CITIZENSHIP, 'XENOPHOBIA' AND COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION IN A SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT: THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE STATE

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology of The London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London, August 2015

Supervisor: Prof Chetan Bhatt
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Citizenship, 'xenophobia' and collective mobilization in a South African settlement: The politics of exclusion at the threshold of the state

Abstract

This thesis develops a layered historical, ethnographic and theoretical analysis of 'xenophobic' mobilisation and informal residence in South Africa. It explores the role of historically and spatially defined political identities in shaping exclusionary collective mobilization in the informal settlement, countering notions of 'xenophobia' as an effect of poverty, racism, elite manipulation, or psychological pathology. It argues that, in a context of stratified citizenship, 'exclusionary' mobilization by infra-citizens may be directed toward fuller citizenship and inclusion rather than toward the exclusion of a racial, cultural or ethnic other.

Moving from the national to the local scale, and using a combination of archival data, documentary analysis, and ethnographic field research, I demonstrate how the South African squatter camp emerged as a site for the insurgent claiming of citizenship and became a place of anticipated transition to equal citizenship in the years leading up to 1994. A double-embedded case study in the settlement of Mshongo in Atteridgeville, Tshwane, depicts how, post-democracy, this site of transition transformed into a static and apparently permanent 'threshold space' neither inside nor outside citizenship. Here, the distinct institutional structures and repertoires of collective mobilization and violence produced by spatial and political inequalities continued to produce a threshold form of (infra-)citizenship, leading to a resurgence of the settlements' traditions of collective action. I argue that individualistic economic and political practices by non-citizen newcomers became vivid transgressions of this tradition, particularly at times of protest where the salience of collective labour and priorities was magnified.

Theoretically, the thesis provides an account of local belonging as built on anteriority and political involvement, challenging dominant readings of autochthony. In addition, it explores the relationship between 'threshold space' and exclusion so as to illuminate tensions between inclusion and exclusion; agency and 'bare life'; citizens' and human rights.
Acknowledgements

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## Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAXA</td>
<td>African Anti-Xenophobia Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Liberation Army, military wing of the Pan African Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Mkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWV</td>
<td>Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDU</td>
<td>Self-Defence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Transvaal Provincial Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
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Introduction

For birds with wings nothing changes; they fly where they will and they know nothing about borders and their quarrels are very small.

But we are always confined to earth, no matter how much we climb to the high places and flap our arms. Because we cannot fly, we are condemned to do things that do not agree with us. Because we have no wings we are pushed into struggles and abominations that we did not seek, and then, after all that, the years go by, the mountains are levelled, the valleys rise, the rivers are blocked by sand and the cliffs fall into the sea.


The words of Karatavuk in *Birds Without Wings* – a novel set in the Ottoman empire, distant in space and time from my own research site – resonate deeply with the themes of mobility, stasis and citizenship captured in this thesis. Much of the thesis concerns the struggles of the birds without wings – to my mind, those citizens whose capacities were mutilated by history, who find themselves condemned to immobile lives, crippled, pecking out a meagre living in places where the freedom and security of citizenship remains far out of reach. It remembers the brutal history that engineered these ‘wingless’ citizens; their attempts to climb to the high places, the bruises they accumulate and the abominations they are drawn into in the trying. It is about what happens when new claimants for the goods of citizenship continually arrive to jostle for survival alongside these ‘wingless birds’, far from the biopolitical regulation of the state – that stuff of utopian fantasy that scholars of the West rail against.

More broadly, it is also about we winged birds – those with the greater capacity to move, to choose, and to thrive in a world of global flows. People such as myself, who enjoy material as well as political citizenship. Who fly where we will, empowered by passports, visas, and airline tickets. The brutal roots of our predominance are safely contained within the pages of history books, though in truth we trade on it with every unencumbered transit through international space. We know nothing about borders: we are keen to extend a beneficent hand to the immigrant; to welcome her into the cities; to live and let live. Let her work to nanny our children; let her live wherever it is that these people manage to reside. They make a positive impact, we argue. We have no quarrel with them. As Karatavuk observes: our quarrels with other winged birds are very small.
Born too late to have a voice in South Africa’s transformation to non-racial democracy, I reached the age of majority unable to disavow the brutal history that gave me my ‘wings’. I dedicated myself to the transformation of rights in my country, and to the cause of social inclusion. I became a migrant rights researcher and lobbyist, fighting inflammatory political rhetoric about the impacts of migration; the exclusion of African migrants from services; their harassment by police; and their mistreatment in the refugee reception system and in immigration detention. It seemed obvious that their exclusion was arbitrary and unconstitutional in a country where most provisions of the Bill of Rights apply unconditionally to “all.”

On 11 May 2008, a collective expulsion of foreign nationals began in a notoriously unstable municipal ward in the township of Alexandra, near Sandton, South Africa’s economic centre. As the month wore on, attacks by ‘black’ South Africans on their African neighbours from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and beyond followed in over 100 sites across the country, killing 62 people and displacing estimates of up to 200,000. As the South African government deployed the army to restore order for the first time in its democratic history, tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans were accommodated in temporary shelter camps erected by the state and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A frenzy of activity to meet the humanitarian needs of victims and to annihilate the scourge of ‘xenophobia’ was unleashed.

I was swept along with the currents of liberal-cosmopolitan outrage and condemnation emanating from my colleagues and peers – many of them from major states of the developed world. But I am South African, and for me the events – and with them, the emergence of a new ‘us’ and ‘them’ as scholars, researchers and journalists condemned the attacks and politicians declared the perpetrators unworthy of citizenship – unearthed a plethora of questions about the materiality of democratic politics and citizenship. The answers to these questions could not be articulated in terms of the national:non-national distinction implicit in the moral panic over ‘xenophobia’; nor in the defensive redrawing of the boundaries of citizenship to exclude perpetrators from the public realm. Indeed, the questions themselves addressed the very unity of the South African ‘nation’ and the challenge this apparent disunity posed to the life of the public realm.

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2 In a similar way to terms capturing racial categories, I place the concept of ‘xenophobia’ and etymologically related terms in quotation marks to acknowledge that the qualities that this term confers upon certain attitudes, acts and practices should not be accepted at face value. For instance, the term ‘phobia’ has psychological resonances that seat such attitudes and behaviours in the individual psyche (De Genova, 2008, p. 46), thus naturalizing and depoliticizing them. This chapter will demonstrate my commitment to a political reading of ‘xenophobic’ practices.
Having lived through the process of struggle and deliberation that forged a democratic community of shared destiny out of apartheid's "us" and "them", this new spectacle of violence and its forceful repression by the state recalled the spectres of a history of state violence ranged against the insurgent citizenship claims of 'black' South Africans: a very personal, parochial history of bomb evacuation drills at school; stockpiles of tinned food amassed by parents in fear of civil war; evening news reports of assassinations by the special forces; of massacres in villages and churches by political militias. The relationship between violence and the struggle for political life cannot be easily forgotten.

But equally, I lived through our reformulation as equal citizens of the 'rainbow nation' – a facile metaphor, but still a signifier of our collective waiting in hope for the wounds of history to heal; for a bridge to hold across the chasm of horrors between 'white' and 'black'. With so much to divide it, the unity of the South African political community had necessarily to be centred on the country's liberal constitution and Bill of Rights. But a profound disjuncture was revealed between Constitutional values and the values of communities who attacked their immigrant neighbours. Among the founding provisions of the Constitution are "equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms"; yet the actions of those communities clearly violated the human rights and freedoms of African immigrants. The Constitution recognizes the injustices of the past and the need for racial equality, yet in a country where social divisions have historically run along racial lines, 'black' South Africans were evidently turning against their 'black' African neighbours. The Constitution honours those who "suffered for justice and freedom." Why then would the beneficiaries of the political struggle in South Africa turn around and abuse those whose countries of origin gave asylum to South African freedom fighters during apartheid?

These are just a few of the lacunae the attacks presented to the possibility of shared political values and faith in the Constitution as a bastion of meaningful political compromise. If the good society must be one based on “shared moral values that the members affirm” (Etzioni 2000: 193), how were we to bridge the chasm between ‘we’ liberal cosmopolitans in the universities, newspapers, and higher echelons of government, and ‘them’ – the perpetrators stigmatizing and victimizing their immigrant neighbours in a manner incommensurable with ‘our’ country’s lauded constitution? To draw on Hannah Arendt, what were we to conclude about the public realm when the words of the Bill of Rights parted company with the deeds of citizens; where brutal deeds signalled the vacuity of rosy principles of fundamental human rights (Arendt, 1959, pp. 178-179)? And while the deployment of the national defence force in
affected communities might prevent further bloodshed, what hope of a good society of shared values when so many marginal communities had to be forced into submission to those values by military force?

My purpose in writing this thesis is to take the first step in answering this question, by seeking out the political meaning of collective mobilizations that rupture the membrane of deliberated liberal democratic values. I am interested in how the political subjectivities that produce these transgressions can test and stretch our understanding of power, citizenship and political community. Focusing on the sub-national territories strongly associated with ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa, my findings challenge the often implicit assumption that all birds have wings: that citizenship is an attribute conveyed by legal statute. I show instead that materiality of citizenship varies along spatial, temporal and biopolitical dimensions, which serve as vectors for variance in political subjectivity and values.

In Chapter 1, I reproduce for the reader my own journey through the fitful knowledge produced in the wake of the May 2008 attacks, which brought me step by step to my current investigation of the particularities of squatter citizenship. I demonstrate how a focus on the interface between citizen and foreigner produced a reifying emphasis on the nation-state boundary while effacing the boundary between de jure and de facto citizenship within the category of national citizens, producing a reductive reading of the attacks as an exclusion of powerless outsiders by South Africans possessing the power resource of citizenship and utilizing it as a tool of exclusion. I draw on studies that emphasize local history and spatial variation in the attacks to decentre this aggregate view of political identity and illustrate the richer political account and novel forms of theoretical engagement made possible by an emphasis on the local. I identify the historically marginalized space of the squatter camp as a key locality for the outbreak of such attacks, and a potential site for the local exploration of unorthodox political subjectivities that emerge out of spatial and historical particularities.

Chapter 2 provides an account of how a materialist theory of political identity shaped my methodological gaze and led me toward a mix of methods including secondary and archival data, documentary analysis, and ethnographic field research. It is a research design that makes for productive encounters between a variety of actors and forces, and takes account of the substantive effects of various institutional scales from the national to the local level. My dissatisfaction with the depoliticizing and aggregating currents in the literature convinced me that a robust excavation of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization would require a genealogy of the informal settlement from apartheid through the first decades of democracy. This component
would function not as an historical backdrop to the study, but as the foundation of an historical explanation that would facilitate a move from ethnicity-based explanations and towards a political account of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization. Hence, I drew on archival material to trace the national and provincial forces that shaped the meaning and practice of squatting, before exploring the richness and theoretical potential of the local through a double embedded case study of two parts of a single informal settlement called Mshongo, which lies on the southern boundary of the township of Atteridgeville in Tshwane, Gauteng. The first, Jeffsville, was occupied in 1991, before the advent of democracy and its promise of an equal citizenship, while Brazzaville, the second, was occupied in 1998, four years into the new political dispensation. Similarities and differences, connections and disconnections across the two sites increased variation across a number of variables, providing a resource for triangulation, and making for more robust findings.

Chapters 3 and 4 draw on literature, documentary sources and archival material to construct a genealogy of the larger historical and institutional context that has substantively shaped squatter citizenship and mobilization both politically and materially. I explore spatial strategies which state institutions have deployed in attempts to consolidate or dismantle stratification, and the way in which issues of time and space shape citizenship claims as a result. In Chapter 3, I explore national spatial strategies of rule, which in the process of producing squatters as unequal citizens produced forms of resistance that played an important role in dismantling the apartheid state. Chapter 4 focuses specifically on the challenge presented by ‘squatter camps’, and how the law came to shift its exclusionary focus from the ‘black’ body in general to the squatter body in particular, through provisions for containment and repression. Yet contradictions within the embodied state led to these provisions being used selectively at provincial level for the purpose of inclusion of urban ‘blacks’, contradictorily turning squatting into a mechanism of transition. This helped shape squatting as a practice both hopeful and defiant.

The next three chapters draw on ethnographic fieldwork in Jeffsville and Brazzaville, Mshongo, to illustrate how these institutionally shaped spatial and temporal processes of stratification have played out at the local level over time. First, I was interested in how the context of historical stratification shaped active citizenship claims in Jeffsville and Brazzaville, before and after democracy. I discovered that novel institutional structures, forms of political membership and regimes of regulation/governance, developed as a result of spatial and political inequalities, and scale contradictions in the production of national membership. In Chapter 5, I
explore these findings, emphasizing the role of collective action and insurgency in the making of these settlements as sites for the pursuit of equal citizenship. The theme of transition also reasserts itself as I explore narratives of entitlement in contention between Jeffsville and Brazzaville over an opportunity for formal inclusion.

The focus on active citizenship led me to the question of how far squatters in Jeffsville and Brazzaville have, in the interim, progressed in their attempts to secure equal rights of citizenship. As discussed in Chapter 6, I found that the spatial and temporal conditions of the squatter camp in contemporary, democratic South Africa has transformed them from a place of transition to equal citizenship, to a static and apparently permanent ‘threshold space’ neither inside nor outside citizenship, whose interstitial geography, temporality and institutional structure continues to produce only a threshold form of (infra-)citizenship.

In the process of analysing the ethnographic data, it became evident that, to at least some extent, anti-foreigner mobilizations were enmeshed with the spatial and temporal particularities of the squatter camp and the threshold form of citizenship it has produced in recent years. Chapter 7 illustrates how the entrance of newcomers impacted on the contestation of infra-citizenship in the squatter camp, and how certain economic and political practices by newcomers became vivid transgressions of communal solidarity and threats to the insurgent imaginary. It also sketches local parameters of the larger imagined community of citizens, in light of which exclusionary practices appear to be informed not by fear/ phobia or hate, but by a clear political logic.

In the concluding chapter, I consider how this study's insistence on spatial, temporal and biopolitical variations in the materiality of citizenship helps to explain aspects of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization that accounts based on race, elite chauvinism or local instrumentality do not. I discuss the broader implications of these findings, emphasizing the way in which exclusionary mobilization may express a claim for inclusion by the historically marginalized, based on narratives of anteriority that differ markedly from conventional understandings of autochthony or nativism. I consider the implications the findings for critical scholarship on subaltern urban politics, and on broader accounts of biopolitics. Finally, I discuss the challenges of bringing together the contradictory temporalities and spatialities of struggles for universal human rights and national struggles for equal citizenship, calling for a methodological cosmopolitanism that admits the deterritorializing impacts of global flows without underplaying the still resolutely territorial struggles for equal citizenship – the struggles particular to the ‘birds without wings’.
Chapter 1: 'Xenophobic' violence and informal settlement in South Africa

Less than half an hour from OR Tambo international airport, squatters are watching their homes being torn down and burned in the shack settlement of Makausi, east of Johannesburg, South Africa. Just decades ago, these might have been ‘black’ South Africans witnessing a police eviction of squatters under apartheid’s Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act – a tool to rid the city of ‘surplus’ urban ‘blacks’. But it is Sunday, 18 May 2008, and these are ‘black’ South Africans displacing their sub-Saharan African neighbours. What could explain this strange inversion? In this chapter, I outline the explanations scholars have provided for contemporary ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa, and explain the contribution I hope to make in providing an historical, theoretical and ethnographic account of the politics of citizenship in squatter settlements and producing a political reading of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in relation to it.

1.1. Grappling with the unthinkable: A critical review of knowledge production

Let us return to Sunday, 18 May 2008. Police hover feebly around the edge of the Makausi informal settlement, firing rubber bullets and ducking to evade flying rocks and petrol bombs. They say it is too dangerous to enter the settlement and do a body count. In a settlement further east, community members in the shack settlement of Ramaphosa bludgeon a Mozambican immigrant, pour fuel over his body and set him alight. He is still alive, but the police don’t know how to douse the flames. When they finally do, the man is on all fours, a charred shape barely recognisable as human. Photographers capture the pitiable image of his dying body coated in white powder. To the West, in Zandspruit, where at 7am residents had gathered to stone a man at the local sports field, police are dodging bricks hurled by civilians. The chaos intensifies as the day wears on and the attackers loot taverns, fuelling the violence with alcohol. In the old CBD of central Johannesburg, police at their wits’ end try to disperse a crowd using the blades of a low-flying helicopter.

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3 I choose to place racial categories in quotation marks to render their descriptive function problematic. Terms such as ‘black’ and ‘white’ are entangled in the historical processes of racialisation and even where intended to refer neutrally to a population demographic, are haunted by historical linkages made between physical attributes and supposedly analogous cultural, religious and civilizational characteristics.
These were the events still unfolding exactly a week after collective ‘xenophobic’ violence broke out in a notoriously unstable municipal ward in Alexandra, near Sandton, South Africa’s economic centre, on 11 May 2008 (see Figure 1). Attacks on foreigners followed in a succession of other townships and city centres across the country, resulting in the most widespread and calamitous period of anti-foreigner violence the country has seen. To end the crisis, the South African government deployed the army to restore order for the first time in its democratic history. Tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans, including some South Africans, were accommodated in tents in temporary shelter camps erected by the state. Tens of thousands more fled back to their countries of origin. Although the reported death toll of 62 was comparatively low, the destruction of life, property, livelihoods and social bonds in South Africa was catastrophic (Igglesden, Monson, & Polzer, 2009; Misago, Landau, & Monson, 2009; Monson & Arian, 2012).

**Figure 1: Map of ‘xenophobic’ incidents in Gauteng Province**

![Map of ‘xenophobic’ incidents in Gauteng Province between 10 and 20 May 2008 (adapted from Bekker, Eigelaar-Meets, & Eva, 2009, p. 10)](image)

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4 In a similar way to terms capturing racial categories, I place the concept of ‘xenophobia’ and etymologically related terms in quotation marks to acknowledge that the qualities that this term confers upon certain attitudes, acts and practices should not be accepted at face value. For instance, the term ‘phobia’ has psychological resonances that seat such attitudes and behaviours in the individual psyche, thus naturalizing and depoliticizing them. This chapter will demonstrate my commitment to a political reading of ‘xenophobic’ practices.
Atrocity was with us each day – in the news on our desks or desktops – and the call to respond both physically and intellectually ever-present. It was a spectre of the tumultuous period of ‘black-on-black’ (Bartholet, 1990, 5 March; Contreras, 1990; Hoagland, 1987) political violence that led up to the country’s first democratic elections. A reminder of apartheid’s repressive policing, with armoured mine-proof Casspir vehicles prowling the streets of poor, ‘black’ residential areas. A sneer at the country’s hopeful liberal-democratic constitution, with its promises of human rights and equality (Albertyn, 2008). A blow to the ideal of South Africa as a ‘rainbow nation’ (Everatt, 2011, p. 8; Worby, Hassim, & Kupe, 2008, p. 3). My project has its somewhat parochial starting point in the struggle of South African scholars to think the unthinkable in South Africa amid the flames, ruin and destitution of May 2008. It is a project with resonance far beyond the immediacy of this particular place and case, to the struggle of scholars across the globe to make sense of seemingly ‘senseless’ violence. As Mahmood Mamdani points out in his study of the Rwandan genocide, making popular violence thinkable is important “not because of what it can tell us of Rwanda and Rwandans, but because of what it can tell us about ourselves as political beings” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 18).

As we struggled merely to apprehend the unprecedented scale and intensity of this course of events, and its significance for our conceptual tools, the victims, government departments and civil society bodies, and our own consciences, called upon us to respond – urgently; immediately. The effort to produce knowledge in this unstable context produced an initial “frenzy” (Nieftagodien, 2011, p. 109) of unsatisfying and non-empirical sociological readings, both lay and scholarly. It was as if in our hurry to make sense of the attacks we were compulsively reproducing comforting conceptual territories without regard for their actual explanatory power. It is perhaps a consequence of a breakdown in reflexivity that, according to Kalyvas (2009, p. 33), can be attributed to our focus on the most extreme and brutal elements of the violence (Žižek, 2008, p. 5). We hesitate to allow thought to venture too far into the sacred horror of atrocity: as Everatt observes, “dithering and bickering” over the causes of the attacks seemed “rather academic in the face of the murder, rape, injury, theft and displacement that resulted” (Everatt, 2011, p. 11).

Seven years later, as I write up this thesis, the mystifying quality of the 2008 violence continues to inhibit sociological thinking. I will focus below on three main tendencies in the literature: the view of violence as an effect of individual pathology, criminality or opportunism; as an effect of aggregated structural factors; or as an effect of elite discourse or manipulation.
All fail to deal with the full complexity of collective violence as a social phenomenon, and specifically to provide an adequate account of social mobilization and agency.

1.1.1. Individual pathology

There is a long history of research into ‘xenophobia’ in South Africa. Although ‘xenophobia’ is usually defined as an irrational hatred or fear of outsiders (Chigeza, De Wet, Roos, & Vorster, 2013, p. 501; Jonathan Crush, 2008, p. 15; Steenkamp, 2009, p. 439), in South Africa it has become a portmanteau for any dislike, distrust or antagonism toward foreigners, irrespective of rationale. The attacks in May 2008 were almost immediately dubbed ‘xenophobic’ attacks because of their primary targets. In many cases, scholars continue to use the concept of ‘xenophobic attacks’ without unpacking what it might mean to qualify violence as ‘xenophobic’. Here, we first encounter the depoliticization of anti-outsider violence in a term that becomes so ubiquitous as to become unnoticeable: antagonism toward outsiders becomes, by definition, a ‘phobia’ – a form of psychological pathology in which fear has no adequate referent. By definition, such antagonisms are depicted as irrational, “imaginary”, or “excessive” (Lewis, 1976, p. 21); and in the case of South African ‘xenophobia’ in particular tend to misleadingly brand the participants as "morally or psychologically depraved and politically beyond the pale" (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013, p. 577), or at best as an angry and aimless “lumpenproletariat” (Gibson, 2012, p. 53). The psychological overtones of the term ‘xenophobia’ depoliticize in two ways: seating antagonism towards outsiders within the individual psyche, and reducing the antagonism to an emotional rather than rational response. The uncritical adoption of this term (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013) goes a long way toward explaining the persistence of resolutely apolitical readings of incidents of collective violence that simply cannot be reduced to effects of individual pathology. This explains my use of quote marks to keep the term under erasure throughout this text.

An interesting counter-narrative has ironically had the same depoliticizing effect. Government officials, reluctant to view the violence as a form of prejudice and hatred in a country lauded for its progressive constitutional principles, began labelling the attacks ‘just crime’ (Everatt, 2011; Monson, 2012a; Worby et al., 2008, p. 6) – a matter for police and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to suppress with force. This interpretation conveniently deflects attention from the challenge the attacks presented to state sovereignty (Monson, 2012a); for, as studies of religious radicalisation in North Africa and rioting in India have shown
violent mobilisation can be understood as an expression of “anger toward the state”, even when directed against a particular social group (Basu, 1995, p. 73). It can also express alternative normative frameworks to that of the state (Baker, 2008; Tamahana, 2000). Scholars have been hesitant to accept as an ‘explanation’ the idea of simple criminality, which has been a common assertion by police responding to other episodes of communal anti-foreigner violence before and beyond those of 2008 (Misago, Monson, Polzer, & Landau, 2010, p. 16; Polzer & Takabvirwa, 2010). It is undeniable that criminal opportunism played a role in the attacks, but two factors militate against a reduction of motives to merely criminal ones. First, it leaves open the question of why criminals would choose foreign nationals as their targets. Second, and more importantly, we remain unable to explain the popular nature of mobilization against foreigners unless we are content to assert that entire communities are comprised of ‘criminals’.

It is more likely that the collective nature of participation in expulsions of African foreigners from their communities of residence indicates broader social mechanisms. Popular support indicates some level of social consensus and legitimacy of the attacks in the eyes of local communities – what Daryl Glaser has described as an exercise of popular democracy (Glaser, 2008). In a series of case studies of incidences of collective violence in 2008, I have shown how in some communities the eviction of foreigners was undertaken in an attempt to support the rule of law (Monson, 2012b; also see Steinberg, 2012). Even where an initial phase of deliberate targeting was followed by a second, more ‘criminal’ stage in which community members stole or looted goods from abandoned properties under cover of the general chaos (Coplan, 2009; Human Sciences Research Council, June 2008; IDASA, May 2008; Parliamentary Task Team, 2008; Polzer, 2010), this raises more questions about the sequence and incentive structure of mobilisation, which studies of civil war have shown does not rely only on “ideological conversion in the abstract” (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008, p. 41, citing Goodwin and Skocpol; Kalyvas, 2009, pp. 44-46) and often involves a spiralling of endogenous violence unrelated to the primary causes of a conflict (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 82). Thus, although there is certainly substance to the claim that criminal intent played a role in the attacks, criminality is insufficient as an explanation of the phenomenon of ‘xenophobic’ violence.
1.1.2. Aggregates and abstractions

Certain sociologists and political scientists have highlighted the tendency to attribute the agency in collective violence to aggregate social ills or homogeneous identities and loyalties (Kalyvas, 2009; Malešević, 2010, p. 3). In South Africa, Karl von Holdt has warned against treating ‘xenophobia’ and violence as mere “epiphenomena in relation to the narrative of capitalist accumulation, class domination and class struggle” (Von Holdt, 2011, p. 29). This echoes Malešević’s observation that studies of violence tend to reduce “the highly complex sociological processes involved in organised collective violence” to a matter of scholarly “commonsense” (Malešević, 2010, p. 51).

Among the shortcomings of these approaches – which helpfully highlight forms of structural violence that could potentially provide a political explanation for violent mobilization – is their inability to account for how broad attitudes (such as ‘xenophobia’) or aggregate subjectivities (such as that of ‘the poor’ or of the racial subject traumatized by apartheid) came to manifest as violent social action in the places where attacks occurred. Thus, although the focus on “underlying structural and ideological factors... generally offered cogent and persuasive analyses” that countered weak official deflections (Nieftagodien, 2011, p. 109), they did not produce a convincing sociology of the violence. Neglecting the “social character...politics and...histories” (Nieftagodien, 2011, p. 109) of affected areas, they tend to overgeneralize and oversimplify, both in their treatment of the relevant social identities and in their treatment of the social action through which this contestation manifested as collective violence.

In the review below I consider grievance- and race-based accounts of the violence as instances of over-aggregation and abstraction. In a country in which poverty remains phenotypically 'black', these are both attempts to answer why poor, 'black' communities mobilized against ‘black’ African immigrants. In both cases, the aggregated way in which group identity is cast makes it impossible to account for mobilization. Instead, agency is vested once again within the individual, reducing the collective character of the violence to the news-headline stereotype of the ‘angry mob’ of atomized actors mobilized not by social action but at the individual subjective level by high levels of negative emotion.
Grievances

Grievance-based accounts of the violence focused largely on ‘frustration’ related to poverty, inequality (Gelb, 2008; Pillay, 2008) and perceived competition for resources and opportunities (Amisi, Bond, Cele, & Ngwane, 2011; Human Sciences Research Council, June 2008; IDASA, May 2008; Joubert, 2008; Parliamentary Task Team, 2008). Implicit in these accounts is an echo of Banton’s theory of racial and ethnic competition (Banton, 1983), understood by Miles as competition between class fractions (in Barot & Bird, 2001, p. 608).

From this point of view, the culprit for ‘xenophobic’ mobilization was poorly managed immigration (Bernstein, 2008; Hopstock & De Jager, 2011; Human Sciences Research Council, June 2008; IDASA, May 2008; Joubert, 2008), vividly conjured in the image of a ‘human tsunami’ crossing South Africa’s borders from Zimbabwe in particular, and the South African government’s failure to halt or manage it. Certainly, it is true that unprecedented levels of immigration have been a distinct feature of post-apartheid life. It is only since 1994 that immigration policy has been liberalized; prior to that, even domestic mobility was limited by apartheid’s influx control and (racial) group areas legislation. Political, economic and humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe have undoubtedly accounted for a great deal of migration into South Africa, and some scholars have interpreted ‘xenophobic’ attacks as a form of bottom-up securitisation (Hammerstad, 2012; Monson, 2012b; Steinberg, 2012) in the face of apparent state incapacity. Yet research has found no correlation between ‘xenophobic’ attacks and the highest levels of foreign residence in South African wards (Fauvelle-Aymar & Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2012; Misago et al., 2009), indicating that aggregate immigration levels do not explain the attacks.

In addition to this empirical contradiction, the hardening of insider/outsider boundaries that could be expected given the ostensible competition between ‘locals’ and ‘foreigners’ is not synonymous with violence; as Abdi points out, this literature “rarely distinguishes negative attitudes from violent action” (Abdi, 2011, p. 693). And indeed, case study research has shown that negative evaluations of economic competition between South Africans and foreigners existed across areas unaffected by ‘xenophobic’ violence as well as areas that were affected (Misago et al., 2010, p. 165). Thus, broad grievance-based explanations fail to explain the geographic contingency of collective violence as a response.

A powerful corrective to grievance-based arguments was a subsequent quantitative analysis of the demographic characteristics of affected and non-affected wards in South Africa. The study
found that violence was not associated with the most extreme levels of poverty (Fauvelle-Aymar & Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2012). This resonates with robust comparative research into conflicts worldwide, which has demonstrated the relatively weak role of economic grievances in contrast with the primacy of mobilisation in determining conflict trajectories (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000, p. 577). This calls to mind the debate over the basis of Banton’s theory of racial and ethnic competition in rational choice theory, and the emphasis its critics placed on the importance of recognizing the power dynamics that constrain choice for certain populations (Chivers, 1985, p. 469; Lyon, 1985, p. 477; a more recent critique of rational choice theory in explaining ethnic conflict can be found in Malešević 2002). Answering the question of how anti-outsider mobilisation unfolded in some places and not others given similar profiles of “structural economic stress” and “superexploitation” (Amisi et al., 2011, p. 60), for instance, requires us to probe further into contexts that might shape the choice constraints of particular communities.

Refreshingly, Amisi et al provide a nuanced analysis of the structural and local political economy of ‘xenophobia’, examining several case studies to illustrate, for example, the way in which a “xenophobic consciousness” develops as a “logical result” of a sort of economic rationality that features immigrants driving up rental prices and “exacerbating the underlying condition of scarcity” (Amisi et al., 2011, p. 69). The strongly empirical character and multifaceted analysis differentiates their contribution from the largely non-empirical commentaries that first put forward economic explanations of the 2008 violence. But, like many responses in the wake of the 2008 attacks, Amisi et al conflate anti-foreigner attitudes with practices, producing explanations of the dynamics behind anti-immigrant feeling as if these were sufficient to explain the manifestation of these feelings as collective violence. As Hooker has observed, the political solidarity that results in collective action is not synonymous with emotion; solidarity is possible without affection or liking and thus, dislike of a group does not lead inexorably to mobilisation against that group (Hooker, 2009, pp. 9-10). Numerous studies of conflict in Africa demonstrate the importance of attending to questions of mobilisation in constructing accounts of collective violence (Blanton, Mason, & Athow, 2001; Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000; Cedarman & Girardin, 2007; Eck, 2009; Heilman & Kaiser, 2002; Heribert & Moodley, 1992; Mamdani, 2001; Piombo, 2005), so it is clear that these explanations can tell us little when viewed at an aggregate level, where the social and institutional mechanisms of mobilization in affected areas remain out of view.
Race in the violence

Given the historical politicization of race in South Africa, commentators expressed surprise that ‘black’ South Africans, having found their freedom in South Africa’s constitutional democracy, would choose to victimize their ‘black’ neighbours from other African countries. Several scholars have attempted to deal with this question (Gqola, 2008; Matsinhe, 2009, 2012; Mngxitama, 2008; Tafira, 2011). Generally, they observe the ways in which ‘xenophobic’ attacks appeared to duplicate South Africa’s past practices as a racial state in which ‘black’ identity was denigrated. Labelling the 2008 violence as an instance of “negrophobia”, Gqola, for instance, argues that “race science, apartheid and white supremacy” are at the root of the “categorisation of who belongs to South Africa and who not” (Gqola, 2008, p. 211). She argues that ‘black’ foreigners have been constructed as a disposable population, in line with the “throw-away” ‘black’ populations of apartheid, and hence considers the process an effect of racialization of the foreigner within apartheid’s political identities. Similarly, Tafira (2011) illustrates parallels between the subjection of foreigners today and the subjection of ‘black’ people under apartheid. Yet although he designates this phenomenon “the New Racism” (Tafira, 2011, p. 114) he is unable to show convincingly how phenotypical difference lies at the foundation of this subjection. Though he claims African foreigners have been ‘racialized’, he does not explain the racialization process or consider the merits of the concept of ‘xenoracism’ developed in analyses of Europe (Cole, 2004, 2009; Fekete, 2001), or the distinct conceptual framework of autochthony developed in analyses of conflict in Africa (Espeland, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Marshall-Fratani, 2006), or other alternative conceptual frameworks consistent with his findings (Silverstein, 2005). This is disappointing, since the literature on conflict in Africa provides many convincing and substantive analyses of the role of race, ethnicity and local identity in anti-outsider mobilisation on the continent (for instance Mamdani, 2001; Muzondidya, 2007; Tadjo, 2008).

One of the pitfalls of analysing issues of race and ethnicity is the potential to conceptually reify racial or ethnic groups in the process (Rogers Brubaker, 2002, p. 164;166), and thus exaggerate the importance attached to phenotypical difference in relation to the various other divisions of identity (Banton, 2005, p. 472) and structures of discrimination (Barot & Bird, 2001, p. 610) that characterize contemporary society. It is important to recognize the “multiple axes of differentiation” – not just in race, ethnicity or place of origin but in migration channel, legal status, and locality (Vertovec, 2007, p. 1049) – that impact on social processes. Even where mobilization has an ethnic or racial character, it should be distinguished from motivation (Eck,
2009). It appears to me that, in this context, existing claims about the racial basis of ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa conflate coincidence with cause. Noticing the correlation between victimization and the racial origin of migrants, the authors fail to consider covariates of the correlation and treat blackness/Africanness as the independent variable in a causal relationship. Matsinhe’s recent qualitative work is an example of this tendency (Matsinhe, 2012). In characterizing ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa as indicative of ‘black’ South Africans’ fear of ‘themselves’ (that is, ‘black’ Africans), he neglects to consider key empirical realities such as the high proportion of ‘black’ African migration in relation to other migrant groups, the predominantly irregular or humanitarian nature of ‘black’ African migration, and the average economic profile of white and ‘black’ immigrants (and citizens) respectively. Most importantly, he overlooks the spatial distribution of different migrant groups across South Africa’s still racialized national space (Abdi, 2011, p. 693) – the fact that poor, black, unemployed immigrants live in areas populated by poor, black, unemployed South Africans, and even more fundamentally that generally there are no white immigrants (indeed, usually no white residents at all) in the areas where ‘xenophobic’ violence occurs. There is no racial variation in immigration as it appears in most affected communities, and therefore no indication of whether attacks manifested antagonism toward ‘black’ Africans as a racial group.

The question of why subalterns ‘turn against each other’, so to speak, is not a unique puzzle – compare, for instance, the question of inter-ethnic violence between youths of migrant heritage in the United Kingdom (Asthana & Townsend, 2006; Edwardes, 2004). What we should learn from the apparent contradiction of exclusionary practices within marginal social groups is the need to interrogate the aggregated and reductive way in which we conceptualize these groups, and to consider ways of reorienting our understanding of the parties in conflict through close attention to the particularities that distinguish contexts in which anti-outsider mobilization occurs. This lesson for our conceptual frameworks goes beyond the case of South African ‘xenophobic’ violence examined in this thesis, to problematize the use of aggregated identities to analyse the motivations for violence further afield: for instance, religious identities in episodes of communal violence in India, ethnic identities in conflicts elsewhere in Africa, or racial identities in Europe. Religious and ethnic networks and markers can also play an important role in mobilization processes independently of religious or ethnic motivations – for instance by making individuals more easily identifiable

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5 South Africa stood as the number one recipient of asylum seekers worldwide from 2005 through 2011, due largely to socio-political crisis in Zimbabwe (UNHCR, 2011, p. 88).
for recruitment (Eck, 2009, p. 372) or contributing to group coherence among parties in conflict (Bonneuil & Auriat, 2000, p. 575).

1.1.3. Elite discourse

Discussions of the subjective construction of national belonging that animates ‘xenophobia’ have begun to emerge, claiming that ‘xenophobia’ is a symptom of a ‘new nationalism’ (Kersting, 2009, p. 10; Landau & Freemantle, 2009, p. 380) or new national subjectivity (Hayem, 2013). Kersting suggests that ‘xenophobia’ is a new form of nationalism directed at foreigners rather than at colonial powers; a turn to “internal othering” rather than a focus on an “external enemy”; and a contingent phenomenon which “could have been prevented” (Kersting, 2009, p. 16;17) were it not for immigration policies, police corruption and media stereotyping of foreigners. His account illustrates two problems in the literature: a flawed notion of the novelty of the distinction between citizen and non-citizen; and a top-down perspective that implicitly denies popular agency.

First: the distinction he makes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of nationalism is misleading. It overlooks the supra-structural conditions under which territorial political communities are established in the global system of states. This presents as exceptional the notion that citizens should be the primary concern of the state, when in fact it has equally been argued that citizenship is by definition a form of social closure (Wimmer, 1997, p. 28). In a similar misreading, Mosselson claims that extra-legal practices in officials’ dealings with foreigners in South Africa have “established non-nationals as being outside the political community” (Mosselson, 2010). This is a surprising claim, because the legal order itself places non-nationals outside the political community. A non-national cannot vote in South Africa until they fulfil the legal requirements for citizenship – the bounds of political membership could not be more clearly circumscribed. Even more broadly, such boundaries are fundamental to geopolitics and to the content of citizenship. It is useful to recall that states’ attempts to monopolize the legitimate means of movement have gone hand in hand with their monopolization of the legitimate means of violence (Torpey, 1998, p. 240) in the development of the modern state as a simultaneously “sheltering and dominating” (Torpey, 1998, p. 241) structure, making the control of mobility and of state membership central operations in the realization of political community. If ethnic or civic nationalism are understood as a subjectively constructed ‘sense’ of belonging (Kersting, 2009), convictions about who is or should be a member of the polity go...
beyond this, as they have a structural character that is inseparable from the territorialization of political community across the globe. As Mukherji asserts in his analysis of the civic-secular basis of the Indian nation-state: “There can be no state without its being a nation, and no nation exists until it has carved out a state for itself” (Mukherji, 2010, p. 18). A state “cannot exist devoid of any ‘sentiments’ attached to it at some level if it has to exercise the ‘legitimate’ use of force, engage in governance, provide social and political security to its citizens, and so on” (Mukherji, 2010, p. 21). Political identity as we know it is intimately tied to the meaning and boundaries of citizenship, so that concerns about civic belonging are neither new nor exceptional. Hayem’s (2013) claim that the attacks embody a shift to a particularistic conception of citizenship can be critiqued on the same basis.

Second, Kersting’s top-down view of the construction of the ‘new nationalism’ places excessive emphasis on the power of elites and institutions. Like several other studies, which emphasize the role of South African elites at the macro-level in shaping a national discourse of ‘xenophobia’ (Klotz, 2012; Neocosmos, 2008; Sharp, 2008), Kersting’s analysis fails to acknowledge that participation and initiative can also come from below (Mamdani, 2001, p. 8). The same approach is often taken with regard to elite manipulations of ethnic and national identity elsewhere in Africa (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Whitaker, 2005). These are useful indicators of the discourse of fear within which immigration is embedded, and the contribution politicians and officials make to public perceptions of foreigners as a threatening and unmanageable presence. Yet their macro-perspective may exaggerate the power of elite discourses to construct popular sentiment, when more focused empirical work has concluded that order “is not only imposed from above, but shaped and established from below” (Von Holdt, 2013, p. 127, see also Monson 2012, Landau and Misago 2009). The same applies to the regulation of that order (Hammerstad, 2012; Monson, 2012b). Once again, this observation can be applied more broadly: political elites have indeed played a role in manipulating or sustaining resentments and violence in numerous cases from Bosnia to Sri Lanka (De Juan, 2008), but these are too easily viewed in a top-down manner (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 43), without accounting for “the interests and dynamics at the grassroots level of society” (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 693).

The three lenses I have examined – those of the pathological individual, the aggregated social problem, and the impact of elite discourses and practices – exhibit shortfalls in their representation of power and agency in mobilization against foreigners. None is able to illuminate the mechanics through which negative sentiments transform into collective social
action. In the next section, I demonstrate how studies that disaggregate the national territory or explore the local level provide a more useful basis for the present study, which explicitly seeks a more political account of popular ‘xenophobic’ mobilization.

1.2. Towards a deeper perspective

The poverty of the accounts discussed thus far is to a large extent located in the remote, birdseye view they adopt, which misses the richer empirical insights that could be garnered by attending to variation. In his impressive study of civil war violence, Kalyvas insists that “incorporating the local dimension... almost always uncovers the plurality and lack of uniformity of civil war experiences and outcomes... thus introducing variation that makes empirical investigation both possible and fruitful” (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 44). Comparative studies of the localities where violence does or does not occur is one way of complicating and testing aggregated accounts of the causes of violence (Varshney, 1997, p. 2) – at the risk of producing other problematic forms of generalization (Wilkinson, 2013, p. 104). Another is through the method of the local case study, which makes room for the exploration of the micro-level dynamics that are inseparable from any credible theoretical and empirical study of collective violence (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 391). In this section, I consider the literature that has emerged to complicate top-down, aggregating accounts of ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa.

Varshney has argued that it is difficult to distinguish ‘facts’ from ‘representations’ if we study only those places “where the communal fire has broken out,” and not the places “where it never does or, if it does, is extinguished quickly” (Varshney, 1997, p. 2). I participated in just such a study, led by Jean-Pierre Misago, in the wake of the 2008 attacks in South Africa. This qualitative, multi-site comparative case study of localities where violence unfolded or was quelled (Misago, 2012; Misago et al., 2010; Misago, 2009 #164) remains the largest and most empirically robust qualitative study of the causes of the attacks yet undertaken. The study investigated popular claims about the root causes and triggers of attacks and found that they could not explain why violence occurred in some places and not others, as supposedly causal variables such as poverty, deprivation, diversity and anti-foreigner sentiments appeared constant across affected and unaffected areas. The study claimed that the nature of local leadership was the differentiating factor among localities conditioned for violence by high crime levels, impunity and the relative absence of the state. Specifically, we concluded that violence against foreigners had been organized by local actors – often ‘self-proclaimed leaders’
– whose political or material interests had been served by mobilizing residents against outsiders (Misago et al., 2009, p. 2-3).

The study led by Misago (2009), echoing Brass’s rejection of moncausal explanations and emphasis on the actors who incite violence in India (Brass, 2003), was crucial in bringing agency to the forefront of our understanding of South African ‘xenophobic’ violence. Yet in subsequent field engagements I grew dissatisfied with our emphasis on local elites and their instrumental use of the violence. The breadth of the comparative approach did not provide the depth to meaningfully analyse popular agency in the attacks – a crucial aspect of explaining mass violence, since instigators cannot succeed without support from below (Mamdani, 2001, p. 8). As a result, our work seemed inadvertently to support the problematic “assumption that elites are highly strategic, if not implausibly cunning, while masses are non-strategic and easily manipulated,” and overlook “basic and important questions about why ordinary people participate in such risky collective action” (Scacco, 2008, pp. 5, see also Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p.2693). Revisiting some of our original data with a fine-tooth comb did not allow me to answer questions of popular mobilization in sufficient detail (Monson, 2012b), and this was what drew me to design a new study and seek fresh field data for the PhD research presented in this thesis.

Misago et al's (2009) study explained how the attacks served leaders' agendas without a correspondingly detailed explanation of what motivated people to participate in or acquiesce to the leaders' agendas. It remained unclear whether the 'local communities' in affected areas were co-conspirators with their leaders and whether popular participation indicated general consensus about the legitimacy of attacks on foreigners, or was an initiative of partisan groups within the community, or simply banditry by criminal elements led by identifiable community members. Were communities manipulated, or were the attacks a manifestation of popular democracy, as Daryl Glaser suggested (Glaser, 2008)? Studies in North and East Africa suggest that people do not blindly follow manipulative elites, but may genuinely be motivated by elements of the local context that leaders might ignite for instrumental purposes (Githens-Mazer, 2009). Indeed, the choices local elites make may also be constrained by popular and structural pressures (F. Robinson, 2005, pp. 9-10). Nevertheless, the study highlighted the ways in which micro-level politics and institutions varied across space, explaining variance in the fate of neighbouring zones of the same residential area. In a secondary analysis of three of the original case studies, I subsequently demonstrated that forms of authority and regulation also varied across affected areas, along a continuum from formal to informal (Monson, 2012b).
I argued that in extreme cases, affected areas could be virtually autonomous territorial polities in their own right, policing the borders of micro-territories according to informal rules. Yet neither study provided the sociological depth to understand how certain sites had developed both the informal institutions and informal discourses of belonging that appeared to have provided the mechanism and fuel respectively to set popular violence in motion.

A crucial clue to the opaque question of popular mobilization in the attacks arose out of another comparative study of spatial variation in the incidence of violence: the highly robust quantitative analysis of affected and unaffected wards of South Africa, carried out by Christine Fauvelle-Aymar and Aurelia Segatti (2012). Significantly, this study found that there was no significant statistical association between the occurrence of violence and the greatest levels of poverty, deprivation, or immigrant population in electoral wards in South Africa. This provided statistical support for some of the conclusions drawn by Misago et al's (2009) qualitative study: that violence was not a knee-jerk reaction to poverty or diversity. More crucial for my purposes, however, was the finding that one of the variables most strongly associated with the occurrence of violence in a ward were high levels of informal residence. In South Africa, informal residence is synonymous with ‘squatters’ who reside in makeshift homes, referred to variously as shacks, shanties, pondoks, mkhukhu or mjondolo. These may occur in the backyards of formal properties in South African townships, but are concentrated in distinct informal settlements or ‘squatter camps’, which often border townships. Squatter camps consist entirely of unauthorized and overwhelmingly informal dwellings – at the time of the 2011 census, 1.25 million people were recorded as residing in informal structures not in a backyard (Statistics South Africa, 2011 - using 10% sample with weighting applied) – 8.6% of the populations versus 4.9% living in backyard informal housing. Therefore, it becomes reasonable to deduce from Fauvelle-Aymar & Segatti’s study that there is a significant association between ‘xenophobic’ violence and informal settlements in South Africa.

On one hand, this appears as a truism, since it was evident, for instance in news coverage, that most attacks occurred in informal areas (Steinberg, 2012, p. 356), but often they were glossed more as a “township” phenomenon – evidence of a failure to disaggregate the spatial characteristics of areas of ‘black’ residence. On the other, recognizing the distinctiveness of the squatter camp only in terms of its developmental disadvantage (seeing it as a proxy for housing grievances as in Fauvelle-Aymar & Segatti’s study, or for concentrated unemployment,

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6 Some scholars avoid this term due to its association with stigmatization and oppression of shackdwellers under apartheid. I use it because it captures the historical contouring of shackdweller agency through precisely those state mechanisms intended to repress and negate it. Respondents continued to use the term in the field in 2012 – especially when talking about Mshongo’s history and meaning.
as in Steinberg’s), meant the association could easily be co-opted to support simplistic causal accounts based on aggregated economic and resource-competition.

What remained to be asked was the question of whether the significance of the variable of informal residence went beyond demographic characteristics to the kinds of history and politics common to many informal settlements in the country. The association between informal residence and the occurrence of ‘xenophobic’ violence would gain in sociological importance if it could be shown to tie a very specific set of economic and demographic characteristics (poor; ‘black’) together with a set of historical and political ones, in line with Pithouse’s recent call to recognize the shack settlement as a site of political agency (2014). Two further studies, which delved deeper into the issues of history and political community that bear on ‘xenophobic’ violence, led me to a review of the political history of informal settlements in South Africa, with a view to discovering historico-political dimensions of the variable of informal residence.

There have not yet been many in-depth studies of the historical context of ‘xenophobic’ attacks in South Africa, but the value of historicization is evident in an historically nuanced case study by Nieftagodien (2008, 2011). He took a magnifying glass to the history of Alexandra township, where the May 2008 attacks first broke out, tracing the history of insider/outsider politics back to the notion of a ‘bona fide’ resident of the township, and linking ‘xenophobia’ to a double-edged mechanism of autochthony that refers both to local and national belonging. The study is particularly helpful in demonstrating the contingency of ‘xenophobic’ violence, and the fact that its roots are not “ineluctable” but dependent on “patterns of pressure, opportunity, incentive and lived experience that render some ways of seeing and acting more probable than others” (Glaser 2008: p56). The success of this approach in mining the significance of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization highlights the importance of a genealogical approach to the past – history not for history’s sake but as a means of comprehending social relations in the present. The study also contributes to our growing sense of the salience of the local scale to our understanding of the meaning of insider and outsider in affected communities. However, Nieftagodien’s case is in its very nature parochial, and does not reflect on what insights we might draw from this case to inform our theoretical and empirical exploration of other sites of violence.

More helpful in this respect is Von Holdt et al’s report linking protest and ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa through the theme of insurgent citizenship (Von Holdt et al., 2011). I have found the concept of insurgent citizenship – originating in Holston’s study of Brazilian
democracy (Holston, 2008) – particularly illuminating in the quest for a political account of the 2008 violence, because it concerns unauthorized platforms and practices of counter-politics that arise out of historical inequalities in citizenship. Von Holdt et al do not recognize the association between ‘xenophobic’ violence and informal residence in their analysis, but their perspective on the common political underpinnings of different types of violence in South Africa is nevertheless helpful. I felt it was important to consider this perspective in light of a broader literature on social movements and contentious politics in South Africa, in which squatter settlements feature strongly (Chance, 2011; Desai & Pithouse, 2004; Selmeczi, 2012). In juxtaposing these bodies of work, I became keenly interested in the politics of informal residential areas, and the ways in which it can be explained by South Africa’s history of racialized spaces and a crude, structural differentiation of citizenship at once racial and territorial. This would inspire my attempt in this thesis to construct a political explanation for ‘xenophobic’ violence out of an historical account of apartheid policies, laws and practices, stitched together with an ethnographic study of a particular locality.

Studies on communal violence in India and Africa emphasize the role played by local networks and local politics in determining the character of collective mobilization (Froystad, 2009; Scacco, 2008; Varshney, 1997; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2004), and studies of South African settlements where violence against foreigners was avoided have similarly gestured toward the importance of “place-based identity” (Kirshner, 2012, p. 1321) and the politics and norms of belonging within a particular locale (Scott, 2013, p. 532). Clearly, these are historically embedded phenomena. In the section that follows, I discuss the long but now largely overlooked history of squatter insurgency to suggest that these areas offer a rich new scale for the analysis of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization.

1.3. A new lens: the politics of informal settlements

The review of literature above has followed three key trajectories in emerging accounts of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in South Africa: a move towards probing the 1) geography, 2) history and 3) stratified politics of citizenship underlying the attacks. These movements bring us closer to the synthesis of history, geography and politics that is crucial to any attempt at making popular agency in mass violence thinkable (Mamdani, 2001, p. 8), laying a course with potential to move us beyond reductive aggregate notions of violent mobilization against outsiders as a clash between national citizens located in the centre of structural power, and
foreigners located on its margins. Through this synthesis, I define in this section a new lens for the exploration of ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa, arguing that the particular history, geography and politics of informal settlements may offer important insights into popular ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa. This is not only because settlements are strongly associated with the incidence of violence against foreigners, but, more qualitatively, because they bring together a specific set of demographic, historical and political characteristics with the potential to produce common interests and agendas, as well as the social and institutional infrastructure for mobilization. In this section I show how informal settlements in South Africa have been depoliticized by an overemphasis on their developmental features, and recall to the reader an older South African literature that explored the distinct origins and politics of squatter movements, suggesting a long history of insurgent citizenship in these sites. In so doing, I build an argument that informal settlements have a distinct place in the political topography of the South African state, which may shed light on the political identities, institutions and practices underlying violent ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in South Africa.

1.3.1. Developmental discourse and the depoliticization of squatter settlements

Informal settlements are “those settlements of the urban poor that have developed through unauthorized occupation of land” (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006, p. 3). They may result from gradual settlement over time or emerge “literally overnight as a result of a large-scale planned invasion” (Obudho & Mhlanga, 1988, p. 10). Informal settlements are a common form of slum on the African continent: residential areas with little or no road system or basic utility infrastructure, in which “insubstantial” (Obudho & Mhlanga, 1988, p. 8) dwellings are constructed out of waste materials such as wood, sacking or corrugated iron sheets. Much of the literature on informal settlements frames them as simply an insistent developmental problem, to be solved through state provision of public housing. They are often read as a marker of lack – lack of proper housing, lack of services, lack of infrastructure, lack of jobs, lack of regulation, and so on (Jenkins, 2006, p. 85; Martin & Mathema, 2006, p. 126). For instance, in South Africa they have been referred to in the past as a “black belt” of disease, vice and crime (Maylam, 1983, pp. 414; 415-416), and a “septic fringe” (Minnaar, 1992, p. 27). Today they are often characterized in terms of lack of food security (Oldewage-Theron & Kruger, 2011), housing (Del Mistro & Hensher, 2009), sanitation (Allison, 2002), and health (Vearey, 2011). Of course, these claims have validity: informal settlements are a site of major disadvantage: over half of households in informal settlements have no electricity or piped
water on their property (Housing Development Agency, 2012, p. 34); 80% of squatters have not completed secondary education (Housing Development Agency, 2012, p. 51), and unemployment is 7% higher than the national average, at 32% (Housing Development Agency, 2012, p. 39). In 2012, a total of 39% of households had a per capita income of less than R20 – at that time, approximately $2.40 or £1.50 – per day (Housing Development Agency, 2012, p. 38). Among residents of informal settlements, the risk of murder, rape or robbery exceeds the national average (Housing Development Agency, 2012, p. 50). These are just a few of the problems facing residents of informal settlements, but they are political rather than simply developmental problems.

In a similar way, informal settlement residents are often seen as populations to be acted upon through a variety of developmental initiatives (Juppenlatz, 1970, pp. 3-4; Martin & Mathema, 2006, p. 126), rather than as political communities. Yet the need for urban access and shelter that prompted people to occupy land illegally and erect informal dwellings in South Africa “stems from a deep marginalization and exclusion from formal access to land and development” (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006, p. 4). In Chapters 3 and 4, I will provide a detailed analysis of the link between ‘race’, space and citizenship that is embodied by South Africa’s informal settlements. For now, it is sufficient to observe that in South Africa, squatters were not simply “denied their proper urban citizenship” by inflation of land values over time (Juppenlatz, 1970, p. 31) but were deliberately excluded from developed economic centres by racist territorial and mobility control policies during the apartheid era. In this sense, the blossoming of illegal shacks on tracts of urban land can be seen as a manifestation of the quest by marginalized citizens to carve out a space for themselves in the centre, in much the same way as ‘autoconstruction’ is deemed a citizenship-claiming act in Holston’s analysis of Brazil (Holston, 2008).

1.3.2. History of squatter autonomy

In this sub-section I show how the history of informal settlement in South Africa has been one of continuous confrontation between state and informal agendas in terms of the organization of space. Yet, over the last two decades, South African scholarship seems to have lost interest in exploring squatter insurgency, with the exception of clearly defined post-apartheid social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo (Chance, 2011; Gibson, 2008; Selmeczi, 2012). Much of the literature on informal settlements is grey (Kinkead-Weekes, 1983; Maree, 1978;
Mashabela, 1990; Van Tonder, 1989), dated (Maree, 1978; Stadler, 1979) and/or focused on the first half of the twentieth century in South Africa (Bonner, 1990; Stadler, 1979; Van Tonder, 1989). There has been virtually no research into the politics of squatting after the end of apartheid. This loss of interest in informality as a political geography of insurgency may be related to an epistemic shift prompted by South Africa’s transition to a non-racial democracy – a shift perhaps based on an exaggerated assessment of the historical break represented by the transition in the relations between margin and centre. However, older studies of squatter mobilization offer useful food for thought about contemporary conditions. More than 20 years ago, Bonner observed the deceptive tendency of scholars to focus on “organized squatter movements” such as those at Cato Manor and Crossroads, to the virtual exclusion of the rest of the continuum of squatter mobilization (Bonner, 1990, p. 89). In fact, he asserted, those best known movements were only “the most visible concerted expressions of what has been an almost continuous phenomenon of massive proportions from the beginning of the [20th] century to the present” (Bonner, 1990, p. 89), and which helped to germinate “a spirit of independence and insubordination which the authorities subsequently found difficult to suppress” (Bonner, 1990, p. 99).

It is thus not from a social and political vacuum that informal settlements manage to prevail against the will and instruments of the state and the letter of its law, against stigmatization by inhabitants of formal residential areas, and against the hazards of an existence beyond the embrace of most state protections. Within this void of state institutionalization, new forms of regulation may emerge over time. In many cases, novel forms of locally based governance emerge to control land usage and related conflicts in these settlements (Martin & Mathema, 2006, p. 127), including in South Africa (Mashabela, 1990; Minnaar, 1992; Stadler, 1979; Van Tonder, 1989), as studies of ‘xenophobia’-affected informal areas have more recently shown (Misago et al., 2009; Monson, 2012b). Historically, a range of strongmen, from traditional chiefs to town councillors, have gained positions of autonomous power in squatter settlements (Minnaar, 1992; Stadler, 1979; Van Tonder, 1989). Warlords or vigilance organizations often enforced informal regulations, levying fees for permits, space or protection and punishing “offenders against the regulations with fines and beatings” (Stadler, 1979, p. 105). Thus, squatter settlements tended towards political autonomy as well as being territorially distinct from state space. We see, then, that their treatment as an object upon which to act should not obscure the threatening political agency implicit in informal settlements.
Contrary to representations of informal settlements as a manifestation of lack, abandonment and helplessness (notably Davis, 2007), Stadler asserted the “significance of squatting in the political struggles of the working class”, and its linkages to other forms of mobilization such as “industrial action, transport riots, and food riots” (Stadler, 1979, p. 123). The social structures in an informal settlement are strengthened by threats to its existence (Martin & Mathema, 2006, p. 143), as illustrated by recent community-based mobilizations in response to government evictions in South Africa (Chance, 2011; Cross, 2006; Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, 2011). Squatter settlements in South Africa have faced threats since their first appearance (see, for example, Kinkead-Weekes, 1983), and the instruments of a formal democratic order have continued this trend – the South African government’s policy to halt “the production of informality” and “eradicate” informal settlements echoes the repressive policies of apartheid with its forced removals, though under the sign of development rather than racial segregation (Cross, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2010; Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006, p. 7). It is clear from the consistency of squatting and attempted removals both before and during the era of racial segregation (Kinkead-Weekes, 1983; Mashabela, 1990; Vawda, 1997, p. 4) that the practices of insurgent citizenship that characterized early squatter movements are not a thing of the past, but have continued across the transition into democracy. The transition may have changed the discourse of squatter exclusion, but not its substance. In this sense, the ‘black’ squatter’s struggle for a place among the citizens has continued across the epistemological break signalled by the 1994 elections.

However, most current work on squatter camps emerges from the town planning literature (Cross, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2004, 2010), and in terms of sociology appears in the form of studies of a limited number of so-called ‘new social movements’ in South Africa. In the latter case, the links of such social movements to informal settlements is presumed to be one of class – that evasive class so easily labelled ‘the poor’ (as in the work of Chance, 2011; Desai & Pithouse, 2004). There is a failure to disaggregate ‘the poor’ into more meaningful social categories, encapsulated in the refusal by (Desai & Pithouse, 2004, p. 306) to countenance the possibility that a poor community could have a political ‘elite.’ This insistence on class metanarratives reads ‘shackdweller’ as ‘the poor’, subsuming into an economic category the very particular micropolitical and microhistorical characteristics of informal residence I have highlighted in this discussion. The focus on ‘new social movements’ as the primary actors in these expressions of insurgent citizenship is also potentially misleading: many of their

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techniques are far from new. As I will demonstrate in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the insurgent practices we see in squatter camps today draw on expertise and repertoires of squatter insurgency that originated before non-racial democracy.

In the next section, I propose that this continuity of insurgent practice across the transition to democracy invites us to consider the insurgent squatter settlement as a micro-level political community, consolidated over many years by shared oppression, resistance, and proximity. I argue that attention to the historical, spatial, legal and social context of squatter settlements may open up new ways of understanding anti-outsider mobilization: as a phenomenon shaped by the historical and spatial politics of communities whose historical trajectory and spatial location place them on the margins of citizenship.

1.3.3. Insurgency, territoriality and political community

Holston’s work on insurgent citizenship demonstrates how those on the margins of a ‘differentiated citizenship’ can, through their very marginalization and peripheral location, consolidate a counter-politics. The squatter practices discussed above clearly exhibit marks of such a counterpolitics, and this is even more prominent in the case of informal settlements established in more recent history through a planned invasion or occupation of land bordering established residential areas (Vawda, 1997, p. 6). Holston observes that insurgent citizenship renders citizenship unstable; even dangerous. In line with this, the concept of land invasion clearly implies a form of insurgent urbanization, constituted by a kind of militant mobilization for access to space. Semantically, the terms “invasion” and “occupation” express an implicit recognition of the metonymy between insurgent settlement and other more clearly political forms of insurgency, such as secessionist movements, which also connote an incursion into the state’s territorial sovereignty. To underline this point, I may mention that, during fieldwork in 2010 in an informal settlement near the city of Tshwane in South Africa, a police station commander described how municipal police deployed to evict land invaders had on two occasions been ejected through the sheer force of the settlement’s residents advancing against them with makeshift weapons. This kind of defence of territory could lead us to an analogy of squatter mobilization with the state’s defence of territorial sovereignty; as if an informal settlement could take on the characteristics of a sub-polity distinct from the rest of the national space, with a distinctly insurgent form of citizenship.
What do we make of squatter settlements – where insurgent counter-politics takes a distinctive territorial form, and is accompanied by non-state norms and forms of governance? As Hannah Arendt insisted: “the most crucial political issue is, and always has been, the question of Who rules Whom?” (Arendt, 1986, p. 64). In the case of squatter settlements where unauthorized, sub-national territories emerge and begin to operate outside of or against the rule of the state, the question of who rules whom is not easy to answer. In occupying land, defending it and agreeing to acceptable means of governing it, squatters constitute an alternative site of power, understood in Arendt’s terms as the human ability to act in concert (Arendt, 1986). In terms of Weber’s definition of the polity as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 2002, p. 13), the squatter settlement begins to appear as a quasi-polity; a micro-political community. Whereas “national boundaries have conventionally been the basis for separating the inside and outside of political community” (Held, 1998, p. 22), the nature of the squatter settlement suggests that we need to re-examine this assumption not only in terms of the deterritorializing flows of the global (Held, 1998; Van Houtum & Strüver, 2002), but also in terms of smaller-scale, sub-national borders and emergent forms of territoriality. This provides a conceptual foundation for my study of squatter politics in exclusionary collective mobilization: what is the nature of the distinct identities of the political self and political other produced through the formation of a political community of squatters? The dynamics of anti-outsider mobilization should be understood against this local backdrop, rather than against a broader and more reified notion of the national-scale insider and outsider. It seems intuitive to ask whether and how attacks on foreigners within insurgent settlements might constitute a practice of insurgent citizenship – one that distributes its own categories of insider and outsiderhood and, in some cases, subjects outsiders to its own technologies of control. This enquiry has the potential to add to a growing body of work engaged in rethinking assumptions about the configuration of political identity, regulation and territory embodied in the contemporary nation-state.

1.4. Conclusion

When mobilization presents itself to us primarily as collective violence, we are too easily satisfied with explanations that bypass the question of popular participation and fail to probe the local-level social and institutional infrastructure for mobilization – a defining factor in civil conflict trajectories. We are often over-reliant on generalities in defining the meaning of
mobilization, and indeed of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status; overlooking the historical and spatial contingencies that may arise from the changing and often unequal distribution of institutional forces, pressures and opportunities across space and time.

In this chapter, I have argued that explanations of exclusionary mobilization that over-emphasize individual pathology, elite manipulation or aggregate socio-economic conditions fall short of explaining the clear role of popular agency in such mobilizations. Demonstrating that aggregated accounts of race, class and national origin are insufficient to explain these mobilizations, I have presented signposts toward an account of the violence as a form of social action grounded in the richness of history and locality. In so doing, I clear conceptual space for the consideration of violent mobilization beyond the broad conceptual dichotomy implied between ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’ in popular notions of ‘xenophobia,’ in which the national citizen is imagined as the bearer of structural power and privilege in hierarchical distinction to the construction of the non-national migrant as a powerless victim.

Focusing on the work of scholars who emphasize spatial variation and local specificity, I have highlighted the crucial finding that, unlike immigration levels or absolute poverty, which are not significantly associated with ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa, informal residence is strongly associated with the incidence of this form of mobilization. This leads me to propose a richer approach to thinking ‘xenophobic’ violence, which focuses on the detail of collective mobilization within the particular historical and spatial setting of the informal settlement – a space populated by marginal citizens and historically characterized by insurgent forms of collective action. As Chapter 2 will show, this approach requires not only a detailed ethnographic account of the informal settlement but also an rich understanding of how its particularity has been shaped by broader institutions, policies and practices of the state – hence the space devoted in this thesis to tracing the genealogy of the informal settlement back to multi-scalar political and institutional dynamics in the 1980s.
Chapter 2: The politics of the squatter camp: concepts and methods

Years of inductive research have taught me that material histories can give unexpected meanings to places and produce surprising forms of power, logic and practice. I learn this lesson again every time a respondent exceeds the pigeonhole my presumptions have created for him or her. In Alexandra, I was shocked when a Mozambican migrant revealed his support of 'anti-foreigner' evictions as a "noble" plan (Monson, 2012b, pp. 181-182). It became clear that I had taken much for granted about who was considered an outsider in this particular place, and what kinds of collective action could be considered legitimate by whom. In Atteridgeville, I would be taken aback once again when an anti-xenophobia activist insisted that the squatter camp should not benefit foreigners as "it's a place we created for ourselves as South Africans" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012). Exclusionary mobilization is, it seems, intimately bound to the meanings and functions of place.

We can study the agency of place in social practices, norms and power relations in two ways: the "first is to explore how places come into being, the second is to find out what places accomplish" (Gieryn, 2000, p. 465). Both approaches require an appreciation of how the past has shaped the meaning and agency of place in the present. In this chapter, I outline the complex methodological gaze through which I attempt to capture the conceptual indivisibility of history, geography and politics; of structure and agency; of past, present and future in the "single fabric" of location, material form and meaning (Gieryn, 2000, p. 466) that is the squatter camp. I take a constructivist perspective (Grix, 2001, p. 27), in which social realities, including political identities and repertoires of collective action, are produced through social interaction in a particular location. This in turn is shaped by material forces at various scales, which may be imposed unevenly across spaces, and upon populations subjected to different currents of the same national history, living in settings more or less strongly connected to the centre of state power, in places accomplished to produce, reproduce and/or resist inequitable citizenship (Lalloo, 1998).

The squatter camp can be seen as both a setting and a process: on the one hand, the social world of the squatter is structured by particular historical, political, economic and other factors (many of which are embodied in elements of the material form of the settlement). On the
other, it is never whole and final, built as it is by a multitude of social actors who subject it to continual revision. Ideas and identities have longevity, but they are ever evolving rather than being 'handed down' fully formed by previous generations (Calhoun, 2012, p. 97). Political identities are neither primordial nor "available for instant manipulation" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 15) by political entrepreneurs; nevertheless, they are not radically contingent, for institutions and practices give weight and longevity to a field of structural forces that distribute power among a particular range of available political identities. 'New' or oppositional identities are often formed through insurgent practice, but upon the same field of forces and thus always already tied to the past.

This chapter presents an integrated account of the concepts, theory and methods that interact to form the bedrock of my study. I address two central methodological challenges of my constructivist view of politics and place: on the one hand, there is a multiplicity of potential forces in the social construction of the squatter camp, which calls on me to define those forces that receive my attention in this thesis. I detail the approach that I adopt through an elaboration of Mamdani's construct of political identity and Gieryn's reflections on the sociology of place. On the other hand, there is the question of how – as a researcher whose analytical gaze is conditioned by a particular, familiar set of ‘constructs’ – I set about accessing, analysing and representing potentially unfamiliar or ‘other’ constructs. Far from being objective or disinterested, such an analysis risks reproducing the researcher’s own conceptual territory, with its inclusions and exclusions, and its taken-for-granted borders. Indeed, sociology has been accused of tending towards the (re)production of a certain version of political ontology, (re-)constituting the legitimate field of politics along familiar lines and thereby writing certain communities out of political existence (Calhoun, 2012, p. 64). Yet the humanistic style of qualitative research demanded by an exploratory search for a political account of exclusionary mobilization in the squatter camp seems to preclude the positivist notions of the ‘objective' investigator. I elaborate a useful methodological response to this quandary through Burawoy’s nuanced conception of ‘reflexive science’ (Burawoy, 1998, 2009).
2.1. Designing research at the intersection of history, geography and politics

In his study of the genocide in Rwanda, Mamdani insists that popular agency in violent collective mobilization can only be understood through a concept of political identity that synthesizes history, geography and politics. In his view, historically conditioned political identities are linked to geography through the necessarily territorial concept of the state – the most obvious example of the institutionalization of political community. Mamdani sees political identities “in their own right” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22) as “a direct consequence of the history of state formation” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22). The construct of institutionally shaped political identities provides, in my view, a refreshing freedom from a priori conceptions of the salience of variables such as race, ethnicity and nation, viewing the identifications that underlie mobilization as “historical and not primordial, and institutionally durable as opposed to being available for instant manipulation by those in power or seeking power” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 15). It insists that individual power in the social world is predominantly structured by one’s relationship to an (always already territorial) political community – in Mamdani’s analysis, the state.

2.1.1. Capturing the top-down forces shaping squatter political identity

Identities are politically institutionalized through laws, policies and practices, which can both individualize and collate identities. In the process, the “group identities” that “shape our relationship to the state and to one another through the state” are produced (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22). These identities become the starting point of “our struggles”; our “political action” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22) – the foundation of our agency. Even identities formed “in contention with power” take state-forged identities as their starting point, simply operating in a different direction (Mamdani, 2001, p. 23). Methodologically, this called for close attention to the way in which state institutions shaped the political identity of squatters through technical and legal techniques. To some extent, this process could be reconstructed through a review of relevant historical literature, but, wishing to avoid subsuming the institutional forces shaping squatter politics into the forces that arguably shaped a broader ‘black’ political identity under apartheid, I chose to supplement the literature with an exploration of archived government material relating to squatting. This allowed me to construct a genealogical account of the institutional construction of the squatter over time and across the different institutional scales of the state, which, in turn, I would relate to the counterpolitics that arose among squatters.
Mamdani’s construct of political identity is integrally related to how a particular nation-state came into being, and what it produced in so doing. Yet, as Yang Su observes in his outstanding book on collective killings during China’s Cultural Revolution, “the simple fact of geographical variations in countries that experience mass killings” calls for community rather than state as the unit of analysis (Su, 2011, p. 12). The state is undeniably both a subjective, cultural construct and an empirical phenomenon, both a “structural effect” of particular social relations and practices, and a producer of them (Mitchell, 1991, p. 94). But just as the state territory can be seen as “a distinctive mode of social/spatial organization” that is historically and geographically contingent (Elden, 2010, p. 810), so can territories that emerge at lower scales within the imagined container of the state. Considering the history of squatter insurgency and quasi-autonomy outlined in Chapter 1, and the evidence of sub-national sovereignties that I uncovered in a previous comparative study of violence-affected areas (Monson, 2012b), the squatter camp or informal settlement can be seen as a micro-scale territory within the territory of the South African nation-state. Extending Mamdani’s argument, we could argue by analogy that there is also a role played by micro-scale, informal institutions and practices in shaping political identity – particularly if, as Nieftagodien found in Alexandra, insider/outsider identities can refer both to local and national belonging (Nieftagodien, 2011). Thus, political identity needs to be understood at multiple scales, embedding the local within the material practices of state institutions more broadly. Toward such an understanding, I chose to complement Mamdani’s approach to political identities with Gieryn’s approach to the agency of place, understood at a far lower spatial scale.

2.1.2. Local-scale political community: concepts and approach

the local is not the provincial or the parochial but rather the social and, most importantly, the empirical (Kalyvas, 2009, p. 44)

I have suggested above that political identity is not determined only by the high-level political community of the nation state, in which the institutions of political community define political ontology, distributing agency, rights and sanctions through legal categories such as citizenship and voting rights. Institutions of local political community established at the sub-national scale of a squatter settlement, while nested in (and often in contention with) political identities shaped at the national level, also have the potential to shape political identity and political action. The geographic boundaries of a squatter camp may be analogous to those of the state, defining the limits of a collective ability to both “act in concert” (Arendt, 1986, p. 64) and
legitimately exercise violence in contention with the state’s coercive regime (Weber, 2002). This is particularly likely in the case of those unauthorized settlements formed or sustained by collective action such as land invasion, popular justice or insurgent protest, which in the process of defying the exclusory terms of a prevailing order of urban land access, provide the foundation for collective identification (Chance, 2011, p. xxv) as well as for future collective mobilization (Cotto, 1990; Huizer, 1972; Lemanski & Oldfield, 2009). Through this lens, squatter populations can be seen to constitute “political communities” in their own right (Chance, 2011, p. xxv). Mamdani’s view of political identity as instantiated through material practices could therefore be extended to the microcosm of the insurgent settlement, creating the methodological demand to view history, geography and politics together through the lens of the local.

Further, it is not at the aggregated level of ‘the nation’ but in the particularity of the local that we can hope to identify the forms of collective identification and popular agency that underpin exclusionary mobilization. Communal relations and networks of trust, overlapping and intertwined interests, and the everyday, mundane reproduction of established practices and worldviews, can offer “a pre-existing organisation capable of securing the participation of individuals in collective action” (Calhoun, 2012, p. 98). Hence, local conditions may have the defining influence on how ‘enemies’ are defined and dealt with, while the state may exercise only an indirect effect through the “interaction between state policy and local conditions” (Su, 2011, p. 12). It is often the history of localized political identities that forms the faultlines for conflict, rather than national-level cleavages:

> In any given community, there are myriad ways of classifying its members – class, religion, skin color, language, clan lineage, and so on. However, a history of prior conflicts often renders one way as particularly salient and is easily invoked as a salient fault line for new conflict, which provides a potential cultural source for building new collective identities in a time of mobilisation.

(Su, 2011, p. 14, my italics)

According to Gieryn, the capacity for community, as well as the capacity for domination and control, emerge out of place: that is, the indivisible elements of geographical location, material form, and meaning (Gieryn, 2000, p. 475). At the local level, each of these elements is historically conditioned by material forces at different scales, even if some remain in a state of emergence. In this way, the local is a place of empirical richness, where we can most richly witness and unpack the interaction between the forces shaping political identity at different

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8 Although we should note that, unlike Calhoun, the specificity of Su’s analysis leads him to insist upon the ability of “extreme elements” to “hijack the will of the community and kill in its name” by rendering bystanders incapable of resisting or protesting (Su, 2011, p. 13).
scales. It is in the empirical richness of the local that we may conduct a meaningful exploration of how the squatter camp is accomplished, and what it accomplishes, embedded as it is in time and shaped by structural forces exerted at a variety of institutional scales. Also, it is through the lens of the local, as a methodological entry point, that we may hope to develop novel theoretical perspectives on social relations that can be easily co-opted into our usual ways of seeing when taken in aggregate.

2.1.3. Capturing locality to enrich theory: a case study design

Given the simultaneous theoretical and methodological importance of the local, I sought to design into my research as close an encounter as possible with my unit of analysis, the informal settlement. I needed a method that would elucide history from a local perspective; sketch and give flesh to local, often informal institutions and practices; and give insight into the meaning of collective identities. Given its qualitative design, the study would not aim to produce empirically generalizable findings, but instead to produce novel insights through the lens of the local, which would be worthy of generalizing to theory. In designing it as such, I adhere to Biernacki’s maxim that the objective of our analysis should not be to identify "a catalog of empirical attributes or averages" but, instead, to demonstrate "what is potential or possible, the conditions that constrain or unleash action" (Biernacki, 2012, pp. 148-149).

Biernacki outlines an "ideal type method" drawn from Weber’s Protestant Ethic, consistent with my aim of giving substance to a set of hypothesized variables and exploring their potential contribution to theory. Using Weber’s exemplary sociological study as a starting point, he suggests that we "rethink the task of generalisation as that of proposing characteristic constellations or iconic exemplars of how judgment and human conduct is organized", elaborating cases whose "singularity makes other cases of this-worldly discipline more intelligible", and developing models that can make sense of a case without collapsing into it (Biernacki, 2012, p. 147).

My personal interest in the specific questions around ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in South Africa made the informal settlement the site of my search for appropriate cases. However, the question of squatter settlements in South Africa, and their relation to exclusionary mobilization, echoes globally across unauthorized, informal and unregulated settlements the world over. These settlements share many characteristics: the ambiguous legal status of housing, land, and/or residents; their complex relationship to state services; their dependence
on the informal sector for income; their status as an entry port for flows of migrants –
domestic, international, or both – in the still rapidly urbanizing cities of the ‘developing’ world
(Landau, 2014). I am familiar with the comparative dimensions that link South African squatter
camps to similar settlements in Latin America, India and elsewhere in Africa, and draw insights
from studies of these settlements throughout this thesis. However, the form of intensive,
exploratory investigation I planned required case study research, which provides sufficient
depth to explore hypotheses “in a rough-and-ready way” (Gerring, 2007, p. 41), providing
scope for a level of qualitative detail that in cross-case, comparative studies such as that of
Misago et al (2009), have been sacrificed for the sake of breadth.

Together with my supervisor, I chose to focus on one locality, embedding a comparative
dimension into the case study through the selection of two distinct areas within it. This kind of
case study, incorporating within-case variation, offers a more magnified view of a
phenomenon, and the opportunity to identify and explore more of the elements “at the scene
of the crime”, as Gerring puts it (2007, p. 41). It provides a fertile environment to explore
causal mechanisms and reflect on the necessity and sufficiency of existing theory, and is a
method well-suited to what Biernacki calls the "imaginative portrait," which "keeps us moving
in a productive uncertainty" (Biernacki, 2012, p. 147) towards schemas that do not exhaust the
possibilities of social phenomena, but nevertheless make them more intelligible. The
embedded case study design also optimized the depth and breadth I could achieve in the time
and resources available to me.

I selected an informal settlement where ‘xenophobic’ mobilization had previously occurred, to
allow links to be made between the political subjectivity and practices of the local political
community, and the experience of mobilization against foreigners. To maximize the
exploratory scope of the research, I decided not to include a comparison of similar affected or
unaffected areas. However, these types of studies do have an important contribution to make
to the understanding of collective violence (Kirshner, 2012; Varshney, 1997), and the findings
of the present study provide an exploratory foundation for the development of comparative
work.
2.1.4. Embedded cross-case study: reflexive case selection

In selecting an embedded cross-case study, I was concerned to ensure that my qualitative approach applied a suitable degree of reflexive rigour, for a humanistic mode of inquiry must nevertheless satisfy

the “hard” science criteria of transparency, of retesting the validity of interpretations, of extrapolating from mechanisms, of appraising the scope of interpretations, of recognizing destabilizing anomalies, of displaying how we decide to “take” a case as meaning something, of forcing revision in interpretive decisions, of acknowledging the dilemmas of sampling, and of separating the evidence from the effects of instrumentation. (Biernacki, 2012, p. 151)

Therefore, my case selection was guided by considerations concerning the distribution of “useful variation” (Gerring, 2007, p. 56). The universe of possible cases included those that occurred before and after the 2008 outbreak, as well as over 100 incidences during the 2008 period. In selecting a case, I wanted to attempt to control for the role of media coverage in prompting ‘copy-cat’ incidents that might bear less relation to political identity – there is a relatively small population of violence-affected areas where anti-outsider mobilization broke out locally without the possible interfering variable of a media-disseminated national crisis of violence and impunity. I also wished to control for the effects of the passage of time. I was concerned that temporal effects might skew the findings of research carried out several years after the original incidence of violence, when the passage of time had seen various police and civil society interventions suppressing and stigmatizing anti-outsider mobilization. For this reason I hoped to examine in more detail an area that had been the subject of previous research. I approached Karl von Holdt and Loren Landau to request access to secondary data from case studies they had carried out in previous years. The latter granted me access to transcripts of interviews carried out for the comparative study by Misago et al (2009). I had already analysed secondary data from three of these sites in prior projects, and to ensure the originality of my contribution in this PhD project, I selected a site I had not previously analysed, where violence had occurred prior to May 2008: the informal settlement known as Mshongo, located in the township of Atteridgeville in Tshwane Metro, Gauteng.

Mshongo was a case which I expected to have a particularly high level of useful variation, because it is an informal area broken up into five separately named but physically contiguous settlements, different parts of which emerged under different political and historical conditions. I expected the within-case variation to potentially offer more robust material for a reflexive, theory-building analysis. Importantly, the case in question was practically located and familiar from previous unrelated fieldwork. I knew that this would mitigate some of the
risk and uncertainty attached to conducting research in an unfamiliar informal environment (more detail provided in Risk and ethics below). Therefore, Mshongo made a very good case study. In addition, it promised to provide a “crucial case” (Gerring, 2007, p. 116) in terms of the concept of micro-local political community, as its founding settlement, Jeffville, was rumoured to have been formed through an invasion of defence-force land prior to the first democratic elections. Certain respondents in Misago et al’s study had identified the founder of Jeffville with a kind of parallel government of the settlement. It was therefore an excellent example of the conditions under which a distinct squatter political community could hypothetically be established.

Figure 2: The constituent settlements of Mshongo in Atteridgeville, Tshwane

I introduced some within-case variance into my study by selecting two areas of the settlement, both of which had experienced ‘xenophobic’ violence in 2008: the founding settlement of “Jeffville” – named for its founder and established in 1991 – and the settlement called Brazzaville (founded in 1998, third in a series of new settlements established after a political schism between founding members of Jeffville). The selection of these two sites thus embedded spatial and temporal variation into the case study – they enabled me to examine two parts of a single affected settlement, but parts occupying different physical spaces over different periods of time, and established under different national political regimes. This allowed me to explore the longevity and reach of political identities emerging out of the settlement’s original formation, discover whether different formations of local political
community might exist in distinct parts of the settlement, and deepen any analysis of collective mobilization.

Having explained the way in which I embedded my study in the richness of the local scale through an embedded cross-case study of the Jeffsville and Brazzaville areas of Mshongo, Atteridgeville, I turn to a more detailed discussion of time and scale in relation to political identity, as an entry point into a discussion of the specific methods I selected in order to explore the political identities of squatters in Mshongo in relation to a broader structural context.

**Figure 3: Images from Jeffsville**

![Images from Jeffsville]

**Figure 4: Images from Brazzaville**

![Images from Brazzaville]
2.2. Time, scale and material practices in squatter politics: selecting methods

Places are endlessly made, not just when the powerful pursue their ambition through brick and mortar, not just when design professionals give form to function, but also when ordinary people extract from continuous and abstract space a bounded, identified, meaningful, named and significant place. (Gieryn, 2000, p. 471)

In this section, I explain how I used a mix of data types and data collection methods to operationalize this multi-scalar methodological gaze in the current study, drawing on Mamdani's synthesis of history, geography and politics and Gieryn's cognate synthesis of location, material form and meaning in understanding the production and agency of place and political identity.

2.2.1. Exploring the local: primary ethnographic methods

I have noted that this thesis views the 'squatter camp' in constructivist terms, as both place and practice. As a place, the informal settlement has distinctive features that might include marginality, informality and limited infrastructure. These features were produced by specific historical, and in some cases political, trajectories of particular populations over time. In turn, these features of marginality, informality and poor infrastructure continue to form the everyday life context of residents and continue to shape the everyday practices that produce what Calhoun might call local tradition. As he notes, tradition is not simply 'handed down', but nor is it broken with in any absolute terms. Instead, it shapes and is shaped by changing circumstances, co-opted for new purposes under new circumstances, and shared – not necessarily consciously – through common but constantly renegotiated taken-for-granted beliefs about the social world (Calhoun, 2012). As practice, the informal settlement is the sum total of these shared meanings and their incessant renegotiation through mundane as well as expressly political interactions between residents themselves, between residents and those who (claim to) lead them, between longer standing and newer residents, foreign-born and South African residents, between residents of the informal settlement and residents of the formal township adjacent to them, as well as between informal residents and 'leaders' and the representatives of the local and national state.

Drawing on the notion of material practices as productive of political identity, I designed in-depth interviews to elicit participants' narratives of collective social action in the squatter
camps. The interview was framed as an historical enquiry, and presented in a non-directive manner in order to enable participants to direct the course of the interaction and reveal through their interaction with me which themes held the most weight. Questions were phrased as far as possible in broad terms, such as 'Tell me the story of how you came to live in Jeffsville'; with prompts such as 'Did you notice anyone in charge of the settlement?' and follow-up questions about current conditions, such as 'How do you deal with crime in the settlement?' Within the interview, violence was not singled out for special attention, but allowed to emerge in the course of discussion, enabling violent practices to be discussed as part of the broader social process of the informal settlement; as one type of social action among several that have emerged over time from its socio-political milieu. By treating ‘xenophobic’ violence as unexceptional in this sense, I follow Mamdani’s imperative to make atrocity thinkable within its social context.

In each field site, I conducted approximately 20 field encounters. In total, I conducted seven 'key informant' interviews (with figures involved in the establishment and informal regulation of Jeffsville and Brazzaville), two focus groups with members of the official community policing structure, and 28 additional interviews with residents, for all of which consent was duly sought and granted. To complement the interviews with key informants, I organized a walk with each of these respondents, to allow for participant observation and the development of a better understanding of the material form of the settlement. This enabled me to meet several new contacts, collect photographic evidence, and obtain documents held by residents who had been involved in the leadership of the settlements. Observations and ongoing reflections were recorded in a combination of written field diary and dictated notes.

2.2.2. Taking account of time effects: secondary analysis of an existing data set

From the viewpoint of reflexive science, time impacts upon situational knowledge and dynamics. The systemic context in which research takes place is time-bound, because the dynamics of a particular social milieu are transformed over time, often by external forces that “lie outside the realm of investigation” (Burawoy 2009: 42). Local social realities are not only shaped by external forces; they in turn shape the external system in which they are embedded. Media coverage and editorializing about the May 2008 violence created a feedback loop in knowledge production, so that some respondents were likely to reproduce as fact the propositions they had been exposed to in the press or on television. With growing
In order to provide a check on the potential effects of time, I supplemented the 44 original, primary field encounters I collected in 2012 with 21 transcripts from field research carried out by Jean-Pierre Misago in 2008. Secondary analysis of an existing qualitative dataset is a valuable method in its own right, especially for studying sensitive issues and elusive populations (Long-Sutehall, Sque, & Addington-Hall, 2010). I conducted a fresh analysis of these transcribed interviews in order to consider older accounts of local history and the local experience of ‘xenophobic’ violence along with the new accounts collected during my 2012 fieldwork. Misago’s research, conducted early in the wake of the attacks, offered a window into a different time; a time closer to the events in question, when details were perhaps more lucid and accounts more diverse as residents were still in the process of making their own sense of events. Bringing the older and newer bodies of data into an encounter with one produced a different kind of data too; insight into the revisions and reiterations that constitute an ever-evolving tradition and the durability of particular political identities across such changes.

### 2.2.3. Describing local conditions: census data

I made limited use of census data to generate descriptive statistics about the current social and material conditions in Mshongo. These had to be inferred from broader descriptive statistics, as I was unable to disaggregate the census data to the level of the individual settlement. The component settlements of Mshongo fall into separate enumerator areas and in some cases were combined with adjacent formal neighbourhoods, making it difficult to extract an accurate dataset.

### 2.2.4. Triangulating respondents’ claims: news clippings and archival material

I also sought out relevant news clippings from the archives of several newspapers; in particular, the Tshwane Sun’s bi-monthly Atteridgeville edition, which provided reporting on incidents that helped confirm claims made in the field. I sought evidence of the settlements’ history in the National Archives in order to examine local and biographical constructions of
history together with 'official' accounts. This, I hoped, would enable me to attempt the necessary analytical stitching of local and state orders which I hoped would help to sketch the broader social processes that constitute “the conditions of existence of the locale in which research occurs” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 15). This turned up very little of direct relevance to the history of the squatters, but provided some important contextual details about the political life of townships residents around the period that the first land invasions in Atteridgeville began.

2.2.5. Depicting the role of state institutions: government archives and documentary analysis

In order to embed my analysis of local political identity and practices in the settlements within their historical and institutional context, I sought to identify evidence of the legal and technical strategies and techniques through which state institutions shaped the political meaning of the squatter camp and the squatter citizen. This impact occurred not only in a top-down way, through techniques of repression or tolerance, but also in a bottom-up way, through the emergence of counter-political practices. In the national archive, I consulted Cabinet memoranda for discussions of squatting as a national problem, as well as constructing a longlist of archived files featuring the keyword ‘informal settlement’, ‘squatter’, ‘squatting’, or their Afrikaans translations (see Appendix 1 for a list of specific materials consulted).

Atteridgeville never featured in Cabinet discussions, to my disappointment. Instead, I became fascinated by the overwhelming prominence of the settlement of Crossroads in Cabinet discussions. This settlement, which seemed to embody a perfect storm in terms of the challenges it posed to apartheid’s racial stratification, emerged as a laboratory for an astounding range and variety of institutional arrangements and practices aimed at curtailing the urban access of squatters. I drew heavily on these rich discussions, supported by a review of historical literature on South Africa, to develop an account of the impact of national-level politics on the political identity and practices of squatters. Chapter 3 presents evidence from these archival documents alongside analysis of key policies in order to provide a national political context for the case study of squatting in Mshongo.

I gained more detailed insight into the changing nature of national policy and legislation surrounding squatters from documents held by the Transvaal Provincial Authority, into whose jurisdiction Atteridgeville fell during the late Apartheid era. I became fascinated by certain documents that revealed ideological conflict between the provincial and national scales of
government, and consequent contradictions between legislation and practice in relation to squatting. This helped me illustrate how provincial-level practice made room for a new political meaning for squatter camps in the Transvaal. These insights into the impact of scale-interactions and temporal change are captured in Chapter 4 of the thesis.

2.3. Researching an 'outside': seeking and analysing divergent constructs

...instead of using documents to reactivate a collective memory or point to what people really did and said, they should be treated as monuments, traces left by the past, that the historian tries to decipher and organise into intelligible groups in relation to each other, not in relation to some reality we can never quite capture... we can never know what really happened. (O'Farrell, 1989, p. 62)

The mix of methods I have outlined – developing an ethnographic account of local political identities and practices, while drawing accounts of their top-down shaping at the provincial and national level from historical literature and the archive – represents a multi-perspectival approach suited to the constructivist ontology this thesis adopts. In line with Foucault’s treatment of history, described by O’Farrell in the quotation above, I do not seek to produce the final, ‘true’ account of ‘what really happened’ through my forays into the field and the archive. Although I sought to exhaust the empirical data I collected, I was aware that there would be inevitable silences, deceptions and omissions such that my work would never be able to claim the final word. Instead I sought to construct a robust but necessarily limited account of national, provincial and local forces in the shaping of squatter political identity and practice, to make them “intelligible... in relation to each other” and thereby to “decipher” a political structure that may illuminate recent exclusionary mobilizations in squatter settlements (Biernacki, 2012, p. 147). This is one way in which I combine multiple constructions into a single representation of social process.

The principle of bringing divergent views or constructs of a single phenomenon into relation with each other penetrates my methodological choices profoundly. I drew inspiration from Burawoy’s methodological model of “reflexive science”, which elevates dialogue as its defining principle and views context effects – seen as ‘limitations’ from the perspective of positive science – as the very essence of knowledge production. It joins together what “positive science separates: participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its field of location, folk theory and academic theory” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 14). Along similar
lines, I chose through my approach to sampling, data collection strategies and analysis, to place various historical, epistemological and even temporal constructs in a defamiliarizing encounter. In this section, I discuss these choices in more depth.

2.3.1. Sampling

Reflexive science produces generality by reconstructing theory, and not all reconstructions are equal. It does not seek statistical generality, but must nevertheless aspire to as robust and (qualitatively) valid an account of social reality as possible. This demands that, as we proceed, we do not simply seek “confirmations” of our emerging theories and ideas, but also “refutations that inspire us to deepen that theory” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 16). Following a principle of dialogue between constructs, I felt it was important to maximize variance — to invite the widest possible range of dialogues to ensure breadth of analysis and include the maximum possible variety of possibly conflicting constructs. I anticipated several potential faultlines that informed my pursuit of variation. First, I expected potential conflicts between leaders’ accounts and those of ‘the man in the street’. Leaders have an important role in mobilization, but might not be willing to speak openly about their part in illegal collective action. I thus included a range of key informant encounters with elites in the two sites, as well as interviews with non-elite residents who might shed a different light on the life of the settlement. The fact that the leadership structures of the two settlements were male-dominated meant that my key informants were all male. As a counterbalance, I sought out longstanding female residents of each site, and was able to interview several women whose long history in the settlements made for rich material. However, only 30% of respondents were female. Finally, I anticipated there might also be a generation gap in political opinions and practices, given that the youth are often blamed when mass action turns violent. Older residents were a particularly rich source of data for my project, as many were long-term residents who held a longer view of the development of the settlement’s social order over time. However, I purposively sought to include respondents who would have been in their teens or twenties during the time of the 2008 violence in Mshongo, to provide space for generational conflicts to surface. Respondent ages ranged between 19 and 70, with a mean age of 54.

The emphasis I placed on longer-term residents came at a certain cost in terms of variation. For instance, one limitation was a lower representation of newcomers to Mshongo among my
primary field participants. Fortunately, this was partly remedied by the fact that the secondary dataset contained interviews with a number of newer residents. Another limitation resulted from the fact that few of the young people I reached were willing to commit to participation in the project. Several agreed interview dates only to cancel on the day or simply not turn up. My only alternative would have been to purposively sample at youth hangouts in the settlement, and as these are strongly associated with alcohol, drugs and violence, this was not an avenue I could pursue. A table providing basic demographic information for my primary fieldwork participants is included in Appendix 2. Respondents were sampled through a combination of a purposive multiple-entry-point snowball technique focused on the social networks of several long-term residents of each site, supplemented by the social network of a young resident of the formal township who agreed to assist me in the field. I also used purposive door-to-door sampling (for instance, for additional women respondents and business people) where necessary. After a great deal of consideration, I chose not to sample foreign-born residents, due to the very real possibility that this would expose them to unwanted and possibly dangerous scrutiny by those responsible for harassing or victimizing them either during periods of ‘xenophobic’ violence or through criminal behaviour. There was also the possibility that this could set in motion rumours and suspicion about the purpose of my work, which would endanger both my person and the success of my fieldwork. However, it did seem essential to incorporate the experiences of those residents most likely to have been targeted by ‘xenophobic’ violence. As a compromise, I decided to draw most of my evidence on the experience of foreign residents from my secondary analysis of Misago’s existing 2008 dataset – this method is after all particularly suited to studying hard-to-reach populations (Long-Sutehall et al., 2010). Of the 2008 interviews, 43% (9 out of 21) had been conducted with victims of the 2008 attacks. This material allowed me to access the experience of those constructed as ‘outsiders’ by the 2008 attacks, without the need to put respondents at risk. In my own fieldwork, I was able to gain important insights through two serendipitous encounters with non-nationals – one during a walk with a key informant, and one through the social network of my field assistant – without drawing undue attention to either. A table in Appendix 3 shows basic demographic details on participants in the secondary data set, including their place of birth.

In the government and newspaper archives, which I consulted for insight into constructs of the squatter camp as shaped by local, provincial and national government, I was influenced by the nature of the indexing systems for the respective archives. In the case of the government archives, material was indexed by keyword as well as by institution or department, and I was
able to construct a longlist of archived files featuring the keyword ‘informal settlement’, ‘squatter’, ‘squatting’, or their Afrikaans translations ‘plakker’ and ‘plakkery’. I physically browsed most of these, and all of those available for the 1986 to 1994 period. I also browsed the records of key Cabinet Committees concerned with political development for discussion of squatting as a political issue during the decade immediately preceding the founding of the first squatter settlements at Jeffsville: the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs; the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional (Political) Development; and the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development. A limitation was that the archive did not hold records beyond 1994, and the amount of available material waned from the 1990 holdings onward (see summary table of archives consulted in Appendix 1).

In the newspaper archive, I found a bi-monthly local Atteridgeville newspaper (Tshwane Sun Atteridgeville) which I sampled based on the approximate dates of important incidences of social action reported by interview respondents in Jeffsville and Brazzaville. As this local newspaper has a very different readership, reporting priorities and more tabloid style than conventional ‘broadsheet’ newspapers, I decided also to sample the city and national newspapers whose readers tend more often to occupy the centres of power rather than the urban and economic periphery. Historically, they have also tended to target a privileged white readership, and I expected that this might surface historically important contrasts in the way squatter identity and squatter mobilization has been constructed by and for different population groups. Thus, for important incidents that participants were able to provide relatively precise dates for, I sought coverage in the daily regional newspaper, Pretoria News – the fact that few were covered provided an important insight in itself. I also obtained some additional supporting news articles from an Atteridgeville information pack that had been collated by the main Pretoria library. A list of newspaper articles and sources broadly summarized by theme can be found in Appendix 1.

2.3.2. Data collection strategies

The aim to prompt dialogue between constructs impacted on the data collection techniques I used in the field sites. Reflexive science values reactivity in the research process, and considers interactions in the field as interventions into the respondents’ lives, which serve as a catalyst for unexpected revelations. Seen in this way, interactions with respondents can be designed to provoke different kinds of dialogue between the realities of the researcher and respondent
respectively. Interactions can remove participants from their own space and time and subject them to that of the researcher (Burawoy, 1998, p. 14), enabling conversations that would not otherwise have been possible. Alternatively, they can entail the researcher “moving with participants through their space and time” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 14). And, as there are both discursive and non-discursive aspects to situational knowledge, different methods can be used to get at discursive and tacit knowledge respectively (Burawoy, 1998).

The data collection techniques I chose for fieldwork in Atteridgeville involved a combination of these techniques. The majority of interviews were conducted outside the informal settlement for reasons covered in my discussion of risk and ethics below. The interviews played out as a semi-structured conversation over a meal at a shopping mall near the exit of the township. I chose to conduct interviews over food both as a gesture of goodwill and to reduce the formality of the interview process, but nevertheless the interviews conducted outside the settlement did suspend participants’ everyday lives and remove them from the place where they are most ‘at home’. This was an advantage in that it placed participants at a remove from their everyday lives and context, and minimized the inhibition that can result from fear of being overheard or becoming the subject of rumours among neighbours or leaders in the dense, racially homogenous environment of the informal settlement, where a researcher’s conspicuous ‘white’ body evoked uncertain meanings. It was less effective in getting at tacit knowledge, and more prone to manipulation by respondents with something to hide. Certain interviews were conducted in the settlement where respondents insisted upon it, and there were a few cases where being subjected to the respondent’s space and time seemed to be a distinct disadvantage – respondents felt more comfortable calling the interview to a premature close, for instance, or friends and relatives joined the interview in ways that required a great deal of extra time and management and sometimes affected my ability to get to the data I most needed. Respondents interviewed at home also tended to be more fearful of the potential consequences of our interaction.

I also designed into the research a limited number of ‘walk-and-talk’ interactions within the settlement. These were undertaken after the initial interview with certain respondents whose social position made them less vulnerable to risk as an effect of being seen with an unknown, ‘white’ female researcher. It was the respondent’s prerogative to decide where we would walk, and I probed certain themes as the opportunity arose ‘organically’ from the interaction. This gave me better access to the time and space of respondents, helping reveal tacit data that might not readily come out of formal interviews. The walks provided an opportunity to observe
respondents embedded in the mundane particularities of the site, whereas the structured interviews removed respondents from this context. Subjecting myself to the time and space of participants was sometimes uncomfortable, but in several cases the unexpected or unwanted elements of the interaction – the resistance or interference I encountered – revealed much about the social context of the sites and helped me to distinguish between the social and political climates of the two embedded cases. The walks also enabled me to meet additional respondents whom I could not have encountered any other way.

Figure 5: Mixed methods mapped onto time, scale and distance from respondent

The diagram in Figure 5 above depicts some of the ways in which I mapped my methodological choices so as to capture distinct ‘realities’ constructed at different points in time, at different spatial or administrative scales, and in different degrees of proximity to respondents in the field, thus promoting dialogue between different constructs in this study. For instance, I brought lay and academic theory together by drawing on both a review of historical literature and analysis of accounts derived from ethnographic work in the field. The combination of archival and documentary material generated in the 1980s with secondary data collected in 2008 and primary data collected in 2012, enabled a dialogue between past and present
constructs as well as between official and biographical accounts of the squatter camp. Choices made for data collection in the field complemented this by putting the researcher’s space and time in dialogue with that of participants, and space was also made for a marriage of local elite perspectives and the views of ordinary residents. The variety of sources of data was empirically useful in a confirmatory sense (Small, 2011, p. 63), allowing me to reconstruct a rough history of the sampled sites. At the same time, it added depth to the analysis through incorporating material that was the product of different subject positions and positions in relation to history.

2.3.3. Data analysis

One uncertainty a reflexive science approach presents in relation to its attempt to speak back to theory without positivist aggregation is that of how multiple perspectives, which are also in flux, can be adequately represented, and indeed how they can be subsumed into a single argument. When it comes to historical data, such as the question of 'what happened and when', it makes sense to use qualitative triangulation to confirm whether 'event A' actually took place, and basic details about where the event unfolded and when it happened. At this level, multiple accounts remain amenable to a type of 'watered down' positivism, although there is no way of gauging what is omitted from the accounts under analysis, and in this sense the reconstruction of an historical account is like reconstructing a house with only a motley selection of the original building materials – it may bear a resemblance to the original, but will inevitably be a patchy approximation.

However, when it comes to respondents' value systems and the schemata by which respondents interpret events and produce knowledge in relation to them, the task of "aggregating" this "collection of situational knowledges into an account of social process" that speaks back to theory (Burawoy, 1998, p. 15) presents a dilemma that cannot be papered over by a ritualistic coding process – as Biernacki’s recently published review of several key sociological studies convincingly shows, this can serve to "efface the boundary between reporting and creating facts" (Biernacki, 2012, p. 1). This scepticism is consistent with my ontological position in relation to knowledge production, and requires me to adopt an interpretive approach to data analysis that has no pretensions to 'aggregation'. For, as Biernacki observes, "the aim of cultural analysis cannot be that of reaching summaries of meanings 'on average' nor to measure variation in outputted meanings across samples" (Biernacki, 2012, p. 147). I therefore approach my analysis in a largely interpretive way,
preferring a rigorous humanistic analysis to an unsuitable and precarious attempt at approximating positivism.

2.3.4. Analytical process and tools

My analytical process began inarticulately, in the conceptual filters I used in facilitating conversations with respondents, or skimming thousands of pages of poorly organized government documents in the National Archive, selecting those remotely relevant for copying and further perusal. When I returned from the field, the development of my analytical gaze continued in this uncodified way as I transcribed my interviews over the course of several months, and read in full each of the 315 government documents and 204 news articles I had brought back from the National Archives and National Library.

Among the archival documents was much of general historical interest, but thematically I was drawn to those which bore testimony to the material practices produced in response to squatting. I did not adopt a specific analytic method for documentary analysis, but read the texts simultaneously or consecutively for chronological and factual information and for clues to social and institutional relations. I identified texts that testified to a conflicted process of change in the management of squatting in the mid-1980s. Within this body of texts, I identified key sites of political and discursive struggle. Through a combination of close textual analysis and comparison of different primary and secondary texts, I explored the interplay of different actors, positions and perspectives in these struggles, revealing important currents of discourse and practice that have shaped squatter identity and produced the squatter camp as a deeply ambiguous site of material and political contention. Although I did not conform to a particular style of document analysis, my approach bears some resemblance to Hajer’s method of discourse analysis (Hewitt, 2009, p. 12).

In the case of my transcribed primary field interviews and the secondary transcripts I obtained from earlier research, they were electronic documents, and therefore easily inputted into NVivo to save paper and aid annotation during the analytic process. In order to help me construct a sketch of the history of Jeffsville and Brazzaville, I used NVivo as a tool to organize the data thematically around key moments in the life of the settlements, enabling me to reconstruct certain events in as much detail as possible, drawing on a variety of voices in each case. I also began building up a large range of categories to represent key ideas that emerged from the transcripts, some of which I organized into categories and sub-categories. At this step
in the process, my focus was largely literal: seeking and flagging constructions of historical events; flagging statements and discussions to highlight ideas whose importance could not yet be assessed. In the process of reading and categorizing, after already having listened to and transcribed my field material, certain larger themes began to present themselves: the role of violence in almost every arena of the social field and across time: before and after democracy; by the government and by the squatters; in the occupation of land and in evictions to clear it; in crime and in policing. The profound contradictions in the role played by the squatter camp: first a route to equality; later a mire of social immobility. The sheer number and constant shapeshifting of informal institutions whose intimate relationships to their constituents seemed as impossible to pin down as they were impossible to deny. The entanglement of changing forms of suffering and practices of solidarity. The relationship between social justice and social borders. I wrote each morning in a reflexive diary in which I grappled with emerging ideas and placed different pieces of evidence in dialogue with each other and with ideas drawn from theory and literature. This process of reading, thinking and writing formed the foundation for the chapters in this thesis. The categories I had developed did not correspond in a linear way to the themes. They were used mainly as a means of easily accessing material relating to specific institutions, practices or events, and considering different participants' reflections side by side. NVivo was designed to support "subtle and flexible research" that would allow for the "incremental" development of ideas (Richards, 2002, p. 211). I used it as a tool to minimize both the inconvenience and environmental impact of paper-based coding in the earlier stages of analysis, while choosing at the later stages to adopt a more free-form style of analysis enabling me to work beyond the structure of categories and sub-categories through which I initially ordered ideas in the cognitive process of coding.

2.4. Risk and ethics

Participating in an encounter between constructs involves risk, both personal and social. The level of risk is aggravated by the fact that social risks may have physical implications in an environment of chronic uncertainty and insecurity, yet these risks are difficult to assess by a researcher who is an outsider to the research site. I took very seriously the uncertainty surrounding issues of risk both to myself and to participants in this research, and as a result these considerations became a constraining framework for my research design on almost every level.
First of all, I chose a familiar research site, where I had a greater ability to anticipate risk. Due to family responsibilities, I could not spend an extended period in the field during which I could make contacts, build trust and get my bearings in an unfamiliar research site. I had just a few months to plunge headlong into fieldwork, and I therefore chose a place where I had done some research work in the past. That experience, which involved participatory mapping with three key respondents to elicit information relating to measures of social cohesion, gave me a reasonable mental compass and a few, albeit tenuous, contacts – two had passed away in my two-year absence. I chose a site close to family who could assist me in an emergency, and close to an institutional centre with which I have strong links – the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. There, I approached Jean-Pierre Misago, an ex-colleague who had previously worked in Atteridgeville, to be a contact with whom I shared my daily schedule of appointments during my fieldwork. This provided some reassurance to me that, should an unforeseen situation arise, he would be able to provide practical advice informed by a knowledge of the physical and social geography of the area.

Nevertheless, I identified some serious risks associated with conducting interviews within the informal settlement. For my own part, the settlement is on the periphery of the state’s ability to police, and my subject position as a white (read ‘privileged’, in the South African context), female researcher is potentially a liability in a deprived, unpolicied area. One condition of my risk and ethics clearance from LSE was to avoid entering the informal settlement at any time unless accompanied by a familiar person. An officer at the Atteridgeville police station was also concerned about my presence even in the formal township and warned me not to walk alone in the township or perhaps reconsider conducting research there at all. He told the story of a pair of male researchers who had ventured too freely around the township only to fall victim to a mugging. He told another story of an American couple visiting a farm bordering the informal settlements, where the farmer was murdered during their stay. Although these incidents are not uncommon or in any way specific to the research enterprise – rather, they are a risk of everyday life in South Africa – the university required me to take precautions for my own safety and I did this as far as possible, interviewing most respondents in the township shopping centre, and generally entering the informal settlement only in the company of a familiar person, usually my translator.
2.4.1. Designing for my subject position

My subject position as a 'white' researcher had an enormous bearing on issues of risk. In the informal settlements where I was working, the population is almost exclusively 'black African'. Although South African cities are the archetypal ‘rainbow’ of South African racial and ethnic demography, townships remain predominantly inhabited by 'black' South Africans. To some extent this is mitigated in the more iconic townships by their rebranding as exotic destinations for tourists both domestic and foreign, but during the two month period that I conducted research in Atteridgeville, I saw perhaps ten other 'white' people on the street or in the shopping centre. In the informal settlements, the appearance of a 'white' woman was regularly met with exclamations of shock and surprise, and wherever I went the expression 'lekgoa' ('white' person) followed me. This experience was one that I anticipated, and that structured my decisions about the ethics of my approaches to data collection. Being so clearly identifiable as an outsider, my interactions in the field would never be private. As I was likely to be identified as a researcher, journalist or NGO representative, my presence was likely to prompt rumours and suspicion, especially as my interviews touched on forms of mobilization that might involve criminal behaviour. This impacted my decision to conduct most interviews outside the settlement, and to conduct walks only with respondents whose social position reduced their vulnerability to reprisals. My approach changed slightly once I progressed with fieldwork and gained some insight into the politics of my embedded cases. In Brazzaville, there was less suspicion; whereas in Jeffsville one had to take care not to expose respondents to surveillance. The walks and an increased number of independent trips into the settlements with my interpreter provided very valuable observations and chance encounters that provided me with essential insights into local institutional practices, the state of social networks, and social capital in the settlements.

Another aspect of my racial interpellation as 'white' hinged on the fact that, in the squatter camp, it is almost impossible to divorce race as a characteristic from economic characteristics and issues of agency. 'White' signifies agency; surplus resources; a position closer to the centre of power. History has turned race into these things, and a polarity persisted between myself and my respondents through the awareness of the staggering contingency of our social positions, which have been conditioned by the history of our skin colours. This manifested itself in the expectation by respondents that I could be used as a bridge to a better resourced

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9 I have already signalled my reluctance to use these ascriptive terms, steeped as they are in the racial orders that produced them. However, it is worth noting that, in South Africa in particular, those racial orders persist in the social divisions that structure everyday life, as well as in many aspects of discourse including political and policy discourse. It is a clear example of the durability of political identities.
world, and I was asked for money, jobs, equipment and a variety of contacts for a variety of purposes. I dealt with these requests ethically, at the emotional cost of being a constant disappointment to the people I encountered, and in some cases at a cost to the quality of my research, because for some respondents there was simply no reason to forge any kind of social bond with an individual who professed to have nothing to give in return. The assumption that I had the ability to do something about their situation was often linked up to what was perceived to be my 'place of origin.' When people heard I was studying in the UK, they often assumed I was a ‘white’ foreigner, and this had consequences too. People assumed my work had some kind of developmental implications or that I would know international donors who could assist in their small-scale plans. Some people thanked me for the work I was doing, which they imagined would make a big difference to their lives. I always had to correct them, which was a disheartening experience for all concerned.

Finally, I was aware that certain 'leaders' within the areas would have been approached by white outsiders before – often representatives of organizations with resources or opportunities to offer within the settlement. What I had not anticipated was that these leaders might be accustomed to benefiting politically or financially from their identity as representatives or brokers of the squatter population. The presumption that I had something to offer created one very uncomfortable ethical dilemma when a particular group of leaders insisted quite aggressively on sharing the imagined 'proceeds' of my research. Fortunately, when after consulting with my supervisor I explained that this was not possible and that I would have to continue without their assistance, they agreed to assist me anyway. I can only imagine that they had merely been posturing in the hope of forcing my hand if there was something to benefit, but that they derived some satisfaction or benefit from the public performance of the power contained in their brokering or gatekeeping role. Indeed, it was clear in one case that leaders were vying for the monopoly on this role when one witnessed me walking and talking in the settlement with another and made quite a scene of interrupting us in order to stake his claim on the interaction.

2.4.2. Approaching violence obliquely

The 2008 anti-foreigner violence led to a greater stigmatization of 'xenophobia,' and various state and NGO-led interventions to change attitudes and preclude further attacks. In research elsewhere, respondents expressed frustration at the inability of outside institutions to
appreciate what they considered to be the legitimate concerns fuelling collective violence, but given the passage of time and the hegemony of tolerance and inclusion as validated personal and communal values, I anticipated that respondents were likely to adopt 'the accepted line' if approached directly about ‘xenophobic’ violence in the area. I was also concerned that, if residents of the settlement were to realize my interest in ‘xenophobic’ violence, immediate social closure might ensue. There was a possibility that leaders – whose participation was essential to my historical research – were involved in organizing or participating in the violence. A large number of non-elite residents of the research site were also likely to have participated in the violence and destruction, and would likely wish to avoid scrutiny of their actions which might lead to identification by the police. I also worried that, in a divided community, the insiders who were essential to my research were likely to freeze out someone whose interest in anti-outsider violence might be perceived as being biased against the community that carried out the expulsions. These considerations affected my choice to rely on a body of secondary data comprising interviews conducted in 2008, which were primarily focused on ‘xenophobic’ attacks. This additional data, collected closer to the time at which the attacks occurred, was less influenced by the effects of time and enabled me to approach the issue of violence obliquely in my interviews. I structured the interviews historically to allow respondents to speak first about the settlement's establishment, management and evolution over time, trying to let the subject of the attacks come up organically in the discussion. Where it did come up, I adopted a disinterested tone in order not to signal any prejudice in regard to the rightness or wrongness of violent social action. In addition, I never used the word 'xenophobia' unless it was introduced by the participant, in order not to presuppose the meaning of anti-outsider mobilization for participants.

2.5. Conclusion

Politics and place are intimately related. Political identities are shaped by the process of state formation (Mamdani, 2001) as well by the particularities of specific localities (Gieryn, 2000). Studying the political subjectivities and practices of the squatter camp means treating place sociologically as both product and process; both structure and agency. The fabric of place is shaped by the ways places have been structured by actors, for various purposes, at multiple scales, dynamically across the course of time. It is at the site of local emergence that new insight can be gained into the meaning of citizenship, cosmopolitanism and violence, but local political identity and practice exist in a larger institutional context. This chapter has explained
how, by combining a historical genealogy of the squatter camp and an embedded cross case exploration of the areas of Jeffsville and Brazzaville in the settlement of Mshongo, I operationalized a complex methodological gaze through a mix of methods and data collection techniques that allow for an analytical movement between different institutional scales, political eras, actors, and bodies of knowledge. This in turn serves as a strategy for applying methodological and analytical rigour, seeking to address issues of validity in a humanistic way, following the dialogic principle of reflexive science, which makes deliberate connections between “participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its field of location, folk theory and academic theory” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 14). Chapters 3 and 4 follow immediately, drawing on archival and documentary research in order to set the institutional scene for the ethnographic study of Mshongo in Chapters 5 through 7.
Chapter 3: Spatial strategies of rule and the 'question of citizenship' in South Africa

I was taken to court this very morning, charged with intending to steal and with roaming about Nairobi without being a resident of the city, without a job, without a house and without a permit. Vagrancy or something like that, that is what they called it. But, our people, think: I, Wangari, a Kenyan by birth – how can I be a vagrant in my own country as if I were a foreigner? I denied both charges: to look for work is not a crime.

Wangari in Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's (1987) Devil on the Cross, p.43

Outraged by denial of her right to the city, Wangari rails against being treated as a foreigner in Kenya, her "own country" – perfectly capturing the notion of citizenship as the primary threshold for the definition of “what form of life is eligible for protection” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 104) by the state. Although Devil on the Cross is set in Kenya, this is particularly apt against the backdrop of South African history, in which the state not only denied 'black' citizens equal rights to urban (and indeed all) space, but also made concerted attempts to move them outside the protection of the state through the establishment of independent 'black' states within the South African territory. If the history and institutions of the state interact in producing durable “political identities” that “shape our relationship to the state and to one another through the state” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22), then the laws and institutions devoted to defining membership of a polity play a crucial role. And, as Wangari points out, the question of membership is not always as clear-cut as the citizen-foreigner distinction might imply. Instead, law, policy and practice shape distinctive strata among the citizenry, creating inequalities that render the borders of belonging deeply ambiguous. In the process, individuals who find themselves "collated" by shared experiences of material and political inequality take these unequal political identities as the starting point for collective struggle (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22). In this chapter, I explore the shaping of political identities in South Africa through the deliberate political ordering of state space during apartheid – spatial strategies whose legacy is clearly evident in Mshongo in later chapters. Importantly, I show how the production of unequal membership through the engineering of exceptional places paradoxically formed the foundation for interstitial politics and insurgent claim-making. It is against the history of productive sovereign exceptionalism outlined in this chapter that Chapter 4 will explore the rise of the squatter camp as an insurgent space of exception, and the unexpected form of
inclusive exceptionalism that materialised as a consequence of conflicting state-scale institutional responses.

The borders and meaningfulness of place distinguish it conceptually from 'space', as we have seen in Gieryn's sociological conception of place as a whole comprising geographic location, material form and meaning. Yet the political organization of space that is involved in the process of establishing, consolidating and managing a nation state produces bordered and meaningful places through the demarcation of administrative boundaries and the configuration of power implicit in "establishing structures of governance within particular spaces" (Strandsbjerg, 2010, p. 3, following Soja). The practices whereby place is produced immediately recall Mamdani's insistence on the institutional practices through which political identities are forged (Mamdani, 2001). The South African state is a particularly interesting example of the use of spatial strategies to calibrate political life, given its historical use of territorial separation of populations and powers, as well as urban segregation and the organization of specific patterns of urban property dispossession and accumulation. It has proved difficult to categorize the form of the apartheid state because of its unusual combination of racial and liberal modernist forms of rule, but it nevertheless (perhaps consequently) provides a stylized exemplar of the techniques of space and scale by which modern states produce and reproduce insiders and outsiders, members and non-members, through administration of “the entire condition of contemporary society” according to an instrumental rationality (Opello & Rosow, 2004, pp. 139-140). Taking up the theme of political identity in explicit relation to apartheid’s modern strategies of spatio-political organization and their production of a stratified citizenry, this chapter proceeds through three phases. It begins with a general conceptualization of citizenship as both a key locus of political identity and a site of ambiguity. It proceeds to consider the ambiguity of the South African city as a field for the coexistence of contradictory forces of racial exclusion and capitalist production, and how a nexus of exceptional places in the form of the homeland and township respectively was designed in an attempt to manage this tension. I go on, in the section that follows, to highlight the productive ambiguities created by this modernist attempt to simultaneously include and exclude 'black' subject-citizens, and the insurgent practices that emerged in the interstices between apartheid’s institutions of exclusion and the agency of citizens within the exceptional spaces the regime produced. In this manner, the chapter illustrates the ambiguous way in which space – or, in Gieryn's terms, place – "not only structures social practices but also can be a resource, or a source of power in itself" (Kaspersen & Strandsbjerg, 2009).
3.1. Citizenship, stratification and the boundaries of political membership

It is perhaps self-evident that in the modern world of nation-states, political identity is primarily embodied and expressed by juridical citizenship. Citizenship has historically been no less than “the main institution regulating membership in political communities and has provided the philosophical rationale and quotidien structure for the socio-political organization of societies and legitimate systems of governance” (Guarnizo, 2012, p. 11). Juridical citizenship defines both “the prerogatives and encumbrances” of social membership, and forms the “basic means and rationality” around which governments organize their states of jurisdiction (Holston, 2008, p. 21). Unlike various other collective identities – or identifications, as Brubaker and Cooper would prefer us to say (2000, p. 14) – citizenship as both a normative and administrative category is inherently reifying. As the overarching positive legal category through which identity is assigned, citizenship is analytically distinct from the everyday universe of self- and other-identifications. As Holston powerfully asserts: “although it is one of many associational identities people normally assume, the state that defines it is like no other association” (Holston, 2008, p. 21):

Although the state is part of society, it also frames it. Although the state is an association, it is also an association of associations that establishes the rules of other associations and regulates their membership. Therefore, as the primary identity of state association, citizenship is like no other status. Its conditions have greater effect because it articulates the other statuses in terms of the nation-state’s particular framework of law, institutions, demands, and sentiments. Accordingly, where the modern state came to compete with and dominate other forms of union, national citizenship became a trump status, managing the differences of other identities.” (Holston, 2008, p. 21)

Crucially, democratic citizenship has a simultaneously universal and bounded character (Bosniak, 2006, p. 35), linked to the territorial boundaries of the state. That is, it offers a universe of norms and privileges universally to those eligible for its protection. Of course, if citizenship is the identity which directly links the individual to the political life of the nation-state, the nature of this linkage has varied through the history of the modern territorial state, such that citizenship has not always precisely embodied the democratic structure of popular sovereignty and universal suffrage that predominates in the democratic imagination of today (Opello & Rosow, 2004). In this sense, citizenship may involve varying degrees of popular political agency, but regardless signals inclusion both “in the community of normative priority” and in “the various economic, social, political, and personal benefits” (Bosniak, 2006, p. 137) entailed in that priority.
Theoretically, citizenship is a “trump status”, an “identity which subordinates and coordinates all other identities—of religion, estate, family, gender, ethnicity, region, and the like—to its framework of a uniform body of law” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 187). A fully democratic citizenship therefore has potential to erode “local hierarchies, statuses, and privileges in favour of national jurisdictions and contractual relations based in principle on an equality of rights” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 187), and to act as “a buffer against the vagaries of the market and the inequalities of the class system” (Saunders, 1993, cited in Sassen, 2002, p. 9). But despite the apparent obviousness in the popular imagination of citizenship as a legal endowment of birth or heredity, “the class of citizenship’s subjects and the domain of citizenship’s substance are not always in alignment” (Bosniak, 2006, p. 35). Rather, rights of citizenship are often stratified, both in terms of political agency and political entitlements. Historically, citizenship and suffrage have not always gone hand in hand (consider for example the Navajo in Arizona up until 1948 - Phelps, 1985, p. 136; white women citizens in America during the 19th century - Tarrant, 1996, p. 51), so that certain populations have held citizenship without holding the vote. In addition to this, citizenship – democratic or otherwise – has not always guaranteed equal rights or protections in practice. This fact fundamentally challenges democracy’s basic assumption of a common good to be distilled from a political community “of shared purposes and commensurable citizens” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 192):

If the formal refers to membership in the nation-state and the substantive to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess and exercise, much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following problem: although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship. That it is not sufficient is obvious for many poor citizens who have formal membership in the state but who are excluded in fact or law from enjoying the rights of citizenship and participating effectively in its organization. (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190)

Such stratification of citizenship rights and agency can be a result of uneven penetration of the national territory by state institutions (O'Donnell, 1993, p. 1361), or can be deliberately built into the juridical substance of citizenship, so that “citizenship itself [becomes] formulated as a means to distribute rights to some citizens and deny them to others” (Holston, 2008, p. 19). This was certainly the case in historical formulations of South African citizenship, which featured an array of exclusionary legal instruments and the subsequent depoliticization of their legacy once those instruments were set aside leading up to and into the era of democracy. Thus, though formal citizenship may be the threshold status defining the contours of the population of bodies universally “eligible for protection” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p.
“legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights” (Sassen, 2002, p. 11) or “in itself promote economic or social equality” (Storey, 2001, p. 63). Despite citizenship status, pre-existing hierarchies of privilege within the state will continue to stratify society (Sassen, 2002, p. 11; Storey, 2001, p. 63) and serve as gatekeeping mechanisms to power. Thus, even “where groups may have full citizenship, this may not be enough to prevent them being treated as second-class citizens through various subtle and not-so-subtle forms of discrimination and victimisation” (Storey, 2001, p. 63). These ‘second-class’ citizenships can assume various "mutilated" forms, which Chetan Bhatt has referred to as "infra-citizenship" (Bhatt, 2004, p. 145; 2006, p. 104).

The inequality and ambiguity introduced into citizenship through distinctions between de jure and de facto citizenship, or indeed through the formal differentiation of substantive rights among different member groups within a state, is a productive force that shapes citizens’ struggles and agency. In this sense, ambiguity and inequality have the potential to transform citizenship from a status imposed from above to a practice exercised from below. This recalls Holston’s view of marginality as a foundation for counterpolitics, transforming citizenship from a “static attribute” to “a claim to be made upon society” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 197; Roy, 2009, p. 8). It also resonates with Mamdani’s assertion that counterpolitical subjectivities and practices may emerge not in spite of but because of, and in relation to, the institutionalization of political identities by the state (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22).

Therefore, the existence of structural discrimination should not lead us to view citizenship as merely a technique of state power through which individuals are coerced or co-opted into their own subjugation. Rather than simply being a mode of domination, citizenship can also be seen as

a double practice of political subjectivation [...] a practice of being positioned, and of positioning oneself, simultaneously as subject to be governed and as subject with a right to act creatively upon modes of government, the nature of polity, and the formation and distribution of rights and obligations. Citizens are not the people to be governed but subjects who enact themselves as being simultaneously subjected to and subjecting government. (Huysmans & Guillaume, 2013, p. 23)

Citizenship is therefore seated both within the state and within the subject – an “ambivalent practice that equally easily mobilizes discriminations and exclusions, as well as challenges them”(Huysmans & Guillaume, 2013, p. 23). In this sense, the concept of citizenship, and the equality it implies, produces the potential for contention and conflict, such that citizenship “both constitutes fundamental structures of modern society and unsettles them” (Holston,
Rather than being simply “a static attribute to be possessed and wielded”, it is also “a claim to be made upon society” (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 197), as those at the threshold of political community – the threshold between bare life and the good life citizenship embodies (Agamben, 1998) – attempt to move toward the centre, creating new sites and scales of struggle (Isin cited in Huysmans & Guillaume, 2013, p. 26).

Thus, just as the governmental work of citizenship stratifies and hierarchizes through techniques exclusion and domination, the subjective work of citizenship counteracts these techniques through disruptions and appropriations – generating an “interstitial politics” of the alienated and subjugated subjects of the state (Huysmans & Guillaume, 2013, p. 27), or, as Holston refers to it, an “insurgent citizenship” (Holston, 2008). I would argue that one of the fields of such contention is territoriality – defined “as a way to ‘control people and things by controlling area’; ‘a strategy to establish different degrees of access to people, things and relationships’” (Sack in Ditchev, 2005, p. 347). Governments have often used territorial techniques to manage populations through division and stratification – consider the ways in which indigenous reserves have served state power in the US (Rifkin, 2009), Australia and South Africa (Tedmanson, 2008), the way central and peripheral spaces were mobilized as a political tool in communist Russia (Ditchev, 2005), or the relegation of Bedouin Arabs to “gray spaces” in Israel/Palestine (Yiftachel, 2009). In fact, it has been argued that “the citizen is a kind of geographical and historical assemblage: an achievement of a multitude of human/environment interfaces” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 260), including not just spatial divisions such as the state and the city, but also “the definition of legitimate mobility” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 260; also see Torpey, 2000).

It is clear, then, that although citizenship is fundamental to political identity, it is a deeply ambiguous phenomenon. It can be an equalizing or a stratifying force: on the one hand, it is a status defining the inside and outside of the national political community, and offering a universal basis for equality within state borders; on the other, it may be defined in such a way as to produce inequality through the stratification of members of the polity. The ambiguity created by distinctions between formal and substantive citizenship, or differentiation of formal rights among citizens is productive, however, turning citizenship into a claim-making practice and an ongoing process of negotiation. This complex understanding of citizenship as a form of political identification and practice, produced interactively in a top-down and bottom-up manner in response to inequalities and ambiguities in political membership, provides an important conceptual background for the following section. I turn to an examination of the
geographical and historical assemblage of political identities in South Africa, discussing the deliberate spatial strategies of rule used at national level by the modern apartheid state to differentiate the citizenship of different population groups. In constructing this account, I draw on and synthesize a novel range of theoretical sources from the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and geography. Drawing heavily on archival materials, I then move onto a discussion of the paradoxical way in which this produced an ‘interstitial’ politics and insurgent practices.

3.2. Engineering citizenship through place: the challenge of the city in South Africa

How did the South African state attempt to impose modern order given the inherent ambiguity of a racially stratified and politically unequal citizenry? Ambiguity would seem to be anathema to the modern state. Modernity is associated with the orderly management and control of societies through clearly defined logics, techniques and technologies of governance. Rationalization through data collection, administrative regulations, and the definition of bureaucratic procedures have all been important components of the development of rationalities of rule in the modern world, much of it directed at reducing, if not eliminating, ambiguities. Yet the ordering and fixing imperatives of modernity can create contradiction and ambiguity instead where different logics collide, or where de facto institutional practices introduce informal elements into formally defined laws, policies and procedures. Human geographers have highlighted this in contemporary states and their cities, in the varying extents to which they are shaped by tensions "between nationalizing/ethnicizing and urbanizing/capitalist forces" (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003, p. 674), and in the sometimes contradictory practices of the nation state as an embodied, rather than abstract, institution (Mountz, 2003). Whereas Chapter 4 will touch on the latter, in this chapter I focus on the former: specifically, the tension apparent in the racial and spatial stratification of citizenship/membership in South Africa prior to its first democratic elections in 1994. Cities were created as sites of irreconcilable contradiction between the racial and capitalist logics of the state, demanding the contradictory goals of excluding ‘black’ citizens while including ‘black’ workers. This ambivalence produced places and political subjectivities that stubbornly exceeded the spatial and political boundaries allotted to them. Even as the apartheid state attempted to contain this excess through changing strategies of rule, it paradoxically produced
ambiguous political identifications and practices that undermined the state’s regulatory intentions.

Despite the unique characteristics of its political history, the South African state in its racial form exhibited many of the ordinary features of modernity (Popke, 2001, p. 737). South Africa’s racial-territorial techniques of government expressed a high modernist faith in the “plasticity of the physical and social world” (Pierson, 2004, p. 28) and the amenability of social order to rational engineering. Many of its unusual features attempted to engineer the form taken by transformations in demographic, economic and social life wrought by modernization, and distribute the costs and benefits of modernity in service of its politically dominant ‘white’ citizens. This involved state direction of the commodification of economic relationships, such that ‘white’ citizens were protected as the cost of their ‘black’ counterparts by state-led controls on demographic change (especially urbanization and urban population growth) through the regulation of mobility, residence and property rights – that is, by intervening in the relationship between populations and places. This process allowed the benefits of industrialization and capitalism to accrue to the dominant racial minority, while physically confining the majority to feudal, agrarian forms of government and economy, excluded from the advancing modernity of ‘white’ South Africa. Modernization has involved the disciplining of space according to abstract ordering logics, producing uniformity "through the application of plans and the operation of property and capital markets, which reduce social and spatial complexity to the logic of profit and the rationality of social and spatial engineering" (Popke, 2001, p. 742). Certainly, spatial strategies and supporting technologies, such as the state’s monopolization of the legitimate means of movement (Torpey, 1998) through the pass laws, played a crucial role in the South African state’s attempts to manage the expansion of political participation latent to modernization, as it attempted to externalize the political institutionalization of the subject race through quasi-autonomous ‘independent’ and ‘self-governing’ states within the national territory.10

In its aspirations to “transform society in line with the dictates of reason” (Pierson, 2004, p. 30), in the interests of one political community at the cost of others, the South African racial state project contains echoes of Nazi modernism (Z. Bauman, 2002). However, it can be distinguished from holocaust necropolitics by a key internal ambiguity. The racial state project involved simultaneously inclusive and exclusive imperatives: the imperative to utilize the other as a commodity (which required some level of inclusion among the universe of polity

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10 My discussion of modern characteristics of the state is informed by Pierson’s chapter, ‘Placing the state in modernity’ (2004, p. 28).
members), while nullifying his or her political life (which required all kinds of controls and special institutional arrangements to perform such exclusion within the constitutional dispensation of the modern state). Importantly, this process brought diverse populations of unequal citizens to the cities, transforming certain city spaces into fields of simultaneous containment and contention.

Despite the insular tendency of apartheid policies, I show in this chapter that South Africa’s cities contained the conditions of possibility for “new structurations of power” and “openings for new types of political actors” (Sassen, 2002, p. 21) – in part because of the exceptional spaces opened up within the city to manage the tension between racial nationalist and capitalist priorities. Such claim-making is related to the concentration of disadvantaged strata in cities, which works against the reduction of the powerless to an invisible and impotent mass (Sassen, 2002, p. 21). Sassen asserts that contemporary citizenship practices “have to do with the production of ‘presence’ of those without power and a politics that claims rights to the city” (Sassen, 2002, p. 19). Although her focus is predominantly on the political subjectivity and agency of non-citizens in the city, her thinking on the way cities provide a political platform for the marginalized coincides with Holston’s more recent articulation of “insurgent citizenship” in relation to disadvantaged citizens within stratified democracies. Holston views this more specifically as a way in which the exclusionary histories of state- and citizen-making are made manifest within cities, opening space for insurgent claim-making by citizens:

Yet, under the sign of the city, the very same factors that produced this entrenched regime [of differentiated citizenship] mobilize an insurgence of citizens. The same forces that that effectively fragmented and dominated the rural poor by reducing their existence to a “mere life” incite the urban poor to demand a citizen’s life. [...] It is an insurgence that begins with the struggle for rights to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen’s dignity. [...] These are the citizens who, in the process of building their residential spaces, not only construct a vast new city but, on that basis, also constitute it as a polity with a different order of citizenship. (Holston, 2008, p. 313)

The interaction that is evident here between structural forces and the agency of ‘insurgent citizens’ depicts once more the relation between structure and agency, politics and counterpolitics, implicit in Mamdani’s conception of political identities. Against this backdrop, I will consider the interrelation between these forces, and their coproduction of political subjectivities and practices within the South African state under apartheid. I focus in particular on the specific ways in which spatial strategies of rule, aiming to order and control through places of exception and containment, paradoxically gave rise to ambiguous and productive spatial interstices, demonstrating that “place is not merely a setting or backdrop, but an
agentic player in the game – a force with detectable and independent effects on social life” (Werlen cited in Gieryn, 2000, p. 466).

3.3. Spatial strategies of rule: producing political identity through exception, containment and excess

If power and inequality intersect with the location, form and meaning of places, becoming evident in “how places come into being” and “what places accomplish” (Gieryn, 2000, p. 468), we must explore apartheid’s places of exception and containment within their historical and political-institutional context in order to understand the forces that produced them, and the purposes for which those forces were deployed. Such an exploration offers the basis for an analysis of the role of space and place in the discourses and practices of political identification employed by the South African state and the interstices opened up by the agency of the marginalized in response. In this section I discuss the way in which spaces of exception and containment were created by the apartheid state in an attempt to police the racial topography of citizenship. Largely an exploration of the establishment and management of places for 'black' populations, it has as its largely unspoken corollary the archetypal ‘white’ citizen produced and reproduced by the South African state until the 1990s: a citizenship marked by modernity, urbanity and permanence.

3.3.1. Exceptional spaces: a topography of (infra-)citizenships

The native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man’s creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases to so minister. (Stallard Commission, cited in Unterhalter, 1987, p. 6)

This statement, made in the early 1920s, embodies the dynamic of inclusion/exclusion that resulted from the contradictory priorities of excluding the racial other while exploiting his or her utility. This dynamic persisted throughout the first half of the 20th Century in South Africa, and culminated in territorial apartheid’s system of urban exclusion. With the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 emerged a territorial technique by which the organization of space would privilege the ‘white’ citizen, making cities and their economic infrastructure the right and property of the citizen, while the ‘black’ citizen was objectified as simply part of the machinery of commerce – an object devoid of entitlements or political subjectivity. In line with this, the
The edifice of territorial apartheid was built to serve the purpose of instrumentalizing ‘black’ people while denying them equal rights as members of the national polity. Broadly, this saw the creation of a racially stratified ‘white’ South Africa “consisting of the major urban and industrial cores” (Platzky & Walker, 1985, p. 16) and a collection of largely barren rural hinterlands (referred to as reserves, bantustans or homelands) (Cohen & Cobbett, 1988, p. 10). Only to the extent that labour requirements created a rational demand for ‘black’ residence in the cities, were urban ‘black’ residential areas known as ‘townships’ developed. Forced removals, moving ‘blacks’ from ‘white’ areas to townships or ‘homelands’ in service of these techniques, resulted in enormous dispossession that severely afflicted the economic geography of ‘black’ space (Lalloo, 1998, p. 730; Viljoen & Sekhampu, 2013), with a legacy continuing up until the present day. In this section I demonstrate how intensified rationalization under apartheid saw the ‘homeland’ and the ‘township’ developed into a nexus of spatial forms with the purpose of cementing the political and economic position of the (‘white’) citizen, while utilizing the labour and containing the political life of the (‘black’) citizen who was, as far as possible, reduced to a subject.11

“Homelands”: producing a structural outside

Let us examine this nexus more closely, starting with the rural reserves. In terms of material form, the ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ consisted of farmsteads bequeathed under various forms of traditional authority that worked according to a principle of communal ownership. In this sense, they were constructed as a kind of primitive or premodern geography of ‘traditional’ authority, communal tenure, and basic agriculture, in contrast to the rationally governed ‘white’ state, a world of commerce, industry, wage labour and individual property ownership. Importantly, in terms of their material size, the bantustans comprised 13% of the national territory (Letsoalo & Rogerson, 1982, p. 302), set aside for 75% of the country’s population (Smith, 1992, p. 4). Reserve land did not offer a viable alternative form of wealth or livelihood to ‘black’ subjects; rather, it was an external container of poverty, out of sight and out of jurisdiction of the South African state. What value reserve land did hold diminished due to an historical process of underdevelopment, and the rigging of economic structures against ‘black’ farmers, to the point that wage work became necessary to maintain subsistence on bantustan land, increasing dependence on migrancy in order to secure a supply of labour for ‘white’ South Africa (Letsoalo & Rogerson, 1982, pp. 303-304). Physical restructuring and

11 Along the lines laid out by Mamdani in his study of the legacy of late colonialism in Africa (Mamdani, 1996).
forced resettlement of populations in the bantustans under modernist policies of ‘betterment’ deprived huge proportions of ‘homeland’ residents of farmland (Letsoalo & Rogerson, 1982, p. 305), entrenching this dependence on jobs elsewhere and spatializing this dependency within bantustan settlements with virtually no access to livelihood opportunities (Jones, 2001, p. 48; Letsoalo & Rogerson, 1982, p. 313). In this sense, the material form of land in the ‘homelands’ produced a population dependent for its subsistence on perpetual mobility into South Africa in search of wage work. ‘Homelands’ were therefore deeply ambiguous places – simultaneously autonomous and dependent; inside and outside; perpetually mobile and radically immobile. In this sense, they resembled the "zone of indistinction" that Agamben calls the camp – containers of 'bare life' where people are denied political life but nevertheless subject to political power (Agamben, 1998, pp. 168-170).

For the state, the bantustans performed a crucial function of regulating the flow of ‘black’ people into ‘white’ South Africa (Smith, 1992, p. 2). In this sense, they were a form of storage of labour, part of a process of commodification of the ‘black’ body. This reduction of the ‘black’ person to a useful object had as its corollary the need to neutralize the danger represented by this objectification – its potential political and social consequences. The ‘homelands’ served the purpose of containing this threat – a kind of political quarantine holding the political life-potential of a marginalized majority outside the metropolitan areas. The so-called ‘pass laws’ – linking city access to employment and housing – provided the infrastructure to police the borders between cities and homelands. The conditions placed on permits to be or work in the city confined legitimate movement to those who were economically useful to the South African state, and even then marked the bearer as always an ‘outsider’ in ‘white’ space. This process of urban gatekeeping can be seen as a strategy to close down the opportunity cities present for the development of new political actors and capacities, and the fermentation of membership crises as diverse groups of disadvantaged migrants gain increasing presence and visibility (Sassen, 2002).

Sassen’s thinking on the political potentiality of refugees and undocumented migrants is all the more resonant in the South African case, since the apartheid state worked tirelessly to turn ‘black’ citizens into foreigners. The ‘black’ reserves were further engineered in typically modern fashion, in tandem with the state’s efforts to divide the ‘black’ population into ethnic minorities as part of its strategy of ‘white’ (minority) rule. This technique of population division aimed to consolidate ‘white’ rule: managing the political threat of a heterogeneity that would otherwise unify the ‘black’ population as a subjected majority; and spatially dividing groups
into more governable populations (Beningfield, 2006, p. 126; Mamdani, 1996, p. 79). The identification and enumeration of ‘black’ ethnic groups and their geographic distribution into ethnic ‘homelands’ was intended to foster the emergence of ethnic nationalism to underwrite the establishment of separate territorial polities within the national territory – quasi-states capable of opting for ‘independence’, producing a pseudo-geopolitics of international relations within the territory of a single state. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 was the legislative instrument of this technique of rule, identifying every ‘black’ subject with an ethnic ‘homeland’ (Platzky & Walker, 1985, p. 124) which would anachronistically become his or her place of origin – regardless of whether he or she had ever set foot there. The South African government immediately sought independence negotiations with these pseudo-polities. With independence, the arbitrarily defined members of the homelands that opted for independence lost their de jure South African citizenship and by law became foreign nationals whose rights were no longer the concern of the South African state but purely a matter of diplomatic agreement. Most of the non-independent homelands, also referred to as ‘self-governing national states,’ refused independence because they recognized the value that even a heavily strictured ‘citizenship’ of South Africa entailed. Chief Minister of QwaQwa, Kenneth Mopeli, in a meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, insisted that the homelands were merely ghettos “with no economic basis”, so that to be a citizen of one was to be “a citizen of poverty.”

12 The institutionalization of these exceptional places, populated (pending independence) by ‘black’ subjects who by statute held dual citizenship of both homeland and South Africa, but enjoyed substantive rights of citizenship in neither, embodies a “zone of indistinction” (Agamben, 1998, p. 170) – an “interstitial zone” (Lee, 2010, p. 60) where, paradoxically, law and right dissolve while being held in suspension by the law itself. Agamben considers this zone to be the paradigmatic modern political space, and builds a profoundly negative view of politics on this foundation. What do we make, then, of the South African state’s imperative to divest itself of these spaces; its willingness to surrender sovereign control over them and constitute them as distinct, self-governing states? I will come back to this question later, arguing that Agamben takes too pessimistic a view of the zone of indistinction, overlooking the threatening political agency that these ambiguous zones represent. First, I will examine the township as a complementary spatial form to the homeland, and a technique through which the state attempted to include the ‘black’ citizen in the city for instrumental reasons, while strictly delimiting her political and material freedom and agency.

12 Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984a, p. 193.
Townships: containing the outside within

Townships were a separate but interlinked material form produced by the South African state – a manifestation of “the most fundamental contradiction of urban apartheid – the contradiction between the inclusionary and exclusionary imperatives of the system” (Maylam, 1995, p. 35), which depended economically on the labour of racially excluded citizens. The laws and institutional practices that established and managed these places differentiated the formal rights of ‘black’ citizens in terms of their utility to the capitalist system, the strength of their relation to an employer, and their length of stay in the city. As such, we will see, political identity was institutionalized through laws and regulations that differentiated people according to binary oppositions of necessity/superfluity; permanence/temporariness; and belonging/non-belonging.

To some extent, ‘black’ townships pre-existed National Party (apartheid) rule due to the urban segregation policies already in place, but they were consolidated and took their current form during apartheid. Conceptually, townships became deeply ambiguous places, representing on one hand an embodiment of the state’s inscription of temporariness and non-belonging on all ‘black’ subjects, and on the other an instrument through which the ‘black’ populace was further differentiated through the inscription of varying degrees of permanence and superfluity. In the 1950s and 60s, ‘black’ freehold property owners in urban areas were forcefully removed to newly established townships on the urban peripheries, where they were no longer entitled to own property but could only rent housing from the municipality. In this sense, the townships became a mode of settlement through which the state rendered even established urban ‘black’ residents as ‘temporary sojourners’, as part of a policy of discouraging “long-term African settlement in towns” (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 73; 74). Ambiguously, despite the increased precarity implied by these changes in tenure and the economic effects of forced removal, these original township residents benefitted from the state’s acknowledgement around the same time that there existed a permanent, settled “urbanised” and “detribalised” ‘black’ urban worker population. This resulted in the conferral of urban residential rights on this class via Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, as amended by the Native Laws Amendment Act in 1952 (Hindson, 1985, p. 403), as well as the subsequent freezing of township housing development to deter further urbanization and attempt to ‘stabilize’ this recognized urban workforce (Posel, 1991, pp. 78-79; 82-85) in segregated areas within the modern ‘white’ state rather than in the feudal, agrarian reserves. The stabilization process – further evidence of the apartheid state’s recognition of the city as a
site of potentially threatening political emergence – was accompanied by the establishment of an urban labour preference policy supported by labour bureaux that ensured existing urban residents were prioritized for employment. Though it remained an infra-citizenship, a more substantive political existence was gained by a certain class of urban ‘black’ subject, with some level of legal guarantee and implementing institutions reproducing a kind of positive urban membership. As Posel observes, “conferral of residential rights created a category of city-dwellers entitled to remain there whether or not they were unemployed and therefore ‘surplus’ to white needs” (Posel, 1991, pp. 82-83). Hindson explicitly labels this a "process of stratification within the urban African population" into a permanent, settled stratum entitled to family living quarters, and a temporary stratum of single workers consigned to single-sex labour barracks or lodgings with settled families (Hindson, 1985, p. 404). Through the bureaucratic machinery of influx control, that subjected both groups to constant permit checks (Hindson, 1985, p. 404), those in the temporary stratum could be rendered “surplus” and removed for lack of utility at any time, whereas the permanent class could claim a valid presence in the city, giving them something more of what Holston calls “the dignity worthy of a citizen” (2008, p. 313).

Thus, despite the inscribed superfluity of all ‘black’ subjects, the interface between geographic regions and the distribution of temporal rights through permits created a more permanent, stationary and socially integrated population in townships, and a temporary, perpetually mobile and atomized urban population of migrant workers who were forever on the edge of being rendered ‘surplus’ by unemployment and becoming excepted as a result.¹³ In townships, this stratification of populations with variant levels of political subjectivity, rights to presence, and capacities, was evident in the material form of housing. Single migrant labourers were confined to single-sex, barracks-style ‘hostels’, either in multi-story or cottage style (J. Robinson, 1992), precluding the accommodation of family members, which was in any case not permitted. Their rights to presence depended completely upon utility to the state and their reduction to a labour resource devoid of almost all rights and belonging. Their superfluity kept their families at a distance in the ‘homelands,’ which had been strategically produced as their place of ‘origin’. On the other hand, the more stable permanent residents occupied family houses with small yards. This embodied their socio-economic advantage: the advantage of greater space, privacy and social continuity, as well as potential income streams from migrant lodgers. Permanence allowed for continuous access to the job market and amenities related to

¹³ In Chapter 5, however, we will see that this distinction was eroded as the state froze housing development, providing no substantive mechanism for the realization of township housing rights by citizens who held them, redrawing permanent residents as superfluous urbanites.
‘urban advantage’ (Espino, 2015, p. 4), to the improved capacities and agency offered by the city, as well as the legal space to seek alternative employment and to live with dependents, fostering social reproduction.

As they were places in which a designated outside appeared within the national territory of South Africa, townships were not simply urban labour containers, but a spatial assemblage of processes of political containment to manage the contradictory impulses of inclusion and exclusion of potentially useful ‘black’ bodies referred to earlier. Townships were designed to expedite administration and control and thus contain the political threat residents might present (J. Robinson, 1992, p. 296), as well as the threat congested, inaccessible and disorganized slum accommodation could present to order, health and sanitation (J. Robinson, 1992, p. 296; 297) – key attributes of the modern city. The design of the township was intended to contain “the threat of violence within a policable area” (Beningfield, 2006, p. 217) – and we must of course note here that violence appears to be synonymous with political agency in this context. Migrant hostels were designed in such a way that their administration and surveillance was expedited – for instance, they would have only one entrance, or be set around a courtyard such that they could be easily sealed off in case of violence (J. Robinson, 1992, p. 296). Townships were laid out “with wide streets in a radiating pattern in order to assist in the control and surveillance of the populations”, and dwellings “were detached and laid out in precise rows, which enabled the movement of bodies between properties to be seen from the street” (Beningfield, 2006, pp. 217-218). High level spotlights, referred to as “Apollos”, presumably after the Greco-Roman god of the sun, were installed for the purposes of surveillance, “turning darkness into daylight” at night (Mbembe, Dlamini, & Khonou, 2008, p. 243). In this sense, compared to ‘homeland’ dwellers, township residents were subjected to higher levels of surveillance through spaces that made them more visible and controllable by police. Indeed, “township life under apartheid was, to a large extent, a mode of inscription of people’s lives in a space subject to high levels of surveillance” (Mbembe et al., 2008, p. 242). In addition, townships were ethnically zoned in tandem with the division of the ‘homelands’. In this way, the state divided and distributed the population in a controlled way, often along ethnic lines around ethnically-targeted educational facilities, attempting as far as possible to reproduce its techniques of ‘homeland’ rule over through spatial divisions in the townships. In sum, township planning was inseparable from “administrative imperatives” and township housing was far more than merely the provision of shelter, but aspired to the production of “places of manipulation, domination and control” (J. Robinson, 1992, p. 297).
This view of place as a tool of political domination is, of course, only half the story. As we have seen, citizenship and placemaking can also be seen in a more positive light as practices through which marginalized citizens can assert their agency and thereby claim political subjectivity and substantive equal rights. How can we conceptualize the distinction between the space of 'white' South Africa during apartheid and the spaces of the 'homeland' and 'township' respectively? In the nexus through which they were deployed together they constitute a technology of exception, producing 'black' subjects under the ever-present threat of abandonment, most evident in the status of the ‘homeland’ populace. On the other hand, the state acted on the townships through intensive biopolitical (Foucault, 2003, pp. 244-245) administration. And yet, again, it was through this administration that the “cut that severs bare life from politically qualified life” (Gregory, 2006, p. 406) was continually reproduced, and subjects distributed to an excluded but biopolitically administered life (Foucault, 1990, p. 138) – or instead to a zone of abandonment antagonistic to the production of life. Yet in turn, this constantly reproduced ‘cutting’ or differentiation of the population emphasizes the “mobile, oscillating” definition of the boundaries of political life [by which here I mean a life that is understood to have some form of rights or entitlements] which renders the frontiers of political life precarious; always poised to go in a new direction (Gregory, 2006, p. 406).

3.4. Cycles of containment and excess

We have seen, then, that homelands and townships were deployed together in a nexus comprising complementary technologies of rule that worked to identify ‘black’ citizens with temporariness, superfluity and non-belonging, and thereby to deprive them of avenues for legitimate claim-making on the state. The quasi-autonomous homelands constituted a technology of spatial exception, in which de jure ‘black’ citizens of South Africa were abandoned to a ‘zone of indistinction’ outside the space of citizenship, neither protected by South African law, nor free from it. In contrast, the townships – in particular, those closest to the urban centres of South Africa – constituted a technology of biopolitical containment of the ‘black’ outside within the urban centre of the state. Rather than being expelled and abandoned, this excess ‘surplus’ life was subjected to containment through an intensified level of biopolitical administration. However, in this section I show how this nexus, ostensibly aimed at holding ‘black’ people outside the boundaries of the South African political community through techniques of rational separation, division and distribution, paradoxically produced a threateningly ambiguous/amorphous ‘black’ infra-citizenship, which stubbornly exceeded the
state’s modern techniques of dividing, ordering and distributing rights among urban and homeland residents. Drawing on archival material along with historical literature, I discuss the interstitial politics that arose within the state-structured places of containment. As Chapter 4 will later detail, these techniques would eventually meet their limit in the phenomenon of squatting in the 1980s.

3.4.1. Political life in containment

Modern strategies of rule treat space in an abstract and instrumental way. But by creating bounded space, and giving it political meaning through laws and practices curtailing political life, these strategies inadvertently produce places. Through their combination of location, material form and meaning, places shape the capacity for community as well as the capacity for domination and control (Gieryn, 2000, p. 475). In this sense, places develop a form of agency that is irreducible to the instrumental logics they are produced to serve. This is evident in the various ways in which the township – that ambiguous space of containment of the outside within the urban centres of the South African polity – became an incubator for counterpolitical subjectivities and practices. I am particularly fascinated by the way in which the apartheid state’s spatial strategies of rule produced in the township a fertile place for the political life of ‘black’ residents, specifically through the relations of proximity, solidarity and continuity it fostered.

First: proximity. Despite the state’s spatial nexus of ‘black’ exclusion, and the intense biopolitical attention whereby it attempted to reproduce racial and spatial differentiation in the townships, these places nevertheless took on the emergent qualities of the city (Sassen, 2002), becoming places of mingling, heterogeneity, contestation and emergence. For instance, the ethnic structuring of township space did not suffice to reproduce in the cities the artificial ethnic politics embodied by the ‘homelands’. Since political ethnicity was largely a mythology of origins given structural form by the modern state in an attempt to undermine ‘black’ resistance (Beningfield, 2006, p. 126; Mamdani, 1996, p. 79), the coexistence of these imagined communities in urban areas – albeit it ethnically structured – challenged the “complete and distinct” (Beningfield, 2006, p. 131) identities fundamental to the political division of the ‘black’ populace. One arena in which this was evident was in the arts, in which David Coplan, for instance, has traced a struggle for a distinct ‘black’ urban culture in South Africa (Hamm, 1987). Another instance was the way in which migrant labourers’ hostels – a
separate disciplinary container for urbanites marked by their temporariness – existed "in close proximity to areas of community mobilisation" and were subject to control by the same local authorities, placing migrants "close to many efforts at community organisation" (Sitas, 1985, p. 32) and thus bringing them into the quotidian embrace of the 'community' from which they were exempted by formal statute.

This brings us to the theme of solidarity. Relations of solidarity grew as diverse families and common struggles undermined the state's attempts to divide urban from rural 'blacks', 'permanent' from temporary; and one ethnicity from another. Townships have been read as "arenas of bitter struggles against the passes, lodgers permits and beer raids, poor transport, high fares, housing shortages and high rentals which dogged daily life" (Sapire, 2013, p. 176). In the 1950s, increasing public transport costs, for instance, led communities to mobilize collective bus boycotts (Dauskardt, 1989) – an emergent solidarity of workers and commuters. Later in the century, similar boycotts were called on schools, 'white' businesses (Sapire, 2013, p. 172), and township rent and service charges (Seekings, 1992, p. 28). The attempt to create a stabilizing sense of order and community in townships (J. Robinson, 1992, p. 298) through the production of governability, order and control, had paradoxical effects that undermined the purpose of control by closely entangling the public and private spheres: virtually every social act was "deeply embedded in a complex network of mutually reinforcing and restrictive laws," which had the effect of intimately linking individual and collective interests (Frankel, 1981, p. 836). Everyday, mundane forms of suffering and struggle coexisted with and fed into more explicitly political forms of solidarity. Apartheid's indiscriminacy in "spreading humiliation through the black population" linked every individual, with "enormous socio-political consequences", including the "blunting" of conflict within township communities (Frankel, 1981, p. 835). The shared experience of insecurity resulting from the policies of temporariness that depicted townships as transient containers of labour ironically produced "a powerful tranethnic we-feeling" and a readiness to adopt local norms (Frankel, 1981, pp. 835-836), as well as a distrust of state authorities (Frankel, 1981, p. 839).

It is also important to recognize the role of social continuity set in motion by rights of permanent residence. Under conditions of perceived permanence, the future is imagined in relation to others in the same locality, fostering a sense of community and continuity of social relations (Mbembe et al., 2008, p. 240) that provides a potential foundation for collective agency rather than simply rendering township 'inmates' a "subject people" (Frankel, 1981, p. 837). Frankel observed "a perception of social futures in collective rather than individual
terms, a strong collective problem-solving ethic, and a high estimation of the notion of community service” in townships, “particularly among the small but socially influential township middle class,” and asserted that these orientations “would encourage resistance to the psychologically demeaning onslaught of popular racial ideology” (Frankel, 1981, p. 837).

By the late seventies and early eighties, scholars were observing that growing political consciousness in the townships, the tendency of blacks to subordinate ethnic differences to the imperatives of racial solidarity, emerging polarities between the dominant and subordinate race groups, and profound black discontent at discrimination in all its manifestations suggest the existence... of a political culture proximate to the subjective preconditions for revolution (Frankel, 1981, p. 842).

The irrepressibly political nature of urban township life under apartheid meant that, despite recognition of a stable urban ‘black’ population in the 1950s, the permanent urban ‘black’ population in particular was seen as an ongoing policy problem, which the state attempted to solve from the late 1960s onwards. One way in which the state attempted to ‘solve’ the problem was through removals of many townships to ‘homelands’ or the redrawing of ‘homeland’ boundaries to incorporate existing townships, resulting in huge increases in long-distance commuting to workplaces (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 80). By 1983, 730,000 people (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 79) had been removed from the ‘white’ space of citizenship in this manner. But these top-down measures of spatial exclusion, and heavy-handed repression of consequent protests and rioting in townships from 1976 onward – such as the shooting of school pupils during the Soweto uprising of 1976 – bolstered solidarity and political identification among those suffering in common, and gave rise to an emergence of local political organizations (Frankel, 1980, p. 203). It also drew domestic and international censure, and inspired increasing guerrilla activity. Increased attention to the ills of apartheid and the growing civic danger to the state and civilians through political activism led the state to seek new and unprecedented measures to manage the expansion of politically unruly townships through spatial techniques, as I will show below.

3.4.2. Sharpening distinctions between ‘township’ and ‘homeland’ subjects

In response to the threat of ‘black’ political life inherent in their urban residence, the state introduced new laws, policies and practices aimed at producing stronger distinctions between ‘black’ permanent residents and migrant workers, which, it was hoped, would contain and
domesticate the permanent urban ‘black’ population by reinforcing its class rights and privileges over ‘homeland’ migrant workers, while strictly policing the boundaries of permanency. This was particularly necessary in the context of the 1970s to serve the demand for skilled workers in the wake of mechanisation, while warding off the social and political costs of high unemployment among unskilled workers in the townships (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 34).

The Riekert strategy of 1979, which recognized the rights of permanent residents to remain and enjoy increased freedoms in cities, produced Bills dismantling a number of the existing restrictions on urban ‘black’ residents (Hindson, 1985, p. 406). The state presented this as “a genuine attempt to remove hurtful discrimination from the statute book” (The Guardian, 1980, 31 October). On the contrary, it introduced a new stratification of rights amongst ‘blacks’ through “a strongly maintained division between a relatively better paid African urban population with property rights, reasonably high living standards and job mobility, and an impoverished Bantustan population surviving through low-paid contract labour, living on the margins of subsistence as a reserve army of labour with no free access to work” (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 35). To summarize the biopolitical measures deployed against ‘homeland’ migrants versus permanent urbanites, influx control prohibited ‘black’ citizens from remaining in an urban area for more than 72 hours at a time, or from holding employment without special permission, unless they had rights of permanent residence based on “birth; 15 years’ continuous lawful residence, or 10 years’ service with one and the same employer” (Friedman, 1979, 22 May). The privileged latter class would comprise about 1.5 million of a population of 8 million ‘black’ people. The Riekert proposals included further provision for the families of permanent residents to join them in the townships; rights to move freely from one site in South Africa to another, subject to the availability of jobs and approved housing; and the right to buy 30-year leasehold rights on township housing if they could afford to (Friedman, 1979, 22 May; Soni, 1992, p. 45). In reality, these de jure rights could still be difficult to realize, but their promulgation does indicate a slight shift in the policy of temporariness to which South African ‘blacks’ were subjected, introducing a new form of inequality into the range of ‘black’ political identities produced by the state.

In the same pattern of containment and exception we have already seen, this expansion of rights had as its corollary an expansion of abandonment/exception. Efforts to police boundaries of permanency, making this category of life harder to penetrate, were evident in state responses to liberal court judgments. For instance, when the Appeal court upheld an
historic judgement giving contract workers the right to permanent residence if they had been continuously employed by the same employer for over 10 years in the Rhikoto case, the Cabinet Committee on Political Development discussed legal means to “prevent people from gaining further rights in the future”, and proposed a bill be established respecting the Appeal Court’s decision and worded to imply that in order to qualify in terms of Article 10, the following principles should be fulfilled by Rhikoto cases: a 10-year undertaking by the employer and employee to keep the latter in employment; procurement of a call-in card from the Administration Council; departure to national state during annual leave; re-attestation of the contract by the Labour Bureau in the national state to be returned to the employer.

New bodies of law were issued to tighten up the liberal leakages of other laws, such as the 1983 Laws on Cooperation and Development Act, which stipulated that no-one who did not already have approved accommodation could gain permanent residence, nor bring dependents to the cities if they did not already have family housing (Unterhalter, 1987, p. 37).

The shortage of approved and family housing resulting from the deliberate suspension of housing development in the townships (Platzky & Walker, 1985, pp. 165-166) largely precluded this possibility, of course (and, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the consequent overcrowding of family residences would become a mundane mark of superfluity on the relatively privileged permanent population). This is an interesting reflection on the bureaucratic gymnastics required to maintain radically unequal citizenship while adhering to the constitutionalism of a modern state, or “the insistence that government should be conducted according to clearly established laws and that all participants should respect certain ‘rules of the game’” (Pierson, 2004, p. 41).

Despite the creation of a privileged class of ‘black’ urbanites, the state remained determined to hold any claims of equal citizenship in abeyance. We also see in later deliberations by the state of liberalizing proposals such as shorter routes to permanency and the restitution of property ownership rights in townships, explicit resistance to any liberties that might appear to confer de facto citizenship. For ‘black’ citizens, urban permanence, it was argued, must be obtained after 10 years and not five, since a five year period might be seen as synonymous with the five-year route to citizenship by immigrants. The fact that the state feared ‘black’ permanent township residents might wish to claim an inclusion equal to that of foreign nationals applying for naturalization underlines the virtually negligible rights 'black' South African citizenship status contained at this point, reminding us that the apartheid regime.

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14 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1983b
15 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1983b
effectively provided more rights to non-nationals than to nationals, creating an indignity more grave than that suffered by Wangari, in the epigraph to this chapter, being arrested for vagrancy and "treated like a foreigner".

For a similar reason – expressing again the need to simultaneously include urban 'blacks' and perpetuate their exclusion – the Working Committee for the Cabinet Committee on Political Development disagreed with the Riekert principle that rights of property ownership should be conferred on 'black' permanent residents:

There is not a great difference between leasehold and ownership rights but there is a psychological and therefore by implication political result of the cumulative effect of permanent residence rights, municipal status and ownership rights. Flowing from this it would eventually be difficult to escape the question of citizenship. ¹⁶

The last reference in this quotation – "the question of citizenship" – is pregnant with meaning. The question of citizenship was one that could not be answered under the ambiguous conditions of the time. Although every 'black' citizen had been made a citizen of a homeland, this citizenship had little meaning unless the homeland in question opted for independence. Independence would strip any South African citizenship rights from a homeland's 'black' population, including those in urban areas who might never have set eyes on this contrived 'home' polity. If such rights could be stripped away, the implication was of course that 'black' South Africans were indeed citizens of South Africa – but if this was the case, their citizenship was of an order so depleted of meaningful content that it could barely be considered citizenship at all. In this sense, 'black' South Africans were simultaneously included and excluded from citizenship. If their citizenship were to be formally acknowledged, their insurgent claims for equal political and material rights would earn legitimacy, and attempts to brand the political struggle as the criminal work of a guerrilla fringe would fall apart. This was the answer to the "question of citizenship", and the reason why the Cabinet wished to prevent the question from ever being explicitly posed. Instead, the hope was that it might be possible

¹⁶ Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional (Political) Development, 1980, p. 146. Note that there was no explicit legislation exempting 'black' subjects from de jure citizenship – other than with the independence of their 'homeland' of 'origin' – so by law the majority of urban and homeland 'black' residents were indeed citizens of South Africa. In other words, the reticence to raise the issue of citizenship was a reticence to render visible the impossible contradictions inherent in the stratification of citizenship within a state whose rule-governed and rational modernity would dictate that such subjects be either fully excluded (as was the purpose of the drive to 'homeland' independence) or granted full citizenship. This unspeakable ambiguity of 'black' citizenship status that underlies Cabinet discussions is evident in the way in which on one hand Cabinet committee members acknowledge that most 'blacks' are citizens (Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984b, p. 186), yet never refer to them as South African. Instead, they refer to them as 'blacks' "outside" the national states (Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1983, p. 259; 1984c, p. 225), as if their primary citizenship of these entities is a fait accompli. This helps to explain the linkage policy described in the next section, where the South African Cabinet attempted to negotiate and codify some form of rational political membership for the problematically heterogeneous township populations in order to do away with the latent 'question of citizenship' that hung over urban 'blacks'.

to quietly divest South Africa of its insurgent ‘black’ citizens through the independence of the homelands.

3.5. The township as a foothold for interstitial politics

Townships appear as spaces simultaneously inside and outside, occupied by populations on the very margins of membership, and constantly vulnerable to the power of sovereignty to move them finally across the threshold encompassing those members eligible for protection by the South African state. We have seen that they were a site around which the “cut that severs bare life from politically qualified life” was continually reproduced, and subjects distributed to a segregated, disadvantaged, but biopolitically administered life or instead to a zone of abandonment antagonistic to the production of life. In this sense, the multiplication of state controls through successive legislative and bureaucratic amendments that focussed on the boundary of the township as the threshold of some sort of political life, can easily be read only as the awesome repressive power of the apartheid state. I would argue that instead, these compulsive separating gestures suggest abjection – a state of being "in process/on trial" (Kristeva, 1982), and the state’s struggle to perform its power in the face of a threatening ambiguity: an outside within that was continually reproduced by exactly those acts of biopolitical administration that placed ‘black’ citizens constantly under threat of abandonment. In the frenzied activity of the modern South African state on the township and on the boundary between politically qualified and politically abandoned life, we do not see interstitiality moving as it does in Agamben’s analysis into an "immobile binary between the political beings of citizens and the excluded bodies of bare life" (Lee, 2010, p. 58). Rather, we find what Lee observes in refugees and undocumented migrants elsewhere: an "interstitial agency of the abject that sidesteps the binary of bare life and citizenship life" (Lee, 2010, p. 59), and is itself interstitial in nature, occupying "a terrain of resistance/negotiation inside and outside the normative arrangement of citizenship" (Lee, 2010, p. 58). The spatial techniques designed to 'encamp' the politically excluded within the polity, far from stabilizing the township as a permanent place of exception or inclusive exclusion produced and presided over by sovereign decision, instead created spatially concentrated conditions for insurgent citizenship, and a foundation for the solidarity and agency of the excluded. Far from stripping ‘black’ citizens of political life, these places produced emergent forms of political subjectivity and practice.
Paradoxically, the social continuity provided by permanent residence in the 1980s played an important role in creating the conditions for sustainable civic organizations, whose platform for political mobilization was exactly the social conditions and tools of control that the state wielded to contain ‘black’ political life. In Atteridgeville, the site of my embedded case studies, organizations such as the Saulsville-Atteridgeville Youth Organization (SAYO) and Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Association (ASRO) emerged in the early and mid-eighties to mobilize protests about education, calls for the resignation of local councillors, and legal challenges against township rent and service increases that resulted from the state’s refusal to continue subsidizing ‘black’ local authorities (Seekings, 1988, p. 68). These forms of resistance undermined the workings of the state, as schools had to be closed and rent increases abandoned (Seekings, 1988, p. 68). The ever-present threat of violence as a result of insufficient investment in the reproduction of township labour and in township education – such as the bombing of the mayor’s house in 1984 (Seekings, 1988, p. 68) – produced more financial demands on the state, and demanded more repressive actions to sustain the regime, at the same time as such actions prompted a vicious cycle of domestic and international censure as well as more township violence. This is a far cry from the more nihilistic visions of the ‘camp’ as a zone of indistinction. Instead, political identity is a constant negotiation between structural forces of the state and forms of political agency exercised at various scales and in a variety of ways, from the mundane to the sensational.

The more spectacular forms of insurgency – and their power to impact the capacities of the state are evident in records of the Atteridgeville police station. The station seeks funds for a vehicle for firefighting during riots, additional weaponry due to escalating “unrest” in the township, including automatic weapons to protect City Council members attending public meetings, and the development of “single quarters” for police officers who were at risk in shared accommodation due to the “political climate.” A new, “unmarked vehicle” was also required to provide officers with special transport to their homes at night, as 15 police officers had already resigned due to threats, intimidation and assaults resulting in hospitalization. At the same time, the “widening of the scope of union action beyond production to the sphere of reproduction – including demands for adequate pensions, maternity rights, housing and unemployment benefits” contributed to the “deepening crisis in the social formation” in the mid-1980s (Lambert & Webster, 1988, p. 28). This posed a countermove to efforts to divide permanent and migrant workers in townships.

17 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, p. 191
18 S.T. Rammala Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1986
19 S.T. Rammala Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1986
In turn, the intensive top-down administration and surveillance techniques of the state prompted the development of bottom-up techniques of invisibility by township civic organizations. Residents’ associations such as ASRO could provide a proxy institutional infrastructure for banned organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC). Through squatting – which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4 and 5 – these informal institutions could occupy and navigate space in ways that frustrated the surveillance imperatives of the state through deliberate production of dense, congested, hard-to-navigate territories and unadministered populations outside of the bureaucratic forms of surveillance and control exercised by the state through permits and permit conditions. State attempts to filter urban residence through the condition of ‘proper housing’ attempted to secure a “measure of control” over squatting, not only for the stated aim of “accommodat[ing] people properly” (The Guardian, 1980, 31 October) but also because over the years squatting almost always presented a political threat rather than simply a problem relating to living standards (Bonner, 1990; Maree, 1978; Maylam, 1983; Minnaar, 1992; Stadler, 1979; Vawda, 1997).

Another way in which containment gave rise to ambiguity was in its production of a protected class of permanent infra-citizens whose ambiguous position between ‘black’ and ‘white’ political spaces rendered them unable to exercise political rights through the (albeit segregated and unequal) channels established by the racial 'geopolitics' of national and ‘homeland’ spaces. It was thought that rationalization of the political structuring of the state could be achieved by linking townships to ‘homeland’ politics, thereby providing some semblance of political participation, and indeed rendering urban ‘blacks’ more fully ‘citizens’ of the ‘homelands’ to which they had a de jure relationship designated by ethnicity. This was particularly necessary given the “conflict potential of unfulfilled aspiration” for political participation in urban ‘black’ areas.20 The PWV area, into which Atteridgeville falls, and in which most of the 2008 ‘xenophobic attacks occurred, was seen to present the “biggest problem” with regard to the inclusion of urban ‘blacks’ in political processes.21

Discussions of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Affairs reveal how the state hoped to extend the powers of the ‘homelands’ so that the ‘black’ urban areas would fall within their political jurisdiction, subsuming the political life of South Africa’s politically contested townships. This appears a highly paradoxical move given the investment the state had already made in cementing class boundaries between the two spaces. Unsurprisingly, this ‘linkage’ policy was highly controversial, and Cabinet ministers had to acknowledge that the

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20 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983b, p. 285
21 Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984c, p. 225
ethnic heterogeneity of urban ‘black’ populations would hinder any simple marriage of each urban area with a particular ‘homeland’\(^{22}\) – evidence of the contradictions created by the state’s consolidation of spatial strategies of rule that attempted a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of ‘black’ populations in urban areas. In addition to this, it was uncertain both whether the ‘homelands’ themselves would be willing to exercise “extra-territorial” powers over their citizens in ‘white’ South Africa, and whether urban ‘blacks’ would be willing to accept their jurisdiction.\(^{23}\) Given these ambiguities, even more unorthodox proposals were put forward for reifying townships into manageable political objects that would maintain the state’s vision of a bifurcated political destiny for ‘black’ and ‘white’ respectively, while creating a justifiable and rational order of political membership for all persons. As such, the working group of the Cabinet Committee on Political Development also considered designating ‘black’ urban areas as “city states” – “autonomous local authorities/regions.”\(^{24}\)

In these efforts to identify a way of juridically excluding the political claims of ambiguous township citizens through new institutional arrangements, Cabinet discussions were held with leaders of the ‘self-governing national states’, in which discussion of various confederal-type arrangements were presented as a way of accommodating the political life of the townships,\(^{25}\) and eliminating the stratification of citizenship in which people participating in the existing political system of ‘national state’ governments participated to the exclusion urban ‘blacks’, who did not have a comparable level and institution of participation.\(^{26}\) However, the ambiguities of the existing system – and the state’s desire to simultaneously expand and contain the political life of township dwellers – complicated these negotiations. The Chief Ministers of the ‘homelands’ resisted co-option into any arrangement that would require abdicating South African citizenship.\(^{27}\) They refused to exit exceptional space by taking ‘independence’ and becoming ‘autonomous’ polities politically linked to urban townships, recognizing that such a move would serve as the cut that would finally produce all ‘black’ subjects as distinct from the political community of other South African citizens, as it required the forfeit of juridical South African citizenship. This presents another glimpse into the positive political potential of the 'camp', as the subjects of the homelands cling to the productive interstitality of these 'outsides within' because their status as zones of indistinction keeps open the horizon of political life.

\(^{22}\) F.W. de Klerk in Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984c, p. 225
\(^{23}\) Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984c, pp. 225-226
\(^{24}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983b, p. 280; 286
\(^{25}\) Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984b, p. 194
\(^{26}\) Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984e, pp. 153-154
\(^{27}\) Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984b, p. 191
The long-avoided ‘question of citizenship’, was thus raised explicitly at Cabinet level in the discussions around linkage policy: a direct consequence of the state’s inability to control the political potential within the places it had established exactly for the purpose of precluding that life. The unanswerable question, once raised, articulated a counterpolitics of citizenship, an insurgent demand that "destabilises the present and renders it fragile, defamiliarizing the coherence with which it usually presents itself" (Holston, 2008, p. 34). The debates on extending homeland powers over townships led to an insistence that no common political structure of South African citizens could be sustained where differentiated identification documents and mobility restrictions belied any shared citizenship between ‘white’ and ‘black’ citizens, and between township and ‘homeland’ citizens. With the rationalization of political structures as a key theme in Cabinet discussions of the time, these points could hardly be rebutted.

However, despite protestations by the ‘homeland’ leaders about political discrimination and the redundancy of a ‘black’ citizenship devoid of significant rights and powers, meetings of the Committee in the absence of the ‘black’ delegates reiterated the President’s refusal to countenance universal suffrage or inclusion of ‘black’ leaders in a fourth chamber, conveying a sense that deliberations should express goodwill and emphasize commonalities primarily for the purposes of defusing political opposition to the regime. This led to yet more ambiguity as the state made some concessions to a shared citizenship while continuing to withhold voting rights from ‘black’ citizens. The President’s Council Report of September 1985, deracialized controls on ‘black’ urbanization without resolving the problem of unequal citizenship – indeed, the question of citizenship was “deliberately excluded” while the government continued to seek a way of permanently separating the political destinies of ‘black’ and ‘white’ through alternative “geographically and ethnically based constitutional dispensations” (Hindson, 1985, p. 416). This was a doomed process, as illustrated by the minutes of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, which sincerely tried to resolve the absurdly paradoxical conundrum: “If there is one citizenship for all, yet not one-man-one-vote, what is the meaning of citizenship […]? Essentially, this paradox remained unresolved until 1992, when the ruling National Party under F.W. de Klerk held a referendum among ‘white’ voters to test whether they would accept political power-sharing between the races.

28 Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984b, p. 147; 1984e
29 F.W. de Klerk, Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984e, p. 143
30 Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984e, pp. 157-158; 154-155; 1985, pp. 76-77
31 Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984d, pp. 126-127
32 F. W. De Klerk in Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1984a, p. 218
3.6. Conclusion

This chapter has been the first step in my genealogy of the forces that would shape squatter politics. I have explored the ways in which the South African state, in its attempts to consolidate a modern form of racial domination, emplaced political and socio-economic inequality through distinctly modern techniques of differentiation, segregation and documentation linked to spatial ordering at national, city, and township levels. The structures – legislative, institutional and physical – produced by this system of rule sought to deactivate the political subjectivity of ‘black’ South Africans and produce docile bodies defined by their utility to the modern state, rather than their membership of it. In so doing, the state introduced a tension between impulses to exclude and include ‘black’ citizens in ‘white’ urban space. This implanted ambiguity at the core of the racial state project – an ambiguity that, as Chapter 4 shows, would confront the state in the form of the squatter camp, prompting new institutional responses that would shape squatter politics in contradictory ways in the closing years of apartheid.

I have outlined the territorial strategies whereby the apartheid state in South Africa produced a range of citizenships in an attempt to both utilize and exclude the ‘black’ population: ‘homelands’ as spaces of abandonment, and townships as spaces of intensive surveillance, administration and containment. I have also considered the ambiguities this elicited, and begun to show the way in which townships – the very spaces designed to contain and marginalize the ‘black’ shadow-citizen within the ‘white’ city – gave rise to an ambiguous, interstitial counterpolitics, disrupting the state’s spatial order and compelling it to seek new and different techniques of managing ‘surplus’ life. This face of the camp, following Holston, casts doubt on nihilistic understandings of the politics of the ‘zone of indistinction’, showing that the spatial stratification of citizenship – including the establishment of places that appear very much as ‘camps’ encompassing bare life, in Agamben’s terms – can create the foundations of insurgent political claim-making. Citizenship, as the predominant group identity shaping “our relationship to the state and to one another through the state” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22), appears in this light as a site of constant negotiation.
Chapter 4: Squatter placemaking and the state: from repressive to inclusive exceptionalism?

During my fieldwork in Atteridgeville, I was puzzled by the seemingly contradictory accounts I heard while reconstructing the story of the 1991 land invasions in Jeffsville, three years before regime change in 1994. On the one hand, I heard that the settlement was deliberately established as an "island" impenetrable to the state, in an unmistakably insurgent register. On the other, I heard that the very same squatters who participated in this insurgency expected that the government would provide houses for them as a result. Central to the question of squatter political identity was the question of what could explain this seemingly contradictory movement by which collective mobilization responded simultaneously to the threat of exclusion and the prospect of inclusion. Continuing to seek the roots of the present in the past, this chapter presents archival evidence of broad institutional forces which would later shape the political meaning of the informal settlement of Mshongo.

Using Cabinet discussions of the paradigmatic squatter settlement of Crossroads in the Western Cape, I show that such settlements represented a radical spatial form of the excess of ambiguity produced by the apartheid state’s attempts to seal, segregate and control space. I illustrate how this form of insurgent placemaking contributed to the reshaping of national spatial strategies of rule, which in turn saw the squatter replace the ‘black’ subject as the city’s ‘surplus’ even as spatial policies appeared to be liberalising. This new manifestation of apartheid’s internal ambiguity – its imperative for simultaneous inclusion and exclusion – gave rise to contradictions as control over enhanced squatter laws was handed over to provincial government. In the case of the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), laws intended to foster containment of the urban ‘black’ subject were instead deployed toward the goal of inclusion in the city. Yet even as the provincial government produced a new imaginary of the squatter camp as a place of transition to fuller citizenship, the transition of the ambiguous space of the squatter camp necessarily required – once more – the accommodation of ambiguity at the heart of policy. A form of progressive exceptionalism therefore emerged, which would interact with South Africa’s transition to democracy to create a structure of
anticipation in squatters’ relation to equal citizenship, coexisting with continuing instruments and practices of repression and exclusion at other institutional scales.

In South Africa, a series of legal instruments and amendments over the course of the twentieth century worked to produce squatter land occupation as unlawful, in line with the consistent trend of policy in opposition to ‘black’ urbanization across the same period. Significant squatter movements prior to the 1980s played a key role in prompting these legislative changes, confronting the state with a human excess that in eluding modern state controls not only consolidated a counterpolitics, but occupied a particular territory within the state, threatening to usurp the state’s territorial monopoly of legitimate violence (Bonner, 1990, p. 99; also see Vawda, 1997). Thus, although the history of squatting in South Africa is certainly one of repression, it can also be read as a record of squatters’ power to goad the state to new governmental innovations and extremes, including both repressive and productive techniques of redistribution back into the exceptional outside of the reserves, or into township containment. Forced removals of squatters to ‘homelands’ or temporary ‘controlled camps’ was the primary technique for this redistribution during the 20th century (see for instance Bonner, 1990).

Yet here again, the state’s nexus of spatial controls – intended to consolidate its regulation of the inclusion and exclusion of ‘black’ subjects – produced its opposite. I will explore below how the accumulating economic effects of the abandonment of the ‘homelands’ reached irreversible proportions, stimulating growing flows of migration outside the legal framework of restrictions on movement and settlement that secured the state’s regulatory nexus. Popular fears of squatting in the late 1900s were depicted in terms of migrants “streaming” or “pouring” in (Bonner, 1990; Maree, 1978), and of these newcomers as “illegal Africans” from “outside” (Maree, 1978 p. 2). Although the ‘outsiders’ in question were ‘black’ South Africans migrating from the artificially produced ‘homelands’, this imagery is strongly reminiscent of the language of anti-foreigner ‘xenophobia’ in today’s South Africa (see J. Crush, 1999, p. 2; Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 72). This depiction of the squatter-migrant as ‘xenos’ is most stark a parallel when scholars uncritically label rural internal migrants as “immigrants” (Bonner, 1990, p. 91; Maree, 1978 p. 6) – this even for so-called ‘coloured’ (mixed-race) squatters who had no homeland that could stand in as the metonym of foreign ‘origin’ (Maree, 1978).

Simultaneously, the accumulating housing deficit for legal and permanent ‘black’ urban residents, and an emerging economic abandonment of townships by the national government, created irresolvable demands for living space. An accumulation of repressive measures had led
to increasing domestic and international pressure on the state, and growing political resistance among ‘blacks’ in urban areas, raising the political costs of repression for the state. As a result, squattin
g multipl
cross South Africa in the early 1980s – with four times the number of shack
to formal houses in some areas of the (then-)Transvaal province, and local authorities often tolerating or even encouraging the practice under the impossible financial constraints placed on them by the state’s insistence of townships’ financial autonomy (Seekings, 1988, p. 65). The evident contradiction in this mundane conflict between exclusionary national policies and tolerant municipal coping strategies point towards a different, more nuanced understanding of exceptionalism within the embodied state – one that acknowledges the suspension of a rule not necessarily as an instrument of political repression but as a potential condition for the making of citizenship claims (Das, 2011, p. 322).

Cabinet archives show that the primary focus of high-level political concern during the late apartheid period was the squatter camp of Crossroads in the (then-) Cape Province. Possible reasons for the prominence of this particular settlement might be the fact that migration into it was largely from the ‘independent’ homelands of Transkei and Ciskei, whose ‘citizens’ had explicitly lost South African citizenship and thus been rendered effectively ‘illegal aliens’. It may also have been that in the Cape province, stratification of the racial identities and livelihood entitlements of ‘black’ and mixed-race or ‘coloured’ people (Brown, 2000) made the presence of ‘surplus’ migrants a political issue of increased priority at every level of government. Whatever the reason for its national-level prominence, Crossroads – to the exclusion of virtually all other similar settlements – dominated key Cabinet discussions of the 1980s and became virtually analogous with the state’s policy on and dealings with squatting as a political issue. I therefore use this site to explore the powerful impact of squatter politics on the state.

I begin this chapter by using Cabinet discussions of Crossroads to piece together an account of the squatter camp as a territorial embodiment of the excess that overflowed apartheid’s modernist controls. I then consider the technical shift in spatial regulation from influx control to squatter control in the mid-eighties and the way in which, in the Transvaal province at least, related changes in authority structure and legislation used familiar exceptional strategies in a fundamentally new attempt to integrate the ambiguous squatter ‘outside’ into the South African political body through the creation of spaces produced to foster a transition into more equal citizenship.

33 Resistance in Crossroads was eventually broken through a collaboration of state security forces and vigilantes under the direction of a Crossroads community leader (Unterhalter, 1987, pp. 135-137) – a brutally repressive strategy which Cabinet documents suggest was in fact a rather desperate measure resulting from the state’s inability to utilize its rational modern techniques to curtail this ‘outside’ within.
4.1. Squatter placemaking: a counterpolitical topography

We have seen that, inasmuch as the ‘homeland’ and township spaces we have discussed were engineered to produce docile subjects, their human contents exceeded these modern technologies and strategies of rule. In the townships that remained in ‘white’ South Africa, the effects of years of ‘frozen’ housing development meant increasing overcrowding, as population growth among township families, and increases in migrant worker population, swelled far beyond the existing housing infrastructure. Compounding this already pressurized situation was the state’s insistence on defraying the costs of labour to the state by making ‘black’ local authorities self-funding through monies raised from house rents and services. As ‘black’ local authorities’ costs rose, the state refused to subsidize them through tax increases or direct subsidies, leading to exponential rises in rents and service charges, which the majority of township residents could not afford (Seekings, 1988, pp. 60-61). At the same time, the perverse effects of apartheid’s spatial controls contradictorily prompted more rural migrants to seek job opportunities in the city. Whereas ‘black’ urbanization into ‘white’ South Africa flattened during between 1950 and 1970 due to the state’s attempts to “displace” ‘black’ urbanization through removals and the system of migrant labour (Hindson cited in Gelderblom & Kok, 1994, p. 99), the urban African population nevertheless grew by close to 2 million between 1960 and 1980 (Potts, 1992, p. 33). By 1990, the Witwatersrand area of the Transvaal province was classed as the third most overcrowded city region in the world, (second only to Nigeria’s Lagos and China’s Guangzhou) in a study of 100 of the world’s largest metropolitan areas (Gelderblom & Kok, 1994, p. 142) – with the lowest housing standards and poorest secondary school attendance. As young urban families sought freedom from the overcrowded conditions in formal township housing (Makhulu, 2010, p. 558), the result was the proliferation of informal settlements during this period – places that not only produced/invented space for the pursuit of human capabilities where there was none, but were also “relatively free from the authority, as well as from the financial demands of the local state” (Seekings, 1988, p. 65).

Squatter camps have often been glossed as disorganized places of lack, abandonment and helplessness (notably Davis, 2007; Jenkins, 2006; Juppenlatz, 1970; Martin & Mathema, 2006), a “septic fringe” (Minnaar, 1992, p. 27) of disease, vice and crime (Maylam, 1983, pp. 414; 415-416). But given that space had been a key instrument of biopolitical control for the apartheid state it is important to examine this apparent disorder more closely – as Marcuse observes, “neither cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the question is only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose” (cited in Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003, p. 673). Scholarly work
on squatter movements prior to the 1980s underscores this point by highlighting the kind of popular sovereignty often expressed through the “creation and protection of pockets of illegal space” (Bonner, 1990, p. 93), through “direct action and defiance” of the state (Maree, 1978 p. 11). Squatters often formed “rudimentary administrations” along with “a distinctive political culture and set of political practices” (Bonner, 1990, p. 93) including practices such as:

- the virtual deification of squatter leaders, (Bonner, 1990, p. 95);
- “rudimentary policing” by squatter leaders, including the mediation of squabbles (Bonner, 1990, p. 96);
- creation of cooperatives to provide commodities to the settlements;
- “insurance” (Bonner, 1990, p. 97) in the form of payments for burial, undertaking facilities, and healing by “faith healing sects” (Bonner, 1990, p. 98); and
- “holding official policing at bay” (p98).

Although official accounts of squatter leaders tend to describe them as “authoritarian bullies”, “powerful reciprocal relationships of authority and trust often existed between squatter leaders and their followers” nevertheless (Stadler, 1979, p. 106). The geographic location, material form, forms of authority and the meaning of apartheid-era squatter camps thus signify a potential counterpolitical form of placemaking.

We have seen that townships were designed to reinforce the ‘homeland’/urban ‘black’ division by careful filtering of the characteristics of the urban ‘black’ population, through complementary techniques of organization such as the linking of employment contracts to housing provision, the differentiation of living quarters between permanent and temporary urbanites, and the ethnic distribution of residential areas to diminish solidarities between the supposedly distinct national ethnic groups. The case of Crossroads demonstrates that the squatter camp evidenced no such logic, accommodating migrant newcomer and Section 10 permit holder alike in similar self-built makeshift shacks, manifesting a dangerous intermingling of populations the state had worked to domesticate by division and separation (Makhulu, 2010). In this sense, it closely resembled the city space as a place of simultaneous conjuncture and disjuncture, a place with the potential to produce new political subjectivities and practices (Sassen, 2002, p. 18). This is evident in the complexity Cabinet committees faced in trying to deal with the mix of township and ‘homeland’, legal and illegal, employed and unemployed urban ‘blacks’ living together at Crossroads but occupying a spectrum of legality that made different groups subject to different policies and laws that severely constrained the possible solutions, especially given the overarching policies of racial segregation and province-specific policies of labour and residential stratification. The palimpsest of applicable laws and policies for permanent ‘urban’ residents, migrants from non-independent homelands,
migrants from independent homelands, and migrants from neighbouring countries made it difficult to deal with different squatter populations in an “orderly” way without opening up potential for new problems. As the squatter populace ‘originated’ from different areas, subject to different influx control and immigration control regimes, they also required interventions by a variety of different departments, and co-operation of departments at various governmental authority levels. As a single squatter community this heterogeneous population expressed a collective solidarity that hindered the division and redistribution of occupants – making space for claims in opposition to the existing stratification of ‘blacks’.

Returning to Gieryn’s principles of placemaking – location, material form, and meaning – the location of squatter camps was a key and meaningful element of squatter placemaking. We saw in Chapter 3 the instrumentalization of intensely bureaucratic permitting systems that obstructed access to city jobs and accommodation, as well as the overall constriction of ‘black’ urban accommodation options. These processes were used as a tool to raise the cost of urban life to unsustainable levels that would discourage ‘black’ urbanization and even prompt its reversal. Such strategies found their limit in the excess ‘free’ space produced by squatting on urban commons such as the “buffer zones” between townships and main roads or neighbouring racial areas. Ananya Roy has argued that in the informal housing market that emerges in such spaces, “affordability accrues through the absence of planning and regulation” (Roy, 2005, p. 149). This freedom from planning and regulation becomes explicitly political against the backdrop of the intensively regulated townships and the constantly policed township-homeland nexus. Through their multiplication of housing supply under the particularly strict rule-government of ‘black’ urban areas during apartheid, squatter camps lowered the costs as well as the supply constraints that constituted the firm boundary of ‘black’ urban spaces during apartheid. These encampments cleared urban space for an expansion of populations long deemed ‘surplus’ to the requirements of the ‘white’ city. Given the strict limitations that formal red tape placed on individual agency, access to employment, and family life, Makhulu reads squatting in Crossroads as a claim to “to personal autonomy, jobs, and even family” (Makhulu, 2010, p. 558). On a grander scale, squatter settlements defied the exceptional topography to which the state would assign them in a head-on confrontation with stratified citizenship:

34 For instance, see Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, p. 175
35 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983a, p. 254
36 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983a, pp. 240-241
37 Such as claims for s10 permits by illegals at Crossroads - see Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1985b, p. 288
In their insistence on remaining in the city—a site of work, schooling, and family—Africans rejected restrictive rights afforded them within South Africa’s “racial democracy.” Peri-urban zones became [...] sites of the production of alternative entitlements and access. (Makhulu, 2010, p. 561)

Distinct from the townships in their capacity as spaces captured from the state and formed from the bottom up as residential territories, squatter camps became an insurgent response to, and a terrain on which to resist, the inscription of indignity that state spatial limitations exercised on the ‘black’ body, as well as the incapacity it inscribed through the exclusion of the majority of ‘blacks’ from urban property rights – thereby exempting them from the moral community of property ownership that protects the human capabilities of each citizen in relation to the other (Sanghera & Satybaldieva, 2012, p. 97). As such, in the process of trying to establish living space in the city squatters became “agents of a very particular history of struggle” (Makhulu, 2010, p. 561) against the edifice of spatial controls that structured ‘black’ infra-citizenships.

In terms of material form, in contrast to the surveillance-oriented planning that optimized the visibility of social activities through the layout and size of roads and the nature of street lighting in townships, for instance, the ‘disorganization’ of squatter camps enabled evasion of the apartheid state’s “securocratic” controls through “the constitution of radically distinct modes of spatial organization” (Makhulu, 2010, p. 560). In general, informal areas tend to be unmapped spaces (Blomley, 2008; Dovey, 2012), but they are also known to strategically utilize invisibility (Sanghera & Satybaldieva, 2012; Skuse & Cousins, 2007). Whereas we have seen how townships were designed explicitly for the purposes of surveillance, control and policing, the material form of squatter camps achieved the opposite effect – so much so that in a discussion of methods for removing squatters at Crossroads, a police representative on the working group for the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs opposed removals. Very much against the grain of prevailing discussion, he recommended in-situ development simply because riots in the area could only be quelled “with enormous and life-threatening difficulty” due to their material form:

The situation in the old Kruispad [Crossroads] squatter camp is of such a nature that the SAP [South African Police] can’t police it properly and effectively. This state of affairs was once again clearly emphasised during the large-scale riot during the last week of December 1983, when people were killed and injured and a large number of residences burned down. The SAP could only with enormous and life-threatening difficulty bring this situation under control. [...] The biggest stumbling block for police is the density of housing and a total lack of usable entryways, elementary streets and lighting. When police vehicles move around inside they continually risk an ambush in the narrow streets. Sharp bends and short turns in the road prevent the effective use of Kasper [sic] vehicles. At
night the situation is obviously more dangerous and vehicles are damaged by stones and no-one can
tell where they were thrown from. The same problem was faced by the fire brigade when they tried
to extinguish the burning houses. Ambulances and other emergency services will also not be able to
move within the area if they have to assist.  

As feared by the state, these illegible, insurgent spaces are often places contradictorily
constituted by the operation of exclusory apparatuses such as state surveillance and
repression (Makhulu, 2010), where subjects can only be expected to resist the centre that
excludes them. Unsurprisingly, they tend to be politically unruly (Mahadevia, 2010; Sidaway,
2007), and one of the strategies of government in response can be to seek ways of neutralizing
any community leaders who may develop the capacity to mobilize squatters (Jean-Louis Van
Gelder, 2010, p. 261). This was also the case in Crossroads, where the government
consolidated and made strategic use of squatter disaffection with the “tyrannical” leadership
of Crossroads leader J. Nxobongwana.  

Placemaking at Crossroads has been called a form of historical demand by those denied
citizenship rights (Makhulu, 2010, p. 561). Rights to land are a component part of citizenship
(Davy, 2009, p. 258), indeed, land rights can be seen as the basis of “self-determination and
freedom from want”, containing within it “the largest ‘bundle of rights’, including the right to
possess, use, convey and bequeath”, such that the right to own private property can be seen
as “the strongest individual right ... empowering the owner of a parcel of land against any
other person” (Davy, 2009, p. 258). Although it cannot mirror private ownership rights in the
strong sense, occupation of urban commons under conditions where private property rights
are unequally distributed among citizens clearly constitutes a spectral claiming of property
rights. This can be seen to apply to occupation of private property too, given the stratification
of access to spaces of wealth (Davy, 2009, p. 231) in South Africa and dispossession of the
‘black’ population by removals and counter-urbanization policies that secured in South Africa
what Blomley has called the “enclosure” of cities for citizens with greater rights; a process of
accumulation by dispossession (Blomley, 2008, p. 311). All this makes for an “unquiet”
(Blomley, 2008, p. 325) urban landscape in contrast to the domesticating work of territorial
apartheid and influx controls – a visible expression of the intractable claims of the
“surplus/ outside” on a landscape where these claims had been erased by the modern state’s
spatial distribution of populations.

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38 Brigadier Odendaal, Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, pp. 180-181
39 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984d, pp. 61-62
40 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984b, p. 35
41 I use this term in a similar sense to Appadurai, in his discussion of spectral housing “that exists only by implication and by
imputation” (Appadurai, 2000, p. 627).
For those whose tenure in cities was insecure due to their illegal permit status or lack of income, the squatter camp can be seen to offer some degree of tenure security outside state legal system (Jean-Louis Van Gelder, 2010). In the case of Crossroads, this was achieved through sheer numbers and the political implications that repressive measures at such a scale would encompass – consider here the explicit demand by ‘illegal’ squatters at Crossroads for S10 permits guaranteeing their urban tenure, in exchange for their cooperation with the state’s planned resettlement of Crossroads squatters at Khayelitsha. The informal systems of property rights operating in squatter camps can be seen to produce a moral community (Sanghera & Satybaldieva, 2012, p. 97), contributing to the tendency of such areas to become semi-autonomous social fields (Jean-Louis Van Gelder, 2010, p. 255) and places of opposition (Makhulu, 2010, p. 552). The case of Crossroads suggests that the forms of exceptionalism designed to simultaneously include and exclude a population leave room for far more ambiguity and contention than the “pure, absolute and impassable biopolitical space” (Agamben, 1998, p. 123) of the death camp or the contemporary prison camp. If sovereign power is a practice of division as well as a spatial performance, then the need to allow some limited passage between inside and outside – for instance to exploit the labour utility of members of the ‘outside’ – opens up complexities and ambiguities that are difficult to regulate. The result is a more porous biopolitical space that leaves room for agency, for fluid spatial and political relationships, and the emergence of hybrid forms of life “in which the limits of exception can be simultaneously transgressed and maintained” (Sanyal, 2011, p. 890). This allows for uses of exceptionalism that are less antagonistic to the entry of bare life into the realm of the political, as I will explore in the next section.

4.2. Ordering urbanization: from influx control to squatter control

The visibility of the apartheid state’s repression of certain squatter settlements through forced removals or conversion to ‘controlled’ camps (Platzky, 1985; Platzky & Walker, 1985) led many scholars to focus on the agency of the apartheid state in such a way that the agency of squatters is depicted as passive and inert. By peering into the classified Cabinet discussions of the 1980s, I am able to bring into view the agency not only of squatters themselves, but of the squatter camp as a place. I also reveal the limits of sovereign state power to regulate and repress – the limits of state agency in the face of an ever-more complex web of regulatory, legislative and diplomatic forces built around the seminal ambiguity of inclusion/exclusion.

42 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1985b, p. 288
Struggles that remain (strategically) invisible in official speeches and dramatic footage of forced removals – struggles to operationalize control measures, to manage the political sensitivity of repressive state action, and to strike a balance between the jostling sets of rights and regulations to govern the racially, spatially, ethnically, and nationally differentiated populations apartheid had created – become visible in the silence of the archive. In this section, I examine the irresolvable challenges Crossroads presented to the state at national level, and the concerted efforts that were made to recuperate the modern, rule-governed apartheid city in its wake. I will go on to show how the disingenuous orderly urbanization policy adopted in the process – another precarious balance of inclusionary and exclusionary elements – once again fell foul of its internal contradictions. In the Transvaal province, where I focus my discussion, this process was helped along by cross-purposes between the administrative scales of the state when provincial authorities were given powers to implement a vision of squatter control defined at the national level.

The state faced severe difficulties in its attempts to deal with the problem of squatting at Crossroads through the existing spatial nexus of exception and containment. The emergence of squatting at Crossroads as an excess impervious to the apartheid state’s modern repressive spatial techniques, was met at first with more attempts at repression, which unsurprisingly failed once more. Plans to redistribute the squatter population within the existing topography of exceptional ‘black’ space faced intractable challenges, for instance. The fact that many of the squatters in Crossroads were citizens of ‘independent’ ‘homelands’ who had been stripped of South African citizenship and rights to permanent residence, should have facilitated removal of this “surplus”, “illegal” urban population through diplomatic channels. However, their subjection to alienage made it no easier to arrest, detain and repatriate them. Indeed, their determination to return to urban South Africa was such that complex and costly contingency plans had to be made to prevent any deportees from returning the very same day. These included roadblocks manned by the South African Police, provincial traffic authorities and Department of Transport inspectors, and control of trains by the South African Rail Police.

While these measures may appear as evidence of the state’s might, it is important to recognize that the deployment of this range of coercive measures also bears testimony to the intractable agency of the "surplus" 'black' subject that manifested itself in the squatter phenomenon of the 1980s.

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43 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984, 21 June, p. 118
44 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984a; 1984d, p. 60; Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 247
45 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984d, p. 60; Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 247
In addition, mass repatriations required diplomatic negotiations with the 'independent' states of which the “illegals” were citizens. But here, the spectral nature of ‘homeland’ nationalism failed – not least due to the ever-deteriorating conditions within these nominal states – and the independent Ciskei and Transkei homelands refused to receive ‘their’ repatriated citizens. An ironic by-product of the apartheid state’s success in contriving sovereign states to which to divest large portions of the South African 'black' population, this refusal required efforts to convince or manipulate the states into receiving ‘their’ citizens, which exposed the fragility of even this most extreme of the apartheid state’s territorial strategies. Various Cabinet committees contemplated carrot-and-stick measures to overcome this problem, from offering development aid or additional land in exchange for receiving ‘repatriated’ illegal urban ‘blacks’, to threats to reduce such states’ grants from the South African state if they failed to comply.

As for the “legal” squatters – that is, those employed and with section 10 rights of urban residence, but deprived of formal housing by the freezing of township development – efforts to control and accommodate them on plots of land in the newly developed but more distant township of Khayelitsha proved equally difficult. Forced removals had elicited much controversy already, and the volatile political climate of the 1980s made the Cabinet committees hyper-aware of the political fallout of repressive measures and the need to ensure that any control measures would appear defensible and "humane" to liberal 'white' South Africans and the international community. They were cognizant that “The Crossroads squatter problem was politicized to the point that it was no longer about provision of better housing but about policy aspects of the RSA government”, such that “large-scale forced clearing could … lead to international repercussions.” The need to put a positive spin on removals to Khayelitsha led to the deliberate use of the term ‘settlement’ rather than ‘removal’:

that clearing actions and movement of people will not be voluntary and the current attitude of the RSA toward “forced removals” should be kept in mind.[...] To lessen the impact of so-called "forced removals" on RSA, in future all stakeholders must refer to the resettlement as "settlement" instead.

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46 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984b, pp. 185-186; 1985b, p. 281; Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 254
47 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, p. 175
48 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 248
49 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, p. 181; 183
50 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984a, p. 191
51 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984c, p. 100
In addition, a “psychological climate creation plan” was to be developed to support the removal strategy.\(^5\) This was attempted with some success by spinning the Crossroads issues as “a health issue rather than a political one.\(^6\) which involved the strategic use of ostensibly independent spokespeople to frame the Crossroads problem as one of health, sanitation and human dignity.\(^7\) Further contradictions resulted from the regime’s own labyrinthine laws – requiring the area to be repealed as a ‘black’ urban residential area and reproclaimed as an emergency camp before resettlement was possible.\(^8\) All the while, the continuing repressive force being used under executive authority of the prime minister, was constantly undercutting attempts at “psychological climate creation.”\(^9\) These examples illustrate the irreducible tensions and internal ambiguity introduced into the ordering apparatus of the modern state in the process of managing a contrived system of unequal citizenship that could countenance neither full inclusion nor complete exclusion of the ‘black’ subject.

Finally, even as the Cabinet committees struggled to engineer a way in which to return ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ squatters to township and homeland spaces respectively, they considered longer term measures to curb the flow of ‘black’ migrants – now virtually synonymous with squatters – into the Cape province. The co-presence and intermingling of these two policy priorities is unmistakable in Cabinet documents as an indication of the virtual synonymy of squatter control and influx control. These included all-too-familiar immigration control techniques, such as carrier sanctions on buses transporting people from the homelands into the Western Cape;\(^10\) deposits against the overstaying of temporary permits;\(^11\) and raising fines for employers who employed illegal (unpermitted) workers.\(^12\) This task was made more difficult by the government’s concessions made to Transkei and Ciskei on independence, allowing their citizens 14 days permit-free in urban areas. While this concession might have assisted the state to externalize the states' populations through the production of homeland ‘sovereignty’, it made it virtually impossible to effectively identify and prosecute ‘illegals’ in Crossroads, as there was no way to prove whether a person had overstayed the 14 day period.\(^13\) Talk of the

\(^{5}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 253
\(^{6}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984, 26 March, p. 146
\(^{7}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984, 21 June, pp. 115-117
\(^{8}\) Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984d, p. 61
\(^{9}\) see for instance Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984b, p. 41
\(^{10}\) Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984d, pp. 60-61; Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, pp. 244-245
\(^{11}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, pp. 246-247
\(^{12}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983c, p. 231
\(^{13}\) Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983c, pp. 230-231
institution of an entry-stamping system ensued, as did rather futile talk of diplomatic negotiations about withdrawing the concessionary provisions.\textsuperscript{61}

The consequence was that, when the working group requested legal opinions on the appropriate Acts for the resettlement of legal residents of Crossroads and removal of illegal residents, it became clear that influx control legislation would not serve the purpose of eliminating Crossroads. There appeared to be no legal option for removing ‘illegals’, since pass books theoretically qualified as a valid travel document for citizens of Transkei and Ciskei and if illegals were declared ‘prohibited persons’ in some other way, the appeals process would “bring the removal to a standstill.”\textsuperscript{62} The modern sensibility of the apartheid state, in its attempt to manufacture an unequal socio-political order through a complex machinery of laws and regulations, kept running up against its own internal ambiguities. Thus, paradoxically, the very pinnacle of the state’s exclusionary apparatus – the quasi-sovereign ‘black’ state – became the reason why the state could not curtail the unregulated growth of urban ‘black’ populations, which the squatter camp embodied. Instead, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act was identified as the best Act to facilitate the resettlement of legal ‘black’ urbanites (Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984b, p. 48) while keeping the city closed to unwanted, ‘surplus’ ‘black’ bodies not through the traditional influx control measures but by subjecting them to enhanced provisions against ‘illegal squatters.’ This provides the context within which the Cabinet Committee ceased to apply the distinction between legal and illegal presence to squatter populations, placing emphasis instead on the crime of squatting as “the unlawful and/or uncontrolled settlement of persons for residential purposes in an area, or on a plot or in a building, against the legal determinations that apply.”\textsuperscript{63} In other words, the figure of the squatter in state law and practice was to take the place of the illegal ‘black’ migrant as the form of life to be excluded from urban space. This was to be achieved through a focus on specific elements of place – the material form and location of squatter dwellings – which became a proxy for what was previously exercised through the larger scale spatial strategy of influx control through the township-homeland nexus.

This is an early indication of the state’s recognition that influx control could not curb the excess represented by squatter camps, and that a new regime of control would be required to exercise control over urban ‘blacks’. This had been hinted at two years previously, when it was

\textsuperscript{61} Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983c, pp. 230-231
\textsuperscript{62} Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1984b, p. 48
\textsuperscript{63} Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1985a, p. 173; Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1985, p. 3, my italics
suggested that the issue of squatting “could not be fully resolved, but could be regulated.”

Paradoxically, wielding control over squatters meant setting one bundle of laws (influx control) in abeyance in order to enable a second legal regime to take hold of this population. As the state was unable to remove the Crossroads squatters to the ‘outside’ constituted by the ‘homelands’, its only option to bring the squatter camp under its control was eventually to establish all residents of Crossroads, legal and illegal, in ‘temporary’ emergency camps – first in situ, and then in Khayelitsha. In other words, suspension of the law was the only way to bring the settlement within the ambit of the law under the de facto conditions of the time. A legal exception had to be opened up within the rule of law, new zones of indistinction established as distinct places – ‘camps’ – in order to subject to containment the excess represented by squatting.

The residents nevertheless resisted moving, and several groups of ‘illegal’ residents demanded section 10 (permanent residence) rights in exchange for agreeing to move to Khayelitsha. The Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs proposed accepting this demand and legalizing the groups, in order that “proper control will be able to be exercised over them, as opposed to others illegally present in the Cape Peninsula.” Once again, we see the contradictions implicit in managing an outside within leading to the paradox of having to subsume illegality into the system, albeit temporarily. The exceptionalism of this measure is captured in the Committee’s insistence that this would not be a policy but simply an “ad-hoc action” for application only to the specific problem of Crossroads/Khayelitsha. The fact that this form of incorporation was intended to be temporary – a stopgap for a problem that from the viewpoint of the state remained unsolved – suggests that at this point it could be classified as what Yiftachel refers to as “gray spacing” in a study of Israel: “the practice of indefinitely positioning populations between the ‘lightness’ of legality, safety and full membership, and the ‘darkness’ of eviction, destruction and death” (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 247). Subsumed into controlled townships, the squatters were “neither integrated nor eliminated” (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 250); instead, they were preserved and contained “in a state of ‘permanent temporariness’; concurrently tolerated and condemned, perpetually waiting ‘to be corrected’” (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 251).

However, despite the ‘temporary’ and ad-hoc character ascribed to the Crossroads solution, a similar form of exceptionalism was in fact to become institutionalized as the default way of managing squatting under the policy of ‘orderly urbanization’ that was adopted in the mid-

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64 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983a, pp. 240-241
65 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1984a, p. 61
66 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1985b, pp. 288-289
67 Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs, 1985b, p. 289
1980s. This policy, which I explore in the next section, attempted again to juggle inclusionary and exclusionary elements, albeit under a new and apparently more liberal rubric. Once again, I show, it would founder on its internal contradictions, inadvertently bolstering claims for urban inclusion by the ‘surplus’ ‘black’ population.

4.2.1. The national turn to orderly urbanization

The Crossroads debacle became the germination point for a new national strategy for managing the excess embodied in the political problem of squatting. The sheer enormity of implementing influx control to rid Crossroads of squatters, most likely together with recognition that many of the measures were only legally possible because Transkei and Ciskei were ‘independent’ states whose ‘citizens’ were not South African citizens and could be ‘repatriated’, triggered a policy concern with squatting as a national problem. Lengthy Cabinet deliberations on how to deal with illegals in Crossroads prompted recommendations to investigate – well in advance of the repeal of influx control and the implementation of the orderly urbanization strategy in 1986 – “how this problem could be regulated on a regional basis”, along with “methods for its regulation.”

That is, even as the state continued to attempt to address Crossroads through its existing infrastructure of laws and policies, it began to recognize that these spatial manifestations of this outside within might have to be subsumed rather than eliminated. The focus on resettlement of squatters as a form of repressive power has obscured the uneasy dynamic between the state and the excess of 'black' citizens making claims for space in the city. A reconstruction of these practices through government archives shows the agentic role that the squatter camp played in state decisionmaking. It created a quandary to which exceptional practices were the only solution, thus perpetuating the destabilizing ambiguity at the heart of the state’s system of inclusion-exclusion.

A renewed demand for the production of data about instances of squatting throughout the national territory was part of these efforts toward a strategy for managing squatting, as was

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68 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 255 – it should be borne in mind here that the “problem” of urbanisation remained a “problem” of ‘black’ urbanisation, since the other (far smaller) population groups in South Africa were far closer to the maximum level of urbanization by 1980 (Gelderblom & Kok, 1994, p. 97) – which helps explain why urbanisation policy continued to have a strong flavour of urbanization control.

69 Although South Africa now has squatter camps populated by ‘white’ squatters, prior to democracy “the authorities knew of no white squatters” – the phenomenon was seen as one occurring exclusively among members of “the Black-, Coloured- and Indian population groups” (F. W. De Klerk - Cabinet Chairperson, c 1987, November, p. 3).

70 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983c, p. 233
intensive monitoring on a biweekly basis. By 1987, the Transvaal province stands out clearly as the leader, with 861,528 squatters as compared to a mere 316,376 in the Cape Province in which the beleaguered Crossroads lay. In fact, over 50% of the 1,376,944 squatters in the country were located in a single region of the Transvaal: the metropolitan PWV area, comprising the relatively contiguous metropoles of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the East and West Rand, or what is presently known as the Gauteng City Region. Given the difficulties encountered in attempts to eliminate Crossroads, the ubiquity of this phenomenon posed a serious dilemma for the state, which had for some time recognized that squatting varied in character from place to place, and because of this local variability – not to mention the complex government structure produced to govern South Africa’s segregated populations and group areas – squatting could not be “solved on only one authority level.” As such, powers over the Squatting Act, which were previously held by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, were handed over to the various group authority structures in October 1986.

At the same time, the Cabinet considered the legal architecture for dealing with other instances of squatting among its various regions. In 1986, the government abolished influx controls, introducing a policy of ‘orderly urbanization’ in its place. This resulted in the repeal of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act which upheld influx control via the pass laws, and restoration of South African citizenship to citizens of the ‘independent’ states. This meant it was no longer illegal for any ‘black’ person to be present in an urban area, and as a result the most explicit stratification of ‘black’ citizenship into ‘township’ and ‘homeland’, ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’, legal and illegal appeared to fall away. However, the state had found a less politically charged way to sustain controls on ‘black’ urbanization. One of the key strategic changes the President’s Council Report on urbanization recommended, before the passage of the White Paper on Urbanisation in 1986, was exactly “the replacement of traditional pass and influx controls with (formally) racially neutral measures such as squatter, slums and health regulations” (Hindson, 1985, p. 417). The force of exclusionary measures would now be directed not at the ‘black’ body but at the squatter body – the disorderly and hazardous other of the policy’s vision of “orderly urbanization”. In this way, the permanent and temporary residential categories that disappeared from legislation with the repeal of the Natives Urban Areas Act were resurrected via productive measures to accommodate existing squatters and

71 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983d, p. 256
72 F. W. De Klerk - Cabinet Chairperson, c 1987, November, p. 3
73 Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1983a, pp. 240-241
74 Cabinet Committee: Political Affairs, 1983
repressive measures to be applied to newcomers. Thus, comparatively liberal though they were, the urbanization control measures that replaced influx control deracialized the most direct instruments of mobility control while attempting to maintain much of the inter- and intra-racial stratification of citizenship, both political and substantive, through the mechanism of squatter control. How, then, could new squatters at Jeffsville speculate that inclusion, through the provision of formal housing by the state, would follow from their insurgent land occupation? I answer this question in the discussion below, illustrating how the new measures around the regulation of squatting were taken up in an unexpected way in the Transvaal province, turning their exceptionalism into a potential passage toward permanent urban inclusion and the promise of a more equal urban membership for all squatters.

4.3. Transition through exception: squatter law in the Transvaal

If government is a practice of tactically 'disposing things' (Foucault on governmentality, cited in Garmany, 2009), and power is exercised from a multiplicity of positions rather than from a traditional notion of sovereign power as an attribute held and wielded from a single site of domination (Foucault, 1990, p. 93), then taking an ethnographic view of the institutions of the state can counteract the potential of notions of exceptionalism to mystify state power. In this section, I draw on archived provincial government documents to illustrate the transformative potential of internal inconsistencies within the fragmented body of the state. I show how inconsistencies between national and provincial government scales obstructed the institutionalization of squatter-related law as a technique for reinforcing the containment established through the township-homeland nexus. This, I argue, played a role in reconfiguring squatter camps as places not of containment, but of transition to a more equal citizenship, shedding light on contradictions in the political subjectivity accompanying land invasions in Atteridgeville. For an analysis of political subjectivity and practice in the squatter camp, this is a significant change, as it subtly moves squatter claim-making from an explicitly illegitimate, counterpolitical and insurgent practice to a claim for inclusion en route to legitimization by the state.
4.3.1. Transformations of squatter law in the 1980s

Legislation, and its embodiment through institutions and practices, is a defining feature of the structural bedrock of political identity created by the state. Therefore, the law governing squatting in South Africa provides potential insight into the mechanisms through which the squatter camp would come to shape the political subjectivity and practices of a certain population of 'black' citizens. Squatting was defined as a criminal act as early as 1942, leading to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (Muller, 2013, pp. 382-383). Subsequent amendments tightened the definition steadily over time, so that whereas in 1944 squatting was merely the act of inhabitating land without the owner’s permission, amendments of the 1970s criminalized the occupation of unauthorized structures\footnote{ Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March , Annexure B} and in the 1980s extended its prohibitions even to those living in unapproved structures with permission from the landowner, redefining squatting simply as the crime of inhabiting an unauthorized structure.

The penalties for title or lease holders who permitted squatting as well as for squatters themselves, was raised, and compulsory summary eviction stipulated.\footnote{ J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March} Penalties were raised for anyone involved in levying of fees or “exercising of authority in respect of the organizing of illegal squatting” – a fine of R10,000, five years imprisonment, or both.\footnote{ J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March} Thus, in many ways, the amendments of the 1980s enacted sharpened repressive provisions in relation to squatting.

Yet there was also an inclusionary face to the amended Act. It also contained a substantial range of provisions providing for existing land occupied by squatters, or alternative vacant land, to be declared “transit areas”\footnote{ J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March} by local authorities or the provincial (or other) administrator, and formalized through other measures provided by the legislation. Provision was made for the designation of particular areas as informal towns which could later be converted into “conventional towns.”\footnote{ J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March} All of these measures echoed the ad-hoc measures attempted at Crossroads, suggesting that Crossroads was the laboratory for these new forms of spatial engineering. They clearly provide a way to subject to containment any existing squatter densities that might prove equally impervious to elimination. The term ‘transit’ was deliberately chosen to signify that existing squatter areas would eventually be “settled” (read: removed) to other sites.\footnote{ Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March , Annexure B} Broadly, then, the legislation was a form of influx control by other means (Simon, 1992, p. 56), strengthening the measures put in place to prevent any further
uncontrolled leakage from rural to urban territories, despite allowing unprecedented scope for a form of inclusion that would impose order and structure on the ambiguity and volatility of existing, uncontrolled squatter camps. Crucially, the amendment also divested national power over squatting into the hands of provincial governments – a move that, it was hoped, would depoliticize squatter control.\textsuperscript{81} This was a key transformation, since a contrary orientation at the provincial scale of government would subvert the containment function implicit in the Act, turning it into a mechanism for a more broadly inclusive city.

4.3.2. From national law to provincial practice: scale contradictions

Although the Act’s productive and repressive provisions had potential to produce a new stratification of de facto permanent urbanites versus ‘illegal’ newcomers, archival records suggest that, in the Transvaal province at least, this led to a policy of transition to formality for all squatters, rather than reproducing the long-standing distinction between established, permanent urban ‘blacks’ and temporary migrants. In this sense, the Act’s exceptionalism came, in a de facto sense, to serve the ends of inclusion rather than exclusion. Having approached the archive with a somewhat monolithic conception of the functioning of the apartheid state structure, I was fascinated to discover that the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA) viewed the Squatting Act in a distinctly negative light, and considered its repressive provisions out of line with the generally liberal tone of the White Paper on Urbanisation, which elaborated the ‘orderly urbanization’ strategy in 1986 (Murray, 1987, p. 311). Most likely, this was due to the province’s misrecognition of squatter controls as a component part of the urbanization strategy, rather than a counterpoint to those liberal currents which was intended to stem the free flow of ‘black’ urbanization in a racially neutral and hence depoliticized manner. In a 1987 memorandum, the TPA took a strong orientation against the “parochial” and “exclusionary” elements of the 1986 Act, declaring the Act out of line with the reality of squatting as experienced in contemporary times as a “social phenomenon inherent in the process of urbanisation.”\textsuperscript{82}

It is not surprising, then, that the TPA, once handed power over the Act, deliberately chose to disregard the “accusatorial” measures provided by the Act – relating to squatting and the levying of related fees as a criminal offence, linked to powers of eviction and demolition, and chose to focus solely on the “counteractive measures” which empowered local authorities to

\textsuperscript{81} Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development, 1985, p. 3
\textsuperscript{82} Executive Director: Community Services - TPA, c 1987, p. 9
establish emergency camps and provinces to set aside areas for the residence of ‘homeless’ people. Claiming that the repressive measures were outside their functional competency and should be left to the police, the TPA “accepted as policy that it is concerned with the so-called positive steps in terms of the Act, that is, the establishment of emergency camps and the establishment of informal, affordable towns.” 83 It explicitly deems the Act’s powers to provide land for the homeless and provide for the gradual, orderly development of such land, to be a more appropriate response to the social phenomenon of squatting, giving “impetus to the Government’s White Paper on Urbanisation” through its establishment of “informal towns” which might in time “prosper and flourish to fully-fledged municipal status... or be incorporated in existing municipalities.” 84 Here, the TPA takes the sanitized language of the urbanization policy at face value, using it to justify a partial application of the Squatting Act that largely neutralized its potential as the instrument of a new form of influx control and continued spatial stratification of the ‘black’ citizenry.

4.3.3. From containment to transition in the Transvaal

The TPA praised the 1986 amendment to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act which allowed for the production of exceptional spaces for the formal inclusion of existing squatters, appreciating the power it provided in allowing a provincial administrator to designate land for the settlement of “people who cannot find accommodation” – a move that affirmed the province’s conviction that squatting is not a crime but “a social malady which can really only be cured through the provision of land and services.” 85 Within two years of receiving powers over the Act in October 1986, 86 the TPA had produced detailed financial projections relating to provision of land and services in various areas, identified potential land for acquisition, and engaged with a variety of roleplayers to identify possible sources of funding for housing, 87 corporately recommending that attempts to identify and free up land should not be directed only at immediate problems of landlessness but make provision up until the year 2020. 88 A working group had already been established to begin working to ensure that “all action be taken in order to ensure that meaningful urbanisation is quickly achieved in the province.” 89 It is noteworthy that at what was now the highest political level at which the Act would be

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83 Chief Director - Land Use, c 1987, November
84 Executive Director: Community Services - TPA, c 1987, pp. 10-11 and 11-13
85 Executive Director: Community Services - TPA, c 1987
86 Assistant Director-General: Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1987
87 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 12 December
88 Transvaal Provincial Authority, 1988, December 1 and 2
89 Transvaal Provincial Authority, 1988, December 1 and 2
carried out, the definition of urbanization was positive, as something ‘meaningful’ to be ‘achieved’ through positive steps, rather than a problem to be controlled. This was not necessarily the intention of the Cabinet when it devolved the powers of the Act, however: F.W. de Klerk, then chairperson of Cabinet, had “warned” the TPA “not to take an overly narrow approach to the interpretation and application of the [Squatting] Act.”\(^{90}\) An archived letter from the Office of the State President to the TPA demonstrates clearly that the province’s approach is confounding the intended use of the Squatting Act to continue to police the boundaries of ‘black’ urban areas in the absence of influx controls. The letter expresses concern that in Thokoza – a township on the East Rand, within the PWV region of the then-Transvaal province –

The authority’s attempts to legalize the residence of inhabitants of illegal squatter camps by upgrading current squatter camps to emergency camps or to resettle inhabitants elsewhere, is now being used as a means of movement [‘skuifmeul of middel’] by other Blacks/inhabitants of towns, who have a need for housing, to quickly obtain occupation.\(^{91}\)

The State President’s Office clearly views the productive measures in the Squatting Act as a measure to contain urbanization; allowing existing squatter populations to transition into formal inclusion, while holding further squatting at bay. It complains of a “vicious circle” whereby “Local Blacks as well as migrants see this situation as an ‘opportunity’ and are beginning to use illegal squatter camps as a shortcut to obtaining legal occupation.”\(^{92}\) In the TPA’s response, it is clear that the province sees the situation very differently. Addressing these concerns, the TPA makes no apology. It resists the imperative to use the Act as a new form of influx control, insisting that such a “vicious circle” is an inevitable consequence of the demise of influx control and the under-resourcing of ‘black’ local authorities:

1.1. Since the repeal of influx control two years ago, the families of thousands of Black breadwinners have joined them from elsewhere and moved into over-full houses and backyards in urban Black residential areas. This “illegal” residence cannot be controlled or constrained by the relevant local authorities.

1.2. Local authorities, even with the help of the state and the private sector, are not in a position to provide housing at an acceptable speed to their residents.

1.3. As long as employment is unobtainable in rural areas and Black states, migration to the cities will continue.\(^{93}\)

Regardless of the potential “vicious circle”, he continues, “the reality of an ongoing influx to the PWV region cannot be ignored.”\(^{94}\) In this manner, it becomes clear both that the national

\(^{90}\) F. W. De Klerk - Cabinet Chairperson, c 1987, November, p. 4
\(^{91}\) Chairperson: NASSEM - Office of the State President, 1988
\(^{92}\) Chairperson: NASSEM - Office of the State President, 1988
\(^{93}\) Executive Director: Community Services - TPA, 1988, 18 March, p. 2
state hoped to use the ‘negative’ provisions of the Squatter Act as a gatekeeping mechanism to urbanization, and that instead the TPA provided an institutional “structure of anticipation” (Das, 2011, p. 329) in which it became imaginable that both established and new squatters – indeed, all urban ‘blacks’ suffering the consequences of the state’s decades-long spatial techniques of rule – could enter into an incremental trajectory towards urban inclusion. For an analysis of political subjectivity and practice in the squatter camp, this is a significant change, as it subtly moves squatter claim-making from an explicitly illegitimate, counterpolitical and insurgent practice to a claim for inclusion en route to legitimization by the state. I read it as the genesis of a structure of anticipation in squatter politics, and a change in the meaning of the squatter camp from a place of defiant survival to a place of hope for socio-political mobility, which would eventually give rise to a “patient” rather than insurgent politics after 1994 (Zikode in Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509). The politics of hope that germinated here and blossomed as the transition to democracy progressed, provides an important backdrop to the ascendant politics of despair that we will witness in the later chapters of this thesis, as the expected transition fails to materialize (for more on hope and despair in slum politics, see Eke, 1982, p. 153; Sanghera & Satybaldieva, 2012, p. 98).

It is worth reflecting on the broader theoretical significance of these findings from the archive, which illustrate that a principle of productive encounter can be usefully applied where the archive is seen not as a repository of truth but as a source of traces of the past that illuminate the present, comprising multiple and often competing voices and constructions of phenomena. It is interesting that one can trace, through paper artefacts of the relationship between national and provincial government, significant differences of orientation; and in the dry environment of the archive find oneself just as moved as the ethnographer “by the manner in which an underlying allegiance to the idea of preserving life both at the level of the individual and that of the community comes to be expressed in the moments when the State is able to put aside its function to punish infringements of law” (Das, 2011, p. 330). The encounter reminds us that, rather than being a disembodied unity; a single and unified institutional actor, the state is embodied through a heterogeneous assembly of institutions, actors and instruments that do not behave in a perfectly coherent and synchronous manner. It is embedded in different spatial scales; empowered with different, sometimes changing functions and capacities; enjoying different forms and intensities of interface with governed populations and other organs of state; and populated by networks of individual officials through whose bodies state agency is animated (see for instance, Mountz, 2003).
4.3.4. Emergence of an affirmative exceptionalism?

This understanding of the embodied state militates against an overly pessimistic view of exceptional practices, and toward a more dynamic and dispersed understanding of the operation of power. The dispersion of power need not add up to a thoroughgoing and ever more inescapable form of governmentality. Indeed, governmentality as a practice of “disposing things” at a variety of institutional sites and scales can turn praxis away from its intended applications, rather than “intensifying” the same (Garmany, 2009, p. 725). Considering the exception from this viewpoint, then, we must consider that exceptional practices may be harnessed to multiple agendas, rather than always being reducible to a coherent underlying logic of sovereign power. In a similar vein, in her work on the housing struggles of the urban poor in India, Veena Das has proposed an alternative to Agamben’s view of exception, suggesting that “the relation between law and life” can render visible “an alternative tradition of conceptualizing the notion of a rule and its suspension” (Das, 2011, p. 322). She observes that there is often a dynamic relationship between the concepts of “life, law, and exception”, so that it is “the force that each of these concepts exerts on the other that come to define the conditions of possibility for the emergence of claims over citizenship” (Das, 2011, p. 320). Through the intersection of life, law and exception a zone of indistinction can function to bring what was a constitutive outside into the ‘inside’.

However, it is worth observing the contradiction in the Squatting Act’s simultaneously productive and repressive, inclusive and exclusive provisions. The irony of this legislation is that, on the one hand, it defined the offense of squatting specifically in terms of its character as a manifestation of illegal forms of land use and transgression of planning regulations, while on the other in the form of “transit camps” and “designated areas”, it provided the scope to reproduce these forms of land use within the territory and jurisdiction of the state. The affirmative measures of the Act embed ambiguity within the ‘transit areas’ and ‘informal towns’ that are to bring existing squatters into the ordinary legal order/jurisdiction/embrace of the state, for in order to capture these areas into the ordinary legal order, the state had to render their extralegal characteristics legal. The transit areas would be subject to “special regulations”, while “a number of laws, normally applicable to towns, will not apply to such areas.”95 They are made simultaneously legal and illegal through their exemption from a range of laws relating to town planning, health, and building standards because if such laws are “too stringent the squatters will not be able to comply therewith and the whole object of

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95 J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March
establishing a transmit [sic] area will be frustrated.” In the case of “designated areas” set aside to allow areas of “controlled squatting” to be “established on a permanent basis” as townships, it is noted that

It will not be possible, for economic reasons and also due to the urgency of the matter, to establish a township initially and to apply all the provisions relating to the establishment of townships, town planning, subdivision of land and building standards. These laws and the Slums Act, 76 of 1979 will therefore not apply in designated areas.

The TPA used the exceptionalism enshrined in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act to accelerate the development of ‘black’ towns, multiplying exceptions to get around the bureaucracy usually involved in township development:

As a result of the great shortage of Black [sic] housing it is realized that the usual strictly controlled development with all its restrictions and accompanying delays cannot be applied in this situation. To bring relief it is decided to give freer rein [...] The authority has already amended many of the procedures and standards for town establishment to encourage speedy development. Further, every application is evaluated on its own merits and local circumstances are taken into account so that the conditions can be adapted where necessary.

It is interesting to note the ambiguity that enters into law and policy here, as the order and specificity of apartheid modernism opens up into heterogeneous considerations of contingency and contextual negotiation. It was suggested that structural guide plans become “non-statutory” due to the “changed circumstances”; that zoning laws be changed to allow industrial, residential, retail and commercial rights on the same property under certain circumstances; that the Physical Planning Act be repealed. Despite all this exceptionalism, there remained scope for the Administrator to make certain laws applicable “when the time is ripe to commence the upgrading of the area to a township.”

In addition to this, the province resolved as a matter of policy that, since “a considerable number of squatters cannot afford economic housing,” it must accept in establishing informal towns that “the standard of services and infrastructure must of necessity be lower than those provided in a properly developed town” and indeed that only “such infrastructure and services as can be afforded by the squatting community concerned can be provided.” Nevertheless, the province resolved also that “infrastructure must be installed in such a way that it can be

96 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March, Annexure B
97 Copy of the Act in Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March, Annexure B, p.7
98 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March, Annexure B
99 Transvaal Provincial Authority, 1988, 15 November
100 Transvaal Provincial Authority, 1988, December 1 and 2
101 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1988, 18 March, Annexure B
102 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1987, 24 August
improved gradually as the community’s financial position improves. Here again, the motif of gradual transition, or what Das has called "structure of anticipation" (Das, 2011, p. 329) of future improvements in the realization of urban membership, emerges. In all these mechanisms, we see a principle of transition through exception – a trajectory toward inclusion expressed in the implicit teleological concept of a movement from illegality toward legality, from abnormally low standards to better ones – mediated by a temporal and spatial transition embodied by “transit areas” and “informal towns” that progress toward formal township status. It is clear how this clearly codified and emphasized notion of transition constructs the squatter as a body destined for permanent inclusion into the closed space of the city.

However, it becomes apparent that, in order to address the inequality produced by the ambiguity at the heart of apartheid’s spatial order, ambiguity must somehow be subsumed into the legal order: in other words, a life-denying exceptionalism must be replaced by a life-affirming exceptionalism. Whether deliberately produced or simply apprehended, ambiguity remains at the centre of both forms of exceptionalism. In this sense, the zone of indistinction cannot be reduced to an initiative of political nihilism; indeed, it can also be an initiative to support the emergence of greater equality, of allowing "claims of life to trump claims of law" (Das, 2011, p. 331). Yet the ambiguity that persists at the heart of this latter form of exceptionalism remains an important quandary. On the one hand, the historical stratification of citizenship creates structural conditions that are not always conducive to a smooth and orderly transition to full inclusion, as I note briefly below. On the other, ambiguous space can play an agentic role in reproducing infra-citizenship regardless of the motives for which it was created, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.

4.4. Inclusion after exclusion: challenges to transition?

Making space for a transition to inclusion through squatting, although perceived as a “means of movement” into the formal city, did not necessarily produce an inevitable teleology to the anticipated urban inclusion, as I discuss further in Chapter 6. However, clues to the tenuousness of the promise of transition abounded in the archives of the TPA. For instance, The Executive Director for Community Services observed the irony that the problem of squatting was produced by withholding urban land rights from ‘black’ people and adequate

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103 Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal, 1987, 24 August
104 J. C. Heunis - Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1988, 24 March
funding from ‘black’ local authorities, so that its solution would require the post-hoc provision of that land and money in a still under-resourced context:

However, in an ironic manner, the section [of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act relating to the designation of areas for settlement of homeless people] completes the vicious circle: squatting is generally caused by a dearth of land and money, and this section enables the Administrator to combat squatting by providing land and infrastructural services, i.e. with land and money. 105

This was in a context in which most land was already enclosed. Hence, attempts to identify sufficient and suitable land for the formal resettlement of squatters met with difficulty. Many potential sites for development fell by the wayside when surveyors found them to be inhabited by squatters already, or geologically unsuitable for human habitation – such as at Balfour and Phola/Oogies.106 Most of the province’s suitable land had already been absorbed through primitive accumulation under apartheid. In addition, faced with the exponential return of demand suppressed for half a century prior to the repeal of influx controls, provinces did not have the necessary funds to provide for the level of need.107 A memorandum submitted by the Executive Director for Community Services reflects with concern on the complexity of the challenge facing the province, noting that despite the approximately 60,000 stands potentially available for housing development in the PWV area, “more than double” that number would be required, since more than 85% of the squatters were concentrated there.108 On top of this, the state had transferred housing provision into the hands of the private sector, and with the restitution of ‘black’ property ownership rights in 1988, an “abnormal” inflated property market characterized by “speculation and profit-seeking” ensued, creating new blockages in access to property and hindering the social goals of further township development.109 In other words, a variety of structural conditions stood to hinder the “cure” to squatting needed for the achievement of “meaningful urbanisation.”

Also important to apprehend in light of the theme of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization is the fact that the prospect of squatting as transition opened up space for the contestation of access to the city between existing claimants for formal housing in overcrowded township homes and newcomers from rural areas, some of whom came with the “exclusive aim of obtaining rights of passage” to relocation sites.110 Roy has observed that processes of formalization can contain “great internal conflict for squatter settlements” and highly contentious, sometimes violent,
“sorting out of legitimate claims” (Roy, 2005, p. 6). This potential was magnified by the fact that ‘black’ local authorities were dealing with serious overcrowding of township housing, as well as suffering financially due to the national state’s insistence that they become ‘self-financing’ (Gelderblom & Kok, 1994, p. 88). This led some to refuse to receive squatters, as they would be “advantaged at the expense of the residents”\(^1\) – an early resonance of established/newcomer tensions we will later witness in contention of space in Atteridgeville. The TPA recognized these faultlines even as it asserted the priority squatters should receive in the allocation of housing. It acknowledged that “not all the families on the historical waiting lists of Black local authorities are squatters”, concluding that “the picture that emerges is not conducive to optimism.”\(^2\) As we will see in Chapter 5, the competing claims that would arise out of the notion of squatting-as-transition would complicate squatter politics. Although archival records dwindled after the year 1990, I continued to find traces of the theme of transition and the complexity that accompanied it during fieldwork in my case sites, the analysis of which I turn to in the next three chapters.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has contrasted the state-centred techniques of exception and containment discussed in Chapter 3 with forms of placemaking that opened space for claims on the city by ‘surplus’ citizens. I have argued that contradictory impulses to simultaneously include and exclude the ‘black’ population created a destabilizing ambiguity at the centre of statecraft, which constantly re-emerged to unsettle attempts at modern regulation and control. Using the example of the Crossroads squatter Camp in the Western Cape, which forms a focal point of discussion on this issue in Cabinet documents in the early to mid-1980s, I have explored the bottom-up emergence of the squatter camp as a spatial manifestation of this ambiguity, and a counter-political site embodying the claims of ‘surplus’ ‘black’ urban dwellers for a place in the city.

I have shown that elements of place, such as the location and material form of the squatter camp, because of its apparent disorder and lack of planning, wielded a distinct form of agency against the efforts of the national state to repress and control ‘black’ urbanization. The squatter camp was both an insurgent response to, and a terrain on which to resist, the spatial strategies of rule that defined many ‘black’ citizens as an unwanted ‘surplus’ and reproduced

\(^1\) Overall Co-Ordinating Committee on Squatting, 1988, 7 December, p. 12

\(^2\) Executive Director: Community Services - TPA, c 1987, pp. 14-15
their exclusion through controls on movement and township development. In an attempt to recuperate the ambiguous space of the squatter camp back into its nexus of containment, the state produced legal amendments that attempted to include existing squatters by bringing them into township containment and from that point forward redirect exclusionary measures from the 'black' body in general to the 'squatter' body through which future unwanted 'black' urbanization would be manifested. Yet, once again, the entanglement of inclusive and exclusive orientations would prove an obstacle, creating space for provincial government to exercise its own discretion to subvert the exclusionary intentions of the amended Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. The policy of life-affirming exceptionalism adopted by the Transvaal Provincial Authority challenges nihilistic readings of this phenomenon, since exceptional strategies became a route to a form of inclusion that compromised containment, giving rise to a politics of hope and a sense of the squatter camp as embedded in a temporal trajectory toward improved de facto equality. At the same time, however, bringing the illegal squatter into the realm of the law involved a process of legalizing illegality, producing the squatter camp as a profoundly ambiguous site that would not quite cross the threshold between inclusion and exclusion. In the next Chapter, I turn to my field research to introduce the squatter settlements of Atteridgeville against the backdrop of the politics of squatting laid out here. Going beyond the temporal limits of the archival material I could access, I draw on ethnographic field encounters to explore currents of active insurgency and more passive transitional politics of citizenship in the settlements before and after the transition to democracy in 1994.
Chapter 5: Squatter politics in Mshongo: insurgency, anticipation and political identity

A riot and a queue might seem to have little in common, but, in the ambiguous climate created by contradictions in national and provincial orientations to the squatter camp, both metaphors could be used to describe the way in which squatters claimed a place in the city through their occupation of land south west of Atteridgeville. Having looked at the ways in which the national state worked to construct and contain the ‘surplus’ urbanite, and how the Transvaal provincial government sidestepped practices of containment in order to transition that ‘surplus’ into a legitimate place in the city, I will now consider the counterpolitical identifications this ambiguous institutional context shaped in Mshongo. In both Jeffsville and Brazzaville, we will encounter forms of collective mobilization to occupy and domesticate space, through which, I argue, squatters laid claim to both the political and material rights of citizenship and also forged a political community. Among these are insurgent, coercive discourses and practices, deployed against the repressive forces of the state, which call to mind the metaphor of the ‘riot.’ Yet coinciding with this register of defiance, disorder and violence, we can also detect the optimistic expectation of a future transition, structured by the mechanism of the housing waiting list. This notion of the ‘queue’ for inclusion, I argue, introduced a notion of anteriority that constituted a faultline in squatter political identity, suggestive of a narrative of belonging in which anteriority and political involvement create a hierarchy of priority within the squatter community.

5.1. Making space in Atteridgeville: space and politics in transition

The archive has revealed to us the traces of two faces of the squatter settlement. First, it appeared as an insurgent practice of placemaking through which the ‘outside’ of the apartheid state entered ‘inside’, into the space of citizens. Second, it appeared as a vehicle for transitioning a population historically identified as an unwanted ‘surplus’ into the city, as legitimate claimants for urban space. Both faces emerged in the context of intractable ambiguities in the inclusive and exclusive orientations of the modern South African state. We
have seen, too, that these two faces coexisted in the closing decades of apartheid, as organs of the state at different scales moved in sometimes contradictory directions. As a result of these ambiguities, the squatter settlement of Jeffsville – established in 1991, the auspicious year in which Nelson Mandela was released from his imprisonment for treason – was produced partly in hopeful anticipation of future inclusion and incorporation into the formal urban order, and partly as an autonomous territory of insurgent defence against continuing material and political exclusion. Giving an account of the rise of the squatter movement in Jeffsville requires me to stitch a seam between the archival and ethnographic components of my investigation. It is a difficult task, not least because while one account is made partial by the uneven and sometimes inscrutable nature of the archive, the other is of necessity loosely woven from the sometimes thready, sometimes knotted, sometimes fraying fabric of respondents’ memories. To fill in what was left unsaid, I draw on literature and archives to round out respondents’ reflections on the socio-political and spatial context in which squatters began to mobilize in Atteridgeville in the late 1980s.

**Figure 6: Present-day Atteridgeville in the province of Gauteng, South Africa**
5.1.1. ‘Living Politics’: Claims of the “surplus” for living space in Atteridgeville

Despite the Transvaal Provincial Authority’s tolerant view of migration into cities as an inevitable part of urbanization, we have seen that the national state, which had historically used a range of methods to control ‘black’ citizens’ access to urban land and resources, continued its attempts to keep out ‘surplus’ people (Platzky & Walker, 1985, pp. 28-30; 157), even after influx control was abandoned in 1986. Together with the strengthening of anti-squatting legislation, a range of “subtle institutional blockages” (Booth & Biyela, 1988, p. 636) remained – such as constraints on housing development, the privatization of the housing market, and an insistence that already under-resourced townships become self-funding through the imposition of ever higher rentals and service fees. We have seen in Chapter 4 that the consequent shortages of land and funds made ‘black’ local authorities unwilling to accommodate squatters despite the TPA’s tolerant stance toward the phenomenon. In this section, I argue that the social effects of these constraints as they were manifested in Atteridgeville joined together the mundane and the political to produce squatting as an embodiment of the 'living politics' of 'surplus' people.

Due to the use of housing policy as an indirect form of influx control since at least 1983, an average of nine people were dwelling in every modest township house in parts of the PWV, while housing supply was increasing at a third of the speed of population growth (based on figures from the East Rand in Platzky & Walker, 1985, p. 163). In Atteridgeville, all housing development and expansion of the township had been ‘frozen’ since 1964 and reiterated at ministerial level as late as 1985. Toward the goal of producing non-productive ‘blacks’ as surplus, candidates for family housing in Atteridgeville had been obliged to apply for it in Soshanguve, a township 25 km outside Pretoria (see Figure 6 above), which was earmarked for inclusion into the Republic of Bophuthatswana (see Figure 7 below), an independent Setswana homeland which had been nominally independent since 1971. Relocation to Soshanguve was strongly opposed by the local populace, who were not willing to uproot themselves and move far from their workplaces. Beyond this, the prospect of incorporation into an ‘independent’ national state threatened to strip them of South African citizenship entirely. As suggested in Chapter 3, citizenship of a derelict 'independent' 'black' state

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113 These shortfalls were caused by privatisation of the property market and an insistence on the financial autonomy of black local authorities, leading to increased rents and service costs (Booth & Biyela, 1988, p. 637) that made urban life more and more unaffordable to ‘black people’. This led to contention through rent and service boycotts including in Atteridgeville (Atteridgeville Town Council, 1984; Gunene, 1990; Lombaard, 1992; Motau, 1985; “‘We will not pay’,” 1996).
114 Director General and Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1987
115 Mayor of Atteridgeville, c.1987
116 Director General and Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1987
represented an absolute form of abandonment by the South African state under the sign of a contrived ethnic sovereignty. The independence of a 'homeland' enabled the apartheid state to divest itself entirely of responsibility for its 'black' South African infra-citizens. In addition to this, many urban 'black' residents had never even visited the 'homelands' with which they were officially identified. Remaining within the township-homeland nexus provided a better chance of maintaining continuity of social relations, accessing urban opportunities, and keeping the political struggle for equal citizenship alive. It is hardly surprising that much of the 'surplus' population clung to its foothold in Atteridgeville, resisting offers of more plentiful family living quarters further from the city.

Figure 7: Atteridgeville in the Transvaal province, in relation to the province's 'homelands'

The effect of this tenacious ‘surplus’ was overcrowding of formal houses, and a proliferation of informal 'backyard' accommodation that eventually led to the declaration of Atteridgeville as a housing "crisis area" in 1987 (Scheepers & Heunis, 1987). Seen in the light of the state’s production of ‘surplus’ people and its deliberate delineation of exceptional spaces into which to relegate them, residents' willingness to suffer these conditions illustrates ‘black’ resilience.
in the face of government attempts to expel a human ‘surplus’ to the outside of ‘white’
political space. However, the resistance of ‘black’ urban dwellers to the productive power that
sought to govern their relation to the city through spatial constraints, manifested through a
stoic refusal to yield to the pressure to leave, did not eliminate but rather changed the manner
in which that power was imposed on the bodies of township residents. By withholding
adequate shelter from the growing township population, the state subjected residents to a
measure of biopolitical abandonment within the city – withholding its power to foster life
(Foucault, 1990, p. 138) even as it had attempted to disallow life in the city through township
planning and surveillance. Overcrowding and the consequent deterioration of living conditions
can be seen as a mundane and ever-present inscription of their designation as ‘surplus’ people.

The emergence of land invasions by would-be squatters in Atteridgeville can be seen as a form
of resistance to this inscription, and thus as a form of insurgent citizenship through which, by
virtue of their very marginalization, ‘surplus’ township residents constituted a counterpolitics
(ingoing the premise of insurgent citizenship in Holston, 2008; see also Roy, 2009, p. 8).
Alternatively, it can be seen to represent the mobilizing power of hardship, or “living politics”,
as the contemporary South African shackdwellers’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo, has
called it (Chance, 2011, p. 38; Zikode, 2006). The invasion of land at Jeffsville in 1991-92 was
led by longstanding claimants on the waiting list for municipal housing.117 Asked why they
decided to squat, the reasons long-term squatters gave seemed unremarkable, but for the
political origins of their parochial conditions:

I lived in Atteridgeville with my parents. You know, our houses have four rooms [a total of four
rooms, rather than four bedrooms] with the whole family living there. There were six children in
my family, and two of my siblings had their own kids.118

We were living in Atteridgeville; we were suffering at home. I was fighting with my brother and
he chased us out with our mother.119

Jeff Ramohla, one-time leader of a people’s court in Atteridgeville, and the prime mobilizer
of squatters in the establishment of Jeffsville described the squatters’ plight this way:

I used to solve people’s problems, everybody, but it touched me when we found out that two
brothers were fighting. Those two brothers had wives, but they were staying in one room, four of
them. So... there were no houses by that time. [...] So one day I told my seniors, [...] this problem,
it become bigger and bigger and bigger. To end the problem, we must look for a place where
everyone can take his wife and stay with his wife. Because you can’t stay two men and two

117 Male resident, Jeffville, 19/08/2012
118 Female resident, Jeffville, 04/08/2012
119 Female resident, Jeffville, 19/07/2012
women in one place, it’s not safe; you will always fight. Because you know how women are. That one will complain about that one; that one will complain about that one. At the end of the day brothers will fight or sisters will fight one another.\textsuperscript{120}

Although Ramohlale’s first concern was for the growing families residing in municipal houses in the township, whose congested lives were a product of the housing shortage, backyard lodgers struggling to pay rent to their better-established ‘black’ landlords, and enduring the mundane politics of landlord-tenant relations, became another group of early squatters.

\textit{Ja}, [in backrooms] at the location, rent was higher. And sometimes, problems, problems… You get to work and hear that your wife is fighting with the owners, see? So I thought I must move into Mshongo.\textsuperscript{121}

In more recent years, new social movements in South Africa have drawn attention to the necessarily political nature of everyday suffering. In this view, the presence or absence of basic infrastructure to support "the domestic space where the reproduction of life is operative" (Chance, 2011, p. 39) is a way in which politics is written directly onto the ordinary conditions of life, onto the private, and therefore largely invisible, domestic realm. Everyday proximity to hardship, and the immediacy of one’s immersion in "the temporality of the singular suffering life" gives rise to a "politics of the present tense," (Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509), which I would argue coincided with the more abstract temporality of the liberation struggle during the apartheid era.

The domestic realm is often imagined as a place and time that can exist outside politics (McDougall, 2014, p. 19), but being a central context within which political and material inequalities are manifested, the home is far from apolitical under conditions of stratified citizenship. Inasmuch as basic service provision may be seen as part of the biopolitical regulation of populations, the denial of such interventions constitutes a form of exposure to biopolitical abandonment (Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509). If citizenship is understood as the primary threshold for the definition of “what form of life is eligible for protection” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 104), then the suffering of those who are unprotected due to their exposure to forms of biopolitical abandonment, cannot but be explicitly political.

As such, conditions of everyday hardship and suffering in the home not only express political conditions, but also serve as a form of political subjectivation (Selmeczi, 2012). Occupying vacant land and erecting dwellings of their own offered squatters a form of freedom from the

\textsuperscript{120} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012  
\textsuperscript{121} Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
superfluity symbolized by beds in the kitchen and shanty accommodation in a landlord’s backyard. It is in this light that the squatter mobilization in Atteridgeville gains a political meaning, consistent with Chance’s insistence on the political meaning of everyday tactics and practices “through which residents collectively mobilize and identify with each other as political communities” (Chance, 2011, p. xxv). Counterpolitical claims and agency emerge here not necessarily through an articulate discourse of rights, but out of the everyday experience of injustice:

...living politics always is articulated between ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ between an existential observation about daily life amongst poor residents, and an ethical proscription arising from that daily life.
—That there are not toilets, but that there should be toilets is living politics. (S’bu Zikode in Chance, 2011, p. 38)

We can read a similar ‘living politics’ in these many complaints about the troubles and stresses of congested family homes that motivated people’s illegal occupation of land. ‘Living politics’ arises from the mundane apprehension that, though it should be, it is not possible for adult children to leave their parents' increasingly congested four-roomed township houses and access legal family accommodation for their own expanding families. When I move on to more recent events in the squatter camps of Atteridgeville in Chapters 6 and 7, it will be useful to recall how politics has historically been expressed and apprehended through the prism of everyday struggles and mundane living conditions, such that parochial phenomena may form the political basis for sometimes violent incidences of collective mobilization.

Through all of this, however, remained a hopeful structure of anticipation, which can be linked to the institutionalization of squatting-as-transition in the Transvaal, as well as to the softening of government policy around the expansion of Atteridgeville. Even as they enacted an insurgent demand for space through land invasions, squatters held fast to a hope that squatting would facilitate official recognition and a transition into formal housing:

Some of us we were paying rent, and some were not working and didn’t have that money to pay the rent, so we said “No, let’s go and start our own houses, shack houses, and maybe the government will provide houses for us.”

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122 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
123 Male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012
124 (Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986)
125 Male resident, Jeffville, 17/07/2012. This occurred around 1991, a time during which archives of the Transvaal Provincial Authority show that this province was attempting to address ubiquitous squatting through progressive formalization, fostered by a deliberate focus on the ‘positive’ rather than punitive provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. Among other things, this prompted “Local Blacks as well as migrants” to view “illegal squatter camps as a shortcut to obtaining legal occupation” (Chairperson: NASSEM - Office of the State President, 1988).
5.1.2. National struggle politics: Claiming political space in Atteridgeville

As respondents virtually unanimously cited mundane living constraints as their motivation to squat, it would be tempting to read the squatter movement in this very parochial way, as simply a kind of organic collective action by which a subject population claimed space for itself. However, this would be to obscure the entanglement of different political scales and the impact of national struggle politics on the local environment. In fact, the early squatter settlement emerged at the interface between the more parochial 'living politics' of 'black' township dwellers and the explicit political strategies of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies.

The linkage between ‘living politics’ and national struggle politics has origins in the campaign of ‘ungovernability’ the ANC had forged in South Africa’s townships in its attempt to mobilize an oppressed majority against the massive military-security complex of the apartheid state (Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, p. 93). In essence, it was an approach that recognized the state’s scalar strategy of isolating insurgent localities and addressing them with concentrated force. It aimed to promote chaos at the municipal level across the entire South African territory, such that the state’s resources would prove too scarce to deal with all the turmoil simultaneously (Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, p. 101). With state forces spread thinly, operatives of banned organizations would be able to enter the country and enjoy a relative freedom of movement across space within it (Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, p. 101). Although the ANC had never envisaged any kind of conventional military occupation of state territory, its strategy of ungovernability was paired with a call for popular township structures such as:

- "Parliament in the form of street committees;"
- "army and police in the form of self-defence units and combat groups;"
- "its courts: the people's courts." (cited in Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, p. 95)

The establishment of these bottom-up democratic structures through the institutions of the everyday – in which the ‘street committee’, neighbourhood watch or residents association was woven into the explicitly political fabric of an alternative order of legitimate force comprising a parochial parliament, judiciary and military – clearly smudged the imagined line between public and private, political and domestic life in the townships. Just as the state wrote politics onto the bodies of township residents through their mundane hardships, blurring the distinction between life and politics, so the institutions developed in response contained this same element of indistinction.
The response to the call for popular structures in South African townships was one of “extraordinary intensity” (Bozzoli, 2000, p. 80). It gave rise to a repertoire of urban revolt that emerged from the mid-1980s onwards, which some believed had potential make the townships “permanently ungovernable” (Bozzoli, 2000, p. 103) even after the coming of democracy. Atteridgeville was not particularly prominent among the most insurgent townships; indeed, in the late 1980s the town clerk referred to it as “the safest and most stable black residential area in the R.S.A.” Nevertheless, archival materials record evidence of this repertoire of insurgency. A Department of Cooperation and Development folder contained the Atteridgeville Saulsville Residents Organization’s (ASRO’s) objections to tariff increases proposed in 1984, and the Atteridgeville City Council’s acknowledgement “that certain organizations which are politically opposed to the councils have used the increases as an excuse to incite people to riot and in this way to attempt to embarrass or even cripple the newly-established local authorities.” Other folders hold records of the Atteridgeville City Council lobbying for additional policing resources, overtime and staff to deal with revolutionary activity and respond to “unrest” that tended to get “out of control” and required the police or army troops to respond.

Pleas for additional police vehicles to transport officers to and from their homes highlight the coercive practices of “Comrades” of the liberation struggle, and the prevalence of threats, intimidation, petrol bombings of officers’ homes and assaults leaving police officers in intensive care. Perhaps the clearest indication of the ungovernability of the time is a request issued for the purchase of ten Uzzi machine guns that were considered of “cardinal importance” in allowing Council members to hold public meetings. For automatic weapons to be seen as a prerequisite for any engagement between Council members and township residents draws attention to the law-making and law-preserving violence (Benjamin, 2007) of the government structure, which is hidden or at least obscured by the rule of the majority in democratic regimes but is here manifested in the attempts of a minority government to repress the political agency of the majority. If the need to use its “strong arm” indicates a state’s “weak authority and inadequate controls” (Garland, 1996, p. 449), its ability to govern is called further into question when even the repressive instruments of state sovereignty cannot establish a safe public space for its political representatives.

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126 Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1988  
127 Atteridgeville Town Council, 1984  
128 Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1988  
129 Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1987  
130 S.T. Rammala Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1986
In the early nineties, Atteridgeville was still embroiled in an ongoing confrontation with government over debt that had accumulated as a result of service boycotts (Gunene, 1990; Hlahla & Own correspondent, 1991). Responding to threats of power-cuts by the council, the ANC – by that time unbanned – wielded the spectre of violent ungovernability, threatening in its turn that cuts would be “a perfect recipe for violence’ in the Pretoria area” (Hlahla & Own correspondent, 1991). At this time, Jeff Ramohlale, the initiator of the original settlement in Atteridgeville, was an ANC cadre presiding over a disciplinary committee or ‘people’s court’, operating under the banal guise of the Atteridgeville Saulsville Residents Organization (ASRO).

He described to me how when the municipality cut power to streetlights during the boycott, “we used to light them on our own”, either by simply climbing the pole and switching the power back on, or by illegally entering sub-stations to switch it on within. He also talked about the process of arranging secret meetings to organize protests during the time when such gatherings were illegal, so that the authorities would be taken by surprise. Township civic organizations or ‘civics’ such as ASRO have been described as institutions that “fought for development in the sense of securing resources from the oppressive state or withholding resources in the ‘community’ from that state” (Seekings, 1996, p. 137). They built up “the collective identity of township residents as members of the ‘community’ and as claimants to full political citizenship” (Seekings, 1996, pp. 137-138). They mobilized boycotts and reconnected cut services illegally. However, they also functioned as a guise under which banned political parties could operate covertly (Ellis, 2012, p. 622).

As an ANC activist leading an ASRO committee, Jeff Ramohlale illustrates the function of the civic as an interface between different scales of activism. For the squatter movement was not a general ASRO initiative but one that was initiated in the people’s court Ramohlale presided over. As one respondent noted, the squatter camp “did not come from the whole town, but from that Kangaroo Court.” Nor was it simply an expression of Ramohlale’s civic compassion for the living conditions of residents of overcrowded Atteridgeville. It was paired with the explicit idea of creating a safe space that the police “would not be able to penetrate.” At the time, the South African government was still engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, despite the gradual liberalization of many apartheid policies, and anti-apartheid activists and militia members could not risk returning from exile as a result. ASRO had the idea of creating an ‘impenetrable’ space for the safe return of exiles and the security of ‘comrades’ from}

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131 In reality power was often illegally reconnected when cuts materialised, as interviewees attested, back up by historical press reporting (Hlahla & staff reporter, 1990).
132 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
133 Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
134 Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
revolutionary militias such as *Mkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) in the township.\textsuperscript{135} Apparently, this was a broad strategy in the founding of informal settlements in the closing years of the National Party's half century of apartheid rule.\textsuperscript{136}

Thus, alongside the mundane need for living space and the desire to transition into appropriate formal housing, there was simultaneously a more explicitly political purpose for the squatter camp as a tool in the national struggle for the political life of 'black' South Africans and racial equality in South Africa. In this way, squatting joined the mundane politics of superfluous life with the revolutionary politics of the anti-apartheid struggle, embodying an insurgent claim for both the material and political rights of citizenship. In this sense, the squatter camp would be produced through the agency of 'surplus' people as a manifestation of the township's politics of indistinction – a term borrowed from Agamben (1998) explicitly to problematize any necessary link between indistinction and naked life. By actively establishing a bounded space to be occupied by an ambiguous ‘living politics’ of the ‘surplus’ citizen, squatters created a territorial zone of indistinction characterized not by bare life but by insurgency.

### 5.2. Producing ‘the island’: violence, community and the founding of a ‘disorderly’ place

In this section, I will show how squatting at Jeffsville involved the co-production of a place and a micro-scale political community – that is, a community motivated by common convictions to pursue justice (Arendt, 1986; Habermas, 1986), and using the “means of coercion” to “realize collective goals” (Habermas, 1986, p. 76). The place produced by squatters, we will see, appears as distinctly disorderly, but as Yiftachel has argued "neither cities nor places in them are unordered, unplanned; the question is only whose order, whose planning, for what purpose" (cited in Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003, p. 673). Given that the characteristics of place shape the capacity for both community and control, I will argue that repressive state action

\textsuperscript{135} Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012. MK was banned until February 1990, and even after that time operatives did not expect to be welcomed with open arms by authorities — correspondence from the 1980s shows that “comrades” were wanted for criminal incidents such as theft or forceful commandeering of taxi-cabs to transport them to particular destinations (S.T. Rammala Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1986). It was only in 1993, that South Africa’s interim constitution referred to the possibility of an amnesty process for crimes committed for political purposes (Mamdani, 2002, p. 33). If “comrades” were synonymous with “criminals” in the minds of local police, it is not surprising that, although 1990 purportedly marked the end of MK’s existence as a “dark network,” (Bakker, Raab, & Brinton Milward, 2012, p. 41) respondents’ testimonies show that, in Atteridgeville at least, operatives maintained a covert existence into the early nineties.

\textsuperscript{136} Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012
strengthened the violence with which squatters contended space. I also explore elements of the quasi-autonomous order squatters established, arguing that the production of a non-state (dis)order served particular social and regulatory functions for the squatters, although in turn it also introduced destabilizing ambiguities into the functioning of the squatter political community.

5.2.1. Occupying marginal space: contending orders of legitimate violence

Violence lies at the heart of territorial politics. Walter Benjamin, for instance, introduced the concept of the “law-making” (p273) as well as “law-preserving” (p274) functions of violence; that is to say that violence does not simply uphold the law, but founds the legal order through force (Benjamin, 2007, pp. 273-274). Max Weber encapsulated the same dual principle in his description of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 2002, p. 13) – a view of the polity as a legal-normative order constituting and constituted by the use of force. Later work examines the corollary of these ‘positive’ definitions of violence as constitutive of order: their unexamined outside; a "constitutive outside" necessary for the "creation and definition of the very space in which the juridical-political order can have validity" (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 112) Defining this space requires "not simply the taking of land but the taking of an outside or exception" (Agamben, 1998, p. 19) in which life is subject to the violence of the juridical-political order but exempt from the rights of citizenship (Agamben, 1998, p. 8; 126).

It seems, then, that from the 'law-making' violence at the origin of political life, to the exclusion from rights that is the constitutive corollary of an order that guarantees rights, political orders do not merely exercise violence but are produced by it and sustain themselves only by sustaining a normative hegemony backed by violent action. Whereas many conceptions of non-state violence – ethnic violence; religious violence; xenophobic violence; and even some renderings of ‘political’ violence – depoliticize violence, or represent it as the illegitimate other of a purported nonviolent norm,137 we can instead consider the collective occupation of Jeaffsville and its subsequent violent defence in terms of the duality of originary and sustaining violence, or law-making and law-preserving violence, by which territory is

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137 It is not intellectually useful to take for granted the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence, or between a rational and virtuous regime of state coercion versus irrational and pathological interpersonal violence when it comes to incidents of collective violence (Tilly, 2003). The crisis that collective violence represents may be more than a deficit in the state’s capacity to monopolise the use of force against the irrational, pathological elements of disorder within it. It may instead, or also, represent a deficit in the state’s legitimacy, a lack in state political rationalities, and a concomitant emergence of alternative rationalities at different scales.
produced through the occupation of land by power (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 66;79). In this section I show how through collective mobilization and specific repertoires of violence, squatters carved out a physical space in which to pursue the distinct purposes of a micro-scale political community – an extraordinary expression of how the agency of those on the periphery of a “differentiated citizenship, "can, through their very marginalization and peripheral location, consolidate a counter-politics (Roy, 2009, p. 8).

We saw in Chapters 3 and 4 how anti-squatting legislation was amended to replace influx control when the latter was abolished in 1986. While the legislation made space for the formalization of existing squatter camps, it strengthened provisions to deter further squatting. The Transvaal Provincial Authority chose not to actively pursue the punitive provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, focusing instead on only the ‘positive’ provisions facilitating the transition of informal settlements to formal ones. However, the Act’s sanctions against renewed squatting remained in place if local authorities or police took the initiative to evict. It appears that this is exactly what occurred in Atteridgeville from 1989 onward, as would-be squatters began attempting to occupy vacant land around the township. The squatters erected dwellings on open land on numerous occasions: squatters led by Jeff Ramohlale were evicted from the area near what is now Kalafong Heights, on the east of the township, and subsequently from what has since been developed as the suburb of Lotus Gardens to the north of Atteridgeville (see markers 1 and 2 in Figure 8 below).138 The Atteridgeville squatters offered no resistance when police came to demolish their shacks, confiscate their materials and order them off the land. Ramohlale attested that resistance to police was discouraged because, in that late apartheid period, police tended to use live ammunition to quell it.139

In the confrontation of peaceful squatters by armed police and the destruction and appropriation of the squatters' property, we can therefore perceive the indirect violence of 'orderly urbanization' policy transforming from its mundane inscription on the conditions of everyday life to the direct and repressive form of blunt force and physical damage. This was once again evident when squatters launched a third invasion at Schurweberg, on the western boundary of the township (marker 3), in 1990. Ramohlale resisted police for the first time, attempting to retrieve confiscated building materials from the truck onto which they were being loaded. He was arrested and detained for six months without charges or trial.140 This was not unusual at the time, since prior to democracy detentions without trial were permitted by statute.

138 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012; 30/07/2012
139 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
140 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
in South Africa, under the Internal Security Act of 1982. But in this way, a form of contention over local space, pitting local residents against local police and municipal officials, was escalated through the explicit connection Ramohlale’s arrest and detention made between the local pursuit of space and the coercive edifice of the national regime.

Figure 8: Sites of land invasion in Atteridgeville

When he was released in 1991, Ramohlale immediately returned to the site of his arrest, leading a group of would-be squatters to re-erect shacks over and over again, nightly after the police demolished the previous night’s work. This acceleration of invasions may well have been a reaction to the magnified use of state force, and the explicit imposition of suffering on Ramohlale as the squatter leader: paradoxically, state coercion fosters a counter-movement of popular force. The occupations were very obviously an expression of a contentious claim for urban space, embodying popular resistance by 'surplus' people to both the direct and indirect expressions of the state’s coercive control over the borders of (urban) citizenship. The repeated unsuccessful occupations expressed an expectation that at some point the state would tolerate rather than evict the claimants, either by sheer force of squatter numbers, or by exhaustion with the investment of time and resources in ongoing eviction, demolition and removal of confiscated building material. It is instructive to observe that repressive state practices can be co-opted against the interests that motivate them: here, the squatters deliberately invite eviction in order to effect a depletion of the state’s repressive force in much
the same way as the ANC’s strategy of ungovernability aimed to exceed the state’s capacity to respond.

Eventually, the police were demolishing 200 shacks that had sprung up overnight. The impasse led to some talks with the authorities, the exact nature of which was never clearly described by respondents, nor recorded in any of the Council’s archives. However, it was apparent that officials permitted the squatters to re-erect their shacks in the place where it now stands, and that they intended it to be for a short duration. Government housing has since been developed on the site squatters were moved from, which is now called Atteridgeville Extension 7, and some Jeffsville residents were rehoused in that area. So it is likely that the squatters were moved from a site of anticipated development that was expected to solve the housing problem their settlement represented – hence the belief that it could be temporarily tolerated.

JS [English]: They said nee, it’s not allowed to stay here… They say better you move it there, but it’s only temporary for 6 months. They told us like that. They said nee, it’s only temporary for six months, but they don’t want to load people the way you see here now.

However, this notion of squatting as a necessarily bounded phenomenon, a phenomenon to be tightly contained before being accommodated within existing development plans, resonates more with the national government’s notion of squatter law as a mechanism of influx control than with the Transvaal Provincial Authority’s deployment of the law as a mechanism for a gradual process of inclusionary transition taking into account urbanization up until 2020. Certainly, it seems to have been recognized as such by the squatters, who took the opportunity to settle ‘legitimately’ on the proposed ground, but did so in a spirit of defiance rather than submission. As a respondent on the sidelines described it, the squatters and their leaders rejected the restrictions the government wished to place on the growth of the settlement, and entered the area with no intention of adhering to these restrictions:

This wasn’t a government idea, it was ours. So we forcefully entered where Jeffsville is now and started squatting.

Ramohlale himself recalled the enormous demand for space in the squatter camp as a result of the structural effects of spatial strategies of rule and deliberate township underdevelopment, which made it impossible for him to adhere to the 300-shack limit imposed when they were granted leave to settle south-west of the township’s edge:

141 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012; male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
142 Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
143 Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
So when they came they said ‘No, we are now tired. You can stay with your people here but we don’t need more than 300 shacks here. I said ‘No’, but on a daily basis 50, 60 people will come in and look for a place. Are you going to chase them away or allow them to be there? I said ‘No, just get in. There’s no way I can chase you away, because you are also struggling the same as I.’

After the settlement was established on 16 September, the residents voted to name it after Ramohlale; hence the name ‘Jeffsville’.

5.2.2. Co-producing territory and community through founding violence

Mamdani asserts that political identity originates in the process of state formation, through institutions that shape people’s relationships to each other and to the state itself (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22), such as those discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Yet field research in Jeffsville revealed that formations of territory, identity and power can also be constituted at the local level, through informal practices and institutions. I explore this process below, indicating how the establishment and consolidation of a local, territorial formation of political community at Jeffsville embodied and shaped squatter political identity, defining squatters’ relationships to one another and to the state through informal institutions.

When the squatters under Ramohlale dug in on 16 September 1991, the marks of “fundamental, founding violence” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 71) were evident both in the squatters occupation of land and in their war-like defence of it, marking their collective mobilization as more explicitly political:

Then began the attempts to demolish our shacks. The community gathered again. Now it was different, a real protest that went on for days, with tear gas all over the place. The community fought, day and night. We had people patrolling in the night, with day and night shifts.

Here, for the first time in his telling of the story of the squatters, the speaker began to talk about them as a “community.” At the same time, he notes a change in the nature of mobilization – it was “different”; more “real”. Ceasing to submit to the violence of state order as they had during previous invasions around the outskirts of Atteridgeville, the squatters acted collectively to resist that order and defend the informal territory against the state. Exercising collective violence, they “fought”. As Chance has argued, everyday squatter practices such as resisting eviction and improvising irregular access to services are activities “through which residents collectively mobilize and identify with each other as political
communities” (Chance, 2011, p. xxv). In a sense, the transgressive nature of these activities that build a sense of squatter community suggests that the very process of mobilizing to establish a ‘disorderly’ space fosters solidarity and political community – not only because these transgressions play out in the everyday life spaces of squatters but also because their transgressiveness prompts opposition by the state. The polarizing effect of this opposition solidifies group boundaries and sets in motion a collective experience of suffering which, as we have seen, feeds back again into the social process of ‘living politics’. This points towards the co-production of territory and political community on a micro-scale.

The apparent relationship between this forcible collective mobilization and the sense of being a “community” brings us back to Mamdani’s conception of political identities as institutionalized by the ways in which law “collates” identities, producing the “group identities” that become the foundation of “political action” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 22). This is far from simply a discursive phenomenon, for the enforcement of laws impose collective suffering and prompt collective resistance even as they inscribe collective identity. It echoes the historical phenomenon we have already seen, by which techniques for the constant reproduction of the boundary between the politically qualified and disqualified life in South African cities paradoxically prompted forms of contention that undercut those boundaries.

It has been argued that “borders are perhaps even constitutive of political life”, performing a range of epistemological and ontological functions. The state border, for instance, forms the "condition of possibility" for the legal and political systems (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 1), “orients the convergence of people” with a particular territory and notions of common history and identity (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 3), and defines "different forms of subjectivity" produced by the juridico-political order (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 3).

An essential way in which states ‘embrace’ and ‘take hold of’ their subjects (Torpey, 1998, pp. 244-245) is through boundaries that define their jurisdiction and delimit membership. The operation of disciplinary power has been described as a process of structuring space by enclosing and hierarchically arranging elements within it: “the first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and without limit” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 79). It is significant, then, that the period of squatter resistance against the repressive violence of the state went as far as the creation of a physical boundary that prevented the demolition of their shacks:

We dug trenches so the police could not penetrate – there near the entrance where you were [presumably referring to earlier in the day when he saw me with another respondent]. So they
had to stop where they are, they couldn’t touch our property. Police used to patrol around the place but they couldn’t enter.146

The formation of a physical boundary to the squatter camp can be understood as performing a similar function to the state border, but at a local level, exercising power and defining a community of members through spatial structuring. However, the motives of this power were explicitly opposed to elements within the prevailing spatial and political order of the state, and its mechanisms were designed to hold the instruments and the surveillance of the state at bay. Whereas a crossing was improvised out of “train irons” and “zinc” to enable cars to enter the settlement, these would be removed to keep “the soldiers and police” out during community meetings.147

Thus, the boundary both represented and constituted a quasi-autonomous political territory. The digging of the trench around Jeffsville, and the commencement of patrols of this ‘borderline,’ can be seen as part of an explicit strategy to “transform the relations of law” (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 71). A ‘ditch’ may sound rather flimsy as a border technology, but Ramohlale likened the trench to the Berlin wall – a metaphor clearly conveying the settlement’s construction as a separate, bordered political territory, state-like in its autonomy.148 This was attested by the language used to refer to the camp in a subsequent trial where Ramohlale was tried for “taking the law into his hands” and creating a territory “like an island” that the police could not access.149 The state’s designation of Ramohlale as a criminal contrasted with the views of many: after all, Jeffsville had been named after Ramohlale by popular consensus. As a resident said, “he fought for this place and we honoured him by calling the place Jeffsville, after his name.”150

Within the border, counterpolitical regulatory strategies were embedded within the spatial layout of the settlement. Whereas state space – such as the formal township – was ordered to promote visibility and surveillance, and rationalize navigation by security and service vehicles and personnel, squatter spatial strategies sought security in obscurity and apparent disorder. Ramohlale’s committee marked out plots to be densely packed along narrow alleys, promoting invisibility and inaccessibility. Residents co-produced this environment by complying with norms not to build fences – which would obstruct comrades’ escape from police or special

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146 Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
147 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
148 This statement must be seen in light of police reliance on protective vehicles during the unstable eighties – for instance, police requisition documents of the mid-eighties record requests for additional vehicles, bullet-proof glass and specialised bumpers to penetrate roadblocks (S.T. Rammala Atteridgeville Town Clerk, 1986), suggesting that makeshift barriers could be very effective.
149 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
150 Female resident, Jeffsville, 21/07/2012
forces in a chase.\textsuperscript{151} No names were given to the narrow lanes and paths through the settlement, as it was believed this would aid the police in mapping and navigating Jeffsville.\textsuperscript{152} Recalling police complaints about the inaccessibility of Crossroads in Chapter 4, these examples provide a lucid illustration of how the material form of place determines the capacity for domination and control (Gieryn, 2000, p. 475), and the strategic role that can be played by apparent disorder.

Coercive force is a key element in the exercise of political rule; a means to the realization of collective goals (Habermas, 1986, p. 76). Squatters did not lack coercive resources. Ramohlale’s committee of ANC ‘comrades’ served as an infrastructure of specialists in violence, which allied with members of the resistance militias to institutionalize informal coercive rituals to secure Jeffsville’s political and territorial autonomy, and provide security of person and security of tenure to civilian residents given its inaccessibility to the police. These “comrades” were well versed in practices of resistance and familiar with existing repertories of contention (such as holding secret meetings and illegally reconnecting township electricity supplies when they were cut during the service boycotts).\textsuperscript{153} Ramohlale had the militaristic functions and authority of a “commander.”\textsuperscript{154} Ex-militia members joined to support the settlement’s leadership after the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle in 1990. Many had played an important role in the township ungovernability campaign of the 1980s, and when thousands of militia members were repatriated from exile in Uganda and Tanzania (Mashike, 2004, p. 90), some integrated back into township self-defence units, never having been fully disarmed and demobilized. Clandestine patrols emerged\textsuperscript{155} to keep state authority out, especially as state intelligence operatives began attempting to infiltrate the camp with the return of MK and APLA operatives\textsuperscript{156} to reside among the people.

If patrols discovered "an enemy" – that is, an ‘enemy of the people’ rather than simply a criminal, the penalty was death. There was a palpable reluctance to talk about the details of the camp’s "intelligence" function or to reveal the classified operations of previously banned organizations. Those who did go into more detail requested anonymity. One participant in patrols asserted that:

\begin{quote}
Respondent: They were the enemy. We knew once we got an enemy here what he is here for.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{151} Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012
\textsuperscript{152} Key informant, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
\textsuperscript{153} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
\textsuperscript{154} Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
\textsuperscript{155} Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012; key informant, Jeffsville, 02/08/2012
\textsuperscript{156} Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012
Tamlyn: And was it particular people’s job to decide what to do? Like, did you have to take him to the person who must decide?

Respondent: No, in comrade’s life, it’s like, you know [...] one would say ‘hey, let him be killed.’ And that’s the way. There’s no hearing or nothing like that.\textsuperscript{157}

Their experience in the township underground and in the service of liberation militias meant that “comrades” and their networks held substantial resources for violence. The same respondent revealed the extent of these resources when he spoke about the way in which they would execute enemies of the struggle:

Tamlyn: OK. And then if you decided that [to kill an enemy], how would you go about doing it?

Respondent: It’s either petrol bomb – you know, they let you drink petrol, nee, they let you drink petrol, they give you a cigarette and then that cigarette is light. PUMM!!! He go. Or they stone you. There were illegal guns here; a lot of illegal guns. A lot of illegal guns. We were in possession of not only guns, even rifles. We had rifles here. A lot of them. And automatics.\textsuperscript{158}

He also recalled the fate of a defector who was beaten by Ramohlale’s comrades. The victim’s injuries were so severe that the respondent was surprised he had survived.

While I heard that the most brutal of the comrades were no longer alive, and that weapons had for the most part been surrendered during post-apartheid amnesty processes, it was clear that the settlement still contained some of the human infrastructure of Jeffsville’s early days, and that certain repertoires of violent contention remained, resources that could be drawn on when needed. It was difficult to explore these resources in more detail however, primarily because they seemed to be shrouded in deliberate obscurity. Ramohlale, for instance, noted that secret meetings are still held at times to circumvent the efforts of informers to notify police of activities in the settlement.\textsuperscript{159} These invisibilities of the field were a hindrance to my efforts to understand the precise mechanisms that shaped subsequent violent mobilizations in the settlement, but their existence, however opaque, attests to a latent infrastructure for the coordination of coercive practices in the settlement up until recent times.

\textsuperscript{157} Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012. This is not surprising when viewed within the context of siege within which struggle operatives had been working during the 1980s. ANC strategy had called for forms of self-defence activity including "units to protect leaders of people’s committees and democratic organisations; a system of patrolling the streets and warning signals; units to harass enemy patrols; attacks on enemy encampments; elimination of agents; procurement of weapons and so on" (‘Organs for People’s Power’ cited in Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, pp. 97-98, my italics). It had emphasized the crucial need for secrecy and prudence in selecting members of self-defence groups and warned of the ubiquity of state security agents determined to eliminate members of these groups (Stemmet & Barnard, 2003, p. 98). Hence there was a ‘kill or be killed’ approach to security agents of the apartheid state.

\textsuperscript{158} Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012

\textsuperscript{159} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
5.2.3. Defending territory and producing community through everyday practices

While “comrades” provided a useful infrastructure for mobilization and a variety of coercive repertoires, many of the practices deployed to establish and defend Jeffsville relied on everyday investments by squatter residents. For instance, the flow of ‘dark network’ (Bakker et al., 2012) members into the camp gave rise to a mundane but thoroughgoing counter-intelligence regime, in which everyday social relationships within the settlement were knitted into its political structures. For fear of infiltration by police or army agents, squatters were drawn into practices of everyday surveillance in which any person who was not immediately familiar became an object of suspicion to be reported to the office and thoroughly investigated:

[The intelligence agents] were from outside actually, and we didn’t know them. But we were suspicious, you know, to be surrounded by people who we don’t know. Your identity was very, very important to us. Because once I saw a new face next door, I had to report to the office and the office had to come and collect you, you should go direct to the office and report who you are. And that’s when they would now scan you, if I have to use the word, they would have to scan you. And how they did that – the office was connected actually with the ANC either [sic] the PAC, and they were the... they were in possession actually of these materials where one can be scanned, you know, see who he is. If you say you are Lawrence Mathe, then they’ll have a check where are you, is there any Lawrence Mathe? I am just making an example. Because people would come and say ‘I’m Lawrence Mathe’, only to find he’s not Lawrence Mathe, he’s here for a certain purpose.\(^{160}\)

It is fascinating to note that while squatter leaders designed the territory to promote invisibility to the state, they in turn invested in a parallel, informal infrastructure of surveillance to render the social world of the squatter camp visible and legible. Given the interest I have expressed in the question of more recent violence against outsiders, it is interesting to note the threat we find associated here with the stranger, and the intensive web of collective practice associated with rendering the stranger knowable in order to defuse the threat they might represent to the political world of the squatter camp. The rise of the ANC to power in 1994 would render these fears and practices redundant.\(^{161}\)

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\(^{160}\) Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012

\(^{161}\) The threat of the unknown would resurface in a new form in Brazzaville after democracy, in observations about involvement of out-of-towners and foreigners in crime, and the institutionalization of informal practices to control the problem.
5.2.4. Squatter institutions, consent and solidarity

The surveillance and security functions in Jeffsville cannot be understood merely as impositions by squatter leaders. If we apply Arendt’s reasoning on power to the quasi-autonomous micro-polity of the squatter camp, we are reminded that it is consent that brings representative law and government into being, and that it is the support of the people that sustains them and gives them power (Arendt, 2002: 27): “no government exclusively based upon the means of violence has ever existed” (Arendt, 2002: 30). If a large-scale political institution like the state must be founded on domestic legitimacy and power, as she argues, then it is important when examining the smaller-scale political community of squatters in Atteridgeville to look not only at coercive practices as evidence of power occupying squatter territory, but also at the evidence of consent animating that power. In so doing, the entanglement of the mundane and the political in the squatter camp becomes ever more clear, as does the relationship between collective practice and the production of a sense of community.

The entanglement of urban marginalization and wholesale political repression made for strong bonds of solidarity among a diverse group united by both the inscription of racial politics on their bodies through the compression of everyday life in the township, and their necessary shared support of the more explicitly political anti-apartheid struggle. Thus, when Ramohlale’s committee set up a nightly patrol with the purpose of identifying intelligence agents and apprehending criminals to bring them before a ‘people’s court’ of leaders, it was a deeply collective effort:

There was not the case of who, you know, who likes to be next to the civic office, no. It was a case of EVERYONE must participate because we’ve got enemies amongst ourselves. […] ¹⁶²

All men amongst the squatters were also expected to perform everyday surveillance functions, so that anything suspicious could be fed to those in ANC and APLA who were able to investigate:

everyone was responsible to see to it […] So I couldn’t say that I don’t know who is staying on my left hand side or on my right hand side of my shack; front opposite or back opposite. I MUST know. ¹⁶³

¹⁶² Male resident, Jeffsville 02/08/2012
¹⁶³ Male resident, Jeffsville 02/08/2012
In the early life of the settlement, it appeared that solidary behaviour defined the boundaries of the community, as illustrated by residents’ memories of how non-participants were singled out for punishment. A woman recalled that people who went to work on a day when a protest had been called would be punished by being physically beaten, stripped, and made to walk home naked. A shopkeeper pointed out that any shop that did not close its doors in solidarity with protest action would be subject to harassment, with attackers using their non-participation as a way of legitimizing theft or assault. Thus, efforts to advance squatter citizenship through collective practice and a communitarian ethos generated their own violations and injustices, even as they constructed private mechanisms of accountability and justice. However, this period was associated with a deep nostalgia by many respondents, who conjure up a time when the community was smaller, the social fabric more comprehensible, and residents joined together by relations of familiarity and reciprocity:

... what I wanted to pointed out is that, you know, [at] that time we were united. Not like now. We were UNITED. And that’s what, you know, was important to me during those times. The unity shown by the people towards each other. There was no discrimination.

...it was one unit, we would like have community meetings and talk about stuff, [...] that’s the way we like counteracted the problems.

These relations were to change over time, as the population of the squatter camp grew and social difference multiplied (a point I will return to in Chapter 6):

Back then, people used to know this shop was owned by this guy that shop was owned by that guy. Then people no longer knew who owned the shops.

5.2.5. Informal justice and injustice

Another inherent ambiguity was the way in which attempts to secure the squatter camp from state forces through its disorderly material form produced a separate range of security problems. The settlement’s deliberate inaccessibility to the state and its negative orientation towards the police as agents of an oppressive political regime, together with the risk-elevating
characteristics of the squatter camp – such as lack of street lighting and the flimsy construction of dwellings – posed security risks to ordinary residents beyond the more explicitly political risk of intelligence infiltration already discussed. While some remembered the early days of the settlement as a time with few incidents of crime,\textsuperscript{169} it was apparent that if this was initially true, it changed with time.

The people stealing; oh, it is too much, because they know tomorrow you go to your job and there’s nobody [at home]. And they’s coming here and they take your things and... \textit{ja}.\textsuperscript{170}

There were many [incidents]. You see, like I said before, there were no Apollos [floodlights] by that time. It was too dark. Maybe when somebody came from work [...] they’ll take his money, everything from him, and he’ll come running [to the office].\textsuperscript{171}

Given the deliberate disconnection between the squatter camp and the security forces of the state, when crime occurred, squatters ‘ran to the office’ where Ramohlale operated, rather than to police. Ramohlale’s disciplinary committee worked in consultation with members of the community, knitting together the parochial world with the political through a principle of popular participation in the (informal) judicial process, tempered with a form of due process implemented by an informal ‘disciplinary committee:’

I will say to the community, ‘Now if this man has done 1,2,3, what are you saying, you know, as community? Then community says no, we have to punish; I said, no, as long as you have a disciplinary committee, let him go to the disciplinary committee and found out is he wrong or not wrong.

Tamlyn: OK. So if he was guilty, then what happens next with the disciplinary committee?

Jeff: They will warn him. Maybe they will warn him and talk to him. And then we’ll go. If he repeats the same mistake, it’s where they will punish him.\textsuperscript{172}

The disciplinary committee, which comprised 10 people who would question an apprehended criminal “like in court” and if necessary “\textit{sjambok} [whip] him until he understands what people need,”\textsuperscript{173} had a clear precursor in the “kangaroo court”\textsuperscript{174} Ramohlale had led in the township before the founding of Jeffsville. The disciplinary committee would decide on the nature of any

\textsuperscript{169} Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012
\textsuperscript{170} Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012.
\textsuperscript{171} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
\textsuperscript{172} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
\textsuperscript{173} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
\textsuperscript{174} Male resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
punishment, usually a number of lashes. If the crime involved theft, the proceedings would also involve reclaiming the stolen items.\footnote{Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012}

Just as judicial process unfolded differently in Jeffsville, so was the definition of crime particular to the perspective of residents. For instance, one respondent told me that no crime took place in the early days of Jeffsville, before adding the following qualification:

No, there were criminal incidents happening. For instance the bakeries. The bakeries when they came here, they would be robbed. But that was not actually considered to be criminal. [...] You know, these bakeries are here to feed people. People had to take this bread and eat, you know, because we are struggling.\footnote{Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012}

The everyday ‘struggle’ of squatters appear here as the benchmark for deciding the legitimacy of the use of force. It is as if the exceptional forms of everyday hardship caused by the state’s longstanding racial-spatial exceptionalism – its use of the law to victimize some while sustaining others – has produced an insurgent corollary in the squatter camp, where the law is reconfigured in order to ameliorate the harms it has done. Where ‘black’ urbanites rights have been curtailed in the interests of profits to the state and its ‘white’ citizens, here the rights of profit are suspended to provide sustenance to those it has victimized.

In this sense, the making and defence of squatter territory established and preserved ‘laws’, procedures and judicial mechanisms parallel to those of the state, often in contravention of state law. It appears that a conception of collective wellbeing took precedence over a traditional liberal conception of individual rights, or indeed a neoliberal notion of the rights and freedoms of commercial enterprises. Whereas this represented in many ways an insurgent form of political community and the expression and institutionalization of its values and priorities, it is important to recognize the instability of this informal ‘constitution’ and the informal regime that upheld it. Some respondents complained that the ‘magistrate’ presiding over the disciplinary committee was biased toward his ‘comrades’ in any incident involving them, and had sometimes abused disciplinary procedures to his own advantage – for instance, sentencing a husband to compulsory patrol duty in order to pursue an affair with the man’s wife during his absence.\footnote{Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012}

A similar double-edged sword were the patrols that provided civilian security. Initially, self-defence units (SDUs) comprising operatives of MK, APLA and the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) played a major role in the patrols, and this was supported by
compulsory recruitment of male residents. However, as time went by, political differences among the political organizations that conducted patrols in the early years of the camp led to their withdrawal from patrols. Presumably, the arrival of a democratic dispensation in 1994 also had a demobilizing effect. Yet, as the squatter population grew in size, patrols became a more and more important means for the leaders to “control everything,” and money had to be collected to pay patrollers for their services. The disciplinary committee sometimes sentenced transgressors to compulsory patrol duty. While this represented an attempt to foster security in the squatter camp, it may also have meant the depletion of expertise, leadership, discipline and commitment from the patrol function, arguably leading to the use of excess force and unilateral action. As such, popular policing had the potential to harm as well as help.

One respondent described the fate of a man who was apprehended by a patrol after trying to steal the respondent’s car on a night when the office was closed:

> Ja, now they hit him, that guy. Very hard. I didn’t feel nice because they hit him very, very dangerous. They hit him with a crate like that one [which I was sitting on], I was... And then tomorrow I look for where this guy come from, ja Extension 7. And then I ask his wife, why your man is troubling the people like this? [...] I say no, now who can fix my car? That wife, she said to me, I can fix the car don’t worry to fix the car, but the people, they damaged my husband. You can see my husband is fucked up. She says nee, what I must do? I say I don’t know.

>[JS’s voice becomes less audible at the end, as if he is losing heart to talk about this. A pause follows.]

I say no, but it’s not me, it’s the office people doing that. So I felt, no, that guy, they hit him too much... [...] Ja, ja, it was bad. I say to my wife no, it’s better to leave that guy and his wife who is crying also. Leave it and then I can fix my car. It cost me, uh, R2200 to fix all the way, take it out, put another glass. I say nee, it’s alright, don’t worry.

Here, we see the contradictory way in which a locally constituted practice to protect squatter residents had the opposite effect, irretrievably harming a perpetrator and his family, while also failing to ensure compensation for the victim of crime. Seen together with the accusations of unjust rulings by the disciplinary committee, we find that informal mechanisms of regulation and justice at a distance from the state are deeply ambiguous, simultaneously hurting and harming, protecting and exposing, the squatter constituency. While on the one hand they appear to manifest a popular communitarian social contract and a regime of self-defence, they also have the potential to be co-opted for interests of local elites, or in their informality to transform into destructive instruments of excessive force which hurt as much as they help.

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178 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
179 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
180 Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
5.3. Anticipation and insurgency west of Jeffsville: squatter politics after democracy

Deepening the question of ‘whose order’ the squatter camp represents, Ramohlale's leadership practices were contested by a group led by businessman Montgomery Matenji around 1993 – resulting in a violent struggle by the Jeffsville office to retain power, which eventually led to Ramohlale’s arrest and imprisonment. The Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA) conceded land for Matenji’s group to settle on a little to the west of Jeffsville. Today, the settlement, called Phomolong or ‘we are resting,’ to mark an escape from the forms of informal taxation levied in Jeffsville, is coterminous with Jeffsville because of subsequent settlement and densification of what was once a no-man’s-land between them. As it was actively offered to squatters, in an attitude of tolerance, in order to resolve the conflict between different factions in Jeffsville, Phomolong does not have the same insurgent foundations as Jeffsville. Nevertheless, consistently ignoring the limits set by the TPA on the expansion of the settlement, Matenji settled squatters across an area of nearly 3.5 km to the west of Jeffsville over the subsequent decade, creating the contiguous but separately named settlements of Phomolong, Vergenoeg, Brazzaville and Siyahlala.

Despite the time lag between the establishment of Jeffsville and its neighbours, these adjacent informal settlements were also territories formed for the claiming of a place among the citizens. Here, occupying land represented a claim on the substantive goods of citizenship more than the political ones, as democracy had granted squatters entry into the electorate. Many longstanding squatters’ stories speak of the squatter camp as an escape from the mutilated domestic life of single-sex (usually male-only) workers’ hostels – the fate of perpetually migrant workers, many cut off from spouse and children as the mundane price of a livelihood that would sustain their dependents in the destitute reserves:

> You see, our black people are suffering for a living place [...] Now many people wanted to live here [in Brazzaville], because, look, if they are here, they could live with their wives and children. Now in the hostel you cannot do that. [...] Where must they go? That’s what made us to do things like this – like the squatters’ camp.182

The distorted but mundane domestic arrangements faced by hostel dwellers were important ways in which the state's production of superfluous life continued to inscribe itself on the

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181 It is unclear from fieldwork what the TPA’s motives were for delimiting the size of the squatter camp, but these limits did not necessarily represent a new attempt as ‘freezing’ urban expansion. Environmental conditions in the area were not suited to human habitation due to the threat of subsidences and the existence of buried mortar bombs in the region due to previous defence force activity (see further discussion in Chapter 6). In addition, subsequent events suggest that the habitable part of Atteridgeville’s periphery was benchmarked for the development of formal housing to accommodate existing squatters.

182 Key informant, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
everyday through the transition to democracy, interweaving the mundane and the political. Despite de jure equality of citizens, many ‘black’ township residents still lived the same everyday conditions of infra-citizenship that they had during apartheid. Labourers residing in single-sex hostel accommodation remained structurally separated from their spouses and families, who continued to reside in far-off ‘homelands’ due to the material form of the hostels and the lack of family housing options in Atteridgeville. In this sense, democracy had not liberated these citizens from the parochial forms of suffering imposed by the state infrastructure built to alienate ‘surplus’ ‘black’ citizens. Matenji’s continued transgression of the TPA’s nominal efforts to circumscribe the borders of the settlement represents his recognition of this fact: the fact that would-be squatters’ circumstances as population ‘surplus’ to the housing capacity of the formal township were deeply rooted in past state policy.

Congestion in the township was such that in 1995, a year into South Africa’s new democracy, there were an estimated 110,000 residents living in 12,190 formal houses (Fourie, 1995) in Atteridgeville. Another 54,850 people were residing in ‘backyard’ accommodation (Fourie, 1995). Thus, the everyday conditions that gave rise to the Jeffsville occupation in 1991 remained much the same as new squatter settlements developed, despite regime change in 1994. As such, there was a great deal of common ground in the meaning of squatting across the different settlements, which later made space for the mobilization of Mshongo as a single political community of squatters despite differences in leadership.

As in Jeffsville, residents in Phomolong and Vergenoeg engaged in collective practices that built solidarity and political community among residents. To give but a few examples, in 1997 the leadership committee provided whistles to every household so that if a crime took place they could alert their neighbours, who would gather in large numbers to try and detain the perpetrator and hand him or her over to the informal court of the leadership committee – which would dole out warnings or lashes183 – or to the police. Every household was required to pay a one-off fee of R21 to secure the necessary pipework for the installation of several water points in the settlement. This echoed a similar initiative undertaken by Ramohlale in Jeffsville. Together, squatters, both men and women alike, physically dug the trenches to install the pipes – they can be seen exposed here and there along some routes in the settlement; a reminder of the collective labour invested in making these places.184

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183 Male resident, Brazzaville, 09/07/2012
184 Key informant, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012; key informant, Vergenoeg, 20/07/2012
5.3.1. From anticipation to insurgency

Ongoing tolerance of the settlement’s gradual expansion, and faith in the hope of an eventual transition to formal stands or housing, meant there was little need for insurgency in squatters’ claims on space in the settlements west of Jeffsville up until 1998. The political subjectivity of this period is probably better characterized as a ‘politics of patience’ (Zikode in Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509) in anticipation of an eventual transition, whose inevitability will have been reinforced by the launching of government housing projects under the new regime. However, a new moment of reckoning came for Matenji and recent squatters in 1998, when the City began attempting to evict new squatters who had settled immediately west of the boundary of Vergenoeg, at the far edge of Mshongo. Brazzaville was named for the implicit threat of squatter violence that underwrote the expansion of the informal settlement to the west of the stipulated boundary of Vergenoeg.

As I will illustrate below, the threat of eviction resurrected the spectre of the surplus ‘black’ body and gave rise once more to squatter insurgency, albeit distinct in form from what we saw in Jeffsville. The difference was that this spectre re-emerged under the new democracy; in a democratic regime explicitly built to counteract the sufferings and deprivations wrought by a century of exclusion not only political but also spatial. Insurgency returned as squatters found their local councillors – no longer apartheid puppets but legitimate political representatives who had been elected out of the ranks of Matenji’s office – reviving the previous regime’s exclusionary orientation:

[the councillors] stopped him there by Vergenoeg. They said no; no longer. The councillors! I mean, those councillors were elected out of his own office, out of Montgomery’s office! They decided to say no, now we no longer want informal settlement to grow, it must stop here [...] So he called them and he talked to them: hey guys, people are looking for places to stay, [...] they demolishing the hostel and many peoples want places to stay, on the backyard in the township peoples don’t afford the rent, they want to come to informal settlement just to have a place to sleep. And you say we cannot add more people. What are we doing with these people? The councillors said, no, no, no; we no longer want the informal settlement to grow.185

At the prospect of renewed efforts by the now democratic, non-racial state to construct a new population of surplus people to be excluded from claiming space in the township, Matenji blatantly defied the limits set on Vergenoeg, proactively recruiting new squatters to join the settlement the following Sunday. At the time, a civil war was ongoing in Brazzaville, in the Congo. When a large number of would-be squatters gathered, Matenji told his comrades:

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185 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012.
These people [the new squatters], we will take them there, where they said, ‘Vergenoeg is ending here.’ There is no boundary there, it is just the shacks, so these peoples will go and build next to those shacks and those who want to touch those people they will cause the conflict that is happening in Congo, in Brazzaville.\textsuperscript{186}

The persistence of a notion of transition was strongly embodied in the quasi-cadastral practices of Matenji and his committee, who measured stands and laid out roads in the western parts of the settlement with an explicit view to facilitating their eventual formalization. In this sense, their occupation of land was an expression of faith in the idea of transition. This comes across strongly in Matenji’s description of his committee’s reaction when first approached to vacate the periphery of Vergenoeg in 1998 – their expectation was that the purpose of vacating it would be to facilitate its transformation into a formal residential area for the benefit of current residents:

They [the City Council] said we must leave that place so they could upgrade it. [...] So we said OK, take a piece of land and when you are finished, we will bring the people to live there.\textsuperscript{187}

Their response expresses a politics of transition to inclusion in the City; an imagined trajectory towards permanent and formal accommodation in which informal tenure, though temporary, would presumably be surrendered in exchange for formal tenure. This was not what the City had in mind, however. In fact, the City’s position stratified the ‘black’ residents of the city margins, constructing recently settled squatters as an illegitimate surplus with no claim on the city:

And they said no, go back where you came from. And I said, where must people go? And they said they must go back where they came from. So I called the people, and I told the people “They say you must go. You must go there where you came from.” The people, then they said no, we are going nowhere. They can do what they will. Then I said, if I was you, I wouldn’t go along with them. Let them break these houses of ours themselves. And they will see what we will do.\textsuperscript{188}

Matenji’s settlement of newcomer squatters, primarily from the hostels, backyards and peri-urban farms of the surrounding area, had unfolded without violence up until 1998 and was tolerated by the City up until that point. Yet at this moment, threatened by the force of the state and its power to render squatters surplus and repel them once again to an infra-citizenship outside the boundaries of the city, squatters reasserted their belonging through the refusal to leave and the explicit rendering of the confrontation with the City within the

\textsuperscript{186} Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012.
\textsuperscript{187} Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
\textsuperscript{188} Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
interpretive framework of civil war, redrawing its bloodless modern developmental logic as a fundamentally violent, violating and illegitimate act.

Despite its name and its expression of squatters’ commitment to stay at all costs, no actual ‘war’ unfolded in Brazzaville – a democratic era made non-violent alternatives available, although nevertheless, several residents were killed when the community tried to resist an attempted eviction. Following this, Matenji’s committee collected donations for legal representation and confronted the City in court. Yet even in contesting their exclusion by reference to the law, the squatters engaged in collective practices through which they performed and (re)produced collective political identity. For instance, in an expression of unity and solidarity, residents queued outdoors until 10 pm to complete affidavits for evidence to be used in the court case:

There’s a big trunk in Phasha’s yard. They started there: two lines to down there [down the main road]. We finished at 10-o-clock.

It is easy to identify, in this history of popular participation in shared initiatives to address physical hardship and the threat of exclusion, the making of a distinct political community. This is not simply because the name of the territory – ‘Brazzaville’ – is an expression of the insurgent political subjectivity that inspired settlement in the area, and the fight for a place in the city waged against the state in court. It is also because political community has been repeatedly made manifest through the collective labour of squatters with a shared interest in maintaining their foothold in the city and securing the means for reasonable living conditions: the installation of water infrastructure; the collection for legal fees; the queuing to complete affidavits.

Where the squatters of Jeffsville claimed their place in a more revolutionary manner during the closing years of minority rule, seceding from the state into a realm of deliberate liminality, residents of Brazzaville drew on formal legal strategies to fight within the formal judicial system for their right to a place in the city. Manifesting several years into non-racial democracy, under a fully revised and codified regime of equal citizenship, squatters in Brazzaville could be seen to be “contesting privilege with right” (Holston, 2011); that is, using the institutions supporting citizen’s rights to resist an historical culture of citizenship that privileges elites, as Holston has observed among historically marginalized citizens in Brazil (Holston, 2011). However, I found virtually no explicit discourse of rights in Mshongo: indeed,

189 Male resident, Brazzaville, 04/08/2012; key informant, Vergenoeg, 20/07/2012
190 Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
one of the two respondents who made mention of formal rights saw South Africa’s liberal constitution with its notion that “any people have got rights” as a “problem” rather than a solution.\textsuperscript{191} Reflecting on Brazzaville’s victory in court, Matenji’s description of this victory constructs it as a political victory over the inscription of ‘suffering’ on ‘surplus’ people, and an affirmation of the right of the voting citizen to a place in the city:

> Yeh, we have suffered enough there. I fought, fought, a good fight. And I won that fight. Because I was reasoning: those people vote for ANC, and then when they get the government, the government wants those people to be chased away from Brazzaville. They must go back to where they come from. Why?\textsuperscript{192}

Like other respondents, Matenji seems to refer to an implicit, lay conception of social justice as an historically conditioned response to the unequal citizenship structured by the spatial strategies of the apartheid state. With no mention of formal ‘rights’, a notion of citizens’ entitlements was clearly evident both here and in the way other respondents talked about the injustice of the City’s attempts to return them to ‘where they came from’ – to a place of origin construed as being outside the boundaries of the township and beyond the jurisdiction of the City. The spectre of apartheid-style spatial injustice could not be clearer in this process.

A strong counter-discourse emerged in respondents’ repudiation of this as a myth of origins in which the implicit move was to render squatters as surplus, superfluous citizens, along the established lines of apartheid history. Repudiating this claim were counter-claims that squatters had all moved into Brazzaville from the township and its surrounding farms, and therefore had no other place of origin or anterior reference point. The strongest expression of this counter-discourse was the claim that, to return where they came from, squatters would have to return to their “mothers’ womb”.\textsuperscript{193} The strong primordial overtones of this last statement bring to mind the many studies of autochthony (or nativist) claims as expressing a kind of primal belonging or rootedness in the soil (Geschiere, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006). Since the invocation of a ‘mother’s womb’ appears as an undeniable reference to the “natal entitlement” (De Genova, 2008, p. 46) associated with nativist claims, it is crucial to note that although this statement would appear to express a form of local autochthony, neither respondent in the conversation claimed to have been born in Atteridgeville. The speaker had been a migrant labourer from a rural area living in a hostel in the township when Brazzaville was established. In this thesis, I therefore use the term “autochthony,” but in a manner that places its accepted meaning under erasure, drawing on emerging critiques of the

\textsuperscript{191} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11 July 2012
\textsuperscript{192} Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
\textsuperscript{193} Key informant in interview with male resident, Brazzaville, 9 July 2012
notion of autochthony as necessarily synonymous with being ‘born from the soil’ (Keller, 2014, p. 58; Nyamnjoh & Brudvig, 2014, p. 351). It has been observed that the conventional meaning of autochthony may privilege a discourse of identity over the materiality of politics in a world in which claims of anteriority do not simply exclude others but function to empower marginalized people to claim a legitimate place in society and resist further exploitation and domination (Bellier, 2011a, 2011b). In this case, I would argue that the claim to have no other place of origin – to have been born into belonging directly from a ‘mother’s womb’ – cannot be a claim to a ‘pure’, transhistorical form of local autochthony, given the contrived relationship apartheid created between populations and sub-national spaces through its township-homeland nexus. Rather it appears as an appeal to the equality and legitimacy of claims within the embrace of citizenship, an insistence on the legitimate humanity, presence and life of the squatter body, as opposed to its construction as a ‘surplus’ warranting removal or reversal. The impossibility of returning an adult to its mother’s womb expresses a claim by recent squatters to a legitimate and irreversible place in the present.

5.4. The waiting list for citizenship: a hierarchy of entitlement in transition

Though the struggle of squatters at Brazzaville would seem to signal shared coordinates of political identity with squatters at Jeffsville who had suffered in the same way as a ‘surplus’ population, and weathered similar evictions in the apartheid era, I found instead that there had been contestation of further settlement at Brazzaville by the squatters of Jeffsville. The leaders of Jeffsville had refused to support those of Brazzaville, despite the fact that conflict between Ramohlale and Matenji had been resolved by then, and all the leadership institutions of the settlement were co-operating in a single forum. This anomaly caught my attention, and in probing further I discovered unexpected differentiation within the broad political community of Mshongo squatters – differentiations originating in the ‘queue’ – the waiting lists that mediated squatters’ transition into formal inclusion. While squatters in Brazzaville appealed to a universal claim for equal entitlement to urban land, squatters in Jeffsville would counter with their notions of the rights associated with anteriority. This is an established-newcomer dynamic that, we will later find, prefigures the ‘xenophobia’ of future years.
5.4.1. Democracy and the waiting list for citizenship

If the closing years of apartheid introduced a pathway to more substantive inclusion in the city for politically excluded 'black' South Africans, the arrival of democracy in 1994 and a liberal array of constitutional rights including the progressive right to housing produced a de jure citizenship both political and material. Non-racial though this formation of citizenship was, the material effects of history produced a highly stratified citizenry – those who had already realized a full citizenship through their capacity to access rights including land and housing (the elites of the former era) and the subaltern ranks who were now entitled to these rights, but subject to their ‘progressive realization.’ Squatters were among those inserted into this teleological trajectory towards full citizenship. Beyond the implicit and explicit promise of a better life for all expressed in the rise of the once-banned ANC to power, an important way in which this transition was institutionalized was through housing development programmes and associated waiting lists (Oldfield, 2000: 858). In South Africa’s metropolitan areas, the extent of housing demand was expressed by waiting lists that ran into the hundreds of thousands (Oldfield, 2000: 858).

As a mechanism of transition to formal inclusion into the City, the post-apartheid waiting list was not a new technology. In Atteridgeville, for instance, a waiting list for municipal houses persisted after further housing development in the township was suspended in 1964, and reiterated at ministerial level as late as 1985 (Scheepers & Heunis, 1987). So despite the housing freeze, potential claims for space in the city were administered via a mechanism that apportioned inclusion according to the duration of a person’s claim; their position on a list that administratively sequenced the right to housing in the township. In other words, democracy’s promise of a better life was not made in an historical void but in the context of an already temporally structured contention for inclusion, and in a context in which people’s temporal relation to the city was already differentiated along two axes. First, in terms of ‘black’ citizens’ relative permanence or temporariness in the city – differentiating the longstanding permanent township ‘elite’ from more recent migrant arrivals who had no right to housing – and second by the order of existing claims on the waiting list, which organized the ‘legacy’ claims of permanent residents whose earlier date of entry into the stunted administrative machinery of housing allocation determined their priority. In the stalled teleology of the waiting list during apartheid, a modern ordering logic of the state made itself present in its absence, and with it a kind of spectral recognition of rights to the city for the most longstanding claimants.

194 Republic of South Africa, No 108 of 1996, p. s 26(22)
Apartheid’s perpetually deferred right to urban housing can be seen as an alienating temporal relation to the city, holding rights-bearing citizens in a position on an abject boundary between inclusion and exclusion. The experience of waiting can also be seen as what Harms, in his study of people awaiting eviction, has termed a ‘visceral engagement’ (Harms, 2013, p. 346) with time; time as a form of inscription of power on the body. We can see this visceral engagement as occurring within the “temporality of the singular suffering life”, and in this sense the basis of the ‘living politics’ of the “present tense” of the poor shackdweller (Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509).

We have seen the various mundane manifestations by which the designation of ‘surplus’ person was applied – for the permanent residents primarily through overcrowding in township houses; for the migrants through exploitation in backyard shacks; and the prolonged suspension of family life implicit in hostel accommodation. The move to squatting as a mode of transition to formal housing was a mark of agency and a manifestation of the insurgent citizenship of both these ‘surplus’ populations. Nevertheless, the telescoping wait in the shacks for an ever more spectral moment of transition into formal inclusion can be read as gradually transforming the squatter settlements into a new technology for the inscription of superfluity. Just as the waiting list prioritized people for formal housing by length of stay, so variations in length of stay in the settlement represented a more or less prolonged engagement of the body with hardship over time. I will say more about this in Chapter 7, but it is worth bearing in mind as we examine tensions between groups of squatters around the time of Brazzaville’s formation.

5.4.2. Hierarchies of entitlement in the contestation over Brazzaville

Contestation over entitlement became evident as respondents shared their memories of Brazzaville’s struggle for recognition. I was surprised to find that there had been a lack of solidarity between squatters in Jeffsville and those facing eviction in Brazzaville, especially as these were not related to tensions between the leaders of the two settlements:

Jeffsville was against Brazzaville because of these evictions. They’ve been promising people of Jeffsville housing, saying, ‘No, the people of Jeffsville are residing in a dolomitic area, that place is not safe for them.’ So then they wanted to build houses in Brazzaville and take the people of Jeffsville and reallocate them there; that’s what their [the municipality’s] demand was. So no, we denied to give them the land; we challenged them in the High Court […] We wanted to defend ourselves; they wanted us to go away so they can take the land.195

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195 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012
At the centre of the disjuncture in squatter solidarity, then, was the emergence of a prospect for the accelerated transition of a single, territorially distinct group of squatters within a far larger population of squatter citizens, each with the common purpose of maintaining and formalizing their place in the city. Priority was assigned to this beneficiary group primarily for geotechnical reasons related to the risk to life and property posed by settlement on land underlain by dolomite formations, which is prone to sinkholes and subsidences (Van Schalkwyk, 1998: 167). Given the state’s responsibility to protect citizens against the dangers posed by unstable ground conditions, it is not surprising that the Jeffsville squatters were prioritized for accommodation in this way. But in the contestation of this rationale by squatters in Brazzaville and the counter-discourse brought to bear on it in court, a complex conflict between universal and particular definitions of citizens’ entitlements emerges – all of which can be traced back to the original role of time and place in ordering squatters’ formal inclusion.

The language used to justify Brazzaville residents’ eviction in favour of the resettlement of Jeffsville residents reveals strong conditioning by the temporal ordering of transition. In submissions to the court, the municipality accuses the more recent squatters of Brazzaville of effectively ‘jumping the queue’ for housing by occupying land earmarked for the development of formal housing for legitimate ‘residents of Atteridgeville’, who are defined as those on the existing waiting list. Emphasis is placed on the claim that barring a few ‘who claim to originate from Atteridgeville and Saulsville’ the Brazzaville squatters’ ‘specific origins cannot be traced.’ The implication is that because of their purported lack of provenance in the local area, these more recent squatters do not qualify for space in the city. Whereas those on the existing waiting list are defined as ‘the homeless’ or ‘the beneficiaries’, new squatters are classified as ‘unlawful’ occupiers or ‘illegal squatters’, and accused of snatching the hope of transition out from under legitimate claimants.

This brings us back to the theme of autochthony, a term I will continue to use with a critical orientation toward its conventionally accepted connotation of being ‘born from the soil.’ Some scholars have analysed autochthony as an essentially ‘empty’ and thus highly malleable discourse of belonging preoccupied with ‘purity’ of origins (Geschiere, 2009, p. 129) and the

196 Town Planner - City Council of Pretoria, c. 16 April 1988, p. 19
197 Town Planner - City Council of Pretoria, c. 16 April 1988, p. 13
198 Town Planner - City Council of Pretoria, c. 16 April 1988, p. 7
199 Ward 2 Councillor - Atteridgeville, 16 April 1988, p. 3
200 Town Planner - City Council of Pretoria, c. 16 April 1988, pp. 8-9; 13-14
201 Town Planner - City Council of Pretoria, c. 16 April 1988, p. 8
relationship between 'blood and soil' (Geschiere, 2009, p. 132). However, others, such as Bellier (2011) have attempted to correct such views through an emphasis on autochthony as a political category arising from the material histories of, for instance, ethnic and racial groups reclaiming the rights stripped from them during colonialism. Such demands for recognition, she argues, do not "necessarily operate through the paradigm of essentialism" and may explicitly question the meaning of "a people" (Bellier, 2011a, p. 205). Returning to Mamdani, they may be claims relating to political identity, structured not according to essential or transhistorical identifications but by how discrimination, manifested through state institutions and practices, has historically operated (Bellier, 2011a, p. 205). A similar dynamic is evident here as the municipality attempts to temporally order claims on urban land by privileging those squatters it identifies as having the earliest claims. Given the existence of waiting lists for family housing prior to democracy, which by virtue of apartheid’s exclusionary structure would first have enrolled ‘permanent residents’ of the township, we can detect an anteriority of claims that precedes the foundation of the settlements. Jeffville’s establishment is strongly associated with that anteriority, since as we have seen, its founders were those who had languished on the waiting lists a long time.\footnote{Male resident, Jeffville, 19/08/2012} In this sense, these claims of anteriority, which appear to refer to local autochthony, are not about essential identity or belonging but about rational pathways to inclusion shaped by concrete, state institutions and processes.

Yet as we have seen in Chapter 4, this a priori mechanism of ordering was structured by the stratification of township residents into permanent and temporary classes: hostel dwellers and other migrant labourers working in and around what is now Tshwane had no right of permanent residence, and hence no right to join the waiting lists for township housing. Interestingly, Brazzaville’s discourse of quasi-autochthony, emphasizing both relations of anteriority in the Tshwane region, and the basic human equality of citizens in their entitlement to a place outside the womb is, just like the City’s deployment of autochthony to prioritize ‘legacy’ claims, oriented toward social justice and inclusion. In the final analysis, neither claim lacks validity, reminding us that claims of anteriority may be amenable neither to idealization – as is often the case in analyses of indigenous peoples – nor to vilification, as we see in analyses of the exclusionary claims of defensive autochthons (Gausset, Kenrick, & Gibb, 2011). As Bellier has argued in relation to ambiguity over the designation of "indigenous peoples", conflicting autochthony claims can coexist as a result of "the unfinished processes of decolonization" as previously marginalized groups seek "to re-enrol as subjects and actors in a disputed modernity" (Bellier, 2011a, p. 205). These assertions suggest that insurgent citizenship, or the
process of claiming equal standing against a backdrop of discrimination and de facto inequality, may necessarily involve more than one valid – rather than ‘empty’ (Geschiere, 2009, p. 129) – claim to priority, and that these claims may be structured by the forces shaping political identity rather than by primordial or essentialist identities. Rather than necessarily representing a menace to social justice, autochthony claims may relate in complex ways to "the articulating mechanisms of systems of rights...which have the capacity to expand the body politic" (Bellier, 2011a, p. 206).

Corresponding to the distinct claims of anteriority outlined above, I found traces of a social distinction between ‘legacy’ squatters and newcomers in Jeffsville, but not in Brazzaville. Respondents told of a distinction being made between those who are “from here” versus those who “came here”, and the implicit priority expected by those “from here.” This potentially reveals the origins of ‘xenos’ in Mshongo, linking future ‘xenophobia’ to the notion of a hierarchy of entitlement mapped onto established and newcomer identities. Fascinatingly, South African citizens who migrated from other areas recalled being labelled ‘kwerekwere’ – a derogatory term to describe the ‘incomprehensibility’ of newcomers’ home languages (Hickel, 2014, p. 103), which in recent years has become synonymous with foreign-born migrants.204 This remained a relatively banal form of stigmatization. In one case, it took on an exclusionary form. One woman who was granted a place in Brazzaville reported that she did so after being denied a place in Phomolong – the settlement west of Jeffsville to which many original Jeffsville residents moved to escape Ramohlale’s informal taxation regime:

*Ja,* because the first time, before I came to [Brazzaville], I went there to Phomolong. When I got there it was no, you come far, from Bloemfontein [in the Free State province]. They looked at my pass and they said no, you may not come here. I said why? I am a South African. Here’s my pass.*205

Given the absence of a strong corresponding discourse of hate or prejudice against domestic migrants in Atteridgeville, this appears as an interesting example of how, in an effort to redress the local effects of history – here, by prioritizing local claimants – ostensibly autochthonic claims take on an exclusionary dimension that references spatial and temporal relationships with no pretensions to primordialism or purity. Instead, length of stay and place of origin have become formally politicized in the struggle for government housing and a formal and legitimate place in the city/township. The definition of membership and entitlement being

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204 Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012
205 Female resident, Brazzaville, 01/08/2012. A ‘pass’ refers to an identity document issued by the apartheid state to ‘black’ people for the purposes of influx control. It contained endorsements and permits regulating the ‘national origin’, mobility and residential permissions granted to the individual.
constructed here is a doctrine of the rights of first comers, of the established over the newcomer, and rather than representing a non-rational primordial attachment is in fact a rationality of entitlement fully rooted in the teleology of transition instituted by the state.

5.4.3. Autochthony as capital: defining legitimate claims

Thus far, I have emphasized temporal ordering as a basis for autochthony claims in Mshongo, while distinguishing these claims from the prepolitical, ontological claims usually associated with this term. The political identities of established versus newcomer squatters revealed in the contention over Brazzaville’s eviction draw on an existing structure of temporally defined entitlement to space and housing with its roots in the structure of transition. However, I came to recognize that claims of anteriority in Mshongo have a meaning beyond this, which challenges any attempt to reify established/newcomer identities. To explore this complexity, I will use Mathieu Hilgers’ (2011) brilliant analysis of autochthony as capital as a framework with which to understand a revealing, emotionally charged outburst by a respondent in one of my final encounters in the field.

The outburst centred on a recent decision by the City to prohibit the charging of rent by squatter landlords. This intervention into the life of the settlement was intended to eliminate the inequality implicit in a situation where landlords occupy their plots for free, while charging rent to more recent arrivals in the city. It depicts the land as property of the state, to be dispensed with at will, and residents of the squatter camp not as active bearers of a distinct, historically defined political subjectivity, but as the apolitical beneficiaries of development. One of the earliest squatters at Jeffsville revealed a very different understanding of the meaning of squatted land and squatter identity:

Department of housing, they said the land is Tshwane Municipal Land, so they control the squatter camp. But when the squatter camp was formed, municipality was not there.206

The respondent begins here by contesting the ownership of the camp. Despite the fact that the land is owned by the municipality, he suggests that the squatter camp is not simply land; it is territory: land occupied by power (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 66;79). It was constituted as a place of residence, as place with a specific location, material form and meaning, by the original squatters who occupied and regulated it, and not by the municipality. This resonates with

206 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
Hilgers' provocative assertions about the foundation of the principle of autochthony, which is worth citing in full:

This principle can hardly be reduced to its strictly demographic aspect: being autochthonous is not just, and in some cases is not at all, being first in the order of migrations. If the principle of autochthony always refers, at least formally, to this order, it is because it assumes that the first people to arrive in an untamed space were the ones who made it humanly viable by combating, domesticating or allying with the visible and invisible natural forces that reigned there. Beneath the demographic issue, the principle of autochthony thus includes a sociological dimension: the contribution of a group to the prosperity of a collectivity that resides in a given space. The first group to arrive in a space is, according to the principle, the first to civilize it. (Hilgers, 2011, p. 38)

Having founded the settlement and established the social and material relations that exist within it, the respondent views the stands laid out in the occupation of Jeffsville through the prism of that social world: from this perspective, the landlords do own their properties and have a right to dispose of it as they choose, just as would be the case if they owned formal property and by extension held the conventional property rights associated with citizenship, which are an important basis for freedom and wealth. In the respondent's eyes, the municipality is unjustly commandeering private property:

So you see, it causes tension, because of... at some stage the municipality will take other people's property and give it to the tenants, you understand. [...] You cannot forfeit other people's properties, you understand what I mean. Because for some people... that shack is their home, you understand. It's their last home.

The observation that an irregularly occupied shack is the only property some squatters possess – 'their last home' – serves to remind us of the political meaning of squatter dwellings as a claim to the property rights historically denied to 'black' South Africans in the cities. The respondent continues along this train of thought, emphasizing a distinction between the political identities not of the landlord and tenant but of the squatter and tenant, in a way that is deeply revealing:

It’s their last home. Then you take it, you benefit somebody who even never thought of squatting, you understand. He came as a tenant. So you empower him on behalf of other people’s property. So that is wrong. I won’t accept it, I won’t agree with that.

A number of social facts in the locality are implicit in this outburst of anger. First, a clear identity division is reiterated between older and newer squatters ('squatters' and 'tenants'), whose distinct historical claims to property rights are not recognized by government. Second,
‘squatting’ is implicitly defined as a political practice, an act expressing political commitment and the pursuit of political goals. Merely renting a shack is defined as apolitical; as a purely economic transaction. There is an indication that many of the established squatters (landlords, for want of a better term) have earned their place by commitment to the life of the camp in its initial establishment; that they have come to ‘own’ their space in the city by virtue of their participation. This resonates with Hilgers’ observation that the principle of autochthony establishes a hierarchy "within a given space of relationships" – one that supposes the existence of a collectivity whose development was made possible by the contribution of different groups. The degree of autochthony is defined and attributed according to the position that each group occupies in the common space, and reflects, at least implicitly, the contribution of each one to the success of the collectivity. Groups are therefore not merely autochthonous or not, they are more or less autochthonous depending on power relations and the issues at stake in the space from which the autochthon-allochthon distinction is determined. (Hilgers, 2011, p. 42)

A narrative of belonging emerges in which anteriority and political involvement define the boundaries of the ‘squatter’ community. Thus, we find those who came as 'squatters' and those who 'came as tenants', falling within an established hierarchy of social relations in which 'squatting' is read as the political process by which an individual comes to possess land s/he has laid claim to by forceful occupation. Tenants as a class are cast as mere consumers, who have not invested the commitment needed to ‘own’ a place. On the other hand, government policy, egalitarian in intent, classifies all residents of the squatter camp as a universal category of the poor: ‘it’s their policy: everyone who lives in the squatter camp is underprivileged so there’s no need for one to pay rent.’209 The notion of a continuum of ‘autochthony’, even as it helps us map these juxtaposed images of 'squatters' and 'tenants' onto established and newcomer identities, also reminds us that the match between these identities need not be seamless: some newcomers have been able to purchase stands from exiting squatters, and have thus entered the ranks of the squatters/landlords. Others have become involved in the reproduction of the squatter camp, making investments in "the success of the collectivity." As Hilgers notes, autochthony is not "structured on a principle of binary opposition" but can be seen as a form of "capital that can be invested in and profited from, "such that a newcomer can move from their point of entry into the city to a position of gradually fuller participation in the social history of a place, gaining "a position that must be taken seriously on social issues or spatial transformations of their city” (Hilgers, 2011, p. 41). This will be an important point to

209 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
bear in mind when, in Chapter 7, we consider the distinction drawn between longer standing and more recently arrived foreign residents in Mshongo.

5.5. Conclusion

In Chapter 4, I discussed the emergence of squatting as a stepping stone to a more complete citizenship by virtue of an uneasy relationship between national policymaking and provincial implementation during the closing decade of apartheid. This chapter has stepped down to yet a lower scale, to examine the manifestation of squatting at the local level in a Transvaal township before and after the formal transition to democratic rule in April 1994. This involves recognition of the ways in which the racial and spatial stratification effected by the apartheid state shaped the squatter political identity that confronted the local state in Jeffsville. In turn, it involves recognition that the mechanism of transition through which squatters hoped to gain formal access to land in the city also shaped political identity in the settlements going forward.

This chapter has shown how ‘squatter’ political identity was forged through shared suffering and practice – living politics – and reproduced through the collective struggle and repertoires of communal solidarity that produced and sustained squatter territory, simultaneously instantiating a micro-scale political community. By exploring the rationality and legitimacy of coercive practices that governed the small-scale territorial enclave of Jeffsville – which drew on expertise, resources and repertoires for potentially violent collective mobilization that remain latent within the informal settlement – this chapter has also shed light on an alternative account of justice in the squatter camp. The making and defence of squatter territory established and preserved ‘laws’, procedures and judicial mechanisms parallel to those of the state, often in contravention of state law. In addition, a conception of collective wellbeing seems to take precedence over a traditional liberal conception of individual rights (or indeed a neoliberal notion of the rights and freedoms of commercial enterprises). In line with the narrative of belonging that has emerged from this chapter, squatters in Brazzaville used both their universal claim as voting citizens, and their long legacy as residents in and around Atteridgeville, to assert the legitimacy of their claims.

I have argued that, in both Jeffsville and Brazzaville, squatting expressed a collective counterpolitical claim by those deemed ‘surplus’ for their rightful place among the citizens. The two sites have also utilized similar collective repertoires to defend and domesticate informal territory. Yet I have shown that there are nevertheless faultlines in squatter political identity.
Drawing on a key instance of contention between squatters of Jeffsville and Brazzaville, I demonstrated how the claims of anteriority implicit in the waiting list as a modern institution for the mediation of squatters' transition to formality raised the spectre of autochthony. A more recent contentious issue demonstrated further complexity, suggesting that the legitimacy of claims is also related to the extent of people's investment in the making of the squatter camp. Through the collective struggle and repertoires of communal solidarity that produced and sustained squatter territory, the identity of ‘squatter’ comes to have an originary, though certainly not primordial, quality, in which membership is produced through common hardship and collective activity rather than by date of arrival or place of ‘origin.’ This, it seems, is fractured by the chronological structure of inclusion that by necessity favours those who have waited longest – chief among whom are the children of the historically privileged class of ‘black’ permanent residents in Atteridgeville. In this sense, a narrative of belonging that combines anteriority and political involvement appears as an unorthodox version of autochthony. These fractures in squatter political identity seem to materialize as contention at times where the salience of these identities is magnified by uneven opportunities to claim the resources associated with them (Tilly, 2003: 76-77). In Chapter 7, I will return to this theme to discuss the targeting of foreigners during times of collective protest action. However, this must first be placed in the context of an indefinitely deferred transition to inclusion signalled by the continued toleration enforced by the High Court in respect of Brazzaville in 1998, and the seemingly permanent threshold position this has placed squatters in. In the next chapter, I unpack the implications of this threshold position for squatter citizenship.

I am at pains here to distinguish the originary quality of the ‘squatter’ identity, coproduced with the territory of the informal settlement at a particular point in time for distinct reasons and through explicit practices, from the notion of primordial identity which claims a mythical genesis in the immemorial past, and a consequent ‘natural’ claim on territory. The claim made by squatters is explicitly not a claim of natural right but a notion of right flowing from investments of labour and suffering, with a sequencing defined by historical state policies.
Chapter 6: Suspended Transition: (Infra)Citizenship on a Permanent Threshold

We have seen that the squatter camp became an embodiment of claims for citizenship against the backdrop of a history of spatial stratification and differentiated citizenship. We have seen how it became an ambiguous place between law and lawlessness as the TPA subsumed an informal and illegal material form into the ambit of the legal and tolerable to transition a once ‘surplus’ population into the formal order of the city, and, in a different sense, as squatters produced the camp as a place immune to the coercive forces of the state. Whereas zones of indistinction have often been read as places antithetical to political life, we have seen that, in the form of the squatter camp, indistinction can be emplaced to facilitate a transition to fuller citizenship. But I show in this Chapter that, after two decades, there are many for whom this transition has not occurred. This opens up an important question: what political promise does the squatter camp hold if transition is suspended, and claimants for citizenship find themselves permanently mired in the camp’s ambiguities? In this Chapter, I consider the ‘living politics’ of life on a seemingly permanent threshold between order and disorder; law and lawlessness; citizenship and abandonment. I argue that, stripped of its status as a place of transit between a prior state outside the realm of the citizen and a future state within the realm of the citizen, the squatter camp must be read in terms of a politics of the present in a physical and social threshold space neither inside nor outside citizenship. This ‘unfinished’ citizenship becomes an important context for the resurgence of insurgent practices, and with them ‘xenophobic’ violence, which I discuss in Chapter 7.

I use the notion of the threshold space as a portmanteau for the profound and multi-dimensional ambiguity I encountered in the squatter camps. Although this threshold resembles Agamben’s notion of the exception, as that which “cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included” (Agamben, 1998, p. 25), I feel it is necessary to distinguish it theoretically from his notion of the sovereign exception and of the camp. In terms of the Schmittian notion of the sovereign ordering of space, which forms a foundation for Agamben’s work, the squatter camp cannot be understood as the negative counterpart or “outside” produced by the agency of the
sovereign as a corollary to establishing “a juridical and a territorial ordering” (Agamben, 1998, p. 19). As we have seen, the exceptional status of the contemporary squatter camp can be seen as arising both from the Transvaal Provincial Authority’s (TPA’s) attempt to bring an historical outside in to the inside of state space, and also from the agency of infra-citizens in inaugurating an “outside” in the city. Therefore, it becomes a camp in the sense of being “a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable”, but not in Agamben’s sense, in which the exception that founds the camp is a process of excision or “taking outside” (Agamben, 1998, p. 170). Rather, the exception that is the squatter camp, produced to counteract the externalizing movement of apartheid’s spatial strategies, resembles a grafting of an outside onto the body politic: a grafting of the disorderly, informal and illegal onto the orderly, formal and legal realm.

Nevertheless, I will show in this chapter that the opening up of the ambiguous space of the squatter camp, in an attempt to internalize an outside, produced many vectors of infra-citizenship. As hopes of transition faded for many, the threshold transformed from exception to rule, giving rise to many of the pathologies Agamben attributes to the camp, where subjects inhabit “a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit” (Agamben, 1998, p. 170). I explore the ways in which the squatter camp’s ambiguity precludes the realization of citizenship in material, legal and political terms. On this terrain explicitly created for the claiming of citizenship, it is important to recognize the impossibility of realizing de facto citizenship. I focus on three key areas of ambiguity: squatters’ threshold position in relation to 1) the state’s formal mechanisms for security and justice; 2) the systems established to promote democratic participation in formal government; and 3) the biopolitical protection/care of life by the state. In light of squatters’ ongoing liminality, we come to see the squatter camp in a new light as pharmakon—simultaneously a cure for infra-citizenship and a vector for the same.

6.1. Suspended on the threshold of citizenship

So as you can see now, people don’t have a belief anymore that they’ll still be relocated somewhere else. They take it as their home. It’s where they stay. Some even die there. They even bury each other there. The first time I experienced that the squatter camp is not going anywhere is 2003, when they begin to bury people in the squatter camp. They used to take these people

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211 A concept from Plato interpreted by Jacques Derrida as a substance that “acts as both a remedy and a poison”, and which “can be – alternatively or simultaneously – beneficent or maleficent” (Derrida, 1981, p. 70).
home and bury them there. Now they were beginning to bury them, arrange a funeral there at the squatter camp.

It was several years into the new millennium, and 12 years into the life of Jeffsville, that this respondent first considered that the hoped-for transition might not be forthcoming; that it might in fact be the terminating point of squatters’ struggles for citizenship. This terminal view of the squatter camp is profoundly distinct from the view of the camp as a temporary place of transition to formal citizenship which underwrote the squatter movements led by Ramohlale in Jeffsville and Matenji in Phomolong, Vergenoeg, Brazzaville and Siyahlala. The camps were not intended to be a termination point in residents’ struggle for equal citizenship, but part of a trajectory; a taken-for-granted expectation of progressive realization of the rights of citizenship historically denied to squatters. With the suspension of this trajectory, time once again becomes an alienating form of inscription of power on the suffering body (Harms, 2013).

The variable of time plays a central role in constituting any notion of transition, or of a progressive trajectory from one socio-political position to another. Like space, time is not simply a field in which action takes place, but an active player. In a context partly constituted by a temporally structured pursuit of social and political equality, time is an important analytical lens and a variable in shaping the objective context of the settlement, as well as aspirations, identities and the nature of political engagement.

Let us look at the transformation of the squatter camp from a place of agency, hope and potential, a place in motion, so to speak, to a site of permanent immobility over the course of time. First, in the form of the transition to democracy, time brought changes in the relationship between the founding squatters and the living environment they had created – having fulfilled its political purpose and played its part in producing de jure equal citizenship, the squatter camp awaited de facto improvements. The time for transition had come, and with it the expectation of proper sanitation and housing, albeit mediated by an acknowledgement of the technical demands of ‘service delivery’ to millions. The legitimacy of the ANC as the liberating party, giving rise to an unprecedented switch from a belligerent relationship between state and civil society to a co-operative one, created “a hiatus in popular and radical activity in the mid–late 1990s” (Ballard, Habib, Valodia, & Zuern, 2006, p. 862). Attending this was what shackdweller activist S’bu Zikode has described as a ‘politics of patience’, which acknowledges the complexity of the democratization and service delivery process against the backdrop of over a century of distorted development:

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212 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
Then you begin to say: ‘comrades, no, hang on, be patient’ because you tend to understand this technicality. ‘This thing is complicated, you know, we have to go and find another architect or an engineer’. […] So, you’ll be the first one to say: ‘but hang on, this thing is really complicated. . .’. (in Selmeczi, 2012, p. 509)

A ‘politics of patience’ can be seen to transform active claimants for citizenship into “passive consumers or beneficiaries who just need to be plugged into the grid of serviced life by a benevolent state” (Pithouse, 2011). A certain degree of temporal distancing is inherent in the optimistic anticipation of a gradual progress of transition through which the worst off will predictably and inevitably join the ranks of the included “as backlogs are steadily overcome” (Pithouse, 2011). The corollary position is that “patience is a virtue” and dissent uncalled for (Pithouse, 2011). This said, it was never anticipated that the wait might exceed two decades for some, and with the passage of time came instead a gradually rising “sense of betrayal by the ANC and a disappointment in the fruits of democracy,” leading by the mid-2000s to frequent militant social protests nationwide (Dawson, 2014, p. 862).

We thought we might be squatting for 2, 3 years. That’s why I tell you it’s no longer an issue of squatting. For 22 years? […] So you want to tell me it’s a squatter camp, it’s an informal settlement? It’s no longer squatting. If you squat… our members make it a point to move within a short period of time, you understand. You don’t have to stay long while squatting. 213

Forms of waiting map onto more abstract and more mundane articulations of time. On one level, time is abstract, and twenty years may be seen as a long or a short time in relation to other abstract timescales. But on another level, time is visceral (Harms, 2013), here marked not by the hands of a clock but by how many times you have rebuilt your shack after a fire; how many times you have registered for a government house; how many times you have voted for promises that turned out to be empty. In the sections that follow, I explore three key forms of structural ambiguity in the squatter camp that preclude the realization of substantive equal citizenship and reproduce the mundane experience of infra-citizenship even after democracy.

6.2. Between legality and illegality

Legal and political rights form the foundation for all other rights of citizenship (Janoski & Gran, 2002, p. 14). The legal rights associated with membership of a democratic citizenry provide for security of person, justice and security of transactions, and freedoms of choice and conscience.

213 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
They represent the marriage of a consensually defined normative regime – that is, laws – with a regulatory machinery to guarantee the enactment of rights and enforcement of prohibitions. This is an ideal of citizenship that has its origins in a highly modern and rational conception of politics in which state institutions are highly formalized and institutionalized, and evenly spread to enable the realization of a rational regime of universally applicable rights and sanctions. However, the squatter camp, existing on the threshold of modern institutions of politics, law, and regulation, is anathema to such an ideal. It is a place where a variety of legal ambiguities constrain the extent, content and depth of squatter citizenship and perpetuate a spatially stratified citizenship even after democracy. In this section, I highlight competing normative orders and regulatory machineries in the threshold space as key vectors constraining the legal citizenship of squatters. These create complex entanglements of formal and informal norms and practices, so that the legal rights of citizenship become deeply ambiguous. This is not a comprehensive discussion of every conceivable component of legal citizenship. Rather, led by the themes that emerged in the field, I venture in two directions, considering how ambiguities in law, authority and regulation in the settlement impact on squatters’ property rights and security of person.

6.2.1. Property rights and tenure security

Rights relating to property are a fundamental element of the legal rights of citizenship, intimately related to the concept of tenure security. Security of tenure “refers to the relationship between a tenant and a landlord, as well as the relationship between an owner and others, such as the state” (Obeng-Odoom & Stilwell, 2013: 321), and involves clear definitions of the rights and obligations of the various parties, to minimize conflict and manage it if it arises. Although there is debate over what form of tenure is preferable (Obeng-Odoom & Stilwell, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2012), tenure security is widely understood to be a key way of minimizing transaction costs and risks, and alleviating poverty (Obeng-Odoom & Stilwell, 2013: 319). While the importance of tenure security initiatives including legal titling has been widely recognized in the development literature (De Soto, 2001; Simbizi, Bennett, & Zevenbergen, 2014; Jean-Louis Van Gelder, 2010), South Africa has not focused on codifying the property rights and obligations of squatters. Given that under apartheid, ‘white’ citizens held an estimated 87% of the country’s freehold land, in the first decade of democracy South Africa focused largely on transfers of private property from ‘white’ to ‘black’ ownership.
The legislation introduced around tenure security—that is, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (1997) and Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (1998)—prevented the arbitrary eviction of squatters and provided rights of continued land use to people who had occupied land with permission on or before 4 February 1997 (Black Sash & Education & Training Unit (ETU) for Democracy & Development, 2014). While this would seem to provide some certainty to squatters with respect to their rights to remain on the periphery of Atteridgeville, I will argue that it produces ambiguity once again, reproducing the squatters’ threshold status by suspending them between the inside and outside of the law. This requires briefly addressing the problem of informal planning, which I will explore further in the later discussion of squatters’ relation to the care of the state.

Town planning can be seen as a key practice in the spatial manifestation of citizenship and a crucial mediator of the right to the city. As Davy has observed:

… planners respond to property (or spatial exclusion) and social citizenship (or spatial inclusion). They shape the allocation of land uses and the distribution of the benefits and burdens of property; they define the citizens’ right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996; Mitchell, 2003). Each time a binding land use plan is issued, a planning permission is granted or refused, or public spending is determined by a plan, planners are arranging spatial exclusion and inclusion. (Davy, 2009, p. 231)

Here, Davy considers the direct practices of approving or disapproving a land use plan. But what happens when the definition of land uses consists in tolerating the existence of land use that has not been subject to planning regulations? The Atteridgeville informal settlements have neither suffered a disapproval of their land use, nor benefited from an approval thereof. Rather, they exist in a tolerated interstice of formal planning. We will see some of the material effects of this fact later in this chapter. Here, however, I will focus on the effect of lacking any codified property rights.

In formal spaces, citizens benefit from precise and well-defined boundaries established by titling. It is clear who the owner of a property is, and the owner’s right to accrue benefits from or dispose of their property as they see fit is legally protected. Equally, the owner’s obligations toward a tenant are clear and legally defined, providing both landlord and tenant with formal rights and obligations that mediate tenure security between the parties. In the informal space of the squatter camp, however, tenure security is ambiguous. Disentangling this ambiguity, I draw on Van Gelder’s conception of tenure security as a tripartite structure composed of

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214 Of course, in the case of Brazzaville, occupied in 1998, there was no such guarantee; hence the need to resolve their attempted eviction in court.
legal security (the removal of uncertainty by clear legal definition of property rights and the
enforcement of such rights by the state), de facto security (protection arising from conditions
such as length of time and conditions of property that, in ‘real life’, confer some guarantee
against and safety from losing one’s property rights) and perceived tenure security (the belief of
people that their property rights are protected). (Obeng-Odoom & Stilwell, 2013: 316)

Tenure security would entail a close correspondence between these three elements, but in the
squatter camp the correspondence is tenuous. Clearly, there is a form of legal security for
squatters – entailed in the Acts already discussed, and demonstrated in the High Court’s
judgment in favour of the Brazzaville squatters after their attempted eviction by the
municipality in 1998. However, it is an ambiguous form of legal security far removed from the
legal regime that protects formal property owners and tenants. Whereas formal rights clearly
distinguish owners from occupiers; landlords from tenants; and one parcel of land from
another in unambiguous terms, the diminished form of tenure security granted to squatters
provides no differentiation of their individual claims and no codification of the extent of their
erven, dwelling structures, or rights to dispose of these freely.

We saw how a degree of de facto tenure security was achieved through settling high squatter
communities and exercising civil disobedience until the authorities wearied and made concessions
(helped along, no doubt, by the TPA’s tolerant policy). Tolerance as the settlements spread
West under Matenji will have reinforced this sense of de facto security, until the attempted
evacuation at Brazzaville. This underlines the fact that, without clear legal status, “de facto
security is still precarious, based on critical mass and internal organization, which ensure the
effective control of the land” (Jean-Louis Van Gelder, 2010, p. 253). Beyond this, unstable
geological conditions, as well as the ephemeral construction of most shacks and their
disproportionate vulnerability to fire, mean that there is no de facto protection against loss of
property either. One’s shack could burn down at any time or be subsumed by a sinkhole – both
products of the interstitial character of the squatter camp. Whereas in a formal area, houses
can be insured against fire, squatters cannot accrue security through insurance, as their shacks
lack the necessary legal status. In this sense, by law, shacks are not property at all; merely an
ephemeral arrangement of found objects on the property of a beneficent third party.

Despite these problems of legal and de facto security, longstanding squatters display a strong
sense of perceived tenure security.215 This appears to be a consequence of de facto
considerations such as their long tenure, investment of money and labour in the purchase of

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215 As the majority of my respondents were longstanding squatters, I cannot reflect reliably on the experiences of newer squatters,
although it could be assumed that the newer the squatter, the less investment he or she will have made in the settlement, and the
more likely he or she will be a ‘tenant’ rather than a ‘squatter’ with a perceived right of ownership of a stand.
their stand from squatter leaders and/or the development of their dwellings, and more broadly in the life of the settlement (through participation in digging water pipes, or paying legal fees to oppose eviction). These investments, together with recognition of their ownership by fellow residents and by the mechanism of the housing waiting list that turns squatters’ stands into proxies for formal property, can be seen to attest “the existence of a property right even though this right lacks official status” (Jean-Louis Van Gelder, 2010: 254). Perceived tenure security has also been structured by institutionalized informal norms relating to tenure: the informal codification process performed or implied by the exchange of money for the measuring and issuing of stands by the informal settlement leaders; or the shadow market of property transactions through which some squatters have purchased stands and dwellings from people exiting the settlement, for instance to occupy titled stands in government housing projects.

The mechanism of transition has also impacted on perceived property rights in the settlement. We have seen how the TPA articulated its ‘transitional’ approach to informal settlements as a difficult but necessary response to deregulated domestic mobility in South Africa, and a form of redress of a history of deliberate stratification of land and funds – an idea of transition to formal property ownership that was taken up by ‘black’ South Africans who turned to squatting in an attempt to lay an informal property claim as this new possibility for social justice began to emerge. In Brazzaville, demarcation of stands and roads was carried out with the explicit idea that the camp would most likely be formalized, and a rational layout would mean minimal obstacles to formalization. These property claims were later given institutional acknowledgement as shacks were assigned numbers to structure the allocation of formal housing on several occasions. Effectively, informal structures thus became proxies for titled property through their treatment as a vehicle of transition to formality.

We can trace in all this the emergence of a form of spectral property in the squatter camp, and even a form of spectral property market, as squatters began renting shacks in their yards to newcomers and selling their shacks on departure from the settlement. In this sense, spectral property has become an informal basis for some of the rights associated with property ownership, that is, the right to purchase property at rates affordable to the historically dispossessed, the right to dispose of that property as the owner sees fit, and the right to enter into contracts in relation to that property. Although irregular, there is little clarity as to whether these transactions are really legal or illegal. While the land is not the formal property of the squatter, his or her right to reside on the land has been acknowledged by the state.
There is no formal contract with the state that codifies the squatter’s rights and obligations to the land, and hence nothing to prohibit him or her from disposing of it as he or she sees fit, especially since the cost of erecting the shack has been borne by the squatter, or it has been paid for in the case of those who purchased shacks from others. This informal property market signals the development of an informal moral economy of land entitlement in the squatter camp.

**Figure 9: Shack marking in Mshongo**

A shack in Jeffsville marked on three different occasions for the purpose of administering claims for formal housing.

Yet in the absence of titling or any other form of explicit, codified land use rights in the settlement, the security of squatter land use is necessarily unstable. As we saw in Chapter 5, contention has emerged over a well-intentioned municipal initiative to improve the tenure security of squatter tenants, which has by extension required squatter landlords to “forfeit” their perceived property rights. Lack of clearly codified and individually defined property rights has given rise to this contention over the nature of squatter tenure. While the respondent defines each squatter yard as a unit of property belonging to a single party who may build additional dwellings and lease them out for profit, the municipality defines each

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216 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
dwelling as the property of the occupant, regardless of any anterior claim on the stand, and regardless of who built the dwelling in question. Ironically, this underlines the fact that, despite the fact that the land occupation embodied a claim for equal citizenship, the municipality now chooses to view the squatter camp as an apolitical field of charitable intervention, emptying it of its meaning as a vehicle for the realization of citizenship. Whereas the occupation of state-owned land began as an insurgent practice through which the agency of infra-citizens was expressed, its contested ownership has been co-opted in manner that reconstructs squatters as a flat, passive population of humanitarian beneficiaries; a population to whom broad ‘human rights’ apply, rather than citizens’ particular rights.

As much as the municipality’s attempt to remedy inequalities among the squatter populace served to protect tenants, it also corroded the economic citizenship of established squatters, rendering rent-based livelihoods\(^{217}\) unstable. Productive land use – such as the leasing of rooms or running of home-based businesses – is a key route out of poverty (Hendriks, 2011, p. 113), but security of such livelihoods depends on legitimate title or clearly defined rights over land. In this case, perceived rights are arbitrarily stripped away and social contracts between ‘landlords’ and ‘tenants’ in the settlement rendered void. In the meantime, formally owned property in the cities has remained sacrosanct, preserving the position of the historically advantaged and those with the substantial economic means to buy into the ranks of the urban elite.

Another expression of squatters’ perception of long-term tenure security is the fact that some squatters have made the decision to build brick houses or shops on their stands:

> I noticed a house built of brick and commented on the confidence people have to build in this way. [The respondent] did not seem surprised and just said it had been a long time people have been here, 13 years, living in a shack.\(^{218}\)

The fact remains, however, that at any given time, squatters may be legally compelled to move: while their continued land use is legally secure, eviction will be permitted once alternative land is available for the accommodation of the squatters – for their transition to formal housing. As one shopkeeper said of another who had invested in building brick structures in Mshongo:

\(^{217}\) Livelihoods concern the extent to which an individual or household’s means of living – a combination of assets, capabilities or activities –provides “the ability to recover from shocks and stresses and to maintain and enhance capabilities and assets” (Hendriks, 2011, p. 112).

\(^{218}\) Key informant, Brazzaville, 06/08/2012
As long as you know it’s not permanent. Ja, you can do it. Like that man you see, he built lot of houses there, but he know if Mshongo is going tomorrow, he’s going to lose. Ja, this man is building, he comes, he builds with bricks, he loses a lot of money to build, but tomorrow they can bring a letter saying this place is finished, you must now vamoose.... don’t cry, because you know it’s a squatter camp here. It’s not the right place you can do anything expensive. Do light things, and then when they break them, you can’t cry.219

At this point, any investment in more secure housing will be lost, either because the spectral property market will disappear when the community is relocated, or because the cost of a brick house built without a title will not be able to be recuperated on the spectral property market, or indeed because the municipality might choose at any time to demolish permanent structures built in the settlement, as there is no certainty about whether such an act is legal. If squatters are relocated to formal housing, there is no legal basis for compensation to those who made the significant investment in dwellings of brick and mortar. Thus, improving de facto security through the building of more robust houses only opens squatters up to a series of new de facto risks.

Figure 10: Tenure insecure brick dwellings in Mshongo

De Soto has explored in detail the economic implications of informal property holding, and although he has been critiqued for his “morally individualistic understanding of property rights” (Sanghera & Satybaldeeva, 2012, p. 97), the fact remains that elites and other formal property owners benefit from exactly such an individualistic understanding of property rights.
under liberal democratic citizenship, and squatters’ lack of capacity to claim the same rights is an important signal of the stratification of citizenship. Since the mid-19th century, minimal definitions of civil rights have included “the liberal economic rights to own property, make contracts and to work” (Woodiwick, 2002, p. 53). But the protection of property rights in the modern state depends on full incorporation into the rational ordering systems of the state, and squatters remain teetering unstably on the limit of legitimate land use, without access to the formal bureaucratic recognition that would empower them to dispose in legitimate ways of the property they occupy. In the threshold space, property and tenure rights and contracts are precarious, uncodified, and subject to change without notice, placing squatters at the mercy of the very contractual uncertainties citizenship of a state should protect against.

Therefore, despite the squatter camp having emerged in the city as the cure for ‘black’ citizens excluded condition, lack of secure tenure – indeed, lack of any certainty at all about the nature of their tenure – means the ‘poison’ of exclusion remains latent in the settlement.

6.2.2. Security of person on the threshold of the law

We have already seen how the material form of the squatter camp placed it out of reach of the state’s security infrastructure, and how informal systems to ensure the security of residents emerged in the absence of the state’s coercive forces. We have seen, too, how these security initiatives functioned both to help and to harm. Post-democracy, a volatile interface between formal and informal machineries of law enforcement continues to produce shortfalls in the policing of the settlement, undermining the rights of both victims and perpetrators to security of person. This is an interesting prism through which to explore the difficulty of ‘grafting’ together formal and informal orders.

Ramohlale was eventually tried and incarcerated for his leadership role in producing Jeffsville as “an island” impenetrable to police, and for “taking the laws into his hands.”220 This made it easier for police to make inroads into the settlements, as other squatter leaders could be threatened with Ramohlale’s fate. After the founding of Phomolong, Matenji received such a warning and began cooperating with the police.221 Co-operation was not necessarily effective however, and community members lamented the ease with which criminals returned to the settlement after being taken into custody. Recourse to established repertoires of popular

220 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12/07/2012
221 Police officer, Atteridgeville, 07072012
policing was one solution. In Jeffsville, a traditional healer named Phineas Mdlalose defected from the Jeffsville Office to form a new office during Ramohlale’s imprisonment. ‘Mdlalose’s office’ was particularly strong in managing the informal security infrastructure of patrols and the disciplinary committee, and crime was low under his system of popular policing and disciplinary action – although some respondents pointed out that unlike Ramohlale or the formal police station, Mdlalose’s office charged for their services and would not assist those who were unable to pay.222 This placed the informal security regime beyond the means of some. Having seen ‘gangsters’ kill people and nevertheless manage to return from police custody, a young man I interviewed was strongly in favour of this informal security system:

...the police sometimes, like they don’t act on some situations that we have. Like a guy comes and breaks in the house, [...] So, when Mdlalose was in charge they would, like, beat the guy and then obviously if you get beaten up, you wouldn’t do that thing again. Unless maybe, like, your head is not okay or something, ja. [...] I mean, the police guys... obviously the guy had money, and if he was arrested he could easily bribe the people, you know. If it’s the community, you can’t bribe the community, cos we know what’s best for us, right. Ja, ja, that’s the right way.223

Mdlalose’s office administered justice by combining the institution of the disciplinary committee with that of the mob. There was a logic to the form of punishment administered by the leaders, with the punishment tailored to the crime – although the machinery of informal justice was a far cry from that of the state:

...if you stole something, you don’t get killed. They would hit you with a sjambok on your bum; I don’t know, they count the shots [lashes] by the Mdlalose guys. But if you kill, they will actually kill you, but by the whole community. They will tell the community that this person has done this-this [a specified crime], so you have to do this [a specified punishment].224

Collective killing appears to have been a deliberately mystifying institution deployed to perform an execution as a communal act which, by spreading responsibility across scores of people, evaded the individualizing machinery of the state justice system.225 As long as an assault was carried out collectively, participants were secure in the knowledge that responsibility would be impossible to determine. Of course, we might also conclude that the only guarantee against identification as an assailant would be the death of the suspect, who would then be unable to testify.
Despite the greater police access to the settlement after Ramohlale’s departure, it was only if you were “very lucky” that the police could save you from the retribution of popular justice. This depended, the respondent said, “on the number of vans they would come with”:

If they only come with one van, there is no way they will get involved because they cannot go through, there is just too many people there. And you [the police officer] know you want to save that person, but you can’t run over the people that are trying to kill that person.\(^\text{226}\)

Paradoxically, a veteran police officer at the Atteridgeville Police Station called Mdhlalose “a very nice man” who was willing to help the police trace and even apprehend criminals. This is where another ambiguity emerges, as given its limited penetration of the squatter space the police service comes to tolerate structures of popular justice and use them where possible as an instrument of state justice. This kind of cooperation with informal institutions gives rise to a degree of tolerance of some of the other extralegal practices that these offices institutionalized, and in some senses strengthens and stabilizes the informal institutions despite their exceptional characteristics.

Similar informal policing structures existed in Phomolong and its antecedent settlements. One-time leader of Brazzaville, Cuthbert Makgalo – who had previously been a member of the police force – explained the informal institutionalization of justice under his leadership in language that illustrates its parallel function to the security infrastructure of the state. He saw his job as ‘to control the people, give the people order and secure the people.’\(^\text{227}\) When asked how he went about giving order and security, Cuthbert explained:

... he would call a meeting, people would come and hear the problem, and then they would ask the person why he did it and tell him never to do it again, or face a lashing. Cuthbert referred to this as giving ‘notice’. The case would then be written down, and you would have to sign it. He reiterated: ‘the first time, I give you notice; second time, I give you warning; third time, siyashaya [we will hit you].’\(^\text{228}\)

Around the turn of the millennium, an informal policing office known as Phepheng (‘scorpion’) was initiated in Brazzaville by a resident member of the South African Defence Force, Vincent Mothadi.\(^\text{229}\) This seems to have spelled a move away from popular beatings and toward arrest and detention by Phepheng, followed by collection and processing by the formal police. According to the police, Phepheng was of great assistance in their work, patrolling at night, arresting and cuffing suspects, and calling the police to the scene without assaulting the

\(^{226}\text{Focus group participant, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012}\)
\(^{227}\text{Brazzaville, 09/07/2012}\)
\(^{228}\text{Brazzaville, 09/07/2012}\)
\(^{229}\text{Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012}\)
perpetrator. Respondents in Brazzaville agreed that Phepheng helped put an end to high levels of crime in Brazzaville. Cooperation between Phepheng and the police was particularly strong from around 2003, during the incumbency of certain Station Commissioners at Atteridgeville Police Station – Station Commissioners Muthla and Naidoo were both mentioned as close to Phepheng, even providing them with bicycles and providing training and handcuffs to assist in the arrest process.\textsuperscript{230} At high points in formal-informal co-operation, police would arrive in Brazzaville within three minutes of receiving a call about an impending arrest, whereas in earlier days the police would not enter the settlement at all.\textsuperscript{231}

\textbf{Figure 11: Phepheng office and record book}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Phepheng_office_and_record_book.png}
\caption{Phepheng’s office in Brazzaville (top; bottom left); Phepheng’s record book (bottom centre); anti-xenophobia awareness poster in Phepheng’s office window (bottom right).}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{230} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
\textsuperscript{231} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
However, because of its ambiguity as an alliance of formal and informal forces, this productive interface was very vulnerable to the cycles of institutional time – specifically, to regular changes in high-level command. A subsequent station commissioner arrived, who opposed Phepheng’s use of handcuffs, and several Phepheng members were arrested as vigilantes when they continued to do so\textsuperscript{232} – especially as they had arrested certain police officers for soliciting bribes from foreign traders, and the same officers had accused them of assault and theft.

Without consistent support from the formal police, Phepheng struggled to find resources to support its work, as residents became “tired” of being asked for donations to support patrollers, for instance to maintain the patrol bicycles after the loss of formal police support.\textsuperscript{233} Thinking back on a suspect he had helped arrest, who received three back-to-back life sentences, a respondent who wished to remain anonymous showed me Phepheng’s record books, but couldn’t find the case number to show me. He reflected sadly “I forgot that case number, because our books, ... our books are not alright anymore.”\textsuperscript{234} This struck me as a metaphor for the simultaneous gravity and weightlessness of his years of informal labour for security in the community, which despite its powerful potential to support the formal justice system could so easily disappear without a trace from records as well as from the institutional memory of police.

Lacking resources and support from the formal police, Phepheng’s decline and the corresponding rise in deaths by popular justice in Brazzaville can be linked to the unassimilable quality of the threshold space. There is a story here about the failure of trust at the formal/informal interface, and its effect on the morale of informal patrollers. In the attempt of the formal justice system to discipline and domesticate the informal system, it created an untenable situation for informal patrollers working in the ambiguous and uncertain world of the threshold space. Denied any formal powers, forbidden to carry handcuffs, and held liable for any harm done to suspects, Phepheng volunteers “become tired along the way.”\textsuperscript{235}

Due to its location on the threshold of the law, the uneasy paradox of Phepheng’s alliance with police could not be resolved by no doubt well-intentioned attempts to render its practices more regular and rule-governed. According to the respondent from Phepheng, the more the formal police tried to domesticate Phepheng’s ‘vigilante’ characteristics and subsume it into a modern normative order of rights and regulations, the less they were able to provide an effective response to crime:

\textsuperscript{232} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
\textsuperscript{233} Male resident in walk with key informant, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
\textsuperscript{234} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
\textsuperscript{235} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
At that time we were [very] strong, but now we are not strong anymore. Because of this constitution of South Africa. Because they say any people have got rights – that’s the problem.236

As a result, he said, community members prefer to take matters into their own hands rather than call the CPF or Phepheng, whose obligation to uphold the law will only limit their ability to punish the wrongdoer.237 The result is a polarization of formal and popular approaches to justice, in which the police become once again unable to extend the reach of state justice into the squatter camp. As attested earlier by a young respondent from Jeffsville, police are often unable to enter into a situation where mob justice is unfolding. Consider this vignette from my walk with a male respondent in Brazzaville, where our conversation was helpfully joined by another resident in the vicinity who described the fate of a man who was witnessed breaking into a house and stealing a phone, and was chased and attacked by residents:

John (not his real name) jumped in to explain that what happened was that a police vehicle came, but because the community was very angry, they chased away the police vehicle. I asked how [it was possible for people on foot to chase away the police], and both seemed amused by the question. The man who had told the story chuckled and said, ‘There’s too many of them’, at the same time as John reiterated twice, ‘The community can do that’. I asked what they do to make the police go away and they both said (John loudly, and the other softly) very simply, ‘Stones’. They stone the police vehicle and it can call for backup but before the backup comes the vehicle will be attacked by the community.238

The same conversation revealed how the penal logic of the mob operates in a similar way to the original “notice, warning, siyashayo” structure of the early disciplinary approach the Brazzaville Committee took under Cuthbert Makgalo.

Looking beyond the perpetrator to the relationship between the mob and the police, it is fascinating to observe how violence comes to be employed against the police. This is a complex interaction of formal and informal legal orders, both of which can be seen to use “violence against violence in order to control violence” (Esposito, 2011, p. 29). It appears that violence against police serves both to preserve the coercive force of informal justice, and to protest the use of force against the collective in order to preserve the individual. The latter resonates with Buur’s analysis of the configuration of national personhood in South African settlements as a fluctuating marker, “constructed in terms of relations rather than substance” (Buur, 2007, p. 129), and “subordinated to the values that order the community” (Buur, 2007, p. 141).

236 Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
237 Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
238 Key informant and male resident, Brazzaville, 06/08/2012
The violence of the mob is qualitatively distinct from that of the police, and in the case in question seemed to display a disproportionate cruelty. Describing what happened next, the speakers were palpably uncomfortable relaying the horrific qualities of the punitive process:

John then explained that in the case he had mentioned, the man in the vehicle had said that he would come back and kill them one by one, which made the community angry and they started burning his genitals with a plastic. I asked again how you can ‘burn with a plastic.’ Neither of them wanted to answer, John said ‘Aish’ and the other guy chuckled uncomfortably. John [the main respondent] said they make a fire with a tyre and melt plastic and when the plastic comes they take it to his genitals. I asked what happened to him in the end. Simultaneously, they said he died. When I probed, it was not from the burn but from the beating he also received. 239

Despite this discomfort, there remained a sense in their explanation that mob justice is both logical and mundane. When I asked the reason for such a ferocious response to the petty theft of a mobile phone, neither hesitated to answer. In fact, despite the fact that the two men had only encountered one another minutes earlier in the street, their responses were identical and simultaneous:

John said, ‘You see, they can caught you to jail [for a first crime]. Next time [a crime occurs], it’s you.’ ‘It’s you again,’ said the other guy, immediately [affirming the same]. ‘The police always take you to the police station, but you come back,’ said John. He said this was why the community changes [its approach to a minor offence]. The other guy affirmed this, saying it’s always the same faces. He laughed again, and John reiterated what he had said, that you will be arrested; the next week you will be back hitting [stealing from] people another time, the police take you again, and after four times, people will say it’s a problem and they have to take the law into their own hands. That is why they attack them, he said. 240

Having eroded Phépheng in the attempt to subject it to the rigours of formal regulation, police have replaced an ambiguous but functional shadow policing system with uncontrollable lynch mobs. An elderly respondent in Brazzaville observed that since the demise of Phépheng, popular justice has become even more ferocious:

Since there are no patrols, they will do anything in their power. If maybe they catch a thief, they will kill that person, and even if they call the police, the police will tell them that after you are done with the person, whether he is dead or alive, you’ll call us. 241

Ironically, police officers come to tolerate popular justice as an inevitable and even mundane phenomenon. This struck me in an interview with a police detective at Atteridgeville Police Station. When I asked if he had seen incidents where community members attacked someone accused of a crime, he told me the community had killed a man “this morning” because he

239 Key informant and male resident, Brazzaville, 06/08/2012
240 Key informant and male resident, Brazzaville, 06/08/2012
241 Female resident, Brazzaville, 01/08/2012
“tried to rape a lady” on her way to work. Despite the disjuncture between formal and popular policing, a strange entanglement was embodied once again both in the veteran detective’s acceptance of a *prima facie* account of justice being served – the community killed a rapist; case closed – and the remarkable indifference with which he presented the facts. On the one hand, this may simply indicate the extent to which violence saturates the social field, such that it is no longer remarkable. On the other, reading it with the quotation above, in which the police respond only after the community is ‘done’ with a suspect, it suggests that the fate of suspects in the threshold space of the squatter camp has been surrendered to informal forces, who are tolerated in substituting for an absent state in whatever way they deem fit. This affirms Sen & Pratten’s observation that “justice at the margins of the state is not simply a matter of ‘folk’ notions of law and justice versus state sanctioned ideas of justice. Though they are locked in unequal relations, they are enmeshed in one another” (Sen & Pratten, 2007, p. 15).

**Figure 12: Mob justice in Mshongo**

*Body of a man stoned and burned for alleged housebreaking in Phomolong, Mshongo. (source: Tshwane Sun Atteridgeville, mid-March 2008, p.3).*
Gaffikin & Perry have emphasized the importance of “‘anchor’ institutions in shaping social space, in an era marked by greater fluidity, mobility and impermanence” (Gaffikin & Perry, 2012, p. 702), and insisted on the importance of “unravelling the association between the formal and informal; between the consensual and contested; and between foundational and less rooted institutions, and most importantly by appreciation of the engagement among these three dimensions of informality, governability, and human settlement” (Gaffikin & Perry, 2012, pp. 702-703). We can see in the tenuous quality of alliances between the formal police and the informal Phepheng an instance of what they observe as “an underdeveloped capacity for anchor institutions in the urban arena to connect with informal agencies and processes to the mutual benefit of both” (Gaffikin & Perry, 2012, p. 720). Here, we find that this lack of connectivity, which holds squatter citizens in an incomplete relationship with the institutions and protections of state law – is in many ways an effect of the ambiguity of threshold space.

6.3. Formal political rights on the threshold

Political rights include the right to vote, stand for office and form a party, union or social movement, as well as the rights to access information and to assemble and protest (Janoski & Gran, 2002: 15). In this respect, the year 1994 was a milestone in political rights for Jeffsville and Phomolong as, along with the rest of South Africa, residents hailed the advent of democracy and voted in the elections that brought the African National Congress (ANC) to power. The democratic Constitution broadened the rights of citizens and paved the way for fresh and optimistic policies to address the social products of the country’s racial history – such as landlessness, homelessness, rural underdevelopment and unemployment. From a position of legal positivism, this was the moment that marked the transition of squatters to full political citizenship – no longer ‘second-class’ nationals, but fully represented and equally influential members of the South African polity through the power of the ballot.

However, in the lived reality of the transition to democracy, and in the entanglement of formal and informal politics in subsequent years, democracy subsumed squatters into its modern and progressive forms of governance to only a limited degree, leaving them once again suspended in an ambiguous political location both inside and outside the view and reach of the modern state. In the discussion in this section, I consider various ways in which Mshongo’s squatters have continued to experience a deficit of political representation after democracy, again largely due to their position on the threshold of legal and illegal; formal and informal. Due to
conflict and disjuncture between the squatter constituency and its informal representatives, on the one hand, and formal political structures on the other, the voices of squatter citizens have commonly been silenced or ignored.

6.3.1. Formal/informal disjuncture

Where the informal settlement and its informal, bottom-up institutions were once a deliberate strategy to advance the cause of ‘black’ political representation in South Africa, that same informality and its threatening insurgency has come in the democratic era to work against the voices of squatters in formal politics. As Atteridgeville is a stronghold of ANC support, a number of its activist residents – previously closely acquainted with the ‘comrades’ in Jeffsville – were ushered into positions of power within the ANC governing structure after the transition to democracy. Competition for support in the 1994 elections is a theme that quietly simmers in some respondents’ descriptions of the local township politics that attended Ramohlale’s arrest and prosecution for his actions as Jeffsville’s figurehead. Indeed, the figure of Jeff Ramohlale embodies the fallout of the uneasy transition of the ANC from an underground existence informally institutionalized in the ‘organs of people’s power’ in the townships, to a formal and high profile existence at the head of a modern state. Although Ramohlale was so instrumental both in the township’s ANC underground and in creating Jeffsville as an impenetrable space that served returning ANC exiles, with the party’s ascent to power Ramohlale’s reputation for informal and extra-legal activity became a liability. As a one-time member of his office described it, “Jeff feels the pain from the ANC because they used him during the apartheid era to target so-called impimpis [traitors], but then they banned him from the ANC.”

Like a watchdog, “they used him and then ‘he barked, he barked, he barked... they chased him away.” After his conviction, the ANC withdrew Ramohlale and his associates’ party membership and has refused to reissue them with membership cards ever since. This is particularly ironic given that in contemporary times, numerous ANC politicians have been given positions in parliament even after conviction for crimes perpetrated under the new regime.

Just as the transition to democracy saw the offices of the municipality repopulated by people who had once been comrades-at-arms with the squatter leaders, the transition saw the latter...

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242 Key informant, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
243 Key informant, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
244 Examples can be found in the Democratic Alliance’s ‘Crooked Comrades Monitor’ at http://www.da.org.za/campaigns.htm?action=view-page&category=7364&sub-page=7366
pushed outside the borders of the party they had served. Yet for good or bad, these leaders remained key representatives of the squatter constituency. Respondents spoke highly of Ramohlale and the sacrifices he made for ‘us’. The respect he commands was visible when I walked with him in the settlement; squatters greeted him in a variety of languages to which he responded in kind, and everyone referred to him as ‘Bra Jeff’ (brother Jeff). In interviews, several respondents expressed great gratitude towards Ramohlale for his sacrifices in fighting for the squatters, and even leaders with reasons for antagonism towards him express regret at his relegation by the ANC. While there appeared to be more to Ramohlale than I saw or respondents were willing to say – signalled only by comments made in passing and in a few non-verbal cues, inconsistencies and silences – it was also clear that his commitment to the Jeffsville squatters is sincere and has taken a toll on his personal and emotional life. But because of his exclusion from formal politics, he cannot stand as a local candidate for his party of choice, despite his recognition as a legitimate representative and his ongoing advocacy for the area. As a result of his excommunication from the ruling party, Ramohlale tends to oppose government initiatives. This polarization introduces a faultline among the informal leaders of Mshongo.

Being ineligible for party membership, Ramohlale cannot be nominated as a candidate for election as an ANC ward councillor. Yet this is the only route into local politics as the area is staunchly supportive of the ANC. Consequently, some Jeffsville residents complain that their recent councillors have been deployees brought from other provinces, who they claim have no understanding of life in the settlement and are unresponsive to its struggles. Others object when social stratification rather than origin divides a councillor from his/her squatter constituents:

I remember Linda [referring to the previous councillor of a ward comprising Jeffsville and Matlejoane]. Linda, when she started working for ANC, she moved to these other houses, like these houses at Kalafong, you know, like they’re obviously of a different class. [...] The people are very unhappy because if we don’t have power and she’s living a very leveraged life then it’s very unfair, I mean she’s from the same place where we are not having power, so she should be experiencing the same problems, in order that if she is experiencing the same problems she would actually be doing something about it. But now she is in a very different place; she’s living a very good life. These kind of things [extended electricity cuts], they don’t happen [there]; she’s not concerned. That’s where the people started getting angry and saying, “You know what, let’s just do this. It’s very unfair, you’re living a very precious life and then… ja. I mean, electricity is a

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245 Ninety percent or more of voters at every voting station in Mshongo voted for the ANC in the 2004 and 2009 elections, dropping to a more moderate majority of 60% and above in the 2014 elections (Independent Electoral Commission, c. 2014).
246 Focus group participant, Jeffsville, 20/10/2008; Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 20/07/2012
basic need, everyone needs to have that, so if you don’t have that, that’s why these other people decided that, you know what, we’re going to fight, and that’s when her house burned.247

**Figure 13: Informal Jeffsville as compared to formal, middle-class Kalafong Heights**

A leader’s shack in Jeffsville (left) as compared to the middle-class formal development of Kalafong Heights in the east of Atteridgeville (right), where a councillor for the area was living.

This description of violent collective action, following from a councillor’s socio-economic advantage, recalls the notion of “living politics,” in which collective political subjectivation emerges out of proximity to everyday hardships (Selmeczi, 2012), and the immediacy of ever-present suffering motivates political action. A councillor who refuses to share in this suffering essentially refuses to share in the political subjectivity of the settlement. It is this betrayal of the political community that appears to give rise to violent insurgent practices.

In Brazzaville, which falls under a different ward councillor, the squatter leaders clash with the councillor, accusing him of being “far away from the community of Brazzaville”, and making decisions in his office without consulting them.248 In this respect, squatters are subjected to a reproduced invisibility and feel that formal modes of political representation exclude them. On more than one occasion, aggrieved Jeffsville residents have burnt down a councillor’s home, and this only widens the disconnect between informal constituents and the councillors who embody their voice in the political hierarchy. Many tensions between offices in Jeffsville occur here, once again at the threshold between formal and informal institutions. Where one office attempts to co-operate with ANC officials as the only way of getting anything done, the other

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247 Male resident, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012
248 Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012; key informant, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
decries any such cooperation. The resultant work at cross-purposes stymies progress in fighting for the squatters’ cause.

6.3.2. Fragile alliances and shape-shifting institutions

The interface between formal and informal has also given rise to difficulties mobilizing squatters as a single community. In the mid-nineties, the various contending offices in the settlement – including Ramohlale, Mdalose and Matenji’s offices, which we have already encountered, formed a ‘Committee of 12’ in an attempt to work together to secure formal housing for the squatters. But the unstable interface between formal and informal has plagued a unified struggle ever since. Although the Committee of 12 helped secure the development of formal houses at Lotus Gardens and Atteridgeville Extension 7, this represented only a small inroad into the existing housing need, and yet key Committee of 12 members, including its Chairperson Noel Ndlovu, were drawn out of the political life of the settlements by co-optation into leadership of these development projects. Another problem was that many government departments refused to work with the committee, stigmatizing it as a ‘vigilant group’ with an uncertain provenance, rather than a ‘registered organization’:

...they were just trying to say, this Ndlovu (chairperson of the Committee of 12) is not an ANC member; he is the AZAPO member, and he is leading the people who was the ANC, and now he comes here with them and says he is the Committee of Twelve. So what is the Committee of Twelve, because […] we know that he is the AZAPO leader. Now today he joined our members, and changed the name and says he is the Committee of Twelve, he came with them to us, no we don’t want to talk to them.

This anxiety about the nature and identity of informal institutions – an uncertainty about their shapeshifting potential, which could at any moment conjure up new and altered forms of themselves, perhaps a ‘Committee of 13’ with new demands, expresses the magical and unstable quality of the “moving slum” – places that “form the constitutive outside, or the very limits, of postcolonial urban governmentality” (Kalyan, 2014, p. 55). In order to present a legitimizing institutional identity, the settlement leaders re-established their alliance as the Atteridgeville West Informal Settlement Forum (AWISF) “under the banner of South African National Civic Organization [SANCO]” with Noel Ndlovu as the chairperson, Matenji as the

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249 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012; female resident, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012; male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012
250 Female resident, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012; male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012
251 Male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012; key informant, Vergenoeg, 02/08/2012
252 Male resident, Brazzaville, 09/07/2012
253 Male resident, Brazzaville, 09/07/2012
organizing secretary, Ramohlale as the deputy chairperson, and Mdlalose as treasurer. This became a kind of 'container' organization providing a legitimizing stability to what was a diverse and constantly transforming set of alliances. Within AWISF, a schism re-emerged between Jeff's office and the other offices, which established a separate Community Forum under Mdlalose, while continuing to participate in AWISF alongside representatives of Jeff's office and a set of ward councillors.

The ability of the various squatter leaders to pursue the interests of their squatter constituents independently of the exclusionary system of political representation has been rendered fragile by their threshold character. Just as Phepheng was unable to stabilize its relationship with the formal police, squatter leaders have struggled to gain and maintain recognition by and alliances with the formal authorities that squatters make claims on. Matenji still recalls the betrayal of Brazzaville by councillors who had previously been their allies, who supported the municipality in its attempts to evict new squatters at this edge of the settlement in 1998:

...these two councillors, they were my friends. They know I started squatter camp, but they just turn around and fight me. It was Dubaza and Phatedi, they were my friends. Instead of helping me, they start fighting me. [...] They wanted the things [shacks] must move from there. But those people vote them to be councillors. That was a stupid thing now. That's why the second time they didn't vote for them.255

Court documents from the ‘fight’ Matenji refers to, in which the Pretoria City Council sought an interdict against their ‘unlawful occupation’ of the land (Maluleke, 1998), include supporting affidavits by these councillors and the township manager, which cast doubt on the bona fides of the local leaders. Once again, we see suspicion of the informal nature of local leaders and doubts about their legitimacy, which reveal the uneasy interface between formal and informal orders.

6.3.3. The silencing of protest

The South African constitution upholds the political right to protest. But this right is codified and embodied through a typically modern bureaucratic process that requires protesters to behave in a measurable, rational and predictable way. Under the Regulation of Gatherings Act which defines the line between legal and illegal gatherings, protesters have a right to assemble. However, it places responsibility on the organizers of protest marches to ensure

254 Male resident, Brazzaville, 09/07/2012.
255 Female resident, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
that the protesters and their actions are subject to orderly limits and do not transgress laws or hinder the smooth running of the modern city in the process. The convenor of a march must submit a notification giving their own details, the time, date and place of the gathering, the number of people likely to attend, the number of marshals to be deployed, and the route and form of transport to be used if the protest will move from one place to another (Freedom of Expression Institute, 2007). The demands the process makes on the resources and capacity of organizers and protesters illustrates, in other words, that the right to protest is subject to the demand that those involved perform as a rational and integrated institution, in conformity with the formal rationality of the modern state’s institutions. This, of course, enables the state to make its ordering preparations: predict possible problems, make contingency plans, redirect traffic, and deploy police to uphold public order.

However, squatter leaders do not know how many people will attend a gathering, and can provide woefully inaccurate estimations. They do not have the institutional resources to provide large numbers of trained, reliable marshals. Finally, given the size of the settlement – 68,584 people at the last census (Adrian Frith, c.2013) – their constituency is far from knowable and predictable, and they lack the robust institutional capacity for monitoring large numbers of participants. In other words, they cannot hope to guarantee the kind of regulated and rational gathering the state defines as legal. This reality has progressively paralysed protest mobilization in Mshongo, as march organizers have, one by one, been disqualified from further applications as they are held responsible for the unruly behaviour of participants. The fact that there had been no recent marches when I conducted my fieldwork in 2012 seemed to be in part because several of the settlement leaders had been disqualified in this way. On several occasions, protest convenors have been blamed for attacks on foreigners that occurred during protests – even when they were absent from the settlement at the time:

We have marched from Brazzaville, we take bus to Luthuli house [in Johannesburg, c. 100km away]. When we are at Luthuli, xenophobia [meaning attacks on foreigners] it was here. And all the buses in Luthuli, and the taxis. But the xenophobia start this side. So the ANC, the ANC itself, they blame us. 256

Ironically, some of the most volatile illegal protests have occurred after last-minute interventions by the municipality to apply obstructive regulatory limits to protests (for instance, by diverting buses carrying protestors to weighbridges to check their capacity; or intervening to prevent the railway from providing transport to large numbers of protesters). 257

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256 Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
257 Male resident, Brazzaville, 28/06/2012
At the same time, squatter leaders complain that protests garner no response. A previous member of Mdlalose’s office in Jeffsville captured this sense of powerlessness and fatigue—the futility of legal marches and the risk attached to unapproved, ‘illegal’ ones:

Respondent: What is the government doing with such things? If you come up with marches, you say, you arrange a march, you hand out the memorandum to these people, they won’t respond. They’ll always tell you seven days; they won’t come to the people. They won’t respond. We’ve been doing that and we’re sick and tired of illegal demonstrations because of it ends up harming another people. People tend to do crime and attacking the foreigners, looting from their shops, and etcetera, so that’s an unacceptable situation.258

The violence that has accompanied unapproved marches has resulted in informal organizers being ‘blacklisted’ as demonstration convenors. A leader in Jeffsville explained how attacks on foreigners after protest actions had led to their disqualification from convening gatherings in future:

We were blacklisted. In our office, Jeff is blacklisted, we were blacklisted. I don’t know if Concern—Tamlyn: Blacklisted in what way?

Respondent: If we call the march. We used to call the marches. If you apply for a march you must go via the High Court. They evaluate that on the previous march that you called, what happened. If there’s been some looting, infrastructural damage, public transport disturbance, assault and running of the people, the community. Such cases, you are not allowed to call a march. Of course it’s what we experience when you call a march at the squatter camp. Such things happen, you understand. Looting of other people’s property... So we were blacklisted. As if we orchestrate xenophobia. But it is not a matter of orchestrating xenophobia. It was a plea for service delivery. That... things tend to be upside down, you see, when they come back from the march they come with another agenda, which we don’t know who was in leadership. People tend to be helped by criminal elements from the formal settlement. People hear there’s a march there, all those guys who smoke Nyaupé259 come into the squatter camp, they tend to break those stores.260

In Brazzaville, a key informant confirmed the same:

The march is the problem in this area. If you can arrange the march for service delivery, but in their mind they go to march, after that they do xenophobia at the back. If today you march from here to Pretoria, if you march to Pretoria they will come back and they start that attack, xenophobia. After that... the person who arranged the march, they’re going to blame you. [...] We don’t arrange a march anymore because we don’t know what’s going to start.261

The upshot is that despite the right to demonstrate and protest, squatters in Mshongo are largely unable to do so legally since their historical leaders have been stripped of their

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258 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
259 Nyaupé is an addictive drug made from a combination of heroin and cannabis.
260 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
261 Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
mobilizing power. Once again, this erosion of the right to protest has its roots in the position of the squatter camp on the threshold of law and formal modernity.

6.4. On the threshold of the state’s care

The final area of ambiguity that I would like to consider concerns the positioning of the squatter camp on the threshold of the state’s care of life – that is, its incomplete relation to the infrastructure of biopolitical administration. This administrative infrastructure, which embodies the function of power to “ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put [life] in order” (Foucault, 1990, p. 138), consists of “techniques, technologies, experts and apparatuses for the care and administration of the life of each and all, from town planning to health services” (Rose, 2001: 1). Considering the various ways the apartheid state attempted to curtail rather than sustain and multiply ‘black’ populations, democratic citizenship offered not only the hope of equal access to political life and justice, but also the hope of being encompassed within the embrace of the state’s protective biopolitical care of life.

In the case of Mshongo, I want to focus on the ambiguities created by its tolerance as a residential area outside the reaches of town planning provisions – effectively, this is once again an effect of the settlements’ existence on the threshold of the law. Town planning can be seen as a way in which territory is subjected to the law: spaces are measured, mapped, evaluated, and approved through the process of proclamation. Once deemed safe and eligible to support habitation, they are subject to laws that guarantee the care of life through rules ensuring their penetration by networks for the delivery of electricity, water, and for the more fortunate, telephone and internet services; the removal of waste; and for the safe entry and exit of vehicles that deliver products, services and assistance. The Mshongo squatters live on land that has not been subjected to these protective laws. Never having been subject to the rigours of land use application or official proclamation as a township, shortfalls in road infrastructure, water and sanitation, and power infrastructure were destined to continually inscribe precarity on the bodies of squatters in the Atteridgeville informal settlements, even after their de jure citizenship was clearly articulated by the 1994 elections.

Human settlement at Mshongo was not subject to approved environmental or geological conditions. Much of the area may never be proclaimed, simply because it is hazardous to human life. Rich in dolomite, it is prone to sinkholes and geologically unsuitable for human settlement (Netplan, 1997). The settlement is also environmentally perilous – previously a
defence force training site, it has not yet been fully cleared of buried explosives. Other considerations in living on unproclaimed land are that, unlike proclaimed townships, it has not been subject to a formal process of erf delineation and title issuing; nor has it been subject to the normal preconditions of requisite services on each erf and connection to the existing service system. Roads, water supply and egress outlets, sewage and waste disposal, and electrical supply are preconditions in proclaimed townships, but in Mshongo only a limited array of these have been achieved, largely through self-help methods. Those services provided by the municipality have been hard won and often required significant physical and/or political labour. Presumably in part because of its geological instability, the City of Tshwane has resisted placing service infrastructure in Mshongo – investing its resources instead in settlements with a prospect of permanence. Thus, tolerance of a settlement on shifting ground has meant a simultaneously inclusion and exclusion of squatters from the modern city: they have been allowed to live in close proximity to the city, but largely denied the basic service infrastructure to “sustain” and “order” that life (Foucault, 1990, p. 138).

This has given impetus to self-service solutions. While these can be viewed as a positive representation of agency and resilience, they can also be seen as a marker of stratified citizenship: Whereas basic services are provided by default in formal areas of the city, the squatters have had to make major investments of funds and labour to acquire them – investments with no guaranteed return given the uncertain future of the settlement, both politically and physically. In addition, ad-hoc, self-help service infrastructure – designed by squatters for a temporary transition, and tolerated by authorities for the same reason – is poorly suited to withstand and respond to the longevity and population growth of the settlement. Jeffsville, an area of 700m², has persisted for 24 years, and between 2001 and 2011 alone swelled from 14,745 to 19,042 residents. This is a population density of 27,202/km², as compared to 6,547/km² in formal Atteridgeville. There are numerous ways in which informal planning inscribes precarity on the lives of squatter citizens, of which I will briefly discuss just a few.

262 Of course, regardless of geology, the struggle of local authorities with the cost/benefit calculations in respect of servicing transient settlements has been evident since the earlier 20th Century, when squatting under the guise of labour tenancy on peri-urban farms became a major dilemma for city engineers and urban planners in an era of great resistance to the tolerance of a ‘native’ presence in ‘white’ cities (P. J. Strauss: Acting District Commandant, 1941, 24 July; Secretary for Native Affairs, 1945, 16 February).

263 Calculated from population data analysed by (Adrian Frith, c. 2013; Adrian Frith, c. 2003, c. 2013).
First, the settlements have no proper sanitation infrastructure. Water points were installed by collective labour, and in the absence of sewage infrastructure, squatters dig their own pit toilets. Water is provided free of charge to the squatters – a way in which the state’s care of life has been partially extended to an area whose ambiguous status precluded the provision of full sanitation infrastructure. Part of squatter agency in counteracting infra-citizenship was the labour they had to invest to meet their own sanitation needs at a deliberate distance from the state. Yet in thus counteracting their exclusion, they also created a vector for precarious life. Over the course of 24 years in Jeffsville, with a growing population, the proliferation of pit toilets and the degradation of the self-help water infrastructure subjects squatters to life-threatening risks that are simply not faced in other residential areas. One respondent had been caught in a pit toilet that collapsed in the unstable soil of Jeffsville,²⁶⁴ giving credence to the fears of a mudslide expressed by another:

*The place is dolomatic [sic]. It can easily have a mudslide, many people can die if the landslide happened, many people are going to die. [...] That place is decaying. It can easily have a landslide because of there’s water running there on a daily basis, lots and lots of pit toilets, you understand. These people, they dig toilet, they do away with it, you understand. Build a shack on top of that... [trails off]*²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Female resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
²⁶⁵ Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012

Some parts of Mshongo have benefited from the installation of electricity infrastructure. Yet the fact that this infrastructure was installed as a temporary solution to a temporary problem...
has led it to produce the same forms of precarity it was intended to cure. As the population has grown beyond the capacity of the electricity infrastructure, squatters have improvised a solution by pirating household electricity. This in turn causes overloading of the limited power supply, which causes power failures sometimes several weeks in length.\textsuperscript{266} This was demonstrated as I walked with a respondent through an area on the western edge of Jeffsville, where music was playing at a high volume, making it difficult to converse:

As we were speaking, there was an enormous ‘POP’ and silence descended. A transformer had blown. The respondent whistled and repeated ‘electricity’ several times. He said the electricity was overloaded and complained that the government had said it would overhaul the whole system, which was installed in 1995 and cannot cater for the current population. They haven’t done that, he said; instead they have installed new transformers with the same capacity.\textsuperscript{267}

This is not merely a source of inconvenience but once again of life-threatening risk through accidents with candles and fires caused by cooking appliances that switch on again when power unexpectedly returns. While walking with Jeff Ramohlale, I encountered the still-smouldering remains of two shacks in a Jeffsville yard after a tenant had gone to sleep with candles burning.\textsuperscript{268} For Ramohlale, this was not simply an apolitical ‘act of God’ but “part and parcel of the struggle”\textsuperscript{269} for inclusion in the city. The implication was that on the unstable threshold between the modern infrastructure of the state and the sheer exposure of an outside, the struggle for freedom and equality has not yet been won. Until the transition to formality is completed, and the care of the state thus extended equally to all, the struggle continues, transmuted into a new set of everyday risks that can be read once again in terms of ‘living politics’ (Chance, 2011), or the politics of mundane suffering.

As the threshold space of the camp persists, receiving more and more claimants, electricity turns from cure to poison once again; from a medium to support life, it transforms into a medium to destroy life. The unstable electricity supply must therefore be understood as more than simply a mechanism through which the conveniences of modern living are unequally distributed among the population of citizens. Intermittent power has far graver consequences, transforming the mundane pursuits of everyday life – such as cooking a cow head\textsuperscript{270} – into potentially lethal acts. Where in other places, functioning electricity infrastructure is a quotidian embodiment of the state’s productive power administering citizen’s lives, in the threshold space it is transformed into a schizophrenic power: now fostering life; now

\textsuperscript{266} Translator during interview with male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012
\textsuperscript{267} Key informant, Jeffsville, 02/08/2012
\textsuperscript{268} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
\textsuperscript{269} Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
\textsuperscript{270} Key informant, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
producing destruction and death. That volatility may be read as analogical to the mutable relation between the state and squatter citizens, who are now embraced, now abandoned by the infrastructure of its care. Hence Ramohlale’s assertion that erratic power is “part and parcel of the struggle,” which echoes Chance’s observation that “Residents of shack settlements... understand fire as neither natural nor criminal, but explicitly political” (Chance, 2011, p. 104).

**Figure 15: Shacks destroyed by fire during a power outage**

![Shacks destroyed by fire during a power outage](image)

*The remains of two shacks destroyed by fire in Jeffsville during a power outage.*

Finally, multiplying the risks of fire and crime associated with life in impermanent living structures, is the way in which Jeffsville in particular was informally planned. We have seen that, in the early days, the density and arrangement of dwellings fostered a hard-to-navigate terrain and tightly surveilled blocks that together served to protect key inhabitants from security forces during the closing years of apartheid. However, the extra-legal form and layout of housing, which served to counteract the insecurity squatters associated with the state prior to democracy, now adds to their insecurity and precarity. The density of dwellings aids the spread of fires, while the informal cadastre of the settlement’s layout – which served deliberately to render its social world invisible to authorities in the initial life of the settlement – now hinders the entry of service vehicles such as fire engines and ambulances. During
apartheid, inaccessibility kept a repressive state at arm’s length; today, it holds the state’s care and protection at bay.

Compounding this difficulty is the lack of formal records or maps of the extent, thoroughfares, dimensions, organization and ownership of land in the settlements: it remains a terra incognito to police and emergency services. This was explicitly evident on the map of the Atteridgeville policing sectors in sector policing office at Atteridgeville Police Station. Out of the six settlements that make up Mshongo, only Phomolong is mapped to show individual yards and streets. The other settlements are represented only by a black outline around white space. It was clear that the sector police I spoke to, who had only been at the station nine months, had no working knowledge of the settlements or even of their most prominent political personalities. Administratively, therefore, because of its liminal legality, the threshold space has no durable existence, and can only access the protection of the state in ad-hoc ways.

**Figure 16: Unmapped Brazzaville**

*Left: Brazzaville seen in the distance from the formally planned area of Atteridgeville Extension 16. Right: the sector policing map details the road and erf layout of Atteridgeville Extension 16 (ATTX16), while the only detail for Brazzaville to the South and Siyahlala to the West is a red sticker showing the taxi rank.*

**6.5. Continuing infra-citizenship in the threshold space**

In light of the various ways in which the ambiguity of the squatter camp precludes the realization of substantive citizenship, prolonged time ‘in transition’ can be seen as a new modality through which a sense of superfluous pervades everyday life through mundane
experiences of precarity, risk and exposure, producing a sense that this temporary condition may in fact be permanent. A sombre theme of many of my discussions with informal leaders was their sense of the futility of the struggle for formal housing, and by extension, formal inclusion. As one recalled of his own quest for a house:

I applied again in 2002, 200 and ... ja. Then I give up. They came now with this JV what-what numbers [a new numbering system], we apply again this year. So we keep on applying, applying, applying, and nothing is happening. Just keep on applying. Nothing happening. 271

The sense of the squatter camp had become a place in which lack is endlessly reproduced, and transition practically impossible, was Matenji’s explanation for his withdrawal from the settlements:

They are too much. They are too much. We can’t get them finished. That is why I run away from that place, because you can’t build. One take his shack to Lotus gardens, the other one went in [to the vacated plot]. You can’t finish there. Many people who want a house. Many people, and if you want a house, you must start staying at the squatter camp. 272

Sadly, more than one other leader expressed to me the wish to do the same – to escape a sinking ship, so to speak. But they lack the necessary resources for escape, as do the majority of squatters: that is, money:

Really. This place has got a lot to tell. Lot of bad stories. I’m off the record that once I have money, I will take my family away from this place. 273

This shared conviction that the transition to formal inclusion will never be completed signals the failure of the queue/bureaucratic systems as a route to citizenship, and a sense that the transition will be permanently suspended. In discussions with residents, this was expressed not explicitly but implicitly in a variety of ways that illustrate the inextricable entanglement between the political and the personal in the threshold space. For instance, discussion of life and death in the squatter camp was one way in which this sense of suspended transition was reflected. The duration of children’s lives marks the long passage of time and the ripples of stratified citizenship through the generations. Some families see their children reach adulthood still mired in the hardships of the squatter camp – the ages of children become a manner of expressing the long duration of suffering in the settlement:

My last born is now 20. People are suffering; no-one wants to stay there. 274

271 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
272 Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 05/07/2012
273 Key informant, Mshongo, 09/07/2012
Others turn down the security of a government stand in their old age, passing the advantages of private property ownership to children, allowing the next generation to enjoy the goods of citizenship denied to their parents during two decades in Mshongo:

I got that stand [from the government]. I put my son there. My firstborn stays there.  

The reference to ‘firstborn’ and ‘lastborn’ children articulates the history of the settlement simultaneously with mundane family histories. These references mark the sheer length of time that respondents have been living in the threshold space, as well as the emptying out of its potential to transform the lives of future generations through the transition of families into the formal city. Reflections on death are also interesting, especially given Geschiere’s emphasis on funerals as a site for the performance of belonging in many parts in Africa. Geschiere insists on the potential political significance of the funeral, due to its status as the “final test of belonging”, for traditionally “a person belongs where he or she will be buried” (Geschiere, 2009, pp. 55-56). Whereas Geschiere focused on the ways in which people claim belonging through performative funerals at the site of belonging/burial in Cameroon, in Mshongo we find a pattern in which, through burials, the squatter camp is produced not as a place of transition but as a terminal place of residence; a permanent home, recalling an earlier citation:

So as you can see now, people don’t have a belief anymore that they’ll still be relocated somewhere else. They take it as their home. It’s where they stay. Some even die there. They even bury each other there.  

Here, death marks the end point of an unfinished struggle for inclusion. A similar sombre reflection of the experience of futile suffering came from Ramohlale, who admitted wanting to retire but not wanting to do so until he had seen the squatters in formal housing. He added that he never had time to make a tombstone for his first wife, who died only six months after his release from prison. Her remains are buried “next to the shacks where we live” – her body, apparently interned in an unmarked grave, appears as a symbol of the loss and sacrifice as yet unredeemed.

It appears, then, that time in the threshold space is experienced as waiting. AbdouMaliq Simone, in his work on changing African cities, has foregrounded waiting as a prominent activity in the African city more generally (Simone, 2004, p. 65; 108). However, I am particularly interested in the ambiguous signification of waiting in the threshold space I have

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274 Female resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
275 Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
276 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
277 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
outlined. On the one hand, waiting may signify hope, anticipation, and faith in the rational structure of the administration of transition. This is a ‘modern’ form of waiting, expressing a faith in order, bureaucracy and the rule of law, and in a teleological structure of progress, advancement and development. This mode of waiting is affirmed as long as current conditions continue to be seen as temporary and transient. On the other hand, prolonged waiting may signify the permanent suspension of transition. This is a ‘threshold’ form of waiting: a form of temporal ambiguity that cannot be resolved and which marks its subject as being somehow outside time, outside the temporality of modern citizenship, in a place where order and disorder, crime and law, bureaucracy and anarchy, permanence and temporariness disappear into an uncertain event horizon. This latter state could be seen as the converse of what Zygmunt Bauman called ‘light modernity’: a condition whose developmental horizon is a state of “weightlessness...the infinite volatility and flexibility of human agency” in which space becomes irrelevant (2012, p. 119). In contemporary ‘light modernity’, mobility and speed are the characteristics of power, and freedom can be measured by the extent of one’s ability to escape constraints (Z. Bauman, 2012). In this scenario, Mshongo’s squatters remain in a state of “enforced immobility, boundedness to the ground” (Z. Bauman, 2012, p. 120). In Chapter 7, it will become evident that, along with this condition of immobility and inertia, the squatter camp remains dependent on mutual political engagement in a global liquid modern “epoch of disengagement” (Z. Bauman, 2012, p. 120).

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has depicted the emptying out of the promise of transition in the contemporary squatter camp, due to the seemingly endless wait for the expected move to formally planned, legally titled, serviced dwellings. Due to Mshongo’s ambiguous relationship with the law, there are multiple ways in which life on this threshold erodes the quality of citizenship among squatters, preventing the realization of material, legal and political rights of citizenship. Today, squatter citizens are mired in a settlement that continually reproduces infra-citizenship. They exist on the outer edge of the biopolitical care of the state, in a tenuous and volatile relationship with the state’s protective mechanism of security and justice, and face unique challenges of democratic participation due to the multiple ambiguities of the threshold space in which they live. Suspended between citizenship and its outside, the squatter camp appears as pharmakon. The very qualities of marginality that made the settlements a remedy for infra-citizenship, now function to perpetuate the same. Far from the places of temporary transition
towards equal citizenship that early squatters envisaged, the squatter camps have become places of permanent temporariness – an oxymoron that resonates with the manifold ambiguities that constrain citizenship in the threshold space. These are not benign ambiguities, but pernicious ambiguities that reproduce a diminished, threshold form of citizenship; an incomplete citizenship, neither fully abandoned, nor fully embraced.

For those whose claims for ‘re-enrolment’ in a “disputed modernity” (Bellier, 2011a, p. 205) rest on relations of anteriority and labours of placemaking and political commitment in the settlement, this can be seen to conjure a new meaning for the metaphor of the ‘son of the soil.’ The immobility we encounter in the threshold space appears as a form of rootedness that contrasts markedly with conventional notions of roots connecting the autochthons to an authentic home territory, drawing up the sustenance necessary for life and reaffirming the subject’s belonging and sense of being ‘at home’. Just as the anteriority claims in Mshongo contrast with the primordial claims of autochthony even while resembling them, the rootedness we encounter here is one of being ‘rooted to the spot’ and unable to escape imminent danger; of being ‘rooted’ in a substance that slowly subsumes the subject into non-existence – not the natural non-existence of death, but the political non-existence of confinement in a permanent threshold between citizenship and its opposite. Burial in the squatter camp depicts a subject who has been produced by structural conditions as an unsettling doppelganger for the ‘son of the soil’: rather than appearing as the ‘son’ born into the fullness of membership by primordial right, in Mshongo it appears as the naked life which, having failed to enter fully into the ‘good life’ of citizenship, returns to the soil from which it was never able to free itself.

An abyss opens up between the subject and the political horizon of de facto citizenship under the conditions of ‘threshold waiting’ that are experienced in a state of suspended transition. Mired in the temporal immobility of the present, and poised on the boundary between protection and abandonment, the threshold space is ripe with potential for contention over the definition of who – or “what form of life” – is eligible for protection. Conflict is all the more likely given the fact that tenure status, rights and obligations are not clearly defined, and in a social field in which even governance and political protest are articulated through violence, contention is likely to be particularly flammable. In the final chapter to follow, I relate the squatter camps’ failed transition to ‘xenophobic’ mobilization, outlining areas of tension related to in-migration, and analysing their magnification through the resurgence of collective struggle against the everyday re-inscription of superfluity.
Chapter 7: The Context and Logic of ‘Xenophobic’ Mobilization

Mildred is one of the birds without wings. She came to Atteridgeville as a hopeful 25-year-old from Giyani, a town in a far north-western corner of South Africa, close to the border with Mozambique. She was part of the occupation of Jeffsville and expected to obtain a government house, but she never found the life she hoped for. She realises, she told me, that “if you are poor, you will remain poor.” Having lived in a shack for 20 years, she expects to live out the rest of her life in Mshongo. It is, in the words of an earlier respondent, ‘her last home.’ For Mildred, the squatter camp, built for the pursuit of citizenship, serves now as the place where infra-citizenship is affirmed and reproduced. This chapter explores the ways in which this transformation has provided a context and logic for ‘xenophobic’ mobilization.

I begin by analysing the attacks on foreigners that broke out in March 2008, outlining the widespread consensus the forced eviction of foreigners enjoyed in the community, the established-newcomer structure of the evictions, and the distinctiveness of further rounds of attacks that occurred in 2010 and 2011. I then show how the felt transformation of the squatter camps – from sites of transition to greater equality into sites of permanent marginality and precarity – links to a process of polarization between established and newcomer identities. This is a complex picture in which immigration status, length of stay and competition for livelihoods each play a role. I highlight the resurgence of insurgent citizenship claims in the mid-2000s as a consequence of this transformation, and show how differences in the political subjectivities and practices of established squatters and foreign newcomers magnified tensions between these identities in the settlement. I go on to argue that the social and political context of protest marches – which feature centrally in each of the three trajectories of ‘xenophobic’ violence that Mshongo has witnessed – magnifies the polarization of local and foreign identities based on markers of their respective political commitment and political indifference. At the same time, it concentrates the emotional and institutional resources available for violence. These processes occur at the micro-local scale. However, they also occur within a larger political scale, which I explore by reconstructing and analysing two lay theories that respondents used to capture the link between conceptions of national citizenship and anti-foreigner sentiment. These present an unusual and fundamentally political

278 Female respondent, Jeffsville, 21/07/2012 – Mildred is not her real name.
vantage point on the exclusion of the non-citizen, and a challenging notion of such exclusion as a socially just response to as yet unresolved legacies of citizen exclusion in the postcolonial democratization process.

7.1. Attacks on foreigners in March 2008

Xenophobic time. I was there. I was inside the squatter camp. I was watching everything. You know, a group of people will just enter into a shack, break that shack in 20 minutes. Everything will be taken away in 20 minutes time... Spaza shops, ai... they take the whole grocery, they even take the roof. They tell that foreigner ‘Go’. If he talks, they will attack him. The other one died there. They burn him... They burn him alive.\(^{279}\)

In March 2008, the media carried reports of attacks on foreigners in the informal settlements of Atteridgeville – these occurred before the nationwide outbreak in May 2008 but after attacks had occurred in nearby areas including Laudium and Soshanguve.\(^{280}\) The attacks were not reported on in enormous detail, so many of the nuances had to be assembled through fieldwork. People estimated that between five and seven people had died during the 2008 violence in Mshongo. These include Somali shopkeeper Noor Ali, who was killed during a robbery on the day the attacks began,\(^{281}\) and a Mozambican resident of Brazzaville known as Abram, who was killed after returning to the settlement once the attacks had subsided.\(^{282}\) Two of the deceased were South Africans who died when they were “caught by fire while looting,”\(^{283}\) while another had been killed in a revenge attack.\(^{284}\) In other words it is clear that the deaths during this period were to some extent endogenous to the outbreak of violence and therefore not reducible to motives of ‘xenophobia.’ Indeed, although a popular eviction of non-citizens was evidently organized through a range of networks in the settlements (discussed in more detail later), respondents insisted that the more sensational violence was committed by ‘black sheep’;\(^{285}\) and reserved for those foreigners who refused to submit to the eviction and who fought their attackers instead. In my search for evidence of a political logic to anti-foreigner mobilization, I will focus on the primary form of coercion exercised during the attacks: that is, the forceful eviction of foreigners and the destruction of their premises, which unlike the killings and looting of property attracted a substantial amount of consensus among the squatters.

\(^{279}\) Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
\(^{282}\) Male respondent, Brazzaville, 06/08/2012
\(^{283}\) The late CPF chairperson Waxton Nxele, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008
\(^{284}\) Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012
\(^{285}\) Key informant, Jeffsville, 09/07/2012
My findings suggest this logic relates, in the main, to the economic and politico-legal spheres of the social formation, rather than in the cultural-ideological sphere which is often assumed to take precedence in mobilization against racial and ethnic others. The analysis serves as an empirical corrective to the body of research that implicitly views ‘xenophobic’ attitudes as received stereotypes conditioned primarily by negative orientations to immigrants among politicians and the media (Jonathan Crush & Ramachandran, 2014; Danso & McDonald, 2001; Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore, & Richmond, 1999). Such attitudes are indeed prevalent across South Africa, but they do not have a causal relationship with popular mobilization. I find that mobilization arose at the intersection of an existing infrastructure of resources and repertoires for collective mobilization with various social tensions in which citizens found themselves occupying trajectories of material decline, social immobility, collective obligation and waiting, whereas non-citizens appeared to free-ride on the labours of others, achieving material advancement, individual freedom and speedy progress toward the ‘good life’ associated with citizenship. This argument represents the culmination of my entire genealogy of the squatter camp.

7.1.1. Widespread consensus

The impetus for the 2008 eviction came from Itireleng, the settlement lying west of Laudium and a short distance south of Mshongo, on the other side of the hillface onto which the Atteridgeville settlements extend. Foreigners had been evicted from Itireleng in February 2008, and a number of respondents reported a delegation from Itireleng visiting the settlement to canvass support for an eviction in Mshongo to oust those foreigners who had fled there. Although researchers have implicated the Jeffsville offices in organizing the evictions, my fieldwork found evidence that at least some leaders, both in Jeffsville and Brazzaville, had opposed popular resolution of the ‘problem’ of foreigners. Indeed, one Brazzaville leader left the leadership structure after the popular eviction went ahead despite confirmed plans to consult the police and immigration control officials for a formal solution the following week. As attacks began during a march protesting rumours of relocation to Hammanskraal, some people blamed the organizer, Jeff Ramohlale, for the attacks. An alternative explanation, offered by a Mozambican respondent, was that the organizers of the evictions were informed about legitimate meetings in the settlement, and hijacked these to promote evictions:

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286 I use these terms echoing Althusser (Oswell, 2006, p. 161).
287 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012; male resident, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012; male respondent, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008; female respondent, Mshongo, 20/10/2008; male respondent, Mshongo, 20/10/2008; the late Phineas Mdlalose, Jeffsville, 20/10/2008
It seems some people from this area informed the attackers in Laudium that there would be a meeting here. Some people thought the local office called the meeting to co-ordinate the attacks but we always go to meetings and nothing of that sort ever happened.  

Despite the apparent lack of centralized organizing by informal leaders, it appears that a party from Itireleng met with groups throughout the settlement, possibly using the informal infrastructure and expertise of former self-defence unit members, block committee members or street committee members, or local shopkeepers. I heard a variety of different accounts of the run-up to the evictions, suggesting that organizing happened differently in different parts of the settlement. Some had heard about or even attended meetings where residents had complained about foreigners and decided to evict them. A respondent in Brazzaville said meetings were held in Jeffsville, Phomolong, Vergenoeg and Brazzaville about the issue of ‘foreigners’, who were given two weeks' notice to leave the settlement. One respondent had seen notices and flyers posted outlining the reasons why foreigners should be evicted, though others had not witnessed these.

Once evictions began, respondents saw the forms of intelligence utilized to target foreigners as evidence of some form of organizing and institutional expertise. Among the crowds were people who possessed intelligence regarding the tenure status and ownership of shacks, and were approaching dwellings in an organized way:

When they entered your house they would start asking for your identity particulars. When some were asking for your particulars others would be busy looting your property and tell you that they do not want to see you again. That would happen if the shack was not yours, but if it were yours they would even set it alight… I say it was organized because there were some people who would know all the information. They would know that this one is renting and that one owns the shack.

This supports the involvement of at least some local leaders who could profile the local area and identify targets. However, it was also clear that patterns of denunciation emerged, so that attackers could gather intelligence from local participants in the crowd who could draw on their everyday cognitive maps of the settlement to identify potential targets if they wished to. This was certainly not foolproof, however; in some cases neighbours deliberately misled the

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288 Mozambican female respondent, Mshongo, 20/10/2008
289 Police officer, Atteridgeville, 07/07/2012; male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012; male resident, Brazzaville, 04/08/2012; focus group participants, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012
290 Female resident, Jeffsville, 19/07/2012
291 For a discussion of how the ‘foreigner’ was defined, see section 7.1.2 ahead.
292 Male resident, Brazzaville, 19/07/2008; male respondent, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008
293 Male respondent, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008
294 Zimbabwean male respondent, Mshongo, 24/10/2008
crowd about the occupants of certain dwellings; and some foreigners were able to exit their homes into the mob and become invisible through that performance:

The neighbours know that we are not South African so they would tell them to enter our place. It was in the evening; we ran out of the compound and mingled with them. They couldn’t recognize us and they went into our shacks and took everything.295

Although the precise nature of the organizing network remained obscure, it was clear that organizers found a very receptive audience among the squatters of Jeffsville and Brazzaville, and eviction plans met with broad consensus and participation. The majority of the community supported the eviction of foreigners,296 and a wide cross-section participated in the looting that accompanied it:

It was messed up. Young, old, granny... Everybody who was trying to compete, was trying to get. Even our South Africans, those who have business, spaza shops, né, they even get their bakkie go and steal fridges, steal empty bottles. So everybody was using as an opportunity. Because the door it was open like this, shop it was full of everything. No-one is there. Police are standing THERE, waiting for you to finish up.297

As reflected here, police stood back until crowds had thinned, fearing for their lives in much the same way as we have seen in the case of mob justice incidents:

...sometimes those police are scared for their life. They say if you go there, those people are angry, got lot of stone things, if you go there they can also kill you. Then they stay there, supporting the community. Say nee, just do it.298

This goes some way toward explaining observations of the “peculiar absence” (Von Holdt et al., 2011, p. 3) of police from incidences of ‘xenophobic’ violence until the initial furore has abated. Similarly, support for the evictions was so high that leaders were unable to stop the attacks even if they tried. One respondent said Mdlalose did not have “enough authority to stop the people,” and though he tried to stop the destruction of shops, he did not succeed.299 Another said that Ramohlale called a meeting to tell people to leave foreigners alone.300 These appeals don’t seem to have worked. With a very limited coercive machinery – illegal weapons, for instance, were surrendered during amnesties early in the new dispensation – leaders were

295 Mozambican male respondent, Mshongo, 22/10/2008
296 Zimbabwean male resident, Vergenoeg, 03/08/2012; two female residents, Brazzaville, 01/08/2012; key informant, Vergenoeg, 20/07/2012; male respondent, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008; female resident, Jeffsville, 19/07/2012
297 Male resident 1, Brazzaville, 28/06/2012
298 Male resident 2, Brazzaville, 28/06/2012
299 Male respondent, Jeffsville, 22/10/2008
300 Female resident, Jeffsville, 19/07/2012
unable to oppose the community during the attacks for the sake of their own safety. As one leader put it:

You won’t stop them. You must support them. If you stop them, they attack you. How can you stop them? .... Because, hey, it was a majority of people, the whole squatter camp. It wasn’t like one person, or three four people there, it was the majority.\(^{301}\)

This broad participation, and the evidence of public deliberations of some kind, suggests that, although not all residents supported the way the eviction was carried out, most people supported the general idea of evicting foreigners. It was revealing that those who objected to the physical violence used in carrying out the eviction nevertheless conjured up notions of a ‘proper’, ‘legal’ model for a popular eviction of foreigners, in which eviction was still positively valued and labelled legitimate, but looting, destruction and violence were not. One woman, rebutting claims that foreigners steal South African jobs, said:

It’s actually us taking their things. And when we evict them, we don’t do it in a humane manner, coz the community fights with them and takes their things, and the foreigners leave with nothing. When you chase someone away, you don’t take their things, you let them leave with their things.\(^{302}\)

This parallels a similar view of the 2008 evictions expressed by a foreign-born resident of Alexandra, where attacks on foreigners broke out a few months after those in Atteridgeville. He said that evictions had involved “noble plans” to improve the safety and governability of the area but had disintegrated into chaos and looting due to the involvement of the unemployed youth (Monson, 2012b, pp. 181-182). The fact that longstanding foreign-born community members were able to relate to the logic of ‘xenophobic’ evictions is a clear indication that the political faultline around which attacks erupted was not one of ethnic or nationalist chauvinism. I will go on to demonstrate that the pertinent division was instead the distinction between established squatters and immigrant newcomers.

7.1.2. Established-newcomer logic of eviction

Who was the ‘foreigner’ against which attacks were targeted? What characteristics constituted the ‘outsider’ in this ‘xenophobia’? In the 2008 eviction, the primary targets were newcomers,

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\(^{301}\) Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012

\(^{302}\) Female resident, Jeffsville, 21/07/2012
and specifically those presumed to be without legal migration status. As a Mozambican respondent asserted:

I have stayed with them for a long time, even when this community started... The people they wanted most were the newly arrived. If they had known you for a long time they would say, “You, we know you, we won’t attack your shack.” They made it clear to the newly arrived that they should leave the area because they did not even have documentation allowing them to remain in South Africa.\footnote{Mozambican respondent, Mshongo, 22/10/2008}

Objectively, there had been major increases in the foreign squatter population since 2005: 9% of squatters are foreign born, and close to half (45%) have arrived in South Africa since 2005, according to 2011 South African census data. In large part, this reflects the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, which saw South Africa’s transformation into the world’s number one host of new asylum seekers between 2006 and 2011 (UNHCR, 2012).\footnote{Misago et al report that 2008 did not see an increased influx of immigrants compared to other years, but viewed against this backdrop it is clear that the increased level of newcomer arrivals would have been sustained over several years in advance of the attacks.} Eighty-five percent of Zimbabwean squatters have arrived since 2000, constituting more than half (55%) of the foreign-born arrivals into squatter camps of the Tshwane municipality since 2000. As the largest newcomer group, it is not surprising that most victims of the 2008 evictions were Zimbabwean.\footnote{Zimbabwean male respondent, Malas shelter, 24/10/2008} Close to a fifth of foreign-born squatters – predominantly Mozambicans – have acquired citizenship, so that the primary targeting of Zimbabweans might also be explained by their being perceived as less likely to hold legal immigration documentation. As one respondent reported, “Most of the Mozambicans have identity books and they came a long time ago... very few were attacked.”\footnote{Zimbabwean male respondent, Malas shelter, 24/10/2008} However, growth in the original Mozambican population was also seen as problematic:

... most of [the Mozambicans] we lived with them maybe some couple years in informal place, so we know them. But later stage they called their brothers and sisters also and they came in and we saw after that there were lot of foreigners. Some we don’t know really where they come from and some of them have dangerous weapons in their shacks.\footnote{Male resident, Jeffsville, 17/07/2012}

‘Foreignness’ here implies those who are newer to the area. Arriving into the density of a rapidly urbanizing periphery, they are anonymous – unknown – and potentially dangerous. We have seen that these concerns are not unprecedented – the knowability of newcomers, linked to the potential threat they presented, was subject to an intense informal regime of

\footnote{Mozambican respondent, Mshongo, 22/10/2008}
surveillance in early Jeffsville. In this sense, concerns about the foreigner are paradigmatic of the multiplying risk and ambiguity of the contemporary squatter camp.

The growing presence of foreign newcomers was also associated with a corresponding proliferation of new informal shops in close proximity to each other in the unregulated environment of the squatter camp. This was a phenomenon that eroded established traders’ livelihoods and social bonds between residents and local shopkeepers:

Back then [before 2006], people used to know this shop was owned by this guy; that shop was owned by that guy. Then people no longer knew who owned the shops. Then South Africans stopped going to the South African shops and went to the foreigners shops. 308

The figure of the unknown foreigner is thus associated with a significant change in the economic world of the squatter camp, in which the known becomes unknown and social relations linked to the livelihoods of established squatters empty out.

The entry of newcomers into retail enterprise in the settlements brought unprecedented forms of commercial competition that made long-established shops unsustainable, and saw the emergence of micro-scale retail empires – one shopkeeper who was asked to leave owned one shop in Jeffsville, two in Phomolong and four in Brazzaville. 309 In response to the evident foreign domination of the retail market, residents began to meet and discuss possible solutions to the problem. 310 A longstanding police detective reported that South African petty retailers had called for the eviction of foreign competitors at a meeting prior to the 2008 attacks. This was just one of several different accounts of the genesis of the attacks, but the element of commercial tension it introduces helps explain the otherwise puzzling fact that, although the focus was on evicting Zimbabweans from shacks and shops, certain longer established Mozambican enterprises were also targeted. 311 Here, the key to conflict appears to be the economic relations between an established set of survivalist citizen traders and an emerging mercantile class of non-citizens whose gains represented losses for established petty traders.

Large numbers of foreigners were displaced in March 2008, and many did not return. However, after the subsequent nationwide attacks in May of the same year, a growing number of Somali shopkeepers who had fled from settlements in the Cape arrived to establish new businesses in Mshongo. This, according to Ramohlale, was when the problems began in earnest for South African spaza shops. It is well known that Somali entrepreneurs have far

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308 Male resident, Jeffsville, 07/08/2012  
309 Male resident, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012  
310 Male respondent, Jeffsville, 05/08/2012  
311 Zimbabwean male respondent, Malas shelter, 24/10/2008
greater buying power than South Africans, and use social networks to purchase bulk stock at lower prices (Abdi, 2011). Although most Somali migrants either hold or qualify for refugee status, locals found it difficult to conceive how people fleeing a war-torn country could be in a position to establish large supermarkets. In contrast, Ramohlale says, South Africans “would buy a small amount with the little bit they had.” At this point in a walk with Ramohlale, we had stopped to talk to a local shopkeeper who described his plight as follows:

Jackson said ‘Ja, you can buy five loafs, but you will have to eat that loafs, because nobody can come buy, because they get bread there cheaper.’ I felt sad at the thought that this had probably literally happened to him. He went on: ‘You suffer to sell your stuff, put everything... like mielie meal. I can’t sell mielie meal. They sell mielie meal there very very very cheap. I sell here... that mielie meal I must eat with my child. [chuckles] I can’t sell.’

*Figure 17: Comparing established and newcomer shops in Jeffsville*

*The South African trader on the left, who has operated his stall since the early days of Jeffsville, sells a tiny selection of products opposite the thriving Somali-run Ngwenya Tuck Shop.*

These newcomer shops were targeted in attacks during 2010 and 2011, in incidents that left the remaining Mozambican and Zimbabwean residents relatively unaffected. The 2010 and 2011 attacks did not enjoy the same level of consensus and participation, nor did they extend into attacks on homes – though it should be noted that Somali shopkeepers either sleep in their shops or live in areas outside Atteridgeville. Nor, however, could these subsequent attacks be seen as mere opportunism, violent commercial competition, or crime. While these motives no doubt played a role, attacks on foreign-owned shops should also be viewed as symbolic attacks on a vector of compounded marginalization. Recent work on ethnic competition argues that collective action is activated not only by competition, but by the real
or perceived equity of such competition (Tadao Tsukashima, 2007, p. 848), and that perceptions of the relative economic, social and political status of groups is potentially more important in understanding inter-group violence than their “objective share of resources” (C. Bauman & Leech, 2012, p. 2210). I will show that, despite their reduced scale, the justifying logics produced in relation to the targeting of Somalis echo those produced in relation to the 2008 attacks, and link the theme of newcomer exclusion to the pursuit of meaningful inclusion by the established. I go on to discuss the established-newcomer dynamics that have shaped the transformation of the squatter camp into a place of suspended transition, and how renewed insurgency in response has polarized established locals and foreign newcomers as a result of their distinct political subjectivities and the nature of their relationship with squatter territory. Drawing on the protest march as a common element in distinct sets of attacks on newcomers, I also explore ways in which the context of a march serves to reinforce this polarization.

7.2. Time, population change and the rise of established/newcomer stratification

In Chapter 6, I described the squatters of Mshongo as citizens waiting endlessly on the threshold of citizenship. Here, I wish to return to the theme of time and trace its relation to new forms of stratification among the squatter population. In the form of demographic change and the emergence of opportunities for transition, time has seen the entangled rise of opportunities for transition and consolidation of new social strata within the squatter camps within the context of declining material conditions. This internal stratification of the squatter population has had corollary impacts on the nature and purchase of collective claims for citizenship.

7.2.1. Population growth and material and social change

Being an anti-apartheid initiative, the squatter camp was intended to be open to all ‘black’ South Africans: it was “open for everyone, because it was for all the peoples in the country who must stay wherever they like.” This meant that the settlements brought together people from a variety of distinct social backgrounds – township permanent residents, ex-

313 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012
migrant labourers lodging in backyards or single-sex workers’ barracks, and foreign-born residents who shared in the area’s history and helped establish it. Later came newcomers from the homelands seeking jobs in a time of largely jobless urbanization. The commonality was a shared legacy of historical subjection to one or another of apartheid’s spatial instruments of rule, which created varying degrees of economic and social impoverishment. Nevertheless, there was a distinction: the first newcomers were those who arrived “After we won the battle and we started to stay there freely”; 314 in this sense, though many shared with local squatters a national political legacy of land poverty, they did not automatically share the local political identity produced through shared local struggles, collective labour and suffering invested in the making of Mshongo as a ‘free’ space. More recently, as we saw earlier, regional political and economic crisis has brought unprecedented levels of cross-border migration from neighbouring states. New migrants share neither the national nor the local history of the settlements, and often occupy the camp in the capacity of tenants: consumers rather than producers of squatter territory. In several senses, then, they are seen to form a socially distinct group. Whereas at least one longstanding foreign-born resident 315 features in the leadership structure of the settlement, and a small number of foreign-born squatters have operated businesses in Jeffsville since its inception, 316 the situation is different for more recent arrivals. A Zimbabwean resident confirmed that although foreigners do participate in the leadership of the settlement, “only those who have been here for a long time have a chance.” 317

Asked how the early unity of the settlement broke down, a shopkeeper in Jeffsville answered that it was due to different people coming from different places to the settlement. Significantly, the problem was not any ethnic or other primordial form of difference, but their indifference to the political meaning of the camps – a point I will explore in more detail later on:

Because other one he come, he didn’t want to know why we stay here. It’s ’net so lank ek het space’ [’just as long as I have space’] he stays. And then if you going to him and you tell him what is happening here he don’t want to listen [chuckles]. 318

The increase in population, and an increasingly disembedded population at that, has also meant deterioration of social bonds and organized surveillance. A respondent who had once been involved in the patrol rotation in Jeffsville clarified that it had been possible because of

314 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012, my italics
315 Zimbabwean male resident, Mshongo, 20/10/2008
316 Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
317 Zimbabwean male resident, Mshongo, 22/10/2008
318 Male resident, Jeffsville, 01/08/2012
the strength of social ties at the time: “We knew each other, Tamlyn, the place was not so big like it is now.”\textsuperscript{319} In addition, population growth has brought greater congestion and pressure on the self-made infrastructure of the settlements. As we have already seen in Chapter 6, growing numbers of pit toilets and illegal electricity connections have given rise to potentially fatal risks. The increase in foreign population, the breakdown in social bonds, and the telescoping of formal housing opportunities into a distant future for some, occurred concurrently with the deterioration of living conditions resulting from congestion in the context of inadequate infrastructure. The rise of drug misuse in the congested, physically fragile neighbourhoods of the settlement, and the phenomenon of sedentarism linked to high unemployment, leads to heightened crime rates, and this in turn to higher levels of mob justice with the exhaustion of centralized patrols. As we have seen, some of this depletion of civic structures is due again to the exit of those who found avenues for individual advancement free from the confines of the collective. Time has eroded and depleted the power of informal institutions, with infighting and fragmentation among the leadership, and depletion of voluntary service as people grew old or ‘tired along the way.’\textsuperscript{320}

### 7.2.2. Opportunities for transition and contestation over entitlements

Along with these demographic and social changes, time also brought opportunities for transition into the formal city, via government housing developments designed to provide free property to apartheid’s dispossessed. Opportunities for formalization are always ripe with potential for “brutal” contestation of legitimate entitlement (Roy, 2005, p. 152), as we saw in the evocative naming of Brazzaville after a site of civil war in the Jeffsville/ Brazzaville contestation of space in Chapter 5. Temporally structured contestation also arose between established and newcomer groups as a high-level housing official began issuing fraudulent titles to public housing, circumventing the temporal structure of distributional justice imposed by the housing waiting list, and contributing to a transformation of ‘modern’ forms of waiting to threshold forms. At first, recent migrants from the homelands were the most visible culprits in this irregular economy; there was no way they could have obtained houses ahead of established Atteridgeville residents unless by fraudulent means, and through the mundane channels of the local grapevine travelled stories of squatters whose distant relatives secured ‘RDP’ houses ahead of locals:

\textsuperscript{319} Male resident, Jeffsville, 02/08/2012

\textsuperscript{320} Key informant, Brazzaville, 11/07/2012
He said the real problem was: how could somebody get a house who hadn’t applied for one? [...] some of those people had family in the area who would say ‘I know that person, I know where he comes from, how could he get a house when I can’t get a house?’ He gave the example of someone who had been on the waiting list since the beginning, then finding that this person, who wasn’t even on the waiting list at all, had a house – how would I feel, he asked.  

There are others who, once issued with a land title by the government, encountered a third party already ensconced there when they went to occupy it:

I’ve been 10 years up and down to the city council. The Department of Housing asks for my ID and says you’ve got a house already. They showed me the stand number. But when I found the house, the people there were running a business, using it as a business premises. It even had burglar proofing.

Popular attempts to evict illegitimate property holders from formal housing have occurred regularly since 2005, leading to censure by officials for whom such mobilizations are ‘against the law’, and warnings that mobilizers will be arrested. Ironically, officials insist that the only legitimate actor to coordinate evictions is the Department of Housing – the department from which the original illegality originated. While officials attempt to disable popular mobilization, attempts to regularize the ownership of stands by conventional channels in the modern judicial system do not necessarily work, as in the still unresolved case cited above. The respondent’s final statement – ‘it even had burglar proofing’ – is heavy with meaning. On one hand it expresses a strong metaphor of the historical experience of being locked out, constructed as an intruder, in relation to urban land to which citizens have a rightful claim. On the other, it expresses the illegitimate occupant’s strong sense of legitimate ownership and entitlement to the property; faith in the power of a financial transaction to secure contested property. As a result, the issue has not been easy to resolve; this respondent has not been able to evict the illegitimate occupant – even with a court order. He has refused to leave until the R50,000 paid to a senior housing official for the property is returned.

The established vs outsider structure that popular evictions from RDP houses took appeared to me at first glance as a form of ‘xenophobia,’ albeit toward newcomers generally rather than non-nationals. However, Ramohlale pointed to the potential fallacy in my probing about reports of attempts to evict squatters from the ‘homelands’: ‘Even you, you would get upset if somebody got a house without applying; you would get upset’, he said, as if to deny any

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321 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
322 Female resident, Jeffsville, 04/08/2012
323 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
324 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
325 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
326 Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30/07/2012
implicit inference that these evictions were evidence of prejudice or chauvinism. Instead, he represented it as an attempt to defend the temporal structure of redistributive justice, and the potential of modern ordering systems to redress historical inequality in a legitimate way. It has been observed that ethnic mobilization does not necessarily express ethnic motivation (Eck, 2009), and that use of ethnic or racial categories risks subsuming into a single concept “a multitude of inter-group differences that require separate examination” (Banton, p. 472). This was a case where anti-outsider mobilization appeared in this more complex light – not in fact motivated by ascriptive characteristics but by the implicit logic of justice in which the identities of established and newly arrived residents participate through the eminently modern mechanism of the housing waiting list. As many forms of ethnic or racial antagonism might also make claims about justice, it is perhaps important to acknowledge, first, that these evictions did not target any particular ethnic or national group; they targeted the occupiers of dwellings that according to Department of Housing records officially belonged to a third party on the waiting list. Second, this appeal to justice related to a formal mechanism for the restitution of historically produced inequality, and contestation was structured in terms of the provisions of that still legally binding mechanism. In other words, this is distinct from the pliable notions of justice that are easily constructed to legitimize racial discrimination, being a claim for administrative justice relating to a material mechanism for the resolution of historical stratification and the legacy of racial discrimination.

This contestation of entitlement between established and newcomers signals the emergence of an important rift in the political identity of squatters, as another respondent observed:

...we were no longer the same, you see. Because of people [trails off...] someone could come from as far as Transkei [a former independent homeland], haven’t squatted, just get into your house, just because of the corruption that was happening in the municipality. And it has created a lot of painful thoughts to people who were on the waiting list and who didn’t even achieve, and who fought for that squatter camp to be what it is today. But they never benefited from it, just because of the municipal officials who were corrupt.\(^{327}\)

Though competition for limited resources is certainly a theme in this observation, the dynamics of competition have not arisen out of a priori ethnic, racial, or national group identifications. Rather, the competition appears to have produced a new sense of class groupings, where previously squatters viewed other claimants for formal property as ‘the same’ as themselves – people who, through squatting, actively claimed a place in the city, and who, through the waiting list, entered into a trajectory toward the formal realization of their

\(^{327}\) Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
rights. The respondent’s insistence that “we are no longer the same” points to how internal stratification of the squatter populace has eroded this pursuit of a just solution to stratified citizenship. A link is made not only between the waiting list and the entitlement to housing but also between entitlements and the labour invested by those who ‘fought’ to produce the squatter camp. Both linkages are frustrated by the individual instrumentalism of both the corrupt official (whose infamous name is well known in the community) and his market.

We see another form of stratification between those citizens who laboured locally to produce a pathway to their entitlements, and those who circumvent this pathway to merely consume the goods associated with citizenship. It sketches the schism that has emerged between those whose wait for citizenship is tied to the institution of the waiting list, and those whose access to the good life of the citizen can be purchased. Though it may be counter-intuitive to identify the dynamics of ‘liquid modernity’ in the informal dynamics among the lower economic strata of a developing state, the image of (relative) affluence as a resource for the production of liquid modern power – that is, choice and mobility (Z. Bauman, 2012, pp. 89-90;119-120) – is echoed in the distinction that emerges here between the immobile subaltern who waits, and the mobile subaltern who need not. The power distinction that appears between those collectively submitting to a ‘politics of patience’, and those acting individually to secure the simultaneous material and political advantage of urban property ownership, brings to mind Bauman’s observations of the decline of collective politics with the rise of individualism; tellingly captured in his image of “the individual in combat with the citizen” (Z. Bauman, 2012, p. 30). Pertinent to the power dynamics encapsulated in these distinctions is his observation that the mobility and flexibility of a liquid modern mode of life “are not so much vehicles for emancipation as the instruments of the redistribution of freedoms” (Z. Bauman, 2012, p. 90).

Being clearly identifiable to all as among the most recent arrivals, foreign newcomers are among those identified in the latter group, to whom the fruits of citizenship denied others are accruing. Since they not only arrived more recently than other claimants and – unlike South African ‘queue-jumpers’ – do not share the national history that government housing exists to redress, the acquisition of homes by foreigners adds insult to injury.

... we are here waiting for our houses for quite a long time. The next thing you see a foreigner inside an RDP house. So while they are here they are still going to take our places.328

The theme of competition is very strong in the description of foreigners ‘taking our places’, and this clearly occurs in a context in which “the structural conditions of choice” between the

328 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
parties are unequal (Lyon, p. 477): capital is what distinguishes the choices available. The fact that better resourced non-nationals are able to purchase the inclusion for which impoverished squatters have worked and waited for so long ‘in harm’s way’ (Auyero & Burbano de Lara, 2012, p. 550) appears particularly unjust, since many neither laboured for citizenship nor had the same historical claim on urban property that South Africans shared by virtue of their common subjection to the racially stratified primitive accumulation of land.

We have looked, thus far, at the agency of time in relation to social life and political subjectivity in the settlements. This includes various contingencies introduced by time – regime change and the sense of expectation it magnified, followed by changes in population, social fragmentation, interference with the system of distributive justice embodied by the waiting list, and the heightened exposure to risk entailed in these changes. It also entails the personal experience of time embodied by waiting in simultaneous anticipation of an ever receding transition to inclusion, and dread of a terminal suspension of that transition. A theme running through much of the discussion has been that of the impact of individual agency – the rise of a tenant class with little interest in local politics, and the emergence of an illicit property market in which individuals began transgressing the temporal structure of transition as a collective citizenship-claiming project.

It is against this backdrop that I wish to consider the resurgence of insurgent citizenship practices in the squatter camp, and the way in which these practices functioned to reproduce, through repertoires of concentrated coercion and performance, the potential for marginality to become, once more, a resource for collectively claiming the goods of citizenship. These moments of concentration, I will show, increase the salience of political commitment and insurgent citizenship as distinguishing characteristics of squatter identity, and increase social distance between the politically committed and the politically indifferent – a distinction that to a large extent runs along national lines, dividing South Africans from foreigners. As the most established foreign-born squatters now qualify as citizens too, it is distinctly the political identity of citizenship that marks the boundary between South African and foreigner, rather than any primordial antagonism or crude racial prejudice. Citizenship, rather than phenotypical or cultural characteristics, appears as the marker for inclusion.
7.2.3. From a politics of patience to renewed insurgency

For 22 years in this squatter camp. There’s no changes. Instead, the squatter camp is growing. It’s developing further. And there are people, their lives in the squatter camp... [pauses to search for words]. People there, they live... [pauses to search for words again, then gives up]. Basic human needs, you understand, they are not catered for. The government is not catering for these people. Instead these people are creating shelter for themselves, they are creating sanitation for themselves, and they buy electricity from the municipality, you understand. Water, yes, water is what they provide. And it’s by force also. 329

Deborah James has observed that an ‘aspirational ethic’ continues to predominate in South Africa, becoming the ‘political horizon’ of those for whom change is not an everyday reality (cited in Dawson, 2014, p. 867), and who are often pushed into greater hardship as others in South African society become more affluent. A “politics of waiting, therefore, signifies the supremacy of change as a political horizon for both the individual and the community” (Dawson, 2014, p. 867). If this practice of ‘waiting’ or ‘patience’ is directed toward progressive change, then the stasis and degeneration of conditions in the settlements over a period of two decades, as expressed by the respondent above, signals the continual recession of that horizon and the consequent vacuity of a ‘politics of patience.’ Citing reports to parliament of over 5,000 legal protests and over 800 illegal protests between 2004 and 2005, Booysen (2007, p. 23) observes a ‘change of gears’ in the politics of obtaining service delivery in the mid-2000s, from a more passive approach relying only on “voting and representation” to a “critical, even confrontational stance”, and renewed grass-roots action (Booysen, 2007, p. 22).

In line with this nationally observable pattern, memories of protest seemed to be concentrated on the early life of Jeffsville and on mobilizations in recent years. Joint mobilization among the settlements broke down around 2000 when Mshongo was demarcated into separate administrative wards 330 and leaders of Brazzaville generally opted for lower profile strategies for pursuing improvements, such as sit-ins in municipal buildings. However, worsening conditions in the growing squatter camps, and the sheer duration of exclusion from services in some areas, appears to have led to a reinvigoration of cross-settlement solidarity and protest from the mid-2000s onwards – as though the ‘politics of patience’ set in motion by the transition to democracy were being abandoned in favour of a more insurgent form of citizenship-claiming once again as faith in an inevitable transition to urban inclusion hollowed out. The reinvigoration of collective action may also have been impacted by the fact that a primary actor in the mobilization of the settlement joined the

329 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
330 Male resident, Brazzaville, 07/08/2012
leadership in 2005, bringing experience as a shop-floor organizer who had received formal political training. This particular individual brought significant organizing expertise to Jeffsville and his political entrepreneurship may in itself have provided a renewed impetus to local struggles. In 2010, the leaders of the respective regions of Mshongo began cooperating in protest under the banner of the Atteridgeville West Informal Settlement Forum, mobilizing the whole of Mshongo together. It is not entirely clear whether a resurgence of squatter political identity and practices occurring at the time produced protest, but close analysis indicates that the protest context certainly (re-)produced these identities and practices, in a magnified and time-bound manner. Below, I consider the evidence of protest as a concentrating force for polarization, drawing on Geschiere’s (2009, p. 35) proposition of a similar force at work in religious practices in magnifying the identities of autochthon and allochthon elsewhere in Africa.

The concentrating force of protest

The pursuit of equality, according to Hannah Arendt, is dependent on membership of a group directed towards the mutual guarantee of equal rights. Political community is the product of such “human organization” (Arendt cited in Owens, 2009, pp. 576-577). Following this definition, we can see squatters’ various collective practices as an expression of a distinctive political community nested within the larger national political community, for these collective practices draw on membership in the squatter group to struggle for the realization of equal rights that the Constitution of South Africa already guarantees. Yet, as we have seen, these practices and the sense of communal solidarity that once characterized the settlements has not been evenly sustained over time, with the advent of democracy, the ‘politics of patience’, (informal) institutional fatigue, and demographic change.

Yet protests resurrect historically contoured forms of popular violence in Mshongo. The first mass mobilization led by this new organizer in 2006 saw coercive techniques of the past reinstated in an effort to extort solidarity under conditions less hospitable to collective action, in which, as we have seen, squatters no longer benefitted from the primitive bonds of knowing one another or indeed the normative pressure of ubiquitous social surveillance. Mobilization across the six parts of the settlement involved barricading the entrances with burning tyres from 2am, creating a performance of apartheid-era ungovernability – a kind of return to an insurgent subjectivity familiar to most longstanding ‘black’ urban dwellers, and a
signal for the obligation to perform solidarity. If this signal was not enough, entrances were also manned by organizers carrying whips, which would be used on anyone transgressing collective action by going to work:

Tamlyn: So you would even sjambok them?

Organizer: Yeah, we sjambok them physically. We sjambok them and they'll go back [home]. And the one who gets sjambokked he is going to make sure that he’s also going to sjambok somebody who’s also going to work.

[Translator laughs in agreement, clearly familiar with this strategy]

Organizer: You know, so that it becomes some sort of a chain. That is how we brought that strong unity about.\textsuperscript{331}

Whereas earlier forms of collective action occurred within a community far more internally coherent and politically engaged than the transformed post-millennial squatter population, we see the same resources of coercion mobilized here to reproduce unity. Ironically, but in line with the principle of insurgent citizenship as a form of power premised on marginality, solidarity was produced through enforced marginalization of the squatter populace. Those with jobs were forced to lose their income for the day, and through their victimization recruited into a performative collective production and policing of the squatter community as a community of suffering and marginalization. Where older forms of reciprocity have diminished, we see here the instrumentalization of violence to create a cycle of reciprocity in which individuals are recruited to the confines of community under threat of violence, and in that capacity join in exercising violence against anyone seeking escape.

The prominence of protest mobilization in trajectories leading to violence against foreigners brings me to Geschiere’s assertion of the power of ‘a concentrating force’ to generate ‘a shared sensorial experience of the world’ (Geschiere, 2009, p. 35), uniting diverse individuals in a feeling of autochthony or ‘authentic belonging’ (Geschiere, 2009, p. 34).\textsuperscript{312} By conjuring a dynamic embodiment of local political community, a performative process in which a heterogeneous populace is united in shared commitment to political action, the technology of the demonstration may serve to ‘concentrate’ a sense of shared belonging. The mobilizing strategy laid out above, and the ‘chain’ of censure it sets in motion, is itself a collective performance of shared suffering and shared threat; a concentrated embodiment of the historical experience of collective suffering that gives the march its personal-political resonance and from which it obtains its primary mobilizing force. While the march is a protest

\textsuperscript{331} Key informant, Jeffville, 09/07/2012

\textsuperscript{312} As we have seen, in Mshongo this form of belonging is not a primordial claim but a claim structured by a combination of anteriority, contributions to placemaking, and political commitment.
against suffering and marginality, it also stages and reproduces suffering and marginality, increasing their salience even for those newcomers who may not share in the longer history of local suffering and insurgency. The armed organizers man the boundary between those who are immobilized in the settlement, unable to move, lacking in choice and agency, under threat of physical harm and without protection from the state; and those outside, who are not mired in the collectivity of the settlement but mobile, able to pursue their individual goals unrestrained. In a sense, the march itself becomes a concentrated performance of life on the threshold of modernity even as it expresses the squatters’ desire to move across the threshold, to be absorbed further into the modernity of the city; the life-promoting certainty of formal service infrastructure and titled property ownership; the solid modern foundation from which a global liquid modernity has taken flight for others.

Marches may respond to situations that reproduce squatters’ historical exclusion and victimization all too vividly – the march that preceded the 2008 attacks was a response to rumours that the settlement’s land had been purchased\(^{333}\) and that the squatters would be forcibly removed to the more distant area of Hammanskraal),\(^{334}\) giving it special potential to reproduce latent political subjectivities that sharpen the borders between autochthon and allochthon, and between the committed and the indifferent. Stories of protest experiences also suggest that government responses to collective action can serve to magnify the shared experience of suffering together, becoming a mirror of historical experience. One demonstration that ended in attacks on foreigners began with a last-minute refusal of the squatters’ application to march after people had been gathered all day. Another began after buses transporting protesters to the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg were diverted to a weighbridge and deemed to be overloaded. Protesters were returned to Atteridgeville and had to wait for the return of leaders who had made it through to Johannesburg in a taxi. Chaos and looting ensued when officials, who squatters believed had deliberately obstructed their planned protest, then called a separate meeting to discuss the issues.\(^{335}\) The failure of collective mobilization is in effect a failure to secure visibility for the squatters as a political community. Securing visibility or being recognized as political actors, as citizens embodying a legitimate demand on the state, is of great importance to the squatters, and leaders observed that the only conditions under which protests could be kept under control was when participants were able to carry out the planned action and be seen to hand over a list of grievances to the relevant official:

\(^{333}\) Male respondent, Jeffsville, 27/10/2008
\(^{334}\) Focus group participant, Jeffsville, 20/10/2008
\(^{335}\) Male resident, Brazzaville, 28/06/2012
he said ‘the only weapons’ they have to elicit a positive response is to conduct the march from the departure point to the destination and deliver the memorandum. This, he said, was the only way to ‘calm them down’, especially when they see someone from the municipality come and accept the memorandum. That is ‘the tool’, he said. He said if either of these aspects doesn’t work out, the situation becomes problematic [not his word]. He said this is what resulted in them ‘looting the shops in the name of xenophobia’, when it was actually because of ‘frustration’.336

In this sense, the march appears as a practice bridging the chasm between the present and the future, reconstituting the political subjectivity and agency required to reinstate a sense of movement toward the future and a sense of potential change. The anger that develops during these occasions may be less a default expression of frustration at slow development and poverty than an expression of the sense that change is impossible, agency futile and suffering undertaken in vain. It is a reinforcement of immobility, and a reiteration of the abyss between present and future which cannot be bridged, signifying the fact that squatters indeed inhabit a terminal rather than a transitional space. Against this backdrop of the magnified importance of political commitment, foreign newcomers tend unwittingly to perform political indifference, such that a political faultline begins to operate simultaneously with the faultline of inter-group politico-economic competition already outlined. I discuss this in further detail below.

7.2.4. Commitment, indifference and polarization

We have seen that collective action has always been an indispensable part of the life of the squatter camp – from collective land invasions, to nightly patrols, to gathering to protest or complete affidavits for court action. It has been a fundamental practice in actively constituting squatter political identity both in Jeffsville and Brazzaville. It is staged once again in protest marches, in which squatters act collectively in pursuit of the dignity of citizenship. One of the most prevalent complaints about foreigners focused on their failure to contribute to the collective struggle for better living conditions – a failure considered exploitative since they reap the benefits of social mobilization along with everyone else:

They say these people [foreigners], when we go to march, they don’t go there. They say they’re not belonging to this... they are here for business. [...] They say OK, because they are here for business, we have to work for them [by mobilizing for improvements]. Now we’re going to punish them.337

This statement makes an interesting reflection on how established-newcomer relations echo

336 Key informant, Jeffsville, 30 July 2012
337 Male resident 1, Brazzaville, 28/06/2012
the power relations between the collective and the individual in liquid modernity. As tenants, newcomers are those who consume property in the settlement rather than producing it; in the quotation above they are seen as consuming livelihood opportunities in the settlement without participating in the reproduction of the space that sustains that livelihood. They are seen not to ‘belong’ – not in a primordial sense, but in the sense of refusing the political obligations and relations of reciprocity that belonging is felt to entail. It is important to notice that the statement ‘they’re not belonging to this’ is juxtaposed not with any primordial alternative identity or form of belonging such as ethnicity or nationality, but with their individual business interests. Deliberate non-belonging – that is, the refusal to perform belonging through collective action – is seen to express freedom from want and from political obligation. The burden of collective life falls to some, while others collect the benefits. This emphasis on forms of political commitment and civic labour as the basis of authentic membership was reiterated over and over again by different respondents:

... the issue is in terms of attendance. Some of these foreigners would ignore the call for the meetings and continue with their business [...] And when things are fixed they would be first felt by those same people yet we are the ones who attend meetings. 338

... the reason they would try to evict them is because if there is a vote, people from South Africa would maybe stand in a queue and vote, whereas those people would not do anything, so they think that they’re living for free here. 339

In fact, foreign newcomers do not have the right to vote in South Africa, and are perhaps unlikely to share in local struggles and political mobilizations. For many foreign newcomers, the political project of the host community will be at best secondary to the immediate need to establish a life in South Africa, or at worst entirely irrelevant. Having no direct stake in local struggles, the political struggles of many remain elsewhere, often in fragile states beyond South Africa’s borders – as it happens, leaders in Jeffsville have assisted ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) and Frelimo (Mozambique) election campaigns in the settlement since 2008. 340 Therefore, foreigners’ pursuit of shelter and livelihoods in South Africa, though it appears as a common plight with poor local squatters, does not contain the same collective political claim for dignity and inclusion in citizenship’s community of rights, as it does for squatter citizens. Added to the political indifference of foreign newcomers are the felt effects of their subsistence tactics, which also have a political dimension, as expressed by a woman who complained of foreigners’ lack of concern about unfair casual labour dynamics and working conditions:

338 Male respondent, Mshongo, 27/10/2008
339 Key informant, Vergenoeg, 20/07/2012
340 Male respondent, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
...they don’t care if you want houses, they are just there to make money. And they will accept any money. If they get a job they will accept R50 or R100 per week. They don’t care.  

The assertion that foreigners “don’t care” what they are paid – that they are indifferent to collective principles around fair working conditions and are willing to subject themselves to abhorrent labour contracts in order to earn a living – could be interpreted as evidence of their vulnerability and powerlessness, but here that indifference is interpreted as a mark of individual power being exercised against the interests of community. The priority foreign newcomers purportedly attach to ‘making money’ renders collective priorities secondary; thus, they will continue to work regardless of the demands collective action places on those around them; regardless of the extent to which their labour conditions erode the rule of laws established to uphold the dignity of citizens as workers. This echoes recent findings by Hickel, who found anti-foreigner sentiments in Masiphumelele, Cape Town to be centred on rejection of the moral economy of “the ideal neoliberal subject” (Hickel, 2014, p. 121) which immigrants were seen to embody, thus eroding the conditions for social reproduction – with worrying implications for migrants connecting shallowly with host communities in an individually advantageous “tactical cosmopolitanism” (Landau & Freemantle, 2009, p. 380). Speaking of Somali shopkeepers who continue to operate their shops during community protests, a Brazzaville leader noted:

If you say people let’s go, let’s march, let’s fight, he going to get cross with foreigners – they are keeping, they’re benefiting themselves in shops.

Lack of commitment appears as a betrayal of the political community, and the financial gain that accrues to the uncommitted as a result of their indifference heightens the sense of outrage.

The link to foreigners ‘care’ or political commitment may help explain why several respondents insisted that violence against foreigners occurs only during marches. Foreigners are often seen as convenient ‘soft targets’ for popular anger, but this obscures a deeper politics to the violence as a solidarity born of politicized suffering polarizes the committed and the uncommitted. There is a ‘politics of proximity’ (Selmeczi, 2012) intrinsic to the collective experience of suffering and resisting together, which increases social distance from non-participants. Beyond this, protest mobilization relies on similar repertoires and evokes the
insurgent subjectivity of the ‘struggle’ years, with the same coercive strategies to build solidarity, the same iconography of revolt (such as burning tyres), the same tradition of singing revolutionary songs.

It is very clearly not a simple ethno-racial hatred that motivates collective attacks on shops. Nor is it simply a case of opportunistic looting, although certainly that did occur. The attacks clearly also relate to the idea that non-citizen newcomers take from the community without giving; that they benefit without contributing; that they are indifferent to the unfinished struggle of the squatters for citizenship. Of course, this idea echoes well-worn prejudices – rumbles about migrants ‘taking our jobs’ and the like are heard everywhere that anti-immigrant sentiment is expressed. We usually read these as the exclusionary voice of the privileged national, raised against the disadvantaged migrant in the absence of reason or evidence, but these findings give pause to consider the prejudice we may be guilty of if we too glibly dismiss the claims of the (infra-)citizen. Paradoxically, we have seen that despite their position as victims of the structural exclusion inherent in non-citizen status, foreign newcomers are perceived as exercising powers in their individual capacities that damage the collective cause of citizenship. Ironically, it appears to be precisely in their justifiable pursuit of survival as individuals structurally excluded from the community of citizens that brings newcomers into conflict with the community. In the final section of this chapter, I consider evidence of lay theories of political life that further illuminate this paradox.

7.3. Meaningful membership in a multi-scalar world: the national and the global in the parochial

...the freedom of the citizen is expressed most importantly in its institutionally founded distinction against others, both nationally and globally. (Franke, 2011, pp. 47-48)

Several scholars have argued that the 2008 ‘xenophobic’ attacks originated in exclusionary narratives produced by political elites (Hayem, 2013; Neocosmos, 2008). However, given the entanglement of the personal and the political in the squatter camp, it is important to consider also how ‘xenologies’ (Bhatt, 2012) – a more helpful term that ‘xenophobia’, which allows room for the potential rationality of anti-outsider feeling – are produced from the bottom up. This may provide space to understand narratives of outsider status beyond their instrumental use in service of holding or obtaining power, as expressions of lay theory produced in the
realm of the everyday, which is always already embedded in larger scale politics and structural power relations. In this section, I draw on some revealing reflections by respondents which I see as artefacts of lay theory. By taking citizenship seriously as a moderator of equality and an instrument for the management of scale relations in a world that is simultaneously local, national and global, these lay theories destabilize some prevalent assumptions within sociology about the linkages between xenology and racism, autochthony, or alternatively chauvinism or fascist nationalism.

**7.3.1. A father’s promise: the personal in the political; the (inter)national in the local**

I will start with a reflection by a longstanding resident and one-time leader in Brazzaville as he tried to explain the popular antagonism to foreigners. What struck me was the way in which he chose an analogy of the state with the family to explain why members would not be pleased to welcome newcomers on an equal footing. This was consistent with the tradition of discursive renderings of the state as a parent, encapsulated in terms like “mother country” and “fatherland,” and indeed in the construct of “natal entitlement” (De Genova, 2008, p. 46) that infamously accompanies nativist/autochthonous politics. Yet in this context the analogy also offered a fascinating insight into lay views on the relationship between citizen and state, and of how the notion of the ‘outsider’ is produced in relation to it:

> Now, let me come back into this question, Tamlyn. Let’s say you’ve got four children. Now these four children are yours. Now you get another six outside, coming, or moving into your house? How are you going to manage four plus six, how much will it be? [...] Because you couldn’t manage for your four kids. This, we, people of South Africa now, we are crying about it. We are saying our government cannot support us, or cannot do for us everything we want. But the government, our government, it now doesn’t care how many foreigners are here.  

The fact that the respondent perceives the infiltration of the family as disproportionate to the family’s size and resources – six orphans to four existing children – is certainly, from an empirical perspective, inaccurate at the level of national aggregation; according to the 2011 census, only 9% of the squatter population are foreign-born. However, the respondent is one of the earliest squatters in Brazzaville and previously lived in a workers hostel in Atteridgeville. In the squatter camp, where squatters originating from Atteridgeville township are perceived as being about 5% of the population, high levels of in-migration in proportion to the

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344 Key informant in interview with male resident, Brazzaville, 09/07/2012
345 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
remaining established residents probably magnifies the perception of being overwhelmed by newcomers.

Several things become apparent in this analogy. First, there is an assertion that the protection of the family/state cannot be infinitely extended without a corollary decline in what can be offered to members. From the vantage point of an elite university in the heart of an ex-colonial power, and from a discipline in which cosmopolitanism is valorized above parochialism, this may appear as an expression of conservatism, nationalism or simple prejudice. It is worth remembering the physical and social context in which this lay theory is being expounded: the respondent and I are walking along a dirt road in Brazzaville; we have to tread carefully through a significant body of water that has pooled across the road near the leaking water tank from which residents collect their water in buckets or used cooldrink bottles. The respondent, who is 70 years old, picks up bottles along the way, which he collects for recycling in order to earn an income. Having lived in Brazzaville for 14 years, he does not yet have electricity. His entire ‘house’ is about the size of my bedroom in a London terrace. Presumably, this is the cognitive frame for a home he is calling upon when he conjures up an image of a family with four children, aptly reflective of the congestion and constraint experienced within a shack settlement.

The idea of having four children in this environment of structural unemployment (55% of South African-born squatters had not worked for any form of pay in the week prior to their participation in the 2011 Census), sketches a picture of overstretched resources – an apt analogy for the legacy of accumulation by dispossession faced by the new regime in 1994, which we saw in the troubles the Transvaal Provincial Authority had as early as 1988 in identifying sufficient land for current claimants as it tried to account for growing demand up until the year 2020. Some deny that immigration is a zero-sum game by reference to the aggregated impact on migration on developmental indicators (Jonathan Crush & Frayne, 2007, p. 7), and indeed the view of an economy as a “fixed lump” has been problematized as one that will inevitably produce conflict (Steinberg, 2011, p. 9). However, we need nevertheless to consider whether at the level where anti-foreigner mobilization occurs, this survivalist paradigm may be more than a dubious ‘belief’ to be countered as popular mythology. South Africa remains, from the vantage point of the squatter, a state that “can’t manage for its four kids.” Given that the state faces such apparent difficulties in providing the basic services associated with urban life to longstanding residents, it is presented as irresponsible to

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welcome further members into the family, that is, the originary political relationship. Indeed, the suggestion is that if the six ‘adopted’ children survive, the four ‘biological’ children will not.

Second, there is an assertion of the natural priority due to children by their parents, and by extension due to citizens by the state to which they belong. At first, I read this as a ‘naturalizing’ assertion of originary belonging, but on further thought realized that it is an apt analogy in a world of states into which citizens are thrown by the ‘lottery of birth’. One is thrown into an originary political relation to a territory – that is, land occupied by power (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 66;79) – a relation from which one cannot escape in many parts of the world. Borders, visas, carrier sanctions and the like are for many the prison bars of state membership. Money or a Western/Northern identity document provide some freedom of choice in this relation, denaturalizing it, so to speak, but for the African subaltern, mired not only in the South African state but also in the squatter camp of Mshongo, it seems valid to assert a form of originary relation similar to that between a child and a parent. It describes a primary relationship which designates the threshold for what form of life is eligible for protection (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 104). The “four kids” deserve as much as you can manage to give them, since they “are yours”; belonging to the state in an originary political relationship.

The analogy expresses the personal-political character of the squatter camp not only in using the intimacy of the family as an analogy for political membership, but also because it designates squatters as children – those family members least independent and individualized; whose fates rest almost entirely on the beneficence or negligence of parents/the state. This is an interesting portrait of political subjects who do not fit the individualism of a global ‘liquid modernity’ in which the effective biopolitical administration of life has freed the individual from the necessity of communitarian politics (Z. Bauman, 2012); from the tyranny of the collective. To use Esposito’s language of bios and immunity, the individual in this portrait of the family is not immune, not self-sufficient, and therefore mired in the collective with no resources for advancement but that collective.

Third, following from the issue taken with welcoming more members into the originary relationship, it is clear from this analogy that grievances about foreigners do not focus on the person of the additional members, but on the status of the relationship between the children/citizens and the parent/state. The respondent does not qualify the additional children as being rejected due to racial or cultural difference. Indeed, they are acknowledged in this analogy simply as other children, equally human, equally needy, perhaps orphaned, deprived
of their own parent/state. The ‘other’ children are simply those who will make the same claims on the parent/state as the other children/citizens, and it is their claim to share in the same rights and goods as the children/citizens that is taken issue with here. The analogy of the children within a family surrounded by an ‘outside’ depicts the citizen within the state within a wider world. It is echoed more recognisably in the following statement:

what frustrated us, was that people from the outside [the respondent confirmed this meant foreigners, not internal migrants] were just coming in South Africa, and South Africa couldn’t control them. 347

In this sense, the idea of the child, within the family, within ‘the outside’, embeds the personal-political life of the squatter within a national and international context. With its assertion of the need for a membership limit to be set in order to make the best possible life available to the ‘first-order’ children, the analogy implicitly expresses a nostalgia for a modernity that has not yet been realized in post-apartheid South Africa. For the protections afforded to the modern citizen by the state have depended not only on the monopolization of legitimate coercion but, even more so, the monopolization of the legitimate means of mobility (Torpey, 1998).

Of course, this may appear as a nostalgia for the mobility controls of apartheid, with its eminently modern regulation of the boundary between first-order and second-order members. I would argue, however, that this does not give the citizen/foreigner division a racial overtone; rather, apartheid modernity appears merely as the most proximate example of how the protection of ‘first-order’ citizens should function. In support of this claim, the same image of excessive permeability was similarly expressed by a Mozambique-born leader in Jeffsville in 2008. This established ‘foreigner’ not only expounded a similar logic of the priority due citizens by the state, and of the link between the evictions and squatters’ incomplete citizenship, but pointed towards the global protectionism in immigration policy to problematize indiscriminate tolerance of cross-border migration in the context of a stratified South African citizenry:

If the truth be told, our government is to blame. 2010 is approaching but the promise that living in shacks will end has not been fulfilled. […] government had not prepared to deal with the problem of foreigners, how to handle the problem of housing when it comes to foreign nationals […] there is no other country that can keep such a large number of foreigners, it’s too much. For this thing to start, it is because of promises, even when a child goes to school and as a father you

347 Key informant in interview with male resident, Brazzaville, 9 July 2012
promise that if they pass you will do something for them, they do not forget. The child works hard and is always mindful of your promise.\[348\]

Once again, we have an image of the citizen as child and the state as ‘father’, with the claim that popular violence occurs because of “promises” that the citizenry “do not forget.” Unsurprisingly, the ‘promise’ of de facto citizenship is seen to be achieved through the child’s “hard work,” which is always directed towards the promised reward of formal inclusion.

Both of these reflections capture a sense of the political as profoundly personal, of political community as intimacy and obligation, and of the inseparable interweaving of the local, national and international into political sociology at this most parochial level. The choice of the family, and the supervised passage from childhood to adulthood, as a metaphor of squatter experience, brings to mind Arendt’s observations on the necessity of community for the realization of equality:

‘Equality,’ she wrote, ‘in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but is the result of human organization... We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights... (Arendt cited in Owens, 2009, pp. 576-577)

Arendt also observed the necessity of group boundaries to the realization of rights, asserting that one loses human rights in the process of being rendered apolitically ‘human’; simply “a human being in general” (Arendt cited in Owens, 2009, pp. 576-577). This is exactly the process depicted when children lose their special status as members of a particular family and are subsumed instead into the wider category of ‘children in need.’ For this reason I want to emphasize once again that ‘xenophobic’ mobilization cannot be reduced to a simple failure of cosmopolitanism – a failure of inclusivity and egalitarianism. Cosmopolitanism would insist on the moral arbitrariness of group characteristics in determining interests – a position tenable from the point of view of a global elite in the developed world whose asymmetrical political and material power in relation to the marginal citizens of developing nations is palpable. But for squatters, the quest for full citizenship is far from morally arbitrary, since their second-class citizenship is a vestige of a particular history of structural racism. In addition to this, squatters do not possess the rights cosmopolitanism would expect them to extend to others. By viewing citizenship as a stable category, cosmopolitanism wrongly assumes that citizens “both have homes, and are at home, in their state”(Franke, 2011, p. 52). It fails to register that a citizen

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348 Mozambican male resident, Mshongo, 20/10/2008
may, him or herself, remain in the position of the displaced and is therefore unable to extend their emplacement outwards to other displaced subjects (Franke, 2011, p. 51).

7.3.2. From squatter camp to refugee camp? Tensions between political and exceptional space

That the displaced person may be genuinely understood by the citizen as also human – even as a citizen of humanity – does not bring the citizen any closer to responding equally to the claims of others... humanity is insufficient for membership in the political community of the citizen (Owens 2004: p.299). Moreover, in his or her mere humanity, a manner of being not already organised into defensible political community, it is against the displaced person that the citizen must most protect her- or himself... (Franke, 2011, pp. 47-48)

In one of my final interviews in the field, the political relevance of the mingling of established and newcomer squatters in Mshongo was given greater depth in an emotionally charged outburst by a member of the African Anti-Xenophobia Association in Jeffsville. Coming from a leader who had been active in attempts to reintegrate displaced foreigners and establish a record of their losses in the hope of promised reparations from the state, I was taken aback by the unexpected outburst of frustration at the fact that Mshongo was becoming, in his view, “a refugees camp”:

Why don’t you ask yourself if the influx on a daily basis of people from outside countries, where do they end? ... Rural areas and squatter camp....[where there’s] not so many police, you understand. So the squatter camp has been identified as a sort by the United Nations. They told us point blank that squatter camp has been identified as a sort of refugees camp. So every refugee flood into the squatter camp. We’ve got Somalis, Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Ghananians [sic], Pakistaniens [sic], Ethiopians, in the squatter camp. You can see with your own eyes. So we sharing the infrastructure. It’s no longer a service we have started long time ago that we go there as an aim of government aiding us for houses. No, it’s no longer the same. It’s a refugees camp.

It is clear from his reference to the UN that the respondent has been party to negotiations with the UNHCR and similar stakeholders to ‘anti-xenophobia’ work in the settlement, which has included goodwill games, a cleansing ceremony with the slaughter of cattle to ritually cleanse the settlement, and a social cohesion intervention by the Nelson Mandela Foundation to name but a few. Paradoxically, despite his horror at the 2008 attacks, his role in seeking redress for victims and the fact that he has been victimized himself for advocating on behalf of foreign tenants, the respondent was expressing a clear and intense negative view of the impact of foreign in-migration on squatter territory. Or rather, he appeared to be searching for an absent language to articulate such a view. At the time I failed to see why, for someone who
clearly recognized the humanity of victims of the 2008 attacks, this equivalence between the squatter camp and the refugee camp should constitute such an emotive problem. At the surface level it appeared petty or jealous, a refusal to ‘share’ infrastructure; a conservative desire to keep things ‘the same’ and exclude ‘refugees’. It was only in a detached analysis of the interview transcription that I recognized the logic of this disjunctive exclamation and its coherence with the larger political story of the squatters. Where other respondents articulated the implicit political impact of migrants in compromising the boundaries of the state’s protective embrace of citizens, this statement, and its discursive context, expressed the explicit political impact of a growing population of vulnerable migrants: its capacity to permanently strip all squatters of political life.

For 22 years? It’s a loophole for the government… It’s no longer squatting.349

In his concept of an enduring ‘loophole for government’, we find something better resembling Agamben’s concept of the Camp. Whereas squatting is conceived as a short-lived, tactical act expressing political agency, the experience of indefinite stasis in the confines of the threshold space is something else, something difficult to articulate, but certainly not the political act of squatting. It is, as he says, a ‘refugees camp’ in which pertinent social and political distinctions have disappeared into a single category of ‘the underprivileged’: “they tell you it’s their policy. Everyone who lives in the squatter camp is underprivileged so there’s no need for one to pay rent.”350 This is illustrated in his discourse by the example of tenants being told they owe nothing to squatter landlords – newcomers being “empowered on behalf of other people’s property.”351 This well-intentioned, humanitarian move cements the impression that established squatters’ claims to land have lost recognition and that what was a transitional and temporary space has become in the eyes of policymakers a permanent exception. Here, the subject of humanitarian assistance replaces the subject of citizenship, negating established political subjectivities and disabling political agency.

Once again, time is a key factor in this transformation. The settlements originated as temporary territories established as instruments for the claiming of urban space and the exercise of political life, with a view to improvement or transition over time. The opening up of this temporary space of exception – initiated both at the level of provincial government and at the ‘grassroots’ level of township organizing – fostered dynamic claims for political and material goods of membership in the South African state. It was a far cry from the politically

349 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
350 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
351 Male resident, Jeffsville, 19/08/2012
negating instrument of subjection upon which Agamben’s analysis of the Camp is based. Like the death camps that form the basis of Agamben’s philosophy, the squatter camps were territorial manifestations of a state of exception; but unlike the Nazi camps, the agency in opening up these spaces came both from the subject and from the sovereign; they were not a ‘pure’ expression of sovereignty as subjection but consisted in the coercive force of mass agency and the province’s utilitarian response. Indeed, the province’s tolerance of further exceptions can be seen as evidence of an “underlying allegiance to the idea of preserving life at both the level of the individual and that of the community” (Das, 2011, p. 330).

The refugee camp, on the other hand, is an example par excellence of the camp as conceived by Agamben as a place simultaneously inside and outside the remit of the law, in which individuals are subject to the law but denied political life, becoming hominis sacri (Agamben, 1998, pp. 131-134; Diken & Laustsen, 2005, pp. 87-88; Owens, 2009, p. 572). The refugee camp represents a site of radically limited political agency, given that the very “category ‘refugee’ in international law and policy signifies a human condition that occupies a space external to the political community of the nation state” (Daley, 2013, p. 895). Refugees are reduced to an explicitly humanitarian rather than political problem, and addressed in that capacity as subjects outside the realm of politics, requiring only that care “which maintains ‘bare life’” (Daley, 2013, p. 896) as “innocent, ahistorical, apolitical victims” (Turner in Daley, 2013, p. 899). Yet to treat them as such – as a population warranting treatment in their general attributes as humans rather than in their particular attributes as citizens and non-citizens; earlier and later arrivers – is to invalidate their produced claims to rights, and to transform their particular claims into general claims that, rather than protecting their rights, actually removes the possibility of their realization:

The conflation of citizens’ rights with human rights can actually obstruct the political empowerment and participation of citizens, in that the goals of political community become harnessed to ideals far beyond the political scope of citizenship. (Franke, 2011, p. 46)

As Arendt and others have argued, essentially in distinction to Agamben’s negative view of politics (Owens, 2009), human rights are only realizable within political communities and not in our capacity as individual humans:

‘The Paradox involved in the loss of human rights’, she wrote, ‘is that such loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general.’ (Arendt cited in Owens, 2009, pp. 576-577)
If “the loss of one’s grasp on political society effectively entails also one’s expulsion from humanity” (Arendt 1973, p.296-7 cited in Franke, 2011, p. 45), then Agamben’s negating appraisal of political life cannot offer an alternative vision for the realization of justice. Rights of citizenship are similarly universalizable rights, but, unlike human rights, they are attached to specific sites from which to claim “dignity, agency and freedom” (Franke, 2011, p. 46), in which practical jurisdiction exists for the implementation of rights protection. In the cases I have examined, it is clear that the sites within which rights claims have historically been embedded are twofold: they are embedded first within the territory of the state in the political identity of the citizen (defined in Agamben’s terms as those belonging in the realm of bios, or that form of life which is eligible for protection) and then within the territory of the squatter camp – the local site from which claims for citizenship have been made, and the legitimacy of claims temporally structured.

“Enabling political ‘agency’ is not ‘a romantic argument’, but a recognition that sustainable solutions lie not with humanitarian interventions, but in the capacity for people to champion their rights within the local and national space, and a recognition of the lived realities of the displaced, which often transcend national boundaries and the citizen-refugee divide – and may suggest new ways of imagining the political community” (Daley, 2013, p. 909)

From this point of view, the respondent’s emotional response to the idea that the squatter camp has become a ‘refugees camp’ may be understood beyond the ascriptive idea of the foreigner or refugee as a marker of primordial or ethnic difference. It can instead be understood as a response to the political disablement that can result when a territory established for the claiming of citizens’ rights becomes through in-migration a territory for the claiming of more general human rights. Life in such a ‘refugees camp’ involves, for the citizen, a loss of belonging to the political community of the citizen in favour of belonging to the moral community of the human. This places the ‘unfinished’ citizen once again outside the political community. Here, the infra-citizen has “no site from which to claim its dignity, agency and freedom” (Franke, 2011, p. 46).

7.4. Conclusion

Instead, in examining the context from which attacks on foreign newcomers emerged, we are reminded of Gieryn’s assertion that place “is not merely a setting or backdrop, but an agentic player in the game – a force with detectable and independent effects on social life” (Gieryn, 2000, p. 466). As Gieryn notes, place is a combination of geographic location, material form
and meaning or value. Understanding how place intersects with “social practices and structures, norms and values, power and inequality, difference and distinction” requires an understanding of “how places come into being” and “what places accomplish” (Gieryn, 2000, p. 468). In this chapter we have seen that, to comprehend the meaning of ‘xenophobic’ evictions in Mshongo, we must register that politics is ‘placed’ at more than one scale, and that political identities are emplaced both locally and nationally through their relation to the agency of local and national territories, which are understood to accomplish certain political ends that are intimately related to the historical ‘coming into being’ of these territories.

We have seen that the settlements of Mshongo were established through collective labour as a route to political life and de facto citizenship, and we can clearly identify the thread of the same unfinished struggle in incidences of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization. That this local pursuit of inclusion is embedded in a larger-scale understanding of the state’s obligations to its unfinished citizens – the ‘children’ it has yet to raise up – was evident in lay understandings of the boundaries of membership in the state. Social changes, such as the arrival of migrants with little attachment to the original purpose of a place, can threaten to subsume the history and meaning of place into a humanitarian or developmental discourse that displaces the emplaced struggle for equal citizenship. While this is a distinct phenomenon from that of prepolitical claims of autochthony, it does affirm the way in which globalization, mobility and democratization have contributed to preoccupations with belonging that have been analysed under that rubric (Geschiere, 2009, p. 6; Nieftagodien, 2011, p. 111).

Importantly, we have also seen in this chapter the relationship between ‘xenophobic’ mobilization and the exhaustion of the idea of transition, which provided the context for a reactivation of latent modes of collective action to demand the anticipated goods of citizenship. The collective practices used to pursue these claims created palpable tensions between the communitarian politics of squatters and the apparent individualism of foreign newcomers. Foreigners, who were stereotyped as the main economic beneficiaries of the squatter camp, were also seen to exempt themselves from reciprocal suffering and display indifference to the settlements’ primary purpose as vehicles for the realization of citizenship, while contributing to the suffering of living politics by monopolizing the retail market. These collective practices also created contexts in which scripts for collective violence and denunciation of non-participants were ready and waiting, and once set off space became available for the development of endogenous violence such as opportunistic looting, revenge
attacks and misadventure. In this sense, ‘xenophobic’ attacks can come to mean both more and less than prevailing interpretations allow.
8. Conclusion: Reflecting on Exclusion at the Threshold of Citizenship

I began this thesis by reflecting on the phenomenon of collective ‘xenophobic violence’ in South Africa. Yet the focus of the study is neither violence nor ‘xenophobia’ as such. Instead, using a specific set of spatial and temporal coordinates, it has mined the referent ‘xenophobic violence’ in search of its political significations. Concerned about the depoliticising tendencies of explanations that focus on individual pathology/criminality; elite instrumentality/manipulation; and aggregated variables such as race and class, I set out in this study to seek a political explanation for the strong association between ‘xenophobic violence’ and informal residence in South Africa (Fauvelle-Aymar & Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2012). Hence, the focus of this thesis came to rest on the politics of the squatter citizen; the ‘bird without wings’. In essence, it has illustrated the historical, spatial and political processes that have held squatters on a threshold neither inside nor outside citizenship, and how this ‘infra-citizenship’ has contributed to a politics of exclusion that is inseparable from a claim for a long-awaited inclusion. Drawing on Mamdani’s insistence on political identity as the root of popular agency in violent mobilizations, I have worked across different analytical scales, using different methods and different types of data, to present a set of forces – both top-down and bottom up; both repressive and productive – that have contoured the emergence of a distinct politics and set of collective political practices among squatters in South Africa. Working from the proposition that state practices have a central role in defining even counterpolitical identities, I used archival material to sketch the conflicting roles of national and provincial government in shaping the larger-scale context within which squatter movements emerged and persisted, before moving to the local scale of a double embedded case study where I explored bottom-up practices, repertoires of collective mobilization, and the changing political meaning of place over the transition to democracy, in order to produce an inductive understanding of the politics of collective ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in the settlements.

In Chapter 3, I illustrated the emplacement of political and socio-economic inequality through the apartheid state’s techniques of differentiation, segregation and documentation linked to spatial ordering at national, city, and township levels. The legislative, institutional and physical structures produced by this system of rule sought to deactivate the political subjectivity of ‘black’ South Africans and produce docile bodies defined by their utility to the modern state,
rather than their membership of it. In so doing, the state introduced a tension between impulses to exclude and include 'black' citizens in 'white' urban space, implanting an irresolvable ambiguity at the core of the racial state project, which consistently re-emerged to destabilise it. For instance, I explored the 'township-homeland nexus' of exceptional spaces, showing how townships, though designed to contain and marginalize the 'black' infra-citizen within the 'white' city, produced an ambiguous, interstitial counterpolitics, disrupting the state's spatial order and compelling it to seek new and different techniques of managing 'surplus' life.

In Chapter 4, I examined some counter-currents to national strategies, through which squatting became an avenue for the claiming of fuller citizenship by those defined as 'surplus'. Here, the national political context outlined in Chapter 3 provided the background for understanding the significance of squatter placemaking as an insurgent, bottom-up political practice produced by the interstitial politics of the township-homeland nexus. Focusing on Cabinet Committee discussions of the high-profile Kruispad (Crossroads) squatter camp during the 1980s, I illustrated how, through squatting, 'surplus' people exercised a practice of insurgent citizenship by laying claim to peripheral spaces in the 'white' city. The squatter camp was a physical manifestation of a counterpolitical identity, being both an insurgent response to, and a terrain on which to resist, the spatial strategies of rule that defined many 'black' citizens as an unwanted 'surplus' and reproduced their exclusion through controls on movement and township development.

In the same chapter, I showed how, as the racial stratification of citizenship through racial space and mobility controls became more difficult to sustain by the national-level state, the figure of the squatter came to replace the figure of 'surplus black' person as the unwanted excess to be held outside the bounds of the city. In an attempt to bring the ambiguous space of the squatter camp back into its nexus of containment, the national-level state produced amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 1988 that admitted existing squatters into township containment and redirected urban exclusion from the 'black' body in general to the 'squatter' body, through which future unwanted 'black' urbanization would be manifested. While this change had the advantage of 'depoliticising' state control measures at a time when the national government was becoming careful to manage its international reputation, the motivation for the change was deeply political. Turning the force of the law on the squatter was a strategy by the national state to sustain the unequal distribution of citizens' rights to the city in a more justifiable guise; rein in existing insurgent squatter territories through processes
of formalization; and preclude the formation of new interstitial territories through the popular agency of squatters. Yet in contrast to the negative potentialities of the state's repressive and productive powers, embodied in this rather cynical legislative change, I also illustrate the persistence of positive modalities of power, embodied by the deliberate policy choices of the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA). The TPA chose not to implement its negative, repressive powers and thereby transformed the productive powers of anti-squatter legislation into powers to produce space in the city for apartheid’s ‘surplus people,’ opening an avenue of transition to greater inclusion. This notion of the exceptional space as a (temporary) site of transition, which was geared to remedy inequality, ran counter to nihilistic assessments of exceptionalism. However, the specific temporality and structure of anticipation that ‘transition’ space opened up became an important theme in my subsequent analysis of ethnographic data from the case-study sites, in which ‘permanent temporariness’ would eventually change the meaning of the squatter camp.

I moved to the local level in Chapters 5 to 7, in which I explored the embedded sites of Jeffsville and Brazzaville in the large informal settlement of Mshongo in the township of Atteridgeville, which fell within the province of Transvaal prior to democracy, and the newly produced province of Gauteng from 1994. Chapter 5 investigated the theme of political community in the case sites both before and after the first democratic elections in South Africa. The effects of apartheid’s racial and spatial stratification on squatter politics, as discussed in Chapter 3, was clearly evident in the analysis, as was the link between the notion of transition and the faultlines that emerged in the structure of identity politics in the contestation of rights to space in the vicinity of Brazzaville. The chapter shows how ‘squatter’ political identity was instantiated and reproduced through the collective struggle and repertoires of communal solidarity that produced and sustained squatter territory.

Consequently, the identity of ‘squatter’ came to have an originary (though not primordial) quality, in which membership was produced through common hardship and collective activity rather than by date of arrival or place of ‘origin.’ Nevertheless, this construction of belonging was fractured by the chronological, ‘waiting list’ structure of formalization that by necessity prioritized for inclusion those who had waited longest. However, the fractures in squatter political identity seem only to have materialized as contention at a time where the salience of these identities was magnified by uneven opportunities to realize the hope of a transition to greater de facto citizenship (in an echo of Tilly, 2003: 76-77).
Transition was an emplaced temporality, and in Chapter 6 I illustrated how this notion appears to have emptied out over time. The long passage of time and transformation of place through population growth, social fragmentation, and the emergence of micro-inequalities between established and newcomer squatters gave rise to a felt sense of perpetual exposure to ambiguity in a place on the threshold of citizenship. The temporary suspension of standards adopted by the TPA, which opened up the squatter-camp-in-transition as a zone of indistinction in order to facilitate transition, became ever more permanent over the course of two decades, turning Mshongo into a 'threshold space' whose ambiguous relationship with the law creates multiple vectors for the erosion of the quality of citizenship among squatters, preventing the realization of material, legal and political rights associated with membership of the state. The marginality that was once a tool to remedy infra-citizenship now functions to reproduce it. Failure to even out inherited asymmetries in socio-economic and political status and capabilities has transformed the meaning of the squatter camp. No longer a place of temporary and tolerable exception pending a much-anticipated transition to more equal citizenship/access to the city, the settlements now loom for some as places of permanent temporariness; a terminal point in the struggle for equal citizenship; a case where the exception has become the rule and the squatter camp finally threatens to become the life-denying camp that Agamben theorized so incisively.  

I argued that the threshold space of the squatter camp, teetering on the boundary between protection and abandonment, is a fertile site for conflict over what form of life is eligible for protection. This is all the more so in an interstitial realm where tenure status, rights and obligations are uncertain and subject to change without notice; where the realms of the public and the private are densely enmeshed; and where the social field has been historically saturated by violence.

Chapter 7 focused on the context and logic of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization in Mshongo. Commencing with a description of collective mobilizations against foreigners, I proceeded to unpack the rise of established-newcomer stratification in the settlements over time. I demonstrated its links to material and social change, blockages in the access routes to transition, and the re-emergence of insurgent practices, which reactivated latent modes of collective action and historical scripts for collective violence and denunciation of non-participants. At the same time, I demonstrated how palpable tensions emerged between the communitarian politics of squatters and the apparent individualism of foreign newcomers in Mshongo as the latter performed political indifference during collective action, reinforcing the

352 However, as an largely inductive researcher alive to the heterogeneity of political life, I consider Agamben’s application of the concept of the camp to the whole of contemporary to overly aggregating.
polarizing effect of foreign predominance in the informal retail market. This tension perfectly illustrates the politics of place, because places are used as agents to accomplish different purposes by different actors. This can give rise to contention, especially where the deployment of place for individual, economic ends is seen to compromise its deployment for collective, political ends. In the same chapter I also elaborated and analysed lay theories of political community through which squatter citizens legitimized an exclusionary order of citizenship. I argued that squatter politics is ‘placed’ at more than one scale; in an echo of Nieftagodien’s findings in Alexandra (Nieftagodien, 2011), political identities are emplaced both locally and nationally. I suggest that this occurs through their relation to the agency of local and national territories, which are understood to accomplish certain political ends that are intimately related to the historical ‘coming into being’ of these territories. In this context, well-intentioned interventions aimed at equalising the distribution of rights in such settlements can threaten to subsume the history and meaning of place into a humanitarian or developmental trajectory that displaces the emplaced struggle for equal citizenship.

8.1. Rereading ‘xenophobic’ mobilization

This thesis offers a useful contribution to the literature and public debate on the phenomenon of ‘xenophobic’ violence in South Africa. It does so in several ways. Taking a first step towards understanding the potential political factors that might explain the significant association between informal residence and the incidence of ‘xenophobic’ violence, the thesis extends the distinctive work of Von Holdt et al (2011) in its explicit treatment of citizenship as a variable rather than a universal attribute of nationals, and indeed as a variable that may have a qualitative explanatory power in our debates over this issue. I found that ‘xenophobic’ mobilization arose out of socio-political tensions between, on the one hand, citizens mired in material decline, social immobility, collective obligation and waiting, and, on the other, apparently indifferent non-citizens whose material advancement, individual freedom and realization of key elements of the ‘good life’ associated with citizenship was seen to be gained by free-riding on the political labour and suffering of others. The findings offer the basis for a critique of some popular arguments about the causes of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization. In 2008, established foreigner-born squatters were largely exempted from violence, so that the arguments placing race and ethnicity at the core of attacks (Gqola, 2008; Matsinhe, 2009, 2012; Mngxitama, 2008; Tafira, 2011) fail to explain the Atteridgeville case. The distinction made between the ‘newly arrived’ and the established foreigners, in addition, seems to go
beyond the discursive effects of elite ‘xenophobia’ or chauvinism (Hayem, 2013; Mosselson, 2010), since it adds unexpected nuance to the discursively reified category of the scapegoated ‘foreigner’. Finally, the argument that instrumental leaders plotted the attacks to bolster their own power and legitimacy (Misago et al., 2009) seems inadequate given reports of their resistance to the attacks and indeed the price they have paid for their potentially wrongful association with the violence: we saw that all have been blacklisted and prevented from organizing marches because of the ‘xenophobic’ disturbances caused during events they previously organized. While in Ramohlale’s case this may have been unexpected fallout, in the cases of other leaders who were blacklisted after attacks during mass actions in 2010 and 2011, it is difficult to imagine how these leaders could have seen fit to organize unrest that would in fact erode their already waning powers.

The thesis contributes to an emerging recognition of the ethical and political issues at work in incidences of collective mobilization against foreigners, which call into question the often received construct of ‘xenophobia’ to describe these phenomena (Kerr & Durrheim, 2013; Monson, 2012b; Von Holdt et al., 2011). It also helps to fill a gap in the literature through its empirical focus on the history, motives and mechanisms of popular agency, so essential in explaining a phenomenon which requires residents to turn out en masse to displace their neighbours. This focus on popular participation is to a large extent missing in the existing literature. My analysis of the squatter settlement as a radically ambiguous space saturated by violence and characterised by a distinct range of violent communal modes of collective action, by virtue of its position on the threshold of the law and of state power, usefully extends thinking on the relationship between ‘xenophobic’ and protest violence (Von Holdt et al., 2011). In addition, demonstrating the link between this legacy of collective action and contemporary collective mobilization against foreigners provides an important insight into why informal residence is particularly strongly associated with the incidence of collective mobilization against non-nationals. The focus on the construct of the squatter – understood as an active claimant of political, physical and social space in the city – is an improvement on aggregated constructions of the ‘subaltern’ (Glaser, 2008), or ‘the poor’ (Alexander, 2010), not only in the general sense that there is differentiation among even these marginal groups (Von Holdt et al., 2011), but also because squatting encompasses notions of collective labour and suffering tied to the physical, social and temporal ordering of a particular place. This theme of place distinguishes the contribution of this thesis to work on the politics of shackdwellers in South Africa (Chance, 2011; Makhulu, 2010; Selmeczi, 2012). It is a theme that opens up space for further consideration of configurations of historical, political and spatial identifications that
have not been explored in accounting for ‘xenophobic’ mobilization – including those that occur in central business districts rather than informal settlements, as in the Durban attacks of April 2015.

Another distinctive contribution is the view the thesis provides of how the politics of ‘xenophobic’ exclusion arises due both to broader normative understandings of the political as primarily a vehicle for the protection of a pre-defined group of members (i.e. citizens), and more particular normative understandings of the purpose and meaning of a particular locality at a micro-scale. This sheds new light on our understanding the geographic distribution of ‘xenophobic’ mobilization, which has defied many more aggregated explanations (Misago, 2012; Misago et al., 2009).

8.2. Crossing broader conceptual thresholds

While on one hand the analysis appears very grounded in the specificities of a South African case, the findings gain a broader theoretical significance by illuminating areas of unresolved tension between key sociological concepts or frameworks of analysis, which become evident at the ‘threshold of citizenship’ described in this thesis. I will explore three of these here, presenting them once again as thresholds – sites of indeterminacy and ambiguity that sit uneasily within existing theoretical coordinates.

8.2.1. Between inclusion and exclusion

This research adds support to the recently asserted link between violent practices and struggles for inclusion in South Africa (Von Holdt et al., 2011, p. 24). In my analysis of contention structured by anteriority in Mshongo, I have engaged critically with conventional understandings of autochthony discourses as an assertion of the naturalness of one group’s belonging over another. In contrast to notions of autochthony as an appeal to the primordial, and therefore prepolitical, ‘rootedness’ of the subject, I argued for a notion of autochthony as a claim for the entitlements of first comers, structured both by investments of labour in the domestication of a place (which is seen to accrue into ‘autochthony as capital’), and by the institutional mechanisms that embed anteriority into material claims on the goods of citizenship. Presenting an alternative account of the meaning of ‘rootedness’, I suggest that in Mshongo it is synonymous with a disabling immobility, clearly distinct from the often used...
biological image of roots through which an authentic home territory sustains the subject, in which a “son of the soil” is one who is mired in a place that continually depletes rather than affirms their political life. From this perspective, squatters’ practices of exclusion are not oriented toward the protection of an existing membership status, but instead express a claim for such a status, which despite their de jure citizenship they have never yet achieved. In other words, exclusion at the threshold of citizenship can in fact express a claim for inclusion.

What is called ‘xenophobia’ in South Africa if often subsumed under the label of ‘racism’ elsewhere – for instance in historically racially homogenous countries that are now receiving migrants who are often visibly identifiable as ethno-racial others. Negative sentiment towards such new arrivals is often attributed to bigotry, racial/cultural stereotyping, and nationalist supremacism – all of which tend to imagine the ‘racist’ or ‘xenophobic’ subject as occupying a position of social privilege. With its proposition that exclusion may instead represent a claim for inclusion by historically disadvantaged groups of citizens, this thesis provides food for thought for scholars of racism and nationalism, and a reminder that the stratification of citizenship challenges the notion of a typical national or racial subject. Rather than expressing a notion of inherent racial or cultural ‘supremacy’, anti-outsider mobilization may constitute a claim against social changes that threaten to prevent marginal groups’ achievement of equal citizenship or reverse any gains that have accrued from years of struggle for recognition and a place (both literal and figurative) among the citizens.

8.2.2. Between political agency and bare life

Turning to a different sub-field within sociology, this thesis also offers insights for scholars of urban studies working on the politics of slums. The squatter camps this study has analysed pose a challenge for conceptualising the politics of the margins, or what Ananya Roy has termed "subaltern urbanism" (Roy, 2011, p. 223; Vasudevan, 2015). This growing literature has posed a radical challenged to dominant dystopian accounts of the slum by recognizing and celebrating "spaces of poverty and forms of popular agency" that otherwise "remain invisible and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory" (Roy, 2011, p. 224). In particular, Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis highlight these forms of popular agency, asserting the squatter as a subject of history in much the same way, and illuminating in Chapter 5 the positive content of the ‘squatter camp’ in contrast to the negating diagnoses of more apocalyptic readings of the slum (such as Davis, 2007; Jenkins, 2006; Martin & Mathema, 2006).
On the other hand, emerging analytical approaches gesture toward the "vanishing points" of subaltern urbanism (Roy, 2011, p. 232); among them, Holston's analysis of peripheries as a contradictory site for the production of new orders of citizenship by marginal citizens (Holston, 2008, p. 313). Holston acknowledges the instability of such a site, and the present study sheds a particularly stark light on what Von Holdt has called "the dark side" of insurgency (2011, p. 7). This provides an important counterpoint to the literature celebrating the 'heroic' politics of the slum and, in South Africa particularly, the potentially skewed vision of squatter politics produced by the predominant focus on the inclusionary social movement Abahlali baseMjondolo (Chance, 2011; Desai & Pithouse, 2004; Gibson, 2008; Selmeci, 2012). My analysis of ‘xenophobic violence’ as an insurgent form of counterpolitical action (following in the vein of Von Holdt et al., 2011) adds an unsettling vantage point on the politics of Holston’s ‘barely citizen’, which illuminates in greater detail the forms of socio-political closure that insurgent struggles for citizenship may entail. Attending to these dynamics in the ‘threshold space’ of a squatter settlement, rather than in the auto-constructed neighbourhoods of Brazil where marginal citizens occupy a less fragile periphery, has allowed me to trace the instability of insurgent citizenship is a second way too. While people on the margins of citizenship may forge insurgent resistance on the basis of their marginalization, their insurgency does not always secure reliable gains in the quality of citizenship. At the very threshold of legality such citizens may fend off their reduction to bare life through the exercise of insurgent political agency, but may nevertheless fail to gain entrance into the life of the citizen if the space they gain is one of proliferating ambiguities and shifting ground.

Another category that stands in contrast to a celebratory subaltern urbanism is Oren Yiftachel's concept of ‘grey space,’ which refers to the way in which sites or subjects may be deliberately positioned between “the ‘lightness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of eviction/destruction/death” (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 250). While the form of spatial ambiguity Yiftachel focuses on resembles Agamben’s camp, he too observes that this very process can give rise to resistances. My analysis resonates with the concept of 'grey space', but, going beyond its current conceptualization, makes it clear that the production and reproduction of such spaces can be thought both with and beyond Yiftachel’s state-centred frame of "delegitimizing and criminalizing discourses, regulations and violence" (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 250). As we saw in Chapter 5, these in-between spaces can be authored by their own residents rather than by the state. Indeed my analysis, with its emphasis on the ambiguities of the threshold, would suggest that in his focus on processes of state-led 'whitening' ('cleaning up') or 'blackening' (destroying) of spaces, Yiftachel overemphasizes the power of the state and
overlooks the agency of place itself – that is, ambiguous, threshold places – which under the right circumstances can work beyond the intentions of state actors to erode or preclude the realization of citizenship independently of whether state actors have mobilized such spaces for the purposes of “whitening” or “blackening”.

These reflections on the negative content of political agency in the slum resonate with emerging critiques of the nihilism inherent in Agamben’s account of biopolitics (Das, 2011; Owens, 2009; Sanyal, 2011). As we saw in Chapter 4, even where geographies of exception are deliberately imposed as a strategy to quell the political life of citizens, they can contradictorily create the foundations of insurgent political claim-making and thereby produce the very thing they seek to preclude. Beyond this, the state's establishment of zones of exception is not always aimed at annulling the political life of its residents; indeed, such zones can aim to redress existing inequalities created by prior exceptional geographies. The complexity of motives for exceptional practices (Baptista, 2013; Das, 2011), the politically productive effects of encampment (Sanyal, 2011), and the internal contestation between scales within the too-easily reified ‘state’ (Baptista, 2013) are themes beginning to emerge from empirical data on spatial exceptions, which could be usefully deployed to critique and extend these dominant theories of biopolitics. This thesis contributes usefully to that emerging body of work. This is not to deny, however, that some zones of indistinction do function to erode political life. As we saw in Chapter 6, ‘threshold space’ poses serious challenges to the realization of citizenship and when it ceases to be a space of transition and agency, it does indeed come to resemble a site of a negating near-absolute indistinction between life and law. Human agency continues to contain the potential to make room for change within such a space, but as we saw, the nature of political action on such a disabling threshold may not resemble liberal ideals for democratic politics. The fact that the solution to indistinction may be to reiterate distinctions, replacing boundlessness with boundaries, makes it a stretch to read, as Holston might, exclusionary mobilization as a ‘regressive’ form of politics in contrast with universal inclusion as a progressive alternative.

Going one step further, the thesis could also be used to challenge Hardt and Negri’s (2004) optimistic vision of a global multitude as the solution to the thanatopolitics of exception: as in the case of mobilization against foreign newcomers, the multitude can offer a resistance that shares in the same logic of exclusion that it rails against. Further, the prospect of realizing a deterritorialized multitude in response to the proliferation of global structures of power seems dim if inequalities, despite their global dimension, are being addressed through territorial
politics at the sub-national level where global flows are exceeding state control capacity. The notion of an undifferentiated multitude in a world so profoundly structured by historical, spatial and geopolitical power relations and identifications seems the stuff of fantasy.

8.2.3. Between human and citizens’ rights

Concerning broader questions of justice and ethics, this thesis draws attention to the too-little examined tension between human rights and the rights of citizenship as answers to the ethical demand for a just politics in a world that is structured by a system of container-like states, but characterized by transformative ‘cosmopolitanizing’ phenomena. Among these are significant flows of migration, such that, as Beck and Levy assert, we have seen the rise of a ‘world risk society’ which has in turn seen the legitimacy of sovereign states come to depend not only on their contract with citizens, “but also by their adherence to a set of nation-transcending human rights ideals” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 13). Globalization has thus required sociology to abandon “methodological nationalism”, which takes the nation state for granted as the stage on which social, economic, political and cultural processes unfold, in favour of methodological cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, the growing body of cosmopolitan analyses has several limitations, not least of which is the use of cosmopolitanism as a normative orientation – the “antidote to nationalism” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 4). This thesis contributes to the emerging critique of this normative orientation, in which “cosmopolitanism is good and nationalism bad for human values and rights” when, as Beck insists, cosmopolitanism can only grow out of nationalism, since “meaningful identifications express particular attachments: one’s identity, one’s biography of belonging, is always embedded in a more general narrative and memories of a group” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 9). If, as Beck argues, this means that “particularism becomes a prerequisite for cosmopolitan orientation” and a potential mediator “between the individual and cosmopolitan horizons along which new identifications unfold” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 9), then evidently we must be prepared to consider whether, in the face of "enforced cosmopolitanization" (Beck, 2012, p. 11) of excluded citizen populations, the exclusionary logic we witnessed in Mshongo may in fact be the face of such a cosmopolitan orientation. If we cannot accept this proposition, we must explicitly acknowledge that our cosmopolitanism expects squatters to extend to others rights that they do not possess themselves (Franke, 2011, p. 52).
This thesis suggests that, inasmuch as methodological cosmopolitanism should be embraced, we should not see this as a call to abandon the “national territory as a yardstick” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 7) – for we have seen that the national state is the primary vehicle for the redress of historical injustices and inequalities among citizens, and this role shapes the political subjectivities of its members. Even where political identities emerge out of other territorial formations, such as the squatter camp at the sub-national level, these are still intertwined with an understanding of the national state’s role in instituting justice for its members. Therefore, the sociological imagination must not lose sight of the central structural role political territories and regimes of citizenship play in distributing justice within the borders of states. It is not always, as Beck appears to suggest, morally arbitrary to privilege “inequalities within national societies” at the expense of “inequalities between national societies” (Beck, 2012), since infra-citizenship is a vestige of a particular history of structural racism that, having been imposed by the nation-state, must be redressed by the same.

Zygmunt Bauman argued in *Liquid Modernity* that, in today’s global era, power takes the form of speed, choice and mobility (Z. Bauman, 2012). As neoliberal citizenship advances, and inequalities begin to widen in even the more affluent countries of the world, the disjuncture between those with choice and mobility, and those permanently ‘grounded’, stretches wider and wider. In this context, is nostalgia for the modern nation-state regressive, or is it on the contrary a nostalgia for the horizon of substantive citizenship? For what foundation has the subject mired by poverty and marginality in the ‘soil’ of a nation-state to claim justice on – other than as a member of that political territory? And where membership is one’s only basis for claiming social justice, is it surprising that the struggle to achieve or maintain substantive citizenship would necessarily entail a re-assertion of the primacy of the citizen and of the importance of defining who will and will not be eligible for protection? Here, cosmopolitan tolerance cannot be viewed as “a cultural disposition involving an intellectual and aesthetic stance of ‘openness’ towards peoples, places and experiences” from different nations, as, for instance, Mary Kaldor presents it in her discussion of ’new nationalisms’ (Kaldor, 2004, p. 175). Such openness is perhaps an "intellectual and aesthetic" stance only to the ‘winged birds’ of our liquid modernity. Admitting new members into the polity when one’s own membership is fragile or incomplete will obviously be less tolerable; yet the label of 'intolerance' we would easily attach to this has normative overtones that seem not to recognize that social phenomena are not experienced equally, nor are their costs and benefits equally distributed, in situations of stratified citizenship.
A potential casualty of this line of thinking is the notion of human rights as a viable framework for achieving social justice in a global context. Naturally, this is a vision compatible with methodological cosmopolitanism and reflects a desire to move our ethical vision beyond political and territorial borders. A human rights approach implicitly deborders ethics, but, as we saw in this study, the corollary is that at the same time it may dehistoricize and depoliticize existing struggles for justice. While a universal ethics is a worthy goal, it is states with their territorially-based instruments and processes that distribute justice through the mechanism of citizenship. In situations of stratified citizenship, it may not be possible to move beyond citizenship as a principle for the distribution of justice without enacting an historical revisionism and producing not justice but charity – once again, a vision compatible with neoliberal citizenship. The potential of a human rights approach to strip the subject of political qualification creates a perverse resonance with Agamben's camp, begging questions as to how it can represent a viable means to social justice.

This is theoretically significant, as it uncovers a potentially fatal flaw in human rights and cosmopolitanism as responses to violent exclusion, and indeed as solutions for the marginal in a structurally unequal world. For the human can, it seems, only be protected outside of the realm of politics. This is hardly surprising if we attend to the intimate relationship between the sovereign polity and the protection of life through immunitary guarantees, whose function is to neutralize "the potential risk of a world given in common – and for this reason exposed to an unlimited indistinction" (Esposito, 2008, p. 66). This in turn should warn us against reading the instability of insurgent citizenship in terms of what Holston calls its simultaneously 'progressive' and 'regressive' qualities (Holston, 2008, p. 311); instead we should consider whether the violence such informal regimes utilize, and the exclusions they exercise, represent something integral to the domain of the political. For it is exactly in seeking after these guarantees of protection that squatters render visible the inherent contradiction within biopolitics, which is that in order to protect life, it must utilize what inhibits, curbs and destroys life. To use the words of Roberto Esposito, whose 'immunitary paradigm' of biopolitics combines its life-affirming and life-denying elements into a single horizon: the negation at work in immunity "doesn't take the form of the violent subordination that power imposes on life from the outside, but rather is the intrinsically antinomic mode by which life preserves itself through power" (Esposito, 2008, p. 46).
8.3. Roads not yet travelled

While this thesis offers new empirical data, and an entry point to some interesting propositions and theoretical questions, it also has several limitations, leaving room for further research. In Mshongo itself, an ethnography of the most marginal youth in the settlements – particularly those associated with drug use and crime – might provide fascinating insight into violence and politics from a potentially very different vantage point from the one I have presented here, in a study substantively shaped by risk-related concerns. Similarly, a full ethnography by an experienced anthropologist would likely expand on the impressionistic view I gained of who did what, and how, during incidences of anti-outsider mobilization. There remains a significant gap in the literature in terms of a thick and detailed view of the precise mechanisms and agents of mobilization. There would also be space to develop more detailed accounts of the nature, motives and interests of micro-scale social strata in the settlements, in order to further nuance the account of squatter politics presented here.

A comparative study of violence-affected squatter settlements in different provinces, or indeed between affected and non-affected settlements in a single province, would be an interesting follow-on to this study, providing insight into the more general applicability of the phenomena analysed in Mshongo, and the potential of these insights for to found empirical generalizations. Another area for further research would be to apply a similar political lens to understanding outbreaks of ‘xenophobic’ violence in central business districts (CBDs), such as those that occurred in April 2015. CBDs are a very different type of space that is obviously also being contested, and it would be interesting to see a political account of this contestation. What fascinated me most, however, is the question of what elements of ‘threshold space’ might be common across informal settlements – not only in South Africa, but also beyond. The legal marginality of such settlements in countries around the globe suggests to me that there may be certain shared conditions that give rise to distinct forms of political action and political subjectivity in such settlements. A study offering insight into the potentially global phenomenon of ‘threshold space’ might open up a fresh view on global political inequality, and globally unequal distribution of freedoms in a time of ‘liquid modernity’ in which speed, choice and mobility are the distinguishing marks of power; the ‘wings’ with which some fly and without which others peck out an existence entirely dependent on the soil.
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Ward 2 Councillor - Atteridgeville, J. D. (16 April 1988). Confirmatory affidavit in the High Court of South Africa [Transvaal Provincial Division] in the matter between The City Council of Pretoria and Montogomerry Matentjie (first respondent), Dr Noel Ndhlovu (second respondent), The Chairperson: Dr Noel Ndhlovu, Committee of 12 (third respondent), The Chairperson: Dr Noel Ndhlovu, South African National Civics Organisation Atteridgeville West (fifth respondent), all persons occupying land forming part of Extension 16, the remainder of portions 25 and 26 Schurveberg 488 JQ, Atteridgeville Western Extension (further respondents).


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Appendix 1: Archives Consulted

Table 1: Sources from National Archive of South Africa, SAB Database
(Public Records of Central Government Since 1910)

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Appendix 2: Summary of Primary Fieldwork

Table 3: Summary of Demographic information for Primary Fieldwork Respondents

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<td>Focus group discussion</td>
<td>08/08/12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Brazzaville</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Policing forum member</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
<td>08/08/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Atteridgeville</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Police detective (born in South Africa)</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
<td>07/07/12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix 3: Summary of Secondary Dataset**

**Table 4: Summary of Demographic information for Secondary Dataset Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>27/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>22/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mshongo</td>
<td>40-45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>20/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Malas shelter</td>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Displaced resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>24/10/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Malas shelter</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Displaced resident</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>24/10/08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: Summary of Key Themes in News Sources Consulted

This table presents the main themes around which news clippings were collected. Clippings that fell outside the main themes are not included in this summary.

Table 5: Summary of News Clippings by Theme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia'</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2008; 2010; 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tshwane Sun Atteridgeville</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2004; 2008; 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rekord - Atteridgeville</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tshwane Sun Atteridgeville</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2004; 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle history</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1990; 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beeld</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1990; 1991; 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political violence</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2008; 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evictions</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2000; 2003; 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sowetan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing in Atteridgeville</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1984; 1985; 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beeld</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Star</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Interview Guide

The text in this appendix represents the overarching themes explored in interviews. I have included my breakdown of each main question into separate arrays of questions that capture the various issues each central question aimed to get at – this was constructed to assist the translator in preparing to translate during the interviews.

The questions were designed to ensure interviews could flow conversationally, so that not all the questions had be asked, and they were asked in ways appropriate to the tone and direction of the conversation.

THEME: HOW AND WHY THE SETTLEMENT (JEFFSVILLE OR BRAZZAVILLE) WAS ESTABLISHED

Q: Tell me how you first came to this settlement.
- Did you find people living as one? (was the community unified or divided)
- What changes did you notice in the community here since you came? (Think of ubuntu feelings; level of crime; population; services)
- As a newcomer, was anyone against you?
- When there was an influx from the homelands or other countries, how did the community feel to accept them?
- Did you hear anybody complaining that newcomers must go back where they came from?

THEME: PRACTICES, ACTORS AND MOTIVES IN LEADERSHIP OF THE SETTLEMENT

Q: When you arrived, did you notice some people in charge of the settlement?
- Who controlled newcomers entering the settlement? How?
- Who controlled where people lived or worked here? How?
- Who controlled crime? How?
- Who intervened when neighbours of businesses had a disagreement? How?
- Who arranged to fight for services? How?
- Were leaders divided or united?
- Did leaders always act for community interests, or for their own benefit?
- Are these things still controlled now, and if so, are they controlled by the same people?
- Are leaders now united, and do they act for the community or for themselves?
THEME: HISTORY, MEANING, PRACTICES AND ACTORS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

Q: While you were living here in Jeffsville/Brazzaville, did you witness the community organising to fight together?
- Did you witness the community fighting eviction or fighting criminals?
- Did you witness the community mass action for services?
- Did you witness the community evicting foreigners?

In each case:
- Who organised to gather people to fight?
- How did they gather people (eg calling a meeting, distributing notices, announcing with a loudhailer, whistling)?
- What did they say or do to motivate people to fight?
- Which people were eager to fight and which ones not so eager?
- How did people treat those who were not eager or did not participate?
- Has this changed over time or does mobilisation still happen the same way nowadays?

THEME: HISTORY, MEANING, PRACTICES AND ACTORS IN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Q: Can you tell me about a time when the community organising caused damage or injuries?
- Did you witness it?
- How did people gather?
- What motivated people to cause damage?
- Did some people resist causing damage?
- Please tell me about the moment when the action changed from peaceful to violent?
- What kind of damage was caused with what type of weapon?
- Did most members of the community agree with the damaging action? Why?
- How did the government react to this incident?
Appendix 6: Consent Form

The text contained in this appendix formed the basis of a verbal consent process, ensuring that all participants were fully informed and their demographic details recorded along with their consent and decision with regard to anonymity. The consent form was translated into sePedi and Afrikaans to ensure it could be covered by me or my translator in a manner accessible to any participants who were not confident in English.

MY RESEARCH

My name is Tamlyn Monson. I am a PhD student at London School of Economics and Political Science. I am conducting research into the history of the informal settlements of Atteridgeville, focusing on Jeffville and Brazzaville. I am interested in how people can make a settlement for themselves and take charge of that settlement without support from the government. This is part of the struggle in South Africa that needs to be remembered.

The research is for my degree but by the end of 2013 I will submit a summary report on the history of the settlements to the Atteridgeville Library and the National Library so that the struggle and achievements of squatters in Atteridgeville will not be forgotten. The report will be accessible to residents of Atteridgeville through the library.

If you agree to speak to me, I will ask when you came to Jeffville/Brazzaville, what you remember about that time, how the place has changed, and what you remember as important events when people of the settlement got together in large numbers to fight for their interests.

After the first interview, I may contact you again to ask if you can show me the place where an important event happened and tell me more about it or introduce me to people who took part or witnessed it.

YOUR RIGHTS

There is no obligation to speak to me. If you agree to speak to me, you can change your mind at any time and I will respect that.

There is no reward for speaking to me, except to enjoy sharing memories and telling the story of this settlement.

If you prefer to speak in SePedi, a translator will assist in the interview.

If you speak to me, I will keep your identity secret in case you tell me something confidential. If you would like your name to be recorded in the report I will send to the library you can say so, but otherwise I will always keep your identity safe.

You can contact me (Tamlyn Monson) after the interview using the following contact details:

Cell phone when in South Africa: 072 499 7676
Cell phone when in London: +27 7427 645053
Email address: tj.monson@lse.ac.uk or tamlynmonson@gmail.com
Street address: Centre for the Study of Human Rights
Department of Sociology
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
YOUR CONSENT

I agree to participate in this research, and I am free to stop at any time.

I give permission for the information I share to be used in Tamlyn Monson’s degree research and any article or book chapters related to it, as well as the historical report which will be submitted to the Atteridgeville and National Library.

___ I would like to remain anonymous.

___ I would like my identity to be known except where otherwise indicated during the interview. I understand that the researcher may choose to keep my identity secret regardless of this permission if in the light of further research she considers that it may pose a risk to me.

DEMOGRAPHIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

The following information can be used to describe me where my identity is kept secret:

Age: _____

Gender: _____

Occupation: ________________________________

Place of origin: ________________________________

Residential zone: ________________________________

Length of stay in Atteridgeville: ________________________________

Length of stay in Jeffville/Brazzaville: ________________________________

Signed: ________________________________

Name: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________