

**The London School of Economics and Political Science**

***Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956***

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International History

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## **Abstract**

This thesis deals with the Soviet Union's Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee. Chapter 1 outlines the domestic and international context which fostered the peace movement (provisional title) and endeavours to construct a narrative of the political and social situation which the Soviet Union found itself in after World War II (as a superpower and an empire leading the Socialist Bloc) in order to put forward the argument that the motivations for undertaking the project of the 'peace movement', above all, were of an international-political nature, rather than of an internal and domestic nature. Chapter 2 starts off with the Soviet project of establishing an international peace movement, including firstly the World Peace Congress, which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and then proceeds with the institutional, political and social development of the Campaign up to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not merely to chronicle the history of the Soviet Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying themes and organise them accordingly. Finally, Chapter 3 deals with internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task here is to construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through the institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate the relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions and its dependency on and implications for political decision-making processes within the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the Soviet Peace Committee and its affiliated institutions in the advancement of Cold War propaganda through the media (i.e. press, journalism, etc.), literature (i.e. novels, poems, etc.), film and political art (i.e. posters, caricature, etc.).

## **Conspiracy of Peace:**

### **The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946-1956**

#### **Table of Contents**

<b>Acknowledgement.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Chapter 1. The Political, Social and Ideological Origins of the Soviet Peace Movement</b>	<b>23</b>
Fall of an Alliance, Rise of ‘Peace’ .....	23
Peace Sells, but Who’s Buying?.....	38
A Revolutionary Theory of Peace .....	47
<b>Chapter 2. The Global Peace Campaign: Establishing the Soviet Brand of ‘Peace’ .....</b>	<b>63</b>
Cominform Beginnings.....	63
Signs of Revolt.....	88
Undermining the American-led European Project and the Biological Warfare Campaign.....	101
Expanding Beyond Europe and the Crisis of the Movement after Stalin’s Death.....	116
The Movement dithers, diplomacy returns, peace come crashing 1953-1956.....	134
<b>Chapter 3. The Internal Soviet Peace Campaign.....</b>	<b>154</b>
The Soviet Peace Committee: Bureaucracy of Peace.....	154
Performing Peace: Soviet Commedia dell’Pacem.....	169
The Peace Propaganda Industry.....	187
Internalisation: Consuming Peace.....	199
<b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>206</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>211</b>

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## INTRODUCTION

On March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2014, two days before the referendum in the Crimea which would become the starting point for what many are calling a new Cold War, a dramatic scene took place at the UN Security Council. Addressing the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk held up the UN Charter and accused Russia of violating it:<sup>1</sup>

*Addressing Mr Churkin directly, he said in Russian that Kiev was "looking for an answer to the question, whether Russians want war" with a country with whom it has "for decades had warm and friendly relations".*

*"I'm convinced that Russians do not want war," he said. "I hope that the Russian Government and the Russian president will heed the wishes of their people and that we return to dialogue and solve this conflict."*

*In response, Mr Churkin said: "Russia does not want war and nor do the Russians, and I'm convinced that Ukrainians don't want this either."*

*"Furthermore, we do not... interpret the situation in such terms. We don't want any further exacerbation of the situation."*

At the Hall of the UN Security Council, during the past decades since the end of World War II, many speeches about peace have been delivered and the word 'peace' and its derivatives have almost always been the most widely used. Many speeches were made especially during the Cold War and occupied much of the history of the United Nations (1946-1991). The Cold War was accompanied by constant recriminations of aggressive tendencies and the never-ending "struggle for peace." In a sense, the Cold War was a "war for peace". With almost complete mutual misunderstanding, one thing united Yatsenyuk and Churkin – both were brought up in the Soviet era and speak the same "language of peace". This code was hardly noticeable to anyone in the room, apart from them: "Do the Russians want war?" This is not simply a rhetorical question. This is the refrain of the Cold War. One of the most popular Soviet songs, with words by Evgeny Evtushenko, has since 1961 become a kind of anthem of Soviet peace, absorbing all the basic ideological codes developed in Soviet propaganda during the formative period of the Cold War, 1946-53:

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<sup>1</sup> BBC, "Ukraine crisis: Russia tells UN it does not want war". Accessed May 15, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26564851>

*O, do the Russians long for war?  
Ask of the stillness evermore,  
Ask of the field, or ask the breeze,  
And ask the birch and poplar trees.  
Ask of the soldiers who now lie  
Beneath the birch trees and the sky,  
And let their sons tell you once more  
Whether the Russians long for war.*

*Not only at their country's call  
Did Russian soldiers fight and fall;  
They died that men from ev'ry shore  
Might live without the fear of war.  
Ask those who fought, and those erased,  
Ask those who at the Elbe you embraced.  
These monuments are only for  
To show if Russians long for war.*

*Yes, we can fight when fight we must;  
Be we don't wish to breathe the dust  
Of soldiers brave from ev'ry clime  
Who give up life before their time.  
Ask of the women in our life,  
Ask of our mothers - ask my wife -  
And you will never wonder more  
Whether the Russians long for war.*

*Their answer rises loud and clear  
For all men, ev'rywhere, to hear.  
The message now is as before:  
The Russians do not long for war.*

*(translation by Leonard Lehrman)<sup>2</sup>*

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<sup>2</sup> "Do The Russians Want War?" Accessed May 20, 2015. <http://llehrman.artists-in-residence.com/translations/DoTheRussiansWantWar.html>

How durable this linguistic code appears to have been, if two former allies and today's geopolitical enemies resort to it almost a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War! How unreliable and misleading should it have proved to be that even people raised with this common language could no longer understand it? The rhetoric of the struggle for peace - this is only the tip of the iceberg, the main part of which was hidden beneath the surface of public policy.

This thesis was conceived as an attempt to look at the "battle for peace" in the Soviet Union, since it has never been fully explored from this perspective, while the "struggle for peace" in the West has been investigated in some detail. However, for war (albeit a cold one), as in tango, you need a partner. Therefore, the picture of public policy of Western countries will be incomplete as long as there is no clear picture of what was happening on the Soviet side during the most crucially formative period of the Cold War of 1946-53. If this will help us to understand why this iceberg appeared to be unsinkable, and why possibly a "new Cold War" has begun with the same rhetoric of peace on which the former Cold War ended a quarter of a century ago, I would consider my mission accomplished.

## **Situating the thesis within Cold War literature**

The early Cold War years produced a generation of historians under social and political pressure, whose works at times mirrored the government's foreign policy. Proponents of the orthodox approach to the Cold War, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Herbert Feis and Louis Halle, did not so much attempt to explain the dynamics of the Cold War as justify the US Government's policy of Containment. The justification – that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power whose aggressive foreign policy based on Marxist class warfare was a real and global threat to internally weak and emerging new nations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia - closely paralleled the official view presented by the United States Government without any serious challenge.

Out of the traditionalist historians, Schlesinger's analysis best exemplified the over-emphasis on ideology that was characteristic of many in the field at the time. Schlesinger assumed that "Leninism and totalitarianism created a structure...which made post-war collaboration ... inherently impossible."<sup>3</sup> The fundamental problem with this line of argument

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<sup>3</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (1967): 12.



was that it took the Soviet Union's official rhetoric on Marxism at face-value, without acknowledging the de-ideological shifts which took place once Stalin came to power. The signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Nazi Germany in 1939 could have hardly been achieved by a Stalin who strictly abided by a version of Marxism-Leninism "the world according to which all societies were inexorably destined to proceed along appointed roads by appointed stages until they achieved the classless nirvana".<sup>4</sup> The Soviet Peace Campaign was very much the work of an ideologically flexible and opportunistic leader who wished to preserve the 'spheres of influence' not unlike of previous European Powers. In hindsight, the Anglo-Saxon bias in Schlesinger's argument was glaring: It was inevitable that the Soviet Union would not be able to collaborate with the Allies after the war because it was not a traditional state, but a totalitarian one, "a phenomenon very different from America or Britain".<sup>5</sup> Schlesinger's analysis discounted the fact that besides being a totalitarian state, the Soviet Union, like Britain, was an empire wishing to strengthen its security. By overemphasising negotiations between top diplomats, Stalin's paranoia, and Marxist-Leninist ideology, Schlesinger's analysis could not encompass other channels of diplomatic manoeuvring, such as the Peace Campaign, employed by the Soviet Union in order to maintain a post-war peace.

Equally problematic for the orthodox approach was to prioritise the historical narrative at the expense of analysis and interpretation. They approached the early Cold War period with a preference for "letting the facts speak for themselves", which resulted in historical determinism. This was particularly emblematic in Louis J. Halle's *The Cold War as History* (1967) and Herbert Feis' *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (1970). Though less ideological than Schlesinger, Halle's and Feis' works overestimate the inevitable outcome of the post-war international landscape. Halle saw the Cold War as a logical sequence of history over which the main players had only little control. Yet implicit in the narrative was that it was the Soviet Union's decision to move into 'power vacuums' as a result of allied policy, which only set it towards a collision course with the Western decision to check Soviet expansion. No less importantly, the strength of the traditionalists' stance was weakened by the (understandably) limited access to Russian sources and their low level of Russian. Feis, for instance, quoted almost exclusively the English version of the periodical *New Times*, while Halle was limited to citing world leaders.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

The revisionists that emerged in the mid-1960s were no less politicised than their predecessors. Largely in response to America's involvement in Vietnam, the so-called Revisionist or New Left historians sought to explain the origins of the Cold War as a US initiative. William Appleman Williams, as one of the earliest revisionists, put forward a path-breaking thesis that the United States' 'informal empire' – since the Spanish-American War in 1898 – precipitated the Cold War.<sup>6</sup> In this narrative, it was the Soviet Union, who, as any other great power protecting its national interests after two German invasions in less than thirty years, found itself reacting to the US Government's push into its security zone, which was largely motivated by the capitalist system's need to expand into foreign markets and seek foreign investment and raw materials. Yet, this thesis failed to account for the Soviet Union's initiatives which only accelerated the Cold War. According to Williams, the United States, relying upon its possession of the atomic bomb, believed that the Soviet Government could be pushed back to its traditional borders in Eastern Europe by 'nuclear diplomacy'. However, he failed to account for the fact that the United States made great efforts to put atomic weapons under rigid international control under the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949, the Soviet Union's uncooperativeness at the San Francisco Conference for a Japanese-Allied peace treaty, and the Soviet Union's perpetual abuse of the veto in the United Nations.

Thomas G. Paterson's work, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan*, continued in the same vein. Patterson contended that George F. Kennan, as the architect of the containment policy, was no less of a cold warrior as the other members of Truman's administration. By accepting Kennan's analysis, Paterson argued that American leaders made the mistake when dealing with the Russians of "confusing goals with actual behaviour".<sup>7</sup> Paterson faults Kennan for his failure to realise that what Americans perceived as aggressive Kremlin behaviour was in reality only a response to provocative American policies that stemmed from an exaggerated view of the Soviet threat.<sup>8</sup>

Although revisionists have greatly contributed towards explaining the internal dynamics and logic of US foreign policy during the Cold War, much of what is said of the Soviet Union's role in the Cold War is very debatable. The (over)emphasis on the US presented

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<sup>6</sup> See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1959); William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

<sup>7</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), 47.

<sup>8</sup> For a more balanced revisionist perspective see R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993).

the Soviet Union as a victim of misguided US foreign policy. By denying any ideological component in Soviet policy and refusing to see Soviet actions as springing from internal needs and sources, revisionists rule out the possibility that the Soviets acted as they did in accordance with their own internal dynamics. This is a very one-sided view of the historical process, since the Soviet Union is merely reduced to responding to America's unreasonably aggressive foreign policy. In approaching matters by analysing American data and motivations alone, revisionists fail to treat the Soviet side, and thus deny any possibility of writing history as it was, that is, a complex interactive process, in which no one possesses enough of the facts, and usually lacks a clear grasp of his own or his opponents' purposes.

Equally problematic is the revisionist critique of America's use of its economic power as a 'weapon' rather than a 'tool' for peace during the Cold War. Implicit in this argument is that the US alone possessed the military, political and economic power to attempt to fashion the world to its liking, and indeed did so. This argument is weakened if we look beyond military and economic factors, such as the manipulation of public opinion. The Soviet peace offensive demonstrated that the Soviets considered themselves just as capable of shaping the post-war world as the US. It was not a question of who manipulated the international situation through economic or military means since the US had the economic and military means to do so, while the Soviet Union possessed the propaganda apparatus.

From a methodological standpoint, both orthodox and revisionist modes of engagement defined the Cold War on an overtly military and economic basis. Yet, as this thesis will demonstrate, one of the most crucial aspects of the Cold War was the propaganda dimension. That is not to say that these modes of engagement were mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they were strongly interconnected. Bridging the gap between the different ways in which the Cold War was waged helps us to see the full picture. For instance, the revisionists pointed to the Marshall Plan as the primary way in which the United States waged economic war during the early Cold War period. Yet, as this thesis will demonstrate, the Soviet Union understood the importance of the economic struggle during these early years and was not merely reacting to American initiatives. Through the peace offensive the Soviet Union attempted to infiltrate the International Cooperative Alliance and turn it against the US.

The problems of methodology and theory exhibited by orthodox and revisionist scholars – a narrow focus on diplomatic history, (over) reliance on English sources, perception of the Cold War as a European conflict above all, and a tendency to blame either the United States or the Soviet Union for starting the Cold War - was partly understandable: Besides the politicised environment of academia in the West, before the collapse of the Soviet Union a

historian's access to Russian archives was severely limited. Because of a lack of reliable sources about the Soviet Union, Western analysts were forced to 'read between the lines' when it came to understanding the decisions made in the Kremlin. Yet by the early 1990s, with the opening of multiple archives, historians no longer had to guess at communist actions, goals and intentions. Historians now had access to letters, secret records, meeting minutes and directives. As a result, orthodox claims about the extent of Soviet control of the Eastern Bloc, about the extent of unity within the Bloc itself, and even basic orthodox assertions about the essential nature of Soviet intentions throughout the Cold War are now being reconsidered in light of new evidence.

Before the end of the Cold War these problems were widely recognised and the post-revisionist school which emerged during the early 1980s – most notably with John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn P. Leffler – attempted to stake out a middle ground: Though the US was partly responsible for the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed a genuine security threat to Europe and Japan.<sup>9</sup> The post-revisionists accepted US European policy while separating it sharply from US Third World policies. The escalation of the Cold War was explained by a misperception of political and power realities within the context of the constant struggle over power during which both the US and the Soviet Union reacted to one another's (mis)perceived aggression. Although linked together by common explanatory factors (e.g. *realpolitik*, national interests, decision-making based on psychological analysis, etc.), post-revisionist historians have come to rather diverse conclusions. For instance, in *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, Truman Administration and the Cold War* (1993) Melvyn Leffler attributed the escalation of the Cold War outside of continental Europe to the US Government's (mis)perceived threat of communism as dictated by the Domino Theory and Containment. As a result, the Soviet Union found itself largely responding defensively to US initiatives.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, post-revisionists such as Geir Lundestad, Lloyd Gardner and John Lewis Gaddis have characterised

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<sup>9</sup> See John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 7 (1983):171-190; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). The post-revisionist viewpoint continues to be dominant in the most popular history textbooks; see J. Samuel Walker, "The Origins of the Cold War in United States History Textbooks," *Journal of American History*, 81 (1995): 1652-1661.

<sup>10</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 513. See also Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations," *Diplomatic History*, 19 (1995):173-196.

the various episodes of the Cold War as operating within a wider post-war system of a divided Europe that suited both the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>

Yet, on a more general level, the post-revisionist use of realist theory in explaining the Cold War is problematic. The realist theory posits that competition in the name of national interests determined policies. Thus, the spread of Communism was bound to fail because state nationalism and self-interest, not ideology, were the bases for forming alliances. Taken to its logical extreme, it could be argued that there was no Soviet Bloc unified by ideology. However, applying such an argument to Europe is less convincing than applying it to the post-colonial world. At least on a rhetorical level (and what is the Cold War without rhetoric), ideology shaped the political landscape of post-war Europe. Yet, as Odd Arne Westad argues, “the Cold War, as a political paradigm, was always stronger in the center than in the periphery”.<sup>12</sup> The internationalisation of the Cold War did not mean that states on the periphery internalised the logic of the centre. Nations which were undergoing profound changes (i.e. independence, modernisation, political revolutions, etc.) did not think in terms of the Iron Curtain or Capitalism and Communism, but in pragmatic terms by “seek(ing) cooperation with the foreign power which could most effectively assist in achieving their revolution”.<sup>13</sup> The Soviet campaign was indicative of such a dynamic. At least in terms of cultural diplomacy (which the Peace Campaign was very much about) the Soviet Union found itself accommodating powerful emerging nations, India and China in particular, who very much sought national interest irrespective of the supposed bipolar world.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said of this approach. In the context of the Soviet Peace Campaign, it provides a fresh approach to interpret the campaign’s rhetoric, not merely as anti-American propaganda, but a genuine attempt at sending diplomatic ‘feelers’ to the US when it seemed that the Cold War could escalate into a real conflict. Even if we take into account that the Soviet campaign was rife with antagonistic Marxist ideology, it can still be argued that the Soviet Peace Campaign was part of a wider effort (part of which had failed in the negotiating rooms) to maintain the immediate post-war geopolitical system (or as the Soviet Union understood – ‘spheres of influence’). The orthodox (and even some revisionist) historian would dismiss such a thesis by arguing that Marxist ideology, not national interest as evoked

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<sup>11</sup> See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1987), Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), Lloyd Gardner, *A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (Oxford University Press, 1986).

<sup>12</sup> Odd Arne Westad, “Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 29 (1992): 462.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 459.

by realists and post-revisionists, dictated Soviet foreign policy (and consequently its propaganda). Yet, such an argument calls for a refinement of the meaning of ideology, as Douglas Macdonald argues, "...the national interest is a combination of objective (structural) and subjective (ideational) factors that cannot be isolated from one another so easily."<sup>14</sup> From this perspective, the references to Marxist ideology in the peace campaign did not demonstrate a willingness by the Soviet Union to put their ideology above national interests but an indication that Soviet national interests were communicated through Marxist ideology, and were not necessarily shaped by it.

## **Situating the thesis within peace movement literature**

The proposal in question touches on a wide range of fields, including political, cultural, and, above all, institutional history of the Cold War. However, the Soviet anti-war movement especially in its institutional dimension is clearly under-researched, which is evident by the limited number of secondary sources.

It is impossible to talk of Western literature on the peace movement produced during the Cold War as striving for historical objectivity by post-Cold War standards. Many works produced from the late 1960s to the end of the Cold War on peace movements are problematic in terms of providing a reference point for my thesis. Firstly, much of it was limited to the pre-Cold War period. Most historians did not venture to analyse contemporary peace movements.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, historians did not link the peace movements with other areas, such as diplomacy, internal bureaucratic dynamics, etc. Even after the Cold War, the history of the peace movement of that time has not been written about within the context of the foreign policy and cultural framework. Most works approached the peace movement from the point of view of social history. Finally, Western literature on peace movements has mainly focused on peace movements of particular countries without providing an international context. The idea of a

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<sup>14</sup> Douglas J. Macdonald, "Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis" in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad, (London: Routledge, 2000), 187.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969); Sandra R. Herman, *Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969); David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

peace movement was not exclusive to one country. Its supporters had links with different peace groups from other countries.

Works which dealt with the anti-war movement during the Cold War were very much a product of their time; assessing the movement in the present and coloured by bias. A case in point is Irving Horowitz's *The Struggle Is the Message: The Organization and Ideology of the Anti- War Movement* (1970). Though Horowitz details the organisation of the anti-war movement, the various social and ideological groups within it, and the changes in philosophy and tactics as American involvement in Vietnam deepened, the book is essentially a platform for Horowitz (who was a member of the task force on violent aspects of protest formed by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) for criticising the American Left, and in particular its radical wing, for its willingness to employ violent tactics. Furthermore, Horowitz explained radicalism in the peace movement in quasi-psychological and sociological terms. Radical involvement in the peace movement was characterised by a greater concern with self-redemption than with success, "that therapy was more important than victory. Orientation overrides achievement. Passion and meaning in struggle were more valuable than material accomplishment."<sup>16</sup>

Charles DeBenedetti's *The Peace Reform in American History* (1984) on the history of the American peace movement provided a more balanced overview. Chronologically organised, the book succinctly surveys the subject from 1607 to 1975. DeBenedetti tries to define the relationships between peace movements and other developments throughout American history. DeBenedetti's subsequent work, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (1987), interweaves two major themes: The internal dynamics and tensions within the anti-war movement as well as the government policies that both spawned and responded to it. The work is distinguished by its wide scope of research, including scores of memoirs, journalistic accounts and secondary works on aspects of the movement. DeBenedetti's access to available government records of the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations is particularly revealing. FBI records substantiated the peace movement's claims of the government's unscrupulous attempts to publicly derail the movement by spreading rumours about the anti-war leaders' alleged communist connections.

Nevertheless, DeBenedetti's book has its limitations. As with other works, DeBenedetti's work relied mainly on records produced by peace groups with little regard to

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<sup>16</sup> Irving Louis Horowitz, *The Struggle Is the Message: The Organization and Ideology of the Anti-War Movement* (Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1970), 90.

other kinds of sources. Neither did he attempt to compare the American peace movements with similar movements in other countries or to consider the impact of peace movements on American policy and diplomacy. Equally problematic was DeBenedetti's inability to disassociate himself from the movement. He clearly identified with the peace reform and saw a need "to build sizable antibodies within the US body politic against the various war pathologies that afflict America and the world".<sup>17</sup> He was critical of the movement's radical left wing, some of whose supporters hoped to reproduce in the United States a version of the guerrilla war being waged in Vietnam. But he was also critical of moderate anti-war liberals who sought both to oppose the Vietnam War and disavow Vietnamese communism. They also tried to police demonstrations in the United States so as to exclude "extremists", who displayed National Liberation Front flags. As Horowitz did, DeBenedetti tended to criticise the movement as an insider, instead of evaluating it objectively.

In contrast to the American peace movement, the British peace movement provides a more useful example to draw parallels with the Soviet Peace Campaign. Richard Taylor's *Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958-1965* (1988) succeeded in objectively analysing the movement's rise and decline up to 1965 through the use of an impressive range of material on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) with several private collections and interviews with many of the most prominent participants. What is particularly revealing, in regards to the Soviet Peace Campaign, was the movement's rather undemocratic origin. There was tension between those who saw it as frankly elitist and resisted its expansion into a mass movement. It comes as something of a surprise to find Canon Collins trying to avoid addressing the first Aldermaston March in 1958, and A. J. P. Taylor resigning in 1961 because CND had adopted a democratic constitution! There was also the gulf between those who saw CND as essentially a moral-pacifist campaign rather than as a political organisation that would achieve its aims through a suitable vehicle such as the Labour Party.

That fundamental division between the leaders and most of their followers, Taylor convincingly argues, was a major contributory factor to the movement's ineffectiveness and ultimate failure as it broke apart into tiny squabbling factions. Because Taylor's study excels at analysing the various organisational problems of the movement, the ideological debates, and the problems of strategic choice, it is a useful reference for my research on the Soviet Peace Campaign.

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<sup>17</sup> Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 230.



Within the post-Cold War historiography no work parallels my own research more so than Robbie Lieberman's *The Strangest Dream: Communism Anticommunism and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963* (2000), which examines how grassroots peace work became associated with communist subversion in the early Cold War years thereby silencing whatever contributions the peace movement may have had in influencing governmental policy.<sup>18</sup> Lieberman's depiction of the political climate in the US during the early Cold War years sheds light on why the Soviet Union was so sceptical in its attempts to use the American Communist Party to infiltrate the American peace movement. Besides the Red Scare and McCarthyism, the post-war period witnessed a major shift in foreign policy thinking amongst liberals. In the course of the 1930s and 1940s, many of them became disillusioned with the Soviet Union and leftist causes and were now championing anti-communism and interventionism against the perceived 'Domino Theory'. Within this climate, post-war liberalism split apart. The celebration of Cold War America, especially among many left intellectuals, cut peace activists off from their traditional bases of support. The coalitions and alliances that once bolstered peace work were now broken and in disrepair as the peace movement's main bases of support became entrapped by bitter quarrels over the communist challenge at home and abroad.

Lieberman's work is especially noteworthy on the impact McCarthyism had on the peace movement from inside the workings of two organizations: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and the newly-created Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy. It is here that the "strangest dream" unravels - "the fear from within the peace movement that Communists were taking over".<sup>19</sup> The issues confronting peace groups during this period were often difficult to separate: "Some activists were concerned mainly with how the organization functioned, others with what it looked like from outside". Currying public respectability, peace groups went to great lengths to purge communists and former 'fellow travellers', with many being victims of guilt by association. Lieberman begs an answer to her question: "Did excluding Communists strengthen peace organizations by heightening their

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<sup>18</sup> The role of communist peace activists has been generally ignored in Charles F. Howlett, *The American Peace Movement: References and Resource* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1991); Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels Against War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Catherine Foster, *Women for all Seasons: the International League for Peace and Freedom* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989). The few works that have attempted to demonstrate how communists sought to manipulate the peace movement include David A. Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959) and Maurice Isserman, *If I Had a Hammer* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

<sup>19</sup> Robbie Lieberman, *The Strangest Dream: Communism Anticommunism and the U.S. Peace Movement, 1945-1963* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 14.

credibility, or did it weaken them by keeping out skilled organizers and making civil liberty battles more difficult to fight?"<sup>20</sup>

Lieberman's conclusions on the American peace movement are revealing in how it compared and contrasted with the Soviet peace campaign. On the one hand, like the Soviet peace movement the American peace movement understood the importance of public perception and saw infiltrators (in this case communists and 'fellow travellers') that needed to be purged. On the other hand, as with all of his works, Lieberman's book attests to the voluntary civic nature of Western peace movements by way of their political fragmentation, lack of coordination and tensions with governments. None of this was permissible in the Soviet Peace Campaign. Nonetheless, as with other works on Western peace movements, Lieberman fails to connect the American peace movement to the wider, international peace movement community and its role in foreign policy. This is an approach which has largely been ignored within the analytical framework of peace movements by historians. This is especially glaring if we consider the Soviet Union's attempts to attract non-communists in the West in order to legitimise its own version of 'peace' in the eyes of the Western mass public.

Gerhard Wettig's work was the first work in the post-Cold War West to document the World Peace Council's attempts at attracting pacifist groups in the West outside of the prism of Sovietology. Instead of framing the Peace Campaign as part of the larger tit-for-tat propaganda war between the West and the Soviet Union, Wettig attempted to answer whether the World Peace Council was more than just a Soviet prop. Both Phillip Deery and Weston Ulrich focused on the British Government's attempts at derailing the World Peace Congress which was to be held in Sheffield in 1950. These works are useful in understanding the difficulties Western communists had in the West when undertaking the Soviet Peace Campaign. However, they only covered half the story. No work has relied on Soviet archival sources to account for how the Soviets themselves understood the Peace Campaign and the problems they encountered in Europe.

## **Archives and Dissertation Outline**

In telling the story of the Soviet peace movement, I have been greatly aided by three main archives in Moscow: the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), and the Russian State Archive of

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 134.

Contemporary History (RGANI). Each archive provided valuable sources of information. The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History was particularly useful since it included all the materials of the Foreign Commission of the Central Committee, Molotov's personal documents and Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) documents. From this material I was able to construct the beginnings of the Soviet peace movement. In addition, the State Archive of the Russian Federation included the whole archive of the Soviet Peace Committee. Finally, RGANI allowed me to look at the Soviet Peace Committee's dealings between 1953 and 1956.

Chapter One offers a detailed analysis of the political, social and ideological origins of the Soviet peace movement. The task here is to construct a narrative of the political and social situation which the Soviet Union found itself in after Second World War in order to put forward the argument that Stalin's primary motivation for undertaking the project of the 'peace movement' was of an international-political nature, rather than of a domestic nature. Central to the collapse of the post-war Alliance in the early years of the Cold War was the unbridgeable gap between the two superpowers on what peacetime Europe would look like. During the mid-forties, Stalin framed Soviet security within the context of an Eastern buffer zone. For Stalin, the crux of Soviet security relied on consolidating and then maintaining the *status quo* in Europe, which invariably meant the division of Europe into two political blocs. Yet, this transition into a divided Europe and its acceptance by the Western powers was not guaranteed and therefore ran the risk of renewed military conflict. With a hard-won victory over the Axis powers, Stalin understood that the prestige the Soviet Union now commanded, as one of the two remaining superpowers, could be harnessed into new diplomatic and propaganda initiatives as part of a broader effort to consolidate the Soviet Union's hold over the Eastern Bloc. The peace movement would fulfil this initiative because it had the potential of putting pressure on Western governments to not escalate the situation in Europe by convincing Western societies of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions.

The consolidation of the Eastern Bloc directly impacted Stalin's domestic policy. As resources poured into rebuilding the country after the war, much more was poured into propping up Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe and modernising Soviet nuclear capabilities. Stalin was not sure how war-weary Soviet society would react to food shortages, rationing, the slow rate of rebuilding and the lack of general reform as security demands took priority over improving living standards. The problem was compounded by veterans who had witnessed Europe's higher living standards and therefore could derail the regime's attempts to justify to the public that Soviet foreign policy of consolidating the Eastern Bloc should take precedence over domestic politics. Therefore, when the Soviet Peace Committee was

established in 1949 in the wake of the World Peace Congress, it served a completely different function to the campaign which the regime presided over in Europe. In the Soviet Union, the Soviet Peace Committee and its Republic and local offshoots were meant to be the official conduit through which people could voice their traumas and war grievances and direct them in support of the regime, lest they turned against the regimes handling of Cold War. Chapter One concludes with the Marxist/Leninist ideological origins which underpinned the Soviet peace movement. Since the Soviet Union was built on an ideology that was based on spreading revolution and class war, Stalin had to reformulate Soviet peace rhetoric as ‘peaceful coexistence’, without contradicting Marxist/Leninist ideology in order to make it more appealing to Westerners. This section logically leads to Chapter Two as it hints at the struggles the Soviets would come up against in the West when trying to attract genuine peace movements to join the World Peace Council, such as pacifist groups.

Chapter Two starts off with the beginnings of the peace movement, including the first World Peace Congress which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and proceeds with the institutional, political and social development of the campaign up to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not to merely chronicle the history of the Soviet Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying patterns which emerged in the first decade of the Soviet peace movement. The origins of the Soviet peace movement, through the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (henceforth referred to as the Cominform) in 1947, meant that the Peace Movement would from the beginning be perceived as a front for Soviet propaganda. Yet, this is a half-truth. As this chapter demonstrates, Western communists and non-communists who took part in the campaign perceived it as a genuine movement. Even as the Soviets used bribes and political pressure, as well as simply funding much of the movement, they faced growing resentment and criticism from their Western counterparts who were expected to implement unsuccessful campaigns. The chapter chronicles two major developments within the movement: Its ties to the biological warfare campaign in 1951, which isolated it from the UN, and the ‘lost’ years of the movement after Stalin’s death in 1953 when it had no particular purpose and fractured in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in October of that year. I argue that by 1956 the Soviets saw no need for the movement, as the invasion of Hungary did not disturb the European *status quo* of the two blocs.

Chapter Three examines the internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task of this chapter is to construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through the institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate the relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions. In the

second part of the chapter, I break down and analyse the type of people who attended the endless local and national peace meetings to gain an understanding of how their speeches contributed to ritualising these events, in which all participants had predetermined roles to play out and spoke in clichés that attested to their faith in the Soviet leadership. It was during the first decade of the Cold War that the internal Soviet peace movement ossified into a mindless ritual which the Russian poet and dissident Alexander Galich so aptly described in his poem. Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the Soviet peace Committee and its affiliated institutions in the advancement of Cold War propaganda through the media (e.g. press, journalism, etc.), literature (e.g. novels, poems, etc.), film and political art (e.g. posters, caricatures, etc.).

Given that the Soviet peace campaign was an integral part of Soviet foreign and domestic policy, it is surprising that its institutional origins in the formative years of the Cold War (1945-1956) have yet to be the subject of serious research. The existing works on the topic are few and far between and what has been said has been far too general or treated as a historical footnote, dismissed as merely an agitation effort relative to high-ranking diplomatic negotiations. In contrast, by shifting the focus for the first time from rhetorical analysis of propaganda and into the inner workings of the peace campaign, the thesis at hand presents a radical rethinking of the Soviet peace campaign and its importance in Soviet international and internal policy.

Firstly, the thesis posits that the peace campaign was actually two separate projects: one for domestic consumption and the other for abroad. As such, they had different institutional origins, internal political dynamics and distinct objectives shaped by different contexts. Since both sides in the Cold War thoroughly scrutinised the propaganda efforts of the other, I argue that the Soviet Peace Campaign abroad was not merely a propaganda offensive but a diplomatic initiative that the Soviets used to communicate with the West in place of failed formal negotiations on preserving the immediate post-war *status quo* in Europe.

By contrast, the peace campaign project at home had different objectives: In the domestic sphere, the peace campaign was part of the Soviet leadership's effort in strengthening legitimacy for the regime. I put forward the argument that despite the fact that Stalin was seen as the nation's saviour after the war, there was serious concern as to how the Soviet public would react to a new round of isolationism and maintaining an economy which placed a premium on arms over consumer products, irrespective of the immense suffering from which the Soviet people had only recently emerged. The Soviet Peace Campaign helped to promote the new Cold War narrative and to bolster the Soviet public's self-image as a people of peace.

Seen from the perspective of winning ‘hearts and minds’, the Soviet leadership wished for as many people as possible to join its peace campaign and had to compromise. In order to attract as many non-communists as possible, it would be more flexible in its dealings with foreigners. The domestic peace movement, by contrast, had no such constraints and was, therefore, controlled more tightly and was more dogmatic in its Leninist-Marxist interpretation of peace.

By focusing on how the Soviet leadership formulated, implemented and modified the peace campaign abroad in accordance to Western perception, the thesis makes vital contributions to a topic that hitherto has not been adequately researched. The existing literature relegated the Soviet Peace Campaign to a more general anti-Western campaign. As such, the peace campaign was viewed as a public relations failure driven by Leninist-Marxist ideology. By focusing on the institutional foundations of the peace campaign in early Cold War period, the thesis is set apart from existing literature on Cold War propaganda and Soviet foreign policy in several ways. The institutional dimension of the peace campaign strips away the Leninist-Marxist ideology assumption to reconsider the day-to-day realities of running the campaign pragmatically.

Therefore, by shifting the focus from official Soviet rhetoric and the Western public’s response to it (of which substantial literature already exists) to the Soviet formulation of initiatives in response to that very same popular reception – i.e. toning down ideological rhetoric, divorcing the peace campaign from communist parties, drawing in moderates and especially non-communists - the thesis challenges the long-held assumption that the Soviet Peace Campaign abroad was driven from the outset by Marxist-Leninist ideology of revolutionary class warfare.

# CHAPTER ONE

## The Political, Social and Ideological Origins of the Soviet Peace Movement

### Fall of an Alliance, Rise of ‘Peace’

Victory in World War II found Stalin and the Soviet Union in a situation for which they were very much unprepared. From the 1920s right up to the commencement of World War II in September 1939, the Soviet Union was viewed by the public in the West with suspicion and distrust; its calls for a Comintern Popular Front in the 1930s<sup>21</sup> against fascism largely fell on deaf years and culminated with Stalin signing a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, effectively losing much (but not all) credibility that the Soviets had in the eyes of Western leftists. More than ever, the invasion of eastern Poland in September 1939, the ‘mutual assistance’ pacts forced upon the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that gave the Soviets air naval bases in those countries, and the unprovoked invasion of Finland in October confirmed to many on the left the Soviet Union was beginning to resemble the old Russian Empire. As a result, in December 1939 the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> In essence, the Soviet Union found itself a pariah state, along with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan.

However, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in 1941 and the alliance which formed in its wake created unforeseen consequences for the Soviets to manage their new (self) image. On the one hand, the Americans and the British were willing to temporarily see the Soviet Union as an ally for democracy in the common cause against Nazi Germany, thus granting political prestige which it had never enjoyed up to that point in its existence. On the other hand, this prestige rested on how the Soviets would conduct their foreign and domestic policy and the extent to which they could conform to Western notions of democracy and respect for the sovereignty of other European nations, international law and basic human rights. This

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<sup>21</sup> See Kermit E. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of a Doctrine* (London and New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

<sup>22</sup> Leo Gross “Was the Soviet Union Expelled From the League of Nations?,” *The American Journal of International Law* 39 (1945). For Soviet Union dealings with the United Nations prior to expulsion see I.A. Khormach, *Vozvrashchenie v mirovoe soobshchestvo: bor'ba i sotrudnichestvo Sovetskogo gosudarstva s Ligoi natsii v 1919–1934* (Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, 2011).

was always going to be a failure, as Stalin understood diplomacy mainly in 19<sup>th</sup> century imperial terms<sup>23</sup> in which victors were entitled to ‘spheres of influence’ that transcended national sovereignty and disregarded Western concepts of human rights. During the war years, it was evident that the Soviets were incapable of cultivating a Western-friendly image. For instance, Hitler’s defeat in Stalingrad in February 1943 did not see the strengthening of Allied cooperation. As Vojtech Mastny explains, “the Russians began almost immediately to put that solidarity to the test” by “harassing the British personnel attached to the arms convoys, interfering with their navigation and subjecting them to various indignities”.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet silence on the importance of the American Lend-Lease deliveries in the press resulted in the United States Ambassador, William Harrison Standley, publicly criticising the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup> The post-war image of an ally of the West had now to contend with the sense of imperialistic entitlement that came with victory over the Nazis. Now was the time to restore Russia’s historical rights, lost in the previous ill-fated wars of the twentieth century, and to convert the gigantic losses and victories into lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle.

But Stalin complicated diplomatic perceptions by balancing two contradictory positions: How to consolidate Eastern Europe as a buffer zone without having it seem as such. Stalin wanted to preserve stable relations with the West for a number of reasons, including preventing the resurgence of German and Japanese power as well as legitimising the new borders of the Soviet Union and confirming its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In Stalin’s view, an amicable division of war spoils was clearly preferable to a confrontation with his wartime allies. Cooperation was also necessary to secure economic assistance for reconstruction and allowed time for British-American differences to surface. Finally, because Stalin was fully aware of the formidability of the British-American military-industrial alliance, he wanted to prevent a conflict he knew the Soviet Union could not win, or postpone it until there was a fracture in the Western alliance system that could give the Soviet Union a winning shot. In short, Stalin hoped to combine his geopolitical agenda with cooperation from the West – at least during the crucial transitional period of settling post-war problems – but between these two tasks the former clearly assumed a priority. Stalin may have been convinced that the British and Americans gave tacit approval for Eastern Europe to be his ‘sphere of influence’,

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<sup>23</sup> Svetozar Rajak, “The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956” in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>24</sup> Llewellyn Woodward, (ed.). *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (Vol.2). London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971, 566.

<sup>25</sup> Vojtech Matny, “Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II”, *The American Historical Review*, 77 (1972): 1373.



but as it became clear, it had not meant imposing Soviet-style political and economic systems. From the Anglo-American perspective Stalin was reverting back to the Leninist-Marxist ideology of spreading communism.<sup>26</sup> From Stalin's perspective, there was no "blueprint for a Communist take-over" but an "acknowledgement [of] the post-Second World War settlement between ideologically opposed victors".<sup>27</sup>

In fact, Stalin's approach to strengthening security was haphazard and inconsistent and suggested not a grand geostrategy based on Marxism but a reaction to the (perceived) intentions of the Americans and the British. As Svetozar Rajak argues, Stalin came to understand that Soviet marginalisation in Italy in 1943 and Britain's military intervention in Greece in December 1944 meant that the British and Americans were asserting their power 'within their zone of occupation'. Stalin's definition of 'zone of occupation' evolved with what he perceived to be America's and Britain's 'zone of occupation'. In Italy and Greece, despite communism's popularity, Stalin instructed the local communists not to engage in political subversion. Yet, this merely revealed the fact that Stalin could only control foreign communists to a limited degree. Despite his understanding that Greece would fall within the Western sphere of influence, the Greek communists instigated a civil war that for the West merely reinforced Western suspicions of a Soviet grand expansionist scheme and compelled the Truman Administration to formulate a new foreign policy of 'containment' of communism based on economically rebuilding Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and later organising NATO.

The Cold War did not start off with the resumption of ideological tensions between capitalism and communism but with the more practical question of how the rebuilding of the German economy (and by extension the European economy) would impact the hard-won security that the Soviets had achieved in the wake of the Third Reich's defeat in May 1945. As Hans-Peter Schwarz argues, one of the primary factors for the failure of joint occupation was the establishment of separate zones of administration in Germany, despite the fact that the four Allies – the British, French, Americans and the Soviets – had agreed to coordinate all rule through the Allied Control Council (ACC) by requiring unanimity for all decisions. Yet during the first years of post-war occupation, the ACC "degenerate(d) into a cumbersome multilateral

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<sup>26</sup> Kennan, George F. "Long Telegram." Accessed on 21 November 2014. [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf). See also: Melvyn P. Leffler, "National security and US foreign policy," *The Origins of Cold War: An International History*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York: Routledge, 2005).

<sup>27</sup> Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans,' 202.

body” that was incapable of making common decisions.<sup>28</sup> The ACC’s ‘contradictory dualism’, with the aim of coordinating decision-making between the four occupied zones on the one hand, and on the other, requiring unanimity from the commanders-in-chief ensured that in the case of a veto each occupied zone would be able to implement its own policies.

All this meant that the Soviet conception of post-war peace in Europe sharply diverged from the other Allies. Yet this had less to do with ideological differences between Marxism and capitalism and more to do with the differing priorities the Allies had for post-war Europe. For the Americans the most important aspect of the post-war settlement was to withdraw American troops from Europe by helping Western Europe get back on its feet economically. By May 1946, the strain of paying for administering their occupied zones compelled the British and the Americans to agree to a joint economic administration – a Bizone – to come into effect at the beginning of 1947.<sup>29</sup> With the Germans allowed to run the Bizone’s economic administration and the Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat), the American’s had signalled the first step in handing over political control to the Germans.

This only reinforced the fact that the rebuilding of Western European economies relied on a robust German economy, in particular the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr and the chemical, electrical and machine-tool industries.<sup>30</sup> From the Soviet perspective, as an international pariah and one which up to that point was not integrated into the Western European economic system – both out of its own Marxist ideological principles and Western perception of Soviet desires to spread Marxist revolution to all of continental Europe – rebuilding Western Europe was of secondary importance and not desirable at all if it required the strengthening of Germany’s economy and loosening of political control (and from the Soviet perspective, accordingly, Germany’s military capabilities). Throughout 1945 and 1946, many military commanders “...cast aside the Bolshevik code of modesty and aversion to property and acted like Spanish conquistadores, accumulating war booty”.<sup>31</sup> Reparations – much of which went to the Soviet military and state security elite – were the main preoccupation of the Soviets in their zone. In effect, Germany “was a giant shopping mall where they did not pay for anything”.<sup>32</sup> The Soviet conception of peace did not extend beyond

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<sup>28</sup> Hans Peter-Schwarz, “The division of Germany, 1945-1949,” in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 134.

<sup>29</sup> Charles S. Maier, “The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth”, in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> Peter-Schwarz, “The division of Germany, 1945-1949.”

<sup>31</sup> Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War, from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 9.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

the cessation of war to tackle the economic and political problems the Germans were facing after the war.

Even before the end of the war in May 1945, the Soviets had already come to realise that American post-war aid would not last. At the end of April 1945 the Truman Administration ceased the Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR, which had been so vital during the war. This only highlighted just how fragile the Soviet economy was after the war, as the State Defence Committee (GKO) decided to appropriate 113 million dollars from gold reserves to make up for losses.<sup>33</sup> With the Truman Administration failing to renew the Lend-Lease programme for the Soviets in September 1945, they viewed their occupied German zone as the only reliable source of war reparations. To Soviet planners, “the Western insistence on a certain amount of German industrial recovery for the sake of the economies of Western Europe smacked of a silent cooperation between the capitalists of the Western powers and those of western Germany”.<sup>34</sup> The blame for this spiral of mutual suspicion can largely be attributed to the Soviets, who failed to seriously consider the Western concept of long-lasting peace, which relied on Germany’s economic recovery for Europe’s stability. The American’s viewed Soviet hindrance to Germany’s economic recovery as something that would create conditions for social and political discontent that could lead to a new war. The Soviet idea of maintaining peace, in its basic form, went no more than beyond military occupation, and in its more subtle form, allowed for Soviet-friendly puppet states. Thus, economic recovery for the Soviets, in the Western sense, was not a way of achieving long-lasting peace, but a bourgeois abstraction that had the potential to result in another attack on the Soviet Union.

Although the French opposed the American and British efforts to relax constraints on German production, there was now a clear divide between the Soviets and the other Allies. Both suspected the other of attempting to build Germany for its own advantage. Thus, during the Moscow and London meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of April and December 1947, the Americans refused meet further Soviet suggestions for rebuilding German institutions – fearing they were intended to establish communist influence in the West. Indeed, the dilemma for the Soviet Union was that as it had emerged as one of the two superpowers, it gained political power and prestige on the global stage but had neither the means to help rebuild Europe economically nor the vision for its political stabilisation which went beyond its own

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>34</sup> Charles S. Maier, “The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth,” in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 136.

security considerations that merely envisioned Eastern Europe as a buffer zone against future German attacks. Some, such as Wojtech Mastny, have argued that Stalin's idea of Eastern Europe as a buffer zone had its origins in 1943 when he was unable to obtain a territorial settlement from Germany.<sup>35</sup> In essence, the Soviet conception of maintaining the Alliance (and therefore, peace) was a balancing act of creating Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe without resorting to force and to do so without the United States and Great Britain perceiving it as a hostile takeover which required countering with the establishment of a corresponding Western Bloc.

On the diplomatic front, Stalin had hoped for 'quiet revolutions' in Eastern Europe to avoid any damage to the Alliance that could arise from US and British suspicions that he intended Eastern Europe to be under Soviet control. Accordingly, national communist parties in countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania would take power slowly and indirectly. The communists employed a two-prong strategy. By forming political coalitions with centre and leftist groups, they attempted to distinguish themselves from the Soviet model of socialism by avoiding a dictatorship of the proletariat. For all intents and purposes, the façade of democracy was to remain in the form of political coalitions, multiparty systems and parliaments. At the same time, with the help of Soviet advisors, national communist parties used administrative pressure to strengthen their grip on the state apparatus by expanding government-owned industry and taking over key sectors such as transportation, finance and initiated land reform. However, on Soviet orders, they stopped short of fully nationalising industry and collectivising agriculture.<sup>36</sup>

Once their power over the state was consolidated, the communists employed a mix of administrative pressure, subversion and direct repression to attack both their social democratic 'allies' and political opponents. Much of the repression against political rivals was under the pretext that rivals were plotting against the state. Such tactics had already been employed in Eastern and Central European countries before the war and immediately after. In Bulgaria, political rivals such as the leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov, and defence minister and leader of the Zveno Party, Damian Velchev, were removed from power and in the case of the former, arrested and put on trial. Such patterns of intimidation and electoral manipulation were repeated ahead of elections in Romania in November 1946 and Poland in January 1947.

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<sup>35</sup> Wojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II," *The American Historical Review*, 77 (1972): 1387.

<sup>36</sup> Norman Naimark, "The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944-1953", in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

In other countries, domination was achieved by forcibly merging other leftist parties with communist parties. In the German occupied zone, the German Communist Party (KPD) united with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to form the communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party (SED). By the late 1940s, most of the leftist parties that were allowed nominal independence functioned as tokens of the 'democracy' facade the Soviets had hoped would smoothen the transition of Eastern and Central Europe to spheres of influence.

Throughout the war and leading up to the Marshall Plan, Stalin saw no need to develop a particularly new method of public relations between the Soviet Union and the outside world. As Eduard Mark argues, from 1941 to 1947 both the Comintern - the Soviet led organisation for coordinating 'the fight against the bourgeoisie' with other communist parties - and its successor - the Department of International Information - would consolidate Eastern Europe by establishing national fronts that were reminiscent of the Kremlin's push for a Popular Front to counter fascism in the 1930s.<sup>37</sup> The primary difference between the Popular Front of the 1930s and the National Front during very early years of the Cold War was that the former was a broad coalition of mainly leftist groups while the latter aimed for mass public support. In essence, the National Front strategy of creating popular democracies would allow for seamless Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe without resorting to force. As Eduard Mark argues, communist parties in Eastern Europe would gain power by "the creation of broad communist dominated coalitions that outwardly observed the conventions of 'bourgeois democracy'".<sup>38</sup> This would have the dual benefit of weakening local anti-communist forces (and therefore anti-Soviet) while retaining the veneer of 'democracy' by keeping popular support through programmes of reform and recovery and minimising Western objections to the creeping establishment of regimes dominated by communists and directly subject to Moscow.<sup>39</sup> This in fact established the model for the future peace movement.

The problem was that none of this was convincing. From the American and British perspective, the Soviet conception of a post-war settlement of Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence began to resemble a repetition of Hitler's expansion prior to the start of World War II in September 1939. Such a perception was expressed publicly and behind closed doors as early as 1946. Winston Churchill's "Sinews of Peace" address in March 1946, at

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<sup>37</sup> Institute of General History, Russian Academy of Sciences, *Komintern i Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina*, 2, Posle 22 Iyunia 1941 g. (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi Myicli, 1998), 89, quoted in Eduard Marks, "Revolution by Degrees Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947," *Cold War International History Project* (2001): 6.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

Westminster College outlined Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe as an "iron curtain", while George F. Kennan, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the Soviet Union, connected the communist takeover of Eastern and Central Europe with Marxist ideology. Kennan's 'Long Telegram' argued that Soviet policy saw a future with capitalist countries as inevitable and in order to avoid conflict would not only expand westwards to create buffer states but strengthen ties with Marxists in capitalist countries to gain as much political and propagandistic leverage in those countries as possible.

The overarching design of the Truman Administration was to lock West Germany and Japan into permanent association with a Western alliance system spearheaded by the United States. To do this, additional risks had to be taken to cede more sovereignty to the West Germans and the Japanese in return for their promises to stay aligned with the West and allow the United States to use their territories to enhance its strategic reach. From an inchoate beginning, Harry Truman and his advisers had transformed the strategic posture of the United States in the post-war world. Their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary from conquering or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II. Even if the United States were not attacked, as it had been at Pearl Harbour, it could not be indifferent to what it perceived to be Soviet aggression or communist subversion. Having witnessed Soviet consolidation of Eastern and Central Europe during the first two years after the war, Truman had come to the conclusion that nations which were still free needed to be united under one military framework otherwise communism would absorb all of Europe and economically isolate America.<sup>40</sup>

George Kennan's predictions were only partially realised. Stalin may have viewed a future conflict with the West as inevitable, but the division of Europe in the wake of the Marshall Plan consolidated a *status quo* in Europe that fit with Stalin's idea of security. Stalin understood this new European *status quo* as not merely the creation of an Eastern Bloc but also the strengthening of the Western Bloc by holding back any forces which might destabilise the political and economic order of Western Europe. The creation of the Cominform, therefore, was not merely to coordinate the activities of various communist parties, but a vehicle for Stalin to align them with his foreign policy of maintaining the two blocs. In Stalin's mind, Greece and Italy were by 1944 Western Bloc countries. The fact that the Greek Communist Party

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<sup>40</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, "The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945-1952" in *Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

started a civil war in Greece despite Stalin's orders and that Tito's plans to absorb Albania and Greece in cooperation with Bulgaria, thereby setting up a powerful Eastern Europe Bloc outside Moscow's control, only reinforced Stalin's belief that no communist party in Europe should endanger Soviet security by spreading Marxist revolution.

Stalin's dealings with the Italian and French Communists highlighted the contradictory desire to restrain the communists, on the one hand, and test their loyalty to the Soviet Union, on the other hand. In the Italian case,<sup>41</sup> as Silvio Pons argues, the strategy that emerged at the March 1944 meeting between Stalin and the head of the PCI, Palmiro Togliatti, was to avoid civil war and social revolution since the political divisions in Italy were making it possible for the British to expand into the Mediterranean and instead adapt a policy of 'national unity' to counter the threat of civil war and any further British incursion into the Mediterranean. They also agreed that the 'two camps' dividing Italy (traditional post-fascist institutions vs. anti-fascist forces) were weakening the country and facilitating British expansion in the Mediterranean. In essence, before the war's end it was already clear as to how the communist parties of Western Europe would be used to consolidate various political goals. In Western Europe, the French and Italian communist parties were tools for maintaining Soviet influence in countries that Stalin understood to be firmly within the Western sphere of influence. In contrast to Eastern Europe, where democracy was used as a facade to mask the takeover by communist parties and their socialist reforms, in the West, Stalin instructed communist parties to genuinely work in left-wing coalitions. A moderate approach by the Italian Communist Party was seen as the best way to preserve a balance of power between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. As Silvio Pons argues, the Stalin-Togliatti meeting of March 1944 was thus a paradigm of communist policy making in the post-war years.<sup>42</sup> Above all, Stalin viewed Western communist parties as tools for continental politics in which "Communist moderation in coalition building was in keeping with the joint Soviet goals of maintaining relations with the Western powers while simultaneously keeping a check on their conduct in the West's own sphere of influence".<sup>43</sup>

Having made a powerless and partitioned Europe one of the key essentials of Soviet security as he comprehended it, Stalin was sure to see any indications of its recovery and unification with unease. He appeared comfortable with the increase in US military assistance

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<sup>41</sup> Silvio Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (2001): 5-6.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 9

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

to Greece and Turkey—countries peripheral to both Soviet and American security—after the announcement in March 1947 of the Truman Doctrine establishing US support for democracies threatened by communism. He became, however, justifiably alarmed by the launching of the Marshall Plan three months later, aimed at the economic, political, social and moral rebirth of Western Europe as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism.<sup>44</sup> As Geoffrey Roberts argues, the Marshall Plan, following the Truman Doctrine and other negative developments in post-war Soviet-Western relations, confirmed Moscow's deepest fears about the possibilities for collaboration, negotiation and agreement with the West. What the Marshall Plan suggested was the ultimate failure of what can be called an integrationist strategy in US foreign policy—the political and economic integration of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence into the wider European and international context. With the coming of the Marshall Plan, that kind of integration, it seemed to Moscow, was only possible on the basis of giving up vital Soviet positions and interests in Eastern Europe.<sup>45</sup>

The announcement of the U.S. Marshall Plan for Europe in June 1947 complicated Stalin's strategy because it threatened to move Western countries in a decidedly pro-American direction, whereas Stalin's strategy relied on a politically neutral Europe where national communist parties would have some leverage in government. The contradiction between making communist parties in Western Europe more acceptable to the public and integrating them into mainstream politics on the one hand, and the need for submission and obedience to the Cominform's 'two camp' line was never resolved by Stalin. Therefore, the Soviet decision to abandon the Paris Conference was announced while the Italian Communist Party's (PCI) Central Committee was still in session. From the perspective of Western communists, the Soviet Union was reversing its own policy. Instead of playing a constructive role by going along with other political parties and public opinion on the Marshall Plan, Western communists were now expected to boycott the Marshall Plan, just as their Eastern counterparts would do. Western communists were aware that such a move might backfire. Italian communists initially hoped to remain cautiously positive about the plan in order to avoid alienating Italian public opinion. The Soviets were unwavering, and the Western European parties were forced to change their stance. The change was apparent as early as July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1947, when Togliatti again spoke to the PCI Central Committee, this time in a more alarming tone. Among other things,

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<sup>44</sup> Vojtech Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56", *Cold War International History Project*, working paper no. 35 (2002):11.

<sup>45</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46 (1994): 1381



he referred to the possibility that the line of “progressive democracy” launched by the Italian communists, with its emphasis on peaceful tactics, might no longer be appropriate in the new international context. The Soviet Union’s staunch opposition to the Marshall Plan thus placed Western European communist parties in an unwelcome position. They were now forced to contemplate the prospect of instigating political violence in their own countries.<sup>46</sup>

The Soviets regarded the Marshall Plan as a political rather than a military threat. Accordingly, they responded to it by a political act—the creation in September 1947 of the Cominform as an organisation of their dependent communist parties designed both to supervise their campaign to destabilise the pro-American governments in Western Europe and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern Europe. The proclamation at the founding meeting of the Cominform of the doctrine of “two camps” by Stalin’s chief ideologue Andrei A. Zhdanov conveyed Moscow’s perception of two hostile blocs along with its determination to fight the capitalist one by any means short of war—the essence of the Cold War.<sup>47</sup>

In a meeting with Dimitrov on August 8<sup>th</sup>, 1947, Stalin stated his unhappiness with French communists, attacking their policies as “absolutely mistaken.” He was also scathing about Italian communists. Stalin’s bluntness during this meeting indicates that he had already sought to denounce the policy agreed earlier by the PCI and PCF. The meeting foreshadowed Zhdanov’s infamous attack on the Italian and French communists at the Cominform’s founding conference in September 1947. The decision to sacrifice Western communists was made in August 1947, in accordance with a memorandum submitted by Zhdanov to Stalin. It is worth discussing two further points here, however. First, the Cominform conference had not given clear indications to communists in Western Europe about whether they should continue in their “parliamentary way.” Second, even the conversations with Stalin did not resolve the question of any future strategy. The Stalin-Secchia Pietro (a deputy to the Constituent Assembly) meeting was shrouded in even more ambiguity than their meeting in 1944. Stalin gave Secchia reason to believe that civil war was not likely, however, he left a great deal of room for various interpretations to be made by communist parties in Western Europe, including the views espoused by factions that wanted to provoke civil war (as Stalin himself knew). The Soviet leader allowed this lack of clarity to persist partly because he wanted to avoid tying his own hands, but also because of uncertainty in the Soviet decision-making process. The records of the

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<sup>46</sup> Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (2001): 16.

<sup>47</sup> Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye,” 11. See also Matteo Lodevole, “The Western Communists and the European military build-up, 1949–50: A preventive strategy,” *Cold War History* 10 (2010): 203–228.

meetings between Secchia, Zhdanov and Stalin and other archival documents on the Cominform reveal these conflicting aspects of the Soviet Union's reaction to the launching of the Marshall Plan.<sup>48</sup>

The change in Soviet policy towards the PCI and the fate of Italian communists in late 1947 and early 1948 did not seem fully adequate to confront the challenge initiated by the Cominform. The Eastern Bloc was shifting towards isolationism, with less focus being placed on countering Western interests, something which had been raised amid great fanfare in September 1947. Moreover, Soviet officials continued to avoid offering an alternative to the Marshall Plan. Their reticence accentuated the dilemma of the Western European parties. In vain, the Italian communists pleaded with the Soviet Union to make an official pledge of economic and food aid in the event of a leftist victory in national elections. Stalin stated that this request was dangerous and that any such move would be interpreted as a violation of Italian national sovereignty. The Soviet Union thus adhered firmly to the rule of avoiding interference outside of its own sphere of influence—interference that might prove costly in Eastern Europe. This stance implied the need for a degree of passivity vis-à-vis Western Europe.<sup>49</sup>

In private, however, the Soviet leader probably viewed the Italian elections of April 1948 as a turning point—just as the United States had. The results not only confirmed the failure of the strategy adopted by West European communist parties after the setting up of the Cominform, but also showed the daring of the forces of the opposite “camp.” Consequently, the Soviet Union deemed it even more appropriate to define its security concerns within the narrow limits of the Eastern Bloc. As Silvo Pons argues, from this point on, the policy of attempting to prevent the formation of a cohesive Western Bloc was largely abandoned.<sup>50</sup>

Despite the outcry Moscow raised at allegedly aggressive Western intentions, its internal assessments show that its concern was not so much about the prospective alliance's modest military capabilities as about what its coming presaged for the future. Rightly estimating its creation as primarily a diplomatic act, the Soviets responded to it by a political and propaganda offensive masterminded by Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov and his assistants without input from the military. The offensive opened with the publication on January 29<sup>th</sup>, 1949, in *Izvestiia*, of a lengthy declaration protesting the forthcoming formation of NATO.

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<sup>48</sup> Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti,” 19.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 20

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

At Moscow's signal, communists in Western Europe stirred up a massive 'peace' campaign against the project. Starting with French party boss Maurice Thorez invoking the threat of war but not its inevitability, the campaign grew progressively shriller. According to Giancarlo Pajetta of the Italian party directorate, the point was "to make it clear that we are in a position to create . . . a difficult situation for those who want war".<sup>51</sup> By the end of February, leading Western European communists were publicly serving notice that if war were to come, the Red Army would be welcomed in their homelands as a liberator.

Since the Red Army's success had been based on a massive concentration of manpower and equipment in World War II, its substantial demobilization following the defeat of Nazi Germany suggested that Moscow, despite the cooling of East-West relations, did not view a new outbreak of hostilities likely. However, to counter the American nuclear advantage and the West's overall superiority in resources, which would be decisive in any outbreak of hostilities between the East and West, the Soviet leadership tried to conceal the degree of the Red Army's demobilization and the defensive nature of its strategy. Since it was all but impossible to distinguish between an offensive and a counteroffensive strategy, however, the concealment served Moscow's interests poorly by stoking up Western fear of its military power and inviting countermeasures.

However, in June 1948, the Soviet Union made its greatest blunder. In reaction to the Western military governors' invitation to convene a constitutional assembly for their zones and undertake a separate currency reform (in June 1948), Stalin ordered the blockade of the roads and waterways to Berlin. The Western powers had to decide whether to abandon their plans to establish a Western government or pull out of their sectors in Berlin with a tremendous loss of prestige. The blockade threatened war and was a massive gamble. It helped convince Western public opinion of the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the determination of the Germans in West Berlin to resist Soviet pressure had another significant impact in the West. For the first time since the war, West Germans appeared to be opting voluntarily for the West and capable of becoming reliable allies in the Cold War. When President Truman, supported by London and Paris, decided to break the blockade with a huge Allied airlift, Stalin dared not interfere; his gamble had been a massive failure. Nobody could have thought up a better plan to convince West Germans of the need to accept a provisional division of their country.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Irwin M. Wall, *French Communism in the Era of Stalin: The Quest for Unity and Integration, 1945-1962* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 97 quoted in Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye," 17.

<sup>52</sup> Peter-Schwarz, "The division of Germany," 149.

In the autumn of 1949, after the setting up of the West German Government, Stalin allowed the GDR to be established, thereby sealing the division of Germany, even though he had always been against it. However, although the Soviet Union lost its chance to attract Germany into its orbit or, at least, neutralise a united Germany, it had a crucial strategic advantage within the heart of Europe. The GDR served as a reliable 'iron wall' that separated Poland from the West. Thereafter, the exposed western sectors of Berlin always reminded Western statesmen and FRG leaders that they were extremely susceptible to Soviet pressure.<sup>53</sup>

The emergence of NATO did not trigger any frantic military build-up by the Soviets. Despite their obvious concern, they did not appear as if they were worried by the alliance's alleged aggressive intentions. Their military response was moderate rather than alarmist: a 20 percent increase in defence spending, mainly for public effect, reinforcement of the troops stationed in East Germany, and the establishment of an office to supervise the modernisation of the armed forces of its Eastern European allies. Having previously preferred to keep them weak as potentially disloyal, Moscow now initiated a purge of their officer corps, to replace holdovers with more reliable party men.<sup>54</sup>

From his well-placed spies, Stalin was well informed about NATO's capabilities and intentions. This unintended 'transparency' of the alliance during a period of critical weakness may have been a blessing in disguise. Although the Soviet dictator could never be absolutely certain that the West were not plotting to attack him—and had in fact been led by his doctrine to believe precisely that—he could at least be certain that an attack was not immediately likely. It was extremely important that the intelligence he received from NATO's innermost sanctums did not encourage him to launch a preventive war while this appeared feasible, but rather to postpone it indefinitely. Therefore, he could embark on long term Cold War confrontation.

In mid-1949, Stalin told China's second-ranking communist, Liu Shaoqi, that war was unlikely as no one was strong enough to wage it. This was a logical assessment of both the Soviet Union and the West, and greatly contrasts with the exaggerated estimates of Soviet capabilities in NATO's early planning documents, particularly its first strategic concept of October 1949 and its medium-term plan for a five-year development of its conventional forces adopted half a year later.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>55</sup> MC 3, 19 October 1949, and DC 13, 28 March 1950, in *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow (Brussels: NATO, 1997), pp. 1-8 and 107-77 quoted in Mastny, "NATO in the Beholder's Eye," 23.

Up until then, the Soviet Union had not regarded NATO as a credible threat. However, it epitomised the hostile capitalist conspiracy that had always been an integral part of Soviet thinking. It bore testimony to all that had gone wrong with Stalin's post-war quest for security that had so unexpectedly made him feel more insecure. It indicated the West's material superiority that could be called upon to defeat the Soviet Union in a war of attrition. It stood for the worst that Stalin had reasons or imagined having reasons to fear in Europe—U.S. atomic bombing, restoration of German power, and the attraction of the voluntarily unifying Western Europe on his forcibly regimented Eastern Europe. Despite this, what NATO did not represent at that time to Stalin was a credible military threat. Encouraging Western leaders to transform it into one was another of Stalin's miscalculations.<sup>56</sup>

Stalin's desire to establish a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe suggests an interesting dynamic between his foreign and domestic policy. Rather than domestic politics contributing to Stalin's foreign policy and to the Cold War, as James Richter argues<sup>57</sup>, it was in fact foreign policy which shaped domestic policy. Make no mistake, after the catastrophe of the Nazi invasion and occupation, the Soviet people craved security keenly, but as to how this was to be achieved was entirely in Stalin's hands. Stalin's preference for domination in Central and Eastern Europe over official diplomatic channels that would guarantee Soviet security without dividing Europe was a key factor in the East-West division of Europe and the breakdown in relations between the former allies of the United States and Soviet Union. The latter was significant in changing Soviet foreign and domestic policy and the direction of Soviet propaganda.

In foreign policy, Stalin was keen to deescalate tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. By 1947, when the Eastern Bloc had been consolidated, Stalin felt that the best strategy for a stable Europe was to rein in Western communist parties (particularly in Greece, Italy and France) in case they took the political initiative into their own hands and threatened the stability of the Western Bloc. Even if the Cominform, the World Peace Congress, the various national peace committees and the World Peace Council were seen by the Allies and the Soviet Union as crude propaganda tools for different reasons – for the former as communist infiltration and attempted social instability, for the latter a way to negatively influence public opinion on Allied foreign policy – the peace movement in one important way complemented U.S. containment. Through the Cominform and the peace movement, Stalin

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 25

<sup>57</sup> James G. Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of International Patterns of Behavior," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (1992): 271-301.

rolled back any attempts by Western communists to win elections or cause any serious economic or political disruptions in the 'Western' Bloc.

Within the Soviet Union, the breakdown of relations with the United States had a powerful impact on domestic policy. As US economic aid ceased and with the onset of a potential military conflict with the West, Stalin's domestic policy once again harkened back to the 1930s of economic autarky and isolationism. In both cases, the international pressures resulting from the division of Europe compelled Stalin to establish a global and domestic peace movement. In both cases, the Soviets intended the peace movements to be mass movements, attracting as many people as possible. Yet, when it came to building the peace movement in the Soviet Union, Stalin had to formulate legitimating myths about the country's role in the war and the post-war world in order to justify the dire economic conditions the Soviet people found themselves in and to mobilise them for rebuilding the country.

## **Peace Sells, but who's buying?**

In this section I trace the conditions of post-war Soviet society to demonstrate what concerns the Communist Party had about the ramifications of its decision to stand by its harsh economic and political policy after the war, instead of conceding to the Soviet people's hopes for economic reform. I argue that while victory in the war made the regime more popular than ever, its popularity was based on people's hopes for higher standards of living. Just as the Soviet Union was consolidating its buffer zone, it had lost whatever economic aid it had been receiving during the war. Stalin understood that this trade-off between military security and living standards would damage his popularity (and thus legitimacy), in particular among specific groups who had a strong sense of entitlement from past grievances (the suffering inflicted on the peasants by collectivisation) and recent sacrifices (soldiers coming back from the front). For the Party, it was crucial that a convincing campaign addressed issues of food shortages, high prices and rationing to make it clear to people that the biggest reward for victory in the war was not future economic prosperity, but the maintenance of peace.

In the second half of this section I trace back the mobilising campaigns throughout the late 1920s and up to the eve of the war in order to demonstrate the continuity of the Soviet Peace Campaign with past campaigns. Here, I argue that the peace campaign was the product of tension in the Party between using Marxist-Leninist ideology and Russian nationalism as a mobilising tool. This dilemma was violently solved by the Nazi invasion, when during the war,

the Party attempted to co-opt patriotic sentiments into ‘official patriotism’ and shape the mythology of the war. By co-opting patriotism, the Party was bypassing (but not ridding itself of) Marxist-Leninist ideology and its focus on internationalism, which as a tool for mobilising the Soviet public, proved itself inadequate. In this sense, the Soviet Peace Campaign was unique because it functioned side by side with more ideologically-driven propaganda of Stalin’s *Short Course*, which had been used during the late 1930s and employed again after the war. This explains then why the peace campaign functioned within ‘official patriotism’. It had to be a ‘grassroots’ and ‘civic’ movement without the explicit appearance of the Party.

The decision to launch the peace campaign in the Soviet Union, beginning with the establishment of the Soviet Peace Committee in 1949, was not taken in haste but as a response to the political, social and economic situation that had been developing in the Soviet Union since the end of the war in May 1945. Elena Zubkova has characterised the first three years of the post-war period as “one of the key phases in the development of Soviet government and society”. By 1949, the regime had achieved its core security goals of establishing an Eastern buffer zone and gaining control over Western communist parties through the Cominform. However, this came at a considerable price. The regime had not only lost significant diplomatic ties with the West but crucial economic assistance that came with it. The US cancellation of Lend-Lease in September 1945 and the calculated-to-be-rejected provisos of the Marshall Plan in 1947 meant that the Soviet regime was once again economically isolated and had to resort to transferring the full cost of economic rebuilding on the Soviet people as the price for consolidating the Eastern Bloc.

As Fieseler argues, the first few years after the war were to be a crash course in rebuilding the country in order to safeguard its ‘spoils of war’. At the same time, the social consequences of the war had to be ‘overcome’ so as not “to threaten the regime from within and endanger its ideological and structural make-up”.<sup>58</sup> The press had again and again promised ‘comprehensive care’ to injured and crippled veterans and thus confirmed the Soviet state’s commitment to welfare.

The question of peace was inextricably linked to Soviet domestic policy. While Stalin had intended for the political and economic structures of the USSR to remain unchanged, the war had fundamentally changed the hopes and expectations of what people expected from the government given the massive sacrifices endured. During the first 3 years after the war, the

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<sup>58</sup> Beate Fieseler, “The bitter legacy of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ Red Army disabled soldiers under late Stalinism”, in *Late Stalinist Russia Society between reconstruction and reinvention*, ed. Juliane Füst (London & New York: Routledge), 46.

Party had to contend with, above all, the hope for the liberalisation of the Stalinist regime. As Zubkova argues, the “postwar situation...rearranged priorities of different categories of society in pursuit of their interests, and influenced the relationship between the people and the state”.<sup>59</sup>

What emerges in the post-war ruins is a divergent regime and population. The war forced the regime to give up a degree of control over the people as victory over the enemy was given top priority. After the war, Stalin was keen to re-establish this control and return society to a kind of ‘barracks’ that were “ideally manageable units of administration” for “establishing a kind of collateral dedication to duty”.<sup>60</sup> For the people, the war gave an opportunity for genuine civic spirit, stripped of the regime’s ideological and propagandistic façade.<sup>61</sup> It was the formative experience of fighting for one’s life and fatherland, and not as state duty, that made pre-war life a distant past.<sup>62</sup> Although this is not to suggest that the war had delegitimised the regime in the eyes of the public or changed people’s relationship to the regime, the psychological impact of the war - first and foremost, the initial shock of invasion and the Red Army’s subsequent retreat in the face of years of official Soviet propaganda - allowed people to think critically and outside of the limited bounds permitted by the regime.

This ‘psychological orientation’ was no more apparent than in those at the front, who had experienced life abroad and could now compare living standards between Europe and the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup> The regimes anxiety over a possible neo-Decembrist plot may have been grossly exaggerated, but given the post-war makeup of society it was expected. The war had changed the face of society, with the traditional categories— the urban and rural industrial workers and civil servants, youth and pensioners—gone. The war had transformed the bulk of Soviet men into veterans, who totalled 11 million people by the end of the war.<sup>64</sup> Everybody had to transition to normal society after the war, but it was the veterans who would find it the most difficult to economically, socially and psychologically adjust to peacetime life, especially the youngest soldiers who had gone to the front without gaining any skills. The social and economic alienation the veterans would come to experience in the wake of the Cold War only

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<sup>59</sup> Elena Zubkova, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957* (London & New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 5.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>61</sup> For post-war Soviet politics see: Timoty Dunmore, *Soviet Politics, 1945-53* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984); Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Sheila Fitzpatrick; “Postwar Soviet Society: The ‘Return to Normalcy’ 1945-53”, in ed. S. J. Linz, *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1985), 129-56.

<sup>62</sup> Zubkova, *Russia After the War*, 15.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.



strengthened their sense of belonging, even if it never manifested into any political action. Yet the thought of military trained men who had been exposed to the higher standards of the West questioning or even challenging the regime was enough for Stalin to immediately set upon reaffirming his role in the victory.<sup>65</sup>

Propaganda organs, such as *Pravda*, launched a campaign to monopolise public discourse on Stalin's role in the war on the day after the victory. *Pravda* divided the credit for winning the war in the following way: "the heroism and military prowess of the Red Army and of the Soviet people was led to victory by the organisation of the Bolshevik Party. It was 'led by our great Stalin...Long live our great Stalinist victory!'"<sup>66</sup> In his 'Address to the People' on May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1945, Stalin made no mention of the Party, simply addressing himself and the people as 'we', promising that "the innumerable deprivations and losses suffered by our people in the course of the war, the intensive labour in the rear and at the front, offered on the altar of the country, have not been made in vain and eventuated in the complete victory over the enemy."<sup>67</sup> It was this hierarchy which would inform the rhetoric of the Soviet Peace Campaign four years later: Just as Stalin had led the country to victory he would maintain peace during the Cold War.

It was important for Stalin to maintain a monopoly on rhetoric as the first signs of economic hardship for the country began to appear in the summer of 1946. Just as the Soviet peace campaign bound people to put their trust in Stalin to maintain peace, it bound them to his post-war domestic policy. The food supply crisis in the summer of 1946 was the first taste of the economic hardship resulting from the West's economic embargo.<sup>68</sup> Even though the 1946 harvest was 7.7 million tonnes smaller than that of 1945 due to the harsh weather, the regime insisted on pushing through with requisitioning and to avoid any reduction in the state

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<sup>65</sup>For more on veterans in post-war Soviet Union see: Mark Edele, *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Mark Edele "Veterans and the Village: Red Army Demobilization and Postwar Demography," *Russian history/Histoire russe* 36 (2009): 159-82.

<sup>66</sup> *Pravda*, 9 May 1945.

<sup>67</sup>Stalin, J.V. "Stalin's Address to the People Victory Speech"

<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1945/05/09a.htm>.

<sup>68</sup> For-post war economic policy and how it affected workers see: Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Naum Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952* (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1961); Eugene Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Alex Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991* (London: Penguin, 1992); Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

grain reserve.<sup>69</sup> As a result, the majority of collective of state farms were forced to give up a portion of crops that would usually have been shared among the peasants.<sup>70</sup>

From a propagandistic perspective, economic dislocation also threatened the Party's official line on domestic policy. Without any information on the Party's economic plans, many people resorted to rumours to make sense of the regimes plans. In the summer of 1947 in Moscow, it was widely rumoured that there would soon be, around July, 15<sup>th</sup> another increase in ration prices. Once again, great lines formed in the stores, and people began withdrawing money from savings accounts. In the course of 1947, 1948, and even at the beginning of 1950, there were many cases of the interrupted supply of bread and other vital food products. Rumours created war panic and undermined official propaganda.<sup>71</sup>

The Soviet regime understood that the priorities in building the Eastern Bloc and rebuilding the country were starting to clash. Judging by the questions most often raised at lectures and interviews at industrial enterprises, on collective farms, and in government institutions, there were a lot of doubts about the wisdom of supplying other countries with food, something really difficult to understand in view of the food supply crisis at home. This particular concern reached massive proportions in 1946-1947, the most urgent period in the domestic food market. Stalin had to convincingly justify the Soviet Union's external and internal predicament with a campaign so that its foreign policy was seen as legitimate by the public.

The traumas of war had cancelled out the disillusionment many felt after the war for reform and the loosening up of the Stalinist regime. The threat of war would long be perceived in the people's view as the explanation of their economic problems, and the saying "just don't let there be war" would serve as the ultimate justification of the deprivations of the post-war period, for which there would otherwise have been no explanation. Once the Cold War began, the regime could use military factors to explain all of the problems endured by the Soviet people. In Zubkova's words, "the perception of happiness as the absence of unhappiness took form among people experiencing the disasters of wartime, especially the attitude toward life and its problems. Here was the origin of the incantation "but for the war", and the willingness to

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<sup>69</sup> Zubkova, *Russia After the War*, 40.

<sup>70</sup> For more on the state of peasants and collectivization after the war see: Alec Nove, "Soviet Peasantry in World War II", in ed. Susan J. Linz, *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1985), 77-90; Zima, V.F. *Golod v SSSR 1946-47 godov: proiskhozhdenie i posledstviia*. Moskva: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii RAN.

<sup>71</sup> Timothy Johnston, "The Soviet Struggle for Peace, 1948-54", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86 (2008): 276.

forgive the government for all of its unpopular policies if only it fulfilled the people's wish to avoid a new war".<sup>72</sup>

With the launch of the peace campaign, this attitude of the people was consciously utilised by the government and its propaganda. As recent allies were transformed into enemies whose aggressive intentions obstructed social programmes and thus weighed heavily on a people still suffering from the recent war, the regime hoped for people to rally around it. Yet as Zubkova argues, the government's explanation "cannot be considered exclusively as a propagandist trick or an example of the clever manipulation of public opinion", since "the psychology of hostile encirclement was part of the Soviet mentality, a characteristic feature of the thinking not only of the people, but of the leader as well".<sup>73</sup>

The regime was spurred into launching a peace campaign because it dealt directly with foreign policy issues, something which the public increasingly became interested in. Usually two-thirds of the questions in the resumes prepared for the central authorities concerned matters of international affairs, the situation in different countries, and foreign-policy initiatives of the Soviet leadership. In contrast, only one third of questions dealt with the internal situation of the country. Another reason for the increased interest in foreign policy was that it was simply impossible to openly discuss the domestic situation. The famine in the country, for example, could not be mentioned, though the euphemism "provisioning problems" could be. The supreme authority could not be criticised (such criticism was regarded as anti-Soviet agitation).<sup>74</sup> This was not on ideological grounds, as most were preoccupied with day-to-day life rather than 'capitalist' aggression or national liberation movements in Europe and China. Yet people's interest in problems of international life was linked with their day-to-day life and "their need to be reassured that there would be no new war." Hence, a peace campaign had to address the following issues: to convincingly demonise the West (particularly America) as warmongering, Soviet diplomacy's ability to preserve the interests of peace, and the strengthening of the Soviet Bloc (which was viewed as a guarantor of peace).

Yet unlike other propaganda campaigns, the requisite of the peace campaign was that it had to have the appearance of a grass-root, civic organised campaign, stripped of any officialdom. The main channel for official discourse was the official network of information, which included propagandists and agitators, and the media network of newspapers and journals, posters, cinema and radio. The resort to rumours already undermined officially-sanctioned

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<sup>72</sup> Zubkova, *Russia After the War*, 85.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 87.

discourse. Public scepticism towards official information “could be read creatively in order to learn something, which was not intended by the senders of the message”.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, it was the public space that needed to be monopolised so that other opinions would be pushed out. It was the congregation of the people that the regime had to control. Face-to-face communication created rumours which allowed the sharing of individual memories and ideas between more and more people, creating a parallel universe of information to the official channel.<sup>76</sup> This space had to be under control by channelling official discourse through a seemingly mass grassroots movement.

The fundamental characteristic of the Soviet Peace Movement, even if its state sanctioned origins are taken into account, was that it was modelled as a mass, civic and grassroots movement. That is, those involved in numerous meetings and propagated Stalin’s rhetoric on the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions were not Party cadres, but ordinary people. To understand why the regime decided to model the peace movement on a grassroots organisation we must trace the pre-war strategy of the regime to mobilise the public. The decision to make the peace movement into a ‘civic organisation’ was the culmination of the tumultuous developments and failures of state propaganda organs between the Great Terror and before the Nazi invasion in 1941.

One major lesson which the Soviet regime learned from their experiences from the late 1920s to the early 1930s was to de-ideologise the peace campaign. It proved to be effective during the war when official ideological propaganda rhetoric was quickly dropped as its failure to rally the nation in defence of the state became apparent. In its place, the state adapted a more straightforward, emotive rhetoric of ‘official patriotism’, with the press producing ‘narrative of peoples’ as symbols of the “unity of the great family”.<sup>77</sup> No longer was the struggle against the enemy framed in Marxist terms, but as the defence of the motherland. Internationalism was

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<sup>75</sup> Mark Edele, “More than just Stalinists The political sentiments of victors 1945–1953 Possibilities of political thought”, in ed. Juliane Fürst *Late Stalinist Russia Society between reconstruction and reinvention* (London & New York: Routledge), 174.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>77</sup> On Stalin and the Orthodox Church after the War see: Steve Merritt Miner, *Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Tatiana A. Chumachenko, *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Dimitry Pospelovsky, *The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime 1917–1982, vol. II* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984); On Stalin and Russian/Soviet nationalism see: Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Serhy Yekelchuk, “The Civic Duty to Hate: Stalinist Citizenship as Political Practice and Civic Emotion (Kiev, 1943–53),” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7 (2006): 529–56; Richard Stites, ed., *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Eric van Ree, E., *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth-Century Revolutionary Patriotism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), ch.16 &17; Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Harvard University Press, 1967).

dismissed with the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 for traditional Russian patriotism, as exemplified by an agreement between the state and Russian Orthodox Church in September of the same year.<sup>78</sup>

Yet even if the cult of Stalin continued to dominate official propaganda organs, war journalists and correspondents, such as Ilya Ehrenburg (who would later become vice-deputy Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee), Konstantin Simonov and Vasily Grossman brought to the fore de-ideologised and personal accounts of the war that appealed to humanistic values aimed at ordinary people. As Jeffrey Brookes notes, Ehrenburg and others “briefly appropriated the flowers and children that the press had previously identified with Stalin and used them to tell a story with other heroes”.<sup>79</sup> Their wartime accounts about obligation, citizenship and courage were part of the mobilisation effort that brought victory. Yet they also reflected the public’s aspirations for a post-war Soviet civil society.

It was during the early post-war years that Stalin once again attempted to re-impose the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy on the propaganda organs as way to “put the genie of an imagined civil society back in its box”.<sup>80</sup> Stalin had traded any economic prosperity that would have been possible under positive cooperation with the Allies for a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. The challenge that the Soviet government faced during the early post-war years was to present convincing propaganda to a population that had been transformed by the war, with new identities and civic courage, and convince them that the rebuilding and strengthening of the Soviet state was more important than any economic or political reforms that the people might have felt entitled to for their sacrifices in the war. In order to effectively mobilise the Soviet public it had to be done without resorting to ideological propaganda, which had been delegitimised and looked upon with ridicule after the war.

By the end of the war, the cycle from Marxist ideology to popular patriotism had been completed.<sup>81</sup> The Great Patriotic War changed the regime and the public’s self-perception: victory was not a result of Marxist superiority as an ideology but a combination of the people’s heroism and sacrifice and Stalin’s leadership, as Soviet patriotism, the love of the Motherland, and the Soviet project (building communism) were fused together.<sup>82</sup> The sacrifices made

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<sup>78</sup> Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 190.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>81</sup> See David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

<sup>82</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Late Stalinism in historical perspective”, in ed. Juliane Fürst *Late Stalinist Russia Society between reconstruction and reinvention*, (London & New York: Routledge), 271.

during the war made Marxist-Leninist internationalism less of a useful creed for mobilising the Soviet public for rebuilding the country. Soviet patriotism also deemphasised class warfare, which made it more inclusive and easier for those with 'alien' class origins to be more openly involved in the Soviet project. As Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, "for the majority of post-war citizens... 'Sovietness' was a natural attribute of all those who had fought in the war, either actually at the front or metaphorically on the 'home front', and survived".<sup>83</sup>

It was from these convulsions – the constant struggle between Marxist-Leninist propaganda and populist patriotic propaganda – that the Soviet Peace Campaign formed. The War itself ended this struggle, as Marxist-Leninist ideology and popular myths came to work in tandem. As Amir Weiner noted, "Marxist eschatology... provided the Soviet polity with historical meaning by situating it in the context of a perceived human destiny", but "...that policy was legitimized by certain myths... such as the Great Patriotic war, which related it to a concrete situation".<sup>84</sup> Thus, the Soviet peace campaign was used to legitimise Stalin's foreign policy by playing its part in elevating the Great Patriotic War into a myth and using it to give meaning and understanding to Soviet domestic policy so that people would accept the post-war situation not as a betrayal of the sacrifices they made but an achievement of the Soviet state to guarantee peace.

It was this mythical representation of the war, with its heroism, sacrifice and victory that shaped the peace campaign, with its carefully coordinated, yet endless meetings. For this to be convincing, the pre-war state sanctioned ideological propaganda, which had to be thoroughly discredited after the war, had to fuse with the new myth of the Great Patriotic War. The state may have orchestrated the peace campaign, but this time it was Soviet citizens and *not* the Party cadres who used it as a platform to express - albeit within the bounds of regime-approved rhetoric - their hopes, fears, pride and, crucially for the state, their allegiance and trust in the Soviet regime as guarantor of peace. It was this 'mandate' that allowed the peace campaign to connect domestic policy (rebuilding and rearming without outside economic assistance) to foreign policy (the consolidation of the Eastern Bloc) and to justify the lack of reforms on the grounds that consolidating security was more important to achieving peace than economic or political reforms.

Yet this is not to suggest that the regime acknowledged this change. Even as it engaged with the public on a grassroots level, the Party presented the post-war project of 'reconstruction'

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 271-2.

<sup>84</sup> Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002) 18.

as “recreating as exactly and as quickly as possible the pre-war situation that had been destroyed”.<sup>85</sup> That meant not just reconstructing ruined cities and railroads but also – to the disappointment of those who had hoped for institutional reform and liberalisation – strengthening (and, if necessary, recreating) collective farms and re-imposing discipline in the cultural sphere. While agitators in the kolkhoz were likely to be exiled and members of the intelligentsia – in literature, the arts and scholarship – risked their careers during the disciplinary campaigns in 1946–1948 known collectively as the Zhdanovshchina, they were unlikely to be arrested and executed. It was, nevertheless, made clear that there would be no major reforms or liberalisation of the Stalinist system.

## **A Revolutionary Theory of Peace**

The purpose of this dissertation is to trace and document the formation of Soviet "soft power", cultural diplomacy and the "battle for hearts and minds" during the first decade of the Cold War. At the heart of this process was the so-called "struggle for peace", which had its own institutional, political and ideological dimensions. Its goals corresponded to both foreign and domestic policies. These two spheres were closely intertwined: After the war the Soviet Union unexpectedly found itself with the new status of a world power and embroiled in a new imperial project (the creation of the Eastern Bloc, and later "the world socialist system"). At the same time, victory in World War II finally legitimised the Soviet system,<sup>86</sup> while the merging of the National Bolshevik ideology of the Stalinist regime with its xenophobia, autarky and imperial designs demanded the cultivation of a new Soviet identity.<sup>87</sup>

At no time during the Soviet "struggle for peace" was peace ever intrinsically valuable. It was always understood to be strictly political, i.e. confrontational. And, therefore, it can be seen as the very opposite of peace. In the Soviet interpretation, the struggle for peace was a struggle for Soviet strategic objectives during the Cold War. It is easier to understand the specifics of the Soviet struggle for peace when referring to the criticism of Soviet imperialism made by major Soviet dissidents, who, although representing opposing poles of the political

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<sup>85</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Late Stalinism in historical perspective”, in ed. Juliane Fürst *Late Stalinist Russia Society between reconstruction and reinvention*, (London & New York: Routledge), 274.

<sup>86</sup> See: Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>87</sup> See Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*.

spectrum - from liberal-internationalist (Sakharov) to conservative-nationalist (Solzhenitsyn) - agreed that the Soviet "struggle for peace" was nothing but a form of war.

Pacifism was Sakharov's central idea, which he consistently defended in such works as *Razmyshleniia o progresse, mirnom sosushchestvovanii i intellektual'noi svobode* (1969), *Mir, progress, prava cheloveka* (1975), *O strane i mire* (1975), an "Open Letter to Brezhnev" in 1980, and *Trevoga i nadezhda* (1990), etc. For Sakharov, pacifism, non-violent alternatives and human rights movements were closely linked. Moreover, it was namely pacifism that was a priority, while national interests were secondary.<sup>88</sup> This line of liberal dissidence was in sharp conflict with the nationalist-traditionalist émigré camp, at the centre of which was Solzhenitsyn.

Solzhenitsyn, being a Russian nationalist and critic of empire, built his criticism of Soviet hegemony on the basis of the Russian pacifist tradition. In the work *Peace and Violence* (1973), where Solzhenitsyn, by the way, put forward Sakharov as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, he argued that "the juxtaposition of 'peace-war' a logic error (...) War is massive, thick, loud, bright, but far from the only manifestation of eternally uninterrupted wide-ranging global violence. The juxtaposition is but logically balanced and morally valid, there is 'peace-violence.'" In fact, Solzhenitsyn noted, besides wars, history is full explosions of revolutionary, national, religious, racial, political, and other forms of violence that disrupt social peace. Therefore, in Solzhenitsyn's understanding, "pacifism is not against war, but against violence. Humanity constantly gravitated towards a nonviolent alternative." As examples, he cited the Indian Ahimsa, Christ's Sermon on the Mount, Tolstoy's nonviolent resistance to the evils of violence, and Sakharov's antinuclear pacifism.<sup>89</sup>

Of course, Russia's history had its own peculiarities. The external factors may include: from civil wars before and during the Tatar siege to the persistent search for warm sea ports to expansion into to the East and South to its militant history to the idea of 'defending the motherland', Russia itself became the target of aggression in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and at the same time was itself an active aggressor. There were internal factors: authoritarianism, serfdom, a lack of parliamentary and human rights, the suppression of alternative thinking and developed ideas of violent revolutionary social renewal, whereas the parliamentary nonviolent alternative was not receiving a response. This was not conducive to the development of pacifist ideas in the country. The specifics of the history of the Russian church were also a big factor, considering that no powerful heretical Protestant denominations existed in Russia, and it was

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<sup>88</sup> On this is written in detail in: Liudmila Alekseeva. *Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR noveishii period* (Vermont: Khronika, 1984).

<sup>89</sup> A.I. Solzhenitsyn, *Mir i nasilie* (YMCA Press, 1989), 125-126.



precisely from the many sects in the West (e.g., Quakers) that many pacifist ideas originated. As Solzhenitsyn noted, Marxism caught on in Russia because it diverged from the ideas of social peace/harmony. On the contrary, "the Marxist ideology has always been an ideology of struggle/class war and never concealed its tendency towards violence. It picked out of the historical and cultural context ideas of retaliatory beginnings, rebellion, revolutionary, and besieged fortress."<sup>90</sup>

In this regard, Lenin took a consistently Marxist position. Before the revolution, he actively opposed Tolstoyism. As is known, Leo Tolstoy advocated the idea of Christian non-resistance, arguing that non-violence is not passivity or reconciliation with the refusal to fight violence: "To not resist evil by force, it does not mean not to resist evil, but to not resist evil by violence (...) You cannot put out fire with fire, pour water over water, destroy evil with evil. And yet [people have grappled with] this matter since the dawn of time and have brought about the situation in which we find ourselves in."<sup>91</sup>

Although pacifist ideas were widespread in Russia in the late 19th - early 20th century<sup>92</sup>, they did not have broad social support and were confined to the intellectual and cultural milieu. At this time, Lenin sharply criticised pacifism (particularly during World War I) in the works *English Pacifism and the English Dislike of Theory* (1915), *Pacifism and the Slogan of Peace* (1915) and *Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism* (1916). Opposing the war and calling for the defeat of their own government, the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan of "turning the imperialist war into a civil war". This was essentially a slogan of class war, which, needless to say, contained little pacifism.

Lenin proceeded from the fact that the problem of war and peace was a problem of class. For Lenin, pacifism as a resistance to all forms of war, which called for the cessation of war and the upholding of peace, regardless of eradicating the root causes of war, was primarily "an ideological trend (...) - the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, in which everyone's living conditions are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices."<sup>93</sup> To him pacifism seemed unacceptable because "pacifists dream of perpetual peace without throwing off the yoke and domination of capital" and that the essence of pacifism was "the idea

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Tolstoi, Lev N. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. 63. Pis'ma 1880–1886* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1934), 259, 119-120.

<sup>92</sup> see R.M. Iliukhina, *Rossiiskii patsifizm vchera i segodnia* (Moskva: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN - Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1992), 13-24.

<sup>93</sup> Lenin, V. I. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 27*, (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1969), 306. [http://www.kpu.ua/ru/22067/lenin\\_pss](http://www.kpu.ua/ru/22067/lenin_pss)

that war is not linked with capitalism, there is no continuation of the policy of peace.<sup>94</sup> This is theoretical falsity; and practical falsity in the fact that it bypasses social revolution."<sup>95</sup>

If so, then pacifist ideology is not simply hostile to Marxism, but is directly aimed at strengthening the ruling regime: it is "speaking the language of mathematics, both necessary and sufficient to fool the workers: it's impossible to offer them any less, since one cannot lead the masses, without promising them a fairer world and not frightening them with dangers."<sup>96</sup> This was how Lenin explained pacifism's rise during wartime. He wrote that the "imperialist bourgeoisie require lackeys to console and soothe the angry masses with a sweet chant of peace", that the "bourgeois pacifists and reformists are people who, as a general rule, in one form or another get paid for strengthening the rule of the bourgeoisie by means of influence peddling so that they lull the masses and distract them from the revolutionary struggle."<sup>97</sup>

In pacifism he saw the same danger as in religion, which lulls the mass consciousness: "Social pacifists, that is, socialists in name, conductors of bourgeois pacifist hypocrisy in practice, now play absolutely the same role as the Christian Pope has played for centuries, embellishing phrases about love of neighbour and the commandments of Christ's policy on the oppressed classes (. ..) reconciling the oppressed classes to their domination."<sup>98</sup> Therefore he called for "winning over the millions of workers that the bourgeois pacifists have duped."<sup>99</sup>

In full accordance with this programme, the Soviet government curtailed the activities of numerous pacifist organisations along with different political and religious organisations (including the particularly discriminated-against Tolstoyans Mennonites, Adventists and Doukhobors). Therefore, by the time of Stalin's rise to power (1927-29), there were no pacifist organisations that had existed since before the revolution and the first years of Soviet power. Pacifist alternatives were now exclusively in dissent. It is sufficient to mention the work of the writer and religious thinker Daniel Andreev, *Peace Rose The Rose of the World* (1950-58), which he wrote in prison, and which put forward original ideas of ecumenism and pacifism associated with the Russian religious tradition.

With the intensification of the conflict between the former allies, from the very beginning of the Cold War, previous Soviet anti-pacifist discourse was confronted with the realities of the post-war world. When it came to violence and war, Stalin remained a consistent

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., Vol. 31, 172.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., Vol. 49, 376.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., Vol. 26, 279.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., Vol. 30, 343, 345.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 277.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., Vol. 27, 307.

disciple of Marx and Lenin. Thus, he argued that Marx's phrase about violence as a "midwife of history, pregnant with the new" was brilliant and the best formulation of the essence of historical materialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the Stalin era, when revolutionaries, the leaders of popular uprisings and military leaders were glorified, concepts such as pacifism, humanism, peace-making and nonviolence received only negative connotations and were referred to as "imperialist," "bourgeois" and "abstract".

Two weeks after the Fulton speech on March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1946, Stalin's response during an interview with Associated Press correspondent Gilmore was published, in which he made no mention of Churchill's speech and praised the UN as an organisation whose strength "lies in the fact that it is based on the principle of the equality of States and not on the principle of the domination of some over others. If the United Nations Organisation succeeds in the future, too, in maintaining the principle of equality, then it will undoubtedly play a great positive role in guaranteeing universal peace and security." He called fears of war baseless, proclaiming that "neither nations nor their armies seek a new war. They want peace, and seek to secure the peace. That means that the present war scare does not come from that direction. I think that the present war scare is aroused by the actions of certain political groups who are engaged in propaganda for a new war and thus sowing the seeds of dissension and uncertainty." Although Stalin replied briefly to Gilmore's last question on what was needed to be done in order to prevent war, his response indicated that he understood the Cold War as a purely propagandistic enterprise: "It is necessary that the public and the ruling circles organise widespread counter-propaganda against the propagandists for a new war, as well as for the maintenance of peace; that not a single utterance of the propagandists for a new war gets away without the rebuff it deserves on the part of public opinion and the press; that in this way the war-mongers be promptly exposed and given no opportunity to misuse freedom of speech against the interests of peace."<sup>100</sup>

Thus, according to Stalin, the main task was, in fact, to propagandise peace. A year later, on April 9<sup>th</sup>, 1947, in conversation with Harold Stassen, Governor of Minnesota (1939-43) and future President of the University of Pennsylvania (1948-53), Stalin spoke of the principle of peaceful coexistence between communism and capitalism. He developed the idea that wars occur not only between states representing different systems, since the "economic systems in Germany and the United States are the same, but, nevertheless, war broke out between them". This was unorthodox for Marxist reasoning: "The U.S. and U.S.S.R. systems are different but we didn't wage war against each other and the U.S.S.R. does not propose to.

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<sup>100</sup> I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 16 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Pisatel', 1997), 32.

If during the war they could co-operate, why can't they today in peace, given the wish to co-operate? Of course, if there is no desire to co-operate, even with the same economic system they may fall out."<sup>101</sup> It turns out that everything was determined by "the desire to cooperate", and not strictly by the "class laws of social development". It was all a preamble for disavowing previous irreconcilable statements.

On Stassen's puzzling question on how the Soviet Union could cooperate with the capitalist countries, Stalin replied that he "could not have possibly said that two different systems cannot cooperate. The idea of cooperation between the two systems was first expressed by Lenin. Lenin is our teacher, says I. Stalin, and we Soviet people - students of Lenin. We never have nor will we ever deviate from Lenin's instructions." It may be, that Stalin had said in the past that one system, for instance, the capitalist, does not want to cooperate, but this was attributed to a lack of willingness rather than a lack of opportunity to cooperate. As for opportunities for cooperation, Stalin adhered to Lenin's view on the possibility and desirability of cooperation between the two economic systems. As to the desire of the people to co-operate on the part of the U.S.S.R. and the Party, it is possible—and the two countries could only benefit by this co-operation. For Stassen, it remained only to answer that "the statements I referred to are those made by you at the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 1939 and the plenary session in 1937—statements about capitalist encirclement and monopoly". From Stalin's announcement, Stassen concluded that "now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, the situation had changed".<sup>102</sup>

Interestingly, once he began the usual revision of Marxist doctrine and rewriting Lenin to recast him into a "fighter for peace," Stalin was nearly compelled to abandon ideology in favour of *realpolitik* in this interview. He bluntly told his U.S. interviewer that mutual accusations of monopoly capitalism (USA) and totalitarianism (USSR) were no more than propaganda: "As for indulging in criticisms of monopoly and totalitarianism - this was propaganda, while Stalin considered himself to be 'a business-like man'. 'We should not be sectarian' Stalin would say. 'When the people wish to change the systems they will do so. When we met with Roosevelt to discuss the questions of war, we did not call each other names. We established co-operation and succeeded in defeating the enemy.'"<sup>103</sup>

These two interviews with Stalin (1946 and 1947) give different starting points, yet they are unanimous in the fact that what lies, in Stalin's view, at the heart of the ensuing Cold War is

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 59.

propaganda. Stalin himself begins to act in accordance with the parallel reality created by this propaganda. So, in an interview with Pravda on February 17<sup>th</sup> 1951, he indulges in rhetoric about who wants peace more - the Soviet Union or the West, exposing the "warmongers": "Prime Minister Attlee portrays himself as a champion of the world. But if he really stands for peace, why did he reject the proposal of the Soviet Union to the United Nations for the immediate conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, China and France? If he really stands for peace, why did he reject the proposals of the Soviet Union for an immediate start to reduce arms; for an immediate ban on nuclear weapons? If he really stands for peace, why does he persecute supporters of peace; why did he forbid the Congress of Defenders of Peace in England? Is the campaign for the defence of peace a threat to England's security? Clearly, Prime Minister Attlee stands not for the preservation of peace but for the outbreak of a new world war of aggression."<sup>104</sup>

These rhetorical passages belong to the realm of pure propaganda. Stalin was acting out fully in accordance with the task which he set himself at the time, when on February 1<sup>st</sup>, 1951, the Soviet Union suffered a fiasco at the UN. On this day, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 498, condemning the People's Republic of China as an aggressor. Since the Korean War was the first large-scale confrontation between the two camps, and the Soviet Union was isolated, Stalin made a desperate attack on the UN. In an interview he stated that he regarded the UN decision as "shameful": "Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, to declare that the Chinese People's Republic which has defended its borders and striven to take back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor."<sup>105</sup> Stalin carried out the attack on the UN in full accordance with the logic of the Cold War: as the UN cannot be an instrument of the Soviet Union, it becomes "an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable (...) The United Nations treads the same disgraceful path as the League of Nations. Thereby it buries its moral authority and dooms itself to decay."<sup>106</sup> What way out did Stalin see out of this situation?

A reporter's question about whether he thought a new world war inevitable, Stalin delivered a monologue which would then be quoted in the Soviet press an infinite number of

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 146.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 147.

times. He proclaimed that war cannot be considered inevitable, despite the fact that in the U.S., Britain and France there are "aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue that brings colossal profits. They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the preserving of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans." That is why "they fear the campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive intentions of the reactionary governments," and why "they oppose the proposals of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary."

Despite all this, Stalin knew the answer to the question of what will end the struggle between aggressive and peace forces: "Peace will be preserved and strengthened, if people take the preservation of peace in their own hands and will defend it to the end. War may be inevitable if the warmongers succeed in ensnaring the masses with their lies, in deceiving them and drawing them into a new world war. Therefore, a broad campaign for the preservation of peace as a means of exposing the criminal machinations of the warmongers is now of paramount importance."<sup>107</sup>

The more the USSR became isolated in the UN and Soviet politics became aggressive, the more desperate it "fought for peace". *Realpolitik*, which Stalin demonstrated in 1947, even without having the atomic bomb, was replaced by a rigid Marxist rhetoric, imposed at a time of increasing Stalinist paranoia and conspiracy theories.

In his last work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952) Stalin devoted a chapter to "the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries", in which he rationalised in Marxist terminology the lack of "willingness to cooperate". Here he argued that "the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force", because Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war was not out-dated, despite the "rise of powerful popular forces working for peace, against a new world war". These forces, according to Stalin, stand

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 148.

only for peace, unable to eliminate the real preconditions of war - imperialism: "The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism - it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims".

Stalin did not rule out that in "a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism." In other words, the imperialist war will escalate into class war. Meanwhile, Stalin depicted the "struggle for peace" almost as pacifist and depoliticised. He explicitly states that "most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force. To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to destroy imperialism."<sup>108</sup>

It was not by chance that in the Soviet Union this work was seen as Stalin's 'political testament'. The ending statement - an example of Stalinist dialectic - was not just a 'classic', but best illustrated the specifics of the Soviet struggle for peace and why it was truly important to wage a war for it. However, after paroxysms of World War II and the outbreak of the Cold War with its arms race, pacifism found new life (suffice to mention the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955, which initiated the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs). But the Soviet "struggle for peace" was set up in opposition to pacifism.

Although at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 Khrushchev spoke in a conciliatory tone that "there is no fatal inevitability of war," he added that "in an atomic war socialism will win."<sup>109</sup> Declarations and statements made at the Moscow Meeting of

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 178.

<sup>109</sup> *Kommunisticheskaiia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz, 20-i s"ezd KPSS (14-25 fevralia 1956 goda): Stenograficheskii otchet. Vol. 1* (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1956), 23-24.

Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960 continued to assert the Stalinist thesis that only the "victory of socialism in the world would finally eliminate the social and national causes of all wars." They treated the peaceful coexistence of states as a "form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism". The United States, which the peace struggle was to be directed against, was called "the biggest international exploiter (...) the main bulwark of world reaction and the gendarme (...), an enemy of the peoples of the world."<sup>110</sup> This position remained virtually unchanged until the beginning of *perestroika*. So even at the peak of the Detente, Brezhnev asserted at the 25<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU in 1976 that capitalism is incapable of existing "without resorting to aggression and threats of weapons, but encroaching on the independence and interests of other peoples."<sup>111</sup>

The end of the Detente in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served as a flashpoint for a home-grown pacifist movement. In 1982 the first independent pacifist group appeared in the Soviet Union: "For the establishment of trust between East and West." Its members were subject to KGB repression and harassment by the Soviet Peace Committee. They were against the aggression in Afghanistan, for the right to refuse military service for conscience reasons and the introduction of alternative military service, the demilitarisation of society, the abolition of the death penalty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states and other countries.<sup>112</sup>

But along with the official "struggle for peace" and dissident pacifism existed semi-legal pacifism. In his book, *We - the People of the Sixties* [M̃y - shestidesyatniki], one of the most prominent liberal writers of the war generation, Ales Adamovich, wrote of the "underground pacifism" of front-line soldiers-turned-writers as being far from patriotically one-sided.<sup>113</sup> These ideas were expressed during the Military Literature and the Nuclear Age Conference in Minsk in 1983. However, pacifist ideas were not openly expressed in the USSR until the beginning of *perestroika* and the proclamation of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking'.

Even in the early 1980s, Soviet propagandists continued to struggle with the "social-pacifism of rightist opportunists and rightist revisionists" which "objectively serves as a fifth

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<sup>110</sup> *Programmnye dokumenty bor'by za mir, demokratiuu i sotsializm: dokumenty Soveshchaniĭ predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii, sostoiavshikhsia v Moskve v noiabre 1957 g., v Bukhareste v iune 1960 g., v Moskve v noiubre 1960* (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961), 8-9,40,43,56-57,60-61.

<sup>111</sup> *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza, 25-i s'ezd KPSS (24 fevralia - 5 marta 1976 goda): Stenograficheskii otchet. Vol. 1* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1976), 39.

<sup>112</sup> See: Iliukhina, *Rossiiskii patsifizm*, 181; Iu. Krasnorutskii, "Gruppa 'Doverie'," *Informatsionnyi Biulleten' 'Grazhdanskii mir'* 1 (1990); *Vek KhKh i mir* 7 (1990): .37, 39; E. Kuznetsov, "The independent Peace Movement in the USSR," *In Search of Civil Society*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu. (New York: Routledge, 1990).

<sup>113</sup> Ales' Adamovich, *My – Shestidesiatniki* (Moskva: Ruskii pisatel', 1991), 28.



column in the ranks of the communist and workers' movement." <sup>114</sup> Explaining the incompatibility of pacifism with the Soviet "struggle for peace", Soviet propagandists noted that "the essence of pacifism is not the struggle for peace but an absolute struggle for an abstract peace, without eradicating the root causes of war, without overthrowing the regime whose policy exacerbates global climate, and which, ultimately, is the cause of war." <sup>115</sup> It can, therefore, be said that the essence of the Soviet "struggle for peace" was not so much the struggle for peace but the struggle against imperialism.

Thus, even on the eve of *perestroika*, official Soviet propaganda continued to assert that "the struggle for peace in modern terms - in essence a mass democratic struggle (...) The immediate objective of the anti-war struggle is not to abolish capitalism but to prevent a world war. However, the communists explain to their partners in class alliance that it is precisely the aggressive militaristic policy in its most naked form which reflects the essence of modern imperialism and its class aims. In these conditions, the struggle against the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of the USA and its allies acts as a struggle against the very essence of modern imperialism. This struggle not only expresses humanist values, but also the class interests of all participants in the anti-war movement." <sup>116</sup>

It was because pacifism's main priority was upholding peace as such that Soviet fighters for peace viewed pacifism as hostile - not so much in its form as in its essence: "Because of its essence, the pacifist struggle for peace, even though if its political content is progressive, it is at odds with the essence of the Communists struggle for peace. Consequently, Marxism and pacifism express differing essences in the anti-war movement and this very clash between them is a clash of different entities." <sup>117</sup>

And yet, forty years of experience of the "struggle for peace" taught Soviet "peace activists" that it was necessary to seek forms of cooperation with the pacifists. If during the Stalinist years they were talked about with open hostility, now it was written that "Marxist-Leninists never link together binding associations for practical cooperation with the pacifists with a need for a certain ideological choice. Ideological differences do not have to be an obstacle to unified socio-political action. An example of this is the nearly 30-year participation of Soviet scientists in the work of the Pugwash movement (...)." <sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Iu. I. Samsonov, *Leninskaia metodologiia analiza patsifizma i ee znachenie dlia ideologicheskoi bor'by v sovremennykh usloviakh*. (Moskva, 1983), 14.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. 17.

<sup>116</sup> I.I. Luneva, "Bor'ba za mir – bor'ba obshchedemokraticeskaiia' iz knigi Minaev," in *Kommunisty i bor'ba za mir*, ed. L.M. Minaev (Moskva: institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina pri TsK KPSS, 1985). 61-62

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 18.

It took decades until pacifism had ceased to be seen only as an enemy. Moreover, in 1983, Soviet propagandists claimed that "an important feature of the ideological confrontation between Marxism-Leninism and pacifism on the issues of war and peace is that - propaganda against pacifism should be done tactfully, in a calm and respectful tone, excluding any type of insult to the feelings and identity of pacifists. The important thing is that Marxism-Leninism, while opposing pacifist ideology, supports their practical steps in the fight for peace and is not fighting against pacifists, but is for them; for them to overcome in their minds the utopian, non-scientific views on the solution to the problem of war and peace."<sup>119</sup>

When at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 13<sup>th</sup>, 1984, Chernenko repeated Stalin's 1947 mantra of how "the great Lenin bequeathed to us the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. We are ever true to this principle"<sup>120</sup> it might seem that Soviet political thought had been conceptually suspended in animation since the forties. But it was not. Although criticism of pacifism in the Soviet Union turned into a real industry<sup>121</sup>, discussions during mid-1980s show that not only had the tone and discourse changed, but there was a revision of some of the major ideological postulates, which although occurred with some reservations a few years later, in the wake of Gorbachev's announcement of a new course in foreign policy, would radically change the understanding of the 'struggle for peace' itself.

On the eve of *perestroika*, Soviet propaganda manoeuvred between loyalty to the principles of class war and *realpolitik*. It was awkward manoeuvring from the Stalinist "struggle for peace" which could already be seen dying. The fact was that, pacifism, so disliked by Soviet propaganda, was strongly associated with the main political enemy of the Bolsheviks - social democracy. To the extent that the position (and consequently political weight) of social democracy grew in Europe, ideological differences, especially strong under Stalin, were put on the back burner and the fear of social democracy subsided and was replaced by a sense of

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>120</sup> *Pravda*, 14 fevralia. 1984.

<sup>121</sup> See – E.A. Anufriev, *Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennykh usloviakh* (Moskva: MGU, 1970); *Antivoennye traditsii mezhdunarodnogo rabocheho dvizheniia* (Moskva: Mysl', 1972); I.D. Dubinina, *Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennykh usloviakh* (Kiev, 1967); *Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennuiu epokhu* (Moskva: Nauka, 1964); N.A. Ponomarev, *Problemy voyny i mira v sovremennykh burzhuaiznykh obshchestvenno-politicheskikh ucheniakh* (Leningrad, 1967); A.S. Milovidov, and E.A. Zhdanov, "Sotsial'no-filosofskie problemy voyny i mira," *zhurnal Voprosy Filosofii* 10 (1980); P.I. Edemskii, *Problemy voyny i mira i ideologicheskai bor'ba na sovremennym etape* (Moskva, 1979); E.I. Rybkin, *Kritika burzhuaiznykh uchenii o prichinakh i roli voyny v istorii* (Moskva: Nauka, 1979); Iu. I. Samsonov, *Leninskaia metodologiia analiza patsifizma i ee znachenie dlia ideologicheskoi bor'by v sovremennykh usloviakh* (Moskva, 1983); *Religioznye deiateli za prochny mir, razoruzhenie i spravedlivoie otnosheniia mezhdur narodami: Materialy Vsemirnoi konferentsii, Moskva 6-10 iunia 1977* (Moskva: APN, 1978).

urgency for building constructive relations. Of course, professional Soviet peace fighters would now assert that "at the forefront of the struggle for peace are the Communists, for whom the struggle to prevent the threat of nuclear war is the foundation of all their foreign policies".<sup>122</sup> However, they had to concede that "modern social democracy is a major force in the international labour movement".<sup>123</sup> Now it was said that during the previous two decades (i.e. after Khrushchev) there had "been some positive developments" in the relationship between Communists and Social Democrats. Cooperation with the Socialist International developed during contacts with Western socialists (Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Olof Palme, Neil Kinnock and others). The position of the Soviet Union was interpreted as "balanced" and aimed at dialogue for "strengthening the anti-war movement, strengthening the labour movement in the front of the struggle for peace"<sup>124</sup>, whereas the position of the social democrats was supposedly "reluctant".

These reservations had to conceal the obvious: in the struggle for peace, the Soviet position at the beginning of the Gorbachev era practically coincided with the position of the Socialist International, the former implacable enemy of the Bolsheviks. However, before the official proclamation of 'the new thinking' this was presented as the opportunism of social democrats themselves: the alleged "contacts between the two currents of the labour movement and their specific interaction in the struggle for disarmament contributed to some positive evolution of social democracy's conception of foreign policy"<sup>125</sup>, and not the Soviet communists. Soviet ideologues suggested, though not really trusting their new allies, that social democrats were now claiming that the social democracy was supposedly always a "fighter for peace and opposed to the war".

According to the Soviet side, this was certainly not the case, since previously "such broadcasted slogans of peace and calls for collective security in practice were accompanied by support for aggressive foreign policy actions of U.S. imperialism and ascribing aggressive intentions to the Soviet Union."<sup>126</sup> However, in the mid-1950s a shift began. In 1957, the social democrats supported several Soviet proposals to limit nuclear weapons production; the VI Congress of the Socialist International (1959) secured a positive attitude towards the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; and the X Conference of Socialist International

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<sup>122</sup> V.F. "Kommunisty i sotsial-demokraty v bor'be protiv ugrozy iadernoi voyny," in *Kommunisty i bor'ba za mir*, ed. L.M. Minaev (Moskva: institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina pri TsK KPSS, 1985), 93.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 99.

(1966) discussed the need for general and complete disarmament and the prohibition of the use of space for military purposes. Thus, Soviet propaganda, moving ever-closer to the social-democratic position, attempted to depict social democrats as opportunists. "Under the conditions of the Detente (...) begins and a more realistic approach to foreign policy issues by powerful forces of social democracy."<sup>127</sup> The social democrats condemned the coup in Chile, welcomed the elimination of regimes in Portugal, Greece and Spain, demanded the end of the war in Indochina, and finally made for peaceful coexistence as the "only approach to contemporary international politics".

In reality, the convergence was gradual. The 1978 Socialist International Conference in Helsinki was the first time that a CPSU delegation (headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee on International Affairs Boris Ponomarev) attended the conference. The blame for the crisis in the relationship between East and West was shifted completely by Soviet propagandists to the social democrats. They argued that, until the mid-1960s, "there was a sharp turn to the right in the entire the social democratic movement; In those years the rightist circles managed to push it into the abyss of anti-Soviet militarist hysteria and channel it into imperialist preparation for aggressive military-political actions against the USSR and other socialist countries."<sup>128</sup> In general, the position of the social democrats on the issue of the struggle for peace was treated as opportunistic (as they were supposedly forced to reckon with the will of voters) and that the Soviet "struggle for peace" should not rely on them in any way, since several social democrat leaders were "implicated in the spread of the Pentagon-penned myth of 'the Soviet military threat' and participate in a variety of ideological and other diversions of imperialism against socialist countries"<sup>129</sup>. From all this it is impossible to understand why the social democrats changed if the communists were allegedly always "unwavering [in their] principle position". It is easy to assume that the shift occurred precisely on the Soviet side. When Gorbachev proclaimed in his book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* that "the core of the new thinking is the recognition of the priority of human values and more precisely - the survival of humanity"<sup>130</sup> it was then impossible to conceal this political shift.

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>130</sup> M.S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988) 149.

After August 20<sup>th</sup>, 1949, when the first Soviet atomic bomb<sup>131</sup> was detonated at the Semipalatinsk test site, the Soviet Union conducted hundreds of nuclear weapons tests. From 1954 onwards tests began on the northern islands of Novaya Zemlya - constant tests (except during the 1989 moratorium). As *Pravda* reported in October 24<sup>th</sup>, 1990, in the period from 1981 to 1990, 714 nuclear explosions were conducted on Soviet nuclear test sites. In Kazakhstan alone there were 467, 131 in the north range and 115 (from 1963) at underground sites. It was not surprising, therefore, that it was in Kazakhstan that the antinuclear movement 'Nevada - Semipalatinsk' began in February 1989 with aim of banning new types of weapons of mass destruction. The leader of the movement was the People's Deputy of the USSR Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleymenov, who proclaimed that the struggle for peace starts "in our own home because for too long we fought for peace throughout the world. Let everyone start from their homes. We want to shut down the test sites." He introduced in the Supreme Council "a bill banning the production and testing of nuclear weapons"<sup>132</sup>. At the same time, several other movements arose, including the anti-nuclear movement, For a Nuclear-Free North<sup>133</sup>, the Soldiers' Mothers Movement, the revived Tolstoyan societies in Moscow and Kiev, the Tolstoyan Society of the USSR, and the Yasnaya Polyana Fund Accord. The group Trust became a pacifist movement at the beginning of *perestroika*. It had branches in Moscow, Leningrad, Lvov, Kiev, Chernobyl, Kuibyshev, Baku, Riga, Saratov, Vyborg and even Paris. Its aims included alternative civil service, disarmament, demilitarisation of society, human rights, democratisation of the army, and the creation of a "Union of Soviet refuseniks". At the end of 1990 at a meeting in Moscow of several peacekeeping, human rights, and youth organisations, the Movement for Demilitarization was formed.<sup>134</sup>

Against this background of genuine, grassroots, informal and non-institutionalised pacifism, the Soviet Peace Committee, as well as other state-sponsored and party nomenclature-led "social organizations", was in deep crisis. The Soviet press began to write openly that it is now "impossible to carry out class-based politics and to mechanically follow the governmental policy in international relations and especially to impose it on its foreign partners. Deprived of an independent peacekeeping outlook and not recognizing the trans-

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<sup>131</sup> See: David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956: Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-56* (New Haven: Yale Press, 1996).

<sup>132</sup> *Argumenty i Fakty* (1990) 31.

<sup>133</sup> See: *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, 1990, oktiabria 13, 17, 26; *Pravda*, noiabria 13, 1990; *Izvestiia*, oktiabria 29, 1991; *Kuranty*, iiunia 21, 1991.

<sup>134</sup> On the aims of the movement see: *Megapolis Express*, 33, 22 November, 1990.

ideological peace movements in the 80s that were close to pacifism, the Soviet Peace Committee began to lose confidence in the wider circles of Soviet society."<sup>135</sup>

The WPC found itself in an equally difficult position and also began rapidly losing authority by being in line with Soviet foreign policy and trying to monopolise the leadership in the global movement for peace. "The bitter story of the WPC's leadership" - wrote chairman of the board of the Japanese Peace Committee Akira Kashi – "was that by obeying great power chauvinism and hegemony for many years, it has forced the movement to follow the foreign policy of some governments. This was the main cause of confusion in the WPC and the international nuclear movement."<sup>136</sup> Just as it had been in the early years of the Cold War, the main obstacle to reform, even at the end of the Cold War, was the Soviet Peace Committee. American anthropologist R. Prince, who represented the U.S. in the WPC, wrote that the Soviet Peace Committee blocked any possibility of reform in the WPC: "In my view, this organization has been working on itself, having lost touch with mass movements. Mass meetings remain only for functionaries and the sole purpose of giant ceremonial meetings is only to demonstrate 'who's who' of the independent movements and organizations. Numerous committees are concerned with their own affairs (...) In the main, it is the money of the Soviet people that is being wasted, who have not a clue as to who is spending it and calling it a struggle for peace."

In fact, the Soviet "struggle for peace" finished along with the Cold War, which proves that it had been an integral part of the Cold War.

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<sup>135</sup> See: Iliukhina, *Rossiiskii patsifizm vchera i segodnia*, 63; G.M. Lokshin, "VSM v meniaiushchemsia mire," *Vek KhKh i mir* 4 (1989); Lokshin, "Vo imia mira." *gazeta Sovetskaia Kul'tura*, iulia 9, 1990.

<sup>136</sup> *Peace Courier* 9 (1990), 12.

## CHAPTER TWO

### **The Global Peace Campaign: Establishing the Soviet Brand of 'Peace', 1947-1956**

#### **Cominform Beginnings**

The Soviet Peace Campaign began with a declaration of (ideological) war against the West. In the wake of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, Stalin called upon the representatives of nine European communist and workers (communist) parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and the Soviet Union to convene in Szklarska Poręba (Poland) to establish the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, known as the Cominform. Brushing aside the Marxist revolutionary ethos of its predecessor, the Comintern, the Cominform had more modest and pragmatic aims: simultaneously provide a forum for the communist parties and coordinate their work. The meeting was noteworthy for establishing the Soviet foreign policy that would last until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Andrei Zhdanov, speaking for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, laid the groundwork for the "peace" offensive, in which the "international arena" was divided "into two major camps"— "the imperialist and antidemocratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other". Zhdanov identified "the principal driving force of the imperialist camp" as the US and "the anti-Fascist forces comprise ... the U. S. S. R. and the new democracies".<sup>137</sup>

The cycle of campaigns which followed from the Cominform meeting established the nature of the 'peace offensive' in its initial stage as a bureaucratic initiative with the task of political and cultural infiltration abroad. A campaign would start off with an 'appeal' for peace from a 'non-governmental' organisation, publicised in the press, endorsed by other 'non-governmental' organisations, and meetings, protests, conferences and congresses would be organised in which votes would be put forward for establishing a new organisation. This was how the 'peace campaign' was launched abroad.

The founding of the Cominform and the launching of the peace campaign played a tortuous role within Stalin's overall post-war foreign policy. With the launch of the Marshall

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<sup>137</sup> Committee on Un-American Activities, *Report on the Communist 'Peace Offensive: A Campaign to Disarm and Defeat the United States*, (Washington D.C.: Committee on Un-American Activities, 1951), 4.

Plan, Stalin was convinced that the US intended to economically rebuild Western Europe and consolidate it within its own 'sphere of influence'. Thus, the Cominform's task of enforcing the Eastern bloc to toe the Stalinist party line was a response to the perceived shift in post-war Europe from a multi-polar system to an American-led anti-Soviet coalition. Yet the Cominform and the ensuing peace campaign were not merely aimed at turning Western public against this bipolar political design. The rhetoric of peace was intended to promote the immediate post-war *status quo* in Europe, in which Stalin wished to "convert the gigantic losses and victories into lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle".<sup>138</sup>

In the autumn of 1947, an open letter addressed to "Writers and men of culture in the United States of America!" was signed by 12 Soviet writers, including Alexander Fadeev, Constantine Fedin, Boris Gorbатов, Valentin Kataev and Alexander Korneichuk. All coming through the Stalinist system, they would become the backbone of the peace campaign. Fadeev was the co-founder of the Union of Soviet Writers and its chairman from 1946 to 1954, Fedin was a novelist and literary functionary who would also go on to serve as chair of the Union of Soviet Writers, Korneichuk was a playwright, literary critic who held senior positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Arts of the USSR and as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Their letter was published in the journal *Soviet Literature* in 1948, and read in part as follows:

"The ideas of fascism have of late been constantly finding champions and proponents among prominent statesmen, diplomats, military men, industrialists, journalists, and even scientists in your country...The peoples of the world want to hear their voices from the pages of newspapers, magazines, and books, from the boards of theatres, from canvases and screens... we call upon you, masters of American culture, to raise your voice against the new threat of fascism, against the instigators of war."<sup>139</sup>

In the wake of this 'spontaneous' campaign, a World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace was held in Wroclaw, Poland on August 25 to 28, 1948, and announced the establishment of the International Committee of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace. It was attended by hundreds of writers, artists and scientists representing 46 countries, primarily

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<sup>138</sup> Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Soviet Union and the world, 1944-1953", in *Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91.

<sup>139</sup> Committee on Un-American Activities, *Report on the Communist 'Peace Offensive*, 5.



supportive of left-wing policies. They included Pablo Picasso, Louis Aragon, Frédéric Joliot, Irène Joliot-Curie, Aldous Huxley, Julian Huxley, Bertolt Brecht, Jorge Amado, György Lukács, Fernand Léger, Roger Vailland, Salvatore Quasimodo, Paul Éluard, Olaf W. Stapledon, Leon Moussinac, Jorge Amado, Alan J.P. Taylor, John Haldane, Dominique Desanti, Martin Andersen-Nexo, Sir John Boyd-Orr, William Gropper, Eugénie Cotton, Anna Seghers, Aubrey Pankey, Alves Redol and Julien Benda.<sup>140</sup> With a total of 600 participants, the congress was the first test run for the Soviets in attempting to gather intellectuals and cultural figures from all over the world and forcing upon them a Soviet definition of peace after the war. Ultimately, it allowed the Soviet Union to consolidate a portion of intellectuals for its own propaganda cause while alienating several Western figures, namely from America and Great Britain.

The Congress was officially proposed by Polish communist activist and writer, chief of the communist press and publishing syndicate, Jerzy Boreza, who with other Polish activists and politicians saw it as an opportunity to strengthen ties with the West.<sup>141</sup> However, any notions of the conference being neutral were dispelled. At the beginning of the meeting a short letter by Albert Einstein to the congress was read out which omitted a call for the creation of a global body to oversee the development of atomic energy. The initial friendly climate changed dramatically after the chairman of the Soviet delegation Alexander Fadeev, who sharply attacked US policy, proclaimed among other things that "The shackles of US imperialists have turned the world into a police precinct and its people into slaves of capital".<sup>142</sup> Criticising writers who in his opinion had betrayed the proletariat, Fadeev said: "If the jackals could learn typing, if hyenas knew how to wield a pen, what would come out would certainly resemble books by Miller, Elliot, Malraux, and Sartre" (all prominent Leftists in the West who were critical of Soviet human rights abuses).<sup>143</sup> Responding to Fadeev's speech, which caused consternation among part of the delegates, the prominent British historian, Alan J.P. Taylor, responded: "The task of intellectuals is to preach tolerance and harmony rather than hatred. And here is proclaimed a war, not peace. Comparing American democracy with fascism is unacceptable."<sup>144</sup> The atmosphere at the congress became increasingly unpleasant. In view of

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<sup>140</sup> "Ziemie Odzyskane i miłośnicy pokoju", *Wrocław gazeta*, September 18, 2008. Accessed January 14, 2015. [http://web.archive.org/web/20080630013931/http://pryzmat.pwr.wroc.pl/Pryzmat\\_111/111konin.html](http://web.archive.org/web/20080630013931/http://pryzmat.pwr.wroc.pl/Pryzmat_111/111konin.html)

<sup>141</sup> "60 lat temu we Wrocławiu obradował Światowy Kongres Intelktualistów | Aktualności o polskiej nauce, badaniach, wydarzeniach, polskich uczelniach i instytucjach badawczych". *Nauka w Polsce*. August 25, 2008. Accessed March 20, 2015. <http://naukawpolsce.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,203868,60-lat-temu-we-wroclawiu-obradowal-swiatowy-kongres-intelektualistow.html>

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

this situation, some of the participants of the congress, among them Julian Huxley (then director of UNESCO) and Alan J.P. Taylor, left the meeting.

Despite these walkouts, the Soviets were successful in imposing their definition of peace on other Western figures. At the end of the conference the Soviets pushed through a resolution to defend world peace which stated that "The culture of humanity was saved from fascist barbarism by the democratic forces of the Soviet Union and the nations of the United Kingdom and the United States. However, contrary to the wishes and desires of the peoples of the world a handful of greedy people in America and Europe who have inherited the fascist idea of racial superiority and the negation of progress...are planning the assassination of the spiritual heritage of peoples of the world."<sup>145</sup> The various delegations voted for the adoption of the text first among themselves with Argentina, Belgium, France and Poland all in favour. Upon the US and British delegations fell a deep silence. Yet only 11 delegates voted against: 7 out of 32 from the US, and 4 out of 32 from Britain.<sup>146</sup>

From the Soviet perspective, this was a victory. The Soviet delegations managed to shape the agenda of the conference, effectively overtaking those who could obstruct the Soviet definition of 'peace' and 'warmongers'. The congress was part of Stalin's aim of slowing down the development of the nuclear weaponry by the West at a time when the USSR was still a year away from obtaining its own. The aim of the congress was to influence world public opinion, portraying the communist powers as supporters of peace, and the West as a threat to it. The timing of the congress also coincided with another international event in Wroclaw, the Exhibition of the Regained Territories, which was used by Polish propaganda to justify the territorial changes of Poland after World War II and the securing of the so-called Regained Territories. Together, the congress and the exhibition aimed to convince the world that the border change was beneficial to Europe and world peace, which was part of the Soviets general aim of consolidating the Soviet Bloc as a buffer zone.

Besides the standard barrage of anti-Americanism, the World Congress of Intellectuals was noteworthy for calling on the establishment of national branches and electing a Standing Committee with headquarters in Paris. The French capital would have a lasting impact on the Soviet peace campaign. Intended as a secure location for communist-backed organisations, with the Standing Committee surrounded by a network of communist-front organisations such as World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Women, World

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<sup>145</sup> "Ziemie Odzyskane i miłośnicy pokoju".

<sup>146</sup> "60 lat temu we Wrocławiu obradował Światowy Kongres Intelktualistów".

Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the choice of location proved to be a mistake.

The Congress of Intellectuals was important for another reason: it called for a Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace to take place in New York from March 25-27. Nominally organised by the communist-backed National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions (a descendant of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions which was founded by Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the *Daily Worker* – a Comintern-backed Communist Party USA publication – and was repudiated in 1946 by Harold L. Ickes, its chairman, because of its communist character), the aim of the conference was to test out the peace campaign abroad in order to use its template for the World Peace Congress to be held in Paris the following month. As a propaganda campaign, the conference failed spectacularly. The Conference was attacked by civic organisations. Outside of the Waldorf Astoria, where the conference was being held, demonstrators organised by the American Legion, Catholic and patriotic groups harassed the attendees, most notably the cream of the US cultural elites such as Lillian Hellman, Clifford Odets, Leonard Bernstein and Dashiell Hammett. Arthur Miller recounted how “... every entrance would be blocked by a line of praying nuns for the souls of the participants, who had been deranged by Satanic seduction”.<sup>147</sup>

The legitimacy of the conference was further damaged by Vladimir Nabokov’s participation (as part of the CIA’s effort to disrupt the conference). Nabokov managed to humiliate Shostakovich by asking him if he agreed with *Pravda*’s call for the ban on the music of Paul Hindemith, Arnold Schoenberg and Igor Stravinsky in the Soviet Union on the grounds of “decadent bourgeois formalism”. Shostakovich, taken aback and pale, was only able to answer after ‘consultation’ from a KGB apparatchik that he “...fully agree(d) with the statements made in *Pravda*”.<sup>148</sup>

Timing was crucial: the first World Peace Congress was planned more than three months before the Scientific and Cultural Conference. The disaster of that conference had several ramifications. Firstly, the Soviets stepped back from relying on visibly communist organisations. The negative press surrounding the Scientific and Cultural Conference made the Soviet leadership determined to draw in as many non-communist participants as possible in order to off-set the communist element of the campaign. However, the ‘peace campaign’

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<sup>147</sup> Frances Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 47.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

became more centralised. From 1947 until the Scientific and Cultural Conference in March 1947, the operation was in the hands of the Cominform. By contrast, the Central Committee the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took direct control of organising first World Peace Congress, as this ratified resolution from January 6<sup>th</sup> makes clear:

“1) With the aim of mobilizing forces which stand for peace and checking the war mongers it is considered imperative that a World Congress of peace supporters and representatives of democratic organizations convene in Paris (or Geneva) in February-March 1949. In the event of difficulties in organizing the Congress in Paris (or Geneva) it is possible to convene the Congress in Warsaw or Prague.

2) Take steps to ensure that as many representative of democratic organizations as possible (i.e. trade unions, youth organizations, women’s organizations, peasants’ organizations, cooperatives, religious organizations, cultural organizations, journalist organizations, academic organizations, writers’ organizations, artistic organizations, representative of parliamentary groups) take part in the Congress.

3) The initiator of the Congress should be the International Liaison Committee, which should be elected at the Congress of Culture (in Wroclaw) jointly with the International Women’s Committee, Committee of Democratic Youth, and other organizations.

4) It is imperative that the Congress passes a special resolution on the establishment of a Peace Committee or a similar type organization.

5) Earmark \$75,000-100,000 for the convening of the Congress.”<sup>149</sup>

Yet despite these circumspect directives, the preparatory committee responsible for organising the Congress came to a standstill almost immediately. In February 1949, the French government launched an investigation of the French Communist Party, accusing it of intelligence gathering for the USSR. The Interior Ministry arrested 4 French communists who worked as representatives for the Soviet Information Bureau. By March 15<sup>th</sup> the visas for Soviet delegates to the preparatory committee expired. The French Government came under pressure from ‘progressive intellectuals’ to extend the visas for Soviet delegates. By this time the Soviets were under siege. During preparation, the Soviets were convinced that the French Government had attempted to derail the event by getting “reactionary pacifists”, “revolutionary pacifists”

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<sup>149</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op.2, part 3, d.1399, l.1-2 - Molotov’s Archives: Resolution on the World Peace Congress, draft.

“revolutionary-democrats” involved. While the Soviets were desperate to get non-communists involved they had their boundaries. They were approached by the French Federation of Youth and a certain ‘G. Davison’ who came to Paris and demanded to be part of the congress to voice his manifesto. The French press hyped up Davison’s movement and he demanded that visas be given to all delegates.

Another, more pressing problem emerged within the preparatory committee. The head of the Polish delegation, Jerzy Borejsza (head of the giant publishing house Czytelnik (Reader) and one of the organisers of the Wroclaw meeting in August 1948), came into conflict with the Soviet and French delegates. The writer Louis Aragon had caused a headache for the Soviets by hyping up the importance of the congress in the press, which had only made the French authorities suspicious that the whole affair was a Soviet intelligence gathering mission. In order to downplay the French media’s negative image of the upcoming Congress and allay the fears of the French Foreign Ministry, Borejsza gave an interview in which he downplayed the importance of the upcoming congress, seeing no real outcomes from it and, in his opinion, the French authorities should give everyone a visa to attend the congress in Paris.<sup>150</sup>

The problems with the French authorities meant that many delegates were refused visas into the country. As a result, the first World Peace Congress took place simultaneously in Paris and Prague. It established a World Committee of Partisans for Peace, led by a twelve-person Executive Bureau and chaired by Professor Frédéric Joliot-Curie, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist, High Commissioner for Atomic Energy and member of the French Academy of Science. Most of the Executives were communists (including Joliot-Curie himself). The Bureau of the World Peace Congress also included 10 Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary General Jean Laffitte and other 7 secretaries, who were in charge of operational work, including Palamedes Borsari (Brazil), Reverend John W. Darr (USA), Zhilberd De Chambray (France), Amy Xiao (China, later replaced by Li Yi-Mann), Fenoaltea Giorgio (Italy), Guliaev (USSR) and Ivor Montagu (England, later replaced by Roy Gorham). Laffitte lead the Secretariat, the apparatus in Prague and the French Peace Council, while Guliaev led the organisational work of the Secretariat and coordinated work with the Peace Committees of Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. Roy Gorham was engaged in the national Peace Committees of England, USA, Canada and Australia, while Lee Yi-Man was engaged with the socialist countries of Asia and Southeast Asia. Within the Secretariat, five members of the WPC also worked. These were preoccupied with ties with Latin America, international organisations

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<sup>150</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op. 137, d. 27, l.24-30 - Report: Political conditions during the preparations for the Congress.

working for peace, cultural exchanges and celebration of great anniversaries, propaganda and information, as well as an editorial committee, which produced a variety of newsletters. In addition, within the apparatus of the Secretariat worked 60 people from the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, England, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Brazil, and Syria. From November 1950 to December 1953, 5 WPC sessions were held and between them many Bureau meetings. At each session of the World Peace Congress by-elections for the WPC were held, so that by the end of 1953 it consisted of 440 people.<sup>151</sup>

The congress was widely publicised in the Soviet Bloc, with the official organ of the Cominform, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, 'welcoming' the Paris Peace Congress in its March 1949 issue.<sup>152</sup> Yet the proceedings of the congress demonstrated just how narrow the meaning of peace was. During the course of the sessions, the victory of the Chinese Communist armies was announced, bringing the assembled 'peace' delegates to their feet in an outburst of cheering. The delegates were asked if they wanted the Chinese war to continue. They answered with a thundering "Yes!" They were asked if they wanted peace now in China. They shouted "No!"<sup>153</sup>

Officially, the congress was presented as an occasion for all strata of society to converge in the name of peace, with the intelligentsia and the workers taking a lead with 719 and 664 delegates, respectively.<sup>154</sup> Yet, as the real numbers demonstrate, the Soviets relied heavily on the intelligentsia (e.g. scholars, professors, writers, journalists) and white-collar professionals (e.g. engineers, lawyers, doctors), which made up more than two thirds (1034) of the 1556 of the delegates. The occupational makeup of the delegates consisted of 193 scholars, 356 workers, 246 writers and journalists, 140 students, 128 trade unionists, 102 directors of schools and teachers, 97 deputies and senators, 84 lawyers, 58 doctors, 51 engineers, 63 theatre directors, artists, and musicians, 26 peasants and 12 farmer labourers.<sup>155</sup> In reality, the congress reflected a curious mix of Soviet strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, the event went smoothly, with the typical barrage of speeches and resolutions condemning the Americans and praising the Soviets. This was mostly due to the firm grip the Soviet had in deciding the political composition of the congress: communists – 1205 (59%), socialists – 189 (9.5%), liberal-

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<sup>151</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152, ll.35-37 - Information on the Secretariat of the World Peace Council.

<sup>152</sup> For further information see Mihaela Teodor "Cominform propaganda arm: For a Lasting Peace. For a People's Democracy! (1947-1956)" *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 14 (2010): 189-208.

<sup>153</sup> *Pervyi Vsemirnyi kongress storonnikov mira: Parizh - Praga. 20 - 25 apreliia 1949 goda (materialy)* (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1950), 239-240.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 526-29.

<sup>155</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d. 27, l.3 - Top Secret summary of the make-up of the First World Peace Congress in Paris, 20-25 April by S. G. Korneev, (dated 2.6.1949).

democrats – 274 (13.1%), Christian democrats and religious members - 75 (2.5%), and members of bourgeoisie parties – 14 (0.6%).<sup>156</sup>

On the other hand, the congress highlighted the lack of legitimacy of the peace campaign in the West. As indicative of the national make-up of the congress, the campaign failed to attract non-communists. France had the biggest delegation – 610 delegates, with 482 communists, Italy contributed 459 delegates of whom 256 were communists, while of the 262 English delegates, 162 were communists. In essence, the congress failed to make the propaganda breakthrough in the West and became an occasion for preaching to the converted.

In terms of alliance-building, the congress found the Soviets at a dead-end. Failing to substantially expand their base beyond the communists of Italy, France and the UK, the Soviets would find themselves oftentimes (over)reliant on these groups to carry out the peace campaign in the West. However, reliance on their communist counterparts did not always ensure success. Communists and communist-affiliated groups in the West were marred by various internal problems and faced suspicious governments and masses, which were, at best, indifferent to the Soviet call for peace. For the Soviets and their counterparts, a point of contention was whether the movement should adopt more of a grass-roots approach to leadership, one that allowed for spontaneous initiatives or continue with a centralised, bureaucratic leadership where nothing happened until it was approved by the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. From the Soviet perspective, spontaneity was needed to give the movement a sense of scale and national participation. On the other hand, to be effective, the movement needed tight organisation and planning. The Soviets had to contend with many communists in the West who were not in agreement with the Soviet organisational framework or even the Soviet priorities.

Ahead of the plenary session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in Stockholm in March 1950, the Soviets were determined that left-leaning organisations play a part in the signature-collecting campaign in what would become the Stockholm Appeal. This called for an unconditional ban on nuclear weapons and the establishing of strict international controls in overseeing it. It would be received coldly by the Western press and governments, but for the time being it was essential to gain grass-root support.

Tensions between the Soviets and their Western counterparts arose between March 15<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>, 1950 during a Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC on the effects of Soviet control of the movement. Soviet control of the movement meant that the WPC was slow to defend itself against accusations of Soviet control in the Western press. During the

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

session, the Italian communist senator, Emilio Sereni, General Secretary of the Italian Peace Committee, insisted that “we have to talk about the autonomous nature of our Movement”.<sup>157</sup> Sereni’s enthusiasm and sincerity betrayed a certain naivety characteristic of Western leftists at the time on how mass persuasion worked in the real world. Sereni passionately argued that “without a doubt, the communists played the biggest part in the beginnings of our Movement. I too am a Communist and feel no need to hide this. Admittedly, our movement did not emerge spontaneously, but the atomic bomb, as far as I know, did not emerge spontaneously either.” Yet within the same speech Sereni warned that within the movement there are those who would not agree with “what has been said by some here that they would want to in ‘a Stalinist world’”.<sup>158</sup> Sereni suggested the movement avoid such expressions “not as a question of formality... [or] a political stunt... [but] as a practical question” so that “dozens of millions can join us”.<sup>159</sup> Sereni and other Western leftists in their push towards making the movement more transparent in its political affiliations did not understand that for the Western press it was easy to equate communism with Stalinism. As the Soviets understood it, it was much more effective to attract people by disassociating the Soviet Union from its own campaigns rather than putting out public statements in a vain attempt to persuade people of the movement’s political autonomy. In reality, the movement had to establish links with (and within) the trade unions to gain grassroots support for its campaign, which was not always guaranteed.

The level of control at the top and attempted manipulation at the grassroots level was evident with the Stockholm Appeal. In preparation for the 15-19 March session in Stockholm, the Soviet delegation held a prior meeting with Jolie Curie, Jean Laffitte, Laurent Casanova and Emilio Sereni since “it was essential for the Soviet committee to take a number of measures in order to ensure that the work of the session goes smoothly”.<sup>160</sup> They discussed the order of the work to be undertaken at the session. During the meeting Jolie Curie and Jean Laffitte laid out their positions in the speeches that they would be making at the session. It was decided that Jolie Curie would propose during the session the “urgency of declaring that government which initiates a first-strike attack against any other nation as criminal”<sup>161</sup>. The Stockholm Appeal was essentially instigated by the Soviet Union.

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<sup>157</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.222, l.197 - A report by Fadeev to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC from 15-19 March 1950 (5.4.1950).

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.



The Italian Communist Party provides a vivid example of the Soviet method of backroom dealings for the Stockholm Appeal at the grassroots level. At the 22nd Congress of Italian National League of Cooperatives held in Florence on 15-25 December 1949, the Italian Left were more than willing to show that they were ready for negotiations. According to a report by the head of the Soviet delegations, the Chair of the Revision Committee of Tsentsosoyuz, the socialist D. Timofeev, proclaimed that "One of the main objectives of the League is to protest against contracts which have military goals. As we fought for the liberation of our country from fascism and military oppression we now too must fight for peace in the whole world and for the unity of the Democratic Cooperative Movement."<sup>162</sup> The member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, Novallo, put it more bluntly: "It is urgent that there be unity and solidarity between workers, unions, and cooperative organizations in the struggle for peace."<sup>163</sup>

Not coincidentally, the congress took place during Stalin's 70th birthday. Accordingly, Stalin's 'politics of peace' was praised and a meeting among city residents of Florence was organised by the Italian Communist Party, which was attended by the Soviet delegation of cooperatives. Fadeev's report paints a rather bombastic picture of the event:

"A massive hall of the palace where the meeting took place was overflowing with workers, artisans, the intelligentsia and the members of their families. Many women brought their children along. All aisles were also filled with attendees. With a paper on the life of comrade Stalin, a member of CC of the Italian Communist Party, President of the National Cooperative League, Senator, G. Cheretti, was constantly met by stormy ovations [...]

When it was announced that a member of the Soviet delegation would give a speech it was met with wild ovation. Even before the Italian translation was read to the crowd every mention of the names 'Stalin' and 'Togliatti' was met with wild applause. With the words 'Soviet people believe that blood spilled by the Italian people will not be in vain, but will serve to foster the Italian Peace Movement against the war mongers' the crowd stood up. By the end of the meeting dozens of hands were reaching with handshakes to the Soviet delegation to greet all of the Soviet people."<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d. 219, l.5.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.219, l. 7-8.

What the report did not mention was that during their stay, the Soviet delegation were approached by Senator Cheretti to request that Tsentrosoyuz donate a 'gift' of 30 tractors to the Agricultural Cooperative of South Italy and Sicily. As it happened, the Agricultural Cooperatives of South Italy and Sicily up until then had refused to buy tractors, since the Italian government was forcing them to buy American tractors. Seizing the opportunity, Tsentrosoyuz asked the Central Committee to endow them with 30 tractors that they could give as a 'gift'. The Italians received 20.<sup>165</sup>

Getting Cheretti for the Soviet campaign was crucial. In Helsinki, between August 14<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup>, 1950, a session of the Executive and Central Committee of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) was to take place, bringing the national cooperatives of all countries together. As a return for the 'gift', Cheretti coordinated his work with Soviet delegates, whose directives included "putting forward a proposal for the ICA to intensify efforts in the struggle for peace and for the CC of the ICA to approve the Stockholm Appeal" and to have the "CC of the ICA call on the main union cooperatives of all nations to send their representatives to the Second World Peace Congress". This was a rather peculiar order of priorities, if one considers that, in principle, the cooperative movement's main objective was to safeguard worker's rights, not engage in a peace campaign.<sup>166</sup> Cheretti performed his part by defending the Soviet Bloc countries' participation in the ICA (and in effect legitimising the Soviet cause) by criticising those who claimed that the "cooperative movement in the countries of People's Democracies (*strany narodnoi demokratii*) was under pressure".

However, Cheretti's support was not enough to legitimise the Stockholm Appeal for the countries participating in the ICA. With the Swedish delegates particularly vocal against the Stockholm Appeal's dubious wording on banning only atomic weapons, only 25 countries voted in favour of it. Thirty-seven were against it, putting the supporters of the Soviet proposal in a minority. The reception to the Stockholm Appeal was indeed cold. The head of the Soviet delegation, Alexander Fadeev (Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress and Secretary General of the Union of Soviet Writers), bitterly complained that the "the Swedish press and radio (excluding the progressive press) were completely silent on the work of the session... The press and radio did all they could to hush up the session proceedings."<sup>167</sup> Such a reception was understandable given the inconsistent tone of the Soviet

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<sup>165</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.219, l. 14 - A 'secret' letter from the chair of Tsentrosoyuz, I. Khokhlov.

<sup>166</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.219, l.117.

<sup>167</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.222 - A report by Fadeev to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Council from 15-19 March 1950 (dated 5.4.1950).

peace campaign at the time. While one Soviet organ would preach the banning of nuclear weapons, another would praise them – and both in the name of peace! Just five months before the launch of the Stockholm Appeal in March 1950 Mikhail Suslov, Secretary of the CC responsible for international affairs, gave the speech, ‘Defence of Peace and the struggle against the war mongers’, at the third Cominform conference in November 1949. The timing was crucial, since three weeks earlier the Soviet news bureau TASS had officially confirmed that the Soviet Union had succeeded in building its own atomic bomb. Suslov’s speech was unabashed in its support of the Soviet Union having the atomic bomb and on the militant attitude of the peace campaign:

“TASS’s report has caused embarrassment and confusion within the camp of imperialists and war mongers, weakened its strength, and delivered a shattering blow to Truman’s and Churchill’s ‘atomic diplomacy’. They built their hopes on the monopoly of the atomic bomb and on blackmailing nervous people with this weapon. At the same time, all defenders of peace are welcoming the Soviet Union’s possession of the atomic bomb as victory for peace since they know that the Soviet authorities stay true to their political beliefs and, irrespective of them possessing the weapon, and by their old position of unconditionally banning atomic weapons [...]

From the fact that the anti-democratic imperialist camp has weakened one cannot also conclude that threat of war has also lessened. They would be deeply mistaken. History teaches that the more insecure imperialists are the more enraged they become, increasing the chances of military adventurism on their part.”<sup>168</sup>

Suslov’s speech demonstrated that the Soviet peace campaign had yet to formulate a coherent rhetoric and organise internally. Judging by the hostile reception of the West toward it was not surprising that by the second half of 1950 the initiative for the campaign had moved away from the militancy of the Cominform towards the more (gradually) cautious line of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. By no means did this entail the loosening of the Soviet control over overseas operations.

This also reflected the movement’s fortunes in attracting the masses. A top-secret comprehensive analytical survey was prepared in March 1950 by the Soviet Embassy in France on the movement’s situation. In France, local peace committees had Christian democrats as

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<sup>168</sup> RGASPI, F. 575, op.1, d.74, l.16, 25.

majorities, which was a problem since it required formulating a mutual language to build trust and cooperation. In Italy, the movement found itself at a dead-end, as it failed to gain ground outside of the major urban areas. It was the traditional supporters of leftist politics, such as the intelligentsia and artists, and working class people, such as dockers, sailors and railway workers, whom the movement managed to attract. Yet even among these groups the support was not as great as was hoped since “in 1949, during the formation of the French delegation to Moscow all liberal figures, under various pretexts, turned down invitations to go to Moscow”.<sup>169</sup> However, the report also highlighted that the Soviet understanding of success did not always have to do with mass membership, but the level of control they were able to exert on national peace committees. In Norway, for example, the movement was deemed to be in trouble not because of mass indifference but because it was connected to the opposition which arose within the Norwegian Communist Party. The head of the opposition became the Secretary of the Committee, Tedemond Johansson, a close friend of Peder Furubotn, who had been expelled from the Norwegian Communist Party in 1949 on charges of nationalism and Titoism. The report concluded rather conspiratorially that “in fulfilling the wishes of Furubotn he [Johansson] did everything possible to divide the Committee”.<sup>170</sup>

The report did manage to highlight some success and a faint glimmer of hope. American communists, who had yet to see any success, were recommended to “establish an organ with mass representation” since “progressive trade unions, women, youth, and a few religious organizations make up a serious base for the establishment of mass organizations for Americans in the defence of peace”. There was some success in smaller countries such as Belgium, where in some regions 50-90% of the population signed the Stockholm Appeal, and in Western Germany, where within 4-5 months of establishing the German Peace Committee, 30 organisations joined it.

What was perhaps puzzling was that given the highly detailed nature of these reports, why the Soviets pursued policies that brought little success. Even more so, those at the top, such as Molotov, actively and successfully campaigned to steer the movement to be more flexible. A decree on the ‘Measure to be taken to further expand the Peace Movement’ practically reflected the conclusions reached by reports: “Significant shortages, which impede the growth of the Peace Movement, still remain a tight noose around national committees. Oftentimes the Movement exhibits almost purely party-oriented inclinations, barely attracting

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<sup>169</sup> RGSPI, F.17 op. 137, d.223, l.42.

<sup>170</sup> RGSPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223, l.51.

any non-communist figures or organizations who potentially can become members of the Movement. Within the Movement's leading cadres, the Permanent Committee and the Bureau of the WPC being among them, the Communists dominate, with only a small number of representatives of other political and non-political leanings. Consequently, many public figures – that is, academics, artists, as well as those belonging to trade unions, athletic, cooperative, cultural, and other organizations – which could be part of the Peace Movement have chosen to stay away from it”.

A July 1950 briefing on the Swedish peace movement exemplified this. The report pointed out that the peace movement was completely under communist control and that social democrats did not take part in it. However the report also conceded that “the Communist Party in leading the Peace Movement in Sweden has bad relations with the intelligentsia and attempts to recruit the intelligentsia into the Movement were not met with success”. It turned out, for example, that despite the very fact that it was in Stockholm where the Appeal had passed, in Sweden itself no work was undertaken to collect signatures and the communist press did not publish anything on the struggle for peace. The fact of the matter was that the signature campaign was and remained “an undertaking beyond the strength of the small-numbered and weak Swedish Peace Committees”.

The Swedish Peace Committee's weakness was attributed to its staff. The Chairman of the Committee, Eva Paimér, was the wife of Gustav Johansson, executive editor of the main communist paper in Sweden, *Ny Dag*. According to the report, she “lacked ability, organizational talent, and authority”, while the Committee Secretary and communist, Per-Olov Zennström “treated the intelligentsia with weak nerves and bad organizational ability”<sup>171</sup>. Of the 36 members of the committee, “many are only nominal members and don't conduct any work.”<sup>172</sup> Besides this, there were many among them who came out against the USSR, with one member proposing to establish “a socialist party in Sweden independent of Moscow and modelled on the party of Tito”.

It would later be revealed that out of the purported 500 million signatures, only 50,706,000 was from the West and out of those, France and Italy, the two biggest pro-communist countries in Western Europe, accounted for 23,000,000 million signatures leaving 27,706,000 for the rest of Western Europe, all of the countries of the Americas and Asia.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op. 137, d. 223 no.3, l.278 – Soviet Peace Committee's briefings to the Central Committee, March 1950.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.126, l.7 - Transcript Sessions Bureau Copenhagen, May 6-8, 1951 – Report by Isabella Blum.

The Soviet response to problems facing its movement was multi-faceted. It consisted of control and manipulation, intrigue and rebranding: funding and Soviet agents was used to gain dominance of various Soviet-fronted organisations in the West and constant double-dealing and conspiracies were used to purge the movement of those who were not in line with the Soviet conception of peace. It was apparent by 1951 that working through communist and communist-fronted organisations was ineffective in gaining mass support in the West. In order to expand the base of the peace campaign, the Soviets would not only have to work with the communist parties of the West, but through them. In order to draw in non-communist individuals and organisations, the Soviet leadership used the Soviet delegates as a go-between with communists in the West.

Since the first World Peace Congress in Paris and Prague, there had been deliberations regarding tens of millions of francs for propaganda materials, travel abroad and publishing. Expenses for the congress amounted to 31 million francs (\$100,000), while the proposed Peace Awards were estimated to cost 15 million francs. Distribution of peace-themed films and publishing materials from the congress both amounted to one million francs each, while the work of the committee (including accommodation, transportation and staff salary) cost 3 million francs and a bi-weekly monthly journal 30 million francs per year.<sup>174</sup> The fact that the national peace committees in the West were unable to raise such funds only highlighted their dependence on the Soviet Union and its satellites for funding and, in turn, reinforced Soviet infiltration and control of all the important committees associated with the peace movement. The Kremlin was not only able to get its people into the Standing Committee, but also within the committee's inner workings. That is how the editorial board of the journal *Peace Defenders* was sent a Soviet representative (an agent by the name of Trishin), who sent back reports to the Soviet leadership on the development of the journal. Yet it was Molotov's involvement which demonstrated the Soviet grip on Soviet-backed publications in the West.

Initially, no consensus existed as to what the general tone of the Soviet-backed journals should be. The Soviets knew less of what they wanted than what they did not want, namely religious and pacifist groups whose conception of peace clashed with their own. For instance, the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Nikolai Tikhonov, writing to V. Grigorian (Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Central Committee), complained that "the journal *Peace Supporters* is wholly inadequate to become a genuine, militant, purposeful organ of the

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<sup>174</sup> RGASPI, F.17 op. 137, d.27, l.56-66 - On the work of the Committee of the World Peace Congress, Materials on the Paris Congress, 1949.

world peace Movement. Many of the publications of the journal bear the marks of pacifism.”

<sup>175</sup> Tikhonov had envisioned a more confrontational, straightforward and uncompromising take on the ‘struggle for peace’, warning that the “publications in the journal could (mis)lead readers into overestimating the strength of imperialism. What could potentially arise for the reader of the journal is not a spirit of the struggle against the war mongers but instead a fear of them.”<sup>176</sup>

Yet it was Molotov who took the initiative to tone down the militancy of the journals in order to appeal to a broad spectrum of people. The change was apparent following the Stockholm Appeal when Soviet-backed publications were in full-swing promoting the Appeal. In a letter to Molotov, Grigorian had suggested that the French edition of the journal *Peace Supporters* should publish the Standing Committee’s appeal and have it accompanied by an editorial note.<sup>177</sup> Molotov was presented with drafts of the editorial note, since according to Grigorian the original French text was ‘unacceptable’.<sup>178</sup> Comparison between the original French text and Molotov’s edits demonstrate a willingness to move away from the abrasive tone of the original, which branded those who did not sign the appeal as warmongers:

The following is the French draft of the editorial note:

“It is imperative to call upon every man and woman - irrespective of political and religious views, occupation and social status – to give their signatures to the Stockholm Appeal. It should be demanded of every single person who has not signed the Appeal to explain themselves and be shown that by refusing to do so they side with the enemies of peace. Anyone who has a heart and a conscience should sign the Appeal, since it is aimed at ridding humanity of deprivation and death.”<sup>179</sup>

The following is Molotov’s edited version:

“Ladies and Gentlemen, to those of you who have signed the Appeal! Ask your elected members of parliament, city councillor, heads of the trade unions, peasant, artisan and other public organizations which you are member of to sign up to the Appeal.

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<sup>175</sup> RGASPI, F. 17 op. 137, d.223, no.3, l.56 - Letter from Nikolai Tikhonov to Grigorian 17 March 1950 – about the journal *Peace Supporters*.

<sup>176</sup> RGASPI, F. 17 op.137, d.223, no.3, l. 57.

<sup>177</sup> RGASPI, F. 82, op. 2, part 3, d.1396 - Molotov’s Archive: Letter from Grigorian to Molotov concerning the editorial heads of the journal *Peace Defenders*, dated 19.5.1950,

<sup>178</sup> RGASPI, F. 82, op. 2, part 3, d.1396, l.100 - Molotov’s Archive: Top Secret letter from Grigorian, (dated 5.6.1950).

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 102 .

Try to get a public explanation from those who refuse to sign this Appeal for peace and security for all nations!

Ladies and Gentlemen, all young people, with no exception, give your signatures to the Stockholm Appeal in the defence of peace!”<sup>180</sup>

Molotov was equally adamant refashioning another journal, *Peace*. This journal was published until the formation of the World Peace Council (prior the World Peace Council, the Standing Committee of World Congress of Peace published the journal *Peace Supporters*). When the World Peace Council was established, the Soviet delegation suggested that the journal be renamed *Struggle for Peace*, but was met with opposition from the other delegates. Molotov was against the idea, while Fadeev, in a letter to Stalin, suggested that the Soviet delegation drop the matter, since “naming the journal *Struggle for Peace* turns it into an openly communist title, since the phrase ‘Struggle for Peace’ is still used by the Communist press in Western Europe, America, and the Soviet Union. The title ‘Peace’ is more acceptable to non-communists who are involved in the peace campaign.”<sup>181</sup> In the end, the journal was re-titled *In Defence of Peace* as a compromise. This was an indication that the Soviet leadership, in particular Molotov, were becoming aware of Western public perception of the peace movement, which created tension with their Western counterparts who did not necessarily appreciate the Soviet strategy of separating the peace movement from communist influence.

This journal was conceived as a ‘broad platform’ (for diverse political outlooks) to draw in non-communist groups from the West. The mission statement of the new editorial board was to “build a bridge between two worlds – the West and East. If we acknowledge the possibility of peaceful existence, then we must demonstrate this by initiating free discussions between the two existing systems”.<sup>182</sup>

Yet these compromises were not the only ones that the editorial board found themselves having to make, as lack of readership that had plagued *Peace Supporters* was now evident with *In Defence of Peace*. Problems with the journal’s lack of appeal to the target audience were apparent. Tikhonov and Ehrenburg not only constantly complained to the CC that the quality of the content in the journal was of an “extremely low standard”, but also proposed quite a radical solution. Since national peace committees were allowed to alter a quarter of the content

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 1.101.

<sup>181</sup> RGASPI, F.17 op.137, d. 531, 1.1- Correspondence on the renaming of journal: Fadeeva’s letter to Stalin (dated 16.1.1951).

<sup>182</sup> RGASPI, F.17 op.137, d.531, 1. 13.



of each issue (i.e. editing out portions of the content and replacing it with something else) Tikhonov and Ehrenburg not only proposed to allow just 1 or 2 articles intended for the target audience of each particular country, but have completely different content for each country, since they understood that the target audience of France, for example, differed to that of Poland.

The proposal did not come into fruition. Molotov rejected it, not out of fear that such decentralisation would undermine Soviet control, but out of pragmatism. In reply to Ehrenburg's and Tikhonov's letter, Molotov asks as to "who will write it?" - implying the lack of people for such a massive undertaking.<sup>183</sup> Despite all the effort, the journal was a financial liability. As the organ of the World Peace Congress, it was published in France, the Soviet Union, China, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Australia and Algeria. The French edition of the journal was the costliest and by August 1951 was on the verge of closure, requiring 18 million francs (most of which had to go towards covering expenses for the issues that had been printed but had not been sold). Having completely covered the expenses for printing the journal in capitalist countries, the peace campaign was overstretched and in complete financial chaos. Consequently, the 18 million francs had "to be paid by us (the Soviets), since \$15,000 that are to be invested by national peace committees of the GDR, Romania, China, Poland and Bulgaria towards reprinting their own versions of the journal will now entirely go towards printing a Swedish version of the journal."<sup>184</sup> In reaction to the dire financial situation, the Soviets requested that all nation members "directly address the financial (situation) of the journal through the Soviet representative to the editorial board, comrade Efimov, instead of the World Peace Congress".<sup>185</sup>

Paradoxically, Soviet (over)funding was a source of the campaign's weakness. By attempting to cover the expenses of printing the journal in as many countries as possible, the quality of the content had significantly deteriorated and the journal was unable to properly target the intended audiences. It was not surprising, therefore, that by the end of 1951, the Soviets, already burdened by the situation in Europe, considered publishing a Mexican version of the journal as sufficient to target the whole of Latin America and a single version in Arabic to target Algeria, Egypt and the Lebanon.<sup>186</sup> And yet this (over)funding had its own logic: it allowed the Soviets to have a tight grip on other national peace committees that they deemed as stepping out of line.

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<sup>183</sup> RGASPI, F.17 op.137, d. 531, l.37- Correspondence on the renaming of journal: Fadeev's letter to Stalin (dated 16.1.1951).

<sup>184</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.531, l.42 - Letter to Stalin from Fadeev and Ehrenburg (dated 2.8.1951).

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 143.

And this was part of the problem: for a magazine that was meant to considerably distinguish itself from other Soviet propaganda it took the same approach of Soviet centralisation, censorship and content as Cominform propaganda. Two years prior to the World Peace Congress' launching of Peace Defenders in 1949, the journal *For a Lasting Peace. For a People's Democracy!* was established at the Cominform's first meeting in September 1947.<sup>187</sup> Before publication, each issue of this journal was sent personally to Stalin and Molotov in Moscow to be censored. Pavel Yudin, the Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosopher, politician and academic, as head of the journal from 1947 to 1950, at times would have corrections dictated from Moscow.<sup>188</sup> The target audience for the journal was not the average communist party member or the interested non-communist, but rather the functionaries of the international communist movement, as a training and propaganda guide for party members, for activists. The journal employed ideological clichés and focused mainly on the achievements of communist-controlled countries such as collectivisation, industrialisation and party discipline and to assert the principal themes of anti-Western and anti-Titoist campaigns and the 'struggle for peace'<sup>189</sup>.

The magazine *Peace Supporters* proved to be more a battleground for the Soviets to vent their frustration at the British Peace Committee. A scathing article attacking the British Peace Committee was published in the February 1950 issue criticising it for its sluggishness and defeatist attitudes. The following month at the Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC, British Peace Committee Chairman J.G. Crowther expressed rather understatedly that "our committee was not quite satisfied with the form of criticism contained in an editorial". Despite ideological solidarity with the Soviet Union, the openly critical nature of the article highlighted a clash of different institutional cultures between the members of the movement. As Crowther argued, "in England it is the custom that when someone intends to make a public criticism, he sends the person who is being criticized their comments prior to publication so that misunderstandings can be resolved before the critical statement is released to the press. In our case this was not afforded to us."<sup>190</sup> Crowther acerbically argued that since "this criticism is out in the open, our committee is looking forward to...publish a response...where we would have stated some critical comments on the Secretariat of the

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<sup>187</sup> Teodor, "Cominform propaganda arm", 2010.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 197.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 200.

<sup>190</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op. 1, d.80, l. 32 - Proceedings of the III Session of the Standing Committee WPC in Stockholm, 15-19 March 1950.

Permanent Committee in regard to the situation of countries where the peace Movement is underdeveloped.”<sup>191</sup>

Instead of helping to foster a united front, *Peace Supporters* only dredged up unresolved issues that the movement had not up to then been able to resolve through official channels. What was meant to be a launching of the Stockholm Appeal broke down into mutual mud-slinging and humiliation. In a retort to Crowther, Secretary General of WPC, Jean Laffite, commented that “our friends in England” had been “cautioned for their wait-and-see concept”, which was fostered because of “isolation...for the sake of formality, and not for the sake action”.<sup>192</sup> In other words, the British Peace Committee members were reluctant to be more active and engage with the masses not because of “the perception that people do not believe in the threat of war” but simply due to an “underestimation of their own forces”.<sup>193</sup>

Tensions between the Soviets and the British would linger on for the rest of the year, as the British continued to demand change in how the magazine was written. At a meeting of the Bureau of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in mid-August, British delegate and biochemist, Norman Pierre, argued that while the materials used for the *Peace Supporters* were “acceptable for conscious Polish and French readers are absolutely unthinkable for the British”. Accordingly, Britain needed its own content for the magazine to appeal to the British public. Pierre maintained that the “Peace Movement wanted to catch any fish on one and the same bait”<sup>194</sup>. Instead, as Pierre argued, “the Bureau should have been examining more deeply the intellectual environment in which the 'fish' in question is living in, and must use the literary 'bait' which will more likely bring success”.<sup>195</sup>

The scandal with the British Peace Committee also underlined a certain strategic dilemma for the Soviets: having near total financial control of the movement and its press meant that the movement’s propaganda was ineffective in mass persuasion since it was unable to use the ‘literary bait’ of each country. The Soviets chose financial control and ineffective propaganda over a potentially autonomous movement even if it potentially entailed more effective propaganda. The World Peace Council had been attempting since early 1950 to establish a funding system for the movement. In a letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Nikolai Tikhonov, the Secretary General of the WPC, Jean Laffite, outlined a

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 32-33.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 192.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op.1, d. 81, l.11 - 16-18 August 1950.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

method by which financial contributions were to be made. This consisted of "contributions...assigned depending on the size of the organization in each country and the contribution it has made to the international Peace Movement".<sup>196</sup> This was based on the amount of signatures collected for the Stockholm Appeal and an appeal for the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great powers, where \$1 was donated for every 250 signatures.

None of this ever amounted to a potential threat to Soviet control over the movement. Albania would contribute only \$3,500, Bulgaria \$23,305, China \$98,331, GDR \$68,284, Hungary \$30,100, Poland \$ 72,312 and Romania \$44,340.<sup>197</sup> As Soviet Bloc countries or close allies (i.e. China) of the Soviet Union, these countries merely rubber-stamped Soviet initiatives within the World Peace Council and posed no threat to Soviet control of the movement. In these calculations, the Soviet Union, whose entire adult population supposedly gave their signatures to the Stockholm Appeal, unsurprisingly retained its status as the biggest contributor, with \$153,866, while Western counterparts, such as France and Italy, were to only contribute \$28,000 and \$34,000, respectively.<sup>198</sup> It highlighted the financial dependence of the Western Peace Committees, their failure to raise funds domestically and Soviet willingness to keep the entire peace movement financially afloat in order to keep Western Peace Committees in step with Soviet foreign policy.

At the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee in March 1950, the French pushed the agenda of raising funds not merely for financing the movement but by tying it to the movement's credibility in the eyes of the public. As a French delegate argued, "If it appeal[s] to millions of honest people all over the world it becomes a major organizational objective. If we succeed in its implementation - and we will achieve this- then the campaign will become a goal of the struggle that will determine the very existence of our Movement".<sup>199</sup> Yet, the Soviets understood perfectly well that their Western counterparts wanted financial independence from the Soviet Union and a peace fund would have been the means to do so. The Soviet Union gave money to the World Peace Council but a peace fund would have been a separate, independent organisation that would raise money around the world, thereby providing the World Peace Council its own source of revenue without depending on the Soviet Union. The issue was brought up again between May 31<sup>st</sup> and June 1<sup>st</sup> 1950 in London at a meeting of the Bureau for the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Congress where a

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<sup>196</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.164, l.37-38.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> GARF, F.9539, op. 1, d.80, l.101 - Proceedings of the III Session of the Standing Committee of the WPC in Stockholm, 15-19 March 1950.

resolution on the peace fund was passed. Yet this seems to have been overridden by the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council, since a peace fund would only be allowed to get off the ground in 1962.

This dire financial situation could be explained by the fact that the Soviets assumed that they could indefinitely finance the movement as a way of compensating for their tight grip over it, despite calls for reform from their Western counterparts. Soviet representatives were caught in the middle of this and were often divided as to what approach they should take. As it turned out, the Soviet peace activists involved in the peace campaign included a mix of high and low ranking Party functionaries; those that were able to acutely observe the internal dynamics of the 'peace' movement and converse with their foreign counterparts and those who were narrower in their objectives. The former would call upon reforms and present the 'human' face of the Soviet Union, while the latter worked in the background towards gaining as much control for the Soviet leadership as possible. In this sense, the hierarchy within the Soviet delegacy was completely subverted, as those at the top, such as Fadeev and Ehrenburg, who could write directly to Molotov and Stalin, and those lower down the ranks could write only to Grigorian, had no noticeable success in persuading the Soviet leadership in democratising the movement. This dichotomy was no more so evident than the struggle between Fadeev and Trishin.

Fadeev envisioned the peace campaign having as many non-communists as possible participating fully. From early on he had complained of the dominance of communists in the Standing Committee of World Peace Congress. Without the least bit of irony, he described the situation to Stalin as:

“The organization of the Secretariat and apparatus of the Standing Committee under which only Communists work is wrong. The Secretariat of the Committee includes French representatives, Italian representatives, South American representatives, and Soviet representatives – all were communists. The Committees apparatus is chosen from French communists, mostly among the young people and resembles some youth division of the French Communist Party instead of an organ of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress.

The selection of staff from the Soviet Union is wrong. With the current staff it is clear that none of them are scholars, writers, journalists, or any other active cultural figures. Most are mere party functionaries, specifically sent to the Committee.”<sup>200</sup>

By the time of the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress on 15-19 March 1950, Fadeev had come to the conclusion that “we want to draw into our work independent activists, so that they are involved in practical and active work. But we, as a Peace Movement, have to give them more freedom so that they would feel they are part of our organizations as they do of the other one’s they are in.”<sup>201</sup> Fadeev was especially condemnatory of Trishin, who was sent as member of the editorial board of the journal *Defenders of Peace*. Fadeev detected in Trishin “a complete lack of understanding of the essence of the peace movement...treats everyone the same irrespective of rank, being chummy (*po-panibratski*) and pompously preaching to foreign delegates”.<sup>202</sup>

Fadeev’s frustrations were understandable. Given the task of recruiting foreign intellectuals for the peace campaign, Fadeev saw the lower ranking Party functionaries, such as Trishin, undermining his efforts. Given their bureaucratic background and a lack of contact with foreigners they did not understand that it was outside of etiquette to complain to high ranking Western representatives about trivial matters, such as overspending on food. The tensions were indicative of the Soviet balance of attracting prominent Westerners and attempting to cut down excessive waste.

Indeed, Trishin and P.V. Guliaev (a Soviet representative at the WPC Secretariat and member of staff at the Foreign Commission of the Central Committee), who had been temporarily brought into the Secretariat, were part of the delegacy in order to ensure that Soviet orders were implemented. Whether Trishin’s contribution to the journal *Peace Defenders* was questionable is hard to ascertain, but there can be no doubt that he was mainly brought in to simply report back on the workings of his Western counterparts. Reporting on the calls of others in the Committee for democratisation he concluded that “the Secretariat of the WPC and Bureau (were) not in step with peace defenders, are not directing their work. Everything has

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<sup>200</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op. 137, d. 27, l.224 - Materials on the Paris Congress in 1949: Fadeev’s Memos to Stalin, “On the defection from the peace movement of several Western European and American bourgeois activists”, dated 6.12 1949.

<sup>201</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.222, l.190 - Report by Fadeev to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee of the WPC from 15-19 March 1950, dated 5.4.1950.

<sup>202</sup> RGASPI, F. 17 op. 137, d.27, l.224.

been reduced to only obtain information on national committees, with no active intermediation in their work for peace.”<sup>203</sup>

Fadeev recommended that Trishin be called back and replaced with a qualified journalist or writer as a member of the editorial board for *Defenders of Peace*, while Guliaev, who was “known all too well as a former member of staff at Comintern” and “judging by his personality, is more likely an executor rather a person who sets out an initiative”, should have been replaced by “a cultural figure who is already famous within the Peace Movement”, desirably “2-3 bourgeois figures from different countries”.<sup>204</sup>

Yet Fadeev’s recommendations for re-organising the apparatus of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress so that it did not have such an open communist element were completely ignored. At the Second World Peace Congress the Soviet delegacy were met with opposition amongst whole hosts of members in attempting to reform the Standing Committee of the World Peace Council. A Standing Committee consisted of a Congress with each delegation nominating its own representative, whereas a Peace Council did not have this direct representation – the council itself was to be elected and could block the delegates. By comparison, the Standing Committee was not elected and resembled a parliament. The Soviets wanted a Peace Council, which they would have been able to easily manipulate, since national delegates would have no control over it. Despite opposition, the reforms were passed at the second World Peace Congress in Warsaw, with 227 people elected to a Peace Council.<sup>205</sup> However, Fadeev ominously warned that “the opposition ostensibly confirms that at this current stage of the Peace Movement, members are not ready to establish such a representative body”.<sup>206</sup>

The origin of the peace campaign was rooted in the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan through the consolidation of Eastern Europe as a security buffer. As such, the major element in the consolidation was to contain and direct all European communist parties, and especially those in the West, towards the Soviet strategy of politically legitimising the Eastern Bloc. The Soviets did not apply an innovative strategy towards organising and mobilising a genuinely civic movement in the West. Instead, the old Soviet strategy of using prominent

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<sup>203</sup> RGASPI, F. 17 op. 137, d.27, l.210 - Materials on the Paris Congress in 1949: Document titled ‘On the work of the Committee of the World Peace Congress’ – Trishin’s correspondence with Guliaev, also sent to Grigorian, dated 9.12.1949.

<sup>204</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.27, l.225 - Materials on the Paris Congress in 1949: Fadeev’s Memos to Stalin “On the defection from the peace movement of several Western European and American bourgeois activists”, dated 6.12.1949.

<sup>205</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152, l.35 - Information of the Secretariat of the WPC,.

<sup>206</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d. 224, l.231 - Report from Fadeev to Stalin on the Second World Peace Congress.

public figures became the overriding pattern from one campaign to another. Yet in the first three years the Soviets maintained cohesion to the peace movement. Despite chastising Western communist parties, most notably the English, in mobilising their resources to draw in as much of the British public as possible, the Soviets did not face any open opposition from their Western counterparts. Despite the failure of the World Peace Council's journal – mostly due to Soviet centralisation and too closely resembling Cominform propaganda – they were willing to put up with it mainly because the Soviets funded the overwhelming majority of all the movement's activities and because the regime struck a balance between Soviet apparatchiks and intelligentsia within the World Peace Council.

## **Signs of Revolt**

The Central Committee's insistence on centralisation came with a price. It further strengthened the public perception that the peace campaign was a Soviet backed project, which only further held it back from attracting non-communists, in particular left-leaning liberals. In preparation for the Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in Vienna that was to take place in December 1952, Frédéric Joliot Curie, as President of the World Peace Council, found himself trying to convince reluctant liberals to attend. The Liberal deputy in the Italian parliament, Giuseppe Nitti, in a correspondence with Joliot Curie, wrote that many of his comrades, "approach the work of the World Peace Council with a sense of caution, since it is strongly influenced by social and political forces and groups. They have doubts whether the upcoming Congress in Vienna will be an occasion for a collaborative platform that we all want it to be." Nitti demanded "a guarantee" from the organizers of the Congress, since many liberal peace activists and supporters believe "that instead of working towards a mutual agreement your Movement's opinions will be imposed on the others".<sup>207</sup> Accordingly, Nitti presented a list of rather defensive demands to be met before he and his colleagues would agree to participate in the congress:

"1) Everyone (including the observers) is to have a say at the plenary and committee session.

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<sup>207</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.811, l. 95.



- 2) No participant is to feel that he or she is politically or morally bound to any appeals or resolutions for which they did not sign up for or voted for.
- 3) Within the framework of the Congress everyone is allowed to engage with whoever they want or gather into any group they feel like.
- 4) Every participant has the freedom to make any comment to the press.”<sup>208</sup>

To understand why by the end of 1952 the peace campaign was failing to attract liberals and centrists we must look back at the political developments that were taking place since 1949. It was because the campaign, as any other Soviet endeavour which dealt with public relations, was under such strong centralised control that it was subject to Stalin’s whims. As a result, instead of focusing on advocating peace, the Soviet Peace Campaign was the centre of (unintentionally public) political feuds with Stalin’s (perceived) enemies, among them Titoists, pacifists and agents of ‘American imperialism’.

The Paris Congress in 1949 – the Soviets first real run of the peace campaign in the West – should have been an opportunity to gain as much mass support as possible. Soviet delegates felt particularly bitter towards the “reactionary pacifist and anti-Soviet formations” that aroused “so-called revolutionary-democratic unity from the leading Trotskyist Sartre”.<sup>209</sup> According to Fadeev, the pacifists put up anti-Soviet and anti-FCP posters all over Paris. The Soviets used the occasion to prevent the infiltration of so-called reactionary pacifists, but instead alienated some of their closest allies who had been trying to attract non-communists into the movement.<sup>210</sup> The French representatives, and in particular the head of the French delegacy, Yves Farge, were adamant that everyone who was in favour of peace be allowed to speak. However, after Yves Farge, Jacques Hadamard and others “carried out some work with the pacifists, they became aware of the provocative disposition of all types [of people] within the pacifist movement”.<sup>211</sup> Still, even the Soviet functionaries could not hide the fact that the pacifist movements were capturing some figures within intellectual circles and also had influence on the conduct of the famous writer and poet and member of the Preparatory Committee of the WPC, Louis Aragon, who had been actively trying to attract to the congress all organisations that declared themselves supporters of peace.<sup>212</sup> The Soviets suspected that

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.27, l.29 - Materials on the Paris Congress in 1949 Fadeev’s memos to Stalin – 3 documents, sent 6th December 1949.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 26.

the pacifist movement was assisted by many of Aragon's friends, who themselves were part of the pacifist movement. The Soviet delegates did not understand that the intense atmosphere of suspicion they were creating was off-putting and frustrating to Aragon's efforts. Fadeev, in a report to Stalin, could not understand why "Aragon started to get nervous and to behave with an extreme lack of self-control, display excessive pride, and even treat some of the Soviet workers in the Preparatory Committee somewhat spitefully". There were occasions when Aragon would declare his refusal to work in the Preparatory Committee and had the intention of leaving the congress even if "... on the whole, Aragon was a very valuable member of the Committee and carried out enormous work on convening of the Congress".<sup>213</sup> Aragon's frustration could be explained by the fact that, unlike the council or the bureau, where the Soviet delegation was occupied by more culturally aware and tactful representatives, such as Ehrenburg and Tikhonov, the rank-and-file of the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Committee was occupied by Soviet embassy officials and trade representatives.

Aragon would not be the only one who found himself frustrated by the Movement's power hierarchy. Jean Laffite recounted how during the London session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC in June 1950, Sereni expressed frustration with the Congress' "lack of initiative, purely executive work, and the publishing of a journal which is of no use".<sup>214</sup> Afterwards, Sereni, as General Secretary of the Italian Peace Committee, cut all direct ties with the Permanent Committee of the WPC, with the Italian Secretariat Grad acting as a go-between.

The Soviets were so preoccupied with purging the congress of anyone deviating from the Soviet conception of peace that even suggestions from fellow comrades on expanding the movement were overridden. The head of the Polish delegation to the Preparatory Committee, Jerzy Borejsza, suggested that 'progressive Catholics' be invited. Borejsza's idea was to form close ties between Polish and French Catholics in order establish a united movement against the Vatican.<sup>215</sup> This idea was strongly opposed by Korneichuk. The attack by the French government by refusing to grant visas to attendees could only contribute to the Soviets' siege mentality.

However, the occasion not only demonstrated a sense of paranoia but also a lack of coordination between Soviet organs to seize opportunities to expand the movement. Borejsza was right: K.I. Korneev, an intelligence officer by profession with the rank of colonel lieutenant,

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, part 3, d.1399, l.53 - Jean Laffite's account of the session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC in London, received from the CC of the French Communist Party, (dated 21.7.1950).

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 29.

was a senior advisor to the head of the First Department/Division at the Soviet embassy in France. In a top-secret report to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Korneev spoke of the potential of establishing links with progressive Catholic movements in several Western countries, who were “the main reason for discontent in the Vatican”.<sup>216</sup> This progressive Catholic movement purportedly “abandoned the main principles of the Catholic Church of supporting anti-Soviet plans of American imperialism”<sup>217</sup> and believed in the victory of communism since already “among them there are those with much yearning to study the writings of Marx and Lenin, with many already having read the *Brief History of the CPSU(b)* 2-3 times”.<sup>218</sup>

The anti-religious policy pursued by the Soviets within the movement was not entirely unjustified, at least on the surface. Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress, Alexander Fadeev, had suspicions about US Reverend John W. Darr, who had been elected as one of the 7 secretaries in charge of operation work to the Secretary General of the WPC, Jean Laffitte, in 1949.<sup>219</sup> Fadeev’s secondary role was surveillance. At the Foreign Commission of the Central Committee he was shown Semyon Ignatiev’s (head of the Ministry for State Security) report on Darr and concurred that the findings “correspond to our own observations” of Darr as “unreliable and most likely a spy”.<sup>220</sup> Fadeev suspected that Darr intended to disrupt the proceedings of a regional Peace Committee conference of South and North America that was scheduled to take place in Brazil on August 25<sup>th</sup>, 1952. In the opinion of P.V. Guliaev (Soviet representative at the WPC Secretariat and member of staff at the Foreign Commission in the CC), “during this period the US is putting pressure on [Brazilian President Getúlio] Vargas with the aim of preventing this conference from convening. They needed to stall for time in order for the conference not to take place on the scheduled date and it was Darr who fulfilled this function.”<sup>221</sup>

As had been demonstrated by the Soviet conduct in the *Peace Supporters* journal with the English Peace Committee, Fadeev exemplified the Soviet belief that any given national committee’s failure to expand could not have possibly been the fault of Soviet policy and could only be a result of mismanagement, defeatism or worse, conspiracy to sabotage. Fadeev could

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid., 32

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>219</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152, ll.35-37- Information of the Secretariat of the WPC.

<sup>220</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1397, l.182 - Fadeev’s letter to Stalin on head of the Secretariat of the WPC from the US, (dated 15.7.1952).

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

not believe that it was “possible that with an honest American present in the Secretariat we would be so cut off from any American public organization”.<sup>222</sup> Darr’s addition into the Secretariat meant that “we [the Soviets] are practically cut off from the progressive circles in America...”.<sup>223</sup> Fadeev’s only proof was that Darr “has consistently involved people in the World Peace Council who are obviously suspicious... everything that is taking place at sessions Darr jots down in great detail in his huge notebook...”<sup>224</sup> Fadeev’s ‘solution’ bordered on the conspiratorial: Darr would “not [be] allowed [him] to leave Prague” with Guliaev and a Western counterpart assigned to work with Darr to prepare for the upcoming Congress in North and South America in order to monitor him, as it would have been possible to remove him only at the upcoming Viennese Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in December 1952.<sup>225</sup>

Yet Vyshinsky (Minister of Foreign Affairs), having heard of this, overrode Fadeev’s suggestion and coded a message to Guliaev at the Soviet embassy in Prague instructing him to fully remove Darr from the managing preparations for the congress and to conceal from him “the real locations of the national peace committees not just in North and South American, but also of all other countries.” Vyshinsky’s machinations to purge Darr required Guliaev to keep Darr completely in the dark on the task assigned to other WPC representatives, who were heading to the Bermuda islands to meet with their American counterparts to put forward a motion to have Darr recalled from his position as a secretary of the Peace Council as soon as possible and have him replaced with someone else. To what extent these extreme measures were justified is unknown considering that the House of Committee on Un-American Activities had already outed Darr as a communist “unreliable and most likely a spy” in 1951.<sup>226</sup> Neither would this be the last time when the Soviets would have to watch their backs.

In June 1954, the German Peace Council in Berlin warned the Soviet Peace Committee of a West German Catholic pastor, Dr. Helmut Jordan of Ratingen, who appealed to the Soviets for permission to visit the Soviet Union. Anyone who had the slightest taint of the Vatican was an enemy. Because Pastor Jordan was a specialist in oriental studies under the supervision of the Vatican, the German Peace Council did not support his request, as it had “reason to believe that this gentleman’s desires for travel are dictated not by love for peace and to be actively

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Committee on Un-American Activities, *Report on the Communist ‘Peace Offensive*, 57.

involved in the Peace Movement”.<sup>227</sup> The Soviet Peace Committee was all too happy to pass the letter on to the Foreign Ministry and await instructions.

The Cominform, which two years previously had defined the struggle for peace between the capitalist West and the socialist East, was now in the midst of purging its ranks since Tito’s expulsion the year before. The 1949 Cominform conference which took place on 16-19 November proceeded in the wake of one of the tensest moments in the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union was asserting itself militarily vis-à-vis the United States and politically in the Eastern Europe. By this time the Soviet Union had acquired the atomic bomb, paving the way for the first arms race of the Cold War.<sup>228</sup> Speeches given by the representatives of socialist countries were almost completely preoccupied with the struggle against “the agents of Anglo-American imperialism, Titoist criminals, Catholic clandestine groups, and sabotage of industry, army, and Party”. The trials were a manifestation of “a massive international conspiracy organized by Anglo-American imperialists against the countries of People’s Democracies, the Soviet Union, and peace”.<sup>229</sup> The Yugoslav government became a fascist conspiracy masterminded by imperialists to disrupt the socialist world.

The term ‘fascist Tito clique’ entered the lexicon of all communist parties as the ‘peace’ campaign was instantly diverted towards demonising ‘Tito’s criminal regime’. Since cutting off ties with Yugoslavia, Stalin had sought to eliminate Tito and replace him with a hardliner. Air Force General Pero Popivoda and his associates, who had been involved in an attempted coup d’état against Tito, was now promoted through the peace campaign as “the genuine Yugoslavian defenders of peace, who are struggling against the Tito-Rankovic gang of fascist murderers serving Anglo-American warmongers.”<sup>230</sup> The World Peace Congress’ journal, *Peace Supporters*, was now subject to the Central Committee’s foreign policy, as it was ordered to publish Popivoda’s article, ‘Belgrade accessories to the war-mongers of the new war’. The article enumerated the ‘crimes’ of the Titoist regime and concluded that “the Yugoslavian nations understand very well that their struggle against the fascists clique of Tito-Rankovic is

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<sup>227</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.297, l.42 - Letter from the German Council Peace in Berlin to Soviet Peace Committee, (dated 19.06.1954).

<sup>228</sup> For the US response to the Soviet atomic bomb, see Robert Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998).

<sup>229</sup> RGASPI, F.575, op.1, d.74, l.153 - Papers on Conference of Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, (dated 16.11.1949 -19.11.1949).

<sup>230</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.370 - Letter from the Chairman of the Romanian Peace Committee, Mihail Sadoveanu, (dated 25.7.1950).

a part of the noble struggle of all progressive forces in all countries for a lasting and durable peace”<sup>231</sup>

Yet if Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform, the ejection of its representatives from the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress and the imposition of an economic and diplomatic boycott was intended to be accepted by peace supporters in the West without question, then the Soviet authorities were sorely mistaken. A very public feud erupted between the American delegation and the Soviets and their allies by March 1950. John Rogge, a prominent American liberal, a contender for the Progressive Party’s vice-presidential nomination and a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress, had steadily been deviating from the Cominform’s thesis of ‘two camps’ since the first World Peace Congress in Paris towards a more neutral stance. There, he had drawn hisses and boos when he stated that the Soviet Union should take equal blame with the United States for the present international tensions. Rogge told the hostile audience that the communist countries “must learn to live with the capitalist countries for each has its virtues and defects and each can learn from the other”.<sup>232</sup>

Rogge’s complete break with the Soviet line came at the Stockholm Plenary Session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in March 1950 during which he expressed his pro-Yugoslav stance. In Fadeev’s account of the Stockholm session, the Soviet delegacy did all they could to isolate Rogge from the rest of his American colleagues. Rogge’s substitute at the delegation, Albert E. Kahn, (who is characterised as a “progressive American writer-publicist and member of the U.S. Communist Party”) did not agree with Rogge’s ‘liberal-bourgeoisie, double dealing position’. Rogge’s other opponent within the American delegation was the artist Rockwell Kent. After the session Kent told the Soviet delegation that he “wished to have nothing to do with Rogge” and “wouldn’t let him set foot in his house.”<sup>233</sup>

Rogge formally confirmed his stance during a session of the Bureau for the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress between May 31<sup>st</sup> and June 1<sup>st</sup> 1950 in London where he handed a resolution to have the Yugoslavian delegacy invited to the Second World Peace Congress. The British Peace Committee, which was host to the session, instantly understood

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<sup>231</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.161 - Grigorian’s note to Molotov (dated 22.3.1950).

<sup>232</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, 25 April, 1949, 3; *New York Times*, 24 April 1949, 14.

<sup>233</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.222, l.10 - Report by Fadeev, as head of the Soviet delegation, to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress from 15-19 March 1950, (dated 5.4.1950).

that the situation barred Rogge from giving his speech on the last day on the excuse that they “intended to have only one speaker from each country.”<sup>234</sup>

Besides facing opposition to reform the Standing Committee, the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw on November 16-22 for the Soviets seemed like a show trial, a ceremony of unmasking hidden enemies. Fadeev recounted that everything went well, except that “reactionary elements, similar to Rogge, were courting representatives of China...”<sup>235</sup> There was an attempt at splitting up the congress. The provocateur and dissenter sent (on this mission) was none other than Rogge, who “attempted to assemble his clique”. In this conspiracy to derail the congress, “he [Rogge] was working collaboratively with several of the delegacies, but did not manage to find many like-minded people”.<sup>236</sup> Besides Rogge, this clique included an English lawyer by the name of Harvey Moore, who gave an anti-Soviet speech, and a Danish representative by the name Elin Appel. Rogge’s provocative speech, during which he attempted to “slander the Peace Movement and at the same time praise Tito’s fascist regime, was met with united condemnation from the Congress, and especially from the U.S. delegacy”. In his speech, Rogge called three times on the Chinese to join the side of Tito.

Fadeev praised the American lawyer, H. Howard, and a representative of Yugoslavian émigrés, Pero Popoivoda, who defected to the Soviet Union after fleeing Yugoslavia in the wake of a failed coup attempt against Tito, for “unmasking [Rogge] as a paid agent of Tito”.<sup>237</sup> As always, the Soviet bloc countries followed suite by putting forward an overblown proposal to have Tito declared the world’s most wanted criminal, which was ultimately left off.<sup>238</sup> The only semblance of a balanced debate within the congress came from the U.S. delegacy, which proved rather unpredictable. According to Fadeev, U.S. delegate Canon put forward an “unsuitable proposal of making distinction between indirect and direct forms of ‘aggression’”. He declared that “presently [we] abide by a single definition of aggression ... [which is] not enough since there was new form of aggression: indirect interference in the affairs of other states”. However, attempting to be impartial, Cannon “recalled the anti-Soviet hysteria in imperialist countries and anti-capitalist propaganda in East European countries.”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> GARF, F.9539, op. 1, d.56, l.2 - Transcript of John Rogge’s press conference, Waldorf Hotel, London, (dated 2.6.1950).

<sup>235</sup> RGSPi, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1401, l.65 - Fadeev’s report to Stalin on the outcome Second World Peace Conference, (dated 19.12.1950).

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., 72.

By contrast, in a thinly-veiled attack on Rogge, delegate Paul Robeson, the famous African-America singer and Civil Rights activist, declared, “Agents of the Yugoslavian regime shouldn’t be allowed to infiltrate the Peace Movement.”<sup>240</sup> Private denunciations were also not uncommon. Jean Laffitte (General Secretariat of World Peace Committee) and A. Korneichuk (Soviet Peace Committee representative to the Bureau of the Standing Committee) thought Rogge should be considered for expulsion as a “paid agent of Titoist gangsters”.<sup>241</sup>

Rogge’s name was publicly dragged through the dirt in a sarcastic article by Fadeev, entitled ‘Who then is this Rogge?’ The article resemble a bitter epitaph, concluding that: “As a petty careerist and rogue, Rogge’s work in the Peace Movement is what the Americans call with the dirty word ‘business’. And now out in the open he fulfils the tasks set out by his masters, sent here amongst the peace activists...he turned into a paid agent-advocate for the bloody firm of American imperialism”.<sup>242</sup> Unsurprisingly, Rogge was not re-elected as vice-chairman of the Standing Committee at the second World Peace Congress in November 1950 in Warsaw. More damagingly (at least from the Soviet perspective), Rogge, now disillusioned with the peace campaign, was involved in convincing a key witness to implicate Julius and Ethel Rosenberg on charges of passing on information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union.<sup>243</sup>

At the same time as some on the left were becoming disillusioned (or driven out) the Soviets failed to take advantage of religious interest in the peace campaign. Rhetorically, the Soviet peace campaign and the Quakers’ pacifism were incompatible. One put the blame for the Cold War on capitalism and had a very narrow, ideologically-charged definition of what peace meant. The other insisted that both sides were to blame and called for all forms warfare to be abandoned. The Soviets saw the Quakers as another Rogge on their hands. Yet strategically, the failure to meet the Quakers halfway was a massive loss of opportunity that only highlighted Soviet inflexibility during this time.

When the British Peace Committee was established in 1949 it not only faced a hostile government and public, but competition from peace organisations that had a long established tradition prior to the Cold War. It was the National Peace Council, established in 1908 and

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<sup>240</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.305 - A. Korneichuk’s report to the CC on the Bureau session, 31.5.1950 – 1.6.1950.

<sup>241</sup> RGASPI, F. 82, op. 2 part 3, d.1399, l.53 - Jean Laffitte’s account of the session of the Standing Committee of the WPC in London, received from the CC of the French Communist Party (dated 21.7.1950); RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.224, l.109 - A letter from Korneichuk to Grigorian (dated 20.06.1950).

<sup>242</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.224, l.208 - Excerpt from article.

<sup>243</sup> For further reading on the political development of Rogge see Phillip Deery, “A Divided Soul”? The Cold War Odyssey of O. John Rogge,” *Cold War History* 6 (2006): 177-204.



encompassing 40 organisations, which was dominated by Quakers, pacifists, academics and trade union groups. They did not make exceptions in accommodating the Soviet agenda – they had their own. They were friendly towards Yugoslavia and Tito, while their brochures highlighted the Soviet Union’s unfairness in its hostility towards Yugoslavia. The council did not cooperate with the British Peace Committee and saw it simply as an extension of Soviet influence. Yet in Great Britain the council had “a big sway, especially over the intelligentsia” (as acknowledged in a secret report by the Third Secretariat of the Soviet Embassy in Britain, P. Kuznetsov).<sup>244</sup> Moreover, by September 1951 the British Peace Committee was thoroughly demoralised. J.G. Crowther, scientist and Chairman of the Committee, resigned, citing that the movement’s “lack(s) a militant program” and “intellectual sluggishness and lack of ideas”, warning that “since our Movement here in England is lacking a working class base it will turn into a middle-class movement and will not be able to withstand pacifism”.<sup>245</sup>

The Quakers, had they been won over, would have greatly expanded the social base of the Soviet Peace Campaign. Instead, the Soviets took Crowther’s warning to heart and viewed the Quaker’s with deep suspicion. Yet it was the Quakers who approached Vladimir Erofeev (First Counsellor of the Soviet embassy in the UK) on visiting the Soviet Union at the end of 1950. While in preparation for their visit in late January 1951, Erofeev was instructed to find out the “real aims of the Quaker delegacy”.<sup>246</sup> During the visit, the Quakers were subjected to the standard treatment of foreigners: surveillance and officialdom. The distrust was so deep-rooted, that, according to the report on the Quakers’ visit to the USSR on January 15-26, individuals from the delegation attempted to walk around the city without translators to check whether anybody was pursuing them and have the opportunity to walk freely around Moscow.<sup>247</sup> The Quakers also presented a programme strongly contrasting that of the Soviets. The Soviet response did not suit the Quakers, as one delegate commented that “the speeches made by the members of the Soviet Peace Committee are just run-of-the mill bombastic and boastful excerpts from Soviet propaganda. If such exercises in rhetoric continue, then we won’t get very far.”<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.533, l. 17.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid. 19-20.

<sup>246</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2 part 3, d.1396, l.156 - Molotov’s Archive: Gromyko’s and Grigorian’s letter to Molotov, a coded telegram sent by Gromyko to the Soviet embassy in the UK, (dated 11.12.1950).

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.535, l.62 - File consisting of 115 pages, 40 of which make up a report on visit of the English Quakers delegation to the Soviet Union.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., 69. (The fact that the report included private conversations between Quaker delegates demonstrates the level of surveillance within the SPC).

Yet even after such an awkward visit the Quakers were willing to give the Soviet Peace Committee another chance at establishing links. From the Quakers' perspective, Soviet academics insulated themselves from European colleagues. As one of the heads of the delegation, the professor of crystallography at UCL Kathleen Lonsdale, insisted that Soviet scholars be given individual invitations for a conference on crystallography, even though individual invitations were not usually sent out. The Academy of Science confirmed that the invitations were received, after which Soviet academics were sent personal telegrams and further individual letters. Not one among them replied. Katelyn Lonsdale "got the impression that they were not allowed to enter into correspondence".<sup>249</sup> At the International Crystallography Congress held in Sweden, only 2 countries did not have representatives attending: the Soviet Union and Franco's Spain. Another British delegate observed that when Soviet delegates attended an international conference, they did not so much partake in the work of the conference, as make political speeches and then leave; "(One) gets the impression that they come to conferences for purely propagandistic purposes."<sup>250</sup>

This highlighted a permanent problem that beset Soviet delegates: most (with the exception of top-ranking members, such as Ehrenburg, who could communicate more freely) were mobilised by Soviet official discourse and were given specific directives as to what to say and how to say it with the aim of discovering from their Western counterparts potentially useful information for future propaganda and diplomatic leverage or to convince them to join the World Peace Council. In other words, the Soviet delegates acted as an extension of the propaganda wing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many of these were academics who had no prior training in propaganda techniques. The genuine peace organizations, such as the Quakers, found their interactions with the Soviet delegates puzzling, as they had been historically accustomed to freely criticising their governments' foreign policy. For them, much of the language with which the Soviet delegates unconvincingly spoke sounded like official party-line discourse that simply promoted Soviet foreign policy. The experience of the Quakers only confirmed to Western peace movements that were historically genuine civil organisations that the Soviet Peace Campaign was a front for the Soviet state, which merely simulated the appearance of a grassroots organisation.

Restrictions on communications between Soviet delegates and foreign delegates were systematic. One of the members of the Quaker delegation after returning to England sent a

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

letter every month to those Soviet people who he had meet with in the USSR. For each of them he wrote 4 – 5 letters for the purpose of establishing friendly contact. He did not know whether those letters were received or not and did not receive a single reply. Eventually, after not receiving replies, most people gave up writing.<sup>251</sup>

However, it would be wrong to assume that such an unaccommodating position was held by all involved in the campaign. A. Korneichuk (Soviet Peace Committee representative to the Bureau of the Standing Committee), complained about the “trivial” discussions held between the Bureau of the Peace Council and the Quakers as “a testament to the fact that the heads of the Bureau have yet to put their declarations of expanding the Movement into practice” and suggested “that we must once again raise the question of expanding the Movement to the Peace Council and invite to one of its sessions representatives of various pacifist groups and organizations whose work corresponds to that of our own.”

The intransigence of the Bureau of the World Peace Council on relatively small matters was demonstrated by its lukewarm response to some of the Quakers’ proposals. The Quakers were willing to sign up to the Stockholm Appeal agreement on the condition that the statement declared that those who refused to sign it be excised. This was not only advantageous to the Quakers (as those in the Bureau would have perceived it), but would have expanded the social base of the campaign. Even though by the middle of 1951 the Quakers were still unwilling to work with the British Peace Committee, they were willing to sign the World Peace Congress’ appeal for the peace pact of the five great powers, provided that the clause on any country refusing to sign it as evidence of that country’s government having belligerent intentions be omitted. The Quakers considered the term “belligerent intentions” as too harsh and something “which would have put off many people from an otherwise good piece of document”.<sup>252</sup>

However, one of the Quakers’ demands went too far, challenging even the purpose of the peace campaign. They wanted to introduce an extra proviso into the World Peace Congress’ definition of aggression (established during the Warsaw session): “Aggression also constitutes one government’s moral support for forces or parties in another country which aim to change their country’s regime through the use of force”<sup>253</sup>. Such a definition would have contradicted

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<sup>251</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.815, l.64 - Report of the heads of the SPC - Ehrenburg and Fadeev - on meeting with British writers, (dated 19.6.1952).

<sup>252</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2 part 3, d.1396, l.186 - Molotov’s Archive: Coded telegram to Molotov from the Soviet British embassy on Korneichuk’s meeting with the Quaker delegacy in London (dated 28.5.1951). For further see Christi Bartman, “Lawfare: The Use of International Law, Diplomacy and Propaganda by the Soviet Union during the Korean War,” *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 14 (2010): 163-188.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid.

the peace campaign itself, since, in its very nature as a tool of Stalin's foreign policy it was involved in one way or another in supporting subversive elements in various countries all in the name of peace.

The Soviet Peace Campaign was launched during an unprecedented time in the history of the Soviet Union. In the wake of World War II the Soviet Union emerged as a military and political superpower (nearly) on a par with the United States. Yet its hard-won prestige presented it with a dilemma: the political Marxist-revolutionary discourse that the Soviet Union had espoused up to World War II (excluding the 1930s call for peace against fascism) was completely inadequate in addressing the post-war political landscape. In the political deadlock of the first two years of post-war Europe, it was the United States that initiated the vision for post-war, peaceful Europe through the launching of the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union required a new political discourse, one that incorporated the peace rhetoric without compromising the Marxist ideology or the Soviet Union's prestige. The formative years (1947-1952) of the 'peace campaign' were very much a story of how these (often-times) contradictory objectives clashed and coalesced as the Soviets were in the midst of establishing a peace movement.

The peace campaign was a new venture for the Stalinist regime, which required reaching out and winning over a diverse range of groups and individuals who were either depoliticised or did not fully endorse the Soviet Union. The Soviets had no prior experience of successfully organising such a movement in the West. It therefore fell back on the old predisposition of purging the movement of anyone susceptible to holding un-Soviet views. With the Paris Conference and other incidents it isolated Catholics and the Quakers, and Rogge. It managed to simultaneously isolate itself from two opposing strands of the Western peace movement – the religious organisation and the atheist, progressive left. The World Peace Council, therefore, failed to even resemble a peace organisation, as during these years it devolved into a battleground for purging those who were not staunchly pro-Soviet and Titoists.

This largely explains why the internal institutional dynamics of the 'peace' campaign were so wildly inconsistent. Despite the early negative public reaction to the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace that took place in New York the Soviets were still unsure as to how to go about expanding the social base of the peace campaign. As this chapter has demonstrated, the attempts in balancing out between the rebranding of the peace campaign as a non-communist endeavour, and having complete control over it largely failed. For instance, though Molotov was sensitive in editing the *Peace Defenders* in attracting moderates, the overfunding of the journal in order to gain as much control over the editorial board resulted in

the overstretching of finances, so that when it came time to expand the journal in other parts of the world the Soviets had little resources to call upon. As a result, the Soviets resorted to publishing a single journal to cover a particular area, which compromised its effectiveness in appealing to specific audiences. Yet this clash - manifested in the constant struggle between the tightening and loosening of Soviet control in the course of the institutional development of the 'peace campaign' - demonstrated just how indecisive the Soviet authorities were, how, despite the planning of congresses, establishing councils, or publishing journals, everything was improvised. In essence, this was new territory for the Soviets, one in which they would have to learn to operate.

## **Undermining the American-led European Project and the Biological Warfare Campaign**

By early 1951, the Soviets realised that something needed to be done about their Western counterparts' dissatisfaction with the handling of the peace movement. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and subsequent Soviet backing of North Korea and China complicated matters for Westerners within the World Peace Council. Westerners saw the alignment, if not integration, of the World Peace Council with the United Nations as a way to bring the peace movement into mainstream politics and give it legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The outbreak of the Korean War meant that by virtue of the Soviet Union's isolation in the Security Council, as a result its protracted battle in the United Nations to define aggression, the World Peace Council would eventually be dragged into backing the Biological Warfare Campaign – a propaganda misinformation campaign aimed at providing 'proof' of America's aggression and indirectly delegitimising the United Nations in the eyes of colonial nations as a rubberstamp for America's imperial ambitions. This only further isolated the World Peace Council from the United Nations.<sup>254</sup> Western supporters of the movement would become more vocal in the wake of Stalin's death in 1953 for greater control.

The question of Germany's role in Europe provided the Soviets with a temporary solution for manipulating and distracting their Western counterparts from their demands for internal reforms. The 'German question' – its reunification, rearmament and integration within Europe – was a major reason for the post-war alliance. Yet, its use by the Soviets to manipulate

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<sup>254</sup> For an in-depth at the Soviet boycott of the U.N. during the Korean War see Christi S. Bartman, "Lawfare: The Use of International Law, Diplomacy and Propaganda by the Soviet Union during the Korean War", *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 14 (2010).

members within its own movement demonstrated that even the most anti-war, progressive leftists were uncomfortable with the prospect of a reunified Germany. The Soviets caught on early to the potentialities of using the ‘German question’ for quashing dissent from the *status quo* within the movement. For the Soviet Peace Movement, the ‘German question’ provided both a propaganda opportunity and to put on a united front, something which they were never able to achieve in the UN. At the Paris session of the Permanent Committee of the World Peace Council in mid-August 1949, Fadeev recounted from private conversations with Yves Farge, Emmanuel d'Astier de La Vigerie and other liberal figures that even though they did not openly express their disapproval of the Soviet Union backing up the establishment of a German socialist regime, a “French nationalist stance on West Germany and on the German Democratic regime was apparent”.<sup>255</sup>

The Soviet’s first real push for the German question came at the Geneva session of the Bureau of World Peace Council in early January 1951. Molotov’s directives not only instructed the Soviet delegation but practically outlined the entire outcome of the Bureau session. At the session, the delegation was to put forward the following viewpoints:

- “a) Remilitarization is the preparation for a new war as dictated by American billionaires.*
- b) Remilitarization plays into the hands of warmongers.*
- c) Remilitarization rules out the prospect of maintaining international peace.*
- d) The struggle for peace and remilitarization are incompatible since they are mutually exclusive.*
- e) Those who strive for peace must also strive against remilitarization. Those who strive for remilitarization help turn the German people into cannon fodder for American warmongers.”*<sup>256</sup>

Considering the rigid nature of this directive, but also its tautology, its pure sloganeering and lack of argumentation, it was surprising that the World Peace Council would approve this wording for its appeal for the peace pact between the five great powers. The ‘German question’ gave the Soviets the opportunity to readdress the balance of power in the Soviets’ favour, since it was Molotov who approved the composition of the WPC. Quotas of

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<sup>255</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1399, l.8 - - Molotov’s Archives: On the German Question: Fadeev’s report to Stalin on the work of the Bureau of the Permanent Committee of the WPC in Paris (dated 16.8.1949).

<sup>256</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1397, l.27 - Molotov’s Archives: Directives for the Soviet delegacy at the session of the Bureau of the World Peace Council.

representatives from different organisations were worked out by the Central Committee and were by default pro-Soviet. One variation of this quota was 1 person representing 5 or 10 million people. The logic of this was that if 1 person represented 5 million people then it would be an advantage to Western countries, such as Belgium. Instead, it was decided on 1 person per 10 million people, so that the majority consisted of communist and third world nations, such as the Soviet satellites, China, and India.<sup>257</sup> Such an aggressive move towards creating a Soviet ‘consensus’ highlighted the fact that the Soviets were not only increasingly modelling the World Peace Movement on the UN, but intended to promote it as the ‘real’ UN. This had been borne out of frustration with the UN, of which the Soviets complained to be paralysed by a US-dominated ‘automatic majority’.

Practically from the very beginning the Soviets saw the peace movement as being independent of the U.N. During the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 1950 a resolution was passed defining ‘aggression’ with references to “a) war of aggression b), any type of propaganda that calls for a war of aggression, and c) the deployment of nuclear weapons for aggressive wars and mass extermination”. Yet the wording of the definition of ‘aggression’, as with other things, had to be submitted and be approved by Molotov. The initial version that Grigorian sent to Molotov included references to the U.N. Declaration, all of which Molotov would omit in his draft. The original draft also defined aggression as “any use of non-defensive force by one state against another that is found to be in breach of the U.N. Security Council regulations as adopted in accordance with the UN Charter.”<sup>258</sup> Crucially, the definition also included the following: “The U.N. Security Council, in accordant with the UN Charter, is responsible for defining ‘aggression’ and ‘aggressor’.”<sup>259</sup> Molotov omitted these references to the U.N. because the Soviet’s definition of ‘aggression’ did not match those of the Security Council’s and the U.N. Charter’s definition.

Having been ignored by the U.N., the peace movement’s frustration was mounting. There was a constant desire to not simply legitimise the peace movement but to practically have it subject to international law – as if to have it on the same level as the U.N. The best time considered for putting this forward was when the Soviet Union would have chairmanship of the Security Council. In a coded message Molotov instructed Malik, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Soviet ambassador to the U.N., to do everything within his powers for the WPC delegacy to have an opportunity to come to New York in order to hand to the Chairman

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<sup>257</sup> Ibid., 32-35.

<sup>258</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1401, L. 16.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

of the U.N. General Assembly and the Chairman of the U.N. Security Council the WPC's proposal.<sup>260</sup> At the Berlin session of the World Peace Council on February 21-26 1951 it was decided that the WPC would send a delegation to the U.N. and demand that it review the various points made in the appeal of World Peace Congress and the various resolutions of World Peace Council and have the U.N. "return to the role that the charter prescribed it, to become a place of agreement between governments and not an instrument of the dominant group".<sup>261</sup> Trygve Lie, the UN Secretary General, agreed to receive the delegation on April 9<sup>th</sup>, 1951 in Paris. However, it became clear that the delegation, by this time assembled in Paris, would not be possible (in addition to European delegates, it included representatives from China, Chile, Africa, Mexico and India). In addition, all required visas. Therefore, the meeting had to be abandoned (a response from the UN Secretary General was received 10 days prior to the scheduled meeting). Joliot-Curie, however, demanded a meeting at the UN itself, and not during a trip in Paris. Trygve Lie refused, explaining that he was very busy, constantly departing from New York and "unable to specify exactly as to when he would be able to receive the delegation in NY."<sup>262</sup> However, he informed that he had studied the resolution and sent his written response to them. Trygve Lie's reply was relayed in a very harsh tone. While defensive about the UN as acting solely in the interests of peace and peaceful coexistence, Trygve Lie, in a thinly-veiled retort, contrasted the U.N. work with "those whose actions aim to weaken the UN to undermine its credibility and inflate disagreements, the presence of which is inevitable in the global organization [as] not true friends of peace, whatever they may say".<sup>263</sup> Lie guaranteed that if the peace movement "honestly and consciously support the UN and you will get peace".<sup>264</sup>

The World Peace Council backed off. Just two days after the scheduled meeting on April 10<sup>th</sup> a three-day meeting of the Secretariat of the WPC convened in Prague, where it was decided not to send any more queries to Trygve Lie but appeal, albeit with less stubbornness, to the UN Security Council so that he would receive the delegation.<sup>265</sup> That is, instead of asking the Secretary General to accept a delegation of the WPC they decided to turn to the UN Security Council for an invitation.

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<sup>260</sup> RGASPI, F. 82, op. 2, part 3, d.1397, l.63 - Resolution of the World Peace Congress and the World Peace Council in Berlin, 21-26 February 1951.

<sup>261</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.112, l.122.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid., 178.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., 180.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., 179.



Trygve Lie's refusal to meet with the WPC council may not have been purely down to scheduling or even principles. Sensing that the meeting would be seized as a propaganda opportunity by the Soviets and would legitimise the peace movement by having a non-Soviet Secretary General accept the delegation, Trygve Lie refused to meet. This was a blow to the movement's goal to be legitimised by the U.N. When the Soviets took on the presidency of the Security Council, the WPC had no other choice but to 'accept' Yakov Malik's invitation on June 16<sup>th</sup>. The setback was further compounded by a further humiliation. The Soviets might have had the U.N. presidency, but had no say on American visas. Laffite informed Tikhanov to start preparing applications for U.S. visas. That same day a telegram was sent to Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, and to the U.S. Embassy with a request to grant American visas to the delegates. In a repeat of the situation during the Paris Congress in 1949, the U.S. State Department refused to issue visas, which provoked further attacks on the United Nations. Joliot-Curie condemned the State Department for "grossly violat[ing] the rights of the President of the Security Council", that "the UN [was] no longer able to function normally in the United States."<sup>266</sup>

Frustration at the U.N. spilled over at the Helsinki session of the Bureau of the WPC in July. At the session, Fadeev outlined the task of the movement on a more virtuous basis of "getting the UN to return to its charter (...) to explain that the UN is not fulfilling its functions (...) to continuously criticize and expose the United Nations".<sup>267</sup> In the opening keynote speech, Joliot-Curie went both on the offensive and defensive. Responding to criticism that the appeal for the peace pact between the five great powers actually duplicated the UN Proclamation, he proclaimed that "our work does not in any way contradict the UN Charter. In fact, it is the UN that is not abiding by the principles of its charter."<sup>268</sup> Accordingly, the WPC had more legitimacy than the U.N. since "the task... to be the highest international body capable of enforcing the people's will" was entrusted to the WPC "every time agencies that are responsible for preserving peace cease to perform their task!"<sup>269</sup> Joliot-Curie's bombast would be outdone by the Soviets themselves. At the Third All-Union Peace Conference at the end of November 1951, the Soviets made an appeal to the World Peace Council which called the U.N. "...an instrument that serves America's imperialist diktat and more and more is losing humanity's

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<sup>266</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.127, l.15-16 - Documents on sessions of the Bureau of the WPC in Helsinki, July 20-23, 1951.

<sup>267</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.127, l. 54.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>269</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.127, l.19 - Documents on sessions of the Bureau of the WPC in Helsinki, July 20-23, 1951.

trust”, and as a result, “many simple and honest people all over the world turn away in revulsion at the deceiving words and black deals taking place inside the U.N and, instead, appealing to an organization (..) on whose work all honest people all over the world have pinned their hopes on – is World Peace Council.”<sup>270</sup>

Of all the representatives at the Helsinki session of the Bureau in July it was the Chinese representative, writer Emi Siao, who cut through the Soviet’s balancing act. Just three months earlier the Chinese and the Koreans, with the support of the Soviet Union, presented charges that the U.S. had used germ warfare to the U.N. Security Council, a campaign whose veracity had yet to be taken serious by all members of the U.N. The Soviets and their allies condemned the U.N. as U.S. puppet. All the presentations given by the members of the Bureau stressed that the commencement of negotiations on Korea would strengthen the fighters for peace. However, then suddenly Emi Siao took the floor and stated that the “the truce is really a victory of popular will, but at the same time, it is the result of the victory of the people of China and Korea over U.S. aggression. This last factor must be mentioned among the reasons for this first victory for the forces of peace.”<sup>271</sup>

In June of 1950, North Korea crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. On June 25th 1950, the Security Council adopted a draft resolution which concluded that the armed attack by the North Korean forces on the Republic of Korea constituted a “breach of the peace.” Stalin’s hesitancy in openly intervening in the Korean War suggested that he was less concerned about UN condemnation of the Soviet Union and more about the persistent possibility of North Korea’s attack prompting the United States to intervene and thus possibly dragging the USSR into the conflict.<sup>272</sup> Stalin made it clear to Kim Il Sung that the Soviet Union would under no circumstances send its troops to his assistance.<sup>273</sup> Although he approved the request of Terentii Shtykov (Ambassador of the Soviet Union to North Korea) on June 20th to allow the KPA to use Soviet ships for amphibious landings, he refused to allow Soviet personnel on the ships “because it may give the adversary a pretext for interference by the USA.”<sup>274</sup> When the Chinese finally decided to send their troops after all, Stalin revoked his

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<sup>270</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.530, l.147 – dated 27.11.1951-29.11.1951.

<sup>271</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.127, l. 57.

<sup>272</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.127, l. 57.

<sup>273</sup> Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” Stalin and the Danger of War with Americas, Cold War International History Project series, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2002, 11.

<sup>274</sup> Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 13 October 1950, APRF. Conversation between Stalin and the governmental delegation of the DPRK headed by the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Kim Il Sung, 7 March 1949. Cited in Evgenii P. Bajanov and Natalia Bajanova, “The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century,” quoted in Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?,” 80-81.

evacuation order, but placed sharp limitations on Soviet military assistance to China in order to minimise the risk of provoking a direct conflict with the United States. By November 1<sup>st</sup>, Stalin amended his orders to allow Soviet fighter planes to cover Chinese bases near the border and protect the bridges over the Yalu River, but he forbade them to pursue American planes over enemy-held territory for fear that a downed Soviet pilot could be taken prisoner and thus expose the Soviet presence in the war.

Once the Korean War began the Chinese and the Koreans protested to the U.N. that America was engaging in biological warfare. For Stalin, this was an opportunity to discredit the U.N. as an enabler for American aggression and to paint America as a genocidal imperialist. Thus, the World Peace Council's involvement in the campaign against the use of biological weapons in February 1952 was a formative experience for the organisation for all the wrong reasons. Unlike the Stockholm Appeal and the Peace Pact two years before, the Biological Warfare Campaign was completely out of its control. It was, above all, a Chinese-North Korean initiative, that had already been in the pipeline since May 1951.

Even though the Stockholm Appeal and the Peace Pact were top-down campaigns initiated at the behest of Stalin and Molotov the World Peace Council was still allowed a degree of freedom in how the campaign would be operated. Most importantly, these two campaigns allowed the World Peace Council to propagandistically exploit calls for peace on genuine fears of nuclear war. By contrast, the Biological Warfare Campaign was marked by a complete fabrication of evidence in order to generate such fear, since prior to the campaign, the fear of biological warfare did not grip mass consciousness as nuclear weapons had. Even though members of the World Peace Council, in particular the Soviet Bloc members, made outlandish statements demonising the United States and its allies, the council had yet to be involved in a campaign built on total lies. When the US pushed back by obtaining a UN vote to investigate the allegations the campaign would fall apart.

The first initiative of the Biological Warfare Campaign merely amounted to allegations in the hopes of stirring up controversy. On May 8<sup>th</sup> 1951, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) sent a cable to the President of the United Nations Security Council claiming that the United States had spread smallpox in Korea during the period of December 1950 to January 1951. Given that the notice failed to stir up the controversy that it intended it was not until 7 months later that another attempt was made to bring allegations of biological weapons to the UN. This time the allegations were much more specific and detailed. According to an official statement addressed to the UN Secretariat by Bak Hun Yung, North Korea's Foreign Minister, the US had dropped infected insects of several

kinds bearing plague, cholera and other diseases over North Korean territory on January 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup>, and February 11<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup>.<sup>275</sup>

This time, however, the Chinese and North Korean governments decided to bolster their claims by setting up a ‘commission’ of their own to oversee investigations. It was the Chinese who took the initiative while the Soviets were in the background. On the Soviet side it was Beria who was in charge of coordinating with the Chinese and the Koreans their Biological Warfare Campaign. Beria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs colluded with the North Koreans in setting up “two false areas of the exposure” with cholera bacteria obtained from corpses in China. Soviet advisors helped create “an unworkable situation” by intimidating the international scientific commission by setting off explosions near these areas of investigation.<sup>276</sup> Prior to the arrival of the World Peace Council’s organised ‘international scientific commission’, Beria’s Ministry of Internal Affairs advised the Military Medical Department of the Korean People’s Army that the US had spread smallpox. According to Lieut. I.V. Selivanov, an advisor to the Military Medical Department of the Korean People’s Army, it was the North Koreans who approached him and other Soviet advisors in late 1951 to help create “sites of infection” and the medical reports before the arrival of the commission since the Koreans felt they had yet to create such convincing sites.<sup>277</sup>

The push to get Soviet propaganda organs involved in the campaign would come only at the end of February 1952, with Andrei Gromyko, then as the acting head of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, urging Stalin to take steps to publicise America’s resort to biological warfare in the Korean War. He suggested that the Soviet Peace Committee, the international Democratic Federation of Women and the World Federation of Youth protest against the use of biological weapons and that it be publicised in newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud* and *Red Star*. Prior to this official start of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the campaign, Soviet propaganda organs were not in step. A particularly revealing example of this was a July 6<sup>th</sup> 1950 *Pravda* review of the book *Peace or Pestilence* by Columbia University Professor of Microbiology Theodore Rosebury, entitled ‘Revelations of an American Cannibal’.<sup>278</sup> Upon reading the review, Sergei Striganov, then working at the US Department of External Affairs, wrote to a scathing letter to Boris Ponomarev (First Deputy Head of the

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<sup>275</sup> Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 1 (1998): 186.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, 195.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d. 236, l.161 – A letter from Striganov (Dept. of US in Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to B. Ponomarev – October 3, 1950.

Department of Relations with foreign communist parties of the TsK VKP(b)) on how the *Pravda* review misled and took quotes out of context. The reviewer, L. Kremontsov, misquoted Rosebury to make it seem as if he dreamt of war, when instead Rosebury intended to say that in the case of a third world war the consequences would be more horrible than the Second World War. Kremontsov concluded that “the most enraging and repulsive part of the book is where this imperialist lackey diligently confirms his masters that he and his ‘academic colleagues’ are ready to kill people without hesitation”.<sup>279</sup>

Though Rosebury was a pacifist, he nevertheless, as Striganov reminded Ponomoryov, was one of the founders of Congress in Defence of Peace which took place in New York in March 1949 and was a member of the Preparatory Committee for the ‘progressive’ US delegates who would attend the 2<sup>nd</sup> All-World Peace Congress. Such gross defamation was not only wildly inaccurate but also hurt the movement since it meant losing allies. Yet this did not stop the microbiologist M.N Pokrovoskaia at the Second All-Union Conference of the Defenders of Peace from calling Rosebury a “fascist microbiologist” and damning him as “deader than a corpse” that had “died alive from shame...in the eyes of all honest people”.<sup>280</sup>

Similarly, the World Peace Council found itself unprepared for the Biological Warfare Campaign. Initially, the campaign was intended to be strictly a Chinese-Korean operation with Soviet assistance. Problems came to a head when in March 1952 the Chinese and North Korean governments ignored Soviet advisors to produce more convincing evidence before going public with allegations. Yet, even with the preparation of false areas of contamination and with China’s own investigating commission issuing a report, the campaign lacked international credibility. The findings of these reports were presented at a special week-long session of the World Peace Council held in East Berlin at the beginning of July. The affair was mostly preaching to the converted, generating very little publicity outside of the Council. The main problem was believability. As a Chinese representative to the World Peace Council put it, China and North Korea “did not consider the International Red Cross Committee sufficiently free from political influence to be capable of instituting an unbiased enquiry” and neither was the World Health Organization, as an organ of the U.N. The Chinese, North Koreans and the Soviets knew that the campaign could only gain credibility if it was truly investigated by an international commission.<sup>281</sup> Yet all three knew that the campaign would be wholly discredited if an “unbiased enquiry” were to take place. Therefore, the solution to this crisis lay in creating

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<sup>279</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War,” 186.

an ‘international commission’ that would affirm the findings of the Chinese report. This was where the World Peace Council came in.

For the Soviets, the World Peace Council was slow to take the initiative in organising an ‘international scientific commission’ to research China’s and North Korea’s allegations. In the past, when the Soviets wanted something from the World Peace Council they would exert indirect pressure on the organization. However, the biological warfare allegations put the Soviets in a challenging position of supporting their allies while at the same time risking its own credibility in the UN. Having been notified by Mao at the end of February 1952 of America’s supposed use of biological weapons, Stalin publicly backed the allegations at the UN since neither the People’s Republic of China nor North Korea belonged to the UN.

Given the logistics involved in organising an international commission of scientists to get involved in the fact-finding mission, it was perhaps not surprising that the World Peace Council could not keep up with the rapid pace of diplomatic developments. Nevertheless, this did not mean that those within the organisation, particularly from the Soviet Union, did not understand that the campaign was in jeopardy if it continued in the direction that it did. The Council convened in Oslo from March 29<sup>th</sup> to April 1<sup>st</sup> for a bureau session to discuss propaganda put out by the World Peace Council based on Chinese and North Korean ‘evidence’. In a letter to Stalin at the beginning of April, Fadeev complained that upon examining various documents concerning America’s use of biological weapons produced during the session, he concluded that the “material suffers from great shortcomings”.<sup>282</sup> Though Soviet advisors established that Chinese and North Korean evidence of biological warfare was flimsy, the World Peace Council’s own handling of this evidence further undermined the credibility of the campaign in the UN. As it stood, the council’s propaganda had badly mimicked what a real scientific investigative report would look like. Some of the weaknesses included in the WPC’s propaganda merely stated facts without backing them up with any proof, with same facts backed up by different sources, with different dates and names of the same eyewitness (as result of different transliteration). More glaringly, the WPC’s propaganda misreported basic facts. For example, lice were mentioned as the spread of cholera and very often it was reported that people showed symptoms of illness right after the bacteriological weapons were dropped from planes without taking into consideration the incubation period that had to take place for the disease to set in. Fadeev was acutely aware that “hostile propaganda uses such mistakes”.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>282</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1396, l.53.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

Proving the allegations became a top priority for the Soviet regime. Whereas Molotov's Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated past campaigns, the Central Committee now took control. The Chairman of Foreign Policy Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Head of The International Department of the TsK VKP(b)), Vagan Grigorian, writing to TsK Secretary Mikhail Suslov at the beginning of May 1952 complained how the Secretariat of the World Peace Council "should have by now enlarged the international campaign against Biological Weapons, establishment of a an international commission for fact finding on American aggression".<sup>284</sup> Thus, in Grigorian's judgement, with the Secretariat having dealt 'weakly the tasks assigned to it' it was recommended that A. Smirnov (Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission at the International Department of the Central Committee, Deputy Head of The International Department of the TsK VKP(b)) be sent to the headquarters of the World Peace Council in Prague.

With political pressure from the CC CPSU, a committee at the Prague headquarters was formed in order to go through a massive revision of the propaganda through late March and early April. Ehrenburg reported that even though the committee "sorted out the documents, omitting improper scientific terms... In the long term, we need to demand of our Chinese and Korean comrades to thoroughly edit all materials concerning the use of biological weapons by the Americans". Aiming to block all future Chinese and North Korean reports from being publicised before careful revision and editing, Ehrenburg suggested that all documents intended by the Peace Council be sent to Prague only and not to London and Paris, where it was easier to control the flow of information. Like Fadeev, Ehrenburg understood that bad propaganda had helped "reactionary forces [to conduct] an energetic counteroffensive... to prove that the uproar surrounding the use of biological weapons in Korea and China is just a badly staged dramatization orchestrated by the Chinese and Korean communists". Ehrenburg, like the rest of the Soviet representatives to the World Peace Council and the staff at the International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU had agreed that the Chinese and Korean reports were a liability to the campaign and that the only solution for salvaging it was to form a special fact-finding investigating commission. Fadeev had already outlined this in a letter to Stalin in early April. This commission had to include, besides the leading members of the Soviet Peace Committee, bacteriologists, experienced military specialists, several writers and journalists, and among them people who actually understood Chinese and Korean. Fadeev

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<sup>284</sup> RGASPI, F.5, op.22, d.812, l.30 - Chairman of Foreign Policy Commission of CC, V. Grigory to M.A. Suslov, 6th May 1952.

hoped that the committee would include famous scholars, lawyers and religious figures, who were not part of the peace movement. It is interesting to note that Fadeev, who had yet to see a single shred of credible evidence of America's use of biological weapons, genuinely believed in the 'crimes' of America and that the campaign was not a propaganda exercise but a genuine investigation. Fadeev's letter demonstrated the hierarchy of those privy to information. Fadeev had neither up to that point participated in the falsification of evidence nor had any knowledge of it. Even as Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Fadeev was both a propagandist whose task it was to make it more presentable to the public and a recipient of propaganda itself.

However, the Soviets had more pressing concerns for calling on an international scientific commission to quickly convene and investigate the biological weapons allegations. On March 4<sup>th</sup>, the US responded to the allegations of biological warfare, with the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson categorically denying such accusations. More importantly, he challenged the veracity of the allegations by requesting in the United Nations an immediate investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the World Health Organization (WHO). On March 12<sup>th</sup>, the ICRC contacted the Chinese and North Koreans about sending a small team composed of three Swiss members, two Indians, and a Pakistani. The pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans was also indirectly compounded by direct appeals from Red Cross societies of all Soviet Bloc states to investigate "US atrocities". Throughout the next six weeks the ICRC would appeal 3 more times to the Chinese and North Koreans to investigate their allegations. The Soviets and the Chinese seemed at a loss as to how to respond to the ICRC's request. Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, who had introduced the bacterial warfare charges into the work of the UN Disarmament Commission on March 14<sup>th</sup>, rejected the ICRC's offer. China took a less rational approach. Having avoided officially responding to the ICRC's offer, China responded in its press throughout March and April by characterising the ICRC "as a most vicious and shameless accomplice and lackey of American imperialism", whose only purpose to investigate was "to find out the effectiveness of the American aggressors' unparalleled, brutal crime".<sup>285</sup> On April 30<sup>th</sup>, the ICRC officially called off its offer to investigate the allegations.

From the outset, the World Peace Council's involvement in the Biological Warfare campaign as a fact-finding investigative committee was tightly controlled by the Soviets. Consequently, it exposed the investigative committee to the dysfunctions of Soviet propaganda organs. In a telegram to Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee Nikolai Tikhonov, General

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<sup>285</sup> Milton Leitenberg, "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War," 190.



Secretary of the World Peace Council Jean Laffitt pointed out that TASS reported on May 17<sup>th</sup> of the arrival of WPC investigative committee to Korea and China with intention to investigate American the use of biological weapons, when in fact the committee was just being organised.<sup>286</sup>

The committee was led by Dr. Joseph Needham, a well-known British biochemist and Marxist who had already participated in an investigation of Japanese use of biological weapons in China during World War II. Others included Elenor Andrea Andreen from Sweden, Oliver Mario from Italy, and Malter Jean Felix from France. Before making the trip to China and Korea the committee was flown to Moscow to meet with the Soviet Peace Committee to be briefed. The committee was given just one week – from June 11<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> – go over new materials that Yves Farge, Chairman of the French Peace Committee, brought back with him after a 3-day stay in Korea. The members of the investigative team were briefed that their task was to prove that 1) biological weapons were used, 2) that they were dropped from planes and 3) that it was American planes that were dropping them.<sup>287</sup> Though most members of the investigative committee were pro-Soviet, from the outset they expressed scepticism about the mission.

They were keenly aware that with a lack of more neutral participants, such as the heads of the Red Cross, the investigations would have little credibility in the eyes of the international community. In a report to Grigorian, Senior Secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee Kotov noted that the team “were treating the situation in China and Korea not as a case of biological warfare, but as an experiment in the use of biological weapons”. They were of the opinion that the works published by Chinese academics on the use of insects infected with bacteria in China and Korea were insufficiently scientifically substantiated. On the initiative of Andrea Andreen, the committee discussed what tangible evidence or other convincing proof was needed in order to corroborate America’s use of biological weapons. As is evident from this report, the prevailing mood within the committee was one of uncertainty and dispiritedness. The uncertainty was due to the fact that no one in the West wanted work with the committee, since in the current climate “not a single academic is willing put their career at risk”.

Kotov himself expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the committee, stating that “the committee will not have much authority behind it since its members are not bacteriologists but peace activists”. This was accurate, since many on the investigative committee were chosen

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<sup>286</sup> RGASPI, F.5, op. 22, d.812, l. 65-66.

<sup>287</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.815, l57 - Kotov’s (Senior Secretary at the SPC) report to Grigorian, (dated 30.9.1952).

for their political leanings rather than for being scientists. Andrea Andreen was a doctor, radical pacifist, member of Socialist Party, and Chairman of the Swedish Organization for Democratic Women, while Jean Molter was a zoologist, and Head of Laboratory at the French Academy of Agriculture. They all urged the expansion of the committee and even sent telegrams to Jolie Curie suggesting that the chairmen of the Red Cross and the Human Rights League, as well as bacteriologists, be included. With the Chinese and Koreans making this next to impossible and with no bacteriological experts to effectively analyse evidence, the head of the committee, Joseph Needham, nearly quit the committee before the departure to Peking. Needham declared that “he didn’t consider himself a member of the committee and could not take on the responsibility, since he was not a bacteriologist”.<sup>288</sup> He was therefore willing only to “maintain contact and assist the members of the committee”.<sup>289</sup>

The committee’s investigation in North Korea and China took place between June 23<sup>rd</sup> and August 31<sup>st</sup>. In order to distinguish the investigative scientific committee’s work from the Chinese investigation that had been taking place since mid-March, an Emergency Session of the World Peace Congress took place in Berlin between the 1<sup>st</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> of July during which the Chinese presented their evidence. By Kotov’s account the members of the committee, arriving in Moscow after their investigation, had a completely different outlook on the situation. Needham was apparently “proud that to be given the task of investigating the facts of America’s use of biological weapons in Korea”.<sup>290</sup> He declared that after “having reviewed the evidence of America’s use of biological weapons against China and Korea up-close he was certain beyond a shadow of a doubt that the US had waged biological warfare. There was irrefutable evidence on the matter”.<sup>291</sup>

However, Andreen’s and Needham’s own account of the investigations greatly differed. Both had expressed a deep sense of doubt about the conditions under which they were working. Andreen acknowledged that “the scientific foundation of the Commission’s work consisted of the fact that the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and evidence.”<sup>292</sup> Needham was even more ambiguous, admitting that he had no actual proof that what the Chinese and Koreans had shown were samples of plague bacillus from the alleged swarms of voles contaminated by Americans, suggesting that it was “possible to maintain that

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., 113

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> RGASPI, F.5, op. 22, d.812, l.69-72 - Note from M. Kotov (secretary of Soviet Peace Committee) to V.P. Tereshkin, (dated 20.5.1952).

the whole thing was a kind of patriotic conspiracy”.<sup>293</sup> Needham preferred to accept the Chinese at their word.

As a result, the massive report of the committee at the end of 1953 barely distinguished itself from the ‘evidence’ the Chinese and North Koreans were already publishing with their own investigative committee. Some 30 years later, Needham recounted the committee’s dependence on whatever Chinese and North Koreans were willing to produce as evidence, with the committee permitted to see “specimens of the containers that had been used and of the vectors as well as victims of the attacks”.<sup>294</sup> The testimonies and reports which the committee accepted were all formulaic. A typical report would start off with a scenario such as: “On 26th March 1952 at 9 in the evening American planes ... peasants hearing the noise came outside or saw a crater nearby with mosquitoes, lice, flies, ticks or spiders in the snow.” Essentially, the investigative committee were recipients of propaganda that they had to turn into ‘evidence’ presentable for the UN.

On the diplomatic front, the investigative committee’s report did nothing to persuade the international community of America’s use of biological weapons in China and North Korea. Dismissing the World Peace Council’s investigative committee, the US delegates at the UN had been calling since July for a UN-organised investigative committee to carry out an investigation into the biological weapon allegations. The Security Council vote in favour of the resolution was ten to one with the Soviets vetoing it. In turn, the US attempted to discredit the allegations and delegitimise the WPC’s investigative committee by introducing a second draft resolution which stated that if the Chinese, North Koreans and the Soviets refused an impartial investigation, then charges of biological weapons must be presumed as false and, be therefore condemned as a fabrication and dissemination of false charges. Ultimately, the biological weapon campaign died with Stalin.

As the new leaders of the Soviet Union scrambled to find a political solution to the Korean War in the wake of Stalin’s death on March 5<sup>th</sup> 1953, the biological weapon campaign was stripped of its *raison d’être*. A day before the US finally managed to get its proposal of forming an investigative committee approved by the Political Committee of the UN on April 8<sup>th</sup> 1953, the USSR offered to withdraw its allegations of bacteriological warfare if the US dropped its proposal for the said investigative committee. The campaign fizzled out by the end of July with no clear diplomatic victory for either the Soviet Union or the US. While the US

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<sup>293</sup> Milton Leitenberg, “New Russian Evidence on the Korean War,” 187.

<sup>294</sup> Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets* (London, 1989) 255.

managed to use the UN to delegitimise the Soviet-backed and WPC-organized investigative committee, China's and North Korea's continuing lack of cooperation made it impossible for the UN-organised fact-finding committee to investigate the allegation, with the President of the General Assembly of the UN reporting on July 28<sup>th</sup> that the committee was unable to accomplish its task. Despite these failures, the Korean War and the subsequent biological weapons campaign allowed Stalin to move the Cold War out of Europe and into a 'militarily' safer region – a cheap war for the Soviets, with little commitment in terms of troops – and an opportunity to engage in a new propaganda war.

## **Expanding beyond Europe and Losing Purpose after Stalin's Death**

The launch of a diplomatic 'peace offensive' by the regime (as opposed to the one waged by the World Peace Council) was the first break in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death. At the outset, Malenkov contradicted himself on the regime's new foreign policy. On the one hand, "the Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct a consistent policy of the preservation and strengthening of peace... a policy proceeding from the Leninist position concerning the possibility of prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition between two different systems—the capitalist and the socialist." A few days later, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov stated that "A state interested in the preservation of peace can be confident, now and in the future, of the durability of the peace policy of the Soviet Union."

Solving the German question would continue to be at the forefront of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death. Yet despite the fact that Molotov and his officials at the Foreign Ministry took German reunification seriously, their approach did not fundamentally differ from Stalin's previous proposals - a reunified Germany as a demilitarised and democratic state—with a peace treaty that would guarantee German neutrality and non-alignment in the Cold War. Molotov and the Foreign Ministry drafted proposals for the Presidium in early May 1953 outlining the need for a new initiative on the German question, at the core of which was the call for a provisional all-German government. The East German communists were ordered to roll back socialist policies for a series of economic and political reforms intended to recover their popularity and authority. Among the measures proposed were "to put the tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany and to conclude a peace treaty at the center of the attention of the broad mass of people both in the GDR and in West Germany."

It was hoped that by reforming the GDR, communists in the GDR and in Western Germany would have a greater impact in forming a pro-Soviet left-wing government once Germany was reunified. However, protests which erupted in East Berlin on June 16<sup>th</sup> for the reinstatement of previous lower work quotas quickly turned into demands for the East German Government's resignation. The GDR regime was overwhelmed and turned to the Soviet Union for military support. The protests were suppressed, but exposed the GDR's lack of legitimacy and vulnerability. The Soviets for the next two years led a contradictory policy: propping up the GDR and pursuing German reunification. On the one hand the Soviets genuinely sought to reunify Germany, on the other, the GDR had to be used as a bargaining chip for negotiating a Soviet-approved peace. As a result, the peace offensive became expendable for the Soviets, in the sense that it could be used to bolster peace negotiations and maintain the *status quo*, which itself was a hindrance for genuine peace.

The Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers on January 25<sup>th</sup> –February 18<sup>th</sup> 1954 was the first attempt after Stalin's death to tie in the German question to European collective security. The Soviets attempted to prevent the formation of the European Defence Community - seeing it as a potential military threat – by proposing an alternative collective security system for all of Europe which would only then create favourable conditions for negotiating Germany's reunification. The Soviets insisted that this system should not include the US, a precondition thoroughly rejected by the Western states, since from their perspective the key to European collective security was German integration first, collective security second. The failure of the Berlin Conference to solve the German question would in hindsight prove to be a blessing in disguise. Although 1954 and 1955 seemed at the time like a roller-coaster in diplomatic fortunes, it would ultimately solidify the Western Bloc.

The Geneva Conference from April 26<sup>th</sup> to July 20<sup>th</sup> was an impetus for further Soviet diplomatic initiatives. Although the conference's outcome was the Geneva Accords, which ended the Indochina War, it failed to deliver a resolution on the Korean War. Even with this failure, the Soviets realised that further diplomatic ventures, irrespective of their chances of success, would ultimately lead to the stabilisation of the Cold War *status quo*.

Immediately after the Geneva Conference the Soviets refocused on the German question and collective security. On July 24<sup>th</sup>, the Soviets proposed a revised draft on European collective security to include a clause on economic and political cooperation and called for a new conference on establishing a new system of collective security, this time with US participation. Even though this proposal went nowhere, the Soviets were relieved when the French National Assembly rejected the plan for the EDC on August 30<sup>th</sup>. This was short-lived,

as Western states restated their demands for all-German elections and a peace treaty with Austria.

It seemed as if negotiations had reached a dead-end, as both could not agree on what was needed to be resolved first: German reunification or European collective security. From October 1954 to May 1955 the European *status quo* would be entrenched, as both sides came to agree to disagree. The London-Paris Agreement on October 23<sup>rd</sup> essentially recognised the division of Germany into two separate states, recognising the sovereignty of West Germany and allowing it to enter NATO. With this the Soviets had accepted that German reunification was temporarily out of the question, but formalising the Eastern Bloc was now a distinct reality. On May 11<sup>th</sup>, the Eastern Bloc countries convened in Warsaw for the Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security to conclude a multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which formed the basis for the Warsaw Pact. Yet even as a response to the London-Paris agreement, the Soviets had not fully ruled out European collective security. The final article of the treaty allowed for the pact to cease if and when a collective security system had been achieved.

Yet the mutual division of Europe did not mean both sides failed to diplomatically recognise the division of Europe as the *status quo*. The Warsaw Pact did not prevent four power negotiations resolving the Austrian question. It was Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in February 1955 which removed the roadblock to an Austrian peace treaty. Molotov modified his previous stance on an Austrian treaty by promising to withdraw all Soviet troops if Austria guaranteed against a new *Anschluss* even before a peace treaty with Germany was achieved. After four-power negotiations in Vienna a treaty on Austria was signed on 15 May.

The Austrian treaty forced both sides to return to the question of Germany's reunification. The summit on 18-23 July and a Foreign Ministers Conference on 26 October-16 November, both in Geneva, allowed the Soviets to once again present a European collective security proposal but within the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Neither achieved anything as the Soviets refused and the Western states insisted on a deal for all-German elections. The roadblock to a European security pact would not be overcome. Yet from the Soviet perspective, a new proposal on Germany's reunification allowed the further strengthening of the *status quo* in Europe because in the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Germany's reunification would be long and gradual and would require normalising relations between the GDR, the FRG and the Soviet Union. By January 1955 the Soviets had issued a decree declaring the state of war with Germany formally over and in June proposed the establishment of direct political, trade and cultural relations with the FRG and inviting West

German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, for talks in Moscow. In September, Adenauer visited Moscow to establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG. The Soviets were finally so comfortable by fully extricating themselves from Germany that on September 20<sup>th</sup> the GDR and the Soviets signed a “Treaty on Relations” in which the two states pledged friendship, cooperation, and continuing efforts to achieve “the reunification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis”. Equally as important, the Soviets announced the abolition of their High Commission in Germany and the transfer of control of all GDR borders with West Germany to the East Germans (including those in Berlin).

The experience of the first half of the 1950s forced the Soviets to expand the movement into post-colonial countries. The Soviets’ failure to hinder West Germany’s integration into Western Europe and the struggles which it endured with the U.N. during the biological warfare campaign all pointed to the fact that the Soviet’s needed to expand the movement outside of Europe since the political situation in Europe had already solidified into two camps. As a result, the Cold War was now moving into the periphery, with the Soviets needing to take advantage of dissatisfaction with the U.N. felt by many post-colonial countries and offer an alternative. The move away from Europe was not accepted as the new political reality until Stalin’s death and only in 1956 during the Suez Crisis did it become apparent to all that the Cold War had moved to the periphery. Yet the shift towards Africa, Asia and Latin America did not mean the movement was going to be fundamentally reformed. In fact, just as they were looking to expand beyond Europe the Soviets continued to resist reforms proposed by the Western Europe counterparts in the wake of Stalin’s death in March 1953.

The Soviet’s first foray into expanding the movement into Asia came during the Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference held in Beijing on October 2-12, 1952. Delegates from dozens of countries attended the conference, which included a number of speeches and opening remarks by Mao Zedong. The Soviets sent a 6-person delegation led by director of the Institute for World Literature, Ivan Anisimov, to survey the political makeup of the conference. Anisimov’s report to Malenkov reads like a war correspondence: “There are many communists. Along with progress-minded people there were Trotskyists, as well as those in the Indonesian and Ceylon delegation openly working for American intelligence (gathering).”<sup>295</sup> This information was obtained by the Soviet delegation as soon as they arrived in China (most likely from the Chinese authorities). As Anisimov comments, “We were to

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<sup>295</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.811, l.114 - dated 16.11.1952.

isolate the enemy elements and unite the progressive majority of these Asian delegations.”<sup>296</sup> By comparison, the situation in Latin America was complicated: “advance knowledge of the composition of the Latin American delegations is very much lacking. Therefore, studying them was of great importance.”<sup>297</sup> There were “hostile elements” who wanted to split the congress into Latin and Asian cliques, but thanks to the brave and heroic Soviet delegation “these efforts were thwarted”.<sup>298</sup>

Anisimov’s attempt to depict the conference in a triumphant light betrayed the challenges faced by the Soviets in gaining support from the delegates. Anisimov gloated that with “every ensuing speech the people’s simmering resentment towards the actions of the American warmongers became more and more obvious” and that the pro-American delegates were unable to gain support, with the Chilean delegate Castelli’s calls for neutrality on the Korean War getting ‘snickering silence’.<sup>299</sup> Yet, on the other hand, there was no particular enthusiasm for the Soviet Union amongst the delegates. The best Anisimov could muster was the fact that here was not one single speech made against the USSR during either the plenary session or committee session, “although, no doubt, we were prepared to give them a fitting rebuff”.<sup>300</sup> The conference was not about the Soviet Union or peace but about developing countries feeling each other for potential alliances. The Soviets were particularly anxious about any alliances between China and other countries since China was the biggest ally of the Soviet Union at the time. Although Anisimov noted that the “anti-imperialist charge (...) became the spirit of the Beijing Congress and even held under its sway those old Gandhists”<sup>301</sup>, he was particularly anxious about the Indian delegation, which “had agendas outside of the officially designated bounds”. During its meeting with the Chinese delegation the Indians “brazenly inquired whether a Chinese-Indian alliance could offset the Chinese-Soviet alliance”.<sup>302</sup> The Indians also openly asked the Chinese delegation whether Titoist ideology had a broad base of support in China. From listening to the speeches delivered by the Indian delegates at the Congress, Anisimov was convinced that the overall intention was to emphasize the Chinese-Indian friendship and completely at the expense of the Soviet Union.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Ibid.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., 121.



The Soviets had no choice but to compromise in a way that they refused to in Europe. In comparison to Europe, where the Soviets had established networks of party branches and sympathisers, Africa, Asia and Latin America were foreign territories where the Soviets calculated they had to tread more lightly in order to appeal to the broadest groups of people, many of which were entering a phase of national reawakening in the wake of imperialism's collapse. From studying the membership of the delegations Anisimov concluded that success of the World Peace Congress to draw these groups into Soviet Peace Movement depended on "establish[ing] a durable progressive core, which would lead the whole of the sophisticated and multi-faceted mass of delegates".<sup>304</sup> Such an ambiguous solution only meant that the Soviets were willing to change the meaning of 'peace' to whatever best suited them for gaining support in the developing world. In Europe peace meant 'negotiations', 'disarmament', 'collective security', and 'demilitarisation', while in the developing world the Soviets had no qualms about making the slogan 'struggle for peace' synonymous with the struggle for national independence. It was this call that served to unite the decisive majority of the delegates through complete mutual understanding, irrespective of differing religious views and political convictions. The Soviets hoped that if "the progressive core was able to lead the nationalist-oriented delegates", then it would override any potential anti-Soviet sentiments from petite bourgeoisie nationalists.<sup>305</sup> As with West Germany and the EDC, the Soviets found themselves having to use the nationalist card with the African, Asian and Latin American countries since they perceived Americans as cosmopolitans who wanted to destroy the sovereignty of nations. Ehrenburg presented the Kremlin with an ultimatum: "Either a narrowly-defined (assembly), but one that is suitable for the task" or a "Broadly-defined (assembly), but one that is limited in its ability for the task".<sup>306</sup>

The ramifications of immediately integrating this new meaning of 'peace' within the peace movement for the sake of gaining support from the developing countries was not given much thought nor subject to any discussion with Western counterparts. As a result, the Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna on December 12-19, 1952 did not convene as the Third World Peace Congress since it now included not only nationalists from the Near East and North Africa, representing Latin American organisations with anti-American leanings, but

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<sup>304</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>306</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1403, l.53-58 - Molotov's Archives: Ehrenburg's letter to Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Bulgakov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Saburov, Khrushchev, and Grigorian, (dated 30.10.1952).

also Western European opponents of NATO, French neutralists, leftist Labourites, Dutch radicals, etc.

Underneath the propaganda about its strength and expanding popularity, the Soviet peace campaign was facing serious problems. Despite promotion and publicity throughout 1950, the Stockholm Appeal revealed the movement's lack of success in garnering support. This in turn brought out long-held misgivings about the movement's political orientation and organisation amongst the Western counterparts, in particular the Italian and British delegates. Yet the dividing line between those who wanted a decentralized apparatus and those who wanted it to be more centralised was not confined to Westerners and the Soviet Union, as both the French and Belgians both pushed for a more centralised leadership. In effect, this clash, brought about the perceived failure of the peace campaign, and led to a 5-year deadlock as to how the peace movement should reform. It was not until Khrushchev's speech "On the Personality Cult and its Consequences" in February 1956 that this paralysis was lifted.

Despite the triumphant proclamation of having collected 500 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal, the Bureau session in Copenhagen on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 1951 was a sobering reminder and an admission (at least within the organisation) of the massive shortcomings of the Soviet peace movement: its reliance on propagandistic slogans to mask its lack of mass appeal in the West. Even the most enthusiastic members, such as the Belgian socialist Isabella Blum, had to concede that in the West the campaign did not add up to much<sup>307</sup>. Of the 500 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal, only 50,706,000 were from Western Europe, with signatures from France and Italy comprising nearly half of that number.

The session was also noteworthy for reinforcing the divide that had occurred on the eve of the launch of the Stockholm Appeal on March 15<sup>th</sup>, 1951. By the beginning of 1950, tensions between the Soviets and their Western counterparts arose as to how the peace campaign should be coordinated. The Soviets envisioned the peace campaign as a national front organisation. That is, one mostly funded, and in effect, dominated by the Soviets from behind the scenes in order to give it a veneer of genuine autonomy. However, what the Soviets had yet to learn at this time and what their Western counterparts tried to desperately communicate to them was that even a hint of pro-Soviet sentiment would delegitimise the peace campaign in the eyes of people in the West. Even the most ardent Western communists understood this. During the Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of World Peace Congress held in Stockholm on March 15-19, 1950 the head of the Italian delegation, socialist journalist Emilio Sereni,

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<sup>307</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.126, l.7 - Transcript Sessions Bureau Copenhagen, May 6-8, 1951.

pointed out “that the majority of those that have joined the movement do not...want to live in ‘a Stalinist world’” as had been expressed by some, and suggested that the movement avoid such expressions since “dozens of millions – can join us, but will not agree to such expressions”.<sup>308</sup>

Those in the West who called for less Soviet intrusion into the peace movement felt keenly the suspicion that fell on the movement even from those on the left. Writing to Jolie Curie on the then-forthcoming Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace in Vienna in December 1952, the Liberal deputy in the Italian parliament, Giuseppe Nitti “approached the work of the World Peace Council with a sense of caution, since it is strongly influenced by social and political forces and groups”<sup>309</sup>. Nitti demanded “a guarantee” from the organisers of the congress, since many liberal peace activists and supporters believe “that with your initiative for the Congress of Nations the World Peace Council’s views will be dominant. That, instead of working towards a mutual agreement your movement’s opinions will be imposed on the others.”<sup>310</sup>

What is noteworthy about the internal debates on reforming the peace movement in the first half of the 1950s was not the lack of ideas but the reluctance on the part of the Soviets to go through with the obvious reforms. The Soviets failed to acknowledge even behind closed doors what was already widely believed: that the Soviets were the main financial contributors, and thus the main decision-makers in the World Peace Council. In the United States and Great Britain, where anti-communism was more intense in comparison to France and Italy, religious and pacifist organisations lambasted the World Peace Council as a front for Soviet political diplomacy. For instance, the National Executive Committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliations, an American peace movement, criticized the World Peace Council and any affiliated groups as “such organizations...[are] regarded as an instrument for strengthening the party, favouring the goals of the communist movement, as well as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, including the policy of war and the ‘defence’”.<sup>311</sup> If such an organisation was under the control what would be the point of raising money for it since it could fall apart or change in accordance with the party line?

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<sup>308</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d. 222, L.186 – A report by Fadeev (head of the Soviet delegation) to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC from 15-19 March 1950, (dated 5.4.1950).

<sup>309</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.811, l. 95.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.110, l.6 – Materials on the on the US peace movement – a July 1950 pamphlet from the National Executive Committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

The Soviet's own evaluation of the expansion of the British peace movement in 1953 best illustrates the dichotomy between acknowledging the real problems of mass acceptance of the peace campaign while at the same time refusing to provide the much-needed reforms. An internal report on the British movement painted a bleak picture. During the campaign for the peace pact between the five powers the British Peace Committee managed to collect only 1.3 million signatures.<sup>312</sup> It was also noted that while over the previous 3 years large groups of peace activists poured into the movement "in the long run the total number within the movement remained the same because of the permanent dropout rates of previously active participants"<sup>313</sup>. With broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and farmers were still not involved and the movement was on the periphery.

Yet, even when acknowledging these problems the Soviets attributed them to the movement's leadership lack of organisation. The Soviets complained that there were no peace committees in factories, only 200-300 local organisations and groups within the British Peace Committee, and the almost lack of printed material, with only one newspaper, *The Daily Worker*, regularly reporting on the peace campaign. It blamed all of this on a "weak leadership" marred by "disunity and fragmentation", with the work of many in the movement lacking a "routine nature" and focusing on a particular campaign. The leadership was chastised for "still not overcome(ing) its deep-rooted belief that the working class supposedly cannot be the vanguard in the struggle for peace and rally all sectors of the population"<sup>314</sup> and was criticised in the 7th issue of the journal *Peace Supporters*<sup>315</sup>. To remedy the situation the Soviets recommended an increase in funding and staff, particularly for the General Secretary and Secretary for Administration.

To understand just how out of touch the Soviet authorities were in their assessment of the situation, one has to put the British Peace Committee in the context of the political and social landscape of early 1950s Britain. British scientist John Bernal, vice-president of the World Congress of the Supporters of Peace and leading figure of the British Peace Committee complained that the British government "managed to make the English working class its partner in conducting politics of war". Therefore, the situation in England was more complicated than in Italy, France or Belgium, "where the American is viewed strictly as a foreigner". The British authorities "managed to convince the English working class that

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<sup>312</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.533, l. 17.

<sup>313</sup> GARF, F.9539, op. 2, d. 211, l.27 - Informational material on the expansion of the peace movement in England, 1953.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 28.

American politics is essentially Anglo-American politics... the Americans are now viewed not as foreigners, but as allies. To overcome this perception is currently our most important task.”<sup>316</sup>

Adding to the isolation of the British Peace Committee at the end of June 1950 the Labour Party ordered all organisations associated with the party to cut ties with the committee, in effect cutting off mainstream leftist support for it. The Labour Party waged its own McCarthy-esque witch-hunt, urging “all genuine peace activists to isolate everywhere communist leaders of dangerous imperialist politics of Soviet Russia and to ‘unmask the true goals of this so-called campaign for peace.’”<sup>317</sup>

In essence, the British Peace Committee was embattled and demoralised, with its Chairman J.G. Crowther resigning in frustration in 1951. Yet the problems facing the British Peace Committee, did not, as the Soviets had concluded, spring from a ‘disunited’ and ‘weak leadership’ or from lack of ‘routine’ work<sup>318</sup>. In fact, the opposite was true. The British counterparts relied too heavily on Moscow’s directives on what to do. The lack of a ‘militant program’ and ‘intellectual sluggishness’ for which Crowther complained was simply down to the fact that “once the signature campaign... finished they [the members of the English Peace Committee] have no specific goal to work towards”<sup>319</sup>. Yet even as late as March 1953 (after Stalin’s death) the Soviets applied the same generic assessment towards the British Peace Committee as they had years before: Funding for more publications, staffing for administration and standardising working hours. These bureaucratic reforms masked the real problems that the Soviets were unwilling to address.

Stalin’s death on March 5<sup>th</sup> 1953 did not loosen the Soviet grip on the World Peace Council. The most immediate impact was purely tactical: the call for a peace pact between the five powers was dropped in favour of negotiations. For most members present at the Bureau session in Stockholm on May 5-6, 1953 the change was understood to be in line with the new political situation, since Stalin’s death presented an opportunity to end the Korean War that had been up to that point dragging on for 3 years. A call for negotiations instead of a demand for a peace pact was seen as part of the new conciliatory diplomacy. At the session Ilya Ehrenburg, journalist and vice-president of the World Peace Congress, noted that the “form of

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<sup>316</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.222, l.81- Speech by Bernal 1950.

<sup>317</sup> RGASPI, F17 op. 137, d.223, no.3, L332 - This document was sent from the Foreign Ministry to Grigorian with a resolution from Molotov: Comrade Gigorian, we need to give a rebuff in the in our press, (dated 30.6.1950).

<sup>318</sup> RGASPI, F. 17, op.137, d.533, l. 19-20.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

negotiation is not a question of principle but method”<sup>320</sup>. Such a statement encapsulated Soviet thinking on the peace movement in general: reforms would not minimise Soviet control of the Peace Council.

Stalin’s death did not signal a move towards democratising the peace movement. In fact, the post-Stalin years were marked by a sense of drift and a lack of purpose. Bound to the Kremlin as it had been since its inception, the Soviet Peace Campaign was forced to keep pace with the rapid political developments of the ensuing power struggles between the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Malenkov-Khrushchev duumvirate that emerged at the end of 1953 and would last for only two years had been embroiled in a struggle against the stauncher Stalinists, such as Molotov. As such, the Soviet counterparts in the peace movement, who had relied on the Soviet leadership for instructions, could not meet the demands for decentralisation from their counterpart in Europe. With the ever-increasing dissension within the movement, Soviet figures such as Ehrenburg and Fadeev found themselves trying to substitute a change in rhetoric for the much-desired reforms.

Change in the peace movement’s rhetoric was evident in early April 1953 when the Soviets proposed to withdraw allegations of bacteriological warfare in China and North Korea amidst the US’s push for establishing a UN investigative committee to substantiate the allegations. This was not the only setback. With the death of Stalin, the World Peace Council’s calls for a peace pact between the five great powers were essentially shelved. It was only in December of the previous year that the WPC-organised Congress of Peoples in Vienna made an Appeal "to immediately begin negotiations on a peace pact". The Congress also made an 'appeal to the public', which stated that "all modern problems can be resolved as a result of conclusion of a peace pact. This Pact will return meaning to the UN".<sup>321</sup> In light of the humiliating withdrawal of Soviet allegations of the bacteriological warfare the Kremlin strategy for rhetoric now rested on backtracking on the rather aggressive insistence for the Western Power to sign a ‘pact’.

In the wake of Stalin’s death the members of the Soviet Peace Movement found themselves at a crossroads. At a presidium meeting of the SPC at the end of March, Ehrenburg and Fadeev, while discussing the outcome of the Bureau of the WPC meeting that followed the congress in December of the previous year, acknowledged the unpopularity of the peace pact amongst their Western counterparts and the challenges that lay ahead in formulating and

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<sup>320</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.222, l.186 – A report by Fadeev to Grigorian on the Stockholm session of the Permanent Committee of the WPC from 15-19 March 1950, (dated 5.4.1950).

<sup>321</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152, l.67 - Information on Secretariat of the World Peace Council.

implementing the new campaign slogan. While Fadeev noted that the “Communist circles believe [that the Pact] is still relevant ... is necessary” the campaign from the Soviet perspective seemed like preaching to the converted since it did not appeal to “circles who believe that it is necessary to find some wording in connection with national security (...) to satisfy the neutralists”. It was therefore crucial that the new campaign had a wording demanding the elimination of military bases and the withdrawal of American troops, “since people [that] are switching to position of a neutralists... need help” and “require a system of guarantees”.<sup>322</sup>

Yet for Ehrenburg, who was the most pro-Western member of the SPC, attracting non-communists to the World Peace Council and the Peace Movement did not mean that the council should have to seriously accommodate these people within its upper ranks or that this was even desirable. By this time the council had already experimented with establishing a special committee solely on the basis of those most ideologically distant from communism. Even Western moderates such as Ehrenburg and Joliot Curie were not ready for these non-communists, since “[they] carried on with such nonsense that even initially Joliot Curie was taken aback”.<sup>323</sup> Non-communists could not be included in the council only because they had signed the congress’s appeal, noted Ehrenburg.

Fadeev and Ehrenburg had to also contend with the socio-political realities that their Western counterparts were facing. The SPC had toyed with the idea for Western European countries to withdraw from NATO, but as Fadeev noted, “the proposal... seems to them as communist, because, as they say, it gives them nothing in return”.<sup>324</sup> Isabella Blum pointed out that most Belgians believed that their standard of living had not declined due to American hand-outs. They believed that the U.S. gives them material aid. Therefore, “they are worried about what we offer them in return”. Pietro Nenni treated the idea of a peace pact very much with scepticism and going so far as saying that “even cats do not believe it's real”.<sup>325</sup> The reality was that the political landscape of Europe was unfolding at a rate that the Soviet Union (and in turn the Soviet Peace Movement) in one respect could not keep up with. Though the Soviet Union played a deliberate part in dividing Europe it was evident by these conversations that even in 1953, when the divisions had hardened and solidified into a *status quo*, Soviet propagandists could entertain that such flights of fancy might make for effective propaganda.

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<sup>322</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1 d.195, l.4 - Meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee March 28, 1953.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

Fadeev had suggested that “it would be worth showing them [Western counterparts] that the Atlantic Pact pushes them into the war on their own territory, with their own hands”.<sup>326</sup>

The new slogan had to avoid making references to specific countries (i.e. America) or “contain any aggressive points” in order to have mass appeal. In essence, counterparts in the West were arguing that the slogan had to adapt to the political status of a divided Europe. Just as Western European countries had signed the North Atlantic Treaty with the US, they argued that “if such a pact was signed between the USSR and the People's Democracies, [it] would [be] consider it as an instrument of peace” if it “reject[s] those measures, which give it a military nature”.<sup>327</sup> Therefore, the solution was not to transcend the blocks but to make them more ‘peaceful’. The problem was that the new slogan was thought of on a purely pragmatic basis – to avoid seeming communist and be “acceptable for the entirety of the oscillating masses”.<sup>328</sup>

In Europe the change was instantaneous, with the new slogan of ‘talks and easing of the international situation’ being promoted throughout June and July. The agenda was discussed during WPC sessions in Stockholm on May 5-6 1953 and in Budapest on June 15-20 of the same year and was followed by a promotional campaign by other peace committees all over the world, including a national conference in Paris on June 27-28, a National Assembly for Peace held in Rome on June 22-23, and a meeting of the West German Peace Committee in Dusseldorf on July 18-19.<sup>329</sup> The Budapest session in June saw the WPC distance itself from the Bacteriological Warfare Campaign, calling the UN as the proper platform for negotiations. As the leftist MP Jacques Mitterrand argued, “We deplore certain actions of the UN precisely because we remain faithful to the UN Charter” and not to allow the “criticisms made by us in addressing UN, be distorted by our enemies”.<sup>330</sup>

As such, internal institutions in the middle of the hierarchy oftentimes lacked the experience, and were overzealous in their efforts when making their own public statements on international diplomacy and peace. These would oftentimes come off as inappropriate, coarse, clumsy or unnecessarily rude. One such instance of this was when the All-Union Council of Trade Unions intended to issue a statement supporting the decrees of the Central Committee about carrying out a campaign in the USSR in support of WPC decisions on negotiations and

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>329</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.152 - Information on Secretariat of the World Peace Council.

<sup>330</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.256, l.52 – Materials on World Peace Council session in Budapest.



the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Unaware of the new tone of the propaganda or in an attempt to what it thought it would be, the Central Committee of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions put out rough drafts of a statement to be approved by Suslov in which it called the "elimination of reactionaries in Berlin an important victory for the peace-loving forces" and for greater vigilance against "the attempts of reactionary circles in the U.S. with the fox Syngman [first president of South Korea] as the yes-man to derail the armistice in Korea".<sup>331</sup> It was only after Suslov edited the text, removing any specific references and insults to the US and Syngman, that the statement was allowed to be published 3 weeks later at the end of September in the newspaper *Labour (Trud)*.<sup>332</sup> Though this was purely for internal promotion, intended for the workers of the Soviet Union and members of trade unions, it was characteristic of not only the Central Committee's attempts at extinguishing the passions of a few propagandists from the trade unions but also highlighted the inexperience of such institutions in keeping with the Kremlin's ever-shifting diplomacy and the terminology required to communicate it effectively.

Within the Soviet Union the institutional hierarchy and the Stakhanovite approach to the campaign could not be replicated in other countries for two main reasons. Firstly, the slogan was not particularly well thought-out. Reporting to Khrushchev on the meeting of the Bureau of the WPC in Vienna in September and on the Bureau and the Secretariat of the Council of the WPC on October 12-13, 1953 in preparation for the WPC session to be held in Vienna on November 23-28, I. Vinogradov (Deputy Head of the Central Committee on Relations with foreign communist parties) and V. Tereshkin (Head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC) noted that the "the campaign [had] not received the proper scope" because "there [was] no such central requirement that could provide the campaign with great determination and unite most of the public at large in different countries. The absence of such a requirement leads to the fragmentation of efforts of the movement." In other words, there was nothing which distinguished the new campaign from the old campaign. Whereas the Stockholm Appeal and the peace pact had concrete objectives - an appeal and a pact respectively - the new campaign for 'negotiations' was simply too vague.<sup>333</sup>

Therefore, during a meeting in the Central Committee with Surkov, it was suggested to Ehrenburg and Tikhonov to "put forward the central issue of carrying out campaigns for the demand of arms reduction and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass

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<sup>331</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.114, l.116.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>333</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.119, l.192 – Letter from Vinogradov and Tereshkin to Khrushchev, October 28, 1953.

destruction [...] This would distinguish WPC's campaign in form from political campaigns on international issues carried out by communist parties and other democratic organizations".<sup>334</sup> In preparation for the November session of the WPC, Gromyko, in line with the Central Committee's new 'softer' approach to diplomacy, edited a set of directives for the Soviet delegation that attempted to give the new campaign a specific object of "reduc[ing] armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons". Gromyko also instructed the delegation to use more restrained wording at the sessions, such as "The decisions of the Bureau of WPC should be noted that ...", "It is essential that the Bureau of the WPC urges all ...", "The WPC should contribute to the discussion of participants in international meetings suggestions on the following question", "Support ...", "Agree to ...", "consider it possible ...", etc.<sup>335</sup>

The 'German question' would continue to be politically expedient after Stalin's death, when there were renewed calls by Belgian, British, Canadian, French and Italian members of the Council to reform the movement. Five months before the vote on ratifying the EDC treaty in August 1954, French opponents of the treaty organised an international conference of "countries under threat by inclusion in the European Defence Community" on March 20-21. Participants included senators, deputies and political figures, among them the leaders of the French peace movement, such as Laurent Casanova and Gilbert de Chambray, former ministers and others. Also invited were supporters from the Benelux countries, Italy, Germany and England. The main goal of the conference was to speak out against the remilitarisation of Germany by its acceptance into the EDC and to propose a counter-plan. The stance of the chairman of the Conference, Senator Edmno Mischle, was "that the EDC would mean war and the inevitable final catastrophe. Just about anything but this community would be preferable".<sup>336</sup> However, the positions of the speakers were not only unconstructive, but also unrealistic. For example, the German representative, Pastor Herbert Mohalsky, apocalyptically predicted that the "creation of German divisions within the EOC increases the likelihood of civil war in Germany. And a German civil war would inevitably transform the Cold War between East and West Germany into a hot war that will involve all countries."<sup>337</sup> If some spoke of apocalyptic predictions then others would from a legalistic position, demanding that such an agreement should not have been signed, since a military build-up of Germany meant a

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<sup>334</sup> Ibid., 193.

<sup>335</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.119, l.235-237 - Policy directives to the Soviet delegation to the World Peace Council session in November 23-28, 1953 in Vienna.

<sup>336</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.318, l.7 - Proceedings of the international conference.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., 21.

complete revision of the Atlantic Treaty. The last one was signed against a potential aggressor – Germany - and if it joined the organisation, then it would mean that NATO - is simply against the Soviet Union while France had a 1944 treaty with the Soviet Union on the avoidance of a revival of German militarism.

The Soviet Union played upon this nationalism since the conference was anti-German for French nationalists. Louis Vallon, deputy of Seine, spoke of the EDC as “only a curtain that conceals what tomorrow will be a real spectacle” where a hegemony over Europe would be imposed and led by “rootless technocrats who want to set up a secretariat” whose “real power...will merely be wielded by the U.S. government”.<sup>338</sup> Emil Kahn, Chairman of the Human Rights League, called the EDC “a threat of European McCarthyism”, while condemning “French supporters of German remilitarization” for “wanting to create a German army that would be stronger than the Red Army, but weaker than the French!”<sup>339</sup> Pietro Nenni, the Italian MP and winner of the Stalin Peace Prize in 1951, warned that while “anything can be demanded of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary”, there would be “no consent to an agreement in which these countries see Germany achieve reunification within a military block directed against them”.<sup>340</sup> However, not everyone was against NATO and the US. Claude Bourdet, founder and head of *France-Observateur*, pointed out that the vote on the EDC was a result of “Molotov's proposal [being] rejected by many because it was perceived as being directed against 'organizations existing in Strasbourg, with the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation)', it was perceived as a 'means to destroy the already partly existing European confederation' than to deter 'supporters of a Strasbourg Europe.'”<sup>341</sup>

In essence, the Soviets had hoped to strengthen the ranks of the Europeans with regard to 3 aspects: Anti-globalization and anti-European project, anti-Americanism and nationalism, and anti-German sentiment and fear of revanchist German. At an Emergency Session of the WPC in Berlin in May, Jean Laffite laid out the choice for Europe: “either the European defence community is realized and Europe remains split into two mutually hostile parts, which will lead to a risk of war, or all the European states become associated not in order to dominate one over another, but with the aim of ensuring mutual security and peace throughout the whole

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid., 65.

of Europe (...)".<sup>342</sup> From the Soviets' perspective, the peace movement's efforts contributed to the failure of the ratification in the French National Assembly on August 30<sup>th</sup> 1954.

Yet the victory was short-lived. The failure to ratify the EDC was only a minor setback in the overall process of European integration. In September and October, two conference in London and Paris diffused fears over the 'German question' with the signing of the Paris Accords on 23 October. The accords granted full sovereignty to West Germany, lifting the occupation and admitting it into NATO. The Soviet response only highlighted its helplessness and reinforced the movement's dependence on the Kremlin. On the eve of November 13<sup>th</sup>, 1954, the Soviet Government appealed to all European nations with a note which stated that the signing in London, and then on October 23<sup>rd</sup> in Paris "of separate measures on the German question is a violation of existing agreements on Germany" and that the "London and Paris agreement unties the hands of West German militarists and revanchists to build up an army of half a million and unlimited weapons production".<sup>343</sup> The Soviets argued that what was needed was not to arm Germany but to establish in Europe "an environment of trust". For this they purposed the signing of a "pan-European treaty on collective security in Europe".

In a desperate bid to derail the accords, the Soviets offered to organise a meeting on November 29<sup>th</sup> in Moscow – a mere two weeks after issuing the appeal! A WPC session slavishly followed, during which nine resolutions and appeals were adopted. Chief among them was "for ensuring cooperation between all countries of Europe in order to organize their global security", wherein the London and Paris Accords were sharply condemned. The WPC practically mirrored the official Soviet line, urging "nations [to] offer resistance to the ratification" and "...demand an immediate start of negotiations between the four powers with the aim of Germany reunification".<sup>344</sup> There and then the same 'figures of France', who organised the conference in Paris on March 20-21 took up an initiative for a new conference on December 11-12, 1954 in the same city in order to sabotage the ratification of the London and Paris Accords.<sup>345</sup> This is an important turning point – make it a bit more dramatic & divide it up better

The Soviet conduct throughout the first half of the 1950s demonstrates a certain lack of understanding about the European integration process and the type of pressure involved in Western European countries. Leaders of Western European countries realised that in order to

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<sup>342</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.308, l.422 - Emergency Session the World Peace Council - Berlin, 23-28 May 1954.

<sup>343</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.332, l.38 - World Peace Council session, Stockholm 18-23 November 1954.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., 34-37.

avoid war they needed to somehow integrate West Germany into the European project. The leftists, nationalists and isolationists who made up the bulk of the anti-German and anti-EDC force were impossible to unite against West Germany which would have meant having two enemies - both West Germany, and the Soviet Bloc. Integration was therefore necessary. Then, an idea emerged to establish on the basis of the European Economic Community a common market. On this basis, it would also be possible to create the so-called European defence community, which would include West Germany. Naturally, this frightened nationalists, anti-Germans and anti-Americans who were afraid that if Germany was integrated it would be a great danger to France. Thus, temporarily their interests converged with those of the Soviets when the French Parliament did not vote for a European Defence Community. In essence, the European Defence Community treaty failed to get ratified and by default it pushed West Germany into NATO (which joined in May 1955).

The 'German question' reemphasised Soviet dominance over the peace movement. It also pointed to the Soviets' frustration of not achieving their goals through official diplomatic channels and having to ever-increasingly turn to propaganda institutions. The United Nations in particular caused the Soviets headaches. They found themselves in the minority and unable to push through any proposals. For the Soviets, the peace movement legitimised their policies while at the same attempted to delegitimise the U.N. by presenting itself as an impartial organisation and the U.N. as an instrument of the American war machine.

## **The Movement Dithers, Diplomacy Returns and Peace Comes Crashing Down with Hungary, 1953-1956**

For the Soviets, the Bureau meeting in October and the World Peace Council in November 1953 provided opportunities to distract reform-oriented members through divide and conquer tactics. Soviet anxieties of the previous 3 years on such issues as the signing of the Treaty of Paris in April 1951 that established the European Coal and Steel Community, the signing of the European Defence Community treaty in May 1952, and the London Agreement on German External Debt in February 1953 were channelled into the congress. The slogan of negotiations seemed especially ominous in light of an uprising in East Germany in mid-June 1953 that was violently suppressed with the aid of Soviet tanks. Anti-German sentiment permeated the congress to divide Western countries that shared Soviet anxiety over a potentially rearmed Germany.

Ehrenburg, eloquent as ever, balanced between mocking the Allies and insisting on “a security tripartite between Moscow, London and Paris under which the Soviet Union proposed to various countries nonaggression pacts and safeguards that would be provided by all European countries”.<sup>346</sup> Such a proposal required neither American involvement, nor the establishment of a European Union, nor a military build-up of Germany. Italian and, in particular, French delegates found this a much more attractive prospect than, as Petro Nenni put it, a “revived Holy Roman Empire of the German nation” as “an instrument for carrying out revenge and domination”.<sup>347</sup> This anti-European Union sentiment drowned out the smaller countries, such as Belgium, who had doubts about a great power coalition providing security.

In fact, the next two and half years witnessed the deepening of this division between supporters of centralisation and decentralisation. The Bureau meeting of the World Peace Council in Helsinki in December 1955 was the culmination of the organisational and political crisis that had divided the movement for some years. Given the sharp exchange of views between members on the future of the movement, the Bureau proceedings were never published. Even the Italian Peace Committee, which found a more receptive public than anywhere else in Western Europe with the exception of France, began to protest against the ever-increasing centralisation in the movement. Achille Corona, the Italian Socialist politician, speaking at the fourth session of the second day of the Bureau session on December 12, argued that the movement often did not assess international developments and its role within them correctly. Informing the Bureau members about his impressions from visiting certain countries in Europe and Asia in order to get acquainted with their national movements, Corona argued that these movements often adhered to such hard-line positions that it made it impossible for any alliance.<sup>348</sup> The experience of the Italian movement showed that the movement should allow each committee to gradually form potential alliances.

It would have been surprising for Corona and others who would be arguing for decentralisation throughout the three-day meeting that right after his speech the General Secretary of the WPC Jean Laffitte would read out a letter on behalf of Curie outlining further centralisation. Dressed up as reforms to address the increasing bureaucracy of the movement, Joliot Curie proposed to increase the power of the Secretariat. It was explained that since the Secretariat was the only permanent organ of the movement it should assist in carrying out

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<sup>346</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.235, l.219 - Minutes of the meeting of the Bureau of VSM, Vienna, 12-13 October 1953.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> GARF, F.9539, op. 1, d.419, l.58 - The proceedings of the Bureau of WPC in Helsinki (11-13 December, 1955).

decisions taken jointly by the Bureau and the World Peace Council, to participate in the preparation and development of political decisions concerning the position of the movement. In addition, if circumstances required it, and if the Bureau was unable to convene, the Secretariat should be given the opportunity, after consultation with the Chairman and members of the Bureau and the National Committees, to familiarise the public with the position of the movement for events that would change the direction of its activities. Yet even with these suggestions it was “necessary...that a sufficient core in charge of the Secretariat to remain in place in order to ensure continuity and centralization”.<sup>349</sup> Though Joliot Curie acknowledged the need for expanding the Secretariat he was unwilling to democratise the process, since “allowing certain national movement to appoint a representative to the Secretariat... can lead to ‘inflation’ of secretaries”.<sup>350</sup> The Soviets, through Joliot Curie, while allowing the Secretary to be appointed with the consent of his/her national committee, would nevertheless insist that appointees be approved by the council. Yet, even Laffitte had to admit that his own comrades in the French Peace Committee raised the question of abolishing his post of General Secretary. Supporters of the abolition cited the fact that the leadership was unable to keep up with the growth of some of the national committees.<sup>351</sup>

It was widely acknowledged that the Bureau sessions did not inspire or interest many members, with usually only one third of the members attending. Many were frustrated that the sessions did not tackle specific issues relevant to their own countries and were more of a formality, where long and vague reports were read. In addition, some members of the Bureau expressed frustration for not having proper help on specific issues of importance to their countries. The attitude of many Bureau members, as British representative Monica Felton (chairwoman of the British National Association of Women) explained, was due to the fact that many did not feel obligated to carry out their work as members outside of the session. Yet Felton also argued that many Bureau members “come back to their countries with a sense of dissatisfaction with their participation” because of the fragmented structure of the sessions. Instead of having dynamic and stimulating discussions, plenary sessions were occupied by long reports. This highlighted the fact that copies of reports were not sent ahead of sessions and neither was the agenda of the sessions drawn up in advance by the Secretariat in consultation with the Bureau. In essence, the Soviet structure of the peace movement did not encourage

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<sup>349</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 72.

coordination of work and discussions outside of the sessions, effectively making these generic consultative meetings that reinforced the Soviet approach.

The national peace committees were well aware that what was needed was not, as Joliot Curie proposed, a Secretariat under the Chairman, but to make the Secretariat a truly executive body. Such an arrangement only served to divide the Secretariat, resulting in “a ‘bureau’ attached to the Bureau”.<sup>352</sup> Those members of Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Monica Felton (UK), William Morrow (Australia) and James Endicott (Canada) were the most vocal opponents of Joliot Curie’s proposal. William Wainwright, British Communist Party member and secretary of the British Soviet Society, was even blunter: the proposal “would contradict the principles under which governing bodies of the Movement still function”.<sup>353</sup> What was needed was for the Secretaries to really be the leading figures and, in particular, the General Secretariat to speak more frequently in public. For those within the Secretariat who understood the difficulties the rank and file faced in attracting the public to nation peace committees there was now a realisation that a Soviet-controlled organisation was not only incapable of undertaking genuine civic mobilisation but was in fact antithetical to such mobilisation. Even its most ardent supporters began to see the ever-increasing centralised Soviet management of the Movement as a way to control its members rather than run a successful organisation. To them, Soviet centralisation had turned the World Peace Council into an ivory tower that merely simulated a civic organisation, where countless meetings lead to a dead-end.

Isabelle Blum, who had been one of the most pro-Soviet figures in the peace movement by the time of the Helsinki Bureau session on December 11-13, 1955, began to seriously doubt the Soviet approach. While she agreed that Joliot Curie should receive all the help needed the proposal would “change the very nature of the post, since in this case, the Secretariat would be the new Chairman of the governing body of the Movement”.<sup>354</sup> For those opposed to the Joliot Curie’s proposal, a major sticking point was that this centralisation would physically divide the movement since there would be two political centres: one in Paris with Joliot Curie as Chairman and head of a select group from the Secretariat and the other in Vienna where the rest of the Secretariat would be. As a result, the Secretariat’s work would become complicated and would have to duplicate the work of the Secretariat of the Chairman.

The Helsinki session, for the first time, sharply pitted Soviet representatives and those they backed (i.e. Laffitte and Joliot Curie) against their Western counterparts. Ehrenburg,

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<sup>352</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid., 78.



Gulyaev and Korneichuk simply could not defend the proposal and instead relied on vague statements, recrimination and assurances regarding the independence of the Secretariat. Avoiding any of the political implications of the proposal raised by the others, Gulyaev expressed that “members of the Bureau carefully study the various problems and took numerous consultations in order to achieve an increase of participants in the sessions, thereby increasing their responsibility and the value of their work”. He also suggested that the Bureau and the national movements “seek ways to engage in the work of non-active members of the Council and thereby making it possible for more influential members of the Council to better carry out their tasks”.<sup>355</sup> For Gulyaev, the lack of success in building alliances with the major international non-communist organisations such as the World Federation of Friends of the United Nations, the Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches, was not a result of Soviet centralisation but of the passivity of the Secretariat. Ehrenburg tried a more diplomatic, but no less evasive, approach to the criticisms levelled at the proposal. He argued that there was “a misunderstanding in the interpretation of the nature of the proposal” and assured that the French, who were pro-Soviet, would not have a monopoly on the Secretariat of the Chairman, since no particular nationality would be represented.<sup>356</sup> Korneichuk explained the proposal as merely Joliot Curie “requesting assistance so that he can strengthen his leadership as a prominent leader of the peace movement” which was “the duty of Bureau members”.<sup>357</sup> Yet it must be noted that division was not always so clear-cut and there were exceptions. In a departure from his Italian comrade Achille Corona, Spano Velio called for the Bureau to “not only accept this request, but also thank the Chairman on behalf of members of the Bureau for the additional duties that he would thereby be taking upon himself”.<sup>358</sup> The Chinese vote of approval, however, was unsurprising.

With such strong opposition, the session could have ended in deadlock. A compromise was reached. It was Isabelle Blum, who earlier had such strong reservations about the proposal, put forward the proposal that members of the Bureau inform Joliot Curie in a letter of their unanimous consent to the proposal to establish a secretariat under his control and express their gratitude to him for agreeing to make a greater contribution towards guiding the movement. In turn, Ehrenburg proposed that decisions about the governing bodies of the movement contained in the Secretariat's report be postponed until the next Bureau meeting, which would have been

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<sup>355</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid., 83.

preceded by the next session of the World Peace Council. This way both groups would avoid a public spill-over and continue the façade of a united front. The passing of both proposals did not solve anything since they cancelled each other out: Joliot Curie got his Secretariat of the Chairman, but any further discussions on the workings of the movement were ceased.

Despite these setbacks in reforms there were encouraging signs that the peace movement's goals were coming to fruition. What would later become known as 'the Thaw' was already evident as early as May 1955 when Khrushchev visited Belgrade. This was an important first step for in re-establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, an issue that for the peace movement had been urgent since Yugoslavia's expulsion had divided it. Even more promising was the Geneva Summit in July 1955. Though the summit did not lead to any concrete agreement it nevertheless improved communication and relations between the two blocs, which would be crucial for future negotiations on trade, tariffs, the arms race, international security and disarmament policy. More importantly, from the perspective of the peace movement, their slogan for negotiations between the great powers was being realised.

Yet by the end of 1956 Soviet control of the World Peace Council and its foreign policy could no longer coexist within the peace movement. The epiphany for those in the West that the peace movement was purely a Soviet adjutant under the sway of Soviet diplomacy and would never transform into a genuine peace movement came at the end of the year when two pivotal events of the Cold War – the Hungarian uprising on October 23<sup>rd</sup> and the Suez Crisis on October 29<sup>th</sup> – put the peace movement to the test. Yet, the first half of 1956 was seen by those in the West who had been pushing for reforms of the peace movement's leadership as an optimistic year. After all, having been accustomed to interference whenever Soviet diplomacy changed course, 1956 must have been seen by many as a new start. The inconsistencies in diplomacy and official rhetoric which had plagued the Soviet Union were seen by many as a by-product of the power struggles within the collective leadership. Beria had been executed in June 1953. These political developments, though not suggesting that Soviet diplomacy was to take a radically conciliatory direction, hinted that at least a coherent Soviet diplomacy could be formulated under a new 'collective leadership'.

Such an optimistic outlook was further bolstered in late February 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress. Intended to reinforce Leninist principles of 'collective leadership' and 'party democracy', but in fact an attack on hard-line Stalinists, Khrushchev's speech "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" not only condemned Stalin's dictatorship and the Great Terror as an aberration from ideals of communism but also rejected the orthodox view of war between the capitalist and communist worlds being inevitable. Though, not an explicit call for

reconciliation with the West, Khrushchev called for economic competition with the West, arguing that capitalism would decay from within and that world socialism would triumph peacefully. This competition with the West necessitated not isolation but a degree of openness and establishing contact with other nations.

Even for the harshest critics within the movement these political developments provided a surge of optimism, a sense of renewal and willingness to re-engage with the movement. This was evident at a Special Session of the WPC in Stockholm on April 5-9 in 1956. Achille Corona declared that “this thaw will melt the opposition like ice”.<sup>359</sup> Corona was still critical of the direction the peace movement took, admitting that “we sought to form a split in the camp of our opponents rather than to unite with their organizations as a whole”.<sup>360</sup> Although Corona called for the abandonment of “old methods of schism” he fell short of condemning the situation as inherent, pointing out that “the period of the Cold War and instigations that lead to military conflicts...was typical of the clear division between those 'for' and 'against'”.<sup>361</sup> Corona came to the conclusion that a new era of international relations had emerged and the Cold War dichotomy was no longer relevant to the movement’s survival. Corona’s calls for reforms were ambitious, yet he also saw the limitations of what the movement could achieve. On the one hand, he proclaimed that “We [as members of] the peace movement, are neither diplomats, nor a great power, nor a political party”, reiterating the movement’s impartiality in pursuit of peace.<sup>362</sup> On the other hand, he wanted the movement to admit to its past mistakes and called Social Democrats and religious leaders as natural allies in Europe.

Even Soviet representatives echoed some of these sentiments. Ehrenburg called for an “end [to] the split in public opinion” and to “...get in touch with representatives of all parties of all currents that seek international cooperation and disarmament”.<sup>363</sup> The WPC was to work on an equal footing with others, without imposing on anybody its principles or methods of work.

Others, such as Isabella Blum, were more defensive. In a thinly veiled attack on Corona, Blum countered that the WPC should “avoid the mistakes of admitting to what it is not guilty of, and exaggerating its weaknesses” since it was tantamount to surrender. Though she agreed that new alliances needed to be made, Blum warned that the movement “must not confuse the

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<sup>359</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.490, l.102 - Special Session of the World Peace Council in Stockholm (April 5-9, 1956).

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid., 209.

passion and determination of our struggle with a silly claim of monopoly in the cause of peace".<sup>364</sup> Despite the fact that those in the West were still critical of the peace movement's methods, the overall atmosphere was optimistic. Corona could say that "for the first time there are conditions for the easing of international tensions".<sup>365</sup> The peace movement's objective was "to preserve the spirit of Geneva" since the Thaw had ushered in a new post-Cold War epoch.

Yet by the middle of the year it had become increasingly clear that nothing was really moving forward in terms of reform or new tactics. A Bureau session of the World Peace Council that took place in Paris on June 23-25 was essentially a re-run of the same debates except with more division and pessimism. The French were split. Both Emmanuel d'Astier and Pierre Cot echoed Corona's sentiments about the peace movement's need to adapt to the new international condition or face being "perceived as a 'weapon of diplomacy of one of the two blocs', as an instrument for communist and progressive parties."<sup>366</sup> Pierre Cot outlined three radical changes that the movement needed to urgently make. Firstly, the uncompromising stance of the movement – either the 'peaceful' socialist bloc or the 'warmongering' capitalist bloc – put off any moderates from joining. Cot argued that for many outsiders the movement came off as presumptuous by implying that it was the only legitimate peace movement. Secondly, the movement needed to shake off its reputation of being a Soviet-front organisation in order to attract a broader section of society. For Cot and Corona, the movement was in denial of its assumption that it could not function and remain independent of the communist parties. This was reinforced by the fact that the Chairman and Secretary General, as well as most of the members of the secretariat and national leaders were all communists. Cot noted that the movement could not be considered independent, since in 95% of cases it took a position similar to that of Soviet diplomacy.<sup>367</sup> Thirdly, not only was the top leadership of the movement advised to bring in non-communist members within its ranks, but the structure of the leadership itself needed to be decentralised, since "the composition of the WPC in no way corresponds to the scope of movement".<sup>368</sup>

Yet it was Joliot Curie, as Chairman of the WPC, and as a French representative, who was the most resistant. Impervious to the sense of optimism that had spread through the WPC and Bureau members in the wake of the Geneva Summit, he warned the others they "cannot fall into euphoria", since the key to its effectiveness is "mobilization... despite the efforts of

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>366</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.494, l.27 - Session of the World Peace Council Bureau, Paris, 23-25 June 1956.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid.

diplomats”.<sup>369</sup> Joliot Curie was completely out of touch with the rest of the peace movement. At the meeting, Ehrenburg and Korneichuk provided a softer version of Joliot Curie’s stance. Ehrenburg, who had two months earlier supported the expansion of the movement, was now backtracking. He confirmed Cot’s and Corona’s claims that the communist members in the leadership hierarchy simply could not grasp that non-communists amongst their ranks would be able to run the movement as successfully. For Ehrenburg, the solution was to let the WPC solve its own problems. Accordingly, the WPC should first “provide greater freedom and initiative and for our national and regional movements”.<sup>370</sup> Although he admitted that the hierarchy of the leadership chocked off all initiative at the bottom, that on “its own the WPC is narrower than the movement; the Bureau is narrower than the WPC, and the Secretariat even narrower”. He was unwilling to put the blame on communist control, euphemistically noting that “the closer [one gets to] the leadership, the more there is a kind of an invalid political selection”.<sup>371</sup> Hence, what was needed was a reorganisation of the Bureau and the Secretariat. For Ehrenburg, the reorganization reorganisation of one would automatically correct the other. Korneichuk blandly concurred, "I agree with some of the statements... regarding the reorganization of our methods and structures" and offered a token gesture of having the Soviet delegation removed from the Secretariat “if it [was] found to be necessary”.<sup>372</sup>

Although two opposing sides could be observed, other members exhibited a sense of exhaustion and defensiveness. Italian politician Celeste Negarville complained how "today it is more difficult to mobilize the masses than it was during the Cold War." Isabella Blum in a thinly-veiled criticism of the Soviet Union’s hypocritical propaganda of a war-mongering West, suggested that “It would be easier to establish communication with organizations opposing war, if it could be proved to the Movement that the question of military service by convictions would, with the help of our friends from the USSR and China, also be raised in these two countries.”<sup>373</sup> Australian feminist and human rights activist, Jessie Street, complained that the WPC’s propaganda was at a disadvantage when coming up against harsh economic realities. The WPC’s call for a reduction in armaments did not take into account the negative impact it would have on mass employment, since many countries had massive weapons industries.

In hindsight, the Bureau meetings at the end of April and June were a disaster for the peace movement because they failed to take it in a new, bold and unified direction. For those

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid., 49.

in the West who faced the harsh realities of selling the movement at home these meetings were the last test and the last straw to see if the Soviets and their supporters were serious in making the necessary changes for the movement to have broader appeal outside of communist and socialist circles. The meetings were seen as an opportunity to reverse the centralisation and the further domination of communists and communist sympathisers that had culminated in the Helsinki decision to centralise the Secretariat. Isabella Blum exemplified this sense of disillusionment among Western WPC members. Up to 1956 she appeared to be one of the most ardent supporters of the WPC, irrespective of the direction it was going in. In a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to Belgium, V. Avilov, Belgian artist and pacifist, Baron Allard, spoke with Blum at the end of March about the state of the peace movement. In a conversation with Blum, Nenni "spoke very disparagingly of the Peace Council as an organization that fulfilled in its time the necessary task, but is now outdated and dying".<sup>374</sup> Blum agreed with this and stated that she too was intending to leave the Secretariat of the Council, as she did not like to "waste time." Allard himself believed that "the body [peace movement] had very much outgrown the head [Peace Council], and that at the present stage of international relations, which presents an opening for great new opportunities for developing the Movement, its leadership is clearly unable to cope with the situation because they do not understand it"<sup>375</sup>.

Even the Soviets had to acknowledge this. In a report on the state of the World Peace Council, Soviet Peace Committee aide, O.N. Bykov, pointed out that the Chairman Joliot Curie and his Office in Paris had almost no contact with the Secretariat in Vienna. In addition, the Office, consisting of the chosen Secretariats, "operated virtually without the Chairman himself".<sup>376</sup> As a result, all of the work of the Office was conducted by a small team of French staff (despite Ehrenburg's assurances!) led by the Vice-Chairman Roge Meir. Meir found himself often in conflict with the Secretariat in Vienna, who accused him of abusing power. Bykov's defence of Meir as simply "acting on behalf of the Chairman" belied the predisposition the Soviets had for giving power to the French and the French's subservience to the Soviets, both of which the rest of the Secretariat tried and failed to avoid.<sup>377</sup> In any case, Bykov noted that "almost all secretaries, with a sense of bitter regret, note that lately the Chairman devotes too little time to the peace movement."<sup>378</sup> Joliot Curie, who was grieving from the death of his wife, Irène Joliot Curie, since March 1956 was also elected as a member

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<sup>374</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.448, l.127 - Statement of Ambassador V. Avilov.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.

<sup>376</sup> RGANI - F.5, op.28, d.448, l.197 - Report of O.N. Bykov, Vienna (dated 14.10.1956).

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. The peace movement would not be his top priority, which meant he was unsuitable for the Chairman position.

The failure of the April Bureau session to resolve these issues turned the then upcoming June session into a crucial last test in the eyes of Western WPC members for the Soviets to take their calls for radical reform seriously. In a second conversation with Avilov on June 12<sup>th</sup> – just 12 days prior to the Bureau session in Paris - Allard expressed his conviction that the Soviet Union had lost interest in the movement. Blum, Allard revealed, intended to leave the Peace Council, as "there is nothing to do now", with "the Peace Council... simply dragging out its existence, waiting for the end."<sup>379</sup> Despite Ehrenburg's assurance at the Bureau session in Helsinki in December 1955 that no nationality would have precedence in the Secretariat, Allard complained even though the Peace Council "need[ed] to be to preserved at all costs" the leadership needed to be replaced, "especially the French, [who are] useless organizers."<sup>380</sup> Yet Allard also echoed the dilemma many in the West had: despite the fact that they wanted more non-communists within the ranks of the leadership and a policy of Soviet non-intervention, they could overlook the fact that from its inception the peace movement was a Soviet undertaking. Ideally, the Western members wanted to maintain links with their Soviet counterparts and receive financial backing from the Soviet Union, but simultaneously have the movement formulate its own initiative even if it meant criticising the Soviet Union's foreign policy. As Allard acknowledged: "if there is no centre, which the USSR was, then it all collapses".<sup>381</sup>

Yet Allard's view, besides highlighting the frustrations of Western WPC members, reinforced the hard reality of the peace movement: it was a Soviet propaganda institution and instrument of 'soft power' to be utilised whenever Soviet diplomacy required it. For all intents and purposes, during the latter half of 1956 the Soviet Union would find itself looking inward to deal with the unintended political consequences of Khrushchev's 'Cult of Personality' speech and the Thaw. Khrushchev's speech was interpreted by Soviet Bloc states as a sign of the Soviet Union loosening its grip over their countries to allow for a more independent course of local and national socialism. The Polish protests were based upon such a misconception. Just as the Bureau session in Paris was taking place, a protest of 100,000 people in Poznań, Poland was being brutally crushed with 400 tanks and 10,000 soldiers. The source of discontent was wages and rising taxation among workers at the Joseph Stalin Metal Industries factory, of

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<sup>379</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>381</sup> Ibid., 134.

all places. A delegation of workers was sent to Warsaw on June 23<sup>rd</sup> to meet with the Minister of Machine Industry to reach a compromise. On June 27<sup>th</sup> the delegation was notified by the Minister of Machine Industry that promises that made several concessions would be withdrawn. Strikes started the next morning and would only be crushed on June 30<sup>th</sup>. In the aftermath, 600 were wounded and 57-100 people were killed, including a 13-year old boy, Romek Strzałkowski, who would become a national martyr. This was not how the Soviets envisioned the Thaw, but neither would they hesitate to use force if they felt their bloc was crumbling. The crushing of the Polish protests did not deter other Soviet bloc countries from attempting to loosen the Kremlin's grip.

In late October two events put the peace movement in a difficult position – one in the Soviet Bloc and the other in the Middle East. In comparison to the Polish Uprising, the Hungarian Uprising on October 23<sup>rd</sup> was much more damaging to the peace movement's credibility from the Western perspective. Whereas the Polish Uprising lasted only 4 days the Hungarian Uprising would only be crushed after 18 days. Yet more importantly, and unlike the Polish Uprising, the Soviets decided to invade Hungary. What started off as a student protest inspired by the Polish Uprising on June 23<sup>rd</sup>, with a list of sixteen points calling an end to Soviet domination over Hungary, gave way to a nation-wide revolt that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet-backed government and the establishment of a new government made up of hastily formed workers councils. This new government disbanded the State Security Police, intended to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and promised to hold free elections. In reaction to these events the Soviets initially declared a willingness to negotiate only to invade the country on November 4<sup>th</sup>. By November 10<sup>th</sup>, when the revolt was crushed, Hungarian casualties amounted to 2,500, with 200,000 refugees forced to flee.

The Soviets found themselves alienated and discredited from their own movement. At the 45<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Executive Committee and a session of the Council of the Interparliamentary Assembly, both hosted in Bangkok on November 10-24, the Soviet delegation met with a very cold reception after the Hungarian Uprising. In a secret report to the Central Committee, the Head of the Soviet Parliamentary Group K.A. Gubin wrote that apart from participants from Asia and the socialist countries, the Soviet delegation was faced with real obstruction. The French and British delegations initially refused to meet Soviets and when they did, the meeting took place informally at the apartment of a staff member of the French Embassy, where the embassy delegate, Devaux, "compared the actions of the Soviet troops with those of the Nazis". In addition, the head of the French delegation, E. Faure spoke of Soviet 'terror' in Budapest and declared that this caused "irreparable damage to the prestige



of the Soviet Union".<sup>382</sup> The head of the British delegation, Stoddart-Scott, spoke of Soviet 'colonialism', of how "we reject the colonies while you restore them in new forms in Eastern Europe".<sup>383</sup> Even the Soviet's allies spoke out against the invasion, as head of the Polish delegation S. Zolkiewski argued that "the USSR has really undermined its prestige and military action in Hungary was a serious mistake, as it has aroused bitterness among the Hungarians and indignation of public opinion in Europe."<sup>384</sup> The Soviet found themselves pariahs among their allies.

What should have been at least a start to a reconciliation turned to further humiliation for both the Soviets and their allies. At a WPC meeting in Helsinki on November 20<sup>th</sup>, the Soviets negotiated for the council to adopt a mild(er) resolution on Hungary. For Hungary itself, the peace movement was virtually destroyed. The Soviet delegation managed to convince the WPC to pass the new resolution by promising to "take any steps to alleviate the situation in Hungary in respect to the role of the Soviet military intervention".<sup>385</sup> Ehrenburg felt a particular pressure in trying to convince the Soviet regime to alleviate the situation. In a letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee, Ehrenburg outlined the urgency of the situation, pleading that "if the Soviet Peace Committee is not given a chance to demonstrate its peaceful initiative in a particular issue, then it will accelerate the collapse of the global movement."<sup>386</sup> After Helsinki, another meeting took place in Moscow between the Soviets and the Hungarian Peace Committee. In Moscow, they declared that "in the current conditions the peace movement is in deep crisis. The Hungarian Peace Council as such [has] actually collapsed."<sup>387</sup> It was thoroughly delegitimised in Hungary and could only be rebuilt from the beginning again.

Ehrenburg's letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee was sent in desperation over the deteriorating situation of the peace movement and ahead of a Paris session of the WPC in December. The pressure on the Soviets by the end of 1956 was such that Ehrenburg and other Soviet representatives could no longer simply represent Soviet interests and hinder reforms within the World Peace Council. The letter was uncharacteristically blunt in describing the dire situation and presenting the alternatives the peace movement realistically had. Ehrenburg argued that in order to preserve the movement within the existing framework it was "now necessary to change our tactics and, through mutual concessions, find a platform that has

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<sup>382</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d. 447, l.186 – Secret Report to the Central Committee.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>385</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d. 448, l.221 - Ehrenburg's secret letter sent by Shepilov to all members of the Presidium, candidates for membership to the Presidium and the Secretaries of the Central Committee, December 10, 1956 .

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

<sup>387</sup> RGANI, F.5, Op.28, d. 449, l.190 - Meeting in Helsinki, November 20, 1956.

up to now primarily served the peace policy of the Soviet Union but can in this or that question quite clearly differentiate from the Soviet diplomacy line."<sup>388</sup> The peace movement's rhetoric would now have to apply to the Soviet Union itself, as Western counterparts "will insist on a clear mention of Hungary as a state affected by the failure of collective European security or rejection of universal agreements to withdraw troops from foreign territories".<sup>389</sup> Ehrenburg laid out three options:

"The Movement can be frozen. That is, not convene any of the governing bodies till some a relaxation of tensions. In this case, it makes no sense to go to the Paris meeting. However, it is necessary to take into account that it is impossible to be sure that the Movement will be able to be revived afterwards."

"The Movement can remain as it is. In this case, it is necessary to clearly state that for the foreseeable future it will shrink and in Western countries it will become exclusively communist. (...) "

"We can finally choose the third solution and begin to reorganize the Movement on a more flexible basis, but for this we need to have an answer from the CPSU Central Committee before departing to Paris."<sup>390</sup>

The members of the Presidium of the CC were not impressed with Ehrenburg's suggestions. As with the Polish and Hungarian demands there would be no compromises. The peace movement would fundamentally stay the same. The best the Soviets could give by way of concessions was to rather cynically present the Hungarian Peace Committee propaganda with "gift materials" worth 100 thousand roubles in January 1957 as support after the events of 1956.<sup>391</sup>

The gesture was symbolic of the fact that the Soviet regime had no longer regarded the peace campaign as a crucial element for legitimising the Eastern Bloc. The Hungarians did not receive help from the West in their revolution because the configuration of relations with the Soviet Union – in the nuclear age – was too critically important to disrupt fundamentally, and because

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<sup>388</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d. 448, l.219 - Ehrenburg's secret letter sent by Shepilov.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., 220.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid.

<sup>391</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.502.

Khrushchev was too willing, if unpredictable, an interlocutor to ignore for long. By April 1957, Soviet officials were openly saying that the diplomatic situation was ‘settling down’.<sup>392</sup>

The normalisation of diplomacy between the Soviet Union and Britain had been gradually taking place in parallel with the Soviet Peace Campaign after Stalin’s death. De-Stalinisation had made a growing network of contacts possible in diplomacy, politics, culture, academia, the professions and everyday life. These contacts were so crucial that they would easily survive the crisis of de-Stalinisation of November 1956, and indeed subsequent crises.<sup>393</sup> Indeed, the Presidium of the Central Committee’s reluctance to decentralise the peace campaign to allow it evolve into a genuine mass movement stemmed from the fact that after Stalin’s death it became increasingly apparent that scientific, economic and cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States were more effective in normalising relations, and in turn, solidifying the East-West *status quo* in Europe which the Soviets so desired over the peace campaign’s diplomatic assault.

As early as January 1954, American businessmen began to travel to the Soviet Union to establish contacts with their industrial counterparts. After Stalin’s death, small groups from both sides were soon making visits. The following year a number of ‘reciprocal visits’ on both sides took place, with American figures from the steel, agricultural, housing and electrification industries visiting the Soviet Union and Soviet delegates visiting in September and October.<sup>394</sup> During these two years, both the West and especially the Soviet Union began to understand the value of these exchanges in normalising relations. This normalisation of relations rested on the understanding that neither would exploit indirect conflicts, such as the Suez Crisis, or internal crises, such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary, to destabilise the *status quo*. These strengthened links were institutionally de-Stalinised in the USSR immediately following the Suez–Budapest diplomatic breakdown: the State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS) was formed, and VOKS (the Stalin-era organisation for promoting cultural ties abroad) was replaced with the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.<sup>395</sup> At the British end, the process took place before the secret speech in 1956, with the formation of the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council. In 1955, the committee was involved in the arrangements of 18 visits from the Soviet Union to Britain. These visits ranged from large delegations of doctors to trips by single scholars and by 1956 the number of such visits totalled

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<sup>392</sup> Mark B. Smith, “Peaceful coexistence at all costs: Cold War exchanges between Britain and the Soviet Union in 1956,” *Cold War History* 12 (2012): 546.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, 553.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, 546-7.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, 548-9

29.<sup>396</sup> In the context of this new diplomatic development, the peace campaign was becoming increasingly irrelevant.

This was in marked contrast to the Second World Peace Congress in 1950 which was intended to take place in Sheffield but forced to convene in Warsaw when the British Government cancelled visas that had been granted and refuse to leave land non-visa delegates. Subsequently, the Cabinet decided to exclude about half of the Soviet ‘support’ staff accompanying the delegation, granting only 10 of the remaining 40 visa applications and refusing entry to over half of the delegates that did not require visas. The Government interpreted the WPC’s Stockholm Appeal for the abolition of atomic weapons as a Soviet tool for manipulating the British public. From the British Government’s perspective, the peace campaign exploited Western freedom of speech to persuade the public to sign a disingenuous appeal that supported Soviet foreign policy and potentially compromised Britain’s security by binding it to Soviet demands.<sup>397</sup>

After Stalin’s death, the Soviets realised that opening official diplomatic channels was much more conducive to gaining legitimacy from the West than conducting an intrusive campaign aimed at putting public pressure on Western governments. The thawing in relations did not culminate with a new peace campaign but old-fashioned diplomacy: Between April 18<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, led a delegation to Britain to discuss frankly the European *status quo*. As Mark B. Smith has argued, “the visit had most of the trappings of a state visit and all of the punch of candid talks between the two countries’ most powerful politicians. It was a historic conjuncture that symbolised the new ‘transnational’ reality: the powerful array of links that shot through the iron curtain after Stalin’s death.”<sup>398</sup> These links – in culture, science, education, trade, technology and politics – ensured not only the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union and Britain, but also made possible the sustainable international system of the post-Stalin Cold War.

The immediate challenges to Soviet-West relations in late October 1956 following the Suez Crisis, which threatened to pit Great Britain against the Soviet Union in the wake of the former’s invasion of Egypt, and the Soviet invasion Hungary, which threatened the East-West *status quo* in Europe, was a litmus test of whether cultural exchanges could sustain the new

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<sup>396</sup> Ibid., 548-9.

<sup>397</sup> Weston Ullrich, “Preventing ‘peace’: The British Government and the Second World Peace Congress,” *Cold War History* 11 (2011): 356.

<sup>398</sup> Mark B. Smith, “Peaceful coexistence at all costs: Cold War exchanges between Britain and the Soviet Union in 1956,” *Cold War History* 12 (2012): 538.

dialogue between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The immediate response on both sides to the near simultaneous crises suggested that the goodwill built over the previous 2 years would break down. The Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council held a special meeting on November 6<sup>th</sup> and cancelled an imminent visit by the Sadler's Wells Ballet to Moscow, "[i]n view of public opinion in this country, which strongly condemns the renewed suppression by Soviet forces of Hungarian liberty and independence". The committee agreed to boycott an upcoming reception at the Soviet Embassy, and arranged for other postponements and abandonments. In response, the Minister of Culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, circulated a neo-Stalinist note in January 1957 decrying the fact that "modern bourgeois propaganda is exerting a noticeable influence on the artistic intelligentsia".<sup>399</sup> Despite these setbacks, there was soon desire to re-institute contact. On February 21<sup>st</sup>, the Soviet Relations Committee noted that the Foreign Secretary had requested "a cautious resumption of officially-sponsored Anglo-Soviet contacts", though for the time being these should be "unobtrusive". By April, the Foreign Office had setup arrangements for a full resumption of cultural relations. In June, this process was effectively formalised. The Soviet Peace Campaign was now essentially obsolete. It had fulfilled its mission: not of mobilising Western public against their own governments' foreign policy and increasing communist influence, but of keeping Western communists from potentially destabilising the post-war *status quo* in order to give the Soviet regime diplomatic manoeuvrability to the division of Europe into two stable blocs.

For the Soviet regime the invasion of Hungary in November 1956 vindicated two things. Firstly, by not supporting the Hungarian Uprising, the West had come to recognise and accept the division of Europe into two blocs as the post-war *status quo*. Secondly, cultural exchanges and the normalisation of diplomatic ties was much more effective in making the West come around to the idea of this new *status quo* than any 'peace offensive'. The Hungarian crisis confirmed for different reasons for both the Soviets and their Western counterparts that the peace campaign was no longer a top priority.

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<sup>399</sup>E. S. Afanas'eva, et al. In *Apparat TsK i kul'tura, 1953–1957: dokumenty*, ed. E. S. Afanas'eva (Moscow: ROSSPEN), quoted in Smith, "Peaceful coexistence at all costs": 552.

The origins of the peace campaign were rooted in the two most pivotal moments of the early Cold War period: The collapse of the Alliance system and the rise of the Eastern and Western blocs. For Stalin, the aim of the peace campaign was to mobilise the Western masses to put pressure on Western governments to ensure that the transition from the collapse of the Alliance to the Iron Curtain did not escalate into a new military conflict between the former allies.

Yet, the very nature of the peace campaign precluded it from ever reaching the Western masses in the way Stalin had hoped for. Firstly, the peace campaign was explicitly anti-Western (and anti-American in particular) and anti-capitalist in its rhetoric. Its main function was to spread the idea in the West that it was the Western capitalist governments which were the source of tensions in Europe after the war. This propaganda could never effectively counter Western propaganda on the Soviet Union's takeover of Eastern Europe, which meant that the campaign's lack of political neutrality linked it firmly with the Soviet Union – something which the World Peace Council would not be able to shake off neither internally nor publically.

Secondly, despite having emerged as one of the two great powers, the Soviets failed to effectively modernise their propaganda techniques to effectively capitalise on their hard-won prestige. The organisational and rhetorical elements that made up the Comintern's Popular Front policy against the rise of fascism throughout the 1930s were essentially adopted by its successor, the Cominform. Despite its aim of creating a grass-roots spontaneous network of organisations, it exhibited all of the ideological and bureaucratically centralised predispositions of the Cominform. There was none of the spontaneity and inclusivity that characterised a genuine peace movement – a fact picked upon very quickly in the West. Instead, in 1947 a blatantly pro-Soviet, anti-Western 'open letter' from Soviet literary figures sparked off three successive conferences, each one validating the next. The World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace in August 1948 in Wroclaw snowballed into the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace in March 1949 in New York, which then led to the World Peace Congress in April 1949 in Paris and Prague simultaneously. The congress established the World Committee, which would then transform into the World Peace Council the year after, during the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw.

During these formative years, the congresses and conferences demonstrated the contradictions in Soviet aims. On the one hand, each successive conference and congress purged any undesirable elements from the ranks of the movement and kept those who whole-

heartedly submitted to Soviet dominance, such as Frederic Joliot-Curie, Jean Laffitte, Cheretti, Sereni, Isabella Blume and Paul Robeson. At the same time, the peace campaign still retained the rhetoric of an all-inclusive grass-roots organisation aimed at all strata of society. Yet by the time of the First World Peace Congress the movement had solidified into another Soviet-backed intelligentsia front, with the congress consisting of scholars, professors, writers and white-collar professionals, such as engineers, lawyers and doctors.

While the Soviets had no qualms about purging the movement of real or imagined enemies, such as John Rogge, Titoist ‘infiltrators’ or Catholic Papal spies, the rest of the movement temporarily tolerated Soviet dominance because it was the Soviets who financed it. Yet increasingly, Soviet control of the movement and its aim to expand it beyond the communists and the far-left intelligentsia began to clash with each other. While the Stockholm Appeal in March 1950 and the peace pact between the five great powers in November 1950 received a massive amount of signatures, the vast majority of these came from the Soviet Bloc countries, in particular China and the Soviet Union. Internally, the Soviets could not understand that their domination and centralisation of the movement could have contributed to the Western perception that the movement was a tool of the Soviet Union! The Soviets instead turned their frustration on the communist parties that dominated the national peace committees in the West and roundly criticising them for their supposed lack of effort and organisational skill. Likewise, Soviet funding of the magazine *Peace Supporters* ensured that it would never evolve beyond Cominform propaganda. In essence, it demoralised Western communists and left them to implement the Soviet-dominated peace campaign and suffer the social and political consequences of an indifferent and hostile public and press.

As Western communists became vocal about adapting their peace committees to their respective countries, such as pushing through for a peace fund independent of Soviet funding, it became increasingly apparent that the peace campaign was an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. As Stalin became increasingly frustrated with the US-dominated United Nations, the Stockholm Appeal and the peace pact between the five great powers were employed to present the World Peace Council as an alternative to the United Nations. This culminated with the Bio-Warfare Campaign, in which Western scientists were organised as part of a fact-finding mission to prove America’s use of biological weapons in Korea and China. The campaign failed in its objective and eventually died out as the United Nations intended to investigate the findings.

After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet foreign policy refocused on European collective security and the question of Germany’s reunification. This shift caused it to lose

direction and purpose. Khrushchev's leadership meant that the World Peace Council was entangled in the ever-rapidly evolving diplomacy that would continue for the next three years: the back-and-forth proposals and counter proposals between the Soviets and the West, the Berlin Conference in January 1954, the Geneva Summit and the Geneva Conference in May 1955 and October 1955. More importantly, the Soviets realised that the stabilisation of the Western and Eastern blocs could only be achieved through diplomacy and *not* the peace campaign. In April 1956, Khrushchev further strengthened this approach so that when a potential diplomatic breakdown occurred during the Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in October it became apparent to the Soviets that the peace campaign, viewed by Western governments as a destabilising force, could be a threat to Soviet diplomatic efforts. It, therefore, could not be allowed to reform and fulfil its function, at least as Western communists had understood it: As a weapon to strengthen their political credibility with the Western electorate.



## CHAPTER THREE

### The Internal Soviet Peace Campaign

#### The Soviet Peace Committee: Bureaucracy of Peace

Because the peace campaign had its roots in the Soviet response to the escalating tensions in post-war Europe, the internal version of the campaign mirrored its international counterpart with a crucial exception: Unlike the World Peace Council, the Soviet Peace Campaign did not contain divergent and clashing views, which meant that the campaign was controlled and orchestrated from the top much more tightly. The early history of the ‘struggle for peace’ begins with its institutionalisation in the wake of the World Peace Congress in 1949. Grigorian and Shepilov characterised this as “practical steps intended for consolidating the gains made by the Congress”<sup>400</sup>. In practice this meant organising the Soviet Peace Committee very much in the same manner as the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace that took place in Wroclaw in 1948. Molotov ordered that the intelligentsia convene in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tashkent and Baku and that the Soviet delegates of the World Peace Congress make speeches. In essence, this solidified the Soviet Peace Committee’s place in the pecking order: along with the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformbiuro) and the Committee for Radio Broadcasting (Radiokomitet), the SPC (and the republic and regional offshoots that revolved around it) would be a vehicle for propagandising the message of the World Peace Congress and (later) the World Peace Council. The impetus of the establishing the Soviet Peace Committee was to maintain links with the World Peace Congress and the national committees of countries represented at the congress.

Equally important, the peace campaign was to capture the war-weary mood of the nation through its institutionalisation, centralisation and instrumentalisation. From the outset, the peace campaign was not about Soviet citizens coming together but of Party institutions congregating on the Kremlin’s call. Yet to balance this out, most of the organisations called upon were the closest things to ‘civic’ organisations that the Soviet Union had. In accordance

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<sup>400</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1396, l.1 - Molotov’s Archive: letter signed by Grigorian (as Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Central Committee) and Shepilov (Head of Agitprop in the Central Committee) addressed to Stalin and sent to the rest of the Central Committee, including Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Kosygin (dated 7.4.1949).

with the draft resolution of the Central Committee of CPSU, the Soviet Peace Committee would be established at a meeting of representatives from the trade unions, women's organisations, youth organisations, academic organisations and other social organisations that had participated at the World Peace Congress. The Chairman of the SPC would be Fadeev.<sup>401</sup>

At the end of August 1949, Moscow hosted the first All-Union Peace Conference, with 1200 delegates in attendance, including 76 deputies of the Supreme Soviet, 139 deputies of federal and autonomous republics, 26 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 105 Heroes of Socialist Labour, 190 Laureates of Stalin's Prize and 1,034 decorated soldiers. The conference elected the Soviet Peace Committee consisting of 70 members, including poet Nikolai Tikhonov as Chairman, writers Alexander Fadeev, Alexander Korneichuk, Konstantin Simonov and Aleksei Surkov, academics Sergei Vavilov and Boris Grekov, film director Sergei Girasimov, and representatives of youth organisations including Nikolai Mikhailov (who was the first Secretary of TsK of Komsomol). Trade unions and women's organisations also took part. As part of wider propaganda campaign, a film titled 'Peace will defeat War' about the work of the All-Union peace supporters was prepared.<sup>402</sup>

Yet in one way the Soviet Peace Committee did reflect its Western counterparts: like other national peace committees, the Soviet Peace Committee gave more prominence to the intelligentsia. There were 70 delegates representing the Union of Soviet Writers, 20 representing the Union of Soviet Composers, 10 representing the Union of Soviet Architects, 50 representing the USSR Academy of Sciences, 20 representing the Academy of Medical Sciences, 10 from the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 10 from the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 10 from the Academy of Arts, 20 from the Academies of Soviet Republics, 25 from Moscow State University, 15 from Leningrad State University, as well as 100 from the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women, 100 from the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth, 340 from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, 130 from the kolkhozes, 10 from the Slavic Committee, 10 from the All-Union Society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge (in 1963 renamed the All-Union Society "Knowledge"), 15 from the Centre for Cooperative Unions (Tsentrsoiuz), 4 from the Russian Orthodox Church and 100 by personal invitation.<sup>403</sup> Although more than half of the delegates were represented by so-called "public", "non-governmental" organisations such as the Anti-

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

<sup>402</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223, no.3.

<sup>403</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.27, l.25-41 - 'Top Secret project' - TsK resolutions on the All-Union Peace Conference prepared by Grigorian (as Chairman of the International Committee of the TsK) and Shiepilov and signed under Malenkov's name, (dated 25.6.1949).

Fascist Committee of Soviet Women, the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions etc., election of 74 members for the Soviet Peace Committee at the All-Union Conference resulted in a majority of cultural and political elites, with 20 writers, 16 academics, 21 from the nomenclature, 4 film directors, 2 actors, a composer and 10 kolkhoz workers.<sup>404</sup> While the republican and local peace committees would be dominated by everyday people, the Soviet Peace Committee was intended as the face of the Soviet Union to its Western counterparts and as such, included ordinary people only as a token of its supposed inclusivity.

Grigorian, Malenkov and Molotov all presided over the Soviet Peace Committee and its relations with the World Peace Congress and (later) with the World Peace Council and all aspects of representation of international affairs in the country. All three edited a speech that was to be given by the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and SPC member, V. Kuznetsov, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Stockholm Appeal in June 1950. Over six versions of the speech were edited by Grigorian, Malenkov and Molotov before it could be approved. Molotov's drafts are especially noteworthy. He excised whole sections from the text pertaining to the merit of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress (i.e. "the main authority of the international community", "the spokesman of the hopes and aspirations of millions of regular people who yearn for peace", "the voice of all peace-loving humanity's conscience"), instructing Kuznetsov not to praise the committee.<sup>405</sup> Molotov's reasoning might have been that given the Standing Committee's 76 country membership and no guarantee of a Soviet majority it would, therefore, have been prudent not to praise the organisation since at any given time it might turn anti-Soviet.

The All-Union Peace Conference, the republican and local peace committees, however, were under Malenkov's control. Even though it was Grigorian and Shepilov who prepared the Central Committee resolutions on the All-Union Peace Conference, including the agenda, the makeup of the Presidium of the conference, the programme and who would be speaking and the budget, it was Malenkov, as Secretary of the Central Committee, who approved everything. For example, SPC's response to the invitation from the Standing Committee to the International Peace Awards had to be approved by Malenkov and even plans of action for preparation and carrying out in the Soviet Union on International Day for the struggle for peace on October 2<sup>nd</sup>,

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<sup>404</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, part 1, d.6, ll.186-88 – Election of the SPC at the All-Union Conference.

<sup>405</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d. 223 no.3.

1949.<sup>406</sup> The choice of Malenkov to rule over the domestic peace campaign reflected Stalin's post-war mind-set to hinder any potential civic activity that could have arisen as the Soviet regime was in the middle of re-consolidating its political grip over the country. By 1952, Stalin increasingly withdrew from the business of the Communist Party Secretariat, leaving the task of supervising the Soviet Communist Party entirely to Malenkov<sup>407</sup>.

Malenkov's background in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, which was responsible for the central administration of the party, and the Organization Bureau (Orgburo), which oversaw the work of local party committees, shaped the Soviet peace movement into a highly-centralised organisation completely dependent on the Kremlin with a strong hierarchical structure, but one that understood that resources needed to be used for pragmatic purposes. Working within a meagre budget and relying on other institutions for hand-outs, the Peace Committee faced "unsolved organizational questions in comparison to other organizations".<sup>408</sup> The Soviet Peace Committee was intended to be an umbrella organisation that brought together members from other "public organisations". As such, it needed a large staff to make it work. Grigorian's letter to Malenkov highlighted the Soviet Peace Committee's lack of status among other organisations. The Soviet Peace Committee had less staff than the Slavic Committee, which had 70 staff or the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth that had 59 staff<sup>409</sup> since the latter two had been formed nearly a decade earlier at the start of the war. The Peace Committee still had no separate space for prestige ceremonial purposes, such as meetings with foreign delegations, nor any qualified translators.

Mikhail Kotov, Executive Secretary of the SPC, reiterated the SPC's need for assistance in his budget plan to the Central Committee for 1950. Out of the 3.1 million roubles required for the top-ranking positions of the SPC, such as the Executive Secretary and the permanent representatives of the SPC to the World Committee of Peace Supporters, 3,000 and 4,000 roubles would be paid, respectively. Out of 33 posts, only 5 were executive posts – Executive Secretary, his deputy, permanent representatives to WCPS, permanent representative of the SPC to the journal 'Peace Supporters', and Chairman of the SPC. The rest were assistants, translators, maintenance staff (including street sweepers, 2 cleaners, doormen, guards) and the head of the secret service department. Yet none of this was enough to convince the Central Committee to fund the Peace Committee in accordance with Kotov's suggestions. The resolution passed by

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<sup>406</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.27, l.25.41 - Materials on the Paris Congress in 1949 - Document on a Top Secret project (dated 25.6.1949).

<sup>407</sup> See Ch.6 in Yoram Gorlizki Oleg Khlevniuk's *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953*.

<sup>408</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.3 – Grigorian's letter Malenkov.

<sup>409</sup> Ibid.

the Council of Ministers in April 1950 allocated only a little more than half of the 3.1 million Kotov had asked for. For compensation the resolution called for State Supplies of the USSR (Gossnab) to allocate two 'Pobeda' automobiles and 80,000 roubles worth of furniture for the Soviet Peace Committee's offices and the Ministry of Trade to supply to the Soviet Peace Committee's offices 200 metres of upholstery material, 100 metres of silk, 100 metres of satin and 3 radio sets.

Throughout 1950 the Soviet Peace Committee continued to barely function. Tikhonov, as Chairman, in hopes of improving the situation outlined the dire situation to Molotov. The SPC still had only three full-time members of staff, no library, and requests to have phones installed were rejected. Furthermore, it did not have its own headquarters (with the Slavic Committee letting them use a room at 10, Kropotkinskaia Street). The SPC also did not have adequate transportation (relying on a single 'unusable car'), no reviewers, no translators, and no furniture.<sup>410</sup> However, Grigorian found it inappropriate to "acknowledge this increase of staff and budget at this time".<sup>411</sup>

The mix of centralisation, underfunding and friction and dependence with other propaganda institutions had a detrimental effect on the Soviet Peace Committee's visits abroad and its hosting of counterparts in the Soviet Union. Members of the SPC, usually well-known scholars, writers and artists, would be sent in groups to different countries and often complained that the funding scheme for trips abroad was not even enough to cover the minimum living costs. For example, a group of SPC representatives going abroad could not even afford a standard room in a hotel. Prominent Soviet figures found themselves struggling as they could only afford the cheapest third-rate rooms. They all received a meagre sum of 23 roubles for each day and 11.80 roubles for hotels, prescribed sums that were nowhere near enough to cover even standard type rooms.<sup>412</sup> For example, Simonov and Kovalevskii ran out of money and the SPC requested from Molotov to give a directive to the Finance Ministry to send Simonov and Kovalevskii \$200. On March 21<sup>st</sup> 1950, Molotov sent this request to Grigorian to help out. Even for such an insignificant issue, a hearing at the Secretariat of TsK on March 10<sup>th</sup> 1950 had to take place.<sup>413</sup> Under the existing paying scheme, scientists and cultural figures found themselves in a tight financial position when abroad. It was suggested

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<sup>410</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.224, ll.179-182 - Letters from Tikhonov to Molotov and from Molotov to Grigorian, (dated 8.12.1950).

<sup>411</sup> Ibid.

<sup>412</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.202 - A letter to Molotov from (signed by) Surokov and Kotov, (dated 17.3.1950).

<sup>413</sup> Ibid, 203.

that the allowance to cover living expenses should be raised by 25% and for allowance accommodations to be increased to cover 'actual cost'.<sup>414</sup>

Soviet delegates abroad were forced to contend not only with barely getting by but also having to follow a rigid regime when interacting with counterparts in the West. Molotov's archives contain 24 memos to Stalin on the resolution for the convening of the Second WPC with Molotov's corrections. The Second World Peace Congress was organised in a similar fashion: a Special Resolution by the TsK with Molotov's secretariat drawing up lists of all Soviet delegates grouped in various categories. Five rebuff speeches by Soviet delegates were prepared "because of the possibility of speeches being presented at the congress that include charges against the Soviet Union on several issues ('the iron curtain', 'economic discrimination' and 'escalation of the Korean situation')".<sup>415</sup> As a result, many Soviet Peace Committee delegates seemed cold and aloof to their Western counterparts. Even after Stalin's death Soviet delegations appeared to be ineffective. The logic of staging speeches for purely propaganda reasons continued to dominate. Undertaking preparations for the World Peace Assembly in Helsinki in 1955, Ehrenburg devised a system of topics and subtopics. There were 16 topics and each one was assigned to a member of the Soviet delegation, who was given a theme according to their specialisation. A maximum of 4 speeches were allowed to be read by each delegation and Ehrenburg decided to prepare two speeches on general topics. These speeches would be distributed in the following way: "one would speak with positive denunciation (sic!) against preparation for war, and the other with a negative".<sup>416</sup> That is, if other delegates accused the Soviet Union of preparing for war a speech would be prepared to counter the accusation by arguing that Soviet preparations (and only Soviet) were for defensive measures, unlike NATO's. Then there would be two speeches on the big issues (i.e. disarmament and the prohibition of atomic weapons and security in Europe). The idea was that since the Soviets could not control the process they needed to prepare speakers who would either appear with counter-propaganda in case anyone spoke out against the Soviet Union or those who would speak out with positive propaganda. Since the course of the assembly could not be predicted it was decided that what speeches would and would not be given during the course of the assembly.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1396 - A letter from Grigorian and A. Zverev (Finance Minister) to Molotov (dated 8.4.1950).

<sup>415</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.1400, l.86.

<sup>416</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.334, l.16 - Meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee on May 31, 1955.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid.

Most Soviet delegations, in John Bernal's (Vice Chairman of the WPC) opinion, "carry themselves with an aristocratic manner; in their composition are very few ordinary people, workers, peasants, rank and file intellectuals".<sup>418</sup> Typically, many delegates who went abroad did not dare to act independently, kept silent and spoke bureaucratically before an audience - lively, interesting speeches rarely happened. Russian delegations going abroad did not engage with representatives of various local social circles.<sup>419</sup> Even other Russian delegates, those more attuned to the etiquette of their Western counterparts, understood this. Commenting on the inefficiency of the Soviet Peace Committee in establishing cordial links with their Western counterparts (subtly critiquing the committee's lack of initiative), Ehrenburg's admitted that "Western members of the movement are increasingly saying that the performances of Soviet Peace Committee and its leaders 'invariably carry the official state character.'"<sup>420</sup> Even for pro-Soviet peace activists, Soviet delegates increasingly resembled the official mouthpiece of the Soviet Union. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee at the end of May 1955 ahead of the World Peace Assembly, Ehrenburg noted how glad he was that all delegates would be accommodated in private homes since it would make it impossible for Soviet delegates to be in constant contact with each other and compel them to talk with other delegations. Ehrenburg even went so far as suggesting that Soviet delegates should be prohibited from lunching and dining separately from other members of the assembly, as "this is the practice of the three congresses and we ought to live like everybody and eat with everyone".<sup>421</sup>

As someone who understood the Soviet Peace Committee's predicament, this was a source of frustration for Ehrenburg. He came to the conclusion that if Soviet delegates were to be convincing there would need to be a degree of independence of the Soviet Peace Committee from other Soviet propaganda institutions. The committee raised the issue of condemning any Soviet newspaper article or book published overly harsh in tone to show that "we fight for peace", but was not able to implement it. For the Kremlin, the Soviet Peace Committee was never meant to question the Soviet Union's foreign policy but merely frame it in a more subtle way. Soviet delegates could not divorce themselves from this task or question Soviet foreign policy as this would undermine the *raison d'être* of the Soviet Peace Campaign.

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<sup>418</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.448, l.179 – Report on the visit of Vice Chairman of the WPC, D. Bernal, to the Soviet Peace Committee 1956 in August.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid.

<sup>420</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d. 448, l.221 - Ehrenburg's secret letter (sent by Shepilov) to all members of the Presidium, candidate for membership to the Presidium and the Secretaries of the Central Committee, (dated 12.10.1956).

<sup>421</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.334, l.19 - Meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee May 31, 1955.

Compounding financial pressure was the fact that Soviet delegates, besides having to read speeches towing the Party line, were ordered to act as observers of their Western counterparts. After their trips they had to write reports. The SPC's briefings to the Central Committee resembled intelligence reports. These reports minutely recounted the conversations of foreign visitors, their personalities, their opinions of other delegates, their views on the internal problems of the peace movements and the political situation in their respective countries. Establishing links with other national peace committees also gave access to Soviet diplomats working abroad to gather intelligence on their 'allies' and 'friends', since there was a high degree of cooperation between the Soviet Peace Committee and Soviet diplomats abroad. For example, secretary of the Soviet embassy in Sweden, Georgii Farafonov, and TASS correspondent in Stockholm Anisimov would update the Central Committee about their conversations with the Secretary of the Swedish Peace Committee, Per-Olov Zennström. The report includes a 3-page profile of all the members of the Swedish Peace Committee, rating their political outlooks, and in some cases even their familial connections.<sup>422</sup> These reports sent to the TsK were carefully reviewed. This is not only shown by the (mandatory) signatures of those who read them, but also by the markings/underlining in the text – especially on specific details.

SPC secret reports to the TsK were regular and systematic. The reports were accompanied by cover letters – either of Tikhonov or Kotov – and were not only compiled by Ministry of State Security agents working in embassies or as TASS correspondents, but also by wholly respectable cultural and academic figures. For instance, in the briefing of the academician Alexander Oparin, who was head of the SPC delegation to Finland during the festivities in commemoration of the 'relay for peace' in the spring of 1950, the SPC delegation meeting with heads of the Finnish Peace Committee and Finnish MPs was described. The 6-page report recounted in great detail the conversations which took place. During a visit to Helsinki University in which they saw the chancellor, Professor V. Kiparsky was also in attendance as a translator. Oparin notes of Kiparsky, "that even though he is head of the Russian Institute (at the University) and despite his glibness it is doubtful he would be a close friend of the USSR".<sup>423</sup> Oparin regretted that he was only shown around the humanities departments at the university and was not allowed to visit the bio-chemical institute, where he would "have liked to get acquainted with the facilities". Yet he was only able to access the botanical garden

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<sup>422</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.223 no.3, ll.280-2 - Secret Report of SPC presented to the Central Committee a week after the delegations flight on 22/3/1950.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid., 286.



and only after repeated requests.<sup>424</sup> To their counterparts in the West, Soviet Peace Committee delegates seemed detached and unconvincing in their demeanour. Undoubtedly, the Soviet delegates' dual tasks of performing the Soviet script in speeches and gathering intelligence negatively affected social interaction with their Western comrades.

The Soviet Peace Committee found itself in limbo as a result of the regimes harsh regulations regarding tourism. Ahead of the World Peace Assembly in Helsinki, the Soviet Peace Committee was keen that it had to address the difficulties their Western counterparts faced trying to get into the Soviet Union. As Ehrenburg noted in 1955, "the Austrians will very keenly raise the question of the cost of tourist trips. They have already mentioned that a 5-day trip to Prague from Vienna is at a cost equal to a trip 3-week around the Mediterranean Sea. They consider this a humiliating ban on tourism."<sup>425</sup> Ehrenburg bemoaned that the high cost of tourist trips "opens doors for all kinds of people with special tasks and makes it impossible for those from whom we would have much more benefit".<sup>426</sup> The committee could not arrange hotel accommodations for a large number of tourists and was practically unable to widely conduct foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. It would only be two years later that the Kremlin decided to relax visa restrictions and prices during the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students.

Cultural exchanges highlighted not only the tight control under which the Soviet Peace Committee found itself but also the organisation's rather undefined place among other institutions that promoted the Soviet Union. Moscow could not decide whether the Soviet Peace Committee was merely a propaganda organisation or a vehicle for cultural exchange as well. Because Soviet delegates were promoting the Soviet Union through propaganda and, in effect, encouraging cultural exchange with their Western counterparts to reinforce the Soviet gestures of 'peaceful coexistence', the Soviet Peace Committee's work would overlap with other institutions, such as Introurist and VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), that dealt with tourism and cultural contacts. Yet the Soviet Peace Committee neither had the personnel, the resources, nor the institutional clout to undertake any activities related to tourism. For example, Charlotta Bass, a member of the US Communist Party, head of the Congress of American Women, editor and publisher of a "progressive negro newspaper", *Californian Eagle* (which had been published in Los Angeles since 1879), visited the Soviet Union in September 1950. She was only shown the most attractive places. She was

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<sup>424</sup> Ibid., 287.

<sup>425</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.334, l.16 - Meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee May 31, 1955.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid., 17.

taken to a factory, an assembly line, child and medical institutions, and schools for teacher training. She was welcomed everywhere with hospitality. However, she got the impression that everything looked good only when it was prepared in advance. She visited a factory, accommodations, a day-care centre and a kindergarten. Yet, as a report to the TsK (written by the translator who accompanied Charlotta Bass) attests: “she persistently asked to see where workers lived, which no one was prepared for. In the front entranceway of the tenement building where she was taken it was unbelievably dirty, almost resembling a toilet. The second tenement building shown was cleaner, but all apartments were shown, even those that weren’t clean.”<sup>427</sup>

As they were ordered to do so abroad, Soviet Peace Committee members used these opportunities to create profiles of their guests. The meetings between SPC and their foreign counterparts were recorded as secret verbatim records and sent to the TsK. These reports had an interrogative feel about them, with the conversations consisting of brief questions and lengthy responses from the foreign visitors. This was evident in Charlotta Bass’ verbatim, with such questions being posed as: How did the Congress of American Women organise its work? Who are the members of the Congress in California? Are women’s organisations linked with the Communist Party?<sup>428</sup>

1953 would prove to be a particularly busy year for receiving foreign delegates. The Soviet Peace Committee received 30 delegations from 16 countries, a total of 173 people. This included people from India, China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Burma, Australia, Mongolia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Sweden, Norway and West Germany. Of them, 39 were WPC members, 11 state and 38 public figures, 33 writers, 7 artists and 35 members of parliament.<sup>429</sup> Considering that most of the foreign delegates were not ordinary people but usually prominent cultural or political figures it was doubly important that these visits made a positive impression in case delegates were to publicise their visits in their home press. With such a wide variety of foreign visitors it was impossible for the Soviet Peace Committee to coordinate the excursions to a degree which the Soviet regime expected since many visitors wanted to see the Soviet Union beyond Moscow and Leningrad. Each year, the Soviet Peace Committee presented to the Central Committee multipage lists of destinations and establishments where it was possible to take foreign delegations on tourist excursions. It was only after the approval of the Central

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<sup>427</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.224, l. 73.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid., 75-87.

<sup>429</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.119, l.270 – Tikhonov’s Report to the TsK on the activities of the Soviet Peace Committee in 1953.

Committee of the CPSU and regional and territorial Party committees that foreign delegations were sent invitations.<sup>430</sup> Tikhonov complained of local organisations “not systematically instructing heads of enterprises, institutions and collective on the nature of the discussions with the delegations and other events related to visiting foreigners.”<sup>431</sup> By then the Soviet Committee was wary of organising excursions for Western counterparts as the process was burdened by red tape and a lack of cooperation with other political bodies.

Mere requests became massive operations. For example, in July 1953 two representatives from Vietnam at the World Peace Council, Ngun Juan Thong and Tran Dai Ngiya, appealed to the SPC with a request to arrange for them to visit the construction of Moscow State University and a tour of Moscow River. Turning to Suslov, Tikhonov spoke of the Vietnamese delegates’ ‘objectives’.<sup>432</sup> Yet even with the Central Committee’s approval, the Soviet Peace Committee could not rely on other institutions for these tourist excursions. As foreign delegates had come to feel that their visits were staged many began refusing to come to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Peace Committee, by the fact that, they considered it a political organisation and preferred to visit via VOKS. Even the head of the Soviet Peace Committee saw the organisation as a hindrance to attracting prominent foreign cultural and political figures. For example, in late November 1955 at a session of the Presidium of the SPC, members discussed delicate issue of inviting an American delegation to the Soviet Union to commemorate Benjamin Franklin’s 250<sup>th</sup> anniversary without having the Soviet Peace Committee to issue the invitation.<sup>433</sup> Ehrenburg suggested that the American Peace Committee issue the invitation, since an invitation “from our Committee won’t get us anywhere and will just be another pointless gesture”.<sup>434</sup> The operetta actress Evdokia Lebedeva dismissed the idea of any peace committee and suggested the literary journal *Friendship of Nations* while Tikhonov and others suggested VOKS and the Academy of Science.

When things did not go according to plan the Central Committee scolded the Peace Committee for these failings. What should have been a useful tool for promoting the Soviet Union’s ‘peace agenda’ to foreigners became a logistical nightmare for the Peace Committee, as gradually the Soviet Peace Committee became a passive actor in organising ‘peace nomenclature’ tourism. It became politically expedient to evade responsibility by blaming

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<sup>430</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.120, l.87 – Kotov’s letter to Vinogradov (dated 30.9.1953).

<sup>431</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.119, l.284 – Tikhonov’s Report to the Central Committee on the activities of the Soviet Peace Committee in 1953.

<sup>432</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.121, l.331 - Tikhonov's letter to Suslov (dated 15.7.1953).

<sup>433</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.335, l.6 – session of the Presidium of the SPC on 21.11.1955.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid.

those below, such as the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. A Brazilian delegation visiting the Soviet Union in 1953 exemplified this situation. While all expressed admiration for what they saw, there was also frustration. For example, the head of the delegation, General José Pessoa Cavalcanti complained that he was not given a plan of the city and that in the visits to Kharkov and Kiev his requests to visit workers apartments and prisons were not met. A tourist excursion was a rare opportunity to get a sense of the extent to which Soviet propaganda corresponded to actual Soviet reality. The Soviets were well aware that foreign delegates would not only contrast the Soviet Peace Committee's speeches to Soviet life, but would also come in contact with ordinary people indoctrinated by domestic Soviet propaganda. It was therefore understandable why the Soviet's wanted to have as much control over what their guests saw and who they came in contact with.

It was deeply embarrassing to bring un-indoctrinated Westerners to witness indoctrinated Soviets spouting the superiority of the system not least of all because it undermined the committee's effort to present their campaign (and by extension most Soviet campaigns) in a sincere and honest light independent of official propaganda. For the Western observer, when these carefully coordinated trips showed the slightest sign of breaking down they revealed a rather surreal situation. The Brazilian delegation came across such a situation. General Cavalcanti observed that the Soviet people dressed rather poorly, and it was rather ironic when a representative of management for a silk-weaving combiner named Shcherbakov, proclaimed that silk had ceased to be a luxury item and was being snapped up like hot cakes by the lowest paid strata of the population. Cavalcanti also noted the huge queues at the department store Centre Mostorg, how crammed the buses and trolleybuses were, and the large number of dilapidated wooden houses in Moscow. He was particularly unhappy when visiting factories as his questions about the number of workers, products manufactured, work programme, and on the area occupied by the company were not answered.<sup>435</sup>

The (seeming) complacency of Soviet citizens to a foreign observer was a result of the domestic propaganda strategy that the Soviet regime hoped would boost the country's moral. In its own work the Soviet Peace Committee played a balancing act between its objectives abroad and at home. Abroad, the Soviet Peace Committee's propaganda promoted anti-Americanism by scaremongering Western masses of the prospect of a third World War. At home, anti-Americanism was intended to boost official Soviet patriotism and the threat of war offset by the military prowess of the Red Army. Thus, it was up to the Soviet Peace Committee

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<sup>435</sup> RGANI, F.5, op.28, d.121, l.17 - Report on working with the Brazilian delegation, 5.5.1953.

that the World Peace Council's magazine, with its ever changing title (from *Peace Supporters* to *Peace* to *In Defence of Peace*), was appropriately censored and that it convincingly portrayed to its Western target audience and to the Soviet people the possibilities of nuclear war. In essence, the WPC magazine could not undermine domestic Soviet propaganda efforts of portraying the Soviet people as brave and defiant, full of bravado and without fear of a new war.

Molotov was in charge of censorship of the magazine *Peace Defenders* for domestic consumption. In an attempt to shore up support for the signature collection campaign for the Stockholm Appeal to ban nuclear weapons in early 1950, the French editors of the magazine decided to publish a special edition with a free brochure with every copy 'I Want to Understand the Atomic Question'. The brochure described in gruesome detail the outcome of nuclear bombardment, citing the accounts and stories of eyewitness of the atomic bombing in Japan. In a letter to Molotov on the matter, Grigorian dismissed the brochure having "well-worn sensationalistic elements and contains unnecessary details which might give off the wrong impression about atomic bombs."<sup>436</sup> The clash between French and Soviet editors was not resolved even when the magazine had undergone a name change in the beginning of 1951. In issue 4 of the now-titled *Peace* magazine the French once again published a nuclear war-themed piece deemed inappropriate by Moscow for the Soviet audience by Pierre Boucard (a French physicist) entitled 'Is it Really Possible to Protect Oneself from an Atomic Bomb?'. In what was for the Russian publisher a direct contradiction of Soviet domestic propaganda, Boucard stated that "the underestimation of the dangers of nuclear weapons is one of the methods of continuing of the Cold War". As he had done before, Grigorian dismissed the article as "intended for those readers abroad who still need clarification on the dangers of war through well-known scare tactics. It goes without saying, that the Soviet people do not require this".<sup>437</sup> Such articles were not encouraged in the Soviet Union, since they were considered "demoralizing" and "disarming" for Soviet people.

Yet by 1952 the Soviets had lost interest in the magazine, by now called *In Defence of Peace*. Nikolai Tikhonov and P. A. Vishniakov, the editor of the Russian edition, appealed to the Central Committee of the CPSU to have the circulation of the journal increased from 30,000 to 40,000, only to have it rejected. It was inexpedient to increase the print run since the magazine was prioritised for foreign readers and was intended "for top-level workers at the

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<sup>436</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.223 no.3, l.119 - letter from Grigorian to Molotov (dated 19.5.1950).

<sup>437</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.531, l.51 - Correspondence on the renaming of journal: Fadeeva's letter to Stalin (dated 16.1.1951).

peace committee”.<sup>438</sup> Of the 30,000 copies, only 20,000 went to the USSR and another 10,000 to People’s Democracies. This circulation provided copies to all Soviet Peace Committees and “met the demands of the Soviet readers”. Yet this explanation glossed over serious problems that the Soviet Peace Committee faced in adapting the World Peace Council’s magazine to a Soviet audience. These problems had less to do with the Party’s mingling and censorship and more to do with a lack of financial support to diversify the magazine and develop national spin-offs that could be aimed at the domestic audience of each country.

The magazine *Supporters of Peace* was the first national publication of the peace movement. It was assumed that it would be the first step in establishing an extensive series of magazines for the movement’s audience. However, it proved to make little headway for the movement’s propaganda. Looking back at the magazine’s development 5 years later, Vishniakov, explained to the Soviet Peace Committee why the magazine failed to attract a large audience in the Soviet Union and in other European countries for that matter. The main obstacle for the magazine was not Soviet but French dominance over the magazine’s content. Vishniakov argued that “at the beginning this arrangement ...was necessary” in order “to support the system, it was necessary to establish authority for the main edition, and it was necessary to faithfully reproduce”.<sup>439</sup> However, this necessity “has long ago disappeared”.<sup>440</sup> The French dominance over the magazine meant French content took up most of the pages, which hardly made it appealing to an international audience. The task of the Soviet editors was to simply translate the articles. Such a passive role “did almost nothing to attract the broader Soviet society, Soviet writers, economists, and athletes to participate in the political dilemmas” that would have given the Russian edition of the magazine mass appeal.

Part of the problem was not only the predominance of French themes but also the writing style. From the French editors’ perspective, the magazine was written to attract “those groups of intellectuals who need to be convinced”.<sup>441</sup> It was therefore impossible for both Soviet and French articles to be included in a single edition of the magazine since both were accustomed to and preoccupied with writing for their respective domestic audience. Soviet writers did not have to write in a neutral tone since they did not have to compete with other ideas. Likewise, Soviet articles could not be submitted to French editors without extensive editing to make them appealing to the French masses. As Ehrenburg argued, through his hands

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<sup>438</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.137, d.813, l.112 - Grigorian’s letter to Suslov (dated 4.7.1952).

<sup>439</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op.1, d. 335, l.38 - Minutes and transcripts of the meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee from - November 21, 1955 - Proposals for the magazine In Defence of Peace.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid., 39.

passed more than one hundred articles, of which more than 70 or 80 were sent out. "Unfortunately, we have few people who are currently capable of writing for abroad. 'Etude Sovietique' had success in France, because the French journalists working there received our articles and completely reworked them. For example, one article on gastronomy, began as follows: 'Under the leadership of the party and government ...' and ended on 'the triumph of the socialist system'".<sup>442</sup> Senior editors would give specific topics and order 5 articles, accept 3 of them, but none of them would be printed. Often, when the issue was discussed in the World Peace Council, Soviet delegates would complain about the purely French character of the magazine, but the French would say, "Give different materials, arrange a Swedish or Danish article - we are happy to publish them".<sup>443</sup> The solution, as Vishniakov argued, should have been to decentralise all the editions and exchange materials between all countries when it was required. This would have given the magazine impetus to develop a national identity instead of merely translating content catered to the French public.<sup>444</sup>

The Central Committee's handling of the magazine hinted at a lack foresight on the difficulties it would encounter by publishing one magazine for different countries. The Central Committee wanted a magazine that would unite the "world's peaceful forces" under Soviet slogans. Instead, it ended up with a journal that was completely unusable for the Soviet internal audience as this audience had fundamentally different perceptions of the world, the dangers of nuclear weapons and political reality.

From this perspective, we can see that some other problems that the Soviet Peace Committee encountered were the result of this. By not clearly stating the aims of the peace campaign many Soviet people did not understand what the campaign was actually for and what the committee was responsible for. This was because the peace propaganda was superfluous for the Soviet audience, in which case it was perceived as an organisation for abroad. Poet and Deputy Chairman, Alexei Surkov, outlined a rather passive role for the committee in which "agitating the Soviet people about peace is not our task" and by "taking advantage of the great interest towards our country... use parallel channels to establish links and contacts". Surkov believed that the Soviet Peace Committee in its domestic practices would not be "substituting the World Peace Council".<sup>445</sup> In essence, the Soviet Peace Committee would take its directives

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<sup>442</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid., 45-46.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>445</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op. 137, d.530, l.92 - Verbatim record of a session of the Presidium of SPC on 17.3.1951.

from the World Peace Council (supposedly independent of the Soviet influence!) and would merely be a channel for establishing networks "...wherever and whichever way possible".

This was neither politically feasible nor practical by Moscow's understanding of the Soviet Peace Committee as primarily a propaganda institution cloaked in civic garb. The public's perception of the SPC was altogether different. Many thought it was a charity organisation. By March 1951 the SPC was receiving up to 500 letters a month, many of which asked for help or assistance. An example of this was Ivan Kazeka – a disabled war veteran of the Great Patriotic War and defender of Sevastopol. Turning to the SPC, he wrote "Before the war I was a combine operator. But now no one is willing to hire me. I have seizures during which I temporarily lose my eyesight. I need to go for treatment, but have no money and the District Social Welfare Department is unwilling to help me. My pension can't cover my expenses. Help me to cover expenses for the sanatorium. I will be grateful for this and so will my children, whom I have to raise."

The SPC was flabbergasted by such responses and could only reply in a very formal, rigid tone: "we warmly welcome your patriotic spirit. We share your righteous anger towards the bloody gangs of aggressors who are attempting to start a new world war". A copy of the disabled war veteran's letter (which included a request for a sanatorium voucher) was sent to the Krasnodar Party Regional Committee. The Krasnodar Regional Party Committee Secretary, Nikolai Ignatov, sent a copy of this correspondence to Suslov, who then complained to Grigorian that the SPC was taking on work for which it was not responsible.<sup>446</sup> The SPC's attempts at ridding itself of handling such requests were chastised by the Foreign Department of the TsK since Party organs also did not want to deal with such issues.<sup>447</sup>

Yet in another way the SPC was successful in mobilising Soviet society. The anti-imperialist, anti-American speeches given all over the country by republic, regional and local committees served to legitimise and articulate the official political peace discourse. Just between January and March alone, 700 letters were received by the SPC outlining solutions for 'peace'. Suggestions from letters included arranging an international tribunal to "expose and punish the warmongers", posting a list of the "warmongers in order to condemn their actions and sentence them as enemies of the people", building an International Peace Palace and creating a Peace Fund in order to arrange a cash lottery and fundraising for child victims of the war in Korea.<sup>448</sup> However, to a degree these proposals also highlighted the impracticality of

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<sup>446</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>448</sup> RGANI - F.5, Op.28, d.120, l.222-23 - Proposals of Soviet citizens in letters.



this mobilisation since, given the SPC's lack of resources and political independence, none of the suggestions, even the more feasible ones, such as building a Peace Palace, would come into fruition. It was only 10 years later that the Peace Fund would be established.

## **Performing Peace: Soviet Commedia dell'Pacem**

*About how Klim Petrovich spoke at a meeting for defence of peace*

*by Alexander Galich*

*You can ask my wife, Dashka,  
You can ask her sister, Klavka  
Well, I didn't have a drop of drink,  
Only just - a little – to cure a hangover!*

*I spent Sunday well-mannered,  
I washed and took a steam bath,  
And for dinner, as my family gathered,  
We started to joke and tell tales!*

*I only took a hundred grams to start me up  
(Well, not more than one hundred, I swear on my life!)  
Then I see – a car pulls up to the house,  
And I see - it has an obcom [Oblast Party Committee] licence  
plate!*

*Well, I'm on the porch – who is this guest,  
Who did they bring, not a Czech?  
And there - assistant, pen pusher  
"Get in" - he says – "let's go!"*

*Well, if they are calling on me,*

*Then let's go!*

*In the Palace of Culture a morning session is taking place*

*In defence of peace!*

*And the first secretary is there, and other bosses from the oblast  
are there.*

*Well, I sit on the assistant's lap,*

*He hands me a piece of paper*

*I'm not going to argue here.*

*"Get acquainted" - he says on the way*

*"With your outstanding speech!"*

*Okay – I thought – you drive a bargain,*

*Well I am an expert in such readings, thank God!*

*We arrived, come up to the stage,*

*And sit on the side out of courtesy.*

*Then I see the Chairman wink at me:*

*Signalling, "make your working class presence felt!"*

*I head to the centre of the stage,*

*And not reading mechanically, like a woodpecker,*

*I speak slowly and sternly:*

*"Israeli" – I say – "militarism*

*Is known all over the world!*

*As a mother" - I say – "and as a woman*

*I Demand them to justice!"*

*"For all the years that I have been a widow,*

*All happiness has passed me by,*

*But I stand ready*

*For peace!*

*As a mother say to you and as a woman!..."*

*Right then my jaw dropped,  
After all, such blunders happen! -  
This son of a bitch, punk  
Had mixed up the [speech] papers in a hurry!*

*And I don't know - to continue or stop,  
In the hall, there seems to be no laughter or howl ...  
The First (secretary), too, I see makes no faces,  
And nods his head in approval!*

*Well, I gave a quick glance – as they say  
(Thank God everything always looks the same!)  
And as I finished -  
Everyone applauded simultaneously,  
The First (secretary), too - personally – clapped.*

*Afterwards he invited me to his fiefdom  
And he said in front of his entourage:  
"Well, brother, you gave a good working class thrashing!  
You summed up the international situation very correctly!"...  
Such was a story!<sup>449</sup>*

To understand how by the 1960s the Soviet Peace Campaign had become a tired, boring and empty ritual, as Russian poet and dissident Alexander Galich so aptly described, one has to look at its formative years, during which the ritual and linguistic elements were solidified. From its inception in 1949, the All-Union Conference and the Soviet Peace Committee, with its Republic, Oblast, and local offshoots, was organised like clockwork with the sole purpose of staging a tightly choreographed meeting in which the speakers and audience performed

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<sup>449</sup> “O tom, kak Klim Petrovich vystupal na mitinge v zashchitu mira” last modified March 7 2016, <http://www.bards.ru/archives/part.php?id=4071.html>.

something akin to *Commedia dell'arte*: everyone turned into a 'type' and parroted clichés about the Soviet Union's 'peacefulness' while denouncing the 'aggressive' West.

In the first ten years of the peace movement in the Soviet Union, Moscow was the centre of all initiatives. The domestic Soviet Peace Campaign served as a vehicle to legitimise the Kremlin's peace campaign abroad. The annual All-Union Peace Conferences, which brought representatives from all republic peace committees, directed all the peace campaigns in the country without any input from republic, regional or local peace committees. The First All-Union Peace Conference, organised on August 25-27 1949 at the House of Columns, praised the work of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress, with delegates pledging to "...accept the obligation to fully support and develop the propaganda and organizational work of the Standing Committee to rally all forces fighting for peace and against war". The Second All-Union Conference was organised on October 16-18 1950 to express its solidarity for the Standing Committee's (of the World Peace Congress) Stockholm Appeal to "ban all atomic weapons, reduce all kinds of weapons provided under effective supervision, the condemnation of armed aggression and interference in the internal affairs of states". The conference also elected 65 delegates to the Second World Congress to "declare that the Soviet people are ready to join hands with all peace supporters to fight for the prevention of the threat of war".

The Third All-Union Conference was held in Moscow on November 28-29 1951, to discuss and praise (a ritual by this point) the results of the signature collection campaign for the World Peace Council's call for peace pact between the great powers (France, Great Britain, US, USSR and China). The Fourth All-Union Conference was held on December 2-4 1952 to praise the World Peace Council's and the Soviet Peace Committee's campaign against the use of bacterial warfare in the Korean War. As Timothy Johnston<sup>450</sup> and Geoffrey Roberts<sup>451</sup> have argued, with the onset of the Korean War in late June 1950, the meetings organised on republic, regional and local levels to promote the Stockholm Appeal became an opportunity for the regime to gain public approval on its stance on the Korean conflict. As focus shifted from banning nuclear weapons, the Soviet press and those making speeches at the meeting focused on the Korean War and denouncing American involvement, which reflected the official stance.<sup>452</sup> Finally, the Fifth All-Union conference was organised in March 1955 to coincide with the Soviet Peace Committee's signature collection campaign under the Standing

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<sup>450</sup> Timothy Johnston, "Peace or Pacifism? The Soviet 'Struggle for Peace in All the World', 1948-54," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86 (2008): 259-282.

<sup>451</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *Averting Armageddon: The Communist Peace Movement, 1948-1956 in The Oxford handbook of the history of communism*, ed. Stephen A. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 322-338.

<sup>452</sup> Johnston, "Peace or Pacifism?," 270.

Committee of the World Peace Council call against the “threat of a nuclear war” that was made during the Viennese bureau session of the World Peace Council in January 1955.

Even though the campaign for the Stockholm Appeal failed to make the intended impact in the West, with most of its 500 million signatures coming mainly from China, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc,<sup>453</sup> in the Soviet Union the campaign was a propaganda success. By presenting America’s involvement in the Korean War as aggressive the Stockholm Appeal signature campaign convinced the public of the Soviet Union’s moral justification of attaining its own atomic bomb without contradicting or compromising its rhetoric of the ‘Struggle for Peace’. For the Soviet people, the Korean War simultaneously presented the Soviet regime as the guarantor of peace and right for having the atomic bomb because it only strengthened Soviet resolve for peace against aggressive capitalist nations. As Johnston argues, “the language of strength for peace enabled the USSR to reverse its anti-nuclear stance and declare the Soviet acquisition of the bomb as a ‘victory in the cause of peace’”.<sup>454</sup> However, the campaign also highlighted the public aversion to war that, for the Soviet regime, bordered uncomfortably on pacifism. As “comments and questions of a number of speakers at local events demonstrated a concern that US meddling would spark a wider conflict”.<sup>455</sup> Anxiety about whether the Soviet Union would be dragged into the war dominated many of the discussions at the meetings.

The first meeting of the WPC was held in Berlin in February 1951. At that meeting the council decided on a new petition campaign: the call for a peace pact between the five great powers. Such a pact had been a Soviet aim since September 1949 and had featured in the resolutions of the peace movement, but not as a central demand. In February 1951, however, Stalin gave an interview in which he highlighted the demand for a great power peace pact. The Politburo’s instructions to Fadeev and Ehrenburg reflected the new priority attached to this demand. During the next two years 600 million signatures were collected – 100 million more than the Stockholm Appeal - but it was hard-going. In May 1951 Ehrenburg reported to Molotov that the campaign had been slow to develop in the capitalist countries. Many more such reports followed. Even the Soviets found it difficult to mobilise domestic support around the issue and had to give specific and detailed campaign instructions to all regional party organisations. Of the 600 million signatures collected, nearly 500 million were from China and the USSR.

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<sup>453</sup> Roberts, *Averting Armageddon*, 329.

<sup>454</sup> Johnston, “Peace or Pacifism?,” 261.

<sup>455</sup> Ibid.

It was only in September 1951 and in accordance with the decision of the plenum of the Soviet Peace Committee on August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1951, that the first republic and autonomous region Peace Conferences took place. The conferences elected members to the national territorial and regional peace committees.

Before the start of the signature-collection campaign on behalf of the World Peace Council's appeal for concluding a peace pact between the five great powers at the end of August 1951, the Party Central Committee UCP sent out letters to the Central Committees of the Communist Party at the republic, regional (Oblast), city and local (Raion) level to undertake the campaign "under systematic management by party organizations and with mass political activity which target the widest strata of society".<sup>456</sup> The drive to have the entire Soviet population endorse the peace pact was genuinely all-encompassing, and included not merely the civilian population but the armed forces as well. Writing to Malenkov, Defence Minister Vasilevsky commented how the "campaign is proceeding in an orderly fashion thanks to the work of servicemen".<sup>457</sup> In a report by the Russian Navy, 93% to 100% of the Navy's rank and file supposedly signed the petition, while in the army 90% to 99% signed up.<sup>458</sup> Apparently, by the 31<sup>st</sup> of October (coincidentally when the campaign for signatures had finished) 100% of the navy signed the petition.<sup>459</sup> This was not down to propagandistic considerations, since depicting the Soviet armed forces as peace loving would have run counter to projecting Soviet military strength at home and abroad and subsequent Soviet propaganda on the success of the signature collection campaign did not go into the detail on who actually gave their signature. The decision to include the Soviet military in the campaign was down to the fact that 4-5 million Soviets were in the military.

The first peace conferences in the regions and republics took place in the second half of September 1951 and were timed ahead of III All-Union Peace Conference (November 27-29 1951). Complete systematisation and strict signature collection deadlines prevented the campaign from becoming a genuine civic event instead of a purely bureaucratic procedure where everything was measured in numbers and quotas. On the one hand, the peace movement took on the facade and grassroots approaches of civil society. On the other hand, the Kremlin did everything in its power to eliminate any genuine local initiatives by having everything carefully choreographed to only simulate civil society. Peace committee organisers at the

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<sup>456</sup> RGASPI, F.82, op. 2, part 3, d.402, l.80 - Secret/Private letter from Central Committee.

<sup>457</sup> RGASPI F.17 op.137 d. 531, l.89 - Letter (dated 2.8.1951) addressed to Malenkov from Defence Minister, Marshall Vasilevsky.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>459</sup> Ibid., 97.

republic, regional and local level very much understood that the peace conference had to be all-inclusive, with every strata of Soviet society well represented. For example, the Kazakhstan Peace Conference held in Alma-Ata on September 20-21, 1951 consisted of 464 delegates - which included 334 workers, farmers, engineers and technicians, 12 scientists, 18 teachers, 4 writers, 95 Party and Komsomol-union workers, and 1 “servant of the Muslim religion”.<sup>460</sup> Among the delegates there were 31 Heroes of Socialist Labour, 1 Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 recipients of the Stalin Prize, 363 who were awarded orders and medals, 10 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 49 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, 169 deputies of local councils, and 169 women.<sup>461</sup>

The success of the signature campaign could be attributed less to the enthusiasm of Soviet citizens and more to the wide reach that the Peace Committees had at their disposal all over the country. For example, the Karelian Autonomous Republic had 23 regional, 2 urban and 1,167 local committees to promote the struggle for peace in factories, collective farms and schools. In these committees worked 6,784 persons (48.2% women, 64.2% non-Party)<sup>462</sup>. Within the span of 2 weeks after the WPC’s call for the Peace Pact on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 1951 153,339 Karelo-Finnish SSR people signed up.<sup>463</sup>

Moscow and the Moscow region, as the centre of the country, exemplified the powerful reach of the Peace Committees. To promote the signature collection there were 385,750 agitators and speakers (including in 210,397 people Moscow City) who gave 722,079 talks and read 26,190 speeches in factories, collective farms and educational institutions. These were attended by 9,992,428 people (including in Moscow – 370,225 discussions and 9,894 reports - 5,282,390 people attended).<sup>464</sup> Such numbers do not necessarily point to a civic initiative taken up by Soviet citizens as much as a ubiquitous organisation able to penetrate all parts of society.

Stalin’s death in March 1953 did little to change the overall structure of the Peace Committees in the Soviet Union. Although Georgy Malenkov, as the new Soviet Prime Minister, emphasised the USSR’s commitment to peaceful coexistence, the only change that was to come was a new campaign. On March 13-15 1953 the WPC Bureau convened in Prague to discuss the follow-up to the Vienna congress. The congress had established a broad-based commission to issue a direct appeal to each of the five great powers to negotiate a peace pact. This commission was scheduled to meet in Vienna on March 16-17 during the Bureau’s

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<sup>460</sup> GARF F.9539, op.1. d.106, l. 5.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid.

<sup>464</sup> Ibid., 77.

discussions As Fadeev subsequently reported to Molotov, doubts were expressed by some members, including Nenni, about the viability of continuing the peace pact campaign. When the commission met, however, it issued an appeal to each of the great powers to begin discussions about a peace pact. At the same time, it called more generally for negotiations to resolve international disputes. The need for a broad campaign was raised by Nenni and supported by Ehrenburg, who referred to Malenkov's remarks to the Supreme Soviet. On May 5-6 the WPC Bureau met again, this time in Stockholm, to discuss perspectives for the forthcoming plenary meeting of the WPC in Budapest in June. Ehrenburg made another important intervention when he pointed out that the peace pact campaign had been launched at the height of the Cold War. Since then the international atmosphere had improved and a general campaign for negotiations now had a real chance of success. The conclusion of a peace pact, he suggested, was not the immediate issue but would represent the culmination of a campaign for negotiations. In effect, this signalled the end of the WPC's campaign for a five-power peace pact.

Stalin's death saw no let-up in Kremlin's control. An All-Union meeting of 120 representatives of regional, provincial and national Peace Committees held on August 31<sup>st</sup> 1953 saw the heads of the committees spoon-fed the most minute instructions in conducting the campaign for negotiations. The national Peace Committees were instructed as to the sites, dates, the number of attendees, the agenda, how to approve the WPC's new slogan and as to who should be giving speeches at these plenums. After the plenums, meetings were to be held in the first half of September in the largest factories, collective farms and schools. Despite giving a veneer of 'grassroots' campaigning by encouraging ordinary people, workers, farmers, intellectuals, women and youth to make statements in support of the campaign, the top-down power dynamic of the campaign was nevertheless reinforced, since the bulk of the time was dedicated to speeches given by heads of the local Party branch, the Soviets and the trade unionists. The meeting reinforced the fact that the leadership of the entire campaign was to be exercised by the local Party organisations and that the Peace Committee had to carry out all its work in accordance and consultation with the Party organisations. It is rather ironic then, given such formalisation and the highly coordinated nature of the meetings that bordered on the ritualistic, that M. Kotov (Executive Secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee) in his keynote



speech called for a spirit of spontaneity by not “limit[ing] this important event to a campaign approach”.<sup>465</sup>

Soviet promotion of the new campaign for negotiations, just as for previous campaigns, operated like a clockwork system in which the Soviet Peace Committee kept track of all activities. By September 1953 Moscow and its regions alone held 1,434 meetings and 3,250 papers and lectures were given with an attendance of 539,000 people, while within the span of 15 days in early August at a single factory, 70 papers were (supposedly) presented and more than 3,000 discussions on the WPC’s new course of action took place. The Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge Society (*Znanie*), a propaganda institution established in 1947 but officially designated as an educational organisation, was responsible for arranging 22,000 lectures throughout the country in 1953 alone. Such a Stakhanovite approach to the campaign, in which quota numbers of attendees, of lectures given, and of meetings taking place were to be met or surpassed, completely disregarded anything to do with the quality of propaganda or its effectiveness. What mattered crucially was not to disturb the top-down hierarchy of the propaganda institutions in its aim of disseminating the peace propaganda as far as possible.

Because the All-Union Peace Conferences were the most prominent and prestigious events within the hierarchy of the domestic peace campaign in the Soviet campaign they usually established the discursive canon for the republic, regional and local conferences and meetings. Playwright and novelist Leonid Leonov’s speech at the I All-Union Peace Conference in 1949 encapsulates this discursive cannon. This discourse, like much of Cold War discourse, contained five constraining factors: the history of superpower relations, domestic political concerns, the status of both the domestic and world economies, present diplomatic negotiations, and the ever-present possibility of military engagement.<sup>466</sup> As Robert L. Scott, argues, “these five factors are endemic to the very nature of post-World War II life. Each impinges on the other in a constantly changing mosaic of relationships.”

Starting off with the doom scenario that almost echoes the opening of Marx’s *Das Capital*, Leonov paints an ominous picture in which "a belligerent large-capitalist clique under the guise of slander and disinformation, under the shriek for the so-called 'United States of Europe', is carrying out at rapid pace the most shameless expansion” in which “evil gold is

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<sup>465</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.196, l.3 - Instructions - All-Union Conference of Representatives of regional, provincial and national peace committees (120) in preparation for the campaign in support of the negotiations.

<sup>466</sup> Robert L. Scott, “Cold War Rhetoric: Conceptually and Critically” in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy Metaphor and Ideology*, ed. Robert L. Scott, et al. (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 21.

being poured on the unhealed wounds of Western Europe and where “sharp military alliances are directed against the Soviet nation and its people, because we are a major and reliable bulwark of peace, an island of hope against the dusk gathering over the world.”<sup>467</sup> In one sense, Leonov’s depiction of the Cold War was deliberately depoliticised and de-ideologised in order to communicate ‘the struggle for peace’ in a more direct, emotional tone. This was not merely a battle between communism and capitalism, but a battle between a ‘belligerent’, ‘evil’, ‘insane’ and ‘greedy vile lords of capital’ against the ‘bulwark of peace’<sup>468</sup> who are ‘marching’ towards ‘tomorrow’s communist society’.<sup>469</sup> This was a battle between the ‘young’ and the ‘doomed old’, between ‘a poison’,<sup>470</sup> ‘senile hostility’ and a ‘young country’.<sup>471</sup> Aware of “their total social worthlessness”, and their obsolescence, but “unwilling to respectably and voluntarily leave the stage of history”, these capitalists resorted to ‘intrigues’ and ‘conspiracy’<sup>472</sup> to derail peace, but this was impossible not only because starting a nuclear would ‘like a Ping-Pong’<sup>473</sup> but also because ‘handful of gangsters’ were up against ‘avalanche’, a ‘volcanic force’, ‘working class giants’ and the ‘majority of mankind’.<sup>474</sup>

Such apocalyptic siege mentality was reinforced by other high-ranking members of the Soviet Peace Committee. During the promotion of the biological warfare propaganda campaign against the US in 1951, Ehrenburg referred to Americans as ‘madmen’<sup>475</sup>, while Konstantin Fedin spoke of how “an American teacher asked his students a question: What do they want to be in 10 years? 40% of students responded that, in their opinion, in 10 years they will no longer be alive”.<sup>476</sup> For Fedin, America was employing a “sinister method of corrupting human consciousness”, turning its children into ‘neurotics’ and, in effect, “is systematically preparing for the death of its nation and is preparing death for all nations on earth”.<sup>477</sup> At the I Stavropol Regional Peace Conference in September 1951, writer and three times Stalin Prize laureate Semyon Babayevsky spoke of MacArthur, Churchill and Dallas as “unleashed dogs” and “are two-legged beasts reared and trained by the aggressive forces of Wall Street, who cannot live

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<sup>467</sup> GARF F. 9539 op.1 Part 1, d.3, l.1 – Transcripts of the I All-Union Peace Conference, August 25, 1949.

<sup>468</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>469</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>472</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>475</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op. 1, d.94, l.15 - Transcript of the Soviet Peace Committee Plenum of August 28, 1951.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., 35.

without war”.<sup>478</sup> Tikhonov, echoing the paranoia of show trials, warned of “dark forces, sowers of anxiety and masters of provocation, blackmail and threats”, that are “ready to sprinkle peaceful slogans, lofty words about peace, culture and freedom in their speeches so that some may believe that...have been reborn and changed for the better”.<sup>479</sup> But behind the sweet words of the blissfully smiling masks “you can easily unravel the familiar grin of imperialists - the enemies of peace and freedom”.<sup>480</sup>

What this discursive canon demonstrated was how the Soviet Peace Committee erased distinction between metaphorical and literal, when “we stop talking about one thing in terms of another and begin treating distinct terms as virtual identities, as if one were the other”.<sup>481</sup> Such ‘literalized metaphors’ were useful for the Peace Campaign because they vividly amplified war anxieties into a siege mentality but also emphasise Soviet military might.

Inherent in this discursive canon were two potentially contradictory metaphorical concepts – maintaining peace and showing strength. Peace rhetoric had to emphasise peace without compromising on the Marxist goal of liberating the world’s working class from capitalism, destroying imperialism and ultimately achieving communism.<sup>482</sup> The meetings at the local level played a large part in legitimising the Kremlin’s message. In order to be as persuasive as possible it was important to reinforce the character and relationship of speaker and audience. In this case, it meant cutting out the middle-man – no Party functionary, no local politician, and no professional agitator – and letting the ordinary people give speeches to ordinary people. By largely avoiding any state presence in these meetings, the Kremlin intended for ordinary people to propagandise each other. It was not simply enough to have ordinary people reiterating the official Soviet line to other ordinary people on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis. By retelling the same peace narrative over and over again, local, regional, national and All-Union peace meetings became rituals during which the rhetoric of peace eventually became a reality that all participants believed in. For those who attended these almost day-to-day rituals of peace rhetoric and reality, the perception of reality began to blur.<sup>483</sup>

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<sup>478</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op. 1, d. 95, l.22 - Minutes of the Chairman of the Soviet Peace, February-November 1951 Transcript of the I Stavropol Regional Conference for Peace, 16 September 1951.

<sup>479</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.194, l.15 - Proceedings of the Plenum the Soviet Peace Committee August 31, 1953 in support of the negotiations.

<sup>480</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>481</sup> Robert L. Ivie, “Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework of Criticism” in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy Metaphor and Ideology*, ed. Robert L. Scott, et al. (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 72.

<sup>482</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>483</sup> Scott, “Cold War Rhetoric,” 7.

Through the ritualisation of the peace campaign the ‘rhetoric of reality’ could at least re-orientate the post-war trauma towards strengthening the regime.

From this ritualised peace rhetoric a scripted narrative emerged, one that required all participants to play a part in. All the major textual devices of the speeches given at regional peace committees were reproduced from each other. They were all based on instructional brochures issued by the Soviet Peace Committee, which provided the same facts contained from one report to another report and in the same rhetorical style. So much so, that the speakers at the plenary session in Petrozavodsk, for instance, would say the same things as the speaker in Khabarovsk and the speakers in Tallinn would say the same things as the speaker in Dushanbe. The basic structure of a chairman’s opening speech would start off with describing the capitalist machinations for world domination by starting a new World War. This would be followed up by describing the unstoppable gathering of the peace movement all over the world. At the Amur Region Peace Committee in September 1953, the Chairman would speak of how “In England, the Peace Committee called on the population to demand from the government ...”, how millions of Italians “expressed their anger ...”, how “popular movements are increasingly growing in Europe ...”, “In the Netherlands and Colombia there are increasing demands for returning soldiers from Korea ...”, or how “In Japan, there are organized struggles against military bases and remilitarisation of the country ...”.<sup>484</sup>

The final part of the opening address would usually transition to how the “enemies of peace” attempt “resorting to [military] adventures” and “derailing the peace settlement” but would be encountered by the determination of the ordinary people to defend peace and prevent a new war. The most important element of this last section would be to highlight that “at the forefront of peoples fighting for peace, is the great Soviet people, firmly and confidently marching towards communism.”<sup>485</sup>

Not only was this an opportunity to highlight the Soviet regime’s diplomatic initiatives, but crucially, it provided a transition from Soviet foreign policy to internal domestic policy and onto local achievements. In fact, the transition from foreign to domestic to local was intended to be seamless in order to highlight the importance of the Soviet regime towards peace. As Chairman Amur claimed, “the best evidence of the peacefulness of the Soviet Union is its internal policies, which are aimed towards a steady increase of national well-being.”<sup>486</sup> This would often lead into local achievements, where workers of any region reportedly fulfilled the

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<sup>484</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.201, l.16 - Minutes of the Amur Region Peace Committee, September 10, 1953.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid., 18.

quotas by a particular percentage, and “exceeded the collective commitment towards the supply of grain and other agricultural crops” host by a particular percentage.<sup>487</sup> In essence, the opening speech by the Chairman highlighted the fact that even though this was a ritual that was slightly adjusted each time in response to Cold War developments one aspect crucial aspect remained constant: a ‘social contract’, of sorts, expressed in the peace rhetoric in which the Soviet people were touted as the ‘vanguard’ of the peace campaign in exchange for granting the regime legitimacy of its foreign and domestic policy and accepting the hardships of daily life by pledging to fulfil the economic plans imposed by the regime.

As a prelude to the next part of the ritual the Chairman would finish off by touting the Soviet people with such slogans as: "The Soviet people as never before is one and monolithic. The Peace Camp is unbeatable. It is a powerful obstacle to the forces of aggression." Any anti-Soviet propaganda was going to be ineffective since the regime believed that "no matter how much the corrupt liars of the imperialist camp overstrain, they will not be able to conceal the truth about the successes of the USSR and its policy of peace ...".<sup>488</sup> It was the "determination and will of the Soviet peoples of the Soviet nurtures confidence in the vanguard of the struggle for peace and for the peaceful settlement of international problems for democracy and socialism".<sup>489</sup>

The Chairman’s opening speech served as a call for the ordinary people to reaffirm their allegiance to Stalin and the Soviet regime by mirroring his speech during the “discussions”. The Secretary the Regional Committee of Trade Unions of the Amur region would usually talk about how well the workers live in the USSR and how bad they live in the capitalist countries, how "at this time, when millions are unemployed in the capitalist countries, where poverty and hunger dominate and people, where the elderly and mothers are dying, workers are employed in the defence industry, while the consumer goods sector is going through an unprecedented decline, with high rising costs of basic necessities ... our country got rid of poverty and oppression ...".<sup>490</sup> This would be followed by a story about the Party and government's regard for the workers of the region (republic) who "in response to the tremendous care and assistance" work like Stakhanovites and...will fight even more vigorously for the early implementation of the fifth five-year plan within three years and will thereby contribute to the cause of peace."<sup>491</sup>

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<sup>487</sup> Ibid., 26-27.

<sup>488</sup> Ibid.

<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid.

Any professional, be it teacher, lecturer, artist, director of the local drama theatre or doctor was expected to fit their occupation within the strict confines of peace rhetoric even if the statements expressed were awkwardly irrelevant. For example, a milkmaid from the kolkhoz 'The way of Ilyich' in the Amur region pledged that "the collective of our District Committee, responding to the Party and government's concerns, are taking measures to ensure that the cattle have a well-fed and warm in winter. The collective farm 'Dawn of the East' fulfilled the plan for mowing hay and packing silage by 100%."<sup>492</sup> An excavator from Amur proclaimed that miners of the northern section of the town of Rudny concluded on August 23<sup>rd</sup> a nine month plan of coal mining and were already working towards October, having "took up socialist obligations of fulfilling the annual plan of coal mining for the 36th anniversary of the October Revolution. This will be our best contribution to the peace and security of nations".<sup>493</sup> In an attempt to be as inclusive as possible the meeting put forth people to speak who really had not much to say except recount the achievements in their field and try to tenuously link it with 'peace'. A factory director at the Tyumen Peace Committee Plenum in September 1953 spoke of how the WPC's declaration has "met a warm response in the hearts of millions ... our factory team decided to redouble their efforts in the socialist competition for early implementation of the annual plan." As a result "the best people of our factory... perform 250-300% of the norm every day."<sup>494</sup> A foreman of a locomotive depot from Tyumen tried to argue that "[By] saving on fuel and increasing [the number of] heavy convoys our transport workers help the cause of peace. With the reduction of plain locomotives under repair we are helping to strengthen our economy. The labour of all of our locomotive depot workers plays a part in the cause of peace."<sup>495</sup> Even the head of oil production in Baku pledged support for the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet government.<sup>496</sup>

Teachers would often remind people of the trauma incurred by women and children during the war. A teacher proclaimed, "War! Such a hated word! Mothers and fathers do not want their sons and daughters to perish in a war that the Anglo-American imperialists are unleashing. What is the most priceless thing for a mother? Her child. Children – are most priceless for the Soviet state. A joyful feeling overcomes every Soviet citizen, when he sees healthy and vigorous youth. Young people are our future, our hope."<sup>497</sup> Teachers, however,

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<sup>492</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>494</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.206, l.4 - Transcripts Tyumen Plenum of the Peace Committee, September 2, 1953.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>496</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.199, l.5 - Transcripts of the Plenum of Azerbaijan Peace Committee, September 16, 1953.

<sup>497</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.201, l.33 - Minutes of the Amur Region Peace Committee, September 10, 1953.

were not confined to mere sentimentalism. At an Altai Peace Committee Plenum in September 1953, a teacher gave a speech bordering on paranoid discourse. Speaking in simplified language, as if talking to children, she proclaimed, "We are used to translating all international events in the language of peace or war. If we read or hear that the U.S. Secretary of State Dallas concludes an agreement with Syngman Rhee [President of South Korea] on mutual security, or that the American representative of the majority at the UN rejected an offer to participate in the political conferences for the conclusion of peace in Korea or India, or that Adenauer won in West Germany and so forth, we then say: 'This is war'. And if we hear about the visit to the USSR government delegation of the GDR, China, Korea, or impassioned speech of Comrade Vyshinskii at a UN meeting on inviting China to participate in the Assembly or of the atomic bomb tests in the USSR and so on, then we say 'this is peace, because we intend to use the enormous destructive power of the atomic bomb for peaceful purposes'." <sup>498</sup>

Medical professionals tended to emphasise the traumas of the war. The chairman of the health care workers union, speaking at the Azerbaijan Plenum Peace Committee proclaimed that "the tear stains on the eyes of widows and orphans have not even dried yet ... from the wounds inflicted by Hitler's fascism..." <sup>499</sup> And yet comments made by women, doctors or Komsomol members never fully devolved into total victimhood or a genuine show of grief since the memory of war trauma had to be firmly balanced with the rhetoric of strength. Because these were highly staged rituals where each speaker represented an archetype of his occupation and pledged their allegiance to the regime the peace rhetoric could not allow for any discourse which contradicted the Soviet Union as a peaceful and at the same time fearless and strong nation, even grief for the injured and the dead that hinted at the country's military weakness, unpreparedness and incompetence during the war. Doctors also reflected the Party's official foreign policy and attempted to link it with their profession. The Chief Doctor of the Altai Regional Hospital would speak of a conspiracy of health care professionals who collaborated "with the warmongers" and who "unleashed bacteriological war in China and Korea". <sup>500</sup> This would serve to contrast Western healthcare with Soviet, which was "completely different" since "our health workers are fighting for the health of the Soviet man." In fact, Soviet abundance allowed for "an open and broad network of maternity hospitals and free medicine... many American women [who] do not have the right to give birth because they

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<sup>498</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.200, l.12 - Altai Peace Committee, Plenum Transcript of September 24, 1953.

<sup>499</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.199, l.6.

<sup>500</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.200, l.68.

have nothing to pay for a stay in hospital."<sup>501</sup> For such achievements the people were to be thankful to the regime. The Secretary of the Komsomol Tyumen municipal committee reminded the audience that "From day to day our Party and Soviet Government care for our young men and women, as we built recreation centres, schools, colleges, and stadiums" and to let the "U.S. imperialists rage and toss, ... as the future belongs to communism."<sup>502</sup>

Those from the art world had no qualms of touting Soviet art over Western art. The director of the local theatre in Altai dismissed Western-serving "nefarious purposes" and touting Soviet art as the "most humane, the most progressive".<sup>503</sup> An artist practically repeated the same, condemning Western art "as languishing in senility and corruption" where "progressive cultural figures...are deprived of such a noble, beautiful and meaningful service to the people" as Soviet art<sup>504</sup>, while a poet vowed to convince all "how it was all terrible and hopeless before the revolution and how everything changed now" with "a caring Party [that builds] hundreds of schools, colleges, new villages, roads, bridges, and power stations".<sup>505</sup>

For those participating in these Peace Committee meetings the ritual functioned on a subconscious and conscious level without any contradiction. That is, it was a propaganda exercise in the traditional sense, with simplistic language of demonisation (anti-Americanism) and idolisation (the Soviet Union as the hope and future of all mankind) aimed to persuade, but at the same the participants of the meetings were fully aware that it was a propaganda exercise aimed at them and, furthermore, had no qualms about it being as such. For example, at the extended minutes of the extended Plenum session of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Peace Committee Polyakov, the Chairman of the Management Board of the Krasnoyarsk branch of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge insisted that "it is necessary to embed even more deeply in the consciousness of the Soviet people the idea of the struggle for peace and the strengthening of our socialist state, for the successful building of communism".<sup>506</sup> The logic was that economic recovery was essential in maintaining the regime's hold on power and that the economy could only recover when the Soviet people gave a pledge to fulfil the economic plans as a contribution to peace. Therefore, the rituals of the Peace Committees all over the country were essential in reinforcing time and time again the circular logic of peace rhetoric, that the Soviet regime = peace = economic development =

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<sup>501</sup> Ibid.

<sup>502</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.206, l.5.

<sup>503</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.200, l. 35

<sup>504</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>506</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1, d.350, l.27 - Minutes of the extended Plenum session of Krasnoyarsk Regional Peace Committee (January 24 and March 24, 1955).



achieving communism. This logic worked from both ends: the Soviet regime is by definition peaceful (in domestic and foreign policy) and peace brings about economic development which will lead to communism. Conversely, the logic dictated that achieving communism would only come through economic development that comes only with peace, of which the Soviet regime was a guarantor.

The last part of the ritual required reflecting back everything that was spoken to them. This came in the form of resolutions passed at the end of the meetings in which it would be announced that "the people of Azerbaijan together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union warmly welcome the achievement of the armistice in Korea ..." , "All people of goodwill are encouraged ...", "The people of Azerbaijan, like all Soviet people warmly welcomes and endorses this call ...", "The people of Azerbaijan, like all Soviet people, express their outrage at the provocative actions of the U.S. government ...", "Workers of Azerbaijan fully share the Soviet Government's proposals aimed at peaceful ...", and "The Azerbaijan Republican Peace Committee is confident that all citizens of the Republic unanimously respond to the call ...".<sup>507</sup>

From the Stockholm Appeal in 1950 to the Peace Pact in 1951 to the campaign for negotiations that the Kremlin initiated, centralised, and established the parameters of discourse on which the Peace Movement would come to rely on. As Timothy Johnston has argued, the domestic success of the Peace Movement domestically argues, the Peace Campaigns were "a vital platform from which a new, early Cold War vision of the world was communicated to the population of the USSR".<sup>508</sup> However, given the highly organised nature of the campaigns where genuine civic grassroots activity was nearly impossible, Soviet citizens, intentionally or unintentionally, played their part in a ritual. As has been demonstrated, it is not the case that participants in the peace campaigns "creatively re-appropriated them as a platform for the articulation of their personal grief from the past war and their pacifist sentiments", as Johnston argues.<sup>509</sup> Even though the success of the 'Struggle for Peace' derived from the fact that different individuals were able to project different meanings onto the word 'peace', from whichever way they looked at it invariably it demanded the same thing: the Soviet people's devotion to the state.

In the first decade of the Cold War it was crucial for the Soviet regime to create a sense of political inclusivity for the Soviet people. The Peace Campaign served as platform that combined civic activism and political rhetoric. As Durham Hollander has argued, "the

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<sup>507</sup> GARF, F.9539, op.1. d.199, ll. 42-46.

<sup>508</sup> Johnston, "Peace or Pacifism?," 260.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid.

insistence on activism is important... [since] people may be successfully socialized to the political order, it is necessary to continually reinforce earlier learning in order to keep them from slipping into apathy".<sup>510</sup> The speakers and the audience in the meetings "jointly participate[d] in a kind of political ritual which include[d] certain patterns of speech and the acknowledgement of unifying symbols...with [the] audience ha[ving] a good idea of how it is supposed to respond to it".<sup>511</sup> The ritualisation of the peace campaign, with its demand for strict conformity of expressions and clichés, not only served to "demonstrate to the world how 'democratic' the system is, but it keeps people primed for rapid mobilization in the event of crisis".<sup>512</sup> This was crucial, since neither Stalin nor the Soviet people knew if war could be completely avoided during the first ten years of the Cold War. It was during this time that "[Peace] Activism becomes a sort of substitute for revolutionary fervour in a non-revolutionary epoch".<sup>513</sup>

## **The Peace Propaganda Industry**

Just as the struggle for peace on the international arena was aimed at achieving the regime's foreign policy objectives, Soviet art, in its service to the cause of peace, was created exclusively for domestic consumption. It was a huge industry of novels, poems, plays, films, paintings, posters and cartoons, as well as songs and even works of high classical music. Images associated with the struggle for peace watched over Soviet people from the walls of Moscow metro stations, the bas-reliefs of houses, objects of everyday life and even postage stamps.

In fact, the theme of the struggle for peace occupied a key place in Soviet post-war art. To grasp its status, one simply needs look at just how generously the Stalin Prize was given out for works in various art forms on the theme of the struggle for peace:

in music - in the genre of large instrumental and vocal works (Sergei Prokofiev's oratorio "On Guard for Peace", 1950), in the genre of small musical song forms on peace (A. Novikov's 1947 "Hymn of Democratic Youth of the world"; Seraphim Tulikov's 1950 song "We are for peace"; M. Starokodonsky's 1951 children's song "Under the Banner of Peace");

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<sup>510</sup> Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet Political Indoctrination Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 23.

<sup>511</sup> Ibid.

<sup>512</sup> Ibid.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid.

in painting and drawing (Fyodor Reshetnikov's 1950 painting "For Peace"; Boris Efimov's 1949 political cartoons; Boris Prorokov's 1949 series of drawings "Here it is, the United States", the 1951 illustrations "Truman Tanks to the bottom!" and "American gendarmes in Japan "; Kukryniksy's 1950 series of "warmongers" drawings), in sculpture (Vera Mukhina's 1950 sculptural group "We Demand peace ");

in film - for feature films (Mikhail Romm's 1947 "The Russian Question" and 1950 "Secret Mission", Grigory Alexandrov's 1949 "Meeting on the Elbe"; Michael Kalatozov's 1950 "Conspiracy of the Doomed") and documentaries ("On Guard peace ", 1948; "Youth of the World ", 1949);

in literature - for novels ("The Tempest" by Ilya Ehrenburg, 1947; "The Struggle for Peace" Fedor Panferov, 1947; "Guarantee of Peace" Vadim Sobko, 1950; "The Yugoslav Tragedy" Orest Maltsev, 1951; "The Storm over Rome" Dmitry Eremin, 1951), in the field of poetry (Konstantin Simonov for the collection of poems "Friends and Enemies", 1948; Mikhail Bazhanov for a cycle of poems, "The British experience", 1948; Andrew Malyshko for a collection of poems "In the Blue Sea," 1950; Alexei Surkov for the collection "World - the World ", 1950; Nikolai Tikhonov for the collection of poems "Two Streams" and "At the Second World Congress of the World", 1951);

in the field of drama (Konstantin Simonov for the play "The Russian Question" in 1946 and "Someone Else's Shadow", 1949; Nicholai Wirta for the play "Conspiracy of the doomed", 1948; V. Lyubimova for the play "Snow", 1948; Boris Lavrenev for the play "Voice of America", 1949).<sup>514</sup>

The reasons for such growth and direct support for internal propaganda production in all genres and types of art and literature were of a political and representational nature. The point is that the Soviet movement's struggle for peace was promoted as "coming from below", and from the Soviet Peace Committee among the so-called "civic organizations". The fact that "public" and governmental organisations were in total harmony was explained in official Soviet discourse as to the very nature of Soviet public organisations. It was declared that "the international work of Soviet public organisations is an important part of the entire foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state." Moreover, one of the features of the political system of the socialist countries lay in the fact that "due to the nature of their social and political system,

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<sup>514</sup> See: V.F. Svin'in and K. A. Oseev, Eds. *Stalinskie premii: dve storony odnoi medali: Sb. dokumentov i khudozhestvenno-publitsisticheskikh materialov* (Novosibirsk: Izd-vo "Svin'in i synov'ia", 2007), 713-762.

social forces are active here (in contrast to the capitalist countries) in organic unity with the governments, all public institutions, including foreign, that contribute to the effectiveness of foreign policy in general."<sup>515</sup> The same can be said about Soviet art, which is also "in an organic unity with the government and all state agencies."

But, of course, the role of the Soviet peace movement was not only to constantly and entirely conform to the official point of view, but also to send signals to the West that the Soviet regime did not want to communicate through official channels. In the context of a limited set of channels of communication with the West a specific role was assigned for culture in active involvement in the struggle for peace. Through the use of cultural problems of mobilisation, promotion, explaining the changing international agenda of the USSR and the expression of those positions that could not be expressed formally were solved simultaneously. Stalin had felt the need for such a platform since the very beginning of the Cold War. His choice was the *Literary Gazette*, where he put Konstantin Simonov - poet, playwright and journalist, an active participant in the "struggle for peace" – in charge. On July 31<sup>st</sup>, 1947 Orghburo adopted a resolution 'On the 'Literary Gazette'. Simonov recalled how this new project was discussed with Stalin. "All our newspapers - said Stalin - one way or another are official newspapers, but the *Literary Gazette* - as the newspaper of the Writers' Union - may raise issues informally, including those that we cannot or do not want to officially put forward".<sup>516</sup> The 'Literary Gazette', as an unofficial paper, "may on some issues be to the left of us and sharply diverge on the question with the officially expressed view ...".<sup>517</sup> The circulation of the newspaper was raised tenfold. This, of course, did not mean that *Literary Gazette* could express some parallel unofficial position, but it could do it in a less restrained form.

The form itself is especially important, because the 'art' being considered here was part of an overall propaganda effort and was outside of diplomatic formalities. That was how Stalin understood the problem: in his view, the *Literary Gazette* was supposed to become something like the voice of the Union of Writers – an "NGO", a sign of "civil society". To Stalin, to be outside the "official expressed point of view" presented an advantage to the regime, to the extent that he needed such an informal point of view: "It is possible that we will sometimes be criticized in the 'Literary Gazette' for this, but it should not be afraid, and despite criticism, it must continue to go about its own business", as "the Foreign Ministry about its own, so the

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<sup>515</sup> O.M. Gorbatov, *Deiatel'nost' sovetskikh obshchestvennykh organizatsii na mezhdunarodnoi arene* (Moskva: Znaniia, 1975), 6-7.

<sup>516</sup> K.M. Simonov, *Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia: Razmyshleniia o I. V. Staline* (Moskva: Izd-vo Agentstva pechaty Novosti, 1988), 134-135.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid.

'Literary Gazette' - its own", Stalin concluded.<sup>518</sup> In this political puppet theatre the *Literary Gazette* was assigned to the same broad category as other "social organizations" (i.e., the Soviet Peace Committee). Since the scope of diplomacy was shrouded in state secrecy, and in addition, the population could not read between the lines of diplomatic conventions, art and print were almost the only sources from which information could be obtained. Since the message was always the same, with just a change in the mobilisation of specific initiatives, arts and printing reproduced the same "peace discourse", but only in a different tone - for different audiences.

Already by September 20<sup>th</sup> - less than two months after Orgburo's resolution - the *Literary Gazette* was featuring Boris Gorbатов's feuilleton "Harry Truman", in which the US president was compared with the "little corporal from Munich." About the same time, other newspapers published official reports on the speech to the UN deputy by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, "For peace and friendship among nations and against the instigators of a new war," where the United States and Britain were accused of disrupting the work to ban nuclear weapons. In all subsequent issues of the *Literary Gazette* anti-Western articles were printed in a special 'warmongers' column which "exposes the true colours" of Eisenhower, Bevin and Marshall. Ehrenburg condemned western culture and Leonov asserted that the new Soviet patriotism should extend to the whole of Eastern Europe.<sup>519</sup>

Soviet poets depicted a world split "into two parts: / In to a world of good and all possible evils / light and darkness/ Happiness and unhappiness, / in a fairness and arbitrariness" (Veronica Tushnova, "To the Daughters").<sup>520</sup> It was poetry that fed off of images of war, replacing the Germans for Americans and portraying them as fascists. This image was as broad as possible and covered essentially all of Soviet Union's enemies, who were marked as 'warmongers'. That is how Viktor Bershadsky wrote about them in his poem "The meeting in Novorossiysk": "It was clear with doubt / That Hitler was in Padisha Persia / And in Greece, among the chitons. // He was met in Indonesia, - / He walked with English machine-gun. / Into Paris, at the plenary session / He pretended to be a diplomat. / Resettling to George, / He lynched the average black man, / Then started an orgy in a cafe / Just as in old Munich, at home ... ". Western politics in all their manifestations were branded as Nazism: "Let him now be called Marshall. / Kennan or Harriman - / No matter what costumes he now wears, / We are difficult to deceive. / The Fascist will not hide under the mask ...".<sup>521</sup>

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<sup>518</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>519</sup> See: A.V. Fateev, *Obraz vruga v sovetskoi propagande. 1945-1954* (Moskva: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999), 84-86.

<sup>520</sup> *Poety mira v bor'be za mir. Sbornik stikhov* (Moskva: GIKhL, 1951), 266.

<sup>521</sup> *Oktiabr'* 8 (1949), 217.

Just as the Nazis had been depicted in Soviet poetry during the war, the new "warmongers" were also suspected of criminal intentions against the Soviet Union: "In Athens, Vietnam, Korea, China / Hills and valleys flooded with blood, / They now dream after our homeland/ To smash, turn into a wasteland and ruins; / Burn down and savagely rob cities / With bombs killing babies in cradles"- wrote Anastas Ventslova in a poem "Close ranks!".<sup>522</sup> And just as the image of children suffering and crying out for revenge is a favourite of war propaganda, in poetry it is the struggle for peace. The image of a fragile child, protected by the delegates of the World Peace Congress was depicted by the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee and poet Nikolai Tikhonov: "And in the charms of radiance and delicateness / It's not just young life that triumphs / All future in the image of the child / Stands and asks for him to be defended" ('In the name of the best joys in the world').<sup>523</sup>

Soviet poetry became a real outlet for official propaganda. What could not be voiced at the official level could be voiced here. The war for peace had ceased to be a metaphor here. Thus, it is here that the 'army of peace' was mobilised for a real war for peace: "'Peace!'- the rafter beams whisper at the construction site / "Peace!" – rustle the trees in the garden, / "Peace!" - I hear all adverbs. / For such a desire for humanity, / If need be, I'll go to war" (Ivan Baukov, 'I need peace for this'<sup>524</sup>). The demonisation of the enemies of peace reached a degree of hysteria, such as in Sergei Smirnov's poem, 'On behalf of the fathers and mothers': they are "darting around ... / casting a spell of bacillus plague ... / threaten us with bullets, gas, poison," "for the bomb they to harness the atom, / they want to get their hands on the whole world, / Under the flag, like zebra - striped / Bring death all continents".<sup>525</sup>

They were opposed by "all honest people" (it was particularly to this audience which Soviet peace activists appealed to) and those who did not understand where the world was going under the "ruling classes" of America. Addressing them, Alexei Surkov exclaimed: "Before the President and officers / throw you in the battle, like food for the raven / Rise, America's real owners, / Give them a soldierly, angry: NO" (Alexei Surkov, 'To the American soldier').<sup>526</sup>

Visual messages also carried the same content and were divided into two types - the hero-pathétique and caricature satire. The former depicted "progressive people" in different countries, which the Soviet people were meant to identify themselves with. This is clearly seen

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<sup>522</sup> *Poety mira v bor'be za mir*, 69.

<sup>523</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.

<sup>524</sup> *V zashchitu mira: Stikhi sovetskikh poetov* (Moskva: Sovetskii pisatel', 1949), 20.

<sup>525</sup> *Poety mira v bor'be za mir*, 50.

<sup>526</sup> *Ibid.*, 233.

in Boris Prorokov's "Truman's Tanks to the Bottom!" where the "will of the people" materialises in a powerful rush capable of displacing a tank. Vera Mukhina's sculpture "We Demand Peace", on the other hand, a group of people following a mother with a child are depicted as disabled and wounded: a disabled war veteran who lost an arm and a Korean mother with a dead child in her arms. Yet their postures suggest determination, anger and strength, as if to confirm that they want peace, but without asking for it.

This very style was visible in many Soviet posters, where the theme of the struggle for peace is almost always expressed with the mother and child motif. The child's welfare is provided by the Soviet Army's power and its mother's care, who are engaged in defending peace. In fact, what is visualised here was what was shown on the endless rallies in defence of peace, where "ordinary Soviet women" spoke out with condemnation against "warmongers".

Finally, the last type of propaganda visual was dedicated to the warmongers, who were portrayed as pathetic pygmies, while "people of goodwill", who the Soviet people were meant to identify with, were, on the other hand, giants. This image served posters and countless cartoons. These were firstly used as so-called "visual aids" during demonstrations and rallies.

This very dramatisation of peace propaganda made it way into novels, plays and films. Thus, Ilya Ehrenburg's novel "The Storm" (1947) and "The Ninth Wave" (1951-1952) described a pre-war Europe which pandered to Hitler in unleashing the war and the post-war world of the "The Ninth Wave" in which popular outrage prevents the imperialists from unleashing a new war. The same theme is developed in the Nicholas Shpanov's novels 'Conspirators' (1949) and 'Mongers' (1951), where the titles themselves directly hint at the content and message of these novels. These were endless conspiracy theories, disguised in the form of novels, where history and modernity served an imperialist conspiracy against the Soviet Union. These propaganda tasks, which were widely deployed in the post-war years, were conformed to in plays such as Konstantin Simonov's 'The Russian Question' (1946), Vadim Kozhevnikov and Joseph Prut's 'The Fate of Reginald Davis' (1947), Nicole Virty's 'Conspiracy of the Doomed' (1948), Nicholas Pogodin's 'Missouri Waltz' (1949), Boris Lavrenev's 'Voice of America' (1949), Brothers Tur's 'Behind the Walls of the Embassy' (1949), Georgi Mdivani's 'People of Good Will' (1950), Leo Scheinin's 'In the Middle of the Century' (1950), and others. The plays 'Great Strength' (Boris Romashov, 1946-1947), 'The Court of Honor' (the "Law of honor", Alexander Stein, 1948) and 'Someone Else's Shadow' (Konstantin Simonov, 1949) described the intrigues of US intelligence, which aimed at getting its hands on the research and development of Soviet scientists to create weapons of mass

destruction. They fit into the political campaign against cosmopolitanism, which proceeded throughout the post-war years.

In these novels and plays, not only was the Soviet point of view on the present expanded on, but it was also fictionalised and dramatised. Presented in an accessible way, they were easily assimilated by the mass of readers and viewers. Yet above all, movies could convey a message to the widest possible audience. It was not by chance that the most relevant plays, from the regime's point of view, were filmed and would become popular films. The first of these films was Mikhail Romm's "Russian question", based on the play by Konstantin Simonov (1947), which tackled the main propaganda task: to prove to Soviet audiences that the United States was seeking war with the Soviet Union, led by financial and industrial circles, and was trying to prove that it is not them (the Americans), but the Russians who wanted war, and therefore, representing a real threat to peace. To do this, a major publisher hired journalist Harry Smith on a mission - to go to the Soviet Union and to write a book about the Russian attitude to war. The fact that he is given this task is no accident. Smith was in Russia in 1942 and watched the heroism of the Soviet people in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the same year published a book in which he wrote about the Soviet Union in glowing terms. As readers trusted Harry Smith, and his previous book was such a great success, readers would trust him (in accordance to the plans of the current warmongers) if he would now tell them that the Russians want war. But Harry Smith is an honest and brave man. He writes the truth, and on the question "Do the Russians want war?" he answers with an unequivocal "No!" It costs his marriage, home, and career, but he does not give up and in the final monologue, appealing to "the ordinary people of America," states that 'America's enemies' are not in Russia, but in the Pentagon and on Wall Street.

Just as the rest of 'artistic propaganda' that addressed Soviet audiences, films, such as 'The Russian Question', Grigory Alexandrov's 1948 'Meeting on the Elbe', Mikhail Romm's 1950 'Secret Mission', Abraham Room's 1953 'The Silver Dust', and Alexander Dovzhenko's 1951 'Goodbye, America!' not only depicted a world divided into two, but also strengthened the deep distrust of the new "strategic enemy", suspecting it of trying to start a war. The film 'Goodbye, America!' tells the story about an American defector who works at the US Embassy in Moscow and cannot bear the prevailing atmosphere of espionage there. The US ambassador tells his staff: "Peace – this is a small window of time allotted to us in connection with the preparation of a new war, which must assert all over the world the American way of life". The film "The Silver Dust" describes how American scientist, Steele, invents a powerful new weapon of mass destruction - the deadly radioactive silver-grey dust - and the struggle that



ensues for Steele's invention between two military-industrial giant trusts involving gangsters. As noted by Peter Kenez, "The postwar Soviet regime did not hold purge trials. As those murderous spectacles disappeared from public life, so did the fixation on spies, saboteurs and internal enemies of various sort [...] The 'enemy', so very important both for good drama and also for the cohesion of Soviet order, was now almost always foreign. In those post-war films that were made as a contribution to various Soviet propaganda campaigns, the Soviet hero always defeated a foreign enemy."<sup>527</sup>

The main feature of the post-war enemy was that he was a "warmonger". Even in those films that were not devoted to the present, but were about history, the main goal was to depict yesterday's allies as eternal enemies of Russia. So, the film "Secret Mission" showed Soviet audiences that even during the war Americans and the British had a treacherous policy of separate negotiations with the Nazis to direct them against the Soviet Union, and historical films such as Vsevolod Pudovkin's 1946 'Admiral Nakhimov' and Mikhail Romm's 1953 'Admiral Ushakov' spoke of how in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century the British provoked war against Russia. This historicisation of the struggle for peace was an important part of the post-war 'peace propaganda'.

Another important aspect of this propaganda was the glorification of the fighters for peace. In the Soviet Union an entire mythology of the heroic peace fighters was created. Among them were mostly, of course, "ordinary people" - dockers, who refused to unload American weapons in Europe, and women, laying down on railway tracks to stop trains carrying weapons. For example, Mirdza Kempe's poem, 'The Ballad of Raymond Dien' tells the story of a French communist who lies on train tracks to stop a train loaded with weapons headed for the war in Vietnam. Her example was followed by other women. This event was widely reported in the Soviet press: "The train flies by, howling and whistling, / Yet her will is unbending. / And the conscience of France - Raymond Dien / lies on the train's path. // Hundreds of beautiful women, like her. / Lie down with Raymond nearby. / The locomotive stands still ... the driver stunned / This obstruction unprecedented". But this is the whole of France: "In vain, raging, screaming officer / soldier pushing for punishment. / "Do not touch them! - soldiers shout at each other. - / All of France is now like this!"". Dien's feat was captured not only in poetry, but also in music - in Sergei Prokofiev's oratorio "On Guard for Peace", where it was discussed in a separate part of the "war on war".

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<sup>527</sup> Kenez Peter, *Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 235-236.

A special place in this heroic pantheon was occupied by public figures and leaders of the peace movement. Above all, of course, was its permanent leader, Frederic Joliot Curie. The peak of the campaign for the glorification of Joliot Curie had been reached in 1951. On the occasion of Joliot Curie being awarded the Stalin Peace Prize on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 1951, in the Soviet Union a book by B.G. Kuznetsov, "Frederic Joliot-Curie - a scientist and fighter for peace", was published and concluded with the following: "The image of Stalin and his scientific work, his leadership in the building of communism, his wisdom - a guiding beacon for Joliot-Curie, as well as for all progressive people of the world. In Stalin's works, the French scientist finds the most fruitful path towards scientific research and the social struggle. The Award named after the great luminary of science, the great standard-bearer of the world, crowns the work of Joliot-Curie, showing the historical significance of his life, creativity and struggle".<sup>528</sup>

After this, the canonisation of Joliot Curie began to increase. Among the many articles and books, there was a children's story by Julia Annenkov, 'Truth Travels without Visas' (first edition in 1954, Detgiz Publishing). The second, much more complete edition was published in the same publishing house in the series 'School Library' in 1960. The second edition was twice as large as the first. Joliot Curie's life was depicted rather imaginatively for children. This was how Joliot Curie's visa denial for the II World Congress in the UK was dramatised. As it was known, the II Peace Congress was intended to be held in 1950 in Sheffield, but the British government did not issue visas and at the "last minute" it had to be moved to Warsaw.

His visa was annulled on arrival in England: "No more than two dozen passengers received permission to enter. What to do? Would the Congress really go through? Hundreds of people are already on their way to England. Arguing with the police, is, of course, useless, as is as to send a telegram to Mr. Attlee. Joliot approached Laffite:

- The Congress needs to urgently be moved to another country. We will try to do this.

At the handrails stood two English sailors.

- Have you seen Tom? - One of them asked, pointing to the shore.

- No, I didn't see anything.

- But I did ... Now over Dover an iron curtain has descended. That person there that standing by the deckhouse - that is Joliot-Curie. During the war, he sent us a precious stock of heavy water for the production of nuclear energy. And now Mr. Attlee is not letting him enter England. What a shame!

- And the Congress will not be taking place?

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<sup>528</sup> B.G., Kuznetsova. *Frederik Zholio-Kiuri – uchenyi i borets za mir* (Moskva: Goskul'tprosvetizdat, 1952), 78.

- I do not know. How will they travel without a visa?

Joliot-Curie heard this conversation. He came up to the sailors and said

- Give the British sailors and dockers a message, and all those who want peace: The Congress will certainly take place. I assure you! The truth travels without visas!"<sup>529</sup>

At this time in Prague there was a group of delegates at the congress, including Yves Farge (chairman of the French Peace Committee), Ehrenburg and other members of the Committee. News of Joliot Curie not being allowed into England reached Prague immediately. But where he was detained?

"Yves Farge was on the phone. He appealed directly to the French telephone operators. Do they know of the peace movement? Well, of course! Had they heard about Joliot-Curie? Who in France has not heard of the person whom Maurice Thorez named as the glory of science!

And rushed through the telephone lines of the northern coast of France alarming calls: 'Where is Joliot-Curie?' 'Is Joliot-Curie in your city?' 'Hello, Le Havre?' 'Hello, Boulogne?' 'Hello, Dieppe ',' Hello, Dunkirk?" <sup>530</sup> After three hours, Joliot-Curie was found. There and then over the phone the committee meeting took place where "on the proposal of the Polish partisans of peace it was decided that the congress would be relocated to Warsaw."<sup>531</sup>

Later, Ehrenburg would talk about Joliot Curie in the book as "like all other members of Congress who were redirected to Brussels and from there to Prague. The Czechoslovak government organized a Brussels-Prague airlift across Europe and throughout three days airplanes transferred about a thousand delegates. And in the capital of Czechoslovakia locomotives were already standing under steam. Gaining speed, the trains rushed to Warsaw. At each station, a huge crowd of people welcomed the messengers." In Warsaw "three thousand Polish workers, architects and artists working around the clock, prepared for the meetings of the Congress a huge building for the publishing house 'House the Polish Word'." The Congress opened on November 18<sup>th</sup>.

This was all pure mythology. However, as is clear from the Koreneichuk's correspondence with the CC five months prior to these events, the Congress would not be taking place in England and began to be prepared in Warsaw. Joliot Curie's trip was pure

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<sup>529</sup> Iu. Annenkov, *Pravda puteshestvuet bez viz* (Moskva: Detgiz., 1960), 177-174.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid., 175.

provocation. It was because everything was done in advance that everything was managed so quickly.

Joliot Curie's biography was based on the conventions of hagiography. Like a true saint, he was born into a heroic family. His biography, published in the most popular USSR biographical series "Life of Remarkable People", beginning with a chapter 'Son of a Commune': the Communist Joliot-Curie was the son of a Paris Commune hero: "When from the Père Lachaise Cemetery crackling shots of the Versaillais could already be heard gunning down the members of the Paris Commune, the last scattered groups of Communards were still waging fierce battles in the streets of revolutionary Paris. Among them was Henri Joliot", father of the future President of the World Peace Council.<sup>532</sup>

Ehrenburg took part in the creation of the Soviet mythology of Joliot Curie. In his book on Joliot Curie, written after his death in 1958, Ehrenburg began with a description of Joliot Curie's funeral. He describes how he was buried with all-state honours and that when ministers departed and the guards had left, Joliot Curie's friends and comrades, peace supporters, students, workers, housewives – "the common people of France" gathered in a suburb of Paris near the cemetery: "The French nation knew that it had lost a protector, friend, a scientist famous throughout the world, and a friend, loved one, one of its own, who had been with the people through the triumphs as well as tribulations." According to Ehrenburg, gratitude to Joliot-Curie was immense: "American physicists honoured the memory of the great scientist. Negroes of South Africa singed with crosses instead of signatures under the words love and grief. In Hosei University in Japan students carried flowers to the portrait of Joliot-Curie, and in Bombay a mourning assembly was held. Streets were named after Joliot-Curie Street in Soviet towns and a fishing schooner in Norway".<sup>533</sup>

In Eugene Gulak's poem "Soldiers of Peace" Joliot Curie's life is described as a chain of heroic events: "... He sees the night. Defeated Paris. / Interrogation by the Gestapo, excessively long: / "... We know everything, talk truthfully. / That you are a secret agent of the Comintern ... "// The scientist keeps silent, slightly squinting his eyes, / Calmly crumples frayed gloves. / The fascist doesn't realize: before him is a soldier / supplying explosives to the underground fighters." At the end of the poem the legendary founder and first chairman of the World Peace Council is portrayed as the incarnation of the struggle for peace: "And now, ten years later, / When bankers threaten us with war again / As the joy of life, like freedom of light,

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<sup>532</sup> M. Shaskol'skaia, *Frederik Zholio-Kiuri*, (Moskva: izdatel'stvo Molodaia Gvardiia, 1959), 5.

<sup>533</sup> Ilya Erenburg, *Frederik Zholio-Kiuri* (Moskva: izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1958), 7.

/ In our midst came Curie, a soldier of peace. // His call: - 'Down with war, friends! / All over the world people echo this ... / And off the shore and into the leaden waves / tanks and guns are thrown into the sea."<sup>534</sup>

Daniel Khrabrovitsky's 1952 play 'Citizen of France' depicts the great French physicist Professor Frederic Dumont Teri, who worked in the field of nuclear energy. At the centre of the play was his journey from scientist to active fighter for peace. Frederic Joliot Curie served as the hero prototype for the play. The depiction of the hero's life in the play completely coincides with the facts of Joliot Curie's political biography (a member of the French Communist Party since 1942, member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party in 1956). The play covers the period from 1934 to 1951. In fact, it is a hagiography of Joliot Curie. The play was widely performed in theatres in Moscow, Leningrad and the provinces. The hero was depicted as a staunch communist and uttered angry monologues condemning American "warmongers."

Not only Curie, but his deputy - Eugenie Cotton, a prominent activist in the peace struggle - also becomes the object of Soviet poetry. In Konstantin Tyulipin's poem "Eugenie Cotton" her heroic behaviour is portrayed as model behaviour for peace fighters: "I can see it in the partisan ranks / Going to France to fight, / At the women's congress when / entering victorious from courtroom / leading millions behind her". In the end she becomes a generalised heroic image: "There are many such brave Cottons, / One can encounter them in any country / The wider the peace front. / The narrower the road to war ... // And all for whom a son or a brother is dear / So that no tears are to be shed later on / They stand in the same row, / Where the Stalin Prize winner is fighting / Our friend - Eugenie Cotton."<sup>535</sup>

The propaganda production considered here was important since because of it the "discourse of peace" received aural and visual expression. It was precisely around the discursive practices of the "rituals of peace" was formed and the world of Soviet "visual agitation," mass media, official ideological speech, of the poster and the slogan-banner, and of mass propaganda literature and visual art were developed. It is through this that "convergence" between high politics and the people was able to take place. So that as a result, the "simple Soviet man" began to speak the words of peace struggle poetry and look at the world through the prism of what he saw on the screen. So thanks to Soviet propaganda art the above-

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<sup>534</sup> *Stikhi o mire: Sbornik stikhov Kaluzhskogo oblastnogo literaturnogo ob"edineniia* (Kaluga: Izd-vo gazety *Znania*', 1952), 16.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid.

mentioned "organic unity of social forces with the government and all state agencies" was established.

## **Internalisation: Consuming Peace**

The internalisation of peace rhetoric by the Soviet population was the culmination of the entire 'Peace Campaign'. By the end of the first decade of the Cold War the numerous never-ending cycles of campaigns, the regional Peace Committee meetings and the barrage of peace-themed literature, art, music and film transformed the Peace Movement's rhetoric into a ritual and epic-narrative to such an extent that it seeped into mass consciousness. As people expressed their support for the Peace Movement (which by extension legitimised Soviet foreign policy) they did so within linguistic confines and conventions of official propaganda that blurred the lines between the public and the regime. Historians have debated as to the extent to which internalisation was truly genuine. Stephen Kotkin has argued that the Soviet people learned to 'speak Bolshevik' (whether Marxist-Leninist in the 1930s or the peace rhetoric of the post-war years) as an adaptive measure – an "obligatory language for self-identification and as such, the barometer of one's political allegiance to the cause".<sup>536</sup> Whether one believed the rhetoric was not necessary as long as individuals conformed to the rhetoric. By contrast, Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin have taken on the idea that people did not simply 'adopt' the language or adopt a mask to conform to public expectations but in fact engaged with the ideological propaganda to extract and personalise elements to create a new identity.<sup>537</sup>

The image of "millions of little people, the cogs in the great state machine"<sup>538</sup> which Stalin conjured at the reception for the victory parade on June 24<sup>th</sup>, 1945 had by 1951 come to reality, as many would self-identify themselves as such. Many of the letters *Pravda* received from ordinary people giving their blessing to the 1951 All-World Peace Congress had people address themselves as 'simple Soviet person', 'small person' and an 'ordinary citizen', whose

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<sup>536</sup> Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain* (London: University of California Press, 1997), 220.

<sup>537</sup> Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Igal Halfin, *Red Autobiographies: Initiating the Bolshevik* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

<sup>538</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Jersey: Yale Press, 2006), 149.

voice was one with the ‘the entire working masses of the world’ in the struggle for peace against the “greed of Wall street, the Marshall Plan of the Churchills, the insatiable appetite of fascist executioners”.<sup>539</sup> In these letters, K. Ivanov, a furniture factory worker, P. Sapezko, a pensioner, and an S. Shneivas, a retired factory worker and war invalid all highlighted their post-war struggles and a determination to carry on. Yet, as Jochen Hellbeck has noted, Soviet people did not link their struggles and determination to individualist purposes, but to an “urge to write themselves into their social political order”.<sup>540</sup> Just as it had done so in the 1920s and 1930s, the regime attempted to refashion Soviet identity during the post-war years along a narrative in which the Soviet Union was at the forefront in the struggle for peace, with “ordinary working people” all over the world joining in.

P.N. Uspensky’s letter exemplifies this seamless transition from pre-war revolutionary identity to post-war peace identity. As disabled war veteran who “twice had to defend [his] homeland, first, in the Civil War against the Whites, the hirelings of the Entente; the second, against the Nazi invaders”, Uspensky transformed from a Bolshevik fighter to a peace fighter, as part of the “progressive forces straining to repel the madmen from the camp of the American imperialists who want to ignite a third world war”.<sup>541</sup> For the regime to receive such letters it provided confirmation that the propaganda was being effectively internalised, as the letter provided a mirror image of the propaganda rhetoric reflecting back to the regime. Just as peace propaganda called on people to contribute to the various campaigns and restate their trust in the Party’s ability to guarantee peace, the people responded in kind: “As long as we have a glimmer of life and passionate heart beats, we will find the strength to help our people, its government and the Bolshevik Party in the great struggle for peace and brotherhood among peoples”.<sup>542</sup> The Peace Campaign succeeded in blurring in people’s minds the distinction between the nation and the Party. This is not to suggest that ideology was simply replaced by patriotism after the war, but with the nominally grassroots nature of the Peace Movement, Marxist-Leninist ideology fused with patriotism to create a new rhetoric of peace that was simultaneously defensive and confident.

Instead, the new peace rhetoric was so successfully internalised precisely because it was not dogmatic and personalised in accordance with the subjective experiences of a particular person. Joachen Helbeck, argues, that “much of the logic of the revolutionary master narratives

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<sup>539</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.132, d.117, l. 35.

<sup>540</sup> Jochen Helbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, l. 4-5.

<sup>541</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.132, d.117, l. 36.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid.

of transformation was provided and reproduced by Soviet citizens who kept rationalizing unfathomable state policies".<sup>543</sup> As many attempted to make sense of the Cold War and Stalin's harsh social and economic policies, they could graft their experience on this peace rhetoric. Consider the case of I.T. Bushkov, an "ordinary citizen...a former factory worker at the Dynamo factory" and now a war invalid. And yet with the Peace Movement and its "multimillion mass of simple people" Bushkov found a renewed sense of purpose in expressing a rather contradictory mix of anti-war sentiment, war trauma, patriotism and bravado on top of apocalyptic imagery: "We declare to the aggressors: 'do not touch us, we do not want war'. But if it does happen, and you should manage to deceive your nation and impose a war, then they will be met with a holy war in every city – a new Stalingrad. We love our motherland".<sup>544</sup> The internalisation of the peace rhetoric reconciled anti-war sentiment with bluster and war trauma with patriotism that blurred the distinction between private and official sanctioned public sentiment, which was, of course, the intended result.

This contradictory mix of the apocalyptic and the confident was found in many letters and poems that people sent. It had the particular function of redirecting people's everyday frustration away from criticising the Soviet regime (and in effect Stalin) and pouring all their anxieties about the future onto the West (in particular the US) while praising Stalin (and in effect the regime). For example, an Ivan Karpovich Skuparev from Moscow sent a telegram on his own behalf and on behalf of the III World Peace Congress beseeching "To not live as we wish, but as humanity demands of life, which God has created and which Stalin is advancing forward. There will be no end to the proletariat forces."<sup>545</sup> Zhanet Nikolaev Vitvizkoy, a 64-years-old retired category 2 invalid from Penza exemplified just how much the peace rhetoric could refocus people's frustration without any contradiction or tension: "Long live peace throughout planet Earth! Our great genius, dear I.V. Stalin, is conducting the globally difficult peaceful Bolshevik policy for the people of all nationalities - Stalin is with the people everywhere. And the people everywhere are industrious and peace-loving with Comrade Stalin."<sup>546</sup> "I'm a small, simple person. But this does not mean that I'm unable to pour my righteous anger on the warmongers."<sup>547</sup>

This 'righteous anger' was directed away from internal policies which were taking their toll on the Soviet economy and towards international tensions. In many instances, peace

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<sup>543</sup> Helbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, 13.

<sup>544</sup> RGASPI, F.17, op.132, d.117, l. 39.

<sup>545</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op. 1, d. 93, ll.5-7 – Greetings to III World Peace Congress, November-December 1951.

<sup>546</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>547</sup> Ibid.



rhetoric allowed people to graft their hardships onto the West and reimagine the Soviet Union as a ‘worker’s paradise’ as a coping mechanism. This applied to all strata of Soviet society. Along with greetings to the III World Peace Congress in 1951, Philip Fedorovich Ivanov, director of Red-partisan gosplemrassadnik (a state horse breeding cooperative) asked that his poem be read at the Congress. Ivanov, who most likely had never been abroad, seamlessly adopts propaganda rhetoric to paint a vivid picture where "Overseas Eisenhower, Ridgeway, Bradley, Dulles - these greyhounds of Wall Street are frantically scouring the whole of Europe and Asia to find a den of jackals for the preparation of a new imperialist war."<sup>548</sup> Such a sense of belief in the reality presented in propaganda was often taken to absurd levels. Writing to Fadeev, Alexander Matvienko of Kharkov referred to himself as a “self-taught invalid” and asked Fadeev to correct any grammatical and literary errors prior to reading his poem, ‘The sky of life, the sky of death’, “from the heart to all delegates the third All-Union Peace Conference”.<sup>549</sup> Matvienko, as if witnessing the political developments in Europe before his very eyes, warns that "Under America’s sky/Europe is dying /Eastern countries are heading for collapse/ Marshall’s aid for war and famine/The death of nations [brings with it] capital".<sup>550</sup>

In essence, by internalising official propaganda on events that he or she had no direct experience of, the average Soviet citizen became “ideological agents on a par with the leaders of party and state”.<sup>551</sup> This brand of ‘peace’ had less to do with conventional measures of reducing international tensions than with Stalin’s deep-rooted paranoid version of Marxist-Leninism. As people began adopting Stalin’s politically paranoid rhetoric they reflected back Stalin’s own trauma over the war and in effect legitimising his Cold War politics. As Lieutenant U.D. Soloviev of Irkutsk writes in his poem, ‘For Peace we stand’: “Creeping bastards, despicable Yankees / Once again started a war / Be vigilant and cautious / People of all nations / Vile traitors, warmongers / You do not let [them] pass / The intrigues of all sorts – traitors of peace / With a firm hand prevent / The plans of Rockefeller, Schumann, Plevin / Reveal its true spirit / Their plans are clear, plain to see / Their purpose - fascism on earth”.<sup>552</sup> In some cases, the rhetoric reflected back on the regime unintentionally Stalin’s frustrations with diplomatic failures with the West. Soviet citizen Anatoly Scherbinovsky channelled this frustration in his poem to the Moscow Regional Conference for Peace, ‘To the World – Peace’. While praising Stalin, who “dedicates his entire life for the benefit of the people and with the

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<sup>548</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>551</sup> Helbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, 13.

<sup>552</sup> GARF, F. 9539, op. 1, d. 93, l.115.

people works wonders” who performs miracles where “In the dense taiga factories grow, in the snow polar of regions cities bloom”, Stalin is unable to prevent Truman from continuing to “... send to Asia slew of / Carriers of death, having lost count of them.” Where “... the bombs fall on schools, hospitals, / and the blood in the towns and villages flows. While “Factories, museums, spas are burning ... / Millions of innocent people left homeless, / While a gang of gangsters, a criminal cohort, / Are raping, robbing, shooting at children ....”<sup>553</sup> Yet Scherbinovsky was confident that “From the Moscow Tribune the supporters of peace, / Millions of ordinary, good-will people, / Will manage to pry out the White House from the vampires / Cannibalistic, beastly claws!”<sup>554</sup>

If these statements sound absurd it is important to bear in mind that they functioned within the confines of the post-war Soviet identity of official patriotism. Just as in the 1930s when stressing one’s proletarian identity was paramount for social inclusion, stressing one’s support for the Peace Movement was greatly encouraged (if not forced upon) by the regime. It was not necessary to fully believe in state propaganda, but as Stephen Kotkin argues it was “necessary [to recognize]... how to think and behave” and “participate as if one believed”.<sup>555</sup> Since one of the core aims of the Peace Movement was that Soviet society approved Stalin’s Cold War policy through ritualised meetings where Soviet citizens gave their allegiance and total trust this process of internalisation did not necessarily have to be too deep-seated but just enough so that that regime felt confident that people were internalising official rhetoric. Yet this is not to entirely dismiss people as being entirely cynical, as official rhetoric was often the only way to make sense of the Cold War and international relations in general. Thus, Soloviev and Scherbinovsky may or may not have wholeheartedly believed in what they were expressing, since most likely neither experienced what they were describing, but the fact that they were both so willing to dispense with common sense points to a multitude of factors. The lack of reliable information on the developments in Europe, the pressure to conform to the official line and the generally desperate conditions of day-to-day life in post-war Soviet Union all played their part in forcing the average Soviet to either accept the official Soviet version of the Cold War or at least suspend disbelief. The Peace Movement “...was maintained not merely by the power of the security police but by the collective actions of millions of people who participated

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<sup>553</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>554</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>555</sup> Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain* (London: University of California Press, 1997) 220.

in it, for a variety of reasons, including the apparent authenticity of the cause—whatever its nagging deficiencies”.<sup>556</sup>

The end result of the constant peace campaign, the endless meetings, the barrage of peace-themed film, poetry, and other art forms was not what the regime had quite anticipated. The internalisation of peace rhetoric was successful in legitimising Soviet Cold War policy in Europe by the fact that people publically reflected the regime’s rhetoric back to its propaganda organs through letters, greetings and poetry to *Pravda* and the Soviet Peace Committee. Yet this internalisation was uneven and produced a strange mix of everyday rhetoric. Besides the legitimisation of its foreign policy, through the internalisation of peace rhetoric the regime had intended to transform people’s everyday speech on a fundamental level. Internalisation was intended to replace the ordinary Soviet citizen’s everyday coarse and crude language with officially ‘correct’ ideological language. Yet as the letters, greetings, and poems demonstrate, peace rhetoric did not replace everyday vernacular but fused with it to create an absurd amalgamation of politicised crude language. In essence, internalisation failed on a deeper level to teach the Soviet people to communicate in the official language of the regime. Peace rhetoric was absorbed and fused and as Galich’s poem demonstrated, it became background noise devoid of any meaning and spoken as a mere formality.

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<sup>556</sup> Ibid., 230.

## COCLUSION

This dissertation for the first time documents how the Soviet-led “Peace Movement” was conceived, orchestrated, funded and manipulated by the Soviet leadership through four major institutions: the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Peace Council, and the Soviet Peace Committee. As archival sources clearly and evidently demonstrate, the Peace Movement was created in order to support Soviet foreign policy within the Soviet Union and in Europe. This goes a long way towards explaining how the Soviets approached the organizational aspects of both the domestic and international peace movements.

The domestic Soviet ‘Peace Movement’, despite forming in the wake of the World Peace Congress in 1949, had a traditional Soviet from-above organizational structure. Yet the main difference between past Soviet propaganda campaigns and the post-war ‘Peace Movement’ was that the Soviet state was much more subtle in its involvement. No doubt that it was the Kremlin which determined the official rhetoric of war trauma and how this rhetoric would be used to legitimise Soviet foreign policy in the eyes of the Soviet public. However, through endless meetings, signature campaigns, and public speeches, it was the Soviet people themselves who propagandized official ‘peace’ rhetoric. The method for legitimising Soviet Cold War policy was to turn the Soviet Peace Movement into an endless rituals of campaign and meetings in which everyone publically played a role and swore to commit to the state’s economic quotas, trust in Stalin and the state as the guarantors of peace, and the demonization of the West. This was further reinforced by officially sanctioned ‘art propaganda’, ranging from literature to music to cinema. The cumulative effect of this was that people internalized official ‘peace’ rhetoric, but only on the surface as official propaganda failed to fully replace everyday Soviet speech. As Chapter Three has demonstrated, this was a singular approach to propaganda, which did not require any neutrality. It was unabashedly pro-Soviet and anti-Western but with proviso that it allowed the Soviet masses to use official rhetoric to express the traumas of war.

In contrast, the Soviet approach to the international peace movement was one of contradictions. On the one hand, they understood that in order to appeal to the masses in the West and expand the base of the peace movement any links to the Communist Party and the Soviet Union had to be concealed. On the other hand, this itself was the problem: it was merely concealment, and not genuine independence. Instead, the peace movement in Europe was in the shadow of the Cominform from its inception in 1949, its member were either bribed or

pressured into towing the Soviet line whenever the Soviet had to have the World Peace Council's backing. The Soviets also exerted control through financing many of World Peace Council propaganda endeavours, be it the signature campaign for the Stockholm Agreement or the World Peace Council's own journal. Yet presiding over the international movement was also problematic for the Soviets. They could only take a general approach to a propaganda campaign, one that was incapable of adapting to the specific mass tastes and sensibilities of individual countries. They could not understand that the rank and file in the West, who had to sell the positive image of Soviet foreign policy to a suspicious public, was demoralised from having to continue unpopular campaigns.

For Western peace movement members, who were convinced that a more independent World Peace Council would help to attract more members to the 'Movement', the period of 1951-1956 was viewed as a disdain during which the World Peace Council increasingly became a mouthpiece for Soviet foreign policy. From the anti-UN fiasco of the Biological Warfare Campaign in 1951 to the U-turn of the Appeal for Negotiations on ending the Korean War in the immediate wake of Stalin's death in March 1953 to the anti-EDC, nationalist rhetoric in 1954 -1956 and to the fracture resulting from Soviet Union invading Hungary in October 1956, the 'Peace Movement' was stuck in a limbo of not being able to gain independence from the Soviet Union and being subject to Kremlin's ever-evolving foreign policy, which made it impossible for the World Peace Council to take a consistent and independent line necessary for attracting genuine peace supporters in the West.

However, it would be misleading to label the Soviets as hesitant tyrants who impeded the growth of their own movement just because they wanted control over it. As Chapter Two has demonstrated, there was certain logic behind Soviet control of the 'Peace Movement' that fit into the overall Soviet Cold War strategy. The Soviet Peace Campaign was a tool for controlling Western Communists, lest they took any initiative to disrupt the status quo by tying them down to within the Soviet-dominated confines of the Peace Movement. This was why the Soviets were slow to let the movement reform along the lines that Western Communists had been struggling for throughout the first decade of the Cold War. This was a divergence of goals and one to the detriment of the Western Communists: they had wanted to mobilize genuine mass movements and gain power, when in fact they found themselves marionettes for Soviet diplomatic aims for maintaining stability in Europe, with the Soviet acknowledging the Italy, France & Greece as part of the Western bloc. This was very much the source of the Peace Movements institutional dysfunction, which was inherent in Soviet overall strategy for Europe and never understood by Western Communists.

The Soviet Peace Campaign was entirely established and controlled by the Soviets with the aim of maintaining the post-war East/West bloc status quo, which they genuinely understood as the best security compromise that could be obtained after the war with its strategic and ideological enemy (the capitalist West). That is why the Peace Movement and all the Peace Campaign never addressed reuniting Europe. There was a tacit acceptance of a divided Europe. The various campaigns themselves focused on specific points of crisis at the time – de-escalation of tensions through disarmaments, banning nuclear weapons, ‘negotiations’ between the Five Powers, etc. – but never on the source of the Cold War itself: the division of Europe into two military, political and ideological camps and Soviet dominance of Eastern & Central Europe.

The Soviet Peace campaign was also a propaganda tool to negatively impact Western mass opinion of America’s involvement in Europe – from military (a European army to NATO, to Western Germany’s rearmament) to economic matters (Coal & Steel Organization). The Soviet Union acknowledged the existence of a Western bloc, but envisaged it as a European-led, rather than American-dominated. American domination of Western Europe meant a more robust and militarily-capable Europe and a potential threat to the Eastern bloc as Soviet buffer against the West. Hence, the Peace Movement propaganda rhetoric focused almost exclusively on ‘Wall Street war mongers’ as the natural successors of the Nazis and the exploiters of post-war Europe. Any idea which could supplant an American-led Europe was adapted by the Soviet-led Peace Movement. This even included French nationalism and supposed German revanchism to play on European fear and trauma of war allowed to counter America’s dominance and Soviet marginalization in the UN by creating a ‘grassroots, people’s’ organization, as opposed to a governmental organization – i.e. the World Peace Council was the Soviet’s own (“people’s”) “U.N.” This was born out of the position which the Soviet Union found itself after the war – the prestige of being one of two remaining World Powers, in contrast to its pre-war status as a pariah state excluded from the League of Nations for waging an unprovoked war against Finland. Yet, even this new-found prestige could not help to legitimize Soviet foreign diplomacy in the U.N., in particular after the American-backed condemnation of Sino-Soviet involvement in Korea. This further compelled the Soviets to create an international body which would encompass emerging decolonized nations, such as India, China, and those in the Middle East, that were underrepresented in the U.N.

From Stalin’s death in 1953 to the near simultaneous occurrence of the Hungarian Invasion and the Suez Crisis in 1956 spelled a gradual end to Soviet focus on its European Peace Campaign. The failure to reform such critical aspects of the Movement as financial

dealings and the Peace Council's magazine only created a divide between the Soviets and its Western counterparts as the Western Communists demoralization from failure to create genuine domestic mass movements for social action fell on deaf years. By this time the Soviets were as equally interested in attracting the support of the then-emerging decolonized nations, whose rhetoric of national liberation the Soviets hoped to harness as tool for anti-American policy. National liberation calls to violence against colonialism was seen by Western counterparts, both Communist and non-Communist, as directly undermining their efforts to present the Movement as a genuine peace movement, and not as an appendage of Soviet foreign policy. The Helsinki Bureau session 11-13 December 1955 was the breaking point for those in the West who had been attempting to decentralize the Peace Movement away from Joliot-Curies grip, who himself was a marionette of the Soviet Union. By the time the Hungarian uprising was crushed in November 1956 the Soviet Union was convinced that the West had accepted the status quo in Europe, as demonstrated by their non-interference. Those in the West understood that they could no longer attempt to sell the Soviet Peace Campaign as a genuine Peace Movement to the masses. By the late 1950s the Peace Campaign was marginalized, as genuine grass-roots, non-Soviet backed organizations began to emerge, such as the CND.

As Chapter One has demonstrated the origins of the Peace Campaign within the Soviet Union itself were directly related to the military and economic consequences which the Soviet Union faced as a result of consolidating Central and Eastern Europe as a security buffer zone. Its aims were, thus, distinct from those of the Campaign the Soviets waged in Europe. This highlights two points. Firstly, Soviet military security was paramount for Stalin, even if it threatened to irreparably damage the Alliance and consequently add more to the hardships for the Soviet people, even as they dealt with the traumas of the War and rebuilding the country. Secondly, as the Soviet Union saw a rollback of hoped-for US economic aid and an emphasis on hard industries for military defence in order to prop up the Eastern bloc, the task of internal propaganda was to reverse any sense of entitlement which the Soviet people (in particular those who had witnessed Europe's higher living standards, such as the Red Army veterans) had from the government to raise living standards after a hard-won victory and divert its attention to national security and international stability. Thus, the Soviet Peace Campaign was part of the broader effort by the regime to mobilize the Soviet people for rebuilding the country and to accept the idea that it was security, defence and the preservation of peace and not the dire living standards that were most important.

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