The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Political Economy of Islamic Business Associations: Social Movement Tactics, Social Networks, and Regional Development in Turkey

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Abstract

Turkey has undergone large-scale transformations over the past 30 years, changing it from a Kemalist Republic to a country ruled by a moderately Islamic party – the Justice and Development Party (AKP). I study how Islamic business associations (BAs) have gained political influence over dominant secular BAs in Turkey – a key process of these transformations.

Existing literature treats voluntary BAs either as purely economic institutions, or focuses on political elites’ strategic policy and power interests in explaining BAs’ political influence. There is inadequate guidance on when BAs turn into political actors, and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state power struggles. Especially the role of ideology and religion has been neglected, which is relevant for several transition countries’ business politics. This inadequacy can be addressed by developing a social movement framework. Following a grounded theory approach, I conducted a comparative analysis of secular and Islamic BAs’ networks structures (1993–2012), collective action frames, organisational structures and patterns of resource-exchange across changing institutional contexts. Findings are based on 51 semi-structured interviews in Gaziantep’s textile cluster in Turkey and additional archival material.

I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence because they applied typical social movement tactics that are adapted to the cultural and political environment. Conditions of politico-religious contention combined with gradual economic liberalisation have encouraged marginalised businesspeople to apply Islam in a non-contentious and market-based way. By integrating with civil society at the grassroots level, and gaining the support of political elites, Islamic BAs have complemented economic activities with resonant framing. These tactics grounded in Islam have increased Islamic BAs political influence by creating a new pious and legitimate business elite. These findings contribute to the literature by extending the types of institutional incentives, tactics and actors that businesspeople rely on to engage in contentious politics to include ideological factors.
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<td>Business Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Business Associations

- **Askon** - Anadolu Aslanları İşadamları Derneği (Anatolian Tigers Businessmen’s Association)
- **Fiesp** - Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo); Brazil
- **Gagiad** - Gaziantep Genç İşadamları Derneği (Gaziantep Young Businessmen’s Association); member of confederation Tügik
- **Gapgiad** - Gaziantep Paylaşımcı Genç İşadamları Derneği (Gaziantep Sharing Young Businessmen’s Association); member of confederation Tuskon
- **Günsiaf** - Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Federasyonu (Federation of Southeastern Businessmen and Industrialists); member of confederation Tuskon
- **Hürsiad** - Hür Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association); member of confederation Tuskon
- **Müsüad** - Mustakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association)
- **Pnbe** - Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais (National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases); Brazil
- **Tuskon** - Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (Turkey Industrialists’ Confederation)
- **Tügik** - Türkiye Genç İşadamları Konfederasyonu (The Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey)
- **Türkonfed** - Türk Girişim ve İş Dünyası Konfederasyonu (Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation)
- **TÜSİAD** - Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association)

Public and Private Organisations

- **Deik** - Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (Foreign Economic Relations Board)
- **Gaimder** - Gaziantep Imam Hatip Lisesi Mezunları Derneği (Gaziantep Imam Hatip School Alumni Association)
- **Sunder** - Sunguroğlu Liseleleri Mezunları Derneği (Sunguroğlu Secondary School Alumni Association)
- **Tec** - Tennis ve Atçılık Kulübü Gaziantep (Tennis and Equestrian Club Gaziantep)
- **Kosgeb** - T.C. Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı (Republic of Turkey Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organisation)
Sodes | Sosyal Destek Programı (Social Support Program)
---|---
TBMM | Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
Toki | Toplu Konut İdaresi (Housing Development Administration)

**Chambers of Industry and Trade**

GSO | Gaziantep Sanayi Odası (Gaziantep Chamber of Industry)
GTO | Gaziantep Ticaret Odası (Gaziantep Chamber of Trade)
ISO | İstanbul Sanayi Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Industry)
ITO | İstanbul Ticaret Odası (Gaziantep Chamber of Trade)
TIM | Türkiye Ihracaçılılar Meclisi (Turkish Exporters’ Assembly)
TMOBB | Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odalar Birliği (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects)
TOBB | Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)

**Political parties**

**Centre-Right**

DP | Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party); 1946–1960
JP | Adalet Parti (Justice Party); 1960–1980; successor of DP
DYP/DP | Doğru Yol Parti (True Path Party); 1983--; successor of JP; changed name to Democratic Party in 2007
ANAP | Anavatan Parti (Motherland Party); 1983–
AKP | Adalet ve Kalkınma Parti (Justice and Development Party); 2001–

**Milli Görüş Parties (National Outlook Movement Parties)**

MNP | Milli Nizam Parti (National Order Party); 1970–1971
MSP | Milli Selamet Parti (National Salvation Party); 1972–1981
RP | Refah Parti (Welfare Party); 1983–1998
FP | Fazilet Parti (Virtue Party); 1998-2001
BTP | Bağımsız Türkiye Parti (Independent Turkey Party); 2001–
SP | Saadet Parti (Felicity Party); 2001–
HAS | Halkın Sesi Parti (Voice of the People’s Party); 2010–2012, merged with AKP in 2012

**Centre-left**

CHP | Cumhuriyet Halk Parti (Republican People’s Party); 1923–
DSP | Demokratik Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti); 1985–
ÖDP | Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Parti (Freedom and Solidarity Party); 1996–
SHP | Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party); 1985–1995 (merged with CHP)
YTP | Yeni Türkiye Parti (New Turkey Party); split from DSP in 2002, merged with CHP in 2004

**Ultra-Nationalist**

MHP | Milliyetçi Hareket Parti (Nationalist Movement Party); 1969– (predecessor founded in 1948)
BBP | Büyük Birlik Parti (Great Union Party); 1993–
GP | Genç Parti (Young Party); 2002–
Chapter I Introduction

1. The phenomenon and its theoretical relevance

Over the past 30 years, Turkey has experienced both economic liberalisation and wide-ranging political changes. A key dimension of these changes has been the displacement of the traditional secular Kemalist\(^1\) coalition of military leaders, top bureaucrats and state-nurtured holding companies by a new movement of moderate Islamists. This movement consists of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has formed successive majority governments since 2002; the Gülen community or ‘cemaat’\(^2\), one of the most influential international Islamic movements; and the economy-wide voluntary business associations\(^3\) linked to these groups, Müsiad (Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) and Tuskon (Turkey Industrialists’ Confederation). The devout bourgeoisie organised in these Islamic business associations (BAs) has provided financial and human

\(^1\) Turkey’s state ideology dating back to the Republican Period (1923–1946) is Kemalism, the basic principles of which are republicanism, secularism or laïcité, nationalism, populism, statism and reformism (Parla & Davison, 2004). Turkish or Kemalist conceptions of secularism are based on the French concept of laïcité. Kuru differentiates passive from assertive secularism: ‘passive secularism implies state neutrality toward various religions and allows the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, means that the state favors a secular world view in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to the private sphere’ (Kuru, 2006, p. 137). The French and Kemalist conceptions of secularism are of the assertive type where the state actively controls religion. In the following I refer to secular actors and institutions that signal their support for this type of assertive secularism or laïcité, whereas I refer to Islamic as such actors that signal their support for the restructuring of Turkish secularism (in moderate or extreme ways) and/or seeking greater Islamisation in the public, social and cultural spheres (see further point 2.3.2.b in Chapter IV). Actors in both groups may be privately devout Muslims.

\(^2\) A ‘cemaat’ is a religious community – a flexible form of religious organisation that is specific for Turkey’s modernisation process. Its founder colours the discourse, and it has no formal entry or exit. Cemaats grows and specialise with the needs of their members; in modern Turkey they satisfy religious, social, economic as well as political needs (Agai, 2004).

\(^3\) Business associations are a specific type of business group: ownership or contractual ties as in conglomerates or holdings do not link their members. Instead, BAs are voluntary ‘long-term organizations with formal statutes regulating membership and internal decision-making’ (Schneider, 2004, p. 23). This study focuses on voluntary business associations and excludes state-chartered associations. All of the BAs studied are economy-wide, i.e. represent members from all industries. Neither the BAs studied, nor the Chambers are involved in industrial relations. Instead, the voluntary BA TISK (Turkish Employers’ Confederation), which has a narrow policy agenda, focuses explicitly on wage bargaining.
resources to the AKP, and therefore their support has been essential to the AKP’s formation and continued victories (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009; Hale & Özbudun, 2009; Jang, 2005). The AKP’s 2002, and the following 2007 and 2011 landslide electoral victories mark a significant turning point in Turkish history: It is for the first time since the formation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 that a political party with roots in political Islam, ultimately challenging Turkey’s Kemalist institutions, has formed a majority government and reached such widespread popularity. After a long period during which Islam was controlled and delegitimised in the public realm, and a dominant state⁴ distanced itself from Muslim masses in the periphery,⁵ the empowerment of moderately Islamic BAs and political parties marks the ‘resurfacing’ of Islamic political, societal and economic groups (Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003).

Islamic business associations (BAs) that represent the pious middle class in the new industrial districts in central- and south-eastern Anatolia have played a crucial role in this large-scale political transformation. A key question in this

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⁴ Following Stepan (1988), I define the political as made up of three arenas: the state, the political society and civil society. By state I refer to the extensive and interconnected administrative, bureaucratic, legal and coercive system that has the authority to make rules, which govern a society including the government and armed forces. Political society is the arena in which contestations take place, and includes political parties as key actors. Civil society is the arena of mainly voluntary institutions and movements which are not explicitly political, nor involved in state activities, but which still exercise profound political influence. More specifically, ‘we understand 'civil society' as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public community’ (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. ix). The Gülen community and other Islamic sects/tarikats/brotherhoods/cemaats (religious community) often refer to themselves as civil society organisations, and I use this term as incorporating such religiously motivated civil society organisations, as well as any other collective operating in the civic realm, such as Rotary Clubs or NGOs. I refer to these organisations as operating in the civic realm and as composed of civic actors, and networks.

⁵ Turkey’s present party configuration continues many of the characteristics of the centre-periphery cleavage. This cleavage has deep roots in the Ottoman Empire where there were no intermediary institutions linking the military bureaucratic state elites and the Sultan in the centre of power, with the ‘ruled’ (Mardin, 1969; Hale & Özbudun, 2009). In the Republican, single-party era (1923–1946), this cleavage continued, and a united ‘centre’ of Kemalist military, bureaucratic institutions and party leaders subordinated civil and political society in the ‘periphery’. With the shift to multi-party politics after WWII, the new political parties and civil society have remained in a vulnerable position against bureaucratic and military elites (Özler & İnac, 2007). With the emergence of political Islam in the Turkey in the late 1970s, this cleavage overlaps to a large extent with the secular-Islam continuum in Turkey, with Kemalist or secular elites in the centre and Islamic actors in the periphery. This cleavage continues to shape Turkey’s political system and business politics today.
transformation is under which conditions and how moderately Islamic BAs, the AKP’s business constituency, have gained political influence over dominant secular business associations and holding companies. These moderately Islamic BAs have not only increased their membership in size and variety, becoming the most encompassing and dominant associations of the business community. They have also obtained more leadership positions in the semi-public Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), which maintains a central role in guiding the economy. This has been at the expense of their main competitor, Tüsiad (Turkish Industry and Business Association; 1971–), the oldest Turkish voluntary business association, which represents the first generation of state-nurtured, western-oriented, holding companies from the Istanbul-Marmara region (Buğra, 1998).

This raises the larger question of how, and under which conditions, business gains collective political influence in the context of developing and transition countries. Existing literature provides inadequate guidance on when BAs turn into political actors and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state power struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. Especially the role of ideology and religion in business organisation and political power has not been developed, which is relevant for several transition countries’ business politics.

Mainstream management literature on BAs treats them as purely rational economic institutions. The dominant collective action stream is grounded in rational-choice paradigms: Olson’s seminal collective action theory (Olson, 1971) would find the mere existence of large, voluntary BAs puzzling given their inherent free-riding problems. Political activity of BAs is limited to rent-seeking, where it is rationally emerging from market conditions (Olson, 2000). Olson’s approach has been extended in transaction costs and new institutional economics approaches that analyse BAs as purely functional organisations that carry out efficiency-related activities where state and market institutions leave ‘voids’ to be filled (e.g. Khanna

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6 Rent-seeking is a term originating from such rational choice or neoclassical economics approaches. ‘Rent is part of the payment of the owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost.’ (Buchanan, 1980, p. 3). Rent-seeking is regarded as inefficient in that it obscures the efficiency of the efficient, free market economy. It creates social waste because resources are spent in order to maximise one’s share of personal wealth rather than creating social surplus. State interventionism in the economy is argued to increase the opportunities for rent-seeking.
A central focus of political science literature of BAs concerns how they achieve political influence. Most past research has attributed variation in influence to either structural-institutional factors, or political elites’ strategic interests. Structural-institutional variables include differences in party systems (Martin & Swank, 2012), or the institutionalised role of labour unions (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999), or the extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economy (Guillén, 2001). The political entrepreneurship stream within the political science literature regards business organisation and political access as an outcome of state and political actors’ strategic interests. Strong business organisations can provide policy input to vulnerable politicians whose interest to implement and design efficient policy or to get re-elected can induce them to give business special access to policymaking (Culpepper, 2011; Schneider, 2004). Such studies largely focuses on strategic national political and state elites and their interests in re-election, political support and policymaking. Such strategic interests give incentives for business to build strong organisational structures to aggregate and control business interests. Power-building strategies for BAs centre on getting access to policymaking through lobbying or other formal state-business channels. Some studies have recognised the broader role that BAs can play in complex intra-state conflicts and power struggles (e.g. electoral competition) (Markus, 2007; Sinha, 2005). However, the range of actors remains limited, with a focus on incentives provided to political and state actors by the historical-institutional context. The multiple ways through which BAs engage in political struggles and mobilisation, and the role of ideology remain ignored.

This question is important because there are many settings in which competing business interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-state power struggles. These cleavages are most common where power coordination is less regulated and new political and market institutions vulnerable, providing civil

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7 Sinha’s (2005) study of the transformation of Indian BAs to developmental BAs does incorporate business interests into her framework to explain their origins. However, it does not include ideological variables and does not study BA tactics, but focuses on the institutional context.
society at large, and business in particular, a more prominent role in contests that go beyond providing policy input or support for politicians’ re-election. One example is Russia under Putin (Markus, 2007), where BAs’ access to policymaking has been institutionalised in order to exercise pressure on state agents. These intra-state power struggles can also overlap with ideological or other broad social cleavages, bringing ideology and cultural symbols to the fore in political and business mobilisation. This has been observed in an increasing number of Latin American and post-Ottoman and Muslim countries. Business associations that focus on achieving certain political aims, and base their mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, have been observed in several Latin American countries as well as in Turkey. In Turkey, the displacement of secular BAs is part of a broader political struggle between the moderately Islamic and secular alliances consisting of political parties, state elites and civil society organisations, including BAs. Collaboration between Islamic political elites, a particular religious community and SMEs (Small- and medium-sized enterprises) based in Anatolia have played an important role in the formation and growth of Islamic BAs and the empowerment of the AKP (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). Informal grassroots networks at the local level have served as platforms for political mobilisation, the exchange of financial resources and the creation of legitimacy to a new pious economic elite (Buğra, 2002; Demir, Acar, & Toprak, 2004; Hoşgör, 2011; Özcan, 1995). Several examples have also been observed in Latin America: The contention surrounding Peronist ideology has deeply influenced business politics in Argentina, creating polarisation and conflict among Argentinian BAs (Schneider, 2004). The neoliberal populism and ideology applied by Peronist parties in Argentina shows similarities to Turkey in the 1980s (Öniş, 2004). During the transition to democracy in the early 1980s, Mexican businessmen were similarly observed to become involved with ‘movements’ of like-minded capitalists and military officials (Schneider, 2004). In Brazil the modern-day Pnbe (National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases) first existed as a movement of young industrialists in Sao Paulo who were pro-reformism and formed a non-

8 Post-Ottoman countries are those territories in which were part, for a reasonable amount of time, of the Ottoman Empire, including countries of the Northern African Continent, especially modern-day Egypt and Tunisia, the Balkans, and Middle Eastern countries such as modern-day Syria and Iraq. The Kemalist ideology has influenced state-building in Muslim countries beyond the Ottoman Empire such as Iran, and Indonesia (Yavuz, 2003).
hierarchical BA to prevent the concentration of power at the top (Guimaraes & Gomes, 2004). They initially organised themselves in 1987 in competition to the dominant Fiesp (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo), and consisted of young SME owners aiming to stimulate public debates. Although their influence is said to be limited, it still exists today focusing on solving social and ecological problems. All of these collaborations go beyond the rational and interest-based exchanges between political elites and businessmen identified in the existing literature.

These examples show that BAs can mobilise their membership base and engage in political competition through informal means of cooperation with various groups, based on shared political goals, identities and ideology. In spite of such examples, the question of how ideology and religion enter business organisation and under what conditions these serve as sources of political power has not been developed in the BA literature. Existing approaches limit the range of actors, power resources and strategies that BAs can apply to gain political influence. Such functional and interest-based approaches cannot explain the competition between BAs based on shared goals, identities and informal means of collaboration with civil society organisations, political elites and particular business groups in some countries.

In this thesis, I argue that this inadequacy can be addressed by adopting a social movement perspective that combines political institutional and ideological variables in explaining the context, functions and consequences of BAs. I explore how ideology and religion have entered the strategies and success of BAs to gain political influence, based on an in-depth comparative case study of Turkey’s BAs. I study the conditions and ways in which BAs apply social movement tactics to gain political influence, based on a comparison of secular and Islamic inter-organisational networks, framing activities and resource exchanges.

2. Theoretical framework: business associations with social movement characteristics

Social movements are ‘collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a
part’ (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 11). The political process framework and its later extensions (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) provide a useful starting point to study when and how BAs successfully apply ideology to gain political influence. Sidney Tarrow (2011, p. 32) argues that contentious politics are translated into sustainable social movements under the following conditions, or ‘political opportunity structures’ (POS): when threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed. Such changes in power balance trigger incentives for actors who lack the necessary resources for political influence to take action by applying tactics from ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) – the means by which people engage in contentious collective action. Contention successfully translates into sustainable movements ‘when it taps into embedded social networks and connective structures and produces vivid collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention against powerful opponents’ (Tarrow, 2011). Social and organisational bases are necessary to translate claims into movement organisations, as are constructions of identities and mobilising emotions through collective action frames (Tarrow, 2011, p. 13).

Following this literature, I first analyse openings in the ‘political opportunity structures’ to understand when and under what conditions ideology has entered the political empowerment of Islamic BAs in Turkey. Secondly, my thesis analyses the factors contributing to the political success of moderately Islamic BAs in displacing secular BAs in Turkey, based on a comparative analysis of their network structures, collective actions frames, organisational structures and patterns of resource exchange across changing institutional contexts at the grassroots level. In Turkey’s environment of politico-religious contention, or generally where social struggles ‘revolve around broad cleavages in society’, success in political mobilisation depends on ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). The question is therefore how ideology and religion have been incorporated into the social movement tactics of economic institutions – business associations – to provide sources of political power.

A key element of successful social movements, in addition to an ability to grasp political opportunities, is whether and how they can tap into embedded networks with civic and political actors. Networks can fulfil various functions, allowing for the exchange of resources, building of solidarity and trust as well as
common goals (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007; Tilly, 2005), and can ‘form bridges laterally and over time’ between organisations (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). As formal cooperation between Islamic organisation and political parties has been forbidden since the 1980 military coup, integration has been achieved through the overlap of informal membership between organisations. Network patterns based on membership data are, therefore, an indicator for the cooperation/competition between relevant business, civil society and political organisations, as well as for the opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, political support and solidarity in the associated network. The chapter on social networks will study if and how Islamic vs secular BAs have been able to tap into local embedded networks with political and civil society organisations over time. More specifically, I compare levels of cohesion and the structure and extent of political and civic ties in the two subgroups9 between the pre- and post-AKP eras (from 1993–2012).

In order to bind networks of organisations together and to motivate collective action, successful social movements require collective action frames that define a common problem, goal, identity, and tactics. Frames are ‘collections of idea elements tied together by a unifying concept that serve to punctuate, elaborate, and motivate action on a given topic’ (Snow & Benford, 1988). Effective frames that ‘resonate’, according to the literature, fulfil all these tasks of framing and ground their idea elements in familiar cultural narratives and ideology. I compare the quality or resonance of Islamic and secular BAs’ collective action frames, which depends on their coherence, specificity, completeness and grounding in cultural or ideological narratives. I illustrate how Islamic BAs create internal solidarity and legitimacy, and motivate collective action through resonant framing.

Without some degree of formal organisation, however, we can expect movements to fade away, i.e. interpersonal networks are not sufficient for successful movement activity. As part of the early political process paradigm (Tilly, 1978), the resource mobilisation approach (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) argues that organisations with more resources are essential for political

9 I refer to the two ideologically based alliances of organisations as subgroups. The Islamic subgroup qualifies as a movement, which is the overall argument of this thesis, and therefore I refer this subgroup also as a movement and to the organisations as social movement organisations. The secular subgroup does not qualify as a movement, but only as a coalition of organisations.
mobilisation and internal control. Such resources include the availability of organisational venues, expertise, time, and financial assets. I finally analyse the types of activities and resources that BAs provide to their members and collaborating civil society and political organisations. What activities, or rather tactics, do Islamic as compared to secular BAs offer their members through their embedded networks with political and civic elites? And how do these resource exchanges increase the political influence of Islamic BAs in a competition with secular BAs? I analyse whether exchange patterns and tactics extend beyond providing efficiency-related services to companies and politicians; in other words, whether BAs play a contentious role beyond providing resources that market institutions do not provide, and beyond exchanging patronage\textsuperscript{10} resources with politicians (i.e. campaign financing, re-election support in exchange for commercial interests and policy access). The study of resources and tactics extends to BAs organisational structures that either facilitate or hinder inter-organisational cooperation. The question is what kind of organisational structures Islamic BAs have built into their organisational fields\textsuperscript{11} to facilitate both the exchange of resources, while retaining the ability to act and speak with one voice, and also integrating flexible local interests. Are these different from the majority of BA and movement literature, which suggests that hierarchical and strong organisations are crucial for collective action?

3. **Summary of research design, sample and methods**

I chose Gaziantep, or short Antep, as a city case because it is one of the most successful growth centres of the new industrial centres of central- and south-eastern Anatolia (Anatolian capital). Gaziantep’s economic growth is most evident in its export performance, where it has gradually overtaken older industrial centres (like Adana) since the 2000s. This displacement extends to the political realm: Above all, the secular BA and political parties have increasingly lost the competition with more influential Islamic BAs and political parties in Gaziantep (as will be established in

\textsuperscript{10} By patronage I mean the use of the state resources, e.g. appointments to office or other privileges, such as state tenders, in exchange for electoral or political support to individuals.

\textsuperscript{11} Organisational fields are ‘a set of organisations that share overlapping constituencies and interests and that recognize one another’s activities as being relevant to those concerns’ (Cress and Snow, 2000, p. 1074). This definition is consistent with work on multiorganisational fields in study of social movements, and the institutional perspective on organisations.
Chapter III. The increase in political influence of Islamic BAs and businessmen is apparent in their positions at the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GSO) and the Union of Chambers (TOBB). Gaziantep differs from other Anatolian capital provinces in that it has had a stronger secular political and political elite. The increasing competition and gradual displacement in Gaziantep through Islamic elites is therefore all the more puzzling and provides an ideal study ground to analyse how a new and vulnerable Islamic movement gained political influence at the expense of an already established secular elite.

Gaziantep has three Islamic business associations, two of which are affiliated with Tuskon, and one of which is a local Müsiad branch. There is one secular business association. This study focuses on the textile manufacturing cluster in Gaziantep in its selection of a network sample and interviewees. The economy-wide voluntary business associations in Turkey aim to mainly organise powerful industrial companies, and therefore non-industrial companies were excluded. The textile cluster is among the internationally most competitive and largest of Gaziantep’s industries. By selecting companies with industry activities in one specific cluster, we can rule out the explanation that specific production and task requirements in textiles shape the differential networking strategies of Islamic and secular companies. Although there might be slight differences between industries, the mobilisation of Islamic business associations takes place across all sectors, and Gaziantep’s textile industry reflects a valid company sample of these tactics.

I rely on a grounded theory approach to develop a social movement framework of BAs. After tracing the conditions or political opportunity structures that have impacted upon Turkish business politics, I conduct a comparative analysis of secular and Islamic BAs’ networks structures (from 1993 – 2012). Findings are based on 51 semi-structured interviews in Gaziantep’s textile cluster in Turkey and additional archival material. The comparison of Islamic and secular BAs’ frames relies on a frame analysis; the following comparison of Islamic and secular BAs’ activities and resource exchanges in their organisational fields relies on a thematic analysis of different sections of the same source material.

4. Summary of findings, argument and contribution
I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence at the expense of secular BAs over the 1993–2012 period because they combined a broad range of resources and
actors by applying typical social movement tactics that are attuned to the political and cultural environment. In Turkey, conditions of high politico-religious contention and threats, combined with gradual globalisation, have encouraged businesspeople in the periphery to apply Islam in a non-contentious and market-based way through collaboration. This non-contentious, market-based collaboration grounded in Islam is evident in Islamic BAs’ tactics that reinforce each other and are adapted to their environment. It is evident in their networks, frames and resource exchanges. By integrating with civil society at the grassroots level, as well as gaining the support of political elites, Islamic BAs have been able to provide strong economic activities with complementary framing. These tactics have increased Islamic BAs political influence by enhancing the public legitimacy of a new generation of pious economic elites that can compete with existing secular elites. This exchange is contentious insofar as it is supports wider movement interests and organisations, and paves the way for disruption and institutional change.

The social network analysis shows how Islamic BAs have created strong, yet diverse local networks that bring together political and civic elites at the grassroots level. These informal networks based on co-membership have supported movement tactics by serving as important bases for the transfer of resources, political support and solidarity vis-à-vis a threatening centralised state. This is adaptive in that Islamic BAs have built venues for collaboration and political mobilisation where alternatives were closed off since the collaboration between political parties and civil society was limited with the 1980 military coup.

The framing analysis shows that Islamic BAs have created a coherent and complete frame that develops a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that frame and of Islamic BAs’ tactics. This frame supports Islamic BAs’ networks by incorporating the interests of collaborating social movement organisations (SMOs) and by promoting solidarity by establishing shared identities and goals. It supports BAs’ activities by giving market-based and civic activities an otherworldly legitimacy. The key goal is defined as creating a legitimate, pious business elite. This frame is adapted to its environment insofar as it amplifies religion and develops a value system that is not directly disruptive to state elites, but based in themes of civic service, hard work, entrepreneurship and piety.

The analysis of the resource exchange and activities of Islamic BAs shows again how Islamic BAs’ tactics reinforce one another by being based on a coherent
and non-contentious type of capitalist Islam and collaboration among SMOs. Islamic BAs’ activities and resource exchanges are in line with framing by adhering to the defined goals and tactics, and facilitated by networks across SMOs. Islamic BAs receive resources of legitimacy and economic resources through their networks with political and civic elites, to build a new pious business elite with public legitimacy. Yet Islamic businessmen also return financial and political support. This inter-organisational collaboration is facilitated by BAs’ organisational structures. These are characterised by hybrid structures, which are strong, resource-rich and flexible at the same time. Combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s sensitivity to local interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and business interests across the network.

The promoted resource exchange is indirectly contentious, promoting movement organisations and goals. First, economic resources are received in return for providing political support and financial resources toward collaborating SMOs, the AKP and the Gülen community, and this process creates interlocking dependencies and continued support. Second, this exchange creates parallel Islamic organisations and institutions that are aimed to supplant existing institutions. Thereby such seemingly non-political economic and CSR services, in the civic and economic realm provide sources of political power for the whole Islamic movement. Third, this resource exchange is indirectly contentious, as the provision of such resources is largely limited toward co-religionists and requires compliance with certain Islamic civic, business and private codes of behaviour and institutions. These were previously illegitimate and were aimed at restructuring Kemalist state institutions.

In contrast, the secular BA’s elitism is reflected in its network, activities and frames, which qualify it as a ‘club’ rather than movement. I find that the association does not focus on economic activities, but on CSR and socialisation activities to create friendship and solidarity among large business owners internally, and public legitimacy externally. Similarly, the network analysis showed that the secular BA has not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but have forged ties with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. Political elites of the secular coalition were more likely to be members of such elite clubs, rather than of the business association, showing the reduced focus on political integration via the secular BA. This is reflected in the fact that Islamic BAs overtook
the secular BA in their political integration during the formative years of the new moderately Islamic and capitalist AKP. This has reduced members’ access to economic resources today, unless they become strategic and join Islamic BAs. Combined with their incoherent collective identity and the focus on nationalism and elitism in their collective action frame, this has resulted in a gradual loss of political ties, economic power and public legitimacy compared to Islamic BAs.

Social movement theory particularly focuses on collective action outside established institutional channels, which is goal-oriented, aiming to challenge or defend authority (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). When business becomes part of broader intra-state struggles, and traditional means of political mobilisation are cut off, BAs can adopt such movement characteristics as well. Both political entrepreneurship approaches to BAs and the political process models of social movements give primacy to political contexts and state actors in shaping the mobilisation tactics of civil society organisations. But while the former includes only state and BA actors, and tactics focused on strong organisations and policy support for rational politicians, I argue that different political contexts condition different types of tactics to successfully provide political support. The application of a social movement framework of BAs allows for the incorporation of ideological and political-institutional variables. By studying the dynamics of religious organisational forms and their influences on broader processes at large, I aim to extend the BA and organisational literatures overall, where such processes are little understood (Tracey, 2012).

First, in terms of the conditions for achieving political influence, I argue that BA literature needs to go beyond the rational policy interests of state elites and structural institutional environments to include context-specific politico-ideological incentives and constraints. Secondly, concerning how BAs achieve political influence, I argue that there are variety of actors that provide a multiplicity of power resources at both the centre and periphery of power, and accordingly, a large range of tactics are applied by BA to achieve political influence. Most importantly, in line with social movement approaches, I argue that the boundaries of BAs have to be extended to include other ‘social movement organisations’ in BAs’ organisational fields. Civil society organisations, including religious groups, can be important actors in addition to political elites, providing essential economic, political and legitimacy-based resources. Similar to political parties and civil society
organisations, BAs’ strategies of power-building and power resources can include shared goals and beliefs.

The political process approaches to social movement excludes collaborative, and indirect forms of contention that go beyond ‘symbolic and peaceful forms of disruption’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.102). The modern Islamic movement in Turkey however has combined indirect socio-economic and private forms of contention with disruptive aims. I show that BAs can apply collaborative, market- and civic-based tactics to attain goals that ultimately challenge authorities, thereby extending the range of ‘repertoires of contention’ to include indirectly contentious tactics. This is line with recent developments in social movement literature that suggest that tactics can range from contentious to non-contentious, and from attacking state or cultural authority through collaboration and/or confrontation (Bakker, Hond, King, & Weber, 2013).

5. Structure of the thesis
In the following literature review (Chapter II), I will first give an overview of the existing literature on business associations’ political influence to situate the current study. I develop limitations of the existing literature, and justify why voluntary business associations in Turkey provide a useful case to address the lack of religion and ideology in explanations of business political power. I then build a social movement framework that analyses social networks, collective action frames and resource exchanges, embedded in POS, as tactics of power building for BAs. Finally, I briefly outline the general methodological approach and research design.

Chapter III first presents empirical data and literature to establish the phenomenon or puzzle, being the increasing political influence of Islamic over secular BAs. Next, I justify Gaziantep as city case for studying the competition between secular and Islamic BAs. The second part of this chapter provides an analysis of the political opportunity structures (POS) and background conditions of Turkish business politics. This analysis traces what background conditions have shaped the tactics and political success of Islamic business associations.

Chapters IV to VI are dedicated to the empirical analyses of social movement tactics in Gaziantep, comparing Islamic and secular BAs’ membership networks, collective action frames and patterns of resource exchange. Each of these empirical
Chapters features its own introduction, methods chapter and discussion of findings at the end.

Chapter IV focuses on the membership networks of BAs’ organisational fields, asking if and how BAs have built local coalitions with civil society and political organisations before and after the AKP’s inauguration (from 1993–2012). As formal ties between political and Islamic groups have been delegitimised at certain time periods, overlapping memberships have become an important way of connecting Islamic actors. Tapping into embedded networks is a key element of transforming contention into successful social movements. Variations in the cohesion and extent of political and civic inter-organisational ties between secular and Islamic BAs across time indicate differences in network-building strategies and access to political, civic and economic resources. Those resources will be analysed in more detail in the final empirical chapter.

Chapter V compares the completeness and coherence of Islamic and secular BAs’ collective action frames with a special focus on their use of ideological variables. According to the literature, the resonance of frames crucially depends on how coherent, specific and complete frames are, adhering to identifying a common problem, identity, goal and tactics. How well the frame resonates with actors also depends on the fit between the ideological contents of the frame with the wider cultural environment. I illustrate how building resonant frames, coherent and attainable identities and goals, has been important to bind inter-organisational coalitions together, to motivate actors, and to gain public legitimacy for Islamic BAs.

Chapter VI compares secular and Islamic BAs’ activities, the resources provided to members and collaborating organisations through such activities, and the organisational structures that facilitate this exchange. This chapter analyses the kind of tactics through which Islamic BAs, compared to the secular BA, achieve the goals set out in their collective action frames, and how these generate political influence. A large and rich range of resources, and strong hierarchical organisational structures are regarded as important facilitators of movement success.

Chapter VII concludes with a short summary of findings, before discussing their contributions to the relevant literature. I then note some limitations of the present study. I finally present avenues for future research and comment on Turkey’s outlook for democratisation and economic development.
Chapter II Literature Review

1. Situating the study within the literature

Among the existing approaches, the literature of business associations intersects with three broad literatures on collective action: the rational choice paradigm and its expansion in transaction-cost and neo-institutionalist approaches, corporatism, and political science. Each of these streams has differing explanations for the emergence, functions and consequences of voluntary BAs.

The dominant collective action literature analyses BAs as economic organisations that carry out efficiency-related activities aimed at maximising economic results for their members. Olson’s classic rational choice paradigm regards economy-wide, voluntary BAs as anomalies, and as causing market distortions through their inherent fixed interests in rent-seeking and free-riding (Olson, 1971, 2000). Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ (1971) follows a rational choice paradigm, focusing on which and how internal organisational and structural characteristics (e.g. group size and heterogeneity) can alleviate the inherent free-riding problems in collective action. Rational actors in large, heterogeneous groups face strong incentives for free-riding that make cooperation difficult to achieve. While small and homogeneous groups are likely to organise, the pure existence and persistence of economy-wide, encompassing BAs with voluntary membership are puzzling to this strand of theory, and assumed to be short-lived and weak at best (Schneider, 2004). That is especially true where membership is voluntary, lacking means of coercion or other exceptional ‘selective incentives’ for members only. Additionally, BAs are regarded as rent-seeking organisations only, seeking market privileges from entrenched state and political actors to gain monopoly rents, for example, through lobbying. However, multiple studies have shown that BAs can also take on more positive developmental functions (Doner & Schneider, 2000; Sinha, 2005), and participate in political activity beyond rent-seeking and lobbying. Olson assumes that the political activity of business solely derives from the fact that multiple markets and related industries segment the larger business communities; political participation then becomes rational in these smaller groups. However, there is poor empirical support and even contrary findings as there is simply ‘too much’ political activity among BAs (W. L. Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005).
An extension of Olson’s theories of collective action can be found in the ‘new’ institutional economics (Ménard & Shirley, 2008; North, 2008) and transaction cost literatures (Williamson, 1981) where associations are assumed to form to lower several key transaction and information costs. While Olson’s theories regard the process of business mobilisation in non-partisan ways, neo-institutional accounts see associations as primarily functional entities responding to market and state failures (Sinha, 2005). Inefficient market institutions propel the development of non-market institutions such as BAs to lower transaction costs and to fill ‘institutional voids’ that normally underpin the efficient functioning of markets, such as venture capitalists, financial analysts, labour market intermediaries, or even judicial institutions and a rigorous financial press12 (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007; Luo & Chung, 2005; Tan & Meyer, 2010). The key debate in this stream of literature is whether BAs are ‘paragons or parasites’, i.e. whether or not business collective can have positive consequences for economic growth.13 BAs and their political activities are analysed as functional facilitators to get access to economic resources. Gaining political influence is not regarded as a goal of BAs, but as a means to achieve greater efficiency, disembedding political from economic dynamics. While BAs and their members can be assumed to be inherently interested in economic profit-maximisation, this strand of literature neglects that BAs can serve as vehicles for mobilisation and be involved in the interest formation of their members and broader power struggles.

The corporatist and political science literatures pay closer attention to how political structures and actors affect the emergence, functions and consequences of

12 For example, some studies tested whether measures of capital market development and of the legal system, on the one hand, and the extent of risk sharing provided by business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005) as well the extent of vertical integration and of the diversification premium, on the other hand, (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), are correlated. However, the authors admit there was no clear evidence of the institutional-void explanation for financial market institutions. For example, risk-sharing characteristics through loans and mutual insurances can only be observed in South Korea, and to a lesser extent in Thailand and Taiwan.

13 These empirical studies estimating economic effects of group membership mainly focus on business groups with ownership ties where data are more readily available (especially analysing South-East Asian cases like South Korean ‘chaebol’, Japanese ‘keiretsu’ networks, or Chinese business groups (Chang & Hong, 2000; Keister, 1998, 2009). However, these are unlikely to have implications for voluntary BAs where members are independent of each other.
BAs. Bringing the state and political dynamics into the analysis is key as much literature suggests that the state is an important actor influencing the organisation of business in transition economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia (Buğra, 1994; Schneider, 2004; Teichman, 2001). BAs are not limited to merely economic organisations that provide efficiency-related functions to their members, but understood as political organisations contingent on their contexts.

The corporatist literature emerged to conceptualise tripartite concertation agreements among labour, business and employers in social Europe (e.g. Baccaro, 2003; Cawson, 1985; Lehmbuch, 1984; Schmitter, 1974; Streeck, 2006). Generally speaking, analyses in the corporatist literature are mostly historical and contextualised, explaining collective action by one group as related to other groups, political actors and institutional constraints (Schneider, 2004). A dominant approach to BAs from the corporatist tradition argues that their activities and outcomes are shaped by a large variety of factors including not just members’ interests, but more importantly, trade union and state structures. Such factors influence whether BAs orient themselves toward their members’ or state interests’, and thus their dominant activities and political influence at large (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). However, it focuses heavily on institutional variables, namely the cooperation in national-level policymaking between organised interest groups and governments. The European model with concerted agreements among peak associations and government leaders is not likely to be viable in developing countries or in transition countries such as Turkey that are in the process of economic liberalisation and democratic consolidation (Bianchi, 1984; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995).

The corporatist literature and some political analyses give primacy to structural-institutional variables to explain BAs’ political influence (e.g. party systems, extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) and corporate ownership). Cross-national variations in corporate ownership and the extent of FDI in transition economies have been assumed to influence the propensity and structure of collective action: the type of goods and investment capital governments and powerful social groups allow multi-national corporations (MNCs) to import, makes a difference in what space is available for domestic business to organise, and whether these groups are strongly dominated by large foreign firms (Biggart & Guillen, 1999; Guillén, 2001). However, there are several examples, which defy this line of argument. For example, Mexico attracts among the largest level of FDI in Latin America, yet also
has strong, organised voluntary BAs (Schneider, 2002, 2004). Turkey has received comparatively little FDI until the 2000s, mainly in the form of joint ventures with large holding companies, who did not choose to exit, but many of who instead chose to get organised in Tüsiad. Since the mid-2000s, FDI inflow into Turkey has increased considerably, but so has the organisational strength of voluntary BAs.

Concerning political institutions, a range of scholars expect that macro-political factors such as state-led development, the structure of party systems, the existence of military dictatorship or democratisation will affect patterns of business organisation (Schneider, 2004). For example, Offe (1995) argues that generally interventionist states tend to promote group formation while governments inspired by liberal doctrines ignore organised groups or, in extreme cases, attempt to dismantle them. A key structural example from the political-institutional literature are the historical and comparative analyses by Martin and Swank (2004, 2012). The authors compare Denmark, Germany, the UK and US and ask under what conditions business was more likely to exert policy influence toward ‘social investments’. Using mixed methods, they find that business was the most developmental where strong peak BAs were organised by politicians, whose incentives, in turn, were shaped by party systems. More specifically, multiple party systems in Germany and Denmark gave incentives to defer policymaking to private peak BAs, who increasingly self-regulated and promoted social investments. Dual party systems gave no such incentives.

Such macro-political and structural factors are important as boundary conditions to set the stage for the actions of particular state and business actors. However, alone they cannot explain under what conditions and how BAs gain political influence. Much more depends on such actions within a dictatorship, for example, or on specific events during the process of implementing a new development strategy than on these macro parameters themselves, especially in transition economies where ‘young’ democratic and neoliberal institutions are less stable and more vulnerable than in mature economies (Schneider, 2004; Teichman, 2001). For example, Schneider’s (2004) analysis shows that there are a variety of responses within the same structural arrangements: developmental states featured either personal relations bypassing associations in some countries, or preferred collective representation in others (e.g. in Chile and Colombia, or Brazil under Vargas), or favoured associations in informal consultation.
In line with this approach, another stream within the political science literature, referred to as political entrepreneurship, criticises the overly structural focus of the aforementioned political-institutional and of corporatist approaches. Instead, political entrepreneurship argues for a more actor-centred approach where political and state elites are regarded as initiators’ of business’ political influence (Culpepper, 2011; Markus, 2007; Martin, 1991, 1994; Maxfield & Schneider, 1997; Polsky, 2000; Schneider, 2002, 2004, 2010a; Sinha, 2005). Business organisation and political access is regarded as an outcome of state actors’ strategic interests. Organised business can help political elites in various power struggles (e.g. electoral competition, struggles between executive and legislature), and promote efficient policymaking. In this regard, Culpepper (2011) studies the variation in the influence of business on corporate governance reform across Germany, the Netherlands, France and Japan, although he does not explicitly focus on BAs. He argues overall that the policy influence of business originates from the rational policy interests of state elites to implement effective policy and to gain political support. How, and under what conditions, business exercises influence is shaped by the complexity of policy issues and their political salience.$^{14}$ Policy interests of state elites and political support have also been analysed as key drivers of BA organisation in emerging economies. Schneider’s (2004) seminal study comparing the organisational strength of Latin American BAs (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico), traces their variation back to state actors’ interests in policymaking. More specifically, Schneider (2010b) argues that businesspeople distribute their political investments into various influence channels according to their returns; and these returns depend mostly on the opportunities offered by the political system. Where state actors prefer to deal with organised businessmen through encompassing BAs (rather than through personal networks or political parties), this gives incentives for business to invest into encompassing BAs that exercise political influence (Schneider, 2004). The author

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$^{14}$ If issues are complex, like corporate governance, and do not seem very important to the average voter, then the influence of business is high. In such circumstances business influences legislators through ‘quiet tactics’ like lobbying and influencing the media and legislators, who rely on businesspeople’s alleged managerial expertise. The influence of business decreases when the salience of issues is high which increases public scrutiny of political elites. Institutions in general, and trade unions and corporate governance institutions in particular influence managers’ preferences, i.e. for share- vs stakeholder governance arrangements, but not managers’ superior political power at large.
finds that it is especially under conditions of high vulnerability, e.g. through high electoral volatility or after a military coup, that political elites look to business for mobilising political support, to acquire information for complex policymaking, and to facilitate effective policy implementation. In another study, he finds that business participation also tends to vary according to the type of policy (depending on scope, uncertainty, and length of implementation) (Schneider, 2010b). The aggregation of business interests and provision of market information through peak business organisations to prevent rent-seeking was also a key motivator of European corporatism of the 1970s (Schmitter, 1974). The provision of efficient information to state bureaucrats by businesses to facilitate their implementation of economic policy autonomously from particularistic interest-group preferences has been identified as a key contributor to the successful economic growth in South-East Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan (Buğra, 1994; Haggard & Moon, 1990).

The presented approaches mainly treat BAs either as purely economic institutions, or focus on structural institutions and rational politicians’ strategic interests in explaining BAs’ political influence. However, some studies of political entrepreneurship focus on how business can enter broader political power struggles and support political actors (Markus, 2007; Martin, 1991, 1994; Polsky, 2000). In the US, office-seekers have been found to ‘engage in a discursive exercise to remould business (…) interests and undertake the mobilization of these interests’ to support their political campaigns and ‘alter the distribution of power at the national level’ (Marcus, 2007, p. 280). Martin (1991, 1994) has extensively studied how mobilised business in the US can support activist presidents to counteract political opposition and to increase support for their policies. In transition economies, Schneider (2002) finds that in Mexico in the 1960s, the then centre-left president promoted business organisations to perform certain neoliberal economic policies, such as attracting FDI, so that the administration could focus more strongly on socialist policies to keep its electorate. Markus (2007), studying the new strong business organisations in Russia, argues that BA organisation can become a part of intra-executive struggles (e.g. between state bureaucracy and government) especially in transition economies. In Russia, the ‘shift from monetarism to market dirigisme in Putin’s government drove the demand of presidential state agents for cooperation with institutionalized business, since the latter allowed the state principals to increase pressure on state agents. This pressure is exerted via institutionalizing BAs’
access to economic policymaking’ (Markus, 2007, p. 282). These studies have argued that organised business can play a more active role in complex intra-state conflicts and power struggles (e.g. electoral competition) (Markus, 2007; Sinha, 2005).

Such intra-state conflicts are not just relevant for post-Communist polities, but apply in general to transition economies with a legacy of strong centralised states disembedded from civil society. When industrialisation and nation-state building take place at the same time, industrial activity takes on strong political dimensions along partisanship lines (Buğra 1994; Siegel, 2007), and a strong state becomes an ultimate provider of resources and legitimacy. Some transition economies with strong states have a weak state capacity for implementation (Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998). Their state and political elites suffer high vulnerability due to transitions from authoritarian military regimes and the foreign dependence of weak financial systems. Under such conditions vulnerable state or political elites may turn to civil society, actors outside of politics proper, to generate political support in power struggles, and to implement and create effective policies. This is further facilitated by the fact that the institutional system, especially the legal system and bureaucracy are highly contested and unstable, as they reflect the short-term necessities of economic development rather than accepted norms (Buğra, 1994; Teichman, 2001). Businesspeople, enjoying the greatest structural power compared to other social groups through their control over jobs and growth, often acquire premium access in such conditions, especially if labour is weak. If those civic actors have limited options for political representation and power building, they have a high incentive to participate in broader power struggles. If political parties and policy channels do not provide the opportunity for political participation, civil society organisations and social movements can serve as alternatives to traditional institutions for businessmen, as platforms for political mobilisation, and as sources of legitimacy and resources (Singerman, 2004).

Such conditions apply to some Latin American countries, for example, as well as Turkey and other countries that share its Ottoman legacy of a strong centre-periphery cleavage between state and civil society. South Korea, in contrast, is often given as a counter-example where a strong state disembedded from civil society combined with a strong state capacity was able to implement effective macro-economic policy and transition independent of business interests. In a number of
Latin American and post-Ottoman countries, such intra-state power struggles also overlap with broad societal cleavages, which bring ideology and religion to the fore in political mobilisation. BAs that focus on achieving certain political aims, and base their mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, have been observed in several Latin American countries. In Turkey intra-state struggles overlap with deep ideological cleavages. The displacement of secular BAs is part of a broader political struggle between the moderately Islamic movement and secular coalition consisting of political parties, state elites and civil society organisations, including BAs.

And while the political entrepreneurship literature recognise the broader role that BAs can play, the range of actors remains limited to political and state actors, and the focus is on studying the incentives provided by the institutional context and on strategic state elites’ interests. There is inadequate guidance on when BAs turn into political actors and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state power struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. The multiple ways through which BAs may achieve political mobilisation, and the role of ideology remain ignored. This question is important because there are many settings in which competing business interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-state power struggles that also overlap with other ideological or cultural cleavages. For example, in some countries that share an Ottoman legacy, a strong centre-periphery cleavage overlaps with an Islam-secularism dimension. BAs in Turkey have cooperated with political parties and civil society organisations to gain political influence, but there are several examples where BAs are not purely focused on rational business interests, but combine such interests with political mobilisation around shared beliefs. In other words, BAs can have social movement characteristics. However, research has neglected how BAs engage in power building and how ideology and religion influence the conditions under which and how business gains political influence. This inadequacy can be addressed by taking a social movement perspective to build a new framework that combines political and ideological variables in explaining the context, functions and consequences of BAs. I rely on a detailed case study of Turkey’s voluntary BAs to advance the BA literature.

Both the political BA and social movement literatures are broadly concerned with collective action that is directed to achieving political influence for a constituency. Social movement theory particularly focuses on collective action
outside of established institutional channels, which is goal-oriented and aims to
challenge or defend authority (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). Where business becomes
part of broader intra-state struggles, and traditional means of political mobilisation
are cut off, BAs can adopt such movement characteristics, making a combination of
them meaningful. Both political entrepreneurship approaches to BAs and the
political process models of social movements give primacy to political contexts and
state actors in shaping the mobilisation tactics of civil society organisations. But
while the former includes only state and BA actors, and tactics focused on strong
organisations and policy support for rational politicians, the latter posit that different
political contexts condition different types of tactics to successfully provide political
support. Social movement concepts can therefore provide a fruitful extension to BA
research.

A social movement framework extends the types of institutional incentives
and actor-based conflicts that encourage businesspeople to engage in contentious
politics, as well as the range of tactics that BAs apply. Tapping into embedded social
networks with civil society, creating frames that rely on common goals and
identities, and applying repertoires of contention—these are key established
processes through which resource-poor social movements build a multiplicity of
power resources at the grassroots level that can feed up to the national level.

Concerning the conditions and context, the concept of ‘political opportunity
structures’ (POS) from political process models allows studying the role of state
actors and ‘other micro-political institutions in encouraging or disorganizing
business’ (Sinha, 2005, p. 4). POS are ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal,
permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious
politics’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 32). Such perceived incentives and constraints go beyond
the rational policy interests of state elites and structural institutional environments to
include context-specific politico-ideological institutions. In social movement
research, it is widely accepted that ‘especially when struggles revolve around broad
cleaves in society, that bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols
becomes more important for mobilisation’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). That is, in an
environment of politico-religious contention, successful mobilisation and
establishing political influence requires incorporating ideological factors. Secondly,
concerning how BAs achieve political influence, a social movement approach
includes a variety of actors that provide a multiplicity of power resources at both the
centre and periphery of powers, and, accordingly, a large range of tactics applied by BA to achieve political influence. Those go beyond the rational policy interests that state elites at the national level provide through formal, institutionalised policy channels; they also go beyond traditional BA tactics such as lobbying through organisationally strong BAs at the centres of political power.

Social movement research is traditionally differentiated from collective action through interest groups such as BAs by operating ‘outside of institutional or organizational channels’ (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). However, it extends the organisational boundaries of BAs to include not just political elites but any relevant actors and organisational forms, including civil society organisations, in BAs’ organisational fields with which BAs collaborate to achieve change-oriented goals (Snow et al., 2004). Although an important impetus for the organisation and political influence of BAs originates from state actors, the conditions for and tactics of mobilisation can take various forms; political actors can mobilise business or labour unions to alleviate their vulnerability or to increase their political support and policy efficiency, but they can also include powerful civil society, social or religious actors as allies (in the following: civic actors). Social movement research not only focuses on actors and formal channels at the centre of power, it is concerned with how resource-poor groups achieve movement goals. It focuses on how important resources for resource-poor groups can be generated at the periphery of power then feed back to the centre of power. While business organisation may be promoted ‘top-down’ from political elites, this process also triggers down to the periphery, outside of national power centres, where a multitude of power resources are generated that have an impact on the central-national level. For business politics, the ‘centre of power’ is also where political power is concentrated, i.e. the cities and capitals with the seats of government.

2. The context: Turkey’s voluntary business associations

Turkey provides a good case to address the inadequacy of the existing BA literature. Several observers argue that the competition between secular and Islamic BAs is part of a broader long-term intra-state power struggle between the secular coalition in the centre of power, and the Islamic movement in the periphery. The former was supported by a Kemalist developmental and étatist state since the early Republican era, and incorporated bureaucrats, military officials and early party elites (as well as
the Judiciary and Presidential offices). Since economic liberalisation in the late 1980s, a movement of Islamic political parties, BAs and civil society organisations, has competed and gradually displaced the secular elite. The intersection of political parties, civil society organisations and BAs in an environment where religion and ideology come to the fore in political mobilisation makes Turkey an ideal ground to study the conditions and means by which ideology supports the process of BAs achieving political power. First, it allows studying in depth how a new actor beyond state and political elites, namely, civil society organisations and religious communities may support BAs’ political power. Second, it allows studying under which conditions and how politico-religious contention affects the political mobilisation of BAs. And third, it allows studying in depth the various types of means and tactics that BAs may use to compete with each other, and how ideology enters those. Several scholars have observed that, instead of traditional political channels, informal networks at the grassroots level between Anatolian SMEs, political and civic actors have played a key role in Islamic BAs’ empowerment. Others have analysed the construction of a socio-economic type of Islam in its frame as part of the AKP’s success and popularity. This case therefore opens the venue for analysing alternative tactics of political mobilisation for BAs grounded in religion.

Several observers argue that the development of Islamic BAs is closely linked to the politico-religious contention in Turkey (Buğra, 1998). The Islamic movement since the 1980s has shifted from political Islam to a socio-economic type (Yavuz, 2003), encompassing Islamic BAs. While the AKP built up a cross-class support base, it is the incorporation of the new capitalist class in Anatolian growth centres that is a key ingredient of its success (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). The SMEs and petty traders in the previously under-developed central-and south-eastern Anatolian provinces have been the backbone of the Islamic movement in Turkey. These businessmen are mainly represented in the Islamic BAs Müsiad and Tuskon. Today’s Anatolian industrial districts are where moderately Islamic BAs have emerged, and this region continues to be the base of their economic and political power. Some of these provinces have emerged into new centres of economic growth since the economic liberalisation of the 1980s.

While there are examples in the Turkish studies literature that have studied the intersection of political and business ties at the national level, the local and grassroots levels have been neglected. Mobilisation at the local level, however, is an
equally important arena where important power resources are created through collaboration. Also, as the examples below will show, the focus has been mainly on the AKP or the Gülen community, and less on Islamic BA’s political mobilisation.

There are a few studies that have looked in more detail at the overlap between the AKP and Islamic BAs at the national level. Businesses organised in the association Müsiad were found to have provided substantial human and financial resources for the formation of the AKP in 2001 (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). For example, the Albayrak Group, a Müsiad member company, became one of the chief financiers of a progressive group within the political Islamist Milli Görüş Movement (the so-called ‘yenilikciler’); and thereby supported their split from the Milli Görüş to establish a new party, the AKP. Numerous Müsiad members were found to join the AKP in local offices in Anatolian cities, and in the Grand National Assembly (e.g. 20 Müsiad members were elected as AKP MPs in 2002) (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009; Jang, 2005). These authors argue that the pious Anatolian capitalists who previously supported the political Islamist parties of the Milli Görüş have re-shuffled their alliances to form the backbone of the moderately Islamic AKP (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009; Jang, 2005).

The links between political elites and religious groups, generally speaking, are less visible. Turam (2007), for instance, argues that there is generally no overlapping membership between the AKP and the Gülen movement. They have remained organisationally independent and disconnected in their activities, and this independence from the state has been necessary for development of civil society. This is not to say that linkages have not existed, but they have been informal and have contributed to the religious movements’ influence. The Gülen movement’s economic power has been fortified through its strong connections with national and local politicians in Turkey. Gülen followers are known to vote for the AKP since its break from the Milli Görüş – a political Islamist movement that has produced many political parties since the late 1970s (see more details in Chapter III). Yavuz (2003) stresses that ‘Nurcu’ reading or study circles, of which the Gülen community is the

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15 Said Nursi (1876–1969) was the founder and leader of the ‘Nur’ Movement. It is the most influential Islamic movement in Turkey; in the late 1990s it was estimated to have 5–6 million followers (Yavuz, 2003). The Gülen community constitutes the largest offshoot of this movement and it emerged in İzmir in the 1970s where Fethullah Gülen was then working as a state ‘ımam’ (preacher). During times of state repression, ‘Nurcu’ circles were
biggest offshoot, were used as instruments for ‘wielding informal political power through unofficial ties to politicians’. Turgut Özal had been a follower of Gülen’s sermons since the 1960s and since his election as the PM in 1987, the Gülen movement was enjoying more freedoms (Agai, 2004) – among other things, the consequence of the ‘TIS’ (Turkish-Islam Synthesis) followed after the 1980 military coup. As the Gülen network widened considerably in the 1990, and the first schools were opened abroad, politicians started visiting those establishments both in Turkey and abroad. F. Gülen also met with T. Çiller of the DYP in 1994 and with PM B. Ecevit, with whom he supposedly had excellent relations (Agai, 2004). These examples, while focusing on the AKP and Gülen community show that informal connections between religious and political elites have played an important role in the empowerment of the Islamic movement at large.

Concerning BAs it is especially Ayşe Buğra’s work that has focused on business-state links (Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2012, 2014). It analyses BAs as rent-seeking organisations, which provide legitimacy to patronage networks between big business and political elites. These studies have analysed patronage relations at the national level as the key source of BAs’ political access and influence, and have focused on tracing the changes in the types of patronage resources over time. The author argues that during private sector led import substituting industrialisation (1960–1980), Turkish business increasingly consolidated its presence in the industrial sector and in society, but particularism in state-business relations and strong state support and interventionism persisted (Buğra, 1994). With the foundation of the first voluntary, economy-wide BA, Tüsiad, in 1971, state-business relations changed significantly, as the corporatist legacy ended and voluntary BAs begin to become as or even more influential than the Chambers. It was mainly big business profiting from protectionist measures during this time period. Prominent individuals e.g. V. Koç or S. Sabancı got easy organised secretly and played a key role in creating a counter-elite in the face of state repression, and in conserving Islamic identity (Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). The Nur movement stood for a move from oral to a print culture, and argued to keep politics separate from Islam (other than the Milli Görüş). It has focused on the private sphere, education and later, with Gülen, the business realm. Other important Islamic groups are the Sufi Order of Nakşibendi, the aforementioned political Milli Görüş (National Outlook) Movement, as well as the brotherhood/cemaat of the ‘Süleymancilar’. The Nakşibendi Sufi Order served as the ‘matrix for the emergence in the 1970s of these leading contemporary Turkish Islamic political and social movements’ (Yavuz, 2003).
access to information and funds through unmediated direct contacts with ministers and bureaucratic elites (Buğra, 1994). Support mechanisms included the provision of cheaper input material to the private sector, cheap credits from state banks and infrastructure investments by central governments. In spite of trade and later financial liberalisation in the 1980s, government interventionism merely changed its form to support the foreign trade regime (Atan, 2004). The allocation of resources continued to be based on connections to political elites rather than on merit and clear criteria, which resulted again in uncertainty, rent-seeking activity and hostility between bureaucratic, political and business elites. Such clientelistic relations continued well into the 1990s. In this era, ‘exporters, who were supported by tax rebates, investors in tourism and real estate benefiting from preferential credits, and the bidders for public sector enterprises in privatisation deals have all appeared as important actors in newly emerging networks among public authorities and private businessmen’ (Buğra, 2003). Public tenders and privatisation deals, as well as the provision of cheap credit through public banks (e.g. Halk and Vakıf Bankası) continue to constitute an important tool to support business elites today, according to the authors (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). While the altering political and economic context modified the tools of state interventionism, these studies argue that clientelist exchanges have continued to dominate the state-business relationship up to this day.

One important difference from the past is that Anatolian industrialists have also taken advantage of the step-wise trade and financial liberalisation since 1980, and relied on informal grassroots networks and a pattern of pooling private resources instead of predominantly relying on state subsidies and protectionist policies (Demir et al., 2004; European Stability Initiative, 2005). This is not to say that Anatolian SMEs did profit from the ANAP administration’s export promotion, providing export- and other incentives. Existing Turkish area studies have not studied how Islamic BAs have generated resources at the local level, and how these have increased their political influence. They mainly focused on either BA–AKP relations at the national or the Gülen community. While studying these rent-seeking coalitions at the national level is important, this research neglects the role of civic

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16 For example, a study by TMOBB (the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) shows that in Gaziantep 93% of companies founded their companies with the help of family capital (TMOBB, 1998 cited in Ayata, 2004, p. 569).
actors and the wide variety of resources exchanged and created at the local level, where such patronage networks may be one of several exchange mechanisms. This is all the more surprising given that Anatolian industrial districts in the periphery have been argued to be a key support base of centre-right parties, the Gülen community and of Islamic BAs. To address this inadequacy, I conduct my study of how Islamic BAs have gained political influence at the grassroots level in the former periphery of Anatolian industrial districts.

The importance of the local level for the Islamic movement is further supported by the following observations in the Turkish studies literature. In the political realm, Çarkoğlu (2002) argues that in spite of Turkey’s highly centralised political system, or maybe because of it, local and regional factors have been shaping national election results over the past half a century. Studies of the AKP have shown that the AKP has merged neoliberalism with strong local organisation and mobilisation – a legacy of political Islam. In their in-depth study of the AKP, Hale and Özbudun (2009) show that the AKP fulfils one important aspect of a mass-based political party; the AKP is more active, and more highly motivated and elaborately organised at the local level than any other political party in Turkey. Local activities feature service provision, intra-party education and face-to-face interactions with potential voters. A study on the social backgrounds of AKP deputies in 2007 confirms the trend of the AKP toward greater localism. Sayari and Hasanov (2008) show that the percentage of deputies born in their constituencies increased considerably between 1999 and 2007, and especially among the AKP, increasing the influence of local interests. In 2007, the AKP had the highest share of local deputies from the Anatolian regions (Eastern-, Central-, South-eastern-Anatolia, ranging between 78%–100% of deputies), and the second lowest share from the Marmara region (44% of AKP deputies, slightly above the nationalist MHP).

The importance of cooperating with civil society organisations at the grassroots level has become even more important since many municipalities have been in the hands of the AKP and are allowed to contract welfare provisioning out to private firms (Göçmen, 2011b). With increasing decentralisation, the resources of local municipalities have increased and the range of activities to be subcontracted locally has widened from infrastructure, which continues to be an important arena for rent-seeking (e.g. through the agency Toki), to further social services (Göçmen, 2011b).
Hale and Özbudun (2009) report how the AKP maintains close contacts with like-minded civil society organisations (associations, foundations, etc.) active in the sub-province, mainly to guide and inform voters of the various social welfare programmes conducted by the central government (e.g. Social Solidarity Fund), the metropolitan municipal government and local municipalities. Such local activism has also been attributed to Islamic BAs, Tuskon affiliates and Müsiad branches alike, that mainly serve to build up local solidarity and support, and to provide meeting points with AKP politicians and civil society organisations (Hale and Özbudun, 2009). Yavuz (2003) observes that Müsiad’s economic interests overlap with provincial/ideological ties to create a more effective and rooted associational life. For instance, the majority of Müsiad members in Konya are also members of diverse cultural associations. Müsiad members are thus members of overlapping networks. The informal characteristics of these networks, which are based on interpersonal trust and derived from Islamic identity, ‘help to promote work ethics and new channels of communication for collaborating and sharing business information’ (Yavuz, 2003). The author argues that the current Islamic movement in Turkey has conjured a successful blend of capitalism and a secular, rational Islam. Another consequence of Islam in business circles has been argued to be that adherents ‘situate themselves among the faithful devoted to just causes and beyond the realm of economic interests’ (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012).

In sum, several authors argue that both the political mobilisation of the AKP and the rise of the confident Anatolian bourgeoisie have been maturing outside traditional institutional channels, party politics and deliberate forms of political mobilisation (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). The relevance of informal grassroots mobilisation for the political power of the moderately Islamic movement, which is based on a common Islamic identity among political parties, business elites and religiously motivated civil society organisations, has been noted. However, these processes have not been studied in depth at the grassroots level. Therefore I propose to compare Islamic and secular BAs’ power-building activities at the local level, incorporating their informal networks with local elites, their framing and resource-generation activities, using social movement theory. The following section justifies such an approach and discusses social movement theory in more detail.
3. A social movement framework of business associations

The political process framework of social movements and its later extensions (McAdam et al., 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1978) provide a useful starting point to study when and how BAs successfully apply ideology to gain political influence, i.e. move from the periphery to the centre of political influence. Sidney Tarrow (2011, p. 32) argues that contentious politics are translated into sustainable social movements under the following conditions, or political opportunity structures: when ‘threats’ are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed’. Such perceived changes in the power balance trigger incentives for actors who lack the necessary resources for political influence to take action by applying tactics from ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) – the means by which people engage in contentious collective action. Contention successfully translates into sustainable movements ‘when it taps into embedded social networks and connective structures and produces vivid collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention against powerful opponents’ (Tarrow, 2011). Social and organisational bases are necessary to translate claims into movement organisations, as are constructions of identities and mobilising emotions through collective action frames (Tarrow, 2011). Networks can fulfil various functions, building solidarity, trust as well as common goals, and allowing for the exchange of resources (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007; Tilly, 2005); they can ‘form bridges laterally and over time’ between organisations (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132). However, without some degree of formal organisation we can expect movements to fade away, i.e. interpersonal networks are not sufficient for successful movement activity (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124). As part of the early political process paradigm (Tilly, 1978), the resource mobilisation approach (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977) argues that organisations with more resources are essential for political mobilisation and internal control. Such resources include the availability of organisational venues, expertise, time, and financial assets.

Following this literature, my thesis analyses the factors contributing to the political success of the moderately Islamic in displacing secular BAs in Turkey,

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17 ‘By threats, I mean those factors – repression, but, also the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents – that discourage contention’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 32).
based on an analysis of their networks structures, collective actions frames, organisational structures and patterns of resource exchange across changing institutional contexts at the grassroots level. Such an analysis can answer the major research question of how the increasing Islamisation of politics impacts upon the different mobilisation tactics, and the political power of secular vs moderately Islamic BAs.

I define social movements as ‘collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part’ (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11). Sustainable social movements grasp and shape perceived POS at the right moment to translate contentious politics into social movements; by relying on embedded networks and resonant collective action frames, they thereby gradually create the resources (including resource-rich organisations) they initially lacked, to achieve their goals. Below I discuss the relevant debates within the social movement, social network and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures concerning the various tactics of BAs that inform my conceptualisations and methods.

A general theme from social movement theory is that successful tactics fit with the political environment in that they grasp political opportunity structures and, within the cultural environment, build on existing feelings of identity and solidarity. This is in line with the general tenet of an economic sociology approach that regards organisations as embedded and shaped by their social ties, ideological institutions and political contexts, all of which shape organisations’ opportunities, constraints, and organisational patterns in their economic and political advancement (Beckert, 2010; Granovetter, 1985; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). Repertoires of contention, or movement tactics, after all, are ‘learned cultural creations (…) that emerge from struggle’ (Tilly, 1993, p. 264). Movements have lived experiences and cultural and ideological backgrounds that affect their tactics and how movement actors perceive and enact those tactics. This is how ideology and religion enter BA’s power-building tactics, as they need to be built on ideological bases to create solidarity and identity. Especially where struggles revolve around broad political and ideological cleavages in society, successful mobilisation requires ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). Under conditions of high politico-
ideological contention, we would therefore expect ideology and religion to enter the mobilisation tactics of movements in their networks, by including not only political elites, but also civic and religious actors who can provide additional power resources, in their frames, as well as resource-building activities. I study the resource-based and ideological mix of tactics in framing, network and resource-building activities that BAs may use to create political influence. Just like social movements, business in the periphery can build economic, ideological and ultimately political power through social movement tactics. For such an analysis I rely on a case study on Islamic BAs in Turkey who have relied on networks and framing to build up a variety of resources to emerge from the periphery toward the centre of political power. I build tentative hypotheses regarding the conditions under which ideology enters into the political mobilisation of business and how it is applied in networks, frames and resource-building activities.

3.1. Political opportunity structures and threats
First, I analyse openings in the ‘political opportunity structures’ to understand when and under which conditions ideology has entered the political empowerment of Islamic BAs in Turkey (Chapter III, point 3). Social movement scholars state that contentious politics is produced when ‘threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed’ (Tarrow, 2011). Perceived opportunities or political access, the existence of allies, shifting political alignments and the opportunity to exploit divisions or vulnerabilities of opponents, are key ‘political opportunity structures’ developed in political process theories, in addition to threats from the establishment (Tarrow, 2011). While threats have received less attention in the literature, they are key in explaining ideological variables in political mobilisation in late-developing countries with (semi-) authoritarian regimes. Shifts in political opportunities have altered the types of tactics that pay off for the mobilisation of political support. This analysis is presented in the following chapter.

As will be argued in Chapter III, the specific historical conditions of a strong centre-periphery cleavage have created an environment in which Islamic BAs with social movement characteristics have emerged and displaced part of the existing secular establishment. In Turkey’s case the central intra-state conflict is traditionally between ‘the centre’, traditionally the military and bureaucratic as well as state
elites, and ‘the periphery’, the rest of civil society, including political parties. Most observers of Turkish politics agree that the centre-periphery is the key cleavage that produced the present-day Turkish party system and that has deep roots in the Ottoman Empire\(^\text{18}\) (Hale & Özbudun, 2009; Heper, 1980; Mardin, 1969, 1973). In modern Turkish politics, the centre-periphery largely overlaps with the secular-religious cleavage,\(^\text{19}\) which ‘has led to a particularly deep and a potentially explosive division, a real dichotomy, in Turkish politics.’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 33–34). Changes in intra-state conflicts have allowed secular and Islamic actors to exploit various openings in political opportunity structures at different times. Shortly after tracing the history of Turkish business politics, I analyse whether the traditional POS defined in the political process literature apply, and how, and whether there are further boundary conditions at play. For this, I rely on secondary literature to build hypotheses concerning the context of politico-religious contention and its effect on BAs’ mobilisation tactics.

### 3.2. Social networks

Besides grasping political opportunities, another key element of successful social movements is whether and how they can tap into embedded networks. The chapter on social networks therefore studies if and how Islamic vs secular BAs have tapped into local embedded networks over time, comparing pre- and post-AKP eras (from 1993–2012). Local interpersonal networks matter because successful organisations may begin as local networks ‘that spread through the diffusion of contention, and ultimately either disappear or scale upward to regional and national levels’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124). A movement view of networks defines them as ‘informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity’ (Diani, 1992, p. 13).

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\(^{18}\) ‘Under the sharp dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled in the Ottoman Empire, the centre signified the military bureaucratic state elites headed by the Sultan, while the periphery referred to the rest of the society who had no role in conducting government affairs. The absence of powerful intermediary institutions in the Ottoman Empire made this cleavage much sharper than in Western Europe’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 33–34).

\(^{19}\) ‘The present Turkish party configuration reflects many of the characteristics of a centre-periphery cleavage.’ And while ‘this cleavage is not identical with the one between Islamists and secularists, one should not overlook a large degree of overlap.’ The AKP is […] the party of the excluded or marginalised sectors of the society, imbued with religious and conservative social values’ (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, p. 33–34).
Beyond such interpersonal ties, some degree of formal organisation is usually necessary for social interactions to translate into sustainable social movements. I analyse network patterns in order to understand how Islamic BAs have been able to gain political influence over dominant secular BAs, building on economic sociology’s insight that BAs’ advancement is also shaped by their informal, social ties with elites. While the political science literature largely focuses on institutionalised state-business channels like lobbying, policy or tripartite bodies, informal social ties with political and civic actors can provide crucial platforms for solidarity building and resource exchange.

Tracking inter-organisational networks over time can help explain the expansion and growing influence of a movement as the shape of networks can be regarded as the outcome of network-building strategies (Diani, 1995). Network patterns are an indicator of the (informal) cooperation/competition between various associations, as well as of the opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, political support and solidarity in the associated network. In order to study the cooperation/competition between the various organisations at the local level, both the extent as well the structure of ties between BAs, political parties and civil society organisations are relevant. Social network analysis (SNA) is the most relevant tool to study relational data: the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachments and meetings, which relate agent or social groups to another (Scott, 2000). It allows for depiction of the interconnectedness, or embeddedness of groups and the exchange of different types of resources.

Religious networks in general, and modern Islamic networks in particular have been observed to be multifunctional, escaping the traditional network distinction between ‘solidarity-based’ networks and instrumentally driven ‘transaction networks’ (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007). Instead, religious networks can facilitate the building of ideological, spiritual and material resources (Agai, 2004; Harders, 2000; Loimeier, 2000). Informal networks and social movements often serve as alternatives to traditional political institutions, when they are discriminatory and exclusionary (Singerman, 2004). It is especially marginalised groups that organise participation-relevant resources in such informal networks (for examples in the Middle East, see Bayat, 1997; Singerman, 1995). Similarly, modern Turkish Islamic movements have been observed to be socio-economic and fulfil a variety of
needs (Yavuz, 2003), providing platforms for resource exchange, business contracts, and the generation of public legitimacy and political support.

The politico-religious contention in Turkey has created BAs that relied on the pooling of private resources in informal networks. As political parties have been forbidden to enter alliances with ideological civil society organisations, such ties have remained informal. An important way to achieve integration has been through *overlapping memberships*. Such overlapping memberships, or so-called affiliation networks, are a way to track changing alliances among social movements, political elites and civil society organisations. The insight for studying affiliation networks comes from expanding Simmel’s intuition on the duality of persons and group (Diani, 2003). Just as ‘persons are linked by their shared memberships of social groups, groups are likewise connected by the members they happen to share. (…) The identity of persons is ultimately the result of the particular intersection of their group memberships, while the position of groups depends on the multiple memberships of their members’ (Diani, 2003, p. 301). Other studies have emphasised the role of overlapping memberships as channels for the circulation of information, resources, expertise and solidarity among organisations (Diani, 2004). Already in the early 1970s, individual activists were regarded as inter-organisational links (Curtis and Zürcher, 1973, cited in Diani, 2004). Rosenthal and colleagues’ study (1985; 1997) of 19th-century women reform leaders in New York State is one of the earliest and most systematic treatments of overlapping memberships as inter-organisational links. Studying network patterns among local business, political and civic elites is thus a crucial way to understand how Islamic BAs in the periphery have gained political influence.

### 3.2.1. Cohesion: bonding versus bridging

In addition to the social movement scholarship, several studies in the social networks and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures have studied how social networks can provide crucial resources to resource-poor populations. A key debate across these different streams of literatures concerns whether more or less *cohesion*, i.e. connectedness, or rather ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’, is more advantageous to accumulate a larger range of resources (Lee, 2009). I therefore first compare the levels of cohesion between Islamic and secular networks to analyse how they have gained political influence.
Bonding and bridging are among the most common concepts of social network analysis and incorporate various indicators such as density, tie diversity and tie strength, and structural holes in both ego-networks and overall networks. Density reveals the percentage of connectivity in a network or its potential to achieve saturation (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005a, pp. 30–37; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, p. 30); tie diversity refers to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of ties, and just as with tie strength, its exact definition depends on what kind of ties are measured (tie content).

Social movement studies have shown that extent of cohesion can have implications for the propensity of political mobilisation: ‘Gould (1991, 1993, 1995) pioneered the empirical study of the relationship between collective performance and network variables. The author looks at levels of resistance by different Parisian neighbourhoods in the commune uprising of spring 1871 and finds that the stronger the link between two neighbourhoods, [i.e. the stronger the cohesion], the more similar the levels of resistance. Both sustained mobilization and demobilization was significantly affected by network properties’ (cited in Diani, 2004, p. 345).

Granovetter (1973) argued that weak ties, [i.e. less cohesion] can serve as better bases for mobilisation than strong ones, because strong ties are more restricted, leaving out potentially useful actors. However, the adequacy for mobilisation depends on the goals of the respective movement. ‘Consensus movements and broad reformist movements prospered on relative weak networks, [while] high-risks groups (...) depended on the extremely strong ties of family and close friends whose ties had been hardened’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 132).

The literature on inter-organisational networks shows how bonding, or cohesive networks can foster emotional similarity and motivation during trade (Borgatti & Foster, 2003), and enhance the levels of inter-firm resource exchange. Individual actors with some element of high cohesion acquire resources and learning capabilities that increase innovation diffusion (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). Walker and colleagues (1997) showed that the psychological closeness felt among a close-knit network of biotechnology firms can reduce transaction costs (unfair and opportunistic behaviour), and increase the flow of privileged information and resources. Bonding networks were also found to encourage moral obligations, intimate information sharing, and a sense of solidarity and belonging (Fukuyama, 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). When network actors communicate frequently
with each other, this creates not just internal trust and enhanced resource-sharing, but also reputation-building and legitimacy (Lin, 1999).

Studies of ethnic entrepreneurs and developing countries stress the effect of exclusionary institutions on network structures and frames; by restricting access to resources to certain groups and thereby discriminating against others, strong cohesive pockets characterised by high in-group solidarity and thus a fragmented group structure overall, may emerge (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Dense and cohesive networks are then usually supported by an equally homogeneous and strong collective identity. Such dense ego-networks tend to be more homogeneous and thus highly controlled and conformist (Harders, 2000). Following from the discussion of social movement, bonding networks and ethnic entrepreneurship literatures above, we would expect bonding networks characterised by high cohesion and strong ties in the Turkish environment. Where marginalised business groups have been relying on each other, and under conditions of imminent state threats, strong solidarity and trust are required to facilitate a rich resource exchange.

On the other hand, economic growth requires diverse and innovative resources and information that extend beyond ethnic communities and the potential lock-in of dense local networks. In that respect, we would expect less cohesive (i.e. more diverse, weaker and less dense) ties in Anatolian industrial districts. Empirical studies on the advantages of less cohesive bridging networks stress their merits for economic growth. For example, Burt (2001) holds that the key source of social capital is a network of ties characterised by many structural holes: a sparse network with few strong ties and a richness of brokers, or bridges linking groups that are not otherwise connected. Burt and colleagues (2000) established structural hole theory by comparing the networks of French and American managers. The authors found that managers with sparse networks and disconnected ties that bridged more structural holes acquired more innovative information than those managers who relied on their cohesive ties. Early adopters of new practices are likely to be situated at the intersection of multiple networks, with links to diverse information sources. Lower cohesion facilitates not only quicker access to innovative information, but also allows for the flexibility necessary to adopt such new ideas, whereas cohesive ties can create stronger constraints for managers (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Ambitious firms that seek high growth and market share across diverse geographic regions should therefore encourage brokerage, which was shown to enhance product
innovation and exploitation of new markets (Zaheer & McEvily, 1999). On a whole network level, the economic growth and export-oriented networks of Anatolian capital that require innovation and access to diverse resources and information, would therefore be expected to be less cohesive. Consolidating these two contradictory expectations from the bridging/bonding debate, I expect changes across time as Islamic networks increase their economic and political influence.

Expectation for cohesion: The Islamic networks studied here originated from marginalised, emerging SMEs that were competing against established elites; but gained increased influence from the late 1990s as the Anatolian industrial districts experienced economic growth. They would thus be expected to be more cohesive (stronger bonding) than their secular counterparts during the early 1990s (1993–1998) when they were being formed; and to grow less cohesive (stronger bridging) in later periods.

3.2.2. Political and civic integration
While most network approaches do not differentiate the content of ties (i.e. between political, economic and civic types of ties) to explain network effects, there are good reasons to do so in a study of social movements in late-developing countries. However, social movement scholars have incorporated links to political elites as determinants of mobilisation success into their analyses. For example, Snow and Cress (2000) find that sympathetic allies in the city council increase the success rate of local homeless mobilisation, among other factors. Similarly, Amenta and his colleagues (Amenta, 2006; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Amenta, Caren, Fetner, & Young, 2002; Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992) argue for the presence of both strong organisations and a sympathetic political context:

They propose a political mediation model, whereby successful mobilisation typically requires mediation by supportive actors in political institutions. In particular, they look at the presence of sympathetic regimes and state bureaucracies that would benefit from protest outcomes (in addition to the presence of strong SMOs). In the absence of sympathetic political actors, they argue that more aggressive tactics are likely to be required by SMOs in order to obtain desired outcome. (Cress & Snow, 2000)

Similarly, in the Turkish context, Tuğal’s (2009) ethnography stresses that institutional change cannot happen only in the sphere of ‘civil society’, as state institutions still are the most powerful source of legitimacy in the normalisation process of identities, habits and everyday practices. The state remains a major target and source for BAs in Turkey after economic liberalisation (Buğra, 1994), and the
continued decentralisation has increased the importance of the state-business relationship at the local level (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010). The extent of political ties, then, increases the political influence of a movement, not only by providing access to state resources and legitimacy, but also by providing security vis-à-vis threatening elites. The high vulnerability of Islamic political parties and civil society, in the Turkish case, makes necessary further civic ties as sources of legitimacy and as platforms to reach out to actors at the grassroots level. My network study therefore compares to what extent and how political and civic elites are integrated into Islamic vs secular BAs. I track affiliation networks from the formation of the first BA in 1993 to 2012.

Expectation for extent of civic and political integration: The heightened vulnerability of political parties and civil society in the Turkish case makes extensive civic ties particularly important for political influence. First, I expect Islamic networks to have fewer political ties than the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 period when they were in the periphery of power. However, their relative share of political members should increase over time alongside their growing political influence. Second, I expect Islamic networks to make up for their lack of access to resources through political elites in the 1993–1998 period by relying more on internal resource exchange with civic elites through cohesive networks. They should thus exhibit a larger share of civic ties compared to the secular coalition. Third, I expect the extent of civic ties to be strong not just in early periods, but in all time periods (1993–2012), as the Gülen community has been strongly incorporated in the Islamic movement since its foundation.

3.2.3. Multiplexity and effects

Another key aspect of networks that facilitate political influence is how these three layers of relationships meet and intersect. A movement that approximates a bonding network would not only show high density, but also include strongly overlapping ties across the business, political and civic spheres; that is, many BA members are, at the same time, members of political parties and civil society organisations. Safford (2009) calls this type of overlap across relationship layers, embedded multiplexity. A movement that approximates a bridging network would feature comparatively independent business, political, and civic layers, where being a secular member in a
BA does not increase the chances of being a member in a political party and/or civil society organisation, for example.

Multiplexity has been shown to have effects for political mobilisation. For example, Sean Safford (2009) and Padgett and Ansell (1993) analyse the emergence and effects of regional networks from a long-term historical perspective, and come to the conclusion that networks of intersecting multiplexity (with independent relationship layers) bring greater advantages for economic development and political mobilisation. While Padgett and Ansell explain the political mobilisation of the Medicean political party in Renaissance Florence, Safford focuses on the successful economic restructuring of Allentown in contrast to Youngstown (from the 18th century). Both studies stress the negative effects of strong, cohesive and multiplex ties across different layers of relationships (i.e. embedded multiplexity). According to Safford, the key variable in shaping the different post-industrial trajectories of Youngstown vs Allentown is the type of multiplexity shaping the availability of leadership and of focal organisations within a social structure; these can serve as unifying forums of interaction and engagement in critical moments of restructuring. Intersecting multiplexity allows for diverse information sources to solve complex problems, and provides a larger pool of potential leaders. This goes against the bonding view that holds that more overlapping ties cause a closer and holistic bond, in which obligations spill over from one sphere to the other.

Social movement scholars have also studied multiplexity, but less in connection with the bridging or bonding debate, and more because of its consequence for movement expansion and coalition building. Scholars of networks in movements have shown how networks of individual activists can help create formal coalitions between organisations, and how they can create bridges between social movement organisations (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004; Mische, 2008). Including resource-rich actors and organisations into the movement can increase influence for resource-poor actors in the periphery, and increase its political influence in the long run. Studying the emergence of how the civic, business and political spheres have come to intersect is key in the Turkish case. Strong threats have made illegal formal alliances between political parties and Islamic groups. However, studies on the AKP have claimed that the new moderate Islamists have gained political influence through their grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with entrepreneurs and the Gülen movement. How the Islamic movement has managed to
increasingly mobilise both civic and conservative political elites at the grassroots level is puzzling. To shed light on this phenomenon, I track their organisational ties across the three relationship types in comparison with the secular coalition. This can help understand what kind of networking tactics Islamic actors have used under conditions of politico-religious threats.

Expectation for multiplexity: In the Turkish case, formal alliances between political parties and Islamic groups are illegal. However, studies on the AKP have claimed that the new moderate Islamists have gained political influence through their grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with entrepreneurs and the Gülen movement. Thus, in the 1993–1998 period, I expect the Islamic movement to have a weaker membership overlap between civic and political elites than in the secular coalition. In the later time periods, I expect increasingly stronger overlapping memberships across the three types in the Islamic movement (i.e. ‘embedded multiplexity’). I track how this change from weak to strong overlapping memberships has been achieved over time.

3.3. Collective action frames
This study focuses on an in-depth study of how Islamic BAs have gained political influence at the expense of established secular elites by generating innovative social movement tactics, namely, informal grassroots networks to support resource exchange, and framing to bring diverse actors together in a common cause and identity. After studying how Islamic versus secular BAs have built informal grassroots networks as alternative, non-traditional platforms for the creation of solidarity, resource exchange and political influence, I will focus on what has actually ‘happened’ in these networks. Framing activities have been a key tactic supporting Islamic BAs’ power building.

The creation of collective action frames is another central process of successful movements that has not been discussed in the existing BA literature. Social movement literature asserts that the ‘coordination of collective action depends on the trust and cooperation that are generated among participants by shared understandings and identities, or, on the collective action frames that justify, dignify, and animate collective action’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31). Many great movements of the past centuries (seeking abolition of slavery, child labour, or the promotion of women’s suffrage movement) ‘sought major legislative changes, but were
unthinkable without altering people’s views, which depended upon reaching their hearts and minds’ (Snow, 2004, p. 390). Likewise, the moderately Islamic movement, and collaboration between business and other actors in the political or civic sphere, requires a common goal, vision, identity and thus binding mechanism. Collective action frames are essential to mobilise, bind together and organise or alter members’ views (Turner, 1983).

Collective action frames (frames in the following) are collections of idea elements tied together by a unifying concept that serve to punctuate, elaborate, and motivate action on a given topic (Snow & Benford, 1988). ‘Frame analysis is explicitly about social actors’ lenses as they are deployed, particularly in the service of collective advocacy, mobilization, or public policy’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Frames are collective ‘cognitive structures’ that we can access ‘through the spoken words of participants and written texts of social movement organisations’ (Johnston, 1995, p. 231). What frames do is ‘render events meaningful and thereby organize experiences and guide action’ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005). The framing perspective is rooted in a symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle that regards meanings as not automatically attached to objects, events or experiences, but as arising, instead, through interactively based interpretive processes (Snow, 2003). Frame analysis has been suggested as a strategy not just for social movements, but for organisational research, too. This method offers tools to analyse the effects of societal and contextual issues on organisations (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002, p. 35), and thus to unpack how culture and religion influence intra-and inter-organisational tactics.

Successful framing can have internal and external effects. It can bind social movement actors together internally, and create public legitimacy externally. Diagnostic and prognostic framing not only help to ‘define and bring into sharp focus grievances, targets of blame, targets of action, and lines of action, but, in doing so, may also help SMOs enhance organisational legitimacy within the organisational fields in which they are embedded’ (Cress & Snow, 2000). In turn, this legitimacy is likely to increase the prospect of securing sympathetic allies and official political support. In other words, effective framing creates cohesion, solidarity and trust by organising experiences and giving them a shared meaning, identity and goal, thereby promoting collective action. Public legitimacy is crucial for BAs in the Turkish
context where business remains dependent on state resources (Buğra, 1994) and where Anatolian capital and religious actors have been marginalised not just economically and politically, but also in the cultural sphere. Generally, private organisations that wish to influence public policy the need to build up legitimacy by formulating goals in alliance with public interests (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999).

The quality and mobilisation potency (‘resonance’) of a frame depend on how coherent, specific and complete it is, and in the Turkish context, how ideology is applied in it: Firstly, the quality of collective action frames can be judged by studying the quality of three inherent framing tasks that collective action frames ideally adhere to. The three relevant framing tasks to be studied in this research follow from Gamson and Lasch’s (1983), as well as Snow and colleagues’ research programme (Cress & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). These consist of ‘diagnostic framing’ (problem identification and attribution, including collective identities), ‘prognostic framing’ (goal or plan formulation), and ‘motivational framing’ (rationale for engaging in action, articulation of motive). By pursuing these core framing tasks, movement actors foster both consensus and action (Klandermans, 1984). The quality of frames depends on how coherent, complete and specific they are. In the highly polarised Turkish context another key qualifier is how well the content reflects the cultural narratives and symbols relating to the centre-periphery cleavage – a key qualifier of a frame’s resonance (mobilisation potency or quality). These are the two key sets of quality indicators applied in this research.

Social movement research has established that social movements need to tap into deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. Nationalism, ethnicity and religion are often used as bases for social movement organisation as they have been ‘more reliable bases of movement organization in the past than the categorical imperative of social class’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.11). This is especially true in Turkey and other late-emerging economies where mobilisation based on social class has been punished in favour of classless ideologies like nationalism, Kemalism and Islam (Buğra, 1994). In Turkey, as Ayşe Buğra (1994) argues, the specific historical ideological legacy has created a business community that is deeply dependent on the state. However, lobbying and class interests, and profit-maximisation are not legitimate objectives in a society that is still today shaped by the Ottoman legacy of a ‘classless society’, which means that such objectives are instead replaced with nationalist and
ideological themes. In such historical contexts, religion and ideology become major sources of solidarity and legitimacy that successful movements need to build upon. In environments of high politico-religious contention, successful mobilisation requires ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29).

Therefore, the framing chapter (Chapter V) analyses and compares how ideologies, especially Kemalism/secularism and Islam, are used in the collective action frames of Islamic and secular subgroups as sources of political influence. I compare the quality of Islamic and secular BAs’ frames with a special focus on their use of ideological variables in the three framing tasks. That is, how do their problem and goal formulations, collective identities and proposed tactics, create cohesion across an alliance of organisations as well as ideological power or legitimacy? Are the frames coherent, specific and complete? How has the Islamic movement incorporated the interests and claims of political, civic and business actors to create cohesion and solidarity across these SMOs? How have Islamic BAs managed to tap into deeply felt experiences and Islamic-cultural narrations vis-à-vis a threatening state? And most importantly, how have Islamic BAs married seemingly contradictory religious and moneymaking claims to create public legitimacy?

These questions link up with a set of processes identified in the framing literature: the ‘strategic efforts by social movement organizations to link their interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers’ are conceptualised as ‘frame alignment processes’ (Snow et al., 1986). Frames are ‘developed, generated, and elaborated on not only via attending to the three core framing tasks, but also by way of three sets of overlapping processes that can be conceptualized as discursive, strategic, and contested’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). Strategic processes are the most relevant in the present context,

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20 Framing processes comprise the definition of collective identities, i.e. the self-ascribed characteristics vis-à-vis other actors. The concept of ideology is different from frames, as parts of different ideologies can be combined in the process of framing (Snow, 2004). Ideology is a ‘broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs that affect one’s orientation not only to politics but to everyday life more generally’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). In contrast, frames are more action-oriented and fulfill a mobilisation purpose for a collectivity, whereby ideology can function as both a constraint and a resource, by influencing a frame’s resonance with cultural narratives.

21 Contested processes concern how counter-frames affect a movement’s activities, a process which is beyond the scope of the present analysis, as are discursive processes.
since they are goal-directed, aimed at recruiting and bringing together SMOs to facilitate resource-accumulation. These are efforts by SMOs to link their frames with other powerful actors and potential supporters and resource providers.

Four basic processes have been researched within these strategic processes, called frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. In my frame analysis I will explore whether and how processes of frame bridging, extension, amplification and transformation have been applied by the Islamic BAs. Frame transformation involves the re-definition or transformation of existing ideas to incorporate them into an existing frame. For frame transformation, ‘new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or ‘misframings’ reframed’ (Tarrow, 1992, p. 188). ‘Frame amplification involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). This process seems particularly relevant to enhance ideological resonance in a context of politico-religious contention:

Given that one of the key factors affecting whether or not a proffered frame resonates with potential constituents has to do with the extent to which the frame taps into existing cultural values, beliefs, narratives, folk wisdom, and the like, it is not surprising to find that most movements seek to amplify extant beliefs and values. (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624)

And while I do not have data to study how movement frames have invigorated the existing values of members, I study in detail how ideologies have been incorporated into movement frames and build upon those pre-existing values. Frame bridging refers to ‘the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Of particular interest is here how Islamic BAs have brought together Islamic with neoliberal capitalist references to integrate them into a coherent frame. Additionally, how have the views of businessmen, the AKP and the Gülen community been incorporated into Islamic BAs’ views? This question links to the process of frame extension, which concerns the extension of the boundaries of the proposed frame to include views and interests of targeted groups.

3.4. Resources, activities and organisational structures

After analysing the emergence of the Islamic network that has contributed to the political influence of Islamic BAs, and the frames that supported these networks, I will analyse what kind of resources have been exchanged within these networks.
today to perpetuate these ties. What activities or tactics do Islamic compared to secular BAs offer to their members through their embedded networks with political and civic elites? In other words, what kind of power is created through such resources: is the focus on economic growth activities for SMEs only, as some institutional void accounts of BAs would have it? Or do political activities go beyond rent seeking, as Olson (1971) conceptualises BAs, to include more collective activities like providing political support and policy influence? And is there an ideological and contentious aspect about these tactics that would qualify BAs as movements? Are these activities and resource exchanges in line with the tactics, goals, and identities constructed in their collective action frames?

To answer such questions, I compare the resources provided by Islamic versus secular BAs through their various activities in the political, economic and civic realms. To understand the political influence of the Islamic movement, it is essential to study the activities of and resources exchanged among allied BAs and civil society organisations at the grassroots level. These constitute central sources of political power. Among such resources, organisational capacities’ influence on political mobilisation has been much studied by movement scholars (Amenta, 2006; Gamson, 1990). Movements require some degree of formal organisations to survive and exert public and political influence (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124). The key for movement organisers is to construct organisations that are robust enough to structure contention and to collaborate with other SMOs, yet flexible enough to include local communities and informal networks (Diani, 2009, cited in Tarrow, 2011). Resource mobilisation approaches (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977) argue that organisations with more resources are essential for political mobilisation and internal control. Such resources include the availability of organisational venues, expertise, time and financial assets. In this traditional view of social movements, informal as well as formal forms of organisation were regarded as important as they ‘offer insurgents sites for initial mobilization at the time opportunities present themselves and condition their capacity to exploit their new resources. Despite some evidence to the contrary (…), a large body of evidence finds organizational strength correlated with challengers’ ability to gain access and win concessions’ (McAdam et al., 2001). Gamson (1990), for example, comparing 53 American challenging groups, finds that strongly hierarchical and centralised organisations, among other factors, were the most effective at achieving policy outcomes. Equally, in the BA literature,
organisational capacities have been found to fulfil essential functions of political mobilisation: first, the ‘control’ of members to follow common goals, and second, the mobilisation at the local level to support those goals (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). This BA literature also stresses that ‘strong organisations’ are necessary to provide the policy and political support that political elites require during vulnerable times (Doner & Schneider, 2000; Schneider, 2004). However, in the Turkish literature it stated that Anatolian SMEs have thrived on grassroots mobilisation in combination with ties to the hierarchically-organised AKP (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). My analysis of the organisational structures of Islamic BAs thus aims to resolve this puzzle to analyse which combination of hybrid structures has allowed Islamic BAs to be flexible enough to integrate bottom-up resources interests, yet also allow top-down control.

More recent social movement research has focused on hybrid forms that manage to combine grassroots groups with bureaucratic and centralised organisations – an insight that could also apply to the dominant BA literature that regards centralised organisations as the most effective. Tarrow (2011, p.129) summarises the literature on hybrid forms, which includes a range of local, regional, and national, centralised and decentralised membership and non-membership organisations. McCarthy (2005: 196, cited in Tarrow, 2011) identifies a wide variety of action types of social movement organisations, ranging from classical federated structures all the way to freestanding local groups through a variety of regional and networked organisations. The following section outlines the indicators of organisational strength developed in the BA literature that I will compare among secular and Islamic BAs.

**Indicators for organisational strength**

Following major studies of BAs’ organisational structures, proxies for organisational strength concern associations’ material resources and internal intermediation mechanisms (Schneider, 2004; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). The mere existence and persistence of economy-wide BAs is an indicator of strength, as it shows the amount of money and time that prominent capitalists invest. Additionally, an estimate of BAs’ staff and branches reveals the material investment by its members and its key constituencies. The quality of internal intermediation is another important indicator of the organisational viability of an association’s organisational strength (Schneider
2004), however, Schneider (2004) does not provide clear indicators of this important concept. Therefore, I apply Schmitter and Streeck’s (1999) definition of ‘organised complexity’, which concerns the functional differentiation of tasks and interests into subunits (e.g. into sectoral committees), and the institutionalised coordination toward common goals among such subunits, (which can be achieved internally or externally). The level of centralisation/hierarchy, or how local-level branches and the national-level headquarters relate to each other, is also key in how the balance between controlling and attracting a heterogeneous (because economy-wide) membership is achieved. These latter aspects (centralisation, coordination) concern the internal intermediation of BAs. According to the authors, multi-level pyramids, such as those of the confederations Tuskon and Türkonfed, represent the highest forms of organisational capacity as they allow both centralised control and responsivity to local members’ interests.

4. Design and methods
The ultimate purpose of this study is to infer explanatory hypotheses, and to further existing explanations of how and when BAs gain political influence through a case study of how Islamic BAs have increasingly displaced secular ones in Turkey. Existing literatures rooted in political entrepreneurship and collective action cannot sufficiently explain when and how Islamic BA have gained political influence. I address this ‘inadequacy’ (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) through a comparative case study at the grassroots level of secular and Islamic BAs in Turkey from 1993 to 2012. By in-depth study of how Islamic BAs have applied ideology in networks, frames and resource building to generate political influence, I aim to add grassroots ideology-based mechanisms of power-building to the BA literature. The comparison with the secular BA serves as a necessary ‘control’.

By selecting an ‘outlier’, ‘deviant’ (Lijphart, 1971), or negative case that is poorly explained by existing explanatory variables, we can identify unknown causes and mechanisms (Evera, 1997). Therefore, this kind of case study has also been called a ‘theory-generating’ (Evera, 1997) or ‘explorative’ case study (Hancké, 2009). The justification for selecting Gaziantep as a suitable city case is presented in the following chapter, which defines the suitable universe of cases among Anatolian industrial districts.
This study follows a grounded theory approach to theory building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The strength of qualitative methodologies is precisely that it allows one to go beyond strict hypothesis testing by engaging in the on-going refinement of concepts, the iterated fine-tuning of hypotheses, and the use of specially targeted case studies that appear likely to suggest new hypotheses and theoretical ideas, which can then be tested (Munck, 2004). Accordingly, I adopt a qualitative approach to social networks that relies on the interpretation of visual graphs aided by network indicators. The analyses of resources, organisational structures and collective action frames rely on a thematic analysis, and a frame analysis of semi-structured interviews and further archival data.

This section justifies the selection of manufacturing companies largely from the textile cluster in Gaziantep for the analyses of networks, frames and activities. As this sample affects all three empirical chapters, it is discussed in the present section; further methods will be discussed within the three respective empirical chapters focusing on networks, frames and activities/resources. Findings are based on 51 interviews with 36 actors and further archival data as well as membership data for the network analysis; all based on Gaziantep’s textile manufacturing cluster. The frame and resource-exchange analysis rely on different sections of the same interview material (and further documents). The analysis of resources is conducted via a thematic analysis, while collective action frames rely on a frame analysis.

Selection of interviewees
The following overview of interviewees is summarised in Table 1. Interviewees were chosen to represent as large a variety as possible of politico-religious views and affiliations. According to their affiliations and interview material, businessmen were placed into the following categories reflecting their politico-religious views: Islamic Leaders and Islamic Businessmen (differentiating between those who are active in organisations, and pious businessmen who are less active in organisations); Strategic Political Entrepreneurs (owner family/board members turned politicians – mainly members of conservative parties which represent business interests); Strategic Businessmen (who may lean in Islamic or secular directions, but who join different associations, depending on the incumbent government); and Secular Businessmen (those who do not join Islamic groups at all). These categories were merged in the network analysis and translated into either ‘Islamic’, ‘mixed’, or ‘secular’ codes, or
given no coding at all. Industry and coalition leaders were identified with the help of local experts from the GSO and BAs. Such leaders are the most involved in politico-religious arrangements; ‘outsiders’ and former elites were added to the sample in addition to current leaders. Further snowball sampling was employed, by asking businesspeople for further connections from their sector. I also tried to balance the number of interviewees among SMEs and larger firms, but note that the sample is skewed toward larger industrial firms, some of which are among the top 1000 in Turkey. However, these are the companies mainly involved in setting the political agenda.

Interviews were semi-structured and questions differed between businessmen, and association and civil society organisations and public institution representatives. Because of the sensitivity of politics and religious issues, not all businessmen were asked the same questions. I conducted 51 semi-structured interviews in total. Some of these interviews represent different roles of businessmen, e.g. as both a BA representative and individual member/industrialist. In total, 36 distinct interviewees are quoted in this research. Of these, 26 are businessmen (22 owner-managers/board members, 3 top-level managers, 1 lead engineer) and 9 are current BA leaders or representatives. Two interviewees are leaders of Müsiad at the national level, while all the others are leaders or representatives of Gaziantep’s associations. All of Gaziantep’s BAs are included, namely, the Islamic Tuskon affiliates Hürsiad and Gapgiad, as well as Müsiad’s Gaziantep branch and the secular Gagiad. All but two of the businessmen are active in the textile industry cluster and included in the network analysis; the other two businessmen have companies in other sectors and provided insightful insider information beyond sectoral concerns. In addition to those 26 businesspeople interviewed, the sample consists of 5 representatives of relevant public institutions: the municipality, the Kosgeb (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organisation), the Development Agency, the City Council, and one teacher. All interviews were conducted in Turkish and subsequently transcribed verbatim. An approximate interview guide can be found in the appendix section 9.

Textile cluster sample
The following industries were included in the textile cluster sample (following NACE Rev. 2 codes, see appendix 1. for further details): manufacture of textiles
(preparation of cotton and other fibres, weaving and finishing of textiles; manufacture of other textiles like knitted fabrics, technical textiles, carpets and rugs; manufacture of wearing apparel (e.g. underwear and work wear); manufacture of leather and related products especially footwear; and manufacture of rubber and plastic products (especially plastic shoe wear, packing goods and plastic goods and sacs). The textile cluster incorporates several industries along the value-chain, from the spinning and preparation of yarn, to the manufacturing of dyes and side products like plastic. Other cluster-related industries of the textile industry like dyeing, design services, or machinery were excluded due to fundamental differences in production and task requirements. The same applies to service-industries like design services or machinery repair workshops. Note that the production of plastic packing goods resembles the production of yarns as the same resource is used and several companies are involved in both or diversify into plastics.

Industry- and production-specific requirements can influence inter-organisational ties and network strategies with institutions (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 2005), and therefore a specific industry was selected. For example, in industries that require a large amount of government regulation, e.g. contracting and telecommunications, political ties may become more important for businessmen than in less regulated industries. Furthermore, limiting the sample to organisations providing the same types of services enhances comparability and reduces extraneous sources of variation and measurement error (Becker & Gerhart, 1996, p. 792). By selecting companies from one specific cluster, we can rule out the explanation that specific production and task requirements in textiles shape the differential networking strategies of Islamic and secular companies.

The classification as a textile firm is based on the firms’ primary activities (e.g. carpets, apparel, technical textiles). Diversification represents the major growth strategy of most Turkish firms, which is common in many emerging markets (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001), and most large firms are integrated to include yarn production, dyeing and carpet production, for example. Companies move to diversify into areas as they become profitable, such as currently non-woven technical textiles, or energy production (several interviews). While the industry code thus reflects the major activity, most sample firms have diversified activities, albeit mainly in textiles and related industries (e.g. the carpet manufacturer Merinos has moved into furniture production to grow in the interior designs area). Therefore, I would argue that the
present findings are not limited to the textile cluster, but have implications for other industries as well.

Why was the textile cluster chosen over other industries? Most importantly, it is this rapid growth to one of Gaziantep’s largest industries, and its overtaking of existing industrial centres that makes the textile cluster the most relevant cluster to study. It is among the internationally most competitive and largest of Gaziantep’s industries with roots back in the 14th century. Gaziantep’s textile sector is among the city’s most developed in terms of technology and capacity utilisation (Söylemez, Arslan, Çakar, Kalaycioğlu, & Özgen, 2012). The textile industries of Gaziantep, especially the manufacture of carpets and related products, developed fast in the post-liberalisation phase from the 1980s, overtaking the traditional leading textile cities Istanbul, Adana, Bursa and Izmir. Rather than being deeply embedded in Antep’s history, the successful machine-woven carpet industry, for example, emerged in Gaziantep only in the 1970s and grew as result of export-drive in the 1980s and 1990s (Oz, 2004). Companies can be considered ‘young’ overall, but due to Antep’s long industrial history, companies are more mature than in some industrial districts like Denizli that have even more recent industrial histories (Ayata, 2004). Textile companies appear to be younger than that estimate as a more recent survey by the TEK for the textile, apparel and leather industries in Gaziantep finds that only a small percentage of companies were founded before 1980, and the large majority founded in the late 1990s and 2000s (Söylemez et al., 2012). Because of a lack of coherent data on SMEs (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2004), the actual figure remains somewhat unclear.

Nevertheless, this industry incorporates some of the city’s oldest and largest holding companies, allowing studying leading holding companies such as Sanko or Merinos, and increasing the potential for studying changes across time. Not only are there more mature firms, but the textile cluster also incorporates a variety of younger firms developing in the new millennium, all of which allows studying the networking strategies of a large variety of firms that have emerged and grown in different political environments. By selecting firms within a growing cluster, this study attains a variety of firms with different affiliations, yet incorporates the most successful examples of secular and Islamic elites across time.
Selection of manufacturing companies

Only textile companies registered at the GSO were included. In Gaziantep, industrial firms have to register at the GSO as opposed to the Gaziantep Chamber of Trade (GTO). The GTO encompasses merchant and traders and non-industrial interests (e.g. construction sector), while the GSO encompasses industrial interests. Until 1989, the two Chamber Bodies used to be united under one roof; companies registered before 1989 are therefore usually members of both.

Bayırbağ (2010, 2011), in his in-depth study of Gaziantep’s associational landscape, observes that the GSO is politically and economically more powerful than the GTO. The membership base of the GTO and the GSO combined constitutes around one third of the entrepreneurs in Gaziantep.

The rest, composed of petty traders and artisans, i.e. the ‘esnaf’, are organised under a separate local union of numerous sector-based chambers, (…) which is represented by the TESK (The Confederation of Tradesmen and Artisans of Turkey) at the national level. Despite the fact that the (…) esnaf has a large membership base with a strong guild tradition and sense of sectoral solidarity, and that such micro-enterprises considerably contribute to the employment in the city, esnaf remains at the periphery of the local political arrangements and the local policymaking scene. (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 12)

Therefore, the study sample excludes firms that operate only in trade or commerce (i.e. are registered at the GTO), as well as small shopkeepers, artisans and workshops (‘esnaf’). Naturally this manufacturing sample has a larger section of large companies than is typical for Turkey’s industry overall. The economy-wide voluntary BAs in Turkey aim to mainly organise powerful industrial companies (several interviews). Additionally, the growth of Anatolian industrial districts has been driven by the manufacturing sector. Consequently, this study focuses on industrial companies registered at the GSO. SMEs and family firms dominate Gaziantep’s economy at large as is typical for Turkey’s economy. In a 2011 study, 53% of companies were estimated to be micro firms with 1–9 employees; 32% of companies were small (10–49); 5% medium (50–99); 7% large (100–250) and 3% very large (above 250) (Kunt & Zobu, 2011). Data on size are not available for all sample companies, but interviews were conducted predominantly among SMEs and very large firms rather than micro-enterprises.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee no.</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Dates of Interview</th>
<th>Company Size, Age (GSO registration date) and Size (employees) in 2012* in Textile</th>
<th>Organisation/Company category</th>
<th>Network coding of company based on affiliations across three time periods (Islamic/Secular/Mixed/None); Same for all time periods unless indicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hürsiad representative (Tuskon)</td>
<td>30/06/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hürsiad leadership (Tuskon) Owner-manager</td>
<td>29/11/11</td>
<td>2001; Medium (2)</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gapgiad representative (Tuskon)</td>
<td>29/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gapgiad leadership (Tuskon) Owner-manager</td>
<td>17/11/11</td>
<td>1984 Very large (4)</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I (99-12); None (93-98)</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Gagiad representative</td>
<td>13/6/11 16/11/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Secular Leadership</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gagiad leadership</td>
<td>23/6/11</td>
<td>Not in textile</td>
<td>Secular Leadership</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Müsiad Gaziantep leadership</td>
<td>14/6/11</td>
<td>Not in textile</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Müsiad co-founder</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>Not in textile</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Müsiad HQ representative</td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>Not in textile</td>
<td>Islamic Leadership</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Municipality employee</td>
<td>2/12/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>City Council representative Owner-manager</td>
<td>8/12/11</td>
<td>1998 Small or Medium (1 or 2)</td>
<td>Strategic Political Entrepreneur (conservative)</td>
<td>n/a S (04-12); M (93-03) (overall mixed)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Kosgeb representative</td>
<td>29/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Development Agency representative</td>
<td>21/6/11</td>
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<td>Public Institution</td>
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<td>Not quoted</td>
<td>GSO/GTO representatives (ca. 4 for data, referrals, publications)</td>
<td>16/6/11 and other</td>
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<td>Public Institution</td>
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<td>Academic, University in Gaziantep</td>
<td>23/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Academic, University in Gaziantep</td>
<td>23/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Academic, University in Gaziantep</td>
<td>17/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution</td>
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<td>3 Academics in Istanbul who have worked on Anatolian capital; and further at Zirve Uni</td>
<td>May 2010 20/6/11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Public Institution – Uni</td>
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<td>Type of Business Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Teacher in Gaziantep 5/12/11 n/a Public Institution n/a</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Owner-manager 14/6/11 1995; Large (3) Islamic Business (99-03; 04-12), None (93-98)</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Owner-manager 28/11/11 1990; Large (3) Islamic Business (04-12), None (93-03)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Top-level employee 20/6/11 1992; Large (3) Islamic Business (99-03; 04-12), None (93-98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Owner-manager 1 15/6/11 2001; Medium (2) Islamic Business (little membership) (04-12), None (93-98)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Owner-managers 2 and 3 2/12/11 2001; Medium (2) Islamic Business (little membership) None (but pious)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Owner-manager 27/6/11 1993; Medium (2) Islamic Business (little membership) None (but pious)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Owner-manager 30/11/11 1985 Very large (4) Strategic Political Entrepreneur Mix (04-12), S (93-03)</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Owner-manager 21/11/11 1973 Large (3) Strategic Political Entrepreneur Mix (04-12), S (93-03)</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Owner-manager 21/6/11 1988; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12), I (93-03)</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Top-level manager 24/6/11 1988; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12), I (93-03)</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Top-level manager 7/12/11 Textile: 2003; Medium (2); Overall group: (3) Strategic Business I</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Owner-manager 23/11/11 1996; Large (3) Strategic Business Mix (04-12), I (99-03); None (93-98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Owner-manager 22/11/11 1996; Medium (2) Strategic Business None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Owner-manager 25/11/11 1983; Very large (4) Strategic Business (tend secular) S (04-12), I (99-03); Mixed (93-98) (strategic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Owner-manager 20/11/11 1993; Medium (2) Secular Business S (strategic)</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Owner-manager 22/6/11 1993; Medium (2) Secular Business S (99-12); None (93-98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Owner-manager; co-founder of secular organisations 13 and 22/6/11 1988; Small (1) Secular Business S</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Top-level manager outside textiles 5/12/11 Not in textile Secular-Nationalist Not in textile sample</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Owner-manager outside textiles 18/11/11 Not in textile Secular-Nationalist Not in textile sample</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Classification of firm size based on number of employees; source: provided by GSO (largest companies only); interviews and company homepages: Small firms (1) <49 employees; Medium firms (2) 50–249 employees; Large firms (3) 250–999 employees; Very large firms (4): 1000+ employees*
Chapter III Background and Case Selection: The Political Influence of Anatolian Capital

In the following, I present data and literature to establish the empirical puzzle or phenomenon, namely that Islamic BAs’ political influence has increased at the national level, and also that leadership in Chamber Bodies is an important site of political contestation (and therefore a valid indicator). I then show that the regional arena is key to understanding the political empowerment of the Islamic BAs. Anatolian capital is the backbone of the Turkish Islamic movement, its political parties and BAs that have developed into new economic growth centres and elites. Finally, I justify the selection of Gaziantep as a city case to study the local arena of political contention, and give a short overview over its industry.

In the second part of this chapter I analyse the background conditions that have shaped BAs’ power-building activities and social movement tactics, which will be analysed in more detail in the following three empirical chapters. I trace the institutional changes in business politics, through the lens of ‘political opportunity structures’. I use the term politico-religious contention to summarise the key POS that have shaped the emergence, tactics and political influence of Islamic BAs.

1. The puzzle: the political rise of the Islamic movement
1.1. Indicators of political influence

Controlling leadership positions in Chamber Bodies is an important source of power at both regional and national levels. In spite of the multiplicity of voluntary BAs, the Chambers maintain their role of guiding the Turkish economy through their participation in official, social and commercial institutions and establishments (Atan, 2004). Membership is obligatory. At the regional level, the Chambers’ potential to integrate sectoral interests into a single Chamber Assembly, provides businesspeople with an official and influential voice to represent local economic interests more widely.22 The Chambers fulfil a range of bureaucratic functions that are highly relevant to businessmen, providing official documentation to members e.g. for export activities. Most importantly, they connect local businessmen with government

22 Each provincial or sub-provincial Chamber of Commerce and/or Industry has ‘a single Chamber Assembly where all sectors are equally represented. Sector specific issues are dealt with initially at the level of sectoral committees, but the decision-making organ is the assembly’ (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 9).
bodies. Because of such functions, leadership positions in Chambers provide ample opportunities to influence policymaking, to represent business interests to elites and to acquire easier access to information and resources from government bodies.

In order to acquire such top-level posts, businesspeople face several elections from the lower to the upper-level hierarchical bodies of the Chambers. Appointments into higher-level decision-making bodies such as the Chamber Assembly and the Board of Directors are the result of deliberate and careful campaigning among Chamber members (interview 34). Several observers of Turkish business politics regard the Chambers as an important site of political contention. Bayırbağ’s (2011) study of Gaziantep’s associational landscape observes that private BAs like Müsiad try to ‘take over’ or appropriate the semi-public Chambers (Bayırbağ, 2011). Aysçe Buğra also regards the Chambers as an arena for political contestation; in an interview she states:

It’s not easy for governments to control the Chambers. There’s little research on this topic, but Chambers have always been arenas where very lively political debates have been fought out. Governments cannot easily influence them because the Chambers’ governance mechanisms are democratic, elections are taken very seriously; they’re strong bodies. During elections, voluntary organisations compete for the highest posts to take control of its administration, and build election alliances. We can say that Turkey’s polarization also affects the Chambers (…) but I don’t think as strongly as in other structures. (Özvarış, 2013)

Consequently, leadership positions in the GSO and the national-level TOBB serve as indicators of political influence, both for companies and for BAs. In line with this, many businessmen in Gaziantep, the city case, regard the Chambers as an integrating

Legislation states that Chambers are responsible for a range of bureaucratic and technical tasks (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB Legislation], 2004), ranging from providing official government documentation as well as information and news on industry, trade and relevant legislations, to managing industrial sites, setting industry standards (e.g. in capacity usage, wastage), and to aggregate industry interests and inform government bodies. For businesspeople this is highly relevant when, for example, Chamber leadership can get into easy contact with the Energy Ministry if there are problems with access to electricity in parts of an industrial site. To give another example, official documentation from the Chambers is required for businesspeople to register a company, to get bank credits, buy input or other material from SOEs, etc. (interview 34).

The lowest organs are the ‘meslek gruplari’ or professional groups, followed by Sectoral Committees, the Chamber Assembly, and finally the Board of Directors. Businesspeople can then be elected from regional into national-level Chamber Bodies (some positions become automatic members) (“Oda ve borsaları seçim heyecanı sardı [Chambers in Election Fever],” 2008, Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB Legislation], 2004).

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body efficient at aggregating industry interests into one voice (e.g. interviews 6, 19, 21, 31, 34). The political influence of the GSO both at the local and national level has also been observed by Bayırbağ’s study (2011) of Gaziantep’s BAs’ political contention. The weight of the GSO’s membership in Gaziantep’s economy turned it ‘into a political agent that constantly negotiated the boundary between the local and non-local, exploring and introducing new agendas, thus becoming the agenda setter of the local corporate regime’ (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 11). Gaziantep’s economic growth has also been reflected in their improved position among national-level institutions.25 In an interview with the GSO’s secretary-general in the same study, the GSO representative gives some examples of this:

While it [GSO] was being represented with one delegate in the TOBB at the beginning [note: from 1989], now it is represented with three delegates. Our President of the Chamber is on its Management Board (‘koordinasyon kurulu’) [of TOBB at the national level]. Our President of the [Chamber] Assembly is on the [TOBB’s] Industry Council. Also, since 1980, Gaziantep has sent Ministers to every government. (Bayırbağ, 2011, p. 15)

Indeed, many of GSO’s and TOBB’s long-term leaders continue to enter party politics at the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey), e.g. Nejat Koçer, the GSO’s 11-year long president entered parliament in the 2011 national elections as an MP (Member of Parliament, ‘milletvekili’) for the AKP. In sum, leadership positions at the GSO constitute an important source of power for Gaziantep’s businessmen, both to shape the local corporate regime, yet also to reach national decision-makers. Therefore, such positions are used as an indicator of political influence.

1.2. The political influence of Islamic business associations at the national level

Islamic BAs have increasingly acquired important leadership positions in the semi-public TOBB. Another important aspect of their influence is that they have increased their membership in size and variety, becoming the most encompassing and dominant associations of the business community. That is, at the expense of their main competitor, Tüsiad (Turkish Industry and Business Association; 1971–), the

25 A number of members are elected and partly sent from each regional Body of Chamber into the national Body of Chambers, TOBB. From the ‘Genel Kurul’ or National Assembly, organized along broad sectoral lines into five Councils (‘konsey’), members can be further elected into the Board of Directors and other management bodies. (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği ile Odalar ve Borsalar Kanunu [TOBB Legislation], 2004).
oldest Turkish voluntary BA, which represents the first generation of state-nurtured, western-oriented, holding companies from the Istanbul-Marmara region (Buğra, 1998). Figures are hard to come by and are limited to the BAs’ own irregular claims and reports and researchers’ interviews or newspaper articles.

For example, two recent chairmen of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO), and TOBB vice-presidents, are at the same time influential members of the Islamic BA Müsiad, as well as AKP founding members. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce is one of the largest chambers representing approximately 300,000 of TOBB’s total 1.6 million members (Özgentürk, 2012). Further more systematic data will be presented for the regional-level analysis below.

Islamic BAs represent a wider variety of businesspeople than secular BAs do, and while their combined industrial output remains smaller than that of Tüsiad’s, it has grown considerably. In the 1990s, Müsiad ‘became the country’s largest and most widespread businessmen’s association (…)’ (Eligür, 2010, p. 203). Müsiad’s membership consisted of ca. 136 businessmen in 1991, which increased to 524 by 1993, roughly doubled to 1000 by 1996, and stood at 1500 by 2001 at the time of the AKP’s formation. According to some very optimistic figures, in 1998, Müsiad was representing ‘nearly ten thousand enterprises, which together employed roughly half a million people. The member enterprises’ annual revenue in 1998 was $2.79 billion’. After the AKP’s formation these figures grew even faster, so that the association reached around 2000 members in 2003 and around 3000 members in 2009. In the 2011–2012 period, Müsiad had 3,150 senior members (and another 1750 members in their ‘Young Müsiad’ section), representing more than 15,000 companies, whereas Tüsiad had 600 members representing around 2,500 firms in

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26 This section refers to Murat Yalçıntaş, who had a background in political Islam before joining the AKP, and İbrahim Çalık, both of whom went on to become vice-presidents of TOBB. Murat Yalçıntaş was the FP (Fazilet Parti; Virtue Party) Istanbul Regional Chairman’s Assistant (‘İstanbul İl başkan yardımcısı’) from 1998-2001. The FP is a political Islamist party that is part of the National Outlook Movement, from which the AKP split in 2001.

27 This data has been compiled from various sources: The figures concerning the 1990-2004 years were reported by Ali Bayramoğlu in the Milliyet Newspaper of April 4th, 2004, as reported in Gümüşçu (2008). The 2009 data was taken from Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010; the 2012 figures from Müsiad’s homepage (“MÜSIAD’la tanışın [Meet Müsiad],” 2012).
2011\(^{28}\) (TÜSIAD, 2011). Tüsiad represents a much smaller, albeit economically powerful section of the business community, and reflects Tüsiad’s strategy of remaining a club, selecting the largest holding companies as members. According to the associations’ information, Tüsiad members contribute 65% of the industrial production and 80% of the foreign trade volume of Turkey (“Verilerle TÜSIAD [Tüsiad in figures],” 2011). Nevertheless, Müsiad members contributed 15% of Turkey's GDP and 17 billion US Dollars to Turkey's export revenue in 2012 (“MÜSIAD’la tanıșın [Meet Müsiad],” 2012).

The confederation Tuskon, which is affiliated with the Gülen community and was only founded in 2005, already represented around 33,260 entrepreneurs in 2012 (www.tuskon.org). The secular equivalent to Tuskon is the confederation Türkönfed (Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation), initiated by Tüsiad in 2004. Although both the secular Türkönfed and the Islamic Tuskon were founded almost at the same time, Türkönfed represents far fewer\(^{29}\) businessmen than Tuskon. The Islamic BAs also have more branches throughout Turkey and include more small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than their secular counterparts, making their membership base more heterogeneous.

This development has been paralleled in the business sphere as more and more members of Islamic BAs have entered TOBB’s list of Turkey’s largest 1000 manufacturing firms (according to net sales figures). Although both Müsiad and Tuskon represent more SMEs than Tüsiad, big holding companies have increasingly developed across Anatolia. In fact, 55 Müsiad member companies were among Turkey’s biggest 1000 companies in 2008 (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010). The figure remains unclear for Tuskon, although it can be expected to be much larger due to its larger membership base.

In sum, it can be concluded that Islamic BAs represent a larger and more varied section of the business community and expanded their political influence as well as their economic potential, at the expense of secular elites and institutions. The latter have not disappeared or been completely displaced, but rather been forced to

\(^{28}\) That is up from 484 members in 2000 (TÜSIAD, 2001), and 545 members in 2005. Tüsiad’s figures refer to 2011, Müsiad’s to 2012.

\(^{29}\) In 2010, Türkönfed had 10,000 businessmen-members, organised in ten regional federations and 105 B.As, including Tüsiad (“TÜRKONFED History,” 2012).
adjust and appropriate. How can we explain this political rise of Islamic BAs to the very centres of power at the national level? As established in the Turkish studies literature (see previous chapters), the local and grassroots level play a key role in this empowerment. The following section establishes that Anatolian capital is the backbone of the Turkish Islamic movement, its political parties and BAs, and that it has developed into new economic growth centres and elites.

1.3. Anatolian capital: the backbone of the Islamic movement

Turkish studies secondary literature, arguing that Anatolian capital is key in the Islamic movement’s empowerment, was presented in the literature review. This section confirms these claims with original data showing that Anatolian capital constitutes the power base of the moderately Islamic movement, of Islamic parties and of Islamic BAs. Parallel to the rise of the moderately Islamic movement. These formerly underdeveloped provinces in the periphery have developed into successful industrial districts.

Anatolian capital is a term used to coin these industrial centres, and businessmen, who are a product of the new liberalised era of economic development, have been catching-up with the traditional industrial centres (Istanbul, Kocaeli, Izmir, Bursa, Ankara, Adana). These were created and supported by a secular developmental state during the import-substitution-industrialisation era (1960–1979). The traditional industrial centres, and some of their neighbouring areas that have developed into the second generation of industrial centres, are depicted in Figure 1 in red and blue, while Anatolian capital is depicted in green. Based on economic performance indicators of private sector based manufacturing and the timing of the industrialisation process, Pamuk (2012) classifies Denizli, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya as part of Anatolian capital. These formerly neglected central- and south-eastern Anatolian regions have developed into new economic growth centres rivalling traditional industrial centres. In the last three decades, successful businesses in many manufacturing industries, notably in construction, furniture, textiles, food-processing and car-making, have tended to develop most in fast-growing Anatolian cities (“Silk road to riches,” 2010, p. 16). Anatolian industrial centres show rapid catch-up rates. In 1980, only 3.5% of the top
500 manufacturing companies had been located in these Anatolian districts (excluding Malatya), whereas this figure increased to 10.4% in 2008 for the top 500, and to 16.6% for the second top 500. This rapid catch-up is also reflected in the share of exports from the Anatolian region. Most notably Gaziantep and Denizli have moved into the top eight exporter provinces in Turkey in the 2000s. They are competing closely with the mature industrial centres in Izmir and Ankara (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012), and overtaking, for example, Adana in terms of their annual value of exports. The aggregate share of Anatolian industrial districts in national export and GDP rates remain low when compared to the aggregate traditional Turkish industrial provinces. Nevertheless, compared to the traditional Turkish industrial provinces, the share of Anatolian provinces in manufacturing value-added and in total exports has increased (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012). In spite of these impressive growth rates, the competitiveness of many Anatolian SMEs is unsustainable, as productivity and technology levels remain low for SMEs in Turkey in general, also because access to credit and equity is limited (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2004). The term Anatolian ‘tigers’ is clearly a euphemism, especially comparing the performance of Turkey with East Asian economies such as South Korea (Öniş & Bayram, 2008).

Figure 1: Traditional industrial provinces in red; second generation of industrial provinces in blue; third generation of industrial provinces/Anatolian capital in green
Islamic BAs operate in all parts of the country but, compared to secular BAs, a much larger section of their membership is made up of Anatolian capital. Indeed, a publicly announced goal of Müsiad’s formation has been ‘extending its organizational networks in eastern and south-eastern Turkey’ (Eligür, 2010, p. 202). Detailed, longitudinal membership data by region are not available, but based on the regional membership data presented in the secondary literature, the following estimates can be made: In 1995, about 30% of Müsiad’s member companies were registered in the newly emerging Anatolian districts (Denizli, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Konya, Malatya); circa 33% in the wider Istanbul region; and 10% in Ankara. In 2010, Müsiad’s membership in Anatolian districts has declined to represent 20% of its total membership, whereas its share of the Istanbul region has slightly increased to 36%.

The importance of local activism is clearly reflected in the number of branches outside of Istanbul and Ankara. Compared to the secular Tüsiad’s two branches across Turkey, Müsiad features representational offices in 31 of Turkey’s provinces (2012 data). There are 12 Tuskon-affiliated BAs in the 6 Anatolian growth centres, each of which also hosts Müsiad branches. In contrast, Tüsiad has no branches outside of Istanbul and Ankara. Türkonfed, the secular confederation and counterpart to Tuskon, in spite of its 133 member associations, also appears weak in central Anatolia. It currently has no BA affiliates, neither in Kayseri, Gaziantep, nor in Kahramanmaraş or Malatya. Interestingly, the BA Askon (‘Anadolu Aslanları İşadamları Derneği’) that is close to the present-day parties of the National Outlook Movement, compared to the moderately Islamic BAs, draws most of its members from the Marmara and Black Sea region rather than central- and southeast Anatolia (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010).

The fact that Anatolian capital is the political backbone of the Islamic movement can be seen in regional election patterns. Below, in Figure 2 and Figure 3, I present the municipality voting patterns of the six Anatolian capital municipalities from 1989 until 2009. I compiled the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute to encompass the study period of 1993–2012. The next section on Gaziantep presents voting patterns of the ‘lowest’ possible administrative region, Anatolian capital

31 Calculations are based on membership data presented in Buğra (1998), and Buğra & Savaşkan (2010).
provinces (NUTS-3 Region32), in general elections between 1991 and 2011. Local election data at the municipal level are assumed to reflect local dynamics more strongly than election data for the general elections at the national level.

The political Islamist parties of the National Outlook Movement (or ‘Milli Görüş’) achieved higher voting shares in local, rather than in national elections in Anatolian capital, especially since 1999. This difference is even more pronounced in the case of centre-right parties, which show stronger local votes, especially in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 local elections. Secular-left parties display the opposite trajectory. Until the turn of the millennium, secular-left vote shares were on average higher in Anatolian capital municipalities than in national elections. This shows that the centre-right and Islamist parties have a strong presence in Anatolian capital. The local prominence of the political Islamist Milli Görüş can be most clearly seen in the 1999 municipality and 1995 general elections. In more than half of Anatolian growth regions the Milli Görüş party acquired the highest share of votes. Most importantly, Milli Görüş votes shares are well above the Turkish average across all time periods and elections. Since the AKP foundation in 2001, AKP vote shares are also well above the Turkish average in Anatolian capital (except for Denizli). In the new millennium, the regional shares for the AKP have been well above the national level, whereas the votes for the secular CHP party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) have been well below the national level (except for Denizli). Before the AKP’s existence, other centre-right and political Islamist parties were dominating these regions in both local and general elections. This prior support for the Milli Görüş in the Anatolian heartland shifted toward the more moderate AKP since its foundation (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). Based on these findings, it can be argued that Anatolian capital forms the political backdrop of the Turkish Islamic movement.

The following section justifies the selection of Gaziantep’s prominent textile cluster as a case study of the displacement of the secular coalition by the Islamic movement. That is, firstly, by establishing that the phenomenon and puzzle exists in

32 ‘NUTS’ is the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, a (1998) standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. The standard is developed and regulated by the European Union, and thus covers the member states of the EU in detail (“Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics,” 2014). Within the framework of the EU accession process, the Turkey’s Statistical Institute has adapted the EU’s statistical standards.
Gaziantep, i.e. the increasing influence of Islamic BAs over the secular BA at the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GSO); and the growth of Islamic BAs over the secular BA in general. Secondly, based on voting patterns compared to other Anatolian capital regions, I argue that Gaziantep provides an ideal study ground to analyse the displacement of an initially strong centre-left/secular coalition by a centre-right/Islamic movement. Finally, I give a short overview over Gaziantep’s textile cluster.

Figure 2 Municipality election results by party group in 6 Anatolian Capital municipalities in the 1989, 1994 and 1999 local elections [%]; source: TÜİK (“TÜIK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)
2. Gaziantep as city case

This section establishes that Gaziantep is a relevant city case where the proposed mechanisms can be studied in depth. Showing ‘causal homogeneity’ (Munck, 2004), i.e. that the proposed processes are present in a case, and is a necessary part of case selection. I do this, first, by establishing Gaziantep’s economic growth; second, by comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ influence in the Chambers, and the size and economic influence of their membership over time; and third, by comparing electoral data with other industrial districts. I argue that Gaziantep has not only developed into
an economic growth centre over the past 20 years, but also that the secular BA and political parties have increasingly lost the competition with more influential Islamic BAs and political parties. After justifying this choice of Gaziantep, I give a short overview over its industry and justify the selection of the textile cluster as an industry case.

2.1. Gaziantep as economic growth centre

Gaziantep is one of the most economically dynamic cities in the Anatolian region. Gaziantep, compared to other Anatolian capital regions, has among the strongest manufacturing sectors according to employment shares. Furthermore, according to the figures compiled by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO) every year, Gaziantep has a high share of top manufacturing companies. To give an example, in 2008, Gaziantep hosted 31 of Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing firms, whereas in Konya this number was 20, in Kayseri 27, in Denizli 22, and in Kahramanmaraş 11. According to my own compilations of ISO data, between 1993 and 1998, 13 holding firms (or 10 holdings) with headquarters in Gaziantep were among the top 1000 manufacturing firms. This number increased to 16 holdings firms between 1999 and 2003 period, and more than doubled to 34 holding firms (24 holdings) in the post-AKP between 2004 and 2012.

Additionally, Gaziantep features the highest value of manufacturing exports among the Anatolian capital cities, which can be seen in Figure 4 below. This graph plots the value of manufacturing exports in 1,000 USD for each year for which this data are available, from 1996 to 2012, comparing 18 traditional and new major industrial centres (NUTS–3 Region; excluding Istanbul). Istanbul is excluded to improve the readability because values are far outliers, e.g. manufacturing export values in 2012 reached ca. 74 billion USD (similar level to that before the global

33 According to Regional Statistics provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute for the year 2009, 32% of Gaziantep’s working-age population was employed in manufacturing, ca. 25% in agriculture, 24% in services and ca. 19% in retail. In contrast, this manufacturing employment share was 25% in Kayseri and 24% in Konya. Source: TÜİK (“TÜİK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)

34 Based on profit and/or sales turnover, both net.

35 Exports values are the most readily available data for the longest time period by NUTS-3 region, whereas information on value added or other performance measures is sparser. I compiled this data from the homepage of the Turkish Statistical Institute; the Institute provided additional data for earlier years.
economic crisis in 2008) – compared to Gaziantep’s 5.4 billion USD. Istanbul remains Turkey’s economic centre, however economic activity has spread from traditional manufacturing centres to a wider region encompassing Anatolian capital. Before the turn of the millennium, Gaziantep and other Anatolian capital provinces like Denizli or Konya’s export performances were far below those of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana or Bursa. However, Gaziantep and Denizli are especially notable, improving their performance over traditional centres like Sakarya or Adana. Gaziantep, due to its strategic location toward Middle Eastern markets, shows the strongest export performance, gradually reaching levels similar to Ankara or even Izmir in the late 2000s. The fact that Gaziantep has gradually overtaken older industrial centres in exports since the 2000s makes Gaziantep a good choice to study the displacement of older industrial centres and elites.

![Graph showing annual value of manufacturing exports in USD (1000$) by year by 18 traditional and new industrial centres (NUTS-3 regions), excluding Istanbul; source: TÜİK (“TÜİK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)](image-url)

Figure 4
2.2. Business association displacement in Gaziantep

Gaziantep has three Islamic and one secular BA. Firstly, there is a local Müsiad branch. Then there are Gapgiad (‘Gaziantep Sharing Young Businessmen’s Association’), and Hürsiad (‘Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association’), which are both members of the confederation Tuskon (which is affiliated with the Gülen community). Finally, the bourgeois club with secular leanings, Gagiad (‘Gaziantep Young Businessmen’s Association’), represents the most elitist businesspeople of the region, and shows similarities to Turkey’s most prestigious and oldest voluntary BA, Tüsiad.

The increase in political influence of Islamic BAs and businessmen is apparent in their positions at the GSO and TOBB. The figures of Table 2 discussed here refer to the study sample of business groups in Gaziantep’s textile cluster, which have been aggregated into three time periods by ideological affiliation. The ideological categorisation rules for business groups as Islamic, secular or mixed are explained in the network chapter. Most TOBB are also GSO leadership members, but were only included in the TOBB column to prevent doubling those business groups. Listing in ISO’s top 1000 manufacturing firms (based on turnover and profit figures) by affiliation is included in a further column.

Overall, TOBB positions became more diversified with business groups with Islamic memberships (mixed and predominantly Islamic) dominating over predominantly secular business groups in the post-AKP era. This domination is all the more puzzling if we consider the domination of secular business groups in the early 1990s. In the 1993–1998 time period, all TOBB members (2 business groups) are secular BA members only (no other BA membership); there are also more secular than Islamic businessmen in GSO leadership positions (32% vs 23%). In the 1999–2003 time period secular Gagiad members continue to dominate at TOBB (among the 4 TOBB members, 3 are in Gagiad, 1 in Tuskon plus Gagiad, none in Müsiad). There are no Islamic TOBB members in this time period, but two secular and one

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36 The TOBB and GSO provided this leadership data. As businesspeople can be members in multiple BAs, expressing leadership positions by BA membership is less meaningful than by overall ideological categorisation that takes into account all memberships. Due to the aggregation into time period, the 1999–2003 period appears to have fewer GSO members (see N=14, compared to 1993 N=22). This is due to fewer elections/fewer member changes among the leadership bodies in that time period, resulting in a smaller variety of business groups.
mixed business group (plus 1 non-categorisable). The pattern at the GSO is similar to the earlier time period (note: more members with no affiliation in this time period). The local GSO has had a more mixed profile than the TOBB from the early 1990s onward. Nevertheless, in the post-AKP time period, 43% of GSO leaders have predominantly Islamic affiliations, while only 9% have predominantly secular affiliations, illustrating Islamic dominance in the GSO. Secular business groups are still strong at TOBB, but competition has increased. An equal share of TOBB members has predominantly secular and mixed memberships now (38% of members each), in addition to one Islamic member (8% of members). Islamic influence is also reflected in the top 1000 manufacturing companies list, where for the first time Islamic business groups dominate over mixed and secular ones in the 2004–2012 time period. The majority of Gaziantep’s top companies now have Islamic affiliations (36% Islamic vs 20% secular), while the pattern was reversed in early 1990s (40% secular vs 30% Islamic). Mixed affiliations reach an all-time high; and the share of businesspeople with no affiliations reaches an all-time low, illustrating the advantages of membership overall.

Table 2 Sample business groups’ leadership positions in the GSO, TOBB, and in the top manufacturing companies’ list compiled by the ISO, aggregated across three time periods, by ideological affiliation

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<th>Business groups nr (%)</th>
<th>GSO 93–98 (only)</th>
<th>GSO 99–03 (only)</th>
<th>GSO 04–12 (only)</th>
<th>TOBB 93–98</th>
<th>TOBB 99–03</th>
<th>TOBB 04–12</th>
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<th>ISO 99–03</th>
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<td>100%</td>
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The increasing influence of Islamic over secular BAs in Gaziantep is also reflected in their membership figures. Figure 5 shows the number of members

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37 Overall, all BAs in Gaziantep combined represent approximately one third of the companies included in my textile cluster sample in the post-AKP period (2004–2012), which is up from around a fifth (22%) in the 1993 – 1998 time period. The number of companies without membership is probably over-estimated as the textile sample may include companies which are only registered to be active in textiles, but are in fact not operational in that area.
(businesspeople) of all BAs across all sectors over three time periods (overlapping memberships possible). In 1993–1998, Gagiad had the largest number of members, 103 businessmen, slightly more than either Hüriyat (Tuskon affiliate) at 96 and Müsiad at 91 members. This completely changed in the 2004–2012 period. Now Hüriyat (Tuskon affiliate) has the most members (476 businessmen), followed by Müsiad (226 businessmen), the secular Gagiad (209 businessmen), and the second and smaller Tuskon affiliate, Gapgiad (ca. 101 businessmen). Especially Hüriyat’s membership growth is notable, and although the elitist Gagiad does not follow an equally expansionist strategy as the other BAs, focusing only on the largest companies, the reversal of the pattern over time is remarkable. Across all three time periods, the category of membership that displays the lowest growth rate is businessmen who are exclusively Gagiad members (i.e. not members in any Islamic BA). The increase in Gagiad membership overall is smaller than the overall firm growth rate in Gaziantep and much smaller than the growth in exclusive Müsiad/Tuskon memberships (figures are not displayed here, but see appendix section 8).

![Figure 5 Number of total members (businesspeople) off Gaziantep’s four business associations by time period (accumulated), across all sectors](image)

Focusing only on the textile cluster sample, a similar pattern emerges. The sample data in Figure 6 no longer refers to businesspeople, but to companies, the unit of observation (number of companies in the textile cluster which have a board member who is a BA member). The post AKP 2004–2012 time period witnesses an increase in the number of companies with memberships in all three BAs. As memberships overlap, the figure of total company members is overestimated, and

but in another (interviews with GSO representatives); it’s impossible to estimate that number, however.
rather reflects the total number of memberships.\textsuperscript{38} Having noted that, most importantly, in 2004 Tuskon (combination of Hûrsiad and Gapgiad) slightly overtakes the secular Gagiad in representing the textile cluster firms of the study sample (152 vs 145 companies). While in the early 1990s, Tuskon only represented approximately half the number of firms that Gagiad represented among the textile cluster firms, Tuskon membership has shown a massive boost in the post-AKP period, reaching stages at par with Gagiad, with Müsiad not far behind. In sum, this section provided data to show that Islamic BAs and businessmen have increased their political influence vis-à-vis a dominant secular elite in Gaziantep – in terms of Chamber leadership and company representation in BAs, and partly economic performance.

Figure 6 Number of sample companies with owners who are members in Gaziantep’s BAs and total number of sample companies by time period (accumulated)

2.3. Political arena: political displacement in Gaziantep

This notable and fast change in influence is also reflected in the political arena. Comparing national voting patterns to the other Anatolian industrial centres, Gaziantep is unique in that it has experienced a political transition in its electoral behaviour from voting for the centre-left parties slightly above the national average in the 1990s, to voting for the centre-right AKP above the national average. Local voting results (municipality election results) are presented above which show a similar pattern. Indeed, from 1989 until the local administrative elections in 2004,

\textsuperscript{38} Between 1993 and 1998, of the 401 sample companies, 87 or 22\% are BA members. The ratio remains similar between 1999 and 2003 where, of the 590 sample companies, 138 (or 23\%) are BA members. The ratio of BA relative to none-BA members increases slightly in the post–AKP 2004 time period where, of the 830 sample companies, 258, or 31\% of companies are BA members.
charismatic mayor Celal Doğan had dominated the municipality for the centre-left CHP (Republican People’s Party). In 2004, the AKP took over (2004–present). Such a long dominance of the CHP in the municipality is unusual among other Anatolian capital cities; this is also reflected in general elections where the centre-left parties receive a larger share of the votes in Gaziantep compared to other Anatolian industrial districts, especially compared to Konya, Kayseri and Kahramanmaraş (but less so compared to Denizli).

Generally, Figure 7 and 8 show how after the AKP’s inauguration, the party has become far more dominant than any other party was throughout the 1990s. The (political) Islamist parties of Milli Görüş have been decimated and absorbed in the aftermath of the AKP formation; this is in comparison to their strength in the 1995 and 1999 general elections. Centre-left parties have become much weaker in Anatolian capital, and the nationalist MHP has also lost some ground (although it has been growing stronger again more recently).

In spite of a stronger than average centre-left support base in general elections, centre-right parties received the majority of the votes in Gaziantep province in the 1990s. Political Islamist parties were close to the national average, while centre-right parties were weaker than average. However, Gaziantep develops from having a larger than average centre-left voting share, to having a larger than average AKP voting share from 2004 onward. In the 2007 and 2011 elections, the AKP received 12% more in Gaziantep province than the Turkish average, reaching a maximum of 62% of the votes in 2011. The centre-left parties combined even received 7% less in Gaziantep than the national average, while it had consistently received several percentage points above the national average in the 1990s general elections.

Gaziantep, as part of Anatolian capital therefore mirrors the national-level transition to a dominant AKP well, and provides the most suitable study ground to explore how the Islamic has gained political influence vis-à-vis the dominant secular elite. Having a stronger centre-left and somewhat weaker right political landscape makes Gaziantep the least likely case among Anatolian capital to develop a very strong AKP support base, as observed in the late 2000s. In contrast, the strongholds of Islamist politics, especially Konya, have been more homogeneous in their political landscape and thus do not reflect this struggle and ascent as well as in Gaziantep.
Figure 7 General election results by party group in 6 Anatolian Capital provinces (NUTS-3 region) and Turkey in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections [%]; and in the 2002–2011 general elections in Figure 8; source: Tüik (“TÜIK-Turkish Statistical Institute,” n.d.)
2.4. Gaziantep’s textile cluster: a short overview

Gaziantep’s industry is diverse with extensive complimentary relations among the local manufacturing industries in the food, textiles and clothing (e.g. machine-woven carpets, shoes), chemicals (soap and detergents), plastic products, and miscellaneous machinery sectors. Almost all of these are internationally competitive (Öz, 2004). This study focuses on the textile-manufacturing cluster in Gaziantep in its selection of a network sample and interviewees.

**Extent and performance of textiles and clothing in Gaziantep**

Gaziantep’s textile cluster plays an important role in terms of manufacturing capacity and export performance in Turkey’s textile industry. In 2002, the year of the latest Census of Industry, ca. 34% of Gaziantep’s industrial companies were active in textiles, leather and footwear, apparel and plastics (all of which were partly included in the present sample); providing altogether ca. 64% of employment (TÜİK, 2002).

Turkey has a global competitive advantage in the following subsectors of textiles, which also dominate Gaziantep: Machine-made carpets, yarns, tricot apparels, non-woven technical textiles, PP sac and big bag (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012). According to 2013 TOBB data presented by the GSO (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2014), Gaziantep fulfills 94% of Turkey’s manufacturing capacity ratio in machine made carpets, 86% in PP yarns, 80% in nonwoven fabric, 77% in tuft-in carpet, 53% in fancy yarns, 71% in acrylic yarns, 45% in cotton yarns, a high percentage in plastic slippers, and ca. half in bags and sacks from PE/PP band (plastics); rates are also high for macaroni and semolina/bulgur production. Gaziantep is dominated by textiles over clothing (Kunt & Zobu, 2011). Technical textiles and carpets are the most concentrated sectors in Gaziantep.

In 2013, textiles and clothing combined made up ca. 51% of Gaziantep’s exports; in 2003 that figure was slightly higher at ca. 64% (Gaziantep Sanayi Odasi, 2014). In 2009 and 2010, the products most exported from Gaziantep, were machine-made carpets, and among the top ten products were further clothing and textile subsectors (pp yarns, outerwear, woven and knitted fabrics, acrylic yarns). The number one export market across all sectors in 2010 was Iran (39% of exports), followed by Europe (21%), other Middle East Countries, Africa, USA, Turkic republics and Syria. (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012, Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2012).
It is mainly medium-sized and large companies rather than small and micro firms that are involved in exports (Ayata, 2004).

**Short history of Gaziantep’s industrial district: From periphery to centre**

In modern Turkey, Anatolian capital’s competitive advantage has lain in its cheap labour force, as well as the lax government controls on tax and insurance payment (Ayata, 2004). Gaziantep’s industry and Anatolian capital at large undertook an extraordinary growth from underdevelopment to competing with traditional industrial centres increasingly since the 2000s. This is all the more astonishing in Gaziantep where state investments and FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows were particularly low, and where subcontracting among local companies has been limited; even when compared to other Anatolian cities like Bursa or Denizli (Ayata, 2004; Bademli, 1977; Özcan, 1995; Öz, 2004).

Gaziantep’s industrial roots date back a long time. In the Ottoman Empire Antep had been an important trade and industry centre due to its strategic location toward Middle Eastern Markets, however, in Republican Turkey, it was neglected (Bademli, 1977; Özcan, 1995). The fact that Gaziantep industry was not developed by the state is a source of local pride, as was stressed by many interviewees and supported by other studies on Gaziantep. For example, Ayata (2004) argues that being on the periphery has been an advantage in that Gaziantep industry managed to grow autonomously and not under the control of big state or private holdings or international capital. Its growth impulses result form the independence from state control, and Gaziantep’s supply of cheap labour and a strong entrepreneurial spirit. Other than the usual infrastructure developments, none of the classic SOEs (state-owned enterprises) in industry, agriculture or energy were developed in Gaziantep (Ayata, 2004). Bademli’s study (1977), the first systematic and detailed study of Gaziantep’s industry, shows that direct state involvement in factory building in Antep only began in the 1950s, and was far less than in Eskisehir and other western cities. In the 1970s Gaziantep was still regarded at the periphery of the mainstream of the Turkish industrialisation process (Bademli, 1977, p. 158).

39 The first state-supported developments in Gaziantep were a ‘raki’ and wine factory in the 1950s, employing around 400 workers. In another cooperation with the private sector, the state built a cement factory for about 550 employees (Bademli, 1977)
With the export-promoting economic policies of the 1980s, the buyer-driven apparel industries in Turkey began to produce large gains. This led to a gradual incorporation of SMEs into global value chains through subcontracting, contracting, and licensing agreements (Tokatli, 2003). The growth of all Anatolian industrial districts is to be regarded as part of this broader global process. In line with this development, the export drive of textiles increased in the 1990s when textiles/clothing made up around 60% of Antep’s exports (Ayata, 2004). Major export markets for Gaziantep’s textile at that time were Middle Eastern and the new post-Soviet states. The city’s industry profited from not only from the Iran-Iraq war and its close location to those markets during and after the war, but also from the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Many cheap and low quality carpets were exported to central Asian and post-Yugoslav countries at the beginning of the 1990s (Ayata, 2004). Most of my interviewees also reported that early companies were able to exploit the high demand in these new markets to grow quickly, which was not only facilitated by export incentives in the 1980s, but also by the Gül en community (interviews).

During this time period, many firms became manufacturers for global brands (e.g. Boyner holding signing licensing agreements with Benetton Group). In the 1990s, in spite of ‘comparatively low productivities, some domestics have evolved from simple assembly initially to full-package production, and then to original brand-name manufacturing’ (Tokatli, 2003, p. 1880). Learning from this, some companies moved on to create their own brands, while others entered more gradually into franchising/licensing joint ventures (Tokatli, 2003). This process can also be partly observed in Gaziantep. Although there are less international brands, there are some successful examples that I observed during my fieldwork that show that the sector in Gaziantep is expanding and partly climbing up the value-added ladder. There are several large companies that manufacture for global labels and department stores and that have entered joint ventures,\(^40\) and some are developing their own brands that they export.\(^41\)

\(^{40}\) For example, the Islamic carpet producer Bayteks entered a joint venture with a Belgian carpet company in 2012; the Islamic Naksan Holding produces Pierre Cardin carpets; the leading Sanko holding entered its first joint venture in 1997 with German cement company Ytong and produces clothing as subcontractor for retailers like M&S, Walmart and fashion brand like Levi’s and Nike; Selçuk Iplik produces cloth for Dolce & Gabbana; Islamic
3. Politico-religious contention and the political rise of Islamic business associations

The connection between SMEs in the periphery of power and the Turkish Islamic movement has been conditioned by various changes in Turkey’s political and economic institutions. These will be analysed below through the concept of POS (political opportunity structures). POS are ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow, 2011). Perceived opportunities or political access, the existence of allies, shifting political alignments and the opportunity to exploit divisions or vulnerabilities of opponents, are key POS developed in political process theories, in addition to threats from the establishment (Tarrow, 2011).

3.1. Tracing political opportunity structures

Since the establishment of multi-party politics in 1950, the centre of power, the military and Kemalist state officials and bureaucrats, have meddled heavily with political parties, closing them down through military coups. Such ‘threats’ have had a large impact on business politics. After coups in 1960 and 1971, the intervention in 1980 resulted in the harshest Constitution toward associational activity and Islamic groups (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). Further post-modern coups in 1997 and 2008 also left deep marks and contributed to the moderation and reshuffling of the Islamic movement. By supporting more moderate over radical groups, Anatolian business elites, who had an economic interest not to confront the secular state, arguably carpet-producer Kaplan produces carpets, amongst others, for several German retailers like Aldi (interviews with respective owner-managers). For example, Merinos Holding has built up his own brand in carpets and furniture; Onur Group has built up its brand DreamOn Bridals.

This is not to say there are also important international factors and institutions at play, like the EU anchor or US interests in the Middle East. However, the analysis is focused on how domestic actors have made use of and/or pro-created openings in the Turkish political opportunity structure and created a moderately Islamic and socio-economic movement. The origin of such opportunities is secondary compared to the primary focus of how actors made use of them.

In 2008, with renewed ideological debates among the military, who feared the introduction of an Islamist state by the AKP, brought the case of the party’s closure to the constitutional courts (Karadağ, 2012). This process ultimately failed, resulting only in a fine, but gave the AKP further incentives to resort to resentment politics and to start courts proceedings against Kemalist elites (referred to as Sledgehammer/Ergenekon).
contributed to the moderation of Islamist politics in Turkey (Keyman & Öniş, 2007; Öniş, 2006; Pamuk, 2012). After the imprisonment of several MÜSİAD members in 1997, the association decided henceforth not to publicly refer to Islam in its activities and publications (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). The militarisation of Turkish politics (Jacoby, 2005) encompassed periods of threats and incorporation from the state, military and bureaucracy on the one hand, to the political parties as well as civil society, on the other hand. This competition has created structurally weak political parties and led politicians to look for support outside ‘politics proper’ to business and social welfare organisation at the grassroots level.

State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods of threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing important opportunities for political access – access and threats are two of the POS established in the political process literature. After the 1971 and 1980 military coup, the respective political-Islamist parties of Erbakan’s ‘Milli Görüş’ Movement were closed down. After the 1980 coup, the military encouraged moderately Islamic movements such as the Gülen community to become more visible publicly. This move reflects an effort that has now been called the ‘TIS’ (‘Turkish Islam Synthesis’), in which the military was seeking public support for its intervention, for tools to strengthen moderate over more radical Islamist movements, and to supplant class organisation by promoting the uniting force of Islam. When Turgut Özal, a follower of Fethullah Gülen’s sermons, and an adherent of the Nakşibendi Sufi Order, became Prime Minister in 1983, various ‘cemaats’ (religious community) and ‘tarikats’ (Sufi order) were given more freedoms, paving the way for expanding Islamist charity and associational activity (Agai, 2004). This increasing ideological opening contributed to the later electoral victories of the political Islamist parties in the 1990s and increased their opportunity for access.

By constraining organisational links with Islamic groups, and by decimating trade unions after the 1980 coup, BAs remained as the major legitimate

44 After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Islam was to be eliminated from the public realm and institutionalised in the form of a state-interpreted, official version of Islam as an integral part of the government structure; brotherhoods, tarikats and other institutions were forbidden (Agai, 2004). Religious sects and educational institutions, which had formed an integral part of the Ottoman empire for centuries, did not simply disappear, but continued to exist ‘underground’, initially as a popular spiritual ethical movement
organisational base in a neoliberal Islamic project. As a counterpart of rigid state laicism, Islamism made its first formal political appearance in Turkey in 1970 when Necmettin Erbakan formed successive political parties mobilising political Islam. After the 1980 coup, party ideologies as well as parties’ organisational links with civil society were further constrained (Hale and Özbudun, 2009). This has led the political Islamist movement to rely on informal networks at the grassroots level with Islamic groups and charities. As a consequence of legal restrictions, inter-organisational ties tend to be informal, based on personal networks and overlapping memberships rather than official organisational ties or channels. Such ties with Islamic civil society were further facilitated by BAs and Anatolian SMEs, which provided a legitimate platform. Necmettin Erbakan, the political Islamist Milli Görüş Movement’s leader did not only mobilise among the poor and pious, but also polarised Anatolian SMEs.

The exclusion from the negotiating tables and state resources (e.g. finance for SMEs, infrastructure projects), has given incentives for the businessmen of Anatolian capital to rely on local, informal networks and on a pattern of pooling private resources for community and business purposes. This newly emerging middle class felt excluded from economic elite circles and political participation, as well as from platforms for identity-formation and thus looked for alternatives. Political Islamist parties, since the 1970s, have gradually transformed this grievance into a powerful impetus for collective action for upwardly mobile Anatolian businessmen. SMEs in general and the central- and south-eastern Anatolia have indeed been neglected in the state’s initial engineered economic development program, which is not unusual as scale economies associated with modern technology require ‘starting big’ (Buğra, 1994). The arising political Islamist parties successfully mobilised SMEs from smaller business constituencies, which developed more independent and aggressive means of representation and associated themselves with the Islamic periphery.

Erbakan successfully exacerbated cleavages in the business community based on region and size of enterprise to win political support from small manufacturers in Anatolia and merchants in the depressed east (Bianchi, 1984). Around the time when

(Yavuz, 2003). This legacy of controlling Islam has continued throughout Turkey’s modern history.
he founded his first political party, N. Erbakan was elected as leader of the TOBB with the support of small merchants and middle-income businessmen, a position from which he was soon removed (Bianchi, 1984).

In spite of repeated military interventions and because of incomplete oppression, Islamic actors have managed to increase their access over time, and to create new powerful allies. In addition to threat and access, the availability of allies is another key POS that has shaped Turkish business politics. The following section shows how this has been made possible through their efficient grassroots mobilisation, and new resources made available through gradual integration into international markets and through gradual decentralisation reforms.

Through efficient grassroots mobilisation and organisation, the Islamists emerged as the leading party in the 1994 municipal elections, and in the 1995 general elections. The current PM Erdoğan became mayor of Istanbul as representative of the Milli Görüş Movement’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP). Most observers of Turkish politics attribute this electoral success to the Welfare Party’s ‘achievements in local government’. In an environment of high inequality, and rapid urbanisation, ‘Islamist municipalities channeled more services to poorer districts and distributed free coal, food and clothes. Simply by curtailing municipal corruption, the Islamists achieved a notable improvement in the quality of urban services’ (Tuğal, 2007). Efficient hierarchical organisation down to the grassroots level (Eligür, 2010, pp. 186–188), and patronage networks are key aspects of these achievements, legacies which are present in the AKP’s organisation today:

The RP [political-Islamist Welfare Party] provided both selective material incentives and emotional rewards through face-to-face contacts with the electorate that established close, friendly relations with their constituents, especially those who resided in shantytowns. The fact that municipalities exist, that the Turkish state is organized on multiple levels of governance, created a degree of inherent “openness” of the system to entry by new political actors. The Islamist movement exploited this structural opportunity. Having gained access, the successful performance of municipalities under WP control gave Islamists increased credibility on the national level as an alternative to parties tarred by the malfunctioning state. (Eligür, 2010, p. 213)

These local networks have gradually increased their resources since the 1980s: While business was heavily dependent on state nurturing during the ISI era (import-substitution-industrialisation), the deepening economic liberalisation in the 1990s has created a new business class. The emergence of a pious middle class
without adequate representation at the national level has provided a new range of allies for the Islamic movement. PM Özal’s ANAP Party (centre-right Motherland Party), from 1983 onward, pursued an export-led growth strategy, providing export- and other incentives to the emerging pious middle classes (e.g. tax rebates to exporters, preferential credits and privatisation deals; Buğra, 2003), giving way to deepening corruption cycles in the 1980s and 1990s (Zürcher, 2004). Through such incentives and international trade, Anatolian industrialists have gained sufficient disposable income to invest into the Islamic movement and Anatolian industrial districts, more or less independently of the state. In sum, both economic liberalisation that allowed pious industrialists to apply new market tools, and decentralisation projects that allowed religious-conservatives to come into power in local administrations, increased their financial resources and autonomy from the centralised state – two important boundary conditions.

Efficient local administration is an important factor contributing to the later electoral successes of Islamist parties and the AKP at the national level (Demir et al., 2004). Most importantly, political Islamists’ popularity in the 1994’s local elections, and their leader Erbakan becoming PM for a short period in 1996, were major turning points in increasing the perceived political access of Islamists. R. T. Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul for the RP in 1994. The RP entered a coalition government with the centre-right Right Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) after the general elections in 1995, which collapsed as the Constitutional Court closed down the RP in 1997 (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012).

The perceived access and new range of resources and allies managed to facilitate the empowerment of the AKP in the 2000s because of the electoral volatility and de-legitimisation of existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility or rather ‘shifting political alignments’, as well as divisions amongst elites, are two further POS that also apply in the Turkish case.

The existing political parties and Kemalist alliance of bureaucrats, military and state-nurtured holdings gradually lost their legitimacy for several reasons, the first being, through corruption scandals, and the incurred costs of the biggest economic crises in modern Turkish history. The deep economic crises of 2000–2001 and the subsequent social costs of restructuring incurred due to a new IMF (International Monetary Fund) package, combined with the bad management of the devastating 1999 earthquake, led to a broad rejection of established political
parties.\textsuperscript{45} The stigmatisation by the military of Islamist parties (and Kurdish parties) as enemies of Kemalism (Karadağ, 2012) helped the new moderately Islamic movement to construct itself as the only viable alternative to the dominant centre-right parties (DYP, ANAP) of the 1980s and 1990s, as well to the secular CHP. It has also provided ample opportunity to Islamic actors to depict themselves as the unjustly oppressed, as well as to give their cause a pure and religious appeal that cuts across classes and is situated beyond power interests (Özcan & Turunç, 2011). It was also in the 1990s, that the political Islamist parties increasingly established themselves as the sole true anti-establishment parties, aiding a self-description as ‘the other and oppressed’, later to be perpetuated by the AKP. This strongly felt external threat has furthermore intensified out-group derogation, escalating suspicion and hostility toward an elite that is constructed as coherently ultra-Kemalist. The combination of Islamic and capitalist aspects by the moderately Islamic movement is regarded as an important draw of the AKP toward lower-income groups as well as businessmen (Özcan & Turunç, 2011).

Second, the high \textit{electoral volatility of the 1990s} increased the preference of politicians to mobilise and polarise heavily among civil society and BAs. During the changing and weak coalition governments of the 1990s (Karadağ, 2012), different parties have increasingly polarised different sections of the civil society, and thereby created deep divisions among elites. Such electoral volatility makes existing elites vulnerable, resulting in uncertainty among state and political actors (Tarrow, 2011, p. 165), creating an opportunity for new actors to capture.

It is a new party, the AKP that rises to win the sentiments of the majority by exploiting such \textit{divisions among elites} created by previous electoral volatility, and economic crises. This opening in the political opportunity structure was quickly seized by a young and reformist wing within the Milli Görüş Movement who would establish the AKP. This new party with roots in political Islam, had an inherent high vulnerability \textit{vis-à-vis} the powerful and Kemalist bureaucracy, state elites and

\textsuperscript{45} The devastating earthquake in Izmit in 1999 led to about 20,000 casualties and further made visible the deep-seated corruption (Green, 2005). The following economic crisis seems to have been the last straw, which destroyed voters’ trust in the existing political parties. Although under the economic leadership of Kemal Derviş essential reforms were initiated by the then coalition government between the DSP (Democratic Left Party), the ANAP and MHP (Nationalist Populist Party), the fruits of these reforms which set the foundations for the following economic recovery, were reaped by the AKP.
military at the time of its inception in 2001, after repeated military coups ousting political Islamists. This vulnerability has increased AKP politicians’ need for the support of social groups outside of the state apparatus. A variety of non-governmental organisations, such as the voluntary BAs and civil society organisations in the former periphery of Anatolia, have formed an important support base for the AKP. After several of these elites had been imprisoned repeatedly, including several Müsiad leaders and R.T. Erdoğan himself, this new movement has largely refrained from using direct Islamic references. As these new groups had a lot to lose from direct confrontation, they have adapted moderately Islamic frames presenting themselves as equivalents of European Christian conservatives and applying non-contentious tactics. They won international allies, by not only supporting IMF reforms and neoliberal reforms, but also by seriously pursuing EU accession, and implementing EU reforms toward democratisation (Öniş & Türem, 2002; Uğur & Yankaya, 2008).

3.2. Discussion
Successful movements seize perceived POS at the relevant time and develop tactics within a ‘repertoire of contention’ that fit, adapting them to the cultural and political environments. Repertoires of contention are ‘learned cultural creations (…) that emerge from struggle’, including contentious action involving violence, organised demonstration, and creative disruption (Tilly, 1993, p. 264). Movements have different experiences that impact the tactics they implement. In an environment of politico-religious contention, successful tactics and mobilisation have to refer to ‘inherited cultural symbols’, yet also adapt to specific political conditions. Based on the above analysis, I argue that changes in intra-state conflicts have allowed secular and Islamic actors to exploit various openings in POS at different times. Islamic actors have grasped emerging political opportunities by developing an effective set of tactics that has adapted to the political and cultural environments: a non-contentious repertoire that is grounded in a capitalist Islam. In the face of state threats, Islamic actors have relied on tactics outside of state control, to increase their access, range of allies and resources. Market-based tactics and informal networks in collaboration with civic actors in the periphery have allowed Islamic political actors and BAs to capture the centres of political power. Such non-contentious tactics in the periphery constitute an effective adaptation to state threats from elites in the centre.
Most importantly, these tactics are grounded in the cultural environment, developing a socio-economic type of Islam in their framing activities.

Social movement scholars state that contentious politics are produced when perceived political opportunities are grasped, when threats are experienced and opportunities for political access are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed through changing political alignments or internal divisions (Tarrow, 2011). Threats are key in the Turkish case, yet the other POS developed in the literature are relevant as well in conditioning a set of non-contentious tactics that is well adapted to the Islamic movement’s environment. I argue that this creative adaption is key to the Islamic movement’s success.

State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods of threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing important opportunities for political access. Access and threats are two of the POS established in the political process literature. In spite of the repeated military interventions and because of the incomplete nature of oppression, Islamic actors have managed to increase their access over time and to create new powerful allies. In addition to threat and access, the availability of allies is another key POS that has shaped Turkish business politics. This has been made possible through their efficient grassroots mobilisation, and Turkey’s gradual integration into international markets and decentralisation, which has provided new tools outside of state control.

Economic liberalisation allowed pious industrialists to apply new market tools, and decentralisation projects allowed religious-conservatives to come into power in local administrations, both of which increased Islamic actors’ financial resources and autonomy from the centralised state. These are key factors contributing to the later electoral successes of Islamist parties and the AKP. Gradual decentralisation and globalisation act as important boundary conditions for the political success of Islamic BAs. These are similar to conditions identified in the existing literature that asks under what conditions developmental BAs emerge. Sinha (2005), in her study of developmental BAs in India, has found that competition from other BAs, and federalism in India, have been important boundary conditions that have shaped intra-state conflict dynamics, and promoted the involvement of business actors. Additionally, Doner and Schneider (2000) found that in Latin America, the
availability of competitive markets was an important incentive for the emergence of encompassing, developmental BAs.

The perceived access and new range of resources and allies helped the AKP to come to power in the 2000s because of the electoral volatility and de-legitimisation of existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility or rather ‘shifting political alignments’ as well as divisions amongst elites are two further POS that also apply in the Turkish case. The stigmatisation by the military of Islamist parties (and Kurdish parties) as enemies of Kemalism (Karadağ, 2012) helped the new moderately Islamic movement to construct itself as the only viable alternative to the dominant centre-right parties (DYP, ANAP) of the 1980s and 1990s, as well to the secular CHP. It is a new party, the AKP that rises to win the sentiments of the majority by exploiting divisions among elites created by previous electoral volatility, and economic crises. An important factor in the ’s success is the construction of a socio-economic Islamic frame, combining themes of piety and purity with capitalism, in the face of the prevalent corruption of previous administrations. Relying on a strong business constituency, built up through gradual decentralisation and market-tools and a non-contentious frame, this group has managed to capture openings in the POS to emerge as the new ruling elite.

The historical institutional context of Turkey has brought ideology to the fore in political mobilisation and has created a new set of social movement tactics for power generation. In Turkey, the centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1969, 1973) that overlaps with the secular-Islamist and left-right continuum, is the key institutional change that has made the application of Islam and the informal cooperation with civil society organisations at the grassroots-level profitable for the new devout middle classes. These tactics go beyond those developed in the political institutional literature, that focus on providing information and policy support to rational political elites, through strong organisational structures that aggregate and control business interests. I refer to the collection of those changes as politico-religious contention.
Chapter IV Network Analysis: Membership Networks across Time

1. Introduction
If and how actors tap into embedded networks is another key element of transforming contention into successful social movements. The present network analysis compares how and to what extent Islamic and secular BAs have built such embedded networks – local coalitions with civil society and political organisations before and after the AKP’s inauguration (from 1993–2012). Variations in inter-organisational ties between secular and Islamic BAs across time would indicate differences in network-building strategies and access to political, civic and economic resources (in both type and quality). Network patterns are an indicator for the cooperation/competition between various associations, as well as for the opportunities and obstacles to the transfer of resources, political support and solidarity in the associated network.

The emergence of such multifunctional inter-organisational networks at the local level has been conditioned by alternating threats and encouragements by Kemalist state structures toward Islamic actors in the periphery (see POS analysis in Chapter III). The modern Islamic movement in Turkey fulfils spiritual and material needs, as well as providing platforms for political mobilisation (Yavuz, 2003). As political Islamic movements were partly pushed ‘underground’ by a threatening state, informal ties and religious communities have gradually emerged into multifunctional platforms for marginalised actors. As a result of alternating threats and opportunities by the state, some Islamic actor began to rely on informal networks at the grassroots level with Islamic civil society organisations, politicians and business actors, in what has gradually emerged into a socio-economic type of moderate Islam. After the 1980 coup, party ideologies as well as parties’ organisational links with civil society were constrained (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). As formal ties between political and Islamic organisations were delegitimised or even illegal at various time periods, overlapping memberships have become an important way of connecting these actors. Therefore I study how memberships overlap among local civil society, business and political organisations (so-called affiliation networks) as an indicator for the cooperation between organisations and the inter-organisational resource exchange among them.
What aspects of networks matter in influencing resource exchange and political mobilisation? In order to study the cooperation/competition between various organisations, both the extent as well the structure of membership ties among BAs, political parties and civil society organisations are relevant. I compare three aspects of these networks: the level of cohesion between the Islamic and secular subgroups; the extent and structure of different types of relationships; and the ‘multiplexity’ or the intersection between different layers of political, economic, and civic relationships.

First, I compare the level of cohesion within both the Islamic and secular subgroups. Several studies have shown that cohesive networks can enhance trust building and legitimacy and facilitate inter-organisational resource exchange (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Fukuyama, 2001; Lin, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001; Walker et al., 1997). However, weaker and more diverse ties are required to acquire the innovative and diverse information and resources required for economic growth (R. Burt, 2001; R. S. Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Koka & Prescott, 2002; Zaheer & McEvily, 1999).

*Expectation for cohesion:* The Islamic networks studied here originated from marginalised, emerging SMEs that were competing against established elites, but gained increased influence from the late 1990s as the Anatolian industrial districts experienced economic growth. They would thus be expected to be more cohesive than their secular counterparts during the early 1990s (1993–1998) when they were being formed, and to grow less cohesive in later periods.

Second, I compare the extent and structure of different types of relationships or memberships in Islamic and secular networks, differentiating between business, political, and civic layers within each subgroup. How many members does each subgroup have who are members of political parties and relevant civil society organisations and how does this civic and political integration change across the three time periods? Social movement studies have shown that more extensive

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46 I refer to the two ideologically based alliances of organisations as subgroups. The Islamic subgroup qualifies as a movement, which is the overall argument of this thesis, and therefore I refer this subgroup also as a movement and to the organisations as social movement organisations. The secular subgroup does not qualify as a movement, but only as a coalition of organisations.
political and civic ties in a movement can support political mobilisation (Amenta, 2006; Amenta et al., 2010, 2002, 1992; Cress & Snow, 2000).

Expectation for extent of civic and political integration: The heightened vulnerability of political parties and civil society in the Turkish case makes extensive civic ties particularly important for political influence. First, I expect Islamic networks to have fewer political ties than the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 period when they are in the periphery of power. However, their relative share of political members should increase over time alongside their growing political influence. Second, I expect Islamic networks to make up for their lack of access to resources through political elites in the 1993–1998 period by relying more on internal resource exchange with civic elites through cohesive networks. They should thus exhibit a larger share of civic ties compared to the secular coalition. Third, I expect the extent of civic ties to be strong not just in early, but in all time periods (1993–2012), as the Gülen community has been strongly incorporated in the Islamic movement since it was founded.

Third, I compare the intersection of different layers of political, civic and economic relationships, examining the structure of these relationship layers and how this structure has changed over time. In the network literature, this is referred to as ‘multiplexity’, or the ‘degree that the relationship between two individuals exists on multiple dimensions’ (Safford, 2009, p. 137). Multiplexity can be embedded, e.g. when a businessperson is a member of all three types of organisations; or intersecting, e.g. when the relationship layers are largely independent, but connected at various points through only a few businesspeople who are members of several types of organisations.

Expectation for multiplexity: In the Turkish case, formal alliances between political parties and Islamic groups are illegal. However, studies on the AKP have claimed that the new moderate Islamists have gained political influence through their grassroots mobilisation and cooperation with entrepreneurs and the Gülen movement. Thus, in the 1993–1998 period, I expect the Islamic movement to have a weaker membership overlap between civic and political elites than in the secular coalition. In the later time periods, I expect increasingly stronger overlapping memberships across the three types in the Islamic movement (i.e. ‘embedded multiplexity’). I track how this change from weak to strong overlapping memberships has been achieved over time.
In sum, I find that the overall level of cohesion differs only slightly between the Islamic and secular subgroups. While cohesion is somewhat stronger in the Islamic movement during the 1999–2003 period, Tuskon members appears to have the most diverse memberships of all BAs. It appears then that the absence of bonding, and some limited form of bridging, supported the export and economic activities of Tuskon. This also holds for the civic plane, where, contrary to expectations, both subgroups have similarly strong overlaps with various civil society organisations. In addition, the secular coalition has even stronger civic ties than the Islamic movement in the early time period.

In line with expectations, the Islamic movement overtakes the secular coalition in the extent of its political ties in 1999–2003. However, the two become more similar again in the post-AKP era (2004–2012). The most important finding concerns the structure of relationship layers. Islamic BAs have gradually bridged the gap between the popular Gülen community and conservative political parties, facilitating their cooperation through non-contentious membership in BAs. In contrast, secular BAs have not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but forged strong ties with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. Political elites in the secular coalition were more likely to be members of such elite clubs rather than of the BA. And while conservative political entrepreneurs of the 1990s were more often members of the elitist (secular) Gagiad than of the (Islamic) Müsiad or Tuskon, Islamic BAs overtook the secular BA in their political integration during the formative years of the new moderately Islamic and capitalist AKP.

2. Methods
In its network analysis, this study applies a largely qualitative approach that is based on the visual interpretation of network graphs and descriptive network indicators (as compared to inferential statistics for networks, which are a relatively new and complex field). Such an analysis is preferred over a fully quantitative statistical analysis because ‘visualisation creates a locus for storytelling based on an integrated geography of positions, roles and information’ (Fisher, 2005). Data visualisation can transform relationships into spatialised images, making interactions visible, while also representing indicators accurately. Such an analysis provides more in-depth information than a single indicator can, and is therefore more suitable to
understanding complex processes. It is not the absolute size of an effect that matters, but the comparison of how two structures (Islamic and secular) have changed relative to each other. It encompasses altering datasets, adjusting visual properties, refining filters and network layouts and thereby modifying the research goals and questions until reaching a clear picture that facilitates interpretation (D. Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010). In the present case this involves recoding the network to analyse only the core of each subgroup to clarify patterns emerging from the organisational-level analysis.

Descriptive indicators serve as additional confirmations of graph interpretations. Interpreting network graphs entails a hermeneutic circle, moving from an initial understanding of parts or subgroups to the overall network and their relations to the political context, and then back to an improved understanding of each part (Klein & Myers, 1999). Network visualisations are essentially a vehicle for exploration and facilitate an in-depth qualitative investigation, although they cannot rule out alternative explanations or factors on why the Islamic movement has gained political influence. However, they provide potential paths that can be further examined relying on further data sources and methods (Diani, 2002, p. 174), and overall this mixed-method approach provides a complex analysis and thick description of the process of how and when Islamic BAs have gained political influence.

2.1. Network indicators at the organisational and subgroup levels

Networks were studied through membership data, resulting in so-called affiliation networks. Affiliation networks were chosen because affiliation data allow studying both the ties between actors and between events/affiliations (Borgatti & Everett, 1997). In this view actors are linked to one another by their affiliation with events (or associations), and, at the same time, events (or associations) are linked by the actors who are their members (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Affiliation or membership networks are so-called two-mode networks as they depend on two units of observation: structural variables are measured on two sets of entities or modes, a first set containing the actors (here: corporations or business groups), and a second set containing the events (here: business, political, and civic organisations) (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005b). A tie is recorded if an actor takes part in an event, in this case, if a business group owner is a member in (or affiliated with)
an organisation. The original sample therefore consists of two types of entities (organisations and companies), the selection of which will be justified as follows. In a first step, I visualised these two-mode networks to get an insight into the data. In order to refine my investigation, transformation of the original two-mode into one-mode networks was necessary. Indeed, the majority of network measures requires one-mode data (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). There are two possibilities, both of which I applied: in a one-mode event-by-event network, organisations or events are regarded as related through their joint memberships (of business groups’ owners). This type of event-by-event network was used to study the overlaps between organisations (organisational overlaps) within and between the secular and Islamic movement. The more members two organisations share, the larger the organisational overlap, and the more they are linked. In such networks, organisations are related through their joint members, and the analysis takes places at the organisational level.

In one-mode actor-by-actor networks, actors or business groups are regarded as related to each other through their joint affiliations or memberships in organisations. These networks were used to analyse further indicators of cohesion and structure, not at the organisational, but at the larger subgroup level. The interest here is not in how Tuskon and Müsiad membership, for example, overlap, but in making generalisations about the Islamic movement or secular coalition as a whole, which makes an aggregation necessary. Data about membership in various organisations were combined to reflect affiliation with a subgroup. Depending on their memberships, not all members were included because only specific combinations of could be clearly associated with a Secular, Mixed or Islamic subgroup. This second transformation is the only possibility for differentiating between business, political and civic ties within each subgroup, combining, for example, membership in Müsiad, Tuskon and Gagiad into one business membership category to be able to compare the business layer overall between Islamic and secular subgroups.

The following indicators of cohesion and structure were analysed in one-mode networks at two different levels, the organisational-level (event-by-event network) and the subgroup-level (actor-by-actor network). The multiplexity and the extent of civic and political integration are mainly analysed at the larger subgroup level. The key concept of cohesion incorporates several network indicators, and I
compare tie strength and density (general level of cohesion) at the subgroup level, as well as tie diversity at the organisational level. Density is a key measure of social network analysis and describes the general level of cohesion (Scott, 2000). For binary data, density measures are interpreted as the percentage of possible ties that are present (sum of ties/total possible ties). ‘Density is simply the number of ties in the network, expressed as a proportion of the number possible’ (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005b, Chapter 7). Bridging ‘emphasizes open networks characterised by outward or extra-community network linkages across diverse social cleavages’ (Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In other words, bridging (or low cohesive) networks are characterised by higher tie diversity. Furthermore, Burt (2001) and Granovetter (1973) argue that weak ties are commonly associated with the process of bridging as they are based on loose emotional tendencies, and maintained via infrequent communication between heterogeneous groups. ‘Overall density’ describes the general level of cohesion (Scott, 2000). In contrast, bonding (or high cohesion) refers to the ‘inward’ or ‘intra-community’ network linkages that help cement homogeneous (similar) horizontal ties with actors who develop moral and fair values (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). That is, bonding networks are characterised by high density, lower tie diversity and stronger ties; scholars generally agree that bonding entails actors who communicate frequently and develop similar levels of thick trust, emotional intimacy and mutual empowerment (Fukuyama, 2001; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Among those who focus on internal ties within a given society (e.g. Ostrom, 1994; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994), networks often mean the informal, face-to-face interaction or membership in civil society organisations or clubs.

2.2. Network measures

I compare tie strength, tie diversity, and density to evaluate density. For this, I first calculated organisational overlaps according to Bonacich’s normalised subgroup overlap measure (1972); a measure which is based on a formula counting the number of shared, (and non-shared), members among organisations, and then normalising/adjusting for the size of the organisations. Overlaps are recorded in both total numbers of companies (in brackets in tables; red figures in full network graphs) and a normalised subgroup overlap measure that adjusts for the membership size of organisations. The former serves as additional information to judge the size of the
effect, whereas the normalised measure is preferred for interpretation. Overlaps based on companies rather than holdings are chosen because this allows introducing a ‘weighting’ mechanism for the influence of larger business groups. After all, the influence or the extent of cooperation between two associations increases the bigger or more influential its (shared) members are. Bonacich values are presented in the appendix (section 2.), whereas graphs are presented below in the findings section.

According to Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 324):

Bonacich proposed a measure of subgroup overlap, which is also independent of the size of the events. His measure is analogous to the number of actors who would belong to both events, if all events had the same number of members and non-members. Bonacich analyses these overlap measures by treating them as analogous to correlation coefficients (...).

A value of 0.5 is equivalent to independence; the measure ranges between zero and one. Values larger (smaller) than 0.5 signify an association: being a member in one association increases (decreases) the chances of being a member in another association.

Depending on the organisations included, organisational overlaps serve as basis for various indicators: first, overlaps of organisations with the Chambers served to evaluate which organisation, with a special interest in BAs, had the most members controlling the Gaziantep Chamber GSO, and the national Chambers TOBB and how that changed over time. Overlaps among various organisations served to evaluate cohesion: overlaps among subgroup organisations served to evaluate the level of cooperation within; and overlaps between subgroup organisations served to evaluate the level of tie diversity. For example, how many members do the Islamic BAs Müsiad and Tuskon share with each other, and how many with the secular BA Gagiad? The larger the cohesion, the larger the number of companies shared among Islamic (or secular) organisations. Cooperating organisations are expected to have higher organisational overlaps. Additionally, overlaps between BAs and political parties as well as civil society organisations gave a first insight into the extent of political and civic integration of the secular coalition and Islamic movement. To evaluate this at the subgroup level, transformation of network data was necessary.

Measures and analyses that compare the Islamic and secular subgroups are conducted at the subgroup level to compare the overall levels of cohesion (density), the strength of ties (as well the structure of business, political and civic relationship types, see below). This focus on the subgroup means that only a subset of association
members who can be argued to be part of the subgroup, are included in these analyses (the rules of these inclusions and network recoding are further outlined below). The strength of ties is measured by the number of memberships across all organisations and types within each subgroup (i.e. if two actors are members of several organisations within each subgroup, they would be linked by a strong tie; the more strong ties each subgroup has, the stronger the level of cohesion). ‘Isolates’ or rather companies without any membership (in Chambers or associations) were excluded because they provide no further information.

More specifically, I calculated densities ‘by group’ (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Standard density measures make comparisons between groups more difficult as they vary by network size: the smaller the network (or group), the more ties between actor would be expected. The measure of ‘densities by group’ is exactly designed to make densities comparable between subgroups (Islamic, Secular, Mixed) that originate from the same dataset; this makes densities for the subgroups comparable within each time period. Isolates or companies with no affiliation were excluded because they add no relevant information to the questions of how cohesive the subgroup is, or how the various relationship layers intersect. These densities were calculated for valued data (by adding up the number of memberships), and dichotomised at different numbers of memberships, which allowed for the comparison of tie strengths. Dichotomised binary data capture only whether membership exists (0= no membership; 1= membership), at different levels or numbers of membership (i.e. at level 2: 0= not 2 memberships; 1= 2 memberships). For binary data, density measures capture the proportion of actual observed ties relative to the total possible number of ties in a network. By calculating the proportion of observed ties for businesspeople with 1, 2, or more affiliations or levels, I can compare the densities at different tie strengths and conclude which subgroup has a higher or lower density of ‘strong’ ties. Tie strength is simply measured by the number of memberships. The average tie strength is measured by calculating the density of valued, not binary, data: then density is ‘the average of all values, which is to say we compute average tie strength’ (Borgatti et al., 2013, 47).

\[47\] In order not to lose information about each business groups’ membership, ‘reflexive ties’ reflecting individual actors’ affiliations, were included in the analyses.
Again, what matters is the relative comparison between Islamic and secular networks rather than the absolute sizes of the measures. These cohesion measures of the subgroup complement the broader organisational overlap measures.

Overall, a cohesive bonding network would feature small tie diversity, i.e. a smaller amount of shared members with non-subgroup organisations than with ideologically close subgroup organisations. At the subgroup level, such a network would also display a higher level of density and stronger ties. A less cohesive bridging network would feature larger tie diversity, i.e. a similar amount of shared members with non-subgroup organisations to subgroup organisations. At the subgroup level, such a network would also display a lower level of overall density and weaker ties.

As outlined above, the content of ties, differentiating the three layers of relationships is a further aspect to be studied to evaluate their extent within each subgroup and how they intersect. These analyses are based on the business group-unit, combining firms or companies into business groups based on their ownership. Calculating such structural indicators at the company level would lead to their overestimation; density measures would also be distorted.\(^{48}\)

For the structural analysis, the extent of political and civic integration was evaluated by simply counting the numbers of business, political and civic business group members in each subgroup and then dividing them by the total number of business groups to arrive at a relative frequency. Such frequencies do not include any information on the tie strength, i.e. if a businessperson is a member of both Islamic BAs, this was counted as one Islamic BA membership (to make results easier to interpret as a percentage of the total subgroup of business groups). Then, for

\(^{48}\) For example, the holding ‘Sanko’ has 19 firms in the textile cluster in the 2004 period; if it were a member in all three types of relations, the level of civic, business and political integration would be 19 times the level of a sole company with the same memberships, if measured at the firm-unit. This would be misleading given that the major interest is in the relative structure of the three relationship layers. The business-unit is also preferred for density measures because a similar overestimation would arise, given that the density measure would count the ties between those 19 companies if the group owner had one relevant membership. In the analyses focusing on organisations overlaps, the firm-unit is preferred: if ‘Sanko’ were a member of both Gagiad and Müsiad, this would result in a larger subgroup overlap measure than if a small company were a shared member. Sharing a larger business group increases the overlap measure, and thus indicates more cooperation between two associations to reflect the larger number of shared companies that are controlled by one parent company. In the latter type of analysis, the author goes back to check the largest of holdings like Sanko so that these extremes do not cloud the overall interpretation.
example, to analyse how political ties are integrated into each subgroup, I compare the numbers of business groups with both a political and BA affiliation vis-à-vis those with both a political and civic affiliation (pol+BA vs pol+civic). If politicians are mainly integrated into a subgroup via civic ties, the pol+civic share should be larger than the political+BA share. The extent of embedded multiplexity in indicated by the number of companies with all three relationship types (BA+pol+civic) in each subgroup. Whether a BA focuses more strongly on civic or political integration can be judged by comparing the BA+pol with the BA+civic membership shares. A network with high embedded multiplexity is where businessmen tend to be members of political, civil society and BAs at the same time. A network with high intersecting multiplexity is where businesspeople tend to be members of either a political, civil society, or BA with only a few members featuring multiple affiliations who then connect the three different relationship layers.

The multiplexity of ties, if and how the political, business and civic relationship layers intersect, is also evaluated via a qualitative interpretation of subgroup graphs. Indicators enable the analyst to make sense of the crowdedness of the network as it appears in the sociogram. The visualisation gives the user a sense of the structure and depth of the network while the statistics provide a way to both confirm and qualify the visual findings (D. Hansen et al., 2010). The frequency measure loses information on the number of memberships or strength of ties, which is added back in the graph visualisations where thicker lines reflect multiple memberships (and the outcome is visualised as well). A combination of indicators and graph visualisations increase the validity of the claims. All data were analysed with UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), a software package for the analysis of social network data, and visualised in NodeXL (Smith et al., 2010), which has additional visualisation properties to the more quantitative UCINET programme. The measures are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Network measures for different constructs at two levels of one-mode networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network constructs</th>
<th>Organisational level (companies); event-by event network</th>
<th>Subgroup level by relationship types (subgroup members’ business groups); actor-by-actor network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Organisational overlaps (normalised Bonacich values) and graphs to evaluate: tie diversity (across and within subgroups)</td>
<td>Density (across all relationship types aggregated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tie strength (across all relationship types aggregated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of political and civic integration</td>
<td>Indicated by overlaps between BAs and political parties/civil society organisations</td>
<td>Frequencies: compare relative amount of memberships in political/civic/business layers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiplexity – Structure of business, political and civic relationship layers</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Frequencies (cross-memberships, e.g. BA+pol) Qualitative interpretation of movement graphs by relationship types</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome measures

Leadership positions⁴⁹ in the GSO and the national Chambers TOBB serve as an outcome measure of political influence, both for companies and for BAs. These data were provided by the TOBB. Another outcome measure, which is only available for few firms, is economic performance measured through the firm’s rank in Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing firms based on production-based sales. These data are collected through self-report every year by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry and made publicly available. However, in the 2004–2012 period only about 30 firms from Gaziantep entered the top 1000 firms, so this indicator cannot be studied systematically; instead it was used to select firm-case studies and as additional information. Rather than production-based sales, the present study considers these firms’ ranking based on their period profit and sales turnover.

The following section (2.3.1) justifies the sample of two-mode data: first, the companies/business groups, and second the organisations included. I explain how these data were aggregated to represent three time periods. I then explain how the

⁴⁹ In the national-level Chambers, TOBB, membership in the following bodies was considered as a leadership position: ‘General Assembly’ (‘Genel Kurul’); the Chairs of Sectoral Committees; Board of Directors (‘Yönetim Kurulu’); the Disciplinary and Coordination/Management Bodies (‘Disiplin Kurulu’, ‘Koordinasyon Kurulu’). In Gaziantep’s GSO the following two highest-level bodies were considered as leadership bodies: the General Assembly and the Board of Directors.
necessary transformations to one-mode networks at the organisational and subgroup-levels were conducted (2.3.2), resulting in event-by-event and actor-by-actor networks. While the former organisational-level event-by-event network includes all members, the latter only includes a subset of actors that can be justified to be subgroup affiliates. I developed a method based on combinations of memberships to focus on subgroup actors, which is justified in section 2.3.2b. I then present the network findings, summary and discussion.

2.3. Network samples, time periods and transformations

2.3.1. Original two-mode affiliation networks

2.3.1.a Mode 1: Sample of companies and business groups and aggregation into three time periods

The sample of firms registered as operating in Gaziantep’s manufacturing textile cluster in 2012 was obtained from the GSO. The geographic boundaries of the network are limited to organisations falling within the statistical metropolitan area of the city of Gaziantep. The list of actors considered for inclusion are the owner-managers of the firms in the manufacturing textile/apparel cluster registered at the GSO. This sample was split up into three groups representing three time periods based on the firm’s foundation date.

The vast majority of firms are family-owned, and I grouped individual firms into business groups. The information on cross-ownership was gathered from various local and national newspapers and the homepages of the companies by comparing company addresses of branches and some expert interviews; the Gaziantep Registry Office did not give me access to this data. Therefore it may underestimate the real cross-ownership as such information is more readily available for larger business groups. The sample numbers for the different time periods are:

- 2004–2012: n=830 companies, 646 business groups
- 1999–2003: n= 590 companies, 470 business groups
- 1993–1998: n= 401 companies, 334 business groups

Data on the following additional node attributes were partly available: for almost all firms, the maturity or age (registration at GSO), and the current (2012) industry codes are available as reported by the GSO. The size of firm, measured in

50 The relevant officials argued that ownership data are sensitive data that they feared I would publish and thereby create tax and other issues.
terms of number of employees, was collected from various sources, but is only available for a smaller selection of firms and therefore not reported at an aggregate level.

This sample was split up into three groups representing three time periods based on each firm’s GSO registration date. Only surviving firms are included in the sample, as no systematic, local level record of liquidated firms is available. The time period covered by this study falls between 1993 when the first local BAs were built in Gaziantep and 2012 when most interviews were conducted; it covers the essential year 2004 when the AKP overtook the CHP in Gaziantep.

The fundamental changes in the political, cultural and economic institutions in Turkey’s modern history allow for the identification of critical turning points, and studying the effect of such national changes on the pattern and political influence of BAs in Gaziantep in different time periods. Three time periods were chosen to investigate the changing tactics, embedded in the changing national institutional context, with which Islamic BAs have gradually displaced secular BAs. The relevant turning points identified here relate to changes in political Islam in Turkey, which are reflected in Gaziantep’s local elections. Gaziantep slightly lag behind national-level electoral developments: 1993 was set as the beginning of the first time period as it is the year in which all BAs except for the younger Tuskon-affiliate Gapgiad, (founded in 2002), were formed in Gaziantep. During this time Gaziantep remains dominated by secular centre-left coalitions, but political Islam gains in popularity in elections. The general and local elections in 1999 mark the end of the first time period from 1993 to 1998 and the beginning of the transitional time period from 1999 to 2003. The twin economic crises of 2000–2001, inter alia, and the previous banning of parties of political Islam result in a rejection, also in Gaziantep, by the public of

51 Mixture of GTO database of registered companies (“Gaziantep Ticaret Odası e-GTO portalı [Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce e-GTO membership portal],” 2012), some figures were reported by GSO to me; with additions from Capital IQ database (“Capital IQ [Company Screening Report - Buyers/Investors],” 2012), and ISO Top Manufacturing Firm lists.

52 Only aggregated rates of liquidation are available: liquidation rates appear to be relatively small, therefore this method of splitting up current surviving firms can be justified. For example, a publication by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK, 2009, p. 91) on Gaziantep lists 490 companies, or only 0.1% of total companies, closed down between 2004 and 2009 in TRC11 Gaziantep (including surroundings beyond the city of Gaziantep).
existing political parties, and the re-formation of the Islamic camp to create a new party of moderate and capitalist Islam in 2002 – the AKP. In Gaziantep, the centre-left coalition gradually loses its popularity at the turn of the millennium, resulting in the election in 2004 of AKP’s Asım Güzelbey as mayor. This political turning point in Gaziantep in 2004 marks the beginning of the last time period from 2004–2012, in which the moderately Islamic movement increasingly dominates, and the affiliated BAs increase their political influence.

2.3.1.b Mode 2: affiliation/membership data and aggregation into three time periods

For each company in the GSO data, network data were collected on their affiliation/membership in eight different organisations of three different types (political, business, and civic) across three different time periods. Lists of each type of affiliation were finally compiled into three final lists showing all affiliations of each company in three different time periods. For the organisational-level analysis these data were kept to differentiate among the various organisations, whereas further structural analyses required an aggregation of this information into three different relationship layers and two subgroups.

Three types of political parties, three BAs and two civic categories (in parentheses the respective labels in the organisational-level graphs) were considered:

- Centre-left/secular parties (Pol_Left)
- Centre-right/Islamic parties (Pol_Right)
- Political Islamist parties (Pol_Islamist)
- Müsiad (BA_Musiad)
- Tuskon – combination of local affiliates Hürsiad and Gapgiad (BA_Tuskon)
- Gagiad (BA_Gagiad)
- Secular civil society organisations (Civic_Secular )
- Islamic civil society organisations affiliated with the Gülen community (Civic_Islamic)

These are in addition to the outcome measures: companies’ leadership positions at the Turkey or Gaziantep Chambers, (Chambers_Turkey, or Chamber_Antep), and

53 Parties of centre-right and political Islam were later combined to the Islamic category for the subgroup-level analyses, but was only included if a business group had additional membership in another moderately Islamic organisation. Businessmen with a sole political Islamist affiliation were added to the ‘none’ category. See further details below in 2.3.2.b.
companies’ ranking among Turkey’s top 1000 manufacturing firms (only relevant for actor-by-actor networks).

Which organisations exactly were included? With respect to BAs, Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates represent centre-right/Islamic case studies, and Gagiad the secular case. Members and leadership levels alike were included, where possible, across the three time periods. Membership information was available for various years within each time period, and was extended to the full time period. As membership stays relatively stable (various interviews with BA representatives), and only a few members ever leave their respective association, the procedure of including members from previous into the next time periods can be regarded as valid.

More details on all of the affiliation data sources can be found in the appendix (section 3).

Access for civil society organisations was even more difficult. For all official civil society organisations, only leadership level data were available, rather than membership. Nevertheless, leadership reflects stronger engagement, and is therefore valid data. Concerning civil society organisations, the Gülen community has been widely acknowledged in the literature and in my fieldwork as the most relevant religious community. Belonging to the Gülen community, which has no official membership, is coded through the following strategies: first, if a businessperson has made a large contribution to a school or educational institution known to be part of the ‘cemaat’ (religious community), he/she was coded as affiliated with the cemaat. This information turned out to be very sparse as I was told that many businessmen preferred to keep this kind of Gülen sponsorship a secret. Additionally, therefore, I included two local charities that promote ‘imam hatip’ schools or Koran courses: Gaimder and Sunder (Gaziantep Imam Hatip Lisesi Mezunlari Derneği; Sunguroğlu Liseleri Mezunları Derneği), which were chosen because a newspaper described them as the most active of such education-related charities (‘imam hatip dernekleri’).

54 The education system is a key topic of contention between the secular coalition and Islamic movement in Turkey. Imam hatip schools were opened in the late 1940s as vocation schools to train Imams and hatips (Muslim preachers). Their numbers particularly increased in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Kuru, 2006, p. 150). Under the AKP, they became regular schools, albeit with a heavier focus on religion, and their graduates were oriented towards all sorts of professions (see further in Chapter VII), which secular actors regard as a major assault on laïcité. Religious education is controlled by the Presidency of Religious affairs (‘Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’), and private education of Islam is prohibited, and thus there are specific additional public schools to teach the Koran (Kuru, 2006).
in Gaziantep (“İmam Hatip dernekleri ne işe yarar?,” 2010), and they also provided online access to their board members (“About GAIMDER,” 2012, “Sunguroğlu Liseleri Mezunlar Derneği,” 2012). Both charities are members of the cemaat’s south-eastern educational charity arm Günder (“Özel Gaziantep Güney Eğitim Kurumları (Günder),” 2012), which is known to be associated with the Gülen cemaat. The cemaat schools listed by the teacher are largely members of these charities as well. Again, this information was limited, and therefore I also included further coding by hand: Board members of the Light Insurance (İşık Sigortası) and Bank Asya, both of which are also affiliated with the Gülen cemaat (included in a specific time period). Additionally, if one (or ideally two) interviewee(s) identified a company owner as a cemaat member, that company was coded as such. Concerning secular civil society organisations, the Tennis and Equestrian Club (TEC) was mentioned several times by leading businessmen as a place where elite secular businessmen meet. Rotary clubs were included as well. Again, only leadership levels were considered.

Political affiliation data are not based on party membership, but on whether a businessperson holds or runs for office in the Gaziantep city or province council, or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This information is available for each election period and was gathered from various sources (including local newspapers for earlier time periods or the Turkish Statistical Institute). For earlier time periods, information at local bodies was largely limited to leadership levels. Table 4 shows which parties were included for each of the three time periods, which encompass several general and local elections (1993–1998; 1999–2003; 2004–2012): nationalist parties like the MHP were ignored because both secular and Islamic parties have nationalist factions, and nationalist parties do not easily fit into the left-right or rather secular-Islamist categorisations. Also, for the 2004–2012 period, I excluded the DP/ANAP from the centre-right/moderately Islamic spectrum, and only included the AKP and partly political Islamist parties. I was mainly interested in studying the effect of AKP affiliations, and by excluding these weaker centre-right parties I was able to not confuse AKP with other centre-right parties’ effects. The classification of parties into a left-right or rather secular-Islam continuum is derived from various political scientists’ observations and analyses of the Turkish party system and voting preferences. These authors argue that religiosity has been dominant in determining party choice since the 1980s in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2004, 2007, 2008; Hale &
and that importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus the values of the periphery continues to be signified by religiosity (Kalaycioğlu, 1994).

Table 4: Political parties included in each time period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Centre-right/ Islamic</th>
<th>Political Islam (National Outlook Movement)</th>
<th>Centre-left/ Secular</th>
<th>Ultranationalist (excluded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993–1998 (91 and 95 general elections; 89 and 94 local elections)</td>
<td>DYP, ANAP</td>
<td>RP, FP</td>
<td>SHP, DSP, CHP</td>
<td>MHP, BBP (na)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2003 (99, 02 general elections; 99 local elections)</td>
<td>DYP, ANAP, AKP</td>
<td>SP, BTP (n/a)</td>
<td>DSP, CHP, YTP (n/a), ÖDP</td>
<td>MHP, BBP and GP (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–2012 (07,11 general elections; 04 and 09 local elections)</td>
<td>(DYP/DP, ANAP – excluded, minor), AKP</td>
<td>HAS (merged in 2012 with AKP) SP, BTP</td>
<td>MHP, BBP and GP (n/a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n/a: where no members were found in Gaziantep)

Leadership positions in the GSO and the TOBB serve as an outcome measure of political influence both for companies and for BAs. These data were provided by TOBB and are available for each election period since 1989.

After gather this membership data for various time periods, it had to be cross-referenced with the GSO’s textile company list to filter out those members who are also owners of a company in Gaziantep’s textile cluster. The resulting lists for the three time periods are so-called ‘incidence matrices’ with rows of business groups and columns of affiliations/memberships, which can then be read into the social network programme UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). The procedure of cross-referencing is explained in more detail in the appendix (see section 4).

2.3.2. One-mode networks: transformations to organisational- and subgroup-level networks

2.3.2.a Matrix transformations in UCINET

The lists resulting from the matching or cross-referencing procedure, which were uploaded into UCINET, are binary incidence matrices – the two-mode affiliation networks described above. They are depicted as a rectangular data array of business groups by affiliations and characteristics (size, foundation date, ISO rank and further economic performance data available for few firms). The affiliations make up one-mode and the business groups the second. As described above this two-mode data had to be transformed into one-mode data: the affiliations or memberships are turned
into ties connecting affiliations by shared members, and business groups by shared membership in affiliations. As a first step, I visualised two-mode datasets illustrating business groups and their memberships in eight affiliations to get a first overview of the network. Following from this, I proceeded to transform this two-mode data into one-mode data in UCINET.

In order to calculate and analyse organisational overlaps, I first had to transform these two-mode data into a one-mode data set where associations are connected through shared members (organisation-level analysis of event-by-event networks). Secondly, I transformed them one-mode data sets where actors (business groups) are connected through shared memberships (subgroup-level analysis of actor-by-actor networks). For the latter, organisational membership data had to be transformed to reflect Islamic and secular business, political and civic ties rather than memberships in different organisations. I limited the number of business groups to those who could be argued to be members and supporters of the business part of the subgroup. I developed a set of rules to determine, based on their memberships, which business groups should be included in either an Islamic, Secular, or Mixed network. These rules naturally result in a network with stronger overlaps (than one without any exclusions) as companies with singular affiliations could not easily be assigned to either subgroup as sympathisers. These rules are described in more detail below; further information on how this new categorical membership/affiliation data were first created, and then transformed into ties between actors can be found in the Appendix section 5 (see 5.1.b for the creation of actor-by-actor networks, and 5.2. for transformations into actor-by-actor networks).

The first step after this transformation was to export the matrix to the program NodeXL (Smith et al., 2010), which offers more possibilities of visualisation than UCINET. After a first graph interpretation, I calculated basic frequencies by hand to support graph interpretations. In order to calculate densities within each subgroup, the ties across the three relationship layers (business, civic, political) had to be aggregated (see section 5.2. in the appendix).

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55 This was done via the ‘data>affiliations’ procedure in UCINET, turning attributes into ties.
2.3.2.b One-mode subgroup-level networks: Islamic, Secular and Mixed categories

As argued above, in order to analyse the differences in the mobilisation strategies between the secular and Islamic subgroups, affiliation data were recoded to describe Secular, Islamic, Mixed kind, (or none), and within these categories were further allocated among political, business or civic ties, resulting in nine levels. Depending on the combination of affiliations/memberships of each company in these eight organisations, the company was coded as either Secular, Islamic, both (Mixed), or none, and within each category, whether the affiliation is of a business, political and/or civic kind.

I define as Islamic those groups who aim to redefine Turkey’s assertive secularism or laïcité (see further footnote 1, Chapter I), either directly by attacking the state (as Islamist parties did until 1997), or indirectly by aiming at transformations in the cultural sphere (following Tuğal, 2009). The latter includes, for example, if the association or actors expresses opinions supportive of relaxing the headscarf ban or generally to increasing religious freedoms (which in reality mostly means Sunni Muslim freedoms), aims to increase the number of imam hatip schools or Koran courses, and to extend brotherhoods, cemaats and tarikats, generally increasing conservatism and religiosity in society. Secular are those actors and institutions that largely seek to uphold the status quo. Both subgroups may contain liberal actors, who seek to support a more liberal notion of secularism, but this is a small and negligible faction, and the ‘Mixed’ category allows for the inclusion of ambiguous cases. Actors in both groups may be privately devout Muslims, but secular actors restrict religiosity to the private sphere, whereas Islamic actors seek a more visible role of Islam to inform the cultural, social, economic or political spheres. The crucial aspect for the following categorisation is that the perception of the affiliation is what matters as each affiliation signals an ideological closeness, which in turn shapes the opportunities for information- and resource exchange available to companies. I tried to validate this procedure by checking my coding for individual firms against interviewees’ judgements of these firms.\(^{56}\) Note also that this

\(^{56}\) For example, the categorisation works well for bigger companies like Canan, or Gulsan; for Kocer 2004 with three BAs, civic-secular and centre-right affiliations; or MB holdings with Gagiad and Tuskon memberships.
is a rating concerning several company board members at the company level, therefore the coding aims to establish the major tendency overall. If there is no majority of Islamic or secular affiliations, then the company is coded as Mixed (both).

**Rules for assigning ‘ideological score’ and subgroup**

Membership data were used to assign a company to either category. I did two rounds of coding where the second version was a stricter version that required more than one membership for non-BA affiliations for a clear categorisation. This naturally resulted in a network with more overlaps than in the first round of coding as companies with sole political or civic affiliations are coded as ‘none’ and therefore excluded from the analyses. I made sure to apply rules in parallel to the secular and Islamic subgroups to ensure that results are comparable (and differences in findings do not result from differences in the rules applied). I arrived at those rules by going back and forth between example cases where I had good additional information through interview data and making sure that the rules categorise these companies similar to interviewees’ judgements.

Different rules were applied for sole and multiple affiliations, because sole affiliations are less clear (especially for centre-right parties and civil society organisations in general), whereas in combinations an ‘average’ or general tendency can be established more easily. Therefore sole civic and political affiliations were excluded; single BA memberships were coded as Islamic for Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates and as secular for Gagiad. Sole BA membership was included because this is a study of BAs’ political influence. Gagiad is perceived by local businessmen to be rather secular, whereas Müsiad/and Tuskon are clearly known to be closely affiliated to the AKP and the Gülen movement, respectively, and therefore are perceived to

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57 While this means a loss of data for the already sparse coding of civic-Islamic Gülen cemaat members, it had to be applied as some civil society organisations like Rotary clubs cannot clearly be categorised. And while centre-left parties can clearly be categorised as secular, the case is harder for centre-right parties, which are made up of different coalitions, which change according to changes in leadership. For example, in AKP’s early period many liberals joined the party (Onar, 2007), but it also had a large political Islamist wing (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). The ANAP and DYP similarly have consisted of various coalitions and in the study period of the 1990s leaned more strongly toward promoting a (neo-)Kemalist agenda (Arat, 1998; Ayata, 1996; Çavuşoğlu, 2010). In order to keep the rules parallel for both subgroups, all sole centre-right, centre-left and political Islamist affiliations were therefore excluded (categorised as ‘none’).
also have a transformational agenda. This argument is further supported in the following chapter that analyses the activities of BAs.

I developed a points-based system where different points were assigned in mixed combinations to each BA/pol/civic membership, and categorised as either I/S/M or none depending on whether a differentiating threshold of Islamic vs secular affiliations was crossed. Political ties received the most points, followed by BA and civic ties (2 points for political ties, 1 point for BAs, and 0.5 points for civic ties). Political Islamist and centre-left party membership earned 2 points for their clarity, whereas centre-right party membership received no points due to its ambivalence, making it neutral and necessary to establish a general tendency through further ties. However, political Islamist parties were only included, if an additional, moderately Islamic membership was present in order to include only members of the moderately Islamic movement. Each Islamic and each secular affiliation received points, which were then added up for an aggregate ‘ideology score’; the more memberships, the larger the size of the necessary differential for an I/S categorisation.\(^{58}\) If the threshold was not crossed, the company was either coded as Mixed or None if there was not enough information for a coding to be assigned (e.g. only civic or only political affiliations). Further details can be found in the Appendix (section 5.1.a).

Because of the strict coding scheme, this mostly and automatically resulted in subgroup organisations that are ideologically close being considered in each subgroup (i.e. businesses in the secular coalition with a civic affiliation are all of the civic-secular type).\(^ {59}\) The focus of this analysis is on the extent and structure of ties rather than actual shared organisational memberships between individual actors in

\(^{58}\) For affiliations up to 2.5 or 4 points, the threshold has to be larger than 1 (e.g. through one Islamic BA membership); for affiliations with more than 3 or 4.5 points, the threshold increases to 1.5. The second larger threshold applies to businesses with political-left or political Islamist affiliations that receive 2 points, whereas centre-right and no political affiliations receive 0 points in that category, reducing the overall amount.

\(^{59}\) There are only a few exceptions to this rule: in 1993, all civic and political ties in the Islamic movement match with Islamic civil society organisations and centre-right parties; all memberships in the secular coalition automatically match with secular civil society organisations and political_left or centre-right parties. Additionally in 1999, all civic ties in the Islamic movement match with Islamic civil society organisations; only 4 BA memberships are additional secular BA affiliations (on top of Islamic BA affiliations). By leaving centre-right parties ambiguous, this way of coding resulted in including AKP members in the secular coalition in 2004. In sum, it adds some secular BA membership to Islamic networks, and some AKP membership to secular networks.
The numbers of business groups for each category after this recoding are summarised in Table 5. The present table shows the numbers for each subgroup, whereas further tables in the appendix show the numbers for each relationship layer, differentiated by the amount of memberships (see appendix section 6).

Table 5: Number of business groups per subgroup in each time period after recoding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All categorised</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N holdings</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Network findings

3.1. Graph visualisation information

For better readability throughout all graphs I adopted the following colour scheme: different colours represent different types of relationships where the secular coalition is depicted in lighter, and the Islamic movement in darker shades. Blue tones are selected for BAs and BA affiliations; red/brown tones for political and green tones for civil society organisations and affiliations. In the graphs of organisational overlaps, Chambers and their affiliations are shown in shades of grey.

Visualisation information for one-mode graphs of organisational overlaps (event-by-event networks)

I visualised organisational overlaps for the full network of organisations for each time period (see Figure 10, Figure 12, and Figure 14). The circles represent the various organisational memberships or affiliations. The size of the circle represents the size of the sample membership of the respective affiliation; the number of member companies is added at the end of the label as well (e.g. Chambers_Turkey_10). The thickness of the line reflects Bonacich’s subgroup overlap measure: the thicker the line, the higher the value, and thus the overlap. Cut-off points were chosen to reflect different ranges of the measure (see below). The figures on the lines are the total number of companies shared by two affiliations. All Bonacich values and shared company figures can be found in the appendix (section 2.)

For a clearer visualisation of the strongest overlaps of each BA, I also created graphs of organisational overlaps which are ‘one-step’ graphs (Figure 9, Figure 11,
and Figure 13): these focus on BAs as the ‘ego’ and show only overlaps of this ego with all other associations (‘alters’). All overlaps of the ego are included, not just the strongest ones as in the full network. Ties among alters are excluded to focus on each BA and its integration. In these graphs, the lines again represent organisational overlaps ordered from strongest (left) to weakest (right). The figures on the lines are the respective Bonacich values.

In the full organisational-level network graphs, all organisations are included, and so are the strongest overlaps between them (weaker overlaps were excluded to reduce clutter). Bonacich values, in general, are high due to the small number of organisations; most values, especially in later time periods are larger than 0.5, (which signifies independence), and range between 0.5 and 1. The few cases smaller than 0.5, which signify a negative relationship are discussed individually. In the 1993 and 1999 time periods, overlaps ≤ 0.6 were removed while in 2004 this threshold due to the very high overlaps rose to ≤ 0.75. Exploring graphs to clarify patterns is a common interpretation tool for qualitative network interpretation and I tried several versions to arrive at a threshold with little loss of information that at the same time maximised clarity (D. Hansen et al., 2010). The resulting exclusions of overlaps in the graphs are explained in more detail in the Appendix (see section 7).

Graph information for subgroup-level graphs (actor-by-actor network)
The last type of graphs compares how the different relationship layers intersect between the Islamic vs Secular subgroups (see Figure 15–Figure 21). Business groups with several companies are capitalised; single companies are not. Thicker lines reflect multiple memberships – information lost in the frequencies measure, but reflected here. In the Islamic movement, I additionally filtered out stronger ties, usually members with more than two affiliations (of any kind), to get a clearer picture of the core structure (see Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 18).

The coloured circles around the companies’ names reflect that business group’s memberships (reflexive ties); the black and white discs or circles associated with the label show additional characteristics: companies that are listed among the

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60 The exclusions for the 1993–1998 period are: Gagiad-Tuskon .61; Gagiad-Civic Islamic .52; Gagiad-Musiad .39; Musiad- Civic Secular .5; Tuskon-Civic Secular .60; Civic Secular- Civic Islamic .47; Civic Islamic- Pol_Centre-Right .60. The exclusions for the 1999 time period are: Tuskon-Civic Secular .58; Musiad-Chamber Antep .59; Civic Islamic-Chamber Antep 0.52.
top 1000 firms in that time period have a disc (full black circle). The size of circle reflects membership in the Chambers: the standard small size means no affiliation; medium reflects Gaziantep Chamber membership and the largest circles reflect national Chambers membership.

3.2. Outcome: domination of Chambers across time

Table 6 below shows how the number of leadership positions is distributed among the Islamic and secular subgroups as well as the mixed and non-categorised business groups. Note that TOBB (Chambers_Turkey) members are usually also Gaziantep Chamber, i.e. GSO (Chamber_Gaziantep) members, but that the Gaziantep Chamber column excludes those TOBB members (to remove duplicates). The ISO columns refer to the number of business groups ranked in Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO)’s list of top 1000 manufacturing companies based on turnover and profit-based sales. Companies of the Islamic movement gradually increase their amount of leadership positions, but do not fully displace secular companies, which, in Gaziantep or Antep, still keep a strong presence especially in the national Chambers. The Islamic movement’s influence is especially obvious in the GSO, where Islamic business groups have doubled their presence between 1993 and 2012, whereas secular business groups only control 25% of the seats in post-AKP period that they had controlled in the 1993–1998 time period. In the national Chambers, Islamic business groups remain less dominant than their secular counterparts. However, this body has become more diversified with the same number of mixed and secular business groups in the 2004–2012 period. In the pre-AKP period secular business groups had fully dominated the TOBB. The economic growth of the Islamic movement is also reflected in the increasing number of Islamic business groups that have entered ISO’s (Istanbul Chamber of Industry) list of top manufacturing companies. While the number of secular business groups from Gaziantep in the top 1000 has stayed relatively stable at about 5 business groups, Islamic business groups have tripled their placement from 1993 to 2012 to 9 business groups. Similar, previously absent mixed business groups have increased their presence to six business groups. In Gaziantep, Islamic business groups have increasingly dominated the Gaziantep Chamber and top 1000-company list over secular counterparts and the national Chambers have become more diversified. This increasing domination is also reflected in the organisational overlaps of secular vs Islamic organisations with the
Chambers, presented below. Table 6 provides more detail on which organisations control the Chambers.

Table 6: The number of business groups across subgroups with leadership positions across three time periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GSO) only</th>
<th>National Chambers (TOBB)</th>
<th>Business Groups in Top 1000 (ISO data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1993–1998

The major notable feature of the full network graph of organisational overlaps (graph 4) is the domination of the secular coalition in the Gaziantep and national-level Chambers: this is reflected in the thick lines, i.e. large membership overlaps between the affiliations Gagiad, Civic secular, Chamber Antep and Chambers Turkey. Indeed, secular BA and club members take up all leadership positions at the national Chambers (the normalised overlap score between Gagiad and national Chambers is a perfect 1). The subgroup overlap measures of the Gaziantep Chamber are also much stronger with secular civil society organisations and Gagiad (at 0.94 and 0.85, respectively) than with the Islamic BAs Müsiad, Tuskon or Islamic civil society organisations (all between 0.63 – 0.67). Islamic BAs and civil society organisations have only minor Chamber Antep integration, and none with the national Chambers. It also becomes apparent that in spite of the domination of the political centre-left CHP in the local council, the party’s influence in the manufacturing business circles is much smaller than that of the neoliberal centre-right parties ANAP and DYP. For example, the Antep Chamber shares 13 firms with centre-right parties, compared to only 1 firm with centre-left secular parties.

1999–2003

Gagiad, the secular BA, and secular civil society organisations still share the strongest overlaps with both the Gaziantep and national Chambers (national Chambers share their largest overlap with secular civil society organisations at 0.94, and Gagiad at 0.93; and Gaziantep Chamber shares its largest overlap with secular civil society organisations at 0.90 and Gagiad at 0.80). However, Tuskon which was
not represented in national Chambers positions in 1993–1998, now has six firm members represented at the national-level Chambers (increase in overlap measure from 0 in 1993 to 0.64 in 1999), and continue to have a similar amount of Gaziantep Chamber members as in 1993. Interestingly, the centre-right parties share less direct overlaps with the Gaziantep Chamber in this time period at 0.63, and now seem more indirectly integrated in to the Chambers via Islamic BAs (note that the integration of centre-left parties with Gaziantep Chamber increases in this time period, but is only carried by one company). This is mainly because of the fact that the major groups of Sanko and Yetkinsekerci withdraw their former political alliances from the centre-right parties, and move up into national Chambers positions at the same time.

2004–2012
The integration of the Islamic movement into the Chambers’ leadership has been achieved as an outcome of their earlier network strategies; and the organisational patterns reflect the subgroup-pattern presented above in Table 6. While the strongest overlap of the national Chambers is still secular civil society organisations at ca. 0.90, the Islamic civil society organisations now have an overlap of 0.78 as well (up from 0 in 1993). Additionally, Müsiad and Tuskon together share 56 firms with national Chambers, compared to Gagiad’s 44 (translates into normalised values of 0.89 for Gagiad vs 0.73–0.77 for Tuskon and Müsiad). The national Chambers have become more diversified, but secular business groups are still strong in their leadership bodies.

   Islamic domination is most evident in the Gaziantep Chamber: while the secular civil society organisations share the largest overlap with the Gaziantep Chamber leadership, Islamic civil society organisations have reached a very similar level (normalised overlaps at 0.875 for secular vs 0.826 for Islamic; company numbers at 50 vs 40). Most importantly, Tuskon and Müsiad together share 127 companies with the Gaziantep Chamber leadership compared to only 75 for Gagiad (normalised values: 0.775 for Tuskon; 0.809 for Müsiad and 0.829 for Gagiad).

The AKP61 dominates the Gaziantep Chamber over their political left counterparts (0.8 vs 0.73 normalised values; left parties’ integration is overestimated because of two massive holdings’, Sanko and Merinos’s, diversified strategies). The

61 Only AKP members are included in the 2004–2012 time period.
AKP now has several shared businesspeople with both the Gaziantep and national Chambers, even without mediation by BAs, showing their increased influence. After establishing this growing influence of Islamic over secular organisations, the following section focuses on comparing various network indicators of cohesion and structure across time.

3.3. Cohesion: densities and tie strengths across all time periods

Table 7 shows the densities for the Islamic, Secular and Mixed categories across time, first for valued (density measures average tie strength), then for dichotomised datasets (density measures proportion of actual relative to possible ties). Comparing the densities between the secular and Islamic subgroups reveals slightly higher values overall, and stronger ties for the Islamic movement in all time periods. The difference is most pronounced in the middle time period. The Mixed business groups are those who are the most strongly connected with memberships on both sides. We would expect higher density values for this mixed subgroup because their coding, but also because smaller subgroups with fewer actors are usually more connected than larger subgroups with more actors.

In 1993–1998, the difference between the subgroups in cohesion is small: the difference in average tie strength is only about 0.19, and the binary densities at different tie strengths are largely similar. For example, 58% of possible ties with two or more memberships (≥2) are present in the secular coalition vs 52% in the Islamic movement. The Islamic movement has a slightly higher range of strong ties (above ≥3).

The share of strong ties and the density differential between the subgroups is the most pronounced in the 1999–2003 time period: average tie strength of the Islamic movement is about 54% stronger than that of the secular coalition, and the percentage of possible ties across stronger ties is also larger in the Islamic movement. This difference declines in the 2004–2012 post-AKP period where the subgroups are more similar again. While the secular coalition has a slightly higher ration of ties with two or more memberships, the Islamic movement has again a slightly higher ratio of ties across very strong levels (≥ 5 and upward). Average tie strengths differ by about only 0.5. Based on density data, differences in cohesion are not very large between the subgroups. The following section analyses organisational
overlaps to identify the level of diversity within each subgroup and the strength of integration with inter- and intra-subgroup organisations.

Table 7: Densities by subgroups across three time periods for valued and binary data (dichotomised at various tie strengths)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Densities within groups</th>
<th>93–98 Islamic N=44; n=23</th>
<th>93–98 Secular N=44; n=17</th>
<th>93–98 Mix N=44 n=4</th>
<th>99–03 Islamic N=69; n=41</th>
<th>99–03 Secular N=69; n=23</th>
<th>99–03 Mix N=69 n=5</th>
<th>04–12 Islamic N=133; n=84</th>
<th>04–12 Secular N=133; n=35</th>
<th>04–12 Mix N=133 n=14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density (valued)</strong></td>
<td>2.185</td>
<td>1.993</td>
<td>3.125</td>
<td>2.402</td>
<td>1.563</td>
<td>2.880</td>
<td>2.818</td>
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</table>

3.4. Cohesion: organisational overlaps within and between coalitions (tie diversity)

3.4.1. Intra- and inter-subgroup overlaps (tie diversity): business associations and full networks

1993–1998

First, I focus on BAs’ ego-networks and their integration with various organisations within and between subgroups. Figure 9 illustrates that the strongest overlaps of each organisation are in line with their respective subgroup, suggesting that two subgroups of organisations can be differentiated via overlaps.

Müşiad and Tuskon’s overlaps with each other are among their strongest overlaps at a normalised score of 0.8 each. Müsiad shares about half of its membership companies in the sample with Tuskon. Müsiad as well as Tuskon dominate the Islamic civil society organisations on overlaps ranging between 0.7 and
0.75. There is only one businessman who is a member of the political Islamist party in this time period, and he is integrated into the Islamic BA Tuskon only (resulting in a perfect overlap measure of 1). Gagiad and civic-Islamic memberships are independent of each other (overlap measure of 0.52), and being a Gagiad member even decreases the likelihood of being a Müsiad member (overlap measure of 0.39). Similarly, civic-secular and Müsiad, as well as civic-Islamic memberships are independent of each other at a value of about 0.5 each. Müsiad and Islamic civil society organisations are clearly differentiated from secular organisations in the types of members they attract.

Figure 9: 1993–1998 Organisational overlaps of each BA (One-step ego-networks), ordered by strength of Bonacich normalised subgroup overlap measure (see line labels)
The secular Gagiad shares most of his members with the Chambers and with secular clubs. Unexpectedly, Gagiad’s integration with secular clubs or civil society organisations is stronger than that of internal overlaps in the Islamic movement (the Gagiad civic-secular overlap is 0.94 vs Islamic BAs’ overlap with civic-Islamic is in the range of 0.7–0.75). However, BAs are not completely disconnected: Tuskon and Gagiad memberships share a slight overlap of 0.6. Müsiad only shares one company member with Gagiad, who is additionally in Tuskon, whereas Tuskon and Gagiad share eight company members overall.

Figure 10: 1993–1998 Full network organisational overlaps (event-by-event network) based on largest Bonacich subgroup overlap measures

Figure 10 above additionally allows a closer study of the integration of political parties; interestingly, the secular Gagiad shares the largest overlap with centre-right political parties with a strong measure of 0.81 (14 companies- see line labels), whereas Tuskon shares no members with centre-right parties, and Müsiad only 2 companies (0.64). Similarly, it is secular rather than Islamic civil society organisations that are integrated with political right parties (measures of 0.86 versus
0.60). Powerful business groups such as Sanko and Yetkinsekerci largely drive this integration of secular organisations into political right parties. And while these business groups slightly overestimate Gagiad’s political integration, they illustrate the strong influence of the secular BA, which manages to attract powerful political entrepreneurs. The political left shares no members with any BA and is only indirectly integrated into business circles via overlapping memberships with secular civil society organisations or clubs. This shows the strong integration of centre-right parties with secular organisations and Chambers in this time period.

Two subgroups that are only slightly integrated can therefore be differentiated: Tuskon, Müsiad, Civic-Islamic, and Political Islamist form axis 1, versus Gagiad, Civic-Secular, Political Right and the Chambers, which form axis 2. The two axes, and the stronger internal integration in the secular coalition within and with the Chambers can be seen in the full network graph.

1999–2003

Figure 11 shows that compared to the earlier time period, Islamic BAs are more strongly integrated with the secular BA Gagiad: Müsiad’s previously negative relationship with Gagiad increases to 0.62, and Tuskon’s to a medium 0.7. Gagiad’s membership is slightly more strongly integrated with Islamic civil society organisations as well (from near independence in 1993 to a weak to medium positive relationship at 0.66).
Figure 11: 1999–2003 Organisational overlaps of each BA (one-step ego-networks), ordered by strength of Bonacich normalised subgroup overlap measure (see line labels)

In spite of increasing diversity and inter-subgroup overlaps, BAs’ strongest overlaps are still shared with their respective subgroup organisations. However, Gagiad’s strongest overlaps remain the Chambers and the secular civil society organisations (Gagiad’s integration into secular clubs is nearly perfect at 0.93). Islamic organisations actually increase their intra-subgroup overlaps compared to 1993. This can be seen clearly in Figure 12, where the thickness of lines representing Bonacich values is more similar within the subgroup than it was in 1993–1998. More specifically, Müsiad, Tuskon and Islamic civil society organisations still exhibit a strong overlap (0.74 between Müsiad and Tuskon, which is slightly lower than in 1993). In fact Islamic BAs have increased their integration of Islamic civil society organisations (overlap between 0.78–0.85), which is now more similar to Gagiad’s civic-secular integration (at 0.93). Tuskon’s strongest membership overlaps are with other movement organisations, which now include the political right (ANAP, DYP and the new AKP), Islamic civil society organisations, the political Islamist party and Müsiad. There is near independence between Tuskon and civic-secular membership at 0.58. Similarly, Müsiad shares the largest part of its membership base with Islamic civil society organisations (13 companies at 0.85), the political right and Tuskon. Müsiad still shares about half of its member companies with Tuskon, and half with Islamic civil society organisations.

Differences between Müsiad and Gagiad’s homogeneous and Tuskon’s diverse strategy become apparent in their civic and BA linkages: Tuskon, is similarly strongly integrated with Gagiad, as it is with Müsiad (at 0.70 vs 0.74) and has a more diversified integration into civil society organisations than Müsiad: while Müsiad shares no members with secular clubs, Tuskon shares a few (albeit at 0.58); Tuskon’s integration into Islamic charities is also weaker than either Müsiad or Gagiad’s
integration into their respective civil society organisations. Gagiad similarly increases its diversity through a larger shared membership with Tuskon and Islamic civil society organisations than in 1993, but at the same time remains much more strongly connected to secular civil society organisations and the Chambers.

Another key development is the changing integration of centre-right parties (this is further analysed in the section on the extent of political integration below): in the previous time period the centre-right parties were integrated with the secular subgroup, and political Islamist parties with the Islamic movement. Now, Tuskon shares its strongest overlap with centre-right parties with nine companies, Müsiad with five and Gagiad with four companies. Indeed, with a measure of 0.83, centre-right parties are the strongest overlapping organisations of Tuskon.

Figure 12: 1999–2003 Full network organisational overlaps (event-by-event network) based on largest Bonacich subgroup overlap measures
In sum, there is both increasing internal and external integration with the latter being mainly driven by Tuskon. The political centre-right becomes more integrated with Islamic organisations in this time period. An Islamic BA member between 1999 and 2003 is still much more likely to be a member of the political right, and the Gülen community than of secular civil society organisations (and to a lesser extent, of Gagiad). It therefore makes sense to regard Islamic BAs, sections of the political right and the cemaat as cooperating social movement organisations.

2004 – 2012

The most notable feature of the 2004–2012 affiliation-by-affiliation graph is the large extent and similarity of overlaps across all groups. All BAs have become increasingly diverse in the post-AKP period with stronger inter-subgroup integrations. Consequently, the two subgroups have become harder to differentiate in this time period, as can be seen in the full network graph Figure 14.

This diversification is indicated by the fact that the differences in overlap measures between the strongest and weakest overlap have become much smaller (see Figure 13): at Tuskon, the difference between the weakest overlap (political Islamist party) and the strongest overlap (BA_Musiad) has shrunk to only 0.15 in the post-AKP period, from a span of 0.4 in 1993. Similarly at Gagiad the differential between the strongest and weakest overlap was the largest in 1993 at 0.6, and now has shrunk to about 0.2.

While Tuskon’s integration with Gagiad remains similar to before, Müsiad now has also increased its Gagiad integration (to 0.74). However, Müsiad has the lowest variance in the span of normalised overlap measures across the three time periods. It is the most homogeneous of all three BAs. The inter-subgroup integration appears to be mainly driven by Tuskon and Gagiad in previous time periods; in the post-AKP period, Müsiad diversifies further into secular organisations, however to a lesser extent than Tuskon had. In spite of such integration, in absolute terms, the two Islamic BAs share well over half of their respective membership (82 companies in 2004). Most importantly, all BAs still share the largest normalised overlap measures with close subgroup organisations (see Figure 13). In fact, Müsiad becomes Tuskon’s largest overlap for the first time (at 0.83), and Tuskon constitutes Gagiad’s smallest overlap. Civic-Islamic and political right parties remain the strongest overlapping organisations of Islamic BAs, followed by the Chambers.
The large integration of the political left into the Islamic movement (especially into the Islamic civil society organisations and Islamic BAs at about 0.7) is exaggerated as it is carried mainly by two large holdings’ affiliations: Sanko and Merinos. This is also true for the political left’s integration into the Chambers.

This integration and diversification can be seen in the inter-subgroup overlaps in Figure 14: the integration between Gaggiad and Islamic BAs has become even stronger, and especially increased with Müsiad (up from 0.39 in 1993 to 0.61 in 1999 and to 0.74 in 2004). Civic-secular clubs shared no members with Müsiad in 1999 and only one in the early 1990s; the overlap measure has increased from independence in 1993 to a relatively strong 0.75 in the post-AKP period. Civic-
secular elite clubs used to be mainly integrated with Gagiad with near-perfect overlap measures and 0 or independence from Islamic BAs. In the post-AKP period, secular organisations have become much more diversified and integrated with Islamic organisations. This suggests that Islamic elites now increasingly join elitist secular associations. Indeed, political entrepreneurs of the AKP appear similarly likely to join Islamic BAs and the secular BA Gagiad (overlap measures of AKP with Tuskon at 0.80, with Müsiad at 0.83 and with Gagiad at 0.72). To further support this statement I have calculated the growth of the sample membership for each BA and BA combination relative to firm growth (see appendix section 8); the share of companies who are members of the secular BA Gagiad only is less than firm growth over the study period, whereas the growth of Tuskon and Müsiad-only memberships increases faster than firm growth. The category that increases the most is companies with membership in all three BAs, indicating that the increase in Gagiad membership is driven by mixed membership, namely, Islamic BA members entering Gagiad.
3.4.2. Structure: extent of political and civic integration

3.4.2.a Organisational overlaps and frequencies 1993–1998

Organisational overlaps showed that in 1993, Gagiad dominates centre-right parties, and has both stronger civic and political integration than the Islamic movement overall. Tuskon has only one political party member of the otherwise isolated political Islamists party. Frequencies at the business group level (see Table 8), which make up for any bias of group size, confirm the finding that the secular coalition is more strongly integrated into centre-right parties and civil society organisations in the 1990s than Islamic BAs: 12% of secular business groups have political membership compared to 9% of Islamic business groups. While this difference is smaller than in overlaps, the fact that the secular BA had integrated these influential political entrepreneurs shows their influential political integration.

Table 8: Frequencies of three relationship layers and their combinations compared between Secular and Islamic subgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Percentages (total business groups)</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>Secular</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Business Association only</strong></td>
<td>65% (11)</td>
<td>78% (18)</td>
<td>74% (17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic total</td>
<td>35% (6)</td>
<td>13% (3)</td>
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<td>Political total</td>
<td>12% (2)</td>
<td>9% (2)</td>
<td>4% (1)</td>
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<td>BA + Civic only</td>
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<td>13% (3)</td>
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<td><strong>BA + Political only</strong></td>
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<td>9% (2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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<td>Civic + Political only</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BA + Civic + Political</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total Business Groups</strong></td>
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As for civic integration, Gagliad’s three strongest overlaps are shared with the Chambers and the secular civil society organisations of Gaziantep. In the early 1990s, civic integration in Gaggiad (0.94) appears much higher than in Tuskon or Müsiad (0.69 for Tuskon and 0.75 at Müsiad). Frequencies (see Table 8) confirm
overlap findings showing that the level of civic integration in the secular coalition is much stronger in the early 1990s (35% vs 13% in the Islamic movement). The Islamic movement catches up in its level of civic integration in the following time period (2% difference). The two subgroups remain similar in the post-AKP era (6% in 2004–2012); it is actually the secular coalition that has slightly more civic ties in the post AKP era, not the Islamic movement.

3.4.2.b Organisational overlaps and frequencies 1999–2003

In this time period, it is especially Tuskon that strengthens and diversifies its membership base, gaining the strongest influence in the centre-right parties. Most importantly, Gagiad’s overlap with the centre-right parties reduces to 0.62 (from 0.8 in 1993), whereas Tuskon’s increases to 0.828 from 0. Both Tuskon and Müsiad have the political right as their strongest overlap. This shows the gradual shift in centre-right parties from secular to more Islamic groups in this time period. Gagiad, which has 88 members in the textile industry in this time period, shares only four companies with any political party, whereas Tuskon and Müsiad combined have 15 centre-right party members (among their 90 firm members in the textile cluster). This is also reflected in frequencies based on coalition data, which only includes ideologically close members; the extent of political ties is now larger in the Islamic movement (4% vs 10%).

However, it is not only the extent, but also the influence and ideological closeness of the company that matters. Gagiad’s overlap with centre-right political parties is now only mediated through ideologically less close firms like the Islamic firm Eruslu, and the mixed Prosep (a former ANAP politician). These companies, while being Gagiad members, are in fact members of the Islamic movement and mixed categories, not the secular coalition (and are therefore not reflected in subgroup frequencies presented above). The secular coalition only features one ideologically close political member in this time period, namely, ‘boyasboya’ (political left member). In contrast, Islamic BAs’ centre-right integration is direct and incorporates four ideologically close Islamic companies⁶² (see Figure 16).

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⁶² This refers to the following business groups. The business group ‘Gurteks’, a DYP and Müsiad-only member in the previous time period, now additionally joins Tuskon. The business ‘üzer tekstil’, a political Islamist party and Tuskon member in the previous time period, now additionally joins a centre-right party. ‘üzer tekstil’ also becomes a leader at Müsiad and the AKP in the 2004–2012 period. The group ‘Ozsever’, a Tuskon and
Interestingly, the centre-right parties share fewer direct overlaps (0.63) with the Gaziantep Chamber in this time period; they now seem more indirectly integrated into the Chambers via Islamic BAs, which additionally underscores Islamic BAs’ increasing influence.

Importantly, the Islamic movement also catches up in the amount of civic integration in this time period, which is confirmed by both frequencies at the subgroup level and organisational overlaps. The percentage of total civic ties is at 20% in the Islamic movement in the 1999–2003 time period, versus the secular coalition’s 22%. In the early 1990s, the secular coalition has more than double the Islamic movement’s civic integration. Overlaps showed that Gagiad’s strongest overlap is with secular civil society organisations in this time period again, rather than with political parties. This shows the secular BA’s focus on civic integration; Gagiad’s overlap at 0.93 with secular clubs is much larger than Tuskon’s 0.75 with the Gülen cemaat (Müsiad has a stronger civic integration than Tuskon at 0.85).

One example of an Islamic company entering leadership positions in this time period is the civic-Islamic member ‘Akteks’, which in this period also takes the leadership of the Tuskon-affiliate Gapgiad and moves into a Gaziantep Chamber position. Bigger and more diversified firms such as Merinos, one of the largest carpet producers in Turkey, add more Islamic affiliations.

3.4.2.c Organisational overlaps and frequencies 2004–2012

In this time period, the AKP shares the largest part of its membership with Tuskon and Müsiad (0.802 and 0.829 respectively). The AKP’s integration with Gagiad has also increased considerably from 0.62 in 1999 to 0.72 in 2004. Although Gagiad now has increased again its integration into the AKP, many of those shared members are also members of Islamic BAs. Again, this can be interpreted as the moderately Islamic movement increasingly entering Gagiad and thus changing the nature of this secular association. This pattern is reflected in the frequencies at the subgroup level where 29% the secular coalition’s ties are political versus the 14% on the part of the Islamic movement. Approximately half of the secular coalition’s political ties are AKP members. The extent of political ties is less than expected in the Islamic

Gaziantepe Chamber leadership member in the previous time period, now also joins a centre-right party. The business group ‘Eruslu’, which is a member of all BAs, and a centre-right party.
movement, as AKP members have similarly entered the secular BA (and due to the nature of the coding, combined AKP and Gagiad members were ranked as secular vs combined AKP and Islamic BA members as Islamic).

The extent of civic ties is still slightly higher in Gagiad at this time than in the Islamic BAs. The ranking of organisational overlaps showed that Gagiad’s largest overlaps are still with civil society organisations and the Chambers rather than political parties (rank 4), whereas Müsiad’s second strongest overlap is with the AKP, for example. This is also reflected in the frequencies where the extent of civic ties is 26% in the secular and 20% in the Islamic movement.

3.4.3. Structure: multiplexity and structure of three relationship layers
To analyse how political ties are integrated into each subgroup, I compare the numbers of business groups with both a political and BA affiliation vis-à-vis with both a political and civic affiliation (pol+BA vs pol+civic). If politicians are mainly integrated into a subgroup via civic ties, the pol+civic share should be larger than the pol+BA share. The extent of embedded multiplexity is indicated by the number of companies with all three relationship types (BA+pol+civic) in each subgroup.

Whether a BA focuses more strongly on civic or political integration can be judged by comparing the BA+pol with the BA+civic membership shares. The multiplexity of ties, if and how the political, business and civic relationship layers intersect, is also evaluated via a qualitative interpretation of subgroup graphs.

1993–1998
The secular BA has a stronger overlap with civil society than with political groups, while the opposite is true for the Islamic movement. The secular coalition has a larger share of political centre-right ties, and these are to a lesser extent affiliated with the BA Gagiad than with secular civil society organisations. Core Gagiad members are closer to secular civil society organisations than to the centre-right parties (the BA+civic share is 24%, while the BA+political share is 0). Although the core of the Islamic movement is less integrated into centre-right parties in the early time period, this integration is achieved via Islamic BAs to a larger extent than in the secular coalition (the BA+civic share is 13% in the Islamic movement, while the BA+pol share is 9%, compared to the secular’s 0). From the start, it appears that Islamic BAs focus more on political integration than the secular BA. Of the two political members in the Islamic movement, both are also affiliated with Islamic
BAs, and none with the Gülen community, while of the two political members in the secular coalition, both are also affiliated with secular civil society organisations, and one additionally with Gagiad (Sanko Holding). This trend is to intensify in the following time periods and is supported by further indicators.

Note that no shared members exist in the Islamic movement between political parties and the Gülen cemaat – a structural hole that is to be effectively filled by Islamic BAs in the following time period. Compare the Islamic network in Figure 15 with the secular network in Figure 19: the political red/brown ties in the Islamic movement are only connected to Gülen community members (green) via BA membership (blue). In the secular coalition, both political members (boyasboya and Sanko; red circles) are members of secular civil society organisations. In the Islamic movement, civic membership also partly overlaps with stronger BA ties (thicker blue lines), while political membership does not (thinner blue lines). In other words, political entrepreneurs are not part of the strongly connected core.
Figure 15: 1993–1998 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)
Figure 16: 1999–2003 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)
Figure 17: 2004–2012 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)
Figure 18: 2004–2012 Islamic company-by-company (business group) network for actors with more than two affiliations, based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), and Outcome Measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)

Figure 19: 1993–1998 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)
Figure 20: 1999–2003 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)

Figure 21: 2004–2012 Secular company-by-company (business group) network based on relationship type (blue: BA; green: civic; brown: political), number of affiliations (line thickness) and outcome measures (Chambers positions; top 1000 ISO lists)
Concerning the structure of relationships, the 1993 trend continues and clarifies in this time period: in the Islamic movement, there are still no shared political and civic members. Instead, strong BA ties bridge those relationship layers. In the secular coalition, the only politician is a secular club rather than a Gagiad member. This shows again the Islamic movement’s focus on business mobilisation, combining centre-right with Islamic BA membership, whereas secular politicians lack this focus on BAs and are more likely to be members of elitist clubs. This is also reflected in the frequencies: 10% of Islamic companies are members of a centre-right party as well as Tuskon and/or Müsiad, while the Political+BA membership combination does not exist in the secular coalition. Indeed, political party and BA integration does not exist at all until the post-AKP 2004 period in the secular core, whereas it has been a focus in the Islamic movement from 1993 onward. Instead, the secular coalition’s politician is a member of a secular civil society organisation. That civic-political combination, in turn, does not exist in the Islamic movement.

Figure 16, especially the network graph on the right that filters out only the strongest ties, shows this pattern: Islamic BAs play an important role in bringing together the Gülen community and centre-right politicians through informal common membership ties (a bridge that remains taboo otherwise). It is mainly strong BA ties that bridge that civic-political ‘structural hole’. In the 1999 secular coalition, illustrated in Figure 20, the company ‘boyasboya’ is the only company with a political membership. The company has an additional civic membership, yet not BA membership; the same was true in the previous time period (see red ring around company). In 2004–2012 the various relationship overlaps become much more similar between the two subgroups, showing the blurring of the two.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 illustrate the large 2004–2012 Islamic networks, whereas Figure 21 illustrates the secular network. The percentage of civic ties is again slightly larger in the secular coalition in this time period, and so is the percentage of political ties. Most importantly, for the first time with the AKP’s strengthening, combined political and Gagiad membership exists in the secular coalition (see Figure 21). This illustrates the AKP’s, but not previous centre-right parties’ focus on business mobilisation. Five of the ten business groups with political affiliations in the secular
coalition are AKP members and five are CHP members.\textsuperscript{63} It is also the first time that the multiplex combination of all three relationship layers becomes more common in both subgroups equally.

Equally important is that the political and civic layers in the Islamic movement are now directly connected; namely through some of the core companies of the previous periods with the strongest ties (including the business groups/companies ‘Gurteks’, ‘Eruslu’, ‘uzer tekstil’, ‘Kaplan 1’; see in Figure 18 the group of four business groups with all ties in middle part of graph of strong ties). Strong BA ties have been key to linking the civic and political planes in the Islamic movement; this is evident in the company group with the strongest ties and all three types of ties.

Overlaps of centre-right political and civic-Islamic membership have also been absent in the category of business groups with mixed affiliations until 2004. In the 2004 period, it is the leading Sanko holding with mixed affiliations that combines almost all types of memberships; it is the only business groups with overlapping AKP and Gülen community affiliations within this category. These large companies with multiple affiliations have not been depicted here to focus on the Islamic and Secular subgroups. The number of mixed companies has especially grown in the 2004 time period where subgroups are harder to differentiate. In 1993 there were only four and in 1999 only five business groups coded as Mixed, while there were 14 in the 2004 time period.

The following business groups/companies in the network of the Islamic movement have moved up to leadership positions: For example, ‘Kaplan’ has moved to the centre, from previously being a Mısiad and civic-Islamic member in the 1990s, to additionally joining Tuskon, the AKP and finally the Gaziantep Chamber in the 2004–2012 period. The ‘Akteks’ group continues its previous Gaziantep Chamber leadership position and so does the AKP member ‘Eruslu’ group. Islamic groups have also increasingly joined the secular Gagiad.

\textsuperscript{63} Five AKP (of which four: Gagiad plus AKP; one with additional civic membership), five CHP members (‘Merinos’ with all three memberships; ‘boyasboya’: pol+civic; three: CHP plus Gagiad)
Observations on companies and outcomes

Throughout all time periods, we can see a trend that the largest, top 1000 firms are also those with the most connections, and the best connected are also often national Chambers members, although this appears less clearly. That means that the best connected, most central companies accrue the most benefits in terms of resources (in network terms – companies with higher ‘degree centrality’), and not those that bridge/connect layers. This is especially true for the Islamic movement: only companies with at least two types of ties are economically successful, while in the secular coalition companies with only Gagiad membership are also among Turkey’s top 1000. ‘Boyasboya’ of the secular coalition appears to be a rare case of company that appears in Gaziantep Chamber leadership without any BA affiliation in 1993. BA membership has increasingly become a necessity for economic growth. In 2004, ‘tekerekoglu tekstil’ is the only company in the Islamic movement, which is among Turkey’s top 1000, yet it is only a BA member; all other top companies have additional strong ties.

Concerning Chambers’ leadership, in 1999 the two Gaziantep Chamber leaders in the Islamic movement are among the companies with the strongest ties (Eruslu, Akteks). In comparison, part of Gagiad’s Chambers’ leadership has only Gagiad ties (Yildirim_Sanko; Yetkinseker). It appears then that the strong ties that have gradually bridged the civic and political layers in the Islamic movement are the companies with the strongest benefits and political influence.

Some of Gaziantep’s most influential holding groups like ‘Sanko’ or ‘Kocer’, (a Gagiad co-founder, who controlled the Gaziantep Chamber for over a decade and is now an AKP MP), increasingly diversify their ties over time. The Kocer group is in the Mixed category in all three time periods. It appears that for long-term political influence an extensive diversity of strong ties is required to become less dependent on a certain social and/or political group. In the 2004–2012 time period, Sanko has come to a position where it has ties to all BAs, civil society organisations and political parties (except political Islamist ones). It therefore appears that the politically influential firms increasingly diversify their ties, in spite of showing a clear allegiance at one time period.

64 There are fewer GSO and TOBB members in the 1999–2003 period than in the other two periods.
4. Summary of findings

Several indicators and graphs were prepared to compare cohesion (organisational overlaps, densities, tie strength), and the structure and extent (frequencies and graphs) of the three relationship layers between the Islamic movement and secular coalition. In terms of cohesion, I first analysed density and tie strengths. There are few differences between the subgroups in these measures in the early 1990s (1993–1998) and post-AKP (2004–2012) time periods. The share of strong ties and density differential between the subgroups is the most pronounced in the 1999–2003 time period, but even here differences remain negligible; the average tie strength of the Islamic movement is about 54% stronger than that of the secular coalition, and the ratio of possible ties across stronger ties is also larger in the Islamic movement.

When analysing organisational overlaps, the early secular coalition actually appears to share more members within the network, i.e. shows a stronger cohesion, than the Islamic movement. Unexpectedly, Gagiad’s integration with secular civil society organisations is stronger than that of the internal overlaps in the Islamic movement. Two subgroups of organisations can be differentiated that show stronger organisational overlaps within than between them (i.e. low tie diversity). In other words, each subgroup shows stronger overlaps with ideologically close organisations of the same subgroup than with ideologically distant organisations of the opposing subgroup. Islamic and secular BAs are weakly integrated and not completely disconnected. For example, Tuskon and Gagiad memberships share a slight overlap.

In the 1999 to 2003 time period, both cohesion and diversity increase in the Islamic movement. In this time period, the overall strength of network ties and density increases the most within the Islamic movement relative to the secular coalition. At the same time, the two subgroups become more integrated with each other, i.e. more diverse, compared to 1993. This diversification is mainly driven by Tuskon in the Islamic movement, which is more diverse than both the secular BA Gagiad and the Islamic BA Müsiad. Overall, there is both increasing internal and external integration. The two subgroups become clearly differentiated in this time period, but the strengths of overlaps increase within the Islamic movement and catch up with the secular coalition, resulting in two more similar looking subgroups.

The most notable feature of the 2004–2012 affiliation-by-affiliation graph is the large extent and similarity of overlaps across all groups. Consequently, the two subgroups have become harder to differentiate in this time period. Two subgroups
with stronger internal overlaps can hardly be made out, especially as Müsiad increases its diversification as well. Overall, all BAs have become increasingly diverse and less cohesive in the post-AKP period with stronger inter-subgroup integrations.

Concerning *network structures*, there are important differences between the Islamic movement and secular coalition. In 1993, the secular coalition has more civic and more influential political ties than the Islamic movement. The stronger integration of civic ties into the secular coalition in the 1993–1998 period is contrary to expectations, whereas the somewhat stronger integration of political ties in the same period was expected. However, in the following time period, Islamic BAs overtake the secular BAs in the extent of their political ties, and catch up in the amount of civic ties. At the same time, Islamic BAs increase their political influence in the Chambers in the 1999 to 2003 time period.

This growth in political integration was expected during the time period when Islamic BAs experienced growing political influence. However, the integration was not as strong as expected. In the post-AKP era (2004–2012) in Gaziantep, AKP members were similarly likely to be members of secular and Islamic BAs. Civic integration remains slightly stronger in the secular coalition in the post-AKP period, but relatively similar between the subgroups overall.

Most importantly, the subgroups differ in the structure and in the types of ties that connect businessmen with political parties and civil society organisations. Political elites of the secular coalition are more likely to be members of such elite clubs rather than of the secular BAs. It is civic members that tend to be politicians, and not BA members. Overlapping BA and political membership (exclusively) do not exist until 2004. In contrast, in the Islamic movement, this category has existed since 1993 and has become as frequent as overlapping political and civic membership in 2004.

In the Islamic movement, there is a very clear pattern in the scarcity of combined political-civic ties, which reflects the state’s hostility toward civil society. Between 1993 and 1998, Islamic civil society and political organisations do not share any members (intersecting multiplexity), while in the secular coalition they are directly connected (embedded multiplexity). This is in line with the multiplexity expectations. Instead, Islamic BAs connect Islamic civil society organisations with
centre-right parties. Combined political and civic memberships without any BA membership have become possible for the first time in the post-AKP era.

The companies that connect the two layers are those with the strongest ties (i.e. multiple memberships) of previous time periods. It appears also that the business groups with the strongest ties in the Islamic movement gain the most economic and political benefits (as reflected in their position in top 1000 company list and Chambers’ leadership positions).

As with the political integration, the extent of overlapping ties across all three types is not much different between the secular and Islamic subgroups in the post-AKP period. Originally, I had expected much stronger embedded multiplexity in the Islamic movement. However, the difference between the two subgroups remains small, which is due to the increasing overlap between them. This again suggests that this is an AKP legacy stretching to both subgroups, whereby Islamic actors increasingly enter and transform secular organisations.

5. Discussion

First, I interpret findings on cohesion: based on density figures, it cannot be said that the Islamic network is considerably more cohesive than the secular network at any time period. Contrary to expectations, the early secular network (1993–1998) actually appears more cohesive than the Islamic network. In the following time period, rather than decreasing or increasing cohesion, there is a more complex pattern where stronger (rather than weaker) and more diverse ties are built in the Islamic movement. Finally, in the post-AKP time period (2004–2012), all BAs have become increasingly diverse and less cohesive with stronger bridging. Analysing membership patterns more closely, it can be argued that in the post-AKP period, secular organisations have become much more diversified and integrated with Islamic organisations. I therefore interpret the increased integration as Islamic BAs increasing their influence in secular elite clubs and BAs. Overall, there is both increasing internal and external integration, i.e. bonding and bridging in the Islamic movement.

Second, I interpret findings on network structures; contrary to expectations civic integration has been slightly stronger in the secular coalition throughout all time periods, and especially in the early 1990s. Most importantly, Islamic BAs overtake the secular BA in political integration and catch up in Chambers’ leadership
positions. Based on these findings, I argue that the increasing political influence in the 1999–2003 time period of Islamic BAs is a consequence of the Islamic BAs’ stronger diversification and political integration in the same time period. In the post-AKP period the pattern of political integration somewhat mirrors the finding of increased diversification of the secular BA. Together with the stronger diversity of secular civil society organisations and BAs, this suggests that both Islamic business and political elites have increasingly entered secular elite organisations and increased their influence in them. The political integration of AKP elites extends beyond Islamic BAs to the secular BA.

The most important finding concerns how relationship types have been connected in the Islamic movement (i.e. multiplexity). The Islamic movement has gradually strengthened its internal cohesion and bridging, as well as its civic and political ties vis-à-vis the secular coalition. But its key advantage lies in how it brought these layers together: secular BAs have not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but forged strong ties with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. Centre-right parties of the 1990s focused less strongly on grassroots business mobilisation; rather, these political elites mingled in elitist secular-civic circles. Joining Islamic charities was a bigger taboo for centre-right politicians; those with stronger Islamic leanings joined Islamic BAs instead. Gradually, Islamic BAs have bridged the gap between the popular Gülen community and conservative political parties and facilitated their cooperation through non-contentious membership in BAs. It is through core Islamic BA members that eventually the way was paved for direct civic-politics links. Based on this finding I argue that in the Islamic movement, BAs have served as platforms for political mobilisation. Islamic BAs have provided a crucial platform for political mobilisation and resource exchange among social movement organisations, making overlapping political, BA and civic membership possible for the first time in the post-AKP era.

These findings have implications for debates on how cohesion relates to political influence. It appears that bridging and diversification (i.e. low cohesion) have been more advantageous for the growing political influence of the Islamic movement. The observed structure is not one of cohesive and cutoff cliques, as some ethnic entrepreneurship literature has observed for excluded ethnic communities in the periphery (Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993;
The Islamic network exhibits a strong level of cohesion; however, this cohesion is not just inward oriented, but crucially extends to extra-community linkages with secular organisations. Tuskon has been more diverse in its membership than the secular Gagiad and the Islamic Müsiad. This strategy may have contributed to supporting Tuskon’s export promotion and economic growth activities by facilitating access to a wide, diverse range of actors and resources. Müsiad’s stronger homogeneity, in turn, may have supported the internal trust building required for the thick exchange of high-quality resources as argued in the bonding literature. On the company level, within the Islamic movement, I find that it is companies with multiple memberships that also accrue the most benefits, rather than those that ‘bridge’ several layers. This supports the interpretation that strong bonding ties, i.e. the ‘core’ members with multiple memberships, facilitate multifunctional resource exchange. However, bridging brings advantages, too, as some of the most influential companies of Gaziantep increasingly diversify their ties to build up strong connections to both subgroups. This, combined with the finding that the Islamic movement does facilitate diversity also supports the interpretation that bridging has facilitated political influence. The combination of Tuskon’s diversity and Müsiad’s stronger homogeneity may have supported both Islamic BAs members’ economic growth and internal solidarity, combining the positive consequences of bridging and bonding discussed in the network literature. The observed network structure is based on a ‘cemaat’ structure with a strong, coherent, core and diverse edges with weaker ties.

The observed network structure is similar to what Agai (2004) has observed in the Gülen community’s educational network, and seems to be typical of modern socio-economic Islamic movements in Turkey (Yavuz, 2003). Gülen’s educational network is also characterised by a multitude of relationship with differing qualities, strengths and densities rather than just coherent, strong networks. Gülen does not officially appear as owner of any of the multiple organisations associated with his movement, and he has an institutionalised link to only one civil society organisation. The author finds that the ‘founders and sponsors of the various organisations associated with Gülen report that they were “inspired” by his ideas, whereas people working at the lower levels might not even know about the connections’ (Agai, 2004), especially outside of Turkey. The linkages are less visible as it is an informal network which connects the organisations to Gülen: The cemaat, consisting of partial
networks itself, builds the core of the network in which relationships are especially strong. Agai (2004) finds that the cemaat overlaps with the formal hierarchies in educational organisations. That is, members of the cemaat often had jobs in the higher levels of the educational institutions associated with Gülen.

The route to political influence has been to catch up and overtake secular actors in cohesion, diversity, civic integration, and especially in political integration, as political mediation models suggest. Most importantly, Islamic BAs have managed to bring together these different types of relationship layers and actors. According to the network literature, such networks can provide important platforms for resource exchange, political mobilisation and solidarity building – what is going in these networks is the topic of Chapter VI.

I hold that it is not the network structure per se that has provided advantages, but rather the inventive adjustment to the political and cultural context, relying on informal co-membership networks at the grassroots level where traditional forums for political and economic mobilisation were closed off. The political context had forbidden cooperation between political elites and civil society, and thus conditioned a ‘structural hole’ that Islamic BAs have gradually captured. Threats from the state increased the incentives for and advantages of building strong collaborative grassroots networks among Islamic actors in the political, civic and business realms; these serve as alternative platforms for the building of solidarity, political mobilisation and resource exchange. The resources built up in and through these informal collaborative networks were the only option left to Islamic actors in the periphery.
Chapter V Collective Action Frames

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed that Islamic and secular BAs’ networks have distinctive characteristics – Islamic BAs were shown to rely on both bridging and bonding, and to integrate previously disconnected political and civic actors. However, this raises the question of what actually goes on in these networks; the structure and content of relationships only tell part of the story of how Islamic BAs were able to build political power. It is important to understand how BAs build power through distinctive tactics, how they use networked relationships and mobilise support. In this chapter, I use frame analysis to examine the framing tactics, based on 51 interviews with 36 people, and further archival material.

I use frame analysis because my focus is on how Islamic BAs have generated political power at the expense of secular BAs. My central argument is that Islamic BAs were able to gain power through social movement tactics grounded in Islam. The frame analysis is used for analysing how SMOs mobilise support for collective action, how they build the internal trust and solidarity necessary to motivate action, and how they establish public legitimacy to support their movement goals and tactics. An important question is how ideology\(^65\) and religion enter the collective identities and goals of frames. This is especially important in the Turkish case where Islamic groups have been delegitimised in the public sphere and linking political with Islamic aims has been forbidden for civil society since the 1980 military coup. In the task of frame creation, ideologies based on nationalism, ethnicity and religion become even more important when struggles are based on such ideological cleavages in society. In the Turkish context, the Kemalist-Islamist dimension has come to the fore, as class-based activism has been discouraged in favour of unitising classless ideologies. However, beyond Turkey, social movement research has shown that ideologies based on ethnicity, religion and nationalism in general have been used ‘as

\(^{65}\)The concept of ideology is different from frames, but parts of different ideologies can be combined in the process of framing (Snow, 2004). Ideology is a ‘broad, coherent, and relatively durable set beliefs that affect one’s orientation not only to politics but to everyday life more generally’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 200). In contrast, collective action frames are more action-oriented; they fulfil a mobilisation purpose for a collectivity, whereby ideology can function as both a constraint and a resource by influencing a frame’s resonance with cultural narratives.
more reliable bases of movement organization in the past than the categorical imperative of social class’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 11). The quality of frames therefore crucially depends on how such cultural symbols and ideologies are incorporated into Islamic versus secular BAs’ frames.

Frame analysis focuses on speech and ‘the signifying work that is intended to mobilise supporters and to demobilise antagonists’ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Frames matter because they bind actors into common identities, goals and event interpretations, forging the trust and solidarity necessary to reach people’s hearts and minds and to animate collective action. Effective frames render events meaningful and thereby organise experiences and guide the actions of individuals in line with collective frames (Johnston, 1995). Bonding networks and trust have also been found to facilitate resource exchange. For private actors to influence public policy, formulating goals in the public interest is key to creating public legitimacy, especially when they have been marginalised and partially threatened. This is all the more crucial in bringing a subgroup of formally independent SMOs to act together.

Framing is a key movement mobilisation tactic through which ideology and religion enter the power building efforts of Islamic BAs. It supports collaboration and resource exchange among marginalised actors at the grassroots level, and provides public legitimacy. Such ideological sources of political power have been neglected in the literature on BAs’ political influence. This Chapter aims to demonstrate that framing processes have provided essential support for the collaborative resource exchange among SMO networks that, in turn, have allowed them to make political claims. This occurs in two ways. First, ideological framing provides a coherent, legitimate goal and identity based on supposedly pure, non-contentious Islamic goals. These goals are then merged with capitalist aims, which serve and bind together all parties involved. This is the key process analysed here. Second, the framing process facilitates the mobilisation tactics that are analysed in the other chapters, through binding a diverse network of independent actors together into a common identity and goal (supporting the networking studied in Chapter IV). This forges the trust and solidarity that is necessary to improve resource exchange (supporting the resource exchange studied in Chapter VI), and to motivate to collective action at large. Framing activities therefore indirectly support the economic growth of a legitimate pious business elite – which, in itself, has been defined as a key goal of Islamic BAs.
This chapter compares the resonance of Islamic and secular BAs collective action frames with a special focus on their use of ideological variables. The resonance of frames critically depends on how coherent, specific and complete the three framing tasks (diagnosis, prognosis and motivation to action) are adhered to. How well the frame resonates with actors also depends on the fit between the ideological contents of the frame and the wider cultural environment. This concerns further strategic processes, namely how different groups and their interests have been incorporated into the frame, and how well existing beliefs and values have been built upon (processes of frame extension, bridging and amplification). Frame amplification denotes the ‘clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469), including the fortification of ideology. Frame extension adds issues to a frame that were irrelevant previously, in order to be more attractive to targeted groups. Such an extension may be achieved through frame bridging, i.e. adding ideologically congruent but unconnected frames, or frame transformation, i.e. changing the meanings of incongruent frames to make them congruent. More specifically, how have the interests and beliefs of political, business and civic actors been incorporated into a common Islamic frame vis-à-vis an established secular elite? In the following, I first discuss the three framing tasks, and their quality indicators and other methodological concerns further. Then, I study these framing processes and quality indicators of each framing task, comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ frames.

The three framing tasks include the definition of a problem and a collective identity (diagnostic framing) as well the formulation of goals and tactics (prognostic framing), and motivations for action (motivational framing). Actors have to believe that goals are worthy and attainable if they are to engage in potentially risky collective action. Appeals to principles and ideology can be powerful methods of persuasion in environments where political struggles are ideologically based. By defining what the problem is, and attributing blame to a target, diagnostic framing essentially encompasses the construction of collective identities, differentiating between doer and receptor and a string of events connecting the two. By collective identity, I mean a common conceptualisation of who ‘we’ are compared to ‘the others’, the ‘self-definition of the contending group’ (Tuğal, 2009, p. 425). Several studies have shown that collective action framing processes constitute one central mechanism facilitating the linkage of collective and personal identities, thereby
I find that Islamic BAs have created a coherent and complete frame, based on a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that frame. Most importantly, the frame is extended effectively to combine the interests and beliefs of the SMOs involved. Feelings of exclusion based on religious beliefs and practices enter and amplify the Islamic frame’s problem identification, collective identity, goal, strategies and motivational framing. Such an incorporation of largely non-contentious ideology is also highly embedded in cultural narratives and threatening political contexts. A capitalist version of Islam and the feeling of exclusion in the economic, political and civic realm are topics that are highly relevant to and incorporate all business, political and business actors (adhering to frame extension, bridging, and transformation). By amplifying such religious sentiments and concerns, Islamic BAs have created a frame that resonates well with cultural experiences and beliefs of actors (frame amplification) and is embedded in them. This provides a source of legitimacy based in religious reliefs and a collaborative binding mechanism that facilitates collective action and increases the Islamic frame’s resonance.

In contrast, I find that the secular BA has not defined a common problem and only developed a rather diverse collective identity. Its frame remains incomplete and fairly incoherent, based predominantly on an elitist discourse of nationalist development. In addition, its members and leadership have not successfully argued against the Islamic frame’s identification of secular elitism with corruption. Together these aspects of its framing activities appear to have hindered the secular BA’s ability to reach the ‘hearts and minds’ of the public in the same way as the Islamic BAs. Rather secular frames have rather been accommodating and adjusting to Islamic frames. In sum, I find that the Islamic frame relying on religion and exclusion creates a more resonant frame than the secular Gaggiad’s elitism. I argue that these differences help to explain why secular frames have lost legitimacy vis-à-vis Islamic frames.
2. Methods

2.1. Three framing tasks and frame resonance indicators

The three framing tasks to be studied in this research include 1) ‘diagnostic framing’ (problem identification and attribution of blame and causality, including the definition of collective identity); 2) ‘prognostic framing’ (definition of goal and strategies); and 3) ‘motivational framing’ (rationale for engaging in action, articulation of motive). These are based on categories developed by Gamson and Lasch (1983), as well as Snow and colleagues (Cress & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986). By pursuing these core-framing tasks, movement actors foster both agreement and action, or in other words, attend to the core tasks of ‘consensus’ and ‘action mobilisation’ (Klandermans, 1984). For example, in the Vietnam War, the US attributed causality to the military attack by the Soviets against a US ally and independent country, while appealing to principles such as the defence of the weak and innocent against unprovoked aggression, the honouring of one’s word, and commitment to friends as a rationale for intervention (Gamson & Lasch, 1983).

I study two sets of factors that determine the resonance of a frame developed by Snow and Benford (1988). These factors are summarised in Table 9. The first set of factors concerns the completeness, specificity and coherence of the three framing tasks. The more the three tasks are attended to (completeness), the more specific, richly developed (e.g., use of clear targets) and interconnected they are (coherence), the more successful the mobilisation effort. Cress and Snow argue that articulate and coherent frames ‘clearly specify what is problematic and in need of amelioration and identify the culpable agents or institutions. Articulate prognostic frames specify what needs to be done in order to remedy the diagnosed problem’ (2000, p. 1078).

Coherence in frames concerns how problem identification, remedy suggestion and call for action are interconnected. There can be overall agreement on the problem (e.g., lack of political representation of Anatolian SMEs), but not what the underlying factors are (e.g. political, economic, regional, ideological), potentially resulting in different factions proposing different types of action. Coherence also concerns whether the proposed solution and strategies (in prognostic framing) flow from problem identification/causal attribution in diagnostic framing (e.g. political solutions stressed if regarded mainly as a political problem).
The second set factors determining the resonance of frames concerns the use of ideology. The higher the cultural and religious embedding and relevance of how events and issues are framed the higher the frame’s resonance. Another aspect is how competing frames are argued against. This set of factors relates to strategic framing processes, like frame extension, bridging and amplification: most importantly, how have the various interests and beliefs of SMOs been integrated into an Islamic frame? How have ideological beliefs been amplified in business interests? Cultural beliefs, dominant ideologies and values can constrain the resonance of frames and serve as a resource.

Table 9 Two sets of factors studied that affect the resonance of collective action frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Completeness, Coherence and Specificity</strong> of the three framing tasks</td>
<td><strong>Diagnostic frames:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Identification of a problem</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Attribution of blame to a target, includes construction of collective identity, us vs them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Attribution of causality</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Prognostic frames:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Goal-setting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Solution: strategies, tactics</td>
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<td><strong>Motivational frames:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rationale for engaging</td>
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<td>- ‘Call to arms’</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>2. Ideological Factors</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Linkage between cultural narratives and the way in which events or issues are framed, and their relevance to lives of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Strategic framing processes: frame amplification (amplify existing values, beliefs and interpretations at large), frame extension, bridging and transformation (extending frames to include target groups and their interests by bridging congruent beliefs or transforming incongruent ones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Way in which competing frames are argued against</td>
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</table>

2.2. Sampling, procedure and quality criteria

Overall, frame analysis allows putting forward the ‘ideological underpinnings of frames’, i.e. the normative political positions and ideologies involved (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Similar to the thematic analysis (of the following chapter), the analysis of frames first involves a rough coding, then a more refined second coding. By giving provisional labels grounded in the text, the researcher can uncover the motivations, interests and perspectives of various interviewees. The analysis then has to take into account who speaks in which context, as different idea elements can take on different meanings in different contexts (Gamson & Lasch, 1983).
Shapes and contents of frames vary according to interviewees’ roles and situational contexts. However, it makes sense to aggregate individual frames for subgroups within social movements that share general cognitive orientations towards events (Johnston, 1995). Due to the difficulty of researching questions of politics and religion in the business realm, this research cannot differentiate between frames of leaders, activists or movement bystanders, for example. Instead, I will present two aggregated frames for the subgroups of Islamic and secular businessmen and BAs, which largely rely on leaders’ and leading members’ frames.

Frame analysis requires sampling of relevant texts. It has to be justified why a particular text is taken as representative. The texts have to express coherent views on conflictual issues (Johnston, 1995), and comprise ‘packages of integrated idea elements held together by some unifying central concept’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). In this research, text sections mainly come from my interviews with BA leaders and members, and partly from BAs’ brochures and homepages (e.g. relating to BAs’ official statements on contentious issues where available), as well as published interviews with further BA leaders. This analysis relies on different sections of same interview material also used for the thematic analysis in the following chapter. Information on the selection of interviewees can be found in the literature review’s methods section. Beyond such text passages, information on the organisational and personal context was consulted. Views on contentious issues and personal contexts are best acquired through loosely structured interviews (Johnston, 1995), which this research employed.

The selection of texts and interviewees aimed at capturing the variety of views along the secular-Islamic continuum range from Islamic leaders and businessmen, to pious businessmen (with few affiliations), conservative political entrepreneurs (strong political ties), strategic businessmen (with multiple mixed affiliations), and finally secular-left businessmen (see also Methods section, Chapter II). Views of actors from different points of view increase the validity of the analysis (Cress & Snow, 2000). Other quality criteria concern how richly the analysis captures the frames and how deeply it peels away the different layers. Novelty is a further quality criterion of frame analysis. I also attempted to be as aware as possible of my own preferences and reflexive positions that can colour the analysis by trying to remain critical of and balanced towards all positions (Gamson & Lasch, 1983).
Religion and politics are very sensitive topics to businessmen that could only be discussed with a few businessmen. Two strategies make up for this: first, the incorporation of earlier newspaper interviews with BA leaders. Second, other than in traditional frame analysis, I did not only ask for interviewees’ opinions on contentious issues directly, but also asked indirect questions to capture opinions and self-conceptualisations in relation to contentious issues. Questions that elicit recall and traditional storytelling, and are best suited to get at representations of events and underlying ideologies (Johnston, 1995). The material was coded with NVivo 9 (NVivo9 Qualitative Data Analysis Software, 2010) – a software package to conduct computer-assisted qualitative data analysis by facilitating the arrangement and classification of information.

3. Findings: comparing the resonance of Islamic and secular frames

3.1. Diagnostic frames: problem identification and collective identities

3.1.1.a Problem identification

Diagnostic framing encompasses the identification of a collective problem and the attribution of blame to a target. The construction of a collective identity is an essential part of these tasks and a key criterion for social movements.

Secular businesspeople, but not the leadership, accuse the current regime of profiteering and they complain about feeling excluded when it comes to getting economic stimuli or relevant information, because they are less close to the AKP (e.g. interviews 33, 34, 36):

Since the AKP came to power, there have been good and bad developments. On the positive side, infrastructure has improved, and municipalities have more resources and thus provide more services. But, I haven’t been able to take advantage of any of these resources, I tried, but I don’t seem to have the right connections. (interview 34)

A secular businesswoman also complains in length about how the current government increasingly supports financial markets rather than the real economy (interview 33), or about problems with customs in exports (e.g. interviews 33, 31). These complaints are not strongly or coherently attributed to ideology: no secular leader clearly states that they feel excluded because of their vision of secularism; ideology is not included in problem identification and in the attribution of causality. While there might be individual exceptions to this rule, secular leadership has not developed as a public topic of contention, or even of exclusion. Such complaints
therefore lack a coherent, specific problem identification and causal attribution to a target.

Compared to Gaziantep’s Gagiad, confident Tüsiad leadership can, at times, be more contentious and openly criticise the government. For example, Koç Holding, one of Tüsiad’s biggest members, and the current head of Tüsiad Muhtarrem Yılmaz, positively evaluated the recent Gezi protests as pro-democratic (Levent & Cengiz, 2013). Tüsiad leadership was quoted to have said in the Turkish daily ‘Hürriyet’:

We have seen that democracy in our country has gone bad. There is a public that wants democratic standards to improve. Turkey should not miss the opportunity provided by the Gezi protests to translate its new economic weight into democracy. (Levent & Cengiz, 2013)

Yılmaz calls for a new constitution, and Tüsiad representatives are part of a civil society consultation platform for the creation of one that will replace the 1982 version put in place by a military junta. Nevertheless, this type of open criticism is usually limited to leadership and has created internal conflicts between the rank-and-file and leadership in the past (Buğra, 1994). Being a publicly less visible association, Gagiad appears not to have the same clout as Tüsiad to voice such political criticism.

Instead, secular leadership partly complained about the exclusion of Gaziantep as a city from the state development programme at large. The blame is shifted to a regional level with nationalist undertones. However, blame is not attributed to a specific target, and no specific explanations are given; it remains a complaint. Only one businessman (interview 34) argues that this might be due to the fact that Gaziantep voted for a mayor from the secular CHP from 1989–2004 and was perhaps punished for that by conservative parties in government, and the AKP after 2002. Secular leadership does not publicly include such targets. For example, in 2004 the then head of Gagiad complains that ‘Gaziantep’s entrepreneurs and industrialists were punished’ by their exclusion in the economic stimuli programme, although they had been promised to be included (“Gagiad,” n.d.).

The rule of moderate Islamists has almost become an accepted truth, which secular-leaning businesspeople have adapted to by increasingly joining Islamic BAs, or which they expect to disappear over time. In a defeatist fashion, some argue such patronage has been a feature of business politics throughout Turkish history; those closer to government have always been able to profit more: ‘This has been the case since Atatürk, always those close to the regime receive news faster and make more
money’ (interview 34). So, instead of developing a frame to blame the perceived hypocrisy of the moderate Islamists, secular actors regard patronage as a normal way of doing business in Turkey and adjust to the party in power.

A key ‘diagnosis’ of the Islamic frame is the active exclusion of Anatolian SMEs by secular elites from negotiating tables and economic resources due to ideological reasons and company size. Erol Yarar, the confident co-founder of Müsiad describes the association’s history in a contentious way. He used to be very prominent in the 1990s and his framing is highly indicative of Müsiad’s goals; his contentious way of framing is no longer representative of the Müsiad leadership’s framing. He argues that Müsiad became necessary as an organisation because pious Anatolian SMEs were not accepted into Tüsiad, which is too elitist and discriminated against Islamic businessmen. He uses the terms ‘Black Turk vs. White Turk’. It juxtaposes Anatolian or ‘Black Turks’, depicting them as dark-skinned with Arab origins, as well as Islamic and backward with ‘White Turks’, depicting the urban Republican elite as a group with a fair and Western skin-tone. This statement, while not very specific, amplifies a sharp distinction between institutions regarded as Kemalist and urban-elitist, and a pious group of rural underdogs. The statement also essentially combines Islam with business issues. Müsiad’s organisation is aimed at increasing the social mobility and influence of pious Anatolian elites:

Müsiad gathered the Anatolian SMEs under its roof and opened them to the world. We developed a bourgeois class with Anatolian tigers. My father was among the founders of Tüsiad, my mother was in the same class as the Ecevits at Robert College.66 I graduated from İşık Lisesi, but I saw in my family that we could unite religion and worldly affairs. But in society these two sides were strangers to each other. So much that when we organized Müsiad’s first congress in a five-star hotel, our friends said ‘what business do we have here?!’ They had forgotten that they were the foundation, they had accepted their marginalisation, and they felt like they had become Turkey’s Blacks. (…) They didn’t expect it [referring to the foundation of Müsiad]; they had control mechanisms that are similar to those used in a zoo. In Turkey, religion has always been kept under control; the situation resembles a river that is held back by a dam and only let free occasionally to get at a desired amount. (Şahin, 2009)

In Gaziantep, less confident and present-day Tuskon leadership frames this exclusion in much more neutral terms:

66 Refers to PM Bülent Ecevit, PM for the centre-left CHP in the 1970s and from 1999 to 2002 for the secular-left DSP; Robert College is an elite private school in Istanbul, originally founded by US-American missionaries.
There used to be [the secular BA] Gagiad. But their membership is limited, they don’t take that many members, and just joining costs about 4000 dollars! There are, however, many businessmen who don’t want to spend that much money, but who are still dedicated Antep businessmen. These are the people whom we targeted when founding this association. (interview 4)

The exclusion of Anatolian SMEs is a topic that secular or mixed-strategic elites often subscribe to, although Islamic frames add religious content to it. It shows how secular and strategic elites do not formulate a strong counter-argument, but rather build a more accommodating stance. This accommodation is well expressed in the following statement that builds upon a common regional bond of solidarity. It illustrates how secular BAs have not managed to overcome such regional or company size divisions, limiting the popularity of a nation-wide and encompassing secular movement. In this statement ‘Sanko’ Holding stresses the exclusion of Anatolian SMEs from the elitist BA Tüsiad, but without linking it to religious issues. In a newspaper interview (Kadak, 2010), the Konukoğlu family is described as ‘real Anatolian’ who is still loyal to Antep despite global joint ventures. In response to the question why he has not become a Tüsiad member, the owner says:

‘I won’t ever join things like that. In the past they didn’t use to take our region, then they offered, but I didn’t join. Their goal changed, they wanted to give the impression of welcoming the southeast, of wanting to be all together. We didn’t give them the chance to do so.’ The industrialist agrees to the following statement by PM Erdoğan’s recited by the journalist: ‘Istanbul capital excludes Anatolian capital. But there are big names in Anatolia: In Antep, there’s the Konukoğlus, in Kayseri there’s the Boydaks and in Manisa, there’s the Zorlus.’ A. Konukoğlu answers: ‘Yes, this used to be the case, but now Anatolian businessmen don’t want to join. In the past, Tüsiad appeared to be appropriate for Istanbul capital only. (…) Anatolian businessmen didn’t use to become members because they were small- and medium-sized. (…) Now they keep inviting us, but we don’t want to join anymore.’ Nevertheless, he admits that he does business with the then Tüsiad head, Ümit Boyner and other Tüsiad member companies: ‘Of course, we do business; we’ve been acquainted for a long time. But membership is not a matter of persuasion; it’s a matter of principle. And I won’t change my principles.’ (Kadak, 2010)

Another issue stressed by the Islamic frame, especially by the Gülen community’s followers, is education – the ban of headscarves in public schooling (and administration in general), and the perceived discrimination through a secular system. This framing by Islamic BAs, especially of Tuskon, is clearly strategic in that it incorporates the civil society organisations’ interests. The majority of problem formulations remain non-contentious. Education is a key debate on secularism in Turkey, although moderately Islamic frames depoliticise it in their public speech. In
a newspaper article given to me by the Tuskon-affiliate Hürsiad (that is also published on their homepage), an economist from Gaziantep’s Zirve University explains:

A further important factor [in the rise of Anatolian capital] was education, Dede added. While the old secular business elite used to send its children to excellent universities, often abroad, religious Anatolians had long been hesitant because they feared negative influences on their children. (Finke, 2011)

Islamic owner–managers who are involved in the Gülen community state that:

The path of education is very important, and Turkey’s educational sector is broken. Now we provide scholarships, open study centres and cram schools [‘dershane’]. These activities don’t go against the state, the state can take them, our ‘hoca’ [referring to the cleric Fethullah Gülen] even wants this because education is actually a state responsibility. (interview 22)

Creating an alternative, yet state-supported education system is regarded as an important step towards improving the influence of pious actors (a strategy which will be further explored in prognostic framing):

But the establishment of schools and universities in Turkey, which combined a good education with a conservative religious framework, overcame these reservations and hence helped create a reservoir of well-trained conservative Anatolian managers, engineers and politicians. (Finke, 2011)

Who exactly is being blamed for this exclusion? Again, the targeting is not very specific, but ideology-based. Mature industrial elites nurtured during the ISI period are regarded as corrupt and feeding on state resources, and the political elites supporting them as undemocratic, or even fascist Kemalists supporting economic statism. This depiction of secular elites is further discussed in the following section on collective identities. For now, it suffices to say that the Islamic frame mainly blames parties of the political left as well as coalition governments of the 1990s in general, which are blamed for decisions leading to political and macro-economic instabilities. The military is not specifically mentioned. A strategic businessman who currently joined a Tuskon-affiliate (interview 29) stresses that the economy hasn’t ever been as stable as it is now in Turkey, equating AKP governance with economic growth. Similarly, a pious businessman argues:

Past governments caused a lot of damage. There was Menderes for a while; during Atatürk’s time there were also many despotic issues [referring to Adnan Menderes, who was the first publicly elected PM from 1950-1960, and leader of the centre-right Democratic Party]. The transition to democracy isn’t easy; you should hang on to a good man if you’ve come across one [referring to PM Erdoğan]. The CHP isn’t like that, and the 1990s have been completely lost in Turkey, but currently there are big gains, we can see the material gains in our immediate environment. You know those 10 years in the 1990s went completely for nothing; in 2002, Turkey went completely
bankrupt again; all that corruption. (…) People vote for the AKP because they can see that and because the economy is going so well. When the government changes, this system will change as well. (…) We are businessmen, we look at profit-and-loss, and choose the option that generates less loss, there’s simply nothing else available on the market. And the other option; well, they [referring to the CHP] would cause too much harm to our homeland. (interview 21)

Not just the CHP, also the conservative DYP (True Path Party) and other parties involved in various coalition governments in the volatile 1990s are held responsible for the economic troubles of the 1990s. This rule excludes Turgut Özal’s leadership in the ANAP throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Turgut Özal has been hailed for beginning the Islamic capitalist restructuring of Turkey and is regarded as a model leader by AKP elites.

Erol Yarar directs his blame directly at the Western capitalist system, to which Müsiad then claimed to offer an alternative Islamic modernity. This quote underscores the amplification of Islam in the frame.

The capitalist system is a model that adversely affects the world economy and people. It needs to change. In our culture and religion are dynamics that can change it. Müsiad was founded with the belief that such an idea can only grow through institutional structures (…). (Şahin, 2009)

Since the ‘soft’ military intervention of 1997, the moderately Islamic movement rarely applies such direct Islamic references publicly. This Islamic alternative and its strategies are explained in more detail in one of Müsiad’s key publications, ‘homo Islamicus’ (Müsiad, 1994), which will analysed in the section on prognostic framing.

3.1.1.b Collective identity

The combination of Islam and capitalism is obvious and amplified in Islamic frames’ collective identities. They describe themselves as a new breed of Islamic capitalists: democratic, hard-working and ‘truly’ capitalist, yet pious and discriminated against. This self-depiction combines ideas of democracy, capitalist production, Islam and modernity and extends to civic, business and political elites. The comparative use of ideology in collective identities is discussed in more detail in the following section.

Beyond businesspeople, the collaborating politicians of today’s AKP are all regarded as pious, hard-working, modern, democratic and economic liberalisers

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67 The Motherland Party’s (ANAP) Turgut Özal, was Prime Minister from 1983-89, and President from 1989 to 1993. Özal is also widely regarded as the PM to allow greater freedom to Islamic movements, orchestrating, for example, the entry of Islamic banks into Turkey (Buğra, 1998), promoting the Gülen community (Agai, 2004) and Anatolian industrialists (Turam, 2007).
supporting free markets in the face of suppression. AKP elites and Anatolian businessmen like to depict themselves as hard-working vis-à-vis a lazy secular elite that only grew through state support (interviews 2, 7, and 8). Political elites of the AKP and business elites of Müsiad are constructed as ‘true democrats’ that have been systematically discriminated against. For example, the then head of Müsiad accuses state elites in a newspaper interview of banning Islamic political parties in the past, and for trying to ban the AKP in 2008. This topic has not been addressed by secular business elites, and illustrates the efficiency of Islamic frame’s counter-framing where secular frames remain silent and thus lose credibility:

No political parties have been banned in Europe during the same period. It is the case not only in the West but also in the East. For instance, neither in Pakistan nor even in Thailand, no political parties have been banned in spite of the long-term political chaos. We believe that political parties should not be banned in democratic republics if they are not involved in violence or terror. Especially, we consider it as an unfortunate issue that the ruling party, which won 47 percent of the votes is targeted to be banned just after 85 percent of the will of the public was reflected in Parliament, and just seven and a half months after the general election. When we look at the accusations on which the case against the ruling party is based, we see that most of them consist of newspaper clippings and are extremely controversial. Those events have hurt the conscience of most people in our country regardless of which party they support. It is not possible for the ones who have common sense to be pleased with this, except for those ones who defy democracy. (Öylek, 2008)

AKP elites are also perceived as providing economic and political stability, invigorating the Turkish market economy; businessmen in Islamic leadership positions give a positive evaluation of the AKP because ‘they have invigorated the economy, provided a stable environment which is good for investment’ (interview 4). ‘What we’re pleased the most is that the AKP takes the constitutional reform seriously, and secondly their economic reforms’ (interview 1). Secular critics (interview 36) argue that to keep their business voters, the AKP constantly stresses the political and macro-economic stability they have generated after the lost decade of the 1990s. A pious businessman explains why he votes for the AKP:

Right now I vote for the AKP, not because of their Islamic views, but because they are hard working. The CHP isn’t like that (…). They [referring to AKP] have brought democracy to a certain stage. The others are much worse. This way democracy gets stronger; we get stronger. If there were an alternative, I would give them my vote, too, but they’d have to be hard working. (interview 21)

The negative identity of ‘the other’ is fortified in the Islamic frame with a strong differentiation. Anatolian capital and Islamic leadership depict themselves as
the true capitalists and secular big business as state-dependent. The ‘other’ is harshly defined and differentiated as Western Republican elites, as corrupt and somewhat fake industrialists feeding on state resources, and as undemocratic or even fascist. This is coherent with the problem identification where the same supposedly elitist Kemalist group is regarded as the culprit. The new entrepreneurs from Anatolia are juxtaposed against the ‘old secular Turkish business elites’ whose ‘conglomerates concentrated on established markets in the West’ (Finke, 2011).

We are different from Tüsiad because we don’t exploit the state. (…) Müsiad has more members; Tüsiad has more money. They have 40 years worth of capital, but the difference has become much smaller. Tüsiad is the past; Müsiad is the future. (Şahin, 2009)

The then Müsiad head argues that ‘Anatolian capital represents the entrepreneurial spirit of Turkey, motor power and the picture of a developing Turkey’ (Öylek, 2008). An Islamic BA leader explains how Müsiad promotes ‘real’ exports, comparing that to the practice of ‘fake exports’ where exports are only documented to get access to the state’s export promotion stimuli programmes in the 1980s:

That’s what the imposter producers of the 1990s used to do, everybody was afraid of exporters back then, but now since the 2000s, since the paradigm has changed, this fake production is over, export is now gaining in prestige. Many industrialists who exported between 1990 and 2000 are imposters. (interview 9)

The co-founder of Müsiad tries to establish Anatolian capital as the ‘true bourgeoisie’, constructing Müsiad’s heritage from the Ottoman Empire:

The interviewee asks: ‘In Turkey, capital developed through the state. Anatolian capital, on the other hand, developed naturally like in the West. Can we therefore, at least conceptually say that this is new capital is Turkey’s true bourgeoisie?’ To this Erol Yarar answers: ‘Definitely. Because these are the children of the families who gave their lives on the battle fronts. When the Janissary was abolished [note: elite infantry units of Ottoman sultans, mostly non-Muslim, abolished in early C19], soldiers increasingly came from the Turkish people, and trade domination was taken over by the non-Muslim communities. The 19th century was a century of wars, the Ottomans went to war for about 35 years; this was followed by the Balkan and World Wars, and our dynasty ended in Çanakkale. There was nobody left to do trade. Orphans were first forced to become farmers, the in the 50, when population increased, they became workers. In the 1980s Özal introduced a bit to trade, and in the 1990s Müsiad opened them up to the world.’ (Şahin, 2009)

Vis-à-vis elitist big business centred in Istanbul and Ankara, Islamic businessmen stress their nature as excluded SMEs from rural Anatolia (although they also have larger businesses and many companies in Istanbul and Ankara). All Islamic BAs stress their regional (Anatolian) and business size (SMEs) differentiation. They
do not just represent big business like secular BAs, but also SME interests, and focus on morality in comparison to their secular counterparts:

Müsiad looks for moral quality. Financial size isn’t important for us. We have many small business members. But we also have very large ones, who employ up to 20,000 people, and those who employ 20 or 2 people. But we don’t take ‘esnaf’.

(interview 8)

Another Islamic BA leader says that ‘We take all the SMEs and industrialists emerging in Anatolia as members’ (interview 9), and in 2008, the then head of Müsiad stated in a newspaper interview that ‘two-thirds of our members are located in Anatolia and we are frequently in touch with the business enterprises in those regions.’ (Öylek, 2008)

Just as noted above in problem identification, in collective identities there is also an internal differentiation between Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates or rather the Gülen community. While some Müsiad members more openly stress their Islamic goals and identities, Gülen community members like to appear more modest by stressing their non-contentious nature and belief in equality for all religions, as reflected in their education efforts. The two groups do not publicly speak out against each other, instead focusing on their common ‘enemies’ and goals rather than their internal differentiation. This achieves frame extension – the inclusion of Gülen community followers.

Müsiad’s co-founder Erol Yarar’s newspaper quote on how he wants to create an Islamic bourgeoisie to rival the secular elite has become famous in Turkey; it is certainly more contentious Gülen members’ discourse, which instead stresses their modesty and classless nature. Tuskon and Müsiad cultivate friendly relations because they shared the goal of displacing secular elites, however they are still separate organs, which increasingly have become more diverse as they have managed to gain a larger section of the pie. Erol Yarar depicts Anatolian capital as the true bourgeoisie, the Muslim upper class, vis-à-vis the Republican bourgeoisie. This is part of the movement’s aspiration to define a capitalist version that moves away from introspection and mysticism towards entrepreneurship, rationalism and the written word [as popularised by the Nur movement, from which the Gülen community is an offshoot]. In one example, he states:

(…) I don’t belief in the philosophy of one mouthful and one coat [‘hurka’; referring to modesty in Islamic principles]. That’s a pill we were forced to swallow! God likes to see the blessings he sends on us mortals. Ottoman sultans don’t dress like Karacaoğlan [folk poet]. If the benchmark is to wear the minimum how do we
explain how Imam Azam [Islamic scholar] got dressed? His house was the most beautiful among all in Baghdad. If you give alms [‘zekat’], then nobody in Islam has the right to ask you why you do this or that. God’s Messenger does not allow you to give away all your belongings. People seem to think that as soon as they get rich they have to live like the poor. This is not the case. (Şahin, 2009)

Some pious businessmen regard this class focus with suspicion, and Müsiad members or the clubs like the new Islamic Equestrian club in Antep, as a different category of upper class Muslims (interview 21). In spite of this internal differentiation, these SMOs have defined a common target or enemy, which facilitates their cooperation.

A key difference is that secular BA elites more confidently depict themselves as business elites, whereas some Müsiad leadership aims to achieve a bourgeois status and Tuskon shies away from class-related terms altogether. The secular BAs self-depiction does indeed stress its elitist and nationalist character. A secular businessmen in leadership positions says:

We, our members represent 80–85% of Gaziantep’s economy. (…) Gagiad was founded in 1993 by 44 businessmen. It consists of top-level firms and managers. That means our members come from certain firms, from the top levels, that is from the company boards. (…) Our working principles and membership portfolios are different from Müsiad and Tuskon. Of course we also have common members, but we were the first organisation. (interview 6)
The second and third generations from most of Antep’s leading business families continue to be members in Gagiad. (interview 31)

As with the rest of diagnostic framing, identities also aim more at integration rather than opposition to Islamic BAs. Leadership only stresses those aspects publicly that are shared with Islamic identities. Both parties’ leadership depict Anatolian industrialists as generally neglected by state development as argued above. Most secular business leaders in Gaziantep, like their Islamic counterparts, stress their growth through capitalist means independent of the state (e.g. interviews 6 and 31). While some (e.g. interviews 34 and 36) businessmen are more self-critical and see a general pattern of political corruption in Turkish business, most do not talk about this subject. This means avoiding the criticism directed at secular elites’ rent-seeking coalitions with political elites in the 1970s or 1990s. For example, several secular businessmen in Gaziantep seem to have profited from closer relations to PM Demirel’s administration in the 1970s. In addition, present-day patronage networks of Islamic and strategic businesspeople are not criticised by the secular coalition, as they largely aim to enter, rather than criticise such exchanges. The lack of a counter-
argument by secular leaders weakens the secular frame. This accommodation shows that the secular BA’s collective identity is generally less coherent and more diverse than that of the Islamic BAs.

Gagiad and Tüsiad’s membership is quite diverse, as it is based on elitism rather than a clearly amplified ideology. The ‘other’ is less strongly differentiated by secular leaders, their negative identity less amplified. Gagiad includes many Islamic businessmen, which makes the association’s identity diverse. For example, the 2012/13 head of Gagiad states on the homepage that he is ‘looking forward to greater regular information exchange with Hürsiad, the Islamic Tuskon-affiliate, following a meeting of their leadership:

Both Hürsiad and Gagiad were founded a long time ago. They have important members and therefore common values, and by sharing our views we can support Gaziantep’s development. (“Gagiad,” n.d.)

This integration is illustrated in the following statement:

If it were 10 years ago, back then it was hard for firms from the religious community, but in the present environment, even if you don’t have any relations with them, you’d like to appear as being involved with them. (…) The owners of this business group have relations with the religious community. They are involved with them, but their views aren’t really like that, they have adapted to a reality. (interview 28)

This yet again shows the diversity of the secular coalition. And because of this overlap and diversity that has increased since the AKP’s domination, Gagiad leadership does not publicly disparage Islamic leadership. As the network analysis shows, this diversification within Gagiad and the GSO increased at the turn at the millennium and, in the last decade, it has become harder to differentiate between secular and Islamic associations altogether.

Secular businessmen, not leaders, do strongly define themselves against the ‘others’, but also do not clearly define a collective identity. Reference to nationalism, development and secularism can be found but are not strongly amplified compared to the use of Islam in Islamic identities – a point further analysed in the next section. Just like the secular-Republican elite by Islamic BA, the new Islamic businesses are regarded as being fed by the corruption of state resources by some secular businessmen (interview 36). Some secular businessmen accuse the AKP, Müsiad and Gülen community of trying to establish an Islamic state and thus reversing Atatürk’s Westernisation project (interview 33). Islamic businessmen are thought to display a fake and purely strategic piousness to attract naïve and poor followers, which is in
stark contrast to their own claims of being pure and honest. Secular businessmen attribute the popularity of the AKP and the Gülen cemaat as an outcome of low education and development levels that leaves people vulnerable to ‘think with their stomachs, not their heads’ (interview 34). The moderate Islamic movement is depicted as a group that actively tries to exploit the naïve and poor:

You know what this is? In non-developed societies they keep people together by deceiving people and promising them they will enter paradise in the afterlife if they cooperate and contribute. Am I making this clear? (interview 25)

‘Dinci’ is a person who mainly cares about how people in his environment evaluate him, who is a bit fake; ‘dindar’ is a person who truly and fully believes in God. A dindar or true believer will not turn his religion into a public display; as it says in the Koran, if you pray, do so in secret. Dinci are those people who put this display first. You only realise this difference gradually as you get to know people. For example, a person who will dutifully do his prayers but then give you a cheque that bounces is a dinci. (interview 34)

This contention of some secular businesspeople, however, is not translated into a collective secular frame by leadership. There appears to be a more specific and coherent depiction of ‘them’ than there is of ‘us’ in the secular coalition.

3.2. **Prognostic frames and goal definition**

Defining a goal and strategies is the task of prognostic framing. How Islam is amplified in the justification and motivation for these goals, compared to the role of Kemalism in secular frames, is further discussed in the next section.

Secular BAs regard collective representation of their members’ interests as an important goal of the organisation, but the goal is mainly to exert pressure in favour of the elite’s public policy interests and to provide a platform for socialisation and civic activities. One of the secular Gagiad’s founders says:

Gagiad’s mission and the reason for its foundation is to be able to be together, to act in unison and provide collective representation of its members vis-à-vis the state. (...) This way we are more powerful. It means we can have our voice heard. It’s impossible for one person to have their voice heard (...) Gagiad, since its foundation has brought together the city’s elite. Those elites, the families that burden themselves with industrial production, that make up the city’s industry, form one big family. Therefore we can have a stronger voice and express ourselves better towards the state. (...) If you go as Gagiad, we believed that this community of families would be treated with greater care. (interview 34)

The biggest goals of secular business leaders are improved representation vis-à-vis the state and contributing to Gaziantep’s development through corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects. These promote business within Gaziantep, while also providing an integration of big business into civil society and much-needed legitimacy. Gagiad leaders also like to stress their non-political nature (e.g. interview
31), and their contributions to national and regional development. Formulating such goals, which are in the interest of the wider public, is important for BAs’ public legitimacy if they want to achieve political influence. Ideology, however, remains less amplified in secular than in Islamic frames. Gagiad achieves its goals by organising multiple activities for socialisation and civic projects (cf. in Chapter VI):

Yes, of course, members join Gagiad and come together because they want to gain some kind of advantage. Our goal is that Gagiad’s young entrepreneurs get to know each other and maybe enter business with each other and together, to become more social and cultural beings. Of course, trade brings profit. And those social and developmental activities bring people together. And why shouldn’t people enter for these advantages? Not everything in the world is due to economic profit. (interview 34)

Secular business elites, however, do not formulate contentious or challenging goals vis-à-vis Islamic elites. Again, such a lack of argument against competing frames weakens the frames’ resonance among secular businessmen and further potential followers.

The collective organisation of Islamic BAs has an additional goal compared to the secular BA: The fact that this organisation intends to create an alternative Islamic economic elite to compete with secular elites is most clearly voiced by Erol Yarar in the news:

Müsiad opened Anatolian SMEs to the world by organising them. With Anatolian tigers we have achieved to create a healthy and beautiful bourgeoisie. (…) In the 1990s Anatolian businessmen mainly hadn’t been abroad and regarded themselves as enemies of Europe, America and Russia. They believed in the philosophy of ‘one mouthful and one coat’ [referring to modesty]. They gave away their belongings with their blessing and asked for little, as long as their son would take over the business, and didn’t encourage their daughters to study – those views are wrong. And to change them, I started to organize certain events. (…) This was a nationalist religious mission. Turkey’s economy has too much potential as to leave it over to 3 or 5 families and we had to create a level playing field, to bring them down. This country had to make peace with its culture. (Şahin, 2009)

The following comparison of Müsiad to elitist clubs reveals this BA leader’s bourgeois ambitions, which it aims to combine with its Islamic credentials:

We became a club. When you say that you’re a MÜSIAD member, people will stop and go ‘wow’. Just like Rotary and Lion’s Clubs are businessmen’s clubs. All of them have a certain level of members, Rotary is a bit above the Lions, it’s harder to get in there. Likewise it’s become a privilege to be a MÜSIAD member. (interview 8)

The goal to organise Anatolian SME’s as competition to secular elites is a direct consequence of Islamic businessmen’s diagnostic frame identifying their exclusion as a key problem. In the face of such exclusion Tuskon and Müsiad leaders decided
to create their own organisations to represent their Anatolian members, a strategy that coherently follows from their problem identification. Islamic BAs thus aimed to organise Anatolian SMEs who, in general, could not or did not want to join elitist secular BAs like Gagiad in Gaziantep, or Tüsiad in Turkey both of which they regarded as elitist and exclusionary. Islamic BAs also regard collective representation as key to voicing their interest to the state, creating a new economic elite and gaining access to political elites (various interviews).

As shown in the quote by Erol Yarar above, the organisation of Anatolian SMEs has contentious goals – displacing a secular elite and creating a new elite that is nationalist and Islamic through trade activities, which are to be supported by a redefined form of Islam that does not believe in modesty, but supports money-making. Most other members of Islamic leadership, less contentiously, depict trade/export support and political representation for Anatolian SMEs as their key goal, which is more similar to Gagiad’s non-political self-representation. These strategies closely conform to the strong economic activities and efforts put into political representation by Islamic BAs, as analysed in Chapter VI. This fit and coherence between the largely non-contentious framing and activities increases the resonance of the Islamic frame. As a Müsiad leader puts it:

Tuskon represents more members who are part of the religious community, they focus more on foreign trade, international trips, whereas Müsiad has a focus on research and with publications we want to be a pressure groups, we want to exert pressure. (interview 9)

Tuskon leadership, in an even more technical and non-contentious way, stresses it is the promotion of exports as one of its key missions:

The advancement of the Anatolian people, their introduction and opening to the world and its markets, their coming out of their shells – these are the reasons for our hard work and investment. (…) Our key differentiating factor from Gagiad and Müsiad are our international representation and the counselling/guidance that comes with it. (interview 1)

To achieve the goal of creating a new economic elite, Tuskon focuses more strongly on exports than Müsiad. Müsiad leaders publicly detail a wide range of activities to increase inter-firm trade, business education and competitiveness for SMEs; they do so, for example, by organising trade fairs, improving the provision of information to and education of family business owners, and promoting their cooperation (e.g. Öylek, 2008). Such tactics are analysed in detail in Chapter VI.
Beyond such strategies in the Islamic movement, there is the additional goal of creating new markets in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, which is regarded as contentious by some. This is mainly driven forward by Tuskon, and supported by the AKP government’s new ‘zero-problems’ foreign policy. For businessmen this is a more economic and strategic interest. AKP and other elites incorporate this aspect into their ideological system by presenting greater integration with the Middle East and Muslim countries as a kind of neo-Ottoman and Islamic unification.

Beyond such economic tactics and goals, the educational realm is also stressed, integrating and extending Islamic frames to include Gülen community actors. These strategies are still coherent with the publicly identified problems because they encompass a broader range of economic, political, educational and ideological topics. As argued above, fixing the education system has been defined as another key issue in the Islamic movement, and supporting activities have mainly been carried out by the Gülen community. As an academic from Zirve University, the community’s recently opened university in Gaziantep, notes:

The establishment of schools and universities in Turkey, which combined a good education with a conservative religious framework, overcame these reservations and hence helped create a reservoir of well-trained conservative Anatolian managers, engineers and politicians. (Finke, 2011)

An important tool to improve the chances of Anatolian capital in the future, is the establishment of schools for the pious, i.e. imam hatip schools, which is reflected in the Gülen community’s focus on cram schools (‘dershane’), dormitories, and schools. Dershanes are ‘special evening and weekend schools that prepare students for college entrance exams. These schools constitute one of the Gülen community’s major sources of influence and recruitment’ (Tuğal, 2013). Increasing human capital levels and improving the level of the education system is not only a key goal for Islamic BAs (interview 9), but also one for the secular Gagiad (interview 6); however, the reasoning differs between the movements. Their motives for doing so, which reflect different value systems are further discussed below.

3.3. Comparison of use of ideology in diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing

The following discussion of how ideology enters Islamic and secular frames is relevant for all three framing tasks. These values are the major ‘motives’ given by the BAs as ‘calls to arms’, as motivations to engage in collective action.

Motivational framing remains at that ideological level, complementing the tactics
defined in prognostic frames that are applied as repertoires of contention. As the focus is on non-contentious tactics, their definition and grounding in ideology do serve as motivational framing. There are no calls to boycott or protest against supposed Kemalist domination, but rather calls to contribute to an alternative Islamic system. Islam and capitalism are combined and redefined in Islamic frame’s collective identities as well as their goals and strategies. Appeals to Islamic principles also serve as a major motivator for action by justifying tactics as worthy. The discussion therefore also relates to motivational framing.

Islam enters the explanation of why hard work and entrepreneurship are important qualities. Islamic leaders construct hard work as an Islamic necessity, secular businesspeople refer more frequently to Atatürk quotes like the student oath: ‘I am Turkish, honest and hardworking’ [‘Türüküm, doğruyum, çalışanım’] (interview 33). The strategic, yet secular--leaning Merinos group, for example, lists several values on its homepage, among which is also ‘hard work’. The Islamic Müsiad’s leader stresses the role of Islam in the BA:

Müsiad is an ideological association. Am I making myself clear? Müsiad is an ideological association; it has a clear ideology. It’s not an association that was just founded to make money. We have a mission and a vision, but no borders or affiliations. That’s why our organisation is the largest. Our key strategy is promote an Islamic identity and to translate that into business life. We don’t take members who are not Muslims. Secondly, they have to have key Islamic principles like honesty, fairness and integrity and should have proven that in the market economy. This principle is expressed in our motto: High morality, high technology. Our key characteristic is that we are conservative (‘muhafazakar’), the English term conservative is something a bit different, but we could call it high morality, and we need to internalise moral values to produce high technology. Müsiad members are those who have adopted this philosophy and this is our collective value. (interview 8)

In the association’s 1994 publication ‘homo Islamicus’ (Müsiad, 1994), this vision of a supposedly Islamic free market economy is further specified. This publication illustrates the amplification of Islam in BA activity; by transforming the meaning of capitalist production and giving it a religious meaning, the frame changes the meanings of capitalist production by giving it additional holy qualities beyond economic interests. While this vision in the early 1990s was more in line with the

68 The report was edited by Islamic academic Hüner Şencan (each chapter has a separate author), under the leadership of Müsiad’s Research Committee; Erol Yarar wrote the foreword.
then political Islamist movement’s anti-Western rhetoric, it already defined free-
market, if not secular, mechanisms as tactics for collective action. Such tactics are
non-contentious insofar as they are based in the market-sphere rather than directly
attacking state structures. They have important consequences for the economic and
political power of Islamic BAs and businessmen.

The publication ‘homo economicus’ is split into different parts, the first of
which focuses on the ‘Muslim psychology’, and the second on Islamic business
practices. It identifies as the culprit the rational profit maximising and secular ‘homo
economicus’ that is at odds with the value judgements and human beings of the
Muslim world. The ‘Western’ view is equated with positivism, a ‘Western secular
understanding of science and knowledge that is cut off from values and religion’
(Müsiad, 1994). It states that instead of ‘universal laws’ there is a need to develop
‘laws with divine origins’ rooted in Islam for Muslim countries and companies. It
provides a justification for Islamic capitalism as rooted in the Koran, and based on
cooperation and morality rather than competition and rationality. An Islamic
businessman operates within a free-market economy, but does not just work for
profit, but for the good of the community and according to moral values. The homo
Islamicus claims to go beyond ‘attaching small Islamic motives to (…) a Western
system’.

Alternative business and organisational mechanisms are developed and the
East Asian model is hailed as a superior model. Each chapter focuses on a different
area: for example, there is a chapter on employee relations, which argues for
cooperative, paternalist and informal relations with employees, and is anti-unionist at
large. Instead, where necessary, Müsiad promotes the yellow, Islamic union Hak-İş.
Philanthropy and patriarchal labour relations are favoured over traditional tax,
welfare and industrial relations systems.

Another chapter aims to provide a new definition of efficiency by redefining
the idea of profit-maximisation and providing a complicated mathematical model to
calculate an alternative, supposedly Islamic type of equilibrium. It is also argued that
instead of focusing on self-interested profit-maximisations, Muslims need to
maximise ‘felâh’—salvation and happiness in the present and afterlife. Therefore
paying alms, for example, should not be regarded as interrupting economic
efficiency but as an investment into their afterlife in paradise. Zekat should be
gathered annually and requires special management.
The publication also stresses that ‘Allah permitted trade, but forbade interest (‘riba’), promoting Islamic banking and interest-free forms of investment and capitalisation (Müsiad, 1994, p. 168). A prominent example this is ‘green capital’ (‘yeşil sermaye’) – a form of capitalisation based on the direct investment of small savings. Such a model initially relied predominantly on the remittances of Turkish guest workers across Europe (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003). These multi-ownership companies were mainly formed in the 1990s and based in Konya, but largely collapsed during the economic crisis of 2000. Müsiad and political Islamic parties, (and major Arab Islamic institutions), were the key champions of green capital ‘by providing their networks, political protection and business information’ (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003, p. 2073). Green capital ‘followed the Islamic finance principle of profit-and-loss sharing or partnership finance through selling issued bonds of companies and investors to individuals, families and businesses’ (Özcan & Çokgezen, 2003, p. 2070). These principle also apply to Islamic banking (Hoşgör, 2011; Kuran, 2011). It appears this type of ‘green capital’ is rare in Gaziantep, but a pious interviewee remembers two multi-ownership Islamic companies that collected remittances from abroad, but then collapsed (interview 21).

The principle of profit-and-loss sharing in business is constructed as Islamic as compared to interest-based investment strategies and ownership structures. However, these are essentially integrated into a global free-market system and are in line with neo-liberal policies by favouring reductions of the welfare state and state involvement in general. While the state provides the necessary infrastructure for a free-market economy, moral businessmen provide ‘zekat’ or alms to care for the poor. Welfare states are unnecessary in this vision as families, philanthropic businessmen and religious communities provide social care and cooperation. What this vision of homo Islamic does is to transform the meaning of capitalism to be more in line with Islam – the process of frame transformation. This vision can therefore mainly be regarded as complementing Islamic BAs’ economic activities (analysed in Chapter VI) by bridging Islam and business practices.

As the following discussion will show, Islam is not just consistently amplified throughout the frame, and combined with capitalist production, but also extended to the private and civic realms. The focus on education in civil society engagement incorporates the interests of the Gülen community – an extension coherently carried through all framing tasks. Hard work, entrepreneurship and practices of the ‘homo
Islamicus’ are constructed as callings by the Prophet, but so are civic engagement (beyond zekat) and a pious, modest lifestyle. This kind of incorporation of Islam into the frame has important consequences. First, creating strong trust and solidarity within the Islamic movement, which motivates collective action and supports resource exchange. Second, it has important political effects, facilitating indirect institutional change by establishing Islamic tactics in the non-contentious civic, private and business realms. These processes further become obvious is the below discussion comparing secular and Islamic BAs’ membership selection processes, including their understandings of morality, and their motives for educational/CSR engagement.

The membership selection process of all of Gaziantep’s BAs requires two references by current members, and further checks into the creditworthiness and business activities in general, as well as into the private and social lives of potential members. In Islamic BAs, additional checks are made into their ideological orientation: for example, Gapgiad’s membership form (“Gapgiad Üye Başvuru Formu [membership application form],” n.d., “Hürsiad üye müracaat formu [membership application form],” n.d.) includes questions on political orientations, and which charities and religious leaders are being followed. As business people’s families are expected to socialise, the private lives of businesspeople are also investigated. In Islamic BAs, these checks include investigations into their pious private behaviours (various interviews). Islamic and secular BAs and members alike describe themselves as ‘conservative’, and as seeking morality (‘ahlak’) in their members. While Islamic BAs explain conservatism and morality with the help of the Koran and expect to see a range of behaviours, the secular BA sticks to conservative values in business and family life, and restrict their religiosity to the private realm. In Islamic membership selection, what matters most and thus is a key part of their collective identity is to evaluate ‘ahlak’ or morality, as BA leaders explain (interview 1 and 4).

Internally, common membership can forge trust and solidarity among businesspeople. This applies to all BAs that apply stringent membership selection processes to increase inter-firm trust by reducing fraudulent activities (interview 4). Multiple network studies have shown that trust as social capital can increase the quality and quantity of resource exchange, and several businessmen confirm such
beneficial effects on business exchanges. Such a process has been reported for all BAs alike. Members state the following:

If most members mainly work in Gaziantep’s industrial zones, it is advantageous for them to get to know each other, and that’s why new entrants also profit from joining our association. It’s a way of entering those circles, getting to know others in your sector. From this closeness, also through social activities, trust emerges gradually. (interview 3)

Business associations are important as bridges, to secure your work, because, yes, members get close to each other. (interview 23)

Strategic and secular businesses have a similar view of the importance of morality in business and private life, which are regarded as intertwined. Being moral to these actors means ‘being true in business life, keeping to your word and honour contracts, to not lie’ (interview 6), and accepting one’s social responsibility as a business owner. The common definition by all types of businessmen focuses on keeping one’s word in business agreements, independent of religion or race (e.g., interviews 21 and 31), and keeping an orderly family life. Ideology is not amplified.

Our mission is to internalise virtuousness and morality as a way of life; to develop a firm culture that is aware of its social responsibility. (…) This is not just related to trade or business, this is a way of life. When we internalise these values, when we act right, then this will also affect our trade. It’s got to do with your character. (interview 29)

A secular businessman in a leadership position describes the selection process of Gagiad and their checks on a member’s morality (‘ahlak’), which is similar to the above Islamic BA quotes:

We have various steps that an applicant has to pass. We don’t accept every application. Within these criteria, we always choose people whose business is moral, that is, who have an orderly private life, who have a good record of settling their accounts, who do proper production within the legal boundaries, generally honest businessmen. We also check family lives, because we want our members to become friends, and they will meet each other together with their families, and therefore we have to check it. (interview 6)

Some Islamic businessmen and leaders go beyond that by referring to the Koran as their inspiration for morality and Islam as an aspect of their associations’ self-definition:

All of these business associations are similar, but their understandings are quite different: Müsiad, for example, is religious, it accepts moral people as members; for example, Müsiad members won’t drink alcohol, so they have a different world view from Gagiad, and it’s people with similar views that will want to get together. (interview 23)
A second requirement to enter Müsiad is you have to be moral. This is part of our religion anyway; our religion is moral. Thirdly, you have to stick to your word; your word has to be more reliable than your cheques. (interview 7)

There are therefore differences in the ideological content of collective identities. The secular BA creates trust and solidarity by creating friendship ties among elitist business families through social and civic activities. Islamic BAs, in contrast, additionally create such trust and solidarity through common beliefs in Islam and a strong collective identity. The latter can serve as a stronger and more effective binding mechanism in the parochial environments of Anatolian urban hinterlands. A secular businessman describes the emergence of multifunctional religious community ties in the periphery and how they can gradually translate into trade ties:

Now, the most important thing when it comes to the cemaat, is to imagine a neighbourhood, a family. Imagine within a family, one or two people believe in something and convince their neighbours of this. Once a sense of community has emerged, the leader will say: ‘Now, come my brothers, why don’t you also join this other group [referring to Islamic BAs], there are benefits attached to it, trade benefits, you can increase your profits by joining.’ Once that first sense of community has been established, tradesmen and businessmen are directed to these business associations. (interview 34)

The different ideological contents of collective identities influence the strength of solidarity among members. The stronger solidarity created in Islamic BAs through shared religious beliefs across different spheres of lives can be hypothesised to serve as a stronger binding mechanisms that supports resource exchange to a larger extent than in secular BAs.

Secular businessmen may also refer to religion, be it strategic or not, as part of their philosophy, but they regard it as part of a person’s character and private life rather than trying to define economic and business practices according to it. A secular businessman, for example, says that he prays regularly and fasts, but he keeps this separate from his business life – religion is a private matter (interview 34). Merinos Group, a strategic, yet secular-leaning business group also refers to Islam on its homepage as part of its philosophy; this may be regarded as strategic in terms of its adjustment to the current climate.

If we respect ourselves, we also have to respect our creator; and if we respect our creator, then we should also respect all things he created (alive and inanimate). No company, property or commodity belongs to persons; it belongs to our sovereign God/Allah. (“Merinos misyon ve vizyon [mission and vision],” n.d.) This is where [owner name] is different. He is not one of those Anatolian tigers who combine the Islamic piety with the joy of expensive cars. He lives like a Dervish. (…) He can play cards with a previous postal services worker and a guard in Bursa
Orhangazi, he strolls around in the slums of İstanbul. (‘First a dervish, then a boss,” 2011)

The Islamic all-encompassing vision of economic success requires businessmen to follow Islamic practices in the civic, business and private realms. Justification for pious behaviour in the private realm as a prerequisite for economic success is given in the following excerpt:

Even if there’s a differentiation in Turkey, this is actually an inseparable part of us…A ‘dindar’, a truly religious person is a loving person. I am a person who loves his religion. I won’t ever lie (…). You are also a part of me; you are my sibling and that is why I am helping you (…). Doesn’t alcohol make people drunk? It does. How would a foolish person be helpful? When you drink alcohol, you lose your good judgement; you would show wrong behaviours towards me, right? It makes people uncomfortable. And it makes people unproductive. (…) If a person lives according to the right principles, then he’ll find peace. If I went to a bar and my wife would wait for me at home, would she still love me? But if I were to spend that energy that I wasted, this beauty, on my home, we would be happy. Everything is connected. (…) Religion is the language of love, of beauty, if you have it, then you are beautiful, if you don’t have it, there’s nothing. (…) Isn’t that part of our culture? It is, but only few people live it. I don’t need alcohol; when I look around me, when I look at a tree, I feel drunk. I feel drunk all the time because I see Allah everywhere. (interview 23)

A conservative, pious family lifestyle similar to that of PM Erdoğan is regarded as essential for economic success at large:

For your work to prosper, peace and morality are very important, that’s true for politics as well, you need a moral family life, and for example, you can see that in Erdoğan whose success has been made possible through his conservative lifestyle. For example a politician like Sarkozy who rather spreads his attention among women and other things, he can never be successful, with this kind of lifestyle you won’t make it because your mind will become scattered and you won’t be able to concentrate. (interview 21; see interview 22 for a similar view)

This citation also shows how many conservative businessmen identify themselves with Erdoğan, the self-made man from a poor background, and the ‘clean’ image projected by pious Islamists leading a simple devout life. The perceived control of and discrimination against Islam are highly central issues to Islamic businessmen, which give the Islamic frame further resonance.

Islamic BAs and members construct Islamic business, economic, civic and private behaviours as part of worship, a religious duty. This extends to incorporate the Gülen community’s focus on educational activities. Comparing the rationales between Islamic and secular BAs for engaging in CSR activities provides further insights into different underlying value systems. If questioned why they contribute to large-scale educational and civic projects, Islamic businessmen give reasons such as
religious duty, and national development – the promotion of welfare where the state has failed:

We do this to fulfil God’s will. Everything turns good for a good person; you will also do your work well. The path of education is very important and Turkey’s education system is broken. (…) These activities are not against the state, we want the state to take possession of them. Our hoca [referring to cleric Fethullah Gülen] even wants it this way, because education is actually the state’s responsibility. Apart from education, we provide social help to the poor. We go to poor neighbourhoods and distribute food every day to almost 1000 people, to the needy, the ill, we directly go to their homes. These social activities don’t bring us any advantages, everybody can come, this is not an economic activity. It doesn’t bring any profit for companies [heavy protest!] This is voluntary work (...). (interview 22)

The education system is regarded as key for national development:

The religious community currently fills a void and the state can fill this later on by itself, but for that a social welfare system has to develop. (…) I don’t like it particularly, but it’s like this because the state doesn’t seem to have the necessary reach, and therefore the normal public education system falls behind. (…) Only if people get a proper education, they are able to build proper systems, education is key. (interview 21; see also interview 30)

Islamic BA leadership also stresses the importance of increasing the educational levels of the general population as well as businessmen in particular:

Currently we are in a catch-up process, Turkey is gradually developing, and the monetary funds by the EU, and our projects to support children’s education through SODES funds help. We give education to unemployed youth (...), for example. (interview 1)

Fethullah Gülen develops this religious value of education that his business followers take up in his numerous publications. The following example is taken from his English homepage:

Gülen believes that education plays the primary role in achieving the values that make a person a real human being. (...). Gülen says that non-educated people will never find the meaning of their existence, why they are created, where they come from, and where exactly they are going. (...) Therefore, according to him, a public education campaign should be done everywhere. (...) According to Gülen, science should lead the person to the understanding of the meaning of his/her entity. In other words, it should lead the person to the knowledge of the Supreme Creator, his position before Him and to fulfilling his liabilities to Him. Gülen also believes that education gives the opportunity that people with different religions, languages, cultures and nations can live in peace with each other. (...). He says that religion and science can never be separated from each other and that no contradiction exists between them. On the contrary, they have a very close relationship. (...) Gülen also believes that education can save one’s life in here and in the hereafter. (“Fethullah Gülen,” n.d.)

While the secular BA looks for justification in Atatürk’s vision where education is regarded as key to catching up with Western modernity, Islamic BAs are more likely to look for justification in the writings of Islamic clerics like Fethullah Gülen.
Gülen’s official vision of Islam is in sync with science, rationalism, capitalism and harmony with the state: He believes in the ‘necessities of establishing a positive direction in education, in cooperation with the state’ ("Fehullah Gülen," n.d.). In order to achieve those goals, Gülen asks of his followers to fully commit to the community’s activities, which requires a large investment of time and, if available, of financial capital (Agai, 2004). Those activities include private and business-related areas, as will be shown in the following Chapter: attending meetings several times a week, donating alms, following a pious lifestyle (e.g. attending prayers regularly, fasting) and business practices. This vision of Islam put forward is nationalist in that these strategies and goals are also promoted as supporting the development of Turkey or Anatolia, where the state has failed.

Secular frames take their main inspiration from the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s modernisation project dating back to the Republican Period (1923–1946). The major principles of this so-called Kemalism included Republicanism, secularism, nationalism and statism (Parla & Davison, 2004). It also regarded a secular, Western-style education as a major necessity in the catch-up process. Grounded in this state ideology, the secular BA and its members regard their CSR activities as contributions to the fatherland’s development and modernisation. While secular businessmen also regard themselves as religious and adhering to Islamic values, they do not aim to transform the state’s secular institutions and try to keep their faith in the private realm.

Secular and strategic businessmen have a similar view of the necessity of increasing human capital and education for development and critical thought. The rationale is more similar to Atatürk’s vision than the Koran. The orientation towards ‘Western’ development, nationalism and the importance of human capital is elaborated in the following quotes:

Education is always good, no matter how it’s being given. An educated person is one who can think, judge and discern right from wrong. (interview 25)

When we look to mature economies, like America, or in Europe, to Germany or France, or to Japan, they always do one thing. They first increase a nation’s education standards, and then benefit from people with higher educational levels to increase their production standards. Only this way can there be further development. (interview 31)

We have come to a stage where we impose that all our activities have to promote Gaziantep’s and Turkey’s development. Our priority is that our projects support the city and country. We make sure that rather than providing economic advantage to an individual, we support Gaziantep. That’s how Gaziantep has come to this level, has supported Turkey’s export, that now even five industrial zones have become
insufficient to hold our entrepreneurs. Our members, who make these kinds of investments, don’t need money anymore. (interview 6)

This is different from, for example, Erol Yarar’s statement, which regards Müsiad’s mission as one a nationalist religious movement with Islamic goals. This is another excerpt from the current head of Müsiad’s response to the Gezi protests:

Let’s not forget that the path ahead is long. Our education, and justice systems have become much more comfortable. We have to grow, to develop, and to gain more. (…) Our Prophet is not just referring to economic and financial development. Goodness and help, both to the environment and to us, have to be equal goals. (“MÜSİAD Genel Başkanı Nail OLPAK, Gezi Parkı tartışmalarını ve büyüme rakamlarını yorumladı,” 2013)

Beyond nationalism, Atatürk references are much more muted than the Islamic BAs’ references to the Koran. Gagiad mainly displays these in their membership material and some of their cultural projects. Present Gagiad leadership did not refer to Kemalist ideals beyond nationalism in my interview material. Kemalism also does not enter the goal definition of the secular BA. To give examples of Gagiad’s use of Kemalism, I translated the following vision of the secular BA from its membership booklet:

Within the guidelines of our association’s constitution, we as Gaziantep’s industrialists and businessmen, aim to, following in the light of Atatürk’s principles, aim to promote the social and cultural development of Turkey within a democratic and planned order, and to contribute to socio-economic development through our members by assisting their challenges and cultivating a spirit of solidarity among young industrialists and businessmen. (GAGIAD, 1995, GAGIAD, 2010a)

In the cultural realm, Gagiad organised a photo exhibition with previously unseen photographs of Atatürk in 2005, commemorating Atatürk 67 years after his death (“Gagiad,” n.d.). The association also regularly put out special statements to its members on public holidays related to Atatürk, while the Islamic BAs more often does that for Islamic holidays. Generally, civic contributions are justified through their promotion of Turkey’s development, continuing Atatürk’s modernisation project. The first page of the association’s booklet (GAGIAD, 1995, GAGIAD, 2010a) is dominated by the Declaration to Turkish Youth by Atatürk from 1927 (Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi, 20/10/1927).69

69 This good translation was found online (“Atatürk’s declaration to the Turkish youth,” n.d.).
Oh, Turkish Youth!
Your first duty is forever to preserve and to defend the Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic.
This is the very foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there may be malevolent people at home and abroad who will wish to deprive you of this treasure. If some day you are compelled to defend your independence and your Republic, you must not tarry to weigh the possibilities and circumstances of the situation before taking up your duty. These possibilities and circumstances may turn out to be extremely unfavourable. The enemies conspiring against your independence and your Republic may have behind them a victory unprecedented in the annals of the world. It may be that, by violence and ruse, all the fortresses of your beloved fatherland may be captured, all its shipyards occupied, all its armies dispersed and every part of the country invaded. And sadder and graver than all these circumstances, those who hold power within the country may be in error misguided and may even be traitors. Furthermore, they may identify their personal interests with the political designs of the invaders. The country may be impoverished, ruined and exhausted.
Youth of Turkey's future,
Even in such circumstances it is your duty to save the Turkish Independence and Republic.
You will find the strength you need in your noble blood.
Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

The secular BA seeks legitimacy for their projects more often in Atatürk’s modernisation project to which they want to contribute through their own civic projects than in the Koran. Secularism in the Kemalist sense of ‘laiklik’ thus becomes part of their collective identity. Their activities and identities, however, remain diverse as discussed above. This contrasts with the amplified, yet non-contentious use of Islamic ideals in the Islamic movement. There are no referrals to Atatürk in Hürsiad or Müsiad’s Homo Islamicus, for example, but only to the Koran.

4. Summary of findings
The comparison above examined two framing processes: diagnostic and prognostic. First, diagnostic framing encompasses the identification of a collective problem and the attribution of blame to a target. The construction of a collective identity is an essential part of diagnostic framing tasks. Second, defining collective goals and strategies to achieve them are key tasks of prognostic framing. Motivational framing is carried out through appeals to ideology and Islam and therefore analysed as part of the use of ideology throughout the other two framing tasks.

While the Islamic frame clearly identifies a target and attributes blame to it, secular businesspeople do little but complain in general about economic policy, their disadvantage in accessing state resources and their exclusion from rent-seeking coalitions. Problem definition remains a complaint of a specific interest group
lacking the identification of a common political problem around a distinctive collective identity. This qualifies the secular frame not just as incoherent, but also as incomplete. Leadership is unwilling to define a common issue publicly, but instead seeks to adjust to moderate Islam. There is a hopeless and defeatist tone in secular framing, and the leadership is not willing to publicly speak out. Leadership, at best, attributes economic exclusion to Gaziantep’s exclusion, creating a bond based on hailing from the same place (‘hemşehrilik’). Such a bond is inclusive in that Islamic actors are not clearly distinguished. Blame is shifted to a broad regional level with nationalist undertones. Secular businessmen, but not leadership, may also bring secular identity into this equation, but without clearly developing a target or explanation, and with a muted application of ideology.

In contrast, in the moderately Islamic frame, blame is clearly attributed to Kemalist state elites, secular-left parties and former centre-right parties of the 1990s. Although this blame attribution is clear and strongly argues against secular elites, it remains unspecific. Islamic businessmen and BAs characterise Anatolian capital as a group of pious actors excluded systematically by a centrist state because they are devout SMEs from Anatolia rather than big businesses in Istanbul. These state and political elites are not only blamed for the active exclusion of Anatolian SMEs from negotiating tables and economic resources, but also from the education system because of ideological reasons and company size. This control and discrimination against pious Islamists has allegedly contributed to political and macro-economic instabilities in Turkey’s past by favouring corrupt secular business groups that feed on state resources over pious, hard-working Anatolian SMEs.

This reference to Islam has changed over time. During the early 1990s, before the overthrow of political Islamists by the military, Islamic actors more openly used Islam as a reference and proposed an alternative to Western integration. After the turn of the millennium, as Islamic elites of the moderate coalition largely agreed to abstain from direct Islamic references, this has become much more muted and indirectly contentious. The amplification is carried less through attacks on Kemalist state elites, and more through collaborative non-contentious strategies. As an example of an earlier, more contentious way of framing the problem, a confident co-founder of Müsiad publicly blames the Western capitalist system for Turkey’s boom-and-bust cycles and the control of religion by a Kemalist regime; current BA elites
are less contentious. Similarly, the current Gülen community focuses on the education system in a non-contentious manner.

Control of and discrimination against Islamic groups is not merely a private spiritual matter, but extends to the economic, polity and education system. Blame extends from economic mismanagement, political instability, and corruption to the control of Islam by the state in general. This ‘diagnosis’ is rather unspecific overall. However, the key is that the role of religion and Islam is amplified in the explanation of their ‘exclusion’, and it combines business and political interests as well as the Gülen community’s interests. Such frame extension to business, political, civic and private realms, and the amplification of Islam in this frame increases its resonance over secular frames.

Islamic BAs’ collective identity continues to amplify the use of Islam. Coherently following from the problem identification, secular Istanbul-based elites are strongly differentiated from pious Anatolian SMEs. This differentiation is based on religion, a regional dimension and partly company size (where businesses regard themselves as representing large, moral Anatolian holdings, but are also upwardly mobile SMEs). By portraying a negative identity of ‘the other’ that is coherent with the group to which blame is attributed, the collective identity of Islamic BAs becomes fortified (Gamson, 1992). Islamic frames amplify Islam by combining and changing the meanings of capitalism, democracy and piousness. In their collective identities, they describe themselves as a new breed of Islamic capitalists vis-à-vis undemocratic, corrupt secular elites. Islamic BAs define themselves and their allies as democratic, hard-working, and true capitalists, yet pious and discriminated against.

In contrast, secular collective identity shows greater diversity and less internal coherence. In line with their status as leading businessmen, these actors regard themselves as the elite of the nation: nationalist, conservative and devout, yet secular. While this could be a true alternative, the secular and Kemalist aspects remain rather muted. As with the rest of diagnostic framing, identities aim more at integration than opposition with Islamic BAs. Leadership only stresses those aspects publicly that are shared with Islamic identities (regional exclusion). Some secular businesspeople, although not the leadership, clearly differentiate themselves from what is a derogatory view of pious, naïve and fake Islamic actors. However, this is hardly expressed publicly as in the Islamic case. Even these businesspeople focus
more on the other than defining a coherent notion of ‘us’. Furthermore, frame amplification of secularism and Kemalism is nonexistent in the leadership framing of identities.

A second framing process examined in this analysis is prognostic framing. Defining collective goals and strategies to achieve them are key tasks of prognostic framing. The secular Gagiad provides little political goal definition beyond promoting the association’s political representation and promoting national and regional development. This makes the secular frame even more incomplete. Ideology is not amplified and no goals vis-à-vis Islamic elites are formulated. This lack of ideological amplification and resistance weakens the secular frame’s resonance.

In general, moderate Islamists, and especially businessmen, remain cautious about directly stating their goal as transforming Turkey’s secular political and market institutions. The non-contentiousness of Islamic goals is a key aspect of the moderately Islamic frames, which instead construct tactics in the business, educational and private realms that gradually aim at institutional change. Islam remains amplified coherently by transforming and bridging ideals of capitalism, human capital and education, and Islam. The definition of common goals and strategies complete the three framing tasks coherently. Motivational framing is achieved by appeals to Islamic principles consistent with non-contentious goals and strategies. Importantly, this non-contentiousness and extension towards different realms allows the movement to bring together different interest groups. Only exceptionally confident leaders of Islamic BAs state their contentious goals explicitly, illustrating that Islamic goals and strategies are indirectly contentious. Other actors and the Gülen community largely phrase their goals as non-contentious and a-political, a characteristics that differentiate the Turkish Islamic social movements from others.

The Islamic frame defines as its key goal the economic promotion and political representation of excluded, pious Anatolian SMEs. Furthermore, it aims to develop new markets and Islamic economic alternatives, which are ultimately not replacing Western capitalist production, but adding Islamic meanings and mechanisms to it (mainly Müsiad). Gülen community followers less contentiously frame their goals as fixing the discriminatory and inefficient education and welfare system (mainly the Gülen community). Major strategies are firstly to collectively organise pious Anatolian SMEs, and promote their cooperation, access to resources
and information, and export capacity. The second set of strategies in the civic/educational realm is to develop an alternative system of schools that is in line with state regulation and thus appears non-contentious, but which is aimed at pious businesspeople and thus increases the human capital of this group. Beyond such organisational and human capital aims, the Islamic strategies importantly extend more widely to the business, market, and private realms. Islamic BAs and members construct Islamic business, economic, civic and private behaviours as part of worship, a religious duty, and essential to for eternal peace and worldly economic success alike.

Comparing the use of ideology in the secular and Islamic frames more closely, I find the following differences affect the subgroups’ frame qualities: the key topics of the secular frame are national development and elitism. Their strategies and rationales of action are informed partly by a Western style of modernity embracing secularism-Kemalism, and partly by their elite status as socially-conscious benefactors to the nation’s welfare and development – a moral duty that comes with elite status and is part of the developmental project begun by Atatürk. In line with their status as big businesses, these actors regard themselves as the elite of the nation: nationalist, conservative and devout, yet secular. While this could be a true alternative, the secular aspect remains muted. The key difference is thus that secular frames are not only less coherent and incomplete, but also less ideological; businessmen refer to nationalism and secularism, and partly Kemalism as a value system, but this is not specified beyond CSR activities and not consistently apparent throughout the frame. A secular vision of Islam and Kemalism are not stressed in the BA’s collective identity, which aims more at integration rather than opposition with Islamic BAs. Frame amplification of secularism and Kemalism is non-existent. There appears to be no frame extension to attract further groups, either.

In contrast, what makes the Islamic frame so resonant is its coherent amplification of Islam: the construction of an ideological belief system grounded in the Koran, a rational and capitalist type of Islam that intertwines economic, religious, civic and private lives. By transforming the meanings of business, everyday and civic practices, this value system essentially combines the interests of the AKP, the Gülen community and BAs. Müsiad’s ‘homo economicus’ and Fethullah Gülen’s vision outline an economic, business, welfare and private system that incorporates Islam. In the business realm, for example, this occurs by promoting the payment of zekat
(competing with tax and welfare systems), or interest-free banking and profit-and-loss sharing mechanisms. Gülén’s frame additionally constructs extensive religious service and contributions to educational and civic activities as the path to salvation. Going on pilgrimages (‘ümre’), praying five times, abstinence, going to cemaat meetings and contributing actively, are constructed as necessities for economic success and finding salvation. Only a good Muslim, who devotes his financial and human resources to God’s cause and follows Islamic business practices, which in the definition of the Gülen community includes donations to educational activities, can become a successful businessman.

5. Discussion
In this chapter, I have used frame analysis to compare the frames used by secular and Islamic BAs. My objective has been to identify key differences in these frames, based on three major framing processes; diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. The broader purpose of conducting this analysis has been to examine the extent to which this tactic of framing, argued in the social movement literature to be a key source of power, differs significantly between these organisations. Frames that are resonant are viewed as a significant source of power in this literature. I studied frames’ resonance by analysing how complete, coherent and specific the three major framing processes are, and how well they are adapted to their political and cultural-ideological environment as well as to people’s everyday lives. Findings from my analysis show that the Islamic frame exhibits many of these characteristics – while the secular frame does not. These findings further contribute to my argument that to explain the growing political influence of Islamic BAs we need to conceptualise them as social movements. In transition environments where struggles revolve around broad cleavages, encompassing ideologies and cultural narratives based on religion, ethnicity, nationalism, etc., become important in mobilisation, especially when class-based mobilisation is not possible. Framing processes grounded in ideology are key for marginalised and resource-poor actors: in the face of state threats, bringing together marginalised actors’ networks and uniting them in a common cause that is worthy and relevant becomes crucial for mobilisation. Islamic BAs have integrated ideology in a way that is non-contentious to authority, but reaches actors’ hearts and provides legitimacy for marginalised actors. This adjustment to the threatening political environment, through integrating religion, is a
key strength of Islamic BAs’ frames. Forming a collective identity and common goals are key criteria for organisations to qualify as SMOs. Although these goals are not contentious in the traditional sense, they are indirectly disruptive to secular elites and state institutions. These behaviours normalise parallel Islamic norms, institutions and behaviours in non-contentious realms, with ultimately disruptive goals to the secular establishment. The combination of exclusion with a non-contentious Islam is particularly powerful in the face of violent military and state threats. I argue that this efficient framing of the Islamic BAs has created a ‘resonant’ frame that has created internal trust and solidarity and increased the movement’s public legitimacy and mobilisation potency at large. The ineffective framing of the secular group is assumed to have contributed to their loss of legitimacy in the public sphere.

The role of framing and ideology in BAs’ activities has been neglected in the existing literature. I find that ideology has entered Islamic BAs’ non-contentious tactics in a complementary fashion; in their frames (through use of Islam, see present chapter); networks (through cooperation with Islamic civil society organisations, see Chapter IV); and activities (by promoting a new pious business elite and Islamic norms and behaviours, see Chapter VI). In the present chapter, I showed that resonant framing can facilitate collective action by increasing solidarity to hold together networks, and by giving meaning and legitimacy to BA activities or tactics, thereby supporting Islamic BAs’ economic and political empowerment. Legitimacy and solidarity are two important ways through which ideology or religion in framing can improve the power-generation tactics of BAs.

Concerning the resonance of frames the following key differences emerged: first, the Islamic frame is more complete as it adheres to all three framing tasks, whereas the secular frame is weak in its problem identification and identity-creation aspects. The Islamic frame is also more coherent, yet rather unspecific. In the Islamic frame, there is a problem-, goal- and collective identity- identification, motivating supporters to collective action by appealing to worthy, Islamic principles. The secular frame lacks the identification of a shared problem, yet formulates strategies for business socialisation and CSR activities. These differences in frame coherence and completeness increase the Islamic frame’s resonance vis-à-vis the secular frame. Second, the frames differ in how they incorporate ideology: the usage of secularism or Kemalism in the secular frame is muted and does not extend far beyond references in BA material and values based on (regional) nationalism. The
Islamic frame successfully constructs a non-contentious capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that frame and is amplified throughout. Third, Islamic frames raise topics that are relevant to participants and utilise familiar cultural narratives grounded in Islam. The Islamic frame has been very effective at delegitimising what they regard as one unified Kemalist elite. The secular frame has not been able to argue against this alternate frame and thus remains regarded as an elitist, Kemalist and exclusionary elite. Such elitism does not attract as many pious Anatolian businessmen who feel discriminated against by secular state elites and businessmen, and to whom the topics of exclusion and piety are more relevant. In addition to the quality of the three framing tasks, relevance and grounding in familiar cultural themes also affects frame resonance. Another key difference emerging from the material is that the frames differ in their range of topics: in the Islamic frame, the problem areas, goals and strategies identified have a wide range and involve a large group of supporting organisations (frame extension). The range of issues covered by the Islamic movement is relatively large, and includes educational, political and economic issues because of the non-contentious tactics involved. However, as the three framing tasks adhere to these issues coherently and in all three parts, this is to the movement’s advantage rather than disadvantage. In the framing literature, covering too many issues is discussed as potentially resulting in ‘over-stretching’, but in the current case the blurring of private and public issues is what makes the Islamic frame powerful. Only through this non-contentiousness and focus on the educational and private realm, did it manage to survive and adapt to a socio-economic form of Islam. Additionally, through its large range of issues, there are many issues covered that are highly salient to collaborating SMOs, thereby facilitating cooperation.

I illustrated how such differences in resonance influence the public legitimacy and internal solidarity of movement actors – two important processes of power-generation for resource-poor business actors in the periphery that can be reinforced or undermined by and with other movement tactics. First, resonant Islamic framing has increased internal trust and solidarity among diverse SMOs; resonant frames bind together the diverse Islamic network of civil society, political and business organisations into a common goal and identity. Islamic BA’s framing therefore complements the grassroots networks of business, civic and political actors. Second, by building frames based on Islam and public issues, Islamic BAs build up
legitimacy. Frames have to create appropriate, worthy ‘repertoires of contention’ to gain support. The perception of what is appropriate and worthy is based in the movement’s cultural background (Ennis, 1987; Swindler, 1987), and also determined by the political context.

The incorporation of Islam into BAs’ power-generation has helped them to attract powerful allies and to create legitimacy by ‘situating themselves among the faithful, devoted to just causes and beyond the realm of economic interests’ (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2011). By appearing non-contentious through contributions to welfare and education, these activities achieve a high level of public legitimacy, and widespread popularity in a conservative country. This non-violent resistance allows them to depict themselves vis-à-vis a violent state and military as peaceful community workers who sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the Turkish people, not wanting to cause disruption or open political protest as political Islamists or fascist Kemalists would. This is supposedly in line with the Islamic doctrine of meeting evil with good behaviour.

Islamic BAs’ goals are change-oriented and have political consequences nevertheless – another criterion of SMOs. The movement changes institutions more indirectly through collaborative (rather than competitive) civic, private and market-based tactics. By fostering a new parallel economic elite and creating public legitimacy, the Islamic movement aims to gain economic and political power at the national level. Beyond that, the business, private and civic strategies defined in Islamic frames, and carried out through Islamic BAs’ activities gradually normalise Islamic norms, behaviours and institutions and create a parallel system. Islamic frames are not ‘laik’, secular in a Kemalist definition, because this understanding does envision a restructuring of institutions in the business (e.g. through interest-free profit-and-loss sharing mechanisms; private and informal employment relations), private and civic realms at large (e.g. through promoting Islamic alms as parallel to welfare and tax institutions).

In the educational realm, for example, Gülen schools are recognised by the state and administer the secular state curriculum; its promoters regard these CSR activities as promoting development and public goods. Critics argue they promote conservative and Islamic values in children’s behaviours at large and gradually reform Turkey’s secular education sector. I argue that Islamic BAs tactics have contributed to the increasing legitimacy and normalisation of Islamic practices. Such
social movement tactics of the Islamic movement have paved the ground for real institutional changes (see further in Chapter VII).

According to the social movement literature, this resonant framing constitutes a significant source of power. However, beyond successful framing, and tapping into embedded networks, there is another key social movement tactic that can provide important sources of political power. The frame analysis established that creating a new, legitimate pious business elite to displace secular elites is a key non-contentious goal of the Islamic frame. In the next chapter, I examine the activities through which this goal is achieved, in other words Islamic BA’s ‘repertoire of contention’, and to what extent these activities fit the defined frames.
Chapter VI Resources, Activities, and Organisational Structures

1. Introduction

Islamic movements have, in line with political process frameworks, translated contention into sustainable and successful collective action by grasping political opportunities at the right time (see POS analysis in Chapter III). I have shown how Islamic BAs have gained political influence because they have built bridges between centre-right parties and religiously motivated civil society organisations over time, and have thereby acquired not only political support, but also civic integration (see Network analysis in Chapter IV). Furthermore, Islamic BAs have created effective, resonant, yet largely non-contentious collective action frames around themes of religion and discrimination, in a way that is compatible with a polarised environment (see Frame analysis in Chapter V). Building embedded networks and creating resonant frames rooted in religious ideology are key social movement tactics. Finally, this chapter analyses through which kind of tactics Islamic BAs achieve the goals set out in their collective action frames and facilitated by diverse, yet strong local networks. It compares secular and Islamic BAs’ activities, and the resources provided to members and collaborating organisations. This concerns the question of if and how religious contention enters BAs’ activities: Are BAs’ activities and resource exchanges ‘contentious’ in any way, i.e. are they means to engage in contentious collective action? And if so, what kind of tactics do BAs employ in an environment of politico-religious contention to acquire resources and to achieve political influence?

These tactics and goals, in contrast to the political process framework, are expected to be largely market-based and non-contentious, and focus on the growth of a new pious business elite, and indirect institutional change by establishing Islamic capitalist practices in the private, economic and educational spheres. Tuğal’s (2009) ethnographic approach has argued that the Islamic movement, adapting to state threats, has developed a set of tactics that focuses on the socio-economic and private realms while aiming at long-term institutional change. Building on this work, gradual normalisation of Islamic frames and practices paves the way for later direct state attacks, as does the creation of a strong support base, consisting of a pious Anatolian business elite with public legitimacy. The frame analysis has shown that the creation of such a business elite is a key goal of Islamic BAs, a goal that is market-based,
seemingly non-contentious, relying on collaboration with political and civic elites rather than in confrontation toward state elites. This chapter focuses on what exactly such a set of collaborative, seemingly non-contentious tactics looks like and how it promotes bottom-up political influence. Since such social movement tactics for BAs have not been established before, this part of the study is largely exploratory.

In the following, I will present empirical material that compares Islamic and secular BAs’ activities and cooperating partners in the economic, political and civic spheres and their differential effects on BAs’ political influence. Finally, I discuss the costs of affiliation and their consequences on gradually promoting institutional change.

The collective action literature has largely focused on how BAs provide services to members to fill institutional voids or support the efficiency of businesses in general. Following the collective action literature, the question is whether in the economic realm, Islamic BAs go beyond mere ‘service-provision’, and if there are contentious and religious aspects to their business-related functions. Since one way in which BAs’ economic activities go beyond efficiency-related activities is that Islamic BAs’ activities promote a goal in collaboration with a religiously motivated civil society organisations: I firstly analyse how Islamic BAs achieve their goal of promoting a business elite through a range of mainly export-focused activities (3.1.1), and how this compares to the secular BA’s activities (3.1.2).

In the existing political science literature, BAs’ activities to gain political influence focus on information and policy-provision by organised BAs for rational political elites at the national level, in addition to lobbying and campaign financing for political elites. Ayşe Buğra (Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2014) has found that Turkish state-business relations are mainly characterised by rent-seeking and patronage, where BAs exist purely as a legitimate platform for such personal networks between political and business elites. The question is whether the exchange between political and BA elites at the local level goes beyond such established mechanisms to include further goal-oriented, religious and contentious aspects. If so, how does the Islamic movement promote the growth of a new legitimate, yet pious business elite? What kinds of resources are provided through the Islamic movement’s organisational network spanning BAs, civic and political elites to businessmen achieve this? And how do political BA activities promote the political influence of the Islamic movement in a non-contentious way? These questions will
be analysed in section 3.2, with a comparison between the political activities of Islamic and secular BAs. First, the access routes of secular and Islamic BAs will be compared (3.2.1); and then there will be a more detailed investigation of what kind of resources Islamic businessmen receive from their political ties (3.2.2), and of what kind of power resources they provide in return (3.2.3).

The network analysis (presented in Chapter IV) showed that Islamic BAs have increased their collaboration with civil society organisations over time, and therefore that BA activities go beyond business-state relationships. The section on the civic sphere compares what kind of civic activities BAs and their members conduct, and how they collaborate with different kinds of organisations (new and old public organisations, religious or secular civil society organisations) (3.3.1 and 3.3.2). If and how this collaboration goes beyond non-contentious corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the Islamic movement is a question to be answered in the analysis of civic sphere of BAs. I will therefore discuss in more detail how the collaborating Islamic Gülen community provides important resources to further the growth of a new pious business elite (3.3.3.), and what political elites gain from promoting the Gülen community (3.3.4).

The analysis of how a new legitimate, pious business elite is created through various channels does not, however, explain why this remains contentious. The tactics are subtle. First, creating a business elite is regarded as a process of creating new powerful partisan institutions and organisations that can compete with existing secular institutions and organisations (see section 3.4 and throughout). Secondly, the analysis shows how the resources provided by Islamic and political elites are essential for SMEs, which creates a pressure to join. By joining and gaining access to resources, businesspeople are expected to provide resources in return: Islamic businesspeople are expected to support movement SMOs by providing financial and political support to collaborating organisations (the AKP and Gülen community) in return. This aspect is analysed at the end of each section, since it provides indirect political influence by increasing the resources and legitimacy of other SMOs. Further, the costs and expected personal and business behaviour of membership, through which Islamic businessmen indirectly promote institutional change, are analysed in detail in section 3.5 (as they concern all three realms).

An important condition of providing political support is the development of organisational structure of BAs (3.6). Most organisational literature in the resource-
mobilisation tradition finds that centralised and hierarchical organisations are essential for successful collective action; similarly BA literature stresses the importance of resource-rich organisations for political influence. As Islamic BAs and parties have been reported to combine centralised control with grassroots mobilisation, I study what kind of organisational structures have supported such flexible integration of political, business and civic elites. Key indicators in the BA literature are the material resources of BAs (e.g. staff, number of branches) as well as internal intermediation structures, the level of centralisation and coordination between subunits that mediate between centralised control and local interests.

2. Methods
The comparison of secular and Islamic associations’ resources and activities relies on interviews conducted in 2010 and 2011, and on additional archival data – the brochures and homepages of BAs and companies, as well as newspaper and magazine interviews with businessmen and BA leaders. Businessmen were selected from Gaziantep’s clothing and textile manufacturing sector organised at the GSO. I conducted 51 semi-structured interviews with 36 people and relied on additional archival material. A summary of the selection of interviewees can be found in the literature review’s method section.

Archival data served partly as confirmation of interview data, but mainly to provide additional points of view to increase the range of interviews. The material was again coded with NVivo 9 (NVivo9 Qualitative Data Analysis Software, 2010). I conducted a thematic analysis to study the different kinds of resources, activities and organisational structures for the present chapter. Different sections of the same interview material and additional archival data were used to conduct a collective action frame analysis to study secular and Islamic BAs’ frames in the previous chapter.

The study of resources and organisational structures followed a ‘hybrid approach’ to thematic analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Thematic analysis is a ‘research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The present research

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70 These authors describe ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, yet this could perfectly describe thematic analysis as well.
applied a so-called hybrid approach in that themes were not only created from the bottom-up inductively, generalising from codes to more global themes. Additionally, codes were created deductively from theoretical concepts of BAs and social movements. Such concepts concerned, for example, organisational structures, such as internal intermediation structures; and whether or how BAs operate as ‘firms’, providing economic services that the institutional environment lacks; as ‘rent-seeking’ coalitions; as ‘clubs’; or as ‘movements’ as basis of their political influence. A short interview guide can be found in the appendix (section 9). Starting from such global themes, these were used as initial coding categories and further refined and adapted to the research context, while at the same time, new codes and themes were allowed to emerge from raw data in relation to pre-defined theoretical concepts or as altogether new codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach allowed conducting a more directed thematic analysis, or ‘directed qualitative content analysis’, as Hsieh and Shannon (2005) refer to it, essential for extending existing concepts and theories.

3. Findings

3.1. Economic activities

3.1.1. Islamic business associations: export-promotion and inter-firm trade
This section analyses what kind of economic services BAs provide to their members and asks if and how Islamic BAs promote the growth of a legitimate Islamic business elite. One of the key themes coming out of the interviews is the strong promotion of international trade supported by the Islamic BAs, especially by the mature Tuskon affiliate Hürsiad, but also by the younger Tuskon affiliate Gapgiad. BA representatives and members as well as non-members alike regard the facilitation of exports as Tuskon’s key draw, especially for SMEs in deprived Anatolian regions. Müsiad membership was also described as an important resource to foster international trade, but less so than membership in Tuskon. Müsiad leadership compares itself to the Islamic confederation Tuskon:

Tuskon represents members who are part of the religious community, they focus more on foreign trade, exports, international trips, whereas Müsiad has a focus on research and with publications we want to be a pressure group, we want to exert pressure. (…) They have had a positive effect in creating an international network for international trade, to open those Anatolian towns to the world. (interviews 8 and 9)
In contrast, secular Gagiad members do not look to their association for such direct economic support. Gagiad members are partly regarded as international players who no longer require BA support on these matters; however, there are also smaller company members. The secular Gagiad and its confederation Tügik (The Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey) do not organise their own exclusive trade fairs to facilitate exports, but support their members’ attendance at trade fairs in general. And while they also organise international trips, Gagiad has no international branches or collaborations, limiting its services in export promotion, which is not a key activity of the secular association. In contrast, Islamic BAs promote exports by providing essential services to SMEs in the periphery in terms of infrastructure, information, contact points and even financial capital. Islamic BAs provide an international network of branches, contact points and pro-create an ethno-religious market; they organise large international trade fairs and international trips supported by political elites; they provide a professional technological e-service for members; and they indirectly serve as a mediator in unstable markets.

3.1.1.a International branches
Tuskon affiliates strongly rely on Tuskon’s international network of branches all over the world, but especially in the emerging economies of Central Asia and Africa. This does not just include BAs affiliated with Tuskon, but also the Gülen community’s network of schools. As a religiously motivated civil society organisation, the Gülen community provides important economic resources for the Islamic movement. Islamic BAs’ international activities range from simple services (e.g. booking flights and hotels), to organising relevant business meetings (e.g. finding relevant carpet wholesalers), or providing information on those markets.

Representatives of the Islamic Tuskon say:

Our greatest differentiating factor from Gagiad and Müsiad are our representative offices abroad and the guidance and counselling that comes with those. Let a Müsiad member go abroad, let him find those contacts, he won’t be able to do it, but a Hürsiad member will get guidance, and he will meet businessmen, and he will also have arranged his hotel room and car. We will even accompany him to his return flight, so it’s as if he went from here to Urfa [note: refers to the close-by city of Şanlıurfa]. That’s our biggest advantage, our international representatives, and our guidance in business endeavours. (interview 1)

The number of Tuskon’s international contact points can be assumed to be much larger than the five branches publicised on their official homepage (Istanbul,
Brussels, Washington DC, Moscow, and Beijing). This is because the network of Gülen schools abroad also serves as indirect business branches, not just in emerging, but also in mature economies. As even the number of these schools remains a secret, data on how they facilitate trade is even more elusive. In the short-term, as some critics argue, these schools benefit trade directly by buying supplies predominantly from firms affiliated with the Gülen community. For example, Kaynak Holding, a company formed to supply Gülen schools, is now Turkey’s largest supplier of educational materials (Rodeheffer, 2013). Two current outsiders, yet former secular elites confirm that the cemaat has a big purchasing power, providing an international religious market:

The religious community needs to buy goods for its big network of followers who run firms, hospitals, media outlets, newspapers, TV and radio stations, and supermarket chains; that is in addition to the school network. The cemaat’s economic power allows it to buy from member companies ‘above the market rate’, if it chooses to support a certain member; and it provides a large market. (interviews 34 and 36)

More importantly, these schools can partly take over functions of BA branches. A carpet producer describes these advantages in the following way:

Look, one of my partners is in the midst of these movement activities (…). There are a lot of schools world-wide, I think they maybe have 600 or so schools, and of course they have relations with these schools, they go and stay there, at least when they travel abroad they have somebody whom they know (…). There is definitely an advantage to that, because the owner of the school lives there, (…) and he deals with visitors and does pass on contacts and information. This is useful for firms who can’t get the information on who the biggest wholesalers are and cannot contact them by themselves. (interview 21)

Indeed, two men from Afghanistan joined us during my visit to this company. They had met the owners at a Gülen school in Afghanistan and now came to buy their carpets (interview 21). A former elite secular businessman gives further details this external trade process:

The cemaat definitely has such advantages. For example, the directors of the German Gülen schools have multiple local contacts and relations and via the cemaat, which is currently the number one channel, you can get into touch with those markets. The owner of a Turkish supermarket chain in Germany might say, for example, ‘I need plastic bags’, and his cemaat friends may then act as mediators and transfer trust onto his business credentials. Likewise, on the Turkish side, the cemaat connection confers trustworthiness onto a specific businessman; then this trade starts to roll, and plastic bags are exported to that supermarket chain from here. (interview 34)
Beyond direct services promoting exports and trade in general, Islamic BAs function as mediators and facilitators, providing essential services to SMEs for international business cooperation. Selective membership procedures provide a sense of security for international collaborations as members can rely on associations’ background checks and company valuations. Finding customers and business partners who are trustworthy, i.e. who are law-abiding and honour contracts, and acquiring information about new marketplaces in general, are important resources for businesspeople looking to create trade relations in foreign markets, especially in countries with political instabilities and/or where market institutions are inefficient (multiple interviews). Tuskon therefore fills an ‘institutional void’ in the sense that it operates as a mediator in unstable international markets and creates ethnic and/or religious markets. This need was especially high for exports to post-war Middle Eastern markets or post-Soviet states where market institutions and bank systems were not developed (e.g. interview 34). BA ties can facilitate trade by simply providing a platform for businessmen to meet (interviews 30 and 32). Such religious ties, mediated through BAs, can result in important business relations. Members who trust each other may even found multi-ownership companies. At the Islamic Hürsiad, board members established a multi-ownership export company; I was told, however, that it ‘didn’t work properly’ (interview 1). At Müsiad Gaziantep, members are in the process of forming a cooperative energy company to share cheaper energy rates among members (interview 6). A Müsiad leader states:

> Of course, our members do business among each other, they offer cheaper rates to each other, for example, if a member needs a certain agricultural product, he will usually get it from within, and members can obtain cheaper petroleum from one of our members as well, or discounts on cargo rates. (interview 7)

In the previous chapter I have shown that that Islamic BAs have a more coherent and stronger collective identity based on Islam, across three SMOs. This creates a stronger bond among Islamic businesspeople, supporting inter-firm exchange to a larger extent than in the secular coalition.

3.1.1.b Trade conferences, international trips, and e-services

In addition to international branches, Islamic BAs invest heavily into trade fairs and international trips, both of which provide contact points to meet potential customers and business partners.

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71 There are also international trade fairs for which no business association affiliation is required. These appear to be narrower and more specialist, e.g. concerning machine-
international collaborators, subcontractors or customers; to catch-up on current
trends; to understand national markets; and to present businessmen’s product range
to a wide international audience. Most members indeed regard such services as
crucial to forge contacts in new markets. Both Islamic BAs organise trade fairs
exclusively for their members (Tuskon’s version is called ‘Trade Bridges’, Müsiad’s
versions are called ‘International Trade Fair; International Business Forum - IBF’).
Tuskon’s ‘trade bridges’ are supported by the Turkish Ministry of Economy and by
the public TIM (Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, the semi-public Union of Exporters).

Tuskon started the organisation of its trade bridges in 2006, and currently
three are organised each year at the sectoral level. According to Tuskon’s figures, a
turnover of 25 billion US dollars has been generated at trade fairs between 2006 and
2011 (“Our members returned from the 2011 Tuskon Trade Bridge program,” 2011;
interview 4). These conferences may focus on a specific region, like the recent
Africa trade bridge, for example (interview 1). At the 2011 trade bridge, there were
ca. 3000 participants; 26 Tuskon members from Gaziantep participated with their
own stands, and ca. 20 face-to-face business meetings were arranged. According to
Tuskon’s figures, a turnover of 25 billion US dollars has been generated at trade fairs
between 2006 and 2011 (“Our members returned from the 2011 Tuskon Trade
Bridge program,” 2011; interview 4). For example, Gapgiad participated with 15
large firms at Tuskon’s trade bridge in 2010. Following this fair, 15 businessmen
from the Philippines visited multiple production plants and trade organisations in
Gaziantep, which ultimately led to further investments and business deals (Gapgiad,
2010).

Concerning international business trips, Hürsiad organises up to five each
year. Most recently, the association went to Morocco with 17 businessmen from
Gaziantep to visit a Moroccan Tuskon affiliate (interview 1). On these occasions,
visits to industrial and business zones are organised as well as one-to-one meetings,
and visits to consulates and public officials. As a result of such activities
businessmen often find new customers, partners, or wholesalers (interview 3).

manufactured carpets only, and are more important to keep up with international
developments in a sub-sector, such as new design trends or new machinery (interviews 21
and 31).
Müsiad organises its own conferences and international trips. Müsiad’s representative in Istanbul reports about their planned trip to the USA with 70 businessmen, meeting ministers, BAs, Turks, and universities. The results usually range from simple networking, to starting a joint venture or buying a trademark (interviews 8 and 9). To give a high-level example: 300 Müsiad and Tuskon members joined Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Minister of Economy on their January 2013 trip to Nigeria, Senegal, and Gabon. Generally, Tuskon and Müsiad’s news sections on their homepages are filled with numerous examples of prestigious international trips.

Both Islamic BAs have also created e-services to promote trade and cooperation among members nationally and internationally and offer an ethnic religious market. Tuskon has a professional e-service (“Tuskontrade,” 2012) that operates internationally, transferring calls for bids among their members across the globe. These result in serious business profits for members (interview 1). Müsiad offers a similar service for their members.

Gagiad offers no such deliberate inter-firm trade services. However, in its early years, 74 members formed a multi-ownership company in garment production (Gagiad, 1995). The company (Giateks A.Ş.) no longer seems to exist, but it shows that the secular BA may have had a stronger focus on trade promotion in the early 1990s when its member companies were still smaller. Gagiad/Tügik neither organise their own trade conferences, nor do they have international alliances or branches, nor do they offer an online networking platform (interviews 5 and 6). The secular BA does support their members’ attendance at general trade conferences. Although Gagiad also organises international trips, none of these activities reach the same extent and level of organisation that Islamic BAs offer (the same applies to the national-level, secular Tüsiad). Gagiad leadership confidently says they don’t regard it as their task to give information on international markets or to provide contacts, because many of their members are big international players already. However, sometimes requests arrive at Gagiad for certain goods, through previously forged contacts. For example, Gagiad recently visited Syria, meeting the Syrian trade attaché, the consulate, and an influential BA. During this visit, Gagiad set up one-on-one meetings and various company deals emerged from that (interview 6).
3.1.2. Secular business associations as clubs: social activities and class

Schmitter and Streeck (1999) categorise BAs as clubs if they focus mainly on their membership rather than mediating with political or other outside actors, and on social activities that centre on solidarity goods and identity-related activities. In practice, club-like BAs often focus on a small number of large capitalists (Schneider, 2004), representing a certain elitist class (Buğra, 1994).

From the interviewees’ point of view, it is the secular BAs, Gagiad and the famous Tüsiad, that fit this categorisation of BAs as clubs for ‘big bosses’ best. One of Gaziantep’s two Tüsiad members describes it as a ‘patrons’ club’ that is in the ‘hands of three to five business groups’ (interview 30). Comparing membership profiles, Gagiad, on average, has the biggest, oldest and most influential firms. In spite of a lack of systematic data, it can be said that Islamic BAs have a more mixed membership with a larger share of SMEs than Gagiad (interviews 1, 3, 4, and 8). Gagiad’s membership fees are also much higher than Islamic BAs’ fees, and Gagiad membership is limited to companies with profits above a certain threshold, whereas Islamic BAs do not have profit-related criteria.

Analysing in detail Gagiad membership lists, it appears that BA membership is passed down to the next generation, which reinforces the association’s club and elitist character. Gagiad’s leadership compares the BA to a school, preparing businessmen to take up leadership positions in the Chambers and politics (interview 6).

Beyond membership profiles, social activities, such as dinners and trips, are regarded by all BAs as important in creating trust and familiarity among their members, which can facilitate business. Local businessmen describe Gagiad as an association that is occupied mainly with social and civic activities (interview 23). It serves to establish social connections (interview 29) to bring Gaziantep’s leading businessmen together (interviews 25 and 26). Such ties can also translate into trade advantages among the established businesses of Gagiad, as a member explains:

Gagiad represents businesses that are already established and if Gaziantep had 100 successful businesses, these businessmen’s children would go to Gagiad. So how does this work? Let’s say a particular young businessman manufactures carpets, and he has a friend whose family produces yarns. So he might go up to his friend and say: ‘Come, brother [‘ağabey’], why don’t you buy your yarns from us?’, and it’s

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72 Business associations interviewed did not have readily available information about business association members’ firm characteristics such as size or foundation dates.
likely he will do so. I myself may call up other Gagiad members and ask why they wouldn’t buy from me, given we are Gagiad friends. And in these cases, they might answer: ‘Okay, if you give me a good price, I’ll buy from you. Currently I buy for 30 TL, and if you can give me product for the same price, I’ll switch to you.’ In return, I might have to reduce my prices so that I can go into business with my Gagiad friend. So there are advantages that members and friends can give to each other, based on prices, delivery, or quality. (…) Family and friendship come into play in business. (interview 34)

To support these activities, Gagiad has long had a so-called women’s council, which consists of the wives of Gagiad board members. The Islamic Hürsiad has more recently started such a council as well, but it wasn’t active at the time of interviewing. Gagiad’s women’s council is very active in organising both social and civic activities (the latter is analysed in more detail in 3.3):

We support our members’ getting to know each other through our social activities, and the civic activities the women’s council organises. Our members’ wives can meet there and get closer. For example, we organise a ball once a year combined with an award ceremony, we organise meals with our wives. (…) We organise trips in Turkey and abroad, and there, of course, friendships get forged during such trips. That’s exactly why we do these activities. (interview 6)

That is not to say that Islamic BAs do not organise such social activities to increase familiarity, e.g. breakfasts or dinners for the whole families of members. To give another example, Hürsiad recently organised a Bosphorus tour for their young members, together with a Tuskon association in Istanbul. However, they regard them as supporting trade activities among members (interview 3).

3.2. Political activities
This part of the study analyses if and how AKP elites provide Islamic BAs and businesspeople with relevant resources to create an alternative, legitimate, pious business elite, and how this exchange compares to the secular BA’s access. It then asks what kind of support AKP elites expect in return from Islamic businessmen and BAs.

3.2.1. Comparing political access routes
Business collective action fulfils the crucial function of representing the business community to the polity, and providing a bridge to local and national-level political and bureaucratic elites. In Gaziantep, the Chambers used to be the sole organisation fulfilling this purpose for decades. Ever since 1993 the private BAs Tuskon and Müsiad have been competing with and trying to control these semi-public institutions
Through these BAs, pious businessmen have been able to get better access by bypassing, and later increasingly taking over the Chambers.

From the different channels of political access emerging from the interviews it is clear that: BAs can collaborate with the Chambers to bring pressure to bear at the national level – this is the secular Gagiad’s preferred route; local BAs also have access to local politicians such as the mayor, or the provincial administrator (‘vali’), and Gaziantep’s MPs, who provide an important bridge to Parliament and national political elites.

Gagiad members argue that the Chambers are most effective in pushing for certain industrial policy collectively, for example, to argue for or against receiving economic stimuli in a certain sector (interviews 6 and 34). The Chambers have an official identity as a semi-public institution that it puts forward in such cases, and it also represents a bigger section of the business community. According to a secular businessman, ‘a major holding owner can also go to the government himself, but it wouldn’t have the same clout. In such a situation Gagiad’s most influential members would bring their case to Gaziantep’s Chambers, who would then represent them and pass on their requests to the upper decision-making levels’ (interview 34).

Good relations with political elites are also considered to be crucial for access by secular businessmen: ‘An MP is more effective at presenting your case to the government because he is closer to it. If you have good relations with a Minister or MP, he or she can argue your corner in Ankara.’ However, Gagiad was less able to meet national and international top politicians, such as the Prime Minister on its own behalf; that was only possible with better on-going relations (interview 34). Therefore, as an organisation, Gagiad has less direct access to national or international political elites. Although Gagiad is also a member of the nation-wide federation Tügik, this federation lacks the kind of clout that Tüsiad, Müsiad or Tuskon possess. Although collective access by the secular BA is not good, large business owners successfully forge personal ties with political elites, irrespective of their membership.

By contrast, Müsiad and Tuskon do have good relations with the AKP, and therefore collectively get easier access to top-level politicians and institutions, be it with or without the Chambers (interview 34). While the Chambers are still regarded as an important institution, access for Islamic Anatolian SMEs has improved through private Islamic BAs:
There has been an important change in Turkey’s civil society organisations [referring to the Gülen community and Islamic BAs] and public institutions, they are more flexible and operate more efficiently and work harder than they used to. Our access has much improved and we can’t complain. (interview 19)

The importance of collective political representation is reflected in Islamic BAs’ activities who regularly invite and visit, for example, the mayor, the provincial administrator (‘vali’), MP candidates and current MPs, ambassadors, representatives of the Turkish National Police (‘Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü’) or the Ministry of Economy:

For our Gapgiad members getting to know state and government representatives and to have good relations with them is important, and therefore we organise many such meetings. If there are visitors to Gaziantep from the government, we try and arrange meetings with our association (...). (interview 3)

The Hürisiad representative explains that they have no difficulties getting access to political elites, who are eager to hear their opinions. The AKP mayor Asım Güzelbey and the AKP MP and Family Affairs Minister Fatma Şahin (until 2013) are important in that respect. Tuskon headquarters’ intervention is not required to meet such political elites associated with Gaziantep, as relations are so close. Hürisiad leadership also likes to recount how the Prime Minister on his last visit spared one hour of his time to meet association members (interview 1). Similarly, the Islamic Gapgiad’s head says that they can easily voice their concerns to MPs, who are key contact points in reaching higher-level decision-makers:

Of course, we regularly meet Antep’s MPs. When we visit Ankara, we meet them there, too, or they come and visit our association. They are permanently with us and we are permanently with them in different situations. We can meet them easily when we wish to. Our voice is always heard. (...) We have no complaints when it comes to our mayor, the provincial administrator or the MPs. (...) We don’t need Tuskon for these relations, because at the provincial level, we can easily meet whom we desire to meet. (interview 4)

Islamic BA representatives mention that their access to other national and international elites, is facilitated by Müsüad’s headquarters in Müsiad’s case, and the federation Tuskon’s headquarters, in Hürisiad and Gapgiad’s cases (interviews 1, 2, 4). Müsiad leadership in Gaziantep actually regards their representation and cooperation with the incumbent government as Müsiad’s main activity: ‘Our cooperation with the government has produced a ‘magnetism’ that pulls everybody in’ (interview 7).

Gaziantep’s leadership did not go into any further detail. Members do not mention any institutionalised or official type of policy-exchange, rather visits to and from the
associations, as well as meetings at social and civic events. In spite of these close relationships, not all members feel that their interests are heard by the administration (e.g. interview 18). While access to patronage resources is facilitated, real collective policy influence appears more limited to the largest of Islamic business groups, even for Anatolian capital. Good relations between AKP elites and Islamic BAs rather result in economic advantages for pious Anatolian SMEs through the various ways discussed below.

3.2.2. Political ties and advantages

3.2.2.a Access to information and bureaucracies
Good relations with AKP elites can provide essential information to BAs collectively. Islamic BAs are more active in providing market-relevant information than the secular BA, which they acquire through their better AKP relations. Islamic Tuskon affiliates and Müsiad regularly organise seminars and talks to inform their members about the state of the economy, public stimuli programs (e.g. from the EU or the Development Agency), organisational strategy, or foreign markets, whereas the secular Gaggiad has less such activities. Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates also organise more talks by bureaucrats (e.g. from Kosgeb or Tübitak), academics and other experts on general issues such as generational change within family firms, etc. (interviews 1 and 8).

AKP bureaucrats or politicians cannot simply confer financial resources onto their favourites, as official procedures still have to be followed. This process is more indirect, as preferential information on support schemes is exchanged with BA leaders during ‘dini sohbet’ meetings (religious conversations), BA or other club dinners:

No, they can’t simply ‘give’ away such advantages. But how would this work? (...) They generate a certain support, for example cheaper credits for SMEs, and then those companies who fulfil the stated conditions can apply (...). But the important thing is to be among the first to know about this opportunity. (...) Or even if you have a friend in banking who can tell you about good investments or macro-economic conditions, that’s helpful, too. It’s not just getting the information, but also having your application or paperwork processed faster. For example, I tried to get support from Kosgeb and began to despair for a sum of eight billion TL (‘8 milyar TL’). But then I hear that others got that money within a few hours! But you can’t blame the employees at Kosgeb, this is an affair that comes from the top. (...) So everybody can apply to these things, and it’s not like only those with cemaat or AKP connections can get the deals. But if you have the right connections, everything turns faster, you don’t have to wait in the line and jump through all the hoops. (interview 36)
Preferential treatment of movement-affiliates through AKP ties results in indirect economic assets by providing tailor-made and faster relevant information and bureaucratic processing to Islamic businesspeople, for example, during public tenders and economic stimuli programs. Acquiring information on future economic and foreign policy, or rather forward guidance, is a further key information resource provided through political ties. Changes in economic stimuli packages, foreign policy (e.g. the abolishment of visas to and from Syria), or macro-economic policy (e.g. interest-rates adjustments), can create major problems or advantages for businesses. Such political connections are even more important during periods of macro-economic instabilities.

The macro-economic instability and high inflation of the 1990s made companies reluctant to undertake investment (interview 29). Political stability is regarded as key to macro-economic stability and the ability to plan ahead; most interviewees favourably judged the AKP on providing political and macro-economic stability (e.g. interview 29). Such uncertainty is also at its height during election periods, when investment decisions are usually put off (e.g. interview 23; Çakan, 2007). There are still many difficulties for exporting textile companies arising from fluctuating dollar exchange rates and financial speculation affecting petrol and/or cotton prices (interviews 34 and 36). Under such high dependence on global financial markets and uncertainties, the largest companies especially require political and civic connections to get access to favourable loans and other support (interview 36).

To give another information-related example, many businessmen complained about the economic stimuli package to the neighbouring city of Kahramanmaraş, supposedly causing troubles for many Gaziantep textile companies due to an artificial and price-based competition (interview 34; “Koçer siyaset sahnesinde,” 2011). Company owners who are aware of this decision ahead of time could open a production plant in Kahramanmaraş to profit from the stimuli package; or diversify into another profitable sector, like energy, or into production of higher value-added materials (e.g. technical textiles). As in other walks of life, being aware of the government’s plans can allow you to make the right strategic decisions which will translate into profits (interview 34).

The same can be argued about changes in foreign policy, which are also crucial for companies with a high export share such as Gaziantep’s textiles. For
example, a large carpet manufacturer explains how the company initially had many difficulties, trying to set up their production plant in Russia concerning, freight, customs and other documentation, at a time when the Turkish government’s relations with Russia ‘were bad’. The final decision and investment was only made after the manufacturer was assured that the relations would move towards ‘zero problems with neighbours’ (interview 31). Especially at the start, teething problems require bureaucratic support, e.g. when freight and customs issues arose (interview 31); such relations, are more readily available to those with personal connections, facilitated by Islamic BAs. Some authors have argued that the new Islamic BAs have influenced Turkey’s foreign policy (Özcan & Turunç, 2011; Özvarış, 2013). Although not directly mentioned by my interviewees, the interests if the cemaat, conservative businessmen in Gaziantep and the AKP are aligned in foreign policy where the AKP aims at ‘zero problems with neighbours’, creating friendly relations with Middle Eastern and Turkic neighbours – areas where the Gülen community is also very active and Tuskon has focused its export promotion (beside the African continent). A national Müsiad representative mentioned their support for the direction taken (and indeed this might be more relevant at headquarters at the national level):

We need to develop a foreign policy where we don’t just orient ourselves toward the West, but have to provide funds to the development and control of the East, especially the Caucasus, and Central Asia and Africa. The broadening of our foreign policy implies the expansion of our foreign trade with those countries, and Müsiad, Tuskon and Tüsiad as well as other civil society organisations promote this development by providing support and educational projects to their members. (interview 7)

3.2.2.b Patronage networks: benefits for businesspeople

The facilitated access to bureaucracies and market-relevant information described above can result in considerable advantages for Islamic businesses. New, more flexible public institutions operating at the local level were arguably founded by the AKP to support this patronage exchange, like the City Councils, Development Agencies or the infamous TOKI (‘Toplu Konut Idaresi’, Housing Development Administration). The resources of local administrations and the privatisations of public services were also stepped up, increasing the availability of local public rents (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2012; Göçmen, 2011b; Özcan, 2006). Political ties generate economic growth for groups close to the government, either through BAs, who pass such information on to their members, or through personal networks
facilitated by BAs. Interviewees mentioned several advantages created through patronage networks that go beyond information provision.

An insider interviewee describes how some of Gaziantep’s big businesses have the PM on their phones’ ‘speed-dial (interview 30). These direct relations provide ample opportunities for certain business interests to be actualised in policymaking, public tenders or privatisation deals. This top-level manager has worked at various big business groups in Gaziantep, and at one company was responsible for political relations. He describes his job as encompassing lobbying, keeping good relations with different public institutions, following developments in stimuli packages, and making strategies about how best to acquire and make use of them. This example illustrates how large business groups can profit from political ties by directly influencing policy-making in their favour:

When I was working there, there was a clause in tax legislation that companies can profit from tax reductions, large offsets from corporate tax, when they found other companies, for which they cover the construction costs and a certain start-up capital. (...) The same goes for those entire corporate social responsibility projects that can also be offset from the corporate tax, if it’s an official school, for example. But this is not the easiest way of tax evasion. (interview 28)

When this piece of legislation was about to come to an end in 2002, the employee claims that the holding owner called the PM and had it extended. He definitely has the power to change legislation pieces or to remove or introduce them. I don’t know if this type of support still exists in the legislation today. But this kind of thing is not just relevant for today, it has always happened in Turkey. (...) This reminds of George Orwell’s quote ‘All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others’. (interview 28)

Such connections importantly extend to land dealings, and infrastructure projects through public tenders (interview 25). And while local infrastructure public tenders may not be relevant to textile operations, many big business groups are diversified to operate across sectors. Income from such big public tenders can be diverted to support investments in the textile branch. Acquiring building plots at a regional price in general is relevant to all expanding companies and requires political ties (interview 34). Therefore these processes are relevant for all sectors. For example, locals argue that Gaziantep’s leading holding has acquired many preferential deals, such as winning the privatisation deal of a public cement firm, or buying building
plots at a very good price\textsuperscript{73} (interview, 35). One of this holding’s board members, whom I interviewed, is also an MP candidate for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). He complained at length about the previous centre-left administration’s (CHP, 1989-2004) supposedly anti-business policy in Gaziantep, not providing the holding with a suitable building plot, which resulted in the partial move of the holding’s business operations to another city (interview 24). This illustrates how even for large business groups good relations with political elites at the local level can create serious (dis-) advantages.

Another major Islamic holding in Gaziantep, while appearing to largely operate in plastics, has been said to make huge profit from infrastructure speculation due to its connections with the Gülen community and the Prime Minister. This observation is supported by the fact that they are involved in major building projects throughout Gaziantep with the TOKI. They are said to be able to buy land below the market rate, and then massively drive up prices through obtaining government or ‘cemaat’ support in their building contracts, and then selling on such real estate for inflated prices (interviews 36 and 34). This can be achieved by, for example, changing the status of a piece of land from industrial use to be declared suitable for development and dwelling (interview 36). In the most recent wave of ‘corruption scandal’ arrests in Turkey, it was especially the ‘winners of corrupt, neoliberal urbanization’ and mass housing projects through TOKI and other mechanisms that were targeted (Tugal, 2013). Since the corruption scandal, there has been growing evidence that the government ‘has been manipulating public tenders for private gain’ (Rodeheffer, 2013).

In sum, patronage networks generate economic growth for Anatolian capital collectively or individual businessmen individually through the following ways: preferential treatment during public tenders, privatisation deals, and economic stimuli programs (e.g. taking advantage of lower VAT or other tax rate programs or better loan conditions for SMEs from Kosgeb or the Development Agency); acquiring building plots and permits required to diversify into more regulated industries such as energy; pressuring political elites into business-friendly corporate and economic policy.

\textsuperscript{73} For example, a small park in Gaziantep’s centre was said to have been sold for a low price to an influential business group to build a shopping centre there.
3.2.3. *Patronage networks: benefits for AKP elites*

The consequence of such political capital is the generation of economic rents for Anatolian capital, which are then re-distributed to AKP elites and the Gülen community. AKP elites additionally gain crucial political support through patronage networks created by the Gülen community and Islamic BAs.

In Gaziantep, several businessmen observe patronage networks where businessmen provide political and financial support in exchange for preferential access to policy-making and economic stimuli programs, (interviews 36, 34 and 25). MPs use businessmen’s help in the social realm, e.g. by creating jobs, to create electoral support:

> Before the elections, that’s always a big topic; the politicians will then start talking about social help, and promise some of them gold, some of them ‘lahmacun’ (Turkish pizza), others will get carpets or washing machines, and yet others are promised jobs. Everybody is looking for work, and then the MPs will call us and say: ‘Look, why don’t you find him some job in your firm.’ I have my own workers, but I can’t say no to an MP, and so you’ll agree and hire some people until a little while after the elections, and then fire them again. But during that time period those employees will feel like they should give that MP their vote, because he gave them a job after all. (interview 34)

This mechanism of social welfare provision is even more prevalent in the cooperation with the religious communities, which will be outlined further below.

‘TOKI and urban development projects were not only created for new urban capitalists, but also provided transitory housing solutions and false hopes to lower income sectors, thereby expanding the party’s electoral base’ (Tuğal, 2013).

Additionally, political and state elites require influential industrialists’ support for re-election or re-appointment to a post. For example, the provincial administrator (‘vali’) may request businessmen’s contribution to build schools in return for access to the central government or other favours. In order to secure re-appointment, good relations with business elites are important (interview 34). Companies profiting from movement assets will vote for the AKP to continue this system of exchanges, and may also persuade their employees to do so. This process has allegedly been witnessed by the interviewee at two big companies in Gaziantep (interview 36).

A third way in that politicians profit from businessmen is through their campaign financing. Some go as far as to argue that companies have to make campaign contributions to their local AKP MPs because ‘they had to secure their futures’ (interview 36):
Businessmen try and get close to the government through different ways; becoming a *cemaat* member is one of the most effective ways. They become party members and work for certain politicians’ campaigns. (...) There’s serious money spent on these election campaigns and they need substantial sums for that (...). And this financial support is provided through those networks. Isn’t it the same in the US? (interview 28)

During my visit after the 2011 general election, on two occasions, two different businessmen were called up by a peer and asked whom they voted for. Both businessmen had voted for the secular-left CHP, but pretended to be enthusiastic AKP supporters on the phone (interviews 34 and 36). This implies the existence of pressure and control mechanism in electoral processes.

### 3.3. Civic activities

This analysis goes beyond BAs’ activities to include businessmen’s activities with Gaziantep’s most important civil society organisations, including the Gülen community, and further clubs where secular or neutral businessmen meet, like the Rotary clubs. Also highly active in the social and welfare realm are ‘new’ public institutions like the City Council (‘Kent Konseyi’), run by the municipality, and the new Development Agency (‘Kalkınma Ajansı’) set up by the central government. I compare the types of activities companies and BAs engage in, and identify the institutions they cooperate with, and the advantages that such civic society projects can generate for owner-managers. The present investigation analyses how, through cooperation with the Gülen community, a religiously motivated civil society organisations may promote the growth of a legitimate pious business elite, and what resources are provided in exchange. It also shows how the simple activity of supporting Gaziantep’s education sector can be highly contested and how CSR provides a source of economic and political power (by displacing public institutions in the welfare/public realm, providing legitimacy, and indirectly economic rents by facilitating access to political elites and Gülen community).

#### 3.3.1. Islamic business associations and the Gülen community

All BAs make donations to leading charities or the government when major natural disasters occur. Islamic BAs are also very active at distributing food and other products to the poor during religious holidays. Islamic BAs support mainly charities that are affiliates of different Islamic sects, such as the Gülen community’s ‘Kimse Yok Mu’, or to ‘Deniz Feneri’. Gagiad, on the other hand, does not provide any major funds to external charities linked with movements or parties.
Islamic BAs stress their educational contributions. Most importantly, Islamic BAs encourage or even require their members to donate to religiously motivated civil society organisations. Müsiad leadership says that most of their members are already very active in the CSR realm with ‘vakıfs’, so that the association needs to provide little CSR activity (interview 9). Tuskon affiliates, but not the secular Gagiad, even evaluate civic engagement in their membership application form.

Islamic BAs run a range of business-related and civic educational activities to support their membership and the Gülen cemaat. By contributing to such public welfare goods, they fill an ‘institutional void’ where human capital development is low and an urgent problem (several interviews), yet also make public institutions’ activities redundant. The Tuskon member Gapgiad outlines the importance of the Social Support Programme (‘Sosyal Destek Programı’, Sodes) projects for their members, provided through funds from the central government. Within this scheme, courses for members are organised to train, e.g., administrative personnel, give computer courses, train secretaries, graphic designers, all of which are all very popular and book up quickly. One businessman confirms that he took part in the course to train his secretaries and notes that the company could not have achieved this easily otherwise (interview 2). Hürsiad, the second Tuskon affiliate, even has its own classroom in its branch to support some its educational programmes: There are further courses offered to the general public, with additional funds from the EU that focus on youth unemployment (interview 1). The Hürsiad representative also states that they are active in the City Council’s education committee and the other local

74 Islamic law sets vakıf institutions’ standards. They were the main institutions delivering social services in the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century and played an important role in the social, cultural and economic life. They relied on a combination of public and private funds. Secular vakıfs with the involvement of party members were founded during the inter-war étatist period, while Islamic vakıfs were abolished. With the gradual re-emergence of Islam in Turkey’s political sphere after economic liberalisation in the 1980s, Islamic vakıfs have begun to make a comeback both in the private and public spheres. In the public sphere, the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund of 1986 was the first step by the Central Government to build institutions modeled on Ottoman vakıfs to provide social services to those not covered by social security systems; currently there are over 900 State vakıfs. Alongside these, private vakıfs or civil society organisations and social assistance through municipal governments also began to mushroom (Göçmen, 2011a, pp. 3–7). The Sodes Program is one of those State vakıfs operating at the regional and local levels since 2008. It was formed with the aim to promoting the development of southeastern Turkey to reduce regional and social disparities (as part of the well-known GAP program). This program relies on local dynamics and projects are mostly supported and implemented by collaborations of public, private sector and civil society organisations (Kurtipek, 2012).
vakıfs. Hürsiad also provides scholarships, supporting the Gülen cemaat’s core activity (interview 1).

3.3.2. Secular business association and secular clubs

Just like the Islamic BAs above, Gagiad also provides donations during natural catastrophes, however these are limited to Turkey and publicised in a neutral, non-contentious way (interview 6). Nor does Gagiad offer activities and donations related to religious holidays or to religious charities when questioned about civic projects; whereas Müsiad leadership stressed the association’s contribution to Islamic art, helping the poor during Ramadan, etc. (interviews 6 and 8).

Analysing Gagiad’s homepage and brochures (GAGIAD, 1994, p. e.g., GAGIAD, 2007, GAGIAD, 2010a, GAGIAD, 2010b, GAGIAD, 2011), Gagiad has initiated a large range of activities: Building pre-schools, improving teaching in technology and in pre-schools, building a library for the hearing- and reading-impaired, planting trees or even increasing female labour market participation (interview 5). For example, Gagiad built about 70-75 such pre-school classrooms and were also involved with the university in trying to improve the pedagogical education of teachers by providing insights into the pre-school education and informing them also about the private school sector and its pedagogical requirements. Each of these classrooms is estimated to cost on average about 3,000 TL (interview 6).

These activities are run in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the vali, and the public Gaziantep University, but financed by the association itself and given over to the authorities, once finished. For example, the library is a project coordinated with the municipality and the Chamber of Industry (interview 6). Compared to Islamic BAs’ activities, neither further civil society organisations, nor the cemaat are involved, nor is there direct state support (compared to Tuskon’s quasi-public functions receiving state funds to implement training courses). A Gagiad representative also takes part in the City Council meetings together with various Gagiad members, besides their involvement in the Ministry of Education committee on education. This again shows the secular BA’s involvement with

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75 An exception to this rule is Gagiad’s recent technology project where they were awarded funds from Sodes as well (“Gagiad,” n.d.).
bureaucratic and older public institutions rather than private and religiously motivated civil society organisations. Gagiad is the only non-governmental organisation invited to participate in this committee that deals with educational issues together with the Chambers, the provincial administration, the provincial treasury and other bureaucratic organisations (interview 5).

Rotary and Lions clubs are very active in Gaziantep, too, and their activities and self-descriptions provide a good comparison with the Gülen community. The Rotary club member stresses that compared to the Gülen cemaat, the club is not interested in promoting inter-firm trade among its members. It criticizes educational activities by the cemaat and its affiliated vakıfs (e.g. the Ipek Vakif) for only serving their followers and Islamic goals (interview 27). They also do projects beyond education, as their goal was not to create a ‘league of followers’:

When we give out scholarships, we give them equally to girls with and without headscarves. They [referring to Gülen cemaat] aren’t like that. During my term as head of the club, we left the selection of students to an external vakıf. (interview 27)

Rotary’s scholarships in Turkey are on a much smaller scale than those of the Gülen community; the interviewee estimates that the cemaat may support half a million students with scholarships. Some regard Rotary and Lions Clubs as direct competitors to Islamic civil society organisations: ‘What does the government do to react to these clubs? It builds its own system to profit from it; it builds a system for pious citizens’ (interview 34). The Rotary, and Tennis and Equestrian clubs as well, are regarded as staunchly secular institutions that are oriented toward or even controlled by a nebulous group of Western and US powers. In opposition to these, Islamic actors create social alternatives such as a new Islamic Equestrian Club or religious meeting groups. This again illustrates the political competition among even civil society organisations and social clubs.

76 Naksan’s vakıf is called the Ipek Vakıf. The holding is said to be the Gülen cemaat’s unofficial Gaziantep leader.

77 Of course, the club also contributes to international projects that Rotary worldwide organises where a larger budget comes from all clubs.
3.3.3. Benefits from corporate social responsibility

3.3.3.a Public legitimacy, access to network resources and human capital

Many businessmen in Gaziantep conduct individual CSR activities. They gain major legitimacy by promoting themselves as alleged providers of public goods (e.g. education) by sponsoring highly visible institutions and naming schools, hospitals, and mosques after themselves (interview 10). A current employee at the municipality, who has had insights into local budgets also through a previous position, describes businessmen’s motivation for CSR:

The provincial administration together with the Ministry of Education deals with building schools. The municipality does only have a legal role in the maintenance of those schools. (...) Businessmen can make donations to the Ministry, or they can themselves buy land, build a school and then donate it, usually under the condition that the school carries his name. But only when they see a monetary advantage, when they can put their name on the school, will they donate. Another way for the provincial administration to have a school built is to contract out the construction through public tenders (interview 10).

‘Last year approximately ‘25 trillion TL’ was spent to build schools’ (interview 11), illustrating the huge cost involved. Most importantly, Islamic BAs and businessmen make such donations to get access to the Gülen community’s socio-economic network, and to political capital. Only companies selected by the local bureaucracies are ‘allowed’ to donate and name schools after themselves, a process that requires political connections (interview 10). In return, making these donations with and through the Gülen community provides the cemaat with capital to fund its network and with public legitimacy. These advantages are reflected in the large amount of CSR conducted by Gaziantep’s firms: In Gaziantep many insider firms openly or secretly donate funds or whole educational institutions such as dorms, cram schools (‘dershanes’), or schools to the movement. A businessman with cemaat connections argues that most of the schools built by businessmen in Gaziantep are done for and with the cemaat (interview 21), such as those built by Gapgiad and Hürsiad leadership (interviews 4 and 2). Many of these projects actually stay hidden because members may not want to openly show their affiliation in public (Interview 19). The most influential firms also build their own independent schools, like the private Sanko School or Merinos’s schools, and run their private vakıfs for such large projects (interviews 21 and 31). The most active holding in the corporate social responsibility realm in Gaziantep is Sanko Holding. Many interviewees’ children go to the private Sanko School and the current mayor used to work at the Sanko
Hospital. Leading, large business groups are simply expected to make large donations for legitimacy reasons, because they set an example (interview 34). A pious businessman points out that those businesses spend about 5-10 million YTL on constructing a mosque or school (interview 23). There are numerous examples of large contributions by Islamic businessmen to the Gülen community. The unofficial Gülen movement representative in Gaziantep has made large contributions by building a university, Zirve University, and so has the Kalyoncu group by building the Gazikent university and the private Erdem schools (which are known as cemaat schools; interview 17). The Islamic Gapgiad’s leadership, who is also the owner of a large business group, donated three schools named after their family in 1995 (interview 4). Hürsiad’s leadership tells me of its multiple school donations (e.g. building 2 dorms) and its scholarships offered to the Gülen-affiliated Ipek Vakıf (interview 2).

Besides fully sponsoring schools, Islamic businessmen also pay ‘zekat’ or alms (1/40th of budget) to religious communities, a major pillar of Islam and financial resource for the Gülen community. As part of their religious service, the co-owners of a medium-sized carpet manufacturer (interview 22), give zekat, organise pilgrimages (‘ümres’) and donate scholarships to the cemaat. They say they do this to gain God’s approval and because the ‘hoca’ asks them to contribute to Turkey’s education sector. Further such justifications and conceptualisations of charity and business activity as fulfilling Allah’s calling were discussed in Chapter V.

The AKP plays an important role in legitimising and supporting private and religiously motivated civil society organisations’ contributions to public goods. The ‘cemaat’ is inherently more dependent on political elites to legitimise its active pursuit of Islamic interests. And while the secular Gagiad also requires legitimacy for its money-making, the once outlawed Islamic elites have a larger vulnerability. One key advantage of collaboration is therefore the acquisition of public legitimacy through public support and friendly/supportive policies toward Gülen schools. The fact that the Ministry of Education accepts Gülen schools is a support mechanisms between the community and the AKP, ultimately legitimising its educational projects. A second legitimising process is Tuskon affiliates’ quasi-public function in running education-related projects in its branches with funds allocated by the central government’s SODES Program (Social Support Programme). And so are the tax advantages provided to companies who give donations to Islamic vakıfs and specific
charities in Turkey and abroad. Companies donating schools accepted by the Ministry of Education can be offset from corporate tax (interview 10). Tax legislation thereby indirectly supports the cemaat’s educational activities. Of course, these kinds of mechanisms exist worldwide and it is not just movement members that can profit from such tax reductions. The areas of tax reduction have shifted over time to include, e.g. mosques or health centres, depending on the government’s welfare needs (interview 10).

Finally, Islamic BA members who support Gülen’s educational activities may be able to employ graduates of these schools, and therefore find suitable employees more easily. This can help ‘to create a different kind of team spirit, they become a group’ (interview 25). Indeed, owner-managers constantly complain about not being able to find good mid-level managers and apprentices, and about the low level of human capital in Gaziantep province in general (interviews 33, 30, 21, 20, 18). A local teacher explains that the cemaat is very interested in tracking the best students. They do detailed family checks on the family and expect you to ‘fit in with their philosophy’, arguing that in her experience access depends on religiosity. Ipek Göçmen (Göçmen, 2011b, 2014) in her in-depth study of various religiously motivated welfare organisations in Turkey, supports this point of view. Of course, that does not prevent students from being independent after graduating from a Gülen school (interview 17). Less gifted but devout children are sometimes later placed in companies in Turkey and the Middle East as workers (interview 17), providing human capital to Islamic businesses. Gülen schools abroad are often high-quality schools that often train the children of national elites and help developing close relations with political elites (Rodeheffer, 2013).

3.3.3.b Further financial resources provided by Gülen community and political ties

So far I have shown that CSR provides access to network resources and public legitimacy. Beyond the economic resources offered by Islamic BAs directly, this section focuses on further resources that the Gülen community and AKP elites provide to build a pious business elite.

Both Tuskon and Müsiad can offer financial resources via access to top bureaucrats and politicians. Müsiad leadership, for example, explains that it does not directly provide financial help to its members, but will liaise with financial institutions if a member is in financial distress. Müsiad cannot pay a member’s debts,
but it will bring its members in touch with the right people and thus provide opportunities to protect them (interview 8). Müsiad elites can get preferential deals from public banks or the Gülen community’s Bank Asya. Bank Asya, has grown to be among Turkey’s largest banks with the support of AKP elites (Rodeheffer, 2013).

Hürsiad, via the Bank Asya, offers ‘financial help if a company is in distress’ (interview 1), and certain legal services for free. Members can acquire loans more easily and faster when key political elites and/or shareholders vouch for a businessman’s creditworthiness. Through such ties, loan conditions can be improved too, providing lower interest rates, or longer repayment periods to members.

In contrast, the secular Gagiad’s leaders and members state that there are no such financial opportunities offered (interview 6). Nevertheless, big business groups may enjoy similar possibilities through personal contacts to top politicians. The key difference is that through the Islamic Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates such possibilities are now available to a broader base of businesses across the country, on the condition that members have proven to be trustworthy and sympathetic to the BAs’ goals through supportive activities and long-term membership.

The following example of a large textile group’s current financial troubles illustrates how the religious community can build up an entire business group. The current owner-manager of this company is in a leadership position at a Tuskon affiliate and has sponsored multiple schools to the Gülen community. A current outsider, yet former elite businessman, details this example. This businessman is at the same time a remote relative of the textile group owners in question, and his family also features prominent secular-left politicians:

They [the Gülen community] are a big power. Imagine that if one of them is about to go bust, if a big firm is about to go bankrupt, the cemaat has its own bank, so they steer it to them; they give them cheques. They get all sorts of assistance, be it economically, during the sales process; they’re a very big power/force. When they founded a company, they didn’t have any background in the industry, nothing in their past, no money; imagine that! Even right now, [the owner] (…) is completely broke. After its foundation, it wobbled once, in 2007/2008; Bank Asya took care of that. (…) It’s one of the easiest things in the world to ruin a company, especially a large one. (interview 36)

A businessman whose partners are involved in the cemaat confirms this story as it is widely known in Gaziantep that this textile group had to almost close down due to bankruptcy. But it has managed to survive due to its bank connections. According to this interviewee, the company’s financial troubles have been caused by: the on-going
civil war in Syria that stopped production at its plant over the border; the trade union DISK strikes; and the general difficulty of generational change from father to son (interview 21).

Some older and secular businesses, who do not vote for the AKP or join the *cemaat*, attribute their current financial struggles to their deteriorating political capital. Interviewee 36 inherited a plastics and a yarn firm; his father was among the founders of the free trade zone, and he himself was a founder of leading secular organisations. He explains that his family company did suffer from internal family problems that eventually led to a split-up of the family business in the 1980s. But the loss of connections is regarded as key reason for deteriorating business:

> Of course, what does the *cemaat* do: It gives its firms financial help, for example interest-free loans. Our firm was one of the first in Gaziantep to produce nylon plastic bags, I mean we weren’t the first, but we were among the first two to three companies doing this business in Gaziantep. Another firm that opened at the same time as us closed down; but most came later. Naksan [note: owner is said to be the local Gülen *cemaat* leader] only started two years before us. Originally they didn’t do printed bags – that’s what we did back then – but then they got their own machinery for printing. Of course, their development has been very different from ours, they grew very fast, and you know the reasons for that. Because we couldn’t profit from the same things, they grew very fast. (interview 34)

### 3.3.4. Patronage networks: creating political support for AKP elites

The support of the *cemaat* and of Islamic BAs is regarded as crucial for the AKP’s continued electoral victories, both through their social and welfare programs and their financial and electoral support. This is the key incentive for AKP’s collaboration in this resource exchange. Several businessmen describe how the financial and social help by the *cemaat* to the very poor, and their endorsement for the AKP, has created electoral support among the low income sectors:

> Remember that many Turks are still illiterate or have never been to school; and they don’t have any bread (...). Those people are easily controlled through their stomachs. Then somebody comes who promises them a job and income, and makes some political propaganda. And then he’ll ask: ‘Do you believe in Allah, in the Koran?’ Of course the poor devil will say: ‘Yes, I believe. I swear by the Holy Scripture.’ In the same breath, he’ll be asked to vote for the AKP, and get in return a table, chair and some money. He’ll let him eat and then collect his vote. Of course, such people are not just naïve, but also poor and hungry. (interview 34)

> They keep saying they’re independent, but they’re not. They showed their true colours during the election, they all worked for the AKP, and they said that openly during their religious meetings/reading-groups (*dini sohbetler*). The supporters of the *cemaat* , especially the lower classes, are often very naïve people, who do this to fulfil Allah’s will, to win his grace, these are people with very good intentions. Many *cemaat* workers are like this. (interview 36)
Engagement in civil society and rent seeking can go hand in hand. For example, when businessmen take over public functions by investing into infrastructure projects in return for access to and influence in policy-making:

Of course, the vali is often involved in these development projects; he tries to gather enough money and therefore he will try and have good relations with the Chambers and businessmen. People will also want to meet him because of his position. The vali could decide that there should be a school built on a certain plot of land according to the province’s development plan, and he might refer that responsibility to the owner of Sanko holding, who will then do it. This exchange creates positive externalities for both parties involved. Actually this benefit is based on profit. The vali needs the support of the population and influential leaders for the party to be voted back into power and to keep his position. The businessman, on the other hand, will, of course, in return request favours from the vali, often it’s a problem that involves the central government. Many mosques and schools were built in this way in Gaziantep. (interview 34)

Some businessmen argue that the Gülen cemaat with its millions of followers and its spiritual sway has so much power that it can significantly influence the outcome of elections.78

It does currently look as if the AKP’s electoral victories do depend on the cemaat’s support. But this trajectory can change at any time. The cemaat can at any time withdraw its support for the AKP, at the end of the day, whether they cooperate or not depends on how the battle of profit is played out. (interview 28)

Others argue that the cemaat doesn’t contribute much to the AKP’s electoral victories (interview 21). The current corruption scandal and mud-slinging between the AKP and Gülen movement has shown that the cemaat can at least shape public opinion and politicians’ careers through controlling a large media network, and access to its followers in the judicial and police forces.

3.4. Politico-religious contention in business organisation

BAs’ activities analysed above are contentious, because, as the frame analysis (Chapter V) has shown, the Islamic movement aims to promote a legitimate, pious business elite and support base through Islamic BAs. BAs are organised along

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78 The most recent 2014 local elections seem to show that the cemaat cannot easily direct its followers to not vote for the AKP. In spite of the conflict between AKP and Fethullah Gülen, the AKP actually increased its votes in comparison to the 2009 local elections. Why the conflict has not resulted in a loss of votes for the AKP remains unclear: It might be that the patronage networks have become so strong and self-reinforcing that their profiteers do not wish to exit them in spite of leadership’s disagreements. Or else, the new pious middle and lower income sectors supported by such networks do not find there is a good alternative to the AKP. At present it is too early to judge the effects of these conflicts.
politico-religious lines and nurture only their own memberships, where access depends on providing support and religiosity. Business organisation is regarded as an arena of political contention by businessmen. Several businessmen point out the importance of collective organisation for businessmen to create public legitimacy, representing collective rather than individual interests. They also indicate that political and bureaucratic elites prefer to deal with larger organised groups. Gaziantep’s BAs do more than ‘window-dressing’, in spite of any personal exchanges. They are essential bodies for legitimate collective action for businessmen. Leadership from Hürsiad, explains:

I don’t have any complaints, if I require I can easily get an appointment at the financial administration. But there’s a difference, as a civil society organisation you represent civil society. Hürsiad has more than 400 members in Gaziantep. It’s completely different to pick up the phone and make a call as the leader of Hürsiad or as the producer [interviewee name removed]. I’m not just representing myself anymore, but a group. Your counterpart will perceive and judge you very differently. They express their problems, you express yours and by organising you can meet under one roof and get the chance to express those to relevant parties. (interview 2)

Even the owner of one of the largest carpet manufacturing firms worldwide, who may be expected to rely on personal networks only, argues that ‘organising always brings advantages. To have your voice heard, to express your force/power’ (interview 31).

Beyond such legitimate representation, BAs are perceived to be part of broader political power struggles, i.e. as political rather than just efficiency-related organisations. They represent different factions based on politico-ideological views along the left-right spectrum. A businessman asked about the key difference between Gaziantep’s BAs, comes up with the following underlying distinction:

There are many groups, but there are two key factors here: The first system is a system that mixes politics with religion; the second is a system that regards politics and religion as separate. These two different world views are reflected in the associational landscape, they give rise to different groups, now there are extreme ends of this continuum, and more moderate groups (...) and these split up into different factions. (...) There are also groups like Hamas here, but we as industrialists are very distant from them, I wouldn’t know anything about them. (interview 34)

It is not just secular, but also Islamic businessmen who regard religion as a key differentiating factor between Gaziantep’s BAs:

They have many resemblances, only their understandings are different; one of them relies on religion, on morality; that is Müsiad, whose members don’t drink alcohol. So they have different understandings; and it is people with similar views who will get together. (interview 23)
There is a specific group of people that would go to these associations, and another group would go to another type of association (…). The Chambers are independent. (interview 21)

The contention and polarisation between these factions is illustrated in the next statement. This pious businessman regards BAs in Turkey as different factions and class-based organisations that he does not want to be a part of. In a heated discussion about the secular-Islamic polarisation he complains about how this has created tensions with his business partners, who contribute to the Gülen community, which he does not like (interview 21). He continues:

We argue a lot about this here. They are so against the AKP, they find Erdoğan fascist. It’s because members of the military have been put into prison increasingly, and their trials haven’t been worked on – it’s not right, I agree (…). But there aren’t any common points to agree on, they are so against us, they are against the publicisation of the Dersim massacres, they are against bringing up old problems, they are like dinosaurs, and they still get around 30% of the vote! (interview 21)

A large carpet producer puts this polarisation in more moderate terms:

All civil society organisations are positive as long as they don’t have a political identity or are connected to a specific group (…). (…). It’s most dangerous when different factions emerge to represent people’s different skin colours, languages, religions, ethnicities or religious views. We’ve seen many examples of this across the world, and this continues to be one of Turkey’s most pressing issues. (interview 31)

Islamic BAs’ collective action is regarded as a political process that challenges state authority – a key aspect of social movements:

It’s matter of balance. It’s harder to destroy people when they’re organised, but it’s very easy to destroy them one by one. In order to put pressure on the government…it’s not possible to do that as an individual. One person cannot be more powerful than the government. (…) But a large group can create fear in the government, and they [referring to Islamic BAs] are aware of it. (interview 36)

Islamic BAs promote production and trade, information-exchange and provide other seeming non-contentious services. However, these services are limited to each association’s own membership (interview 4), aimed at promoting a limited business class:

All of these business associations have their own goals, they are business associations, but our [referring to City Council] goals are different, we only want to promote Antep’s development. (…) We don’t just represent a certain section of the population; (…) the other associations operate in their own interest and for themselves. (interview 11)

And although knowledge and information can easily flow to all businessmen because they can be members of multiple associations, core advantages and activities are only
conferred to key members who have shown their convictions repeatedly with multiple projects. This is also reinforced by the rigorous membership selection process, which is also based on religiosity (see Chapter V). While Tuskon’s extensive trade conferences are very helpful, it is only the most active, who are chosen to participate, and there are long waiting lists (interview 19). This can be interpreted as an effort to create a distinct business elite along politico-ideological lines.

3.5. Costs and consequences: indirect institutional change

This resource exchange is not only contentious because it promotes the movement’s political influence through the creation of a legitimate, pious business elite, but also because it indirectly promotes institutional change. As well as providing political and financial support to SMOs in return for access to essential resources, Islamic businessmen are expected to conform to certain business and private codes of behaviour.

Businessmen acknowledge that these political exchanges are similar to the pre-AKP era. While the types of groups involved have changed as well as the benefits themselves, the mechanisms are largely the same. Business groups close to the governments were always able to profit more, be it under Atatürk, the PMs Menderes, Özal or now Erdoğan (interviews 21, 36, and 34).

This cooperation is built upon profit. Each period has its pasha. The rich of the Özal period are different from those of the Ecevit or Demirel periods. Demirel’s family members got very rich during his terms, but as soon as the government changed, it completely destroyed them. (interview 36)

However, one key difference to earlier periods of business politics is the types of pressures and costs associated with membership in BAs. Since the AKP took over the local administration in Gaziantep in 2004, neighbourhood pressure has increased and many businessmen feel forced to exhibit their religious piety in an ‘AKP-appropriate’ way:

The AKP has introduced this Islamic weight, that’s why people who wouldn’t have prayed or fasted during religious holidays before, now suddenly show off how they supposedly don’t drink, pray five times a day and have their wives and daughters covered, just so the others see him and say: Look, he’s an AKP supporter. (…) They check everything, where did you go to school, who are your friends, where did you go, they will know if you went to a restaurant and had a drink. (…) They note if you’ve been to the Friday prayer or not. (…). But I believe what’s in the soul is important, and it doesn’t matter if you drink or not, as long you don’t hurt anybody. I believe in Allah, but I vote for the CHP. (interview 34)
Some businessmen who are not already so inclined or practice privately, feel they now have to signal their alliance by exhibiting behaviour in their private lives that match the AKP’s and the cemaat’s views of a pious (Sunni) Islamic capitalist. Businessmen who are not directly involved with these groups also feel the pressure to display certain codes of behaviour. This extends to businessmen’s families, because BAs check the family backgrounds of their members (e.g. interview 29). The same applies to applicants of training programmes or scholarships from Islamic BAs. Beside building schools for the movement and joining certain clubs and associations and not others, daily life in the factory is also affected: For example, it is obligatory to provide a prayer room for employees, to go the mosque during Friday prayer, to organise and participate in pilgrimage tours, and not to offer any alcohol to employees or to drink themselves (e.g. interview 23). Islamic businessmen also feel obliged to buy the Gülen community’s newspapers and put them on display (e.g. Zaman newspaper), to pay ‘zekat’ (donating 1/40th of company’s profit to a vakıf or the cemaat), or to conduct interest-free banking (through the Gülen community’s bank Bank Asya or other Islamic banks), beside contributing to the cemaat’s educational efforts and taking part several times a week in religious meetings (interviews 34 and 21). Islamic BAs promote such business practices and institutions more or less directly. For example, Tuskon leaders state that their members are conservative anyway, and that therefore there would be no alcohol during trips, dinners or meetings (interviews 1 and 4). However, the following quotes indicate that businessmen perceive such Islamic practices and behaviours more as forced upon them and controlling, resulting in a loss of freedom. I ask a businessman who is very pious, but secular, why he personally does not like to become a member of an Islamic BA or the cemaat. He says he often fights with his business partners about this issue because they are cemaat and Islamic BA members, but he thinks it’s wrong:

A normal, independent man who knows his job doesn’t need this, his work could actually get worse, because they can rob you of your independence. By getting into these circles, a set of dependencies emerges. (…) Why should I have my worldview registered? I only want to be known by my work, not by my political or religious views, because in business there should be no such thing. (…) I don’t like being imposed with a certain view. (…) Of course this is not secular (‘laik’). (…) It’s difficult, and there’s only so many times you can say no, for example, I declined being a part of their ‘Turkish Olympics’ recently, so at least, yes, you have to buy and display their [referring to the cemaat] newspaper. (interview 21)
This view is strikingly similar to the view by one of Gaziantep’s older secular elites who argues that joining results in loss of independence in business decisions:

They [referring to cemaat] don’t leave you alone, but tell you: ‘Now it’s your turn to go and help Ali, for example’. Once the company has grown, (…) they direct you. (…) Right now I am my company’s dictator, what I say is the truth. But once you join them you lose your independence, you become dependent upon them. (interview 34)

Both the secular-left and pious businessmen quoted above are against involving religion in business affairs (interviews 21 and 34).

Look, we do pray and read the Koran, but our faith is our own, it’s nothing you can force somebody to do. Faith is not something where 2 and 2 equals 4, it’s not something that can or should be part of a group that checks individuals’ strength of faith. It’s not mathematics, it’s a very deep topic, there shouldn’t be the need for a reference or whatever confirming your faith. (interview 21)

While not all-encompassing, the importance of signalling the right types of behaviours and affiliations has created a strong pressure for those who are not strong insiders, and can significantly impact upon a company’s reputation. That does not mean that all businessmen suddenly follow these codes of behaviour. Within big companies, it is often the case that one or two of the owners who are already so inclined do strengthen their efforts in the Islamic direction, whereas other owners may join or stay with the secular business elite. But large business groups feel the pressure, too. A very large carpet producers got a bad reputation for allegedly not allowing its employees to fulfil their religious duties of prayer and not praying themselves; a prayer room (‘mescit’) was then provided (interview 21) and the Friday prayer is even advertised on the company’s homepage now. Its owner-manager gets angry about this issue in the interview and says:

There is absolutely no way we would forbid Friday prayer, this is completely wrong! We even have a bus service to make sure all our working friends can fulfil their religious practices. (…) This rumour was spread as part of a smear campaign by one of our competitors. (interview 31)

Interviewees provide mixed messages as to what extent the cemaat can actually force business decisions such as which subcontractor to select, on its members. While some argue that this is the case, other interviewees point out that the system works more subtly through referrals. Once a company has reached a certain size it has to go beyond the religious cemaat market and therefore can no longer make business decisions based on partisanship and religion. However, as illustrated
above, large business groups’ dependence on the movement is magnified through their larger financial vulnerability and needs. The type and extent of the cemaat’s business influence therefore depends on firm size and also on the extent of a company’s involvement in the movement:

[The cemaat] can’t directly tell you this is correct, this is wrong. But because they have control over these people, as they are the reason the company even got to a certain stage, they can say: ‘You should enter the energy market’, and if the owner does not have the necessary skills for this business, they will find a cooperating partner for him. (…) (…) But a lot of money goes to the Gülen cemaat’s schools, where they indirectly nurture trade by educating students in the Turkish language and Islamic culture so that they might later enter trade relations with Turkey. And then they can say, because they might have a spiritual sway over a person or might have given them a scholarship: ‘Come, why don’t you buy your chocolate biscuits from Ülker [originally Islamic business group].’ (interview 34)

On the other hand, that does not mean that subcontractors, customers, and providers of input materials, are only selected among the movement’s membership because this would hurt its economic survival in the long run, especially for big firms expanding internationally:

That doesn’t mean they [referring to Müsiad and Tuskon members] will ALWAYS sell their products to outsiders at a higher rate. It also doesn’t mean that you will always accept another member’s order just because you are in the same association, it can be up to the firm to decide if the opposite side looks trustworthy to you (…) They don’t exclusively sell products to other members, because the number one concern is the company’s profit and survival. If there is a serious potential customer who looks good to them, no matter of what colour, the company’s first goal is profit. (interview 34)

You can’t survive by just selling your products to cemaat members; you have to sell to anybody. (interview 25)

The cemaat can no longer dictate to Naksan what to do every step of the way; they’ve become too big. (interview 36)

But as argued above, BAs or the cemaat can function as important bridges and mediators between businessmen, creating trust and closeness based on similarity, and thereby promote business through referrals:

If a firm is looking for plastic bags and knows a plastic producer because, say, they’re both Müsiad members and they like each other, why should that firm go to another producer who is a stranger, outside of that association? Another member can give you a price reduction, whereas an outsider will pay the full price. (interview 34)

They can’t always tell you to work with a certain other company because that might create serious losses for the company, and therefore also for the cemaat. But providing referrals through the system is important way of doing this. (…) For example, I bring my good friend to my business association, and they run a business background check on that person. Has he paid his cheques, ever committed any fraud? Does he share the associations’ convictions? And if so, he will join and then also join religious meetings where people get even closer, meeting several times a week, meeting certain decision-makers (…). (interview 36)
3.6. Organisational structures

This section analyses the organisational structures of the three local BAs in Gaziantep and their national affiliations, where it applies. Tüsiad, the oldest of Turkey’s BAs that represents mainly the large holdings from the Istanbul-Marmara region is partly included as a point of references; I interviewed two Tüsiad members in Gaziantep. The results are compared in Table 10. Organisations with strong structures have rich resources (in terms of staff, membership fees/available budget) and effective internal intermediation; that is organisational structures that allow mediating between central/leadership and local/members’ interests, between control and interest aggregation. In other words, strong organisational structures effectively represent members’ interests to external actors (if that is part of a BA’s activities) and allow for the integration of a variety of local interests.

The Islamic Tuskon affiliate Hürsiad and the secular Gagiad show the highest level of internal intermediation. Tuskon’s pyramidal confederation structure allows for both control and aggregation of interests (cf. Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). This type of organisational structure supports mobilisation of local interests and their combination into shared goals. The secular Gagiad is also a member of a national-level confederation called Tügik. However, none of Gagiad’s members in describing its activities ever mentioned that confederation, other than for occasional social trips and visits to other member BAs. Tügik does not appear to be involved in the interest formation to the same extent as Tuskon is for its BA members. While Gagiad’s internal intermediation is high, that of its confederation appears to be low, therefore it overall receives a lower rating in internal intermediation compared to the Tuskon affiliates.

The flexible integration of local interests, and centralised control at Tuskon, is indicated in the following way: Tuskon affiliates and the secular Gagiad, but not Müsiad, make decisions within their Gaziantep branches, and decide upon their programs, activities and membership selection themselves, rather than following orders from central headquarters (interviews 1, 3, and 6). Both Tuskon affiliates were to some extent independent before joining Tuskon, which also shows that the Gülen community appropriated existing structures rather than creating new ones in its effort to create political influence. That does not mean that the local associations can pursue whatever activity they desire, they still have to be within Tuskon’s framework if they aim to remain members. Gapgiad’s representative, for example, says that the
association cannot pursue activities without Tuskon’s prior knowledge (interview 3). Tuskon’s high importance for export activities gives the federation important leverage and the ability to gather local associations behind the central organisation. Sending staff from headquarters to local associations additionally achieves the control of local interests. At the same time, there is local flexibility, as Tuskon affiliates decide themselves whom to admit as members and on details of activities (interview 1). Similarly, the secular Gagiad’s leadership remarks that they decide themselves on details of activities and members but have similar politics/interest as their confederation (interview 6). Additionally, Gaziantep’s BAs are not fully dependent on their confederations as they actually partially fund them (interviews 6 and 1). The secular Gagiad and Islamic Hürsiad are arguably the most powerful BAs within their regional federations Giaf and Günsiaf; BA leaders point out that they were heavily involved in the formation of their regional federations (interviews 6 and 1). Tuskon affiliates and the secular Gagiad financially support their confederations and federations, rather than the other way around:

All that we need from Tuskon is the ‘trade bridges’ and international representative offices, other than that we don’t get financial support, actually it’s us who send money to Tuskon to organise these trade bridges. Other than that the member associations can set their own activities, budgets or fees. (interview 1)

Müsiad is strongly centralised, all local decisions have to be approved by the central headquarters (interview 7). All Müsiad branches across the country are organised in the same manner (interview 8). This allows for little local input and shows the association’s focus on control rather than aggregation of businessmen’s interests.

Beside central-local relations, internal sub-structures and the coordination between them affect the quality of internal intermediation. I have little information on this other than their formal presence, which also indicates the BAs’ different activity focus. Like in any other Müsiad branch in Turkey, Müsiad Gaziantep has sectoral committees (e.g. in textile, agriculture,), which shows their focus on industry and trade activities. Note that Tuskon affiliates also have such sectoral committees, but not the secular Gagiad. The secular BA mainly organises social activities that serve to create closeness and trust among members, and serves as a platform to network with local and national political elites. Gagiad’s focus on CSR and social activities to bring elites closer is reflected in its organisational structures. It has
separate staff, a committee on civic projects (women’s council and separate project coordinator), and spends its budget primarily on organising relevant projects and big receptions. It has no committees organised according to civic projects and trade in general, namely the EU relations committee, the women’s council and the trade/industry committee (interview 6).

Gagiad is the most elitist of Gaziantep’s BAs and has the strongest organisational structures in terms of organisational resources, but does not translate this into collective political power. Gagiad appears to have the largest budget based on membership dues, and it has an active membership, which is reflected in the frequency of its boards’ and committees’ meetings.

Müsiad appears to have the least staff and worst offices of Gaziantep’s BAs. Instead, most resources seem to be invested into the national headquarters. Müsiad Gaziantep is the least transparent and most opaque of the organisations, with little professionally organised activity in either the civic or economic realm. Compared to the secular Gagiad, Müsiad Gaziantep runs no public civic activities; and compared to Tuskon affiliates there is no professional staff trained in and keen on publicity. Instead, Müsiad headquarters provides the major export and trade activities.

Hürsiad’s real budget remains unclear because the association also receives large sums through ‘donations’ (interview 1). Hürsiad’s representative claims that to build new branches for Gapgiad and Hürsiad their 2011 budget amounted to one trillion TL. Overall, the number of staff and budget available are high at Hürsiad. The fact that Tuskon affiliates implement public projects suggests professionalism. Association members frequently meet within their board or committees, showing that members are not just prepared to spend membership fees, but also valuable time and effort at their organisations. Tuskon affiliates’ professionalism has come through their joining the confederation in 2005. In fact, the Hürsiad representative interviewed was sent by the Tuskon headquarters and has clearly been trained in public relations and in running an association (interview 1). This can also be seen in the fact that Tuskon affiliates have independent and rather detailed homepages and brochures that are publicly available, whereas Müsiad Gaziantep has no internet platform independent of Müsiad central.

The combination of Müsiad’s closeness to AKP political elites, and Tuskon’s export network as well as organisational structures makes this subgroup very efficient at mobilisation and acquiring political and economic capital. Tüsiad, the
oldest BA of Turkey, in contrast, has only two branches across Turkey, in Istanbul and Ankara, and only two members in Gaziantep. Their effort at local mobilisation is addressed through their confederation Türkönfed (Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation) – to this point there is no affiliate in Gaziantep, and generally their alliances in central- and south-eastern Anatolia are weak; not even Gagiad is a member. The weakness of non-Islamic BAs to mobilise a business constituency at the grassroots is reflected in the absence of a strong confederation vis-à-vis Tuskon.

In sum, I have argued that the effective combination of Müsiad and Tuskon affiliates’ organisational structures and activities has supported the movement’s mobilisation efforts and the integration of their interests and activities. The strength and flexibility of Tuskon’s decentralised structure has enabled both grassroots mobilisation and cooperation across political, business and civil society organisations. Müsiad’s centralised structure complements the former by facilitating access to national elites and the control of business membership.
Table 10 Comparing the organisational strength of Turkey and Gaziantep’s most important voluntary, economy-wide secular and Islamic business associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associations*</th>
<th>Members: Numbers and Profiles (Businesspeople)</th>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Dues/Budget</th>
<th>Meeting Frequency</th>
<th>Internal Intermediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tüsiad (1971–)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Secular BA</td>
<td>Turkey: 600 members representing 2500 companies&lt;br&gt;Gaziantep: 2 members (interviews)</td>
<td>2 in Turkey: Istanbul and Ankara; 5 international</td>
<td>None in Gaziantep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Across Turkey:&lt;br&gt;- 4/5 big meetings per year&lt;br&gt;- Sectoral committees meet monthly (interview)</td>
<td>Expected to be Medium (not analysed directly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gagiad (1993–) Tügik (2002–)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Secular BAs</td>
<td>Confederation Tügik: ca. 7000 members; Gaziantep Gagiad: 209 members&lt;br&gt;- Largest industrial companies; profit has to be above a certain threshold (represent ca. 80% of Gaziantep’s economy)&lt;br&gt;- Up to 45 years of age, then honorary member (all from interviews)</td>
<td>Tügik: 8 regional federations; 55 BAs</td>
<td>Gagiad: 5 members of staff (interview)</td>
<td>Gagiad:&lt;br&gt;- Entry: 5,500 TL;&lt;br&gt;- 90 TL monthly dues&lt;br&gt;- Dues make up budget; few donations, which are project-based (all interviews)</td>
<td>Gagiad:&lt;br&gt;- Committees meet every 15 days; women’s council and board of members meet every week (all interviews)</td>
<td>High for Gagiad&lt;br&gt;- Member of federation Giaf and confederation Tügik&lt;br&gt;- Committees: EU; industry and trade&lt;br&gt;- Board and women’s council (concerned with running CSR projects with project coordinator)&lt;br&gt;- Decision-making in Gaziantep (all interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Müsiad (1990–)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Müsiad Gaziantep (1993–)&lt;br&gt;Islamic BAs</td>
<td>Turkey: 3150 senior members, 1750 ‘young’ members (18-30 years); representing 15,000 companies&lt;br&gt;Gaziantep: 226 members (incl. Young Müsiad)&lt;br&gt;- Mix of SMEs and big industrial companies; professionals (interview)</td>
<td>31 in Turkey; ‘94 contact points in 44 countries’</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Medium&lt;br&gt;- Decision-making by centre (interview)&lt;br&gt;- Sectoral committees at local level; additional working groups at HQ (international relations, education, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Federation Structure</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>Affiliates</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Classification</td>
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</table>
| Türkonfed (2004–)  
Secular federation | 10,000 members (2010 figures) in Turkey;  
No affiliate in Gaziantep | 16 regional and sectoral federations; total 133 member associations | | Expected to be High  
- Pyramidal organisational structure |
| Tuskon (2005–)  
Gaziantep affiliates:  
Hürsiad (1993–)  
Gapgiad (2002–)  
Islamic Federation and Associations | 33,260 members  
Hürsiad:  
- 476 members  
- 95% of members are SMEs; 5% big industrial companies and professionals (interview)  
- Young Hürsiad (18-30 years)  
Gapgiad:  
- 101 members  
- Big manufacturing companies; professionals (interview)  
- Up to 45 years of age, then honorary member (interview) | 7 regional federations; 160 member associations (all provinces); 5 international centres and more unofficial (‘partner organisations in 140 countries’)  
Gapgiad:  
3 members of staff (interview) | | Very high for Hürsiad  
Hürsiad  
- Board meets every 15 days; committees once a month (interview) |
|  |  |  | Hürsiad:  
- Entry 1000 YTL  
- Annual fee: 540 YTL |  
- Annual budget from dues about 300-350,000 TL in 2011; with donations up to 1 trillion in 2011  
Gapgiad:  
- Entry: 500 Dollar;  
- Annual fee: 600 TL  
- Annual budget is 120-150 milyar TL (excl. public funds); few donations (all interviews) | | |
|  |  |  | Hürsiad:  
- Board and new women’s council  
- 5 sectoral committees (textile/shoes; construction; agriculture; services; chemicals and machinery) (all interviews)  
- Gapgiad appears to have no committees  
- Both Gapgiad and Hürsiad members of federation Günsiaf and confederation Tuskon  
- Decision-making in Gaziantep (interview) | | |
4. Summary of findings

The analysis has shown how Islamic BAs have gained economic and legitimacy resources through their activities in the economic, political and civic realms. They have a very strong focus on economic activities, the resources and possibilities for which they acquire from their ties to political elites and their access to the Gülen community’s international network of branches, schools, banks, insurance companies and media companies.

Gagiad can be regarded as a club due to its focus on civic and social activities for bigger companies, which are also intended to increase inter-firm trade, albeit indirectly. Trade promotion dominates at Islamic BAs, whereas social and civic activities dominate at the secular BA.

In the political realm, the AKP has supported the growth of an Islamic business elite and their legitimacy through various ways (legal and bureaucratic; access to state information and resources; patronage networks). AKP and business elites regard collective organisation as essential to organise and legitimise political access to a group of businessmen rather than to individuals. Islamic BAs are crucial vehicles to organise pious Anatolian SMEs excluded from existing vehicles of collective action, such as secular BAs or Chambers, and increasingly to compete with these for political access. Islamic, but not secular BAs, are important vehicles for politicians to create political support, granting them several economic advantages.

Through new private organisational BA channels, and personal networks, Islamic BAs have acquired wider access to political elites mediating between the local and national levels; and thus more channels through which economic rents and legitimacy resources can flow. Secular businessmen try to achieve access either individually, or collectively by mobilising the Chambers, but not their BAs. Close ties to AKP mean that Islamic BAs have better access to information and state resources that are then distributed to its members (3.2.2.a); and that BAs provide a legitimate platform to facilitate personal patronage networks between political elites and Islamic or strategic big business (3.2.2.b). Through these mechanisms business groups and associations close to the incumbent government have made bigger profits and increased their legitimacy relative to secular outsider SMEs. However, this is an exchange system: In return this new pious business elite provides financial resources,
political support (campaign financing, providing jobs and infrastructure developments; and electoral behaviour) to AKP elites. I find little evidence for policy- and information input from Gaziantep’s business side into AKP’s policy; the focus appears to be more on creating a parallel, legitimate pious business elite. There are considerable social and business pressures associated with this inter-organisational resource exchange, and these promote institutional change. This contentious aspect and the involvement of religiously motivated civil society organisations makes this exchange different from the political support outlined in the existing literature that focuses on rational politicians’ interests in re-election and policy-making at the national level.

In the civic realm, Islamic BAs and businessmen are very active with CSR activities in line with the movement’s goals and in cooperation with the cemaat and other religiously-motivated civil society organisations: Leaders and key members of the Islamic BAs donate schools, dorms and mosques via the Gülen movement or cemaat (religious community). Gagiad is also very active in the civic realm to acquire legitimacy, but mainly conducts its civic activities in cooperation and in line with ‘older’ (pre-AKP) public institutions and no private bodies or civil society organisations. Such CSR activities increase not only public legitimacy, but provide access to network resources. Again, it is through this cooperation that Islamic BAs get access to additional economic resources that the secular BA has little access to as an organisation. For example, in addition to directly providing an international trade network, the Gülen community’s wider socio-economic network can also improve members’ financial assets and human capital. Such activities are also key to gaining public legitimacy for the cemaat’s activities. The AKP government supports Tuskon and the Gülen community’s educational efforts in direct and indirect ways, allowing their member not just access to public funds and political elites, but also to increase their public legitimacy. First, SMOs take over quasi-public functions. Second, the AKP has arguably also put in place ‘friendly’ legislation to support the Gülen community’s civic and educational engagement. As other scholars also point out, supporting the Gülen community has generated a further supporter base among the pious in Turkey’s shantytowns.

Islamic BAs were the first to organise conservative Anatolian business elites at the grassroots level and have generated strong, yet flexible inter-organisational structures to facilitate this mobilisation and political representation. It is a hybrid and
flexible structure, combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s strength at incorporating local interests that facilitates Islamic BA’s political influence. Although Gagiad also has strong organisational structures, it lacks the collective political access and centralised control that Müsiad provides to the Islamic movement.

5. Discussion

Islamic BAs have gained political influence by receiving rich economic resources and legitimacy through their ties with the AKP and the Gülen community at the local level. This chapter shows that a combination of economic activities provided through Gülen community ties and AKP ties facilitated by flexible organisational structures, has promoted the growth of a legitimate Islamic business elite. Previous chapters have shown that resonant frames based on Islam have complemented this exchange based on strong Islamic networks between business, civic and political elites.

In line with some collective action literatures, Islamic BAs engage in rent-seeking (Olson, 1971) and provide economic resources to fill institutional voids in deprived Anatolian regions (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Yafeh, 2005, 2007; Luo & Chung, 2005; Tan & Meyer, 2010). In the political realm, Islamic state-business relations are characterised by patronage (Buğra, 1994; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010, 2014). Islamic BAs also seem to provide some limited policy input (e.g. into foreign policy), and political support through voting behaviour and campaign financing, as argued in some political institutional literatures (e.g. Culpepper, 2011; Martin, 1991, 1994; Markus, 2007; Schneider, 2004).

This resource exchange goes beyond providing policy support to rational political elites at the national level and/or economic services to members. Islamic BAs’ activities encompass inter-organisational collaboration, a collective goal and indirect contention that qualify them as movement tactics, rather than as economic services to members or political services for rational politicians. While the incentive for the creation of flexible, yet strong BA organisations do originate from political elites as some BA literature has it, my analysis shows that essential power resources can also be created at the grassroots level; it also shows that religiously motivated civil society organisations can be important local providers of resources, not just state and political elites at the national levels.
This inter-organisational cooperation extends to networks, frames and activities, and also to organisational structures. Islamic BAs’ structures are characterised by a hybrid structure that is strong, resource-rich and flexible at the same time. Combining Mûsiad’s centralisation and Tûskon’s sensitivity of local interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and business interests. This is contrary to most BA literature that argues that resource-rich organisations are key, and contrary to some classic resource-mobilisation literature that argues that centralised and hierarchical organisations are key to gaining political influence.

But how does a new, legitimate, pious business elite increase political influence and how is that contentious? I argue that the grassroots level inter-organisational exchange through movement tactics has paved the way for institutional change by providing the legitimacy, resources and normalisation of Islamic practices essential to attack powerful actors in the centre. First, this collaborative resource exchange has created a new confident, compliant business elite that serves as a powerful support base, providing both financial and political support to the AKP and the Gülen community. In the business realm, a parallel pious elite has been created that can compete with existing elites in the centre, together with a new set of private and public institutions: the new powerful Islamic BAs compete with secular BAs, and their quasi-public functions in exports, state-business relations, and welfare compete with existing public institutions (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2010). For example, private BAs compete with Chambers; institutions for SMEs and foreign relations, DEIK and Kosgeb; new, flexible local public institutions compete with old, centralised ones, e.g. TOKI, City Council, Development Agencies; Gülen community Islamic BAs’ welfare activities compete with existing education and welfare systems. The availability of resource-rich and confident allies paves the way for direct confrontation with former actors in the periphery.

Second, by providing essential resources, yet making access to them dependent on providing support and following certain Islamic capitalist practices, this exchange normalises types of behaviour and practices that were previously

79 Tuskon’s trade bridges are supported by the Turkish Ministry of Economy and by the public TIM (Turkish Exporters’ Assembly, the semi-public Union of Exporters).
illegitimate. Islamic BAs and businessmen have gradually normalised a new set of Islamic codes of behaviours, norms and institutions to facilitate institutional change in the long run. For example, by promoting the Gülen community, it has provided the ground for changes in the educational realm (increasing number and legitimisation of imam hatip schools and headscarves). Additionally, Islamic BAs foster business practices and private behaviours expected of members (e.g. Islamic banking, zekat vs tax system) (see for a similar argument concerning Islamic welfare and education organisations: Agai, 2004; Göçmen, 2014; Tuğal, 2002, 2009). These are non-traditional movements insofar as they do not directly attack the state through contentious tactics, but rather apply non-contentious tactics in the economic and CSR fields through collaboration (Bakker et al., 2013). Due to multiple threats by the Kemalist establishment, Islamic movements in Turkey have transformed to apply economic and civic tactics to gradually transform the society from the bottom up, paving the way for direct state attacks and institutional change.
Chapter VII Conclusion

I start the Conclusion with short summary of findings, before discussing their contributions to the relevant literature. I then note some limitations of the present study. I finally present avenues for future research and comment on Turkey’s outlook for democratisation and economic development.

This thesis set out to explain under what conditions and in what manner Islamic BAs in Turkey have gained political influence at the expense of secular BAs. Such a study has broader implications for business collective action and political power in the context of developing and transition countries. Chapters I and II established that existing literature provides inadequate guidance on when BAs turn into political actors, and how they engage in mobilisation and broader intra-state power struggles vis-à-vis competing BAs. The literature is especially inadequate regarding the role of ideology and religion in business organisation and political power. Mainstream management literature on BAs treats them as purely rational economic institutions or rent-seeking coalitions. When accounting for BAs’ political influence, most explanations focus either on structural-institutional factors, or on political elites’ strategic policy, election and power interests. The multiple ways through which BAs may achieve political mobilisation, and the role of ideology remain ignored. This question is important because there are many settings in which competing business interests are allied with different political parties in deep intra-state power struggles. In an increasing number of Latin American and post-Ottoman countries, such intra-state power struggles also overlap with ideological cleavages. A few examples of BAs that focus on achieving certain political aims, and base their mobilisation on informal cooperation and shared ideologies, have been observed in several Latin American countries as well as in Turkey. Functional and interest-based approaches cannot explain how BAs become active agents in mobilisation and intra-state power struggles in some countries, collaborating with civil society organisations, political elites and particular business groups based on shared goals and identities; instead of on narrow input into policymaking and electoral support in return for patronage resources.

This inadequacy was addressed by developing a social movement perspective of BAs, combining political institutional and ideological variables in explaining the context, functions and consequences of BAs. Social movement theory provides a
useful extension by widening the range of actors, power resources and strategies that BAs can apply to gain political influence. I explored how ideology and religion have entered the strategies and success of BAs to gain political influence, based on an in-depth comparative case study of Turkey’s BAs. By studying the dynamics of religious organisational forms and their influences on broader processes at large, I aim to extend the BA and organisational literatures overall, where such processes are little understood (Tracey, 2012).

Based on social movement literature, I first analysed the political opportunity structures and institutional environment of Turkish BAs (Chapter III, part 2). I then compared secular and Islamic BAs’ informal inter-organisational networks among business, civic and political elites (Chapter IV), their framing activities (Chapter V), and their resource exchanges to achieve political power (Chapter VI). This analysis was based on a case study of Gaziantep, a new pious industrial centre in the former periphery of central- and south-eastern Anatolia.

1. Summary of findings and argument

The analysis in Chapter III showed that state threats have played a key role in shaping BAs’ mobilisation tactics, but all POS developed in the movement literature are relevant. State threats were never complete (Bianchi, 1984), but instead periods of threats alternated with periods of encouragement for Islamic actors, providing important opportunities for political access – access and threats being two of the POS established in the political process literature. In spite of the repeated military interventions and because of the incomplete nature of oppression, Islamic actors have managed to increase their access over time and to create new powerful allies (a third key POS). This has been made possible through their efficient grassroots mobilisation, and Turkey’s gradual integration into international markets and decentralisation, both of which have provided new tools outside of state control. The perceived access and new range of resources and allies enabled them to come to power in the 2000s because of the electoral volatility and de-legitimisation of existing parties and elites. Electoral volatility, or rather ‘shifting political alignments’, as well as divisions amongst elites, are two further POS that also apply in the Turkish case.

The network analysis of Chapter IV compared whether, and how, Islamic and secular BAs have created cohesive networks with political and civic elites at the
local level. The analysis shows that Islamic BAs have gradually created strong, yet
diverse local networks that bring together political and civic elites at the grassroots
level. The route to political influence has been to catch up with the secular BA in the
extent of cohesion and civic ties, and to overtake them in diversity, as well as in the
extent of political integration. Above all, Islamic BAs have managed to bring
together these different types of relationship layers and actors.

Chapter V showed important differences between secular and Islamic BAs’
collective action frames. I studied frames’ resonance or mobilisation quality by
analysing how complete, coherent and specific they are, and how well they are
adapted to their cultural-ideological environment. I find that, first, the Islamic frame
is more complete than the secular frame, since it adheres to all three framing tasks.
The Islamic frame is also more coherent, although it is not very specific. In the
Islamic frame, there is a problem-, goal- and collective identity- identification,
motivating supporters to collective action by appealing to worthy, Islamic principles.
The secular frame lacks the identification of a shared problem, yet formulates
strategies for business socialisation and civic activities. These differences, in frame
coherence and completeness, increase the Islamic frame’s resonance vis-à-vis the
secular frame. Most importantly, the frames differ in they ways in which they
incorporate ideology. The usage of secularism or Kemalism in the secular frame is
muted and does not extend far beyond references in BA material and values based on
(regional) nationalism. The Islamic frame successfully constructs a non-contentious
capitalist Islamic value system that informs all aspects of that frame and is amplified
throughout. Islamic resonant frames raise topics that are relevant to participants and
all SMOs, and utilise familiar cultural narratives grounded in Islam. I illustrated how
such differences in resonance influence the public legitimacy and internal solidarity
of movement actors, and thereby influence their political power.

Chapter VI analysed the kinds of activities and tactics through which Islamic
vs secular BAs have gained political influence. Economic activities provided
through Gülen community ties (export and trade promotion through international
branches; Islamic bank and insurance, human capital) and AKP ties (legitimisation,
export promotion, access to public banks), further facilitated by flexible
organisational structures, have together combined to create new powerful
organisations, and a new, legitimate pious middle class in the former periphery of
Anatolian industrial districts. Islamic BAs’ organisational structures are
characterised by hybrid structures, which are strong, resource-rich and flexible at the same time. Combining Müsiad’s centralisation and Tuskon’s sensitivity to local interests across organisations has facilitated the integration of political, civic and business interests across the network of SMOs. This resource exchange is collaborative in that Islamic BAs provide financial resources and political support for these SMOs in return. However, there are important costs for members of Islamic BAs who have to adjust, if not so inclined, their private behaviour, political opinions and business practices in line with the movement’s understanding of capitalist Islam. This is partly achieved through social pressure, and is required of members in order to access essential resources. This involves a set of practices and behaviour encompassing the private realm (praying, abstaining from alcohol, headscarves, cemaat newspaper etc.), and the business realm (e.g. paying ‘zekat’, interest-free banking, choice of business partners), including stakeholder relations (organising pilgrimages, providing prayer rooms, time for prayers).

I argue that Islamic BAs gained political influence because they combined a broad range of resources and actors by applying typical social movement tactics that are grounded in the cultural-ideological environment and adapted to the political context. Conditions of high politico-religious contention and threats, combined with gradual globalisation, have encouraged businesspeople in the periphery to collaborate with other vulnerable Islamic actors in informal networks. They also encouraged them to build up resources in these networks through alternative market- and civic- based means complemented by resonant framing and flexible organisational structures, tactics that have escaped state control and threats. This non-contentious, market-based collaboration grounded in Islam, is coherently applied in Islamic BAs’ tactics that reinforce each other – in their networks, frames and resource exchanges. By building strong, informal networks with civic and political elites, Islamic businessmen have gained access to economic resources and legitimacy not provided by the central state. Resonant frames grounded in a capitalist, non-contentious Islam and flexible organisational structures, complement such economic activities and informal networks. Tactics grounded in religion have increased Islamic BAs’ political influence by providing a source of solidarity and the public legitimacy necessary to support the growth of a new business elite through resource-exchange among diverse actors in the periphery. This exchange is contentious insofar as it is
supports wider movement interests and organisations, and paves the way for disruption and institutional change.

More specifically, my argument has four parts devoted to the four different movement aspects essential for political influence: grasping political opportunity structures; developing embedded networks; developing collective action frames; and supporting such collaboration with rich resources and suitable organisational structures. Based on these findings, I argue that the political influence of Islamic BAs is due to their grasping POS at the right time and adapting their tactics to the political and cultural environments. State threats have played a key role in giving Islamic actors an incentive to develop a non-contentious, market- and CSR- based repertoire that is grounded in a capitalist Islam. Gradual decentralisation and globalisation act as important boundary conditions for the development of these successful tactics.

Tapping into embedded networks is another condition of successful social movements. Islamic BAs have built informal venues for collaboration and political mobilisation where alternatives were closed off. They have managed to attract important political elites and powerful civic actors, while also to diversifying their ties to secular organisations. I hold that it is not the network structure per se that has provided advantages, but rather the inventive adjustment to the political and cultural context. The political context had forbidden cooperation between political elites and civil society, and thus conditioned a ‘structural hole’ that Islamic BAs have gradually captured. Threats from the state increased the incentives for, and advantages of, building strong collaborative grassroots networks among Islamic actors in the political, civic and business realms that serve as alternative platforms for the building of solidarity, political mobilisation and resource exchange.

The completeness and amplification of Islam within Islamic BAs’ increases their internal solidarity and public legitimacy, thereby facilitating collective action. Frames interact with other social movement tactics in these processes, with the potential to reinforce or undermine them. Resonant framing can facilitate collective action by increasing solidarity to hold together networks among SMOs, and by giving meaning and legitimacy to BA activities and tactics. Islamic BA’s framing complements the grassroots networks of business, civic and political actors by creating internal solidarity through shared goals and identities. By constructing a non-contentious, capitalist Islam, Islamic BAs have incorporated the interests of all
SMOs involved. Additionally, by building frames based on Islam and public issues, Islamic BAs build up legitimacy. The amplification of Islam complements Islamic BAs’ economic activities aimed at creating a new, legitimate pious business elite to displace existing secular elites. Frames have to create appropriate, worthy ‘repertoires of contention’ to gain support. The non-contentious aspect of the Islamic frame, focusing on creating a new, pious business elite, is highly adaptive to a threatening Kemalist state, while the incorporation of religion is attractive to the conservative constituency. The combination of exclusion with a non-contentious Islam is particularly powerful in the face of violent military and state threats, and is well adapted to the cultural-ideological environment.

The analysis of the resource exchange and activities of Islamic BAs shows how Islamic BAs’ tactics reinforce one another by being based on a coherent and non-contentious type of capitalist Islam and collaboration among SMOs. Islamic BAs’ activities and resource exchanges are in line with framing by adhering to the defined goals and tactics, and facilitated by networks across SMOs. Islamic BAs receive resources of legitimacy and economic resources through their networks with political and civic elites, to build a new pious business elite with public legitimacy – a key goal of Islamic BAs. Yet Islamic businessmen also return financial and political support. The Islamic movement’s resource exchange is indirectly contentious, promoting movement organisations and goals. First, this mutual resource exchange creates interlocking dependencies and continued support. Second, it creates parallel Islamic organisations and institutions that are aimed to supplant existing institutions. Thereby such seemingly non-political services in the civic and economic realm provide sources of political power for the whole Islamic movement. Third, the provision of such resources is largely limited toward co-religionists and requires compliance with certain Islamic civic, business and private codes of behaviour and institutions. These were previously illegitimate and aim to restructure Kemalist state institutions.

In contrast, the secular BA’s elitism is reflected in its network, activities and frames, which qualify it as a ‘club’ rather than movement. I find that the association does not focus on economic activities, but on CSR and socialisation activities to create friendship and solidarity among large business-owners internally, and public legitimacy externally. Similarly, the network analysis showed that the secular BA has not cooperated with a popular civil society organisation, but have forged ties
with elitist secular clubs and the semi-public Chambers of Industry and Trade. Political elites of the secular coalition were more likely to be members of such elite clubs, rather than of the BA, showing the reduced focus on political integration via the secular BA. This is reflected in the fact that Islamic BAs overtook the secular BA in political integration during the formative years of the new moderately Islamic and capitalist AKP. This has reduced members’ access to economic resources today, unless they become strategic and join Islamic BAs. Combined with their incoherent collective identity and the focus on nationalism and elitism in their collective action frame, this has resulted in a gradual loss of political ties, economic power and public legitimacy compared to Islamic BAs.

2. Literature contribution

I established that in the BA literature little is known about how BAs engage in broad political struggles: Under what conditions do they become part of broader intra-state conflicts and how do they build up political power over competing business organisations? The role of ideology and religious groups in the processes of generating political power has been particularly neglected, although it is key for many transition economies with broad cleavages that bring ideology to the fore in political mobilisation. I propose that this inadequacy can be addressed by combining political-entrepreneurship with social movement approaches.

Both the political-entrepreneurship and social movement literatures share a concern with collective action that is directed to achieve political influence for a constituency. Both political approaches to BAs, and the political process models of social movements, give primacy to political contexts and state actors in shaping the mobilisation tactics of civil society organisations. The former focuses on strategic political, state and BA elites, and tactics based on strong organisational structures and formal policy-exchanges. In return for access to state information and resources, rational businesspeople are assumed to organise and exchange resources in formal channels. A social movement approach extends the conventional boundaries of BAs by studying them as embedded organisations. Schmitter and Streeck’s (1999) framework mentions the category of BAs as movements. These are BAs that predominantly formulate goals and seek to have influence by exerting pressure on
public authorities for public goods.\textsuperscript{80} In order to become political actors, such BAs are required to build a sense of solidarity, and organisational structures to impose discipline. Additionally, to exercise influence, collective actors have to be able to formulate goals in terms of commonly accepted values in the public interest to gain legitimacy. Some of these processes are similar to collective action frames in social movements and relate to further discussions of what effective social movement organisations are. However, this category is not developed without explanation for how and why such BAs with movement characteristics might emerge and without mentioning ideological variables. I aim to develop such a category further.

First, my framework adds ideological institutions to the study of contexts through the concept of POS, which condition the relevant range of actors, power resources and tactics. Secondly, it extends the range of relevant actors in BAs’ organisational fields, and the tactics and resources of power to include ideology and religion. This suggestion is based on my findings that show that Islamic BAs political influence originates from their alignment with, and exchanges with, the broader moderately Islamic movement beyond the organisational limits of BAs. I find that conditions of politico-religious contention have given incentives for Islam to enter Islamic BAs’ tactics in a complementary fashion; in their frames (through the use of Islam); through networks (cooperation with Islamic civil society organisations); and by means of activities and tactics (promoting a new pious business elite and Islamic norms and behaviours). Ideology and religion can increase BAs’ political influence by supporting members’ economic growth, by complementing business-related activities in BAs’ embedded networks with sources of public legitimacy and facilitating collective action through building solidarity. Religious groups, and not just political or state elites, can be important providers of economic resources and legitimacy for BAs.

With regard to my first point, concerning the institutional context, conventional BA theory has neglected the role of the ideological context and how it affects BAs’ political mobilisation. Existing literature has focused on vulnerable political and state elites and their need for support from powerful business interests.

\textsuperscript{80} Activities like encouraging participation of their membership, providing services to them or developing control of membership, are less important in BAs that act as social movements (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999).
against either internal or external competitors. This vulnerability is profound in a number of transition countries that have been struggling to transform from military dictatorships and closed authoritarian regimes to democratic and neoliberal systems. In Turkey state threats from the centre have similarly created vulnerable political actors and complex intra-state struggles. However, these threats additionally overlap with ideological cleavages between Kemalist state structures as well as elites, and the conservative civil society in the periphery, including civic, political and business actors. The centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin, 1969, 1973) that overlaps with the secular-Islamist and left-right continuum, is the key institutional change that has shaped BAs’ mobilisation tactics. I refer to the collection of those changes as politico-religious contention. It has given incentives for collaborative business mobilisation and brought ideology and religion to the fore in political mobilisation at large. Islamic BAs have developed an effective set of tactics adapted to the threatening political, and conservative cultural environments. This is a non-contentious, market- and CSR- based repertoire in the periphery, which is grounded in a capitalist Islam, and in collaboration with other Islamic actors. This is in line with Tarrow’s (2011) assertion that cultural and ideological symbols become important where struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society.

The proposed social movement framework extends not only the types of institutional incentives and intra-state conflicts that encourage businesspeople to engage in contentious politics, but also the range of tactics and actors that BAs apply to include ideological and political factors. The analysis shows that economic resources and legitimacy cannot only be provided by state elites at the national level, but also in collaboration with religiously motivated civil society organisations at the local level. While the incentive for the creation of flexible, yet strong BA organisations do originate from political elites as some BA literature has it, essential power resources can also be created at the grassroots level and feed up. Especially when traditional means of political mobilisation are cut off, BAs can adopt alternative informal movement tactics in collaboration with civil society organisations in the peripheries of power. Other important work in the area of networks and industrial districts argues that the local and organisational levels are crucial arenas for political and economic change (Sabel, 1999; Safford, 2009; Saxenian, 1994). For example, Safford’s (2009) historical institutional analysis argues that the locus of economic or political change is not only located in national-
level institutions, even in state-dominated varieties of capitalism, but feed down to the organisational level in regional industrial districts. The author argues that the sources of regional economic growth lie in the micro-level networks of state and non-state actors at the local level, shaping the availability of leadership and unifying platforms of political engagement.

My second point in this context is that these tactics go beyond those developed in the political entrepreneurship literature that focus on providing information and policy support to rational political elites, through strong organisational structures that aggregate and control business interests. When BAs get embroiled in political-ideological struggles, this dynamic can feed down to the grassroots level to civic actors. Islamic BAs have ‘tapped into embedded networks’ (Tarrow, 2011), by building strong and informal coalitions with civil society organisations and political elites at the local level, and built up important resources through such collaboration. Common political goals and identities based on Islam and feelings of exclusion, built up in collective action frames have played a key role in supporting this resource exchange. This shows that the political access of BAs is not just based on narrow and strategic interests, but on broader shared politico-religious struggles, which can take place in informal networks at the local level.

Islamic BAs have gained political influence by receiving rich economic resources and legitimacy through their networks with the AKP and the Gülen community at the local level. Providing legitimacy to activities and solidarity in networks are two important ways through which ideology or religion can improve the power-generation tactics of BAs; and civil society organisations can be key providers of these. I find that worthy and relevant shared identities and goals have united actors in diverse networks, by providing a source of solidarity, and motivated them to act in the name of legitimate, pure and religious aims. Accordingly, the boundaries of BAs have to be extended to include relevant organisations in their organisational fields and context-specific tactics grounded in ideology and religion. This is especially relevant in environments where ideology plays a large role in political mobilisation and party systems.

These tactics are successful because they are adapted to the cultural-ideological and political contexts and based on a goal-oriented collaboration and shared identities.
The established non-contentious tactics do not only escape state control and threats as they are based in the market economy, private and civic spheres, but also because they are based in the periphery – the previously poor regions of central and south-eastern Anatolia. Above all, these tactics are grounded in the cultural environment, developing a socio-economic type of Islam throughout all tactics. This is in line with a specific model of the political process framework. Political mediation models of social movements argue that ‘challengers need to alter strategies and forms to address specific political contexts’, such as the partisan regime in power (Amenta, 2006; Amenta et al., 2010, p. 299, 2002, 1992). The more tactics fit the political circumstances or POS and the interests of institutional political actors, the more likely are they to be successful. Asserting an interaction between POS and successful tactics is a useful addition to the BA literature where dominant approaches argue that political interests are mainly served by organisationally strong BAs and their participation in formal policy channels at the national level. A political mediation model rather argues that the effectiveness of BA tactics for political support can go beyond such mechanisms, depending on the context.

On the basis of such findings, I suggest the inclusion of a larger variety of relevant actors in BAs’ organisational fields, and of a wider range of power tactics, depending on different institutional incentives and constraints. Different contexts condition different types of tactics to successfully provide political support. Such an economic sociology approach regards BAs as embedded and shaped by social ties, ideological institutions and political contexts at both the regional and national levels – Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) termed these structural, cultural and political embeddedness. All of these social structures powerfully shape the types of opportunities, constraints, and organisational patterns that businesspeople and BAs face as they seek political and economic advancement (Granovetter, 1973, 1985). Through such a study I aim to make a contribution to the BA literature by showing how religion and contention can enter the activities and tactics of power-building efforts of BAs.

Social movement theory focuses particularly on collective action outside of established institutional channels, as long as it is goal-oriented, aiming to challenge or defend authority. Social movements are defined as ‘collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity, outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is
institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part’ (Snow et al., 2004). Traditionally, interest groups and established organisations such as political parties are not regarded as movements, although they can be part of movements. In the Turkish case Islamic BAs collaborate with political parties and a specific religious movement.

Focusing on how resource-poor groups mobilise and gain power, social movement research has developed a rich account of how groups who lack political power can generate resources at the periphery. I hold that this literature can apply to interest groups such as BAs where they collaborate with other resource-poor organisations, lack political influence and resources, and aim to achieve contentious goals. Islamic BAs’ activities encompass inter-organisational collaboration, a collective goal and identity based on Islam, and indirect contention that qualify them as movement tactics, rather than as economic services to members or political services for rational politicians.

The fact that not only state institutions, but also religious institutions can serve as important sources of legitimacy and economic power has been established in social movement theory. Religious groups and organisations have been dubbed ‘crucibles of social movements’ (Zald & McCarthy, 1998, p. 24). For example, Proffitt and Spicer’s (2006) study of shareholder activism over 35 years reveals that religious organisations were behind around 60% of the more than 2000 shareholder proposals in the US on topics relating to international human rights and labour standards. The tactics for gaining political influence go beyond providing policy support to rational political elites at the national level, as described in political-entrepreneurship literatures, and/or economic services to members, as described in collective action literatures. The observed tactics in Turkey also go beyond contentious and directly disruptive tactics identified in the traditional political process framework of social movements. These are non-traditional movements insofar as they do not directly attack the state through contentious tactics, but rather apply non-contentious tactics in the economic and civic spheres through collaboration (Bakker et al., 2013). Due to multiple threats by the Kemalist establishment, Islamic movements in Turkey have transformed to apply economic and civic tactics to gradually transform the society from the bottom up. Islamic BAs have gained political influence by fostering a pious, legitimate business elite. The seemingly non-contentious activities of increasing the business exporter base of
Anatolian SMEs in the periphery by providing a trust-base, contacts, financial resources and information, is part of the moderately Islamic movement’s goal of creating a new pious business elite.

But how does a new, legitimate, pious business elite increase political influence and how is that contentious, even indirectly? I argue that the grassroots level inter-organisational exchange through movement tactics, has paved the way for institutional change, by providing the legitimacy, resources and normalisation of Islamic practices essential to attack powerful actors in the centre. Firstly, this collaborative resource exchange has created a new, confident, compliant business elite that serves as a powerful support base, providing both financial and political support to the AKP and the Gülen community. This increases the economic power and legitimacy of all parties involved. In the business realm, a parallel pious elite has been created that can compete with existing elites in the centre, together with a new set of private and public institutions. Above all, this exchange normalises types of behaviour that were previously illegitimate. Islamic BAs and businessmen have gradually normalised a new set of Islamic codes of behaviours, norms and institutions to facilitate institutional change in the long run.

In the early political process and resource mobilisation approaches, social movement actors were assumed to make strategic use of contingent opportunities provided by the political structure to mobilise constituencies, and to target the state in order to reform institutions. Identities and frames were viewed as resources that rational and strategic actors make use of and that may be transformed as a result of mobilisation (McAdam et al., 2001). The focus of mobilisation was on state actors and contentious, non-institutionalised tactics, which ‘excludes collective claims-making focused on affirmation of identity from his definition of repertoires of contention’ (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 266). More recent political process approaches assert a more dynamic process of tactics. Claimants contend not only through known repertoires but can ‘expand them by creating innovations at their margins’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.11), creating a mix of tactics. Tarrow (2011) differentiates between conventional or contained (e.g. lobbying, press conferences, elections, but also established forms such as strikes and demonstrations), and disruptive and violent
protest actions. These continue to exclude, however, collaborative and indirect forms of contention that go beyond ‘symbolic and peaceful forms of disruption’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.102). The ‘new social movement’ literature (Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1985, 1989; Touraine, 1981), by contrast, highlights the importance of transforming everyday life and identities for social movements and the generation of power. Melucci (1989), and Touraine (1981) argue that the set of beliefs, symbols and values, with the goals of restructuring everyday life practices, should be the focus of analysis as they are not only tools towards, but also the goals of some movements.

The modern Islamic movement in Turkey, however, has combined indirect socio-economic and private forms of contention with disruptive aims. In connecting these two approaches to movements, more recent literature suggests that tactics can range from contentious to non-contentious, and from attacking state or cultural authority through collaboration and/or confrontation (Bakker et al., 2013). Especially when it comes to studying the political influence of BAs it can be expected that with their increasing institutionalisation that a larger range of non-contentious and market-based activities are employed (e.g. lobbying, campaign financing). My study therefore also contributes to social movement theory by providing an empirical example of how indirect contention in the market- and civic realms can achieve social movement goals. The political process approach of social movements would not regard such market- and -identity based, collaborative tactics as a form of contention.

Such a combination of contentious and non-contentious, rational and ideological accounts is particularly relevant under conditions of threat, where direct contentious activities may be impossible, and where religion enters contention. Under such circumstances, ideological power is required to challenge authorities and to build up legitimacy, and the collective affirmation of new values, practices, and

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81 ‘Disruption is the common coin of contentious politics and is the source of the innovations that make social movements creative and sometimes dangerous’. The most dramatic forms, violent ones, are the easiest to initiate, but under normal circumstances, they are limited to small groups with few resources who are willing to exact damage and risk repression. The opposite forms, contained ones, offer the advantage of building on routines that people understand and that elites will accept or even facilitate. This is the source of its numeric predominance in the repertoire, but also of its institutionalization and lack of excitement. The third set of forms, disruptive ones, break with routine, startle bystanders, and leave elites disoriented, at least for a time.’ (Tarrow, 2011, p. 99)
identities can become an important goal of movement activity. Ideology and religion enter tactics ‘especially when struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society’, as ‘bringing people together around inherited cultural symbols’ becomes even more important (Tarrow, 2011, p.29).

Some students of Islamic movements in Turkey similarly argue that the Turkish case provides a curious combination of ideological and rational resources, and of contentious and non-contentious tactics (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003). Yavuz (2003) finds that Turkey’s modern Islamic movement can be categorised as a new social movement as it seeks to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, education and economic spheres. Tuğal (2002, 2009), relying on a Gramscian approach, also argues that the early Islamic social movement in Turkey did not directly challenge the state. However, the author regards these tactics as ultimately disruptive as they aim at a long-term transformation through the creation of new ‘counter-hegemony’ in the cultural realm, in collective identities, habits and everyday life practices that pave the way for direct state challenges. Tuğal’s study relies on ethnography of the Islamist movement in Istanbul, but does not analyse Islamic BAs. I apply the author’s framework to argue that Islamic BAs have gained political influence by applying seemingly non-contentious Islamic tactics in the economic and CSR spheres in collaboration with the Gülen community and AKP elites. I argue that the creation of a new pious business elite through Islamic BAs is part of this set of non-contentious tactics in the economic realm. Such an argument is also supported by two other in-depth studies that find that the Gülen community has ‘two faces’ in that it displays tolerance and pluralism and the public sphere, but promotes ‘pious uniformity and rigid morality in domestic and communal sites’, for example, gender segregation, punishment of adultery, traditional gender roles and inequality, and other restrictions in individual liberties (Turam, 2007). The community’s public image may present a progressive, tolerant and pluralist image by focusing on knowledge, education, science and international commerce, which however, under-represents its Islamic face and faith-based activities (Turam, 2007; Agai, 2004).

The study of Turkey’s BAs may have implications for the study of BAs in other transition economies, in which economic development has been driven by strong states cut off from civil society, that at the same time suffer from a low
capacity (Buğra, 1994; Evans, 1996; Woolcock, 1998). Civil society and business in particular can become an active part in such intra-state conflicts where state and/or political elites are particularly vulnerable. This is often the case in countries, which are in the process of transformation from strong authoritarian and military regimes, creating conflicts between old and new political institutions and elites. Especially where such conflicts additionally overlap with ideological, ethnic or other social cleavages, cultural and ideological symbols form an important part of political mobilisation and business politics.

This is for example the case in some countries that share an Ottoman heritage of a strong centre-periphery cleavage that additionally overlaps with the cleavage between Islamists and Secularists. A new middle class that is blending ‘Islamic piety and capitalist fervor’ (Nasr, 2010, p. 11) has been developing in the Middle East over the last few decades. This has led Islamism to partly turn into ‘a bourgeois movement consisting mostly of middle-class professionals, businessmen, shopkeepers, petty merchants and traders’ (Gerges, 2013, p. 407). The growth of an Islamic finance and banking sector worldwide is testimony to this process. The politicisation of religious identity is not unique to Turkey and the ‘Turkish experience is regarded as prototypical in the process of modernisation’ as the ‘Kemalist ideology of modernization and nation-building was imitated in the experiences of other developing Muslim countries like Tunisia (Bourgubaism), Iran (Pahlavism), Egypt (Nasserism) and Indonesia (Pancasila)’ (Yavuz, 2003, p. 7). The Turkish experience may have implications for these countries in the future if they progress on their gradual democratisation and liberalisation processes. Turkey’s experiences have so far remained unique in comparison with the violent struggles of most Middle Eastern countries such as Algeria, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s diversified and competitive business environment, and its comparatively early transition to multi-party politics since the 1950, which has offered different, business-focused venues of political mobilisation to Turkish Islamists, in a way that is very different from the violent struggles of the Middle East. In Egypt, even before the Arab Spring, economic liberalisation had been limited compared to the Turkish experience (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009). Religious states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran (Westerlund & Hallencreutz, 1996) cannot usefully be compared to Turkey’s de jure parliamentary democracy. However, the Turkish experience may have implications for their future development. Currently, Indonesia has undergone a
similar process of moderating Islam with an increasing growth of a Muslim middle class (Hefner, 2011). Ideology and mass mobilisation among businessmen is also prevalent in some Latin American countries such as Argentina’s Peronism (cf. Chapter I).

3. Potential limitations

There are several potential limitations to this study. Sparse network data and the highly polarised environment made a study of the role of religion very difficult, both in interviews as well as in data access. This also applies to political affiliations, but to a lesser extent, as such data are more readily available. The first limitation of the network coding is therefore that for earlier time periods, especially civil society, but also political affiliation data were more limited than for the 2004–2012 period, which may underestimate civic integration, and to a lesser extent political integration in the 1990s. Because affiliation with the Gülen or any other religious movement is a highly contentious issue, the present data may especially underestimate civic-Islamic memberships in the early 1990s. Additionally, movement-level actor-by-actor networks are sparse. That is mainly due to the strict coding excluding companies with fewer affiliations that cannot be clearly categorised; it is also an effect of the sparse data for early time periods. However, a strict coding system gives the findings more validity. The fact that political and civic integration may be underestimated only means that the patterns found may be even stronger in reality. The weaker civic Islamic integration of the early time periods might be a result of lacking data. That does not change the fact that civic integration remains strong in the secular coalition. It’s unlikely that additional data would change the differential between the two subgroups to a large extent.

I aimed to increase the validity of my findings through the following strategies. First, all my findings are interpreted in relation to each other rather than in absolute terms. Findings about the Islamic movement only make sense in relation to the secular coalition, which serves almost as a ‘control group’. Second, in the network analysis the combination of visualisation and descriptive data allows identifying patterns between groups and across time, giving the emerging hypotheses validity. Third, the integration of archival and interview data with network data provides further validity through a triangulation of data sources. In spite of sparse
and hard-to-access data, a consistent and valid pattern has emerged across various data sources and movement tactics.

The present research focuses on generating hypotheses of a new phenomenon that is hard to access. Most importantly, a qualitative network approach relies on refining datasets and hypotheses until a clearer picture emerges to extend existing theory, rather than to test theory. In a future study, the hypotheses from this PhD may be tested or expanded on another sample of holding groups, for which more public data are available (e.g. limiting the datasets to companies registered at the Istanbul Stock Exchange). Accordingly, I transform and refine my initial network data to generate more in-depth hypotheses about Anatolian capital based on business’ affiliations. In order to make sure that differences in subgroups are not a result of differences in re-coding, transformation rules were applied consistently to both subgroups. Critics may argue that there is circularity in transforming networks based on affiliations (which is done to arrive at subgroup-level networks), and then studying the resultant affiliations. An alternative approach to such network transformations could have been to use an external criterion to categorise business groups as either Islamic, Secular or Mixed. For example, a survey could be used to determine attitudes toward contentious issues to categorise members as belonging to either subgroup rather than relying on membership data for such categorisations. In the highly polarised political environment of the present study, this was not, however, possible, as it was hardly possible to raise such issues in interviews, let alone in a survey.

In spite of the increasing competition and gradual displacement in Gaziantep, it appears that the polarisation between the secular and Islamic subgroups in Gaziantep is not as extreme as in other cities. BA representatives were not keen on criticising the other BAs in the city and largely remained respectful. This is probably the case because of the presence of the Konukoğlu family, the head of the large Sanko holding group, who plays an integrating leadership role in the city through its large presence in the Chambers and other local and national institutions. This has also been observed by Buğra and Savaşkan (2012), who regard the polarisation, especially in Kayseri, to be more extreme because of the absence of such integrative leadership. The Chambers in Antep, albeit contested, still serve as unifying forums and the leadership of a few companies that remain above politics, keep large
hostilities at bay. As a result, the differences between the two movements might be stronger and more clearly differentiated in more polarised city cases.

Finally, the selection of textile cluster companies may cause a limitation to the generalisation of results to other industries. Although there might be differences between industries, the mobilisation of Islamic BAs takes place across all sectors, and I would argue that Gaziantep’s textile industry reflects a valid company sample of these tactics. The focus on one industry was chosen to rule out industry-specific effects of task- and production-requirements. If at all, the textile sector may underestimate the extent of political mobilisation, because textiles is generally not considered to be an industry where political connections are as important as in telecommunications or construction (e.g. less permits required).

In spite of such potential limitations, we can still conclude that Islamic BAs’ political influence originates from their application of typical social movement tactics, combining political and civic elites at the grassroots level, and their economic activities with resonant framing grounded in Islam. These non-contentious tactics have generated a new pious business elite with the necessary resources, legitimacy and support base to compete with, and gradually displace secular elites.

4. Further research and outlook for Turkey
The above research could be complemented by a comparative case study of companies, tracking the growing and declining political influence of secular and Islamic businessmen across time. Further information on company economic performance and background would be required for such an analysis. These more easily available for large holding companies registered at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and thus findings could be assessed studying the effect of affiliation on this new sample. The current fallout between the Gülen community and the AKP also provides the opportunity to study how the change from cooperation to competition affects the business community. Are there changing alliances and tactics of Islamic BAs and what is the reaction of secular BAs? Furthermore, a comparative case study could further develop the conditions under which BAs with social movement characteristics emerge, and why some rise to political influence while others don’t. Useful comparative cases would be transition economies with vulnerable political systems and a history of military interventions, varying the extent of ideological/religious cleavages in society. Latin American cases such as
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, Indonesia and/or Malaysia, India and South Korea are possible comparative cases.

This thesis on Turkey’s state-business relations and their power generation has implications for Turkey’s democratic consolidation. The adequate representation of business is a core concern of several major theories of democratic consolidation. Some even argued that in Latin America democracy could only be consolidated where elites’ interests were effectively protected either through electorally strong political parties or through direct influence of elite groups (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). In Chile, Colombia and Mexico, strong and encompassing BAs contributed in some instances to macroeconomic stabilisation, coordinated policy reform, trade negotiations and other aspects of economic governance (Schneider, 2004). Throughout Turkey’s modern history, narrow patronage-based elite networks have dominated the business environment. A more encompassing input of the collective interests of businessmen irrespective of partisanship would mean a significant improvement in the democratic consolidation and economic development of the country. The question then is, will the current state-business relations repeat past patterns of corrupt business cycles (Zürcher, 2004) in a different guise? Or will they be a force for economic development and democracy?

On the positive side, the AKP administration has overseen a decade of economic growth and promoted development in previously neglected regions. A new middle class has emerged. This trajectory is evident in GDP growth rates, the increasing rates of construction and improvements to infrastructure, local services, healthcare, and a larger number of universities. Greater religious freedoms and the increased civilian control of the military were also reforms welcomed by the pious middle class. In spite of all these positive economic developments, it appears that the Islamic movement has continued Turkey’s fate of ‘corruption cycles’, in addition to increasing polarisation and authoritarianism. With the Gezi Park protests and the graft probes, numerous examples of corruption involving the AKP and Gülen community have resurfaced. This Çalık Group, a holding run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law, is a perfect example of this. This Group ‘made much of its initial money in the notoriously impenetrable and repressive state of Turkmenistan in the 1990s, as the country emerged from Soviet collapse, and the country’s first dictatorial president, Turkmenbashi, began to be courted by Gülen elites, who curried his favor by
translating Ruhama, his “sacred writings,” into Turkish.’ In turn, Çalık Group is a major stakeholder of the Gülen-affiliated Bank Asya, which has been booming until recently thanks to AKP support for Islamic banking (Rodeheffer, 2013).

I have argued that the social movement tactics of the Islamic movement have paved the ground for real institutional changes. Indeed there have been several ‘reforms’ of Kemalist institutions to promote greater ‘religious freedoms’. For example, in the educational realm, religious ‘imam hatip’ schools have recently been put to the same status as public state schools (Dombey, 2012; Yinanç, 2014). This has also led to a boom in building or transforming regular schools into imam hatip schools. Additionally, wearing a headscarf is now permitted in public schools and most public institutions (outside of the military and judiciary). Education and the headscarf issues have been two important areas of contention for the moderately Islamic movement. In the economic realm, Islamic banking has grown. ‘Bank Asya, the Islamic bank formed by Gülenists with less than $1 million in start-up capital in 1996, is now one of Turkey’s ten largest banks, reaching $14 billion in assets by 2012 while benefiting from the support that the AKP has given to Islamic banking (and a bank in which the founder [Prime Minister Erdoğan’s son-in-law’s] of Çalık group is a major stakeholder).’ Until the recent falling-out between the AKP and Gülen community, the latter has arguably had a large impact on Turkey’s foreign policy, which promoted friendlier relations with Middle Eastern neighbours (Kirişci, 2011; Öniş, 2011, p. 56; Özvarış, 2013). The Islamic movement has also decreased the power of traditional secular strongholds, such as the military, and increased its own presence in the judiciary, police and the office of the Presidency. Gülen

82 Several reforms to the educational system have been enacted. The so-called ‘4+4+4’ school system replaced the current eight uninterrupted years of primary school education. The change allows children aged 10-14 to attend specialist religious schools, known as imam hatip schools’ (Dombey, 2012), and allow their graduates universal access to all universities. Originally imam hatip schools served to train the Islamic clergy, but they now teach the national curriculum, albeit with a heavier focus on religious education.

83 Imam hatip schools have increased in number by 73% between 2010 and 2011, showing the AKP’s political and bureaucratic support, whereas a large number of general high schools were shut down or transformed. It is provincial directors at the local level responsible for making such opening/transformation decisions, showing once more the local roots of the moderately Islamic movement (Yinanç, 2014). And while there is no gender segregation in public schools, increasingly new vocational schools and imam hatip schools practice some form of gender segregation (e.g. separate floors/buildings in imam hatip schools; separate dorms in vocational schools) (Özgür, 2012, pp. 90–91).
community followers have gradually taken key positions within the police and judiciary (Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins, & Schenkkan, 2014; Dombey, 2013), and the military has been brought under greater civilian control. With the current AKP-Gülen falling-out, the government has removed prosecutors and police officials it deemed too close to the Islamic cleric and replaced it with its own sympathisers, besides increasingly bringing the judiciary under control of the executive in general.

I suggest that the direction this Islamisation will take depends to a large extent on external forces, and the interests of foreign powers in the continuing Arab uprising, which has once again put Turkey in a key geopolitically strategic position for ‘Western’ powers. Internally, although business is not expected to be a force for greater democratisation, the new pious middle classes would not support a departure from liberal market economies toward a state-controlled Islamist state and economy. Anatolian capital’s political preferences and support for the AKP crucially depend on continued economic growth and political stability, and so does the AKP’s continued electoral success. Although they may continue to support a greater Islamisation of the country with increasingly conservative and authoritarian reforms, the group studied is mainly interested in upward economic and social mobility rather than creating an Islamic state. In a sense the the proposed changes to secular institutions have been more in the direction of promoting a passive type of secularism, removing state control of the religious sphere and allowing for its greater public visibility (Kuran, 2008). This type of Islamism appears closer to an US American version of religion and conservatism, where schools with religious curricula flourish, and certain Catholic groups promote the downplaying of evolutionary theory in textbooks and to make illegal abortion (Tuğal, 2013). The real obstacles are not full-fledged Islamisation but the increasingly authoritarian stance of the AKP under Erdoğan, although restrictions on personal freedoms and religious minorities are troubling.

As long as economic and political stability prevails and the opposition remains weak, further polarisation and authoritarianism is to be expected. Business preferences might shift if a credible opposition could arise that would be perceived to support economic growth. Indeed there are ample opportunities for the opposition with the increasing graft and corruption allegations of the Islamic camp, as well as the Gezi Protests. Internal division between the AKP and Gülen community also provide an opportunity that could be exploited, and so is the slowing down of Turkey’s economic growth. Additionally, in spite of many positive reports of
Turkey’s economic growth during the global recession, Turkey has an urgent current account deficit problem (Röhn, 2012), and has struggled to to climb up the ladder to higher value-added production. Large inflows of ‘hot money’, increased corruption, and political instability have added to an uncertain economic future. The term Anatolian ‘tigers’ that the Islamic movement likes to use is thus clearly a euphemism (Arslanhan & Kurtsal, 2010; Öniş & Bayram, 2008). However, the framing analysis has shown that the secular opposition lacks a charismatic leader that could counteract dominant Islamic frames and build on society’s parochial values in a secular way. Due to the CHP’s association with the military, this would almost require a new political party, in the same way the AKP arose from within the political Islamist movement. Most importantly, the solving of the Kurdish issue stands in the way of a unified secular-liberal opposition.

It remains to be seen what the consequence of the Gülen-AKP break-up will mean for state-business relations. ‘The strongest indication that the fight was approaching a point of no return came when the government announced its decision to close down dershanes, special evening and weekend schools that prepare students for college entrance exams. These schools constitute one of the Gülen community’s major sources of influence and recruitment’ (Tuğal, 2013). So far it appears that the AKP is strengthening its political Islamist wing in response to this. There has been a revival of Islamist forces, especially since the AKP-Gülen fallout, with Erdoğan more recently reviving ‘anti-imperialist, pro-Iran, and puritan tendencies in Turkish Islamism’ (Tuğal, 2013). Either way, as long as this state-business exchange is based on peer and neighbourhood pressure and excludes non co-religionists, it also promotes further polarisation, and it is Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies that constitute the major obstacle to further democratisation. Recent reforms by PM Erdoğan to bring the judiciary under the executive’s control and the intention to reform Turkey to a Presidential system have removed checks and balances and the separation of powers. The costs associated with exit mean that business is unlikely to be a force for greater democratisation.
Appendix

1. NACE Rev. 2 Industry Codes for Textile Cluster Sample
The following industries were included in the textile cluster sample, following NACE Rev. 2 codes (Eurostat, 2008):
- 01.6.3.02 Preparation of cotton fibres from Section A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing
- Division 13: Manufacture of Textiles from Section C: Manufacturing; includes, for example, the preparation of fibres, weaving of textiles, finishing of textiles; other textiles like knitted fabrics, carpets and rugs, non-wovens and technical textiles
- Division 14: Manufacture of wearing apparel (e.g. underwear, workwear)
- Division 15: Manufacture of leather and related products, especially the manufacture of footwear
- Division 22: Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products, especially plastic products and plastic packing-goods (similar production process to synthetic yarns and several firms involved in plastic and yarns)

2. Bonacich values
Table 11: 1993–1998 normalised Bonacich overlap measures; shared firm numbers (brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bonacich measure (firm numbers)</th>
<th>Gagiad</th>
<th>Tuskon</th>
<th>Musiad</th>
<th>Civic Secular</th>
<th>Civic Islamic</th>
<th>Political Centre-Left</th>
<th>Political Centre-Right</th>
<th>Political Islamist</th>
<th>Antep Chamber</th>
<th>Turkey Chambers</th>
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<td>0.393</td>
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Coding strategies

3. Data sources for affiliation/membership data
With respect to BA membership, the secular Gapgiad representatives provided the most complete data with a list of members according to their joining date, which was used to group companies into the three time periods. For example, companies joining in the years between 1993 and 1998 were accumulated and all added to the 1993–1998 time period. These members were then also carried over to the later time periods, unless later membership lists lacked the company names. For Tuskon affiliates and Müsiad, this information had to be compiled from various resources as the associations did not have such information ready at hand: for example, the association Hüsiad provides lists of previous board memberships since their foundation on their homepage (“Dünden bugüne Hüsiad yönetim kurulu-Hüsiad nostaljii [Board membership from past to present - Hüsiad nostalgia],” 2012); these were used as a starting point for earlier time periods. The present (“e-Müsiad,” 2012, “Gapgiad üyeler [Gapgiad members],” 2012, “Hüsiad üyeler [Hüsiad Members],” 2012), and past (board) membership information was then supplemented with secondary membership lists I found on earlier version of the associations’ websites.\(^8^4\) For Tuskon affiliates, I was also given an earlier version of a membership booklet from 2006 (Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Federasyonu, 2006), which was combined with their online list of membership accessed in 2012 to complete the 2004–2012 period. Similar procedures were used for the second Tuskon affiliate – Gapgiad, and Müsiad membership. Where no information on timing was available, firms were sorted into three time periods according to the company’s founding date as a last resort.

With respect to civic engagement, affiliation with the Islamic Gülen community was, first, coded through information on school sponsorship to the community’s schools and educational institutions. This information was acquired by having a local teacher identify Gülen cemaat schools in Gaziantep, and by scanning local newspapers to confirm that information. The Ministry of Education, at the time, provided some information on school sponsorship on its official homepage (“Il Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü Gaziantep - kurumlar rehberi [Ministry of Education of Gaziantep

\(^{84}\) Accessed via waybackmachine, an internet archive that allows one to view earlier, publicly available versions of a homepage (“Wayback machine,” 2014).
Province - organisations’ list),” 2012), and especially schools with names of industrialists were checked in detail to find further information online (in local newspapers or company homepages). This affiliation was then assigned to the relevant time period based on the founding date of the school. These data were complemented by affiliation with local charities promoting ‘imam hatip schools’ and other Gülen community organisations. With respect to secular civil society organisations, leadership level data for Gaimder, Sunder, TEC (‘Gaziantep Tenis ve Atcilik Kulubu [Gaziantep Tennis and Equestrian Club].” 2012), and Rotary85 were available since their foundation across several elections. Other than in BA coding, earlier civic involvements were not automatically included in the next time periods for Islamic civil society organisations. This is also true for political coding. For secular civil society organisations, earlier members were only included in later lists as long as their names still appeared on later membership lists.

4. Cross-referencing of affiliation/membership information into one incidence matrix per time period
First of all, these lists had to be cleaned up and standardised to a common format by removing Turkish characters. Secondly, a simple algorithm was written to compare the Gaziantep Chamber file with the other network membership files and combine all memberships into one file if a matching businessperson’s name was found. This matching mechanism brought together all memberships of a businessman if his full name (first and last name; only two words considered) is also listed in other documents. A second document was created that included potential hits through a mechanism that matched businessmen based on their last names only.86 This is because some membership lists did have full names, while others only provided initials for first names. This alternative matching file was created to not miss some crucial matches in the already sparse data. I sorted out the potential matches by hand by comparing further information on companies with membership information. I also


86 For example, if the prominent businessman Abdullah Nejat Kocer is listed as A. Nejat Kocer, Abdullah N. Kocer or Nejat Kocer in the Chamber leadership, this was coded as a definite match because two of the three words of the name match. If his name were listed as A.N. Kocer or N. Kocer only, then this would be included in the ‘maybes’ list.
re-checked the ‘definite’ matches to make sure there were no false hits. To sort out the potential cases where last names matched, for example, I relied on comparing company addresses (e.g. of Gaziantep Chamber and some BA lists), and if there was a match, the businessman’s membership was added as a definite match. Another secure way was to check the online Gaziantep Chamber information or company website which sometimes provided more board member names than were on the textile company list given to me by the GSO. For political entrepreneurs, election lists sometimes provided job information and if both last name and job description as businessman matched, that owner-manager’s political affiliation was added to the list of definite memberships. Again, this could be expected to under code memberships because I tended to exclude rather include many of these potential hits, especially where the last name was a very common name. This was initially done for companies before combining them into business groups. This combination into business groups was done through research. As outlined above most companies are family businesses and often information on bigger business groups could be found on the homepages of the companies, by comparing company addresses and through expert interviews (e.g. with the head of Gapgiad, who provided some information on their bigger member firms; several company owners provided information on their own firms’ ownership structures). Cross-membership is probably under-estimated and I remained cautious. In the network graphs business groups in textiles are spelled with a capital. There are cases where companies within the same family are independent, or even competitors, according to their owners’ statements (e.g. the Tat Group, which has two largely separate branches), in which case they were treated as separate. Other cases where cooperation or competition remains unclear were coded as separate but within the same family (e.g. in the network graph see the cases of the Kaplan family with multiple companies in the carpets and yarn sectors: Kaplan1, Kaplan 11 and so on).

If a business group company is a member, this membership was extended to all the other business group companies by coding the whole business group as a member. The following table shows the final number of firms/companies coded as ‘definites’ in each affiliation next to the number of holdings in parentheses. The figure in the second line shows the initial definite matches found through comparing two-word names. These numbers do not include the Islamic civic affiliations for time periods before 2004, which I added by hand after performing the matching
algorithms. These initial matches are most similar to the holdings in size because, as argued above, not that many potential hits could be added as definite matches. Also, the final company figures are much larger because affiliations were added to all companies of a business group.

Table 14: Numbers of companies and business groups in each association after initial and final matching procedure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample firms (groups) / initial definites</th>
<th>BA Musiad</th>
<th>BA Tuskon</th>
<th>BA Gagiad</th>
<th>Civic Islamic</th>
<th>Civic Secular</th>
<th>Pol Right</th>
<th>Pol Islamist</th>
<th>Pol Left</th>
<th>Antep Chamber</th>
<th>National Chambers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004–2012</td>
<td>116 (43)</td>
<td>152 (72)</td>
<td>145 (56)</td>
<td>79 (26)</td>
<td>49 (14)</td>
<td>91 (35)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>40 (14)</td>
<td>105 (33)</td>
<td>48 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ 42</td>
<td>/ 91</td>
<td>/ 68</td>
<td>/ 29</td>
<td>/ 12</td>
<td>/ 46</td>
<td>/ 4</td>
<td>/ 18</td>
<td>/ 65</td>
<td>/ 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2003</td>
<td>30 (14)</td>
<td>60 (36)</td>
<td>88 (33)</td>
<td>27 (12)</td>
<td>35 (8)</td>
<td>13 (9)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>56 (17)</td>
<td>24 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ 15</td>
<td>/ 36</td>
<td>/ 45</td>
<td>/ na*</td>
<td>/ 18</td>
<td>/ 7</td>
<td>/ 2</td>
<td>/ 2</td>
<td>/ 29</td>
<td>/ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1998</td>
<td>14 (9)</td>
<td>30 (20)</td>
<td>57 (23)</td>
<td>19 (11)</td>
<td>27 (8)</td>
<td>20 (7)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>57 (24)</td>
<td>10 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ 7</td>
<td>/ 15</td>
<td>/ 29</td>
<td>/ na*</td>
<td>/ 16</td>
<td>/ 11</td>
<td>/ 1</td>
<td>/ 1</td>
<td>/ 31</td>
<td>/ 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial datasets are binary (before further transformations in UCINET).\(^{87}\) ‘1’ was coded for a company, if one or more company board member directly, or a close family member indirectly, is affiliated with an association (BAs/political parties/civil society organisations); and ‘0’ otherwise. If there were more than one businesspersons of a business group who were members of the same association, this was still coded as ‘one’ network affiliation.\(^{88}\) The coding was then extended to all firms of a family group as the whole family or business group is expected to profit from a leader’s affiliation, which makes sense due to the highly paternalistic and authoritarian business culture in Turkey in general (Soylu, 2011), and in the

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\(^{87}\) For network data analysis, the program UCINET has been used for data entry, data transformation and for calculating indicators, such as Bonacich’s subgroup overlap measures, whereas the open-source program NodeXL has been used for network visualisations as it has more functions to analyse graphs and subgraphs than the quantitative program UCINET.

\(^{88}\) There are such cases, especially for larger business where several board members might be members of the same BA. However, as the data structure is complicated enough encompassing 9 levels, this information was ignored as it does not add much additional information. This procedure was applied to all companies, therefore consistently applied and cannot be said to bias the results in either camp. Tie strength, instead was captured by summing up memberships across political, business and civic layers.
conservative Gaziantep, in particular. Also, as most of the analysis is conducted on the basis of the business group anyway, there is no overestimation of membership.

5. Subgroup-level adjacency matrix transformations
5.1.a. Further details on rules for assigning Islamic, Secular, Mixed and None codes to business groups

For centre-right parties, different types of combinations were taken into account. Therefore, a company with a director of a centre-right party is not automatically coded as centre-right/Islamic, but can be coded as Mixed/both or secular depending on further business and civic affiliations, or as none if there is no additional information. To be categorised as Islamic, a further Müsiad/Tuskon or civic affiliation was necessary. I found that these rules apply well to the judgements made by interviewees, bar two exceptions: centre-right plus one civic affiliations are counted as either Islamic (if plus civic_Islamic) or secular (if plus civic_secular), although according to the rule they should be categorised as none (only 0.5 differential). According to the rules, centre-right and Gagiad membership also results in a secular categorisations. These rules result in an overcoding of secular political ties in 2004, where there are multiple AKP members, who are additionally Gagiad members in the secular network. The goal was to err on the side of caution in categorising companies as Islamic. Also, Gagiad plus both civic affiliations should be coded as secular according to the rules, but fieldwork shows that mixed makes more sense and therefore I coded these cases as mixed.

A political membership is regarded as the strongest type of membership because entering political parties is a risky choice for businesses that openly shows their political ideology, and might endanger their competitiveness whenever government changes (cf. Siegel, 2007). In general, political membership requires a strong ideological affiliation and a larger time investment. BAs are the second strongest type of membership because joining also requires ideological closeness (cf. discussion of the accession process in Chapter VI). However, Gagiad appears as the least coherent of the BAs, increasingly accepting all types of large businesses as members (cf. supported in framing analysis), and therefore its signalling quality decreases if it is combined with Islamic BA memberships (only 0.5 points in those cases).
Political Islamist parties were only included, if an additional, moderately Islamic membership was present in order to include only members of the moderately Islamic movement. Overall, there were only a few such cases among Gaziantep’s industrial elite. Six such business groups were found, three of which were excluded because across the three time periods they included no other memberships. The other three companies are additional Tuskon and/or Müsiad members and later switched to a centre-right party.

5.1.b. Creating Islamic, Secular and Mixed actor-by-actor networks in UCINET
More specifically, after developing and applying rules to code companies as either Islamic/Secular/Mixed or None (codes 1, 2, 3, or 0; see 2.3.2.b and 5.1.a of the Appendix), this information was added as a column in the original incidence (affiliation) matrix. Then I counted and added the number of BA, political and civic affiliations for each company coded as I/S or M, in order to be able to differentiate the business, civic and political ties of each subgroup. This resulted in nine extra valued attributes or columns per business group: Secular_BA/Secular_Pol/Secular_Civic; Islamic_BA/Islamic_Pol/I_Civic; and Mixed_BA/Mixed_Pol/Mixed_Civic. The column Secular_BA, for example, counts the number of BA memberships of a company coded as secular. The maximum value in the BA column would be three (member of all three BAs), in the political column two (member of both a political_right and political_left party), and in the civic columns two as well (member of both an Islamic and secular civil society organisations). In the secular coalition, the memberships are largely binary, and as there are two Islamic BAs (rather than one secular BA), Islamic companies have more valued data. The procedure of creating a one-mode adjacency matrix in UCINET involves the command that turns attributes into ties by the cross-products.

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89 In the 2004–2012 time period, there are four political Islamist party members: ‘yeni yasam’ (no other affiliations) and ‘kamil tekstil’ (no other affiliations) were excluded; but ‘Mustafa Kilic’ (also in Islamic BA) and ‘ozturk orolluo’ were kept (also in AKP and Islamic BA). In the 1999–2003 time period, there were two company groups, one of which was kept (uzer tekstil, also in Müsiad and later AKP leadership) and the other removed (celikaslan tekstil with no other affiliation). In the 1993–1998 time period there was only one such case, namely, the same company as in 1999, ‘uzer tekstil’, which has an additional Islamic BA membership in addition to switching to the AKP in the 2004 period.
method (multiplication), where the diagonal (reflexive ties) was kept as valid as it contains information of the business group’s membership.

5.2. Transformations of tie values following multiplication method of turning affiliations into ties between actors

To analyse differences in the relationship layers between the Islamic and secular subgroups, one-mode adjacency matrices for each relationship layer were created. This was done according to the procedures described in section 2 of this chapter. For each of the 9 attributes a separate adjacency matrix was created (27 in total for 3 time periods), with businesses groups as rows and columns and the cells showing whether two Islamic businesses, for example, are connected by a common BA affiliation. The values of the multiplication method were then transformed again to produce a meaningful interval-level data to range between 0 and 3. The values of the multiplication method were then transformed again to produce a meaningful interval-level data to range between 0 and 3; for example, a value of 1 indicates that both business groups share 1 affiliation, where one of the business groups may have one or two additional affiliations, not shared by the other business group:

- 0: if each pair of two business groups, none is a member (match), or one is a member while the other is not (mismatch) (0-0; 0-1; 1-0) – recoded to remain 0 (relevant for BA, c, pol)
- 1: match where both companies of a pair are members of one organisation (1-1) – recoded to remain 1 (relevant for BA, c, pol)
- 2: match where both companies of a pair share membership of one organisation, while one of the two companies has an additional membership (1-2; 2-1) – recoded to 1, to reflect match in one organisation (relevant for Ba, c, pol)
- 3: match where both companies of a pair share membership of one organisation, while one of the two companies has two additional memberships, (1-3; 3-1) – recoded to 1 to reflect match in one shared organisation membership (relevant for BA)
- 4: match where both companies of a pair share membership in two organisations – recoded to 2 to reflect match in two shared organisation memberships (relevant for BA, pol, c)
- 6: match where both companies of a pair share membership of two organisations, while one of the two companies has one additional memberships (2-3; 3-2) – recoded to 2, to reflect match in two organisations (relevant for BA)
- 9: match where both companies of a pair share membership in three BAs – recoded to 3 (BA)

To calculate densities by group of the Islamic and secular subgroups, business groups with mixed affiliations, i.e. with connections to both subgroups, were added.
to both matrices. To arrive at one matrix per subgroup, ties across the BA, political and civic relationship layers were summed up to create a valued multiplex adjacency matrix (min is 1; max value is 7). Additions (of affiliations) make sense if we assume that each relationship type carries a similar weight. Then, to transform these affiliations into actor-by-actor ties, the cross-products method was again used and resulted in different values to the previous transformation (because of the sums and additions of mixed/ambivalent ties). Then, densities by group were calculated for both valued and dichotomised matrices at different levels. I dichotomised the matrices at different tie strengths or membership levels and interpreted densities by group at different tie strengths (densities would decrease at stronger ties because ties smaller than a certain level would be excluded, e.g. <= 2). As with all indicators the interpretation is relative rather than absolute and based on a comparison. (These dichotomisations are arrived at through the command ‘Transform – Graph-theoretic – Multigraph’ which automatically dichotomises valued matrices at various levels).

6. Frequencies of relationship layers and strengths after assigning categories of Islamic (I; 1) / Secular (S; 2) / Mixed (M; 3) / None (N; 0)

After this recoding, the numbers of business groups for each category are summarised in the following tables. The tables below show the numbers for each relationship layer by tie strength (i.e. number of affiliations)

Table 15: Number of business groups in the 1993–1998 subgroup-level graph

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 affiliation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 affiliations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 affiliations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Business Groups I/S/M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Number of business groups in the 1999–2003 subgroup-level graph

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 affiliation</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 affiliations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 affiliations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Business Groups I/S/M</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Organisational overlaps: visualisation information and details on exclusion of weakest overlaps in graphs

In the full graphs, not all organisational overlaps are shown, and instead only the strongest were selected to reduce clutter. In 1993, seven overlaps were excluded; six were between approximately 0.5 and 0.6, signifying a weak positive relationship. In 1999 only three overlaps were excluded ranging again between 0.5 and 0.6, i.e. weak positive relationships. In 2004 this method led to an exclusion of approximately 14 overlaps, all of which range between 0.5 and 0.75. The exclusions for the 2004 period are:

- Gaggiad-Tuskon; Gaggiad-Musiad; Gaggiad-left; Gaggiad-pol right – all in the 0.7 range;
- Tuskon-civic secular; Tuskon-left, Tuskon-pol Islamist, Tuskon-TOBB – all above .68;
- Musiad-civic secular; Musiad-left, Musiad-pol Islamist all larger than .53;
- left-right ; left-Gaziantep Chamber; right-Islamist – all above 0.7.

Different shades of grey were added to make subgroups clearer. However, I refrained from a stronger colour differentiation because the interest here is in organisational overlaps and not movements. Social movement organisations usually share the strongest overlaps so that there is a good overlap between the strongest overlaps of each organisation and its affiliated movement. Lighter grey reflects the strongest overlaps of secular organisations, darker grey of Islamic organisations and medium grey of neutral organisations. In 1993, light grey lines for the secular organisations were chosen for the strongest overlaps larger than 0.79. Islamic organisations have a slightly lower threshold due to weaker overlaps, so that dark grey lines were chosen for the strongest overlaps larger than 0.69. In this time period, the strongest overlap of each organisation is in line with its respective subgroup (e.g. Müsiad has strongest links to other Islamic organisations). In 1999, the threshold for the strongest overlaps is similar for the secular and Islamic subgroups, and is set to
overlaps larger than 0.74. Again these are largely in line with each subgroup. In 2004 the threshold chosen for colouring the strongest overlaps was set at larger than 0.8. But in this time period, the strongest overlaps of each organisation are not completely in line with its subgroup. There are, for example, unexpectedly strong overlaps between civic secular with political left (0.84; coloured silver) and civic Islamic at 0.78.

8. Growth in Business Association Membership Categories of Textile Cluster Sample Companies Across Time
This table is based on membership data at the company/firm level and incorporates the study sample companies only. It shows the growth of each BA and BA combinations as well as the total number of firms; first in total numbers, then in percentage, expressed as a ratio relative to the previous time period. A percentage smaller than 100 means a decrease in membership, but percentages are interpreted relative to firm growth in the cluster. Categories with larger (bold) or smaller than firm growth changes are of most interest although BA membership increases overall across all time periods.

Table 18: Firm-level membership data across three time periods by BA category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD only</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON only</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSIAD only</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+TUSKON</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+MUSIAD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON+MUSIAD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+TUSKON+MUSIAD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSIAD total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n (number of firms)</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19: Firm-level membership growth across three time periods by BA category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth % relative to previous time period</th>
<th>1999–2003</th>
<th>2004–2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD only</td>
<td>124%</td>
<td>118%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON only</td>
<td>181%</td>
<td>197%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSIAD only</td>
<td>188%</td>
<td>193%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+TUSKON</td>
<td>257%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+MUSIAD</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td>250%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON+MUSIAD</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>450%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD+TUSKON+MUSIAD</td>
<td>700%</td>
<td>786%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAGIAD total</td>
<td>154%</td>
<td>165%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSKON total</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td>253%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSIAD total</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td>387%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>144%</td>
<td>127%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n (number of firms)</strong></td>
<td>147%</td>
<td>141%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Interview Guides

Overview: Businesspeople interview topics

- Company Background: Firm info, History, and Performance (profits, exports)
- Production Process in textile industry cluster (specific assets):
  - Financial Capital (e.g. for start-up capital; which banks),
  - Exports (major markets; support from organisations; trust),
  - Innovation (uni-business relations, etc.) and Expansion (growth strategy)
  - Flexible specialisation: Subcontracting, Input material and sales (where buy what from/sell what to; key materials); cooperation with other companies/evaluation in Gaziantep
- Corporate Social Responsibility: examples of projects by companies and in cooperation with BA/political/ civil society organisations; aims and motivations
- Organisations: Role of connections and examples of cooperation of firms with organisations
  - BAs, Political parties, public institutions (Chambers and Kosgeb; local and national-level politicians); e.g. ever received stimuli from institutions?
  - Civil society groups: CSR projects and activities and their functions
- Trust and Morality: meaning and role in economy; role of associations in process
- Contentious/Political: state-business relations; role of religious community

Overview: Business Association interview topics

- Organisational structures: membership figures/growth; personnel; budget; board of members (size, election procedure); membership selection process; relations with headquarters; internal committees
- Activities: key activities for members; support activities for economic production/trade; relations among members and with political elites – how facilitated and why; specific BA questions (e.g. at TUSKON on their international trade conferences)
- Network: relations with civil society organisations, public institutions, political parties, other BAs; effectiveness at creating ties with political elites (compared to personal networks)
- Civil social responsibility: activities; aims and motivations; budgets and outcomes
- History, identity of association and vision: evaluate political parties, own association in relation to each other

Overview: Public institutions interview topics
- Public areas where businessmen are involved individually/collectively, e.g. school donation and mosque-building processes
- Rents that can be extracted; resources offered to business community
- Evaluate state-business relations
- Evaluate textile cluster: influential companies; other background data
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