The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Integrated Ideal in Urban Governance

Compact city strategies and the case of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy in London and Berlin

Philipp Rode

A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, July 2016
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 99,977 words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy-edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Katherine Wallis.
Abstract

This thesis investigates how objectives of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies have been pursued in key case study cities as part of a compact city agenda since the early 1990s. Focusing on the underlying institutional arrangements, it examines how urban policymakers, professionals and stakeholders have worked across disciplinary silos, geographic scales and different time horizons to facilitate more compact and connected urban development. The thesis draws on empirical evidence from two critical cases, London and Berlin, established through a mixed method approach of expert interviews, examination of policy and planning documents, and review of key literature. Four main groups of integration mechanisms were identified and analysed: those related to (1) governance structures, (2) processes of planning and policymaking, (3) more specific instruments, and (4) enabling conditions. Based on having identified converging trends as part of the institutional changes that facilitated planning and policy integration in the case study cities, this thesis presents three main findings. First, rather than building on either more hierarchical or networked forms of integration, integrative outcomes are linked to a hybrid model of integration that combines hierarchy and networks. Second, while institutional change itself can lead to greater integration, continuous adjustment of related mechanisms is more effective in achieving this than disruptive, one-off ‘integration fixes’. Third, integrated governance facilitating compact urban growth represents a form of privileged integration, which centrally involves and even relies on the prioritisation of certain links between sectoral policy and geographic scales over others. Integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy at the city and metropolitan level, this thesis concludes, is essentially a prioritisation, which the compact city model implies and helps to justify.
Acknowledgements

This thesis has been my companion for a long time. The considerable number of people who have helped me on this journey reflects this and I am immensely grateful for their support. I would first like to thank my supervisor Fran Tonkiss, who has been my motivator, instructor and advisor from the very beginning of this project through to its final stages. Fran’s dedication and commitment to supporting my work has been exceptional and incredibly inspiring. The stamina that she has shown in going over my multiple drafts, line by line, and tirelessly providing helpful comments and recommendations has been key to getting me to the stage of final submission. Many thanks Fran.

I further owe a very special thanks to Richard Sennett, without whom this thesis would not exist. It was Richard who not only urged me to pursue a PhD in the first place but who assisted me with his enormously valuable and constructive feedback. On a day-to-day basis, Ricky Burdett enabled me to work on this project by variously taking on roles as an advisor in critical moments, as a meticulous reviewer, pushing me to be clearer and more expressive with my writing, and as a prompt to remind me to dedicate enough time to my thesis. Anne Power, as my second supervisor, has given me essential advice on advancing this project and how to focus in order to get to the core of my arguments. The constant reminding by Richard, Ricky and Anne of what it is I really want to say turned out to be crucial.

For the final period of completing this thesis, my examiners Harry Dimitriou and Carsten Gertz played an essential role and I thank them for their comprehensive, critical and constructive feedback. Their input greatly improved the overall quality of this final version. Halfway through my research, Bridget Hutter and Alan Mace, who agreed to sit on my upgrade panel, provided me with fresh and critical feedback during a more challenging phase of my thesis. This enabled me to proceed in a more focused and rewarding direction thereafter.

I must further express great gratitude to all my interviewees in Berlin and London who are, or have been, centrally embedded in local and national government, public administrations and various other institutions. Without their invaluable and in-depth insights and reflections, which they openly shared with me, this thesis would have been impossible. Those that agreed to their names being published are listed in the Appendix A1.

At different times of my research I was also fortunate to receive feedback and input from Tony Travers, Daniel Geiger, Savvas Verdis, Edgar Pieterse and Hilmar von Lojewski, as well as encouragement from Wolfgang Nowak, Ute Weiland, Dieter Läpple, Andy Altman and my brother, Christoph Rode. This work also benefited immensely from being embedded within an inspiring team at LSE Cities and from broader conversations and work with my colleagues over many years. For more specific input, I am thankful to Priya Shankar, Jens Kandt, Alexandra Gomes and Catarina Heeckt. I was also very lucky to have Katherine Wallis agree to copy-edit this thesis. She has been exactly the right kind of support in the crucial final stages of this project.

This research project has also been a loyal fellow traveller. It has joined me both physically and mentally on my travels and, as such, has profited from fresh ideas and new perspectives. Two locations abroad ultimately enabled this thesis to come together: the homes of my families in Markdorf, Germany and Cali, Colombia. These places just worked for my work and I owe a great debt of gratitude to my mother Doris Rode and my Colombian family,
Bertha and Edgard Cobo, and also Cirley Duarte, for enabling me to be so productive during time spent in their homes.

Finally, there is my own London-based family that needs to be thanked. Adriana has been the unique mix of critical advisor, tolerant companion and, above all, supporting partner that one can only wish for when embarking on a project like this. And then there are Olivia and Sasha, neither of whom were even born when I started to work on this thesis and who have seen their father, probably more often than they should, working away at something that appeared to have commandeered all his time. By now, being both of school age they are old enough to have some idea of what I was doing but, throughout, they have been tolerant of a father who may have been physically present but was all too often absent, engrossed in his thoughts.
# Table of Contents

## Chapter 1  
Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 15  
1.1 Motivation for the research ...................................................................................................... 16  
1.2 Problematique............................................................................................................................... 18  
1.3 The research questions .............................................................................................................. 21  
1.4 Thesis structure ............................................................................................................................. 24

## Chapter 2  
Research framework and methodology....................................................................... 27  
2.1 Overarching research framework........................................................................................... 27  
    Theoretical framework...................................................................................... 28  
    Comparative case study method ....................................................................... 29  
    The cases and unit of analysis .......................................................................... 31  
2.2 Research Design ........................................................................................................................... 33  
    Data collection.................................................................................................. 33  
    Research analysis ............................................................................................. 35  
2.3 Case study city selection ............................................................................................................ 37  
    Selection criteria ............................................................................................... 38  
    Selecting the cases ............................................................................................ 40  
2.4 Case study data collection: Expert interviews and existing data ................................ 42  
    Systematising expert interviews ........................................................................ 43  
    Expert selection in London and Berlin ............................................................. 44  
    Conducting the interviews ................................................................................ 46  
    Existing documentary information and archival records ................................. 48  
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 49

## Chapter 3  
The institutional dimension of compact urban growth...................................... 51  
3.1 From meta to matter: Institutions, policy capacity and outcomes ....................... 52  
    Institutional arrangements, policy problems and outcomes ............................ 52  
    Institutional stability and change........................................................................ 55  
3.2 Compact and connected urban development.............................................................. 58  
    Cities as transport solutions: Access beyond movement ................................. 59  
    The critical nexus: Urban form and transport .................................................. 61  
    The compact city: Planning policies and debates ............................................. 63  
3.3 Planning revisited ........................................................................................................................ 68  
    Planning discontent and necessity..................................................................... 68  
    Strategic planning ............................................................................................. 70  
    Can strategic planning be collaborative?.......................................................... 73  
3.4 Implications for planning and policy integration............................................................. 75  
    The integrated ideal and urban governance ...................................................... 75  
    The integration paradox...................................................................................... 78
## 3.5 Defining and operationalising integration .................................................. 80

- Three forms of integration ........................................................................... 80
- Levels, depth and directions of planning and policy integration ................. 81
- Towards a framework of integration mechanisms ........................................ 83

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 88

### Chapter 4 From Europe to Berlin and London: Compact urban growth and its institutions ................................................................. 91

#### 4.1 From spatial paradigms to planning in Europe, Germany and the UK .......... 91

- Europe: advancing the European city model through strategic spatial planning ........................................................................................................... 92
- Germany: strategic planning through multi-level governance ....................... 95
- United Kingdom: spatial planning as national politics .................................... 98

#### 4.2 An introduction to Berlin’s and London’s systems of government .......... 102

- Berlin reunited: Land and municipality ......................................................... 104
- London consolidated: governance by strategic authority ............................... 107

#### 4.3 Berlin’s strategic development agenda: the production of ‘spatial images’ ...... 112

- Gentle urban renewal and critical reconstruction .......................................... 112
- The compact city of short distances ............................................................... 114
- From decentralised concentration to the Metropolitan Region of Berlin-Brandenburg ........................................................................................................ 116

#### 4.4 London’s strategic narrative: Joining world city agenda and sustainability ...... 119

- London World City ......................................................................................... 120
- Sustainable urban transport ........................................................................... 121
- Compact city policy ......................................................................................... 123

Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 127

### Chapter 5 Berlin: Integrating multi-level metropolitan governance .................. 131

#### 5.1 Integration structures: Advancing multi-level governance while concentrating sectors ................................................................. 131

- Adjusting constitutional governance geographies .......................................... 131
- Concentrating spatial development portfolios .............................................. 136
- Combining hierarchy and networks ............................................................... 141

#### 5.2 Integration processes: A system of plans as integrated planning process .... 146

- Vertical integration: cascading and counterflow planning ............................ 146
- Horizontal integration: synchronising sectoral plans .................................... 154

#### 5.3 Integration instruments and enabling conditions .......................................... 160

- Technical instruments for multi-sectoral assessments .................................... 161
- Knowledge, skills and capacity .......................................................... 162
- Plurality of actors: Integrated planning impediment or enabling condition? 167

Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 173
Chapter 6  London: Urban governance with a new centre.........................................................176
  6.1 Integration structures: From partnership to leadership..................................................176
    Rescaling the state and adjusting governance geographies .............................................176
    Enabling leadership around policy bundles .................................................................181
    Balancing mayoral and network governance ...............................................................187
  6.2 Integration processes: Integration by advancing spatial policy coherence ............192
    Vertical integration: more plan than process ...............................................................192
    Horizontal integration: synchronising sectoral planning and development ................199
  6.3 Integration Instruments and enabling conditions.............................................................205
    Integration through data and assessments .................................................................205
    Financing instruments for horizontal and vertical integration ..................................208
    Knowledge, capacity and staff culture ..........................................................................210
    Network actors facilitating integration .......................................................................214
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................220

Chapter 7  Comparison and implications ..............................................................................224
  7.1 From policy agenda to institutional change .................................................................224
  7.2 Convergence: Sectoral integration by citywide governments ......................................229
  7.3 Divergence: Vertical alignment of strategic planning and implementation ..............231
  7.4 Practical implications, transferability and recommendations .......................................235
    The timing and type of institutional change ...............................................................235
    The transferability of practical research insights .......................................................236
    Recommendations across and beyond the case study cities .......................................239
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................242

Chapter 8  Conclusion: Concepts for integration ...................................................................245
  8.1 Hierarchies and networks: The meta-governance of integration ...............................245
    The reliance on hierarchy for integrating planning, design and transport ...............246
    The complementary role of network governance ......................................................248
    Integration through meta-governance beyond the classic trade-offs .......................251
  8.2 Institutional change as integration: The role of continuity and disruption ................254
    Continuity as integration .............................................................................................254
    Disruption as integration ............................................................................................256
    The temporality of integration ...................................................................................258
  8.3 From total to privileged integration .................................................................................260
    The paralysing nature of integration ..........................................................................261
    Integration as the privileging of certain relationships ...............................................262
    Privileging the urban form and transport nexus .....................................................264
  8.4 Closing ........................................................................................................................268

Appendices .......................................................................................................................272
  A1 – List of Interviewees ...............................................................................................272
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A2 – Samples for Guiding Interview Questions</th>
<th>274</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guiding Interview Questions - Sample Phase 1</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiding Interview Questions - Sample Phase 2</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1 – Spatial Governance timeline for Berlin and London</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2 – Development Trajectories of Berlin and London</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin: the development trajectory of a reunited city</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London: the growth of a European global city</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 – List of informal metropolitan coordination networks for Berlin-Brandenburg</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 – Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP) and its core characteristics</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 – The London Plan and its core characteristics</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 – List of London Plan (2008) references to coordinated transport and urban development</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 – Persisting integration barriers and tensions</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 – Two forms of integration</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 – Compact urban growth and integrated governance</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography | 305 |
List of Figures

Figure 1: Trade-offs in the establishment of effective regional governance
Figure 2: The research focus and spectrum between institutions and policy outcomes
Figure 3: Comparative Case Study Method – Research Framework
Figure 4: Data collection ‘theoretical sampling’ and data analysis ‘coding and categorising’
Figure 5: Modernist transport planning versus accessibility planning
Figure 6: Urban footprint, transit infrastructure and modal share in Atlanta and Berlin
Figure 7: Integrated policymaking, policy coordination and cooperation
Figure 8: Principal types of integration structures across three levels and two sectors
Figure 9: System of spatial planning in Germany with four key scales
Figure 10: Berlin (l) and London (r) administrative boundary and built-up area
Figure 11: Berlin (l) and London (r) population density (24 hour average)
Figure 12: Berlin (l) and London (r) rail network
Figure 13: Structure of Berlin’s government (in 2012)
Figure 14: Berlin’s government – political representation
Figure 15: Key governance scales of the Berlin Metropolitan Region
Figure 16: Structure of London’s government (in 2012)
Figure 17: London’s Government – political representation
Figure 18: Key governance scales of the London Metropolitan Region
Figure 19: Poster announcing a public planning workshop on the ‘end of the motorway’
Figure 20: Institutionalising coordination between Berlin and Brandenburg
Figure 21: Brandenburg planning regions
Figure 22: Berlin’s boroughs before and after 2001
Figure 23: Organogram of SenStadtUm
Figure 24: Berlin’s system of plans and the vertical integration of planning
Figure 25: Joint State Planning escalation path (Konflikttreppe)
Figure 26: Public employees in Berlin 1991 to 2013
Figure 27: The Greater South East
Figure 28: The governance of transport prior to setting up TfL
Figure 29: TfL – internal structure 2013
Figure 30: London – vertical integration of planning
Figure 31: Policy integration foreseen by the GLA Act
Figure 32: Technical procedures to integrate Mayoral Strategies
Figure 33: Public Transport Accessibility Levels (PTALs) for Greater London
Figure 34: Timeline of Berlin’s major institutional events and spatial policy initiatives
Figure 35: Timeline of London’s major institutional events and spatial policy initiatives
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Urban nexus – towards an x-shape of integration</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Berlin’s government – change since 1980</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>London’s government – change since 1980</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Population development in Berlin 1991 to 2014</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Migration between Berlin and its hinterland 1991 – 2014</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>House building in Berlin between 1993 and 2010</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Berlin’s rail-based public transport infrastructure and additions since 1990</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Berlin’s modal split in 1998 (l) and 2013 (r)</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Greater London building growth 2004-2012</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Housing completions in Greater London</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Density of residential dwellings completed in Greater, Inner and Outer London</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>London’s rail-based public transport infrastructure and additions since 1990</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>London’s modal split (based on journey stages) in 1998 (l) and 2013 (r)</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Traffic Volumes in London 2001 to 2014</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Two forms of integration</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 1: Substantive selection criteria for case study cities
Table 2: List of competences and organisations of interviewees
Table 3: Residential density thresholds to support different public transport modes
Table 4: Characteristics of strategic spatial planning
Table 5: Spatial development and transport trends in Berlin since the early 1990s
Table 6: Spatial development and transport trends in London since the 1990s
Table 7: Berlin’s Senate Administrations 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2011
Table 8: Committees related to Transport and Planning in London after GLC abolition
Table 9: List of GLA Stakeholder Groups as at October 2000
Table 10: Persisting integration barriers and tensions
Table 11: Potentially transferable integration mechanisms
Table 12: Population (in thousands) of Berlin Boroughs 1991 – 2014
Table 13: Urban development by key land use categories in Berlin

List of Photos

Photo 1: B101 expansion (2005 - left and 2009 - right) - coordination conflict across Land boundary Berlin and Brandenburg
Photo 2: Westfield Stratford City Shopping Centre, where parking standards far exceed the recommended levels in the London Plan
Photo 3: London Street Designs 2009 – 300m apart, same street, same borough, different design principles
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALG</td>
<td>Association of London Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATOS</td>
<td>Access to Opportunities and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BauGB</td>
<td>Baugesetzbuch (federal building code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEP</td>
<td>Bereichsentwicklungsplanung (area development planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVBS</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPlan</td>
<td>Bebauungspläne (Building Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVG</td>
<td>Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (Berlin Public Transport Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVV</td>
<td>Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (local borough parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVWP</td>
<td>Bundesverkehrswegeplanung (federal transport infrastructure planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
<td>Cost Benefit Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CfIT</td>
<td>Commission for Integrated Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETR</td>
<td>Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiL</td>
<td>Design for London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiT</td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difu</td>
<td>Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Development Plan Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Spatial Development Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNP</td>
<td>Flächennutzungsplan (Land Use Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung (Joint State Planning Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLC</td>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government Office for London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>London Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Local Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEP</td>
<td>Gemeinsamer Landesentwicklungsplan (Joint Spatial Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEPro</td>
<td>Landesentwicklungsprogramm (State Development Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEU</td>
<td>London Ecology Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIP</td>
<td>Local Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLDC</td>
<td>London Legacy Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPAC</td>
<td>London Planning Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>London Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTDS</td>
<td>London Travel Demand Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mayoral Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPF</td>
<td>National Planning Policy Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVP</td>
<td>Nahverkehrsplan (Urban Transport Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODPM</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG</td>
<td>Planning Policy Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Planning Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTAL</td>
<td>Public Transport Accessibility Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAST</td>
<td>Richtlinien für die Anlage von Stadtstraßen (urban street design code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Regional Spatial Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Spatial Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SenSUT</td>
<td>Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie (Senate Department for Urban Development, the Environment and Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SenStadtUm</td>
<td>Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz (Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERPLAN</td>
<td>South East Regional Planning Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StEK</td>
<td>Stadtentwicklungskonzept (Urban Development Concept)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StEP</td>
<td>Stadtentwicklungsplan (Urban Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StEP Verkehr</td>
<td>Stadtentwicklungsplan Verkehr (Urban Development Plan for Transport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TfL</td>
<td>Transport for London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban Development Corporations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1
Introduction

"We have much studied and much perfected, of late, the great civilized invention of the division of labour; only we give it a false name. It is not, truly speaking, the labour that is divided; but the men; - Divided into mere segments of men - broken into small fragments and crumbs of life; so that all the little piece of intelligence that is left in a man is not enough to make a pin, or a nail, but exhausts itself in making the point of a pin or the head of a nail.”
John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, 1852

This thesis investigates the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies that has emerged in London and Berlin since the early 1990s. It examines how urban policymakers, professionals and stakeholders have sought to work across disciplinary silos, geographic scales and different time horizons to facilitate more compact and connected urban development as part of the broader sustainability agenda. Focusing on detailed case studies of London and Berlin, the analysis explores recent urban practice and inquires about the degree to which new approaches to urban governance have been able to advance planning and policy integration beyond hierarchical decision-making structures and processes.

The research is centrally attached to a prominent subject of public administration, policy and planning: the coordination and integration of government action. More than just a recurrent theme, this has been referred to as possibly the most overarching governance issue and challenge, a fundamental dimension of governing social life and a central perspective through which the role of the state and other actors can be described and analysed (6 et al. 2002). At the same time, the enduring challenge of planning and policy integration has not insulated the subject from varying levels of interest and it has been exposed to both great attention and relative neglect. In approaching this subject through the lens of how urban governance over recent decades has engaged in steering the physical development of cities in order to facilitate more compact urban growth, the research focuses on a specific period, a particular scale of governance and key policy sectors in which there is significant interest in an ‘integrated ideal’ of governance. These are temporal, spatial and policy contexts that are characterised not only by substantial ambitions for advancing planning and policy integration, but – it might be said – by the necessity of doing so.
Since the early 1990s, the spatial governance of cities has seen an increasing awareness of ‘wicked problems’ (Harrison 2000, Head 2008, Weber and Khademian 2008), above all the environmental crisis, and an accelerated demand for more coordinated and integrated policy responses (CEC 1990) coupled with a greater popularity of system thinking. Furthermore, considerable cross-sectoral synergies are characteristic of the scale of the city, referred to in terms of an ‘urban nexus’ (GIZ and ICLEI 2014). The research addresses the policy sectors of spatial planning, city design and urban transport, arguably the most fundamental dimensions of the urban policy nexus, which are also central to an agenda for compact urban growth. The analysis does not focus on the environmental, social and economic claims to be made for compact urban development – on which a considerable body of literature is based; rather, it focuses on institutional arrangements of urban governance that might support or have been adopted in pursuit of this agenda.

In order to address this research focus and to develop a detailed research framework, I have structured this thesis into eight chapters, which I present in the final section of this chapter. This first chapter functions as an overall introduction to the thesis and covers my motivations for the research, the problematique that serves as a backdrop to the study and the research questions which this study aims to explore.

1.1 Motivation for the research

This research was motivated by three general critical perspectives, which position my study within the broader field of urban planning while also making important links to political science and public administration.

First, I acknowledge a general understanding that business-as-usual urban development is unsustainable. This is premised on a full acknowledgment of the scale of today’s urban development challenges, which in turn highlights the need for more effective government intervention (Marcotullio and McGranahan 2007, Stern 2009, UN Habitat 2011, UNEP 2011, Glaeser 2012). There is overwhelming evidence that urban policymakers across the world struggle to balance the escalation of activities in cities with more sustainable forms of urban development (Hardoy et al. 2001, Cohen 2006, UN Habitat 2009, Sorensen and Okata 2010, Burdett and Sudjic 2011). Questions regarding the size, speed, shape, and spatial distributions of densities, land uses and morphologically differentiated areas of the city and their relationship to transport infrastructure have become increasingly complex and politicised. A particular threat to urban sustainability is linked to the level of horizontal urban expansion of cities – urban sprawl in the extreme case – producing potentially unsustainable transport patterns and extreme congestion (Cervero 1998, Docherty and Shaw 2008, GCEC 2014), risks for social inclusion and equitable city access (Vasconcellos 2001,
Litman 2006), and increasing energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions (Kennedy et al. 2005, IPCC 2014).

Second, I embrace a perspective suggesting that compact urban growth is a central component of a more sustainable global development pathway. To a degree, this implies that the kind of development required for a safer and more prosperous future seems to have been already identified. Today, knowledge about the various global causalities of, for example, human intervention and environmental impacts is reasonably sufficient (IPCC 2007, Giddens 2009, Stern 2009, UNEP 2010). This is also the case for the spatial development of cities across developed and developing world contexts, where urban theorists, planners and policymakers have argued for a compact city model with a central objective of reducing the environmental footprint of cities, while improving their socio-economic performance (Jenks et al. 1996, Thomas and Cousins 1996, UTF 1999, Rogers and Power 2000, Williams et al. 2000, GCEC 2014).

The compact city model is arguably among the most prominent contemporary examples in urban development of a relatively clear agenda on ‘what to do’. Essentially, it aims to increase urban density and mixed-use, promote public transport and non-motorised transport, and improve the quality of urban design (UTF 1999, Burgess 2000, OECD 2012). The successful application of such broad principles is obviously highly contingent on appropriate translation to specific contexts. By and large, these principles are also motivated by seeking to avoiding their opposite: a further increase of sprawling, mono-functional and car-dependent urban development – the ‘what not to do’ on which agreement may be even more widespread. Over the last two decades, this agenda has informed planning and policy practice in a significant number of cities around the world, generating knowledge on ‘how’ such an agenda might be implemented (OECD 2012).

This leads me to the third and final general perspective, which motivated the focus of my thesis. This perspective suggests that the delivery of more compact urban growth centrally depends on more integrated planning and policymaking. It thus shifts the focus from questions about ‘what to do’ to those of ‘how to do it’ while also acknowledging a broader and pervasive ‘implementation deficit’ in sustainable urban development (Owens and Cowell 2011). Related arguments have been made by numerous scholars of sustainable development and planning theory, emphasising planning and policy ‘process’ in addition to ‘content’ (Hajer 1995, Healey 1997, Flyvbjerg 1998, Kearns and Paddison 2000, Rydin 2003). And while there are many studies and reports on policy instruments advancing compact urban growth, a research focus on the broader institutional arrangements supporting this agenda is less common. This has led me to my research interest in the capacity for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies; a capacity facilitated by the
integration mechanisms I investigate here and which, in turn, allow for adapting a generic compact city model to specific local conditions.

More generally, and as I discuss in the next section, integrated planning and policymaking has been identified as an area where surprisingly little academic literature and research exists (Meijers and Stead 2004, Kidd 2007).

1.2 Problematique

Since the early 1990s, and often alongside references to the 1992 Rio Declaration of principles of sustainable development (United Nations 1992b), demands for integrated policymaking have become widespread. Equally and directly related, in an urban development context, “going beyond sectoral approaches” (CEC 1990, p1) has been a consistent theme for some time. More recently, the ‘urban’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 11) make reference to “integrated and sustainable human settlement planning” and target “adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans” (UN 2015, Goal 11.3 and 11.b). And specifically in relation to the subject of this thesis, the first draft of the 2016 Habitat III ‘New Urban Agenda’ includes the aim “to implement integrated urban spatial development strategies supporting the realization of compact, integrated, and well-connected cities” (Habitat III 2016, p13).

However, there is currently insufficient knowledge about integrated planning and related governance structures, and identifying the desired level of coordination while acknowledging critical trade-offs – such as those shown in Figure 1 for regional transport and land use governance – remains extremely difficult. Busetti (2015) further stresses that “the link between coordination problems and specific institutional architecture remains ambiguous” (p13) and that “though the equation between institutional integration and policy integration is quick, it is nonetheless deceptive” (p17). There is also, as highlighted by Cowell and Martin (2003), a sustained naivety regarding the “tough political decisions about control, resources, organisational design, and (potentially conflicting) policy objectives” (p162f) that result from shifting towards more joined-up practice. Looking at spatial development, Kidd (2007) comes to a similar conclusion that, “while there is general recognition that integration is an essential feature of spatial planning, understanding of its complexity in terms of spatial planning theory and practice is still emerging” (p161).
Overall, there are only a few studies on policy integration, particularly related to the horizontal management of policy sectors (Peters 1998) and to urban governance in connection with a compact city agenda. Meijers and Stead (2004) suggest that it “should be regarded as a relative frontier of knowledge”, where understanding “can build on some decades of research in organisational science addressing cooperation and coordination between different sectors” (p12). Still, specific advice on how to achieve greater integration and how to draw lessons from existing inter-sectoral working practices is largely absent (Underdal 1980, OECD 1996, Hull 2008), with the few exceptions tending to situate the debate in relation to particular periods and specific national contexts (6 et al. 2002, Bogdanor 2005).

The most conventional integration mechanism relies on a hierarchical management structure, which creates oversight capabilities at each level and facilitates integration through the next level up (Thompson 1991, Schreyögg 2007). Most efforts to integrate transport and land use developments in cities continue to rely on such hierarchical principles. They are, for example, a key characteristic of the widely praised Dutch planning system (Kennedy et al. 2005). Public administrations tend to coordinate from the top level downwards, leaving any integrative capacity with a few senior officials and politicians. Greater control over processes and personnel, as well as clearer lines of communication and responsibilities, are commonly regarded as key advantages of hierarchical structures (Kerzner 2009). Similarly, planning documents at different scales tend to cascade downwards from the higher, general to the lower, more detailed planning scale.

But as coordination becomes more complex and agendas include competing priorities, the central nodes of hierarchical systems can easily be overwhelmed and communication flows...
are more difficult to synchronise (Thompson 1991). More recently, this has also become
evident for the specific case of governing large metropolitan regions (Röber and Schröter
2002b). Not surprisingly, integration based on hierarchical, top-down processes, and
particularly if leading to greater centralisation, is increasingly difficult to achieve as well as
what you must, decentralize whatever you can!” (Boelens 2009 p146) has become the latest
principle, even in Dutch planning. Therefore, alternative integration models have had to be
developed, taking into account various integration challenges that have affected urban
policymaking over recent decades (Peters 1998, Stead 2008). Above all, network
governance, which integrates more horizontally and “trades off control for agreement”
(Rhodes 2000, p161), has emerged as a key paradigm for integration.

Three challenges are particularly relevant for coordinating urban planning, design and
transport and each informs my inquiry into new modes of integration. The first integration
challenge relates to the well-documented transition ‘from government to governance’
increased flexibility of planning and the greater involvement of the private sector (Greiving
and Kemper 1999) – and a shift from an ‘active’ to an ‘enabling’ state (OECD 1996) with
the aim of increasing plurality and the potential for democratic decision-making (Röber and
Schröter 2002b, Evans et al. 2006). These shifts have led to more networked forms of
governance (Powell 1990, Rhodes 1997b), expanding the number and diversity of actors
involved in an increasingly nonlinear policymaking process and challenging hierarchical
integration (Greiving and Kemper 1999, Hajer and Versteeg 2005). The ongoing
privatisation of urban services, infrastructure delivery and operation (Thornley 1996, Cowell
and Martin 2003, Harvey 2005, 2007) adds to the complexity of achieving greater policy
integration by constraining accountability and strategic visioning. Furthermore, a shift
towards new public management, quasi-market mechanisms and the proliferation of public
agencies have added to this integration challenge (OECD 2004, Dunleavy et al. 2006, Catney
et al. 2008).

The second challenge of integration arises from a general requirement to cut across temporal
and spatial scales. With regard to bringing together short-term action and long-term strategy,
political impatience is a major barrier. Perri 6 et al. (2002) identify three types of impatience
for the case of the UK government. The first emanates from the urgency of politicians to
“secure their licence to govern from a sceptical public” (6 et al. 2002, p99). The second
impatience is a result of electoral cycles, which considerably constrain windows of
opportunity. Thirdly, a lack of trust among policymakers at different governance levels and
between politicians and professionals results in short-term hyperactivism (6 et al. 2002). As a
result, long-term interests are considerably discounted. Similarly, bridging geographic scales is challenging, particularly as a result of urban expansion and in cases where administrative boundaries are unable to catch up and match the functional integration of metropolitan regions (Shaw and Sykes 2005). Berlin is an extreme example of this, having been confronted with rapid sub-urbanisation following Germany’s reunification, which mostly took place outside the administrative boundary of the Land Berlin.

Finally, the legacy of many decades of fragmentation and isolation of planning practice, sometimes not even connected at the top, is arguably the most significant obstacle to achieving more strategic urban development based on joined-up transport and urban planning. Division of labour in modern organisations is of course an inevitability, as stressed early on in the seminal works by Max Weber (1922) and Emile Durkheim (1894). But there appears to be a particular difficulty in overcoming the long-term path dependency of funding mechanisms, operational set-ups, and distribution of political and administrative power and resources, which reinforces turf wars, budget protection and therefore fragmentation (Steiner 1997, Steer Davies Gleave 2002, Page 2005, Dunleavy et al. 2006). Perri 6 et al. (2002) observe that prioritising control particularly among politicians is one critical factor that leads to functional fragmentation, following the logic of ‘divide and rule’. Furthermore, professional capture, whereby professions tend to secure their monopolies within defined spheres of knowledge, is commonly identified as reinforcing fragmentation (6 et al. 2002). Again, growing evidence suggests that cities may be able to overcome these problems, raising the question of how to deal with barriers such as institutional inertia, conflicting interests (Dimitriou and Thompson 2001), and professional culture and capacity (Klein 1990, Geerlings and Stead 2003, Sennett 2012).

Each of these challenges and lines of inquiry provide a backdrop for the research focus of this thesis. And it is the related knowledge gap referred to above that this thesis aims to address, through an analysis of the relevant governance structure, planning processes, instruments and enabling conditions in two key case study cities, London and Berlin.

1.3 The research questions

Many studies of integrated planning and policymaking follow a problem-oriented research approach. They are centrally informed by issues, tensions and challenges of policy praxis and are motivated by the possibility of feeding back to planning and policy communities. They may even aspire to impact directly on reform agendas addressing greater policy coherence, the improvement of integrated planning and, more broadly, multi-level governance. These are common characteristics of applied research initiatives by, for
example, the European Commission, the OECD and various organisations of the United Nations.

My research is no exception and similarly attaches itself to the above problematique, informed by common observations and questions emerging from urban planning, city design and transport policy. And besides recognising the limited attention the subject has received in academic literature and research, the choice of my research focus stems from a personal observation regarding the limited knowledge on the part of city governments about how to respond effectively to new demands for integrated planning and policy. At the same time, putting urban level governance at the core of my thesis means investigating a context that has been regarded as relatively more successful in advancing integrated planning and policymaking, in contrast to reforms targeting central government itself (Mulgan 2005, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 2007).

It is in the context of the compact city model that many cities have indeed pioneered new approaches to strategic spatial planning and urban governance, aiming to integrate policy across sectors, geographic levels and timescales. The OECD emphasises that the very aim of compact city policy is to address integrated urban policy goals (OECD 2012). Thus, being in some sense a ‘system solution’, implementing the compact city agenda relies on multi-level, networked governance arrangements and coordinated planning and policy, cutting across transport, urban design and land use. It is only successful, if, for example, local street design makes urban living more attractive, while enhancing sustainable transport at all city scales.

Therefore, this thesis focuses on the compact city as a constructive example of what utilitarians consider a ‘task’ from which ‘organisational form’ follows (6 et al. 2002) or what Hill (2012) regards as ‘the matter’ which, over the last 10 to 20 years, has informed ‘the meta’: the organisational strategy and ‘appropriate institutional arenas’ (Albrechts et al. 2003 p127) that lie behind the facilitation of more compact, public transport-oriented and higher quality urban development. More specifically, the thesis aims to document recent experience of trying to overcome one of the most critical barriers for compact city development: the ‘silo-isation’ of spatial planning, design and transport strategies within the broader government-led strategic planning process.

This focus is developed around the following three research questions, which both emerge from the underlying motivations for the study and seek to address the problematique outlined above:

1. *How have objectives for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies been pursued as part of a compact city agenda in key case study cities since the early 1990s?*
2. What mechanisms for integration can be identified at the scale of city government and other relevant scales?

3. What broader concepts in relation to integrated governance can be detected through the analysis of key cases?

These three questions form the central reference for all elements of this thesis. Ultimately, I concentrate on the most significant institutional arrangements that have evolved since the early 1990s to strengthen integrated spatial governance. It is helpful to illustrate this focus by positioning my research across the wider spectrum characterising the relationships between institutions and policy outcomes (Figure 2). The main focus of my thesis is on integration mechanisms while I also consider several relationships across this spectrum. However, directly addressing the long and complex causal chain between institutions and policy outcomes would be too ambitious (if not impossible) as part of this research. Instead, and as Figure 2 illustrates, what is of interest here is the narrower link between institutional arrangements and the capacity for integrated planning and policymaking. I return to this issue as part of my theoretical discussions in Chapter 3.

Figure 2: The research focus in relation to the wider spectrum between institutions and policy outcomes
Source: own representation
Indirectly, my first research question also addresses the issue of institutional change and the extent to which such change is informed by intentional reform based on a pre-existing policy agenda. Again, this issue serves as a central backdrop to my analysis, one to which I return on multiple occasions, but it is important to stress that it is not the exclusive or primary focus of the research. As presented in more detail in the following chapter, the primary goal of my research is to identify and categorise institutional arrangements facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policy, and to develop analytic generalisations on this basis.

1.4 Thesis structure

This thesis is presented in eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 ‘Research framework and methodology’ presents in two parts the overall research approach of this study. The first part covers the research framework which guides the analysis. This includes an introduction to the comparative case study method and the definition of my cases and unit of analysis. I then present the research design, which involves an iterative approach combining data collection and analysis based on expert interviews, documentary information and archival records. The second part introduces further details of the core elements of my research methodology. Concerning the comparative case study method, I discuss the case study selection. For my research programme I focus on the details of my expert interviews and additional data collection efforts.

In Chapter 3, ‘The institutional dimension of compact urban growth’, I present the key components of my theoretical framework. The chapter begins with a discussion of the links between institutional arrangements, policy capacity and outcomes. I then move to the substantive policy agenda that this thesis is structured around, with an overview on the compact city model and related debates. This brings me to the critical role of urban planning for implementing compact urban growth, which motivates a discussion of related planning discourses in the third section. The fourth section addresses implications of compact urban growth for planning and policy integration, while providing an overview on broader perspectives related to integration and holistic governance. The final and concluding section covers the central definitions and the operationalisation of planning and policy integration. It also presents my framework of integration mechanisms, which underpins the empirical analysis in my case study cities.

Chapter 4 ‘From Europe to Berlin and London: Compact urban growth and its institutions’ moves to the empirical part of my analysis with an overview of the broader contexts of my two case study cities Berlin and London. The chapter also establishes the evidence for the existence of a compact city agenda in the two cities. I begin this chapter
with a contextualisation of some of the earlier theoretical discussion on compact urban growth, spatial planning and governance for the case of Europe and at the national scales for Germany and the United Kingdom. This is followed by an introduction of the two case study cities Berlin and London through a general presentation of their systems of government and recent changes thereof. The final two sections are dedicated to the strategic agenda for each city’s development with a particular focus on the politics, policies and planning related to the compact city model.

In Chapter 5, ‘Berlin: Integrating multi-level metropolitan governance’, I turn to the first case study city. Following my framework of integration mechanisms, I present institutional arrangements that have impacted on and potentially enhanced the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies. I begin my account by exploring integration structures as well as changes thereof that may have facilitated planning and policy integration in Berlin. This very much considers the arguments presented earlier on, in particular that any attempt at greater policy integration will ultimately rely on having structures in place that can support desirable levels of coordination. My account cuts across the administrative geography of the metropolitan region as well as the distribution of sectoral planning and policy powers across national, regional, city and district/neighbourhood levels. I also give special attention to network governance approaches based on involving a large set of stakeholders and discuss the relationship between hierarchical and network integration.

The chapter goes on to explore the integration processes and relevant adjustments that facilitated the linking of land use planning, city design and transport. Here, I first introduce changes to local approaches in supporting the most relevant vertical integration across the metropolitan, city and district scale. I then discuss planning mechanisms that facilitate better horizontal, sectoral integration between urban planning, city design and transport policies. Across both directions of integration, the Berlin case indicates a considerable reliance on plan making, which in turn facilitates a planning process in which multiple stakeholders are involved. The final section cuts across integration instruments and enabling conditions. As part of a focus on more specific integration instruments I highlight various assessment tools, while the key enabling conditions cut across institutional knowledge, the capacity of individuals and the plurality of involved actors.

Chapter 6 ‘London: Urban governance with a new centre’ broadly mirrors the same structure and discussions of the previous chapter for the second case study city. The first section, on changes to the city’s governance structure, focuses in particular on the impact of the creation of a Greater London Authority with a directly elected Mayor of London. Inevitably this involves a discussion of the role of leadership in facilitating integration, which is complemented by my observations of whether and how network integration has
balanced more centralised and hierarchical coordination mechanisms. The second and third sections on planning processes, instruments and enabling conditions more directly follow the same discussion as presented for Berlin. Key differences however, which will also be addressed in the concluding chapters, relate to the limitations of vertical integration mechanisms in London.

In Chapter 7 ‘Comparison and implications’, I return to a broader perspective on planning and policy integration, informed by my research questions based on a comparative understanding of integration practices in Berlin and London. The first section argues that my findings do indeed allow for a linkage between a compact city policy agenda and the observed institutional changes. This is followed by a comparative perspective of the actual ‘how’ of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies in London and Berlin in the second and third sections. While I compare and contrast the Berlin and London experience throughout this chapter, these sections also offer a more explicit overview on converging and diverging tendencies as part of the approaches in the two cities. Finally, I return to urban practice and identify possible practical implications of my findings. I also consider insights from the two case study cities that may be transferable to cities elsewhere.

Chapter 8 ‘Conclusion: Concepts for integration’ brings together the empirical insights on integration mechanisms of the previous chapters and the theoretical discourses presented in Chapter 3. I first present relevant insights that relate to the central question about the role of hierarchical structures and networks in facilitating integration. Moving on, I turn to a discussion on the role of institutional change itself and to what degree disruptive or more continuous change positively or negatively impacts on the integrative capacities of organisations. The third section of this chapter is dedicated to the ‘privileging’ of certain integration content – i.e. policy areas – as part of integrated planning and policymaking. It discusses the degree to which the urban form and transport nexus is part of a totalising strategy of integration or not. I argue that privileging the urban form and transport nexus is the most appropriate way of approaching the integration between these two critical areas of government intervention. The closing section is dedicated to final deliberations and a perspective on related future academic inquiry.
Chapter 2
Research framework and methodology

This thesis examines how objectives of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies have been pursued as part of a compact city agenda in key case study cities since the early 1990s. It is interested in the mechanisms that assisted these integration objectives and aims to identify broader concepts in relation to integrated governance. In this chapter, I present the overall research approach to this research agenda.

First, I will introduce the research framework, which is structured around the above research questions and interests while establishing the key link to existing theoretical perspectives. This includes the presentation of the comparative case study approach as the principal research method and the definition of my cases and unit of analysis. The second section presents the research design, which underpinned the case study approach and details the chosen data collection and analysis. It is an iterative approach that combines data collection and analysis based on expert interviews, documentary information and archival records.

The latter part of this chapter then discusses the most central elements of my research methodology in greater detail. First, and with regard to the comparative case study method, the third section focuses on the case study selection. Second, in the fourth section I present my research programme of expert interviews in more detail and provide further information on collecting other data sources.

2.1 Overarching research framework

The character of the three research questions of this thesis strongly relate to a qualitative research framework. They are open and exploratory questions attached to the above identified knowledge gap. Corbin and Strauss (2014) emphasise the interpretive and dynamic characteristics of qualitative studies: they “are usually exploratory in nature” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p35) and tend to generate new concepts rather than test existing ones. Qualitative research is also likely to be more interested in the representativeness of these concepts rather than the representativeness of the cases under analysis, which is usually more relevant for quantitative investigations (Corbin and Strauss 2014).

The fact that my area of research has not yet been thoroughly investigated puts a particular emphasis on discovery and systematising of concepts: How is integration being facilitated? What are the key integration mechanisms? How can these be understood as concepts and
categories? Rather than either targeting pure description or aiming for ambitious theory building, the goal of my research links this ordering of concepts emerging from my empirical study to suggestive generalisations. Overall, my research goal comes closest to ‘analytic/theoretical generalisation’ where “the researcher arranges the categories according to their internal relations” and “the empirically generalized findings are framed by a theoretically inspired perspective” (Meuser and Nagel 2009, p36). The first subsection below presents the choice of such a theoretical framework followed by an overview on the comparative case study methods and the definition of my cases and unit of analysis.

**Theoretical framework**

The basis of my ‘theoretically inspired perspective’ is a literature review, which is presented in Chapter 3. The emerging understandings, framings and information derived from this review were used as “context knowledge” (Flick 2014, p66), not only for building the theoretical framework, but also for identifying the knowledge gap and refining my research questions. Towards the final phase of my research, these also assisted the discussion of my key findings.

For this thesis, two contexts of theoretical understanding need to be differentiated. First, there are relevant theories of urban development and planning that cut across a range of substantive issues related to compact urban growth. Second, there are theoretical perspectives related to urban governance and institutionalism, holistic governance and strategic planning, and planning and policy integration, which are of direct relevance to my subject. Both types of theoretical underpinnings inform the focus of the following chapter and are also relied upon as part of my findings presented in Chapters 7 and 8.

This approach reflects Yin’s (2013) recommendation for public policy research, highlighting the importance of considering the theory related to the substance of policymaking under investigation (in my case ‘compact urban growth’). Here, this not only helps with framing institutional issues from an applied perspective but allows for identifying critical connection points between the previously introduced ‘matter’ (policy agenda) and ‘meta’ (institutions). In fact, some of the planning theory related to strategic planning that is discussed in Chapter 3 directly assists the bridging between policy substance and institutional arrangements.

At the same time, the choice of my research questions and their focus on institutional frameworks beyond substantive policy matters also presented a challenge regarding identifying a fully developed and appropriate theoretical framework. First, given the identified knowledge gap, I could not rely on a pre-defined and strong theoretical framework. And second, even in the broader context of urban governance, Pierre (2005) suggests that “there is not as of yet a full-fledged theory of governance” (Pierre 2005, p452).
He further emphasises that the most dominant theories in urban politics and governance “fail to properly conceptualize or explain” (p449) and have considerable limitations linked to context as they tend to be based on abstractions derived from the American city (Pierre 2005).

The implications of this absence of a strong existing theoretical framework that could act as an umbrella for all key aspects addressed in this thesis are twofold. On the one hand it re-emphasises the requirement of bringing together the range of different theoretical contexts identified above and, on the other hand, it reinforces the exploratory character of my study. This importance of exploration brings me to the rationale for an empirical study based on multiple cases, to which I turn below.

**Comparative case study method**

The analysis presented in this thesis is based on a comparative, multiple case study method (Agranoff and Radin 1991, Yin 2013) and looks at two case study cities and their regions, London and Berlin. The choice of this method is directly determined by my research questions which refer to ‘key case study cities’ and its considerable utility for public administration research (Agranoff and Radin 1991). Besides comparing the governance of two different cities, my research evolves around contrasting different institutional arrangements that existed in each of the two cities at different times.

As a principle form of social science research, case study research is an alternative to other forms such as experiments, surveys or modelling. According to Yin (2013) they are the preferred method for exploratory “how” research questions and for investigating contemporary phenomenon, both central characteristics of the subject of this thesis. In relation to the discussion above, it is usually emphasised that comparative or case study research tends to depart from a theoretical framework (Pierre 2005, Yin 2013).

Case study research primarily generates context dependent knowledge, which is the main reason why it has been exposed to substantial criticism in the past (Flyvbjerg 2006, Yin 2013). However, rather than regarding this as being inferior to purely theoretical knowledge, Flyvbjerg (2006) considers context dependent knowledge an indispensable part of the processes of learning and understanding. Furthermore, while the aim of case study research clearly is a “precise description or reconstruction of cases” (Flick 2014, p121), so is the development of concepts that apply beyond the case and which tends to be a “particularly instructive example of a more general problem” (Flick 2014, p122).

Generalising from case studies for a theoretical understanding is directly assisted by including more than one case (Yin 2013) and this also supported my choice for considering a
comparison of two case study cities: “Analytic conclusions independently arising from two cases, as with two experiments, will be more powerful than those coming from a single case (or single experiment) alone” (Yin 2013, p64). Essentially, comparison allows for removing “the idiosyncratic nature of many case studies” (Agranoff and Radin 1991, p204). More generally, it is important to stress that case study analysis permits generalisations in relation to theoretical propositions (analytic generalisations) and not for ‘populations’ (statistical generalisations) in a scientific sense (Yin 2013).

While comparative analysis has become a standard method across many research fields, it faces a number of challenges for the study of urban politics and governance. Most importantly, urban disciplines tend to be challenged by the required reductionism of comparative research potentially conflicting with the holistic and context-specific approach common in urban research (Pierre 2005). An extreme position might even argue that cities are unique, making any comparison a meaningless research effort. Indeed, urban governance and institutional structures tend to be city or country specific, have developed as part of a particular local history and are informed by their social, political and cultural contexts.

However, as clearly argued by Pierre (2005), cities are also characterised by many institutional similarities, have comparable relationships with the broader metropolitan region and are variously impacted by globalisation. He further suggests that city comparisons might indeed be a more fruitful approach than comparing nation-states as “the embeddedness of cities in national institutional contexts” (p455) provides additional contextual information. If these elements are considered together with other interrelated economic, political and social factors, comparative research on urban governance across national contexts may well be a rewarding research strategy (Pierre 2005).

But sound comparison of urban governance requires an awareness of empirical differences that may be hidden behind nominal and even conceptual similarities (Pierre 2005). For example, the function and role of a mayor or what constitutes the metropolitan region are typical cases where the same terminology is used to describe potentially divergent arrangements. Thus, the relational positioning of such concepts is an important component of a comparative analysis. While acknowledging such methodological challenges, I have opted for this method in a belief that it is the most promising empirical approach to address integrated planning and policymaking in urban governance.

Operationalising comparative case study research requires the development of three key phases (Figure 3): A first phase of ‘define and design’, which establishes the research framework, the approach to the literature review and theoretical framework as well as a strategy to the case study selection and data collection; a second phase of ‘collect and
analyse’ which includes the actual data collection and analysis based on a common research design but conducted for each of the case studies individually; and a third phase of ‘compare and conclude’, which develops the comparative perspective across the two cases and, based on this, advances potential theoretical generalisations. Critical for all three phases is a clear definition of the actual cases of the case study analysis and the unit of analysis. Both are defined in the next subsection below.

The cases and unit of analysis

Defining what the analysed case is a case of, alongside the applied unit of analysis, is a central precondition for embarking on case study research. Broadly speaking, I am interested in how different cities have adjusted their institutional arrangements in response to the same stress linked to increasing environmental pressures and as a result of embracing a compact city development paradigm. Furthermore, this interest is centrally linked to the question about the degree to which these city-specific institutional adjustments are characterised by converging or diverging tendencies.

The cases around which this thesis is structured are cases of ‘urban governance’. Pierre (2005) defines urban governance as “the process of coordinating and steering the urban society toward collectively defined goals” (p448). Given the particular focus of this research on the strategic level of governance, the analysis involves a particular but not exclusive examination of ‘urban governments’ – “the reliance on political structures in governing the local state” (p448). The chosen cases of urban governance and government, which are the
functional equivalents of my case study analysis, come from the two cities Berlin and London and their metropolitan regions. In addition, my cases are bounded by a temporal focus covering the two decades from the early 1990s onwards, following the introduction of a global commitment to sustainable development. Across that period, particular attention is given to the phases that followed after important institutional reforms. In Berlin, this implied a particular attention to the period from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s while the primary focus in London was on the decade following the setting-up of the Greater London Authority in 2000, and cutting across the Livingstone administration up to 2008 and only the initial years of the Johnson administration.

Embedded in these cases is the unit of analysis that I defined as ‘integration mechanisms’, facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policy. As emphasised earlier, I consider the effectiveness of these mechanisms primarily in relation to the institutional capacity to integrate across policy sectors and not with regard to policy outcomes. While this approach reduces the causal chain to be considered here, it needs to reflect that measuring policy capacity is less quantifiable than outcomes. In my analysis, I therefore seek to explore this capacity through the views of strategically based actors, the presence of more integrated plans and policy documents and the evidence presented by other studies.

Throughout this study, integration mechanisms are understood as institutional arrangements for planning and policy integration. Applying a ‘rules of the game’ definition of institutions (Lowndes 2009 p93) then implies looking beyond issues of formal institutional design (Dryzek 1996). Thus contemporary institutional analysis (Lowndes 2009) is particularly concerned with informal relations; the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) that exist next to formal rules and organisations.

These more informal rules and relations of institutional dynamics also directly affect integrated planning and policymaking. For example, Lowndes (2005) identifies departmentalism, a form of institutionalised fragmentation, as something that can be produced by informal factors. Weak ties are also regarded as particularly relevant for networks and multi-level governance, which both feature prominently as part of urban governance. An institutionalist perspective is therefore pertinent to analysing urban governance and its diverse arrangements (Lowndes 2009). It recognises the city as a territorially bounded arena within which a multiplicity of network actors coexist and engage in collective action (Pryck et al. 2014). And it views the behaviour of these actors as not only shaped by institutions but at the same time emphasises that institutions are shaped by actors: “Individuals and institutions are seen as mutually constitutive” (Lowndes 2009 p102).
Based on this overview of my research framework I now turn to the research design, which underpinned my empirical analysis.

2.2 Research Design

The research design, here understood as the approach to data collection and analysis, which facilitated the study of my two cases as well as the comparison, is based on an iterative approach. I borrow this strategy from Corbin and Strauss’ (2014) approach to qualitative research which interrelates research analysis and data collection: “After initial data are collected, the researcher analyses that data, and the concepts derived from the analysis form the basis for the subsequent data collection. Data collection and analysis continue in an ongoing cycle throughout the research process” (p7). The subsections below present each of these two research design components separately.

Data collection

My main research programme is expert interviews, which have been identified as an appropriate and useful “data generating instrument in those cases in which the research focuses on the exclusive knowledge assets of experts in the context of their (ultimate) responsibility for problem solutions.” (Pfadenhauer 2009, p84). Expert interviews are considered a core instrument of social and political science research enabling access to interpretive and procedural knowledge (Littig and Pöchhacker 2014). They are aiming to generate “explicit, tacit, professional or occupational knowledge” (Littig and Pöchhacker 2014, p99). More generally, expert interviews have been referred to as “an independent procedure” (Pfadenhauer 2009, p81) within the broader category of qualitative interviews and Littig (2014) highlights that expert interviews have been a particularly distinct social science research programme in German-speaking countries. These are similar but not identical to elite interviews, an established category in Anglo-American methodological debates and both tend to share a focus on the professional roles of individuals. Further details on the chosen approach to expert interviews are introduced in Subsection 2.4.

Given the context and objectives of this thesis, expert interviews have several advantages compared to other methods such as ethnography, political discourse analysis or social network analysis. Using ethnography with its central ambition of “observing events and processes while they occur” (Flick 2014, p42) was essentially untenable for addressing my research questions, which cover processes occurring over a longer period of time and many of them in the recent past. Political discourse analysis implies a particular attention to substantive matters. Its primary focus on political power and the critical analysis of social and political inequality (Van Dijk 1997) would have refocused this study away from its more ‘technical’ interests in integration mechanisms. For reasons related to resources and the
exploratory character of this study I also chose not to make use of a social network analysis (Scott 2012). Essentially, this method would have meant adding a considerable quantitative dimension to my research without allowing me to forgo the qualitative part required for addressing my research questions.

Besides making use of newly generated data from my expert interviews – “talk as data” (Flick 2014, p43) – I make use of two additional types of existing data. I have relied extensively on documentary information, which cuts across administrative documents, as well as existing formal studies related to my case study cities. As Yin (2013) emphasises in the context of case study research, “the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin 2013, p107). I have also made use of archival records, including organisational records, charts, maps, surveys and some statistical data. Some of these have been particularly useful for the description of the substantive issues related to compact urban growth in my case study cities. Overall, the use of multiple sources of evidence considerably strengthens case study research and the robustness of its findings (Yin 2013).

For identifying my data sources across these three types of data I made use of theoretical sampling, which has been defined as “interplay of coding and sampling” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p145): “Analysis begins after the first data are collected. Data collection is followed by analysis. Analysis leads to concepts. Concepts generate questions. Questions lead to more data collection so that the researcher can learn more about those concepts” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p135). Theoretical sampling has become an established ‘step-by-step’ method for data collection in qualitative research including expert interviews (Flick 2014, Littig and Pöchhacker 2014) where each interview can help in identifying additional interviewees (Bogner et al. 2009). And it has been highlighted as particularly helpful for exploratory research as “it allows researchers to explore issues and problems from many different angles and to keep their minds open for discovery” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p136).

Given the particular importance of expert interviews, and in order to facilitate text-based analysis, most of the interview material was transcribed. In addition, written memos and summaries of particularly important passages from interviews were added. Similarly, extracts from documentary information and archival records were processed in such a way that either relevant passages of the original texts or summaries were added to the data pool. The computer programme NVivo served as the central tool for analysing my textual data. The wider approach to research analysis is covered in the following subsection below.
Research analysis

As indicated above in Figure 3, the analytical part of this study was conducted in two phases. A phase of ‘collect and analyse’, which included the interrelated data collection and analysis for each of my case study cities individually, and a phase of ‘compare and conclude’, which combined, compared and contrasted the findings of the previous phase in order to establish the desired theoretical generalisations.

My main data analysis method for each of my case study cities was based on coding and categorising, which I applied for all relevant textual data across my three types of data. Essentially, this is the process of taking part of the data out of their original context and grouping it with other but similar elements of data to establish relevant relations (Flick 2014). The sequentiality by which parts of the data are presented and statements within individual interviews are made is not of interest as part of the chosen method (Meuser and Nagel 2009). My coding approach relied on an inductive category development whereby categories are developed “as near as possible to the material, to formulate them in terms of the material” (Mayring 2000, p3). This was the preferred choice over a deductive category application that relies on having theoretically pre-defined categories, which for the case of the focus of my thesis did not exist at the desired level of maturity.

The iterative process of coding for this study involved three steps (Figure 4). The first was a simple, line-by-line labelling or identification of ‘nodes’, which are based on an initial classification of references to institutions, organisations, geographies, individuals, etc. The second step entailed the development of concepts, which are groups of nodes sharing the same conceptual heading. Not all nodes were integrated as part of concepts, which also helped to reduce the amount of data considered. These conceptual headings already considered my unit of analysis more directly, i.e. integration mechanisms, and resulted in a long list of mechanisms such as the idea of ‘bundling competencies’, ‘establishing overlords as central coordinators’ or ‘developing strategic plans and visions’. The third and final step involved the grouping of concepts into categories, of which I identified four: Mechanisms of integration based on governance structures, planning processes, integration instruments and enabling conditions. It is this final step of the data analysis that establishes the basis for my ultimate research goal of conceptual ordering and theoretical generalisation.

The iterative approach to this three-step process allows for a form of constant comparison, evaluation and interpretation (Corbin and Strauss 2014). This circular analysis also creates a feedback loop for the data collection, which facilitates theoretical sampling. Constant comparison and theoretical sampling therefore implied that coding of the initial datasets was conducted in a more open, node generating mode whereas data including interview material added at a later stage were analysed with an increasingly robust set of existing nodes,
concepts and categories. It also meant that over time expert interviews and data collection itself became increasingly focused. Finally, it allowed me to identify the point of saturation of my data based on having been able to fully develop my categories.

Figure 4: Data collection 'theoretical sampling' and data analysis 'coding and categorising'
Source: own representation

The final, ‘compare and conclude’ phase of my research involved two main steps. First, I conducted a cross-case synthesis, which was structured around a compare and contrast exercise across my two cases. Making use of related and similar concepts and categories in the case study cities, this step explores whether replications or opposites can be identified.
Of particular interest is an understanding of whether the previously identified convergent evidence within each case study is replicated across both cases. Yin (2013) stresses the extent to which this process depends on a robust argumentative interpretation and “to develop strong, plausible, and fair arguments that are supported by the data” (Yin 2013, p167).

The second and final step entailed the analytic generalisation, which allowed me to make suggestions potentially applicable beyond my two case study cities. As discussed below, generalisability was centrally supported by the strategic choice of case studies. Based on convergent evidence in both cases, this step made use of pattern matching (Yin 2013) whereby empirical patterns from my case study analysis are contrasted with the conceptual patterns emerging through my theoretical framework. Essentially, this approach helps building the internal validity of my research (Yin 2013).

In terms of ensuring overall research quality, the most considerable risk is that perspectives and biases, not least coming from the researcher her/himself, impacts on research findings. Several of the above approaches help to mitigate these risks. For example, constant comparisons throughout the research analysis with its ongoing identification of similarities and differences as well as checks of consistency while developing categories and conceptual understandings are particularly helpful in this regard. Theoretical sampling and the increasing focus on already developed concepts during the later stages of the research further allowed for a more targeted validation of preliminary interpretations.

In the context of organisational research, Froschauer and Lueger (2009) also emphasise the importance of avoiding the premature use of available knowledge. In this regard, the choice of an inductive approach to coding and developing categories increases their proximity to the empirical evidence. Finally, Gläser and Laudel (2009) suggest considering the quality of data sources as part of the interpretation of the data which they expand to considering the quality of different experts. Overall, this has been less of a concern for most of my sources.

The following final two sections follow up on some of the above in more detail and I begin below with the selection of the two case study cities.

2.3 Case study city selection

I selected the two case study cities, Berlin and London, based on my research questions and driven by an information-oriented selection as opposed to a random selection. This allows one “to maximize the utility of information from small samples and single cases” which “are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content” (Flyvbjerg 2006 p230). In the context of case study research and for selecting cases, Yin (2013) stresses the
importance of applying replication and not sampling logic, rendering sample size (the number of case studies) irrelevant. Therefore, instead of considering cases as ‘sampling units’ they are “the opportunity to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or principles” (Yin 2013, p40). It is based on this understanding that the comparative case study method consisting of ‘only’ two cases assists my stated research goal of analytical generalisation.

The two case study cities were mainly selected as ‘critical cases’ (i.e. cities that are of particular relevance for a better understanding of integrated urban practice), while also taking into consideration ‘extreme case’ selection (i.e. the largest conurbations within broader geographic regions characterised by significant urban change and a certain degree of urban complexity). The idea that cases can simultaneously have two or more properties such as ‘critical’ and ‘extreme’ is explicitly mentioned in Flyvbjerg’s (2006) elaborations on case study research. The decision for selecting only two case study cities seemed a reasonable compromise between dealing with a manageable amount of cases, whilst allowing for an instructive degree of comparative analysis. More generally, a small sample of cases is a common feature for information-oriented case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006).

The kind of comparison that underpins my research is therefore a ‘most similar’ comparative case system design that is interested in replication. And although I am not aiming for confirming or falsifying a predefined hypothesis as part of this thesis, both cases can be considered as ‘most likely’ cases in the sense that they are likely to offer valuable insights with regard to the integration mechanisms this thesis seeks to explore. Besides essential similarities across the two cases, a few but substantial differences and contrasting situations between them were not only impossible to avoid but also supported my goal of analytical generalisation. This is due to an enhanced robustness of conceptualisations if they are linked to similar phenomena in different contexts.

Before moving to the selection criteria and actual selection of my cases below, it is important to emphasise that while referring to cities, the cases under investigation in my study are not the two cities themselves but urban governance and the system of government for and in the case study cities and their metropolitan regions.

Selection criteria

Four substantive selection criteria guided the choice of my two case studies. In addition, and of universal relevance for any case study research, considerations of access to data had to be taken centrally into account. This subsection details all these criteria.
First, and following an information-oriented selection, the most important criterion for selecting the case study cities in this thesis is the existence of an established policy agenda related to the compact city model (the ‘task’ or ‘matter’ as introduced earlier). As discussed in Chapter 3, good indicators for the existence of such an agenda in spatial planning include regulatory policy for promoting higher urban density, mixed-use and brownfield land developments and design quality. Transport-related policies typically concentrate on investment, regulatory and pricing mechanisms to reduce vehicular traffic, while promoting the use of public transport and non-motorised transport. Second, and related, cases need to include institutional arrangements (the ‘meta’) supporting the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies. Indicative for this, again discussed in the next chapter, are, for example, planning systems and institutional frameworks, which include strategic spatial planning capabilities. To reflect my interest in the matter-meta relationship, ideally cases should even have witnessed a shift towards such arrangements, which essentially means that at least some institutional reform has taken place.

Third, ensuring that the selected case study cities are characterised by a significant degree of urban complexity is a further selection criterion. It follows from Flyvbjerg’s (2006) extreme case selection facilitating logical deductions. This is important insofar as increasingly complex environments have been identified as a major challenge for traditional planning and policy integration, as highlighted in the introduction. Looking therefore at urban practice in cities with more complex governance arrangements and change may more likely allow for identifying innovative approaches to integration. Indicative for the complexity of urban governance arrangements is, for example, the existence of two or more urban governance levels (typically citywide and borough level). This allows the research to consider the internal tension between city-level administrative centralisation and decentralisation (Röber and Schröter 2002b) and its impact on planning and policy integration. Substantial structural, cultural and political change further serves as a solid predictor for the complexity of urban change. Related to the above and a basic proxy measure for the degree of complexity of a city is its size. But there are also other complexity descriptors such as the diversity of urban populations, cultures and economic structures.

The fourth substantive criterion differs from the ones above insofar as it seeks to ensure that there is a relevant difference between the two case study cities, rather than ensuring further commonalities. This allows for exploring different ways in which cities are pursuing compact and connected urban development and provides instructive insights on how a common set of principles are implemented in different contexts. The most valuable differentiator I have identified for selecting the case study pair is differences regarding the level of centralisation of urban governance, the overall planning culture and attitudes.
towards government. Table 1 below provides an overview of the main substantive selection criteria.

Table 1: Substantive selection criteria for case study cities

1. **Strong compact city agenda**
   - 1.1 Existence of spatial planning policy promoting higher density, mixed-use and brownfield land development and design quality
   - 1.2 Strong influence of progressive transport policies focusing on a modal shift from private vehicular traffic to public transport, walking and cycling
   - 1.3 A significant degree of synchronisation of transport and urban form

2. **Integrated planning practice**
   - 2.1 Institutional arrangements that support the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies
   - 2.2 Recent changes to the planning system and institutional framework facilitating strategic spatial planning and network governance
   - 2.3 Recent reform agenda addressing the sub-national state or local government level

3. **Urban complexity**
   - 3.1 Complex institutional structures with, for example, two or more tiers of urban governance
   - 3.2 Significant structural, cultural and political change
   - 3.3 Significant city size to guarantee a certain degree of complexity
   - 3.4 Diverse urban populations, cultures and economic structures

4. **Differences**
   - 4.1 Different degrees of centralisation of urban governance
   - 4.2 Different planning cultures and administrative regimes
   - 4.3 Different attitudes towards government

As already indicated, a final and essential criterion for the selection of case studies relates to the research process itself and considers access to data, data sources (Yin 2013) and the existing knowledge of the researcher (Pfadenhauer 2009). This can be broken down into several subcomponents. Given the choice of expert interviews as the primary research programme, both access to interviewees and a general requirement for ‘co-expertise’ of the interviewer (which is discussed in the next subsection) needs to be considered. Similarly, access to documentary information and archival records depends to a considerable degree on pre-existing knowledge of the researcher. For international research across linguistic borders, language skills of the researcher are a further point of consideration. And finally, I have also taken account of a central idea of a ‘new comparativism’ (Peck 2015) in urban studies by ensuring that my case study selection allows for creating a broader sensibility of the relevant patterns under investigation. It may be argued that such sensibilities are best underpinned by not only theoretical knowledge about a research context but also by practical exposure to it.

**Selecting the cases**

Based on my first two criteria, the Western European context emerges as a suitable global region for the case study analysis, combining an urban policy focus on compact city development (EU 2007) with ‘strong-state’ traditions, including a significant capacity for public sector-led strategic development (Albrechts et al. 2003). Cities that over the last
decades have become an international reference point for compact urban development include, for example, Barcelona, Berlin, Copenhagen, London, Munich, Stockholm and Vienna. Furthermore, most European countries have a long history of multi-level governance, and European-level policy on sustainable urban development and city governance links the cases together even across different national contexts. Within the EU, both the United Kingdom and Germany have pioneered cross-sectoral integration as part of urban policy since the 1990s (6 2005).

As for the two countries, among their larger conurbations, institutional change at the city and metropolitan level over the last decades has been most evident for their largest urban centres, London and Berlin. While, for example, within Germany my first criteria would certainly also have to consider case study cities such as Hamburg and Munich, my second criteria concerning institutional change prioritises Berlin. The choice of London and Berlin is also supported by my third criterion linked to urban complexity. Not only in terms of the complexity of urban governance and absolute populations but also with regard to urban and political change do these cities surpass the relevant characteristics of other larger cities within their respective countries.

Regarding my fourth criterion linked to differences of the organisation of the state, planning cultures and attitudes to government, it is helpful to first differentiate between European welfare state traditions. Pairing the UK (‘liberal/basic security’) and Germany (‘continental/corporatist’) assists this differentiation (Nadin and Stead 2008). In addition, the Rechtsstaat tradition in administration-dominant Germany provides a considerably different context for policy integration than that of a public interest country such as the UK (6 2005). In terms of their administrative regimes at the city level, London traditionally represents a more decentralised approach with independent boroughs as core units of local government while Berlin is a more centralised system, dominated by a citywide government (Röber et al. 2002).

Similarly, their respective planning systems – for the UK based on land use regulation and in Germany referred to as ‘comprehensive/integrated’ (Nadin and Stead 2008) – and diverging Anglo-Saxon and Continental planning cultures (Booth 2005) support this selection. The UK is among the few European countries which operate a discretionary planning system, where planning decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis. Spatial planning in Germany (and in most other Continental countries) is based on a binding system, including legally binding land use plans (Albrechts 2004a).

Finally, while London and Berlin match all the important criteria listed in Table 1, the research process oriented selection criterion concerning access to data and pre-existing...
knowledge of the researcher strongly reinforces their selection. In fact, they are the two European cities in which I have spent most time living, studying and working in over the last two decades. This not only implies a considerable degree of general understanding of their political systems, administrative reforms and planning practice but a better access to interviewees, documentary information and archival records. All these criteria, with further evidence also presented in Chapter 4, establish a strong case for my analysis to focus on London and Berlin. In summary, this recognises a unique opportunity of pairing organically-grown London, which saw continuous reform towards more pronounced models of integrated planning during the 2000s, and Berlin, which is regarded as a well-integrated compact city with nevertheless high levels of institutional reforms affecting spatial governance.

Following this presentation of selection criteria and actual selection of the studied cases, I continue below with a more detailed discussion of the data collection that assisted the research for each case study city.

2.4 Case study data collection: Expert interviews and existing data

Understanding how urban planning, city design and transport policies are related to each other at the strategic and implementation level requires access to tacit knowledge not readily available in existing documents and archives. Even though some of the organisational structures of city governments, their agencies and planning processes are formally documented, they do not necessarily represent the day-to-day practice of urban policymaking, planning and implementation. It is for this reason that this case study research relied heavily on expert interviews, which generated new data for the analysis of integration mechanisms and institutional arrangements operating within the urban development and transport nexus.

Expert interviews are an established research programme with different interview typologies, approaches to identifying interviewees and numbers of interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009, Littig and Pöchhacker 2014). Overall, Trinczek (2009) underscores the importance of ‘adequacy’ in relation to the research object as the only appropriate criterion as “no single best solution in the choice of interview method can be derived from abstract methodological considerations” (Trinczek 2009, p213). Below, I introduce the chosen method and selection of interviewees alongside additional considerations concerning the role of the interviewer, interview technique and capture, and research ethics.
As mentioned above, data from expert interviews is complemented by two additional types of pre-existing data: documentary information and archival records. I introduce these and some of the required data processing in the last subsection.

**Systematising expert interviews**

In accordance with my research goal of ‘conceptual ordering’ I have chosen “systematising expert interviews” as my main typology of expert interviews. These types of interviews are primarily interested in a “systematic retrieval of information” (Bogner et al. 2009, p7) and in reconstructing ‘objective’ knowledge (Littig 2009). They are differentiated from “exploratory interviews” focusing on providing orientation or “theory-generating interviews” aiming at “reconstructing social interpretative patterns” (Bogner et al. 2009, p7) which, given my research questions, I have ruled out for this study. Systematising expert interviews are used to interview individuals who have developed their expertise in praxis based on pre-existing expertise or an exclusive position (Audenhove 2011).

A particular focus of this type of interview is “on knowledge of action and experience, which has been derived from practice, is reflexively accessible, and can be spontaneously communicated” (Bogner and Menz 2009, p47). Bogner (2009) further stresses the particular role of systematising expert interviews in organisational sociology and that it is “not the experts themselves who are the object of the investigation; their function is rather that of informants who provide information about the real objects being investigated” (Bogner and Menz 2009, p47). More generally, expert interviews explicitly refer to the professional context of the interviewees (Meuser and Nagel 1991) and focus on relevant technical and process knowledge. They are based on the elaborations and stories by selected experts regarding a pre-defined thematic framework and aim to exclude topics that are not relevant to the research topic (Flick 2014).

Expert status is often granted to individuals directly by researchers themselves, depending on the specific research area in question (Meuser and Nagel 2009): to some degree “experts are the “construct” of a researcher’s interest” (Bogner and Menz 2009, p49). More generally, individuals tend to be contacted as experts if they are responsible for the conceptualisation, implementation or control of problem solving, or if they have privileged access to information about organisations or decision processes. They are also “seen as “crystallization points” for practical insider knowledge and are interviewed as surrogates for a wider circle of players” (Bogner et al. 2009, p2). Rather than only selecting from the top level of organisations, experts to be interviewed as part of a qualitative analysis are often identified at the second or third level, allowing for greater access to specialised knowledge and a better
understanding of the preparation and implementation of decision-making (Meuser and Nagel 1991).

**Expert selection in London and Berlin**

The process of identifying experts for this study combined the above-mentioned theoretical sampling of my data sources with ‘purposive sampling’ (Flick 2014). This approach can be distinguished from either sampling based on convenience (‘easy access’ as main criteria) or snowball sampling common in social network analysis and its quantitative orientation. With regard to theoretical sampling, Corbin and Strauss (2014) remind us that “it is not sites or persons per se that are the objects of analysis but concepts” (Corbin and Strauss 2014). One implication of this is that the overall number of interviews is determined by the level of maturity of concepts and categories rather than a targeted number defined upfront.

However, and irrespective of my general approach of theoretical sampling, some pre-structuring of my data collection was nevertheless important with a general anticipation of the number and roles of interviewees. This is where my choice of purposive sampling implied considering my research questions and to prioritise accessing experts with internal process knowledge. In the context of organisational research Froschauer and Lueger (2009) stress the insufficiency of relying on external experts “because their knowledge has already been homogenized in line with generalizable principles” (Froschauer and Lueger 2009, p224). Of interest therefore are individuals with particular functions within an organisational or institutional situation.

The main approach for identifying a first group of experts to be contacted for interviewing relied on three inputs. First, some of the documentary information, above all existing studies, for my case study cities contained information on key organisations, positions and/or individuals of relevance to my research questions. Second, I conducted a series of informal interviews with urban and governance scholars I had immediate access to and who had insider knowledge that helped with identifying experts. And third, I relied on my own judgement and knowledge regarding the potential of gaining access to relevant information by interviewing individuals who I already knew or was aware of.

Most helpful was establishing a list of key competencies and organisations (Table 2), which directly led to the identification of the political leadership, directors and senior officials. For the most obvious cases such as the mayor, deputy mayor, senator and state secretaries the principle question was less about ‘who’ but ‘when’, i.e. at what stage of my research an interview with senior officials would be most valuable. In several cases, the relevant interviews were consciously pushed back to allow for a more informed interview.
Several organisations and individuals were less obvious and required additional judgements on adequacy. For example, in both cities it was important to capture perspectives from senior officials at the borough level, which required selecting the most relevant boroughs as well as individuals with key insights. Here I relied on advice from academics knowledgeable of my subject area and the case study cities. This led to considering boroughs that once again could be considered as critical cases to my study or where key individuals were known to have particularly privileged access to information. Specifically in the case of the boroughs, I also aimed to balance individual accounts by at least considering two different boroughs in each city.

Finally, I also included external experts in each case study city who have considerable theoretical knowledge and secondary expertise related to the subject of this thesis. In both case study cities and given their academic status, these turned out to be external experts at the inside of many of the processes I was analysing, i.e. they were involved in planning and policymaking in an advisory capacity.

Ultimately and informed by theoretical sampling, this research project included about 20 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in each city. Listed below is a general categorisation of the types of competences and organisations key stakeholders and experts came from (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Political leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Department for Communities and Local Government, UK Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• German Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opposition Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Design for London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Urban Planning and Projects, Senate Department for Urban Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corporation of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London Borough of Hackney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London Borough of Lewisham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Berlin Borough of Prenzlauer Berg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Berlin Borough of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transport planning and operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transport for London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transport Planning, Borough Berlin-Mitte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BVG Berlin Transport Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S-Bahn Berlin GmbH, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economic development and housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Third Party / Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• University College London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu), Berlin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the role of leadership in integrated governance, a considerable number of political and administrative leaders were included. Interviewees included the former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone, former Minister for London Nick Raynsford and former Berlin Senators for Urban Development Peter Strieder and Ingeborg Junge-Reyer. Interviewed senior executives and civil servants were London’s Transport Commissioner Peter Hendy, State Secretary Engelbert Lütke Daldrup and several borough heads in both cities. Their views and insights were complemented by a range of other experts, civil servants, policymakers and private/third sector representatives. A list of all interviewees who agreed to their name being published is attached in Appendix A1.

Conducting the interviews

For conducting my interviews, I have followed an approach that accepts and takes advantage of a more organic and evolving nature of the ‘quasi-normal’ conversations that are part of expert interviews (Bogner and Menz 2009, Pfadenhauer 2009). Expert interviews for my thesis were therefore conducted based on ‘semi-structured interviews’, with several key and guiding questions prepared prior to interviewing. Compared to ‘structured interviews’, this allows for greater openness and flexibility for adjustment of the focus prior and during each interview (Flick 2014). At the same time, and in contrast to ‘unstructured interviews’, the use of a principal structure as ‘topic guide’ (Littig and Pöchhacker 2014) ensures that the thematic focus does not entirely get lost (Meuser and Nagel 1991). In addition, participants are also able to add relevant information even if questions are not directly asking for it (Corbin and Strauss 2014). Furthermore, sharing some of the key questions prior to conducting the interview allowed for some degree of preparation of the interviewee and enhanced the quality of the information obtained.

Most interviews were conducted in batches during two main phases: a first scoping phase in 2007 and an in-depth follow-up phase in 2012 and 2013. The initial guiding interview questions were developed based on the research questions and considerations for initiating a productive and engaging conversation as well as being based on a first review of other data sources. Throughout, and following the iterative data analysis method of ‘constant comparison’ introduced above, the guiding interview questions were adjusted to reflect the increasing maturity of the generated concepts and categories (Corbin and Strauss 2014). Questions were also personalised depending on the different roles and expertise of interviewees in order to optimise access to new insight. Appendix A2 includes two samples for my guiding interview questions. The first is an example for what was used for the initial interview phase with a stronger focus on influential underlying planning paradigms, general perspectives on integrated planning and policymaking, related critical projects and key documents. The second list of questions is an example of the structure of interviews
conducted towards the end of my data collection efforts. They have a stronger focus on understanding progress regarding integrated planning and policymaking and the by then already established key integration mechanisms linked to structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions.

A further key consideration for expert interviews is the role the interviewer assumes when conducting the interview. In this regard, an important principle for the interviewer is to aim as much as possible for a status as ‘co-expert’ (Bogner and Menz 2009, Pfadenhauer 2009, Audenhove 2011). This status is best achieved if interviewers have considerable pre-existing knowledge of the field and institutional context in question. In my particular case this further strengthened the argument for case study cities to which I had considerable professional exposure to prior to embarking on this research project. Related, it has also been argued that neutrality while interviewing experts is not only impossible to achieve but can be counterproductive. Instead, ‘trading information’, sharing knowledge and keeping the interviewee interested by stimulating a discussion is regarded as more appropriate and effective for accessing the information required (Pfadenhauer 2009, Trinczek 2009, Audenhove 2011).

I chose to record all interviews to ease the flow of the conversation and to ensure that all details were documented correctly. Written notes were only taken of the main points. Digital recording proved to be of a great advantage for processing interviews, allowing for direct access to certain passages and file sharing for full transcription of most interviews. These advantages outweighed the potential negative side effects of interviewees being more careful with statements and less likely to disclose information. I conducted all interviews in the experts’ native languages, either in English or German, which raised the question of the most appropriate point of translation. Rather than fully translating all German interviews into English, the ‘data collection and analysis’ phase for Berlin, as mentioned above, was mostly conducted in German. Direct quotes in German were translated by myself and all quoted, translated material was agreed with the interviewees.

The key ethical consideration as part of conducting the expert interviews for this study related to informing my interviewees about the research project, the use of data from interviews and obtaining authorisation for the use of any references made to individual experts. At the beginning of each interview, experts were informed about how the recorded material would be processed and authorised. Interviewees were also asked to give their consent to recording at the beginning of the meeting. Following the analysis, authorisation was requested and obtained for publishing any extracts of the interview. Some interviewees also opted for anonymity. If not stated otherwise, when referring to the position held by interviewees in my thesis it is the role they held at the time of being interviewed.
**Existing documentary information and archival records**

As already discussed while introducing my research design above, in addition to expert interviews, I collected two additional types of existing data: documentary information and archival records. Documentary information included existing studies, planning and policy documents and other relevant data and materials, which provided further information on institutional arrangements and the integration of urban planning, city design and transport. Partially informed by the more specific material identified during my interviews, the types of general information included:

1. Laws, legal and constitutional frameworks that specify the assignment of planning and policy powers across the fields of urban planning, urban design and urban transport
2. Documentations and studies of institutional change which affected integrated urban planning and policymaking
3. Strategic documents, manifests, white papers, visions and principles that make reference to compact and connected urban development and/or integrated urban planning, city design and transport policies
4. Strategic spatial development plans that articulate integrated planning and/or plan implementation
5. Other spatial development plans across different geographic scales that play a central role as part of vertical integration of spatial planning
6. Transport planning and policy documents which relate to transport infrastructure development and/or operational aspects of transport impacting on spatial development
7. Planning policy and regulations centrally addressing key components of compact urban development, above all density standards, mixed-use regulation, parking standards and street design codes

The collation of archival records, my second type of existing data, included maps, plans, charts, organisational records, photography, statistical data and illustrations. Most of this data links directly to the key scales of urban governance in the two cities. In addition, I included archival records for particular areas in the case study cities that are experiencing urban development and where the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies was particularly successful or where it failed.

Based on this effort in gathering this type of data, some of it was processed to establish the foundation for my actual analysis. At the most basic level, I detailed the governance geography and the extent to which different political powers are assigned to different administrative areas across the metropolitan regions of the case study cities. Central to an understanding of the institutional arrangements discussed in this thesis was also the provision of overviews on the central departments, units, commissions and working groups.
involved in the urban planning, city design and transport policies. In addition, their specific roles and powers across different sectors and levels of governance had to be specified. Similarly important was a synthesis of the internal organisational structures of those organisations centrally involved in the planning and policymaking of the case study cities. In cases where I quote official or legal documents that were originally published in German, I relied on my own translation.

Across all these institutional dimensions, I also documented the key changes that occurred particularly over the last two decades and which provided a critical basis for the more detailed analysis in my thesis. Throughout, this preparatory data collection effort was supported by various visualisations including the following:

1. Mapping of administrative boundaries, including information on the area, population and number of elected officials for each administrative level
2. Charts of governance structures identifying the key state powers regarding transport, spatial planning and urban design decisions by the level of governance
3. Charts of agencies that are working collaboratively on urban planning, city design and transport policies.

Similar preparatory data collection and visualisation was conducted with regard to the mapping of planning processes in the two case study cities. Here, particular attention was given to the multi-scalar cascading of planning processes and documents. Of related interest were the links between plan development and plan implementation as well as how specific policy instruments are attached to broader plan-making processes. Overall, I paid particular attention to positioning the strategic planning effort in both cities between broader national and regional planning frameworks on the one hand and local building development plans on the other.

Conclusion

With this chapter I have introduced my overall research framework and methodology. In the first section, I positioned this study within the broader context of qualitative research, emphasising the exploratory character of my research questions implying a focus on discovery and systematising of concepts. Rather than pure description or ambitious theory building, I refer to ‘analytic generalisation’ as my overarching research goal. Based on my research questions and this goal, I then identified the comparative case study method as an appropriate research vehicle to investigate the subject of this thesis and differentiated three phases of my research: (1) define and design, (2) collect and analyse, and (3) compare and conclude. The first section also identified my cases as cases of ‘urban governance and
governments’ and my unit of analysis as ‘integration mechanisms’, defined as institutional arrangements supporting the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policy.

I then moved to the discussion of my research design, which defined the data collection and analysis for my two case study cities. I introduced an iterative approach of interrelating the collection and analysis of data as an underlying principle for my research. Three types of data sources were used for this study: newly generated data was based on expert interviews, and existing data consisted of documentary information and archival records. Data analysis was both part of the second ‘collect and analyse’ phase conducted separately for my cases and of the third ‘compare and conclude’ phase cutting across both cases. The main method for data analysis within each case was based on inductive coding and categorising supported by constant comparison, evaluation and interpretation. For comparing findings across both cases, a cross-case synthesis based on a compare and contrast exercise then led to conceptual generalisations based on pattern matching.

The third section introduced the choice of Berlin and London as case study cities. This was justified by an information-oriented selection and shared characteristics such as a ‘strong-state’ European context, a considerable urban governance complexity and city size and diversity, as well as recent institutional change and a clearly identifiable compact city agenda. In addition, their differences in terms of underlying planning cultures and levels of centralising political power at the city level allow for extracting insights on how a common set of principles are dealt with in a more context-specific manner. Central for case study analysis, I also considered access to information and pre-existing local knowledge of the researcher, i.e. myself, as an important criterion.

The final section proceeded with the methodological discussion and focused on further details related to data collection, above all expert interviews. I identified systematising expert interviews as the method of choice and provided details on the choice of experts in my case study cities. I also described the way I conducted interviews and explained the decision for making use of semi-structured interviews. Important additional considerations that were presented concerned the role of the interviewer as co-expert and the communication approach of trying to ensure an engaging conversation rather than aiming for neutrality. The final part then referred to and detailed the collection of existing data, stressing that in many instances these too required preparatory data processing and illustration to facilitate the main analysis.

Having presented my research framework and methodology, I now turn to the development of a theoretical framework based on a review of existing general literature in Chapter 3.
Urban governance discourses tend to evolve around prominent substantive urban policy concerns such as affordable housing, urban regeneration or policing. In fact, and particularly in the case of practice-oriented deliberations, urban governance is often conflated with policymaking itself. At the same time, scholars of institutional theory and governance have framed urban governance as the ‘institutional dimension of urban politics’ (Pierre 1999), emphasising the wider institutional conditions which impact on our political choices. In this case, urban governance is clearly positioned on the previously introduced spectrum from institutions to outcomes on the side of institutions while establishing an ambiguous relationship with policy outcomes.

This thesis focuses on one specific part of the ‘institutions-outcomes spectrum’ by aiming to conceptualise the institutional arrangements that are facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policy, which in turn may enable more compact urban growth. Hence, it is a research focus that requires an upfront theoretical discussion on integrated governance and urban planning. In addition, establishing a theoretical framework also necessitates a broader perspective. Most importantly, integrated planning and policymaking capacities need to be related to the substantive policy agenda of compact urban growth and underpinned by a critical inquiry into the relationship between institutional change and policy outcomes.

Below, this chapter introduces these critical components of my theoretical framework. While I present this framework prior to my case study analysis, it is important to note that several elements were developed alongside my empirical analysis given the limited availability of a strong pre-defined theoretical framework as discussed in the previous chapter. The first section is dedicated to the links between institutional arrangements and change on the one hand and policy capacity and outcomes on the other. In the second section I introduce the compact city model, which then leads to a discussion on the role of planning in the third section. The fourth section addresses implications of compact urban growth for planning and policy integration, while providing an overview on broader discourses on integration and holistic governance. The final and concluding section covers the central definitions and the operationalisation of planning and policy integration. This includes the establishment of my framework of integration mechanisms, which structured the case study analysis.
3.1 From meta to matter: Institutions, policy capacity and outcomes

To begin, it is beneficial to revisit briefly the definition of institutions before advancing my discussion below. As stressed earlier, institutions are more than organisations (Heritier 2007, Lowndes 2009) and constitute “a system of social factors that conjointly generate a regularity of behaviour” (Greif 2006, p30). The principal value and purpose of institutions is an increase in stability and predictability of social interactions (Goodin 1996) and the reduction of related uncertainties (North 1990). In the context of this thesis, I refer to institutions in the “sphere of politics” and their role in relation to the “control of the mobilization of resources for the implementation of various goals and the articulation and setting up of certain goals for the collectivity” (Eisenstadt 1968, p410 quoted in, Goodin 1996, p22).

This section introduces the relationship between institutions, policymaking and policy outcomes as already briefly presented in the introduction. I discuss this relationship here first through a static (institutional arrangements) and then through a dynamic (institutional change) lens.

**Institutional arrangements, policy problems and outcomes**

The existence of institutions can be the result of historical accidents, evolution or intentional design. Goodin (1996) reminds us that in most cases it is highly likely a mix of all three. For this study, a particularly important question relates to the third cause and is about the intentionality behind their design. Chapter 1 already illustrated the conventional way of thinking about institutions as a means to an end. However, assuming that this end is necessarily related to achieving policy outcomes may be misleading as it is often institutional self-interest that shapes institutional arrangements (Scharpf 1986).

It is certainly true that calls for improving institutional arrangements tend to be commonly associated with addressing policy problems: "After all, if political institutions emerge as a historical product of particular struggles, it is only natural that these institutions are designed to help resolve precisely those conflicts" (Hajer 2003, p177). Yet, this assumes that we can assess institutional performance in relation to policy outcomes. And while considerable work has been done on the effects of institutional arrangements on political and social outcomes scholars have also stressed the limitations of institutional determinism (Radaelli et al. 2012). Above all, linking institutions and policy outcomes has been challenged by the long causal chain, long time lags and an enormous number of interfering variables that exist between the two (Pierson 2000b, Radaelli et al. 2012). On top, there are numerous problems with measuring policy outcomes (Pierson 2000b).
Lane and Ersson (2000) further emphasise that instead of institutions, policy outcomes may be determined by belief systems, cultural patterns, macro social conditions or actors’ preferences. The physical development of cities and transport infrastructures are an instructive example of this, often centrally informed by socio-technical circumstances, political tensions, normative values related to housing and mobility as well as the broader economic development context. Furthermore, policy outcomes can only be observed in the long run and many of the descriptors of urban development are only now becoming sophisticated enough for solid analysis due to greater universal use of GIS and land use monitoring.

The main implication of the above determinism for this research is the following: rather than primarily looking at the long and complex causal chain between institutions and policy outcomes, a narrower theoretical framework is helpful. As suggested in the introduction, the focus here is between institutional arrangements and policy capacity. This framework is based on accepting that institutions first and foremost shape decision-making processes, which in turn enable or compromise policymaking capabilities (Weaver and Rockman 1993). Two types of instrumentalist perspectives for understanding the relationship between institutions and policy capacities can be differentiated: structuralism and functionalism.

The first, structuralist way of looking at this relationship is to inquire how policymaking is shaped by institutions. This directly links to the question about which policy choices were eliminated as a result of institutional constraints (Scharpf 1986). For example, attention to problems that are located between or across boundaries of policy sectors and their departments is reduced (Scharpf 1986) while, in turn, institutional arrangements can also establish a policy arena within which actors address policy issues (Radaelli et al. 2012). An example of policy capacity contingent upon institutions of particular importance to this thesis is how arrangements for cooperation between or within government units are facilitating coherent policymaking. Similarly, the organisational proximity or distance of policy areas, or their status reflected by the level they are positioned at are further relevant examples of institutional arrangements impacting on policy capacity (Scharpf 1986).

But even in these cases, “the link between institutional conditions and the substance of public policy is more easily perceived in practice than established in empirical research” (Scharpf 1986, p2). Above all, policy preference (e.g. a change in government) can easily be misinterpreted as an institutional effect. Still, even if difficult to establish empirically, Scharpf (1986) stresses that in many instances the links between institutional conditions and policy choices can certainly be specified theoretically. And there are indeed numerous cases for which empirical evidence has supported our conceptual understanding. For example, environmental policy capacity has been considerably increased by the introduction of
national level departments for the environment in Western Europe (Weidner et al. 2002). To err on the safe side and in relation to the topic of this thesis, I rely on Scharpf’s conclusion that institutional arrangements can indeed “help to increase the probability of positive coordination.” (Scharpf 1986, p187).

The second, functionalist perspective relates to how institutions are shaped by policy agendas. Tsebelis (1990) argues that in case causality between institutions and outcomes are established “a political actor or a coalition of political actors may operate on the cause in order to modify its effects” (Tsebelis 1990, p97). Again, this kind of reasoning is confronted with a range of related limitations. Most importantly, and as Pierson (2000b) argues, it is one thing to establish the structural link above but an entirely different one to assume this is the reason for the existence of an institution.

A range of related critiques have been presented in this regard: first, policy concerns are only one among many aspects of institutional performance (Goodin 1996); second, perceived rather than actual policymaking benefits may motivated actors to pursue a certain institutional design; and third, there are numerous unanticipated consequences even if institutional design is functionally motivated (Pierson 2000b). More generally, the complexity and uncertainty of the political realm may not allow for functionalist theories to be applied (Busetti 2015).

Furthermore, functionalist perspectives on how institutions are shaped tend to ignore issues of political power and agency (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and assume that societal problems are framed and potentially determined by technocratic institutional practices rather than politics (Hajer and Kesselring 1999). As a result, as Hajer (1995) stresses, they target a “techno-institutional fix for the present problems” (p32) which leads to a focus on efficiency, innovation, integration, and coordinated management. What is not considered are questions of establishing a public domain for collective decision-making, broader goals of democratic legitimacy and political issues linked to rights and inclusion. However, political science and sociology have repeatedly highlighted the extent to which political struggle, conflicts over distribution and resistance to change are centrally embedded in institutional configurations (Moe 2005). Therefore, political power confronts rational institutionalism with precisely those tensions over the distribution of resources and individual interest and renders it either naïve or ignorant.

Essentially, functional explanations of institutional arrangements are not wrong per se but incomplete (Pierson 2000b) and at a minimum should acknowledge “the inherently political character of public policy choices” (Scharpf 1986, p182). This is even more the case when trying to understand institutional change, which brings me to my second lens of looking at
the above relationship based on a more dynamic relationship as part of institutional transformations.

**Institutional stability and change**

Institutional change is exposed to the same principal issues of institution building just introduced. What is of particular interest here are the factors that reinforce the relative stability of institutions but also why and how they change. I will first look at the stabilising forces.

As highlighted above, achieving stability in social interactions is the central purpose of institutions, which in turn implies that stability is also designed into institutional arrangements. The key mechanism through which this is achieved is through a system of "nested rules" (North 1990, p83) with “rules at each successive level in the hierarchy being increasingly costly to change” (Goodin 1996, p23). In practice, stability is then commonly achieved by requiring institutional change to overcome several veto points and by requiring ‘supermajorities’ (Pierson 2000b). As a result “in multactor policy systems with high consensus requirements, innovators will be at a competitive disadvantage in interactions with the defenders of the status quo" (Scharpf 2000, p769).

Furthermore, there are additional dynamics at play, which support institutional stability. For example, institutional change is becoming less attractive once actors adapt and commit to arrangements: “social adaptation to institutions drastically increases the cost of exit from existing arrangements”(Pierson 2000b, p492). For institutional change to materialise, the perceived superiority of an innovation must not only be in relation to the status quo but also on top of the costs of transition (Scharpf 2000). And still, stability of institutions should not be considered a result of passive behaviour but also of active and continuous political mobilisation (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

In addition to these forms of ‘institutional stickiness’ (Pierson 2000b), the possibility for institutional change may be severely limited by path dependency and lock-in effects (Thelen 1999, Pierson 2000a). Essentially, path dependency refers to a situation where constantly reinforcing effects of past events are determining a trajectory of transformation. Or, to put it differently, it describes a situation of positive feedback, which narrows options through raising exit costs to one single alternative of development (Pierson 2000b). Mahoney identifies two additional defining features of path dependency: sensitivity to events sequencing (earlier events weigh more) and contingency (final outcomes can’t be predicted) (Mahoney 2000).
While institutional stability may be a defining and desirable feature of institutions, it would be wrong to imply that institutional change is exceptional or problematic. Even under the above conditions of path dependency, more transformative change does happen. In these cases, change is linked to critical junctures, the moment when a new path begins typically during short periods of relaxed influence of existing structures. As a result, institutions tend to be characterised by long periods of stability and punctuated change.

A more recent line of thinking in institutionalism emphasises gradual institutional change based on incremental adjustments, which over time may still lead to considerable institutional transformation (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). One underlying assumption here is that change is not only taking place in moments of institutional vulnerability or crisis but as a more permanent condition and as a result of institutional ambiguities which offer permanent opportunities for interested agents to alter them (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

Streeck and Thelen (2005) differentiate four types of gradual institutional change: displacement (slow shifts in institutional arrangements), layering (new structures added to existing institutions), drift (change largely as a result of changes in the environment without explicit politics) and conversion (redirecting and redeploying existing institutions). A typical example of the latter type of incremental change is the reorganisation of ministerial departments. In most cases, however, these are examples that don’t reflect issues related to policy capacity but instead reflect personnel shifts linked to power issues or policy preference (Scharpf 1986).

Scharpf (1986) also offers a compelling rationale for the often cyclical pattern of certain institutional reforms – the cycle of centralisation and decentralisation being a particularly prominent example. He links this to our inability to fully “appreciate the latent benefits of the status quo” (p185). As a result, reforms prioritise values, which are unrealised at the expense of destroying existing and critical arrangements. Later on, this then leads to reforms in the opposite direction while once again ignoring some of the virtues of the status quo.

As part of the expanding scholarly interest in institutional change, a main distinction is made between endogenous and exogenous change. The first relates to new preferences of existing actors, the latter to external shocks (Busetti 2015). Of relevance is the further question of intentionality as part of institutional change. Intentional intervention in institutional arrangements is characterised by “deliberate interventions of purposive, goal-seeking agents” (Goodin 1996, p25), which once again poses the question to what extent policy concerns may be part of such purposive reform.
A close link between institutional change and substantive policy actors is proposed by Radaelli et al. (2012) who regard such change less as an outcome of exogenous shocks. The underlying functional logic is that rules change when policy change requires it. But besides the above point that institutional stability would tend to prevent such change as much as possible, a functionalist view of institutional change needs to recognise similar limitations such as the ones for institution building discussed earlier.

On top of this, Pierson (2000b) refers to two additional constraints to functionalism in the context of institutional change: first, desired policy effects may only materialise in the long run while short-term consequences may be the real motivation amongst agents of change; and second, considering again the long causal chain between institutions and policy outcomes implies that unintended consequences are almost certainly the outcome of institutional change.

Furthermore, and even when we may have a sophisticated understanding of the links between institutional arrangements and the quality of policies, Scharpf (1986) warns that “logical possibility does not imply practical feasibility” (p182). Considering the above limitations, to therefore simply assume ‘purposive and instrumental design’ by those deciding on institutional rearrangements can be misleading (Busetti 2015).

To summarise, it is crucial to recognise the profound social complexity that characterises the link between the policymaking ‘matter’ and the institutional ‘meta’. And when analysing institutional effects, it is further helpful to be particularly mindful of the fact that policy can change as a result of changing policy preferences, normative and cognitive alterations, even if institutional arrangements remain constant (Scharpf 2000).

At the same time, it may be short-sighted for research efforts to give up entirely on exploring institutional causation. In this context, Busetti (2015) suggests looking for meaningful simplifications rather than attempting to appraise the complexity of social life. According to him these simplifications could be attached to a theoretical understanding of links between institutions and policy outcomes. One key purpose of the four sections that follow is to establish such a theoretical understanding for the case of the compact city agenda (the matter) and institutional arrangements for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy (the meta).

Therefore, the next section provides a more detailed overview on compact and connected urban development, which will also consider some of its commonly discussed links between sustainability outcomes.
3.2 Compact and connected urban development

In an increasingly urban world, many social, economic and environmental challenges are more and more linked to the physical development of cities (UN Habitat 2010, UNEP 2011, GCEC 2014, IPCC 2014). Partially as a result, a broadly accepted view has emerged that effective government intervention is required to directly address the physical shaping of cities and urban environments rather than merely relying on indirect measures (Penalosa 2008, OECD 2010, UNEP 2011, Glaeser 2012). Such direct intervention in steering urban development is typically based on broad universal, and often preconceived, ideas or planning paradigms that shape related policy. Since the turn of the last century, urban planning has seen numerous basic ideas including highly influential paradigms such as Ebenezer Howard’s ‘garden city’ (1902) and the ‘modernist city’ as postulated in the Charter of Athens by the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in 1933 (Conrads 1970).

The last few decades have again seen the emergence of a general idea in urbanism, which has become an influential framework for urban planning and policy in different parts of the world. The most commonly used terminology in that regard may be the ‘compact city’ while there are other related models, which I briefly introduce below. In many ways, the compact city is a spatial development interpretation of sustainable development as put forward by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Jenks et al. 1996). It is also a response to the perceived failures of the various 20th-century models of urban development. The latter have, for example, informed the car-oriented designs of American suburbia, the anti-urban decentralisation agenda behind the UK’s new towns and the post-war urban renewal policies, which led to the development of large-scale, socially divisive housing estates. Above all, the compact city is a critique of the functionally segregated city and its simplistic view of the relationship between urban life and city design. With that critique comes a new ambition for better addressing the complexities, interrelationships and codependencies – the urban nexus – characteristic of city systems. Instead of planning the city through self-contained and segregated policy sectors, this ambition is directly targeting this urban nexus as part of the spatial governance of the city. As I will show below, this becomes most evident in the context of the relationship between urban form and transport and how both elements need to be dealt with jointly to provide accessibility to people, goods and ideas in cities.

This section first introduces the theoretical foundation that has led to a renewed interest in physical accessibility in cities and then presents the latest empirical evidence that characterises the relationship between transport and urban form. The final part introduces the
compact city model in greater detail and illustrates the most relevant characteristics and potentials, while also acknowledging some of the most frequently voiced criticisms.

**Cities as transport solutions: Access beyond movement**

Contemporary transport planning theory provides a backdrop for an increasing interest in compact city development. No longer, it is argued, should transport be regarded as the simple facilitation of movement; instead it should concern itself with the overarching objective of increasing accessibility (Topp 1994, Houghton 1995, Gertz 1997, Cervero 2001, Simpson 2004, Knoflacher et al. 2008). Since the early 1990s, calls for a ‘new realism’ (Goodwin et al. 1991, Owens 1995, Docherty and Shaw 2008) in transport planning have forcefully argued for the ‘predict-and-provide’ model of transport planning to be replaced by a greater focus on demand management and land use planning. These acknowledge the fact that the transport sector alone – the “maker and breaker of cities” (Clark 1958 p237) – is not able to achieve accessibility objectives and has so far failed to address successfully not only wider negative externalities such as high resource intensity and carbon emissions but also narrower transport concerns, in particular traffic congestion, road accidents, loss of productivity and transport inequalities (Hajer and Kesselring 1999, Vasconcellos 2001, World Bank 2002, Litman 2011).

Transport has the potential to increase accessibility between different activities and services such as housing, working, shopping, education, and leisure opportunities. This logic has also been at the heart of modern transport planning, which aimed to ‘integrate’ metropolitan regions based on car-oriented infrastructure and urban form (Gandy 2003). It is the kind of traditional transport planning that is essentially driven by objectives of ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1990, Urry 2001) and which only looks narrowly at optimising the trip from activity A to activity B, usually by increasing travel speeds. Yet this approach tends to miss the far greater opportunity for facilitating access to activities A and B: reducing the physical distance between the two, or even co-locating them in one place and thereby reducing the need to travel (Owens 1995, Banister 1997). Figure 5 illustrates this point by contrasting the principal and greatly simplified urban development phases of modernist transport planning and accessibility planning.

Furthermore, many transport solutions of the past have even severely compromised accessibility (Topp 1994, Gertz 1997, Hajer and Kesselring 1999) by facilitating the segregation of different land uses, increasing community severance and reducing the attractiveness of urban environments. By contrast, accessibility based on physical proximity implies a particular attention to planning, designing and managing the specific local
condition at a human scale that often escaped the transport profession previously (Baxter 2001).

Figure 5: Modernist transport planning versus accessibility planning – impact on travel times and physical distances between origin A and destination B
Source: own representation

It is further argued that successful co-location of different uses at the neighbourhood level relies on improved walkability and micro-accessibility rather than facilitating greater speeds for urban mobility. Also, it is suggested that a greater consideration of this ‘last mile’ of urban travel needs to be carefully balanced with the macro-accessibility required at the metropolitan scale. Following this perspective, future urban transport planning would therefore have to aim at “… connecting places while at the same time creating locations” (Knoflacher et al. 2008 p347). In summary, accessibility-based transport planning and
compact urban development is increasingly regarded as more successful in addressing traffic congestion and excessive travel costs, increasing energy and carbon efficiency as well as advancing the sociability function of cities (Rode et al. 2014a).

The critical nexus: Urban form and transport

In transport studies, the new interest in accessibility in cities rests on advances in the empirical analysis of the transport and land use relationship (Newman and Kenworthy 1989, ECOTEC 1993, Houghton 1995, Newman and Kenworthy 1996, Dimitriou and Gakenheimer 2011). The interdependence of fixed structures such as buildings, public space, streets and infrastructure as well as their uses and the possibilities for moving people, goods and information is often regarded as a determining factor in shaping the city (Knoflacher et al. 2008, Rydin 2011). It is also a relationship where cause and effect can be identified in both directions: urban form affects transport and transport impacts on urban form.

For the first direction of causality – urban form affecting transport – a prominent point of reference is the extent to which travel distances, the most relevant factor for transport-related energy demand, and travel times are affected by land use, density, urban design and street layouts. It is self-evident, for example, that the more codependent land uses (residential, work places, retail and services) are separated, the longer the journeys between them are (Cervero 1988). City size also plays a role and it is widely accepted that bigger cities have longer trip lengths and more traffic congestion (Batty 2008, UN Habitat 2013). Similarly, modal choice depends on the availability of certain travel options, which are themselves a function of urban form, density and urban design (Barrett 1996). The comparison in Figure 6 of Atlanta and Berlin, two cities with relatively similar population and wealth levels but diverging urban form and transport patterns, illustrates this point. After travel distances, modal choice is the second most relevant factor for transport-related energy demand (ECOTEC 1993, UN Habitat 2013).

In the past, a central criticism of attributing travel behaviour to built environment effects highlighted interfering residential self-selection effects whereby attitudes already impact on the choice of residential location, which then in turn also determine mobility patterns. However, even when controlling for self-selection, several studies have confirmed a significant relationship between urban form and mobility behaviour (Handy et al. 2006, Cao et al. 2009).
Among various descriptors for urban form, density (most commonly measured by residential density) is usually singled out as the most relevant factor for travel intensity. The National Research Council in the US estimates that doubling densities within metropolitan regions can reduce vehicle-kilometres-travelled (VKT) by up to 25 per cent when also concentrating employment (National Research Council 2009). More detailed research on the density-transport relationship further emphasises that it is what comes with higher densities that affects travel choices (Holtzclaw et al. 2002). Influential ‘density associations’ include, amongst others, better public transport, walkability, cyclability and limited parking (Mindali et al. 2004). For example, a threshold density of 100 people per hectare is essential for a good bus service (UTF 1999) and about 3,000 dwellings per km² are needed for efficient rapid transit (see Table 3). It is therefore often suggested that density is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing travel and shifting modes (UN Habitat 2013).

Table 3: Residential density thresholds to support different public transport modes
Source: OECD (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Min. residential density (dwelling units per km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local bus</td>
<td>1 bus per hour</td>
<td>990-1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate bus</td>
<td>1 bus every 30 minutes</td>
<td>1,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent bus</td>
<td>1 bus every 10 minutes</td>
<td>3,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light rail</td>
<td>5 minute headway or better during peak hour</td>
<td>2,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid transit</td>
<td>5 minute headway or better during peak hour</td>
<td>2,965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second direction of causality concerns the effect of transport on urban form. Cervero (2001) has identified four principal effects on land use and activity as a result of transport interventions: location, intensity, composition and value. Transport infrastructure is a critical driver for shaping cities, enabling the centralisation of economic functions and the accommodation of a growing population along metropolitan rail and road corridors. Where public transport infrastructure is not sufficient, roads and motorways tend to dominate, usually resulting in a further reduction of urban densities with more sprawling urban development and greater traffic congestion as increases in private car-use persistently run ahead of road building. For US metropolitan regions, empirical estimates show that each new highway piercing through an urban core led to an 18 per cent decline in central city residents (Baum-Snow 2007).

A particular feature of the transport-urban form relationship is the time lag between spaces and flows: land use and physical environments change at a far slower pace than activities and related movements. Wong (2002) suggests that this tension creates socio-economic and environmental challenges, including property cycles, house price inflation, traffic congestion and pressure on releasing new land. A second feature is the long design life of urban form and transport infrastructure, which creates significant ‘lock-in’ effects, reducing alternative urban development options in the future. These in turn lead to a change-inhibiting cultural and political equilibrium far beyond the narrower spatial system. The cliché of an ‘American Way of Life’ and its association with suburban or exurban lifestyles centrally dependent on the motor car may be considered as such an extension of a spatial development and infrastructure pattern. It is this kind of equilibrium that may prove very hard to change or to escape from, even if it turns out to be unsustainable in the long run.

The compact city: Planning policies and debates

Taking the above theory of a new realism in urban transport and the empirical evidence into account, the compact city model stands out as the most generic planning and policy principle underpinning a new focus on accessibility in cities. It therefore serves as the underlying planning paradigm, guiding the governance and planning processes investigated in this thesis. While also accommodating links to the broader urban sustainability agenda and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Jenks et al. 1996), the compact city is primarily regarded as an antidote to “wasteful” urban sprawl (Green 1996). Related concepts include the European city model, transit-oriented development, New Urbanism, decentralised concentration and smart growth. All share the idea of reinforcing city access based on proximity and highlight the importance of higher density and mixed-use urban form (Gehl 1987, Kelbaugh 1989, Calthorpe 1993, Jenks et al. 1996, Thomas and Cousins 1996,
Implementing compact and connected urban development is particularly reliant on policy cutting across different urban scales and sectors. Typically it includes a focus on urban regeneration, the revitalisation of urban cores, the promotion of public and non-motorised transport; extensive environmental controls and high standards of urban management (Williams et al. 2000, Breheny 2001). Burgess summarises the compaction agenda as aiming “to increase built area and residential population densities; to intensify urban economic, social and cultural activities and to manipulate urban size, form and structure and settlement systems in pursuit of the environmental, social and global sustainability benefits derived from the concentration of urban functions” (Burgess 2000 pp9-10).

To date, compact city policy has relied heavily on spatial planning and investment strategies involving three top-level policy targets: higher urban densities, mixed-use and urban design quality (Sherlock 1990, Owens 1992, Breheny and Rookwood 1993, UTF 1999, Rogers and Power 2000, Burton 2002, Kenworthy 2006). These are usually considered at the scale of the functional urban region and synchronised with transport strategies that focus on expanding the provision of public transport; improving walkability and opportunities for cycling while mitigating the adverse effects of vehicular traffic (Apel et al. 1997, Gertz 1997). Typical policy instruments include regulatory planning tools (e.g. urban growth boundaries, minimum density standards or mixed-use requirements) and direct government interventions or investments (OECD 2012). Less common are market-based instruments and pricing tools although they are regarded as particularly beneficial when addressing multidimensional policy goals (Cheshire and Sheppard 2005). Compact city policies are generally seen as most effective for new developments given the difficulties of changing established urban structure, but they have also proved successful for retrofitting existing built-up areas (OECD 2012).

By and large, these policies are justified by pointing to various real, as well as perceived, benefits of urban compaction. Besides transport and accessibility-related advantages presented above, a range of additional co-benefits are frequently referred to. Jenks et al. (1996) list as general advantages the conservation of the countryside, more efficient utility and infrastructure provision, and the revitalisation and regeneration of inner-urban areas. A number of analysts and studies also claim that compact, mixed-use cities can impact positively on social inclusion and economic performance (Thomas and Cousins 1996, Burton 2002, OECD 2012, GCEC 2014). One may also want to add that the compact city’s emphasis on placemaking is well positioned to respond to a ‘qualitative turn’ in the consumption of space. The latter captures a shift of urban dwellers demanding a higher
quality of their wider living and working environments – the consumption of ‘place’ rather than ‘space’ (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000).

Overall, the evidence related to environmental benefits of compact urban development tends to dominate in the literature, on top of the already mentioned energy, resource and carbon efficiencies related to transport. The potential for energy efficiency at the building level, mainly heating and cooling (UNEP 2011, Rode et al. 2014c), as well as for supplying decentralised grid-based green energy such as combined heat and power, are such advantages (Owens 1992, OECD 2010) as is a lower embedded energy demand for urban infrastructure due to greater utilisation (UNEP 2011). Finally, the importance of design quality for the compact city agenda further promotes energy efficiency at the building and neighbourhood level (UTF 1999, UNEP 2011). As a result, urban compaction is regarded as a central measure for reducing carbon emissions (UN Habitat 2012, GCEC 2014) and increasing energy price resilience (Cortright 2008).

At the same time, a fundamental critique of the compact city model is that it ignores negative side effects and critics claim that potentially negative externalities of higher density levels, such as traffic congestion, increased local air pollution and the urban heat island effect, are not equally considered (De Roo 2000, Van Der Waals 2000, Neuman 2005, Coutts et al. 2007, Cox 2012). Other negative density associations that are frequently highlighted include overcrowding and reduced privacy, an increase in noise and crime, reduced access to nature, and loss of open and recreational spaces as well as increased health hazards and greater vulnerability to natural disasters (Rudlin and Falk 1999, Burgess 2000, Williams et al. 2000, OECD 2012).

The compact city model is also exposed to a more general critique of any type of universal model or general idea for urban development. Hajer (2000) specifically refers to the compact city concept as an example which risks that national spatial planning becomes authoritarian and paternalistic. A main issue here is usually one of grossly underestimating the importance of context, ranging from specific local geographic and socio-economic circumstances to broader political, cultural and developmental conditions. With regard to the transferability of concepts for urban planning, transport and infrastructure development, numerous commentators have emphasised contextual factors and the degree to which borrowed or imposed ideas may be ill-suited for specific local conditions (Marshall 2000, Neuman 2005, Watson 2009, Dempsey and Jenks 2010, Dimitriou and Gakenheimer 2011).

A particular concern here is an often problematic disregard of the differences between developing and developed countries (Watson 2009, Dimitriou and Gakenheimer 2011). This can be easily illustrated by only considering the physical characteristics of cities: Regarding
the specific case of urban density, Angel (2011) shows that average population densities in
developing countries are twice those in Europe and Japan, which are, in turn, double those in
North American and Australian cities. These general differences obviously require different
strategies of dealing with the management of density itself.

A more normative critique of urban compaction policy is based on a position that generally
rejects state intervention that potentially goes against consumer preference (O'Toole 2009).
In the case of the UK, Breheny (2001) highlights that higher densities remain unpopular with
residents and local politicians alike and that people want to live not in flats but in houses,
ideally with a garden, in a town or rural area. Similarly, from a US perspective Richardson
and Gordon (2001) make the case for consumer sovereignty, prioritising access to good
schools, safety from crime, access to the countryside and recreational amenities, as well as a
high degree of mobility. Indeed, the compact city ideal may go against two possibly
universal aspirations: motorisation and a steady increase in personal living space.

In the context of transitioning to a network society, Hajer and Zonneveld (2000) argue that
connectivity rather than physical proximity is most relevant for social organisation. This,
they argue, potentially undermines the creation of proximity as an underlying orientation of
planning. Some commentators even challenge the idea of reducing the need to travel. For
them, it is the ‘greening’ of existing automobility that will extend the ongoing “liberation
from the tyranny of proximity” (Echenique and Saint 2001 p2). It is also in this context that
the “desire to travel” or “desire to reach destinations that involve travelling further” is
introduced (Simmonds and Coombe 2000 p125). Here, commentators emphasise that most
households choose locations not to minimise the journey to work but to trade-off multiple
factors. It is for this reason that Richardson and Gordon (2001) even reject the very notion of
‘excess commuting’ and critics warn that lowering travel demand could lead to a reduction
of economic competitiveness and output. Thomas and Cousins (1996) conclude that the
compact city model tends to ignore the causes and effects of decentralisation as well as
related benefits.

A more implementation-oriented critique of the compact city model concerns not so much
the desired outcome itself (more dense, mixed-use and accessible urban development) but
the means by which it is usually achieved. To a significant extent, today’s compact city
policy relies on regulatory planning mechanisms, which have been characterised by some
economists as ‘second best’ as they distort markets and lead to a range of negative side
effects. For example, research has linked the UK’s broader spatial planning policy to
increased house prices and lower housing quality, greater housing market volatility, higher
office rents, lower retail productivity and lower levels of employment in small independent
concern has been with policies that involve urban growth boundaries, which aim to limit urban sprawl without compensating the resulting constraint on greenfield housing supply with more active promotion of housing construction within the built-up areas of cities. In the case of Greater London, Hilber and Verleumen (2010) emphasise that regulatory constraints on ‘vertical development’ is a major factor in London’s extraordinarily high house prices. Such restrictions have a regressive impact on housing supply, affordability and housing equity (Barker 2006).

Finally, many critics stress the need for realism, as urban containment implies a reversal of the prevailing direction of urban development over the last 50 to 100 years (Angel et al. 2005). For rapidly growing cities, some experts argue that it is better to prepare and steer horizontal expansion rather than constrict and contain development, which has proved difficult in any event (Angel 2011). At the same time, most cities in the developed world will only add a marginal amount of newly built form to their territory, which could be constructed at higher density. Beyond that, any further compaction seems politically difficult since it would imply converting existing urban land back to nature (Bertaud 2004). In the latter contexts, more realism is also demanded with regard to the positive environmental impacts of compact city development. Studies for the UK as well as the US suggest that even draconian urban containment policy might only result in modest gains with regard to reducing overall energy consumption (Breheny 2001).

To summarise, it is helpful to turn to urban practice where many of the core principles of the compact city model have been acknowledged by urban policymakers and planners, while accepting some of the central criticisms introduced above. The OECD concludes that “by and large, they [the outcomes of urban compaction] appear to be positive and significant” (OECD 2012 p20). And while on the one hand – and certainly in a European context – urban compaction policy has become a mainstream planning approach, on the other hand the predominant trend of urban change remains, with some notable exceptions, one of dispersal and decentralisation.

But as emphasised upfront, the focus of my analysis is not on the various claims related to the environmental, social and economic outcomes of compact urban growth but on the practical means urban governments have adopted in pursuit of this agenda. Essentially, I simply accept that certain cities have bought into this agenda and with this research I focus on related institutional implications. This brings me to the critical role of urban planning as part of the ‘how’ to implement compact urban development. I therefore continue in the next section with a broader introduction of contemporary planning discourses of relevance to my research focus.
3.3 Planning revisited

A central theme of the compact city discourse is the role of government in planning and managing an increasingly complex urban system. I briefly touch upon this debate in this section as it serves as a general backdrop to this thesis. First, I discuss a defining tension of contemporary urban planning: the dialectic between discontent and necessity. I then introduce the notion of strategic planning, which is considered a prerequisite for implementing compact urban growth (Dieleman et al. 1999) and establishes key links with planning and policy integration. The final section presents pervasive planning deficits in meaningfully involving civil society actors based on a ‘collaborative turn’ perspective, a critical discourse in contemporary planning theory.

Planning discontent and necessity

A number of critical approaches in planning theory (Allmendinger 2002, Lindblom 2003, Scott 2003) have argued that proactive and state-led urban planning is hopelessly overwhelmed by the complexities, loss of shared values and divergent interests that exist in cities today (Healey 1997). Boelens suggests that the “multidimensionality of life-world” (Boelens 2009 p20) of a post-modern (Harvey 1989) or network society (Castells 1996) has gone together with a fragmentation of state activities and relocation of planning decisions outside government that has been evident since the early 1980s. For cities, this fragmentation is essentially the driver for what Graham and Marvin identified as ‘splintering urbanism’ – the collapse of the integrated ideal of modern urban planning and an ‘unbundling’ of networked urban infrastructure (Graham and Marvin 2001). This postmodern scepticism towards planning is mirrored by neoliberal thought, which more generally rejects planning as state-led interventionism, both viewing “progress as something which, if it happens, cannot be planned” (Albrechts 2004a, p743).

At the same time, experiences with market-led ‘planning by project’ (Archibugi 1996), which became increasingly popular during the 1980s and for which London’s Canary Wharf redevelopment is a prime example, identified major weaknesses with limited government involvement in urban development. These include increasing negative externalities of random development, particularly related to the environment (Breheny 1991), and often even higher costs for the public sector (Logan and Molotch 1987, Imbroscio 1997, Dalla Longa et al. 2011). This has led to a renewed interest in long-term thinking (Friedmann 2004) and the related role of government planning and state intervention, which over the last ten years has been further accelerated by concerns about climate change and the need to decouple resource use from economic prosperity (Giddens 2010, Swilling et al. 2013). The 2009 UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements argues that planning not only represents an essential urban management tool but is indispensable in responding to the complex challenges of
climate change, rapid urbanisation, uncertain economic futures, and spatial inequalities (UN Habitat 2009). Not surprisingly, strong regulatory and legislative approaches to planning continue to dominate in most cities around the world, as well as for large public infrastructure projects.

The dialectic between the insufficiency of planning on the one hand and its necessity on the other has been a defining character of contemporary planning praxis. A decade ago, Friedmann identified the withdrawal of the nation state from the urban agenda as perhaps the most significant change to urban planning in the recent past (Friedmann 2005). As a consequence, city governments had to become entrepreneurial, work in partnership with the private sector and find ways to deal with the new responsibilities given to them. Today, this pronounced shift is supplemented by a similarly important transition: the reconsideration of planning (Giddens 2009, Newman et al. 2009, Stern 2009, Rydin 2010). It is argued, for example, that the large-scale investments required for the transition to a low-carbon, green economy will have to come alongside a government-induced ‘next industrial revolution’ (Stern and Rydge 2012). In this context there are frequent references to plan-led urban development, coupled to a significant upgrade of urban infrastructure networks (UN Habitat 2009, UNEP 2011, OECD 2012).

So far, however, commentators agree that this renewed emphasis of the value of planning does not, nor should, equal a return to problematic models of post-war ‘comprehensive planning’ – a technocratic, positivistic approach largely influenced by civil engineering (Graham and Marvin 2001, UN Habitat 2009, Innes and Booher 2010, Hill 2012). The key problems associated with comprehensive planning arose from a knowledge gap – incomplete information about existing and future developments – as well as compromises and delays related to democratic decision-making and the coordination limitations of a centrally organised system (Rydin 2011). The strict differentiation of facts and values was identified as another weakness of this paradigm (Rittel and Webber 1973, Beck 1974). Transport planning in particular, with its scientific models informing decision-making, failed to integrate the qualitative dimension of urban life with quantitative ‘objective’ goals (Graham and Marvin 2001). The result was a bias towards maximising traffic flows, highway capacity and speed and a neglect of designing streets as urban places while disregarding community cohesion and severely compromising public health.

Similarly, in many cities traditional land use based planning is no longer seen as a credible option. It has been characterised as a weak exercise in identifying desirable development patterns while failing to consider the processes that could lead to implementation (Rydin 2011). Too often, the implementation of land use plans was further sabotaged by other policy fields, which supplied the required budgetary and technical resources (Kreukels 2000).
Furthermore, land use planning has been criticised for a passive attitude towards controlling undesirable developments without enabling desirable outcomes, as well as for focusing on the physical aspects of development rather than broader socioeconomic objectives (Albrechts 2004a). By contrast, today’s ‘rediscovery’ of planning is based on both the rising importance of strategic planning and a significant increase in collaborative practices – the so-called collaborative turn. I discuss both in the following two subsections.

**Strategic planning**

The notion of ‘strategic planning’ is a shift in recent planning discourses motivated by a recognition that complex problems can only be addressed through a combination of strategic visions and short-term actions (Albrechts 2004a). The origins of strategic planning have been traced back to both corporate approaches that emerged in the US in the 1960s (Kaufman and Jacobs 1987, Mintzberg 1994), and strategic spatial planning in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s (Albrechts 2004a). For Friedmann (2004), strategic spatial planning is essentially long-range planning for territorial development, while Healey offers a wider interpretation of strategy-making as “a process of deliberative paradigm change” (Healey 1997 p244).

Contemporary strategic spatial planning emerged in Europe during the 1990s, where it developed from a tradition of government-led strategic intervention (Healey et al. 1997, EC 1999b, Salet and Faludi 2000, Albrechts et al. 2003, UN Habitat 2009). It is regarded as a cross-disciplinary response to the shortcomings of traditional citywide master planning, as well as the problems of market and project-led urban development. This included concerns about long-term infrastructure development and its links to spatial planning, where market-driven approaches have failed to deliver more sustainable outcomes and the required degree of coordination (UN Habitat 2009). As a result, strategic planning has become an established approach to planning over the last decade and is increasingly used as a central reference for urban development approaches across the world (Friedmann 2004, UN Habitat 2009).

Strategic planning aims to develop a more coherent spatial policy that connects land use regulation, environmental sustainability, urban regeneration and infrastructure delivery (Albrechts et al. 2003). Hajer and Zonneveld (2000) see it above all as the “proper integration of national spatially relevant policies” (p352) to enable regional plan making. Strategic planning aims to recognise place qualities in economic development, integrate investments and establish links with specific development projects. This integrative ambition positions strategic spatial planning as a key mechanism for developing more compact urban form (Dieleman et al. 1999, UN Habitat 2009). Arguably the most prominent reference to strategic spatial planning is the “Barcelona Model” – denoting the city’s successful planning
efforts to promote compact city development and urban design quality over different political cycles (Albrechts et al. 2003, Balducci 2004, UN Habitat 2009).

Rather than representing a fixed approach with defined outcomes, strategic planning is usually regarded as a set of concepts, procedures and tools, which require careful adjustment to specific local contexts (Bryson and Roering 1996). According to Dimitriou and Thompson (2007a), the essence of strategic planning is “a systematic, integrated approach to policymaking which takes full account of context, resources and the long term” (p3). Based on an extensive literature review, Albrechts introduces the following general definition of strategic spatial planning: “a public-sector-led, socio-spatial process through which a vision, actions, and means for implementation are produced that shape and frame what a place is and may become” (Albrechts 2004a p747). Based on his review, further characteristics of strategic spatial planning are summarised in Table 4.

Table 4: Characteristics of strategic spatial planning
Source: based on Albrechts (2004a p747)

- a focus on a limited number of strategic key issue areas
- taking a critical view of the broader context within which planning takes place
- studying the external trends, forces and resources available
- identifying and gathering major public and private stakeholders
- allowing for broad (multi-level governance) and diverse (public, economic, civil society) involvement during the planning process
- developing a (realistic) long-term vision or perspective and strategies at different levels
- taking into account power structures, uncertainties and competing values
- designing plan-making structures and developing content, images, and decision frameworks for influencing and managing spatial change
- building new ideas and processes that can carry them forward
- generating ways of understanding, ways of building agreements, and ways of organising and mobilising for the purpose of exerting influence in different arenas
- focusing both in the short and the long term on decisions, actions, results, and implementation, and incorporating monitoring, feedback, and revision

Across these diverse general characteristics, there are four particularly important and interrelated qualities of strategic spatial planning. First, there is the ‘strategic’ aspect of this planning mode, which is derived from ‘a hierarchy of aims’ (Dimitriou 2007) prioritising certain aspects over others (Albrechts 2004b) and focusing on “a few central principles” (Dimitriou 2007, p44). Usually, this priority is given to the linkage between spatial planning and transport infrastructure while taking into consideration broader questions related to socio-economic development (Hyslop 2004, UN Habitat 2009, Rydin 2011). As Peter Hall stressed, “planners should consider land use and transport as one seamless web, and handle the two in some very delicate combination” (Hall 1997, p142). The emphasis here is also on
a proactive approach, which ensures the provision of infrastructure before or alongside new urban development (Rydin 2011). In fact, this is where strategic planning re-emphasises a long tradition in city making: that transport infrastructure can lead to urban development. Today, this priority often includes the explicit promotion of public transport and walkability to drive urban compaction and accessibility as discussed above. Linking major transport infrastructure with large-scale developments and mega-projects are also identified as priorities of strategic planning (UN Habitat 2009).

The second key characteristic, and arguably the most contested, concerns the long-term perspective of strategic planning. UN Habitat argues that guiding urban development is by definition a long-term process and that it cannot be successful if development directions are significantly altered, for example, each time there are changes of the political leadership (UN Habitat 2009). Certain infrastructure simply demands extremely long-term planning: big transport and energy infrastructure operate with lead-times of up to 30 years and affect cities for a century or more after their implementation. In this context, Hyslop (2004) suggests that the long-term time horizon of strategic planning can be driven by both these lead times and a long-term vision of the relevant stakeholders for the kind of city desired. Giddens (2009, 2010) suggests that backcasting might play a particular role in a new ‘politics of the long term’ and defines it as “asking what changes have to be made in the present in order to arrive at alternative future states” (2009 p98).

A third key characteristic of strategic planning establishes the most direct link with the focus of this study. Strategic planning gives particular importance to the coordination and integration of policy across sectors and governance levels (EC 1999a, Bryson 2004, Dimitriou and Thompson 2007a). A critical concern here is how policy solutions to one problem link to those addressing other problems (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007b). In that regard, Albrecht et al. (2003 p114) emphasise that “the focus on the spatial relations of territories holds the promise of a more effective way of integrating economic, environmental, cultural, and social policy agendas as these affect localities.” Or, to put it another way, it is in the context of organising and managing territory that policy integration comes to life and is potentially most effective. But it is argued that this can only be achieved by embedding strategic planning within new institutional relationships (Albrechts 2001), which has resulted in a new emphasis on effective institutional and regulatory frameworks for planning. To assist policy integration, strategic planning practice typically includes the development of a broad spatial plan to which development frameworks and principles are attached (UN Habitat 2009). Bryson also emphasises that strategic planning is not centred on producing a ‘strategic plan’ per se, but instead assists decision-making and leads to actions that shape and guide future development (Bryson 2004). Fassbinder even associates strategic planning with
the coming together of different plans, planning and decision-making processes across
different scales (Fassbinder 1993).

A fourth crucial characteristic of strategic spatial planning relates to a new focus on co-
producing plans by involving not only wider stakeholder groups (EC 1999b), but also
weaker interests that were previously excluded from proactive involvement (Albrechts
2004a). In this context, Balducci (2004) emphasises that the value of strategic planning is not
the strategic plan itself but the process, which mobilises and promotes the commitment of
key actors. This is particularly important in cases where strategic planning remains an
informal, non-statutory form of planning and where value can only be derived from the
involvement and commitment of relevant actors (Balducci 2004). At the same time, it is
precisely the involvement of broader stakeholder groups and particularly the direct
participation of the general public in strategic planning processes where ambition and actual
praxis often diverge. I continue below by exploring related shortcomings.

Can strategic planning be collaborative?

Strategic spatial planning is undoubtedly an ambitious agenda, which aims to move planning
from the margins to the very centre of urban management and governance. However, critics
have already highlighted various shortcomings, emphasising that in practice it often fails to
involve civil society actors to a meaningful degree and has rarely shifted spatial development
trajectories or produced a ‘paradigm shift’ in Healey’s sense (Healey 1997, Albrechts et al.
2003, Friedmann 2004). Friedmann also dismisses the idea of focusing on the production of
a plan, while emphasising the value of planning in promoting public debates (Friedmann
2004). A useful perspective on how planning continues to struggle with incorporating more
fundamental participatory practices has emerged through discourses related to the
‘collaborative turn’.

Over the last three decades, critical analysis of comprehensive planning, triggered by a loss
of confidence in the political system it relied upon, has given rise to a collaborative or
Flyvbjerg 1998, Fainstein 2000, Innes and Booher 2010), now established as arguably the
most prominent postmodern planning approach. Aiming to overcome the ‘narrow
instrumental rationality’ (Healey 1996) of comprehensive planning, this model aims to shift
the focus of planning from “a preoccupation with the distribution of material resources” to a
much broader “process of working out how to coexist in shared space” (p219). At the heart
of this shift lies a new recognition of the diversity of people affected by planning, their
complex relations, and varied interests and values.
Collaborative planning directly draws on the social theory developed by Jürgen Habermas (Rydin 2011) and its strong belief in communicative, social and political practices (Healey 1996). It challenges more traditional notions of representative democracy by advocating more direct participation and is linked to the broader concepts of participatory or discursive democracy (Held 2006). In particular, communicative planning implies a radical transformation of the planning profession: it is a model which sees the “planner’s role mediating among ‘stakeholders’ within the planning situation” (Fainstein 2000 p452) or “the planner in the midst of a web of contacts, who are all working together to produce a plan” (Rydin 2011 p20). This redefinition of the relationship between the planning subject (the planner) and the object (stakeholders and their environment) is widely seen as the main innovation of the communicative planning model. It implies far-reaching involvement of multiple stakeholders, the full integration of their perspectives and input into the planning process, and more public argumentation. The more advanced this involvement, the more this planning paradigm implies new forms of network governance, independent from traditional planning structures (Hajer and Zonneveld 2000, Rydin 2011).

Besides offering more inclusive and democratic decision-making, collaborative planning approaches are seen to have other potential benefits. Common points of reference include the generation of social and human capital, fostering community empowerment, long-term commitment of key stakeholders and new relationships between them, social learning, and ultimately greater social and environmental justice (Healey 1997, Randolph and Bauer 1999, Huxley and Yiftachel 2000, Innes et al. 2005, Innes and Booher 2010).

A specific example for collaborative planning in the context of strategic planning and major infrastructure development is the idea of ‘societal inquiry’ (Hajer 1995). Hajer (1995) defines this as the creation of a civic stage “where people contribute knowledge and take part in deliberations principally as citizens” (p288). This inquiry takes places in parallel to or even ahead of decision-making, overcoming the problem of societal input simply being structured as feedback to existing proposals. Such a mechanism could then help to increase the appeal of a common political project, re-energise the policy process, address issues of balance of power, and understand the nature and possibility of a political consensus (Hajer 1995).

But while many commentators emphasise the enormous advances and important successes of collaborative planning, others highlight its failings and structural weaknesses (Flyvbjerg 1998, Fainstein 2000, Huxley 2000, Yiftachel 2001, Boelens 2009). The focus of collaborative planning on process rather than content is frequently identified as problematic in respect of planning practice. Furthermore, it is typically challenged by lengthy time requirements, by differences between participants and their expectations, knowledge and
skills, and by language barriers. Involving citizens is challenging for strategic, metropolitan-wide planning, where large communities have to be targeted and where local familiarity is often not a given (Fainstein 2000). Finally, the desire for consensus building as part of collaborative planning is regarded as unrealistic, particularly in the context of major infrastructure developments where it is impossible to avoid having winners and losers. Thus, the key shortcomings of current models of participation are particularly pronounced in the context of a strategic planning agenda, which makes it extremely difficult to incorporate greater participatory elements at that level of planning.

At the same time, and central to the focus of my thesis, both strategic planning – with its objective of ‘joining up’ policies across different sectors, geographic levels and timescales – and the collaborative turn – with its ambition of bringing together different inputs from diverse stakeholders – require at their core a fresh engagement with planning and policy integration. Building on this perspective from planning theory, it is this engagement around which this thesis is structured, focusing on the specific case of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies. My discussion now shifts to an overview on the current state of discourses related to planning and policy integration, while also clarifying its relationship with some of the aspects presented thus far.

### 3.4 Implications for planning and policy integration

Advancing compact and connected urban development centrally relies on strategic planning capabilities, which in turn tend to be based on more coordinated and ‘joined-up’ policymaking. In this section, I introduce the notion of planning and policy integration in greater detail, whilst at the same time including parallel debates in organisational science, public administration and political science. This cuts across a wider discourse on holistic governance, which it is helpful to present here because it provides a broader context for shifts in spatial governance to which I then return exclusively in the chapters that follow.

**The integrated ideal and urban governance**

Demands for introducing or intensifying policy integration are typically related to market and policy failures, alongside political ideology and the inability of existing arrangements to deliver desirable outcomes. At the city level these calls are motivated, for example, by the desire to address the negative outcomes of sectoral policies of previous decades, which have been particularly persistent for spatial planning, city design and urban transport (CEC 1990, EC 1999b, Potter and Skinner 2000, OECD 2001, World Bank 2002, EU 2007, Kidd 2007, UN Habitat 2009, UNEP 2011). Economists further emphasise that cities are ultimately built around ‘integrated returns’ by profiting from a range of cross-sectoral synergies, economies
of scale and low transport costs (Krugman 1991, Glaeser 2008) – which, one might argue, also demand appropriate policy practice.

In practice, and particularly across the fields of contemporary politics, management and planning, integration is generally regarded as a positive feature, both as a prerequisite for, and as an indicator of, success (Meijers and Stead 2004, EU 2007, Schreyögg 2007, Raisch et al. 2009). Concepts closely related to integration and prominently featured in the literature are ‘policy coherence’, or ‘holistic’ and ‘joined-up’ policy, governance and government (OECD 1996, Wilkinson and Applebee 1999, UK Cabinet Office 2000, 6 et al. 2002), whilst fragmentation and inconsistency are commonly regarded as its opposite (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, OECD 1996). With regard to the latter, some scholars stress that fragmentation should not be equated with specialisation (6 et al. 2002) and that high levels of integration can indeed be achieved in contexts that are highly specialised and differentiated (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).

The new emphasis on integration relates above all to the challenge of managing complex, interrelated issues and the benefits of increased efficiency and effectiveness of policies and governance regimes. A central case for integrated planning and holistic governance emerges from recent demands to orientate policy around problems and challenges rather than policy sectors (6 et al. 2002). It has also been noted that most policy outcomes that matter to citizens are produced by multiple departments and professions (Smith 1996). As a result, governance discourses have, for example, turned away from new public management and the deconstruction of public agencies towards the reintegration agenda of digital-era governance (Dunleavy et al. 2006).

Integration is variously seen to: take advantage of synergetic effects and to improve policy coherence (OECD 1996, Greiving and Kemper 1999, Paulley and Pedler 2000); avoid blind spots, inefficient duplication and redundancy (6 et al. 2002, Anderson 2005, Bogdanor 2005, Kidd 2007); overcome poor sequencing (6 et al. 2002); enhance social learning (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007, UN Habitat 2009, Rydin 2010); and break organisational lock-in to escape institutional inertia and enable innovation (Geiger and Antonacopoulou 2009, Sydow et al. 2009). Above all, the global environmental crisis, coupled with increasing difficulty for governments at all levels to respond to new sets of interdependencies that cut across disciplinary and departmental boundaries (Hajer 1995) – the ‘wicked’ problem of our time (van Bueren et al. 2003, Brown et al. 2010) – has elevated the need for simple coordination to a far more ambitious strategy for integrated governance.

The acknowledgement that future development would have to include a far greater systemic approach was introduced at a global level by the UN Rio Declaration on the Environment

And while sustainability is often identified as a central reference for policy integration, territorial development has been singled out as strategically positioned for its translation into specific investment programmes and regulatory practices (Albrechts et al. 2003). The latter directly relates to city-level governance and the opportunities that exist for metropolitan and city governments to address the urban nexus and to steer spatial development. Urban governance tends to be seen as a mode of organising policy around place-based intervention, which requires horizontal integration instead of functionally organised sectors, and silos which prevail at higher levels of governance (Stoker 2005).

Furthermore, the recognition of various integrative skills and capacities of local government (Richards 1999) has itself motivated the desire to devolve powers from national to metropolitan and city governments. Spatial planning in particular, a policy field which is usually led by city governments (Rode et al. 2014b), is driven by a desire for greater coordination, and contemporary planning has been characterised as ultimately being “about integration and joined-up thinking in the development of a vision for an area” (Rydin 2011, p19). The recent UN Habitat report on planning sustainable cities even points to the potential “to use spatial planning to integrate public-sector functions” (UN Habitat 2009 pvi).

Across various spatial policy sectors, the particular dynamics between land use and transport, and related concerns about environmental impacts, position the pair at the forefront of the ‘green’ integration agenda (Geerlings and Stead 2003, Kennedy et al. 2005). Within urban transport, related challenges have been specifically linked to a “bad distribution of the responsibilities between the many parties involved” (Dijst et al. 2002 p3). Hence, a range of policy statements have highlighted the role of integration and cooperation across different departments, service providers and different levels of government in helping to ‘green’ the sector (DETR 2000b, ECMT 2002, US EPA 2010).

Cost-effectiveness and infrastructure funding opportunities also support a more integrated agenda (Lautso et al. 2004, Laconte 2005, Litman 2011), and combining the development of land and transport infrastructure further can lead to unique financing opportunities (Cervero and Murakami 2009). Finally, important arguments for city design and transport integration are put forward by those concerned with the quality of the built environment. The Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities has coined the critical term Baukultur: “the
The interaction of architecture, infrastructure planning and urban planning must be increased in order to create attractive, user-oriented public spaces and achieve a high standard in terms of the living environment, a *Baukultur* (EU 2007).

At the same time, integration has also been linked to discredited planning and policy practices. The various paradoxical associations of integration, with which I continue this discussion below, are important for a broader positioning of the term and related interventions.

**The integration paradox**

Generally, policy integration tends to be associated more with ‘designed’ development rather than ‘evolution or emergence’ (Johnson 2001) – both ultimately code words for more government-led versus more market-driven systems. Without rehearsing related arguments, it is clear that a libertarian perspective may argue that greater integration brings a loss of freedom and more power for already mistrusted governments, politicians and professional elites. And from a citizenship theory view it might pose additional challenges for democratic participation as indicated above. It is further suggested that integration and holistic governance may have centralising tendencies (OECD 1996) and rely on hierarchical organisation, which has attracted intense criticism from various academic fields (Jaques 1990, Powell 1990, Thompson 1991, Healey 1997). Centralisation is regarded as even less equipped to deal with ‘wicked’ problems and, on top, may have adverse effects on devolved units of government (Stoker 2005), potentially even undermining integrative capacities at the local level (6 et al. 2002). Furthermore, Bendor (1985) has argued that redundancy and non-integrated duplication in public administration increases reliability and therefore even contributes positively to effectiveness.

From a more theoretical perspective, it is also argued that the risk of integration being pursued as a ‘totalising strategy’ (Sennett 2011) deprives it of the advantages of open systems and potentially leads to significant disabling problems (Luhmann 1995, OECD 1996). This is in line with most retrospective commentary on ‘the integrated ideal’ (Graham and Marvin 2001) of modern city making, seen as a reductionist and mechanistic approach that ultimately fails to deliver desirable outcomes (Sandercock 1998). The static and technocratic character of comprehensive planning and its inflexibility eventually led to its collapse, since it was unable to respond to rapid or large-scale societal changes. In today’s context, the planning expert John Friedmann emphasises that “the integration of ‘everything’ in policy terms has been a cherished dream of planners as long as I can remember” (Friedmann 2004 p52). He notes that, besides integrating the two traditional dimensions of the social and economic, integrating environmental sustainability and cultural identity as part
of territorial policy agendas is hopelessly overambitious. Others, as discussed by 6 et al. (2002), also warn that the integrated policy agenda can lead to a focus of governments on organisational arrangements and reorganisation, which rather than being a means of achieving something else becomes an end in its own right.

The importance of recognising the limitations of coherent policymaking has been articulated in numerous publications over recent decades. The OECD (1996) calls for “a measure of caution concerning the extent to which coherence can, in practice, be strengthened” and emphasises that, “Governing in a democratic political system necessarily involves a degree of incoherence” (p8). Peters (1998) considers policy coherence the most difficult to achieve of the core dimensions of coordination, which also include addressing redundancy and avoiding blind spots. He argues that this relates to the underlying rationale of how organisations act and their links to particular clientele. As a result, and particularly in the case of network integration, individual positions can simply be too different to come together. Having analysed ‘joined-up’ governance in the UK, Pollitt identifies a number of specific costs associated with greater integration (Pollitt 2003). These include lines of accountability that are less clear, difficulty in measuring effectiveness and impact, opportunity costs of management and staff time, and organisational and transitional costs of introducing cross-cutting approaches and structures.

So, how is it possible that the same term is associated with diametrically opposed judgements? Does integrated planning and policymaking belong to an outdated model of governing through comprehensive plans or is it a paradigm at the heart of governance for an ecological age and more people-friendly cities? Is integration hopelessly overambitious and unrealistic in an increasingly complex world or is it in fact the most solid response to a new set of interdependencies? Does it reinforce the powers of existing elites or facilitate transformative change with progressive outcomes? Does it require greater centralisation or instead advance greater autonomy for city-level, local governments?

So extreme are the different perspectives on integration that they lead to another set of questions. Is it possible to suggest that there is a difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ (‘bad’ and ‘good’) integration of planning and policy? If so, what are the differences? What, for example, are the tools that allow for system integration without resulting in the negative outcomes that have been associated with modernist urban planning? Or is the level to which integration is desirable, just like centrist politics more generally, a consequence of the extent of excessive fragmentation of previous public policy and governance regimes (6 et al. 2002)? And why is it that regardless of the universal emphasis on integration, it ultimately remains more the exception rather than the norm (Challis et al. 1988, Peters 1998)?
The ambiguity of interpreting integration is also characteristic of debates in planning theory, where some associate it with comprehensive, modernist planning (Graham and Marvin 2001) and others with strategic approaches and network governance (Rydin 2011). At times, the relationship to integration in old and new planning approaches seems not all that different, even within the same text: “Modernist planning as a process is characterised by aspirations to a comprehensive approach, taking all factors into account in devising the plan” (Rydin 2011 p18), while the new ‘rather different model of planning’ “is about integration and joined-up thinking in the development of a vision for an area” (Rydin 2011 p19). The EU compendium of spatial planning systems even identifies one out of four European spatial planning traditions as a combination of both ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ – the comprehensive, integrated approach of the Netherlands and Nordic countries (EC 1997).

By investigating contemporary integration and joined-up thinking for urban planning, city design and transport policies in two case study cities, this thesis aims to offer insights into a possible new approach to planning and policy integration, such as integration beyond hierarchy and centrism. Before moving to the empirical chapters of this thesis, the final section below addresses important definitions and introduces my framework of integration mechanisms.

3.5 Defining and operationalising integration

The underlying definitions presented here facilitate a more productive use of the key terminology throughout my thesis. They are based on a literature review of various framings, characterisations and groupings of planning and policy integration. This also formed the basis of developing a typology of different dimensions, levels and directions of policy and planning integration. In addition to a clear definitional basis of the key terminology, my detailed analysis relies on an investigative framework differentiating principal mechanisms for planning and policy integration, which I introduce in the last subsection.

Three forms of integration

The use of the term ‘integration’ as part of the discourse on policymaking and planning tends to be vague and suffers from a lack of clarity as to its meaning (Underdal 1980, Potter and Skinner 2000). Stead and Geerlings (2005) suggest we should regard policy integration as “the management of cross-cutting issues in policy-making that transcend the boundaries of established policy fields” (p446). Peters (1998) considers coordination “as an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae” (p296). In his book on integrating land use, transport and the environment, Westerman (1998) refers to integration as implying “a concern with the
whole, agreement on common outcomes, and a commitment to actions and targets to achieve these outcomes” (p3).

While these characterisations of policy integration make it entirely clear that it is policies themselves that are subject to integration, the actual use of the term in the context of urban planning, city design and transport policies often expands beyond it. For my detailed analysis there are at least three important subcategories or forms of integration that need to be differentiated: integration related to spatial systems, policy targets and governance. While it seems easy to differentiate them here, in actual conversations, interviews and literature about planning and policy practices they often get conflated. It is therefore crucial for any related analysis to specify the demarcations of these forms of integration upfront.

The first form of integration is concerned with the integration of systems, which includes built form, infrastructure networks and the larger socio-spatial structures of cities. The second form of integration refers to the inclusion of additional policy targets that previously were either not considered or played only a marginal role in the decision-making process. Arguably the most prominent example of target integration over the past 30 years has been the sustainability agenda, particularly the environmental dimension with its ties to ecological modernisation (Hajer 1995, Kirkpatrick and Lee 1999, Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007, Rydin 2010, Wilson and Piper 2010). This has also been specifically referred to as ‘environmental policy integration’ (Stigt et al. 2013). The third form of integration is governance integration, which refers to the joining-up of institutional arrangements that, in most cases, were subjected to a far-reaching division of labour. It is, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have defined it, “the process of achieving unity of effort” (p4).

It is the third form of integration related to the spatial governance of cities that this research focuses on, while my detailed analysis will also have to establish multiple relationships with systems and target integration. To some degree, the first and third forms of integration also correspond to the concept of the ‘matter’ (content/policy outcomes) and the ‘meta’ (processes/governance/institutional structures), which was introduced in Chapter 1. And just as spatial planning translates organisational practices into physical structures, an inherently process-oriented form of ‘integration’ can assume an output or product dimension (Rotmans et al. 2000). This becomes obvious for urban development, where the built environment itself is the product of a policy and planning process and, depending on the level of process integration, can be itself more or less well integrated.

Levels, depth and directions of planning and policy integration
Substantially richer than basic definitions of planning and policy integration in the reviewed literature are references to various levels, hierarchies or ladders of integration (Westerman
1998, Greiving and Kemper 1999, Potter and Skinner 2000, Geerlings and Stead 2003, Meijers and Stead 2004, Hull 2005, Stead and Geerlings 2005). In this context it needs to be stressed that the three related terms – coordination, cooperation and integration – are often used interchangeably, while subtle differences have been identified with regard to their policy impact and the formally structured processes that they require. Using the example of land use and transport policy, Greiving and Kemper (1999) regard ‘coordination’ as aiming to achieve higher levels of policy coherence, while integration entails the combination of policies.

Meijers and Stead (2004) present a helpful hierarchy of integration (Figure 7). Starting with cooperation, which seeks more efficient sectoral policy, the next level up is coordination, where sectoral policies are adjusted to make them more coherent with each other. At the top level, one reaches integration, where different actors work together to create joint policies. For them, this hierarchy correlates with an increase in interaction, interdependence, formality, resources, lack of autonomy, comprehensiveness, accessibility and compatibility.

Similar hierarchies have been identified for the related terms of ‘joined-up’ (consistent goals and means) and ‘holistic’ (reinforcing goals and means) policies (6 et al. 2002).

With regard to an actual measurement of the depth of integration, 6 et al. (2002) propose four component measures: the first is ‘intensity’ which measures the resources that are shared by integrated activities; the second is ‘scope’ and measures the number of collaborating agencies; the third is ‘breadth’ which measures the range of activities brought together; and the fourth is ‘exposure’ which considers the degree to which the core business is exposed to integration and related risks.
Besides levels of integration, there are two different directions of integration that dominate: vertical and horizontal integration (Greiving and Kemper 1999, Hull 2005) – a differentiation that has emerged from theories of corporate organisation (Schreyögg 2007). In public administration, vertical integration is usually required where different tiers of government overlap. A typical example is the coherence of urban policy at the city level with that at the national level impacting the city, or the delivery of major infrastructure such as transport, energy, waste and water projects (Barker 2006). Horizontal integration, on the other hand, is policy integration within the same governance level but across different policy sectors or portfolios such as energy, economic development, housing, transport and planning (Curtis and James 2004).

As part of planning praxis, the above forms, levels and directions of integration are usually brought together. A good example is the definition for integrated transport planning in the German planning and policy literature. Here, ‘Integrierte Verkehrsplanung’ (Beckmann 1993, Holz-Rau 1996) is commonly seen as cooperation between different transport modes (transport integration), sectoral integration across relevant policy sectors and disciplines, vertical integration between different levels of planning, horizontal integration between neighbouring planning areas, and integration of actors, which brings together all affected and relevant parties (Holz-Rau 2011).

Cowell and Martin (2003) emphasise the importance of distinguishing these various definitions and typologies of integration by concluding that “current policy discourses tend to conflate all of these very different types of joined-up working, and often fail to recognise the tensions that can exist between them” (p161). As far as possible, I have therefore based my detailed analysis on a greater acknowledgment of these different integration types. Ultimately, however, my thesis required me to operationalise integrated planning and policymaking beyond these definitions and to establish a framework of integration mechanisms which I turn to now.

Towards a framework of integration mechanisms
In political science, discourses on integrated governance commonly identify three generic types of coordination devices and differentiate hierarchy, markets and networks (Thompson 1991). Given the focus of my thesis on public administration rather than the private sector, I am mainly considering hierarchies and networks while nevertheless acknowledging that even here ‘quasi-markets’ and incentive structures may facilitate integration (Bogdanor 2005).

Below, I introduce four main groups of integration mechanisms, which emerged from my empirical analysis based on constant comparison and categorisation. I introduce these here, linking back to the relevant theoretical literature, as they structure the presentation of my
empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 6. By definition, these are generalised and abstract categories and the possibility of making use of these integration mechanisms and their effectiveness in practice in increasing integrated policy capacity depends centrally on the specific local context. The four groups of integration mechanisms are, first, those related to governance structures, second, those that focus primarily on processes of planning and policymaking, third, a range of more specific integration instruments and, fourth, underlying enabling conditions.

In an ideal world, integrated governance is above all facilitated by creating structures of governments and governance, including strong legislative frameworks, which are conducive to more coherent planning and policy processes. In that regard it is broadly accepted that institutional architecture and governance structures have a profound impact on the behaviour of actors within them (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Newman and Thornley 1997, Rhodes 1997b, Nee and Strang 1998, Pierre 1999) and can determine certain policy capacities as discussed earlier. A first order and defining structural element of governance is administrative boundaries. Belaieff et al. (2007) emphasise that if these reflect contemporary system boundaries instead of being the result of historic demarcations, they can act as major facilitators for greater policy coherence.

A further structural factor central to integration capacities is the distribution of responsibility, power and oversight across and within different government levels. Peters (1998) identifies the uniformity, autonomy and connectivity of departments as key dimensions impacting on policy integration. A basic integration mechanism relies on authority bundled into one identifiable coordinator or ‘overlord’ who in turn facilitates the steering of activities at different subordinate units (Bogdanor 2005). But, as indicated in the introduction, hierarchy as an organising principle and related institutional structures have led to severe shortcomings and are regarded as unable to cope with more complex conditions (Hansen 2006).

Network structures, on the other hand, are based mainly on informal communication and coordination between experts and divisions with relatively flat hierarchies (Quinn 1992, Snow et al. 1992, Goold and Campbell 2002). Here, authority is replaced by trust, mutual interest and interdependence (Powell 1990) and hierarchical accountability by shared responsibility (Newman 2004). Peters (1998) argues that the capacity of networks to allow for effective coordination is informed by characteristics such as the degree to which networks are integrated with each other, the interdependence of their members and their level of formality. Figure 8 provides a schematic and idealised overview of different types of integration structures across three vertical layers and for two sectors each.
Overall, Scharpf (1997) identifies four principal coordination mechanisms: unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote and hierarchical direction. Similarly, and from a legal-institutional perspective, Bogdanor sums up three basic types of coordination (2005): coordination without authority, which is based on pooling information; coordination based on mutual agreement; and coordination based on authority through a single ‘overlord’. It has also been pointed out that creating workable governance structures alongside integrative capacities will always have to deal with inherent conflicts, and that organisation theory is only beginning to engage with the “paradoxical requirements in organizations and networks” (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010 p1259).

While broader discourses on coordination and integration underline the critical role of governance structures, related discussions in the context of urban planning and transport policies tend to focus on integrated planning processes. Differentiating governance structures and planning processes is not always easy and there is a considerable degree of overlap between the two. A generic observation may suggest that processes are less visible than structures, making them a particularly important subject for my research. A more concrete differentiation is a tendency by which structures are conventionally seen as static, and processes as dynamic elements of organisations or institutional arrangements (Hennig 1934, Nordsieck 1972).
From this dynamic character of processes follows a temporal dimension: planning processes are defined by steps and stages, which include different interrelated tasks and milestones. The inclusion or exclusion, as well as the sequencing and assignment of these tasks, centrally determine the level of integrated planning. For example, for integrating environmental perspectives as part of the planning and policymaking process, not only can it be essential to consider related input but to include environmental assessments early on, ideally upfront and in several steps rather than as a last hurdle (Eggenberger and Partidário 2000).

A defining element of integrated planning processes relates to the collaboration between the most relevant stakeholders (Belaieff et al. 2007) and a cross-sectoral approach reaching beyond the public sector (Greiving and Kemper 1999). It requires persuasion, open information, learning and a culture of support (6 et al. 2002) as well as social bonds, which assist planning and policy integration through informal collaboration (Bogdanor 2005). Some further suggest that the type of collaboration required for integrated planning relies on various forms of public participation and that involving all stakeholders is critical for integrated outcomes (ISIS 2003, Hansen 2006, Innes and Booher 2010).

The dynamic character of planning processes and related collaboration can be considered a plus as it makes integration more amenable to change than structural arrangements. Above all, it allows for easier future adjustments when new information becomes available and circumstances change, and therefore can avoid a procedural lock-in that might compromise integration in the long term (Geerlings and Stead 2003). However, commentators also warn that as a result, too often procedures for planning and policy integration are initiated ad hoc and as part of a trial-and-error approach (Stead and Geerlings 2005).

Both integration structures and processes are usually supported by a range of integration instruments (Peters 1998) and enabling conditions. Cutting across all of these is information and communication technology (ICT), which “holds out the promise of a potential transition to a more genuinely integrated, agile, and holistic government” (Dunleavy et al. 2006 p489). A first set of more specific integration instruments includes strategic visions and integrated plans. Visions can offer a great potential for aligning individual policies (Geerlings and Stead 2003), joining them under a ‘highest level holistic strategy’ (Potter and Skinner 2000 p284) and balancing the role of the private sector. Integrated plans, on the other hand, are at the heart of coordinating different policy fields, particularly in a spatial planning context.

Integrated planning is further supported by calculative instruments designed to assess, compare or prioritise various policy options. Such tools may include all kinds of assessments (e.g. financial, economic or environmental assessments), multi-criteria analysis, appraisals...
and forecasting and backcasting methods, which have been developed over time and in each category now include relatively sophisticated, often computer-assisted, approaches.

Different evaluative instruments play a key role in providing feedback, which allows two things: first, to readjust the existing policies in light of the progress achieved or changed circumstances (Geerlings and Stead 2003) and second, to inform future policymaking. These instruments include, for example, audits, monitoring and benchmarking – all heavily reliant on access to reliable and comparable data, which in turn requires robust definitions of related accounting standards.

Planning and policy integration also centrally depend on the distribution of resources, in particular finance (Geerlings and Stead 2003). Over the last decades, Anglophone countries in particular have tried to make use of a budget process targeting multidimensional policy objectives as a key device for policy coordination (6 2005).

A broader set of conditions which enable integration relates to the capacity of individuals, groups and civil society – a form of social and institutional capital (Baker and Eckerberg 2008) – to engage with multidimensional, cross-sectoral policymaking. Similarly, leadership and, more generally, the quality of senior elected officials play a particularly important role in the context of urban governance where true political will is needed for the integration of complex urban systems (Paulley and Pedler 2000).

At a basic level these enabling conditions are concerned with increasing knowledge and experience beyond a core discipline and expertise. Typical examples include education programmes, staff exchanges and staff mobility and a range of capacity building tools. But this also includes identifying the appropriate people and teams that can ensure that work is conducted more collaboratively in the short term. In the long run this may help in creating an ‘administrative culture’ (Geerlings and Stead 2003) that values engagement across sectors, departments and policy communities and represents a form of social learning that is increasingly acknowledged in theory and practice (Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007, Rydin 2010). Finally, the plurality of actors also beyond the formal institutions of the state can in itself serve as an important enabling condition particularly for accessing information that is not readily available in professional networks.

To summarise, it is important to acknowledge that integrated planning and policymaking on the ground usually operates without a conscious differentiation of governance structure, planning processes, instruments and related enabling conditions. Still, I was able to establish these categories based on my empirical analysis of constant comparison and link these back to the theoretical literature above. As discussed in Chapter 2, once established, this typology of different integration mechanisms also facilitated a more targeted research approach during
the second half of this research project. And it supported my comparative analysis of the
diverse and divergent approaches to planning and policy integration in the two case study
cities, Berlin and London.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced my theoretical framework and presented a broader discussion on the
institutional dimension of compact urban growth. I began with a more general exploration of
the relationship between institutional arrangements, policy capacity and outcomes. This
allowed me to emphasise the considerable social complexity that characterises the link
between institutions and policy outcomes, which in turn poses a substantial challenge for
related research. Working instead with a framework that relates institutions first and
foremost to policy capacity rather than outcomes establishes a more manageable research
basis. Furthermore, while presenting the arguments that regard policymaking being shaped
by institutions and institutional change informed by policy agendas, I also emphasised that
such explanations can easily be overemphasised at the expense of considering policy
preferences and institutional self-interest as key factors.

The second section was dedicated to a more detailed exploration of compact urban growth as
the substantive policy agenda this study is structured around. I first presented the emergence
of a compact city model through a transport planning perspective where it is linked to a ‘new
realism’ about the limits of accommodating traffic growth in cities. Pairing instead urban
form and transport considerations, as many scholars and practitioners have argued, can
enable better accessibility in cities, which is not only facilitated by movement but also by co-
location and physical proximity. It is this perspective that establishes the related requirement
of planning and policy integration this thesis is investigating. The section concluded with an
overview of compact city policies and the wider debate related to this increasingly
ubiquitous model of urban development. This allowed me to highlight some of the most
relevant critiques of compact urban growth, which include its universalist aspiration and
several normative objections as well as concerns linked to the policies that have evolved for
delivering a compact city strategy.

At the same time, I also emphasised that the evidence for the benefits of compact urban
growth has been expanding and that this has become an increasingly prominent reference as
part of urban practice. It is the latter observation that brought me back, in the third section, to
related planning and policy capacities and the broader institutional frameworks through
which compact urban growth can be facilitated. In this regard, I have shown that the hostile
views of planning as policy capacity have softened since the early 1990s while the notions of
strategic planning and a more collaborative ideal of spatial governance gained traction. And I
have stressed that both planning models directly address policy capacity, which is so central to the compact city agenda: the ideal of integration.

The fourth section then directly discussed this integrated ideal and first included a wider theoretical presentation of integrated planning, joined-up policymaking and holistic governance. While presenting the case for policy coherence, the reduction of fragmentation and inconsistency and a renewed interest in integration as part of environmental sustainability, I also observed various critical perspectives. These cut across the risks of a ‘totalising strategy’, reduced reliability, democratic deficiencies, and practical limitations to integration. Above all, however, I was able to detect a somehow paradoxical framing of integration as a highly desirable, essential and critical component of urban governance on the one hand and as a potentially problematic return to outdated planning practices of the modernist project on the other hand.

This ambiguity as to the meaning and desirability of integration is not only indicative of the earlier identified knowledge gap but demanded an even greater effort in defining and operationalising integration as part of this study. I have addressed this requirement in the final section by first introducing several underlying definitions of integration and by identifying three forms of integration – integration related to systems, targets and governance – as well as levels, depth and directions of integration. Most importantly for my inquiry, I introduced the central differentiation between vertical (cross-scalar) and horizontal (cross-sectoral) integration. I continued by discussing how integration can be operationalised and introduced four principal integration mechanisms, which I arrived at through my empirical analysis and which, above, I underpinned with a theoretical perspective. These main groups of mechanisms are governance structures, planning processes, integration instruments and enabling conditions. This differentiation not only informed the structure of Chapters 5 and 6 but also the second research phase and its more focused empirical data collection and analysis.

Establishing these four principal integration mechanisms therefore represents the most central link between my theoretical framework and the empirical analysis to follow. In addition, I explicitly return to several other theoretical perspectives, as set out above, as part of my case study analysis. First, and directly following in the next chapter, I contextualise the theoretical ideal of compact urban growth for the case of Europe, Germany and the UK, and introduce the relevant policy agendas in Berlin and London. Second, and also as part of the following chapter, I provide a first overview on the major institutional changes in the two case study cities while highlighting the most relevant top-level reform triggers. Third, alongside presenting the four principal integration mechanisms in Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss their effect on changing the capacity for integrated planning and policymaking. Fourth, as
part of the comparative analysis in Chapter 7, I return to the question of how a compact city agenda may have influenced institutional change in Berlin and London. And finally, my conclusions in Chapter 8 centrally revisit the theoretical perspectives on integrated governance, strategic planning and its relationship with compact urban growth as part of several analytic generalisations derived from the case study analysis.
Chapter 4
From Europe to Berlin and London:
Compact urban growth and its institutions

With this chapter I move to the empirical part of my research and to an exclusive focus on the broader contexts of my two case study cities Berlin and London. Being the first of a total of four case study related chapters, it serves as an introduction to the context within which I conducted my primary analysis, which is then discussed from the next chapter onwards. Equally important, I establish below the evidence for the existence of a compact city agenda in my case study cities from which my research questions departs. This chapter also acknowledges a principal need for a multi-scalar perspective, which avoids a ‘locality trap’ of case study research by presenting relevant interactions between geographic scales (Getimis 2012, p26).

Below, I first contextualise some of the earlier theoretical discussion on compact urban growth, spatial planning and governance for the case of Europe and, at the national scales, for Germany and the United Kingdom. I then introduce the two case study cities Berlin and London through a general presentation of their systems of government and recent changes thereof. The final two sections are dedicated to the strategic agenda for each city’s development with a particular focus on the politics, policies and planning related to the compact city model. This also includes a general overview on actual changes related to populations, urban form and transport.

Throughout, this chapter also provides further support for the rationale for selecting the two case study cities by not only detailing the evidence on the existence of a strong compact city agenda but also on considerable urban complexity, recent institutional change and differences in broader planning cultures. Furthermore, by repeatedly juxtaposing compact city paradigms, spatial planning and governance, this chapter establishes the basis for my discussion of the relationship between institutional change, policy capacity and policy ideas to which I return in Chapter 7.

4.1 From spatial paradigms to planning in Europe, Germany and the UK

Before exclusively shifting my attention to the two case study cities and their metropolitan regions, this section serves as a broader contextualisation of the compact city agenda and related spatial planning and governance. Below, I first discuss the wider European context
that impacts on both of the case study cities and then the German and British settings, which more centrally inform spatial development and governance in Berlin and London respectively.

It is important to stress that several broader challenges and development pressures have centrally informed developments across all these scales. Influential economic drivers of change include the globalisation of markets, increasing competition also between cities and shifts towards service-led urban economies. Furthermore, social challenges, above all demographic change, inequality and migration, together with environmental pressures of climate change and resource use establish the wider context of contemporary urban development in Europe (Richardson and Jensen 2000, Dimitriou and Thompson 2007a, Reimer et al. 2014).

Of particular relevance in terms of the spatial development of cities is an overall revived interest in the development of urban cores and ‘growth within’, which is often related to the transition towards a post-industrial urban economy (Cheshire 1995, Scheurer 2007). In fact, a clear attitude shift of most European cities can also be identified regarding the preference of urban renewal over expansion (Mega 2000). At the same time, Reimer et al. (2014) highlight various spatial problems affecting most cities such as “urban sprawl, uncontrolled land-use development, regional inequalities and demographic problems, lack of sufficient infrastructure and transport, environmental degradation, energy supply issues and urban decay in old city districts” (Reimer et al. 2014, p279).

The first discussion below on the European context cuts across all four main European planning traditions of (1) regional economic planning, (2) the comprehensive integrated approach, (3) land use planning, and (4) the ‘urbanism’ tradition (EC 1997). This is then followed by further details on a combination of (1) and (2) for the case of Germany and of the land use planning tradition for the UK.

Europe: advancing the European city model through strategic spatial planning

Compact city characteristics have been repeatedly linked to the very essence of the European city (Scheurer 2007). An illustrative example of this is the following characterisation by Joan Clos, Barcelona’s former Mayor and now Executive Director of UN Habitat: “The normative European city is a dense, compact area grouped around a core rather than sprawling like American cities … it favours mobility on foot or public transport …” (Clos 2008, p160).

It is the latter transport-related point that most prominently differentiates the European version of compact urban growth from its American counterpart of New Urbanism. According to Scheurer (2007), New Urbanism accepts the dominant role of the car as part of
the urban transport equation while a European compact city ideal aspires to substantially reduce the number of cars in cities. This also follows a strong recognition by the EU that, above all, transport trends threaten any real progress in relation to sustainable development (Richardson and Jensen 2000). Furthermore, it is Europe’s overall higher population densities, related settlement pressures, and its ideals of urban culture, social and cultural integration which elevate the relevance of urban compaction compared to a North American context (Scheurer 2007).

From the 1990s onwards the compact city model has become a prominent spatial development approach for addressing sustainability concerns across Europe (De Roo 2000, Scheurer 2007). In fact, many commentators identify the European Union as an early and keen promoter of compact urban concepts (Hall 1997, De Roo 2000). A pivotal point in this regard was the publication of the Green Paper on the Urban Environment by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC 1990), which demanded actions for “avoiding urban sprawl”, “strategies which emphasize mixed use and denser development” (p40) and “a significant shift in the balance between modes of transport, favouring public over private transport” (p42).

While the compact city agenda at a European-wide level really took off from the 1990s onwards, it was able to build on earlier related policy shifts and considerable national level experience in some selected countries, above all The Netherlands, Spain and Denmark. Furthermore, the 1970s and 1980s saw renewed efforts by European cities to develop new public transport systems (Hall 1997) while also introducing traffic calming measures within urban cores and urban neighbourhoods (Kjemtrup and Herrstedt 1992, Gertz 1997).

Throughout the second half of the 1990s, European spatial policy discourses centred around the preparation of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (EC 1999b). While advancing a common agenda of spatial development across member states, it also included a specific reference to substantive compact city policy: “Member States and regional authorities should pursue the concept of the “compact city” (the city of short distances) …” (EC 1999b, p22). The various European documents promoting compact urban growth also make reference to related institutional requirements. The ESDP specifically highlights the cooperation between the city and its regional hinterland as well as new partnerships helping to reconcile different interests (EC 1999b).

The substantial degree to which the implementation of compact urban growth depends on strategic planning capacities has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Substantial evidence for this link has also been established for the European context. For example, Dieleman et al. argue that it was due to the strategic planning tradition in The Netherlands
that the country was able to implement compact city strategies early on (Dieleman et al. 1999). It is therefore imperative to contextualise the earlier general observations on strategic planning for the wider European and national contexts of my case study cities.

For the case of European countries, there is widespread agreement that strategic planning has experienced a considerable revival since the 1990s (Reimer et al. 2014), a shift that has been identified in the context of regional planning (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007a), spatial planning (Healey 2004) and urban regeneration (Fassbinder 1993). This European revival of strategic planning has been linked to diverse challenges ranging from increasing economic competitiveness to spatial equity while it is consistently linked to the central problematique of this research: coordination problems of urban policy, sustainable development, and multi-level, multi-stakeholder governance (Healey 2004, Reimer et al. 2014). Related institutional change, however, has so far been more gradual with comprehensive changes such as the introduction of metropolitan governments being the exception rather than the norm (Scheurer 2007).

Fassbinder (1993) notes that the introduction of strategic planning in most European countries has not replaced the legal frameworks of more classical planning instruments but that these are “freed from being the one and only instruments of urban planning and design discovery, communication and decision making” (Fassbinder 1993, p14). She identifies two new types of this complementary role: first, various forms of visual analysis and representation such as design proposals, architectural competitions and charrettes; and second, different types of discursive planning such as round tables, expert and citizen fora, project and steering groups. Furthermore, she suggests that strategic planning also implies that the strict differentiation of the spatial focus of urban design, planning, development and regeneration has disappeared (Fassbinder 1993).

In terms of EU-level policy frameworks, the above-mentioned ESDP (1999b) has played the most significant role in advocating for a common approach to strategic spatial planning (Healey 2004). In this context, spatial planning is understood as embracing “territorial policy for a much wider range of sectors in an integrated approach than does land-use planning” (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007a, p3). At the time of publishing, the ESDP’s ambition was considerable and its possible legacy may well be that even more recent commentary refers to a form of ‘Europeanisation’ of spatial planning systems, policies and practices (Reimer et al. 2014).

While the non-binding ESDP essentially implies a strategically oriented, informal approach to European spatial development, which establishes a ‘meta-narrative’, it has been complemented by formal acts and monetary incentives (Reimer et al. 2014). Its application
has, for example, been enabled through other programmes such as INTERREG, which offers support for transnational regions (Healey 2004), and ESPON (European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion), which establishes a central node for spatial research and practice (Reimer et al. 2014). Promoting a more cross-cutting perspective of spatial development particularly in relation to environmental impacts was further achieved by the EU’s introduction of mandatory Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) (Glasson 2007).

Regardless of the above overall ambition for an increasingly common approach to strategic spatial planning within the EU, the Union’s principle of subsidiarity ultimately strengthens devolved strategic planning responsibilities at the national, regional and municipal level. As a result, as Reimer et al. (2014) stress, it is countries that define the specific content of strategic goals based on their particular priorities. Vickerman (2007) draws a similar conclusion for the case of European transport policy. Still, some observers have detected at least some impact of the above spatial planning narrative on changes to planning systems of member states (Waterhout 2008).

Moving on to the cases of Germany and the UK reveals the extent to which the compact city model also evolved bottom-up from the specific experience with urban development practice in each country’s cities and towns. Similarly, and as I show below, relevant reforms of spatial planning and governance are also more directly informed by country-specific planning cultures and institutional arrangements.

**Germany: strategic planning through multi-level governance**

In (West) Germany, the evolution of a compact city model can be traced back to the momentous shifts in urban development discourses in the late 1960s and early 1970s, broadly aligned with what was happening across many Western countries at the time. Above all, it was the major shift away from the modernist city ideal and the ideology of urban landscapes (Stadtlandschaften), which was propagated in Germany, for example, by Berlin-based architect Hans Scharoun (Sohn 2008). Such a model of a car-oriented city based on urban motorways and ‘objects in the park’ was not only the basis for individual, large-scale housing projects. It was, as Berlin’s former city architect Hans Stimmann emphasised during our interview, also broadly aligned with a strong belief in technological progress, which was particularly prevalent among Germany’s Social Democrats, who had political control over West Germany’s urban areas until the late 1970s.

The formal political agenda for urban development in West Germany began to shift with the 1971 ‘city building support law’ (Städtebauförderungsgesetz) assisting with the regenerating and retrofitting of existing historic centres (BMVBS 2011). The general line of thought
behind this law, with its focus on existing rather than new urban areas, has informed the most relevant urban development programmes and paradigms ever since. These include the urban regeneration and retrofitting programmes following Germany’s reunification (Stadtumbau Ost); the new emphasis on quality of life in cities and aims to make inner city living again attractive for families; far-reaching traffic calming measures and the new emphasis on the quality of the public realm; as well as social integration programmes such as the federal initiative on ‘the social city’ (Soziale Stadt) (BMVBS 2009).

Worth noting for the German case is a particularly well-established political discourse, which connects debates of urban development with environmental sustainability. Voula (2000) highlights the extent to which environmental awareness in Germany was centrally linked to socio-political transformation in cities, which enabled a culture around urban ecology. At the national level, the compact city agenda was also framed through a growing concern about converting open space to land uses related to settlement and transport functions (Blotevogel et al. 2014). Recognising the sustainability paradigm of efficient land use and the protection of open space, the Federal Government established a goal of reducing the daily amount of new land being developed from 130 hectares in 2002 to 30 hectares by 2020 as part of its 2002 National Sustainable Development Programme (Bundesregierung 2002).

But to what extent do Germany’s spatial planning and governance capacities map onto such ambitious targets and the broader urban regeneration agenda? Germany’s planning tradition has been described as a mix of regional economic planning and the comprehensive integrated approach (EC 1997). As part of an international comparative perspective, Blotevogel et al. (2014) refer to Germany even as “the motherland of comprehensive spatial planning” (p83). Indeed, some of the country’s strategic planning institutions date back to the early 20th century and a national spatial planning system was introduced during the 1960s and 1970s (Blotevogel et al. 2014). Regardless of the extensive transformations since, above all Germany’s reunification, this system has prevailed with relatively little modifications, and today has reached considerable maturity, revealing inertia around change (Reimer et al. 2014).

Three principles centrally inform Germany’s hierarchically structured planning system: (1) the principle of subsidiarity, (2) municipal planning autonomy, and (3) countervailing influence (Scholl et al. 2007). A multitude of formal planning processes at four key spatial levels play a particularly important role as part the country’s proactive and public sector-led spatial planning efforts (Figure 9). I will introduce these here alongside the distribution of competencies and powers related to transport planning. This distribution of power is aligned...
with the provisions made by Germany’s constitution or ‘basic law’ (Grundgesetz - GG (1983)).

First, there is the federal level at which sustainable spatial development acts as the guiding vision alongside other principles both stipulated by the Spatial Planning Act (ROG 2008, § 1 and § 2). For transport planning, a Federal Transport Infrastructure Planning Exercise (BVWP) assesses and prioritises funding for transport infrastructure projects by lower tiers of government (Daehre 2012). The second level is that of the Bundesländer (federal states) at which separate planning laws and plans address the spatial organisation across the Land and at regional levels. Länder also have control over their own transport planning and investment priorities.

A third, regional level targets the coordination of spatial development at the regional level and usually also the integration of public transport provision. Of all the four levels, this is the least formalised and, as a result, is exposed to tension between its sub-units, adjacent regions and with the respective Land. Germany’s municipalities make up the fourth level, which has extensive, largely autonomous urban planning and transport powers secured by the Grundgesetz. The Federal Building Code (Baugesetzbuch (BauGB 2004)) regulates all key compulsory municipal planning tasks.

A key difference between spatial and transport planning across all levels is the latter’s link to sizeable public budgets, thus often able to receive more attention and to activate more stakeholders. In turn, spatial planning’s success rests on its ability to inform other spatially relevant policies (Vallée 2011).
In terms of more recent changes to Germany’s comparatively stable planning system, some smaller transfer of planning authority from higher to lower levels of planning can be identified, including a degree of municipalisation of spatial planning (Blotevogel et al. 2014). More importantly, a gradual turn towards more strategic, communicative and networked approaches has occurred. Blotevogel et al. (2014) refer to an emerging principle of “soft forms of communication and consensus building as much as possible, hard forms of binding goals and hierarchical control as much as necessary” (p105).

Most related perspectives further highlight the increasing role of informal planning processes and instruments which have developed in parallel and in support of the existing legal system (Fassbinder 1993, Reimer et al. 2014). Partially as a result, the deductive sequence of planning has become more flexible with parallel interventions and implementation at different scales operating with different planning horizons (Fassbinder 1993). Furthermore, the role of the plan has shifted from simply describing a final state to becoming part of a strategy which facilitates dialogue and coordination across planning scales and actors (Fassbinder 1993).

While vertical integration is generally regarded as fairly successful, recent strategic coordination efforts have so far been unable to successfully address horizontal integration and reconcile various spatially-impacting policies and traditionally strong sectoral approaches to planning (Blotevogel et al. 2014, Reimer et al. 2014). An exception is some city level informal strategic planning mechanisms (Franke and Strauss 2010).

**United Kingdom: spatial planning as national politics**

In the UK, the compact city agenda became politically significant during the 1990s and was connected to planning approaches that have a longer history. For example, urban containment efforts aiming to limit urban sprawl led to national green belt legislation based on the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (Kühn 2003, Amati and Yokohari 2006). Furthermore, from the 1980s onwards the urban regeneration agenda addressed urban decay of inner city areas and targeted the reuse of brownfield areas for new development (Imrie et al. 2009). Compact city approaches were then developed further throughout the 1990s and key elements became part of national level supplementary planning policy guidance (PPG).

Efforts to integrate environmental concerns as part of planning, transport and the development of cities accelerated after New Labour came to power in 1997. According to Richardson and Jensen (2000), during the years that followed, the UK was even going beyond the environmental ambition of spatial development as advanced by the EU. The strongest and most direct endorsement of compact city principles at national level was the publication of the government-commissioned Urban Task Force Report ‘Towards an Urban
Renaissance’ (UTF 1999). Nick Raynsford, Minister for London at the time, emphasised in our interview the key role the report played in putting forward the idea of compact rather than sprawling urban development.

New Labour also introduced a new focus on integrated, sustainable transport as part of their 1997 election manifesto (Labour Party 1997), which was then incorporated in the 1998 White Paper on transport (DETR 1998) and included the establishment of the Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT 2010). These developments came along with a pro-public transport agenda, demand management for traffic (Vickerman 2007) and a policy shift away from road building (Richardson and Jensen 2000). While the above points towards a broader urban development consensus, Nadin and Stead (2014) also emphasise that it was ultimately economic growth, often under the banner of sustainability, that had dominated as a national policy imperative for planning ever since the 1990s. And several commentators have argued that it is due to this latter priority that actual environmental sustainability goals advanced through the planning system have been compromised (Allmendinger 2011, Nadin and Stead 2014).

From the above, the critical role of central government is already becoming clear and can be directly linked to the country's spatial planning and governance system. In the absence of powers constitutionally assigned to different levels of government, the UK’s central government not only plays a leading role in the English planning system but has kept spatial planning on the broader political agenda. As a result, planning procedures and planning powers assigned to different government levels are frequently changing. A national spatial plan for the UK or England does not exist (Nadin and Stead 2014).

At the other end of the scale, local governments – boroughs in the case of London – have had a relatively stable role as administrative units responsible for local planning and for granting planning permission locally. However, given a comparatively low local tax base and considerable dependence on national transfers, incentives for local authorities to support physical development are lower compared to many of their European counterparts (Nadin and Stead 2014).

By contrast, and subject to great debate, responsibility at the regional level (England’s region including Greater London) has been subjected to major change and, again compared to many European countries, has been traditionally weak. It is at this level where the EU’s agenda, outlined above, and the notion of ‘spatial planning’ may have had the most significant impact (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007a).

Concerning all scales above, the UK’s spatial planning tradition falls under the land use planning category (EC 1997) while its most distinctive feature is arguably the discretionary
nature of the country’s planning process (Booth 1996). Rather than development plans having total legal authority, national planning policies and local development plans provide a framework for site-specific, negotiated agreements. Thus development decisions occur only when a proposal is put forward and towards the end of the planning process rather than when a plan is adopted (Nadin and Stead 2014).

In terms of strategic planning, Dimitriou and Thompson (2007a) identify a cyclical nature of its application, which has resulted in a general lack of well-established institutions and qualified professionals. This is seen as the result of strategic planning’s political currency being closely linked to a government’s appreciation of state intervention addressing market failures (Swain et al. 2013). For example, strategic planning institutions were considerably weakened or even abolished during the libertarian Thatcher era. Eventually the 1990s saw the resurgence of strategic planning, which led to new regional level instruments as well as related national planning policy under the Blair government (Hall 2007, Reimer et al. 2014). It was then also directly linked to broader ideas of ‘joined-up’ government and decentralisation (Nadin and Stead 2014).

Nadin and Stead (2014) identify three key phases of planning reforms since the early 1990s. During the 1990s the UK reformed its ‘muddling through’ planning system and worked towards a ‘plan-led system’ which some have interpreted as a sign of convergence with a continental, ‘legal plan’ planning tradition (Yewlett 2007). The 2000s devolution period saw the implementation of a strategic turn and from 2010 onwards strategy-orientation was shifted towards both greater centralisation and localism of planning (Reimer et al. 2014).

The return to strategic planning during the 2000s was part of a broader agenda of rescaling planning functions in England. It was linked to the introduction of regional planning through Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) (Allmendinger and Haughton 2007), which sit between national guidance and local development plans. In transport planning too, a new strategic role came along with the requirement to prepare Regional Transport Strategies (RTSs) (Simmonds and Banister 2007). Going beyond strategic elements for regional planning, the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (UK Government 2004) pushed for strategy-making across all scales of spatial planning. For example, by replacing some of the existing local planning instruments with ‘Local Development Frameworks’, ‘Masterplans’, and ‘Community Strategies’ alongside an upgrading of ‘public consultation’ to ‘public participation’ (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 2007).

However, some commentators have noted that in many instances the new strategic component of planning remained a form of “soft coordination of single ‘projects’ and sector planning” (Reimer et al. 2014, p300). This also implied that economic growth targets mostly
trumped other critical planning concerns ranging from sustainable development to territorial cohesion (Reimer et al. 2014).

After 2010 the new coalition government initiated a major review of spatial planning and, besides the localism agenda, began working on a National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The key elements of the reform include the removal of regional development strategies – except for Greater London where the London Plan continues to exist – and the introduction of neighbourhood planning within local plans. This latest phase therefore combines efforts of extreme localism with a recentralisation agenda most notable in the context of infrastructure policy and the role of the Treasury (Nadin and Stead 2014).

Overall, most commentators agree that while considerable reforms of planning and spatial governance took place since the 1990s, the most relevant challenges linked to policy coordination in the UK remain. For the case of strategic and regional planning in the UK, Dimitriou and Thompson (2007a) identify persistent poor horizontal and vertical coordination. Related efforts also suffered from the absence of a national strategy for transport and spatial development (Vickerman 2007). Davoudi (2006) further notes that, overall, the planning discourse in the UK focused on process rather than substantive matters.

In summary, the above contextualisation of a compact city agenda and relevant spatial planning and governance for the case of Europe, Germany and the UK has identified a substantial related dynamism. Not only do these contexts display a strong overall political commitment to compact urban growth, they have also established various mechanisms facilitating its implementation. Indicative of the latter is a revival of strategic planning with various new instruments for multi-level and cross-sectoral coordination. At the same time, deeply entrenched coordination shortcomings that are identified across the various contexts.

Diverging trends concern primarily a recent withdrawal of strategic planning at the regional level in England, which cannot be detected for the case of Germany. In line with Reimer et al. (2014), this also indicates the degree to which changes within planning systems are informed by path-dependent factors that differ in each country. For England, this is particularly the case of the persisting and dominating role of central government and its political agenda while Germany’s subsidiarity principle more robustly limits the role of its federal government as part of multi-level spatial planning. Whether the latter is ultimately more able to facilitate compact urban growth or not requires further discussion based on additional evidence.

Finally, while the above discussion largely remained on an abstract European and national level, it has indirectly made clear that moving to the regional, city and local implementation scale may come along with considerable research utility to further related perspectives. It is
in this spirit that I continue below by introducing the two case study cities Berlin and London. Given the focus of this thesis, I will do so initially by treating them as political entities and by presenting their systems of government first.

4.2 An introduction to Berlin’s and London’s systems of government

London and Berlin are the two largest administrative cities in the European Union. With 8.6 million and 3.5 million inhabitants respectively, their city governments represent more residents than, for example, those of Paris, Madrid or Rome. In terms of the functional urban region, London is usually associated with a metropolitan region which includes between 12 and 21.8 million inhabitants, a figure that varies in the case of Berlin from 5 to 5.8 million inhabitants (Eurostat 2012, Burdett et al. 2014).

As a result of their particular histories and the path-dependent evolution of systems of government, Berlin and London today feature distinctively different arrangements. In terms of the more static differences between the two cities, it is important to re-emphasise their distinct national systems: In the case of Germany, a federal state with strong, constitutional powers assigned to state and municipal level governments and in the case of the UK (England), a unitary state with a particularly strong centralisation at the national level. The main context of recent urban governance change in Berlin has been Germany’s reunification while in London it is linked to the UK’s devolution agenda. Below I introduce the most relevant arrangements and variations of the two cities’ systems of government.

Before discussing each city separately, Figure 10 to Figure 12 offer a static, comparative picture of Berlin and London: they introduce the administrative boundary mapped onto the built-up area, the ‘ambient’, 24-hour average population density and the main rail and underground transport infrastructure of the metropolitan core. Above all, these illustrations already suggest that a considerable degree of the metropolitan built-up territory, population and infrastructure is located within the boundaries of the respective political city – an area of 890 km² in Berlin and 1,570 km² in the case of London. But they also demonstrate that in both cases the metropolitan system extends indeed beyond the administrative city boundaries, in turn requiring my analysis to go beyond a presentation and discussion of just the administrative city in each case. I continue below with two subsections, introducing first Berlin and then London separately.
Figure 10: Berlin (l) and London (r) administrative boundary and built-up area
Source: based on LSE Cities (2009)

Figure 11: Berlin (l) and London (r) population density (24 hour average) and city administrative area
Source: Rode et al. (2015)

Figure 12: Berlin (l) and London (r) rail network
Source: based on LSE Cities (2009)
Berlin reunited: Land and municipality

Arguably, Berlin has undergone one of the world’s most radical political and administrative transformations as part of Germany’s reunification (see Appendix A2). Reunification meant the adoption of West Germany’s constitution or ‘basic law’ (Grundgesetz - GG (1983)) for reunited Germany in 1990 (BGBl 1990, Art 3). This law determines the three principal German governance scales and the roles for their respective governments. It defines the powers assigned to the federal government (Art 72 and 73 GG), guarantees default powers in Art 30 and 70 to Germany’s 16 Bundesländer (federal states) and to Germany’s municipalities (Art 28.2 GG).

In the unique case of Berlin, reunification also meant that two city governments of two distinctively different political regimes had to be merged. The new Land Berlin was created by joining the West German State of Berlin, with 2.1 million residents in 12 boroughs, and the former GDR Capital City Berlin (Hauptstadt Berlin), with 1.3 million inhabitants in 11 city districts (Stadtbezirke). This re-established political territory was granted an unusual status, prominently emphasised by the first Article of Berlin’s constitution (VvB 1995): “Berlin is a German Land and at the same time a municipality” (Art 1.1, VvB). It implies that one single government is responsible for state level responsibilities such as education, policing and culture, as well as municipal powers typically including water and energy provision, waste management and local planning.1

As a federal state, Berlin further profits from far-reaching powers regarding spatial and transport planning as well as transport provision. For urban and regional transport, Germany’s 1993 law for regionalising public transport (Regionalisierungsgesetz (RegG 1993)) equips Berlin with legal and financing instruments to oversee public transport provision, which also became the exclusive remit of the Land Berlin (Figure 13). Similarly, all large infrastructure projects are coordinated by the Land Berlin with little direct involvement of the boroughs (Häussermann 2003). Furthermore, the Land Berlin implements projects on behalf of the federal government, for example, major transport infrastructure projects such as the federal motorways A113 and A100.

As Figure 14 indicates, the executive power of Berlin’s government rests with the Berlin Senate. The powers of the Senate, a cabinet-like centre of Berlin’s government, are relatively equally shared by the Governing Mayor and the eight Senators. In the context of developing

---

1 In addition, Berlin also owns almost 370 km² or more than 40 per cent of its land area, which is more than any other German city (Mäding 2002).
the overall city development strategy, some general perspectives come from the mayoral level and are then mostly developed more independently by the senators and their sectoral departments.

A further exception in Berlin’s governance is the city’s two-tier structure. Unlike boroughs in German cities without city state status, such as Munich, Cologne and Frankfurt, Berlin’s boroughs are responsible for a whole range of municipal tasks. They have, for example, their own elected borough council (Bezirksverordnetenversammlung - BVV), which elects the Borough Mayor. Boroughs are of particular political importance as most city-level politicians begin their careers within borough-level units of political parties (Wegrich and Bach 2014). However, legally, borough administrations can only act ‘on behalf of the Land Berlin’ (Land Berlin 2011, Art 2) while Berlin’s senate administrations retain all municipal powers as ‘Einheitsgemeinde’ (unity municipality). Naturally, the two-tier system leads to additional coordination challenges (Röber 2002), which many of the interviewees who work at the city-borough interface commented on.

The reduction of local borough administrations in Berlin from 23 to 12 in 2001 was a more recent reform in urban governance, doubling the average size of each borough. This also involved granting greater powers to the boroughs and relaxing the procedural standards of certain local planning routines. The relatively dynamic development and readjustment of Berlin’s governance is even more astonishing, considering the relative institutional stability that is generally ensured by Germany’s approach of assigning some of the most relevant administrative powers through its constitution. The significant institutional changes over the last two decades can largely be explained by the unique circumstances of Germany’s reunification coupled with the considerable reform pressures as a result of Berlin’s budget deficit (Mäding 2002).

---

2 Up to 2006, the Governing Mayor did not have the legal power to determine the broad policy framework. This changed with the 2006 reform of the Berlin constitution, which gave the Governing Mayor stronger oversight (Senatskanzlei 2006, Röber 2002).
Figure 13: Structure of Berlin’s government (in 2012)
Source: own representation

Figure 14: Berlin’s government – political representation
Source: own representation
In addition, several other governance scales play an important role for Berlin’s governance. While Germany and Berlin were reunited, a second major administrative task and reform was redefining the relationship of the Land Berlin with the surrounding Land of Brandenburg (Figure 15). After a proposed merger of the two Länder failed in a referendum in 1996, new administrative powers were assigned to a joint governance arrangement for the Berlin-Brandenburg metropolitan region. This also had to consider that the State of Brandenburg is subdivided into 14 land districts (Landkreise) and 419 local municipalities (kreisfreie Städte und Gemeinden) (Land Brandenburg 2013).

![Figure 15: Key governance scales of the Berlin Metropolitan Region](image_url)

Furthermore, following the decision to relocate the German Federal Government from Bonn to Berlin, significant federal investments were assigned to Berlin and coupled to additional oversight by federal government, particularly in relation to strategic developments in the centre and for major infrastructure projects. Finally, Germany’s Grundgesetz also makes provisions for European-level governance (Art 24 Abs. 1 GG) with the above-discussed implications for spatial planning.

**London consolidated: governance by strategic authority**

Even though London’s governance has not seen the dramatic changes of Berlin, it too has undergone considerable reform over the last decades and this can certainly be considered radical within its political context. In recent history, the formal governance of London has relied on two permanent scales of decision-making, that of central government and that of 33
London boroughs. The role of sub-national government in the UK is subject to control by central government and is not protected by constitutional arrangements common in many other countries (Tomaney 2001). Partially as a result, two additional scales have been far more dynamic and experienced great change even over the last 20 years.

First, there is the level of citywide government (Greater London), which is the most relevant for devising and implementing compact city strategies as well as the wider metropolitan scale, which includes the English regions of East of England and the South East. Secondly, there is the community level, which has been addressed most recently by the 2011 Localism Act (UK Government 2011). In addition, and at the supranational level, the European Union provided the policy context for strategic spatial planning as part of Greater London governance particularly through the 1999 European Spatial Development Perspective (EC 1999b).

The most relevant change has been the reinstatement of a London-wide government in 2000, with a directly elected Mayor and the Greater London Authority (GLA) (see Appendix B1). This reform followed the election of New Labour in 1997 and an election promise to re-establish a London government following the abolition of the Greater London Council by the Thatcher government in 1985. A referendum in London on 7 May 1998 decided in favour of this new citywide government, leading to the drafting and then publishing of the GLA Act in 1999. Defining the territory of a new London government was helped by a relatively clear geographical definition of Greater London for which boundaries had only changed twice in more than a century (Bailey 2008).

Among the key powers that were assigned to the GLA (Figure 16), strategic planning and transport were among the most important ones alongside inward investment, policing and overseeing emergency services. An important administrative reform that occurred alongside the Greater London Authority was the establishment of Transport for London (TfL) – still today one of the most progressive institutional arrangements for planning and operating transport at city level. TfL oversees mobility delivery for all transport modes: walking, cycling, all public transport and road traffic. Ultimately, the main political and executive power within the GLA lies with the directly elected Mayor who also oversees TfL rather than the Assembly (Figure 17). Rydin et al. (2002) emphasise that the new institutional arrangements of the GLA can even result in a potentially ‘overly powerful Mayor’ (Rydin et al. 2002, p19).
Figure 16: Structure of London’s government (in 2012)
Source: Rode et al. (2014b)

Figure 17: London’s Government – political representation
Source: Rode et al. (2014b)
An important principle for assigning powers to the new London-wide government was based on the experiences with the GLC and involved a clearer separation of strategic, enabling capacities on the one hand and direct service delivery functions on the other. While the first were granted to the GLA, the latter were deliberately left to other tiers of government and private service providers. As former Minister of Housing and Planning Nick Raynsford, who was centrally involved in setting up the GLA, put it in our interview: this was done so as “not to burden the GLA with running services and to allow the Mayor to focus on overall policy coordination.” It also ensured avoiding having to recreate the large bureaucracy of the GLC, with over 10,000 employees (Sweeting 2002, Bailey 2008) lacking the strategic perspective that is at the heart of the GLA’s institutional design, with just below 600 staff in 2002 (Travers 2002).

Overall, some commentators emphasise that with the GLA a new voice for London had been created, democracy was returned to Londoners and opportunities for strategy making and coordination were put in place (Rydin et al. 2002). However, others suggest that the creation of the GLA “falls far short of a genuine devolution of political powers from Parliament” (Tomaney 2001, p245) and that only responsibility and no legal powers or financial independence was part of decentralisation (Thornley 2003). The sources of funding for local government after setting up the GLA support the latter view. Travers suggests that about 70 to 80 per cent of the money spent by the Mayor and the boroughs are central government grants (Travers 2003). And only about 20 per cent of London’s expenditure was overseen by the GLA, the other 80 per cent by the boroughs (Schröter 2002). As a result, devolving further powers to the GLA remained on the political agenda and led to amendments to the GLA Act. The 2007 GLA Act extended the Mayor’s powers in particular related to housing (GLA Act 2007).

With regard to the governance of the wider metropolitan region (Figure 18), a formal unified mechanism does not exist. In parallel to setting up the GLA, New Labour granted some powers to the other two metropolitan regions, the East of England and South-East England (Travers 2003, Allmendinger and Haughton 2009). These were all part of the government’s devolution agenda at the time, which, besides establishing the GLA, led to the creation of Regional Assemblies and Regional Development Agencies for the two regions outside of London. Widely regarded as ineffective, they were abolished between 2009 and 2010 (Pearce and Ayres 2012). One key shortcoming was their weak and indirect electoral representation, mainly through councillors from local authorities.
Given the considerable degree to which planning in the UK and London is informed by changes in government, it is also important to consider that London has undergone one significant leadership change over the last decade: the transition from the mayoralty of Ken Livingstone (Independent/Labour) to that of Boris Johnson (Conservative) in 2008. This transition has resulted in citywide government-led planning shifting again towards greater involvement of local and borough-scale stakeholders and greater entrepreneurial intervention by the private sector. A parallel shift has happened at the national level, where the coalition government elected in 2010 emphasised localism as a new planning paradigm, abolishing regional development agencies in 2011.

In summary, Berlin and London share substantial changes to their systems of government over the last two decades. In the case of Berlin, by and large this entailed the reunification of a divided city and city region with additional arrangements for metropolitan governance and borough-level reforms. In London, institutional adjustments focused primarily at the citywide level with reinstating a London-wide government and a directly elected mayor. Regardless of their principal differences, both systems of urban government can ultimately be referred to as a two-tier system with a strategic citywide government and a more implementation-oriented second tier at the borough level. These first order urban governance arrangements and changes present the broader institutional context within which I have analysed the integration mechanisms to be presented in the following chapters.
In advance of this, however, the second part of this chapter will establish the city-specific evidence on a pursuit of compact urban growth in both Berlin and London.

4.3 Berlin’s strategic development agenda: the production of ‘spatial images’

Berlin’s physical development strategies can be linked to three broad spatial development paradigms that, over the last two decades, have been most influential in the city and its region. They include ‘gentle urban renewal’, the ‘compact city’ and initially a focus on ‘decentralised concentration’. I discuss below how these paradigms evolved during the 1990s and 2000s and to what extent they are expressed through spatial and transport development planning and policy.

**Gentle urban renewal and critical reconstruction**

The origins of most of Berlin’s contemporary urban development principles can be retraced to the above-mentioned shifts in West Germany’s urban planning discourses throughout the 1970s. At the time, the well-documented problems of the modernist urban project began to surface and, together with increasing local opposition to further expansion of urban motorways, eventually led to the demise of the car-oriented city model. In Berlin, protests against the ‘Westtangente’ (a proposed urban motorway through inner city areas of West Berlin) initiated this shift in transport planning (Holzapfel 2015), while squatter movements in Charlottenburg and Kreuzberg helped to rehabilitate Berlin’s historic urban structure, including its characteristic social and functional mix (Lang 1998).

A new paradigm of ‘gentle urban renewal’ (behutsame Stadterneuerung) became increasingly influential through Berlin’s 1974 ‘urban renewal programme’ (Stadterneuerungsprogramm) and was formalised with specific principles by the Berlin Senate in the run-up to the International Building Exhibition in 1984 (Bodenschatz 1987, Hämer et al. 1995, Bernt 2003). The legacy of these entirely rethought urban renewal programmes of the 1970s prevails to this day and is directly connected with the broad intention of contemporary urban policy (SenStadt 2004 Goal No 1, 2 and 3 p7, 2008a Section 1).

For example, during the 1990s, Berlin established the related paradigm of ‘critical reconstruction’ (Kritische Rekonstruktion) – both criticised and applauded for being a post-modern reinterpretation of historic Berlin – aiming to strengthen the city’s inherited and historical qualities (Groth 2010, Hennecke 2010). Related regulation cuts across building height limits, and details the organisation of public spaces and mixed-use, all in reference to historical urban patterns which have proved their advantages for over a century.
This approach has great transport implications as many of the building and urban design qualities of the historic city are directly linked to urban footprints and layouts. In turn, the latter define the public realm and urban street space, and with it the spaces that can be assigned to transport functions. For some parts of Inner Berlin critical reconstruction implied a substantial reduction of road space and traffic capacity, particularly when downsizing modernist road designs such as those for Leipziger Strasse, An der Urania and Molkemarkt. An example of a proposed redesign is illustrated in Figure 19 as part of a poster announcing a planning workshop for the Eastern part of Leipziger Strasse. While specific projects led to substantial debate, and some remain on the drawing boards, the underlying urban design principles are the most noticeable shifts away from the idea of a car-oriented city.

Figure 19: Poster announcing a public planning workshop on the ‘end of the motorway’ in Berlin’s centre
Source: SenSUT (1998a)

The overall reactivation of the logic of the 19th-century city was obviously a difficult and controversial task, considering extremely different socio-economic conditions in the contemporary city. But at the same time, living in neighbourhoods characterised by 19th-century Berlin blocks has become immensely popular across different social groups in the city (Häussermann and Siebel 1990, SenStadt 2005). Overall, disagreement with critical reconstruction was more related to individual projects rather than the broad conceptual idea.
The most vocal criticism concerned issues of building culture, such as rebuilding the Berliner Schloss (Schug 2007, Bodenschatz 2013).

**The compact city of short distances**

From the early 1990s onwards, and particularly following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, an important paradigmatic addition to gentle urban renewal was also based on an increasing acknowledgement of environmental sustainability. In Berlin this promoted an even greater emphasis on healthy urban living environments in the inner city. Peter Strieder, Senator for Urban Development from 1996 to 2004, referred in our interview to the broadening of the environmental policy dimension of planning beyond narrower ecological concerns such as biodiversity. Most importantly, this led to embracing the wider notion of resource efficiency as part of planning policy, which, in turn, became a central trigger for the implementation of influential paradigms such as the ‘dense, compact city’ of short distances (SenStadt 2004, Goal 8), with a more intensive use of existing infrastructure.

Targets related to the overall efficiency of urban form, including economic and carbon efficiency, firmly established the ‘inner before outer urban development principle’ (SenStadt 2004, Goal 1), also communicated by the catchphrase ‘urban formation before urban expansion’ (Stadtwerdung vor Stadterweiterung) established in 1994 (Bunzel et al. 2012). Above all, related strategies aimed to limit urban sprawl along Berlin’s periphery and to protect green and open space (SenStadt 2004, Goal 6), while strengthening urban living in liveable inner city areas with low car use and a higher share of public transport and non-motorised modes (Umweltverbund). To a degree, these strategies also re-established a ‘European’ city design approach for Inner Berlin as promoted by the Planwerk Innenstadt (Inner City Masterplan) (SenStadtUm 1999). These inner city developments were generally prioritised over some of the more polycentric projects along or beyond the S-Bahn ring. More recent policy from 2000 onwards aiming to further reduce suburbanisation also supports lower density house building in the inner city and led to adjustments in the relevant planning frameworks (SenStadtUm 2015b).

The aim for more concentrated development was further aligned with the desire to stabilise Berlin’s fine-grained functional mix (SenStadt 2004, Goal 2) and to maintain the extremely localised multidimensionality of living, working, leisure and culture. This led, for example, to a 20 per cent housing requirement for the Potsdamer Platz project. Furthermore, the idea of a ‘finely subdivided city’ (Parzellierte Stadt) became increasingly prominent (Hennecke 2003), aiming to avoid as much as possible the transfer of large areas of land to one developer and thereby circumventing the segregation of uses.
In terms of transport infrastructure, Berlin has strongly promoted an ‘infrastructure first’ approach to ensure that new developments are well connected, mostly by public transport, prior to being finished. Traditionally, transport infrastructure development in the city ran ahead of urban development and after reunification Berlin planners and policymakers were able to build on integrated urban and transport developments that existed in East and West Berlin. The specific requirements of a reunified Berlin meant above all to physically reconnect East and West Berlin (Bunzel et al. 2012). For the development of railway infrastructure, the so-called ‘mushroom concept’ (Pilzkonzept) became an influential idea from the early 1990s onwards (SenVB 1992) and preceded many of the contemporary urban development programmes. It was designed to allow for decentralised access to inter-city rail and for convenient interchanges with regional rail and S-Bahn, and thereby strengthened the polycentric character of Berlin (SenStadt 2004, Goal 5).

Overall, Berlin can rely on a generously sized public transport infrastructure system. This is partially the result of re-establishing the pre-war S-Bahn network and upgrading and expanding East Berlin’s light rail network, including some extensions into West Berlin and some minor underground rail developments. At the same time, these substantial investments in public transport initially did not translate into citywide targets for a modal shift from private to public modes. The most influential specific target was an 80:20 share between public and private transport for Inner Berlin (Cramer 2003), which was developed based on a technical road assessment exercise rather than a result of environmental policy or broader urban development targets.

On the back of a realisation that supply side policies would not lead to the desired modal shift, Berlin’s head of transport planning, Friedemann Kunst, referred to a rethinking about transport policy that began during the late 1990s. This was the point when more integrated transport strategies emerged for the reunited Berlin, which ultimately needed to be facilitated by an even greater overlap between urban planning and transport strategies. Related shifts in travel behaviour were generally able to rely on a significant degree of public acceptance, with Berlin being one of the least car-oriented cities in Germany. Furthermore, push policies disincentivising private motorised transport became more pervasive with the introduction of fees for on-street parking in Berlin’s centre, a low emission zone in 2008 and continuous efforts for traffic calming and the gradual introduction of a speed limit of 30 km/h across the city’s street network.

With the exception of the planned 3 km extension of the urban motorway A100 through Treptow, Berlin has entirely shifted its transport policy toward the promotion of public and non-motorised transport. This differs significantly from surrounding Brandenburg, where major road infrastructure projects were prioritised throughout the 1990s. Until recently, my
interviews revealed, new highway access was the primary assessment criteria for many new developments within Berlin’s hinterland while public transport accessibility tended to be ignored. Nowadays this has changed and decisions to develop housing along the periphery are centrally informed by the levels of rail accessibility.

*From decentralised concentration to the Metropolitan Region of Berlin-Brandenburg*

This brings me to the spatial development strategies for the wider metropolitan region, which, since the early 1990s, have been distinctively different from those in Berlin. With a lower share in specifically urban forms of economic development, Brandenburg was confronted with more substantial trade-offs between short-term economic growth and long-term sustainable settlement structures. As a result, its initial economic development focus included a more dispersed and decentralised form of development (Kujath 2005, Brenke et al. 2011). Still, the overall developmental priority for the metropolitan region always remained the promotion of economic development, while at the same time aiming to contain undesirable land consumption and urban sprawl (Häussermann 2003).

Immediately after reunification, the Potsdam Planning Group (Planungsgruppe Potsdam) was looking into spatial development options for Berlin and Brandenburg. It highlighted the importance of regulating for concentrated development to prevent urban sprawl, particularly in light of the great urban growth that was expected at the time (Planungsgruppe Potsdam 1990). Their position more or less reflected the views that also emerged from West Berlin planners, who were coming from a strong land use planning tradition in an urban context. Government officials from North Rhine-Westphalia who assisted metropolitan planning in Brandenburg after reunification also endorsed a robust land protection paradigm. These planners were influenced by the negative experiences with extensive horizontal urban development in the Ruhr Area and were particularly keen to avoid urban sprawl.

Berlin’s general position with regard to regional spatial development was relatively simple. Essentially, the city only wanted to have development take place in Brandenburg in the event that its own large development areas would be built out. In that case spillover developments should then ideally only take place in Brandenburg’s regional centres. These perspectives were translated into a planning approach that included the promotion of regional parks and, overall, relied on a land use planning culture linked to Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP). However, while Berlin wanted to ensure that as little development as possible happened within its immediate hinterland, Brandenburg wanted new development across its entire territory.

The initial compromises between the two Länder resulted in the establishment of a ‘star shape development model’ (Stern-/Achsenmodell) assigning development along public
transport corridors, radiating from Berlin with the clear intention to avoid the more sprawling patterns that characterise the Ruhr Area. Ultimately, the main spatial planning focus was on protecting open land between development corridors (Achsenzwischenräume), which was achieved through the establishment of regional parks. “The overall aim agreed upon by both Länder is the sustainable development of the region; that is, to preserve and protect natural resources, to perform cautious scalable settlement activities and to concentrate available settlement cores” (Häussermann 2003, p121). Regional parks were successfully able to combine strategic planning goals of establishing accessible open areas for recreation with maintaining natural areas as environmental resources (Häussermann 2003).

A related but nevertheless distinctive development model for the metropolitan region was ‘decentralised concentration’ (Dezentrale Konzentration). This paradigm initially aimed to concentrate and channel development within six regional urban centres surrounding Berlin so as to avoid uncontrolled sprawl within Berlin’s immediate hinterland. It therefore also included the upgrading of public transport infrastructure and improving the connectivity between Berlin and these regional centres. As part of decentralised concentration, Brandenburg established an approach for identifying areas for growth paired with targeted efforts to avoid new development elsewhere (Mehwald 1997).

In the end, the paradigm of decentralised concentration was untenable in the case of Berlin-Brandenburg (Matthiesen 2006). Jan Drews, Director of the Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department, emphasised in our interview that it was mainly a question of lacking critical mass (Spielmengen) in the metropolitan region. Therefore, an important shift in the planning efforts for Berlin and Brandenburg was the move away from balancing interests (supporting weaker regions) to a focus on economic development and infrastructure provision (Bürkner 2006). This shift also coincided with a further formalisation of the European Metropolitan Region of Berlin-Brandenburg, which, while covering the entire territory of Berlin and Brandenburg, reinforces the role of the region’s core. This is particularly the case given the important role of national and international transport accessibility, which is concentrated within the latter.

The concentration on growth cores is aligned with ideas related to ‘strengthening strengths’ (Bürkner 2006). At the same time, the creation of ‘equal living conditions’ (Schaffung gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse) is no longer at the core of developmental programmes for the region and has been replaced by a focus on the economic growth of future-oriented locations (Kujath 2006). Accordingly, spatial planning efforts have also shifted towards a stronger implementation focus. Most recently, these developmental shifts have led to the
concept of a ‘city ring’ Berlin-Brandenburg (Städtekranz), providing a collective identity for the main regional centres within the immediate hinterland of Berlin (Zahn 2006).

In summary, Berlin has over the last 20 years produced distinct and recognisable development paradigms and spatial development models. It could be argued that the city may even have a particularly strong inclination to produce ‘spatial images’ (Raumbilder) in Detlev Ipsen’s sense (Ipsen 1997, Ortelt 2011). These go beyond specific attachments to economic or social development goals and instead are informed by cross-cutting, integrated perspectives centrally emerging from urban planning. Across the board, these Raumbilder are attached to value-driven ideas about urban living and production aiming to join-up with some of the most promising economic development opportunities of the city.

The most relevant spatial development paradigms, such as gentle urban renewal, the compact city and decentralised concentration are not simply derived from sectoral policy goals but represent a normative framework that in many instances precedes and then frames more targeted thematic objectives, including economic goals. Furthermore, I was also able to identify a considerable degree of consistency across the most relevant policy documents and plans with regard to the overall commitment to these overarching paradigms. Together, these observations establish my evidence for a considerable degree of policy capacity in Berlin linked to the compact urban growth agenda.

To conclude this section, Table 5 provides an overview of some of the actual spatial development and transport trends that were registered for Berlin and its region during the recent period when relevant policy was dominated by the ideas described above. It is a mixed picture with some compact urban growth trends, which followed some earlier trends towards dispersal and lower densities. The above-mentioned national target of 30 hectares of new land being developed can be translated to a daily land take for Berlin of 0.85 hectares, which the city already achieved during the most rapid development phase during the 1990s (SenStadtUm 2011a). Further details on this are also provided in Appendix B2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends towards compact urban growth</th>
<th>Trends towards dispersal, low density or functional segregation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reduction of suburbanisation rate since late 1990s (2010 net loss of 4,000 pers.)</td>
<td>• Suburbanisation directly following re-unification (1998 peak of net loss just below 30,000 pers.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong growth of central boroughs between 1991 and 2014</td>
<td>• Between 1993 and 2000, hinterland grew from 0.8m to 1.1m inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban form</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 85% of building developments in Berlin within existing settlement structure between 1991 and 2010</td>
<td>• Peak of suburbanisation in 1997 included 22,000 new housing units in Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amount of open space remained relatively constant</td>
<td>• Since 2000, single and two-family houses in central locations in Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consolidation of differentiated, small-scale retail</td>
<td>• Shift towards large scale retail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transit-oriented development in Brandenburg</td>
<td>• Large-scale retail units in proximity of major regional highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Major upgrading and expansion of public transport infrastructure</td>
<td>• Major regional expansion of road and highway network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Major traffic calming measures and increase in place function of streets</td>
<td>• 3km extension of A100 urban motorway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expansion of cycle network, bike and ride facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobility patterns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Share of non-motorised travel in Berlin increased from 35 to 44 per cent between 1998 and 2013</td>
<td>• Reduction of public transport passengers in Brandenburg by 4 per cent during 2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Car and motorcycle use in Berlin dropped from 38 to 30 per cent between 1998 and 2013</td>
<td>• Increase of car ownership in Brandenburg from 516 to 521 cars from 2000 to 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Car ownership in Berlin fell from 358 to 327 cars per 1,000 pers. between 2000 and 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 London’s strategic narrative: Joining the world city agenda and sustainability

Over the last two decades, London’s strategic agenda has largely been informed by specific economic development goals. This is hardly surprising given that throughout that period London had clearly identifiable business activities, which, in addition, were also well organised and able to shape the political agenda (Thornley et al. 2005). Furthermore, the UK’s economic recession in the early 1990s led to the establishment of a strong public-private platform for reconsidering more proactive economic strategies for London (Newman 1995). As a result of dominant economic development goals for London, strategies also tended to seek opportunities for mutual reinforcement with social, cultural and
environmental objectives rather than having to balance economic growth and these other policy objectives (GLA 2004, 2011).

Overall, Imrie et al. (2009) identify ‘globalisation’ and ‘sustainability’ as the two overarching conceptualisations of development in London that have ultimately been most influential for the city’s strategic agenda. Below, I begin by presenting London’s dominant ‘world city’ paradigm and then discuss the two aligned policy narratives around ‘sustainable urban transport’ and ‘urban compaction’. Through these more concrete policy agendas for transport and spatial development I identify considerable overlaps between ‘world city’ and ‘green city’ strategies based on, at least on the surface, shared mutual drivers such as efficiency and quality of life.

**London World City**

The early 1990s saw the establishment of the global city narrative (Sassen 1991, Knox and Taylor 1995, Ancien 2011), which has dominated the strategic positioning of London up to the present day. Partially triggered by the UK’s recession at the time but also due to a new awareness of the unique position of London at the centre of an increasingly global economy enhanced by the de-regulation of the financial sector during the 1980s, several highly influential documents began referring to London’s global city status, most notably the 1991 London World City Report (LPAC 1991). As the UK’s eminent urban planner Peter Hall stressed in our interview, this provided London with ‘the overwhelming paradigm of the global city’ acknowledging the city as a particularly special place in the world with employment opportunities that are virtually non-existent in other UK cities.

As a result, over the last 20 years, there has been a far-reaching political consensus about the priority of securing London’s role in international business. During the 1990s, this consensus cut across central government with the Government Office for London (GOL), the City of London, London First, the London Pride Partnership and the London Planning Advisory Council (LPAC) (Thornley 1998). From 2000 onwards and after the creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA), the London world city agenda was further formalised under Mayor Ken Livingstone. In this regard, Syrett and Baldock (2003) highlight the significant shift in London policy under the GLA compared to the Greater London Council (GLC) in the 1980s, both led by Livingstone.

In contrast to the latter, the GLA has pursued a surprisingly neoliberal approach (considering Livingstone’s leftist political orientation), which makes use of competition and innovation targeting economic growth. The result is a pro-growth, pro-business globalisation agenda, which has rarely been questioned since the first Mayor took office, even during the recent financial crisis. In fact, the 2008 London Plan begins by first highlighting London’s place in
The world: “Its strengths are unique. It is: one of the three world financial centres, Europe’s financial capital, and the world’s most economically internationalised city, a hub of unsurpassed international transport connections” (GLA 2008b, p1).

Directly related to a ‘global’ London and the city’s pronounced economic growth focus is an emphasis on population growth. For example, the first London Plan (GLA 2004) projected from the base year 2001 an 800,000 population growth by 2016 and in 2013 the Mayor’s 2020 vision refers to a population growing by a million from 2011 to 2021 (GLA 2013c).

In terms of policies addressing urban growth and maintaining global competitiveness, the biggest priority over the last two decades was to initiate a substantial investment programme. Initially the focus was on improved access to London’s airports and considerably upgrading the city’s public transport system (Thornley 1999). Labour’s GLA referendum manifesto in 1998 ‘Let’s Get London Moving’, for example, was entirely focusing on the lack of investment into the city’s transport system (Pimlott and Rao 2002). Soon, investments also cut across a broader set of urban infrastructures and services.

Related quality of life objectives established an obvious connection between the global city concept and environmental sustainability, which, put together, received significant political attention in London’s case. This link is based on the common understanding that location and place qualities are an asset which can attract globally mobile workers and foreign direct investment. Thus greater environmental quality of a location becomes itself an important economic advantage (Rogerson 1999). Similarly, the quality of urban living becomes a key factor for a city’s economic attractiveness. The new consensus around the importance of the intensity of public life and economic activity in London was highlighted in my interview with Mark Brearley, former director of Design for London (DfL). He spoke of a belief in the ‘virtue of compactness’, which, as I show below, has become characteristic of London’s urban development policy.

A more pragmatic view on the underlying paradigm for developing London as a global metropolitan region is put forward by John et al. (2005). They simply identify more effective planning as the central agenda: dealing more effectively with housing demand, transport investments, and public services is what they consider as the principal agenda. This brings me to the specific case of transport policy.

**Sustainable urban transport**

Transport policy in London has persistently played an exceptional role. A combination of the political powers assigned to London-wide governments, the severe shortcomings of the city’s transport system, as highlighted earlier, and the overwhelming dependence of
London’s economy on an efficient transport network has always put transport at the very heart of the politics of London. This also meant that transport was at the top of the political agenda when the Mayor took office in 2000 and that the development of a transport strategy was given priority over all other strategies, including the overarching and more comprehensive spatial strategy for London.

Similarly as in Berlin, the most important turning point of transport policy in London was the substantial local opposition to urban motorway programmes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Eventually, in 1973, this created a platform across the GLC and the key boroughs making the case for dropping plans for building the so-called Motorway Box, a new ring of highways in Inner London (Jenkins 1973). While public sentiments against further road building changed policy in many cities, implications for London were particularly significant. Here, road capacity constraints were already far more severe as strong property rights had largely maintained the historic street grid in Central London, characterised by a more random alignment of narrow streets and lanes. At the same time, the city was able to build on the legacy of a vast, 150-year-old public transport system.

But transport policy shifts in London were not only the result of local factors. Towards the end of the 1990s, as former GLA Head of Transport Henry Abraham emphasised, and introduced above, influential policy changes happened at the national level prior to setting up the GLA in 2000. The most prominent transport policy introduced by the GLA to manage traffic demand in Central London was congestion charging, which reduced the number of private vehicles entering Central London by 27 per cent (TfL 2008). In addition, shifting more people onto bicycles and encouraging walking has been a consistent political goal certainly since the GLA was created. Pedestrian strategies have focused on improving the experience of walking, access to public transport and overall pedestrian safety. Across London, traffic-calming measures were introduced alongside substantial redesigns of streets.

In terms of overall impact on urban mobility and actual capital expenditure, the upgrading of London’s public transport system remains by far the most relevant transport policy programme. Supported by national policies and funding, the principle of re-establishing public transport as the definitive solution to citywide personal mobility gained traction from 2000 onwards.

Across all transport policies, Director of Strategy and Planning for TfL Surface Transport Ben Plowden sums up the new London consensus as the ‘mixed mode city’ with a key role for walking, cycling and public transport. As a result, there has been a steady stream of changes to the road network designed to support these modes, by both TfL and London's boroughs. These have included new pedestrian crossings, public realm improvements, cycle
lanes and bus priority measures. But the development of this new transport agenda also took time:

“The rationale for urban motorway building started to be challenged in the 1960s, but in London, when Ken Livingstone became Mayor, there was a major shift in transport policy away from the car. The maintenance of highway capacity ceased to be the absolute imperative.”

Peter Bishop, Director, Design for London 2007-2011

Mark Brearley links London’s transport turn ultimately to the realisation that a well-functioning city with the required compactness cannot be achieved when it is car-based. I now continue with an overview of precisely that political agenda that positioned the compact city model at the core of London’s spatial development.

**Compact city policy**

Compared to transport, spatial development paradigms and policy for London have had a stronger relationship with the national planning discourses introduced above. Related political initiatives also mirrored new areas of public interest, which became increasingly important in the political debate about London’s future: sustainability and the links between environment, transport and new forms of urban living. Nicky Gavron, Deputy Mayor from 2000 to 2008 and previously chair of LPAC, referred to sustainable development as the ‘central unifying feature’ of LPAC’s integrated approach to spatial planning policy following the 1992 UN conference in Rio. Already in 1994, this was then presented in LPAC’s Strategic Advice to the UK Government.

A particularly strong integrative agenda for spatial development was then pushed by LPAC’s ‘Endowment to the Mayor and to the Boroughs’ alongside the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) mentioned earlier. West et al. (2002) quote the endowment (LPAC 2000) as aiming to integrate “land use with transport, regeneration, economic and social policy and environmental matters” (West et al. 2002, p7). Ultimately, sustainable development was centrally incorporated in the GLA Act (GLA Act 1999, Section 30) and, according to Nicky Gavron, facilitated Ken Livingstone taking up the vision of London as an ‘exemplary, sustainable world city’.

Following on and since the introduction of strategic planning for London facilitated by the GLA in 2000, compact city policies have matured and guided the majority of London’s developments. The 2004 and 2008 London Plans make numerous direct references to the notion of the compact city (GLA 2004, 2008b). And while direct compact city references are entirely absent in the 2011 Plan, the underlying principles of urban density linked to transport infrastructure are indeed referred to and also put into concrete policies (GLA
Compact city principles have also been guiding paradigms for London’s most prominent urban regeneration efforts, above all King’s Cross and the Olympic Village and Park in East London. In fact, the underlying urbanistic principle for the design of London’s 2012 Olympic Village was not only based on a compact city ideal but it featured centrally as part of the London Olympic bid and related place marketing (Muñoz 2006).

Across these more recent policies, densification, urban containment and mixed-use targets were motivated by slightly shifting priorities and increasingly had to reflect potential shortcomings particularly related to housing affordability. Limiting urban sprawl through higher densities to simply protect the countryside (‘deep green’ objectives) was more and more complemented by ‘light green’ objectives such as concerns about natural resources and climate change (DETR 2000a, ODPM 2005, DCLG 2006a). At the same time, concerns about economic competitiveness and housing affordability led to increasing criticism of London’s current green belt policy (Evans and Hartwich 2005a, b). Densification programmes also had to be adjusted to the relatively low density and suburban nature of much of London, particularly in Outer London. Ultimately, density policies became most evident within Inner London and for larger brownfield sites with good public transport accessibility; areas that were specifically targeted as opportunity sites by the London Plan.

Real controversy and tension over the last decades existed with regard to planning approaches aiming to create a more polycentric London. One group, mainly staff in the Mayor’s office, which in the end also included Mayor Livingstone, looked at polycentricity as a more limited idea about an eastern extension of the Central Business district. The other group around the GLA’s Strategy Directorate and planning professionals demanded policies more proactively supporting jobs and business locations in town centres outside the city’s core (Rydin et al. 2002, West et al. 2003). Ultimately, policy and implementation strategies over the last decade tended to prioritise the former rather than the latter perspective.

To summarise, it appears remarkable to an external observer the extent to which the strategic development agenda in London is communicated as bringing together a whole range of usually competing policy goals, cutting across economic development, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. Similarly, it seems surprising from an international perspective

---

3 Dropping the term ‘compact city’ in the 2011 Plan was for political reasons as the term was seen as ‘too left wing’, as one officer noted. Furthermore “Outer London constituencies who voted for Boris Johnson also have greater difficulties with urban compaction as a desirable idea” (interviewed GLA official).

4 The terminology of ‘light’ and ‘deep’ green objectives with regard to green belt policy was introduced by Henry Overman at the LSE Debate ‘Should we build on the green belt?’ (Overman 2012).
how transport and spatial development programmes have been able to translate these bundled policy goals into combined and mutually reinforcing strategies on the ground. To a significant degree this can be explained by the very nature of the ‘London consensus’ as overwhelmingly ‘pro-development’ – in Hajer’s sense, a clear storyline supported by a wider discourse coalition (Hajer 1995). And, arguably, it is applying only relatively narrow, local standards for environmental sustainability and social equity. For example, the global implications of corporate business models that form part of London’s economy or the embedded energy demand and carbon emission related to its booming construction industry are rarely considered, nor is the regional wealth divide across the UK as a result of London-centric investments. Allmendinger (2011) further emphasises that sustainability concepts related to planning in the UK were intentionally used for consensus building and for covering up conflicts and contradictions.

The most profound implication of this pro-development consensus has certainly been the level of physical transformation in London over the last decades. Above all, and in order to trigger substantial private sector investments, considerable public investments since the 1990s have enabled London’s development. Imrie et al. (2009) note that state spending, together with welfare policy, was at the centre of the new ‘politics of sustainability’ in London while also identifying an alignment with “the city’s attempts to sustain and enhance its global city status” (Imrie et al. 2009, p10). Major public investments focused in particular on new and upgraded infrastructure for the city, typically justified by highlighting the resulting economic benefits which would not only occur for London and its metropolitan region but for the UK as a whole.

Applying the compact city model to London similarly implied substantial physical transformation, often confronting conservationist agendas. As I have shown above, related policies were inherently pro-growth and mostly took a strong view on where and how development should occur while considering a broader range of objectives than previously. The result was a clear preference for retrofitting the existing urban fabric, increasing the intensity of use in areas of high public transport accessibility, prioritising brownfield development and assisting urban regeneration rather than expanding suburban developments at fringes of the city. At the same time, the desire for intensifying existing areas of the city was most controversial for areas of more extensive use, particularly in Outer London. Dealing with more suburban and lower density areas remains a great challenge and, alongside other concerns, led to the creation of the Outer London Commission in 2008 (OLC 2015).

While the broad political consensus, at least on paper, appears to have elegantly connected sustainable growth, business opportunities and global competiveness, it was also pointed out
during my interviews that most related policies in London are simply building on what the private sector was already doing or demanding. This certainly seems to have been the case for some of the most important strategic issues such as further strengthening the role of Central London, including Canary Wharf, as a business hub and implementing related strategic transport infrastructure. And the degree to which planning in London focuses on the interests of financial and business services or retail-led consumerism is considerable (Raco 2005, Thornley et al. 2005, Massey 2007). According to Allmendinger (2011), related broader shifts of planning in the UK which are also coupled to a democratic deficit suggest that planning has become a form of “neoliberal, spatial governance” (p1).

Moreover, London’s environmental sustainability agenda not only comes second to economic development but is approached with a far less global perspective. For example, the wider environmental impacts of London-based economic activity and consumption are not well understood and rarely addressed (Best Foot Forward 2002). Imrie et al. (2009) even see an increasingly insular tendency with little regard for impacts on regional geographies within the UK and beyond. The most recent London Plan shifts even further away from a sustainability focus (Holman 2010).

Some have concluded more broadly that the sustainability paradigm has ultimately failed as part of spatial planning practice, proving unable to address competing social, environmental and economic objectives (Allmendinger 2011). Instead, sustainability has become an ‘undercurrent’ of frequently updated and temporary policy paradigms, never entirely disappearing nor replacing any competing policy narratives. Planning for London may be a prime example of the latter. Still, the basic idea of compact urban growth as embraced by London’s main planning narratives incorporates several fundamental concepts that have emerged through environmental discourses. Together with several of the more concrete compact city policies, this suggests a considerable degree of related policy capacity in London.

As for Berlin, and to conclude this section, Table 6 provides an overview of some of the actual spatial development and transport trends that were registered for London and its region during the period when the above policy ideas dominated. It is a considerably robust picture of compact urban growth trends, particularly regarding changes related to transport infrastructure and mobility patterns. Further details on this are also provided in the Appendix B2.
Table 6: Spatial development and transport trends in London and its region since the 1990s
Source: own overview based on multiple sources (see Appendix B2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends towards compact urban growth</th>
<th>Trends towards dispersal, low density or functional segregation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• From 2001 to 2011, strongest regional growth is within Greater London with 14 per cent</td>
<td>• 2001 to 2011, considerable growth of around 8 per cent within region but outside London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nine out of ten fastest growing local authorities in metro region are London boroughs, five are Inner London boroughs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban form</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 75 per cent of all new office floor space in 2006/07 with good public transport access</td>
<td>• Traditional suburbanisation in booming Cambridge, Oxford and Milton Keynes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strong centralisation of new retail floor space</td>
<td>• Development of traditional business parks and high-tech industry clusters in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strongest growth of housing floor space in inner London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proportion of development on previously developed land between 95 and 98 per cent between 2006 and 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Significant investments in public transport infrastructure</td>
<td>• Some additional local road building to support suburban developments within the metropolitan region outside of Greater London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Redistribution of street space for public transport, non-motorised transport and place functions</td>
<td>• Some highway expansion including M11 during the 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Major investments in cycle infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobility patterns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• From 1998 to 2013, increase of public transport share in Greater London from 33 to 45 per cent</td>
<td>• Small increase of work trip-related car use (40 to 41 per cent) in the metropolitan region outside Greater London between 2001 and 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drop of car use from 45 to 33 per cent, share of cycling doubled over the same period</td>
<td>• Growth of car ownership in the metropolitan region outside Greater London between 2001 and 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2001 to 2011, increase of car-free households from 38 to 42 per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Traffic reduction on London roads between 2011 and 2015 by 10 per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

This chapter served the purpose of introducing the empirical part of my thesis and presented the broader context within which the case study analysis is situated. I began by contextualising the general discourses on the compact city, spatial planning and governance presented in Chapter 3 for the specific case of Europe and my two national contexts of Germany and the UK. This allowed me to identify not only a considerable commitment to a
compact city agenda across these contexts but a range of adjustments to the respective planning systems which, overall, have enhanced the relevant capacities for its implementation. At the same time, I was able to point to numerous commentators who emphasised the persistence of deeply entrenched coordination shortcomings, which continue to compromise the effectiveness of spatial planning and governance.

I continued this chapter with an introduction to my case study cities Berlin and London. This section focused on the role of the cities as political entities and presented the arrangements and changes of their respective systems of government. This allowed me to highlight the fundamental differences between these urban governments with Berlin as Bundesland and municipality and London with a relatively weak strategic authority but a politically powerful, directly elected mayor. Furthermore, the main drivers for the main institutional changes differed considerably: reunification in Germany and devolution in the UK. Still, and with all their differences, the two systems of urban government are also both cases of a two-tier system with a citywide strategic government and a local, borough-level tier.

The second part of this chapter was dedicated to a discussion of each city’s spatial development paradigms and policies as they emerged over the last decades. This allowed me to conclude that Berlin has a particularly strong tradition in putting forward such paradigms above and beyond more concrete socio-economic development goals. Instead of mapping spatial concepts onto broader non-spatial goals and objectives for the city’s development, in Berlin the production of ‘spatial images’ and perceptions of spatial development are a mature and independent process in their own right. While they obviously take account of cross-cutting, sectoral perspectives, these paradigms are essentially attached to value-driven ideas about urban living and production.

London’s strategic agenda evolved around the city’s role in the global economy and an increasing awareness of sustainability requirements. And the principal ideas behind a compact city model for London flow from this strategic agenda. I was also able to show that this model can easily be identified as a dominant spatial planning narrative over the last two decades across governance levels and political leadership. The actual and related policy intent in both cities is fairly similar and aligned with compact urban growth. Policies in both cities feature a strong commitment to redeveloping existing urban land rather than building on green fields, prioritising development in central areas and those with good public transport provision, and major investments in public transport and the public realm. It is important to note that the existence of these more concrete policies indicates a considerable degree of policy capacity in relation to a compact city model and its requirement of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy.
I concluded both final chapters by introducing the actual spatial and transport development trends since the 1990s. This allowed me to show that, overall, both cities have diverged from business-as-usual urban development characterised by de-densification, suburbanisation and motorisation. Instead, population densities in both cities are on the rise, the majority of urban development within the cities has taken place on previously developed land and the ownership and use of private vehicles has been declining since the turn of the millennium. However, rather than seeing these developments purely as a result of policy intent, they also need to be considered as consequences of other independent, as well as interrelated, factors cutting across external and internal economic and societal change.

Before moving to my primary research in the following chapters it is also important to consider a range of implications, which follow from operating within the chosen contexts. These implications relate to the specificities, which emerge once the general discourses in Chapter 3 are framed through the chosen geographic settings. First, I have identified a particularly strong demand for integrating urban planning and transport policy as part of a European compact city agenda. As shown earlier, this follows from a more pronounced and ambitious agenda for reducing car use in European cities compared to related spatial development strategies in North America.

Second, both Berlin and London have a long history of planning and they represent two distinct planning cultures within the European context, largely informed by their national context. The extent to which more recent and often similar shifts in spatial planning and governance were mapped onto these existing systems is essentially determined by path-dependent institutional change. This is particularly evident for the case of multi-level governance in Germany and the role of national government in the UK.

And third, while the broader compact city agendas in Berlin and London appear to share many similarities, the closer analysis above suggests crucial differences, particularly regarding the underlying first order principles. In Berlin, these are much closer to a particular spatial idea of urban development, while in London, a compact city agenda is derived from the overarching goal of economic growth and sustainability. This difference has important implications for the type of integration mechanisms that have assisted planning and policymaking in the two cities.

To conclude, the recent development trajectories, policy paradigms and intent, and changes to the first order urban governance arrangements in the two cities provide a fruitful context for addressing my research questions. And not only do these local dynamics offer valuable comparative insight but, put together, lead to a range of general implications of great importance to the subject of this study. Within the next three chapters, it is this context
within which I explore and discuss the governance structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions that facilitated the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in Berlin and London.
Chapter 5
Berlin: Integrating multi-level metropolitan governance

This chapter moves to the presentation of my empirical case study research and starts by introducing and discussing my findings for the case of Berlin. Following the framework of integration mechanisms introduced above, I present institutional arrangements that have impacted on and potentially enhanced the integration of urban planning, city design and transport policies. In this regard I also discuss the extent to which these mechanisms may have advanced the capacity for drafting, deciding on and implementing a compact city agenda in Berlin. I begin by exploring the role of integration structures in the first section followed by integration processes in the second part. The final section cuts across integration instruments and enabling conditions.

5.1 Integration structures: Advancing multi-level governance while concentrating sectors

My account of organisational structures that facilitate integrated governance cuts across three central aspects. First, I address the administrative geography of Berlin’s metropolitan region. Second, I present the distribution of planning and policy powers across different governance levels and their organisational units. And third, I identify the key stakeholders as part of newer network governance approaches and discuss the role of hierarchies and networks in supporting integration.

Adjusting constitutional governance geographies

After reunification, the default option of creating a new administrative system for state level governance for the former GDR territory was simply to go back to the historical boundaries of Germany’s pre-war provinces (Kunzmann 2001). Thus, Berlin (East and West reunited) and Brandenburg became two separate German Länder. From the early 1990s onwards there were then significant efforts at merging the two.

However, instead of a full merger, which was rejected in a referendum required by German constitutional law in May 1996, a unique form of joint regional planning between the two Länder was implemented (Krappweis 2001). The full structural arrangements for joint spatial development were enacted by the regional planning treaty (Landesplanungvertrag) of 6 April 1995, an open-ended treaty which includes a notice period of three years (Berlin and Brandenburg 1995, Art. 24.1).
At the heart of this treaty was the creation of a Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department (Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung - GL), which institutionalised the various planning groups and commissions that were addressing joint spatial planning more informally until 1996 (see Figure 20). The Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department (GL) began its work in 1996, charged with steering and integrating spatial development in both Länder. It was therefore positioned between and jointly led by the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development and the Brandenburg Ministry for Agriculture, Environmental Protection and Spatial Planning.

Executive powers within GL are based on the ‘tandem principle’ enacted by the planning treaty as a ‘four eyes from two Länder approach’ (Krappweis 2001) with one director (Abteilungsleiter) from Brandenburg and a deputy director from Berlin (Berlin and Brandenburg 1995, Art. 5). At the top level, GL is subjected to political oversight through the regular state planning conferences (Landesplanungskonferenzen), which are chaired by the Governing Mayor of Berlin and the Minister-President (Ministerpräsident) of Brandenburg.

Overall, GL integration and coordination structures in the case of spatial planning appear to compensate for the absence of a single state overseeing spatial developments across the entire metropolitan region. Throughout my interviews, the department was not only identified as having a positive effect on coordinating spatial development but on several occasions was singled out as a real marker of integrated urban and transport strategies within the Berlin metropolitan region. However, it is a form of integration that almost entirely relies on land use policy as the mediating instrument connecting spatial and transport planning.
With a focus on spatial planning, GL does not directly deal with transport infrastructure and operations nor does it facilitate cooperation between Berlin and Brandenburg for the relevant technical departments and units (Häussermann 2003). As GL Director Jan Drews put it, “We simply receive the news from sectoral planning.”

It is important to note that parallel to GL and for public transport operations in Berlin and Brandenburg, a joint organisation, the Verkehrsverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (VBB), was set up in 1996. Its responsibility is mainly to ensure integrated public transport services, fares and ticketing, and travel information and bringing together about 40 transport operators. However, as part of my interviews, the VBB did not feature as a key integrating factor beyond operational aspects of public transport.

Several structural governance arrangements and demarcations in Brandenburg make it difficult for GL to provide regional integration. In 1995, Brandenburg created five planning regions, each running as a long slice from the border with Berlin to the outer fringe of Brandenburg on a ‘pie slice model’ (see Figure 21). This meant that coordination within the immediate sphere of influence (the direct hinterland of Berlin) included all five regions, each demanding the balancing of interests of the metropolitan core, with those of outer areas at the periphery of Brandenburg.

![Figure 21: Brandenburg planning regions](source: own representation)

By far the most important structural foundation for integrating land use and transport developments after reunification was the re-establishment of a Berlin-wide government covering both the eastern and western part of the city. Of particular importance to my research is the internal administrative structure of the Land Berlin. Berlin is governed by the Berlin Senate, comprising the Governing Mayor and currently eight Senators with departmental responsibilities. The city’s governance structure strictly follows the portfolio...
principle (Ressortprinzip), clearly differentiating tasks and responsibilities of sectoral
administrations (Art 58, VvB). For any kind of policies cutting across portfolio boundaries,
this setup makes collaborative work difficult. And, not least due to this shortcoming, Berlin
was subject to ongoing debate and criticism related to its administrative system even before
reunification (Nissen 2002).

For a long period, Berlin’s public administration was regarded as inefficient, inflexible,
labour intensive and expensive (Nissen 2002). During the early 1990s, reforming municipal
administrations more generally was put on the agenda by the ‘Neues Steuerungsmodell’, the
German equivalent of New Public Management (Mäding 2002, Wegrich and Bach 2014). As
a result of these various shortcomings, and ultimately triggered by the pressures of Berlin’s
budget deficit, three distinct reforms in addition to a broader constitutional reform
(Verfassungsreform) were put forward: administrative reform (Verwaltungs-
Managementreform), functional reform (Funktionalreform) and area reform (Gebietsreform)
(Nissen 2002, Röber and Schröter 2002a). Of the three, the latter two are seen by Nissen
(2002) as particularly important, as they have fundamentally changed the previously existing
structures of Berlin’s government.

Berlin’s area reform (Gebietsreform) – part of the second administrative reform law of 1998
(Land Berlin 1998) – legislated the reduction of the number of Berlin boroughs from 23 to
due for the year 2001 (Figure 22). Primarily motivated by reducing overall administrative
costs, interviewees at the borough and state level also confirmed that it made it possible to
strengthen and professionalise borough administrations, which ultimately improved planning
integration. This was an effect that also relied on the parallel functional reform
(Funktionalreform), which directly addressed the often unclear distribution of tasks between
Berlin’s two governance levels (Wegrich and Bach 2014).

Prior to the reform, the assignment of responsibilities followed a general responsibility of the
Senate administration (allgemeine Zuständigkeit der Hauptverwaltung) (Land Berlin 1989).
Devolving certain powers directly to the borough level changed this, with some
commentators referring to a weak form of municipalisation of the boroughs (Röber et al.
2002). For example, boroughs were made responsible for the handling of building
development plans (Bebauungspläne) (Ulbricht 2002), which are then only reviewed by the
SenStadtUm regarding their compliance with citywide plans rather than prepared by it
(AGBauGB 2005, §5-7). Senate-level planning official Elke Plate emphasised: “The
borough reform was really important. Berlin’s boroughs have the size of a medium-sized
city. Following the principle of subsidiarity, the reform has led to a substantial
simplification.”
At the same time, Bull (2012) concludes that the management-oriented administrative reforms over the last decades have not been able to solve the friction between city and borough-level administrations. Furthermore, initial coordination barriers were created by not only reducing technical supervision and intervention at the level of the senate administration, but also by allowing boroughs to organise their portfolios and administrations individually.
More recently, however, this has led to re-synchronising the structure of borough-level administrations and their portfolios with those at senate level.

Also, the reform did not address the fragmentation of responsibilities for Berlin’s street network, which exposes some of the integration shortcomings of Berlin’s multi-level governance structure. The difficulty of dealing with the street network has been emphasised in many of my interviews and some of the related literature. These difficulties are not only a result of different categories of streets being overseen by different tiers of government but stem from the fact that planning procedures differ substantially, depending whether streets are assigned to borough, state or federal-level administrations. Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf Borough Councillor for Urban Development Marc Schulte stresses: “This makes network thinking [for the road network] within boroughs extremely difficult.” The situation within the metropolitan region, where local streets are in the hands of Brandenburg’s municipalities, has proved similarly difficult for planning and policy integration.

Below, I discuss some of the key reforms in greater detail and explore the extent to which they informed urban planning, design and transport integration.

**Concentrating spatial development portfolios**

Across my research, the concentration of interlinked portfolios within the same organisational unit or under the same leadership emerged as a central approach to tackling fragmentation. This structural integration strategy is clearly visible at many levels of Berlin’s governance but is most advanced in the case of the reforms of the senate administrations.

Berlin’s Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment (SenStadtUm), as it is constituted today, is an amalgamation of portfolios that were initially part of three different departments. Over time, combining these portfolios created one of the world’s most comprehensive urban development departments. As shown in Table 7, in 1991, portfolios of relevance to my research were assigned to a Department for Transport, a Department for Construction and Housing, and a Department for Urban Development and the Environment.

These concentration efforts were related to the broader administrative reform introduced earlier, which reduced the number of departments in Berlin from sixteen to ten in 1994 and then to eight in 1998 (Wegrich and Bach 2014). The particular portfolio assignments for the newly created departments were largely motivated by political considerations. In my interview with Peter Strieder, who was Senator for Urban Development between 1996 and 2004, as well as leader of the Berlin SPD from 1999 to 2004, he emphasised the role of party political negotiations for shaping departments.
Table 7: Berlin’s Senate Administrations 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2011
Source: expanded based on Nissen (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Interior and Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Justice and Consumer Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Health and Social</td>
<td>Labour, Education and Women</td>
<td>Labour, Health and Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Health and Social</td>
<td>Labour, Education and Women</td>
<td>Labour Integration and Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Women</td>
<td>Health and Social</td>
<td>Labour, Education and Women</td>
<td>Health and Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Operations</td>
<td>Construction, Housing and Transport</td>
<td>Construction, Transport and Urban Development</td>
<td>Urban Development and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and Housing</td>
<td>Urban Development and Environment</td>
<td>Construction, Transport and Urban Development</td>
<td>Urban Development and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development and Environment</td>
<td>Construction, Housing and Transport</td>
<td>Construction, Transport and Urban Development</td>
<td>Urban Development and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy, Technology</td>
<td>Economy and Operations</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Economy Technology and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, Research</td>
<td>Science, Research and Culture</td>
<td>Culture and Science</td>
<td>Culture and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and Family</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Education, Youth and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools, Education and Sport</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Education, Youth and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal and European Affairs</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Schools, Youth and Sport</td>
<td>Education, Youth and Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, bringing together urban development, transport and the environment in one department reflected an important principle for enabling sustainable urban development. And it was in line with ideas regarding planning and policy integration developed by the EU and the UN at the time, which according to several senior policymakers I interviewed, were never entirely absent from the restructuring debate.

The concentration of the most relevant spatial development portfolios in one department increases the importance of how the department is structured internally. In the case of SenStadtUm, the internal portfolio assignments were based on assigning oversight to one of three state secretaries (see Figure 23). As a result of repeated changes of these assignments, several SenStadtUm interviewees stressed that over time new productive connections were created across the department. More generally, disciplinary boundaries within the department were no longer as stringent as when they were assigned to different departments. Urban design expertise, for example, was added to the transport planning unit so as to balance the engineering perspectives within street design programmes.
Overall, the effects on planning and policy integration of SenStadtUm have been relatively clear and positive, regardless of whether the relevant reforms were specifically motivated by improving the coordination of urban planning, city design and transport strategies or not:

"Merging transport and urban development departments had the benefit of operating in a more integrated manner and urban planning is now really setting the parameters for urban development instead of transport planning."

Christian Gaebler, Speaker, SPD Parliamentary Group, House of Representatives of Berlin

This advantage was also felt throughout the administration and emphasised by every single interviewee in the Berlin case study. One reason for the particularly positive integration effects of SenStadtUm was that previously when transport and urban development were assigned to different departments the linking of the two sectors suffered from an 'institutionalised conflict' between two senators from different political parties.

"This [joining the transport and urban development senate administration] has certainly improved the situation, considering that the two administrations were previously in conflict with each other"

Siegfried Dittrich, Senior Officer Transport Planning, Borough Berlin-Mitte

In turn, the cultural change that came along with the new department also allowed individuals to quickly adjust their roles to more cooperative practices. Particularly in the transport division, as former Senator Peter Strieder suggested during our interview, it did not take long for more integrated and sustainable transport strategies to emerge instead of
traditional traffic volume and capacity related arguments. Friedemann Kunst, director of transport planning underlined this point and emphasised that SenStadtUm had finally created the conditions to implement the sustainable transport policy approach agreed upon earlier.

The positive and integrative effects of SenStadtUm were also felt outside the department with commentators from the boroughs and private and third sector perspectives generally being in agreement. Jan Eder, Managing Director of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, identified a relatively positive ‘interlocking’ and Klaus J. Beckmann, Director of Difu, speaks of the ‘Chorverständn’ (the mutual understanding and comprehension of a choir) which the department created.

However, and as one would expect within a significantly expanded department, internal integration is far from complete and there also exist relatively independent and isolated sub-units within SenStadtUm. Also while urban development-related portfolios were brought together successfully within one department, joining policy across the remaining, if fewer, departments continues to be difficult as a result of a marked portfolio principle characteristic of Berlin’s government.

A generally positive effect of a ‘super-ministry’ on integrating urban planning and transport policy could also be detected following the reorganisation of Germany’s federal ministries. After the 1998 federal election, which shifted powers to a centre-left coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (BMVBS)\(^5\) was set up and existed up to 2013.\(^6\) As in the case of SenStadtUm, the advantages of integration under one instead of two ministers was a critical factor:

“If you have two Ministers [one for urban development and one for transport] they have to get along very well, which is quite unusual, to initiate real cooperation.”

Klaus J. Beckmann, Director, German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu), Berlin

Regardless of various cases of persisting departmentalism within the department, the positive impact of a combined BMVBS, according to several interviewees involved with national planning processes, was evident. For example, the combined portfolios made it possible to incorporate environmental assessments and spatial impact assessments

\(^5\) Until 2005 it was called the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing

\(^6\) After the 2013 federal elections and with the reinstatement of a grand coalition, BMVBS was fundamentally reorganised, and after 15 years, transport was once again separate from urban development. Besides political considerations as part of the coalition agreement, the reason for these reassignments are linked to political priorities and policy bundles that may require a particularly urgent and temporary ‘integrated fix’, to which I return in Chapter 8.
(Raumverträglichkeit) as part of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Planning exercise (Bundesverkehrswegeplanung). It also strengthened various integrated city development and urban design programmes, which were of great relevance for Berlin.

Moving on to issues of leadership and the roles of individuals, I found little disagreement that by far the most important role for coordinating urban planning, design and transport in Berlin is the Senator for Urban Development heading SenStadtUm. In fact, the integrative capacity of this department is inextricably linked to the political oversight by one Senator, a good example of what Bogdanor refers to as ‘overlord’ (Bogdanor 2005), equipped with far-reaching powers under Berlin’s portfolio principle.

Reflecting on the years between 2000 and 2011, Head of Transport Planning Friedemann Kunst emphasised the positive effect of SenStadtUm leadership in being able to identify clear common goals and to also push hard to achieve better cooperation. The advantages of single-handed leadership were also felt beyond the core units of Berlin’s government, for example, by public transport providers:

“*There is one Senator who is responsible for the environment, urban design, urban planning and transport which makes many things easier. Both for urban planning but also for transport operators and their requests*”

Felix Pohl, Director, Planning, S-Bahn Berlin GmbH

It is hardly surprising that single-handed leadership and being at the top of a hierarchical administrative structure was also seen as a clear integration advantage among the two senators I interviewed for this research. Peter Strieder emphasised his role and the political motivation for greater policy integration by stating:

“*Ultimately, I regarded myself as an essential integrating force of transport and urban planning, not least because I wanted to get re-elected*”

Peter Strieder, Senator for Urban Development 1996-2004

Hans Stimmann stressed in our interview that the relevance of leadership in planning and policy integration also implies considerable reliance on individual character: even prior to setting up SenStadtUm, “personality of senators mattered enormously for integrated urban development practices.” The degree to which Senators have, for example, engaged with more theoretical planning paradigms varied significantly, and my interviews confirmed that the position and role of the senator continues to rely not only on personality but also individual expertise and disposition at the top level.

But even deeper within the administration, the steering and management of individual state secretaries and directors was essential. Friedemann Kunst, director of transport for more than
a decade, introduced a clear focus on sustainable transport with strong links to urban planning and design. At the borough level, heads of borough administrations facilitate sectoral integration often much closer to the implementation phase of urban design and transport initiatives, where:

“Bringing the different sectors together relies on individuals and, inevitably, this requires stimulus and guidance from the top.”
Marc Schulte, Head of Urban Development Department and Councillor, Berlin Borough of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf

The importance of leadership also raises important questions with regard to the role of hierarchical governance structures, which usually support the required oversight. I now move to a discussion on integration based on hierarchies and alternative forms of network integration in Berlin.

**Combining hierarchy and networks**

The preceding discussion has pointed to the relevance of leadership and hierarchical relationships as part of the governance structures that facilitate integrative practices in Berlin. At the same time, and as I have shown in Chapter 3, hierarchy has been a powerful barrier to policy and planning integration and is generally regarded as a conventional, possibly even outdated, mode of centralised control.

Overall, my findings for the case of Berlin suggest that hierarchy per se does not act as an integration barrier. Instead, it is in cases of hierarchy where management lines do not come together at the level that ultimately supports the integration of particular policy items that integration is compromised. This also points to a certain trade-off between what is integrated and what not. Up to a point, strong hierarchies may facilitate vertical coordination but act as a major barrier for cross-departmental collaboration. If the administration of transport and urban planning had continued to be located in two separate departments, this would not have allowed for the fruitful collaboration that can be observed today. At the same time, the barriers between senate departments also protect and foster integration of those portfolios that are positioned under one roof. In the case of SenStadtUm, transport and urban planning are not only more connected but also isolated and sheltered from other external sectoral interests in other departments (economic development in particular but also finance).

In spite of the prevailing dominance of hierarchical, leadership-based governance in Berlin, over the two decades since reunification it has been complemented by increasing exchange, collaboration and co-production. In fact, many network arrangements are relatively formal and in some instances even institutionalised, making them broadly compatible with the hierarchical structures introduced above. As a city state, collaboration between Berlin’s
administrations is even guaranteed by Germany’s constitution: “All authorities of the federation and the Bundesländer mutually provide each other with legal and administrative help” (Art 35 GG). For the specific case of spatial planning processes in Germany, the key principle of ‘public authorities participation’ (Behördenbeteiligung) is another legal basis for coordination (BauGB 2004, §4a).

At the level of Berlin’s government and its senate departments, collaboration tends to be relatively consensual and the city’s primarily hierarchical administrative system is not always centrally on display. At the senate level, the ‘collegial principle’ (Kollegialprinzip), a principle of collaboration between different senators, acts as the most relevant top-level network governance arrangement aiming to balance narrower portfolio interests (Nissen 2002). In reality however, cooperation across sectors is strongest within departments, in the case of SenStadtUm particularly, where it is facilitated by project groups. Working across senate departments usually requires more formal arrangements, which are facilitated by collaboration boards (Arbeitsgremien).

As discussed above, joining transport and urban planning under one roof within SenStadtUm helped to reduce divisive hierarchical structures that before were limiting cross-sectoral work. One interviewee pointed out that since the department’s remit was broadened there was generally more communication among officers from different sectors, and that these exchanges were also more relaxed than they used to be. This was confirmed by interviewees across the department who also referred to an overall greater appreciation of networking activities. One simple measure of success in that regard was more frequent phone calls to colleagues from different units and sectors.

For the senior leadership of the department, cross-sectoral exchanges are facilitated by a regular Friday meeting (Freitagsrunde). This important tradition, according to Peter Strieder, brought together the Senator, all State Secretaries and Directors (Abteilungsleiter), bringing most issues to the table. In addition, a more or less daily cross-sectoral briefing of the Senator by the three State Secretaries ensured regular synchronisation of work within their individual portfolios. Furthermore, officer level exchange (Referenten) provides the basis for sectoral contributions on planning content, suggestions regarding the internal organisation of project groups and the definition of work procedures.

For example, as part of the current emphasis on housing policy, officers within the transport division assist their counterparts within the housing division to ensure that planning decisions on the ground are in line with the most relevant sectoral perspectives. While this kind of collaborative work may initially help achieve sector-specific goals it also establishes the foundation for synchronising broader planning and policy agendas at the strategic level.
Typical meeting frequencies across and within the SenStadtUm units are two meetings per week of the department’s leadership, one meeting per week of group managers (Gruppenleiter) and once a week a coordination meeting, which includes all directors, State Secretaries and the Senator.

One particularly important form of networking across organisational units within the department is facilitated by project groups. This relates also to a more general point, which my interviews confirmed: it is through concrete work and projects that network arrangements are most likely to lead to meaningful interdisciplinary exchange and to sectoral integration. SenStadtUm staff might get involved in project groups on a sliding scale ranging from a full-time commitment to a one-off involvement at a certain point only. And while there is no real secondment of line managed staff into project groups, there are indeed project groups requiring a 100 per cent time commitment by some officers over a certain period of time. Interviewees from SenStadtUm emphasised that project work is currently being formalised even further, particularly by adjusting project leadership arrangements. According to one employee, “cross-cutting project management and leadership is now the new buzz word.” Within and across borough administrations, a range of network arrangements have also strengthened cross-sectoral exchange.

Greater exchange between sectors and disciplines also created tension. Within SenStadtUm, disagreement often emerged when deciding about the leadership of project groups and different units were keen to take the lead. Furthermore, project management arrangements also came along with the classic conflict between content and coordination. Questions about how much coordinators need to know about content and technical issues were frequently posed. It is here where some SenStadtUm officials felt that the department might be going too far by appointing project managers that do not have the relevant technical background and formal training.

Beyond the network arrangements that exist within established hierarchical governance structures, I encountered various types of networks that cut across the different governance levels and their respective hierarchies. And these too, have played a clear role in facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies. At the level of the metropolitan region, the Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department (GL) is

---

7 One example of such a significant collaboration was the StEP Transport project group, which was operating for three years in the run-up to the latest 2011 edition.
complemented by multiple networks of often more informal metropolitan coordination assisting the vertical integration across planning scales (see Appendix C1).

Within Berlin, a mechanism for network connections between borough-level governments and the Berlin Senate is the Mayors’ Forum (Rat der Bürgermeister), which is enacted by Berlin’s Constitution (VvB Art 68). This law ensures that there is a monthly meeting between all borough mayors, the Berlin Governing Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Assessing the effectiveness of this forum, (Nissen 2002, p.176) identifies a mixed response by commentators ranging from “an important connector” to “powerless”. Network arrangements also play an integrative role in cases where formal governance structures remain ambiguous and fail to deliver desirable outcomes, such as for the management of Berlin’s streets.

At the borough level, institutionalised network governance connecting neighbourhood and borough-level governance includes advisory councils (Beiräte) as well as city quarter committees (Stadtteilausschüsse), which enable a broader consideration of transport and urban planning. In the specific case of local cycling policies, a ‘bezirklicher FahrRat’ (borough-level cycle committee) brings together politicians, public officials, representatives from the police and is sometimes even moderated by third sector advocacy groups such as Germany’s Cyclist Confederation, the ADFC.

Moving beyond network arrangements between public administrations, far broader collaboration includes the private and third sector as well as the general public. A wide range of formats such as workshops, round tables, stakeholder participation, expert exchanges (Fachgespräche) and the internationally recognised Stadtforum Berlin facilitates such collaborations. Many generate input used across senate and borough-level governance and by different sectors. Unilaterally these are regarded as an important contribution to more integrative urban practice and important cases are discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter.

Key stakeholders are a particularly significant category of network actors for urban governance in Germany as they often carry the status of ‘organisations of public interest’ (Träger öffentlicher Belange). These have to be integrated into network governance arrangements by law (BauGB 2004, § 4). Such key stakeholders include a range of actors of public significance who are formally asked to contribute and feedback to planning processes and urban development decisions. With regard to urban planning and transport integration, Berlin’s transport operators play a particularly important role as key stakeholders. This is due to a division of labour whereby the entire infrastructure planning rests with SenStadtUm and not with transport operators, including BVG, S-Bahn and Deutsche Bahn. Several
transport sector interviewees stressed that this clear differentiation of transport infrastructure planning and operations makes it particularly important for transport providers to provide early input as part of plans for infrastructure developments.

To summarise, my research revealed a considerable dominance of hierarchical structures facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in Berlin. Furthermore, the roles of hierarchies and networks appear to be far more synergetic than it is usually portrayed as part of discourses on governance integration. But neither were a guarantee for fruitful planning and policy integration. In the case of hierarchies, silo-mentality and fragmentation have under certain circumstances indeed flourished. This was the case for transport and urban planning when related portfolios were assigned to two separate departments for most of the 1990s. More generally, Nissen (2002) emphasises the reactionary tendency created by Berlin’s hierarchical ‘portfolio principle’ which can block any modernisation attempts for integration cutting across portfolio boundaries.

New approaches to network governance in Berlin were usually complementary to hierarchies and often motivated by various shortcomings of hierarchical integration. Whether these are networks operating within or beyond existing hierarchies, I was also able to show that the role of such arrangements has been increasing over the last two decades. Network governance actors in Berlin range from exclusively public actors at the same governance level to a multidimensional combination of public, private and third-party actors cutting across governance scales. For successful network governance to take place, interviewees repeatedly emphasised the importance of working on something concrete, for example, in the context of project groups. By contrast, more scepticism was shared when network governance was purely motivated by a procedural approach in the context of steering groups or where integration becomes a process driven formality.

One might also add that the formalisation of network governance in Berlin ultimately meant that public institutions have remained central actors, if not leaders, within these networks. In the context of urban planning, city design and transport strategies, SenStadtUm has not only maintained its role as the most decisive network actor but has arguably also advanced its role as network facilitator. And both were possible not least due to the department’s hierarchical structure and strong political leadership. Overall, it seems that Berlin’s governance reform has been relatively effective in facilitating the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies precisely because of instituting a favourable combination of hierarchy, leadership and network arrangements.

In the following section I turn to how the governance structures above are activated in the case of strategic planning processes and for implementing specific policies on the ground.
5.2 Integration processes: A system of plans as integrated planning process

This section concentrates on strategic planning approaches linking urban planning, city design and transport strategies and how these are translated to the implementation level. In many ways, this brings me to the core of what is often considered as an integrated planning approach: primarily a process driven method, which aims to achieve greater vertical and horizontal integration of plans and planning procedures. I have divided this chapter into two sub-sections and discuss the vertical and horizontal integration of the main planning processes of relevance to this study separately.

Vertical integration: cascading and counterflow planning

Vertical integration in Berlin is facilitated by a clear hierarchy of cascading plans – a system of plans – located at three key spatial scales (see Figure 24). It broadly follows the main principles of traditional hierarchical coordination. Aligned with the governance geographies introduced in the previous chapter, the three scales include the metropolitan level with a joint state plan, the citywide level with Berlin’s Land Use Plan and the local, borough level with area development plans and building development plans.

Higher tier planning at the level of EU planning frameworks have only played a marginal role in advancing integrated urban planning and transport in Berlin. At the federal level, arguably the most influential policies that determine planning approaches at lower levels are general planning and building laws, ordinances and codes. For transport planning, it is the Federal Transport Infrastructure Planning Exercise (BVWP). I refer to these when discussing the levels of vertical integration that they primarily target and impact on.

Two components of aligning planning vertically have emerged as most innovative. The first is the Joint State Development Plan, which details the strategic spatial development of two neighbouring Länder without involving a higher government level such as the Federal Government. The second is a mechanism called counterflow planning (Gegenstromprinzip), or principle of mutual consideration (Häussermann 2003), which ensures that information and planning input not only flows in one direction from higher to lower-level plans but also in the opposite direction.

---

5 In the case of Berlin it has been mainly important for highway and rail infrastructure in addition to federal or state transport infrastructure in smaller municipalities (below 80,000 inhabitants) within the metropolitan region (SenStadtUm 2015, Daehre 2012).
BERLIN

01 FEDERAL PLANNING FRAMEWORK

Area: 357,000 km²
Scale: 1:1,000,000

At the federal level, Germany does not have an overall central spatial plan but produces guidelines, principles, and goals of spatial planning. Important components include the Federal Spatial Planning Act, Guidelines for Regional Planning, the Federal Building Code, the Federal Land Utilisation Ordinance, and Spatial Planning Policy Guidelines.

02 JOINT SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (LEP)

Area: 3,370 km²
Scale: 1:100,000

Based on unique joint spatial planning agreement between Berlin and Brandenburg. Defines general goals for spatial development with regards to: (1) general spatial structure, hierarchy of towns and cities, infrastructure (link: transport), (2) potential areas for development and open spaces, (3) protected open space and ecological zones, (4) development centres and special developments areas for improvement of quality of life.

03 BERLIN LAND USE PLAN (FNP)

Area: 1,040 km²
Scale: 1:20,000

With its status as city state and municipality, Berlin combines regional and municipal planning at the level for the entire city. Berlin Land Use Plan as an overall development plan with general land use zoning categories (as planning objectives). It is a non-site specific plan with a resolution targeting areas larger than 9ha. Its principal contents include: (1) definition of different built-up areas and open spaces, (2) density categories for residential building land, (3) type and location of mixed use and commercial/industrial building land, (4) location of community facilities and public utilities of more than local importance, (5) important transport corridors and (6) open space (green areas, forest, agricultural land).

04 URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS (SEP)

Sectoral urban development plans (UDP) support the Land Use Plan and are designed for the whole of Berlin. They include directives and objectives for different functions such as work, living, social infrastructure, transport, and waste disposal. They are the “basis for all future planning” and subject the Land Use Plan by defining spatial and temporal priorities and pointing out the necessary measures to be taken.

04 UDP TRANSPORT (SEP Verkehr)

Area: 190 km²
Scale: 1:20,000

05 AREA DEVELOPMENT PLANS (BEPs)

Area: 5 to 30 km²
Scale: 1:5,000 to 1:10,000

Main, non-statutory borough level planning instrument translating the broader FNP framework to large borough level areas.

06 BUILDING DEVELOPMENT PLANS (BPlans)

Area: 1 to 30 ha (approximately)
Scale: 1:500 to 1:2,000

BPlans are prepared by boroughs following the binding principles of the Land Use Plan. They are legally binding for individuals and planning permission is only given if building plans are followed. BPlans often include requirements regarding mixed use.

Figure 24: Berlin’s system of plans and the vertical integration of planning
Source: own representation based on key Berlin plans
The coordinating ‘hub’ for strategic spatial planning in Berlin is located at the citywide level. Here, Berlin’s Land Use Plan (Flächennutzungsplan – FNP) is the primary planning instrument for spatial development, coordinating all territorial planning efforts and addressing particularly the land use and transport nexus. The FNP is essentially a decision-making process that leads to a citywide strategy for urban development, documented in a 1:25,000 scaled plan. It defines areas available for development and others that need to be kept as open space. It also specifies broad characteristics of areas to which it attaches different density levels, mixed-use specifications, levels of industrial/commercial land use, and possibilities for special land use purposes (see Appendix C2).

Vertical integration from the FNP to lower planning scales is essentially guaranteed through its regulatory strength. Individual citizens are not directly affected by the Plan and it does not grant planning permission for specific projects, even if these adhere to its principles. While broadly specifying building density levels and urban functions, the FNP does not define these for specific development sites and allows for a certain overall flexibility.

It is mostly related to this flexibility that I was able to detect more critical views regarding the degree to which the FNP achieves vertical integration in practice. On the one hand, a considerable consistency exists with lower-level plans for which implementation is legally guaranteed. For example, one officer at SenStadtUm emphasised the effectiveness of the FNP to prevent large-scale retail in areas that have not been assigned as mixed-use: “there, you immediately have the FNP as a very effective barrier.” On the other hand, this also meant that more flexible areas with mixed-use assignments have been increasingly accommodating larger retail units. Relatedly, the director of the German Institute of Urban Affairs noted a general shortcoming of the FNP by questioning the extent to which the Plan is effectively translated at the implementation phase:

“I am not that convinced that the things included in the Land Use Plan really impact on all public agencies and sectors at various levels. ... It is the implementation phase that is not strategically organised”

Klaus J. Beckmann, Director, German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu), Berlin

Furthermore, the FNP also continues to struggle with the vertical integration of some specific local conditions and great efforts are required to synchronise the design of individual projects with the overall strategic specifications set in the plan. Indicative of such tension are some of the related conflicts between SenStadtUm’s urban projects group and its land use planning team. The first group approaches sites through a project-specific urban design lens and is therefore able to consider more specific local conditions while the latter addresses sites through a ‘codified’, legal land use plan perspective.
Among the various vertical integration efforts, the Berlin-Brandenburg joint state planning process is arguably the most innovative and unique. Facilitated by the Joint State Planning Department (GL) introduced in the previous chapter, joint state planning is structured around the production of two main planning documents for the Berlin-Brandenburg Metropolitan Region, the State Development Programme (Landesentwicklungsprogramm - LEPro) and the Joint Spatial Development Plan (Gemeinsamer Landesentwicklungsplan – LEP). Joint state planning is based on the joint state planning law (Berlin and Brandenburg 1995) and is a comprehensive interpretation of federal legislation requiring consideration and coordination between neighbouring Länder as part of spatial planning (ROG 2008, §8(3)).

The LEPro constitutes the overarching framework for joint state planning and identifies the broad spatial development principles for Berlin and Brandenburg. Based on the LEPro, the Joint Spatial Development Plan (LEP) is prepared for the entire area of Berlin and Brandenburg covering an area of 30,370 km² at a scale of 1:250,000. It defines, amongst other things, the hierarchy of central places and urban core areas, the principal infrastructure including transport, potential development areas, land for open space and conservation. Given the plan’s relatively large scale, more traditional land use planning (in line with German land use plans) is deliberately left to more detailed plans such as Berlin’s FNP. To a great extent, joint state planning focuses on preserving undeveloped land located between the main radial public transport corridors and thereby aims to channel spatial development pressures in a more sustainable way (GL 2012).

The LEP is prepared every ten years with the current plan published in 2009.9 Following the principle of mutual consideration, lower-level planning in Berlin or Brandenburg’s municipalities needs to recognise the specifications in the joint state development plan. Ultimately, local plans cannot come into force unless they show full consideration of the targets in the joint state development plan (Häussermann 2003). As a result, about 2,000 individual decisions for local planning need to be confirmed by the joint planning department every year.

The governance and decision-making arrangements for joint state planning follow a clearly defined escalation path (Konflikttrepppe – see Figure 25). In the first instance, GL negotiates only internally with its representatives from both Länder and decisions can only be reached mutually (Häussermann 2003). If agreement cannot be achieved, discussions and decisions

---

9 The latest LEP published in 2009 replaced the 1998 version, which also included a more detailed Joint Spatial Development Plan for the Berlin-Brandenburg Metropolitan Region (Gemeinsamer Landesentwicklungsplan für den Inneren Verflächungsraum – LEP eV) prepared at a scale of 1:100,000 and covering a metropolitan core of 5,370 km² (GL 2009).
move to the next higher level. First, to the level of state secretaries, then minister/senator and finally to a state planning conference (Landesplanungskonferenz) attended and chaired by both the Mayor of Berlin and the Minister-President of Brandenburg (Berlin and Brandenburg 2015). While these conferences are seen as an effective coordination mechanism (Junge-Reyer and Szymanski 2006) it is, however, politics that prevail when taking decisions at the state planning conference and, according to the current director of GL, Jan Drews, decisions are rarely based on the actual technical questions and planning considerations at stake.

![Figure 25: Joint State Planning escalation path (Konfliktfalle)](image)

*Source: Krappweis (2001)*

Overall, the joint state planning process is considered an effective form of vertical integration. As highlighted in the previous section, there is no stronger collaboration between two German Länder as the one between Berlin and Brandenburg in the context of joint state planning. Krappweis (2001) stresses that after a period of adjustments and upgrading throughout the 1990s, joint state planning has become a mature and effective mechanism. And many interviewees emphasised the importance of joint state planning for connecting the city with the planning of its periphery:

*"The joint state planning attempts to balance competing objectives, it is never perfect but of enormous importance and a crucial instrument for city planning."
* Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig, Opposition Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Berlin

The former Berlin Senator for Urban Development Peter Strieder highlights the enormous importance of a formalised joint state planning approach as a process “that was normed and that was binding.” As a result, only 1 per cent of all land, which received permission for
residential development since the LEP\textsuperscript{10} was first published, was within green open space. This allowed the Brandenburg government to declare that implementing the inner before outer development principle through the LEP has been successful (Füger 2000). In addition, the regional parks, which are a by-product of the LEP, were welcomed by a broad coalition of key stakeholders, particularly given their function for regional recreation. Other positive outcomes of joint state planning include some progress with regard to the steering of retail developments in the metropolitan region and improved coordination related to large development projects and road building strategies.

Still, certain challenges and problems remain. Overall, the joint planning efforts continue to be challenged by the extremely divergent views and perspectives related to spatial development. Berlin’s urban focus ultimately is difficult to align with the larger area and also rural-based planning approach in Brandenburg. Such tension is further exacerbated by the significant degree of local autonomy of Brandenburg’s municipalities operating with their own self-perceptions.

Conflict related to specific planning content arose in particular with regard to Berlin’s land use plan, Brandenburg’s regional planning, the airport locations, large-scale retail (Krappweis 2001) and, according to several interviewees, the capacity of roads crossing Land boundaries. In particular, assigning land for retail developments remained for a long time a principal area of conflict (Junge-Reyer and Szymanski 2006). Furthermore, legal hurdles, which are considerable for any formal plan-making effort in Germany, challenge the joint state planning exercise. There is also a sense that at least for the last two decades, joint state planning kicked in too late after a few years of frantic and often uncontrolled development in Berlin’s periphery (Häussermann 2003).

More generally, transport planning is not centrally included in the joint state planning process, and synchronising road expansion programmes in Brandenburg with the urban street network of Berlin has been difficult (Photo 1). As mentioned in the previous chapter, while the coordination of spatial development with transport infrastructure investments is targeted by the LEP, the control of these investments does not rest with GL and is not decided based on the joint state planning process. This is particularly the case for transport investments linked to the federal transport infrastructure planning exercise (Bundesverkehrwegeplanung), which, according to GL Director Jan Drews, leaves little scope for concerns related to coordinating metropolitan spatial development:

\textsuperscript{10} This refers to the LEP eV (engerer Verflächungsraum) – inner area of influence (metropolitan Berlin).
“The federal transport infrastructure planning exercise includes tough negotiation and officials fighting for funding at the federal level will not contact the Joint State Planning to ensure a coordinated approach”

Jan Drews, Director, Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department, Potsdam

Similarly, transport planning efforts at Land, regional associations and municipal level are mostly dealt with independently from the LEP process. Overall, joint state planning mainly relies on a form of indirect coordination with sectoral planning efforts, which are not part of the narrower spatial planning remit. It is a coordination left to those planning levels which are informed by LEP and which in addition have direct sectoral integration mechanisms in place. Above all, this is the case for Berlin’s strategic planning exercise built around the land use plan.

Photo 1: B101 expansion (2005 – left and 2009 – right) - coordination conflict across Land boundary Berlin and Brandenburg

Source: Google Earth

The vertical links between citywide and local planning is based on a requirement of the latter to build on the specifications of the FNP. Local planning is administered by Berlin’s boroughs and includes three main components: area development planning, building development planning and neighbourhood management.

Area development planning (Bereichsentwicklungsplanung - BEP) sits directly underneath the FNP and constitutes an informal planning process that lies between the legally binding

---

11 The photo on the left shows the already constructed dual-carriageway in Brandenburg (upper half of image) while Berlin’s hesitation to expand road infrastructure led to a delay (compare photos left and right) in building the corresponding dual carriageway within Berlin (lower half of image).
and formal Land Use Plan (FNP) and building development plans (BPlan). BEP is binding for all public administrations and needs to be considered when developing building development plans (AGBauGB 2005, §4(2)). It is the quintessential borough-level planning instrument and has helped considerably to establish effective local planning led by the boroughs following the merger of borough administrations in 2000. BEP exercises prepare plans at a scale of 1:10,000, which are confirmed by a vote in local borough parliaments (BVV). And while these plans are prepared relatively infrequently, they are part of the counterflow planning arrangements in Berlin and identify changes that then need to be accommodated within the FNP.

Neighbourhood management (Quartiersmanagement) are area-specific programmes and the most localised form of urban planning and development (SenSUT 1998b). While these have a particular focus on social programming and improvement, they also cut across physical regeneration with substantial local urban design and transport considerations (Becker 2006). One of the main characteristics of neighbourhood management is the integrative character cutting across usually disconnected disciplines (Bagge 2002).

The direct legal power of any of the plans discussed so far relates to the degree that they are reflected in building development plans (Bebauungspläne - BPlan), as only these are legally binding for individual land and property owners. Germany’s Federal Building Code (BauGB, § 9) provides the basis for the kind of regulation that BPlans can put forward. According to German planning law, BPlans must be produced as soon as and as far as urban development makes it a requirement (BauGB 2004 §1(3)).

Essentially, BPlans are laws that regulate possible uses for an area and in addition define binding boundaries (e.g. for open space, transport corridors and streets), assign height limitations, floor area ratios and ground coverage of buildings. BPlans are the basis for planning permission and the final inspection and acceptance of construction works (Bauabnahme). As BPlans have to follow the general land use and urban form framework of the FNP as well as the guidelines set by all superior plans, they guarantee vertical integration by implementing all prior planning considerations for individual sites and building projects. Plans are published at a scale of 1:1,000.

In principle, BPlans are prepared by Berlin’s boroughs and confirmed by vote in the borough council, however, there are certain areas of particular relevance where the Berlin Senate is in charge of preparing these plans. In any event, all BPlans need to be checked by the technical oversight of the Senate administration (AGBauGB 2005, §6(4)). This is a relatively new division of labour that was introduced with the borough reforms in 2000, while previously the senate administration prepared BPlans.
While devolving the BPlan responsibilities to the boroughs has been broadly welcomed, there also remain problems with ensuring an analogous approach across the city. One interviewee with a citywide perspective highlighted the procedure related to building permissions, which, depending on issues related to transport and the environment, are often dealt with quite differently from borough to borough.

To summarise, vertical integration as part of Berlin’s urban development and transport planning efforts rests on a refined formal system of cascading spatial development plans. While these service both the vertical integration of spatial planning and transport planning, there is a substantial difference between the two.

The spatial planning system is directly plan-based and has been calibrated to also allow for feedback loops (Rückkopplung) from boroughs to senate administration and from the senate administration to the GL through the principle of counterflow planning. It is also important to once again emphasise the particularly innovative approach for joint state planning ensuring that lower-tier planning in Berlin and Brandenburg is synchronised. Based on my interviews and the related literature, overall, the vertical integration of spatial planning can be considered relatively advanced and effective. At the same time, it is also important to stress that due to generally low development pressures, the latest iterations of vertical coordination practices have also not been particularly challenged.

Vertical integration of transport planning is mainly based on aligning investment programmes starting at the federal level with National Transport Infrastructure Planning (Bundesverkehrswegeplanung). Down to the level of Berlin’s strategic planning effort built around the FNP, the vertical integration of these transport investment programmes are running parallel to and fairly separated from spatial planning. This implies a critical role of the horizontal integration of spatial planning and transport at the citywide level in facilitating the vertical integration of transport planning. Essentially, by coordinating transport and spatial development at the central node of citywide strategic planning, the refined processes of vertically integrating spatial planning are ‘mapped onto’ transport planning. This leads to a form of indirect vertical integration of transport planning. I discuss the details of this horizontal coordination at this central citywide node of planning in the next section.

**Horizontal integration: synchronising sectoral plans**

Sectoral integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies is clearly concentrated at the citywide level of the Land Berlin. Here, all related planning efforts and plan productions are facilitated by SenStadtUm, Berlin’s comprehensive urban development department. It is at this level where Berlin operates a set of integrative plans and planning mechanisms parallel to and informed by the Land Use Plan (FNP).
The most established and legally acknowledged planning mechanism for integrating spatial development in Berlin is the city’s land use planning (FNP) effort. Crucial for successful land use and transport integration, this strategic planning process defines and synchronises spatial development patterns such as density levels and the distribution of city functions with major transport corridors including important thoroughfares, the network of Berlin’s U-/S-Bahn and regional/inter-city rail. In addition, the Plan identifies community facilities and public utilities of supra-local importance, as well as green spaces, forests and agricultural land.

The process that establishes the FNP brings together the various sectors involved with urban development and the resulting common spatial strategy is the central reference point for all subsequent sectoral Urban Development Plans. More generally, Berlin’s Land Use Plan also centrally contributes to agenda-setting more widely and very openly communicates a normative agenda for compact urban development as introduced in the previous chapter. And overall, most of the interviewees and the relevant literature acknowledge Berlin’s FNP as an efficient tool for converting a holistic vision for Berlin into a spatial strategy.

According to my interviews, a particularly valuable dimension of the FNP concerns the capacity for keeping the Plan up to date. The frequency with which Berlin’s Land Use Plan is updated is unusually high. Between 1994 and 2012, the FNP was changed 175 times (Bunzel et al. 2012). Changes from 1994 to 2015 affected about 5 per cent of Berlin’s land area, with an increase in housing and green areas within the city but a reduction of sites for urban expansion (SenStadtUm 2015b). Regardless of this continuous change, the underlying strategic direction of the Plan was never put into question even as part of more significant updates (Bunzel et al. 2012). Every five years, the FNP is republished to include all new legal updates. Changes or additions to the FNP are commonly triggered by new requirements related to concrete investments or if large-scale adjustments of entire city districts are needed (Bunzel et al. 2012).

The overall flexibility and responsiveness of the FNP is enhanced by the fact that smaller changes can be agreed and only later are included in the redrawing of the overall plan. The 20 to 30 small changes of the FNP every year are announced as part of plan updates published every three to five years. With respect to the transport policy and projects, frequent updating of the FNP has ensured that all key projects were processed by the city’s cooperative planning scheme, rather than one administrative unit pushing through transport developments in parallel to the overall plan.

In 2004, the FNP was complemented by an additional strategic planning mechanism called the Urban Development Concept (Stadtentwicklungskonzept - StEK), which establishes the
underlying criteria for urban development in Berlin. Interviewed planning experts and policymakers emphasised that the StEK does not determine a specific ‘cityscape’ or an explicit planning approach but rather identifies the fundamental principles for urban development in Berlin and thus contributes to integrating sectoral planning, which has to work in accordance to these principles.

At the heart of translating these strategic planning efforts to sectoral planning exercises are so-called Urban Development Plans (Stadtentwicklungspläne - StEP) (SenStadtUm 2015d). StEPs are prepared for different sectors such as housing, economic development, social infrastructure, transport, utilities and waste disposal, while always relating back to the big picture set by the Land Use Plan. Their statutory relevance relies on a clause within the German Federal Building Code granting StEPs a critical role for the preparation of Building Development Plans (BPlans) which needs to consider the StEP’s objectives (BauGB 2004, § 1(6.11), AGBauGB 2005, § 4(1)). Still, several city-level interviewees pointed out that these plans have more of an informal character and to a large extent rely on their factual effect:

“StEPs do not have any legally-binding components, and property owners and investors cannot claim any rights based on them. But they are of enormous importance as guiding principles for spatial planning, based on which individual projects can be and are assessed, particularly by us representatives in the Berlin House of Representatives.”
Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig, Opposition Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Berlin

As ‘informal’ plans, StEPs do not require the formal procedures characteristic for conventional statutory plans but they are considered in the House of Representatives and sanctioned by vote. The integrative character of StEPs is widely valued across different sectors and the political spectrum and these plans have become an effective instrument for Berlin’s urban development:

“Berlin has a feature for which many other cities in Germany envy us. We developed sectoral urban development plans. … What works here relatively well is that these sectoral plans are well coordinated between each other and are regularly synchronised and updated with the Land Use Plan.”
Jan Eder, Managing Director, Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK)

One SenStadtUm official emphasised the ability of StEPs to function as an effective addition to Berlin’s strategic planning process as they provide direct feedback loops for the FNP. Following a similar perspective, Bunzel et al. (2012) highlight the ability of the StEPs to ensure a regular sectoral testing of the strategic objectives set out in the FNP.
Amongst the various StEPs, the Urban Development Plan for Transport (StEP Verkehr) plays the most important role for the subject of this study. Some interviewees even identified the StEP Verkehr as a real marker of a new integrative planning approach in Berlin. The plan, first published in 2003, combines specifications from the Land Use Plan with elements of the overall vision for Berlin, as well as more transport-specific objectives. The current StEP Verkehr of 2011 considered a time horizon up to 2025. Local experts emphasised the degree to which objectives and strategies – as well as measures of success that were developed for the Plan – took into consideration spatial structure, economic development and environmental effects. The plan also ensures that individual transport projects are not only analysed with respect to their transport effects but also with regard to the broad range of goals presented in the FNP. A diverse group of interviewees including the Head of Urban Planning and Projects, the Director of Transport Planning and the Speaker of the SPD Parliamentary Group were in agreement regarding the successful transport and land use integration facilitated by this plan:

“There is a truly remarkable coordination between urban development and transport. ... Thus there exists an integrated approach that from my perspective deserves all the honour.”
Hilmar von Lojewski, Head, Urban Planning and Projects, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin

“With the Urban Development Plan for Transport we have essentially for the first time a real integration of spatial development and transport following urban development policy targets.”
Christian Gaebler, Speaker, SPD Parliamentary Group, House of Representatives of Berlin

Important elements that made the StEP Verkehr a successful tool for horizontal integration relate to a noteworthy participatory effort and the use of calculative and evaluative instruments, which I discuss further below. The collaborative development of the StEP Verkehr ultimately served as a tool for communicating key causalities between land use and transport, which allowed the Plan to make a strong case for spatial development that recognised the negative effects of urban sprawl. Furthermore the StEP Verkehr provides the basis for assessing the appropriateness of projects that for years were controversially discussed without reaching any decision.

The StEP Verkehr also informs subsequent planning within the transport portfolio, most importantly the Urban Transport Plan (Nahverkehrsplan - NVP), which specifies accessibility, service quality and multi-modal integration of public transport services (SenStadtUm 2014b). In turn, the NVP forms the basis for the contractual agreements between transport operators and the Land Berlin (Verkehrsvertrag).
Another distinctive feature of the StEP Verkehr is the fact that it includes a financial assessment of all measures proposed. Each are further matched with possible funding sources and categorised by potential short, medium or long-term implementation. Berlin’s head of transport at SenStadtUm considered the inclusion of aspects related to financing and implementation yet another success factor of the StEP Verkehr. The budget for the period 2003 to 2015 was about 12 billion euros and prioritised funding for projects that promote public transport as well as walking and cycling. The only critical perspective that local interviewees voiced with regard to the implementation of the StEP’s overall strategic orientation concerned how the horizontal integration at the city level is then translated into a system of vertical integration between the city and borough level. As a result, borough administrations often seem to continue working quite independently from the StEP’s considerations.

A second category of congruent plans that supplement the Land Use Plan (FNP) at the citywide level are so-called Masterplans (Planwerke). These are prepared for areas of ongoing change and strategic importance and specify three-dimensional urban design characteristics at a scale of 1:1,000. Masterplans are entirely informal plans that are used to generate discussions, spread information and develop guiding spatial principles for future urban development. According to several officials at SenStadtUm, masterplans simply borrowed various procedural approaches of the StEPs. They are not based on any legal framework and were simply invented by the Urban Development Department. Unlike the two-dimensional Land Use Plan, masterplans include a significant amount of urban design and architectural principles. They are the most three-dimensional planning efforts conducted by SenStadtUm.

To date, masterplans have been prepared for four areas and include the inner city and the south-eastern, north-eastern and western areas of Berlin. Of particular interest with regard to urban design visions for Berlin is the Inner City Masterplan (Planwerk Innenstadt), the first masterplan that was sanctioned by the Berlin Senate in 1999 following many years of intense debate. It was prepared under the leadership of Hans Stimmann, Berlin’s then City Architect, and is recognised as a document with a relatively clear and strong vision for spatial development within Berlin’s core. Its key ambition was the rebuilding of Berlin according to the city’s historic street layout, overcoming the legacy of the period of car-oriented city planning. One expert summarised the effectiveness of the Inner City Masterplan as follows:

“The Land Use Plan does not lead to urban form. We know that. The Inner City Masterplan on the other hand generates interest amongst investors, identifies areas for business.
opportunities, public land to be sold, and other areas that the State of Berlin would like to see activated by the Federal Government.”

Hilmar von Lojewski, Head, Urban Planning and Projects, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin

In our interview, Hans Stimmann further emphasised that the ‘Planwerk Innenstadt’ meant a return to an urban design focus in urban development that is more concrete than the FNP. He regards it as a plan that tries to build on an architectural language, rather than that of land use planning (FNP at 1:25,000) or legal specifications (BPlan): “the success of our discipline [architecture] is to create images.” According to Stimmann, the Planwerk includes ‘1:1,000 images’, which the general public as well as politicians can read, and “the legibility of the plan is also its ability to accept criticism.” When the Planwerk Innenstadt was confirmed by a vote in Berlin’s House of Representatives, it was a novelty for an urban design plan to go through a Land parliament in Germany.

Implementing the Planwerk Innenstadt also relied on a particularity of the German building law, which has been used extensively in the case of Berlin. This relates to the law’s paragraph 34 (BauGB 2004), which allows for ‘plan-free’ interventions as long as urban design coherence with the existing urban fabric is guaranteed. According to one SenStadtUm official, this ‘fit with regard to the existing urban structure’ is “the real value of German spatial planning. You won’t find this too often in Europe.” It essentially allowed for plan-free development for many of Berlin’s inner city infill sites.

Another important case of better connecting urban planning with design concerns highway codes and public space designs. Since the 1990s, there has also been a shift in the federal and Berlin-wide guidelines for the design of urban streets (Richtlinie zur Anlage von Strassen - RAST). The classic approach when having to decide on the sectioning of street space was to choose from a range of street typologies, which specified required street sections depending on overall traffic flows. The revisions of these guidelines now cater for more individualised and thematic street designs that can be developed based on the guideline’s recommendations for a procedural step-by-step approach.

As a result, legal requirements for street designs can no longer be blamed as much as before for car-oriented layouts and as a result a more conscious weighing up of different options is taking place. Berlin has also worked on more concrete urban design interpretation of the RAST with its own manual for street and public space design ‘Handbuch zur Gestaltung von Strassen und Plätzen’ (SenStadt 1999). Former city architect Hans Stimmann stressed that Berlin’s interpretation of the RAST is a product of SenStadtUm’s urban design division and not that of the transport division.
To summarise, Berlin’s portfolio of interlocking plans and planning processes at the city level has undoubtedly created a solid and formal basis for horizontal, cross-sectoral integration. At its core sits Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP), a legally binding plan enacted by parliament and over time calibrated to what is generally seen as an appropriate geographic scale for citywide planning. However, several SenStadtUm interviewees stressed that the FNP by itself does not produce urban form, nor does it trigger transport strategies and private investment for urban development. It therefore is complemented by sectorally differentiated plans, the Urban Development Plans and the masterplans and ultimately achieves its integrative nature by its clearly defined role within a larger planning framework built around a system of plans. Given the considerable number of different plans, most interviewees further highlighted the importance that planning efforts in Berlin are conducted as a continuous process of ongoing exchanges instead of producing a plan only every ten or fifteen years.

At the same time, I could not detect major supporting instruments of horizontal integration beyond this core system of plans. For example, more innovative financing at the transport-land use interface such as land value capture is still relatively rare in Berlin. And the reliance on a sizable number of plans at the city level comes along with related challenges. Several interviewed planners, as well as one external observer, voiced concerns about the total number of plans and a risk of unmanageable plan proliferation. Above all, horizontal integration of planning processes faces the common problem of plan sequencing. For example, the Urban Development Plan for Transport was developed at a time when the Department for Urban Development had not even started with its new debate on integrated urban development and the Urban Development Concept was not finished.

To conclude this section, so far, I have considered the two main dimensions of vertical and horizontal integration separately. This has already shown a great codependence between the two, which is most evident through the role of citywide strategic planning as a form of ‘integration hub’. Furthermore, multiple underlying themes of planning integration have emerged which necessitate further discussion. Above all, this concerns the increasing plurality of planning actors as well as questions of information and knowledge, which establish the basis for multi-scalar and multidimensional planning for Berlin. The last part of this chapter below is dedicated to these cross-cutting themes.

5.3 Integration instruments and enabling conditions

This final section is dedicated to integration instruments and underlying enabling conditions, which have emerged through my research as particularly relevant in relation to both horizontal and vertical integration efforts. These cut across more technical instruments for
multi-scalar and multidimensional planning: the role of knowledge, skills and capacity as well as the plurality of actors. I discuss all three in separate subsections below.

**Technical instruments for multi-sectoral assessments**

The basis of most technical instruments used to advance the integration of urban planning and transport strategies are comprehensive datasets on existing and past urban development and activity patterns. These in turn enable a wide range of assessments, modelling, forecasting and backcasting exercises. Strategic planning exercises in Berlin, as is common in many cities, rest to a substantial degree on such forecasts, projections and expectations about future development.

Berlin operates and maintains various databases cutting across general socio-demographic, economic and environmental information. In addition, the monitoring of land development (Flächenmonitoring) and information on transport and travel patterns are particularly relevant for the policy nexus discussed here. Berlin’s land development monitoring entails a regular GIS-based recording of land uses, which serves, for example, as the basis for the FNP and BPlans. Three reports have been produced so far, the first covers the changes between 1990 and 2000 and the second and third reports, changes up to 2005 and 2010 respectively (SenStadtUm 2011a). This monitoring exercise has also been identified as an important instrument to check and confirm strategic planning targets (Bunzel et al. 2012).

Extensive monitoring of data is further related to transport with detailed and often real-time traffic flow information recorded by Verkehrslenkung Berlin und Verkehrsinformationszentrale (SenStadtUm 2011b). Public transport operating data and detailed passenger counts are produced by transport operators and shared with public authorities. In addition, SenStadtUm commissions a detailed urban travel survey that includes about 20,000 households and is usually conducted every ten years.

Among the various forecasting and modelling exercises for Berlin, interviewees from the transport sector identified future-oriented analysis of the city’s mobility patterns and transport system as among the most relevant for integrated urban and transport planning. Transport models are one part of this and are extensively used by transport operators and SenStadtUm. Berlin’s head of transport, Friedemann Kunst, highlighted that some of the transport modelling turned out to be particularly helpful for making the political case against ongoing suburbanisation as it was able to clearly show potential congestion and traffic volume effects of suburbanisation. Similarly, the influential policy target of 80:20 public versus private motorised transport in Inner Berlin was the result of a technical capacity analysis and not simply the outcome of a normative political agenda.
At the same time, several interviewees emphasised certain shortcomings, for example with regard to the limited theoretical testing of whether certain locations are indeed capable of accommodating additional activities and related transport demand. Instead, a more general awareness of accessibility levels for different parts of the city has been the prevailing approach for assigning different land use capacities.

With regard to a greater consideration of environmental externalities of urban interventions, environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a central device for related policy integration. Häussermann emphasises that such assessments have become particularly important for large infrastructure projects such as highways, airports and larger retail centres (Häussermann 2003). At the same time, EIAs are now also an integral part of strategic and building planning exercises. For Berlin’s FNP, as well as BPlans, European Law has required a formal environmental assessment since 2004 (BMF 2004). Today, these requirements have led to the development of methodologically differentiated Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments (Strategische Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung – SUP) (GL 2015). According to several interviewees, they guarantee certain minimum standards with regard to environmental sustainability and the integration of environmental concerns as part of spatial development strategies.

Another comprehensive planning instrument, which includes a wide-ranging impact analysis, is Germany’s Project Planning Approval Procedure (Planfeststellungsverfahren). It is required for the implementation of bigger infrastructure projects and also includes provisions for compulsory purchase. It is frequently used for transport projects and, in Berlin, has also been applied for some key street redevelopment programmes. In the context of urban streets, the requirement for this approval procedure was stipulated in 1999 with the introduction of the Street Law (Strassengesetz) making it compulsory for the redevelopment of category 1 and 2 streets. The head of transport at Berlin’s borough Mitte stressed the enormous efforts related to conducting ‘Planfeststellung’ but also acknowledged its significant advantages with regard to an integrated planning approach which, in addition, then rests on a particularly solid legal basis.

The integrative force of these technical instruments is two-fold. Their direct impact facilitates the integration of a wider set of objectives as part of spatial development decisions while they indirectly foster multi-sectoral planning practice and collaboration.

Knowledge, skills and capacity

Regarding broader enabling conditions for integration, institutional knowledge needs to be considered first. As shown above, multi-sectoral departments like SenStadtUm are set up around the creation of ‘policy-bundles’ that cut across the urban planning and transport
portfolios. By default this bundling has created a legacy of institutional knowledge related to the management of cross-sectoral issues. This includes, for example, the experience in setting up cross-sectoral working groups, managing the input from a diverse group of key stakeholders, convening multidisciplinary advisory boards and establishing an overall culture of multi-disciplinary collaboration. Still, several interviewees stressed that targeted approaches of pooling knowledge at SenStadtUm remain rare and so do rigorous methodologies that would assist knowledge pooling at different stages of the planning process.

Creating institutional knowledge which assists the integration of urban planning and transport strategies is obviously even more challenging for organisations that are not directly charged with catering for a broader policy spectrum but which nevertheless have some level of involvement with relevant strategies. In Berlin, public transport operators are a good example of this. For Berlin’s S-Bahn, Director of Planning Felix Pohl emphasised the importance of acquiring at least a certain competence in related fields, particularly urban planning, in order to effectively fulfil the role as key stakeholder. Above all, he referred to potential coordination problems if operators only act as ‘coachmen’ (Lohnkutscher), which would eventually mean that individual key stakeholders retreat from broader planning and policy debates.

Within the urban transport and planning sectors, Berlin also complemented its institutional knowledge by accessing important information on integrative programmes elsewhere. Some of the knowledge transfer was facilitated by the European Union, and State Secretary Engelbert Lütke Daldrup emphasised EU programmes such as EUKN, URBACT and INTERREG\(^\text{12}\), which allowed Berlin to learn from experiences across European Cities. In addition, an extensive degree of ad hoc and network exchanges with other cities in Germany and worldwide was highlighted.\(^\text{13}\) According to local interviewees, the transport sector in particular appears to have profited from significant opportunities to transfer specific integrated policy ideas ranging from parking regulation to cycle policy and pedestrian planning.

By contrast, Berlin’s public administration is traditionally less known for directly involving local university scientists and researchers as advisors (Arndt and Becker 2003). However, I also found some evidence that this may be beginning to change. On the one hand, recent

\(^{12}\) An overview of these programmes is provided by the European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN 2015)

\(^{13}\) For example in Germany the Deutscher Städtetag and Difu and globally ICLEI, C40, EuroCities and Metropolis
years have seen an increasing exchange between academics and public officials and on the other hand I detected a clear appreciation of stronger links in this regard. In the case of Berlin-Brandenburg joint state planning, its director Jan Drews even identifies urban studies and science as providing the ‘justification context’ (Begründungszusammenhang) for planning measures.

A further theme that emerged through my interviews in Berlin in relation to institutional knowledge concerned continuity and longer-term time horizons. It was repeatedly put to me that building the capacity of working together required time. In the context of borough restructuring, Councillor for Urban Development in Pankow, Jens-Holger Kirchner, emphasised that directly after the merger between the Boroughs of Pankow and Prenzlauer Berg a lot of energy was spent simply getting to know each other. And it is only now, more than ten years later, that working together has become constructive. In many cases, however, the time required to develop institutional knowledge on collaborative practices was not available and this, according to several interviewees from both borough and city-level administrations, led to coordination problems.

Furthermore, the experience in Berlin has shown that organisational restructuring often impacts negatively on institutional knowledge, as some of the key relationships nurturing cross-disciplinary knowledge can get lost. Such knowledge and related losses not only exist for intra-organisational collaboration but also for joint work between organisations. One interviewee highlighted the negative consequences for coordination between SenStadtUm, the boroughs and transport operators as a result of frequent restructuring within Berlin’s main transport operator BVG. In these and related circumstances, one mitigating factor for limited and disrupted institutional knowledge was the ability of individuals to support integrated planning and policymaking.

The Berlin case study also provided many pointers with regard to the skills and capacity of individuals involved in planning and policymaking and their part in facilitating work across disciplinary boundaries. In fact, throughout my interviews in Berlin, this emerged as a particularly prominent dimension of integrated urban development:

“Ultimately, integrated urban and transport planning depends on individuals that are able to think in a cross-sectoral way”
Friedemann Kunst, Director, Transport Planning, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin

“It is all about individuals and people when it comes to integration”
Officer, SenStadtUm
Ensuring that broader cross-sectoral know-how exists at the level of individuals presents a challenge even within large departments such as SenStadtUm, which are generally able to accumulate a substantial degree of knowledge across all relevant policy sectors. On the one hand, the decade-long collaborative work created a fruitful basis for related capacity building. On the other hand the department had to secure key individuals at the senior management and director level that were equipped with related knowledge prior to their appointment. As former Senator Peter Strieder asserted, the ability of individuals to deal with conflict resolution between different sectors was a key consideration particularly for several transport-related appointments. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, there were several key individuals who have centrally facilitated transport and urban development integration. At the same time, there were those who had a narrower sectoral perspective and had to be substituted:

“Transport planning with new personnel was an integrated component of more integrated urban development. … From 1999 onwards integration in my department was very much based on personnel”
Peter Strieder, former Senator for Urban Development, Berlin

In addition to a small number of new staff members across Berlin’s administration, a suite of education and skills upgrading measures, ranging from professional training to trainee programmes, is used to build capacity and enhance individuals’ skills. Most of these are facilitated by Berlin’s Academy for Public Administration (Verwaltungsakademie Berlin), an organisation dedicated to the education of current and future public officials. A further example of capacity building for more collaborative and integrated practices is linked to project-based work. According to several urban development officers, this has recently pushed skills and skills development related to project-oriented leadership much higher up on the agenda. At the same time I encountered important reminders that there are fundamental barriers to training and skills upgrading:

“Some people can or want to work in an interdisciplinary way, others don’t. In the latter case I can write as many proclamations about interdisciplinary work as I want … but in reality it is not happening”
Siegfried Dittrich, Senior Officer Transport Planning, Borough Berlin-Mitte

Furthermore, a major constraint for capacity building within Berlin’s administration at senate and borough level is the city’s budget deficit and related austerity measures, which resulted in a prolonged hiring freeze. As a result, less than 2 per cent of SenStadtUm staff is younger than 30 years (PStat 2014). Along the same lines, borough administrators referred to the lack of a certain level of staff turnover as limiting new and fresh input. This was regarded as
particularly important given the cultures of public administrations, which tend to discourage creativity.

Furthermore, staffing policy for Berlin’s public administration included a significant reduction plan for public sector jobs (see Figure 26 for actual reduction). This implied that the skills of individuals often do not match the requirements of the post they have been assigned to. In addition, at senior levels, a particular tension between political and technical appointments exists. One SenStadtUm interviewee suggested that too many senior appointments are linked to political careers rather than technical expertise, which may compromise the quality of cross-sectoral collaboration.

![Figure 26: Public employees in Berlin 1991 to 2013](source: Wegrich and Bach (2014))

Individual capacities to bridge knowledge areas also depend on access to information. The importance of personal relationships in achieving this and for strengthening interdisciplinary collaboration across the relevant sectoral spectrum is self-evident. More interesting and context specific is the way these relationships are fostered. In Berlin, in some instances they were created through project work, which can easily include over 100 meetings per project and therefore can build relatively strong personal relationships between different team members. Furthermore, collective experiences outside of meeting rooms and offices also positively contributed to more personal working relationships. In this context, the additional benefits of joint site visits as a form of collective experience and confrontation with the planning reality on the ground was clearly recognised.

Another form of personal relationships leading to significant collaboration advantages is based on long-term connections. Sometimes, as experienced by several interviewees, these even date back to university. It is in these instances, as one local official pointed out, where one has the enormous benefit of speaking openly to each other about certain developments along the lines of: “What kind of nonsense are you doing over there?”
Creating a solid basis for more integrated working relationships has also been achieved by exposure to similar experiences. For example, in the case of the borough administration in Pankow, building works at one point eliminated car parking and meant that many employees started to arrive by bike or public transport. In turn, this behaviour change generated a much better understanding of these systems and their links with urban development. Councillor Kirchner emphasised the importance of cycle affinity within his administrations, which ultimately enabled an effective integrated cycling policy. In these cases, the daily experience of the city from a user’s experience among city officials has made a positive difference to integrated planning.

**Plurality of actors: Integrated planning impediment or enabling condition?**

This final subsection considers the role of engaging a plurality of network actors in enabling integrated planning and policymaking. It is expanding the above discussion on network governance beyond the narrower question of organisational structures and considers actor plurality as a broader enabling condition. For statutory planning processes in Germany, the involvement of key stakeholders (Trägerbeteiligungsverfahren) is required by the German Federal Building Code and brings together representatives of public agencies and organisations of public interest (BauGB 2004, §4). Typically this includes lower tiers of government, the chamber of commerce, transport operators and a whole range of advocacy groups. According to most interviewees and the reviewed literature, Berlin is characterised by a comparatively strong commitment to including key stakeholders in various planning processes ranging from the conceptualisation through to the implementation phase. At the city level this involvement is most formalised for the preparation of the Land Use Plan (FNP):

“For Berlin’s Land Use Plan, we have meetings every six months where really everybody sits at a large table to talk about required changes. This is then not about some minor details but about how our criteria or the consensus of urban development plans is reflected in these changes. This is a continuous process. ... What works quite well in Berlin is the ability to cooperate regarding the most relevant issues to ultimately reach a consensus. This consensus has to be in the heads and not on paper.”

Jan Eder, Managing Director, Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK)

Stakeholder engagement of most planning efforts in Berlin takes place at an early stage of the planning process and interviewees repeatedly highlighted related advantages. At the level of citywide planning in Berlin and for the development of the StIEK and related general principles, the involvement of key stakeholders provides the basis for sectoral integration. The director of Berlin’s Chamber of Commerce identified the relevance of Berlin’s urban development principles as a result of being “developed in a relatively integrative and
cooperative way.” Difu’s director, Klaus J. Beckmann, echoed this by underlining that the key links between the StEK and various sectoral planning perspectives are ensured by a relatively wide contribution and collaboration as part of the StEK preparation process.

Among the various sectoral planning exercises of relevance to this study, transport-related initiatives have a particularly strong stakeholder engagement component. Groups that are typically included here are the public transport operators (above all BVG and S-Bahn Berlin) and a range of third sector advocacy groups such as the German Automobile Club (ADAC), the German Transport Club (VCD), the Public Transport Passenger Association (IGEB), the railway lobby group ProBahn, and several environmental groups. Their involvement tends to be most effective at the level of the StEP Verkehr and the Urban Transport Plan:

“There were round tables … and there was a lot of exchange of the various interests and due to process orientation this ultimately led to far-reaching support for final results.”
Klaus J. Beckmann, Director, German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu), Berlin

The StEP Verkehr round table acted as both a sounding board as part of the plan-making process and as a mechanism to secure commitments of key stakeholders to the implementation phase. To guarantee a productive working relationship within the round table group, exchanges were structured around achieving broad and unifying objectives rather than a project-oriented approach, which, according to one interviewee, would have divided the group from the beginning.

In addition, a scientific board of appointed practitioners and academics also assisted the preparation of the 2011 StEP Verkehr. Cutting across a wide range of disciplines, including transport and mobility research, economics, urban development and ecology, board members were frequently asked to comment on key strategies and informed the planners about state-of-the-art practice. These integrative procedures enabled the StEP Verkehr to put forward a central transport-related argument against urban sprawl within the metropolitan region.

The most recent engagement process as part of the 2011 StEP Verkehr required more than two years, during which round table meetings took place every four to eight weeks. According to Friedemann Kunst, it was a process through which certain limitations became clear, for example with regard to a threshold level of technical complexity that could be communicated in such a process. Still, one interviewee stressed that the participatory efforts of the StEP Verkehr ensured, for example, that there was not a single transport project that would have not been presented and discussed as part of the StEP Verkehr process.

Parallel to the engagement of key stakeholders, public participation is a further central component of Berlin’s formal and informal planning processes. However, its implication for
The Integrated Ideal in Urban Governance

Chapter 5 – Berlin

planning and policy integration diverges from that of involving key stakeholders. The nature of public participation for individual processes is legally specified, for example, in the Federal Building Code (BauGB 2004, §3) and ranges from distributing information to allowing for proactive input. In 1995, changes to Berlin’s constitution also opened up possibilities for public referenda. Conducting referenda became more common from 2007 onwards, following the simplification of upfront conditions that had to be met before a public vote would be possible (Wegrich and Bach 2014).

The statutory requirement for public participation is strongest for the formal components of Berlin’s planning framework, above all for land use planning (FNP) and building development planning (BPlan). Overall, the portfolio of participatory instruments for Berlin’s FNP far exceeds what is the legally required minimum (Bunzel et al. 2012). However, references to any considerable impact of this form of participation on the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies were largely absent throughout my interviews and may suggest that it has not been an important factor for planning integration.

By contrast, the most recent experience with public referenda indicates that this form of direct democracy may be a more disruptive force for planning and policy integration. On 25 May 2014, a referendum that opposed the Senate’s plan for redeveloping parts of former Tempelhof Airport passed the required quorum and won the majority of votes. As a result, the city had to stop the development of its masterplan, related building development planning and the amendment process for the FNP (SenStadtUm 2014a).

The participatory dimension of transport planning differs significantly from that of spatial and building planning. Most importantly, there is a difference between participation related to strategic transport plans, which tends to be limited, and public involvement in specific transport projects, where there are far-reaching legal requirements for participation. The first category includes the National Transport Planning Exercise, Berlin’s StEP Verkehr and Urban Transport Plan (NVP).

The second category of transport project-related participation includes, for example, the previously mentioned plan approval procedure (Planfestellungsverfahren), for which public participation is clearly defined. Still, as Berlin’s transport director Friedemann Kunst acknowledges, in general, this participation also only takes place relatively late in the process, includes only a few affected individuals and overall suffers from insufficient resources.

At the borough level, transport projects feature a range of different forms of participation. Interviewees differentiated between two principal cases. First, those where initial project
ideas (and funding) come from higher levels within borough administrations and are then introduced to the general public through several rounds of participation and opportunities for feedback. Second, cases that are more open and intensive forms of participation, which focus on understanding local problems first while collecting initial ideas for problem solving.

Still, even at the local level of project-based participation, shortcomings of its effective integration into the formal planning process were raised. Several interviewed planners expressed their concerns related to participatory processes, which are unable to take full account of the significant legal constraints, such as those related to street design standards and norms, under which planning decisions are taken. Without knowledge of these legal arrangements, as one local planning officer highlighted, explaining the framework for certain decisions to the general public is difficult.

A final component of a wider engagement of actors and citizens in Berlin specifically relates to the city’s planning culture, which is characterised by a strong and engaged civil society, a ‘Bürgergesellschaft’. As in the case of public participation, its role with regard to planning and policy integration remains ambiguous while certainly no less relevant to be presented here. There are many indications for an engaged civil society, ranging from a considerable interest of the general public in urban politics and public life\textsuperscript{14} to key institutions and processes of co-production. Some of these processes are initiated by residents, others by the political leadership but all imply a certain level of dialogue across public officials, key stakeholders and citizens.

Cases of entirely citizen-led approaches are citizens’ initiatives and action groups, which have a long tradition in Berlin. Some prominent examples of these have established the basis for recent referenda while others focus more on a project-level engagement with particular sites and local opportunities and challenges. Prominent examples of the latter are bottom-up initiatives targeting the temporary use of public and private spaces. These range from urban pioneering, which established new localised instruments for urban interventions, to urban catalysts, which create opportunities for future urban development through temporary strategies (SenStadt 2007, Oswalt et al. 2013).

A conclusive perspective on how such initiatives relate to the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies is difficult. On the one hand, it was partially the legacy of local activism in Berlin that introduced the shift away from the car-oriented, modernist city,

\textsuperscript{14} The 2014 Berlin Study (Anheier 2014) indicated that 86 per cent of Berliners are interested in the city’s politics and public life.
which in turn established the more integrated practices addressing different scales of urban and transport planning. Similarly, many of today’s local action groups are aligned with the principles of strategic planning in the city and above all demand a more rapid implementation. On the other hand, and as in the case of new forms of direct democracy, Wegrich and Bach (2014) identify a certain tension between the proactive citizenry and the institutionalised governance and administration of Berlin. This also implies a certain degree of disruption of Berlin’s refined formal integrative planning processes.

By contrast, linking dialogues between the city’s citizenry and formal planning processes appears to be easier when these are initiated by Berlin’s administration in the context of strategic planning. An example for open dialogue implemented by Berlin’s political leadership is the Stadtforum Berlin. The Stadtforum is widely considered an important component of public engagement, debate and strategy finding for a city that has been exposed to considerable change over a short period of time. It features several of the core characteristics of Hajer’s (1995) idea of ‘societal inquiry’ introduced in Chapter 3 – a civic stage for public deliberations which informs strategic decision-making. A central quality of the Stadtforum was to constitute what one interviewee referred to as a ‘cultural urban society’ based on discussions about the future of the city:

“If these discussions exist, people are coming together with their very different backgrounds, they are open to dialogue and also qualify their own thinking about the city and the related engagement.”

Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig, Opposition Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Berlin

The Stadtforum has gone through two phases. First, and directly after reunification, it has been a bottom-up initiative which included engaged citizens and experts. Later on it was institutionalised under the leadership of Senator Hassemann, who was described by one interviewee as having had a particular interest in dialogue and process rather than concrete project development. A much broader range of experts were then officially invited to participate, some of them also as consultants. The mid-1990s then saw the attempt of using the Stadtforum to formulate a citywide development strategy, which since then has been repeated and most recently led to the 2030 Urban Development Concept (SenStadtUm 2013).

While strategic questioning always remained the underlying approach, the strategies discussed at the Stadtforum also tended to include a focus on specific areas or aspects. In the 1990s this was the urban design strategy around the Planwerke and, more recently, there is a ‘smart city’ focus. The Stadtforum, while being reformed under each state secretary over the
last 20 years, has never lost its role as an integral component of participation and stakeholder engagement for the strategic development of Berlin.

In summary, I was able to find clear evidence that access to information and knowledge played a fundamental role for planning and policy integration in Berlin. This role tended to be multidimensional even for individual categories of information. For example, data on land use development directly informed the integrated development of the FNP but also created a context for collective discussions and engagement across disciplinary borders. This in turn enabled more collaborative practices, which strengthened integrated planning.

Similarly, fundamental, institutional knowledge on collaboration was recognised as a key dimension for integrated planning but appears more vulnerable given the ongoing restructuring of Berlin’s administrative system. Such changes compromise the long time periods required to establish effective practices and also build the connection points between units and individuals. As a result, integrative practices in Berlin also depend, to a considerable degree, on individuals. Some of these had to be brought into the administration as newcomers and equipped with the capabilities to work across silos. However, most existing staff had to adjust to more integrated practices ‘on the job’. This may suggest that Berlin’s experience in integrated planning and policymaking is well aligned with the idea that processes of cooperation are first and foremost processes of learning (Axelrod 2006).

Finally, across all forms of actor engagement, the process-orientation of planning efforts in Berlin greatly assisted sustained contributions by a wide range of actors and citizens. However, while I was able to confirm a plurality of actors engaged in the most relevant urban development and transport planning exercises, implications for planning and policy integration were more difficult to derive. The clearest evidence emerged with regard to the critical role of involving key stakeholders for effective integrated planning in Berlin. It is here where the bringing together of a multidimensional and multi-scalar perspective, particularly in the context of the FNP and the StEP Verkehr, is regarded as a central support system for planning and policy integration.

With regard to wider participatory practices that involve the general public, I registered further advantages but also impediments to integrated planning. On the one hand and in the absence of such practices, strategic planning may be exposed to problems of acceptance or even legitimacy while individual projects may be subject to considerable opposition at a planning phase when further revisions are either costly or impossible. On the other hand, I recorded various references to more localised, insular participatory perspectives, which did not ‘synchronise’ well with broader strategic planning frameworks.
One possible explanatory factor for the degree to which the plurality of actors implies a real contribution to more integrated planning and policymaking may be the extent to which it translates into improving access to information and knowledge. The latter certainly appears the case for involving key stakeholders. In the case of wider participatory practices, access to localised knowledge can be considerable but may be compromised by the limited information and knowledge of the same actors regarding broader strategic issues, legal planning contexts and technical requirements. In the following final section, I explore the broader role of information and knowledge as the foundation for integrated practices.

Conclusion

Spatial governance and planning in Berlin is characterised by a deeply rooted aspiration for integration. By and large, this chapter has identified a substantial range of governance structures, planning processes, instruments and enabling conditions that are deliberately addressing integrated urban planning, city design and transport strategies in Berlin. And, over the 20 years following Germany’s reunification in 1990, these have been upgraded and improved by combining hierarchy with networks, and have ultimately become more capable of addressing the strategic compact city agenda introduced in the previous chapter.

With regard to additional broader understanding of integrated planning and policymaking and in relation to my research questions, my observations in Berlin established three particularly relevant perspectives. First, I encountered a high degree of convergence of vertical and horizontal integration. Second, the Berlin case study underlined the long time required to establish more integrative practices. And third, my analysis inferred that the benefits for integrated planning of a greater plurality of actors depended on whether or not these allowed for accessing otherwise inaccessible information and knowledge. Below, I consider each of these perspectives to conclude this chapter.

The convergence of vertical and horizontal integration has become evident in several instances and presents a challenge to the idealised typologies of planning and policy integration presented in most of the literature. To begin with, Berlin relies on funding programmes from higher tiers of government that often have clear specifications for cross-sectoral considerations. For example, the Federal Transport Infrastructure Programme (BVWP), which is essentially a funding-related transport plan, requires multidimensional impact assessments conducted by lower tiers of government. Similarly, many federal-level support programmes for urban development necessitate evidence on planning and policy integration as a pre-condition for making funding available.
A further case of vertical-horizontal integration convergence relates to the role of the central node for horizontal integration, i.e. the citywide level with the FNP and related processes. It is here where vertically integrated but sectorally differentiated planning processes are ‘mapped onto’ each other as part of Berlin’s wider system of plans. This in turn establishes horizontal integration at higher and lower planning scales. Not surprisingly, the opposition leader, Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig singled out the urban development plans, together with the vertical integration efforts of the joint state planning, as planning instruments of the greatest importance for Berlin’s collaborative and integrated planning.

A third example concerns the integration of two-dimensional land use planning and three-dimensional city design. On the one hand this is addressed by Berlin’s cascading system of plans, which represent a pure form of vertical integration. From the almost entirely two-dimensional FNP downwards, three-dimensional design considerations are becoming more prominent and are then incorporated at the level of building development planning (BPlans). On the other hand, the planning-design integration is also addressed horizontally at the citywide level. Here, examples range from the city’s masterplanning efforts to establishing a street design manual. Both build primarily on linking separate disciplinary perspectives, above all urban planning and transport, by making use of issues related to design and placemaking.

A second perspective relates to the long timescales required for establishing more integrated planning and policymaking. First, there was the considerable effort and lengthy process that established new planning mechanisms, facilitating better integration throughout the 1990s. But even with new mechanisms in place, above all joint state planning (LEP) and the informal sectoral urban development plans (StEPs), substantial adjustment periods were required to make a real difference on the ground. As a result, even though the early 1990s saw many of the ideas for new integrated planning in Berlin-Brandenburg emerge, it took, for example, another ten years before it was possible to steer suburbanisation more successfully.

The long implementation phase of more integrative practices also underscored the relevance of continuity in enabling the collaborative processes within and across different institutions. Given the long lead times of calibrating new working relationships in extended actor networks, limiting disruptions and organisational change to a minimum level appeared critical. Related also is the recurring theme of the advantages of Berlin’s planning system as a result of establishing ongoing processes of collaboration rather than one-off or infrequent moments of coming together. In Berlin, the continuity of planning processes and relationships have ensured precisely the type of ‘fluidity’ of interaction on which integration
is largely based, and restricted the falling-back to the organisational default of fragmentation and isolation.

This brings me to my final observation in relation to implications for integration as a result of an increasing number of planning actors. I certainly encountered solid evidence that the involvement of key stakeholders at multiple stages of the planning process has had a positive effect. By and large, this effect was the result of accessing specialised knowledge combined with getting actors on board for an implementation process that inevitably relied on some of them for its success. To a degree, the same effect has also been highlighted for the participation of the general public. However, there are additional dynamics in the latter case, which present integrated planning and policymaking with an inherent challenge. First, the extent to which fruitful engagement in planning relies on technical and legal knowledge and, second, the balancing of localised interest and strategic objectives at the citywide level.

With regard to the latter, Berlin’s Bürgergesellschaft, coupled with opportunities for engaging at the strategic level of planning, may be a mitigating factor for excessive local opposition. The considerable impact of strategic planning on local planning, certainly by international standards, may in fact be one enabling factor. Assigning an influential role to the citywide level of planning could be seen as one reason for greater public participation at precisely that level, which is, in turn, less prone to be driven by primarily local concern and NIMBYism. At the same time, new mechanisms for direct democracy are capable of potentially disrupting the finely tuned strategic planning process led by Berlin’s formal government institutions.

Up to this point any of the perspectives above on the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies are entirely case study specific and may only relate to the particular experience in Berlin. To move beyond such single case study observations, contrasting these findings with those of the London case study establishes some indications as to whether these are potentially generalisable. Therefore, before further extending my conclusions in the final two chapters, I now move to the presentation and discussion of my research findings in London. I do this by broadly following the same structure as for Berlin.
Chapter 6
London: Urban governance with a new centre

With this chapter I turn to the London case study, covering the broad categories of integration mechanisms developed for my research framework and presented for Berlin in the previous chapter. I initially explore the role of integration structures in the first section, which is followed by integration processes in the second part. The final section includes the key integration instruments and enabling conditions.

6.1 Integration structures: From partnership to leadership

I begin the presentation of integration structures for London by introducing the devolution of political authority from national to London-wide government and by addressing related changes to the governance geographies. I then move to the more specific role of newly created leadership arrangements around ‘governance bundles’ targeting more integrated land use and transport development. The last section focuses on the balancing of mayoral, hierarchical coordination efforts and wider network integration with broader groups of key stakeholders.

Rescaling the state and adjusting governance geographies

The considerable change in governing Greater London since the 1980s has resulted in clearly identifiable variations in citywide governance structures, with substantial effects on planning and policy integration. The abolition of the GLC in 1986 left decision-making for London highly fragmented (Rao 2008) and its administration dysfunctional (Brown 2002).

Overall there were three general approaches to dealing with the former powers and responsibilities of the GLC. The most pronounced shift of powers was towards national government, followed by enhancing the roles of London boroughs and additionally by assigning responsibilities to special ad hoc organisations (see Table 8) (Newman and Thornley 1997). Following GLC abolition, governing its former territory had become highly fragmented and individualised. Jones (2008) refers to the Local Government Handbook of 1988 which identified over 60 organisational units dividing Greater London in almost 30 different ways.

The most relevant group in the context of this study was the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC). The committee’s main task was to provide feedback on major development proposals discussed by local planning committees and to represent the London
boroughs as part of the strategic planning exercise led by national government. At the time, strategic frameworks materialised in the form of policy guidance that needed to be recognised by the boroughs for preparing their unitary development plans (Pimlott and Rao 2004).

Table 8: Examples of Committees related to Transport and Planning in London after GLC abolition
Source: edited based on Thornley (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Joint Committees of the Boroughs</th>
<th>b) Organisations set up by central government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership comprises representatives from Boroughs and the City Corporation.</td>
<td>Apointments made by central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London Planning Advisory Committee</td>
<td>• London Docklands Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London Committee on Accessible Transport</td>
<td>• London Regional Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parking Committee for London</td>
<td>• London Regional Passengers Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• London Ecology Committee (not all Boroughs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the re-election of the Conservative government in 1992, demands for increasing coordination for London were translated into governance and policy reform. This came along with an increase in the number of centrally controlled agencies to lead the drafting of strategies, related research and assist with the distribution of resources for London (Bailey 1997). Most importantly, it included setting up the Government Office for London (GOL), a Minister for London and a Minister for Transport in London in 1994 (Pimlott and Rao 2002, Busetti 2015). Central government leadership throughout the 1990s generated, for example, the strategic guidance for London and London Pride Prospectus (Thornley 1999). By 1993, research by Skelcher and Stewart (1993) quoted by Thornley et al. (2002) suggests that there were 272 agencies in Greater London cutting across education, health and transport services.

In addition, significant efforts were made to facilitate all kinds of partnerships at the city level. While some of these focused on collaborations between local government and public sector entities, above all the London boroughs, the main objective was to connect the private and public sector. Arguably the most important effort at the time was the London Pride Partnership that brought together London First, the most relevant business sector organisation, the Association of London Government (ALG), LPAC, and the Cities of London and Westminster (Rao 2008).

Still, the partnership arrangements of the 1990s could not overcome more fundamental coordination deficits. Most importantly, having to deal with and coordinate 33 local authorities not only limited strategy making but also led to difficulties in implementing networked infrastructure and management schemes, particularly in transport (Turton 2002). Besides coordination failures, the most important concern was a democratic deficit (Syrett
and Baldock 2003) in what Salet et al. (2003b) identify as a technocratic, quango-driven metropolitan regime. These were among the many factors that eventually led to the re-establishment of a citywide government in 2000, which I turn to below.

The creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000 as a strategic authority including a directly elected mayor provided the basis for democratic legitimacy at the Greater London level. It also established new opportunities for coherent policymaking and planning. An important reference to the general thinking about how to facilitate integration through structural change was highlighted by New Labour’s government modernisation agenda, which identified “a more corporate approach to achieving cross-cutting goals” (UK Cabinet Office 1999, p20). Setting up the GLA was by far the most important single structural reform that impacted on, and as most commentators argue improved, the coordination of transport and spatial planning in London. In fact, coordinating and integrating policy is itself a major objective of the GLA Act, which specifically emphasises the GLA’s role in ensuring consistency of different sectoral strategies (GLA Act 1999, Section 41.5).

More generally, holistic governance was emphasised by defining the principal purposes of the GLA as promoting “economic development and wealth creation”, “social development” and “the improvement of the environment” in Greater London (GLA Act 1999, Section 30.2). But it was specifically assigning transport planning and operations responsibilities and strategic planning powers to the GLA (GLA Act 1999, Part IV and VIII), which created tangible opportunities for aligning related sectoral strategies at the level of Greater London. Both the new competencies and related coordination capacities at the GLA level were, among others, helped by consolidating a long list of joint arrangements and bodies such as the LRC, LPAC and the Joint London Advisory Panel (Rao 2008). Still, the basic structure within the GLA and its functional bodies follows conventional divisional lines (GLA 2013a, TfL 2013), which come along with coordination problems such as the blind spots that I discuss in the next chapter.

In Chapter 4 I have already identified the separation of strategic and delivery functions as a key principle for setting up the GLA and it was primarily the first, strategic function that was granted to the new London government. Tewdwr-Jones identifies in this approach the principles of New Labour’s ‘joined-up government’ agenda to enhance coordination (Tewdwr-Jones 2009). However, the separation of strategy-making and implementation powers was also referred to by several interviewees as ‘artificial’ and even ‘ridiculous’. It was also seen as leading to a dilemma in identifying what is strategic and what not. And interviewees from inside and outside London government tended to agree that the results of
policymaking were much better where powers were more extensive and included implementation and operational authority.

The governance of transport serves as a good example. Here implementation and service delivery is indeed closer to GLA oversight with the Mayor of London chairing the TfL board while still separated by the GLA – TfL differentiation. In some ways this is a structure that, at least in theory, acknowledges transport as derived demand, i.e. the result of urban form and the distribution of city functions, which itself is centrally informed by urban planning and spatial policy. London’s governance structure reflects this by establishing a degree of hierarchy between urban development, which is directly assigned to the GLA/Mayor of London level (higher), and transport, mainly attached to the TfL level (lower).

While the GLA (strategic) and TfL (service) differentiation seems to be generally working, it is also clear that it was ultimately the extension of mayoral powers and interests deep into transport delivery and service provision functions that has facilitated integrated transport. According to the interviewed transport experts, this more detailed engagement by the Mayor with transport service and operations is also something that the general public expects. West et al. (2003) therefore question the benefits of separating enabling/strategy and service provision and highlight the potential barriers to policy integration. Syrett and Baldock (2003) even note that the blurring of the strategic versus service delivery distinction has weakened the strategic role of GLA institutions.

In contrast to the numerous observations regarding the level of devolution that was achieved by setting up the GLA and how it impacted on coordination capacities, questions regarding London’s governance geography were less common. Adjusting political and administrative boundaries to system boundaries such as the functional urban region or commuter belt – a first-order integration principle for city regions – has always been fundamentally untenable in the case of the London metropolitan region. First, it is a metropolitan region (Figure 27) that suffers from a particularly vague and contentious definition (Bailey 2008). This is not helped by the green-belt buffer zone between its built-up core (Greater London) and a wider metropolitan hinterland (Thornley 2003), which also includes large regional centres such as Portsmouth, Brighton and Milton Keynes with their own, largely independent regional dynamics. Second, with anything between 13 to 20 million inhabitants and a significant share of Britain’s economic output, a political London metropolitan region would simply be too powerful to be tolerated by the UK’s central government (Travers 2003).
As a consequence, authority over regional planning and transport within the metropolitan region is ultimately left to central government (Salet et al. 2003b).

“A London Metropolitan government will never actually be allowed to happen and central government is always bound to control the planning of that region.”

Peter Hall, Bartlett Professor of Planning and Regeneration, University College London

Instead, noticeable state and planning rescaling took place one level below the London metropolitan level, focusing on powers granted to the three sub regions, the East of England, South-East England and Greater London (Travers 2003, Allmendinger and Haughton 2009).

Concerning planning and policy integration, implementing regional governance in the first place had the clear intention of tackling regional institutional fragmentation (Thornley 2003). And it was for that reason that it was enthusiastically promoted by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott during New Labour’s first term. However, the arbitrary division of the London metropolitan region into three regions is widely regarded as a coordination failure (Thornley 2003, Travers 2003). As a result, for example, key development corridors such as the Thames Gateway had to be co-planned by three different regional bodies representing the three regions (Brownill and Carpenter 2009).
Essentially, integrating planning and transport strategies within the London metropolitan region relies on national government and today rests mainly with the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the Department for Transport (DfT). Over the last decades additional coordination support came from the Government Office for London (GOL), government offices for the other regions and the South East Regional Planning Conference (SERPLAN). SERPLAN advised on regional planning strategies up to 2000 (Thompson 2007).

In its place came an advisory interregional forum, which facilitated cross-regional engagement between the then newly created GLA and the two neighbouring regions (John et al. 2005). This non-statutory forum typically met three times per year and according to Nicky Gavron, Deputy Mayor of London from 2000 to 2008, struggled to galvanise more ambitious regional collaboration. Abolished alongside regional governance in 2010, this coordination body is today replaced by a vague ‘duty to cooperate’ between and across local planning authorities and county councils when addressing ‘strategic matter’ (UK Government 2011, Part 6. 110).

Overall, integration at the metropolitan region scale has been unsuccessful and, not surprisingly, was almost entirely absent from my interviews. Even for the period between 2000 and 2010 with stronger but divided regional governance, Thornley (2003) concludes that strategic coordination in the metropolitan region became more difficult. Besides the role of national government as ‘background coordinator’ for the metropolitan region, my interviews also revealed a related proxy role of London’s government.

**Enabling leadership around policy bundles**

A standard approach to tackling fragmentation is the re-bundling of competences within the same organisational unit and under the same leadership. This approach is clearly visible in the London case and over the last 20 years could be observed in multiple instances. From my interviews, the reviewed academic literature and government reports it became clear that the role of the directly elected mayor is arguably the single most important structural component of the new governance arrangements in London. And it has centrally facilitated urban development and transport integration. In the words of TfL Managing Director of Planning Michèle Dix: “The whole is more than the sum of its parts. That is what you get with the Mayor.” But rather than deriving powers from control over urban functions, budgets and services, the Mayor’s power and legitimacy rests primarily on being directly elected.

Important mayoral powers in relation to the subject of this study evolve around the preparation of the spatial development and transport strategies. For these, the Mayor also needs to guarantee, as highlighted above, cross-sectoral coherence and alignment with other
tiers of government (GLA Act 1999, Section 41). Mayoral powers are particularly enhanced by a relatively weak Assembly limited to scrutiny powers (Travers 2003), ultimately leaving London with ‘a mayor without government’:

“Policy and planning coordination was easy for me because the Mayor is just the entire decision-making structure. Therefore basically everything fed into me. It is a lot easier when it is focused in one person. Therefore there were no great debates and schisms once I have made up my mind about something.”

Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-2008

Furthermore, the Mayor’s powers can potentially balance a technocratic transport-centric policy agenda as a result of the strong accumulation of public authority related to transport. The Mayor has direct control over TfL’s budget and management and not only chairs TfL’s board but also appoints its commissioner and all its board members (Pimlott and Rao 2002, Travers 2002). In our interview, Ken Livingstone’s assessment of his authority as Mayor of London over TfL became absolutely clear: “I was able to push TfL into every direction.”

The Mayor has also become a key point of contact for any investor considering the development of a larger site with significant transport implications.

Given these powers, the approach of the first directly elected mayor turned out to be particularly influential as it was during the first years of the new London government that the GLA Act had to be translated into governance practices. While the established approach is widely regarded as having assisted mayoral coordination of urban planning, city design and transport strategies, descriptions of this mayoral system put to work by Ken Livingstone have also ranged from ‘autocratic’ (Stakeholder Interview) to ‘kenocracy’ (Travers 2003). In related contexts, scholars have repeatedly raised questions about whether a strong executive mayor with a weak Assembly might indeed pose structural barriers to policy integration (West et al. 2003). One area of great concern remains the strong emphasis on political priorities associated with the mayoral model, which may act as a significant barrier to coordinated policymaking (Thornley and West 2004). Stand-alone ‘pet projects’ of a mayor exemplify such risks to planning and policy integration.

At the same time, limited mayoral powers also seem to have resulted in substantial coordination shortcomings, of which those related to housing are arguably the best example. Furthermore, some have highlighted the inability of London to stimulate leadership across a network of agencies that are in competition with each other, singling out planning, housing and transport (Tewdwr-Jones 2009). Considering related shortcomings and, as discussed earlier, the 2007 Amendments to the GLA Act granted the Mayor additional powers.
particularly related to planning applications and housing (GLA Act 2007, Section 28 and 32).

Across the institutional reforms that came along with setting up the GLA in 2000, the creation of Transport for London (TfL) is widely regarded as particularly impactful (Figure 28 and Figure 29). And it is a case in which interviewees largely agree regarding its positive effects on integrated transport strategies and a better coordination with spatial development. To this day, TfL is a rare example of an urban transport authority that is responsible for planning and servicing of all transport modes.

“The strength of TfL in terms of planning is because you can produce transport plans which are comprehensive and not just limited to the public transport modes that you control”

Peter Hendy, Transport Commissioner, London

The most significant merger that was achieved with TfL was the joining of London Transport (until 2000 the city’s public transport authority) and the London-focused oversight of the Highways Agency. In addition, TfL absorbed the Traffic Director of London, the Traffic Control Systems Unit, Docklands Light Railway, London Regional Transport and some responsibilities of the Government Office for London (Pimlott and Rao 2002). Furthermore, the rescaling of transport powers which bundled authority for TfL was an exception as it not only included devolving powers from the national to the city level, it also shifted control from the boroughs upwards to TfL (Busetti 2015).

To a degree, the integration of different modes within one agency simply transfers conflicts and coordination efforts from between agencies to units within the same agency. However, the TfL experience seems to show that these conflicts are much better dealt with under one roof. Accumulating all urban mobility functions within one authority has centrally enabled London’s progressive transport agenda. For example, it allowed for the successful implementation of London’s Congestion Charge by providing for enough public transport capacity prior to introducing the scheme and thereby ensuring that travellers who shifted away from the car could be accommodated right from the start.
Figure 28: The governance of transport prior to setting up TfL
Source: Busetti (2015) adapted from Travers and Jones (1997)

TfL Board
Chaired by the Mayor of London

Transport for London
Commissioner of Transport for London

Figure 29: TfL – internal structure 2013
Source: own representation based on TfL (2013)
Furthermore, TfL was subject to several internal reorganisations aiming at further improving efficiency and overall integration. Initially TfL had four big divisions: buses, streets, Underground and rail. This differentiation was then changed in 2003/4 with the creation of the surface department by merging the bus division, which only operated the buses, and the streets division, which dealt with road safety and pedestrian issues but also bus priority street designs. As a result, transport operations and infrastructure (in the case of buses) was no longer separated (Figure 29). A similar reorganisation followed by combining rail and Underground. The new organisational structure within the departments is now based on lines of activity such as analysis, design, implementation and operation rather than being differentiated by transport schemes (bus, pedestrian, traffic flow, etc.) that previously were developed independently from each other.

A remaining key shortcoming, which several interviewed senior policymakers and transport experts emphasised, concerned the control over streets. TfL only recently assumed direct control over all traffic signals and has limited oversight over local streets, which are overseen by individual boroughs. Also, regardless of its innovative approach, TfL has ultimately limited its remit so far to the planning and service delivery of mobility. Unlike, for example, Hong Kong’s MTR, it does not extensively act as a major player within the property market.

There are also several other public agencies and GLA units that were structured in such ways that they allowed for a better coordination of urban development and transport. By and large these relied on the same basic principle of assigning portfolio bundles to more effective leadership. Most importantly, and only second to TfL, the London Development Agency (LDA) was charged with combining economic development and regeneration strategies through the RDA Act (1998) and the GLA Act (1999) (Syrett and Baldock 2003).

Particularly during the first years of the GLA, the LDA played a key role in developing and implementing new land development strategies, while having to navigate the legacy of a highly fragmented institutional landscape. Syrett and Baldock (2003) quote LDP (2000) estimates of more than 500 regeneration and economic development bodies in London in 2000. As a result, coordination of strategic policy for regeneration remained difficult and when possible relied on the LDA’s role as mayoral agency (Syrett and Baldock 2003). In 2012, the LDA was closed down as part of austerity measures by central government and some of its functions were transferred to a newly created Mayoral Development Corporation.

Between 2007 and 2012, London government also included a separate design strategy and policy unit called Design for London (DfL), which replaced the GLA’s Architecture and Urbanism Unit set up by Richard Rogers and led by Mark Brearley. With about 20 people at its peak, DfL focused on integrating urban design and architectural perspectives as part of
planning and transport infrastructure development. Its former director, Peter Bishop, emphasised the coordinating role of DfL in this context:

“We are the only organisation that sits and bridges across TfL, LDA and the GLA… We see every planning application that comes in and is referred to the Mayor… Everything that involves physical planning, we see, we comment on, we agree, and sign off their design.”

Peter Bishop, Director, Design for London 2007-2011

Over the period of its operation, DfL was able to take over what was previously coordinated through ad hoc steering groups and liaison meetings. In doing so, it effectively positioned itself as a catalyst for integrating physical planning and development strategies across the most relevant units of London government (Carmona 2012). The closure of DfL was met with considerable regret by London’s architecture and urban design community (Fulcher 2010). It also reflected the different approaches and attitudes to urban design issues between the Mayors Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson.

By contrast, more recent reorganisation of the GLA’s governance structures related to housing was seen by several interviewees as a step toward greater planning and policy integration. Alongside increasing the GLA’s overall role in preparing and delivering a London-wide housing strategy, David Lunts, GLA Executive Director of Housing and Land, identified one important structural improvement. He saw new opportunities for London as a result of breaking down old barriers between the Housing Corporation and English Partnerships – one focusing on housing finance and the other on development. According to him, the new housing regime is able to better combine the two and offers a housing delivery approach that considerably improves delivery partnerships.

Arguably the most prominent case of re-bundling urban development and transport portfolios under single leadership occurred within central government prior to setting up the GLA. Addressing the negative consequences of government silos stood at the heart of bringing together what were previously the Department of Transport and the Department of Environment in one large Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in 1997. This merger very much represented the joined-up thinking popular at the time. The department was led by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, who was hugely influential with regard to Britain’s devolution agenda and for setting up new regional governance structures.

However, the DETR re-bundling effort ultimately failed and the department was broken down in 2001 into a Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR), leaving the environment portfolio to the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. According to Nick Raynsford a key factor in this failure was transport officials
resenting not working in their own separate department, and also the fact that Prime Minister Tony Blair felt that the department was ‘too unwieldy’. In addition, DETR’s work was compromised due to the enormous political pressure related to the fuel protests in 2000. According to Raynsford, these ultimately undermined the way the department was operating.

**Balancing mayoral and network governance**

The idea that the success in policy and planning coordination in London since 2000 primarily evolved around one person at the top may come as a surprise. Evidently, London-wide government is a hierarchical organisation. Clear hierarchies are most established in areas over which the Mayor has the greatest control. In these cases, hierarchical integration runs from the Mayor’s office with its deputy mayors deep into the GLA bureaucracy and the wider GLA family:

“The examples of successful integration in recent years would not have happened without the creation of the London-wide Mayor in 2000 with his planning powers over significant developments and control over citywide transport as chair of Transport for London.”

Peter Hendy, Transport Commissioner, London

So far, there has been a clear tendency by both mayors to concentrate on those policy issues where hierarchies, direct control and power were most developed. This explains, for example, the particularly strong focus on transport, which was given far more attention than spatial development particularly during the first years of the GLA. In an interview with West et al. (2002) Ken Livingstone explained the reason for prioritising transport: “That’s the only area where I’ve got real power. In everything else it’s marginal” (West et al. 2002, p10).

Accepting the relevance of centralised coordination through the Mayor demands a principal understanding of the work practices at this central node. Direct access to the Mayor was given to leading advisors and also facilitated by regular morning meetings (Thornley et al. 2005). Under Mayor Livingstone, every Monday morning all key staff of between nine and twelve advisors\(^\text{15}\) were gathered around his table and spent a couple of hours discussing, coordinating and deciding:

“Nothing mattered but the Monday morning meeting. ... That was the point of coordination.”

Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-2008

---

\(^{15}\) Key advisors included Simon Fletcher (chief of staff), John Ross (economic development), Redmond O’Neill (transport), Mark Watts (environment), Lee Jasper (policing), Murziline Parchment (major projects), Kumar Murshid (regeneration), John Duffy (waste), Jude Woodward (arts and culture).
Livingstone emphasised in our interview that these meetings were the centre of integrated decision-making and it was within this group that he wanted to have the most open debate possible, allowing him to avoid making mistakes. He also emphasised that his advisors were not segregated by very hard and defined silos and that most of them would have got involved with a whole range of different policy issues. During the first Livingstone years, a clear hierarchy existed between a small group of trusted individuals on the one hand and the Deputy Mayor, cabinet members and other appointees on the other (Travers 2003).

The above raises the critical questions about the degree to which leadership and strong hierarchical integration can go with new forms of network governance. On the one hand, more direct and personal involvement by the Mayor can indeed compromise collaborative practices between different agencies, boroughs and the GLA. This is mainly due to an unequal power relationship and the constant risk of any collaborative effort that ultimately decisions might be escalated and decided at a higher level. According to the experience of Steve Bullock, the Mayor of Lewisham, less direct involvement by the Mayor of London meant more discussion and collaboration at a lower level among officers who would otherwise retreat.

On the other hand, Clark and Moonen suggest, “as a one-person executive, the Mayor encourages the networked implementation of strategies in collaboration with partner institutions” (Clark and Moonen 2012 p16). This argumentation has a compelling rationale, which relates to the limited direct controls of the Mayor that also limit the hierarchical delivery of planning and policy strategies. Above all, the Mayor with his limited financial powers is hugely dependent on the private sector to implement his strategies (Thornley et al. 2005). And given the deliberate set-up of the GLA mainly with enabling responsibilities, Sweeting (2002) sees the Mayor as being incentivised to build what Huxham (1996) refers to as ‘collaborative advantages’ by working with private and other public sector actors.

According to many commentators, network governance in London significantly advanced as a consequence of the abolition of the GLC in 1986. This resulted in setting up a range of ad hoc, non-hierarchical bodies to mitigate some of the coordination deficits linked to the vacuum left by the GLC (Pimlott and Rao 2002). I have detected three important phases of collaborative, network arrangements at the urban development and transport interface in London since the early 1990s. The first phase throughout the 1990s saw the maturing of collaboration and a move away from the fragmented and untrusting relationships of the late 1980s. The second phase followed the creation of the GLA. This was a period of stronger executive and hierarchical governance with the Mayor at its core, focusing on a few selected policy areas, mainly transport, and collaborating only with very few, ‘willing’ partners. The third phase of maturing arrangements began with Livingstone’s second term (after having
rejoined the Labour party) and was further consolidated following the election of Mayor Johnson. Building on the by then more established governance structures facilitated both greater trust and more networking across the city’s administrations and key actors.

Repeatedly, partnership arrangements in London were considered the quintessential tool facilitating the collaboration of network actors. During the 1990s, the Conservative government actively promoted borough collaboration through partnership bodies including the Cross River Partnership or the Thames Gateway Partnership (Newman and Thornley 1997). At the same time, the limits of metropolitan governance built around partnership – particularly between national government and local business – were already clear (Tomaney 2001, Thornley et al. 2005).

In addition to and complementing partnerships, area and site-specific engagements played a key role for networked spatial governance. A focus on individual developments is further intensified by the UK’s planning culture with its emphasis on incrementalism and discretion at the local scale (Allmendinger 2011). Not surprisingly, cross-sectoral integration based on network governance did substantially rely on project-based work, with focused site-orientation and project delivery vehicles breaking down overall strategic planning into manageable and more tangible sub-units (Salet et al. 2003b).

The most prominent and ambitious forms of the above have been the urban development corporations (UDCs), which first emerged in London in the 1980s (Imrie and Thomas 1999). Different perspectives were offered on the capacity of UDCs to facilitate desired levels of urban and transport planning integration. However, delivery appeared to be stronger due to better access to finance; and today, London can build on the significant experience gained with the London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC), which operated between 1981 and 1998. It allowed for the structuring of a second generation of UDCs in such a way that it was politically less controversial, and might allow for more cooperation with boroughs and existing communities (Brownill and Carpenter 2009). For example, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), set up in 2009 and converted into the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) in 2012, initially reported to the Mayor as Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) (UK Government 2011) and now includes a diverse board of public and private sector representatives (LLDC 2015).

Slightly less formal than UDCs but often concerned with similar project and site-level concerns are task forces, which throughout the last decades have been an important device to address particular integration challenges, including those related to the Thames Gateway. Such initiatives had considerable trickle-down effects even within the partnering
organisations. The former Director of DfL, Mark Brearley noted: “This brought the entire organisation [GLA] together with weekly meetings and a Thames Gateway action group.”

I conclude this section by returning to the network dynamics related to the various bodies of London government to explore my question regarding the co-existence of networks alongside hierarchies controlled by the Mayor. Throughout my interviews, the level and quality of exchange between the GLA and its functional bodies was commonly reflected by references to positive and dynamic relationships. At the same time, structural challenges for fruitful exchange and collaboration within the GLA and across the GLA family exist. For example, such exchange was not embedded in the organisational set-up and therefore needed to be invented and scaled up from 2000 onwards. Travers emphasises that the Mayor’s advisors frequently sidestepped the boards of TfL and the LDA and approached commissioners and senior officials directly (Travers 2003). Often, the boards only learnt about policies when they were on track for implementation, such as in the case of congestion charging.

Establishing more collaborative processes required time. Across my interviews, local officials emphasised that the frequencies of meetings was increased over the years, considerably improving collaborative work as part of task forces and project groups as well as in ad hoc meetings. Very clear observations on what determined the quality of these collaborations and how hierarchies did indeed act as barriers were shared by the former Director of Design for London:

“When people were afraid to violate hierarchical arrangements, that was bad news. Where people were insisting that only the same hierarchy level people can talk to each other, that was bad news. Where hierarchies were less pronounced, there was more success. Where structures were relaxed and where people wanted an ongoing dialogue across hierarchical layers, that is where things were working better”

Mark Brearley, Director, Design for London 2011-2013

It is with this perspective in mind that he emphasised the important role of individuals like Richard Rogers, the Mayor’s advisor on architecture and urbanism, in deliberately ‘engineering jumps between hierarchical levels’. For example, he would acknowledge the importance of crossing hierarchies by bringing even year-out students to high-level meetings as long as they had good ideas.

Of particular importance for the subject of this thesis is the relationship between the GLA and TfL. In principle, as both Isabel Dedring, Deputy Mayor for Transport, and Michèle Dix, TfL Managing Director for Planning, emphasised during their respective interviews, the role of the Mayor with the GLA on the one hand and TfL on the other is relatively clear. TfL can
analyse transport situations and offer a range of technical solutions but it is ultimately up to the political leadership within the GLA to make decisions based on a political judgement. However, several interviewees working at the GLA-TfL interface also indicated that there were coordination shortcomings as a result of a strong TfL with considerable capacity and resources but located outside the GLA.

Isabel Dedring underlined that relevant exchange between the two organisations mainly focused on strategic contacts. As a result, work on specific transport infrastructure proposals is often advanced within TfL without wider GLA involvement. In turn, when later being reviewed by the GLA these proposals often require considerable redesign and constant reminding: “have you talked to these guys?” Because of its size, Dedring concludes, the institutional presence of TfL results in a ‘tail wags the dog’ approach to transport planning with engineering standards overpowering questions around place quality in the first instance, which are then mitigated through GLA involvement at a later point.

Strategic exchange between London-wide government and the boroughs was initially more difficult as boroughs were uneasy about the new controls exercised by the Mayor (Travers 2008). Over time, however, vertical collaboration in London improved. Today, high-level liaison between boroughs and the GLA is provided through political channels, exchanges between specialist officers and the formal planning processes that will be discussed in the next chapter. In addition, borough officials feed back to the GLA through commissions and regular weekly meetings with GLA colleagues.

To summarise, the central element that made the new London-wide government more effective for planning and policy integration is the role of the Mayor of London. However, the Mayor’s integrative role, in turn, relied to a substantial degree on organisational arrangements that included the bundling of urban planning, city design and transport strategy functions. This has become most obvious in the case of Transport for London, where the combination of strong political leadership by the Mayor, executive leadership by the transport commissioner and internal restructuring ultimately facilitated more integrated transport planning and better coordination with strategic spatial planning.

Strong mayoral control also raises critical questions with regard to the balance between hierarchical and network integration. The common advantages of network structures can clearly be identified in the case of coordinating and integrating urban development and transport in London. Connecting policymakers and implementing agencies, expanding available information and expertise, increasing acceptability of policy and thereby compliance as well as amplifying the overall resources available to policymakers (Rhodes 2000) all featured strongly in the London case study. A more networked culture within
administrations has made a considerable difference, enabling junior officials to work across departments and meet with colleagues from different government levels as well as diverse sectoral administrations. Task force groups and project-based working have all helped to balance hierarchical decision-making structures within single units and departments.

In summary, it may well be that hierarchy remains and has returned as the ordering principle at the top level of London governance while networking has facilitated integration within bureaucracies, as well as between the most powerful players in the city. Or put differently, network governance works where hierarchical powers are in place, which may also be one explanation for the difference between policy failure in the case of housing and relative success in the case of transport policy and intervention. I explore this issue further as part of the discussion about changes to planning processes that enhance integration, in the next section.

6.2 Integration processes: Integration by advancing spatial policy coherence

This section looks at the more specific case of plan making and planning processes in London that were established as part of the changes to London governance discussed so far. As for the equivalent Berlin section, I have divided this section into two parts, which address processes of vertical and horizontal planning integration separately.

Vertical integration: more plan than process

The vertical plan-making hierarchy that emerged in London since the late 1990s covers three principal scales (see Figure 30): government guidance (central government), strategic planning (GLA level) and local planning (borough level). The same three scales are also the most relevant for transport infrastructure planning.

The most considerable change occurred for the GLA level. At the same time as setting up the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000, the UK government legislated (in the GLA Act and secondary legislation) for a new citywide Spatial Development Strategy (SDS). Besides more conventional land use and development perspectives, the SDS introduced policies cutting across broader social, economic and environmental objectives. The SDS followed the spirit of the 1999 European Spatial Development Perspective’s (ESDP) idea of a framework for integrated policymaking. However, former Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron stressed in our interview that a much fuller model had already been laid out by LPAC during the 1990s, separate from any work that was going on in Europe.
01 NATIONAL GUIDANCE

UK Area: 245,000 sqkm
England Area: 130,000 sqkm
Scale: no scaled plan at this level
The English planning system gives central government a key role in spatial planning. Its Department for Communities and Local Government establishes guidance to local authorities and initiates programmes to achieve sustainable communities and urban regeneration. A spatial plan for all of England does not exist and the top hierarchy of plans is assigned to the regional level.

02 THE LONDON PLAN

Area: 1,570 sqkm
Scale: no scaled plan at this level
The London Plan is:
1. required by law through the Greater London Authority Act 1998
2. prepared by the Greater London Authority under the Mayor of London
3. a statutory mayoral strategy mandatory for the GLA family
4. acts as guidance for borough-level planning, as such not legally binding

03 THE MAYOR'S TRANSPORT STRATEGY

Area: 1,570 sqkm
Scale: no scaled plan at this level
While the London Plan is the Mayor's central citywide plan, there are other statutory mayoral strategies. The London Plan is the integrating framework for all others. Of particular importance for the integration of land use and transport is the Mayor's Transport Strategy, which was published in 2001 and 2010 – on each occasion prior to the London Plan.

04 LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

Area: 12 to 130 sqkm (typically)
Scale: typically not scaled (great variety)
Planning permission in London is granted by the city's boroughs who traditionally have a high degree of control over spatial planning. Besides being the implementation agency for most spatial initiatives they are also responsible for developing so-called Local Development Frameworks (LDF).

Figure 30: London – vertical integration of planning
Source: own representation based on key London plans
The SDS stood out among several new city-level strategies as the ‘plan of plans’ and the only one with a clear statutory function, replacing previously existing regional planning guidance for London (West et al. 2002). According to Nicky Gavron, assigning the integrating role to a spatial development framework and positioning “planning as the core policy function” also directly built on the work of LPAC throughout the 1990s. Early on, the SDS was simply called ‘The London Plan’. An initial draft plan required by the GLA Act was published as ‘Towards a London Plan’ in 2001. The first London Plan was then published in 2004, putting an end to a period of nearly 20 years where London did not have a comparable strategic citywide plan.

The London Plan’s main support for vertical integration is derived through its presence as a document rather than through a refined integrated planning process. The cascading and hierarchical planning processes as part of a system of plans as in Berlin are largely absent in the London case. However, the degree to which the London Plan rehabilitated the city’s positive attitude to strategic planning in general, and integrated plan-led development more specifically, is considerable. Throughout my interviews in London I encountered far-reaching consensus amongst experts, ranging from planning expert Peter Hall to London’s Transport Commissioner Peter Hendy, that the introduction of the London Plan has been “the outstanding development of the past decade” and a “major innovation in London”. Under the mayoral leadership of Ken Livingstone between 2000 and 2008, it became the core of integrated planning practice in the city.

Given the strategic importance of the London Plan and its leading position among several sectoral strategies prepared at the London-wide level (see Appendix D1), its preparation is centrally overseen by the Mayor and his office. Within the GLA administration, the Plan is developed by the GLA’s planning team, which under Ken Livingstone’s mayoralty met on a regular basis with Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron and the Mayor’s economic advisor John Ross. A high level of proactive support also came from the London Development Agency (until it was abolished in 2010) and TfL’s planning unit, reflecting the resources and broader planning capacities available within the transport authority. Since finalising the first London Plan, there has been a broad general consensus among the key contributors within the GLA, TfL and the LDA on its direction.

The planning framework above the London Plan and other Mayoral Strategies is provided by national level planning policy. At the national level, the main planning framework for London until recently was mainly provided by Planning Policy Statements and Guidance (PPS and PPG). A national spatial plan or a national spatial planning framework for the UK or England does not exist (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009). The GLA Act includes a
general requirement for consistency with national and international frameworks (GLA Act 1999, Section 41.5), which applies for all the London Plan and other Mayoral Strategies.

More informally, the London Plan provides the GLA with a platform for linking upwards to the national level. For example, the Plan played a key role as a fundraising tool for national government budgets. As Gordon (2003) emphasised, the focus on world city narratives was not only the result of business pressures but a convenient instrument to attract national government attention and investment. In many ways, this directly relates to the Plan being used more as a vision document and ‘lobbying’ device rather than a spatial plan.

Formal vertical coordination based on compliance with national frameworks is assisted by direct control. For example, the London Plan and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy are subject to reserve powers by the Secretary of State (Pimlott and Rao 2002) while other strategies are less exposed to powers from above. One key anomaly of vertical integration is the possibility for national government to ‘call in’ planning applications and trigger a public inquiry. So even if the GLA and the boroughs agree, projects can be delayed (as in the case of the London Bridge Tower, now the Shard) or even cancelled (for example the Thames Gateway Bridge). National level interference with GLA planning projects was particularly strong for transport schemes:

“\textit{What I noticed was that every single scheme I proposed was rejected by the Department for Transport. Every single one. And I had to bypass the officials and deal directly with politicians.}”

Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-2008

Livingstone’s main explanation for the DfT’s resistance was its officials not trusting the GLA to deal with budgets. Trying to avoid being confronted with an inquiry, doing nothing was simply the best option for them. Those projects that succeeded, including Crossrail, required a very hands-on approach by the Mayor dealing directly with national ministers.

Besides formal compliance requirements and overriding powers, vertical integration of spatial planning between the national government and the GLA included a certain level of personal exchange. On spatial development, regular meetings between the GLA and national government included the Minister for London and DCLG ministers (GLA 2008b). Up to 2010, the Government Office for London (GOL) remained the main point of contact for the GLA at the national level. On transport, the London Plan emphasises regular meetings between the Minister for Transport and the Mayor “to examine transport in London and prioritise investments” (GLA 2008b, p393). In that regard, for Isabel Dedring, it is even the lack of financial devolution for transport investment that works as an integrating device:
“And there is indeed a very close working relationship with national government. We do get a lot of stuff from them. If we do focus and get our minds together we do get it.”
Isabel Dedring, Deputy Mayor for Transport

Still, overall engagement between the GLA and national government was limited and by most interviewees not seen as a genuinely productive form of collaboration. Some interviewees identified differences in perspective between national level civil servants and city-level officers as a key barrier, besides national government entities being “fairly unwilling to collaborate”, as suggested by one officer. This was also not helped by the difficult relationship between London’s first mayor, Ken Livingstone, and the New Labour leadership at the national level. One major exception to this was the Thames Gateway planning process where national government became centrally involved and tried to steer the direction. Nevertheless, it resulted in an approach that was widely seen as ineffective.

Integrating planning efforts of the GLA with the two neighbouring regions were even more limited. As already indicated in the previous chapter, the London metropolitan region not only lacks a clear boundary but is simply too large in the UK context for the national government to assign any real powers, planning included, to that level (Thompson 2007). Across the board, the interviewees were very clear regarding the inevitable shortcomings for integrated planning in the metropolitan region:

“Integration within the larger metropolitan region is an unbelievable gap. There might be a meeting with South East leaders twice a year and very infrequent meetings with officers. But you would expect there is a forum that is senior and monthly.”
Isabel Dedring, Deputy Mayor for Transport

“There are of course, issues about the relation between the Mayor’s vision and the national vision - very serious issues of how the London Plan joins up - or, in some cases, does not join up - with the plans of the regions immediately outside London’s boundaries.”
Peter Hall, Bartlett Professor of Planning and Regeneration, University College London

At the macro level, and following the removal of regional development strategies after the coalition government came to power in 2010, it is widely accepted that regional integration across the metropolitan region has been further weakened and so far is only covered by a general ‘duty to cooperate’ between local governments (UK Government 2011, p103).

Turning to vertical integration with planning scales below the London Plan requires the consideration of two main scales: the level of local plans and the level of granting planning permission. Local Plans or Local Development Frameworks (LDFs) are prepared by London’s 33 boroughs and include a portfolio of Development Plan Documents (DPDs).
LDFs cover the entire borough with land areas between 12 and 150 km². The Mayor of London can direct boroughs to change their LDFs if they are not in general conformity with the London Plan (GLA Act 1999, Section 344). Additional conformity of LDFs with the London Plan as well as national planning policy was introduced by the 2004 Planning Act (UK Government 2004).

The degree to which the London Plan establishes a clear development framework for the boroughs also depended on the leadership style of the Mayor. Holman (2010) identifies a strong instructive tone in the 2008 London Plan with regard to what boroughs should do, which is less pronounced in Mayor Johnson’s revision of the plan. Reverse vertical integration is provided by extensive consultation: “No strategic plan can be prepared without the boroughs” as one borough-level planning director stressed during our interview. Above all, it is the Examination in Public that boroughs rely on to feed back their views on the London Plan.

The London Plan includes site-specific endorsements and, as such, returns to crucial location-based considerations, while having to keep away from land use specifications. Since it was first published in 2004, most of the Plan’s designated priority ‘opportunity areas’ for redevelopment have seen developments come forward, most prominently in the cases of the Lower Lea Valley with the Olympic Park and Stratford, the Isle of Dogs, Paddington and King’s Cross. According to several interviewees, it is in this context that the London Plan is able to successfully combine private sector interests and national policy to ensure that urban development takes place ‘according to plan’.

When moving from local plans to project implementation, the granting of planning permissions, which is usually a borough responsibility, ultimately needs to ensure overall vertical planning consistency. However, this vertical integration is challenged by a particularity of UK planning law which, since the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, stipulates that plan and planning permission remain essentially separate (Allmendinger 2011). Legal compliance with strategic planning is addressed indirectly: the Mayor can overrule borough planning decisions on strategic planning applications if they violate London Plan policy (GLA Act 2007, Section 31).

Most interviewees acknowledge that vertical integration essentially remains a weak process, particularly when considering the actual impact on the ground. Here, the London Plan’s fate is a combined result of its own non-binding character in relation to planning permission and the limited powers that were given to the Mayor of London to implement a citywide strategy.

For example, despite the formal requirements for conformity, the London Plan’s quantitative standards for housing, density and parking provision have not always been followed by
boroughs and developers when implementing actual projects (see Photo 2). This problem is exacerbated by the time lag between the publication of the London Plan and the preparation of borough LDFs. More generally this is the result of certain tensions that remain between the GLA and the boroughs.

Not surprisingly, besides the formal planning hierarchy from the London Plan via LDPs to planning permission, the vertical integration of GLA and borough-level activities also rely on informal collaboration. And according to my interviews, this has improved considerably over recent years. Regular meetings that facilitate GLA-borough coordination include meetings between the Mayor and the Chair of London Councils as well as the borough engagement programme, which brings together the Mayor, senior GLA officials and the boroughs. A key dynamic of these informal exchanges is linked to a mutual dependence on national government funding:

“The presence of a national government that ’steals’ all your money and then gets it back to you is a wonderful forcing device of bringing everyone in London together. A collective enemy is a great integration forcing device.”

Isabel Dedring, Deputy Mayor for Transport

With regard to local transport planning, boroughs continue to operate as local transport authorities (Pimlott and Rao 2002) while having the obligation to consult with TfL on their local planning initiatives. Their Local Implementation Plans (LIPs) for transport are
approved and can be amended by the Mayor (Busetti 2015) and TfL oversees the budget for LIPs. Still, coherent approaches, for example, to the design of streets appear to remain a challenge even with the same borough (see Photo 3).

Photo 3: London Street Designs 2009 – 300m apart, same street, same borough, different design principles
Source: Catarina Heeckt 2015

Additional site-specific project work at the GLA, which cuts across sectoral input, is further ensured by its role of having to review certain planning applications. The GLA Act (2008, Section 31) regulates that for certain projects that are dealt with by the boroughs, the Mayor needs to be notified (UK Government 2008). Initial estimates suggested that there might be about 100 to 300 applications per year (0.5 per cent of all of London’s applications) going to the Mayor (Tomaney 2001). In 2009, this figure typically stood between 10 and 20 applications per week (GLA 2009), which suggests that a considerable degree of additional vertical integration at the project level is facilitated by the GLA.

**Horizontal integration: synchronising sectoral planning and development**

The horizontal integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London is primarily associated with the Mayor of London and the GLA. Here, the London Plan acts as the key instrument for horizontal integration – “by far the most dominant thing that does that” in the words of one GLA-based interviewee. The Plan’s status as Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) grants it a particularly important role in providing an overarching perspective on development in London (Pimlott and Rao 2002). And, as the 1999 GLA Act specifically notes, the SDS engages with other strategies through the lens of spatial development (GLA
Act 1999, Section 334.4). Therefore, the London Plan represents a case of spatial planning functioning as an integrating device for a range of other sectoral perspectives on development.

All parts of the GLA group must have regard to the policies set out in the Plan when preparing their own strategies. Most importantly, the London Plan establishes the central reference for all other statutory strategies, which in turn are considered during the preparation of the Plan. These strategies include economic development, transport, housing and environment, and their synchronisation through the London Plan facilitates the statutory duty held by the Mayor to ensure consistency between sectoral strategies.

At the most generic level, the integrating character of the London Plan is injected into the planning process by a legal requirement to centrally consider the three top-level cross-cutting themes of “equality of opportunity”, “health of persons in Greater London” and “sustainable development in the United Kingdom” (GLA Act 1999, Sections 33 and 41). In 2004, the national Planning Policy Statement 11 further emphasised the role of RSSs (the London Plan being one) in the broader context of a need to “integrate policies for the development and use of land with other policies and programmes which influence the nature of places and how they function” (ODPM 2004, Section 1.6).

Overall, the rhetoric of the London Plan is essentially one of ‘deep’ horizontal integration, particularly related to transport. References to coordinated transport and urban development are plentiful throughout the Plan (see Appendix D2) and appear to reflect the underlying legislative intention. For example, Bailey (2008) refers to the 2000 Government Office for London Circular (GOL 2000), which specifically highlighted the need for the London Plan to bring together the geographical and locational aspects of transport as well as a range of other sectoral policy goals.

A particular focus of the London Plan’s requirement to ensure horizontal integration is related to the integration of policy outcomes, i.e. the integration of spatial development and infrastructure itself. The 2008 Plan states that it “integrates the physical and geographic dimensions of the Mayor’s other strategies, … strongly linked to improvements in infrastructure, especially transport” (GLA 2008b, p.vii), and that “Spatial policies cannot be considered in isolation from their links to existing and proposed transport accessibility and capacity” (GLA 2008b, p56).

But how did these statements of intent ultimately impact on planning praxis? At the heart of the integrating role of the London Plan is a shared (spatial) vision for the city’s development. My interviews confirmed that the commitment to a clear vision in the London Plan was regarded as having a particularly positive and integrative impact on follow-up decision-
making. As Transport Commissioner Peter Hendy put it, “without that overall vision you are not able to fit anything underneath it.” By openly recognising overarching objectives, key elements of the Plan became more comprehensible and could be translated more easily to sectoral strategies and to the local implementation scale. Being a spatial strategy, the London Plan’s clear ideas for a principal physical shape for London, as introduced in Chapter 5, were summarised by the Director of Design for London, Peter Bishop, during our interview, as follows:

“We have the London Plan and it encapsulates the physical vision for London. It is going to be more compact and is going to grow eastwards along the Thames Gateway. New development will be around public transport systems. Public spaces will have to play an increasingly important role. ... We will develop brownfield sites and not grow the city physically into the green belt.”

Peter Bishop, Director, Design for London

Overall, this vision is shared by all three editions of the Plan so far (2004, 2008 and 2011). Considering the change of political leadership between the 2008 and 2011 iterations of the London Plan this is a strong indication of its consensual character. One interviewee also pointed out that one reason why the vision of the London Plan did not create major controversies might be related to the plan’s very general character, in some ways putting forward a loose vision for the city. And most importantly, at the centre of this vision was a sense of optimism about the city’s future, which had not existed ten years earlier.

In addition to the London Plan, the 1999 GLA Act requires the Mayor to produce thematic, sectoral strategies, which include transport, economic development, biodiversity, waste management, air quality, ambient noise and culture (GLA Act 1999, Section 41.1). The Act also stipulates the overall horizontal integration of these strategies (see Figure 31), which includes a general requirement for consistency across the Mayoral Strategies (GLA Act 1999, Section 41.5b). However, the GLA Act does not specify how all other sectoral strategies are traded-off against each other and mainly proposes ‘a reasonable balance’ between its main goals of economic and social development and environmental sustainability (GLA Act 1999, Section 32.3b).
Of particular relevance to the subject of this study is the actual praxis of planning and policy integration that emerged immediately after the GLA began its operation in 2000. This was a unique moment when new approaches could be implemented, backed by considerable political attention given to joined-up policymaking at the national level. The evolution of horizontal integration at this particular moment is eloquently captured by a study of West et al. (2002) which I draw on here.

This study finds that there were three broad categories of strategy integration, which emerged over the first six months of GLA operations (see Figure 32): first, avoidance of major inconsistencies between strategies and compliance with the overarching goals of the GLA Act; second, aligning strategies to an overall long-term vision for the GLA; and third, ensuring consistency of strategies with regard to the short-term priorities of the Mayor (West et al. 2002). The required checks for the first integration category were facilitated by three dedicated policy officers who reviewed all strategies and also conducted interviews with each strategy officer (West et al. 2002). In addition, integration meetings that included all strategy officers happened monthly. However, West et al. (2002) conclude that these integration efforts fell short of a more “genuine co-development of strategies” (p13).
Ultimately, Thornley and West (2004) note that during the first years of the GLA the integration of strategies was less of a priority than acknowledging the Mayor’s political agenda. A similar experience was shared by Isabel Dedring with regard to the first term of Boris Johnson, which required first to ‘sort out the day job’ before moving to strategy and overall integration: “I only have the luxury to get into these issues [integrated planning] when the day job is stabilised and during the first two years doing this job it was impossible.”

The focus of this study requires a separate account of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS). But it is also the special role of the strategies for transport and economic development, thus being referred to as ‘master strategies’ (Thornley and West 2004), that demand this attention. Two versions of the MTS have been published to date, one in 2001 under Ken Livingstone and one in 2011 under Boris Johnson. The MTS is required to cover both the planning and operations of London’s transport system and it puts forward the key transport policies and targets. The primary function of the transport strategy is to inform the Mayor’s transport schemes, as well as subsequent planning and implementation of transport projects by TfL, the London boroughs and other implementation bodies (GLA 2010d).

The MTS was also the first of all the Mayoral Strategies to be developed since 2000, reflecting a particular urgency linked to the implementation schedule of congestion charging and the priority of transport policy of the Mayor at the time (West et al. 2002). Later on, linking the MTS to the London Plan was mainly a task left to the planning team preparing the latter document. And the transport dimension in the London Plan is directly based on the main objectives of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy, which was first published in 2001 – prior to the first London Plan – and its latest version in 2010, again ahead of the 2011 London Plan.

Today, horizontal integration related to the MTS is primarily focused on links with the London Plan and the Economic Development Strategy. However, ensuring consistency across these planning documents frequently fails to provide a robust enough framework to induce corresponding development on the ground. For example, Isabel Dedring stressed the difficulty of advancing integrated planning for some of the key opportunity areas identified by the London Plan, including Nine Elms, Old Oak Common, Lea Valley, and Barking Riverside. In these cases, un-coordinated sectoral planning efforts have created a standoff.

---

16 The MTS has a time horizon of 20 years with the current MTS setting out a transport strategy for the period up to 2031.
between transport strategies prioritising new transport to areas where demand already exists and approaches to new housing with an upfront requirement for good public transport access.

Increasingly, in these cases the Mayor and senior GLA staff are trying to provide ad hoc bridging functions by helping to make the business case for transport investments based on planned housing numbers in order to unlock national government funding. In the context of the Thames Gateway, TfL’s leadership emphasised that it is often the Mayor who was the primary contact for discussing the spatial implications of TfL’s transport strategies, together with key advisors and officials from economic development, regeneration and the LDA. But on the ground, horizontal integration has also remained difficult and even the most basic form of integration, retaining land for transport purposes, has often been compromised.

Furthermore, transport and land use integration suffers from blind spots and the current planning regime struggles to advance strategies for areas with underutilised transport accessibility but with development opportunities. Potential developments along the Bakerloo Line were specifically highlighted in this regard. Concerns were expressed also by Peter Hendy that some of the larger-scale developments emerging in London might lead to transport demand that is not properly considered as part of the planning phase. Some of these challenges are directly linked to a more integrated approach to financing transport infrastructure alongside urban development, which the final section of this chapter explores further.

In summary, according to most commentators, vertical integration of spatial and transport planning in London remains below its potential even though some progress has been achieved over the last decade. To a large extent this is directly related to a comparatively fragmented planning process in England. I identified several shortcomings in the London Plan’s relationship with other planning scales in both directions, towards the regional and national level as well as to the local, borough level. Some of these are the result of the London Plan operating primarily as a planning document rather than a planning process, limiting the possibility for building broader planning coalitions across scales.

By contrast, the horizontal integration of urban planning, design and transport in London has been substantially upgraded by a package of Mayoral Strategies, which ultimately all rely on a mayoral vision for London. At the same time, horizontal integration is also characterised

---

17 A response to some of these shortcomings was a new additional planning document to the MTS, the 2050 Infrastructure Plan. According to Isabel Dedring, this plan should be considered as a joint high-level programme, which connects people across the spectrum around a shared agenda for infrastructure development.
by several dichotomies. The first concerns the central reference for various sectoral planning efforts, which, on paper, is the London Plan. However, the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and the Economic Development Strategy have repeatedly outpaced the London Plan and have acted as a de facto ‘master strategy’ for other sectoral policies and also given shape to the London Plan itself.

The second dichotomy relates to the fact that while the transport strategy has taken a strong lead, it mainly concentrates on more pragmatic, short-term operational aspects rather than providing a long-term strategic steer for transport-led spatial development. Finally, there is a dichotomy about the level at which horizontal integration really happens. On the one hand there are the strategic planning exercises around the development of Mayoral Strategies, including the London Plan. And these have clearly allowed for a form of strategic sectoral integration, which did not exist prior to setting up a London-wide government in 2000. On the other hand, a certain granularity of cross-sectoral phasing and business case creation is absent at the strategic level and results in coordination problems with implementation.

### 6.3 Integration Instruments and enabling conditions

With this final section, I move to cross-cutting instruments and enabling conditions for integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies. I discuss more technical integration mechanisms including data and assessment methods as well as financing instruments in the first two sections. Broader enabling conditions are included in the third and fourth sections with a focus on knowledge, capacity and staff culture as well as the importance of involving network actors.

**Integration through data and assessments**

By international standards, London and the UK have exceptionally good data collection and analysis in place, which assist urban development and transport planning. These also provide a solid backbone and a common analytical basis for many of the integrated planning processes introduced above. According to Nicky Gavron, London’s own research capacity was also maintained throughout the period without London-wide government through the London Research Centre (LRC).

Over the last decade, detailed economic data, focusing in particular on employment, is regularly produced by GLA Economics and published in their Economic Evidence Base document (GLA 2010a). TfL’s data collection informs the detailed Travel in London report (TfL 2012), which includes a London Travel Demand Survey (LTDS) conducted every five years. And so-called Annual Monitoring Reports regularly publish the level of progress achieved in relation to policy goals put forward by the London Plan (GLA 2013b).
Besides the baseline data above, certain metrics have become more influential in recent years and are positioned at the core of a more integrated planning agenda. For example, data on modal share of different transport modes and on carbon emissions have become of strategic relevance. With regard to land use, the calculation and publication of so-called Public Transport Accessibility Levels (PTALs) is highly influential and is used as a dominant reference for transport and urban development synchronisation throughout the London Plan (GLA 2008b, Map 2A.3). PTALs measure, for any location in Greater London, the level and quality of public transport access (Figure 33). On this basis, the London Plan sets ranges for housing density in its density matrix: the better public transport access is, the higher the density level at which the area should be developed (and the lower the private parking provision).18

---

18 It is important to note that none of these standards are legally binding and the 2011 London Plan simply aims for a 95 per cent compliance rate (GLA 2011, p259).

---

Figure 33: Public Transport Accessibility Levels (PTALs) for Greater London
Source: based on GLA (2014)

According to Design for London Director Peter Bishop, it is not only strategic plan making which is profiting from PTALs but the scrutiny of individual schemes where it has allowed for joined-up urban development and transport systems:
“PTALs meant that there has been a great deal of thought in a scheme by scheme basis which has linked planning, development, land use and transport systems together.”
Peter Bishop, Director, Design for London

More generally, PTALs facilitate the overlaying of transport networks and spatial plans to confirm that they relate to each other. Two types of imbalances can exist: either accessibility is high but land underdeveloped or land use is intense but currently not matched by appropriate transport access. The principal direction of adjusting Public Transport Accessibility Levels and land use intensities can then be derived based on these potential imbalances. However, no legally binding standards are directly based on PTALs and the GLA is mainly targeting a high rate of compliance.

In 2010, TfL also, for the first time, published broader accessibility indicators, so-called Access to Opportunities and Services (ATOS) levels, which measure accessibility in terms of travel time to jobs, educational establishments, health services, retail and open spaces (TfL 2010). While this represents a direct interpretation of the integrated transport paradigm, which aims to shift from providing mobility to the provision of access, it has not been accommodated in the Mayor’s Transport Strategy or in the 2011 London Plan. For Isabel Dedring, this was a clear indication of where integration is not working. Both the PTAL and ATOS analysis are conducted by TfL’s strategic analysis team.

Over the last two decades, London has also increasingly adopted a rigorous approach to assessing different urban development scenarios. These are particularly well developed with regard to expected transport volumes and capacities but also include assessments related to macroeconomic costs and benefits and environmental protection.

For individual developments with considerable implications for the transport system, the London Plan stipulates that planning applications include a transport assessment and a travel plan (GLA 2008b, Policy 3C.2). These assessments are specified by TfL (TfL 2006) and are endorsed by National Planning Guidance PPG13 (DCLG 2006b, Section 23). The most recent approach to better anticipating the potential effects of different transport interventions includes an increasing use of field experiments. Particularly in the context of a one-off event such as the 2012 Olympic Games, TfL promoted an entire range of innovative operational approaches in transport. TfL Managing Director of Planning Michèle Dix highlighted the Games Lanes, traffic signal operations and travel demand management in this context.

19 The Games Lanes were dedicated traffic lanes, which were only used by official Olympic Games vehicles and emergency vehicles.
In relation to decisions about transport infrastructure projects, cost benefit analysis (CBA) remains an integral part of upfront project assessments. However, given the relatively narrow perspective of CBAs, rather than helping to facilitate land use and transport integration, CBAs have proved to act as barrier for more integrated planning approaches. A good example was the above-mentioned question of whether or not to build a Crossrail branch connecting the Docklands. An initial CBA by TfL based on a transport perspective was not favourable to this idea and it was ultimately a perspective about potential future urban development that enabled the Mayor to make a convincing case for it.

In cases where the Mayor won the support of national government for key strategic projects, the GLA with TfL produced their own CBA in order to strengthen their case. The GLA embarked on related assessments with its economics team, which, above all, included an attempt at an objective assessment of Crossrail. This, Livingstone stressed, ultimately convinced Ed Balls, at the time Economic Secretary to the Treasury, to lend his support to the project. This experience is today informing the approach to making a business case for transport investments to the Treasury that is based on housing numbers, for example in the case of Barking Riverside.

The inclusion of sustainability goals as part of more integrated planning in London was also addressed through dedicated assessments including sustainability appraisals and environmental assessments. However, not one of the interviewees highlighted sustainability assessments as having a considerable effect on overall integration. While one senior GLA officer referred in that regard to early multi-sectoral assessments, he emphasised that in particular the environmental assessments ended up as ‘box ticking’ exercises. Instead, he acknowledged that the Mayoral Strategies themselves became the assessment tools, not separate assessment spreadsheets. Ultimately compliance with these plans became the more influential ‘checklist’.

Financing instruments for horizontal and vertical integration
The overall arrangements for financing urban development in London are of great complexity and tend to have adverse effects on integrating urban planning, design and transport. Transport Commissioner Peter Hendy was particularly adamant: “Funding is often a major impediment to better integration.” According to him, it is particularly around major transport interchanges where this shortcoming leads to sub-optimal solutions and the full

---

20 For the case of the London Plan, Nicky Gavron suggested in our interview that the Plan’s strong sustainable city focus pre-empted more critical results of sustainability assessments.
transport potential is rarely realised, as in the cases of Elephant and Castle and Victoria. Ultimately, the level of infrastructure development that could fully unlock the opportunities for individual sites are often beyond the scope of what developers can pay for as planning obligation, or what can be afforded from the public purse.

While most cities are exposed to similar constraints, integration efforts backed by urban development-related funding in London are compromised as a result of the GLA’s comparatively small budget and limited tax raising powers. Across the board, interviewees highlighted the importance and current difficulty of accessing upfront capital to incentivise the implementation of more integrated developments. Isabel Dedring considers London to be “very un-integrated on the thinking about funding and financing of transport projects” and suggested that many government grants could be replaced by developer funding. In addition, so far the GLA has not institutionalised an approach that would allow the bureaucracy to make its own business case for transport investments by national government based on housing numbers and regeneration targets.

Still, over the last two decades, London has been exposed to various strategies (mostly by national government) of using funding arrangements as an instrument for more integrated urban and transport developments. The most direct approach to steering outcomes through funding is the use of public money in incentivising desired outcomes. Part of this equation was the implementation of competition to access national government funding in the 1990s, which helped shape different local attitudes. Instead of making a case for national level funding purely based on local problems and related needs, local governments were required to include a stronger emphasis on opportunities for development. As a result, competitive bidding programmes such as the City Challenge Programme, established in 1991, and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), implemented in 1994, meant that regeneration approaches became more concerned about strategic, long-term and balanced objectives (Allmendinger 2011).

More recently, and following the introduction of a London-wide government, funding arrangements have also facilitated vertical and horizontal integration between the GLA and the boroughs. Across a range of urban development and transport schemes, former Design for London Director, Mark Brearley emphasised: “Funding helped to strengthen collaboration.” Specifically related to transport, the already mentioned Local Implementation Plans (LIPs) have ensured TfL oversight on these plans by controlling related funding for boroughs, even if transport improvements include streets that are not under the remit of TfL. LIPs are used in cases where boroughs want money from TfL and the main criteria for accessing related funding is the compliance with targets set by the London Plan and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy.
The last two decades have also seen various attempts at securing private funding for more integrated urban development. Overall, strategic and development planning in London is profoundly embedded within a principal idea of tapping into the economic gains of private development. Therefore, enabling the latter and offering incentives for more intense development became a primary tool for implementing desirable development (Thornley et al. 2005). Most importantly, the Town and Country Planning Act in 1990 introduced a planning obligation, so-called Section 106 agreements, which links planning permission for private developers to their contribution to funding public infrastructure (UK Government 1990). Since its introduction, planning obligation has become standard practice across the UK but commentators also stress that it has been seen as slow and inefficient (Allmendinger 2011).

In the London case, Section 106 has remained the prevailing mechanism for accessing private funding for more integrated urban development. However, its effectiveness for funding transport infrastructure was repeatedly challenged throughout my interviews. Peter Hendy stressed that the sums collected under these agreements are limited because they are negotiated on an individual basis by developers. Also, the payments are ultimately based on impact rather than benefit and the range of competing needs related to transport, affordable housing and community infrastructure are traded-off against each other, potentially cancelling each other out with little impact in each category. Peter Hendy concludes that “the means of getting money from the developers for transport improvements is not as strong as we would like it to be.”

More recently, TfL’s approach has shifted from a reactive role to a more proactive one. TfL Managing Director of Planning, Michèle Dix, emphasised that TfL is actively engaging in strategies that can ensure growth is happening where it is needed. It has also developed funding strategies where development can be first unlocked and then costs recovered from the development. This is currently being done for the Northern Line extension into the Battersea site where an integrated transport and development package include 25,000 new jobs and 16,000 new homes. The £1bn for the Underground extension will be covered by an increase in the business rate for the area in addition to a Community Infrastructure Levy and Section 106 agreements.

Knowledge, capacity and staff culture
Developing and maintaining institutional knowledge that can facilitate the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies has been challenged as a result of the recent institutional changes. There was however a significant degree of continuity for institutionalised ‘knowledge bundles’ during the transition years around 2000. For example, Pimlott and Rao (2002) emphasise that several London-wide organisations that existed prior
to 2000 became a constituent part of the newly created GLA. These organisations included the London Research Centre (LRC), the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC) and the London Ecology Unit (LEU), and allowed for the transfer of a considerable amount of institutional knowledge to the GLA.

More specifically in the case of strategic planning and for preparing the London Plan after the GLA was set up, Bailey (2008) identified institutional continuities through GLA planning staff who were previously working on the Greater London Development Plan and the LPAC spatial programmes. Several interviewees engaged with spatial planning stressed the importance of the GLA having been able to build on the legacy of experience, skills and expertise that was embedded in strategic planning exercises prior to 2000. A substantial degree of this knowledge was pooled at borough-level administrations, from where it migrated to the GLA from 2000 onwards.

During the early days of the GLA, the lack of institutional knowledge was also compensated for by a continuous engagement of a core group of trusted individuals with whom Ken Livingstone also worked as part of his mayoral campaign. After being elected, the Mayor was adamant not to replace this team with the official GLA transition team, which up until then had had little exposure to him. And while the Mayor was officially allowed to appoint 12 individuals in his office – all others should have been appointed to the Assembly – Livingstone expanded the number of his appointees to 35 individuals (Travers 2002). Livingstone stressed that, initially, everything ultimately depended on the role of the Mayor in steering the building of a new administration. He regarded this as one of the key problems of the mayoral system, which could have been avoided if instead, “you had a city council with real powers, so it would also attract people with talent.”

The initial absence of strong institutional knowledge within the newly created GLA, TfL and LDA therefore meant that they relied to a significant degree on hiring staff who would bring along considerable levels of individual and collective knowledge. And the new London-wide organisations were very successful in doing so as they could offer attractive working environments and job packages. At the same time, this had adverse consequences for borough administrations where skills and staff were ‘sucked away’ and which were ‘depleted of local resources and knowledge’ as interviewees pointed out.

But it was not just better pay that allowed the GLA to successfully tap into existing knowledge pools. Interviewees from within and outside the GLA stressed that there was clearly a certain degree of innovation and creativity that the GLA was able to offer institutionally. Compared to the GLA, my interviews suggested that the capacities of
individuals at the local, borough level were less advanced with regard to more integrated work.

Besides added capacities within the various levels of London’s bureaucracies, appointing a broader range of highly qualified external consultants advising on specific projects also supported integrative planning perspectives. Across the board, it is the increasing sharing of institutional knowledge that has compensated for discontinuities and blind spots in individual organisations. For the case of economic development and regeneration, Syrett and Baldock (2003) observe that the bringing together of a wider range of actors ultimately meant that a greater level of expertise was coming together.

Complementing institutional capacities are the sets of skills and capacities of individuals who are centrally involved with urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London. Being an entirely new authority, the main organisational shortcomings for the newly established GLA were not so much about institutional inertia and conservatism as about the lack of knowledge and experience. Indeed, in an earlier interview for Travers (2003), Livingstone acknowledged a certain lack of expertise among the 500 GLA staff, while at the same time emphasising the steep learning curves among new team members.

In the interview for this study, he further stressed that, being able to “bring in the people who wanted to do the job” was a unique opportunity when setting up the GLA. And reflecting on the capacity of GLA staff over the eight years of his mayoralty, he shared the following perspective: “I was very impressed by the team and it just worked … I was lucky to have bright young people at the GLA.” Similar assessments emerged in other interviews with, for example, GLA Executive Director of Housing and Land David Lunts highlighting the importance of a generational shift wherein the last decade has seen the promotion of a lot of younger and new people.

An important factor for these positive experiences with new staff was a considerable recruitment effort by the GLA and its functional bodies, often with direct involvement of the Mayor. Overall, and across the GLA family, the Mayor made more than 200 appointments during the first 12 months after being elected (Tomaney 2001) and these efforts ensured that highly qualified staff filled new posts at all levels. For senior roles, Livingstone emphasised that it was a global search for talent that ultimately led to the appointment of key individuals such as Bob Kiley (TfL), Jay Walder (TfL Finance and Planning), David Higgins (Olympics) and Richard Rogers (advisor on design and architecture).

As much as being able to rely on highly qualified, dynamic and motivated staff within the newly created GLA emerged as a key enabling theme, it could not be taken for granted. For example, throughout my interviews I repeatedly encountered comparisons with the GLC.
According to Ken Livingstone, the GLC planning department was “full with very old and established figures who were deeply cautious.” More generally, staff culture at the GLC was strongly characterised by a long period of tenure. Officers entered the administration after school or college and typically stayed for their working life. Apart from the director levels, posts were filled by people from inside the administrations moving up in the hierarchy who mostly replicated what was done before. It also was a largely white male bureaucracy, which, according to Livingstone, was important to overcome in implementing a modern, joined-up city government.

Injecting new and integrative capacities into London-wide government not only relied on recruitment strategies for employing new staff. Although this was primary for the GLA itself, which had to be built from scratch, the approach at TfL, which mainly brought together previously existing agencies, also had to consider replacing existing employees. For example, Livingstone noted, “in 2003, we took over the Underground, within a year 27 to 30 top managers had been removed. We had a real clear out of the bureaucratic debt that was there.” In addition, senior officials at TfL were shifting their jobs between divisions, which helped to inject more collaborative behaviour even beyond what the reforms of formal structures were trying to achieve.

A key success story of TfL, the turnaround of the bus system from a transport mode for ‘kids and pensioners’ to one for everyone including business people, was indicative of the success of the new regime. Livingstone stressed the importance of motivated and committed staff: “We brought in people like Peter Hendy to run the buses, people who were completely committed to public transport rather than those wanting to just have a secure job and a pension. People who wanted to do things.” Furthermore, there was a degree of embedding a joint agenda for prioritising urban transport modes within the newly created TfL by leaving those that were exclusively working on car-oriented transport with national government and its Department for Transport. By contrast, my interviews indicated that professional training contributed far less to more advanced integrative capacity than new recruitment and replacement.

Referring to new skills and knowledge requirements in spatial planning, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009) offer a more general reflection on the capacity challenge and stress the importance of communicative skills rather than deep thematic knowledge. They conclude that “The contemporary challenge is not for planners to be able to claim expertise in each thematic area a plan might need to engage with, but rather to work productively with other professionals and equally importantly, with various bodies representing different aspects of the general public, lobby groups, interest groups, and so forth.” (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009, p621f). To a significant degree, it seems from my interviews that this is precisely what
was achieved, at least at the level of the GLA. Mark Brearley expressively referred to a critical mass of ‘sparky people’ who wanted dialogue, which in turn was supported by individuals higher up in the hierarchy.

**Network actors facilitating integration**

The integrative effect of network governance for urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London unfolds at two main stages of the planning process. First, there is the strategic planning component setting out spatial policies, which are initially exposed to debate and input by key stakeholders and the general public. Second, there is the implementation component, which in the London context plays a particularly important role due to a strong project-based planning tradition.

Partnership arrangements are a quintessential characteristic of London governance, which allow the city to operate in a distinctively different way compared to the national government. By comparison, city-level interviewees emphasised that London government is relatively effective in joining up key processes, involving multiple stakeholders and supporting partnership arrangements. This relatively constructive collaboration of various stakeholders relied to a large degree on the legacy of the partnership arrangements that were developed informally throughout the 1990s, which I discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, some of the partnerships and their planning concepts only became influential with regard to strategic policy implementation after the establishment of the GLA.

Following the introduction of a London-wide government, the various urban planning and transport-related partnerships had to be translated into a network of key stakeholders as part of the city’s extensive network governance arrangements. The broader stakeholder category in London is applied to a wide range of actors, cutting across different government bodies and agencies as well as business and non-governmental organisations and representatives of the general public. Beginning with the first, the GLA Act stipulates the consultation with GLA functional bodies, the Assembly and the boroughs as part of the preparation or revision of any mayoral strategy (GLA Act 1999, Section 42).

Across my interviews, local officials emphasised that the frequency of related meetings was increased over the years, considerably improving collaborative work as part of task forces and project groups as well as in ad hoc meetings. Many key individuals also held several roles within and beyond London-wide government, which helped to connect the dots between sectoral and portfolio-based perspectives.

The London Plan further specifies that key institutions have to work together, pool resources and seek synergies across their work (GLA 2008b, p369). From 2000 onwards this has
translated into a significant level of exchange between all members of the GLA family, and particularly between GLA officers and Transport for London. This includes formal weekly meetings between the London Plan team and TfL, joined-up statistical work and, overall, a more seamless cooperation. 21

“During the London Plan preparation process there was a group that met every Thursday morning. This included the lead people on the London Plan, the Transport and Economic Development Strategy. It was the thing that led to integration and consistency.”

Nicky Gavron, Deputy Mayor 2000-2008

In addition, different types of project-based planning are facilitating the bringing together of stakeholders, in turn assisting the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies as part of the GLA’s work. While most of these are usually led by borough administrations, the GLA and its functional bodies, particularly TfL, are nevertheless frequently involved in project-specific work. These typically involve staff who are five or six levels below the leadership. Project-level collaboration across the GLA’s strategic leadership has only recently become more dynamic and frequent. And according to Deputy Mayor Isabel Dedring, integrative efforts at that level have become particularly productive for joint work on the London Plan’s opportunity areas. Here, bi-weekly meetings coupled with clear deadlines have ensured a more fruitful coming together of all the key individuals.

Across the board, interviewees singled out project-level planning as the context where sectoral perspectives were stitched together more easily than at the policy and strategy level. As one former GLA officer emphasised: “project-based work works, policy is more difficult.” In this regard, city officials stressed that getting to ‘on-the-ground action questions’ and more ‘innocent project topics’, rather than being stuck with political ideology at a general level, helped in building a cross-sectoral consensus.

The provision of public space has become a unifying implementation-level issue. The London Plan looks at the design of public space in relation to transport strategies that aim to promote walking and cycling and has incorporated the ‘better streets principles’ published in the Transport Strategy (GLA 2010d). However, design strategies put forward in the London Plan remain at a general level. Therefore, London’s first mayor also stipulated that every development project funded or commissioned by TfL or the LDA must be approved through a formal design review process. To accomplish this, Design for London (DfL) established

21 Some sections of the London Plan were also entirely outsourced to TfL. For example, the policy on land development in relation to transport using Section 106 agreement for which TfL took the lead together with the boroughs.
what its first director called a ‘control system,’ whereby design experts are hired and trained to implement specific review processes. “This is crucial to institutionalising integrative work” according to Peter Bishop, the former director of DfL.

The importance of such a control system became evident following the closure of DfL in 2012. As a result, exchange on placemaking considerations between the GLA and TfL once again reduced. Isabel Dedring stressed above all the lack of a ‘forcing device’ for TfL to engage with urban designers at the point of making the key decisions. According to her, incorporating urban design considerations as part of street and intersection designs often “turns more to a ‘paint it pink’ when you are all done” approach. And typically, technical transport engineering perspectives are the central consideration rather than a broader vision of a place from which other aspects follow.

More challenging than connecting different parts of the GLA family was the establishment of a broader stakeholder engagement process after the Mayor took office in 2000. At the same time, this was particularly important given the relatively limited powers of the GLA to directly execute key policy programmes. Essentially, stakeholder engagement is a central approach to assist the implementation of Mayoral Strategies (Sweeting 2002). In fact, the London’s Plan implementation strategy even rests to a substantial degree on coordinating actions of the key stakeholder groups (GLA 2008b, p367).

Some of the difficulties of setting up effective stakeholder engagement relates to the identification of the relevant actors and groups. The first GLA documents, which included direct references to stakeholders, tended to convey a view that stakeholder roles are self-declared: “Stakeholders’ are in fact self-defined: they are groups, alliance and networks which consider themselves to have a common interest in issues affecting Londoners …” (GLA 2000, Section 3.1). At the same time, the GLA also took the view that stakeholder engagement was broadly positioned between the consultation of statutory bodies, technical experts and the general public.

Initially, the GLA identified 18 key stakeholder groups (Table 9) for the preparation of the London Prospectus. Thornley et al. (2002) emphasise that some groups such as the Association of London Government and the London Business Board had very clear representations while others did not have such a single group behind them. During the first years, the overall outcome of stakeholder consultations remained unclear (Thornley et al. 2002) particularly after it became evident that the London Prospectus would never be published. And conducting individual meetings with each of the 18 stakeholder groups as part of the preparation of Mayoral Strategies turned out to be too ambitious (Thornley et al. 2002, 2005).
Table 9: List of GLA Stakeholder Groups as at October 2000  
Source: GLA (2000)

1. Academic institutions  
2. Black and minority ethnic communities  
3. Boroughs  
4. Children  
5. Civic Forum  
6. Disabled people  
7. Faith communities  
8. Irish communities  
9. Lesbian and gay communities  
10. Older people  
11. Private sector – black and minority ethnic business  
12. Private sector – general  
13. Students  
14. Sub regions  
15. Trade unions  
16. Voluntary and community sector  
17. Women  
18. Young people

Most of the consultation and engagement processes that brought stakeholders together were ultimately triggered by the various new strategies required by the GLA Act. Indeed, more than any other strategy, the preparation of the London Plan includes requirements for involving key stakeholders and parties (Pimlott and Rao 2002). As part of the preparations of the first London Plan, Nicky Gavron recalled about 100 presentations she gave to stakeholder groups in her capacity as Deputy Mayor and political lead on the London Plan. The 2008 London Plan then included a revised illustrative overview of the key stakeholders and identifies four main categories of stakeholders from the public, supply, private and community sectors (GLA 2008b, p380).

More relevant for the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies than simply identifying key stakeholders is an understanding of their level of influence, which differed considerably. In this regard, Bailey (2008) emphasises that, for example, stakeholders representing environmental perspectives, including the Environment Agency and Friends of the Earth, were less effective in communicating a coherent view, particularly compared to the business sector.

The business sector’s role as leading stakeholder is further linked to the limited implementation powers assigned to the GLA and due to the legacy of the network governance arrangements developed throughout the 1990s. Private sector stakeholder representation is centrally facilitated by London’s business group London First, London Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).

Unlike many other stakeholders, business groups had frequent and direct access to the Mayor’s office. London First former chief executive Stephen O’Brien referred to monthly meetings between London First and the Mayor, which covered both short- and long-term planning issues. “Weekly if not daily” contact between one business organisation and the Mayor’s economics advisor, John Ross, was also identified by Thornley et al. (2002).
The various forms of intense engagement with business groups as part of planning and policymaking in London have also led to criticism (Thornley et al. 2002, 2005, Bailey 2008). Thornley et al. (2005) identify a lack of balance between stakeholder groups: while there was strong influence by business groups with direct and continuous access to agenda setting, other groups were marginalised as part of the unsuccessful establishment of a big tent agenda after the Mayor took office in 2000.

Furthermore, Thornley et al. (2005) suggest that interactions with business included a degree of secrecy, with frequent private meetings. As a result of the above, they identify a clear ‘business privilege’ in the case of London’s new governance and the existence of an ‘urban regime’ – “a mutual dependency and relationship of trust” between business and London’s government (Thornley et al. 2005 p1964). At the same time, former Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron stressed in our interview that engaging with the private sector was a two-way affair and also about “getting business on board for what we were trying to do.”

What is more difficult to assess with regard to this business privilege is its effect on integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London. On the one hand, the prioritisation of one stakeholder group risks that one-dimensionality prevails and that economic concerns are considered more centrally than social and environmental ones. This can then frustrate more multi-sectoral planning approaches within the city’s administration, as happened during the early days of preparing the first London Plan.

On the other hand, the absence of any hierarchy of privileges related to key stakeholders may simply overwhelm a more integrated planning approach. A good example for the latter is the planning for the Thames Gateway, for which Allmendinger and Haughton (2009) observed a degree of coordination ‘overkill’: “our interviews revealed how almost everyone is busily coordinating with others, across scales and across sectoral boundaries. Just as there is no clear 'scalar privilege' evident in the Thames Gateway, so there is no clear privileging of a particular lead 'sector', such as business, economic development agencies, or planners” (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009, p629).

Establishing the GLA was further linked to upgrading public participation at the citywide level. Besides more information-based engagements with the general public, the preparation of the Mayoral Strategies includes the possibility for the general public to submit comments in writing. In the case of the London Plan, the process that leads to the publication of each edition of the Plan includes a statutory three-month public consultation period. The consultation is based on a Draft London Plan and is followed by an Examination in Public, a process by which a government-appointed panel tests the strategy for robustness, effectiveness and consistency with other strategies and government policies. The panel
publishes a report to inform the drafting of the final London Plan, which can also be vetoed by central government if it conflicts with national policy.

While all eight statutory strategies have a requirement for public consultation (GLA Act 1999, Section 42), the framework for involving the general public is strongest in the case of the London Plan (UK Government 2000, Part II). But even in this case, public participation occurs at a relatively late stage in the planning process, relies entirely on written submissions and lacks a clear process for involving lay members of the public (Harrison et al. 2004).

Furthermore, while Thornley et al. (2002) acknowledge that overall there has been a substantial amount of activities related to innovative forms of participation, at the same time these efforts seem not to have been embedded in such a way that they could have resulted in tangible impacts on the ground. This is also reflected by the following statement by Ken Livingstone, quoted by Thornley et al.: “When asked how much external groups influenced him in his policies, he answered that ‘in areas where my mind is made up absolutely none’. This would apply to issues like congestion charging or tall buildings. However where he had no fixed views he would listen” (Thornley et al. 2002, p13).

By contrast, community involvement at the project and local neighbourhood level has always tended to be more impactful and, in the London case, has received increasing attention over the last decade. The 2004 Planning Act improved the influence of public involvement by frontloading it in the planning process (UK Government 2004, Section 19). A 2009 DCLG report further emphasised the unique position of local government for considering perspectives by local residents and businesses as part of regeneration efforts (DCLG 2009, Section 7). Most recently, the national government’s Localism Act has translated such general opportunities into more clearly defined proactive and bottom-up planning processes as part of neighbourhood planning (UK Government 2011).

At the same time, Allmendinger (2011) reminds us that these changes have happened during a period where there has been an overall democratic deficit within planning. It is a deficit that he links to a broader turn towards a more neoliberal form of spatial governance where local communities are forced to accept change. Related shortcomings of community involvement as part of planning and urban regeneration in London have been documented by many commentators (Harrison et al. 2004, Thornley et al. 2005, Imrie et al. 2009).

Throughout my interviews, public officials and experts rarely referred to public engagement as having had a tangible impact on integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies. At the citywide level, the direct influence of public engagement is generally difficult to detect and the local level of planning, where most actual engagement takes place, is often confronted with inherent barriers to vertical integration. But experts did
acknowledge the importance of debate and the need for the general public to, as one interviewee put it, “become responsible critics for urban development.”

In summary, integrated planning and policymaking in London profits from a range of supporting instruments and enabling conditions. On the instruments side, this includes a sophisticated data collection and analysis effort. Of particular importance to the integration of land use and transport is TfL’s Public Transport Accessibility Level (PTALs) measure, which serves as a central indicator, informing the degree of land use intensification, transport infrastructure investment and parking space requirements. A further integration instrument discussed above was related to funding and finance. On the one hand, conventional finance (mostly by the public sector) has not been sufficient to pay for larger integrated transport and land use projects, while alternative public-private financing models have so far not delivered the desirable level of project integration. On the other hand, the pressures to move away from state-financed transport projects have opened up the route for more innovative finance including land value capture and development obligations, which are increasingly helping to deliver large scale infrastructure. Still, these are not yet scaled to a level where they could possibly replace national government backing.

With regard to broader enabling conditions such as relevant institutional knowledge and the capacities of individuals, the new citywide government proved well equipped. Similarly, London appears to be prepared for more networked forms of governance, profiting considerably from the period when London did not have a government. This collaborative legacy of the pre-GLA years goes beyond the boroughs and also cuts across business and civil society groups. At the same time, converting these more informal partnership arrangements into a more clearly defined stakeholder engagement as part of a London-wide government allowed certain groups, above all business, to be more influential than others.

A more ambivalent picture emerged in relation to the involvement of the general public. Overall, engagement as part of strategic planning efforts mostly focused on consultative rather than participatory approaches. And the more recent moves towards more localised planning might be locally more consensual but do not reflect strategic planning objectives (Holman 2010) and, instead, risk being ‘piecemeal’.

**Conclusion**

Strategic planning and transport policy in London are arguably among those government interventions where institutional change in urban governance over the last decades has been most impactful. And across the board, agreement exists with regard to the intention of
institutional change to facilitate the integration, coordination and synchronisation of urban planning, placemaking and mobility strategies.

My interviews, as well as the relevant literature, also clearly suggest that integrative planning capacities were indeed improved in London over the analysed period, particularly at the strategic level. GLA directors emphasised that “we are getting better at it”, with integration having improved for “big strategies but less so further down the ‘food chain’”, or that integration is “generally better but less clear the more you go down to a lower spatial level.” A clear identification of “new links” and “a particularly positive experience with transport” were referred to by borough and national government representatives. And, it was not only the planning process for which considerable improvements were registered. It was also the actual system integration on the ground and the delivery of more compact urban development that has become evident. For former Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron, the integration of land use, transport and regeneration was “the underpinning of everything I have been working on for more than 20 years.”

Further acknowledgements referred to integration as “probably a lot more effective than what we would give London credit for” and one interviewee emphasised “that London is in a much better shape in terms of planning and transport integration than it was pre-2000.” The Commissioner for Transport, Peter Hendy, put it simply as “this is the best situation ever.” TfL Managing Director of Planning Michèle Dix highlighted the importance of overcoming the pre-GLA difficulties in having 33 boroughs supporting development and implementing strategic transport solutions. The Mayor of Lewisham, Steve Bullock, specifically referred to the Crossrail project in this context: “How would we have gotten Crossrail? Individual boroughs would have never agreed on this.”

Related academic literature echoed such assessments and also identified overall improvements in more coordinated spatial and transport planning (Travers 2003, Thornley and West 2004, Allmendinger and Haughton 2009). At the same time both my interviews and the literature also urged a more nuanced perspective. Some underscore the limits to actual change in the planning system due to its inertia (Allmendinger 2011), persistent fragmentation (Pimlott and Rao 2004, Imrie et al. 2009) or, above all, unsolved vertical integration in London, which in particular has led to tensions between strategy and delivery. More recently, there has also been a reversal of some of the advances in regional strategic planning.

Across the various aspects above, I was able to derive a range of key observations with which I will bring this chapter to a close. First, the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London is challenged by a complex relationship between vertical
and horizontal integration. In fact, most of the evidence I encountered for this study seems to suggest that the two are dealt with by separating them to a considerable degree. Indicative for this is also the fact that some of the literature dealing with urban policy integration almost exclusively looks at horizontal, sectoral integration at the citywide level.

Horizontal integration at the level of policy strategy is the more successful direction of integration compared to that across scales of policymaking. The first has not only profited from the establishment of one central overall vision, the London Plan, but has also been closely watched by the Mayor’s office, particularly with regard to the other two most important ‘master’ strategies: transport and economic development. In these cases, cross-sectoral integration rests on political leadership by the Mayor coupled with more technical consistency checks by the bureaucracy.

Synchronising strategic land and transport infrastructure development is, however, compromised as a result of the limited financial autonomy of London-wide government. And new financing tools, which are based on integrating transport and land use through mechanisms such as land value capture, are only beginning to emerge. However, so far these remain the exception and are applied in a number of specific cases only. The importance of financing instruments for integration is also indicative of the shortcomings of vertical planning integration.

For vertical integration, I detected a sense that coordinating across planning scales not only remains isolated from horizontal strategy integration but that it suffers from serious shortcomings. Besides the entrenched neglect of the wider metropolitan dimension of planning, the form of multi-level spatial governance in London had the following implication: rather than working based on a large public budget, cascading systems of plans and legally binding planning standards, connecting across policy scales primarily relies on politics and stakeholder engagement. And the Mayor has been positioned at the centre of this ‘planning by politics’. It involves negotiating upwards with national government, particularly in relation to infrastructure funding and dealing with borough-level implementation by directly interfering with decisions not aligned with Mayoral Strategies. In addition, strategy implementation relies on brokering deals with key stakeholders, above all the private sector with its financial resources.

This brings me to a second observation, which considers the role of network governance in delivering planning integration in London. Here, I identified a substantial collaborative legacy that was created during the 1990s in the absence of London-wide government. But while the ‘governance by partnership’ model of the 1990s created an extensive web of network governance, it ultimately relied on consensual decision-making. Stephen O’Brien
summarised: “Things that did not happen were the ones where there was not support from all spectrums.” By contrast, planning and transport initiatives that followed after 2000 progressed under the leadership of the Mayor and did not rely on an overall consensus.

Still it is through the legacy of the earlier partnerships that many of today’s fruitful exchanges between different stakeholders, network actors and actors within different public administrations have become possible. And related collaboration was able to take advantage of a high degree of shared values among network actors, which is generally regarded as a critical facilitator of integration (Peters 1998). At the same time, converting the loose partnership arrangements of the 1990s to stakeholder contributions under a GLA-led London also brought distortions and led to a significant ‘business privilege’ as part of London governance. While the impact of the latter on integrated planning is difficult to assess, it has certainly compromised a certain degree of legitimacy, which the GLA’s planning efforts were aiming for. This is further exacerbated by ineffective public participation for most of the GLA’s strategic policy.

Finally, my third observation relates to how institutional knowledge facilitating integrated planning and policymaking is maintained and generated during periods of considerable institutional change. In the London case, this has been achieved through a combination of advanced data collection and analysis, the pooling of knowledge and by relying on the skills and capacities of individuals. A specific example of the first, and of particular relevance for integrated planning in London, was the establishment of Public Transport Accessibility Levels (PTALs), which allow for a better synchronisation of land use intensities and transport accessibility. PTALs are complementing much broader data collection, analysis and modelling efforts cutting across demography, the economy and transport.

Equally relevant, the London model of planning integration relies considerably on pooling knowledge that exists across public, private and third-party network actors and organisations. Specifically related to capacities at the GLA and its functional bodies, I was further able to detect the recruiting of well-educated, motivated and innovative staff as an important factor. Together with the establishment of a collaborative staff culture, new working environments were created and remained attractive. On the downside, a lot of key human resources migrated from borough to city-level institutions, leading to skills gaps at borough level, which were partially addressed by training programmes.

By concluding this chapter, I also bring to a close the case-specific part of my analysis. The next two final chapters that follow below build on my empirical findings from Berlin and London, advancing a comparative perspective while linking back to a broader conceptual perspective on planning and policy integration.
Chapter 7  
Comparison and implications

With this and the following final chapter I return to a broader perspective on planning and policy integration informed by my research questions and based on a comparative understanding of integration practices in Berlin and London. This also includes the discussion of links between the experiences in the case study cities and broader theoretical framings as introduced in Chapter 3.

In relation to my first research question on how integrated governance has been pursued as part of a compact city agenda, I begin below by arguing that my findings do indeed allow linking such a policy agenda to the observed institutional change. This is followed by a comparative perspective of the actual ‘how’ of integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies in London and Berlin, which centrally considers the relevant integration mechanisms my second research question inquired about.

While I compare and contrast the experience in the two case study cities throughout the final two chapters, it is these second and third sections that provide a more explicit overview on tendencies towards convergence and divergence in their respective approaches. Ultimately, I contend that converging trends across the two cities feature more strongly, which also establishes the basis for some of the tentative generalisations to follow in the final chapter.

In the fourth section I then suggest several key practical implications of my study and consider insights from the two case study cities that may be transferable to each other and cities elsewhere. It is important to note also at this point that the underlying definitions concerning the compact city, strategic spatial planning and integrated governance more generally did not fundamentally differ across the two analysed contexts. Furthermore, to a large extent, the key governance scales discussed for Berlin and London, including the borough, citywide and metropolitan levels, also represent functional equivalents. This is important insofar as it is essentially a precondition for the comparative perspective advanced below.

7.1 From policy agenda to institutional change

I concluded the previous two chapters by highlighting the evidence on how the institutional arrangements that emerged in Berlin and London over the last two decades increased the capacity for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy. This section goes
one step further and follows up from my theoretical discussion of Section 3.1, and discusses the degree to which the observed institutional change was the result of intentional design linked to spatial policy agendas.

At a generic level and for analysing the factors that led to institutional change, institutionalists differentiate between exogenous and endogenous change (Busetti 2015). Following this differentiation, which I also briefly touched upon as part of my theoretical discussion, institutional change in Berlin and London presents two fundamentally different cases. In Berlin, the most fundamental factor of change has been Germany’s reunification, which matches the main criteria of an exogenous, external shock resulting in institutional restructuring. By contrast, reforms in London are mostly characterised by endogenous change and present a case in which the rules change when policy change requires it.

In the UK more generally, links between territorial policy and reforms to governance structures generally tend to be more pronounced than in many Continental countries. Arguably this is a result of a greater flexibility in structuring sub-national governance in the absence of constitutionally defined roles. On the one hand this results in what Nick Bailey (2008) refers to as the intimate relationship between socio-economic and environmental change in London, the creation of new institutional frameworks and the political discourses about spatial development. On the other hand, setting up a governance structure that facilitates cross-cutting policymaking was also based on New Labour’s pragmatic and un-ideological ‘what works’ approach (Allmendinger 2011).

However, the actual dynamics of institutional change in both cities were ultimately more similar than a perspective based only on the macro trigger of change may suggest. And as I show below, the new political realities of a reunited Berlin required administrative reform even there to consider more specific local policy agendas. To begin with a more detailed and comparative perspective between the two cities, Figure 34 and Figure 35 present an overview timeline of the relevant major institutional events and spatial policy initiatives. Above all, this illustrates once again the degree to which new institutional arrangements precede new policy capacities which the various highlighted policies and strategies are indications of. A comparative perspective between the two cities also needs to highlight the overall earlier and more concentrated institutional reforms in Berlin (mostly throughout the 1990s as a result of reunification) compared to overall later and more dispersed, in some cases even retracted, reforms in London.
Figure 34: Timeline of Berlin’s major institutional events and spatial policy initiatives
Source: own representation

Figure 35: Timeline of London’s major institutional events and spatial policy initiatives
Source: own representation
What these timelines do not reveal is, of course, the question about the extent to which the wish to increase spatial policy capacity actually informed these reforms in the first place. Considering the types of reform in question, such as setting up joint state planning for Berlin and Brandenburg or a new government for London, it is clear that the institutional change discussed in this study is characterised by considerable levels of intentionality. The question therefore is more about what motivated the purposive design of institutions and to what extent policy capacities were part of the relevant considerations.

In relation to advancing integration mechanisms of interest to this study, city-level changes in both Berlin and London were the most central ones. And in most instances these were also the result of deliberate intervention informed by factors other than spatial policy capacities. The far-reaching changes in Berlin’s administration, which were prepared by the Berlin Senate between 1992 and 1994, were motivated primarily by increasing administrative efficiency and effectiveness. Portfolio assignments at the department level were also a result of coalition arrangements, which had little to do with spatial development considerations.

In the case of London, a recent analysis by Busetti (2015) identifies four broader reform conditions beyond narrower functionalism that led to the kind of city-level government for London described above. First, he emphasises the ‘Blair Factor’ and New Labour’s agenda of establishing “strong leaders and light organisations” (p63). Second, local authorities in London, as well as business, were demanding metropolitan reform. Third, potential resistance to devolving powers away from national level bureaucracies was limited as a result of the unusual set-up of the Government Office for London (GOL), which “had nothing to lose” (p67). And finally, New Labour was indeed hesitant to devolve too much authority to the GLA, not least given the lack of trust in a potential (and later on elected) Mayor Ken Livingstone.

At the same time, many of the institutional arrangements discussed in the previous two chapters can indeed be linked to an identifiable policy agenda. Across all cases, this may be most obvious for reforms at the metropolitan level in Berlin. At the most generic level, the opportunity after reunification for developing a metropolitan region coherently was a central motivation for many of the structural reforms that followed. Related, and with direct links to the focus of this thesis, the limiting of urban sprawl and avoiding settlement patterns that surround the two other German city states, Hamburg and Bremen, was a clear and joint strategic objective of the Länder of Brandenburg and Berlin and resulted in the creation of the Joint Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Department (GL).

Furthermore, the early 1990s saw significant efforts to position sustainable development more centrally as part of integrated rather than sectoral policies. These certainly supported
Berlin’s decision to concentrate spatial development portfolios within one department. More specifically, bringing the environment portfolio into the urban development department was seen as an important acknowledgement of the expansion of the environmental sustainability perspective beyond traditional ecological concerns and linking it, in particular, with issues related to resource efficiency and urban form.

London’s agenda-driven governance restructuring also had a clear relationship with the development paradigms introduced in Chapter 4. As Thornley (1998) notes, this agenda for sustainable growth, business opportunities and global competiveness very clearly required institutional cooperation across Greater London as well as more long-term perspectives (Thornley 1998). And both sustainable development perspectives and related spatial considerations such as the compact city agenda have also left their mark on governance reform over the last two decades.

Several interviewees emphasised that the formation of the GLA happened at a time of heightened awareness of sustainability. More generally, the emerging sustainability discourse was also directly impacting on New Labour’s joined-up policy agenda and some of the key principles of modernising government across the UK. In our interview, former Minister for London Nick Raynsford referred to the Kyoto Protocol as having centrally informed the thinking in relation to setting up the GLA: “It was not a coincidence that the Kyoto Treaty was negotiated at exactly the same time as the GLA was set up.” He further saw the compact city model giving considerable shape to the new government for London, which brought together strategic spatial development and transport powers at the newly created citywide governance level.

With regard to the world city agenda, it was the concern about London as a global financial centre, with new competition from Frankfurt and the ongoing rivalry with New York, that demanded a level of leadership for London, which did not exist after the abolition of the GLC. London needed a coordinated investment programme, which, according to most commentators, required a London-wide administration. At the end of the 1990s the pressure for leadership in facilitating investments was enormous. Stephen O’Brien, the former chairman of London First, identified the assignment of certain responsibilities to the GLA, such as transport and inward investments, as a direct translation of these pressures and the world city perspective for London’s development.

To summarise, both London and Berlin have relatively successfully dealt with one spatial scale to advance integration: the city level. And it is at that level where institutional change towards greater integration capacity coincided with substantial advances in compact urban growth on the ground, as presented in Chapter 4. Irrespective of the difficulty of establishing
direct causality between institutional structures and outcomes, reforms of institutional arrangements in both cities are strongly marked by an agenda-driven approach with policy objectives (matter) having had a considerable effect on institutions (meta). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the relationship between paradigms, ideas and policy (the matter) and the relevant governance structures (meta) in both cities is at least one of mutual reinforcement.

I continue below by discussing the degree to which a shared compact city agenda and desire to increase the capacity for planning and policy integration in the two cities has led to converging or diverging tendencies of institutional change.

7.2 Convergence: Sectoral integration by citywide governments

In both cities my research revealed one central and relatively consistent view among most interviewees and in the relevant literature: the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies has markedly improved, from the 1990s onwards. Furthermore, I encountered substantial evidence with regard to the intentionality of this advance in planning and policy integration. Here, I discuss the converging trends of the relevant approaches in Berlin and London by first looking at governance structures and then at planning processes, instruments and enabling conditions.

Convergence of integrating governance structures is greatest for sectoral links at the citywide level. This was centrally informed by administrative reforms that made the overall governance of the two cities more similar (Röber et al. 2002): the decentralised model of London’s governance became more centralised with a new strategic citywide administration while Berlin’s powerful administrative centre become more strategic, reducing costs and devolving some planning powers to the boroughs. Today, both cities represent urban governance cases that combine and try to balance centralised and decentralised governance.

As part of these broader shifts, Berlin and London share three principal structural changes, which provide the backbone for planning and policy integration. First, spatial planning functions and transport policymaking were concentrated within one larger organisational unit. And, most importantly, this unit is not competing for power, autonomy or legitimacy with another unit with a similar remit. In the case of Berlin, this is the Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment (SenStadtUm), which was created in its current form in 1999. In London, the Greater London Authority (GLA), with Transport for London (TfL), was set up in 2000 and similarly bundled spatial development and transport.

Second, hierarchical organisation was coupled with effective leadership as part of planning and policy coordination. In London, the directly elected Mayor who first came to power in
2000 can easily be singled out as the most important structural component for planning and policy integration. Positioned at the heart of London’s new government, the Mayor not only oversees a hierarchical bureaucracy within the GLA but is in a unique position to link the GLA with TfL, chairing its board and appointing its commissioner. Berlin’s constitutionally endorsed ‘portfolio principle’ establishes a hierarchical and monocentric organisation of senate departments, and the strong line management within SenStadtUm continues to function as a critical integration mechanism. Top-level leadership is provided by the Senator for Urban Development, who has also been identified as a key integrative force alongside his/her state secretaries and the department’s directors.

Third, newer forms of network governance have emerged as additional factors, which have ultimately improved planning and policy integration. But rather than more inclusive notions of deliberative democracy and participation by the general public, the form of network governance mostly referred to consisted of professional public and private network actors who represent a form of ‘networked technocracy’. These advanced the quality of collaboration and increasingly co-produced more integrated urban and transport development. In this respect, both cities also share similar histories around the evolution of the compact city agenda and its advocacy. While the initial impetus for rejecting the modernist city emerged through local community action, the mainstreaming of compact urban growth appears to have subjected it to more technocratic governance. However, this process often carried with it its leading advocates who were then centrally embedded within the new formal network structures.

In Berlin, network integration was helped by a constitutional requirement for ‘public authorities participation’, the ‘collegial principle’ between senate departments and the recognition of ‘organisations of public interest’ as a critical network actor. More recently, these have been complemented by a range of boards and advisory committees, and a substantial increase in project-based work. Together, they have softened very strict hierarchical arrangements and facilitated greater cross-sectoral fertilisation. London’s network governance advanced particularly throughout the 1990s when a citywide government did not exist and, as a result, unusual coalitions had to be developed. The legacy of that period continues to facilitate a more fruitful exchange between different tiers of government, public, private and third-party actors. Similarly, project-based work as part of development corporations or for large-scale urban redevelopment has increased considerably and helped to establish a platform for cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary exchange. The recognition that ‘project-based work works’ to strengthen integration is a common thread in both cities.
Besides changes to governance structures, a wide range of planning processes, instruments and enabling conditions were enhanced or set up following a similar approach to assist the integration of urban development and transport. The analysis presented above suggests that both cities have established a system for strategic citywide planning that is able to integrate urban form and transport to a considerable degree. Strategic planning in both Berlin and London is structured around one anchor: their respective citywide plans. Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP) and the London Plan mirror the prevailing planning cultures in each city and represent a pragmatic adjustment to a governmental framework that essentially determines the scope and procedures that shape these plans. Four high-level commonalities can be identified with regard to planning processes and instruments that broadly assisted integration.

First, there is the capacity of strategic planning – through the London Plan and Berlin’s FNP in combination with the urban development concept – to set a holistic agenda for urban development and to commit to a clear vision for the city. Second, there is a certain consistency of targeting mainly strategic issues at the level of citywide planning processes, while allowing for a degree of flexibility necessary to adjust to specific local conditions without compromising overall strategic objectives. Third, strategic planning in both cities is a continuous process, with ongoing engagement of a range of network governance actors and frequent updates of the most relevant planning frameworks. And fourth, subsequent and parallel sectoral planning efforts, above all those related to transport, directly build on and inform strategic citywide planning. In addition, various concrete and similar technical integration instruments cutting across monitoring, modelling, forecasting and various assessment methods were advanced to assist planning and policy integration.

This short illustration of shifts in governance structures and planning approaches in London and Berlin already points towards a considerable level of convergence related to planning and policy integration. However, before reaching any further conclusions, I now turn to the key differences in the relevant integration approaches to identify patterns of divergence in the two cities.

7.3 Divergence: The vertical alignment of strategic planning and implementation

Overall, diverging approaches to integration in Berlin and London relate to ongoing, stable differences rather than cases of increasing dissimilarity. Most of these differences can be linked to path dependencies created by the broader institutional and cultural contexts within which the two cities operate. Several underlying and fundamental differences in urban governance therefore need to be re-emphasised upfront.
Berlin is characterised by comparatively high levels of autonomy in a federal ‘Rechtsstaat’ system and its government holds constitutionally protected powers as one of Germany’s Bundesländer as well as a municipality. By contrast, London’s government operates within a unitary ‘public interest’ state and was created by national government legislation, which gave it far more selective powers and limited autonomy (Pimlott and Rao 2002, Salet et al. 2003a). And, overall, there is a significant local-central tension that has dominated London government historically (Hebbert 1998). Therefore, the principal authorship of reforming governance structures, planning processes and instruments in Berlin has emerged from within Berlin’s government while in London this authorship lies primarily with national government.

As is often the case with structural reforms that are initiated ‘from within’, in contrast to those emerging ‘from the outside’, the first are more closely aligned to actual practices on the ground and can potentially evolve in a way that is more closely related to plan implementation. This pattern can be recognised for many of Berlin’s governance changes, including the reform of Senate departments with the important merger of the urban development and transport portfolios that created SenStadtUm, the upgrading of the FNP and the establishment of a broader range of sectoral planning frameworks such as the StEP Verkehr. By contrast, London’s reform ‘from the outside’ is based more on a theoretical ideal of imagining integrative practices without specifying actual routines on the ground. Thornley and West identify the policy integration processes presented in the GLA Act (Part II, section 30, 33 and 41) “as a highly rational process” (Thornley and West 2004 p97). Less clear, however, is how integration objectives can be operationalised as part of implementing urban development on the ground, which requires a clearer view of vertical policy integration.

Furthermore, London’s government is based on a mayoral system with a strong, directly elected mayor and a relatively weak assembly, which mainly fulfils a scrutiny function. Berlin’s government is cabinet-based with currently eight Senators and a Governing Mayor. The Mayor is elected by Berlin’s powerful House of Representatives and since 2006 appoints all Senators, who before were also elected by the House of Representatives. In the case of London, top-level integration of planning, city design and transport strategies is provided by the Mayor who is balancing transport and land use integration with other policy objectives, above all economic development. In Berlin, top-level integration is provided by the Senator for Urban Development, which allows for a ‘purer’ form of integrating the core agendas of spatial development and transport, which are both assigned to one department.

A case of actually diverging trends relates to integrating the broader metropolitan region. In the absence of an administrative boundary that corresponds with the functional urban region,
Berlin has implemented a joint planning institution that deals effectively with the most relevant requirements for cross-boundary synchronisation and vertical planning integration. This has enabled Berlin to play a proactive role in planning its hinterland. By contrast, there is no dedicated institution responsible for planning in the London metropolitan region nor does the region have a metropolitan-wide planning process (John et al. 2005). In fact, regional governance was recently weakened as a result of abolishing regional assemblies and planning in 2010. Instead, the coordination between the Greater London area, the 1,570 km² covered by the London Plan, and its larger regional hinterland of up to 30,000 km², rests with national government (Salet et al. 2003b) and an unspecified ‘duty to cooperate’ between local authorities. National government facilitates the required integration mainly through its green belt policy and by overseeing and funding selected transport projects.

An important structural difference related to the horizontal integration of urban development and transport in Berlin and London concerns planning and implementation powers with regard to transport. In Berlin, these are concentrated within SenStadtUm, allowing for direct and in-house coordination with spatial planning and urban design. This leaves Berlin’s public transport operators such as BVG and S-Bahn Berlin primarily as transport service providers who are subcontracted by SenStadtUm. By contrast, London’s government is characterised by a separation of strategic and implementation powers. In the case of transport this means that all implementation powers rest with Transport for London (TfL), the city’s multi-modal transport authority, which is chaired by the Mayor but operates separately from the Greater London Authority (GLA). In fact, most transport planning activities are also assigned to TfL. This requires very effective collaboration with the GLA’s strategic planning efforts, which, besides the critical role of the Mayor, is established by frequent meetings, working groups and personal relationships.

The differences in integration efforts linked to planning processes are largely determined by the substantial differences between spatial planning in the two cities. The most relevant one is the degree to which strategic planning translates into legally binding building regulation. The Berlin Land Use Plan is a legally binding document for all subsequent plans, including building development plans (BPlans), which are in turn legally binding for individuals and therefore exercise a degree of planning power that is entirely unknown to the London Plan. The latter relies on sending strong strategic and political messages to boroughs, which themselves have to separate plan and planning permission as stipulated by UK planning law. Ultimately, the power of the London Plan is linked to its legitimacy as the central strategy of a directly elected mayor coupled with the potential threat of local planning permission being vetoed by the Mayor. Overall, planning in London is far more politicised as it always leaves
options for adjustments at the borough level, which increases overall flexibility but risks compromising the overall strategic cohesion of different spatial and transport strategies.

Vertical integration in Berlin is facilitated by a system of plans based on a clear hierarchy of cascading, legally binding plans following the traditional model for coordination, while adding three innovative components: first, joint state planning between two equal entities without interference from federal government; second, the calibration of plans at each geographic level to define the most appropriate level of detail; and third, counterflow planning, whereby lower-level planning and plans also inform planning processes at a higher level. In London, vertical planning integration primarily focuses on the translation of strategic London-wide targets defined by the GLA and the granting of planning permission by the boroughs. This form of integration ultimately requires significant levels of collaboration between the GLA and the boroughs as part of important local urban development projects. Travers also points to the size of local authorities as a barrier to integration: “The creation of relatively small unitary authorities has increased fragmentation, made strategic planning for transport, economic development and education more difficult” (Travers 2003, p141).

Finally, there are several enabling conditions for greater planning and policy integration, which play very different roles in London and Berlin. London has established various funding arrangements, which have acted as an important integrative force and which play a less important role in Berlin. More notably in London as well were changes of skill sets, knowledge and capacity, all key factors in enabling integration. Berlin, on the other hand, had far fewer changes to its public sector workforce and primarily continues to reduce the relatively large number of public sector employees.

To summarise, the considerable level of convergence of Berlin’s and London’s integrated governance comes along with deeply rooted and pervasive differences. However, with the one big exception of metropolitan-wide institution building and planning, these differences have remained static and not significantly increased the differences between the two cities. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, overall, integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies in the two cities has become more rather than less similar.

I now turn to the most relevant practical implications that can be derived from the above. More specifically, I discuss the extent to which the presented integration mechanisms could be applied to contexts beyond the case study cities.
7.4 Practical implications, transferability and recommendations

This final section on the practical insights gained through my research and the analysis of integration mechanisms in London and Berlin is based on two assumptions. It assumes for a given urban governance context that an aspiration of compact urban growth actually exists and that this comes along with a related desire for enhancing the capacity for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policy. If these conditions are met, what can be learned from the two case study cities and their experience with integrated governance? What are more general practical implications? And what are potentially transferable lessons to similar socio-political contexts elsewhere?

The timing and type of institutional change

With regard to more general implications, an important question concerns the timing of institutional change. Here, both cases indicate that critical reforms occurred as part of a broader context of institutional adaptation. In the case of Berlin, this context was centrally informed by Germany’s reunification in 1990 and in London by a new political momentum at the national level when New Labour came to power in 1997. Furthermore, reform requirements were also enhanced by Berlin’s fiscal constraints and considerable pressures for increasing the efficiency of its public administration. Similarly, pressures in London for accelerating the upgrading of the city’s infrastructure translated into efforts of related institutional reform.

This shared experience of improving the mechanisms for integrated governance during a broader period of reform links well to what Kingdon (1984) has referred to more generally as windows of opportunity for change in public policy. This may indeed imply that waiting for the ‘right moment’ for introducing more fundamental integration mechanisms such as super-ministries, overlords, legally binding planning frameworks or multi-modal transport authorities is a precondition for successful implementation.

Furthermore, and even under advantageous circumstances for institutional reform, the experience of London and Berlin has shown that one specific policy agenda alone (such as compact urban growth) may not create enough momentum for the desired changes. Thus, the building of coalitions beyond such specific functionalist motivations becomes important. In London this was achieved by bringing together sustainable development actors and world city advocates. Similarly in Berlin, those concerned about administrative reform did connect with green transport and gentle urban renewal interests. Coalition building further implies a certain “sensitivity to motivational complexity” (Goodin 1996, p41) alongside a clear awareness of losers and winners of institutional reform (Busetti 2015).
At the same time, a large repertoire of mechanisms enhancing integrated planning and policymaking may be more amenable to tactical, evolutionary or even ad hoc implementation. Above all, the various informal instruments for horizontal coordination such as Berlin’s StEP Verkehr, London’s PTAL mapping or project-based work in both cities were less reliant on a broader institutional reform momentum. Instead, they required leadership at specific administrative levels, political will and cross-sectoral project management capabilities. An additional advantage of these mechanisms are their propensity to ‘learning by doing’, also facilitating what Goodin (1996) has referred to as an important principle of institutional design: “revisability… kept within limits” (p40).

The above point also links to a final practical implication about the role of formal and informal integration mechanisms. In that respect, the experience in London and Berlin appears to suggest that a legally binding, formal system of planning and policy integration is most important for vertical integration. Above all, this conclusion can be drawn from a direct comparison between the more effective vertical integration in Berlin and a less satisfactory situation in London. To a considerable degree, this difference stems from Berlin’s system of legally binding and vertically integrated plans, which does not exist in London. At the same time, the informal integration mechanisms I just mentioned appear to be more effective for horizontal integration at the city level. This implication is hardly surprising considering that horizontal integration mostly concerns efforts within the same unit of government whereas vertical integration most likely involves a range of different units, spheres and institutions.

**The transferability of practical research insights**

When considering the transferability of my research findings, one component can be highlighted as more universally applicable without the important concern about neglecting context. It is the appropriateness and usefulness of using the four core categories of integration mechanisms that my research established. Whether it is for the analysis of the status quo or for advancing institutional reforms in any given urban governance context, differentiating integration structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions may indeed be of great utility. This framework of integration mechanisms may be helpful in terms of a more systematic approach to integrated governance, better means of communicating and discussing key mechanisms, and for prioritising certain aspects of institutional reform over others. In addition, it is also a framework that enables a comparative perspective as shown throughout this thesis while assisting with more structured discussions about transferability.

By contrast, moving to the transferability of the more tangible specifics of enhancing integrative capacities requires a careful consideration of context. Most importantly, the experience in London and Berlin shows the considerable degree to which strategic and
integrated governance is backed by mature institutional arrangements and government structures capable of integrating the key aspects of urban development at the top of city-level decision-making. Berlin’s status as Bundesland combined with its holistic urban development department is arguably the best example across my research. In London, the creation of the Greater London Authority coupled with a multi-modal transport agency has similarly improved London’s capacity for strategic citywide planning.

This may well suggest that, in the absence of such institutionalised capacities, the degree of strategic and integrated governance that I have described for the case study cities is impossible to achieve. Therefore, any considerations of transferability will have to reflect centrally the different levels of institutional and democratic maturity that exist in different cities. Possibly my only universally applicable finding is an inherent tendency of sectoral and scalar fragmentation alongside persisting integration barriers and tensions (Table 10). In turn, this may imply that greater planning and policy integration relies on a continuous effort of cultivating ongoing collaborative and cross-sectoral practices regardless of overall development levels.

Table 10: Persisting integration barriers and tensions (see also Appendix E1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Tensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Governmental silos impossible to overcome in their entirety</td>
<td>● Metropolitan governance which cuts across multiple municipalities and needs to deal with competing interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Professional differences associated with the involved disciplines and sectors</td>
<td>● Municipal finance systems which reinforce prioritising competition rather than collaboration across a metropolitan region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Requirement for greater upfront resources as part of more integrated planning and policymaking compared to sectoral approaches</td>
<td>● Oversight of linear network infrastructure (e.g. road network) cutting across municipal and sub-municipal boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Communicating integrated policy agendas to the general public more difficult than communicating sectoral goals</td>
<td>● Limited expertise in relation to more integrative planning and policymaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Complexity of administrative tasks associated with holistic governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to avoid a problematic “institutional isomorphism” (Pierson 2000b) ignorant of particular local conditions, any discussion on transferability must also consider the wider national and European context within which London and Berlin operate. In Chapter 4 I highlighted a range of particular features of a European compact city agenda, including a clear commitment of providing alternative transport solutions to the private car. I also emphasised the generally higher population densities in Europe compared to a North
American context. Since the 1990s, a further particularity of the European context has been the considerable promotion of public-sector-led strategic spatial planning directly addressing coordination concerns of urban policy. For contexts that are more similar to those in London and Berlin, Table 11 provides an overview of integration mechanisms that are potentially, and in parts, transferable.

Table 11: Potentially transferable integration mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Enabling conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Enhanced autonomy of metropolitan region and/or city</td>
<td>• Prominent and influential strategic planning processes</td>
<td>• Developing a city vision with broad principles based on a long-term assessment of a city’s assets and weaknesses</td>
<td>• Acknowledging the challenge of involving the general public as part of integrated and strategic planning, emphasising where it has potential but also where it may not be able to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthened urban nexus by assigning main integration role to city level</td>
<td>• Well-calibrated plan-making hierarchy – a system of plans – to support strategic planning logic: top-level plans with lower resolution and more strategic, lower-level plans considering specific local conditions</td>
<td>• Enhancing data collection efforts and supporting data availability across sectoral boundaries</td>
<td>• Assisting far-reaching collaboration through project groups, recruitment and staff management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Single leadership positioned at central nodes of integration</td>
<td>• Positioning urban design as the glue between strategic planning and local implementation as well as a key mechanism for cross-sectoral collaboration based on a common language</td>
<td>• Establishing measures for accessibility which take account of access through connectivity and physical proximity</td>
<td>• Considering recruitment and staffing policy as a central instrument for integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Metropolitan coordination facilitated through joint planning departments</td>
<td>• Establishing transport infrastructure as a driver for integrated spatial development</td>
<td>• Recognising finance mechanisms as potentially powerful integration instruments</td>
<td>• Exposing planning and policy professionals to shared city experiences on the ground to foster a better mutual understanding of key issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrated transport supported by multi-modal transport authorities</td>
<td>• Enhanced transport planning beyond ‘predict and provide’ and empowered by a joint role with urban planning and city design to enhance urban accessibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This overview differentiates integration structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions, which cut across vertical and horizontal coordination. At least some of these
approaches on ‘how to’ advance integrated planning and policymaking may also be applicable for cities outside higher income countries and with lower levels of institutional maturity.

Recommendations across and beyond the case study cities

Fairly irrespective of the specific local planning culture, vertical integration is likely to remain an important priority of strategic planning. Related desires have certainly led to great efforts as part of citywide planning in the two case study cities, such as, for example, Berlin’s system of plans and combined approach of cascading and counterflow planning. A challenge most cities grapple with is coordinating development across the metropolitan region while avoiding a “race to the bottom” of competing municipalities within the same functional urban region. In that regard, Berlin’s approach may offer relevant insights, potentially even for London. Setting up joint state planning with the surrounding Federal State of Brandenburg has limited the potentially adverse effects of governing spatial development within two separate and largely independent political territories.

Rather than unifying the entire metropolitan territory under one government, the Berlin-Brandenburg approach may have even been advantageous for the specific case of compact urban growth. Maintaining a narrower boundary of the political city can result in urban containment being incentivised by the administrative city eager to accommodate development within its territory. This, of course, presupposes the possibility of considerable urban intensification as well as clear advantages of increasing the number of residents. Similarly, such narrower boundaries may protect more progressive transport and urban design policies for the core city – in Goodin’s (1996) words a form of “social laboratory” that is part of a more federalist metropolitan region – which otherwise would be compromised by more suburban and rural interests in the wider metropolitan region.

However, the mechanism for metropolitan coordination in Berlin implies that the metropolitan region outside the core city is organised in a unified way to engage and collaborate with the core city as an equal partner. And this may be very difficult to achieve in contexts that do not allow for federal state or province status to provide such a ‘donut umbrella’. At the same time, I have not come across any evidence that, all other things being equal, central government would be in a better position than city governments to assist with aligning planning efforts across a metropolitan region. Even in the case of the Netherlands, Hajer and Zonneveld (2000) have similarly argued for a more selective involvement of national government and more devolved plan-making powers. Therefore, aligning citywide government with the functional city may indeed allow for more vertically integrated and strategic planning and policymaking. But there are only a few cases that could provide
evidence on this, unfortunately, as the number of cities that have recently aligned their political boundaries accordingly is low. However, even for the complex case of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipalities, which increased the city’s administrative area from 1,864 km² to 5,343 km² in 2004, the OECD suggests that the new boundaries “provide a good basis for co-ordination” (OECD 2006, p241).

Horizontal integration, at the minimum, aims to limit contradictory planning and policy objectives and interventions emerging from different sectoral perspectives. The experience in the two case study cities clearly seems to suggest that the sectoral integration of urban planning, city design and transport policy is best achieved at the level of a citywide government. Considering all governance levels, the integration structures that have emerged in the two cities may be characterised by an ‘x-shape’ of governance and integration: Horizontal integration is strongest at the city level (the centre of the x). Higher up, towards national government and further down, towards the borough level, a stronger sectoral approach has been evident (Figure 36).

This observation may suggest that bundling integrative and strategic development capacities at the citywide level (the centre of the ‘x’) is an important priority. In fact, this may indeed
imply that greater autonomy and leadership at precisely this level is a promising pre-
condition for better addressing cross-cutting issues related to the physical development of
cities. In both Berlin and London, this bundling happens at the top level of urban governance
rather than through additional government units specifically charged with an integrative
agenda such as the Barcelona Smart City office or the Medellin Integrated Projects office.
The advantages of injecting integrative capacities at the core of existing governance
arrangements rather than setting up new mechanisms that are attached to what already exists
have also been identified as part of integrating urban and environmental policy (UNEP
2013).

Furthermore, addressing vertical and horizontal integration at the same time, Berlin and
London have both established a strategic planning exercise around their main citywide plans.
At least components of these approaches are regarded a success and may suggest that such
plans are an important underlying requirement for integrative planning practices. They also
share a clear recognition of the role of transport infrastructure as part of strategic urban
development. In most cities, among the plan-led developments, transport infrastructure is
arguably the biggest driver of modern urban form and a central component of what Graham
and Marvin referred to as ‘mediating networks of contemporary urbanism’ (2001, p10).
Without coordinated, cross-sectoral planning and delivery arrangements, the potential for
transport provision to forge the future of cities can be wasted. First and foremost, one can
conclude from the experiences in London and Berlin, that strategic planning will have to take
transport planning out of the box of a ‘predict and provide’ exercise and empower it, jointly
with urban planning and design strategies, to shape the city in a holistic manner. This is also
beginning to be acknowledged by international urban development advice (UN Habitat 2009,

At the macro level, strategic, integrated planning in each of the two cities begins with a long-
term assessment of the city’s assets and weaknesses, which then underpins a vision for the
city’s future. This appears to be the baseline for many integrative processes that then follow.
For the different plans themselves, ongoing calibration of planning scales and content was
characteristic for the planning frameworks in London and Berlin. Top-level plans tend to be
more light touch and with a lower resolution; local planning and building development plans
then interpret the big picture input for specific local conditions. Furthermore, it is at the more
local scale where strategic planning, if successful, needs to connect with the qualitative
dimensions of city making. Urban design is not only the glue that enables integrated urban
development to take place but can play a significant role in achieving far-reaching
 collaboration. Discussions about the shape of cities at the local neighbourhood level are
usually based on a common language that connects different professionals, stakeholders and citizens.

There is potentially also a range of integration mechanisms, which may be transferable between the two case study cities. With regard to lessons from London that may be of relevance for Berlin, the British capital’s experiences with a truly multi-modal transport authority and calculative instruments, including PTAL mapping as well as a considerable effort in data provision and analysis, could be analysed further. And once Berlin’s financial situation has improved, there may be important lessons with regard to staffing strategies for building a modern public administration, which attracts employees with a greater propensity for interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral collaboration.

Besides Berlin’s approach to metropolitan planning and governance, London could further explore adopting Berlin’s strategy of creating a more meaningful public debate on strategic planning. While Berlin’s Stadtforum and citywide public referenda established formats to directly engage with strategic questions for the city’s development, public participation in London tends to focus on local, neighbourhood planning, which is prone to come along with a considerable degree of NIMBYism.

Evidently, the scale at which participatory practices are assigned centrally shapes the content of such exercises. And for public participation to be helpful for strategic planning processes, its consideration of the metropolitan scale is essential. In other words, the question that may have to be addressed is how public participation can be linked to top-down decision-making, which will have to continue playing a key role for integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies. As The Economist provocatively reminds us in the context of addressing the current global crisis in urban land use planning, “[policymakers] should ensure that city-planning decisions are made from the top down” (The Economist 2015, para. 9).

In summary, the kind of urban governance that may be best equipped to advance the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies will certainly have to recognise a substantial degree of decision-making capacity and leadership at the city/metropolitan level. But aligned with Gerry Stoker’s governance concept, this may not imply a one-dimensional requirement for either more state, more market or more participation but a considerable and right mix of all three (Stoker 2002).

Conclusion

This chapter allowed me to address the first two of my three research questions based on a comparative perspective cutting across Berlin and London. I began this chapter by clarifying
that a compact city agenda did indeed impact on institutional change associated with the integration mechanisms discussed for both cities. This is not to suggest that these functionalist and agenda-driven reforms did not occur within a broader context of institutional change. Quite the opposite: Germany’s reunification alongside Berlin’s pressures for administrative reforms as well as the UK’s political shift associated with New Labour coming to power and London’s world city aspiration were fundamental triggers of related institutional change.

In the second and third sections I then directly addressed the question of how objectives for integrating urban planning, city design and transport policies were pursued by comparing and contrasting the integration mechanisms in Berlin and London. This allowed me to emphasise various converging trends, above all the perceived and actual advances in integrative practices linking the shaping of urban form with the development of transport infrastructure since the early 1990s. Overall, convergence of sectoral integration mechanisms at the citywide level was more pronounced compared to vertical integration, for which substantial differences and even diverging trends between the two cities exist.

Ultimately, the latter are down to the intensity of multi-level governance, which is more advanced in Berlin with its status as city state and a legally binding planning framework from the metropolitan to the implementation level. And these diverging trends can easily be traced back to the impact of deeply embedded institutional path dependencies. As Perri 6 (2005) emphasises, it is important to note that such variations in the institutional styles that address integration are themselves political, i.e. they are shaped by ideologies and world views that prevail in these contexts.

The final section was dedicated to a discussion on practical implications, transferability and recommendations across and beyond the case study cities. I began this section with a perspective on the timing and type of introducing integration mechanism and argued that more fundamental enhancement may have to consider the ‘right’ moment for successful implementation. At the same time, various more informal integration mechanisms appear to be more amenable to tactical and ad hoc interventions.

With regard to any transferable insights from my study, I singled out the framework of integration mechanisms, which this thesis established (integration structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions) as potentially a more universally helpful approach for related analysis and intervention. Furthermore, I emphasised the importance of context and the particularity of Berlin and London that needs to be centrally considered as part of the potential transferability of any of the presented, more concrete integration mechanisms. On
the basis of this need to be mindful of context, I have provided a list of opportunities for enhancing the capacity for integrated planning and policymaking.

The concluding part of this section was then dedicated to a selection of recommendations, which were discussed in greater detail. This included approaches to more federalist metropolitan governance as well as the positioning of citywide government as the central node for horizontal and vertical integration. This part also allowed me to highlight a range of experiences with integration mechanisms in each of the case study cities that may be of relevance for the other.

To conclude, beyond identifying overall converging tendencies, the degree to which London and Berlin have developed similar as well as differential approaches to improving planning and policy integration for the urban form and transport nexus indeed suggests a certain operationalisation of an ‘integrated ideal’ in urban governance. This begs the question whether it is a return to conventional integration based on hierarchy and centrism or whether new, networked forms of integration are beginning to emerge. I address this point in the final, concluding chapter.
Chapter 8
Conclusion: Concepts for integration

Throughout this thesis, I have repeatedly come back to a range of broader, conceptual questions that have also emerged through the empirical perspectives of the previous chapters. This final and concluding chapter addresses three prominent, more general themes and directly targets my third research question on broader concepts that can be identified through my case study research in relation to integrated governance.

First, I present relevant insights that relate to the central question about the role of hierarchical structures and networks in facilitating integration. I propose that hierarchies continue to play a dominant role for integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies but that these hierarchies are centrally supported by new forms of network governance, jointly establishing a new form of meta-governance of integration.

Second, I discuss the impact of institutional change itself and to what degree disruptive or more continuous change may positively or negatively affect integrative capacities of organisations. Here, I suggest that integrated planning and policymaking require continuous processes, the establishment of patterns and routines rather than various forms of more disruptive and one-off ‘integration fixes’.

And third, I reflect on the privileging of specific integration content as part of integrated planning and policymaking and discuss the degree to which the urban form and transport nexus is part of a totalising strategy of integration or not. I argue that the forms of integration I have investigated here ultimately rely on privileging certain policy links over alternative ones and present a possible rationale for this.

The final, closing section is dedicated to final deliberations and a perspective on related future academic inquiry.

8.1 Hierarchies and networks: The meta-governance of integration

A central theme of political science, public administration and institutionalism is the degree to which social life is organised and coordinated through markets, hierarchies or networks (Thompson 1991). Given the public sector focus of this study due to its dominant role in the case of urban planning, city design and transport strategies, it is the latter two that are primarily of interest here. Below, I first discuss the extent to which hierarchies continue to provide the organisational basis for planning and policy integration and then move to the role
of network arrangements. In the final section I argue that it is indeed a hybrid model of coordination and integration which delivers the integrative outcomes in London and Berlin and that this combination of hierarchy and networks can be linked to the emerging framework of meta-governance.

_The reliance on hierarchy for integrating planning, design and transport_

This study has identified a persistent reliance on hierarchical structures as the backbone of coordinated planning and policymaking in Berlin and London. Furthermore, both cities share an increasing role of hierarchies in the specific case of transport and land use integration. And there is also a strong underlying assumption that a critical level of centralisation and bundling of the relevant functions at the citywide level serves integration. This presents a rather intriguing finding as hierarchical structures have long been subjected to intense critical analysis as part of academic work, cutting across political science, organisational science and planning theory (Jaques 1990, Powell 1990, Thompson 1991, Healey 1997).

It is therefore helpful to link my account of the various hierarchical integration mechanisms in Berlin and London to the principal coordinating logic of hierarchy. This logic is based on ordering a number of sub-tasks in such a manner that superordination and subordination can take place in an effective manner (Thompson 1991). The process of governing then implies the use of power and authority over subordinate actors and functions (Thompson 1991). And, as discussed in Chapter 3, integration in hierarchical structures is facilitated by oversight capabilities for each level through the next level up (Thompson 1991, Schreyögg 2007). As such, hierarchy is the coordinating logic of classic Weberian bureaucracies (Coyle 1997). Related examples that emerged through the case studies are the organisational logics of any of the public authorities discussed in this study. These were most explicitly emphasised in my interviews for the case of line management within Berlin’s Department for Urban Development and as part of the internal reorganisation of Transport for London.

A certain persistence of hierarchy is generally accepted by the relevant literature (Jaques 1990) and, at times, its virtues are acknowledged (Peters 1998). Thompson further notes that “in practice we can hardly escape the notion of hierarchy as an organisational technique” (Thompson 1991, p9). And Peters identifies one specific advantage of hierarchies over networks: "Hierarchies or even markets are able to allocate resources in a single interaction, but for networks to form there must be some repetition and stability" (Peters 1998, p306). It is therefore difficult to imagine that real decision-making power can be given to an organisation without applying a certain degree of hierarchical organisation.

Furthermore, a range of typical deficiencies of hierarchical integration did not emerge through my study as a clear problem. For example, one of the most fundamental technical
critiques of integration facilitated by hierarchy is the risk of overwhelming coordination at the top. As Rhodes notes: “When you are sitting at the top of a pyramid and you cannot see the bottom, control deficits are an ever present unintended consequence” (Rhodes 2000 p161). Similarly, overall governance efficiency may be compromised as “there is a limit to what can be controlled efficiently from one central position” (Salet et al. 2003b p382). For the case of London and its Mayor, Thornley and West (2004) speculate whether the significant concentration of power in one role may have compromised policy integration.

Based on the evidence collected for this investigation, however, there are hardly any instances where efforts of greater planning and policy integration targeted the reduction or dismantling of centralised structures at the city level. If anything, London and Berlin have both witnessed a strengthening of centralised decision-making for strategic planning and transport policy. This is observable not only in the case of the Mayor of London and the Berlin Senator for Urban Development, as well as for the concentration of all transport portfolios within TFL, but also for planning, transport and urban design portfolios within Berlin’s Department for Urban Development (SenStadtUm) and the vertical integration efforts of the Berlin-Brandenburg metropolitan region. And as I will discuss further below, the real risk appears more with regard to what is outside a pyramid of hierarchical organisation rather than how to link the top with the bottom within that pyramid.

Similarly, the risks of hierarchical systems operating based on narrowly defined policy silos (Allmendinger and Haughton 2009) is considerably mitigated in both cities by ensuring that the flow of hierarchical authority connects at critical nodes where urban planning, city design and transport strategies are integrated. In London, newly created oversight within TFL, which combines all surface transport modes, provides an example of hierarchical integration aiming to overcome a too-departmentalised structure. Several interviewees referred to the governance of transport as the context in which the biggest changes towards more integrated and collaborative practices emerged alongside a more fundamental attitude change. And still, this change ultimately happened within a conventional, hierarchical bureaucracy, while arguably profiting from innovative leadership.

Nevertheless, there were instances where hierarchical structures were identified as integration barriers. Line management and reporting within SenStadtUm compromised project teamwork and matrix structure arrangements. Berlin’s portfolio principle and related portfolio egoisms (Nissen 2002) can have fragmenting effects if different portfolios are not assigned to the same department. For example, considerable problems exist with regard to tax policy, which is often entirely decoupled from urban development. Here, departmental and mental barriers are extremely difficult to overcome, while major trade-offs with other policy objectives may also exist. Similarly, coordination with Berlin’s Department for
Finance often compromises planning and policy integration facilitated by SenStadtUm as the former prioritises the selling of public land for the maximum value rather than considering a wider set of factors. In London as well, governance structures based on narrow silos are regarded as a major impediment to integration as, for example, in the case of the hierarchical organisation of more narrowly defined central government departments with responsibilities for development in London.

All this points to a certain conundrum: integration inside the pyramid might be facilitated by hierarchies but they certainly act as barriers for issues located outside that pyramid. Having the top of the pyramid at the urban, citywide level appears essential for the case of integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies. But if the bundling of urban policy portfolios within one large hierarchical structure exceeds certain thresholds, i.e. if a pyramid is becoming too big, then the likelihood of stronger and more divisive sub-pyramids emerging might increase and the situation begins to resemble a structure that is more departmentalised from the beginning.

From his study of private corporations, Jaques (1990) emphasises the importance of considering the distance between each layer within a hierarchical organisation and identifying what he considers ‘real managerial and hierarchical boundaries’, which also correspond to distinguishable responsibility time spans at each level. This may indeed provide some justification for the long-range decision-making and the strategic functions characteristic of urban planning and transport being associated with the top level of an urban governance hierarchy. But this also emphasises the importance of how all subordinate nodes of decision-making operate, how many there are, which level they are assigned to and what power they have.

I now continue by synthesisising the experience in the two case study cities with regard to the role of newer, networked forms of integration.

The complementary role of network governance

The ongoing reliance on hierarchical integration and organisation presented in this study demands some discussion with regard to a wide body of literature that has consistently argued that hierarchies are increasingly replaced by networks (Powell 1990, Rhodes 1997b). Directly related accounts have identified a retreat from traditional top-down planning (Klosterman 1985, Innes 1996, Hall 2006), a shift from government to governance (Rhodes 1997b, Stoker 1998) and the communicative turn in planning and policy (Healey 1992).

Where network arrangements assist planning and policy integration in London and Berlin, their characteristics correspond with generalisations in the literature. Instead of structures of
authority, network organisations are of a more social nature and rely on personal relationships, mutual interest, trust and interdependence (Powell 1990). They also depend on a more reciprocal exchange between network actors (Powell 1990).

I was able to detect such relationships for a range of critical sectoral boundaries, for which a negotiation style that “trades off control for agreement” (Rhodes 2000, p161) appears to be slowly emerging. The in-house collaboration within Berlin’s SenStadtUm, particularly in those instances where working groups were set up, is one clear example. Similarly, collaboration in London between TfL, the GLA and London’s boroughs represent reciprocal approaches. Many interviewees also emphasised the importance of personal relationships, by and large following Powell’s observation that “the most useful information … is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the past and found to be reliable” (Powell 1990 p304).

Similarly, the advantages of network arrangements in bringing together the level of policymaking and policy implementation, which in turn leads to greater access to knowledge and expertise (Rhodes 2000), is characteristic of the GLA/TfL relationship in London. Such network integration advantages are also detectable for vertical relationships between the GLA and the London boroughs and more generally between public sector planning and private sector operations on the ground. The strength and importance of these network interfaces are all the more pronounced given the intention of the GLA Act to separate strategic and implementation powers. But even in Berlin where this separation is not as strict, the benefits of, for example, accessing the expertise of transport operators as part of strategic planning processes was singled out as an important asset for more integrated policymaking.

Finally, several examples where integration in Berlin and London is achieved, or at least supported by networks, have also increased acceptability and thereby improved compliance among the most relevant actors – another key benefit usually highlighted as part of network governance (Rhodes 2000). A good example are the key stakeholders who are part of the preparation of Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP) and the Urban Development Plan for Transport (StEP Verkehr). In London, an improved relationship between the boroughs and the GLA over the first ten years of its existence had similar effects. In the case of the GLA, this is even more important as legal frameworks for implementing strategic planning are loose enough for local actors to have a certain flexibility regarding compliance.

Overall, the documented experience in London and Berlin also corresponds with several of the more general 'costs' of network organisations as identified by Rhodes (2000). They are difficult to steer, cause delay and can be immobilised by conflicting interests as, for example,
the networked partnership arrangements in London proved during the 1990s. Similarly, planning within the Berlin metropolitan region prior to setting up more formal structures of coordinated metropolitan governance suffered from related shortcomings.

By contrast, my findings bear little opportunity for a framing through a communicative planning model as presented by Healey (1992, 1996, 1997) or Sager (1994). Overall, the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London and Berlin is characterised by a relative absence of a proactive citizenry beyond professionalised interest groups. Similarly, the role of deliberative and discursive forms of democracy has been marginal in that regard. In most instances the general public is represented by governments and their bureaucracies, and a few effective pressure groups at various levels. And they are given the role of critical observer, whose input is usually confined to processes of consultation rather than participation. Notable exceptions are some local-level efforts of integrating street design and transport strategies, but even then, complicated legal and planning frameworks are considerable barriers for a proactive engagement of the general public. At least for the specific context of this study, the idea to use the democratic process itself as an opportunity to aggregate dispersed information (Stoker 2002) appeared more the exception than the norm.

Tensions between post-modern planning theory and integration praxis in the two cities also emerge with respect to the role of experts. Here, the actual practice in both cities points towards a more technocratic form of planning as defined by Faludi and van der Valk (1994), far from Friedmann’s notion of a ‘non-Euclidian mode of planning’ (1993). What may have possibly changed, however, are the personal and professional backgrounds of politicians, experts and others involved in the professional planning process, which can be characterised as more diverse and representing a broader cross-section of society. But concrete evidence for this claim would have to be established by future research.

Still, several aspects of Healey’s characteristics of communicative planning (1992) can be used to describe the changes that happened within the spheres of professional planning and policymaking. For example, I was able to detect a “mutual process of learning” and “collaboration to achieve change” as part of the integrative processes addressed in this study. Both were most notable in Berlin’s Department of Urban Development (SenStadtUm) after bundling urban development and transport portfolios, as well as for integration processes led by the GLA and TfL.

In summary, new network integration does play a clear role in both cities but not necessarily the way it is sometimes portrayed in some of the key literature. Below I move on to
discussing its relationship with the persistent hierarchical forms of coordination identified earlier.

Integration through meta-governance beyond the classic trade-offs

A theorisation of the integration practices that I encountered may have to be based on more hybrid perspectives, which combine hierarchical integration with network integration. The way in which the two can potentially reinforce each other can be understood when considering some of the shortcomings of network integration and how hierarchies may help in these instances. For example, Thornley and West (2004) question, for the case of London, how policy integration can take place in a loose form of governance. I begin by presenting three important preconditions for networks as identified by Rhodes (2000), while indicating, based on the case studies, why these may be created through the existence of hierarchies.

The first precondition is the existence of cross-sector, multi-agency cooperation, which confronts disparate organisational cultures. Arguably the best example of how hierarchy has enabled this precondition is the merging of urban development and transport portfolios in one new Department for Urban Development in Berlin. It was ultimately the requirement for a new institutional culture across all sectors of urban development and transport that allowed cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary project groups to flourish. Similarly, the organisational cultures of the GLA and TfL were adjusted through substantial interference from the top (i.e. the Mayor of London), which then allowed for pragmatic and fruitful exchange.

The second precondition consists of actors who perceive the value of cooperative strategies. This precondition can be broken down into two components. First, the existence of institutionalised advantages, which may be derived from cooperation and which are related to the principal objectives of actors. An alignment of these objectives across cooperating actors is therefore the best starting point. This is where strategic plans and principal visions, which actors in a hierarchical regime have to comply with, can help (as in the case of the GLA and its functional bodies). The second component concerns the ability of actors to cooperate, which is more difficult to achieve if basic skills are absent. Once again, hierarchical structures can help by ‘governing through’ and targeting related skills or making these a requirement as part of recruiting practices.

The third precondition involves long-term relationships, which are needed to reduce uncertainty. This may be the one which is most supported by the hierarchical structures that lay behind the integration of transport and urban development in London and Berlin. Ultimately, this is due to the underlying stability that is provided by hierarchical organisations, as opposed to more fluid organisational structures. It is hierarchy that can better assist with the formation of long-term and stable relationships.
A further test regarding the existence of a hybrid model of integration is a discussion of how typical trade-offs between hierarchical and network models play out in the cases I study here. A central theme is the trade-off between technocratic efficiency, which hierarchies can provide, and endogenous and exogenous flexibility facilitated by network governance (Salet et al. 2003b). Others have expressed this dilemma as a tension between governability, i.e. the maintaining of influence and ensuring strategic objectives are implemented, and flexibility, which is taking account of different circumstances (Jessop 1998, 2000).

And indeed, on the one hand, there are several examples in the case study analysis, which correspond to this trade-off. The flexibility of London’s boroughs to interpret the strategic guidance of the London Plan for their specific local condition has compromised the governability of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and its spatial strategy. This can be seen in the case of the Thames Gateway development (lower density of new developments) or for parking standards (higher than intended by the London Plan). Similarly, in the Berlin-Brandenburg metropolitan region, the governance of transport infrastructure (which is not part of the formalised joint state planning process) allowed the two Länder as network actors to flexibly pursue their road building strategies but compromised efficiency in those cases where road infrastructure upgrades were not synchronised across Land boundaries.

On the other hand, however, there are multiple examples where flexibility is embedded in governability. Arguably the most representative case is the governance of plan making in Berlin, starting with the joint state development plan all the way down to building development plans. Here, the overall hierarchical structure is supplemented at each planning level with multiple forms of network arrangements, such as the two Länder collaborating as part of the joint state planning and the key stakeholders participating in the process of developing the Land Use Plan. Furthermore, each planning layer has been scrutinised with regard to its level of detail, aiming to leave the greatest flexibility possible for the next lower level of governance, while determinedly seeking to govern the most strategic and critical issues.

An example of a different kind of approach in combining governability with flexibility can be found in the case of London. Here, the arrangements for governing the long-term development of the Olympic site and its surroundings in East London included leadership through the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), now the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), the central involvement of four London boroughs and oversight by the GLA, TfL and national government. Flexibility for dealing with the specific local condition was largely guaranteed by the OPLC. At the same time it had to follow the broader strategic direction set out in the London Plan, which was also reinforced by the hierarchical oversight of the Mayor of London and by TfL for key strategic transport developments.
These examples, as well as the more general characteristics of planning and policy integration in London and Berlin, support the view that integration is based on a hybrid form of governance combining hierarchical and networked modes of coordination (Röber and Schröter 2002b). Such a perspective can build on an entire strand of political science literature that suggests that recent changes in governance structure are moving toward such hybrid models rather than towards network governance (Brownill and Carpenter 2009).

Influential work in this regard also talks about meta-governance, governance in the 'shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994, Jessop 1997) and the existence of quasi-hierarchical and quasi-network governance (Exworthy et al. 1999). At a more general level, meta-governance refers to how governments remain centrally involved in organising and guiding the ‘self-organisation of governance’ (Jessop 1997).

Of further importance is the question of to what extent planning and policy integration ultimately requires centralisation and whether hierarchy equates to centralisation. A key debate in this regard focuses on a requirement for either more centrism at the national level or greater support for devolved governments (Stoker 2005). Concerning this inquiry, the research suggests that this may ultimately depend on the policy sectors in question. In the case of integrating urban form and transport, it seems to necessitate greater autonomy for the metropolitan level in order to most effectively address the spatial scale of the relevant system boundaries (e.g. commuter belt).

At the city level, and as shown above, integration in London may not be centralised but it is certainly 'nodal' or 'spiky', by which I mean that there are clearly identifiable points from which integrative and coordinating authority is transmitted through hierarchical networks. Considering not only transport and spatial development, Travers characterises the shift of London’s governance as one from “network governance with no centre” to “network governance with a relatively weak centre” (Travers 2003, p138). At the same time, there is not one overpowering hierarchy with only one central point for coordination. Similarly, integrative governance in Berlin, although more centralised within SenStadtUm, includes multiple poles. The experience in both cities seems to suggest that without these nodes, current communication and decision-making appears unable to deliver more integrated outcomes.

To summarise, network arrangements without political power and therefore hierarchy are meaningless for policy implementation, as the 1990s have proved for the case of transport infrastructure planning in London. These partnership arrangements were simply ‘toothless’. What these arrangements did, however, was to effectively build alliances and agreement, trust and a range of other social conditions for integration. For policy implementation, however, hierarchy needed to come back into the picture.
The bigger question that remains is how far hierarchical integration can function when incorporating policy content beyond transport and land use, for example, industrial development, macroeconomics, social policy or other. And even for the case of networks, the level of their internal integration capacity may correlate negatively with coordination capacities across networks (Peters 1998). Privileged integration and preferential treatment of certain components that require greater integration will have to be centrally reflected as part of this discussion and will be introduced further below. Before this, I turn to a discussion on the relationship of institutional change itself and the question of its enabling or compromising tendencies for integration.

8.2 Institutional change as integration: The role of continuity and disruption

Up to this point, I have primarily focused on the question of how the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies has been pursued in the two case study cities. And while this also included a detailed discussion on how integration mechanisms changed over time, I have not yet addressed the effects of institutional change itself and how it has impacted on coordination capacities. In order to do so, I consider here the role of continuity, as well as disruption, that brings along changes to integrative capacities. As part of this, I primarily illustrate this for London, which has been exposed to more recent and pronounced institutional change. I close with a final section, which identifies the temporal prioritisation of certain integration content. Overall, I argue below that the kind of planning and policy integration analysed here is characterised by a continuous adjustment of related structures, processes and instruments rather than more disruptive and one-off ‘integration fixes’.

Continuity as integration

Since 1990, the two case study cities have been exposed to substantial levels of institutional change, both in relative terms compared to cities and metropolitan regions elsewhere in the world, as well as compared to historical changes within the two cities over similar time spans. The principal trigger of modifications in London has been endogenous to the governance of the city and primarily relied on the deliberate changes in conceiving London governance by the UK’s national government. By contrast, the underlying trigger in Berlin has been exogenous to urban governance and was the result of Germany’s reunification.

The establishment of a reunified Land and municipal government for Berlin in 1990 and the setting up of the Greater London Authority in 2000 (labelled as “extraordinary” by one interviewee) are arguably best described as what Allmendinger (2011) refers to as punctuated evolution or sudden change. However, a considerable process of evolutionary change or adaptation (Allmendinger 2011) occurred in the shadow of these events. The latter cuts across the shifts from partnerships to formalised network governance in London, the
governance reforms affecting Transport for London, and the advances in strategic planning with a continuous improvement of linking the London Plan with the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (both in terms of content and timescales). More generally, and for the changes that occurred in planning in the UK, Allmendinger (2011) emphasises that these are far more continuous and evolutionary in character than often portrayed.

In Berlin, the efforts that led to the establishment of joint state planning, the reform of senate departments with the setting up of SenStadtUm, as well as the implementation of sectoral urban development plans, above all the Urban Development Plan for Transport (StEP Verkehr) are equally characteristic of a processes of adaptation rather than sudden change. Across the board, the institutional change observed in the two cities share many characteristics of Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) four types of gradual institutional change, with layering (new structures added to existing institutions) and conversion (redirecting and redeploying existing institutions) being the most prominent.

Overall, my research confirmed that this form of evolutionary upgrading of integration mechanisms has been advantageous for more coordinated practices. To enable these, many interviewees in both cities emphasised the importance of continuity and consistency over time. Interestingly, this appears to have been particularly the case in London where formal institutional structures were affected by more recent and sudden change. But the governance of London generally relies more on network governance, which in turn requires a greater level of continuity and the recurrence of interaction.

As discussed by several political science scholars, rapid change compromises network negotiation and related coordination as they destabilise the negotiations between network actors (Powell 1990, Rhodes 1997a). Furthermore, incentives to cooperate rather than to maximise gains of individual actors are greater if decisions are not seen as independent one-off events (Peters 1998). At a more fundamental level, it may even be that “repeated interactions define the existence of a network” (Peters 1998, p11).

Indeed, even during a period of substantial change of governance structures and planning processes, continuity was provided through multiple factors: key individuals in positions of leadership; employees of the newly created citywide authorities who had worked on related London subjects in public or private institutions previously; many network actors that continued to exert their influence after setting up London-wide government; and a range of programmes which were developed during the 1990s and then adopted by the new institutions. For example, in the case of strategic spatial planning, considerable continuity was provided by LPAC and its chair Nicky Gavron, who became Deputy Mayor when the
GLA formally took over strategic planning powers. During our interview, Nicky Gavron stressed that “in terms of planning, there was massive continuity.”

Several commentators have even suggested that overall continuity rather than disjuncture better describes the transition from the partnership arrangements of the 1990s to citywide government from 2000 onwards (Syrett and Baldock 2003, Travers 2003). Travers regards the persistence of network governance in London itself as a signifier of overall continuity as part of governing London (Travers 2003). It is further argued that there was continuity of certain ideologies with a view that partnerships needed to be strengthened even after implementing stronger strategic governance for London (Tewdwr-Jones 2009).

Still, considerable institutional changes are characteristic of London as well, as captured by the following account by Tewdwr-Jones: “It seems that London, governmentally and institutionally, is in a continual state of flux, searching for an institutional fix to govern and coordinate intervention, while arguing about the delineation of power to strategise the range of ongoing economic, social and environmental problems and bring about change” (Tewdwr-Jones 2009, p60). Naturally, such a ‘state of flux’ comes along with more disruptive changes and I now turn to related effects on planning and policy integration.

**Disruption as integration**

The disruptive force of setting up the GLA has undoubtedly enabled integrative practices, as it was able to reposition and bring together a range of key actors and knowledge within a relatively short time frame. The new citywide institutions brought with them new excitement and their perceived strength was that they did not have to deal with the legacy of past bureaucracies. As a result, above all the GLA and TfL were able to concentrate the considerable knowledge of people with diverse backgrounds, skills and exposure to the governance of London.

Establishing Transport for London, in particular, avoided creating just another large, bureaucratic public sector body and with the appointment of Bob Kiley as transport commissioner was targeting a more flexible, modern institutional structure and organisational culture. A central indicator of the change in culture was, for example, the great number of individuals in leading positions that had previously worked for the private sector. And possibly more than in the case of planning, disruptions of institutional structures within the urban transport sector, which traditionally tended to operate more in isolation, ultimately facilitated the development of new capacities for integrating transport with land use strategies.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion

It was also widely acknowledged that the period of the 1990s was an important phase of network governance precisely because there was a break from GLC-led governance and the more confrontational style of how London boroughs had engaged with each other before. As a result, this phase allowed for building important links and partnerships, which enabled various groups to be more connected even after the GLA was set up. In our interview, the former chairman of London First, Stephen O’Brien, highlighted this effect for the case of the business sector, which was able to come together as a result of the absence of party politics in London throughout the 1990s: “people were happy to come forward and work together.”

And several interviewees regarded the ideas that developed bottom-up after the abolition of the GLC as most important for the cultural change that facilitated the integration of transport, urban design and spatial development. Today this culture has been converted back into a more top-down system, ultimately equipping the ideas of the previous decade with real implementation power.

However, these disruptions of governing London also had significant costs, which compromised integration. To start with, the knowledge and expertise that was pooled at the citywide level from 2000 onwards was sucked away from the boroughs and other institutions, compromising their related capacities. Many interviewees also emphasised how much time and energy it takes to build the level of integration required, even when, on paper, organisations were set up to do so right from the start. For example, according to some, the strong collaboration and good working relationship that now exists between the GLA and TfL took more than five years to establish. And even the rotation of staff, which can considerably increase cross-departmental understanding, has its downside as it can compromise ‘institutional memory’ and related expertise within organisational units (Stead 2008).

As one interviewee noted: “Usually everything that has to do with people takes ten years to change. … changing the culture and institutions takes time.” The clearest assessment of the potentially negative effects of London’s disruptive governance regime was shared by the former Mayor of London:

“No, disruption has not facilitated integration. It was just very lucky that once they decided to create the mayoralty that I was around and I had the experience of running the system before. And I have been embedded in London politics for 30 years…. It was continuity that facilitated integration.”

Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-2008

Another context where substantial changes of governance structures were seen as compromising integration was that of the national level and the restructuring of departments.
In particular, the case of changing the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), which operated from 1997 to 2001, to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), which took over most of its responsibilities up to 2007, and then to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was referred to as “wasteful and unnecessary.”

The changes that occurred in Berlin similarly support a view that emphasises the role of continuity as part of facilitating integration. Here, the hierarchical structures within SenStadtUm allowed for a relatively instantaneous shift towards more integrated planning approaches after transport and urban development portfolios were incorporated. Still, throughout interviewees stressed the importance of avoiding disrupting important connections, often based on personal relationships, which link across important sectoral boundaries. At the same time, the repeated changes of assignments within SenStadtUm, particularly related to the responsibilities of state secretaries, have also contributed to new productive connections across the department.

To what extent then can integration mechanisms be regarded at all as a one-off solution to previously existing disjointedness? And what are, therefore, the implications for the temporal character of integrated planning and policymaking? These are the questions I now address in the final subsection to follow.

**The temporality of integration**

Above all, the question about the temporal character of integration needs to address the extent to which integration can either be seen as a one-off fix to disjointedness or as an ongoing process, which develops its value if pursued and adjusted over a longer period of time.

One possible condition for the first, integration as a one-off fix, is the necessity to reform governance structures if certain threshold levels of minimal integration are no longer achievable. In this regard, Davies (2004) discusses how institutional dislocation is the result of getting close to or surpassing the limits of elasticity of existing governance structures. A good example of this is the historical struggle of aligning the governance geography of a city with the actual city boundaries as urban expansion has repeatedly exceeded the elasticity of governance arrangements of the modern metropolis. The London County Council was set up in 1888 and, soon after, its governance geography did no longer match the real extent of the city (Robson 1934). It was only in 1965 that it was superseded by the Greater London Council with its revised, more appropriate boundaries. But even then these, again, did not match the functional urban region.
A further example of governance demands exceeding the capacity of existing provisions was the incapacity of London’s partnership arrangements throughout the 1990s to deliver strategic infrastructure development. And in particular, aligning such development with a broader strategic spatial planning framework was beyond the elasticity of these arrangements. Instead structural reform was required to enable a new level of planning and transport integration. Related tipping points, which may have supported institutional reform in London and Berlin, once again include a horizontal as well as vertical component. They are either actual or perceived deficiencies of integrating across sectoral boundaries or of integrating across governance levels, which also includes a minimal level of coordination across territories defined by the relevant system boundaries (e.g. the metropolitan region).

With regard to the first, there is a clear recognition that the integration of transport and land use was not satisfactory in both London and Berlin. In fact, and as shown above, the entire discourse related to sustainable transport and compact urban growth is precisely addressing this point. Similarly, and with regard to the second, there was also a recognition that certain scales of policymaking needed to be more supportive of integrated transport and urban development, above all at the citywide and metropolitan scales. The boundaries between these tipping points that led to institutional change are of course blurred and the greater these integration deficiencies become, the more they spill over from horizontal to a vertical component and vice versa. This is particularly the case for the integration of urban development and transport with its multi-level spatiality.

While such reactive ‘integration fixes’ can be clearly identified, the requirement for an ongoing process of planning and policy integration, including continuous adjustment of related structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions, emerged more prominently. Several interviewed experts specifically highlighted the importance of a continuous effort given an overwhelming trend towards segmentation and differentiation. Berlin’s director of transport planning was particularly adamant about this point, emphasising that the default of work patterns is one of splintering and fragmentation. A certain ineptness of ‘concluding integration’ of urban planning and transport was also highlighted at the federal level for which State Secretary Engelbert Lütke Daldrup emphasised that “integration is a process that has started but is far from being concluded.” For example, action around the relationship between urban planning and taxation policy is only beginning to emerge.

Furthermore, and often for good reasons, institutional change is a slow process. Allmendinger refers to “institutional stickiness” to describe how, for example, regulatory and professional frameworks lag behind integration efforts at the strategic policy level (2011). In the context of reforming metropolitan governance, Salet et al. (2003b) suggest that
government structures “should not attempt to keep pace with the social and spatial dynamics of metropolitan development” (Salet et al. 2003b, p378) and that the focus needs to be on “durable institutions of government” (Salet et al. 2003b, p378) that provide coordination through flexible policies. And besides a few reforms at specific points, integrative practices in both cities are facilitated through such durable institutions, alongside the continuous cultivation of collaborative and cross-sectoral practices.

In conclusion, a process orientation of integration, which is sustained over a considerable length of time, emerges from both cities as an important insight regardless of the bundled and more disruptive adjustments of government structures at particular moments. This also resonates with the observations by governance scholar Guy Peters: "Everything else being equal I would expect coordination processes to be more effective when each event represents one in a continuing series of interactions" (Peters 1998, p11).

In a sense, integration cannot be ‘concluded’ and instead appears to be part of an evolutionary process of constant, yet not abrupt, governance change. Particularly when considering that the elasticity of existing governance structures tends to be underestimated (Allmendinger 2011), greater opportunities for such ongoing integration may exist. Still, the establishment of durable institutions of government remains a prerequisite of the latter. It remains to be seen whether the GLA, SenStadtUm and Berlin’s joint state planning may represent such durable institutions. My guess is that they will.

This discussion on the temporal dimension of integration, as well as hierarchical integration explored earlier, also centrally links to questions about the level of integrated planning and policymaking that is desirable and indeed possible. I now turn to an exploration of this issue in my final section.

8.3 From total to privileged integration

In this final section I focus on the degree of integration across the spectrum from ‘fully integrated’ to ‘fully fragmented’. The particular question I explore in that regard concerns the actual integration content and the extent to which certain sectors, disciplines or geographic scales are more integrated with each other than others. I first re-emphasise below the impossibility of total integration and its theoretical ideal to consider any possible interrelationship. I move on by arguing that the type of integration I have analysed in this study is a form of privileged integration, which centrally involves and even relies on the prioritisation of certain links between sectoral policy and geographic scales over others. I conclude by exploring the rationale of privileging the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies.
The paralysing nature of integration
It is self-evident that there exists a natural limit to the level of integration and the extent that integration content can be considered equally as part of integrated planning and policymaking. First, the wider the spectrum of policy issues and their interrelationships to be considered is, the narrower the policy options become. As Friedemann Kunst, Berlin’s Transport Planning Director, put it “if I want to service economic, ecological and social objectives equally, the more reduced are the possibilities to optimise compared to a narrower approach by a sectoral policymaker.”

And secondly, the more integrated policymaking aims to be, the more complex it becomes, with significant risk to the effectiveness of related measures. This can be best observed in the case of sustainability objectives and the related policy ideal of integrating the social, environmental and economic dimension. In this regard, two alternative critical perspectives on integration for sustainability are often referred to. First, a view which stresses the impossibility of complete and optimised system design, which would require a ‘totalising strategy’ as critiqued in Chapter 3 (Luhmann 1995, Sennett 2011), and second, a perspective which argues that economic, social and environmental targets may indeed be irreconcilable (Brownill and Carpenter 2009).

In this study, I have also touched upon modalities of integration beyond the integration of policy sectors. Above all, these included: integration across geographic scales; integration between policy development and implementation; and integration across time scales, linking short, medium and long-term objectives. What characterises these modalities of integration is their inherent interdependency. For example, the more long-term a policy target, the more it tends to acknowledge integrated perspectives. The most extreme form is, once again, deep sustainability. In this idealised case, sectoral integration merges fully with horizontal integration and process integration with system and target integration. The result is an overwhelming and potentially paralysing recognition of integrated policymaking that ‘everything is connected with everything’.

I was able to detect such problems of scope already in the specific case of transport and urban form integration, a much narrower but nevertheless ambitiously wide-ranging policy field. For example, complex interrelationships may explain the difficulty of engaging the general public. The trade-offs, path dependencies and interrelationships, which are part of the urban form and transport nexus, make it extremely difficult to subject them to a more deliberate and communicative approach of decision-making.

Considering the above, it is no surprise that throughout my research I have detected various forms of privileging the integration of particular geographic scales and policy links over
others. In fact, even within an already privileged integration nexus of transport and urban form, specific relationships mattered more than others. My discussion in the next subsection will build on this perspective and argue that integration praxis is inherently about privileging certain connections.

Integration as the privileging of certain relationships

This study focuses on, and thereby implicitly privileges, the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies. And while these areas of urban policymaking have a considerable breadth, it is not difficult to identify alternative combinations with and of other areas of policymaking for cities, which are not directly addressed. As I have shown in the introduction, urban form and transport are characterised by a particularly strong interrelationship, a relationship that has also received substantial attention as part of urban governance targeting a more integrative approach in both London and Berlin. This special and privileged relationship is important to consider when drawing broader conclusions on policy and planning integration.

To begin with, the choices related to governance geographies require a certain degree of prioritisation of certain policy content over others. As Allmendinger notes, deciding on administrative or political boundaries privileges certain relations and interests (Allmendinger 2011) and may even link back to the broadest sectoral prioritisation, such as putting economic interests over social and environmental ones (Healey 2009). Re-establishing London-wide government within the boundaries of Greater London indirectly built on historical demarcations that were originally drawn as a reflection of the extent of the built-up area of the city. Therefore, central considerations may have been related to the delivery of urban infrastructure and related services but not, for example, to the relationship between the city and its rural hinterland with framing activities such as the provision and distribution of food and other natural resources.

Broadly speaking, the choice of city boundaries in London and Berlin supports the governance of the urban form and transport interrelationship. This is not to say that administrative boundaries are matching the functional boundaries of this relationship. Far from it, as shown above, Greater London may only cover, depending on the definition, between 5 to 20 per cent of the land of the functional urban region, while Berlin’s joint state planning area stretches more generously across the metropolitan region but has limited authority over transport infrastructure development. Still, the political boundaries in both cities may service the overall urban form and transport relationship far better than many other links between other policy sectors, which are more peripheral to the transport-urban form nexus.
The prioritisation of certain cross-sectoral relationships, which is induced by the choice of governance geographies, is then either mitigated or further enhanced by the governance arrangements that are attached to these territories. In both case study cities, it is clearly the case of the latter with relevant autonomy assigned to citywide government. This includes critical powers related to transport and urban form as well as the specific integration structures, processes and instruments addressing the transport-urban form link, as discussed above. The clearest case is Berlin and its Department for Urban Development (SenStadtUm), which combines responsibility for urban development, city design and transport.

More generally, the notion of privileged integration resonates with Perri 6’s proposition that rather than breaking down boundaries, integration is about “attempts to put boundaries in different places” (6 2005, p52). This is particularly the case for hierarchical integration with its clearly defined boundaries of what is within and beyond its pyramid of control. As shown above, integrating transport and urban form in London and Berlin relies extensively on such hierarchical and centralised integration. In turn, this leads to a significant potential for disconnecting integration content that lies outside this hierarchical authority. And in both case study cities, even important relationships that are part of the urban form and transport nexus are indeed peripheralised.

In London, above all, it is the link between transport infrastructure and housing which, at least up to 2008, could not be addressed effectively given the limited authority of the GLA over housing. In Berlin, an important component of land policy is the parceling of public land, which is assigned to the Department for Finance. As a result, there is a disconnection with broader urban development policy by SenStadtUm. Similarly, the price of public land to be sold is also decided by the Finance Department and this tends to prioritise the highest price over many objectives of more integrated planning and policy. And in both cities, the governance of urban form and transport includes blind spots in areas such as a deeper understanding of urban development strategies and their impact on goods movement and city logistics.

As stressed earlier, the challenge for hierarchical integration in the case study cities, particularly in Berlin, is therefore not so much about connecting the top with the bottom of the pyramid but instead how to link the inside of the pyramid with what lies outside it. The extent to which hierarchical organisation can severely compromise integration was clear during the period when transport and urban development portfolios were assigned to different departments. Whenever Berlin’s strict portfolio principle divides sectors in such a manner it acts as a great barrier to integration, as tasks within each of the organisations cannot be reshaped to include assignments that cut across portfolio boundaries (Süss 1995). Including all senate departments, Berlin has about 60 directors of different units and,
according to one interviewee, they have never met together. Given Berlin’s portfolio principle, it remains extremely difficult to integrate policy beyond what is assigned to one department. Links to critical elements that directly relate to urban development such as economic development, the legal structures of land policy and finance and taxation are all peripheralised as a result.

The equivalent challenge in London is the privileging of strategy integration through the Mayor and the GLA over delivery and implementation at the borough level. In some ways, this, in turn, links back to the lack of vertical integration as emphasised by planning expert Peter Hall during our interview: “If the Mayor has been given the job of strategic planning, he has to be given the capability to deliver that plan even when the boroughs may not agree with him.” Here it is again housing that was singled out as among the least satisfactory policy items with an enormous relevance for spatial planning and transport integration.

In summary, the relative success of integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies in London and Berlin rests to a substantial degree on prioritising their interrelationship over links with and between other policy sectors. In fact, one possible conclusion could even be that the integration of transport policy and urban form is precisely about the privileging of this relationship over one that would look, for example, at mobility and the transport industry (see Appendix E2). Such a prioritisation requires a shift of our attention to the rationale that lies behind it, with which I continue below. At the same time, the particular relationship that exists between the urban form and transport nexus indirectly addresses a much wider spectrum of sustainability goals (UN Habitat 2009, UNEP 2011, 2013, GCEC 2014). And it may do so without applying a totalising strategy or aiming to achieve total integration.

Privileging the urban form and transport nexus
Public policy scholar Edward Page reminds us in his essay on joined-up government (2005) that fragmented, silo-based governance does not result in equally negative impacts for different relationships between different sectors: certain policy fields and links are affected more than others. At the same time, he stresses that identifying intrinsically ‘important’ cross-cutting policy areas is difficult and can easily be politicised. In fact, any form of cooperation is centrally embedded in interest-based and political dynamics: “Without interest opposition, cooperation would not be necessary, and without interest interdependence, it would not be possible” (Marin 1990, p60). In other words, while it is clear that some sectoral connections matter more than others we still need to ask critical questions about the underlying rationale of advancing certain sectoral links and not others.
For the case of prioritising the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies in the context of compact urban growth, three prominent reasons can be highlighted (see also Appendix E3). First, higher urban densities necessitate considerable coordination with high-capacity urban transport. Second, mixed-use development requires sophisticated planning capacities able to manage ‘connection points’ of complementary but also conflicting uses. It also implies the effective negotiation of movement functions and place functions of public spaces and streets. And third, multi-modal non-motorised and public transport take the lead role in providing mobility for compact cities, which in turn relies on integrated transport planning.

In addition, I was also able to detect two broader and more general conditions, which are important to consider as part of the privileging of the urban form and transport nexus. First, there is a special relationship between urban governance and the physical shaping of cities. As noted above, the territorial character of cities presents a unique opportunity of adjusting political boundaries to boundaries of physical systems, i.e. the extent of the built-up city, the commuter belt or the functional urban region. This differentiates the city from other governance geographies at state or national level with their geopolitical histories. In turn, governing the physicality of the city, by which I mean the city’s infrastructures, built form and other city design characteristics, is often granted a particularly important role as part of the political power assigned to city governments (Rode et al. 2014b).

This is clearly visible in the case of the reform agenda in the UK that created the Greater London Authority: two out of its initial four key powers are linked to the physical making of the city – strategic planning and transport. The other two, economic development and emergency services, are more ‘spatially neutral’. In Berlin, constitutionally protected powers related to spatial planning and transport are similarly bundled at the citywide level. Assigning territorial governance, urban transport and placemaking functions to city-level authorities can also be observed more widely and is a common characteristic of multi-level governance in many countries (Rode et al. 2013). It is therefore also less surprising that related portfolios are exposed to a particular attention as part of integrated planning and policymaking at the city level.

Second, the complementary characteristics between professional spatial planning and transport planning lend themselves to a potentially fruitful collaboration. Transport planning and transport departments are usually of a public nature and they are large organisations equipped with large budgets, technical expertise and other key resources. Their traditional operating model for transport planning activities is based on a ‘predict and provide’ basis, i.e. they are passive, trying to follow behaviours generated by markets or other inputs. At the same time, they often have the capacity to directly implement large-scale physical
interventions and infrastructures. These dynamics of transport planning are not only the result of a particular planning culture, they may well be far more inherent to the transport portfolio as a whole: ultimately, transport is ‘derived demand’ and, regardless of the pronounced public powers at the heart of managing this demand, it remains principally a reactive approach to governing cities, particularly with regard to spatial development.

By contrast, planning departments are usually smaller, with substantially smaller budgets for capital expenditure, and are mainly relying on regulatory powers. Particularly in the UK these powers are often described as negative powers, i.e. limiting development rather than generating greater physical change. The more proactive forms of planning, which is governed through spatial planning approaches, are mostly related to private markets. However, a closer tie between spatial planning and transport planning potentially facilitates a more hands-on and strategic form of planning that can indeed induce development. In this case, transport planning becomes a part of strategic spatial planning and is no longer tactical and reactive. It then also escapes the remit of traditional transport planning and its decision-making methods such as conventional transport modelling. London’s approach in planning for Crossrail, which combined transport and urban development perspectives, is a clear example of the latter. To a degree, this also represents a return to the proactive tradition of transport planning, which historically may have been most impactful when it was used as a land development tool.

But how does the ‘natural fit’ of spatial planning and transport at the urban policy level impact on other policy capacities? If, as I argued in the previous section, the integration of two sectors may at the same time advance the fragmentation between an alternative policy set, it should be possible to identify the ‘integration shadow’ of the compact city agenda. This is attached to the physical shaping of cities, which inevitably involves a degree of spatial determinism, putting non-spatial or spatially-neutral policy areas in second place. This also differentiates the compact city from the sustainable city approach, which aims to get closer to the theoretical ideal of ‘total integration’ by incorporating non-spatial dimensions of social, economic and environmental objectives. As a result of prioritising integrated transport and spatial development, potentially neglected integration may relate to industrial and employment policy. Similarly, health, education, policing and social services may be de-coupled from the typical integration priority that is linked to compact urban growth.

I was also able to detect a certain potential for alternative, and possibly competing, integration priorities to emerge. For the two case study cities, this is most obvious at the national level. In 2013, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Building, Transport and Urban Affairs, which existed from 1998 and which was praised as an important and innovative
alignment of transport and urban planning, was entirely restructured. Today, a Federal Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure and another Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety address transport planning and urban development entirely separately. Besides party-political consideration, this restructuring also indicates a new integration priority for the transport and digital technology interface on the one hand and for building (urban development) and the environment on the other.

The UK has a similar history of restructuring national level departments largely in response to political requirements but also reflecting temporal integration fixes helping to address certain policy links for a limited period of time. However, within the case study cities, the urban planning, design and transport portfolios appear to have a much stronger standing and have not only been prioritised over a considerable amount of time but have, overall, established more deeply rooted integrated planning and policy integration. But even across these more stable and integrated policy dimensions, the more recent pressures on housing in both cities may lead to new priorities and strategic links with housing policy and social housing provision.

In addition, a broader and more wide-ranging discourse on the particular importance of spatial development (UN Habitat 2009, UNEP 2011, GCEC 2014) seems to reinforce the privileging of integration related to compact city outcomes. And prioritising urban form and transport infrastructure has been centrally linked to strategic planning (UN Habitat 2009). This seems to recognise that the urban form and transport nexus represents the most long-term and path-dependent policy context in cities. A nexus that also features many of the characteristics of a platform, which once it is established, allows other development to emerge more organically and in a less planned fashion. Similar to the Manhattan grid, compact urban growth may indeed just establish a long-term playing field, which liberates other policy sectors from being too prescriptive.

In conclusion, the explicit intentionality of setting up greater integrative capacities in order to facilitate compact city outcomes may indeed imply a prioritisation of the transport and urban form relationship. And ultimately, it is this form of prioritisation that makes planning strategic and may help in overcoming the integration paradox identified in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the clear links between system and process integration and the complementarity of professional transport and spatial planning may have enhanced the rationale for privileging the integration of urban form and transport over other policy pairs. But most importantly, it is the scale of urban policymaking which is attached to the system boundary of the city that may have elevated the intentional shaping of this territory to a requirement for integrated urban planning, city design and transport strategies. Not
The Integrated Ideal in Urban Governance

8.4 Closing

My final two chapters have shown that a comparative perspective on integrating urban planning, city design and transport strategies in Berlin and London also provided a fruitful context for discussing more general framings of integrated planning and policymaking. Three distinct areas were covered in this chapter. First, I argued that a traditional understanding based on the duality of hierarchical integration and network integration falls short of capturing the dynamics I was able to detect in the two cities. Instead of a shift from hierarchical government to network governance, I identified a surprising level of persistence, in some cases even of re-establishment, of top-down, hierarchical organisation that facilitated the integration of urban form and transport. At the same time though, network arrangements do play an increasingly relevant role and also may have necessitated a new form of meta-governance to ensure that integration takes place, even in the context of more loosely and self-organised network actors. I also emphasised that such framings correspond well with the most essential characteristics of strategic planning.

The second conceptual issue related to the role of institutional change as part of integrative practices, and I discussed the degree to which integration is facilitated either by more disruptive and nodal change or by more continuous adaption. And while both cities over the last two decades – London slightly more so than Berlin – profited from a certain break with past institutional arrangements, the overwhelming evidence points towards the advantages of a more continuous and adaptive upgrading of integrative structures and practices. These were best observable for the case of refining Berlin’s Land Use Plan and setting up the sectoral urban development plans, as well as for the ongoing improvement of the working relationships between the GLA and TfL in London.

And finally, I discussed the tension between ‘total integration’ and ‘privileged integration’. This allowed me to emphasise that I only focused on one particular link of integrating planning and policy, i.e. the link between urban form and transport rather than integration in its totality as advanced by sustainability discourses. From the outset, my study therefore privileges the analysis of a particular relationship over other potential policy links. And, as I was able to show, this prioritisation, in many ways, also guarantees the integrative outcomes in the case study cities, particularly where hierarchical governance structures are involved.

Essentially, this brings me back to future research questions about the privileging of certain integration content: To what extent can and should planning and policy integration be
isolated from broader and even more complex issues than the integration of transport and spatial planning? Are there alternative combinations of integration that could be prioritised? And, how far can we go up an integration scale that peaks with total integration – a maximum that would be impossible to achieve? Urban praxis has responded in a pragmatic way: ultimately it does not address how to deal with issues in the face of complexity but rather, as I have argued above, how to make the case for prioritising certain policy bundles that may appear to be more relevant to integration than others.

Related future research could also address a more robust quantification of the actual depth of integration achieved through various mechanisms, across different policy bundles or directions of integration. Such efforts could build on the framework by 6 et al. (2002) introduced earlier, differentiating intensity, scope, breadth and exposure of integration. Furthermore, such analysis would be particularly helpful for investigating potential trade-offs between horizontal and vertical integration. An interesting hypothesis emerging from my research relates to the risk that strong sectoral integration at certain spatial scales leads to fragmenting different spatial layers and territories in a similar way as infrastructural and sectoral units of the city were disjointed before.

The quantification of the depth of integration may also assist a more robust testing of the various assumed links between integration mechanisms, policy capacity and outcomes. As I have emphasised throughout my study, the considerable causal complexity, particularly between institutional arrangements and policy outcomes, is a major research challenge. Whether or not additional quantification of institutional arrangements will allow for more meaningful analysis or not remains to be seen. At a minimum it would advance the repertoire of empirical research tools available to advance this critical debate.

There are also other opportunities for future related research, which this study was unable to address. An interesting question concerns the choice between more binding, stable institutional arrangements, which foster planning and policy integration, and more flexible, evolutionary processes of ‘learning by doing’ (Goodin 1996). While flexibility is certainly appealing not least because it offers options for immediate intervention it may, at the same time, compromise the most central role of institutions in creating stability and predictability. Others have also warned that learning dynamics may actually struggle to deliver effective institutional enhancement (Pierson 2000b).

Furthermore, and given a concrete policy agenda such as compact urban growth, there is the central question about prioritising institutional change over direct substantive policy intervention. While the two are not mutually exclusive, a strong desire for changing institutional structures may imply that such changes come first to then facilitate ‘better’
forms of policymaking. Along the same lines, a clear priority of implementing policy first may render institutional reform less relevant. Scholars such as Fritz Scharpf (1986) have argued that addressing a public policy concern through institutional reform “may not be a very promising strategy” (p187). He contends that outcomes are difficult to predict and benefits only occur in the long run. At the same time, recognising and understanding the role of institutions and their self-interests, he argues, may be more valuable.

Finally, my thesis raises important questions about the potential tension between democracy (rights) and technocracy (efficiency) as part of institutional change. For some time, new institutionalism has stressed the importance of considering both values and powers when analysing political institutions (March and Olsen 2005). Thus, future research could more directly acknowledge the normative dimension of integrated governance by shifting its focus beyond the technocratic coordination of systems. And the broader compact urban growth agenda appears to be a fruitful context for such critical analysis of the politics of institutional change – particularly when considering rapid urban growth countries with less mature institutions and democracies than the ones analysed here. Motivations behind the compact cities may include new norms regarding urban living, environmental sustainability, health and well-being but are potentially also exposed to elite interest, asymmetric power and institutional self-interest.

To conclude, this study has engaged with one of the planning profession’s most central aims of better integrating the development of urban land with transport infrastructure and strategies. It also attached itself to political science discourses on ‘joined-up government’, ‘holistic government’, and ‘coherent policymaking’. And of course I write these lines at a time of ubiquitous emphasis on integration as part of global urban development. For example, related governance and planning agendas feature strongly in reports by the World Bank, the OECD, UNEP and UN Habitat (OECD 2010, Suzuki et al. 2010, World Bank 2010, UN Habitat 2011, UNEP 2011, UN Habitat 2013). It is also centrally embedded within the so-called ‘urban’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 11) (UN 2015) and the drafts for the Habitat III ‘New Urban Agenda’ (Habitat III 2016). In addition, many cities across Europe, as well as a diverse range of countries such as India, Chile and South Africa, currently have pronounced policy or even institutional agendas aiming to support more integrated urban governance, often directly targeting urban planning and transport policymaking (Pieterse 2007, SECTRA 2009, Metropolis 2011, MUD 2014, Eurocities 2015). And increasingly, integrated planning and policymaking is centrally embedded as part of so-called ‘smart city’ strategies (EC 2013).

But even beyond this contemporary buzz, integrated governance is here to stay. It is directly linked to quintessential coordination issues of organisations, it lies at the heart of facilitating
compact urban growth, and is centrally included as part of sustainable development strategies. However, even within the narrower context of urban planning, city design and transport policy, the term ‘integration’ remains a vague notion linked to diverse meanings and applications. These differences and nuances are commonly ignored following an overall attitude of ‘we know what we mean by integration’. To further academic inquiry as well as to improve planning and policy praxis, building on and further sharpening the way we refer to ‘integration’ within urban planning contexts remains a critical point. And, increasingly, a more precise use of the term will hopefully also allow us to generate not only a better mutual understanding but corresponding governance and policy practice. This is where cities and the integration of urban development, city design and transport strategies will possibly continue to be among the most visible and path-dependent examples in the long term.

And finally, my study underlined the extent to which integrated planning and policymaking has an inherent relationship with the work of designers, engineers, planners and policymakers. Such work operates in a context where intentional steps are taken to target future outcomes. In turn, this requires a certain minimum level of deciding upfront ‘how things should be’. This approach is inevitable for city making informed by collective decisions, agency of the general public and more technical planning, design and policymaking. In London and Berlin, I have shown that it is in this context that planning and policy integration is responding to the requirements of the compact city agenda. Above all, this is a requirement to prioritise the integration of urban planning, city design and transport strategies. And at least for the case study cities, it is this new priority, which, over the last two decades, has been characteristic of an integrated ideal of urban governance.
Appendices

A1 – List of Interviewees\(^{22}\)

**London**

Henry Abraham, former Head of Transport, Greater London Authority, 17/05/2013

Peter Bishop, Director, Design for London 2007 to 2011, 20/08/2007

Mark Brearley, former Director, Design for London, 2011-2013, 25/03/2013

Steve Bullock, Mayor of the London Borough of Lewisham, 10/05/2013

Isabel Dedring, Deputy Mayor for Transport, Greater London Authority, 29/04/2014

Michèle Dix, Managing Director of Planning, Transport for London, 10/06/2013 (since 2015 Managing Director of Crossrail 2)

Nicky Gavron, Deputy Mayor of London 2000-2008 and Assembly Member since 2000, 26/03/2015

Peter Hall, Bartlett Professor of Planning and Regeneration, University College London, 21/08/2007


Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 2000-2008, 10/06/2013

David Lunts, Executive Director of Housing and Land, Greater London Authority, 26/04/2013

**Berlin**

Klaus J. Beckmann, Director, German Institute of Urban Affairs (Difu), Berlin, 17/07/2007

Siegfried Dittrich, Senior Officer Transport Planning, Borough Berlin-Mitte, 19/07/2007

Jan Drews, Director, Joint Berlin Brandenburg Planning Department, Potsdam, 03/06/2013

Jan Eder, Managing Director, Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK Berlin), 17/07/2007

Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig, Opposition Leader, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 06/07/2007

Christian Gaebler, Speaker, SPD Parliamentary Group, House of Representatives of Berlin, 13/07/2007


Jens-Holger Kirchner, Head of Urban Development Department and Councillor, Berlin Borough of Pankow, 23/07/2013

Friedemann Kunst, Director, Transport Planning, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin, 27/04/2012

Engelbert Lütke Daldrup, State Secretary, German Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Affairs, 13/07/2007

---

\(^{22}\) The individuals below agreed to be named while two to three interviewees in each city requested anonymity.
Fred Manson, former Planning Director, London Borough of Southwark, 09/08/2007
Guy Nicholson, Councillor and Head of Urban Regeneration, London Borough of Hackney, 24/04/2013
Stephen O’Brien, former Chairman, London First, 29/04/2013
Nick Raynsford, Minister for Housing and Planning 1999-2001 and former Minister for London, UK central government, 22/04/2013
Peter Wynne Rees, City Planning Officer, Corporation of London, 20/03/2013

Elke Plate, Planning Officer, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin, 25/07/2013
Felix Pohl, Director, Planning, S-Bahn Berlin GmbH, 18/07/2007
Boris Schaefer-Bung, Berlin Director Cycle Policy, ADFC (German Cycling Association), 15/05/2012
Marc Schulte, Head of Urban Development Department and Councillor, Berlin Borough of Wilmersdorf-Charlottenburg, 04/06/2013
Hans Stimmann, former City Architect and State Secretary, Senate Department for Urban Development, Berlin, 05/07/2013
Peter Strieder, former Senator for Urban Development, Berlin, 01/07/2013
A2 – Samples for Guiding Interview Questions

Guiding Interview Questions - Sample Phase 1

A. Introduction

1. What do you believe to be the top three issues challenging your city?
2. Do planning agencies play any role in helping to resolve any of these three challenges?

B. Development paradigms

3. From your perspective, is the city being developed based on a consistent vision for its future? If so, who develops this vision? Has your organisation been involved?
4. Does this vision include a strong spatial component such as an idea about city form and design? Are there any urban planning, design and transport policies in your city addressing this overall city vision?
5. Which general urban planning principles or guidance of the city do you regard as most influential? Which do you welcome and which do you regard as problematic?

C. Integration

6. To what extent are different elements of planning, such as land use and transport in the city integrated with each other? What facilitates this integration and what are impediments to it?
7. How are vertical planning layers from upper to local levels synchronised? What facilitates this integration and what are the potential impediments to it?
8. Which other urban development mechanisms and funding schemes at the interface of city design, housing, social infrastructure and transport are critical in your city?
9. Which recent projects in the city exemplify integrated planning and, in contrast, which projects are characterised by a lack of integration?
10. Which key documents should be looked at for analysing the city?
Guiding Interview Questions - Sample Phase 2

A. Introduction

Opening ‘Hypothesis’: The last 20 years have been characterised by significant efforts to better integrate urban planning, design and transport in London.

1. Do you agree with this statement? What are your views and experiences related to the changes at the interface of urban and transport planning in London over the last 15 years?

2. Vertical integration: To which extent did the coordination of urban design and transport planning between Greater London and the boroughs change? How about changes related to the coordination between National Government and Greater London?

3. Horizontal integration: How did the integration between urban planning, city design and transport evolve? How was integration promoted, improved or compromised over that period?

B. Integration – details

4. Is the ‘new’ integration of planning, design and transport in London based on a network of actors or strong top-level leadership? Are there organisational units that were restructured or created at any of the three governance levels? Are there other committees, ad hoc groups or individuals crucial to facilitate integration?

5. How are different perspectives of key stakeholders integrated in the planning process? What are important meetings and how often do they take place? Which kind of upfront assessments and studies are making a difference?

6. What are important metrics, assessments and financing tools that are advancing the integration of planning, design and transport? To which degree has integration been achieved by advanced networking, new knowledge, experience and skills of key professionals?

C. Closing

7. What are the most important barriers to integrating urban planning, design and transport in London?

8. To which degree has disruption and change of London’s governance over the last 20 years facilitated or compromised the integration of planning, design and transport?
B1 – Spatial Governance timeline for Berlin and London
### Berlin Governance - Spatial Planning and Transport 1980 to 2010

**Rode 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governments of E./W. Germany</strong></td>
<td><strong>Federal Government of Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/SPD Coalition Government</td>
<td>SPD/SPD/Green Coalition Government</td>
<td>CDU/USPD Coalition Government</td>
<td>CDU/SPD Coalition Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helmut Kohl, Department for Transport</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder, Department for Transport, Building and Urban Affairs</td>
<td>Angela Merkel, Department for Land Use, Building and Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Zimmermann, G. Krause, M. Wisssmann</td>
<td>Franz Müntefering, R. Kliemt, K. Bodewig</td>
<td>Manfred Stolpe, Wolfgang Tiefensee, Peter Ramsauer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Joint State Planning Berlin and Brandenburg**

**Land Berlin**

| **Governments of E./W. Berlin** | **Land Berlin** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | SPD | CDU/SPD Coalition Government | SPD/Left Coalition Government | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Senatorkantei | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Regierende Bürgermeister (Governing Mayor) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | W. Mömke, Eberhard Diepgen | Klaus Wowereit | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Transport and Operations | Const., Transport and Housing | Department for Urban Development and Environment* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Herwig Haase, CDU | Jürgen Kiemann, CDU | Peter Strieder, SPD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Construction and Housing | Urban, Environ. & Tech. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Wolfgang Nagel, SPD | Peter Strieder, SPD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Urban & Environment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Volker Haster, CDU | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | S-Bahn Berlin (Deutsche Bahn) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

**11/12 Boroughs of E./W. Berlin**

| **Berlin Boroughs** | **11/12 Boroughs of E./W. Berlin** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 23 Boroughs of reunited Berlin | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Transport, Housing, Green Spaces, Environment, Construction, Planning** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

* environment portfolio was separate from Urban Development Department from 2006 to 2011
** little consistency across boroughs with regards to the organisation of departments and subunits
*** borough departments since 2001 are still not entirely consistent across different boroughs and names in individual boroughs differ
# London Governance - Spatial Planning and Transport 1980 to 2010

Rode 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conservative Government</th>
<th>Labour Government</th>
<th>National Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Margaret Thatcher</td>
<td>Tony Blair</td>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
<td>Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>John Major</td>
<td>George Young</td>
<td>Department for Communities &amp; Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John Prescott</td>
<td>Witts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Greater London**

- **Greater London Council**
  - Council Leader: Ken Livingstone
  - Departments: Architecture & Civic Design

- London Planning and Advisory Committee (LPAC)
- London Ecology Unit (LEU)
- London Research Centre (LRC)

**Greater London Authority (GLA)**

- Mayor and Mayor’s Office: Boris Johnson
- Strategic Directorate / Mayor’s Management Board
- London Assembly
- Planning Committee
- Transport Committee
- GLA Bureaucracy

**Transport for London (TfL)**

- TfL Board
- Ken Livingstone: Boris Johnson
- Chief Officers and Leadership Team: Bob Kiley
- Planning and Strategy: Peter Hendy

**London Boroughs**

- 32 London Boroughs and City of London
- Council Departments for Planning
- Council Departments for Transport
- Council Departments for the Environment

**London Councils**
B2 – Development Trajectories of Berlin and London

This appendix presents a brief general overview on Berlin’s and London’s recent development trajectories, spatial development patterns and changes in their transport systems. It also provides a short illustration of how Berliners and Londoners have adjusted their mobility behaviours, which may at least partially be related to these broader structural transformations.

It is important to consider that these development trajectories are not only the result of intentional policy. They are also centrally informed by many interdependent factors such as global, national and regional economic development, political and economic crises elsewhere (e.g. resulting in international migration), legal structures at EU, national and state levels, socio-demographic and technological change, the quantitative and qualitative development of housing supply and a changing overall attractiveness of the case study cities within the national and international context.

Berlin: the development trajectory of a reunited city

Over the last two decades, developments in Berlin have been shaped primarily by Germany’s reunification in 1990, which also re-established the city’s function as Germany’s capital in 1999. Since the early 1990s, the city has struggled to shift its former industry and administration-based economy to a mixed knowledge economy. Between 1991 and 2001, more than 150,000 jobs in the traditional industry sector were lost, without compensating growth in the service sector (Krätke 2004). More recently, Berlin’s economy has become more dynamic. Since 2003, the number of jobs grew by 240,000 to a total of 1.79 million in 2015 (SenStadtUm 2015b) and the city saw an increase of urban economic functions particularly related to the creative industries, the knowledge economy and tourism (Fischer et al. 2005, Lange et al. 2008). It is now among the more competitive cities in Europe for digital technology, with a vibrant start-up culture (Westervelt 2012).

The overall population development in Berlin reflects these economic shifts (Figure 39). The city’s stagnant economy up to the early 2000s kept its overall population remarkably constant, with between 3.3 and 3.5 million inhabitants by 2013 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2013). More recent population growth has been considerable with a growth of 135,000 persons between 2012 and 2014 alone and new estimates suggesting a total population of 3.6 million for the end of 2014 (SenStadtUm 2016a). Between 2010 and 2014, of about 300,000 persons moving to or leaving Berlin, only 11 per cent were migrating between Berlin and its immediate hinterland, about 39 per cent between Berlin and the rest of Germany and 50 per cent between Berlin and other countries (SenStadtUm 2016a). In terms of population age, in-migration to Berlin was higher for populations between 7 and 46
years than out-migration, while age groups 1 to 6 years and above 47 had higher levels of out-migration (SenStadtUm 2016a).

Of particular importance in the context of this thesis are changes to the distribution of the metropolitan population since the 1990s and the degree to which the region has followed a pathway towards more compact urban growth. Following the reunification of Germany, the Berlin-Brandenburg metropolitan region witnessed considerable suburbanisation processes but overall still not close to related population shifts in Western German cities. The peak of suburbanisation was 1998 with a net loss of almost 30,000 persons as a result of former residents of Berlin moving to the metropolitan hinterland in Brandenburg (Figure 40). Ever since, this number has dropped considerably to levels as low as 4,000 persons in 2010 (SenStadtUm 2015b). Between 1993 and 2000, the number of residents in Berlin’s hinterland grew from 0.8 to 1.1 million inhabitants (SenStadtUm 2015b).
Between 1991 and 2014, population growth and densification within Berlin has been particularly strong in the more central boroughs of Mitte (13% increase) and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (13% increase) alongside Pankow (16% increase) (SenStadtUm 2016a), which extends beyond the core but also includes the centrally located neighbourhood of Prenzlauer Berg (Table 12).

Table 12: Population (in thousands) of Berlin Boroughs 1991 - 2014
Source: SenStadtUm (2016a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pankow</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitte</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treptow-Köpenick</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neukölln</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spandau</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steglitz-Zehlendorf</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichtenberg</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinickendorf</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempelhof-Schöneberg</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzahn-Hellersdorf</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Berlin</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,444</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,331</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,339</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,388</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,562</strong></td>
<td><strong>231</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These population shifts broadly mirror the changes of land uses and urban form. Overall, the most relevant spatial development over the last 20 years was a short but pronounced sub-
urbanisation phase throughout the 1990s and the city’s developmental focus on its core (Matthiesen 2002, Meuser and Stimmann 2002, Duda 2008). Between 1991 and 2010 and within the administrative boundaries of Berlin, 85 per cent of building development took place within the existing settlement structure of Berlin (SenStadtUm 2011a). During that period, a total of 38 km² were redeveloped which is about 4.3 per cent of the entire area of the city. Table 13 indicates the land use shares of all revised building areas: housing is the single biggest category with 43 per cent, followed by business and industry with 17 per cent and then large-scale retail with 14 per cent. The absolute number of open space remained relatively constant while considerable areas were converted from open space to other uses but compensated by the reverse reassignment elsewhere (SenStadtUm 2011a).

Table 13: Urban development by key land use categories in Berlin
Source: SenStadtUm (2011a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning goals</th>
<th>space use [ha] by implementation period</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban redevelopment (re-use existing urban land)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for building uses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal spaces</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade and manufacturing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large-scale retail</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other building uses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unbuilt, open space rehabilitation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conversion (principal use unchanged)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extensions of existing uses</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infill of open spaces</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total of urban redevelopment</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new urban green space</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban expansion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for building uses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal spaces</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade and manufacturing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large-scale retail</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other building uses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open space</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renaturation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all planning goals)</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>1,487</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The peak of land being redeveloped was during the second half of the 1990s when about 95,000 housing units were built (SenStadtUm 2011a). A brief phase of building new suburbs during the 1990s led to the greenfield development such as Buchholz-West, Karow-Nord and Rudow-Sued. But these urban extensions only accounted for 21 per cent of the areas for housing developments during the period of 1991 and 2010 (SenStadtUm 2011a). New housing development during the 1990s also included the redevelopment of former industrial
and military areas such as the ‘water cities’ Spandau and Rummeslburger Bucht, and Biesdorf-Sued (SenStadtUm 2011a).

This phase also coincided with the strongest phase of suburbanisation beyond Berlin’s political boundaries when in 1997 alone, 22,000 new housing units in Brandenburg were introduced to the market (SenStadtUm 2011a). Figure 41 not only indicates the considerable fluctuation in absolute construction of new housing units but the considerable dominance of apartment building over single or two-family houses. From 2000 onwards the provision of housing shifted from delivering quantity to a focus on quality and also included a new focus on single and two-family houses even in more central areas.

![Figure 41: House building in Berlin between 1993 and 2010](source: SenStadtUm (2011a))

In terms of urban functions beyond housing, Berlin witnessed a considerable increase in retail, service sector and institutional floor space since 1990. Some of the first also came along with a shift towards larger retail units, doubling between 2000 and 2010 from less than 200 hectares to more than 400 hectares (SenStadtUm 2011a). This compromised more organically grown shopping in some areas while small scales and differentiated retail continues to exist across most of Berlin (SenStadtUm 2015b).

In term of retail space, it is important to appreciate the great increase in retail floor area from 0.95 m² per capita in West Berlin and 0.45 m² in East Berlin to 1.4 m² in today’s reunited city. The latter levels are similar if not higher compared to other large German cities mostly with higher purchasing power (SenStadtUm 2015b). A lot of this is in shopping centres, which were established in public transport accessible city and district centres across Berlin and in East Berlin often take on the function of more organically grown retail areas. 70 per
cent of today’s retail is in large units of more than 5,000 m² compared to less than 40 per cent during the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time, small-scale and differentiated retail continues to exist and only in more remote areas has been exposed to a thinning-out process (SenStadtUm 2015b).

Regarding service sector and government building-related works, signature projects within the city included the Potsdamer Platz redevelopment, the Federal Government district and extensive regeneration activity within the inner city, particularly in the former Eastern part of Berlin. Service industries focused on the more central areas and additional locations along the S-Bahn Ring initially struggled to be positioned as attractive service activity locations. Instead, these areas now feature considerable retail activities (SenStadtUm 2011a).

At the metropolitan level, the spatial development model of ‘decentralised concentration’ led to the development of new greenfield sites along major rail corridors, while strengthening the regional cities in the surrounding Land of Brandenburg (Weickmann 2007). The major exception to this were new large-scale retail units which were developed in proximity to major highways or highway intersections, with no consideration for public transport accessibility. Overall, and as a result of its particular history, Berlin’s metropolitan region still features a strong corridor-based urbanisation pattern along its radial rail lines, easily recognisable as a star-like shape when mapping the built-up land of the metropolitan region (Figures 10 and 11).

The development and upgrading of transport infrastructure in Berlin has arguably been even more extensive than the above land use change and building construction. In the early 1990s it was primarily aimed at reuniting a divided city: streets across the former border were reconnected, radial and orbital rail routes reinstated and several tramlines expanded from the East into Western Berlin. The city was able to build on an existing and extensive public transport system, based on a well-developed underground system in West Berlin and a vast citywide S-Bahn and a tram system in East Berlin (Figure 42). Today, Berlin’s public transport infrastructure is said to be able to accommodate the potential growth of the city by another million inhabitants.

Over that period, considerable investments were also made in relation to traffic calming measures and to support non-motorised transport and the place function of streets and the public realm. Of Berlin’s total street network of 5,300 km (excluding motorways), more than 70 per cent of total road length has a reduced a speed limit of 30 km/h (elsewhere it is 50 km/h) (SenStadtUm 2016b). By 2015, Berlin finished seven radial and three orbital main cycling routes with a total length of about 200 km and the city’s network of cycle lanes alongside streets grew to 1,470 km in total length (SenStadtUm 2016b). Following a sizeable
investment programme over the last decades, a total of 27,000 bike and ride parking facilities exist today (SenStadtUm 2016b).

Figure 42: Berlin’s rail-based public transport infrastructure and additions since 1990
Source: Rode et al. (2015)

As a result of a range of different factors but including the above developments, the following changes in mobility behaviour were registered in Berlin: from 1998 to 2013, the share of non-motorised travel increased from 35 to 44 per cent while car and motorcycle use dropped from 38 to 30 per cent (Figure 43). While there was a substantial motorisation phase in the 1990s, when East Berlin was catching up with the motorisation levels of West Berlin, the city maintained its character as a public transport and non-motorised-travel-oriented metropolis. More recently from 2000 to 2013, car ownership levels have fallen from 358 to 327 cars per 1,000 inhabitants while the number of car-free households in 2013 stood at 40 per cent (Rode et al. 2015). Since 2003, the number of cars on the main roads has been dropping by 8 to 10 per cent (SenStadtUm 2015b). For Brandenburg, the main picture shows a different trend. Here, the number of annual public transport passengers fell around 4 to 5 per cent during both the 1990s and 2000s while motorisation continued to increase even during the 2000s with 516 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 2000 to 521 cars in 2010 (MIL 2014).
London: the growth of a European global city

By contrast to Berlin, London’s overall developmental history over the last two decades has been more linear and is characterised by relatively sustained economic growth. Urban change in the city was significantly informed by its economic success as one of the world’s top three global cities (Sassen 1991, Gordon et al. 2002) and this despite a history of political fragmentation as discussed further below. Accelerated population growth beginning in the 1980s was accompanied by new service sector job growth following the de-regulation of the banking industry. London is often referred to as the world’s most international city, with strong economic and political ties to many parts of the world. Following the financial crisis in 2007, London has experienced some diversification of its industry, with shifts towards digital technology, tourism and education (Hoffman 2011, Nathan et al. 2012) and away from the narrower finance and insurance sector (Hoffman 2011).

The population in 2015 was estimated at 8.6 million, up from 6.4 million in 1991 (GLA 2010c, 2015b). This growth has largely been the result of international migration and more recently of natural growth within the city. For example, between 2001 and 2009, the net inflow from abroad was 560,000 compared to a net loss to the rest of the UK of 640,000 (GLA 2010b). The annual net loss of London residents to the wider metropolitan region (East of England and South East England) has roughly been around 60,000 to 80,000 persons (GLA 2010b). By contrast, natural change of London’s population between 2008 and 2009 alone was 78,000 persons (GLA 2010b).

From 2001 to 2011, the population within the wider metropolitan region of London (the three regions of Greater London, East of England and South East) grew from 20.6 million to 22.7 million (ONS 2011). Over that period, growth in London has been most pronounced with a 14 per cent increase from 7.2 to 8.2 million residents. East of England and the South
East grew by 8.5 and 7.9 per cent respectively (ONS 2011). Nine out of the ten fastest growing local authorities across all 150 local authorities within this wider metropolitan region are London boroughs. Five of these are located in Inner London with boroughs such as Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Westminster growing by 30, 21 and 21 per cent respectively (ONS 2011). While these figures already suggest a considerable degree of densification and urban compaction over the last two decades, it is important to consider related changes in the built environment.

London’s spatial development continues to be a product of its primary economic functions. The global banking industry and an extremely active producer services industry have reinforced the central core of the city as the main area of economic activity (GLA 2011). As Figure 44 indicates, most recent additions to London’s 2005 total office floor area of 28.5m sqm (ONS 2011) are within central locations and aligned with public transport provision. For example, 75 per cent of all new floorspace approved for business activities in 2006/07 was for areas with good public transport accessibility (GLA 2008a), in 2014/15 this was still the case for about two thirds of all approved business space (GLA 2016). Figure 44 also shows the extent to which new shopping floor space – 16.9m sqm in 2005 (ONS 2011) – has broadly followed a strong tendency of centralisation and that even new housing development primarily was considerably stronger in Inner London.

Furthermore, the proportion of development that took place on previously developed land consistently remained between 95 and 98 per cent between 2006 and 2015 (GLA 2016). And
even earlier, land use change within Greater London primarily affected previously developed land. For example, between 2001 and 2005 land use change linked to an increase of land for housing, pathways and a range of smaller other uses was associated with an almost two-thirds share of land reduction linked to non-domestic buildings, roads, rail and domestic gardens (ONS 2011). This is the result of intensification and brownfield redevelopment following the economic shift from industrial to service sectors, which led to land vacancies, particularly east of the centre (GLA 2010d). The Thames Gateway, including the 2012 Olympic area, and redevelopments along Regent’s Canal and King’s Cross are part of this.

At the metropolitan scale, London’s built-up area also remains reasonably well aligned with its administrative boundary (Figures 10 and 11), mainly as a result of a half-century-old green belt regulation. At the same time though, many towns and cities beyond this belt in the so-called home counties are booming, with Cambridge, Oxford and Milton Keynes being the most prominent examples (Centre for Cities 2012). Here, more traditional suburbanisation has continued to develop jointly with new business parks and high-tech industry clusters.

Following the general patterns of population change outlined above, Inner London boroughs were affected by more considerable land use changes compared to Outer London boroughs. This is also the case for provision of new housing (Figure 45 and Figure 46). According to the UK Census, the total stock of dwellings in Greater London increased from 2001 to 2011 from 3.09 million to 3.36 million units. Once again, the growth of dwellings in Inner London was, with 12 per cent, significantly higher than in Outer London with 6 per cent over the same period (ONS 2011). In addition, Figure 46 illustrates the considerable increase in average densities of new housing developments just after the turn of the millennium.
Recent transport developments in London overall also mirror compact city development, with substantial investments in the city’s extensive public transport system, a rediscovery of non-motorised transport modes and one of the most significant efforts worldwide to reduce car use in the city centre with the introduction of the London Congestion Charge in 2003 (TfL 2008, 2010). These efforts have redistributed street space in favour of bus lanes, cycle paths and pedestrian areas, at the same time significantly upgrading the quality of the public realm. Land use and transport integration have been central to rolling out new infrastructure such as the Jubilee Line Extension, which opened in 2000, the expansion of the Docklands Light Rail and the London Overground, all designed to improve accessibility to central parts of East London (Figure 47).
Partially as a result of the above, mobility patterns in London changed considerably, most noticeably in relation to an increased modal share of public transport growing from 33 per cent in 1998 to 45 per cent in 2013 (Figure 48). By contrast, the share of car use decreased over the same period from 44 to 33 per cent (TfL 2014). Between 2001 and 2011, the number of car-free households increased from 37.5 to 41.6 per cent (Rode et al. 2015). And since 2001, traffic on London roads (vehicle km) has reduced by about 10 per cent; in Inner London by more than 16 per cent (GLA 2016) (Figure 49). This in turn has helped to double the share of cycling from 1998 to 2013 (TfL 2014). By contrast, mobility shifts in the wider metropolitan area outside of Greater London included a slight increase of car use as well as car ownership between 2001 and 2011. Over that period the share of car-based commutes increased from 40 to 41 per cent and vehicle ownership grew from 530 to 555 vehicles per 1,000 residents (ONS 2011).
To summarise these recent developments in Berlin and London, I will relate them more directly to the compact urban growth framework of Chapter 3. Overall, both cities appear to have departed from the globally persistent urban development trajectory of de-densification and increasing decentralisation alongside conventional forms of motorisation. Similarly, they also seem to have crossed a tipping point in relation to their own previous developmental direction, which, well into the 1990s, was characterised by suburbanisation and an increase in car ownership and use. Arguably the most pronounced shifts introduced above relate to a considerable reduction in car-based travel in both cities over a relatively short period of time. Evidently, these may only be partially related to the various structural changes further
indicating a ‘compact city’ turn and a greater degree of integrating urban form and transport developments.

With regard to the latter, it is the redistribution of populations across the metropolitan region and the recent, considerable increase of population densities particularly within the more accessible urban core of Berlin and London, which offers the most robust indication. These population shifts are aligned with concentration of land use changes and building activities while both cities saw far-reduced greenfield development. Both, concentrated development on existing brownfield land and more transit-oriented development, were assisted by an extensive upgrade of each city’s public transport system. On top, non-motorised mobility and micro-accessibility was supported by comprehensive changes to street layouts and designs increasing the capacity and quality for walking and cycling.

At the same time, there have also been divergent developments and those that cannot be directly framed through a compact city lens. The metropolitan hinterland of both cities continues to grow with more traditional suburbanisation and has registered an increase in car use and car ownership even since 2000. Besides differences in overall size, economic dynamism and housing markets\textsuperscript{23}, London continues to suffer from a lack, rather than an oversupply of transport infrastructure as is more the case in Berlin. With far less population and housing growth pressures, Berlin also saw, since 2000, the development of some lower density housing within its urban core. On the one hand this helped to reduce sub-urbanisation, on the other hand this may risk a degree of underutilisation of scarce central land if population growth continues at current levels. By contrast, London’s central housing market is characterised by increasingly dense, vertical developments.

\textsuperscript{23} A considerable contrast also exists for example with regard to the densest borough in each city: extremely affluent Kensington and Chelsea in London with 13,080 pers/km\textsuperscript{2} and lower income Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain in Berlin with 13,800 pers/km\textsuperscript{2} gross population density (ONS 2011; SenStadtU/m 2016a).
C1 – List of informal metropolitan coordination networks for Berlin-Brandenburg

- Working group of regional centres (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Regionaler Entwicklungscentren (AREZ)), which includes important municipalities in Brandenburg with strong links to Berlin. This group has been particularly influential in promoting the concept of a strong city ring (Städtekranz) with Berlin at its centre. Partially based on its connections with GL, the group has a special focus on improving accessibility to and from Berlin (Zahn 2006).

- Five regional planning communities (Planungsgemeinschaften) within Brandenburg where usually the land district or municipal associations take the lead (Häussermann 2003).

- Four inter-municipal neighbourhood forums in Berlin-Brandenburg (Kommunales Nachbarschaftsforum) have been initiated. These include outer boroughs of Berlin and neighbouring municipalities in Brandenburg to “provide an opportunity to exchange information, to coordinate and to discuss the aims of and controversies surrounding the ongoing spatial development” (Häussermann 2003, p123).

- Two groups to facilitate additional participation of Berlin at regional planning processes in Brandenburg: the Regional Planning Conference (Regionale Planungskonferenz), which includes representatives of Berlin’s Boroughs, and the Regional Planning Forum (Regionalplanungsrat) with representatives from all regional planning areas in Brandenburg and two representatives each from Berlin and Brandenburg. Facing little conflict after being set up in the late 1990s, both groups only met very sporadically (Krappweis 2001).
C2 – Berlin’s Land Use Plan (FNP) and its core characteristics

The legal requirement for instituting a Land Use Plan (FNP) is defined within Germany’s Federal Building Code (Baugesetzbuch (BauGB 2004, §5)). The first FNP for the combined territory of East and West Berlin after Germany’s reunification was constituted in 1994. The Plan and its frequent updates are enacted by Berlin’s parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) and are legally binding for local authorities and other public and statutory bodies that are part of the formal spatial planning process (BauGB 2004, § 7).

The level of detail in the FNP has been calibrated over decades and, according to some local experts, today represents a good mix of reliable strategic specifications at a scale of 1:25,000 and enough leeway for local planning of sites of less than 3 hectares, a level of detail the Plan does not address (Bunzel et al. 2012). This current resolution followed a ‘coarsening’ (Entfeinerung) of the FNP after reunification, acknowledging both a much larger territory of the reunited Berlin for which the Plan is developed, as well as the experience with land use planning in West Berlin.

Directly related to the level of detail of the FNP is a certain flexibility in translating the standards set by the Plan to specific local conditions. The FNP does not define specific development sites for which, for example, floor area ratios have to be adhered to. Instead, it indicates areas for which certain broad-range density standards need to be followed as part of subsequent local planning efforts and when granting building permissions. Density specifications provided by the Plan also focus on maximum levels and boroughs are allowed to develop areas at slightly lower floor area ratios. Equally important, there is a degree of flexibility for residential areas with regard to mixed-use.

At the strategic, citywide level, the preparation or amendment of the Land Use Plan (FNP) includes a two-level participatory process. First, citizens are invited to inform themselves about intended changes to the FNP and to comment on the general direction. These comments are published and considered. Second, a draft of the FNP or for intended changes is published and citizens are allowed to submit objections and comments a second time, which are also published. Berlin’s House of Representatives then votes on proposed changes following this participation period and the review of feedback. The FNP updating process happens usually twice a year and takes about one month.
D1 – The London Plan and its core characteristics

A key feature of the London Plan is its exclusive focus on high-level strategy rather than detailed land use planning, in spite of its emphasis on spatial development. The GLA Act emphasises the London Plan’s strategic nature: it should only deal with matters that are of strategic importance to Greater London (GLA Act 1999, Section 334.5). While strategies put forward do allow for a certain level of interpretation, the Plan is, as one interviewee stressed, nevertheless relatively specific and clear on different policy areas. As a result, the London Plan is a text-heavy, 300- to 500-page document setting a strategic vision rather than specifying territorial features or land uses based on a scaled map.

In fact, the central map-like representation within the document, the so-called ‘key diagram’, has to be kept at a schematic level to avoid conflicting with the detailed planning undertaken by the boroughs. The relevant legislation goes as far as to state “no key diagram or inset diagram contained in the spatial development strategy shall be on a map base” (UK Government 2000, Section 5.4). Instead, the key diagram identifies key growth corridors, ‘opportunity areas’ and ‘areas for intensification’. The specific strategies for these corridors and areas are then dealt with in greater detail by the relevant boroughs (working with the mayoral agencies).

Essentially, the London Plan remains a mayoral and therefore personal vision for London and its preparation is directly influenced by the political priorities of the Mayor of London. Partly as a result, some commentators also referred to a ‘patchy’ production of the London Plan, with various contributions being prepared in an ad hoc way. In some instances, however, professional planning has also defended the Plan against political intrusion by the Mayor.
D2 – List of London Plan (2008) references to coordinated transport and urban development

- "The Mayor will seek to influence the spatial development […] by improving London’s accessibility through the coordination of transport and development with an emphasis on improvement to public transport and reducing traffic congestion." (GLA 2008, p42).

- "Spatial policies cannot be considered in isolation from their links to existing and proposed transport accessibility and capacity. […] Map 2A.3 shows the existing Public Transport Accessibility Levels across London, based on the PTAL method, which provides a consistent framework for assessing public transport accessibility." (GLA 2008, p56).

- "The transport policies in Chapter 3C seek to assist in achieving spatial development priorities by integrating development with existing and future public transport infrastructure and services as well as exploiting existing areas of good public transport accessibility and promoting demand management." (GLA 2008, p57).

- "The Mayor will work with TfL, the government, boroughs and other partners to ensure the integration of transport and development by: […] reduce the need to travel […] improve public transport, walking and cycling capacity […] supporting high trip generating development only at locations with both high levels of public transport accessibility […] Parking provision should reflect levels of public transport accessibility […] encouraging integration of the major transport infrastructure plans with improvements to the public realm" (GLA 2008, p126).
E1 – Persisting integration barriers and tensions

As much as Berlin and London may have advanced a more integrated approach to governing and planning the urban form and transport nexus, the experience in the two case study cities also confirms various deeply rooted integration barriers. This appendix introduces those examples of barriers and tensions that are particularly difficult to overcome, even in conditions where integration is achieved through privileging transport and land use issues over other policy links.

In both cities, governmental silos are a reality impossible to overcome in their entirety. Schreyögg and Sydow remind us that, essentially, any organisation needs to remain something different from the environment they operate in and that “organisations cannot exist without boundaries” (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010, p1253). And particularly in the context of public administrations, departmental silos continue to define the very nature of bureaucracies.

Overall, the more traditional portfolios such as transport, public works, finance and justice tend to be particularly prone to protective behaviours that defend sectoral authority. This, for example, extends deep into certain sectoral standards or guidelines, which are often even seen as untouchable or ‘God-given’, as one interviewee referred to traditional street design codes. In this regard, interviewees repeatedly also highlighted the important role of professional differences. For example, in the case of Berlin, transport planning professionals continued to struggle with urban designers and architects for whom it was difficult to appreciate the central and often legal role of such codes and guidelines. The legacy of conventional silos and disciplinary divisions also remained strong due to the disciplinary boundaries that exist for the relevant research on which urban practitioners can build on.

Similarly, integrated planning and policymaking requires more upfront resources and time than sectoral decision-making. At the most basic level, this is simply a result of more issues having to be considered and more people being actively involved and/or consulted. The danger here is to regard only the planning content as the outcome of integration when instead it services multiple objectives such as social learning, the creation of new knowledge, creative new ideas and possibly even the establishment of greater acceptability of projects and their democratic backing. Financial constraints to public resources are therefore a significant barrier to integrated planning and policymaking. Experts in Berlin, for example, stressed that integrative practices may be already compromised due to the cost reduction regimes in public authorities.
Communicating integrated policy agendas to the general public may be another difficulty. The more complex the relevant interdependencies, which may have to be considered in more integrated planning and policy, the greater the difficulty to communicate, particularly with ordinary citizens. These interdependencies not only make short newspaper headlines impossible but require more time and greater efforts to present integrated plans, projects and initiatives. Or to put it differently, the public is unable to participate because integration is not an ‘inductive experience’ (Sennett 2015). To a degree, this may even compromise transparency, which is more difficult to achieve under conditions of greater integration and has to recognise a far greater number of inputs. Instead, a sector-based ‘tunnel vision’ may not only be easier to convey but, in addition, limits the requirements to work with more people and to address diverse interests.

On top of complex interdependencies, which make integration difficult, there is the complexity of administrative tasks which many contributing professionals outside, but even inside, the administration have difficulty in understanding. The more ambitious an integrative process, the more they will have to engage with that complexity and be able to navigate it. In London, the crowding of the institutional landscape continues to compromise policy integration (Syrett and Baldock 2003). And institutional complexity is mostly referred to as having increased since the GLA was set up, partially as a result of ongoing ‘agencification’ but also given the ongoing encouragement of a partnership governance model that stood at the heart of New Labour’s consensus building.

Partially as a result of the above, integrated planning and policymaking in the two cities is also exposed to ongoing tensions. Two dimensions of these tensions can be differentiated. First, there are structural, management tensions for which governing the metropolitan region is arguably the best example. And these are certainly not unique to Berlin and London. History has shown that even in the absence of definitional difficulties of metropolitan boundaries, the growing city struggles to argue against the municipal privileges created for suburbs and regional centres that are not part of the core city. Pimlott and Rao (2002) emphasise that as a result: “Fragmented governance, and the intractability it brings, is the metropolitan problem” (Pimlott and Rao 2002, p7).

Similarly, deep and inherent integration tensions also appear to exist with regard to the oversight of linear network infrastructures, which cut across municipal and sub-municipal boundaries. In particular, the case of integrating and managing urban street networks has repeatedly been characterised throughout my interviews as inefficient but also without an obvious solution. Both cities currently experience various coordination deficits as a result of distributing the responsibilities for streets depending on their hierarchy across borough and citywide authorities. On the one hand, the responsibility of boroughs for local streets in
London has, for example, been a clear barrier for implementing free-floating car sharing schemes, which would require a citywide approach to parking policies. At the same time, the devolution of local street management has also helped to advance integrative practices, as some boroughs were able to be far more progressive with their respective policies than it would have been possible in the case of a citywide approach. Similarly, experimentation and trialling has been encouraged by such a more fragmented setup. The introduction of a borough-wide 20mph speed limit is a good example of this.

Second, regardless of the integrative practices that were developed in both cities, some of the main underlying ‘content’ tensions have continued to dominate local planning and policymaking, i.e. the ‘meta’ has not been allowed to overcome certain ‘matter’. Above all, there are numerous accounts of perceived or real trade-offs between environmentally-focused compact city development and economic development. For example, granting planning permission for large-scale retail was repeatedly singled out as an area where planning integration seems to fail – once again there seem to be horizontal integration conflicts with economic development strategies but also vertical integration shortcomings with regard to strategic planning and borough-level implementation. Most of these new larger-scale centres in Berlin and London are peripheral to the existing neighbourhood centre, built on vacant, brownfield land while usually adopting parking standards far exceeding those set by integrated policy.

Lacking integration between environmental and economic considerations was also registered for the implementation of the low emission zone in London and the Umweltzone in Berlin, for which some perceived a lack of coordination with economic development policy and a too-short-notice announcement with regard to the type of vehicles that may no longer be able to enter central city areas. And of course, parking policy and parking fees – the latter particularly in Berlin – are commonly framed as operating across conflicting goals of affordability on the one hand and broader integrated transport strategies on the other. In Berlin, the development of, and opposition to, parking fees have also been referred to as ‘party-political football’.

And there are even more extreme cases where – at least from the outside – contradictions between the compact city agenda and actual planning praxis exist. In Berlin, several senior interviewees referred to the expansion of Berlin’s urban motorway ring as an ‘inherent necessity’, which represents a strategy conflict between more integrated planning (with compact city orientation) and higher-level interests. Such an assessment also hints at a strong perception of integration as content integration, i.e. the compact city agenda and its prioritisation of public and non-motorised transport. A final example of typical policy
content tensions relates to broader tax policies, which in both cities include entrenched mechanisms that support more sprawling urban development.

The deepest level of fragmentation that negatively impacts on integrated urban development relates to the way income for municipalities is structured. In Germany, for example, the more inhabitants municipalities attract the better it is in local revenue terms (Gutsche 2004). As Häussermann (2003) highlights for the case of Berlin’s hinterland, control over spatial development would be lost if municipalities simply acted upon this principle. He points to the problem of lacking financial equalisation within the urban region and as a result, municipalities compete for more taxpayers and activity (Häussermann 2003).

Considering the relatively long timeframes over which most of these barriers and tensions can possibly change already suggests that these cannot be easily overcome. Adding on top my insights from Berlin and London may even allow for greater scepticism with regard to mitigating their fragmenting effect. It is here where these integration challenges have persisted, even over periods which were characterised by considerable efforts of improving integrated planning and policymaking. Quite possibly, the single most important and cross-cutting barrier for integrated governance, and therefore for the facilitation of compact urban growth, may be limited expertise. If this was indeed the case it would require getting back to the tension between democracy and technocracy with one central question: does greater involvement of the public advance or compromise integrated governance?
E2 – Two forms of integration

Figure 50: Two forms of integration
E3 – Compact urban growth and integrated governance

Throughout my research for this study, I repeatedly encountered an assumed natural connection between integrated planning and policymaking and related institutional frameworks on the one hand and compact city ideals and outcomes on the other. Furthermore, some literature and interviews used terms such as ‘compact’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘integrated’ interchangeably. But what are the reasons for this strong relationship? And how does this relate to the considerable limitations of establishing causal relationships between institutional arrangements and policy outcomes?

One higher-level explanation is important to note upfront. The compact city model essentially represents a case in which a pre-conceived idea exists about how development should take place. And policy contexts for which outcomes are already defined upfront are predestined for a more proactive and designed intervention. Furthermore, this existence of a clearly defined policy target establishes an essential pre-condition that allows integration facilitated by hierarchy to take place (Thompson 1991).

Ultimately, however, the close link between compact urban growth and integrated planning relates to the specific requirements of the first. Below, I will therefore build on the theoretical understanding of links between institutions and policy outcomes as introduced in Chapter 3 and add the empirical and comparative insights from my case study cities.

Most importantly, there is a significant degree to which compact urban growth relies on the integration of different spatial and infrastructural systems. In turn, this system integration necessitates governance structures and planning processes that can produce integrated outcomes. This can be illustrated when considering the constituent parts or defining characteristics of the compact city model, which I already introduced as part of Chapter 3.

The first core characteristic is a relatively high-level of urban density, which cuts across the density of populations, workplaces and other urban functions. Planning for greater density necessitates a considerable degree of synchronisation with high-capacity urban transport systems. And in order for the planning of this synchronisation to take place, both of the case study cities rely on the integrative mechanisms discussed above. The most specific integration instruments in this regard are the Public Transport Accessibility Levels (PTAL), which identify desirable density levels as part of the London Plan. Similarly, the zoning of floor area ratios in Berlin’s Land Use Plan considers public transport provision.

The second core characteristic of compact urban growth involves relatively high levels of mixed-use. In contrast to more mono-functional urban development, mixed-use inevitably leads to a considerable number of complementary but also conflicting ‘connection points’
between different uses at the local level. While post-industrial cities like London and Berlin may no longer have to negotiate the locating of air- and noise-polluting heavy industry, conflicts between residential, commercial and service functions still exist. Managing these connection points inevitably requires the combination of different sectoral know-how.

The distribution of urban functions and the finer scale at which this is propagated by the compact city model also leads to additional connections between urban design and transport. On the one hand, micro-accessibility mostly based on non-motorised transport becomes an increasingly important dimension of transport planning and needs to be efficiently linked to more rapid, motorised transport systems. On the other hand, and directly related, movement functions of public spaces and streets start mixing with place functions related to stationary uses that take place in the same urban environments. Managing related synergies and conflicts naturally demands broader expertise and integrative capacities as part of planning and designing urban environments.

In Berlin and London, such requirements are translated to urban practice in several ways. On the one hand, multidisciplinary teams frequently engage with each other as part of project-level city design tasks in London or for master planning exercises such as the Planwerk Innenstadt in Berlin. Similarly, highway codes and transport planning frameworks have been adjusted to better deal with place functions of streets and micro-accessibility. On the other hand, London may have experienced a shift from sectoral fragmentation to a fragmentation of planning scales as there are several shortcomings in advancing vertical integration. Such potential trade-offs between vertical and horizontal integration have also been registered more generally (Peters 1998). This problem may be less pronounced in Berlin although even here the granting of planning permission of several large-scale shopping centres and retail outlets suggests inconsistencies with higher-level planning frameworks.

A third compact city characteristic, which is helpful to consider here, is the prioritisation of non-motorised and public transport. Unlike transport systems which are based on private motorised modes and which provide direct door-to-door connectivity, the provision of ‘compact city mobility’ requires multi-modality. This involves at least the integration of one or several public transport modes with walking but increasingly comprises a multitude of integrated public, shared and non-motorised modes of travel. And multi-modality is both a requirement for and a result of system integration. Not surprisingly, it is reflected by the governance structures and processes in the two case study cities: Transport for London is among the world’s leading multi-modal transport authorities and SenStadtUm in Berlin contains an urban transport division similarly tasked with multi-modal transport planning. In the latter case, further integration with urban planning occurs within the same department. In
London, this relies on the links between the GLA’s planning team and TfL, which developed based on network collaboration overseen by the Mayor.

What these three characteristics of compact urban growth have in common is that they required integration that cannot be easily ‘Taylorised’, i.e. broken down into disparate subtasks along sectoral divisions. The traditional technocratic approach of coordinating infrastructures and land uses in the spatially segregated modernist city would therefore naturally struggle with the requirements outlined above. This may have a lot to do with the spatial scale at which sectors need to mix. The compact city model requires this mix to be more localised and fine-grained compared to the modernist city. By contrast, the modernist city tends to equip, for example, strategic infrastructures with enough ‘breathing space’ so these can be dealt in greater isolation and as disparate subsystems. For the compact city, it is the combination of multiple, complex layers of urban function in a relatively contained and small area which appears to necessitate the opposite. This may therefore also suggest that the fine-grained, human scale orientation of the compact city requires more advanced institutional capacities.
Bibliography


Apel, Dieter; Michael Lehmbrock; Tim Pharoa and Jörg Thiemann-Linden 1997. *Kompakt, mobil, urban: Stadtentwicklungskonzepte zur Verkehrsvermeidung im internationalen Vergleich*, Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik.


BMVBS (Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung) 2011. *40 Jahre Städtebauförderung.*


Booth, Philip 1996. *Controlling development: certainty and discretion in Europe, the USA and Hong Kong,* Psychology Press.


Brenke, Karl; Udo Ludwig; Joachim Ragnitz and Dresden Berlin 2011. *Analyse der Schlüsselentscheidungen im Bereich Wirtschaftspolitik und ihre Wirkung auf die ökonomische Entwicklung der vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte im Land Brandenburg. Studie im Auftrag der Enquetekommission" Aufarbeitung der Geschichte und Bewältigung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur und des Übergangs in einem demokratischen Rechtsstaat im Land Brandenburg"(EK 5/1).*


Challis, Linda; Susan Fuller; Melanie Henwood; Rudolf Klein; William Plowden; Adrian Webb; Peter Whittingham and Gerald Wistow 1988. *Joint Approaches to Social Policy: Rationality and Practice*, Cambridge University Press.


Cortright, Joe 2008. *Driven to the brink: how the gas price spike popped the housing bubble and devalued the suburbs*. CEO for Cities.


DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) 2006a. *Planning and Climate Change: A Supplement to PPS1 Consultation*.


DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) 2009. *Transforming places changing lives: Taking forward the regeneration framework*.


Durkheim, Emile 1894. The division of labour in society, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
EC (European Commission) 1997. The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies, Luxemburg.
EC (European Commission) 1999a. The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning - Germany, Luxemburg.
EC (European Commission) 1999b. European Spatial Development Perspective.
EC (European Commission) 2013. European Innovation Partnership on Smart Cities and Communities: Strategic Implementation Plan.
Eggenberger, Markus and Maria do Rosário Partidário 2000. Development of a framework to assist the integration of environmental, social and economic issues in spatial planning. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 18, 201-207.


Evans, Bob; Marko Joas; Susan Sundback and Kate Theobald 2006. *Governing local sustainability*. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 49(6), 849-867.


Flick, Uwe 2014. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, SAGE Publications.


GL (Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung Berlin-Brandenburg) 2009. *Landesplanungsplan Berlin-Brandenburg 2009 (LEP B-B)*.
GL (Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung Berlin-Brandenburg) 2012. *Gemeinsam Planen für Berlin und Brandenburg*.
GLA (Greater London Authority) 2013a. *Full departmental organisation chart (July 2013)*.
GLA (Greater London Authority) 2015a. *Housing in London 2015*.
GLA (Greater London Authority) 2015b. *London population confirmed at record high*.


Goodwin, Phil; Sharon Hallett; Francesca Kenny and Gordon Stokes 1991. *Transport, the new realism*. Transport Studies Unit, Oxford University.


Kennedy, Christopher; Eric Miller; Amer Shalaby; Heather MacLean and Jesse Coleman 2005. *The Four Pillars of Sustainable Urban Transportation.* Transport Reviews, 25(4), 393-414.


Land Brandenburg 2013. *Die kommunale Verwaltungsstruktur*.


Lautso, Kari; Klaus Spiekermann; Michael Wegener; Ian Sheppard; Philip Steadman; Angelo Martino; Roberto Domingo and Sylvie Gayda 2004. *PROPOLIS - Planning and Research of Policies for Land Use and Transport for Increasing Urban Sustainability*. Final Report ed.


LPAC (London Planning Advisory Committee) 2000. *Endowment to the Mayor and the Boroughs*.


MIL (Ministerium für Infrastruktur und Landesplanung, Brandenburg) 2014. Verkehrstatistik.


Page 319


Overman, Henry 2012. Should we build on the green belt? Available from: http://spatial-economics.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/should-we-build-on-green-belt.html [Accessed 02/08/2015].


Owens, Susan 1995. *From 'predict and provide' to 'predict and prevent'? Pricing and planning in transport policy.* Transport Policy, 2(1), 43-49.


Rode, Philipp; Graham Floater; Jens Kandt; Karl Baker; Marina Montero Carrero; Catarina Heeckt; Duncan Smith and Michael Delfs 2013. *Going Green: How cities are leading the next economy*. London. LSE Cities, ICLEI and Global Green Growth Institute.


Rode, Philipp; Alexandra Gomes; Priya Shankar; Madeleine Lee; Francis Moss; Catarina Heeckt; Nuno da Cruz; Roxana Slavcheva; Jens Kandt; Shriya Malhotra; Shabana Shiraz and Sofia Garcia 2014b. *Data Section*. In: Burdett, Ricky; Philipp Rode; Priya Shankar and Shan Vahidy (eds.) *Governing Urban Futures (LSE Cities Conference, Delhi, India, 14-15 November 2014)*. London LSE Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science.


Rode, Philipp; Duncan Smith; Jens Kandt; Karl Baker; Catarina Heeckt and Marina Montero Carrero 2012. *Data Section*. In: Burdett, Ricky and Philipp Rode (eds.) *Urban Age Electric City*.


Page 323


SenStadt (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung) 2008b. *Mobilität in Berlin: Bilanz zum Personenverkehr in der Stadt (SrV 2008)*.


SenStadtUm (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) 2011b. *Verkehrsinformationszentrale - VIZ*.

SenStadtUm (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) 2013. *Stadtentwicklungskonzept 2030*.


SenStadtUm (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) 2015b. *Flächenutzungsplanung für Berlin: FNP-Bericht 2015*.

SenStadtUm (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) 2015c. *Organisationsplan*.

SenStadtUm (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt) 2015d. *Stadtentwicklungspläne (StEP)*.


Stern, Nicholas 2009. *A blueprint for a safer planet: how to manage climate change and create a new era of progress and prosperity*, London; Bodley Head.

Stern, Nicholas and James Rydge 2012. *The new energy-industrial revolution and international agreement on climate change*. Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy, 1(1).

Stigt, Rien; Peter PJ Driessen and Tejo JM Spit 2013. *Compact City Development and the Challenge of Environmental Policy Integration: A Multi-Level Governance Perspective*. Environmental Policy and Governance, 23(4), 221-233.


UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) 2013. *Integrating the Environment in Urban Planning and Management.*


Williams, Katie; Mike Jenks and Elizabeth Burton 2000. *Achieving sustainable urban form*, E & FN Spon.


World Bank 2014. *Supporting Reports II - Urban China*


