Remaking Rio de Janeiro through “Favela Integration”

The Politics of Mobility and State Space

Tucker Landesman

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This thesis examines how states develop and implement urban planning and governance policies and programmes in response to segregation and socio-spatial inequalities. Rio de Janeiro has long been constructed as both a “marvellous city” and as strictly “divided” between the so-called formal city and the self-built favelas that developed into “consolidated” neighbourhoods. While never granted full legal tenure and continuously denied basic rights as guaranteed in the 1988 “Citizens’ Constitution,” public policy in the late twentieth century recognised the permanence of the favelas and state interventions evolved from demolishing to “upgrading.” Since the early 2000s, the municipal, state-province, and federal governments have all pursued objectives to “integrate” the favelas. These include participatory urban planning interventions, militarised occupation and policing of favelas, implantation of social and cultural infrastructure, and technocratic good-governance projects. I argue that these combined efforts amount to a new paradigm of “favela integration,” and I seek to understand how “favela integration” is produced and contested; in what ways state interventions meant to “integrate” the favelas transform urban space; and how techniques of urban planning and governance establish favela space as legitimate and constitutive of the city.

Based on 18 months of mixed-method qualitative fieldwork, and drawing on the literatures of landscape and critical mobilities, I argue that “favela integration” is hegemonically defined through state facilitation and regulation of flows of people, goods, and services in and out of the favelas. Discursively produced based on liberal notions of citizenship and favela residents’ right to the city, I use critical mobilities analysis to reveal how “favela integration” reproduces spatial inequalities. I then consider the paradigm as a state spatial
strategy of territory. I build on contemporary theories of *state space* and *territory as effect* and consider how planning, technocratic governance, and infrastructure employ social technologies to bridge the favela/city binary and produce the “integrated city.” I engage with literature concerning state spatiality under neoliberalism to examine how “favela integration” follows hegemonic socio-economic ideology, but I argue for a nuanced understanding of the state and discuss how such ideology is contested at various scales.
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# List of abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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| BNH          | Banco Nacional de Habitação  
National Housing Bank |
| BOPE         | Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais  
Police Unit of Special Operations |
| BRIC         | Brazil, Russia, India, China |
| BRT          | Bus Rapid Transit |
| CHISM        | Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área  
Metropolitana do Grande Rio  
Coordination of Social Interest Housing of Greater Metropolitan  
Rio |
| COHAB        | Companhia de Habitação Popular  
Company of Popular Housing |
| CSR          | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| DCOD         | Delegacia de Combate às Drogas  
[Police] Department to Combat Drugs |
| DIEESE       | Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos  
Inter-Syndicate Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Research |
| EMOP         | Empresa de Obras Públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro  
Public Works Company of Rio de Janeiro State |
| GIS          | Geographic information system |
| IAB-RJ       | Instituto de Arquitetos Brasileiros do Rio de Janeiro  
Rio de Janeiro Chapter of the Brazilian Institute of Architects |
| IBGE         | Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística  
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (census bureau) |
| IPEA         | Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada  
Institute of Applied Economic Research |
| IPP          | Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos  
Pereira Passos Municipal Institute of Urbanism |
| LSE          | The London School of Economics and Political Science |
| MCMV         | Minha Casa Minha Vida  
My House My Life |
| MRP          | Mapa Rápido Participativo  
Rapid Participatory Map |
| MTST         | Movimento Trabalhadores Sem Têto  
Homeless Workers Movement |
| OS           | Organização Social |
Social Organisation

PAC  Programa de Aceleração do Crecimento
     Program for Accelerated Growth

PMDB  Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
       Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PMERJ  Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
       Military Police of the Rio de Janeiro State

PPP / PPPP  Public-private partnership / Public-private participatory partnership

POUSO  Posto de Orientação Urbanística e Social
       [Municipal] Post for Urban and Social Orientation

PR  Partido da República
    Party of the Republic

PSOL  Partido Socialismo e Liberdade
       Socialism and Liberty Party

PT  Partido do Trabalhador
    Worker’s Party

RJ  Rio de Janeiro

SMH  Secretaria Municipal de Habitação
     Municipal Housing Secretary

SP  São Paulo

UPA  Unidade de Pronto Atendimento
     Rapid Healthcare Centre

UPP  Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora
     Pacifying Police Unit
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Urban segregation and spatial inequality have emerged as predominant concerns in what is now a globalised capitalist and urban world. As cities expanded in both population and economic importance and the gap widened between the rich and poor, invoking Dickens’ famous depiction of a “tale of two cities” as a descriptive analogy of contemporary urbanity has become as tempting as it is cliché. This is especially true in regard to sprawling informal housing settlements, “slums”, or favelas throughout Latin America. Rio de Janeiro is iconically “divided” with favelas antagonising the so-called “marvellous city” from nearly every viewpoint, including the white sand beaches of Copacabana and penthouses in even the most “noble” of neighbourhoods.

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, politicians, scholars, urban planners, elites and populists have debated the persistence and proliferation of the favelas as a social problem plaguing Rio de Janeiro, the 450-year-old city that once served as the capital of the Portuguese empire, the federal capital of Brazil, and the postcard of tropical cosmopolitanism (Perlman 1976; A. Leeds and Leeds 1978; M. C. Abreu 1999; Souza 1999; J. de S. e Silva and Barbosa 2005; Gonçalves 2013; B. McCann 2014). The favelas themselves have served as field-sites and objects of analysis for social scientists of all disciplines concerned with socio-spatial transformations resulting from societal and economic modernisation (Valladares 2005). A non-exhaustive list of research topics includes: rural to urban migration and social marginality, informal circuits of economy and under-development, capitalist growth and uneven development; urban violence, gang territorialisation and drug trafficking; police violence and state abuse, place-based stigma and
social resilience, popular organising and resistance, advanced urban marginality under neoliberal capitalism, socialised housing and urban planning solutions, informal architecture and unplanned urbanism, and favela tourism and the spectacularisation or commodification of poverty and violence.¹

This thesis benefits from the rich history of inquiry and current scholarly debates even as it does not take the favelas or their residents, but rather the urban state, as its principal object of inquiry. As policy makers, politicians, technocrats and advocates in civil society attempt to finally end the socio-spatial dichotomy excluding the favela from the city, I dislocate the traditional research problem of the spatial manifestations of inequality, segregation, and failure of planning and instead problematise the state’s attempt to transform the production of urban space.

1.1 Arrival to the field and defining the problem

Rio de Janeiro elites have long treated housing forms of the working poor with suspicion, discrimination, and violence (J. M. de Carvalho 1987; Chalhoub 1996; Batista 2003). Favelas, the diverse category referring to unregulated settlements of various precariousness built on unused urban land, are simply the most recent and prominent example.² Strict socio-spatial segregation

¹ A discussion of relevant debates and the historical development of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro is developed in Chapter 2.
² Definitions for the term favela have varied considerably throughout history and across Brazil. Similar to the “slum” (see Gilbert 2007) favela is a culturally loaded term and its meaning is often context dependent. Signifying that favela has more of a cultural rather than a technical meaning, The Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) uses the term “subnormal agglomerate,” defined as more than 50 housing structures of poor construction quality, illegally occupying (currently or in the past) land in a dense and unordered fashion, and lacking at least one essential public service (such as water, sanitation, or trash collection) (IBGE 2010, 18). Based on that definition, the IBGE calculates that 22 percent of municipal residents live in favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Researchers such as Perlman (2010), understand favelas more broadly based on a broad degree of informality, planned or unplanned, and includes both lotimentos (parcelled housing plots) and conjuntos habitacionais
intensified during the mid-twentieth century, as a result of a dramatic shift in demographics. Waves of impoverished immigrants from the surrounding states and North East Brazil arrived to the then nation’s capital searching for work and social mobility (Perlman 1976; A. Leeds and Leeds 1978; Valladares 2005). With no means to buy into the private housing market and no viable public housing solutions, the migrants constructed their own homes on unused private and public lands.

Over the course of the twentieth century, government response to the multiplying favelas varied greatly, from apathetic inaction to violent slum clearance. Between the two extremes emerged various schemes to upgrade the favelas, re-house residents in large-scale developments on the outskirts of the city, or “urbanise” the areas, a term used to signify the paving of roads and provision of basic city services (Burgos 1998; Fischer 2008; Freire and Oliveira 2008; Gonçalves 2013; B. McCann 2014). The programmes were underfunded given the scale of the housing crisis, and while a programme of “upgrading” the favelas in the 1990s known as Favela-Bairro showed promise and received international praise at the turn of the millennium; it was only in the past ten years that the state consolidated decades of accrued experience and expertise and enacted multiple policies and programmes recognising the favelas’ permanence and sought to definitively “integrate” them into the city.

This research took place during an exceptional as well as definitive moment in Brazilian history. Rio de Janeiro was in the midst of rapid and dramatic change. Brazil was coming to the end of a decade-long economic boom, and Rio was centre-stage with a global spotlight. In less than ten years the city played host to an array of mega events including the 2007 Pan American Games, the 2011 World (public housing complexes) together with favelas. This conflation of categories adds up to nearly 40% of Rio’s population.
Military Games, the 2012 United Nations Rio+20 sustainability conference, the 2013 Catholic World Youth Conference, the 2014 FIFA Men’s World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The political party that controlled the state and municipal executive governments had formed an alliance with the ruling Workers Party (PT), and to Rio’s benefit, billions of dollars had been invested in infrastructure, education, and health. Some of the most profound changes were taking place in the city’s more than 1000 favelas. Rather than pursuing strategies that would eradicate or drastically reduce the presence of favelas in the city, the municipal, state and federal governments rolled out coordinated urban planning and governance programmes, policies, and projects with the aim of comprehensively “integrating” the favelas into the “formal” city.

Figure 1.1 – Favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro (2013)
Using municipal data, the above map shows how the favelas (marked red) are spread throughout the city.

My interest in “favela integration” began while studying for a Masters degree in Public Health at the University of Buenos Aires. As a HIV/AIDS and health activist I considered how health systems could better reach so-called “vulnerable populations” that face barriers accessing healthcare. “Slums”, especially when viewed through the
lens of informality (Roy and AlSayyad 2004), seem to operate antithetically to how public health systems—rigid, hierarchical, and slow to change—organise and serve populations. This prompted the question, how might the state adapt to the realities of the favela? Geography seemed a logical “home” for addressing this question because of the strength of critical urban geography literature as well as its interdisciplinary approach. As I made the conversion to geographic thought, my original interests, rooted in programmatic public health pragmatism, led to broader questions related to the production of urban space and the workings of state spatiality in relation to the favelas.

During preliminary research into government programmes and policy, programme analysis, and development specialists’ opinions, I noticed a repetition of words and ideas related to connecting “the favela” with “the city.” Universities and think tanks held public debates and seminars about “integration” and the right to the city. Government institutions were publishing reports about the importance of successfully “integrating” favela communities that have been socially excluded. Mayor Eduardo Paes championed the slogan “we are one Rio” (Somos um Rio), employing an ideology of unification.

It was clear that “integration” was a loaded term, but what remained unclear was what and who defines “favela integration.” Is it simply a buzzword or does it qualify as something new? What would an integrated Rio de Janeiro look and feel like? What precisely is there to integrate? The favelas of Rio de Janeiro exist both as real neighbourhoods, homes to millions of people, and as an abstract spatial category, subject to cultural stereotypes, state violence and social stigma. What is the capacity of the state to break down the very socio-spatial divisions that government policy and actions were complicit in producing for over half a century?
Thus the research problem pertains to how the city is conveyed, particularly in regards to the socially constructed spatial binary *favela/cidade* (slum/city) and how “favela integration” as an urban ideal, championed and imposed by the state, transforms the production, experience, and governance of urban space in Rio de Janeiro.

### 1.2 Research questions and summary of claims

The specific questions that guided fieldwork and analysis are:

- How is “favela integration” discursively produced and defined by the state in Rio de Janeiro as part of a larger narrative of urban reform and renewal?
- How is the meaning of “integration” interpreted, represented, challenged, or appropriated by popular media, special interest groups and citizens?
- In what ways do state interventions designed to “integrate” the favelas transform urban space?
- How do techniques of urban planning and governance establish favelas as legitimate urban space subject to and benefiting from state rule?

To pursue answers, I conducted mixed-method ethnographic fieldwork from May 2013 until October 2014 and gathered data on a number of municipal, state-province and federal programmes that characterised the paradigm of “integration.” The federal government had allocated billions of reals to infrastructure and housing in Rio’s favelas through the national stimulus package PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento). Rio’s state government added additional money to PAC and was spending hundreds of millions of reals on a new Pacifying Police Force to practice a supposed version of
community policing in the favelas. The municipal government was ramping up the new Morar Carioca “integration of precarious and informal settlements programme” by matching loans from the Inter-American Development Bank with public funds after Mayor Paes had set the ambitious goal of “urbanising” all of the favelas by 2020. The municipal government also championed UPP Social, an initiative developed by critical thinking scholars, technocrats and UN Habitat experts to engage favela residents in generating local demands and public policy solutions that reduced socio-spatial and economic inequalities.

This research draws on and engages with geographical, anthropological, and sociological research on favelas as a particular form of urban inequality as well as with policy and programme analyses of state interventions alleging to “integrate” the city without fully belonging to either camp of literature. When asked in the field, I often explained that I was researching the state through its interventions into the favelas. Thus my aim is not to present new knowledge about the self-built neighbourhoods, nor theorise informality or analyse the programmes and policies I followed into the field. Rather my objectives are twofold.

First, empirically, I wish to “interrogate favela” integration as a paradigm of urban development, because I believe its principles will continue to define urban policy towards informal housing settlements in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and abroad. Indeed favela integration may be read alongside the celebrated model of “social urbanism” applied to great fanfare in Medellín, Colombia (Samper Escobar 2010; Brand and Dávila 2011; Oviedo Hernandez and Dávila 2016; Maclean 2015; Sotomayor 2015). A number of factors have pushed state actors (e.g. policy makers, urban planners) to recognize favelas (conceptually as well as materially) as constitutive of urban space. These factors are many and include, but are not limited to, the contemporary liberal
construction of citizenship that evolved post military dictatorship, federal institutionalisation of certain housing rights influenced by “right to the city” ideology, local historical development of electoral politics in Rio de Janeiro, limitation of public funds and/or lack of political will to pursue systematic re-housing of favela-residents in a universal social housing scheme, lessons learned from past modernist urban planning failures and slum-upgrading successes, and expert knowledge and analysis produced by academics and urban development specialists.

No longer pursuing large-scale demolition of favelas as pockets of illegitimate non-city spaces, the state constructs the moral imperative and legal authority to intervene using new strategies and policies that re-conceptualise the favelas. Once seen as antithetical to contemporary urban life or threatening to urban development (as “marginal territories” are traditionally represented), the favelas are now productively participating in and benefitting from development and even representative of Brazil’s social democratic advancement. But “favela-integration” does not take place in a vacuum; and it is subject to a diverse array of processes and interests, including but not limited to real estate markets and private developers, electoral politics, social movements and politics of resistance, middle class and bourgeois stereotypes and fears concerning poverty and race, mega-event planning, and macro-economic trends and policies. As such “favela-integration” is contested and socio-political and economic power dynamics are simultaneously challenged and reinforced. In the ideological struggle to envision a better Rio de Janeiro, the recognition of favelas as constitutive of legitimate urban space engenders new opportunities for social change, but it also risks co-opting radical visions of the “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996; D. Harvey 2008; E. Fernandes 2007).

Second, and theoretically, I aim to contribute to the
understanding of urban state spatiality and the production of territory. Because the favelas have been historically produced as non-city spaces “abandoned” by the state or controlled by organised crime, “favela integration” necessitates the territorialisation of urban enclaves spread throughout the city. A renewed interest in the state (Jessop 2001; T. Mitchell 1991) generated a debate considering the spatial production of the state under neoliberal capitalism (Brenner 2004; Brenner et al. 2003; D. Harvey 2012). A similar rethinking of territory by Agnew (1994) has resulted in a rich literature exploring the many ways territory is produced at various scales (Painter 2010; Haesbaert 2004; Brenner and Elden 2009). This research project contributes to the budding literature considering state spatiality and territory outside the Global North (Nuijten, Koster, and de Vries 2012; Klink 2013; P. Harvey 2005; Freeman 2012; Garmany 2014; M. Richmond 2015). I argue that “favela-integration” constitutes a spatial strategy of territory. The interventions analysed throughout this thesis first make favelas legible to state technocracy (Scott 1998) and construct the defined areas as requiring development and governance (Ferguson 1990), and then roll out various technologies of governance (Painter 2010) and spectacular infrastructure in order to envelope the favelas into urban state territory.

1.3 Thesis structure

The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I introduce the city of Rio de Janeiro within the context of the research problem and questions. I review relevant literature that explains the socio-political and economic development in Rio de Janeiro that produced the dramatic division between the 1000-plus favelas and the “formal” city. I review how theories of urban marginality exacerbated the “favela problem” (Perlman 1976; Perlman 2010; Valladares 2005) and argue
that its resurgence, “advanced urban marginality” (Wacquant 1999; Wacquant 2008a; Wacquant 2009b) ignores past shortcomings. I then set the scene of this research project—contemporary Rio de Janeiro—and review recent research discussing the unprecedented investments in urban redevelopment and the favelas as the city is actively marketed as Brazil’s global city in an era of mega-events, real estate speculation, and spectacle.

I construct the theoretical framework for the research in Chapter 3. Building on the concept of landscape as a “way of seeing” (Cosgrove 1985), I draw from Lefebvre’s theory of abstract space (1991) to understand how landscape creates a totalising vision of a spatial category (for example Rio de Janeiro, “the marvellous city”) through various modes of abstraction that obscure politics, struggle, and hegemonic power. I then pair this analytical framework of landscape with the growing field of critical mobilities, principally Cresswell’s (2010) “politics of mobility” in response to Maddrell and Qvistrom’s call (2016) to consider how landscapes are composed of various forms of mobility and how mobility is shaped by landscape. I subsequently review contemporary theorisations of state spatiality and the production of (state) space on the one hand and the renewed debate on territory on the other. I draw from overlapping literature of Lefebvre and his contemporaries (Elden 2001; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jessop, Brenner, and Jones 2008) as well as post-structural geographers and spatial-thinking social scientists (Painter 2006; Elden 2007; T. Mitchell 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Finally, I follow some of these scholars to a renewed debate on territory, its production and relation to state space (Painter 2010; Brenner and Elden 2009; Haesbaert 2004). These literatures facilitate the analysis of how the state transforms a city through a spatial strategy, such as “favela integration”, in order to achieve the effects of territory—the illusion of even sovereignty and governance across bounded space.
Chapter 4 summarises my thinking, reading, debating, and writing about methodological challenges. After defining the research problem and questions, the two most significant decisions that shaped this research concerned (i) whether to include the urban protests of 2013 into the project’s focus and similarly how to approach counter-hegemonic organised resistance within the favelas; and (ii) how to conduct ethnography of “favela integration” in Rio de Janeiro without a defined, and defining, field-site. I outline my approach to intertextual discourse analysis across genres of policy, political, expert, news, and citizen-produced texts (G. Rose 2007; Waitt 2010). Engaging with contemporary debates on ethnography and constructing the field, I employ Lefebvre’s spatial triad to supplant the site with a constructed field of spatial process: “favela integration.” Ultimately, I recognise that this project does not qualify as traditional ethnography largely due to decisions made while in the field, but I detail how the research nonetheless adheres to reflexive ethnographic principles in research design and analysis.

The first of three empirical chapters, Chapter 5 seeks to interrogate the paradigm of “favela integration” through the theoretical model of landscape-mobilities constructed in Chapter 3. Building on the idea that the favelas represented a “crisis of landscape” (Barbosa 2012), I argue that the dichotomous production of the “divided city” operated as a coping mechanism meant to maintain Rio de Janeiro as “marvellous” despite stark inequality and segregation. Nonetheless the duality separating the favela from the marvellous eventually constituted a socio-political crisis of landscape itself. “Favela integration” as a paradigm of urban governance and planning has been presented as the solution. I argue that “favela integration” is hegemonically defined through state facilitation and regulation of flows of people, goods, and services in and out of the favelas. Discursively produced based on liberal notions of citizenship
and favela residents’ right to the city, I argue that analysing the *politics of mobility* (Cresswell 2010) reveals that “favela integration” reproduces spatial inequalities.

Chapter 6 tells the tumultuous story of the programme formerly known as UPP Social. Based on the consensus that police “pacification” of the favelas establishes the necessary conditions for better governance and quality services, the progressive programme UPP Social rolled out in “pacified” favelas in order to engage residents and create favela-specific policies to address local demands. Shortly after its creation in the State government of Rio de Janeiro, the programme was shifted to the municipal government’s planning institute where it morphed into a technocratic supposedly apolitical intra-government favela consulting service. I argue that this favela-specific knowledge, produced through descriptive and inferential quantitative and qualitative data, serves “favela integration” in two connected functions: first as a technocratic lens through which the state sees the favelas as objects needing intervention (Ferguson 1990) and second as the effectuation of territory (Painter 2010).

The central concern of Chapter 7 is similar to that of Chapter 6: the techniques and processes of state territorialisation of defined pockets of space considered ‘outside’ of state control and thus lacking the benefits of governance. However, whereas the previous chapter focused on a technocratic programme largely preoccupied with abstract space (in the forms of maps, GIS, descriptive documents, coordinated plans etc...), Chapter 7 takes the large-scale interventions of PAC-favelas as the central object of analysis. Describing the structure and planning processes of PAC-favelas and the interventions in Rio de Janeiro as state spaces of territory, I argue that in contrast to neoliberal Europe, Brazil has not seen the same downshift in statehood towards neo-localism (Brenner 2004) but that scale continues to be politically contested under late capitalism (Klink
This chapter spends considerable time analysing a cable-car system known as the Teleférico do Alemão that is seen as the flagship of PAC and a symbol of the state’s presence in the favelas and the favelas integration into the city. Chapter 7 further contains an exploratory analysis of “favela integration” and territory through an explicit feminist lens in which I observe that defining aspects and types of labour of “favela integration” are gendered; and I argue for a feminist approach to the resurgent theorisations of territory.

I present my conclusions in Chapter 8. I review the empirical analysis in the previous three chapters in dialogue with contemporary literature about Rio’s transformations. I attempt to synthesise my claims about “favela integration” as a state spatial strategy that seeks to transform Rio’s cityscape from the divided city to a unified city by making the favelas marvellous and producing the favelas as territory. I then consider my claims beyond the immediacy of Rio. Despite Rio de Janeiro’s exceptionality, it serves as a reference for other Brazilian and Latin American urban policy makers and international organisations adopting more inclusive and rights-based strategies towards informal housing settlements. Reviewing the challenges and limitations of the research design, I consider the lessons of this project for contemporary urban and un-sited ethnography. Finally, reviewing this project’s contribution to the theorisation of territory and state spatiality, I consider implications for future research.
Chapter 2 – Historical and Contemporary Understandings of Urban Segregation, Inequality, and “Marginality” in Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro is far from the only city described as “divided,” “fragmented,” or “partitioned.” The theorisation of cities whose form is marked by conflict—war, religion, race, national identity, or economic polarisation—has been examined as a growing global trend in recent decades (Allegra, Casaglia, and Rokem 2012). Some argue that this literature has led to a “false gospel” that cities are newly divided as a result of neoliberal market dominance and state ineffectuality (Marcuse and Kempen 2002). Rio is an example of a city whose socio-spatial division and its study predate such literature and assumptions built into critiques of neoliberalism. As the authors cited above note, it is near impossible to theorise polarised and polarizing spatial differences on a global scale or even by ideal-type categories. This is not to discourage comparative research but rather dissuade an observer to conclude, based on a cursory examination, that similarities of urban form necessarily result from common causes. Each city must be understood by its unique geography and history prior to comparison and/or theoretical generalisation. This chapter has the objective of reviewing the historical production of Rio de Janeiro as defined by the dichotomous divide favela/cidade [favela/city]. Despite evidence to the contrary, for more than half a century the favelas were considered economic and culturally “marginal” to the metropolitan city, a drain on public resources and an impediment to modernity. Detailing the construction of segregation
and inequality as a problem is fundamental to understanding the current proposed solution, a strategy of favela integration.³

The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.1 I offer a brief summary of Rio de Janeiro’s 450-year historical development, ending with the founding myth of the favelas. I review the proliferation of the favelas as an urban “social ill” during the twentieth century. As neighbourhoods constructed on unused land by poor rural migrants and Afro-Brazilians, favelas were the only housing option for many among the poor labouring classes. Section 2.2 offers a nuanced reading of how the favelas and their residents (sometimes referred to as favelados)⁴ were understood as a social problem through the lens of social marginality, the product of crossed theories from political economy on the one hand and urban anthropology and sociology on the other. I argue that the perversion of scholarship on social marginality and the culture of poverty persisted in vernacular and political thinking towards the favelas. Building on those scholars who have critiqued advanced marginality empirically and theoretically, I add an ethical critique drawing on feminist literature as well as Wacquant’s own criticism (writing with Pierre Bourdieu) of academic “imperialism”. Section 2.3 outlines academic debates among urbanists

³ In the previous chapter, each mention of “favela integration” was placed in quotation marks to underscore my treatment of it as a hegemonic paradigm produced through “specialist,” technocratic, and political discourse (explored in depth throughout empirical analysis, but especially Chapter 5). From this point on, I cease to mark the term with quotation marks except its first mention in every chapter or when I wish to call particular attention to its construction and imposition as a dominant idea.

⁴ Favelado is a culturally loaded word that I use sparingly and self-consciously. It is difficult to use the term matter-of-factly due to the framing of favelas and favelados as social problems throughout Brazilian history. The term favelado is increasingly, but not universally, claimed by residents as a socio-spatial identity of which to be proud. While many researchers who conduct ethnography of favelas use the term in a similar context or simply to denote those living in favelas, I do so cautiously, recognising that even today when the term is spoken by those with social privilege it is most often deployed pejoratively. It may be helpful to note that there is no similar term in contraposition to the favelado. Those residents living in apartments and homes on the planned streets of the city are linguistically unmarked, as is often the case with privileged social groups.
seeking to explain the recent and undergoing transformative state interventions in the favelas in an era of economic boom and mega-events during the longest period of democratic governance in Brazil’s history. I review the chapter in Section 2.4 and preview the next.

2.1 The founding of Rio and the foundations of the favelas

*Rio de Janeiro (city): A beautiful and grand city, the mercantile premier of meridian America, capital of the empire of Brazil. It sits on the shores of one of the most beautiful bays in the world at twenty-two degrees and fifty-four minutes latitude, and forty-five degrees and thirty-six minutes longitude.*

The [Guanabara] Bay of Rio de Janeiro is the most beautiful ornament for Brazil’s capital. It would be more beautiful still if its margins and wharf were not rife with buildings of recent date so that the only place where one may disembark in comfort is the handsome new pier with stairs on its three sides constructed near the navy arsenal. One finds all other places to disembark full of blacks dumping filth at all hours of day and night.

The above text, written by former French military officer J.C.R. Milliet de Saint-Adolphe, is excerpted from the description of Rio de Janeiro in the *Descriptive Geographic and Historical Dictionary of the Empire of Brazil* (Saint-Adolphe 2014, 743–44). Originally published in 1845, Saint-Adolphe, who historians suppose arrived in Brazil as a refugee after Napoleon’s fall, spent a decade researching and travelling the country as a topographer before publishing the massive dictionary (republished one and a half centuries later). The city that Saint-Milliet described was founded in 1565 and considered the jewel of the Portuguese Empire.5 The wealth that flowed from the port of

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5 The city of Salvador predates Rio de Janeiro, founded in 1549 as the colonial capital of Brazil, but by the beginning of the nineteenth century economic and political power had consolidated and shifted from the North-East to the South-East
Guanabara Bay to Europe was so great that when Napoleon invaded Portugal, the entire Portuguese royal court led by King Dom João VI fled to Rio de Janeiro and declared the city the capital of the Portuguese Empire in 1808. Even after the threat of the French subsided, the King remained. Saínt-Adolphe wrote of the envy and indignation of the Portuguese ruling class in Lisbon as they saw the royal family constructing a modern capital—a state of the art hospital, military academy, and botanical gardens—in Rio de Janeiro, relegating Portugal to the status of a colony. The threat of revolution in Lisbon forced the King’s return and the transfer of the imperial capital back to Portugal; but he left his son, Dom Pedro I, as his regent, who swiftly became Emperor when Brazil declared independence in 1822. Rio de Janeiro remained the capital of the Empire and then the Republic of Brazil (declared in 1889) until the federal government was transferred to Brasilia in 1960.

The “blacks” Saínt-Adolphe complained about sullying the “most beautiful” Guanabara Bay were likely slaves arriving to dump domestic waste or to bathe in the seawater. Brazil was founded and developed on the backs of enslaved Africans and their descendants. From 1501 until 1866, an estimated five million Africans were brought to Brazil by Portuguese slave traders (Eltis 2015). Brazil did not ban the transatlantic slave trade until 1850 (a previous law was enacted in 1831 to appease the British, however it went unenforced and became referred to as “para inglés ver,” or for the English to see). A law from 1871 declared all children born to slaves free, but the practice itself was not fully abolished until 1888. According to a census cited by Saínt-Adolphe, the 85,000 slaves in Rio de Janeiro in 1844 represented half of the total population.

By 1891 the general population of Rio de Janeiro had more due to mining in Minas Gerais and large scale agriculture, especially sugar and coffee, in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (Prado 1971, 86–89).
than doubled to 522 thousand (J. M. de Carvalho 1987, 16). The abolition of slavery corresponded to a large influx of European immigrants as well as the arrival of newly freed slaves. The ballooning population drove down wages, and a significant portion of the city found itself unemployed and destitute. Rio de Janeiro, now the federal capital, had lost its imperial grandeur and the elite began to consider it dangerous, full of criminals and radicals. Overcrowding in the tenements resulted in a yellow fever outbreak, and the unsanitary conditions were deemed a public health crisis justifying evictions and demolitions (J. M. de Carvalho 1987; Chalhoub 1993; Chalhoub 1996).

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, a group of soldiers returning from quelling a rebellion in the North East (the Canudos War) squatted on a hill facing the Ministry of War. They were owed wages and promised land (M. Abreu 1987; Valladares 2005). At first they occupied a small existing covenant but erected makeshift shelters as their numbers grew. The hill upon which they built their shacks became referred to as Morro do Canudos and then Morro da Favella after a plant covering the hill the soldiers recognised from the North East. Valladares (2005, 28–30) refers to this story as the “origin myth” of the favelas. The soldiers’ encampment of shacks spilling down the hill was not the first informal housing structures occupied by the poor in the city. In fact at the base of the hill had stood the largest and most infamous cortiços (tenement slums, lit. beehive), known as Cabeça do Porco.⁶ Considered an embarrassment to the city, an aesthetic eyesore to citizens of good taste and breeding, a hotbed of immorality and criminality, and a threat to public health; the city issued a decree prohibiting cortiços in 1893. Cabeça do Porco was

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⁶ The cortiços were famously depicted at the time by the novelist Aluísio Azevedo. His book O Cortiço, published in 1890 told the story of a hotel-residency transformed to a sprawling tenement slum. In line with bourgeois fears at the time, the book depicts cortiços as determining factors of immorality and sordid sociality (See Sà 2010).
demolished the same year and just a few years before the founding of Morro da Favella (eventually named Morro da Providência) (M. Abreu 1987; Valladares 2005; Fischer 2008; Gonçalves 2013).\(^7\) Valladares suggests that the quality of the favella plant, a hardy shrub that grows even on steep and rocky hillsides, was symbolic of the hillside settlements as their residents struggled against a powerful oppressor (2005, 29).

With the prohibition of cortiços but lack of state solution to the housing crisis, self-constructed shacks on unused land became the only option for Rio’s arriving or dispossessed poor. This incipient spatial divide between the rich and the poor grew more pronounced in the early twentieth century by an aggressive campaign to modernise the city through public planning. In the new republic, politics were tumultuous; but because voting rights were severely limited by gender and literacy requirements, the state remained firmly in the control of the country’s elite (J. M. de Carvalho 1987).

Modern Rio de Janeiro is often traced back to Mayor Pereira Passos, who, supported by the learned and landed classes, envisioned Rio de Janeiro as a modern metropolis. Passos admired Haussmann’s Paris and embarked on a campaign to oversee its tropical replication (Benchimol 1992; Hahner 1986; L. L. Oliveira 2002; Fischer 2008). In addition to demolishing remaining cortiços, widening streets, and constructing open squares, Passos enacted a number of planning and public health regulations. He issued decrees regulating how people used urban infrastructure and behaved. He instructed police to enforce bans on pushcarts, street-hawking of lottery tickets, and public begging; prohibited the raising of pigs and the circulation of dairy cows in the streets; and demanded that residents stop spitting

\(^7\) Fischer (2008), while not the first to tell this story, offers the most thorough English summary of the literature and original archival work. See especially chapter 7.
on the walkways and in trolleys, urinating in public, and even emptying tobacco pipes on the streets (Benchimol 1992). The reforms corresponded to a strict set of modernist and racist bourgeois aesthetics that exalted a specific urban form and social order and found concentrated forms of poverty and growing population of black and mixed-raced Brazilians particularly distasteful and fearful (Batista 2003).

Such groupings of households on the hills and thin tracks of unused land in the expanding city of Rio de Janeiro continued to proliferate during the mid-twentieth century as more migrants arrived but there was no legal private or public housing market to accommodate them (Perlman 1976; A. Leeds and Leeds 1978; Valladares 2005). The push for modernisation corresponded to global capitalist urban industrialisation. According to historian Caio Prado Jr. (1971, 281-287), Rio de Janeiro became a major industrial centre for a confluence of structural reasons. Its history as an imperial city and site of political power meant that it was already the centre of national and international private capital and large banks. Rio was also a principal arrival point for European migrants, including many artisans who sustained the city’s cosmopolitan flair. Finally imported energy (coal) and industrial machinery arrived at the port of Guanabara, meaning ground transportation was minimised if factories were built near by. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Rio de Janeiro began to take shape into its current form: industrial to the north of the city centre wrapping around the large bay with new factories and working class neighbourhoods, and residential and privileged to the south along the Atlantic coast. These neighbourhoods—Flamengo, Copacabana, Ipanema, Lagoa, and Leblon—became known as the “noble neighbourhoods” of the South Zone. The favelas expanded with the city in all directions, to the industrial North and the domestic service economy in the South.
Valladares (2005) notes that at this time of industrialisation and modernist influence, the favelas were constructed as a social problem for the city. The intellectuals, doctors, and engineers empowered by Passos continued to wield substantial influence during the 1930s and '40s through organisations such as the Rotary Club (Valladares 2005; Fischer 2008). These Cariocas (Rio natives) saw the favelas, especially those adjacent to wealthy mansions and buildings in the noble neighbourhoods, as urban blight, a sickness afflicting the city. The geographer Andrelino Campos (2005) argues that the early spatial production of favelas could be compared with that of the *quilombos* settled by runaway or freed slaves. Their poverty and seemingly chaotic organisation was the opposite of the old slave quarters known as *valongos*, rudimentary structures resembling barracks and easy to police. He suggests this tension contributed to the construction of favelas as the antithesis to the desired city and eventually their criminalisation. Barbosa (2012) refers to the widening divide between the illegal and impoverished favelas as a “crisis of landscape” that threatened the collective cultural identity of Rio de Janeiro (explored in depth in Chapter 5). Despite the fact that a significant portion of favela residents worked in the expanding urban economy, often informally and for low wages, the city’s elite constructed the favelas as parasitic (Perlman 1976; Valladares 1978; Piccolo 2006). The aesthetics of the favelas—both in urban form (no roads, precariously built shacks in no apparent order, lack of water and electricity) and demographic makeup (black and mixed race former slaves and economic migrants from the rural interior)—were understood as proof that the city could not absorb the growing population, that those living in the favelas were not needed and did not belong in Rio de Janeiro. The favelas became considered *marginal* to the city and the favelados *marginal* to urban society.
2.2 Urban social marginality – the theory that just won't quit

The conceptual roots of social marginality lie in the confluence of a particular Marxist critique of capitalist industrialisation in Latin America with the theorisation of cultural reproduction of poverty in industrialising cities. As a precursor, Robert Park of the “Chicago School” of sociology and anthropology (Apter et al. 2009; G. A. Jones and Rodgers 2016) wrote of the “marginal man” in reference to migrants as divided between two worlds and thus truly belonging to none (Park 1928). His research focused on race relations and migration in the Untied States, but he became influential among Brazilian scholars by the 1930s that believed his analysis applicable to rural-to-urban migrants in Brazil (Valladares 2010). Throughout early industrialisation and its associated urbanisation, scholars and public intellectuals considered the favelas slivers of rural provincialism within the city (Bonilla 1961; Perlman 1976; M. C. Abreu 1999; Valladares 2005).

During the mid-twentieth century, Latin American world system theorists were concerned about the unequal distribution of benefits in capitalism. The political economists constructed dependency theory to explain how wealth flowed from poor to rich countries (from the “periphery” to the “core”) in the form of natural resources and unrefined commodities. This created a system of poor countries’ dependence on rich countries, since free trade ideology meant that lesser-industrialised countries struggled to develop competitive internal markets or economic autonomy (Nun 1969; Quijano 1971; Kowarick 1975). The constrained development meant industry could not absorb the available labour force, and a certain portion of the population would be made structurally redundant, the

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8 This section draws heavily on a longer essay I wrote titled “The historical and contemporary pitfalls of marginality” (Landesman Forthcoming).
marginal masses (Zuazúa 2005; Montoya 2006; Filho and Oliveira 2012). Most dependency theorists did not elaborate claims about slums or the particularities of urban poverty, but it was a short leap to associate the población marginal with “precarious” settlements that were multiplying around urban peripheries (Montoya 2006).

A consolidated theory on urban social marginality incorporated Oscar Lewis’ culture of poverty (Lewis 1959; 1961; 1966b; 1966a). Studying poor families in a tenement of Mexico City (and later impoverished Puerto Rican immigrants living in New York City), Lewis argued that remarkably similar behaviour patterns, family structures and psychological beliefs were present in poor slum neighbourhoods across the Western world, and interrupting the cycle necessitated a focus on this “culture of poverty” (1966a). Scholars and intellectuals began associating urban shantytowns with the material manifestation of a redundant economic class as well as sites of hopeless poverty. The so-called “marginal neighbourhoods” were thought to increase or solidify urban poverty.

Poverty in the Brazilian metropolis was historically associated with social representations of the vadio (the vagrant or bum), of a weak moral character, and a result of the choices and actions of an individual (Valladares 2005). During the 1930s and 40s, populist President Getúlio Vargas engendered a new narrative of poverty: near insurmountable obstacles that faced poor Brazilians and a lack of choices to pursue a life of dignity through work. This narrative allowed for the construction of poverty as a social problem in which the State had the moral imperative to intervene (Fischer 2008). Brazil

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9 According to the Argentine scholar Nun (1969 cited in Valladares 2005), the “superpopulação relativa” (relative surplus population) referred to the unemployed or underemployed, the “exército industrial de reserva” (industrial reserve army) corresponded to labour that private capital could eventually incorporate into production, and the "masa marginal" (the marginal masses) constituted the multitudes that would never find employment as a result of Third World dependency.
experienced rapid rural-to-urban migration between 1959 and 1980, and most new migrants settled in favelas. The relocation of poverty from rural to urban Brazil gave the impression that poverty itself had increased as a result of urbanisation. Structuralist frameworks of economic modernisation became dominant in the region (Maiolino and Mancebo 2005) and were invoked more frequently in reference to favelas and shantytowns in Latin America than in Asia or Africa (Lloyd 1979). Brazilian geographers raised concerns about “over-urbanisation” or “hyper-urbanisation” and unemployment figures suggested that the growing economy could not accommodate the rising demand for jobs in the urban industrial sectors (Perlman 1967, 5-7; Valladares 2005, 128-128), seeming to confirm hypotheses of unemployable marginal masses.

Janice Perlman took aim at the culture of poverty and sought to debunk social marginality in her modern classic, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (1976). She claimed that the favelas of Rio de Janeiro offered a solution to a housing crisis, as the occupation of unused land and auto-construction of homes was the only option for the migrating poor. Her empirical data suggested that the city relied on the cheap, mostly informal labour of favela residents. She presented the favelas as socially organised and politically engaged and showed how residents prioritised family and community and created rich culture.10 The favela population of Rio de Janeiro was not marginal to the socioeconomic relations of the city, but their participation in the wider society was “asymmetrical.” They suffered discrimination and disdain of the middle and upper classes, but they were neither socially

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10 Perlman primarily focused on samba music, which originated in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and which President Vargas promoted as national Brazilian culture.
inconsequential nor economically redundant. A lasting consequence of Perlman’s work is a slow paradigm-shift away from viewing the favela as a problem-source. Perlman effectively showed that the “favela problem” was socially constructed to reflect current stereotypical views about poor people, rural peasants, and Brazilians of mixed race.

Despite some attempts to vindicate Lewis and rehabilitate his theories, both the culture of poverty and social marginality (the two are intertwined by Perlman in her critiques) remained largely shunned until the end of the twentieth century. Urban sociologist Loïc Wacquant reinvigorated the debate about social marginality under neoliberalism, arguing that the reordering of economic relations, particularly of labour and government, has produced a novel form of advanced urban marginality (Wacquant 1999).

Wacquant theorises contemporary social inequality as a product of transformed urban economic relations aggravated by the neoliberalisation of the State. Based on his comparative sociological interventions into the US ghetto and the French banlieues, Wacquant developed a Weberian model (a socio-historical abstraction of real phenomenon) to explain the “resurgence of extreme poverty and destitution, ethno-racial divisions (linked to the colonial past) and public violence” in concentrated urban territories in “advanced societies” (1996, 121). Advanced marginality consists of six properties:

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11 Perlman was not alone in thinking that marginality was not an applicable theory to explain the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. According to Valladares, who was a colleague of Perlman’s also researching the favelas during the late 1960s-early 1970s, the small number of researchers engaged with the city’s favelas all knew each other and more or less agreed that marginality as a theory did not make sense (Vallardes 2005, 17). Apart from Valladares and Perlman that included Lucien Parisse, Jean-Pierre Bombart, Anthony and Elizabeth Leeds, Paul Silverstein, Lawrence Salmen, Diana Brown, Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, and Rogério Aroeira Neves.

(i) Growing internal heterogeneity and desocialisation of labour: undermining of the Keynesian wage labour contract through flexibilisation and reduction of benefits.

(ii) Functional disconnection from macro-economic trends: unemployment and poverty in these areas are permanent, regardless of economic growth.

(iii) Territorial fixation and stigmatisation: residents and outsiders directly associate marginalised urban enclaves with poverty, crime, and anti-social behaviour. Residents experience discrimination outside of their neighbourhood based on the stigma attached to living there.

(iv) Territorial alienation, or the dissolution of ‘place’: a result of the latter, the marginalised territory loses a sense of wholeness, of internal safety, and identity. A politics of space supplants that of place (following J. Z. Smith 1987).

(v) Loss of hinterland: the dissolution of place precludes community-supplied relief for the structurally unemployed. As a result, individuals often turn to the informal and illicit economy, hustling to get by, which adds to territorial stigma.

(vi) Symbolic and social fragmentation: marginalised subjects are treated as “human rejects,” considered “hopeless,” contributing to class decomposition and precluding class-based political mobilisation.

In a later paper, Wacquant (1999) outlined four “structural logics” that produce urban marginality. First is growing social inequality. Second is the weakening of wage labour as a stance from which to organise politically by the elimination of low-skill jobs as a
result of technological innovation and foreign outsourcing as well as the withering of benefits associated with fulltime employment. Third is what Wacquant refers to as the “reconstruction of welfare states,” which entrenches socio-economic differentiation through policies responding to or regulating poverty, unemployment, education, and social welfare. Fourth is the spatial concentration of marginality that produces “no-go areas” that are clearly identified—by “outsiders” as well as residents—as urban “hellholes rife with deprivation, immortality and violence where only the outcasts of society would consider living” (Wacquant 1999, 1644).

In the early twenty-first century, Wacquant (2003) took interest in Brazil. Relying heavily on the research of other social scientists, Wacquant considers Brazil a laboratory for the containment and punishment of the poor in class-polarised cities, in part due to a number of structural similarities with advanced marginality and punitive incarceration in the United States. He states that a “fateful triangle formed by economic deregulation, entho-racial division, and state restructuring in the age of triumphant neoliberalism” has produced a “dictatorship over the poor” (2008a, 58). His new focus was on the penal state (Wacquant 2009a; 2009b) and took his theory of marginality for granted, often referencing his past publications without dedicating adequate time to examining whether or not the neoliberal reordering of the state and socioeconomic relations in Brazil produced the same “marginality” as witnessed in the United State or France.

Wacquant’s theories of marginality and the penal state have been widely read in Brazil. His books are translated into Portuguese, he is widely cited by postgraduate students and university researchers alike, and he has given well-attended public lectures at Brazilian universities. Nonetheless, Brazilianists focussed on urban socio-spatial inequality have critiqued and criticised his application of
advanced marginality in “the Brazilian metropolis.” Existing critiques focus on discrepancies between Wacquant’s structural logics and observable empirical data in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo as well as the strict structuralist vision of social relations that discount the agency of individuals and community groups alike.

In a review essay titled “Marginality, Again?!” Teresa Caldeira (2009) accuses Wacquant of recycling the arguments put forward by the dependency theorists reviewed above: that one can point to a population-group and deem it wholly redundant and inconsequential to the reproduction of socio-economic relations. Drawing from her research in São Paulo (Caldeira 2001; Caldeira 2006; Holston and Caldeira 2008), she notes that in the poor peripheries home ownership is high and violence is decreasing. She highlights successful grassroots community building initiatives and points out that many residents of the supposedly absolute redundant population have become social organisers, NGO employees, artists and musicians. Caldeira says that Wacquant’s theory is incapable of recognizing these collective expressions of identity, language, and resistance because it does not follow a “Fordist script” determined by “trade unions, political parties or intellectuals who might be able to judge their proximity or distance from the ‘right’ parameter of class consciousness” (2009, 852).

Janice Perlman returned to Rio de Janeiro in 2001 to conduct a follow-up study to her 1968-69 ethnography that debunked the “myth of marginality”. Although she rebuts Wacquant’s model, she makes a surprising and puzzling, about-face and claims that the myth has become a reality (Perlman 2006; 2010, see Chapter 6). (I offer an interpretation of this curious conclusion later in this section.) Perlman tests the four “structural logics” of advanced marginality against data in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil and concludes that it fails to adequately explain inequality experienced by favela residents. While neoliberal
reforms did structurally reinforce urban poverty, the welfare state expanded and the percentage of residents working in the formal sector increased, as did general education levels. I continued Perlman’s exercise and additionally held data from Rio de Janeiro to the six properties with updated published research, data and observations (Landesman Forthcoming), and concluded that the favelas are not “declining” and indeed the heterogeneity of the favelas precludes the type of generalisations that Wacquant’s model requires. Furthermore, levels of poverty in Rio de Janeiro’s poor neighbourhoods are not divorced from macro economic trends, nor do residents of favelas psychologically divorce their personal identities from their neighbourhoods as a mechanism to emotionally cope with territorial stigma.

This last point related to territorial stigma, alienation, and identity is further substantiated by two recent research projects on the favelas from Rio de Janeiro. Both Cavalcanti (2007) and Richmond (2015) critique advanced marginality as limited by its structuralist attempt to explain the everyday realities and life trajectories of favela residents. Neither of the two discounts Wacquant’s theoretical usefulness to critique neoliberal inequality at a macro level, but Cavalcanti “counters [...] analyses that hinge on the increasing dualisation of the social structure” as unable to explain the “concrete social and spatial dynamics” that have produced the transformation of favelas from shantytowns to “consolidated favela” neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro (2007, 26). For his part, Richmond suggests that Wacquant’s theory of identity formation of residents subjected to marginality only scratches the surface of a complex process involving structural stereotyping and perceived social, cultural, and moral “ordering” that result from hegemonic as well as local historical framing (2015, 295–97).
Given all the evidence to the contrary, why does Perlman conclude that, “taken together, the negative stereotypes about those living in favelas have formed an ideology of marginality powerful enough to blot out all evidence to the contrary” (2010, 148, emphasis added)? I argue that those who interpret Perlman’s latest work as conceding Wacquant’s theory are misreading what type of marginality Perlman believes to have become “real.” In Brazilian Portuguese, the pejorative use of the word marginal to refer to a person of irreparable morality dates back more than half a century. By the time Perlman conducted her original fieldwork, she noted that the term “has exceedingly derogatory connotations” (1967, 91). She identified five vernacular categories of marginal persons: inhabitants of squatter settlements (favelados), the urban underclass employed in the precarious informal market; migrants and members of subcultures, racial or ethnic minorities; and social deviants. The racialised term continues to be used widely to disparage gang members, drug dealers, street sleepers, and petty thieves. Perlman presents evidence of residents resisting the social label of “marginal” because it strips them of claims to morality and citizenship. Perlman rightly engaged marginality both as an academic theory and a vernacular category of social standing. While she did not always distinguish between the two, she originally sought to deconstruct the cultural and debunk the academic. The “ideology of marginality,” for Perlman, is the conflation of elitist class morality with academic theory. When she laments that marginality has gone from “myth to reality,” she refers to the material effects of the anti-favela, dehumanising ideology that perverted academic theory to justify revanchism.

Wacquant is not totally ignorant of the vernacular use of “marginal” in Brazilian Portuguese. He references the term in one of his articles, although he oversimplifies its social meaning when he translates marginais as “low-lives” (2008, 61). Therefore he is either
unaware of or unconcerned by the historical impact that marginality thinking has had on the social representations of poverty in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil as a whole. In an essay about urban ethnography and social theory, Wacquant berates authors who uncritically adopt “folk concepts” as analytical categories (Wacquant 2002). In Brazil there is a dynamic process of constructing marginality: the historical, the vernacular, the external, the internalised, and the foreign. A critical and reflexive theorisation of class and place-based oppression must take into account this perverse relationship between marginality as a theory and as a “folk concept.”

The reviewed critiques of Wacquant’s “advanced marginality” address the limitation of a structuralist approach—the stripping away of agency—and the failure of Wacquant’s Weberian model to hold up to empirical scrutiny in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. I would like to offer a third line of critique based on ethical considerations. To do so I read Wacquant (writing with Bourdieu) against Wacquant and draw on radical intersectional feminist theory. In an essay titled “The cunning of imperialist reason,” Bourdieu and Wacquant rebuke US academia as imperialist: “The neutralisation of the historical context resulting from the international circulation of texts and from the correlative forgetting of their originating historical conditions produces an apparent universalisation further abetted by the work of ‘theorisation’” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999, 41). They warn against subjective interpretations of categories (such as the “underclass”);

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13 It is important to state that my critique of Wacquant does not question or discount his politics. Unlike Perlman, I do not associate Wacquant’s theory of advance marginality with a moralist discourse that blames the victims for their impoverished existence. I also acknowledge that some of Wacquant’s arguments are persuasive, and that his claims about the abuse suffered by the urban poor are valid and substantiated by a plethora of data. Furthermore he presents his theory with a cohesive logic that is relatively easy to follow and understand; and he gives his readers a toolbox of terminology that facilitates an academic discussion about the phenomena that they are witnessing. These are some of the reasons why I believe he is well respected and cited in academic circles, including in Brazil.
and they attack a US Black scholar for what they claim was an uncritical and ideological attempt to force Brazilians into thinking about race through a US cultural lens. They argue that even non-native US scholars who study or base themselves in the US become unknowing agents of imperialist thought when they write about their home countries uncritically applying theory developed to explain cultural phenomena in the United States.

I argue that application of Wacquant’s model of marginality is an ironic case of Euro-American theoretical imperialism. Marginality (one presumes the ‘old marginality’) is invoked to explain in a general manner or reference the phenomenon of favelas without historical contextualisation, and while he lists Perlman’s famous book debunking marginality in his bibliography, he neither engages with her arguments nor attempts to reconcile the “new” with the “old” marginalities. The favelas are repeatedly referred to as subject to advanced marginality, but he reports little-to-no fieldwork in any favelas or Brazilian urban spaces. He mostly relies on published literature concerning Rio de Janeiro with some references to São Paulo and Curitiba, and then conflates all of the informal housing settlements in the country as the “favelas of the Brazilian metropolis.”

His failure to engage with marginal as a pejorative racialised slur lodged against favela residents and the history of what Perlman calls the “ideology of marginality” reinforces his US-centric positionality.

I interpret Wacquant’s new marginality as a theory of dystopia, despite his claims to an empirically grounded Weberian model.

14 While the objectives of the paper were well received, Wacquant and Bourdieu came under heavy fire for their mischaracterisation of Brazilianist literature. They were accused of being irresponsibly ignorant of Brazilian culture and of its many examples of critical national literature in which Brazilian scholars successfully theorised race in Brazil without succumbing to US intellectual imperialism (French 2000; Healey 2003).

15 Following Crook’s (2000) distinction between utopian, dystopian, and anti-utopian social theory. While the lines separating the categories can be blurred, utopian theory is understood as optimistic and working towards a more perfect
Wacquant leaves his subjects, the victims of marginality, virtually powerless to alter their life circumstances. He offers three visions of how marginality under neoliberalism can be confronted (Wacquant 2008b, 276–79). The first is the spectacular expansion of the penal system that criminalises poverty and incarcerates the marginalised (the internationalising US-model). The second is to revitalise the European social democratic welfare state (one could argue this has been the approach of Presidents Lula and Dilma). The third option is the radically decoupling of subsistence from work by instituting a “citizen wage” and free education/job training for life. Wacquant argues that this radical option is the only way to adequately dismantle advanced marginality, but only mentions it in the last paragraph of the postscript to his 2008 monograph. How such a policy is achievable when the new marginality supposedly rules out class or place-identity political mobilisation is left unexplored.16

Intersectional feminist thought may explain why some scholars (myself included) are so forceful in our critique of advanced urban marginality. Wacquant’s theorisation reaffirms spatial and conceptual dualities where the only type of power is that which is found in the centre. This is incongruent with feminist theory that seeks to destabilise imperialist “white-supremacist capitalist hetero-patriarchy” and disavow the relationships of power upon which such systems of domination are built (hooks 1984; hooks 2012). Rather
than seizing power, hooks insists that we construct theoretical models that conceive radical change as possible at the margins.\(^{17}\) The new marginality, just like the old, places a structural analysis of class domination above all other forms of oppression; and only engages with race when “ethno-racism” neatly coincides with class domination. Robust intersectional analysis of race, gender, and sexuality necessarily destabilise the reductively clear delineation between those supposedly marginal subjects and the rest. That is to say, for all of its usefulness as a spatial metaphor when discussing the placement of poverty and the working of territorial stigma, urban marginality as an explanatory theory offers at best an incomplete account of urban inequality and segregation while unjustifiably dismissing organised resistance in the neoliberal city. Judith Butler makes a similar point in her critique of Agamben’s concept of “bare life” (explored in relation to favela residents in Section 2.3):

*Those who find themselves in positions of radical exposure to violence, without basic political protections by forms of law, are not for that reason outside of the political or deprived of all forms of agency. Of course, we need a language to describe that status of unacceptable exposure, but we have to be careful that the language we use does not further deprive such populations of all forms of agency and resistance, all ways of caring for one*

\(^{17}\) Also see Soja (1996) and Holloway (2002). On the surface this breaks with the classic Gramscian-Marxist model of occupying centres of power. However hooks and others do not invalidate traditional class struggle, but rather insist on the radical potential of building alternative social relations that subvert hegemonic power rather than seeking to seize it. In Rio de Janeiro, the radical visionaries behind Observatório de Favelas are an inspiring example of building on a Gramscian foundation of occupying spaces of power by relocating them from the centre to the margins. For example, their quest to open a public university in the favelas Complexo da Maré.
another or establishing networks of support. (Butler 2015, 79–80)

As scholars and researchers, we may be in the unhappy position to conclude that sometimes resistance of the poor and dispossessed has little-to-no-effect on neoliberal economic structures. But we have no moral authority to declare that resistance is futile, that their collective action is incapable of creating change, that it means nothing.

2.3 From marginality to mega-events and “bare life” – contemporary debates

Valladares (2005) notes that marginality, along with the culture of poverty, fell out of fashion among academics by the 1980s; and Misse (1999) studying the social representations of poverty and crime, similarly notes that stereotypical fictional characters explained by marginality largely disappeared in popular media around the same time. My own archival research of the largest Rio de Janeiro newspaper, O Globo, shows no such decrease in use in news media. The term “marginal” was routinely used in reference to violent crime occurring in the favelas or criminals “from” the favelas through the end of the century. What is noted is a near disappearance of the term “social marginality” as an indicator of a social phenomenon or academic theory. In the final decades of the twentieth century, economic inequality and segregation in urban Brazil became further entrenched by economic liberalisation, particularly during the 1990s when President Cardoso followed the neoliberal economic principles of the “Washington Consensus” and prioritised low inflation rates and steady GDP growth rates through open markets and marked decrease of public expenditures. Critics then claimed Cardoso, who at one time was a dependency theorist scholar (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), had
led Brazil towards “neo-dependency” (Rocha 2002).

The effects on Brazil’s urban centres were severe (A. C. Fernandes and Negreiros 2001). Already having lost economic activity tied to the status as the federal capital, Rio de Janeiro experienced factory closures and large-scale privatisation of public companies with accompanying lay-offs. To this day, abandoned factories and warehouses are scattered throughout the North Zone. Concomitantly the international cocaine trade developed shipping routes through Rio de Janeiro to Europe and the US, and gangs began to consolidate the local market operating out of favelas throughout the city, recruiting youth as packagers, look-outs, dealers, and ‘soldiers’ (E. Leeds 1996; Arias 2006; Perlman 2010; M. H. M. Alves and Evanson 2012). As turf wars between rival gangs intensified and the state adopted aggressive criminal justice policies and policing strategies in line with the US-led “war on drugs,” an arms race ensued and Rio’s homicide rate skyrocketed. Social scientists began discussing the “territorialisation” of the favelas by the drug gangs—referred to as o tráfico (the traffic) or traficantes (traffickers) in the news media and popular discourse—as they increasingly controlled the behaviour of residents and local economies and politics (Cavalcanti 2007; Penglase 2014). The authority wielded by the gangs in the favelas was considered so absolute that some described them as a “parallel power” to the state (E. Leeds 1996; Heritage 2005). This too trickled from academia to news and popular discourse.18 Beyond the borders of the favelas, organised crime affected the real-estate prices of homes in the immediate surroundings (Cavalcanti 2007) as well as municipal and state-province electoral politics (Arias 2006). Equally violent were the

18 For example a 2002 news articles in Folha de São Paulo titled, “Traficantes institute parallel power in the favelas,” describes the situation as such: “The traficantes control access to the favelas and have the power to expel people from the area. They charge a tax on businesses, cancel community projects, close schools and have power of life and death over the population. They even have a parallel justice system to punish enemies.”
police, an institution still ran by the military hierarchy under the control of the state-province government, who killed suspected gang members or petty criminals with impunity. The police also profited from the drug trade, by demanding payoffs from gang leaders as well as selling guns and ammunition (Alba Zaluar 1995; L. E. Soares 1996; Larkins 2015). Eventually, corrupt police formed their own mafias, the so-called milicias, that took advantage of the state security apparatus to expel gangs and assume control of the area. Publicly depicted as private citizen-led initiatives with support of local police and politicians, the milicias prohibited the drug trade and extracted mafia-like sales taxes on local staples like propane gas, internet and cable connections, and provision of public safety (A. Zaluar and Conceiçao 2007; Cano 2013).

The confluence of neoliberal structural reforms and its effects on the labour market and conditions of Rio de Janeiro and favela territorialisation by drug-trafficking gangs led to what the geographer Marcelo Lopes de Souza calls the “fragmentation of the socio-political spatial fabric” of the city (Souza 1999; for a condensed version of argument in English see 2001a). This refers to the production of differentiated urban spaces in exclusionary opposition to one another. The “legal” city, the asfalto, began to produce increasingly closed off private spaces of consumption and leisure through gated condominiums, shopping malls, and the expansion of wealthy suburbs (also see Guimarães 2015), whereas the favela, even those once ‘porous’ favelas in the city’s South Zone and centre, ‘closed off’ and became marked by fear and stigma of gang control. This corresponded to a broader pattern in urban Brazil. In São Paulo, Caldeira (2001) described a “city of walls” built to protect the middle class and wealthy from violent crime and increasing hysteria related to urban insecurity; and Silva (2004) argued that urban life was increasingly characterised by a “sociability of violence” that encouraged fear,
entrenched segregation, and justified violent repression of the poor and those deemed “marginal.” For Souza (1999; 2007), reworking some of the population-labour categories of the Marxist dependency theorists, the favela residents morphed into a “hyperprecariat” class—politically disenfranchised and caught between a negligent state and repressive police on the one hand and the violent control of the gangs on the other. In his vision of urban social transformations after Brazil’s return to democratic rule in the 1980s and neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, the socio-spatial fragmentation of urban space resulted in the “erosion of citizenship” as self-segregation of the wealthier classes eroded public space, a necessary condition for the *polis* and practice of democratic politics.

If rights and citizenship became a centre of debate after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1985, there are significant contributions to the literature that deny the idea that the poor and favelados ever achieved citizenship to begin with. Fischer (2008) argues that the poor suffer from a “poverty of rights.” She writes “Rio’s urban poor never have achieved full rights, and their weak citizenship has become a deeply entrenched component of Brazil’s economy and politics, where both wealth and power are frequently built on the legal vulnerabilities of those with few resources” (2013, 7). Fischer’s argument echoes that of Milton Santos when he said rather boldly in a documentary of which he was the subject, “Brazil never had citizens; and we the middle class do not want rights. We want privileges. And the poor don’t have rights. There is not, therefore, citizenship in this country. There never has been” (Tendler 2006). The geographer and activist scholar Jailson de Souza e Silva (2011) has argued that in neoliberal Brazil, citizenship is not constructed via participation in democratic elections, local campaigns, or claims to rights; but rather via consumption. Those that are able to participate in the frenzy of consumerism feel, and are considered superior to those who consume
less and of poorer quality. Nevertheless Silva and colleagues (2015) advocate for the reconceptualisation of highly fragmented cities with differentiated urban peripheries (including favelas that may not be located on the physical peripheries of the city) as operating with multiple cultural and political centres where identity and citizenship are constructed. This line of thought corresponds with Holston’s (2008) optimistic “insurgent citizenship:” the idea that when the labouring class self-constructs their own homes and neighbourhoods on the urban peripheries, they simultaneously construct the city (as opposed to constructing illegal, non-city settlements) which in and of itself constitutes a polis. These new spaces of politics and participation produce a “different order” of citizenship that does not conform to that enshrined in constitutional law but is no less valid from the viewpoint of democracy as an incomplete and contradictory process, a utopian project always needing completion.

The academic debates summarised above also occurred in political, news, and popular discourse at varying degrees of sophistication, as will be evident throughout empirical analysis. Of particular concern to the paradigm of favela integration is the “fragmentation” of Rio de Janeiro, in which the favelas are produced as “territories” unto themselves, abandoned by the state and subjected instead to the rule of drug gangs. This has evolved as the new “favela problem” which the state attempts to solve through planning and governance interventions involving civil society and the private sector. These solutions have been conceived and implemented during an exceptional moment in history during which Brazil sought to rise as a global economic and political power. Part of Brazil’s ascension was Rio de Janeiro playing host to a series of increasingly high-profile sporting, political and religious mega-events. Within this context, the “solution” of favela integration has been constructed in the international spotlight as indicative of the city’s prominence and
the nation’s progress. As such, this project seeks to understand favela integration as a response to a century-old debate concerning “marginal” spaces of poverty and criminality within a metropolis, as well as within the context of contemporary socio-political and economic transformation.

This approach will at times parallel but ultimately differ significantly from those explaining the contemporary production of Rio de Janeiro and state-favela relations through mega-event exceptionalism. Ever since Rio de Janeiro was awarded the 2014 FIFA Men’s World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the issue of mega-event planning and urbanism became a major focus of academic research. Since the 1990s Rio de Janeiro planners and policy makers had cited the “Barcelona model” and positioned the city as a prime location to play host to major international gatherings (Compans 2004; N. G. de Oliveira and Gaffney 2014). But the scale of investment and magnitude of transformation that Mayor Eduardo Paes, backed by Governor Cabral and President Lula, promised in anticipation of the two largest global sporting events landed credence to the argument that Rio de Janeiro was becoming a city made for and by mega-events (Gaffney 2010; 2015). Richmond and Garmany (2016) delineate between what they argue are two competing narratives that explain Rio de Janeiro’s broad transformation during mega-event planning: that of the “post-third-world city” or as a neoliberal city of [mega-event] exceptionalism. The former is produced through officialist discourse—political rhetoric, Rio’s Olympic bid proposal and planning documents, and promotional materials the many initiates to redevelop the depressed old port area and integrate the favelas—and tells the story of Rio de Janeiro (and broadly Brazil) emerging as a world city and global power. As I will discuss at length in later chapters, this discourse does not shy from issues of inequality, violence, or socio-spatial fragmentation of the city; but it presents
those problems through the lens of a pluralistic, participatory democracy and purports to already be implementing solutions through planning, governance, and development initiatives. The latter, mega-event exceptionalism, is an academic critique of the officialist narrative. Based off Agamben’s (2005) theory of the “state of exception,” some critical geographers and urbanists argue that the state uses the pressing importance of mega-events to justify suspending normal rule of law and clandestinely subverting democratic processes in order to serve capital accumulation and the political interests of the elites (Freeman 2012; Rekow 2016; Gaffney 2012; Saborio 2013; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013; Vargas 2013). Researchers employing the state of exception often do so to explain how the state justifies favela removals near mega-event venues (seen as a form of social cleansing), the police militarisation of favela space through the Pacifying Police Force, and the disregard of environmental degradation among other abnormal planning and approval processes (Brum 2013; Gaffney 2010; Gaffney et al. Forthcoming; Freeman and Burgos 2016; Faulhaber and Azevedo 2015). A related argument as categorised by Richmond and Garmany is that the result of state urban interventions, including strategies purporting to integrate the favelas, is by design capital accumulation through dispossession or creative destruction.

Although these narratives are depicted as in competition, because one is grounded in social theory and the other is political discourse, they may not always do so in the same arenas. Richmond and Garmany offer a critique of the neoliberal city of exception thesis. They find three points of weakness. First, they find the uncritical blame-it-all-on-neoliberalism position a reductive depiction of the Brazilian state, citing research that challenges the equal understanding of neoliberalism as theorised in Europe and the USA with neoliberalism as it “actually exists” in the Global South broadly
and Brazil specifically. Similar to Souza, they do not deny processes of neoliberalisation in Brazil or their negative effects on socio-economic inequality, but they argue that it must be understood from a nuanced discussion of the time and space of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Second, the authors recognise that many urban planning and governance programmes were attached to the spectacle of the Olympics and World Cup as part of the “post-third-world city” narrative, but argue that such an association does not necessarily mean those interventions are wholly attributable to the mega-events. The integrating planning intervention Morar Carioca, the evolution of Favela-Bairro (both of which I explore in Chapter 5), as well as the UPP were rolled out in many favelas that are not near sporting or tourist venues and lie outside of the so-called “ring of security”. They suggest that in order to understand local contexts within the city, a nuanced empirical approach is necessary and caution against applying the “state of exception” carte blanche across city space since policies are rolled out unevenly and contradictorily. Third, they argue that social processes related to gentrification, suburbanisation, and diversification at the urban peripheries may have been exacerbated by mega-event planning and infrastructure but they are processes that occurred independent of the mega-events due to Brazil’s strong economic growth for over a decade due to the commodities boom, expanding significance of the Rio de Janeiro off-shore oil economy, and global capital investment associated with the BRIC phenomenon. Moreover they are all processes also found in other large Brazilian cities.

Of course, much of the research following the narrative critiqued above present well reasoned arguments and strong data. Some indeed offer a nuanced discussion of Rio de Janeiro development and history of state-favela relations (Brum 2013; Freeman 2014), although I would suggest that they sometimes come
close to privileging elitist political interests as the only interests that matter. There are scholars who have already offered a complex theorisation of the state of exception independent of the mega-events. For example, Larkins (2015) argued that the favelas existed in a state of exception long before the Olympics were awarded to Rio de Janeiro or the UPP pacification strategy was announced. She argues that the state of exception in Brazil dates back to the military dictatorship and the political repression, torture and murder of “subversives.” However even after the return to democracy the favelas remained subject to the state of exception, largely corresponding to urban violence and gang control. The position of the favelas within the fragmented city, their illegal formation, informal organisation, and criminal territorialisation are invoked to justify why favela residents are denied so many of their basic rights as citizens and subject to extreme levels of police violence.

Larkins applies another concept from Agamben (1998), that of bare life as a dehumanising condition forced on favela residents living in “enemy territory” and guilty by association. These subjects are stripped of citizenship, humanity, and dignity in the eyes of the state, the justice system, and society made of citizens (non-favela residents). Larkin’s use of “bare life” to describe the normalisation of violence against favela residents is persuasive, although in curious contrast to Holston (2008, 311) who argues that the poor are maintained at bare life in rural settings but are better equipped to make political demands by constructing the city at the peripheries. This difference may be explained by which moment of Agamben’s concept the authors engage. The result of bare life is the reduction of a being, or a category of subjects, to the bare minimum of substance, such that their lives can be taken without constituting a loss. The conceptual construction builds on political philosophy that theorises how citizen-subjects are produced through participation in the polis, political
space. Holston and others (J. de S. e Silva et al. 2015; and more cautiously Cavalcanti 2007) engage with the theory at this point and argue that favela residents can succeed in engendering the polis at the periphery. They thus preclude wholesale application of bare life to favela residents. While Butler’s critique of the concept, referenced above in relation to advanced marginality, causes me hesitation to theorise favela residents as reduced to bare life—especially given the rich history of favela activism and the resurgence of contemporary youth activism I saw during my fieldwork—Larkins and others (Biehl 2004; Roy 2005; Garmany 2009; Appadurai 2013; J. A. Alves 2014; Poets 2015) make persuasive empirical arguments. While some are rash in offering sensationalist depiction of favelas as a lawless zone of anything-goes violent exceptionalism, most are cautious to not strip their subjects of agency.

2.4 Conclusions

This chapter reviewed a series of academic and political debates that have shaped the understanding of urban poverty and segregation in Rio de Janeiro with the objective to understand how the “favela problem” is currently understood within the broader context of Rio de Janeiro and urban development. I traced the history of the formation of urban poverty, from slum tenements to the “first favela” on the hill at the turn of the twentieth century. The favelas proliferated throughout the next 100 years, scorned by elite society and targeted for removals and violent repression. Based on a review of literature and drawing on my own analysis, I argued that social marginality was one of the most significant social theories that shaped modern representation of the favelas. I reviewed how the theory fell out of fashion and its resurgence as advanced urban marginality. Building on existing critiques, I argued that the theory does not
adequately explain Rio de Janeiro empirically, that it theoretically precludes favela residents’ agency historically proven to affect their own lives in the city, and is ethically dangerous. There are three reasons why I have discussed and critiqued marginality theory to this length. One, the historical debate on marginality had deep and detrimental influence over how the favelas were socially constructed and understood in both intellectual and popular debates. Two, marginality as an idea shaped public policy serving revanchist ideology to blot out the favelas from the landscape; and I will argue it continues to shape the liberal attempt to incorporate that which was “informal” into the “formal” (see Chapter 5). Three, advanced marginality theorises the state as a neoliberal monolith. Without an explicit understanding of scale, and without acknowledging the state as a space of contestation, it cannot explain the evolution of the “consolidated favela” as explored by Cavalcanti, nor the ideal of “favela integration” explored in this project.

I then turned my attention to contemporary debates concerning socio-spatial segregation and inequality in relation to Rio de Janeiro, the favelas and the state since Brazil’s return to democracy and economic liberalisation during the 1990s. The entrenchment of economic inequality, increased fear of violence, and the territorialisation of the favelas by organised criminal groups contributed to cementing the socio-spatial divide between that which was formal and informal, legal and illegal. Even though marginality had been unmasked as myth, the “ideology of marginality” continued to serve as an excuse to stigmatise the favelas and their residents. In Chapter 5, I will return to this moment in history and further elaborate how the increasing otherness of the favelas created the notion of a city divided in two, desperately needing unification. This is the origin of “favela integration” as a hegemonic ideal.

To contextualise favela integration within the contemporary
debate as Rio de Janeiro as a global city, I relied on the recently published review by Richmond and Garmany concerning urban transformations during an era of mega-events and sustained economic boom. I concur with the three-pronged critique offered by the authors, and this thesis responds to and builds on their call for a more nuanced understanding of state interventions into the city's favelas with the aim of urban transformation. I analyse favela integration discursively and across different genres of text accounting for hegemony and contestation (further detailed in Chapter 4). I consider the urban planning interventions, Morar Carioca and PAC-favelas within the historical context of “slum upgrading” and favela “urbanisation” dating back to the 1980s in Chapter 5. I pay close attention to inter-scalar and electoral politics in the rolling out of the state and rolling back of programmes and engage in the debate of “actually existing neoliberalism” through favela integration in Chapters 6 and 7.

The next chapter reviews theoretical concepts and debates necessary to respond to my research questions related to state spatiality and the production of favelas territory. Additionally I elaborate a conceptual model based on landscape and critical mobilities in order to analyse the discursive production of favela integration.
Chapter 3 – Concepts and Theory

This chapter outlines the concepts and theory necessary to analyse the paradigm of “favela integration” and substantiate the arguments previewed in Chapter 1. In order to discuss “the favela” as a socio-spatial category within the city of Rio de Janeiro as a generalizable and specific place, I use the concept of landscape. I draw from Cosgrove (1984; 1985) as well as Lefebvre (1991) to understand landscape as an ideological way of seeing that totalises space and obscures social relations of domination. I pair the concept of landscape with critical mobilities, in particular drawing on Cresswell’s (2010) politics of mobility, an analytical model that interrogates social relations of power reproduced through movements and flows. While I began my research influenced by Cosgrove’s theories in considering the visual effects of favela integration, my interest in mobilities emerged towards the end of fieldwork as I reviewed the data in search of the meaning behind integration.

State and space are central themes of this project, which was conceived from very broad questions related to how the state—itself a concept requiring problematisation—transforms urban space by targeting pockets of space historically produced in large part by the conceived absence of the state. As the project developed, interests narrowed, and I attempted to make sense of the data fieldwork, I returned to discussions concerning the state as effect (T. Mitchell 1999) and state spatial strategies that reorder socioeconomic relations (Brenner 2004). In seeking a theoretical framework that could explain how non-city space can be reproduced as constitutive of the city, I found debates on territory (Painter 2010; Haesbaert 2004; Brenner and Elden 2009) to be most useful.
This chapter is structured into five sections. Section 3.1 reviews the concept of landscape within the field of human geography drawing from Cosgrove and proposing that Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space further explicates the effects of landscape. Section 3.2 surveys the emerging field of critical mobilities in urban studies and suggests its application to research regarding development interventions into self-built neighbourhoods or research problematising the so-called “divided cities.” The section ends with an original pairing of landscape and mobilities (in response to Maddrell and Qvistrom 2016) in order to analyse the planning and governance paradigm of favela integration. Sections 3.3 – 3.5 are separated for conceptual clarity but should be read together as building a theoretical framework to understand favela integration as a state spatial strategy of territory. I review recent literature that effectively redefined the state as a concept and object of analysis in Section 3.3, eventually committing to Timothy Mitchell’s call to understand the state through the many processes that give it the appearance of an autonomous structure. Section 3.4 reviews state spatiality: how states are spatially produced, and how states produce space according to neoliberal ideology. I follow Neil Brenner’s framework developed in New State Spaces, with some important distinctions. In Section 3.5 I review how the re-thinking of state and space leads to a productive re-conceptualisation of territory as the appearance of state sovereignty spread evenly throughout bounded space produced continuously through various technologies and practices (Painter 2010; Haesbaert 2004). I close with a review of the chapter.

3.1 Constructing “landscape”

The Dictionary of Human Geography calls landscape a “cardinal term” of the discipline, serving as “central object of investigation, organizing principle and interpretive lens for several different
generations of researchers” (Gregory et al. 2009, 409). Within human geography, one may compare its expansiveness with that of *spatiality* itself. The lack of conceptual consensus within the discipline may have encouraged its overuse as a general backdrop, a reference to vaguely defined regions or places, or to reference differentiated spatial experiences of social groups. Many scholars, perhaps especially outside of human geography, invoke the word landscape as a spatial metaphor referring broadly to visual aesthetics without defining the term, referencing an extensive literature, or specify whether they intend to analyse landscape (as relations between humans and “nature”), apply landscape as a tool of analysis (as a *way of seeing*), or simply use as defined by vernacular dictionaries.19 This last option places the burden on the reader to understand the author’s intention via context and may lead to conceptual confusion if “landscape” is featured prominently (for example in the title) or repeated throughout the text. In a pointed essay, Cresswell expresses his weariness of the term altogether, suggesting that landscape is “burdened by its own history,” and “too stuck in the humanities to make it amenable to [...] critical theory” (2003, 269). A big part of the problem, Cresswell notes, is that the term is routinely used within

19 In limiting my review to scholarship on urbanism in Rio de Janeiro or authors cited elsewhere in this text, a number of writers make regular use of “urban landscape” to refer to general qualities about the city or the visual urban form (e.g. Roy 2005; Brum 2013; Chalhoub 1993); and varying use of “political landscape,” and “cultural landscape” (Arias 2006; Vargas 2006; Amar 2013) in open-ended references to broad social processes or conditions. Authors may cause readers confusion if they mix landscape metaphors with references to landscape as a theoretical concept, a material process, or a specific place (e.g. Goldstein 2003; Freeman 2014; McGuirk 2014). Both Perlman (2010) and Larkins (2015) use the term sometimes in reference to cultural urban processes and other times in reference to the physicality of favelas. Larkins subtites a section “Aesthetics and discourses of favela as landscape” (88), which leads the reader to expect a ‘reading’ of landscape as discourse, but what follows is limited to a discourse analysis of how favelas are visually represented in Brazilian film and the discussion makes no reference of established literature. Perlman titles cartographic maps showing the location of favelas in Rio de Janeiro as “landscape of poverty and inequality” (57) but also refers generally to “landscapes of political participation” (213).
academia as well as popular media to mean “just about anything” (Ibid., 269). While I share his frustration, I do not see this as a reason to avoid the concept but rather as a call to be explicit in one’s intent.

I employ the concept of landscape based on the conceptual framework developed by Denis Cosgrove rather than as a material object of analysis (D. Mitchell 2002; 2003), a particular form of discourse to be ‘read’ through structural semiotics (Duncan and Duncan 2003), or most generally referring to people’s relations to “nature” or modifications of the topography (Lowenthal 2007).

Cosgrove famously reviewed landscape’s historical evolution and critiqued its ill-defined, apolitical use during the 20th century. Tying landscape to ideological “ways of seeing” and operating [bourgeois] power over space, Cosgrove argued against what he saw as an antiscientific, humanist geographical application of the term (1984). His monograph insisted on a materialist reading of landscape, and his analysis focused primarily on cultural artefacts such as painting and architecture in order to expose class hegemony in the visual production of land and nature (Cosgrove 1985). Highly influential, the book has been credited with shaping the sub-discipline of cultural geography (Berg, Duncan, and Cosgrove 2005). The theorisation of landscape as a “way of seeing” continues to influence contemporary scholars, such that within human geography landscape is conceptually inseparable from discussions of power or hegemony.

Landscape has been particularly useful to analyse how social groups understand or represent their relationship to “nature” and how cultural and economic ideology moulds behaviour to shape the “natural” environment. However an analysis of the visual imagination and placement of urban poverty and segregation in Rio de Janeiro (or any city for that matter) needs further elaboration. If we understand landscape as a totalizing visual ideological ordering of space, how then does landscape operate? And what are its effects? Such questions
are asked by Mitch Rose (2002) who wants to know how landscapes are actively “called forth” and what work do they do? He critiques the classic cultural Marxist construction of landscape as both hegemonic ideological structures and realms that permit subjective agency. Despite cultural geographers’ best intentions to recognise agency, it is necessarily through the lens of class struggle and hegemony and therefore limited by inherent structuralism. In such theorisation, landscape requires consistent interpretation so that subjects may indeed struggle against hegemonic production of landscape but are never able to produce landscape themselves. Rose suggests ditching the structuralist tradition and offers actor network theory as an alternative. Cosgrove explains that trying to resolve the structure-agency dilemma was a principal concern of his at the time (see Berg, Duncan, and Cosgrove 2005), and I am hesitant to disregard Cosgrove in favour of a post-structuralist approach simply because some tension still remains. I do, however, find Rose’s provocations useful, and in Chapter 5 I discuss how the “marvellous city,” the “divided city,” and the “integrated city” are all landscapes that are called forth to do political work.

In so doing, my approach is informed by Lefebvre’s theorisation of abstract space. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre does not develop a robust accounting of landscape. The word is most commonly grouped together with ‘monuments,’ ‘buildings,’ and ‘pictures’ or as a general term referring to geographical areas, such as ‘rural landscapes’ and ‘industrial landscapes.’ In the first, landscape is understood as a visual representation of space, such as a painting, full of signs for the subject to decipher. In the second, landscape is offered as something of an intellectual spectrum of consciousness toward, but not quite reaching, spatiality. In a short passage on “spatial architectonics” Lefebvre elaborates:
The power of a landscape does not derive from the fact that it offers itself as a spectacle, but rather from the fact that, as a mirror and mirage, it presents any susceptible viewer with an image at once true and false of a creative capacity which the subject (or Ego) is able, during a moment of marvellous self-deception, to claim as his own. A landscape also has the seductive power of all pictures, and this is especially true of an urban landscape–Venice, for example–that can impose itself immediately as a work. Whence the archetypal tourist delusion of being a participant in such a work, and of understanding it completely, even though the tourist merely passes through a country or countryside and absorbs its image in a quite passive way. The work in its concrete reality, its products, and the productive activity involved are all thus obscured and indeed consigned to oblivion. (1991, 189 emphasis original)

Expressly, a landscape allows the tourist, the generic observer of a place they do not inhabit, to self-deceivingly comprehend a complex socio-spatial reality from a single, privileged vantage point and frame of reference without truly knowing—that is to say inhabiting and producing—the space that the abstraction represents. Lefebvre’s description calls to mind the pedantic traveller who goes on holiday and returns making explanatory proclamations about a place and culture they briefly toured. But the same is often true for the native. For example the middle class Brazilian who professes authoritative knowledge about the culture of the favelas and the nature of their “problems” without spending any significant amount of time in any favela(s). What is the origin of this innate and unquestioned comprehension?

While the explicit development of the landscape idea in The Production of Space is scant, we can call on Lefebvre’s theorisation of abstract space. In contrast to social space (consisting of the triad spatial practice, representation of space and representational spaces, revisited in Chapter 4), abstract space operates as falsely objective, a
“set of things/signs and their formal relationships [...]” (1991, 49). Abstract space can erase differences, forcing them into “symbolic forms of an art that is itself abstract” (Ibid., 49). For Lefebvre, abstract space is closely tied to positivist social science and state power. In opposition to social space, the abstract poses as a pseudo subject, manipulating reality, hiding hegemonic agency, and obscuring the “real ‘subject’, namely state (political) power” (Ibid., 51).

As articulated by Lefebvre, at times vaguely, abstract space has some clear differences with the use of landscape described by Cosgrove. Landscape is not purely political, institutional, or a product of state power. Neither is it dependent on supposedly objective scientific data. Lefebvre is principally concerned with how numerical data and architectural plans create a false reality, ignore the complexity of lived space, and obscure politics. Here we may draw a parallel to James Scott’s (1998) theorisation on how states use statistics, maps, and visual data to abstract from detail and make populations and space legible and thus manageable; but at first glance abstract space seems to be in contrast to the cultural approach of landscape. We should understand landscape as synonymous to abstract space as theorised by Lefebvre, however the effects of abstract space parallel those of landscape. Lefebvre proposes that abstract space has three elements (which he calls “formants”): the geometric (Euclidean space), the visual/optical, and the phallic (which is best understood as masculinist symbols of violence). For present purposes, I want to underscore the second element, that of the optical, which operates as a “logic of visualisation” such that metaphorical writing and “spectacularisation” (following Guy Debord) dominate over other sensorial perceptions of space. The gaze transforms details and difference into a totality, Lefebvre argues, noting that the visual “tends to relegate objects into the distance, to render them passive” (1991, 286).
How can Lefebvre’s abstract space, read alongside Cosgrove, inform our understanding of landscape? Offering a visual understanding of a social process (social reproduction, urbanisation, land regulation) bounded by a spatial category (the city, the beach, nature reserves etc...), landscape creates a totalizing vision of harmonious relationships between signifying objects/subjects through various modes of abstraction. Obscuring social processes and power, this visual representation deletes difference in service to hegemony and presents a false totality as the natural order of things, passive and readable, reassuring to the “native” and easily comprehensible to the “tourist”.

3.2 Pairing a “politics of mobility” with landscape analysis

My pairing of landscape with critical mobilities responds to Maddrell and Qviström (2016), who are interested in the two concepts as dynamic and interrelated: how landscapes are composed of and produce movement defined in the broadest sense. Since Sheller and Urry (2006) proclaimed a “mobilities turn” in social science, a growing number of critical scholars have explored the possibilities mobilities offers to urban studies (Graham 2001; Söderström et al. 2013; Kwan 2013; Maksim and Bergman 2016). These advocates argue for a perspective that incorporates inhabiting cities on the move as opposed to what they see as analyses of static freeze-framed moments of urban processes. Reaching for an understanding of urbanity beyond understanding the city as a composition of urban enclaves, Jensen (2009) argues that mobilities changes our understanding of place: that the geographical concept must be

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20 Cresswell wrote a series of three essays reviewing the expansive and expanding streams of mobilities research (2011; 2012) as well as a research agenda (2014), however he cautioned against seeing the field as completely new, noting that many of the arguments pre-exist the so-called mobilities turn in fields such as transportation and migration studies.
understood relationally by flows; and that understanding of places and the broader city is developed through the experience of moving through urban space.

Mobilities literature emerged, and continues to grow, examining differentiated movement within the context of gender, race, age, and broadly social exclusion. Scholars argue that “attention to the mobilities of the urban poor—their physical movements as well as the associated representation and practices—will enable a better understanding of mobilisation towards collective claim making as well as individual attempts to achieve social mobility” (Jaffe, Klaufus, and Colombijn 2012, 644). Few scholars have used the literature to examine self-built housing settlements, although some have written on tourist mobilities in connection with slum tourism and service-work in Mexico, Jamaica and India (Dürr and Jaffe 2012; Dürr 2012; Diekmann and Hannam 2012) as well as “symbolic mobility” of aesthetics and architectural design in Ecuador (Klaufus 2012). I propose that mobilities is a valuable framework to examine planning and governance programmes targeting slums as well as broader cultural and spatial phenomena such as tourism, gentrification and (state) violence within such neighbourhoods. This thesis serves as one example of such application, following Cresswell’s work on the “politics of mobilities.”

Cresswell states that “mobility exists in the same relation to movement as place does to location” (2010, 18). That is, mobility

21 An important stream of mobilities literature concerns “policy mobilities,” how innovative ideas transformed into policy ‘travel’ from one place/context to another (Ong 2007; E. McCann 2011; Robinson 2015; Baker and Temenos 2015; Prince 2016). I do not directly engage with this literature for the sake of maintaining a manageably narrowed focus, however there are possibilities of discussing “favela integration” and policy mobility in regards to the UN Habitat’s “safer cities” network and educational exchange trips that Rio’s policy makers and programmers took to Medellín. These opportunities will be evident to interested readers in Chapters 6 and 7, although I do not return to the subject of policy mobilities until Chapter 8 in discussing implications for future research.
imbues movement with social meaning. Cresswell’s theoretical formulation of how to conceptualise the politics of mobility builds directly on Lefebvre’s spatial triad. His triad of physical movement, representations of movement and embodied experience mirrors Lefebvre’s triad of spatial practice, representations of space, and lived space. In the same way that social space is a composite, all forms of mobility—walking, flying, travelling, transportation of goods or services, for example—exist in the nexus of the physical practice of movement, the representation of that movement (which we may also call discourses on movement), and the experience and social meaning engendered by movement. Only by taking these together do we arrive at an analysis of mobility.

Cresswell’s approach is especially useful to understand favela integration beyond its discursive imagining of a united Rio de Janeiro. As I argue in Chapter 5 and continue to demonstrate throughout empirical analysis, state interventions often have the explicit objective to encourage and/or regulate how people and things move through the city and in and out of the favelas. I highlight many examples that substantiate the claim that mobility is political in the sense that it is subject to power. A politics of mobility takes into account how movements are both productive of social power distribution and produced by those very dynamics. Cresswell argues that a nuanced understanding of mobility can inform theorisation of social relations according to economic class, race, gender or other identity categories. In Chapter 7, I discuss how different bodies moving or hanging about in favela space are targeted for scrutiny, and argue that this heightened friction (see below) works against the progressive notion of integration by reifying racialised, place-based stigma.

Cresswell identifies six thematic aspects of mobility through which one can analyse the politics of mobility: (i) motivation behind exerted force, (ii) velocity of movement (which is often hierarchical),
(iii) rhythm, following Lefebvre’s *rythymalysis* looking closely at repetition and pace broadly defined (e.g. the gait of a young male walking, *swag*, or the beat of Afro-Brazilian music); (iv) route, drawing on Deleuze and Gutarri’s “smooth space”, or the quest to produce ordered and predictable movement; (v) experience according to bodily senses and emotive response, and finally (vi) friction, or how and when does movement stop? As I detail in later chapters, the policies and programmes currently targeting the favelas aim, explicitly or not, to modify and regulate the movement and flows of people, goods, services, and even ideals (such as citizenship and specific rights) that flow in and out of the favelas. The analytical model offered by Cresswell is useful to interrogate what types of mobility are encouraged to achieve integration and what types are prohibited, marked as dangerous, or targeted for regulation.

Pairing landscape with critical mobilities is a valuable analytical framework because the integration paradigm is an attempt to modify the exiting visual spatial ordering of Rio de Janeiro. As Soares (2013) argues, the landscape of Rio de Janeiro—in the sense of landscape as a type of city identity—has become an object of public policy; and one of the principal focuses of landscape-altering policy is modifying how the favelas are understood in relation to the broader city. Thus *landscape* allows an empirical evaluation of Rio de Janeiro as a whole; and *mobilities* provides the analytical means to understand how landscape is “called forth” beyond discourse. The two concepts together answer how favela integration fits into pre-existing and historic hegemony that for decades delegitimized favela neighbourhoods as malevolent urban blight as well as exposing residual revanchist politics embedded in state interventions.
3.3 Redefining the state

Building a theory of the state is difficult work in part because defining what “the state” is, where it begins and ends, and how it operates has proved near impossible. As Timothy Mitchell writes, any “scholarly analysis of the state is liable to reproduce in its own analytical tindiness [an] imaginary coherence and misrepresent the incoherence of state practice” (1999, 76). Both Mitchell (1991) and Jessop (2001) review the various theoretical attempts to describe and analyse the state post World War II. Mid-century social scientists largely abandoned the state of as object of analysis and instead favoured a political systems approach that avoided state singularity and attempted to understand the more complex connections between institutions, parties, and political actors in an era where comparative governance studies corresponded to United States and Western Europe’s international objectives during the uncertainty of the Cold War (T. Mitchell 1991). The political systems theory did not however solve the problem of defining the boundaries and limits of the state, and by the late 1960s and 1970s scholars were calling for a “return to the state” (Nettl 1968; Poulantzas 1978; Krasner 1978). Jessop points out this shift corresponded to the Latin American dependency theorists concerns regarding the role of the state in facilitating poor countries’ subjugation to wealthy countries in a world system of extractivist capitalism and alternatively how the state could be harnessed to prioritise national development and internal markets.

Political scientists and sociologists who revived the state constructed what was critiqued as a “statist” approach that fetishises the state as “an autonomous entity whose actions are not reducible to or determined by forces in society” (T. Mitchell 1991, 82). Jessop (2001, 153) refers to Marxist political economists of the time as following a “state-centred” approach that largely ignored Antonio
Gramsci (1971) and Nicolas Poulantzas’ (1978) efforts to pay closer attention to state power as relational and understand how its influence spread beyond its institutional boundaries. Nonetheless Jessop argues that state-cantered Marxists did well to note that political forces engender the state with a specific form and function that allow it a certain degree of autonomy to pursue political, economic and social objectives independent from civil society or the economy.

After tracing the modern historical development of how various fields of scholarship have engaged with the state, from Marxists, to Foucauldians, feminists, and neo-statists, Jessop summarises that:

\[\text{the state is seen as an emergent, partial, and unstable system that is interdependent with other systems in a complex social order. This has vastly expanded the realm of contingency in the state and its operations and this implies the need for more concrete, historically specific, institutionally sensitive, and action-oriented research} \]

(Jessop 2001, 166).\(^{22}\)

This thesis is informed by and indebted to Jessop’s substantial contributions to theorising the state and state power as objects of analysis. He influenced and collaborated with spatial thinking political theorists and geographers to develop a nuanced discussion on state scale and state space, which I return to in the next section. Ultimately, however, I do not abide by his theoretical approach here. Even though Jessop accounts for the weaknesses of past statist/state-centred approaches by understanding power as relational and by

\(^{22}\) Jessop later develops an impressive and comprehensive model to research the state called the "strategic-relational approach," (SRA) to which he has updated throughout the years to incorporate concepts and ideas from various fields including feminist theory, Foucault's notion of bio-power, and actor-network theory (Jessop 2008; also see Jessop, Brenner, and Jones 2008). I do not apply the SRA in this thesis but some scholars working in Brazil have (Ioris 2011; Leubolt 2013).
incorporating bits of feminist and post-structuralist critiques; his objective seems to be to finally arrive at that “totalising science” (Mitchell 1991) of a state, as if one can finally comprehensively study and understand The State if the model is complex enough. This is a task that I do not think possible. While he has said that a main objective of his approach is to find a Marxist way out of the structure-agency debate, he still understands “the state” as conceptually separate from “society” and “the economy.” These divisions allow critiques of neoliberalism to continue to see the state acting singularly with explicit intentions to facilitate the interests of a bourgeois capitalist class. This is a common position implied by the literature on Rio de Janeiro as a “city of exception” as noted in the previous chapter.

Mitchell offers an alternative approach that “acknowledges the power of the political arrangements that we call the state and at the same time account for their elusiveness” (19991, 94), that is the state as a structural effect. His theory builds on Foucault’s reading of power and notions of discipline and government. To approach the state, one must abandon the idea of a sovereign as the host, centre, and wielder of power, a power that is transformed into governing decisions and policies through a vast, strict hierarchy of systems and institutions. Rather, the ‘state effect’ perspective shifts to a concern with discipline, the various forms of local, internal, and productive powers that are increasingly organised and regulated into schools, armies, health systems, and bureaucracies. This is also referred to as the governmentisation of the state or statisation (see Ferguson 1990; Painter 2006). Mitchell sets out to do what Foucault did not, that is to explain how “disciplinary powers are somehow consolidated into the territorially based, institutionally structured order of the modern

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23 The strategic-relational approach became increasingly complex as Jessop incorporated ideas from critical realism, systems theory, regulation theory, actor-network theory, and Foucauldian theories on power (Jessop 2008; also see interview with Jessop on the SRA by Ji and Kytir 2014).
state” (1999, 178). The appearance of structure is fundamental; that is, the state is engendered as a structural entity separate from society on the one hand and economy on the other. I cite him at length:

*The precise specification of space and function that characterise modern institutions, the coordination of these functions into hierarchical arrangements, the organisation of supervision and surveillance, the marking out of time into schedules and programs, all contribute to constructing a world that appears to consist not of a complex of social practice but of a binary order: on the one hand individuals and their activities, on the other an inert “structure” that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives. Indeed the very notion of an institution, as an abstract framework separate from the particular practices it enframes, can be seen as the product of these techniques. Such techniques have given rise to the peculiar, apparently binary world we inhabit, where reality seems to take the two-dimensional form of individual versus apparatus, practice versus institution, social life and its structure—or society versus state (1991, 94).*

We must analyse the state as such, a structural effect. That is to say we should examine it not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist. (1999, 180).

Mitchell calls for interrogations of the state to further explicate the forces that give rise to structural effects. As an example he mentions how legal processes are organised into a framework, the law, that is imagined as controlling social behaviour from ‘above,’ and operating independent of the persons living ‘under it.’ The expression nobody is above the law reinforces this hierarchical and spatial division between individuals living in society and the mechanisms of discipline that give structure to the state. Applying this approach to the research problem presented in Chapter 1 could consider how urban planning
regulations and strategic policies seem to organise urban space and shape behaviour. But the favelas very explicitly and very visibly do not conform to planning codes or logic; and thus their very form does not produce the same state effect as the asfalto, but appears to challenge it. This thesis explores how favela-specific plans and policies address the failure of favelas to structure the state. The full significance of Mitchell’s state effect will be realised in discussing the production of territory, also as an effect, as fundamental to the duality of state/society.

### 3.4 State + space (under neoliberalism)

In understanding “favela integration” as a state spatial strategy and government programmes such as PAC, Morar Carioca, and UPP Social as state spatial projects, I am borrowing conceptual vocabulary from Neil Brenner (2004). However, my following of Mitchell and the state effect precludes a strict application of Brenner’s approach to state space. Below I summarise his major claims, and then clarify how I modify his conceptual terminology and specify to what degree I engage directly with his theories.

Brenner argues that accompanying the rise of contemporary neoliberal capitalism there has been a radical rescaling of “statehood”.²⁴ He classifies the era preceding the 1970s as “spatial Keynesianism”, that is the centralised national government of the nation-state pursued spatial policies that sought to distribute capital and development throughout its territory. This changed beginning in the 1970s with decentralisation of state regulatory authority, the

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²⁴ Brenner favours the term “statehood” over simply “the state” because, as he says, “it does not ontologically prejudge the configuration of state scalar organisation, the level of state centralisation, or the degree of institutional isomorphism among state agencies” (Brenner 2004, 4). The term refers broadly to social relations embedded in state institutions.
adoption of neoliberal discourses about market competitiveness in relation to subnational geographies, and the subsequent reordering of political economic policy so that cities and urban regions compete for resources and capitalist investment. This rescaling of statehood engenders and necessitates “new state spaces” from which state power facilitates economic policy.

Following Lefebvre’s (1991) seminal work *The Production of Space*, Brenner recognizes space as ‘co-constitutive’ of time and historicity and asserts that space is best understood within a dialectical space-as-process framework (Brenner 2004, 32). He establishes the inherent spatiality of the state by Lefebvre’s claims that the origin of the state lies in spaces of accumulation and that the principle of sovereignty attempts to encapsulate all spatialised political and economic processes by directing violence against space (Lefebvre 1991, 279-80). Lefebvre states that the ultimate goal of the state is “unification”, that is the production of space in which a homogeneous society is perfected. To Lefebvre, space is what makes the state concrete. Without a spatial framework, and without the conceptualisation of space as a contested social process, the state remains abstract. To ignore the production of state space results in what Brenner critiques as state-centrism, defined as perspectives that view space as static, social processes as contained by territorial boundaries and the nation-state as pre-existing condition of politics (Brenner 2004, 38, 43).

Brenner defines state space as dialectical: state space in the “narrow” and “integral” senses. State space in the narrow sense is territory-specific, and refers to distinctive physical organisational forms of the state and its juridico-political and regulatory institutions. The territorial characteristic of nation-states with heavily militarised external borders and differentiated partitioned subnational territories corresponds to state space in the narrow sense and results in the
common form of all states in the inter-state system of modern history (Taylor 2003). State space in the integral sense refers to how state institutions and their policies shape socioeconomic relations within specific geographies. In this broader conceptualisation of state space, spatial policies target social processes and economic relationships in place-specific areas of defined territories. It also includes the spatial effects of seemingly aspatial policies (such as fiscal policy). Taken together, the narrow and the integral dimensions of the state “interact reciprocally to produce historically specific formations of state spatiality” (Brenner 2004, 79). For Brenner, therefore, the production of the state and the exercise of state power are defined by this continuous dialectical process.25

Specifically, Brenner outlines two processes that spatially reproduce the state, and that I find useful in analyzing favela integration: state spatial projects and state spatial strategies. State spatial projects refer to administrative, bureaucratic and regulatory activities that simultaneously coordinate and differentiate state institutions at various locations and at all scales (national, subnational, regional, provincial, metropolitan and local). Because the projects operate with clear institutional objectives to regulate intrastate workings as well as to structure particular economic and other activities, state spatial projects are associated with state space in the narrow sense. State spatial strategies on the other hand are concerned less with institutional relations and more with

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25 Brenner et al. 2003 also names “representational state space” as a third dimension, This includes place- and scale- specific state spatial strategies, power/knowledge relations in the context of territory, and the everyday contested subjectivities of state spatiality. However writing alone, Brenner collapses representational state space into integral state space. The three dimensional approach appears to be an attempt to work within a state spatial trialectic, inspired by Lefebvre's trialectic of spatial practice, representations of space and representational space (Lefebvre 1991, 245). Brenner does not elaborate on why he leaves out this third dimension of state space in his personal work; but the reader might infer that he is more comfortable working within a dialectical framework, which is evident when analyzing the specifics of state spatial reproduction.
encouraging, regulating and manipulating geographies of economic development. The neoliberalised states examined by Brenner use a wide range of policy instruments—including housing policies, urban and regional planning, labour regulations, industrial development and economic initiatives—to facilitate capitalist accumulation, development and investment. State spatial strategies operate within state space in the integral sense (Brenner 2004, 92-93). Strategies and projects work parallel and simultaneously. State spatial projects decentralise regulatory authority to local and municipal levels leaving cities and local government bodies to develop, plan and implement place-specific economic policies. State spatial strategies seek to encourage territorial competitiveness by ensuring the redistribution of capital to those places (cities, municipalities and regions) deemed most productive.

Brenner’s theory on the rescaling of statehood and what he calls neo-localism is a useful reference point when discussing the federal programme PAC-favelas (discussed in Chapter 7). However I must differentiate my use of state spatial strategies and projects from how he defines them. Brenner’s theorisation of the state follows Jessop’s neo-Marxist approach and aims to understand how the state is spatially reproduced with the objective to neoliberalise socio-economic relations. My research questions are concerned with how the state is spatially reproduced through favela integration in response to the dichotomous urban divide between “the favela” and “the city.” As suggested in the previous section, a key claim of this thesis is that favela integration produces the state effect by spatially producing the state ‘inside’ the favelas, thus producing the favelas as ‘within’ the city. This objective is pursued to a large extent through regulating the flows in, out and through favela spaces. As such, I use state spatial strategy to refer to the efforts to integrally reconfigure the favela/cidade divide; and state spatial projects in reference to
specific activities, regulations, and policies and coordinated techniques employed materially. While this still corresponds to Brenner’s conceptualisation of state space in the integral and narrow sense, it also parallels Mitchell’s discussion of the appearance of [spatial] structure on the one hand and the efficient organisation of disciplinary power on the other.

3.5 Territory as effect

Territory, until recently, was left relatively unexplored in the emerging state space literature because it is historically associated with those approaches deemed statist. The often-cited critique is Agnew’s (1994) “territorial trap” in which he notes a number of assumptions political theorists attach to territory: that states operate absolute sovereignty within bounded, demarcated space; that political and economic relations are “polarised” between the domestic and international spheres; and that the state is best understood as a container, or series of containers (Taylor 2003), encompassing the economy and society. Agnew’s critique was couched in the debate on the crisis of the state in a globalising world. Territory has conceptually been re-imagined within the discipline of geography by Painter as effect—following Mitchell’s the state effect. Particularly useful is that his relational-network approach is applicable up and down the state scale. It is the final conceptual tool necessary to analyse favela integration as a state spatial strategy of territory. Below I review Painter’s theory with references to the Brazilian geographers Souza (1995) and Haesbaert (2004), but first I review how scholars currently employ territory to discuss the favelas in relation to state power in order to distinguish my approach here.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, when drug-trafficking gangs began to operate systematically in Rio de Janeiro and exerted
increased control over daily life, researchers referred to gang “territorialisation” of the favelas. In some cases the term is employed without a discussion of its conceptual history or literature and with various degrees of nuance. Often the author simply wishes to indicate that the gang, not the state, operates a monopoly of violence within the bounded space of the favela (Burgos 1998; Goldstein 2003; Vargas 2006). State discourse of favela pacification relies heavily on “reclaiming territory” from the gangs (Prouse 2013). Others refer to favelas as territories in order to call attention to their apparently bounded unique spatial qualities (Koster 2009; Izaga and Pereira 2014; Olinger 2015). While Brenner and Elden (2009) wish to make an explicit distinction between territory as place and territory as state space, I do not think such a distinction can be made in this case. Even when the term is invoked to refer to a favela as a bounded place, the implication is that it is a bounded space apart from the state.

More nuanced uses make this obvious as they generally correspond to Taylor’s (2003, 101) definition of territoriality—“a form of behaviour that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome”—even if not explicitly referenced or constructed independently. For example, Cavalcanti calls territorialisation a “regime of power” in which the power of the drug trade becomes objectified (materially consequential) through the threat or use of force in the spaces of the favelas. Paired with internal and external discourse constructing the favelas as domains of the gangs, the boundaries of the favelas become structural principles of daily life (Cavalcanti 2007, 236–37). Thus the theorisation of favela territorialisation in Rio de Janeiro rests on the Weberian notion of legitimate claim to a monopoly of violence paired to the idea of the state as bounded territorial power. In the case of the favelas, the state’s power stops at the boundary of the favelas, in part because the gangs performatively patrol the space and claim authority through the
use/threat of force, and in part because discursively the gangs are recognised in media and quotidian discourse as in control. Thus, scholarly, journalist, and vernacular understanding of favelas as subject to the territorial rule of the gangs—or more recently the milicias\textsuperscript{26}—discursively reinforces the spatial otherness of the favelas as [illegitimate] territories ‘outside’ of the unnamed legitimate territory of the rest of the city in which the state presumably rules unchallenged.

The construction of territorialisation as a Durkheimian social fact\textsuperscript{27} has proven useful to examine the ways in which gangs’ use of force spatially produces the favela and effects residents’ embodied experience of the socio-spatial fragmentation of urban space as they ‘cross over’ demarcated boundaries on their way to/from home. But in such cases this responds to territory as place rather than territory as state space. If used to describe state territoriality it falls into Agnew’s “trap” and a statist approach to space.

The Brazilian geographer Marcelo Lopes de Souza (1995) develops perhaps the most thorough concept of territory at the urban scale and territoriality in relation to organised criminal authority in Brazil. Drawing from sources as diverse as Sun Tzu, Hannah Arendt, and Claude Raffestin; he understands territory most basically as a concept to discuss power relations that define and bound a space. He recognises different territories, from the traditional nation-state—

\textsuperscript{26} While the milicias and trafico are both organised crime syndicates with comparable behaviours, they are not a perfect parallel in this example principally because the milicias were, at least at their origins, composed of police officers with strong and open connections to local politicians who defended the milicianos territorialisation as doing the state a favour in combating drug trafficking and keeping peace. In that sense, the milicias were discursively produced as quasi-state actors, although public perception and the modus operandi of the police mafias have changed significantly in recent years. There is still very little research published on the milicias.

\textsuperscript{27} Durkheim (1982) defined a “social fact” in The Rules of Sociological Method as any behaviours or thoughts that individuals coercively incorporate into their daily lives as a result of external pressures.
reified through ideology and metaphor—to the complex quotidian territorialisation of place, often with a distinct temporality, in the metropolis (for example zones of sex work). He categorises drug gang “command” of the favelas as “low definition territoriality” since the disperse groups operate in open conflict with one another. He argues that the specificities of gang territorialisation in Rio de Janeiro necessitates building a “conceptual bridge” between the traditional territory presupposing spatial contingency and network, the sewing together of the flows of people and goods (Ibid., 94) acting as points in space. He proposes to call networked-territories “discontinuous territories” as opposed to “continuous territories.” The defining difference being that discontinuous territories are constructed through networked points (people and objects) and continuous territories operate unchallenged across the surface of space. For the purposes of this project, I do not see the necessity of distinguishing between continuous and discontinuous territories if the major difference is whether or not multiple armed groups dispute control. The undisputed territory is still a product of networked points; and in the case of gang territorialisation of favelas, the space is always in dispute—if not between different gang factions then by the state. Still, Souza offers an early example of thinking through territory both relationally and with networks.

Territory as defined by Painter (2010) is the effect of networked social technologies (technical and material) that produce contiguous, continual, and bounded spaces. In relation to state territory, this amounts to the appearance of state sovereignty operating evenly, in some cases homogeneously, across bounded space. Painter balks at academic discourses that view “territory and network [as] incommensurable and competing forms of spatial organisation, and that territory thinking and network thinking are mutually incompatible” (2010, 1093). Territory is produced through
socio-technical processes, following Andrew Barry’s (2001) definition of *technology*: “a concept which refers not just to a [technical] device in isolation but also to the forms of knowledge, skill, diagrams, charts, calculations and energy which make its use possible” (cited in Painter 2010, 1105). Painter continues: “from this perspective, effectuating territory requires considerable inputs of labour, expertise and other resources. Moreover, the work involved is continuous and repetitive. Delimitation, contiguity and coherence have to be constantly reproduced to sustain the effect of territory through time” (1105). Examples of socio-technologies that Painter studied in relation to the production of English regions include various forms of mapping, strategic policy documents, economic modelling, and benchmark setting. In reference to favela integration we could include the techniques of urban planning and governance, architectural plans, mapping, policy documents—in short the activities and results of state spatial projects.

Painter is not alone in insisting that territory and networks are *not* diametrically opposed. In debunking the “myth of deterritorialisation,” the Brazilian geographer Haesbaert writes, “today, territorialisation also means to construct and/or control flows/networks and create symbolic references in a space in movement, in and by movement” (2004, 280). This idea that a territory is maintained through meaningful repeated actions, in particular movement, is of particular interest to my analysis of favela integration, both because of the attention paid to critical mobilities as well as the types of technologies the strategy of integration rolls out in the favelas.
3.6 Conclusions

This chapter presented two separate but related theoretical frames through which I analyse the paradigm of favela integration. The first pairs landscape with mobilities. Examining favela integration through the lens of landscape reveals spatial ideology at work. An uninhabitable imagination of human ecology—in this case a city—landscape obscures dominant social relations and renders socio-spatial conflict passive and distant. Critical mobilities—focusing on how urban space is experienced and how political relations shape that experience—brings social, cultural and economic power dynamics to the foreground. In accordance with Soares, I argue that the state has devised and implemented policies that seek to alter the working of hegemonic landscape in relation to the favelas. I draw on Creswell’s politics of mobility in order to critically understand the objectives of favela integration and to reveal how the proposed landscape, the “integrated city,” is called forth to do political work. In addition to building on emerging literature exploring the interaction of landscape and mobilities, in applying this framework I demonstrate how the politics of mobilities can be a useful tool to examine informal housing settlements, especially in regards to state interventions.

The second framework engages with state spatiality. In bringing together Mitchell’s theorisation of the state effect with Painter’s similar approach to territory as effect and borrowing from Brenner the conceptual framework of how states are reproduced though strategies and projects, I have constructed a theoretical approach to analyse the planning and governance paradigm of “favela integration” as a strategy that structures the state in relation to society by producing the favela as state territory. In this sense, the interventions targeting the favelas for integration work to redefine
the favela-city divide by transforming how the state is spatially reproduced in relation to the favelas.
Chapter 4 – Methodology and Methods

This chapter presents the methodological approach to the research problem as well as methods of data collection. Discourse analysis and participant-observation are well suited to address the social, political, spatial and economic complexities of the current state interventions into the city's favelas. The research design closely follows the problem and questions as outlined in Chapter One:

- How is “favela integration” discursively produced and defined by the state in Rio de Janeiro as part of a larger narrative of urban reform and renewal?
- How is the meaning of “integration” interpreted, represented, challenged, or appropriated by popular media, special interest groups and common citizens?
- In what ways do state interventions designed to “integrate” the favelas transform urban space?
- How do techniques of urban planning and governance establish favelas as legitimate urban space subject to and benefiting from state rule?

The first two questions note discourse analysis as an approach to examine the production of favela integration as a way of thinking and consider its implications for the notion of cityscape. Discourse analysis parallels and complements participant-observation and semi-structured interviews. I do not present the research as ethnography even though ethnographic methodology was pivotal to the research design, particularly my approach to questions related to the material practice of favela integration as a state intervention, the production of the urban space mediated through state projects, and the socio-spatial differentiations dependent on the favela/cidade categorical binary. Additionally, three researchers who employed discourse analysis to
inform and guide their ethnographic inquiries were especially influential to the formative ideas to my research.

Emphasizing discourse analysis within ethnographic inquiry is particularly useful when the researcher engages the concept of ‘state’ or the workings of policy and social programming. Gupta (1995; 2012) argues that discourse analysis compensates for methodological weaknesses of participant-observation. Face-to-face encounters “in the field” and in close proximity to “the other” are not enough to understand how the state is constructed. Research subjects and informants are contained to a localised area (the researcher-defined field-site), but they regularly engage with media operating beyond the local geography. Discourse analysis allows an extension of the analytical framework beyond the traditional geographically defined locality of the neighbourhood.

Employing on discourse analysis, Ferguson (1990) revealed how the international paradigm of “development” consolidated a specific type of knowledge necessary to construct poor countries, and socioeconomic relations of regions within poor countries, as knowable objects that are subject to “development” knowledge. Scholars or civil servants write country reports and project plans that may directly contradict published data or their own personal knowledge in order to construct a targeted region/country as subject and responsive to the tools of development. Although it is a leap from “development” in Lesotho to “favela integration” in Rio de Janeiro, Ferguson’s observation that “thinking is as ‘real’ an activity as any other, and that ideas and discourses have important and very real social consequences […]” (1990: xv) was especially helpful. Consequently, I sought to design a research project that would uncover some of the “very real social consequences” that result from a possible paradigm shift in thinking about the relationship between the favelas of Rio and state-stimulated urban development.
Finally, Tarlo conducted analysis on various genres of text—historical intellectual accounts, political propaganda, bureaucratic documents, and a museum exhibition—in her study of The Emergency (1975-1977) in India under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Discourse permeates the “everyday” through various types of media; and the strategy of collecting data for discourse analysis can simultaneously engage with critical reflexive processes that define ethnography. Tarlo blends the two methods to the extent that she gathered productive ethnographic data while conducting archival research in a municipal records office and while scrutinizing the historiography of Indira Gandhi and her family in their family home-turned museum.

This chapter is structured in eight sections. The first details the context in which I began fieldwork and how the research project came close to a radical change given the sudden appearance of urban protests in Rio de Janeiro. Section 3.2 builds on the literatures of ‘global ethnography’ and multi-site ethnography, ultimately arguing for an un-sited field through the application of Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad. In section 3.3, I lay out the differences between my approach and that of traditional ethnography. Discussed in greater detail below, my approach lacked the process of embedding myself in a place, community, or institution, but I maintain that both the fieldwork and analysis were fundamentally ethnographic. Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 elaborate on each of the three strategies used to collect and analyse data: participant observation, discourse analysis, and semi-structured interviews, in that order. Finally, I discuss relevant ethical considerations before closing with a chapter summary.

4.1 Beginning fieldwork and reflections on a path not taken

Prior to initiating fieldwork the research design relied on a hybrid of urban ethnography and ethnography of the state; however during fieldwork I deviated from this design in two significant ways.
First, there was a temporary shift in focus during six months of intense urban dissent and disruption that occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 2013. The second deviation was the realisation that I could not conduct traditional ethnography given the scope of the project’s principal research question and constraints faced while in the field (related to time, resources, and research ethics). Both of these deviations are discussed below. Not only does detailing the ‘paths not taken’ enrich the methodological discussion, it also indicates what this project ultimately pursued. Moreover, while this monograph neither centres on popular resistance nor takes the form of traditional ethnography, acts of dissent were ever-present during fieldwork as well as analysis and the production of data, and it follows many of the principles (if not the form) of ethnography.

Formal fieldwork began in April 2013 and ended in October 2014. After the first six months, I returned to London for two months, during which I met with supervisors and presented and discussed research progress and possible shifts in focus. A pressing concern was whether to include the growing social movements of dissent into my research design. Roughly two months after my arrival, in mid-June 2013, urban protests erupted across Brazil (Maricato 2013). Rio de Janeiro quickly became the vanguard of urban dissent with regular protests and extended occupations outside the governor’s private residence and the Municipal Legislature (Venturini

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28 Prior to systematically collecting data, I conducted three preliminary trips to Rio de Janeiro between 2010 and 2013 totalling eight weeks in order to elaborate a research project proposal, familiarise myself with the city, collect various relevant texts (newspaper clippings, government promotional materials about urban redevelopment, and scholarly books) and gain valuable language experience. I learned Portuguese rapidly due to the language’s similarity to Spanish. Prior to beginning the PhD, I lived in Buenos Aires from 2008-2011 where I completed a master’s degree at the University of Buenos Aires. In 2010 I began Portuguese language classes, which continued through 2011. After my move to London I continued private study, largely through regular reading of Brazilian newspapers and texts relevant to my research. I spoke fluently by the time I began formal fieldwork.
The street demonstrations made for sensationalist headlines that dominated the newspapers and vexed politicians for months (Amar 2013; Solano, Manso, and Novaes 2014). Commentators criticized President Dilma’s and the PT’s meek support of protestors’ rights, and public approval of Rio’s Governor, Sergio Cabral, dropped to single digits, the lowest of any sitting executive politician in the country (Saad-Filho 2013). While protests in June and July attracted hundreds of thousands of Cariocas, participation withered by September. Relatively small street marches continued semi-regularly well into 2014, particularly in the run up to and through the FIFA Men’s World Cup Tournament, and then for the most part ceased.

As a critical geographer with a history in grassroots organizing, I began accompanying the protests, which were profoundly urban and relatable to the literatures that informed my research questions. I frequented street demonstrations, protest encampments, activist planning meetings, and social events. Some of the resistance was directly related to my research, particularly protests organised by favela activists. I continued to collect data following my defined research questions, collecting news and popular media, political and technocratic texts related to the urbanisation and integration of Rio’s favelas; but I also took extensive notes while conducting participant observation of urban resistance and collected texts related to the protests with the objective of carving out a significant portion of my dissertation to discuss urban dissent and the right to the city.29 The two-month pause in my fieldwork, during November and December of 2013, provided opportunity to organise research materials and contextualise the seemingly spontaneous grassroots dissent on the

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29 Throughout the protests I wrote blogs and essays about the radical social movements organizing and leading dissent (Landesman 2013a; 2013b; 2014a), the particularities of favela-organised protests (Landesman 2014b), and the significance of media activism and citizen journalists in both reporting and producing resistance (Landesman and Davis, Forthcoming).
one hand and the state governance and planning programmes to make Rio de Janeiro more equitable and socially cohesive on the other hand.

I synthesised my fieldwork and initial findings into a short presentation delivered to a small group of faculty and PhD students at the LSE Department of Geography & Environment. Despite the potential links between the new urban social movements and state spatial strategies in Rio de Janeiro, following the protests as a new principal centre to the research would have meant rapidly designing a new set of research questions and put pressure on the ability to complete fieldwork as events would determine research timing. I decided to return to Rio de Janeiro and refocus on the original objective of interrogating the paradigm of favela integration.

Despite the decision to refocus the research on the state paradigm of favela integration and the specific programmes and projects meant to realise the idealised integrated city, following the protests and social movements proved beneficial on multiple fronts. The public debates instigated by the protests rapidly advanced my understanding of local politics, the legislative process, and public security policies. Conducting participant-observation at demonstrations, occupations and additional events brought me into contact with many local activists, civil society actors, journalists, and state employees relevant to the original project. One contact I met at a protest in July 2013 worked at the municipal Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP), which administered UPP Social. He later introduced me to various UPP Social employees and became a close friend. My experience following the protests also bought me some “street credit” with certain audiences, particularly activists but also critical thinking technocrats and architects who sympathized with the protestors and found their right-to-the-city discourse enticing. On more than one occasion I was introduced as a researcher of urban dissent or a researcher interested in state urbanisation of favelas but who also is
“very involved with the protests of 2013.” These introductions piqued the interests of potential research participants. I would offer a corrective contextualisation of my research objectives; but my experience and perspective on the urban protests as a foreign researcher with a history of grassroots organizing provided useful as a conversation topic in many situations. To some extent this engagement might be considered a form of exchange—I was able to offer insight, with a certain degree of expertise and familiarity, on a timely topic in which people were interested, prior to soliciting their knowledge and expertise as architects, planners, or advocates connected to the state programmes I was examining. Of course, these exchanges were weighted to my benefit. Even so, in certain cases conversations about the 2013 protests and urban resistance both established common intellectual ground as well as signalled to participants my critical approach.

Lastly I believe that the seemingly spontaneous protests and nascent urban social movements of 2013-2014 demanded critical discussions about the current state of the city in the media, professional associations and networks, as well as in ordinary conversations between residents. As such, many research participants offered critical analysis of state interventions in the favelas, often pointing out, unprompted, discrepancies between official discourse and their lived experience. I cannot speculate as to whether widespread critical reflection resulted from the protests—indubitably many of my research participants have a long history of critical thinking—but I have no doubt that the extended moment of popular resistance in 2013-2014 and the various movements that continue in its wake made dissent more visible and weakened the hegemonic consensus defining favela integration and the integrated city.
4.2 Defining the field using Lefebvre’s spatial triad

Conducting a thorough inquiry of the urban state requires a departure from the traditional clearly defined field-site. Because “the state” and “the city” are not reducible to neatly defined neighbourhoods, the traditional site of urban ethnography (Hannerz 2003), the field necessarily must be constructed on a different scale according to different parameters. A growing number of researchers have begun to practice and advocate for multi-site ethnography since George Marcus’s (1995) influential article arguing that ethnographic research in a transnational capitalist world requires researchers to free themselves from the bounded limitations of single-sited ethnography (for examples of multi-site ethnography of informal housing settlements, see Ghertner 2015; M. Richmond 2015).

The rise of globalisation as a field of study led to the global ethnography, for which Michael Burawoy and his collaborating team abandoned the Chicago School field-site in order to study the relationships between constructed “fields” (Burawoy et al. 2000). This redesign of ethnography unsurprisingly results in pragmatic and conceptual complications. Candea (2009) argues that multi-site ethnography ignores the benefits of constructing a single site—principally the methodological benefits of clear inclusion/exclusion criteria—and that it naively presumes that transgressing a single site invariably results in a more complete knowledge. Cook and colleagues (Cook, Laidlaw, and Mair 2009) support Candea’s critique, noting that advocates of multi-site ethnography falsely presume that single-sited ethnographies are somehow less rich or less complex. They instead move conceptually beyond site as a container in which the researcher collects data by applying the geographical concepts of space, place and field. Field, they argue is simply “the sum total of all the points in the network [...] examined” in the course of the ethnography (Ibid. 60).
Thus the researchers ‘un-site’ the field in which the ethnography occurs, allowing the researcher to follow leads to diverse places and spaces.

My own research does not seek to understand the whole of a world system, follow ethnic diasporas or migration patterns, examine transnational capital flows or any research topic explicitly noted by Marcus in his original call for multi-sited ethnographies. Nor does it follow Burawoy’s theories of the globalisation of capital and transnational labour. Nonetheless the debate is relevant to my methodological framework because constructing a singular or finite number of field-site(s) as criteria for inclusion/exclusion is counter-intuitive to the research questions at hand. Favela integration is discursively produced through an array of media—political rhetoric and technical documents, mainstream news media and online social networks—and experienced not only in the favelas during the public works financed by the state programmes but also favela tourism, *baile funk* dance parties frequented by middle class youth, artist exhibitions both in favelas and museums, press conferences and protests. Rather than privileging one or two specific places in Rio de Janeiro and gathering data through observing and participating in the daily lives of corresponding inhabitants, I collected data in order to trace the socio-spatial process of favela integration and the re-visioning of cityscape across the city. Over the course of my fieldwork, I sought out where integration discourse was produced and practiced, or alternatively where integration was contested and resisted through countervailing discourse or acts of protest. Physical boundaries demarcating the field-site are therefore supplanted by spatial parameters of state intervention.

In order to translate this conceptualisation of field-as-spatial-process into the pragmatic selection of networked points (to follow Cook et al. 2009), I rely on the work of Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre
sought to lay the foundations for a ‘science of space’ in his seminal work, The Production of Space (1991) through disassociating mental space—which he characterised as realms created by philosophers and intellectuals to categorise knowledge by discipline and framework—and physical space—which he defined as the practice of listing things in space—from social space. Social [ontological] space, argued Lefebvre, is a set of ‘creative’ relations and forms. Both ‘work and product’, space is the materialisation of ‘social being”’ (Ibid., 102).

The concept of space as a social process—rather than a static background in which social relations and behaviours manifest—radically influenced the social sciences in what theorists label the spatial turn (Massey 2005; Warf and Arias 2009).30 Lefebvre conceptualised space as a concrete abstraction, “a universal form of social practice” (Stanek 2011, 134). Building on Hegel and Marx, Lefebvre states that space is both abstract—in the sense that as a concept it generalises distinct materialities—and real—giving form to the social relations necessary to engender productive forces (although he does concede that space is not as tangible as Marx’s commodity or money) (Lefebvre 1991, 27).

Of the triad mental-physical-social space, Lefebvre further conceptualises social space into a second dual triad of perceived, conceived, and lived space and spatial practice, representations of space and spaces of representation. Most Lefebvre scholars agree on the pairing between the parallel triads (that is perceived space/spatial practice, conceived space/representations of space, and lived space/spaces of representation) as well as basic categorical definitions of the triad terminology (Stanek 2011, 129).

30 Indeed the work of Lefebvre has become so widespread that his radical positionality as a Marxist philosopher is often ignored, and indeed some of his work—particularly his ‘right to the city’ framework (1996)—has been appropriated by mainstream liberal institutions and discourse (for example see: UN-Habitat report (2010) titled The Right to the City: Bridging the Urban Divide).
Representations of space, or conceived space, have been described as ‘discourses on space’ (Shields 1999), and associated with fields of knowledge (for example urban planning, mathematics, and architecture): the mental or imagined spaces of maps, plans, design schemata and so on. Lefebvre warns that ideology is often imbued in conceived space disguised as knowledge (1991, 45) and subsequently enacted through spatial practices. Spatial practices, or perceived space, are material interventions into the physicality of the environment: for example engineering works related to infrastructure, housing complexes or constructed boundaries (walls, demarcations of national territories etc…). Finally, spaces of representation, or lived space, are fluid and defined by everyday actions of those actors inhabiting space, appropriating symbols and reproducing social meaning. Shields (1996) named lived space discourses of space (as opposed to the discourses on space associated with conceived space). These three interlocking and interdependent processes work together in the production of space.

Thinking about social phenomena through this three-pronged conceptualisation of space can be confusing. The difference between spatial practices/perceived space and spaces of representation/lived space can seem particularly nuanced, subtle, or overlapping. Conceived space is identified easily enough by its mental abstraction; like a photograph, it means to represent something more complex. It relies on experiential knowledge (in the case of a photograph) or technical knowledge (in the case of an engineering blueprint) to understand the implications of the abstraction. Perhaps the difficulty in clearly delineating spatial practice from spaces of representation (note that rigid categorisation is not the objective since the conceptual triad is only valid when considered together) is that these two spaces both seem to be physical, material, and tangible. But materiality does not act as a defining attribute in Lefebvre’s triad. Spatial practice does
deal with physicality, but necessarily in relation to the subjective interpretation of physical form. It is not simply what we see, but how we see (and in the instances of intervention, how we act), hence the pairing of spatial practice and perceived space. Lived space is less closely associated with physical form and more concerned with social meanings that are (re)produced when social actors appropriate (inhabit) physical forms through spatial (inter)actions.

As noted by Pierce and Martin (2015) the most common application of Lefebvre’s Production of Space is to empiricise one leg of the spatial triad in order to analyse a set of data while abstracting from the other two. However, this violates Lefebvre’s insistence that “the triadic relations are always simultaneous and co-constituting: conception, for example, never proceeds separately from the traces of practice or experience, and must always be simultaneous rather than partial or fragmented” (Ibid., 1286). The authors do sympathize with colleagues and acknowledge that Lefebvre seemed uninterested in the applicability of the spatial triad outside of historical analysis. They argue that a relational-place approach is the best way to study the production of space as a unity object, concluding that, “a relational place-oriented approach exerts a kind of methodological demand that researchers acknowledge the epistemological multi-dimensionality of places” (Ibid, 1295). In doing so they build on, and critique, the work of Merrifield (1993) who argued for a reconciliation of the two concepts through a Marxist dialectic—space as a process and place as the concrete location—in which the spatial triad liberates place from its Cartesian confinements.

While Pierce and Martin’s paper is epistemologically useful, the implications for fieldwork methods are far from explicit and, similarly to Merrifield, their arguments imply the application of a spatial analytical framework to a bounded site or place. Increasingly ethnographers appear to design a methodological approach with the
spatial triad in mind—for example Rickly (2016) on the body and the production of rock climbing spaces; Petersen and Minnery (2013) on the meaning of home for older people living in retirement housing; Shortell and Brown (2016) on walking and urban ethnography of The European City; and Jones and Popke (2010) on a US Department of Housing demolition and rebuild intervention. Predominantly, however, urban ethnographers have applied Lefebvre’s theories on the production of space as a theoretical tool of spatial analysis rather than as a guide towards a spatialised methodology (for example Vargas 2006; Zeiderman 2008).

Knott goes further than most in explicating the methodological implication of Lefebvre’s theories in her decade-long project to develop a spatial approach to studying religion (Knott 2005; Knott 2009; Knott 2015). She writes, “the aspects of space—developed from Lefebvre’s spatial triad—provide a way of breaking open a place, object or event with reference to its spatial routines and representations” (Knott 2009, 417). She argues that a well-developed spatial framework, building on Lefebvre’s Production of Space and subsequent theorists associated with the spatial turn (D. Harvey 1992; Soja 1996; Massey 2005), constitutes a methodology as “a system of principles, practices, and procedures applied […]. Rather than a set of practical methods—which we often associate with the idea of methodology—this approach is analytical and interpretive. Although it would certainly inform the collection of data, it is not a guide to the means by which those data should be collected” (Knott 2005, 176).

Following Knott, I submit an explicit methodological operationalisation of Lefebvre’s triad to construct an un-sited field. The field, that spatial process producing favela integration, supplants the site in facilitating the locating of data. I thus engage with the literature on global, multi- and un-sited ethnography in order to build
on the methodological applications of Lefebvre’s spatial theories, particularly Knott’s acknowledgment of how those theories inform the collection, if not the method, of data. By naming favela integration a spatial process I necessarily triggered the spatial triad, which in turn demanded the collection of data corresponding to the three prongs of the triad. This translated into seeking out those locations where favela integration was produced without fretting whether or not it corresponded to a fixed-location field-site: diverse texts that produce the policy and interventions meant to engender the integrated city (laws, programme literature, expert analysis, political speeches) as well as texts in response (from civil society, news media, citizens on social media), research seminars on favelas and public policy at universities, debates about improving auto-constructed homes as complementary to social housing construction at the Rio de Janeiro Architects Association, the physical work sites of project interventions and their finished results; art exhibitions and cultural events—from the Art Museum of Rio de Janeiro, to an open-air photography installation in the gardens of the National Palace, to a one-day “cultural occupation” in the favela of Vila Matinha in the Complexo de Alemão—meant to curate comment and debate on the historic transformations of Rio de Janeiro as an unequal and segregated city; public debates about gentrification in Vidigal or security and police repression in Alemão, or the screening of a documentary about favela tourism projected on to a white sheet hung between two posts in a public square in the middle-class neighbourhood of Laranjeiras.

In sum, the field constructed around a spatial process facilitated my own movement (both physical and conceptual) between discursive and conceived imaginations of favela integration (representations of space/conceived space); physical sites of state territorialisation meant to spatially practice integration, such as infrastructure, housing, or policing projects (spatial
practices/perceived space); and the quotidian experience of integration, that is the everyday social processes and relationships affecting and affected by the "integration" paradigm (spaces of representation/lived space).

4.3 Ethnographic, not ethnography

My research design, questions, and fieldwork objectives are characteristically ethnographic; however, due to significant deviations from traditional methods resulting from decisions made while in the field, I do not present this thesis as ethnography. In this section I would like to make a claim to an ethnographic approach, however I first must acknowledge three principal differences that preclude a claim to ethnography. I did not embed myself in an objectively defined field-site, case, or institution, with discernible inclusion/exclusion criteria. Relatedly, data collection did not depend on my personal relationships to participants or tacit knowledge of specific places. Finally, while reflexive, analysis does not continuously make explicit my own experience and reflexions, centre around finite, in-depth case studies, or seek to explain socio-cultural phenomena from the perspective or through the voices of a population specific to a site/field/institution/case.

As discussed above, multi-sited and un-sited ethnography have emerged in recent years in the contexts of global and urban research (of course the two often overlap). While these progressive approaches challenge the Cartesian definition of field, ethnography still fundamentally requires a level of embeddedness, a mutual adoption between a researcher and a community. A less romanticized characterisation may not require “adoption” which implies that the researcher is considered part of the community, if only temporarily. Institutional ethnography or ethnography of infrastructure (for example a road) may not have an obvious community to which the
researcher approximates assimilation. In such cases the researcher must then embed themselves in the social relations that define the field (for example see Uribe 2016; P. Harvey 2005). It is in part the tension of the insider/outsider status that produces rich and valuable analysis that distinguishes ethnography from other qualitative approaches (Woodward 2008; Kondo 1986).

The privileged quality of data and the closeness to the research subjects requires a significant time investment in order to build trusting relationships and to know the field-site, that is to inhabit the space in the Lefebvrean sense. This investment may be greater for non-native ethnographers, who may find local participants curious and forthcoming, but nonetheless face handicaps related to language, local history and customs, shared social networks, and tacit knowledge of place and culture. Non-native, and non-local, researchers conducting ethnography in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro may spend months selecting a site and finding a place to live, and then months more building a local network of trusting and meaningful relationships with neighbours and potential research-participants (for e.g. Goldstein 2003; Penglase 2014; Cavalcanti 2007). Ethnography of the state—for example through an institution, office of state bureaucracy, or project—have different but equally challenging barriers to entry. Unless data collection occurs in a public space, the researcher’s presence is most likely subject to approval from authority figures before navigating the awkward logistics of closely observing people as they work (for e.g. Gupta 1995; Sundaresan 2015; Zeiderman 2016).

My research questions pertain to favela integration as a paradigm—a way of thinking about, a way of seeing, urban development in the context of segregation and inequality that has influenced academics and experts, civil society, cultural activists, technocrats, and policy makers—and as a collection of state policies
and programmes that target the favelas for intervention. These programmes are diverse in tactics but all profess similar objectives of ending the bifurcation of Rio de Janeiro between the favela (informal, irregular, lawless, lacking) and the asfalto (legal, legitimate, state regulated). This research project collected data on three of those programmes: (1) Morar Carioca, the evolution of the celebrated slum upgrading programme Favela-Bairro, (2) the participatory data and planning programme UPP Social, and (3) PAC-favelas, also a project to “urbanise” favelas but with significant resources for “social infrastructure” such as health centres and schools and a predisposition for high profile “connective” transport architecture. In addition to these three programmes (which span the municipal, state-province, and federal governments) I make regular mention of a fourth programme, the “pacifying police” referred to as the UPP, however as explained in Chapter One I chose not to focus my research on the police nor urban violence/security. Embedding myself into all three of these programmes simultaneously or sequentially, while also leaving time to explore favela integration by non-state actors, would have been impossible to achieve in equal depth given time limitations.

While the physical settings of ethnography have evolved beyond rural and easily demarcated single sites, the classic field diary and notebook remain standard-requisites of ethnography (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2011; Goodall 2000). I kept a diary while conducting fieldwork, both in notebooks and digitally. I took notes while conducting participant observation during site visits, community meetings, after interviews and conversations, and protests. I also wrote regularly reflecting on the days and weeks, synthesizing experiences into cohesive narratives or potential arguments. While reflexive and detailed, I did not make writing diary entries a strict habit, thus failing a basic requisite of the ethnography tradition. Furthermore, while I often consulted my diary and notes while
writing the empirical chapters, I do not treat my entries as data in themselves, nor quote those entries at length, as is common with reflexive ethnographic analysis (Burawoy 2003; Willis and Trondman 2000; Goodall 2000).

My position avoids the methodological turf war over what does and does not constitute “real ethnography” (Agar 2006; Ingold 2014) while affirming that the strategies included in the ethnographer’s toolkit are valuable even if disassembled from the whole. Thus I view this research as a similar to those scholars that blur the boundaries of ethnography by incorporating methods such as discourse and historical analysis. Not only have I built my research questions upon a base of literature rich with ethnographic analysis, I also borrowed heavily from the tradition of participant-observation, reflexive field notes, extended fieldwork, and analysis that required the synthesis of varied qualitative data.

4.4 Participant observation

Ethnographic inquiries privileging participant observation have revealed new understandings of the role of the state in a thoroughly urban and globalised world. Although sociologists concerned with the social order of political and economic exclusion in urban metropolises promoted ethnographic grounded theory during the first half of the twentieth century (Apter et al. 2009), contemporary researchers draw from a broad range of critical social theory to produce and promote novel forms of urban ethnography in the age of the mega-city, globalisation, and neoliberalism (Snow, Morrill, and Anderson 2003; Bourgois 2002; Bourgois 2009; Burawoy et al. 2000; Wilson and Chaddha 2009). Likewise, as the state emerged as a legitimate subject of ethnographic inquiry, participant-observation has presented valuable new analyses of the state’s changing position in relation to the unyielding encroachment of
transnational capitalism (Auyero 2000; Auyero, Lara, and Berti 2014; Billo and Mountz 2016; Biehl and McKay 2012).

Participant-observation that I conducted in the field can be grouped into three settings. The first is the aforementioned spaces of resistance. I draw from protests and community meetings organised and attended by favela residents and civil society directly related to state interventions and the idea of “integration,” or more broadly related to urban inequality, segregation, violence and social justice. Protests and other acts of resistance were generally public and publicized on social media and reported by news media. By showing up and hanging out, marching, and listening to debates (at one point baking cookies and bringing food supplies to occupiers outside the Governor’s Leblon penthouse, outside the Municipal Legislature, and inside an indigenous museum and cultural centre adjacent to the Maracanã stadium), I met activists, organisers, other researchers, and local and international journalists. These moments led to discussions and debates that I would later record in notebooks or as audio dictations and would consider ethnographic encounters (Ingold 2014), as well as more introductions to new contacts which sometimes led to formal interviews and in a few cases friendships that continue to this day.

The second were site visits to various favelas in Rio de Janeiro where Morar Carioca, PAC, and UPP Social were operating. The project where I spent a significant amount of time, often for hours hanging about was the PAC intervention in Complexo do Alemão, in particular the flagship infrastructure of the Teleférico do Alemão, the first public mass-transit gondola heralded by local and national politicians. I toured the Teleférico and Complexo (in that order) with a World Bank contractor, led by a local entrepreneur tour guide. I regularly chatted with residents as we shared a gondola cabin and employees at the station, librarians and doctors at their places of work inside the large
Teleférico stations, and shop owners in the vicinity. On a few occasions I visited with friends—both local Brazilians and internationals (such as the World Bank contractor) who were intrigued by the intervention and/or my research and listened to their thoughts and opinions. In the case of UPP Social (described in depth in Chapter Six), I encountered fieldworkers in action mapping parts of Complexo do Alemão (as well as other favelas such as Santa Marta), hung out with employees during happy hours and after-work dinners, and in one instance was able to sit-in on a training session for UPP Social favela resident fieldworkers after having conducted a group interview at the Municipal Urban Planning Institute. Participant observation of Morar Carioca was more structured: in-depth conversations with architects and urbanists involved past or present with the program, formal interviews of two architects (one junior, one senior) of the same intervention, and guided visits to that favela by the president and vice president of the residents association early during the construction (this favela was not subject to UPP policing and was controlled by a trafficking gang).

The third was spaces of intellectual debate, cultural events and art exhibitions. The interventions and socio-spatial reconfigurations in Rio de Janeiro are both spectacle and topic of heated debate in various mediums. Already mentioned were the round table seminars at local universities and professional associations. In addition I sought out cultural and artist exhibitions around the city that either exemplified the integrated favela—such as an all day and all night art and music festival in the hip Zona Sul favela of Babilônia which attracted the city’s young avant-garde artists, hipsters and queers but may have fallen short on community participation—or that made an explicit critique of favela–cidade social relations—for example the display of Anthony Leeds archival photography during his fieldwork in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro titled “What Rio Wanted to Deny” (“O
Rio que se queria negar\(^\text{31}\) hosted in the National Palace of Catete, the permanent art installation of the favela model Morrinho (Angelini 2016; Angelini 2015; G. Jones 2011) at the Rio Art Museum, or the exhibition of amateur photography clubs of Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Maré at the Afro-Brazilian Museum of Pretos Novos. In these cases I followed in the steps of Tarlo (2003), treating these spaces as discourse producing as well as sites of possible ethnographic encounter.

Reflecting back on constructing the field as spatial process of favela integration, participant observation was never conducted with the intent to analyse a specific place, event or action; but rather with the aim of dialoguing with qualitatively distinct data in order to answer how the process of favela integration was practiced, debated, and resisted.

4.5 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is a relatively new addition to the methodological toolbox of critical urban geographers. In a review of the practice within the disciplinary literature, Lees (2004) argues that researchers are too often scant on the details of their specific methods for discriminatorily gathering texts and analyzing data. She lodges two major critiques at urban geographers conducting discourse analysis. First, she posits that most researchers are ignorant that there exist two distinct approaches to the study of discourse: structural Gramscian-Marxist and poststructural Foucauldian. The former relies on an empiricist account of (political) rhetoric and semantics to “discover particular narrative structures, issue-framing and how storylines close off certain trajectories of thought and action

\(^{31}\) Anthony Leeds (1925-1989) was a well-known anthropologist who spent decades researching favela residents in Rio de Janeiro among other Latin American cities. He and his wife, Elizabeth Leeds, remain influential references of Brazilian urban studies. The photography exhibition mentioned was curated from the Anthony Leeds archive at the Casa de Oswaldo Cruz, donated by E Leeds in 2007.
at the expense of others” (Ibid. 102). In this approach, discourse is a tool to wield power and establish class hegemony; and discourse analysis illuminates that process and facilitates the categorisation of actors into political groups. The second approach follows Foucault’s theory that actors, objects and agents are produced through discourse. Discourse analysis of the poststructuralist sort therefore seeks to uncover the workings of power relations by examining the societal construction of so-called ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1980).

Second, Lees charges practitioners of Foucauldian discourse analysis with obfuscating their exact data-collecting tactics and analytical strategies. Further, while critical urban scholars mostly classify their discourse analysis as Foucauldian, she argues that they use poststructural analysis to examine the construction of concepts such as “the city” or “the urban” while implicitly relying on a Gramscian concept of hegemony to make up for Foucault’s lack of explicit theory concerning agency.

Outside of the geography discipline, discourse analysis has long been used to examine state actions through the workings of policy. Despite strong criticism of the approach by some researchers across disciplines (I. Parker and Burman 1993; Antaki et al. 2002), it has continued to gain popularity in the urbanist academic literature. Jacobs (2006) posits that the method has proliferated in the face of opposition because it facilitates a critical analysis of power and ideology within the policy-making process and because it addresses the importance of language as productive and active. In a review of urban ‘policy-as-discourse’ literature, Bacchi (2000) explains the branches of discourse analysis distinctly from Lees. Rather than separating the poststructural from the structural, she ignores the Gramscian approach and focuses on the nuances of poststructural analysis. She claims that within the policy-as-discourse literature, definitions of ‘discourse’ are hazy and sometimes reduced to simple
rhetoric or strict text (readable but not productive). Furthermore, she lodges that many researchers in the discipline define discourse and select texts according to their political ideologies and research agendas. Whereas those following the trend in literary deconstruction see everything as text to be interpreted by the ‘reader’, social deconstructionists—Bacchi categorises most policy-as-discourse analysts as such—place more emphasis on the production of the text itself. Further, the policy-as-discourse camp may be categorised as “affirmative postmodernists” as opposed to “sceptical postmodernists.” Here Bacchi follows Rosenau’s (1991) dualist understanding of affirmative and sceptical postmodernism in which the ‘sceptics’ treat modernity despairingly as the dissolution of the subject and the “impossibility of truth” whereas the “affirmatives” remain optimistic that positive progressive change is possible (Bacchi 2000, 47). The affirmative approach is an ideological necessity, according to Bacchi, if the researcher seeks to offer practical recommendations for improving policy.

In reviewing contributions to the policy-as-discourse literature, Bacchi argues that policy analysts view discourse as a means through which dominant groups wield power. Whereas researchers acknowledge the uses and the effects of discourse, they tend to associate uses of discourse with powerful groups or dominant classes, and effects of discourse with oppressed minorities or subjugated social classes. Those already wielding power exploit their privileged positions (in the case of policy, institutional positions) in order to use discourse to their ideological and material benefit. Discourse in turn moderates what can be said, pre-emptively invalidating certain speech and silencing certain subjects. Those with power make discourse while those without power suffer the effects of discourse. One reason for this limiting conceptual framework within the policy-as-discourse literature is that policy is a privileged form of
discourse, constructed by actors within or close to state institutions and relying on power relationships defined by the state and dominant socio-political and economic interests. If policy-as-discourse analysts focus exclusively on state policy, it is far too easy to slip into the above false dualism of associating power with *using discourse* and powerless with suffering the *effects of discourse*. As a result, opportunities for resistance and change, or the recognition of resistance, are limited to the embodied experiences of policy—a post-discourse reactionary stance—rather than challenges to policy through discourse.

The substantial contribution from the policy-as-discourse approach to my methodology is the premise that social problems do not exist *a priori* to state intervention. Rather policy itself discursively constructs the problem that it seeks to remedy or alleviate. However, this study does not privilege policy over other forms of discourse, nor is it defined by the bureaucratic implementation of policy or the political processes and power dynamics often obscured by the dry, technical language of policy. Policy is only one of the text genres collected while in the field. Some of the critiques of discourse analysis raised by the policy analysts above are addressed simply by expanding the texts selected, by understanding discourse as relational, and discourse analysis as the consideration of various types of texts produced by different social actors. By including texts constructed by popular media, citizen-activists and NGOs, I seek out discourses that question, challenge, influence or resist what may be considered as the current dominant discourse. Further, by contextualizing policy-as-discourse within the historical development of knowledge concerning the favelas, I seek to delineate the various non-state actors who may have historically influenced current policy making.

I followed a general guide to *doing* Foucauldian discourse analysis offered by Rose (2007) and later elaborated by Waitt (2010).
In this approach there are seven ‘stages’ meant to guide (not dictate) the process of discourse analysis (see the methodological appendix for this strategy presented in table form). In order to examine the discursive production of favela integration and consider its implications, I examine various texts produced by the state that technically describe current projects and programmes meant to integrate targeted favelas as well as political texts, either in the context of party and electoral propaganda or in state-produced media aimed to educate and inform the public about the current government interventions.

My research design follows the theoretical perspective that the state, its functions, programmes and institutions are on some level discursively produced externally and from ‘below’. State discourse representing the integration of the city’s favelas and detailing the intentions and objectives of public projects may be meticulously managed and edited before public consumption, but media produced by private enterprises or ordinary citizens often offer counter narratives and alternative perceptions. One function of popular and news media outlets is to inform and offer commentary on governmental actions. Likewise citizen groups, non-governmental organisations, favela resident associations, and activists respond to government discourse and actions through communiqués, direct actions, press releases, blogs, and social media posts. Evaluation of such materials makes for a richer analysis of how favela integration is discursively produced by the state while simultaneously produced by those seemingly ‘external’ to the state.

32 Here I draw on the over simplified notion of insider/outsider status: those actors employed by a government ministry or institution or those intimately related to state projects are considered to work ‘inside’ the state system while those actors operating in the private sector or civil society are considered largely ‘outside’ of the state. The boundary between those ‘outside’ and those ‘inside’ is wholly metaphorical. Where the state ends and civil society or private sector begins is hardly ever clearly delineated, yet the inside/outside divide is reified largely
Relevant here is the fact that favela integration occurs on an international stage, prompting international debate. The global spotlight is principally due to the media attention surrounding the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympic Games, but also in part due to the novelty and scale of the state interventions, the trajectory of urban innovation in Brazil, particularly in regards to informal housing settlements, and the implications for other Latin American cities if the “Rio model” is deemed successful.

My approach to collecting texts for discourse analysis—be it materials related to the protests or government projects—did not rely on software designed to collect and facilitate social media analysis, nor did it follow any formulaic inclusion/exclusion criteria. Rather I discovered texts much the same way an ethnographer discovers and develops leads in the field. Sometimes that involved starting with an expansive pool of texts, for instance the Facebook event pages of a protest march or a keyword search in the archives of O Globo newspaper. From that starting point I would narrow my focus, pull out and save relevant posts, photos, and news stories for further consideration and eventual analysis of key, representational texts. Conversely, sometimes a single document or photo that I happened across online or mentioned by a research contact would pique my interest. From that singular reference point, I may expand, collecting similar documents or ‘following’ that text to another. An example of this logical progression: during a preliminary trip to the field I visited Complexo do Alemão, where in the entry hall to the gondola transport system, there stood on display a photo exhibition titled “A Year of Conquests” (Um Ano de Conquistas) that documented both the initial military occupation of the favela by the armed forces as well as the physical construction of the gondola infrastructure. Examining the

through discourse reinforcing the social perception of the state as a wholly separate entity from society (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
exhibition and how passerby and visitors interacted with the exhibit was an ethnographic encounter. But when I mentioned that I had seen the exhibition to the social communications team of the private company that operated the Teleférico do Alemão, they gifted me a coffee table book that included all of the photos and texts of the exhibition. The book thus became a complementary text to include in the discourse analysis. Furthermore, when I searched online for some of the quotes cited in the book attributed to executive politicians, I ‘discovered’ the complete video of the official inauguration speeches by President Dilma, Governor Cabral, and Mayor Eduardo Paes amongst other political appointees.

While much of the data I collected on the protests and urban social movements discussed in Chapter 1 was set aside, there are some significant pieces of data that I have included, and certain field experiences helped to shape my inquiries after returning to the field in December 2013. For example, protests organised by favela residents often explicitly criticized or formulated demands of state projects that constitute favela integration. In such cases, my observations and related materials (news clippings or protest pamphlets for example) are retained as examples of counter-hegemonic discourse. The protests also turned me on to social media as a rich source for material. During the months of protests I spent hours following Twitter hashtags and Facebook posts, reading blogs, and comment threads pertaining to the protests as well as state interventions in the favelas. I took screenshots and saved photos I found relevant and interesting at the time, and in some cases weaved them into the intertextual discourse analysis, particularly in relation to power dynamics. Thus heeding Bacchi’s (2000) warning to not present dominant discourse as the only discourse.

A major task was the consideration and selection of texts, and finding a balance between different genres while assuring that depth
of analysis is not sacrificed for breadth. See the methodological appendix for a table of texts included in discourse analysis, separated by genre (policy documents and technical reports; political rhetoric and propaganda, news & popular media, and citizen media).

4.6 Interviews with key informants

Interviews and in-depth conversations with architects, planners, social workers, resident activists, advocates, researchers, and programme/project implementers make up another body of data collected during fieldwork. In total, I conducted formal interviews or had multiple in-depth conversations with 28 participants (see methodological appendix for a table of these participants and their occupation or roles relevant to my research). The majority of formal interviews occurred during the final six months. I prepared extensively for each formal interview conducted, and only conducted interview with subjects I deemed as key-informants based off the accumulating experience in the field. With three exceptions, all interviews were conducted with participants that I met while conducting participant observation or were introduced to me by other interviewees or contacts.33

I had significant difficulty and ultimately failed to obtain access to employees at the Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH). I believe this was a result of various factors: i) 2014 was an election year (although not for the municipality) and the mayor’s government wanted to protect the party (PMDB held both the mayor’s and governor’s offices); ii) the programme I wished to discuss, Morar Carioca, had

33 Exceptions were the President of the Rio de Janeiro professional association of architects (IAB-RJ), which designed and administered the competition and selection of Morar Carioca projects, and the Supervia director of communications and community relations and one of his team-members responsible for operating the gondola in the Complexo do Alemão. In both these cases I made initial contact and arranged for an interview via email (president of IAB-RJ) or navigating corporate bureaucracy of communications (Supervia).
received a string of bad press and criticism from local experts and academics for the failure to appropriate funds and some creative bookkeeping that reclassified dozens of pre-existing project designs as Morar Carioca projects even though they did not follow the new programme methodology; and iii) a number of urbanists who had signed on to work with Morar Carioca both within the programme and in a parallel civil society oversight committee quit as a result of difficulties and failure to roll out promised projects. In lieu of interviewing SMH employees, I did manage to interview a former employee (who at the time worked for the IPP, where UPP Social was housed), one of the programmes’ design-consultant from civil society, a number of architects who designed a Morar Carioca intervention, and the president and vice president of the resident association corresponding to the same intervention.

4.7 A note on ethics

This last section provides a brief discussion of ethics during fieldwork. Pragmatic ethical considerations most relevant to data collection revolve around privacy and consent of the interviewees. All persons who spoke to me at length about their work understood that I was conducting fieldwork as an international PhD student interested in critically examining the state paradigm of favela integration. In the majority of cases, participants received an email that explained both my research objectives and my rationale for including them in the research data. Data gathered through formal interviews was neither personally intimate nor politically or criminally sensitive. Some participants did express concern about their professional relationships and/or advancement if they expressed critical opinions about their bosses, co-workers, politicians, or projects on they worked. Two did not want their bosses (whom I also interviewed) to
know they granted me interviews, and two additional participants asked me to change their names. While I made neither violence nor corruption a main talking point during our discussions, both issues arose from time to time with interviewees accusing certain politicians or interest groups of corruption. Sometimes the participant directly accused an individual of stealing public funds. Other times it was implied through hand gestures, facial expressions and carefully worded emphasised sentences. Similarly, a few interviewees accused co-workers, bosses, or public employees of ethical corruption—not of the criminal sort but of anti-poor prejudice or a banal attitude towards the daily injustice and violence witnessed in Rio de Janeiro, particularly in the favelas. While the majority of participants gave me permission to use their full names, in order to respect those who wished to remain anonymous and to protect the careers of those who voiced critical opinions, I have changed the names (and in a few cases the gender) of all participants except those with public profiles who explicitly granted permission to use their full names.

Most formal interviews were recorded digitally with the consent of the participants. When interviewees preferred not to use a recording device, I took notes during our conversation and would often record my own voice memos after the interview concluded. I did not remunerate any interviewee in exchange for their participation; however in the few cases where an interview was conducted at a café, I paid for the coffee and cake.

**4.8 Conclusions**

This chapter laid out the methodological approach to addressing the research questions and detailed the decisions I made based on events after initiating fieldwork in April 2013. I aim to contribute to literature discussing the methodological implications of
Lefebvre’s theories on the production of space. In particular I demonstrate how his spatial triad of conceived, perceived, and lived space may be operationalised to construct the field of research. In doing so I followed networked points in the *un-sited* field of favela integration, collecting documents and texts for discourse analysis (conceived space), speaking with experts, architects, project employees and activists as well as visiting sites of intervention (perceived space), and seeking out or waiting for meaningful interactions, experiences and conversations about how the process and paradigm of favela integration affects daily life in the “divided city” (lived space).

Beyond some cases of textual and visual data—for example architectural drawings, political propaganda, or programme descriptions—very rarely do data points align with a single leg of Lefebvre’s triad. I did not tour the construction site of a *Morar Carioca* intervention with the purpose of collecting data specific to the spatial practice (perceived space) of favela integration, and then subsequently write up my field notes from various community meetings on insecurity, the police, or gentrification as *lived space*. To do so would have repeated the mistakes of scholars who empiricise a single leg of the triad. The goal was not to disaggregate into three trialectical streams of data (for a discussion of Lefebvrean trialectics see Soja 1996), but rather to understand favela integration through the triad and allow that explicitly spatialised methodology to guide my fieldwork. As discussed, this permitted the collection of data through interviews, site visits, participant observation, varied text and document collection from distinct places, institutions, programmes and publications that together produce the spatial process favela integration. The field, constructed as such, facilitated the weaving together of data points that might otherwise seem fragmented.

This approach was challenging, and the organizing of texts,
transcribing notes and interviews, coding and connecting the diverse data to form narrative arguments was laborious and time consuming. But the scale of the research objective—to interrogate favela integration at the city-scale of Rio de Janeiro—necessitated a complex methodology. The following chapter puts this into practice in order to examine how the state paradigm of integration places the historically banished favelas into the landscape of the marvellous city.
Chapter 5 – A Crisis of Landscape: Urban Segregation and Favela Integration in Rio de Janeiro

“Somos um Rio,” the words appear as graffiti spray-painted against a black wall. “We are one Rio” is the title-track of Eduardo Paes’ mayoral re-election campaign song.34 During a preliminary trip to the field in 2012 I saw his campaign’s TV advertisement: a music-video clip in the style of an urban hip-hop dance party interlaced with sweeping aerial footage of Rio de Janeiro and close-ups of seemingly ordinary Cariocas smiling in their everyday surroundings. The most repeated phrase of the song, a male-female duet, is, “I live in the favela [o morro] and she lives in Zona Sul.” The spatial division bridged by the artists (the favela and wealthy Zona Sul) parallels another division conquered, that of racial segregation: “I’m big and black [negão], she is blonde with blue eyes.” The video pans a group of 20-something Cariocas, racially diverse and fashionably dressed, dancing against a night sky; not unlike the open-air parties now frequented by Zona Sul “playboys” and tourists atop the famous favela Vidigal. The commercial then cuts to thousands of commuters disembarking at a busy train station, followed by shiny new Bus Rapid Transit vehicles whizzing by city traffic. Cut to favela Santa Marta, and the camera pans the hillside showing densely packed homes, then transitions to two young black boys playing bare-chested on a laje (a flat rooftop). We hear the duet continue, “I know I’m poor, but my heart is noble, and what’s mine is hers. / And today I’m no longer afraid to say that I live in the favela. / Because the city changed, it renewed and became more beautiful.”

34 Somos um Rio was also the name given to the coalition of 19 political parties, including President Dilma’s PT, backing his candidacy.
“Favela integration” is a paradigm in response to an urban crisis. The crisis is cultural—in regards to how the city of Rio de Janeiro is collectively imagined and socially reproduced at local and global scales—as well as political—in regards to what tools the state employs to respond to favela settlements in Brazilian contemporary democracy. Employing the landscape-mobilities framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter argues that while historically favelas were excluded from Rio’s landscape—the so-called “marvellous city”—through demonisation and state policies of violent removal, contemporary advances in the constitutional right to housing and protection against unfair eviction as well as growing popular politics of human rights has produced “favela integration” as a paradigm of urban planning and governance supported by civil society, development specialists and social scientists. Analyzing the discursive construction of “favela integration” reveals the prioritisation of flows of people, goods and services in and out of the favelas in order to include the favelas in the celebrated cityscape. However, employing a framework of critical mobilities readily identifies that certain flows of goods and people and certain forms of movement have been prioritised and others targeted for scrutiny and regulation, revealing the power dynamics of deeply entrenched urban inequality and segregation.
The chapter is structured into eight sections. Section 5.1 historicises the bifurcation of Rio de Janeiro through the theoretical lens of landscape as outlined in Chapter 3. Building on Barbosa (2012) who writes that in contraposition to the “marvellous city” the favelas constituted a crisis of landscape, I argue that subsequent production of Rio de Janeiro as a “divided city” was a cultural and socio-political way of seeing that maintained the city as “marvellous” despite condemnable inequality and segregation. Section 5.2 argues that the divided city between the “marvellous” and the “miserable” proved unsustainable when the carioca middle class perceived rising urban violence and inequality as an existential threat. Due to expanded rights of favela residents after Brazil’s return to democracy, wholesale eviction was no longer an option; and “favela integration” emerged as a progressive response to unify the city and make Rio ‘whole.’ Returning to Mayor Eduardo Paes’ campaign video described above, I examine the discursive production of the “integrated city” as a hegemonic utopian landscape produced by the state in section 5.3.
Turning the analysis towards policy and urbanist interventions in the favelas, section 5.4 traces the evolution of “favela-upgrading” to “favela integration” by examining the programmes Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca. I argue that state discourse of integration relies on regulating flows of people, goods, and services in and out of the favelas.

While the novel urban planning and governance paradigm recognises the favelas as legitimate urban space, section 5.5 discusses how the utopian vision is still subject to hegemonic politics through examining the competing discourses of “the favela is the city” versus “the favela belongs to the city.” This is particularly visible in how police “pacification” of the favelas is represented as “liberating” favela residents and creating the necessary conditions for sustainable urbanisation interventions, which in turn makes the favelas marvellous and “opens” the historically stigmatised neighbourhoods to the outside world. Section 5.6 takes a closer look at the importance of the “right to come and go” within the paradigm of favela integration, and applies Cresswell’s “politics of mobility” (2010) to moving in, out and through favela space. I demonstrate how in practice favela integration targets certain bodies in certain types of movements for heightened scrutiny and structural violence. Finally in section 5.7 I focus on a single intervention, a gondola transport system named the Teleférico do Alemão, as a spectacular and contested piece of integrating infrastructure in one of the most infamous areas of the city. Through ethnographic description, I analyse the politics of travelling to and moving through Complexo do Alemão as a marvellous experience; but I argue that the infrastructure is a sanitised form of witnessing the favela without actually experiencing favela space, a device that facilitated the totalising and abstracting construction of Rio de Janeiro as an “integrated city” landscape. I review the chapter’s main arguments in section 5.8.
5.1 Rio, a cidade maravilhosa, a cidade partida

Rio de Janeiro has long been referred to as a cidade maravilhosa, or the marvellous city. The “natural” beauty—steep hillsides facing expansive sandy beaches, green jungle, panoramic views and consistently stunning sunsets—is indeed worthy of marvel. Privileged views abound atop Sugar Loaf Mountain, or the iconic statue of Christ, or after a steep climb in the National Forrest of Tijuca. The tagline, a cidade maravilhosa, has three cited origins: a book, a radio programme, and a samba. In 1928 Coelho Neto published a collection of short stories titled A Cidade Maravilhosa in which a painter from the “city of dreams” enchants a scrupulous lady from the countryside. Shortly thereafter in 1933 a popular radio programme titled “Chronicles of the Marvellous City” aired to a general audience broadcasting tales of grandeur from the federal capital. The radio programme inspired a samba march titled “Cidade Maravilhosa” as an ode to Rio de Janeiro, which eventually became the municipality's official hymn.

In brief review of the history covered in Chapter 2, the favelas have been present since the early 1900s and proliferated rapidly throughout the latter half of the century. They have long been spread throughout the city, including notably on the hillsides visible from the white-sand beaches and wealthy neighbourhoods of Zona Sul (Perlman 1976; Pino 1997; Valladares 2005). However the favelas were never directly included in the marvellous city. Rather they were considered to blight the natural beauty of the city and the antithesis of modernity, which both municipal and federal governments attempted to advance (J. de S. e Silva and Barbosa 2005; Fischer 2008; Perlman 2010; Gonçalves 2013; B. McCann 2014).

While various actors in government and wealthy society attempted to wipe the favelas from the “noble” neighbourhoods of
Zona Sul and downtown, the settlements were hardly if ever included in plans, calculations, and maps published by the government and the journalistic press (Novaes 2014). Novaes argues that the “cartographic silencing” of the favelas during the early and mid-twentieth century represented the indifferent ignorance and lack of knowledge that characterised the elite’s attitude towards the favelas as well as the expectation that the favelas would be removed as the city modernised through urban planning. To say that the favelas were expunged from the hegemonic landscape of the marvellous city is not to say that they were absent from public discourse and popular culture. Rather they were flattened of their complexity and humanity. They served to represent social marginality, violence and danger (Perlman 1976; E. Leeds 1996; Zaluar 1995; Batista 2003). As Barbosa (2012) argues, the favelas constituted a “crisis of landscape”. Their presence, stubborn and visible, challenged the visual narrative of the marvellous city. To preserve the dominant mode of urban growth, one that was prescribed by and worked in the interest of the political elites, owners of industry, and residual Portuguese nobility; the favelas were banished from the marvellous city, both figuratively and materially. Early after the first clusters of precariously built homes began to dot the hillsides, they were the target of systematic removal and prohibition (Valladares 1978; Fischer 2008; Brum 2013). Similarly, the precursor to the favelas, cortiços had been despised by the wealthy classes, targeted by the police, represented as a threat to public health and morality and ultimately destroyed (J. M. de Carvalho 1987; Chalhoub 1996). As reviewed in Chapter 3, Mayor Pereira Passos sought to replicate Haussmann’s Paris, and the desired urban aesthetic of modernity and progress required the demolition of the favelas (Needell 1983; M. Abreu 1987). The French urbanist Alfred Agache, a medical doctor by training who was hired to present the city’s first Master Plan, spoke of Rio de Janeiro’s unparalleled natural
beauty under threat of malignant, uncontrolled growth (Oliveira 2002; Fischer 2008). Rio's Rotary Club became a place for the business class to rally behind hygienist campaigns against the favelas. The journalist Mattos Pimenta spoke to the club in 1926 exposing what historians represent as a common attitude of the wealthy:

>Whatever form the plans for the city might take, and even before their adoption, we must put an immediate end to, raise a prophylactic barrier against, the devastating infiltration of Rio de Janeiro's beautiful mountains by the plague of the favelas—that aesthetic leprosy, which began over in the hill between the Central do Brasil railroad and the Avenida do Cães do Porto and has gone disseminating itself everywhere, choosing the newest neighbourhoods, most blessed with natural beauty, to fill with filth and miserable poverty [...]”

(cited in Fischer 2008, 41).

During mid-twentieth century, government anti-communist hysteria was spatially focused to the extent that journalists and politicians spoke of a “war for Rio de Janeiro” against the communist threat of the favelas (Perlman 1976; Gonçalves 2013). During that same era, social scientists in Brazil concerned with the idea of “underdevelopment” associated urban poverty and the favelas closely with the “inferior circuit” of informal economic exchanges (M. Santos 1978); and theories of social marginality fuelled revanchist attitudes towards the favelas. Such attitudes lasted through the twentieth century, such that between 1962 and 1973, an estimated 140,000 people were removed from their homes in favelas principally located in the wealthy Zona Sul district (J. de S. e Silva and Barbosa 2005).

The material effect of landscape in the cidade maravilhosa was the systematic persecution of the favelas and residents, and the partial relocation of poverty's spatial form to the outskirts of the city.
Parallel to the landscape of the ‘marvellous’ there developed a landscape of misery, which Barbosa calls the “anti-landscape”. The anti-landscape was composed of “marginal” bodies and stigmatised neighbourhoods, principally the favelas and public housing complexes that had fallen into disrepair and gone through a process of ‘favelafication’. Despite all that favela residents had contributed culturally and economically to Rio de Janeiro, “the favelas were never recognized for their positivity and importance in the construction of urban space in the city [...]. That non-recognition of otherness of the rest of Rio de Janeiro’s inhabitants has produced exclusionary, intolerant relations that, in turn, reproduce the negation of a primordial social right: the right to be [part of the] landscape” (Barbosa 2012, 39).

This denial was on prominent display a half-decade later at the Museum of the Catete Palace, which served as the presidential residence from 1897 until 1960. The gardens of the Palace hosted a photography exhibition titled *O Rio que se Queria Negar: as favelas do Rio de Janeiro no acervo do Anthony Leeds*, which translates to “The Rio that was Rejected” or “What Rio Wanted to Deny: the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the archives of Anthony Leeds”. The exhibition consisted of roughly two dozen photographs enlarged so they stood well over a metre off the ground (see figures 5.2-5.4) depicting the mid-twentieth century favelas and their residents going about their daily lives. Interspersed with the images were lyrics of popular sambas of that era signifying the politicised nature of the favelas and the resilience of the residents in the face of state prosecution and prejudice. Samba—the famous musical tradition that originated in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro—was one of the most powerful cultural tools

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35 Anthony Leeds (1925-1989) was a well-known anthropologist who spent decades researching favela residents in Rio de Janeiro among other Latin American cities. He and his wife, Elizabeth Leeds, remain influential references of Brazilian urban studies.
of favela residents to produce counter-hegemonic discourse (Oliveira and Marcier 2006; Misse 1999). Below I cite the lyrics the exhibition curators featured by the sambista Nelson Sargento: a song titled "The Charm of the Landscape" [Encanto da Paisagem] (see figure 5.4):

Hill, it's the charm of the landscape
Sensuous character of rudimentary beauty
Hill, slow and primitive progress
It's important to the scenario
Inspiration of nature
In the topography of the city
With all of its simplicity,
It's call to elevation
Passageways, alleys, and shacks
Without discrimination.
Hill, shoeless feet on the stairway
Water can atop the head
Crude auspicious life
Children without future and without school
If they aren't lucky with the football
They will suffer their entire lives
Hill, your samba was mined
Became so sophisticated,
It's no longer traditional
Hill, it's beautiful when the sun rises
And the blemishes result from
Social maladjustment.
Figure 5.2 - "O Rio que se Queria Negar"
The Opening Plaque of the photography exhibition in the garden of the Palace of Catete.

Figure 5.3 – Anthony Leeds’ photographs at the Catete Palace.
Photos included in the exhibition documented the daily lives of residents as well as the settlement’s position in the topography of the city.
The exhibition was bold. By placing the large photographs along the entry walkway to the gardens, the curators brought the shacks to the palace and obliged visitors to walk through a representation of the favelas in the pristine park-like museum. Sponsored by the national Ministries of Culture and Health, it placed the favelas in the historic centre of power of the Republic, the very place that stood for Brazil’s progress and housed the men that pushed for its modernisation, a concept that excluded the favelas on the hills. The curators acknowledged in the first line of the introductory billboard-sized plaque that the favelas were “vehemently denied as an integral part of the city” and challenged the viewer to reflect on the city as a whole and place the favelas at the forefront of Rio de Janeiro.

Like Leeds, the celebrated poet and Pulitzer Prize winner Elizabeth Bishop was captivated by Rio de Janeiro, where she lived for well over a decade. Bishop often wrote about the city, and more generally Brazil, for US publications. A self-described progressive, she was ironically partnered with a Brazilian aristocrat and, in stark
contrast to Leeds, moved amongst the richest and most powerful elites of what was then Brazil’s capital city. A narrative poem she titled “The Burglar of Babylon” (published by The New Yorker in 1964) captures the precariousness of the favelas during that time and the prejudiced vision of the city’s elites. It tells the saga of a violent criminal who has escaped from prison and went home to visit his aunt in the favela Babilônia, located in the neighbourhood of Leme. After a final farewell and a last beer, he takes refuge in an old fort and waits for a squadron of army soldiers to hunt down and kill him. The poem is based on a true story, and Bishop and her partner, who kept an apartment in the neighbourhood, watched the manhunt unfold. Below I cite the first three stanzas, which repeat at the poem’s end.

On the fair green hills of Rio
There grows a frightful stain;
The poor who come to Rio
And can’t go home again.

On the hills a million people,
A million sparrows nest,
Like a confused migration
That’s had to light and rest,

Building its nests, or houses,
Out of nothing at all, or air.
You’d think a breath would end them,
They perch so lightly there.

Perhaps Bishop’s outsider status and artist’s sensitivity allows her to humanize favela residents and their drama to survive in the city. She quietly critiques the dominant gaze of the wealthy and middle class when she names the favelas as “fearful stains” upon the beautiful green hills. Literary scholars debate whether Bishop’s poem is subversive or dismissive (Brogan 2001) and her at-times
contradictory positions on Brazilian politics and culture (Moser 2012). But this poem, rarely considered among Bishop’s greater accomplishments, exemplifies the growing fear of losing the marvellous landscape to the millions of poor migrants “invading” and blighting the hillsides with such precarious homes that they might be blown away by the wind. In comparing the urban migrants to sparrows building nests, she exemplifies the dehumanisation of favela residents. The othering distance between the favelas and the wealthy is further signalled by the latter’s use of binoculars to watch the police manhunt from the rooftops of their apartments.

The revanchist state policies, the denial of the favelas as constitutive of Rio de Janeiro, the proliferation of favelas, and the escalation of systemic violence and fear resulted in the *cidade partida*, or the divided city (literally the partitioned city). Rio began to be discursively produced as “the city” and “the favela”, the *asfalto* (where the roads were paved) and “the morro” (the hill upon which the poor “invaded” to build *barracos*, or shacks). The city was understood through this dichotomous categorisation as it was reproduced in popular and news media as well as intellectual and academic work. Novaes (2014) documents how the favelas, previously silenced through their absence in cartographic depictions of the city, became daily references to drug trafficking and violence. In the “divided city,” newspapers began to map the favelas in relation to gang territory conflicts and the drug trade, producing the favelas as spaces under the control of the gangs operating as “parallel states.”

Perhaps the most famous depiction of Rio de Janeiro dichotomously divided is the book by celebrated journalist Zuenir Ventura titled *Cidade Partida* published in 1994 and reprinted
Based off 10 months of qualitative journalistic fieldwork, Zuenir tells the story of the partitioning of Rio de Janeiro through the account of residents of the infamous favela Vigário Geral. The narrative-styled non-fiction, which he calls a chronicle noir, is reminiscent, in contrast, to the aforementioned popular radio program that gave Rio its tagline, “Chronicles of the Marvellous City.”

The book was a resounding success and many consider Ventura a progressive voice advocating for favela residents to this day. As a columnist for O Globo, he has championed the so-called “social” side of “favela pacification”, advocating for the complete and total regularisation of social services and economic activities within the favela.

He writes in 2011 that the state must “bring to the favela, after pacification, the conquests that the asphalt already enjoys, good or bad” (Ventura 2011). Ventura was not the first to speak of Rio de Janeiro as divided in two, but his sensationalist and reductionist depiction of the bifurcated city, and his subsequent work as a prominent journalist has had lasting impacts, so that even some development specialists and scholars advocating for favela residents’ right to the city represent Rio as a “broken” or “divided”.

The representation of Rio de Janeiro in popular and intellectual media as a divided metropolis, partitioned between the formal city and the favela, has not gone unchallenged. Many activists and academics have contested the notion of a divided city and some have responded directly to Ventura debunking the spatial metaphor (Matiolli 2012; J. de S. e Silva 2003). As scholar-activist Jailson de Souza e Silva asked in a Ted-X Talk, divided for whom? “The city is divided for some; but not for others” (2011). Those “others” are the favela residents themselves who leave their homes and neighbourhoods and move about the whole city to work, study, shop,
and confront public bureaucracy. Artists and cultural activists have also pushed back on the false division through film (Costa 2013), music, dance, theatre, and community art projects (Heritage 2005; Neate and Platt 2006; Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernández 2013).

The “divided city” operates as a visual imagination of Rio de Janeiro that copes with violence and inequality, leaving the “marvellous city” under threat but largely intact. It ignores the decades-old lessons learned from the debunking of social marginality: the effects of capitalist urbanisation and the inequitable distribution of its benefits (stark inequality and urban poverty) do not constitute its spatial materialisation (the favelas) as antithetical to the city or marginal to its society. On the contrary, it is part and parcel to urban form and life. The relationships are intimate and interdependent. The working of landscape is to negate this fact; that is, as Barbosa asserts, to deny the favelas and their residents the right to form part of the marvellous city.

In summary, the social imagination of the cidade maravilhosa historically privileged the “natural” beauty of wealthy neighbourhoods and vantage points of the city, whereas the favelas have always been seen as a threat to such beauty, disorder within modernity, chaos disrupting progress. The favelas and other socio-spatial evidence of poverty are shamefully incongruent with the marvellous and therefore ignored, hidden, despised, and expelled. They were “anti-symbols” in the words of Barbosa and the state responded with urban policy seeking to cleanse them from privileged and strategic areas. This engendered the cidade partida, also a totalizing abstraction that mythically separates the miserable from the marvellous, the favela from the city, the formal from the informal.

5.2 Searching for solutions to the cidade partida

A new paradigm has emerged in Rio de Janeiro that seeks to
end the bifurcation of urban space between “city” and “slum,” recognize self-built settlements as legitimate neighbourhoods, and use urban planning as a tool to foster social inclusion and spatial integration. While progressive social scientists, politicians and civil society activists had long expressed such sentiments, the affirmation of *favela* as legitimate and positive urban space within state policy and interventions is still relatively nascent. It began rather meekly with “slum upgrading” programmes and continues with ambitious planning interventions and broader governance objectives ranging from public security, to health, to tourism and culture. Building on Barbosa’s argument that policies of extermination and re-housing at the urban periphery in the mid-twentieth century were a response to “the favela problem” (a crisis of landscape), I argue that “favela integration” responds to the deplorably unequal “divided city”.

What prompted “favela integration”? In short, evicting favela residents and demolishing their homes became increasingly difficult. By the end of the 1970s, favela residents were organised and politicized at the neighbourhood level and throughout the metropolitan region by larger federations (McCann 2014). Resident associations and their increasingly influential networks of political and cultural actors organised for access to water and electricity and successfully resisted when threatened with eviction (Gonçalves 2013, McCann 2014). Wide-scale eviction turned politically untenable with Brazil's gradual return to democracy: the military government permitting local elections in 1974, new rights gained by favela residents at the end of the dictatorship in 1985, and the promulgation of a “citizen’s constitution” in 1988 (Gonçalves 2013). The Constitution mandated municipal master plans, and the lauded Statute of the City (passed in 2001) fundamentally changed the legal rights of favela residents and the legal responsibilities of governments to intervene in the interests of favela citizens.
The divided city—between the marvellous and the miserable—proved unsustainable for two broad reasons. The first is the aforementioned rights to housing and social services and the political imperative of city governments to provide basic urban services. Likewise with growing proportions of residents living in favelas, in a country where voting participation is obligatory, the favelas became important on the electoral maps even without officially recognized home addresses. The second, that I want to focus on here, is that reproducing the *cidade partida* in state planning and security policy is untenable because it makes for an intolerable life for middle and upper-middle class Cariocas. I do not wish to direct attention away from Rio’s poor and favela residents, who suffer disproportionate levels of violence as a result of the *cidade partida*, but the suffering, fear, and trauma experienced by the middle class was fundamental to forming the liberal consensus that *something must be done*. Below I elaborate on the claim that urban violence; rooted in spatialised and racial inequality, segregation and oppression; grew intolerable to the middle class.

The cultural and spatial division between the favela and the *asfalto* requires an intense and constant othering of the favelas and their residents largely based on racism, xenophobia (especially against North-eastern Brazilian migrants) and anti-poor revanchism, resulting in extreme suspicion and fear. This intensified during the 1990’s when violent crime and drug-related violence soared, and sensationalist media constructed a gripping narrative of urban warfare between police and criminal gangs in the favelas (*Leite 2001; Penglase 2007; M. H. M. Alves and Evanson 2011*). The threat of favela-communism had waned, but Rio de Janeiro was still at war, this time against drug traffickers, gangs, and street bandits. Fear gripped the city so tightly that it influenced urban design, policy and development above the ideals of citizenship and equity (*Souza 2005;*...
Souza 1999; Lucas 2010; Batista 2003). The induced panic politically justified extreme measures taken by the police and state, most aptly exemplified by the expression “a good bandit is a dead bandit,” an opinion made famous by the police officer turned politician José Guilherme Godinho Sivuca Ferreira (a.k.a. Sivuca).37

Clamouring for “peace,” the Carioca middle class generalised their moral revulsion at police massacres of the poor (especially against children, e.g. the Candelária Massacre) with violent crime committed by poor people categorised as social “marginals” and presumed to live in the favelas. This is perhaps best represented by the 2000 campaign “Basta! Eu Quero Paz” (Enough! I Want Peace), launched by the politically influential civil society organisation Viva Rio! Their “march for peace” drew over one hundred thousand city residents in addition to memorializing victims of violence with a large-scale mural downtown, “The Wall of Pain” (see Paim et al. 2004). The Wall did not distinguish between those killed by armed thieves, assassinated by police officers, killed by rival gangs, or caught in crossfire between warring factions and the police. Rather the organisers sought to build a consensus based on a call for peace, as if declaring a ceasefire could halt structural violence. While apolitical discourse resonated across socio-spatial classes, a call for peace falls short of a call for justice. And this liberal consciousness raising—violence begets violence and violence affects us all—neither explicitly connected violence to race/space/class inequalities nor resulted in advancing poor favela residents’ claim to the city. As such, the push for an “integrated city” is as much a result of middle class exasperation at urban violence and desperation to feel safe in their

37 The full quote that Sivuca often repeated enthusiastically is “a good bandit is a dead bandit, buried feet first so he doesn’t take up too much space.” He miss-attributed this quote to US General Custer in reference to Native Americans: “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.” However historians attribute that infamous phrase to General Phillip Sheridan who reportedly said, “the only good Indians I ever saw were dead.”
homes and moving throughout the city as it is an attempt to guarantee
the rights of poor and working class residents; or as Barbosa puts it,
the right to form part of the landscape.

This liberal, conflating discourse is present in how some policy
makers and technocrats interpret their own social role, or social
responsibility, to affect change through state interventions in the
favelas. For example, the President of the Pereira Passos Institute
(IPP), the principal technical and information hub of municipal
planning, tells a personal story of violence that she interpreted as a
calling to public service. Having “retired” young after making a small
fortune in the private financial sector, she accepted a job with the
municipal government after a near death assault:

Because I didn’t want to bulletproof my car. I took a bullet, I
didn’t want to bulletproof my car, and I wanted the city back
before giving up. I said, I’m going to do my part. [...] Five
years ago, almost six, I was shot. And I said, no, I want to
work [in the public sector] because I want the right to come
and go; because that guy [who shot me] is poor and pitiful,
and I want his son, his grandson, to have the same
opportunities as my grandson, that we may live together in
this city, yeah? With respect to diversity of income and
everything else...

(Eduarda La Rocque, President of IPP)

The right to come and go, to move about the city without fear of
violence, is key to “favela integration” and is often repeated in state
texts referring to the imperatives of state programming. Violence in
the “cidade partida” reached a breaking point. Eduarda calls on her
personal story when speaking to a group of privileged cariocas, both
to explain why she left the luxury of the private sector, as well as to
discursively build consensus among the elite that the only way
forward is through socio-spatial transformation of the city. La Rocque
told her story at an event hosted by the civil society organisation *Move Rio* (she later repeated it to me during an interview). *Move Rio* in Portuguese translates to Change Rio, but the verb *mover* literally means to physically change position or to advance forward. Here it insinuates the progressive transformation of the city in motion. The NGO is composed principally of young professionals and ambitious students from elite backgrounds looking to network and engage with prominent public figures and officials.

The venue for La Rocque’s speech was as indicative as it was ironic. Ironic because the talk concerned the municipal government’s “social” interventions in the pacified favelas, and was held in an ostentatious room above the famous Brazilian jeweller Amsterdam Sauer showroom in Ipanema, Zona Sul. It took place shortly after the one-year anniversary of massive urban protests in Brazil and during a time when the pacification was beginning to show operational failure in the larger occupied favelas. Indicative because there was nothing exceptional about this elite space, wholly inaccessible to favela residents, as the site of debate and decision-making concerning public policy and spatialised socioeconomic inequality. This seems to substantiate Souza’s claim that citizenship is eroded as the *polis* is privatised in elite spaces. It is also precisely in such spaces that a consensus was built among the city’s elite to endorse seemingly progressive public policies that make up favela integration. La Rocque’s personal narrative attempts to do just that, to convince the elite of the necessity of integration not just to ensure the rights of the “poor and pitiful,” but for a better quality of life for the wealthy, for their right to come and go without need for a bullet-proof car.

Language referencing integration is included in public policy, urban planning programmes, objectives of architects’ design

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38 One of the heirs to Amsterdam Sauer is a founding member of Move Rio, which may explain the meeting place.
interventions, and both civil society and academic writing. “Favela integration” and the “integrated city” exist as an idealistic normative vision of what should be, rather than as explicitly defined by policy and state programmes. Viewed through landscape analysis, as an ideological vision and ordering of space “favela integration” means to strive toward a more equitable urban democracy: the integrated city. Based on the discourse of “integration” the solution sought is not the end of the favelas, but a shared urban ideal that affirms the rights of all urban residents, guarantees social services based on status as equal citizens, and celebrates spatial difference. We might think of it as a cooperative, give-and-take dialectic in which the city as a whole transforms.

5.3 A cidade integrada, utopian visions of a united Rio

Political rhetoric typically leans toward utopia if not fantasy, as demonstrated by Mayor Paes’ re-election campaign video referenced at the opening of the chapter. The lyrical theme of “Somos um Rio”, especially the opening line “I live on the hill, she lives in Zona Sul,” is reminiscent of a song titled “Já me Acostumei” (I’m already used to it) by the musician Ah Muleke performed with the group Turma do Pagode. The song tells the story of an impossible love between a man and woman opposite both in material life conditions, demeanour, and personal taste in music and film. The opening line, “She was born in Zona Sul and I’m from the favela” is nearly identical to Paes campaign song. The significant difference is that in “Já me Acostumei” the contrast between the two lovers is too great, and the love is doomed. The last line sings, “I already know how it ends. / It doesn’t matter, I love you.” In contrast, “Somos um Rio” offers a vision of unity. It does not matter that one is of the favela and the other Zona Sul because “the city has changed” and reality has transformed so that differences are celebrated. In an integrated Rio de Janeiro, love thrives.

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Paes’ music video clip, which aired as a TV commercial, accompanied a longer 16-minute campaign video posted to YouTube by the Mayor’s re-election campaign. Eduardo Paes narrates between vignettes of projects his administration accomplished during his first term, highlighting those that supposedly renovated stigmatised neighbourhoods—interventions that encourage residents to visit places formerly thought of as ‘far’ or ‘no-go zones.’ He states: “I’m very happy to see Rio de Janeiro finding itself; a city more integrated and united. [...] For a long time that type of space [of leisure, culture, and social interaction] only existed in Zona Sul, but I committed myself to bring citizenship and dignity to all parts of the city.”

Here we have the imaginary Rio de Janeiro—divided by race, by class, by spatial category—striving to unite through diversity: the “negão” from the hillside favela flirting with the blonde-haired, blue-eyed woman from a wealthy neighbourhood; the area once considered the “last neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro” becomes a destination point with a new state-sponsored cultural centre. Political rhetoric is highly invested in discursively constructing the “integrated city”, where flows of people and goods are uninterrupted. Scholars working at Universidad Federal Fluminense have argued that a selling point for the Bus Rapid Transit system, pushed by Paes government with federal financing and tied to Rio’s Olympic bid, also calls on the imagining of a city united through the advanced technology of bus-exclusive lanes, transporting workers from low-income areas and tourists from the airport to the natural centre of growth and home to the Olympic Village, the wealthy Barra de Tijuca (Gaffney et al, forthcoming). Employing a discourse of integration to refer to public transport directly connecting areas of the city imagined as separate, Paes’ assertion that planning during his term of office uses culture and the arts as a regenerative tool suggests that the integration paradigm extends beyond even the favelas. The objective is the integrated city.
5.4 From favela upgrade to favela integration

While there are some condemnable contemporary examples of anti-favela eviction in relation to large public works and mega-event constructions (Brum 2013), these are the exception, not the rule.39 Since the 1990s, state policy targeting the favelas accepts their semi-permanence (Gonçalvez 2013). Correspondingly, scholars and “experts” of urban development, poverty, and informal housing settlements began to have some effect on the policy and programmes drafted as they were incorporated into the state planning and policy apparatus. This section examines favela integration through systematic urban planning programmes that were meant to largely preserve the self-constructed neighbourhoods’ form while improving the urban infrastructure. The first major program targeting the favelas on a large scale was known as Favela-Bairro, designed by a group of planners and architects close to the municipal government (Fiori et al. 2000). This is when we begin to hear language referencing the “integration” of favelas into the formal city.

Favela-Bairro was arguably the municipality’s first comprehensive approach to intervene in the favelas based on legislated priorities and planning methodology. That is to say an approach that did not call for or principally aim to eliminate the favelas, and a scalable methodology. Its approach to urbanisation represented a significant shift in policy in that it did not prioritise re-housing residents—indeed the programme explicitly discouraged construction of new housing units except in cases where residents were “removed” from areas deemed “high risk” of landslide or as a

39 The Rio de Janeiro chapter of the Comitê Popular de Copa e Olimpíadas, a diverse activist group consisting of residents affected by the mega-events, academics and students, has done an excellent job of documenting and publicizing arbitrary evictions and human rights abuses in connection to the 2014 FIFA Men’s World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. See their website for more information and a dossier on rights abuses published in 2015: http://rio.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/
result of widening a road (in some cases that amounts to a forced eviction)—but focused on “collective needs of the favela as a whole” such as sanitation infrastructure, paved roads, public lighting, trash collection points, and communal recreation areas (Fiori et all 2000, 58). The principle behind Favela-Bairro was that if architects and planners installed certain urban signifiers within the favela that mirrored planned urban space, then the favelas could be perceived as working-class neighbourhoods (Cavallieri 2003; Gonçalves 2013; Miranda 2015).

Morar Carioca is the municipal government programme that followed Favela-Bairro. The full name of the programme, translated, reads The Municipal Program to Integrate Informal Precarious Settlements—Living Carioca; and it was legally adopted into the city’s Master Plan for Sustainable Urban Development in 2012 by executive decree 36388. Morar Carioca can and should be read as a sort of policy upgrade of Favela-Bairro. The decree states that the “accumulated experience of the municipal administration in the last decades in urbanisation and land regularisation of favelas and public housing developments (loteamentos) qualifies [the government] to reach more advanced levels of these types of actions”. This implies a linear progression of thought. If Favela-Bairro was principally interested in “upgrading” the favelas until they resembled, or met some criteria to qualify as, a “real” neighbourhood of the asfalto, then Morar Carioca discursively recognizes that the favelas have always existed as both neighbourhoods and legitimate urban space. In the typically sensationalist language connected with the Olympic Games, the Municipal Government website, A Cidade Olímpica (“The Olympic City” has become a tagline of Mayor Paes) calls the programme a “true revolution in the concept of social integration [...] bringing citizenship and dignity to a significant portion of the population that still lives under less favourable conditions.”
The political rhetoric claiming that planning interventions deliver citizenship along with basic urban infrastructure is common in Rio de Janeiro and has been parroted by both uncritical journalists and urbanist intellectuals.\textsuperscript{40} While many observers might be quick to dismiss such posturing as typical of bombastic politicians, it serves as evidence of the continued reproduction of dichotomous urban space: “the city”, which conforms to hegemonic notions of urbanity and where residents are citizens, and the favela, settlements lacking legitimizing infrastructure and where residents will have the opportunities to become citizens after state interventions. The fetishising of urban infrastructure as conduits of citizenship, following Kaika and Swyngedouw (2000), ultimately serves the expansion of the marvellous landscape to include the favelas, even when embedded in contradictory discourse on urban social belonging. The mundane—paved roads, sewer lines—suddenly becomes marvellous as if their arrival stimulates something as intangible and fantastic as citizenship.

In one video uploaded to YouTube (since removed) by the Rio municipal government to publicize the Morar Carioca interventions, brown streams of raw sewage are magically turned blue in what can only be a spectacularly exaggerated representation of installing covered sewer lines. No on-site treatment facilities are installed as part of favela urbanisation, and the vast majority of Rio’s waste remains untreated and funnelled directly to the Guanabara Bay or out to the ocean.\textsuperscript{41} While the bad flows out in the promotional clip, the good flows in on newly constructed roads that facilitate vehicle access. In another video, a scene in an architecture studio shows a group of presumed architects and engineers gathered around the

\textsuperscript{40} For example see Mehta’s (2013) write-up of security and planning interventions in Rio de Janeiro in preparations for sporting mega-events; and my response (Landesman 2013).

\textsuperscript{41} At the start of fieldwork in 2013, it was reported that less than 40% of residents’ waste was collected by the public water company, Cedae (Alencar and Schmidt, 2013).
technical map detailing the favela and surrounding area. One of the architects takes a thick marker and draws a large circle outside the limits of the favela and begins drawing large arrows outwards. Such markings have no discernable technical value—and the same footage is used in multiple videos supposedly depicting favela-specific Morar Carioca interventions—but it reinforces the discourse that integration increases connectivity and facilitates flows in and out of the favelas.

Without harping on claims to revolutionary status, there is consensus among planners and urbanists in Rio de Janeiro that the vision and methodology of Morar Carioca is innovative, even when compared with its celebrated predecessor, Favela-Bairro. Where as Favela-Bairro spoke about “integrating” the favelas with the “formal fabric” of the city, the standard for integration was whether or not the favela, after the intervention, boasted paved roads, acceptable levels of sanitation, and lighting of public spaces.

Morar Carioca positions itself as truly “integrative” because of its relational approach and systematised community participation. In an interview with Pedro da Luz Moreira, President of the Institute of Brazilian Architects in Rio de Janeiro, and one of the protagonists of Morar Carioca, he explained, “the difference between Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca was, exactly, our attempt to have a vision of the favela inserted in the collected city as a whole, you understand? [...] Favela-Bairro was very localist, it looked only at the interior of the favela and it didn’t look much at the exterior.” Michelle, a junior architect who studied Favela-Bairro in college and accepted a job at a Rio de Janeiro firm in order to work on Morar Carioca, explained it to me like this: “Favela-Bairro was basic: street lights, basic sanitation, new housing and that’s it.” Morar Carioca was more “idealistic. [...] You as an ordinary citizen could go to the favela and feel it was part of the city, the formal city.” Michelle, who sees herself as a progressive architect-urbanist and a fan of the “vernacular architecture” found in
self-built settlements, nonetheless classifies “ordinary citizens” as non-favela residents and a qualitative measurement of successful integration would be visiting a favela and feeling as if it were “formal city.”

Planning interventions based not solely on what the favela was “missing” on the inside (roads, sanitation etc...) but in relation to the surrounding neighbourhood and transport networks, was a repeated response from architect-planners when I asked them about the evolution of Morar Carioca as well as how they understood planning for “integration”. Thinking with the new paradigm, there is a preoccupation with ‘opening’ up the favela, facilitating access through transport infrastructure for residents, state vehicles (trash trucks, ambulances, police cars for example), and non-residents. This perspective was institutionalised in the planning of the project through the “Social Diagnostic,” and explained to me in an interview with Fede, lead architect of a top-ranked Morar Carioca intervention42 who is also well known for multiple Favela-Bairro interventions:

Fede: There is a fourth point important to Morar Carioca, beyond that social question, that I am remembering, beyond the [housing] improvements, there is an important point: that is the expansion of the diagnostic phase. The diagnostic gained a little more time. And in addition to the local diagnostic, meaning the diagnostic of the said favela, there was inserted in the scope that which the city government called the macro diagnostic, that is a diagnostic of the immediate surroundings of the favela.

Tucker: More territorial, yes?

Fede: More territorial. So then, looking to do what? Integration—a more profound integration between the favela and the neighbourhood in which it is inserted. So, that is one new thing that Morar Carioca brought as well, which is an interesting point. So we

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42 Fede’s firm was ranked number five out of the 50 winning Morar Carioca proposals.
did a much bigger survey, we didn’t stop at doing a local diagnostic of the favela. We did a macro diagnostic as well. Looking at what? In the intervention plan, beyond the local [internal] intervention, there was what we called the plan of integration, such that the favela connects with its immediate surrounding. That is what we called the plan of integration. So we looked to bring benefits that the city had to offer next to the favela, so that it would become integrated into the favela. I’ll give an example: you have a bicycle path passing close by the favela, why not bring that bicycle path inside the favela? To change its route, bring it inside the favela and after it continues it’s normal route. Not as the only solution, but as an alternative, for those who want to do that [follow the path through the favela]. So the macro diagnostic and plan for integration were very important, and they were brought by the new scope of Morar Carioca.

In this explanation of “integration” through a “macro diagnostic” seeking to sew the favela into the urban fabric of the city, the relatively simple notion that planners should think about favelas as part of their surroundings when designing interventions as both novel and transformative. Here the bicycle path threads the favela with the neighbourhood to operationally deconstruct spatial boundaries by giving residents and passerby the option of cycling through the favela as a normalised action.

The use of “territorial” by architects and planners to describe Morar Carioca’s approach references two paradigm shifts in Brazilian and international planning practice. First, pragmatically it refers to understanding the favela in relation to its encompassing administrative area (which are sometimes referenced to as territories given that they are demarcated zones of governance), of which there are 34 in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Antonio, who had worked

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43 The metaphor of sewing together urban fabric is common among architects and planners’ written and spoken discourse describing favela upgrading and integration interventions. It calls to mind the city represented as a patchwork quilt, and the architect-planners’ job is to form a whole following a cohesive pattern.
for the Municipal Housing Secretary overseeing Morar Carioca before moving to the Institute of Pereira Passos also described Morar Carioca as “territorial” and “relational”. Hastily scribbling on a bar napkin at our first meeting at a restaurant near his office, he sketched three non-contingent squares representing three distinct favelas in one area of the city. He explained that under Favela-Bairro, each of the favelas would require a separate intervention, and in many cases only one of the three favelas would have been urbanised since it was unlikely that the government would implement three self-contained projects in close proximity when resources are limited. He drew a tight circle around one of the squares. Morar Carioca, however, allows the architect-planning team to design an intervention for all three favelas in relation to each other (he drew connecting lines between the squares) as well as in relation to the surrounding formal city (he drew a loose circle encompassing most of the napkin).

Second and more abstractly, “territorial” and “relational” refer to a shift in planning thinking from static architecture-focused “blueprint planning” (called planejamento físico-territorial in Portuguese) to a more interdisciplinary approach that incorporates systems thinking and understands “planning as a process” (see Souza (2001b, 123–35). Whereas the former produces a plan based on the ideal future, the latter grapples with the dynamic present. Better planning, or more planning, has long been considered the solution to the “favela problem” because analysis blames a lack of popular housing planning as a principal culprit of their proliferation. However contemporary progressive planning in Rio de Janeiro no longer sees urban planning as the means to get rid of slums, but rather as a complex and dynamic process to stimulate and facilitate social cohesion, local economy, and community resilience (see 2015 UN Habitat International Guidelines on Urban and Territorial Planning). Favela-Bairro was not an example of blueprint planning—the shift in
planning thinking occurred well before the program’s creation—but because the plans were contained to individual favelas (what Pedro called localist) it prevented a dynamic, relational approach whereas Morar Carioca encourages it through both the “macro diagnostic” and the “plan for integration” as explained by Fede.

Defining “favela integration” in contemporary Rio de Janeiro goes beyond the upgrading paradigm of imitating formality within the favela and delivery of basic services. True “integration” requires that favelas become normal not just for their residents, but also for non-residents. A bicycle path is a simple example of a more complex idea. Fede and others strive to designate favelas as places to frequent, pass through, and visit. Urban design here takes aim as the social representation and spatial experience of the favelas. Designing bicycle paths or building health clinics within the favelas are strategies to “integrate” the favela into the mundane activities of city residents, and they feature prominently in programme propaganda produced by the municipal government. Fede's example of a bike path to normalise favela space also exposes the cautiousness of “favela integration” discourse. His designed bike path—which as it happens never materialised due to budget constrictions that surprised observers and frustrated the responsible architects—gives riders the option of cycling through the favela as an “alternative” route before rejoining with the “normal” path. The division between the favela and the “normal” route of movement would persist; but within “integration” a path through the formerly “no-go” zone is now presented to the urban subject as a state-sanctioned option.

5.5 Competing discourses: the favela is the city versus the favela belongs to the city

In contrast to the paradigm of “favela upgrading” (globally promoted by international development agencies as “slum
upgrading”)—defined through Favela-Bairro principally as interventions to improve the material conditions of urban infrastructure and semiotically approaching formal neighbourhoods—“integration” thinking evolved and prioritises the qualitative experience of the subject moving through urban space and attempts to deconstruct the socio-spatial barriers that mark the favelas as other and illegitimate. This line of thinking extends beyond interventions designed by architects and planners. As we saw above, integration shows up in political rhetoric that imagines the city as a diverse, harmonious democracy. As a paradigm of urban governance, “favela integration” seeks to appropriate the favela into the formal, hegemonic, urban landscape.

There are numerous discursive examples of this logic in state, news and civil society media. The Secretary of Security of the State of Rio de Janeiro, responsible for the militarised occupation and pacification of the favelas (UPP), literally pleaded with the middle class to visit the favelas in order to support the pacification efforts as part of the integration campaign. On the UPP webpage (which is also published in English to presumably facilitate foreign press inquires) a short section titled “A word from the Secretary” published in 2009 Jose Beltrame reads:

*By the end of 2010 I believe we will have logistic conditions to occupy many [favela] communities. But as I’ve always repeated whenever questioned: either society embraces and welcomes these areas or nothing will actually change. Therefore, the police plea with everyone: go up the hill, [the favela] belongs to the city.*

Echoing Beltrame’s claim, when security forces “invaded” the largest single favela, Rocinha, in 2013, the most widely circulated newspaper

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44 This page was removed and the passage deleted from the website at some point during 2015.
O Globo, declared on the front page “Rocinha is ours” (see figure 5.5). There more than a semantic difference between “the favela is the city” as so many community activists and academic sympathizers declare and “the favela belongs to the city” as Beltrame and the headline assert. The “favela is the city” (a favela é cidade) is a declarative performative statement seeking to rectify the historic spatial othering. It discursively implies oppression and prejudice as the root cause of the divided city by negating that dichotomy. “The favela belongs to the city,” equally performative, assumes authoritative responsibility, and declares, ‘enough is enough! We must take back the favela.’ But take back from what? Take back from whom? That unnamed subject—associated with crime, illegality, fear, poverty and insecurity—is named as the culprit. Obscuring the historical social conditions that stigmatised the favelas and produced the “cidade partida” is the discursive production of hegemonic landscape.
Figure 5.5 – A Rocinha é nossa

O Globo newspaper headline the morning after Rocinha was invaded by military forces in preparation for UPP. The headline reads, “Rocinha is ours. Without shots and in less than 2 hours, State retakes 3 favelas and re-establishes services to 100 thousand residents.” The main story is flanked with two quotes. From a Rocinha resident: “I’ve seen a lot of people from here leave dead. Now we have hope that things improve and that the public authority doesn’t continue to abandon us.” Opposite, a quote from a resident of Gavea, a wealthy adjacent neighbourhood: “My feeling is of hope and satisfaction. A new era has begun in Rocinha and Vidigal. The occupation eliminates the fear of shootouts.”
On the days that favelas are invaded, the police often raise the Brazilian national flag, the Rio de Janeiro state flag, and the Military Police and BOPE flags in what has been called an act of “colonisation of the favelas by the state” (Freeman 2014). The claim to ownership—‘the favela is ours, it belongs to the city’—reinforces the historic transformation from revanchist eviction (what Burgos (1998) calls remociónismo, or evictionism), to upgrading and finally to integration. It is not enough that the favela imitates the city. There is a hegemonic consensus that drastic security measures are a pre-condition for “favela integration”. And in political, technical, and news media, the Pacifying Police Units are packaged together with delivery of basic services, urbanisation and social programming. The cited headline in O Globo, for example, also stated in the sub-headline that services were re-established to 100,000 residents with the “retaking” of the favelas. This is patently false since the state had begun urbanisation of Rocinha and Vidigal years prior to the police invasion. But this manipulation of facts and history shows up in a variety of texts.

There is no single document at any level of government that defines “favela integration” as either a governance paradigm or policy objective, however in 2012 the federal Secretary of Strategic Affairs published a report entitled “Integration between Favela and City”. The publication was the precursor to a two-day seminar discussing “favela integration” co-sponsored by a number of institutions, including the federal Secretary of Strategic Affairs, Institute of Pereira Passos, the World Bank, as well as a consortium of private industry (Sistema Firjan) and a civil society research institute (IETS). Rio’s top policy makers, including both the Governor and Mayor, along with the city’s chief planning experts, participated. The document lays out six dimensions in order to achieve “effective and sustainable integration”
(see figure 5.6). Of note here is that security, by means of “pacification” is listed as the first dimension and treated as a priori of further state actions: “there appears to be consensus that the first stage of effective and sustainable integration is necessarily a process of pacification, with careful consideration of human rights.”

Figure 5.6 – Effective and Sustainable Integration
Infographic in “Integration between the favela and the city” produced by Federal Secretary of Strategic Affairs in coordination with a number of Rio de Janeiro local government offices. The graphic lists six “dimensions” bordered by “presence of the state within the communities” (on the left) and “social organization and strengthening of the communities” (on the right). The six dimensions are as follows: 1. Pacification, promotion of public security and capacity to peacefully resolve conflicts. 2. Reorganisation of institutions and leadership and consequently the capacity to identify local necessities and collective action. 3. Transition towards regularity/legality, definition of community norms and guarantee of public order. 4. Re-establishing equal opportunities and access to public services for personal development and reduction of inequalities. 5. Physical, economic and symbolic integration for the construction of identity and belonging. 6. Resignify meaning of youth.
Similarly a report jointly published by the Municipal Government and the Rio de Janeiro Chapter of the Institute of Brazilian Architects, which was pivotal to the development of Morar Carioca methodology and selection of architecture firms to design interventions, also toes this line of consensus. The edited volume dedicated to the “Social Diagnostic” required of Morar Carioca planning teams (explained above) includes an essay written by Manoel Ribeiro, an architect-planner with extensive experience implementing planning interventions in Rio’s favelas. He writes, “The favelas currently are “integrated” with the city, yes, but in a subordinated and perverse way. The great task is to change the quality of that integration, and the UPPs are a very important step in that sense, for *they restore liberty in these territories*” (2013, 54).

Ribeiro’s statement is at once critical of the “integration” discourse, since he affirms that favelas are already integrated to the city, and officialist in his agreement that “pacification” is necessary to “liberate” the favelas. The idea that “integration” necessarily starts with the guarantee of public security through the means of militarised invasion and occupation of favela neighbourhoods is repeated over and over until the UPPs are discursively indissociable from the delivery of basic services and the guarantee of favela residents’ rights.

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45 The affirmation that the favelas are already integrated into the city mirrors the argument against marginality, most famously advanced by Janice Perlman: “The evidence strongly indicates that the favelados are not *marginal* but in fact *integrated* into the society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own interests. They are certainly not separate from, or on the margin of the system, but are tightly bound into it in a severely asymmetrical form (Perlman 1976, 195). Perlman argued that rather than understanding the favelas and their residents through the lens of marginality, they should be understood as perversely positioned to the formal city, so that migrant labour was cheaply extracted without having to provide services associated with living in the wealthy city. Ribeiro’s statement is therefore all the more paradoxical, for he simultaneously references a body of literature that identifies police power as a principal source of violence against favela residents while championing the new UPP as a liberating power.
While we might understand the aforementioned examples as state agents, insiders, and consultants toeing the official line, external observers have parroted the idea as well. International consultants, think tanks, researchers, and journalists have uncritically reviewed and explained the UPPs as establishing peace and state presence in the favelas as the first step toward urbanisation and social integration (see Stahlberg 2011; Felbab-Brown 2011). The line of thinking begins with the Weberian notion that the state cannot function in favela territories without operating a monopoly of violence. And while holding up favela “pacification” as a model for other countries, they represent the occupation and circulation of police in the favelas as agents that symbolically hold the door open for additional services; hence “bringing the state to she slum.” The UPP security apparatus deploys charming, high-ranking officers to grant interviews, and their rhetoric is so well practiced to the point that the award-winning writer Suketu Mehta claimed in the New York Review of Books that the police were responsible for providing social services:

*Under the UPP program, elite police units—and in some cases troops from the army and even the navy—in invade the favelas and stay for up to three months. Then they are replaced by the regular police and squads of UPP civil servants. The UPP establishes schools and garbage collection, brings in public and private companies to provide utilities such as electricity and television, and hands out legal documents such as employment and residency certificates. In the areas under its control, the UPP has set up community security councils, which attempt to mediate conflicts between local hotheads before they spread.* (2013)

Space does not permit a full overview of the UPP and their operations, but suffice to say that the UPP do not have “squads of civil servants”
coordinating basic urban or social services. In regards to local security councils, the community dialogue established between the occupying military forces and community members in the Complexo do Alemão during their more than year-long occupation was dismantled by the UPP, a fact that was brought up with ire at a community-organised public meeting I attended in 2014 that was surrounded and filmed by heavily armed UPP officers. One of the organisers later told me that they “indefinitely suspended” such meetings as a result of threats made by UPP officers.

Beyond factual inaccuracies or misunderstandings of the UPP process, the irony of the consensus—that the UPP is necessary for security and integration—is that it ignores two decades of planning interventions of Favela-Bairro. In some cases (such as the aforementioned essay by Ribeiro) architect-planners who worked on multiple integration projects without police presence, conduct an about face and toe the line. Not only does it ignore the history of Favela-Bairro, it ignores the fact that the large-scale interventions of PAC-favelas were well underway prior to the pacification of Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha, for example; and that pacification is not a precondition for Morar Carioca interventions. Research on the extent to which organised gangs influenced or hindered Favela-Bairro and other upgrading interventions is scant. A recent doctoral dissertation that comprehensively reviews slum-upgrading policies in Rio de Janeiro from the late 20th century until 2012 (Miranda 2015) never mentions the topic in part because architects, planners, and other state agents are prohibited from dialoguing with the gangs as if they were legitimate territorial authorities.46 The most comprehensive evaluation of Favela-Bairro briefly states that the interests of the gangs are presumed to be expressed through the recognised resident

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46 Personal communication with the author.
associations (Fiori et al. 2000). This assertion is substantiated by my own interviews and conversations with architects and resident association representatives. My objective is not to refute the claim that police-enforced “public security” helps sustain successful interventions, but rather to argue that a linear, sequential association between “pacification” and “integration” is unsubstantiated.

The pacification police discursively unite the divided city through supposedly guaranteeing freedom of movement and “opening up” favela neighbourhoods to flows of non-resident visitors, state civil servants, and private capital. Within the discourse of favela integration, it is only after the police enter with force (the official terms used by the security apparatus to describe the process is “invade, occupy, pacify”) and dominate the space through visible and frequent foot patrols throughout the favela, that additional state provided or facilitated services “arrive”.

The UPP are also a key actor in making the favela marvellous and thus worthy of Rio’s landscape. In order to sell the programme both to Rio’s population and to the international media, the UPP officers, especially as the programme was rolled out, were represented almost as caregivers in the favelas, rather than a militarised police force. Their bilingual website boasts news-styled stories of police officers hosting community events, teaching martial arts to children, feeding the hungry, and giving free guitar lessons (see images 3 and 4). These stories are highlighted by the state and reproduced by popular media, thus serving the narrative that pacification restores liberty and delivers dignity to favela residents: marvellous things are happening in the favela.
Figure 5.7 – Police fishmongers
Photograph from the UPP’s website in 2014 shows military police handing out fish in Chapeu Manguiera. The caption reads, "Around 50 people, young and old, received the donations from the hands of the police”.

Figure 5.8 – Party with the UPP
Photograph found on UPP’s website in 2014 shows two officers singing for a small crowd of dancing children. The caption reads, “The event occurred on the corner of the community and with the presence of 50 children.” The accompanying story describes this as a Christmas event organised by the Coroa/Fallet/Fogueteiro UPP that included an officer dressed as Santa Claus who distributed presents to children.

As the discourse of integration focuses on facilitating flows in and out of the favelas, so too does the counter-hegemonic response. The public community meeting in Vidigal referenced above was part
of a series of events titled *Fala Vidigal* and sponsored by the resident association and international NGO Catalytic Communities with the purpose to debate the changes experienced in the favela post-pacification. The theme of the second debate was gentrification. With its stunning views of the Ipanema and Leblon shoreline, Vidigal has seen a rapid influx of new residents, both foreign and native Brazilians, who are willing to pay higher rents for the privileged position. While gentrification is not the norm for the majority of Rio’s favelas, it is a documented phenomenon in those favelas in Zona Sul, almost all of which have been “pacified.” Vidigal, which successfully resisted eviction in the 1970s through strong community organisation and leveraging support from sympathetic celebrities, is perhaps the most “marvellous” of favelas, made evident by the numerous new guesthouses and hostels, a sushi restaurant and real estate investors. During fieldwork, I met a young Brazilian who had bought two small homes in the favela and sold them one year later making substantial profit.

At *Fala Vidigal*, Theresa Williamson, president of Catalytic Communities and an influential interlocutor for international students, volunteers, journalists and academics; argued that in place of a “recipe for integration” the state is following a “recipe for gentrification” by facilitating the “regularisation” of basic services immediately after the pacification process. Indeed a common complaint made by favela community leaders is that the first people to enter the favela after the police invasion are the private companies to end the *gato-Light* and *gato-NET* (illegal electricity and cable/internet hook-ups). The formalisation of these basic services is followed by a “regularisation” of local businesses operating in various degrees of informality. Post urbanisation, via Morar Carioca or PAC-favelas, tens of thousands of favela homeowners are opting to regularise their lot and receive a land title. According to Williamson, these new
conditions are attractive to foreigners and young professionals, especially in geographically privileged Zona Sul favelas, forcing out poorer residents who cannot afford to pay market price utility bills and increases in rent.

André Constantine, the then-leader of a radical community activist group called *Favela Não Se Cala* (The Favela Won't Shut Up) decried Morar Carioca and PAC-Favelas as “state agents of gentrification.” When a young man stood in front of the microphone, an uncomfortable quiet settled the audience after he immediately identified himself as one of the “gentrifiers” mentioned by Williamson (he used his fingers to mime quotes around the word). White, Brazilian and working in theatre, he acknowledged the tension in the changing community but professed love and respect for the community: “I don’t tell people I live in a favela. I tell them I live in the *neighbourhood* called Vidigal.” He also thought more attention should be paid to the positive effects of the influx of new residents, particularly the increased demand for quality services; and said that “maybe we can bring a bank or a nice hospital to Vidigal.” Immediately after, a young woman who had previously complained about discriminatory treatment by the UPP took the microphone. She said she did not think banks moving into Vidigal was a good thing, because “people will start losing their homes”, and looking at the crowd she passionately declared, “I don’t want to live in a ‘community’ or a ‘neighbourhood.’ I want to live in *my favela*, Vidigal.” The crowd cheered.

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47 *Comunidade*, or community, is another name for favela in Brazilian Portuguese. Considered a euphemism by some, the term seems to have originated during the mid-twentieth century by favela residents and organisers in order to fight the stigma associated with the favelas. The term was adopted by populist politicians and is now used interchangeably with favela. Many young favela residents, such as the young woman cited here, have re-appropriated the word “favela” as a spatial identity expressed through popular culture.
5.6 Favela integration and the “right to come and go”

Rewriting the rules of who enters and leaves the favelas has been key since the beginning of this new phase of “favela-integration.” This is often referred to as the “right to come and go,” or the “freedom of movement” which is enshrined in Article V section XV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution (“a liberdade de locomoção”). Intended to prevent arbitrary detention by the State during times of peace (habeas corpus), politicians and other state actors often invoke this constitutional right when speaking of both “pacification” and “integration”. They argue that the UPP guarantees residents the right to enter and leave their own communities.

One could validly argue that police pacification facilitates free movement for many subjects entering and leaving favelas. Gangs have territorially controlled many favelas, barring entry to certain subjects, imposing curfews, and shutting down commerce. During territorial disputes, gun battles are common, and residents rightly fear to move about and return home after dark (Barcellos 2011; M. H. M. Alves and Evanson 2011). However, many residents also feel restricted by the “pacifying” forces, particularly men and youth profiled by race and age presumed by police to be associated with or sympathetic to the gangs. During the occupation phase, photo documentation of school children stopped along the street and searched on their way to school was widely shared on social media as were political cartoons depicting similar scenes (Figures 5.8 and 5.9).
Figure 5.9 – Soldiers pat down school children
During the initial phase of military occupation of Complexo do Alemão, the military patrolled the largest grouping of favelas in the city until enough UPP officers could be trained. Here soldiers have stopped a group of men and boys, some carrying school rucksacks, and ordered them to stand against the wall and submit to a body search. One of the boys covers his head with his jacket, presumably to shield his face from the camera. The image was widely shared on social media at the time.

Figure 5.10 - Latuff Political Cartoon
A cartoon by the radical artist Latuff seems inspired by the scene depicted in figure 5.9. A black mother packing her son’s rucksack (favela homes visible outside the open window) only to have her son searched outside of a public school with a frightened look on his face by a BOPE police officer (indicated by the scull on the officer’s uniform). The cartoon was widely shared on social media by those critical of favela pacification.
“Pacification” that purports to integrate and guarantee the right to come and go prioritises the regulation of certain bodies in motion, including school children, adolescent males standing or walking about, and motorcycles. Motorcycles and moto-taxis are a primary means of passenger transport and delivery of goods in the favelas, offering the quickest, most agile means of transport through congested, narrow streets and up and down steep hillsides. Police treat moto-taxis with suspicion, despite their omnipresence, due to a presumed association with drug deliveries, gang-related errands, and thefts. As such, motorcycles are often stopped by police in “pacified” favelas and checked for proper paperwork. This practice seems to be at its height during the initial occupation phase, when armed forces overwhelm the territory to establish state security presence. Residents of Complexo da Maré made many complaints on social networks during the military occupation, and a video went viral on Facebook of a man in a heated argument with members of the army, dressed in fatigues and carrying assault rifles. In this video, the subject, infuriated, demands his right to come and go without arbitrarily being stopped. The officer repeatedly shouts him down, referring to him only as “cidadão” (citizen), acknowledging his rights but insisting on his submission to a body search, and handing over documents relating to the motorcycle’s registration. His wife films the encounter, insisting on her right to document the interaction when soldiers attempt to block her view. The video was even covered on the online news website of Extra, a subsidiary of the media giant Rede Globo, which noted, “At times it even appeared that the soldier wanted to humiliate the pedestrian”.48 There have been even more

48 The news note mistakenly refers to the man as a pedestrian. He was stopped, with his wife, while riding a motorcycle, which is shown in the 14-minute video uploaded to YouTube and Facebook and viewed by tens of thousands. See: http://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/soldado-grita-com-moradores-durante-abordagem-no-complexo-da-mare-12749356.html
severe cases of police officers shooting moto-taxistas for failing to stop when flagged down or, in one case, for carrying a hydraulic carjacker that apparently looked like a rifle to officers (Sansão 2016; Estadão 2015).

I spoke with Julia, a past co-director of a library and cultural centre in the Complexo de Manguinhos, which was included in the PAC-favelas intervention. She had spent decades working in the state’s largest and oldest museums and theatres, but she told me that after reading about the “social infrastructure” and cultural side of PAC-favelas she enthusiastically volunteered for the programme Biblioteca Parque which built public libraries in three of the largest favelas receiving PAC interventions. During our conversations she convinced me of her passion and dedication, and described the work as a collective “revolution, not with guns but with books.”

I asked if this work in the PAC infrastructure depended on the UPP and favela pacification. She smiled and said, “No. I think the UPP depends on the work of PAC.” Citing Beltrame, she insisted that pacification can only succeed through sustained investments in health, culture, and education. I pressed, “Does that mean PAC-social [the library and cultural centre] could have been achieved without the UPP?” She paused only briefly before saying no, and depicted the programmes as interdependent. The gangs are “arrogant,” she said, and “acted as if they ran everything. Before the UPP they would come into the library with big guns!” She had to confront the leader, Big Mike, over the issue. Fearful and against the advice of her colleagues, she faced him after he entered a restricted room to look for someone on the surveillance video feed:

“This library is for all residents. And you are welcome to come to the library and use the library whenever you want, because you are a citizen and it is your right. But you don’t run things here. This here is
space of the state, and I am the top authority. You can’t go in that room and you can’t bring guns into the library.’ He stood there looking at me for a while—maybe deciding whether or not to kill me [laughs]—but then he patted me affectionately on the shoulder and responded, ‘You’re right, Ms Julia. My bad.’ And I never had any more problems with Big Mike again, and the traffickers stopped bringing in their guns.

The story appears to indicate that Julia managed to negotiate with the gang over ‘appropriate behaviour’ in regards to library use—respect institutional authority, no guns etc... But Julia says she “hated” the traffickers, and that the gang “imprisons the residents” and restricts movement. “With the traffic, the boundaries are invisible. You never know where you are, and if you’re crossing into a rival gang’s territory.” The UPP, she says, improves access to the favelas and guarantees the right to move about. Pacification “gives the space back to the people.”

Nonetheless Julia spoke of multiple complications and confrontations with the UPP. For example, while she successfully negotiated with the gangs to not enter the library armed, she had no luck with the UPP, whose officers would enter with their fingers near the trigger of their assault rifles.49 This made the residents, especially the youth, uncomfortable. She told me of how she marched up to the UPP commander and gave him the same speech she gave Big Mike: the library is public space in which she is the highest authority; and while

49 UPP officers are trained to patrol with their fingers near the trigger, so that they are always ready for a possible confrontation with armed gang members. When they patrol in a police car they drive with their gun barrels protruding from the open windows (this is not unique to UPP in the favelas). In pacified favelas that experienced an insurgence by the previously expelled gangs, I witnessed the police change their patrol tactics. They once walked through the streets casually in small groups, but after confrontations they increasingly patrolled in single file and hugging the walls of homes and shops to minimize their exposure. Those without rifles began walking with pistols in-hand. The UPP Commander sympathised with Julia’s concern, but told her that finger-at-the-ready is programmed into their behaviour, and meant to keep the officers alive.
police officers have just as much right to use the library as anyone else, they should not enter with their rifles. I asked if her speech worked. She laughed and said no. The police continued to come in armed, mostly to use the computers. Additionally Julia told a story that contradicts the notion that the UPP increase citizens’ rights to move around and give space back to the residents.

One afternoon Julia was sitting in her office when some young children came running to find her: “Ms Julia! Some police are going crazy waving their guns around!” Julia immediately got up and ran to see the commotion, furious because she had already told the UPP Commander that officers should not patrol the library as they did the streets. Sure enough the police had their guns pointed at a group of adolescent boys lined up against the wall with their hands on their heads. They had been playing board games on the nearby tables. “What do you think you’re doing!” Julia asked the officers. They responded, “Don’t worry, Ms Julia, we’re just checking their documents. Because if they don’t have their documents we’ll take them—” Julia interrupted, “Not in here you aren’t! This here is the library and I’m in charge. I am the representative of the governor in this space!” The police: “But Ms Julia, these guys are marginals.” Julia: “Marginals to you maybe, because you don’t know them. I know them. I know their families!”

I asked Julia if the police respected her authority. The police did leave, she said, but they marched out with the adolescents at gunpoint. A group of onlookers gathered and Julia sent some youth who had not been caught in the dragnet to run and alert the boys’ families. Making a scandal was the surest way of protecting the boys from possible abuse.

There is no denying that favela “pacification” facilitates entry and exit of the favelas, regulated by the state rather than the gangs. However it remains unclear who are the primary beneficiaries. While
non-residents are freer to come and go, including service providers and public employees, residents themselves, particularly youth and men, experience increased friction, often forced to stop and submit to police search and/or intimidation. Not only are their movements monitored and their bodies subject to search as described above, but their activities are also limited. Widely popular baile funk parties, which are historically associated with the drug gangs, are immediately prohibited post-invasion of the police. This violates the civil rights of residents, but it was nonetheless codified by a Ministry of Public Security decree in 2007 that regulated a 2006 gubernatorial executive decree. The resolution declared police authority to regulate all cultural and social events in the “pacified” favelas. It was condemned by civil society and legal scholars, eventually repealed by the Governor in 2013; however at an Fala Vidigal (referenced earlier) I heard a young resident denounce the police for continuing to prohibit young residents from throwing parties in their neighbourhood, effectively establishing an illegal curfew. In contrast the private parties attended in newly opened nightclubs for comparatively wealthy tourists and Zona Sul “playboys” were allowed to continue all night long.

5.7 Making the favela marvellous, the case of the Teleférico do Alemão

I now focus on a single intervention that embodies the hegemonic notion of integrating the favelas into the marvellous city: the spectacularised construction of a cable-car. Applying a landscape-mobilities analysis, the section describes travelling through Rio de Janeiro on public transport with a destination of Complexo do Alemão, where Governor Cabral with President Dilma, and Mayor Paes inaugurated the gondola in 2011. The Teleférico do Alemão was financed through the federal stimulus package PAC, referenced in
Chapter 1 and discussed in-depth in Chapter 7, and heralded as representative of the most significant public investments in the favelas in the history of Rio de Janeiro. I argue that the Teleférico is a spectacular piece of infrastructure meant to symbolically and materially connect the large favela complex to the public transit system and integrate the favelas into the formal city. I begin the description as a journey to the Teleférico do Alemão as a destination rather than starting point, and in doing so I make explicit that my experience in the field did not mirror that of Alemão residents. When I visited the Complexo, I travelled there as an ‘outsider’ similar to a tourist, commuting state employee or visiting official.50

The journey to Complexo do Alemão from Zona Sul or the city centre is relatively straightforward even if difficult for a foreigner without Portuguese language skills (like most foreign tourists). As the newest tourist attraction, “Teleférico” flashes across the electronic destination screen of the 483 bus, which runs from Copacabana through Zona Sul and the city centre to Bonsucesso train station. While the bus may be the most direct public transport option to the Teleférico, it certainly is not the quickest, taking over an hour without traffic. During peak travel times, when traffic becomes an infuriating stop-and-go for miles at a time, that hour and a half can easily stretch to two or even three hours. The quicker option is to take the metro to Central, the downtown commuter train station, and then take the Saracuruna line leaving from platform 12 to Bonsucesso, where integration to the Teleférico is relatively seamless.

Above the platform fare-gates in Central train station there

50 There may be some major differences to how I travelled in comparison to state officials—who arrive by chauffeur-driven car—or a well-heeled tourist—who may arrive in a taxi or tour van with a guide. Nonetheless this analytical position is designed to reflect my methodological approach, ethnographic but not ethnography. I did not embed myself within the Complexo do Alemão nor the PAC intervention as an ethnographer would; and I make no clams to speak from the perspective or about the lived experience of Complexo do Alemão’s 80,000+ residents.
hang large white signs with the platform number, the train line name and final destination. Above platform 12 the sign additionally lists Teleférico—not Bonsucesso, Complexo do Alemão, or Teleférico do Alemão, the gondola’s branded name, but simply “Teleférico,” same as the flashing LED sign on the busses. This indicates that the Teleférico, not Complexo do Alemão, has become the destination point. This is something of a novelty when compared to other established attractions in Rio de Janeiro. The Corcovado tram up to the iconic Christ the Redeemer statue or the gondolas to the top of Sugarloaf Mountain form part of the tourist attraction but they are not the defining experience. Further below I discuss how the Teleférico was part of a planning strategy to “resignify” Complexo do Alemão form a no-go area to a destination point. But as we can see, the gondola, a form of moving through space (and ‘above’ the city) dominated the spatial representation.

The commuter trains in Rio de Janeiro stand in stark contrast to the metro. Like many large metropolises, the metro fills to capacity during rush hour, a particularly uncomfortable experience during the muggy summers. Central station also can be daunting as the crowds pour out of the car doors in a rushed shuffle, and many passengers begin hurriedly walking, some breaking into a run, up the escalators towards the train station in order to catch the next departure or to beat out the other passengers in arriving first at the platform and securing a seat on the train. Many of Rio de Janeiro’s residents who live in the suburbs and work downtown or in Zona Sul have exceptionally long commute times with multiple transfers. The journey is costly as well as tiresome if they are not lucky, or aggressive, enough to snag a seat on the crowded trains and busses. While the metro is air conditioned, the trains are not, and nor, unlike the metro do they run frequently. Passengers can wait for 15-30 minutes or more for a train, which are commonly delayed during rush
hour. While the metro is kept clean and orderly, the train and stations are littered with trash and are in disrepair. Ticket turnstiles may remain broken for weeks at stations far from the city centre, and without the watchful gaze of the private security guards in the metro, fare dodging can be common. The gap between the train and platform at some stations is so wide that even I, at 5’11” (177 cm) have had to leap in order to make the platform. Poor maintenance on the old trains also result in door failures, which if the passengers cannot physically pull the door shut may result in the train carrying on with the doors ajar. And, while the security presence prevents begging and informal vendors on the metro but tacitly permits music performers, the train is rife with vendors selling small refreshments and daily goods such as pens or socks as well as individuals begging for money or soliciting donations for social projects, most notably evangelical Christian homes for drug rehabilitation.

The metro, which serves nearly all of wealthy Zona Sul and the business district, does stretch out to the poorer industrially depressed North Zone, however the expansion towards the working class areas is recent and slow. Many of the stations north of the city centre were inaugurated in the 1990s. Public transport access to the suburbs was (and to a large extent still is) facilitated by commuter train and an uneven bus network and loosely regulated van services. Both transport activists and some urban scholars have lodged that the Metro is for the rich, while the poor receive substandard transport infrastructure. This argument is seemingly substantiated by the transport planning involved with the Olympics—the Metro expansion added stations in Ipanema, Leblon, São Conrado (which also will serve the large favela of Rocinha) and continued to the wealthy suburb of Barra de Tijuca. In contrast, the North and West Zones gained Bus Rapid Transit lines, which reached and surpassed capacity during rush hour within a year of their inauguration as reported by local
journalists and foreseen by critical transport specialists (Victor and Ribeiro 2015; Funare 2014).

Figure 5.11 is a photograph of political graffiti I snapped from a BRT bus that runs from the international airport, through the industrial working class and North Zone, before curving westward until Barra de Tijuca. The graffiti, written on the wall of a private home not far from the Complexo da Maré, reads, “some have comfort, others [the] BRT”. While middle class Cariocas in Zona Sul use the metro, their counterparts who live in areas primarily served by the BRT, traditional buses, and train are more likely to use cars (Kleiman 2011). One day I took a middle class Zona Sul native familiar with my research to see Complexo do Alemão via the Teleférico. When we arrived at Central station, he sheepishly confessed that this was the first time he had ever been to the station and he expressed certainty that among his childhood friends only those from or with family in the suburbs would have ever used the trains. In Rio de Janeiro, Central is considered dangerous and treated as a no-go place for those privileged enough to avoid it.
The BRT lines were included in Rio’s “Olympic legacy” and sold to the public as an innovative, flexible and high-quality public transport solution (Gaffney et al. Forthcoming). But as exemplified by the graffiti above and discontent expressed by ridership, it stands in equal contrast with the trains to the metro. The Teleférico do Alemão, heralded as the first instance of a gondola used for mass transit in the country,51 is a different story. The gondola journey from Bonsucesso train station to the final station of Palmeiras is 3.5 kilometres and takes on average 16 minutes in one of the 152 gondola cars, each with a capacity of eight passengers. At each station the cars slow down sufficiently on the platform to allow passengers to enter while its

51 Many architects as well as politicians boasted that the Teleférico was the first mass transit system of its kind in Brazil. While true in the sense that the Teleférico was envisioned as a public transport, legally it does not qualify as a “mass transit” system because even at full capacity it cannot transport enough passengers. While this may seem a superficial detail, this technocratic definition means the Teleférico is not subject to the same regulatory oversights as the busses, trains and metro lines.
moving—facilitated by one or two attendants—or it may come to a complete stop to allow persons in wheelchairs or physical difficulties to board. Facilitating movement of people with disabilities, the elderly, or otherwise sympathetic figures’ (mothers laden with shopping bag were often cited by enthusiastic politicians) up the steep hills of the favelas of Complexo do Alemão was prominently featured in political and press discourse.

Boarding one of the bright red cable cars, branded by the ice cream company Kibon (originally a Brazilian brand now controlled by the multinational Unilever), one hears classical music such as Bach and Mozart playing in the Bonsucesso Teleférico station. Attendants usher passengers into the cars, which are not air-conditioned but well ventilated so that even in the hot summers a breeze is more or less constant once off the ground. No music plays within the cabins but there is a PA speaker system that announces the upcoming stations in both Portuguese and English. The gondolas are small relative to those used in mountain ski resorts or at the Sugar Loaf Mountain. Each is equipped with two upholstered benches (each sitting four persons) facing each other. Standing in the middle of the car is possible, but keeping one’s balance may prove difficult since the cable car sways considerably with the wind.

The views from the cable car between stations are impressive. In the gently swaying car, one looks out at the surrounding mountains of Rio de Janeiro and the picturesque bay of Guanabara. Cut into the mountains bordering Complexo do Alemão are rock quarries and a large power station. Looking down one sees thousands of homes, some brightly painted, and narrow streets with hundreds of people walking, standing, biking and washing cars. Slowly driving white combi-vans navigate parked cars on the narrow roads and dozens of zipping motorcycles. One sees a sea of laje-rooftops, some covered by corrugated metal or tarps. A few have above ground pools, many have
laundry hung out to dry in the sun. A few of the lajes that are directly beneath the Teleférico are brightly painted—one mimics the Brazilian flag, another with the colours of Flamengo football club. I’m told that these lajes can be rented for parties and barbecues. On top of the lajes are large water storage tanks, satellites, and resting dogs. During election season one will see hundreds of signs of all sizes with the face of a local politician and their party’s ballot number. Curiously, I have never seen such signs, or any propaganda for that matter, aimed in a manner that suggested a target audience from above (that is looking down from the gondolas), save the branding of the gondola cars and stations. One sees ubiquitous graffiti, tagging and many murals of urban art on the sides of homes, small shops, and retaining walls.

The areas around the enormous pillars of the Teleférico, for which thousands were evicted, stand bare and empty, save the plentiful trash. The trash-surrounded columns are in contrast to the stations, which are well kept and clear of litter. When passing through the stations between Bonsucesso and the final stop, Palmeiras, the stations are most often empty save the attendants working the entry/exit points and occasional private security guards. UPP officers are often visible around the Teleférico stations given that the UPP police stations in Complexo do Alemão were built at the top of the hills near the Teleférico stations; but they rarely enter the stations themselves based on my observations. The hillside of Morro do Alemão, between stations Alemão and Itararé are nearly completely covered in houses, and this is one of the most impressive views one sees from the Teleférico (see figure 5.12). Corresponding to the densest areas of the Complexo, I have heard tourists, both foreign and Brazilian, refer to this site as a “sea of shacks” [mar de barracos]. Most homes are a standard cinderblock-grey; so those that are brightly painted pop out to the eye. If one knows where to look, they can see the former Complexo do Alemão headquarters of the cultural group
Afro Reggae, painted brightly in the pan-Africanist colours of red, gold, and green. The group was forced to abandon the site and turned over its projects to another NGO after the headquarters was firebombed in retaliation for the outspoken founder’s support of the favela pacification program, Governor Cabral, and Secretary of Security Beltrame. There are few roads, and fewer still that can allow two cars to pass each other up and down the hills; but looking in between the densely packed homes one sees an elaborate system of alleys and pathways, stairs and groundwater and sewage runoffs.

Figure 5.12 - A sea of shacks
The view of Complexo do Alemão from the Teleférico, described by tourists and Brazilian local ‘outsiders’ as a “sea of shacks.”

The last laje before arriving at the Palmeiras station, where passengers are required to disembark, is that of an empty home, its residents evicted after being declared “at risk” for landslide. Curiously, this home, and many others that now stand empty for years, is mere meters away from a large UPP station. On top of this
laje rooftop is written “S.O.S Complexo Alemão,” a social media hashtag commonly used by social activists and youth of the favelas when documenting police violence, abuse, or unfinished public works in the neighbourhoods. The Palmerias station is host to a library, community workspace, and family health clinic. Surrounding the station is a spacious look-out points with panoramic views of Guanabara Bay and the city. A small tourist market with regulated stalls sells arts, crafts and souvenirs from local merchants and small kiosks sell snacks and beer.

Figure 5.13 - SOS Complexo do Alemão
The last (former) house the Teleférico passes over before reaching Palmeiras, deemed at “high risk” of being washed down the hill during heavy rain storms. The #SOSComplexoDoAlemão was a hashtag popularised during 2014 when confrontations between gang members and police became common as did accusations of police brutality, unjustified killings, and harassment of community activists and young men.

Palmerias, like the other four stations within Complexo do Alemão stand out on the horizon, whether the viewer is on the surrounding highways or looking up at the hills from inside the favelas. The stations seem disproportionate in comparison to the
surrounding self-built homes and even tower over the largest structures, the UPP stations. The Teleférico was designed to be viewed from a distance, as told by the lead architect Jauregui. Looking at his artistic rendering titled “view from international airport (new presence), localizing Complexo do Alemão in the landscape,” we see a romantic rendering of the stations defining the skyline. The only other discernible objects in the sketch are the lights of homes dotting the hillsides, the figure of Christ the Redeemer statue, and the prominent church and pilgrimage site, Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Penha. The Teleférico and Complexo do Alemão are barely visible to the naïve eye. Figure 5.14 shows the view of the Teleférico from a viewpoint similar to the one suggested in Jauregui’s landscape sketch. The drawing is undoubtedly inspired by Niemeyer’s sketch of the Buenos Aires skyline or his re-imagination of Rio de Janeiro by plane. Jauregui greatly admires Niemeyer work and ideology, often referencing him in his written work, presentation, and interviews. The fact that the Teleférico was meant to be seen from “outside” the favela (or by outsiders) seems to fuel the accusation that the infrastructure was “para inglês ver.”

I will discuss this criticism in greater detail in Chapter 7, for now suffice to say that critics suggest the gondola system is something of an aesthetic ruse, a highly visible intervention to make it appear that the government was delivering socially responsible projects to favela residents while in reality doing little-to-nothing or delivering substandard interventions. Ironically, I do not think that Jauregui, or the defenders of the Teleférico would dismiss the claim that the Teleférico was meant to be a prominent fixture in the Rio de Janeiro cityscape. That is, it was meant to be viewed from the “outside”. Indeed, Jauregui clearly stated in his interview with me that one purpose of the Teleférico is to “resignify” the favelas and the periphery of the city.
Jáuregui: The fact that we connected the hilltops, different than the [gondola] in Medellín, which [has stations] connecting the hillsides. Here we’re on the top, which meant upturning the hill, because the traffickers used to be at the top. There weren’t any roads that lead up there, and therefore it was like a bunker. [...] The Teleférico came and quickly upturned, from top to bottom, made accessible that which was inaccessible. And within the landscape of Rio, it was placed on the top of the hills like... like a... as if it were a Christmas lamp. The whole hill is there and on top, the lamp, which is the light that illuminates the top of the hill. It literally put the Complexo do Alemão on the map, because before one didn’t know where it was. They talked about in the newspapers: the police, Complexo do Alemão, they [the gang] killed [the journalist] Tim Lopez, the microwave, and whatever, everything they used to say in the past. I mean, before the Teleférico the Complexo do Alemão was associated with an imaginary totally and profoundly negative. With the Teleférico it was resignified, and that which was negative became positive. And today the place is more visited than Christ the Redeemer. Why? Because it’s a lot cheaper, on the one hand, and on the other the people want to see what a favela is like, and it’s an experience.

Jauregui thus understands the Teleférico beyond its use value to transport favela residents. He believes that the Teleférico adds symbolic socio-cultural value to the favelas and periphery of the city. Whereas before Complexo do Alemão was infamous for violence,

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52 Tim Lopez was an investigative journalist and video producer for *Rede Globo*’s TV. He had previously won awards for investigative pieces showing drugs sale points in Complexo do Alemão. In June of 2002 while filming a similar exposé in the favela Vila Cruzeiro in which he was investigating reports of sexual exploitation of girls at parties hosted by the drug gang, he was kidnapped, taken to Complexo do Alemão (also largely controlled by *Comando Vermelho*), where he was brutally tortured and eventually burned, stacked in rubber tires, an act known as “the microwave”. Lopez’s death resulted in even fewer newspapers willing to send journalists into the favelas carte blanche, which residents often condemn as contributing to the lopsided coverage depicting favelas as fortresses of criminality and themselves as suspected deviants. Such is the sentiment that Juaregui references in drawing on the history of Tim Lopez.
people who lived in Zona Sul would only know of the huge swath of favela space for the murder of Tim Lopez (for whom a PAC-funded school is named in Alemão), now it boasts the first gondola system to be used for public transit in all of Brazil.

Figure 5.14 – “Localizing Complexo do Alemão in the landscape”
Head architect Jauregui’s drawing of the Teleférico as seen from the international airport.

If the above examples indicate how the Teleférico do Alemão purposefully re-imagines Complexo do Alemão’s position in Rio’s landscape and be associated with a positive social signifier from the ‘outside’ looking in, according to the project’s protagonists, the perspectives of residents is even more important:
In a community in which one could not walk, now one can fly.

Imagine the dreams of that society which can now come and go with dignity.

This is the greatest contribution of the Teleférico: that it guarantees mobility to the largest pacified favela in the State of Rio de Janeiro.

The Teleférico is a reflection of the development of self-esteem of Complexo do Alemão.

These are the pillars of peace, guaranteed by the mutual respect between the citizens.

(Jose Lopez, Secretary of Transportation of RJ State)

The above text is a speech edited, truncated, and presented almost as verse by the team behind *Um Ano de Conquista*, a coffee-table-sized book produced by Supervia celebrating the pacification of Complexo do Alemão and the one year anniversary of the inauguration of the Teleférico. It is an example the fetishisation of the project, attributing almost supernatural abilities to the infrastructure. Lopez implies that before the Teleférico [and pacification] one could not even walk in Complexo do Alemão; but now, after the Teleférico [and pacification] one can fly. Who exactly could not walk in Alemão is left unsaid, but since we know for fact that those who lived in Alemão prior to pacification did indeed walk to and from their homes, and took private collective transport within and around their neighbourhoods, Lopez is either exaggerating for effect or referring to those who did not live in Alemão: those outsiders, tourists of the Carioca middle class, who did not feel comfortable entering Alemão. Those outsiders can now enter and move around through parts of Complexo do Alemão in a controlled environment that is both within the complex of favelas and yet separate.

Similar to how foreign journalists uncritically repeated the rhetoric of the favela pacification programme, many ‘outside’ commentators with supposed ‘insider’s’ knowledge mimicked the
sensationalist rhetoric; believing that the installation of a cable car transport system could fundamentally change what it means to live in Complexo do Alemão:

What most outsiders forget to include in the equation are the psychological benefits of what they call a Teleférico here. In the old days, gondolas were for rich people and tourists climbing up Pão de Açucar to take in the sunset. Sure, people from the favelas could visit Pão de Açucar, but few would feel comfortable. In the eyes of many of Brazil’s ricos, they were the gente baixa. They belonged up in the hills, other hills, often in the favelas of Rio’s North Zone.

Now, those same favela residents can ride up and down their local hills easily and proudly, and perhaps won’t feel so out of place the next time they visit Pão de Açucar. The real action these days is up in the hills close to home, anyway. [...] 

The gondolas’ psychological impact isn’t just another check mark on this benefits side of the equation. It’s a source of self-respect, deep at the root of quality life in Rio’s favelas. With self-respect come more education and entrepreneurship, less violence, and boosts in physical and mental health.

Michael Kerlin, International Management Consultant "Favela Gondolas Offer Pride After First Month"
Rio Times Online, 9 August 2011

Kerlin makes explicit the fetishisation of the Gondola infrastructure. Well-intentioned, he notes how favela residents generally lack access to pay-to-see attractions around Rio de Janeiro. Christ the Redeemer and Sugarloaf are places strongly associated with Rio’s marvellous characteristics. Complexo do Alemão, even with its panoramic views, was not. However, the notion that the Teleférico imbues favela residents with self-respect confuses being the subject of class, race and place-based oppression and stigma with lacking self-respect. Furthermore the suggestion that the Teleférico and the corresponding self-respect would produce better
education results and higher levels of entrepreneurship, or that it could decrease violence is fantasy. Nonetheless Kerlin is on track when he notes that gondolas have historically been associated with tourism and wealth, and some scepticism of the Teleférico may relate to this representation of cable-car travel. The same friend who sheepishly admitted to never having set foot in Central train station also confessed when aboard the Teleférico peering down at Alemão that he felt as if he were on a ride at an amusement park. And during preliminary fieldtrips near the date of its inauguration I heard cariocas calling the Teleférico “Disney in the favela,” joking that those who could not afford to send their children to Disney World (a common treat for the middle class and wealthy Brazilians when they reach adolescence) could take them for a ride on the Teleférico.

5.8 Conclusions

In this chapter I applied the analytical concepts of landscape and critical mobilities as complementary tools to examine urban planning and governance in relation to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. I concurred with and further substantiated Barbosa’s argument that the favelas historically constituted a crisis in the landscape of the marvellous city and that urban policy of favela eviction and peripheral re-housing was a response to the crisis. I argued that the banishment of the favelas from the marvellous landscape resulted in the so-called cidade partida—the cultural, political, economic bifurcation of urban space between the favela and the formal city. While the rich continued to live in the marvellous city, the poor were increasingly relegated to landscapes of misery.

The response failed for many reasons—not least of all due to the inherent contradiction of responding to critical housing shortage by destroying housing stock—but ultimately had to be abandoned due to advances in democracy and rule of law. The divided city proved unsustainable, a landscape crisis itself as violence and inequality
concomitantly skyrocketed during the final decades of the 20th century. Favela integration emerged as a solution to the dichotomous city, first as the urban planning approach exemplified by Favela-Bairro (slum upgrading), and then more generally as a paradigm of hybrid planning and governance interventions. Seeming to adopt the progressive rhetoric of participatory democracy and the affirmation that the favela is the city, “favela integration” discursively aims to incorporate the favelas into the marvellous landscape, a right historically denied.

Analysing favela integration through official and urban planning expert discourse, I argued that integration prioritises the state-facilitation of new, and regulation of existing, flows of people, goods, services and capital in and out of the favelas. Planners design interventions with objectives to normalise moving in and out of favela space, to facilitate the entry of state vehicles and service providers, and to make the experience of travelling through the favela enjoyable, even marvellous. The state security apparatus discursively produces favela pacification as the a priori condition of the integrated city, which many Brazilian and international urbanists support, arguing it restores freedom of movement in favela spaces and opens the way for public and private service providers and commerce. However the tactics of the UPP prioritise regulating and limiting the mobility of favela residents in contradictory ways.

To exemplify how state interventions are meant to place the favelas in the marvellous landscape, I described in detail the Teleférico do Alemão. In stark contrast to working class commutes in non-wealthy neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro, the cable-car system stands as a spectacular piece of infrastructure that relies on the representation of gondola travel to signify that the favela too can be marvellous.

While “favela integration” successfully facilitates new
movement and produces certain privileged favela spaces as marvellous, it does so inequitably along existing social, economic, and spatial power dynamics in Rio de Janeiro. A strengthened civil society and increasingly vocal and radical grassroots movements led by young favela residents leaves the associated projects and programs of integration open to critique, particularly on social media and a diversifying online media market. Struggling against the hegemonic discourse of the new “integrated” marvellous city, these subversive actors call attention to that which landscape seeks to obscure.
Chapter 6 – An Integrated Favela is a Governed Favela

The phrase is simple—*a favela é cidade*—but the idea that the favelas constitute a legitimate part of Rio de Janeiro legally, materially, economically, and symbolically is profound given the city’s history of violent segregation and stark inequality. As reviewed in Chapter 2, hegemonic discourse produced the favelas as pockets of ‘non-city’—initially as internal islands of rural backwardness and subsequently as bastions of “social marginality.” The previous chapter argued that the “divided city,” between the *asfalto* and the favela, constituted a landscape crisis, and the state responded by promising an “integrated city” through a governing paradigm of “favela integration.” Despite the progressive aims of integration, state and ‘expert’ discourse continues to produce the favela by what it lacks according to ‘outside’ evaluation: basic services (sanitation, rubbish collection, road maintenance, postal services), civil rights (education, healthcare, public security, and mobility), and vague fundamental concepts of citizenship and dignity. With explicit objectives to end the bifurcation of Rio de Janeiro between the favela and the *asfalto*, the state rolled out vertically structured urban governance and planning programmes such as Morar Carioca and the UPP. Official narratives claim that such programmes deliver citizenship and secure freedom for favela residents even though these are themselves subject to and productive of hegemonic power relations.

Continually defined as spaces lacking, integration necessitates intervention; and favelas are viewed through the lens of state-facilitated socio-economic development. Following Ferguson, this chapter argues that favela integration must produce the favela as an object of intervention. For Morar Carioca, such a process began with
its inclusion in the city’s Master Plan, became clear with the design competition hosted by the IAB-RJ, and is most obvious through the methodological institutionalisation of the “plan for integration,” created for each favela by the architect-urbanist teams prior to approval of plans. The document includes synthesised data about the favela and how the planning design should modify the neighbourhood and transform its relationship to the surrounding area. The systematic collection of data and the institutionalised production of documents is the process through which a favela, or the favelas in general, become visible and knowable to the state, informing governance, policy, and planning. In addition to serving as a base of knowledge or favela-expertise from which the state, civil society and private interests draw to govern these previously “abandoned territories,” such processes and products are essential to the production of the city as cohesive territory (what Painter calls the territory effect) and the presence of the state as a tangibly structured relationship between citizens and government (what Mitchell calls the state effect).

These arguments are presented in the telling of the programme known as UPP Social. The programme was both heralded and misrepresented by the news and intellectual media, and often misunderstood by Cariocas and even state actors. Launched by the Rio de Janeiro State government in 2010, the programme was transferred to the municipal government in 2011 where it was transformed through a partnership with UN Habitat and renamed in 2014 as Rio+Social before it was defunded at the end of 2015. By the time I began fieldwork, UPP Social had already been transferred to the municipal government, housed at the Municipal Urban Institute of Pereira Passos (IPP).\footnote{All interviews, conversations and observations presented in this chapter were conducted during 2013/2014, while UPP Social/Rio+Social was housed at the IPP and prior to the programme’s defunding.}

UPP Social almost immediately failed to deliver
what its originators envisioned and the state government promised—transparent resident participation in the development of localised, multifaceted public security policy beyond policing to accompany the Pacifying Police Units—and is often judged for that failure without much attention to its reformed role at the municipal government level. This chapter presents a nuanced and critical accounting of UPP Social/Rio+Social. The objective is not a policy analysis. Rather the concern is how the programme engendered favela integration in the interests of state territory.

The chapter is divided in five sections. Section 6.1 discusses the origins and original objectives of the programme at the Rio State level. It notes the progressive vision of UPP Social and details how the programme was ultimately restrained by the politics of participation and fell victim to party politics within the ruling coalition. Section 6.2 follows the downsized and downgraded programme to the municipal government where it lacked the authority to continue its mandate and thus reinvented itself as a planning apparatus to facilitate citywide favela integration. Under the stewardship of progressive urbanists, social scientists and technocrats in partnership with UN Habitat, UPP Social eventually became Rio+Social (pronounced Rio Mais Social, mais meaning more) and attempted to integrate the favelas from within and in-between state institutions. During this period, the programme’s staff increased as they hired dozens of fieldworkers to systematically collect data and produce reports on individual “pacified” favelas, discussed in section 6.3. I argue that the state sees the favelas through these supposedly apolitical technical products and processes which produce the favelas as spaces ready for integrating interventions. In addition, these social technologies—data collection, systematisation, and the modes of presentation (maps, tables, summary papers)—produce the favelas as urban state territory, thus by definition governable and governed. Section 6.4 considers the
remaining politics and neoliberal ideology obscured by technocracy and the production of what Lefebvre would call *abstract space* as Rio+Social struggled to maintain relevance and identity as something akin to an in-house favela-consulting firm of the municipal government. I conclude with a summary of claims and the chapter’s contributions.

### 6.1 The origins of UPP Social

Favela “pacification” through the Pacifying Police Units began in 2008 and rapidly expanded in the subsequent five years. As the programme rolled out to various favelas around the city’s South Zone and eventually the peripheral West and industrial North zones, opinion polls showed residents within and without favela neighbourhoods welcomed the UPPs expansion. The UPPs were deemed an immediate success by government officials and the popular media, a step in the right direction by cautious progressive academics; and the units encountered little-to-no resistance for nearly seven years (Cano, Borges, and Ribeiro 2012; Foley 2014; World Bank 2012; Felbab-Brown 2011). As the UPP “invaded” and “occupied” the favelas, a number of complications arose from having removed to so-called “parallel state” and associated services that the gangs provided to favela residents. Exposing the vacuum of governance

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54 The exception was Complexo do Alemão, which was host to one of Rio de Janeiro’s top drug gang bosses and which the police attempted to “take” without prior announcement or unofficial negotiation. As a result the invasion was a live on-air spectacle of urban warfare televised on Globo TV and resulting in ‘civilian’ casualties (P. R. de Oliveira 2013; Barreira and Maurilio Lima Botelho 2013; S. Abreu and Silva 2013). After the occupation of Alemão, the police never again attempted to invade a favela without advanced announcement, giving the gang leaders opportunity to retreat and avoid heavy shootouts and crossfire casualties.

55 The basic argument of the “parallel state” is that the favelas and other spatial peripheries experience a vacuum of power when the state fails to deliver services and implement policy, including the rule of law through policing (E. Leeds 1996). This in turn delegitimizes the state’s authority within the favela and allows for criminal groups to flourish through their own “law enforcement” policies and strategies as well as supporting individual residents and families in times of acute need. The gangs themselves have been documented embracing the idea of the
and services, the residents turned to the police as the new “bosses” of the favelas to mediate conflicts or provide individualised social assistance. It was not long before State Secretary of Security, Jose Mariano Beltrame, was making public statements reminding the public (and perhaps indirectly his boss and colleagues) that the “UPPs are not a panacea” and cannot be charged with solving socio-economic inequality or the provision of urban services (cited in: Bortoloti and Nogueira 2010; also see Beltrame 2014). The UPP was meant to pave the way for other government sectors to “enter” the favelas post-pacification in order to address the state’s historical “abandonment” of the neighbourhoods.

It was the above context that birthed the programme UPP Social, conceived and designed by a group of politically involved social scientists within the Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights. A policy paper written by two of the programme’s visionaries, Ricardo Henriques and Silvia Ramos (2011) details the political context and objectives of UPP Social. The text begins with the recognition that police pacification has three objectives: (i) to reclaim favelas territorialised by criminal groups, (ii) to deliver peace and tranquillity so that local populations may enjoy the benefits of citizenship, and (iii) to end the logic of urban warfare that have long characterised police operations. Importantly, the paper notes the UPP programme is not designed to end the war on drugs or criminality in general or to decrease socioeconomic inequality. In doing so the authors are in agreement with Beltrame, who made a habit of insisting that favela pacification would not solve the social ills that parallel state (Larkins 2015), and while supported by some scholars (e.g. Goldstein 2003) the idea is contested by others (e.g. Arias 2006). See Braehler (2014) for a review of the debate.

Henriques headed the programme as Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights. Ramos is an academic researcher and former Sub-secretary of Security under Luis Eduardo Soares in Anthony Garotinho’s government, credited with developing a police strategy on which the UPP programme was modelled.
defines the *cidade partida*. Thus the authors argue that the UPPs should not be considered a model of policing to be replicated around the country. It is specifically designed to confront the particularities of a city where organised crime challenge the state’s territorial claim to the monopoly of legitimate force. The policy paper further argues that while the UPP creates the conditions for the “arrival of the republic” to the favelas as the authors claim, it does not constitute the republic’s arrival because uncontested control over favela space does not inherently guarantee citizenship and rights.

UPP Social was created as the programme to consolidate pacification. According to Henriques and Ramos:

> [The] principal objective was the consolidation of territorial control and the pacification of areas with Pacifying Police Units; and not a general programme to combat poverty and inequality. [...] UPP Social was designed to make pacification sustainable, promote citizenship and socioeconomic development in those areas and finally to contribute to realising the integration of those areas into the whole of the city (2014, 3).

In other words, the territorial goals of favela integration—the “arrival of the republic”—would only be fully realised and sustained through the work of non-police programmes coordinated by UPP Social.

An ethnographic study realised by the Secretary of Public Security informed the design of the programme, initially piloted in three of the “pacified” favelas by the end of 2010 (Cidade de Deus, Providência, and Borel). A total of 10 “axes” of action were determined to “consolidate” the pacification process, four of which were considered immediate priorities: (i) “citizenship and togetherness” [*convivência*], which facilitated transparent communication between residents, organisations, the UPP unit, and state institutions; (ii) “legal democracy” to mediate conflicts, orientate residents about legal services and regulations, and coordinate management of public spaces; (iii) “reducing youth violence” through
alternative sport and leisure activities and specialised programmes in response to the educational and socioeconomic conditions of gang-affiliated youths; and (iv) “territorial and symbolic integration” through interventions that valorise favela neighbourhoods and public spaces as equally constitutive of Rio de Janeiro as the surrounding ‘formal’ neighbourhoods.57

The idea that UPP together with UPP Social “brings the republic” to the favela appears to toe the line of official discourse reviewed in the previous chapter: that favela integration, and in particular the militarised occupation and pacification of favelas, constitutes the “arrival” of the state. But the organising team behind UPP Social’s design are critical thinkers, and many have worked in civil society or public service for years. They make explicit that the discourse of the “abandoned favela” until the police arrival is false:

> When the UPPs enter, one of the frequent phrases used to describe the situation of the favelas in the speech of police authorities, community leaders, politicians or NGO activists is, “the public authority has been absent [here] for decades.” In many cases, this statement rings false to public servants present, for example school directors that have led learning centres inside a favela for more than 15 years. The same could be said for healthcare workers, COMLURB [public waste company] managers, representatives of CEDAE [water company], the social worker from CRAS (Social Assistance Reference Centre) [...] (Ibid., 7)

The authors go on to list a number of other public employees who form part of the expansive governing apparatus that have been operating in the city’s favelas for decades. Astutely the authors

57 The additional six focus points of UPP Social as originally conceived: (v) poverty reduction, (vi) human development, (vii) productive and dynamic economic inclusion, (viii) quality of life, (ix) diversity and human rights, and (x) infrastructure and natural environment.
observe that the “favelas constitute a paradoxical case of both the ‘absence’ of the state and its uncoordinated ‘presence’ through hundreds of projects, very often designed in order to compensate for weak public policy” (Ibid., 8). The crux of UPP Social was therefore designed to coordinate effective management of non-police interventions that responded to demands and needs of local residents in accordance with favela-specific public policy.

When I spoke with Jailson de Souza e Silva, who was Sub-secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights and a key figure in the creation of UPP Social, he told me that UPP should have stood for Units of Public Policy (a phrase he repeated at public events after leaving his role in government). As the co-founder of a well-known NGO in Complexo da Maré, the Observatório de Favelas, the PT activist, university academic, and public servant (he had previously served as the Secretary of Education of Nova Iguaçu, a municipality on the periphery of the metropolitan region of Rio), Jailson advocated for the complete overhaul of public security policy, beginning with the demilitarisation of the police and a reconceptualisation of public security that would broaden the scope beyond strategies of control and punishment. While stopping short of calling for the former, UPP Social was envisioned to do the latter. Otherwise, according to Jailson, the favelas would simply transfer control from the gang to the police. Real progress would involve the local communities to generate demands and contribute to local solutions. The unpublicised reason they included “UPP” in the programme name and described the programme as a coordinated effort with police to “consolidate favela pacification” was to downplay the threat of a competing programme and to play to the popularity and prioritised position of the UPP. Ironically, while at least some of UPP Social’s creators disapproved of branding the programme with police pacification, the security apparatus also disapproved of linking the UPP with social
programmes. As noted by Beltrame in a 2011 newspaper interview:

*I don’t like the name UPP Social. UPP is UPP. They said it [UPP Social] in some interview and it stuck; but I’m against it, because the UPP is not social, it allows the social, it permits the social to happen. Beyond that, if UPP Social begins to not deliver, it could take me down with it.* *I don’t want that.*

(Bottari and Gonçalves 2011, no page number)

When I interviewed UPP Social staff, the standard explanation of why the programme moved from the state to the municipal government included a vague mention of “politics,” but they insisted that the move made sense because responsibility for solving most of the problems brought up by residents during the public meetings lies with the municipal government. For example:

*The housing programme is the municipality’s responsibility. Investigating geotechnical risk is the municipality’s responsibility too, as are programmes of health. Even though the Family Health strategy is a federal programme, the management falls to the municipalities. Furthermore, basic education is also attributable to the municipality. So, all of that is to say that the principal services, in fact, are municipally managed. So that is one of the motives for the move [of UPP Social from the state to the municipality]. There was also a political juncture, but there was already the movement towards acknowledging that because all of those services are managed by the municipality…*

(Carolina, Institutional Management, UPP Social)

Carolina is correct when she says most urban services like road maintenance, sanitation, and housing planning are legal responsibilities of the municipal government. Primary family health care is also a legal responsibility of municipal governments, and Rio de Janeiro has made significant investments and progress relative to
other Brazilian cities in its “Family and Community Health” programme. Nonetheless, the state government operates a vast network of urgent and advanced health care facilities, and basic education is split between the two governments with the municipality running most primary schools and pre-school daycares, and the state running most secondary schools (although this split is not perfect).

Some of my research contacts were more forthcoming about the political aspect behind the shift. PT formed part of PMDB’s 15-party coalition state government, and PT led the Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights as part of the alliance. Both Jailson de Souza e Silva and Ricardo Henriques were PT party members, however according to multiple sources Henriques was considered more technocrat than partisan and had good relations with PMDB politicians. In 2011, irregularities were uncovered within the Secretary and PT leadership used it as an excuse to replace Henriques with the ambitious politician Rodrigo Neves, a PT state congress representative who was gearing up to run for Mayor of Niteroi across the Guanabara Bay. Governor Cabral was weary of PT trying to use UPP Social as a party legacy in an eventual electoral challenge to PMDB. It was supposedly the Governor who decided that UPP Social could not stay in the Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights; and so he found a position for Henriques with the municipal government under Mayor Eduardo Paes (PMDB) and arranged with the Mayor for the programme to follow. Career politician, ex-Governor and ex-Secretary of Security Anthony Garotinho (at that moment in opposition to PMDB) wrote on his personal blog that Cabral was “giving with one hand and taking away with the other,” since UPP Social was the “only social programme of any important in the state [government],” the “filet mignon of social [programming]” (Garotinho 2011). The manoeuvre reportedly left PT leaders furious, and the sudden institutional change left most external observers confused as
to how UPP Social would fulfil its mandate at a municipal institute devoted primarily to the collection of urban planning data and map-making.

In the following section I examine UPP Social’s crisis of identity and renovation after it moved from the State Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights to the relatively obscure IPP in 2011 and a change in leadership in 2012. This transition is important to understand how the idea of favela integration was constructed as a type of governance imperative beyond politics and how integration came to require specialist knowledge and sophisticated data (discussed in 6.3).

6.2 Becoming Rio+Social

When the municipal government announced the phasing out of Rio+Social in 2015, the local watchdog website Rio On Watch ran a story titled “The death of UPP Social: failing to make participation work,” which lambasted the programme as feckless, token participation (Bentsi-Enchill, Goodenough, and Berger 2015). If the authors had wished to evaluate UPP Social on the effectiveness of its participatory methodology, the story should have been run four years earlier, in 2011 when it was transferred to the IPP and lost considerable institutional authority.

UPP Social was a misunderstood programme from the start, often confused with the police or as a participatory governance initiative. During its initial phase in the state government, the most tangible actions were connected to the first of the four focus points listed above: citizenship and togetherness. The project was named “vamos combinar” (loosely translatable as let’s work together) which gave the impression of a pact or legitimate negotiations between residents of recently pacified favelas and the police. In reality, the programme had little-to-no influence over the police. Evident in
Beltrame’s quote above, the police saw UPP Social’s responsibilities as necessary but wholly separate from the mandate of pacification. While community meetings facilitated by UPP Social with the participation of UPP officers had ended by the time fieldwork started, videos on social media (since deleted) showed tense and raucous verbal confrontations of indignant residents complaining about how officers disrespect them. Media activists and scholars noted that residents stated their priorities in the community forums as resident-police relations and investments in education and healthcare; but UPP Social turned around and prioritised basic services like trash collection and the regularisation of electricity (T. Smith 2011; Cath 2012). Furthermore, the downshift from state to municipal government occurred before it could implement substantial programming. While *vamos combinar* continued during the first year or so of UPP Social at the IPP, according to multiple contacts with IPP, the mayor ordered the end of public meetings that, in his view, had accomplished little more than to make the government look bad.

UPP Social remained under the directorship of Henriques, who was named President of the IPP, and his deputy, José Marcelo Zacchi, who was part of the original team and named Director of Projects at the IPP. Henriques and Zacchi maintained the conceptual vision of UPP Social, but revamped and expanded the programme in partnership with UN Habitat. Within two years both Henriques and Zacchi left the IPP and returned to civil society, and the IPP came under the leadership of Eduarda La Rocque whose personal call to public service after “taking a bullet” was referenced in Chapter Five.\footnote{Henriques went on to lead Instituto Unibanco, the corporate social responsibility arm of Itaú bank (not to be confused with Itaú Social). Zacchi helped found the Casa Fluminense, a non-governmental organisation that advocates for inter-municipality sustainable urban planning at the greater metropolitan scale, and after obtaining a masters degree from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, he returned to head Casa Fluminense as its General Coordinator.} Below I describe the programme as it had taken shape by the time I
began fieldwork in 2013.

While hosted at the IPP and financed by the municipal government with loans from the World Bank, UPP Social was run through a partnership with UN Habitat, which technically hired and paid UPP Social’s 140 employees (at the time I interviewed UN Habitat’s project assistant assigned to UPP Social and the Country Director). The international organisation brought to the programme knowledge from its Global Network on Safer Cities and the similar initiative of “social urbanism” and the “integrated urban plan” of Medellín.59 Programme leaders in the UN office and IPP attempted to depoliticise UPP Social and to focus on building a mission of favela expertise and evidence-based articulation between state actors:

The participation of a UN agency will always protect a programme from politics a bit. The UN brings neutrality, an exemption of sorts that no other Brazilian agency could bring, because the UN doesn’t participate in moments of political negotiations within the country. We are an inter-governmental organisation, so we represent Brazil and all other members of the organisation, but we bring that impartiality and neutrality. And that applies to all of our projects. In all of them, absolutely, we do not participate [in politics]. Sometimes we don’t even have knowledge about the [political] reality because our workers have a very specific profile.

(Rayane, Country Director, UN Habitat)

For a while it was very difficult, the beginning of UPP [Social]. Very difficult. Because it is a programme that is in an area extremely politicised. So the Vice-Mayor, Adilson Pires [PT], who is Secretary of Social Development, wanted to take the programme, which is a programme managed through UN Habitat...and the Mayor... Are there any journalists here? [laughter] But it’s true. True story. Just

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59 The programme director of UPP Social, Marcelo Zacchi has previously consulted for the World Bank and UN Habitat on the “Safe Cities” program, which may explain why UN Habitat felt confident in taking on a direct role in the programme in the less politicised, technocratic IPP.
don’t put this on Facebook! Everything else is OK [laughter].

(Eduarda La Rocque, President IPP, speech hosted by MOVE Rio)

[When] Ricardo Henrique assumed the Presidency of IPP its mission transformed more to promote social development with the introduction of UPP Social, and since the time of my stewardship we’ve focussed on sustainable development. So, we finally defined our mission and our vision, and that is to do all types of information—produce data, do it correctly, generate information, studies, research and do the work of articulating so that the information creates transformation in favour of sustainable development in the city of Rio de Janeiro and quality of well-being. [...] There were a lot of people who thought that UPP Social shouldn’t be within the IPP. It’s a question of very complex politics, and we can get into that later. But since the beginning, I defended that it was a dignified use of information to create change. So from the beginning of my stewardship, I transformed UPP Social into a strictly technical programme of qualified information and articulation. We are not responsible for anything that is actually done in the favelas.

(La Rocque, interview)

Politics had saturated UPP Social’s brand, including, perhaps especially, the name. After the programme left the State government, its new home was as far from an association with the police as it could get institutionally. The municipal government has no authority over police operations, and the IPP had no history of working with the State police. While in theory UPP Social would coordinate with the UPPs, my contacts in Rio+Social told me that relations between the two programmes were strained from the beginning. Nonetheless UPP Social was still commonly confused with the police programme. The UN Habitat professionals told me one of their first recommendations was to change the name, a sentiment felt by many of those involved in the programme during my fieldwork. One of my contacts at the IPP, Roberto, told me on multiple occasions, “It’s a terrible name. It should have never been named that.” In addition to failing to separate its
brand from the police, favela pacification had become increasingly politicised and controversial. Community activists began to call attention to authoritarian practices and policies of the UPP, critics pointed out that the culture of the war on drugs had not been sufficiently tamed within the military police, and academics began to claim its operations followed an enemy-insurgent strategy (Muggah and Mulli 2002; Foley 2014) and with the principal objectives of “securing the Olympic city” and accumulation through dispossession (Gaffney 2012; Freeman 2012; Freeman 2014; Vargas 2013; Olinger 2015; Penglase 2016).

The perceived link between UPP Social and the UPP put the UPP Social programme at risk, existentially and physically, because the programme now had dozens of fieldworkers travelling to the pacified favelas on a regular basis to liaise with community leaders or collect data for mapping projects:

_The name is wrong, UPP Social. Everyone thinks we are the communitarian arm of the police. Our field agents have difficulty walking around because they are being confused [with the police]. [They think] we’re mapping out where the drug dens are [boca de fumo]._

(La Rocque, interview).

In addition to delinking UPP Social from the UPPs to avoid confusion and depoliticise the work—Eduarda argues that to sustain the work of Rio+Social, the programme had to “become the state” rather than remain part of the [partisan] government—the name change opened the door to applying their model and objectives beyond pacified favelas. As pointed out above, the UPPs are specifically designed to recuperate territory “lost” to organised crime. Rio de Janeiro has more than 1,000 favelas, many of which are described as “peaceful” or “tranquil” by residents to indicate they are
not controlled by drug trafficking gangs or violent militias. In such cases they do not need pacification, but they still need integration. If there is a model built for replication across Rio de Janeiro (or in other cities), it was not police pacification but rather UPP Social as an initiative to coordinate the dozen dysfunctional arms of the state. La Rocque as well as multiple IPP managers told me they saw no reason why Rio+Social should continue privileging only “pacified” favelas. Indeed to do so would end up exacerbating inequalities between favelas on a two-tiered system.

The principles and objectives of UPP Social/Rio+Social at the IPP continued the original principles and general objectives of the programme, but the approach evolved substantial differences. For one, the programme was no longer understood through the lens of consolidation of favela pacification but principally through the integration paradigm. In contrast to the utopian discourse of the integrated city presented in Chapter Five, those steering Rio+Social have a more elaborated vision of what favela integration entails:

For the city to be integrated, you first need to have delivery of services in an equal manner to the whole city. All citizens must receive the same services of the same quality. For example, if you go to a place [in a favela] and ask ‘Do you have water?’ [They’ll respond] ‘Yes, I have water.’ So in the statistics you count that person as having water. But if you ask, ‘Do you have water every day?’ [They may respond.] ‘Ah, no. Here at my house I have water two days a week.’ So something is wrong. Beyond that [equal services throughout the city], you need to think of the whole planning of the city. You’ll never have an integrated city if you continue thinking in a sectoral manner. I believe our difficulty is with getting governments to achieve a vision of territorialised policy. If you look at a territory in an integrated manner, that is to say holistically, you will see that which is working and isn’t working in that territory. Now, if you only look through the lens of education, you’ll only see education. You won’t be able to see if health [care] is working, if social assistance is
working, if the economy is working, if it takes a resident four hours to get to work.

(Rayne, Country Director, UN Habitat)

Tucker: When we talk about UPP Social and Rio+Social, are we talking about the evolution of one programme, or are we talking about two separate programmes? Can you name the moment that UPP Social became Rio+Social?

Eduarda: I think it was a natural evolution, and in the future we are going to broaden our scope of actions in two axes. Well, in reality the old UPP Social had three axes: an axis of information, an axis of articulation, and an axis of municipal public services. Public municipal services was kind of mixed up, confused with information. So we have those three things. Rio+Social is continuously more focussed on the axis of municipal public services that City Hall is providing in the favelas. And there is the axis of information, which is the core business of the IPP. But we are more and more working in partnership with communities, complementing orthophoto [aerial photography] in relation to the information gathered by the field agents with the residents, conducting opinion polls of sorts and including that information on the MRP [Rapid Participatory Map, explained in section 6.3].

As we see from these quotes, Rio+Social understands favela integration principally through urban governance and territorial planning (as opposed to vertical, sectoral planning). Insisting that the favelas are legitimate urban space, they also recognise the favelas as deserving of a differential approach given political history and local material differences between self-built and formally planned and regulated neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the quotes speak to a vision of a coordinated state equipped with favela-specific knowledge developed in partnership with local residents and community groups.

This brings to mind conversations I had with a disaffected former employee of PAC-Social (discussed at length in Chapter 7),
who was so frustrated with the dysfunction of different state offices and agencies that she doubted it could be explained in words: “I don’t even know if I’m relaying enough to you so you understand the extent of the problem.” Discussing what favela integration meant to her work she exclaimed, “What about integration of the state!” The model of UPP Social was designed to address the structural dysfunction of the state that inhibits integration of the favelas. One UPP Social employee described their work as facilitating a dialogue between the “territories” [the favelas] and the various state secretaries and agencies that neither have experience responding to local demands of favela residents nor the tradition of working across sectors. In that sense, UPP Social was favela integration through integration of the state.

6.3 Seeing the favela – data and the favela as governable/governed space

This section examines the practices of UPP Social/Rio+Social in order to demonstrate how the programme produces the territory effect, that is the appearance that the state’s sovereign authority to govern operates evenly across urban space (Painter 2010). Below I describe the structure of UPP Social/Rio+Social, methodologies, and the resulting material products: maps and other data-rich materials. Building on Painter, I argue that the tools of UPP Social are social technologies that produce the favelas as state territory.

The UPP Social programme was divided into three managing departments. Territorial Management had teams dedicated to each “pacified” favela [complex] consisting of a team leader, one-to-three assistants depending on the size of the favela(s) and field agents. Each team was responsible for the systematic collection of data on the ground, organising projects or events, and liaising with community members. As a rule, the field agents were residents of the favelas in
which they worked. IPP staff trained these agents through seminars and in-field practice; and they were the only position within UPP Social that were explicitly recruited from the favelas. The data sought by the teams are primarily cartographic and qualitative and result from close contact with residents and the material environment:

[The information] is more qualitative because we are here to see the local demands. We are taking pictures; we are qualifying the information we bring to the inside of the institute [IPP] so the information can be validated and result in real transformation within the territory. The team is always moving through the communities. We don’t have a base of operations in the favela. All the systematisation [of data] is done here [at IPP]. So we are always circulating, talking with leaders. Let me explain: the first moment of our arrival is with the resident association presidents. You go to the associations, converse with the presidents, understand a little bit about the dynamic of that territory. Afterwards you map out the organisations of that territory, who are the other leaders and so on. Using that information you go out collecting demands [of the population], which you’ll also observe while in the field, be it in the area of education, health, conservation, trash collection... We are able to strengthen some actions within the territory directly.

(Rosane, Team Leader, Territorial Management)

The information collected by Territorial Management is passed to the second department, Housing Studies, whose job is to organise the field data and triangulate with pre-existing data from the census and other state information. This is then presented as both descriptive and analytical documents, some of which are public and published on IPP’s website and some of which are used for internal regulation and communication (these documents and products are discussed further below). This is the crux of what Eduarda La Rocque refers to as the “core business” of IPP, the production of data and management of knowledge. The data, which is referred to as “qualified data”—which
means systematically collected data “elaborated” in ways specific to favela spaces and residents demands or needs—becomes knowledge when it is organised and presented in forms sharable with actors outside of the programme to modify and improve the mundane activities of the state (such as trash collection or mail delivery) and/or inform the creation of new public policy. Mayor Eduardo Paes had previously pledged to “urbanise” all of the city’s favelas through Morar Carioca by 2020. The documents and maps produced by the Rio+Social Housing Studies department on each favela would have been an immediate source of data and contacts for the architectural firms contracted to design the interventions.

This officially sanctioned on-demand territorial knowledge was articulated by the third department of UPP Social/Rio+Social, Institutional Management, which had the responsibility of interfacing with state sectoral services, private businesses, and civil society. According to the UPP Social model, this occurred in multiple contexts. The first was the articulation of a local demand to the proper state actor with the authority to respond. The “strong listening” in the favela by the field workers identified residents’ demands or observes a “need,” which was “qualified” by precise data, and translated into an “ask.” Continuing the conversation cited above, Rosane and Carla provided an example:

Rosane: There was an institute, Raízes em Movimento, that was organising an event and wanted to reorder the trash disposal and collection in that region [of Complex do Alemão]. […] Carlinha [assistant of the Complexo do Alemão Territorial Management team] was already talking with Comlurb [municipal trash collection company] since before I joined the team. They wanted more trash bins in four strategic points along Avenida Central. We were able to facilitate with Comlurb 50 bins at five strategic points all along Avenida Central. An action was planned the same day that involved
in which the community health agents went door to door pamphleting and educating the people about the necessity of... because it doesn’t do any good to just improve logistics of trash collection if you don’t also have an educational campaign that reorganises the actual discarding of trash.

Tucker: So the educational campaign was organised by Raízes em Movimento?

Rosane: No, it was coordinated by the community health agents that took the initiative—

Carla: In reality it was a movement called Pensa Alemão, that together with UPP Social, Raízes em Movimento, Comlurb, personal from their administrative network, together diverse actors.

Tucker: And you all offered what exact services for this—

Rosane: That articulation between—

Carla: For example, they had been trying to get the attention of Comlurb and they weren’t able to. Our participation made that possible.

Rosane: Our articulation with the administrative region as well.

In this example, the placement of rubbish bins along the major thoroughfare through the Complexo do Alemão involved an established NGO (Raízes em Movimento), a community activist group (Pensa Alemão), community health workers from a health centre (who as a rule live in or near the areas they work), the municipal waste collection (Comlurb) and finally the corresponding Administrative Region (of which Complexo do Alemão is one of 26 within the Rio de Janeiro municipality). Municipal services and companies such as Comlurb are not set up to dialogue directly with resident associations. While the community health workers form part of the state governing apparatus, they are employed by the NGO with a government contract, and are at the bottom of a fairly rigid internal hierarchy that does not grant them any privileged knowledge or clout outside of health clinic in which they work. While Comlurb realises
the trash collection, the Administrative Region also needed to approve the change of service. UPP Social served as the one articulating force that “knew” everyone in an otherwise segregated system.

Figure 6.1 – Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, Planning Areas and Administrative Regions (2014)

The municipal government of Rio de Janeiro divides the city into five “Planning Areas” and 34 Administrative Regions. Some of the largest favelas and favela “complexes” (groupings of contingent favelas)—such as Rocinha (27) in the South Zone, Cidade de Deus [City of God] (34) in the West Zone, and Complexo do Alemão (29), Maré (30), and Vigário Geral (31) in the North Zone—constitute their own administrative region.

Another example is working with EMOP (the state of Rio de Janeiro public works company) to redirect funds from a cancelled construction project to install wheel chair accessible ramps in community buildings in Morro da Mineira in Catumbi (near downtown) when the President of the Residents Association approached the Territorial Management team. Similarly the team worked with an educational NGO who ran focus groups with school children to evaluate perceived risks in the neighbourhood. Based on
the consensus that cars and motorcycles sped by the school entrance and ignored the crosswalk signal, they created a campaign asking motorists to respect the stoplight and programme staff guided the resident association president through the bureaucratic process necessary to solicit speed bumps from the corresponding municipal office of traffic planning and engineering (CET-Rio).

Figure 6.2 - "UPP Social: information transformation and integration". Displayed on former version of programme website while hosted at IPP, prior to name change.

When Eduarda arrived at the IPP—a job she took only because it came with UPP Social—she did not understand the institute’s role within the state. Moreover she said nobody there could give her a straightforward answer: “After five meetings with the directors, nobody knew how to tell me what exactly the IPP did. I came to the conclusion that what the IPP does is knowledge management from the beginning of its history.” Eduarda calls the institute a “treasure chest” of information that when pursued with an agenda (such as favela integration) has transformative potential. The main products of UPP Social fit with the historical mission of production of data and management of knowledge. One such example is the “Territory
Panorama" produced for each pacified favela or favela complex. This document was a systematised representation of the favela(s) through the lens of qualitative and quantitative data and cartography. Employees from the Housing Studies team would consolidate information from the national census and additional sources of official data carried out by projects such as Morar Carioca or PAC-favelas.

The Panoramas uploaded to IPP’s website are just the tip of the iceberg according to UPP Social workers. Most of the information collected and organised by the teams working in the field is only accessible internally. When I asked why they did not make all of their data public, I was given a few different answers. First, there is the magnitude of data and the question of how to present it in a logical and easily digestible manner online. A considerable task when there is no clear demand for such a service, especially when the programme had its budget significantly reduced when it was renewed in 2013. Second, much of the data was collected to facilitate government action within the favelas and communication with local actors. Some of this information would actually be inappropriate to make public. For example, the IPP produced a who’s-who contact list of each pacified favela: resident association presidents, informal community leaders, NGO workers, school administrators, health workers, youth workers, business owners and entrepreneurs. These individuals both facilitated data collection and mapping of local demands but also were contact points with whom the IPP could connect to state institutions looking

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60 UPP Social while at the IPP was financed through Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank loans. Because the loans included multiple projects, some of which overlap and many of which seem to differ in execution than as proposed in the loan agreements, it is difficult to measure exactly how much was spent. When the programme was first announced, the Mayor projected a total budget of R$1 billion for the first two years, however it appears that calculation includes all urbanisation and integration projects in the favelas, whether or not managed by UPP Social or the IPP (Schmidt 2011). This stands in stark contrast to municipal budget documents in 2013 that show a mere R$27 million over the following four years (Cinco 2013).
to improve services in a local area as well, private businesses looking for corporate social responsibility investment opportunities, or civil society looking for local partners. The third reason was political in nature: much of the data was pinpointing local problems reported by residents, institutional failures and demands to improve subpar or missing services. While making public such data would serve the interests of resident and civil society, the state interest is for using data to improve internal communications and problem solving as well as to publicly demonstrate their successes, not failures.

The most elaborate data strategy of Rio+Social was GIS (geographic information system) mapping technology. The Rapid Participatory Map (MRP for *Mapa Rápido Participativo*) was a novel project of the programme meant to transform the relationship between favela residents, the larger neighbourhoods and the state. The first stage was the cartographic work cataloguing the streets and alleyways in the favela so that each home could be numbered with an address. This makes possible, if not fact, the delivery of mail directly to homes rather than residents paying for a service similar to a post office box at the local residents association. A state-recognised address is also necessary when filing reports with public (and in most cases private) service providers. Once the streets were mapped and homes numbered, data about existing services and social infrastructure are layered on the map: schools, day care, health centres, social assistance offices, sports facilities etc... Finally a third process was carried out by the Territorial Management team with GIS equipment to survey the favelas and register demands and points of micro-interventions, such as point of open sewage or trash heaps that attract vermin, standing water that poses risks for mosquito borne illnesses, crumbling roads or walls. The favelas were divided into “micro areas” determined by the field teams during the data collection process based on preliminary analysis. These areas do not necessarily
correspond to divisions defined by the residents themselves but rather the researchers’ interpretation of the neighbourhoods (now a constructed “field” of research) based on similarities in home structure, quality of infrastructure (roads, footpaths, sanitation), topography or data relating to social welfare.

The process is labour-intensive and time consuming. It is also a misnomer, as there is little participatory about the process except the field agents who are from the favelas where they work and gather information based on assistance, tips and advice from residents. I encountered a two-person team conducting the third round of the MRP in favela Santa Marta in December of 2013. When I spotted them they were crouching down to look under house structures on the steep hill to evaluate the water ways and check to see if there were any points where rubbish was collecting, blocking rain water run off, and providing breeding grounds for dengue-transmitting mosquitoes. I approached and we chatted. One of the Territorial Management assistants was conducting in-field technology and methodology training with a local field agent. She explained they were spending the whole day in that micro area of the favela, and they would devote the following day to a different micro area. Once the team conducted their survey of each micro area the final product would be a rich visual and numerical data set representing the socio-spatial everyday of favela residents.

The MRP was designed as a sort of ‘living map’ that could be periodically updated by field agents who are in constant contact with the community and residents The GIS technology allows for the desegregation of data into “micro-regions” within single favelas, and even street-by-street statistics that would allow targeted improvement of specific services, such as trash collection, without that sector having to conduct its own in-dept evaluative analysis or rely on less specific general data or non-systematic data (such as
resident complaints). Completed MRP are shared with relevant state secretaries, for example the Municipal Housing Secretary (SMH) or EMOP as planning tools. According to Rio+Social programme staff, they made a point of presenting the MRP as a “diagnostic” not as a sophisticated list of “demands” on the other agencies. Apparently this helped smooth relations across sectoral techno-bureaucracies that resisted the initial posture of UPP Social as coordinating ushers within the state.

These technologies, or statecraft (Scott 1998), are means through which the state “sees” or “knows” the favelas. The MRP was considered to hold special value because it allowed the state to narrow in on exactly where and specifically how the state could intervene in order to achieve integration. Aligned with the UN Habitat vision of favela integration defined by equal provision of quality services and guaranteed rights, La Rocque viewed the detailed GIS maps layered with information as a systematic methodology to measure how well the state is performing. This qualified spatial data are “indicators of integration,” a type of roadmap that shows where the state needs to go in its quest to even out governance and regulation throughout the city. La Rocque makes clear that while Rio+Social had the explicit focus of [pacified] favelas, there is no reason why this model should not be scaled up to all favelas of the city and scaled out to non-favela neighbourhoods.

Such statecraft makes favela spaces legible, reducing an otherwise “large and complex reality” into a “set of categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons, and aggregation” (Scott 1998, 77). Rio+Social’s quest to produce data and manage “knowledge” coincides neatly with Scott’s five characteristics of state simplifications in order to create new truths through aggregation and eventually facilitate “advanced rule,” that is changing the daily habits of its citizens: (i) interested, utilitarian facts that are (ii) documentary
(able to be represented through numbers or verbal category), typically (iii) statistics that are (iv) aggregate facts about systems (e.g. transportation networks) or persons (e.g. employment statistics), and that (v) are standardised, permitting collective and comparative assessments (Ibid., 80). The MRP and favela Panoramas are material products of favela-specialised knowledge fitting to Scott’s five characteristics in order to simplify the “the favela,” a categorical form of urbanity about which the state had limited “knowledge” and minimal information sharing. When I interviewed La Rocque, she confessed that the work was “much more difficult than I imagined,” in part due to inter-sectoral politics and in part because the favela “is a very, super, hyper complex social fabric, and very politicised.” The MRP and many of the diagnostic “products” of Rio+Social are sophisticated technologies meant to make sense of complexity. The MRP presents many layers of data, but by constructing the favela as a field of study where data is collected and categorised, the finished product abstracts from unnecessary complexities such as politics and competing interests. Rather it makes the favelas legible as comparable object-spaces in which to intervene with specific, evidence-informed objectives.

Rio+Mais Social data and “diagnostic” research are in clear contrast to how data and “knowledge” were used prior to the integration paradigm. Valladares (2005) documents decades of official data being used to justify the ideology of favela eradication, beginning with the first Favela Census in 1949. Had Rio+Social succeeded in expanding its reach beyond pacified favelas and sustained the institutional methodology specific to the city’s favelas, it would have constituted the first citywide systematic approach to creating a clearing house of “favela knowledge” meant to facilitate better provision of public services and inform local policies. For Scott, this process equates to “internal colonialisation”, with statecraft employed
to make populations and space neatly legible as a grand project of utopian unification and control.

Beyond favela legibility and facilitating modern state governance, the “qualified data” plays a key role in producing the favelas as territory. The strategies and techniques that UPP Social/Rio+Social employees qualify as social technologies (Painter 2010; T. Mitchell 1999) that produce a spatial continuity of state governance within and throughout the favelas. An overt example occurred in 2014 shortly before UPP Social was rebranded as Rio+Social. For many weeks I had heard from contacts that a name change was imminent but as it turns out the announcement was delayed at the order of the Mayor, who wanted priority given to number crunching and a systematised presentation of data showing how much money the municipal government had invested in pacified favelas. The information was touted at the news conference announcing the name change and on a redesigned website of Rio+Social with info-graphics boasting investment in health, education, urbanisation, and with accompanying information detailing how many schools were built, favelas urbanised and so on. Additionally, an interactive map allowed users to explore the investments and social infrastructure in each of the pacified favelas. When a user clicked on a specific “territory,” a detailed map could be downloaded that showed the limits of the pacifying police units and the location of schools, health centres, public sporting arenas, public assistance offices among other public service providers (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). Thus not only did Rio+Social employ statecraft to render the favelas visible to state bureaucracy but also it simultaneously employed social technologies to make visible the benevolent state within the favelas, thus begging the interpretation that the favela is the city; the favela is governed territory.
Figure 6.3 - "Rio+Social, discover the services"
This navigable map of Rio de Janeiro is the homepage of www.riomaissocial.org (still accessible as of September 2016). The text on top of the map reads: “Information about urbanisation, housing, schools, infant development spaces, family clinics, culture and leisure. The Rio+Social is present in all of the communities [favelas] that received police pacifying units as well as in the Complexo da Maré. Explore the map and discover the services offered in these territories.” Beneath the map are the numerically measured investments in the pacified favelas ($R2.1 billion between 2009 and June 2016), and subsequently categorised by education, family health coverage, Morar Carioca, and mitigation of geotechnical risk.
**Figure 6.4** - "UPP Social, Public Infrastructure in the Complexo do Alemão"
This map is downloadable from the "Complexo do Alemão" webpage within the "Territories" tab of Rio+Social’s website. The red line demarcates the 15 recognised favelas composing the Complexo do Alemão. The blue lines demarcate the limits of the four UPPs that patrol the Complexo. Schools, health centres, social assistance centres and other public direct service providers are marked by colour-coded dots throughout and within the immediate vicinity of the favelas.

### 6.4 In-house favela consulting firm – a neoliberal model?

Nearly everyone I interviewed within UPP Social thought that after moving from the State to the Municipal government and under the charge of Eduarda La Rocque, the programme became less political and more technocratic. However Lefebvre warns that conceived space; that which is concerned primarily with measurements, statistics, and technical drawings; often obscures ideology. Furthermore international and government development projects that approach poverty reduction and socioeconomic development from self-proclaimed apolitical positions have been shown to advance hegemonic politics and power relations, even if they are less explicitly partisan (Ferguson 1990). In this section I
critically examine the claims of a depoliticised Rio+Social. I consider to what extent Rio+Social advanced neoliberal ideology under the leadership of La Rocque; and I note that programme staff are well aware of how their efficacy is limited or shaped by free market ideology.

While discussing the transformation of UPP Social, one of my interviewees inadvertently recognised that depoliticising the programme within the less authoritative IPP—a state office La Rocque called “second tier” in comparison to her previous position at the prominent Secretary of Finance—dampened the ambitions of the UPP Social:

*I think the most significant change was that it became less ambitious and more focussed. As far as initially, the idea was to have Unidades de Política Pública, to coordinate all the services in the favela. But that requires very good relations with the other departments, which is almost impossible because of lots of politics and many other reasons. So now instead of trying to coordinate all of those other Secretaries, the idea is to provide other Secretaries with information and consultancy and communication with social organisations; rather than going to them and saying, “Look, we have 1000 complaints that the sewer system isn’t working. You have to go fix the sewer system.”*  

(Peterson, UPP Social)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Mayor’s PMDB coalition had 19 total parties jockeying for position within the governing apparatus (RJ State governing coalition had 15 parties). Competition to maintain visibility and achieve successes that can be touted in the next campaign season is fierce. Historically the IPP was never a prominent department. It does not have the standing of a Secretary, but rather an institute that answers to the Casa Civil (Mayor’s Office) but speaks with none of its authority. One IPP employee mentioned to me that UPP Social had such difficulty trying
to coordinate the other municipal Secretaries that the Mayor’s Office had to make a round of calls, on two different occasions, insisting that UPP Social’s counterparts return phone calls and emails, hand over requested data, and show up for inter-sectoral meetings.

La Rocque responded astutely. Recognising she lacked the authority to command the attention or the activities of other departments, she returned to the “core business” of the IPP, data management, and re-imagined the role of UPP Social. Below I excerpt part of my interview with La Rocque when she explains how her history in finance and running a risk management-consulting firm influenced her then current project in the public sector:

-La Rocque: These days I see the IPP as a consulting company, so I bring that notion to the people who work here.

Tucker: In this context the clients are the other state organs?

La Rocque: We have numerous clients, principally other organs of the municipal government. We are kind of like...our business, our product, is information—qualified information and articulation. So, our clients are the service providing Secretaries [Secretarias finalísticas], which provide municipal government services, but also the favela residents—principally of the favela but also residents of the city as a whole, because we have that focus in Rio+Social, yeah? So the favelas are also our clients as much as the service providers and the private sector. We produce, we have a significant asset [ativo], which is knowledge of Rio: the whole cartographic base, all of the information and data, social indicators on demographics, populations, urban conditions etc...

For La Rocque reimagining Rio+Social and the IPP as a consulting firm additionally depoliticises the work, for the other state offices and Secretaries are not competitors but clients; and rather than coordinating the actions and delegating responsibilities to other departments, they would provide them with products ("qualified"
data) and services (consulting expertise) in the case they wanted to
improve performance. Critical readers will have already detected a
neoliberal ideology within the revamped Rio+Social under La Rocque.
Her bold embrace of market-speak is unsurprising given her 14 years
of work in the financial sector prior to entering government.\textsuperscript{61} Indeed
she resists the identity of the state, insisting that she is a “non-
governmental individual” (indivíduo não governamental, ING); and
when pressed—she is after all the head of a government institute—
she concedes that she is temporarily of the state and purposefully
mismatched the Portuguese verb to be—“eu estou do estado, não sou
do estado”—to emphasise that she is simply ‘passing through’ and
does not plan on a long career as part of the state.

Beyond the discursive reconceptualisation of Rio+Social’s
work, there are additional concrete practices and proposals that
suggest the programme advances neoliberal ideology while fleeing

\textsuperscript{61} La Rocque’s personal narrative of why she entered government was briefly
mentioned in Chapter 5. At a speech delivered at an elite networking NGO called
MOVERio, she told the audience how she was never motivated by money and did not
relate to her colleagues and others in her social circle who measured success by
levels of conspicuous consumption. While she possesses a PhD in economics, La
Rocque did not feel that academia was sufficiently hands-on, and eventually she
became interested in public service to improve Rio de Janeiro, her adopted city. Due
to her privileged social position, she was well connected with political and
government elites and eventually was invited to serve as Secretary of Finance for
the municipal government. She accepted on the condition that she would not have to
participate in party campaign activities—she insists she has no political ambitions.
While serving as Secretary of Finance she was interested in how to use Municipal
money to stimulate sustainable development and a more equitable city. She sought
out Henriques and Zacchi from UPP Social’s beginning to explore collaboration. She
says employees within the Secretary of Finance would poke fun of her and joke that
“she likes the poor.” According to La Rocque, when Henriques left the IPP, Mayor
Paes offered her the job knowing that she was interested in social programming.
Her departure from one of the most powerful Secretaries to an obscure institute
reportedly raised eyebrows, however she asserts that she has no regrets. La Rocque
left the IPP before Rio+Social was defunded in order to head \textit{O Pacto do Rio (The Rio
Pact)} which is a similar model of articulation between government, private for-
profit corporations, and civil society (NGOs and academia) meant to encourage
“sustainable development” and greater equality in the metropolitan area of Rio de
Janeiro. By design the Pact blurs the boundaries of the state to the point it is difficult
to understand exactly how the initiative is structured. La Rocque continues to
operate within the municipal government, however the Pact has launched both an
NGO and a business to liaise with civil society and the private sector.
from partisan politics. Most immediately, the labour of UPP Social employees is far more precarious than public employees, since they are hired and paid by the UN Habitat office in Rio de Janeiro, even though the financing comes from the municipal government. According to the UN Habitat’s country director, this arrangement is neither uncommon for UN Habitat nor unique within the Brazilian state apparatus when creating a new governance project with an uncertain future. As such, employees do not benefit from collective representation, do not receive the same workers rights as permanent state employees, and were not hired according to a standardised meritocratic selection process (*concurso público*) but rather through UN Habitat’s established sub-contracting process.

A less structural but more prominent example that produces material results in the favela are public-private-partnerships, an operational model La Rocque aggressively pursues. When I asked her what advantages or risks she saw with PPPs she quickly corrected me:

*Tucker:* Can you talk to me a bit about PPPs? What is the purpose of partnering with the private sector in the favelas? What are the advantages or the risks, and what sorts of PPPs do you pursue?

*La Rocque:* “Ah, well, we have public-private-participatory-partnerships, yeah? They have to be participatory.

*Tucker:* OK, PPPPs...

*La Rocque:* Yeah, it’s a PPPP. Because it has to originate, be built together with participation from the community, right? As it is, we don’t see the traditional sort of PPP because we generally work with the corporate social responsibility areas of the businesses. The majority are initiatives of businesses that want to enter that market with profit objectives and then they will revert some part [of the profits] back to the community.

La Rocque clearly believes that private sector participation is integral to favela integration. Of course the favelas already bustle with private
business, but they happen to be small independent businesses that have operated unregulated for years or event decades. UPP Social has not ignored small business owners—in fact they have run pilot projects to support and stimulate local entrepreneurs. But the sort of partnerships that La Rocque covets is significant investment from large corporations or consortiums in collaboration with the government in order to jump-start “sustainable” economic development. To date, interest from the private sector appears to be lacking and the favelas are viewed by La Rocque as a marketing opportunity for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Rio+Social obliges, and positions itself as an authoritative interlocutor for CSR departments looking to “give back” to the favela communities. One of the major beneficiaries of favela pacification in the private sector is the electric company Light, which operates a state-sanctioned monopoly. As noted in the previous chapter, once the police pacification process begins, “services are regularised,” meaning that residents have to pay for their electricity, without public subsidy or credit, post pacification. It makes good business sense that Light would feel a “social responsibility” to invest in pacified favelas given how much it stands to profit from their pacification.

For example you have the project of Light, which is a private company, that came to us and said, “We would like your help to spend some funding that we have earmarked to renovate sporting areas in pacified areas.” The [UPP Social] fieldworkers had mapped all of them. So we have that product—the mapping of all the ball courts, plazas, and leisure spaces in all of the pacified favelas—all mapped out. We took that to Light, and the field team, together with Light and community leaders, thought about which spaces were the best spaces to renovate. Because [The Complexo do] Alemão doesn’t just have two courts, yeah? It has thousands. So they thought which areas should be prioritised, which would have the biggest impact?
After that, Light wanted to hire a “cultural mobiliser” from there to run cultural and sporting programming. They wanted to advertise [for the position] within all the institutions there, which is another product that the Territorial Management has: the mapping of all the NGOs and community organisations in the favelas, including even the local “auntie” that runs a daycare and library in her home and offers after-school help. It’s all mapped.

(Bruna, Territorial Management, Rio+Social)

Examining favela upgrading, demolition and resettlement projects in Recife, Nuijten and colleagues argue that neoliberalism “manifests in the idea that the state, private companies and citizens together are responsible for (re)constructing urban space” (2012, 157). Implemented by a progressive municipal government according to participatory principles, the authors argue that such projects are one example of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002) under a leftist government in the global south. The so-called PPPPs of Rio+Social also speak to the neoliberal co-production of favela space, state intervention, and favela integration as occurring by residents, private industry and the state as equal partners in harmony. While the Nuijten and colleagues conducted an ethnography within a specific favela experiencing a state intervention and major housing and urban infrastructure investments (see Koster and Nuijten 2012; Koster 2009), this thesis demonstrates how the state operates with the same ideology from a centralised position managing data and cultivating and facilitating relationships between dissimilar actors (for-profit companies and local community leaders; school children, NGOs, and street traffic officials).

Given these points, it is clear that Rio+Social corresponds to Rio de Janeiro’s modern history of neoliberal development and business-like public administration (Compans 2004). Nonetheless I stop short of concurring with scholars who paint the programme
(often misrepresenting it as the final phase of pacification) as a neoliberal agent facilitating accumulation through dispossession as part of mega-event planning strategies (Rekow 2016; Poets 2015; Prouse 2013; Saborio 2013). Rather I posit that the programme sits rather awkwardly as a reformist coping mechanism to the militarisation of favela space. Below I give an example of this positionality in the context of favela gentrification.

As UPPs spread to favelas around the South Zone, urbanists and activists began debating gentrification. This narrative of pricing out renters in the favelas was introduced and pushed to the forefront of public debate by foreign academics and visiting journalists and graduate students working closely with Teresa Williamson of Catalytic Communities, the NGO who publishes the watchdog website Rio On Watch. For decades the favelas were viewed as evidence against the forces of gentrification,62 but as house prices skyrocketed in the city and favelas underwent pacification and urbanisation, many researchers and critical academics began arguing that gentrification had taken hold in the favelas (Frischtak and Mandel 2012; Cummings 2013; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013).

During fieldwork I would broach the topic of gentrification during interviews with various state actors involved in implementing interventions of integration. When I ask if they were worried about how the various infrastructure upgrades and police pacification might affect rental prices and gentrification, most shrugged, not out of carelessness but helplessness. Some said they were aware of the debates, but outside of the privileged, relatively small favelas in the South Zone, they were unaware of actual data documenting favela gentrification. My objective here is not to wade into the debate

62 I recall a professor of geography at UFRJ advising a master’s student in 2010 against writing about the threat of gentrification in the Porta Maravilha redevelopment scheme because, “gentrification is something that happens in Europe and United States—it isn’t an issue here.”
regarding gentrification, but rather to highlight the critical reflexivity of many state actors. In early 2014 I was accompanying a senior employee of IPP to a university where he gave a guest lecture to graduate class on urban planning. On our way we discussed work, the protests, and urban politics. I told him about the debates I attended in Vidigal (discussed in Chapter 5) and how about how a radical activist from Favela Não Se Cala called the programmes Morar Carioca and PAC-favelas “state agents of gentrification.” I asked him if he was worried that the interventions meant to integrate the favelas would end up forcing out the poorest residents. He responded slightly exasperated: “And what? What are we doing to do? Should we stop urbanising the favelas?” He pointed out that technocrats such as himself and those running favela urbanisation programmes have no power over the housing market and argued that the debate must happen at a broader political level. The point of contesting gentrification should not be Morar Carioca, he insisted, but rather public policies that regulate and encourage the private housing market. Until there is an option for urbanists to design interventions that could be protected from private real estate interests his hands are tied.

This example of a state agent of favela integration recognising how neoliberal market relations shape and limit the strategies that he and others design and implement was not rare during my fieldwork. Especially within the IPP I became close enough with some of Rio+Social’s employees to share my forming critique of the neoliberal aspects of the programme. I mentioned that La Rocque’s background in finance capital seemed to influence how she pursued partnerships with private industry, and how she viewed the IPP as serving “clients” akin to a consulting firm. On such occasions, these employees acknowledged the critique but suggested that La Rocque was more of a sheep in wolf’s clothing. One contact joked that his mission was to
show that she is less of a fan of the neoliberal market than she herself believed, and in my interview with La Rocque she confessed that she “used to be a lot more radical” in her belief of free market solutions prior to taking over the IPP and Rio+Social.

This suggests that while programmes such as UPP Social/Rio+Social do operate in “actually existing neoliberal” governing apparatuses, many of the state actors charged with implementation are neither ignorant nor villains. Rather they recognise how their actions are limited and reproductive of neoliberal market ideology, and some may even try to contest such forces. While the technical strategies used to collect data and produce knowledge and statistics obscure ideology, it need not only serve hegemonic ideology. The original conception of UPP Social could be seen as a type of Trojan horse attempting to carve out a space for popular participation within the public security and governance apparatus. While defeated and relegated to the technical department IPP, the programme maintained progressive discourse and objectives while insisting that its new technical approach in partnership with UN Habitat depoliticised its nature. While the data and social technologies serve state objectives of deeper knowledge and greater control, reformist technocrats and civil society actors use the same technology and data to pressure the government to provide better quality education, health, and urban services, for which exist legitimate citizen demand.

6.5 Conclusions

While many scholars have considered favela pacification through the lens of military counter-insurgent tactics in order to wrest control of the favelas away from drug-trafficking gangs (Larkins 2015, Gaffney 2012, Freeman 2014) this chapter details the less considered yet equally pivotal state spatiality of governance if the
statement, *afavela é cidade* is to be fully realised and sustained. I have argued that UPP Social was designed to address the fragmented sectoral governance that for decades have characterised the state’s presence in the favelas, that perverse paradox of uncoordinated presence of the state noted by the programme’s originators. The technocratic transformation of UPP Social into Rio+Social operated social technologies associated with urban planning and contemporary (neoliberal) governance constructed the favelas as governable spaces—that is to say knowable, measurable and subject to systematic bureaucratic service provision—and therefore ready for intervention and capable of integration. Additionally, and contradictorily, those same technologies produced data products meant to convince residents that the favelas are indeed governed, that the state is present and providing health and education services and continues to invest in the social and cultural well being of favela residents.

I also discussed Rio+Social’s production of state/official knowledge of the favelas and evidence-based expertise as obscuring politics while advancing neoliberal interests and state power. While Rio+Social is subject to and reproductive of neoliberal political relations in some form, I caution against dismissing the programme as an agent of neoliberalism. Given that “actually existing neoliberalism” allows for local mutation and contradictions, I offered a more nuanced analysis and highlighted what I consider both internal reflexivity and contestation within the state. The programme’s progressive goals and employees are reflexive and critical of how they are restrained by the hegemonic structural conditions of the governing apparatus.

The present chapter examined how the state seeks to territorialise favelas through technocratic strategies of data collecting, statistics and mapping. The subsequent chapter focuses on more significant material interventions—large-scale housing and transport
infrastructure in some of the largest, most iconic, and most infamous favelas of Rio de Janeiro.
Chapter 7 – Favela Integration and the Territory Effect

This chapter analyses the last of the three major state interventions: the Accelerated Growth Programme, or PAC-favelas. In Chapter 5 I argued that “favela integration” constitutes a paradigm of urban governance and planning meant to address the historic bifurcation of urban space. Through the construction of a landscape-mobilities analysis, I demonstrated that “favela-integration,” and in turn the “integrated city,” relies on the facilitation and regulation of flows in, out, and within targeted favelas. I argued that the hegemonic discourse of landscape, the integrated city, obscures how state interventions reproduce power dynamics that historically segregated Rio de Janeiro. In Chapter 6 I argued that the acceptance of favelas as legitimate urban space are subsequently constructed as governable spaces through the production of spatial expertise. Tracing the relatively short-lived programme of UPP Social/Rio+Social, I demonstrated how an intervention originally conceived as political and participatory was reshaped to produce seemingly apolitical technocratic knowledge meant to facilitate interventions into the favelas as object-spaces for development and social inclusion. I argued that this favela-specific knowledge, produced through descriptive and inferential quantitative and qualitative data, serves favela integration in two connected functions: first as a technocratic lens through which the state sees the favelas as objects needing intervention and second as the effectuation of territory. For Painter (2010), building on Mitchell (1999), territory-as-effect is produced through the constant workings of socio-technical practices that maintain the illusion of
sovereign governance operating evenly throughout space. However, Painter writes from a context in which state territory is undisputed.

The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how territory is effectuated at the urban scale specifically in relation to favelas as contested spaces; pockets of the city that are understood as lost or abandoned, outside of daily governance. The chapter supports the claim that favela integration is a state spatial project of territory realised through place-specific interventions that serve spatial objectives of municipal, state-province, and national governments alike. While the previous chapter focused on socio-technical practices concerned principally with data, visual knowledge, and institutional planning and partnerships, this chapter focuses on large-scale material interventions in housing, sanitation, transportation and social infrastructure. Whereas Painter, following his theory on *state prosaics*, exemplifies how the products of specialised technical labour of state actors—policy strategies and reviews, statistics and mappings, and modelling and economic target goals—produces the “effects of contiguity, continuity and boundedness” (Painter 2010, 1103), I argue that the effectuation of territory in cases of contested urban space such as Rio de Janeiro between the so-called informal housing settlements and formal city, additionally relies on socio-technical practices that are spectacular and exceptional.

The chapter is structured into seven sections. Section 7.1 reviews the structure and significance of PAC, and details how the programme invested in large-scale favela urbanisation projects in Rio and explore the political-spatial objectives of the federal government investing in local favelas. Section 7.2 engages with literature considering the scaling of statehood and state space under neoliberal governance. In addition to noting Klink’s claim that PAC signifies a “rolling out” of the developmental state at the national scale in contrast to neoliberal Europe, I argue that PAC-favelas represents a
‘rolling in’ of state sovereignty into areas previously considered ‘outside’ of state control. I continue this argument in Section 7.3 where I use PAC-favelas in the Complexo do Alemão as an example of the state reclaiming the ‘lost’ territories of the favelas. I then offer a detailed analysis of the flagship project of PAC-favelas in Alemão, the Teleférico first described in Chapter 5. Section 7.4 reviews how the project largely failed to achieve its explicit objectives, but succeeded in producing regulated and controlled space useful to the state’s broader objectives of territory. I then offer an example of how the infrastructure provided opportunity for continued electoral gain when the gang reasserted its spatial claims and reportedly barred the Governor from campaigning within the Complexo do Alemão. Finally I ‘make room’ for an explicitly feminist analysis of favela integration in 7.6. While exploratory in nature, I document the gendering of the “social” side of favela integration as both feminine and devalued. I further argue that the state practices territory in the favelas with a paternalist quality, protecting and helping the weak and vulnerable (women, children, elderly and sick) while policing and punishing those bodies deemed as threatening and “marginal.” I close the chapter in 7.7 with a summary of the principal claims.

7.1 Federal investments in local favelas

Until now this thesis has examined favela integration exclusively through projects implemented by the municipal or the state-province governments within the Rio de Janeiro municipal area.63 The bulk of data examined in this chapter relates to a wide-

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63 Favela Pacification through the UPP units is a borderline exception given that it falls under the guise of the State Secretary of Security which had drawn plans to deploy the UPP in favelas outside of Rio de Janeiro municipality, but at time of writing had not implemented those plans. The fact that no favelas outside of the city have been “pacified” may support claims that UPP is exceptional to Rio de Janeiro as an Olympic City or that the programme has not sustained the desired results.
reaching federal programme that designed and implemented local interventions in Rio’s favelas in coordination with the state government. While the focus of my analysis is explicitly at the urban scale, one of the findings of this research is that the programmes and interventions that make up favela integration serve territorial and state spatial strategies beyond the local and municipal scales. As we see in this chapter, PAC-favelas was instigated by the federal government, originally envisioned by local ‘favela experts’ and urbanists, and managed by the state-province government.

This section outlines the structure of PAC as a national spatial economic strategy as well as the origins of PAC-favelas and interventions in Rio de Janeiro. Relying on government texts, existing academic literature, and interviews, the immediate objective is to demonstrate how the interventions benefit the territorial projects of the city, state, and national governments. I rely on this data to engage with literature concerning the political economy of state space, the rescaling of the state through urban development strategies and in particular Brenner’s argument (2004) that under global neoliberal capitalism we have witnessed a rescaling of the state from the federal to the urban scale and a reconfiguration of socio-spatial economics from spatial Keynesianism to competitive urbanism.

The Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Programme for Growth Acceleration), or PAC, was a federal stimulus package designed by the government of Lula in 2007 with a three-year budget of slightly more than R$500 billion (roughly US$277 billion at historical exchange rates). At the time, Brazil was cash-rich after experiencing sustained economic growth due to the worldwide commodities boom, the discovery of immense oil reserves off the

However it is likely that it has not expanded beyond the municipality due to the concomitant economic recession, fiscal and political crises that have hit the state of Rio de Janeiro with particular force.
coast of Rio de Janeiro state, and foreign investment associated with
the so-called BRIC phenomenon (The Economist 2009). Indeed foreign
investment in Brazil reached a point that national authorities became
concerned that the economy would “overheat” and thus increased
taxes on incoming capital flows to stave off further appreciation of the
Real against the US Dollar (Pearson 2011; Wheatley and Beattie
2009). When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, Brazil remained
insulated in part due to high government spending associated with
PAC and extension of social welfare programmes such as the
conditional cash-transfer programme Bolsa Familia and the
subsidized housing financing mechanism Minha Casa Minha Vida
(MCMV) (Madrid 2012). In official government reviews, the PAC is
presented as a successful national economic strategy during a global
economic recession.64

The first four years of PAC (2007-2010) focused principally
on large infrastructure projects: energy facilities, highways, airports,
shipping ports, bridges—high-impact, labour-intensive projects
meant to facilitate long term private investment and mobility of goods
and capital while immediately putting thousands to work. The stated
objective was to reach consistent GDP growth of five percent.
Government data shows construction of roads and highways
increased 76%, and similar increases in construction of commercial
and residential buildings (41%) and sanitation infrastructure
(64%).65 During these boom times statistics show unemployment
shrank from 9.3% in 2007 to 4.3% in 2014.66

64 For example see: “Balanço completo do PAC: 4 Anos 2007-2010” (2010)
65 On the “legacy” of PAC I see: “Lançamento Do PAC 2” (2010).
66 Amid the political crisis and impeachment scandal of 2016, President Lula
defended his and President Dilma’s governments by citing the stimulus packages
and fiscal policies, comparing Brazil’s unemployment rate to Finland and Sweden
(see interview with Greenwald 2016). The unemployment figures cited above, and
invoked by Lula, come from the official statistics reported by IBGE (The Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics). Some economists accuse the government of
manipulating the official statistics to underreport unemployment; and indeed IBGE’s
When Lula announced a second round of PAC financing in 2009 (PAC II) it was thus in the context of Brazil’s growth during a global economic recession under the leadership of a president who challenged dominant neoliberal market-ideology long before the 2008 financial crisis first hit the United States. It also preceded national elections in 2010 when President Lula’s Worker’s Party (PT) and allies were reeling from a vote-buying corruption scheme in the Senate known as Mensalão.\textsuperscript{67} In 2005 Lula plucked the relatively obscure and politically unblemished technocrat, then Minister of Energy and Mining Dilma Rousseff, to lead the Casa Civil (the executive’s office is referred to as Casa Civil at all levels of Brazilian government). Lula also charged Dilma with coordinating PAC, a move that garnered national media attention and provided an institutional base to build political relationships across the country. The political opposition claimed that PAC I favoured municipalities controlled by PT and allies and later that Lula and Dilma used PAC II as an excuse to informally campaign for her presidency outside of the official campaign season.\textsuperscript{68}

categorical qualification of employment is broad. For example, those who report working without remuneration, those who are receiving unemployment insurance, and a portion of those receiving state welfare payments under Bolsa Família are not included in the statistics. Nonetheless, even conservative estimates (for example the labour organisation DIEESE calculates figures that are roughly double those of IBGE) show a decrease in unemployment during the time period.

\textsuperscript{67} The corruption scandal Mensalão (roughly translatable as monthly allowance) was unprecedented in scale. Lula’s chief of staff and chosen successor, José Dirceu, was forced to resign and return as a congressional representative to the lower house. Tried by the Supreme Court, he was eventually found guilty of coordinating the vote-buying payments and sentenced to seven years in prison in 2012. Lula continues to defend Dirceu by noting that no material evidence was ever presented against him. This is true—the Supreme Court convicted Dirceu based on a legal theory known as domínio do fato (dominion of the fact), which argues that conviction may be justified by the facts of overwhelming converging circumstantial evidence. See Michener and Pereira (2016) for a review of the Mensalão case and scandal in political context. In 2016 Dirceu was found guilty and sentenced to an additional 23 years for corruption charges related to the pay-to-play scandal investigated by operation Lava Jato (car wash).

\textsuperscript{68} Political campaigning in Brazil may only occur during a specified window before an election. At the time of writing it was restricted to the 45 days preceding an
In addition to substantially increasing the amount of money invested (from R$650 to R$955 billion), PAC II developed financing streams that prioritised what is referred to as “social infrastructure.” The programme classified projects into six categories: (i) Better City, (ii) Community Citizen, (iii) Minha Casa Minha Vida, (iv) Water and Electricity for All, (v) Transportation, and (vi) Energy. Comparatively, Rio de Janeiro received more PAC financing than most other states, including the state of São Paulo, which is both more populous—roughly 44 million versus 16 million—and has a substantially larger economy—R$1.7 billion in 2103 compared with Rio’s 626 million; although the GDP per capita is roughly the same (about R$39,000 for SP and R$38,000 for RJ). Nonetheless the federal government, through PAC I, invested more than R$400 billion in Rio de Janeiro compared to slightly under R$350 billion in São Paulo (see Figure 7.1). Project analysis of PAC I in Rio de Janeiro reveals that 70% of funds were energy-related, with the objective to facilitate the transportation of oil.

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69 It’s worth noting that projected investments and executed budgets are not the same. PAC investments have changed, been delayed and in some cases curtailed. Therefore the numbers cited are meant to display the significance of Rio de Janeiro in regional federal investment, and do not accurately describe how much money was appropriated and spent.
and gas from the coastal and offshore drilling.\textsuperscript{70} The second largest expenditure designation of funds, accounting for 21%, was the ‘social infrastructure’ associated with urbanisation of precarious settlements (Machado et al. 2010).

![Figure 7.1 - PAC investments by state 2007-2010 (in billions of Reals)](image)

This graph, depicting approved funding for PAC projects (in blue) and already appropriated funds (in pink) by 2010 shows how Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo stand out as the two states that received significantly more PAC investment than other Brazilian states. Source: (Machado et al. 2010)

There are a number of reasons as to why Rio de Janeiro received disproportionate financing through PAC in comparison to the other states. The booming petroleum economy is the most obvious. Major infrastructure was needed in order to exploit the vast reserves of oil found near the coast and offshore of Rio de Janeiro. Less explicit is that Lula and PT’s most important partner in their ruling coalition was the PMDB, the most powerful party in Congress which conducts politics through deep local networks of patrimonial clientelism (Winters 2015; Power and Zucco 2009; Baiocchi 2003; Roett 1999).

\textsuperscript{70} State-run oil company Petrobras announced in 2006 the discovery of massive offshore oil and gas deposits in the pre-salt layer off the coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Named after the former president, the Lula Oil Field (originally named the Tupi Oil Field until 2010) is considered the most significant discovery in the past 30 years (Fick 2009) and indicates Brazil’s proven oil reserves as the 15\textsuperscript{th} largest in the world according to the CIA World Fact Book.
Lula, and subsequently Dilma, maintained close ties with Rio de Janeiro Governor and Mayor (both from PMDB), and PT abstained from running candidates for executive office in the municipality and state until the 2014 elections when relations frayed and the alliance broke during the impeachment process of 2016. PMDB refrained from running a presidential candidate, and throughout their presidencies, Lula and Dilma campaigned with Paes, Cabral, and Pezão in Rio de Janeiro. This relationship increased after Rio de Janeiro won the Olympic bid in 2009 with strong support from then President Lula. But why use PAC to invest in favela urbanisation when most other projects serve the interests of big industry?

PAC-favela was a mechanism to roll out MCMV in dense cities with expansive favelas. Many urbanists consider the MCMV national strategy a step backwards despite representing the most significant financial commitment to social housing than any other previous government (E. A. Nascimento 2014; Rolnik 2015). A hybrid neoliberal model that favours private capital interests over quality of life and quality of construction, the programme seems to ignore lessons learned through favela urbanisation campaigns such as Favela-Bairro and repeat the logic of favela eradication of the historical Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH) (Compans 2012). However, MCMV is structured in a way that allows municipal and state-province governments to fold the programme into local

71 The BNH was established in 1964 by the military dictatorship as a national strategy to stimulate home ownership. A lasting legacy is the labour provision requiring employers to contribute a percentage of worker salaries to a fund which can be accessed in order to buy a home or in times of illness or unemployment. This provision benefitted only those working in the formal sector. For the majority of the poor working in the informal economy and living in the favelas, an agency known as COHAB (Company of Popular Housing) used BNH funds to build low-cost apartment complexes. In Rio, COHAB worked with the agency CHISM (Coordination of Social Interest Housing of the Greater Rio Metropolitan Area), which had the explicit goal of ensuring a city without favelas. While CHISM’s mandate allowed for interventions that we would now consider slum upgrading, it largely pursued favela eradication through demolition and construction of social housing complexes See Perlman (1976), Valladares (1978).
strategies. For example, the RJ municipal government accesses MCMV financing when building new housing blocks as part of Morar Carioca interventions.

According to architect-urbanist Pedro Luz de Moreira the decision to dedicate PAC funds towards favela urbanisation was in part due to the influence of Rio de Janeiro urbanists who had elaborated Favela-Bairro and Morar Carioca programmes. Moreira was the vice-president of the Instituto Arquitetos do Brasil-Rio de Janeiro (IAB-RJ, The Brazilian Institute of Architects) during the time that Morar Carioca and PAC were created and president when I interviewed him. He believes that MCMV was born of closed-minded thinking, but that local advocates were able to persuade federal actors to create a hybrid model through PAC:

Pedro: The mentality installed in the Ministry of Cities thinks like this: 'No, now that Brazil is a great country, it doesn't need—its the seventh largest economy of the world—it doesn't need to urbanise favelas anymore. We are going to build housing complexes for everyone and then we finish with the Brazilian favelas. When in fact, that is to say, we've already had various clashes. Indeed the very creation of PAC-favela was our attempt to influence the Ministry of Cities by saying this: 'Damn, but favela urbanisation is much more sophisticated than building housing complexes.' And from that emerged PAC-favela and what not.

Tucker: So PAC-favela...I didn’t know it emerged from Rio organisations.

Pedro: In part yes, in large part yes, if I'm not mistaken. There is no PAC-favela in São Paulo [for example]; PAC-favela is only in Rio.

To be clear, there is no stream of PAC funding officially named PAC-favelas. Under PAC I urbanisation interventions were categorised as social and urban infrastructure and in PAC II categorised as MCMV with some overlap with Community Citizen which included health
centres, schools, and nurseries. Nonetheless people that I interviewed as well as the news media routinely refer to such interventions as “PAC-favelas”. However, Rio de Janeiro was not even included in the first 12 states that reportedly won PAC projects to “urbanise precarious settlements” (Pariz and Colon 2007). Nonetheless, The Ministry of Cities quickly approved multiple interventions in Rio and the projects received a disproportionately large portion of funding (R$3.59 billion by 2010), although less than São Paulo which received R$5.52 billion for favela “urbanisation” (Chaves and Vieira 2010).

While Pedro’s statement about the origin of PAC-favela is technically incorrect, it speaks to the larger narrative of favela integration, not mere upgrading. Moreira is right in the sense that Rio de Janeiro pioneered a novel approach to urbanisation based on the accumulated experience of Favela-Bairro and the paradigm of integration. Unlike PAC-financed favela urbanisation in other states, interventions in Rio de Janeiro appear unique in pairing spectacular connective architecture with social infrastructure. In this context PAC-favelas continue the city’s long history as an “urban laboratory” of planning interventions in the self-built neighbourhoods (Olinger 2015; Gonçalves 2013; Perlman 2010; Portes 1979).

The story of how the PAC-favela project sites were chosen is worth noting. While I could not definitively verify its truthfulness through official documents or news stories, numerous people close to the projects gave me the same account: Lula, determined to fund projects in Rio’s favelas at the PAC scale (significant, highly visible impacts) took a helicopter tour with Governor Cabral over the largest and most notorious favelas, and decided that Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão, and Complexo de Manguinhos would all be sites of
I posed the question to Renata and Nicole, Director and Coordinator of PAC-Social (respectively), during an interview:


Their statement may raise some red flags with readers familiar with Rio de Janeiro because it does not perfectly match with either the city’s favelas or the PAC-favelas interventions in it. Nicole implicitly acknowledges this when she says, “that’s the story,” as if referencing an origin-myth of PAC-favelas. If the government wanted to target the largest favelas, then what about Complexo da Maré, population 130 thousand? According to research participants I spoke to, PAC skipped over Complexo da Maré because it had been subject of a project in the 1980s under Projeto Rio, financed by the Banco Nacional de Habitação. In addition to size and social welfare indicators the criteria included evaluation of previous urbanisation campaigns.

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72 Pavão-Pavãozinho, a Zona Sul favela in Ipanema that received an elevator connecting it with the metro station was also chosen for the first round of PAC I but is largely left out of the narrative.

73 Projeto Rio, known nationally as Promorar, was an early example of the state, under the dictatorship, pursuing urbanisation rather than demolition and re-settlement. The novel approach was a result of consolidated and effective local pressure by residents who otherwise faced large-scale eviction in order to build a complex of social housing similar to Cidade de Deus or Vila Kennedy (Pandolfi and Grynszpan 2002). Projeto Rio in Maré was the exception to what would have otherwise been Promorar serving BNH’s ideology of favela eradication.
Furthermore, what role did poverty and other indicators play in the selection? A systematic analysis of descriptive statistics would reveal many smaller but poorer favelas, although such indicators tend to obscure the high levels of inequality within larger favelas (Preteceille and Valladares 2001). Rocinha, and the Complexos do Alemão and de Manguinhos, have pockets of abject poverty and as a whole have among the lowest indices for ‘human development’ and ‘social progress’ in Rio de Janeiro. Nonetheless many of their residents have well-constructed homes and lower-middle class living standards.

Finally, this origin story ignores that PAC financed interventions in favela Providência as part of the port revitalisation project, in Pavão-Pavãozinho in Zona Sul, and Complexo de Lins in Zona Norte. This discrepancy is probably explained by the two categories of PAC-favelas interventions: the first category of large-scale multi-year projects that were selected by joint negotiated decision between the federal government and municipal or state governments (a process known as pactuação federativa). The second category, which covers the majority of PAC-favela interventions but of significantly lesser scale (in terms of money invested, generally less than R$10 million), were approved through an annual “open call” of project proposals (chamada para seleção pública) through the Ministry of Cities. The large-scale projects, such as the three large favelas discussed, became flagship interventions, emblematic of the “sophistication” (as Moreira put it) of PAC-favelas even if they are the exception, not the rule.

As a spatial strategy of development, the PAC interventions reproduced the federal state at the scale of the city. Given the political alliance between PT and PMDB-RJ, along with significant federal investments in the state and city, it is of no surprise that Lula, and subsequently Dilma, visited the city often. To evaluate where investments would be made, to announce the projects, check-in on
progress and inaugurate finished projects of PAC or the various sporting and political mega-events. After Lula left office, he and other PT insiders began to devise a plan to break PMDB’s hold on the region, and relations between the two parties frayed. Journalists noted a marked reduction in how often President Dilma visited the city (P. C. Pereira and Bruno 2013) and PT decided to contest PMDB in the race for state governor.74 During these trips to check in on PAC, Lula would often travel around the city by helicopter. None of the three large favela “complexes” had been occupied in the first process of the militarised pacification, so prior to his visits, the police would conduct a “shock of order” to prepare for his visit. Lula would swoop down from the skies and fly off once official business concluded (see Freire 2008).

Lula called attention to and justified the decision to dedicate significant resources to some of the poorest areas of the city. As reported by O Globo newspaper (Freire 2010), at the opening of an urgent care health clinic (UPA) in the West Zone in May of 2010, Lula stated to the press:

_The other day I was hovering around Pavão-Paváozinho [a favela situated in Copacabana, in the South Zone] in a helicopter, and I saw the fantastic elevator, that will take the people from the top of the hill to the metro. Certainly someone will look at that and say: ‘that Sergio Cabral, that Lula, and that Eduardo Paes are jackasses. Instead of spending money on a music centre for the rich they are making an elevator for the poor. The poor having more is what strengthens the calves,’_ he said, receiving

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74 This decision was perhaps cemented after the 2013 protests, during which Governor Cabral’s approval rating plummeted to be the worst of any governor in the country (DataFolha 2013). He resigned six months before his term ended, reportedly to give visibility to his Vice Governor and chosen successor, Luis Fernando de Souza, known as Pezão (bigfoot), who ultimately won the election as the incumbent.

75 _Pobre tem mais é que engrossar a canela_ is not a common idiom in Portuguese. Here I translated it literally because I am unaware of any equivalent expression in English. It serves as a hierarchical body metaphor—if society were a body, the poor would be the
applause from residents of poor communities and a large claque of political allies. [...] ‘Soon, soon, we’re going to inaugurate a gondola in the Complexo do Alemão, so that homemakers don’t have to hike up the slope with their shopping. But there are people who don’t like that we spend money on that. Those people want to keep Copacabana pretty because it’s the face of Brazil to the world, but the poor must be treated with respect and dignity,’ Lula finished.

Citation from Globo G1 news article

Lula’s statement is telling. First, it ties together three levels of political governance, working together at the local scale: the federal government coordinating action with state-province and municipal executives to devote public resources to build infrastructure of grandeur explicitly for poor citizens. Second, it adopts language typical of the labour syndicalist turned president—bombastic, frank, and working class macho—he oversees the project from a helicopter, symbolic of the power of the executive surveying the city. From his position of hyper-mobility he praises an intervention that facilitates the mobility of the poor, a “fantastic elevator” that connects the favela with the metro that historically serving the city centre and wealthier Zona Sul while the public buses, trains and network of informal vans and moto-taxis served the working class and urban peripheries (Caiafa 2013; Kleiman 2011). Lula thus couches this investment as infrastructure of social mobility that pre-empts the insults of a (presumably bourgeois) “somebody” who will accuse him, Cabral and Paes of being “jackasses” for spending money on the poor—on poor female homemakers at that—rather than investing in high culture in order to maintain Copacabana as the beautiful postcard of Brazil.

The discursive representation of local, state, and federal governments acting as a cooperative unit is a pattern in Lula’s rhetoric. For legs, the foundation for standing and that which propels the body forward. Therefore, investing in infrastructure that serves the poor, so that the poor have more, strengthens the foundations of society.
example, two years earlier, at a PAC-RJ groundbreaking ceremony, Lula called Dilma the “mother of PAC”. In the same statement he lays out very clearly the political figureheads of PAC projects at each government. While “mother” Dilma coordinated PAC across the country, then vice governor Pezão was the “father of PAC in Rio de Janeiro” and coordinated PAC at the state level. And speaking directly to the benefactors of PAC in the favelas, he told them that they would need to hold Dilma and Pezão accountable, who would then “hold the mayor accountable, so that the mayor gets a move-on” (Freire 2008).

If the official narrative of why the government chose Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos is poverty eradication, the urbanist technocrats suggest a more nuanced decision making process. For example Moreira suggests that PAC-favelas showed federal policy makers and implementers that large public works, those worthy of the national brand PAC, could translate to “sophisticated” favela integration rather than the old ways of the BNH—the razing of favela homes and the construction of social housing. The head architect of PAC projects in Alemão and Manguinhos, Jorge Jáuregui, suggested that one reason why he was tapped for projects was that he had already conducted extensive research in the communities and published architectural plans for possible interventions. A similar research project headed by architect Luiz Carlos de Menezes Toledo was conducted in Rocinha prior to the PAC project. This research was heralded as participatory and based on the architects’ deep knowledge of community needs, however the planning of the PAC projects was rushed and marred by criticism that the interventions were anti-democratic (see section 7.4).

Through sketching out the structure of PAC-favelas and its origin, we can identify some of the programme’s utility beyond the infrastructure use-value: the interventions called PAC-favelas simultaneously acted as part of a national stimulus package to stave off the global recession, strengthened the regional party alliance between PT and PMDB in Rio de
Janeiro, contributed to the building of the “Olympic City” and thus Rio as Brazil’s “postcard” to the world, furthered presidents Lula and Dilma political claims to devote significant federal resources to improving the lives of Brazil’s poorest citizens, gave the politicians a legitimate excuse to visit the second most populous city frequently prior to and during campaign seasons, and finally provided a highly visible example of multi-scalar governmental cooperation between what is often characterised as a disjointed and dysfunctional relationship between municipal, state, and national governments. The following builds on this data to discuss the political economy of PAC-favelas in relation to multi-scalar state space.

7.2 “Rolling out” the state through PAC-favela

Brenner’s theorisation of neoliberal rescaling of state power, institutional hierarchies, and economic development policy prove useful if not prescriptive. PAC is a state spatial strategy of economic development and growth that shifts the implementation of projects ‘down’ the hierarchy to the state and municipal governments. While the strategy clearly seeks to use state resources in order to drive capitalist growth in various private sectors, it does not mimic a transition from ‘spatial Keynesianism’ to competitive neo-localism. As Klink points out, Brazil never followed a

76 The dysfunctional intergovernmental relationship Continued after the 2014 elections when PT irked PMDB-RJ and decided to contest the Governor’s office, and continued to deteriorate until the two parties split in spectacular fashion when Congress initiated impeachment proceedings against President Dilma, facilitated by the Rio congressman Eduardo Cunha who served as Speaker of the House until he was removed by the Supreme Court due to corruption charges. Simultaneously, Rio de Janeiro state and city experienced fiscal crisis and were unable to make payroll or federal debt payment, even in 2016 when the city, state, and federal governments are all led by PMDB politicians (Romero 2016). In relation to urban planning and the favelas, scholars have long noted how municipal and state maps of the city and favela limits differ, sometimes substantially. One concrete example would be of a set of stairs that climb “the back end” of the favela Providência in downtown Rio de Janeiro. When I visited, half of the staircase was neat and even, recently redone, while the other half was cracked and crumbling. A researcher conducting research in the favela explained that the two halves correspond to different urbanisation projects, one by the state and the other by the municipality.
model of strategic, even economic development that Brenner documents in Western Europe. Rather, Klink argues that the transition from spatial strategy of growth poles and privileging certain metropolitan regions (Rio de Janeiro chief among them) under the military regime to a neoliberal developmental state seeking international competitiveness “has been accompanied by a remarkable number of continuities, which have not been sufficiently highlighted in the literature on state spatial restructuring in Brazil” (Klink 2013, 1183). PAC continues to privilege some regions, including Rio de Janeiro, more than others; and the two-method selection—one through an open call for applications from state and municipal governments and the other through pactuação federal (e.g. the major PAC-favela interventions in Rio de Janeiro)—continue to allow non-transparent deal-making between politicians and between state institutions and oligopolistic construction companies. The unevenness and contradictions that characterise the neoliberal transition in Europe are neither new nor neoliberal in Brazil, but rather, as Klink writes, historical continuities. Far from discounting the critiques of neoliberalism in the “global North,” this research does echo those who argue that neoliberalism has not produced universal socio-economic and spatial qualities and must be studied and considered from various contexts of the “global South” (Klink, Oliveira, and Zimerman 2013; Nuijten, Koster, and de Vries 2012; Parnell and Robinson 2012; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ferguson 2006).

Understanding PAC and MCMV as the “rolling out” of a centralised developmental and technocratic state, Klink argues that reconfigurations of scale are important to consider. If such significant national investments centralise regulatory authority through for example MCMV best practices model provided by the Ministry of Cities (Rolnik et al, no date) or the Statute of the City, such authority is often skirted through contestations of scale by local actors (Klink, Oliveira, and Zimerman 2013; Rolnik and Klink 2011). PAC-favelas in Rio de Janeiro exemplify how these scalar relationships play out. It also suggests that analysis of state space and
reconfiguration under neoliberalism should take inter-scalar politics into consideration. The temporary alignment of priorities of the federal, state, and municipal governments and the interests of the respective stewarding political parties resulted in the rapid approval of unprecedented investment in the favelas. The contestations of scale worked both up and down the state hierarchy. Whereas MCMV and PAC-favela urbanisation interventions navigate around federal regulations, local actors in Rio de Janeiro—the progressive architect-urbanists with a history of favela-bairro—exerted their influence ‘upwards’ so that PAC-favelas adopted the more sophisticated approach of favela integration.

A focus-point of this chapter is the reproduction of state space through favela integration. I argue that PAC in the favelas and the paradigm of integration as a state spatial strategy is more than the converging interests of capital and government in order to restructure socio-economic relations according to neoliberal urban competitiveness. In addition to “rolling out” the developmental state, as Klink argues, PAC-favelas constitutes a ‘rolling in’ of the state through reterritorialisation of urban space. The targets of this strategy are pockets of the city that are discursively produced, with very real material consequences, as abandoned by the state and thus operating independent and disconnected from the formal and cohesively governed city. To advance this argument, eventually arriving at the effectuation of territory through state interventions in the favelas, I must look outside of Brenner’s theorisation of state spatiality. As reviewed in Chapter 3, Brenner conceives of state spatiality through the dialectic of state space in the “narrow” and state space in the “integral” sense, but his categorical definitions lack people and individual or collective agency. This may result from the deviation of the theoretical triadic model that he and others offer in which a third category, “representational state space,” followed Lefebvre’s original model to highlight local knowledge and power relations in the context of territory and the everyday subjectivities and contestations of state spatiality.
(Brenner et al. 2003).

The origin myth of how President Lula decided with Governor Cabral which favelas would receive PAC investments and the proximity that Lula and Dilma maintained to the projects speak to the reconfiguration federal state and local space. There are parallels here with Harvey’s (2005), ethnography of a road in the Peruvian Andes, which recounts a fable-like tale repeated by local residents who were visited unannounced by President Fujimori in a helicopter. Pleased by the town’s hospitality but aghast by the poor condition of the school and dangerous conditions of the road (as informed by the residents) he promised repairs and a new school before flying off again in his helicopter. For Harvey, the visit re-scaled the remote town’s relationship with state power. The President’s passing through, unremarkable for him yet historic and ceremonious for the town, increased the *legibility* of the residents and resulted in concrete federal investment. However, the conditions of Fujimori’s visit—his hyper mobility that allowed him to access the town via helicopter rather than the crumbling road, his blank refusal to sign his promises of development into the town’s book of official acts—simultaneously reinforced the unequal hierarchy of power between the townspeople and chief of the modern state and central power. Similar power dynamics are at play when President Lula tours the city from the sky, and, gazing down at the governed subjects, decides to act in very real immediate ways. When the president did visit a favela on the ground, there were also immediate effects for the residents, as the police carried out “shocks of order” in preparation.

In calling attention to the visual perspective of the President and Governor as they consider governing priorities from a state-owned helicopter, I follow scholars who call for more attention to vertical urbanism (Graham and Hewitt 2012) and in particular ethnographic interrogation of power and height (Harris 2015). In
similar fashion to urban planners who survey the city aerially—for example Koolhaas’ consideration of Lagos (Hecker 2010) or Le Corbusier’s airplane-sketched modernist plans for Rio de Janeiro (Morshed 2002)—Lula and Cabral, reportedly, considered where to intervene based on their visual interpretation of urban inequality backed up, again reportedly, by statistical measurements of poverty and quality of life. Morshed likens this perspective to the decisive vision of a monarch. I would add that the perspective is inherently patriarchal. For even though the governing decisions are based on a sweeping, flattening vision and statistical aggregation, Lula discursively produces PAC-favelas as protecting the poor from bourgeois politics and improving the daily lives of favela residents (the archetype ‘woman with her shopping bags’) through world class infrastructure. As it happens, the infrastructure he celebrates is a pale imitation of the hyper-mobility that government executives and the conspicuously wealthy use to travel through urban space by moving above it. Moreover, Lula naming Dilma (then chief of staff) the “mother of PAC” and Vice Governor Pezão the “father of PAC” reiterates the paternalist relationship between ‘needy’ citizens and powerful governing actors.

7.3 Reclaiming territory

PAC-favelas is constructed as a programme that reclaims lost urban space and brings the favelas into the fold of urban governance. At the inauguration of the Teleférico do Alemão in 2011, Mayor Paes echoed the rhetoric about inter-governmental cooperation, saying that Cabral changed the politics of confrontation between the municipal, state, and national governments in which everyone blamed and cursed everyone else. But now they all work together because the governments have aligned their objectives. And “we are going to keep
working together and construct a city that is marvellous for everyone.” He then rhetorically situated the PAC intervention within the broader citywide project of integration:

There is a street in RJ called Rua São Miguel in between the Mayor's official residence and the mayor's office, the official administrative centre São Sebastião. And I remember when I first moved into the official residence that in order to get to work we had to take a detour because that street was one of those places in Rio de Janeiro where the people and the authorities couldn’t go because it was a territory that didn’t belong to the city. Rua São Miguel is a small example of one of the most severe cases that happen in this city; and the most severe case in this city, without any doubt, is this place we’re at right now: Complexo do Alemão, Complexo da Penha, all of the surrounding neighbourhoods—I’m talking about Inhaúma, Penha, Bonsucesso, Ramos, Higienópolis.—in sum all of the neighbourhoods that are around here, they were neighbourhoods, and not just the comunidades [favelas], but also the surrounding neighbourhoods, were areas that people couldn’t go. And the Mayor couldn’t be mayor, not fully. […]

To this obra de paz [police pacification], we add the intervention of the Teleférico. And what is that? It’s not just a work of aesthetics. Sure it has a touristic aspect, and its an innovative project, but this here, Ms President, this here is a new city; here in Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha—but just in Alemão there lives 150, 200 thousand people […] And what’s going on here, with the Teleférico and with the PAC interventions, and by the way we have achieved 100% coverage for family and community health here [applause]. But what’s going here is a revolution.

(Broadcast on national state-run television channel TV NBR on 7 July 2011)

The Mayor of Brazil’s second largest city, in front of the Governor and President, declared that his authority was fragmented and severely limited—that upon entering office, he could “not fully” be
mayor of Rio de Janeiro. Even as mayor, perhaps especially so, his own mobility was curtailed between his official residence and office given that part of the route was “territory that didn’t belong to the city.” Moreover, he suggests Complexo do Alemão has a radiating effect on the entire surrounding region. Naming any and all of the contingent neighbourhoods surrounding Complexo do Alemão as “areas where people could not go,” indicates not only the Mayor’s complicity in favela stigmatisation but also suggests a lack of knowledge about the place in which he stands and more broadly the North Zone (see figures 7.2 and 7.3). He groups Complexo da Penha with Complexo do Alemão, a common mistake made by the media when reporting gang/police violence that irks the Complexos’ social media users. Moreover apparently he does not know how many people live in Complexo do Alemão. The 2010 census, which the municipal IPP cites in official documents, puts the population of the 15 favelas at just over 60 thousand people (See figure 7.4). Census data has been known to underestimate favela population, and some documents produced by the state of Rio de Janeiro through its PAC office estimate a population of 100 thousand based off their independent census. But mayor Paes’ refers to some 150 or 200 thousand people, a significant difference. He further says the entire region—Complexo do Alemão, Complexo da Penha and five contingent neighbourhoods (all together home to roughly 300 thousand cariocas according to census data)—was composed of places “people could not go”.

Such a statement seems beyond exaggeration for a sitting mayor to make standing before an audience composed in part of people who live in that ‘no-go’ area. But it fits with the mayor’s before-and-after discourse of the integrated city reviewed in Chapter 5: that through public investment in Rio’s peripheries, through favela integration, the fractured city becomes whole.
Figure 7.2 - Complexo do Alemão satellite image
A closer look at Complexo do Alemão using satellite imagery. The limits of the Complexo are outlined in purple with the Teleférico lines dotted in pink between the five stations and connected to the Bonsucesso train station on the Saracuna line dotted in red. The 11 largest favelas composing the Complexo are labelled. Source: (L. B. D. Santos 2014)

Figure 7.3 - Complexo do Alemão and surrounding neighbourhoods
The group of 15 favelas is located in the city’s North Zone. Mentioned by Paes but not labelled on this map are Higienópolis, bordering the south of Morro do Adeus and Mourão Filho, and Inhaúma, southwest of Parque Alvorada. Complexo da Maré, which is visible from the hills of Complexo do Alemão lies east of Bonsucesso, between highway 101 (Avenida Brasil) and the Fundão island, host to a large university campus (UFRJ) and Petrobrás facilities. Further north is Rio’s international airport. Source: Google Maps.
Figure 7.4 – Demographics of Complexo do Alemão

Table sourced from the “Panorama do Complexo do Alemão” compiled by Rio+Social (discussed in Chapter 5) lists the 15 favelas composing the Complexo with corresponding population, number of households, average inhabitants per household, total area, and density (in that order).

However bombastic the Mayor’s rhetoric, it does reflect PAC-favelas ambitious objectives in the Complexo do Alemão. As described by its lead architect, if Favela-Bairro constituted localist interventions, PAC-favela constitutes a project at the city scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comunidades</th>
<th>População (1)</th>
<th>Domicílios (2)</th>
<th>Habitantes por Domicílio</th>
<th>Área (m²) (3)</th>
<th>Densidade demográfica (hab/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estrada do Itararé</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.370</td>
<td>316.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itararé</td>
<td>1.568</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>43.759</td>
<td>358.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquim de Queiróz</td>
<td>6.995</td>
<td>2.090</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>157.628</td>
<td>443.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro da Baiana</td>
<td>2.086</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>40.766</td>
<td>511.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro das Palmeiras</td>
<td>2.138</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>195.361</td>
<td>202.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro do Azevedo</td>
<td>1.102</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>49.861</td>
<td>224.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro do Alemão</td>
<td>14.413</td>
<td>4.138</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>514.191</td>
<td>280.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Armando Sodré</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>17.373</td>
<td>388.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro do Piancó</td>
<td>1.168</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>48.054</td>
<td>241.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourão Filho</td>
<td>1.336</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>18.082</td>
<td>738.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Brasília (RA - Alemão)</td>
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<td>5.750</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>333.842</td>
<td>561.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parque Alvorada</td>
<td>8.912</td>
<td>2.641</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>322.107</td>
<td>276.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relicário</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>44.393</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua 1 pela Admas</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>4.857</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vila Matinha</td>
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<td>359</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>69.137</td>
<td>176.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>60.555</td>
<td>18.226</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1,771.301</td>
<td>341.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fontes: (1) Instituto Pereira Passos, com base em IBGE, Censo Demográfico (2010); (2) Instituto Pereira Passos (2012); (3) Dados do Censo Demográfico IBGE (2010)

The programme [Favela-Bairro] opened up possibilities to finance projects in the favelas—before nobody did projects in the favelas—architects, that is. So it opened a space of practice and thinking about the reality of the informal. [...] The programme Favela-Bairro works at a small scale, a medium scale and a large scale [in reference to the size of the favelas]. [...] The programme sought to place the favela in relation to the neighbourhood—and that had never been done—and to do that we had to work with infrastructure, learn how to work with the infrastructure engineers, with local networks, drainage networks... to work with a very tight cost-benefit budget, for example 3,500 dollars per family in Favela-Bairro. For 1000 families we would
have to do the entire urbanisation of the place for 3.5 million dollars. [...] Favela-Bairro gave us the background, a base of references. Afterwards, when Lula came with PAC, he put up a lot more money so that we didn’t have to work just in one or two favelas at a time, but with whole complexes: 13 favelas in Alemão, 11 favelas in Manguinhos, and Rocinha is a very large favela. [...] So PAC allowed us to pass from the small, medium and large scale to working at a truly territorial scale.

(Jorge, PAC-Alemão architect)

As discussed in Chapter 5, Favela-Bairro was deemed “localist,” “internal,” or “inward-looking” urban planning while Morar Carioca (and more broadly favela integration) is considered to be “territorial” and “relational”, that is planning an intervention in relation to its surroundings to facilitate a social process. When Jáuregui states that the significant budget and objectives of PAC surpassed that of planning for the small, medium, or large favelas and permitted him to think of favela-urbanisation at the territorial scale, here he signals something other than relational planning. He means that the interventions of PAC were meant to have a significant impact on the surrounding geography of the intervention—both materially and symbolically. Jáuregui himself is a fan of Lefebvre, and thinks spatially, such that PAC-favelas should reconfigure the social space of the favela in relation to its immediate surroundings as well as the larger city. For a grouping of favelas as large as Complexo do Alemão, that is so large that it spans three neighbourhoods and constitutes its own municipal administrative region, that is an ambitious project.

The major PAC-favela projects in Rio (those associated with the origin-myth described above) all have the following aspects: typical urbanisation (road paving and widening, stairs and sidewalks through the becos or alleyways, public lighting, renovation of existing common areas, and home removal and relocation from areas
categorised as “high risk” for flooding, landslide, or structure collapse), “social infrastructure” in the form of shopping areas, cinemas, libraries or cultural centres, state social services infrastructure, and prominently visible architecture that serves as a connector between the favela and the surrounding area. This connective architecture is significant for its symbolic statement on integration and the arrival of the state; but it also has been sensationalised by the press and criticised as spectacle by scholars (Larkins 2015). In Rocinha this point is a bridge originally conceived by Niemeyer (and adapted by Jáuregui) as well as plans for a gondola transport system. In Pavão-Pavãovinho a 64-metre (23 stories) elevator connects the metro with the top of the hill facilitating resident access and providing views of the marvellous city for visitors. PAC interventions have all been disruptive and required the removal of thousands of homes and the re-housing of tens of thousands of residents.77

While Chapter 5 chapter used a landscape-mobilities analysis to argue that favela integration responds to the socio-political crisis of the divided city, the present chapter builds on Chapter 6 to examine the spatial practices of the state in order to territorialise the favelas. Paes speaks of the combined works of favela pacification and the Teleférico along with the additional PAC interventions as a revolution that restores the right to come and go to residents, and that restores his authority as mayor to govern and deliver services (such as health care) to the

77 Those “removed” can take a cash payout (calculated based on the structure, not the land for which they have no legal title) or accept a unit in a new housing complex build according to MCMV regulations. Both PAC-favela national standards and Morar Carioca stipulate that residents should be re-housed on-site or adjacent to their community, however there have been instances where the number of “removed” families surpassed the quantity of new units built. Similarly MCMV construction has been delayed or suspended and those families are left in a housing bureaucratic limbo, receiving (if they are lucky) a paltry R$400 per month in housing assistance. While I was conducting fieldwork, a cinderblock one room home in Complexo do Alemão could cost up to R$500-600 to rent.
population. Jorge notes the paradigmatic shift in urban planning that characterise this spatial strategy. With the combined resources and multi-scalar state commitment, state interventions into the favelas go from placing the favela in the neighbourhood to placing the favela in the city. These links between the once fractured city and the “revolutionised” whole city is favela integration working as a “state spatial strategy of territory” (Brenner and Elden 2009) in that it produces the notion of bounded space that is not homogeneous in quality—the favela does not stop being the favela—but subject to homogeneous sovereignty.

7.4 The Teleférico and state space

This section and the next contribute to the discussion regarding favela integration as a project of territory by examining how the Teleférico’s form and functions produce state space. Thus I respond to Brenner and Elden (2009) who argue that the production of state space and territory are concomitant.

The Teleférico of Alemão and other gondola transport in Rio^[78] have garnered much attention but little systematic analysis. General policy and programme analyses have noted an increase of cable-car and similar transport infrastructure included in favela-urbanisation proposals as a novelty or planning trend (Izaga and Pereira 2014; L. A. de S. Pereira 2011; Leitão and Delecave 2011). The touristic marketing of the Teleféricos have been noted as paradoxically transforming long-time social problems into a mega-event tourist attraction that may contribute to favela gentrification (Guimarães 2015; Cummings 2013). Larkins sees PAC-favelas through the lens of pacification, and argues that the urbanisation and symbolic infrastructure are part of a project of “removing and relocating poor

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[78] The historic “first favela” of Providência inaugurated a gondola in 2014 as part of the port-redevelopment project and the PAC-Rocinha project also plans on building a gondola despite sustained resistance from residents.
people and attracting new kinds of residents”, as well as a strategy lifted from global counter insurgency theory in order to convince residents of the benefits of state intervention (2015, 148). Similarly Freeman (2014), focussing mostly on evictions in Providência with some reference to Complexo do Alemão, views the Teleféricos as a state project to “thin” the favelas and install a Foucauldian regime of control.

The few researchers who have closely analysed the Teleféricos and PAC-favelas planning process have focussed on the project’s stated objectives. In such cases the cost of construction is noted as unjustifiable, the infrastructure itself underused, and its imposition draconian with an eye on inflating construction and MCMV budgets as well as its symbolic touristic value (Andrade 2009; Trindade 2012; L. B. D. Santos 2014). Additional criticisms by resident-activists and non-resident advocates include that the Teleférico do Alemão serves a small fraction of the favelas’ residents (13% according to a statistic without a clear source), that it unnecessarily displaced thousands of residents, and that it has failed both to attract a sense community ownership and to deliver significant economic benefits as a celebrated tourist attraction. While such project analysis is important for citizens to hold their governing officials accountable, my objective here is not to analyse the gondola system’s failures but rather to understand what the infrastructure does, what are the productive results of the Teleférico?

79 The statistic that claims only 13% of Complexo do Alemão residents use the Teleférico was often cited by activists and critics who claimed the infrastructure was a “white elephant.” I never saw critics cite a source, and I even asked a couple activists I knew who spoke out against the Teleférico where they got that statistic. They shrugged and said that it was the number community activists in Rocinha were using as evidence against building a Teleférico in Rocinha. Eventually I found the figure cited in news stories about the Teleférico one year after inauguration. Supervia had reported ridership data and 13% of Complexo do Alemão residents had registered with the company to obtain special travel cards granting them two free rides per day. By 2014, that number had risen only slightly, to about 17%.
The Teleférico consists of six stations including the entry point in the Bonsucesso train station, temporarily known as Bonsucesso-Tim while the telecommunications multinational had leased the naming rights from Supervia train company. The integration station between the train and the Teleférico is large, consisting of an exhibition area and public bathrooms before the ticket barrier, as well as administrative offices. During my fieldwork I saw three temporary exhibitions and one seemingly permanent exhibition in the publicly accessible exhibition hall. The first corresponded to the gondola’s inauguration—a photography exhibition documenting both the Teleférico construction and the military occupation of the Complexo through the lenses of the Alemão Photography Club. The small billboard-sized photographs, which commuters and visitors walked through, depicted progress and hope—the military occupation as “peace making” and the Teleférico as transformative. The following year I saw a literary installation celebrating two well known Brazilian authors—Raul Pompeia and Aluísio Azevedo—whose work often centred on the lives of Brazilians living in tenement housing. The exhibition corresponded to a literary festival focussing on Rio de Janeiro’s “peripheries” known as FLUPP (A Festa Literatura das Pereferías). The festival was originally organised in 2012 by the State of Rio de Janeiro in connection with favela pacification (hence the UPP in the acronym). FLUPP as well as the exhibition’s introductory text produces the favelas and urban peripheries as places of growth and promise and the Teleférico as “one of the principal symbols of the new times, of this new class C [the new middle class], of these protagonists raised in the new political scene.” Shortly thereafter a contemporary art project sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Culture, worked with the aesthetics of the favela and the view point of the Teleférico. One installation was exhibited in the Bonsucesso station and various laje rooftops visible from the cable cars were used as display canvasses.
for contemporary artists. What these exhibitions—produced by RJ Sate or Federal ministries (including Mins. Of Culture, Transport, Security) with various corporate sponsors—have in common is the idea that Rio de Janeiro and Brazil are in a defining moment of history in which the favelas are central to economic, cultural and political progress. This is made explicit by the permanent display produced by the IPP titled “From Cortiço Cabeça de Porco to the Teleférico do Alemão: 120 Years of History of Popular Housing in Rio de Janeiro.” The display is structured as a timeline with photos and text documenting state policy towards housing of the poor working classes, honestly depicting the violence and forced evictions suffered by the poor throughout the 20th century until the innovation of Favela-Bairro and finally the transformation of the popular neighbourhoods through pacification, urbanisation, and large-scale investments like the Teleférico.

The Teleférico stations were designed by the architect based on the gondolas in Medellín, Colombia, as dynamic social and economic hubs—eventually becoming centres of work, play, transport, and culture. I spoke with a number of State employees involved in PAC-favelas that visited Medellín. Their educational exchange tours of social urbanism projects in Medellín, including the gondolas and Biblioteca de España, left them feeling inspired, and they returned to Rio de Janeiro with the expectation that residents of Rio’s favelas would embrace the same infrastructure. However the original vision or potential of the Teleférico of Alemão is far from the reality. Pedro da Luz Moreira told me that the Governor and other politicians pressured Jáuregui to include a gondola in his PAC project because they liked what they saw during their educational exchange trip to the Colombian city. Jáuregui had not previously considered a Teleférico in his extensive study and plan of Complexo do Alemão.
Pedro: There was a story on Globo by a journalist. She interviewed a series of residents in Alemão and they said, “No, I don’t use the Teleférico.” Because if we were to look at the structure of Alemão, the greatest density is in the valleys and the Teleférico goes between the ridges, it connects the summits. So in this report the guy says, “I have a problem with my leg, and I can’t walk up 400 and such degree incline to get to the Teleférico station,” you follow? “I get a moto-taxi from here [home], and the moto-taxi takes me wherever.” So the Teleférico in Alemão became a tourist apparatus—which is a good thing. I don’t think that’s bad, because it plays that role to bring people from outside of the community to visit the comunidade. That is a good thing. But it wasn’t thought of, absolutely, to be used like that. Different than Medellín, where you see that the interventions were thought-out actions, planned. Here they’re not... To me, in Brazil, in the field of favela urbanisation, that who came to dictate the programmes are the collective interests of the owners of industry.

Tucker: Do you think the Teleférico of Alemão was simply an imitation of Medellín?

Pedro: Yes, without much coherency.

Tucker: Because the politicians wanted to see a Teleférico?

Pedro: Exactly.

Tucker: So Jorge delivered?

Pedro: Exactly, I think that’s right.

Most of the five stations are empty of people and devoid of commerce, despite the fact that banks and ATMs were placed in two of the stations. (Figure 7.5 lists the six stations, accompanying bureaucratic or social infrastructure, and corresponding population and households (in absolute numbers) according to the most recent census data.) All stations have public bathrooms, a rarity in favelas given the lack of public buildings. The largest stations are Alemão and Palmeiras, which contain a number of offices and community spaces. Notably the first national post office was opened in the Alemão station, along with a federal social assistance office (Centro de
Referência de Assistência Social or CRAS) which has the objective of offering services of "social protection" to "vulnerable populations" and connecting individuals to existing welfare programmes, a social security office where retired populations may access the state pension bureaucracy, office spaces for youth programmes and cultural projects as well as a multi-use community space that is used to teach dance and martial arts. Based on my observations, Alemão station experiences the most traffic from residents because of its social infrastructure, especially related to youth programming. Curiously, I saw the post office was often shut during normal business hours without explanation.

Despite the model of bustling local economic and social hubs, save the cultural installations described above the stations serve principally as host to state offices. For example Baiana station holds the offices of a Post of Urban and Social Guidance (or the Portuguese acronym POUSO), a programme run by the Municipal Secretary of Urbanism that forms part of the paradigm of favela integration (for overview see: Paula 2006; for programmeme evaluation see: Vial and Cavallieri 2009). POUSOs, which originated during Favela-Bairro, are centres established by the municipal government within favelas targeted for "integration" and "urbanisation." A mix of social workers, architects, and engineers staff each centre, promoting and counselling residents to construct or expand their homes according to standard building norms. They also facilitate the legal bureaucratic process for residents, when eligible, who wish to obtain legal documents such as "Habit-se", which recognizes that the structure followed building codes and facilitates obtaining the legal title of a property.80

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80 During Favela-Bairro, the issued documents recognised the residents’ ownership of the structures, not the land, and thus bureaucratically recognised the legal right to stay put that most favela residents gained with the 1988 constitution (exceptions abound) as well as allowing residents to register the purchase and sale of the house with the General Registry of Property (Registro Geral de Imóveis). However the
Discursively the programme is described by the municipal government within the paradigm of integration discussed in Chapter 5:

The Municipal Secretary of Urbanism, traditionally dedicated to planning, licensing, and enforcement of the legal city, now has begun to work with the informal city” (emphasis added). POUSOs have the objective of “promoting the urbanistic normalisation of our city. [...] One can no longer ignore the reality of the urban environment. The Municipal Secretary of Urbanism broke with tradition of working only with the legal city, initiating a new era of Carioca urbanism by beginning to work with the real city as is, composed in great part by irregular settlements” (“Posto de Orientação...” 2010, emphasis added).

This description references the dichotomous divided city—that which is “legal” and that which is “informal”—as an historical falsehood, an error, and that to govern according to such a dichotomy was a denial of reality. In contrast, the municipal government through “favela consolidation”, Favela-Bairro, and POUSO breaks with that error in judgement and decides to confront the material conditions of the “real city”, a city of favelas.

Returning to the Teleférico, Palmeiras station is the last stop and all passengers are required to disembark. The station holds a library, part of a larger network of public state network called Bibliotecas Parque Estadual created by the State Secretary of Culture in 2010 and managed by a non-governmental organised (known as a Social Organisation\(^{81}\)) since 2014. The library consisted of an current municipal government has promoted the granting of official land titles, a policy also supported by the national government and included in the Ministry of Cities’ instruction manual for PAC-favela interventions.

\(^{81}\) Social Organisations, or Organizações Sociais (OS), are non-governmental legal entities with the explicit purpose of delivering or managing a social service. A common example of an OS in Rio de Janeiro are family and community health clinics. See Fernandes, (R. C. Fernandes 1994), who founded one of the most prominent NGOs in Rio de Janeiro, Viva Rio, which operates as an OS in the health care market. For a critique with a focus on how these organisations work in the favelas, see Sinek (2012).
exhibition area, book collection and reading area, a computer lab, auditorium, and community multi-purpose room; however in September of 2014 a large part of the library was controversially ceded to install a health clinic roughly four weeks before elections (discussed below).

The Teleférico stations might be regarded as highly regulated, protected, connected state spaces within the sprawling favela. It allows the state privileged and consistent access to the area. For example, when IMF President Christine Lagarde attended a Central Bank event in Rio de Janeiro the transport technology permitted the international financier to witness the state’s actions in the city’s poor communities despite violence between the gangs and police. News stories note that “Lagarde insisted in visiting Alemão despite violence, but the tour was quite quick and she did not walk through the streets” due to concerns over a gun battle the night before.82 Instead she rode the gondola, stopping at different stations for photo-ops with women recipients of micro-credit loans and to watch a brief demonstration of the Afro-Brazilian combat-dance Capoeira.

As exhibition spaces, the stations permit the construction of public narratives defining both the place of the favela in contemporary Brazil and Rio de Janeiro as well as the relationships between the historically persecuted neighbourhoods and the state. As administrative centres, the stations are points where residents access certain state services (postal service, legal and construction consultation) and experience or collect state benefits (the welfare office, youth programming, health care, library and educational resources).

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82 See: http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2015/05/no-complexo-do-alemao-lagarde-defende-ajuste-fiscal-contra-pobreza.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATION NAME</th>
<th>SERVICES/INFRASTRUCTURE</th>
<th>POPULATION/HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonsucesso-Tim</td>
<td>Exhibition hall, administrative offices, bathrooms, integration w/ train station</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adeus</td>
<td>Banco do Brasil bank branch, ATM</td>
<td>1,102/345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiana</td>
<td>POUSO (Post of Urban and Social Guidance), ATM</td>
<td>2,086/669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão-Kibon</td>
<td>Administrative office, post-office, Social welfare office (CRAS), Social Security office (INSS), Youth centre (CRJ)</td>
<td>14,413/4,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itararé-Natura</td>
<td>Community education classrooms (FIRJAN)</td>
<td>1,568/505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmeiras</td>
<td>Library, Family &amp; Community Health Clinic (former community centre &amp; workspace), auditorium, outdoor terrace w/ tourist gift &amp; refreshment stands</td>
<td>2,138/688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.5 The politics of the Teleférico and fragility of territory

State interventions into favelas are often associated with electoral campaigning both in Brazil and elsewhere. While citizens and political observers may be scornful of vote bank politics—where politicians arrange for some degree of upgrade in services or paralegal recognition to remain without threat of eviction—recently scholars have argued that such strategies are the morally legitimate means by which the urban poor secure their homes, livelihoods, and rights as citizens (Chatterjee 2006; Benjamin 2008; Holston 2008; Ghertner 2015). In such cases the favela is defined by its informality and precariousness; and the absence of the state—the lack of or poor service provision—presents an opportunity to leverage votes for services or vice versa (Gay 1999).

I propose that favela integration as realised by PAC-favelas
alters the political relationship between the state and favelas. Above I demonstrated how the Teleférico operates as a type of highly regulated and controlled state space permitting the practice of territory. This section focussed on the politics of state space. Both how permanent infrastructure may be ‘returned’ to and exploited for electoral gain. Conversely, the Teleférico became a contested state space when residents and activists invoked the symbolic intervention as spectacle and false promise, thus exposing the fragility and challenges to achieving the territory effect.

Rio de Janeiro elections for state governor were held in 2014. A challenge in all elections in Rio is to pay off criminal organisations. Party politics in the favelas, indeed throughout the city, requires navigating a complex web of clientelist relationships between political parties, resident association leaders, non-party political groups and religious organisations (Gay 1990). With the emergence of drug gangs and more recently the illegal police-run milícias, political leaders mediate their relationships with organised crime leaders through civic actors and community leaders (Arias 2006). In order to hold campaign events and erect small billboards around the favela (often on the lajes of homes) the political parties pay the milícias or gangs.83 Exactlly how much the political party pays or in how many of the city’s favelas the practice persists is unknown, but an exposé written in O Globo the same year reported that according to police intelligence investigating the practice, in 2014 political campaigns paid up to R$300,000 to campaign in some favelas, including favelas that were pacified. Such revelations did not surprise the already sceptical and politically disenchanted voting population, which was well aware that

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83 Arias tells the story of a community leader negotiating, on behalf of the local gang, exclusive campaign access to a political party. This leader received money from the party and in turn hires local campaigners with direct ties to the gang; except shortly before the election the gang negotiates a new deal with a competing party and orders all the campaign signs switched to reflect the new alliance (Arias 2006, 78-79).
the gangs and *milicias* are intimately involved in local politics.

I have seen the effects of not paying to campaign in the favelas. During a preliminary field trip in 2012, I visited Complexo do Alemão with a resident NGO worker and cultural activist during an earlier congressional and municipal campaign season. We saw thousands of small billboards for candidates and their parties on top of rooftops and signs attached to homes’ exteriors. He explained that many residents receive a small kickback for displaying campaign propaganda on their homes. I saw signs for most of the major parties and many parties that I never heard of (Eduardo Paes of PMDB ultimately won the Mayor’s Office with a 20-party coalition), but I voiced surprise not to see any signs for Marcelo Freixo of PSOL. The darling candidate of the Left in Rio de Janeiro, Freixo made a national name for himself by combating police corruption and the *milicias*. The film *Trope de Elite 2* personified him through the character of State Congressional Representative Fraga, a crusader for human rights. But our guide, a musician who turned part of his own home into a computer lab and learning centre for neighbourhood children and whom I would see every so often in his capacity as a youth worker and music teacher in the Alemão-Kibón station, dismissively called Freixo a “Zona Sul playboy.” This seemed odd to me at the time, but during my fieldwork I heard other favela activists treat Freixo with similar dismissiveness, stating that he did not understand the reality of the favelas or that he was a politician like “the rest of them.” Freixo, a school teacher who rose in the ranks of the teachers’ union before entering politics, does live in Zona Sul, but in the low-key neighbourhood of Gloria; and he and his party champion policies influenced by a right-to-the-city political framework. When I brought up this seeming disconnect between the ideology of Freixo/PSOL and the expressed attitudes of a few of my research contacts with a friend who works as a economic and political advisor to a PSOL city
councilman, he lamented that the party has had great difficulty in reaching voters in the favelas. He told me that even if PSOL candidates were willing to pay off the milicias and gangs (he assured me that while many would reject this as unethical, others are less scrupulous) the party simply doesn’t have the money given that it does not accept donations from large businesses and does not run a back-campaign with undeclared campaign donations (referred to as caixa 2).

In 2014, Complexo do Alemão saw a resurgence of gang activity attempting to reassert itself and challenge UPP control. The traficantes reportedly barred PMDB and Governor Pezão from entering the Complexo, thus paying to campaign was not an option.84 Another candidate, the populist Garotinho (then of the catch-all party PR, or Party of the Republic) who had served as Governor from 1999 to 2002, was campaigning aggressively in Alemão. I often heard cars fitted with speakers playing campaign jingles promising that Garotinho would return and fight for the people. That included ending the UPP which he repeatedly declared a disastrous public policy, but he had no favela-specific platform beyond reinstating a cash-transfer programme called the Citizen’s Cheque (Cheque Cidadão) (Caballero 2014).

Many of my interviewees feared what a Garotinho administration would mean for favela-integration, not just the

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84 I could not verify these reports—which I heard from both a community activist and local NGO founder and a state employee connected to a PAC project—in local news media. O Globo newspaper reported that Pezão indeed had visited Nova Brasília in the Complexo do Alemão for a campaign stop, which he brought up defiantly in response to a question about violence in the Complexo prior to the election. However the same paper reported that Pezão cancelled at least one event in the Complexo as a result of gang/UPP violence. Pezão did have allies among some resident association leaders, so it is unlikely that the gang was able to exert complete control. However, association leader Luiz Antônio de Moura began to receive threats for his support of PMDB’s UPP policy months before the election and the LGBT activist who organised the Complexo do Alemão annual Pride March was murdered in December 2014 (C. Nascimento 2014). His death received little media attention but was considered a terrible loss among local community organisers and human rights activists.
pacification campaign. With low approval ratings after the 2013 protests, violent police repression, and two popularly supported teacher strikes, Pezão’s re-election was far from secure. The fact that the gang was impeding campaigning in favelas as large as Complexo do Alemão could have a serious effect on the election result.

As reported to me by community activists and one of the managers of the Biblioteca Parque in the Palmeira’s station, a resident association president came up with a creative solution to the entry ban. If Governor Pezão could not enter The Complexo due to security concerns, they would find another way to show the government’s commitment to the people of the Complexo: open a new family health centre, and fast. But opening a new health care facility is not a straightforward task. Under PAC, the state government had already built an Urgent Care Centre in Complexo do Alemão. Family and Community Health Centres are under the jurisdiction of the municipal government, not the state. And as noted by Mayor Paes at the inauguration of the Teleférico, Complexo do Alemão had already reached 100 percent coverage by existing family health clinics in the area according to the municipal health secretary (cited above). PAC funds had been used to build Family and Community Health Centres in Rio de Janeiro, but only where the city has agreed to take responsibility of maintaining them in the long term.

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85 Garotinho had a history of negotiating with the gang fractions when he served as Secretary of Security. He left PMDB to serve as a federal congress representative prior to challenging Governor Pezão in 2014. The anti-drug police sub-department (known as DCOD) accused Garotinho and the Evangelical Pastor Marcos Pereira da Silva of colluding with gang leaders to plan attacks and bus burnings around the city. Their objective was allegedly to mobilise the Comando Vermelho’s forces (the gang that controlled much of Complexo do Alemão and was reasserting itself in the area under pacification) to undermine PMDB’s security policies and re-election chances (Corrêa 2014). It should be noted that the accusations, referring to violence during 2010, were leaked to the press in June of 2014, about five months before elections.

86 In Complexo de Manguinhos, for example, the community expressed a need for another family health centre. PAC Social green-lit the funds to include the new building in the project design but when the project supervisors contacted the
An additional challenge was where to build the centre. Appropriating enough land on which to construct a health centre would have taken months, not weeks, especially if they were to purchase existing homes in order to clear enough space. Therefore, the new health centre would have to be built on space already owned or administered by the government: the Teleférico. The largest station, Palmeiras, contained the library with a computer learning room, an auditorium and a cultural space which served dance and theatre groups, adult learning, and general community enrichment. Often referred to by government and civil society literature as “cultural infrastructure,” the Biblioteca Parque is administered by the State Ministry of Culture. The Casa Civil, essentially the governor’s office, determined that the Ministry of Culture would cede part of this area to the Municipal Secretary of Health for a new Family and Community Health Centre. Construction converting the community enrichment space into examination rooms, administrative offices and medical storage closets would begin immediately and be completed in time for an inauguration almost perfectly timed with elections. The Community Health Centre would house three health teams serving 9,000 residents, up to 300 visits per day. The conversion from library to health clinic would be at record pace. Construction began on 11th September, the very same day the plan was made public, and would be complete within two weeks with a possible inauguration by 30 September. Elections were to take place on the 5th of October.

This decision was not without controversy. Due to the expedited, opaque, and irregular process by which the health centre was conceived and approved, nobody except those directly involved in the decision-making knew what exactly was going on. Employees of Municipal Secretary of Health they were told that according to municipal data Manguinhos was fully covered by existing centres and they were unwilling to assume responsibility for a new centre within the favela.
the Secretary of Culture who worked in the Biblioteca Parque Palmeiras were not informed of the decision and were confounded when they showed up to work and found construction workers unloading tools and materials, supposedly with the authority to appropriate library space.

I visited the library the day after construction began and spoke with one of the librarians confidentially. She was visibly upset when we spoke and told me that the Secretary of Culture only found out about the plans when the librarians called frantically searching for explanations. But it was too late. The decision came directly from the Governors’ office. “This here is a looting!” she told me, “it’s thievery!”

Community “cultural activists” immediately mobilised against what they saw as an authoritarian undervaluing of cultural space in the favela. On Facebook the plans were called a “cultural coup”. Initially these activists decried the total destruction of the library, resulting either from the lack of transparency of the plans or an exaggeration for effect. Photos of Governor Pezão circulated with the demand not to shut the library along with photos of the destruction of the library/construction of the health centre with texts criticizing the location (see figures 7.6 and 7.7).
Figure 7.6 – “#CulturaSim”
Image shared by resident-activists in Complexo do Alemão questioning the logic of installing a family health clinic in the library space in Palmeiras station. The text reads: “I support the permanence of the Biblioteca Parque Alemão. The mayor of Rio wants to install a Family Clinic in the site where the library functions and take away the cultural space for the construction of a space that will not work. If the doctors don’t even come [to work] at the UPA on the Estrada do Itararé, imagine them climbing the hill... #CulturaYes
Figure 7.7 – Challenging the health clinic
A Facebook post of Alan Brum, a well known local activists and civil society leader in Complexo do Alemão. Sharing photos of the construction started on the same day as the health clinic was announced, Alan adds, “Straight talk for those who think that a Family Clinic can be built in 15 days on an inappropriate site. And you’re blind if you don’t see the political marketing (or there is $$$$$ at play). Viva (o)Rio87 and Luiz Fernando Pezão will have political resistance.

The construction of the health clinic and the response from local activists exemplifies how state spaces may be appropriated for electoral politics bypassing meaningful consultation with residents. The sudden reclassification of a portion of the Biblioteca Parque from library to health clinic reinforces the stations as dominion of the state at the whim of governing politicians. Resident-activists took it upon themselves to unmask political pandering and challenge what they see as inappropriate and authoritarian “thievery” of cultural space, community space. While some activists suggest that doctors would not show up for work on the top of the hill, interestingly enough when I spoke to the clinic’s manager she

87 Viva Rio is the OS that has the contract to run the Family and Community Health Centres in the administrative health district encompassing Complexo do Alemão.
suggested that the Teleférico is what would make it possible to recruit health professionals to work in the middle of the infamous Complexo. Her response reinforces the Teleférico as protected infrastructure to operate as centres of social services serving the 15 favelas from their perch on the hills.

7.6 Making room for feminist analysis

In this final empirical section, I wish to examine how favela integration and the work it entails are gendered and consider how a feminist approach may benefit an analysis of territory and state spatiality. Although my research questions are not couched within questions of gender, after fieldwork I understood that any analysis of favela integration that forgoes a feminist approach would be incomplete. This became apparent when I perceived a highly gendered division of labour between the technical, architectural and engineering planning fields dominated by men and so-called “social” interventions spearheaded and staffed by women. I have attempted to integrate feminist analysis into the thesis in various sections in what otherwise is a research field (the state) long criticized by feminists as a masculinist academic field (MacKinnon 1989). However, at the risk of segregating the topic of gender, I wish to devote a section to an explicit feminist analysis of state interventions in the favelas. What follows is far from a comprehensive feminist analysis of favela integration. Rather I have rethought some of my data with a feminist logic; and I present that which constructively engages with literature theorizing state space and territorial projects.

The aforementioned gendered division of labour does not come as a surprise. Men historically dominate the international field of architecture, a trend that has been slow to change (Hanna 1996; Matthewson 2012; Spaeth and Kosmala 2012; Chang 2014; Tether
2016). Curiously in Brazil, pursuing a degree in architecture was considered feminine in comparison to the masculine (and misogynistic) field of engineering. Nonetheless the professional field of Brazilian architecture reproduces the international inequality (Rodrigues 2012; Rubino, Santoro, and Adame 2014; S. Ribeiro 2016); and the gender imbalance translates to integration-urbanisation projects in Rio de Janeiro.

A simple quantitative analysis of the selected winning projects submitted to the open Morar Carioca contest reveals that only one out of the top five winning projects was led by a female architect (see methodological appendix). Out of the 40 selected projects, women led only 12. The gender imbalance between all “authoring architects” is less stark. While 20% of the lead architects were women, they represented 41% of the architectural teams (83:118 F:M). A majority of the competing projects included team members from the social sciences—sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, economists, or social workers—reflecting Morar Carioca’s commitment to community participation and social cohesion. The gender ratio was even for theses posts (22:22). Thus project authority skews heavily male, with increasing equality in absolute numbers down the architectural hierarchy and finally an even division between men and women complementing the design with “social” expertise.

Qualitative data on the PAC-favela interventions also reveals a division of labour. Moreover it clarifies what so-called “social” labour consists of and suggests that within the planning and implementation

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88 This cultural attitude may have taken root during Brazil’s push towards modern industrialisation during the 20th century in which men were pressured to pursue professions to industrialise the country. This attitude is still common among conservatives who complain “Brazil needs fewer sociologists and philosophers and more engineers” (Azevedo 2011). Some of my gay male architect friends have told me of their hesitation, and their fathers’ disappointment at their decision, to study architecture; and one senior engineer confided in me that as a youth he wanted to be an architect but was pressured (by his father and male friends) to graduate with a degree in engineering. Also see (Peccini 2015).
of projects such labour was devalued. There is no precise or official definition of the “social” side of favela integration, however we may conclude from analysis throughout this thesis that a strong focus on “the social” is a fundamental characteristic of the integration paradigm: the social diagnostic of Morar Carioca, UPP Social as complementary to militarised occupations, “social infrastructure” of PAC-favelas with a PAC Social coordinating team.

During an interview with the coordinator of PAC Social and PAC Social project manager for Manguinhos and Complexo do Alemão, the devaluation of the feminized social was made obvious. Within the context of challenges that their teams faced based on the structure of PAC Social within the larger projects, Renata and Nicole expressed some frustration. Specifically I asked if they had experienced a difference in the efficacy of moving from the Governor’s office (the Casa Civil) to EMOPE. I was interested in their responses because Lea—the frustrated ex-coordinator of PAC Social in Complexo do Alemão—had lamented the move. According to Lea’s experience, the relocation amounted to an unethical conflict of interest. Their principal objective was to look out for the interests of the residents and facilitate communication between the target community and the larger project team. As Lea put it, “I cared about making the process as least painful as possible for the residents”. When PAC Social was based in the Casa Civil as a separate entity, she spoke with the authority of the Governor. However when PAC Social moved to EMOPE, the Director of PAC Social now reported to the broader PAC and EMOPE chain of command. Lea: “What is fucked up is that they do the construction and the social work.” Whereas previously Lea considered herself a check and balance, she felt compromised working in EMOPE because her job was “essentially to quickly relocate people so the construction could happen as soon as possible;” and her chain of command ended with people who acted in the best
interests of the construction companies and project deadlines, in Lea’s opinion. Nicole and Renata appear to agree with part of Lea’s assessment, although they put it more diplomatically:

Nicole: *I think that when we were in the Casa Civil, the Secretary closest to the Governor, I think that helped to empower our team. A task or request sent from there to another Secretary had more weight. Don’t you think, Renata? But I never stopped to think about that; I’m doing it now.*

Renata: Yes, for sure.

They did not, however, conclude that their position at EMOPE was a conflict of interest. Rather they continued to feel empowered because they had arrived at EMOPE from the Casa Civil, and indeed they saw benefits of being closer to the project team. But as Nicole was responding to a question she had admittedly never considered, she understandably contradicted herself:

Nicole: *I think that when we came there [EMOPE], we came a bit more empowered already. The people knew us. They knew our work and that helped us a lot. In relation to our work, I think being close to the project facilitated our oversight [...] I think the format... that is where we need to improve. That is where Medellín is ahead of us. We still fight a lot for the social, whereas in Medellín, the social team is seen as a necessary team for the project to happen. Here, from the point of view of the engineers, it seems as if we are “the girls that feel sorry for the [favela] resident,” you know what I mean? So we have to fight every day, because it isn’t that we pity [them]. We are trying to guarantee the rights of the residents! So I think that the difference to what we see in Medellín is [the quality of the] relationship between the social and the engineering. I think that the president of EMOPE recognizes the function of the social, but in my opinion, in my evaluation, that needs to improve a bit in relation to the engineers that are in the field, you know? [...] In an ideal world, the architects*
and the social team would sit down together and discuss everything that is going to be done in the territory.

Tucker: So that never happens? The architect and engineers do their work without consulting the social team?

Nicole: Sometimes, yes. And we have to go running after them in order to fix it.

Júlia: Yeah, there is always a meeting for the construction and then there is a meeting between the construction and the social. They think that we shouldn’t participate in the construction meetings; because, let’s say they make some changes— and they’re like, “ah no, this is just a matter of the [engineering] work.” But it isn’t! Sometimes it changes, I don’t know, the degree of lighting in a street. And they think that is only part of the [engineering] work but it isn’t. We have to let the residents know because maybe its bad for them, or maybe it will be an improvement; maybe there is another way. That is what Nicole is saying.

Tucker: So they have a different perspective than you when they visualise the community—

Nicole: Yeah. For them it’s new to have someone from the social side; I think it only began with PAC. In the other programmes that existed, to urbanise the favelas, the role of the social was very different than it is today. Generally it was one person, a social worker, who accompanied the family. Just that. Today the social has a different outlook, a different task, and it’s much broader than it was in previous programmes. So I think that’s new for the engineers.

In this exchange Renata and Nicole outline the masculinist, forced separation of their work. “The social” is gendered and marginalised in comparison to the project engineering. They note a division, which they identify as a false division, between the technical design of the intervention and the construction—which they refer to as a obra (literally “the work,” translatable to construction or public works depending on context)—and the ambiguously defined “social” side of the intervention, which encompasses everything involving the residents living in and around the site(s) of intervention. In this sense
“the social” refers to community participation, advocating for the interests of the residents, protecting residents' rights, and considering how the residents will experience the intervention both during construction as well as the finished result. Additionally, PAC Social draws up a framework plan for the “sustainable development” of the favela complexes post-intervention. Despite their sense of empowerment from having worked in the Casa Civil, a position considered ‘above’ all other state offices (to use a spatial metaphor of institutional governance), they still feel as if they are seen as the “girls who pity the residents” when they advocate on their behalf. In their own words, they have to fight [against the engineers and architects] to be taken seriously and to gain access to decision-making spaces.

Renata and Nicole perceive that the engineers are not accustomed to having “the social” (or the residents) question their supposed technical decisions. In the past, ‘the social’ was the social worker, whose primary responsibility was with the family. This historical division of labour mirrors the societal divide between the masculine public sphere and the feminine private sphere (MacKinnon 1989; Phillips 1998). On the one hand, the architects, the engineers, the construction companies have the strong masculine role of building (and destroying). On the other hand, “the social” reacts to the masculine and responds to the private sphere needs of the affected families.

That which is considered “the social,” be it the labour typically carried out by social workers in facilitating the eviction and relocation of residents, community participation in the planning process, and socio-cultural programming that complements physical infrastructure such as literacy or art classes, is often produced through paternalist discourse. Lula’s conjuring of the image of the women with their shopping who would benefit from the gondola physically materialised at the inauguration of the Teleférico do Alemão when Dilma pointed
to and named a mother during her inauguration speech. The beneficiaries are routinely imagined as the weak, infirm, very young, and very old: those that need caring for and protection. In the favela in particular, childhood is considered in dire need of preservation, and for good reason. A 2013 study of youth in pacified favelas (patronizingly titled “We are the youth of the UPPs”) found that 12% of adolescents under 18 have left school and are unemployed. That number increases to 34% of young adults (aged 18-29) (see: “Somos Os Jovens das UPPs” 2013). This statistical category is referred to as “nem-nem” as in they neither work nor study. Such categorisation produces favela subjects as “lost” and in need of “saving.” When Julia, the public employee who coordinated the Biblioteca Parque in Manguinhos, was responsible for hiring staff, she looked for employees who had a passion for the project rather than those simply looking for a job. Many of the most qualified and dedicated personnel believed the project’s potential to “save the children from the traffic” by introducing them to creative culture and keeping them in school.

The presumed life trajectory of a “nem, nem” in the favela is the demonized figure of the gang leader, the drug trafficker, or the petty thief. Overwhelmingly these are young, black and mix-raced men and adolescent boys. These are the bodies whose mobility is routinely subject to friction at the hands of the police, and whose lives are often thought of as disposable. These bodies are rarely the discursive subject of paternalist interventions associated with “the social” side of urbanisation and favela integration. They are however the target of the hyper-masculinist and violent side of integration—the pacification programme.

The expanding debate on how and what constitutes territory has included exploration of how territory and borders are made up of bodies (S. Smith, Swanson, and Gökarkısel 2016). Similar to how the politics of mobility reveals how the experience of moving through
space depends in part on social identity (race, class, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability), the above analysis suggests that how favela residents experience the state’s effectuation of territory differs according to whether their body is perceived as a threat or a potential benefactor.

7.7 Conclusions

This chapter examined state space and territory through the programme PAC-favelas. Whereas previous chapters focussed on interventions as a state spatial strategy at the scale of Rio de Janeiro, I argued that coordinated federal investments suggest that favela-integration produces state space at various scales. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the significant levels of investment corresponded to PT’s mandate to expand the economy while investing in social infrastructure that benefits working class and poor citizens. Simultaneously it served the political interests of both PT and PMDB to exemplify a new era of cooperative inter-scalar governance from the municipal to the federal.

While MCMV “rolls out” the developmental state privileging private developers’ interests and largely ignores the principles of The Statute of the City, local experts worked with the Ministry of Cities to influence the programme to the paradigm of favela-integration. Engaging with Brenner and building on Klink, I argued that while neoliberal critiques of spate space developed to explain transformations in Europe and North America are useful references, PAC and specifically PAC-favelas suggests that Brazil has not experienced the same downshifts in scale of statehood towards neo-localism.

This chapter contributes to contemporary discussions of territory by examining how territory is produced to account for and
reclaim “lost” or “abandoned” space at the urban scale. I argued that PAC-favelas, working through the spatial strategy of favela integration, is a project of territory; that is to say the large-scale intervention aimed to erase internal frontiers that fragmented the city and limited the state’s authoritative governance. While proclaiming a monopoly of violence, or “peacemaking,” though pacification figures prominently and is featured prominently in recent scholarly research, I argue that the implantation of bureaucratic and social infrastructure is equally important to achieve the territory effect.

The construction of the Teleférico, while sold to residents within and without Complexo do Alemão as a infrastructure of public transport, was more successful at providing the state office space than it was at transporting commuting residents. Thus, criticism that the Teleférico do Alemão and similar architectural and infrastructural projects in PAC-favelas in other favelas are built *para inglês ver*, is not far off the mark. However, I argued that analysis of this spectacular type of infrastructure is incomplete if it stops after noting what the interventions fail to do for the explicit target population. In this case the Teleférico fails to deliver greater mobility or freedom of movement in any meaningful way to the vast majority of the Complexo do Alemão’s residents. However as showed above, the Teleférico does have a number of other productive effects, material and symbolic: a sanitised highly controlled mode of moving through favela space, political opportunities, and corporate and social media branding. As it relates to the production of territory, the spectacular nature of the Teleférico seeks a broad consensus that state interventions—and here the effect arguably extends beyond Alemão—bring about material benefits for the population.

Finally this chapter sought to view favela-integration through a feminist lens. The analysis offered is exploratory. I could not answer whether design teams dominated by men produce different
integrating interventions in the favelas, but by quantitatively naming the gendered imbalances within the Morar Carioca project teams, I have demonstrated that such a question is worth asking. Moreover the qualitative differentiation between the feminized “social” and the masculinised built interventions and the subsequent marginalisation of “the social” signals the inherent patriarchy of the spatial production of the state and effectuation of territory. Thus this analysis supports calls for an explicitly feminist framework in urban studies (B. Parker 2016; Peake and Rieker 2013) and argues that an intersectional feminist approach enriches debates on state interventions into the favelas and how such planning interventions produces favelas as territory.

It is not my conclusion that PAC-favelas and other integration interventions have successfully territorialised the respective favelas in question or *favela space* as a generic category of planning and governance. Indeed the continued violent and racist/anti-poor differential policing of the favelas, less-than democratic planning processes that produce infrastructure like the Teleférico, the resurgence of gang-police conflicts in many pacified favelas (including both Complexo do Alemão and Complexo de Manguinhos), the highly sceptical attitudes of favela residents and activists, and the blatant prioritisation of the spectacular over the basic necessities of sanitation and health make convincing arguments that “favela integration” fails as a project of territory. However tempting it is to condemn state actions that reinforce hegemonic social relations, such a conclusion would also deviate from the concept of territory used here. Territory is not a product or a resulting condition, but an action in repetition as previously noted by Haesbaert. And in accordance with Painter, these repetitive, rhythmic actions that are mediated and/or regulated by the state through various social technologies are constantly remade because territory is inherently unstable. Therefore,
rather than seeing a failure of territory when we examine the Teleférico, PAC-favelas, the UPP or integration broadly, we must conclude that territory itself is uneven, contested, and produced according to existing socio-spatial inequalities and hegemonic politics and power dynamics.
Chapter 8 – Conclusions

A summary of sorts is in order. However, in lieu of reviewing my arguments point-by-point, I wish to revisit the research problem as constructed in Chapter 1, and synthesise that which I have learned about “favela integration.” Additionally, this chapter reflects on the limitations of this research as well as its contributions to scholarly knowledge. Section 8.1 responds directly to each of the four research questions, summarising cross-chapter analysis to explain the discursive production and contestation of “favela integration” as fundamental to Rio de Janeiro’s twenty-first century transformation, describe how this integrating paradigm alters the production of urban space in relation to the favela/cidade divide, and evaluate planning and governance projects and policies as tools of territory that produce the favelas as legitimate urban space and their residents as subjects benefiting from state rule.

Section 8.2 reviews the contributions I believe this thesis makes to existing empirical, methodological, and theoretical debates. Empirically, I have made data-informed arguments that favela integration is a state paradigm operating through multiple planning and governance initiatives. While the majority of existing critiques of these policies are programme or place-specific, I have analysed the interventions of UPP, UPP Social, Morar Carioca and PAC-Favelas as part of a dynamic state spatial strategy. This has permitted a critical reading across programmes and across the city. Methodologically my application of Lefebvre’s triad to construct an un-sited field following a spatial process contributes to discussions regarding spatialised methodologies. Theoretically, I offer an original framework of landscape-mobilities as applied in Chapter 5, and contribute to the
emerging literature on state spatiality and territory by investigating the workings of territory at the urban scale in a “divided city.” Additionally, however exploratory, my research indicates that current debates on territory and state space will benefit from intersectional feminist analysis.

Section 8.3 acknowledges some limitations of this research. In particular I recognize that my data and analysis does not incorporate the perspectives and experiences of favela residents, which did form part of initial objectives. Finally in Section 8.4 I consider what my conclusions on favela integration might mean beyond Rio de Janeiro as well as implications for future research and debate.

8.1 Summary of arguments

The first question proposed in Chapter 1 reads:

*How is “favela integration” discursively produced and defined by the state in Rio de Janeiro as part of a larger narrative of urban reform and renewal?*

As noted in Chapter 5, there is no “official” definition of *favela integration* any level of government, yet the term is the rhetorical crux of policy documents, political propaganda, and programme literature. Mayor Eduardo Paes built a political campaign on the idea of integrating the city—*Somos um Rio*—indicating that favela integration is part of a progressive, whole-scale urban transformation. But it would be an error to dismiss the term as primarily political, in the electoral sense, or originating in political discourse. Integration was a defining objective in the Favela-Bairro programme, which officially began in 1994.89 Indeed since Favela-Bairro, “integration” is listed as a

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89 A full genealogy of the idea of integration in Rio de Janeiro may point as far back to early “upgrade” pilot projects under the populist Governor Brizola. Outside of ‘state thinking,’ one may look to the arguments of radical architects such as John Turner.
general objective of all the major favela-specific programmes: UPP, UPP Social, Morar Carioca, and PAC-favelas.

The production of favela integration through intellectual, technical, and “specialist” texts works to depoliticise the interventions. While these ‘authors’ of integration are more than capable of recognising the socio-political and cultural roots of inequality and segregation that produced the favelas, they nonetheless insist on apolitical technical solutions. As discussed in Chapter 6, this may actually be a strategy to protect progressive programmes from falling victim to partisan manoeuvring.

An intertextual reading of state discourse reveals “favela integration” as a visual ideology recognising the neighbourhoods as spatially differentiated from the asfalto yet nonetheless legitimate and productive spaces of Rio de Janeiro. This visual ideology, which I analysed through a framework of landscape-mobilities, re-orders the historical position of “the favela” in the “marvellous” city. The integrated city is marvellous in part due to, not in spite of, the favelas. However, utopian visions of the integrated city conceal hegemonic power relations, and achieves making the favelas marvellous principally through spectacularisation of certain privileged favelas and the fetishisation of state interventions as “restoring liberty” to or “guaranteeing citizenship” of the favela residents.

A close reading of the state spatial projects of integration reveal that the paradigm defines integration largely through the facilitation and regulation of flows of people, goods, and services. Some of these flows are relatively new, such as the promotion of tourism. Other flows pre-existed but are now subject to state regulation, such as electricity and cable. The “right to come and go” is of particular importance to the discursive production of favela integration, as gang territorialisation was constructed to have imprisoned favela residents or subjugated them to an illegitimate
“parallel power,” thus turning large swaths of the city into “no go” zones.

From the perspective of planning interventions, “favela integration” is produced as the logical evolution of [slum] “upgrading”. Rather than seeking to integrate the “consolidated favela” into the city through basic urbanisation—understood as an inward looking strategy that provides infrastructural improvements such as paved roads and sanitation and imposes signifiers of ‘formality’ such as street names and house numbers—interventions now have a “territorial” perspective in the sense that they see planning as a process and the favela in relation to its surroundings. The ideal (which is institutionally constrained in Rio de Janeiro) is that architects go beyond the immediate material ‘needs’ of the favela and include social infrastructure for the surrounding region. Territorial planning also seeks to attract new types of mobilities through the favelas by incorporating the spaces into existing flows (for example bike paths) or turning the favela into a destination point of commerce, leisure, or tourist interest.

Similarly the depoliticised “favela integration” may be read as a development paradigm. Documents produced by government think tanks or international organisations such as the World Bank and UN Habitat speak of integration through a series of focussed lines of actions such as “housing,” “mobility,” “security,” and “local economy.” This discourse seems to present a ‘roadmap’ towards favela integration. While it often makes effort to stress community participation and democratic decision-making, it begins with the a priori ideological assumption that “the state” can solve socio-spatial inequality through technical innovations from existing institutions and gradual socio-spatial conforming of the favelas to official regulations and hegemonic urban form. This was reinforced, for example, when UPP Social was rolled back as a project that opened up
the possibility of citizen-led reorganisation of state spatial relations and subsequently restructured as a technocratic project akin to a favela think tank and data clearinghouse.

How is the meaning of “integration” interpreted, represented, challenged, or appropriated by popular media, special interest groups and common citizens?

This thesis focussed on the discursive production of “favela integration” largely through state texts, however I did argue that major media outlets operating in Rio de Janeiro (often with a national presence) and liberal (but not subversive) civil society organisations played significant roles in facilitating the hegemonic consensus of favela integration. Prior to major concerted public investments civil society advocates produced a liberal, human rights affirming discourse that called for “peace” and reconciliation during Rio de Janeiro’s most violent periods. Stopping short of demanding spatial justice or anything similar to favela residents’ right to the city, this discourse did, I argue, set the stage for an increasingly desperate middle class to support significant public investments targeting the favelas. Cultural and art exhibitions, NGOs and community groups working in various favelas have also insisted that Rio de Janeiro citizens at large confront and address social segregation and inequality that worked to expunge the favelas from Rio’s cityscape. Additional cultural projects challenge the persistent “ideology of marginality” by showcasing favela culture as creative, vibrant, and exciting.

While I am cautious to make sweeping generalisations about the “mainstream media,” outlets such as O Globo newspaper championed the state project of favela pacification as the solution to urban violence associated with drug trafficking and organised crime. As argued in Chapter 5, this discourse often produced favela
integration as a reclaiming of, and imposing law and order over, spaces that had been 'lost' to drug gangs. This is the hegemonic idea that the favela belongs to the city rather than the favela makes the city. Within this construction of the integrated city, the favela [and presumably their residents] must accept the same urban rules and regulations as the rest of the asfalto, the “good and the bad.”

Diverse community and activist groups ‘talk back’ to the hegemonic discourse of favela integration, and different examples of resistance were discussed throughout the thesis. The vehicle of counter-hegemonic discourse is often social media—blogs, Facebook posts, short videos, captioned photographs, and political cartoons—but also includes opinion-editorials and essays published in mainstream national and international media and independent news sites, NGO or activist-researched dossiers, documentaries, books, protests, and public community meetings. During the time I conducted fieldwork, much of the resistance was focussed on home evictions considered unnecessary (either for unwanted infrastructure such as the Teleféricos or in areas adjacent to mega-event venues); violent or unfair processes of evictions (without fair notice or a fair buy-out price); the threat of gentrification (mostly in Zona Sul favelas with ocean views such as Vidigal and Babilônia); urbanisation projects that left unfinished sanitation works; and most saliently, police violence and abuse of power. Many activists accused the state of following a path of gentrification and tourism rather than integration, privileging private sector interests such as the construction and utility companies, and encouraging the formalisation of land-titles to incentivise a regulated and financialised housing market within the favelas. This thesis did not aim to evaluate these criticisms, but I argued that some interventions did aim to turn certain favelas into touristic destination points, and that favela integration prioritised tourist and state-actor mobilities while simultaneously targeting
other mobilities—particularly those of favela youth, young black and brown men presumed to be petty thieves or connected to drug gangs, motorcycle-taxis, and funk dance parties—for increased levels of scrutiny, harassment, and violence.

_In what ways do state interventions designed to “integrate” the favelas transform urban space?_

One short and straightforward way to answer this question is, _unevenly_. That is to say the effects of the programmes associated with favela integration have produced widely different results when comparing the same programme in different favelas (this is especially true of UPP) as well as between regions (North, South, and West Zones). One could also say that the effects were uneven in regards to temporality. This may seem somewhat of a didactic conclusion, but it substantiates theoretical assertions that the state and territory are the _effects_ of continuous, uneven, contradictory, and contested processes.

This thesis argued that favela integration is a state spatial strategy of territory working to transform the favela/cidade divide. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro are commonly referred to as “territories” by police authorities, public employees, architect-urbanists, policy makers, journalists, and average citizens. Rarely is Copacabana referred to as a “territory”. The public parks are not colloquially referred to as “territories.”

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90 I cannot recall reading or hearing the term invoked by an urban authority to refer to any neighbourhood of the “real city;” however I do recall the term being used by indignant middle class residents during the summer of 2015 when street crime around the beaches of Zona Sul had dominated local news, and the police had responded by racially and geographically profiling youths, stopping busses arriving from the North and West Zones of the city and detaining unaccompanied minors. On social networks, one post that was reported encouraged residents to take a stand and “defend the territory of Copacabana” and engage in vigilante justice. In this instance this man from Zona Sul—the vast majority of such posts are made by men—depicted Copacabana as land invaded by raiding bandits. The beaches of Zona Sul, and increasingly Barra de Tijuca, have long been spatially disputed (B. Penglase 2007; B. Carvalho 2007; Freeman 2008). The same year _O Globo_ newspaper ran a
metropolis similar to the trickle down of "marginality" from academic debates to everyday discourse that exacerbated favela stigma. Favelas are colloquial "territories" because they are the spatial other, considered apart from the norm. Nobody refers to the “territory of Catete” (where I live) because it is territory taken for granted. Favelas, on the other hand, are disputed “territories [yet to incorporated]” into the city.

To overcome the landscape crisis of the divided city, the broken city, the partitioned city, the favelas must cease to be marked as territories of otherness. The favelas must be seen (in the sense of landscape) as territory equal to Copacabana, Centro, Tijuca, that is to say urban territory that is not “territory.” Thus favela integration, as a state spatial strategy in response to a landscape crisis, necessitates the effectuation of territory. To do so requires the building of hegemonic consensus that state power operates evenly across the city, that the state has not abandoned pockets of urban space, that the borders of favelas do not constitute frontiers of state sovereignty. Effectuating favelas as territory (the unnamed sort) means that while the state may operate diversely in distinct spaces, its mandate to govern is realised and its authority to do so unchallenged. As one architect cited in Chapter 5 said, an “ordinary” citizen should be able to go to the favela and feel like they are in the city, the formal city. The mechanisms through which this is accomplished are the socio-technological processes employed by the spatial projects of urban planning and governance.

*How do techniques of urban planning and governance establish favelas as legitimate urban space subject to and benefiting from state rule?*

column suggesting that the public beaches start charging fees to keep undesirables from ruining the experience of upstanding citizens, tourists, and families who want to enjoy the beach in peace and tranquillity.
An alternative wording of this question might read, how do techniques of urban planning and governance produce the favelas as territory? The socio-spatial fragmentation of Rio de Janeiro, and the common sense understanding that the state is absent from the favelas, means that the appearance of state structure is weaker when observed from the favelas. This has produced the notion that the favelas are *ungoverned* and *ungovernable*. A major challenge of urban planning and governance is to rectify this by producing the favelas as just the opposite. Socio-technical processes such as GIS map-making, descriptive qualitative-quantitative “territorial panoramas,” and the systematic collection of information related to community organisations, service projects, and leadership work to produce favela spaces as *legible*, and therefore governable by identifying opportunities for interventions and integration. This information is used internally to facilitate data-informed governance and externally to advise private corporations interested in private-public partnerships or corporate social responsibility. Additionally systematised data is displayed to the general public to produce the favelas as already governed and benefitting from favela integration. For example the UPP Social publication of GIS maps of the pacified favelas specifying the location of schools, health clinics, social service centres, and public cultural and leisure infrastructure produces the structural appearance of the state operating within and over the favelas. The claims of community participation legitimise this process as democratic.

The material interventions of planning and governance work to visually and physically impose the appearance of structured state governance operating evenly through the favelas. Sometimes such interventions are works of spectacle, such as the Teleféricos, which in addition to providing a visual signifier of the state from afar (*para*
inglés ver) it also secures the state permanent physical space for bureaucracy, events, and VIP visits. As a rule, however, interventions target the pre-existing and mundane processes for more efficient organisation and regulation. Sewage flows are consolidated and covered, roads are widened and paved, public spaces are lit, and electricity and cable provision are legalised and commoditised. In larger favelas, on-site service providers (health, education, social workers) mean that residents increasingly can 'access the state' from their neighbourhoods rather than ‘travelling to’ the asfalto. These interventions made up of various overlapping and coordinated sociotechnologies work to produce the state effect—that is the appearance that [favela] society is separate from and existing under a state hierarchy—through the effectuation of territory, that is the appearance that state sovereignty and governance is operating evenly across a bounded space and that the favelas are included in that space.

Not to ignore the prioritised monopoly of violence and the prominent discourse of public security, policing is a major factor in producing a spatialised state structure. The repeated rhythmic practice of police patrols moving through favela space gives the appearance of uncontested organised and armed authority. However, in the case of favela pacification, the processes of favela-specific policing—rife with abuse of authority and continued violent treatment of favela residents, at time with the presumption of guilt—actually work against the ideal of deconstructing the strict favela/city binary.

8.2 Contributions of this research

This research project has attempted to contribute to existing academic literature concerning urban development in Rio de Janeiro as well as broader debates on the fundamentals of state and territory.
Below I review the methodological, empirical, and theoretical contributions of this thesis.

Methodologically, I responded to Knott’s (2009) call for more spatialised methodologies. A number of factors have encouraged ethnographers to move away from the traditional bounded field-site. Disregarding for the time being concerns of globalisation (of capital, goods, migration), urban ethnographers have increasingly attempted to speak to urbanity and socio-economic processes of the city beyond the traditional, particularistic and inward-looking neighbourhood and community studies (G. A. Jones and Rodgers 2016). In demonstrating how the ethnographic field may be constructed using Lefebvre’s spatial triad, I offer an example of the field as spatial process. This facilitated my movement around the city (both physical and conceptual), between different state offices, and public events while still remaining ‘within’ the constructed field. However, as I noted in Chapter 4, the lack of embeddedness weakens a claim to ethnography and should be accounted for early on in the fieldwork.

Empirically, I have offered a critical ‘unpacking’ of “favela integration.” Calls to “integrate” informal housing settlements into the city through systematic state intervention date back decades, but there has formed a general consensus among scholars that the scale, breadth, and methodology of current programmes and policies do constitute a new ‘moment’ in the socio-spatial relationships between the state, the favela, and the city. I argue that this moment may be described as a state paradigm of integration, and I have attempted to critically interrogate this paradigm throughout the thesis. This project differs from existing critical approaches in that it does not take a vertical programme or singular project evaluative approach, thus limiting my analysis to, for example, Morar Carioca as the evolving favela-specific strategy of urban planning. Nor does it privilege favela pacification above all other state projects targeting the favelas. As I
argued in Chapter 5, the integration paradigm does prioritise a monopoly of violence in Rio de Janeiro, but it is far from a singularly defining objective. My approach allowed me to present a nuanced analysis of UPP Social beyond that of pacification. Finally, while I hope that this thesis may be read in dialogue with contemporary research about the favelas, urban poverty, violence, and resident resistance; my conclusions narrowly address the issue of territory and how the state attempts to alter urban space. In comparison with the research reviewed in Chapter 2, I explicitly avoided centring on mega-event planning and preparations. I did so with the attempt to offer a historically grounded analysis applicable beyond the sites of mega-event development and taking into account the nuances of urban politics and state scalar relations.

The theoretical contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows. My analysis of “favela integration” through the framework of landscape-mobilities demonstrates a successful pairing of the two concepts, strengthening the assertion that the two may be analysed as mutually constitutive. Relatedly, drawing on Lefebvre’s theorisation of abstract space allowed me to build on Barbosa’s idea of a “landscape crisis” as a disruptive spatial-political conflict. In the case of Rio de Janeiro that crisis is constructed as the challenges and conflicts arising from the bifurcation of urban space and the production of the “divided city.”

This thesis contributes to discussions of state spatiality and urban theory in the Global South without reducing Rio de Janeiro to concerns of “development” or “modernisation.” Specifically, while the majority of research on territory as theorised by Painter and Haesbaert has focussed on nation-state territory at the federal and sub-regional scales, I have suggested that the theory is useful to analyse the urban state as well. In particular the concept of territory as effect is useful when theorising cities defined by socio-spatial
fragmentation, such as when self-built (informal) housing settlements are considered abandoned by the state and in need of an increased state ‘presence.’ Finally, my exploratory feminist analysis of favela integration in Chapter 7 suggests that scholars should incorporate intersectional feminist approaches into their theorisation of territory, as the effects of this form of state space are very often experienced based on social identity categories such as gender, race, age, or sexuality.

8.3 Limitations of this research

As with all research, this project responds to a reduced number of focussed research questions. It does not offer a totalising explanation of the state and urban socio-spatial inequality. While I have attempted to construct a cohesive narrative of favela integration as an emerging urban paradigm of governance, various sections, pieces of data, or arguments may have piqued the curiosity of the reader and generated questions that I did not answer. Indeed I hope that was the case, as it indicates possible points of engagement and debate.

In reviewing what was left unsaid in this thesis, but not unconsidered by the project, what may stand out is the lack of a systematic analysis of favela-resident perspectives and experiences. While I have responded to the specific research questions posed in this thesis’ opening and achieved an analysis of “favela integration” across multi-scalar state policies and programmes, forgoing a case-method approach as discussed in Chapter 4 means that I cannot speak to or theorise favela integration from the favela with ethnographic authority. This project initially included a research question regarding the production of the state from ‘below’ and the ‘outside.’ I was motivated by the growing literature of “anthropology of the state”
(Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005; Sharma and Gupta 2009) along with ethnography of the state (especially Ferguson 1990; but also Tarlo 2003; Gupta 1995; and more recently Zeiderman 2016; Uribe 2016). However, after a few months of fieldwork it became apparent that given time and resource limitations, I would not be able to carry out both a systematic analysis of “favela integration” as a governing paradigm at the city-scale in addition to ethnography of the state from the quotidian experience of favela residents. I do look forward to engaging with those researchers who have conducted local and nuanced place-specific projects.

While I do not consider it a limitation, I had wished to include more data from the months I spent following street demonstrations and occupations during 2013 and 2014. My data suggests some interesting comparisons between the ‘general’ urban dissent with those favela-specific protests that occurred in 2013; and I would also have liked to discuss some targeted and strategic occupations of private land by favela residents in 2014 as strategies of “integration from below.” These are examples of data that I look forward to building into future publications. It was important for me as a researcher to acknowledge resident mobilisations and organised resistance, as I did in Chapters 5 and 7. These examples are presented mostly as reactionary to state interventions rather than productive unto themselves. A project that showcased the many forms of creative and productive organisation of favela residents would have been able to theorise resistance as building alternative forms of power at the margins, as suggested by bell hooks reviewed in Chapter 2. I applaud those researchers who have made significant efforts to do just that and eagerly anticipate reading their work.
8.4 Looking beyond Rio de Janeiro

At various points in this thesis I have mentioned the exceptionality of Rio de Janeiro, from an imperial city to a mega-event city. This may lead some readers to conclude that inter-city comparison may be difficult or that the conclusions summarised above are irrelevant elsewhere. Should that be the case, I respond that while Rio de Janeiro is indeed an exceptional city, and while this research took place during an exceptional period of history, there is nothing exceptional about “favela integration.” The socio-spatial fragmentation of the city between the formal and informal is a common observation and research problem throughout many cities in the Global South. Moreover the idea (expressed through policy and planning) that self-built housing settlements have become permanent in the cityscape and should therefore be incorporated in to the official, or formal, fold of urban planning and governance is neither unique nor original to Rio de Janeiro. As mentioned in Chapter 1 and various points throughout empirical analysis, Medellín was a reference and inspiration of “favela integration.” Likewise, Rio’s experience with Favela-Bairro, Morar Carioca, and PAC-favelas are held up as exemplary by the national government and seen as referential for other cities. The involvement of international organisations such as UN Habitat and the Inter-American Development Bank and the bright spotlight of the international press during the past ten years of economic growth, urban renewal and mega-events have meant that

91 The deepening economic and political crises that began in 2015—perhaps as early as 2013 if we historicise the trajectory of impeaching President Dilma finalised on 31 August 2016, a process many believe to constitute a parliamentary coup—may signify that the moment passed, rather ironically, on the eve of the Olympic Games. As I write these conclusions, national newspapers are reporting that the State of Rio de Janeiro will declare bankruptcy before the end of 2016, and rumours are spreading among municipal workers that the city may follow suit. Rio de Janeiro may be facing at a new moment of exception, that of crisis capitalism.

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“favela integration” was discussed, praised, and critiqued on an international scale.

Given the above there are a number of opportunities for future research, but I will limit my suggestions here to two. First is following the “comparative gesture” advocated by Robinson (2011). Medellín seems an obvious choice given the similarities in the discursive production of the problem—a violent city divided between the formal and the gang-controlled informal—and the solution, democratic planning and governance that incorporates the favelas/comunas into the formal urban socio-spatial fabric. A sizable body of critical research on “social urbanism” would facilitate a comparative research project (for example: Samper Escobar 2010; Dávila 2013; Maclean 2015; Ivo and Magnavita 2016). A similar opportunity would be through the lens of policy mobilities. As mentioned, Medellín’s ‘miraculous success’ was useful to garner support for significant public investment in the favelas and served as a place of reference during the designing of integration projects. Dozens of Rio de Janeiro politicians, policy makers, and technocrats visited Medellín on state-organised education trips. However, as one architect at the IAB reminded me, there was a similar round of visits from Colombia to Rio de Janeiro during the success of Favela-Bairro. Beyond the Medellín–Rio dynamic, one could ‘follow’ different elements of the integration paradigm around Latin America and the Global South.

Second, as this project did not offer an ethnographic account of territory and “favela integration” from the experience of favela residents, that also seems like an obvious and immediate research opportunity. While this could be approached from a number of directions, readers interested in governmentality will have noticed multiple points during empirical analysis that could have discussed the various ways state spatial projects of integration attempt to organise and colonise pre-existing micro-relations of power and local
techniques of spatial organisation. I would additionally suggest that researchers play close attention to counter-hegemonic alternatives to “favela integration” as proposed by the state. Beyond reactionary resistance—important without doubt but also widely studied by Brazilian and international academics—original research could focus on how new forms of spatial power relations are consciously being built in the urban peripheries and how residents either attempt to negotiate with state structure or keep state power away from certain local practices and processes. Such examples may be studied from the radical position of autonomist development and planning (see Souza 2000) as counter-hegemonic integration strategies, or perhaps strategies of liberating disintegration.
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## Details of discourse analysis

| Seven stages of discourse analysis (Waitt 2010, adopted from Rose 2007) |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| **Strategy**             | **Summary**                                      |
| 1 Choice of source materials or text | Source selections should follow research objectives, and may be categorised into *genres* (for example, official planning documents, political rhetoric, news articles, academic commentary, interview transcripts, and citizen/civil society media). The relationships between different source materials are important as meaning is often created from those relationships, called *intertextuality*. One should seek out 'rich' texts that offer the opportunity to conduct rigorous analysis of experience, attitude, practices and subjectivity. |
| 2 Suspend pre-existing categories: become reflexive | This stage follows Foucault's argument that one must suspend preconceptions in order to show how knowledge is socially constructed through discourse. Reflexivity refers to the researcher recognizing their own *positionality* and how their personal background, identity, experiences and ideologies affect how they engage research subjects and interpret data. |
| 3 Familiarisation: absorbing yourself in and thinking critically about the social context of your texts | This step might be compared to 'due-diligence', or situating the data and discourse within existing socio-historical processes. This includes thinking critically about power dynamics and the relationship between the author(s) of the text and the audience, the pragmatic construction (what technologies were used) and dissemination of the text (how/where does the audience 'consume' the text), and interrogating the text content and relationship to the audience (Waitt provides a series of questions as starting points (229-230)). |
| 4 Coding: once for organisation and again for interpretation | Coding is the practice through which the researcher may begin to systematise analysis through categorisation. One may begin with descriptive category labels (e.g. context, practices, attitudes, and experiences) or with the more quantitative content analysis (following Rose 2007). This initial round of coding assists the researcher in categorizing various themes and subsequently locating them within and across the sources analysed. The second round of analytical coding facilitates the interpretation of the data through abstraction or reduction. |
| 5 Power, knowledge, and persuasion: investigate your texts for effects of 'truth' | This stage is concerned with identifying ‘discursive structures’ that produce truth. This follows Foucault's (1980) theory that truth is produced through power relations. Once knowledge is established as truth it becomes naturalised and serves a disciplinary purpose. Discourse analysis means to deconstruct truth (or 'truth effects') by exposing the processes through which |
knowledge is constructed and then naturalised as ‘common sense’. [As an aside, this is where many critical urbanists may blur the line between Foucauldian and Gramscian discourse analysis, as mentioned by Lees (2004), because naturalisation of truth through discursive structures may be useful in an analysis of hegemony].

6 Rupture and resilience: take notice of inconsistencies within your texts
Discourse, especially taking note of the relationships between different texts and sources, is neither monolithic nor flawlessly cohesive. Dissonance, contradictions, and ambiguities provide productive data that should be accounted for and critically analysed.

7 Silence: silence as discourse and discourses that silence
Researches should ask whose ‘voices’ are silent within the texts (largely relying on social identities of class, race, sexuality, nationality, age etc...). Silence indicates which actors are socially (in)validated to speak and be heard/ignored. Additionally, researchers should be aware of which discourse becomes ‘dominant’ or which is a ‘privileged discourse’, reproducing power dynamics.

### Genres and texts for discourse analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Examples of texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government reports (technical</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro Master Planning Documents; Morar Carioca policy and programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>documents)</td>
<td>documents (detailing programme aims/functions/structure)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>favela-intervention technical planning documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Morar Carioca and PAC-favelas schematic designs and text planning documents);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/state propaganda</td>
<td>Mayor Eduardo Paes campaign propaganda; official statements by UPP commanders and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro Secretary of Security; state media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representations of interventions (e.g. state-curated art exhibitions representing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>urban renewal and favela integration); Summer Olympic Candidature File.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic/expert knowledge</td>
<td>Public debates and seminars; programme/project evaluations; academic/public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intellectual commentary; international org/bank reports;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News/popular media</td>
<td>‘Mainstream’ news coverage of topics related to favela integration; select</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>international media; song lyrics and poetry;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Grassroots’/citizen media</td>
<td>Blogs, papers, reports, press releases produced by activists, NGOs, resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Interviewees and Informants

Interviews and in-dept conversations with informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michelle</td>
<td>Associate Architect w/ firm contracted by Morar Carioca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto</td>
<td>UPP Social, IPP Special Projects, President’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lea</td>
<td>PAC Social coordinator (former)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio</td>
<td>Director of Special Projects, IPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcelo</td>
<td>Activist from Complexo do Alemão, NGO worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Barbosa</td>
<td>Founder-Observatório de Favelas, Prof. of Geo at UFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Director, PAC Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole</td>
<td>Coordinator, PAC Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruna</td>
<td>Gestão Territorial, UPP Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina</td>
<td>Gestão Institucional, UPP Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla</td>
<td>Assistente de Equipe, UPP Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosane</td>
<td>Gestora de Equipe, UPP Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie</td>
<td>Project Assistant, UN Habitat, UPP Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayne</td>
<td>Country Director, UN Habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pedro da Luz Moreira</td>
<td>President Brazilian Architects Association-RJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduarda de la Rocque</td>
<td>President IPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fede</td>
<td>Lead architect, Morar Carioca project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Jauregui</td>
<td>Lead architect for PAC-favelas, Favela-Bairro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustavo</td>
<td>Director of CSR &amp; Communications, Supervia (Teleférico)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tatiana</td>
<td>Supervia, CSR (Teleférico)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jailson de Souza e Silva</td>
<td>Founder, Observatório de Favelas, Prof Geo at UERJ, subsecretary human rights RJ State (former), Ibase Morar Carioca civil society supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julia</td>
<td>Cultural Project Coord. Biblioteca Parque Alemão (teleférico)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernanda</td>
<td>Head of Family Clinic, Estação Palmeiras in teleférico station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Brun</td>
<td>Founder, Instituto Raizes em Movimento</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92 All names and in some cases gender have been changed except for well-known and public figures, or programme directors who consented to having their name used and who would otherwise be recognised by their title.
(Alemão activist), technical manager PAC-favelas Alemão)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roger</th>
<th>Gestor de Equipe, UPP Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luciano</td>
<td>President Resident Association of Morar Carioca site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José</td>
<td>Vice-President Resident Association of Morar Carioca site</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methods to analyse gender composition of Morar Carioca**

**Concurso project teams**

The Morar Carioca public contest selected 5 projects as winners with honours and an additional 35 as winners. The gender ratio of the winning teams were calculated in order to test the hypothesis that:

i) lead architects or winning teams were disproportionately male

ii) overall makeup of winning teams were disproportionately male

iii) non-architect “social labour” (e.g. social worker) was disproportionately conducted by women.

In order to examine the gendered make-up of the selected project teams: Morar Carioca published a large coffee-table-size volume of all the projects entered titled the Catalogue of Methodological Proposals. Each proposal included a list of team members categorised as lead architect, “authoring” architects, and additional technical and specialised “collaborators”. All members are listed by name and profession. Each team member’s gender was deduced from the corresponding profession, the majority of which are linguistically
coded to indicate the subject’s gender (e.g. arquiteto/arquiteta, sociólogo/socióloga and so on). In the cases where the profession is linguistically gender-neutral (for example social worker or economist), gender was deduced through the subject’s name, which, as a general rule, follow a strict gender-binary in Brazilian Portuguese.

The following table displays the collected data. The gender of the lead architect is displayed, as are the masculine-to-feminine ratios of the general architecture teams (the “authoring architects”), any team-members whose profession is listed to indicate a social function (that is non-technical/legal role) and the total for each project. What I have highlighted as “social” role includes social science professions (geographer, sociologist, economist, anthropologist, and social psychologist are the most frequent in this data set).

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<th>Lead architect</th>
<th>Architect-authors M:F</th>
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