

London School of Economics and Political Science



# Governing Europe for the People? Citizen Representation in European Union Policy-Making

*Christopher Wratil*

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of Economics for the degree of  
**Doctor of Philosophy**  
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## **DECLARATION**

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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## **STATEMENT OF JOINT WORK**

Paper 2 of this thesis was co-authored with Sara Hagemann and Sara B. Hobolt. I contributed significantly to the overall design of the paper and the concept of ‘signal responsiveness’. In particular, I developed hypothesis H2 from the theory section, contributed the idea of collecting and analysing the legislative summaries with quantitative text analysis models as well as the idea of incorporating and analysing media data. I collected the data on public opinion, corrected and integrated the government composition and the party manifesto data, and compiled data for the control variables. I conducted all empirical analyses, including the Wordscores model, the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model, and the media data analysis. I drafted significant parts of the text in the theory section (‘Responsive Opposition in the Council’), 75% of the text in the



empirical sections ('Data and Sample Selection', 'Analysis and Results', 'Government Signals'), as well as 75% of the text in Appendix 2.

Paper 3 was co-authored with Fabio Franchino. I contributed significantly to the overall design of the paper and the argument about the enforcement of coalition compromises through executive and legislative institutions. In particular, I developed the empirical approach to testing the expectations and contributed to the development of the hypotheses (in particular H5) in the theory section. I designed the codebook to identify economic left-right issues from the data of governments' policy positions, corrected and integrated the government composition and the party manifesto data, and compiled data for the control variables. I conducted all empirical analyses, including the SIMEX models in Appendix 3. I drafted significant parts of the text in the introduction, 90% of the empirical sections ('Empirical Approach to Testing the Expectations'), 90% of the conclusion as well as 65% of the text in Appendix 3.

## **STATEMENT OF PUBLISHED WORK**

A previous version of Paper 1 of this thesis was awarded first prize in the *LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series Doctoral Paper Competition 2014-2015* and subsequently published in the series. A previous version of Paper 2 has been published in *Comparative Political Studies*.

## **STATEMENT OF USE OF THIRD PARTY FOR EDITORIAL HELP**

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Lucy Duggan.

## ABSTRACT

The degree to which European Union (EU) policy-making is representative of citizens' preferences is a central contested issue in the debate over the EU's 'democratic deficit'. Previous studies have demonstrated that in many cases political representatives share their voters' attitudes to the EU. However, this research has rarely considered the substance of actual legislative policy-making in the EU institutions. Scrutinising the popular image that EU policy-making is unresponsive to public demands, the thesis investigates EU-level representation along the 'domestic route', on which citizens' preferences intrude policy-making through their national governments in the Council of the EU. Using a range of original and existing datasets, the four papers investigate three classic assessment criteria of representation (mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, congruence) with methods ranging from mixed effects regressions to quantitative text analysis.

Three central findings emerge: first, national governments are responsive to their domestic public opinion when negotiating and voting on legislative acts in the EU. Regarding legislative conflicts over left-right issues, responsiveness is stronger with majoritarian than proportional electoral systems and peaks when national elections are imminent. When it comes to pro-anti integration conflicts, responsiveness is conditional on the salience of EU issues in national political arenas. Second, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs limit the discretion of national ministers in EU negotiations and help governments to deliver their electoral mandates. Third, final EU policy output is most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that have clear-cut opinions on a policy issue and care intensely about it.

These findings are evidence of surprising patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making. They suggest that politicisation of the EU and the diffusion of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs could

strengthen representation. Yet, evidence remains scarce that better representation will end the EU's legitimacy crisis.

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But perhaps most importantly, this thesis would have been written in a much more depressed tone without the continuing emotional support of my friends and partner. The upbeat and fun atmosphere in the European Institute's PhD room has been a reliable source of motivation for me. Special thanks go to

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Christopher Wratil

November 2016

## CONTENTS

DECLARATION	2
STATEMENT OF JOINT WORK	2
STATEMENT OF PUBLISHED WORK	3
STATEMENT OF USE OF THIRD PARTY FOR EDITORIAL HELP	3
ABSTRACT	4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5
LIST OF TABLES	10
LIST OF FIGURES	12
 <b>INTRODUCTION: ASSESSING CITIZEN REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION</b>	 <b>13</b>
CITIZEN REPRESENTATION IN EU STUDIES	15
CONCEPTS AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA OF CITIZEN REPRESENTATION	19
THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU	25
STUDYING THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION	30
DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODS	36
CONCLUDING REMARKS	47
 <b>PAPER 1: SYSTEMATIC OR SPORADIC? MODES OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN EUROPEAN UNION POLICY-MAKING</b>	 <b>49</b>
ABSTRACT	49
THE EU'S POLICY-MAKING SPACE AND DOMESTIC ELECTORAL COMPETITION	52
ELECTORAL SALIENCE AND MODES OF RESPONSIVENESS	55
DATA AND MEASUREMENT	61
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	67
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE	76
CONCLUSION	82
 <b>PAPER 2: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EVIDENCE FROM COUNCIL VOTING</b>	 <b>85</b>
ABSTRACT	85
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN IOs	88
RESPONSIVE OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL	91
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION	95
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	99
CONCLUSION	111
 <b>PAPER 3: ENFORCING THE COMPROMISE: HOW EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS SERVE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT COALITIONS</b>	 <b>114</b>
ABSTRACT	114

COALITION POLICY-MAKING AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS	117
A MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS	120
EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO TESTING THE EXPECTATIONS	131
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	139
CONCLUSIONS	149
 <b>PAPER 4: TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION</b>	 <b>152</b>
ABSTRACT	152
THE NEGLECT OF TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION	155
THE OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE UNDER TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION	157
A NEW DATASET ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EU	165
MAPPING OPINION AND SALIENCE ACROSS THE EU	170
ASSESSING RESPONSIVENESS AND CONGRUENCE	175
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS	184
CONCLUSION	187
 <b>CONCLUSION: CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND POPULAR LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION</b>	 <b>190</b>
CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE	190
CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY	200
FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS	206
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH	208
 APPENDIX 1	 212
APPENDIX 2	232
APPENDIX 3	259
APPENDIX 4	288
APPENDIX 5	312
 REFERENCES	 315

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1.1: POLITICAL THEORY MODELS OF REPRESENTATION AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	25
TABLE 1.2: OVERVIEW OF THE FOUR PAPERS	35
TABLE 2.1: RESPONSIVENESS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION	69
TABLE 2.2: RESPONSIVENESS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION	71
TABLE 2.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS MODELS	77
TABLE 3.1: WORDSCORES RESULTS BY POLICY AREA	99
TABLE 3.2: MODELS OF OPPOSITION VOTES IN THE COUNCIL	101
TABLE 3.3: TOPIC MODEL OF COUNCIL ACTS	105
TABLE 4.1: EFFECT OF COALITION COMPROMISE ON POLICY POSITIONS	140
TABLE 4.2: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH	146
TABLE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONS ACROSS POLICY AREAS	168
TABLE 5.2: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALIENCE	171
TABLE 5.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN OPINION	173
TABLE 5.4: RESPONSIVENESS OF POLICY TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE	178
TABLE 5.5: CONGRUENCE OF POLICY WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL OPINION	182
TABLE 5.6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS	185
TABLE A1.1: OVERVIEW OF DEU CATEGORY SCHEME	214
TABLE A1.2: OVERVIEW OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS	216
TABLE A1.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION	227
TABLE A1.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION	228
TABLE A2.1: VOTES PER POLICY AREA (1999-2011)	232
TABLE A2.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE	233
TABLE A2.3: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS	234
TABLE A2.4: ALLOCATION OF ACTS INTO POLICY AREAS	238
TABLE A2.5: WORD LENGTH OF OEIL SUMMARIES	239
TABLE A2.6: EXTREME WORDS OCCURRING IN BOTH REFERENCE TEXTS	241
TABLE A2.7: OVERVIEW OF LDA TOPIC MODEL	243
TABLE A2.8: MODELS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE	248
TABLE A2.9A: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES	251
TABLE A2.9B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES	252
TABLE A3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE	259
TABLE A3.2: OBSERVATIONS BY COUNTRY	260
TABLE A3.3: COUNTRY MEANS OF KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	261
TABLE A3.4: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS	262
TABLE A3.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING	270
TABLE A3.6: ANALYSIS WITH M&V DUMMY	280
TABLE A3.7: PAYOFFS FOR PARTIES B AND C	282



TABLE A4.2: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES' DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES	290
TABLE A4.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN SALIENCE	301
TABLE A4.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS	304
TABLE A4.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS	305
TABLE A5.1: QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE DOMESTIC ROUTE	313

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1.1: CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU	27
FIGURE 2.1: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE	63
FIGURE 2.2: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY ELECTORAL CYCLE AND SYSTEM	70
FIGURE 2.3: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY PARTY SALIENCE AND EVENT CONTEXT	73
FIGURE 2.4: SUBSTANTIVE MEANING OF OPINION EFFECT WITH EXAMPLES	75
FIGURE 3.1: PARTY EMPHASIS AND PUBLIC OPINION	103
FIGURE 3.2: NEWSPAPER STORIES AND OPPOSITION VOTES	110
FIGURE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING	124
FIGURE 4.2: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE	135
FIGURE 4.3: COMPROMISE POSITION AND DIVISIVENESS	142
FIGURE 4.4: COMPROMISE POSITION, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS	143
FIGURE 4.5: COMPROMISE POSITION, IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS, AND STRENGTH OF INSTITUTIONS	147
FIGURE 5.1: THE EU'S PUBLIC OPINION SPACE	175
FIGURE 5.2: INTERACTION BETWEEN OPINION MAJORITY SIZE AND PUBLIC SALIENCE	184
FIGURE 6.1: TRUST IN THE EU AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION	204
FIGURE 6.2: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN THE EU AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION	205
FIGURE A2.1: PERCENTAGE OF OPPOSITION VOTES BY COUNTRY (1999-2013)	235
FIGURE A3.1: SIMEX COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION TERMS	273
FIGURE A3.2: COMPARISON OF COMPROMISE POSITION TO MEDIAN AND PM PARTY	278
FIGURE A3.3: COMPROMISE POSITION, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT, AND M&V SAMPLE	281
TABLE A4.1: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALIENCE WITHIN COUNTRIES	288
FIGURE A4.1: HISTOGRAM OF IMPLEMENTATION LAG	296
FIGURE A4.2: THE EU'S PUBLIC SALIENCE SPACE	302

# INTRODUCTION

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## *Assessing Citizen Representation in the European Union*

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TO WHAT EXTENT, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, AND IN WHAT WAY DO PUBLIC preferences influence policy-making in the European Union (EU)? This is the broad research question this thesis aims to answer. While this question is empirical in nature, its relevance – in particular for a wider public audience and for policy circles – derives from the idea that a close correspondence between citizens' preferences and policy-making is a central characteristic of democracy. As Andrew Rehfeld (2009: 214) has put it, the relationship between 'citizen preferences and the laws that govern them' is the '*central normative problem*' of democracy. And while most democratic theorists would argue that 'perfect' translation of citizens' preferences into policy, without constitutional constraints, without time for deliberation, and with zero-lag and zero-gap, may not be desirable, most also agree that *some* form of translation is an important value of democracy (Sabl 2015).

Not surprisingly, the question of whether some form of citizen representation exists in EU policy-making is also a central contested issue in one of the most vibrant academic and public debates on the EU: namely the debate about the EU's alleged 'democratic deficit' (e.g. Crombez 2003; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Lord 2001; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Since the beginning of the 1990s, scores of newspapers, television shows, and academic journals have

been filled with mostly theoretical based judgements of EU democracy.<sup>1</sup> In a nutshell, two different lines of argument have been presented: On the one hand, some argue that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit due to unchecked executive dominance, an institutionally weak European Parliament (EP) elected in 'second-order' elections, and a 'felt' distance between the voters and the EU that all contribute to stark policy drift away from voters' ideal policies (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995). On the other hand, some scholars reject this 'standard version' of the democratic deficit thesis by stressing existing chains of democratic delegation, checks and balances, a comparison of the EU to national non-majoritarian institutions (such as central banks), and the potential Pareto-efficiency of EU policy-making (Crombez 2003; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002).

Claims about citizen representation are a central element of both lines of argument. On the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalists, who are sceptical about the democratic deficit, stress that 'EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, (...) responsive to the demands of European citizens (...) in a way quite similar to national polities' (Moravcsik 2002: 605, 618). On the other hand, the advocates of the democratic deficit thesis counter that even if EU policy-making might match people's preferences such a relationship is unlikely to represent stable, reliable, and causal public control. Instead, considering the severe lack of electoral accountability of EU politics, any correlation between people's views and EU policy-making is unlikely to be more than a 'happy coincidence' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556).

But despite the centrality of these claims for the debate, our actual empirical knowledge about the relationship between citizens' preferences and EU policy-

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<sup>1</sup> See Rittberger (2007: 28-29) on the rise of the democratic deficit debate in academic and journalistic articles.

making has remained very limited, in particular at the stage of actual legislative negotiations: do public preferences intrude into the EU policy-making process? How close are policy outputs to public preferences? Do such outputs serve everyone, a European median voter, citizens in certain countries, or more narrow interests?<sup>2</sup> And, is an association between policy outputs and public preferences consistent, stable, reliable, and causal – or just a result of ‘benevolent authoritarianism’?<sup>3</sup> The four papers of this thesis speak directly to these questions, provide some important answers, and point to key areas of potential societal and political change that could improve citizen representation in the future.

## **CITIZEN REPRESENTATION IN EU STUDIES**

The study of the influence of public preferences (or opinion<sup>4</sup>) on policy-making has a long tradition in the US context (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Gilens 2005, 2012; Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). More recently, the field has also produced significant cross-national, comparative work on the topic (e.g. Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012) as well as a number of further country studies (e.g. Brooks 1990; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Jennings and John 2009). However,

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<sup>2</sup> There is disagreement between Majone and Moravcsik vs. Hix and Follesdal on the extent to which EU policy output is Pareto-efficient.

<sup>3</sup> Føllesdal and Hix (2006: 545) have stressed that any association between public preferences and EU policy output may be more a result of benevolent policy-makers than of a causal relationship representing real public control over EU policy-making.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout the text I use ‘public preferences’ and ‘public opinion’ interchangeably. In line with the existing literature, this thesis assumes that public opinion is the major signal of public preferences which policy-makers receive (in particular, see Geer 1996).

with regard to the EU the linkage between opinion and policy (Wlezien and Soroka 2007) has been neglected by academic scholarship for decades, especially throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, when scholarship on US policy-making blossomed.

Historically, empirical and analytical reasons justified this neglect. In terms of empirical relevance, scholars observed that national publics took an uninterested but generally favourable view of European integration in virtually all opinion survey data from the 1950s up to the 1970s. This observation came to be known as the ‘permissive consensus’ and suggested that the integration project had a very low electoral relevance, and hence that the public was unlikely to have a noticeable influence (Haas 1958: 16-19; Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In addition, from an analytical perspective the EU was mostly viewed as an international organisation for which appropriate standards of democratic legitimacy were not obvious and might not necessarily include direct links between citizen preferences and political negotiations (see Dahl 1999; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Wimmel 2009).

Yet, by the mid-1990s empirical findings and analytical lenses changed: at least since the Maastricht Treaty, European integration was increasingly politicised in domestic arenas (Hooghe and Marks 2006, 2009), including a series of highly contentious referendums on integration (Hobolt 2009). Public opinion on Europe became more polarised (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and the media attributed more attention to it (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Vliegenthart et al. 2008). In addition, particularly the strengthening of the EP (Rittberger 2007) turned the EU into a structure resembling many core elements of national democracies – from the separation of powers to a bicameral legislative system. This suggested that the EU could be viewed as a political system to be analysed with the toolkit of comparative politics (Hix 1994, 1999; Hix and Høyland 2011) and that the democratic quality of its policy-making could be measured against the standards applied to national systems (Crombez 2003; Dahl 1999; Zweifel

2002). While these developments did not provide an answer to the normative question of what democratic standards the EU *should* be measured against, they made it analytically viable to apply nation-state standards focusing on citizen representation. As most democratic theorists would probably agree that such standards are either adequate or too high – but not too low – for supranational political systems, criteria of representation provide ‘hard’ tests of the EU’s democratic quality.

Recent studies have provided key evidence that justifies an extended research agenda on representation in the EU context. Importantly, scholars have demonstrated that the fulfilment of the most fundamental necessary condition for any impact of citizens’ preferences on EU politics is being fulfilled: Europe’s citizens (increasingly) use politically meaningful channels like national or European elections to express their preferences on the EU by choosing parties and candidates on their EU-related positions (e.g. Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Schoen 2008; Tillman 2004; De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman 2010; de Vries 2007, 2009). This suggests that EU politics in general, and questions of the scope and level of integration in particular, have become electorally salient, providing incentives to policy-makers to respond to citizens’ preferences. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that these expressions translate into attitudinal mass-elite linkages. Citizens and their political representatives share similar positions on the EU, even though it remains a matter of discussion whether elites mainly follow the public or rather cue it (e.g. Carrubba 2001; Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 2012; Hellström 2008; Hooghe 2003; Ray 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007; Williams and Spoon 2015).

Regrettably, existing research has largely stopped at elite positions and only recently entered the world of legislative behaviour. It thus remains unclear whether political elites merely share or even only pretend to share public positions in EU politics or whether they actually adjust their legislative behaviour.

Even if political actors share public positions in manifestos, elite surveys, or the media portrayal, this does not necessarily imply that they actually *behave* as '*agents of the public*' in concrete legislative negotiations, when taking positions or voting on legislative acts. A few studies on the voting behaviour of members of the EP (MEPs) have found at least some evidence that MEPs are responsive to public opinion (Arnold and Sapir 2013; Lo 2013). Yet, work on national governments in the Council of the European Union (henceforth, the Council), as the EU's primary legislative body, is entirely lacking to date.

Going one step further from legislative behaviour to actual policy output, the very limited existing research on the impact of public preferences has almost exclusively focused on 'systemic responsiveness'. This small but emerging literature ascertains whether the *amount* of EU legislative acts reacts to changes in public Euroscepticism, and whether in turn the public 'thermostatically' adjusts its Euroscepticism in response to EU-level policy activity (Arnold and de Vries 2009; Bølstad 2015; Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011).

The existing evidence is inconclusive. Toshkov's (2011) important contribution using vector auto-regression models of opinion and legislative output reports some troubling evidence that the amount of EU directives negatively reacted to popular Euroscepticism before the mid-1990s but not afterwards. This is surprising, since increasing politicisation in the 1990s and 2000s should theoretically suggest a strengthening and not a weakening of policy-makers' incentives to react to public opinion. In contrast, Bølstad's (2015) work employs an error-correction model that can capture long- vs. short-run relationships between opinion and policy. He finds that public opinion in the 'core' (founding members) as well as the 'periphery' (Denmark, Ireland, UK) generally has a substantial impact on the EU's legislative output. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether these seemingly different results are a product of the different models employed (vector auto-regression vs. error-correction) or rather of the



territorial decomposition of the opinion series in Bølstad (2015). Most importantly, a core limitation of the literature on systemic responsiveness is that it tests a relationship between opinion and the sheer *quantity* of acts. So far, there has been a complete lack of research regarding the influence of citizens' preferences on the *substantive content* of EU policies.

This thesis addresses important gaps in the existing literature. It studies the relationship between EU policy-making and public opinion by focusing on the legislative behaviour of national ministers in the Council and assessing the correspondence between the very substance of positions, votes, final policy output and domestic public opinion.

## CONCEPTS AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA OF CITIZEN REPRESENTATION

Throughout the thesis I assume that citizens' views on policy-making in the EU can be conceptualised along two dimensions: first, '*left-right*' preferences refer to questions of redistribution; interventionism vs. economic freedom; libertarian vs. authoritarian and materialist vs. post-materialist values. This corresponds to a broad, potentially multidimensional, understanding of the left-right semantic that incorporates newer, non-economic aspects that are often referred to under the labels 'new politics', 'authoritarian-libertarian' or 'GAL-TAN' (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1971; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). Second, '*pro-anti integration*' preferences refer to questions of the EU system's scope of authority (breadth of EU activity, number of policy areas) as well as its level of authority (decision-making power of EU institutions) and its geographical inclusiveness (membership, affected constituencies) (Börzel 2005; Schmitter 1970; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). These two theoretical dimensions have been the classic model for understanding the EU's political space (Hix 1999; Marks and

Steenbergen 2002). However, their empirical relevance and relatedness in citizens' attitudes remains a matter of discussion (e.g. Gabel and Anderson 2002).

The thesis is based on a theoretical model of policy representation that maps out the main linkages between citizens' preferences and policy and the corresponding causal mechanisms which lead to citizens having an impact. Scholars widely agree that policy representation is almost entirely based on mechanisms flowing from 'elections as instruments of democracy' (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Powell 2000). According to the empirical literature, two mechanisms are central; these have been formulated in different terminologies by several authors (Mansbridge 2009; Stimson 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995): first, citizens use their vote in elections to (re-)shape the composition of parliament and government so that elected policy-makers best share their respective policy preferences and are likely to implement corresponding policies. This mechanism of '*electoral turnover*' is accompanied by a second that is based on the idea that policy-makers may engage in '*rational anticipation*' of this very turnover. In order to forestall any electoral sanctions at the end of the legislative term policy-makers may change their behaviour and align policy-making to changes in citizens' preferences during the term. This is achieved through close tracking of and reaction to public opinion (e.g. expressed in opinion polls, the media, or on the street) as the primary signal of citizens' preferences.

From a game theoretical perspective, electoral turnover highlights the role of elections as 'adverse selection' games, in which citizens attempt to select policy-makers that are 'good types' sharing their preferences (Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 2009). In turn, rational anticipation captures the role of elections as sanctioning games, in which policy-makers calculate how much they can deviate from the principal's preferences without being punished at the ballot box (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986).

From the perspective of political theory, electoral turnover loosely relates to Jane Mansbridge's (2003) models of '*gyroscopic representation*' as well as '*promis-*

*sory representation*'. When the elected representatives follow citizens' preferences, they may do so because they have similar preferences or political core values themselves and are honest and principled in pursuing them (gyroscopes). Or, because as agents to a principal they succeed in keeping the political promises on which they have been elected – irrespective of their own preferences (promissory representatives) (Mansbridge 2003). While gyroscopes act in citizens' interests out of intrinsic motivation, the core meaning of promissory representation assumes that representatives are externally motivated to keep their promises in order to avoid electoral sanctions (Rehfeld 2009: 220-221). In turn, rational anticipation closely relates to '*anticipatory representation*' in the theoretical literature. As in promissory representation, representatives are sensitive to electoral sanctions under anticipatory representation. But they are willing to compromise their promises if they expect future voters to have changed their preferences in other directions, as voters are expected to audit representatives not only on keeping promises but also on keeping in touch with voters' changing preferences. Anticipatory representation might also create incentives for representatives to manipulate voters' preferences to make them more approving of their actions (Mansbridge 2003: 517).<sup>5</sup>

Pinning down and operationalising the relationship between citizens' preferences and policy-making in empirical data is far from trivial. The papers of this thesis thus focus on three assessment criteria of citizen representation for which

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<sup>5</sup> In a stylised understanding of the popular 'delegate/trustee' distinction, gyroscopes come closest to the trustee end of the spectrum. They rely on their own judgement instead of instructions, pursue the long-term interests of their constituents (whereas classic trustees may focus on the interests of the nation), and are not very sensitive to electoral sanctions. In turn, the representative under anticipatory representation is a delegate, who relies on the judgement of his constituents, also pursues short-lived preferences, and is highly sensitive to electoral sanctions (for a fuller discussion see Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2009).

satisfactory empirical models have been built. First, *mandate fulfilment* refers to the idea that political representatives (or parties) keep the promises they made in election campaigns when legislating during the term (e.g. Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Thomson 2001). Living up to electoral promises does not directly imply that citizens' preferences are realised, as promises could substantially diverge from citizens' preferences. But to the extent that citizens select representatives whose promised policy goals match their own, keeping these promises realises citizens' preferences as long as their preferences are fairly stable over a legislative term. In fact, in a model of promissory representation mandate fulfilment *is* an empirical assessment criterion for citizen representation. Moreover, if electoral promises reflect representatives' genuine preferences, principles, and beliefs, some degree of mandate fulfilment will also be observed in a model of gyroscopic representation. Much depends on the level of measurement of promises: at the level of very specific policy goals (i.e. clearly-defined programmes) gyroscopes may not always fulfil their mandates, as they are expected to act with considerable discretion providing leeway for creative policy solutions (Mansbridge 2003: 522). But if the measured promises accurately reflect representatives' broad political convictions – beyond specific programmes – gyroscopes' behaviour should correspond to their promises.

The second and third criteria more directly assess the linkage between citizens' preferences and representatives' legislative behaviour. *Responsiveness* refers to the idea that due to different levels of public opinion, representatives behave differently and the substantive difference in their behaviour corresponds to the substantive difference in opinion (Lax and Phillips 2012: 148). Roughly speaking, if opinion is different, representatives' behaviour should be different in the 'same direction'. For instance, if public opinion is more 'leftist' in one situation and less so in a second, responsiveness demands that representatives push more 'leftist' policies (e.g. regulation, educational expansion) in

the first than in the second situation. If responsiveness occurs within a legislative term, it is an empirical assessment criterion of citizen representation in a model of anticipatory representation. Sanction-sensitive representatives react to different levels of public opinion in their behaviour because they believe current opinion is a signal of citizens' preferences at the time of the next elections (Geer 1996; Mansbridge 2003: 517; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995: 545). Note that neither promissory nor gyroscopic representation expects significant within-term responsiveness from representatives, as gyroscopes follow their intrinsic principles and promissory representatives keep promises made before the last election.

Third, *congruence* refers to an absolute concordance between majority opinion and representatives' behaviour (Lax and Phillips 2012: 148). If the majority of citizens favour a certain policy, congruence is indicated if representatives push (e.g. with their legislative votes) this policy. In turn, if the majority of citizens oppose a policy, congruence is indicated if representatives abstain from pushing or realising it. All other cases indicate incongruence. According to Mansbridge (2003: 526), congruence relates to all three models of representation: In gyroscopic representation we would expect congruence 'to the extent that the representative was elected descriptively to duplicate the median voter but less to the extent that the representative was elected to behave as a principled notable' (Mansbridge 2003: 526). In promissory representation congruence will occur as representatives may make very specific policy promises concordant with citizens' preferences and keep these very promises when in office. And, in anticipatory representation congruence is the constant goal of the representative to secure re-election, and it should peak before elections. Some level of congruence can then be seen as a 'global' assessment criterion of citizen representation.

Importantly, while responsiveness and congruence are related, they are in no way identical. For instance, it is true that a representative under anticipatory

representation aims to be equally responsive to *and* congruent with public preferences. But conceptually, very strong responsiveness can even impede congruence: if 10% vs. 40% of people favour a policy, empirical tests of responsiveness would expect different behaviours from representatives in these situations, whereas congruence demands that this policy should not be implemented in either situation, as a majority is against it. Here, ‘overshooting’ responsiveness would lead to incongruence. In fact, empirically responsiveness has not only been found to be too weak but sometimes also too strong to congruently realise majority opinion (see e.g. Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993: 92-95; Lax and Phillips 2012). Moreover, responsiveness is not a necessary condition for congruence and relatively high levels of congruence can emerge without substantial responsiveness, i.e. tracking and anticipation of public preferences by the representative. This is particularly the case if representatives are selected to descriptively resemble the preferences of the median voter and these preferences change little. The representatives can then act independently of public preferences, but will still mostly act congruently with them.

*Table 1.1* summarises the relationship between the models of representation and the three assessment criteria. This demonstrates that each of the assessment criteria employed in this thesis relates to at least one vision of representation, and congruence is the most universally valued criterion. The three assessment criteria can each be applied to either the *individual* or the *collective* behaviour of legislators. On the level of individual representatives, their policy positions in negotiations and their votes on legislation can fulfil their mandates, be responsive or congruent with citizens’ preferences. On the level of the collective of all legislators, the policy output agreed on can likewise be assessed with all three criteria. Certainly, the constituency of citizens whose preferences we view as relevant for representation may be different on the individual and collective level. In the case of EU policy-making we might be able to link individual legislators (such as national ministers in the Council or MEPs) to their constituency,

but whether EU-level policy output should represent an ‘average’ EU citizen (e.g. a fictive EU median voter) can be contested from a normative perspective. The thesis takes a clear stance (in Paper 4) on who is best represented by the EU’s policy output, and the conclusion highlights the normative questions posed by these findings.

**TABLE 1.1: POLITICAL THEORY MODELS OF REPRESENTATION AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA**

		Models of representation		
		<i>Gyroscopic representation</i>	<i>Promissory representation</i>	<i>Anticipatory representation</i>
<b>Assessment criteria</b>	<i>Mandate fulfilment: correspondence between electoral promises and behaviour/policy</i>	❖ Strong for broad policy goals ❖ Weak for specific policy goals	❖ Strong	❖ Weak (only coincidentally if preferences are stable)
	<i>Responsiveness: directionally aligned impact of preferences on behaviour/policy</i>	❖ Weak (only coincidentally)	❖ Weak within term ❖ Strong between terms	❖ Strong within and between terms
	<i>Congruence: concordance between preferences and behaviour/policy</i>	❖ Medium for ‘principled’ representative ❖ Strong for ‘descriptively elected’ representative	❖ Strong	❖ Medium to strong

## THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU

Having conceptualised the assessment criteria of citizen representation, I introduce the ‘chain of policy representation’ in EU policy-making as a broad theoretical model of the central linkages connecting citizens’ preferences with

legislative behaviour and policy outputs at the European level.<sup>6</sup> *Figure 1.1* shows how citizens' preferences can – in theory – shape EU policy output through three essential linkages.

First, citizens' pro-anti integration and left-right preferences must affect their voting behaviour in national and European elections. The strength of this linkage is influenced by the quality of the respective *electoral arenas*. Most fundamentally, elections can only function as transmission belts of citizens' preferences if citizens are able to cast votes among a set of clearly identifiable and real political alternatives (Bartolini 1999: 545; Powell 2004: 97-98). If parties or candidates essentially offer the same positions on issues or do not clearly communicate them, voters will not be able to identify an alternative that comes close to their own preferences (i.e. elections do not serve their selection purpose). While electoral competition in this sense is a fairly universal feature on the left-right dimension (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Huber and Inglehart 1995), European mainstream parties have largely shied away from competing on and emphasising pro-anti integration issues due to latent internal divisions and coalition considerations (van der Eijk and Franklin 2007; Green-Pedersen 2012; Parsons and Weber 2011; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; van de Wardt 2014).

Another important feature of the quality of electoral arenas is mass media as the primary source of citizens' information about political issues and parties' positions. Adequate information provision through media has been found to be an important prerequisite for representation of various sorts (Besley and Burgess 2002; Snyder and Strömberg 2008). This is again especially relevant for citizens' pro-anti integration preferences, since media coverage on integration and EU issues is still very limited, despite a general upward trend over time


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<sup>6</sup> The model was developed by adapting Bingham Powell's (2004: 92) 'chain of democratic responsiveness' to the EU context.



(Boomgaarden et al. 2010, 2013). Hence, different electoral arenas may provide for better or worse transmission of citizens' preferences, and their varying quality may especially make a difference to the transmission of citizens' pro-anti integration preferences.

**FIGURE 1.1: CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE EU**



At the second linkage, voting behaviour must influence policy-makers' preferences (e.g. policy positions) by shaping the composition of and majorities in the EU's three policy-making bodies: the European Commission (henceforth, the Commission), the Council, and the EP. *Institutional mediation* refers to a wide range of institutional features of national political systems and the EU system that intervene at this point in the chain. At the stage of national elections and

government formation, electoral systems are of prime concern, as they define how citizens' votes are transformed into parliamentary majorities that usually determine who will get into government. Their effect on representation is contested and arguably varies across assessment criteria: with regard to responsiveness, some authors have suggested that responsiveness should be higher in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional electoral systems (Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). The argument is that changes in vote share typically produce larger changes in seat shares under single-member district (SMD) systems, which should incentivise governments to be highly reactive to public demands during the legislative term in order to secure their majority. However, scholars have at the same time argued that proportional (PR) electoral systems produce more congruence than majoritarian (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Powell 2000). The idea is that coalition bargaining under PR is likely to moderate government policy towards median opinion, while single-party governments under SMD can deliver ideologically distorted mandates. In essence, SMD could 'suffer' from overshooting responsiveness that hinders actual congruence (see Lax and Phillips 2012). However, some recent work has questioned these conclusions about the effects of electoral systems on representation.<sup>7</sup>

At the stage of national governments' policy formulation, executive and legislative institutions may influence citizen representation. Different forms of coordination of EU affairs in the national executive potentially advantage certain citizens at the expense of others. Importantly, some national executives rely on executive coordination of EU policy-making, which entails inter-departmental

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2004) and Rickard (2009, 2010, 2012) stress that SMD creates incentives to respond to geographically concentrated interests that are often much narrower than median preferences. Blais and Bodet (2006), Golder and Lloyd (2014), and Golder and Stramski (2010) question the PR advantage on congruence.

information exchange on EU-level policy formulation and centralised reconciliation of conflicts (e.g. in the prime minister's office). In other countries, EU affairs are generally not coordinated within the executive, with potentially strong discretion for and weak oversight of ministers and civil servants (Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer 2011; Kassim 2013; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000). Depending on the issue, this may, for instance, influence which parties can fulfil their mandate because they hold certain ministerial portfolios. In a similar vein, legislative institutions, in the form of parliamentary oversight of EU affairs, vary starkly between member states (Winzen 2012, 2013). This may likewise empower particular political forces (e.g. opposition parties, small coalition partners) in shaping governments' policy positions, and therefore influence citizen representation.

At the European level, new institutional innovations affect citizen representation at the stage of institutional mediation. For instance, the strengthening link between political majorities in the EP and the appointment of the president of the Commission, at least since the 2014 EP elections, may incentivise the Commission to propose different policies (Hix 2008).

At the third linkage, policy-makers preferences must turn into actual public policies during the legislative negotiations at the EU level (e.g. output, votes on output). This is conditioned by features of the *legislative decision-making* process and procedures. Bargaining power is a decisive factor here. For instance, if some member states are generally more successful in influencing policy-making in the Council, their citizens should *ceteris paribus* also be better represented by EU policies. Research on Council bargaining success is inconclusive but it seems to have rejected the naïve intergovernmentalist proposition (Moravcsik 1998) that a subset of populous and economically powerful states simply 'get what they want' (Thomson 2011: 212-226). Some research has even found that small states do surprisingly well in Council bargaining (Golub 2012b). Certainly, the distribution of bargaining power may also vary from issue area to issue

area or depending on the legislative procedure (e.g. involvement of the EP, decision rule). Hence, different legislative decision-making setups may substantially influence citizen representation.

*Feedback loops* are an important caveat of this model of policy representation in the EU. Not only may public preferences causally influence EU policy-making, but the policy-making processes and policy output itself may in turn shape citizens' preferences: EU policy-makers may engage in priming, framing and persuasion activities in order to influence public opinion (Druckman 2004; Zaller 1992) and the public may react to EU policy-making by adjusting their preferences (Wlezien 1995). I will turn to such issues of endogenous citizens' preferences in the research design section of this introduction.

## **STUDYING THE CHAIN OF POLICY REPRESENTATION**

The chain of policy representation (*Figure 1.1*) maps out two major pathways connecting citizens with EU-level policy-making: a '*European route*' running through EP elections, Commission formation and EP majorities; and a '*domestic route*' through national elections, national government formation, and bargaining in the Council. Both routes are worth studying. However, the papers of this thesis focus on the domestic route as the more likely route of public influence. First, the Council is the most powerful actor in legislative politics compared to the Commission or the EP (Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 2012; Thomson 2011d). Second, national elections compared to European elections function much better as transmission belts for citizens' preferences (Hix and Marsh 2008). The domestic route is therefore likely to be the more fruitful starting point for understanding policy representation in the EU. Hence, three of the four papers of this thesis focus on politics in the Council, and the fourth is based on a theoretical model, in which bargaining in the Council plays a key role.

The papers study different relationships in the chain of policy representation. They vary with regard to dependent variable, independent variable, assessment criteria of representation tested, and their main contribution. Paper 1 is devoted to the relationship between public opinion and national governments' policy positions on controversial legislative acts negotiated in the Council. Its main focus is on how patterns of government responsiveness vary between legislative conflicts over left-right and pro-anti integration issues. It starts from the observation that the two kinds of issues play very different roles in domestic electoral competition. Whereas left-right is a 'super-dimension' that is highly and reliably salient for vote choice in national elections (e.g. van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008), EU integration is an evolving issue whose electoral salience varies greatly over time (e.g. Stevens 2013; De Vries 2010). This influences the relative importance of the first (electoral arenas) and second (institutional mediation) linkage on the chain of policy representation, leading to two stylised *modes of responsiveness*. As governments know that left-right issues are reliably salient in electoral arenas, they can systematically plan their responsiveness efforts and focus on adjusting them to factors of institutional mediation, such as electoral systems ('systematic mode'). Meanwhile, as governments face substantial uncertainty about whether pro-anti integration will be salient in the next election, they will only sporadically respond to public opinion, when EU integration becomes salient in the electoral arena ('sporadic mode').

In line with this argument, the paper finds that the responsiveness of national governments' policy positions in the Council is moderated by the public salience of integration on pro-anti integration issues, but by electoral systems and cycles on left-right issues. The paper does not only contribute to our understanding of government responsiveness in the Council specifically, but also suggests that variability in the electoral salience of an issue dimension may affect what factors influence responsiveness in other contexts (electoral arenas vs. institutional mediation).

Paper 2 also focuses on responsiveness to public opinion but instead of looking at governments' policy positions, it investigates their voting behaviour in the Council. It starts from the important observation that virtually all legal acts put to a vote in the Council have eventually passed with a clear majority in favour. This poses the question of what the purpose of opposition votes is, as they never have a realistic chance to stop or amend legislation. The argument is that, among possible other motives, governments use opposition votes to send *signals* about their political positions to their domestic public (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). This suggests that voting behaviour in the Council must be understood with a view to the national electoral arena. If opposition votes are signals about issue positions, they should be especially important if the related issues become salient in domestic party competition.

The paper finds that on legal acts extending the level and scope of EU authority the probability of opposition votes significantly increases with public Euroscepticism, i.e. negative opinion on integration. Moreover, this effect is stronger when domestic opposition parties increase their emphasis on the EU in their manifestos. These findings support the interpretation of opposition votes as signals about governments' positions on pro-anti integration. The paper also demonstrates that these signals resonate in domestic media coverage, which is higher on acts with opposition votes. In sum, the paper demonstrates the strong relevance of electoral arenas for voting behaviour in the Council, at least on pro-anti integration legislation. It thereby also confirms findings from Paper 1 using a different dependent variable.

Paper 3 focuses on mandate fulfilment and the ways in which is affected by institutional mediation. Starting from the widespread belief that unchecked executive dominance at the EU level allows individual ministers to drift away from their government's electoral mandate (e.g. Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2010), the paper asks whether political institutions can limit their discretion. It develops a novel model of policy-making by multiparty coalitions

that is a synthesis of Martin and Vanberg's (2011) 'compromise model' and the 'ministerial discretion' models (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996). The key argument is that executive and legislative institutions provide information and decision rights to the party machineries of coalition partners that enable them to control ministers, and enforce policy compromises reflecting central government ideology. Thereby, these institutions limit ministerial drift and orient ministers' EU-level policies towards the key electoral promises of their domestic support coalition of parties.

The findings show that governments' policy positions in the Council more reliably reflect the supporting parties' central economic left-right ideology if policy-making in EU affairs is strongly coordinated within the national executive (Kassim 2013), and in the case of minority governments, if parliamentary oversight is strong (Winzen 2012). In addition, compromises limiting ministerial drift are facilitated if the government is a majority government (as opposed to minority) and if ideological divisiveness in the support coalition increases the incentive to control ministers. Normatively, policy compromises are valuable not only because they circumscribe ministerial discretion, but also because they enforce more inclusive, joint decision-making that has intrinsic value from the perspective of deliberative political theory (Mansbridge and Warren 2013). The paper also contributes to the broader literature on multiparty policy-making by refining and questioning key results of Martin and Vanberg (2011), in particular, regarding the role of legislative institutions for coalition compromises.

Paper 4 is the thesis component that focuses on actual EU-level policy output at the third linkage of legislative decision-making. It investigates the relationship between citizens' support for policy change on important political issues

and the EU's record of implementing the desired changes.<sup>8</sup> The focus is on the relative representation of citizens across the different member states: whose nationals are represented best by EU policy-making? The argument is that national governments will push policy change on issues with strong domestic public support, particularly if the issue is highly salient to their citizens. In contrast, they will be willing to give in to other governments on issues their citizens are split about, and particularly if the public cares little about the issue. This opens up opportunities for logrolling and vote-trading (Achen 2006a; Aksoy 2012) between national governments when opinion about and salience of issues varies across countries. Assuming a largely equal distribution of bargaining power between national governments (Thomson 2011e), EU policy should respond to and be congruent with the opinions of citizens in those countries that care the most about an issue.

The findings demonstrate that EU policy output is most responsive to opinion in the five to ten countries where the issue is most salient to citizens. In turn, congruence between EU-level policies and country-level opinion increases when national citizens have clear-cut and salient views on an issue. The results highlight the fact that the EU's political system is unlikely to represent an EU-wide median voter or average citizen. Instead, its decision-making processes and procedures follow strong logics of *territorial representation* – with national governments as key legislators that respond to their geographically defined constituencies (i.e. their citizens). The geographical distribution of salience and opinion is crucial under such arrangements. Thereby, the paper also contributes to the broader literature on citizen representation in other political systems with 'territorial' or 'upper' chambers of parliament (e.g. federal states, US) that has

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<sup>8</sup> While all the other papers exclusively look at legislative politics, some of the policy issues in Paper 4 are constitutional (e.g. issues concerning the Lisbon Treaty). Hence, here the thesis goes beyond secondary legislation and also considers institutional change in the treaties.



so far neglected the relevance of the sub-national distribution of opinion and salience.

**TABLE 1.2: OVERVIEW OF THE FOUR PAPERS**

	<b>Paper 1</b>	<b>Paper 2</b>	<b>Paper 3</b>	<b>Paper 4</b>
	<b>‘Systematic or Sporadic? Modes of Government Responsiveness’</b>	<b>‘Government Responsiveness in the EU: Evidence from Council Voting’</b>	<b>‘Enforcing the Compromise’</b>	<b>‘Territorial Representation and the Opinion-Policy Linkage’</b>
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Governments’ initial policy positions in the Council (left-right, pro-anti integration)	Governments’ opposition votes in the Council (pro-anti integration)	Governments’ initial policy positions in the Council (economic left-right)	Implementation of policy change (policy issues)
<b>Main independent variable</b>	Public opinion (left-right, pro-anti integration)	Public opinion (pro-anti integration)	Election manifestos (left-right)	Public opinion (policy issues)
<b>Assessment criteria</b>	Responsiveness	Responsiveness	Mandate fulfilment	Responsiveness, congruence
<b>Representational linkage</b>	Electoral arenas, institutional mediation	Electoral arenas	Institutional mediation	Legislative decision-making
<b>Main contribution</b>	Modes of responsiveness vary between left-right & pro-anti integration	Opposition votes act as position signals to domestic publics	Executive and legislative institutions facilitate compromises & limit ministerial drift	Geographical/territorial distribution of opinion & salience matters

In sum, the four papers provide significant evidence for patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making. They demonstrate that representation goes beyond attitudinal mass-elite linkages and systemic responsiveness of the EU’s legislative output. Public opinion and party programmes influence substantive policy positions and votes in the Council, the salience of EU integration and

strong political institutions strengthen representation, and final policy output reflects cross-national differences in public support. Certainly, the papers are just a first step and only represent a small share of possible research projects on the chain of policy representation in the EU. Nevertheless, together they provide a first picture of citizen representation in EU policy-making by covering each linkage of the chain, all three assessment criteria, different dimensions of citizens' preferences, and the individual as well as collective behaviour of legislators. *Table 1.2* provides an overview of the four papers.

## DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODS

In this section, I discuss key issues concerning data, measurement, and methods that reappear across the four papers.

### *Independent variables: citizens' preferences and parties' electoral promises*

Throughout the thesis I exclusively use public opinion data as a proxy for citizens' preferences. While this is the common choice in the representation literature, it is by no means uncontroversial. Many studies have concluded that citizens' surveyed political opinions display little structure, are highly malleable in response to additional information, and are sensitive to question-wording and framing, calling into question whether they can be signals of well-ordered preferences (for a critique, see e.g. Althaus 2003). This could lead to the conclusion that citizens lack meaningful political preferences all together, or at least that their preferences cannot be measured by surveys.

But several studies have argued that this picture is too pessimistic. First, while most citizens may lack informed opinions on most issues, for each salient issue there is an 'issue public' made up of few citizens holding informed opinions on the issue. These issue experts can provide cues to the wider public on

what opinion it should adopt on the issue (e.g. Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992). Second, while surveys are no perfect measurement instrument of citizens' preferences, random measurement error on the level of the individuals' survey responses tends to cancel out when aggregating opinion across respondents (e.g. a country or group estimate) (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992). Third, while framing effects do exist and may also affect differently worded questions, they shrink in competitive elite environments that are typical for Western democracies (Druckman 2004).

Moreover, if we set aside for a moment the question of how well public opinion data reflects any well-ordered preferences, Geer (1996) has persuasively argued that, no matter their quality, for policy-makers opinion polls are simply the best available signal of citizens' preferences. What other more reliable and representative source could politicians rely on to retrieve information about citizens' preferences? Relying on opinion data in representation research is therefore no perfect solution, but there is a clear line of justification that collective opinion in surveys reflects meaningful preferences and that surveys are the best available measurement tool for these preferences.

The public opinion data in all papers is taken from the *Eurobarometer* (EB), a survey series of frequent samples of the populations in all EU countries financed by the Commission and conducted by TNS Opinion. The weaknesses of the EB surveys are well-known: in terms of implementation, EB data suffers from slightly smaller sample sizes per country (typically, 1000), multi-stage sampling, and relatively low survey completion rates compared to other social science surveys like the European Social Survey (Schmitt 2003: 248). Fortunately, sample sizes are not a problem for this thesis, since it only uses country-level aggregates of opinion for which standard errors are small. From the point of view of design, it has been claimed that the Commission uses the EB as a 'governance tool' (Signorelli 2012) and tries to design the questionnaire so as to receive the 'desired answers' (Höpner and Jurczyk 2012, 2015). This does not af-

fect Papers 1, 2, and 3, as they rely on only two very widely used items (left-right self-placement and support for EU membership, see below) for which this problem is not pressing. In Paper 4 I discuss in detail the consequences of questionnaire design by the Commission and argue that they should not result in systematic biases relevant to the paper. The minor weaknesses of the EB are counterbalanced by its strong qualities for cross-temporal and cross-national comparisons: the series covers all EU countries and provides half-yearly measures of a large range of standard items. This quality is unprecedented considering that, for instance, the European Social Survey is only conducted every two years and not in all countries for all waves.

The major opinion measures I use pertain to citizens' left-right and pro-anti integration preferences. To capture public preferences on left-right conflicts I use the country-level average of the Eurobarometer's *left-right self-placement* item for which respondents are asked to place their own political ideological position on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Scholars have demonstrated that these self-placements are systematically related to attitudes on economic, cultural, and materialist vs. post-materialist conflicts (Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997), including specific issues such as immigration (de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013), civil liberties and human rights (Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007), and a variety of environmental issues (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004; Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004). Therefore, these placements are a substantive measure of citizens' left-right preferences.

Citizens' preferences on pro-anti integration are measured as the country's average *support for EU membership* ('Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?'). While we have some evidence that attitudes towards pro-anti integration are arguably multidimensional (Boomgaarden et al. 2011), there is little work on which measure best captures common variation in these attitudes. The choice of the Eurobarometer's membership item is therefore

mainly justified by common practice in the field (in particular, Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011) and by the limited availability of alternatives.

The second independent variable used throughout this thesis is governments' electoral promises. I use the *Comparative Manifesto Project's* (CMP) database of parties' hand-coded election manifestos to measure this variable (Lehmann et al. 2015). The CMP is the largest time-series cross-section collection of election manifestos in political science. Except for Malta it covers all EU countries (with some gaps, especially regarding Latvia). Human coders divide the manifestos into quasi-sentences, content analyse them, and allocate them according to their substantive meaning into one of 57 categories/codes. The counts for the categories can be used to construct scales as measurements of parties' electoral promises.

For some readers expert surveys on party positions (such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on Parties) may seem to be a natural alternative to the CMP. However, for the purpose of studying citizen representation using the CMP is preferable for several reasons: first and foremost, whereas the CMP's main purpose is to capture electoral promises (as statements in election manifestos), experts will – willingly or unwillingly – be influenced by parties' actual behaviour in assessing their position (Budge 2000; Volkens 2007). Using expert survey data to judge mandate fulfilment would then become circular as the expert assessments are no pure measurement of parties' promises, but already entail their actual behaviour – that we would like to check against their promises. This point applies more generally as all the papers of this thesis attempt to explain the behaviour of governments and the EU system. Manifesto-based data is much more exogenous to this behaviour than expert data.

Second, the CMP is most likely to provide measurements that are comparable across all EU countries and time (McDonald, Mendes, and Kim 2007). This is due to its universal coding categories and criteria, whereas expert surveys may suffer from 'differential item functioning' (Bakker et al. 2014; King et al. 2004) –

the different perception of terms like ‘left’ or ‘right’ by experts in different countries – as well as from limited time-variation as experts use parties’ ‘ideological reputation’ as a cue. Third, a further advantage of the CMP for studying representation is that the CMP measures party positions at the time of elections. Thereby, it allows us to discern the relative contribution of the two electoral mechanisms (electoral turnover and rational anticipation, see below), whereas expert surveys conducted at arbitrary times in the electoral cycle would not allow this.

In line with the public opinion measures, the CMP measures I use in the papers pertain to electoral promises on left-right and pro-anti integration. For left-right I use the CMP’s summative RILE score, which is calculated by subtracting the category counts for 13 ‘leftist’ categories from those for 13 ‘rightist’ categories and dividing by the sum of counts for all categories (i.e. the sum of all coded quasi-sentences). RILE reflects parties’ promises on key left-right contrasts such as ‘Market Regulation’ vs. ‘Free Enterprise’, ‘Protectionism: Negative/Positive’, or ‘Controlled Economy’ vs. ‘Economic Orthodoxy’ (for a recent evaluation of RILE, see Budge and McDonald 2012). According to Budge (2013), RILE is a deductive measure, as it was not constructed from regularities in the data (e.g. by factor analysis or other multivariate techniques), but categories were identified *a priori* so as to reflect theoretical writings about the left-right division at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Unsurprisingly, there is disagreement on the extent to which RILE adequately reflects ‘cultural’ left-right issues such as immigration or civil rights (e.g. Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Protsyk and Garaz 2011) which play no prominent role in a classic understanding of the left-right semantic, but have been integrated into a multidimensional understanding of left-right in recent years (e.g. Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; De Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013). Paper 3 on mandate fulfilment adjusts for this caveat by excluding observations that relate to cultural left-right issues. Similarly, some

studies are sceptical about the use of RILE for post-communist party systems (of which we have 11 in the EU-28). For instance, Tavits and Letki (2009) demonstrate for Poland and Hungary that parties that were right-wing according to RILE increased government spending and left-wing parties decreased it during the period of market and democracy transition. Certainly, our intuition tells us that the opposite should be the case. However, these findings actually do not demonstrate that RILE lacks any construct validity in post-communist countries, but may simply indicate that parties in these systems have not kept their promises on the RILE dimension, perhaps precisely because they may have ambiguous stances on it. Nevertheless, in Papers 1, 2, and 3 I demonstrate the robustness of results when excluding post-communist countries.

For pro-anti integration, I use a simple EU scale from the CMP that is the count of positive quasi-sentences on EU integration minus the count of negative quasi-sentences divided by the count of all coded quasi-sentences. While to my knowledge this scale has not been validated, it appears to be an obvious choice as only two categories of the CMP codebook clearly relate to EU integration.

### *Dependent variables: policy preferences, behaviour, and output*

With regard to the dependent variables in this thesis, I attempt to improve inferences by *data triangulation*: in particular, Papers 1 and 2 have common theoretical roots but test their hypotheses on different kinds of data. Paper 1 relies on the *Decision-making in the European Union* (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 2006, 2012), which provides spatial information on governments' initial negotiation positions in the Council from expert interviews with bureaucrats and diplomats in Brussels. The weaknesses of expert data on the Council are well-known: first, the question of post-rationalisation (or post-diction) bias (Bueno de Mesquita 2004) potentially impairs validity, as experts could wrongly reconstruct actors' positions in order to best fit their personal beliefs about positions

or a negotiation outcome they already knew. Second, selection bias limits the generalisability of findings, as existing datasets only cover ‘salient’ legislative files, i.e. legislation that received public attention in the media, and are not a random draw from the population of Council acts (for a comprehensive discussion of the DEU approach, see also Mattila 2012). The prime advantage of expert data is relatively high levels of variation, since experts normally report several different positions that were taken by different member states’ delegations during negotiations.

In turn, Paper 2 relies on a dataset of governments’ voting behaviour in the Council (Hagemann 2015), which also forms the basis for the reporting of *Votewatch Europe* ([www.votewatch.eu](http://www.votewatch.eu)), a transparency organisation based in Brussels (see also Hagemann 2007). In contrast to expert data, voting data neither suffers from post-rationalisation nor from selection bias. Votes are officially recorded and public voting (at least since the Lisbon Treaty) is fairly comprehensive covering all votes on legislative files (while excluding many non-legislative votes). However, voting data also has a key drawback: variation in voting data is very limited; that is, a strong consensus norm still seems to prevail at this public stage of Council politics (Heisenberg 2005), which is epitomised by just 1.46% opposition votes in the Council in the 1999-2011 time period examined in Paper 2. As acts are only put to vote when a majority has been secured beforehand, and as experts report much higher levels of controversy than voting data suggests, this poses questions about the extent to which voting data reflects member states’ actual preferences and/or behaviour regarding a specific act. Paper 2 argues that voting in the Council, in fact, is probably primarily a tool used by governments to signal broad and general positions to the public rather than to reveal policy-specific and policy-relevant preferences or behaviour.

Therefore, the two data sources complement each other: whilst expert data lacks generalisability but excels in variation, the reverse is true of voting data.



Whereas expert data is strong in providing information on governments' policy-specific positions, voting data records governments' actual behaviour, which is potentially motivated by broader considerations. The substantial overlap in findings between Papers 1 and 2 should therefore indicate a high reliability of results. While Paper 3 also relies on DEU expert data, Paper 4 provides an entirely novel dataset on the EU's implementation record and policy output with regard to 167 policy issues that appeared on the EU's agenda after Eastern enlargement in 2004. This dataset is a central contribution of the thesis and is described and evaluated in detail in Paper 4.

### *Methods: electoral mechanisms and causal inference*

The four papers of this thesis all rely on mixed or fixed effects regression analyses as their prime toolkit for statistical inference. Furthermore, single papers also employ methods from quantitative text analysis (Paper 2) (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013) as well as factor analysis (Paper 4).

A key methodological issue common to Papers 1, 2, and 3 is the disentanglement of the two electoral mechanisms of citizen representation – electoral turnover and rational anticipation. If citizen representation originates from the electoral replacement of political representatives (that are of different types or make different electoral promises) *and* from the representatives' response to citizens' (changing) preferences, we have to estimate both mechanisms jointly so as not to misattribute effects to one or the other. The thesis follows Stimson (1999) (see also Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), who suggests a quite straightforward procedure for estimating both mechanisms: this is based on the joint inclusion of a measure of citizens' preferences (in this thesis: public opinion) *and* a measure of government type/promises (in this thesis: government positions from election manifestos) in each regression model. The coefficient on citizens' preferences is then controlled for government type/promises and

should solely reflect the rational anticipation mechanism, i.e. governments' efforts at adjusting their behaviour to citizens' preferences. In turn, the coefficient on government type/promises is controlled for fluctuations in citizens' preferences and should solely reflect the impact of government type/promises (for instance, mandate fulfilment).

A key challenge and often a limitation of empirical representation studies is causal inference. As I have outlined in the previous section, citizens' preferences may not only influence policy-making, but there may also be important feedback loops, i.e. citizens' preferences react to politicians' cues and policy output. In methodological terms, this raises the question of endogeneity in the form of reversed causality or simultaneity bias. While in the case of mass-elite linkages, citizens' attitudes may be shaped by elites' attitudes, in this thesis, the main concern is that citizens' attitudes could be shaped by the individual or aggregate legislative behaviour of representatives (e.g. their policy positions, votes, policy outputs).

In the literature on attitudinal mass-elite linkages on European integration the issue of endogeneity has most frequently been addressed through instrumental variable (IV) estimations (e.g. Carrubba 2001; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007). Citizens' attitudes are instrumented with exogenous predictors on the individual level or the group level of party supporters (such as age, gender, occupation, education, and income). The key condition that has to hold for the IV approach to be valid is the 'exclusion restriction', i.e. the exogenous predictors must *not* influence the dependent variable through any other route (including mediating variables) than through their impact on citizens' attitudes. While this is credible at the individual level (e.g. the age of a particular respondent does not influence a political representative's attitude in any other way than through influencing the respondent's attitude that in turn influences the representative's attitude), it becomes more questionable at aggregated levels. For instance, the national average income may not only influence citizens'

aggregated Euroscepticism but it may also influence elites' Euroscepticism directly (e.g. because elites care about the welfare effects of integration). As this thesis operates with country-level aggregates of citizens' preferences, an IV approach would have little credibility.

A second solution to the endogeneity issue is the use of VAR and related time-series models with Granger causality tests. This solution is prominent in much of the literature on the opinion-policy linkage, and some of the literature on mass-elite linkages (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Hellström 2008; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Toshkov 2011; Williams and Spoon 2015). Granger tests infer causality from the temporal ordering of movements in policy and opinion over time using distributed lag structures of both. A central identifying assumption of these models is that opinion and policy influence each other with a delay of at least one time lag, i.e. that effects are not contemporaneous. While this is a strong assumption in itself (especially if time periods are years or even electoral cycles), the main problem for this thesis is that we entirely lack time-series data on governments' positions, behaviour, or policy output at the EU level. The variation in all of the available datasets (including expert data and the novel data presented in Paper 4) is not sufficient to obtain comparable and reliable time-series estimates for any of the dependent variables.

Like key parts of the policy representation literature (e.g. Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2012), Papers 1, 2, and 4<sup>9</sup> of this thesis therefore have to rely on less sophisticated causal identification. As the popular empirical methods of causal identification outlined above are not available, the focus is on 'plausibility probes' which suggest a dominant direction of causality but cannot ultimately

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<sup>9</sup> Note that Paper 3 only focuses on mandate fulfilment for which the direction of causality is of little concern.

prove it. Essentially, I consider which cross-sectional pieces of evidence in the papers point towards bottom-up (from citizens to elites) or top-down (from elites to citizens) dynamics in the relationship between public opinion and policy-making.

For instance, in Paper 1 I argue that the available evidence speaks for bottom-up causality, since the correlation between public opinion and governments' policy positions is strongest in situations of high electoral pressure. Importantly, it is stronger before elections, for electorally more vulnerable incumbents in majoritarian electoral systems, when opposition parties politicise European integration, and when integration is an important national political issue. This is relevant as Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 43) have argued that active cueing and manipulation of opinion by political elites is the strategic choice in times of low electoral pressure but not if electoral incentives are imminent, since then 'it is less risky and faster to respond to public opinion than attempt to change it'.<sup>10</sup> The stronger correlations between opinion and policy positions in situations of high rather than low electoral pressure therefore suggest a dominance of bottom-up over top-down causality.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in Paper 4 I consider which cases are most likely to see manipulation of opinion by elites, and show that citizens' demands and policy do not correlate more strongly in these cases, which they should if top-down causality were dominant.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> For a similar, specific formulation of this argument with regard to referendums on integration (that create electoral pressures) see Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries (2007: 19), who argue that referendums should strengthen bottom-up linkages (i.e. influence of citizens on elites).

<sup>11</sup> The same argument about electoral pressure also applies to Paper 2, although I do not present it in the text to avoid repetition.

<sup>12</sup> Besides national political elites' influence on public opinion, negative or positive feedback from policy, i.e. the adjustment of citizens' preferences in response to exposure to policies, represents a second sort of potential feedback loop that may result in endogeneity. Negative feed-

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis offers one of the very first assessments of citizen representation in EU policy-making. It goes beyond the existing studies of attitudinal mass-elite linkages and investigates the relationship between citizens' preferences and actual legislative behaviour of national governments and EU policy output with regard to three fundamental assessment criteria of citizen representation: mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, and congruence. The overarching argument is that EU policy-making is subject to significant dynamics of citizen representation in various forms. Several key hypotheses about citizen representation developed for the domestic level also apply to citizen representation at the EU level (see particularly Papers 1, 2, 3). At the same time, new patterns of citizen representation emerge in EU policy-making that are a result of the peculiarities of the EU's political system and may so far have been overlooked by scholarship on political systems that resemble the EU in relevant respects (see particularly Papers 1 and 4). While this thesis also raises a host of questions for further research and cannot provide answers regarding all aspects of citizen representation in the EU, it can clearly reject the claim that EU policy-making is taking place entirely independently of public influence.

This introduction is followed by the four constitutive papers of the thesis, and a conclusion. The conclusion serves three main purposes. First, it provides an integrative perspective on the results of the four papers and discusses their contribution to the debate on the EU's democratic deficit, highlighting

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back is well known in the literature on the 'thermostatic model' of spending (e.g. Wlezien 1995), where citizens' preferences for spending increase (decrease) if spending decreases (increases). However, such forms of feedback are of little concern for the papers of this thesis, as they largely parse out common variation in opinion across countries (that might be influenced by the common exposure to previously agreed EU-level policies) through policy issue fixed and random effects.

measures that could strengthen representation in the EU. Second, it also considers whether a strengthening of the domestic route of policy representation could ameliorate the EU's crisis of popular legitimacy. Third, it points to promising areas for future research along the chain of policy representation outlined in this introduction.

## PAPER 1

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### *Systematic or Sporadic? Modes of Government Responsiveness in European Union Policy-Making*

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#### ABSTRACT

Do national governments respond to citizens' opinions when negotiating policies in the European Union? While policy-making in the EU is not only about left-right but to a significant extent also about pro-anti integration issues, conflicts over integration are only occasionally salient in domestic electoral politics, where left-right issues dominate. I argue that this should be reflected in national governments' efforts to respond to public opinion. As governments can expect left-right issues to be reliably salient in domestic elections, their response to public opinion on such issues should be stronger and more systematic than on pro-anti integration issues, whose electoral relevance is highly variable. Statistical analyses of 3,700 policy positions adopted by governments in the Council of the EU provide strong evidence for two 'modes of responsiveness': on left-right issues governments systematically organise their responsiveness according to the electoral cycle and system ('systematic mode'). In contrast, on EU integration issues they only respond to opinion occasionally ('sporadic mode'). These findings challenge the notion of an entirely unresponsive policy-making system in the EU. They also enhance our understanding of how variability in electoral salience influences responsiveness.

SEVERAL STUDIES HAVE INVESTIGATED ‘SYSTEMIC RESPONSIVENESS’ IN THE European Union (EU) by ascertaining the extent to which the volume of EU legislation reacts to public Euroscepticism (Arnold and de Vries 2009; Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011). While this work has produced important findings on policy representation in the EU, it has neither been able to assess the substantive content of policies nor to investigate responsiveness on the level of individual EU policy-makers (but see Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016; Lo 2013). Are EU-level legislators responsive to citizens’ substantive policy preferences, not only adjusting the sheer amount of legislation but also its content? Here, I address this question with regard to the behaviour of national governments in the Council of the EU (henceforth, the Council), the union’s main legislative body, in which national ministers meet and negotiate policy change. This means I focus on the ‘domestic route’ of policy representation in the EU, in which national governments are accountable to national voters in domestic general elections.

To understand government responsiveness at the EU level, I start from the common observation that EU policy-making is characterised by two main issue dimensions, namely conflicts over ‘left-right’ and ‘pro-anti integration’ issues (Hix 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Marks and Steenbergen 2002). While both kinds of issues are similarly salient at the EU level, their role in electoral politics at the domestic level, where national governments are accountable, is strikingly different. Whereas conflicts over left-right ideology – for instance, pro vs. anti economic regulation – play a reliable and prominent part in electoral competition in the member states (van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Whitefield 2002), the electoral salience of conflicts over ‘pro-anti integration’, such as the extension of EU authority, varies greatly over time (Stevens 2013; de Vries 2007; de Vries et al. 2011). More technically, the electoral salience of left-right issues is rather high and stable (i.e. not easily



changed or likely to change) from election to election, while the salience of pro-anti integration is extremely variable over time.

This has important consequences for responsiveness. In particular, it affects the central mechanism of ‘rational anticipation’, which refers to governments’ attempts to forestall electoral sanctions by responding to public opinion on issues that they anticipate will be salient in future elections (see e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Mansbridge 2003; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Importantly, governments should face less uncertainty in anticipating the future electoral salience of left-right than of pro-anti integration issues. I argue that this leads to different stylised modes of government responsiveness in EU policy-making. As governments know that left-right has a certain, rather stable level of salience in domestic elections, they can engage in systematic, long-term planning and organisation of their responsiveness. They can decide on their exact effort of responsiveness, adjust it to national institutions, and distribute it over time to optimise their returns (*‘systematic mode’*). In contrast, as the electoral salience of pro-anti integration fluctuates, it is not rational for governments to systematise their responsiveness efforts, as EU integration may be irrelevant at the time of the next electoral contest. The best governments can do is to take current salience shocks as a signal of potentially high salience at the next election, and respond sporadically when such shocks occur (*‘sporadic mode’*).

Statistical analyses of over 3,700 policy positions adopted by governments from 26 member states in the Council between 1996 and 2008 reveal clear differences in responsiveness between issue dimensions. On left-right issues governments generally respond to public opinion, and their response is stronger if they face majoritarian electoral systems at home and when national elections approach. This indicates that governments systematically tailor and plan their responsiveness efforts with a view to national elections. In contrast, on pro-anti integration issues governments do not systematically or routinely respond to opinion. Instead, they only temporarily consider opinion at times when domes-

tic opposition parties increase their emphasis on EU integration issues as well as when EU-related events increase the salience of integration in the public sphere.

These findings challenge the widely held notion that the EU policy-making process is entirely unresponsive to public demands and a match between citizens' preferences and EU policy-making is mostly 'happy coincidence' (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). In contrast, the results show that, at least, national governments in the EU are systematically responsive to their voters on left-right issues, and sporadically also on pro-anti integration issues. This responsiveness in Brussels appears as a result of their electoral accountability at home. Moreover, the discovery of a 'systematic' and a 'sporadic' mode of responsiveness could potentially be relevant beyond the EU context. Thereby, this study contributes to our general understanding of how issue characteristics shape responsiveness and may facilitate the development of more comprehensive and nuanced models of policy representation in the future.

## THE EU'S POLICY-MAKING SPACE AND DOMESTIC ELECTORAL COMPETITION

In contrast to many landmark studies of responsiveness in national systems that assume the policy-making space to be defined by a single liberal-conservative (or left-right) conflict dimension (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Hakhverdian 2010, 2012; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), responsiveness in the EU has to be assessed on two issue dimensions. Scholars widely agree that, at least from a deductive, *a priori* perspective (see de Vries and Marks 2012), the EU's policy-making space must be conceptualised as two-dimensional (Hix 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Marks and Steenbergen

2002; Proksch and Slapin 2009).<sup>13</sup> Many EU policy-making controversies will naturally connect to conflicts about '*left-right*' ideological issues, encompassing classical economic and newly emerging left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian elements. Examples range from the liberalisation of former state company sectors (like postal services), over visa facilitations, to the treatment of laying hens in farms. But some pieces of legislation also touch upon '*pro-anti integration*' conflicts, as they concern jurisdictional architecture and have direct implications for the scope and level of EU authority or for the EU's geographical inclusiveness (for this definition of integration, see de Wilde and Zürn 2012). Examples range from the European Commission's (henceforth, the Commission) authority in enforcing budgetary discipline to the harmonisation of existing national safety regulations regarding the transport of dangerous goods. Sometimes both kinds of conflict intersect in the same issue.

Yet, while left-right and pro-anti integration issues are of similar significance for the policy-making space at the EU level, they play very different roles in electoral competition at the domestic level. On the one hand, left-right is a 'super-dimension' of political competition with a firm anchoring in classical political cleavages as 'persistent lines of salient social and ideological division' (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967; de Vries and Marks 2012; Whitefield 2002: 181). Left-right has strong social bases, since citizens' preferences on the issue dimension derive in large part from socio-structural and social identity factors such as class, religion, or trade union membership (Freire 2006, 2008).<sup>14</sup> For parties left-right issues often make up their very identity, i.e. they are 'party-defining' (Hurley and Hill 2003). Parties themselves and experts assessing parties use the

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<sup>13</sup> This is despite continued disagreement about the empirical relatedness of the dimensions and the empirical relevance of a third dimension.

<sup>14</sup> For an examination of two Eastern European countries, see Jou (2010).

left-right semantic to summarise party positions, and left-right has been demonstrated to have a common core meaning across Europe from West to East (Bakker et al. 2012, 2014; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Due to its centrality for party identity, left-right also takes primacy in party strategic considerations, for instance, when parties adopt positions on new issues (Marks, Nelson, and Edwards 2006).

In contrast, EU integration and questions of supranational authority have no obvious relation to major political cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan (1967) sense, but are instead an often fragile, evolving issue of electoral competition (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989, 1993). Citizens' pro-anti integration preferences do have some limited social bases (especially occupation, education, and income) (e.g. Gabel 1998a, 1998b), but they remain highly malleable and subject to elite cueing (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007). For parties, pro-anti integration positions are usually merely a 'programmatic addendum' and not the core of their identity (e.g. the French Front National, though a few single-issue parties like UKIP in the UK exist). As an issue that cross-cuts lines of party cleavage (Edwards 2009), EU integration has caused major internal dissent in Europe's mainstream parties, whose leaderships have tried to contain the issue's salience wherever possible (Edwards 2009; Parsons and Weber 2011; van de Wardt 2014). As a consequence, EU integration is mainly mobilised by issue entrepreneurs, i.e. new or existing fringe parties which are losers on the left-right dimension (Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Rovny 2012; Taggart 1998).

These differences between a central dimension of domestic electoral competition (left-right) and an evolving, fragile issue (pro-anti integration) are reflected in the issues' salience for vote choice in national elections. Where longitudinal and cross-national data has been investigated, citizens' left-right preferences prove universally salient for vote choice with not much variation between elections (van der Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008; van der Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder

2005). Some slight long-term decline in the electoral salience of left-right has been reported for some countries. However, this seems to be a result of gradual and predictable occupational change and globalisation (Hellwig 2008). In contrast, the EU issue voting literature has demonstrated that the electoral salience of attitudes on pro-anti integration is highly variable and often low. Importantly, it varies according to current levels of media information on European issues and is stronger after important events related to integration (e.g. referendums) (de Vries 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). Even for the UK, Daniel Stevens (2013) has demonstrated that the relevance of EU integration as an electoral factor has starkly fluctuated between the 1960s and today, following ebbs and flows and no long-term trend.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, left-right issues are *more salient and more reliably salient* in national elections than pro-anti integration issues, whose salience is sometimes substantial but low on average and fluctuates starkly over time.

## ELECTORAL SALIENCE AND MODES OF RESPONSIVENESS

The level and variability of the electoral salience of issues should have paramount consequences for governments' responsiveness, since national elections provide the fundamental incentives for governments to respond to public opinion (Powell 2000). First, a plethora of studies show that a higher *level of issue salience* increases representatives' responsiveness to public opinion, since voters monitor representatives more vigorously and sanction incumbents more strongly for deviating behaviour on the issue (e.g. Burstein 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien

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<sup>15</sup> In Stevens' view, the issue follows Carmines and Stimson's (1989) patterns of issue evolution.

2004).<sup>16</sup> This provides incentives to representatives to respond more consistently to voters' preferences on such issues. Given that left-right issues are, on average, more salient than pro-anti integration issues, governments' responsiveness should be stronger on left-right issues than on pro-anti integration issues.

Second, *variability in issue salience* should also impact on responsiveness. The prime reason for this is what scholars have called 'rational anticipation' (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) or 'anticipatory representation' (Mansbridge 2003) – the idea that politicians try to anticipate 'future voters' in future electoral contests. Chiefly, incumbents want to know whether left-right and pro-anti integration issues will be salient at the time of the next election in order to be able to forestall any potential electoral sanctions by responding to opinion beforehand. However, as the future is inherently uncertain, governments can only form (rational) beliefs about whether the issues will be important in the next election and these beliefs can be true or false to different degrees (Mansbridge 2003, 517; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 545). This is where the variability in salience matters. If governments know that left-right issues are reliably salient over time, they face little uncertainty about the extent of their relevance in the next electoral contest. In turn, if pro-anti integration issues are subject to stark fluctuations in salience, the uncertainty about their electoral relevance in the next election is substantial. I argue that this will affect the way in which governments organise their responsiveness efforts.

In total, the differences in the level and variability of salience between the two kinds of issues should lead to different stylised *modes of responsiveness*.<sup>17</sup> As governments know that left-right issues will be reliably salient in the next elec-

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<sup>16</sup> For sanctioning models of representation, see Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986).

<sup>17</sup> The notion of different modes is based on a simplified view. I use it for heuristic purposes and acknowledge that both stylised modes may simply be the ends of a continuum.

tion, they can adapt their responsiveness efforts to the domestic institutional framework, creating a long-term and highly structured plan (*'systematic mode'*). In particular, with a view to the next election they can adapt their responsiveness to electoral institutions and cycles. This structuring effort is rational, as governments can expect a positive pay-off from their responsiveness at the next election with a high level of certainty. In turn, as the electoral salience of pro-anti integration issues is uncertain, systematic responsiveness and long-term planning may not be efficient, since the issue may be entirely irrelevant at the time of elections. Instead, I argue that governments will handle responsiveness more immediately by only reacting to salience shocks that suggest that EU integration will be important at the next election, and disregarding opinion otherwise (*'sporadic mode'*). Responsiveness should then primarily be triggered by signals of salience such as exogenous events, the activities of the opposition, and media attention.

To test whether governments' modes of responsiveness differ between left-right and pro-anti integration issues, I formulate two testable hypotheses for each issue dimension that should be specific to the systematic and sporadic mode respectively. I start with left-right and systematic responsiveness. First, if governments systematically plan their responsiveness efforts on left-right with an eye towards elections, their efforts should vary over the course of the *electoral cycle*. Such structuring should not occur if governments only respond sporadically. Several studies have demonstrated that the responsiveness of representatives on major issue dimensions increases with electoral proximity (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Elling 1982; Kuklinski 1978; Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2011). Organising responsiveness efforts according to the electoral cycle is effective, as voters' gratitude for government action declines over time and good deeds before elections count more than those in the distant past (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011). Moreover, voters may use the period leading up to the

elections as a heuristic for government performance overall and ‘substitute the end for the whole’ (Healy and Lenz 2014: 33). The first hypothesis is therefore:

**LR-H1:** Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on left-right issues the closer national elections are.

Secondly, in the systematic mode *electoral systems* should be the major institution according to which governments can optimise their responsiveness efforts, which should not be possible if acting in an ‘ad hoc’ or sporadic manner. If the two major parties in a system are neck and neck, marginal changes in vote shares will typically transform into larger changes in seat shares in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional systems. This means that the vote-seat elasticity,  $e_v = \frac{d\text{Seats}/\text{Seats}}{d\text{Votes}/\text{Votes}}$ , is larger under majoritarian systems (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). This should generally create stronger incentives for governments to respond to opinion in majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems, as comparatively smaller electoral losses could dismantle government majorities.<sup>18</sup> A second advantage of majoritarian electoral systems for responsiveness is that they more often produce single party governments that are versatile in reacting to opinion, while multiparty governments under proportional representation (PR) have to engage in costly

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<sup>18</sup> However, there are two caveats concerning this general conclusion. Firstly, the idea that seat-vote elasticities are strictly greater in single-member district (SMD) than in proportional (PR) systems only holds if the two major parties are neck and neck. If one party dominates by a wide vote margin, seat-vote elasticity can approach 0 under SMD, while it will always be very close to 1 under PR (see Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008: 749-750; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008: 313-314). Second, SMD also creates incentives for governments to over-respond to the preferences and opinions of citizens in marginal districts that may often markedly differ from average opinion (see Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rickard 2012). Yet, Kayser and Lindstädt's (2015: 247) ‘loss probability’ model accounts for these caveats and still estimates a higher average electoral risk for Western post-war SMD than PR systems. This underscores the plausibility of LR-H2.



intra-coalition coordination (Wlezien and Soroka 2012: 1413-1414). The second hypothesis can therefore be formulated as:<sup>19</sup>

**LR-H2:** Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on left-right issues in majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems.

Turning to pro-anti integration issues and sporadic responsiveness, two fundamental factors indicate salience shocks and should prompt governments' occasional response: opposition parties emphasising the issues, and events related to integration. First, as party elites play a crucial role in mobilising issues with fluctuating salience in the domestic media and public sphere, governments' responsiveness efforts should be sensitive to opposition parties' *emphasis on integration* (see Carmines and Stimson 1986; van der Eijk and Franklin 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009). In contrast, this emphasis should not matter much if governments respond routinely. As pro-anti integration issues have little cleavage base and often relate to rather unobtrusive and abstract questions such as the competence allocation between national and EU institutions, they cause little genuine interest in the media and the public sphere.<sup>20</sup> Instead, studies demonstrate that party elites must often act as 'vehicles' for pro-anti integration issues to attain media coverage. If party leaders speak about the issues, reframe

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<sup>19</sup> Carey and Hix (2011) have argued that ideological congruence and other representational outcomes are maximised at medium district magnitudes (e.g. four to eight legislators) at which the accountability advantages of small districts are still strong but are topped up by gains in representativeness. While Carey and Hix (2012) show that medium district magnitudes may also be beneficial to legislators' congruence with median voter opinion, it is not clear whether their argument also applies to responsiveness (as defined in this thesis). In any case, unreported analyses did not reveal any statistically significant advantage of medium district magnitudes.

<sup>20</sup> As left-right issues closely connect to social cleavages, people often experience them directly (e.g. unemployment, tax, immigration), which secures such issues a constant coverage in the media and on the public agenda (see also Soroka 2002).

their domestic relevance, and communicate their stances on them, their news value increases (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2016). Therefore, when opposition parties place increased emphasis on integration issues, governments should interpret this as a signal of potential public and electoral salience, and increase their responsiveness:<sup>21</sup>

**EU-H1:** Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on pro-anti integration issues whenever opposition parties increase their emphasis on such issues.

Second, *events related to EU integration* should add to the public salience of integration and therefore prompt governments' responsiveness. Like party emphasis on integration, events can act as a vehicle for pro-anti integration conflicts to enter the public sphere. Research has demonstrated that events like referendums on EU integration, elections to the European Parliament (EP), or the introduction of the euro temporarily increase the coverage of integration issues in national media, as does the period in which a nation holds the EU presidency (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Vettters, Jentges, and Trenz 2009). These events often trigger intense public debates about pro-anti integration, ranging from questions of adopting new EU treaties (e.g. in referendums) to stopping legislation that challenges national sovereignty (e.g. during a presidency). In the specific case of referendums, research has shown that such debates clarify actors' positions to the public, affect public evaluations of leaders (de Vreese 2004), and increase the electoral salience of pro-anti integration in the next national election (de Vries 2009). Therefore, I expect:

**EU-H2:** Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion on pro-anti integration around major events related to EU integration.

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<sup>21</sup> On the effects of media information on electoral salience, see e.g. de Vries et al. (2011).

## DATA AND MEASUREMENT

To test these hypotheses I investigate the responsiveness of national governments from 26 EU countries on both issue dimensions in the Council. Specifically, I measure responsiveness as the effect of domestic public opinion on national ministers' policy positions regarding concrete pieces of legislation negotiated in the Council.<sup>22</sup> I take governments' policy positions as the dependent variable from the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 2006, 2012), which covers actor positions regarding 331 controversial issues from two legislative terms, 1994-1999 and 2004-2009. DEU is based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts from member states' permanent representations and EU institutions, who were asked to report controversial legislative issues and locate governments on corresponding spatial policy scales. It is the most widely used dataset on EU decision-making and has been employed in a diverse range of applications.<sup>23</sup> Importantly, DEU is a selection of the most salient issues in EU policy-making as proposals had to be mentioned in European media and actors had to be divided on key aspects to be included in the data.<sup>24</sup>

In order to identify those DEU issues that substantively relate to the two issue dimensions of interest, I have developed an original coding scheme. The guiding principle has been to construct categories for both dimensions that correspond to the DEU issues and at the same time closely reflect our best

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<sup>22</sup> An overview of all data sources used, including descriptive statistics, is available in Appendix 1.

<sup>23</sup> A full justification of the suitability of DEU in this context is provided in Appendix 1.

<sup>24</sup> Tracking governments' behaviour in the Council with DEU is therefore broadly comparable to tracking American legislators on the basis of ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) or similar scores (see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).

knowledge from the public opinion literature about what citizens associate with ‘left-right’ and ‘pro-anti integration’ conflicts (see below). This guarantees a high substantive relevance between the dependent and independent variable. The resulting scheme consists of eight categories representing the left-right dimension; they cover conflicts ranging from economic regulation, through consumer and environmental protection, to human and civil rights.<sup>25</sup> Four categories capture the integration dimension, covering aspects ranging from harmonisation over EU-level authority to the delaying of EU legislative acts.

The coding<sup>26</sup> reveals that about 61% of the DEU issues fall into at least one left-right category and 31% into at least one pro-anti integration category (with 12% relevant on both dimensions, i.e. both kinds of conflicts crossed in one issue). 22% relate neither to any left-right nor to any pro-anti integration category (e.g. they are connected with geographical cleavages). Wherever necessary the DEU scales with a predefined range of 0-100 have been rescaled in a linear manner so as to ensure that the most ‘right’ and the most ‘integrationist’ options advocated by any government in the estimation sample are represented by 100 and the most left / least integrationist by 0.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Hence, left-right is understood here as a macro-dimension that does not only capture economic left-right but also the ‘new politics’ dimension or GAL/TAN. One could separate these components, but their underlying issues jointly influence voters’ left-right self-placement, which is the only available cross-country, cross-time measure of public opinion (see below).

<sup>26</sup> The full codebook and measures of inter-coder reliability are available in Appendix 1.

<sup>27</sup> Rescaling removes 15 (left-right) / 13 (pro-anti integration) policy issues on which *all* national governments in the sample took the same position. In addition, I exclude 14 / 4 further policy issues on which more than two-thirds of government positions were not reported by the experts, as such large gaps may indicate that experts wrongly identified the policy issue in the first place.

**FIGURE 2.1: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

What are governments' positions on the total CO2 emission allowances for the aviation industry?

*Left*

*Right*

AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, EL, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE, UK	DE	CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SI, SK
Position 0: Annual average of 2004-06 emissions	22: 95% of the 2005-07 annual average emissions	100: Based on an emission level closer to the start date of the regulation

What are governments' positions on the application of budgetary discipline in the CAP?

*Anti integration*

*Pro integration*

AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, EL, IE, IT, PT, ES	LU	DE, NL	UK, SE
Position 0: Council decides on how much and which payments to reduce	50: Commission should have influ- ence, but Council should dominate	80: Commission should decide in most cases, in some the Council	100: Commission should cut money to stay under ceiling and decide how much and where to cut

*Notes:* AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom

Figure 2.1 illustrates the dependent variable with governments' positions on two exemplary issues from the data. Left-right issues are illustrated with a proposal concerning the inclusion of the aviation industry in the EU's CO2 emission trading system (COD/2006/304). In this case, the extent of emission allowances to be allocated to the industry was contested with some governments opting for smaller and others for larger allowances (left vs. right position). Pro-anti integration issues are exemplified by the Commission's power to apply budget-

ary discipline in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (CNS/2004/164). Governments were divided over the degree of authority they should delegate to the Commission in this respect.

To measure public opinion as the primary independent variable I use survey data from the Standard Eurobarometer series by linearly interpolating opinion between the six-monthly surveys. In line with common practice in the responsiveness literature, I use lagged opinion (by six months) to reflect causal ordering, in which governments first observe opinion and subsequently react to it.<sup>28</sup> Public opinion on left-right conflicts is operationalised as the country's average of the ideological self-placement item that asks respondents to identify their own ideological position on a scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Scholars have demonstrated that these self-placements are systematically related to attitudes on economic, cultural, and materialist vs. post-materialist conflicts (Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997), including specific issues such as immigration (de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013), civil liberties and human rights (Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007) as well as a variety of environmental issues (Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004; Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004). Therefore, these placements are a substantive measure of the public's left-right preferences.

In line with the extant literature, public opinion on pro-anti integration is measured as support for EU membership ('Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?'). Support is operationalised as the difference between respondents answering that the EU is a good thing minus those thinking the EU is a bad thing divided by all responses per country. This measure has been shown to correspond with more specific attitudes on integration as well as with

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<sup>28</sup> In Appendix 1, I provide results for different lag lengths (e.g. one year).

actual EU policy activity (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Toshkov 2011).

The moderating factors hypothesised are measured as follows. First, to test whether the electoral cycle influences government responsiveness I operationalise the distance to the next, scheduled national legislative election in 100 day units.<sup>29</sup> Second, the impact of electoral systems is ascertained with a measure of logged district magnitude to map systems on a continuum from majoritarian to proportional.<sup>30</sup> Third, whether an increase in opposition parties' emphasis on EU integration is related to stronger responsiveness is measured with the help of the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) database of election manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). This is operationalised as the simple average percentage of quasi-sentences opposition parties devote to EU integration (positive as well as negative statements) in their manifestos. To capture times in which parties increase their emphasis, I linearly interpolate over time and measure the change in party emphasis over the last four years.<sup>31</sup> Fourth, to determine the effects of major EU-related events I use a dummy variable that is '1' six months before

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<sup>29</sup> Results do not change when coding the distance to the next election that really occurred, i.e. to account for early elections (see Appendix 1).

<sup>30</sup> I use the superior measure of district magnitude as the number of seats available in the district faced by the average legislator instead of the number of seats available in the average district. These measures can diverge considerably if the size of districts varies within a country (see Johnson and Wallack 2005). A log-transformation accounts for potential outliers. I substantively obtain the same results when using Arend Lijphart's formula for the effective electoral threshold or a three-level variable for SMD, mixed, and PR systems (see Appendix 1).

<sup>31</sup> This measure was developed by Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil (2016). The version I use accounts for changes in government and linearly interpolates between such occasions. Using the change over three or five years yields the same results, as does seat-weighting the emphasis across opposition parties instead of using the simple average (see Appendix 1).

and after the following events: national referendums on integration, final ratification of EU treaties, accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, elections to the EP, holding the Council presidency.

I also include measures of government parties' left-right and pro-anti integration positions at the last election from the CMP. For left-right I use the CMP's summative RILE measure, and for pro-anti integration I take the difference between the percentage of positive and negative quasi-sentences on the EU. Aggregated government positions are obtained by seat-weighting. This effectively controls for effects of the 'electoral turnover' mechanism.<sup>32</sup> Not only do governments respond directly to public opinion, but voters also align governments' preferences with their views by influencing the composition of parliament and government through elections. Including measures of governments' promised policy positions guarantees that the effects of public opinion are controlled for any effects of the ideological composition of the government and exclusively represent governments' responsiveness efforts, i.e. rational anticipation (Stimson 1999).

In addition, I control for several factors that are known to influence the positioning of governments in EU policy-making and might at the same time have non-trivial relationships with public opinion. Most importantly, I account for a potentially relevant redistribution cleavage of rich versus poor countries with a measure of countries' annual net receipts from the EU budget (% of GDP) (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005). Second, I include national unemployment and inflation rates to ensure that the relationship between parties' and government's policy positions is more than a reflection of macroeconomic fluctuations (see e.g. Ferguson, Kellstedt, and Linn

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<sup>32</sup> For a discussion of the two mechanisms of responsiveness, see e.g. Hakhverdian (2010) or Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995).



2013). Third, I broadly capture the idea that member states may try to transfer their domestic policies to the European level (see e.g. Börzel 2002) with a measure of domestic economic freedom from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013).<sup>33</sup> All data sources are linked on the date the Commission submitted the relevant proposal to the Council.<sup>34</sup>

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To model the relationship between governments' policy positions and opinion, I use linear regressions with two-way fixed effects for the DEU policy issues as well as for the countries. The fixed effect estimator is based on the within-transformation, a demeaning of the data for each policy issue as well as each country,<sup>35</sup> which is best suited to obtaining consistent estimates in face of the heterogeneous set of policy issues and potentially unobserved country-level confounders. Moreover, I employ the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to provide standard errors that are robust to clustering on the country level. Including interaction terms between public opinion and the respective mod-

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<sup>33</sup> This measure has also been used by Thomson (2011a) to explain DEU positions.

<sup>34</sup> This reflects the fact that DEU measures 'initial positions', just after the introduction of the proposal.

<sup>35</sup> For technical reasons, I implement the model using a within-transformation for countries and dummy variables for policy issues, as a straightforward way of obtaining the correct degrees of freedom for the calculation of the country-cluster robust standard errors. Fixed effects (FE) nested within clusters (in my case, country FEs) should be treated as redundant for the finite sample degrees-of-freedom (DoF) correction of clustered SEs. In contrast, non-nested FEs (in my case, policy issue FEs) should reduce the DoF, which the dummy variables do.

erating variable allows us to test the hypotheses (see Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012). Hence, all models take the following general form:

$$P_{j,k} - \bar{P}_j - \bar{P}_k = \beta_1(O_{j,k} - \bar{O}_j - \bar{O}_k) + \beta_2(Z_{j,k} - \bar{Z}_j - \bar{Z}_k) \\ + \beta_3(O_{j,k} - \bar{O}_j - \bar{O}_k)(Z_{j,k} - \bar{Z}_j - \bar{Z}_k) + \dots + (\epsilon_{j,k} - \bar{\epsilon}_j - \bar{\epsilon}_k)$$

Where  $P$  is a policy position of a national government,  $O$  is public opinion in the member state,  $Z$  is one of the four moderating variables,  $j$  is the index for policy issues,  $k$  the index for countries, and  $\epsilon$  denotes the position-specific error term.

In a first step, I restrict the sample to all issues that relate to the left-right dimension. *Table 2.1* shows the major results. Model A1 regresses governments' policy positions (0 'most left' to 100 'most right' option) on left-right opinion and the control variables. The results show that opinion exerts a systematic and significant effect on governments' positioning in the Council. For a unit change in opinion to the right, governments shift their policy positions by 15.2 points towards rightist policy positions on the DEU scale. This effect is significant at the 5% level. In addition, there is some weak evidence that governments who are net receivers from the EU budget take more rightist policy positions. The coefficients on all other control variables are not statistically significant.

Model A2 investigates the evidence for the two hypotheses specific to the systematic mode. First, it tests whether governments increase their responsiveness on left-right issues as national elections approach (LR-H1). Indeed, there is a significant negative interaction effect between public opinion and the number of days to the next election. As elections approach, governments increasingly consider public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. Second, the model also assesses the impact of electoral systems on responsiveness by

allowing the opinion effect to vary by logged district magnitude (LR-H2). It shows that governments in majoritarian electoral systems are indeed more responsive to left-right preferences than their counterparts in proportional electoral systems, as the opinion effect diminishes with district magnitude. Both of these results are evidence that governments systematise and adjust their responsiveness with a view to national elections. The model also provides some limited evidence that governments with strong economic freedom at home take more rightist positions, which is in line with the ‘uploading’ hypothesis.


**TABLE 2.1: RESPONSIVENESS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION**

	<b>Model A1</b>	<b>Model A2</b>
Left-right opinion	15.213 (7.205)**	47.938 (14.553)***
Days to election		5.584 (2.454)**
Left-right opinion x Days to election		-1.026 (0.452)**
District magnitude (ln)		43.910 (18.976)**
Left-right opinion x District magnitude (ln)		-9.119 (3.653)**
Government left-right position	0.080 (0.130)	0.124 (0.139)
Net receipts from EU budget	3.246 (1.789)*	4.040 (1.869)**
Unemployment	-0.665 (0.719)	-0.895 (0.679)
Inflation	-1.516 (1.548)	-1.657 (1.493)
Economic freedom	5.216 (3.630)	7.944 (4.600)*
Fixed effects	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries
Number of policy issues	172	172
Number of countries	26	26
N	2,965	2,965
R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.28

*Notes:* All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

To illustrate these results, *Figure 2.2* plots the marginal effect of public opinion depending on the days to the next election and separately for SMD and PR electoral systems (prediction for PR is at the average district magnitude of the sample, i.e. ~13). We can see that in the average electoral system public opinion does not have any significant influence on governments' positioning when planned elections lie more than 1300 to 1400 days in the future. However, from around three and a half years before the elections governments clearly consider public opinion when taking policy positions in the Council. In turn, governments facing SMD systems at home are generally responsive, even five years ahead of elections, and when elections are imminent they change their policy positions by up to 48 points for a unit change in opinion. Considering the DEU scale from 0-100, this is a stark effect.

**FIGURE 2.2: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY ELECTORAL CYCLE AND SYSTEM**



*Notes:* 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

In a second step, I restrict the sample to all issues relating to conflicts about pro-anti integration. The results are reported in *Table 2.2*.

**TABLE 2.2: RESPONSIVENESS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION**

	<b>Model B1</b>	<b>Model B2</b>
Pro-anti integration opinion	19.916 (19.087)	9.640 (21.674)
Party emphasis (EU)		-3.230 (1.468)**
Pro-anti integration opinion x Party emphasis (EU)		10.398 (3.612)***
EU event		-16.059 (7.102)**
Pro-anti integration opinion x EU event		27.097 (12.977)**
Government pro-anti integration position	-0.210 (0.608)	-0.290 (0.556)
Net receipts from EU budget	7.285 (2.421)***	3.570 (2.934)
Unemployment	-1.034 (0.550)*	-1.522 (0.541)***
Inflation	-0.523 (1.053)	-0.015 (1.056)
Economic freedom	-1.338 (3.577)	-0.087 (3.624)
Fixed effects	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries
Number of policy issues	82	82
Number of countries	26	26
N	1,448	1,448
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.31

*Notes:* All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01


Model B1 estimates the adopted policy position (0 ‘least integrationist’ to 100 ‘most integrationist’ option) as a function of pro-anti integration opinion and the control variables. In contrast to the findings on the left-right dimension, there is no unconditional effect of public opinion on governments’ positioning

on pro-anti integration issues. The coefficient on opinion is positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero. This supports the idea that governments do not systematically respond on pro-anti integration issues, as pro-anti integration is not reliably salient in domestic elections.

Model B2 tests the two hypotheses specific to the sporadic mode, investigating whether governments respond on pro-anti integration in the face of salience shocks. First, it tests whether governments are responsive when opposition parties increase their emphasis on pro-anti integration in their manifestos (EU-H1). The hypothesis is supported by a significant interaction term (at the 1% significance level). Second, the model tests whether major events related to EU integration play a pivotal role in making governments wary of public opinion on pro-anti integration (EU-H2). The results entirely support this conjecture: before and after major events on EU integration governments shift positions by about 7 points on the DEU scale when about 10% of citizens change their opinion on EU membership (e.g. from 'bad thing' to 'good thing', assuming 'neither good nor bad' answers are negligible). The results demonstrate that governments do not respond systematically on pro-anti integration but sporadically when triggered by opposition parties' emphasis on integration or EU events, both of which signal potential electoral salience.

*Figure 2.3* plots the marginal effect of public opinion depending on the change in parties' emphasis on integration and separately for times with and without an event related to EU integration. In times with no event governments do not significantly respond to opinion, irrespective of opposition parties' emphasis on integration. But around events related to integration opinion exerts a statistically significant effect on governments' positions, if opposition parties have increased their quasi-sentences on integration. However, the opinion effect is indistinguishable from zero, if opposition parties have reduced their emphasis on integration during the last four years.

**FIGURE 2.3: MARGINAL EFFECT OF OPINION BY PARTY SALIENCE AND EVENT CONTEXT**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

In terms of the control variables, the negative and significant coefficient on unemployment in Models B1 and B2 suggests that governments facing unemployed workers at home are more reluctant to extend integration.<sup>36</sup> Also note that neither on left-right nor on pro-anti integration government parties' posi-

<sup>36</sup> This ties in with Toshkov's (2011) findings that support for EU membership is dampened by unemployment with a four-year delay and at the same time influences the amount of integration implemented. Rationally anticipating governments may want to avoid more integration in the face of unemployment, as they know that it is a signal of reduced future support for the union.

tions in their election manifestos prove predictive of the positions they take in the Council.<sup>37</sup>

What do these opinion effects mean in a real world context? First, they can be interpreted relative to average distances in policy positions between national delegations. For instance, the average distance on the left-right scale between the UK, which advocated more 'rightist' policy positions, and France, with more 'leftist' positions, is about 10 scale points (57 against 47 respectively). Given an opinion effect of about 28-48 points in SMD systems and long-run standard deviations of left-right opinion between 0.1-0.2, regular fluctuations in opinion are sufficient to make the UK government adopt positions like its French counterpart. For an example for pro-anti integration, we can compare Ireland, which has largely adopted integrationist policy positions, and the Netherlands, which has been more reluctant. An average of 7 scale points separates them. Given an opinion effect of 15-55 points in most situations around EU-related events and long-run standard deviations of support for membership around 0.1, changes of policy positions by 3-11 scale points are quite frequent. Hence, under Eurosceptic tides of public opinion the Irish government, which has had to face eight EU referendums so far, can be expected to agree with the Dutch delegation.

Second, the substantive impact of opinion can be exemplified by predicting governments' positions on specific policy issues from the data. As an example for left-right I use an issue from a directive on common standards for returning illegal immigrants (COD/2005/167). A key controversy on this directive was for how long member states should be allowed to detain illegal immigrants who


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<sup>37</sup> This is evidence of little overall mandate fulfilment by parties. However, Paper 3 demonstrates mandate fulfilment on economic left-right issues in some contexts.



have received a deportation decision. As an example for pro-anti integration I draw on the member states' decision to establish the EU's Employment Committee (CNS/1999/192), an advisory committee to the Employment and Social Affairs (EPSCO) Council configuration. In this case, it was contested whether the committee should be located in the Council's or the Commission's sphere of influence.

**FIGURE 2.4: SUBSTANTIVE MEANING OF OPINION EFFECT WITH EXAMPLES**



Notes: Arrow connects predicted position at observed values with hypothetical prediction when increasing opinion by two long-run standard deviations (average across countries, 1990-2013). at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lu: Luxembourg; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom.

Figure 2.4 plots the models' (A2/B2) predicted positions at the observed values and connects them with an arrow to the prediction when shifting public opinion two long-run standard deviations towards rightist or pro integration

opinion. This reveals the substantial leverage of opinion. For instance, the French position on detention periods for illegal immigrants would have been predicted 14 scale points towards longer periods, which would have meant between one and four months of additional detention in substantive terms. The next French elections were almost two years away at this point. On the institutional location of the Employment Committee, which was discussed shortly after the 1999 European elections, Belgium is predicted to shift its position by 10 scale points towards higher Commission influence. In substantive terms, this distance represented the difference between ensuring that influence was balanced between the two institutions or giving an advantage to one.

## ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE

I test the robustness of these results by addressing three types of concerns.<sup>38</sup> All results are provided in *Table 2.3*. First, I address the theoretical concern that the modes of responsiveness may not be specific to issue dimensions and that governments may apply both modes on both issue dimensions. In this case, governments would also sporadically increase their responsiveness on left-right due to salience shocks and systematise their efforts on pro-anti integration according to the electoral cycle and system. To test these assertions, I use two indicators of salience shocks on left-right. First, I use a measure of the change in opposition parties' emphasis on left-right conflicts. In analogy to pro-anti integration this is operationalised as the average percentage of quasi-sentences opposition parties devote to the CMP's RILE categories in their election manifestos minus their emphasis on RILE four years before.

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<sup>38</sup> Results of additional robustness checks are reported in Appendix 1.

**TABLE 2.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS MODELS**

	Dimension-specific mode		Dichotomous DV		Measurement concerns	
	<i>Left-right</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Left-right</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Left-right</i>	<i>Integration</i>
Opinion	17.168 (6.100)***	-2.146 (73.897)	2.642 (0.888)***	0.773 (1.331)	28.758 (9.141)***	2.310 (19.352)
Party emphasis (LR / EU)	0.250 (3.141)			-0.150 (0.077)*		
Opinion x Party emphasis (LR / EU)	-0.049 (0.573)			0.522 (0.195)***		
Public salience (LR / EU)	-2.394 (20.680)					-13.015 (4.741)**
Opinion x Public salience (LR / EU)	1.272 (3.782)					35.423 (10.278)***
Days to election		0.200 (0.804)	0.343 (0.140)**		6.041 (2.711)**	
Opinion x Days to election		0.599 (1.625)	-0.063 (0.026)**		-1.103 (0.515)**	
District magnitude (ln)		-5.670 (13.636)	2.653 (1.320)**		42.934 (16.586)**	
Opinion x District magnitude (ln)		2.888 (21.891)	-0.546 (0.251)**		-8.544 (3.246)***	
EU event				-1.238 (0.342)***		
Opinion x EU event				1.923 (0.679)***		
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Fixed effects	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues	Policy issues, countries
Number of policy issues	172	82	172	82	172	82
Number of countries	26	26	26	26	16	26
N	2,865	1,448	2,965	1,448	2,406	1,430
R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.30			0.25	0.31
Type of robustness check	Sporadic mode?	Systematic mode?	Binary DV	Binary DV	Western Eu- rope only	Public sali- ence measure

*Notes:* All are fixed effects linear regressions, except for 'Dichotomous DV', which are fixed effects logistic regressions; Deviations in the number of observations due to missing country reports for public salience measure; Country-clustered robust errors in parentheses, except for 'Western Europe only' with errors clustered by policy issue; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Second, as it is hard to identify a set of events that render left-right conflicts more salient across countries, I create an alternative measure of the public salience of left-right. For this I make use of country reports from *The Political Data Yearbook*, which is published annually by the *European Journal of Political Research*. In these reports, experts discuss the most important political issues that shaped a country's political agenda in a given year. I apply the Laver-Garry dictionary developed for party policy positions to these texts and calculate the percentage of economic left-right words used by the authors (Laver and Garry 2000). This provides a proxy for whether left-right conflicts were salient political issues in the country and the given year.<sup>39</sup>

I interact both measures with left-right opinion and include all control variables. The results show that governments' responsiveness efforts on left-right are neither related to fluctuations in opposition parties' emphasis on left-right nor to whether left-right issues were salient on the country's political agenda. This yields further evidence that governments routinise their responsiveness efforts on left-right and do not react to shocks that signal potential electoral salience. For pro-anti integration I simply use interactions between opinion and the distance to the next election as well as logged district magnitude. Again, the results provide strong evidence for the theoretical conjecture: governments do not plan or structure their responsiveness efforts according to the electoral cycle nor the electoral system on the pro-anti integration dimension.

Second, I address concerns about the distribution of the dependent variable. Since a significant fraction of DEU policy scales are binary (e.g. the legislative conflict only offered two options), the extreme values 0 and 100 are overrepresented, rendering the distribution skewed at both tails. In order to see whether this non-normality drives any results I create a second, dichotomised version of

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<sup>39</sup> I discuss the face validity of this measure in Appendix 1.

the dependent variable: if governments took more leftist / less integrationist positions between 0 and 49 this is coded as '0' and more rightist / integrationist positions between 50 and 100 as '1'. The final models are re-estimated using fixed effects logistic regression. Again, this different specification yields qualitatively identical results, if anything at slightly higher levels of statistical significance.

Third, I address two concerns regarding measurement. With regard to left-right I account for the potentially weak suitability of the left-right self-placement as a measure of opinion in post-communist countries. Some studies suggest that citizens' understanding of the left-right semantic may differ between Western and Eastern Europe, as citizens with strong conservation and security values tend to place themselves on the right side of the scale in Western Europe but often to the left in post-communist countries (Aspelund, Lindeman, and Verkasalo 2013; Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Thorisdottir et al. 2007). This is caused by respondents associating the communist past with 'left' ideology as well as traditionalism and security. A re-estimation of model A2 from Table 2.1 excluding the 10 post-communist countries demonstrates that this potential measurement problem does not seem to drive any results.<sup>40</sup>

With regard to pro-anti integration a central question is whether the moderators investigated are adequate proxies of salience shocks. Sometimes other EU-related events than those selected may trigger salience, and not every referendum or EU presidency may actually resonate in the public sphere. Similarly,

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<sup>40</sup> As excluding post-communist states reduces the number of countries from 26 to 16, I exceptionally estimate the model without country fixed effects to preserve variation and I do not report country-clustered robust standard errors that may not be reliable with a small number of clusters. Instead, I cluster errors by policy issue. Hence, the results should be treated with some caution.

emphasis on EU integration in election manifestos hardly captures all mobilisation activities of opposition parties and its quality as a proxy may be better around elections than during the term. In order to measure public salience shocks more directly, I create an alternative measure based on the country reports from The Political Data Yearbook introduced above. Searching the reports for the terms 'Europe\*' and 'European Union' and manually checking the relevant sentences, I construct a dummy variable that is '1' for years in which at least one aspect of EU integration was mentioned as a salient issue by country experts. Interacting this alternative measure with opinion produces the same results: responsiveness on pro-anti integration is triggered by public salience but is absent otherwise.

The question remains of whether the relationship between opinion and governments' policy positions can be interpreted causally. The entire responsiveness literature is quite aware that elites attempt to prime, frame, and persuade the public, potentially causing 'simultaneity' or even 'reversed causality', so that governments may shape opinion more than they are influenced by it. However, most findings of this study point towards a bottom-up process. Above all, the relationship between opinion and governments' positions only becomes significant with increasing electoral pressure in the domestic arena – be it an approaching national election, an elastic electoral formula, or potentially increased electoral salience of integration due to opposition emphasis or EU-related events. As Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 43) have argued, manipulation of opinion by elites is the strategic choice in times of low electoral pressure but not if electoral incentives are imminent since then 'it is less risky and faster to respond to public opinion than attempt to change it'. Hence, if elite-led dynamics were prevalent, we should detect the strongest relationships between opinion and positions in periods distant from elections, in PR systems, and in times when integration has low public salience. This is precisely the opposite of what I find.

In total, the empirical analyses consistently support the notion of distinct modes of responsiveness which governments apply on the two issue dimensions. The results suggest that governments systematise their responsiveness on left-right, as public opinion has a consistent impact on policy positions that increases when elections approach and under high elasticity of seat-vote conversion in majoritarian electoral systems. In turn, the empirical patterns on pro-anti integration suggest that governments only sporadically consider opinion in the context of salience shocks. Governments' positions react to opinion when parties increase their emphasis on integration or when major events happen, but they are isolated from public pressures at other times.

## CONCLUSION

This study has investigated substantive government responsiveness in the EU's two-dimensional policy-making space. I have argued that due to the different roles which left-right and pro-anti integration issues play in domestic electoral competition, distinct patterns of government responsiveness emerge on the two issue dimensions. While left-right issues are of high and stable salience in domestic elections, the electoral importance of pro-anti integration issues varies greatly over time and is lower on average. This affects governments' rational anticipation of which issue bundles will be electorally salient in the next election. As uncertainty about the salience of left-right issues is low, systematic responsiveness, characterised by long-term planning and structuring of responsiveness efforts along the electoral cycle, is rational and efficient. In turn, as the uncertainty about the salience of EU integration is high, sporadic responsiveness, in response to salience shocks that indicate the potential electoral relevance of EU integration, is more appropriate.



The study findings contribute to our understanding of policy representation in EU politics. Existing studies of policy representation in the EU have proclaimed a link between public Euroscepticism and the legislative activity of the EU (measured as the sheer amount of legislative output) (Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011). But they could not establish whether the actual substance and content of EU policy-making is responsive to public opinion. The results here provide strong evidence that, in many situations, national governments at least attempt to align the substance of policies to domestic public opinion. Thereby, they further challenge the notion that the EU policy-making process is entirely unresponsive to citizens' demands and that a match between EU-level policies and opinion is merely a result of 'happy coincidence' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). Instead, in light of the results presented here, it appears likely that policy representation in the EU is, at least partially, a result of reliable mechanisms rooted in governments' electoral accountability at the domestic level. This is particularly likely for left-right issues, on which we observe systematic responsiveness.

Moreover, the findings potentially also contribute to our understanding of how issue characteristics influence responsiveness in general. While we have known for a long time that the level of electoral salience influences the strength of responsiveness in national politics, the findings suggest that we should also consider the consequences of variability in salience more thoroughly. For instance, it may be no coincidence that most studies reporting significant electoral cycle effects assess responsiveness on issues with very stable salience, particularly a liberal-conservative/left-right issue dimension (e.g. Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Elling 1982; Kuklinski 1978; Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2011).

Null findings might also be reconsidered in the light of the results presented. For instance, so far scholars were unable to detect any relationship between responsiveness and variations over time in citizens' responses to the 'most important problem' (MIP) question as a measure of public salience. While this has

been attributed to MIP measuring ‘problem load’ rather than ‘importance of an issue’, it could also partly be due to the fact that the issues investigated – predominantly defence spending in the US – are at the core of the liberal-conservative cleavage (see Jennings and Wlezien 2011; Wlezien 2005). Given the comparatively low variability in the salience of such issues, representatives may systematise their responsiveness on such issues and respond irrespective of minor salience fluctuations.<sup>41</sup>

While these considerations and the generality of the theoretical argument indicate that different modes of responsiveness might also be relevant in other contexts and for other issues, future work is needed to determine the actual generalisability of the findings. This can involve the re-examination of existing datasets but also new studies comparing different issues and issue dimensions. Then, we will be able to determine whether distinct modes of responsiveness are an idiosyncrasy of EU policy-making, or whether they apply more generally beyond the EU context.

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<sup>41</sup> Interestingly, average *levels* of MIP across issues *do* predict responsiveness, suggesting some validity of the concept, while the *variability* of MIP over time does not (see Soroka and Wlezien 2010: 100-102).

## PAPER 2

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### *Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council Voting*

*With Sara Hagemann and Sara B. Hobolt*

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#### ABSTRACT

Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organisations? This article demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union's primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union. We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analysing a unique dataset on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are sceptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC OPINION IS CENTRAL TO DEMOCRATIC representation. It implies that elected representatives are listening to and acting upon the wishes and views of the represented (see, for example, Mansbridge 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Various studies have shown that policy agendas, government spending, and legislative voting follow the changing policy preferences of citizens (Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995). The fear of electoral sanctioning is an important incentive for governments to act responsively. Not surprisingly, studies have therefore found that in systems in which there is low clarity of responsibility and limited information, where it is difficult for voters to identify policy shirking, elected representatives are also less responsive to public preferences (Besley and Burgess 2002; Carey 2008; Snyder and Strömberg 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). On the one hand, we may expect governments to be less concerned about responding to public preferences when legislating in international organisations (IOs) where clarity of responsibility is blurred by multilevel structures and public scrutiny is generally less pronounced.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, increased transparency and scrutiny of decision-making in some IOs may give governments greater incentives to use this arena to signal that they are aligned with the public's views and preferences.

However, little evidence exists with regard to whether governments are in fact responsive to domestic public opinion pressures when acting in IOs. Although public opinion is generally seen as an important factor explaining government behaviour in the domestic context, empirical literature on the role of

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<sup>42</sup> For discussions of transparency in international organisations, see e.g. Keohane (2003), Risse (2000), Stasavage (2004).

public opinion in IOs is still sparse (see Stasavage 2004). Instead, studies of government behaviour in IOs have mainly focused on other drivers, such as geopolitics, military and economic resources, and special interest preferences (see, for example, Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015; Dreher and Sturm 2012). The contribution of this study is to focus on the role of public opinion in shaping government behaviour in the European Union (EU) in order to understand whether and when governments use the international arena to signal to their domestic electorates. We argue that domestic electoral incentives can compel governments to signal that they are responsive to public opinion even when acting internationally.

Our empirical investigation focuses on decision-making in the EU. The EU is arguably the world's most advanced IO, presiding over a level of economic and political integration unmatched in global politics. We examine government behaviour in its primary decision-making body, the Council of the European Union (henceforth, the Council), where national ministers negotiate and adopt legislative proposals. Legislative bargaining in the Council used to take place behind closed doors; however, since 1999, an increasing amount of information on policy decisions and government positions has become available (Naurin and Wallace 2008). In this article, we analyse a unique data set covering all legislative acts since 1999 and investigate the extent to which government opposition in the Council is a response to popular opposition to European integration. Government opposition in the Council is still a rare event, but one that carries considerable significance (Mattila 2009; Novak 2013). Our argument is that when domestic electorates are negatively disposed toward European integration, governments can strategically oppose EU acts that are concerned with further transfers of authority to the EU to demonstrate that their position is aligned with their public's preferences. Hence, in contrast to the established wisdom that governments are shielded from public opinion when legislating internationally, we argue that popular Euroscepticism incentivises them to voice oppo-

sition in the Council. While this is not ‘policy responsiveness’ in the classic sense of changing the overall policy direction of the Council, we conceptualise it as ‘signal responsiveness’ that serves to communicate governments’ positions to their domestic electorate.

Our findings demonstrate that governments’ opposition to legislative proposals is indeed shaped by public opinion on European integration wherever these proposals extend the level and scope of European integration. We also find that governments are more likely to signal their positions in the Council when the issue gains importance in domestic party competition and that these signals resonate in the national public sphere. Our findings thus not only contribute to our understanding of policy-making in the EU, but may also have broader significance as IOs increasingly face pressures to deepen cooperation and increase transparency and accountability to domestic audiences. Moreover, our study enhances our understanding of democratic responsiveness by highlighting that governments use the international stage to signal to voters at home that they care about their views.

## **GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN IOS**

The relationship between public preferences and government policy is at the heart of theories of democratic representation. There is a rich literature on government responsiveness, asking whether, when, and how government policies respond to changes in public opinion (see, e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson

2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2010; Wlezien 1995).<sup>43</sup> Despite the scholarly focus on how public opinion shapes government positions and policies when they act domestically,<sup>44</sup> far less attention has been paid to how public opinion influences government behaviour in IOs. Overwhelmingly, the literature on government positions and legislative behaviour in IOs, such as the EU, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations, has focused on military and economic considerations, and special interests as drivers of government behaviour (see e.g. Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015; Dreher and Sturm 2012; Hug and Lukács 2014). This is also true of the literature on government behaviour in the Council more specifically.

Numerous studies have in recent years examined decision-making in the Council, not least due to improved public access to information. Yet, none of these have provided a rigorous study of how public opinion may shape government behaviour. Instead, the literature has centred on economic interests and government ideology as drivers of behaviour. A recent example is Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider's (2014) study of voting behaviour in the Council, which demonstrates that government opposition can largely be attributed to economic explanations, notably domestic specialised interests. Others have found that a north-south divide exists between the member states in their voting patterns (Mattila 2009; Thomson et al. 2006) or that the left-right ideology of governments affects their behaviour in the Council (Hagemann 2008; Hagemann and Høyland 2008; Mattila 2009). The general assumption in such studies is that as

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<sup>43</sup> The relationship between public opinion and government policy is, however, complex. Studies have stressed governments' ability to manipulate opinion (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), raised questions about who comprises the relevant 'public' (e.g. Gilens 2012), and highlighted the complex relationship between responsiveness and congruence (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012).

<sup>44</sup> Some studies have also examined the impact of public opinion on politicians' foreign policy positions; see, for example, Jacobs and Page (2005) and Milner and Tingley (2011).

governments are largely insulated from electoral pressures when they legislate in the Council, constituency demands do not play a significant role. As Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider (2014: 441) note,

[T]he electorate is usually not well informed about the Council deliberations as these negotiations are conducted mostly away from the public scrutiny [...]. Therefore, negative votes and abstentions in the Council will be a signal to which mainly domestic interest groups pay some attention.

Public opinion is not entirely absent from the literature on EU policy-making, however. Some studies have examined 'systemic responsiveness' by analysing whether the amount of legislation passed reflects public demands for further integration, showing a relationship between EU support and the amount of legislation (see Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011). Although this work is valuable for studying responsiveness at the system level, it provides limited insight into when and why we would expect individual politicians to act responsively in the EU. Moreover, it is based on the strong assumption that more legislative acts necessarily imply more integration.

In contrast to extant work on systemic responsiveness, we examine the micro-foundations of responsiveness by analysing government behaviour in the Council. If there is any relationship between public opinion and government behaviour in IOs, we would expect to find it in the EU, arguably the world's most advanced IO with high levels of political and economic integration and increasing salience in domestic public spheres (Börzel and Risse 2009). Hence, we cannot easily generalise from the EU to other IOs. Yet, as a 'most likely case', the EU is an important starting point for the exploration of democratic responsiveness in the international arena.



The Council is the EU's primary legislative chamber<sup>45</sup> and we focus on government opposition to legislative acts. While the majority of acts adopted by the Council are supported by all member states, opposition in the Council has increased during the past 10 to 15 years, with more legislation now adopted with one or more governments explicitly recording their disagreement (Naurin and Wallace 2008). Today, 'vote intentions' are publicly available ahead of Council meetings, and minutes and final legislative records from the meetings include information about votes and policy positions by the member states. Council votes are also reported more widely by national media (see below). In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, this study develops and tests the argument that public opinion can play a role in shaping governments' behaviour in the Council.

## RESPONSIVE OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL

How would responsiveness to public opinion manifest itself in governments' voting behaviour in the Council? We argue that governments can use opposition votes in the Council as public signals of their position on EU integration. This *signal responsiveness* is different from substantive responsiveness in that governments cannot directly change the policy substance with their opposition (as virtually all acts put to a vote eventually pass), but they can use it as a communication tool to credibly signal their position on transfers of authority (closer European integration) to a wider audience. However, governments' motivations for signalling their position are similar to when they change policies in line with public opinion during the legislative term. In both cases, it is a form of

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<sup>45</sup> Legally speaking, the Council is one entity, but in practice, it is divided into ten configurations (Competitiveness, Economic and Financial Affairs, etc.), and each Council has to adopt legislation according to a set of rules depending on the legal basis of the policy proposal in question.

‘anticipatory representation’ or ‘rational anticipation’, as they focus on what they think voters will reward in the next election rather than what they promised during the campaign of the previous election (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Mansbridge 2003; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Crucially, however, the EU makes it more difficult for a single government to shift actual policy in line with domestic preferences. Yet, by voting in line with public preferences they are still able to send the signal that they are not out of step with the public mood.

Recent studies have shown that citizens care about government responsiveness (see Bowler 2016; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2016), and the issue of European integration has become increasingly salient to voters. Since the early 1990s, Europe has witnessed a shift away from a ‘permissive consensus’ in favour of elite-led European integration toward more vocal and sceptical public attitudes toward the integration project, so-called Euroscepticism (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; de Vries 2007). The electoral consequences of Euroscepticism have been acutely felt by Europe’s mainstream parties as they suffered a loss of support due to the rise of Eurosceptic parties, mainly on the far right and the far left, both in national and European Parliament (EP) elections (see Hobolt and Spoon 2012; de Vries 2007). Hence, given the increasing salience of voters’ concerns about European integration in electoral contests, political elites have been looking for ways of adjusting their position on the issue.

We argue that Council voting serves as a signalling tool that governments may adopt to communicate their positions on a given proposal, and on European integration more generally, to a domestic audience. Given the strong consensus culture in the Council, opposition sends a clear and generally unwelcome message to negotiation partners that may be costly in terms of reputation and related future negotiation success (see Miller 2013; Naurin and Wallace 2008; Novak 2013). Opposition can also have immediate consequences, as it may lead

to dismissal of the opposing government's preferences when drafting the final policy text. Hence, as there are few benefits (the policy will be passed by the majority in any case) and several costs, it is not surprising that opposition is still relatively rare, accounting for less than 2% of votes during the 1999 to 2011 period we investigate here. This means, however, that as a public signalling tool, opposition votes can be seen as more credible as they involve 'observable costly effort' (see Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

To serve as a public signal of the government's position on integration, an opposition vote must be *interpretable* as a stance against European integration. Most of the legislative proposals in the Council, however, do not relate to transfers of authority to the EU level. Some policy areas, such as agriculture, deal primarily with rather technical amendments or issues in the remit of pre-established EU competences, whereas other policy areas are concerned with extending the *scope* of authority by establishing EU legislation or programs in previously unaffected areas as well as its *level* by delegating new decisional powers to supranational bodies or agencies (Börzel 2005; Schmitter 1970). Our expectation is therefore that opposition which is aimed at appeasing public concerns about European integration will primarily relate to votes in policy areas concerned with extending the level or scope of EU authority. This leads to our first hypothesis concerning government responsiveness in the Council:

**H1:** Governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that affect the authority of the EU when domestic public opinion is negatively disposed toward the EU than when public opinion is positively disposed toward the EU.

The extent to which governments wish to use opposition votes as a signal to their publics is also shaped by domestic political competition. We expect that governments' responsiveness is higher when the issue of European integration is salient in the domestic context. As signal responsiveness aims at communicating positions (and shifts in positions) to the public, it becomes largely obsolete in situations when conflicts about integration are not politicised in the do-

mestic political arena. Political elites play a crucial role in mobilising a new issue in the domestic public sphere, including in the media, and thus making it relevant to voters' choices (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; Hooghe and Marks 2009). The abstract nature of European integration and multilevel governance issues makes the actions of political elites all the more important, as such issues typically lack inherent news value (Soroka 2002). Instead, it is political elites' communication activities on these issues that render them newsworthy in the first place (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013). In turn, increased levels of (media) information on EU integration render the issue more important for electoral competition, as they facilitate 'EU issue voting', that is, they increase the impact of EU attitudes on vote choice (Tillman 2004; de Vries 2007; de Vries, Edwards, and Tillman 2010). Research has shown that in party systems where there is more partisan conflict and media debate on European integration dimensions, EU issue voting is more likely (Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). When political opposition parties politicise the issue of European integration domestically, there are also greater incentives for governing parties to demonstrate that they adjust their position on European integration in line with public opinion. Hence, we expect that wherever opposition parties increase the salience of integration, governments will be particularly prone to signal responsiveness.

**H2:** Governments are more responsive to public opinion when domestic opposition parties increase their emphasis on European integration.<sup>46</sup>

The next sections discuss how we test these hypotheses empirically.

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<sup>46</sup> This hypothesis mirrors hypothesis EU-H1 from Paper 1. The findings below therefore corroborate those on EU-H1 in Paper 1 by showing that under increasing opposition emphasis on integration not only the initial negotiation positions of governments are influenced by public opinion but also their voting behaviour.

## DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION

To test our propositions, we draw on a unique dataset of governments' votes in the Council between January 1999 and October 2011.<sup>47</sup> We define opposition as governments' 'No' or 'Abstain' votes as abstentions always mean a deviation from the majority consensus and effectively count as a negative position when mobilising majorities to meet the required qualified majority threshold. Our dependent variable is therefore binary, with '1' indicating that governments opposed a legislative act.

As our main independent variable to test H1, we measure public opinion on EU integration with the Eurobarometer survey question on EU membership, which asks respondents whether their countries' membership in the EU is 'a good thing', 'a bad thing', or 'neither good nor bad'. This question has been widely used to measure dynamic preferences for EU integration. We operationalise public opinion by assigning '-1' to all respondents who think EU membership is a bad thing, '1' to those who say it is a good thing, and '0' to all who are undecided. Our measure of opinion is the survey-weighted mean of all valid responses by country, and runs from about 0 (when supporters and opponents of integration are neck and neck) to about 0.8 (when there is overwhelming support for EU membership).<sup>48</sup> In all models, we use a six-month lag of opinion

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<sup>47</sup> Our time frame for the estimation of our voting models is restricted by the European Commission's decision to discontinue the question on EU membership in its Eurobarometer surveys from 2011 onward. Our extended dataset comprises all votes up to 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2013. We use this extended dataset for both quantitative text models we use in the paper (Wordscores and Latent Dirichlet Allocation).

<sup>48</sup> We use linear interpolation to cover time points between surveys (see also Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

from the voting date to represent the causal ordering between opinion and government behaviour in which governments react to public opinion.<sup>49</sup>

To test our second hypothesis (H2), we construct a measure of dynamic opposition emphasis on EU integration from the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) coding of party manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). We capture changes in opposition emphasis by first calculating the simple average percentage of quasi-sentences opposition parties devote to European integration and linearly interpolate this measure over time. Our measure is the emphasis at the date of the Council vote minus the emphasis four years prior to this date.<sup>50</sup>

As signal responsiveness is about anticipatory representation rather than a government fulfilling its electoral mandate, we have to rule out the possibility that the relationship between opinion and opposition votes is entirely driven by changes in government composition—that is, that when parties with a more Eurosceptic profile enter office, they also oppose EU legislation more often. We therefore control for the seat-weighted positions on EU integration as well as left-right of all government parties that were represented in the cabinet on the day of the Council vote.<sup>51</sup> This parses out the effects of the electoral turnover mechanism on responsiveness and ensures that the effect of opinion only represents anticipatory efforts by the government. We measure both concepts with the CMP coding from the preceding elections and operationalise parties' positions on EU integration as the difference in the percentages of positive and neg-

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<sup>49</sup> In Appendix 2, we test the robustness of our results with regard to different lag lengths.

<sup>50</sup> See Paper 1 and Appendix 1 for details regarding this measure.

<sup>51</sup> Clearly, we expect that more Eurosceptic governments will more often oppose votes in the Council. With regard to ideology, we expect centre-right governments to oppose EU decisions less often as the centre-right not only formed a majority in the Council but also in the agenda-setting Commission during the period under investigation (see Hagemann and Høyland 2008).

ative quasi-sentences on the EU as well as their left-right position captured by the CMP's summative RILE measure.

Furthermore, we control for several factors that have been shown to influence voting in the Council in previous studies. In particular, we control for economic explanations of governments' voting behaviour (see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014) by including a measure of countries' annual net receipts from the EU budget (% of GDP) as well as unemployment and inflation rates. Finally, we include dummy variables for whether the legislative act was filed under the co-decision procedure, whether the country voting held the presidency of the Council as well as whether the voting took place before or after Eastern enlargement. These differences in institutional and political circumstances could influence the level of opposition.<sup>52</sup>

We only expect to find signal responsiveness on acts that have implications for the scope and level of EU authority. If acts establish EU activities in new areas, set up new supranational agencies, or enforce the harmonisation of rules, opposing such acts can be interpreted by the public as a general stance against 'more integration' or 'more authority' of the supranational institutions. Our expectation is that such legislative acts are strongly clustered in particular policy areas. Specifically, policy domains like agriculture and fisheries or the internal market have been areas of (exclusive) community competence for decades and supranational authority in these areas is well-established (see Börzel 2005; Hix and Høyland 2011). In contrast, in areas where EU competences are not as well-established such as civil liberties, justice and home affairs, or foreign policy, the boundaries of authority continue to shift. To rigorously determine which policy areas are characterised by changes within the boundaries of existing competen-

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<sup>52</sup> More details on all variables, their sources, and operationalisations are provided in Appendix 2.

cies as opposed to areas in which legislative activity pushes these boundaries, we set up a text scaling model based on the well-known Wordscores approach (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003).<sup>53</sup> For this purpose, we collected text summaries of the legislative acts in our dataset from the EP's Legislative Observatory website. These summaries of the European Commission's legislative proposal describe the background, content as well as implications of the relevant act voted on in the Council. In total, we are able to obtain this textual information for 1,793 out of 2,314 acts in our extended dataset.<sup>54</sup>

The Wordscores approach takes as its starting point in a set of manually chosen reference texts that represent the extremes of the substantive dimension of interest. The relative frequency of a particular word in each of the reference texts then provides naïve Bayes probabilities for whether a virgin text is from one or the other reference category. These probabilities are multiplied with chosen values for the reference texts to 'score' each virgin text on the dimension of interest. The procedure is applied to each word in a text and the average word score of a text provides a document score. We create two long reference texts from our sample with negative scores representing acts operating on the basis of established competences and positive numbers representing texts that extend EU authority.

*Table 3.1* displays average rescaled scores of acts per policy area and shows that acts extending EU authority are clearly overrepresented in areas such as 'Employment, education, culture and social affairs', as well as 'Budget', 'Foreign and security policy', 'Transport and telecommunication', and 'Civil liber-

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<sup>53</sup> Further information on the Wordscores model is provided in Appendix 2.

<sup>54</sup> Where summaries were not available, this was mainly the case for acts related to specific adjustments of existing policies (e.g. extending certain derogations of particular member states) and where the EP was not involved procedurally.



ties, justice, and home affairs'. The analysis shows that three policy areas are evidently much more concerned with established EU competences rather than authority extension, namely 'Agriculture and fisheries', 'Economic and financial affairs', and 'Internal market and consumer affairs'. This classification broadly corresponds with the expert judgments provided by Börzel (2005) and Hix and Høyland (2011) on EU authority across policy areas (see Appendix 2). We therefore exclude these areas from our analysis below.

**TABLE 3.1: WORDSCORES RESULTS BY POLICY AREA**

Policy area	Extension of authority vs. established competences
Agriculture and fisheries	-.65
Budget	.68
Civil liberties, justice, and home affairs	.15
Constitutional affairs and administration	.14
Development and international trade	.12
Economic and financial affairs	-.11
Employment, education, culture, and social affairs	.94
Environment and energy	.22
Foreign and security policy	.46
Internal market and consumer affairs	-.03
Transport and telecommunications	.44
Number of acts	1,793

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To analyse this data, we use mixed effects logistic regression models with fixed effects for countries and a random effect for each legislative act voted on in the Council, based on the assumption that our large sample of acts can be

thought of as a random draw from an imagined population of Council acts.<sup>55</sup> The main results are reported in *Table 3.2*. First, we only include public opinion and the control variables in Model 1. The results show that public opinion has a significant effect on governments' opposition in the Council in the policy areas included. The probability of an opposition vote decreases as the fraction of the population that supports EU membership of their country increases. Model 2 adds the governing parties' seat-weighted position on left-right and pro-anti integration to ascertain whether part of the opinion effect is due to changes in government composition. The inclusion of these terms leaves the results virtually unchanged, which demonstrates that responsiveness of governments in the Council is first and foremost a result of anticipatory dynamics, as government parties' positions at the last elections only explain a marginal part of the relationship between opinion and voting in the Council. Hence, in contrast to the existing literature on decision-making in the Council, which claims that public opinion is of little significance, we find that if we focus on acts in policy areas that extend the scope and degree of EU authority, government opposition is clearly a reflection of domestic Euroscepticism. This supports our argument that governments use Council voting to signal responsiveness, adjusting their position during the legislative term in anticipation of electoral sanctions.

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<sup>55</sup> We implement fixed effects for countries with dummy variables and hence report a constant (the same applies to the models in Paper 4). We have some missing data related to party positions from the CMP. While we use list-wise deletion here, Appendix 2 demonstrates that our results are robust to using multiple imputations for these positions. We also present a series of further robustness checks in Appendix 2, including different random and fixed effects specifications, alternative operationalisations of opposition votes as well as party emphasis, different lag lengths of opinion, sensitivity analyses with regard to excluding / including policy areas from the sample, and jackknife resampling at the country level.

**TABLE 3.2: MODELS OF OPPOSITION VOTES IN THE COUNCIL**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Public opinion	-2.414 (0.981)**	-2.392 (0.983)**	-2.957 (1.003)***
Party emphasis (EU)			0.534 (0.141)***
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU)			-1.590 (0.352)***
Government pro-anti integration position		-0.175 (0.061)***	-0.224 (0.064)***
Government left-right position		-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)
Net receipts from EU budget	-0.236 (0.175)	-0.151 (0.178)	-0.179 (0.185)
Unemployment	0.104 (0.035)***	0.100 (0.036)***	0.119 (0.037)***
Inflation	0.087 (0.062)	0.106 (0.062)*	0.121 (0.062)*
Co-decision	0.755 (0.264)***	0.744 (0.262)***	0.769 (0.264)***
Post-enlargement	0.633 (0.288)**	0.501 (0.289)*	0.415 (0.290)
Rotating presidency	-1.246 (0.530)**	-1.262 (0.530)**	-1.352 (0.532)**
Constant	-6.676 (0.860)***	-6.113 (0.889)***	-5.961 (0.890)***
Fixed effects	Countries	Countries	Countries
Random effects	Legislative acts	Legislative acts	Legislative acts
Number of acts	915	915	915
Number of countries	25	25	25
N	18,687	18,687	18,687
Log-likelihood	-1185.03	-1180.22	-1169.48

Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast; Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


Model 3 investigates our hypothesis H2 that party emphasis on EU integration moderates the opinion effect on opposition votes. For this purpose, we include an interaction term between public opinion and the increase in party emphasis on integration during the last four years. The results show that when opposition parties have increased their emphasis on European integration in

their manifestos, governments are more responsive to different levels of opinion than in situations with decreased party emphasis on integration. The moderation term is highly statistically significant and provides evidence for our conjecture that signalling activities of the government are conditioned by competition from the opposition parties.

The results for the control variables are largely in line with expectations. We find that governments oppose acts more often if unemployment is high and if the act was filed under co-decision (when preference realisation is impeded by another veto player, the EP). Unsurprisingly, national delegations holding the presidency are also less likely to oppose acts they have negotiated. We also find that governments that present themselves as Eurosceptic in election manifestos oppose acts more often, which suggests some form of mandate fulfilment by government parties. In contrast, there is no evidence that right-wing governments opposed votes more often. Most interestingly perhaps, we find no evidence that votes can be 'bought' with attributions from the EU budget (for contrasting findings, see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014).

*Figure 3.1* demonstrates the substantive magnitude of these results by plotting the conditional marginal effect of a unit change in opinion (in terms of changes in predicted probabilities) depending on whether party salience of EU integration has increased or decreased. These marginal effects range from essentially 0 up to -2.4 percentage points for a unit change in opinion. Assuming that party salience of integration is increasing, typical movements in opinion within a country (e.g. one or two standard deviations) translate into changes of the predicted probability of opposition votes of about  $\pm 0.15$  to 0.5 percentage points. Although this may appear small at first sight, it must be compared with the overall low frequency of opposition votes, which is just 1.46% in our estimation sample. In this context, the leverage of public opinion is indeed very substantial.

**FIGURE 3.1: PARTY EMPHASIS AND PUBLIC OPINION**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

### *Government signals*

We have now established that government opposition in the Council is more likely when the domestic electorate is more sceptical about the EU, especially when the issue is also gaining salience among political parties. The next step is to look at the *nature* of this opposition and whether the government's signal resonates in the domestic public sphere.

Starting with the nature of the public signal, we seek to investigate the kind of issues on which governments signal their opposition. For this purpose, we use a topic model that allows us to identify the type of acts on which public opinion matters to government opposition. We apply a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003; Grimmer 2010; Quinn et al. 2010) to the legislative summaries of the 1,793 acts where these summaries were available. LDA is a hierarchical Bayesian model that builds on the idea that

each document consists of a mixture of topics that can be inferred from the co-occurrence of words. The proportions dedicated to each of  $k$  topics are assumed to be drawn from a common Dirichlet prior. The word generating process within each document is then modelled by first drawing the topic and then, conditional on the topic, the respective word from a multinomial distribution (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Testing different numbers of topics and starting values, we arrive at a model with  $k = 45$  topics that creates a good substantive delineation of topics and is indicative of key results we obtain across a variety of models.<sup>56</sup>

*Table 3.3* shows the results from the LDA model with 45 topics and each act allocated to its most likely topic. It should be noted that these findings are meant to be exploratory, providing greater insight into when and why governments choose to oppose, rather than a strict confirmatory test. The final column in the table indicates the effect of public opinion on government opposition for legislative acts in that category. It displays the difference in the percentages of opposition votes by countries with opinion below versus above the country mean. A high positive value shows that a Eurosceptic electorate makes government opposition in the Council more frequent; a negative value indicates the opposite (this is only significant in the instance of legislation on ‘Financial institutions [38]’).

The findings are very much in line with our expectations that signal responsiveness is found when legislation is concerned with extending the level and/or scope of European integration, rather than in areas of established EU competence. *Table 3.3* shows that public opinion has the greatest influence on government opposition on acts concerned with further integration in the field of environment, border cooperation and migration, data sharing and harmonisa-

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<sup>56</sup> More details on the LDA model are provided in Appendix 2.

tion of statistical surveys, as well as in the area of EU funding for member states. In contrast, government opposition in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, and the internal market is not related to public opinion (see the last column, 'Difference by opinion').

**TABLE 3.3: TOPIC MODEL OF COUNCIL ACTS**

	Description	Key words	Obs. (%)	Opposition votes (%)	Difference by opinion (%)
1	<i>Budgetary surveillance of member states</i>	Economics, Budgetary, Surveillance, Stability, Imbalances, Deficit, Euro	0.99	0.24	+1.3
2	<i>Passenger rights and EU funding for disasters</i>	Transport, Passenger, Damage, Disaster, Fund, Solidarity	0.88	5.30	+3.0
3	<i>Regulation on food products</i>	Food, Regulation, Label, Consumers, Additives, Product	2.91	4.58	-1.1
4	<i>Communications and research</i>	Programme, Communications, Information	4.12	2.22	+0.8
5	<i>Crime and justice</i>	Criminal, Offence, Judiciary, Crime, Law	3.63	0.35	+0.0
6	<i>Maritime</i>	Ship, Maritime, Law, Regulation	1.87	1.32	-0.0
7	<i>Instruments and programmes to financially support non-EU countries</i>	Instrument, Financial, Assistance, Support, Finance, Region	1.81	1.00	+1.3
8	<i>Agriculture</i>	Agriculture, Product, Market, Local, Organic, Trade, Forest	2.25	4.15	-1.1
9	<i>Companies and financial industry</i>	Companies, Payment, Financial, Transfer, Business, Money	2.09	2.25	+0.9
10	<i>Energy and environment</i>	Energy, Efficiency, Emission, Gas, Greenhouse, Renewable, Fuel	1.43	0.96	-0.4
11	<i>Environment and transport</i>	<b>Emission, Vehicle, Limit, Air, Road, Engine, Reduction, Pollution, Noise</b>	2.80	2.80	<b>+3.2***</b>
12	<i>Environment</i>	Substance, Environment, Waste, Pollution, Recy-	2.86	2.17	+0.3

		cling, Water			
13	<i>Common market in food products</i>	Market, Aid, Price, Regulation, Year, Sugar, Product, Quota	4.56	5.46	-1.1
14	<i>Health, risk management, culture</i>	Health, Protect, Threat, Emergency, Disease, Risk, Culture	1.04	1.45	+0.1
15	<i>EU financial assistance</i>	Assistance, Guarantee, Loan, Financial, Fund, European Investment Bank	1.48	0	0
16	<i>Employment and social policy</i>	Employment, Social, Education, Labour, Training, Work	1.76	1.04	-0.9
17	<i>Transportation and public works contracts</i>	Public, Contract, Air, Carrier, Airport, Transport	1.92	1.16	+0.0
18	<i>Accession of new member states and asylum matters</i>	Accession, Asylum, Application	2.25	1.06	+0.9
19	<i>Regulation on external trade relations</i>	Regulation, Treaties, Trade	3.85	0.74	-0.8
20	<i>Consumer protection and legal enforcement</i>	Consumer, Protection, Rights, Courts, Law, Justice, Legal	1.48	3.07	-0.2
21	<i>Taxation and internal market</i>	VAT, Rate, Tax, Goods, Fraud	2.09	0.24	-0.0
22	<i>Common Agricultural Policy and rural development</i>	Agriculture, Rural, Payment, Fund, CAP, Regional	1.37	1.35	-1.4
23	<i>Internal market in energy</i>	Market, Network, Gas, Transmissions, Electricity, Energy	0.82	0.29	-0.6
24	<i>EU budget</i>	Budget, Million, Payment, Expenditure, Commitment, Amount, Financing, Resources	1.54	4.07	+0.2
25	<i>Animal welfare and disease</i>	Animals, Control, Health, Disease, Veterinary, Import	2.97	3.69	+1.7
26	<i>Customs union</i>	Customs Union, Duties, Import, Tax, Rate, Product, Tariff, Excise	1.48	0.63	-1.2
27	<i>Establishment of agencies and networks on border control, security and migration</i>	<b>Agency, Network, Establishment, Security, Exchange, Border</b>	2.69	0.81	<b>+1.4***</b>



28	<i>Common Agricultural Policy</i>	Farmer, Milk, Payment, Wine, Product, Quota, Market, Crop	1.21	6.38	-2.9
29	<i>Medicine, chemicals and research</i>	Medicine, Substance, Safety, Nuclear, Risk, Chemicals	1.76	2.64	+1.9
30	<i>Single Market</i>	Directives, Amendments, Requirements, Limits, Standards	2.86	0.90	+0.0
31	<i>Implementation</i>	Implementation, Procedure, Instruments, Regulatory	2.91	0.07	-0.1
32	<i>Codification</i>	Codification, Act, Directive, Incorporation, Formal, Law	5.77	0.15	-0.0
33	<i>Fisheries</i>	Fisheries, Vessel, Stock, Conservation, Sea, Catch	4.40	1.44	-0.5
34	<i>Single currency</i>	Euro, Counterfeit, Currency, Adopt, Circulate, Derogation	2.09	0.37	-0.2
35	<i>Research and technology</i>	Research, Technology, Project, Contribution, Financing	1.37	3.02	+0.1
36	<b><i>Financial contributions to member state expenditure and to EU funds</i></b>	<b>Financial, Fund, Support, Assistance, Contribution</b>	2.03	2.98	<b>+2.6*</b>
37	<i>Import and export of goods</i>	Export, Import, Product, Market, Regulation, Rules, Standards	2.31	2.01	-1.5
38	<i>Financial institutions</i>	Credit, Rate, Risk, Capital, Financial, Institutions, Banks	1.10	1.60	-3.5***
39	<i>Communications</i>	Communications, Mobile, Satellite, Providers	1.15	3.18	+2.1
40	<i>EU financing in innovation and infrastructure</i>	Fund, Innovation, Investment, Financing, Infrastructure	1.87	1.54	-1.1
41	<i>Financial supervision</i>	Financial, Supervision, Authority, Bank, ESA	0.66	0	0
42	<b><i>Statistical surveys and data sharing</i></b>	<b>Data, Statistics, Regulation, Quality</b>	3.35	1.16	<b>+1.1**</b>
43	<i>Transport safety and communications</i>	Safety, Railway, Rail, Network, Communications	1.04	4.72	+0.6

44	<i>Schengen and border control</i>	Schengen, Visa, Border, Travel, SIS	3.08	1.34	+0.5
45	<i>Social security and employment</i>	Social security, Citizens, Rights, Profession	2.09	4.43	+1.6

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*Notes:* Column ‘Obs (%)’ shows the fraction of observations allocated to the topic as a percentage of all observations; column ‘Opposition votes (%)’ shows the fraction of opposition votes as a percentage of the observations in the topic; column ‘Difference by opinion (%)’ shows difference in the proportions of opposition votes cast with opinion below vs. above the country mean; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Hence, while we find relatively high levels of opposition on acts about agriculture and budget matters, quite possibly related to special economic interests (see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014), ‘signal responsiveness’ is only apparent when national governments can use their opposition as a signal that they are standing up for national interests by opposing shifts toward further delegation of powers to the EU. The topic model also implies that governments use opposition as a signal to domestic audiences mainly in areas that are likely to be of greater interest to the general electorate (e.g. border control and environment) rather than specialised interests (e.g. agriculture and fisheries).

This leads us to the question of whether such ‘signals’ are visible in the domestic public spheres. Our argument concerning signal responsiveness rests on the assumption that governments have a reasonable expectation that opposition in the Council may come to the attention of domestic electorates. If decisions made in the Council are taken entirely ‘away from the public scrutiny’ as Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider (2014: 441) argue, then it would be less plausible that opposition in the Council is driven by governments’ incentive to improve their standing with domestic electorates. Hence, to substantiate our argument, we investigate media coverage and subsequent public debate in a number of EU member states to show that Council politics is indeed visible to domestic electorates.

For this purpose, we use data provided by Reh et al. (2013), who collected information on the number of news stories in Italian-, German-, French-, and Eng-

lish-speaking print media that dealt with EU legislative acts adopted under the EU's co-decision procedure from mid-1999 to mid-2009 (i.e. for the fifth and sixth EPs). This data cover newspapers from seven different EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom). To test whether aggregate opposition in the Council is related to higher levels of media coverage, we regress the logged average number of newspaper stories regarding an act on the total number<sup>57</sup> of governmental opposition votes submitted by the seven countries covered in Reh et al.'s data using ordinary least squares (OLS). As the last section has shown that opposition votes are more common on certain topics, we include fixed effects for the 45 topics identified in the LDA model. We find a highly significant relationship between the number of opposition votes and media coverage.<sup>58</sup>

*Figure 3.2* demonstrates the substantive consequences: with no opposition vote, an average of 0.4 newspaper articles cover the act; this number rises to 1 article with two opposition votes, and 1.4 articles with three governments opposing. Hence, there are observable effects of government responsiveness: opposition is related to higher media coverage of EU legislation, even when comparing between acts within the same 45 different topic categories.<sup>59</sup> To provide a more in-depth look into the public attention to signal responsiveness, we have examined the media coverage of cases where a government opposed legislation in the Council at a time when the domestic population was particularly critical

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
<sup>57</sup> If there was more than one vote occasion, we sum opposition votes across occasions.

<sup>58</sup> The regression results are reported in Appendix 2.

<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately, the available media data does not allow us to conduct a test of the relationship between government opposition and media attention in the entire EU; however, this analysis is indicative that government opposition in the Council resonates in national media.

(with a public opinion score below the country mean) and which falls under the topics identified in Table 3.3.

**FIGURE 3.2: NEWSPAPER STORIES AND OPPOSITION VOTES**



*Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.*

Our investigation reveals a number of cases where popular national news outlets report on Council agreements and on their government's opposition vote. One example is a media case relating to a vote on 'Environment and transport' (Topic [11] in Table 3.3). In September 2011, Spain opposed a majority in the Council when it voted against an EU directive to substantially increase road tolls for heavy vehicles on European motorways.<sup>60</sup> Spain – together with the Italian government – argued that the new directive would place a dispro-

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<sup>60</sup> Council and EP Directive 2008/0147/COD.

portionate burden on the EU's peripheral countries, as it would result in a subsequent rise in the costs of export and import of goods. The Spanish media reported extensively on the topic and explicitly mentioned the Spanish government's opposition in the Council.<sup>61</sup> The government's opposition was later also mentioned when the national media reported on discussions to extend increased toll taxes to all vehicles crossing borders between EU member states.<sup>62</sup>

This example illustrates how government opposition in the Council can be picked up by a broader public audience beyond the political insiders and narrow organised interest groups with a particular incentive to monitor EU legislative activities. Of course, many votes in the various Council configurations go largely unnoticed by the general public. Nevertheless, national media pay attention to the Council agenda and now seek information on their national governments' positions on individual policies of particular national or regional interest.<sup>63</sup> Overall, this evidence suggests that opposition in the Council may be as much a political signal to domestic audiences as a policy stance vis-à-vis negotiation partners at the European level.

## CONCLUSION

The literature on responsiveness has mostly focused on how governments react to public opinion in the domestic context, whereas the literature on government behaviour in IOs pays little attention to the role of national public

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<sup>61</sup> For example, *La Vanguardia* 14/09/2011: 'Los camiones pagaran los peajas mas caros.'

<sup>62</sup> For example, RTVE 16/09/2011: 'Cobrar peaje autovias para turismos, un modelo polemico aplicado solo en Portugal.'

<sup>63</sup> See the Council's press service: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/>. See also Wessels et al. (2013) and [www.votewatch.eu/media](http://www.votewatch.eu/media).

opinion. The latter generally assumes that governments act in isolation from domestic electoral pressures when they cooperate at the international level. However, this article has shown that governments do use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to domestic public opinion and that when they do so, this resonates in the domestic public debate. Focusing on the EU's primary legislative body, the Council, this paper demonstrates that government opposition to legislative proposals is shaped by public opinion on European integration. When the domestic electorate is negatively disposed toward the EU, governments are more likely to oppose proposals that aim to extend the powers of the EU further. By focusing on legislation that transfers authority to a supranational organisation – the delegation of power to the EU – we are able to demonstrate the effect of public opinion, which has generally been overlooked in analyses that do not make distinctions between policy areas or the nature and types of legislation.

It is important to note that the focus of this study has not been the traditional form of *policy* responsiveness, where governments change policy in response to changing public opinion. Instead, we show that governments use the IOs to *signal* that they are listening to domestic public opinion. We refer to this form of government responsiveness as 'signal responsiveness' and suggest that it is caused by governments' incentives to convey their policy actions at the EU level to domestic audiences. This distinction is important because unlike policy responsiveness, signal responsiveness has no direct short-term consequences for policy output. Hence, while the presence of signal responsiveness indicates that citizens' views are heard, it does not guarantee that they are represented.

We also show that government responsiveness is conditioned by domestic party competition. When parliamentary opposition parties in the domestic arena compete on the issue of European integration, governments are more likely to signal their opposition in the Council in response to public opinion. Moreover, such actions are seen to shape the public debate: our analysis of media cov-

erage shows that when governments show opposition in the Council, there is also greater coverage in the national media. Although this part of the analysis is limited to a subset of EU member states, the findings are compelling, and further research should provide a more comprehensive analysis of how the domestic public debate and public opinion react to government behaviour in the Council.

This study provides an important starting point for understanding the link between citizens and their governments in the EU by going beyond the received wisdom that EU negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. Our findings point to an electoral connection between government ministers and national public opinion in European affairs when it comes to decisions on the scope and extent of supranational competences. This may well be relevant to other international contexts too. Our expectation was that if we were to find evidence of government responsiveness to public opinion in any IO, it would be most evident in the EU Council. The fact that we find such compelling evidence that governments use their behaviour in the Council as a signal to domestic electorates opens the door to future research into the connection between governments and citizens in other international bodies. As incentives increase for international cooperation in many spheres of political life, and IOs gain competences to effectively manage such trans-border cooperation, domestic electorates are likely to form more explicit opinions and preferences over such international engagements. This is accompanied by growing pressures for accountable and transparent decision-making at the international level. Taking all this together, governments may therefore increasingly see an opportunity to signal their responsiveness to domestic constituencies when acting in the international arena.

## PAPER 3

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### *Enforcing the Compromise: How Executive and Legislative Institutions Serve Government Support Coalitions*

*With Fabio Franchino*

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#### ABSTRACT

We present a model of policy-making by multiparty coalitions that analyses how institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises. In contrast to existing research, the model accounts for the benefits not only of legislative but also of executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. In equilibrium, ministers propose the coalition compromise when cabinet participation, executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's proposal and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. We test this model with a dataset of 1,694 policies formulated by national governments at the European Union level. The findings demonstrate that executive institutions can substitute for a lack of legislative institutions, and strong parliaments are only crucial for reaching compromises under minority governments. Importantly, coalitions broadly fulfil their electoral mandates at the EU level, and parliamentary oversight and executive coordination in EU affairs effectively limit ministerial drift.



COALITION GOVERNMENT IS THE NORM IN NEARLY ANY DEMOCRACY IN which government survival depends on the support of legislative parties. Often coalitions of government parties command a majority in parliament, but some have to rely on opposition parties to make policy. Coalition policy-making can, however, be messy and obfuscating, undermining accountability and hampering the ability of voters to identify who is responsible for the policies being enacted. Understanding how the *support coalition* of the government – the set of cabinet and, possibly, opposition parties supporting the executive – solves conflicts and sets policies therefore has important implications for democratic representation.

Two models of policy-making by coalitions of government parties have received particular attention.<sup>64</sup> In the first one, parties strike compromises and implement policies that are somewhere midway between the positions of individual coalition parties (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron and Diermeier 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Straffin Jr and Grofman 1984). In the second model, individual ministers act as policy dictators, realising their preferred policy in their area of responsibility (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996). In a competitive test, Martin and Vanberg (2014) have recently provided strong empirical evidence favouring the compromise model.

We extend this research in a number of important respects. First, our model of policy-making by government support coalitions generalises existing models

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<sup>64</sup> A third approach argues that policy-making is determined by the median legislative party or a centrally-located party (Baron 1991; Morelli 1999; Schofield and Laver 1990). Martin and Vanberg (2014) do not find support for it, nor do we (see Appendix 3). A fourth approach highlights the pivotal role of the prime minister and her party (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). We likewise find no support for this argument (see Appendix 3).

by accounting for a) the influence of opposition vis-à-vis cabinet parties under minority governments and b) the variety of legislative and executive institutional settings under which governments operate. The model is a synthesis of the compromise and the ministerial autonomy models with equilibrium policies located in the interval spanning from the minister's ideal point to the coalition partners' 'full compromise' position. The model's key expectations detail the conditions that render compromises likely and qualify formal and informal arguments recently put forward by Martin and Vanberg (2005, 2011).

Second, we adopt a novel empirical strategy and observe the actual ideological location and content of policies instead of correlates, such as legislative amendments (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011, 2014: 995), process duration (Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2011), or parliamentary involvement (Franchino and Høyland 2009). Inference through correlates is often dependent on strong assumptions. For instance, the identifying assumption in Martin and Vanberg's (2014: 983) tests of the compromise model is that position-taking incentives induce government ministers to propose only policies that are located near the ideal point of their party. Without this assumption, parliamentary amendments cannot be evidence of compromising. In contrast, we directly measure compromise positions and policy content as the key game-theoretic parameters that underpin strategies and payoffs. Third, we significantly expand the geographical coverage of existing studies and take advantage of wide cross-country institutional variation. We employ data from legislative negotiations in the Council of the European Union, which allows us to compare 1,694 positions formulated on the very same issues by different governments across 22 European Union (EU) member states between 1996 and 2008.

We find that the compromise model is especially relevant for majority governments under strong executive coordination and that, in the case of minority governments, it further hinges on strong parliamentary oversight that enables opposition parties to challenge ministerial proposals. We also find that com-

promises are more likely when parties in the support coalition are ideologically divided and divisiveness is especially important if institutions are weak. These results call into question Martin and Vanberg's (2011) claim that parties generally use legislative institutions to enforce the compromise. Our study suggests that the legislature is a pivotal institutional venue primarily for supporting opposition parties under minority governments, and that government parties can substitute parliamentary oversight by drawing on executive institutions at the cabinet and inter-ministerial levels. A diversity of institutions can therefore lead to a compromise mode of policy-making. Also contrary to Martin and Vanberg's (2011) conclusions, coalition divisiveness appears to matter more when institutions are weak, i.e. when the policy benefits from proposing a different measure are high enough to overcome the informational scarcity of a weak institutional environment.

Our study challenges the popular analysis that national executives can use the EU arena for unconstrained realisation of their preferences (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2010; Moravcsik 1993). Instead, it highlights that in many situations ministers broadly fulfil the electoral promises of their support coalition of parties, and institutional innovations of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs effectively limit ministerial discretion. From a normative perspective, executive and legislative institutions in EU affairs are important to enforce inter-party negotiations, which are prerequisites for 'fair compromises' (Mansbridge and Warren 2013).

## **COALITION POLICY-MAKING AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

Government support coalitions comprise all parties on which the government relies in order to pass and implement policy. Hence, they encompass all cabinet parties, but also include opposition parties under minority governments. We model policy-making as a sequence that starts with a minister's pro-

posal and provides the opportunity to the other parties to challenge the proposal. Parties are asymmetrically informed. While the party of the responsible minister faces little uncertainty about a policy's consequences, the other parties in the support coalition cannot be sure about the policy's effects. This renders it costly for them to mount a challenge. Without a credible threat of a challenge, the minister proposes her own preferred policy. In contrast, if she expects a challenge, she proposes a compromise that is located within the ideological range spanned by the support coalition, with its exact location determined by several factors, including the strength of legislative and executive institutions, ideological divisions, and the distribution of bargaining power within the coalition (see below).

Importantly, executive and legislative institutions reduce coalition partners' uncertainty about policy consequences and, in some cases, confer decision rights to parties. This makes compromises more likely. At a basic level, *cabinet participation* offers the opportunity to get better informed about government initiatives and confers upon cabinet parties decision rights in regular cabinet meetings. *Executive* (inter-ministerial) *coordination* further reinforces information exchange between the responsible ministry and coalition partners through regular inter-departmental meetings on all political and bureaucratic levels (e.g. inter-ministerial committee meetings, lower level official meetings), in which information is shared at an early stage of policy preparation. Moreover, coordination often also refers to a pivotal role of the prime minister's office in adjudicating between the ministries and facilitating cross-departmental information exchange (see also Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). Typical structures include a powerful coordinating office under the direct control of the prime minister (PM) which is involved in all policy preparation, expertise and staff capacities to evaluate ministerial proposals as well as the competence to return items envisaged for cabinet meetings to the minister. While such institutions may change in the long run, they have been described and analysed as sticky struc-

tures characterising national executives (Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer 2011; Kassim 2013; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Laffan 2006; Schraad-Tischler and Kroll 2015).

Lastly, *parliamentary oversight* provides information about the consequences of ministerial proposals to all parliamentary parties, including opposition parties that support the government. In their classic form, such institutions encompass tools for *ex ante* as well as *ex post* scrutiny. Their significance is related to the number, size and powers of parliamentary committees, access to documents, the ability to pose questions to the government and individual ministers, the possibility to schedule plenary debates as well as the staff resources of the parliament and its members. A large body of literature has investigated these institutions and their effects and discovered substantial variation between different parliamentary systems (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Strøm, Müller, and Smith 2010; Winzen 2012).

In our model, the effects of cabinet participation, executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight are reflected in lower costs of mounting a challenge to a ministerial proposal. In addition, decision rights of cabinet parties and opposition parties in minority governments are modelled as parties' influence on the location of the adopted policy. The likelihood and location of compromises then becomes a function of the institutions as well as the ideological divisiveness of the support coalition. Whilst for Martin and Vanberg (2005: 98, 2011: 132) divisiveness matters only under strong institutions, they only informally establish this conditioning, since their models already assume the existence of powerful institutions. We instead explicitly model the impact of institutions and the influence of the opposition, and we additionally argue that not only legislative institutions but also cabinet participation and executive coordination lower the

opportunity cost of enforcing compromises and may act as substitutes for parliamentary oversight.<sup>65</sup>

## A MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

Consider a government composed of two parties (A and B) and an opposition party C. Parties have single-peaked preferences represented by ideal points  $x_i$  where  $i$  denotes parties  $a, b$ , and  $c$ , in a unidimensional<sup>66</sup> policy space  $X = R$ . We assume that the ideal policy of party A is located at zero and that the government coalition is connected, that is,  $x_c > x_b > x_a = 0$ .

Let  $\dot{p}$  be the policy realised by the government. We assume that its consequences  $x$  are uncertain. In other words, policy  $\dot{p}$  is subject to a homogeneous random shock  $\omega$  which is distributed uniformly between  $-R$  and  $R$ , that is, the probability density function of  $\omega$  is  $f(\omega) \sim U[-R, R]$ . This shock is added to the policy position and represents the uncertainty about the consequences of a given position. Hence,  $x = \dot{p} + \omega$ .

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<sup>65</sup> Shadow junior ministers represent another important executive institution. For instance, Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011) show that they may be a substitute for strong legislative committees. But, despite earlier positive findings, Martin and Vanberg (2011) have recently concluded that shadow junior ministers only speed up legislative scrutiny. These scholars argue that they cannot rein in the position-taking incentives of ministers.

<sup>66</sup> Unidimensionality captures the departmentalisation along policy jurisdictions that is typical within executives as well as the EU Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw 2002; Laver and Shepsle 1996). It also facilitates the analysis, but the model can be extended to a multidimensional policy space.

Ministerial portfolios are distributed between government parties and the cabinet minister of party A, who is in charge of the portfolio for this issue, is responsible for proposing the initial policy position  $\widehat{p}_a$ . This minister can rely on the resources and know-how of her department in drafting the initial position and she faces lower uncertainty about policy consequences. We account for this informational advantage by setting the parameter  $R$  to zero for party A. On the other hand, party A pays a penalty  $k > 0$  if its proposal is challenged, hence capturing the opportunity costs, and perhaps audience costs<sup>67</sup> of drafting a proposal which is ultimately overturned.

Parties B and C can challenge a policy position at a cost  $w_i$  where  $i = b, c$ . This parameter captures the resources that must be invested to mount a challenge (see e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011). It varies for the two parties as a function of different institutional settings, which have both informational and decisional implications. First, cabinet participation allows party B to rely on the administrative machinery of the executive, lowering the search cost of finding alternatives and, therefore, the opportunity cost of challenging any proposal, hence  $w_c > w_b > 0$ . Second, some government institutions, such as inter-ministerial coordination, are designed to facilitate a common government position, as they compel the minister in charge to justify her policy proposal before the whole executive. Coordination lowers the cost  $w_b$  incurred by party B when challenging a proposal and, as we will show, facilitates common decision-making. A less coordinated executive instead increases  $w_b$  and, as a result, the government operates under ministerial dominance (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Similarly, some legislative institutions, such as strong parliamentary oversight,

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<sup>67</sup> Audience costs may be secondary in the context in which we test this model (EU Council legislative politics). This is also why we exclude position-taking incentives for the proposer. These are likely to be less significant for EU than domestic issues, since the former tend to be less salient and less publicised.

are specifically designed to gather and provide information about the consequences of given government positions. They therefore lower the cost  $w_c$  of mounting a challenge by parliamentary parties. Note that, since  $w_c > w_b > 0$ , legislative institutions set a ceiling to the cost of making proposals.

This setup strikes an acceptable balance between verisimilitude and tractability. The informational benefits of institutions could be operationalised more realistically, but this would significantly impair tractability.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, we could do away with policy uncertainty (the parameters  $\omega$  and  $R$ ) because, as we shall see, since uncertainty is exogenous and there is no learning, such parameters conveniently drop out when comparing expected utilities. However, one can hardly make a case for the informational role of institutions in a full information model. We therefore account for policy uncertainty that realistically has a negative effect on utility.<sup>69</sup>

Once the initial proposal from party A is on the table, the other parties can challenge and amend the proposal – first party B, then party C. If there are challenges, there will be a bargaining process among the parties and we expect that they will eventually agree on what we call a ‘full compromise’, which is located in the Pareto set  $[0, x_i]$  for  $i = b, c$ . Although it is certainly relevant for determining the final government policy, we are not directly concerned with this bar-

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<sup>68</sup> For instance, parties may face a common proposal cost  $w$  and the informational benefit of institutions could be represented by a parameter  $0 < \alpha < 1$ , which narrows the range  $[-\alpha R, \alpha R]$ . The expected utility of equation (1) (see below) would become  $EU_i = - \int_{-\alpha R}^{\alpha R} \frac{(\bar{p} + \omega - x_i)^2}{2\alpha R} d\omega - w = -(x_i - \bar{p})^2 - \frac{\alpha^2 R^2}{3} - w$  for  $i = b, c$ . The results would be substantively similar, but their representation would be significantly more complex.

<sup>69</sup> In Martin and Vanberg (2011: 20), policy uncertainty is eliminated through Bayesian learning after the receiving party pays a cost for scrutinising a proposal. This party is either fully informed or not informed at all. Our model introduces the different informational burdens facing parties in a tractable way.



gaining process here. Our interest lies in the institutions that systematically influence policy formulation. Hence, we exogenously set the full compromise at the mean of the positions of party A and of the parties that have proposed amendments. In other words, the full compromise is  $\bar{p} = \frac{\sum_i x_i}{m+1}$ , where  $i = b, c$  denotes the parties proposing amendments and  $m$  is the number of such parties.<sup>70</sup> As we will see, the full compromise is an equilibrium outcome only under special conditions, while positions between zero and the full compromise – which we call ‘partial compromises’ – make up for the bulk of equilibria.

If no party proposes amendments, the initial proposal  $\widehat{p}_a$  carries through. In the case of majority governments, the opposition party C has no decision-making authority and no effect on the coalition compromise. Coalition governments are frequently based on explicit agreements and, if issues have not been agreed *ex ante*, negotiations within coalition partners are given primacy. Concessions to opposition parties may be equivalent to undermining the agreement on which a government has been formed. On the other hand, in the case of minority governments the opposition party can alter the minister’s proposal or the minister’s proposal as amended by party B.

1. The minister from party A proposes an initial position  $\widehat{p}_a \in R$ .
2. Government party B can choose either to accept this proposal or expend resources, at the cost  $w_b$ , to reach a full compromise position.


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<sup>70</sup> This implies that parties are equally influential in determining the final compromise. Alternatively, we could assume that party seat or portfolio shares or other measures of bargaining power affect the compromise. This would require the inclusion of an additional parameter (see e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2005) without modifying the results substantially. The empirical application of the model weights parties’ positions by legislative seats.

3. Similarly, opposition party C can choose either to accept the outcome of stage 2 or expend resources, at the cost  $w_c$ , to reach an alternative full compromise position.

The final government policy,  $\dot{p}$ , depends on the reaction of the government party B to A's proposal as well as the reaction of the opposition party C to the other parties' actions. Below we solve the model by backward induction for the cases of majority and minority governments. The game tree in *Figure 4.1* summarises the model for the case of minority governments.<sup>71</sup>

**FIGURE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING**



<sup>71</sup> Note that, due to their complexity, players' pay-offs are not included in the figure.

Note that the tree for the case of majority governments is exactly the same except for that the final policy  $\dot{p}$  is  $\widehat{p}_a$  on the left branch irrespective of C's action, and it is  $\frac{x_b}{2}$  on the right branch, again irrespective of C's decision.

### *Policy Formulation in Majority Governments*

First, consider the scenario of a majority government. Parties have quadratic preferences over the final policy outcome  $x$ . Since  $x = \dot{p} + \omega$ , the expected utility for party C is

$$EU_c = - \int_{-R}^R \frac{(\dot{p} + \omega - x_c)^2}{2R} d\omega - w_c = -(x_c - \dot{p})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_c \quad (1)$$

The expected utility is a negative function of the difference between the party's ideal policy and the equilibrium proposal, the level of uncertainty, and the cost of challenging A's proposal if the party chooses to do so. A challenge from party C does not modify the equilibrium position. In other words, the final government policy is  $\dot{p} = \widehat{p}_a$  if there is no challenge from government party B; it is  $\dot{p} = \frac{x_b}{2}$  if there is a challenge. In both cases, party C challenges a proposal if and only if  $-(x_c - \dot{p})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_c > -(x_c - \dot{p})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3}$ . That is, if  $w_c < 0$ . This inequality never holds and party C never challenges.

For government party B, a challenge modifies the position of the government. This party's expected utility is the same as (1), but  $w_b$  replaces  $w_c$ , capturing the lower cost for mounting a challenge or, equivalently, the informational advantage of being in government. Party B challenges a proposal if and only if  $-\frac{x_b^2}{4} - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_b > -(x_b - \widehat{p}_a)^2 - \frac{R^2}{3}$ . That is, if  $\widehat{p}_a < x_b - \sqrt{w_b + \frac{x_b^2}{4}}$ . To simplify notation, we use the function  $\psi(w_b, x_b) \equiv \sqrt{w_b + \frac{x_b^2}{4}}$ . For any given proposal, the likelihood of a challenge increases with the divergence within the government, while it decreases with the cost of a challenge. This condition sets the threshold above which a proposal from party A is overturned.

Recall that party A faces no uncertainty about the consequences of a proposal. Its utility is therefore  $U_a = -\dot{p}^2 - k$ , where  $k > 0$  if its proposal is overturned. Consider now party A proposing  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$ . This is the ministerial government of Laver and Shepsle (1996), and the dominant strategy of party A as long as  $w_b > \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , because the proposal remains unchallenged. Otherwise, the proposal is challenged and the best proposal is  $\widehat{p}_a = x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b)$  to avoid paying the opportunity costs associated with overturning. A unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this scenario is

Party A: If  $w_b > \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , propose  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$ . Otherwise, propose  $\widehat{p}_a = x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b)$ .

Party B: If  $\widehat{p}_a \geq x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b)$ , accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ . Otherwise, challenge and amend  $\widehat{p}_a$ .

Party C: Accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ .

The outcome is  $\dot{p} = x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b)$  if  $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , otherwise  $\dot{p} = 0$ . Party A only proposes the full compromise  $\frac{x_b}{2}$  when  $w_b = 0$ , that is, when challenging is costless. If  $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , party A proposes a partial compromise between its ideal policy and  $\frac{x_b}{2}$ . Here, there is some ministerial drift: party A moves the proposal in B's direction up only to the point where B is indifferent between enforcing the full compromise at a cost and accepting A's proposal. In sum, we should expect more compromises in the case of more heterogeneous coalition governments (as  $x_b$  increases), and when there are lower costs of challenging a proposal (as  $w_b$  decreases), such as in the presence of executive coordination.

### *Policy Formulation in Minority Governments*

Consider now the scenario of a minority government. Opposition party C now has the opportunity to challenge and amend a proposal. Let  $\widehat{p}_b$  be the proposal that comes out of the government decision-making process. It can take the

value of  $\widehat{p}_a$  or  $\frac{x_b}{2}$ . Party C challenges if and only if  $-(x_c - \bar{p})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_c > -(x_c - \widehat{p}_b)^2 - \frac{R^2}{3}$ . That is, when  $\widehat{p}_b = \widehat{p}_a$ , if  $\widehat{p}_a < x_c - \sqrt{w_c + \frac{x_c^2}{4}}$ ; and when  $\widehat{p}_b = \frac{x_b}{2}$ , if  $w_c < (x_c - \frac{x_b}{2})^2 - (\frac{2x_c - x_b}{3})^2$ . Since  $x_c > x_b$ , we should expect compromise positions in case of more heterogeneous parliamentary support coalitions (as  $x_c$  increases), and lower costs of challenging a proposal (as  $w_c$  decreases), such as in the presence of strong parliamentary oversight institutions. To simplify notation, we use  $\psi(w_c, x_c) \equiv \sqrt{w_c + \frac{x_c^2}{4}}$ ,  $\psi(w_b, x_b, x_c) \equiv \sqrt{w_b + (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2}$ , and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) \equiv (x_c - \frac{x_b}{2})^2 - (\frac{2x_c - x_b}{3})^2$ . At its decision node, party B considers four scenarios.

Scenario 1:  $\widehat{p}_a > x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$  and  $w_c > \psi(x_b, x_c)$ . Regardless of B's decision, C will not challenge. Hence, B challenges if and only if  $-\frac{x_b^2}{4} - w_b > -(x_b - \widehat{p}_a)^2$ . That is, if  $\widehat{p}_a < x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b)$ , as in the case of majority government.

Scenario 2:  $\widehat{p}_a > x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$  and  $w_c < \psi(x_b, x_c)$ . C challenges only if B challenges. B challenges if and only if  $-(\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2 - w_b > -(x_b - \widehat{p}_a)^2$ . That is, if  $\widehat{p}_a < x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b, x_c)$ .

Scenario 3:  $\widehat{p}_a < x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$  and  $w_c > \psi(x_b, x_c)$ . C challenges only if B does not challenge. B challenges if and only if  $-\frac{x_b^2}{4} - w_b > -(x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2$ . That is, if  $w_b < (x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2 - \frac{x_b^2}{4}$ .<sup>72</sup>

Scenario 4:  $\widehat{p}_a < x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$  and  $w_c < \psi(x_b, x_c)$ . Regardless of B's decision, C challenges. B challenges if and only if  $-(\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2 - w_b > -(x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2$ . That is,  $w_b < (x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$ .<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> The right hand side of this inequality is negative for  $x_b < x_c < 3x_b$ . If C is relatively close to B, B does not challenge and free rides on C's challenge.

Recall that party A prefers to avoid paying the costs of overturning. We limit our attention to the conditions that lead A to propose a compromise position, that is when  $\widehat{p}_a > 0$ , leaving aside which full or partial compromise will emerge.<sup>74</sup> In scenario 1, A follows the same strategy as in the case of majority government. In scenario 2, party A proposes  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$  if  $w_b > x_b^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$ . Otherwise, it proposes a compromise position. In both scenarios 3 and 4, A proposes a compromise. A unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in minority government is

Party A: If  $w_b > \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \max[\psi(x_b, x_c); \frac{3x_c^2}{4}]$ , propose  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$ . If  $w_b > x_b^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) > w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , propose  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$ . Otherwise, propose a compromise.

Party B: If  $\widehat{p}_a \geq \max[x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b); x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)]$  and  $w_c \geq \psi(x_b, x_c)$ , accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ . If  $\widehat{p}_a \geq \max[x_b - \psi(w_b, x_b, x_c); x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)]$  and  $w_c \leq \psi(x_b, x_c)$ , accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ . If  $\widehat{p}_a \leq x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$ ,  $w_b \geq (x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2 - \frac{x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c \geq \psi(x_b, x_c)$ , accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ . If  $\widehat{p}_a \leq x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$ ,  $w_b \geq (x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$  and  $w_c \leq \psi(x_b, x_c)$ , accept  $\widehat{p}_a$ . Otherwise, challenge and amend  $\widehat{p}_a$ .

Party C: When  $\widehat{p}_b = \widehat{p}_a$ , if  $\widehat{p}_a \geq x_c - \psi(w_c, x_c)$  accept  $\widehat{p}_b$ . When  $\widehat{p}_b = \frac{x_b}{2}$ , if  $w_c \geq \psi(x_b, x_c)$  accept  $\widehat{p}_b$ . Otherwise, challenge and amend  $\widehat{p}_b$ .

The outcome is a compromise position, that is  $\dot{p} > 0$ , if

- $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \max[\psi(x_b, x_c); \frac{3x_c^2}{4}]$

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<sup>73</sup> If  $x_c = 2x_b$ , B never challenges because the compromise position becomes  $x_b$  after C's challenge, while it may challenge as party C moves away from this value.

<sup>74</sup> We can derive more detailed equilibriums, but the measurement of the specific compromise positions, whether partial or full, is hardly accurate and these more fine-tuned expectations are therefore very hard to test empirically.

- $w_b < x_b^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) > w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$
- $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} > w_c > \psi(x_b, x_c)$
- $w_c < \min[\psi(x_b, x_c); \frac{3x_c^2}{4}]$

Since  $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} > \psi(x_b, x_c)$  for  $x_c > x_b$ , these inequalities can be simplified and the outcome is a compromise position if

- $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$
- $w_c < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$

In case of a homogenous parliamentary support coalition (as  $x_c$  approaches  $x_b$ ) or weak parliamentary oversight (as  $w_c$  increases), we should expect compromise positions under the same conditions as in majority government. Otherwise, we should expect compromise positions in case of more heterogeneous parliamentary support coalitions (as  $x_c$  increases) or when the costs of challenging a proposal are lower (as  $w_c$  decreases), such as in the presence of strong parliamentary oversight (these results hold if we increase the number of government parties or change the proposing party, see Appendix 3). Considering both majority and minority governments, we can therefore specify the following testable hypotheses:

**H1:** Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of support coalitions in the presence of strongly coordinated executives.

**H2:** Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of support coalitions when the divisiveness of positions in the coalition is broader.

**H3:** Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of support coalitions of minority governments in the presence of strong parliamentary oversight.

We can produce an additional expectation from the model. Let us drop party B from the minority scenario and consider two coalitions: a majority government between parties A and B, and a minority government between parties A and C. In the latter case, the outcome is a compromise position if  $w_c < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ . Recall that the condition for compromise is  $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  in a majority government. Assume also that parties B and C share policy positions, that is  $x_c = x_b > x_a = 0$ . Since  $w_c > w_b$  (cabinet participation lowers the opportunity cost of challenging proposals), we can produce the following expectation:

**H4:** Coalition compromises are more likely to be reflected in the policies of support coalitions under majority rather than minority governments.

Compare these expectations to those of Martin and Vanberg. First, hypothesis 4 runs counter to their finding that minority status has no impact on the alteration of policy proposals; in their work it only slows down scrutiny when legislative oversight is weak (Martin and Vanberg 2011: 138). Second, Martin and Vanberg (2011: 97-155, 132) argue that greater policy divisions within the government produce more changes to ministerial proposals under strong parliamentary oversight, but not under weak oversight, as parties would lack an ‘effective institutional mechanism for scrutiny and change’ (Martin and Vanberg 2011: 132). Taken to its logical conclusions, this suggests that compromises are out of reach and coalition divisions therefore irrelevant under weak oversight. We account for different degrees of institutional strength and hypothesis 2 emerges as an unconditioned version of Martin and Vanberg’s expectation on divisiveness. Third, for these scholars, institutional strength and divisiveness should be positively related to each other. We reach opposite conclusions: divisiveness ( $x_{b,c}$ ) should have weak effects when cabinet participation, strong executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight (low  $w_{b,c}$ ) result in minimal costs of amending a proposal, as partners in coalitions of virtually any compactness can ‘afford’ the compromise. However, with weak institutions the



high costs of proposing alternatives are weighted against policy benefits, and a compromise emerges at high but not low levels of divisiveness. In other words,

**H5:** The marginal effect of divisiveness on coalition compromises is negatively related to institutional strength (and vice versa).

Divisiveness should predominantly matter for minority governments with weak executive and legislative institutions, but less so for majority governments with strong institutions.

## **EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO TESTING THE EXPECTATIONS**

In order to test our expectations, we use data from EU policy-making, specifically the Council of the EU (henceforth, the Council). The Council is the EU's primary legislative body, where national ministers discuss and negotiate supranational legislation. In particular, we want to ascertain the extent to which governments' policy positions in the Council reflect ideological compromises of their domestic supporting parties. At first sight, Council legislative politics may seem isolated from domestic politics, but an established scholarly tradition has shown that the formulation of the policies with which governments come to the negotiation table in Brussels takes place in and is strongly shaped by the domestic political arena (e.g. Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Finke and Herbel 2015; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Moravcsik 1998; Thomson 2011). Indeed, as we shall see, several executive and legislative institutional innovations at the domestic level have diffused throughout Europe during the last decades, specifically designed for the purpose of formulating national policy positions in the

EU (Kassim 2013; Winzen 2012).<sup>75</sup> The process should therefore, in principle, be subject to the same domestic dynamics outlined by our model.

Focusing on the EU-level policies of governments therefore enables us to ascertain whether the new institutions are indeed effective in limiting the discretion of individual executives and enforcing more inclusive decision-making. Moreover, our test with EU-level policies, compared to relying on policies formulated for domestic implementation, also has a decisive methodological advantage for identifying the effects of cross-national variation in institutions: those policies are formulated with regard to a common legislative agenda (that of the EU). Hence, they relate to the very same substantive issues across countries. If we instead analysed the formulation of domestic policies, the effects of institutions could be potentially confounded with the effects of varying political agendas, thus increasing the risk of omitted variable bias. Here, we draw on a sample of governments' initial policy positions on 145 different policy issues that were discussed in the Council. For our purpose, this data covers 22 countries, for which the number of reported policy positions varies.<sup>76</sup> This compara-

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<sup>75</sup> These EU affairs specific institutions partly mirror pre-existing institutions for the coordination of domestic policies.

<sup>76</sup> Data sources and descriptive statistics are in Appendix 3. We lack party position data for Malta and institutional data for Romania. Moreover, Greece, Spain, and the United Kingdom are excluded because they did not experience coalition governments during the observation period. While our observations are not equally distributed across countries, we have nine countries for which over 100 policy positions are available, and another seven with more than 40 policy positions (see Appendix 3). Importantly, the main reasons for the unbalanced numbers of observations are varying phases of coalition vs. single-party rule as well as the fact that new member states joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, and hence no positions are available for them before these dates. With 20% of observations from minority governments our sample is quite representative of the population with regard to minority vs. majority governments.

tively large country sample makes selection bias as a prime concern of empirical research into coalition politics less pressing.

### *Governmental policy positions*

As our dependent variable we take governments' policy positions on controversial aspects of the Council's legislative agenda from a subset of the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) dataset (Thomson et al. 2006, 2012). This dataset contains spatial information on actors' policy positions regarding 331 controversial issues from the 1994-1999 and the 2004-2009 legislative terms. DEU is based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts from member states' permanent representations and EU institutions, who were asked to report controversial legislative issues and locate governments on corresponding spatial policy scales. It is the most widely used dataset on EU decision-making and has been employed in a diverse range of applications.

While the DEU experts were instructed to report actors' sincere ideal policy positions, one concern is that governments may strategically misrepresent their positions in order to gain in the EU legislative process. If experts were unable to separate strategic from sincere positions, DEU positions would no longer reflect the domestic bargain but partially EU-level considerations. However, the features of EU Council decision-making (open rule, supermajority and – when the European Parliament is involved – inter-institutional negotiations) make voting (veto) power more important than proposal power and weaken the incentives to misrepresent positions (for a fuller discussion, see Appendix 3). Similarly, position-taking incentives are unlikely to exercise a significant influence given the lower public exposure of EU negotiations compared to domestic ones.

For our analysis, we focus on economic left-right policy issues as the major substantive dimension of party competition throughout the EU (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Whitefield 2002) and identify all DEU

policy issues relating to economic left-right conflicts with an original coding scheme. The guiding principle was to construct categories reflecting a construct of ‘left-right’ that does not only fit with the DEU issues but can also be linked to standard measurements of left-right party ideology. The resulting scheme consists of six categories representing the economic left-right dimension; they cover conflicts ranging from economic regulation, protectionism, and equality, to consumer and environmental protection. The coding of the DEU issues<sup>77</sup> reveals that about half of all salient issues fall into one or multiple economic left-right categories, whilst the rest are either related to left-libertarian/right-authoritarian issues,<sup>78</sup> pro-anti integration conflicts, or to non-ideological cleavages (e.g. geography). Wherever necessary we linearly rescaled the DEU issue scales with a predefined range of 0-100 so as to ensure that 100 represents the most ‘right’ and 0 the most ‘left’ option advocated by any national government in our estimation sample.<sup>79</sup>

*Figure 4.2* illustrates the governments’ policy positions – our dependent variable – on a legislative proposal concerning the inclusion of the aviation industry in the EU carbon emission trading system (COD/2006/304). In this case, the amount of emission allowances to be allocated to the industry was contested: some governments opted for a smaller and others for a larger amount, these representing economic left and right positions respectively.

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<sup>77</sup> The full codebook with descriptive statistics is in Appendix 1 and information on inter-coder reliability is available in Appendix 3.

<sup>78</sup> We do not include left-libertarian/right-authoritarian issues in our analysis, since it is a matter of on-going discussion whether such issues are adequately reflected by the categories and the left-right scale of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Protsyk and Garaz 2011).

<sup>79</sup> We exclude some policy issues due to high missingness. Rescaling removes issues on which all national governments in the sample agreed. See Appendix 3 for details.

**FIGURE 4.2: ILLUSTRATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

What are governments' positions on the total CO2 emission allowances for the aviation industry?

*Left*

*Right*

AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, EL, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SE, UK	DE	CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SI, SK
Position 0: Annual average of 2004-06 emissions	22: 95% of the 2005-07 annual average emissions	100: Based on an emission level closer to the start date of the regulation

*Notes:* AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom

### *Coalition compromise, divisiveness, and institutions*

To calculate the expected ideological compromise position of the government's support coalition, we rely on party positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) coding of election manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). For our particular application, using the CMP instead of expert survey data on parties is imperative for at least two reasons: first, election manifestos record party positions temporally close to elections and cabinet formation. Assuming that parties struck some binding agreements when entering a support coalition at the start of the legislative term, the CMP likely provides a better clue to the compromise positions than expert surveys conducted at arbitrary times during the term. At least, the CMP eliminates electoral cycle factors as a source of heteroscedastic measurement error across countries. Second and most importantly, the CMP is more exogenous to parties' behaviour than expert data. The CMP merely captures statements, intentions, and promises, whereas experts may

evaluate parties on the basis of their actual behaviour (Budge 2000; Volkens 2007). As we are aiming to explain the policy-making behaviour of parties, expert surveys could lead to circular analyses, and thus the CMP is more suitable for our specific purpose.

We use the CMP's standard left-right (RILE) scale to calculate a compromise position of the government's support coalition. Importantly, the 26 constitutive CMP categories of RILE map neatly onto our coding scheme for the DEU issues. In particular, our scheme reflects key contrasts of RILE, such as 'Market Regulation' vs. 'Free Enterprise', 'Protectionism: Negative/Positive', 'Controlled Economy' vs. 'Economic Orthodoxy', or 'Labour Groups: Negative/Positive'. As the proposing party in EU Council politics cannot be identified,<sup>80</sup> we use the full compromise position as the most well defined measure based on the CMP. Hence, we operationalise the compromise as follows: a) In the case of majority governments, it is the seat-weighted RILE of all cabinet parties; b) In the case of minority governments, it is the midpoint between the seat-weighted RILE of the cabinet parties and the seat-weighted RILE of all opposition parties (in the case of changing support patterns), or alternatively of those opposition parties supporting the government (in the case of explicit, stable deals).<sup>81</sup> Seat-weighting,

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<sup>80</sup> Neither national nor EU institutions report which minister deals with a legislative file, and available proxies (e.g., Council participant lists) are not reliable (see also Appendix 3). Hence, partial compromise positions cannot be operationalised as their location depends on the proposing party. In contrast, the full compromise is proposer-invariant.

<sup>81</sup> For each minority government we use *The Political Data Yearbook*, a series of annual country reports published by the *European Journal of Political Research*, to ascertain whether the government was supported by one or more particular parties or whether it gathered support on an issue-by-issue basis. Only for about a quarter of our observations on minority governments could we identify a fixed supporting party. In the majority of cases governments relied on alternating parties from the opposition. Hence, our results for minority governments highlight the influence of opposition parties in general rather than a specific supporting party.

particularly for the calculation of the cabinet's compromise position, is suggested by recent findings (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2014). Taking the midpoint between the cabinet and the opposition parties reflects the idea that minority governments are tolerated because supporting parties obtain disproportionate policy influence.<sup>82</sup>

In order to test the impact of ideological divisiveness on the relevance of the compromise position, we operationalise the absolute distance on the RILE scale between the most left-wing and the most right-wing party of the government support coalition, i.e. the ideological range. With regard to executive institutions, we use a dummy variable that is '1' for countries with strong executive coordination in EU policy-making and '0' for countries with little to no coordination. We take the classification of countries from Kassim (2013).<sup>83</sup> Finally, we operationalise parliamentary oversight, as the strength of the legislature's rights with respect to EU affairs, using a comprehensive database created by Winzen (2012, 2013). In our sample this measure runs from 0.29 (in Cyprus throughout as well as Ireland in the 1990s) to 1.75 (in Finland and Lithuania). As we expect the effect of parliamentary oversight to play out mostly under minority gov-

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<sup>82</sup> This calculation of the compromise yields the clearest support in favour of our model. But our main results are largely robust to at least two alternative calculations of the compromise position (see Appendix 3). In general, results become weaker if we reduce the influence of opposition vis-à-vis cabinet parties under minority rule.

<sup>83</sup> We assign '1' for countries employing what Kassim calls 'centralized coordination' in EU policy-making that entails inter-ministerial meetings or committees on EU issues as well as a central 'troubleshooter' (often the PM's office) (Kassim 2003). Kassim contrasts this mode with a 'decentralized, even ministerial, approach to coordination' (Kassim 2013: 286), in which the responsible ministry leads and active coordination 'tends to be minimal' (Kassim 2003: 95). Countries with coordination in our sample are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. See also Gärtner, Hörner, and Obholzer (2011).

ernments, we include a dummy variable for whether the cabinet parties held a minority of seats in the legislature.

In addition, we control for several factors that are known to influence governments' position-taking in the Council and might at the same time correlate with the compromise position. First, we include a measure of public opinion as the average ideological left-right self-placement of respondents from the Eurobarometer survey series.<sup>84</sup> This ensures that the effects of the compromise position are not conflated with governments' efforts to respond to public opinion (Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016). Second, we account for a potentially relevant redistribution cleavage of rich versus poor countries with a measure of countries' annual net receipts from the EU budget (% of GDP) (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2014; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005). Third, we include national unemployment and inflation rates to ensure that the relationship between parties' and government's policy positions is more than a reflection of macroeconomic fluctuations. Fourth, we broadly capture the idea that member states may try to transfer their domestic policies to the European level (Börzel 2002) with a measure of domestic economic freedom from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013; see also Thomson 2011a). Lastly, we also control for a country's population (in million inhabitants), as 'big' member states may differ in their preferences from 'small' (e.g. Schure and Verdun 2008; Thomson 2011a). For instance, small states typically have a less diversified economy and smaller domestic markets than big states. Therefore, they may be advocates of market-enabling, more rightist measures.

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<sup>84</sup> We linearly interpolate opinion between surveys and use a six-month lag (see Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016).



## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To model the relationship between governments' policy positions in the Council and the ideological compromise position of their support coalition, we use linear regressions with fixed effects for the 145 policy issues in our sample. The fixed effects estimator is based on the within-transformation, i.e. we de-mean our data for each policy issue, which is best suited to obtain consistent estimates in the face of our heterogeneous set of policy issues. Moreover, we employ the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to provide standard errors that are robust to clustering at the country level. We test our hypotheses by including interaction terms between the compromise position and the moderators (ideological divisiveness and institutions) (see Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012). Hence, all models take the following general form:

$$P_{j,k} - \bar{P}_j = \beta_1(C_{j,k} - \bar{C}_j) + \beta_2(Z_{j,k} - \bar{Z}_j) + \beta_3(C_{j,k} - \bar{C}_j)(Z_{j,k} - \bar{Z}_j) + \dots + (\epsilon_{j,k} - \bar{\epsilon}_j)$$

Where  $P_{j,k}$  is the policy position of the government of country  $k$  on issue  $j$ ,  $C_{j,k}$  is the ideological compromise position of its support coalition,  $Z_{j,k}$  is one of the moderating variables, and  $\epsilon_{j,k}$  denotes the position-specific error term.

The main results are reported in *Table 4.1*. We regress the government's left-right policy position on the compromise position of the government's support coalition of parties. We also allow the effect of the compromise to vary according to the ideological divisiveness of the support coalition, executive coordination, and – in the case of minority governments – the strength of parliamentary oversight. The results yield strong support for our expectations.

**TABLE 4.1: EFFECT OF COALITION COMPROMISE ON POLICY POSITIONS**

	<b>Estimates</b>
Compromise position	-0.176 (0.310)
Ideological divisiveness	-0.068 (0.123)
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position	0.038 (0.018)**
Executive coordination	-6.533 (3.771)*
Executive coordination x Compromise position	0.545 (0.225)**
Minority government	-9.290 (8.894)
Parliamentary oversight	-1.710 (4.076)
Minority government x Parliamentary oversight	1.294 (8.235)
Minority government x Compromise position	-4.025 (1.688)**
Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position	-0.622 (0.373)
Minority government x Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position	3.412 (1.182)***
Left-right public opinion	9.510 (5.188)*
Net receipts from EU budget	8.300 (1.569)***
Unemployment	-0.478 (0.779)
Inflation	-1.790 (0.949)*
Economic freedom	2.210 (2.263)
Population	0.077 (0.085)
Fixed effects	Policy issues
Number of policy issues	145
Number of countries	22
N	1,694
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30

*Notes:* Fixed effects regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


First, the positive and significant interaction term between coordinated executives and the compromise position demonstrates that the relevance of compromises is stronger in countries that employ inter-ministerial coordination in EU policy-making. This confirms hypothesis H1 and is in line with the expectation that coordination lowers the search costs for cabinet parties and thereby increases incentives to formulate alternative policies that challenge ministerial proposals. Second, the positive and significant interaction term between the compromise position and ideological divisiveness indicates that the compromise is a stronger predictor of governments' policy positions when supporting parties are more dispersed on the left-right spectrum. This is in line with hypothesis H2, and provides evidence for the idea that actors' incentives to invoke the compromise position increase with ideological divisions.

Third, the positive and significant three-way interaction between minority governments, parliamentary oversight, and the compromise position provides evidence that compromises have more influence on policy formulation under minority governments when the parliament can scrutinise the government in EU affairs. This is supportive of our hypothesis H3 and suggests that strong parliamentary oversight serves (supporting) opposition parties in policing the bargain.<sup>85</sup> Finally, we also find clear evidence for hypothesis H4, which expects compromises to be more relevant under majority rule. The interaction between the dummy variable for minority governments and the compromise position is negative and significant, indicating that compromises are generally less likely if one party (the supporting opposition party) is not part of the executive.

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<sup>85</sup> We verified that the linear combination of the coefficients on the three-way interaction and the two-way interaction between parliamentary oversight and the compromise, indicating the effect of oversight on the marginal effect of the compromise position under minority governments, is significant at the 5% level.

**FIGURE 4.3: COMPROMISE POSITION AND DIVISIVENESS**




Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

We illustrate our results in *Figures 4.3 and 4.4*, which plot the marginal effect of the compromise position under different conditions. Both figures also include histograms of the number of observations under these conditions. Figure 4.3 displays the impact of ideological divisiveness. It shows that the compromise position has little relationship to negotiation positions when the support coalition is ideologically compact. In turn, if supporting parties diverge by at least 25 points on the RILE scale, the compromise position turns into a highly significant predictor of the government's negotiation positions.

Figure 4.4 illustrates the role of executive and legislative institutions and plots the marginal effect of the compromise position on policy positions in four scenarios depending on majority status of the government, executive coordination, and parliamentary oversight. The upper left and right quadrants show that the compromise position has virtually no significant influence on governments' policy positions under uncoordinated executives. The confidence intervals for all observations in our sample always cross the  $x$ -axis.

**FIGURE 4.4: COMPROMISE POSITION, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

Hence, for uncoordinated executives the baseline case in our sample is either ministerial autonomy or significant ministerial drift. In contrast, the lower left and right quadrants show that coordinated executives increase the relevance of the compromise. Under majority governments the marginal effect of the coalition compromise is significant for 60-70% of the observations in our sample and only becomes insignificant at high levels of parliamentary oversight (in our sample, these observations stem from the Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia).<sup>86</sup> In contrast, under minority governments parliamentary oversight facilitates the compromise, turning its marginal effect significant wherever oversight is stronger than 1.24 (these observations stem from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, and Latvia). Below this value cabinet parties may be able to rule alone, but above it supporting opposition parties can rely on strong parliamentary oversight institutions to formulate alternative proposals that would engender compromises.

In the next step, we investigate the interaction between ideological divisiveness and institutional strength (hypothesis H5). For this purpose, we consider whether governments operate in a *strong*, *medium*, or *weak* institutional environment. Majority governments with executive coordination enjoy strong (= '2') institutions, since all government parties benefit from information-sharing and decision rights in cabinet and inter-ministerial meetings. Minority governments lacking either coordination or above median parliamentary oversight operate instead in a weak (= '0') institutional environment. In such arrangements, at least one supporting opposition party does not benefit from cabinet participa-

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<sup>86</sup> This might indicate that opposition parties (or alternatively, diverging intra-party factions) in strong parliaments may have some clout on the negotiation position even though the cabinet parties control a majority of seats. However, this is only speculative, since the interaction term between parliamentary oversight and the compromise is negative but not statistically significant.

tion, and either it also lacks influence through the parliament, and/or information exchange among cabinet parties is limited in the absence of executive coordination. Finally, majority governments with uncoordinated executives as well as minority governments with above median parliamentary oversight and executive coordination fall into the medium category (= '1').

We test a three-way interaction between the compromise position, ideological divisiveness, and this ordinal measure of institutional strength, also including our set of controls. Our results are reported in *Table 4.2*. As expected, the three-way interaction turns out to be negative and significant at the 5% level.<sup>87</sup> It therefore indicates that ideological divisiveness becomes less important for whether the compromise is reflected in policy positions as institutions become stronger.

*Figure 4.5* shows the impact of ideological divisiveness at each level of institutional strength. Whereas the range increases the relevance of the compromise position under weak and – to a lesser extent – under medium institutions, it has virtually no effect under strong institutions. This indicates that parties weigh policy concerns against the information costs of challenging a proposal under weak and medium institutions. But once institutions are strong, such as in the case of coordinated majority governments, challenging a proposal is convenient enough for parties that the minister generally proposes a compromise, irrespective of divisiveness. This finding runs counter to Martin and Vanberg's (2011) informal argument about a positive interaction between divisiveness and institutional strength.

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<sup>87</sup> This result should be treated with caution because we do not find this interaction to be significant with the other two alternative operationalisations of the compromise position we test for our main results in Appendix 3.


**TABLE 4.2: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH**

	<b>Estimates</b>
Compromise position	-1.867 (0.885)**
Ideological divisiveness	0.017 (0.178)
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position	0.074 (0.030)**
Institutional strength	3.160 (5.676)
Institutional strength x Ideological divisiveness	-0.043 (0.137)
Institutional strength x Compromise position	1.208 (0.542)**
Institutional strength x Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position	-0.041 (0.019)**
Left-right public opinion	5.055 (6.151)
Net receipts from EU budget	4.969 (0.859)***
Unemployment	-0.225 (0.801)
Inflation	-0.663 (1.161)
Economic freedom	-3.037 (3.471)
Population	-0.022 (0.088)
Fixed effects	Policy issues
Number of policy issues	145
Number of countries	22
N	1,694
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29

*Notes:* Fixed effects regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



**FIGURE 4.5: COMPROMISE POSITION, IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS, AND STRENGTH OF INSTITUTIONS**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

In summary, we find ample support for our model of coalition policy-making. Government support coalitions are more likely to coordinate on compromises when they are majority governments, when the ideological stakes are high, when executives coordinate internally, and when supporting parties can police the government from the opposition ranks in the parliament. Additionally, we have some indication that ideological divisions are less relevant to whether the compromise is reflected in policy positions if strong institutions lower the information search costs to the parties. We corroborate these results with various robustness checks reported in Appendix 3. In particular, we accommodate for concerns regarding the calculation of the compromise position, heteroscedastic measurement error of the CMP estimates, model specification, and missing data.

Lastly, in contrast to Martin and Vanberg (2011), we find no general effect of strong parliamentary oversight on the likelihood of compromises, but only a conditional effect for minority governments. Cabinet participation and executive coordination appear to serve as substitutes for parliamentary oversight in the case of majority governments. How, then, can we account for Martin and Vanberg's (2011) findings on the crucial role of legislative institutions? In Appendix 3 we demonstrate that we do indeed find an unconditional, positive effect of parliamentary oversight on the relevance of the compromise position as predicted by Martin and Vanberg (2011) in the sample of five countries included in their work. However, as we have shown above, this effect is not present in the full data covering 22 countries, and it is likewise not present for the 13 Western European countries in our data. While we have no explanation why the five countries included in Martin and Vanberg (2011) differ so markedly, their result of a key role of parliamentary institutions in facilitating compromises may be due to selection bias on the country level.

## CONCLUSIONS

Managing differences is at the centre of coalition politics. The preferences of parties diverge, but only one common policy can be adopted. Understanding which institutions structure intra-coalitional negotiations and influence whose preferences will be reflected in the settlement of conflicts is therefore a salient concern for scholars of comparative politics. While the literature provides various models of coalition policy-making, key empirical evidence has recently drawn the field's attention to the compromise model (see Martin and Vanberg 2014). In this study, we have analysed which institutional arrangements enable parties to enforce the compromise and thus are boundary conditions of the model. Our results are clear. Compromises are foremost agreed upon by majority governments at the cabinet table and in inter-ministerial committees, where parties share information at the early stages of policy preparation. In addition, support coalitions that are divided into cabinet and opposition parties can end up striking compromises in the legislature if procedures serve opposition parties in extracting information from their cabinet counterparts.

We do not find support for the claim that majority government coalitions are in need of the legislature to organise compromises. Instead, our findings suggest that executive institutions can act as substitutes. In contrast to existing work, we observe the actual ideological location of a policy. This is imperative if more than one institutional venue is used by coalitions: if parties strike compromises in inter-ministerial committees, parliamentary activity reveals as little about coalition policy-making as cabinet bargaining does if compromises are made in the legislature. It is even more imperative if ministers sometimes directly propose a compromise in order to forestall its anticipated institutional enforcement. In this perspective, the seminal findings of Martin and Vanberg (2011) tell us that governments in particular countries (Denmark, and potentially Germany and the Netherlands) use the legislature to establish compromises,

while others do not (France and Ireland). But they do not enable us to conclude the opposite: that no use of the legislature means that no compromise has been reached. In our data, French and Irish governments are estimated to rely relatively strongly on compromises due to executive coordination, at least in EU affairs.

Our results have important implications for the debate on citizen representation in EU policy-making. Most importantly, they demonstrate that in certain institutional settings government parties broadly fulfil their electoral mandates at the EU level, and thereby act in line with the ‘responsible party model’ (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994; Ranney 1962). It is true that our analyses do not tap into the fulfilment of specific party pledges but only gauge correlations between central government ideology and policy positions. But a broad correspondence between policy positions and the promised ideology of the government support coalition of parties appears desirable in itself and is likely a prerequisite for any more specific form of mandate fulfilment. Hence, our results suggest that institutional innovations for managing EU affairs could be further diffused, as they effectively curtail ministerial discretion and enforce compromises as a more ‘inclusive’ form of representation.

This point can be put in a broader perspective. In any non-minimalist account of democracy, the quality of the negotiation process by which policies are agreed matters. As Mansbridge and Warren have noted, ‘the question of justice in the process of negotiation is ultimately part of the question of the justice in democratic representation’ (2013: 92). To the extent that the institutions investigated here enforce joint decision-making over single-handed actions by ministers, they strengthen the democratic intuition that ‘those who have rightful *claims* to inclusion should also have the *means* for inclusion’ (Mansbridge and Warren 2013: 92). In fact, if ministerial autonomy is the alternative, these institutions are effectively prerequisites for any inter-party negotiations at all. Nev-

ertheless, from the perspective of deliberative political theory, the legislature as opposed to the cabinet or inter-ministerial venues is the preferable negotiation forum to reach fair compromises due to its greater inclusiveness. Hence, our finding that parties, at least under the baseline of majority rule, rely more on executive than legislative institutions highlights a key challenge for the quality of democratic representation in European democracies.

Lastly, our results have important implications for the measurement of citizen representation. For instance, most studies on ideological congruence between citizens and government policy make assumptions about the location of government policy in a left-right space. They have either argued that policy is best represented by the median legislative party's position (McDonald and Budge 2005; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004) or alternatively by a seat-weighted coalition compromise (Powell 2000). But what is the better proxy? Our work suggests that it may depend on the country's institutional setup and the compactness of the support coalition. Future work should at least control for these influences and test the robustness of findings to these alternative explanations for variation in congruence.

## PAPER 4

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### *Territorial Representation and the Opinion-Policy Linkage: The Case of the European Union*

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#### ABSTRACT

A key feature of federal systems is the representation of sub-national units or constituencies by ‘territorial representatives’ in policy-making at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that we should expect policy in such systems to be systematically skewed towards opinion in those constituencies where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. Statistical analyses of 167 policy issues from European Union policy-making with over 5,000 observations of opinion-policy dyads provide strong empirical evidence for this claim. Public support for policy change in those countries whose citizens care most about an issue is a better predictor of policy change than average EU-wide opinion. Moreover, congruence between state-level opinion and EU-level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear-cut opinion in a member state. These findings refine our understanding of the role public salience plays for policy representation.

‘TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION’ IS A FREQUENT FEATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE democracies. Most prominently, several of the world’s most studied democracies are federations of constituent states featuring diverse forms of representation of their territorial ‘units’ in federal level policy-making (e.g. state representatives in an ‘upper chamber’ of parliament).<sup>88</sup> How do such arrangements of territorial representation affect the translation of public opinion into policy? To *whom* exactly should we expect policy to respond under strong territorial logics and *who* will get policies congruent with her preferences in such systems? The rich literature on policy representation has generally neglected the effects of federalism and territorial representation more broadly, and instead focused on other key questions such as the effects of economic inequality or policy attributes on the opinion-policy linkage (e.g. Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2007).

Here, I address the open question and argue that the effects of strong territorial representation arrangements on the opinion-policy linkage can be understood by considering the distribution of bargaining power between state representatives as well as differences in opinion and public salience regarding policy across constituencies or states. Assuming representatives are purely re-election motivated and therefore attempt to follow the median voter in their state, conflicts about policy direction between the publics of different territories can be

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<sup>88</sup> Many unitary systems also rely on variants of territorial representation by electing representatives in single- or multi-member districts or from regional lists. In fact, only national level, closed-list pure PR electoral systems are entirely free of any territorial dimension of representation. However, strong geographical differences in opinion and salience as well as a weakly integrated party system are important background conditions for territorial representation to make a difference (see below). Both conditions seem more relevant in federal than unitary systems.

resolved by state representatives' vote trading and logrolling across policies. Representatives will offer their agreement to policy change that is undesired by the majority of their constituents *if* this opinion is ambivalent or less salient, and they will – in return – demand support from other representatives *if* their constituents' opinion is clear and salient. As a consequence, federal policy will be responsive to the power-weighted opinion of *citizens in those states that care about an issue*, and federal policy will match state-wide majority opinion the *clearer and the more salient this opinion is*.

I test these claims with a novel dataset from European Union (EU) politics containing information on cross-national public support for policy change as well as the EU's implementation record<sup>89</sup> for 167 policy issues on the EU's agenda between 2004 and 2010. Methodologically, my dataset builds upon important 'best practices' from studies of policy representation in the US (e.g. Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2012). Focusing on the EU case is effectively investigating a 'most likely case' for the effects of territorial representation, as opinion and salience vary across constitutive units, inter-regional logrolling and package deals are standard practice, and territorial dynamics are facilitated by a weakly integrated party system. This makes the EU *the* case to test whether territorial representation should ever matter for the opinion-policy linkage – if not here, where else?

Empirically, I first map the EU's 'opinion space', uncovering substantial inter-regional differences in public opinion and salience on EU politics across member states. These differences strikingly reflect well-known preference configurations in EU policy-making reported in previous studies. I then show how these differences in opinion are channelled in the policy process: analysing the

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<sup>89</sup> When I use 'implementation' in this paper, I refer to the legal adoption of policy at the EU level and not to compliance with, or implementation of EU laws in the member states.



responsiveness of EU-level policy reveals that the simple average of public opinion for those countries where an issue is salient is a better predictor of policy change than opinion across all countries. Inversely, the analysis of over 5,000 dyads of EU level policies and related opinion in each of the member states shows that congruence between state-level opinion and EU-level policy becomes more likely the more salient and clear-cut state-level opinion is. I also determine that this finding is driven by variation in opinion and salience across countries for the *same* policy issue and cannot be traced back to differences in average opinion between policy issues.

The results highlight a second – so far under-appreciated – role which public salience plays for the opinion-policy linkage. It may not only influence the kind of issues on which governments are more responsive to opinion (Wlezien 1995, 2004), but when citizens in some states or constituencies care more about an issue than others, the dynamics of policy-making under territorial representation may attribute disproportionate influence to these citizens.

## THE NEGLECT OF TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION

A wide range of studies have investigated the relationship between public opinion and policy in various Western democracies (for an overview see Wlezien and Soroka 2007). Many of these studies find significant empirical support for the *responsiveness* of policy output to public opinion (a change in opinion induces a change in policy in the same direction) as well as *congruence* of policy with majority opinion (implemented policies match the preferences of the majority of citizens) (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).

However, almost none of the existing studies address the question of how *territorial representation* affects the opinion-policy linkage. To be clear, by territo-

rial representation I refer to the representation of subnational units or states in political decision-making at the federal level by regionally, (in)directly elected representatives. Territorial representation in this sense is typically a core element of the definition of federalism (e.g. Wibbels 2005: 26), and is commonly associated with state representatives in an upper, 'territorial chamber' of the national legislature. How do democracies with such arrangements deal with the divergent views of their citizens across sub-national units or states? This lacuna in existing research is particularly surprising, as several federal systems, most importantly the US, Germany, and Canada (see above; see also Brooks 1990), have been the focal point of research on the opinion-policy linkage.

Certainly, some limited work has scrutinised the effects of federalism on the opinion-policy linkage, but its focus has been on federalism's impact on citizens' 'policy responsiveness' in the 'thermostatic model' of public opinion and policy (Wlezien 1995, 2004). This work highlights that the various layers of policy-making under federalism make it difficult for citizens to identify responsibility for policy and therefore cushion citizens' reactions to policy-making (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). This, in turn, diminishes electoral incentives for governments to represent public opinion in policy-making (see also John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011). However, despite showing that the strength of representation is diminished, this research has not addressed the question of whether federalism alters the focus of representation (Weßels 2007: 838-840) at the federal level, i.e. who exactly is represented.

To my knowledge, Bølstad's (2015) study is the only one that addresses how opinion in different territories is represented in federal level policy-making. Bølstad finds that public opinion on EU integration has a 'core' and a 'periphery' trend, represented by different groups of countries (Germany, France, Italy... vs. UK, Denmark, Ireland...), and that EU-level policy-making responds to both opinion series. However, he does not analyse under what conditions opinion in one group of member states becomes relatively more influential com-

pared to opinion in other member states. As he has to rely on support for EU membership as a rough measure of ‘public mood for integration’ he cannot identify substantive conflicts over policy between citizens in different territories, and hence, he cannot address how such conflicts are resolved.

In turn, I here develop a micro foundational argument about the interactions of sub-national or state representatives that predicts when certain publics should be influential in federal level policy-making. Moreover, as I employ opinion data on very specific policy issues, I am able to ascertain who gets their preferences realised in case of disagreement.

## THE OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE UNDER TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION

In the development of my argument I presume acceptance of the core ideas of electoral representation models (Barro 1973; Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986; Mansbridge 2003; Stimson 1999) in order to focus on the exact impacts of territorial representation. In particular, I assume that representatives purely care about re-election and therefore try to follow the median voter in their constituency or state. In turn, constituents partially evaluate representatives on the basis of federal level policy change, even though control of policy-making at the federal level is divided between all representatives. The basic idea is that territorial representation creates an inter-regional bargaining space, in which territorial representatives negotiate over policy change. Assume the following simple preference function of each representative in the case of policy change:

$$(1): U_i^{Change} = S_i * (O_i - 50\%)$$

Where  $S_i$  is the salience (or importance) her constituents attach to a policy issue  $i$  and  $O_i$  is the constituents’ support for policy change on the issue (i.e. the percentage of constituents supporting change). Note that this utility is positive

in the case of policy change that is supported by a majority of constituents (i.e. the median voter in the state or sub-national unit), and negative otherwise. This represents the idea that constituents will use the next elections to reward (sanction) representatives for past policy-making that was in line with (against) their preferences. The size of the reward (sanction) depends on issue salience, which ties in with key arguments and findings from the policy representation literature (Burstein 2006; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). Further assume  $U_i^{SQ} = 0$ , if the status quo (SQ) prevails and no policy change occurs.

Representatives vote with a particular decision rule (e.g. majority, unanimity) and have to organise coalitions to pass policy change. Given that representatives' constituents differ in their opinions on policy issues and the salience they attach to them, representatives can engage in logrolling or vote-trading across issues in order to maximise their utility from a set of issues  $I$ :  $\sum_{i=1}^I U_i$ . In essence, representatives agree to undesirable policy changes or status quos on issues that are of little importance to their constituents, and in return receive the support of other representatives on issues their constituents care about and have a clear opinion on. More precisely, representatives will trade their vote on issues for which they face a small utility difference between policy change and the status quo ( $|U_i^{Change} - U_i^{SQ}| = |U_i^{Change} - 0|$ ), and they ask for the votes of others on issues where this difference is substantial.

This straightforward micro foundational argument about bargaining between territorial representatives relates to a wide class of more specific 'exchange', 'logrolling' or 'vote-trading' bargaining models developed in political science and sociology (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Carrubba and Volden

2000; Coleman 1966a, 1966b; Riker and Brams 1973; Stratmann 1992).<sup>90</sup> As Coleman (1966a: 615) has put it succinctly, negotiators ‘exchange their partial control over issues that interest them little for greater control of those that interest them more’. In our case,  $|U_i^{Change}|$  represents precisely this ‘interest’ of negotiators. In the political science literature (e.g. Riker and Brams 1973), this ‘interest’ has sometimes been called ‘salience’, which should not be mixed up with  $S_i$ , the salience in the form of the importance constituents attach to the issue. Nevertheless, the central claim here is that when negotiators are electorally sensitive representatives, their ‘interest’ or ‘salience’ becomes a direct function of constituents’ opinion on and salience attached to the issue (see equation (1)). This means the salience of issues for negotiators is endogenised so as to capture constituents’ demands.

As representatives may differ in their power to influence whether policy change occurs or not, let this power be represented by  $P$  for representative  $j$  and a total number of representatives  $J$ , such that  $\sum_{j=1}^J P_j = 1$ . This parameter does not only capture the share of total votes a representative has (if this number differs), but also and more importantly, her ability to log-roll with others (e.g. her position in the bargaining space) as well as any other resources of power (e.g. vote-buying, see Aksoy and Rodden 2009; Lee 2000; Rodden 2002). We can now easily see the consequences of territorial representation for the opinion-policy linkage. First, consider *responsiveness*, i.e. the question of wheth-

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<sup>90</sup> It is not important for the argument of the paper which specific exchange model characterises inter-regional bargaining. As long as the underpinning model allows representatives to – at least marginally – increase their influence on some issues at the expense of influence on other issues, territorial representation should have the consequences shown here. This includes models of diffuse instead of specific reciprocity, models with certain norms as well as potentially bargaining models with representatives that aim at satisficing rather than optimising their utility function.

er a change in opinion induces changes in policy. Under territorial representation the probability of policy change on a particular issue  $\Pr(Y_i^{Change})$  should increase with either the power of the supporting representatives, or the utility they derive from the change, which is in turn a function of constituents' opinion and salience (see equation (1)):

$$(2): \frac{\Delta \Pr(Y_i^{Change})}{\Delta \sum_{j=1}^J P_j U_{j,i}^{Change}} > 0$$

As a result, policy-making under strong territorial logics should be more responsive to certain constituencies or states with power, strong opinions, and high interest in an issue than to average polity-wide opinion. These constituencies may vary on an issue-by-issue basis and their citizens may favour different policies than the system's average citizen.

Second, the *congruence* of policy-making with opinion, i.e. an actual match between majority opinion and policy, is influenced by territorial representation. Importantly, congruence can be assessed on the constituency or state level. The probability that majority opinion in a particular constituency is congruent with adopted policy (i.e. the majority favours change and it occurs OR the majority favours the status quo and it prevails) should increase with the power of this constituency as well as the difference in representatives' utility between policy change and the status quo:

$$(3): \frac{\Delta \Pr(Y_i^{Change} | O_{j,i} - 50\% > 0\%) + \Delta \Pr(Y_i^{SQ} | O_{j,i} - 50\% \leq 0\%)}{\Delta (P_j | U_{j,i}^{Change})} > 0$$

Hence, as constituents either care more about or have more uniform opinions on an issue, congruence of policy-making with their views becomes more likely, as their representative will focus on these issues in his logrolling strategies. Note that without territorial representation, congruence should be unrelated to state-level opinion and salience if we exclude polity-wide opinion and salience

as potential confounders, i.e. expression (3) should equal 0, when holding 'global' opinion and salience constant.

When will territorial representation make a significant difference for the opinion-policy linkage? Certainly, its effects become stronger, the more dispersed opinion and salience across territories and the less proportional power to constituencies' voter populations. It is therefore likely to be particularly relevant in federal systems of diverse sub-national units. Moreover, the more powerful a territorial chamber vis-à-vis a first, territorially undivided chamber (e.g. elected on nation-wide, pure proportional representation (PR)), the stronger the effects of territorial representation should be. Similarly, strong 'unit representation' (e.g. US Senate) in the territorial chamber should accentuate effects, whereas more 'population-proportional representation' (e.g. German Bundesrat) is likely to attenuate them (Crémer and Palfrey 1999).

Yet, while the presence and policy influence of territorial representatives is a necessary condition for any significant effects, inter-regional logrolling or vote-trading is the key mechanism that manipulates the opinion-policy linkage. In this respect, the integration of the party system may absorb many effects of territorial representation in federal systems by thwarting inter-regional bargaining (Beramendi 2009: 768; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004: 190-196; Rodden 2006; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Wibbels 2001). If strong polity-wide parties exist and their leaderships can discipline sub-national party elites and territorial representatives through career incentives or organisational command, intra-regional logrolling may be minimised (Riker and Brams 1973: 1238). Party leaders may, in particular, sanction representatives for vote trades across party lines, and instead try to gear policy-making to polity-wide opinion. This is especially rational if federal party leaders' own career ambitions are linked to a largely polity-wide constituency (e.g. if the core executive is elected by popular vote or by a pure, nation-wide PR lower chamber of parliament). Nevertheless, work on the US Congress has stressed how party leaders can ac-

tually facilitate intra-party logrolls (Koford 1982) and collected important empirical evidence for logrolling practices in the US (Stratmann 1992, 1995).

In order to test whether territorial representation can ever make a difference for the opinion-policy linkage, I focus here on policy-making in the European Union as a 'most likely case'. The EU's political system – no matter whether it is described as 'federal system' or 'federation' (e.g. Kincaid 1999) – shares a central design principle with any 'truly' federal state, namely strong territorial representation (Börzel and Hosli 2003). The Council of the EU (henceforth, the Council) is effectively the system's upper chamber, it features mild population-disproportional unit representation by national governments (specifically their ministers), and its influence in policy-making is – to say the least – on equal footing with the lower chamber, the European Parliament (EP) (e.g. Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 2012). Furthermore, where policy is made outside the treaties' framework, the only viable procedure is bargaining between territorial representatives (i.e. the national governments) in inter-governmental conferences.

Importantly, compared to party systems in virtually any national federal state, the EU's party system is much less integrated (Thorlakson 2005). Parties in the member states are largely independent from each other and only loosely organise transnationally in a number of 'Europarties' with rather weak organisational and financial resources. It is true that Europarties play an important role in EU legislative politics, e.g. by lowering transaction costs (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007a; B. Lindberg, Rasmussen, and Warntjen 2008: 1111-1114), most visibly through their groups in the EP. But they lack command and control over EU-level legislators. Not even members of the EP, let alone national ministers in the Council, have been found to be consistently loyal to their European party (Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007b). Instead, disciplining authority largely remains with national parties.



The lack of a disciplining federal party system is reflected in logrolling and package deal practices within the Council and across EU institutions, for which scholars have developed theoretical models and provided substantial evidence (Aksoy 2012; Crombez 2000; Golub 2012a; Kardasheva 2013). In particular, the so-called ‘compromise model’, which has been found to best explain bargaining in the Council over continuous policy alternatives, is closely related to the aforementioned models of vote-trading and logrolling concerned with binary choices (particularly to Coleman 1966a, 1966b) (see Achen 2006a, 2006b; Thomson 2011b).<sup>91</sup> It posits that the outcome of Council negotiations is a weighted average of national governments’ spatial policy positions, where the weights are the product of each government’s issue salience and power. The high relevance of logrolling and vote-trading makes the EU an excellent case to identify the impact of territorial representation on the opinion-policy linkage.<sup>92</sup>

Building on my general expectations above, I now specify hypotheses for the EU case. While opinion and the salience of a policy issue can be directly measured from public opinion data, I have to make assumptions about the bargaining power of the different territorial representatives based on existing findings. While some early literature, especially by Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998), has argued that the ‘big’ EU member states (Germany, France, UK) dominate nego-

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<sup>91</sup> Other well-performing models of Council negotiations also allow exchanges and trades (e.g. Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson 2006; König and Proksch 2006)

<sup>92</sup> While territorial dynamics should be particularly strong in the EU case, historically some scholars have argued that citizen representation in EU policy-making is weak due to the public’s lack of interest and little electoral accountability (Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Haas 1958: 16-19; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). However, recent empirical results have challenged this notion and provided evidence for classical patterns of representation due to strong politicisation of EU matters since the 1990s (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016; Toshkov 2011). For a comprehensive overview see Hooghe and Marks (2009).

tiations in the Council as well as in intergovernmental conferences, most subsequent studies could not provide any consistent evidence for this claim. Instead, bargaining models that assume more equal distributions of power between member states have generally been found to yield more accurate predictions of outcomes than those assuming disproportionate power for a particular group of states (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Finke 2009; Golub 2012b; Thomson 2008, 2011e).<sup>93</sup> This result seems to hold despite the continuing replacement of unanimity with qualified majority voting. My assumption is therefore that bargaining power is equally distributed between state representatives, which renders  $P$  analytically irrelevant in the inequalities (2) and (3) for the EU case. This yields the following expectations with regard to the responsiveness and congruence of EU-level policies:

**H1** (*Responsiveness*): The greater the support for policy change among those national publics that view the issue as salient, the higher the likelihood of EU-level policy change.

**H2** (*Congruence*): The greater the national opinion majority on an issue *and* the more salient an issue is to the national public, the higher the likelihood of congruence between country-level opinion and EU-level policy change.

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<sup>93</sup> Of course, bargaining power may vary over time and across policy areas, but most studies using a large number of legislative files and areas could not detect any systematic and significant overall differences. Hence, on average the assumption of equal power should be most appropriate. However, I also challenge this assumption in the robustness checks section below, and provide results for a regressive distribution of power.

## A NEW DATASET ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EU

In order to test these expectations, I collected a novel dataset of public opinion and policy implementation in EU politics.<sup>94</sup> The data covers 167 concrete policy issues that occurred on the EU's agenda after the bloc's enlargement to 25 members with the accession of 10 Eastern European democracies in May 2004. Policy issues were selected from the universe of question items covered in the European Commission's (henceforth, the Commission) regular 'Eurobarometer' survey series.

In a first step, all question items in 'Standard', 'Special', and 'Flash' Eurobarometers with a fieldwork start date between 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004 and 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2010 were screened for a set of keywords (such as 'agree', 'disagree', 'approve', 'oppose', 'favour', etc.). In a second step, items with at least one of the keywords were included in the dataset if they fulfilled additional criteria: they surveyed opinion on policy change, without any conditional twists, they were specific enough to ascertain policy implementation, and the policy domain lay within the potential and growing competences of the EU.

Most of the 167 policy issues identified with this approach were surveyed only once during the period under study. However, a few items (especially on enlargement) were surveyed several times in consecutive years. Out of these, each item was included only once per calendar year, with the most recent survey being selected. Different question wordings on the same policy were treated as separate policy issues. This resulted in a final dataset of 201 questions on policy change.

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<sup>94</sup> Appendix 4 provides detailed information on the new data, including the selection of questions about policy issues, concerns with certain question formats, (re-)scaling of public opinion measures, the coding of implementation records and related variables, and further discussion of potential biases.

Human coders ascertained the implementation record for the selected policies on the basis of official, publicly available sources (e.g. EU institutions' websites; EUR-Lex), and where those were not informative, through written requests to the Directorates-General of the Commission. Coders checked whether the proposed policy change was implemented after the fieldwork start date of the survey.<sup>95</sup> Implementation was usually achieved through EU secondary law, sometimes through primary law, and rarely through bureaucratic acts or changes in bureaucratic practice. The key implementation variable is binary with '0' indicating that the status quo prevailed and '1' denoting policy change. Implementation occurred in 33% of the cases and after a median time lag of 1315 days from the survey's fieldwork date.

In order to ensure a consistent linkage between the public opinion and the implementation data, all Eurobarometer public opinion measures were transformed to reflect the *support for change* in policy. While most questions implicitly asked about change, few items asked about support for an existing status quo. In these cases, the public opinion measures were recoded as the *disapproval* of this status quo, and hence, reflect support for change. As the survey questions used a small number of different answer formats, all response options affirmative of policy change were merged (e.g. 'totally agree' and 'tend to agree') to measure the total percentage of respondents supportive of change. The EU-wide mean support for change across all questions was 61%.

The outlined approach to data construction closely replicates approaches used in prominent US studies on policy representation, most importantly in Martin Gilens' work (2012, Chapter 2) (see also Lax and Phillips 2012). But an

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<sup>95</sup> As over 90% of implementations took place within five and a half years from the survey's fieldwork, later implementations were not counted (status quo prevails = '0') to ensure a close link between opinion and the recorded occurrence of policy change. See Appendix 4 for details and robustness checks in this respect.

important difference between the US and the EU case has to be considered: while US studies rely on question items from several independent survey companies, for this data the single source is the Eurobarometer, conducted by TNS Opinion and financed by the Commission. This poses the questions of *selection bias* and *sponsor desirability bias*: 1) To what extent are the topics of Eurobarometer questions representative of the EU's political agenda? 2) To what extent is item design sufficiently neutral to measure representation?

Table 5.1 displays the distribution of policy questions in the data across 13 hand-coded policy areas. This illustrates that the data is broadly representative of the EU's agenda.<sup>96</sup> Importantly, about 26% of the data relates to 'Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement', which reflects the EU's strong focus on the Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty process as well as EU-28 enlargement between 2004 and 2010. Equally, the regulation of the internal market as a long-runner in EU politics is the second best covered area – the revision of the tobacco and data protection directives as two key policy initiatives are represented with several items in the data. Not surprisingly, key new policy areas like 'Health', 'Environment, animals and energy' as well as 'Justice and home affairs' also feature prominently in the data. Some readers may be worried about the relatively weak coverage of 'Economic and financial affairs'. However, it has to be stressed that most of the data relates to the period before the financial crisis reverted attention to economic and financial issues. Nevertheless, the data includes key policy issues from the ECOFIN Council agenda such as on the EU's planned financial transaction tax, bankers' bonuses, and the supervision of hedge funds.

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<sup>96</sup> See also Haverland, Ruiter, and Walle (2015), who show that most Flash Eurobarometers are about topics in areas of 'shared competences', where EU activity is still increasing. In contrast, areas of long-established, exclusive EU competences as well as exclusive national competences are less covered.

I conjecture that Eurobarometer questions on policy change are broadly representative of the EU's political agenda precisely because the Commission uses the survey as a 'governance tool' (Signorelli 2012). According to Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh (2014: 234-235), it is common practice that Directorates-General (DGs) buy question batteries in the Eurobarometer to survey opinion on legislative files they are preparing or negotiating with the other institutions. Public opinion can then be used as a 'bargaining chip', either internally between the DGs, or when defending policy positions vis-à-vis the Council of the EU or the EP. In Appendix 4, I demonstrate that the overwhelming share of policy questions are fielded by the Commission either during the phase of policy preparation (three to five years before implementation), or in the 'end game' of negotiations (shortly before implementation). This confirms that the questions broadly reflect the central agenda-setter's policy activity.

**TABLE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONS ACROSS POLICY AREAS**

	Questions	%	Cum.%
Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement	52	25.87	25.87
Internal market and consumer protection	33	16.42	42.29
Health	20	9.95	52.24
Environment, animals and energy	19	9.45	61.69
Justice and home affairs	15	7.46	69.15
Economic and financial affairs	10	4.98	74.13
Agriculture and rural development	9	4.48	78.61
Research, development and space	9	4.48	83.08
Transport, infrastructure and public safety	9	4.48	87.56
Foreign policy, defence and neighbourhood	8	3.98	91.54
Cohesion policy	7	3.48	95.02
Trade and international development	7	3.48	98.51
Other	3	1.49	100.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100</b>	

Obviously, if the Eurobarometer is a governance tool, sponsor desirability bias may be a problem, i.e. the Commission may try to instil biases with their question designs in order to receive the ‘desired answers’ (Höpner and Jurczyk 2012, 2015). Arguably, it may be a key interest of the Commission staff to back policies the Commission wants to implement anyway with figures of high public support, and therefore perceived democratic legitimacy. I therefore caution against interpreting any correlation between the *absolute* figures of support for policy change in the Eurobarometer and policy implementation as an indication of policy representation. Different question designs to survey support for the very same policy may yield 40, 50, or 60% support. However, I argue that *relative* figures of support between different geographies or social strata still provide accurate information about the relative distribution of preferences. Engineering overall figures of support is much easier than manipulating the differences in support between groups. In addition, it is doubtful whether the Commission has any interest in deforming relative patterns of support in a systematic way across a large number of policy issues.

Importantly, the Eurobarometer has the strong advantage of providing precise measures of opinion on the same issues for all EU countries. Sample sizes per member state vary between 500-2,000 respondents, providing for small standard errors. This renders the widespread use of the multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) method for obtaining regional opinion measures redundant and circumvents well-known weaknesses of MRP (Buttice and Highton 2013; Toshkov 2015). In particular, MRP is weak in recovering accurate relative rankings of country means, which is of prime importance when assessing territorial representation. To sum up, the new dataset broadly reflects the EU’s policy agenda and provides precise measures of relative differences in opinion between EU countries.

## MAPPING OPINION AND SALIENCE ACROSS THE EU

In the following I use the dataset to investigate the consequences of territorial representation for the opinion-policy linkage in the EU. As I have pointed out, territorial representation will only make a difference if opinion and salience vary substantially across countries creating inter-regional vote trading opportunities. I start by assessing to what extent this prerequisite is given.

First, I demean country-level opinion by question item, i.e. I subtract the average support for policy change across countries (as percentage and excluding ‘don’t know’ and refusal responses) from the specific support in each country ( $O_{j,i}^{Demeaned} = O_{j,i} - \bar{O}_i$ ). Hence, the variable represents positive or negative deviations of country-specific support from average support. This demonstrates that opinion on the same issue varies greatly between countries (see *Table 5.2*). The standard deviation of country-specific support is about 10.6 percentage points on average and almost 15 percentage points in the most contested policy area of ‘Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement’. Country opinions also differ strongly on the internal market and agriculture, and less so on issues such as cohesion, trade, and transport. More than 50% of the country opinions deviate more than  $\pm 5$  percentage points from mean support across countries and the mean range in support (most supportive minus least supportive country) is a remarkable 37 percentage points. This is evidence of striking variation in citizens’ support, especially when compared to the variation explained in US studies focusing on differences between income groups. For instance, in Gilens’ (2012: 86-87) ‘*Affluence and Influence*’, the median income group deviates from the rich by less than 10 percentage points on more than 80% of the policies in his sample.



**TABLE 5.2: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALIENCE**

	Opinion			Salience			N
	SD	Max	Min	SD	Max	Min	
Constitutional affairs, agencies and enlargement	14.68	-44.13	45.16	7.49	-24.83	20.23	1,396
Internal market and consumer protection	10.15	-29.63	30.73	7.41	-35.74	24.96	883
Health	8.46	-28.64	28.39	4.82	-26.03	23.16	526
Environment, animals and energy	8.89	-29.23	33.72	5.19	-27.46	14.40	503
Justice and home affairs	7.09	-23.26	20.29	5.44	-19.91	13.12	397
Economic and financial affairs	7.91	-27.32	20.39	7.05	-32.27	15.85	226
Agriculture and rural development	10.02	-25.78	27.92	6.02	-28.54	11.61	243
Research, development and space	8.41	-21.47	27.98	7.66	-26.20	19.69	237
Transport, infrastructure and public safety	6.93	-40.78	18.89	3.02	-15.16	5.81	243
Foreign policy, defence and neighbourhood	8.35	-25.92	36.96	6.79	-21.07	13.00	216
Cohesion policy	6.41	-22.10	15.07	6.67	-32.54	19.18	189
Trade and international development	6.74	-24.75	17.48	5.53	-17.09	10.72	183
Other	14.26	-33.89	36.75	6.43	-19.53	15.39	77
TOTAL	10.64	-44.13	45.16	6.52	-35.74	24.96	5,319

Second, in line with existing literature (Brooks 1990; Gilens 2005, 2012; Page and Shapiro 1983) I measure the public salience of a policy issue from the fraction of ‘don’t know’ and refusal responses. As Page and Shapiro (1983: 181) put it: ‘When the proportion of don’t knows is relatively low – that is, when more people are willing to offer a preference – it is a sign of more public interest and attention and perhaps also stronger, more intensely held opinions’. Certainly,

this link only holds to the extent that respondents *without* a preference indicate that they ‘don’t know’ and those *with* a preference abstain from doing so. It is well-known that this is only approximately the case (for a review see Krosnick 1999: 556-559): about 20-40% of respondents provide opinions on fictitious political issues (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1986), and social norms and satisficing behaviour may lead respondents to report that they ‘don’t know’ instead of revealing or trying to access their actual preference. Yet, Gilens (2012: 35-37) has demonstrated that the resulting distortions in ‘don’t know’ responses are rather small for typical policy questions. More importantly, as my main interest is in differences in salience across countries and not across questions, distortions from varying question designs are of less relevance here.

Hence, I construct a measure of salience as the percentage of preference-revealing (support/oppose) responses ( $S_{j,i} = 100 - (\%DK + \%Refusal)$ ) and its question-demeaned version as above ( $S_{j,i}^{Demeaned} = S_{j,i} - \bar{S}_i$ ). Like opinion, salience also varies substantially across countries with a standard deviation of 6.5 percentage points (see Table 5.2) and a mean range between the country with most and least salience of 21.7 percentage points. Interestingly, EU citizens disagree the least about the importance of ‘Transport, infrastructure and public safety’ issues and the most about ‘Research, development and space’. In each policy area we find observations of stark deviations from mean salience by  $\pm 15$ -35 percentage points (min/max).

But do state representatives, in our case national governments, represent these differences in opinion and salience when negotiating in the Council of the EU or in intergovernmental conferences? In particular, we should expect that governments’ initial positions – before logrolls and vote-trades take place – reflect opinion differences. Regrettably, we have no information about governments’ initial positions on the policy issues in the dataset. However, what we can do is compare the structure of the opinion differences in this sample of issues with

the structure of initial negotiation positions previous work has discovered for other issues.

For this purpose, I use exploratory factor analysis to uncover the latent patterns of opinion differences across countries. My 25 manifest variables measure the question-demeaned opinions in each EU country.<sup>97</sup> Using the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of an eigenvalue greater than 1, I retain five factors with the principal factor method on 198 observations of questions on policy change.<sup>98</sup> The eigenvalues and factor loadings are reported in *Table 5.3*. The five factors explain about 87% of the variation and the first two factors already sum to 61%. While a screeplot does not show any clear ‘elbow’, the eigenvalue of the third factor is less than half of the eigenvalue of the second factor. I therefore focus here on the interpretation of the first and the second factor.

**TABLE 5.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN OPINION**

	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>	<b>Factor 4</b>	<b>Factor 5</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
	Eigenvalue 6.78	Eigenvalue 4.23	Eigenvalue 2.10	Eigenvalue 1.56	Eigenvalue 1.17	
AT	<b>0.749</b>	0.116	0.025	0.270	0.150	0.330
BE	<b>0.636</b>	0.215	0.180	0.172	-0.353	0.362
CY	-0.422	<b>0.489</b>	-0.107	0.172	0.007	0.542
CZ	-0.041	-0.120	<b>0.694</b>	-0.197	0.380	0.319
DE	<b>0.847</b>	-0.005	0.100	0.287	-0.029	0.190
DK	<b>0.497</b>	<b>-0.528</b>	-0.001	-0.428	0.070	0.286
EE	<b>-0.485</b>	<b>-0.530</b>	-0.211	0.283	0.166	0.332
EL	-0.109	<b>0.552</b>	-0.197	0.119	0.264	0.561

<sup>97</sup> As Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007 and opinion on 33 questions is missing for these countries, I exclude them here.

<sup>98</sup> Three questions concerned the common currency and non-euro countries were not surveyed on these questions. Hence, the number of observations is 198 instead of 201 (the number of questions) as in all other analyses.

ES	-0.385	<b>0.574</b>	0.107	-0.310	-0.308	0.320
FI	<b>0.568</b>	<b>-0.491</b>	-0.303	0.038	0.314	0.244
FR	<b>0.745</b>	0.224	0.130	0.137	-0.164	0.332
HU	-0.277	-0.007	<b>0.569</b>	0.078	0.114	0.581
IE	0.112	<b>0.542</b>	<b>-0.501</b>	-0.124	0.208	0.385
IT	0.321	<b>0.708</b>	-0.005	0.051	0.060	0.390
LT	<b>-0.640</b>	-0.326	0.051	0.311	-0.176	0.354
LU	<b>0.776</b>	0.060	0.006	0.264	-0.177	0.293
LV	-0.300	-0.270	-0.319	<b>0.532</b>	0.095	0.443
MT	<b>-0.601</b>	0.067	<b>-0.480</b>	-0.168	-0.134	0.358
NL	<b>0.537</b>	<b>-0.478</b>	0.199	-0.236	-0.327	0.281
PL	<b>-0.828</b>	-0.012	0.078	-0.157	-0.079	0.278
PT	-0.079	<b>0.762</b>	-0.025	-0.224	-0.098	0.353
SE	-0.016	<b>-0.771</b>	-0.263	-0.286	-0.148	0.233
SI	<b>-0.463</b>	-0.222	0.048	0.177	-0.307	0.609
SK	<b>-0.507</b>	0.040	<b>0.514</b>	0.045	0.322	0.372
UK	<b>0.540</b>	0.013	-0.273	-0.406	0.254	0.404


Notes: Principal factor method; five retained factors (eigenvalue > 1); factor loadings greater than  $\pm 0.45$  in bold; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom.

Figure 5.1 plots the factor loadings for factors one and two. This shows that factor one captures a contrast between ‘core’ Western European member states (Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, and Luxembourg) and the new member states (in particular, Poland, Lithuania, and Malta). In turn, the second factor relates to a contrast between northern member states (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, and Estonia) and southern member states (Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece, but also Ireland). Strikingly, this structure of old vs. new and north vs. south in opinions is *exactly* the same structure studies have found to be present in initial negotiation positions of governments in the Council of the EU (Plechanovova 2011; Thomson 2009, 2011c) (see Appendix 4 for details).<sup>99</sup>

<sup>99</sup> In Appendix 4, I discuss favoured policy changes that are associated with extremity on each factor. This confirms that the opinion conflicts between new vs. old and north vs. south are also

This suggests that state representatives do indeed represent broad opinion patterns in EU policy-making (see also Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2016).

**FIGURE 5.1: THE EU'S PUBLIC OPINION SPACE**



*Notes:* Factor loadings for factors one and two. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom.

## ASSESSING RESPONSIVENESS AND CONGRUENCE

Having provided evidence for the central prerequisites for any influence of territorial representation, I ascertain whether the opinion-policy linkage is affected as predicted by my hypotheses about responsiveness and congruence (H1 and H2).

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similar in substance to those known from Council studies relying on initial positions of governments.

## *Responsiveness*

In a first step, I investigate responsiveness by modelling the probability of policy change using the binary implementation measure as the dependent variable. In order to see whether the probability of policy change increases with public support in those countries that view the issue as most salient, I create a measure that is the simple average of opinion in the five (and as an alternative: ten) countries with the lowest share of don't know (DK) or refusal responses on a question.

As opinion correlates across countries, a significant effect of this measure of *most salient opinion* on the probability of policy change could be caused by a confounding alternative of opinion. It is therefore advisable to compare this measure to its theoretical alternatives. Hence, following a 'placebo logic' I construct a second opinion measure that is the simple average of opinion in the five (ten) countries with the lowest salience on a question (*least salient opinion*). As representatives of these countries should sell their vote on low salience issues, the measure should clearly do worse in predicting policy change than that of countries with high salience. As a second potential confounder I consider simple survey-weighted *EU-wide opinion*. If territorial representation makes a difference to the opinion-policy linkage, a measure correcting for salience and an equal distribution of power should outperform average opinion.

I control for two factors that are likely to influence the baseline probability of policy change. First, I include factor variables for the EU competence in implementing the policy issue ('Mixed competence', 'Mainly EU competence', as opposed to 'Mainly national competence' as reference category), as I expect that EU level implementation is more likely with clear competences at that governance level. Second, I expect that policy issues on which the member state representatives can only agree policy change with unanimous agreement are less likely to be implemented. To test this, I include factor variables for the decision

rule ('Unanimity', 'Unclear decision rule', as opposed to 'QMV' as reference category).<sup>100</sup>

As some policy issues were surveyed more than once and hence questions as implementation opportunities are nested within policy issues, I use logistic regressions with a random intercept at the policy issue level.<sup>101</sup> Results are reported in *Table 5.4*. Model R1 and Model R2 compare opinion in the five (ten in R2) countries for whom the issue is most salient to the five (ten in R2) countries for whom the issue is least salient. The coefficient on most salient opinion is positive and highly statistically significant in Model R1 and close to significance in Model R2, with a p-value of 0.065. In turn, the coefficient on least salient opinion is indistinguishable from zero in both models. Hence, as expected, most salient opinion is clearly a better predictor of policy change than least salient opinion, and the EU system is more responsive to those publics that care about an issue than to those that do not.

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<sup>100</sup> Interestingly, the results on the decision rule are in an unexpected direction, as unanimity increases the probability of policy change. An interpretation of this effect is provided in Appendix 4.

<sup>101</sup> As only 29 policy issues were asked more than once, clustering is only partial (i.e. most of the level-two 'groups' are singletons containing one observation only). Estimates of level-two variance components are likely biased in such settings but are of little substantive interest here. In contrast, the estimation of level-one fixed effects, in our case the public opinion variables, has been shown to be mainly unaffected by modelling choices regarding partial clustering (Bell et al. 2010; Bell, Ferron, and Kromrey 2008; Clarke and Wheaton 2007). The choice of a multilevel model is therefore justified theoretically to acknowledge clustering but may not provide any empirical leverage here. Estimating a pooled logistic regression yields almost identical results (stronger findings in Model R2 and weaker in Model R6).

**TABLE 5.4: RESPONSIVENESS OF POLICY TO PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE**

	<b>Model R1</b>	<b>Model R2</b>	<b>Model R3</b>	<b>Model R4</b>	<b>Model R5</b>	<b>Model R6</b>
Most salient opinion (five/ten countries)	0.429 (0.114)***	0.353 (0.185)*	0.416 (0.128)***	0.371 (0.154)**	0.406 (0.175)**	0.407 (0.244)*
Least salient opinion (five/ten countries)	-0.146 (0.108)	-0.107 (0.132)	-0.093 (0.136)	-0.043 (0.148)		
EU-wide opinion					-0.118 (0.171)	-0.118 (0.239)
Mixed competence	9.790 (3.504)***	9.147 (3.887)**	3.244 (3.829)	3.591 (3.931)	9.866 (2.716)***	8.802 (3.520)**
Mainly EU competence	11.910 (4.058)***	10.675 (4.640)**	12.342 (4.831)**	11.552 (4.695)**	11.954 (3.523)***	12.703 (4.550)***
Unclear decision rule	-0.797 (3.443)	-0.693 (3.495)	-0.669 (5.394)	1.335 (4.075)	-0.750 (2.996)	-0.140 (5.865)
Unanimity	7.321 (3.503)**	6.425 (3.511)*	13.505 (6.024)**	12.265 (4.149)***	6.732 (2.669)**	8.187 (3.386)**
Constant	-36.061 (9.063)***	-31.732 (11.562)***	-38.029 (14.206)***	-36.611 (15.449)**	-36.518 (7.253)***	-37.322 (12.769)***
Random effect	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues
Number of policy issues	167	167	79	79	167	167
N	201	201	96	96	201	201
Log-likelihood	-87.91	-89.61	-40.66	-41.43	-87.95	-90.01

Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



One problem with testing effects of territorial representation on the sample of all policy issues is that for about half of all issues the majority of citizens in all EU countries agreed on whether they favoured change or the status quo (despite substantial variations in the levels of support). On such ‘consensus issues’ we should not actually observe much effect of any intra-regional bargaining, as purely re-election motivated representatives should universally agree on such issues. Instead, ‘conflict issues’ on which national opinion majorities were split between change and the status quo should provide the strongest evidence for the consequences of territorial representation. In Model R3 and Model R4 (five/ten countries) I demonstrate that results hold and even slightly increase in statistical significance if the sample is restricted to such conflict issues.<sup>102</sup>

Next, I check whether most salient opinion is a better predictor of policy change than EU-wide opinion. The results in Model R5 and Model R6 (five/ten countries) are affirmative: opinion in countries that care most about an issue is a statistically significant predictor of policy change even if we control for EU-wide opinion that has a negative sign and is far from any statistical significance in both models.<sup>103</sup> In sum, these results strongly support H1 that policy change occurs the greater the public support in those countries that care about an issue.

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<sup>102</sup> Note that correlated measurement error of the two opinion variables used in each model may cause attenuation of coefficients and incidental sign switches (Achen 1985). This is particularly likely if the two opinion variables are very highly correlated (Bashir 2015), which is the case in Model R1 and Model R2 (i.e. correlation > 0.9). Importantly, this correlation is much smaller in the sample of conflict issues (i.e. about 0.67 to 0.69). This renders the results in Model R3 and Model R4 particularly reliable.

<sup>103</sup> As EU-wide opinion and most salient opinion are very highly correlated (i.e. > 0.9), the results should be interpreted with caution (see footnote [101]). Certainly, even if average EU-wide opinion had some significant effect on policy change, this would not contradict the argument, as territorial representation renders the geographical distribution of salience and opinion relevant – but does not necessarily make average opinion irrelevant.

Moreover, they also show that this is not driven by any correlation between salient opinion and EU-wide average opinion. In fact, territorial representation in the EU has a clear, independent effect on the opinion-policy linkage.

### *Congruence*

In a second step, I investigate congruence between EU-level policies and the opinion of the majority of citizens in individual member states. The binary dependent variable is '1' if either the opinion majority in a country was against policy change *and* the status quo prevailed, or the opinion majority was in favour of policy change *and* this change occurred. In turn, it is '0' if the opinion majority opposed change which nevertheless occurred, or desired change that did not occur. This yields over 5,000 observations of opinion-policy dyads and reveals that EU-level policy and national opinion were congruent in about 56% of the cases.

Following hypothesis H2 that congruence becomes more likely as the opinion majority in a country and the salience citizens attach to the issue increase, the main interest is in an interaction effect of these two independent variables.<sup>104</sup> *Opinion majority size* measures the amount by which the opinion majority exceeded 50% support for either policy change or no change and is constructed as  $|O_{j,i} - 50\%|$ . In turn, *salience* is operationalised as above, exploiting DK and re-

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<sup>104</sup> Lax and Phillips (2012) argue that the opinion majority size and salience should have independent, direct effects on congruence. If I do not include the interaction term, I do find a highly significant effect of the opinion majority size but not of salience on congruence. However, theoretically the case for an interaction effect is more plausible than for direct effects, since the interaction of both defines representatives' pay-offs from congruence (see equation (1)). Direct effects may be especially unlikely under territorial representation, as representatives cannot directly implement policy (as US state governments can), but have to focus on a few high pay-off issues they can influence through logrolling.

fusal responses. All models include interaction terms of the two variables. In parallel to the analysis of responsiveness, I use dummies for EU competence and decision rule as control variables. Given that the observations are now clustered in countries as well as in policy issues, I use mixed effects logistic regressions with fixed effects for countries (implemented with dummy variables) and a random intercept on the level of policy issues.

The results are reported in *Table 5.5*. The baseline Model C1 shows that there is indeed evidence for a strong interaction effect between opinion majority size and salience. The relevant coefficient is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level). This supports the theoretical idea that representatives will jointly consider the opinion majority *and* the salience of the issue, and engage in negotiation exchanges to bring about congruent policy-making on issues for which the product of both is big. As in the responsiveness analysis, we have to check whether this result could potentially be driven by another form of opinion highly correlated with country-level opinion and salience. The obvious, remaining candidate is the EU-wide version of both. If EU policy-making exclusively reacts to an EU-wide average, country-level opinion and salience may still look as if they had an impact on congruence, simply because they are correlated with EU-wide opinion and salience. Hence, in Model C2 I include a second interaction term that is made up of the EU-wide opinion majority size and salience of an issue. The results show that the interaction term between country-level opinion majority size and salience remains positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction term of the EU-wide average measures is indistinguishable from zero, indicating that overall majority sizes and salience are irrelevant to congruence after having accounted for country-level opinion majorities and salience.

**TABLE 5.5: CONGRUENCE OF POLICY WITH COUNTRY-LEVEL OPINION**

	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3
Opinion majority size	-0.098 (0.056)*	-0.090 (0.056)	-0.106 (0.060)*
Salience	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Opinion majority size x Salience	0.001 (0.001)**	0.001 (0.001)**	0.001 (0.001)**
EU-wide opinion majority size		0.342 (0.366)	
EU-wide salience		0.042 (0.076)	
EU-wide opinion majority size x EU-wide salience		-0.003 (0.004)	
Mixed competence	2.729 (0.974)***	3.345 (1.073)***	
Mainly EU competence	1.728 (1.175)	2.554 (1.274)**	
Unclear decision rule	-0.217 (0.613)	0.303 (0.636)	
Unanimity	-0.322 (0.710)	0.623 (0.776)	
Constant	-0.497 (1.639)	-7.227 (7.098)	3.640 (1.647)**
Fixed effects	Countries	Countries	Questions, Countries
Random effects	Policy issues	Policy issues	
Number of policy issues	167	167	167
Number of countries	27	27	27
N	5,319	5,319	2,554
Log-likelihood	-1544.86	-1540.51	-1213.56

Notes: All are mixed effects logistic regressions, except for 'Model C3' which is fixed only;  
Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

In order to entirely rule out EU-wide average opinion and salience or any other question-level confounders as causes of the results, I re-estimate the first congruence model adding fixed effects for questions (instead of a random effect for policy issues) in Model C3. This estimator is therefore only capturing effects from within-country, within-question variation. Implementing this estimator leads to complete separation for questions on which the opinion majorities


across all countries were either uniformly supporting change or the status quo. Hence, the resulting sample is made up of conflict issues only (compare Model R3 and Model R4 in Table 5.4). It is therefore exactly the sample on which we expect the territorial representation effects to unfold most clearly through log-rolling. In line with this, the results provide for the highest coefficient on the central interaction term across the three models estimated. Recall that in a purely naïve model of the opinion-policy linkage focusing on polity-wide averages we should *not* observe any effects of *country-level* opinion or salience on congruence, once we have removed all between-question variation with fixed effects. This confirms the central thesis of this paper that territorial representation has significant consequences for the opinion-policy linkage.

In *Figure 5.2* I plot the predicted probability of congruence depending on opinion majority size at different levels of salience estimated from Model C3. This demonstrates that when public salience is low (e.g. 15-25% DK/refusal), the probability of congruence is around 50%, irrespective of opinion. But if a policy issue is important to the national public (e.g. 0-10% DK/refusal), the probability of congruence increases from around 50% to about 65-75%, as the opinion majority increases from just about 50% to 95%. Unreported results show that the opinion majority size exerts a statistically significant marginal effect on congruence when the fraction of DK/refusal is  $\leq 17\%$ . This is the case for 72% of the observations in the sample of conflict issues.

In substantive terms this indicates that for around 28% of the policies that are least salient to the national public, the probability of congruence is largely decoupled from opinion on the issue. However, on the remaining more salient policies, a greater majority in opinion significantly increases the probability of congruence between national public opinion and EU-level policies. The magnitude of this effect is about 2-6 percentage points increase in the predicted probability of congruence for 10 percentage points increase in the opinion majority.

Hence, the results provide strong support for hypothesis H2, as congruence is more likely with a greater opinion majority *and* higher salience.

**FIGURE 5.2: INTERACTION BETWEEN OPINION MAJORITY SIZE AND PUBLIC SALIENCE**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines.

## ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

I test the robustness of the results with regard to a number of critical issues. The two most important checks are reported in this section (see *Table 5.6*); several more can be found in Appendix 4.

First, I challenge my assumption from the theory section that bargaining power in EU policy-making is roughly equally distributed among national governments. If this assumption was significantly wrong,  $P_j$  would no longer be analytically irrelevant in inequalities (2) and (3).

**TABLE 5.6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS**

	<b>Model RC1</b>	<b>Model RC2</b>
Opinion majority size	-0.068 (0.100)	0.029 (0.275)
Salience	0.017 (0.020)	-0.087 (0.051)*
Votes	0.141 (0.116)	
Opinion majority size x Salience	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)
Opinion majority size x Votes	-0.005 (0.007)	
Salience x Votes	-0.001 (0.001)	
Opinion majority size x Salience x Votes	0.000 (0.000)	
Implementation lag		-0.003 (0.003)
Opinion majority size x Implementation lag		-0.000 (0.000)
Salience x Implementation lag		0.000 (0.000)
Opinion majority size x Salience x Implementation lag		0.000 (0.000)
Control variables	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Questions	Countries
Random effects	Countries	Policy issues
Number of questions	96	67
Number of countries	27	27
N	2,554	1,789
Log-likelihood	-1239.09	-348.12

*Notes:* Both are mixed effects logistic regressions; Standard errors in parentheses;

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Instead, the effects of salience and opinion would likely vary with bargaining power. Therefore, I consider the most prominent alternative to the equal distribution of power, namely a *regressive* distribution (according to the number of votes per country), which is usually the second-best performing distribution in tests of different variants of the Nash bargaining solution in Council negotiations (see Thomson 2011b). Model RC1 demonstrates that including a three-way

interaction between the opinion majority size, salience, and the number of a country's votes in the Council (e.g. 29 votes for Germany, France, UK, and Italy, and only three votes for Malta) does not yield any statistically significant terms in the congruence analysis. Similarly, in the responsiveness analysis a vote-weighted version of most salient opinion does not perform better than the non-weighted version (see Appendix 4). Hence, we have no evidence that differences in formal voting weights affect the opinion-policy linkage in the EU.

Second, I address concerns about the direction of causality in the opinion-policy linkage. If national governments are able to anticipate negotiation outcomes at the EU level years ahead of implementation, they could potentially send cues to their national public to influence opinion in a direction that is consistent with the expected outcome (e.g. to increase the attention or interest of the public regarding issues that will be implemented in their favour). Governments could more influence opinion than being influenced by it. A problem for this endogeneity story is the time lag between the survey fieldwork and the implementation date. The *longer* the lapse of time, the *less* likely it is that the government in office during survey fieldwork *a)* can anticipate the eventual negotiation outcome at the EU level, and *b)* has an incentive to manipulate opinion, as it may be replaced in due course. Restricting the sample to the 30% of issues on which change occurred (and we therefore know the time lapse), Model RC2 shows that there is no impact of the implementation lag on the congruence analysis. If elite manipulation explained the correlation between opinion and salience at the state level and EU-level policy, we would expect this correlation to be particularly strong if the time lag between the survey and policy implementation is short. The data provides no evidence for this.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> As the implementation time is only known if policy change occurs, no related robustness check could be performed for the responsiveness analysis. For defences of the causality assump-



## CONCLUSION

I have argued that strong territorial representation arrangements in federal systems modify the way in which policy responds to opinion. Where opinion on and salience of policies varies starkly across geographies, and state or constituency representatives have considerable power in policy-making, logrolls and vote-trades may take place that redistribute influence to sub-national publics on an issue-by-issue basis. The publics to which policy-making will respond and be most congruent with are typically those that care a lot about the issue and have a clear opinion on it. My analyses of 167 policy issues (and 201 implementation opportunities) in EU policy-making provide strong empirical evidence for this argument. While I do not directly observe the exchanging of votes between territorial representatives, but rely on substantial evidence of it from existing studies (e.g. Achen 2006a; Aksoy 2012), patterns of responsiveness and congruence strongly follow a territorial logic.

The findings contribute to our substantial knowledge about the role that salience plays for the opinion-policy linkage (Burstein 2006; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004). In particular, they highlight that the popular notion that *higher polity-wide salience means higher responsiveness and congruence to polity-wide opinion* may be too simplistic under territorial representation, even if it may often hold by coincidence. Instead, the findings stress the importance of the distribution of salience and opinion across constituencies, and they suggest that wherever the two are strongly (negatively or positively) correlated, territorial representation may lead to unexpected results. Representatives that fully and only comply with their regional electoral mandates may pass policies that are not favoured by the average citizen and reject policies that are favoured. Certainly, this should not

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tion pertaining to very similar datasets see also the online appendix in Lax and Phillips (2012) and Gilens (2012: 93-96).

suggest that average opinion and salience have no impact under territorial representation, but rather that their effects are complemented by their sub-national equivalents.

This work also contributes to the small but growing literature on the opinion-policy linkage in the EU (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011). It is the first assessment of policy representation on the level of actual, substantive, and specific policies, while previous studies were confined to investigating patterns in rough aggregate measures of policy such as the number of legislative acts. The results challenge the widely held view that the EU system is largely unresponsive to public sentiment (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006). The evidence presented rather suggests that while territorial representation may modify the opinion-policy linkage in the EU, a particular sort of representative logic is at play. Viewed in conjunction with previous findings on the equal distribution of power in the Council, the results create an image of EU politics that starkly differs from a German or Franco-German dominated union. Instead, each national public has an effective chance for representation depending on relative preference intensity.

As I have pointed out, the EU case is a 'most likely case' for the impact of territorial representation, especially as it lacks a fully integrated party system. This poses the question of the generalisability of these findings. From my perspective, US federal policy-making is arguably the case with the next highest likelihood of a significant impact of territorial representation. The Senate (but to some extent also the House) provides for strong representation of territorial interests, logrolling is a common feature of negotiations in Congress (Koford 1982; Stratmann 1992, 1995), and the party system is much less integrated than in most Western European federations. In addition, the polarisation of US politics which we have seen during the last years may have further contributed to substantial opinion and salience differences across the states. Yet, substantial further work is needed to ascertain whether territorial representation only af-

fects the opinion-policy linkage under rather special conditions (the EU case), or whether this also applies to some of the most studied democracies.

The question of the normative implications of territorial representation dynamics in the opinion-policy linkage should also be addressed in more depth. Most importantly, wherever we apply a model of polity-wide median voter representation as a yardstick to evaluate democracy (McDonald and Budge 2005; Powell 2000), territorial representation will potentially confound our findings. While in the literature on federalism the '*demos*-constraining' quality of unit representation in territorial chambers and supermajoritarian decision rules are well-acknowledged (Stepan 1999), the representation literature has engaged less with the consequences: should we assess policy representation in strong federal systems entirely on the basis of polity-wide averages? Or do we have to develop assessment criteria that do more justice to territorial logics? The suggestions I make in this respect (responsiveness to most salient opinion and congruence between constituency-level opinion and federal level policy) are preliminary and need more normatively informed advancements. A crucial aspect in the development of more suitable assessment criteria may be the conditions under which territorial representation leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes, something which has been subject to intense discussion from the viewpoint of the central logrolling mechanism (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Coleman 1966; Koehler 1975; Riker and Brams 1973; Schwartz 1977).

## CONCLUSION

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### *Citizen Representation and Popular Legitimacy in the European Union*

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TO WHAT EXTENT, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS, AND IN WHAT WAY DO PUBLIC preferences influence policy-making in the EU? This broad research question has been addressed from different angles by the four papers of this thesis. As argued in the introduction, this question is highly relevant for the debate on the EU's alleged democratic deficit. Therefore, in this conclusion I first discuss the contributions and limitations of the thesis in light of the democratic deficit debate. Second, I consider the relationship between representation and legitimacy, and explore whether better citizen representation on the 'domestic route' is likely to increase the popular legitimacy of the EU. Third, I briefly highlight the broader contributions of the thesis to research in the fields of representation and coalition politics. Fourth, I point to key areas and tasks for future research on citizen representation in the EU.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE

The papers of this thesis demonstrate surprising patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making with regard to the three assessment criteria tested.

### *Key contributions*

First, Paper 3 provides strong evidence for *mandate fulfilment* by national governments in the Council. Ministers of particular national governments adopt negotiation positions on legislative proposals that reflect the central economic left-right ideology promised by their domestic supporting parties in their election manifestos. However, this pattern of mandate fulfilment is only statistically significant if governments rely on strong executive coordination in EU affairs and, in the case of minority governments, it further hinges on parliamentary oversight in EU affairs. According to Kassim (2013), only 14 of the EU-27 member states have developed structures of centralised executive coordination in EU affairs.<sup>106</sup> Hence, on the basis of the evidence provided, we must infer that significant mandate fulfilment is only realised by governments of these countries, or at least, that the extent of mandate fulfilment realised by them is significantly greater.

Second, Papers 1, 2, and 4 provide strong evidence for various forms of *responsiveness* on the part of national governments in the Council as well as in final EU policy output. On legislative issues concerning left-right ideological conflicts, governments adopt negotiation positions that reflect domestic public opinion, and responsiveness is higher with majoritarian electoral systems and peaks before elections. On legislative issues concerning conflicts over pro-anti integration, governments are not responsive in general but only when domestic opposition parties or EU-related events heighten the salience of EU integration. Then, governments consider public opinion when adopting negotiation positions or voting on such issues in the Council. According to these findings, we

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<sup>106</sup> Denmark as the EU country with regular minority governments relies on strong executive coordination as well as strong parliamentary oversight in EU affairs. The count of 14 is therefore also accurate when considering the role of parliamentary oversight under minority rule.

should expect particularly strong responsiveness from the French and UK governments on left-right issues due to their SMD electoral systems, and from cabinets in countries like Denmark or Ireland on pro-anti integration issues due to their frequent EU referendums. In addition, Paper 4 demonstrates that EU-level policy output is most responsive to the opinion of those national publics that care intensely about a policy issue.

Third, Paper 4 provides strong evidence that the level of *congruence* between EU-level policies and country-level opinion increases with the size of the national opinion majority and the salience national publics attach to the issue. One direct implication that follows is that wherever EU issues are politicised in the sense that they enjoy public resonance, salience, and audience expansion (de Wilde 2011; de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2016), the chance of congruence should increase. Clearly, when the preferences of citizens differ starkly between member states and the issue is equally salient across the EU, there is a real trade-off in citizen representation, as congruence for one half is incongruence for the other. But the evidence from Paper 4 shows that where the salience of a policy varies across the EU, the more ‘politicised publics’ with regard to the issue are more likely to get represented.

### *Implications for the ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit*

These findings have major implications for the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit, in which claims about citizen representation are major contested issues. Importantly, they speak to four of the five elements of the so-called ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit thesis, which are 1) executive dominance in EU affairs, 2) the institutional weakness of the EP, 3) the lack of ‘truly’

European elections, 4) the EU's distance to its voters, and 5) policy drift from voters' preferences (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 534-537).<sup>107</sup>

First, the findings provide evidence with regard to the first element, which is exemplified by claims that 'European integration has meant an increase in executive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 534). The major concern behind this criticism pertains to the image of uncontrolled executives (and their top bureaucrats) who use their wide discretion in Brussels to drift away from their electoral mandates. On the one hand, the evidence presented in Paper 3 supports this suspicion with regard to the criterion of mandate fulfilment. In countries without executive coordination (or, for minority governments, parliamentary oversight) in EU affairs, we find no systematic relationship between the electoral programmes of the parties supporting the government and ministers' adopted policy positions. Ministers seem able to drift away from their mandates in such contexts. On the other hand, the findings stress that ministerial drift is not inevitable: if countries rely on executive and legislative institutional innovations in EU affairs, these institutions effectively constrain ministers to adopt policy positions reflecting central government ideology as promised in parties' manifestos. The thesis therefore provides evidence for the relevance of the executive power claim, but at the same time points to institutional innovations as effective remedies.

In this respect, it is important to note that the evidence suggests that majority governments, in particular, rely more strongly on executive institutions than on

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<sup>107</sup> Throughout, I refer to the standard version of the democratic deficit as presented in Føllesdal and Hix (2006). In later work, Hix (2008) presents the standard version slightly differently by merging components two (weak EP) and three (second-order European elections) and introducing a new component three (lack of electoral contest for EU political office). It is important to be aware that while Føllesdal and Hix (2006) present the standard arguments, they only partially agree with them (see also Hix 2008: 72-76).

legislative institutions to limit ministerial drift and negotiate compromises. In contrast, the existing academic literature as well as the EU's constitutional process have paid most attention to the role of national parliaments (e.g. Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Raunio 1999; Winzen 2013) and considered them potential cornerstones for democratisation (e.g. Auel 2007; Bellamy and Kröger 2014; Rizzuto 2003). I suggest that while parliaments may be important for tackling other aspects of the democratic deficit, the oversight institutions which currently exist may be dispensable for the specific problem of spatial policy drift, except for the rare cases of minority rule. Executive coordination proves empirically more effective in limiting policy drift in mandate fulfilment and substitutes for parliamentary oversight under majority rule. The findings therefore suggest that scholars and, indeed, policy-makers should pay more attention to how executive institutions can improve citizen representation in EU affairs, for instance, through intra- and inter-party monitoring.

Second, the findings, if less directly, also speak to the second and third elements of the standard version: the institutional weakness of the EP and the lack of 'truly European' elections (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 535-536). In terms of the chain of policy representation (see Introduction, Figure 1.1), these points essentially stress that the European route of policy representation – connecting citizens with EU policy-making through European elections, the EP and the Commission – is largely dysfunctional. While the empirical accuracy of this claim is well corroborated,<sup>108</sup> liberal intergovernmentalist sceptics of the democratic deficit thesis have insisted that the deficiencies of the European route can be compensated by the domestic route (Moravcsik 2002). According to their analysis, 'the most fundamental source of the EU's legitimacy lies in the democratic ac-

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<sup>108</sup> This applies particularly to the claim regarding the second-order nature of European elections (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2008; Reif and Schmitt 1980).



countability of national governments', which connect citizens with EU policy-making through national elections and the Council (Moravcsik 2002: 619).

Major advocates of the democratic deficit thesis have acknowledged that '[i]ndirect control via national governments certainly provides some control over EU policy outcomes' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 544). However, they remain critical of whether a system of representation relying almost exclusively on the domestic route is 'sufficiently responsive to the best interests of voters' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545). In particular, they suspect that any relationship between EU policies and citizens' preferences may be more a result of 'happy coincidence' than of reliable mechanisms of democratic accountability (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 556). In their view, EU policy-makers may be 'benevolent but non-accountable rulers', acting broadly in line with citizens' preferences, but with no mechanism ensuring their or their successors' future responsiveness (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545). Such a governance mode of 'benevolent authoritarianism' is observationally hard to distinguish from a 'fully-democratic majoritarian' mode (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 545), particularly if citizens' preferences change little due to a lack of deliberation and party contestation on EU issues. Then, what appears to be responsiveness to the people might merely be the outcome of coincidentally representative elite bargains.

The findings of the thesis challenge the notion of benevolent authoritarianism in important respects. Paper 1 provides evidence that national governments do not behave as typical benevolent rulers in the EU setting, particularly not with regard to left-right issues. If national governments were simply benevolent rulers, we would expect their policy positions to correlate almost invariably with citizens' preferences. But the findings of the paper show that correlations are much stronger before national elections and in SMD electoral systems. This indicates that not happy coincidence but reliable mechanisms of electoral accountability make national governments systematically consider citizens' preferences in Brussels. Moreover, Papers 1, 2, and 4 all highlight that policy posi-

tions as well as final policy output correlate more strongly with citizens' preferences whenever EU issues are publicly salient and are politicised by parties or EU-related events. It is under these very conditions that we would expect citizens' preferences on EU policy-making to be in flux and to be changed by public deliberation and contestation. That such conditions are simultaneously associated with stronger and not weaker correlations between policy-making and citizens' preferences suggests a minimum level of responsiveness instead of pure coincidence.

Interestingly, this has mixed implications for the second and third component of the standard version of the democratic deficit. On the one hand, the findings provide evidence for the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that despite the weakness of the EP, EU policy-making is already in its current state, at least somewhat, 'responsive to the demands of European citizens' (Moravcsik 2002: 605). The domestic route of policy representation is more effective than is often claimed. On the other hand, the findings also support the proposal by a prominent advocate of the deficit thesis that politicisation can help to fix the EU's democracy problem (Hix 2008), at least in terms of strengthening citizen representation. But whereas politicisation is often associated with first-order European elections and political contests over top jobs in the EU institutions, i.e. the European route to representation, the thesis stresses that the public resonance of integration will also make the domestic route more effective.

Lastly, the findings also have implications for the fifth component of the standard version: the claim that the EU produces "policy drift" from voters' ideal policy preferences' to the extent that policies 'are not supported by a majority of citizens in many or even most Member States' (Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 537). While I have indicated that my novel dataset presented in Paper 4 might not be perfectly suited to assessing absolute levels of representation, it is the first dataset available that allows us to check the policy drift claim beyond anecdotal evidence. Hence, while the following numbers on policy drift should be

read with caution, they are presumably the most rigorous evidence available. When the EU adopted a policy change after Eastern enlargement and had previously surveyed citizens' opinion on the issue, change was congruent with opinion in the majority of member states for more than 90% of adopted policies. For about 80% of adopted policies, change was congruent with opinion in at least 20 member states. Indeed, incongruence primarily occurred when the EU did not adopt policies but retained the status quo. In about 65% of those cases, the citizens in a majority of member states would have preferred change. Hence, we can tentatively conclude that during the last decade the EU has been drifting away from citizens' preferences due to a status quo bias rather than policy activism.

In fact, Føllesdal and Hix (2006: 545) have acknowledged that policy drift may be limited and granted that 'policy outcomes from the EU may be relatively close to some abstract European-wide 'median voter''. In this respect, Paper 4 demonstrates that rather than representing an EU-wide median voter, EU policies are most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that care about an issue, i.e. the 'salient national median voter'. According to the argument in the paper, this is probably caused by dynamics of logrolling between territorial representatives. It is therefore most likely to be a consequence of the dominance of the domestic route to representation in the EU. Whilst this is hard to anticipate, several arguments suggest that strengthening the European route of representation, as advocated by some (e.g. Hix 2008), would realign EU policy representation from the salient national median voter to the EU-wide median voter. In particular, a strong, agenda-shaping Commission appointed and elected on the basis of the results of EU-wide elections has clear incentives to consider the EU-wide median voter, instead of the median voters in countries with salient opinion (see also Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh 2014, Chapter 9).

### *Cautionary notes regarding two limitations*

Two important limitations of the findings should be stressed with regard to these implications. First, throughout the thesis it has often been difficult to characterise and assess the exact extent or magnitude of representation. While the thesis enacts the crucial shift from studies that simply count directives (e.g. Bølstad 2015; Toshkov 2011; de Vries and Arnold 2011) to the assessment of the substantive content of policy-making, it often pays a price for this. On the one hand, forcing data on diverse legislative substances into single summative issue dimensions to make them comparable for analysis often leads to rather opaque interpretations of the magnitude of effects. What does a movement of 10 scale points on the DEU policy scale really mean in a real-world context (see Papers 1 and 3)? Is this ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’? On the other hand, where I have been able to use measurement concepts with a more straightforward interpretation, such as issue-specific congruence of opinion and policy (see Paper 4), I faced restrictions from the data-generating process. Is an average rate of congruent policy change of 56% a lot given that the Commission selected the policy issues?

Second and partly as a consequence of this, the findings of the thesis are lacking in comparability between EU-level and national representation. If we apply citizen representation as a nation state standard of democratic legitimacy to the EU, it is of obvious interest to compare the EU’s performance to that of national systems (see also Wimmel 2009; Zweifel 2002). However, as studies use very different data sources and effect magnitudes are hard to interpret (see above), it is virtually impossible to precisely compare the extent of EU representation to the extent of representation found by studies of national systems. I therefore cannot answer the question of whether the EU is doing any worse than the political systems in the member states, let alone how much worse. Yet, it is interesting to note that numerous patterns of policy representation frequently found at the national level are also present at the EU-level: representation is stronger

when policy issues are publicly salient and it varies with the electoral cycle and system as well as executive-legislative relations in EU affairs.

Clearly, both limitations also apply to other, even landmark studies in representation research that have summarised diverse policy substances on abstract issue dimensions (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) and as single-country studies are unable to compare representation across systems (e.g. Gilens 2012; Hakhverdian 2010). Nevertheless, these limitations caution us against making generalised claims about the democratic deficit. Yes, the evidence clearly shows that institutional innovations in EU affairs help to improve mandate fulfilment. But are they effective enough to achieve satisfactory representation, similar to the level of representation in domestic politics? We do not know. Yes, the papers provide evidence that EU policy-makers are not just benevolent rulers, but that they significantly and reliably respond to public demands. But does this responsiveness grant people sufficient control, proportional to their control in domestic politics on similar issues? We do not know. Yes, the evidence clearly suggests that when the EU changes policy, it often does so in congruence with the majority of citizens in most member states, especially in those which care about the policy and have clear-cut opinions about it. But is the EU's level of congruent policy-making similar to that in domestic politics and is the EU's representational bias towards the salient national median voter instead of the polity-wide median voter 'normal' for federal systems? We do not know.

Leaving these cautionary notes aside, my net result is that while less seems to be 'wrong' with the EU as a democratic system than some critics have claimed, the cures they suggest – politicisation and institutional innovations for dealing with EU affairs – prove effective in strengthening citizen representation.

## CITIZEN REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY

For most political actors, and possibly even most academics, improving citizen representation in the EU is not only a goal in itself, but is also associated with the hope of strengthening the EU's democratic legitimacy. In some conceptions of legitimacy, representation is indeed a component part or indicator of legitimacy. For Beetham and Lord (1998), representation is a criterion of the normative principle of popular sovereignty that is at the core of the authors' notion of 'liberal-democratic legitimacy'. However, the authors' emphasis is more on the formal principles underlying the system of representation than on its actual empirical performance. Some accounts of measuring legitimacy use citizens' perceptions of representation as indicators, for instance, whether they think the government or politicians pay attention to the people's views (e.g. Weatherford 1992). Yet, many conceptions separate representation from legitimacy and instead conjecture that a high quality of representation will positively affect legitimacy.

This makes particular sense if legitimacy is conceptualised as *popular (or social) legitimacy*, i.e. citizens' conviction that it is 'rightful and proper' to accept the political regime and abide by its rules (Easton 1965, 1975; Føllesdal 2006; Gilley 2006). In Easton's (1965, 1975) system-theoretical account of politics, the beliefs of citizens regarding legitimacy are one dimension of 'diffuse system support' for the polity. In contrast to specific support that relates to citizens' evaluations of current political decisions, policies, or actions, diffuse system support 'tends to be more durable' (Easton 1975: 444). However, 'over a long time period' diffuse system support may change as 'a product of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance' (Easton 1975: 446). This directly leads to the idea that the representational performance of the EU system could affect its popular legitimacy in the long run: if the EU continually delivers outputs that conflict (or conform) with citizens' preferences, citi-

zens might lose (or gain) belief in the EU's rightful and proper exercise of power over them.<sup>109</sup>

Nevertheless, studies providing empirical evidence for a link between the quality of representation and popular legitimacy are scarce – not only in the case of the EU but in general.<sup>110</sup> A key reason for this is certainly the lack of data on cross-temporal and cross-national variation in the actual quality of representation. Hence, the few existing studies have largely reverted to the 'perceived quality' of representation among citizens. Interestingly, we have some evidence that citizens who believe the EU institutions to take decisions in their interest, or at least think the EU takes account of their voice or that of their country, have more system support for the EU (Ehin 2008; Rohrschneider 2002). An obvious problem of these findings is that they investigate *perceived* rather than *actual* representative performance, and such perceptions may well be endogenous to legitimacy beliefs. This means system support may in fact shape whether respondents perceive EU policy-making to be representative – and not the other way around.

Some limited evidence suggests that citizens who are actually, and not only perceptually, better represented by EU policies more readily support the regime. These studies have focused on respondents' left-right self-placement as an indicator of policy preferences and investigated its relationship to support for the EU. The findings illustrate the effect of policy representation evolving over time: up to the Maastricht Treaty, when EU policy outputs focused on lib-

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<sup>109</sup> This argument loosely connects to Scharpf's (1999) argument that the EU lacks 'output legitimacy'. Yet, in his work the focus is not on how accurately citizens' preferences are reflected in outputs, but on whether the EU retains a basic problem-solving capacity as well as on potential trade-offs between participation and effectiveness.

<sup>110</sup> For a recent study of the impact of congruence on satisfaction with democracy across 25 countries, see Mayne and Hakhverdian (2016).

eralising, unregulated market integration, right-wing citizens were more supportive of the EU than left-wing citizens. But when political integration after Maastricht questioned national identity and sovereignty, right-wing opposition increased too and the relationship became curvilinear (van Elsas and van der Brug 2015). Some research also demonstrates that the effect of left-right preferences on EU support varies between contributor and recipient countries from the EU budget (Lubbers and Scheepers 2010) as well as depending on whether existing domestic policies are more left or right (Hix 2008: 57-63). This suggests that citizens evaluate EU policy output in light of how it conforms to their contextually shaped preferences when forming their EU support.

What can the thesis contribute to this literature? The central advantage of the studies presented here is that they provide an understanding of which national publics should be best represented by EU policy-making, as their countries have the factors strengthening representation on the domestic route. The 'ideal type' country for representing its citizens in EU policy-making has 1) a majoritarian electoral system, 2) strong party emphasis on the EU, 3) high public salience of EU integration due to events such as EU referendums, and 4) strong executive and legislative institutions in EU affairs. The thesis (Paper 4) further shows that the size of a country does not matter for citizens' chance to be represented by EU policy-making. Hence, size can be disregarded as a factor here.

In Appendix 5, I provide a rough and tentative classification of all EU-27 countries with regard to whether they fit the four criteria just outlined. For each criterion I identify the top and bottom countries and assign '1' (top) or '-1' (bottom) and '0' for all others. Summing across the four criteria shows that countries providing rather strong citizen representation on the domestic route should be: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Latvia, and the UK, which come top in one or several of the criteria. In turn, we would predict weak representation for Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Nether-



lands, Romania, and Spain, which come bottom in one or several of the criteria. All other countries are classified with medium representation.

If there were a strong link between actual citizen representation on the domestic route and popular legitimacy, we should expect citizens in countries with strong representation to be more supportive of the EU and its democratic system *ceteris paribus*. While I cannot investigate this relationship in any detail here, I can provide some tentative and explorative evidence. For this purpose, I use two survey items to measure system support on the legitimacy dimension, namely institutional trust in the EU<sup>111</sup> and satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU (taken from the Eurobarometer, for details see Appendix 5). While these indicators have been criticised and are far from perfect, they are probably the best ones readily available and have been used in various studies on democratic legitimacy and democratic deficits (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 1997; Ehin 2008; Hobolt 2012; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Norris 2011a; Rohrschneider 2002).<sup>112</sup>

*Figures 6.1 and 6.2* plot country averages for trust and satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU for the years 2004-2008 (before the global financial


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<sup>111</sup> Easton (1975) distinguishes legitimacy and trust as the two main components of diffuse system support. Hence, trust in the EU could be viewed as measuring a concept distinct from actual legitimacy beliefs. I nevertheless include it here, as in some of the literature it is either treated as an indicator of popular legitimacy (e.g. Ehin 2008; Weatherford 1992), or associated, at least in the form of generalised regime trust, with strengthening citizens' legitimacy beliefs (Norris 2011b).


<sup>112</sup> Some might argue that support for EU membership is essentially also a measure of system support on the legitimacy dimension. While this might partially be the case, I argue that it is primarily a measure of preferences towards integration. However, conducting the same analysis as below with support for membership leads to exactly the same conclusion that there is little relationship to citizen representation.

and Eurozone crises) against averages for the years from 2009 onwards (during the crises). In the case of trust, the figure shows the percentage of respondents who 'tend to trust' the EU. In the case of satisfaction with how democracy works, it shows the percentage of respondents who are 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied'. Countries with strong representation on the domestic route have a filled marker, countries with medium representation an empty marker, and countries with weak representation no marker. As expected, the results show that satisfaction with how democracy works, a more diffuse form of system support, has been more stable during the crisis than trust, a more specific form of system support (Norris 2011b). While both forms of support have decreased rather than increased, the losses in trust are greater than in satisfaction with democracy and the average change between the two time periods is 11 percentage points for trust but only 7 for satisfaction.

**FIGURE 6.1: TRUST IN THE EU AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION**



**FIGURE 6.2: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN THE EU AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION**



*Notes:* AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BU: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom.

Most importantly, both figures show that there is little obvious relationship between the quality of representation on the domestic route and popular legitimacy. In both cases, countries with strong representation are scattered from low levels to high levels of system support, and in both cases, the change in support also appears unrelated to the quality of representation. Countries with weak representation are similarly scattered across the entire range of support. Clearly, these patterns do not rule out the possibility that the quality of representation has an effect on system support, as this might be veiled by various confounding factors. However, it clearly suggests that if such an effect exists, it is not very strong compared to other factors which determine system support.

Hence, we can tentatively conclude that – so far – we have little empirical evidence that strengthening citizen representation, at least on the domestic route, should noticeably strengthen the EU's popular legitimacy. Of course, this neither suggests that representation should not be a democratic aim in itself, nor that strengthening representation on the European route (e.g. institutional change of the EP, Commission) instead of the domestic route would not increase popular legitimacy (see also Beetham and Lord 1998; Hix 2008). But it cautions us not to simply assume that more politicisation of the EU and the diffusion of domestic institutions for managing EU affairs will end the EU's legitimacy crisis.

## FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Besides its contributions to the democratic deficit debate and questions regarding the EU's popular legitimacy, the thesis also makes some broader theoretical and empirical contributions to the fields of representation and coalition politics research.

First, with regard to representation research, the thesis develops new theoretical concepts of responsiveness that could be applied in other contexts in the future: the distinction between *systematic* and *sporadic responsiveness* (Paper 1) highlights the idea that rational political actors will only plan their responsiveness efforts systematically if an issue dimension is reliably salient in elections. If electoral salience is fluctuating, sporadic responsiveness in response to salience shocks is probably sufficient. This distinction may be relevant to many studies that investigate responsiveness on issue dimensions with differing variability in electoral salience. Moreover, by coining the term *signal responsiveness* (Paper 2) the thesis aims to clarify a relevant distinction between responsive legislative behaviour that is effective in changing policies and behaviour that is mainly an expressive signalling tool. It thereby essentially adds a middle category to

Hobolt and Klemmensen's (2008) popular taxonomy of rhetorical (statements, speeches) vs. effective (policy) responsiveness, as signal responsiveness goes 'beyond words' to legislative behaviour, but falls short of policy consequences. In light of its fit with this taxonomy, the term could be used in the future to characterise responsive but outcome-inconsequential roll-call or voting behaviour, for instance, in the US Congress.

Second, to my knowledge the thesis provides the first integrated theoretical and empirical treatment of how territorial representation influences the opinion-policy linkage (Paper 4). While research in the areas of federalism (e.g. Rodden 2006) and political theory (e.g. Rehfeld 2005) has provided impressive accounts of territorial representation, its consequences for policy representation have only superficially been considered but not fully theorised or empirically demonstrated. This contribution of the thesis should therefore support future investigations of the effects of territorial representation in other polities. In particular, the thesis provides a novel dataset on policy representation that methodologically matches existing datasets, especially for the US (e.g. Gilens 2012), and potentially enables future comparisons across polities.

Third, the thesis also contributes to the broader study of coalition politics (Paper 3), in particular on the question of how government support coalitions solve conflicts over policy direction. With regard to theory, it transcends existing models that have pointed either to ministerial discretion or to policy compromises as the mode of coalition policy-making. Instead, these options emerge as different equilibriums in the synthesis model presented, depending on legislative and executive institutions, and indeed ideological divisiveness. Empirically, to my knowledge the paper offers the first study of coalition policy-making that directly observes policies' location in an ideological space, instead of making inferences about ideological location through correlates (such as amendment activity). It also draws on an unprecedented country sample of 22 EU member states. It therefore makes a significant contribution to the field,

challenging and refining some of the central findings in the seminal works of Martin and Vanberg (2011, 2014). In particular, it questions the decisive role of legislative institutions in coalition policy-making.

## AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

While the studies presented here investigate key links on the chain of policy representation in the EU, they are by no means exhaustive. First, with regard to *pathways to representation*, the studies here focus on the domestic route of representation. Future work should also address representation on the European route, and investigate to what extent the EP and the Commission are influenced by citizens' preferences in their legislative activity and what factors strengthen representation on this route. Relevant work on this is emerging but is still rather limited (e.g. Arnold and Sapir 2013; Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh 2014; Lo 2013).

Second, policy representation is arguably not only about whether citizens' substantive preferences are reflected at the stages of policy negotiation and adoption, but also whether legislative activity in the first place is concentrated in areas of *citizens' political priorities*. In fact, substantive congruence and responsiveness may be of less value if the EU acts in areas in which people do not want it to act, and stays out of areas in which people would like to see it active. This is particularly pertinent in the EU's multilevel system, since recent research shows that citizens' issue priorities for EU politics differ in non-trivial ways from their priorities for the national level (Bevan, Jennings, and Wlezien 2016). Future research could therefore address the question of the extent to which citizens' priorities are represented by the political and legislative agendas of the EU institutions. Explorative work on the 'agenda responsiveness' of the Council to public priorities was recently conducted by Alexandrova, Rasmussen, and Toshkov (2016).

Third, future work on the EU's chain of policy representation could speak to the issue of *social inequality in representation*, which is extensively discussed in the current US literature (e.g. Bartels 2009; Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2005, 2012). Are affluent citizens better represented by EU policy-making than the less educated and the poor? Are there gender or age gaps in representation in the EU? On a basic level, these questions can be answered with the dataset provided in Paper 4. It will therefore soon be possible to investigate the question of social inequality in EU representation.

Fourth and probably most pressingly, future studies should address the issue of *causal identification*. As I have discussed in the introduction, causal identification is a central challenge in the literature on policy representation. The studies in this thesis do provide important evidence for bottom-up dynamics, but they fall short of employing popular methods of causal inference such as vector autoregression models, or difference-in-differences and synthetic control. All these methods that would allow us to identify causality more convincingly would have to rely on time-series data of public preferences and policy-making. Creating time-series measures of policy-making (e.g. governmental policy positions, policy output) is therefore a primary task for future work. One other alternative for causal identification might be field experiments, but these are difficult – if not impossible – to implement with top-level politicians and officials as experimental subjects.

Fifth, for the field of political theory, the thesis poses the question of whether the *traditional assessment criteria of representation* are adequate in the case of the EU, and to what extent they might have to be amended. While the thesis demonstrates that they can in principle be applied to the case, it also highlights unresolved questions. For instance: is it normatively justifiable (or even preferable) that EU policies reflect the preferences of the salient national median voter (those national publics that care about an issue) rather than of an EU-wide median voter? If yes, then a revised criterion of congruence as the match between

EU-level policies and 'salient opinion' is adequate. If not, other criteria might be preferred.

Looking beyond the chain of representation, this conclusion has also highlighted that we only have a very limited empirical understanding of whether and under what conditions citizen representation enhances popular legitimacy. The widespread conjecture that representation leads to public support is probably more routed in a *déformation professionnelle* of political scientists who believe in the power of democracy than in the available, weak empirical evidence. Irrespective of the answer, crucial evidence as to whether EU-level representation improves the union's legitimacy or not would move various debates in the field into new directions.



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## APPENDIX 1

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This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 1.

### *Suitability of the DEU dataset*

The DEU dataset is ideally suited to this application, in particular, as the weaknesses of DEU are not relevant to the analyses presented here. DEU has primarily been used to test competing bargaining models and this particular usage has been criticised. At the heart of the critique is the sensitivity of such tests to measurement error (Slapin 2013) as well as problems with post-diction – the idea that interviewees who knew the outcome of negotiations could reconstruct actors’ initial positions so as to fit them to the known outcome (Bueno de Mesquita 2004). However, even critics remark that these weaknesses are limited to certain usages of the dataset (Slapin 2013: 13).

First, post-diction is no problem in the context of this analysis as it actually makes the data less likely to have a public opinion bias. As interviews with DEU experts were conducted months and years after the legislative negotiations, it is unlikely that interviewees would be capable of using public opinion at the time preceding the negotiations as a cue to reconstruct governments’ positions. This would demand at least two implausible assumptions to hold: 1) Experts would have to have a better cross-national and cross-time recollection of fluctuations in public opinion than of governments’ positions in the negotiations. 2) Experts would have to have an intuitive understanding that what mat-

ters is opinion (six months) prior to the issuing of the proposal and not opinion during the actual negotiations.

Second, in order to ameliorate any potential biases from post-diction, I exclude from the analysis all DEU issues for which the experts interviewed were not able to report at least one third of national governments' positions. Such large gaps indicate that experts found it difficult to reconstruct positions and may have used cues instead of actual knowledge of positions in their assessments. In some cases, it might also indicate that the identification of the legislative issue as a 'key controversy' was inappropriate in the first place. Importantly, these issues only represent 2.5% of the observations on the left-right and 1.7% of the observations on the pro-anti integration dimension.

Third, concerns about homoscedastic measurement error are not particularly pressing for this application as such errors affect all government positions equally, which are measured as single point estimates. In contrast, it is problematic in applications comparing bargaining models in which actors' positions are measured with varying accuracy (e.g. weighted average of government positions for Council but single point estimates for Commission and EP).

### *Category scheme*

The category scheme for classifying DEU issues on the two dimensions was developed to closely reflect citizens' understanding of the substantive content of the left-right and the pro-anti integration dimension. This promises a close substantive correspondence between the available opinion measures and the substance of the DEU issues.

The existing literature on the substantive meaning of the left-right self-placement and the membership question was the guiding principle in constructing the scheme (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007; Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997; Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug 2012; Neumayer 2004;

Skrentny 1993; Thalmann 2004; de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013). This inductive-empirical approach might sometimes diverge from a political scientist's understanding of the dimensions. For instance, according to the category scheme the protection of civil rights is assumed to be 'left' as research shows that citizens placing themselves left are more likely to support such values (Cohrs et al. 2005, 2007). However, more deductive approaches might view support for civil rights as 'right'.

*Table A1.1* provides an overview of the categories and the share of issues coded into each (if issues were coded into more than one category, they are displayed in the more prevalent category here). The full scheme with coding instructions will be made available after peer-reviewed publication of Paper 1 or Paper 3 of this thesis.

**TABLE A1.1: OVERVIEW OF DEU CATEGORY SCHEME**

Category	Description	Number of DEU issues
1: Consumer Protection vs. Freedom of Businesses (left-right)	Defining new or redefining existing rights and obligations between consumer and producer of goods or services (e.g. warranty, repairs); Prohibiting or legalising the sale of potentially harmful products or the use of potentially harmful substances and components ...	45 (13.6%)
2: Environmental Protection vs. Freedom of Businesses (left-right)	Increasing or decreasing product or processing standards that are intended to protect the environment (e.g. water use, air pollution, climate, waste management); Defining or redefining rules that impact on the protection of wild animals or breeding animals ...	57 (17.2%)
3: Economic Regulation vs. Freedom of Businesses (left-right)	Regulating or intervening in markets by discouraging or prohibiting certain activities (e.g. in order to make businesses work better, restructure competition, fight monopoly/cartel power) or deviating from free market principles (e.g. price competition, freedom of mergers & acquisitions) ...	19 (5.74%)
4: Employees' Rights vs. Other Interests (left-right)	Defining or redefining standards for the organisation of work (e.g. wage, hours, safety); Entitling or disentitling employees of rights or benefits (e.g. unionisation, social security rights) ...	9 (2.72%)
5: Protectionism vs. Free Trade (left-right)	Opening up or closing markets to European or international competitors ...	13 (3.93%)

6: Equality vs. Acceptance of Inequality (left-right)	Affirming or undermining equal rights for all individuals irrespective of social class, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, or sexual orientation; Increasing or decreasing spending to reduce inequalities (e.g. spending on education, social welfare of the weak) ...	10 (3.02%)
7: Immigration vs. Fortress Europe (left-right)	Changing the status of foreign nationals from outside the EU; Relaxing or tightening visa requirements and procedures for foreign nationals from outside the EU (e.g. visa requirement, information collection about visa applicants, ...) ...	10 (3.02%)
8: Civil and Human Rights vs. Fight against Crime (left-right)	Defining and redefining rules concerning the collection, storage, and use of privacy data of individuals (e.g. private communications data, personal information); Defining and redefining rules concerning public access to government documents and information ...	17 (5.14%)
9: Harmonisation vs. National Standards (pro-anti integration)	Harmonising or retaining national standards and rules; Defining or not defining EU-wide minimum standards or targets; Allowing or prohibiting deviations/derogations from EU rules and benchmarks ...	29 (8.76%)
10: Wide vs. Narrow Scope (pro-anti integration)	Including previously unaffected areas (e.g. substance area not covered so far), objects (e.g. particular goods not covered) or subjects (e.g. previously unaffected group of businesses, people, ...) in the application of EU legislation, rules, or practices ...	18 (5.44%)
11: EU vs. Member State Authority (pro-anti integration)	Extending or restricting the rights (e.g. decision-making, monitoring, sanctioning) of the European Commission vis-à-vis the member states (incl. the European Council); Increasing or decreasing the visibility of the EU and its institutions ...	25 (7.55%)
12: Speeding Up vs. Blocking of EU Legislation (pro-anti integration)	Speeding up, subjecting to conditions (e.g. awaiting other outcomes), or postponing legislation's entry into force or its implementation in an area where the EU has not been active (e.g. new proposal) ...	6 (1.81%)
UNCLASSIFIED	Relates to none of the other categories (e.g. relates to geographical cleavages, inter-institutional issues, entirely technical issues, conflicts of interest between businesses)	73 (22.05%)
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>331 (100%)</b>

If an issue was coded into any category between 1 and 8, it was included for the analysis of left-right issues. In turn, if it was coded in any category between 9 and 12 it was included in the analysis of pro-anti integration issues. The inter-coder reliability for the binary variable indicating whether an issue related to any left-right or any pro-anti integration category was assessed on the basis of

Krippendorff's alpha. This reveals satisfactory levels of reliability with  $\alpha = 0.88$  for the left-right dimension and  $\alpha = 0.73$  for the pro-anti integration dimension.

### *Descriptive statistics and variable definitions*

Table A1.2 displays all descriptive statistics of all variables used in the main analyses (Table 2.1 + Table 2.2 + Table 2.3 in the paper). The statistics were calculated by pooling observations on both dimensions (left-right and pro-anti integration). The last column indicates the data source used as well as transformations and interpolations applied.

**TABLE A1.2: OVERVIEW OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS**

Variable	Mean	SD	Max	Min	Source / Definition
Left-right position	51.11	44.98	0.00	100.00	DEU <sup>113</sup> , linearly transformed
Integration position	53.34	45.80	0.00	100.00	DEU, linearly transformed
Left-right opinion	5.30	0.35	4.35	6.46	Eurobarometer (left-right self-placement), average by country applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated on the day level, six-month lag from proposal date
Pro-anti integration opinion	0.43	0.21	-0.16	0.84	Eurobarometer (support for EU membership), average by country applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated on the day level, six-month lag from proposal date
Government left-right position	-2.34	12.32	-23.22	32.71	CMP <sup>114</sup> (RILE), seat-weighted average of cabinet parties at last election

<sup>113</sup> Thomson et al. (2006, 2012).

<sup>114</sup> Lehmann et al. (2015). Government parties were identified with the help of the ParlGov database (see Döring and Manow 2012).

Government pro-anti integration position	2.59	2.11	-0.19	9.91	CMP (per108-per110), seat-weighted average of cabinet parties at last election
Days to elections	8.20	4.57	-0.04	18.21	ParlGov <sup>115</sup> (100 day units to next scheduled legislative election assuming four or five year terms), corrected
District magnitude (ln)	2.57	1.24	0.00	5.01	Author's own assignment <sup>116</sup> , natural log transformation
Party emphasis (EU)	-0.29	1.65	-4.54	4.35	CMP <sup>117</sup> (per108+per110), simple average of opposition parties accounting for changes in government composition, linearly interpolated, difference between proposal date and four years before
EU event	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	Author's own assignment, six months before and after national referendums on integration, final ratification of EU treaties, accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, elections to the EP; during the six-month period of Council presidency as well as three months before and after Council presidency
Net receipts from EU budget	0.34	1.05	-0.85	3.59	<a href="http://www.money-go-round.eu">www.money-go-round.eu</a> , net receipts from EU budget (receipts – payments) in % of GDP
Unemployment	7.80	3.51	2.30	22.50	World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in %
Inflation	2.40	1.49	-0.14	12.35	World Bank (change in consumer prices), yearly rate in %
Economic freedom	7.14	0.73	4.93	8.60	Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the World, area 'Regulation') <sup>118</sup> , yearly and linearly interpolated where necessary
Party emphasis (LR)	1.03	7.05	-29.78	23.39	CMP (RILE), simple average of opposition parties accounting for changes in government composition, linearly interpolated,

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<sup>115</sup> Döring and Manow (2012).

<sup>116</sup> Based on concept by Johnson and Wallack (2005). Details of coding are available upon request.

<sup>117</sup> Opposition parties were identified with the help of ParlGov.

<sup>118</sup> Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013).

					difference between proposal date and four years before
Public sali- ence (LR)	2.16	0.79	0.90	5.21	Relative frequency of words from Laver-Garry dictionary (sum of categories '+State+', '=State=', and '-State-') in country reports of the most salient political issues in <i>The Political Data Yearbook</i> , yearly
Public sali- ence (EU)	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	Author's own assignment, based on country reports of the most salient political issues in <i>The Political Data Yearbook</i> , yearly

### Left-right position and integration position

The measure of government's initial negotiation positions on a legislative proposal is taken from the DEU dataset directly (March 2012 version). Wherever necessary the policy scales of 0-100 were linearly transformed so as to ensure that the most 'right' and the most 'integrationist' option advocated by any government in the estimation sample were represented by 100.

### Left-right and pro-anti integration opinion

I base my measures of left-right and pro-anti integration opinion on questions in the biannual Standard Eurobarometer survey series of the European Commission. For left-right opinion I use the respondent's ideological self-placement item. The exact wording of the question is:

*'In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale?'*

I assign the following codes to the response options:

*Left = 1*

2

3



4

5

6

7

8

9

*Right* = 10

*DK / Refused / etc.* = .

For pro-anti integration I use the question on support for EU membership.  
The exact wording is:

Once a country is an EU member:

*'Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Union (European Community) is ... ?'*

Before a country is an EU member:

*'Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Union will (would) be ... ?'*

I assign the following codes to the response options:

*'A good thing'* = 1

*'A bad thing'* = -1

*'Neither good nor bad'* = 0

*DK / Refused / etc.* = .

In each case, the measure of opinion is the average of all valid responses by country using sampling weights. I assign this measure to the day on which fieldwork for the survey started, and linearly interpolate values between sur-

veys. To represent the causal relationship, in which opinion influences national delegations' positioning, I use opinion six months prior to the date on which the proposal was submitted to the Council.

#### Government left-right and pro-anti integration position

I measure the governments' ideological position on left-right and pro-anti integration from the CMP's<sup>119</sup> coding of election manifestos by seat-weighting the government parties' positions on each dimension. As the measure for left-right I use the CMP's RILE concept as the difference between the percentages of 'rightist' and 'leftist' quasi-sentences:

*Government left – right position*

$$= \sum_{i=1}^N [(per104_i + \dots + per606_i) - (per103_i + \dots + per701_i)] * \frac{S_i}{S_T}$$

Analogously, I measure the governments' pro-anti integration position as the difference between the percentages of positive and negative quasi-sentences on EU integration<sup>120</sup>:

$$Government\ integration\ position = \sum_{i=1}^N [per108_i - per110_i] * \frac{S_i}{S_T}$$

Where  $i$  denotes the respective government party,  $N$  is the number of government parties,  $S_i$  is the number of seats of party  $i$ , and  $S_T$  the total number of governmental seats. The measures are based on the party manifesto issued at the last election preceding the legislative proposal.

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<sup>119</sup> See Lehmann et al. (2015). All CMP-based measures are derived using the '2015a' version of the database.

<sup>120</sup> per108: 'European Community/Union: Positive'; per110: 'European Community/Union: Negative'

### Days to elections

I operationalise the distance to the next scheduled legislative election in 100 day units. After elections in countries with four-year terms, I count down from 1460 days, and from 1825 days for countries with five-year terms. Five-year terms were applied in Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, and the United Kingdom during the period of investigation.

### District magnitude

To characterise electoral systems on a majoritarian versus a proportional continuum, I use a measure of district magnitude from the perspective of the average legislator (see Johnson and Wallack 2005). In order to account for outliers, I use the natural log of district magnitude. This measure runs from 0 for the UK and France to about 5 for the Netherlands and Slovakia. The source data can be obtained from the author upon request.

### Party emphasis

The operationalisation of change in party emphasis is based on the CMP and follows Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil (2016). For pro-anti integration I take the simple average percentage of quasi-sentences which opposition parties devote to European integration<sup>121</sup>:

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<sup>121</sup> One problem with using manifesto data for measuring emphasis on European integration is that on some occasions European elections occurred together with national elections, which normally yields an artificially increased level of attention paid to EU integration. I have estimated this effect on a sample from 1989 to 2014 and deducted it from the measure. However, not applying this correction yields the same results in Paper 1 (Model B2 in Table 2.2) and Paper 2 (Model 3 in Table 3.2).

$$Party\ emphasis\ (EU) = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{[per108_i + per110_i]}{N}$$

Analogously, for left-right I use the simple average of the percentage of quasi-sentences which opposition parties devote to the CMP's RILE coding categories:

$$\begin{aligned} Party\ emphasis\ (LR) \\ = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{[(per104_i + \dots + per606_i) + (per103_i + \dots + per701_i)]}{N} \end{aligned}$$

Where  $i$  denotes the respective party and  $N$  is the number of opposition parties. I linearly interpolate this measure between elections and government changes, and use the difference between party emphasis on the proposal date and four years before as the measure of change in party emphasis.

As described in the paper, I use change in emphasis rather than emphasis itself, as I expect governments to increase their responsiveness when parties mobilise the issue ('sporadic mode'). This idea is less reflected in the level than in the change in emphasis.

### EU events

The measure of EU-related events is a dummy variable that is '1' six months before and after national referendums on integration, final ratification of EU treaties (ratification date of last national parliament), accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, elections to the EP. It is also '1' during the six-month period in which a country holds the Council presidency as well as three months before and after the presidency.

### Public salience

The alternative measures of public salience of left-right and pro-anti integration are based on content-analysing country reports on the most important political issues on a country's agenda from *The Political Data Yearbook*, published annually by the European Journal of Political Research. For left-right I apply automated content analysis using the Laver-Garry dictionary for policy positions. The measure of public salience of left-right issues is the relative frequency of words from the following dictionary categories: '+State+', '=State=', and '-State-'. While this is arguably a crude measure of the public salience of left-right conflicts, it has good face validity. For instance, one among the 10 highest values observed on this measure occurs in Sweden in 2007, the year in which the new Reinfeldt cabinet delivered key components of its right-wing reform programme including property tax reform and cuts to sickness and unemployment benefits.

For pro-anti integration, I searched each report for the words 'EU' or 'Europe\*' and determined whether the country expert reported any aspect of EU integration that was a salient political issue in the respective year. Wherever at least one aspect of EU integration was reported as salient, the dummy variable is '1' for the entire year. The coding revealed that EU-related events (in particular, referendums, discussions about adopting the euro, and Council presidencies) are key triggers of public salience. However, in some cases events such as European elections or the introduction of the euro currency were mentioned, but experts stressed that they passed without receiving any public attention ('0' was assigned). This illustrates the point that EU-related events themselves are often a good proxy for public salience of integration but not in all cases. Yet, the measure of public salience based on expert reports is arguably less exogenous to governments' behaviour than EU-related events. Therefore, it is important to stress that all measures show the same interaction effect with public opinion.

### *Missing data*

The CMP measures are the only source of missing values in the main analyses.<sup>122</sup> I use the ParlGov database to ascertain which parties entered parliament and government (defined as representation in the cabinet). While the ParlGov database provides direct links to the CMP, these links often result in a high degree of missing values on the CMP, e.g. when parties do not issue individual manifestos, or when parties change parliamentary fractions, split, or unite during the legislative term. In order to recover the policy positions in such instances, I employ a number of strategies. In the case of party splits, I assigned the new party/fraction the CMP measures of its 'mother' as long as no new manifesto was available. In the case of electoral alliances issuing a common manifesto, all parties were assigned the related CMP measures. In case of party/fraction mergers, I assigned the CMP measures of the largest party to all parties from the recording date of mergers in the ParlGov database. In the case of marginal parties, I researched whether they sat together with a larger party or supported this party throughout their history. If this was the case, I assigned the CMP measure of the larger party. I also added several links between ParlGov and CMP that were missed by the ParlGov team (e.g. when a manifesto was coded by CMP but the CMP code was missing in the ParlGov database).

With regard to government position measures (on left-right and pro-anti integration), I am able to recover complete CMP measures covering all government parties for about 95% of the observations on each dimension. In about 2% of the cases, single or few cabinet parties were not covered by the CMP, but these parties consistently represented a negligible proportion of less than 10% of

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<sup>122</sup> This applies to the main models in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 in the paper. In addition, there are also some missing values for the measures of public salience from *The Political Data Yearbook* reports.

the government's seats. Hence, I simply assigned the CMP measures of the remaining government parties. Ultimately, I was left with only 2.6 – 3.1% missing values on the government positions from Malta and Latvia. Malta is not included in the CMP so far, whilst the 2006 elections are missing for Latvia.

In terms of the change in opposition parties' emphasis on both issue dimensions, I recover the positions of parties representing more than 95% of all opposition seats for about 87% of the observations on both dimensions at the date the proposal was transferred to the Council as well as four years prior to that data. Moreover, wherever an election was coded, the available CMP measures cover parties representing more than 70% of the opposition seats. Hence, I decided to ignore missing values on single opposition parties.<sup>123</sup> In total, this leaves 3 – 3.5% of missing values on the measures of change in party emphasis from elections not yet coded by the CMP.

### *Additional robustness checks*

In addition to the robustness checks included in the paper (see Table 2.3 in the paper), I address two kinds of further concerns here. All results are reported in *Tables A1.3 + A1.4* for the left-right and pro-anti integration dimension respectively.

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<sup>123</sup> In particular, I checked that in the cases with the most missing values (e.g. more than 25% of opposition seats) the opposition parties not coded were not anti-EU parties and did not have any other outlier status. In the case of caretaker governments that had no clear opposition (e.g. Dini in Italy), I interpolated the measure between the last identifiable set of opposition parties before the caretaker and the next set of parties after the caretaker government. Excluding caretaker governments leaves the results on the interaction term between party emphasis and pro-anti integration opinion unchanged.

First, I address concerns regarding the lag length of the public opinion measures. These are twofold. On the one hand, the claim that governments respond to public opinion may be problematic if different lags of public opinion are so highly correlated that the same results can be obtained with virtually any lag length of opinion (e.g. two years). Then, one could not speak of a timely ‘response’ anymore. On the other hand, if my results hinge on the six-month lag and entirely break down at other, similar lag lengths, this might potentially indicate a chance finding instead of actual responsiveness. Models A1 to A3 and B1 to B3 re-estimate the main models from the paper using current opinion, a one-year lag, and an 18-month lag. They provide evidence that the first concern is unfounded. On each dimension, all results break down with an unreasonably long 18-month lag, which is evidence that the ‘true’ lag in government responsiveness may be between zero and 12 months. However, while results partially hold for pro-anti integration with current opinion and the one-year lag, on left-right issues the central interaction terms are not statistically significant with any other lag length than six months. At least, the coefficients always point in the expected direction and some effects are close to significance.<sup>124</sup> In addition, the direct effect of opinion is strongest for current opinion and weakest for the 18-month lag, which is in line with expectations. Taken together with the results from different lag lengths on pro-anti integration, neither concern seems pressing.

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<sup>124</sup> Unreported models also show that when using the binary version of the dependent variable, the interaction between public opinion and the days to the next election is weakly significant (at the 10% significance level) using current opinion as well as a one-year lag, but is insignificant using the 18-month lag.



**TABLE A1.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION**

	<b>Model A1</b>	<b>Model A2</b>	<b>Model A3</b>	<b>Model A4</b>	<b>Model A5</b>	<b>Model A6</b>
Left-right opinion	35.542 (16.542)**	30.504 (18.337)	6.113 (19.092)	46.245 (15.041)***	16.420 (8.440)*	12.890 (4.834)***
Days to election	3.627 (2.089)*	6.167 (3.698)	3.608 (3.165)	4.724 (2.692)*	5.574 (2.436)**	6.130 (2.667)**
Left-right opinion x Days to election	-0.654 (0.383)	-1.138 (0.688)	-0.661 (0.587)	-0.850 (0.495)*	-1.024 (0.450)**	-1.125 (0.496)**
District magnitude (ln)	31.218 (28.687)	0.599 (33.549)	5.934 (33.719)	44.723 (18.776)**		
Left-right opinion x District magnitude (ln)	-6.664 (5.433)	-0.815 (6.407)	-2.150 (6.584)	-9.178 (3.581)**		
Lijphart threshold					-5.459 (2.069)**	
Left-right opinion x Lijphart threshold					1.122 (0.397)***	
Majoritarian						-47.540 (28.576)*
Left-right opinion x Majoritarian						9.733 (5.798)*
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues
Random effects						Countries
Number of policy issues	172	172	172	172	172	172

Number of countries	26	26	26	26	26	26
N	2,965	2,906	2,859	2,965	2,965	2,965
Robustness check	Current opinion	One-year lag of opinion	18-month lag of opinion	Days to elections that really occurred	Lijphart's effective electoral threshold	Majoritari- an / Mixed / PR sys- tem

*Notes:* All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**TABLE A1.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS ON PRO-ANTI INTEGRATION DIMENSION**

	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3	Model B4	Model B5	Model B6	Model B7
Pro-anti integration opinion	10.761 (15.430)	-20.873 (22.848)	-1.165 (19.340)	9.976 (21.669)	6.312 (21.457)	9.419 (21.639)	19.677 (19.820)
Party emphasis (EU)	-1.684 (1.969)	-2.676 (1.443)*	-1.523 (1.536)	-3.104 (1.592)*	-3.449 (1.725)*	-1.761 (1.070)	-3.077 (1.280)**
Pro-anti integration opinion x Party emphasis (EU)	6.110 (4.303)	7.907 (3.874)*	5.101 (3.744)	11.185 (4.326)**	10.591 (3.469)***	6.373 (2.922)**	9.405 (3.247)***
EU event	-18.243 (6.896)**	-16.292 (7.623)**	-14.272 (7.993)*	-16.078 (7.027)**	-16.339 (6.959)**	-16.670 (7.244)**	
Pro-anti integration opinion x EU event	30.284 (12.784)**	27.330 (13.859)*	23.065 (14.468)	26.856 (13.009)**	27.757 (12.444)**	27.555 (13.312)**	
Council presidency							-15.627 (8.835)*
Pro-anti integration opinion x Council presidency							32.561

							(18.724)*
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries	Policy issues, countries
Number of policy issues	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
Number of countries	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
N	1,448	1,448	1,442	1,448	1,442	1,448	1,448
Robustness check	Current opinion	One-year lag of opinion	18-month lag of opinion	Three- year change in party emphasis	Five-year change in party emphasis	Seat- weighting for party emphasis	Council presiden- cy event

*Notes:* All are fixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures;  
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Second, I test the sensitivity of the results with regard to alternative measurements/operationalisations for the four moderators of responsiveness. In Model A4 I re-assess hypothesis LR-H1 on electoral cycle effects by operationalising the days to the next election that really *occurred* instead of the days to the next *scheduled* election. This addresses the concern that after early elections are announced, governments will not care about the end of the regular legislative term but about the dates of the early election. However, this operationalisation is necessarily less adequate for the time before early elections are announced, when governments may not anticipate that the regular term will not be completed. Importantly, the results are similar with both operationalisations. With regard to hypothesis LR-H2 I test two alternative measures of electoral systems. Model A5 uses Arend Lijphart's measure of the effective electoral threshold and Model A6 uses a variable that is '2' for pure SMD systems (France, UK), '1' for mixed systems without correction (Lithuania), and '0' for PR.<sup>125</sup> Both measures yield qualitatively the same results.

With regard to hypothesis EU-H1, the decision to operationalise the change in opposition emphasis on integration over four years may appear arbitrary. Hence, in Models B4 + B5 I use the change over three and five years respectively to assess the sensitivity of the choice of four years. In Model B6 I also use the change over four years but calculate it as the seat-weighted average across all parliamentary opposition parties instead of simple averaging. All three models entirely confirm the results from the paper and demonstrate that they are not sensitive to such choices. Last, regarding hypothesis EU-H2, my coding of ma-

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<sup>125</sup> Lijphart's threshold calculates as  $Eff.\ threshold = \frac{75\%}{m+1}$ , where  $m$  is the average district magnitude (in my case from the perspective of the average legislator). This measure has been used in some key works to characterise the majoritarian vs. proportional continuum (see e.g. Boix 1999). In Model A6, I use a random effect for countries instead of fixed effects as the variable for electoral systems is time-invariant within countries.

major events related to integration may capture other factors than increased public salience of EU integration. This is best illustrated with regard to European elections, which turn the dummy variable '1' for all countries for an entire year. Clearly, this event could easily be confounded with other year-level factors, such as economic growth in Europe or certain kinds of proposals the European Commission might put forward in such years. Therefore, I re-estimate the results in Model B7 with a simple dummy for whether a country held the presidency of the Council. The advantage of the presidency event is that it only occurs in one country at a time and in an arbitrary order that is very unlikely to be related to any unobservable factors across the data. Even with this single type of event, the interaction is positive and significant at the 10% level.

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## APPENDIX 2

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This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 2.

### *Summary statistics*

The following tables display summary statistics. *Table A2.1* illustrates what fraction of the voting data is excluded due to our selection of policy areas. It shows votes per policy area from 1999 to October 2011.

**TABLE A2.1: VOTES PER POLICY AREA (1999-2011)**

Policy area	Votes	%	Cum %
Agriculture and fisheries	12,492	27.82	27.82
Budget	1,014	2.26	30.08
Civil liberties, justice and home affairs	6,098	13.58	43.66
Constitutional affairs and administration	677	1.51	45.17
Development and international trade	981	2.19	47.36
Economic and financial affairs	7,302	16.26	63.62
Employment, education, culture and social affairs	2,745	6.11	69.74
Environment and energy	4,751	10.58	80.32
Foreign and security policy	409	0.91	81.23
Internal market and consumer affairs	4,719	10.51	91.74
Transport and telecommunications	3,709	8.26	100.00
Total number of votes	44,897	100	

*Table A2.2* displays summary statistics for all variables included in the mixed effects logistic regression models based on the estimation sample for Models 1-3 in Table 3.2 in the paper.

**TABLE A2.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Opposition vote	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00
Public opinion	0.44	0.19	-0.05	0.85
Party emphasis (EU)	-0.39	1.52	-4.71	5.65
Government pro-anti integration position	2.23	1.72	-0.19	9.91
Government left-right position	-2.51	11.73	-23.22	32.71
Net receipts from EU budget	0.35	1.11	-0.95	5.34
Unemployment	7.59	3.30	1.80	21.80
Inflation	2.62	1.93	-4.48	12.35
Co-decision	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Post-enlargement	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00
Rotating presidency	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
N	17,176			

### *Variable definitions and sources*

*Table A2.3* provides an overview of all variables used in the main model in Table 3.2 of the paper, their definition, and source as well as the extent of missing values.

**TABLE A2.3: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS**

Variable	Source / Definition	Missing values
Opposition vote	'1' for 'No' or 'Abstain', '0' for 'Yes'	0
Public opinion	Eurobarometer (support for EU membership), average by country applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated on the day level, six-month lag from vote date	0
Party emphasis (EU)	CMP <sup>126</sup> (per108+per110), simple average of opposition parties accounting for changes in government composition, linearly interpolated, difference between vote date and four years before	1,596
Government pro-anti integration position	CMP <sup>127</sup> (RILE), seat-weighted average of cabinet parties at last election	983
Government left-right position	CMP (per108-per110), seat-weighted average of cabinet parties at last election	983
Net receipts from EU budget	<a href="http://www.money-go-round.eu">www.money-go-round.eu</a> , net receipts from EU budget (receipts – payments) in % of GDP	0
Unemployment	World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in %	0
Inflation	World Bank (change in consumer prices), yearly rate in %	0
Co-decision	'1' for co-decision procedure, '0' otherwise	0
Post-enlargement	'1' from 1 <sup>st</sup> of May 2004, '0' otherwise	0
Rotating presidency	'1' for presidency country at vote date, '0' otherwise	0

### Opposition vote

The EU Council voting data analysed in this paper is part of an original dataset collected over a number of years and continuously updated as information becomes available from the Council's public records. As the Council records

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
<sup>126</sup> Lehmann et al. (2015). Opposition parties were identified with the help of the ParlGov database (see Döring and Manow 2012).

<sup>127</sup> Government parties were identified with the help of ParlGov.



vary in format and presentation of information, the dataset has been manually collected. The data is used for academic research purposes while also forming the basis for the reporting on legislative activities in the Council by VoteWatch Europe ([www.votewatch.eu](http://www.votewatch.eu)), a transparency organisation based in Brussels. The information covered by the dataset is publicly available (see [www.votewatch.eu](http://www.votewatch.eu)) and is collected from three different sources: the Council of the European Union's register ([www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu)), EURLEX ([www.eur-lex.europa.eu](http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu)) and from the EP's Legislative Observatory (OEIL) ([www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil)). The latter has been used for additional information if details were omitted from the Council documents.

**FIGURE A2.1: PERCENTAGE OF OPPOSITION VOTES BY COUNTRY (1999-2013)**



*Notes:* at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxembourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom

Our dependent variable on voting behaviour in the Council is based on the dataset described, covering the period January 1999 to December 2013. The votes are coded '1' for 'No' and 'Abstain', and '0' for 'Yes' votes. To illustrate the distribution of opposition votes across countries, we plot the percentage of opposition votes across the time period for each country separately in *Figure A2.1*.

For further details on all other variables, consult Appendix 1. Variables are linked on the proposal date. Operationalisations and data sources of variables with the same name are identical across papers.

### ***Missing data***

For general information on linking ParlGov and CMP, see Appendix 1. Specific information on missing values in Paper 2 follows.

In terms of government positions on left-right and EU integration, we are able to recover the positions of *all* government parties for 92.7% of our observations in the target sample for the logistic regression models reported in Table 3.2 in the paper. In another 2.5% of the cases, CMP measures for parties representing less than 10% of the governmental seats are missing. We ignored this negligible fraction and simply assigned the CMP measure of the remaining parties. Our only missing values on government positions stem from Malta (not included in the CMP so far) as well as from elections in Latvia after 2002 (which have not yet been coded). They represent about 4.8% of the target sample and we delete these observations list-wise from our estimations reported in Table 3.2 in the paper.

In terms of the change in opposition parties' emphasis on integration, we recover the positions of parties representing more than 95% of all opposition seats for about 82% of the observations at the vote date as well as 86% four years prior to that data. Moreover, wherever an election was coded, the available CMP

measures cover parties representing more than 70% of the opposition seats. Hence, we decided to ignore missing values on single opposition parties. In total, we are left with 7.8% of missing values on the measure of change in party emphasis. In the robustness checks (see below), we demonstrate that our results are robust to using multiple imputations for the CMP measures.

### *Policy areas*

We code the policy area of the act from the legislative proposal that we download from [www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu), or [www.eurlex.eu](http://www.eurlex.eu). The proposal usually indicates a policy area, alongside any additional areas when relevant, as well as the Council working group from which the act originates. The initial working group and the policy area correspond in most, if not all, cases. When no indication of a policy area was included in the Council act itself, we looked up the act in EURLEX and OEIL to find the correct classification of the proposal.

As policy categories have changed considerably over time, we merge the long list of policy categories referenced in the official documents into the 11 areas listed below. The only editorial decisions that have been made in this process are as follows:

1. Policy areas referenced as ‘General Affairs’ since 2004 have been re-allocated to their ‘original’ areas such as ‘Economic and Financial Affairs’, ‘Foreign Affairs’ etc. based on the working group they originated from (included in the Council act’s list of references). Any acts which do not fall into a policy category, but which rather relate to constitutional matters (e.g. accession issues with new member states; the EU flag) and administrative matters (e.g. pensions to EU officials) have been grouped into a new category of ‘Constitutional Affairs and Administration’.

2. Where a previous policy category consisted of two areas which have in later years been reconfigured in the Council's own references, the policy area has been re-coded to the appropriate new area. For instance, in the first years of the period covered by the data, 'Transport' was referenced as 'Transport, Telecommunication and Energy'. Later, 'Energy' was paired with 'Environment' and hence, all acts which were previously in the first reference but related to 'Energy' have been reallocated to the newer category of 'Environment and Energy'.

Please see *Table A2.4* below for details.

**TABLE A2.4: ALLOCATION OF ACTS INTO POLICY AREAS**

<b>Policy area</b>	<b>Council reference categories</b>
<i>Agriculture and fisheries</i>	Agriculture; Agriculture and Fisheries; Agriculture & Fisheries; Fisheries
<i>Budget</i>	Budget
<i>Civil liberties, justice and home affairs</i>	Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs; Civil liberties, justice and home affairs; Justice and Home Affairs; Legal affairs;
<i>Constitutional affairs and administration</i>	Constitutional Affairs & inter-institutional relations; General Affairs (Constit. Affairs & Admin)
<i>Development and international trade</i>	Development & International Trade; Development; International trade; Trade;
<i>Economic and financial affairs</i>	Economic & Financial Affairs; Economic & monetary affairs; Budgetary control; Financial Affairs;
<i>Employment, education, culture and social affairs</i>	Employment, Education, Culture & Social Affairs; Culture & education; Education; Education, Youth & Culture; Employment; Employment & Social Policy; Employment and social affairs; Employment, Social Policy and Consumer Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health & Consumer Affairs; Gender Equality; Consumer Affairs & Tourism (Culture); Labour and Social Affairs; Social Affairs;

<i>Environment and energy</i>	Environment & Energy; Energy; Environment; Environment & Public health; Transport, Telecommunication and Energy (Energy);
<i>Foreign and security policy</i>	Foreign & Security Policy; Enlargement; External Relations; General Affairs & External Relations (Foreign & Security Policy); General Affairs (Foreign & Security Policy);
<i>Internal market and consumer affairs</i>	Internal Market & Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Consumer Affairs; Health; Industry; Industry, research & energy (Internal Market); Internal Market, Consumer Affairs & Tourism (Internal Market & Consumer Affairs); Internal Market, Industry and Research; Internal Market & consumer protection; Regional development; Research;
<i>Transport and telecommunications</i>	Transport & Telecommunications; Aviation; Communications; Telecommunications; Transport; Transport & tourism (Transport); Transport, Telecommunication and Energy (Transport & Telecommunications); Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (Transport & Telecommunications);

### *Quantitative text models*

We employ two different quantitative text models on the legislative summaries of the acts we collected from the OEIL website. Details on each model are provided below. Descriptive statistics on the text length of the OEIL summaries are provided in *Table A2.5*.

**TABLE A2.5: WORD LENGTH OF OEIL SUMMARIES**

Min	25th Percentile	Median	Mean	75th Percentile	Max
29	257	409	522	684.2	3306

### Wordscores

We use Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) to determine whether acts operate within areas of established EU competencies or (partly) aim at extending the scope or level of EU authority. In order to obtain reference texts for this contrast, we first created a codebook defining each end of our dimension of interest to human coders. This codebook is included at the end of this appendix. We then selected ‘candidate summaries’ by running a correspondence analysis on a set of keywords from the acts’ titles that we expected to be associated with the dimension of interest (e.g. ‘harmonisation’, ‘establish’, ‘amend’, ‘extend’). We then read about 250 summaries with extreme title scores. Of those, we pooled 55 into one reference document, to which we assigned the value of ‘-1’ for acts operating within areas of established competences, and 45 into a second reference document, to which we assigned the value of ‘+1’ for acts extending the level or scope of EU authority. Reference texts were balanced across time and policy areas. The coding of the selected reference summaries as either ‘+1’ or ‘-1’ shows high levels of inter-coder reliability with Krippendorff’s alpha standing at 0.92.

We use the *JFREQ* software to obtain the word-frequency matrix (using stemming and removal of punctuation and numbers) and implement Wordscores with the *austin* package in *R*. We first score each individual summary and then calculate the average rescaled score for our 11 policy areas as displayed in Table 3.1 in the paper. We score individual summaries instead of the entire corpus of summaries from one policy area, since summaries have tended to become longer over time. This ensures that equal weight is placed on each act.

**TABLE A2.6: EXTREME WORDS OCCURRING IN BOTH REFERENCE TEXTS**

<i>Word</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Word</i>	<i>Score</i>
asylum	0.94	<b>codifi</b>	-0.96
<b>monitor</b>	0.92	eec	-0.95
polit	0.90	compani	-0.95
<b>intergovernment</b>	0.89	<b>modif</b>	-0.92
situat	0.84	observatori	-0.92
<b>role</b>	0.84	border	-0.91
<b>independ</b>	0.84	regim	-0.91
emiss	0.84	visa	-0.91
<b>strengthen</b>	0.84	<b>codif</b>	-0.90
<b>fundament</b>	0.83	<b>supersed</b>	-0.90
cours	0.82	percentag	-0.89
<b>project</b>	0.82	newli	-0.89
<b>major</b>	0.81	exercis	-0.87
<b>promot</b>	0.80	cohes	-0.87
especi	0.80	substanc	-0.86
<b>creation</b>	0.80	<b>henc</b>	-0.83
<b>agenc</b>	0.79	<b>modifi</b>	-0.83
peopl	0.79	<b>notifi</b>	-0.83
label	0.79	registr	-0.83
<b>greater</b>	0.79	<b>summari</b>	-0.83
<b>cooper</b>	0.78	<b>updat</b>	-0.83

*Notes:* Bold words are particularly indicative of the model's face validity.

Table A2.6 shows the 40 word stems with the most extreme scores that occur at least once in each of the reference documents.<sup>128</sup> The selection is evidence of

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<sup>128</sup> Words that only occur in one of the two reference documents automatically obtain a score of 1 or -1 (with the naïve Bayes probability that we are reading the relevant reference text being 1). They are often uninformative, as they may be very specific to a particular reference summary (e.g. 'wine' or 'postgradu').

the model's face validity as stems like 'codifi' or 'modif' as well as 'updat' occur much more often in the summaries of acts operating within established competences, whereas 'strengthen', 'fundament', 'major' or 'creation' are used to describe acts extending authority. Additionally, to enable face validation we include the two summaries with the most extreme scores (positive/negative) according to the Wordscores model at the end of this appendix.

### Latent Dirichlet Allocation

We use a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003) on the legislative summaries to investigate on what kind of 'topics' or 'themes' governments increase their opposition when opinion is more Eurosceptic. In pre-processing, we use the *JFREQ* software to obtain the word-frequency matrix (using stemming and removal of stop words, punctuation, and numbers) and remove very frequent (>90% of summaries) and very infrequent stems (<0.5% of summaries). We implement the LDA with the *topicmodels* package in R and use the variational expectation maximization algorithm (VEM) for fitting the model.

We estimate various models, adjusting the number of topics  $k$  between 20 and 50. While models with 20 to 30 topics often pool rather unrelated issues (e.g. 'police' and 'research'), the face validity of the model clearly increases from 30+ topics onwards. The model of 45 topics we present provides a good delineation of substantive themes. As we are not interested in determining the most appropriate number of topics dealt with in legislation, but rather want to provide a good indication of the kind of themes governments use to signal responsiveness, we acknowledge that a model of e.g. 43 or 47 topics may also represent the data well. Moreover, as the VEM algorithm may only find local modes, starting values have some influence on model results. Hence, topics may look slightly different even with constant  $k$ . Importantly, a variety of model estimations confirm that opposition votes are related to Euroscepticism on topics such



as environment and transportation, data exchange and statistical harmonisation, establishing new agencies (particularly on border control, security, and migration) as well as (with less consistency) immigration, financial contributions, and disaster management.

Table A2.7 provides an overview of all 45 topics and the 20 most frequent stems<sup>129</sup> in each.

**TABLE A2.7: OVERVIEW OF LDA TOPIC MODEL**

Description	Stems
1 <i>Budgetary surveillance of member states</i>	econ, regul, member, state, correct, council, budgetari, european, commiss, island, surveil, canari, excess, stabil, imbal, deficit, union, in-sur, euro, measur
2 <i>Passenger rights and EU funding for disasters</i>	transport, damag, passeng, disast, road, eur, fund, flood, solidar, regul, major, waterway, affect, direct, total, million, infrastuctur, liabil
3 <i>Regulation on food products</i>	food, regul, label, feed, consum, addit, prodct, market, list, ec, commun, commiss, rule, provis, authoris, inform, legisl, include, safeti, direct
4 <i>Communications and research</i>	programm, european, action, commun, activ, support, object, implement, commiss, inform, promot, develop, decis, field, project, financi, organis, cooper, specif, area
5 <i>Crime and justice</i>	state, member, decis, crimin, person, framework, inform, offenc, nation, judici, author, european, council, measur, crime, law, purpose, execut, order, ensur
6 <i>Maritime</i>	convent, state, agreement, ship, member, commun, intern, law, regul, commiss, rule, countri, parti, recognit, organis, maritim, mainten, relat, document, oblig
7 <i>Instruments and programs to financially support non-EU countries</i>	countri, regul, instrument, develop, financi, assist, support, cooper, measur, commun, financ, implement, programm, region, action,

<sup>129</sup> This contrasts with Table 3.3 in the paper, which provides keywords (or ‘semantically important’ stems).

	oper, provid, object
8 <i>Agriculture</i>	product, regul, measur, agricultur, market, commun, specif, system, local, organ, region, council, oper, trade, produc, illeg, scheme, applica, suppli, forest
9 <i>Companies and financial industry</i>	direct, compani, payment, requir, market, inform, account, financi, state, member, report, transfer, busi, eu, european, regist, money
10 <i>Energy and environment</i>	energi, effici, state, emiss, eu, commiss, member, gas, european, measure, greenhouse, renew, framework, direct, fuel, consumption, council, target, develop, save
11 <i>Environment and transport</i>	vehicl, emiss, limit, requir, system, air, road, engine, reduc, direct, car, instal, pollut, stage, motor, measur. Reduct, nois, fuel
12 <i>Environment</i>	substanc, direct, environment, wast, environ, require, pollut, equip, recycl, state, water, hazard, member, legisl, annex
13 <i>Common market in food products</i>	market, aid, price, regul, year, sugar, product, sector, eur, quota, common, scheme, tonn, reform, purpos, commiss, restructur, council
14 <i>Health, risk management, culture</i>	health, european, eu, culture, action, member, state, protect, threat, emerg, qualiti, respons, commiss, diseas, level, ensur, public, risk, measur, year
15 <i>EU Financial assistance</i>	assist, guarantee, million, loan, eur, financi, fund, amount, eu, financ, commiss, oper, decis, econom, support, grant, european, eib, commun
16 <i>Employment and social policy</i>	employ, social, educ, european, labour, state, member, train, polici, guidelin, year, promot, work, develop, activ, eu, worker, peopl, learn, stratgi
17 <i>Transportation and public works contracts</i>	public, oper, contract, air, state, servic, member, commun, inform, carrier, airport, requir, secur, rule, procedur, commiss, audit, aircraft, transport, provid
18 <i>Accession of new member states and asylum matters</i>	decis, procedur, european, council, commiss, asylum, state, applic, committee, member, access, establish, consult, parliament, set, order, regul, purpos, ensur, draft
19 <i>Regulation on external trade relations</i>	regul, ec, council, european, union, amend, act, impact, commiss, treati, assess, legal, parliament, eu, trade, adopt, function, basi, applic
20 <i>Consumer protection and legal enforcement</i>	right, protect, victim, court, proceed, consum, law, member, state, person, option, european,

		case, ensur, justic, eu, rule, legal, provid
21	<i>Taxation and internal market</i>	vat, state, member, sevic, direct, rate, tax, good, suppli, reduc, appli, commiss, fraud, applic, charg, person, derog, rule, purpos, system
22	<i>Common Agricultural Policy and rural development</i>	regul, develop, agricultur, rural, polici, payment, support, fund, common, cap, region, eur, pillar, measure, framework, direct, council, billion, object
23	<i>Internal market in energy</i>	market, oper, suppli, network, gas, commiss, transmiss, system, regul, cooper, secur, electr, level, effect, european, regulatori, nation, eu, energ, independ
24	<i>EU budget</i>	eur, million, budget, appropri, payment, commit, head, expenditur, amount, increas, year, draft, financi, commiss, total, european, level, resourc, eu, administrat
25	<i>Animal welfare and disease</i>	anim, commun, measur, control, member, state, health, purpos, rule, plant, diseas, veterinari, product, import, countri, year, commiss, decis, inspect, protect
26	<i>Customs union</i>	custom, duti, import, tax, rate, product, measure, tariff, excise, appli, commiss, countri, taxat, agreement, increas, period, safeguard, tobacco, state, union
27	<i>Establishment of agencies and networks, relating to border control, security and migration</i>	agenc, member, state, inform, european, commiss, task, network, establishment, nation, security, exchang, system, border
28	<i>Common Agricultural Policy</i>	milk, payment, wine, commiss, product, member, state, farmer, quota, market, scheme, support, increas, direct, develop, singl, sector, crop, measur, potato
29	<i>Medicine, chemicals and research</i>	product, medicin, authoris, substanc, safeti, market, nuclear, risk, chemic, commun, member, state, requir, activ, assess, procedur, human, protect, report, system
30	<i>Single Market</i>	direct, eec, amend, provis, ec, requir, commiss, council, limit, annex, order, technic, relat, standard, refer, legisl, introduc, protect, articl, safety
31	<i>Implementation</i>	procedur, implement, instrument, ec, commiss, amend, decis, council, adopt, regulatori, element, measur, confer, introduc, act
32	<i>Codification</i>	act, direct, eec, council, codif, codifi, amend, purpos, incorpor, formal, preserv, requir, european, superse, exercis, full, legisl, regul, undertak, law

33	<i>Fisheries</i>	fish, fisheri, measur, regul, vessel, stock, commun, conserv, council, sea, manag, commiss, area, plan, adopt, technic, year, establish, catch, resourc
34	<i>Single currency</i>	eur, regul, state, member, coun, council, ec, derog, counterfeit, refer, date, amend, adopt, purpos, period, nation, currenc, circul, extend, appli
35	<i>Research and technology</i>	research, joint, commun, technolog, programme, project, european, framework, contribut, financ, cost, develop, establish, undertak, specif, instrument, financi, rule, tax
36	<i>Financial contributions to member state expenditure and to EU funds</i>	financi, fund, state, member, programm, period, commiss, european, implement, manag, support, assist, annual, amount, commun, decis, provid, project, contribut, mechan
37	<i>Import and export of goods</i>	regul, control, export, product, requir, option, rule, market, legisl, eu, european, provis, procedur, assess, technic, standard, articl, author, general, import
38	<i>Financial institutions</i>	credit, rate, risk, capit, institut, requir, financi, market, invest, manag, bank, rule, regul, firm, provis, instrument, direct, hous, ensur, asset
39	<i>Communications</i>	servic, staff, commun, eea, oper, commiss, phase, regul, european, mobil, systm, provis, satellit, offici, spectrum, work, member, order, provid, price
40	<i>EU financing in innovation and infrastructure</i>	option, union, polici, fund, europen, impact, eu, innov, invest, object, develop, financi, implement, assess, europ, support, sector, commiss, eur, infrastruc
41	<i>Financial supervision</i>	author, supervisor, european, financi, nation, supervis, system, bank, respons, ensur, commun, establish, board, esa, recommend, member, compet, commiss
42	<i>Statistical surveys and data sharing</i>	data, statist, european, collect, regul, state, member, commun, patent, inform, council, commiss, system, qualit, framework, account, nation, report, product, establish
43	<i>Transport safety and communications</i>	safeti, service, direct, european, railway, establish, system, rail, network, market, develop, commun, regulatori, interoper, common, certif, state, freight, framework, member
44	<i>Schengen and border control</i>	visa, state, member, border, sis, schengen, regul, ii, issu, decis, system, document, countri, applic, council, inform, provis, migrat, travel

### *Analysis of newspaper coverage*

In the paper, we analyse whether opposition votes are related to higher media coverage of an act. For this purpose, we merge our data of voting records with Reh et al. (2013), who collected the average number of newspaper stories (in the British, French, German, and Italian quality press in seven countries) referring to a legislative procedure for all co-decision acts in the fifth and sixth EPs. Their data can be matched with ours for 565 legislative acts on which the Council voted. As the Reh et al. data was collected on the act level, we collapse our data by summing all opposition votes by act (at any vote occasion) given by the seven member states covered in the media data. Descriptively, 1.88 newspaper stories per country are devoted to an act on average, with the median being 0, and some acts being extreme outliers of up to 464.5 media stories per country for the ‘Bolkestein’ or ‘services in the internal market’ directive.

We create two different measures of newspaper coverage. First, we use the logged average number of newspaper stories per country to ameliorate problems with outliers. Second, we create a simple binary indicator for whether an act was covered at all by any newspaper story. 212 of the 564 acts were covered at least by one story. We regress both measures on the number of opposition votes using OLS for the first measure and a logistic regression for the second measure. In both models, we control for variation in newspaper coverage relat-

ed to the 45 topics we identified with the LDA.<sup>130</sup> This comes as fixed effects in the OLS model and as a random effect in the logistic regression for the most likely topic of the act.<sup>131</sup> The results of these models are reported in *Table A2.8* and Figure 3.2 in the paper is based on the OLS results. As we argue in the paper, the number of newspaper stories on an act increases with the number of opposition votes. Similarly, we also have clear evidence (at the 5% level) from the logistic regression that opposition votes increase the likelihood that an act gets on the media agenda in the first place.

**TABLE A2.8: MODELS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE**

	OLS	Logistic
Opposition votes	0.180 (0.064)***	0.452 (0.208)**
Constant	0.553 (0.370)	-0.518 (0.431)
Fixed effects	Topics	
Random effects		Topics
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	-
N	563	563

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

<sup>130</sup> As we lack legislative summaries and consequently topics from the LDA for two of the 565 acts, our number of observations is 563.

<sup>131</sup> We use a random effect rather than fixed effects in the logistic regression to avoid complete separation with regard to topics for which none of the acts received any media coverage. When using topic fixed effects, the significance of the coefficient on opposition votes drops to the 10% level following the loss of observations due to separation.

### *Robustness checks*

We perform several robustness checks on our main results; these are reported in *Tables A2.9a* and *A2.9b*. All these checks concern the mixed effects logistic regression models from Table 3.2 in the paper and essentially represent variations of Model 3.

A first set of checks concerns the fixed and random effects structures. Model 1 addresses concerns of heterogeneity in voting across policy areas. As we have argued throughout, the substance of legislative acts differs between areas and hence they represent an important clustering factor that may or may not be accounted for with our random effect for legislative acts. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results with regard to including fixed effects for the eight policy areas in the sample. The results we obtain are virtually identical. The same conclusions also follow from Model 2, which includes a random effect parameter for the votes instead of the acts. This different specification of the random component does not change our results.

Another set of robustness concerns questions the adequacy of our operationalisations. Importantly, it could be argued that pooling ‘no’ and ‘abstain’ votes in our dependent variable is inappropriate for testing signal responsiveness, since an abstention will be a weaker signal in the eyes of the public than voting ‘no’. Model 3 addresses this concern by excluding abstentions from the dependent variable. The coefficients on public opinion as well as on the interaction with party salience remain highly statistically significant.

A second operationalisation concern relates to the change in party emphasis. Here, our choice of a change over four years might be criticised as arbitrary as well as our decision to weight opposition parties equally. Models 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate the robustness of our findings with regard to alternative choices on these matters. Model 4 operationalises a three-year change, Model 5 a five-

year change, and Model 6 the seat-weighted change over four years. In all three cases, we obtain the exact same results.

A third operationalisation choice that could potentially drive our results is our use of a six-month lag of public opinion (see also Appendix 1). Hence, we present estimates with current opinion on the vote date, a one-year, and an 18-month lag in Models 7 to 9. Importantly, the public opinion effect is very similar for the one-year lag but the main effects of current opinion as well as the 18-month lag are not significant. Hence, while we do not know the best lag representation, it is clear that our results would be the same if we used different reasonable lag lengths between six and 12 months but would not be obtained with unreasonably long or short lengths like zero or 18 months. This provides further confidence in our results.

Another source of potential concern is the Wordscores estimates measuring authority extension vs. established competence areas. Since we restrict our sample based on these estimates, a natural question is whether the inclusion or exclusion of borderline areas makes a difference for our results. Hence, we have compared our Wordscores estimates with classical measures of policy area integration based on expert judgements in order to identify areas with ambiguous classification (Börzel 2005; Hix and Høyland 2011). This exercise shows that ‘Development and international trade’ as well as ‘Environment and energy’ are sometimes classified as established areas and ‘Internal market and consumer affairs’ contains particular sub-areas, in which authority is still extended. In Model 10, we show that excluding trade, development, environment, and energy policies from our sample does not affect the results – if anything, it strengthens them. In turn, Model 11 also shows that including internal market and consumer policies only marginally changes our estimates and leaves significance levels unchanged.



**TABLE A2.9A: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>
Public opinion	-3.002 (1.002)***	-3.022 (1.003)***	-3.897 (1.595)**	-2.905 (1.012)***	-3.253 (1.011)***	-2.770 (1.001)***	-1.754 (1.092)
Party emphasis (EU)	0.554 (0.141)***	0.525 (0.141)***	0.474 (0.212)**	0.580 (0.152)***	0.472 (0.141)***	0.380 (0.126)***	0.431 (0.160)***
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU)	-1.625 (0.351)***	-1.573 (0.352)***	-1.969 (0.524)***	-1.890 (0.393)***	-1.438 (0.350)***	-1.216 (0.316)***	-1.243 (0.388)***
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Countries, policy are- as	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries
Random effects	Legislative acts	Vote occa- sion	Legislative acts	Legislative acts	Legislative acts	Legislative acts	Legislative acts
Number of acts	915	915	915	915	915	915	887
Number of countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
N	18,687	18,687	18,687	18,687	18,687	18,687	18,006
Robustness check	FEs for policy are- as	RE for vote occasions	DV: 'No' votes only	Three-year change in party em- phasis	Five-year change in party em- phasis	Seat- weighting for party emphasis	Current opinion

Notes: All are mixed effects regressions; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast; Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**TABLE A2.9B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODELS EXPLAINING OPPOSITION VOTES**

	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>	<b>Model 11</b>	<b>Model 12</b>	<b>Model 13</b>	<b>Model 14</b>
Public opinion	-2.433 (0.960)**	-0.986 (0.940)	-5.185 (1.308)***	-2.517 (0.847)***	1.220 (0.700)*	-3.274 (1.104)***	-2.013 (0.912)**
Party emphasis (EU)	0.588 (0.139)***	0.658 (0.150)***	0.552 (0.175)***	0.480 (0.124)***	0.063 (0.127)	0.441 (0.179)**	0.532 (0.141)***
Public opinion x Party emphasis (EU)	-1.680 (0.340)***	-1.770 (0.356)***	-1.924 (0.447)***	-1.324 (0.301)***	-0.349 (0.287)	-1.409 (0.419)***	-1.567 (0.353)***
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries	Countries
Random effects	Legislative acts	Legislative acts	Vote occa- sion	Legislative acts	Legislative acts		Legislative acts
Number of acts	915	915	654	1126	1143	915	915
Number of countries	25	25	25	25	26	25	26
N	18,687	18,687	13,430	23,019	23,038	18,687	20,384
Robustness check	One-year lag of opin- ion	18-month lag of opin- ion	Exclusion of policy areas	Inclusion of policy area	Established policy are- as	Jackknife test (coun- tries)	Multiple imputa- tions

*Notes:* All are mixed effects regressions, except for 'Model 14', which is fixed only; No observations for Malta due to missing CMP measures, no observations for Latvia due to no opposition votes cast, except for 'Model 12' and 'Model 14' with additional observations; Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

A related issue concerns our argument that we will only find the public opinion effect as hypothesised in policy areas that are not well-established but in which the boundaries of competences are still pushed in daily legislative activity. To show that this argument is valid and that we do not find the same opinion dynamics in established policy areas, we estimate our model on ‘Agriculture and fisheries’, ‘Economic and financial affairs’, and ‘Internal market and consumer affairs’ only. The results are reported as Model 12. The positive but only weakly significant effect on public opinion clearly indicates that our hypothesis does not hold for these areas and that other dynamics seem to be at play.<sup>132</sup>

Model 13 addresses the concern that our results may be due to a few ‘outlier’ countries, in which governments strongly engage in signal responsiveness, while governments in other countries may not at all do so. In this case, our generalised claims about signal responsiveness may be misplaced. In order to test this concern, we employ a jackknife resampling at the country level, omitting one country after another from the estimation and obtaining standard errors from the variation in the coefficients across estimations. Our results are entirely unaffected by the resampling exercise.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Additional analyses show that the significant positive coefficient on public opinion is driven mainly by ‘Agriculture and fisheries’, the most integrated of all policy areas according to our Wordscores measure as well as according to the expert judgments. In fact, it is conceivable that most changes in this policy area are not extending the authority of the EU but may even restrict it. Hence, an opposition vote in this area could serve to signal support for rather than opposition to full EU integration.

<sup>133</sup> Please note that due to technical restrictions in the jackknife resampling, this is the only case in which we implement country fixed effects by demeaning (using the within-transformation) instead of using dummy variables and we also exclude the random effect for legislative acts.

Lastly, we address the issue of missing values on the CMP measures that resulted in an exclusion of 7.8% of all observations in the models reported so far. To rule out the potential of any bias due to list-wise deletion, we set up a multiple imputation model using regression imputation with chained equations for the missing values (and the interaction between public opinion and party emphasis, treating it as ‘just another variable’). We use 10 multiple imputed datasets with all remaining covariates, country and policy area dummies as well as the dependent variable as predictors. Model 14 shows that we obtain the same results when imputing the missing values.

## Summaries Codebook (Wordscores)

Please code each summary individually. For classification use only the information provided in the legislative summary.

### V1 Extension of EU authority

*Does the legislative act aim at extending the scope, level, or inclusiveness of EU authority or does it provide for changes within areas of already established competency?*

<i>Extending EU authority</i>	<i>Changes within areas of competency</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishing legislation in areas with no existing EU level legislation</li> <li>• Setting up novel programmes / schemes / frameworks / actions in areas with no (or only informal) previous EU activity</li> <li>• Upgrading of existing programmes / schemes / frameworks / actions or legislation (e.g. include new policy instruments, measures, activities, areas, countries)</li> <li>• Establishing new EU level agencies / authorities / networks / organisations / offices or upgrading of their powers (e.g. in terms of mandate, objectives, rights, decisional authority, and funding)</li> <li>• Harmonising / establishing new common (minimum) standards, rules, guidelines, and procedures (incl. implementation) across the EU member states</li> <li>• Phasing out derogations and enforcing common rules / standards / legislation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changing existing legislation, programmes, rules in a substantive sense without altering the EU's authority (e.g. altering already established rules, standards, quotas, targets that relate to the substance matter)</li> <li>• 'Updating' existing regulation in view of new developments (e.g. adapting to technical change or experience from implementation, incorporating international obligations of the EU)</li> <li>• Codifying, clarifying, simplifying, or re-packaging of existing legislation (e.g. changes are of entirely 'technical' nature not affecting substance)</li> <li>• Applying regular (e.g. yearly, monthly) changes to existing legislation</li> <li>• Applying changes of otherwise 'minor' nature to existing legislation, programmes, rules (e.g. temporary, one-off / extraordinary measures)</li> <li>• Discontinuing or suspending existing provisions</li> </ul>
<b>CODE: +1</b>	<b>CODE: -1</b>

### **Example summary A (rescaled score: +4.28)**

**PURPOSE:** to establish a programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through co-operation with third countries (Erasmus World) (2004-2008). **CONTENT :** the Erasmus World programme offers high-profile assistance in the form of 250 European masters courses and thousands of study grants and fellowships for nationals of third countries and for Europeans. Like the Fulbright Programme for the United States (please refer to summary CNS/2000/0263), it will help to strengthen intercultural dialogue and communicate European cultures and values more effectively to the rest of the world. Covering the period 2004-2008, Erasmus World will have a budget of EUR 200 million. The Erasmus World Programme has the following objective is: 1) Creation of 250 inter-university masters courses with the seal and support of the European Union Erasmus World aims to create or develop a European higher education product providing both European students as well as students and invited scholars from third countries with added value. Host European postgraduate courses which already exist or are to be set up will be selected for a five-year period. They will receive funding from the Community and an 'EU' seal. These 'EU Masters Courses' will be an ideal structure for receiving students from third countries under the Erasmus World programme, alongside European students. At the end of the programme in 2008, around 250 'EU Masters Courses' should have been established. To qualify for the 'EU' seal, these courses should involve at least three universities from three different Member States and entail recognised periods of study in at least two of the three universities. These courses will lead to diplomas that are officially recognised in the European countries taking part. They will reserve places for third-country students receiving Erasmus World scholarships. The courses will cover various fields and there will be no conditions regarding the language in which teaching takes place. 2) 'Erasmus World' scholarships for 4 200 students and 1 000 visiting scholars to Europe from third countries Either directly or under partnerships between their university of origin and the universities taking part in an 'EU Masters Course', postgraduate students from third countries will be able to study in Europe for up to two academic years. During their studies, they will follow courses in several Member States, like all the students enrolled in an 'EU Masters Course'. The scholarships, amounting on average to EUR 1 600 per month, will enable the students to come to Europe and cover their living expenses while they are there. When it comes up to speed, Erasmus World should enable over 2 000 third-country students to receive a scholarship of this kind, with around 4 200 scholarships being awarded over the life of the programme. When implementing the programme, special attention will be given to ways of avoiding a 'brain drain' from the developing countries whose students are to take part in the programme. 3) the 'EU Masters Courses' will receive visiting scholars from universities around the world for teaching and research assignments lasting an average of three months. Between now and 2008, Erasmus World will provide support for over 1 000 visiting scholars to Europe from third countries, who will receive an average grant of EUR 13 000. 4) Partnerships between the 'EU Masters Courses' and universities in other continents to facilitate the mobility of 4 000 European students and 800 European scholars Erasmus World will encourage the universities taking part in an 'EU Masters Course' to establish a structured cooperation with top-class universities in third countries through joint projects covering a three-year period. This cooperation on an equal footing will provide a means for the exchange of students and scholars going to third countries with Erasmus World scholarships. Between now and 2008, almost 4 000 European postgraduate students and 800 European visiting scholars should receive support under the Erasmus World Programme. This cooperation will relate to areas given high

priority for higher education in Europe. 5) International cooperation : Erasmus World will provide financial support for the international promotion of European higher education (publicity material, presence at international education fairs) and for the establishment of services facilitating access of third country students to European universities (tools for language training, living conditions for third country students, etc). It should be noted that this programme does not replace, but complements in an innovative way, existing regional programmes such as TEMPUS (mainly with countries from the former USSR, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean Basin), agreements with the United States and Canada, ALFA and ALBAN (for Latin America), Asia-Link, pilot projects with Australia, etc. Compared with these programmes and with national initiatives on cooperation with third countries, Erasmus World will offer third-country students and teachers a greater opportunity for mobility and an enhanced European added value.

### **Example summary B (rescaled score: -5.22)**

**PURPOSE :** to amend for the twenty-ninth time Council Directive 76/769/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations (substances classified as carcinogen, mutagen or toxic to reproduction - c/m/r) **PROPOSED ACT :** Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council. **CONTENT :** European Parliament and Council Directive 94/60/EC amending for the fourteenth time Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations introduced a list of substances classified as category 1 or 2 carcinogen, mutagen or toxic to reproduction (c/m/r) in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC. It stipulates in points 29, 30 and 31 of Annex I of Directive 76/769/EEC that these substances may not be used in substances or preparations placed on the market for sale to the general public. These are substances which have previously been listed as carcinogen, mutagen or toxic to reproduction (c/m/r) in Annex I of Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances. Annex I of Directive 67/548/EEC is regularly updated by way of adaptations to technical progress. Directive 94/60/EC also provides that the Commission will submit to the European Parliament and Council, no later than six months after publication of an adaptation to technical progress of Annex I to Council Directive 67/548/EEC, a proposal for a Directive governing the substances newly classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic and toxic to reproduction in categories 1 and 2, so as to update the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC. Commission Directive 2004/73/EC of 29 April 2004 adapting to technical progress for the twenty-ninth time Council Directive 67/548/EEC, and more particularly Annex I thereto, inserted 146 entries containing substances newly classified as carcinogenic category 1, 21 entries containing substances newly classified as carcinogenic category 2, 152 entries containing substances newly classified as mutagenic category 2, and 24 entries containing substances newly classified as toxic to reproduction category 2 in Annex I of Directive 67/548/EEC. It is proposed to update the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC in order to govern these substances newly classified in the framework of Directive 67/548/EEC. This twenty-ninth amendment will insert 346 entries containing substances newly classified or re-classified under

Commission Directive 2004/73/EC in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC. However, among these 346 entries, 304 contain substances which were already subject to a restriction for sale to the general public due to an earlier classification as c/m/r substance of category 1 or 2. Therefore, only 42 of these entries relate to substances that will be subject for the first time to the restriction for sale to the general public provided in points 29, 30 and 31 of Annex I of Directive 76/769/EEC. Among the 146 entries containing substances newly classified as carcinogenic category 1, 145 cover substances which were previously classified as carcinogenic category 2. Therefore, the list relating to carcinogens category 2 needs to be amended accordingly. In addition, a number of entries in the Appendix of Annex I to Directive 76/769/EEC need to be amended to update the content of the column entitled 'Notes'. This update concerns four entries related to substances classified as carcinogenic category 1, 36 entries related to substances classified as carcinogen category 2, six entries related to substances classified as mutagen category 2, two entries related to substances classified as toxic to reproduction category 1 and three entries related to substances classified as toxic to reproduction category 2.



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## APPENDIX 3

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This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 3.

### *Summary statistics*

*Table A3.1* provides summary statistics of all variables on the basis of our estimation sample.

**TABLE A3.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION SAMPLE**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Economic left-right position	51.25	45.62	0	100
Compromise position	-2.46	11.30	-20.53	29.12
Ideological divisiveness	21.61	12.76	2.71	67.63
Executive coordination	0.50	0.50	0	1
Parliamentary oversight	1.02	0.42	0.29	1.75
Minority government	0.20	0.40	0	1
Left-right public opinion	5.35	0.34	4.53	6.46
Net receipts from EU budget	0.70	0.87	-0.95	3.86
Unemployment rate	7.18	3.02	2.30	18.10
Inflation rate	2.42	1.61	0.19	12.35
Economic freedom	7.26	0.62	5.15	8.60
Population	19.00	25.82	0.49	82.00
N	1,694			

*Table A3.2* displays the split of observations in our estimation sample by country.

**TABLE A3.2: OBSERVATIONS BY COUNTRY**

	Observations	%	Cum.%
Netherlands	142	8.38	8.38
Germany	140	8.26	16.65
Denmark	137	8.09	24.73
Belgium	135	7.97	32.70
Finland	130	7.67	40.38
France	130	7.67	48.05
Ireland	129	7.62	55.67
Austria	121	7.14	62.81
Luxembourg	110	6.49	69.30
Lithuania	60	3.54	72.85
Estonia	56	3.31	76.15
Slovakia	54	3.19	79.34
Slovenia	53	3.13	82.47
Czech Republic	51	3.01	85.48
Hungary	49	2.89	88.37
Cyprus	48	2.83	91.20
Latvia	39	2.30	93.51
Italy	36	2.13	95.63
Poland	28	1.65	97.28
Sweden	25	1.48	98.76
Bulgaria	13	0.77	99.53
Portugal	8	0.47	100
TOTAL	1,694	100	

*Table A3.3* reports sample mean values for the key independent variables of interest by country.

**TABLE A3.3: COUNTRY MEANS OF KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

	Ideological divi- siveness	Executive coor- dination	Parliamentary oversight	Minority gov- ernment
Austria	19.78	0	0.99	0.29
Belgium	27.18	0	0.50	0.07
Bulgaria	21.10	0	1	0
Cyprus	29.67	0	0.29	0
Czech Republic	22.85	1	1.36	0.29
Germany	23.04	0	1.25	0
Denmark	24.43	1	1.42	1
Estonia	6.61	0	1.25	0
Finland	31.57	1	1.75	0
France	17.75	1	0.91	0
Hungary	9.84	0	1.11	0
Ireland	13.03	1	0.59	0.43
Italy	58.76	0	0.62	0.92
Lithuania	24.28	1	1.75	0.38
Luxembourg	6.74	1	0.43	0
Latvia	13.09	1	1.36	0.44
Netherlands	24.70	0	0.78	0.13
Poland	11.03	1	1.11	0
Portugal	15.04	1	0.48	0
Sweden	19.00	1	0.96	0
Slovenia	20.73	0	1.11	0
Slovakia	33.81	0	1.36	0.04
TOTAL	21.61	0.5	1.02	0.20

***Variable definitions and sources***

*Table A3.4* provides an overview of all main variables used in the paper, their definition, and source as well as the extent of missing values.

**TABLE A3.4: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLE SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS**

Variable	Source / Definition	Missing values
Economic left-right position	DEU <sup>134</sup> , linearly transformed	0
Compromise position	CMP <sup>135</sup> (RILE), simple average of the seat-weighted RILE average of the coalition parties and the seat-weighted RILE average of the supporting parties ( <i>where applicable</i> )	70
Ideological divisiveness	CMP (RILE), absolute RILE distance between most 'left' and most 'right' party in the support coalition	133
Executive coordination	Kassim (2013), '1' for coordinated executive, '0' for uncoordinated executive	0
Parliamentary oversight	Winzen (2013), composite measure of indicators of parliamentary control in EU affairs (information, processing, enforcement), yearly	14
Minority government	'1' if cabinet parties hold ≤ 50% of parliamentary seats, '0' if cabinet parties hold > 50% of seats	0
Left-right opinion	Eurobarometer (left-right self-placement), average by country applying sampling weights, linearly interpolated on the day level, six-month lag from proposal date	0
Net receipts from EU budget	<a href="http://www.money-go-round.eu">www.money-go-round.eu</a> , net receipts from EU budget (receipts – payments) in % of GDP	0
Unemployment	World Bank (ILO definition), yearly rate in %	0
Inflation	World Bank (change in consumer prices), yearly rate in %	0
Economic freedom	Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the World, area 'Regulation') <sup>136</sup> , yearly and linearly interpolated where necessary	0
Population	Eurostat, population in million as of 1 <sup>st</sup> of January 2009	0

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<sup>134</sup> Thomson et al. (2006, 2012).

<sup>135</sup> Lehmann et al. (2015). Parties in the support coalition were identified with the help of the ParlGov database (see Döring and Manow 2012) as well as *The Political Data Yearbook* reports.

<sup>136</sup> Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013).

### Economic left-right position

The measure of government's policy positions on economic left-right issues is taken from the DEU dataset directly (March 2012 version). An original coding scheme was developed in order to classify all DEU issues with regard to major substantive dimensions of political competition in domestic and EU politics. See Appendix 1, Table A1.1, for an overview of the 13 categories of the coding scheme.

If an issue was coded into *any* category between 1 and 6, it was in principle included in our analyses (170 issues).<sup>137</sup> Inter-coder reliability of the binary decision as to whether an issue related to any economic left-right category or not was assessed with the help of Krippendorff's alpha that is 0.91. However, we excluded any policy issues for which the experts interviewed were not able to report at least one third of national governments' policy positions (see Paper 1, footnote 27, for a justification). Importantly, only 16 issues were excluded because too many positions were missing. Wherever necessary we linearly rescaled the pre-defined DEU policy scales of 0-100 so as to ensure that 0 represented the most 'left' option and 100 the most 'right' option adopted by any government in our sample. Rescaling removes nine further issues on which all coalition governments in our sample adopted exactly the same position, and variation in positions stemmed from single party governments or the European institutions (Commission, EP), which adopted diverging positions but were not part of our sample.<sup>138</sup> This leaves us with observations on 145 economic left-right issues.

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<sup>137</sup> Categories 7 and 8 do not relate to economic but rather to left-libertarian vs. right-authoritarian conflicts and were therefore excluded.

<sup>138</sup> The value of the common position of governments on such issues (say, 50) has no meaningful interpretation in these cases, as it is referenced against actors outside the model.

### Compromise position

We measure the ideological compromise position of the government's supporting parties from the CMP's<sup>139</sup> coding of election manifestos (Lehmann et al. 2015). As we note in the paper, using the CMP instead of expert survey measures has several advantages in our particular application. In addition to the points mentioned, we would also like to stress that the construct validity of scales constructed from the CMP can be more accurately assessed. While CMP scales are transformations of category counts with a substantive meaning described in the codebook, we usually do not know on what particular conception of 'left-right' experts base their judgment when answering party surveys (Budge 2000). For our analysis specifically, this issue is pertinent to guarantee a good substantive matching between the left-right party positions and our categorised and re-scaled DEU issue positions.

Our measure of the compromise position is the simple average between the seat-weighted RILE of the government parties and the seat-weighted RILE of the supporting party (or all opposition parties, in cases of unclear or varying support):

*Compromise position*<sub>Majority government</sub>

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} [(per104_i + \dots + per606_i) - (per103_i + \dots + per701_i)] * \frac{S_i}{S_I}$$

*Compromise position*<sub>Minority government</sub>

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N_i} [(per104_i + \dots + per606_i) - (per103_i + \dots + per701_i)] * \frac{S_i}{S_I} \\ + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} [(per104_j + \dots + per606_j) - (per103_j + \dots + per701_j)] * \frac{S_j}{S_J}$$

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<sup>139</sup> All CMP-based measures are derived using the '2015a' version of the database.

Where  $i$  denotes the respective government party,  $j$  the respective (supporting) opposition party,  $N_i$  is the number of government parties,  $N_j$  the number of (supporting) opposition parties,  $S_{i,j}$  is the number of seats of party  $i / j$ , and  $S_{I,J}$  the total number of government and supporting opposition seats. The measure is based on the party manifesto issued at the last elections preceding the date on which the proposal was submitted to the Council.

#### Executive coordination

We operationalise the distinction between coordinated and uncoordinated executives by relying on the classification of Kassim (2013) and use a dummy variable that is '1' in case of coordination and '0' in case of no coordination. We do not consider the extent of coordination (comprehensive vs. selective) as most countries with coordination also display comprehensive coordination. In addition, selective (policy-specific) coordination may just be sufficient to bring national ministers in line with the coalition's compromise where they have an incentive to deviate from it.

#### Parliamentary oversight

We take the composite measure of parliamentary oversight in EU affairs from Winzen (2013). This is the most recent version of the data. Values for Romania in 2007 and 2008 are missing, which is why the country is not included in our main models in the paper. However, in the section on robustness checks (see below), we show that re-estimating our main model with multiple imputations of these values leads to exactly the same results as on the restricted sample in the paper.

### Minority government

We identify minority governments by using the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2012) on government composition. However, we corrected the information from this database in several cases after cross-checking it with information from *The Political Data Yearbook*. In particular, we discovered some governments that lost their majority late in their legislative term and acted as minority quasi-caretakers up to their replacement.

For further details on all other variables, consult Appendix 1. Variables are linked on the proposal date. Operationalisations and data sources of variables with the same name are identical across papers.

### ***Missing data***

For general information on linking ParlGov and CMP, see Appendix 1. Specific information on missing values in Paper 3 follows.

For majority governments, we are able to recover the positions of all cabinet parties for 91% of the observations in our sample. The remaining 9% are split as follows: first, for 3.6% of these cases (some observations from France and Italy) we lack the CMP measures of at least one cabinet party and we exclude these observations from the main analyses in the paper, as any measurement of the coalition's ideological divisiveness (and to a much lesser extent, the compromise position) would be unreliable. Second, for three majority governments of Italy (Berlusconi II + III, Prodi I), representing 4.3% of the observations, we face the problem that the government parties issued a common manifesto. Hence, while this manifesto is arguably an adequate measurement of the compromise position of these parties, we again lack information on the ideological range of the coalition and exclude these cases. Moreover, we also lack CMP measures



from the Latvian elections 2006, which leads to the exclusion of the remaining 1.2% of observations from majority governments.

For minority governments which rely on stable support of a single party, we always have full CMP measures for all parties. For minority governments relying on changing support, we use the seat-weighted average opposition party as a proxy.<sup>140</sup> While some opposition parties and factions are not covered by the CMP, the dataset always provides measures for more than 90% of non-governmental seats. Hence, we assume that the average opposition party's position is sufficiently precisely measured by the CMP and do not exclude any observations from minority governments.

In total, we have 133 missing values on ideological divisiveness (7.2%) and 70 on the compromise position (3.8%). Importantly, in the robustness checks (see below) we demonstrate that our results are robust to using multiple imputations for these missing CMP measures.

### ***Robustness checks***

We perform various robustness checks to provide more confidence in our main results by re-estimating variations of our baseline model from Table 4.1 in the paper. The results of these robustness checks are reported in *Table A3.5*.

First, we address four different measurement concerns. As our results may partly hinge on the operationalisation of the compromise position, Models 1 and 2 re-estimate our baseline model with alternative measures. In Model 1, we ascertain the influence of seat-weighting and calculate the compromise as the

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<sup>140</sup> For the alternative calculation of the compromise in 'Model 2' in the next section (see Table A3.4), we use the opposition parties closest to the PM. For this calculation we do likewise not consider parties with missing CMP values.

simple average of all supporting parties (irrespective of cabinet representation). In Model 2, we challenge the assumption that opposition support under minority governments with no fixed supporting parties is best characterised by the average opposition party, and instead select the opposition parties ideologically closest to the PM's party. This reflects the idea that the PM is the effective *formateur*, or alternatively, that this role is played by the responsible minister, who, in most cases, will be from the PM's party. We seat-weight among cabinet and opposition parties identified according to this criterion. In both cases, the results are substantively identical to those from our main specification, with one notable variation in the significance level: in Model 1, the interaction between ideological divisiveness and the compromise drops below the 5% significance level with a p-value of 0.072.

Regarding ideological divisiveness, we test two alternatives to the range. Importantly, the range may overstate divisiveness in support coalitions with  $i > 2$  parties, if the largest party (holding most ministerial posts) is centrally located. In such cases, the distance between the largest party as the predominant proposer and the party located furthest from it in the coalition may be a better measure of divisiveness. We test this measure in Model 3 and largely confirm our results with the interaction on minority governments dropping to a p-value of 0.071. Moreover, the range is not sensitive to the number of parties in the coalition. If each coalition partner can call and enforce compromise negotiations and does so with a certain probability that increases with ideological distance, it is not only the ideological range that matters for the joint probability of compromise negotiations but also the sheer number of parties in the coalition. In fact, the more parties are located further from the central proposer, the more likely compromises should become. We therefore construct a measure of the summed ideological distance of all parties in the coalition to the largest party as predominant proposer. The results in Model 4 mostly confirm our findings. The divisiveness effect appears even more significant compared to our baseline re-

sults (1% level), while the interaction on minority governments is a borderline case for significance at the 5% level with a p-value of 0.05.

One further measurement concern pertains to the cross-national comparability of left-right ideology. While we argue that the CMP is the best approach to measure a universal left-right concept, research has shown that parties that are left or right according to the CMP (and, indeed, popular perception) sometimes implement diametric policies in post-communist and Western Europe (Tavits and Letki 2009). In addition, some research indicates that for parties in post-communist countries some 'left' RILE categories correlate more strongly with 'right' RILE categories than within the set of 'left' categories – and vice versa (Mölder 2013). From our perspective, this may suggest that the RILE concept of economic left-right is not a major structuring factor in party competition in Eastern Europe. But this actually does not demonstrate that the RILE index lacks any construct validity when used for Eastern European parties. Instead, it may simply indicate that many parties in post-communist societies have ambiguous stances on this dimension, which result in rather centrist and less dispersed positions. This is exactly what we see in our sample, where dispersion of the compromise position is much larger in Western than in Eastern Europe. In order to address remaining doubts, Model 5 re-estimates our main model excluding post-communist countries.<sup>141</sup> Our findings substantively hold in this restricted sample, with the interaction on ideological divisiveness dropping in significance to a p-value of 0.07.

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<sup>141</sup> As our sample is reduced to 13 countries, we do not report country cluster-robust standard errors, as they are asymptotic in the number of clusters and we are estimating 19 parameters. Instead, we report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors assuming that our set of control variables sufficiently minimises concerns about clustering in this restricted sample of countries.

**TABLE A3.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON MODEL OF COALITION POLICY-MAKING**

[illegible]

	issues	issues	issues	issues	issues	issues	issues
Number of policy issues	145	145	145	145	145	145	145
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	13	22	23
N	1,694	1,694	1,694	1,694	1,291	1,694	1,841
Robustness check	No seat-weighting	Opposition party close to PM	Max distance to largest party	Sum distance to largest party	Western Europe only	Binary DV	Multiple imputations

*Notes:* All are fixed effects regressions, except for 'Model 6', which is a fixed effects logistic regression; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, except for 'Model 5' with errors clustered by policy issue; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

A last concern about measurement is that we treat the CMP estimates as if they had no uncertainty. Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009) have argued that positions expressed in a 100-page manifesto are arguably measured with much more precision by the CMP than those expressed in a 10-page manifesto. We follow the authors' proposed remedy and obtain standard errors of the RILE scores of all parties by bootstrapping from the coded quasi-sentences.<sup>142</sup> We then use the SIMEX (simulation and extrapolation) algorithm to see how our results would change at different levels of measurement error. For our four main interaction coefficients this exercise is displayed in *Figure A3.1-a + b + c + d*. They clearly show that as  $\lambda$  – the extent of measurement error we add to our data – increases, our results become weaker. Hence, any presence of measurement error in the CMP does not drive our results. Quite the opposite: if we faced no measurement error ( $\lambda = -1$ ), we would have even stronger results than those reported.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> We obtain standard errors of a support coalition's compromise position and its ideological range by analytical derivation from the bootstrapped standard error estimates for each individual party:

$$Compromise SE_{Majority\ gov} = \sqrt{\sum_{i=0}^n \left( Bootstrapped SE_i * \frac{S_i}{S_I} \right)^2}$$

$$Compromise SE_{Minority\ gov} =$$

$$\sqrt{\left( \sqrt{\sum_{i=0}^n \left( Bootstrapped SE_i * \frac{S_i}{S_I} \right)^2} * \frac{1}{2} \right)^2 + \left( \sqrt{\sum_{j=0}^n \left( Bootstrapped SE_j * \frac{S_j}{S_I} \right)^2} * \frac{1}{2} \right)^2}$$

$$Range SE_{Majority/Minority} = \sqrt{\sum_{i=0}^n \left( Bootstrapped SE_{party\ most\ left} \right)^2 + \left( Bootstrapped SE_{party\ most\ right} \right)^2}$$


Where  $i$  denotes cabinet parties,  $j$  supporting parties,  $S_{i,j}$  is the number of seats of party  $i / j$ , and  $S_{I,j}$  the total number of government and supporting opposition seats.

<sup>143</sup> For technical reasons we have to implement the SIMEX analysis using issue dummies for the fixed effects and without any adjustment of standard errors for country-level clustering. But this does not influence the directional impact of the measurement error. We conducted the same SIMEX analysis for hypothesis H5 (see Table 4.2 in the paper), the relationship between institu-


Next, we address one concern regarding model specification: the fact that a significant fraction of the DEU policy scales are binary, i.e. the legislative conflict only offered two options. This renders the distribution of our dependent variable rather skewed at both tails.

**FIGURE A3.1: SIMEX COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF INTERACTION TERMS**

A3.1-A: EXECUTIVE COORDINATION \* COMPROMISE POSITION




A3.1-B: IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIVENESS \* COMPROMISE POSITION




tional strength, ideological divisiveness, and the compromise position. Again, measurement error weakens our results instead of causing them.

### A3.1-C: MINORITY GOVT \* PARL. OVERSIGHT \* COMPROMISE POSITION



### A3.1-D: MINORITY GOVT \* COMPROMISE POSITION



*Notes:* SIMEX estimates with 500 iterations per  $\lambda$ . Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.

While we use linear regression in the paper to preserve maximum variation in the data, we now create a second, dichotomised version of the dependent variable in order to see whether our non-normal dependent variable drives any results. If governments took more leftist positions between 0 and 49, we code this as '0' and more rightist positions between 50 and 100 as '1' (see also Paper 1). Model 6 re-estimates our final model with this dependent variable using logistic regression with fixed effects for policy issues and cluster-robust standard errors at the country level. Again, this different specification yields qualitatively identical results, indicating that the compromise position is a stronger predictor



of whether governments adopt leftist or rightist positions in the Council under the factors we hypothesised.

Last, we address the problem of missing data from the CMP and the Winzen (2013) dataset on parliamentary oversight (for Romania). In all baseline estimations we had to list-wise delete a total of 8% of the observations due to these sources (see above). In order to ascertain whether this causes any potential bias of our results, we build a multiple imputation (MI) model using regression imputation with chained equations for the missing values (and their interactions with other variables treating interactions as ‘just another variable’). We use 10 multiple imputed datasets with all remaining covariates, policy issue dummies, and the dependent variable as predictors. Additionally, we also include a variable indicating the number of party families represented in the support coalition, which should be beneficial for imputing the ideological divisiveness of the coalition. The MI results from Model 7 show that all our results firmly hold, now with Romania included, even across 23 EU countries.<sup>144</sup>

### *Testing the alternatives*

Our data from the Council allowed us to test the extent to which the coalition compromise underpins governments’ adopted policy positions. Regrettably, our test with EU policy-making does not enable us to test directly whether ministerial government prevails when the conditions for the compromise model are not given. This is due to the fact that it is often impossible to ascertain which

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<sup>144</sup> Using multiple imputations (as well as in ‘Model 4’ with the alternative measure of ideological divisiveness) we even find evidence that the effect of parliamentary oversight on the compromise is negative under majority governments (the opposite of Martin and Vanberg’s (2011) argument). Importantly, unreported analyses confirm that the marginal effect of oversight on the compromise under minority governments is still significantly positive.

national minister is responsible for dealing with an EU legislative proposal. Information on this is not generally reported and strategies to collect this information are not reliable.<sup>145</sup> However, what we are able to do here is test the predictive power of the compromise position against two other prominent alternatives that do not feature in our model: the median legislative party (see Baron 1991; Morelli 1999; Schofield and Laver 1990) and the PM party (e.g. Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). If our model provides a sufficient description of coalition policy-making as a game between compromises and ministerial discretion, the positions of the median and the PM parties should have little positive relationship with policy positions.

One complication in testing this claim is that the median legislative party's position in particular, but also the PM party's position, is often highly correlated with the compromise position as well as with the average minister's position (e.g. if the PM party also fills most portfolios). This may cause spurious correlations between policy positions and these party positions. Controlling for the compromise position can ameliorate this problem, but potentially introduces concerns about multicollinearity. We address this problem by estimating a series of models, gradually increasing a minimum absolute distance between the median or PM party's position and the compromise position. The first model includes all observations in our sample, the second model only those where the distance between compromise and median or PM position is more than 1 RILE

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<sup>145</sup> Participant lists of ministerial Council meetings could, in principle, serve as an indication of responsibility. Yet, in the 1990s, member states' Permanent Representatives to the EU attended a substantial amount of these meetings instead of the ministers and delivered pre-planned negotiation lines on their behalf. In addition, the accuracy of the participant lists is not very high. Speakers in official meetings and reported participants do not generally match. Moreover, as many pieces of legislation cover several portfolios they cannot be allocated to certain ministries in a straightforward manner.

scale points, the third model sets 2 scale points as the minimum difference, the third 3 scale points etc. We increase the minimum distance until our number of observations falls below 20% of the original sample. For the comparison with the median party we fall under 20% of the observations at a difference of 9 RILE scale points, whereas the same figure is 12 for the PM party. We include the median or PM party's position and the compromise position as well as all control variables from the last section in all estimations.


*Figure A3.2* shows the results for the coefficients on the compromise and the median or PM party's position for five models each. In parentheses we also report the correlation between the compromise position and the median or PM party's position. In general, the results demonstrate that neither the median nor the PM party's position is a significant positive predictor of adopted policy positions in any of the models when controlling for the compromise position. Moreover, the compromise position has a positive coefficient in most of the models; this is enough to be statistically significant in 6 out of 10 models. This is especially the case when comparing to the PM party in samples where the two positions do not correlate highly, i.e. at 9 or 12 scale points difference on the RILE.<sup>146</sup>

In total, these results suggest that our model of coalition policy-making is capturing the major dynamics between parties and we find no evidence that either the median or the PM party has to be considered in modelling the process of policy formulation.

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<sup>146</sup> While the correlations between the compromise and the PM party shrink significantly with distance between the two measures, the median party's position and the compromise are highly correlated in virtually any sample.

**FIGURE A3.2: COMPARISON OF COMPROMISE POSITION TO MEDIAN AND PM PARTY**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as horizontal lines. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.

### *Results on Martin and Vanberg (2011) sample*

An important feature of our main results is that we find no evidence that parliamentary oversight strengthens the relevance of the coalition compromise under majority rule, as argued in the work of Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2011). In fact, if anything, the results in Table 4.1 in the paper suggest that parliamentary institutions have a negative influence on the compromise under majority rule (negative coefficient on interaction between parliamentary oversight and the compromise position). However, this effect is not statistically significant and from a theoretical perspective – it seems to us – there is little reason to expect any negative impact of parliamentary institutions.

For some readers, the differences in our findings compared to that of Martin and Vanberg may instead raise concerns about our measure of parliamentary

institutions (taken from Winzen 2013). We want to alleviate these doubts by re-estimating our baseline model and allowing the effect of parliamentary institutions to vary between the countries included in Martin and Vanberg's (2011) seminal book (M&V) and those countries not included in their analysis. For this purpose, we construct a simple dummy that is '1' for the countries included in M&V (these are Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Ireland) and '0' otherwise. In order to avoid four-way interactions and following M&V's argument about the general benefit of legislative institutions, we do not consider the differential effect of parliamentary oversight under minority vs. majority rule here. Instead, we simply use a three-way interaction between the M&V sample dummy, parliamentary oversight, and the compromise position. Except for this difference we re-estimate our baseline model from Table 4.1 in the paper.

The results are reported as Model MV1 in *Table A3.6*. The expectations on the ideological range and executive coordination hold as expected. Interestingly however, the coefficient on the interaction term between parliamentary oversight and the compromise position is negative and statistically insignificant, but the three-way interaction indicating the additional effect for the countries in the M&V sample is strongly positive and highly significant. To investigate this further, we plot marginal effects of the compromise position depending on parliamentary oversight and separately for the M&V sample as well as for all other countries in *Figure A3.3*.

This illustrates nicely that we are able to replicate the finding by M&V – that strong parliaments help to police the compromise and make it more predictive of policy positions – for their sample of countries, but that the opposite, a negative relationship, emerges for the 17 countries we can add with our empirical approach. A few readers may still be concerned, as out of the countries we add, nine are post-communist and their parliamentary institutions may not be fully comparable to those in Western Europe and might be deficiently represented by

the Winzen composite measure. Therefore, Model MV2 performs the comparison between countries included in M&V and those not analysed in the book but excluding post-communist countries. The results are substantively the same.


**TABLE A3.6: ANALYSIS WITH M&V DUMMY**

	<b>Model MV1</b>	<b>Model MV2</b>
Compromise position	-0.214 (0.223)	-0.157 (0.466)
Ideological divisiveness	-0.089 (0.102)	-0.038 (0.100)
Ideological divisiveness x Compromise position	0.042 (0.017)**	0.041 (0.016)**
Executive coordination	-6.432 (3.582)*	-3.534 (3.649)
Executive coordination x Compromise position	0.720 (0.211)***	0.844 (0.257)***
Sample M&V	8.496 (6.323)	10.756 (9.046)
Parliamentary oversight	2.178 (3.601)	-1.554 (7.341)
Sample M&V x Parliamentary oversight	-18.321 (5.543)***	-20.528 (8.088)**
Sample M&V x Compromise position	-3.723 (0.748)***	-4.001 (0.914)***
Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position	-0.637 (0.377)	-0.742 (0.491)
Sample M&V x Parliamentary oversight x Compromise position	3.339 (0.665)***	3.595 (0.837)***
Control variables	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Policy issues	Policy issues
Number of policy issues	145	145
Number of countries	22	13
N	1,694	1,291
R <sup>2</sup> (within)	0.30	0.28

*Notes:* Both are fixed effects regressions; No observations for countries without coalition governments; Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, except for 'Model MV2' with errors clustered by policy issue; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

From our perspective, this makes it unlikely that the measure of parliamentary oversight we employ is simply inadequate. While we cannot ultimately rule out this claim, we think that our results rather point to the possibility that the very limited country sample in M&V might bias the effect of parliamentary institutions under majority rule. Regrettably, we have no answer as to why the effects of parliamentary institutions differ in the two samples of countries. This might be due to an unobserved confounder or to various idiosyncrasies of the five countries included in M&V.

**FIGURE A3.3: COMPROMISE POSITION, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT, AND M&V SAMPLE**



Notes: 95% confidence intervals as dashed lines; Histogram of observations as shaded areas.

### *Formal model extensions*

In the following, we discuss whether our results from the formal model of coalition policy-making in parliamentary systems hold in cases of coalitions

with more than two parties and a centrist proposing party. We also discuss the implications of nesting the game within the Council of the European Union.

#### Majority government coalitions of more than two parties

Consider a majority government composed of three parties A, B, and C. The initial proposal comes from party A and the other two parties can simultaneously propose an amendment. *Table A3.7* below summarises the payoffs for parties B and C.

**TABLE A3.7: PAYOFFS FOR PARTIES B AND C**

		Party B	
		Do not amend	Amend
Party C	Do not amend	$-x_b^2 - \frac{R^2}{3};$ $-x_c^2 - \frac{R^2}{3}$	$-\left(\frac{x_b}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_b;$ $-(x_c - \frac{x_b}{2})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3}$
	Amend	$-\left(x_b - \frac{x_c}{2}\right)^2 - \frac{R^2}{3};$ $-(\frac{x_c}{2})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_b$	$-\left(x_b - \frac{x_b + x_c}{3}\right)^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_b;$ $-(x_c - \frac{x_b + x_c}{3})^2 - \frac{R^2}{3} - w_b$

*Notes:* First payoff of party B, second payoff of party C. We disregard the case of  $x_c = x_b$ .

Consider first the case of a non-centrist proposer, that is  $x_c > x_b > x_a = 0$ . We start with the situation where neither party amends – the upper left quadrant in *Table A3.7*. This is a Nash equilibrium if  $w_b > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , since neither party has an incentive to change strategy unilaterally. If  $w_b < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , party C amends.



Party B then amends, if and only if  $w_b < (x_b - \frac{x_c}{2})^2 - (x_b - \frac{x_b+x_c}{3})^2 \equiv \theta(x_b, x_c)$ . Note also that, since  $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} > \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , party B will never amend first. Let  $\psi(w_b, x_c) \equiv \sqrt{w_b + \frac{x_c^2}{4}}$  and  $\psi(w_b, x_b, x_c) \equiv \sqrt{w_b + (\frac{2x_b-x_c}{3})^2}$ . The best reply of party A is: if  $w_b > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , propose  $\widehat{p}_a = 0$ ; if  $\theta(x_b, x_c) < w_b < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , propose  $\widehat{p}_a = x_c - \psi(w_b, x_c)$ ; otherwise, propose  $\widehat{p}_a = x_b + x_c - \psi(w_b, x_b, x_c)$ . The outcome is  $\dot{p} = x_b + x_c - \psi(w_b, x_b, x_c)$  if  $w_b < \theta(x_b, x_c)$ ,  $\dot{p} = x_c - \psi(w_b, x_c)$  if  $\theta(x_b, x_c) < w_b < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ , otherwise  $\dot{p} = 0$ . Note that party B matters only with regard to which compromise position will be adopted, but it is irrelevant as to whether a compromise, that is  $\dot{p} \neq 0$ , will be adopted. The circumstances under which party B amends are a subset of the circumstances under which party C does. The conclusion presented in the main text holds: we should expect compromise positions in case of more heterogeneous coalition governments (as  $x_c$  increases in this three party majority coalition), and when there are lower costs of challenging a proposal (as  $w_b$  decreases).

Consider now the case of a centrist proposer  $x_c > x_a = 0 > x_b$ . Party A's ideal policy is now located between those of the other two parties. It is in itself already more of a compromise than the positions of the other two parties. Nevertheless, we analyse when the outcome differs from A's position, representing therefore even more of a compromise. If  $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} > \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , party C again amends first and party B follows under that same circumstances analysed above. If  $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$ , the two parties simply switch roles. Results therefore hold and they can be easily extended to larger coalitions since the party that is located farthest away from the proposer drives the results.

### A centrist agenda-setter in minority governments

Consider now the same configuration, that is  $x_b > x_a = 0 > x_c$ , but in the case of a minority government. In other words, the opposition party C is closer to the proposer party A than to the other government party B. Again, we can produce expectations about when the outcome differs from A's position.

The strategies of the three parties are the same as those described in the paper. The only difference is that Party C's ideal policy now takes negative values,  $x_c < 0$ . Recall that  $\psi(x_b, x_c) \equiv (x_c - \frac{x_b}{2})^2 - (\frac{2x_c - x_b}{3})^2$ . The outcome is (more of) a compromise position, that is  $\dot{p} \neq 0$ , if

- $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \max[\psi(x_b, x_c); \frac{3x_c^2}{4}]$
- $w_b < x_b^2 - (\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3})^2$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) > w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$
- $\frac{3x_c^2}{4} > w_c > \psi(x_b, x_c)$
- $w_c < \min[\psi(x_b, x_c); \frac{3x_c^2}{4}]$

We have to consider two cases. In the first case,  $x_c < -3x_b$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ . In this circumstance, the outcome differs from A's ideal policy if

- $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$
- $w_c < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$

There is no difference from the equilibriums analysed in the paper. We are however considering an opposition party C which is located quite far away from the two parties. Its distance from A is three times the government range.

In the second case,  $x_c > -3x_b$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$ . In this circumstance the outcome differs from A's ideal policy if

- $w_b < \frac{3x_b^2}{4}$  and  $w_c > \psi(x_b, x_c)$

- $w_b < x_b^2 - \left(\frac{2x_b - x_c}{3}\right)^2$  and  $\psi(x_b, x_c) > w_c > \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$
- $w_c < \frac{3x_c^2}{4}$

In the first set of inequalities, in the case of an ideologically homogeneous support coalition (as  $x_c$  approaches zero -  $x_a$ ) or weaker parliamentary oversight (as  $w_c$  increases), we should expect a compromise position that differs from zero under the same conditions as those in majority government. The second set of inequalities represents a situation of intermediate levels of ideological homogeneity and oversight. Nevertheless, as the parliamentary support coalition becomes more homogeneous (as  $x_c$  approaches zero -  $x_a$ ) or parliamentary oversight weaker (as  $w_c$  increases), it approaches the same conditions as those under majority government. Otherwise, it approaches the first case of minority government. The third inequality is the same as in the first case of minority government.

The conditions that lead to an amendment of party A's proposal are unaltered, but because now A's proposal is more centrist, the substantive impact of these factors is lower. In other words, any given compromise is naturally closer to A's ideal policy if  $x_b > x_a > x_c$  than if  $x_c > x_b > x_a$ . So, say, the same increase in the heterogeneity of the parliamentary support coalition should increase the likelihood of having a compromise position in both cases, but the size of the effect would be smaller when the proposer is centrally located.

#### Nesting the game within the Council of the European Union

The empirical test of our model evaluates whether the degree to which the compromise position is reflected in the negotiation positions of the ministers of the Council varies with the ideological divisiveness in the government's support coalition as well as executive and legislative institutions. This approach has several benefits. However, these positions are formulated on the basis of a bill

proposed by the Commission and, maybe, amended by the EP. We consider here whether this context has implications for our model.

The DEU dataset records the governments' negotiation positions at the earliest possible stage of the legislative process, when information about other governments' positions is most scarce. The key issue is whether governments have strong incentives to misrepresent their positions before the Council. Accordingly, we evaluate whether models of legislative bargaining with incomplete information have implications that must be taken into account in our analysis. Most of these models are centred on an uninformed proposer, which can be the Commission, making an offer to a receiver. For our discussion, it is useful to consider two types of receivers: conservatives who prefer a small policy change, and reformists who prefer a large change. The proposer belongs to the latter group.

Consider the standard Nash bargaining solution where a proposer makes to a receiver a take-it-or-leave-it offer for dividing a pie. The receiver can either have a low disagreement value (a reformist) or a high disagreement value (a conservative). The proposer is more likely to make a conservative offer if the probability of a reformist type is low and the difference, in terms of proposer utility, between a conservative and a reformist offer is small (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). This result indicates that a reformist could be better off if she can manipulate the proposer's belief about her type. Whether this is possible is far from certain, however.

In an important model on veto threats where the receiver sends a costless signal to the proposer (Matthews 1989; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007), the baseline outcome is an uninformative babbling equilibrium where each type of receiver adopts the same mixed strategy over the set of possible signals. A separating equilibrium, where each type sends a distinct signal, does not exist. The most informative equilibrium consists of only the most reformist receivers – those even more reformists than the proposer – signalling their support and

conservative receivers issuing a veto threat and gaining concessions. The implication of this model for our context is that only the governments which want a more radical reform than the Commission have incentives to distinguish themselves from the others. Additionally, a risk of negotiation failure makes a reformist receiver even more likely to compromise than a conservative (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). On the other hand, McCarty (1997) shows how a reformist receiver may instead reject a first-period proposal to build a reputation as conservative and obtain a better outcome from a second-period proposal (the positions of the reformist receiver and the proposer must be sufficiently different for this dynamic to hold).

In sum, these models do not offer obvious implications to take into account in our analysis. A reformist government may have an incentive to manipulate the proposer's belief about her type when reputation is important. In other words, it may report a more conservative position. However, this pooling may not survive if there is a risk of failure (i.e. the bill is not adopted) or for strongly reformist governments.

Moreover, these incentives are rooted in the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the proposer's offer of these models. This setup confers a significant power to the proposer and, therefore, strong incentives for the receiver to manipulate him. In the Council, any government can propose amendments and decisions require supermajority, if not unanimous consent. The EP is another veto player in the ordinary legislative procedure. Open rule, supermajority, and parliamentary involvement make voting (veto) power more important than proposal power. Under these circumstances, a proposer has limited opportunities to shape outcomes and a receiver has weak incentives to misrepresent her views. Accordingly, a minister should have weak incentives to misrepresent her initial negotiation position before the Council.

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## APPENDIX 4

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This appendix provides supporting information on Paper 4.

### *Summary statistics*

In addition to Table 5.2 in the paper, *Table A4.1* below depicts summary statistics of question-demeaned opinion and salience by country instead of policy area.

**TABLE A4.1: VARIATION IN QUESTION-DEMEANED OPINION AND SALIENCE WITHIN COUNTRIES**

	Opinion				Salience			
	Mean	SD	Max	Min	Mean	SD	Max	Min
AT	-7.22	14.26	-43.46	31.79	2.25	3.66	-7.27	13.44
BE	-2.19	7.35	-18.79	16.43	6.00	4.96	-15.44	20.23
BU	6.63	13.60	-24.76	35.88	-8.30	7.20	-32.54	2.88
CY	3.76	10.54	-24.24	33.03	1.21	3.73	-13.04	14.24
CZ	-3.37	9.48	-40.04	26.79	2.23	4.31	-15.68	13.13
DE	-4.33	11.42	-30.30	25.54	3.80	3.65	-5.13	17.08
DK	-4.66	11.78	-44.13	36.96	3.82	3.59	-4.83	17.22
EE	0.29	7.35	-21.72	18.79	-3.82	5.20	-24.63	9.14
EL	1.93	9.25	-22.92	30.92	6.41	5.40	-16.69	23.16
ES	2.59	8.71	-20.30	27.28	-4.35	6.51	-21.14	9.21
FI	-4.57	10.63	-38.86	18.01	4.87	3.70	-9.97	14.65
FR	-1.61	8.32	-29.31	25.40	2.61	2.98	-5.69	14.52
HU	1.86	7.98	-40.78	26.96	-0.21	5.47	-28.32	15.49
IE	2.77	8.23	-19.10	28.13	-4.75	8.04	-26.03	24.96
IT	0.25	10.91	-23.22	30.73	-0.23	4.48	-23.58	20.15

LT	2.21	9.26	-29.23	29.07	-6.34	6.29	-35.74	4.55
LU	-4.10	10.35	-31.85	19.61	2.63	4.36	-9.16	18.32
LV	0.01	7.60	-28.88	20.14	-2.68	5.07	-22.70	11.95
MT	4.46	9.59	-27.32	34.31	-5.30	6.64	-32.27	11.55
NL	-4.89	10.74	-29.02	33.72	4.00	4.52	-28.54	16.43
PL	2.95	9.14	-21.47	26.34	-1.70	3.86	-26.41	9.40
PT	2.11	7.27	-19.26	23.57	-4.78	5.59	-22.53	13.65
RO	7.57	13.64	-22.83	45.16	-7.86	5.87	-31.04	6.51
SE	-0.78	13.80	-33.60	29.63	2.64	4.34	-14.19	15.80
SI	2.73	8.51	-25.49	23.51	3.61	4.65	-22.04	14.23
SK	0.73	8.06	-32.22	21.95	1.83	4.53	-21.88	12.67
UK	-2.52	8.80	-27.44	20.41	-0.65	4.50	-13.93	18.72
TOTAL	0.00	10.64	-44.13	45.16	0.00	6.53	-35.74	24.96

Notes: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom.

This demonstrates that the average differences in opinion and salience across countries are rather small, i.e. within 10 to 15 percentage points for both measures. Importantly, these differences do not seem to follow any obvious structure. In particular, EU policy-making is not consistently more salient in the old than in the new member states or in the big than in the small. While it is true that Bulgarians and Romanians regard EU policies as least salient, citizens in other new and small member states such as Slovenia or the Czech Republic care more about EU policies than Italians and as much as French or Germans.

### *Variable definitions, sources, and data collection*

Table A4.2 provides an overview of the definitions and sources of all main variables used in the paper (in the models in Tables 5.4 + 5.5).

**TABLE A4.2: OVERVIEW OF VARIABLES' DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Source</b>
<i>Policy change</i>	<p>'1' = Policy change occurred (implementation degree <math>\geq 80</math>)</p> <p>'0' = No change occurred (implementation degree <math>&lt; 80</math>)</p>	Author's own data
<i>Congruence</i>	<p>'1' = Policy change occurred and opinion majority in favour of change, or no change occurred and opinion majority against change</p> <p>'0' = Otherwise</p>	Author's own data, Eurobarometer survey series
<i>Most salient opinion (five/ten)</i>	0-100, simple average of support for policy change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) in five/ten countries with highest salience on the question	Eurobarometer survey series
<i>Least salient opinion (five/ten)</i>	0-100, simple average of support for policy change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) in five/ten countries with lowest salience on the question	Eurobarometer survey series
<i>EU-wide opinion</i>	0-100, EU-wide support for policy change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal)	Eurobarometer survey series
<i>Salience</i>	100 minus share of DK/refusal responses as percentage of all responses	Eurobarometer survey series
<i>Opinion majority size</i>	0-50, absolute value of support for policy change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) minus 50	Eurobarometer survey series
<i>EU-wide opinion majority size</i>	0-50, absolute value of EU-wide support for policy change (as percentage, excluding DK/refusal) minus 50	
<i>EU competence level</i>	<p>'1' = Mainly national competence</p> <p>'2' = Mixed competence</p> <p>'3' = Mainly EU competence</p>	Author's own coding following Börzel (2005) and Hix and Høyland (2011)
<i>Decision rule</i>	<p>'1' = QMV</p> <p>'2' = Unclear decision rule</p> <p>'3' = Unanimity</p>	Author's own coding



### Data collection

Policy issues were selected by screening all ‘Standard’, ‘Special’, and ‘Flash’ Eurobarometers with a fieldwork start date between 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004 and 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2010 for the following key terms: ‘oppose’, ‘agree’, ‘approve’, ‘favour’, ‘for it or against it’, ‘do you think’, ‘in your opinion’, ‘do you believe’, ‘would you say’, ‘should’, and ‘would you like’. For each question item that contained these terms, I further ascertained whether it fulfilled the following four criteria:

- 1) *Opinion*: The item asked respondents for their personal opinion on a policy issue, or policy change, rather than whether some policy is ‘useful’, ‘important’, or ‘efficient’.
- 2) *No conditionality*: The item surveyed straight opinion on the policy without hypothetical or conditional twists (e.g. ‘given that X, would you oppose Y’).
- 3) *Specificity*: The item wording was specific enough for human coders to be able to ascertain implementation.
- 4) *Competence*: The implementation of the policy lay within the potential competences of the EU level, and given this competence, the EU had a realistic chance of unilaterally implementing the policy.<sup>147</sup> This excluded any questions on areas with exclusive national competences, but it in-

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<sup>147</sup> The second criterion led to the exclusion of questions on EU enlargement to Switzerland and Iceland, as these countries have proven considerably unwilling to join the EU and unilateral implementation from the EU side is not realistic. In turn, Turkey and countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe are generally assumed to be willing to join the EU, and the EU has a realistic chance of enabling their accession.

cluded areas of weak and potentially growing competence (e.g. public health, nuclear energy).<sup>148</sup>

All questions that fulfilled these four criteria were included in the final dataset. In addition, 29 policy issues (relating to 31 implementation opportunities) were included that mildly violated one or two of these criteria.<sup>149</sup> They were earmarked and in the section on robustness checks below I show that their exclusion does not influence the results of the analyses. In total, 207 Eurobarometer questions on 171 distinct policy issues were identified. But the responsiveness and congruence analyses in the paper and in the robustness check section below had to be performed on a slightly reduced dataset of 201 questions on 167 policy issues. For three questions implementation could not be ascertained due to a lack of cooperation by the DG Agriculture and Rural Development. For two questions the EU was unable to implement policy within the maximum implementation time lag (see below) due to the timing of the next negotiations of the Multiannual Financial Framework, and for one question public opinion estimates were fully missing from the Eurobarometer data provided by GESIS.

As various question formats were used across the 167 policy issues, for each format it was necessary to decide which response options relate to support for policy change and which to endorsement of the status quo. For instance, ‘totally

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<sup>148</sup> As many policy areas are ‘shared competences’ between the EU and the national level, the EU has a chance to implement policies at any time, even though no EU legislation is in force so far. In addition, treaty change can provide the EU with more competences, but ‘candidate’ items rarely related to issues of exclusive national competence.

<sup>149</sup> The data also includes three policy issues regarding the euro currency. For these cases public opinion was only measured in the countries that had adopted the common currency. The general logics of joint decision-making at the EU level should nevertheless apply and the questions were therefore included in the data.

in favour' and 'somewhat in favour' were merged as both representing support for policy change, while 'totally disagree' and 'tend to disagree' were joined as support for the status quo. Allocating response options was mostly straightforward except in the following notable cases:

- 1) *Response indicating indifference*: A very small number of questions offered a 'neither ... nor ...' or alternative option indicating that respondents were indifferent between policy change and the status quo. In these cases, I counted half of the indifferent respondents to be supportive of policy change and the other half in favour of the status quo.
- 2) *Bi-directional policy change*: Some questions relating to the EU budget offered two directions of policy change, i.e. an increase or decrease in the budget, as well as a 'no change' or 'maintain' option. For some of these items, the question text clearly suggested that respondents should view either an increase or a decrease as change. Hence, either increase or decrease was coded as support for policy change and the other response option as well as the 'no change' option were coded as support for the status quo. If the question text provided no suggestion, an increase in the budget was assumed to represent change.

For all questions, support for policy change (as a percentage) was calculated on the basis of opinion-revealing responses, i.e. DKs and refusals were excluded. In contrast, salience (as a percentage) was calculated as 100 minus the fraction of DK and refusal responses on the basis of all responses. Post-stratification

weights provided by the Eurobarometer were used to obtain country and EU-wide estimates of opinion and salience.<sup>150</sup>

Human coders ascertained the implementation record for each policy issue, wherever possible on the basis of publicly available information by the EU institutions, and where necessary by written questions to the DGs of the Commission. Coders assessed the implementation degree, i.e. to what extent the policy change had occurred (scale from 0-100), and the implementation date, i.e. when the change was agreed. Thereby, they also checked whether the proposed policy change had already been implemented *before* the survey's fieldwork, i.e. whether the question asked about support for the status quo rather than about policy change. This was the case for 26 issues (relating to 30 implementation opportunities). For these cases I swapped the public opinion estimates so that they represented support for change and coders checked whether change occurred to the (newly established) status quo. In the section on robustness checks below I demonstrate that excluding these issues yields exactly the same results. Coders also provided URL internet addresses to all information used as well as a short written justification for their assessment of the implementation degree. The coding instructions used are attached at the end of this appendix. One coder first collected the implementation records, before a second coder performed an independent search. A small number of disagreements between the coders were settled in discussion.

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<sup>150</sup> In order to calculate EU-wide estimates of opinion and salience, I randomly sampled 2,000 individuals from the data. If I instead used all 25,000-30,000 observations available in the data, random measurement error in the EU-wide estimate would be substantially smaller than in the country-level estimates of opinion (based on only about 1,000 observations for most countries), which could drive results. However, when using all observations for the EU-wide estimate, results (Models R5 and R6 in Table 5.4 and Model C2 in Table 5.5) are identical except for the coefficient on 'most salient opinion' in Model R6, which is not significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.14.


While coders were generally advised to ascertain the implementation degree as the ‘percentage of the proposed change that was implemented’, more specific guidelines were provided for two types of issues:

- 1) *EU enlargement*: As question items on enlargement were asked three times within the period of Eurobarometers covered (10½ years), coders were instructed to consider a 6-year (instead of indefinite) implementation lag from the start date of survey fieldwork. They ascertained the number of stages (16 in total, from negotiations over an EU Association Agreement to the joining date) countries working towards EU accession had completed within this period. The implementation degree was defined as the percentage (rounded to the nearest 5) of completed stages out of the total number of remaining stages at the start date of survey fieldwork.
- 2) *Differentiated integration*: In some areas (justice and home affairs, open coordination) EU-level policies are agreed but not applied in all geographies (see e.g. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). In these cases of differentiated integration, coders weighted the implementation degree by the number of countries that the change applied to, e.g. if the implementation was complete but only applied in 24 out of 27 countries, the implementation degree was 90 (rounded to the nearest 5).

For the implementation date coders were instructed to determine the ‘date on which the policy change is passed’. In the case of secondary law, this is the date all relevant EU institutions (e.g. EP, the Council) arrived at a political agreement on the relevant legislative act (as reported in EUR-Lex). In the case of primary law, it is the day the last national parliament ratified the relevant international treaty.

The histogram in *Figure A4.1* shows the distribution of the implementation lag (implementation date minus start date of survey fieldwork) across the data. This reveals two peaks in the data: questions on policy change are either fielded in the phase of policy preparation (i.e. 1000-2000 days before a political agreement is reached) or shortly before policy implementation (i.e. less than 500 days before an agreement is reached). This supports the argument in the paper that the DGs use public opinion as a ‘bargaining chip’, either when negotiating amongst themselves during policy preparation, or when defending policy positions vis-à-vis the Council or the EP in the ‘end game’ of negotiations.

**FIGURE A4.1: HISTOGRAM OF IMPLEMENTATION LAG**



*Notes:* Based on cases with implementation degree greater than 0.

Compared to studies of policy representation in the US (e.g. Gilens 2005, 2012), in which 90% of policies that are implemented have a time lag between the survey’s fieldwork date and the implementation date of less than two years,

the median implementation lag in the EU data is four years (1427 days or 1315 days – when excluding outliers, see below). On the one hand, this may be evidence of the complex and lengthy policy process at the EU level. On the other hand, it may also be due to the fact that Eurobarometer questions are posed for the purpose of policy preparation (see above), whereas US survey companies presumably pose questions in times of public attention, e.g. shortly before votes in Congress. To the extent that this conjecture is accurate, the data here may suffer from less endogeneity bias than US data, as politicians who want to manipulate opinion should be less able to predict future implementation the more distant it is in time (also see robustness checks in the paper).

However, the long implementation lags also pose problems, since opinion on policy issues may change over time and it seems problematic, at the very least, to speak of ‘responsiveness’, if citizens’ preferences are implemented after eight or 10 years. For this reason, I decided to correct the implementation degree to 0 for any implemented change that happened after more than five and a half years (or 2008 days). This cut-off was chosen as the distribution of implementation lags starkly drops down after 2000 days (see Figure A4.1) and its long tail seems mainly to represent outliers, making up less than 10% of observations. In the section on robustness checks below, I also show that I obtain substantively the same results, with some variations in statistical significance, when using a cut-off of five years or when including all implementations, even after 10 years.

The binary implementation variable used in the paper was constructed on the basis of the implementation degree and is ‘1’ if the implementation degree was 80 or more, and ‘0’ otherwise. This threshold of 80% implementation is in line with established practice in the field (see e.g. Gilens 2005: 782). Importantly, apart from policy issues on EU enlargement only five issues were assessed with an implementation degree greater than 0 but smaller than 80. In the section on robustness checks below I demonstrate that setting the threshold for implementation to 50 instead of 80 does not affect any results.

In the paper, I discuss the question of sponsor desirability bias in the Eurobarometer data. In particular, I argue that relative figures of support across countries are still a valid proxy of cross-country differences in opinion, as it is hard to influence these figures through question design and as it is unclear whether the Commission has any incentive to do so. In this respect, I would like to acknowledge that it might be possible to construct questions in such a way as to artificially obtain higher figures of support by – say – French or Italian respondents, for instance, by presenting the policy in a certain frame. But this may at the same time have unintended consequences, lowering the support of the Germans or the Dutch. Control is limited. Moreover, while occasionally it may be strategically beneficial for the Commission to showcase high support in certain countries whose governments are blocking legislation, there is no reason to assume that this bias is systematic across policies. Lastly, one should consider that many US studies rely on questions from survey companies that are conducted for particular media outlets with a particular political slant. Absence of sponsor desirability bias is unlikely in such questions. In best case, biases of different companies cancel out on average.

#### EU competence level

The competence level of the EU with regard to implementing policy change was coded on the basis of assessments in Börzel (2005) and Hix and Høyland (2011).

#### Decision rule

The decision rule in the Council of the European Union that has to be used to agree policy change was assessed on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty rules. In some cases, the legal basis on which the change would be agreed was not clear. The decision rule for such issues was recorded as ‘Unclear decision rule’.



In contrast to theoretical expectations, my results in the responsiveness analyses indicate that unanimity as decision rule makes policy change more likely instead of less likely. I suspect that this result could be due to some pre-selection by the DGs, which perhaps only put policy questions with unanimity as decision rule on surveys when they expect strong and uniform support across countries and a real chance of implementation, while they may be less selective on QMV issues. Alternatively, there may also be complex interactions with the EU competence level, as the positive effect of unanimity turns insignificant once I do not control for the competence level.

### *Factor analyses of opinion and salience*

In the paper, I report the results of a factor analysis of question-demeaned support for policy change in order to map the EU's public opinion space. Here, I provide a more substantive interpretation of the policy contrasts behind the first (old vs. new member states) and second factor (northern vs. southern member states) by investigating the factor scores of the question items. It turns out that factor one relates to the difference between prioritising environmental protection and phasing out the common agriculture policy (CAP) vs. support for enlargement of the union. While the publics in the old member states are relatively more supportive of ambitious changes in environmental protection as well as cutting the CAP's budget, the citizens in the new member states prioritise the inclusion of more countries (without a specific focus). In turn, the second factor pits southern publics that prioritise support for federalist competence extension (especially in foreign affairs and symbolic politics) and some integration in financial affairs (transaction tax, consumer rights in financial services) against northern publics that favour differentiated enlargement (esp. Balkans, Ukraine) and cuts to the CAP.

These substantive differences in opinion are in line with the substantive differences found in studies of governments' initial policy positions in the Council (Thomson 2009, 2011a). For instance, these studies also find that old and new member states differ starkly in their preferences regarding the CAP and harmonisation of policies. Similarly, they also find that the north-south divide relates to questions of regulation vs. market-based solutions, which is in line with my finding that publics in the south are more in favour of regulatory projects in financial affairs (such as financial transaction tax or consumer rights in financial services). Taking into account that these studies could not cover policy positions on enlargement or federalist competence extension, which are covered in the data used here, the overlap in substantive meaning of the two divides (new vs. old, north vs. south) is quite striking.

In addition, I here also report results of a factor analysis of question-demeaned salience (*Table A4.3*). Using the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of an eigenvalue greater than 1, I retain five factors with the principal factor method. Importantly, the first two factors explain about 66% of all variation in question-demeaned salience. *Figure A4.2* plots the factor loadings for factors one and two. In contrast to the map of opinion, the country contrasts on the two factors have less straightforward interpretations. On factor one, the starkest contrast is between Finland on the one hand and Spain and Portugal on the other hand. But it is no straightforward north-south divide, as Greece is close to Finland and the Baltic states are close to Spain. On factor two, the opposing poles are Slovakia and Hungary vs. the UK and Ireland. While this configuration is close to a divide between new vs. old member states, Cyprus, Malta, and – to some extent – Poland and Slovenia are closer to the new member states. Hence, it could be characterised as a divide between post-communist vs. Western member states (with the notable exceptions of Poland and Slovenia).

**TABLE A4.3: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN SALI-  
ENCE**


	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Uniqueness
	Eigenvalue 7.31	Eigenvalue 4.64	Eigenvalue 1.41	Eigenvalue 1.25	Eigenvalue 1.19	
at	0.405	0.107	-0.095	<b>0.668</b>	0.192	0.332
be	<b>0.721</b>	-0.111	0.330	0.116	-0.325	0.240
cy	-0.112	0.288	-0.111	-0.181	0.017	0.859
cz	<b>0.544</b>	<b>-0.627</b>	-0.005	-0.142	0.287	0.209
de	<b>0.613</b>	0.255	0.019	0.284	-0.341	0.362
dk	<b>0.631</b>	0.256	<b>0.475</b>	0.095	0.195	0.265
ee	<b>-0.551</b>	<b>-0.473</b>	0.328	0.039	0.260	0.296
el	<b>0.745</b>	-0.144	-0.143	-0.095	-0.088	0.388
es	<b>-0.657</b>	0.268	0.046	0.189	-0.012	0.459
fi	<b>0.827</b>	0.004	0.220	-0.244	-0.049	0.206
fr	0.190	<b>0.564</b>	0.371	0.164	-0.245	0.421
hu	-0.103	<b>-0.725</b>	-0.139	0.224	-0.263	0.324
ie	<b>-0.566</b>	<b>0.642</b>	-0.086	0.091	0.262	0.183
it	0.124	<b>0.624</b>	-0.361	-0.157	-0.041	0.438
lt	<b>-0.549</b>	<b>-0.589</b>	0.007	-0.090	-0.281	0.263
lu	<b>0.578</b>	0.387	-0.144	0.233	-0.011	0.441
lv	<b>-0.477</b>	<b>-0.642</b>	0.285	0.043	0.031	0.276
mt	<b>-0.525</b>	0.315	0.069	-0.385	-0.006	0.472
nl	<b>0.704</b>	0.219	-0.017	-0.304	-0.094	0.355
pl	<b>-0.457</b>	0.036	0.302	-0.139	-0.329	0.571
pt	<b>-0.652</b>	0.136	-0.245	0.194	0.098	0.450
se	<b>0.607</b>	-0.028	0.194	-0.169	0.447	0.364
si	<b>0.576</b>	-0.096	-0.322	-0.112	0.166	0.516
sk	0.280	<b>-0.745</b>	0.015	0.167	0.216	0.293
uk	-0.373	<b>0.641</b>	0.430	0.050	0.221	0.213

*Notes:* Principal factor method; five retained factors (eigenvalue > 1); factor loadings greater than  $\pm 0.45$  in bold; at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxembourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom

In substantive terms, the factor loadings reveal that factor one relates to the difference between those national publics for whom questions of animal protection, research, and space exploration are important (Spain, Portugal, ...) vs. those that find questions of technology (such as stem cell research) and enlargement more salient (Finland, Greece, ...). Factor two is easier to interpret

with regard to its substantive meaning: it pits the difference between publics that care about the CAP, enlargement, and the EU budget (post-communist countries) against those that care more about financial services and constitutional matters (Western European countries). In total, the analysis reveals some structure of salience across countries, but it is rather unrelated to well-known political cleavages from the literature.

**FIGURE A4.2: THE EU’S PUBLIC SALIENCE SPACE**



Notes: Factor loadings for factors one and two. at: Austria; be: Belgium; cy: Cyprus; cz: The Czech Republic; dk: Denmark; ee: Estonia; fi: Finland; fr: France; de: Germany; el: Greece; hu: Hungary; ie: Ireland; it: Italy; lv: Latvia; lt: Lithuania; lu: Luxembourg; mt: Malta; nl: The Netherlands; pl: Poland; pt: Portugal; si: Slovenia; sk: Slovakia; es: Spain; se: Sweden; uk: The United Kingdom

*Additional robustness checks*

In addition to the robustness checks presented in the paper, I perform several additional checks regarding the responsiveness and the congruence analyses in this section. Wherever possible, these checks are based on re-estimations of

Model R1 and Model C3 from the paper. All results are reported in *Tables A4.4* and *A4.5*.

First, I address two concerns regarding the measurement of implementation. On the one hand, the binary measure of implementation is based on a continuous measure (0-100) and successful implementation is recorded if at least 80% of the proposed policy change was implemented. This threshold established in the literature (Gilens 2005, 2012) may seem arbitrary and therefore Models R1 and C1 re-estimate all key results on responsiveness and congruence with a threshold value for successful implementation of 50%. This does not affect the results at all. On the other hand, using a binary measure of implementation is necessary for the congruence analysis, but not the responsiveness analysis, where the binary measure removes variation from the data. To test whether this has any consequences, I re-estimate the main model from the responsiveness analysis with the continuous implementation degree as dependent variable and linear regression with a random effect on the level of policy issues in Model R2. Again, the substantive results remain unchanged.

Second, I address two concerns regarding problematic policy issues in the dataset. As I have alluded to above, 29 policy issues were included in the data that mildly violate the four criteria that had, in principle, to be fulfilled for inclusion. To check whether these ‘borderline’ issues drive any results, I perform the main responsiveness and congruence analyses without these issues in Models R3 and C2. The results are exactly the same when excluding these issues. On the other hand, the coding of the implementation records revealed that the questions relating to 26 policy issues in the data surveyed support for a status quo rather than for policy change. In these cases, I swapped the public opinion estimates so as to reflect support for change. Given the paramount consequences of question design and wording on opinion estimates, asking for support of a change or disapproval of an existing status quo may not be comparable.

**TABLE A4.4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON RESPONSIVENESS ANALYSIS**

	<b>Model R1</b>	<b>Model R2</b>	<b>Model R3</b>	<b>Model R4</b>	<b>Model R5</b>	<b>Model R6</b>	<b>Model R7</b>	<b>Model R8</b>
Most salient opinion	0.459 (0.140)***	1.067 (0.311)***	0.429 (0.153)***	0.529 (0.166)***	0.449 (0.139)***	0.205 (0.077)***	0.332 (0.103)***	0.330 (0.206)
Least salient opinion	-0.158 (0.135)	-0.367 (0.327)	-0.149 (0.167)	-0.294 (0.139)**	-0.137 (0.133)	-0.082 (0.068)	-0.115 (0.104)	
Pro-anti integration issue							-10.755 (7.119)	
Pro-anti integration issue x Most salient opinion							0.078 (0.090)	
Vote-weighted most salient opinion								-0.026 (0.206)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Random effects	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues	Policy issues
Number of policy issues	167	167	139	143	167	167	167	167
N	201	201	171	174	201	201	201	201
Robustness check	Imple- mentation from ≥50%	Continu- ous DV	Exclude items violating inclusion criteria	Exclude items on support for SQ	Indefinite imple- mentation lag	Imple- mentation lag of five years	Interac- tion pro- anti inte- gration issues	Vote- weighted most salient opinion

*Note:* All are mixed effects logistic regressions (except for ‘Model R2’, which is a mixed effects linear regression); Variable ‘Most / least salient opinion’ is average opinion across the five countries whose citizens viewed the issue as most / least salient; Standard errors in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**TABLE A4.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS**

	<b>Model C1</b>	<b>Model C2</b>	<b>Model C3</b>	<b>Model C4</b>	<b>Model C5</b>	<b>Model C6</b>
Opinion majority size	-0.127 (0.060)**	-0.118 (0.067)*	-0.110 (0.062)*	-0.088 (0.060)	-0.152 (0.061)**	-0.244 (0.083)***
Salience	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.061 (0.020)***
Opinion majority size x Salience	0.002 (0.001)**	0.002 (0.001)**	0.002 (0.001)**	0.001 (0.001)*	0.002 (0.001)***	0.003 (0.001)***
Pro-anti integration issue						-7.942 (2.457)***
Pro-anti integration issue x Salience						0.083 (0.025)***
Pro-anti integration issue x Opinion majority size						0.232 (0.108)**
Pro-anti integration issue x Opinion majority size x Salience						-0.002 (0.001)**
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Questions, Countries	Questions, Countries	Questions, Countries	Questions, Countries	Questions, Countries	Countries
Random effects						Policy issues
Number of questions	96	78	90	96	96	201
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27	27
N	2,554	2,082	2,394	2,554	2,554	5,319
Robustness check	Implemen- tation from ≥50%	Exclude items vio- lating in-	Exclude items on support for	Indefinite implemen- tation lag	Implemen- tation lag of five years	Interaction pro-anti integration

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clusion  
criteria

---

status quo

issues

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*Notes:* All are fixed effects logistic regressions, except for 'Model C6', which is a mixed effects logistic regression; Standard errors in parentheses;  
\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



But Models R4 and C3 show that all results hold when excluding these policy issues.

Third, I test the results' sensitivity with regard to the maximum implementation lag that still counts as successful implementation. While I use five and a half years as maximum implementation lag in the paper to exclude outliers and ensure a close link between the measurement of opinion and implementation, I here re-estimate the main analyses with a maximum lag of five years and an indefinite lag<sup>151</sup>. The results are reported as Models R5, R6, C4, and C5. The baseline findings from the paper largely hold across all models. A maximum implementation lag of five years yields substantively the same results. With the indefinite lag, the findings on congruence become marginally weaker in terms of statistical significance. Importantly, the interaction between the opinion majority size and salience is still a borderline case for statistical significance at the 5% level with a p-value of 0.061.

Fourth, I check an important implication from Paper 1 of this thesis: if governments apply different modes of responsiveness to domestic public opinion on left-right and pro-anti integration issues, these modes may also be reflected in territorial representation. An implication of the 'sporadic mode' in Paper 1 is that public salience should be more strongly linked to policy representation on pro-anti integration issues compared to left-right issues. I test this implication with a dummy variable for policy issues in the data that relate to substantive pro-anti integration conflicts. In the responsiveness analysis, I interact this dummy variable with most salient opinion (Model R7). In the congruence analysis, I test a three-way interaction between the dummy for pro-anti integration

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<sup>151</sup> The indefinite lag is applied for all policy issues except enlargement, where a 6-year lag applies (see also above).

issues, the opinion majority size, and salience (Model C6).<sup>152</sup> The interaction in the responsiveness analysis is positive, as expected, but statistically insignificant. In the congruence analysis, the two-way interaction between salience and the pro-anti integration dummy is positive and highly statistically significant, indicating that salience directly increases the probability of congruence on pro-anti integration issues. Indeed, the marginal effect of salience is significant at a p-value of 0.031 for pro-anti integration issues, but insignificant for other issues. In contrast, the three-way interaction is negative and significant, indicating that the interaction of salience and the opinion majority size is more important for issues that are not conflicts over pro-anti integration (e.g. left-right conflicts). In fact, it turns out that the interaction effect is virtually zero for pro-anti integration issues.

These results demonstrate that salience is more important for territorial representation on pro-anti integration issues than other issues. Salience has an unconditional effect on congruence for pro-anti integration issues – irrespective of the opinion majority size. This confirms that territorial representatives (e.g. national governments) focus on salience when making policy on pro-anti integration. In turn, issues that do not relate to pro-anti integration drive the effect of the interaction between salience and the opinion majority size. Presumably, governments act more systematically on such issues and consider whether the crucial combination of salience and a sizeable opinion majority provides them with enough incentives to react to opinion. In sum, these findings provide some cross-validation of key results from Paper 1.

Last, I return to the robustness check regarding a regressive distribution of bargaining power in the Council which was performed for the congruence

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<sup>152</sup> In this model, I have to use a random effect for policy issues instead of fixed effects for questions, as the pro-anti integration dummy is a question-level variable.

analysis in the paper (Model RC1 in Table 5.6 in the paper). Here, I test whether a vote-weighted version of most salient opinion outperforms most salient opinion in the responsiveness analysis. For this purpose, I first rank the opinion of national publics by salience (as for ‘most salient opinion’) and then by the number of Council votes allotted to their country. I add the two ranks and define ‘vote-weighted most salient opinion’ as the simple average opinion of those national publics with a summed rank  $\leq 20$ .<sup>153</sup> Model R8 pits vote-weighted most salient opinion against most salient opinion. As expected, the vote-weighted version of opinion is not a statistically significant predictor of policy change. However, the coefficient on most salient opinion also turns statistically insignificant, with a p-value of 0.11. Hence, we have no evidence that it is necessary to account for a non-equal distribution of power between member states in territorial representation in the EU.

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<sup>153</sup> For instance, a national public opinion estimate would be included if opinion was the 4<sup>th</sup> by salience and the country was the 15<sup>th</sup> by votes.

# Implementation Check Codebook

When checking the implementation record for a proposed policy change, please adhere to the following rules:

1. Wherever possible use **official information from EU institutions** (e.g. the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, EU agencies). The websites of the European Commission as well as EUR-Lex are particularly helpful.
2. Wherever possible point to **legislative activity by the institutions** in order to determine whether policy change occurred. Most policy changes occur in the form of EU regulations and directives and their specific provisions. However, in some instances, informal activity by the institutions represents policy change (e.g. coordination effort, joint planning), or policy change occurs as treaty change.
3. Wherever official information on legislative activity is not sufficient to evaluate the implementation record use information from **objective sources**. These could be, in particular, Wikipedia and news agencies.
4. If the implementation record can neither be determined from official information nor from objective sources, please code the **implementation variables as missing** (blank cell) and add an explanation in the 'Comment' variable. (NOTE: Finding no evidence for implementation should be coded as 'no implementation' and not as missing. Meanwhile, missing should be coded where the information in official and objective sources is ambiguous or does not allow accurate assessment of the exact policy change proposed).

## Variables

### Implemented before survey?

YES = The proposed measure was already implemented by the time the survey was conducted ('political agreement' by Council / EP is sufficient in the case of legislation).

NO = The proposed measure was not already implemented by the time the survey was conducted ('political agreement' by Council / EP is sufficient in the case of legislation).

➔ IF YES: Check whether the change was abolished again after being implemented.

### Implementation Degree

0-100 = Indicates the percentage of the proposed policy change that was implemented following the time the survey was conducted ('political agreement' by Council / EP is sufficient in the case of legislation; last national ratification is needed for international treaties). For instance, if the proposed change is that Croatia becomes a member of the EU, the number of negotiation chapters that have been completed compared to the total number of chapters that have to be completed for admission indicates the degree of implementation.

### Implementation Time

DD/MM/YYYY = The date on which the policy change is passed (or the last significant change occurred in cases of partial implementation). In the case of legislation, this is the date on which the 'political agreement' is reached in all institutions that have to consent (e.g. Council and EP). In the case of international treaties, this is the date when the last national ratification took place. In the case of non-legislative change, this is the date when the proposed policy change was bindingly agreed upon by the relevant decision-makers.

### Sources

Web links to the relevant information sources should be included here.

### Comment

An informal explanation of the assessments should be included here (e.g. 'Data Protection Directive was passed by Council after EP amendments on 19/07/2010. It includes new provisions for the protection of minors that are 'special' in the sense that higher standards of protection apply compared to adults. Hence, policy change has occurred and to a degree of 100.')

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## APPENDIX 5

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This appendix provides supporting information on Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in the Conclusion. First, *Table A5.1* displays the classification of EU countries as those with weak (column 'Sum' < 0), medium ('Sum' = 0), and strong ('Sum' > 0) representation of their citizens on the domestic route according to the four criteria mentioned in the conclusion.

With regard to the first criterion, the three countries with the smallest district magnitude (see Paper 1) were assigned '1', the three countries with the biggest district magnitude '-1', and all others '0'. For the second criterion, I calculated the average change in the opposition parties' emphasis on EU integration (see Papers 1 and 2) for all CMP data available from 1990 onwards. Again, the top three countries were assigned '1', the bottom three '-1', and all others '0'. Regarding the public salience of the EU (see Paper 1), I assigned '1' to Denmark, Ireland, and France as the countries that have held the most referendums on the EU and of which two (Ireland and France) are also members of the euro. In turn, I assigned '-1' to Romania and Bulgaria, which have neither held any referendum on the EU nor joined the euro currency, events which created a lot of attention for EU issues during the crisis years. Lastly, with regard to institutions for managing EU affairs (see Paper 3) I assigned '1' to the three countries in the group of countries with executive coordination that also had the highest parliamentary oversight. In turn, I assigned '-1' to the three countries among those with no executive coordination that had the lowest parliamentary oversight, and '0' to all others.

**TABLE A5.1: QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE DOMESTIC ROUTE**

	Electoral system	Party competition on EU	Public salience of EU	EU affairs institutions	Sum
France	1	1	1	0	3
Denmark	0	0	1	1	2
Ireland	1	0	1	0	2
Austria	0	1	0	0	1
Latvia	0	0	0	1	1
Czech Republic	0	0	0	1	1
United Kingdom	1	0	0	0	1
Malta	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	-1	1	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	-1	0	0	-1
Greece	0	0	0	-1	-1
Belgium	0	0	0	-1	-1
Bulgaria	0	0	-1	0	-1
Netherlands	-1	0	0	0	-1
Romania	0	0	-1	0	-1
Germany	-1	0	0	0	-1
Spain	0	-1	0	0	-1
Cyprus	0	-1	0	-1	-2
<i>Criterion</i>	Majoritarian system	Party emphasis on integration	Events related to integration	Executive co-ordination, legislative oversight	
<i>Data</i>	Author's own data	CMP	Referendums, euro	Kassim (2013); Winzen (2013)	

### Trust in the EU

I measure institutional trust in the EU with the following item from the Eurobarometer series:

*'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The European Union'*

With the following response options:

*'Tend to trust'*

*'Tend not to trust'*

*'DK – Don't know'*

### Satisfaction with democracy

I measure satisfaction with how democracy works using the following item from the Eurobarometer series:

*'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)? Would you say you are...? How about the way democracy works in the European Union?'*

With the following response options:

*'Very satisfied'*

*'Fairly satisfied'*

*'Not very satisfied'*

*'Not at all satisfied'*

*'DK – Don't know'*



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