

There were other leaders of Croatian opinion at the time, and it would be inaccurate to claim that Tuđman was alone in his realisation and that his contemporaries did not share the same awareness. However, it was Tuđman who managed to mobilise the Croatian people around his views and lead them through what many of them defined as ‘the wasteland’. While it can be argued that someone else may have been better able to lead the Croatian people through the desolation of war and its aftermath during the early 1990s, Tuđman was most equipped with the political ability to seize the opportunities.

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that presented themselves and subsequently enabled him to assume leadership. Let us briefly examine his competition.

The Croatian political scene in 1990 was very much focused on answering the ‘national question’, which resulted in the formation and revival of a number of political parties. Croatian parties of the right and centre-right were Tuđman’s biggest competition in securing Diaspora support. Other well-known individuals in the Croatian political sphere were leaders from the 1971 Croatian Spring movement – Savka Dabčević–Kučar, Miko Tripalo, Vlado Gotovac – who also had the ability and the potential to make use of Diaspora’s resources. They had personal commitment, political recognition, excellent reputations, and nationalist credibility. Dabčević–Kučar and Tripalo together formed the Coalition of People’s Accord in an effort to avoid the nationalist and anti-Communist votes being split, thus allowing the League of Communists of Croatia to remain in power. It was joined by the centrist Croatian Social Liberal Party, right-wing Croatian Democratic Party and Croatian Christian Democratic Party, as well as the nominally left-wing Social Democrats of Croatia. The Croatian Peasant Party, a moderate conservative party, initially formed in 1904 under Stjepan Radić and Vlatko Maček, was also reconstituted in 1990 and won several seats in the Croatian Parliament.

In the 1990s the increase in both Croatian and Serbian nationalism also inspired the restoration of the oldest Croatian political party, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)\(^\text{360}\) where the ‘right(s)’ in the party's name refer to the legal and moral validation for the

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independence and autonomy of Croatia. The party was re-formed by Dobroslav Paraga and a delegation of HDZ dissidents who initially joined Tuđman’s HDZ expecting it to be far more radical than it was. As a result, Tuđman and the HDZ faced heavy criticism in 1991 and 1992 from Dobroslav Paraga and the HSP. Donald Horowitz identifies this as ‘flanking’, a central pattern and form of ethnic politics. Flanking, according to Horowitz, is the attempt of an insurgent party representing one ethnic group to challenge the dominant party of the same ethnic group by claiming a more radical, often referred to by themselves as more ‘patriotic’ or ‘loyal’, position. The Croatian political scene of the 1990s is an example of the so-called centrifugal ‘outbidding’ where party competition arises not between ethnic groups but within them. However, because of internal instability, the Croatian Party of Rights did not partake in the Croatian parliamentary elections in 1990, an absence which helped Tuđman’s HDZ gather the votes that would have otherwise gone to HSP. It was Tuđman and his party that would earn the reputation, especially internationally and among Serbs, as the quintessence of extreme Croatian nationalism even without the


Paraga united those who preferred direct and resolute military action against Krajina Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s Army. For this reason, his party formed its own militia, the Croatian Defence Forces (Croatian: Hrvatske obrambene snage, HOS). According to Paraga, his party supports “a Croatia to the Drina, and a Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Adriatic”.


The height of HSP’s political appeal was in 1991 and 1992 when Croatian Defence Forces, its military wing, played a key role in defending Croatia. Paraga was celebrated as the champion of Croatian freedom and independence.
direct link to the Ustaše such as exhibited by the HSP. However, Tuđman’s initial plan to improve the position of Croatia within a more loosely structured Yugoslavia was altered as a result of Milošević’s actions, as well as pressures from the Diaspora, driving Tuđman to seek secession. Frame modification, which will explain how some of Tuđman’s ideas changed due to lack of resonance, is addressed in more detail in Chapter V, ‘From Victim to Victory’.

The other major bloc that emerged at the start of the 1990 election campaign was dominated by the League of Communists of Croatia, re–branded as the League of Communists of Croatia–Party for Democratic Change (SKH–SDP), led by Ivica Račan. Račan saw the increasing nationalist tendencies and its ‘dangerous intentions’ as an opportunity to remain in power. However, Tuđman’s principles were seen by most Croats as the best answer to Serbian nationalism at the time. Tuđman’s nationalist framework carefully and clearly identified ‘the Other’, ‘the Aggressor’, making the decision to reject the status quo very simple. This was in contrast to the Coalition of People’s accord, for example, which not only formed too late in the process but was often criticised as being overly elitist and intellectual. This was an important first stage in broadening one’s support base and gathering resources, with an aim of securing political power. Tuđman’s brand of nationalism particularly appealed to its founders overseas within the Croatian Diaspora. Given the nationalist roots of the politically

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active core of the Croatian Diaspora, they were the best potential ally for right–of–centre, anti–communist parties. As Vesna Pusić, a leader in the centre–left Croatian People’s Party (HNS), observes, the Diaspora’s extremist circles, already leaning toward Tuđman and the HDZ, were reinforced in this tendency by Tuđman's first televised speech on behalf of his party, in which he implicitly called for territorial acquisitions in western Herzegovina, a region that was the homeland of key Croat–émigré figures. Extreme nationalists among the émigrés became instrumental in raising funds for Tudman and the HDZ. [They] joined the HDZ in large numbers and gradually came to fill certain key party and governmental posts.³⁷⁰ It was clear that Tuđman party’s nationalist ideology was well appropriate for the political climate at the time. The nationalist principles went hand in hand with Tuđman’s tendency to discredit his opposition by calling them ‘ignorant non–entities’ and to refer to those that opposed his views as ‘anti–Croatian’.³⁷¹ Therefore, when categorising Tuđman as a charismatic leader, it is also important not to underestimate his power of silencing the opposition.

Relatively quickly, Tuđman managed to overrun his rivals and acquire virtually unanimous Diaspora support. One important advantage Tudman had over his opponents at the time that greatly consolidated his relationship with the Diaspora was his ability to travel abroad. In 1978, the year his passport was reinstated after 17 years, he was one of the only political non–conformists with an ability to travel abroad.³⁷² His passport was his key to developing a relationship with the Diaspora, a luxury not available to his

political competition.\textsuperscript{373} Political opportunity, which, in Tuđman’s case, was his early access to the Diaspora proved to be of utmost importance, if not a deciding factor in his success.

Tuđman was often criticised by his opposition for his policies and his actions. Nevertheless, his skills as a leader remain undisputed even by his opponents, his harshest critics and even by his enemies. During his war crimes trial in The Hague, Slobodan Milošević, the former Yugoslav President, faced charges including genocide for conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. When asked to give his assessment of Tuđman “as a leader or strategist or tactician at the time”, Milošević\textsuperscript{374} stated,

\begin{quote}
I thought Tuđman was an effective leader in the sense that he knew where he wanted to take Croatia. He was able – he surrounded himself with some capable subordinates, such as the Foreign Minister Granić and the Defence Minister Šušak. He was able to delegate to them and yet – and they were able to negotiate on his behalf, and yet he remained in command.
\end{quote}

Tuđman was fastidious in his choice of words and phrases, but also in his choice of subordinates. In his first two years as president, Tuđman appointed and dismissed five prime ministers, five defence ministers, and six foreign ministers.\textsuperscript{375}

**Diaspora Loyalties and Collective Benefits**

Issues relating to the Croatian Diaspora were an important part of Tuđman’s political programme. This becomes evident as early as late the 1980s during his visits to North

\textsuperscript{373}Tuđman was one of the only dissidents given a passport, which led many to suspect the involvement of secret services of UDBA. Several Diaspora activists voiced these concerns (authors interviews; Darko Hudešlić works, 2004.).

\textsuperscript{374}Milošević chose to conduct his own defence in the five-year long trial, which ended without a verdict when he died in March 2006 in his prison cell in The Hague.

America where he set the foundations for a new Croatian national awakening. Tuđman openly advocated the idea of a pan–Croatian reconciliation and Croatian sovereignty, setting the groundwork for a new political movement. His efforts culminated in May 1990, when, with significant backing from the Croatian Diaspora, he won the first multi–party elections held in Croatia since World War II. Many Diaspora members were suitably rewarded for their efforts as they assumed key positions in the new Croatian Government.

When the road connecting Zagreb and Belgrade – the ‘Motorway of Brotherhood and Unity’ (Croatian: ‘Autoput Bratstva i Jedinstva’) named by Tito after the motto of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – was closed due to fighting, it somehow aptly symbolised the failure of Tito’s idealism and the opening of a new road for Croatia and its Diaspora. With HDZ coming to power, more than a million ethnic Croats living abroad had access to Croatian citizenship. The new citizenship law facilitated the naturalisation process for ethnic Croats in the Diaspora by exempting them from several major requirements that non–Croats had to meet. This appealed to euphoric right–

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377 Per Article 8 a foreigner (including residents of other ex-Yugoslav Republics who became aliens after the new law went into effect) wishing to naturalise must meet the following requirements: 1) he or she must be at least 18 years old and be legally independent, 2) he must have his foreign citizenship revoked or submit proof that it will be revoked upon gaining Croatian citizenship, 3) prior to filing the petition, he must have had a continuous, registered place of residence for a period of at least five years on the territory of Croatia, 4) he must be proficient in the Croatian language and Latin alphabet, and 5) his conduct must demonstrate attachment to the legal system and customs in the Republic of Croatia and his acceptance of Croatian culture. Article 11, by contrast, establishes that an emigrant, as well as his or her descendants, can naturalise as a Croatian citizen even if he or she does not meet prerequisites 1–4 under Article 8. Thus, while the Republic of Croatia does not officially recognise dual citizenship without bilateral agreements, the fact that ethnic Croatian emigrants do not need to meet requirement (2) allows ‘them’ to retain multiple citizenships in practice. The same exceptions are granted to foreign citizens who are married to a Croatian emigrant who has acquired Croatian citizenship, and to ethnic Croats in the near abroad (Article 16).

(From Zakon o hrvatskom državljanstvu (Croatian: Croatian Citizenship Law), Narodne novine broj 53m October 8, 1991, as amended).
wing Croatian emigrants, with their identity linked to a symbolically important territory, and their dreams of an independent Croatia. They were highly influenced by Tuđman’s promises and vigorously supported his political ideology. The gift of citizenship also appealed to Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, including some of Tuđman’s closest allies, many of whom were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina only. The 1992 Croatian parliamentary elections – held in exceptionally undesirable conditions with one quarter of the country’s territory under Serbian control and the rest involved in a war raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina – saw hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people facing obstacles in exercising their right to vote. To boost turnout, Tuđman extended voting rights to anyone who claimed one Croatian parent or even merely an intention to acquire Croatian citizenship. Given HDZ had the greatest Diaspora support dating back to the late 1980s, predictions by HDZ revealed that they would continue to receive the strongest support from the Diaspora. These predictions proved correct as hundreds of people lined up in Croatian diplomatic and consular offices, churches, Croatian cultural centres and schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North America, Australia and elsewhere to vote. Over 200,000 ballots were sent abroad for the elections. No information on the election officials was available, but the opposition was particularly concerned that the approved Croatian diplomatic officials abroad were all loyal HDZ devotees. Tuđman was accused by the opposition of manipulating the election campaign to ensure that both he and his party were returned to office.\footnote{The International Republican Institute (1992). \textit{Elections in the Republic of Croatia}. Retrieved from} Diaspora participation in Croatian elections has been the source of contentious debate in Croatian politics ever since.
In his analysis of charisma, Weber argues that it was unlikely that such a personalised reign could be ‘routinised’ because it would be difficult for charismatic leaders to sustain the support of their followers as that would require the constant achievement of ‘miracles’. Once Tuđman had assumed office it become increasingly difficult to separate personal charisma from office charisma, i.e. “the sense of national or ideological mission and legitimate status which comes simply through holding a particular office.”

As the president of independent Croatia, Tuđman held a title that had never been held by any other person before him. This alone was a ‘miracle’ in its own right and it kept him going long after the peak of his popularity. The creation of independent Croatia, international recognition, and the liberation of occupied territories can be labelled as ‘miracles’ performed by Tuđman at the peak of his charismatic powers. These proved his special capabilities as a charismatic leader but were soon replaced by the charisma of his office. As the novelty waned, his appeal also started to gradually dissipate. But charisma was not the only way Tuđman collected voters. He used framing strategies combined with numerous incentives to attract followers throughout his career as a politician. Some were aimed at strengthening educational, economic and cultural, but mostly political ties with the Diaspora. To use Angelo Panebianco’s framework, HDZ Diaspora policies were based on collective and selective incentives that secured Diaspora loyalties. Collective benefits were visible in the form of access to Croatian citizenship, voting rights, and numerous symbolic homeland–Diaspora programmes and proposals. These, in conjunction with selective


incentives in the form of high–ranking positions in the newly established Croatian Government and lucrative opportunities in the country’s privatisation process, helped maintain Diaspora allegiance to HDZ. Chapter VI, ‘Diaspora after Tudman’, focuses on the modern–day Croatian Diaspora and looks at how and why modern Diaspora organisations continue to internalise as well as disseminate ideas framed by Tudman in the 1990s. The chapter also discusses the current status of the Diaspora and its disillusionment with the current political settlement.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce Franjo Tudman, ‘the man behind the frame’, and address a gap in the literature by focusing on human agency – how leaders generate social change, how they take advantage of existing opportunities, but also create new ones, how they fine–tune their image and identity to resonate with their potential followers, and how they arouse commitment and mobilise masses.

Tudman is credited with setting the foundations for an independent Croatia, pulling the country out of communism and towards democracy. His legacy lives on, with Croatian bridges, schools, squares and streets named after him. However, he is often criticised by many for his policies and his adamant nationalism and unyielding discourse, and his reputation remains controversial. Nonetheless, Tudman’s leadership abilities, admired by his supporters and his opponents alike, are undisputed. His abilities, identified by his followers as exceptional, demonstrated his right to lead. As Weber states, recognition on the part of those subject to authority is decisive for the validity of charisma.  

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A conducive political environment was a crucial factor that contributed to Tuđman’s political success. A growing sense of crisis left followers starved for a new leader able to supply them with meaning. The Croatian political arena of the 1990s provided fertile ground for Tuđman’s ideas, which enabled him to form institutions and fully implement his vision. Also, Tuđman’s access to the Diaspora in the 1980s gave him and his party a head start over every other political leader in the country in building momentum abroad.

Tuđman was a man of many contradictions, evident from radical changes in both his political and religious views. However, he endured by staying attuned to the needs of his audience and by being able to remain relevant. His personal experiences, including political persecutions, arrests and imprisonments, helped him publicly identify with the historical injustices suffered by the Croatian nation, which later became key themes of his collective action frames. As a charismatic and politically resourceful leader, Tuđman inspired masses. As a “meaning–seeking, frame–producing” leader, he skilfully manoeuvred abstract conceptions of Croatian identity and interpreted and articulated these to legitimate his political programme. He acted swiftly and creatively and through his discourse, rhetoric and tactics manipulated old ideas and created new ones.

Tuđman and his supporters chose the right – nationalist – political framework, promising imminent transformation to Croats around the world. Within this framework, they successfully identified a question of national urgency, pointing at the same time to the causes of this ‘national distress’. This, as we will see in the next chapter, was achieved

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by carefully constructing what the literature calls meta–frames or master frames. These larger schemata of interpretation linked policies and generated larger narratives connected to collective Croatian perspectives in an effort to move masses to challenge existing policies and practices and to support alternative ones. Although important, we will see that Tuđman’s charisma, his many skills and talents, and his ability to take advantage of political opportunity, were only a part of the puzzle that allowed Tuđman to assume power. Of equal importance was choosing the right framework to tackle the issues that marked the turn of the decade.
CHAPTER IV: The Framing of a Dark Diagnosis – Interpreting Injustices and Naming Enemies

Like a picture frame, an issue frame marks off some part of the world. Like a building frame, it holds things together. It provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking them through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is essential – what consequences and values are at stake. We do not see the frame directly, but infer its presence by its characteristic expressions and language. Each frame gives the advantage to certain ways of talking and thinking, while it places others out of the picture.⁴³³

Croatian emigrants, similar to other emigrant groups, embarked on two kinds of journeys; two simultaneous pursuits for a home and a place of belonging. The first was a physical one, across national borders, from Croatia to new chosen lands, and potentially back to Croatia again. The other kind of journey was a journey through questions of identity, history, cultures, ancestry and belonging. This chapter will look at how some of these notions were used by Franjo Tuđman and his allies to mobilise the Diaspora for a common cause. The 1990s, as we shall see, marked a period when many Croats crossed paths on their respective journeys and joined forces in their support for Franjo Tuđman.

In late February 1989, at a time when the multi–party system in Croatia was only just developing, Tuđman announced that HDZ, his new party, was about to mark the end of Croatia’s long and enforced silence. Vladimir Šeks explains that HDZ emerged as a response to the plans of imperialist Greater Serbian policy. Its aim, in Šeks’ words, was

“getting Croatia out of slavery”\(^\text{384}\). In late 1989, in its appeal to the citizens of Croatia and to its Communist controlled Parliament, the newly formed HDZ strongly advocated for a new multi–party government. It called for a repeal of the Communist Party monopoly, asked for secret and direct elections for Parliament, unrestricted travel for Croatian emigrants and freedom for political prisoners. It also specifically called for Croatian self–determination. HDZ rapidly transformed itself into a mass nationalist movement led by Dr Franjo Tuđman, its founder. HDZ formally took power on 30 May 1990, which has been celebrated as Statehood Day since. Tuđman became the father of his newly proclaimed state of Croatia and HDZ continued to dominate the Croatian political scene throughout the 1990s.

The previous chapter looked at Tuđman as a leader and as a politician, analysing specific traits and experiences from his past that contributed to his charismatic personality and his rise to power. The focus was on Tuđman’s charismatic authority and his symbolic and cultural capital\(^\text{385}\), both localised and universalistic. The localised cultural capital equipped him with the knowledge of local idioms and communities’ experiences, values and practices and connected him with a mass base\(^\text{386}\). The chapter also unveiled a great deal of his ‘universalistic cultural capital’, knowledge and understanding of values, changes, and social dynamics.


sympathies, cultural principles and political trends within the broader public he sought to reach\textsuperscript{387}.

The focus of this chapter is to look at the first component of the framing process – the diagnosis. The goal of diagnostic framing is to identify, and suitably frame a burning national issue as well as attribute blame. “[T]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”\textsuperscript{388} This chapter will look at the ‘national problem’ of early 1990s Croatia, as identified by the framers, and show how the ‘critical mass’\textsuperscript{389} i.e., individuals who had a high interest in the movement goal and initiated the collective action at the pioneer stage of a movement, sought to identify the problem and then attributed it to a specific source that was then transformed into an object of blame and/or responsibility.\textsuperscript{390} To achieve this, the chapter will identify three fundamental elements of the diagnostic framing process, the first one being ‘problem diagnoses’, followed by the formation of ‘injustice frames’ and the closely linked ‘adversarial’ or ‘boundary’ frames. I shall examine how the frames promoted a particular “causal interpretation” and “moral evaluation”, which then enabled the framers to suggest a suitable “treatment recommendation”.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{387} ibid


The Framing of the National Problem

There can be no return to the past, to the times when they, the Serbs, were spreading cancer in the heart of Croatia...\textsuperscript{392}

Addressing the pressing national problem, was, as we shall see in this chapter, closely linked to the process of naming the actors responsible for causing it, most frequently referred to by the HDZ as the ‘great–Serbian aggressor’ (Croatian: ‘velikosrpski agresor’) or ‘Yugo–communist hell’.

The diagnostic frame is often characterised by its selectivity, in that it reduces a series of disparate social phenomena to a few principal themes\textsuperscript{393}. From Tuđman speeches one can identify the following ‘diagnostic themes’: a century–old hardship, associated with the loss of freedom, sovereignty and democracy as a result of years of struggle under foreign domination, linked to the present–day ‘greater–Serbian aggression’ which threatened Croatia’s territorial integrity. The latter can be summed up under ‘greater–Serbian aspirations’ as was generally referred to by Tuđman in his public speeches, also brought together under the same term in the media.

HDZ based its campaign on a centuries–long desire for greater Croatian sovereignty and on a wide–ranging anti–Yugounitarist ideology. These ideas were presented as a way out of the situation Croatia found itself in in the late 1980s. Much of the HDZ campaign was based on a promise to protect the Croatian nation from the threatening Serb ambitions, led by Milošević, towards a Greater Serbia. One of Tuđman’s main axioms,

\textsuperscript{392} Croatian President Franjo Tuđman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Online: http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm

attentively reverberated in his speeches, was his claim that Croatia, built on European traditions, faith and civilisation, should not accept systems based on different civilisational – Balkan – frameworks. In an interview in 1990, when asked why his party won so convincingly in the national elections, President Tuđman’s answer was: “Because we knew the answers to the questions and the hopes of the nation.”

An important part of ‘problem identification’ was setting the scene for Diaspora involvement. It was important to show how the Diaspora’s separation from its homeland was a part of the ‘national problem’, but also, as we shall see later, a key part of the solution. From the beginning, Tuđman’s party had strong sympathisers within the Croatian Diaspora. Many of them were political émigrés longing for a lost homeland, still affected by their tragic exile and looking for a way to redress their historic grievances. HDZ, as an openly nationalist party and the first one to discard the official socialist logos and use the traditional Croatian emblem, outlawed under SFRY, greatly appealed to these groups of migrants. Croatian Diaspora was a central part of Tuđman’s political agenda even before HDZ. Its importance is evident as early as the late 1980s during his lectures in the Diaspora, where he advocated for the idea of an all-round Croat reconciliation and later promoted the creation of an independent Croatian state.

The Croatian Diaspora openly supported the idea. One example of their support is the 1987 letter to the editor of the Fraternalist, the official newsletter of the Croatian Fraternal Union. The letter emphasised that “a nation without its independence is like a

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homeless person living in someone else’s home as a slave.” These sentiments were not only expressed by Diaspora elites but were also voiced at micro levels, as illustrated by the letter:

Those elements in Yugoslavia which are at present in control must understand that the Croatian people will never give up their rights to liberty, justice and self-determination. We want freedom and independence and for this we do not owe an apology to anyone. In today’s Croatia, foreign elements can sing and hoist their flags, but if the Croatian people do the same, they are declared an enemy of the state and placed in jail. Mr. Editor, we Croatians are slaves in our own homeland. If you examine our historical past, I am sure that you will be able to conclude that we Croatians have done so much to advance the cause of Slavism and Yugoslavism, which has brought us nothing more than oppression and misery. For this reason, I am and always will be for Croatian independence and liberty.397

In his speech in June 1989 at the founding assembly of HDZ, Tuđman openly introduced the Diaspora into his discourse, expressing concerns over the number of Croats living abroad. “This is due to historical injustices,” he stressed, “which is why,” he added, the HDZ needs to ensure that all Croatian emigrants, are able to return to their homeland.398 Diaspora return was also a key theme of a popular song ‘My Homeland’ (Croatian: ‘Moja Domovina’), a theme tune of Croatian Radio Television which played at the beginning and end of broadcasting from 1991 to 2000. The song was released in the initial stages of the ‘Homeland War’ and is one of the most popular Croatian patriotic songs, still widely sung today as a symbol of unity and pride.

In an interview for *Spiegel* in 1990, discussing Croatia’s links with the Diaspora, Tuđman stated unreservedly that “We will enable their return”. Later in 1995, he talked about “hundreds of thousands of dispersed Croats” who settled around the world “from the South to the North Pole”. He stressed the need for them to “return to the houses of their grandfathers”, adding that he himself had encountered second generation Croats, who were born over there and have never seen the beautiful lands of Croatia, yet Croatian words and the Croatian national anthem brought tears to their eyes. Today we have an independent Croatia and we have something to offer to them. Ask them to return home.

With HDZ in power, more than a million diaspora Croats became Croatian citizens. The key enabler was the new citizenship law, which made it easier for ethnic Croats to become citizens.

In his speech in Knin in 1995, Tuđman’s sums up his definition of the ‘national problem’ Croatia faced at the beginning of the 1990s:

> And there can be no return to the past, to the times when the Serbs were spreading cancer in the heart of Croatia, cancer which was destroying the Croatian national being and which did not allow the Croatian people to be the master in their own house and did not allow Croatia to lead an independent and sovereign life under this wide, blue sky and within the international community of sovereign nations.

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401The issue of citizenship will be explored in more detail in the ‘Diaspora after Tuđman’ chapter.

According to Tuđman, to address the problems of the nation, the nation needed unity. Diaspora, according to him, was an organic part of the Croatian nation, it had a say in the future of its homeland and its homeland needed its support. This message of unity was heard on many occasions, including as early as 2–5 November 1989, at the 21st National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), hosted by the Midwest Slavic Conference, which took place in Chicago at the Palmer House Hotel. Franjo Tuđman attended the event. This event was preceded by an earlier meeting from 19–21 October in Zagreb, which gathered representatives from the Diaspora and Croatia proper. It became evident that “the wall between Croatia and its Diaspora has fallen and that political and cultural efforts from both the home and host countries have merged, ending the decade on an optimistic note”.

On 29 November 1989, on the last ‘Day of the Republic’ the newly formed HDZ symbolically stressed the need to fight for freedom and again reached out to Croats in the Diaspora inviting them to return home. Less than two months later the growing rift among the branches of the Communist Party and their respective republics led to the effective dissolution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in January 1990 in Belgrade. On the same day at the ‘Croatian home’ in Eastlake, Cleveland, the HDZ organised its first convention. Franjo Tuđman, who was also there

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a year earlier spoke at the convention and invited all participants to attend the first HDZ General Assembly on 24 and 25 February 1990. The meeting was a historical event, held at the famous ‘Vatroslav Lisinski’ concert hall in Zagreb, with a large number of attendees from the Diaspora. Ina Vukić, author, political and humanitarian activist, and member of the Croatia Diaspora, remembers it as follows:

1,760 delegates from Croatia and the diaspora participated, 297 observers, 320 guests and 54 journalists. Among the guests were the US, the French, the Italian and the Soviet consuls as well as a representative from the Canadian Embassy. Thundering applause followed almost every word spoken by Dr. Franjo Tuđman. The resolution on the Croatian hymn was delivered at this event (…) I remember these days as if they happened yesterday! I remember the utter joy at seeing democracy in Croatia on the horizon… reaching for it.407

The Canadian and US chapters of HDZ collected nearly $1 million to support the democratic process replacing the Communist Party in the Republic of Croatia. Given the communist controlled media, the money was used for office supplies, printing and advertising in support of democratic parties.408

Research conducted for the purposes of this study identified two diagnostic frames designed by HDZ in late the 1980s and early 1990s, here labelled as an ‘injustice frame’ and a ‘boundary’ and ‘adversarial frames’. These diagnostic frames were both heavily used in an effort to attract followers from the Croatian Diaspora who mobilised around grievances suffered by Croats now living abroad and their co–ethnics at home. However, before discussing these frames in more detail, let us have a look at how they

406 ibid
fit into the wider Diaspora framing process. Below I gather the main elements of Tuđman’s collective action frames. Some of these will be discussed in later chapters but the below framework is a useful overview of the frames used by Tuđman to inspire and mobilise Diaspora Croats.

**HDZ Diaspora Collective Action Frame (CAF)**

1. Abolition of ‘National Slavery’
   - It was stressed that Croatia had to escape from “national slavery and Bolshevik darkness.”\(^{409}\) To dramatise the issue, traumatic events from Croatian history were brought to the surface, with past injustices emphasised. Croatia was portrayed as a perpetual victim (during the 1990s and throughout history), including the injustice suffered by numerous members of the Diaspora forced to leave their homeland in the past (political émigrés, e.g. those that left Croatia after World War II and during the 1970s Croatian spring);

2. ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’
   - A collective enemy – the ‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ – was identified (also referred to as the ‘Yugoslavian and socialist devil’\(^{410}\) and ‘Yugo–communist aggressor/hell’)\(^{411}\);
   - Clear divisions were created between the Croats and the Serbs, highlighting all existing differences, making a clear point that Croatia was and always has

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\(^{411}\)ibid
been a part of Western Europe (Mediterranean) tradition, while Serbs belonged to the other side, the East. Tuđman stressed that Croatia was a European nation, both traditionally and culturally;

3. All for one and one for all: national reconciliation and pan–Croatian unity

- Tuđman recognised Croatian national unity as a prerequisite for Croatian national sovereignty – unity of Croats within and outside the homeland. He advocated national reconciliation of supporters of former Croatian Domobrans (the home guard of the Independent State of Croatia – NDH), Partisans, Ustaše, and other colours and camps. His plan was to bridge the fractious divide in Croatia between the “sons and daughters of Ustaše”, in his words, and the “sons and daughters of Partisans”⁴¹². In a speech celebrating Croatia’s first Independence Day,⁴¹³ he stressed, “in order to achieve [Croatian independence] (…) we had to unite the disunited Croathood. We had to muster all Croatian wit and reject all Croatian stupidity”⁴¹⁴. In his own words, he mirrored Susurro’s claim that “Diasporas are like trees, the limbs may be distinct but the roots are one”.⁴¹⁵

- Tuđman was not only the advocate of his political aspirations; he was the embodiment of it. He insisted that “we had all been fighting for the same

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cause, the Croatian cause, just in different ways.” All for one and one for all, was the Croatian motto\textsuperscript{416} (also the slogan of the \textit{Fraternalist});

- The Croatian Diaspora was identified as an organic part of the Croatian nation;
- The Croatian Diaspora (its support: financial, political, moral) was portrayed as indispensable for the creation of new Croatia;

4. The ‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’

- Croatia was portrayed as one of the oldest nation states in Europe and Croatians around the world were reminded that they are entitled to the realisation of their ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’\textsuperscript{417}. This was portrayed as their right.

5. Return of all Diaspora Croats

- Tuđman advocated the return of Diaspora Croats. Furthermore, he pushed for legislation that assisted their naturalisation. Croats in the Diaspora “no longer have to hide in exile – today they can proudly say they are Croats”\textsuperscript{418};

6. The Catholic Church – the preserver of Croatian identity

- The Catholic Church was portrayed as a preserver of Croatian identity. The church became an important ally of the HDZ, reinforcing the role of catholic values and principles in the Croatian society, in their fight against the ‘devil’.


The Pope, in Tuđman’s words, is defined as “the first moral power of the world.” In a speech from 1992 celebrating Croatian Independence Day, he stressed that it was achieved with God’s help. The HDZ anthem “God Protect Croatia” became a popular song within the Diaspora.

Below is an excerpt from a speech Tuđman gave in 1995. It is an example of CAF themes expressed in typical Tuđmanesque sentences, described by Gordana Uzelac as “long, often long enough to form a paragraph, with lots of references to history, metaphors and burdened with adjectives.”

It goes without saying that from fertile areas to all these parts we liberated there will be room for all our people, and our nation will celebrate its freedom and build its Croatia for which, since King Zvonimir 11th century, too many Croatian people died and too many of our sons suffered in the dungeons of Venice, Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.

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Developing Injustice Frames


At the beginning of the 1990s, Franjo Tuđman started to use popular discourse that proved successful in arousing the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the Croatian people. Much of this discourse used symbolic representation referring to events from Croatian history, translating them into familiar popular language, giving everyone an experience of the past in the present. The carefully constructed discourse, used by Tuđman and his HDZ allies, was aimed at forming a collective memory, “the active past that forms our identities”.\footnote{Hobsbawm, E. & Terence Ranger (Eds.) (1983). \textit{The Invention of Tradition}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.} These symbolic representations, often allowing for individual changes, revisions, or additions were instrumental in justifying the presence of the new ideology. Collective memories were communicated to the public arena both at home and abroad and grew to be the dominating element of the late 1980s and early 1990s political discourse in Croatia and its Diaspora. For example, the international channel \textit{The Voice of Croatia}, the international programme of the Croatian Radio, was introduced as an hour–long programme of the same name, which began airing in 1991 on short wave radio and was intended for Croatian audiences living abroad. The programme was also referenced in one of the articles of the Fraternalist.\footnote{Direktno iz Zagreba: Slušajte dnevnu jednosatnu emisiju [Straight from Croatia: Listen to the hour-long Daily News Program] (1991, September 11) \textit{Fraternalist}, 14. Djuric, I. (2001). The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the Formation of a Transnational National Community. \textit{Spaces of Identity}, 3, 89—105.} It has evolved since and continues to systematically and expansively cover current events at
home, reports on the lives and activities of Croatians living around the world and provides information about the work of state and social institutions relevant to relations between Croatians at home and those living abroad. It also reports on issues related to the return of diaspora Croats and tells stories about Croatia’s heritage and culture and carries key sporting events. It airs exclusively Croatian music.426

In the early 1990s, the government expected the Croatian media to be ‘responsible’ and to contribute to the war effort. Special military censors were appointed, with powers to ban articles and arrest journalists. Tomislav Marčinko, editor–in–chief of television and radio news programmes, laid down rules for the coverage of the war, including:

Do not broadcast pictures of blown up, badly wounded and shot Croatian soldiers. Casualty figures of guardsmen and police must always be accompanied by [such terms as] ‘fell for Croatia’s freedom’, ‘heroes in the defence of the Fatherland’.

Soon after the 1990 elections, Radio–Televizija Zagreb had been renamed Hrvatska (Croatia) Radio–Televizija (HRT) and remained in state ownership, with its directors, including the director general, Ines Saskar, a known supporter of the HDZ, being appointed by the government.427

Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, an opponent of the HDZ government, argued that

Croatia compensates for losing on the battlefield by showing severed heads and massacred civilians to create a stronger feeling of hatred, which would wipe away the feeling of aimlessness and bitter defeats.428

426 The Voice of Croatia Website. Retrieved from http://voiceofcroatia.hrt.hr/
Nationalism continued to drive censorship throughout the early 1990s and the war years, leaving disobeying reporters of Croatian nationality exposed to the most drastic persecution.

During the war in Croatia, 80 per cent of HRT’s transmitters and more than 30 TV translators were either occupied, damaged, or completely destroyed, but they continued to transmit with reduced power from reserve locations until they were repaired in 1992 – “something that makes HRT proud of its technical staff”.

A separate Croatian section of the Voice of America (VOA) radio service, granted in 1992 and soon expanded to television, was also instrumental in disseminating information to the Diaspora (VOA will be discussed in more detail later). Djuric also reports that in January 1994, as well as the Voice of Croatia, a special satellite Croatian TV programme for North America was introduced, broadcasting one hour per day. In February 1994, an agreement was established with SPAN cable TV to transmit the main daily news. Contribution was expected in return.

Fast and qualitative information from the homeland is of extreme importance for all Croatian emigrants who want to participate and contribute to Croatia's economic prosperity.

Injustice frames constituted a key element of collective memories communicated to Croats at home and abroad. Literature defines injustice frames as affirmed grievances and suffering that function as drivers of collective action (Gamson in Johnston &

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Klandermans; Tarrow; Benford & Snow to name a few). More specifically, “before a collective action frame can be generated, evaluations of existing circumstances must be cast as shared grievances”. Injustice frames are one of only a limited number of broad collective action frames that are expansive, inclusive, and flexible enough to be accepted as master frames within the framing literature. “Master frames are generic; specific collective action frames are derivative. Master frames can be construed as functioning in a manner analogous to linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world.” Tedman’s ‘political grammar’ was wide-ranging and inclusive enough to accommodate a variety of different perspectives and interests both in Croatia and within the Croatian Diaspora. Most importantly, it achieved a cultural resonance to the “historical milieu” that it was situated in.

Social movement theorists (SMTs) observe that the motives that transform people from mere observers into active participants in a movement do not develop spontaneously. In order for them to emerge a pre-condition needs to exist, typically in the form of a

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436 Other examples include rights frames, environmental justice frames (Cable & Shriver, 1995; Capek, 1993), oppositional frames (Coy & Woehrle, 1996), etc.


grievance or an outrage caused by perceived injustice committed by another. The success of the movement is conditioned upon the effective framing of the grievance in question in order to render it relevant in a broader social and political context. Existing literature on diasporas observes that periods of hardship in their homelands causes immigrants to form new diasporic structures or join existing ones.\textsuperscript{440} Political and economic circumstances in the late 1980s and the early 1990s Croatia encouraged individuals and groups abroad to shift from one category to another, and motivated them to enter the intricate and often harsh Diaspora reality by voicing their views in the political arena. Homeland conflict, when used successfully in framing strategies as an instrument of promoting issue salience, has the potential, as evident in the Croatian case, to shake up and rearrange all previously established Diaspora strategies, tactics and types of organisation. It can unify split, ‘inert’, and dispersed entities\textsuperscript{441}. Focusing on shared injustices in this period of national crisis, the HDZ evoked a collective Diaspora identity, which was put into effect and encouraged action in the name of the Diaspora and the nation.

Injustice frames interpret the relevant surrounding events and provide the people with a guide to action. In Croatia’s case, injustice frames made it possible for movement leaders not only to identify the problem but also to bring the issue closer to the people by illustrating how significant it is as well as the alternatives that existed to alleviate these injustices. The injustice frame provided a fertile ground for identifying the victims and the nature and severity of the violations perpetrated against them. It also determined


\textsuperscript{441} ibid
who the perpetrators were and identified the reasons behind their actions. As we shall see in the next chapter, this information was essential for later establishing what kind of solution was required to improve the situation and which actors had the necessary capacity and willingness to deploy their resources.

**A Grieving Nation**

The goal of injustice frames used by Tuđman and his followers was to echo the feelings of both past and present suffering among Diaspora members. Past suffering is linked to memorable events and difficult periods from the Croatian past, explained in more detail in the following section. These are events that many of those in the Diaspora experienced first-hand. Present suffering refers to the situation at home that many diaspora Croats identified with. “Diaspora patriots were very aware of the life and death situation at home and of the fact that their homeland was in a desperate need of material and moral support”.

In due course these sufferings were converted into instigators of collective effort for change. The injustice frame used by HDZ, aimed at amplifying the victimisation of the Croatian people, was a compilation of ideas and symbols used as tools to demonstrate the severity of the problem Croatia faced and identify the guilty actors. Tuđman’s programme “Izložena Hrvatska”, roughly translated as “Croatia in exile” or “Expelled Croatia” was based on shared grievances implying that if not all, then most of Diaspora Croats left their country not because they wanted to, but because they had to. Used by Tuđman in his speeches, delivered both at home and abroad, “Croatia in exile” alluded to populations being coerced into leaving their homeland, escaping from persecution.

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war or poverty. Discourse analysis of Tuđman’s speeches and HDZ publications point to some common 20th century themes including the 1945 Bleiburg massacre and the 1970s Croatian Spring, analysed in more detail later in this chapter.

Further, Tuđman’s CAF promoted a particular moral evaluation. The frames contained implicit or explicit appeals to moral principles\(^\text{443}\) that defined the act of the ‘aggressor’ as morally wrong. Closely linked to the issue of morality, the function of the word ‘homeland’ in ‘Homeland War’ as opposed to ‘civil war’ or simply ‘conflict’ in the political discourse of the 1990s (and present–day) Croatia, was to further amplify the ‘justness of the cause’ principle. Confident of their cause being morally just, Tuđman and his followers portrayed the conflict of the 1990s as a key reason for action. As a result, Diaspora members were more easily mobilised around that agenda.

Below is an excerpt from Tuđman’s “Address to the Croatian people during an open aggression by the greater–Serbian aggressor on the Republic of Croatia” in October 1991. It states that the:

United greater Serbian imperialists and vampire–like remains of the Yugoslav communist army are carrying out a full attack on Croatia, breaking all international peace agreements. \(^\text{444}\)

Tuđman then calls on the Croatian people to join in the defence of their homeland, as it is their “sacred duty” to fight for the freedom of “our Croatian land, our sea and our sky over our eternal and only Croatia”. Tailored for this particular speech, this was an


adapted version of his signature closing statement: “Eternal life to our one and only Croatia!”

This is one of many speeches delivered by Tuđman and his ‘co–fighters’ (Croatian: suborci) aimed at awakening the Diaspora’s need to consolidate its political voice and, consequently, its financial and humanitarian support. Diaspora was a powerful resource with an important voice both at home and abroad and, therefore, it was crucial for Tuđman to win their support abroad in order to advance his interests at home. A shared Croatian identity, based on the idea of a common historical fight and a common struggle for Croatian statehood, continued to be reinforced all throughout the 1990s.

The HDZ focused on overcoming historical differences by making it evident to both Croats within and outside Croatia that many social groups were structurally and ideologically placed in opposition to the recent policies endorsed by the previous government in Yugoslavia. This conviction, as explained through the injustice master frame, was based on shared grievances suffered by various groups and functioned as a channel for identity reformulation.

When I think of the war in our homeland, our struggle for independence (...) I think of it as a touchstone of our identity.

The ‘Homeland War’ is often described as a defining moment, “a moment of truth”. According to one member of the Diaspora, it generated “a shift in the hearts and minds

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445 ibid
447 Quote by a young member of a Croatian-American organisation interviewed for the purposes of this study.
of the people, terminated friendships, transformed lives and linked identities”. It is explained as a:

Shift towards what matters (...) our homeland, our history, our identity. We were all grieving and we wanted to help and be closer to others who felt the same.  

Tudman’s focus on the ‘grieving nation’ rearranged all previously established Diaspora strategies and types of organisation. It united split and dispersed Diaspora entities and prompted decisions to organise on behalf of the homeland. “The merciless war against the Republic of Croatia and her citizens, unparalleled in recent history”449, prompted Diaspora members to invest substantial effort and resources in renewing old and building new host–home country links devoted to preserving and cultivating their relationships with their homeland. Convinced of the justness of their fight for a free, peaceful, and democratic Croatia diasporants were prompted to organise and launch massive political campaigns on behalf of the homeland. Action was seen as their duty.

In its century–old history, the CFU has continuously supported the Croatian people and their fight for sovereignty. During the 1990s the CFU assisted the Croats “morally, materially, and politically in their struggle for a free and independent Croatian state”.450 When communist Yugoslavia fell apart, the CFU supported the democratic processes in Croatia. In a letter to Franjo Tudman, CFU National President, Bernard M. Luketich,

448 ibid
449 From Tudman’s letter to Heads of States at the outbreak of the conflict. The letter was sent on November 21 to various heads of government, including Bob Hawke, George Bush, Francois Mitterrand, John Major and Mikhail Gorbachev;
declared CFU’s “support of all efforts to establish a new democratic government”. Another example of their support is the establishment of the CFU Croatian Humanitarian Aid Fund at the 18th CFU Convention in 1991. Fifty thousand dollars was remitted into the Fund by the Convention itself, and another $6,000 was raised by the delegates during the Convention. “This resulted in the greatest outpouring of humanitarian aid by CFU members and friends.” Frequent supplies were shipped from various CFU locations to the homeland and added to the Home Office totals, amounting to more than $150 million in humanitarian aid in the form of medicines and medical equipment, food, clothing and other supplies, transportation and funds for the reconstruction of Croatian hospitals, orphanages and churches. According to the CFU, members and friends contributed over $1,300,000 to the Fund. The Croatian Humanitarian Aid Fund remains as a fraternal programme to this day.

In addition to the Humanitarian Aid Fund, from 1991 the CFU collaborated extensively with the DORA humanitarian organisation in Croatia to deliver financial support for war orphans. It also resulted in the creation of a network of godparent relationships for 674 war orphans that CFU members supported to their 18th birthday. The CFU–DORA joint effort provided 1,266,947 US dollars, with aid coming both from the well–off and those themselves in need, many of whom lived in very modest conditions, in some of the major cities across North America. The names of donors appeared in every issue of

451 ibid
452 ibid
453 ibid
454 ibid
the *Fraternalist*. CFU’s contributions were also documented in the US Congressional Record. The Croatian Fraternal Union also ardently supported the Republic of Croatia’s establishment as a stable democratic and free market-oriented nation-state as a result of the devolution of the Soviet Union and the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. The CFU was instrumental in developing American support as a founding member of and in steady concert with the National Federation of Croatian Americans for the new Republic’s full accession into western multilateral organizations. This includes full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, in early 2009 and the European Union on July 1, 2013. 456

Franjo Tudman personally thanked CFU national president and the membership of all CFU lodges for the aid they had provided in Croatia's struggle to regain its independence. 457

Toronto in 1993 was no exception. A 10-piece youth ensemble played the national anthems of Canada and Croatia on tamburicas, stringed instruments halfway between guitars and ukuleles, symbols of Croatian melodies. A large audience of 500 people pressed around 60 tables “in the hot and smoky meeting hall of a Roman Catholic church, sang along – louder for Croatia than for Canada”. 458 “Nearly everyone there was a Canadian citizen, but this night was for the home country” 459. Žarko Domljan, the Vice President of the Croatian Parliament, visiting this suburb of Toronto, received two standing ovations before he even started his speech:

459 ibid
I know a lot of you want to know, when can you come back? When can you invest? I tell you, Croatia needs your capital. Croatia needs your talents. Croatia needs your experience. 460

The crowd was cheering. They were on their feet again. It was the fifth fund-raising event in six days, including one for children whose fathers were killed during the ‘Homeland War’.461

The Canadian Association of Alumni and Friends of Croatian Universities (AMCA) also actively supported Croatia during that period. Its mission today is to connect former students of Croatian Universities with each other and with the University of Zagreb, and to “advocate the benefits of the integration of Croatian culture into the Canadian multicultural landscape”.462 It was founded in 1990, when it was known as the centre of intellectual life of the Croatian community in Southern Ontario. In the period of 1990–1995, AMCA’s president was scientist, inventor and entrepreneur Ivan Hrvoić (Toronto Chapter) who immigrated to Canada in 1972. His activities were important for systematically “spreading the truth”463 about Croatia in Canada, and in particular among members of the Canadian Government and Parliament, as well as in Canadian media. He frequently appeared in public and initiated public debates with representatives of the Canadian government and the media, lobbying and “spreading the truth about the situation in Croatia”464. He also organised the delivery of humanitarian aid to Croatia during the war and donated two magnetometers to the Mining and Geological Faculty of

460 ibid
461 ibid
463 ibid
464 A vast number of letters, announcements and proclamations were published in Croatia in two extensive volumes in January 2014.

AMCA’s publication \textit{Gaudeamus}, published from 1990 until 1999, was printed in 3000 copies and distributed to AMCA’s members in North America, Europe, Australia, numerous libraries, including the Library of Congress, as well as to all members of the Canadian Parliament, senators, and selected diplomats and UN representatives. In a recent interview,\footnote{Hrvoić, I. (n.d.). Interview by M. Varga. GEM, Systems, Inc. Retrieved from hrcak.srce.hr/file/60865} Hrvoić stated:

\begin{quote}
When we first founded AMCA in the pre–war years it was obvious that Croatian citizens will need our help. We gathered around 350 Croatian intellectuals and began with our work. We collected everything from blankets, shoes, clothes and money. We represented Croatian interests in front of Canadian authorities and in front of the Canadian media. Of special importance was our meeting with the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. One also needs to stress that Canada’s relationship with Yugoslavia was very strong at the time and the Canadian government did not look favourable upon our organization. We gradually changed that.
\end{quote}

The enormous amount of activity generated by the Diaspora was aimed at broadening support to their homeland as well as advancing the security, prosperity and international standing of their home country and the people of their nation.\footnote{Based on interviews with members of Croatian Diaspora in North America conducted for the purposes of this study.} Tudman’s discourse, when referring to the ‘Homeland War’, evoked the concept of ‘homeland in distress’ which added to the perceived justness of the cause and had a powerful mobilising effect. It brought to mind the centuries–long struggle to firmly and irreversibly put an end to foreign domination. The conflict of the 1990s and Croatia’s fight for independence
provided the Croatian Diaspora with direction and, as a result, Diaspora members fell into orbit around that agenda. The collective Diaspora identity was put into action in the name of the nation. This led to millions of emigrant dollars being poured into Croatia during the war. “Croats were like water boiling boisterously in a pot.”

On 12 September 1996 Franjo Tudman welcomed a CFU delegation from Pittsburgh. The President presented Bernard Luketich, the President of the Croatian Fraternal Union, with a red Croatian Pleter medal for “the work that has been done to uphold the ties between the US and Croatia”. Mr Luketich thanked the President, affirming that the CFU would continue to be the bridge between Croatia, US and Canada. Two hundred and fifty representatives from the Diaspora visited Croatia for two weeks on this occasion.

All Croatian Diaspora members who took part in the research report a significant increase in their contact with family and friends during the conflict. “We remained in daily contact with them; we wanted them to know that we are with them in our hearts and in our minds,” states one member of the Croatian Diaspora. The general attitude toward the situation in Croatia is illustrated in a statement by another Croatian–American interviewed for the purposes of this study. Echoing the words of many other Diaspora Croats, he refers to homeland conflict as a source of strength, a pool of energy that was soon translated into political action towards Croatia:

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I believe that in many ways the path to achievement of Croatian independence strengthened the Croatian–American community. I believe that the most affected generation was the zero generation, older people, with still vivid memories of the prior war, and of the country in struggle, with means and wish to get involved and with full appreciation of what was accomplished.

CFU activities also included protests organised in Washington DC as early as 1988 against the abolition of the Croatian language’s official status in socialist Croatia. Language identity has been a highly emotional issue for Croats throughout their history and particularly in the early 1990s when it also became exceedingly politicised. The dispute over renaming the official Croatian language ‘Croato–Serbian’ in the second half of the 1980s and the failure to do so caused collective distress among the Croatian Diaspora and triggered an eruption of memories of other historical injustices, especially those during the 20th century.471

Croatian language was an important motivator used symbolically by Tuđman. For instance, Boris Maruna, a Croatian emigrant, author and poet, who lived in exile in Italy, Argentina, Spain, United Kingdom and the US for three decades, was personally invited by Tuđman to return home. In 1990 Maruna returned to Croatia and was appointed director of the Croatian Heritage Foundation, an organisation that works with the Croatian Diaspora in helping them connect back to the home country. It also runs several programmes within Croatia and around the world, from language to folklore, in an effort to prevent the assimilation of Diaspora Croats into other cultures. Maruna

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became the editor of its monthly magazine, *Matica*, and later the editor of its literary and cultural magazine, *Vijenac*.472

Sučić observes that in many theories of nationalism language is identified as one of the defining characteristics of nationality and a precondition for the existence of the nation–state. She also points out that, in the case of Serbo–Croatian, “the symbolic function seems to have emerged victorious over the communicative function”.473 Together with his political elites Tuđman promoted the new ‘linguistic reconstruction’ through publishing Croatian dictionaries and books, introducing new ‘purified’ Croatian vocabulary, consisting of words taken from ancient Croatian or an entirely new vocabulary, with a goal of articulating Croatian identity and further distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Apart from language, an amalgamation of historical, cultural and political references, recognisable and adaptable enough to appeal to the worldwide Croatian Diaspora, functioned as powerful symbols and were instrumental in the process of ethnic homogenisation and mobilisation.

*Events worth Remembering*

This section will address key themes identified through discourse analysis. They include the Bleiburg massacre of 1945, the 1970 Croatian Spring movement and the campaign and the debates around the placement of Ban Josip Jelačić’s monument in the main square of Zagreb in 1990 (named Ban Jelačić Square in 1848). We can look at these

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themes rendered by the framers as ‘events worth remembering’. The following pages will also look at how these were perceived by the Diaspora.

**The Bleiburg Massacre**

One of the sources of discursive references was the historical memory of the Bleiburg tragedy, a massacre that happened near the end of World War II, during May 1945, near the village of Bleiburg on the Austro–Slovenian (then German–Yugoslav) border. Thousands of victims, Croatian soldiers and civilians, fled from the defeated Independent State of Croatia (NDH), hoping to surrender to the British Army. However, they were forcibly repatriated by the British who directed them to surrender to the Yugoslav Partisan Army (Operation Keelhaul).[^474]

The Bleiburg post-war massacres of Croatians, still heavily commemorated both within and outside Croatia, are relatively unknown outside the Croatian community. To Croatians, however, these events not only trigger instant shared memories of the 1945 tragedy, but carry strong symbolic weight. “The single word ‘Bleiburg’ summarises the pain endured by an entire nation.”[^475] The events are also often talked about in a more emotional context as ‘the Bleiburg tragedy’. The remembrance of Bleiburg was prohibited in pre–1990 Yugoslavia. Hence, the only people who went there were from the Diaspora.[^476] The Croatian Diaspora, mainly the Croatian political emigration, had always been very vocal about the event and had published numerous accounts on the


[^476]: Interview with Vjeran Pavlaković, lecturer on culture of memory at the Department of Cultural Studies at the University of Rijeka. Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/9946664/Interview_in_Novosti
Bleiburg atrocities and talked of genocide committed against the Croatian people. John Ivan Prcela, a high–school teacher from Cleveland, made it his life’s mission to write about the Bleiburg tragedy. He translated and published two books by Josip Hećimović, a Bleiburg witness. His most significant work is *Operation Slaughterhouse, Post–war Massacres in Yugoslavia*, published in 1970. According to Prpić, although banned in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia, the publishing of the book was an important event for Croatian–Americans and the Diaspora as a whole at a time when Washington DC was supportive of Tito’s regime. An equally important convention on the topic of Bleiburg was held three years later in Cleveland. These Diaspora voices, however, remained largely unheard due to communist Yugoslavia’s position as the protégé of the West. Importantly, the Diaspora elevated the number of Bleiburg victims to 600,000, especially during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The debate on the issue continues.

**The Croatian Spring**

The HDZ discourse also featured references to the Croatian Spring, a 1970s political movement in Croatia, initiated by the *Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Standard Language* published in 1967 by a group of prominent Croatian linguists and poets. Thousands of Zagreb students, many of them prosecuted and

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478 A co-editor of this book was a Croatian-American historian Stanko Guldescu.


Tomasevich states that the number of victims is almost impossible to ascertain. The records of the Croatian Heritage Foundation mention approximately 30,000 POWs, surrendered personnel, and refugees in Corps area, including a further 60,000 reported moving north to Austria.
arrested, participated in organised demonstrations and called for greater rights for Croatia as well as democratic and economic reforms. These events cleared the path for an emerging class of Croatian nationalist intellectuals, including its most prominent member Franjo Tudman. Among those arrested was also the dissident journalist Bruno Bušić who later continued his political engagement from the Diaspora, promoting a free, democratic and independent Croatia. Bušić, one of the best–known preys of UDBA, the Yugoslav Security Service, was portrayed as one of the greatest Croatian heroes and was elected into the Croatian National Council (Croatian: Hrvatsko narodno vijeće, HNV) a representative body of Croatian emigrant groups that operated from 1974 to the nation's independence in 1991. Bušić was in jail until 1973 and killed by UDBA in Paris two years later. When Croatia achieved independence, his remains were relocated to the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb and were laid to rest next to those who died in the ‘Homeland War’.

**Ban Josip Jelačić**

One cannot deny the symbolic importance of monuments in the construction of collective memory. As Rihtman–Auguštin points out: “[t]he statue of a historical personality displayed in a public place is a medium which makes history tangible in everyday life. The monument rescues the historical personality from oblivion”. A

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large statue of ban Josip Jelačić\textsuperscript{483} on a horse in the main square of Zagreb was originally erected in October 1866 by Austrian authorities to commemorate his battle against the Magyars in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. The perception of his historical role changed with the change in government. Jelačić was removed from the public eye, songs celebrating him were banned in 1947 and he was condemned by the Communist government of Yugoslavia as an Austrian collaborator. On 16 October 1990, on his birthday and after the 1990 Croatian parliamentary elections, he was symbolically reinstalled\textsuperscript{484} and was again considered an admirable figure of Croatian history. In late 1989, HDZ members handed out a proclamation that stated the following:

The fate of the unhappy ban’s statue has become a symbol of how Croatian national feelings were trampled on in socialist Croatia, a symbol of a policy of heartless hatred for one’s own nation, its history, culture, heritage.\textsuperscript{485}

The statue of Jelačić was originally faced towards the north, with his sword raised against Hungary; today the statue's position is reversed.

A month before the statue was returned to the square, on 20 and 21 September, Tuđman visited Cleveland’s Croatian home in Eastlake together with Croatian Cardinal Kuharić. They were greeted by thousands of Croatian–Americans expressing their moral and material support. Tuđman went on to visit Croatian communities in other states, including Minnesota, where he met with former governor Rudy Perpich. On 16 October a number of these diaspora members joined Tuđman in attending the symbolic event in

\textsuperscript{483} Jelačić was the ban of Croatia between 23 March 1848 and 19 May 1859. He was a noted army general, remembered for his military campaigns during the Revolutions of 1848 and for his abolition of serfdom in Croatia.

\textsuperscript{484} To celebrate the return of Jelačić and to commemorate his legacy, an entire week, named ‘Ban Jelačić Week’, with entertainment and concerts was dedicated to the event.

Zagreb’s main square where the statue of Jelačić was reinstalled, symbolising Croatian struggle for independence. CFU’s Fraternalist wrote extensively about the importance of the ban and its symbolism.\(^{486}\)

A hero to some and a villain to others, during his lifetime Jelačić was criticised from many angles – as a Panslavist, as a pro Russian, as an Austrophile, and a reactionary, among other and often contradictory labels.\(^{487}\) To Croatians he was first a symbol of their struggle against the Hungarians and a martyr of the Austrian regime\(^{488}\) but grew to represent freedom from any foreign oppression. As Rihtman–Auguštin writes, in his speech during the ‘Ban Jelačić Week’ Franjo Tuđman presented himself “as a personality who creates history – and then interpreting history for us. So he placed Jelačić in the context of current politics”.\(^{489}\) Tuđman “mentioned the ‘undaunted spirit of the Croatian people’, extolled the homeland, and boasted how “Croatia’s prestige has been reinstated”.\(^{490}\)

“Ustani Bane” (lit. Rise/Stand up Viceroy) a patriotic song that glorifies Jelačić, written at the turn of the 20th century by an anonymous author, was recognised as a threat and banned by the Yugoslav authorities who thought of him as a Croatian nationalist leader\(^{491}\) for whom the Croats called whenever they felt repressed. In the 1990s the song

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\(^{486}\) The Ban Jelačić Monument (1989, October 10). Fraternalist, p. 12.


\(^{488}\) ibid


became one of the important HDZ symbols representing Croatian enthusiasm for freedom and independence. A picture of Josip Jelačić is depicted on the front of the Croatian 20 Kuna banknote, issued in 1993 and 2001.\footnote{Croatian National Bank. \textit{Features of Kuna Banknotes: 20 kuna (1993 issue)}. http://www.hnb.hr/novcan/novecanice/e20k.htm?tsfsg=72c2ffab4bf1c37eca77ca1333e8e02b.}

Apart from ‘new old monuments’, updated street names and new vocabulary, independent Croatia received a new national anthem. Its opening words, “Lijepa Naša” (“Our Beautiful”), are commonly used as a metonymy for Croatia by Croatians.\footnote{“Lijepa Naša Domovina” (“Our Beautiful Homeland”). The original lyrics were written by Antun Mihanović and first published under the title ”Hrvatska domovina” (“Croatian homeland”) in 1835. The Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has an information website on the anthem with sound files of it.} The new checkerboard coat of arms (Croatian: šahovnica) adopted in December 1990 is a proud reference to the endurance of the Croatian nation, as it is widely thought to have been created by Stephen (Stjepan) Držislav, a Croatian King in the 10th century.\footnote{Bellamy, A. J. (2003). \textit{The formation of Croatian national identity: A Centuries-old dream}? Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.} In 1994 Croatia also received its new currency Kuna (marten)\footnote{The kuna was a currency unit in several Slavic states, most notably Kievan Rus and its successors until the 15th century. The idea of a kuna currency appeared again in 1939 in Banovina of Croatia (part of Yugoslav Monarchy). In 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) introduced the Kuna, which remained in circulation until 1945, when it disappeared together with NDH. From http://us.exchangecurrency.biz/currencies/hrk}, a pantheon of old heroes, featuring great historical figures such as Stjepan Radić and Ante Starčević, celebrated Croatian poets such as Ivan Gundulić, Marko Marulić and Ivan Mažuranić, and religious figures such as Juraj Dobrila, a notable 19th ct. Croatian bishop.

These specific references were selected in order to highlight the continuity of Croatian statehood, and a nation that endured and withstood all past injustices. Throughout the early 1990s, these historical references, aimed at connecting the modern state of Croatia with particular aspects of its past, became recurring themes in President Tudman’s
‘political rituals’. We can also refer to these, in Hobsbawm’s terms, as ‘invented traditions’ – a “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”496 Hobsbawm observes that invented traditions can function as instruments in establishing or symbolising social cohesion and collective identities.497 The purpose of utilising invented traditions, defined as “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations”,498 goes beyond strengthening group cohesion but also extends to legitimising action.499 Legitimising one’s own action was directly associated with the attribution component of injustice frames whereby the movement leaders delineate boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.

**Nurturing Identify in the Diaspora**

The above resonated in the Diaspora given much of Croatian cultural heritage has focused on the notion of freedom and independence, both in Croatia and beyond, inspiring a number of authors in the Diaspora. These include earlier works by Antun Bonifačić and Mladen Kobalin, Josip Novakovich, Vladimir P. Goss, Hrvoslav Ban, Edward Ifkovich, Melkior Masina, Ivo Sivrić, and Janko Deur.500 There are also

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498 ibid

499 ibid

numerous painters such as Tomislav Gabrić, Marijana Grišnik, and Josip Turkalj, with references to Croatian history, culture, religion and immigrant themes.\(^{501}\)

The articles published in the *Fraternalist* mirror this emphasis on Croatia’s history, national heroes, religious leaders, and poets “which served to revive common memories, a sense of unity and of ethnic identity”\(^{502}\). Djuric further argues that Diaspora served as an essential link in the mobilisation of the Croatian national movement, in keeping with Benedict Anderson’s observation that “the periodical press is of crucial importance in the emergence of national communities”\(^{503}\). The checkerboard coat of arms, for example, featured on the front page of the *Fraternalist*, as a part of its logo. It is also the logo of the Croatian Fraternal Union.

The preservation of the Croatian language was another important theme. In the 1980s the Croatian Diaspora was at the brink of losing its native language. Below is an excerpt from a note first published in the *Fraternalist*:\(^{504}\)

I sit writing this in a jet plane returning to the United States from three weeks in Croatia. I have lived the monumental frustration of my hunger that I do not know if I will ever surmount. I cannot communicate in my grandfather's native tongue. Oh father of my father, why must I suffer this so. I am a bird with spirit in my heart, with wings to fly, to soar in this beckoning sky. Trapped in the small cage of my few words laboriously learned, I am deaf and dumb and nearly blind.


\(^{503}\) ibid


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In 1987 the *Fraternalist* reported on a Croatian Diaspora initiative to, as a response, start a fundraising campaign to establish the first Department of Croatian Language and Culture outside the home country, at York University in Toronto, Canada. The CFU also demanded a separate Croatian section of the Voice of America (VOA) radio service, which they were granted in February 1992. The service initially began on radio only but was quickly expanded into television and was also one of the first VOA services to establish an online presence. Voice of America’s *Croatian TV NewsFlash* was broadcast daily on eight affiliate stations. The popular *Breakfast Show*, a roundup of US, Croatian and world news, was aired for 19 years, “without a single day of interruption”,\(^{505}\) while an evening radio show aired on shortwave and ten affiliate FM stations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. VOA’s director David Ensor referred to the service as “a model of journalistic integrity that provided the people of Croatia with fair and impartial news during the dark days of civil war in the Balkans.” Ensor praised the service, which he said, “served as a vital source of independent reporting and insight into American policy.”\(^{506}\) It was also an important vehicle for preserving Croatian culture among Diaspora Croats.

A large number of articles also appeared in the *Fraternalist* celebrating Croatian national culture. A reader comments:

> I am impressed by the many articles on history and culture. You are using history and culture as a learning tool: looking to the past and


\(^{506}\) ibid
learning from it to bring about a better and more prosperous future, I certainly support your efforts.507

The 1980s also saw the reopening of a number of World War II debates in the Diaspora, “challenging and reinterpreting what was prescribed as official Croatian history”508 with the year 1987 marked as the turning point in the official discourse of the Fraternalist. Djuric observes that instead of its usual ‘middle of the road policy’, the discussion turned more radical. This was evident in a number of articles reporting on past grievances as a response to the “nationalistic Serbian claims and Serbian xenophobic roll–calls hinting at collective Croatian guilt for the atrocities of the Ustaše regime during World War II.” 509 The defensive tone of a letter from Lucian Reichherze is a reaction to those claims:

[The Ustaše ] just wanted a sovereign Croatia. The Ustaše wanted only to liberate their country from the Serbian yoke and be independent, which they once were when they had their own kings etc. Their goal was separation from Yugoslavia. It can be compared to the struggle of the Basques in Spain or the Kurds in Turkey or the Armenians in Turkey or the Irish in Ulster. A nation without its independence is like a homeless person living in someone else’s home as a servant or slave.510

At the end of 1980s, the Fraternalist was closely monitoring the political developments in former Yugoslavia and paid particular attention to Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic Union. Mirroring Tuđman’s discourse of unity, the 1990s also saw a number of Diaspora activities aimed at solidifying relations among different Croatian Diaspora

509ibid
organisations in an effort to initiate a “broad Croatian cultural action in North America”511. Published in an Open Letter512 in the Fraternalist to all AMCA members, the AMCA encouraged reconciliation of the different political ideologies among the diaspora Croats in North America.513 The inter–ethnic gap, however, was broadening. “Once again,” Djuric states514 “traumatic memories and history worked towards creating intra–ethnic homogeneity while at the same time widening the interethnic gap.”

The Croatian Ethnic Institute in Chicago, founded by the Croatian Franciscans in 1975, with a collection of over 20,000 volumes on Croatian culture, history, language, fine arts and literature, including rare editions from the 15th and 19th centuries Croatia, has also played an important role in promoting Croatian history, language and heritage in the Diaspora. Tudman’s references to the continuity of Croatian statehood, openly stressed by Tuđman during his early encounters with the Diaspora, and later on 20 September 1992 in front of a large group of Croats in Eastlake, Cleveland, firmly resonated among Diaspora Croats.

These references were further articulated by Tuđman when he spoke in front of the UN General Assembly in New York515, a first–ever speech delivered by a President of a sovereign Croatian state.

512 Open Letter to the Friends and Alumni of the University of Zagreb. (1990, September 26). Fraternalist; also in Djuric, p. 94.
The Croatian nation is one of the oldest people of today’s Europe. It possesses written documents and stamps of its national statehood independence, as well as of belonging to the Western European civilization, from the Seventh century (A.D.) onwards, in stone and on parchments, in literature and the arts, and what is most important, in its spiritual being. The Croatian nation can be proud of its contribution to the spiritual and real cultural heritage of mankind. Incidentally, it is not by chance that a small part of it is also present here. The entrance through which we pass into the United Nations General Assembly hall is made of Marble from the Croatian island of Brač. That stone in my country symbolizes Croatian survival. In it, during many centuries, the greatest of Croatian sculptors have reflected themselves, including Antun Augustinčić whose equestrian figure, “Monument of Peace”, is found in the park behind this very United Nations’ building.

For the first time in their history, Diaspora Croats felt that they have a state they can refer to as their own – an emotion that was strengthened when Petar Starčević, the first Croatian ambassador to the US, visited President Bush, in November 1992. *The New York Times* as well as CFU’s *Fraternalist* regularly reported on these events at the time. Thinking about those days, one member of the Croatian Diaspora stated:

> Our ancestors who helped preserve our identity through tough times, struggling under Hungarian and Hapsburg domination, would be proud. It is a dream come true to be able to openly celebrate our heroes, our history, and, now our future!\(^{517}\)

Croatia’s ‘Western orientation’ continued to be stressed in Tuđman’s speeches during his visits to Argentina, Chile and Brazil, as well as during his speech in front of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 1994. It was an emotional experience:

> This is the crown of international recognition. Croatia is now a member of the United Nations where it belongs. I am proud to see our flag waving proudly in the heart of New York City!\(^{518}\)


\(^{517}\)A Croatian-American interviewed for the purposes of this study.

\(^{518}\)ibid
Zvonimir Šeparović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, also remembers the occasion:

I was present (…) during the raising of the Croatian flag in front of the UN building on East River, the same as that of China, USA, Monaco and San Marino. My small drop, as Cesarić said, was present during that act and drowned in the big waterfall of Croatian statehood.\(^{519}\)

Regardless of their political orientation, diaspora Croats spoke of their Collective transformation from a historically repressed minority group from the former Yugoslavia to a proud new nation that successfully shrugged off the yoke of communist rule and asserted a new sense of purpose and pride.\(^{520}\)

**Boundary and Adversarial Framing: Naming Enemies**

*Too many Croatian people died and too many of our sons suffered in the dungeons of Venice, Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.*\(^{521}\)

Boundary setting is directly associated with ‘adversarial framing’ which defines movement antagonists as a source of blame thereby setting a clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and thus making injustice frames a more powerful tool for collective action. The literature notes that ‘boundary’ and ‘adversarial frames’ explain the situation at hand from a different angle, allowing prospective supporters to attribute a source of culpability and thus hold particular actors responsible for their circumstances.\(^{522}\)

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521 Croatian President Franjo Tudman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Online: http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm

Gamson identifies the nature of the target as a critical dimension of an injustice frame. Unclear and abstract causes of injustice or harm can dilute the will to act while attributing unjust doings to clearly identifiable persons or groups will heighten the emotional component of the frame. Concreteness in the target is vital for an injustice frame. Gamson contends that as long as the righteous anger is “narrowly focused on human actors with regard to the broader structure in which they operate” injustice frames will be an effective tool for collective action.\(^{523}\) Tuđman’s target was clearly identified and placed within the broader Yugoslavian political structure.

**The Enemy: the ‘Greater–Serbian Aggressor’**

At the outset of the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, in order to sustain collective action, the framers successfully bridged the abstract and the concrete. The responsibility of the human actors, as identified by the framers, for carrying out the physical and material harm in the early 1990s Croatia was publicly visible as well as heavily broadcast by the media, making the injustice frame more credible. With some exceptions,\(^{524}\) Croats have always identified their common enemy as the communist Yugoslav state, and later the ‘greater–Serbian aggressor’ who, very visibly in Tuđman’s discourse and the media, was attempting to annihilate the past, the present, and the future of all Croats. In émigrés words:

> We were oppressed by Serbs, by the Yugoslav Army, by Yugoslav diplomacy, Yugoslav trade, Yugoslav commerce, the Yugoslav banking system, Yugoslav organizations, Yugoslav domination.\(^{525}\)


This shared conviction was communicated in Diaspora narratives highlighting a history of adversity and the ongoing oppression and curtailment of the Croatian people – filled with examples of atrocities.⁵²⁶

Towards the end of 1992 articles appear in a number of weeklies, including *The New York Times*, reporting on the discovery of mass graves of Croats around Vukovar, Croatia, heavily criticising the US for its passive politics in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵²⁷ The reporting continues into 1993 with distressing images of the war in Bosnia on the cover of *Newsweek*. During these months, a number of articles appear in Croatian Diaspora publications such as *Danica* and *Naša Nada*, with the *Associated Press* publishing an article on 30 January 1993 in which it describes Croatian forces as courageous and capable. Other publications include *The Christian Science Monitor* and *The New York Times* and most major Croatian and US newspapers and TV channels. CFU’s *Fraternalist* continuously reported on the situation at home, often recounting articles from Croatian daily newspapers, depicting Serbia as the enemy.

Shared identity is one of the central characteristics of a diaspora. Within a diaspora, as elsewhere, processes of identity formation are heavily dependent on socio–political and cultural contexts; they do not happen freely and independently – they always involve an opposite, the ‘Other’, onto which the image of the ‘Self’ is projected.⁵²⁸ In the case of the Croatian Diaspora, there were plenty of ‘Others’ to choose from – there were the co–
ethnics back home, their fellow Diasporants around the world and the ones within the national borders of their host country. However, it was often the Diaspora groups from other ex–Yugoslav Republics that had the most significant effect on the definition of their identity. Findings from interviews conducted with members of the Croatian Diaspora suggest that the conflict brought differences between the Croatian and Serbian Diaspora groups’ identities to the fore. Emphasis was no longer on what diaspora groups, Serbs and Croats in particular, had in common. As one interviewee put it “the friendships between Croats and Serbs did not survive the war.” The relationship between Croatian and Serbian Diaspora communities mirrored tensions and resentments that fuelled the war at home at the time.

The injustice component, as one of the fundamental constituent parts of CAF, Gamson argues, encompasses not the rational judgment regarding what is fair and just, but a state that cognitive psychologists call a ‘hot cognition’ of injustice, a highly emotional state of mind where a person’s responses to stimuli are heightened. An important component of an injustice frame, one that often gives direction to this ‘hot cognition’, is a clearly identified human actor or a group of actors responsible for some or part of the injustice. When shared Croatian grievances, experienced not only in the early 1990s but throughout Croatian history, were directed at a specific target, i.e. the Serbs, they became an even more effective tool in animating the Diaspora front. The process of HDZ boundary framing clearly identified the ‘Other’: “greater–Serbian aggressor” / creators of “Yugo–communist hell” / “the wave of greater–Serbian adversarial band of soldiers”/ advancers of “mythological greater–Serbian plans” / “Serbo–communist

hordes” to name only a few, thus not only creating a clear enemy but also a potential ally (i.e. all those who had suffered from the repressive policies of the ‘aggressor’). Moreover, the “greater–Serbian aggressor” was portrayed not only as the enemy of Croatia, but also as the enemy of the international community, breaking international agreements, and the enemy of the Catholic Church (“devil”). Thus, injustice, combined with specific boundary and adversarial frames, proved to be an even more effective tool in spurring Diaspora action.

As a result, on 11 September 1993, Croatians in the US created the National Federation of Croatian Americas, an umbrella organisation created for Croatian–Americans, related professional associations, and the many fraternal lodges that collectively represent approximately 130,000 members. Together they promote the interest of the Croatian people. Its early mission was to ‘inform the White House’ of developments in Croatia. The Croatian American Association, formed in 1989, has a similar mission – to lobby the US Congress on Croatian issues, as does the Croatian American Congress.

**Conclusion**

The diagnostic task of the Croatian Diaspora CAF, presented in this chapter, is an important first stage in broadening one’s support base and gathering resources, with an

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aim of securing political power. According to SMTs, an essential prerequisite for a movement is the existence of a contextually framed shared injustice that will provide a reason for mobilisation and trigger action. Accordingly, this chapter has identified three major elements of the diagnostic stage of the Croatian Diaspora CAF, referring to them as ‘problem diagnoses’ ‘injustice frames’ and ‘boundary’ or ‘adversarial frames’.

In the Croatian case, it can be argued that the role of the problem diagnoses, as a justification towards challenging the status quo, was an important driver of collective action. Through CAF, the political elites isolated and suitably framed a question of national urgency, presenting it to their audiences as fundamentally problematic, identifying at the same time the main causes of this ‘national distress’ as well as the perceived perpetrators. This was achieved by carefully constructing meta–frames or

larger schemata of interpretation that generated larger narratives around collective Croatian perspectives and galvanised masses into challenging the *status quo*.

Research conducted for this study suggests that HDZ elites, in the first stages of the diagnostic process, highlighted the ‘victim’ aspect of the Croatian nation, including the Diaspora, foregrounding certain traumatic aspects of the nation’s history – most notably the Bleiburg massacre and the events surrounding the Croatian Spring. Injustice in this case was presented as twofold – as suffered by the Croats at home and those residing in the Diaspora. Past grievances have also been blamed for crippling the Croatian nation by expelling a large number of Croats from their homeland, thus separating the nation into two parts – the disunion that the HDZ movement advocated against, arguing for the unification of all Croats, within or outside the borders of Croatia.

The adopted injustice frame amplified the desire for a ‘centuries–old dream of Croatian statehood’, denied to the Croatian nation by many actors in the past, and most recently, the ‘great–Serbian aggressor’. Building a bridge between that dream and reality is how HDZ constructed much of the prognostic elements of their CAF, to be discussed further in the next chapter. The attribution component of diagnostic framing, i.e. identifying the source of blame and naming culpable agents\(^5\) has been used to construct what Gamson\(^6\) referred to as ‘adversarial framing’, an attribution process led by the HDZ in an effort to delineate the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, between ‘Croatness’


and ‘non–Croatness’. This particular frame achieved a high mobilisation potential by clearly defining the antagonists, and drawing boundaries between ‘us’ and the ‘Other’.

Ernest Renan, the great French philosopher and writer, has defined the nation based on two main pillars: “to have done great things together” and “to want to do more”.540 Indeed, Croatian history and memory in particular were instrumental in steering the Croatian Diaspora, now an organic part of the nation, ‘to want to do more’. The diagnostic stage of the HDZ framing process heavily depended on the processes of commemoration and other symbolic politics that enabled Tuđman and his allies to assemble a new collective memory of the Croatian people. They actively engaged in the process of ‘politicization of commemoration’.541 Tuđman and his supporters provided the materials for memory, carefully selected and meticulously packaged. They also made available an appropriately stimulating discourse that nudged individuals into remembering certain events and disregarding others, confirming Kratochwil’s claim that “it is the present problem that informs the selection of what is considered worth remembering”.542

Through processes of ‘politicization of commemoration’543 and other symbolic politics, Tuđman constructed a new collective memory that in turn helped form a new collective Croatian identity. To succeed in their design, it was necessary to consolidate group cohesion and strengthen Diaspora unity. Group membership, as emphasised by

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Halbwachs,\textsuperscript{544} allows individuals to remember particular events in a coherent and persistent fashion. This also explains the enthusiasm of younger generations of Diaspora Croats – individuals who never experienced any of those historical events in any direct way, yet equally identified with them. Ivana Djuric observes that, between the early 1980s and mid–1990s, all the elements of ethnic identity in Anthony D. Smith’s terms\textsuperscript{545} can be found reading the \textit{Fraternalist}, the official journal of the CFU. She points out that references from Croatian culture, history, myths, language, and religion served as powerful instruments in the process of ethnic homogenisation and were instrumental in the early days of Diaspora mobilisation.\textsuperscript{546}

The next chapter will look at prognostic framing, i.e. the identification of a solution to the ‘national problem’, including the communication and dissemination of that solution, as a tool in attracting Croatian Diaspora members and spurring them into action. It will analyse the rationale for the articulated solution and look at how this particular perspective refuted the logic of opponent solutions, also known as counter–framing. The chapter will also shed light on how “identification of specific problems and causes tends to constrain the range of possible reasonable solutions and strategies”.\textsuperscript{547} The next chapter will also address resonance and issue salience, important motivational elements.


of the framing process that greatly helped reinforce both diagnostic and prognostic elements of framing.
CHAPTER V: From Victim to Victory – Framing Solutions and Attracting Support

The task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to where they have not been.548

Prognostic frames look at the problem and ask, “What can be done? They function as explanatory lenses that offer solutions to collective problems identified through diagnostic frames. Diagnostic frames, discussed in the previous chapter, are intricately linked to prognostic frames, so much so that the ‘national problem’ is framed in such a way that it allows for only a limited number of suitable solutions. Only certain solutions become logical, depending on the national problem’s diagnostic frame. Together with motivational frames, they form collective action frames. My previous chapter listed in detail the main components of the Croatian Diaspora collective action frames. The different components of CAF are all framed as essential steps in Croatia’s journey from victim to victory. Discourse analysis conducted for the purposes of this study identified two central courses of action as part of prognostic framing: national reconciliation and a unified Croatian Diaspora, as a prerequisite for achieving Croatian sovereignty, seen as the realisation of its thousand years of statehood – both to be achieved under the leadership of HDZ. These actions were framed as sine qua non for changing the status quo. They were also the ones most likely to resonate with Tuđman’s key constituency – the Diaspora. This was important, as Croats abroad were a key resource for bringing the proposed solution to life.

548 Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State.
The Prognosis

As the national problem was constructed in such a way to dramatise the most atrocious aspects of conditions, they captured only a small share of practical experience. For this reason, the actions proposed as solutions were very specific, and, most of all, politically fitting for mobilising Diaspora members. These proposed solutions, as we shall see further below, resonated well with the Croatian Diaspora. However, not all proposals were well received and some required adjustment. Only those solutions that resonated with key members of the Diaspora, i.e. the ones capable of further galvanising the meso and macro diasporic levels, lend themselves to detailed analysis; the less popular ones are likely to have been silenced in the very early stage of their development. Therefore a restricted number of ‘failed frames’ can be uncovered and investigated in this study. This is the focus of the following section where I identify proposed solutions that required modification in order to satisfy the needs of the critical mass.

Frame Modification: Seeing Eye to Eye

Framing theory by itself is restricted in its ability to give explanations as to why some prognostic frames are more successful than others. Some research in this area has already begun to emerge labelled as ‘discursive opportunity structures’, which reveal that certain cultural elements in the broader environment facilitate and hinder successful social movement framing (e.g. Koopmans & Olzak549, Koopmas & Statham550). Beata


Huszka’s *Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict*\(^{551}\) looks at the rhetorical frames adopted by particular movements and the changing dynamics of secessionist framing; however, much remains to be done.

The situation in Croatia prior to the free, multi-party parliamentary elections in 1990 was complex. The reformed communists preferred federation at the time, others supported centrist political views favouring confederation, while radicals would only support full independence. One of Tuđman’s early challenges was reconciling the views of the two conflicting wings of his party, the hard-line nationalists and the moderate conciliators. Many of the hardliners were stern anti-communists who escaped Tito's Yugoslavia, or the descendants of Ustaše families who fled Croatia after World War II. Many were Croats from Herzegovina or the overseas Croatian Diaspora, or both.\(^{552}\) Tuđman also encountered problems when advocating Diaspora unity with its embellished internal Diaspora homogeneity. Disagreements like these were inevitable and, as Hockenos observes, Tuđman and the Diaspora “did not always see eye to eye on everything”\(^{553}\). To ensure frame resonance, Tuđman included a large range of themes as part of his collective action frames. As we have seen earlier, the larger the range of issues contained in the frame, the bigger and more diverse the groups of people that can be drawn into the process of mobilisation.\(^{554}\) The flexibility of the Croatian Diaspora master frame and its capacity to include a wide range of related problems proved to be a

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successful tool in attracting Diaspora members across the globe. As the analysis of Tuđman’s discourse and symbolism shows, he presented himself not simply as the future president of Croatia, but the president of all Croats. In addressing the idea of unity, Tuđman proposed to ‘decapitate’ the system of retribution. This was made personal, drawing on events from his own life that others identified with. His words were published in June 1990 in *The New York Times*:

> And I know well the temptation of retribution. Three years ago, when I was 65 years old and after the Communists had sent me to prison twice, I learned the names of the Communist soldiers who shot and killed my father and stepmother in cold blood. These men live today in the Republic of Croatia. For more than four decades, I believed the lie that my parents had been killed by Nazi collaborators. Similar ghastly stories are common in Croatia.

> The Croatian Democratic Union and I were elected to end such tyranny. And, despite 45 years of brutal Communist rule, and despite the association of many people with these oppressors, I vow to allow no reprisals in a newly democratic Croatia. I will work to build a society which is a vibrant marketplace of ideas and initiative, where disagreement and debate are signs of strength.

> The Communist soldiers who murdered my parents will be judged by God alone. I no longer yearn for revenge; the murderous, inhumane system that killed my parents and tens of thousands like them has been judged for its crimes – in free and fair elections – by the Croatian people. That system has been decapitated.555

Tuđman’s message was clear: we must leave the past and our disagreements behind and look towards the future. There was a great deal of appetite within the Diaspora to change the *status quo*, but they disagreed on the path forward.

In my analysis of less successful prognostic frames that deviated from the general framing trend and the main ‘framing recipe’, I will focus on one of Tuđman’s core ideas

Croatian sovereignty. As we know, this idea was central to Tuđman’s CAF and served as a magnet for attracting Diaspora support. The core of Tuđman’s national programme in late 1980s was the goal of establishing the Croatian nation-state, which meant that all past ideological clashes should be reconciled and, as quoted above, the system of retribution ‘decapitated’. What it really meant in practice was that achieving that goal would require a strong support from the Croatian Diaspora. The politically ‘awake’ hard-line nationalists who fled Tito’s retribution after 1945, including those that left in the 1970s, were seen as ideal allies. During Tito’s purges of Croatian nationalists in the 1970s Croatian Spring, some 1,600 Croatian communists were subjected to ‘political measures’ but much of that nationalism continued in the Diaspora among groups who left their homeland as a result of their dislike or fear of the Titoist regime. As we shall see later in more detail, some of Tuđman’s early encounters with the Diaspora included a number of these enthusiasts. But they did not favour federation; they were ready for the possibility of returning to an independent Croatia and harboured strong anti-communist views.

It is a widespread view that Tuđman's final goal was an independent Croatia, but this was initially an ambitions target given the realities of internal and foreign policy. Until the spring of 1991, he was prepared to agree to a compromise solution of a confederation or alliance of sovereign states within Yugoslavia.

There are those, however, even in America, who fear any measure of Croatian democracy. This surge of national identity and authority will, some say, lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia, to civil war, or both. These fears are misplaced. Freedom and self-determination do not threaten

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557 Ibid
stability; repression and tyranny do. To reject Croatia's transition to a democracy on the pretext of preserving regional stability only delays the inevitable – and heightens the risk of regional chaos and violence at some date in the future. The democratization of Croatia will lead neither to the breakup of Yugoslavia nor to civil war. These threats represent a last desperate ploy by the central Communist government in Belgrade to win Western neutrality on the issue of Croatian democratization.558

But with those proposals rejected by the Serbian leadership and with armed provocations intensifying, the idea of a full Croatian independence replaced federalism.559 This resulted in a referendum on 19 May 1991.

However, getting there followed a squiggly line. New ideas easily cause friction and not all frames have resonance. Tudman’s success as a frame creator is evident from his ability to anticipate difficulties that could potentially be associated with initiating controversial topics. Tudman tested some of his ideas during his trips to Canada in 1987, aiming to establish existing views, identify potential 'additions' and 'modifications' to his initial concepts and obtain other useful intelligence. As a former researcher, Tudman was no doubt familiar with the concept of a focus group as a form of qualitative research. He used it to examine perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of émigrés towards new ideas. These tests, not openly identified as such, can be seen as a form of insurance, i.e., as a means of reducing the risks of frames later not resonating with potential supporters.560

Tudman and the Diaspora initially disagreed on the issue of Croatian independence. In 1987, during Tudman’s first trip to Canada, their opinions clashed. Tuđman was not

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convinced of an imminent dissolution of Yugoslavia. The political anti–communist émigrés, on the other hand, thought it inevitable. Tuđman’s initial proposal was to argue for an improved position of Croatia within a more loosely structured Yugoslavia, i.e. a further gradual devolution of centralised powers. He did not advocate for a full independence but a confederation with growing decentralisation and democratisation. His plan envisaged Yugoslavia as a loose confederation of republics, with the possibility of independence somewhere in the more distant future. “We kept saying we didn’t have time for this”, explained Marin Sopta, a former émigré, “that time was running out. We wanted full independence”.  

Bosnian Croats, those from Herzegovina in particular, including Herzegovinians living in the Diaspora, particularly opposed confederation. In their view, this arrangement would only work if existing borders were modified as they could not imagine a proper border between them and the state of Croatia. To remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Croats were the smallest minority, was inconceivable. This also explains why many émigrés, many of whom were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, very much welcomed the gift of Croatian citizenship.

Tuđman’s views on Bosnia and Herzegovina were controversial and continue to be debated. His claims on Bosnian territories, referring to the “unnatural shape of Croatia”, comparing it to “an apple with a bite taken out if it”, appealed to Diaspora Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. His views regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina are also said to

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have been influenced by the model of Croatian Banovina of 1939 as a way of normalising Serbo–Croatian relations. The Banovina had effectively divided Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. A similar division was apparently discussed between Tuđman and Milošević during a meeting in Karađorđevo in March 1991, allegedly leading Tuđman to believe that he had avoided war by satisfying Serbian demands and realising a Croatian state with defensible borders. Some of Tuđman’s early supports, including Marin Sopta, Gojko Šušak and Vinko Grubišić were Croats from Bosnia and were convinced that the Bosnian situation could not be solved peacefully and were prepared to fight.

While Tuđman initially, including during his first visit to North America, “refrained from explicitly demanding Croatian independence”, he openly “made irredentist claims on behalf of the as yet non-existent state”. He also used discourse that did not allow ethnically inclusive identities, which also proved to have a stronger mobilising effect. When representatives from the Diaspora “called on all sons of the Croatian home guard, Croatian Ustaše and Croatian partisans to fight for the interests of the Croatia state” at the HDZ Assembly, no objections were reported. Tuđman also never


discouraged pro-Ustaše views coming from the Diaspora. Similar to this meeting, Tuđman’s meetings with the Diaspora in the late 1980s gave rise to many conspiracy theories. According to these, the Bosnian Croats had somehow used their meetings with Tuđman to advance their influence inside the HDZ, and prioritize and progress their agenda. With their adamant visions and imposing plans, the North America’s radical émigrés “whispered” independence into Tuđman’s ear.

In Tuđman’s mind the program that would later be known as Croatian National Policy – the forging of an ethnic Greater Croatia – was still an amorphous hodgepodge of loose ideas and general ill-defined goals. Its essential outline, though, would become discernible over the course of his visits to North America in the late 1980s. Although secession was initially seen as a last resort, at least in public discourse, Huszka argues that the HDZ rhetoric, present throughout 1990, was an avenue that led to it. The aggressive, nationalist nature of their discourse contributed to the outbreak of ethnic tensions and violence as they spread fears of Serbian dominance within Croatia, purposefully shifting public focus towards existential threats based on fears from the local Serb population and vice versa. According to Huszka, when “fear is widespread, alternative frames for ethnically inclusive identities and moderation, such as the democracy frame or the prosperity frame, are unlikely to win mass support.” These

fears were building on the strong and widespread belief of the late 1980s Croatia that Serbs were joining efforts to create a ‘Greater Serbia’, which helped solidify HDZ’s ‘foreign domination’ frame. In late 1990 this frame eventually took over all other frames, including those that focused on democracy, free elections and prosperity, and led itself away from federation and towards independence, which resonated the most strongly.

Frame transformation, or in this case ‘adjustment’, becomes needed when existing frames do not resonate with core supporters (i.e. right–wing Croatian émigrés) or are overshadowed by other, more powerful, frames that carry more resonance with the general public, including the Diaspora. Regrettably, this alignment approach has not received much attention in movement studies and much more research remains to be done.

Resonance & Issue Salience: “We have our Croatia!”

The proposed solution was tremendously ambitious. To measure the potential of Diaspora mobilisation one must take into account both the interest of the target audience, which defines whether a certain collective good is worth acquiring, and the role of mobilising capacity, which determines whether the group is capable of achieving the collective good. Framing plays a crucial role here in that it can both camouflage the collective good offered and artificially generate interest in acquiring it. In the Croatian case the means for this were found in accentuating common grievances that highlighted

574 “Imamo Hrvatsku!”, often used as a HDZ slogan, is Tudman’s most famous statement, uttered in the main square of Zagreb in front of thousands of supporters, right after the international recognition of Croatian independence in January 1992.
the need to change the status quo, and emphasised that the proposed solution was a thousand–year–long aspiration, which, if achieved, would ease past grievances and end present suffering. For this, it was emphasised, a ‘one team’ was needed; the nation needed to join forces with its Diaspora, a process which Tuđman referred to as “spiritual revival”, a “victory of the democratic spirit and unity between all Croatian citizens”. 575

The democratic movements within the period of the implementation of the first free elections have led to a kind of spiritual revival of the Croatian national pride. The declaration by the enormous majority of Croatian people of choosing the HDZ program goals had, in reality, marked the ending of that “civil war” which had lasted in Croatia since the time of World War II. The victory of the democratic spirit and unity between all Croatian citizens, regardless of their past and their views, has created the preconditions for the removal of all fatal divisions. Finally, divisions of people into first – and second – grade citizens, into conquerors and conquered, into suitable and unsuitable, into trustworthy and enemy, must disappear. We aspire to create a society in which human and work abilities, citizenship and moral virtues, and not origin and attitudinal orientation, will determine the position and value judgments about an individual in society. Besides that, we want to build the genuine democracy in which the rule of the majority will mean the protection of the minority. 576

The motto of the Fraternalist, “All for One…One for All”, mirrors those claims of unity. Special attention in his speech was given to the Croatian Diaspora:

Return and inclusion of emigrants. The establishment of spiritual unity between domiciled and emigrated Croatia is undoubtedly one of HDZ’s successes, which already have significantly contributed to the carving out of democratic transformation. The new Croatian Government should undertake purposeful steps on all levels for the enablement of the quickest possible return of as many Croatians as possible from the world to the homeland (…) Investments by Croatian émigrés in all areas of economic life should be motivated through special privileges. Our distinctive attention must be focused on that, because they have enormous work


experiences, technological and financial potential at their disposal with
which they can significantly contribute to a faster economic and
democratic transformation of their homeland. A great deal also depends on how perceived grievances are presented to the people in an
effort to stimulate a particular response of ‘unity’. For them to have such an effect, shared grievances need to be framed in broader economic, socio–political, and historical contexts. Adverse events, regardless of their scale and consequence, cannot on their own trigger social mobilisation. When properly contextualised, perceived adversity and injustice can trigger and perpetuate an array of collective emotions and can provide motivation, encouragement and justification for action. The CAF put together by Tuđman and his followers succeeded in charging the frames with symbolic power to turn the collective feelings of injustice into meaningful reasons to take action. A great number of highly tendentious constructions were presented as undisputed truth – a result of meticulous selecting, filtering and then carefully packaging and articulating these in political speeches, public statements and interviews. Put together from a novel perspective, these ideas were tied together to echo around the world.

HDZ framing strategy was heavily dependent on making the frame culturally resonant, ensuring that the concepts covered by the frame resonated with the Diaspora’s cultural history and its ‘myths’. Tuđman and his helpers managed to achieve a high degree of narrative accuracy, or what Fisher refers to as “narrative fidelity”. Their framing

577 ibid
discourse was consistent with a pre–existing framework of popular beliefs concerning a Croatian ethnicity such as a collective name, common ancestry, a shared history, distinct culture, association with a particular territory, etc. HDZ’s nationalist framing strategy, which reshaped and often oversimplified complex values and histories as well as political aims and objectives, appealed to a wide audience within the Diaspora. Existing Croatian symbols and their meanings were reshaped and readapted\textsuperscript{581, 582} by the framers to serve their goals. HDZ’s framing strategy derived its mobilisation power from its carefully constructed nationalist discourse – the mobilisation kit it used. Its discourse successfully combined factual, moral and aesthetic framing devices that pursued tasks fundamental for the success of political mobilisation, i.e. diagnostic, prognostic and motivational interpretational frameworks.

Tudman’s nationalism aimed at resuscitating old symbols for the new Croatian state and insisted on using some of the most powerful, yet potentially divisive symbols – the Ustaše and the Partisans. He “sought to denature and appropriate both by condemning the crimes of the Ustaše and stressing the Croatian nature of the Partisans: presenting both as epiphenomena of a particular era in European history, and inviting the descendants of both to build a common Croatian state.”\textsuperscript{583} It was seen as insensitive by many\textsuperscript{584} but, ultimately, the fear of Greater Serbia, built on past and present grievances, was a powerful unifying force. A generalised fear was a powerful tool that kept people

\textsuperscript{583} Sadkovich, J. J. (2011). Father of his country? Franjo Tudjman and the creation of contemporary Croatia. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/304-father-his-country-franjo-tudjman-and-the-creation-contemporary-croatia#sthash.6g5YZbcv.wOzWeH2R.dpuf
\textsuperscript{584} ibid
together, albeit temporarily. We see evidence of Theodor Herzl’s model of a ‘Diaspora in danger’, where external existential threats to the nation bring disparate Diaspora members into ‘one people’. A nation—state that encompassed all Croats was “the only adequate solution to the threat of victimization and persecution, or even worse – genocide.”585 Interviews conducted with members of the Croatian Diaspora, both Ustaše and partisan sympathisers, indicate that the fear of Serbian domination temporarily overruled any past disagreements. According to one member of the Diaspora, [We] didn’t have time to think about the past when the future of our nation was at stake. The future of our country was more important than or past.586 This is evident from the wide support base that Tuđman enjoyed. He had supporters within a number of Croatian Diaspora organisations, including the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU) and the newly formed Croatian American Association (CAA), which jointly organised rallies protesting against “imperial aggression”,587 demanding immediate support for Croatia, and urging the West to recognise Croatian independence.

The HDZ Diaspora frame resonated among the Diaspora because of two of its properties: its validity and its relevance.588 The claims presented by the HDZ were culturally resonant to their historical environment;589 they demonstrated a high degree of

586Member of the Croatian Diaspora in North America interviewed for the purposes of this study.
credibility as well as precise relevance to potential followers’ lives. The validity of the Diaspora frame had much to do with the credibility of its designer Franjo Tuđman. His legitimacy skyrocketed in 1990 when he became the first president of the country following his party’s triumph in the first post-communist free multi-party elections where they acquired around 60 per cent of the seats in the Croatian Parliament. His credibility as a ‘defender of everything Croatian’ stems from the events of the Croatian Spring in the 1970s and 1981 when he served two prison sentences for clashing with central dogmas of Yugoslav Communist elite. His ultra-nationalist HDZ was vocal in advocating Croatian sovereignty – a brand of nationalism that particularly appealed to his right-wing supporters overseas within the Croatian Diaspora. A Croatian referendum on independence conducted in 1991 was another source of Tuđman’s credibility. Tuđman’s “credentialing process” also relied on dozens of visits to the Diaspora, by Tuđman himself or other HDZ representatives, speaking in front of Diaspora representatives and community members, whereby they would bring to light HDZ principles as well as stress the credentials of their party.

An equally important fact is that both Diaspora members and their co-ethnics at home were able to identify with ideas spread by the HDZ. The disastrous consequences of the ‘Homeland War’, used as a reoccurring theme in political speeches, public statements and addresses throughout the media, coupled with a direct reference to those responsible for it, had a great power of bringing ‘us’ against ‘them’. The proposed solution was clear. It involved, as evident from Tuđman’s speeches from the early 1990s, erecting a

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wall between ‘we’, the victims, and ‘them’, ‘the aggressors’. These distinctions are first visible on a linguistic level through discursive devices that express and publicise the foundations of Tuđman’s Diaspora mobilisation process with an aim to progressively install them at a cognitive level. Constant references to the destruction of Croatian cities, Croatian lives and liberties served as a great motivator for those residing far away from the epicentre. Through their dialogue with the Diaspora representatives directly or through speeches, the framers made sure that the effects of the war were felt far beyond Croatia’s borders.

In a public address in 1991 given at the outset of the conflict, a “dramatic and defining moment”, Tuđman lists the names of 14 Croatian cities and assures that the names of their victims “will be forever carved in our Croatian hearts, with pride and with gratitude”. He continues to stress that the “fight for the creation and the defence of free Croatia was and remains a joint fight of homeland Croats and ‘Croatia in exile’”.

The ‘Homeland War’, a defining moment in the lives of the majority of Croatian Diaspora members interviewed for the purposes of this study, remained one of the constitutive elements of the Diaspora CAF. The success of the frame was highly dependent on this particular element as the issue was an everyday part of the private lives and personal experiences of the ‘targets’ themselves.

Further related to issue salience, the HDZ discourse successfully tapped into the personal and collective goals of multiple generations of the Croatian Diaspora. Goals were not simply identified and publicised but they were made personal. An important element in the motivating process was the apparent emphasis on mutual decision—

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making. The Diaspora, as a part of the Croatian nation, was made aware, on numerous occasions, in public addresses and speeches, that it had the right to be directly involved in the decision–making process. The very first electoral slogan of the HDZ at the elections in 1990 was “Let us decide on the fate of our Croatia on our own”. In one of his later speeches Tuđman affirms that “those days when Croatian destiny was decided in Vienna, Budapest or Belgrade are long gone”; “we have decided here on our destiny and this is where we will be deciding on it from now on.”

A similar statement was made in his article published by *The New York Times* in June 1990.

Last month the Croatian people, sick and tired of Communist oppression, joined the peoples of Eastern Europe in looking away from Communism and toward a democratic future.

Mutual ‘decision making’ was further reinforced by Tuđman’s unremitting stress on “Imamo Hrvatsku” (“We have Croatia”), repeated in many post–independence speeches. The well–known statement originally reads:

We have our Croatia, it is ours and it will be the way we ourselves want it to be and we will not let anyone from the outside to dictate what kind of Croatia it should be.

Being part of the decision making process promoted the sense of ownership and accountability, which in turn further contributed to the salience of Diaspora CAF.

Finally, the sovereignty focused prognostic frame also drew its resonance from diaspora Croatians’ conditions in North America, particularly the US, where they were inspired

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by the great American narrative of democracy and freedom. In his letter to President Tuđman, CFU National President Bernard M Luketich pledged its support to Croatia’s new democratic government. Further, the CFU “never abandoned its two most deeply rooted principles; namely, its commitment to the democratic process and its defence of the concept of Croatian identity (...) even the most radical official of the CFU would never have tampered with the Croatian name or the process by which the officials of the organization were elected.” The democracy they enjoyed in their host country was something they also wished to see at home. Tuđman’s speech published on 30 June 1990 in *The New York Times* capitalised on this sentiment, and functioned as a powerful source of resonance:

> We have set the goal of a Croatian society that, like the United States, is based on political and economic freedom, respect for human rights, the protection of individual liberties, an independent judiciary and a government that is truly "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

Similarly, while addressing the Croatian nation at the start of Serbian attack on Croatia, on 16 October 1991, Tuđman refers to democracy as a ‘right’, one that has been enjoyed by other free nations.

> They could not, nor will they ever be able to kill our passion and our need to live in human dignity, in peace with ourselves and with the free nations of Europe. We have carved out that right at our first democratic elections. For this right and for our sacred land we are even ready to die.

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His words mirrored the goals of many diaspora Croats:

This is what all Croats worldwide wished and hoped for – a democratic, sovereign Croatian nation, free of the bloody Communist regime.\(^{599}\)

Remembering HDZ’s First General Assembly held on 24–25 February 1990, touched on in my last chapter, one Diaspora Croat recalls:

How our hearts swelled with pride and love for Croatia. The joy of a new future bright with hope and vigour. You could ‘touch’ the overwhelming feelings that we finally could be free and control our united destiny. What an amazing time. Let’s recapture that spirit, that optimism, that selflessness and determination to overcome and prosper. Serbs tried to take this away from us and nearly succeeded. While lot of energy, treasure and lives were spent on defending ourselves from Serbian aggression, we conquered the impossible odds against us. We can surely conquer anything before us again, and again, and again forever. We need to start to act like the victors that we are, we need to again take the moral high ground and proclaim we are Croats proud and free, we keep only what is ours and will defend ours to the end. We have a righteous place among nations and a prosperous future ahead of us. Za Dom Spremni!\(^{600}\)

HDZ’s strategy was aimed at attracting a wide audience – the Diaspora as a whole, both supporters and outsiders. According to Walsh et al.,\(^{601}\) this type of framing strategy can be of crucial importance in determining the outcome of grass-roots movements – more important than certain fixed variables such as demographic characteristics, i.e. the size and geographic concentration of the Diaspora population as well as the socio-economic status of migrants, their degree of organisation and level of discontent. At the outset, the main challenge the HDZ faced was to construct their discourse so that their movement

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\(^{599}\) A member of the Croatian Diaspora in North America interviewed for the purposes of this study.


gains sufficient critical mass. Proposed solutions were fine-tuned and then framed in a way that would attract as many potential allies as possible, i.e. they were specific enough for the members of the movement to identify with, yet suitably flexible and compatible with the views of those still outside the critical mass.

**Diaspora Mobilising Structures**

*Diasporas are webs, and webs consist not only of fibres or ropes, but also of nodes that link them together*  

As crucial as diagnostic, prognostic and motivation frames are for driving Diaspora political mobilisation, they do not on their own lead to association or organisation; they provide the framework that enables the development of mobilising structures. A comprehensive analysis of Diaspora mobilisation will therefore have to take into account other explanatory factors. Additional factors vital for the scope and scale of a social movement, according to SMTs, are the existence of mobilising structures, which include resources and structures, both formal and informal, that facilitate collective action. Mobilising structures are also defined as tools employed to collect and transfer information and transform individual claims into group demands. Equally important is the support – political, financial or other – from powerful ‘friends and

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allies’, including the emergence of a political opportunity. However, as we have seen on previous pages, it can be argued that CAF can be instrumental in influencing the opening of political opportunity in many ways. The awareness of the fact that, through collective efforts and joint decision–making, change of current circumstances is indeed possible is what Gamson refers to as the agency component. An important element of CAF is the conviction that through mutual efforts it is possible to alter the status quo. Identifying movement participants as potential agents in a position to influence their own future functions as a self–fuelling mechanism within the collective action process. “Perceptions are not only necessary for potential protesters to recognize opportunities, but in many cases perceptions can create opportunities.”

Therefore, CAF can “suggest not merely that something can be done but that ‘we’ can do something.” This leads us to Gamson’s identity component, which is linked to identifying the prospective movement participants capable of delivering that change. As a group they represent the collective ‘we’. The members of this group often see themselves as different in terms of their values and interests from ‘the Others’ who are, often in the most unambiguous terms, marked as the villains. As we have seen in the previous chapter, without a clearly defined enemy, the goals and objectives of collective actions are likely to remain just that – an unattainable aim. Hence, the presence of a human element is vital in the process of ‘enemy–making’.

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This chapter will continue the analysis of mobilising structures through the lens of leadership, with an aim to shed light on how Tudman spread his influence and reached masses. In emphasising the concept of leadership and its effects on movement dynamics, I will look at the key processes in movement development, what Nepstad and Bob define as ‘mobilisation of aggrieved parties’ and ‘activation of third party supporters’. The accent remains on leadership, as it has been defined as an understudied topic among collective action frames researchers. Building on Bourdieu, Putnam, and the existing literature on social movement leadership, Nepstad and Bob⁶¹⁰ argue that these movements’ leaders possess ‘leadership capital’ consisting of cultural, social and symbolic components. I have touched on cultural and symbolic components in the previous chapter, linking them to framing strategies. The focus here is on social capital, a key contributor to Tudman’s success as a compelling and capable organiser.

**Weaving the Web of Support**

Tudman was a politically resourceful leader who inspired and moved the masses. One of his key messages, encompassed in CAF, was proposing national reconciliation in order to increase pan–Croatian solidarity. Tudman emphasised that ‘we are all one nation’, with a goal to appeal to all Croats, at home and abroad. He later portrayed his party as a national movement, rather than a regular political party.⁶¹¹ To bring its ambitions policies to life, HDZ indeed needed to become a movement. It needed to inspire masses to rally behind it and push it forward. Framing, as we have seen,

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provided purpose and resonance. Framing, however, is a dynamic process, influenced by elements of the social–cultural context in which it is embedded\(^{612}\) and it requires framers who are well versed in the social–cultural circumstances. Tuđman’s transcultural skills played an important role in this process. His experience of the ‘Diaspora world’ is not one of spatial proximity, but a socio–political one. As we have learned from previous chapters, Tuđman was well suited to understand some of the struggles Croatian political émigrés faced when leaving their home country. His transcultural and transborder skills enabled him to negotiate meanings and operate effectively in multiple settings and get his message through to large and varied audience. This was an important skill to master as “collective action frames are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared meaning”.\(^{613}\)

It needs to be emphasised that Diaspora mobilisation developed in phases where initially Tuđman played a key role as a frame maker, but in order to successfully advance his strategies, he had to entice a cadre of capable organisers who could further his cause by networking with Croatian institutions, liaising with the media, raising funds for the ‘Croatian cause’ and gathering a varied following of people. Tuđman began this process well before he came into the spotlight. His transcultural skills were most effective when they worked in two directions, not only informing supporters of local grievances but also enlightening them about outside backers. This had the effect of multiplying the

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influence of third party support and it also reinforced the commitment of constituents who might otherwise had been unaware of existing supporters and allies.614

Social Capital

Activation of third party resources and support was crucial for Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, with Tuđman’s social capital playing a key role in this process. Social capital lends itself to multiple definitions, interpretations and uses. Social capital, as defined by Putnam, includes “social network (...) norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”.615 Nan Lin’s concept of social capital defined as access to resources through network ties is a more individualistic approach and also refers to “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace.”616 In *The Forms of Capital*, Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”.617 His usage of the concept is instrumental, focusing on the deliberate construction of sociability and the rewards that social capital brings to individuals.”618 Contrary to Putnam’s positive view of social capital, Bourdieu’s focus is on how social capital can lead to reproduction of inequality where the wealthy and powerful use their ‘old boys’ network’ to advance their own interests, and the interests of those closest to them. This

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618 ibid
definition of social capital becomes relevant in our analysis of Croatian Diaspora members that formed Tuđman’s inner circle and reaped many benefits in later years. As we have seen in previous chapter, a great number of Diaspora members were incentivised by the gift of citizenship. Later, the Diaspora was rewarded by receiving an increased number of seats in the Croatian Parliament, a practice benefiting not only the Diaspora but also the HDZ, as Diaspora only ever voted for one political party. The Diaspora was given an unprecedented representation in the Croatian Parliament, with as many as 12 parliamentary seats out of 127, more than what was allocated to Croatia’s own ethnic minorities.

This electoral framework was changed prior to the 2000 elections introducing a non-fixed quota based on voter turnout, which fixed the number of Diaspora representatives in the Sabor. The number has since gradually been reduced to three, but the voice of the Croatian Diaspora, albeit controversial, remains influential. Prominent members of the Croatian Diaspora became leading members of Tuđman’s government and the ones who had helped finance his 1990 electoral victory also benefited from the process of privatisation from 1993 onwards. It has been claimed that this privatisation created new elites in the 1990s, which included affluent members of the Diaspora.

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Third Party Support

In his analysis of leadership support, Eatwell identifies a major problem with classic theoretical formulations of the charisma thesis: they feature a binary approach focusing only on macro (societal) and micro (individual) factors in model building. Eatwell identifies the group (meso) level as crucial for understanding leadership support. The growth of Tudman’s support network, which was first present at micro and gradually spread to meso and macro levels, supports Eatwell’s claim. Tudman’s charisma first influenced a small émigré minority, the core, who then recruited a wider community of supporters.

Mobilising third party resources played an important role in Croatian Diaspora mobilisation. The literature distinguishes between ‘weak (more distant) ties’ and ‘strong ties’ that are based on face–to–face interactions, personal and social relations, common meeting places and points of reference that encourage group mobilisation. Strong ties enable the leader to identify and employ sub–leaders who have strong ties to lower levels of constituencies. Tudman’s key natural allies were institutions that had been marginalised under the communist rule during Yugoslavia. His obvious options were the Croatian political Diaspora and the Croatian Catholic Church who not only equipped him with human resources that helped spread his message but also provided a source of legitimacy for him and his cause. Once Tudman accessed strong supporters with ties to

lower, more distant levels of constituencies, he was used by them as a “lightning rod” for further external assistance. Strong ties helped create and strengthen connections with distant and disconnected audiences – the weak ties – facilitating the flow of Tuđman’s ideas and spreading some of Tuđman’s key diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames. Weak ties represent members of the Croatian Diaspora outside of this circle of strong natural allies, who, as we shall see, bonded through collective action towards a common goal. Through weak ties, Tuđman’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing transformed elusively felt discontent into strong grievances, motivating individuals to join the collective effort. But let us first turn to discussing Tuđman’s strong ties.

**Diaspora Strong Ties**

Tuđman recognised the potential in the large Croatian émigré community, particularly in North America, where he travelled extensively before establishing the HDZ. Tuđman’s strong ties to the North American Diaspora date back to his first post–prison trip to the continent on 6 June 1987, three years after his release. On this trip he visited Ontario, Canada, together with his wife Ankica. This was also his first public speaking engagement since the days of his imprisonment and the subsequent five–year ban on public appearance in Croatia. This visit was arranged in secret by Marin Sopta, Zlatko Ćardarević, and John Zdunić. They visited the University of York, where Sopta was a former student and a friend of Professor Hector Massey. Sopta migrated to Canada

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Sopta is one of the main contributors to the studies of Croatian Diaspora today.
with his mother, mainly for economic reasons, to join Sopta's uncle, a longstanding political émigré. Sopta describes his story as a “typical example similar to that of other Croats from Western Herzegovina that emigrated at the end of 1960s and the first half of 1970s”. In 1985, he organised a successful international conference on “Yugoslavia after Tito” in spite of Yugoslav protests in Canada. He returned to Croatia in 1995 and led the Department for Return at the Ministry for Development, Immigration and Reconstruction and, more recently, served as the director of the Croatian Centre for Strategic Research in Zagreb.

Tudman’s second lecture, also organised by Sopta, was held at the University of Toronto, from where he travelled to Sudbury and Ottawa where Ante Beljo and Gojko Šušak organised lectures at the Laurentian University in Sudbury and Carleton University in Ottawa. During this trip Tudman also visited the Croatian community in Pittsburgh. As noted in the previous chapter, during his first visit to the Diaspora Tudman did not explicitly mention the possibility of a Croatian bid for independence but his lectures on the Croat patriot and historical figure Stjepan Radić and on “The Question of Nationality in the Contemporary World” were infused by the contours of the idea and, according to Sopta, well received. Tudman’s lectures at universities across North America set the foundation for a new Croatian national awakening. His speeches advocated his idea of an all–round Croat reconciliation and promoted the creation of Croatian sovereignty.

625 ibid
626 ibid
627 ibid
The speech Tuđman delivered on June 19 1987, entitled “On the History of Resolving the Croatian Issue and the Self–Determination of World Nations” and delivered at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto, was published in a booklet and made available to Croats across the Diaspora. This enabled him to start setting the groundwork for a new political movement. In his speech on June 19 1987, he outlined his views to an eager audience of diaspora Croats:

> From the earliest knowledge of mankind’s history, nationalities or nations have been and remain, with all their manifestations of ethnicity and statehood, the highest social configuration of a human community. The whole of human history has concerned itself with the formation and self–determination of national societies and the creation of states. . . . The self–determination of nations, their freedom from external influences and foreign domination, their sovereignty of state, and at the same time the desire for equality and ascendancy in the international arena have been and remain the main characteristics of contemporary historical fluctuation.629

Tuđman and his wife started their second tour of North America on 19 May 1988, visiting Hamilton near Toronto, Kitchener, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Nanaim, Calgary, Monterey in Napa Valley, San Francisco, and Hollywood. It was during these trips to the Diaspora that some of Tuđman’s strong ties were created. During his North American visits President Tuđman solidified his relationships with eager followers – Marin Sopta, Ante Beljo,630 Fr. Ljubo Krasić, Gojko Šušak,631 and Vinko Grubišić632 –


630 Active member of HDZ; appointed general secretary of the North American HDZ, established the Croatian Information Center, a pro-government satellite news service, and in 1993 was appointed director of the influential Croatian Heritage Foundation; Croatian MP in 1995 and 2000.

631 Later became Croatia’s first Minister of Defence.

632 In 1984 and 1986 they operated as the central committee of Croatian Schools of America and Canada (CSAC). With the help of many Franciscans as the founders, directors, and teachers in the Croatian schools throughout North America (approximately 100 schools), they also held international seminars of the Croatian language and folklore. The institution was later renamed to the Croatian Schools of America,
émigrés from Western Herzegovina where Croatian nationalism has traditionally been more pronounced than elsewhere and where its protagonists took pride in being “more Croatian” than Croats in Croatia. They were an example of coterie charism; a group of hard–core supporters, who recognised Tuđman’s ability to embark on his mission on behalf of the entire Croatian nation. He inspired great loyalty and devotion among this critical group of people and was confident that they would put in a special effort on behalf of his cause. On one of the occasions, Mr. Šušak was Tuđman’s host and the two men struck up a close friendship, with Šušak becoming one of Tuđman’s strongest ties in the Diaspora. This was where the seed for independent Croatia was created, the place many regard as the nucleus of the Croatian Diaspora.

Gojko Šušak, who later became Tuđman’s Minister of Defence, helped deliver millions of US dollars to Tuđman’s campaign and also served as an important sub–leader and a point of contact, predominantly with the right–wing Croatian Diaspora. Originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he also played a key role in attracting the support of ethnic Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a group that played a key role in the HDZ’s

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Winland, D. N. (2007). *We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press; and


Winland, D. N. (2007). *We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

state–building project 638 Later on, HDZ BIH, HDZ’s sister party, also had a great influence over Croats with dual citizenship.

Get–togethers and the face–to–face encounters led to strong bonds of solidarity and trust. These meetings also helped Tudman solidify the feeling of a moral obligation of his potential followers to support the ‘Croatian cause’, referred to as ‘cognitive liberation’ by McAdams,639 which moved them from apathy to action. This is strongly linked to ‘symbolic capital’ of a leader that we touched on earlier, i.e. capital that emerged from Tudman’s biographical experiences and his unique personal characteristics. Symbolic capital has the power to turn leaders into charismatic figures able to fire constituents with the commitment and discipline necessary to “hazard time, liberty, and even life against powerful, sometimes ruthless foe”.640 Tudman’s symbolic capital was instrumental not only for establishing a wellspring of trusted sub–leaders, but also for building a constituency, as we shall see later.

Through his support base in in the Diaspora, Tuđman and the HDZ got access to funds to run a professional campaign.641 Tuđman gained the backing of powerful third parties that not only proved crucial for accessing financial resources, but they also served as committed spokespeople and activated more supporters within the Croatian Diaspora.


According to Nepstand and Bob⁶⁴², leaders are more likely to attract third party support if they possess symbolic capital, as described earlier. Their success is even more likely if they also possess cultural capital permitting them to “read their political environment and adapt, where necessary, to the preferences and predilection of potential supporters”.⁶⁴³ Cultural capital was one of Tuđman’s strongest points. He was extremely knowledgeable about the interests, norms and trends of the Diaspora and was able to adapt himself to their preferences, and more importantly, to the preferences of powerful supporters and potential sub–leaders.

Tuđman’s visit to Toronto in September 1990 had a very different feel to his previous, more modest, visits to the area. It concluded with an elaborate gala banquet held in his honour at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre with 1,500 members of the Croatian Diaspora attending. There he also received greetings from young Croatian Canadians, with Ante Beljo and Gojko Šušak, now Croatian Minister of Defence, by his side.⁶⁴⁴ His speech at the Croatian Social and Cultural Centre in Norval, Ontario described as “one of the most important events in the long history of the Croatian community in Canada”, attracted 20,000 people. The Queen of Peace, the Franciscan Center in Norval, describes Tuđman’s visit in 1990 as “the most attended event in the history of the Croatian Centre”.⁶⁴⁵


The idea of Croatian independence was openly voiced in May 1988 by the Croatian National Congress, formed in 1974 in Toronto as an umbrella association of all Croatian emigrants dedicated to the independence of Croatia. The Congress declared a demand for independence of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, spurring leaders of political groups in the Diaspora into action. In June 1990, the New York Times, previously pro-Yugoslavian, published Tuđman’s article “All We Croatians Want Is Democracy,” quoted earlier. Similarly, the Financial Times in London reported on the inevitable fall of Yugoslavia, with other Western newspapers agreeing. On 25 May 1991 Croatia declared independence, followed by Diaspora organised rallies advocating and urging recognition of Croatia. Among the organisers were the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Croatian Catholic Union and the newly formed Croatian American Association. Rallies were followed by Diaspora–homeland conventions both at home and abroad, marking the fall of a division–wall between Croatia and its Diaspora.

Given the nationalist roots of the politically active core of the Croatian Diaspora, it was the best potential ally for right of centre, anti-Communist parties. Many of its contributions to Croatia during the 1990s and its political activity aimed at influencing the host country were noted in my previous chapter. With its political, financial and humanitarian support, the Croatian Diaspora was critical to the unfolding of events in Croatia during the early 1990s and played a crucial role in influencing the international

646 Croatian National Congress (HNV) was formed in 1974, in Toronto, as an umbrella association of all Croatian emigrants dedicated to the independence of Croatia.
650 ibid
community and its policy toward Croatia, and the region. The Croatian Diaspora organisations in North America firmly supported the newly created political parties, especially those that emphasised unrestricted travel to Croatia for Croatian émigrés, freedom for political prisoners, and the right to secret and multi-party elections for Sabor.651

Alongside gatherings in Ontario, a strong example of Diaspora loyalty was the 1991 political rally held in Washington with 35,000652 Croatian Diaspora members advocating and urging recognition of Croatia. For the first time in the history of the Croatian Diaspora in the US, they firmly and openly disagreed with US policy toward the events taking place in Yugoslavia and criticised the attitude of President Bush and the US Government’s lack of support for Croatia. The Croatian Government sent official appeals to the Croatian Diaspora regarding the issue of recognition as well as urging the Croatian Diaspora to inform their local, state and federal authorities about the situation in Croatia. Here is an example of an appeal:

We ask that you serve as witnesses and interpreters in your respective countries. If you can, in any way, please influence the White House and official representatives of the US Government because the People of Europe are waiting to see what the Big Brother has to say.653

In response to pleas from the Croatian Government, a great amount of effort was also invested in lobbying the US Government and in raising the awareness of the US media

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651 Croatian-American organisations (CFU, CCU) showed special interest in the efforts that went into founding new political parties. An example is a publication in CFU’s Fraternalist: Pogledi i misli o Hrvatskoj [Views and thoughts on Croatia]. (1990, March 21) Fraternalist, p. 12.
and their understanding of Croatia. The activities ranged from individual letters, petitions and telephone calls to the White House and the US Foreign Affairs Committee – all communicating discontent and disappointment with the level of US support for the newly established Croatian state. “The Croatian Diaspora in 1990 to 1991 knew exactly what we wanted”⁶⁵⁴, said Dr. Ante Čuvalo, a Chicago–area college professor. Diaspora activities – such as the “Croatian Days on the Hill” organised in 1991 by the Croatian American Association⁶⁵⁵, media activities such as the “Appeal by 104 Nobel Laureates for Peace in Croatia” sponsored by the American Initiative for Croatia (AIC)⁶⁵⁶ letters sent to President Bush and petitions encouraged by the CFU⁶⁵⁷ – all demonstrated the extent to which “the promotional and advocacy functions of Diaspora organisations on the extra–communal levels” can make a significant difference in bringing about positive attitudes toward their homelands.⁶⁵⁸ Fraternalist of the CFU continuously published addresses and phone numbers of US Congressmen and encouraged its membership to send letters, petitions and make telephone calls⁶⁵⁹. According to CFU records, thousands of letters were sent by members of the Croatian Diaspora, as well as Croats from Croatia, resulting in the US recognition of Croatia’s independence in April 1992. It is


⁶⁵⁵ Croatian American Association (CAA) is the primary American organisation registered to lobby Congress on Croatian issues. The CAA is supported each year by the contributions of its individual members; it accepts no funds from the Croatian Government and defines itself as non-partisan. Retrieved from www.caausa.org


doubtful whether an independent state would have been achieved, and internationally recognised, without the support of the Diaspora.

During the war, we Croats have been searching for other Croats, to support each other and to help the cause. The most difficult part was to educate the American public and the American Government. This remains to be a problem even today.⁶⁶⁰

Prompted by the advent of Croatian independence and by the events taking place at home, the Croatian Diaspora representatives in the US stressed the importance of creating a ‘united Croatian front’. The united front was formed in 1993 through the founding of the National Federation of Croatian Americans (NFCA), an umbrella organisation linking 10 major Croatian–American organisations, including the Croatian Fraternal Union, which was the focus of earlier chapters, as well as several hundred individual members. It defines its aim as strengthening the many cultural, educational, humanitarian, public relations, social and political activities important to the Croatian community in the US. The NFCA was instrumental in ensuring US support for Croatia’s eventual membership of NATO through lobbying for the enactment of the so-called ‘Croatian Amendment’ – the ‘Amendment to the 1997 Foreign Appropriations Bill’. The organisation defines itself as a non–governmental, non–profit entity, and engages in political and lobbying activities.⁶⁶¹ The international Croatian World Congress was formed in 1993 as a non–profit, non–governmental and non–party international organisation, and according to its mission statement aims to unite and

⁶⁶⁰ A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora interviewed for the purpose of this study.
network Croatian associations and institutions throughout the world so as to assist in their successful functioning and to promote Croatian heritage worldwide.\textsuperscript{662}

\textit{Croatian Catholic Church}

The Church had a rather marginalised presence during communist Yugoslavia. Although it maintained a presence not just in Croatia, but also Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Catholic Church was often subject to censure. In January 1952, the communist regime officially banned all religious education in public schools.\textsuperscript{663} That year the regime also expelled the Catholic Faculty of Theology from the University of Zagreb, to which it was not restored until democratic changes took place in 1991.\textsuperscript{664} The Church was also exposed to frequently being portrayed as a supporter of the Ustaše regime with allusions to fascist collaboration during World War II. This discourse became more common and increasingly confrontational in the late 1980s prior to the 1990 elections. As part of the nationalist discourse in Serbia, the Church was accused of “clerical nationalism” and for being part of a “conspiracy of the Comintern and the Vatican against Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{665} The Church saw these accusations as severe slander and initiated a series of articles in \textit{Glas Koncila}, its ecclesiastical weekly, to address these concerns. \textit{Glas Koncila} was (and remains) the main publication promoting the opinions of the Church, an activity prohibited during Yugoslavia.

These events lead to the Croatian Church playing a more prominent role in the Croatian society and becoming more vocal in welcoming the breakup of Yugoslavia. The events of the Croatian Spring at the start of 1970s further spread the idea that Croatian culture and identity were imperilled by the Yugoslav regime. These views grew stronger as the political tensions continued but the public arena was dominated by an imposed silence, contributing to a very strong legacy of the Croatian Spring. The silencing of the Croatian Spring also contributed to the failure of the pan–Slavic version of Croatian nationalism. Throughout these years, the Catholic Church became the main stronghold of dissident resistance against the communist establishment, “the guardian of the Croatian Spring”. The Church endorsed the idea of a traditionalist, ethnic version of Croatian identity and given there was no other forum left for national expression, Croatian national identity became even more intertwined with religion.

The Church participated in the debate regarding the road ahead for Croatia, openly supporting democracy but officially refusing to get involved in partisan politics. This announcement was published in a statement issued by the Croatian Catholic bishops in the run up to the 1990 elections but the statement became subject to multiple interpretations, with many equating it with de facto support for the HDZ. Tuđman in particular used the statement to claim that HDZ had full support of the Catholic Church.

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Glas Koncila, in particular, had a reputation of being, in effect, a HDZ publication, subtly supporting HDZ which defended the Church promising to reinstate its rights denied during Yugoslavia. It has been reported that Glas Koncila preferred the HDZ to other parties in the election and that the parish clergy openly campaigned for the HDZ during their services as well as advised parishioners on how to vote. HDZ reciprocated the favour by allowing the Church to organise religious instruction in schools as it came into power in 1990.671

The Croatian Catholic Church functioned as an important supporting organisation in the Diaspora mobilisation process. Tuđman’s strongest supporters within the Catholic Church helped disseminate his message to some of the weaker ties within the Diaspora. Articles about Tuđman were widely distributed through Catholic publications such as Glas Koncila. Catholic institutions proved instrumental for Tuđman, as these weak ties helped broadcast his views to an extended audience. Croatian Catholic parishes and missions in the Diaspora assisted Tuđman in disseminating his message to the Diaspora but they were also a great ally in his fundraising campaigns abroad and raised millions in hard currency for Tuđman’s electoral campaign. Among them were Croatian Catholic priests who knew Tuđman personally, such as the Ljubo Krasić from Canada, now heading the Croatian Ethnic Institute in Chicago, and Tomislav Duka from Germany who once referred to Tuđman as a “prophet sent by Jesus Christ to finish off communism and bring eternal happiness to humankind”.672 Father Krasić, a


Herzegovinian Franciscan, with his fellow Herzegovinians mentioned earlier – Vinko Grubišić, Gojko Šušak and Ante Beljo from Ottawa, and other supporters from the so-called Norwal group – collaborated with Tuđman during his American tours between 1987 and 1990 and supplied him with dollars as well as very reliable cadre.\textsuperscript{673}

Although the Catholic Church was divided in its support for the HDZ, it can be claimed that in some respects they joined forces in the early days. The church organised missions abroad and organised rallies and speeches at HDZ meetings. Priest and clerics rallied support and raised funds for the HDZ from their missions in the Diaspora, with some remaining politically active long after the 1990s. Tuđman, on the other hand, portrayed himself as a close ally of the Church, which significantly increased the legitimacy of his party. References to God and religion, which resonated highly with Croats both at home and abroad, can be found in Tuđman’s speeches throughout the 1990s. An example of connecting Tuđman’s nationalist cause with the Catholic religion is the apparition of Virgin Mary to six Croats on 24 June 1981 in Međugorje, a small town located in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Herzegovina region and close to the border of Croatia. Since then Međugorje has become a sacred place of pilgrimage, with over 40 million people having visited the site.\textsuperscript{674} According to Škrbiš, such apparitions were appropriated by the Croatian nationalist discourse\textsuperscript{675}. Another example is a speech Tuđman gave in Knin in 1995:

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
With God’s help, we will succeed in this, in what no one believed in (...) we knew that the Croatian people can survive this and find strength inside them.\textsuperscript{676}

Another example, the HDZ’s anthem “God Save Croatia”, (Croatian: “Boze Ćuvaj Hrvatsku”) has strong religious connotations, and was written in August 1991 in response to the concern that Croatia’s military capabilities were non–existent compared to the “overwhelming military might of the occupier.”\textsuperscript{677} The song appeared on national Croatian Radio Television at the beginning of September 1991 and was one of the most frequently played songs on both Croatian TV and radio in the early 1990s, including the \textit{Voice of Croatia}, broadcast in the Diaspora. Below is an excerpt:

\begin{quote}
If needed, my lord, this is my vow to you,
Take my life and give it to her,
For better or for worse, stay with us, stay with her,
God protect Croatia, my dear home.
\end{quote}

Religion, twinned with music, doubled the mobilising effect of these lyrics. Pettan’s study on music, politics and war\textsuperscript{678} suggests that one of the key functions of music in wartime, apart from encouragement to fighters and civilians, and humiliation of the enemy, is to “call for the involvement of those not directly endangered – including fellow citizens, the diaspora and the political and military decision makers abroad”.

Content analysis of major Diaspora publications at the time, including Croatian Fraternal Union’s \textit{Fraternalist}, confirms a strong emphasis on religion. With their articles on Croatia’s history, glorifying their nation’s heroes and paying tribute to their religious

\textsuperscript{676}Croatian President Franjo Tuđman’s Speech on "Freedom Train" Journey after Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians from the Krajina Section of Yugoslavia. Posted 17 March 2006. Retrieved from http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/tudj.htm

\textsuperscript{677}Croatian Radio TV, HR. Retrieved from http://www.hrt.hr/arhiv

leaders, alongside Croatia’s artists and sportsmen, in an effort to revive common memories, these publications reflected a heightened sense of ethnic identity and national unity.

**Diaspora Weak Ties**

Weak ties\(^{679}\) represent more distant connections to broader networks.\(^ {680}\) One of the earliest writers to describe the nature of the ties between people was German scientist and philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.\(^ {681}\) Similar to Goethe’s analogy using particles of quicksilver, which find unity through the process of chemical affinity, distant members of the Croatian Diaspora, aggregate or bond through collective action towards a common goal. We should not underestimate the strength of weak ties.

These networks are of utmost importance as they can create and further reinforce links with geographically distant, disengaged, and/or inaccessible audiences. Tuđman’s weak ties facilitated information dissemination and appeal for Diaspora support and also helped spread some of key Tuđman’s frames that, decades later, are still being used by some Croatian Diaspora organisations. Contrary to what McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink\(^ {682}\) claim, knowledge of local conditions does not diminish with distance and greater recruiting success does not depend on potential recruits being spatially proximate to the leader’s strongholds. In the context of Diaspora, the ‘weak link’ category can be


expanded to include what we can refer to as ‘latent links’. These are host country citizens or residents of Croatian origin who do not maintain their diasporic identity and thus cannot be referred to as members of the Croatian Diaspora. Sheffer would refer to this group as the ‘dormant Diaspora’, i.e. entities with successfully implemented assimilationist and integrationist strategies that can under certain circumstances be reawakened.\textsuperscript{683} These individuals did not nurture “relationships with their host societies and governments, homelands, global and regional actors, and other groups from the same nation residing in other countries”.\textsuperscript{684} They were thus harder to access by Tuđman as they were not members of diasporic organisations and institutions and did not participate in political, social, cultural and/or religious activities. However, through weak ties, the combination of Tuđman’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing translated vaguely felt dissatisfaction into well–defined grievances and compelled individuals to join the collective effort.\textsuperscript{685}

I am so grateful to my Croatian friends who brought me closer to my nation. I was proud to be able to contribute. I can honestly say that ‘I once was lost but now am found’.\textsuperscript{686}

The political victory of HDZ resulted in unleashed nationalist currents pouring in from all sides of the Diaspora. Expressing nationalist feeling was no longer off–limits as the HDZ assertively affirmed its Croatian nationalism. This particularly appealed to political émigrés who were forced to leave Croatia because of their political beliefs that


\textsuperscript{686} Member of the Diaspora interviewed for the purposes of this study.
were now encouraged. The masses followed. Transnational engagement of the Croatian Diasporic communities in the US lead to $4 million being collected for Tuđman’s electoral campaign. The voters, both at home and abroad, opted for the unapologetic nationalism of the HDZ, giving it a majority in the Croatian Parliament. Tuđman’s party acquired almost two thirds of the seats and a clean mandate to dictate a legislative and constitutional agenda of its choice. A number of Croatian emigrants, many of them former political émigrés, assumed key political roles in the new Croatian Government. Their influence was most evident in the early days of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one fifth of which was composed of Diaspora representatives. Dozens of ambassadors, ministers and their advisors, including the Ministry of Information, the Ministry for Return and Immigration, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry for Maritime Affairs, Transportation and Communications, and the Ministry of Environment, MPs, political secretaries, directors of Croatian Homeland Foundation and political party leaders, were also former members of the Croatian Diaspora.

The conflict further generated an unparalleled boost in financial support and humanitarian activity, with the Diaspora making significant donations in an effort to help the situation in their homeland. Croatian cultural, educational as well as political organisations jointly participated in the humanitarian campaign, sending millions of dollars to Croatia as direct monetary contributions. The Croatian National Bank records show that, through the Croatian Investment Fund alone, the Croatian Diaspora invested approximately $151 million. An additional amount between $300 and $600 million was invested through individual investments and investments into Croatian banks in the 1990s. As noted in the previous chapter, Croatian organisations also engaged in sending
hundreds of tons of food, medicine, uniforms for the Croatian soldiers, and help for
children who had lost their fathers in the war.

At an Oakville, Ontario church dinner in 1993, one speaker described a conversation
with a Croatian ambassador–at–large who told him contributions from Canada had
“saved us.”

That's nothing. During the war, in 1991, we used to raise $100,000 for
the government with each dinner; people were coming in with their
pension checks and taking new mortgages.687

These were the words of John Sola, a member of the Ontario Parliament, originally from
Croatia. Anton Kikas, on the other hand, a wealthy Toronto businessman, arranged for a
chartered Boeing 707 to fly $1 million worth of machine guns and ammunition from
South Africa to Croatia in August of 1991. When Croatia declared independence in
June 1991 and war broke out between Croatian forces and Serb rebels supported by the
Serb–controlled Yugoslav army, Kikas decided to take action. He describes his action
guardedly in 1993; the contents of the plane, he says, were “certain military equipment”
obtained from British and Austrian intermediaries for about $1 million. In his words:

What motivated me to get involved and work on the Croatian cause are
the lies that were spread by the [Serb–controlled Yugoslav government]
about my nation and my people; I wanted to tell the real truth.688

However, Kikas’ plane was forced down by Yugoslav fighter jets, and he was taken into
custody where he was tortured for two days, then imprisoned. Three months later, he

687 Swardson, A. (1993, March 8). The Croats of Canada prove their hearts are in the homeland.
Washington Post. Retrieved from

688 ibid
was released in exchange for a Yugoslav army general. Kikas returned to Toronto a hero.\textsuperscript{689}

Young men and women, who had previously never been to Croatia, left their homes in the US, Canada, Australia, South America and Europe to defend their homeland. In 1990 approximately 100 New York Croatians arrived in Croatia and joined the Croatian Army as volunteers.\textsuperscript{690} Former Croatian members of the French Foreign Legion, including Ante Gotovina, a Croatian Army general who served in the ‘Homeland War’ and later stood trial at The Hague Tribunal, discussed further in my next chapter, contributed to the advancement of the Croatian military and police forces.

The realisation of the ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’ ended Croatian Diaspora’s stateless existence as they rejoiced in the birth of the new Croatian state. As pointed out by a member of the Diaspora,

\begin{quote}
Homeland was no longer a symbolic reference point, but a source of new focus and rejuvenating force, a place that we can help grow, build connections with and be proud of.
\end{quote}

Diaspora members who took part in the research report an increase in their levels of participation in Croatian cultural events following independence – picnics, dances, festivals and shows – organised by both their local communities and Croatian Diaspora organisations such as the CFU or the CCU. The events in Croatia had a powerful impact on Diaspora Croats in demonstrating “that they [members of the Diaspora] are an

\textsuperscript{689} ibid
organic part of their nation, directly connected with its destiny, although far away from Croatia.**

**Conclusion**

Prognostic frames are critical elements of the framing process as they provide the targeted audience with a sense of direction and a shared goal. Specifically, the prospect of the ‘centuries–long dream of Croatian statehood’ coming true was a compelling prognosis, one that resonated across multiple generations of the Croatian Diaspora. The proposed solutions were framed as the only way of successfully changing the *status quo* and putting an end to existing difficulties. They also clearly identified the leading figures, namely the HDZ, capable of putting that plan into action. These, as we have seen, also included religious representatives and leaders from both Croatia and its Diaspora, acting as self–legitimated spokesmen of the collective Diaspora identity.

Benford** identifies four generic vocabularies of motive: vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety, which we briefly touch upon in Chapter II. These vocabularies proved vital for sustaining the participation of Diaspora members in homeland affairs. The analyses of Diaspora movement activists, elites, politicians and significant others’ speeches, interviews, slogans and statements provide evidence that points to the existence of all four previously identified vocabularies. However, Benford’s list lacks an important component, which is of particular salience for the Croatian Diaspora mobilisation; one I referred to as the ‘perceived justness of the cause’

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in the previous chapter. This vocabulary refers to the feeling of duty and a sense of obligation among the Diaspora to do what is perceived as right – to stand up for the cause that they believe is worth investing in and fighting for, one that promises sovereignty, and territorial integrity of their homeland. These promises mirrored Tuđman’s speeches in North America where he emphasised national self–determination as the unstoppable dynamic of “history’s forward march”.

For a frame to resonate with its audience, it needs to be credible and relevant, ensuring narrative fidelity and cultural resonance. For a frame to be culturally resonant to its historical background, it has to have a high degree of credibility as well as logical and precise relevance to potential followers’ lives. Successful prognostic frames, and frames in general, also heavily rely on the power of emotion. Also, the larger the range of problems covered by the frame, the larger the potential ‘catch’ within the Diaspora. The master frame, broad in scope with magnet–like characteristics, proved to be a successful tool in attracting Diaspora members across the globe. However, this chapter also shed light on factors leading to frame transformation. Examples from the Croatian Diaspora suggest that frame transformation becomes needed when proposed solutions do not resonate or are in conflict with views of core supporters. Unfortunately, this alignment approach has not received much attention and much more research remains to be done.

Alongside framing, Croatian diaspora mobilisation is also the product of a complex historical, political and social dynamics, where leaders play a crucial role in shaping the

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mobilising process through motivating and coordinating people. The success of Tuđman’s leadership is a product of both contextual and individual forces and, as Nepstad and Bob point out, it is difficult to separate leadership from the larger aspects of the movement. Nonetheless, it is possible to highlight the different roles that leaders play.\textsuperscript{696} Tuđman played a central part in Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, which makes it a good case study for analysing leadership roles. It would be difficult to conceive of the mobilising process of the Croatian Diaspora without Tuđman, its leader, who was able to take advantage of external conditions and actualise the potential for change. Leaders do not do it all by themselves, they are encouraged by political opportunities and organisational structures. However, existing theories, with their structural orientation, tend to minimise the role leaders play in processes of mobilisation. Shifting the focus on the leader, both on how he develops individually as a leader and how he leads through his supporters is something that can greatly expand our knowledge of Diaspora mobilisation dynamics.

The following chapter will take a look at the post–Tuđman Croatian Diaspora to examine to what extent it continues to voice ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s. The chapter will also examine examples of post–Tuđman Diaspora engagement, which is still very much guided by the events of the 90s. In doing so, the chapter will also touch on the current status of the Diaspora and their disenchantment with the current political settlement. The chapter will also explore some of Diaspora’s present–day existential questions, including the lack of unity and inspiring leaders, and the question of return.

CHAPTER VI: Diaspora after Tuđman

There is a significant gap between the Diaspora and the Homeland. The Diaspora expected Croatia to open up its doors after the war, but doors have been shut; they were slammed! 697

One of Tuđman’s main objectives, and the focus of his diagnostic, prognostic and motivation frames, was to achieve national unity. Ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s served as ‘glue’ that united disparate networks and disjointed Diaspora identities together. Acting as diasporic entrepreneurs, Tuđman and his party were greatly responsible for the powerful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora and transformed it into a coherent identity network, with an aim of securing Diaspora support for HDZ.

Achieving unity also included reconciling the two wings of Tuđman’s party, the hard–line nationalists and the moderate conciliators. He was obsessed with healing the “national split personality”, 698 so much so that he attempted to metaphorically reconcile the two groups through an infamous endeavour, often described as insensitive, when he proposed to “dig up the past in a mass healing ritual”. 699 He suggested excavating the remains of the Ustaše families buried at Bleiburg and laying them to rest at Jasenovac, the notorious concentration camp where Ustaše murdered tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. He died in December 1999 without fully accomplishing his healing mission. The danger that presented itself after his death was that the persistent historical divisions would re–emerge and the unity created during the early years of his power would slowly dissipate.


699 ibid
This chapter will touch on the changes that took place in the Croatian Diaspora post–Tuđman, specifically addressing the question of unity. The chapter will also analyse the modern–day Croatian Diaspora with an aim to examine how and why active Diaspora organisations continue to internalise and reproduce the ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s. In doing so, the chapter will focus on the current status of the Diaspora and their disenchantment with the present-day political settlement. More specifically, the chapter will examine the controversies that accompany Croatian Diaspora electoral participation; namely, the unique voting rights that Croatian Diaspora enjoyed in the 1990s, the reasons behind that unparalleled position of privilege, and the ‘disenfranchisement’ that followed. The chapter will highlight the main concerns coming from the Diaspora as well as those voiced by the Croatian Government. I will analyse how the modern–day Diaspora political activity in Croatia – as well as direct and indirect influence, through voting, campaigning, financing and lobbying, is still very much guided by the events of the 90s. The discussion will be framed around justice and accountability in the context of Croatia’s path towards the EU, as some of the most notable activities organised by the Diaspora were around those themes. The final section will continue to focus on the recent history of the North American Croatian Diaspora and discuss views of Croatian Diasporic communities after independence, exploring major existential questions, including the question of return.
Heroes vs. Villains

Recent literature on Diaspora Politics challenges the reactionary nature of diaspora communities. Zunzer observes that, “there is no evidence that diaspora communities structurally develop a more conservative perspective on politics in general or on the state of affairs in their home country”.700 Further, it is claimed that, ‘by preserving livelihoods and maintaining vital services in countries emerging from or still experiencing conflicts (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, West Bank and Gaza, Haiti and others), remittances can be seen as a sine qua non for peace and rebuilding’.701 However, the Croatian case demonstrates that deep-rooted suspicion and the widespread negative perceptions about diasporas continue to be very well represented in societies.702 These views include arguments highlighting a more radical side of diaspora communities, emphasising those that engage in, ‘long distance nationalism’.703 These views also support Werbner’s claims that diasporas freely, “endorse and actively, support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements”.704 Works by Stacy Sullivan and Paul Hockenos recognise the impact of ‘long-distance nationalism’ as a crucial part of Balkans’ dynamics. They expose the degree to which transnational actors such as diaspora communities can boost radical nationalist feelings by supporting and spreading political ideologies, providing financial


assistance, and often the supplies of weapons to bolster the conflict at home. Kostovicova and Bojičić-Dželilović argue that political, economic and social transformation of the Balkans, dubbed Europeanisation, will not be determined purely by domestic forces, but by transnational ones, too. They argue that globalisation is internal to the post-communist and post-conflict transition in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia; it “is not just a context that moulds the unfolding transitions, but also a force that shapes them from within”.

Indeed, the modern-day Croatian Diaspora remains politically active; a force that continues to shape Croatia from within. Some of the most compelling examples of their recent engagement are around Croatia’s EU accession process. In its bid to join the EU, Croatia, like any other aspiring EU member country, had to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria which require that a state has stable institutions guaranteeing democratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and that it accepts the obligations and intent of the EU. In view of the legacy of the 1990s, ensuring respect for fundamental human rights has proven to be the most complex element of the EU accession process throughout the Balkans region. The human rights chapter was also the one that triggered a great deal of disapproval within the Diaspora and a vocal debate among the international community. There is concern among a number of international

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and local NGOs, which was strongly articulated during Croatia’s accession process, by Amnesty International in particular, that the lack of political will in Croatia to deal with the legacy of the war creates an atmosphere in which prosecution of war crimes cases is unpopular. A number of Croatian Diaspora NGOs were seen as supporting and advocating the status quo. Croatia has had to extradite several of its citizens to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an issue that was often contentious in domestic politics and one that has raised heated debates with the Diaspora. The human rights debate in the Diaspora has mostly been centred around Ante Gotovina, former Lieutenant General of the Croatian Army who served in the 199–1995 war in Croatia, indicted on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges by the ICTY and found not guilty. His release caused widespread euphoria among Croats, and for many umbrella organisations in the Diaspora, and much of Croatia, Gotovina remains a hero.

The foreign policy of the Croatian Government, especially the issue of cooperation with the ICTY, has deeply divided Diaspora Croats. On one side are organisations such as the Croatian American Association (CAA), the Croatian Worldwide Association (CWA) and the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU) of the USA, who openly expressed dissatisfaction, while on the other side are the Croatian Fraternal Union and the NFCA who worked well with the Government and its diplomatic representatives in the US.

The CWA describes itself as a non–party, non–profit organisation that strives to promote democratic values and principles in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, working for truth, justice and peace. CWA defines its mission as profoundly democratic and patriotic. Its task is defined as protecting Croatia's national sovereignty and the
legitimacy of the ‘Croatian War of Independence’, as well as sponsoring domestic reform in order to create a viable, strong and prosperous democratic republic.\textsuperscript{708} CWA’s goal at the time was “to display support for Croatian Generals, to show the world we have not forgotten these brave heroes who so graciously defended Croatia from aggression and occupation of the Yugoslav/Serbian army.” This included expressing solidarity and support for the release of Croatian General Ante Gotovina and all other Croatian generals indicted at The Hague at the time. Its 2005 public statement reads:

\begin{quote}
We cannot and must not wait a minute longer for others to rewrite our proud history. It has been well over four years since the General's indictment and we must join together and defeat the bogus policies implemented by the U.S. State Department, the European Union and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{709}
\end{quote}

The language used by the CWA in its public statements very closely mirrors the language used by Tuđman in the early 1990s. The refusal to let others ‘rewrite our proud history’ is a common theme used by Tuđman in his speeches. ‘Joining forces’ and acting as ‘one team’ to ‘defeat the enemy’ are another common themes that served as a great mobilising force. One year after the arrest and extradition of General Gotovina the CWA held a rally in support of him at The Hague. More than 12,000 Croats around the world signed the \textit{Free Ante Gotovina} internet petition.\textsuperscript{710}

The Croatian World Congress, which presents itself as ‘the authentic voice of the Croatian Diaspora’, is defined as a non–profit, non–governmental and non–party international organisation that enjoys advisory status as a member of the United Nations.

According to the CWC mission statement, the Congress “works in the interests of both the Croatian Homeland and its Diaspora”.\footnote{CSO Net (2010). \textit{Civil Society Network}. Retrieved from esango.un.org} The CWC was also particularly outspoken in the Gotovina case in its unfailing support of the Croatian General. In 2002, in a letter to Carla Del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY at the time, it expressed its “deep dismay” at his indictment, further stating that the CWC, “firmly believes that General Gotovina is innocent of the charges [that] have [been] levelled against him (…) but believes that if the ICTY Prosecutor insists on Gotovina’s prosecution, the US officials should be prosecuted as well”.\footnote{Balkan Tribunal Turns to Clinton. (2002, July 8). \textit{The Washington Times}. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/jul/8/20020708-033445-6349r/} The letter urges Del Ponte to open a criminal investigation into President Clinton and other top officials of his administration for “aiding and abetting” the indicted Croatian General.\footnote{ibid; also CWA Website. Retrieved from www.croradio.net}

Another vocal political debate within the Diaspora involves another key Croatian figure, General Branimir Glavaš, also a Member of the Croatian Parliament from 1995 to 2010. Branimir Glavaš was one of the founding fathers of Tudman’s Party, the party that the Croatian Diaspora has been loyal to for nearly two and a half decades. In 2009 the Zagreb District Court found him guilty of torture and murder of Serbian civilians and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. When the criminal case against him was initiated in 2006, Glavaš lost his political immunity and was detained due to the possible risk of tampering with witnesses. The CWA, jointly with Croatian Radio Melbourne in
Australia, immediately started an online petition for his release. The Free Branimir Glavaš Petition, the preamble of which describes him as a hero, stated that:

We the undersigned Citizens of the republic of Croatia and Croatians Worldwide plead to prevent the death of one more of our Croatian war veterans. However the outcome of the courts, General Branimir Glavaš should be freed to prepare his defence.

After his release, the Petition website stated, “As a result of all our voices around the world General Glavaš has been freed from jail and is in hospital. It goes to show that if we yell loud enough from every corner we will be heard”.

**Diaspora Disagreements**

*Ante Ćuvalo points out that, “there are no significant efforts on the part of the diaspora to put pressure on the ruling elite in the homeland to steer the national ship in a different direction”.* The Diaspora voices that do get heard are not “visible witnesses to the higher ideals of democracy and civil society”.

Often perceived by their co–ethnics in Croatia as right–wing fanatics and foolish idealists dwelling on romanticised ideas of their ancestral homeland, the modern–day Diaspora Croats report encountering resentment, ambivalence and hostility at home. Croats in the Diaspora point out the unfriendly attitude of the Croatian Government

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715 On May 2009, the day the verdict was announced, the accused fled to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which citizenship he acquired in the meantime. In 2010, when the sentence for Glavaš was confirmed by a court in Bosnia and Herzegovina, upholding a Croatian court’s earlier verdict, he was ejected from the Croatian Parliament, stripped of his wartime medals and rank, and subsequently jailed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His sentence was reduced to 8 years in prison. He was released in January 2015, after Croatia’s Constitutional Court cited procedural reasons for striking down his conviction.


718 Winland, D. N. (2007). *We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’.* Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.
towards potential returnees as well as the current Croatian electoral law, which prevents
the Croatian Diaspora from participating in Croatian elections and politics “in any
meaningful way”.\textsuperscript{719} In an interview for the Croatian Radio show “Bridges, Homeland
and Diaspora”, Niko Šoljak, the President of the CWC, warns that the prevailing feeling
today among the Diaspora is that they are largely alienated, even more so today than
before the 1990s. Members of the Diaspora find it hard to accept that they are
“discarded by the country that they helped so much, the country that would perhaps
never be here today had there not been for the Diaspora”.\textsuperscript{720} At home, Diaspora Croats
are often portrayed in an unfavourable light and referred to by some Croatian media as
hard–core nationalists, ‘political and economic opportunists’ or ‘high–minded idealists’
out of touch with modern Croatia.\textsuperscript{721} It is often stressed in the homeland, particularly by
those critical of the HDZ, that despite the political fragmentations within the Croatian
Diaspora, Diaspora Croats have historically been loyal to only one political party and
have consistently voted for the HDZ both during and after Tudman.

The following pages will focus on the modern–day political activities and discourse of
Croatian Diaspora organisations that continue to reflect some of the key themes that
formed Tudman’s 1990s Diaspora CAF. The next section will touch on the ongoing
controversy in relation voting rights, a topic that has been particularly controversial in
the modern–day Diaspora.

\textsuperscript{721} Winland, D. N. (2007). *We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.
Diaspora’s Right to Vote

Belgrade does not tell Bosnian Serbs what to do whereas Bosnian Croats vote for the Croatian Parliament and President.722

Croats, no matter where they live in the world, have the right to vote in Croatian elections. The post-Tudman era, however, has witnessed a significant reduction in their political representation, and according to Diaspora representatives, a degradation of their voice and their freedom of political action. After the establishment of the independent Croatian state, the newly adopted Constitution and Citizenship Law entitled a great number of Croats to Croatian citizenship. A special ‘Diaspora Constituency’ was created allowing Croatian citizens residing outside Croatia to vote in the elections.723

Political activity of the Croatian Diaspora has been a contested topic since the beginning of the 1990s, spurring heated political debates among both Croatian politicians and Diaspora representatives, particularly with regards to Diaspora voting preferences. It is a well-known public secret that most of the Diaspora vote for the HDZ. Consequently, Tudman’s party has won every parliamentary seat from the Diaspora Constituency in every election since Croatia’s independence. The Organisation for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) observes that, “in October 1995 elections for the lower house of Parliament, 90.02 per cent of participating Diaspora voters supported the ruling [HDZ]”.724 It is often stressed that, for their efforts in the homeland conflict and their financial, humanitarian and military contributions, the new HDZ law allocated as many

722 Said by the Vice President of the Serbian government, Božidar Jelić, at a conference about the future of the western Balkans during an argument with the Croatian President, Stjepan Mesić, concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Bosnian Croats should seek happiness in their homeland. Večernji list, 4 December 2007 (in Croatian).
as twelve seats (9.5 per cent of all seats) in the Parliament to the Croatian Diaspora, outnumbering the seats given to Croatia’s national minorities.

Given Tuđman and his party had the greatest Diaspora support dating back to the late 1980s, predictions by HDZ revealed that they would continue to receive the strongest support from the Diaspora. These predictions proved correct as hundreds of people lined up in Croatian diplomatic and consular offices, churches, Croatian cultural centres and schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North America, Australia and elsewhere to vote. Over 200,000 ballots were sent abroad for the 1992 elections. No information on the election officials was available, but the opposition was particularly concerned that the approved Croatian diplomatic officials abroad were all loyal HDZ devotees. Tuđman was accused by the opposition of manipulating the election campaign to ensure that both he and his party were returned to office. The Diaspora’s participation in Croatian elections has been the source of contentious debate in Croatian politics ever since.

A large part of the controversy surrounding the Diaspora vote lies in the fact that the citizenship of many current Diaspora voters is based on their ethnicity, rather than their current or former residence. In its Special 2007 Report on Croatia, the National Endowment for Democracy observes that

The Diaspora Constituency has become politically controversial. The challenge ahead lies in balancing several competing factors: As citizens of Croatia, Diaspora voters have a legitimate claim to a vote in Croatian elections. As a community, they made substantial sacrifices in the wars leading to Croatian independence. As such, they maintain a strong and

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725 Today there are only three seats allocated to the Diaspora
recent link to Croatia. On the other hand, their citizenship is based entirely on their ethnicity, not on their current or former residence, as many have never lived in what is Croatia today.\textsuperscript{727}

The majority of the people granted Croatian citizenship are based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of whom are also citizens of BiH who have never resided in Croatia proper. Political parties in Croatia differ in their views regarding the question of the Diaspora right to vote, with HDZ supporting current provisions for Croatian citizens living abroad to vote in the elections and have one separate list of MPs. The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)\textsuperscript{728}, on the other hand, maintains its position that the system needs to be changed in order to terminate non-resident Croatian citizens’ right to vote. In 2007, to demonstrate its disapproval of the current regulations concerning Diaspora voting rights and to stress its perception of bias present among the Diaspora,\textsuperscript{729} for the first time in Croatia’s elections, the SDP together with a number of other parliamentary parties did not provide candidate lists in the Diaspora Constituency.\textsuperscript{730} The HDZ on the other hand protected the existing electoral regulations, emphasising the equality of all Croatian citizens before the law. In return, this solidified HDZ’s political capital and maintained its electoral advantage. For instance, it was often emphasised by the opposition that the 400,000–strong Croatian Diaspora eventually decided the very


\textsuperscript{728}The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Croatian: *Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske*) is the main centre-left, social democratic political party in Croatia.

\textsuperscript{729}The bias refers to the fact that the Diaspora favoured HDZ in previous elections.

\textsuperscript{730}Croatia held parliamentary elections on November 25 2007, the fifth in independent Croatia, in a democratic and transparent environment with no significant procedural transgressions, as declared by domestic NGO monitors. However, the extremely tight race between incumbent HDZ and opposition SDP further highlighted the issue of Diaspora vote and its role in deciding the new government. Diaspora vote turned into a hot political issue when SDP refused to be on the Diaspora list and stressed its opinion that electoral regulations regarding the Diaspora needed to be altered.
tight race in the 2007 elections in favour of the HDZ and Ivo Sanader, who served as the Prime Minister of Croatia from 2003 to 2009.

A gathering organised by the Buenos Aires branch of the HDZ in 2008 and attended by some hundred persons honouring the ninth anniversary of Tudman’s passing, further illustrate HDZ’s stance on the matter. Following are the words of Joza Vrličak, who served as the President of HDZ Argentina:

We at HDZ Argentina are convinced that Croatian Emigration has the right, and even the duty to involve itself actively in the political events in the Diaspora, and wherever we, Croatians, live, and of course in Croatia itself.\(^\text{731}\)

The following pages report findings from primary sources, mainly records of Croatian Diaspora organisations, interviews with Diaspora leaders, public statements and press releases related to Croatian Diaspora’s frequently expressed concerns regarding their inability to partake in Croatia's elections more effectively.

**Disenfranchisement of the Diaspora**

* Croatia has not paid its debt to its Diaspora. She is behaving like a stepmother to her own children.*\(^\text{732}\)

Much of the current political debate in Croatia revolves around the category of voters who reside abroad, often permanently, and so do not have a home constituency in Croatia. Instead, they have a separate 11th constituency in Sabor, called the ‘Diaspora Constituency’. The year 1999 saw a reduction of Diaspora political representation when a so-called ‘non-fixed’ quota law was introduced requiring Diaspora parliamentary


seats to be proportional to the number of Diaspora votes. This electoral regulation was brought in to avoid instances in which, in times of lower Diaspora turnout, the number of votes required for a Diaspora parliamentary seat is lower than the number of votes required for the remaining 10 Croatian constituencies – a scenario that occurred in the 1995 election.\footnote{Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament, Article 44 (1999). \emph{Official gazette} (No. 116). (in Croatian).}

Main Diaspora concerns are caused by the fact that the current electoral law consolidates the votes of the Diaspora, effectively giving preference to Croats living in BiH, who are the most numerous. While Diaspora members eligible to vote reside in 43 different countries, more than 70 per cent of them are based in BiH, so the seats allocated to Diaspora in reality belong to Croats in Bosnia. Consequently, Croats living outside Croatia and BiH are left without representation in the Sabor. In his letter to Neven Jurica, Croatia’s Ambassador to the US at the time, Ed Andrus, the President of NFCA in 2005, states:

\begin{quote}
Rather than engendering interest in Croatian politics, the current system results in the effective disenfranchisement of Croatian citizens in the US and around the world. Without an amendment to the electoral laws providing for absentee voting, the political under-representation of the worldwide Croatian Diaspora will remain chronic.\footnote{NFCA Archives. Retrieved from www.nfcaonline.com/ABSENTEE%20BALLOT%20LETTER.htm}
\end{quote}

Croatian Diaspora organisations continue to urge the Croatian Government to consider reforms to the present allocation of Diaspora representatives in the Parliament. They suggest a different allocation of seats to ensure that the worldwide Croatian Diaspora has its own representation in the Parliament. In 2005 the NFCA stressed that
The current system of consolidating the votes of Croatian citizens living in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and elsewhere with those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively leaves those Croatian citizens living outside of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with no representation in the Sabor. The large number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina far outweighs the potential numbers of voters in other countries. We fully support the rights of Croatian citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue to vote for their own representatives to the Sabor; but if Croatia seeks to draw to itself the political, intellectual, economic, and social potential of its Diaspora living abroad, it must make provisions for representation of their interests and concerns in the Sabor as well.\textsuperscript{735}

The latter issue is closely linked to an earlier concern voiced in 2002 by the First Legislative Council Meeting of the Croatian Diaspora held in Poreč, Croatia, which refers to the number of seats allocated to the Diaspora. The open letter to the Croatian authorities reads:

No one in Croatia has the right to take away our right to vote and our right to be represented in the Croatian Parliament. Croatia has forgotten how much the Diaspora contributed to Croatia and keeps contributing by way of remittances and investments.\textsuperscript{736}

Agreeing with the views of many other Diaspora representatives, the letter expresses dissatisfaction with the current regulation system that deprives the Diaspora of the previously allocated 12 Diaspora seats in the Parliament. It urges Croatian MPs to


According to the letter, Croatia receives some 500 million Diaspora dollars annually.
respect the constitutional right of the Diaspora by making at least 10 per cent of parliamentary seats available to them.\textsuperscript{737}

The letter further lists a number of additional proposals and requests from the Diaspora:

1. A law on the Diaspora similar to that of Ireland and Israel.\textsuperscript{738}

2. A Ministry for the Diaspora.\textsuperscript{739}

3. Three Diaspora representatives in Hrvatska Radio Televizija (HRT), Croatian Radiotelevision.\textsuperscript{740}

Further discontent was expressed regarding poor access to information in the Diaspora. At the Council Meeting it was concluded that the “Diaspora finds itself within its own type of information blockade because they do not get the information; they often get more misinformation then real information.”\textsuperscript{741} It was further stressed that Diaspora has to have its own magazine/newspaper and its own portal. An additional necessity

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{738}The Israeli law, established in 1950, began as an open-door immigration policy for Jews and provided extensive support benefits for returnees. It stressed that ‘Jews have a ‘natural right’ to return to their historic homeland’ and they therefore automatically acquire Israeli citizenship upon return: ‘Ius Sanguinis’ – the law of the blood – determines eligibility for citizenship by means of an ascriptive, ethno-religious criterion based on identification which includes Jews, children and grandchildren of Jews and their nuclear families even if the latter are not Jewish. (In Winland, D. N. (2007). We are now a nation: Croats between ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.)
  \item \textsuperscript{739}The law on return has neither been fully not formally implemented; however, key sections of Croatia’s Constitution are devoted to returnees. Article 16 of the Law on Citizenship guarantees automatic citizenship to any Croat who “issues a written statement that he or she considers himself or herself to be a Croatian citizen”. Initially, Tuđman set up separate government units devoted to returnees and established the Ministry for Return and Immigration that was, to reflect changing priorities of the Croatian Government, later renamed to Ministry for Development, Emigration, and Reconstruction. While actively supported by the first Croatian Government, the return of emigrants was not encouraged by the coalition government of 2000–2003. Eventually the Ministry formed by Tuđman was absorbed into the Foreign Ministry to become the Office for Croatian Minorities, Emigration and Immigration.
  \item \textsuperscript{741}ibid
\end{itemize}
identified was a radio and television programme in Croatian and English for the Diaspora that can reach Croatians all over the world.

In 2005 the NFCA and its network vocally expressed its support for absentee balloting to allow Croatian citizens living abroad to participate in Croatian elections more productively. The members of the organisation strongly supported Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s proposal to introduce absentee balloting and stressed that this issue must be given serious consideration. The main difficulty causing low turnout by the voters in Diaspora that many Croats frequently refer to is principally linked to inaccessible and very scarcely available polling stations. In order to reach one of the polling stations, located only at the Croatian Embassy in Washington and Croatian consulates in only eight other US states, Diaspora Croats residing in one of the 42 states without a polling station must travel for hours in order to cast their votes. “Only several thousand votes are tallied across the US, a major under-representation of the Croatia Diaspora.”742 For example, less than 2,000 of them voted in the 2003 elections.

The Diaspora leaders feel that an essential first step in addressing the question of absentee balloting is to bring the issue into the public debate and raise awareness of the concern within the Croatian Government and the media. The NFCA and its network also feel that their attempt to voice their concerns regarding the voting system currently in place has run into a wall of silence in some circles in Croatia because of an apparent lack of appreciation for Diaspora voting rights. Andrus admitted that:

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I and my colleagues in the NFCA have often heard critics of Diaspora voting note that Croats living abroad should not have the right to vote since they do not pay taxes in Croatia. I would note that in the United States it was long ago recognised when poll taxes in some of our southern states were declared illegal that voting is a fundamental right of citizenship and has nothing to do with paying taxes.\(^\text{743}\)

The debate surrounding Diaspora voting rights becomes again exceedingly relevant in 2009 when the Croatian World Congress met in Poreč, Croatia on 17 and 18 January of the same year. One of the discussion points was the upcoming 2010 Presidential elections in Croatia. Niko Šoljak, the President of the organisation, stressed the need for the worldwide Croatian Diaspora to take part in electing a President that would protect the interests of Croatia at home and abroad. “After all”, he pointed out mirroring Tuđman’s words from the previous decade, “Croats at home and Croats abroad are one nation, one unit, one spirit with one and the same desire”.\(^\text{744}\) However, the prevailing feeling today among the Diaspora is that they are largely alienated, even more so today than before Tuđman. Professor Šoljak also listed bureaucracy as another factor that continues to alienate diasporants with hopes to return or with intentions to contribute to Croatia. “They weren’t given a chance. This relationship needs to be changed.”\(^\text{745}\)

Ivo Jolić, the president of CWC Canada, who emigrated from Croatia approximately 40 years ago, identified the 2010 elections a possible step toward strengthening the bond between Croatia and its Diaspora by way of electing a President who will make this goal one of his priorities. Jolić also touched on the question of citizenship, which, according to many Croats living abroad, should be offered to the members of the Croatian

\(^{743}\) ibid


\(^{745}\) ibid
Diaspora who have not yet acquired it. The Diaspora sees the new elections as a possibility to influence Croatian politics in a positive way, not permitting it to go in unwanted directions. In case of a new crisis in Croatia, the Diaspora, with its votes, Jolić comments, would ensure that Croatia does not go astray again. He stressed that the Diaspora “has had enough of wrong directions, wrong ideologies and wrong decisions”.

The Croatian World Assembly proposes a solution that would include introducing nine Constituencies, instead of just the one that is currently provided for by the electoral law, which would account for 10 per cent of all the representatives in the Croatian Parliament. This arrangement, they stress, would have the effect of further heightening the responsibility of the Croatian Diaspora toward its people in the homeland. It justifies its proposal by stating that the number of Croats living outside Croatia, including first, second, third and now fourth generations of Croatian immigrants, reaches close to 15 million. This proposal has been sent to the Croatian Parliament on a number of times – an effort that produced no result on each occasion.

**From Contribution to Entitlement**

The sentiments expressed by Croatian Diaspora organisations are an example of the increasingly vocal role transnational actors play through their continuous cross border influence on the political life in their homeland. Findings suggest that the reasons behind Diaspora’s feeling of entitlement to a more powerful political voice are closely

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746 ibid

connected to its view of the Croatian Diaspora as an organic part of the Croatian nation and, most importantly, as an instrumental agent in the fight for Croatian independence. These views accurately echo Tuđman’s unifying statements of the 1990s. The general sentiment is that, for these reasons alone, strong ties between two groups of Croatians should be maintained by the Croatian Government. This includes the restoration of Diaspora representation in the Parliament, one that is appropriate and gives justice to the size of the Croatian Diaspora. Diaspora leaders further emphasise that, with their efforts in establishing independent Croatia, the Diaspora, many of them having fled their homeland due to political and economic reasons, want to help Croats in Croatia avoid a similar fate. With this in view, Diaspora argues that the government does not have the right to silence its political voice and deride its right to vote in the homeland. Diaspora Croats, having wielded considerable political and economic influence in Croatia, see the Diaspora as a co-founder of independent Croatia and no less a constituent part of the Croatian nation than their co-ethnics at home. For these reasons they feel entitled to full voting rights, a representation in the Croatian Parliament that mirrors that of the 1990s and a strong voice in the political life of Croatia.

Voting rights continue to be one of the greatest concerns among the Diaspora in the new millennium. The Croatian Diaspora has recently used the ‘cannot see the forest for the trees’ metaphor in its claims that participating in Croatian political life from afar enables them to do it from an unbiased, fair and balanced perspective – a privilege unavailable to Croats in Croatia or those in BiH. As we have seen, a number of post-Tuđman Croatian opposition parties continue to disagree, and even question the eligibility of their vote.
The Decline of Unity and Common Purpose: Who are We, Where do We Come From, Where are We Headed?

There is a lack of leadership and a lack of organization among the members of the Croatian Diaspora in the US. The level of our unity and passion is far from that of the early 1990s.748

Through immigrant money, knowledge and experience, Diaspora Croats made a strong impact on Croatia as a whole. Tuđman’s and his party’s efforts generated the highest level of ethnic homogenisation and cohesion among the Diaspora since the first emigration wave in the first decades of the 19th century, and connected all possible means of influence, whether financial or political.749 As we have seen in previous chapters, the years between 1991 and 1995 marked the most intensive period of Diaspora contribution to Croatia.

In their role as bridges between two homelands, Diaspora Croats continue to contribute to both countries to this day. One example is the Croatian Academy of America, which continues to educate the US public concerning Croatian literature, culture and history by organising and sponsoring lectures on these subjects and by publishing articles in the organisation's Journal of Croatian Studies.750 The Croatian Scholarship Fund’s goal is to educate leaders for Croatia's future by providing financial assistance to highly qualified students of Croatian origin.751 The Croatian World Congress, with national branches established in countries throughout the world, promotes humanitarian activities, the

748 A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora, surveyed for the purpose of this study.


promotion of culture, and Diaspora investment in business enterprises in Croatia, pressing forward Croatian and US business and trade links. The Croatian Ethnic Institute produces and promotes materials valuable for the study of the Croatian language and heritage. With its collection of books, periodicals and magazines, manuscripts and artefacts, the Institute encourages research on the sociological, demographic, religious, and political aspects of the Croatian Diaspora. Through their fraternal publications, Fraternalist and Naša Nada, the CFU and the CCU continue to contribute to the religious, political and cultural experience of the Croatian Diaspora. Internet networks and forums such as the Croatian World Network (CROWN) aim to bring Croatians and non–Croatians together through articles and news. These organisations merely represent a fraction of Diaspora organisations that continue their cross–border activities, linking Croatia and the US.

The advent of the Internet further revolutionised the lives of the immigrant communities by creating a new medium through which people express their views and maintain strong ties to their homeland. This has added to the rise in ethnic group identification. However, with the completion of the fight for independence, the vigour, force and power of the early 1990s has dissipated. Tuđman’s efforts in the 1990s had a dramatic influence on the Croatian Diaspora but the results they produced were not as resilient as the enthusiasm and energy of the 1990s might have promised. The unity produced by the events in the early 1990s became exhausted and began to wane.

The absence of a common enemy, a common goal and a mission that can be achieved only if everyone pulls together, has resulted in a decline in Diaspora unity, a gradual

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alienation from the homeland and a decrease in ethno–national identification. This is also partly due to differences in opinion regarding the political developments in Croatia, as well as a deteriorating relationship with the homeland. A symposium titled “Croatian Diaspora in the USA on the Eve of the Third Millennium,” held in Chicago, served as an opportunity for Croatian–Americans to examine the situation of the Croatian Diaspora in the US and think of its future. About 80 representatives of major Croatian Diaspora organisations, together with a number of diplomats from Croatia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, students, young professionals, immigrants and professors, were present at the conference to express their concerns and promote discussions and planning about how to safeguard and promote the Croatian culture so that Croatian schools, churches political organisations, clubs, and other institutions continue to serve as bridges between the two homelands.⁷⁵³

Findings of empirical research conducted for the purpose of this study also reveal important issues relating to concerns faced by the Croatian Diaspora. On the heels of the new millennium, they were faced with the following questions: “What is the future of the Croatian Diaspora in the US?”, “Are Croatian–American political organisations losing their significance?”, “How can Croatian–Americans ensure the future of their ethnicity?”, “Are the young generations of Diaspora Croats interested in preserving their Croatian heritage?” The majority of the respondents continue to question the direction of the Croatian Diaspora and emphasise the need for a new approach to channel their energy. The two homelands need to find new ways of connecting themselves.

They report that language and customs have lost their value as the main identity markers in many homes. There is a need for more Croatian schools in the Diaspora and Croatian institutions, both at home and abroad, that can serve as important sources of knowledge and skills for the young Croatian Diaspora. In similar terms, local community events can function as catalysts for bringing Diaspora communities together and at the same time provide an arena for the affirmation of common values and Croatian identity. Events like the San Pedro Croatian Festival, which includes food, music and dancing by dozens of young Croatian–Americans in national costumes, are both spectacular and entertaining, yet at the same time solemn and highly ceremonial practices that express Croatian cultural heritage in a complex way, drawing from all aspects of culture. Folk dances, theatre shows, gastronomy events and music festivals that draw on the rich cultural, poetic and musical heritage can serve as major symbolic manifestations of Croatian identity. As pointed out by a member of the Croatian–American Diaspora, “we need more drive from community members to change the status quo”.

Šoljak observes that before a meaningful Diaspora mobilisation around voting rights can be orchestrated, Croats around the world need to recognise the common denominator they all share and join forces. Šoljak further states that the Croats living in Croatia and those living abroad are two parts of one whole, equally responsible for maintaining and safeguarding Croatia’s interests. He stressed fragmentation and disintegration of the Croatian Diaspora as one of its most threatening challenges. It is for this reason the Croatian diasporants need to look beyond their differences, get organised and stand up

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755 A quote by a member of the Croatian Diaspora, surveyed for the purpose of this study.
for their views. But most importantly, Diaspora members observe, what is necessary is a new, vibrant leadership and a considerable number of new Diaspora organisations, clubs and associations in order to continue maintaining a Croatian identity in North America.

In February 2015 Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović, a politically conservative member of HDZ, became the first female president of Croatia, winning by the narrowest of margins. Since President Tuđman’s death, HDZ has alternated in power with the Social Democrats but has not regained the presidential post until 2015. The 37,203 registered Croatian voters living in the Diaspora played a key role in deciding the elections. Grabar–Kitarović won in almost all countries with a significant Croat community, including the US, Canada, Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland. In her acceptance speech, Grabar–Kitarović makes special mention of Croats living abroad, acknowledging their contribution to the creation of the Croatian state and its independence – and potentially marking the beginning of a new era for Croatia and its Diaspora. In her speech, she sends this message to Croats abroad:

On this occasion I wish to send a special message to our émigrés throughout the world. You too are Croatia and I shall never permit anyone to neglect your role and your contribution to the creation of the Croatian state.

Referring to President Tuđman’s efforts of the 1990s, she also stresses the need to put an end to ideological divisions:

[References]


It is only through togetherness of the whole nation that we can build a better Croatia. Let’s compete with ideas, solutions and innovation, and not with the roles our parents or grandparents played. We will not realise a better life through ideological divisions nor will be become better people on account of them… Just as president Tuđman had created the preconditions for the creation of the Croatian state through the reconciliation of the divided national being, so too must we open a new page of our better future through a new Croatian togetherness. We seek a better life in the future, not in the past!758

The Question of Return

At the beginning of the 20th century, the short–term nature of Croatian migration abroad was always emphasised at home as one of the peculiarities of Croatian emigration. Although the majority of the early migrants left Croatia with an animus revertendi, estimates show that only one third of them have since returned to their homeland.759 In addition to economic reasons that discouraged migrants from returning, Čizmić identifies important reasons of political nature, in particular, the oppression of the Croatian people that occurred in the former Yugoslavia between the two world wars.760

With socialist Yugoslavia collapsing, the Croatian Diaspora, and political emigrants in particular, welcomed HDZ’s invitation to return home. However, the number of returnees is still fairly small – approximately 5000 families returned to Croatia between 1990 and 1998 from all over the world761 (1200 of which are Croatian–Americans762).

760 ibid
With the establishment of Croatia as a sovereign and a democratic nation, it is expected that Croatian emigration to North America will continue to decline.\textsuperscript{763}

Although not many of them returned home, my findings suggest that Diaspora Croats define the achievement of Croatian independence as a turning point in their lives, giving them personal pride and increasing their self-esteem.

Taking pride in Croatian independence, one research participant captures the prevailing sentiment in stating, “Independence day is dear to our hearts and is an expression of our pride in the historic achievement of the Croatian nation. It is our responsibility to build on this achievement, to continue our dedication to our homeland, and to enhance it, comprehensively.

Another respondent describes her connection to Croatia:

Our pride in our homeland is real and unrelenting. Croatia is where I belong. It is where we all belong, whether we live there, visit or simply feel a spiritual bond to the place. Our homeland is the embodiment of many long years of aspiration, through foreign rule and persecution. It brings us together.

At times, there is ‘more will than way’ to return home. Different factors, including the new social and political circumstances in Croatia, the bureaucracy associated with the return and grim economic prospects, are all factors that slow down the return process. A member of the modern-day Croatian Diaspora voiced an additional vital concern, shared by many young people:

I am finishing my PhD studies in the US and am very much considering going home. I want to go home because I will always be a foreigner in this country and I miss my people, my home, and my city. Realistically, in my field there are no jobs for me. Further, the kind of salary and career advancement that Croatia can offer me at the moment is inadequate.

When Croatia declared independence in 1991, many Diaspora members defined it as ‘mission complete’. Long-term aspirations of their forebears, both at home and abroad, were finally achieved and long-lasting struggle for independence successfully concluded. Contrary to what was expected and predicted both in Croatia and abroad, this did not result in their return home *en masse*. Preliminary research suggests that when the hope of return materialises and the means to go home finally emerge, the satisfaction and fulfilment does not always result in a return to one’s homeland. For many, the mere option of return proved to be enough. For others, a cluster of causes generated by the reality of everyday life proved to be responsible for diasporants re-evaluating their lifelong hopes of return. The majority of the participants in this research have found a balance between having a strong American or Canadian identity and being involved in the life of Croatian–American or Canadian communities. By maintaining a balanced dual identity, they have found a way to preserve both the bond with Croatia as well as their devotion to their new homeland.

In her acceptance speech, the newly elected Croatian President Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović reminds the Diaspora of its importance to the Croatian nation.

> You are an important link between the homeland and the world but, also, our important component that will continue contributing to our national development. Croatia’s door is wide–open to you. Your knowledge and experience are precious to our homeland.  

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Voices from the Diaspora welcomed her victory, observing, “the Croatian people have made it clear that they crave a new direction in the Office of the President of Croatia”. The new President’s discourse and tone has also reminded many of Croatia’s first President, Franjo Tuđman.

**Conclusion**

Croatian Diaspora organisations have remained politically active both locally and globally. Previous research suggests that, by nature, diasporas are “neither innocent nor subversive political actors,” almost always directing their energy at “positive enterprises” and serve as “bridges between cultures, societies, and states”. A number of Croatian Diaspora NGOs pride themselves in working to promote democratic values and principles in the homeland, with a goal of serving the best interests of both Croats at home and their co-ethnics abroad.

However, the controversy that overshadows some of the more recent Diaspora political actions has caused concern at home and within the international community, reflecting Adorno’s observation that, “distance is not a safety zone, but a field of tension”. The legacy of the past, and of the 1990s in particular, including a strong emphasis on ethnic belonging, is still seen as a major influence in some Croatian Diaspora organisations’ political decisions including voting preferences, lobbying, advocacy, advising and media work in their attempts at influencing politics at home as well as putting pressure on other

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765 ibid

external actors. Certain Croatian Diaspora groups are identified as still harbouring the strong passions of the 1990s, which continue to shape the aims and objectives of their organisations.

As we have seen, Diaspora has been vocal in their disappointment with the ICTY, and some of the most recent public debates were framed around justice and accountability in the context of Croatia’s EU accession process. The Diaspora saw the efforts of the ICTY, and Croatian Government’s support of those, as diminishing the significance of the Croatian ‘Homeland War’ and the collective sacrifices made by Croats at home and abroad. Some of their most vocal press releases and public statements heavily borrow from Tuđman’s repertoire of diagnostic and prognostic frames.

A number of Diaspora organisations frequently draw attention to Diaspora’s right to vote stating that the Croatian Diaspora has in effect been disenfranchised. Šoljak,768 echoing voices of other Croats in the Diaspora, clarifies by stating that the Croatian Diaspora in the US, Canada, Australia and Europe have been ‘tricked’ by the current electoral law as they do not have a single representative in the Parliament769. And while Diaspora mobilises to pressure the Croatian Government to enable them to fully exercise their right to vote, the political debate over Diaspora’s eligibility to participate in Croatia’s elections and their apparent bias toward the HDZ remains a highly controversial political issue.

In modern–day Diaspora communications, Croatian Diaspora continues to be identified as an organic part of the Croatian nation. A sense of entitlement to participate in the

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769 The five existing representatives are all from BiH.
political life of their homeland is also central to recent Diaspora debates. These were key elements of Tuđman’s discourse and continue to echo in the new millennium. The Diaspora is also vocal in its observation that participating in Croatian political life from afar enables them to do it from an impartial and balanced perspective; Croats in Croatia or those in Bosnia and Herzegovina often cannot see situations as they really are and easily lose perspective. Croatia’s policy toward neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina remains contested. There are disagreements among major Diaspora organisations, including the Croatian American Association, the Croatian World Congress, National Federation of Croatian Americans and the Croatian Fraternal Union, on whether Croats from BiH are a part of the Diaspora or whether they are autochthonous, being a constituent nation in that country. A similar debate exists in Croatia between the HDZ and the opposition parties.

And while recent events around Croatia accession to the EU, including ICTY matters, as well as Diaspora voting rights have somewhat provided the Diaspora with a common purpose, the energy of the 1990s has dissipated and the Diaspora is now left looking for ways to replenish it. This includes finding new charismatic leaders within the Diaspora, but also leaders in Croatia willing to work towards strengthening the bond between Croatia and its Diaspora and making that goal one of Croatia’s priorities. Findings suggest that Diaspora Croats, having made considerable contributions to Croatia, politically, financially and humanitarily, see the Diaspora as a co-founder of independent Croatia and no less a constituent part of the Croatian nation than their co-ethnics at home. For these reasons they feel entitled to a representation in the Croatian
Parliament that they enjoyed throughout the 1990s. As an organic part of the nation, they feel that they deserve to have a say in the political life of their home country.

The new Croatian President Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović took office on 19 February 2015. Her job is largely ceremonial, but her win may signal a comeback for the opposition HDZ and a new era for the Croatian Diaspora. Her victory has been described as emotional among HDZ supporters at home, and particularly among those in the Diaspora. Openly acknowledging their contribution to the creation of the independent state of Croatia, Grabar–Kitarović vows to do her utmost to make Croatia a wealthy nation for both Croatians at home and in the Diaspora.
CHAPTER VII: Conclusions

There is something about words. In expert hands, manipulated deftly, they take you prisoner. Wind themselves around your limbs like spider silk, and when you are so enthralled you cannot move, they pierce your skin, enter your blood, numb your thoughts. Inside you they work their magic.770

I began this thesis by quoting an article published in a Croatian paper at the turn of the 19th century, which alarmingly described Croatian emigration as the ‘suicide of the nation’. Indeed, the outlook looked dire at the time and the events that followed a century later nearly brought that prediction to life. The reality of the 1990s turned Croatia into a battlefield as the country fought for its survival. This time the papers were equally alarmed by the predicament that Croatia found itself in and their choice of words was no milder. The words they used weren’t accidental either. The discourse that spread itself around Croatia and the Diaspora, obediently mirroring that of President Tuđman and his party, clearly pointed to the enemy responsible for the country’s grievances and created a strong division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The discourse also identified a way out, a solution to the nation’s problem. This was articulated as Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’, its right to sovereignty. This was a bold idea and an ambitious target which meant that ‘we’ had to unite against ‘them’ and act as a unified whole, a strong ‘one team’. It also meant the country needed a much stronger, and a more resourceful, ‘we’. President Tuđman was not the only one to recognise the great potential within the Croatian Diaspora, but he was the only one to take full advantage of it. With the help of the Croatian Diaspora, Croatia was led towards independence, bringing the ‘thousand–year–old dream’ to reality. Getting there,

as we have seen, was a long, arduous journey, one that was carefully planned and skilfully organised.

The overarching question that this study sought to answer was “What shapes diaspora mobilisation?” Are conflict–based arguments on their own adequate to explain diaspora mobilisation or are there additional, less apparent, yet more powerful, driving factors behind it? What is the role of human agency? And, finally, when diasporas do get involved in homeland affairs, what determines the success of their efforts? To what extent do politics at home strengthen networks abroad? Empirical material used in the study of these questions was drawn from the Croatian Diaspora in North America. The study sought to answer the following case study–specific question:

*What were the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation in early 1990s and during the Croatian ‘Homeland War’?*

Closely related to the main question were the following questions:

*What roles were played by political leaders? Why/how did Tuđman and his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ,) succeed in strengthening the mobilisation and political influence of the Croatian Diaspora in their homeland?*

In exploring the process of Croatian Diaspora mobilisation the study identified the nature of the drivers of Diaspora mobilisation, the reasons and motivations behind it, the type and the extent of the resources required for mobilisation and the role and impact of the leader in the process. Acknowledging the plethora of studies that have identified homeland conflict as a key contributor to diaspora mobilisation, this study argues that, while homeland conflict provides important opportunities to mobilise, agents play an important role in framing these opportunities to advance their political goals. Collective
action frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational), designed and disseminated by home country leaders, play a vital role in the successful mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora.

The following pages will provide a synthesis of the main arguments of the thesis. The chapter will also identify the theoretical and policy implications of the study with respect to Diaspora Studies as well as consider implications in a broader context, beyond the points already made. Finally, the last part of the conclusion will provide direction and areas for future research.

**Diaspora Mobilisation: Framing through the Lens of Leadership**

Over many generations large numbers of Croatians left their home country, either voluntarily or by force, and made their homes and lives elsewhere. In the spirit of *animus revertendi*, some returned. However, it was *animus morandi* that prevailed and many others remained abroad. But the bond that they felt towards their homeland remained strong and enduring. As in the case of many other diasporas, like the Irish, Armenian or the New Zealand diaspora, this is a bond that is not bound nor defined by geography or time. However, not all Croatian emigrants and their descendants consider themselves to be Diaspora Croats. The strength of their connection has varied over time and, as we have seen in the Croatian case, depended to a large extent on the circumstances in both their home and host countries.

The previous chapters examined closely the mobilisation of the Croatian Diaspora during the period of early 1990s and analysed the drivers at home that defined the
strength and the scale of Diaspora bonds. It has previously been stressed that a crisis at home has the power to bridge dispersed diaspora entities and prompt these groups to mobilise around their homeland. ‘Dormant diasporas’, in particular, face severe dilemmas during periods of hardship at home.\textsuperscript{771} While recognising the role that ‘homeland crisis’, and conflict in particular, can play in ‘awakening’ the identities of politically inactive diasporas, this study argues that there are additional factors that lead to a sustained diaspora involvement in homeland affairs, the type of involvement that we have seen in the Croatian case. Diaspora involvement characterised by both strength and scale that we witnessed in Croatia was indeed buttressed by the ‘Homeland War’, but the process of Diaspora mobilisation began years before the first gunshot was fired. Indeed, it was words, not bullets, that proved to be the main motivators.

This study argues that Croatian Diaspora mobilisation was greatly aided by the successful framing strategy designed by homeland leaders, namely President Tuđman and his supporters both at home and in the Diaspora. Their discourse acted as a centripetal force that pulled the Diaspora towards the homeland, its centre, and mobilised it around a common cause. This is where the notion of the triangular diaspora–host–home country relationship, as discussed by both Safran \textsuperscript{772} and Sheffer,\textsuperscript{773} is challenged. At a time when diasporas are heavily engaged in their home country affairs, this relationship becomes more circular with the homeland at the very centre, with diaspora groups orbiting around it. The centre–seeking force that kept the Croatian Diaspora groups focused on the homeland was the discourse of political leaders that


compellingly framed issues at the time to make them resonate with Diaspora groups abroad. This force, it can be argued, altered the direction of their focus and brought them closer to home – physically, but also intellectually and psychologically.

The role of leadership was given much-needed attention in this study to address a gap in the literature by focusing on human agency in the process of Diaspora mobilisation. The study was interested in how leaders generate social change, how they take advantage of existing opportunities, and, more importantly, how they create new ones. This study paid special attention to how leaders obtain authority and legitimacy, to what extent they employ ‘injustice frames’ referring to past and present grievances, and how they use references to a collective national identity focusing on shared meaning and cultural narratives to attract Diaspora support. In examining the drivers behind Croatian Diaspora mobilisation, the study revealed how Croatian leaders diagnosed the national problem and proposed a solution in the form of Croatian statehood, freedom and prosperity.

The main protagonist of the framing process, President Franjo Tuđman, the man behind the frame, is often credited with setting the foundations for an independent Croatia and liberating the country from communism. And while his legacy remains controversial, Tuđman’s leadership qualities, admired by his devotees and his critics alike, are undeniable. Without doubt, a favourable political environment was a crucial factor that contributed to Tuđman’s political success. The political system of the late 1980s and early 1990s Croatia was weak and susceptible to change. This weakness was primarily influenced by the growth of political pluralism, elite cleavages and rising political divisions. But no matter how advantageous and conducive the conditions presented by
the opportunity structure, they provide potential actors with nothing more than that – opportunity. At the end of the day, it is up to the individual to harness the opportunities offered and maximise on their benefits. As a resourceful political leader, Tuđman did nothing short of that. In fact, his efforts resulted in a Diaspora undertaking unparalleled by any other period in Croatia’s history. But even with political opportunity on the rise in Croatia in the late 1980s and the 1990s, it would have been difficult for any leader to fully take advantage of the political opportunities offered without the help of powerful and resourceful allies and talented aides. Tuđman’s charisma, his resourcefulness and his talent in taking advantage of political opportunity only formed the foundation necessary for the efforts that followed. They were only a part of the puzzle that allowed Tuđman to assume power and lead Croatia towards independence. Of equal importance was his social and political capital, which enabled him to choose the right collaborators and the framework needed to get him there. To achieve the success he did, Tuđman relied heavily on his core supporters in the Croatian Diaspora. His ability to travel abroad, giving him access to the Diaspora, provided him with an important head start over other political parties and helped him build much-needed momentum abroad.

Tuđman and his allies chose a nationalist political framework, one that proved to be the most suitable one at the time, promising change to Croats at home and those around the world. Within this framework they successfully identified a question of national urgency, and through their discourse clearly articulated the causes of Croatia’s ‘national distress’. Interestingly, the opportunity to create change, publicised by the leaders to attract support, revealed a self-fulfilling aspect of political opportunity structures;
namely, Diaspora involvement, with its financial contributions, created further opportunity.

As a charismatic and capable leader, Tuđman moved the masses. Through his discourse, he manipulated old ideas and shaped new ones. He adeptly finessed conceptions of Croatian identity, interpreting and articulating them in a way that legitimised his political program. This was achieved by carefully fabricating what the literature calls meta–frames or master frames, which will be summarised further below. A man of many inconsistencies, evident from shifts in his political and religious views, Tuđman managed these well, ensuring he remained relevant and attuned to the needs and wants of his audience. His personal journey from political persecutions, to arrests and imprisonments, helped him create an image of a man that was able to identify with historical grievances suffered by Croatians, many of whom settled in the Diaspora. Historical grievances later became key themes of his collective action frames.

**Framing the Road towards Statehood**

Tuđman’s master frames can be defined as larger schemata of meaning that generated larger narratives connected to collective Croatian perspectives. Their role was to contest existing political realities and support alternative ones. The main components of the Croatian Diaspora collective action frames, identified through discourse analysis and elaborated on in Chapter IV, were all framed as essential steps in Croatia’s journey from victim to victory. The discourse framed by Tuđman and his collaborators had two main tasks. The first was to diagnose the ‘national problem’, an issue requiring urgent attention by the Croatian people, while the second was to offer a solution.
The role of diagnostic framing was not only to identify and appropriately frame the national problem but also to attribute blame. The diagnostic frames served as a justification for challenging the *status quo* and were a key driver of collective action. Discourse analysis conducted for this study identified three fundamental elements of the diagnostic framing process: the first one being problem diagnosis itself, framed as the abolition of ‘national slavery’, accompanied by the creation of ‘injustice frames’ that highlighted traumatic events from Croatian history, many of which had forced large numbers of Croats to emigrate. This was followed by the closely related ‘adversarial’ or ‘boundary’ frames aimed at identifying a collective enemy, ‘the greater Serbian aggressor’, responsible for the nation’s distress. This created very clear boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and strong divisions between the Croats and the Serbs. It was stressed that Croatia was a European nation, both traditionally and culturally, and a part of the Western European tradition, while Serbs were closer to the East.

These first stages of the diagnostic process, which focused on the ‘victim’ aspect of the Croatian nation, highlighting a number of traumatic periods from the nation’s history, were important for achieving resonance. Most frequent references in the discourse both at home and abroad included the 1945 Bleiburg massacre and the events surrounding the 1970s Croatian Spring. Tuđman and his allies actively engaged in the process of ‘politicisation of commemoration’, providing a list of events to be remembered – handpicked and methodically packaged. At the same time, their discourse was appropriately emotionally resonant, nudging individuals into action, broadening the framers’ support base and gathering resources. This process in turn helped form a new

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collective Croatian identity, which strengthened Diaspora cohesion and unity. Group membership allowed individuals to remember particular events coherently and consistently.\textsuperscript{775} It also generated nationalistic fervour among individuals who never personally experienced any of those historical events, enabling them to identify with their fellow countrymen who had a more direct involvement with the events. References found in the \textit{Fraternalist}, the official journal of the Croatian Fraternal Union, linked to Croatian culture, history, myths, language, and religion served as powerful tools in the process of ethnic homogenisation and were instrumental in the early days of Diaspora mobilisation.\textsuperscript{776} The Diaspora was explicitly woven into the discourse as Tuđman blamed historical injustices for splitting the Croatian nation in two, as many were forced to leave the country during those times. The HDZ was very vocal, particularly when addressing the Diaspora, against the political disagreements that existed within the Croatian nation, particularly the different political views among the Diaspora. Tuđman openly called for the unification of all Croats, both within and outside the borders of Croatia.

The injustice frame employed by the framers further intensified the longing for the ‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’ among Croats. This was seen as a right denied to the Croatian nation for centuries and, most recently, as emphasized by Tuđman, by the ‘great Serbian aggressor’. The promise to turn that dream into reality was what constituted much of the prognostic elements of Tuđman’s collective action.

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Extra\%20Readings/HalbwachsOnCollective\%20Memory.pdf

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frames. These prognostic frames, intricately linked to their diagnostic counterparts, functioned as explanatory lenses offering solutions to collective problems identified in the process of diagnosis. Achieving Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’ was framed as the solution to the ‘national problem’, providing the targeted audience with a sense of direction and a common goal. Identifying and framing a specific problem helped limit the range of possible solutions. It made the goal obvious, very clear, and almost palpable. Discourse analysis identified two preconditions for achieving that dream: national reconciliation and pan–Croatian unity, including a unified Croatian Diaspora, which was defined as an organic part of the Croatian nation. These were framed as sine qua non for changing the status quo and realising the ‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’. A first step to achieving unity was to enable the return of Diaspora Croats, also a key component of Tuđman’s Diaspora CAF. These achieved a high level of resonance with Tuđman’s key constituency – the Diaspora, a key resource for bringing the proposed solution into reality. The prospect of the ‘thousand–year–old dream of Croatian statehood’ coming true was gripping and inspirational. “It possessed such magnetism about it”. It resonated across multiple generations of the Croatian Diaspora as the only way of effectively changing the status quo. The discourse also plainly identified the HDZ as the only party capable of turning this vision into reality. In executing his plan Tuđman heavily relied on both weak and strong ties in the Diaspora, which included religious representatives and early friends and allies in the Diaspora acting as spokesmen for the collective Diaspora identity. An important part of Tuđman’s CAF was the Catholic Church, portrayed as the preserver of Croatian identity. The church, an important motivational force and a strong source of

777 A member of the Croatian Diaspora interviewed for the purposes of this study.
resonance, became an important ally of HDZ, emphasising the role of Catholic values in Croatian society in its fight against the enemy.

It is important to stress that motivational frames are difficult to separate from diagnostic and prognostic frames, as all frames require a high degree of resonance. Successful frames are primarily so because of their motivational power. Regardless of how accurate the national diagnosis or how rational the solution, without resonance diagnostic and prognostic frames will not result in action. For a frame to resonate with its audience, it needs to ensure narrative fidelity and cultural resonance. Cultural resonance is achieved through having a high degree of credibility and significance in potential followers’ lives, where the power of emotion plays an important role. The breadth of Tuđman’s diagnostic master frame, with a large range of problems in its scope, also proved instrumental in achieving resonance. The prognostic frame promised the much needed protection and relief from foreign oppression. Diaspora support for the homeland was framed as a contribution toward the struggle to obtain these values, carrying a high degree of resonance. The collective identity discourse, which focused on shared meanings and cultural narratives, used heavily by the framers, echoed within the divided groups of the Croatian Diaspora, invigorating them into social, political and economic action.

Analyses of Tuđman’s discourse and its reception in the Diaspora points to the presence of all four generic vocabularies of motive as identified by Benford. These include

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vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety, which proved vital for achieving resonance and contributed substantially to a sustained Diaspora involvement in homeland affairs. However, one additional component proved to be of particular salience for Croatian Diaspora mobilisation: one we can refer to as the ‘perceived justness of the cause’. This vocabulary introduced the notion of duty and a feeling of responsibility and obligation among Diaspora Croats to ‘do the right thing’. Tuđman’s discourse encouraged them to stand up for the ‘Croatian cause’ referring to it as a cause worth fighting for, one that promised the realisation of Croatia’s ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’. These vocabularies are evident in Tuđman’s speeches in North America where he talked about national self–determination as the “unstoppable dynamic of ‘history’s forward march”.

There was great deal of intent and rationale behind first selecting, filtering, and then meticulously packaging and carefully articulating the words that appeared in Tuđman’s political speeches, public statements and interviews. They were packaged to go around the world like a boomerang. What gave the new discourse novelty is “not so much the originality or the newness of its ideational elements, but the manner in which they [were] spliced together and articulated”, accessing ideas from a novel perspective and articulating them accordingly.

His ideas resonated globally, across the Diaspora, and resulted in an unprecedented Diaspora undertaking, bringing the ‘thousand–year–old dream of statehood’ to reality.

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All members of the Croatian Diaspora interviewed for the purpose of this study spoke of a heightened sense of identity, connection, and pride they experienced at the time. To borrow Gamson’s words, Diaspora participation in homeland affairs amplified the diasporants’ personal identity and offered “fulfilment and realisation of the self”.

**Tuđman’s Lingering Legacy in the New Millennium**

Croatian Diaspora organisations have remained politically active both locally and globally; however, their activity has been overshadowed by the controversy associated with some of the more recent Diaspora engagements. A number of Croatian Diaspora groups are seen as still living in a 1990s state of mind, which continues to shape the mission of their organisations. Tuđman’s legacy is evident from their political decisions including voting preferences, lobbying and advocacy, and other attempts at influencing politics at home as well as putting pressure on their host countries and the wider international community. The post–Tuđman Croatian Diaspora continues to strongly voice ideas framed by Tuđman in the 1990s. This is particularly evident in some of the more recent public debates framed around justice and accountability in the context of Croatia’s journey towards the EU. More specifically, the Diaspora’s disappointment with the effort of the ICTY supported by the Croatian Government was seen as downplaying the importance of the Croatian ‘Homeland War’. A large number of Diaspora groups saw these efforts as disrespectful of the joint sacrifices made by Croats both at home and in the Diaspora.

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Modern–day Diaspora communications heavily borrow from Tuđman’s inventory of diagnostic and prognostic frames. In some of the most vocal Diaspora publications, the Croatian Diaspora continues to be identified as an organic part of the Croatian nation. In line with this claim, a central theme found in recent Diaspora debates, which was also a key element of Tuđman’s discourse, is a sense of entitlement to participate in the political life of their homeland. Having contributed politically, financially and humanitarily to the future of Croatia in the 1990s, the Diaspora see themselves as co–founders of independent Croatia and equal members of the Croatian nation. As such, they feel entitled to participate in the political life of their home country. Referring to its right to vote, the Croatian Diaspora sees itself as having been disenfranchised by the current electoral law, as currently all existing Diaspora representatives in the Croatian Parliament are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively leaving the overseas Croatian Diaspora without any representation. And while Diaspora’s passionate pleas for its right to vote continues, its eligibility to participate in Croatia’s elections as well its bias toward the HDZ remains highly controversial and politicised at home. There continue to be disagreements between the HDZ and other political parties in Croatia on whether Croats from BiH fall under the category of Diaspora or whether they are autochthonous to BiH. A parallel debate exists between major Diaspora organisations, including the National Federation of Croatian Americans, the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Croatian American Association, and the Croatian World Congress. An important part of that debate is the view that partaking in Croatian political life from a distance enables the overseas Diaspora to remain unbiased and rational, unlike those in BiH.

Unquestionably, recent political developments around Croatia’s accession to the EU, including ICTY matters, as well as Diaspora’s voting rights have to a certain degree provided the Diaspora with a shared goal and a common purpose. However, there is no doubt that the energy of the 1990s is long gone. Findings suggest that without a charismatic leader, one that is willing to invest in strengthening the bond between Croatia and its Diaspora, it is unlikely that the situation is going to change. With that said, early 2015 brought some optimism to many in the Diaspora, with the new Croatian President Kolinda Grabar–Kitarović taking office in February of the same year. Pointing to the importance of human agency, HDZ supporters at home and abroad described her victory as emotional, and her Presidency as the beginning of a new era for the Croatian Diaspora. In her speeches, echoing ideas expressed by Tuđman, she openly acknowledged the Diaspora’s contribution to Croatian independence, promising to bring prosperity to Croats at home and abroad.

The echoes of Tuđman’s frames in the new millennium, whether voiced in the Diaspora or repeated by the new Croatian President, point to a high degree of resonance achieved by Tuđman’s frames in the 1990s. The resonant power of Tuđman’s discourse contributed to these frames becoming institutionalised in the Diaspora, continuing to generate a modern–day discourse emulating the one that dominated the 1990s. In the 1990s political elites made words their primary tools in stimulating a strong involvement of receptive audiences at home and abroad. They achieved unprecedented success in implementing their ideas through the creation of Diaspora collective action frames and a discourse that endorsed and encouraged a collective Diaspora identity. This study has demonstrated the importance of human agency in the process of Diaspora mobilisation.
and revealed the centrality of the role leaders play in the processes of framing. Going back to Ernest Renan’s claim\(^{784}\) that to be nation is “to have done great things together” and “to want to do more” we can indeed say that Tudman steered the Diaspora towards wanting to do more, but this desire, which was most evident in the 1990s, was carried over well into the 21st century, with the Diaspora working towards new goals, but inside very similar, Tudmanesque, frameworks. The Diaspora not only had “common glories in the past” but a “common will in the present”.\(^{785}\)

**Contributions to Research and Suggestions for Future Study**

What shapes the political agendas of Diasporas? What drives their mobilisation? This study contributes to existing literature by expanding our understanding of the contexts in which diaspora mobilisation operates. The study broadens our understanding of the strategies behind political mobilisation of diasporas and the causes and motivations behind their participation in the political life of their homelands. A plethora of studies focus on homeland conflict as the sole explanatory variable for diaspora mobilisation, arguing that some of the most highly mobilised diaspora groups are conflict–generated. In linking the literature on collective action frames with Diaspora studies, this study offers a complementary explanation, analysing in depth how framing processes (which instrumentlise homeland conflict) work in the presence of charismatic leadership and their framing strategies.

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\(^{785}\) ibid
By focusing on the drivers of Diaspora mobilisation, this study has also significantly contributed to Croatian Diaspora Studies, where much of the focus to date has been on the outcomes of Diaspora engagement, including political activity as such, or the push and pull factors of Croatian emigration. Also, by looking at mobilisation through the lens of leadership, this study has addressed the gap in the literature around the role of human agency in the process of mobilisation. However, further research remains to be done. Indeed, leaders do not accomplish everything on their own; they are assisted by political opportunities and organisational structures. Existing theories, however, with their structural orientation, tend to minimise the role leaders play in processes of mobilisation. Shifting the focus to the leader, both on how they develop individually as a leader and how they lead through their supporters, is something that can greatly expand our knowledge of the dynamics of diaspora mobilisation.

Further, the findings of this thesis can also apply to a larger universe of cases of conflict–generated diasporas linked to sovereignty conflicts in the original homeland. Lyons and Mandaville observe that diasporas are not the only actors to “think locally and act globally”, but homeland-based secessionist elites do so as well.786 A vibrant debate is taking place at the moment, with scholars delving deeper into the factors and processes leading to different types of diaspora mobilisations, and how such mobilisations influence political and social processes in their original homelands. For

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example, Koinova observes that different types of diaspora mobilisation could occur depending on the strength of the linkages between the main secessionist elites and the diaspora. A framing perspective, particularly the leadership aspect of it, can further elucidate our understanding of the strength of diaspora–homeland linkages, allowing us to explain why certain diaspora–homeland collaborations endure and others dissipate. It can contribute to existing literatures by adding more in–depth understanding of the contexts in which transnational diaspora mobilisation operates. It can also further our understanding of how the position of diaspora entrepreneurs in a particular state becomes important for the sovereignty struggle. For example, Kosovo's secessionist elites, in order to internationalise the conflict, needed to create links to alternative nonstate actors, including diaspora entrepreneurs, opening offices in Turkey, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and other European countries as well as overseas, in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Koinova argues that the level of interactions in the transnational space between the main secessionist elites and diaspora entrepreneurs depend on how important the main secessionist elites consider the position of a particular diaspora to be for the sovereignty goal, with linkages being “strong” when a diaspora is considered more able to contribute to the achievement of sovereignty in the homeland. A framing perspective with a focus on the role of human agency can, for instance, help explain why radical and moderate Kosovar diaspora attitudes were strong in the United States and weak in the United Kingdom. This study can expand our view of how diaspora–homeland linkages contributed to the strong radicalisation of US

788 ibid
789 ibid
It can open up new avenues of understanding to how leaders establish durable links with a particular diaspora and how they frame their narrative to unite, organise and mobilise diaspora entrepreneurs around their agenda. In the Kosovo case, it can shed light on how leaders maintained strong relationships with the US–based diaspora, how they capitalised on the internal warfare in Kosovo in 1998–1999, and how they framed and disseminated their mobilisation messages that contributed to the strong radicalisation of US diaspora politics.

This thesis also contributes to the scarce literature on diasporas and democratisation. Shain argues that diasporas are not just insensitive nationalists but can contribute to their home country’s quest for democracy. In his analysis of Mexican, Greek, Haitian, and Cuban cases in the US, he observes that the diaspora fight against authoritarian regimes is often led by political emigrés who were active in the political sphere prior to leaving their home countries. In her analysis of the Ukrainian, Serbian, Albanian, and Armenian diasporas, Koinova observes that there is a high degree of variation in the behaviour of diasporas in terms of the role that they play in the democratisation of their home countries. She argues that a number of different challenges to the sovereignty of their homelands explain whether diasporas involve with procedural or liberal aspects of democratisation. She argues that unless diasporas are linked to home countries that enjoy both international legal and domestic sovereignty, they will involve only with procedural

790 ibid
Shain, Y., 2002. The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation and resolution. SAIS Review XXII (SummereFall), 120e123.
aspects of democratisation. Diasporas filter international pressure to democratise post–
communist societies by utilising democratic procedures to advance nationalist goals. The
Ukrainian diaspora for example, linked to a homeland that enjoyed both international
legal and domestic sovereignty, demonstrated some involvement with liberal aspects of
democratisation after 1989, unlike other diasporas, the Kosovo or Karabakh diaspora for
instance, linked to homelands experiencing challenges either to their international legal
sovereignty or domestic sovereignty, engaged with procedural aspects of democracy
only.\textsuperscript{792}

Democracy was also a frame used by elites to mobilise Croats abroad. In Chapter V we
have seen examples of how the sovereignty focused prognostic frame also drew its
resonance from diaspora Croatians’ conditions in North America where they were
motivated by the great American narrative of democracy and freedom. In line with this
narrative, one of Tuđman’s key claims was that there were two main battles to be fought
collectively by the Croatian nation. These were defined as the battle for democracy and
the battle for Croatia. The analysis of Tudman speeches, among other themes, identified
democracy as a frame used to attract Diaspora support. To achieve it, it was emphasised,
a ‘one team’ was needed; the nation needed to join forces with its Diaspora, a process
which Tuđman referred to as “spiritual revival”, a “victory of the democratic spirit and
unity between all Croatian citizens”.\textsuperscript{793} As we have seen in Chapter V, although the
democracy frame achieved some degree of resonance among the Diaspora, it was

\textsuperscript{792} Koinova, M. Diasporas and democratization in the post-communist world. \textit{Communist and Post-Communist Studies}, 42(2009), 41-64. Retrieved from http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0967067X09000026/1-s2.0-S0967067X09000026-main.pdf?_tid=c24bae46-4a4c-11e6-a7d1-00000aab0f27&acdnat=1468560601_1a4a6b3d9bf58db2f0b39c77842464ff

heavily overshadowed by a much stronger frame, one that focused on fear of foreign (Serbian) domination. According to Huszka, in the presence of widespread fear, alternative frames for ethnically inclusive identities and moderation, such as the democracy frame, fail to win mass backing. In Croatia and in the Diaspora, these fears were built on the strong and widespread belief of the late 1980s Croatia that Serbs were joining efforts to create a ‘Greater Serbia’. This helped solidify HDZ’s ‘foreign domination’ frame, which became a much stronger motivating force. In late 1990 we witness this frame eventually taking over all alternative frames, including those that focused on democracy, free elections and prosperity.

This study also shed some light on factors leading to frame transformation, with examples from the Croatian Diaspora suggesting that frame transformation becomes needed when proposed solutions do not resonate or are in conflict with views of core supporters. Unfortunately, this alignment approach has not received adequate attention and further research remains to be done. Future research would benefit from examining the factors that enable frame resonance and lead to their successful dispersal in the public sphere where they are accepted and internalised, while other, less effective frames, fail.

Furthermore, an analysis of the role of leaders (and their discourse) in mobilising diasporas with homelands that have no existential threats would be valuable from the perspective of governments wanting to leverage the skills, experience and networks of expatriates for economic purposes. These diasporas do not belong to a universe of cases of conflict–generated diasporas for which the emerging literature has identified some

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distinctive characteristics: involuntary emigration, traumatic identities linked to painful experiences, intention or myth of return, and emotional links to original homelands experiencing limited sovereignty. For example, the great New Zealand diaspora, one of the world’s largest per capita, has passed the million mark, meaning one million Kiwis now live overseas. There is a rising sentiment that New Zealand has reached a tipping point, that an ongoing exodus of the best and brightest is a cost the New Zealand economy can’t easily bear, particularly given many expatriates have gone for good. The government is searching for better ways to draw upon the knowledge, skills and connections of New Zealanders abroad. How successful are framing strategies when the home country is a prosperous and peaceful nation? What roles do leaders play?
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