Between Policy, Recognition and Rioting: Analyzing the role of urban governance, historical commemoration and public culture in defining inclusion in Paris, Lyon and Marseille.

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A thesis submitted to the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, 2014
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Abstract:

Investigating why Marseille does not riot: Analyzing the role of policy narratives in defining inclusion in urban governance, public culture and the commemoration of history in Marseille, Paris and Lyon

While exhibiting similar socio-economic disadvantage, concentrated in post-migration communities, as the 274 towns and cities that rioted in the 2005 disturbances in France, Marseille did not riot. As a possible explanation for this behavior this thesis argues that the city has an inclusive urban identity not present in the same form in the other French cities that rioted. It is hypothesized that it is the application of a ‘policy narrative’ (Boswell et al 2011) offering ‘recognition’ (Taylor 1994) to post-migration communities that has given the identity of the city this inclusivity. On the contrary, this thesis takes the two cases of Paris and Lyon as contrasting examples of cities that rioted in 2005 to enable a comparative analysis to take place against two cities adhering to the national French policy context of assimilation that does not offer such recognition to post-migration communities. In light of the similar socio-economic problems across the three cases, and drawing on the literature concerned with the policy applications of multiculturalism, this thesis examines the policy narratives applied across three interrelated areas of municipal policy – governance, public culture and the commemoration of history. This analysis,
however, demonstrates some unexpected trends. In this instance, both Paris and Lyon, in varying ways have begun in the past decade to apply a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities in variance to the national policy context of assimilation. In both cases, however, the application of policies of recognition is both very recent, and very much contested by those interest groups that seek to maintain the status quo of assimilation. This analysis has found that Marseille is much more advanced in both the duration and extent of the policies of recognition deployed by the city across the three areas of governance, public culture and historical commemoration. As such, over the past two decades the city has worked to offer representation and recognition to post-migration communities that could be argued to play an important roll in creating an inclusive urban identity at the local level that militates against civil unrest.
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“When you do things from your soul, you feel a river moving in you, a joy.”

Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi

First and foremost I must say that, the chance to undertake doctoral study is a mercy for which I shall be eternally grateful. It has given me a chance for self-expression that has permitted my development as a person in a number of important ways. It has also allowed me to experience something that is, in my opinion, at the height of the human experience – the ability to become lost in exercising an ability, performing a craft, finely creating something of beauty to be shared with the rest of humanity. This task, however, would not have been possible without undergoing a spiritual awaking in the years up to 2009 that aided in freeing me from the worldly concerns that had kept me from attempting it sooner. After all, doctoral studies bare significant resemblance to a ‘secular monkhood’ where one is shut away for many long hours contemplating reality in a way most individuals never experience. Along the way, many people and places had input into my work that makes it very difficult to take credit for it’s completion.

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Here I feel I must also acknowledge the contribution the city of my birth, London has made to this thesis. Without being born and raised in Ealing, a ‘super-diverse’ fringe of one of the worlds most diverse, creative and knowledgeable metropolitan areas, my academic inclination may have been thwarted at a very young age. London also facilitated my interaction with innumerable cultures, beliefs and customs that have left a lasting impact on my person. West London, in particular it’s colorful people, parks, the Edgeware Road, Queensway, Notting Hill and South Kensington have provided me with both inspiration and environments in which to recharge my batteries over the course of my thesis. London can, however, also be a fickle and difficult muse, which necessitates frequenting other spaces in the world to nurture your soul.
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Joseph Downing, London 2013
Chapter 1: The Marseille ‘Paradox’

1.1 – Situating the Issue of French Urban Policy

1.2 – Why Study Marseille? The unanswered paradox of 2005

1.3 – The State of Play: Assimilationist Dogma or France's Multicultural Moment?

1.4 – Methodology: Policy Narratives and Multiculturalism

1.5 – Roadmap to the thesis

1.1 – Situating the Issue of French Urban Policy:

The thesis attempts a broad analysis of the creation of inclusion for post-migration communities in three French cities; Paris, Lyon and Marseille. This analysis, and the broader discussion of inclusion in framed by an important paradox that sets Marseille apart from it's general cohort of compatriots, namely those cities that have seen large scale immigration from France’s ex-colonies since the end of the Second World War. Within this, Marseille represents a sociological paradox, as it was the only French city that did not riot in 2005, while suffering from the same socio-economic deprivation concentrated in post-migration communities evident in French cities.

1 The explanation for the use of the term ‘post-migration community’ is given in chapter 2
that rioted, including Paris and Lyon. Noticing that the city has divergent behavior to others situated in the same national context hints at the hypothesis that, at the local level the city might have employed policies divergent from the national French norm of assimilation that has enabled post-migration communities\(^2\) to identify with the idea of Marseille.

As such, this thesis seeks to explain this by examining how Marseille might have employed divergent policies at the local level to cities that rioted, most notably Paris and Lyon, to foster this sense of identity with the city\(^3\). As such, I am interested in the aspects of policy at the local level that can create inclusion for post-migration communities in the city and how these can supplant a national policy context dominated by policies that do not recognize difference as a means to deal with the discrimination prevalent in French society directed at post-migration communities. Existing literature on the recurring bouts of unrest that plague post-war French cities has concentrated on explaining how the multiple socio-economic dysfunctions of the ‘hyper-marginalized’ (Waquant 2006) suburban housing estates give rise to running battles between predominantly ethnic minority youths and the ‘forces de l’ordre’ deployed by the French state to ensure law

\(^2\) Literature on detailing these issues is extensive, however one of the best accounts in the English language is Hargreaves (2007) ‘multi-ethnic France’.

\(^3\) The discussion of being Marseillais as a cosmopolitan urban identity open to post migration communities is dealt with in chapter 2. However it is worth stating here that Cesari et al 2001 found that for working class children from Marseille, regardless of ethnic background “they are Marseillais, first and foremost Marseillais”. In a documentary in 2007 (Bringer 2007) a young man of Algerian origin explains the universal and open nature of the identity that the city of Marseille offers him when he states that the ‘Marseillais cannot be defined as being black, white or red, a Marseillais is a Marseillais’ (Bringer 2007). Most recently, an investigation into the city’s Muslim community conducted by the Open Societies Foundation (OSF 2011a) recorded a significant identification with the idea of being from the city by both Muslim and non-Muslim residents of one of the city’s poorest districts.
and order and quell unrest. As such, with very few and somewhat limited exceptions\(^4\), there has been no in-depth, comparative study on how a possible divergence in local policy trajectories could account for how a city like Marseille that resists unrest while under the same socio-economic conditions and national policy context, is possible. In this regard, I consider local policies to be key in any analysis of such a paradox as Marseille, especially in light of the lack of a large, systemic geographical or socio-economic difference between Marseille and cities like Paris and Lyon that riot.

Therefore, by situating the analysis in this way, this thesis is setting up Marseille to be a ‘critical case’ because, while it suffers from the same socio-economic deprivation seen as such important causes of riots in Paris and Lyon, it bucks the trend and does not riot. In terms of research design, utilising critical case analysis is the strongest use of case study analysis because it denotes a case that challenges an established trend in a particular subject (Hanké 2009). This is an especially strong tool for an analysis when one ‘starts by stacking the cards against themselves and in favour of the argument you are against’ (Hanké 2009), by choosing a case study which has all the markers of a case which would conform to the relevant theory, and then proceeds to demonstrate that under these ‘most likely conditions’ (Hanké 2009) the case does not conform to the theory. For Marseille this is an approach focusing on, and problematizing an anomaly, that is something that does not conform to a known, and

\(^4\) One notable work is the paper by Mitchell (2011) ‘Marseille’s not for Burning’ which will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 2 of this thesis.
well-documented trend. Here, a city with comparable socio-economic problems with cities that have rioted, that has not experienced these disturbances, clearly behaves unexpectedly in the manner of a critical case under this analytical designation. Here, it is important to state the overall research question that this thesis aims to address:

1) In what ways does Marseille represent a divergence in policy from Paris and Lyon?

This is, however, extremely general and requires further refinement in as much as this thesis intends to examine how a difference in urban policy might mark Marseille out from other cities such as Paris and Lyon that rioted in 2005. In this regard, this thesis sets out to answer three inter-related questions that will guide this investigation of three key, inter-related, policy areas at the local level as a means to examine exactly how Marseille possibly differs from Paris and Lyon. These are:

I. How does the mode of governance vary in its relationship to post-migration communities between Paris, Lyon and Marseille?

This question sets up an analysis of possible ways that the authorities of the three cities address the question of post-migration ethnic difference. In particular, does Marseille, as the city that did not riot, have a specific mode of governance that deals with difference in
such a way as to be divergent from accepted French norms of assimilation that are assumed to govern policy in Paris and Lyon?

This leads into the second research question:

II. In what ways do the events and displays of public culture in Paris, Lyon and Marseille vary in their depiction of the cultures of post-migration communities?

This question addresses another important area of municipal policy where a policy divergence could occur in relation to how the cities address the question of post-migration ethnic difference. Importantly, does Marseille have a policy of public culture that addresses post-migration difference in a way that does not conform to French norms of assimilation that govern the policies of Lyon and Paris? As such, this also opens up:

III. Do Paris, Lyon and Marseille commemorate the role of post-migration communities in their histories in different ways?

In addition to governance and public culture, municipal authorities also have the power to set policy on how, in the locality of the city, history is defined and commemorated. Therefore, again, against the benchmark of assimilation that govern policy in Paris and Lyon, it is important to establish if Marseille's policies are divergent with regard to the treatment of difference.
Having laid out the focus of this thesis, I now turn to four further questions that still need answering in this chapter. Firstly, I ask what particular value there is in choosing to study urban policy against the backdrop of the 2005 riots in France, as opposed to other examples of urban disturbances. Secondly, I examine the current literature on the national, assimilationist policy context of France and how the specific focus of this thesis has remained unexplored. Thirdly, I state the case for examining this question of why Marseille did not riot from a policy narrative and multiculturalism perspective, and what contribution this can make to the thesis. The final section of this chapter provides a roadmap to the five chapters to follow.

1.2 – Why Study Marseille? The unanswered paradox of 2005

The study of policy integration in the urban sphere is constantly rendered ever more relevant by the increasingly ‘super-diverse’ makeup of contemporary European cities. In addition, as is the case with Marseille, European cities are increasingly becoming ‘plural’ with no identifiable ethnic majority due to the increasing size of post-migration communities. Therefore, a study of the cases presented here will shed important light on how these questions are being handled in a country that has not

5 While this concept is elaborated fully in chapter 2 in relation to this thesis it is sufficient here to state that ‘superdiversity’ refers to the process by which identifiable ethnic minorities are being supplanted by many, new smaller, scattered, multiple origin communities, often without the historical links to the host country that accompanied ethnic minorities in the post-colonial era.
experimented with policies that recognise difference as examples such as the UK and Holland have. However, more dramatically, this question in France is framed by a particularly worrying and explosive phenomenon that first brought my attention to the case of Marseille. The discussion of contemporary French cities as arenas of diversity has been dominated by the recurring bouts of rioting that nearly every French city has experienced. Therefore, an examination of the three cases presented here, and most notably Marseille, because of its lack of rioting, will add increased understanding of these recurring events of unrest. The 1970s saw the first of these in the Vaulx-en-Velin, Villeurbanne and Vénissieux suburbs of Lyon, while the 1980s and 1990s saw their increased frequency and scope in the suburbs of Lyon, and importantly spreading to similar poor, high-rise estates around Paris (Hargreaves 1996). These urban riots followed a repeating pattern, where the injury or killing of an unarmed minority ethnic youth would lead to minority ethnic youths of French citizenship burning cars and fighting pitched battles with the police (Hargreaves 2007).

This pattern reached its crescendo in 2005, when the death of two youths while in flight from the police in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-Sous-Bois caused other youths to riot. This incident was the catalyst for rioting on a national scale (Hargreaves 2007). Their intensity, spread and duration was unprecedented in peace time Western Europe, with an estimated €200 million worth of damage and over 2900 arrests, taking place over 20 nights in 274 French towns and
cities, causing the president to declare a national state of emergency (Sahlins 2006). Understandably, these events have focused analysis of French cities on the multiple dysfunctions of the immigrant rich suburbs of French cities where these riots have taken place. This has rightly pinpointed the causes of the riots as local police brutality, poor upkeep of large estates, and the lack of opportunities for socio-economic advancement for those from minority-ethnic backgrounds. (Hargreaves 1996:2007, Sahlins 2006, Dikec 2008, Moran 2012).

Importantly, the analysis of urban areas that did not riot and how these examples could offer alternatives to the current deadlock of Republican, assimilationist policy, has, thus far, received much less academic scrutiny. However, moving the discussion away from explaining why areas rioted to searching for areas that did not riot requires, as we have already seen, focusing on a singular phenomena, an anomaly standing apart from the rest of its cohort of French metropolitan areas that experienced unprecedented chaos in 2005 and the preceding 30 years of disturbances. This anomaly is Marseille. From a comparative perspective this initially presents something of a paradox. This is because Marseille is a city with all of the hallmarks of a prime case for social unrest given the widely accepted causes of unrest in 2005 in other French cities. It is a city with some of the worst economic problems in France, disproportionately concentrated in minority ethnic communities (Moore 2001). Indeed, Hargreaves (2007) has directly compared Marseille’s post-migration community rich, economically deprived
and high rise *Quartiers Nords* with those areas of Paris and Lyon that have experienced frequent riots owing to commonalities in the concentrations of suburban poverty on large, poorly maintained and geographically isolated housing estates in the three cases. Buttressing this social comparison is Marseille’s underperforming economy, that remains a problem area within the buoyant Euro-Mediterranean economic arc that stretches from Valencia in Spain to the North East of Italy (Moore 2001).

The city houses the ‘triangle of poverty’, an area unparalleled in France for the proportion of the population living in poverty (Moore 2001). This area is where the city’s poor housing, unemployment and social problems are concentrated and houses more than one third of the city’s population (310,000 in 1999) (Moore 2001). This includes 42,000 that are unemployed (32% of adults at 1999 levels), with two thirds of households paying no tax (Moore 2001). The proportion of immigrants in Marseille’s population is also striking. Out of a population of nearly 800,000 it is estimated that 115,000 people of North African origin live in Marseille, with the total Muslim population standing at around the 190,000 mark (Parodi 2002). Therefore, the city has the same socio-economic deprivation concentrated in ethnic minority communities that have been identified as important catalysts for disturbances in the other 274 towns and cities that rioted in 2005, and importantly with the areas of Paris and Lyon that have repeatedly rioted since the 1970s. Ethnic minority communities in Marseille are also subject to the same difficulties as those in the rest
of the country in their continued quest for a viable place in French national identity. Well documented are the mutually reinforcing problems of continued discrimination in the public, social and economic spheres combined with mainstream media discourses questioning the legitimacy of ethnic minorities’ place in French society (Cesari et al 2001, Withol de Wenden 2007).

This thesis takes this paradox and aims to give a broader account of how the city situates post-migration communities in Marseille, Paris and Lyon and addresses how this might vary. While this thesis sets up Marseille as a critical case, this should not be taken as an attempt to distance Marseille as part of a broader discussed on the type of city that riots in France. Marseille is set up here in comparison as different in type from Paris and Lyon, due to it’s behaviour and hypothesised system of urban governance, but not in kind. It is not drastically different from Paris and Lyon in a number of ways, despite it’s situation on the Mediterranean sea. It’ suffers from similar structural conditions of socio-economic deprivation, centred in post-migration communities geographically segregated from it’s central business district (Hargreaves 2007). In addition, and perhaps more importantly for a discussion of local policies, it is also a city which falls under the same political regime as Paris and Lyon. It is not located within a semi-autonomous region, with special exemptions for the relationship between church and state, such as Alsace-Lorraine, for example. There is no substantive difference between the citizenship and state regimes between the three cities. As such,
local policy makers in Marseille are as much constrained by the national policies of laïcité and assimilation as those in Paris and Lyon.

It analysis the relationship between governance, public culture and history and the promotion of public norms of the role of post-migration communities in the city, and in doing so adds to existing research about how the city influences the process of community integration and identity construction in the increasingly diverse context of Europe. In particular, its asserts the importance of the local level of the city in this process as a place not only that overwhelmingly contains the diversity that is so often discussed at the national level, but also where diversity is lived as a daily experience where the context of the city has a dramatic impact on the position of post-migration communities. Thus, this thesis addresses the controversial issue of the contemporary role of the city in creating narratives that are inclusive, or indeed excluding, to post-migration communities. This analysis touches on key issues such as the validity and nature of multiculturalism as a means by which some degree of group difference is given public recognition and how this plays out in a context that insists on formal, public assimilation.

1.3 – The State of Play: Assimilationist Dogma or France’s Multicultural Moment?

There is also a broader context that renders this analysis important and justifies the case selection of the three French cities considered here. This is the broader debate about the composition and durability
of the current French policy context. Even though our paradox of Marseille might stand outside of French norms, as a large diverse city that does not suffer from urban riots, however it does de jure stand within the French nationally defined policy of integration that is dependent on a notion of ‘assimilation’, where immigrants are expected to adapt to French norms, especially in the public sphere. While it is important here to understand the evolution and relative successes of assimilation, it should in no way be considered that the policy direction on the ground at the local level is static and immobile. In short, while policies clearly show some degree of historical continuity, they are rarely, if ever, completely static. A means to understand this situation can be found in the idea of policy path dependence as used by Bleich (2011). Here, Bleich (2011) argues that policy makers, in formulating policies on various subjects, gravitate to existing ‘policy frames’ as a means to guide the shape of future policies. Policy frames, therefore, are ‘a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient an actor within a policy sphere’ (Bleich 2011). As such, they can be said to:

‘help actors identify problems and specify and prioritise their interests and goals; they point actors toward causal and normative judgements about effective and appropriate policies in ways that tend to propel policy down a particular path and to reinforce it once on that path; and they can endow actors deemed to have moral authority or expert status with added power in a policy field. In this way,
frames give direction to policy-making and help account for policy outcomes (Bleich 2011).’

In short, things get done in certain ways because that’s how they have been done, and thus the cycle perpetuates. On the surface, this is especially plausible but importantly not accurate in the French example, as we will now see more fully because of no official policy change at the national level. However, even within this seemingly static context, there is some evidence of limited policy shifts at the local level. In the beginning, the policy of assimilation evolved out of the indirect rule exercised by the early French state that was required to bridge the ethno-cultural difference present in France, a situation Ertman (1996) describes as a ‘mosaic state’ sitting over a multi-ethnic society. As Wihtol de Wenden (2004) argues, once centralisation took hold in the wake of the 1789 revolution, citizenship was increasingly defined by individual legal equality before the state, where expressions of ethnicity and religion became taboo in the public realm. The lack of national cohesion, owing to France’s regional ethnic and linguistic differences was seen as a key weakness partially responsible for the French defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1870 (Weber 1976). This resulted in the centralisation of language and education that dictated the terms by which peasants could be turned into Frenchmen (Weber 1976). Aided by the parallel developments of industrialisation and urbanisation, and the French revolutions declaration of individual legal equality and the separation of church and state (laïcité), this process was fairly successful in
quelling regional separatism and forming cultural and political norms on which to construct the French state. This process of encouraging the adaptation to French norms was also applied to the large numbers of immigrants that arrived in France during the 19th century from Southern and Eastern Europe (Weil 2008). Again, this headed off issues of national cohesion, and again can be said to be fairly successful in assimilating these arrivals to a common sense of French identity. As such, it is no surprise then that this policy remained salient as a conceptual tool to assimilate arrivals from France’s ex-colonies who have arrived on mass since the turn of the 20th century. As such, this idea of assimilation has been the crux of France’s ‘republican tradition [in which] issues of multiple identity and diversity are still taboo’ (Council of Europe 2008). However, it would be inaccurate to assert the absolute hegemony of assimilation in French integration policy, as there exist not only significant critiques of its viability, but also some evidence of a shift occurring at the local level.

The critiques of the assimilationist approach are numerous owing to the significant socio-economic deprivation and discrimination levelled at those from immigrant communities from France’s ex-colonies (Cesari et al 2001, Hargreaves 1996, 2007). Hargreaves (2007) described the participants of the 2005 riots ‘reacting to their ethnicisation by members of the majority ethnic population, in whose eyes they were an alien presence in France because of their roots in non-European, mainly Islamic countries’ who ‘shared the secular
aspirations and values dominant in French society. Their violent acts arose from anger over their exclusions from the benefits of society because of socio-economic disadvantage and racial and ethnic discrimination’ (Hargreaves 2007). Dikec (2007) buttresses this line of argument with his in-depth research into the city of Lyon. Here he describes a ‘thirst of citizenship’ in the city, where individuals from post-migration communities want to not just ‘belong’ in French society but also who wanted to participate fully within it both as political and economic beings, but found themselves blocked in this endeavour. This is a sentiment expressed in a recent documentary made on the subject where Nasr, an individual of Algerian origin and two friends, found it difficult to find employment in the Parisian region. In the documentary Nasr says ‘you start to ask yourself why? I do everything they want, the state asks me to integrate and I integrate, but when I come and tell them “here I am, I am just like you” they don’t give me a chance’ (Aljazeera 2012).

Cesari et al (2001) found a similar process at work in Marseille, where their research constantly found that amongst second generation Algerians in Marseille there was a consistent feeling that their Frenchness was constantly questioned in the media and wider society, making it difficult for them to identify with the idea of being French. Lorcerie (2003), in her study of the experience of minority children, asserts that ethnicity and the questions of belonging to an ethnic group are salient in French society from an early age, playing an important part in both belonging and exclusion even in the
education system. As such, d’Iribarne (2010) sums up well the problem that, while republicanism came about to inform equality after the French revolution, it has become an abstraction when examining the social reality of contemporary French society. This is because ‘on an official level it offers a noble recognition to us as all the same, but it has failed to solve the problem that where significant attention is paid to the question on ones ‘origins’ be they geographical, ethnic, racial or religious’ d’Iribarne (2010). As such, d’Iribarne (2010) sites as evidence the socio-economic problems faced by post-migration communities in France as evidence to argue that France has become increasingly racialised in the post-2005 era through significant discrimination along racial lines in areas including employment and housing. Consummate to this, Lorcerie (2010) argues that the barriers created in French society, its ‘glass ceiling’ are predominantly along ethno-racial lines.

However, to bring back a discussion of path dependency into this sketch of the evolution of French integration policy it is important to bring in the possibility of policy divergence and change. Therefore, it is important to note that while a frame is ‘a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient an actor within a policy sphere’ (Bleich 2011), cognitive and moral maps can and do change. Here, the idea of policies existing as ‘frames’ allows the conceptualisation of the ability to have a degree of room for manoeuvre within a frame, given that very few policy areas are so tightly constrained that there is no ‘wiggle room’. As such, while things get done a certain way because
that is how they have historically been done, this should not obscure movement at the micro level that sets policy on a different trajectory. This is the position at which France currently finds itself, with these micro-changes in policy trajectory beginning to occur within a static adherence to republican integrationism. This can be seen in the demands of national minorities for linguistic rights and the acknowledgement of their contribution to national heritage further challenge assimilation (Wihtol de Wenden 2004). Examples include groups such as the Basque, Breton and Provencal that are using the cultural and linguistic rights afforded to minorities by the EU to challenge France’s mono-cultural narrative to lobby for the right to have their languages taught in schools in a similar way to the Catalans, Welsh and Scots.

However, this is not the only area where a micro-movement away from assimilation is occurring with the policy frame in France. At the national level, Modood (2007) offers the suggestion that assimilation policy may be losing its hegemony as the only recognised means of managing difference. Here, two examples are important. In 2003, President Sarkozy was instrumental in creating the French Council of the Muslim Faith to represent all Muslims to the government in matters of worship and ritual (Modood 2010). How much credence to attach to this as a shift towards more multicultural policies, however, should be limited as Modood (2010) rightly argues that it can be seen as partly top down effort to control Muslims and funnel them down a particular route for both political and security reasons. The second
important example of a possible multicultural shift in France comes in the form of the 2005 founding of the country’s first black association (Modood 2007). This again hints to a multicultural shift in French policy, given that France has had a large black population for much of the second half of the twentieth century, one that Modood (2007) cites as double that of the UK at the time of the founding of the association, without having a black association.

Complimenting this possible policy shift at the national level, are several important studies that assert some degree of policy change at the local level. Here, by examining what in France is referred to as la politique de la ville, essentially what we call in English ‘local governance’, scholars have identified important policy shifts at the local level within an overt adherence to republican assimilation. Doytcheva’s (2007) research in the Garges-Les-Gonesse and Vitry areas of Paris identifies a ‘French affirmative action’ being practiced at the local level where post-migration communities are singled out for particular help, owing to their positions of economic and social deprivation, by the French state. Clearly this goes somewhat against an assimilationist policy tradition that has relied on formal political and legal equality as the means to fight socio-economic deprivation. To circumvent this possible clash of policy perspectives, Doytcheva (2007) has argued that implementers of these policies at the local level have explicitly not made this an affirmative action not based upon race as in the American example, but rather an ‘territorial positive discrimination’. Here, questions of inequality and mediating it
through special assistance is handled by zoning particular geographical areas as requiring special assistance and eligible for public funds for social programs and the upgrading of the built environment. However, in an important observation for this thesis, Doytcheva (2007) claims that this is not de jure announced, because of concerns over violating the principles of secular republicanism, but rather de facto practiced at the local. As such, thinking back to Bleich’s (2011) idea of path dependent policy frames that:

‘help actors identify problems and specify and prioritise their interests and goals; they point actors toward causal and normative judgements about effective and appropriate policies in ways that tend to propel policy down a particular path and to reinforce it once on that path’ (Bleich 2011)

We can see that in this case we are not witnessing complete path dependency. Rather, we are witnessing what can be described as a ‘soft’ policy path dependency where policy makers are finding ways to deviate away from assimilation which is still broadly located within the assimilationist policy frame by subverting assimilationist doctrine to fit a situation that rather requires a policy narrative of recognition to better handle the issues of inequality experienced by post-migration communities in France. It is important to say that this is clearly not unique to the French case, as Stroschein (2007) has correctly asserted, the importance of an informal local form of rule making as
the source of policy trajectories and even a moral regime with more clout than official rules, is common to many local contexts across the world.

In terms of examining Marseille more specifically within this discussion, Mitchell’s (2011) work confirms this assertion of the importance of the local level ‘politique de la ville’ in forcing policy trajectory change in France while still in some ways locating these policies in the assimilationist frame. Her paper presents one of the few scholarly works concerned directly with why Marseille did not riot in 2005. Her analysis attempts to explain Marseille’s peace with a similar starting point to this thesis – notably that ‘many scholarly studies focus on the historical processes that lead to rioting and war, but few examine the forces that produce peace’ (Mitchell 2011). With Paris as her counterpoint to Marseille, she suggests that three processes explain the absence of riots in Marseille, namely the city’s highly developed ethnic capitalism, the city’s particular geography, public infrastructure and social organisation, and finally the communitarian cultural approach of local officials. The strongest element of her analysis, given the common economic context outlined above between Marseille and the French cities that rioted, is the idea that officials in the city have adopted a ‘communitarian cultural approach (difference orientated)’ to minorities.

This is most notably seen in the Marseille Espérance forum, A forum that brings the heads of the city’s nine many religious communities
into the municipal authority to debate issues of importance to the city, to respond to crisis that might threaten communal harmony, and to be a constant representative of the city’s diversity in the public realm. The creator of the forum, Robert Vigeroux, served as the Mayor of Marseille from 1986 to 1995 and a brief examination of his motivations and inspirations for the creation of Marseille Espérance is important in further establishing why a variant policy narrative emerged in the city. Primarily, Marseille Espérance was created in response to the horrific desecration of an historic Jewish cemetery outside of Marseille by the far right. This catalyst, however, does not explain fully why a response to such an issue took the form of a political organ that openly recognises ethno-religious difference, as other such attacks have occurred in other regions of France without a similar policy response being noted. Examining more closely Vigeroux’s reflections on the creation of the forum offers important insight into how a city like could break out of the path dependency dictated by the national policy context. Personally, Vigeroux was not by occupation primarily a politician, but a Professor of Medicine. Here, he explains his thought processes as a detached and lateral thinker, able to consider novel ways to solve social problems (Vigeroux and Ouaknin 2005) that arguably demonstrates a lack of attachment to the particularistic knowledge of the French Republican assimilation strategy, but rather a spirit of objective scientific enquiry into a social pathology of intolerance. Vigeroux also served as a voluntary doctor in 1947, caring for Jews on their way to Palestine after liberation from

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6 See chapter 3 for full discussion of Marseille Espérance
the concentration camps of Europe (Manelli 2012). As such, while not seeking to establish agency through deductive reasoning, witnessing the horrors that resulted from the Nazi’s assimilationist ideas of racial purity may have provided Vigouroux with an impetus as a policy maker, alongside his scientific training, to think outside the box while operating within the French assimilationist policy context.

This does not mean, however, that Vigouroux and the city administration were free to completely abandon assimilation in public, still being constrained by the national adherence to the assimilation policy frame. This can be seen in Moore’s (2003) comparison of local policies of the management of difference in Manchester and Marseille and concluded that the French are moving towards the more Anglo-Saxon model of the management of cultural difference through the recognition of difference. However, in this case, at the time of his research in the early 2000s, this remained hidden and implicitly carried out without making a formal explicit statement that Marseille had decided to abandon assimilation and move towards a policy of recognition. In a book published by Vigouroux and Ouaknin (2005) this policy of recognising difference was presented as part of the assimilationist policy frame as an example of ‘secularism+religions’, where bringing religious leaders into the business of local politics through Marseille Espérance is part of an open and transparent secularism. This emergence of an interesting mix of policy trajectories regarding France’s post-migration difference
renders a discussion of the management of difference in France ever more relevant. As such, this brief discussion of the current state of play in French integration policy has begun to construct the means by which an analysis could be undertaken by examining the comparative policy trajectories of the three cities of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. It is to this question of ‘how?’ that this thesis now turns, and while this section has given a glimpse of the ideas that can be used to examine such policy divergence in Marseille from French norms, these must be far more rigorously fleshed out.

1.4 Methodology: Policy Narratives and Multiculturalism

This chapter has so far demonstrated that there might be some utility in examining comparative policy trajectories as a means to understand how Marseille might have escaped from the rioting seen in 2005 in other French cities owing to its ‘difference-orientated’ policy trajectory. To undertake a comparative analysis of such policies, however, requires a robust methodology. In this respect, the concept of ‘policy narratives’ offers particular utility as a means to conceptualise how different policy trajectories emerge and reproduce themselves. Indeed, it can clearly be seen that this has a direct relationship to the discussion of policy path dependency (Bleich 2011) above. This is because changes in policy narratives rarely occur in a drastic fashion, as we have seen above with the discussion of the tentative emergence of difference-orientated policies at the local level in France. Rather, change occurs within
particular constraints. Therefore, at any given time there is likely to be a degree of continuity and change within any evolution of a particular policy trajectory at any given time. For example, while there is evidence that in the local level in France of adoption recognition based policy narratives towards its post-colonial ethnic difference, policy makers still feel the need to cloak this change in assimilationist rhetoric. This is a somewhat ‘soft’ path dependency that demonstrates a key aspect of Boswell et al’s (2011) concept of policy narratives and how a particular narrative becomes salient.

As such, for any given policy issue there are multiple, competing and contradictory narratives that jostle for position (Boswell et al 2011). Predetermined interests clearly have an important role in rendering certain policy narratives more attractive given their perceived dovetailing with these existing interests. This means that there is clearly a bias towards inherent conservatism in any particular choice. French intellectuals have played a central role in keeping the French Republican model alive in public debate and politics (Boswell et al 2011) precisely because to move away from it would necessitate a departure from a political and policy tradition that these intellectuals are grounded in, and in turn reduce their utility in society as experts in this intellectual tradition. It is important to also recognise that this is a dialectical relationship, where interests are also shaped by existing knowledge and narratives, seen clearly here as in the example of French intellectuals as not separate from their knowledge but rather having their interests constituted by it as well as these interests then
going on to reproduce this knowledge and its deployment. However, lest one adopts a morally thin, instrumental conception of human nature, this explanation must be widened to take account of the cognitive features and persuasiveness of certain narratives over others (Boswell et al 2011). Within this, for a policy narrative to be cognitively appealing and persuasive it must be plausible, consistent and coherent. This may mean that the narrative is rendered vastly different meanings by policy actors, and that the policies ‘multi-interpretability’ is also important in this cognitive appeal. Therefore, the policy narratives need to be able to explain a certain reality to a mixed audience and offer a plausible explanation to why a certain situation has arisen and what can be done to solve it.

Several conceptual assumptions need to be made clear here before a more fuller discussion of the specificities of French policy can occur. Firstly, while there is a role for path-dependency and a certain degree of conservatism here, policy remains a dynamic process. As Boswel et al (2011) notes, there are many contending policy narratives that compete for salience in the face of any social issue. as such, there is no one ‘policy narrative’ in a particular situation, rather several which may gain or lose salience as time lapses. As such, there is no one specified author of a policy as the assumptions that govern a particular actors response to a policy issue are informed by a wide range sources including personal and social experience, media discourse, education and training and the dominant existing policy context, amongst a plethora of factors.
Normatively, it is also not enough to examine these policies as ‘accidents of history’ with some cities having a more inclusive historical trajectory than others. This may be true – but at the same time there is a significant room for maneuver. Examining Smith’s work (2005) on the origins of nations. For Smith (2005) historical memory is important in informing the symbolic content of the nation, as nearly all nations and nationalisms make recourse to far reaching historical evolution. However, for Smith (2005) history here takes on a symbolic and nuanced role. Rather than a history dominating because of objective factors, there is very much a subjective process of social construction at work where what is expressed is not history as such, but rather a very selective, subjective and instrumental symbolic repertoire that supports the requirements of the nation in a given period. The same can be applied here to history and policy narratives in that, while history has a role, the process of policy formation is subject to a significant degree of social construction depending of temporary and social contingencies.

These points frame this emerging analysis. However, they are not of primary importance for this study as it rather seeks to focus in on how policies are implemented or not in the public realm, and not how they are formed, discussed and evaluated by practitioners. As such, it is the application of these policies, and how they produce ‘shared social narratives’ (Anderson 1983) for post-migration communities that is important. As such, there is somewhat of a division here between the ‘policy narratives’ that govern the content and
assumptions of policy, and how policy should be applied to the social world, and the narratives they created for post-migration communities once applied to the social world. As such, a policy discussion might contain important assumptions about the nature of the actions of the state (for example, to recognize difference or not) that are quite separate from the actions the shared social narratives of these policies has once out in society. For example, in the French context, an assimilationist position on the states relationship to recognizing difference forms a policy stance on post-migration inclusion that may or may not generate inclusive social narratives for these communities. This is even the case as policy makers may intend this to be the case. However, critiques of multiculturalism such (Scheffer 2011) blame multicultural policy narratives, which again set out to create post-migration inclusion, do not have this desired affect and create increasing isolation and marginalization from society. These two brief examples also illustrate the earlier point that various narratives jostle for position in the wider debate about post-migration inclusion in contemporary Europe.

As has been discussed above, there is ample historical evidence to support a theoretical adherence to assimilationist policy in France. For example, France’s experience of the successful assimilation of, firstly its regions (Weber 1976), and secondly the multiple waves of immigrants from South and Eastern Europe up until the second world war leant Republican assimilation a significant policy kudos as a cognitively logical and persuasive policy narrative, based in real
world successes. As such, the dominant assimilationist policy narrative, discussed empirically to illustrate the national context in which this thesis is situated, forms a strong and well-versed policy narrative in France. Here, Paris can be conceptualized as falling in the policy narrative of assimilation in that, as the national capital and seat of government it is extremely hard for a deviation from the dominant national narrative to occur. Lyon, in a similar fashion as a regional centre of French industry, politics and culture has also been subject to policy makers utilizing the assimilationist, laïc policy frame in their particular dealings with the city’s large post-migration communities. The exception here is Marseille, with its lack of rioting and its unique ‘difference-based’ mode of governance as described by Mitchel (2011). For this to be accounted for, this thesis must construct a contrasting policy narrative by which to account for possible variations that have been hypothesized for with the case of Marseille.

To construct an image of what this contrasting policy narrative could look like requires drawing on the vein of scholarship concerned with the management of difference. Key in this literature is the idea that offering public ‘recognition’ of minority difference is vital in providing them a place in society (Taylor 1994). This is because of two interrelated processes stemming from this official recognition of difference as it enables the ‘socio-cultural’ validation of the presence of minorities in society, but also facilitates the fighting of socio-economic inequality by tackling discrimination by qualifying minority
groups and identifying the particular problems that they face (Kymlicka 2002). Therefore, this thesis refers to the policy narrative that contrasts to ‘assimilation’ as a policy narrative of recognition. This borrows directly from Taylor’s (1994) formulation of multiculturalism as recognition, a key work in broadening the debate about where inclusive narratives can be created with his focus on the role of giving public recognition to minority cultures to legitimate their position in society, thus facilitating their inclusion. This does not mean, however, that this ‘recognition’ approach to policy can unproblematically applied without some important caveats. Scholars such as Modood (2007, 2010) and Naidoo (2005) argue that this approach could further reinforce otherness by setting ‘minority’ cultures as unitary, homogenous blocks separate from the equally intransient and homogenous ‘majority’ culture thus ignoring the many cleavages and nuances of groups in society. This criticism clearly holds some significant water, rightly questioning the assumptions of unified minority or majority cultures as to use terms such as ‘Muslim minority’ ‘white majority’ and such like overshadows the significant internal heterogeneity present within such socially constructed groups. While this debate will be more fully addressed in the subsequent chapter, it is enough here to say that, in the opinions of scholars such as Modood (2007, 2010) and Naidoo (2005) it is rather more fruitful and less problematic to focus on the diversity that constitutes society as a whole rather than particular groups within it. However, importantly, this should not be taken to invalidate the idea of recognition, but rather should be seen as a modification to the
concept as the focus does not change – even the critiques and updates to Taylor’s (1994) original thesis maintain a focus on how public culture plays an important role in how inclusion can be created. In addition, the intellectual efforts to reform multiculturalism in light of its sustained critique also make a case for more accurate depiction of how history has constituted the present by taking into account the inherent diversity of influences that have exerted influence in a specific place (Naidoo 2005). In addition, the Parekh report, produced by The Runnymede Trust (2000) to investigate the future of multiethnic Britain, demonstrates how to apply this particular approach in specific policy terms. It argues that work should be in tandem in both public culture and historical commemoration to redefining ‘Britishness’ to take into account its multifaceted nature in a multicultural context along with a commemoration of the nations history that takes account the role that Britain’s post-migration communities have played.

Therefore, it is important to note that, in line with the assumptions of the theoretical literature on the subject, post-migration communities would feature frequently and in positive positions within each themes for a case that could be argued to be following a policy narrative of recognition. Taylor’s (1994) work on the politics of recognition draws strongly on the empirical assumptions underlying what is consider to be one of the most successful examples of multiculturalism in Canada, where post-migration communities are given public recognition in cities such as Toronto and Vancouver as valuably
contributing to Canadian national prosperity. One only has to look to examples of cities where the opposite is true. To take extreme examples, both Belfast during the troubles, and Beirut in the civil war, as well as practicing a spatial exclusion between communities, also experienced dis-jointed narratives of inclusion, where opposing groups peddled contending views of who exactly were the legitimate residents of the city. This is not to say that this thesis sets out expecting anything nearly as radical or as clear cut from the three cases examined here, or indeed that this thesis might in fact not find any evidence of a differing policy narrative in Marseille.

1.5 Roadmap to the thesis

The remainder of this study consists of six chapters. In chapter 2 I examine the conceptual dimensions of this analysis, where I firstly assess the current scholarship on Marseille in depth. This chapter also seeks to discuss how identities can be argued to be created by shared social narratives in the city, then examining the implications of using the term ‘post-migration’ community before giving an in-depth examination of the multicultural theory that will be drawn upon to define and assess possible policy narratives of recognition. Chapter 3 draws on this theoretical discussion to forms the first substantive chapter of this thesis, where I examine what the policies of municipal governance across the three cases of Paris, Lyon and Marseille can tell us about their comparative policy trajectories and whether Marseille stands out for pursuing a policy narrative based upon
recognition. Chapter 4 takes this analysis to the subject of public cultural policy to examine how a narrative of recognition might have been applied in Marseille and what the contrasting policy trajectories in Paris and Lyon might look like. Chapter 5 forms the final substantive chapter where this thesis analyses how the policies of the public commemoration of history have addressed post-migration communities across Paris, Lyon and Marseille. In chapter 6 I draw some conclusions, first assessing which policy narratives are being applied to the question of post-migration communities in Paris and Lyon before examining Marseille and what difference, if any, there may be in terms of adopting policy narratives based around the recognition of difference.
Chapter 2: Contextualising the Marseille Puzzle: Defining Identity, the City and Inclusion

2.1.1 Contextualising The ‘Marseille Puzzle’: Explaining a lack of rioting

2.1.2 Deep, Shallow, Mythical or Oscillating? Asserting a Marseillais Urban Identity

2.1.3 Addressing the Historical Specificities of Far-Right Support in Marseille

2.2.1 Defending ‘Identity’

2.2.2 Shared Social Narratives and Identity Construction:

2.2.3 Attaching Identity Construction to the Urban: The imagined city

2.3 Moving Beyond Religion and Responding to ‘Super-Diversity’: Defining the ‘Post-Migration’ Community

2.4.1 Defining Inclusion

2.4.2 Rebutting Assimilation
2.4.3 (Re)Building Multiculturalism

2.5 Conclusion

This thesis seeks to outline the reasons for the lack of rioting in Marseille by examining how its possible policy divergence from the French norms of assimilation has facilitated post-migration communities to feel accepted as part of the city through instituting a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration difference. Conversely, this thesis brings in the examples of Paris and Lyon as cities that both sit within the French policy norms of assimilation that do not offer a narrative of recognition and experienced extensive rioting both before, and during, the disturbances of 2005. This chapter sets out the factual and conceptual background to this puzzle by setting out the fundamental approaches to identity and the inclusion of ethno-religious difference that will be drawn on to define this policy difference in Marseille, based around recognition.

This chapter begins by discussing the existing empirical scholarship on Marseille. Of particular importance in identifying how to situate an analysis of comparative policy narratives between Marseille and cities that rioted, such as Paris and Lyon, are two key aspects of enquiry. Firstly, this chapter analyses the existing competing explanations of the central research puzzle that is Marseille’s lack of rioting with the key existing explanations making reference to the city’s specific economic development, geography, public
infrastructure and the communitarian cultural approach of local officials. As such, this literature addresses important aspects of explaining why Marseille escaped large-scale unrest in 2005, but neglects a discussion of the role that a narrative based social identity could have played in mediating against unrest. Secondly, so as to situate the explanation presented in this analysis that a divergent policy narrative based upon recognition of difference has created an identity of Marseille open to post-migration communities, this chapter examines and discusses the existing scholarship that substantiates the existence of this identity. The scholarship, while asserting that such an association exists between post-migration communities and an idea of being Marseillais, has largely neglected to examine and analyse exactly why the idea of being Marseillais is salient in the city and why it presents an identity that can be accessed by members of the city’s large post-migration populations. As stated, this thesis attempts to explain these phenomena by examining the city’s policy narrative regarding the management of difference and if it has diverted from the French norms of assimilation. For an analysis of this puzzle to occur this thesis requires a strong conceptual framework in which to analyse how a socially constructed identity can work to foster inclusion across ethnic divides.

As such, this chapter moves onto assembling the required conceptual framework for how a divergent policy narrative based on recognition could define an identity in Marseille. This chapter does this by first engaging with the literature that defines how social
narratives construct identities. This literature is a well-established feature of the study of nationalism and ethnicity, where it is theorised that the sharing of common narratives, generated through a wide range of textural and symbolic resources, produces ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 2006) that we can imagine ourselves part of without ever meeting or knowing each individual member of that community. While this vein of literature seeks to explain the emergence of these communities on the grand geographical and demographic scale of nations, its conceptual relevance to the construction of urban identities is highly theorised and well developed. In particular, urban sociology has long been concerned with how the city exists not just in its physical form, but in the imagined form it takes in our consciousness. While this literature establishes the importance of place and physicality in creating this construction, it also identifies that narratives, symbolic and textural, bear significant influence on how we imagine the city and the normative conventions of its population.

This chapter then moves on to justify the choice of language employed in this analysis to define whose inclusion we intend to discuss. Most important in this is presenting a robust argument for intentionally eschewing the language of ‘ethnic’ ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ minorities and rather adopting the term ‘post-migration community’. Conceptually, this is rooted in an analysis of the empirical and theoretical concerns in the cases analysed here and in the theoretical debates in the discipline more generally. An analysis of
the 2005 riots presents a complex picture of who rioted, which cut across possible distinctions made in terms of naturalisation status, racial, ethnic and religious affiliations, even though many of the rioters and their concerns stemmed from their association with an ‘immigrant’ background. Within this, many were not immigrants, but rather born in France to families with immigrant origins, therefore the adoption of post-migration community is an apt term because it serves as a means to connect these diverse backgrounds through their common origins in some form of migration. In addition, the theoretical concerns with ‘superdiversity’ \(^7\) and ‘plurality’ \(^8\) in contemporary European cities also render the mix of peoples present in the three cases of Paris, Lyon and Marseille too complex for a simple analysis of a particular ethnic or religious group and their inclusion in a policy narrative based upon recognition.

The final task of this chapter is to define what terms such as ‘recognition’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘assimilation’ mean in the following analysis. It is important to note here that this is no small task, as all of these terms are contested and multivalent, requiring a nuanced discussion of their theoretical and practical evolution to extract their continued relevance to such an analysis of possible policy divergence across the cases of Paris, Lyon and Marseille.

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\(^7\) See Vertovec (2005) where he identifies the process by which identifiable ethnic minorities are being supplanted by many, new smaller, scattered, multiple origin communities, often without the historical links to the host country that ethnic minorities enjoyed in the post-colonial era.

\(^8\) Cities such as Marseille, Malmö, Birmingham and Leicester are losing an identifiable numerical ethnic or religious majority that is being replaced by many smaller groups.
2.1.1 Contextualising the Marseille Puzzle - Explaining a lack of rioting

It has already been stated that the focus of this thesis is to offer an explanation of why Marseille bucks such a powerful and all-encompassing trend towards urban unrest in France by examining the possibility that it has adopted a difference orientated policy. However, it is important to note that this thesis is not the first attempt to offer an explanation for Marseille’s lack of rioting. It is therefore important to engage from the outset of this thesis with existing explanations of Marseille’s lack of rioting. Policy makers, scholars and journalists have generated a flurry of interest in a city that is the single anomaly that stayed peaceful while 274 French cities experienced such powerful and destructive unrest. Common themes do emerge in the journalistic work done on the city that attempts to explain why the city did not riot. Key in this is recourse to the city’s geography, set between the sea on one side and beaches on the other. So the rationale goes, the lack of room behind the city has prevented the urban sprawl characteristic of Paris (Caldwell 2005) (Dickey 2012), thus preventing the same hyper-marginalised and geographically isolated high-rise estates. This is, however, a flawed assertion empirically in that, while Marseille is indeed smaller than Paris, the city clearly does have analogous areas of marginalisation in its Northern neighbourhoods to those that sparked the riots in Paris. In this sense, it is important to note that Hargreave’s (2007) judged these areas of Marseille comparable in their marginalisation
to areas that rioted in Paris and Lyon. The second common geographical argument advanced by journalists is that the free and open social spaces of the city’s beaches facilitate a means by which people commonly come together (Arnold 2005). This is again without a significant depth of analysis of how the common spaces of other French cities could be argued not to be providing this function, such as the extensive free social spaces offered by riverside areas of Lyon or the shared public spaces of Paris. Kimmelman (2007a) advances an argument that rap in the city acts as a means by which tension can be mitigated and cross-communal relationships can be made. Again, this lacks a rigorous comparative explanation as to why the extensive rap scenes present in other French cities, most notably Paris, do not offer the same function.

Mitchell’s (2011) paper presents one of the few scholarly works concerned directly with why Marseille did not riot in 2005. Her analysis attempts to explain Marseille’s peace with a similar starting point to this thesis – notably that ‘many scholarly studies focus on the historical processes that lead to rioting and war, but few examine the forces that produce peace’ (Mitchell 2011). With Paris as her counterpoint to Marseille, she suggests that three processes explain the absence of riots in Marseille, namely the city’s highly developed ethnic capitalism, the city’s particular geography, public infrastructure and social organisation, and finally the communitarian cultural approach of local officials. While making some ground in explaining the city’s social cohesion, her attempt ultimately falls short owing to
the limits of its comparative element with Paris and its lack of a causal explanation for several of her key assumptions that render her analysis somewhat unconvincing.

To begin, she compares the economic structures of Paris and Marseille as a means to explain that the city’s chiefly North African migrant population is shielded from some of the negative effects of its exclusion from mainstream economic advancement in a way not possible in Paris. Paris, she argues, is a centre of French capitalism, and a key node in the European and global financial system (Mitchell 2011). This course of capitalist development excludes those from ethnic minority backgrounds in two levels. Firstly, its dependence on highly skilled and educated workers excludes those with little formal education, and even when those from ethnic minority backgrounds get a university education, they are disproportionately excluded from this mode of employment based on their ethnicity or address thus reinforcing deprivation in these communities (Mitchell 2011). Marseille, while suffering from similar socio-economic deprivation concentrated in minority communities, the city’s highly developed ethnic capitalism offers these communities opportunities for socio-economic advancement. Here, she concentrates her analysis on the Belsunce area of the central city where significant trade occurs between Marseille and North Africa. This occurs both for residents within the city, who seek out goods from the Maghreb such as food items, and those travelling to the city from the Maghreb seeking goods that are expensive in North African such as German cars,
training shoes and untaxed gold (Mitchell 2011). These networks work somewhat outside of official channels and work through networks of trust governed by sanctions of shame, exclusion from business and physical violence, especially when dealing with organised crime networks.

On the surface, this may seem like a persuasive argument in as much as both structures of economic inclusion and exclusion do indeed exist and can be convincingly argued to act in the way described here. However, the analysis does not do enough to demonstrate like-for-like in the scale and complexity of these economic structures that would be required to assert a causal significance that could be explanatory of the variance in rioting. As such, comparing the advanced economy of the Parisian region to the ethnic capitalism chiefly conducted by one community, the Maghrebs, in a single neighbourhood of Marseille arguably risks equating wildly divergent structures when far more appropriate contrasts could be made. A better comparison would have been arguably to the ethnic capitalism structures of one of the towns of the Parisian suburbs such as Seine-Saint-Denis, Vitry or Nanterre that actually rioted and contain significant, yet understudied, ethnic capitalism (Kepel 2011). Also, there are areas of central Paris such as Barbès and Belleville that are within Paris proper that have significant Maghrebi populations and also trade between France and North Africa. Lyon is notable by its absence from Mitchell’s work and with a comparable size to Marseille and being the birthplace of social unrest by minority
communities in France might have acted as a better comparison in this regard. The Lyonnais neighbourhood of Guillotière also exists as central to the city of Lyon in a similar manner to Belsunce in Marseille and contains large numbers of Maghrebi run businesses and significant ethnic capitalism. Also neglected in her work is an examination of the continual move towards air transport and how this might challenge the centrality of Marseille’s sea routes as the connector between France and North Africa. A move to air travel might have advantaged cities such as Lyon and Paris to supplant some of the high value service provision such as money transfer and the trade in gold that once centred on the sea routes into the Maghreb provided by Marseille’s port.

Linked to these economic structures are the differing structures of space and residence that Mitchell basis her second argument around. Here, she rightly argues that the economic development of Paris has caused the entrenchment of living patterns where the poor, disproportionately composed of post-migration communities, are forced to the outskirts. While this started with refugees and migrant workers arriving in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the cities continued gentrification has forced many more to the periphery. This, she argues is buttressed sociologically by a longstanding racialisation and stigmatisation of the inhabitants of the outskirts of Paris, going back over 100 years to discrimination against early migrants and gypsies who inhabited the outskirts of Paris. Typical of marginalised post-migration communities of the era, many lived precarious
economic existences as itinerant labourers or as traders of second hand goods. This structure means that Paris exists as a ‘dual city’ where there is a sharp division between the wealthy white core of the city and its impoverished suburbs. Marseille, on the other hand, she argues, was welcoming to outsiders from the start due in part to the cities founding myth as a creation of the marriage of a Phoenician sailor from Asia minor to the daughter of a local tribal leader. This, she argues continues through the centrality of the city to the empires of Greece, Rome and France, culminating in the arrival and settlement of North African traders in the Belsunce district in the early 20th century. She argues that, rather than existing as a ‘dual city’ with the poor existing on the excluded margins of the city, in Marseille, although they are still clustered together by ethnicity and economic deprivation, this marginalisation forms a ‘triangle of poverty’ that includes part of the central city. This, she argues, is why minority ethnic youths frequent all parts of the city centre for leisure activities, included the Parc Borély that sits in the city’s richest neighbourhood. This frequency of the use of the central city, in her opinion, coincides with the youths’ feelings of ownership of the entire city, and not just the area in which they reside.

These are arguments that are somewhat valid, as certain parts of the Parisian suburbs demonstrate Europe’s most advanced levels of socio-economic marginalisation (Wacquant 2007). However, other parts, such as Nueilly-sur-Seine are extremely wealthy. Even the houses surrounding the notorious estates of Clichy-Sous-Bois are
home to working middle class white French individuals, something a rush hour trip on the suburban train lines will aptly demonstrate. Again, in like-for-like terms Mitchell misses the key analytical opportunity provided by Lyon as a comparison to Marseille. While Lyon’s marginalised communities are concentrated in its suburbs, in a similar sense to Marseille it also has significant marginalisation close to its commercial centre in the form of the la Guillotière neighbourhood on the banks of the Rhône, which then radiates out to marginalised suburbs of Villeurbanne and Vénissieux. This similar connection to a node of ethnically rich, economically poor residents similar to Belsunce in Marseille does not stop these areas Lyon being the first to riot in France. Added to this she does not attempt a statistical comparison of youth movements or ownership of central Paris. Minority ethnic youths from the suburbs of Paris can be frequently observed in central areas of Paris taking advantage of the city’s leisure services. The implications of this are not fully examined and are worthy of more research, as they might not translate into feelings of ownership over the central city in the same way as Mitchell hypothesises for Marseille.

Mitchell’s final section of analysis concentrates on understanding the efforts made at the local level to manage difference in the city that has significant relevance to a comparative study of policy trajectories as conducted here. Here, she situates this analysis correctly in the on-going tension between a multi-ethnic society full of active minority ethnic associations yet a continued adherence to assimilationist non-
recognition of difference at the level of the state. For her, Marseille Espérance, the city’s inter-religious forum that meets with and works with the mayor is an example of how the local authorities of Marseille are relieving this tension at the local level by subverting assimilation and legitimising the presence of cultural minorities in the city. This is indeed an important element in why the city has been free from social violence, yet at the same time the focus of the paper also does not fully expand on the other important areas that the local policy of the city dictates that have significant possible implications for preserving peace in the city during the riots of 2005 that this thesis examines. Vital to underpinning an analysis of a divergent policy trajectory in Marseille is examining the debate concerning the city’s urban identity.

2.1.2 Deep, Shallow, Mythical or Oscillating? Asserting a Marseillais Urban Identity

Existing scholarship has concentrated on asserting the existence of a strong urban identity in Marseille inclusive to post-migration communities, but has neglected to fully elaborate how a divergent policy environment could have enabled this identity to gain its inclusivity to post-migration communities. The attribute of a Marseillais identity to accommodate ethnic and religious difference is an important feature of Marseillais identity that comes up in a documentary about the city. Here, an individual of Algerian origin who was born in Marseille argues that ‘the Marseillais cannot be
defined as black, white or red, a Marseillais is a Marseillais’ (Bringer 2007). This is articulating an idea that a Marseillais identity exists that is somehow managing to appeal to residents of the city from a number of different backgrounds. An investigation into the city’s Muslim community conducted by the Open Societies Foundation (OSF 2011a) recorded a significant identification with the idea of being from the city by both Muslim and non-Muslim residents of one of the city’s poorest districts. However, this report does not seek to examine why this may be the case, or how such an identity might come into being in Marseille as opposed to other French cities. The idea that the identity of the city is a strong source of identity for residents of the city from all communities is a sentiment consistently expressed in the fieldwork conducted for this thesis. Staff from the Marseille Provence European Capital of Culture 2013 organising committee expressed that a key advantage of organising such an event in the city was the city’s strong sense of identity. In addition, they felt that their attempts to include a diversity of cultures that are present in the city in their programme was facilitated by this strong sense of identity being inclusive to this diversity. Also, the staff of Marseille Espérance, the interfaith forum that works with the city’s Mayor noted that their job in mediating community tensions was helped by the fact that the identity of the city was inclusive to those that came from outside of France.

The most in-depth and significant piece of research done to date on identity in Marseille is Cesari et al (2001). This study found that
regardless of their ethnicity, working class children from Marseille feel a strong sense of identity in being from Marseille, and this has a powerful function in creating integration. As such, for a young person in Marseille their identity is primarily one that is connected to the city ‘he is Marseillais, first and foremost Marseillais’ (Cesari et al 2001), with allegiance to their neighbourhood within the city coming a distant second. Their research also highlighted the context into which this identity exists. Algerians of second and third generation in Marseille see themselves as very dissimilar to their counterparts in Algeria, while at the same time not being considered authentically French, an assumption informed by their treatment in French society and media discourses constantly questioning the place of immigrants, specifically Muslims, in France (Cesari et al 2001). Also, it is important to note that ‘they feel less French than Marseillais, in the sense that the latter attribute is not questioned in public discourse’ (Cesari et al 2001) in as much that they did not consider the notion of their Marseillais identity as being contested in public discourse while their connection to France being the subject of continued questioning regardless of the long term presence of French born citizens of Algerian origin. Here, this could hint at a divergence in policy trajectories towards recognition in the city if ethnic minority youths do not feel that their attachment to the city is question in the public realm. This could be because of a difference orientated local policy that remakes the image of the Marseille in the public realm to take into account these communities. However, this is not a thread that Cesari et al (2001) take up, which leaves this task to the analysis
conducted in this thesis. This is even in light of the fact that Cesari et al (2001) argue that a demand exists for integration policy in France that takes post-migration communities with the acknowledgement of their ethnic differences. Cesari et al’s (2001) work, while offering an important insight into the fact that a strong urban identity exists in the city, does not attempt to explain how and why this identity could be inclusive to post-migration communities and misses a significant opportunity to examine how local policy might be affecting this.

It is also important to note that the idea of a unifying urban identity in the city is not without its detractors. However, importantly, while there have been questions about the significance of the idea of the city in Marseille, these detractors do not deny that it exists. Nassourdine Haidari, a former Imam and current member of the city council, cast doubts on the idea that identifying with the city in Marseille was substantive. He agreed that people identify with the idea, but he was sceptical that it went any deeper than superficial loyalties to things like the city’s football team. This is a sentiment asserted by the French sociologist Parodi (2002) in his comments that: ‘A territorial identity cannot be a substitute for a social identity’ where ‘Marseille is not a social identity, to be Marseillais is good, but it is superficial’ (Parodi 2002, author’s translation). A journalist writing for the French monthly newspaper *Le Monde diplomatique* described the ‘flickering myth’ of Marseille’s integration where ‘Most of the immigrants are in a humiliating social non-world [in the city]’ (Pons 1997, author’s translation). These two conclusions are both rooted in the social
context of the city with its educational, economic, infrastructural and crime problems. These problems clearly are serious and significant in their own right and do not *per se* aide in the urban integration equation, often cited as they are in the contexts of Paris and Lyon as key reasons why social unrest is a regular occurrence. However, it has been the position of this thesis from its outset that allowing such problems to preclude one having significant attachment to a city is taking an overly materialist position on the construction of the social world. Clearly, while efficient law and order, decent education and employment prospects are important, they are not the only things that shape our understanding of our position in the social world and are not the only areas in which municipal authorities can deploy their efforts to offer inclusion to migrant groups.

Again, both Pons (1997) and Parodi (2002) do not examine the possibility that the identity of being Marseillais offers important mechanisms for the inclusion of the city’s residents because of the role of shared social narratives in its integrative and inclusive effect as a product of a policy trajectory that offers a narrative of recognition in the face of a national context dominated by an insistence on Republican assimilation that doesn’t allow for the public recognition of minority identities that the scholars who examine the question of the management of difference would argue presents its own psychological ‘non-existence’\(^9\). In addition to this theoretical insight

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\(^9\) Taylor (1994) makes this argument that with holding the public recognition of the validity of minority cultures inflicts significant psychological damage on minority groups already at the thin end of a power differential vis-à-vis the majority group in society.
into material security only being one aspect of a multifaceted process of integration, the empirical evidence drawn from research on French urban regeneration does not support the hypothesis that an improved material context ensure a smooth integration process. There are significant examples of where urban regeneration of the physical environment has taken place in Paris and Lyon, at great economic cost, residents have commented that this is not enough to ensure social cohesion in both cases (Kepel 2011, Dikeyc 2007). Cesari et al (2001) address this issue in the context of Marseille where their analysis, while taking into consideration the problems of the city still advance that its strength is in providing a local framework of inclusion for its inhabitants despite the national climate of assimilation.

2.1.3 Addressing the Historical Specificities of Far-Right Support in Marseille

It is impossible to sufficiently address the question of the existence of a Marseillais identity inclusive to post-migration communities created by a divergent policy narrative based on recognition without addressing a possibly contradictory phenomenon to this hypothesised inclusion. This is the significant support that far right parties, such as the French National Front see in voting patterns in and around the city. There is an important particularistic explanation for far right support in Marseille, and to a certain extent other large French cities that cannot be applied as easily to contexts such as the UK or Holland. This is the question of the Pieds Noirs (‘black feet’),
who returned from France’s North African possessions, most numerously from Algeria, after an extremely violent and bitterly contested war of independence (Naylor 2000). The ghost of the shock of de Gaulle’s decision to grant independence to Algeria, and the resulting mass exodus of European settlers to France, numbering in the millions, still haunts France, and these communities in particular, in a way analogous to no other decolonising experience in Europe. Some, such as L’Hermine (2012) have attributed the support of the far right to this community in particular, owing to the continuing legacy of collective trauma after experiencing first-hand the trauma of this upheaval. L’Hermine (2012) supports these claims by examining what he describes as a ‘symbol community’ of Pied-Noirs in Carnoux-en-Provence, a town on the outskirts of Marseille where he estimates is 60% constituted by returning settlers from North Africa. Here, his analysis of electoral data finds between 30-40% of the vote going to the national front, far higher than the national average that hovers around the 10-20% mark (L’Hermine 2012). His conclusions, as he notes, are somewhat limited by the fact that they are based on estimating the population of Pied-Noirs owing to the lack of record keeping for such data in France. However flawed, this does offer an interesting insight into possible cleavages that may be beyond the ability of an inclusive urban identity created by a policy narrative of recognition to bridge.

It can be observed clearly from this discussion that there are significant scholarly shortcomings in existing discussions of urban
identity in Marseille. This work is, however, useful to contextualise this study in existing research on Marseille as it informs and also marks out an analysis of the city’s policy for a possible divergence from assimilation to recognition. It is now the task of this chapter to define two vital aspects of how such a divergent policy narrative towards recognition in the city could foster an inclusive urban identity that mitigates against disturbances. This chapter will firstly define how the type of shared social narratives that are created by policies of recognition create ‘imagined communities’ at the level of the city. Finally, before moving to the empirical section of this thesis this chapter will also examine the debates around the deployment of integration policies based on recognition.

2.2.1 Defending ‘Identity’

Identity is a term that will be used repeatedly in this thesis when discussing how the three cities offer collective self-understandings through policies to their residents that may or may not be inclusive to post-migration communities. The use of this term is not as straightforward as one might initially presume. While Tilly (1996) regarded the term as ‘indispensable’, more recently Brubaker and Cooper (2000) have argued for the term identity to be dropped from the scholar’s conceptual toolbox because it is ambiguous and sometimes contradictory especially when compared across different contexts. ‘If identity is everywhere it is nowhere, if it is fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden,
congeal and crystallise? (Brubaker and Cooper 2000) and ‘Identity...bears a multivalent, even contradictory theoretical burden...do we really need it?’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). This thesis sides with Tilly in advocating the continued use of the term because Brubaker and Cooper’s arguments can be, for the sake of this study at least, supplanted by a careful and rigorous understanding of what we take the term to mean in the context of this particular analysis. This would avoid considerable problems possibly created by dropping the term or separating its various definitions into discrete terms. This is because if the terms multivalence and ambiguity stem from the complexity of identities as diverse social phenomena, it would be intellectually inaccurate for one to try and simplify this to fit a vocabulary, or unnecessarily clutter the vocabulary on the subject by using terms for each manifestation and nuance of identity.

‘Identity’ and ‘identities’, as thematic rubrics, are formed by diverse and complex processes and occurrences, and have numerous utilities and meanings. Identities and identity can be and are all of those listed in the citation above, in different contexts. Arguing that they are too complex and contradictory to be possibly compatible in one term, is to look at the social world in a too rational, simplistic and ordered fashion. Although it is the job of the social scientists to sometimes generalise and simplify to viably theorise beyond the specifics of a certain example, this should not be at the cost of oversimplification and outright intellectual impreciseness, as this...
renders any analysis useless. In order to overcome the complexities and problems of defining ‘identity’ and ‘identities’, one should approach these terms as one should any other, in that words represent metaphorical containers, into which a meaning must be poured. Therefore, when one is using the ‘container’ of identity, as an analytical or conceptual tool, they should “pour” in the meaning relevant to that context, thereby escaping the ambiguities and contradictions of definition outlined above. Clearly if in the context being analysed, identities are changing in form and prominence, one must state this, as identities do not constitute themselves identically in all contexts.

Broadly speaking, this need to very carefully define the meaning scholars ascribe to identities has already been met in abundance in social theory. Primordialism considers ethnic identities to be something ‘deeply meaningful and uniquely powerful, irreducible to other social forces or phenomena’ (Cornell and Hartmann 1998), that are ‘fixed, basic to human life’. This understanding has come under sustained and deserved critique owing to its inability to give credence to social factors in the creation and changing importance of identity. Primordialism also offers little flexibility when examining dynamics in the meanings, properties and importance of identities over time. This renders it unsuitable for the study of the way that policies could create narratives of inclusion that mitigate against social unrest in a city such as Marseille as it leaves little room for policies to influence our self understandings. As a useful repost to primordialism, social
constructivism intellectually refutes such essentialist understandings of identity, by taking the position that ‘all communities are imagined’ (Anderson 2006) and offering a means of conceptualising the effect of the social world on how humanity develops its diverse and varied means of collective self understanding. Identities as theorised here have constructed, changing and fluid attributes rather than being essential, unchanging and universal givens to an individual. This thesis owes a particular debt to those social constructivist arguments concerned with the formation of self-understandings through the sharing of public narratives.

2.2.2 Shared Social Narratives and Identity Construction

Social constructivism as a working definition of identity offers a robust starting point by which to identify the relationship between possible policy divergence to a recognition narrative in Marseille and the construction of the city’s urban identity. In this case, identity is taken to mean the self-understandings that individuals acquire through the sharing of public social narratives, which borrows heavily on the social-constructivist vein of theory advocated by the likes of Anderson (2006), Tilly (1996) and Taylor (2004). Importantly, the application of this idea of an a collective self understanding rooted in an imagined concept has been the subject of significant theorising regarding the imagined nature of urban space and identity. This section of the thesis proceeds with a discussion of the social theory concerned with the formation of collective understandings through
the sharing of social narratives and then proceeds to discuss the relevance of how this work has been applied to the city. Anderson’s work on the formation of imagined communities offers important insights into the process of how the diverse ‘many’ come to have a common identity based not on face-to-face interactions, but through the sharing of narratives (Anderson 2006). Anderson’s work addressed itself to explaining the rise of nations in enlightenment Europe. In his view, key in the rise and persistence of the first nations and nationalisms in Europe was the ability for its members, who can never possibly meet each and every other fellow member of their community, to imagine that they are all part of the one group, in this case to ‘think the nation’ (Anderson 2006).

This was facilitated through the parallel cultural developments of a common vernacular language and the rise of print capitalism, where the cultural output was distributed widely due to the capitalist urge to seek profit and find new markets (Anderson 2006). This enabled disparate individuals to consume the same culture, through newspapers, at the same time in a ritualised manner. However, due to the geographical scale of nations and the size of their populations, these communities are only ever “imagined” because the people who perceive themselves as members of this group will never meet each other (Anderson 2006). For Anderson the resulting community was constructed, and thus open to constant change as the community can be imagined in many different ways (Anderson 2006). The contrasting community for Anderson was the pre-industrial, inwardly
looking village, whose community functions precisely because individuals know each other and meet each other owing to the small geographical size of the village, and the intimacy permitted by the small size of its population. Clearly here the developments Anderson conceptualises in his thesis all intimately involve the city. It is the migration from the inward village to the city that makes the change in identity possible, in his view, as the population was sucked into Europe’s growing centres of cultural and industrial production such as Paris, Manchester and London. Also, the narratives created in terms of both news in newspapers, and narrative works of culture, were overwhelmingly shaped by, and produced in the context of the city (King 2007). In fact, it has been argued that the effect of print capitalism in the emergence of nationalism is clearer in respect to cities than rural settings (Harris 1994). This is because newspapers carried news principally generated by urban events, such as crime, politics and innovations in culture and arts. In some senses, it was also the cultural and social norms of the identity of the capital city which overwhelmingly shaped those enforced on the rest of the nation, in the way that Parisian French was enforced as the national French dialect, when in reality it was simply one amongst many in pre-modern France. As such, it is even possible to argue that a sleight of hand occurs in the theory, as in the rise of nationalism itself, where the ‘city’ is actually replaced with the term ‘nation’, so much is the influence of the former exerted on the latter.
This demonstrates something important about Anderson’s work on the imagined community in as much as the forging of the nation did not destroy previous identities, even in the case of assimilationist France that has always remained a ‘de facto multiculturalist country’ (Wihtol de Wenden 2007) due to its significant regional linguistic and ethnic minorities that far pre-date mass immigration from Asia and Africa. Rather, it supplanted to diverse regional, linguistic and religious self-understandings already existing in French territory. This means that the identity of the nation, which the imagined community first deals with, has been forced to be cosmopolitan from the beginning by the nature of society and how individuals conceive of identity. Rather than becoming a superior hegemonic force in society, the nation, at best, became part of the repertoire of identities that individuals have, and at worst, became an outright point of rejection and contention. This is demonstrated by the continued struggle of numerous groups within so-called ‘nation-states’ for autonomy of various kinds, including the Bretons, Basques and the Provencaux in France.

Thus, the forging of the national ‘one’ from the ‘many’ was not simply a linear process that obliterated all that existed before and would prevent the expression of difference in the future. It was something that occurred in cooperative and at times contradictory terms. At best, this involved creating a new layer of identity above regional, tribal, ethnic and religious affiliations bounded by territory, in the case of France this involved the incorporation of many disparate peoples into
a notion of being French, turning the ‘peasant’ into the ‘Frenchman’ (Weber 1976). This did not mean that the peasant lost what it meant to be Breton as he worked in Paris, or indeed what it meant to be Provencal when he migrated to Algiers or Oran to seek his fortune. Therefore, given the familiarity that the concept of the imagined community has with the city means that it is highly applicable to the context being analysed here of forming an inclusive social identity in Marseille. This is because it provides the basic understanding that the social narratives existing in our environment shape our self-understandings. Importantly, and building on this work, the idea of the ‘imaginary of society’ add some conceptual flesh to this understanding of identity formation through the sharing of narratives.

The body of work concerned with the ‘imaginary of society’, taking direct inspiration from Anderson’s work on the emergence of the nation, further adds conceptual weight to the notion that we constitute our understandings of the social world through the sharing of narratives. Here, Thompson (1984) conceptualises this imaginary as ‘the creative and symbolic dimension of the social world, the dimension through which human beings create their ways of living together and their ways of representing their collective life’ (Thompson 1984). Castoriadis (1997) adds to this argument by making the case for ‘The Imaginary Institution of Society’ where ‘the imaginary of society...creates for each individual period its singular way of living, seeing and making its own existence’ (Castoriadis 1997). In this case ‘the central imaginary significations of a
society...are the ideas which tie a society together and the forms which defined what, for a given society, is real’ (Castoriadia 1997). Habermas wrote about this as ‘a massive background consensus’ that made sense of the way in which society operates (Habermas 1996). The idea of the ‘imaginary of society’ finds a fuller elaboration in Taylor’s (2004) work on the social imaginary.

Taylor’s work takes this idea of the ‘imagined society’ in the direction of using it to understand the rules and self-understandings that constitute western modernity in terms of a ‘social imaginary’. For Taylor, the social imaginary ‘can never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines because of its unlimited and indefinite nature’ (Taylor 2004) While containing a normative dimension in the ‘way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings’ that leads to ‘that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2004). Therefore, for Taylor social imaginaries ‘carry an implicit map of social space, of what kinds of people we can associate with in what ways and in what circumstances’ that gives a ‘sense of moral order’ (Taylor 2004). Importantly, as with any moral order there are identifiable conformations and transgressions, where certain actions or occurrences stand out as either agreeing with the moral order or challenging it.

This was an analysis conducted by Taylor in the pursuit of a greater insight into what self-understandings underpin our idea of Western
modernity, and how we in the west identify transgressions to this moral order. For Taylor, this ‘moral order’ is contained in the acceptance of the normative worth of the mutual benefit defined by equal participation in three key cultural formations; a politically independent liberal economy, a free and open public sphere and democratic self governance and in thus defined in opposition to areas of the world lacking these forms of social organisation. Building this idea of social narratives giving a normative dimension to social relations regarding who is appropriate to interact with has extremely important implications for examining how policies of integration inform urban identity because it demonstrates the link between the social narratives that we consume and how these define inclusion within a particular context. In short, if minorities are not given public recognition through policy, this informs the way they, and others, see their position in society as somehow deficient with regard to those who are given recognition by policy.

Therefore, if one seeks to gain an insight into the how a particular group or place gains and configures its self-understanding, and what constitutes a transgression of this self-understanding, one must examine the shared social narratives consumed by that group of people, an important part of which are created for post-migration communities through policies of recognition or assimilation. This is why, in explaining the lack of rioting in Marseille by arguing that the city offers an inclusive urban identity to its residents, studying the policies that lead to the city’s self-understanding is so important.
From these narratives, one can arguably piece together elements of how a particular group of people develops a self-understanding and a sense of ‘moral order’ in their interactions. However, this assertion requires an examination of the agent-structure relationship implicit in this idea of social narratives creating self understandings because it is clearly not a one way relationship in that, while the structure of shared narratives shapes the agent, it is the agent that also shapes the narratives that are create and disseminated. At the heart of this relationship is a key explanatory problem of the social where, on the one hand the individual is a powerful actor in reproducing of transforming the society in which they live (Wendt 1987), but on the other hand, society is made up of social relationships that structure the actions and limits of these actors. Structuration theory is extremely useful here. This is because it offers a bridge between structure and agency away from dichotomous conceptions of the relationship between the two that pit agency and structure against each other.

Agency ascribes to the individual casual powers and a means to intervene in the ongoing events in the world (Giddens 1976). Structuralism, on the other hand, argues that the individual is part of a structure that dictates their actions and place in the ongoing events of the social world, such as the worker alienated through the means of production for the Marxist. Structuration theory offers a means of viewing the social world where agent and structure are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Giddens 1984). As such, the relationship between
agent and structure becomes interrelated and mutually dependent. For Giddens, the structure exists because of the agency of the individuals who create it, and the individuals subject to the structure have a degree of autonomy to act in a free manner. The critiques of this as a grand theory are clearly evident – not all individuals are equally subjected to, or creators of the structure, as in Marxism the worker is clearly at the thin end of a power differential with the bourgeoisie owner of the means of production, and therefore does not have the same degree of agency over the creation of the structure in reality. For the understanding of the constitution of identity the critique remains, while the theory does have some use. This thesis takes a somewhat structuralist understanding of urban identity to explain the existence of an inclusive urban identity constituted through social narratives in Marseille, being the social structures that exist around the individual. In this, individuals are subject to the structure of social messages that then constitute their identities. In Anderson (2006) and Taylor’s (2004) work on the constitution of imagined identities this is clear – it was the profit seeking capitalist in league with the professional writer that facilitated the production and dissemination of the ‘print capital’ that arguably went on to constitute our social world as one dominated by the structure of the nation.

In a similar sense, if we are to argue (see chapter 5) that the social narratives of the inclusive identity in Marseille are facilitated and created by such grand spectacles as physical monuments
commemorating a particular version of the city’s history, then we must question what role the agent has in this production of social narratives. However, this is not to say that they have no power. The discussion of rap music, some of which produced with small budgets and disseminated for free over the internet (see chapter 4) demonstrates that the agents can reinforce and reconfigure this process. Also, while not directly analyzed in this thesis because of the time and resource limits imposed on a PhD, we cannot argue for the primacy of social narratives unless at some point individual action of the agents reinforce them. In Taylor’s work on the social imaginary, social narratives dictate a moral order that determines how we interact with certain individuals.

To turn this on its head, all the positive social narratives possible would arguably count for very little if they are not reflected in the practices an individual sees in society. Cesari et al (2001) give some insight into this process in Marseille in that their interviews with individuals who are Marseille born with Algerian heritage uncovers contradictory feelings about their dual French and Marseillais identities. French, for them, is out of reach owing to their perception of their treatment in French society and in media discourses around immigration and the place of Muslims in France. However, important in their strong sense of belonging to the city of Marseille is the widely reported assumption that their place in being Marseillais cannot be challenged owing to their ethnic background (Cesari 2001, Bringer 2007). Molotch et al (2002) come to a similar conclusion that
interdependence vital in their attempt to define in their quest for a theoretical framework to account for the distinctiveness exhibited by cities. Here, they use structuration theory to argue that that the ensemble of forces that create distinction in any urban area ‘moves through time in a manner not abstract and separate from human action, but rather arise through human action which draws upon, and is constrained by, previous actions and conditions’ (Molotch et al 2000). Therefore, following on from this idea, in an analysis of a city like Marseille, to find it replete with narratives that include those from post-migration communities it could be argued that these narratives lead to a self-understanding that these communities have a legitimate place in the social fabric of the city. This ability of the city to offer this imaginary nexus around which to construct self-understandings is importantly not unique to Marseille, but rather constitutes a rich vein in the literature.

2.2.3 Attaching Identity Construction and the Urban: The imagined city:

To argue for the existence of an inclusive urban identity derived from a policy of recognition in Marseille this thesis needs to connect its social constructivist definition of identity to the context of the city. This draws heavily on the rich vein of literature that discusses how the city is imagined through the sharing of social narratives, including but not limited to ‘literary productions, notions of urban myth, memory and nostalgia’ (Westwood and Williams 1997). Importantly, these
works allow this thesis to conceptually move away from valid concerns of urban sociology that dwells on the importance of the ‘hard’ factors of the physical environment and economic structures in forming our understandings of the city applied to French cities by scholars such as Dikec (2007) and Waquant (2007). As already mentioned, because of the comparatively similar urban problems of Paris, Lyon and Marseille, this approach has limited leverage in the comparison undertaken in this thesis. Rather, this thesis takes a view of urban sociology that is not simply concerned with our interaction with urban environment as simply a physical and tangible reality, but also our engagement with the city exists as an imagined representation. This is not to say that one exists without the other and that they are not intimately related. Indeed, one of the pioneering works that conceptualised the imagined dimension of the city did so with an intimate engagement with the physical reality of the urban environment. This vein of investigation into how we imagine our urban surroundings was given significant impetus by Lynch’s (1960) examination of the visual quality of the city that opened up the conceptualisation of how the urban environment exists as much as an imagined idea as it does a physical reality. Lynch attempted an examination of how individuals construct the city as an imagined representation, and how they could reproduce this as a sketch map when isolated from the particular urban environment. His focus was on aesthetic quality and how this would affect the ability to recall the city in detail, something he termed legibility. The more pleasing and distinct the features of the urban environment, the greater the ability
would be for individuals to recall it in detail, thus the more legible it would be. His concentration was on how differences in urban form would affect the ‘legibility’ of the urban environment. This legibility was the ability of residents of the city to be able to pick out landmarks and organise these into a recognisable map of the urban area. His thesis stipulated that the more distinct and dense in aesthetic quality the urban environment was, the more legible it would be to individuals who would be able to use landmarks to orientate themselves and urban space and be able to reproduce this on paper when taken out of the urban environment. Empirically, this study focused on three cases selected by his perception of their variance in aesthetic quality to test this thesis. Boston was chosen for its hypothesised distinct and pleasing environment, Jersey City for its apparent formlessness, and Los Angeles as outside of the scheme as ‘a new city, of utterly different scale’ (Lynch 1960).

The inference that the city’s legibility, and thus its ability for one to recall it, is proportional to its aesthetic quality was born out by the empirical evidence produced by fieldwork with individuals able to reproduce large areas of Boston with many landmarks and distinctive features evident in the imaginable representation of the city held by its residents. The maps produced by the residents of Jersey City again bore out his inferences by being broken, fragmented and largely incomplete in the individual’s abilities to recollect large chunks of their urban environments. This scholarship establishes two important analytical insights for the analysis of how the city effects
inclusion. Highlighting the fact that cities exist as abstract concepts in our imagination as well as physical and abstract realities is important in stitching the concept of imagined constructs asserted by Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004) to the urban context. However, it goes further than this to also establish the importance of the particularity of structures in the urban environment in informing this imagined conception of the city. As such, this informs the research to be undertaken in this thesis by establishing a link between the physical monuments that exist in the city and how we perceive and recall the city in our minds. As such, the implications that physical monuments, events and sites of commemoration of all kinds in the city are not lost on its population, but rather inform how we construct and reconstruct our mental maps of urban space and our place within it. This is an argument that becomes more applicable to the comparison undertaken in this thesis when examining the work of Donald (1992) that compliments the idea of the imagined city being shaped by its space and physicality by establishing the role that narratives play in this construction. In common with Lynch (1960), Donald (1992) does not see the city as a unitary entity, or indeed a purely physical reality of a ‘collection of buildings’ (1992). Rather the ‘city’ designates ‘the space produced by the interaction of historically and geographically specific institutions, social relations of production and reproduction, practices of government, forms and media of communication and so forth’ (Donald 1992). This expands on Lynch’s idea discussed above by arguing that the idea of the city is constituted by far wider entities than simply the distinctive and attractive architecture but a far wider
range of social phenomena. Indeed, Donald (1992) sees the role of the dissemination of narratives, the ‘creation and dissemination of meaning’ has a critical role to play in the creation of collective identities in the city. This further strengthens the case for examining the imagined representation of the city as being formed in a similar sense to the imagined community and the social imaginary discussed above as Donald goes on to argue that the imagining of the city is facilitated by the ‘discourses, symbols, metaphors and fantasies through which we ascribe meaning to the modern experience of urban living’ (Donald 1992). This means that there is a dimension of how we consider the ‘city’, as defined as more than the sum total of its physical reality, that is constituted through shared narratives that inform us of its character and social attributes.

Donald’s (1992) empirical work focuses on how the city’s depiction in literature plays an important part in defining the imagined identities of both the city and consequently the nation in the 19th century. In particular, the manner with which the city is described in texts plays an important role in deciding which strategies national and local policy makers adopt in dealing with the city. In 19th century Manchester, Donald (1992) argues, the understandings of its metamorphosis during industrialisation and the negative consequences of such rapid and chaotic growth city was perceived by policy makers through the depictions of the city in literature, notably by Engels (1895) in his exploration of the conditions of the working classes in the city. In particular, Engel’s (1895) focus on the
problems of the city as a pathology, where particular areas of the city were presented as ‘sick’ and in need of a ‘medicine’ influenced the policies of municipal authorities. As such, when the authorities saw an area as beyond help, it was demolished and rebuilt, with ‘curable’ districts subject to the policing of health functions by professionals with very specific roles to mitigate against the poor health of the workforce. It would be naïve to overstate this influence of a particular work of literature on urban policy in the period, as practitioners did have, albeit limited, first-hand experience of these social problems through visits to deprived areas. This example, and Donald’s (1992) work more broadly, rather serve this thesis by establishing that there is a connection between how we perceive the city and the narratives that we consume that compliment and inform our lived experience of the urban environment. This serves to make a link between the scale of the city and the importance of social narratives in constituting our social identities established at other analytical scales by Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004). This has important implications for examining an urban identity in a city like Marseille in that this ability of the narrative to affect how the inhabitant of the city sees it demonstrates that narratives could arguably inform an urban identity and thus define its possibility to be inclusive to immigrant groups depending on how these narratives construct an imagined representation of a city. Importantly, establishing the ability of social narratives to constitute the city is not an assertion limited to Donald’s (1992) work, with an important example of the continued investigation into the imagined facet of the city is Molotch et al’s
(2000) attempt to define the elusive ‘distinctiveness’ of cities. In a sense, this represents a link back to, and reassertion of, Lynch’s (1960) pioneering work examined above that aimed to examine how the distinctive features of the city effected how they would be coded in our minds.

Molotch et al (2000) take up this challenge to pin down the distinctiveness of the city by making a similar case for an imagined representation of the city. This is done with a specific emphasis on rehabilitating the notion of the imagined representation against explanations of urban space that take account of the physical reality of the city alone. While they take into the account the importance of these physical factors in defining how individuals construct their ideas of urban space, Molotch et al also argue that it is necessary to take into account the less tangible imagined elements of the city. This was owing to a specific variance between two case studies that acted differently under the same exogenous circumstances over the past 100 years, thus explaining variance within a regime of similarity not dissimilar to the explanation sought here for the variation in urban rioting between the three French cities examined in this thesis that have extremely similar conditions. Santa Barbara and Ventura, they argue, have similar geographies, historical experiences comparable populations in social and economic terms, yet reacted very differently to the discovery of oil and the proposition of a major highway project. Distinctiveness is defined as a city’s ‘overarching qualities that, however difficult to measure, make them durably distinct’ (Molotch et
Defining distinctiveness thus presents a challenge to the social scientist, in terms of explaining exactly how this distinctiveness comes to be, and how it is transmitted through time in a coherent manner. Firstly, it is vital to understand that this distinctiveness is not simply the result of one particular historical event/process/narrative but rather many: ‘Given that there is no single engine of history, places comprise an ensemble of forces that somehow must be examined together’ (Molotch et al 2000). These elements of a city’s history combine ‘through a ‘lash up’ of co-occurrences’ (Molotch et al 2000), and not through the dominance of one factor over another. How this distinctiveness moves through time is explained by structuration theory. This explains that social structures, such as historical narratives, do not stand in the abstract and separate from human action, but rather arise through human action which draws upon, and is constrained by, previous actions and conditions (Molotch et al 2000). As such, this can be argued as intimately linked to Taylor’s idea of the distinctiveness of Western modernity because both are constrained in a similar manor by the normative conventions that govern them. Taylor’s argument that democracy is governed by a normative idea of how it should be practiced, and thus what constitutes a transgression, the distinctiveness of the city not only exists in the abstract but also contains a strong normative element, which could identify any transgressions to the conventions of the way that things are done in a particular city. This has significant implications for the soundness of arguing for an urban identity that can define inclusiveness to certain communities in the city because it
again demonstrates that we hold detailed and rich representations of cities in our minds, and that this representation reaches further than the physical reality of a city, but also delves into the normative social dimensions and conventions of a particular urban area that could legitimately include the position of particular social groups within the city.

Asserting that cities have a narratively defined normative order is an argument that finds further depth in the literature on cities that offers this thesis important insights into how it should examine and conceptualize the issue of identity in the city. An important element of the literature that requires examination for this thesis is that which conceptualises the role of the imagined city in the definition of the city’s identity by influencing how its residents see their socially constructed characteristics. An important example of this is the work of King (2007), the city exists as a unitary representative entity in our imagination, even when in reality it has significant spatial variations and our experience of the whole can be limited to the small parts of it in which we live or work. This draws on Anderson’s notion of the nation as a larger abstract reality that we may feel part of without ever being able to fully experience in the same way that we can feel very tied to the community of the nation without ever meeting every other member, or indeed being very unlikely to experience the territory in its entirety. He uses this idea to argue that this imagined representation of the city offers an identity that confers onto us certain perceived characteristics, similar in a vein to Taylor’s social
imaginary that informs our sense of normative conventions and ‘moral order’. Empirically, King argues that being a New Yorker, Berliner or Delhi-wallah confer a particular means of self-understanding on its residents, and a means by which individuals act in the first instance as Lahoris and Londoners before Pakistani or British. Here, the rapid urbanisation of the world has, in his opinion, meant that as the city has becoming the provider of ‘work and welfare, shelter and sustenance, culture and leisure’ for an increasingly number, the importance of the city as the primary attachment of people’s loyalty is increasingly important (King 2007).

While this should not be taken to overstate a singular idea of identity that fails to take into account the multi-layered nature of its empirical existence, his analysis opens up a means by which to examine the idea of the imagined representation as dictating a normative order constructed from narratives. This opens up a means by which one could argue that the identity of the city can then have its own means of forming an idea of the place of post-migration communities. This is something implicit in King’s empirical example of the New Yorker as someone that is defined more by residence in the city, accent, customs, hard work and social climbing then colour and country of origin. This is not exclusive and does not preclude racism or prejudice, but it does demonstrate that city identities do come with a self-understanding. Arguing that the idea and identity of being a Marseillais effects the way people act, in addition to an idea of being French, Corsican or Moroccan, is something that can be, and will be asserted in this thesis repeatedly and is difficult to conclusively refute.
in an urban environment with very well defined dialect, customs, food and culture. Again this might not supplant other concerns, but does demonstrate that a self-understanding does come along with an identity presented by the city. If this offers a normative order and how individuals act, then it can also be argued that the identity of the city can contribute to defining the inclusion of post-migration communities. It is this attempt to take account of something that is specifically urban that directs work to attempt to understand the distinctiveness exhibited by cities. This literature contributes an enormous conceptual resource to this thesis through its examination and elaboration of the importance of the imaged representation of the city. This is because it offers a bridge between understanding how identity can be constituted by shared social narratives in a similar vein to that argued by Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004) argued, but in the context of the city. However, for a complete discussion of how narratives inform our sense of belonging in the city we must also acknowledge the opportunities presented for this process relates to the sub-units of urban space that sit below the city level.

It is important to also understand when analysing how shared narratives create belonging in the city that narratives are not limited to creating a sense of belonging at the level of the city, but may also create a sense of belonging to a particular neighbourhood or district that operates in tandem with a belonging to the city or indeed supersedes it. Cohen et al (1996) identifies a ‘nationalism of the neighbourhood’ where narratives can come together to form powerful
forms of collective identity around particular areas of a city based on collective myths and collective heritage. This obscure and abstract notion becomes clear in the empirical example of Cohen et al's (1996) work on the Isle of Dogs, in London’s East End. Here, he encountered difficulties in attempting to glean an accurate depiction of individuals’ perceptions of race relations and how the local and global intersected by asking questions about living patterns and direct day-to-day routines. At this impasse, the research team began to examine narratives of home as a means to understand individual conceptions of themselves vis-à-vis their community and their perception of others in the neighbourhood. This approach enabled them to build an understanding of the racialization of the white working class in a manner that could not be explained simply by local forces, such as relations with immigration communities, or the global ideas generated by experiences of being at the gateway to imperialism. What they discovered was that these individuals’ sense of self, and of being white as opposed to being a recent immigrant, was informed by narrative sources, such as his perception of the continued ‘tale of two cities’ played out between rational and bourgeois West London, and irrational and working class East London. Cohen et al’s (1996) chooses to elaborate the example of the construction of the East End boy in effected not only by the lived experiences of living in the East End but by cultural forms such as the Pet Shop Boy’s song about East End boys’ attempts to attract their female West End counterparts in expensive Soho nightclubs (Cohen et al 1996). Again this is an important theoretical insight into
how the representation of the city is defined by the social narratives that its residents consume. Here, Cohen et al (1996) are arguing this is important in the definition of, and resulting juxtaposition, of the two halves of London along the geographical and class distinctions that situate East and West London in the minds of the residents in the Isle of Dogs. While this analysis is somewhat lacking in empirical data, it does open up an understanding of how a consciousness, albeit in this example of a neighbourhood, is produced through the constant sharing of narratives because these narratives depict and represent this neighbourhood in a way that makes sense to its residents. This further reinforces this thesis’s assertion that narratives can be powerful sources of self-understanding as related in the work of Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004). As such, this again highlights an important means by which the ideas of the social theories of imagined identities can be directly applied to the context of the city, where a particular self-understanding can be buttressed, enhanced and given flesh by the consumption of narratives. In addition, in the analyses to be conducted in this thesis on Paris, Lyon and Marseille one must remain vigilant with regard to hastily dismissing a complete lack of belonging to some element of the city, even if belonging is not apparent at the level of the city. This is particularly important in large urban agglomerations such as Paris where policy may be following different narratives and fostering different sense of belonging in the different administrative departments that constitute the region.
It is also important for this analysis to state that such urban imaginings can also go in reverse, where those who once had a place as belonging to the cultural and historical fabric of the city can have their legacy erased. One among several examples that could equally tell the same story is how Ottoman Thessalonica becomes Greek Salonica. This has particular significance to this analysis as opposed to a place such as Muslim Delhi becoming India’s Hindu dominated political capital because of two reasons. Firstly, Salonica, owing to the process of population exchange with Turkey, has had its diversity stripped away in an absolute fashion that is not comparable to a city such as say, Delhi, that still contains a significant Muslim minority. Secondly, its Mediterranean and European situation also render its analysis particularly pertinent to Marseille, given its proximity. This process of ‘de-diversification’ begins with Ottoman Thessalonica; a city composed of and defined by the cosmopolitanism of its ethnically, linguistically and religiously mixed population, which as late as 1913 was equally split between Muslims, Christians and Jews (Taylor 2007). Taylor argues that, up until this point, the city is characterised as a place with ‘commercial syndrome’ that necessitates ‘collaboration with strangers and aliens’ (Taylor 2007) which is an integral aspect of how it focuses on diversity as a constitutive and positive aspect of its makeup. However, this is not to last with the population transfers between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s and the deportation of the city’s Jewry by the Nazis destroying this cosmopolitanism. Especially important to this analysis is not just this physical demographic change, but the change in the way the
story of the city is told, with the Hellenization of the city’s history also means that the cosmopolitan city has been lost to history in a narrative sense, with the story of the city no longer told as one constituted by cosmopolitanism (Mazower 2004). This demonstrates that the city, even when once defined by its diversity, can be subject to such drastic change. This also illustrates the role of policy in creating how the city is defined and moves forward, given that this ‘hellenisation’ is not something that has happened in a vacuum or by change, but rather is directed by the concerns of local officials to fall in line with the dominant policy narrative of emphasising the continuous Hellenic heritage of modern Greece, even though it has only existed as an independent entity for less that 100 years. In addition to the review of literature presented here and all that it can offer to the analysis to be conducted in this thesis, one must also be conscious of what this literature does not do. Namely, it does not define how the idea of the imaged city can define inclusion in the city, or indeed what could constitute a definition of inclusion more generally. For this, this thesis turns to the literature that exists concerned with multiculturalism and the management of difference. In defining identity, this thesis creates a need to define carefully who we are arguing needs to be included in this identity before we can define what this inclusion should entail.

2.3 Moving Beyond Religion and Responding to ‘Super-Diversity: Defining the ‘Post-Migration’ Community
This thesis advances a particular use of language when referring to the communities that make up the cities being studied here. The use of language is never far from controversy when examining issues of the integration of minority groups, whether one’s [intention] is to be offensive, in the case of far-right groups, or simply because of the difficulty in discussing such issues without using terms that might assume empirical certainty, such as ‘minority’ when in fact, demographics may have render a group once a minority issued from immigration into a majority, such as the Indian population of Fiji. Here, guidance in terms of language can be taken from Modood’s (2012) report for the British Academy that refers to Muslims in Europe under the ‘post-immigration’ banner. While this term, and its rational for usage in the report mentioned do not allow its direct and unproblematic transposition to the analysis, this thesis will use a particular term for groups that now live in the city that have come from elsewhere, the ‘post-migration’ community. This is necessitated by several important aspect of the research context of the three cities to be examined in this thesis. In Marseille, there is the breakdown of the ‘ethnic minority’ construct of well-defined, observable minority groups under the strain of the increased number of fragmented communities that exist under ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007). Secondly, traditional ‘racialised’ views of minorities, as the ‘black minority’ set against the ‘white majority’ is also being challenged by the flow of white migrants from ex-Soviet states making up significant new minorities in Western Europe. Thirdly, new vocabulary is required because of the tandem breakdown of the idea of an ‘ethnic
majority due to the emergence of ‘plurality’ in a number of European cities where no one group constitutes an identifiable majority. Fourthly, attempts to define minorities through religion, such as has occurred for the continent’s Muslim minority groups is also a flawed idea, owing to both the internal diversity inherent in any religious community. Lastly, the use of the term ‘post-migration’ community allows us to make the connection between those recently arrived and those born in a given country of immigrant origin. This is important, as both communities are tied together in the media and political discourse on minorities as ‘others’ regardless of the legal status of the second and third generations of migrants’ descendants who have formal legal equality with their majority contemporaries.

We are experiencing a trend where the conception of the ‘ethnic minority’ are no longer fit for the analytical purpose of examining the relations of communities within the city due to the move to what Vertovec (2007) describes as ‘superdiversity’. Vertovec (2007) argues that, in the case of the UK, the discussion of diversity and integration has been framed by the conception of ethnic minority populations as well organised South Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities of Commonwealth origin. Here the accepted construct of a majority community accompanied by a small number of ‘ethnic minority’ communities no longer accurately depicts the reality of many, new smaller, scattered, multiple origin communities. France has experienced a similar process in its large cities in the same period of the last two to three decades where the existing dynamic of
well-established North African communities of returning settlers, Jews and Muslims and those from the French West Indian territories increasingly supplanted by arrivals from West Africa, Latin America, South East Asia and importantly from within the enlarged European Union.

This increased diversity means that it is difficult to imagine a diversity strategy where each of these scattered and differentiated communities can seek representation on an ethnic basis in the same way that was previously possible with well-defined minorities. This problem was experienced in the creation of the Marseille Hope interreligious forum, when the original idea for an organising principle was ethnicity. This was promptly dropped when the over 90 differentiated and scattered ethnic groups came forward to represent themselves. What does tie these scattered communities together is however one common experience – a migration at some point that differentiates them. This is even the case for the returning settlers from North Africa of European origin who may have only lived outside of France for two generations, but on their return in the 1960s were given a label as the ‘black feet’ (pied noir) to differentiate them from the wider society. This leads into the second key reason for the use of the post-migration community in that ethnicity in Europe has gone beyond racialised ideas of black and white with the latest wave of migration coming from white countries within Europe.
Both Gilroy (2002) and Fairclough (2002) took the course of examining the experiences and problems of a particular minority group fitting into a society. Fairclough examined the black community in America and their historical fight for equality from slavery to the year 2000. This works well in examining the context of a particular groups struggle for equality because the locus for acquisition of equality is effectively skin colour and ethnic background, in response to this being the dominant means by which African-Americans have been dehumanised since the Atlantic slave trade. However, when seeking to examine how the nexus of the city can work as a means of inclusivity examining the experience of one community would only work to examine a particular aspect of how the city can offer inclusion. For example, in this instance it would be possible to conduct a study of how the identity of being Marseillais offers inclusion to the Algerian or Senegalese community, but this would not be sufficient in analysing the kind of cross-community inclusion that could be a mitigating factor against urban riots that involved a cross-racial coalition of disenfranchised youths (Hargreaves 2007).

Also, since European enlargement a shift has occurred in the racial makeup of the dominant flows of migration. The fact that the most recent minorities to arrive in large numbers in Western European cities have been constituted by white workers from the former Soviet countries of Eastern and central Europe. This necessitates a change in focus on minorities away from colour as a key tool of analysis for the study of minorities and discrimination. This is because, aside from the Roma who are, owing to distinct lifestyle patterns and skin
colour, very visible, Baltic migrant workers are not immediately visible as differentiated from the colour dynamics of French society – in short they look white. However this does not mean that they do not exist as a minority in terms of residence patterns, having a distinct culture and even being subject to discrimination in the labour market and wider society. Again, the marker that defines them and links them with those with common concerns and problems across the racial, religious and cultural divide is the fact that they have undertook a migration – hence again they can be referred to as a post-migration community. Their arrival in large numbers over the past decade leads into the next conceptual reason why the term ‘post-migration’ community holds water; the reality that while there may longer be distinct minorities to talk of in the city, due to fragmentation of origin of post-migration communities, the population dynamics of cities means that it may not even be possible now to talk of a well-defined majority.

The problem of defining exactly what constitutes the ‘majority’ that sits, often in opposition, to ethnic ‘minorities’ has long been a problem with discourses of diversity. This is because the assumption of a well organised majority is a myth – as with any particular construct of community it is riven with class, social, religious and even ethnic divisions of its own. To talk of a white majority in the UK when there are strong differentiations evident within the group based on class and the ethnic divisions of those of Irish, Scottish, English and Welsh descent has long been documented. In France, this may
not seem such a problem, given the Republic’s overt claims of France being made up of French citizens alone. This, however, would miss the point that France remains a society strongly differentiated by class, economic success, rural urban patterns of life and the ethnic diversity of its Breton, Basque, Provencal and numerous other minorities.

While these differences render the idea of a white majority problematic, the concept itself is changed beyond recognition by another key observation regarding the nature of the modern city. This is that the population dynamics of the modern city mean an ethnic majority has ceased to exist. Leicester and the London Borough of Brent are now ‘plural’ in the sense that there is no one community that forms a clear majority in terms of population numbers. Marseille, and arguably some of the departments of the Parisian region are in the process of experiencing a similar change to plurality where there is no particular group who dominates from a numerical standpoint. This is more problematic to assert in France than it is in the UK due to a lack of ethnic or religious statistics in France, that the government does not collect. However, with official data placing the number of Muslim residents in Marseille at over 250,000 in a city of little under 800,000, it is clear that this is a city heading towards ethnic pluralism rather than clear-cut ethnic minority/majority relations. This is especially interesting if one examines unofficial estimates, such as those cited in an interview with Nassurdine Haydari, who claims that Muslims make up to 50% of the city’s
population. In addition, examining them numerically on a national level hides this trend of pluralisation, because of their hugely disproportionate concentration in cities giving them a much more dramatic demographic impact at the scale of the city. Discussing this community, or others like it, in religious terms also does not accurately define the inclusion we are seeking to pin point in Marseille in this thesis.

Defining minorities in the city in terms of religion is a widely [used] conceptual tool, [used] by the Open Society Foundation’s examination of the Muslim communities in 11 EU cities, but arguably one of the most problematic. Staying with the Muslim community, as it is one of the most regularly defined in religious terms and forms such a large potential minority in the study conducted here, this is a community that is extremely difficult to pin down by religion alone. Islam, as a body of belief, has a nuanced view of belonging in this sense. As a community, Muslims are encouraged to be united across ethnic, cultural and geographical backgrounds as common believers in the same religion. However, the Qur’an specifically identifies ethnic and cultural difference as a means by which the miracle of creation can be understood, bringing to this world as it does variation, beauty and fascination:

‘O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily
the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things) (Surat al Hujurat 49:13).

This reflects the reality of the Muslim communities in Western European cities in that they exist in a state of both unity and differentiation. For example, while sharing some common doctrinal beliefs, there is variance in practices and customs between subdivisions of Islam, between communities of different cultural and geographic origins, and importantly between each individual Muslim. In France, while the Maghrebi communities follow the Malaki strand of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, those from the Comore Islands follow the Shafa’i school of Sunni jurisprudence, and the two groups will also have different cultural interpretations of Islamic customs. As such, it can be argued that there are as many Islams as there are Muslims. Added to this examining an Islamic community would not account for those with Muslim origins and names that no longer follow the Muslim faith. These are not just concerns for the labelling of a Muslim community, but similar differentiation exists in Jewish communities, between Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities, and also within the Christian communities that may come from vastly varied geographical locations and belong to different denominations. This means that simply replacing ‘ethnic’ minority with ‘religious’ minority labels such as that applied to the Muslim community is misleading. Again, the one thing that unites the vast majority of these communities (with perhaps the exception of a small number of
converts to Islam) is that they are again ‘post-migration’ in that the vast majority of Muslims are in Europe because of a migration. Also, the idea of the post-migration community creates a degree of unity when describing groups that cuts across divisions that may not be useful for a study of this sort.

The use of ‘post-migration community’ cuts across a key cleavage in the study of minorities – between the migrant communities, and those descendants of migrants. While this study recognises that these two groups clearly have differences in social belonging, mobility and opportunities, both share the common concern of a need to be part of the remade image of society that they could be part of. For Hargreaves (2007), while those born in France to immigrant parents may have French nationality, so are French according to the law, their treatment in society and the media ethicises them as not being French. This occurs on the grounds that they have origins outside of France, and are there as the result of a migration – thus being a post-migration community. Also, measures directed at migrants are sometimes initiated because of concerns about communities already existing in a society that are there because of a migration. Modood’s (2007) insightful analysis of the tightening of British immigration rules and citizenship requirements in the past two decades demonstrates that these rules were promoted by politicians as a means to have greater social integration. This confuses two, albeit related issues in that there is the arrival of immigrants in the country, and questions about the integration of
communities that have existed here for many generations. Again, what the discourse in politics and the media is connecting here are two groups, immigrants and their descendants who are united by one fact – they exist as post-migration communities. Also, to enable a discussion about a form of multiculturalism where the image of society is remade to include minorities in a positive and inclusive role, then there must be a way of discussing those groups under a single term minority is not sufficient as it lumps in those who are excluded owing to their ethnic origin, with other minorities that may have a central place in society and who have existed in the country prior to mass immigration, such as the Scottish in the UK or the Bretons in France. There is no mass public debate about the need to include these groups more in society, yet broadly speaking all of those that are in society owing to a migration are subject to this discussion, be it Muslim communities or those recent arrivals from Eastern Europe. This thesis now requires an appropriate means by which it can assess the inclusion offered by the identity of the city created by a possible policy divergence towards recognition for these post-migration communities in Marseille.

2.4 Defining Inclusion

The debate about how to facilitate viable inclusion of post-migration communities is not exclusive to the three cases analysed here. The idea that there are a ‘many’ to include in the idea of the ‘one’ stems from the reality that Marseille, like nearly every other large European
city, has experienced mass immigration over at least the last 70 years that now necessitates the political and social management of difference. This is again a vast area of conceptual and empirical scholarship where terms such as inclusive can take on varying, and at times, contradictory meanings. This is where a significant discussion of the literature on managing difference and how this can define the inclusivity element of our analytical framework is important. Fissures exist about exactly how best to identify this difference in scholarly terms, and also how best to set the parameters of its management. Should we even recognise ethnic and religious difference at all, or rely on formal legal equality to ensure social opportunity and cohesion? Not recognising difference is the assumption at the heart of the Republican model of integration practiced in France (Hargreaves 2007).

If we move in the opposite direction, to argue for the political recognition of difference, there exist multiple prescriptions about how this should be managed and what compromises need to be made between recognising group rights, demands and privileges without nullifying the legal and religious equality so central to European democratic government. Both of these debates inform how one goes about examining the three cases included in this thesis existing as they do within both the context of France and more broadly within the policy and scholarship debates around recognising ethnic difference. Secondly, a fissure exists between the local and national level about where the locus of these policies should exist. While the nation state
clearly dominates the political organisation of contemporary European policies of managing difference, it is also evident that cities do not exist simply as part of states, being both specific in their disproportionate concentration of difference through cultural diversity, and the significant policy innovation and autonomy they can exhibit in dealing with it.

2.4.1 Rebutting Assimilation

The first question to be considered when attempting to understand how to define inclusion is whether to acknowledge ethno-cultural difference at all, or to insist on a convergence to a prescribed set of norms. This is particularly salient to any discussion of the management of difference in what Hargreaves terms ‘multi-ethnic’ France because ‘assimilation’ has been the de jure policy of expansionist France from its 10th century Paris kingdom (Weber 1976). This process continued in mainland France until the incorporation of Nice and Savoy in 1860 through a process of the imposition of the French language and culture throughout the entire territory of France. This resulted in the banning of the langue d’oc from official use in the 16th century, and from everyday use after the French revolution. This experience of turning culturally disparate ‘peasants’ into ‘Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976) also formed a basis for the civilising mission of the French Empire, where one could attain French nationality, and vote in French elections, if one was defined as ‘evolved’ through the pursuit of French education and adoption of
cultural norms in the ‘four communes’ of French Senegal (Camiscioli 2009). This idea of assimilation has been the crux of France’s ‘republican tradition [in which] issues of multiple identity and diversity are still taboo’ (Council of Europe 2008).

Here, it is seen that the management of difference is not required as individuals are free to exercise their formal legal equality in the public sphere, and exercise their cultural autonomy in the private sphere. The critiques of this approach, however, are numerous owing to the significant socio-economic deprivation and discrimination levelled at those from immigrant communities from France’s ex-colonies (Cesari et al 2001, Hargreaves 1996, 2007). Hargreaves (2007) wrote about the participants of the 2005 riots ‘reacting to their ethnicisation by members of the majority ethnic population, in whose eyes they were an alien presence in France because of their roots in non-European, mainly Islamic countries’ who ‘shared the secular aspirations and values dominant in French society. Their violent acts arose from anger over their exclusions from the benefits of society because of socio-economic disadvantage and racial and ethnic discrimination’ (Hargreaves 2007). Dikec (2007) buttresses this line of argument with his in depth research into the city of Lyon. Here he describes a ‘thirst of citizenship’ in the city, where individuals from post-migration communities want to not just ‘belong’ in French society but also who wanted to participate fully within it both as political and economic beings, but found themselves blocked in this endeavour. Cesari et al (2001) found a similar process at work in Marseille, where their
research constantly found that amongst second generation Algerians in Marseille there was a consistent feeling that their Frenchness was constantly questioned in the media and wider society, making it difficult for them to identify with the term. This brief empirical history demonstrates two key definitions of France that are neglected in its assimilationist, republican narrative.

France, alongside the other social democracies of Western Europe falls into Marshall’s (1950) typology of the ‘hyphenated society’ where free market capitalism is juxtaposed with the welfare state creating a contradictory economic diversity where the market advocates for the provision of scarce resources along the rational of supply and demand, and at the same time the welfare state plays a distributive role. In addition, France from its inception has been what Ertman (1996) describes as the ‘mosaic state’ sitting over a multi-ethnic society from the outset that required the extensive use of local forms of control in its early years to effect authority in its outlying provinces. However, as Wihtol de Wenden (2004) argues, once centralisation took hold in the wake of the 1789 revolution, citizenship was increasingly defined by individual legal equality before the state, where expressions of ethnicity and religion became taboo in the public realm.

This has however, been challenged more recently by mass immigration into France and the demands of national minorities for linguistic rights and the acknowledgement of their contribution to
national heritage (Withol de Wenden 2004). Examples include groups such as the Basque, Breton and Provencal that are using the cultural and linguistic rights afforded to minorities by the EU to challenge France’s mono-cultural narrative to lobby for the right to have their languages taught in schools in a similar way to the Catalans, Welsh and Scots. Further questioning assimilationist policy in France is the endemic discrimination experienced by post-migration communities in France (Hargreaves 2007). This renders a discussion of the management of difference vis-à-vis France ever more relevant. Marseille stands as an example of how a local municipality is questioning the Republican status quo by not only addressing ethnic difference, but instituting policies that those in the Anglo-Saxon world would recognise as classically multi-culturalist in nature.

2.4.3 (Re)Building Multiculturalism

Applying a multicultural analysis to a discussion of policy narratives in France addresses the paradoxical position that France inhabits of ‘de facto multicultural country’ (Wihtol de Wenden 2004), due to its history of mass immigration, that has, as we have seen above, not embraced multicultural policies (Modood 2007). However, Modood (2007) also leads the discussion of multiculturalism in France towards a realisation that, even without a national policy change, a multicultural treatment of difference may be establishing itself, and thus Republican assimilation may be losing its grip as the sole
legitimate means of managing difference. Modood uses two examples that support this thesis. Firstly, the 2003 creation by President Sarkozy of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM) to represent all Muslims to the government in matters of worship and ritual represents a means by which the government recognises and engages with a community defined by religious difference (Modood 2010). One should be measured, however, in attaching too much importance to this as an example, as Modood (2010) correctly asserts that the creation of the French council of the Muslim Faith can also be seen as a top down effort at pushing Muslims down a particular route for both political and security reasons, rather than a neutral adoption of multicultural policies. The second important example of a possible multicultural shift in France comes in the form of the 2005 founding of the country’s first black association, the Representative Council of French Black Associations (Conseil Représentative des Associations Noires de France, CRANF) (Modood 2007). Importantly, this has not come because of a change in population dynamics on the ground, as it has occurred so late in the evolution of France’s black population that has been significant for at least the past thirty years without having had such a representative association previously. This said, multiculturalism is a much contested and multivalent concept, which requires significant elaboration before its use is possible in defining urban inclusion in Marseille. As Modood rightly argues, at a sociological level multiculturalism can denote the reality of a society constituted of multiple cultural groups, with the groups defined as
such either internally from self definition or outside by society at large (Modood 2010). Multiculturalism as a policy response has ‘grown up in contradictory ways in response to reflections and crises to address the question of plural minorities’ (Modood 2010) in Europe and North America.

Within this broad acknowledgement of the need for policies to address plural minorities, two approaches have emerged, the structural inequality model and the socio-cultural model (Young 2009). The structural inequality model focuses on challenging the formal rules of organisations to tackle the enduring structural, socio-economic inequalities that minorities are often afflicted by to greater extents than the majority population (Tilly 1998). Here, the recognition of minority difference is rooted in the need to identify and tackle this inequality through mechanisms such as the USA’s ‘affirmative action’ and the UK’s ‘equal opportunity’ legislation. As such, this approach is rooted in the material concerns of multiculturalism, which are, correctly, vital aspects of how societies seek to foster greater equality for minority communities within the tolerated inequality of capitalist, market driven economies. These concerns are also rightly highlighted by scholars such as Hargreaves (2007) as central to the French case where structural economic inequality is a continuing concern for post-migration communities of all shades, but particularly those from France’s ex-colonies. However, as this thesis has already demonstrated, Marseille’s post-migration communities suffer from similar socio-economic problems to those in
Paris and Lyon, yet they did not riot in 2005. This is where the 'socio-cultural' model of multiculturalism, advocated by scholars such as Kymlicka (1996, 2002), becomes important in its concentration on how difference is accommodated through recognising the validity of norms, practices and cultural expressions of post-migration communities (Young 2009) where it is posited that 'learning about people’s culture reduces prejudice' Modood (2007). This broad body of literature offers a model by which this thesis can argue that accommodation of some kind is occurring in Marseille, even in the face of similar enduring economic difficulties to Paris and Lyon. With this model being the ascendant means by which difference is managed in the advanced capitalist democracies over the past several decades (Young 2009), it is the subject of a wide body of literature. A solid starting point within this school of thought can be found in Taylor's (1994) ideas on recognition. Taylor argues that recognition is important for a sense of identity, with there being a distinct importance attached to having one’s identity/community/nationality recognised. Taylor suggests that this stems from the nature of democratic equality necessitating a ‘politics of equal recognition’ (Taylor 1994) where everyone is forced to recognise everyone else’s equality before the law. Important for the analysis conducted in this thesis, misrecognition, no recognition or the projection of a negative image of what we desire to be recognised is undesirable and damaging;

‘The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped
by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor 1994)

The implications of this for the analysis conducted here and for the multicultural debate more generally are huge. Taylor’s work informs the basic principle of a means of political organisation that *recognises* difference in that the recognition of difference is not simply positive, but necessary for the good of society. Without such recognition, so the schema goes, individuals suffer, in Taylor’s words, ‘real damage’.

Importantly, the idea of recognition forms an important sub-section of social theory. Important in this field is the work of Honneth (1996, 2007). This vein of enquire contains a similar observation to Taylor, in that societal justice is a concept not simply linked to the quest for access to material wealth (Honneth 1996). neo-hegaliains such as Honneth and Taylor both draw upon the assumption that for the existence of the free and rational individual to occur, a sense of
mutual recognition is required (Pippen 2007). Integrity of the self at stake, and as such a requirement is the recognition bestowed by others (Smith 2012). Thus, social conflict stems from feelings of disrespect, contempt, and humiliation suffered by members of some group. Motivation for engaging in struggle comes from a sense of being. (Smith 2012).

As such, the process of recognition should be conceptualised a complex process that takes into account the grounds upon which the individual chooses to be recognised, but also the structure within which the individual is defined by the broader structures of society (Honneth 2007, Smith 2012). Importantly, this is something particularly pertinent to those trapped in a cycle of ‘disrespect’ and ‘non-recognition’ where discrimination and discrepancy of status is a common feature of their existence in society. The early incarnations of Honneth’s theories were critiques for being undermined by a lack of focus on the material, class and structural concerns of the fight for recognition (Fraser 2003) in favour for my diffuse notions of identity and status. However, to take this proposition at face value would miss a key analytical observation. It is clear that the relationship between recognition and respect, and the distribution of material resources is intimately linked. As such, they are enmeshed in an inter-linked process (Smith 2012) where the inability to bestow meaningful recognition directly impinges on the ability to ameliorate the structural and material circumstances of vulnerable groups. In France, for example, the unwillingness of the French state to institute
a meaningful anti-discrimination platform has been directly connected to the enduring socio-economic disadvantages suffered by post-migration communities (Hargreaves 2007). As such, examining relations of recognition offer important insights into social conflicts, sources of alienation and thus possible solutions to these issues in the contemporary world (Smith 2012)

Of particular importance here, where the engagement with key literature informs a direct research agenda, is examining how this can be directed in practice. It has been theorised that there are three core assumptions of a recognition based research agenda. Firstly, the concept of recognition can be used to make an observational claim about the nature of social conflict, drawing on the relations of recognition in which individuals and groups find themselves (Smith 2012). Secondly, using a theory of recognition can make a claim about the explanatory framework required to make sense of this and thus, thirdly, it can be used to make prescriptions for the actions needed for this (Smith 2012). As such, it is important to note that a passive form of toleration of difference is not sufficient to ensure meaningful recognition (Forst 2007). Therefore, toleration can be interpreted as a means of power, domination and exclusion (Forst 2007) in as much as it is a sub-standard means of existence in the face of the more meaningful and deep notion of ‘recognition’ of the validity of ones place in society.
Situating this more deeply in the study to be undertaken, ‘Non-recognition’ is the background context in which this thesis operates generally in terms of the republican tradition of France, and specifically in terms of the two cases of Paris and Lyon, which, by and large but with a few exceptions, do not offer a large proportion of their residents ‘recognition’ of their identities as descendants of immigrants from France’s ex-colonies. This definition of inclusion, by giving those from outside ‘recognition’ is a vital element of how the identity of Marseille operates in that its constituent social narratives are replete with the recognition of outside influences at the heart of the city’s self image, as will become apparent in the further analysis of this thesis. Recognition of ethnic difference was an important finding of Cesari et al’s (2001) study into attitudes of youth in the city. Here, the study found that those of Algerian descent felt that a colour blind civic French identity was inaccessible to them due to discrimination in French society and negative discourses about Muslims and the descendants of immigrants in the French media Cesari et al (2001). Here, youths of non-French descent would prefer a system of integration that would offer recognition to their ethnic difference (Cesari et al 2001). The adherence to the idea of being Marseillais first and foremost amongst this group in the study (Cesari et al 2001) suggest that there is something in the socially constructed identity provided by the city that offers the recognition that they crave, and are denied, in the idea of being French. This is an important observation as other proponents of multiculturalism take the idea of recognition further by offering a normative dimension to the definition
of multiculturalism, seeing it firmly as a positive and desirable societal structure.

In rethinking multiculturalism, Parekh (2000) argues that social and cultural diversity possess intrinsic value as no culture embodies all capacities and values and by living together, he argues, a diverse environment causes us to realise this and challenges individuals to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures. He also advocates a civic notion of ‘Britishness’ that recognises and includes the diversity of its population (Parekh 2000). Modood’s extensive work on the subject strongly advocates for multiculturalism based upon a civic notion of Britishness that can recognise and accommodate the diversity of its modern population. His ideas on this subject are of particular importance to this thesis. In particular, his proposition of a ‘third level’ of multiculturalism offers a formula where minorities can be included in a remade vision of society. Here, he proposes:

‘moving beyond a focus on exclusion and minorities is a third level of multiculturalism, which is not just about positive minority identities but a positive vision of society as a whole – but remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginalised on the basis of equality and belonging’ (Modood, 2010).
This is a very important theoretical premise for this thesis. This is because it adds to Taylor’s idea of recognition to describe another important element of the inclusive identity offered by Marseille to define difference in its narratives as something that is positive and desirable. This definition of the inclusive element of Marseille’s identity permeates through all of the themes discussed in the chapters of this thesis, and while some progress has been made towards redefinition of what constitutes society in Paris and Lyon, Marseille arguably remains the exception here as the ‘critical case’ within a French context which seems at best unable, and at worst, unwilling to remake a vision of society in this manner. It is also important to bear in mind that with this model’s ascent to dominance over the ‘structural inequality’ model, it has been the subject of a large cannon of critique both policy and academic circles with the elected leaders of France, Germany, and the UK declaring its failure and even ‘death’ over the past decade.

This critique approaches the model from two interrelated positions, questioning its effectiveness in improving the wellbeing of minority communities as well as having issues with the ascription of cultural categories that obscure the internal diversity of cultures. As such, there have been numerous criticisms that multiculturalism has ‘has served to segregate communities far more effectively than racism’ (Malik 2002), thus having ‘fostered fragmentation rather than integration’ (Meer 2006). In a sense, both of these critiques argue
that offering recognition to minority cultures, religions and languages has enabled them to live separate lives from the majority and not fostered meaningful integration into host societies. Scheffer (2011) was a proponent of this opinion in much of his analysis of the Dutch model of multiculturalism. Here, he argues that Dutch multiculturalism has neither empowered the Dutch majority to feel confident in their own values, nor facilitated the integration of immigrant communities into Dutch society. In addition, Koopmans (2010) meta-analysis heaped further criticism on the outcomes for multicultural states:

‘multicultural policies—which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts—when combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour.’ (Koopmans 2010).

The Netherlands performed worst in this analysis, being ranked as the most multicultural state and demonstrating the worst outcomes for migrant populations. These suggestions are part of the more general ‘civic turn’ (Mouritsen 2006) in the debate where a great
emphasis began to be placed on cohesion and citizenship within policies of multiculturalism. This was demonstrated in the policies of the United Kingdom where greater cohesion and citizenship would ensure greater social cohesion in the face of the Bradford riots of 2001 and the London bombings of 7/7, hence the institution of a citizenship test in the UK as an attempt to impart new citizens with a grounding in the basics of ‘life in the UK’. However, given the issues that countries with no official multicultural policy have experienced, like those outlined in this thesis in the French case of socio-economic deprivation concentrated in post-migration communities, clearly such ‘supply side’ criticisms have their limits. Koopmans (2010) ignores, as many other critiques of multiculturalism do, the many other dimensions to integration that a focus on policies that recognise difference ignore, such as sub-standard education, housing and societal discrimination that endure even if immigrants have equal rights and access to the welfare state. Indeed, in the UK context bringing deprivation into the analysis, white working class boys fair worse at school, even by age 5, than those from Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, Black Caribbean and Black African backgrounds (Paton 2012). White working class boys then go onto do worse than any other group at GCSE (Harrison 2013), highlighting the complex and multi-layered reasons why particular social groups may fail in society in relation to others. There is also a critique from within advocates of multiculturalism that centres on the often problematic treatment of culture within multicultural policies.
There is also a prominent critique of multiculturalism in its ascription of identities to minority groups because of multiculturalism’s tendency to define groups in a way that arguably reduces their internal diversity to a unitary and fixed, essentialist notion of what a particular culture is. This begins with issues around defining exactly what ‘culture’ means in this case. This is an extremely complex discussion, with culture a ‘messy concept…sliding between meanings’ (Young 2009). Barry (2001) attempts a definition of culture as the ‘Symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories and so on, through which people express their experience and communicate with one another’. Young (2009) goes for a more simplified version of ‘Normalisation, practice, habit’ in defining what the common factors are that offer a degree of commonality within a particular group. However, neither of these definitions has room for the reality of the contested nature that these norms have within cultural groups. Phillips (2009) takes up this critique in response to gender issues, criticising multiculturalism for conceiving of cultures as static and domineering, and as such ignoring gender inequality issues by effectively re-instating the public-private divide for cultures that has allowed undesirable patriarchal practices to go unchecked. Naidoo (2011) take this critique to a more broad level in that he has also questioned the very notion of the recognition of group cultural difference in official policies of multiculturalism as overlooking the inherent diversity within all cultural groups that a recognition of difference through a group definition arguably undermines, thus reinforcing otherness. Phillips (2009) in building on this critique,
advocates a multiculturalism where culture is fluid, and where the individual within the culture, and not the cultural group, have rights and are the most important element. This offers some salvation for the concept of multiculturalism in as much as there are ways to offer the opportunity for group difference as a means to challenge the domination of the majority, while still having room for individual autonomy within the culture that allows for its contestation and change. This means that neither of these critiques necessarily require dispensing with the idea of multiculturalism as a means by which to define inclusion. Interestingly, how dramatic any changes to multiculturalist policies have been are up for significant debate, as no state that has practiced multiculturalism has abandoned it for a whole-sale assimilationist strategy.

As such, discussions of multiculturalism and the management of difference are still relevant to contemporary politics and governance. Two significant developments will arguably ensure that the management of difference will remain at the heart of policies for all of the states that have experienced mass immigration over the past 70 years. Firstly, the idea of ‘majority/minority’ relations is being challenged by the reality that many cities are in the process of becoming ‘plural’ with no clearly defined, numerical majority, but rather with several, roughly equally weighted communities. Alongside this, we are experiencing the move from a society of clearly defined minority populations to ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007), where society is increasingly made up of large numbers of atomised, diffuse
groups drawn to the city from within Europe and beyond. Both of these processes are apparent in the cities considered here as the traditional relationship between a ‘French’ majority and minority post-migration communities is challenged by immigration from nearly every country on the map. This is also occurring in tandem with an important change where these communities previously considered minorities are becoming numerically on a par with their ‘majority’ compatriots, at least at the local level of the city. If it is posited, as no accurate statistics exist (censuses in France do not collect ethnic or religious date) that between 250,000 and 400,000 residents of Marseille are of North African origin out of a total of around 800,000, then clearly one must question the terminology of calling the group a minority. This is a question that will be returned to in the next section of this chapter where the case is made for the use of the term ‘post-migration’ to consider those to be included in the city. This is a definition that needs to be discussed in light of the search here for means of managing difference.

However, while this is a valid critique of any group definition, in that it can obscure the reality of internal definition, taking it as a queue to abandon diversity of multiculturalism in its entirety goes against Kabir’s (2010) work discussed previously that highlights that post-migration communities do construct their identities with both what exists in the national context and also what exists from their ethnic background. This means that to define inclusion in this thesis both of these demands must be reconciled. This policy response
acknowledges that residing in a territory in which one was not born, and did not grow up in, does not automatically mean one abandons the culture, religion and norms of their homeland, something that Kabir (2010) explains in terms of ‘biculuralism’. This is the:

‘Personal practice of blending the old and the new – retaining religion, ethnic culture and language and taking on new language and culture in order to have dual membership. Enables them to participate as citizens of their host society with a hyphenated/dual identity or diverse/multiple identities’ (Kabir 2010).

This was an observation he made after extensive fieldwork interviewing British Muslims of diverse ethnic backgrounds who all shared a common sharing of the ‘old and the new’ in terms of their culture, language and self identity. The same can be arguably said of all post-immigration communities, and definitely applies to the social reality in the three French cities considered here in that the cultures of those second and third generation migrants of Maghrebi or African descent are neither Maghrebi, African or French, but a hyphenated mix of the two plus all of the diverse cultural influences in the milieu of modern western Europe. A key example of this is the rap music of France, essentially an imported cultural form from North America, but metamorphosing into something unique in France through the use of the French language and the particular African and Maghrebi
influences of France’s post-migration communities. Indeed, a key finding of Cesari et al’s (2001) in depth study of Marseillais identity amongst youths in the city was exactly that those interviewed wanted a system of integration that took into account their ethnic status, rather than simply focusing on an idea of civic French identity that they felt was inaccessible to them. As such, this thesis must then adopt a definition of inclusion that draws on these ideas of multiculturalism without falling into the traps of creating unitary categories for post-migration communities that reinforce ‘otherness’. As such, even Taylor’s (1994) idea of providing public recognition as an important means of integration is not wholly redundant in that Modood’s (2010) ideas of remaking the image of society to take into account minorities in positions of equality still has a role for public displays of this being an important means by which inclusion is defined through creating the public narratives that Anderson (2006) and Taylor (2004) rightly assert as so important in creating our self-understandings.

2.5 Conclusion:

This chapter and the preceding introduction have framed the key conceptual and empirical assumptions within which the following analysis of the possibility of a policy diversion towards recognition that could be argued to produce an inclusive urban identity in Marseille will occur. Given these conceptual definitions, the next chapter turns to an important element of generating inclusion in the
urban environment that is a direct and central part of the policy agenda. This is the process of political governance, where this thesis will specifically examine how the political structures, and importantly the practices of governance, interact with post-migration communities and how this can be said to generate a possible policy of recognition in Marseille. From these interactions, it applied the definition of inclusion developed in this chapter to examine how the social narratives produced from these interactions can be said to inform the inclusivity of the identity of the city. In turn, this process will enable this thesis to make the case for, or against, the specificity of the Marseille sociological anomaly in possessing an inclusive urban identity and thus to what extent Marseille varies from the examples of Paris and Lyon who did riot.
Chapter 3: Examining Urban Governance and Inclusivity in Paris, Lyon and Marseille

3.1. Comparing the Policy Narratives of Municipal Governance

3.2. Paris: Overshadowing Inclusive Narratives with Polemic

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3.5. Conclusion

3.1. Comparing the Policy Narratives of Municipal Governance

The practice of governance represents one of the corner stones of the debate about fostering inclusion for post-migration communities in contemporary, diverse European cities. Chapter 2 established this with its examining of the theorising of multiculturalism which at its core represents a way to govern with a recognition of difference as a means to foster inclusion and ameliorate inequalities (Modood 2010). As we have seen in the French example, the overarching means by which governance is instructed to act is, however, not to recognise difference, in line with assimilationist integration policy which relies on the formal legal equality of all citizens as the means to ensure equality and inclusion (Hargreaves 2007). In this regard, thinking back to the first research question presented in chapter 1, this chapter sets out to examine how the practice of municipal governance in Marseille might step outside these French norms by
applying a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities. If this were the case, it would represent an important beginning by which to assert that the application of a divergent policy narrative of recognition could have been an important factor in creating an inclusive identity in the Marseille that could have mitigated against disturbances in 2005. Conducting this analysis one would also hypothesise from this first research question that Paris and Lyon, cities that rioted, would not demonstrate such divergence from the nationally defined policy narrative of assimilation.

This chapter begins this comparative analysis by examining the Parisian region’s much asserted policy failings manifest in its lack of engagement between municipal authorities and post-migration communities (Hargreaves 2007, Waquant 2007, Kepel 2011). However, this does not mean that the picture on the ground is static, as the analysis carried out for this thesis found some important examples of the Parisian region employing a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities. As such, this thesis identifies several important sites of interaction between post-migration communities and the municipal government that shed important light on the policy narrative being applied at the local level. The Union of Muslim Associations of Seine Saint Denis (Union des Associations Musulmanes de Seine-Saint-Denis, UAM93) are an important example of this, having stepped into the vacuum of political complacency historically present in Seine-Saint-Denis towards post-migration communities to represent their needs to the municipal
authorities including securing building permits for mosques. Also, in
the commune of Nanterre, The Oranges Association (Les Oranges)
have forged a significant relationship with the municipality's Mayor,
who has offered both material and political support to several of their
projects, including the renaming of public spaces after events and
figures drawn from the history of post-migration communities in
France. This is another possible significant example of the adoption
of a narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities in
the Parisian region. However, it is also important to note that this is
not a complete or smooth transition from assimilation to a policy
narrative based upon recognition, as neither the Oranges nor the
UAM93 has escaped from extremely negative media attention for
their activities against the backdrop of a national policy dominated by
republican assimilation. This trend has also marked the mayor of
Paris’ annual Ramadan cultural evening, an example of the
deployment of a policy narrative of recognition that has been running
for more than a decade. While this event is stripped of all religious
content the 2011 plans for this event were subject to a large media
polemic, lambasted as contravening secularism and misappropriating
municipal funds.

The chapter then moves on to analyzing Lyon which, similarly to
Paris, has been conceptualized in the literature as a city that has
experienced significant difficulties with engaging with its large post-
migration communities (Dikec 2007, Hargreaves 2007) by not
adopting a policy narrative towards difference based upon
recognition. However, again it must be noted that the situation on the ground is never static, with Lyon containing a plethora of organizations that represent the interests of post-migration communities to the municipal authorities with some significant examples where their interactions with municipal authorities could be argued to represent a partial deployment in the city of a policy narrative based on recognition towards post-migration communities. The Abrahamic Group of La Duchère (Groupe Abraham La Duchère) interreligious group, which experienced a significant period of non-engagement by the authorities is now being consulted on how to represent minorities in the cultural policies of the city. The Rhône-Alpes Regional Council of the Muslim faith (CRCM, Conseil Régional du Culte Musulman Rhône-Alpes) who lobbies on behalf Muslim interests and has secured 12 mosque building permits, has also experienced a limited degree of recognition through the concessions granted to it by the municipal authorities. These concessions won by the CRCM should be seen in their context, however, having not been secured without significant legal battles with far right groups that have legally contested their right for recognition in the courts. DiverCité is another example of an association with a working relationship with the Lyon authorities that works on behalf of post-migration communities to ‘fight against all forms of discrimination and social exclusion’ (DiverCité 2012) which has succeeded in having its members elected to the municipal commission for human rights, another possible example of the deployment of a policy of recognition towards post-migration communities by bringing their
representatives into the governing process. However, the analysis presented in this thesis also requires examining cases where a policy narrative of recognition has not been deployed in Lyon, as there is still clearly some way to go before it is an accepted norm in the city. An example of such a case where recognition has been withheld is the ‘Body art: athletes of the street’ (Body Arte: Athlète de Rue), a youth organization providing free exercise classes, has experienced significant difficulties in engaging with the municipal authorities, despite seeking their involvement and funding.

This chapter then completes this analysis by examining Marseille, standing apart as it does from both Paris and Lyon in its far more developed and chronologically expansive deployment of a policy narrative based on recognition to handle the difference presented by its post-migration communities. This thesis argues that the governance of the city with recognition is an important part of the process that aids in the creation of the city’s inclusive urban identity that mitigated rioting in 2005. The most notable of these is the Marseille Espérance forum. This forum, based upon governing with the recognition of difference, is the only such organization in a municipal authority in France. The organization brings together the chief representatives of the city’s seven main religious communities. The handling of the grand mosque project by the municipal government of Marseille is another example of how the means of governance in the city could be argued to be producing inclusive narratives for post-migration communities. Marseille Espérance
forum publically backed the project, the municipal government has also appointed a civil servant to oversee the completion of the project and the municipal authority has made land available for a subsidized rent. Marseille also further deploys a policy narrative of recognition by offering municipal funds for post-migration communities to set up a variety of non-governmental groups, such as Radio Gazelle, and the Union of Muslim Families of the Bouches-du-Rhône (l'Union des Familles Musulmanes des Bouches-du-Rhône, UFM13).

3.2. Paris: Overshadowing Inclusive Narratives with Polemic

In analysing the policy narratives deployed by the authorities in the Parisian region in response to the city’s post-migration ethnic difference, it is important to understand the policy context in which this analysis occurs. In response to the riots of the 1980s and 1990s in the Parisian region the French government strengthened their urban policy with the provision of funds for the basic upkeep and provision of services in the Parisian ‘Sensitive Urban Zones’ (zone urbaine sensible) market by high concentrations of public housing, crime and socio-economic deprivation (Wacquant 2007). It is important to note that this attempt at physical and structural renewal of the urban environment arguably did not translate into feelings of enfranchisement in these neighborhoods, however, with Waquant (2007) arguing that these policies did little to tackle the ‘hyper-marginalization’ of these areas in socio-economic terms, a key cause of the huge disturbances of 2005 (Hargreaves 2007). It is important
to know that at this point the authorities also resist implementing a policy of recognition for post-migration difference in tandem with these infrastructural upgrades as an integrated response to the concerns about discrimination and racism experienced by post-migration communities in the city. As such, these infrastructure upgrades to estates and the demolition of a limited number of high rise towers occurred within a continued context of feelings of socio-political marginalization, which scholars note as a key tension that contributed to the 2005 riots (Hargreaves 2007). This is a point picked up by Doytcheva’s (2007) research in the Garges-Les-Gonesse and Vitry areas of Paris that identifies a ‘French affirmative action’ being practiced at the local level where post-migration communities are singled out for particular help through the zoning of deprived urban areas as requiring specific assistance from the French state. Again, with a recourse to multiculturalism theory, while attempting to identify and address some of the key problems post-migration communities face in the socio-economic sphere, it still falls short of providing the public recognition of difference and its validity in society stressed as so important by theorists such as Taylor (1994).

To render this analysis more contemporary, the most in-depth and notable study of the Parisian region of recent publication has been Kepel’s (2011) work on the Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil that identified the rise of the Union of Muslim Associations Seine-Saint-Denis (UAM93) as a representative force for the Muslim communities of the department. Kepel (2011) argues that this group rose to
prominence as a representative force for the Muslim community of the department because of the continued policy and political vacuum that persisted even in the aftermath of the 2005 riots that started in the department. As such, a key conclusion of the study was that, while urban renewal projects have not gone unnoticed by the inhabitants of Clichy, they also insist that mere renovation of the physical environment is not enough to ensure social cohesion. Kepel found that these residents, regardless of this physical renewal, regarded the Republic as a distant actor that had little to do with their daily lives. These residents, in his view, had turned to Islam as a key organizing principle in their lives, which in itself has co-constituted new forms of political organizations to argue for their recognition in social, economic, religious, and cultural terms. The most significant of these identified in the study is the UAM93.

3.2.1 The UAM93 and ‘Halal Buses’

Examining the experience of the UAM93 in this context offers insight into the means by which the governance of the Parisian region is deploying policy narratives of recognition or assimilation, or both, in response to the emergence of such groups that are openly campaigning for a policy of recognition to be employed. The association was formed in 2002 as a means to fill a gap in the representation of the Muslim community in the city. In the opinion of the head of UAM93, M’hamed Henniche, there was a gap in representation between the local mosque associations of France,
and the national body that represents Muslims in France, the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM) (Interview 2012). Here, then, there was a discrepancy between how the Muslim community could garner representation on national issues and how they could be represented locally, in that small, local institutions such as mosques, campaigning on similar issues of representation, planning permits and social problems, did not have a body they could rally behind to press these common issues locally. Added to this, its initiation was also a response to the problem of diaspora politics among the Muslim community in Saint Denis where the countries of origin (predominantly Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey) attempted to control the mosques of their respective communities in France as a means of furthering the political agendas of the respective countries, who, with the exception of Turkey and very recently Tunisia, were under the government of very repressive police states. The key threat seen by these regimes was international Islamist networks that might have been using mosques in France to recruit opposition to these regimes. This was especially pertinent to the Algerian case where the government fought an Islamist insurrection in the 1990’s, with several of the Islamist leaders and fighters moving between France and Algeria during the conflict.

As such, the UAM93’s listed aims also include facilitating relations between the Muslim associations of Saint Denis and the local political organs of the French state, such as the local municipal
authorities present in the Parisian region. Examples of this include lobbying for planning permission to be given for places or worship such as in the example of Pantin. Here, the UAM93 worked towards negotiating the planning permission of a new mosque and cultural centre with the socialist mayor, Bertrand Kern, and the many smaller and ethnically mixed Muslim associations of the area for over four years to reach an agreement between the various parties. This is an area where the relationship between the UAM93 and municipal governance is demonstrating the ability to create some narratives of inclusion, arguably demonstrating Taylor’s (1994) idea of recognition, where the group is negotiating with political power structures for the public recognition of the validity of their cultural and religious practices through the public commissioning of built infrastructure.

The organization also takes into its remit a public role in the response to events that may lead to injustice for the Muslim community of Saint Denis or could cause social tensions. An example of this is their regular public denouncement of hate crimes in the region, such as the defaming of a synagogue in Pantin in November 2012. They also lobby against possible injustices directed towards the Muslim community by organizing protests such as in the case of a security guard that was killed whose murder was not widely reported and that was considered by the Muslim community and others that the police were not taking the crime seriously enough. This has not always been a smooth affair, however, with the politics of the relationship between the authorities and the Muslim community being complicated.
An example of this can be seen in the union representing one of its constituent organizations, the Union of Muslim Associations of Epinay-sur-Seine (UAME), in a dispute with the centre right municipal mayor, Hervé Chevreau. Here, the mayor had negotiated to build a large new mosque and cultural centre for the community in the commune of Epinay-sur-Seine, part of the department of Seine-Saint-Denis. Chevreau, however, acted to cede the leadership of the new institution not to the current community Imam, who had been in place for 15 years, but to someone nominated by the central mosque of Paris. This was in violation of the wishes of the local community who wanted not only to continue to control their affairs locally, rather than ceding control to the Paris Central Mosque, but who also were happy with their long standing religious leader. There is also a dynamic here of the politics of the Muslim diaspora in France, in that the Paris Central Mosque is seen as under the influence of the government of Algeria, something that the mixed local congregation hoped to keep out of their local affairs. Here, the UAM93 organized public protests against the move, the outcome of which had not been settled at the time of writing. This is a pertinent example of how a policy of partial recognition is emerging in the Parisian region, with its own particular problems of that perhaps stem from a lack of experience carrying out such policies as well as the possibility that the issue of security trumps providing recognition at the local level. Modood (2007) has identified the CFCM (the organization the Mayor attempted to give control of the new centre to) as a measure
instituted by the Sarkozy government as a means of corporatist control of the Muslim community in France.

Problems have also occurred with fostering a policy of recognition towards the UAM93 in the media coverage of their engagement with the political authorities. This can be seen in the polemic generated by the ‘Halal bus’ incident during the 2012 presidential election campaign. Here, the association was contacted by the governing UMP party of President Sarkozy to arrange for the mosques to bring Muslim voters to attend a UMP rally. Here, the Union in conjunction with its constituent mosques, organized for buses to bring voters to the rally. This was reported by the French media as the ‘Halal bus’ affair where the buses were supposedly separated by gender. This has been denied by the union and later reported as incorrect in the press, but never the less created significant controversy and polemic in the French media at the time. These experiences of the UAM93 demonstrate the difficulties of attempting to create a local narrative of recognition against a national backdrop of a continued adherence to assimilation because what can be rendered as positive examples of recognition for post-migration communities at the local level can easily be covered in the national press as a significant contravention of Republican assimilationist norms. This pattern of positive local policy develops of recognition being rendered as negative and threatening at the national level is a theme that continually re-emerges in the Parisian region and is an important point with which to question to what extent one could convincing assert that the
region is institution a policy narrative based on recognition that is serving its purpose. The next example of interest to this thesis, where this important dynamic again plays out, is in the activities of the Oranges Association of Nanterre.

3.2.2 *Les Oranges* and ‘Selective Communalism’

Another important example of the tentative emergence of a policy based on recognition at the local level between municipal governance and post-migration communities in the Parisian region is the relationship between the association of the Oranges and the municipal government on Nanterre. The association is governed by the law of 1901, created to facilitate the creation of non-profit making organisations that are neither church nor state. The Oranges officially incorporated in 2004 as a means of continuing work started by activists in 2003. The name ‘The Oranges’ was chosen due to the symbolism of the orange of love and peace, as portrayed by the Algerian author Aziz Chouaki (*Les Oranges* 2012). Their work began when the current president of the association, M’hamed Kaki, proposed two activities to attempt to redefine and question the nature of Algerian identity as constructed in France. Firstly, he produced a piece of theatre to speak to the Algerians in Nanterre about their identity and collective memory in France. Secondly, the group organized a conference with academics and experts from Universities to again question the identity and memory of Algerians, this time through the discussion of a famous Algerian sociologist,
Abdelmalek Sayad. Two key events tie Nanterre to important events in Algerian history. Ali Hadj started the Algerian Peoples Party in a café in Nanterre after being held as a political prisoner by the French. He was concerned with the condition of workers in the Maghreb under the French colonial regime. Also, on the 17th October 1961 a peaceful protest by pro-independence Algerians was quashed in Paris by the police, resulting in anything up to 300 deaths. This incident was officially denied until the 1990s. The largest delegation of the protesters was from Nanterre.

The motivation for the creation of the Oranges association, as discussed in an interview carried out for this thesis, was essentially the question of how to construct a collective identity in Nanterre, and France more generally, which accepts the plurality present in French society resulting from the presence of post-migration communities. Here, the organisation wanted to find ways in which to deal with the memory of immigrant history in France in a way that can take its specific events, successes and struggles, and link them the universal issues that affects all communities in France. This stemmed from the activist’s observations that while there existed multiple identities and memories within Nanterre and its residents, in his opinion not enough was being done to either commemorate and valorize these identities and memories, or indeed to challenge negative aspects of identity and memory in the city. M’hamed noticed that the media discourse against migrants and post-migration communities that has come to prominence in French public discourse was having a detrimental
effect on the self-worth of post-migration youth in Nanterre, and France more broadly, who did not know enough about positive aspects of their cultures. Here, he used the example of Abdelmalek Sayad and Franz Fannon, both prominent scholars in the colonial era from backgrounds of today’s post-migration minorities (Algeria and Martinique), both of whom he argued were little known by the current young people from post-migration communities living in Nanterre and France. If the legacy of figures like these could be better known, he argues that this would be an important way for today’s youths of post-migration communities to have a better self-image by opening up the horizons of opportunity for these communities. His approach has proved popular with post-migration communities, with a demand for expansion meaning that at the time of writing the creation of an Oranges organization in neighbouring Seine-Saint-Denis is underway. It is important here to note that the specific activities of the association that deals with history and culture will be dealt with thematically in chapters IV and V of this thesis. What is important here is to understand the relationship that this organization, given its explicit remit of recognizing difference, has with the municipal authorities of Nanterre as this can yield details about how the authorities in Nanterre might be working to foster a policy based upon a narrative of recognition.

The relationship between the Oranges and municipal authorities can yield this information about the kind of policy narrative being fostered by the authorities because of the nature of the Oranges work. Here,
the Oranges are directly attempting to foster recognition and validation of the bi-culturalism (Kabir 2010) of Nanterre’s post-migration communities, where they create their own mix of French and other influences in constructing their identities and ways of life. The Oranges are attempting this by promoting aspects of collective identity that offer residents of Nanterre from post-migration communities recognition that the aspects of their self understanding that are not French are normatively valid. As stated, this is an important aspect of fostering a policy narrative of recognition by legitimizing the place of post-migration communities in society. Here, the public performance and discussion of important facets of their experiences, such as the anti-colonial struggle, are important means by which this recognition can occur in the public realm. This pits them against the prevailing, assimilationist integration agenda of the French state that wishes to condemn such bi-culturalism to the realm of the private sphere, away from public displays and the ruling structures of government. This makes the relationship between this organization and the municipal authorities important in identifying the policy narrative that is being applied to Nanterre’s post-migration difference, with their mission statement hinting that they are attempting to foster a policy of recognition, and thus challenge the assimilationist consensus.

This said, the Oranges has a complex relationship with the municipal authorities. The Oranges is an association governed by the law of 1901, meaning that they are not formally part of the state apparatus
and are independent of the state. The association has also, to date, not formalised a funding agreement with the municipal government. M'hamed argued that this was a rational matter of the allocation of resources as he has the perception that the small amount of money that would be accessible would not justify the manpower input required to gain access to it. There is also the perception amongst the Oranges that as a group that is confronting the image and perception of post-migration communities in France, most notably that of the Algerians, they are singled out for scrutiny that they are fostering a ‘communitarian agenda’, something which is seen as a serious transgression of French, Republican principles by the political establishment. Here, they feel that they are unfairly treated because regional French minorities, such as the Bretons, are able to organize legitimate Breton cultural activities without interference or stigmatization from the state, due to the minority rights conferred upon them from the EU. Post-migration communities, to date, do not have such rights in terms of non-territorial cultural autonomy in EU states. Therefore, the association relies on local fundraising and revenue generated from its activities to sustain itself in the main. However, this is not to say that the association does not have an important relationship with the municipal authorities.

Fiscal independence does not mean, however, that the Oranges do not engage with local authorities and politicians. Quite the opposite, they have office space in a municipal building set aside for community groups and also hold their activities in municipal buildings.
Personally, the communist mayor has been involved with activities of post-migration groups in the commune, such as in 2005 when M’hamed accompanied the mayor on a trip to Tlemcen in Algeria, a town that Nanterre is twinned with and which is one of the centres of Islamic culture and learning in the Maghreb. The mayor has also supported a proposal by the association to rename two streets in the municipality to reflect figures and events in the history of the Algerian community in France (dealt with fully in chapter V as a means of the public commemoration of history). These successes only came, however, after a failed attempt to name a newly constructed high school after the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad. This attempt generated a large media polemic that again demonstrated the difficulties presented by attempting to govern with difference in the Parisian region. In this regard, these attempts can be met with both departmental disapproval, and ferocious media reprimand, both of which can arguably be said to generate social narratives that are not inclusive that would lead one to question the effectiveness of policy innovations that might be attempting to implement a policy of recognition. With the support of the mayor, the Oranges started a national campaign to have this school named after the sociologist, as there are to date no high schools named after figures from post-migration communities (Bel Hadi 2007). They generated significant support for the initiative by getting researchers and politicians to sign a petition and to get media coverage for the effort of renaming the college. Nikolas Sarkozy, President of the Conseil General at the
time, before he became interior minister and ultimately president, originally accepted this name for the college.

However, the decision was overturned by a vote and the issue stirred up widespread controversy in the French press. Here many French politicians waded into the fray, with Elizabeth Balkini-Smadja arguing for the college to be named after Guy Moquet, a young member of the French resistance who died at the hands of the Nazi occupiers, and that any attempt to name the college after an Arab sociologist was an example of the communist mayor on Nanterre attempting to start a polemic around the issue. This example of the activities of the Oranges demonstrates how some fledgling attempts to govern with a policy that offers recognition of the cultural validity of post-migration communities are beginning to take place in the Parisian region. These are important starting points in possibly offering inclusive social narratives to these communities at the level of the city as, in the case of Nanterre, municipal authorities are beginning to offer recognition of diversity and bi-cultureless in a means not currently offered by the French state. However, this example also demonstrates something important about the experience of these initiatives to date in the Parisian region. This is that they are currently stymied by hostility in offering recognition to post-migration communities both within the political structures of the city and also through the media coverage of such initiatives that are vital elements in fostering a policy based upon the recognition of post-migration difference. Importantly, this shares some striking similarities with the
experience of the UAM93 discussed above, in as much as the local level of the department or commune seems to be drifting towards implementing a policy narrative based upon the recognition of post-migration difference. However, this seems to come into conflict with policy adhered to at the national level, and as such is subject to significant critique in the national press. As such, this thesis is possibly beginning to sketch a picture in the Parisian region that two policy narratives seem to working in tandem but at different levels of governance. This is a state of affairs that is further evidenced when examining the events surrounding the mayor of Paris’ annual Ramadan dinner.

3.2.3 A light Ramadan Meal in Paris, but a Heavy Polemic

Moving away from the context of the suburbs of Paris to the city centre of Paris proper, a pertinent example of the fostering of a policy narrative based on recognition by municipal authorities with post-migration communities is the Mayor of Paris’s annual fast-breaking celebration during Ramadan. During the 2011 session, the socialist Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, organised a cultural night on the theme of Ramadan that included cultural exhibitions and live North African music, where a ‘light meal’ (repas léger) would be served alongside soft drinks and alcoholic cocktails. This differs somewhat dramatically from the formal routine in Mosques or Muslims homes where the breaking of the fast is followed by prayer, and where live music and alcoholic drinks are not part of the program. The mayor’s
program made no provision for prayers or any religious activities to be held. However, its proposal resulted in public complaints being made by the Secular Associations of France, and politicians including Jerome Dubus, a councillor of the 17th arrondissement of Paris and the national secretary of the New Centre (Gabizon 2011). The complaints centered around two key issues. Firstly, those who complained deemed the night to be against the principles of secularism (Laïcité), as the commemoration of religious events are not allowed by the organs of state in France as religious affair are separated from politics in French law. Further to this, complaints made allegations that, even though there was no overt practice of rituals of religion involved in the event, it could be seen to be giving preferential treatment to the Muslim community because no other religious group have a cultural night held by the Mayor. The other major complaint about the event was the cost, and the use of municipal money to fund around €100,000 of expenses incurred by the event. However, the mayor defended his participation in the event because the mayor has been involved in similar events to commemorate Ramadan since 2001, and also is publically involved with other events, such as Jewish New Year, Chinese New Year and the endorsement of a Christmas Tree (Gabizon 2011). What is important here is how this event, and the polemic surrounding it have played out in narrative terms. The event, while clearly focused on the Muslim community of the Parisian region, has made compromises in an attempt to fit in with the separation of church and state, such as the removal of a religious component to the evening, and the lack of
provision for any observance of common Muslim rituals that occur during Ramadan, such as collective prayer at the time of fast breaking, or the additional prayers that are held in the evening throughout the month (Taraweeh Prayers). Also, the serving of alcohol at the event is somewhat at variance with viewing the evening as a religious event, given that especially in the one month of the year when even the most unobservant Muslim is called to piety and as such it is arguably a particularly ill advised time to hold an event that includes it.

Here, there are clearly numerous contradictory elements of both the event and its coverage when analysing what kind of policy narrative that is being applied and its effectiveness. Taking Taylor’s (1994) idea of recognition, this event, cast in this light, is a contradictory mix of recognition on one level, in that in brings an idea of a Ramadan event into the municipal calendar, yet at the same time hollowing it out of certain key elements that constitute what the event is commonly understood as being about, such as the religious aspects of it. It is also the polemic generated by it that could also be argued to be contradicting the possible element of inclusion that it could be generating. The polemic received wide media coverage in France, and served to buttress the on-going negative media coverage concerning Islam-related issues in France from the wearing of the veil to the provision for prayer (Hargreaves 2007). Here, it reignited debates about the place of Muslims in France and whether such an event has a place within an organ of the French state that is
supposed to adhere to a strict interpretation of the separation of religion from the affairs of state (laïcité), and thus be confined to the private realm of individual’s lives. On a local level, it is possible to argue that this coverage of the event renders it in contrast to the recommendations made for fostering inclusion by the key theorists of multiculturalism cited in the definition of inclusion taken in this thesis. Clearly, framing the discussion of the event in terms of violating state principals and being a misappropriation of public funds hardly sets up diversity in the positive image advocated by Parekh (2000) or can be argued to be part of the remaking of society in a positive vein to include post-migration communities in positions of equality as argued for by Modood (2010). Rather, it sets up the idea of diversity as something dangerous, and casts Muslims as a community whose events do not have a place in the public image of French society. Here, a similar picture emerges as seen in the examples above that while the local level of government is fostering policies of recognition, by placing such an event in the municipal calendar, the polemic generated when this policy narrative is contrasted with the nation narrative of assimilation is hugely negative. These attempts may be the foundation of an important change in the policy situation of the Parisian region, as they are evidence that a policy narrative based on recognition that could foster inclusiveness and engagement with difference may be emerging in the region, as many of the policy developments discussed here have occurred in the past decade. However, as it stands that these attempts seem to be continually clashing with nationally defined norms and are scrutinized as being
deviant policy innovations moving away from assimilation and cast in an extremely negative light. Importantly then, it is too early to be able to persuasively argue that this is currently the foundation of a change in policy narratives towards recognition. Here, path dependency cannot be guaranteed for either the local attempts to foster a policy narrative based on recognition, nor the national adherence to assimilation. Rather, the tentative conclusion that can be made here is that there is a somewhat contradictory dual adoption of policy narratives, with assimilation at the national level and attempts to foster recognition at the local level that give this contradictory picture.

3.3. Lyon: Governing with post-Migration Communities at the periphery

In a similar vein to Paris, the municipal government has rather concentrated on fostering an urban policy around the renewal of physical infrastructure rather than attempting to foster an inclusive urban identity or opening up to claims for governance with the recognition of difference. A particular example of this can be seen in the events in Vaulx-en-Velin in the 1990s that illuminate in graphic detail the city’s difficulties in engaging with a section of its population. In 1990 an attempt was made to regenerate the physical environment through urban renewal, however, following the death of a local resident in a traffic accident involving a police car a spate of unrest occurred in which the regeneration work was targeted and burned down (Dikec 2007). As a result, the association Agora was
created in 1991 as ‘a politically engaged association of immigrant youth of the neighborhood’ with the intention to ‘participate in the life of the neighborhood’ (Dikec 2007). Part of this program involved taking over an under used community centre to set up a base of operations. However, seen as a threat to the power of the local mayor, early one morning in 1994, on the direct orders of the mayor, the centre was demolished without notice being given to the residents of the area (Dikec 2007).

It is hard to imagine, in the bounds of legality, in a modern, well developed, Western European urban area how a more directly disengaging gesture could be made to the local community. This gesture, the demolition of a community centre, turned from a failing example of the ineffectual presence of authority in this particular area, into a thriving centre of community life by the very youth which are the overt focus of engagement strategies is bizarre in the extreme, when considering the earlier promises of the mayor’s office to engage with residents of the area. This did not go unnoticed by local residents. In Dikec’s words ‘it put an end to efforts to establish dialogue between the municipality and the young inhabitants of the neighborhood’ who took this gesture as a mark of the changed direction of the mayor’s policy away from the initial enthusiasm for engagement (Dikec 2007).

This brief example again demonstrates the limits of urban policies based around the renewal of physical structure. Here, it is seen that
an adherence to assimilationist policies, buttressed by a separation of state and church, alongside formal legal equality, is sufficient to satisfy the needs of post-migration communities. However, as with any policy context, one should be cautious in attempting to rely on path-dependency as explanatory factor of policy evolution, is there is some significant evidence that Lyon, at least at the local level, has moved to foster a policy narrative based on recognition.

3.3.1 Limited Progress with the Charte de la Diversité and the DiverCité Network

This experience of a governance strategy not based on a policy narrative of recognition contrasts drastically with the current stance of the authorities, who have signed up to the Charter of Diversity against discrimination in the workplace. While this is a charter that seeks to fight discrimination in the domain of the workplace by campaigning so that have workforces that ‘better reflect…the diversity of the French population’ (Charte de la Diversité 2013, author’s translation). Lyon was the first municipal authority to sign up to such a charter in France. This bucks the trend of a reluctance of French state institutions to promote an idea of the need to fight discrimination in the economic sphere as it has been conceptualized as already being fulfilled by the state’s focus on individual rights and not recognizing ethnic difference. Lyon has also set up an ‘equality task force’ to combat discrimination and promote equal opportunities, most importantly in housing and employment (Council of Europe
The Municipal government also funds, and directly lends support to the ‘Diversity in Action’ event in tandem with local NGOs active in anti-discrimination, pro-diversity activities. This event is centered around debating the values of diversity in Lyon and how to ensure it is used as a vehicle that can drive growth in the city, as well as giving Diversity Trophies that recognize the contribution of individuals to promoting diversity and fighting discrimination. For example, in 2010 it gave a trophy for Intercultural Dialogue to Ma Fan, a professor of traditional Chinese medicine that set up an institute for its teaching in Lyon (la Diversité en Action 2010). The 2009 edition of the same event, again supported by the municipal authorities, ended with a cultural evening with representative arts and music from 5 areas, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, The Caribbean and Europe. Supporting such an event, whose catch phrase is ‘diversity is an opportunity’ is important evidence that the policy stance of the authorities are moving towards a multicultural understanding of difference away from Republican assimilation. This can also be seen in the way that the authorities are also engaging with, and incorporating, organizations in society.

There are some important indications, however, that the municipal authorities in Lyon have begun to engage with post-migration communities that may be producing narratives of inclusion. An example of this tentative beginning in greater engagement with these communities is the city’s engagement with the DiverCité network. This association mainly deals with issues of social justice for post-
migration communities. Their mission is to ‘fight against all forms of discrimination and social exclusion’ (DiverCité 2012). The association has existed since 1996 and concentrates on citizenship education to better equip immigrants and their descendants to engage with French political institutions, such as to vote or deal with the city’s civil administration. Their major project is The Social and Citizen café (‘le café social et citoyen’). This is a means to facilitate this citizenship education, and also engage in a debate about ‘the question of memory with inhabitants of local neighborhoods with a view to valorize their cultural contributions’ (DiverCité 2012). Here, the café hosts free legal advice sessions to enable residents to have access to legal professionals for free to aid in fighting discrimination. However, it can be argued that DiverCité Lyon is best viewed as a network of those from the city with common interests that puts together secular workers in law and social services with some Muslim community groups operating in Lyon (Morin 2003). Regardless of its structure, DiverCité is notable for some significant similarities to past actors who have attempted to represent post-migration communities in the suburbs of Lyon – the ‘fight for recognition’ (Morin 2003). Here, while subject to some initial problems, members of the network have begun to find ways into the municipal structures of government. For example, four of their members where elected to the extra-municipal commission for the respect of human rights in Lyon (Morin 2003). However, the recognition of diversity in the municipal governance of the city rests in a strategy of coopting actors, such as those from DiverCité, into
existing power structures without making allowance for the recognition of communities.

3.3.2 Missing an Opportunity? Some Engagement with The Abrahamic group of la Duchère

Examining the policy narrative applied in the interactions of governance with post-migration communities in Lyon follows a similar patter to that of Paris, in that the authorities do not have a central organ for governing with the recognition of difference in a similar vein to Marseille Espérance. This is not to say that efforts to foster inter-religious dialogue as a means for integration are not taking place in the city, but rather the municipal authorizes are not utilizing these efforts to produce something similar to Marseille Espérance. An example of a flourishing group that deals with the religious diversity of Lyon is the Abrahamic group of la Duchère (GAD). La Duchère is a poor suburb on the outskirts of Lyon to the city’s North East that is notorious for its massive public housing buildings and history of riots in the 1990s. In a similar vein to many other large public housing projects in France, it was constructed quickly to accommodate the post-war housing shortage exacerbated by sudden mass migration from North Africa at the end of the Algerian war of independence in the 1960s.

The group emerged out of the circumstances thrust upon the area by the congruence of historical events. The area was populated by
working class French and North African families, who were joined on
the independence by a large number of Pied-Noirs returnees of
Spanish-Jewish origin mainly from the Oran region in Algeria (CRPL
2012). Here, a lack of provision for religious spaces resulted in the
Protestant community renting part of their building to the Muslim
community on Religious holidays, and then to the Jewish community
to hold a Talmudic school up until the local synagogue was created
and the Muslim community created their own prayer facilities. At this
point, residents of the area floated the idea of organizing meetings
between the practitioners of the different Abrahamic faiths present in
the area (Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims). From 1986
these meetings were formalized as a group that would meet monthly
at the Protestant building to discuss ideas relating to their annual
theme, decided by the group in advance. From 2002, the group has
organized public lectures and visits to religious buildings in an
attempt to foster better inter-communal knowledge as a means to
foster better community relations in the neighborhood (CRPL 2012).
As part of this process they issue mutual declarations on important
events, such as the recent killings in Toulouse by an Islamic
extremist. Here, they issued an interreligious declaration whereby
they reaffirmed their belief in the importance of dialogue, especially
between religions, as a means to get to know each other (AAD,
2012).

There is also evidence that the municipal authorities of Lyon are
beginning to engage with the group in the governance of the city in
some limited ways. Under the chart of cultural cooperation\textsuperscript{10} (Charte de Coopération Culturelle), which commit the city’s large cultural institutions to the ‘valorization of diversity and increased visibility of minorities’ and ‘inter-culturality to introduce new arrivals’ (Ville de Lyon 2012, author’s translation), the GAD was consulted on possible cultural projects it would be interested in initiating and being associated with. The result was an event dedicated to ‘the religious minorities of Lyon from the Middle Age to the present’ (Musées Gadagne 2013, author’s translation) that demonstrated how Lyon has received and accommodated various religious minorities during its history. While this will be dealt with more fully in chapter 4 it is worth mentioning here as more possible evidence that the governance of the city is engaging increasingly with organizations that foster a policy narrative based upon a recognition of difference as a means to battle inequality and mediate differences in society.

Another important aspect of how the municipal authorizes are engaging with post-migration communities that could yield information on which policy narratives are being employed to deal with the city’s post-migration difference.

3.3.3 An Uneasy Accommodation of the Rhône-Alpes Regional Council of the Muslim faith

\textsuperscript{10} For full details and analysis of this initiative see chapter IV
Another important sector to analyze which can shed some light on the policy narratives being employed to manage Lyon post-migration ethnic difference is in the relationship that the authorities have with the Rhône-Alpes Regional Council of the Muslim faith (CRCM, Conseil Régional du Culte Musulman Rhône-Alpes) which is the official representative body of the Muslim community in Lyon located in the suburb of Villeurbanne. The organization, as representative of the largest post-migration community in the Lyon region as defined by religion, has a broad mandate. Stated aims include providing Islamic religious duties, such as providing Islamic funerals and advice on performing pilgrimage to Mecca amongst other services. However, their remit also covers broader duties of social engagement with the wider community in Lyon, such as interreligious dialogue. Here, their activities have been numerous, including taking part in public debates and attending other community’s religious occasions. In 2011 this took the shape of attending the Jewish communities Yom Kippur festivities at the city’s main synagogue, the first time Muslim representatives have done so in Lyon (Saphir News 2011). In 2013, these activities resulted in the CNRM being awarded €16,000 to consolidate and promote these activities in Lyon by the municipal government (Khabar News 2013). This is significant evidence that the municipal authorities in Lyon are fostering a policy narrative based on the recognition of difference in as much as they are explicitly funding such activities as a means to manage difference in the city. These are not the only concessions that the city has given to the CNRM, however, with the city also offering officially sanctioned
Muslim burial plots in local cemeteries and slaughter spaces for the Eid sacrifice of lambs (CNRM website). The CNRM has also secured 12 building permits for the construction of mosques in the region (CNRM website) in conjunction with the municipal authorities. This has been despite legal challenges in the courts and protests in the city from far-right groups, including the national front (FN) political party. Again, this demonstrates that the city is somewhat engaging in applying policy narratives based on recognition as a response to the city’s post-migration difference. However, there are also important indications that this narrative of recognition is not being applied evenly across the range of the organizations present in the city, seen in the experience of the ‘body arte’ organization.

3.3.4 Marginalizing the Grass Roots of Body Arte

There are signs in Lyon that any process of applying a policy narrative based on recognition in the city sits alongside examples where this is not the case. This is well illustrated by the experiences of a contemporary community organization in Lyon ‘Body Art Athletes of the Street’ (Body Art Athlètes de Rue) that has struggled for help or recognition by the municipal authorities while regularly attracting between 50-100 young people to its open air physical activity sessions on a weekly basis. Their motto sums up well the spirit of their activities, ‘Body art, athletes of the street: the art of sculpting one’s body outdoors while being entertained, accessible to all’ (Author’s translations) (Body Art (2012) Facebook page). This
organization runs open air fitness sessions on the Quai du Rhône in central Lyon using free outdoor fitness equipment installed on the river bank. It is located on the riverbank closest to the poor, minority rich neighborhoods of le Gulliotière, Vaux-en-Velin, Villeurbanne and Vénissieux. It has been running for both males and females, in a formalized manner since October 2011 by a coach called Agnès Maembe. The material used here comes from direct interviews with Agnès and from archival research into the broader activities of the association. The outdoor location of these activities is the result of a lack of access to an indoor facility owing both to the failure of the municipal authorities to supply one and because the participants are mainly from low-income families. The participant group mainly come from the poor neighborhoods to the east of Lyon and from several minority groups including Algerians, Comorians, Afghans, Uzbeks, Portuguese, Spanish and also from the French population. Some of these young people travel up to two hours to get from their suburbs into the city centre to participate in the Sunday activities.

While the purpose of the organization is primarily to provide physical activity, it also has fulfilled a deeper, civic element. In the interview conducted for this thesis, Agnès stated had used it a means to attempt to regain some ground around enfranchising her participants as full citizens of Lyon. When she had taken them around some of the city’s famous landmarks for photo shoots to publicize the association, such as the Basilica of Notre-Dame de Fourvière, several of her participants had asked if they were still in Lyon, when
in fact they were in Lyon proper, instead of their suburbs of Lyon which, in many cases are not part of Lyon proper. This had shocked her that not only did individuals in their late teens not know the city in which they had often lived their entire lives, but were not even aware of its landmarks and boundaries. She also identified during the interview had also instituted a program where she takes her participants to the central town hall (Hotel de Ville) to register for their voting cards so that they are able to vote in municipal and national elections. The organization has held several competitions of its own between its members and has been featured on several national media outlets, most recently being selected for the national ‘La France a un incroyable talent’ (‘France has got talent’), TV talent show series. However, so far these successes have been met with disinterest and hostility in a similar vein to that which Dikec (2007) witnessed in his scholarship on the city in the 1990s.

It is important to note that the lack of engagement with the municipal authorities is despite the repeated attempts by the organization to engage with the authorities to gain some kind of recognition. During out interview, Agnès discussed how she had attempted to engage with the municipal authorities from the start of her activities but felt a distinct unwillingness of the authorities to engage with her organisation. When she first started the association, she had hoped to find an indoor home, especially during the inclement winter months, and perhaps for this to be offered by city authorities, or at least for them to possibly make a contribution to such an effort.
However, she found them completely uncooperative. This continued when she had established the association and had between 50-100 young people turning up every week to take part in the activities. She detailed in our interview how she then enquired as to whether it would be possible to apply for any funds for equipment of uniforms, and again she was declined, and produced the materials from her own funds, and those donated by the participants. At this point she decided that clearly her engagement strategy was not working, which necessitated her attempting to engage with the municipal political establishment. As such, as somewhat of a last resort measure to engage with the municipal authorities she decided to organize an international dinner, where her participants brought home cooked food from their countries of origin to share with invited representatives from the city. She outlined in our interview how she had sent invitations to the politicians and members of the municipal authorities, and followed up the invitations with telephone calls to ensure that the invitations were received, at which point it was confirmed that they had been received. She then went ahead with the dinner, and her participants bought food from their countries of origin to share between each other and the delegates from the city authorities. She insisted during our interview that the significance of this gesture should not be underestimated in its importance to the participants and their parents and their view on their relationship with the city authorities for two issues. Firstly, she suggested that in several regions where the parents of these young people come from (North and West Africa, Central Asia) the sharing of food is an
important act of hospitality. The failure to be able to provide food is seen as a serious lacking of manners. Also, related to this the failure to share in food that is offered is considered a serious snub. Secondly, she suggested that even when removed from cultural context, the outlay required to send food to such an event is significant for families living of societies lowest incomes in public housing, so supporting such an event can be reasonably considered to be a considerable outlay.

Analytically, the opportunities presented here for applying a policy narrative of recognition to this initiative have not been taken up at the time of writing. This is an important example of how, while progress is clearly being made in providing recognition to post-migration communities in Lyon, an association that has grown from the ‘bottom up’ and presents the municipal authority with an important opportunity to engage with some its most hard to reach citizens, namely young (14-25) minority ethnic youths, is being missed. This is also an initiative that is unique to Lyon, and could also bring the municipal authorities some national acclaim if they created a successful relationship with it. This could arguably produce an important instance of applying a policy of recognition for post-migration difference as their hometown could be seen to be supporting their local initiative on a national scale. This opportunity has presented itself, as several cities have already approached the association for advice on setting up similar initiatives, but the municipal authorities have not been involved with the association to
date. This is important in a comparative policy analysis between cities that have and have not rioted in France in that it demonstrates the issues that still remain when fostering a policy narrative of recognition against a national backdrop that still publically adheres to the notion that assimilation is the only legitimate means by which to recognize difference. This analysis now turns to the city that did not riot, Marseille, to examine how the governance of the city might demonstrate a possible adoption of a policy narrative based on recognition.

3.4. Marseille: Governance with Inclusion

The municipal policy of Marseille arguably stands out from that of other French cities in that it is the only city that has made fostering a policy narrative of recognition of post-migration communities central to its strategy of governance. This arguably produces the kind of inclusive social narratives that contribute to the creation of the city’s inclusive urban identity that this thesis argues is central to the city avoiding the rioting seen in other French cities. Key in this has been the mayor’s innovative creation of a forum at city hall that brings together the representatives of the city’s largest religious communities, Marseille Espérance.

3.4.1 Multicultural Marseille Espérance
Marseille Espérance was created in 1990 by the then mayor Robert Vigouroux. He decided that some means of mediation was required for the city in response to the desecration of the historic Jewish cemetery in Carpentras, 100 kilometers outside of Marseille by far-right fanatics. At first, the idea was muted that a forum based upon ethnic affiliation would be the most appropriate marker on which to base such a forum. However, this resulted in far too many representatives coming forward to make such a forum practical. This was when it was decided that religion should be the basis on which the forum would be organized. Here, it was decided that it would be the representatives of the cities who would be contacted and asked to attend a forum of discussion. The resulting forum consists of the representatives of seven religious communities – Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Buddhist. To remain outside of controversy and inside the law Marseille Espérance adopted an informal structure, where whilst they are in receipt of municipal money for their activities, they are not formally recognized as part of the political structure. They also have certain rules by which they have to act. They must make unanimous decisions and statements. To enable this to happen, they are forbidden from discussing religion or politics at their formal meetings or when on formal municipal business. The municipal government sees this as being part of a ‘peaceful and open secularism’, in that they can bring religious representatives to the open and public space of city hall for discussions without religious conflict, or political
disagreement. These principles govern the groups official meetings, and debates that take place every 2-3 years.

These debates are based around the specific social needs of the city, each community and external international events that may have repercussions for the peaceful cohabitation of the city’s residents. An example of this is the unanimous backing given by Marseille Espérance to the ‘grand mosque’ project of Marseille. The search for a large, central place of worship for the city’s Muslim community has been unfolding since the start of the 20th century, but the proactive nature of the past two Mayors, backed by all of the religious leaders of Marseille Espérance have both found a suitable site and a design, with construction underway. Marseille Espérance also holds a yearly intercultural gala event where performances by various cultural community groups take place. The delegates of Marseille Espérance also publically attend each other’s major religious events. This means that the Muslim representative attends Jewish religious holiday events and vice-versa. The association also produces an annual multi-faith calendar which is available to download from their website, or in hard copy from events and the city hall. The organization also holds a ‘Marseille Espérance Jury’ each year at the Marseille Documentary film festival where they award the ‘Marseille Espérance Prize’, endowed by the city of Marseille (this is further discussed in chapter IV). The organization is also available to act ‘on demand’ to respond to potential problems. Marseille Espérance also acts in a ‘reactive’ capacity in response to events that occur that
could threaten the peaceful coexistence of city residents. Two inter-communal murders in the 1990’s demonstrate this ability of the organization to act reactively in difficult circumstances. The first example is the murder of a youth of Comorian origin, Ibrahim Ali. He was walking with a group of friends in 1995 when they came across a group of far right supporters who had been putting up posters for a far right political party. They were armed, and opened fire on the youths, killing Ali. Incendiary remarks where made by far right politicians, and the mayor called Marseille Espérance to a meeting at which they issued a communiqué calling for peace in the city.

The second example is of murder of a youth of French origin, Nicolas Bourgat in 1996 by a youth of Moroccan origin. At a time when the far right were agitating around the ethnic aspect of the incident, the group visited the victim’s family and highlighted the fact that this was not an incident between a French youth and a Moroccan youth but between two youths from Marseille. Marseille Espérance also mobilized in the aftermath of September 11, 2009 and after the Comorian air disaster of 2009, which claimed several city residents as victims, mobilized Marseille Espérance to hold a memorial service on the old port of Marseille. Both these proactive and reactive activities of the group are designed to create a narrative of inclusion, cohesion and coexistence around the unifying figure of municipal authority, the mayor, which are widely distributed through the media and local networks. Marseille Espérance has also been responsible for two physical projects.
The first physical project that Marseille Espérance was responsible for was the ‘L’Arbre de l’Espérance’ (Tree of Hope, author’s translation) sculpture installation. This installation was produced in 2000 and sits in a prominent position in the city in front of one of its most popular public parks. It was commissioned for the city’s 2600th anniversary as a means to commemorate the coming together of all of the city’s inhabitants. Every resident of Marseille was given the chance to symbolically sign up to the message of tolerance, hospitality and sharing represented by the project and symbolized by Marseille Espérance. 500,000 city residents took the opportunity to sign up and their names are engraved in the stones that make up the bottom of the tree. A replica of the tree has been presented to its twin city, Shanghai, and its partner city of Algiers. The second physical project that Marseille Espérance has sponsored has been the ‘Cubic Meter of Infinity’. This is an interfaith prayer room and place of introspection at the Paoli-Calmettes Hospital. This takes the form of four religious zones and a lay area under one roof surrounding the Cubic Meter of Infinity sculpture produced by an Italian artist. This kind of multi-faith area is unique in Europe. Because of its uniqueness in form and activities, Marseille Espérance has received much critical acclaim. As such, this forum and its activities can be argued to be a very prominent case of the municipal authorities of Marseille fostering a policy narrative based on the recognition of difference. For its founder, Robert Vigouroux, this policy of recognizing difference was presented as part of the assimilationist
policy frame as an example of ‘secularism+religions’ (Vigouroux and Ouaknin 2005) where bringing religious leaders into the business of local politics through Marseille Espérance is part of an open and transparent secularism. This is an interesting way in which this initiative is also presenting a means by which to redefine a policy narrative of recognition as not entirely a departure from secular, republican assimilation, but rather it’s redefinition. This need to disguise instituting a policy narrative of recognition is commonly asserted (Moore 2003, Doytcheva 2007) and demonstrates how policy makers are negotiating their way out of a path-dependency dictated by republican norms of assimilation. Marseille Espérance has also played a role in another important aspect of a policy of recognition in the city, its Grand Mosque Project.

3.4.2 Supporting the Grand Mosque Project

Related to a discussion of Marseille Espérance’s redefining of secularism in the city is the execution of the city’s Grand Mosque project which is central to a discussion of how the city can be said to be fostering a recognition based policy narrative. Here, the forum and the municipal authorities were extremely important in pushing the project through to the early stages of construction, after the project had languished for over a century. Here, the Marseille Espérance forum was used to enable the representatives of all of the city’s religious communities to issue a common directive in support of the project, again demonstrating that representatives from different
elements of society are in support of the project, strengthening the position of the Muslim minority as a central member of society alongside other groups. This is especially important given the discrepancy between Marseille and other French cities in terms of Marseille lacking a central mosque. Large, central Mosques have existed in Paris (1924) and Lyon (1994) for far longer than even the planning permission for a central mosque was awarded in Marseille. Also the project has not taken a wholly positive course to its current position, beset with legal challenges by non-Muslim residents of the city and far right activists. However, it does arguably take on significance as a project on two fronts. Firstly, specifically, there is the way in which the project has come to fruition in terms of its relationship to municipal governance, and secondly, the broader context of mosque construction in the city.

According to information gained from Saleh Bariki, the mayor’s aide for the mosque project in 2008, the first plan was established in 1937 for a Mosque to be built to a neo-Moorish design on undeveloped land in the city centre, behind the old port. Plans where shelved because of the Second World War and the Algerian war of independence until the mid 1970’s when the idea was blocked by a climate of xenophobia resulting in legal challenges to the acquisition of land for the project. On his election in 2001, Mayor Jean-Paul Gaudin acknowledged the need for a central mosque, and took steps to provide land at a reduced price for the project on a brown field site in the city’s 15th arrondissement, 15 minutes drive away from the city
centre on the site of a disused slaughterhouse. The site, in the area of Saint-Louis is directly behind the modern docks of the city. The design that was settled on makes the mosque, still under construction, the largest in France and one of the largest in Europe, with a capacity of 7000 and a minaret 25 meters tall. The cornerstone was laid in 2010, but another legal challenge resulted in the suspension of the construction license in 2011, which was reinstated in 2012. While this project has demonstrated contradictory tendencies of the city of Marseille in dealing with the provision of religious services for its Muslim residents, the manner in which the project has been resolved is significant for the position of the Muslim minority of the city in society.

Marseille’s handling of the grand mosque project arguably casts the project as a significant example of how the authorities in the city are instituting a policy narrative of recognition for those from post-migration communities. This is rendered even more potent by the city authorities have taking a stance to protect the cities Muslim community against xenophobia in the past ten years. This started with the support given to the project by the mayor on his election in 2001 and has continued with following administrations not bowing to far right pressure to abandon the mosque plans and going even further to actually allocate a piece of land at a subsidized price to enable the fulfillment of the project. This has been facilitated and strengthened by the creation of a position in the civil administration of the city solely for the realization of the project, currently filled by
Saleh Bariki. This is somewhat different approach to the authorities in both Paris and Lyon towards mosque construction. As we have seen in Paris and Lyon, groups representing the Muslim community have had to liaise with, and sometimes even fight in the courts, with the municipal authorities to gain planning permission to mosque projects, possibly setting up a dichotomy with the authorities on one side, and the Muslim community on the other. Marseille’s municipal policy of actually leading on the project and appointing a member of the civil administration to oversee it, arguably works to bridge this possible divide and demonstrate that the city is willing to provide an important source of recognition to its Muslim community.

3.4.3 Creating Networks of Inclusion with NGOs

The municipal government of Marseille has continued this subversion of Republican assimilationist policy to provide a degree of recognition to post-migration communities with the use of its money to fund community groups. Cesari (1993) argues that money made available through the city council of Marseille was crucial in enabling people from post-immigration communities to set up NGO’s in Marseille. Moore (2001) also noted the trend of the municipal government’s key role in funding minority NGO’s and through extensive fieldwork uncovered many examples of them functioning in the city. This subverts republican assimilationist policy as this policy does not acknowledge ethnicity or religion as a basis for the claiming of rights from the state, while the municipality of Marseille has allowed this to
happen, by making funding available from the municipal pot for groups who are based on the principle of ethnic groups claims of rights. Marseille’s municipal authorities have found a means to do this by using municipal funding to enable communities to set up their own social organizations. For example, there are associations for young people, including one for young Tunisians, several sports associations and even a multicultural Radio station called Radio Gazelle (Moore 2001). A particular case study from Moore’s (2001) work illustrates the ability of city authorities to reach out to minority groups in the city that is not seen in the same way in Paris and Lyon. In particular the following example of the founding of a youth centre following demands from local youths demonstrates a somewhat different approach to that followed by the city of Lyon described by Dikec (2007) when the authorities reacted negatively to an attempt by local youths to engage with the city. In July 1995 a group of youths of Algerian origin attacked social workers in the Saint-Maur area of Marseille, and later explained their hostility as means to attract attention to the fact that they were neglected and unemployed and wanted local authorities to provide a place to develop leisure activities. (Moore 2001). The authorities responded by setting up a youth centre, and recruited a young man of Algerian origin (35 years old) who had previously ran several associations under regeneration schemes to the city’s large housing estates in the north of the city. This again demonstrates the authorities willingness to respond to efforts of minority populations to engage with the city.
3.5. Conclusion:

The previous two chapters of this thesis defined the key conceptions underpinning the analysis pursued in this thesis in an attempt to evaluate the possible existence of an inclusive element to the urban identity of Marseille through its institution of a policy narrative based on recognition for post-migration communities. Understandably, this opened up a discussion of the role of governance and political structures in providing a policy narrative of recognition to post-migration communities through the focus on this element of the integration process in the work concerned with multiculturalism and managing difference. This chapter has demonstrated that all three of the cases here demonstrate variance in the means by which they manage difference in their municipal political and governance structures.

While the Parisian region focused in the 1980’s and 1990’s on the physical regeneration of the city as a means to integrate post-migration communities and mitigate against future unrest (Hargreaves 2007, Kepel 2011), this, in some cases, may be being supplanted by attempts to engage with these communities in a different way over the past decade through the institution of a policy narrative based on recognition. These attempts, however, remain constrained and rendered contradictory by their political limits and negative media coverage. The experience of the UAM93 has demonstrated this in that while they have been successful in
engaging with municipal authorities to gain concessions for the building of mosques, this has been possible often through recourse to legal battles. Also, their attempts at engaging their constituents with the political process, such as their attendance at a UMP rally, have been the subject of negative media coverage. Both of these have been argued to be producing contradictory social narratives regarding inclusion because the gains that have been made in engagement have been the subject of negative process, such as litigation, or covered negatively in the media. The Oranges Association of Nanterre follows a similar pattern in that, while its existence and the support of the municipal authorities arguably create positive narratives of inclusion, its relationship with the authorities has also created a degree of recognition in local policy for post-migration communities, such as the well documented failure to rename a new high school after the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad. This contradictory nature of the relationship between governance and inclusion in the Parisian region has also been highlighted by the experience of the mayor of Paris’ Ramadan event. While this event has been successfully annually held for over ten years, the 2011 plans for the event were subject to a large media polemic, with them lambasted as against the principle of the separation of the church and state in French politics (laïcité) and a misappropriation of municipal funds. This paints a picture of a city where, while important steps are being taken to engage with and include post-migration communities through the institution of a policy narrative based on providing them with recognition, and thus create inclusive social
narratives, narratives are also being created that are not inclusive for these communities. This arguably gives overall a contradictory message for the inclusion of post-migration communities.

This chapter has shown that Lyon follows a similar pattern to Paris in that while it is starting to create inclusive narratives for post-migration communities, it is also producing social narratives that are not conducive to inclusion. This chapter has also demonstrated that Lyon is situated in a similar context to Paris, in that its response to unrest in the 1970s and 1980s was the physical regeneration of the urban environment Dikec (2007). This ignored the ‘thirst for citizenship’ amongst post-migration communities for engagement and representation in the local sphere of the city (Dikec 2007). However, with this said, this thesis has actually discovered that initiatives such as Charte de la Diversité and la Diversité en Action and the incorporation of elements of the DiverCité network are evidence that local policy in Lyon is, in some ways, a break from this past and the possible beginnings of instituting policy narratives based on recognition and thus moving away from assimilation. This continues with the authorities, albeit fairly limited, engagement with the Abrahamic group of la Duchère interfaith organization. In addition, the limited successes of the Rhône-Alpes Regional council of the Muslim faith (CRCM) in gaining funding and concessions from the municipal authorities is another example of how a policy narrative based upon recognition may be emerging in Lyon. This chapter has also covered the interesting example of the NGO Body Art: Athletes
of the street as an example of another organization that has sought
to work on behalf of post-migration communities in the city that has
had difficulties engaging with the municipal authorities of the city.
Despite running regular activities for youths in the city, and being
featured on French national television, the founder of the
organization, Agnès Maembre, has been unsuccessful in obtaining
support and recognition at the local level of the city. This is another
example where this thesis has argued that Lyon is still not producing
narratives of inclusion for its post-migration communities that could
possibly be the foundation for an inclusive urban identity. In addition,
it is also important to note in any conclusions on the material
presented here that a number of the initiatives that have fostered a
policy narrative of recognition in Lyon are very recent events, thus
making it difficult to assess their impact on post-migration
communities in an environment that has created narratives of
exclusion for these communities.

Importantly, this thesis has argued that Marseille stands apart from
both Paris and Lyon because its mode of governance arguably has
instituted a policy narrative of recognition for over two decades. Thus
can be argued to have fostered inclusion far in advance of Paris and
Lyon thus contributing to the avoidance of violence in the city. The
most notable of these examples covered in the chapter is the
Marseille Espérance forum. This forum, bringing together the chief
representatives of the city’s seven main religious communities into
the city hall to debate social issues and produce joint edicts on
important issues such as supporting the creation of the grand mosque in the city has been argued in this chapter to be a strong example of a mode of municipal governance that can produce social narratives of inclusion. Here, in a fashion similar to Taylor’s (1994) idea of recognition, bringing these representatives into city hall gives their communities recognition of their validity and importance in the urban sphere by consulting them on important issues and having them represent the city during difficult social events, such as inter-communal murders and terrorist attacks. It can also be argued, that by placing the religious representatives of post-migration communities on an equal footing with the religions of more established communities in the city relates strongly to Modood’s (2010) idea of remaking the image of society. Here, he argued for the presentation of a positive image to be projected of society, with post-migration communities in positions of prominence alongside those from more established population groups. The group’s support for the grand mosque project also arguably demonstrates the importance of this project for providing the Muslim post-migration community with a central site of worship at a time when mosque building is such a sensitive situation in Europe. Here, the city has taken a strong stand to offer the Muslim community the recognition of their validity as members of the urban community by demonstrating material support for this project, such as the subsidized allocation of municipal land for the project. Another important means by which this chapter has argued that the municipal government of Marseille has produced social narratives of inclusion for post-migration
communities in the city is in making municipal funds available for post-migration communities to set up a variety of non-governmental groups, such as community radio stations, family associations and youth centres. In summation, this chapter has argued that examining the municipal governance of Marseille demonstrated its institution of a policy of recognition for post-migration communities that could arguably produce an inclusive urban identity in the city. Importantly, this also begins the discussion of the other elements of the city that could also be producing inclusive narratives for post-migration communities.

This chapter has opened up an important discussion about the analysis of inclusion in the urban environment by examining the policy narratives deployed by the municipal governments in each case. By analyzing the possible inclusivity offered by the workings of municipal political structures and the method of governance, it is possible to assert the importance of the other responsibilities of the municipal governments of the three examples present in this thesis. In Paris, Lyon and Marseille the municipal government also plays an important role in setting policies on public culture (chapter IV) and commemorating the history of the city (chapter V) through its many powers for planning, funding and delivering these projects. These analyses will be undertaken in the format established in this chapter. The next chapter will examine what policy narratives have been deployed to manage post-migration difference in the field of public culture.
Chapter 4: Policy Narratives and Public Culture in Paris, Lyon and Marseille: Defining inclusion or exclusion for post-migration communities?

4.1. Cultural Policy and Inclusion: Recognition or Exclusion?

4.2. Paris: Applying Contradictory Policy Narratives in Public Culture

4.2.1 UNESCO and Externalizing Diversity

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4.3 Lyon: From Ignoring Diversity to Promoting Recognition?

4.3.1 Still Presenting a ‘Sectarian’ Flagship Culture

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4.4.1 France and Provence As a Facet of City Culture

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4.4.5 The Naturally Cohabiting Diversity of Marseille Rap

4.5 Conclusion:

4.1. Cultural Policy and Inclusion: Recognition or Exclusion?

The way in which a city or locality governs plays a large role in enlightening this thesis to which policy narrative they are applying with regard to post-migration communities. However, analyzing policy necessitates going far beyond examining the workings of politics and
governance. Drawing on the work of multicultural theorists, it is clear that a fundamental part of identifying any policy narrative of recognition must make recourse to examining how a particular locally deals with the workings of ‘public culture’ (Taylor 1994, Modood 2007, Naidoo 2005). From its inception as a policy platform, performances of public culture such as the Notting Hill carnival and Toronto’s many public parades celebrating post-migration culture, have been vital elements in a multicultural strategy of providing recognition. As already stated in chapter 2, this is not without its critics who have advocated shifting the focus from celebrating particular minority cultures as somehow separate from the majority, towards celebrating the diversity of society as a whole (Modood 2007, Naidoo 2005). As such, this vein of scholarship ties in with the second research question outlined at the start of this thesis, which directs the thesis towards examining how the commemoration of public culture might address post-migration communities differently across the three cases of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. As Marseille is theorized as applying a policy narrative of recognition, post-migration communities should be visible and present in the city’s events of public culture. Paris and Lyon, hypothesized as not applying the same policy narrative of recognition would be expected to not feature post-migration communities so visibly and present in its public culture. As such, this chapter sets out to examine what policy narratives have been deployed towards public culture in Paris, Lyon and Marseille.
This chapter firstly examines the Parisian region to see what policy narratives have been applied when handling post-migration difference in the city’s public culture. Here, the picture is somewhat mixed. While it is a city replete with large, prominent bodies of public culture, such as UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) and the Arab World Institute (L'Institut du Monde Arabe), these organizations do little to provide a narrative of recognition to the city’s post-migration communities. Rather, what recognition that is given to post-migration communities in the Parisian region comes predominantly from independent civil society organizations. An example of this is the association The Oranges (Les Oranges). This association, discussed in terms of its relationship to governance in the previous chapter, also has an important role to play in providing recognition to post-migration communities through public culture in the Parisian suburb of Nanterre. Also, public cultural policy does little to engage with the hugely commercially successful rap music of the city, with the corresponding output of the groups creating social narratives of a lack of recognition and of negative, dysfunction urban relations.

In Lyon, the public culture policy of the city has been dominated by not providing recognition to post-migration communities in the city, in a vein similar to the Parisian region. For example, a Council of Europe (2008) investigation into its membership of the intercultural cities program and bid to hold the 2013 European capital of culture reached the conclusion that in Lyon cultural diversity remained a
non-issue in public culture. However, within this, the city’s large, flagship cultural events, the annual Festival of Lights (Fête des Lumières), the ‘Nights of Sound’ festival (Nuits Sonores), ‘everyone goes out’ (Tout L’Monde Dehors) festival remain extremely limited in this minority representation. However, a lack of recognition is not the only element present in Lyon’s cultural policy. Rather, it appears that significant changes towards instituting a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities, is under way. An example of this can be seen in the city’s adoption of the chart of cultural cooperation (Charte de Coopération Culturelle) that commits all of these flagship cultural institutions and events to increasingly minority representation and participation. However, there remains little evidence that this initiative is having a large effect on the actual representation of public culture in the city.

However, where there is significant movement towards instituting a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities in the city can be found in the small independent organizations that are attempting to commemorate post-migration communities as important in the creation of the city’s culture. The Rhone-Alps Centre for Traditional Music (Centre des Musiques Traditionnelles Rhônes-Alpes, CMTRA) attempts to document the music present in the city’s post-migration communities as a means of commemorating the city’s cultural diversity. Another example of an independent organization that is working to commemorate the culture of post-migration communities as an important part of the culture of Lyon is the
association of the 6th continent (sixième continent). They attempt to do this through two avenues. Firstly, they have a center with a café bar that showcases artists from the city. They also hold a large public festival in the centre of the city. The authorities in the city have also been reluctant to engage with and promote a rap music scene in the city. What output that does exist depicts the city as an environment that withholds recognition while being socially and economically oppressive. In summation, while these present some important inroads into instituting a policy narrative of recognition in the city, these developments are very recent and still seem to remain limited in their scope and depth in actually putting the recognition of post-migration difference to the fore.

In the domain of public cultural policy, Marseille, however, has significantly longer, and deeper ranging applications of a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities. In common with Lyon and Paris, Marseille commemorates regional and national culture in the city, such as the Provençal cultural institutions existing in the city. Other examples of festival in the city that do not offer recognition to the city’s post-migration communities include the festival of Marseille, whose focus is on bringing contemporary art into the public realm of the city. However, in contrast to both Paris and Lyon there are examples of mainstream festivals addressing inclusion for post-migration communities. An example is the International Documentary Film Festival in Marseille (Festival International du Documentaire de Marseille, FIDM) that promotes the
work of the group Marseille Espérance (discussed in chapter III) by offering the Marseille Espérance prize to an outstanding international documentary. This creation of narratives of inclusion continues in the well-developed seam of cultural activities that also offer recognition to the city’s post-migration communities.

Marseille is the only city in France that holds a public commemoration of the most important festival in the Islamic calendar, Eid Al Adha. Its festival, Eid in the City (Aïd dans la Cité), interestingly goes far beyond simply commemorating a religious festival in Marseille. Importantly, it also commemorates the culture of the North African community in the city who constitute the city’s largest post-migration community through holding art exhibitions, music, comedy and cinema. In addition, Marseille’s 2013 European Capital of Culture’s program is another important aspect of cultural policy that is following a recognition narrative for post-migration communities. This is being done by both commemorating the culture of the city as influenced by the Mediterranean region and also constituted by the internal cultural diversity of the city. This is reflected in the infrastructural investments made for 2013. Several large, physical public culture projects are being completed included the Regional Mediterranean centre. Added to this, the program of events for 2013 again commemorates the culture of the city as influenced by the broader Mediterranean region and also of the city’s internal cultural diversity. One example from the program is a performance of the Arabic tale of Ali Baba and the forty thieves.
Another is a focus on the hybrid urban culture created within the city of Marseille, where part of 2013 will contain graffiti festivals and BMX bike riding displays. Separate from 2013, but also important in the commemoration of the contribution to the culture of the city made by post-migration communities in Marseille is the Med’in Marseille website. Set up by a French Marseille resident of Tunisian origin, it aims to commemorate the city through the prism of its diversity. It provides an online forum through which the cultural contribution of those from post-migration communities is recognized as a means to counter perceived negative images that dominate in the media of these communities in France.

Another important area of public culture that has been the subject of a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities in the city has been the municipal authorities approach to the rap music scene in Marseille. From start, through the funding of initiatives such as radio Gazelle, the authorities have engaged with this cultural form and offered recognition to those that have produced it, who are predominantly from post-migration communities. Importantly, some of the most commercially successful acts from the city such as IAM and Fonky Family, and those less well known, such as Carpe Diem, demonstrate almost exclusive reference to their immediate environment as ‘Marseille’ and not its constituent districts, and also depicts the urban environment in positive terms and open to post-migration communities. All of these examples demonstrate how the commemoration of public culture in Marseille promotes inclusion and
contributes to creating the social narratives that inform the inclusive urban identity of the city.

4.2. Paris: Applying Contradictory Policy Narratives in Public Culture

The Parisian region is replete with institutions and exhibitions of public culture consummate with its role as one of the foremost centres of culture worldwide. It has been established by scholars such as Henry et al (1998) that the culture industry has the ability to challenge racism and foster inclusion. As such, the city has significant resources in its numerous cultural institutions that could be mobilized to challenge the racism and discrimination prevalent in French society towards post-migration communities by adopting a policy narrative of recognition towards them. However, there is a significant element of the culture industry of the Parisian region that is not taking the opportunity to foster the recognition and inclusion of post-migration communities within its highly developed narrative of international cosmopolitanism.

4.2.1 UNESCO and Externalizing Diversity

An example of such a missed opportunity presented by the commemoration of a highly developed narrative of international cosmopolitanism can be seen in the public culture produced by
UNESCO (The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization). UNESCO is headquartered in Paris and holds regular public culture exhibitions and festivals in Paris. An example of this is the UNESCO festival of cultural diversity. This commemorates the UN defined “day to celebrate cultural diversity” and results in a full program of activities, spearheaded by the UNESCO head quarters in Paris. In 2011, such events as a classical music concert, a festival in Place Bastille, a discussion of the documenting of living heritage in Kenya, and a theatre production entitled ‘a journey through cultural diversity’. However, this makes absolutely no mention whatsoever of the cultural diversity of Paris itself or how a journey through this diversity might be undertaken. It also makes no attempt to comment on how the living heritage of the many diverse communities of Paris might be commemorated, celebrated, accessed or even acknowledged. While this is not per se their remit as an international cultural organization, it does demonstrate the broader trend of the disengagement of the culture industry of Paris from a responsibility to provide the recognition (Taylor 1994), positive promotion of diversity (Parekh 2000) and/or the remaking of the image of society (Modood 2010) that are so important to the works on the management of difference used in this thesis to conceptualize our definition of inclusion. Another example of this disengagement from the inclusion process by large cultural institutions can be seen in the activities of the Arab World Institute (L’Institut du Monde Arabe) that is located in Paris.
4.2.2 L'Institut du Monde Arabe’s Missing Arabs

The Arab World Institute is another example of the commemoration of international cultural diversity in Paris that is divorced from promoting a policy narrative of recognition and inclusion in its urban context. The Institute was founded in 1980 as part of President Mitterrand’s series of grand projects for Paris. It was founded on an international agreement between France and 18 Arab countries as a means for cooperation and to disseminate information about the Arab world and its cultural, aesthetic and spiritual values. It occupies a site on the left bank of the river Seine in central Paris. The building incorporates several important aspects of Islamic architecture into its modern design and has won international design prizes. Its work is concerned with hosting a library, exhibits and performances that act as a means to further its stated aims of publicizing the culture of the Arab world. An example of an exhibition they have held is an exhibition about the time Napoleon Bonaparte spent in Egypt and the art that has been created to commemorate this particular time. However, its activities, in a similar way to UNESCO, completely neglect local diversity and a possible attempt to foster local inclusion. This is arguably particularly pertinent because of the exact nature of its work. As an institute that is dedicated to working with the Arab world it ignores Paris’ largest post-migration community that is drawn from the Arab League member countries of the Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Indeed, it has been estimated that the Île de France region could have over 1 million Arab residents out of a
total population of around 11 million. This is all the more pertinent because this is a total population larger than the population of several capital cities of Arab countries (Muscat, Oman, has around 700,000) and even of some Arab countries (Qatar has around 200,000 Arab citizens).

This is not to say that this lack of attention to local diversity precludes the Arab residents of Paris from visiting and using the institute for its stated purpose of promoting the culture and values of the Arab world in France. However, it neglects to address the fact that these people and their values are now an integral part of French society, rather than something external and alien. This is because, while it clearly offers recognition of the important and valid achievements of Arab culture it does so as something that is external, exotic and far away, and not overtly something that is important in the culture and heritage of possibly 10% of city residents. It also does not commemorate the culture of the Arab world as the integral part of contemporary France that is has become, owing to the vast amount of individuals from post-migration communities from the Arab world who now hold French nationality.

4.2.3 Les Oranges and Applying Recognition in Nanterre

However, there are important sections of public culture in Paris that are dealing directly with providing post-migration communities with recognition in an attempt to foster inclusion.
An example of this is The Oranges association in Nanterre that is part of the implementation of a policy narrative of recognition and inclusion in the Parisian region. As mentioned in Chapter III this association has two key themes with which they attempt to create narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities in the commemoration of history and culture. This chapter will deal with their cultural activities and how these attempt to create inclusive narratives for post-migration communities. It was formed in 2004 under the name ‘The Oranges’, a name chosen because of the symbolism of love and peace that the orange had in the work of the Algerian author Aziz Chouaki. The Oranges explicitly sets out to produce a cultural program that directly addresses questions of diversity and inclusion in France. In this, their founder M’hamed sees this as part of the associations attempt to serve a civic duty by bringing all residents of Nanterre, from post-migration communities or not, together. Here, the residents can then tackle the specifics of certain situations or historical events, and using their commemoration to make general points about the historical or social problems that effect all residents of the commune. For example, the retelling of France’s colonial history has come later than that of the UK or Germany, for example, and as such still presents both sides of the story with significant challenges of self-perception and stereotypes of the other. In M’hamed’s opinion, the Algerian war of independence remains unresolved in the French national consciousness owing to the pain of what was the bloodiest conflict of France’s imperial era that resulted in the forced repatriation of over 2 million to
metropolitan France. Added to this, the fact that around 3 million Frenchmen served in Algeria, and numerous descendants of both the European settlers, and pro and anti-colonialism Algerians now live in France this is a significant task.

The Oranges has attempted to address this complex history to create narratives of inclusion in public culture in several important ways. Firstly, they have made it the subject of theatrical plays with a satirical edge as a means to bring these contending narratives out into the public sphere in a culture manner that allows for the difficult elements of them to be navigated. For The Oranges this is an important means by which to redefine the relationship between Algerian and French identity. This is because it presents an important supplementary medium that can reach those that would not come to a conference or read a book. It is also, in common with many narrative tools, a means to remake and represent events, figures and eras in new and interesting ways that are important for redefining the relationship between possibly conflicting parties. An example of this is a play that the association produced that examined the history between France and Algeria from 1830 to the present day. Important in this examining of history to the organizers of The Oranges was to somehow make it part of the healing process by presenting the history in a comedic form. The Oranges have also tackled this issue through presenting a show about the meaning of independence to commemorate 50 years of Algerian independence. Here, The Oranges aimed to create narratives of inclusion by focusing on
depicting and discussing independence in a more universal sense than simply focusing on the fraught independence struggle in Algeria.

The Oranges also attempt to use culture to co-create narratives of inclusion in public culture in Nanterre by organizing literary Arabic classes. This concentration on the literature of the Arabic language and not the religious instructions of the Qur’an ensures two things for The Oranges. Firstly, it ensures that their activities remain secular. Secondly, it means that they draw in a diverse audience with what they see as a universally appealing language that, regardless of religious connotations, is interesting as a literary tool in the same way as any other language. This is their attempt to take the specific to the universal, as literature is a common feature of languages that can interest a wide audience in a way that a concentration of religious text could not. This attempt to take the specifics of the Arab immigrant experience and connect them to universal themes as a means to redefine the narrative of identity as a means to create narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities in Nanterre. As such, this is another example of how in some segments of the Parisian region, a policy narrative of recognition may well be emerging in how local authorities interact with post-migration communities in their public culture. This trend, however, should not be over stated, as an examination of the treatment of rap music in the Parisian region demonstrates that a policy narrative of recognition is not being applied across all domains in the region.
4.2.4 Non-recognition and Fracturing the city with Rap

Analyzing the rap of the Parisian region also offers important insights into both how a cultural form that is overwhelmingly produced by those from post-migration communities (Perrier 2010) is treated in the cultural policy of the region. Examining its content also provides important insights into the social narratives produced in public culture that contribute to defining inclusion for post-migration communities in the city, given rap's ability to reflect the social reality of an individual at a given time (Sberna 2008). In France, rap scenes can be seen as early as the 1980s in the two capitals of French rap, Paris and Marseille (Perrier 2010), and from the start rap responded to the new social setting by quickly becoming 'acclimatized, transformed and adapted to the reality of France…a reality different from that of the United States' (Perrier 2010). Perrier (2010) furthers this inference of rap having an important relationship with reality when he argues that the 'poetic power of French rap is nourished by the everyday' in as much as in his opinion it is a genre that takes inspiration from, and reflects back, the reality of the social situations of those who produce it. This demonstrates that again it is arguably important to take what is articulated in this artform seriously when studying how social narratives in the city for urban identities, and to what degree these are inclusive or not. This is again reinforced by Bennet’s (1999) research into the practices of German rappers of Turkish and Moroccan descent in Frankfurt. Here, he found that these individuals developed a local rap scene as a means to articulate their feelings
about racism and citizenship in their predicament as German nationals of non-German descent. This is because ‘rap music takes the city and its multiple spaces as the foundation of its cultural production’ (Forman 2002). Sberna (2008) echoes this inference as she argues from her study of rap in Marseille that it is a means by which one can gain insight into the social situation of an individual. She also argues that it is an important means of discovering the state of society through the content and themes of rap tracks (Sberna 2008). This is important because, as we will see later in this chapter, the municipal authorizes of Marseille gave this cultural form recognition from the outset in its municipal policy. As such, the causal claims being made about Marseille rap and it’s relationship to creating inclusion amongst post-migration communities must be made clear from the outset. Here, Marseille’s early engagement with the art form in it’s municipal policies, such as giving support to local radio stations and recording studios, importance in it’s initial genesis and subsequent rise to importance give us a link with it being part of creating inclusion through policy. However, at the same time it then also goes on to be an expression of inclusion, where artists use the medium to discus and define their inclusion in the city. As such, it should not be taken to be either solely a generator of inclusion, or a product of inclusion, rather as both, and something constituted by inclusion, but then also mutually constituting more inclusion. This contrasts sharply to the Parisian region, where this has not been the case. In the Parisian region, rap music has been intimately linked to any discussion of the riots of 2005 because it was seen as so pivotal
to unrest that legal action was proposed by 200 French MP’s, which
would have seen 7 French rap acts prosecuted for inciting violence
(Muggs 2005).

The content of Parisian rap music does not engage with the idea of
the city as a positive environment that provides post-migration
communities with an important site of recognition. The boundaries
drawn in Paris are fractured, resulting in different sections of the city
being drawn as different communities, where the name ‘Paris’ is
never used. All reference to their physical surroundings and place of
origin refers to their department. This is either done through its name
(Seine-Saint-Denis, or simply Saint-Denis) or through the
department’s number (usually pronounced neuf-trois, not quatre-
vingt treize). Importantly it is not even done in a hyphenated manner,
for example by saying “Seine-Saint-Denis-Paris” or “neuf-trois-Paris”.
An example of this is in their track “Seine Saint-Denis Style”. At one
point they declare that ‘everywhere we go, it comes from Saint-Denis’
(author’s translation). They also frequently mention how they define
their home ‘…is the bomb baby boom! It comes from Saint-Denis’
(author’s translation) and ‘you won’t find words kilometers long, that’s
why you love where I am from, I tell it for the 9-3!’ (author’s
translation). This is not limited to this track. On the track “Paris Sous
les bombes”, this theme continues with them saying ‘big up 9-3’ and
importantly, this means of identification is not unique to this group but
part of a broader trend.
This means of identification with your suburban department is something that is exhibited by other rap groups from the Paris area. It is something that occurs in groups from another of the departments that make up the greater Paris urban area, the 92 department of Hautes-de-Seine. An example of a group from this area is the group ‘Lunatic’. They have made references to their department as their source of belonging on numerous tracks, and also have a track entitled “92” which is about their departments. On the track “Pas l'temps pour les regrets” they twice depict their belonging as to the 92nd department and not to Paris when they say ‘Lunatic Bouba Ali, 92 for life’ (author’s translation) and ‘my 92 childhood’ (author’s translation). On another track “Têtes Brûlées” starts with the line ‘92 Hautes-de-Seine’. It is important to note that these two groups are not the only groups that depict Paris in this fractured manner and, importantly, the city’s rap crews that originate from the 75th departement, Paris proper, experience this same trend. An example of a rap crew from inside Paris proper is Assassin, from the 18th arrondissement of Paris and was formed in 1985. Interestingly, although they originate in Paris proper, their identification is not with Paris, but with the 18th arrondissement. This is clearly seen with their repeated mentioning of the 18th arrondissement as their area of identification, and not Paris as a whole. This occurs on the track Esclave De Votre Société when they talk about ‘in my quarter, the 18th arrondissement’ (dans mon quartier, le XVIIIème arrondissement). There are two incidences when “Paris” as a larger entity features in their music, however this is not in a positive sense,
but rather as a tragic figure in the track “triste Paris” and in negative terms in the track “Paris Theory”. However, this will be explored in more depth in the second section of this chapter, which deals with the depiction in cultural output of civic pride.

The notion of urban relations also comes under sustained critique in Parisian rap music where there is no mention of it as a place that provides these communities with recognition.

Suprême NTM released a track in 1995 depicting urban relations in their Paris, entitled ‘Qu’est-ce qu'on attend?’ the track’s title addresses itself to the topic. When they say ‘What are we waiting for?’ they are calling for a change to the status quo in their Paris where ‘the years pass, and everyone is in their place, more tarmac and so less open space, vital and necessary to a human’s equilibrium, no one has been kidnapped, but it is exactly like they have’ (author’s translation). This track was seen as part of a trend in the Parisian rap of the time that sparked off the riots in Paris in the 1990’s. On the same album there is also a track titled “Paris Sous les Bombes” in which the group talks about amongst other things a desire for Paris to be under attack and to ‘take a real slap’. This pattern of critique of the city with a lack of civic pride continues into the modern cultural output of Paris. The founder of the previously mentioned Parisian rap group Assassin, called Rockin’ Squad, released one of the few examples of Parisian rap which addresses the city of Paris directly in 2010 entitled “Sad Paris” (Triste Paris). It is noteworthy that this serves as a critique of Paris and its lackluster
in the eyes of the artist. This is evident in the lyrics in his song ‘...It’s been years Paris has been snoring...Paris: City of Light...Only in the movies of Woody Allen...I can tell you that nothing is shining here’. Here, again the urban environment is not depicted as a place where the producers of this track feel is providing them with recognition. As such, given the municipal authorities lack of providing resources and recognition to this cultural form in their urban policy, it is another example of how the Parisian region is not applying a policy narrative of recognition to post-migration communities in its public culture.

In summation, it can be seen from this analysis that Paris presents a mixed picture in the policy narratives deployed in public culture towards the city’s post-migration communities. The dominant policy narrative applied to the cities flag ship cultural institutions and its hugely commercially successful rap music scene is one of non-recognition, despite such institutions as the Arab World Institute relating directly to large portions of the post-migration communities in the city. However, there is evidence that simultaneously some change may be occurring in this domain, with small scale local organizations such as The Oranges Association being directly supported by local authorities in attempts to foster a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities. This analysis now turns to Lyon, and how it’s public culture policy is treating post-migration communities.
4.3 Lyon: From Ignoring Diversity to Promoting Recognition?

The policy narrative that Lyon is applying to its post-migration communities in public culture is at an extremely dynamic turn in its evolution at present. At a point in the near past, in a similar fashion to the preceding discussion of contemporary Paris, the large, well established cultural institutions of Lyon, such as the city’s theatres, opera houses and galleries had predominantly ignored the cities post-migration communities in their commemoration and performance of the city’s culture. This resulted in the city failing in its bid to host the 2013 European Capital of Culture. Here the Council of Europe’s auditing of the city’s application finding that ‘diversity is still a non-issue’ (Council of Europe 2008) because of the city’s lack of inclusion of post-migration communities in its program. The city thus lost the bidding process to Marseille, which as we will see later in the chapter has based its program on commemorating its diversity in stark divergence to Lyon. However, this situation is currently subject to much change, with these issues acting as a catalyst for an emerging application of a recognition based policy narrative in the city.

This section will examine a number of acts of public culture in the city to argue that while some recent progress has been made in creating inclusion in the city, its cultural activities are still dominated by the exclusion of post-migration communities. This will begin by examining Lyon’s cultural festivals that do not present a place for
post-migration communities, even though they have recently signed up to the city’s ‘chart of cultural cooperation’ that sets out to increase the representation of minorities in the city’s public culture. Lyon’s primary act of public culture, the Festival of lights (Fête des Lumières), completely neglects to present a place for the city’s large post-migration communities even while it remains the second largest cultural festival in France. Added to this, other large acts of public culture, such as “Les Nuits Sonores” (the Nights of sound), and the festival ‘Everyone come out’ (Tout l’monde dehors) do not offer places for post-migration communities in the city. Also, the city’s membership of the intercultural cities program has been criticized for not including the city’s cultural diversity in its program, an important reason why the city lost its bid to hold the 2013 European Capital of Culture to Marseille. However, the process of joining intercultural cities and making a bid for 2013 has brought the issue of cultural diversity onto the agenda in the city. Currently, some inroads are being made into the commemoration of post-migration communities cultures as important in the cultural narrative of the city by some independent civil society organizations. The Rhône-Alps center for traditional music has been charting and publically commemorating the traditional forms of music practiced by the post-migration communities in Lyon. The 6th continent association has also begun to work to include the culture of post-migration communities as part of the city in Lyon. However, it is arguably a field too under-developed to convincingly argue that these efforts are enough to produce narratives that can foster an inclusive urban identity, owing to the
historical dominance of cultural commemoration in the city that has neglected to examine the role of post-migration communities in contributing to the culture of Lyon.

4.3.1 Still Presenting a ‘Sectarian’ Flagship Culture

Lyon’s record on fostering a policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities in its public culture is less than enviable. In 2008 The Council of Europe (2008) highlighted the fact that the inclusion of minorities in the municipal policy of Lyon is problematic, owing to the constraints of a ‘republican” tradition in which issues of multiple identity and diversity are still taboo’ (Council of Europe 2008). As such ‘it would be exaggerated to say that the urban policy explicitly embraces and promotes cultural diversity as a resource for the dynamism and growth of the city’ (Council of Europe 2008). A key complaint in their assessment of Lyon’s 2013 bid was that the city authorities had not denoted the entire area of the Lyonnais agglomeration but rather a small part of the central city that contains only 25% of the city’s population (Council of Europe 2008). This ensured that the neighborhoods rich with post-migration communities were completely excluded from the bid in favor of the small and wealthy heart of the city. This is seen by the commission as a significant weakness of the city’s participation in the intercultural cities program as it effectively excludes the city’s suburbs that ‘have played in important role in the urban history of France’ (Council of Europe 2008). Importantly in addition, after investigating the city to
complete a profile of it as an ‘intercultural’ city they found that the notion of diversity is ‘perceived as an interesting new concept, however void of content’ (Council of Europe 2008). Also, ‘in the absence of specific minority integration policy, integration is being taken care of by “urban policy’ (Council of Europe 2008), even though its ‘strategy of trying to solve social problems with recreational activities, have showed its limits in the past, and there is no reason that it proves more efficient in the future’ (Council of Europe 2008). This strategy has therefore failed to include any cultural outreach in its urban plan. This means that ‘little cultural activity has taken place outside of established activities for the majority ethnic middle classes, such as opera and theatre’ (Council of Europe 2008). There has been ‘very little outreach of urban subcultures or to new audience groups’ (Council of Europe 2008).

Lyon’s ill-fated bid was based on the concept of Lyon as a place where the cultures of Europe came together to create its cultural heritage, under the title of ‘Lyon, land of confluences’ (Council of Europe 2008). However, given the weaknesses of its cultural policy in terms of the inclusion of minority communities, it is not surprising that this bid failed in favor of Marseille. This does not mean that there is not the possibility for a change to be made in the city’s municipal policy, as there are already some signs that official cultural policy in Lyon may be leaning towards greater inclusion. The Council of Europe’s report does demonstrate some important trends in the city. The fact that the city would join the intercultural cities network and
put a bid for 2013 together based on diversity, however ill conceived, demonstrates some willingness to name and engage with the idea that there are communities in Lyon that require representation in the cultural narrative of the city which should be offered a policy narrative of recognition. Owning to its membership in the intercultural cities program, and the damning report generated by its membership and apparent lack of focus on diversity, the municipal government of Lyon has started to put the idea of cultural diversity on the map. Here, they hold the annual ‘our cultures of the city’ (Nos Cultures de la Ville) days in which they bring together experts and policy makers from the city council to discuss how to approach cultural diversity and make it part of the sustainable development of the city (Ville de Lyon 2012, author’s translation). In this, events are held to discuss cultural diversity and how to bring it into the practice of culture in Lyon. In the 2011 edition, there was a discussion held on ‘the richness of the other: the construction of our identities’ (Ville de Lyon 2011) where the program included the discussion of the construction of France and the reality of the multiple identities that people have in French society. There is also evidence that important steps are being taken by independent organizations to provide narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities.

One of the outcomes of an increased discussion of the apparent lack of diversity in municipal cultural policy is the institution of the city-wide charter of cultural cooperation (Charte de Coopération Culturelle) that could be argued to be further evidence that perhaps a
policy narrative of recognition is being applied to the city’s public culture. While the charter’s evolution began in 2004, it has again been ratified for the 2012-2015 period with some interesting implications for examining how the city’s cultural policy may be embracing a multicultural approach to diversity. There is a clause in the latest draft of the charter, ratified by all of the city’s large, flagship cultural institutions, for the ‘valorization of diversity, more visibility of minorities’ and ‘inter-culturality to introduce new arrivals’ (Ville de Lyon 2012, author’s translation). This has translated to such initiatives as an event dedicated to ‘the religious minorities of Lyon from the Middle Age to the present’ (Musées Gadagne 2013, author’s translation). However, to date the actual impact of this charter has been extremely limited with the performance of the public culture of Lyon has been dominated, by its Latin-Christian heritage. Its largest single act of public culture is the festival of lights (Fête des lumières). The festival’s origins lie in a spontaneous display of candles by citizens of Lyon in 1852 to celebrate a storm clearing during the inauguration of a statue of the Virgin Mary. This has developed into one of the largest cultural festivals in France where it is estimated that it draws around 3.5 million visitors each year to see over 20 large scale lighting projects throughout the city. Each year, different lighting installations are projected onto notable buildings and landmarks in the city, including the town hall, police headquarters, churches and the city’s two rivers. Other notable public festivals of culture include ‘everyone come out’ (Tout l’monde dehors) and the ‘Nights of Sound’ (Les Nuits Sonores) which are large, free, public
festivals of music in the city. While these make inroads into presenting the city as a positive place, they cannot be said to be substantively applying a policy narrative based on recognition vis-à-vis Lyon’s post-migration difference. Therefore, they are neglecting the city’s large post-migration communities in the sense that while offering to recognize and promote the culture of the city of Lyon they do not offer the same opportunities to post-migration communities.

However, the Council of Europe’s report did point towards some other changes taking place in the application of policy narratives in the field of public culture towards a policy narrative of recognition. The report identified some independent civil society actors, mainly ‘small, alternative, often web-based Structures’ (Council of Europe 2008). These included the ‘banlieues network of Europe’ (Réseau Banlieues d’Europe) and Radio Pluriel. The outlets identified, however, felt that they suffered from a lack of resources, the monopoly of commercial media and a lack of support from city authorities. The investigation also found that there were ‘very few NGOs in Lyon organized on the basis of a specific ethnic culture’ (Council of Europe 2008). An exception is ‘Awal Grand Lyon’ which is Berber cultural association promoting Berber culture, targeting both those inside and out of their community. Importantly for analyzing the public culture of Lyon for the application of a policy narrative of recognition to the management of the city’s post-migration difference is the work of cultural NGO’s in the city.
4.3.2 Finding Recognition in Traditional Music

The research for this thesis has discovered that some of the city’s most active NGOs engaged in creating public culture in the city have taken on a more tangible and recognizable policy-narrative based on recognition in tandem with funding support and inclusion in the charter of cultural cooperation given to them by the municipal authorities in Lyon. One example of this is the detailed work done by NGO’s such as the Rhone-Alps Centre for Traditional Music (Centre des Musiques Traditionnelles Rhônes-Alpes, CMTRA) has completed in depth studies of the cultural forms exhibited in some of the most economically deprived and socially marginalized areas of the city. The CMTRA Rhone-Alps center for traditional music has been operating for over 20 years from a base in the Villeurbanne area of Lyon. They express their mission as recognizing the traditional music and dances existing in the Lyon region by ‘valorizing heritage and recognizing the cultural diversities of the territories of Rhone-Alps’ (CMTRA 2012). They do this through the ethnographic collection of evidence and the creation of musical sound archives to bring out music and cultural forms that may not otherwise be seen or heard in the public sphere, which may otherwise be confined to the private sphere of the family and religious services. Their output consists of publications, documentaries and events and a growing web presence where these achievements can be readily stored and accessed by the general public for free. In this, and overtly through their mission statement, they aim to recognize these forms of music.
as constantly going through reinvention and hybridity, and also by attempting to put issues related to the social redefinition of identities and otherness at center stage, bringing the expression of minority cultures out into the public sphere. (CMTRA 2012) interestingly, a large part of their output to this end becomes ‘sounds atlases’ that are released through the internet and for sale of their website. These document the intimate details of the lives and journeys of the musicians from their countries or regions of origins to Lyon and their perceptions of life there. This has been done for the Gulliotière neighborhood, an economically and ethnically diverse neighborhood of the city center. A very recent, and in depth example of this, that can be said to be part of the application of a policy narrative of recognition is the online ‘sound atlas’ available for free of the 8th Arrondissement of Lyon.

The sound atlas of the 8th arrondissement of Lyon is part of the organizations ongoing attempt to recognize the cultural diversity of the Lyon region. The 8th arrondissement makes an interesting case study for such an endeavors because of its economically and ethnically mixed nature, being constituted of both private and public housing, housing both French and post-migration communities. The area also contains the grand mosque of Lyon. The sound atlas is web-based, thus free and open to all. It was accomplished over a two year period by a team of researchers who lived in the area while they conducted the study, who employed anthropological ethnographic methods to document the stories, daily lives and music of musicians
in the area, including meeting them in their houses and taking pictures of their houses for publication online. In total this atlas showcases 13 acts from Africa, South America, the Arab world, and the Caribbean. Each act has its own page with biographical information, several tracks, and a location on the map of their area to demonstrate their place in the geography of the city. Here, however, the project somewhat falls short in its handling of diversity. This is because these post-migration communities are not being depicted as a kind of diversity constituent of the city, vital in a nuanced application of the principle of recognition defined by scholars such as Modood (2010) and Naidoo (2005). Rather, they are being offered some recognition while remaining depicted as ‘foreign’. This is evident as it details that several of the musicians featured came to France some decades ago, and that they live in Lyon’s 8th arrondissement and even that their daily routines of playing have intertwined with physical places of the city. However, there is no attempt to tie these artistic forms to the city as an integral part of being Lyonnais or French, or an attempt to describe these cultures as somehow benefiting Lyon or contributing to its culture.

This treatment of the ‘world’ music of Lyon demonstrates the difficulty in applying a policy narrative based on recognition to the city. An example of this can be seen in the treatment of Mouradia, a group of musicians that meet weekly in restaurants and cafes in Lyon. They play the very hyphenated music of Algiers, Chaabi, that celebrates its mixed influences from different cultures, including Andalusia, Berber
and European, are detailed as being in Lyon since the 1960s. However, in 2012, after possibly 50 years of living and playing in the city, they are still detailed as a ‘world’ music act who play the characteristic music of Algiers, even though in an interview the artists explain that one of the key themes of their music is living through exile from Algiers, demonstrating that their traditional art form has been changed by their residence in France. There is no attempt to explain this in any detail or to somehow attach it in some way to the city of Lyon, even though it is being in Lyon that has changed the subject matter of their cultural production. Again, these issues necessitate a cautious assertion that there is some evidence of a policy narrative of recognition being applied to post-migration communities in the city. This, however, requires further study as it evolves and matures before a full assertion can be made that a well developed policy narrative of recognition is being applied in the public cultural policy of Lyon.

4.3.3 Interculturality in the Maison des Passages:

Another association that deals with the commemoration of other cultures and migration is the House of Passages (Maison des Passages) in old Lyon. This association has also experimented with the application of a policy narrative of recognition for the city’s post-migration communities in its activities. Here, the association has a program again dealing with the new reality of migration in the 21st century (La Maison des Passages 2013). The organization runs an
extremely diverse schedule of events that do not all deal with offering recognition to post-migration communities. An example of this is a debate held about the rise of Islamism and its relationship with the penetration of capitalism in the Middle East held in 2009. However, during the 2008 and 2009 sessions, the organization also began to also focus on dealing with the issues of the city of Lyon and its large post-migration communities more specifically. This includes an event in February 2008 concerning ‘interculturality as a way of life’ and in January 2009 an event entitled ‘French Justice!: living together in cultural diversity’ where the association focused on protesting against discrimination in the post-migration community rich, and socially economically deprived Vaulx-en-Velin neighborhood of the city. This is again more evidence that Lyon is beginning to move towards a policy narrative based on recognition at the local level. This can also be seen in the work of another NGO in Lyon, the association of the 6th Continent.

4.3.4 Moving Focus from the 6th continent to Recognition with Inter-culturalism

The association of the 6th continent (sixième continent) in Lyon is another non-profit association in Lyon that deals with the commemoration of cultures with recent origins outside of Lyon and is also shifting towards applying a policy narrative based on providing recognition for post-migration communities. Their mission is to promote cultures of the world and the valorization of diversity and
cultural mixing (6éme continent 2012, author’s translation). It also attempts to act as a ‘space for discovering the richness and diversities and the cultural mixes of our city [Lyon]’ (6éme continent 2012, author’s translation). They aim to achieve these objectives through two key means. Firstly, they organize a 6th continent festival and have a physical presence in the Gulliotière in the form of a mixed-use cultures venue that holds some of the events of the festival and is open every night as a bar/cafe. The 6th continent festival is organized by the association and takes the form of an outdoor event in a park that each year runs on the theme of a different country. In addition to concerts, the festival also includes art exhibitions, film screenings, discussions of literature and a conference where experts discuss issues relating to the music, the country of origin and issues affecting the music of communities in France. During the 2009 edition of the festival the country focus was on Morocco. Here, the conference was dedicated to discussing the dynamics of migration between Morocco and France, including a session discussing the integration of migrants from Morocco in France. This approach is fairly typical of the yearly programs of this festival, where the focus is on looking at world cultures as something outside of the city even though most of the activities take place in the Gulliotière ethnically mixed part of the city that contains numerous residents with origins in some of the countries explored, such as Morocco.
However, the 2012 program marks a significant change in focus from exploring the issue of world music and cultures as something external to the city, to celebrating how outside cultures have always played a very important role in the culture of Lyon. This redefinition of migration as central to the success and artistic creativity of Lyon in the program of the 2012 festival of the 6th continent is innovative in two key ways. Firstly, it is the first time the festival has commemorated the specific genre of world music as something which is now present within, and part of the cultural fabric of the city of Lyon. This also means that it is presenting an innovative way of commemorating Lyon in a different means more generally as composed of cultural diversity, something the city was chastised for ignoring in the European Councils report on the city that noticed its complete ignorance of its internal diversity. The program of the festival casts the city as a place where ‘since antiquity Lyon has been a destination for immigrants from the Mediterranean, Asia, Europe, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa’ Gulliotière (6ème continent 2012, author’s translation). The program goes on to describe Lyon as ‘rich in cultural diversity, the city today has a rich heritage resulting from these meetings, fusions and blends’ (6ème continent 2012, author’s translation). Here they showcased acts only from the Lyon area with origins in the ‘4 corners of the world’ and held a debate to discuss the issue of Interculturalism. Here, they held an event entitled ‘Interculturalism: When the local collectives engage’ (6ème continent 2012, author’s translation).
This is arguably a very important step towards providing post-migration communities a degree of recognition of their place as important to the contemporary culture of Lyon and thus defining the application of a policy narrative based upon recognition. This is because this is the first time that the city’s major world music festival has examined the culture of post-migration communities as something integral and important to the identity of modern Lyon. This arguably is beginning the processes so important to the definition of inclusion taken at the start of this thesis. It arguably offers a degree of Taylor’s (1994) recognition in that it recognizes that there are indeed large migrant communities in Lyon and that their culture is important and normatively valuable and should therefore be commemorated as such in public in the city by presenting the culture of Lyon as not just as something that is from Lyon but also something that now exists replete with the influences of those from outside the city. It also arguably goes some way to fulfilling Parekh’s (2000) recommendation that is important to cast cultural diversity is an important asset of a society by arguing that from antiquity Lyon has been a destination for immigrants and that this has been a valuable asset for the city and its culture. It even goes arguably as far as Modood’s (2010) recommendation to remake the image of society to take account of those previously marginalized into a position of equality. It does this arguably because for the first time it takes those communities from Asia and Africa in the city and casts them into a positive image of a immigrant rich, diverse Lyon in a position of equality with those from Europe. Importantly, however,
one must be cautious not to overstate the effect this example has in informing and defining the urban identity of the city. However, the authorities in Lyon are still not offering the local rap scene a degree of recognition in the city.

4.3.5 Where are all the rappers in Lyon?

The analysis of popular urban culture in Lyon takes on a different dimension to that in Paris and Marseille in that the city does not have an internationally known, commercially successful scene of rap acts that could be brought in as part of a policy of providing recognition to post-migration communities. There is a scene in the city, but somewhat more underground that those in Paris or Marseille. Reasons for this are numerous. There has been suggestion that part of the reason that the Lyon scene does not get much press promotional locally owing to a de facto ‘boycott’ of the music in the local media owing to discrimination. It has been suggested that there may be an ethnic dimension to this, as rappers are largely from minority ethnic backgrounds, and as such could be the victim of racism (69flow 2011). This again demonstrates that a policy narrative of recognition is not being applied in Lyon to an art form that is overwhelmingly produced by those from France’s post-migration communities (Perrier 2010). It has also been suggested that there may be an economic and geographic dimension to this lack of attention, as rap in Lyon largely takes place in the poor suburbs of the city, far away from the centrality and economic prosperity of the
central business districts (69flow 2011). However, this does not mean that cultural output in the form of rap music does not exist as the changed nature of music production and distribution means that such discrimination does not completely stop the production and dissemination of tracks. This means artists are being sought out by national audiences through avenues such as blogs and YouTube videos where artists can produce content and release it for consumption free of charge, side stepping the need for the record company and media promotion acts have traditionally relied upon (Gaugulin 2011).

Analyzing rap music in Lyon demonstrates a marked difference between its cultural output as rap music to both Paris and Marseille. In contrast to Paris, there is a distinct idea that there is an entity called ‘Lyon’ that the artists use to define their space. However, in contrast to Marseille, alongside this exists a fracturing of the locus of identity away from this idea of the city to the various post-war, high-rise neighborhoods on the city’s periphery. In some ways, there is an interesting amalgamation of what is seen in Paris and Marseille. In Lyonnais rap, the term Lyon is used, at the same time as the neighborhoods where the rappers are from. An example of a song that demonstrates this dual identification is ‘Villeurbane Vaux’ by Baki-RS. The title of the song ‘Villeurbanne Vaulx’ references two of the large suburbs to the North of the city. The song contains frequent references to the toughness of the two suburbs as places where the locals are tough, and places ‘you will never forget’. However, there is
also reference to Lyon such as ‘we have grown up in Lyon city’ and ‘Lyon never bows its head’. Another example, the Bled side song ‘69 crazy town’, there is a mix of referring to 69 for Lyon, and also references to the artists’ neighborhood of Vénissieux through the postcode (69200) and the name of the largest and most notorious housing project in this particular suburb, Les Minguettes. Also, there are no references to the landmarks of the city center but there are plenty of references to the frequent battles fought between youths and the police within the neighborhood of Vénissieux, and other high rise suburban estates. Another example of such a track is ‘Mecs de Villeurbanne’ by Ravage, distributed through YouTube. Here, again, we have the focus on a particular neighborhood as the locus of expression, the suburb of Villeurbanne. Also again, the depiction of the environment of the city is combative, where the youths of the area fight the police. Cassius Belli uses the term ‘Lyon’ frequently in his song of the same title where he details the city and its badly behaved youths whose ‘aggressive style you do not like’. Here, he details the surrounding suburbs as places of toughness and aggression. This song is also one of the few that references the center of Lyon. However, this is not done in a vein where there is pride expressed in the city center as either part of where he feels at home or where he takes in amenities. Rather, to him, it is a place of vices, where you can go to Rue Saint Catherine, a famous late night haunt, for a drink, kebab and a fight, or to Rue de la République, the city’s bourgeois shopping street, where you can be mocked for speaking slang. This again demonstrates an interesting contradictory
element of the social narratives created in Lyon for the inclusivity of post-migration communities. On one hand, there is identification with the idea of the city as a whole and also an element of expressing pride in identifying with the city. However, on the other hand the idea of the city can also be fractured in favor of the particular locality of the groups and urban relations can be depicted as fraught and negative. This, together with the relative lack of a formal inclusion of this rap in the public cultural policy of Lyon is further evidence that a policy narrative of recognition is not being completely applied towards post-migration communities in the city.

In this analysis, Lyon shows itself as having a policy narrative definitely in flux when it comes to offering recognition to post-migration communities. It’s central administration, through initiatives such as the Chart of Cultural Cooperation and the Our Culture of the City Days are clear evidence of an official commitment to applying a policy narrative of recognition in the city. However, it remains to be seen exactly what the substantive result of these policies will be, given their very limited implementation by the city’s flagship cultural institutions. However, the policies pursued in the city’s NGOs show a more sustained and far-reaching commitment to implementing a policy of recognition vis-à-vis the city’s post-migration communities. However, even this is relatively recent and will require further observation over the longue durée before one can convincing assert it as a significant transition. Indeed, it is also too early to assert that it could be the kind of policy change that could provide post-migration
communities with a form of inclusive urban identity similar to that hypothesized in this thesis to exist in Marseille.

4.4 Marseille: Creating inclusive narratives by placing the Recognition post-migration communities at the center of the city’s public culture

Marseille has applied a different public culture policy narrative to Paris and Lyon for some considerable time. At heart of this is utilizing a policy narrative that provides post-migration communities with recognition. While it holds the same kind of generic cultural festivals as Paris and Lyon such as world music and dance festivals, it also commemorates the culture of post-migration communities as central to the narrative of the city. This is arguably an important way that social narratives are disseminated to create an urban identity that is inclusive to these communities in the city. This section will examine the commemoration of public culture in Marseille by firstly outlining briefly how the city hosts similar culture festivals to Paris and Lyon. After this, however, this thesis will develop the divergent commemoration of culture present in Marseille where it commemorates post-migration communities as integral parts of the cultural identity of the city. This will begin with examining existing initiatives, namely the Eid in the city festival (L’Aïd dans la cité), the Med’in Marseille website, and finally the program for Marseille’s 2013 European Capital of Culture celebrations.
4.4.1 France and Provence As a Facet of City Culture

Marseille, in common with Paris and Lyon, holds a large number of cultural festivals throughout the year. In a similar fashion to Paris and Lyon, some of these do not address the question of the inclusion of post-migration communities. For example, Marseille hosts a yearly Festival of Marseille that showcases international contemporary art, dance and music during the summer months. The Marseille Rock Island is a contemporary music festival that features international acts of rock, dance and rap music. However, none of these festivals that take place in the city per se commemorate the city as a place where post-migration communities form an integral part of the city’s cultural identity. This is in a similar vein to the trends discussed above for Paris and Lyon where a lively cultural calendar exists, showcasing a program of international arts and culture without specifically dealing with the cultural diversity which exists locally in the city. This could be argued to not be producing inclusive narratives for post-migration communities in the city by not offering them recognition as part of the city. Marseille is also the sight of several cultural institutions that commemorate its place as part of Provence. These again do not address themselves directly to the post-migration communities in the city. The Foundation Regards de Provence is located in a building that was formally the city library and archive. It is dedicated to promoting the arts and culture of Provence. Here, they hold rotating exhibitions about famous artists, writers and painters that have worked in Provence and have depicted Provence
in their works. In addition, the Museé du Terroir Marseillais commemorates the Provençal language and culture through its artistic and craft outputs. The museum was started in the early part of the 20th century to promote these local traditions and contains numerous rotating exhibits about Provençal culture and traditions and also holds a yearly festival with traditional Provençal music and food.

In contrast to both Paris and Lyon, some of Marseille’s mainstream festivals do address promoting the inclusion of post-migration communities as an implementation of a policy narrative of recognition. The International Documentary Film Festival in Marseille (Festival International du Documentaire de Marseille, FIDM) is involved in this regard by promoting the work of the group Marseille Espérance (discussed in chapter III). It does this by annually offering the Marseille Espérance prize to an outstanding documentary. This program is complimented by a vein of public culture that arguably explicitly addresses post-migration communities as important, integral parts of the city. An example of this trend is the way the city chose to commemorate the 2008 European Year of Dialogue of Cultures. For this, the Alliance Française Marseille-Provence, located in the city, held four days of events commemorating Marseille as ‘at the heart of the dialogue of the Mediterranean cultures’ (JMED 2008). Here, the city was commemorated as part of the Mediterranean where a large part of the city’s post-migration communities come from. Here, conferences were held on Mediterranean languages,
travel, civilizations and how the various actors in the region have existed in dialogue with each other. This is arguably presents the city as somewhere that has existed in dialogue with the other population centers and culture in the region and not somewhere that has existed independently, or indeed somewhere who’s relationship with Europe is the only constituent of its development. The cultural activities of the city that commemorate its public culture in this inclusive manner are not limited to this event, however, and extend much further.

4.4.2 The Only French City with L’Aïd dans la Cité

Marseille is the only city in France where the Muslim holiday of Eid al Adha that marks the end of the Hajj pilgrimage is publically marked with a cultural program, which is another piece of evidence which suggests that the city is implementing a policy narrative based on recognition for post-migration communities. The Eid in the city (author’s translation from the official title of ‘L’Aïd dans la Cité’) festival is a unique festival in France that brings an occasion not celebrated in the rest of France out into the public realm with a full program of cultural activities. Importantly, this festival should not be simply considered a fringe, communal affair because while clearly it celebrates a particular religious holiday of the Muslim community the organizers of this event not only invite members of the non-Muslim communities of Marseille but also regularly achieve 30% attendance at these celebrations by non-Muslims (Pervis 2007). Eid in the city is organized by the Union of Muslim Families of the Bouches-du-Rhône
("Union des Familles Musulmanes des Bouches-du-Rhône, UFM13), an association providing help to families regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliations (UFM13 2012) who are financed directly from the regional authority (Conseil Regional du Bouche du Rhone). The event was first organized in 1998 with the overt purpose of normalizing the presence of Muslims in the city (Pervis 2007). During Eid, the association arranges a broad range of activities so that a wide community and family audience can join in the festive atmosphere. It also provides an opportunity to share Muslim culture and traditions, including movies, debates, exhibitions, and workshops on Arabic. Eid in the city is considered to be a valuable opportunity to meet other members of the local community in a festive context, and it helps counter the more negative images of Muslims that tend to predominate and get the most attention (OSI 2011).

Each year the particular theme of the festival changes. In 2011 the celebrations and activities focused around the Tunisian revolution and the Arab spring, while the 2012 festivities marked the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence from France (UFM13 2012). The program was diverse, featuring a family day, public performances of music and exhibitions showcasing Maghrebi literature and Algerian comic books. This is a very important means of creating narratives of inclusion for the city’s post-migration communities, who predominantly come from the Islamic countries of North Africa. It could be said to contribute to Taylor’s (1994) ideas of recognition in that it offers the culture of a post-migration community
a very public form of recognition in several ways. It recognizes the most important holiday in the Muslim calendar in a public way by bringing it as an occasion out into the public realm as an important occasion normatively validating it as worthy of celebration. Added to this, it goes further than simply bringing a religious holiday into the public sphere. It does this arguably because it attaches a wide-ranging cultural program to the celebrations. This arguably brings a broader part of the culture of these post-migration communities out into the public realm and giving it public recognition that it is something worthy of exhibition and celebration.

4.4.3 The 2013 Capital of European and Mediterranean Culture

Marseille is the city at the center of the 2013 ‘Marseille-Provence’ European Capital of Culture. The city is using the occasion of the European Capital of Culture to continue and buttress its implementation of a policy narrative of recognition for the city. A city of immigration since its foundation over 2600 years ago, the city is using this event to write its current large minority populations from the Mediterranean region into its narrative as a diverse, modern center of commerce and trade. This is a significant step for a city to take in using an occasion not simply to focus on itself but to commemorate itself as part of a larger geographical region, from which most of its historical and recent immigrant communities have been drawn. This is rendered even more significant because the European capital of culture is overtly about raising the profile of a city
while at the same time highlighting and celebrating European culture. The fact that Marseille is using this occasion to also celebrate the cultures of Asia and Africa which exist in the city is not the first time that the city has subverted a convention to aide its integration process. Another key example is its subverting of French secularism rules to establish the Marseille Espérance forum for religious dialogue. The preparations for the European Capital of Culture have been numerous in the city, from the creation of social programs and a detailed set of cultural events, to investment in large infrastructure projects such as the Le Centre Régional de La Méditerranée à Marseille (CRM). In line with the stated aim of 2013 to celebrate and commemorate the culture of all residents of the city and the Mediterranean region, the program of events has been composed to reflect this diversity.

A key component in conceptualizing the program for 2013 was to include not just European culture or perhaps the middle class culture of Marseille, but culture to represent and include all of the city’s diverse residents. This is the aim of the ‘culture for all’ project is to provide cultural activities ‘with priority for young people, residents of poor areas and isolated territories’ throughout the duration of the year. The representation of all areas of Marseille society and the Mediterranean region is the theme that forms the basis of the program of events for the year. There was a production at La Criée Theatre of the classic Arabic tale of Ali Baba. The connection of culture to immigrants and their descents is importantly not limited to
essentialist notions of what constitutes ‘Arabic’ culture, something that could be unfamiliar to French-Arab youths of the third or second generation in France. Here, the programs also incorporate an entire theme of ‘urban culture’ events, including graffiti, rap music, BMX biking and inline skating. Here, this culture is put on an equal footing with other, perhaps more accepted, cultural forms in the program when it is referred to urban culture as ‘tomorrow’s cultural heritage’. The program again acknowledges the role of diversity in cultural achievement when it discusses urban culture as ‘hybrid artistic practices, proof of the cultural diversity which blossoms in densely populated areas’. An important example of the kind of events that are taking place under the ‘urban culture’ theme, is an event where a French rapper composes texts to illustrate the relevance of the much-celebrated French author Albert Camus’s work to the modern era. This is rendered more powerful for the presentation of the cultural diversity of Marseille by the fact the rapper, Abd Al Malik, is a very popular artist in France, and is also a convert to Islam. This theme of commemorating the role of the culture of the Mediterranean region in the city is continued in the infrastructure investments made for 2013, which will insure the initiative’s legacy.

The refitting of the Maison de la Région again reflects the centrality of the inclusion of post-migration communities in the 2013 program. Located in central Marseille in a prominent position on the city’s best-known and busiest street, La Canebière, It holds an interactive space to allow visitors to ‘discover the region’. Importantly, it presents the
Mediterranean to the visitor as a place where the Marseille’s largest post-migration communities come from as having an important role in the constitution of the city. To emphasise this, posters on the wall showcasing all of the alphabets of the Mediterranean region, including Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Armenian, and Phoenician. Stone cladding on the walls is also decorated with letters from these different alphabets. The building also holds permanent exhibits of the projects, which are being undertaken as part of 2013. One of these is *Le Centre Régional de La Méditeranée à Marseille* (CRM), located on Marseille’s docks with the mission statement of being ‘Symbol of the exchange of knowledge and continuing dialogue between the cultures of the contemporary Mediterranean world.’ This museum has been dealt with in chapter III of this thesis that concentrates on the role of the commemoration of history in the creation of inclusive social narratives for post-migration communities. The creation of narratives of inclusion is a sentiment further championed by the local media website Med’in Marseille.

### 4.4.4 Diversity is Med’in Marseille

Med’in Marseille is another example of the city implementing a policy narrative based upon recognition. A community website supported by the French national authority of social cohesion (L’agence nationale pour la cohesion sociale et l’égalité des chances), Med’in Marseille is registered under the law of 1901 as a civil society association that is neither part of the church or a political party. It is a website that was
started in 2007 by a resident of the city of Tunisian origin and seeks to ‘show the city through the prism of its diversity’ (Med’in Marseille 2012, author’s translation). Here, they aim to publicise and promote the common culture of the city alongside its various elements of cultural diversity to create links, and the awareness and recognition of the city’s cultural diversity. The site directly addresses its conception of modern France, as a multicultural country that should celebrate its achievements born out of this cultural diversity, giving the example of the football World Cup win of 1998 where a large role was played by those in the national team from post-migration communities (Med’in Marseille 2012). The site itself covers a wide range of subjects, ranging from international affairs that directly affect the city, such as the Israel Palestine conflict, to national concerns around diversity and racism in politics, right down to the local level where it seeks to promote awareness of events in the city, such as discussing the 2013 capital of culture celebrations and how this is taking in the diversity of the city. In their report on the city’s Muslim community the Open Society foundation found that the website was seen as an important media source by local policy makers and politicians.

They also found that the site was attracting a large audience (thousands of hits per day) and it was felt that the site was offering an alternative, and positive, narrative to those post-migration communities in the city who have been subject to negative media coverage. (OSF 2011). In terms of the analysis undertaken in this
thesis, Med’’in Marseille again strengthens the argument that Marseille’s urban identity has been made inclusive through the production of social narratives that offer inclusion to post-migration communities. In terms of defining exactly how that happens in this case, one can see that there are multiple opportunities within the activities of this website to fulfil the definition of inclusion taken in chapter II of this thesis. In terms of Taylor’s work on recognition, the site explicitly offers recognition of the place of post-migration communities in Marseille. Going further than this, the focus on presenting positive narratives of the contribution of these communities, in the vein of the important role post-migration communities have played in France’s sporting successes, it could be argued that the websites activities are going some way to fulfilling Parekh’s recommendations that cultural diversity is celebrated as a strength for a society.

4.4.5 The Naturally Cohabiting Diversity of Marseille Rap

A further example of the way in which public culture in Marseille has been the subject of the city’s implementation of a policy narrative based upon recognition for post-migration communities can be seen in the city’s rap scene. Unlike Paris and Lyon, the scene from its very beginning in the 1980s and 1990s benefitted from the city’s policy narrative of recognition for post-migration communities. This is because the early scene was given exposure and resources through the municipal governments funding of organisations like Radio
Gazelle. Indeed, Marseille was the first city in France in which a rap scene became established before its migration North to Paris. This support continues today with the use of the *la Friche* culture complex that was created with municipal funding by some of the scenes most well-known groups, including IAM, the most commercially successful of all French rap acts. In the aftermath of the 2005 riots, Marseille’s rap scene was highlighted by journalists as a reason for its lack of social unrest. Journalists argued that it was rap’s ability to express themes of belonging and alienation in the city that enabled it to contribute to avoiding social unrest in Marseille (Kimmelman 2007a). However, what this analysis misses is exactly the means by which rap narratives the boundaries of identity in the city and the positive narratives of urban relations that it creates. In terms of attaching this idea of the definition of inclusion taken in this thesis, it is clear that rap, as the performance of a public culture, is a means by which the hybrid cultures of post-migration communities in the city can receive the public recognition that Taylor (1994) argues is so important in one’s ability to feel part of a particular construct, be it the city or the nation. Scholarship on rap music in Marseille has taken the analysis of this even further. Sberna (2008), in the only full-length monograph study of rap in Marseille argues that ‘rap is a means of interpreting a social reality’ (Sberna 2008) through the articulation of the theme of the city (Sberna 2008). This arguably renders the brief example given at the start of this chapter, where Marseille is described in its rap music as a place that offers inclusion to post-migration communities as more than a subject act forming part of a
rap song, into something that should be taken seriously as an articulation of the reality of a social situation.

This is something that is clearly occurring in the rap of Marseille from the example given at the beginning of this chapter where the most commercially successful group from Marseille directly address the local mode of citizenship in their city as something inclusive to those from various cultural backgrounds. Foreman (2004) has found this a common occurrence in rap scenes across cultural and geographic variations because this is an art-form that is not only intimately linked to the city, but is something that can be practiced without the need for any expenditure and thus open to communities that exist in positions of marginalization both socially and economically in the city. Also, he argues for the common importance of rap music as an alternative means to understand the mapping of urban space as by examining the output of rap music one is given a window into debates of inclusion because of the urban context in which rap is produced.

The depiction of the boundaries of Marseille is very different to those in Paris. From the beginning of rap culture in Marseille, we see the boundaries of community in the city drawn across its entire area, without the fragmentation seen in the example of Paris. IAM’s 1991 album was titled with this theme in mind “…de le planète Mars”, a deliberate word play to mean “from Marseille. The title alone speaks volumes, in that it is a word play on the first three letters of the word
“Marseille” and is also supposed to hint at the city’s separateness from France. On the track on the album “Planète MARs” makes constant reference to the community termed "Marseille” with no separate boundaries drawn to delineate fragmented areas of the city. Added to this a track on the album 'I come from Marseille’ continues in the same vein. This rendered all the more important by the fact that several of the groups members were actually born, raised, and started their rap careers in the suburbs of the city, such as Plan-des-Cuques who are not even officially incorporated into the city proper, in a similar vein to the 92nd, 93rd and 94th departments which surround Paris. Even though they originate outside of the city, in an area that the administrative boundaries do not recognize as officially part of the city, this group’s output repeatedly expresses the collective community with which they identify as Marseille, not as these separate suburban areas as is seen in the Paris rap music analyzed above.

A recent track also demonstrated the continuation of this trend, with the track “13 Département Marseille” by Carpe Diem. The video to the track begins with shots of different areas of the city, with their names. This includes high-rise, poor areas like La Rose and Le Méditerranée but also interestingly Notre Dame (the city’s main cathedral and tourist attraction). This is again a presentation of the city as a coherent whole, without the fragmentation into different district based identities as seen in the Paris example above. There are other examples of groups that depict and draw the boundaries of
the imagined community of Marseille in the same way as encompassing the entire city. 3ème Oeil make reference to this on several of their tracks including “La vie de rêve” when they talk about “doing Marseille by night” (faire Marseille by night). Also, Fonky Family on “Le Retour du shite squad”, “…here we are in Marseille my brother” (author’s translation), again not making reference to a particular area of district. The differences in the depiction of the city are not limited to the boundaries of the imagined community however, they extend further into actual descriptions of the state of integration and the nature of urban relations.

Marseille’s rap demonstrates significant variance here, being replete with examples of civic pride in the city. This is manifest with reference to the city’s physical environment as well as in the identity that it offers, and its state of integration. This cultural narrative of civic pride existing in Marseille’s rap music arguably strengthens the integrative effect of the identity of Marseille. As discussed above, this does not mean that Marseille rap does not address negative issues of oppression. However, in variation to the rap of other cities, alongside this there is a narrative of “civic pride”. This portrays the city as a success for integration, somewhere with profound positive properties, and a place of which one can be proud for numerous reasons. This has been a trend in the rap of the city from its inception, to the present day.
The trend of Marseille rap exhibiting strong evidence of attachment to the identity of the city can be seen from the beginning of the rap scene in the city. This can be seen in a track on the 1991 album by IAM entitled “I come from Marseille” (Je viens de Marseille). On this track the group refers to Marseille as the ‘mythical, mystical nightmare of xenophobes…city of 10,000 cities… But do not get me wrong, the country where I come from has nothing to do with these wonders - I am from Marseille’. This trend continues on a track where the same group, IAM, appeared with the famous Algerian singer Cheb Khaled entitled “Oran – Marseille” on his album Sahara in 1996. Here a member of the group describes ‘My city [where]…Multi Ethnic Cultures cohabit naturally…the colors dancing like a watercolor’. In the same era, a member of the group IAM, Akhenaton, released a solo album in 1995 that featured another track with important examples of civic pride in the city titled “Bad boy de Marseille”. On this track there are the lyrics ‘We say that Marseille is the original city’ and ‘we are born under the sun’. In addition to this more traditional articulation of civic pride in terms of the beauty of the city and its surroundings are examples of the city lauded for other, less conventional sources of civic pride.

The expression of attachment to Marseille is not limited to the “conventional” means of articulation as discussed above of lauding the city for its architectural or natural beauty. An example of this in Marseille is the lauding of the toughness and resourcefulness of the city’s inhabitants as something inherent in identifying with being from
Marseille. An example of this is on the track “Bad boys de Marseille” when the artist rap about ‘No, you know that in my city/we multiply our empire/and we make our music serious’ and ‘late at night, like foxes, we rush to the money’. This is a means of exhibiting civic pride not just in identifying with the city in terms of its beauty or physical environment but with the spirit of its inhabitants. In this respect, it is celebrating a certain kind of industriousness, the ability to make something out of nothing. Another example of this is perhaps slightly more contentious but none the less important. This is expressing civic pride in Marseille with regard to the quality of a certain resource; marijuana. Here, on the track “Le retour du shit squad”, the artists talk about ‘Here we are in Marseille my brother, it comes straight out of the container’ and ‘a little bit of that Marseillaise, and you lose your hair’. This is perhaps a controversial suggestion, that civic pride can legitimately expressed in the quality of the locally available illegal substance. However, it remains true that the expression of civic pride is not limited to “politically correct” idioms, and neither should the scholar attempt to limit their analysis on such a basis. What is important, however, is that the analysis of rap here demonstrates a substantively different output between Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Marseille’s rap music clearly demonstrates a much greater expression of a feeling of recognition by the artists in their urban environment. In addition, this form of cultural output was given a place in the municipal policy through the funding of local radio stations that would given the burgeoning art form an important platform in the city. The extension of a policy narrative of recognition
also continues, with the incorporation of several important acts of French rap into the program for the 2013 European Capital of Culture events that center on Marseille. The completion of this comparative analysis of the social narratives created by the public culture of the three cases examined here enable this thesis to might some important conclusions.

4.5 Conclusion:

This chapter has demonstrated that the policy narrative applied to post-migration communities in the commemoration of public culture has taken varying forms through Paris, Lyon and Marseille. While Paris and, to a lesser extent in recent years Lyon, have both neglected post-migration communities by not following a policy narrative of recognition in their commemoration of public culture, this is not to say, however, that no work is occurring to correct this long standing issue. The most significant work being done in these cities to implement a policy narrative based on recognition, however, is being pioneered by small, grass roots organisations it remains arguably outgunned by the mainstream narrative of neglect for the culture of post-migration communities in the public culture of these two cities. For Paris, this has manifested itself as large and influential cultural organizations such as UNESCO holding festivals of cultural diversity in the city that ignore its significant internal diversity. Also, the Arab World Institute in Paris ignores the culture of the French citizens of Arab origin in the Parisian region, who are more numerous
than the Arab populations of some of its founding members, such as the small gulf state of Qatar. While this clearly demonstrates a lacking in the acknowledgement of the diversity of the Parisian region by these institutions, they also present important opportunities that can be used in the future to commemorate the culture of post-migration communities as important to Paris. The Arab World institute could be particularly useful here, owing to its prime location in the city and familiarity with dealing with the culture of a large proportion of the post-migration community of the Paris region. Added to these future opportunities, the work being done by activist groups in the Parisian region to commemorate the cultural narrative of post-migration communities, as an integral part of the culture of Paris and the French nation is arguably an important starting point through which it could be possible to offer greater inclusion to post-migration communities. The Oranges association, working to commemorate the cultural importance of post-migration communities in France is an important example of how this can be done through focusing on theatre and literature as a means by which to gain recognition for the culture of these communities. However, for the Parisian region this is arguably not enough to offer the kind of social narratives that could create an inclusive urban identity in the region owing to the historical neglect of the cultures of these communities in the commemoration of public culture in the Parisian region. Lyon until very recently, unfortunately, followed a similar patter.
The policy narrative applied to the public commemoration of culture in Lyon has historically neglected the culture of post-migration communities in the city. While signing up to the chart of cultural cooperation that commits them to increased representation of post-migration communities in their work, the large cultural festivals such as the festival of lights (Fête des Lumières) and the nights of sound (Les Nuits Sonores) completely neglect the culture of the city’s large post-migration communities. However, some progress is being made toward the commemoration of a greater diversity of cultures in the city, which are somewhat restricted by early teething problems. The joining of the intercultural cities program by Lyon was found to be a flawed attempt at inclusion because of its exclusion of post-migration communities. This occurred through geographically trying to include only a very small part of the city and also through the exclusion of the culture of post-migration communities. This was also an important reason why it lost the bidding process for the 2013 European Capital of Culture to Marseille, whose bid, as we have seen, was far more inclusive to its internal cultural diversity. However, this does not detract from the fact that the city is at least acknowledging that it has an internal cultural diversity constituted by post-migration communities. This represents progress from a position where diversity was a non-issue. Also, several civil society organizations have begun to make efforts to commemorate the culture of post-migration communities in the city. The Rhône-Alps Centre for Traditional Music (Centre des Musiques Traditionnelles Rhônes-Alpes, CMTRA) and the 6th continent (sixième continent) world
music festival have both turned towards commemorating Lyon as a place that has had important contributions made to its culture from post-migration communities. In a similar vein to the Parisian region, it is arguably not sufficient however, to foster an inclusive urban identity because these narratives of inclusion are still vastly in a numerical minority and position of marginalization vis-à-vis the large cultural festivals such as the festival of lights (Fête des Lumières), the second largest cultural festival in France. Only when these occasions open up to Lyon’s post-migration communities could it be possible to say that public culture is offering narrative of inclusion that could be the base for an inclusive urban identity in the city. Both Paris and Lyon remain in stark variance to the cultural policy position of Marseille.

This chapter has also argued strongly for the existence of a policy narrative that offers recognition to post-migration communities in Marseille. As such, it is the first city in France to pioneer this approach of commemorating the cultures of post-migration communities as an important constituent of its urban culture. It is also the first city in France to publically commemorate the largest Muslim festival, Eid al-Adha, with a public cultural program including dance, music, cinema and debates. Added to this, both its physical infrastructure for the 2013 European Capital of culture and the program of events commemorate the culture of the city’s post-migration communities in an interestingly nuanced way. This means that cultures of the countries of origin of these post-migration
communities being given recognition as valid cultures and as influential in the city. In addition, the hybrid cultures of the city that these communities have been influential in, such as graffiti and rap music are also being included in the program. As Parekh (2000) advances, this could arguably be an important means by which cultural diversity is promoted as an important strength of the society of Marseille. This could also be argued to be a step towards Modood’s (2010) remaking of the image of society in a positive way to include those from previously marginalized communities in positions of prominence. As such, these actions of the commemoration of public culture in Marseille are vital in creating the social narratives that go to define the city’s urban identity as inclusive to post-migration communities. Importantly, the discussion of public culture in this chapter raises an important theme that will form the basis of the analysis to be pursued in the next chapter. This chapter’s focus on the role of the commemoration of public culture in defining the application of a policy narrative based on recognition has raised the issue of history. Indeed, the European Capital of Culture 2013 in Marseille mixes the two, with infrastructure such as the Maison de la Région containing exhibits that address both the city as public culture and also the city as a historical constituted entity that has been the product of positive influence from outside since its founding by a foreigner. It is to this question of if, and how, a policy narrative of recognition has been applied to the commemoration of history in Paris, Lyon and Marseille and Lyon that the next chapter of this thesis will address.
Chapter 5: Knowing your History? Analyzing Policy Narratives of Public Commemoration

5.1. Historical Narratives and Inclusion

5.2. Paris: Attempting to Use History to Create Inclusion

5.2.1 A Colonial National Museum of Immigration

5.2.2 National War Memorial After 60 Years

5.2.3 Les Oranges Putting Diverse History on the Map

5.3. Lyon: Presenting a Monochrome History

5.3.1 Romans, Gauls and the Silk Industry

5.3.2 Monument to the Dead of Oran

5.4. Marseille: Creating Narratives of Inclusion by Commemorating the City as Historically Diverse

5.4.1 Provence and France

5.4.2 A City Founded on the Legend of Immigrants
5.4.3 Monuments in Prominence: Locating Post-Migration Communities in History:

5.4.4 Both European and Mediterranean Civilization in the MuCEM

5.5. Conclusion
5.1. Historical Narratives and Inclusion:

Another important area to interrogate when examining which policy narrative is being applied to a particular case is how a city chooses to commemorate its particular history. Strongly related to municipal cultural policy through common links in the varied institutions of the heritage industry, the inclusion of post-migration communities in the commemoration of history has always been an important facet of multicultural, recognition-based policies. As such, examples such as Ellis Island immigration museum in New York illustrate how the experiences of post-migration communities can be commemorated as a legitimate part of the story of the evolution of a particular place over time. This relates back to the final research question elaborated at the start of this thesis, which directs the thesis to examine how the role of post-migration communities in history is being commemorated differently across the three cases presented here. As such, as a case that is hypothesized to be applying a recognition based policy narrative to its post-migration communities, Marseille would be expected to show significant presence of its post-migration communities in its commemoration of its history. By comparison, as cities that rioted and are hypothesized to not be applying a recognition based policy narrative to their post-migration communities, both Paris and Lyon would be expected not to have post-migration communities at the center of their acts of historical commemoration. Following the format applied to the preceding
chapters of analysis, here I start with Paris, before moving onto Lyon and finally Marseille.

To begin, Paris’s status as the capital of France dominates the policy narrative applied to the public commemoration of history in the city. As such, the commemoration of the city is somewhat synonymous with the commemoration of the nation’s history with public displays of history including the *Arc du Triomphe* and the *Bastille*. Post-migration communities are represented in very limited ways. There are two Museums concerned with Jewish history and art, and one private Museum dedicated to Armenian history and culture. There are two monuments, however, that deal directly with the question of post-migration communities and their place within France. Arguably the most significant site at which a possible policy narrative of recognition has been applied is The National Museum of Immigration History, inaugurated in 2007. However, it is not a site without controversies over how it deals with narrating post-migration communities. As Vale (1999) has argued, in the information age the monument and the media discourse around it are inseparable in how it creates and disseminates narratives on particular issues. Unfortunately, the CNHI has been the subject of intensely negative media coverage from the outset because of its association with the anti-immigration policies of the Sarkozy administration. It has also received poor coverage owing to very real issues with its situation and constitution. Importantly, it is located in a building dating from a colonial exhibition, and as such colonialism is written into the very
fabric of the building in which the CNHI is housed (Kimmelman 2007). The other main site of the commemoration of the contribution of post-migration communities to France is the memorial to the Algerian war and to combatants from Tunisia and Morocco. This is a memorial centrally located on the banks of the River Seine in central Paris. It seeks to be the national site that commemorates both those that have died in the Algerian war of independence and the combatants that fought in the French army during the two world wars from Tunisia and Morocco. However, it was inaugurated in 2005, some 40 years after the last events of the war in Algeria and as such means that Paris has been without a memorial to these deaths for a large portion of time in which the city has been home to large post-migration communities. Therefore, while both of these sites clearly demonstrate some attempt at applying a policy narrative of recognition to post-migration difference, they are both very recent additions to the city’s public commemoration of history.

The activities of The Oranges association is another important means by which the history of post-migration communities is beginning to be acknowledged as important in the urban environment of Paris, however, this process has not been without it setbacks and negative media coverage that arguably render the created social narratives contradictory. The association works to create public acts of the commemoration of post-migration history in Paris, and specifically in Nanterre. The organization, despite some early difficulties, succeeded in renaming several public places in Nanterre.
as a means to commemorate post-migration communities’ history in France. This trend of the commemoration of history in the city lacking the representation of post-migration communities is continued in Lyon.

In Lyon post-migration communities and foreign influence are very under represented in the commemoration of the history of the city. This begins with the commemoration of its founding as a military outpost by a Roman senator. This continues with the Gallo-Roman Museum that is the second largest museum of France that commemorates Lyon’s origin as part of the Roman Empire. Another important part of its historical commemoration is in its role as central to the European silk industry from the 16th century onwards. Both of these historical epochs, possibly rich in foreign contribution, neglect to mention this fact. For example, while silk entered Europe from China by the silk-road traders of the Eastern Mediterranean, this is not part of the commemoration. Neither is the inevitable outside expertise that must have been required to start a silk weaving industry from scratch in the 16th century when no knowledge of how to weave silk was present in the city at the same, time thus necessitating outside help.

A site in the city that does attempt to commemorate a possible role of post-migration communities in the narrative of the city is the monument to the dead of Oran. This monument was originally inaugurated in Oran, second city of French-Algeria, to commemorate
the 12,000 residents of the city who died in the First World War. On independence from France, the monument was moved to Lyon. This monument, while clearly part of a attempt to apply a policy narrative of recognition to the city’s post-migration communities, has suffered from the deterioration of the environment in which it has been placed. Marseille, however, demonstrates significant variance to both Paris and Lyon in the way it commemorates post-migration communities as an integral part of its history.

Marseille stands out from both Paris and Lyon because it has applied a policy narrative of recognition to its commemoration of history that has included post-migration communities as integral parts of its history while at the same commemorating its history as part of France and Provence. Here, the memorial to the French national anthem, *la Marseillaise*, commemorates the city’s role in the French revolution. The city is also home to important commemorations of Provençal history and culture that commemorate the city’s strong regional identity as part of the previously autonomous region of Provence. However, Marseille manages to do this while also commemorating the centrality of post-migration communities to its history. This begins with the way that the city’s foundation is commemorated as the result of a Greek sailor from Asia marrying a local princess and founding the city. This is a story commemorated widely across the city, and in particular is the subject of a large bronze plaque placed at the center of the city’s old port. This continues with the commemoration of the role of foreign troops in the
First World War on the city’s Corniche road in a large purpose built monument. Also, the monument to the repatriates from Algeria is another important monument in Marseille in commemorating the important role of post-migration communities in the city. This takes the form of a large propeller blade located on the city’s Corniche road. The monument was inaugurated in 1972 and has an inscription that welcomes those who left Algeria after independence and states that ‘our city is also your city’. The most recent addition to this has been the Museum of European and Mediterranean civilizations, commissioned as part of the city’s title of 2013 European Capital of Culture. This museum will hold permanent and rotating exhibitions and an events program to promote the contributions made to civilization by the various civilizations of the Mediterranean region. In these exhibitions the civilizations of the Mediterranean region will be commemorated as on par with each other in terms of contributing to the achievements of the region. This is arguably very important for creating an inclusive urban identity for the cities post-migration communities as many of them are from the Mediterranean region and a site in their city that commemorates their countries of origin as on par with those of Western Europe is an important step in providing them with recognition of their cultural validity.

5.2. Paris: Attempting to Use History to Create Inclusion

Examining the policy narrative applied to the commemoration of history and its relationship to inclusion in Paris reveals a complex
and somewhat paradoxical relationship to the inclusion of post-migration communities. While the site of significantly sized communities from France’s ex-colonies, these communities are very poorly represented in the historical commemoration present in the French capital. Rather, commemoration has focused on Paris as center and synonym of France. This is because the city has exerted its influence and authority over the course of French history and culture since the Paris Kingdom of the 10th century. Paris was the site of the important events of the French revolution and its aftermath. It is from Paris that the dialect that is the base for modern French was imposed on the rest of France after the French revolution. As such, weaved into its urban fabric are the museums and monuments that commemorate these events. The notable exceptions of this are the National Museum of immigration and the Memorial to the contribution of North African troops in the French army. These sites present a powerful opportunity for a possible narrative of inclusion in line with the conception of inclusion outlined in chapter II of this thesis. Here, this thesis outlined how Taylor (1994), Parekh (2000) and Modood (2010) all argue for the importance of a public presence of minority communities in generating inclusion. For Taylor (1994) this is a focus upon the recognition of the culture of minorities, while Modood (2010) argues that a further level of inclusion can be generated, by remaking the image of society more broadly to take into account post-migration communities. Therefore, how post-migration communities are commemorated at these important sites of historical commemoration in Paris has serious consequences for the
fostering of inclusion at the urban and national level. This continues with the numerous sites of the commemoration of national history in Paris that are choosing not to take a role in the remaking of French society to take into account minority communities. This is somewhat complicated by Paris’s very particular position amongst French cities as capital, and a place so central to the national narrative. From the beginning of the French national building project the norms of Paris have exerted a considerable influence onto national identity. Post-revolutionary centralization worked to build France around the linguistic, political, cultural and social norms of the Parisian society (Weber 1976). The legacy of this process is that the city of Paris and the French nation are somewhat synonymous ideas. As such, the city is the location of a huge number of museums of national and international importance. Notable in their absence, however, are references to post migration communities. None of the large Parisian Museums have continued schemes of engagement with the city or countries post-migration communities. Apart from two small private museums (the Armenian and Jewish art Museums) the only museums that deal directly with a post-migration community are the Museum of Jewish art and history inaugurated by Jacques Chirac in 1993, with the National Museum of Immigration History, the Cité Nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration (CNHI).

5.2.1 A ‘Colonial’ National Museum of Immigration:
The CNHI is the most significant site dealing with immigration and post-migration communities in both Paris and France as a whole and is a significant sign of the possible application of a policy narrative based on recognition in the city. As the national site of commemoration for the large number of migrants that have come to France, its responsibility for setting the tone for the inclusion of post-migration communities is enormous. The CNHI aims to ‘contribute to the recognition of the integration process of immigrants in French society and to change the attitudes towards immigration in France’ (CNHI website 2012, author’s translation). It also sets out to be a ‘major element in the Republican, social cohesion of France’ (CNHI website 2012, author’s translation). It sets out to ‘recognize the history of immigration as a common heritage inseparable from the construction of France’ (CNHI Website, 2012, author’s translation).

However, this facility has been critiqued for its navigation of the legacy of France’s colonialism in the face of being the prime national site for the commemoration of immigration. The site and function of this museum like others has changed with the changing ebb and flow of history. Under colonialism sites of commemoration were important places to uphold empire and underpin racist thought, such as colonial exhibitions, which are now expected to fulfill an inclusionary role (Lynch and Alberti 2010). This presents another problem inherent in monuments – especially one so intimately connected with a sensitive subject such as colonialism – that it has a contradictory meaning, a place that may be a source of great pride for one group
and hurtful to another Tunebridge (1984). Also, the media has been a source of great critique for the museum. This is important, as in the media rich world in which we live, monuments themselves and the way that they are defined in the media discourse are inseparable. As such, the role of this museum in defining the narrative of the modern city will be pursued under three separate themes. These are its context, its situation and its media reception.

The location of the museum means that it is unequivocally situated at the center of France’s difficult legacy of colonialism that could be argued to make it difficult to sympathetically deal with the history of immigration. This is not to say that over time meanings of buildings or places cannot change, however, in this particular case the very fabric of the building and the way that it has been conserved, make a change of meaning very difficult. It is in sited in the art deco Palais de la Porte Dorée next to the Bois de Vincennes in the 12\textsuperscript{th} Arrondissement. The palace is the final surviving building from the 1931 colonial exhibition, originally built as a museum of the colonies and colonial conquest and art from the colonies. It was designed to ‘celebrate the glory of the French Colonial model’ (CNHI 2012, author’s translation). It was the only building to survive the 1931 exhibition and was designed to give a brief account of empire from an artistic, economic and historical view to encourage visitors to invest in the colonies or even to move to them.
The rebuilding of the palace for the immigration museum included the restoration of the colonial era frescos depicting such things as naked Africans at the feet of a white catholic priest. This continues with a tapestry that is a self-portrait of France as she brings peace to her colonies, however in keeping with the colonial aesthetic – black men presented as the naked savage surrounded by animals and women in sexualized poses with naked breasts. In the central forum depictions of the benefits of colonialism via raw material, trade, goods and foodstuff (Dixon 2012). Outside there is a frieze on the façade that shows French colonial labourers toiling for the glory of the empire and a statue commemorates Jean-Baptiste Marchand who spread colonial rule in Africa, leading a group of half-naked African servants (Kimmelman 2007). There is also a room dedicated to Asia named after Maréchal Lyautey who was the director of the colonial exposition. The director of the museum, when speaking to the press acknowledges this tension; ‘we’re inside a building that is a memory place for colonization, but our message is the contrary: to show what all these people coming to France have brought...which ends up being the history of France’ (Kimmelman 2007). Also, the guide attempts to separate aesthetic appreciation of the artistic nature of the building from the historic symbolism of what it actually depicts, namely the ‘domination and superiority of France over its Empire’ (Dixon 2012). This attempts to downplay the valorization of France’s colonial project into the fabric of the palace. This inability to adequately deal with this colonial past continues to plague the museum in its exhibits.
The exhibits in the museum, while making progress in remaking the idea of being French as something that has multiple meanings, struggles to do this without making some shortcomings. The museum holds rotating exhibition accompanied by talks and discussion of problems communities face which has addressed Maghreb, Germany, Turkey, but lacks engagement with sub-Saharan Africa, also showing a bias to presenting migrants as contributing to sports and the performing arts, such as an exhibition about migrants in French football (Dixon 2012). Also, the museum neglects the commemoration of female migrants in the narrative (Dixon 2012). When women are featured, such as Josephine Baker and Eunice Barber they are presented in scantily clad attire in roles as the sexualized ‘African other’ (Dixon 2012). There is also an exhibition called ‘Milestones’ that attempts to demonstrate journeys taken into France and how many people have made the journey from particular places. However, rather than presenting migration as a multi-directional movement of people, where a significant number of French citizens went to both the North African colonies, especially Algeria, and to French Canada it neglects to show this. Rather, it can be argued to present migration as a one sided, invasion (Dixon 2012). Importantly, in its exhibits it ‘does not do enough to challenge attitudes of cultural superiority’ (Dixon 2012) so important both to the imperial project, and to present day narratives of discrimination in France. This is especially glaring when one examines the circumstances surrounding the departure of the African and Asian art
collection from the building. This was relocated to a site next to the Eiffel Tower that, importantly, was completely free from any colonial connotations. Thus, the prudence of such a move in light of placing a sensitive monument like an immigration museum in a building so intimately linked with the violent past of empire is questionable, when it could have located in a neutral setting. Added to this it has been argued that a monument cannot be examined outside of the equally important media surrounding it.

It is vital to understand that the monuments themselves, and the way that they are defined in the media discourse around them are inseparable (Vale 1999). As such to adequately examine the CNHI as a means to help define the policy narrative applied to the place of post-migration communities in the city, one must examine the media discourse around it, and what dimension this adds to CNHI’s creation of narratives. This is perhaps the area in which CNHI has experienced the most difficulty since its inception in being repeatedly associated with the negative discourse of immigration in France, sometimes in contradictory ways. An initiative of Chirac, the CNHI had fallen out of favor by the time of Sarkozy’s presidency, and as such did not attract the president or the minister for immigration to its launch reported as a failure of the CNHI to make an impact by the national press because of the embarrassment of having ‘an official opening with no officials’ (Chrisafis 2007, Lecière 2009). However, at the same time, its affiliation with the then newly created Ministry of Immigration and National Identity was publically cited as a key
reason why academics associated with the museum resigned because, while the ‘challenge of the CNHI was to present a common history that all could take ownership of’ (Leciére 2009) the ‘ministry [of immigration and national identity] installs division and polarity that history has shown to be devastating (Lacière 2009). This was seen to represent the ‘paradox of 35 years of demonifying immigration while celebrating foreigners who enriched France’ (Leciére 2009). Added to this, another controversy was played out in the public eye when the museum proposed naming a library after a prominent Algerian sociologist, Abdelmalek Al Sayad, who worked with Pierre Bourdieu and who was a senior fellow at the CNRS. An open letter by academics was issued against naming the museum after this figure owing to the stigma surrounding the museum and its association with colonialism and modern day xenophobia (Alain et al 2009). Also adding to the controversy was the failed attempt to name a college in Nanterre after the same figure was dropped and named instead after the Republic, following intervention by the administration of the Hauts-de-Seine department. Notwithstanding concerns over stigmatized relations with politicians, the museum has also been short on critical acclaim with the French press giving poor reviews to the exhibits. In a 2011 review, Le Monde derided the exhibitions as poorly planned and overcrowded (Dagen 2011).

It would appear that the opening of the CNHI offers significant evidence of the application of a policy narrative of recognition in the city, and thus presents opportunities for the reinvention of the
narrative of immigration in French history, in line with the stated aims of the museum to open up an idea of multiple French histories and the positive contributions of immigrants. However, from its inception in a building in whose very fabric is written the ‘domination and superiority of France over its Empire’ (Dixon 2012), it has struggled in this endeavor. It is also important to note that the previous occupant of this building, a collection of African and Asian art relocated to a site next to the Eiffel Tower free of such colonial connotations, a site that might have made a more prudent context for a commemoration of immigration. Academic criticism has also highlighted possible problems with the chosen representations of migrants in the exhibits, concentrating on contributions to sports and performing arts, highlighting the difficulties in escaping the tension between being set in a colonial building and trying to present immigrants in a post-colonial manner while neglecting other contributions they have made to professional occupations in France. However, as Vale (1999) argues, in the contemporary age, it is very difficult to differentiate media coverage of monuments from the monuments themselves, and the thus the extremely negative reception of the museum in the French press further damages it’s attempt to commemorate migrants as part of contemporary French history.

5.2.2 A National War Memorial After 60 Years

Another important possible site that would demonstrate the application of a policy narrative of recognition of post-migration
communities is the recently (2002) inaugurated memorial to the Algerian war and combatants from Morocco and Tunisia that have fought in the French army. Monuments to the contribution of foreign troops to the French army arguably offer an important means by which post migration communities can be commemorated in the city in an inclusive manner. Significant number of North African troops fought for the French army during the Second World War, numbering nearly 250,000 and constituting nearly 50% of total active forces during the period where the French army resided in exile in North Africa. These troops made a major contribution to the liberation of the South of France and during the campaign in Italy. A large number of Algerian Muslims also served in the French army during the colonial era in Algeria and fought to keep that territory part of France. On independence these troops faced the choice of leaving to France or staying and potentially being executed for their collaboration with France. How the commemoration of this major contribution of the ancestors of the current immigrants into France arguably has important possible implications for how they see themselves in society. If, for example, commemoration of this contribution is not visible or even existent, then this does not really send the message that the contribution of foreigners is highly regarded by the French state. The most visible commemoration of the effort of foreign troops in the French army can be found in the monuments that exist to this effort in French cities. As such, this directly connects this effort for the nation to the context of the modern city, as it is within the modern
city that this effort is commemorated, and it is indeed commemorated in such a way in all three of the cities examined by this study.

Paris was not the location of a site of commemoration to foreign troops until very recently, when in 2002 the ‘Mémorial national de la guerre d'Algérie et des combats du Maroc et de la Tunisie’ was inaugurated by the French president Jacques Chirac on the Quai Branly. It commemorates the 23,000 French troops and *Harkis* who died during the conflicts of independence in the French North African territories of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, as well as the civilian causalities. The memorial consists of three columns 5.85 meters high, at the center of which are electronic screens, which correspond to the colors of the French flag. Each screen shows a different aspect of information. The first column continuously displays the full names of the 23,000 soldiers and *Harkis*, who died for France in North Africa. The second column displays messages recalling the period of the Algerian war and the memory of those who disappeared after the cease-fire. On 26 March 2010, the French government decided to add the names of civilian victims of the massacre of pro-independence demonstrators at the rue d'Isly, Algiers, on March 26, 1962. The third column includes an interactive screen at its foot where visitors can search for and view the names of a particular soldier. The ground near the monument is engraved with the following inscription ‘In memory of the fighters who died for France during the war in Algeria and battles in Morocco and Tunisia, and all members of the auxiliary forces, killed after the cease-fire in Algeria,
many of which have not been identified. There is also a plaque with
the following message ‘the Nation commemorates the disappeared
persons and the civilian victims of massacres and abuses committed
during the war in Algeria and after March 19, 1962 in violation of the
Evian agreements, as well as civilian victims of the fighting in
Morocco and Tunisia, in tribute to the soldiers who died for France in
North Africa’.

Analyzing the possible implications for inclusion generated by this
monument is a complicated task. The Quai Branly location of this
monument puts it very much at the center of Paris, near to important
sites of national importance like the Eiffel tower, Les invalides and
the ecole militaire. This places the commemoration of these events,
at least physically, at the center of French national life, and the life of
the city of Paris. This is arguably an important factor in offering the
communities from North Africa in France a degree of recognition in
their role in the national narrative of France and the urban narrative
of Paris. It is also significant that the monument addresses the
independence struggles that those from North Africa fought against
the French Empire as it legitimizes their struggles for equality and
human rights. However, there is arguably an issue of chronology; the
establishment of the monument in 2002 demonstrates how long it
has taken for France to begin to offer recognition to these groups.
This means that the memorial was constructed some 40 years after
the main influx of immigrants from the Maghreb at the end of the
French empires, allowing 40 years during which their history was not commemorated in any way in the national capital of France.

This lag is arguably important for several reasons. Firstly, a significant number of those that came to France from North Africa on the independence of France's ex-colonies did not do so voluntarily, but were forced to flee owing to their collaboration with the French forces and civil administration in North Africa, most notably Algeria. On the granting of the ex-colonies independence, this community was faced with the choice of leaving North Africa or staying and risking death at the hands of those who had fought for independence, and indeed many that stayed behind or who were impeded in their exit were killed. A monument to this struggle could have been an important means of creating a narrative that explained that these communities that had come to France had not done so for voluntary economic migration, but rather because they had at some point attempted to contribute to the aims and goals of France and had no choice but to come to metropolitan France when these aims suddenly changed. As such, while this monument represents some attempt to apply a policy narrative of recognition to post-migration difference, it remains rather early to assert its ability to produce a long lasting effect on the possible mitigation of future unrest. This would also have to examine in tandem with other initiatives that attempt to foster a policy narrative of recognition in the city. Another example that has implications for the designation of a policy narrative based on recognition is the activities of The Oranges association in
Nanterre, who are one of the few examples of a group in the Parisian region working for the commemoration of post-migration communities as part of the city.

5.2.3 Les Oranges: Putting Diverse History on the Map in Paris

The Oranges, an association mentioned for its work in implementing a policy narrative of recognition in the commemoration of history. While this thesis has already analyzed their cultural activities, they also use the commemoration of history to further their goals of constructing a collective identity in Nanterre, and France more generally, which accepts plurality. Here, the organization wanted to find ways in which to deal with the memory of immigrant history in France, in tandem with the municipal government, in a way that can take its specific events, successes and struggles, and link them the universal issues that all communities in France. This is a point of tremendous importance and one that could serve in the present to legitimate the presence of post-migration communities in France. These assumptions underpin the regular debates held by The Oranges association to examine the role of post-migration communities in the history of France and Paris.

Another important dimension of the work of The Oranges is their monthly debate program where they again attempt to pitch the specifics of the Arab experience to universal themes as a means to refine the position of the Arabic community in the general discourse.
Here, they organize conferences and debates on pertinent issues relating to the reshaping the discourse of immigrants in France and elements of French colonial history. Important examples of over thirty debates listed on their website are ‘Xenophobia of the state’ (2010) ‘Teaching immigration history in schools’ (2010), ‘History of France, Memories of Algeria, which transmission?’ (2009) and ‘The sentiment of injustice of the young people of housing estates (2008). These debates follow a common format in that they bring experts to give a presentation and to answer questions from the audience. Several of these debates have generated commercially available publications on these issue, including the book created on the meaning of independence (in all its diverse forms) through interviews with residents of Nanterre and published it with the residents and their opinions in the books. In the eyes of The Oranges, this was an important step in making residents of Nanterre reevaluate what they are capable of, as many of them could never conceive being part of a book before this process was undertaken, while also offering important opportunities for the recognition of their stories regarding independence struggles, like those who had been party to the events surrounding the independence struggle in colonial Algeria and other French ex-colonies that are still to be thoroughly examined in public media discourse in France. Also out of these debates, a 2004 publication on the French-Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad was produced that is available to purchase on Amazon. Out of this event and publication also came an initiative to rename a high school after the sociologist that was very publically stymied.
After the successes of the conference about Abdelmalek Sayad and its related publication, the association realized that no educational institution was named after an intellectual from the colonial era (Belhadi 2007). The idea gained further ground, in 2005 Mohamed took the mayor of Nanterre to Tlemcen in Algeria, a town that Nanterre is twinned with and which is one of the centers of Islamic culture and learning in the Maghreb. During this time the subject of the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad came up, and after learning something about his life and work, the mayor offered the idea that it would be a good idea to name a new college about to be constructed in Nanterre after Abdelmalek Sayad. This was in honor of both his life’s work, where he became a senior fellow at the CNRS and wrote prolifically on migration and exile, but also because of his intimate involvement with Nanterre, where he spent some of his life, and wrote about its shantytowns that housed Algerian refugees in France.

At this point, The Oranges got involved and started a national campaign for this by getting researchers and politicians to sign a petition and to get media coverage for the effort of renaming the college. Nikolas Sarkozy, President of the Conseil General at the time, before he became interior minister and ultimately president, originally accepted this name for the college. However, the decision was overturned by a vote. This was not before the issue stirred up widespread controversy in the French press that arguably inflated the importance of this issue. As we have seen argued in the chapter of
this thesis on the public commemoration of history, the way that these gestures are defined in the media discourse around them and what they are has become increasingly inseparable (Vale 1999). Here many French politicians waded into the fray, with Elizabeth Balkini-Smadja arguing for the college to be named after Guy Moquet, a young member of the French resistance who died at the hands of the Nazi occupiers, and that any attempt to name the college after an Arab sociologist was an example of the communist mayor on Nanterre attempting to start a polemic around the issue. However, although the college was not named after Sayad in the end, the Mayor of Nanterre held a symbolic inauguration of the college on the 23rd of May 2007, where a plaque was placed on the side of the college to commemorate the sociologist. Out of this process, however, came the initiative to rename a street after the sociologist that was successful, Rue Abdelmalek Sayad, in Nanterre.

The proposition was successfully put to the mayor in 2007, and The Oranges see this as an important means by which recognition can be given to the role of the Algerian post-migration community has played in France, as Abdelmalek Sayad was a senior fellow at the CNRS, the French national center of scientific research, and extremely prestigious appointment in France. The Oranges have also successfully lobbied to have another important aspect of the Algerian post-migration community in France’s story publically recognized. On the 17th of October 1961 a peaceful protest by pro-independence Algerians was quashed in Paris by the police, resulting in anything
up to 300 deaths. This incident was officially denied until the 1990s. The largest delegation of the protesters was from Nanterre. This event, the massacre of 1961, has been one of the most important elements of the work of The Oranges in attempting to commemorate the history of post-migration communities in Paris. They have successfully lobbied to have both a Boulevard named after the incident in Nanterre (Boulevard 17-October-1961) in 2011. They also managed to get a plaque commemorating those who went from Nanterre to the demonstration place at the prefecture of Nanterre. Here, M’hamed Kaki, the president of The Oranges, described the aim of gaining these concessions as providing an educational function where the fact that people will come across streets named after an event of a person might make them look into the history behind the particular event or person. Also, for M’hamed it is a mark of success to have gained a concession in such a central place, in his opinion, of France – so that there is a street with a name commemorating the massacre of 1961 next to one of Paris’s most important business districts, La Défense. Also, as described above, it is his hope that the discussion of such issues allows the Algerian (and other immigrant groups more generally) to move from a focus on the specifics of their experience, to the generalities that can be shared with other communities. This can be done, he argues, by highlighting such events as it causes the realization that the events that have befallen immigrant communities have ramifications for the whole of society in that they have been fighting for the universal causes of human rights and equality. As such, the experiences of
The Oranges association, especially given the support lent to their efforts by the municipal authorities of Nanterre, demonstrate further that a policy narrative based on recognition is being applied to post-migration difference. However, as this thesis has highlighted in previous cases in the Parisian region, this effort is still contentious because of its perceived transgressions of assimilationist norms. As such, the snapshot captured here could be exposing an possibly important moment of transition, but only further reflection will be able to assert this more certainly.

This analysis has demonstrated, that in common with governance (chapter III) and public culture (chapter IV), a policy narrative of recognition is beginning to be applied to the management of difference in the Parisian region. However, this is a very recent phenomena, with none of the material analyzed above being in existence only a decade ago. Also, as can be expected with applying relatively new policy principles, such as recognition, to a context previously dominated by assimilation, teething problems have been evident in this regard. The ill suited setting for the National Immigration History museum is emblematic of this. While clearly part of a policy of recognition, its effectiveness can be subjected to serious questions because of its setting in a building that is dominated by references to France’s colonial legacy. This centrality of the national French narrative of history, and the contradictory treatment of post-migration history, is also evident in the public commemoration of history in Lyon.
5.3. Lyon: A Monochrome History

Lyon has clearly yet to fully implement a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities in its public commemoration of history. In presenting its own history, Lyon shares several commonalities with Paris. While not nearly as diverse or with the international significance of Paris as a center of European and global trade and culture, Lyon does fall into a similar paradoxical application of policy narratives to its diversity as Paris. Here, Lyon’s metropolitan area contains vast post-migration communities supplanted with smaller migrant groups from across the globe. However, the narrative of this migration and these post-migration communities is almost completely absent from its discourse of public commemoration. With the exception of a commemoration of the contribution of foreign troops in the Duchère neighborhood, there are no other sites of commemoration of the contribution that immigrants have made to the city at the time of this research. Therefore, this analysis is going to examine how the city commemorates its history before moving to examine the memorial to foreign troops.

The commemoration of Lyon’s history is primarily centered on its place as urban center of Roman, Latin and French civilization. This begins with Lyons founding myth which, alongside several other European cities (notably Barcelona, Turin and Geneva), the city traces its origins to foundation under the Roman Empire. Lyon’s
founding myth as it is presented as being founded by a Roman senator, Lucius Munatius Plancus. The story is that he founded Lyon as a military outpost and trading colony. This commemoration of the city as part of Roman and Latin civilization is the vast Musée gallo-romain de Fourvière, which is the second largest museum in France. This museum is located on a hill near to old Lyon and commemorates the city’s Roman and Celtic heritage with a number of archaeological finds and displays of international importance. Another important site of the commemoration of the history of the city of Lyon is as a center of the silk industry. Here, there silk workers house museum (Maison des Canuts) commemorates the important role that the city played in European silk production from the 16th century onwards. Both of these museums miss possible opportunities to remake the image of the city to offer its post-migration communities a degree of recognition while at the same time commemorating the important aspects of history that they currently deal with. For example, the museum dedicated to the Roman heritage of Lyon could deal with all of its current content while bringing in the important shared heritage that all civilizations that succeeded the Romans have, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean that were also important spheres of influence for Rome. Also, the commemorating the creation of a silk industry, where there was none before the intervention of the French crown opens significant opportunities for the commemoration of outsiders. Silk reached Europe on the silk road trade routes from China through the Islamic world and the creation of the industry in Lyon must have
had some degree of outside expertise to transmit the knowledge of silk weaving to France, which at the time did not have a silk industry. Both of these possible opportunities to provide some important narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities are missed here. One of the few sites where post-migration communities are commemorated in the city is the monument to the dead of Oran.

5.3.B Monument to the Dead of Oran

The *Monument aux Morts d’Oran* is one of the few sites in Lyon where post-migration communities have been the subjects of a policy narrative of recognition with regards to the city’s history. However, the monument has suffered from unforeseeable circumstances in terms of its situation. It was inaugurated in the neighborhood of *le Duchère* during its construction when it was conceptualized as a new, modernist, desirable suburb of the city. However, like many high rise estates constructed at this time it has since fallen into disrepair and marginalization from the city, resulting in it being one of the sites of the sporadic social unrest common in such areas of French cities. As such, today it exists in a marginalized location, away from the historical center of the city. Lyon is also the sight of an important monument for the commemoration of the role of foreign troops in the French army, however, it is situated not in the center of the city, but in the run down suburb of *le Duchère*. The monument ‘Monument aux Morts d’Oran’ also has a context that renders this placement even more interesting. The monument was inaugurated in May 1927
to commemorate the 12,000 residents of Oran who died during the First World War, and was originally called the monument of victory, and was originally erected in Oran in French Algeria. It was over 12 meters in height, and consisted of an imposing stone plinth, on top of which was the representation of 3 symbolic soldiers, and contained the inscription: ‘Le département d’Oran à ses enfants morts pour la Patrie - 1914 – 1918’. It was also inscribed with the names of famous battles at which the residents died: Charleroi, Marne, Aisne, Flandre, Artois, Lorraine, Somme, Champagne, Verdun, Argonne, Dardanelles, Orient. At the back of the monument, facing the sea is the inscription ‘Souvenez-vous (remembering you)’. It also contains the numbers dead from each arrondissement of Oran: 3.208 ; Sidi-Bel-Abbès : 1.217 ; Mostaganem : 3.439 ; Tlemcen : 1.136 ; Mascara : 2.257 ; Sud-Oranais : 1.252. It occupied a prestigious location in a central square of Oran, next to the sea front. In 1956 the city of Oran was twinned with Lyon in France, shortly after which the French occupation of Algeria ended in 1962. At the time in Lyon, the large housing complex ‘la Duchère’ was still being built, and the Mayor of Lyon, Louis Pradel, recognizing the needs of the influx of uprooted people from Algeria gave half of the homes in the estate to them. He also wished to create a memorial space to commemorate their contributions to France, at which time attention fell on the War memorial of Oran. The municipal council mobilized a team to organize and negotiate for the repatriation of the statue, with Napoleon Bullukian, a Lyonnais Armenian philanthropist funding the entire cost of the exercise. In 1967 negotiations with the Algerian
authorities were successful, and the monument was cut from its eight-meter high base in Oran in December, and left for Marseille. The statue was inaugurated in July 1968 in a ceremony attended by many returnees from Algeria, where Mr Fenech, president of the National Federation of Returnees gave the following, insightful speech ‘It reminds our land of Oran and the struggle of two generations of his son to live in France. It will be the Shrine where returnees, who have lost their graves, will evoke the memory of their dead’. Several plaques were also added to the Monument: a Tribute to the ‘Army of Africa’ and a tribute to the battles fought on the ‘Rhine and Danube’ with the following inscription added in gold letters ‘In memory of their native land, from the city of Lyon to the children of North Africa that it has received.’ While this history, on first glance seems inclusive enough, and even somewhat typical as an implementation of a policy narrative based on recognition, several events before and since its inauguration have rendered its meaning somewhat differently.

While the transference of a war memorial from Algeria to metropolitan France, to an area that has received large numbers of refugees from Algeria, might seem like something which would help to foster a sense of integration in the city, several events have rendered this story with somewhat different meanings. Firstly, this act is rendered somewhat hypocritical when compared with the treatment of harkis left in Algeria. While it was possible to fund the negotiations and transportation of a large piece of stone from Oran to
Lyon (with good intentions), it was not possible for the French authorities to negotiate or even accept the return of those Algerian Muslims who had fought in Algeria for the pacification of the country for French interests. They were deliberately blocked, by the policy of the de Gaulle government of the time, from returning to France, unlike Algerian Jews or European settlers who were given French nationality and welcomed back to metropolitan France. Despite guarantees by the Algerian authorities that no reprisals would be taken against them, it is estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 *harkis* and their dependents were killed after independence in extremely brutal circumstances.

Another facet of history that would render this effort to commemorate foreign service in the French army in a different manner than that intended was the fate of the La Duchère itself. When the statue was installed, the development had barely been finished, and the installation of the status in a neighborhood that was largely used to house returning settlers and those that thought for France, it may have been regarded with some optimism as something to commemorate these communities efforts for France. But unfortunately by the 1990’s this was a case par excellence of French urban decay and the well documented failures of the post war building boom and its concentration on constructing high rise, high density housing on the isolated outskirts of French cities. Accordingly this great effort to commemorate this contribution to France eventually came to stand at the center of a run down, stigmatized
and highly problematic area of Lyon, site of regular urban disturbances. Also, the area, like many of those built during the 1960’s would come to house migrants form the Maghreb who came to France as migrant workers who may not have seen the memorial for those who fought to maintain the harsh colonial regime in the middle of their housing estate as something that would have aided in their inclusiveness in the narrative of France. This is at variance with the possibility of it occupying a central location in the cities urban geography. This placement, at least for the past 20-30 years, accidently symbolizes the marginalization of these peoples history and sacrifices in a similar way to their geographical marginalization in the great urban landscape of Lyon, away from the opportunities, amenities and prestige of the city center.

As such, Lyon’s implementation of a policy narrative of recognition in its commemoration of history has been extremely limited. It has neglected important possible examples of outside influence in both its treatment of its Roman heritage and its history as the center of the silk industry. In addition, its Monument to the Dead of Oran has suffered from the passage of time, having been at one point the center of a new housing development, the area has now become a zone associated with poverty and social unrest. However, the commemoration of history in Marseille has been subject to a far more deep and sustained implementation of a policy narrative based on recognition for its post-migration communities.
5.4. Marseille: Creating Narratives of Inclusion by
Commemorating the City as Historically Diverse

Marseille demonstrates significant variance from both Paris and Lyon with the commemoration of its history being situated in a policy context of recognition for its post-migration difference. It has managed to implement this while also being able to balance the commemoration of local and national history while also commemorating a narrative that takes commemorates the role of outsiders in the founding and creation of the city. This represents an important opportunity for the inclusion of post-migration communities in the narrative of the city and as such in the cities urban identity. Commonality is seen with Lyon and Paris in Marseille’s commemoration of itself as part of the local region and national narrative of France through the commemoration of these histories in the city’s museums of Provençal history and La Marseillaise (France’s national anthem). However, the city demonstrates variance from Paris and Lyon in its ability to commemorate itself as a place that owes its creation, prosperity and modern culture to the role of outsiders that have arrived in the city since its founding. This is shown most dramatically with the commemoration of the founding of the city by those from outside opens up the possibility of commemorating the role of outsiders in the modern city through its founding myth and commemoration of the foreign communities that have fought for France and settled in the city.
5.4.1 Including the National and the Regional: France and Provence

Marseille commemorates its history both as part of the constructs of Provence and France and also as constituted by those from outside these areas. In terms of Marseille’s role as the capital of Provence, the two museums mentioned in chapter IV as cultural institutions also serve as sites of the commemoration of this history. The Foundation Regards de Provence is located in a building that was formally the city library and archive. It is dedicated to promoting the arts and culture of Provence. Here, they hold rotating exhibitions about famous artists, writers and painters that have worked in Provence and have depicted Provence in their works. In addition, the Museé du Terroir Marseillais commemorates the Provençal language and culture through its artistic and craft outputs. The museum was started in the early part of the 20th century to promote these local traditions and contains numerous rotating exhibits about Provençal culture and traditions and also holds a year festival with traditional Provençal music and food. The city is also commemorated as part of France.

The city is central to the national narrative of post-revolutionary Republican France. France’s national anthem, la Marseillaise, derives its name from the city. La Marseillaise was originally penned in Strasbourg as a marching song for the Army of the Rhine in 1792. It acquired the name *la Marseillaise* because it was sung by revolutionaries, at a gathering in Marseille who aimed to inspire a
group of volunteers from the city to march to Paris and take part in the French revolution. To commemorate this there is a memorial of the Marseillaise in Marseille. It is located in a building in the central city very close to where the incident described above took place. The monument itself is a recent creation, being inaugurated in 2011. It is designed as a center enabling the exploration of both the background of the national anthem and also the French revolution and its legacy. The exhibits include both achieve material and interactive audio-visual installations. These installations are designed to allow the visitor to explore Marseille on the eve of the French revolution as a means to understand the historical context to the event and the resulting march to Paris by volunteers from the city that would be how the anthem takes its name from the city. In variance to other French cities, specifically Paris and Lyon as analyzed in this thesis, Marseille also commemorates itself as a place where outsiders have been important in its foundation.

5.4.2 Marseille: A City Founded on the Legend of Immigrants

Marseille’s commemoration of the importance of historical narratives from outside begins with the city’s founding myth, which is commemorated on a large plaque on the city’s old port, whose placement can be argued to be clear evidence of the city authorities applying a policy narrative of recognition to the city’s post-migration communities. The myth states that a Greek expedition, lead by Protis, from Asia Minor (Phocaea, in Anatolia, modern day Turkey) was
searching for a new trading outpost. When they came to the coast of Gaul, they found the well-protected cove of Laçydon, fed by a fresh water stream (Temine 2006). They were welcomed by the King of Segobridges, Gyptis, with the result being a marriage between Gyptis's daughter and Protis. Gyptis then gave the couple a plot of land close to the Laçydon to start a new city, Massalia (Temine 2006:7). Calame (2003) argues that founding myths can be important in using a historical event to valorize current community practices, creating symbolic narratives of collective importance. This is a conclusion that has been reached regarding this founding myth in Marseille. Cesari et al (2001) have identified the important role that this narrative has had in informing the parameters of an inclusive urban identity in Marseille:

‘Marseille was created by a couple: a local woman and someone with a different nationality. This founding myth has written into the unconscious of the people of Marseille that immigration is widely considered as the main factor of its identity.’ Cesari et al (2001)

This is an important factor in the building of an inclusive urban identity in the city. This is because it creates a very important shared narrative that deals directly with the management of difference. Here, this is arguably a powerful example of creating a social narrative that goes beyond Taylor’s (1994) idea of recognition of a minority culture
in the city to the positive depiction of diversity important to later theorists of multiculturalism. Parakh (2000) argues for the importance of creating positive representations of diversity and how this is an inherent strength in a society. Modood (2010) goes beyond this to advocate the remaking of the image of society to take into account minorities in central roles. This narrative of the foundation of the city being the result of the marrying of local and outside forces is a very close approximation of these ideas of remaking the vision of society and projecting a positive image of diversity so important to multicultural theorists because of the centrality given to an immigrant in the very foundation of the city. While, clearly, this is somewhat a unique circumstance in that attempting to create a founding myth centered around an immigrant is probably unwise in most cases, it does demonstrate the importance of bringing in narratives of foreign influence into how the city commemorates its history in the modern day as a means by which modern post-migration communities, and indeed those that have not undertaken a migration, are shown the positive aspect of migration and influence that could be seen as foreign. This is at stark variance, for example, to the absolute neglect of the mention of the foreign origin of silks in the commemoration of the silk industry in Lyon that clearly would not have been possible without influence from some outside source. In Marseille, this commemoration of post-migration communities at the heart of the narrative of the city is importantly not limited to its founding myth, but rather permeates into many other instances of commemoration in the
city, including the commemoration of the role of foreign troops in the French army.

5.4.3 Monuments in Prominence: Locating Post-Migration Communities in History:

We have seen that in both Paris and Lyon an important example of an opportunity to commemorate foreign contribution in the city is how the contributions of foreign soldiers to the military campaigns of France are commemorated in the city. However, these events are not commemorated in the same way across the three examples, and a significant variation occurs. In Marseille, the commitment to a policy narrative of recognition has been committed to the upkeep of monuments that it has inherited from the past. An example of this is the Monument of the dead of the Armies of the Orient and Distant Lands (Author's translation, Monument aux Morts de l'Armée d'Orient et des Terres Lointaines). The memorial has pride of place on the important cornice road of the city, one of the city's main thoroughfares, running alongside the beach and some fairly affluent neighborhoods. In 1921, the French government gave authorization to Marseille for a national monument to commemorate victims of the French army who died overseas during the First World War (PACA 2012). A competition for the design was launched after the colonial exposition of 1922, with Gaston Castel being chosen out of 17 contestants. With the sculptor Antoine Sartorio, they proposed a monument in the shape of a door on the coastal road facing out to
sea, to remind that Marseille has the position as the ‘Porte de l’Orient’ and also so that it can be seen from a long distance to ships entering the city’s port. Inaugurated on in April 1927, the monument forms a large arch, with a crescent and star at its center, and its underside decorated with stylized palms. It is flanked on either side with characters of soldiers on foot, in memory of the army and air force, while two female figures with large wings stand on pedestals, representing the heroism of these troops. At the center of the arch stands a statue of Victory, represented in a female form, with arms outstretched to the sky. On the side the names and dates of the major campaigns of the war are inscribed. This monument has arguably had an important part of the commemoration of the role of outsiders in the city.

This monument very prominently gives recognition to the important function played by those from outside the city in not only defending the city, but also the French nation. However, this monument again demonstrates an interesting phenomena in that the meaning of monuments can change dramatically over time given the contextual changes that occur around them. We have already seen that the monument to the dead of Oran in the Duchère neighborhood of Lyon has suffered from the progress of history in that the marked deterioration of the area around it, from new promising neighborhood to decaying suburb that sees recurring social violence might effect its interpretation to those from post migration communities. In a sense one could argue that for this monument in Marseille has been subject
to the reverse effect. This is because very few of those involved with its commissioning or inauguration in 1927 could have foreseen that it would see the loss of the French empire from which those troops came and then the mass movement of people from these ex-colonies to the city as refugees or to seek employment or political asylum. Going even further down this line of deduction, the monument was not completed with the idea of creating an inclusive urban identity for the residents of the city from post-migration communities. However, having such a prominent monument in such an important location on one of the city’s main roads is arguably an important site at which a narrative can be created for the inclusion of post-migration communities in the urban identity of the city. This is because it demonstrates the importance of people from outside of France to the French national narrative and that, indeed without their sacrifices France as a nation-state might not exist in the present at all. This act creates the kind of narratives of inclusion so important to theorists of multiculturalism such as Modood (2010) who argue for the remaking of the image of society to take into account minority communities. Here, the image of the nation is arguably being remade as something that has been constituted not just by nationals, but by those from other nationalities and places and that their contribution is important enough to warrant very public commemoration. Interestingly, this monument featured on the cover of a very successful work of artistic output of the city’s musicians from post-migration communities. The rap group 3ème oeil, consisting of two Marseillais Muslim artists originally from the Comore Islands, chose this monument for the
cover of their 1999 album *hier, aujourd’hui demain* which sold over
160,000 copies in France. This could arguably be an example of the
monument being appropriated by post-migration communities as a
means of identifying themselves in the physical fabric of the city in a
highly symbolic manner. The central commemoration of the history of
post-migration communities continues in Marseille with the
monument to the repatriates from Algeria.

The city’s implementation of a policy narrative of recognition for its
post-migration communities can also be seen in the upkeep of a
memorial to the repatriates from Algeria who left the country on
independence in 1962. The sculpture takes the form of a large
propeller blade and was created by a local artist, César, in 1971 to
honor those who were forced to flee Algeria for Marseille. The
inscription reads ‘our city, is your city’ and details how the residents
of Marseille want to welcome those to the city who have had to leave
their homes across the Mediterranean. It makes no differentiation
between the ethnic origin of whom it welcomes, as the reality of the
exodus from Algeria was that it contained Algerian Jews, Algerian
Muslims who had collaborated with the French and a large number of
Europeans of mixed nationality who had gone to live in Algeria under
French rule. This is an important example of the public recognition
shown to post-migration communities in the city. The monuments
prominent position on the corniche, the cities very busy and attractive
sea road adds to the sense that this is a recognition done in full view
of the city’s population.
5.4.4 Both European and Mediterranean Civilization in the MuCEM

Marseille’s implementation of a policy narrative of recognition for its post-migration communities is also evident in the infrastructure being built for the 2013 Capital of Culture that deals with the city’s history. Central in this is the construction of the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations (MuCEM). The museum is designed to commemorate the cultures and civilizations that have existed in the Mediterranean with a focus on their achievements. The museum will host permanent collections from the different civilizations from the Mediterranean basin as well as rotating exhibitions. One of the first of these will be about different maps that were made of the region from the 18th century onwards and how these maps changed over time. Important for generating inclusion this places figures from Europe and France on par with those from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean and recognizes that all of these actors have contributed to the civilization of the other. This is arguably important in continuing to support an inclusive urban identity for the significant number of residents in the city who have come from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean in offering them some form of recognition that the achievements of their backgrounds not only have helped to form the achievements of the countries that their families have come from but also the country and continent that they now find themselves on.
5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the policy narratives applied to the commemoration of history in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. It has shown through this discussion the varying levels of the implementation of policy narratives of recognition, with Paris and Lyon offering contradictory recognition to post-migration communities while Marseille places them at the center of its commemoration of its history. For Paris, this chapter has demonstrated the centrality of the national narrative of France to its public commemoration of history to the point where it is difficult, if not impossible to separate the national and the urban. As such, for the sake of examining how history creates public narratives in the city, Paris and France are arguably synonymous to a large degree. However, somewhat more pertinent to a debate about the inclusion of post-migration communities is how they are dealt with directly in the environment of Paris in the public commemoration of history. Arguably, the two key sites where this takes place offer very contradictory narratives to post-migration communities. The national museum of migration history explicitly attempts to disseminate a narrative that the immigrants have played an important role in the development of French society, and by extension Paris as a city. However, it also arguably disseminates contradictory narratives in both the press coverage surrounding its inauguration and through the insensitive choice of site for its placement. Negative press around its inauguration connected the
monument to the xenophobic anti-immigrant policies of the Sarkozy administration and highlighted the fact that no minister from the acting government came to the inauguration. Added to this its situation in a colonial era palace arguably presents a narrative counter to inclusion. Its building is replete with colonial era artwork that shows non-French subjects of the French empire in highly racialised and subservient roles compared to the white French colonialists that they are depicted with. The memorial to the Algerian war and combatants from Tunisia and Morocco commemorates the contributions made by North African troops to defending France and attempts to commemorate all those that died in the war of independence in Algeria. This is arguably an important means by which current post-migration communities, of which North Africans constitute the largest group, can be narrated as an integrative part of history of France and Paris. It’s central location near the other important national monuments also arguably offers an important recognition of the importance of their contribution. However, the fact that it was inaugurated over 40 years after France granted independence to its North African colonies means that this recognition was not present in the national capital for all of that significant length of time.

The activities of The Oranges association also further demonstrate the contradictory nature of the application of policy narratives based on recognition to commemorate the history of post-migration communities in Paris. While successfully holding regular debates and
producing publications that commemorate the history of post-migration communities in France, their attempts at forcing the recognition of these communities into the realm of the names of public places and infrastructure have had mixed results. The first attempt at this, to name a high school after the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad was the subject of media polemic that produced hugely negative and very well publicized narratives for post-migration communities by both blocking this attempt, and labeling its very proposition as against French principals of not recognizing group rights, even when the naming of high schools after public intellectuals is a very common feature of the commemoration of history in France. The group did go on to rename a street after Abdelmalek Sayad, and also renamed a boulevard and had a public plaque inaugurated to commemorate the 1961 massacre of peaceful Algerian demonstrators in Paris; it is arguably difficult to assert that it has had an important impact in this respect, especially as these attempts have been the subject of very negative coverage in the French media, especially around the blocking of the school renaming.

Lyon continues with a similar pattern of implementing a policy narrative of recognition to post-migration communities in a conflicting manner. Lyon begins by commemorating its history as part of the Roman and Latin civilizations. Its founding myth is as a military outpost for the Roman Empire, founded by a Roman senator. It also houses the second largest museum in France commemorating the Gaulic and Roman heritage of the city. Added to this are the efforts
made to commemorate its important role in the silk weaving industry of Europe from the 16th century onwards. Here, opportunities are missed to offer inclusive narratives to post migration communities in both instances. Both narratives have opportunities to commemorate Lyon as part of a broader narrative. Being part of the Roman Empire could offer a wider narrative to include the Mediterranean region, which was also part of the Empire’s territory. Also, the establishment of a silk weaving industry from scratch was impossible without some degree of outside knowledge as silk arrived in Europe from China along the silk road. Attempts that are made to commemorate post-migration communities in the city are very few, with the most notable being the monument to the dead of Oran. Originally inaugurated in Oran, French Algeria as a monument to those from the city who died in the First World War, much effort was expended to move the monument on independence from Algeria to Lyon. Here, it was installed in the Duchère neighborhood to both serve its original function, and also to serve as a site of commemoration for those who settled in Lyon after fleeing independent Algeria. Here, this includes those of European, Jewish and Muslim Algerian origin. However, its ability to foster narratives of inclusion is arguably stunted by the effects of the deterioration of its situation. The neighborhood it is in has gone from a hopeful modern development in the suburbs of Lyon to a problem neighborhood with high levels of violence and crime and which also participates in the periodic riots seen in French cities. Therefore, in examining the narratives offered by Lyon it can be seen that they do not give a clear picture of inclusion and recognition to
post-migration communities in the city, and as such are unlikely to foster a positive and inclusive urban identity that post-migration communities can belong to. Marseille, however, demonstrates significant variance to both Paris and Lyon in its commemoration of history.

Marseille, as with its strategy of governance and public culture, also applies a policy narrative of recognition of post-migration communities in the way it commemorates the city’s history. Marseille has managed to balance commemorating its role in the national community of France and its regional role as the capital city of Provence while also commemorating itself as a place of inclusion for post migration communities. This begins with its modern commemoration of its founding myth that is evident all over the city, as well as in the form of a large bronze plaque on the old port in the city center. Here, the myth of the Greek sailor from Asia establishing a new city offers recognition of the important contribution of immigrants to the city from the very beginning. The city also manages to commemorate itself as central to the narrative of France, with its monument to the national anthem, *la Marseillaise*, which takes its name from the revolutionaries from the city who were the first to sing the song in public during the revolution. The city also holds important collections of Provençal art and commemorates publically that element of its identity with public festivals. However, the narratives of inclusion for those that have contributed to the city but have originated from outside of it are also present in large
number and in prominent positions. The large monument to the
collection of foreign troops to the French army is an important
example of this, existing on a prime stretch of the city’s sea road.
Here, it has taken on new meanings in a manner similar to the
monument of the dead of Oran in Lyon, but here with positive
consequences. Inaugurated in 1928 it has experienced the loss of
the French empire and Marseille acquisition of a large immigrant
population from its empire, so that the monument now arguably
stands to commemorate the place of these communities in the
history of the city. This is a theme also expressed in the monument to
the repatriates from Algeria that is also on the city’s sea road. Here,
the large propeller shaped monument welcomes those repatriates
from Algeria, regardless of their ethnic origin, to the city with the
words ‘our city is your city’. This is arguably important as a large
proportion of these returnees now constitute significant post-
migration communities in the city. The investment in an inclusive
historical infrastructure continues in the form of the museum for the
civilizations of Europe and the Mediterranean as part of the 2013
capital of culture. Here, the museum commemorates the role of the
European and non-European civilizations of the Mediterranean on an
equal footing in creating the achievements in the culture and history
of the Mediterranean region. These monuments arguably work
together to offer important narratives of inclusion to the city’s post
migration communities. Taylor (1994) identifies the importance of
inclusion of the cultural validity of minority communities in presenting
them with a bridge to feel that they are accepted by wider society.
and can belong to it. This can arguably be seen in the way that the monuments of Marseille work to put those from post-migration communities at the heart of the historical narrative of the city. This does go some way to Modood’s (2010) suggestion of a higher level of multiculturalism where the focus moves to a positive commemoration of society, with prominent roles of equality for previously excluded minorities. The centrality of minority communities to the commemoration of history in Marseille demonstrates how this can be done.

Completing the analysis of the three substantive chapters of this thesis completes its attempt to sketch the how the implementation of policy narratives of recognition have been undertaken in the three cities of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Across the three themes of municipal governance, public culture and the commemoration of history this thesis has demonstrated that in so far as instituting policy narratives based on recognition, Marseille stands apart from Paris and Lyon. Paris and Lyon have begun to apply policy narratives of recognition to their post-migration communities, to a certain extent in defiance of the original formulation of this thesis. However, these arguably remain rendered contradictory by both their very recent application of policy narrative of recognition in contexts historically lacking them, and also by the co-occurring resistance and criticism that they have faced, which can arguably be said to not offer inclusion to post-migration communities. In contrast, Marseille has been shown in this thesis to be much stronger in its creation of
narratives of inclusion across the three areas analyzed and so can be argued to offer inclusion in its urban identity in a way absent in Paris and Lyon.
Chapter 6: Conclusions on the Convergence of Policy Narratives in Paris, Marseille and Lyon Towards Recognition

6.1 Shifting Policy Narratives From Assimilation to Recognition

6.2 Adopting Varying Policy Narratives of Recognition in Municipal Governance

6.3 Converging Towards Policy Narratives of Recognition in Public Culture

6.4 Defining History with Narratives of Recognition

6.5 Shifting Policy Narratives in France Towards Recognition: Implications for future research

6.1 Shifting Policy Narratives From Assimilation to Recognition:

This thesis set out to explain a sociological paradox. As such, it situated Marseille as standing alone as the single French city that has not experienced large-scale social unrest owing to it’s ability to offer inclusion to post-migration communities. To explain this, the thesis hypothesized that Marseille’s much discussed urban identity possibly offered inclusion to post-migration communities in a way arguably not present in Paris or Lyon, due to the city having a different policy narrative to Paris and Lyon. Drawing on the work of
Boswell et al (2011), this thesis acknowledged that in the French context, while for any given policy issue there are multiple, competing and contradictory narratives that jostle for position, predetermined interests have an important role in rendering certain policy narratives more attractive. As such, given the historical successes in assimilating the regions into France (Weber 1976), and secondly the multiple waves of immigrants from South and Eastern Europe up until the Second World War, an assimilationist policy response to the post-colonial mass migration that occurred in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century could be said to dovetail with these existing interests, which in France has insured the salience of the Republican, assimilationist policy narrative.

However, as with any study in the social sciences that sets up two opposing poles of analysis it was not entirely the case that Paris and Lyon exist without offering a degree of recognition to post-migration communities. While it can be seen that this thesis has found that Marseille behaved as theorised, in that across its governance, public culture and historical commemoration, a strong multicultural policy narrative of recognition was evident, and as such could be argued to be an important component that creates an inclusive urban identity in the city that mitigated against violence in 2005. However, importantly, the same cannot be said for Paris and Lyon. They did not behave completely as the archetypal cases of adherence to assimilationist policy with regard to their post-migration communities. Rather, they exhibited some significant movement towards applying their own,
locally formed and applied, policy narratives of recognition to their post-migration difference. The aspect of change here is of vital importance given that both cities have been theorised previously as adhering to an assimilationist policy narrative when presented with the ethnic difference acquired in the post-colonial, post-war period (Dikec 2007, Hargreaves 2007, Wacquant 2007). It also confirms a trend outlined by scholars such as Moore (2001) and Doytcheva (2007) who have asserted a covert move towards policies that recognize difference at the local level. This also arguably further substantiates Modood’s assertion that the republican, assimilationist policy narrative might be ‘losing its grip’, an assertion he made in light of the observations that, at the national level, the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) under president Sarkozy in 2003 and the creation of France’s first black association, the Representative Council of France’s Black Associations (Conseil representative des associations noires de France CRAN) in 2005.

While this thesis has substantiated this claim with numerous examples, we must also be clear that this change is occurring in varying different forms across the two cases, evolving as it is without a top-down policy change at the national level. This hints strongly at the importance of the local political mix of ‘informal rule making’ that Stroschein (2007) asserts as so vitally important in forming local policies. However, it must be noted that this thesis has also found that this has only been evident in the past decade, and as such can
be seen as occurring too diffusely and too late to be the basis of urban identities constructed on narratives of inclusion as has been argued for Marseille. However, this shift in policy narratives is important in that it demonstrates that the French context is in a real state of flux in the policy narratives available to local authorities, even if on the surface it seems as if the national context is statically adhering to its internationalist, assimilationist Republic policy narrative. These conclusions will become more apparent as this final chapter examines them over the thematic areas examined in this thesis.

6.2 Adopting Varying Policy Narratives of Recognition in Municipal Governance

Chapter III of this thesis set out to analyse how the mode of governance in Paris, Lyon and Marseille defined inclusion for post-migration communities through their policy narratives. The chapter found that all three cases demonstrated some elements of the municipal governance creating narratives of inclusion in the city for post-migration communities. However, in Paris and Lyon these were rendered less effective by narratives contrary to inclusion. The municipal governance of Marseille, however, was found to produce the strongest inclusive social narratives for post-migration communities owing to its direct engagement with post-migration communities the highest levels of the governing structures of the city.
The Parisian region stood out for the changes that are taking place in the attempts to engage post-migration communities through creating narratives of inclusion in municipal governance by shifting from assimilationist policy narratives to recognition policy narratives. This thesis found that, in the past decade a concerted attempt at directly engaging post-migration communities has occurred. This has, however, often been beset with problems in attempting to generate narratives of inclusion, as the experience of the UAM93 has demonstrated with difficulties both politically and in the media coverage surrounding their activities. These are sentiments echoed in the experience of both the Oranges Association of Nanterre and the Mayor of Paris’s Ramadan event. Both their experiences of receiving support from municipal authorities for their activities is an important example of how local authorities in Paris are providing a degree of recognition. However, this recognition has been somewhat by significant issues both in their respective relationship with the local government and also in the negative media coverage of their activities. This demonstrates a rather mixed picture where progress is being made towards providing recognition to post-migration communities, this is still a very contested process. This is not to say that in any case these developments and policy evolutions run smoothly – quite the contrary, in fact, as Modood (2010) states, they rather spring up in contested ways in response to often negative events of discrimination.
A very similar, although by no means identical, process is at work in Lyon. This thesis has also argued that this process of producing contradictory social narratives from the interaction of post-migration communities and governance has also been noted in Lyon. This thesis found that Lyon is demonstrating a similar shift to Paris in the past decade with the municipal authorities increasingly engaging with post-migration communities. This has been the case over a number of specific cases, including the Rhône-Alpes Regional council of the Muslim faith (CRCM) and DiverCité. However, their continued fights for the recognition of post-migration communities, in terms of representation and socio-economic difficulties, makes it impossible to argue that the narratives of inclusion they create are wholly positive.

In addition, the fieldwork for this thesis uncovered a wholly negative example in the case of the NGO Body Art: Athletes of the street. While the organization itself has set out to create a space for recognition for post-migration communities indirectly in its activities, it has been met with hostility by the municipal authorities of Lyon. Therefore, it remains to be seen how this process will play out in the longue durée, and as such more research is required. However, this is not to say that the discussion of this relationship in Lyon, as with the case of Paris, does not offer some important empirical material for the study of inclusion in French cities. On the contrary, the fact that after half a century of mass immigration from France’s ex-colonies, the limited engagement that exists in these two cases could well be an indication that an interesting relationship is emerging whereby municipal authorities are recognizing the need to engage
with post-migration communities in ways dictated by these communities, rather than dictated by racism, thinly veiled as republican dogma. It is too early, however, to be able to argue this as this process is still very much in its infancy.

Marseille, however, as expected has been found to be much further advanced along this process of adopting a policy narrative of recognition towards post-migration communities in the city through its strategy of municipal governance. This has found its most overt incarnation in the Marseille Espérance forum. Bringing together the chief representatives of the city’s seven religious communities into the city hall to debate social issues and produce joint edicts is no mean feat, given the context of Paris and Lyon where far less ambitious initiatives have resulted in highly negative political polemics. Rather this thesis has found that the narratives produced by this organisation have conformed very closely to the definition of inclusion taken in chapter II of this thesis. Bringing the representatives of post-migration communities into the city hall in such as bold manner is a powerful means by which this organisation has created narratives that offer Taylor’s (1994) idea of recognition by showing from the top position of the city that these communities have validity and importance in the urban sphere. In addition, analogous to Modood’s (2010) idea outlined in chapter II, this organization has been argued to be somewhat aiding in the remaking of the image of society with post-migration communities in positions in prominence. Importantly, Marseille Espérance has also
unanimously backed Marseille’s grand mosque project. This is another important initiative of the city authorities whose created social narratives stand in stark contrast to those produced in the examples of Paris and Lyon. While in Paris and Lyon, groups representing post-migration communities have had a mixed experience of fighting municipal authorities for building permission for mosques, the city of Marseille has sided with the creation of a large central religious facility for the city’s Muslim community. This is not to say that it has not been the subject of legal battles, with challenges mounted by far right groups. However, it is important to note that it is not the municipal authorities that have required recourse to the courts to grant permission for the project. Rather, the authorities in Marseille have taken a pro-active approach to realizing the project by creating a position within the municipal government structure for a civil servant, Saleh Bariki, dedicated to the project. These inclusive social narratives are again complimented and strengthened by the municipal authorities of Marseille making funds available for post-migration communities to set up groups and initiatives in the city. This has enabled them to set up a variety of non-governmental groups, such as community radio stations, family associations and youth centers. These create inclusive social narratives by empowering post-migration communities to start initiatives in the city as a means of establishing themselves and gaining public recognition through the public exercise of their cultures. This opens up the discussion of how this has the knock-on effect of creating narratives of inclusion in other thematic areas, such as the ‘Eid in the
City’ cultural event held with the help of these funds every year in the city, and unique in France. In summation, this chapter found that the relationship between municipal governance and post-migration communities in Marseille produces the kind of inclusive narratives that could form the basis of an inclusive urban identity. This examination of municipal governance also served to broaden the wider discussion in this thesis as it highlighted the role of culture and history in creating social narratives of inclusion in the city. This is because in all of the three cities examined in this thesis municipal governments were found to also create initiatives of public culture (examined in chapter IV) and for the commemoration of history (examined in chapter V) through its many powers for planning, funding and realizing such initiatives.

6.3 Converging Towards Policy Narratives of Recognition in Public Culture

Chapter III demonstrated something very important about the work of municipal governments that can foster social narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities. This is the ability of these authorities to initiate, or support, public culture that can create narratives that have an impact on inclusion. This, in turn, necessitated a discussion of public culture which is not engaged with municipal governance, and here the example of rap music stood out as an important example to be analysed because of its huge commercial success, extensive involvement with post-migration communities and its ability
to directly address features of urban relations. Chapter IV thus examined the public culture of Paris, Lyon and Marseille and found again a variance between how the inclusion of post-migration communities is being tackled in each case. Marseille was again found to be notable for its creation of inclusive social narratives for post-migration communities far in advance of Paris and Lyon. The pictures painted by the analysis in the chapter, while mixed, are also analytically significant for Paris and Lyon because they further demonstrate how both cities are moving from a policy narrative based on assimilation to one that adopts a recognition approach to dealing with the cities ethnic diversity. On the contrary, both cities demonstrate, in a similar fashion to the changes in their municipal governance strategies over the past two decades discussed in chapter III, that they are showing signs of embarking on greater inclusion of post-migration communities in their public culture.

In the case of Paris, it sits in a context dominated by large and influential cultural organizations, including UNESCO and the Arab World Institute that do not explicitly address the question of providing recognition to post-migration communities in their activities. However, there are examples of more local-scale organizations that are working to fill this gap. The Oranges Association works to commemorate the culture of post-migration communities is an example of how this is occurring in tandem with the municipal government supporting it receives (covered in chapter III). Here, their work, holding plays in municipal buildings that deal with the
intertwined nature of French and Algerian history is a powerful creator of inclusive narratives, and represents an important departure from post-migration communities being neglected in the creation of social narratives in public culture in Paris. Again, this presents a mixed picture where the provision of recognition for post-migration communities remains a highly contested and dynamic context worthy of further scholarly attention to analyses how this process is developing.

Chapter IV also found a similar evolving, dynamic yet contested situation in Lyon, where there are signs that a long history of neglecting post-migration communities in public culture is possibly giving way to a greater capitalising on diversity in the public culture of the city. Lyon, in a similar vein to Paris, sits in a context replete with acts of public culture. Here, such events as the annual Festival of Lights are of national importance, being the second best attended public culture event in the country. However, post-migration communities are conspicuous in these events only by their absence, where these important events are not being used to create narratives of inclusion and recognition for them. This is also reflected in Lyon’s initial participation in the intercultural cities program. It was highly criticized in a Council of Europe report on its approach to diversity. The report found that diversity was still an alien concept in Lyon, regardless of the fact that the city has contained significant post-migration communities for over half a century. In a similar vein to Paris, work is, however, being done to address the culture of post-
migration communities and to possibly create social narratives of inclusion for them. Chapter IV uncovered some important initiatives that are being undertaken by NGO’s in the city to create narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities. Both the festival of the 6th continent and the Rhône-Alps center for traditional music have recently moved their focus onto the internal diversity of the Lyon region. This means that they have begun to celebrate this cultural diversity in the public sphere in Lyon, arguably creating important narratives in the public culture of the city that could offer inclusion to post-migration communities. Again in common with Paris, the work of local NGO’s in the city demonstrate what could be an important sea change in the creation of narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities. This is because, after a long neglect of these communities Lyon is beginning, tentatively, to address questions of diversity in its public culture. This thesis has found this occurring both in the mayor’s central administration, and in the local NGO’s of the city. As the Parisian example has shown, it is difficult to argue for the effect of such recent initiatives on the inclusion of post-migration communities, given the length of time that the culture of these groups has been ignored and marginalized. It will be of importance for scholars to examine if and how an evolution towards creating inclusivity through the inclusion of diversity in the public culture of the city takes place, and what implications such moves in the urban sphere could have on the national stage. It is, at the time of writing, too early to even suggest that such an evolution is taking place,
however, owing to the recent and limited nature of the reform of the
depiction of public culture in the city.

Marseille stands out from Paris and Lyon in chapter IV as being far
more advanced in its ability to create narratives of inclusion in the
public culture of the city through its implementation of a policy
narrative of recognition. Investigating public culture in Marseille
uncovers its third unique attribute in France. Apart from not rioting
and having the only political structure of any city to recognize
diversity, it is also the single city in France that holds a public
celebration of the Eid al-Adha Muslim holiday. This is a highly
publicized and very public event in the city where municipal funds
contribute to the holding of a variety of activities to mark the occasion
in public culture including debates, film screenings and public music
performances. As previously mentioned, Marseille beat Lyon to the
title of 2013 European capital of culture, in part because of its far
more advanced and informed treatment of the city’s diversity than
that evident in Lyon’s bid. Owing to this success, the city’s cultural
infrastructure is undergoing a massive upgrade. This thesis found
that this is being done with the inclusion of post-migration
communities at center stage. This includes inclusion of both the
cultures of the post-migration community’s countries of origin, such
as Arabic, and also those hybrid cultures created with the
contribution of post-migration communities, such as rap music.
Examining the rap music of Marseille, whose commercial success
has been on a par with the music of Paris, shows dramatic variance
to the music of Lyon and Paris. Here, the unit of identity depicted in the music analyzed was that of the idea of Marseille, demonstrating a coherence of identity with the boundaries of the city. It also depicts urban relations in a far more positive manner than that seen in the music of Paris and Lyon. Here, urban relations and the urban environment are depicted in positive terms, where the city is seen as a place where xenophobia is not welcome.

6.4 Defining History with Narratives of Recognition

The discussion of municipal governance and public culture undertaken in the previous chapters informs the discussion here of how the commemoration of history in the city is managed. It is noteworthy that chapter V found that, while Marseille is clearly far in advance of Lyon and Paris in adopting a policy narrative of recognition in its management of history in the city, both Paris and Lyon again exhibit a movement from policy narratives based on assimilation to a policy narrative based on the principles of the recognition of diversity. For Paris, chapter V investigating the commemoration of history gave a mixed picture for creating inclusion through recognition. Here, examining the commemoration of history in Paris necessitated examining sites of national importance, owing to its status as national capital. Chapter V established two sites of particular interest in the city that arguably have important consequences for the inclusion of post-migration communities, the National Museum of Migration History and the national memorial to
the dead of the Algerian war of independence and for the contribution of troops from France’s ex-colonies in the Maghreb to France. Both were found to offer paradoxical means of recognition to post-migration communities, especially the National Museum of Migration History which not only situated in a building with significant colonial overtones, it has also received significant negative press coverage. Again it was found that, in common with the findings of previous chapters, more local organizations are having a more positive impact on providing recognition. Here, alongside a positive relationship with the mayor of Nanterre, and its work to create narratives of inclusion through public culture, it is also attempting to commemorate history through means such as the renaming of public infrastructure. While this has had mixed results and some significant negative media coverage, it remains an important means by which the local state is beginning to engage with such concerns in its local politics and thus provide a degree of recognition to post-migration communities. Again, as this process is very much in its infancy, it should be asserted that this remains a process that is still in its infancy, and requires further observation over the coming decade to draw full conclusions about its durability and depth.

Lyon was found by chapter V to be still centered in a context of commemorating its history as distinct from the contribution of post-migration communities. Among Lyon’s most prominent creators of social narratives through the commemoration of history is its Roman and Latin history. Its largest museum, the second largest in France,
commemorates the Gaulic and Roman heritage of the city. This ignores any influence that might have been exerted on this imperial outpost from the southern shores of Europe and beyond, important theatres for the development of Roman history and culture. Also uncovered an interesting example of the commemoration of history being disadvantaged by a change in local context. The monument to the dead of Oran sits in the Duchère neighborhood. Originally inaugurated in Oran, in then French-Algeria, it was moved on independence to Lyon. While this could be an important, yet contested site of recognition for post migration communities, it has become disadvantaged by a change in it’s local context to now be sited in one of Lyon’s most impoverished neighborhoods. These examples reflect the broader trend chapter IV noted in the social narratives created by the commemoration of history in Lyon where post-migration communities are not offered narratives of inclusion due to their absence from the story of the city’s success.

Marseille was again found to be much further advanced in adopting a policy narrative of recognition in chapter V through the way that city managed the commemoration of history to include it’s post-migration communities. Importantly, Marseille was found to present a case that does provide this at the expense of situating itself as an important part of either Provence or France. Rather, features such as it’s founding myth, and the Door to the Orient, have been found to creating inclusive social narratives for post-migration communities by offering recognition to the contribution of outsiders to Marseille. While
these could be argued to be accidents of history, they remain salient in their ability to provide the kind of recognition to post-migration communities found lacking in Paris and Lyon. This is in a means analogous to Taylor’s (1994) public recognition of the validity of post-migration communities. Importantly, these examples, and this process of recognition more generally, are being rendered relevant in the contemporary era as part of the 2013 capital of culture celebrations. This has so far included the creation of a museum of the Civilizations of Europe and the Mediterranean that commemorates the role of non-European and European civilizations in their contributions to humanity on an equal footing. This is important in that it conforms to the definition of inclusion adopted in this thesis. It offers Taylor’s (1994) recognition of the validity of these cultures publically through the exhibition of their histories in a positive manner. It also commemorates diversity in history as positive, in Parekh’s (2000) suggested manner, by demonstrating that a diversity of cultures and beliefs has contributed to the creation of civilization in the region. It also arguably remakes the image of society to take into account minorities as recommended by Modood (2012) because it puts ideas and innovations from the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean on a par with positive developments from Europe.

In summation, chapter V uncovered a trend in the commemoration of history in Marseille that creates narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities in the city. This is significant in that this completes the substantive analysis undertaken by this thesis and
compliments those narratives created by municipal governance and public culture demonstrated in chapter III and IV. The concluding statement of this thesis then, in light of these findings is that this trend of the creation of inclusive social narratives in Marseille is significant in the creation of an inclusive element in the urban identity of the city. Importantly, however, this does not mean that the conclusions reached in this thesis only apply to Marseille.

6.5 Shifting Policy Narratives in France Towards Recognition:

Implications for future research:

The thesis has also made important findings for the process of inclusion in both Paris and Lyon because of their move in the past decade to adopt policy narratives based on recognition for their post-migration communities and thus away from an insistence on assimilation as the sole means by which to deal with post-migration diversity. After half a century of neglecting the post-migration communities it appears that both cities are beginning to take tentative steps towards inclusion. In both cases, municipal governments are either engaging with post-migration communities or recognizing the need to do this. This demonstrates a departure from the established trend of ignoring addressing these communities directly while focusing on attempting to appease them with upgrades to the physical environment. This change is also occurring in certain spheres of public culture, where after a period of exclusion, post-migration communities are beginning to be involved in the
performance of public culture. History is showing a more mixed picture in Paris and Lyon, with NGO’s in Paris attempting to have their history recognized, while Lyon still remains somewhat stagnant. This could be the start of an analytically significant trend in Paris and Lyon attempting to include post-migration communities. However, it is too early on to be able to fully substantiate this, and further research over the coming decades will be required to establish if this trend is sustained or not. This discussion also raises questions for a far broader context.

The implications for this thesis are not limited to the three cases examined here. More broadly France is not the only country grappling with the question of the inclusion of post-migration communities. This is rendered especially interesting when one considers the future projects for many of Europe’s largest cities to become plural. This means that, in demographic terms, they will have no discernable numerical majority and will rather be composed of a number of minority communities, including that of the previous majority. These include cities in countries with well-established multicultural policies, such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Leicester and Birmingham in the UK. Indeed, while a rather specific case, the 2011 census demonstrated that the white British population of London is no longer a numerical majority, rather it is 65% composed of ethnic minority residents. This does, however, belie huge spatial variations in the concentration of different communities, in that both Brent and Tower Hamlets experienced the
loss of a white British minority some years before. Also, this 65% is composed of numerous communities drawn from all over the world, akin to Vertovec's (2006) 'super-diversity' discussed in chapter II of this thesis. However, all this said, the future of European cities is getting more diverse, not less so, even with recent restrictions of immigration, and as such how to create narratives of inclusion for post-migration communities will be an issue for the foreseeable future. Perhaps most pressing in this regard is how the cities manage plurality that are newer to mass migration, such as those in Nordic Europe such as Malmö, and possibly Barcelona in the South. Without a history of immigration or empire, and perhaps without the immediate political expertise, it will be important for both scholars and policy makers to examine and understand how these cases respond to this change in context.

This thesis also demonstrates some important possible lessons for these cities in the specifics of the Marseille. Most important here is that offering inclusive social narratives to post-migration communities does not have to come at the expense of other cultural forms of more established groups in the city. There is no need to erase the French and Provençal heritage of Marseille to make it inclusive to post-migration communities. There is clearly enough room for both to be commemorated with prominence in the city. This is an important observation for potential future attempts in Paris and Lyon to foster inclusive historical narratives for post-migration communities. They do not need to make a choice between historical narratives, but
rather can choose a plurality. Marseille clearly has the geographical advantage in supplying these narratives to post-migration communities, as a port of the Mediterranean region from where most of their migrant communities come from. However, this is not to say that Paris and Lyon do not have ample choices to offer similar opportunities. Both cities have been constituted with important inputs from outside both their municipal borders, and the national borders of the French state. The silk industry of Lyon and the countless foreign influences that have shaped modern Paris and France are important examples of this. This means that rather than accepting that the production of inclusive narratives in any particular urban area are determined by its particular history, one must interrogate exactly what these histories are. The means that rather than looking for barriers to the creation of inclusive narratives, municipal officials and policy makers should rather endeavor to locate the ways in which common histories can be used to foster the inclusion of post-migration communities.
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