The Trouble with Studying the Troubles: How and Why an Epistemic Community Emerges

By: Corey R Jentry

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MRes/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 91,286 words.
ABSTRACT

This research is concerned with issues of episteme, epistemology, and community. It asks how and why an epistemic community emerges? It looks at the study of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process as covered in the British and Irish political science academy in order to answer this question. This research is thus ultimately about knowledge, knowledge creators, and the circumstances and conditions in which they develop. It is also a case study of what happens when academics engage with political events. Do they act as innovators or simply as scholar who react to changing political environments? This research explains the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community using the boundary object concept. It asserts that knowledge communities do not develop de novo but instead emerge through academics struggles and frustrations with existing knowledge paradigms. A boundary object is the means by scholars can come together and challenge such paradigms and build new knowledge infrastructures. Through the emergence of the Northern Ireland peace process and scholar’s (re)engagement with and application of consociational theory and comparative methods this epistemic community was made possible. This research looks at the barriers that prevented the emergence of this community during the Troubles, its emergence following the outbreak of the Northern Ireland peace process, and its evolution following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Additionally, we look at the conflicts that developed between members of this community and how these academics define themselves both professionally and in relation to a community they are a part of yet see themselves as a part from.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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5
### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>American Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAIN</td>
<td>Conflict Archive on the Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTPV</td>
<td>Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCU</td>
<td>Dublin City University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Emergency Provision Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic Social Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoT</td>
<td>Game of Thrones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCORE</td>
<td>International Conflict Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPPR</td>
<td>Institute of Public Policy Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Irish Political Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NICRA</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLR</td>
<td>New Left Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUI</td>
<td>National University Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>Official Secrets Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCEA</td>
<td>Police &amp; Criminal Evidence Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSAI</td>
<td>Political Studies Association Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUB</td>
<td>Queens University of Belfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAE</td>
<td>Research Assessment Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Research Excellence Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTÉ</td>
<td>Raidió Teilifís Éireann</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Sinn Féin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>University College Dublin</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVF</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteer Force</td>
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INTRODUCTION

THE QUESTION

This research is concerned with issues of episteme, epistemology, and community. It asks how and why an epistemic community emerges? It looks specifically at the study of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process as covered in the British and Irish political science academy in order to answer this question. This research is thus ultimately about knowledge, knowledge creators, and the circumstances and conditions in which they develop. It is also a case study of what happens when academics engage with political events. Do they act as innovators or simply as scholars who react to changing political environments?

The question is born out of a desire to make sense of developments in the study of Northern Ireland. Specifically, the lack of intellectual engagement from the political science community within the U.K. and Ireland around what was seen as the “the Northern issue” during the time of the Troubles. The conflict in Northern Ireland had long been regarded as one of the most researched in the world (See: Whyte, 1990). Yet the interest in the subject was not shared within the U.K. and Ireland, in whose very backyards the conflict was taking place. Yet this all changed in the early 1990s with the onset of the Northern Ireland peace process.¹

Prior to the peace process the Northern Ireland issue—which was one of the most pressing and prevalent political issues in the U.K. and Ireland—was terra incognita in U.K. and Irish political science discourse. Michael Cox (1997, 1998), as well as Dennis O’Hearn and Sam Porter (S. Porter & O’Hearn, 1995), pointed out that the subject received only minimal recognition in British and Irish journals. Yet today a scholar would be hard pressed to publish a piece of work on any Northern Ireland issue and the ongoing peace process without referencing at least one of several dozen scholars from a British or Irish political

¹ The common term “Irish peace process”, or simply the “peace process”, refers to the series of attempts to achieve an end to the civil conflict and a political settlement of the differences that divide the community in Northern Ireland. There is no general agreement among scholars or journalists on the start date of the peace process. A majority marks this date with the announcement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) “cessation” of military action on 31 August 1994, while some people consider that the process dates to 11 January 1988, when John Hume, then leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had a meeting with Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF). This was the first in a series of discussions that were to take place between the two men from 1988 to 1993. However, the first series of talks broke down, and talks were not resumed until 1993, which ultimately led to the IRA cease fire in 1994 and began the end of one part of the process and the beginning of another phase (Melaugh, 2006).
science academy or a research report from any of the academy’s now internationally recognized institutes. The debates and theories that have emanated from academics in this field have taken centre stage in discourse regarding not only Northern Ireland but also in the wider debates on conflict resolution and peace-building. Evidence of this can be seen in a steady, yet dramatic, increase in publications on Northern Ireland and its peace process emanating from the British political science academy since the peace process began in the early 1990’s. This increase is visualised in the table below:

Table 1.1: Publications Since the Peace Process Began

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (1990-2016)</th>
<th>Article Publications in UK Political Science Journals on Northern Ireland</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Articles Published: 226
Average Citation: 21
Source: Reuters, Web of Science (2016)

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2 The figures in this table are derived from bibliometric data found on Reuters, Web of Science database. This is an online subscription-based scientific citation indexing service. It allows for in-depth and comprehensive exploration into political sciences journals throughout the globe. The search criteria were limited to peer reviewed journal articles in major British political science journals, other countries were excluded. The criteria was limited to British Political science journals given variables such as impact and journal ranking as well as their establishment and recognition both inside and outside the academy. IPS, for example, is an Irish political science journal but was excluded from analysis as its international ranking and impact ranking are low in comparison to British journals. IPS was also among several dozen journals, to lose their impact factor ratings in 2012 and 2013, a loss that occurred because the journals were "found to have anomalous citation patterns resulting in a significant distortion of the Journal Impact Factor, so that the rank does not accurately reflect the journal's citation performance in the literature"(Reuters, 2013). Because of this complication, it was determined that analysis which included these references could skew data. Instead, publication data from IPS was visualised separately in Table 1.2. Displaying the spike in publications in British political science journals alone proves an empirical point which will be made again and again, that interest in the subject spiked following the collapse of the USSR and initiation of the peace process and did not exist during the period of the Troubles. Book publications and book reviews were also excluded from this search. Article publications were identified with its engagement about Northern Ireland and the topics of consociationalism, power-sharing, the Troubles, terrorism, peace process, and political violence.
Of note is that the table displays an uptick in publications and academic interest leading up to and following key dates of the peace process. The two most notable dates are the singing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, which restored the Northern Ireland Assembly. The period following St Andrews in 2006 displays the starkest increase in publications as many scholars, and statesmen’s, noted this ended a period of uncertainty around the peace process and the survival of the Good Friday Agreement (See: O’Learly, 2015; English, 2015; Shirlow, 2015).

This is not limited to the British political science academy or its journals. As an example, Irish Political Studies (IPS), journal of the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI), which was founded in 1986 and is Ireland’s only major political science journal. This association and its journal were founded with the aim of producing high-quality academic articles and discussions on all issues related to Irish politics (PSAI, 2017). IPS covers topics such as: politics in the Republic of Ireland, in Northern Ireland, the politics of their bilateral relationship and the politics of their relationship with the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Since 1990 IPS has publish 302 articles dedicated to the Northern Ireland situation and its on-going peace process. This surge in interest is visualised in table 1.2 below.

**Table 1.2: Total IPS Publications on Northern Ireland Since the Peace Process Began**

![Table 1.2: Total IPS Publications on Northern Ireland Since the Peace Process Began](image)

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3 This data was taken directly from the IPS electronic journal available through ProQuest and the LSE library. Like the previous search criteria book reviews were excluded and articles were identified with authors engagement on and about Northern Ireland and the topics of consociationalism, power-sharing, the Troubles, terrorism, peace process, and political violence. The searches also excluded articles which focused only on issues Northern Ireland elections and institutions such as the catholic church. However, these subjects were included into analysis if they pertained to the political conflict. For example, there were several analyses which looked at the political and religious nature of certain political parties in Northern Ireland such as the Smyth (1986) article looking at the DUP. Yet even with the exclusion of such articles it made little difference in the number of publications on Northern Ireland, especially between the period of 1986 to 1990. In this respect, even controlling for such publications, it made no difference to the total number of publication on Northern Ireland from 1986 to 1990 in IPS.
This data displays similar trends to that of British political science journals in terms of publication spikes leading up to and following key dates around the Northern Ireland peace process; such as the Good Friday and St. Andrews Agreements. The sheer volume of publications in this one journal alone displays the voracious appetite Ireland’s political science discipline developed for research pertaining to Northern Ireland in the peace process period. This is a stark contrast to the three articles IPS produced addressing issues on Northern Ireland and its political conflict from its inception in 1986 until 1990. One of which only did so indirectly, looking at the political/religious nature of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (Smyth, 1986).

With the onset of the peace process, a series of debates emerged concerning potential political solutions for the Northern Ireland issue. These debates centred around various theories of conflict resolution. They were largely the result of the application of primarily top-down, elite-based approaches that sought to establish mechanisms of political accommodation that could house divided identities in a many-roomed political mansion (Taylor, 2009a, p. 16). This is what political scientists called power-sharing or consociational theory. This theory was first applied to Northern Ireland by the theory’s pioneer Arend Lijphart (1975a) in the *British Journal of Political Science*. Lijphart observed that consociational principles were evident in the ill-fated power-sharing experiment of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973–1974. Arguing that consociational democracy was the most appropriate form of governance for Northern Ireland, he was pessimistic about its prospects in the region (Lijphart, 1975a; J. McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). This discussion and its theoretical framework was picked up by, modified, and applied to Northern Ireland by John McGarry (1988) and Brendan O’Leary (1989b). The pair published *The Future of Northern Ireland* (1990b) with the aim of laying out the case for consociationalism in Northern Ireland and directly taking on the dominate paradigm that “the problem with Northern Ireland is that there is no solution” (R. Rose, 1976a, p. 139). This sparked off a series of debates and an enormity of literature.

Looking at these debates it’s apparent that a conflict that had defined the region for over thirty years was refought within British and Irish political science academic circles. During the Troubles political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland were largely absent from and/or reluctant to take on the Northern Ireland topic. However, once scholars began to engage with the Northern Ireland issue, they were as divided on the subject and with each other as the region they researched. The evidence of the pervasiveness of these debates on Northern Ireland can be found not only in the volume of publications but also in the fact that
these debates were so central to the literature. This is apparent in that scholars labelled these debates Northern Ireland’s “meta-conflict” – meaning the intellectual debate about the conflict and (potential) prescriptions for its solution (B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1996).

Scholars in this research describe these debates as being “vitiolic” (McGarry, 2015) with some claiming the debates were seeped more in ideology than in any type of scientific epistemology or empiricism (Patterson, 2015). These divisions, though still in the backdrop of discussions, have been largely reconciled between scholars since the signing of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement of 1998 – the Agreement. This is highlighted by scholars like Professor Michael Kerr at Kings College London who went so far as to claim that, “there may not be reconciliation [today] in Northern Ireland, but scholars of Northern Ireland have reconciled themselves to the study of the Agreement” (Kerr, 2015), meaning that scholars today recognize the Agreement as the legitimate framework for peace and the centre of political analysis in the region.

An aim of this research will be to empirically display that following the signing of the Agreement the study of Northern Ireland, which was previously seen as an “eccentricity” (English, 2015) in U.K. and Irish political science, had become a staple in the discipline’s academic diet. While the question of how and why an epistemic community emerges concerns what happened to facilitate the emergence of that community, this study also looks at how this community flourished and expanded and how it has evolved within a changing political and educational environment.

Such inquiries are important because a common misconception around the formulation of scientific knowledge is that it develops out of and within a consensus (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989). By looking at this community this research will show that, in fact, the opposite is true. Science and scientific enterprises develop out of and through a series of epistemological, ontological, and paradigmatic conflicts. Michael Burawoy’s (2009) research on the collapse of the Soviet Union and Zambia’s post-colonial transition noted that science moves and evolves through a series of obsessions, refutations, and frustrations. Science is inherently conflictual. Yet amid these conflicts scientists are forced to look for the opportunity to open, and then maintain, spheres of direct and constructive interaction to collaborate with each other. Such collaborative efforts are essential to developing new findings, furthering research in a scholar’s discipline as well as helping scholars to establish authority over domains of knowledge.

Collaboration hinges on the ability to discover some kernel around which individuals can come together, to open a forum in which they can research, debate, and refute issues
openly with each other and to sustain these interactions once they have begun. Yet investigations into how epistemic communities come together, or fail to do so, is not well understood in the literature. As an example, research by scholars like Schmidt (2010) has looked at the relationship between knowledge agents and knowledge structures. This research has largely aimed to show how knowledge structures aid in constructing the meanings internal to these agents whose “background ideational abilities” enable them to create and maintain such institutions. Other research has sought to look at the influence of ideology and national context on the policy beliefs of scientific elites in places like the European Union and the United States (N. J. Mitchell, Herron, Jenkins-Smith, & Whitten, 2007; Radaelli, 1995, 1997). All this research has focused mainly on scholars in the fields of economic, climate, and energy regulation and policy. It has been inspired by earlier scholarship that centred on how knowledge elites personal pursuits for power (Foucault, 1970; Foucault & Sheridan, 1979; Foucault, Sheridan, & Dreyfus, 1987), politics (Woolgar, 1988), and prestige (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986) affects their decision-making. Yet these analyses are weighted towards understanding institutions rather than individuals and fail to address how knowledge experts come together and communities emerge.

Northern Ireland offers a compelling and interesting case study that builds on and adds to such analysis by addressing these how questions. Unlike issues of, say, economic or energy regulation, climate change, or nuclear proliferation (areas typically covered in this field of literature) the overwhelming majority of academics that make up this epistemic community come from within or have personal links to the various communities in the region. These academics do not reside in the “ivory tower”, from which academics have traditionally been seen to observe and analyse socio-political phenomena (Zook, 2015). Members of this community had (and have) intimate and sometimes direct experience of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Many have, at times, positioned themselves on various sides of the political divide, some of them have been directly involved in the conflict and its resolution. This research then offers the opportunity to discover how academics manage (or fail to manage) their personal and professional biographies in relation to their research as well as other scholars who might hold opposing political, personal, or epistemological views.
CONCEPTUALIZING EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES

In a project concerning epistemic communities it is important to begin by clarify this concept. In this study, the “epistemic community” refers to the community of political science scholars that focus on Northern Ireland. The concept of epistemic communities became widely known (and utilized) within political science thanks largely to Haas’s (1992) introduction of the concept almost twenty-five years ago. Epistemic community as a term was first employed by Burkart Holzner (1968), who applied the concept in sociology, but it was Haas (1992) who introduced his concept to political science as a means of understanding groups of scientists. Haas looked to build on the previous work of scholars, such as Ludwik Fleck’s (1979) idea of the thought collective and how the emergence and development of scientific knowledge takes place. He did this while employing Michael Foucault’s (1973a) adaptation of the concept of episteme.4 Scholars like Thomas Kuhn (1962) had previously explored the idea of scientific communities. These communities are groups of individuals from a discipline whose work revolves around a shared paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). This consists of shared beliefs and methodological standards for the pursuit of scientific research. Scholars have since sought to broaden the scope of Kuhn’s paradigm, arguing that epistemic communities can arise from anywhere, such as bureaucratic position, technocratic training, similarities in scientific outlook, and shared disciplinary theories or methods (Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2013). International relations scholars like John Gerard Ruggie (1975) noted that epistemic communities share intentions, expectations, symbols, behavioural rules, and points of reference. The key point which scholars agree on is the episteme which unites a community together (Ruggie, 1975, p. 570).

Cross (2013) put forward the idea that the internal cohesiveness of an epistemic community ultimately provides them with an episteme. With this logic, the argument goes that when a group of professionals can speak with one voice, that voice is then seen as more legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position to know. Yet what Northern Ireland highlights is that epistemic communities often lack consensus and cohesion around key issues. They speak with many (and often dissenting) voices. We therefore focus on degrees of internal cohesion and how that process unfolds over time. By looking at the process of how academics on Northern Ireland can come together

4 Foucault refers to episteme as the “orderly unconscious structures” underlying the production of scientific knowledge in a “time and place”. According to Foucault, episteme is developed within an “epistemological field” which forms the conditions of possibility for knowledge in a particular time and space and has often been compared to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm (Cross, 2013; Foucault, 1973a).
despite a lack of consensus one can also gain an understanding of what the *episteme* of an epistemic community is.

To this point, it’s important to recognize that epistemic communities do not simply exist or not exist. Nor do they simply appear and disappear, as has been the assumption in much of the literature to date (see Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2016). The emergence of an epistemic community is not a *de nova* phenomena sparking from the various “big bangs” that occur within a political landscape. If one is aiming to better understand the origins of an epistemic community, it is then necessary to examine the broader (social, political, educational) context within which they exist. One could call this the “primordial ooze” which they emerge out of. This is a process rather than an event. This is particularly true when looking at epistemic communities that develop out of or within areas of protracted political conflict such as Northern Ireland.

The concept of epistemic communities used here is consistent with Haas’s (1992) definition. It is a group of professionals, often from a variety of different disciplines, who produce policy-relevant knowledge about complex social issues (Haas, 1992, p. 16). What constitutes this epistemic community is that it embodies a belief system around one or more issues that contains four knowledge elements:

1.) A shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value based rationale for the social action of community members; 2.) Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; 3.) Shared notions of validity – that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and 4.) A set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992, p. 3)

The community under investigation here fits within Haas’s criteria, as the individuals identified as part of the Northern Ireland epistemic community are: (a) Professionals – academics with official education and training in social science methods and theory. In the case of U.K. and Irish academics, their training has come in a variety of forms but the standards are consistent across national borders; (b) There is a consistent frequency and quality to the meetings of these individuals, meeting regularly at conferences such as the Political Science Association Ireland (PSAI) and publishing regularly in its journal. The more time actors spend together face-to-face, the more likely they are to build strong ties,
strengthen shared professional norms, and cultivate a common knowledge culture (Cross 2013). Informal meetings in smaller groups enable a richer environment for socialization and the development of a common knowledge culture (Checkel, 2001). Frequent meetings also help to solidify a body of shared norms such as epistemological, methodological, research, and peer-review standards within an epistemic community; and (c) The members of this community share and are connected by a sense of professional purpose, identity, practice, and cultural heritage. In the case of the Northern Ireland epistemic community, what unites these individuals is more than simply an *esprit de corps*; it is a common ground by which the actors can identify with one another. Cross (2013) again has noted that an epistemic community with a strong common culture is likely to remain cohesive irrespective of the circumstances and differences they face. In relation to Northern Ireland, this common culture is not simply a commitment to the Agreement, the peace process and the epistemological grounds by which these are studied. It is also a sense of being connected to the region and a desire to find a solution to its problems of violence, a commitment to peace.

This usage of the epistemic community framework places this research within the wider “renaissance of knowledge” movement that has unfolded since the 1990s (Dunlop, 2013; Radaelli, 1995). This means that along with the traditional interests and institutions, ideas and individuals also matter in explaining political and intellectual decision-making. Although material power, identities, and policy legacies remains central to the analysis, this ideational turn focuses its emphasis on decision-makers as “sentient” agents (Schmidt, 2010). They are therefore sensitive to new ideas or new representations of existing ideas. The politics of ideas agenda has been followed eagerly by scholars and resulted in an array of empirical analysis that sheds light on how policy emerges from new ways of thinking, beliefs, rhetoric, and discourse (For example, see reviews in: Dunlop, 2013). The main contribution of the epistemic communities concept as it applies to this research is to remind us that “ideas would be sterile without carriers” (Haas, 1992, p. 27). This is what Radaelli (1997) called an “anthropomorphic conceptualization of knowledge” (p. 169). This research assumes that experts who create knowledge should be a central point of political analysis. To identify an epistemic community is to identify individuals with a degree of professional and social stature to make authoritative claims on politically pertinent and socially relevant issues of the day (Dunlop, 2013).

Over the last twenty-five years the literature has become saturated with publications and problems facing research on epistemic communities. Dunlop (2013) noted over 600 book chapters and articles on the subject since Haas’s 1992 article, pointing out that the term is
firmly embedded in the social sciences lexicon. Political science sub-fields such as Government, Law, Public Administration, and International Relations have widely employed the epistemic community framework as a means of explaining the role of experts with complex policy problems that dominate the politics of contemporary society (For examples see: Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2013, 2016; Walker, 2001). Despite the discipline’s long engagement with the term, the actual identification of epistemic communities and understandings into how and why they emerge and develop over time remains rare.

Wright (1997) and Verdun (1998) argued this is because the term is often utilized metaphorically to describe any group of experts giving policy advice. Because of this understanding the emergence and evolution of epistemic communities can be a difficult process, as identifying, locating, and gaining access to those believed to be members of an epistemic community is often problematic (Wright, 1997). There are a few studies though on how power structures affect an epistemic community’s decision-making and create stratification within the community (Van Waarden, 2002). There is also interesting research that looks at the various “battles” between both epistemic communities and interest groups (Youde, 2007).5

Yet in the political science literature even the above examples are the exception rather than the rule (Dunlop, 2013). Even in the research where scholars do aim to determine the origin and development of beliefs that epistemic communities embody (For example: N. J. Mitchell et al., 2007) the community itself is rarely the centre of analytical attention. Instead they are secondary to the analysis of interest and political groups or institutions. Disciplinary preferences provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon. A political scientists’ attention is almost inherently predisposed towards focusing on political institutions and actors rather than the world of professionals and academics. Using narrative accounts of members of the Northern Ireland epistemic community this research looks to correct this disposition and determine how this community emerged and developed over time. It also seeks to uncover how scholars of this community came to hold the epistemic positions they have and how their interactions with other members of the community and research shaped and possibly altered these positions over time. As the exploration of epistemic communities in the political science subfield of peace and conflict studies has to date been terra incognita, this work looks to pioneer the application and analysis of this concept to a new territory in

5 This research by Youde (2007) is particularly interesting as it touches upon the various “epistemic battles” which exist between members of an epistemic community and that of various “interest groups” in relations to public policy approaches and treatments of AIDS in South Africa.
political science. Yet to do this one needs a theory to explain and link the boundaries these individuals the episteme that binds them; thus, the next section is dedicated to theory.

THEORY AND BOUNDARY OBJECTS

The Northern Ireland case is useful because it resides within a discipline – political science – that is extremely heterogeneous to begin with. That is, the work of political science is conducted by an extremely diverse group of actors: scholars from different disciplines with varying epistemological and methodological traditions. The work of any science, irrespective of the discipline, requires cooperation. Scientific actors cooperate to create common understandings, ensure information reliability across domains and to gather information which retains its integrity across time, space, and local contingencies (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

There is a “central tension” in science between divergent viewpoints and the need for generalizable findings (ibid.). When these tensions arise, collaborative efforts such as developing objective and generalizable findings become difficult. These tensions are exacerbated in political science not only because of the discipline’s inherently heterogeneous nature – drawing from historical, philosophical, sociological, economic, and anthropological approaches – but also because of its relative infancy and (often) contested relevance or existence as a discipline.6 There is a theoretical need in this thesis to explain not only how this tension can be bridged within and between a heterogeneous group but also in helping to identify and explain what the episteme of this community is. This thesis will therefore utilize the boundary object – a concept to be explained in the following – as means of explaining and understanding how and why an epistemic community emerges, as well as how ongoing collaboration and cooperation was and is maintained following its emergence. Thus, even though this is a case study of the Northern Ireland epistemic community it is one that reflects similar communities of conflict management research such as the Balkans, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, to name a few.

By employing the term boundary object, it is recognized that the tension in research and collaboration in scientific affairs occurs along and between a series of boundaries. Whether we speak of learning as the transition from novice to expert in a particular discipline or the shift from peripheral participation to being a full member of a scientific community (Lave & Wenger, 1991), the boundary of the discipline or community is constitutive of what

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6 For example, off the record many scholars noted the contested nature and existence of political science as a discipline in the U.K. and Ireland and the inherent “tension” and battle that the discipline has undergone.
counts as expertise or as central participation (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). Boundaries are becoming more explicit with the increase of specialization in scientific research, despite the increase in heterogeneity. The search for ways to connect and mobilize individuals across social and cultural practices to avoid fragmentation has thus become more important (Hermans & Hermans Konopka, 2010). The challenge is therefore to learn how to create and discover possibilities for participation and collaboration across a diversity of positions. This is true both within institutions and across disciplines (Akkerman, Admiraal, & Simons, in press; Daniels, Edwards, Engestrom, Gallagher, & Ludvigsen, 2010; Ludvigsen, Lund, Rasmussen, & Saljo, 2010). Cooperation rather than consensus is necessary for the successful conducting of scientific research. Such findings have been confirmed in disciplines such as biology and zoology, where scientific work is neither thwarted nor homogenized by a lack of consensus but is rather enhanced by it (See for example: Hughes, 1971; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; J. M. Ruane & Cerulo, 2008). This research holds that this is also true in political science, a discipline where individuals are coming from differing social worlds and methodological backgrounds and where theoretical paradigms intersect.

The term boundary object will be used to mean an analytic concept of one or more scientific objects that inhabit several intersecting social worlds. This object satisfies the informational requirements of each of world and acts to bring such actors and worlds together (Latour, 2005). A boundary object is something that is both malleable enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the various parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain common principles across multiple spectrums (social, political, intellectual). Such an object often has a weak structure in collective use, but takes on a strong structure in individual use. The object(s) may be abstract or concrete can, and often do, have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable – that is, a means of translation (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989). Let’s now look at a practical example of a boundary object that will be used in this research.

**CONSOCATIONALISM AND BOUNDARIES**

Consociationalism theory is one of the central boundary objects of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. In the abstract form, a consociation can be either democratic or authoritarian, but consociational democracies respect four organizational principles (J. McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). These principles are that (1) Each of the main communities share in executive power, with the executive chosen by the people; (2) Each community enjoys
some distinct measure of autonomy and self-government, particularly around cultural concerns; (3) Each is represented proportionally in key public institutions and is a proportional beneficiary of public resources and expenditures; and (4) Each can prevent changes that adversely affect their vital interests; they have veto power \textit{(ibid.)}. These principles allow the application of consociation to be somewhat flexible in terms of structure; however, in application to social worlds by individuals or groups (i.e. Northern Ireland and scholars) this flexibility allows it to adopt a more pronounced structure.

Lijphart’s application of the theory, for example, makes no significant distinction between cleavages that fall along linguistic, ethno-national, or religious lines. In contrast, McGarry and O’Leary (1995) argued that Northern Ireland has primarily experienced a self-determination dispute spanning two states. In their application of this theory this aspect is crucial (both for explanation and prescription). They argue that aside from consociational institutions, from a structural standpoint Northern Ireland requires all-island and all-Ireland cross-border institutions, as well as those linking the United Kingdom and Ireland. These distinctions have been vital in both explanations, analyses (and debates) surround the practical application and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. These themes are consistent across consociational theory as applied to places such as Lebanon, Kurdistan, and Bosnia and the peace agreements implemented there. Yet despite the differences in structure, differing scholars can place themselves under the tent of consociationalism. Though O’Leary, McGarry, and the like would regard themselves as revisionist consociationalist, they nonetheless reside underneath the tent of consociationalism with what they regard as its “skepticism about the universal merits of adversarial majoritarian and integrationist institutions” (J. McGarry & O’Leary, 2006, p. 44). In this research a boundary object is the means of explaining how political scientists and other actors contributing to the development of literature and research in a discipline can translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate, and simplify in order to work together in and across various institutional settings. In this respect it is not only consociationalism and its application to Northern Ireland but also the Good Friday Agreement as well as the peace process (before and after the Agreement) are the objects this research uses to explain both how and why the Northern Ireland epistemic community emerged.

For these objects the issue of translation is especially important. This is because a central tenant of this work is that actors from more than one social world (for example, political scientists, historians, sociologists, etc.) are trying to conduct translations of the boundary object simultaneously. Northern Ireland is not simply a case of non-scientists
translating for scientists (or vice versa) but between political scientists that come from various methodological, academic, and political backgrounds. These individuals do often inhabit different epistemological worlds. Each translator must therefore maintain the integrity of his own research while looking to ensure the interests of the other audiences to retain them as allies. This is ideally done in a way that increases the centrality and importance of his work. What has been described as the n-way nature of the interessement cannot be understood from a single viewpoint (Akrich, Callon, & Latour, 1988). It requires a more holistic analysis which will be outline in the following chapter.

This analysis does not presuppose an epistemological primacy for any one viewpoint; the viewpoints of the consociationalists are not inherently better or worse than that of its critics, for instance. Latour (1986) encourages us by pointing out that the important question concerns the flow of concepts through the network of participating actors and the social and intellectual worlds they occupy. The holistic viewpoint is therefore anti-reductionist in that the unit of analysis is the whole enterprise, not simply the point of view of an individual academic or researcher, but it nevertheless utilizes these individual points of view to draw inferences about the whole (Leigh Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). It is on this point that the choice of method employed becomes key.

**The Question of Methodology**

In this attempt to understand how epistemic communities emerge and how they have developed over time, one is faced with various challenges, one of which is to determine how one selects and measures the variables in question. Because in social science research the selection and measurement of variables can be infinitely divisible, one is left with no choice but to attempt to sketch something that one cannot precisely delineate, to generalize, to abstract. In creating these abstractions one should be free to combine a variety of interdisciplinary techniques, including those of the biologist, sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist (See: McGraw, 1996; Schatz, 2009; Yin, 2003). In fact, Gaddis (2002) argues that because scientists have discovered that “what exists in the present has not always done so in the past”, they have “begun to derive structures from [past] processes” and in doing so have “brought history into science” (p. 39).

This has brought into question purely reductionist approaches adopted in social science as a way of making sense of human societies, many of which have run into major problems given the complexities involved in human relations and the political, religious, and economic interactions between societies (Gaddis, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; A. Wendt, 1992; A.
E. Wendt, 1987). After all, societies are not “complicated” in the way a nuclear reactor is complicated and can be broken into its constituent parts and understood. Rather, they are highly “complex”, involving interdependent variables that interact, often in irregular ways, over any given period. To properly sketch out and control for this complexity one must employ dynamic methods for organizing knowledge that rely on the micro rather than the macro to develop these abstractions. And it is here where the use of narrative story lines, the tool of choice for this research, brings a force and utility.

The narrative approach employed here is a subgenre that uses the life stories of 34 individuals of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. These individuals have been identified and selected based on several criteria, the first being their participation in and publications in the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI) and its journal Irish Political Studies (IPS), as well as their participation (and positions) within research institutes within the U.K. and Ireland. These scholars were identified based on their publications on and engagement with consociationalism and its debates concerning Northern Ireland. All 34 individuals interviewed have at one time or another published something (criticising, reviewing, refuting, exploring, comparing, or defending) consociationalism. They have all engaged with this topic. This research also greatly relied on snowballing in selecting many participants. During the interview process scholars regularly noted the imperativeness of speaking with certain individuals based on their contribution to the discipline and expertise on Northern Ireland as well as their participation in the community. Scholars’ recommendations were also based on professional collaboration projects, as well as professional disagreements regarding theory and academic points of view. This study thus encompasses a variety of scholars with sometime dissenting views. Well over 50 individuals were contacted and asked to participate. In the end, 34 individuals agreed to participate, of which only three are (identified as) female, the rest being male (see Appendix 1). Several academics wished to be anonymized (with respect to name, gender, or, in some cases, both) and all academics had the opportunity to read and edit transcripts to ensure anonymity, review content, and approve and request the omission of that content.

The British/Irish political science community is a small one. The Northern Ireland community is an even smaller one, all with strong ties, prejudices, paranoia, and opinions about one another and the subject they are close to (biographically and/or geographically). I gave my interviewees oral and written information about myself and the research that I was conducting. At first some were sceptical and, surprisingly, some were hostile and/or outright offended at the prospect of participating in such a study. However, some were enthusiastic
and saw the merit and necessity of my research. As I conducted more interviews, it became less necessary to introduce myself: they already knew me, and what had transpired in previous interviews. This eased many of the academics concerns that I was just “stirring trouble” or writing an academic “gossip piece”. This also brought into light what others had told me: “there are no secrets in Northern Ireland” (Arthur, 2015).

Nevertheless, I began these semi-structured narrative interviews either by requesting personal information from my interviewees, such as where and when they were born or who their supervisor was, or by asking their specialisation to the discipline. Then, I asked them how they had become interested in the study of Northern Ireland, what kinds of work they had conducted on the subject, and with whom. I also asked them about their opinions regarding the development of consociationalism and its application to Northern Ireland, what they thought about this, and how they viewed the contribution and evolution of the discipline. Conducting these narrative based (semi-structured) interviews allowed me to engage with questions that I had prepared and provided the academics with before, but the approach also allowed my respondents to reflect more freely on their ideas, memories and personal life histories in a free-style manner. The questions merely acted as sign-posts which allowed me to keep them on track in the narrating their lives. With some more sign-posting was needed than with others. The interviews all lasted between 40 minutes (at the shortest) to two hours and fifteen minutes (the longest).

These interviews were “co-produced identity performances” (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b); meaning, as a researcher, I was not only listening to life stories but also co-producing them. All interviewees who agreed to participate showed a general respect for my academic identity as a PhD candidate from the LSE. However, I did often get the sense that many were feeling me out to see what I was “really” getting at with regards to my research and were somewhat cautious and calculating in choosing their words and how they talked about their experiences within the discipline. This certainly was not the case with all academics. Several were more than candid with their opinions and criticisms. Academics could be extremely harsh in their accusations and critiques of others, the discipline, and their work at times. Irrespective of what was said I made sure to remain neutral and not to comment either way. At times, I would play devil’s advocate in terms of pressing them on counter opinions but in most cases I tried to remain as neutral as possible. I think my position as an American (outsider) with no Irish (or British, for that matter) roots or links helped greatly in conducting my research and interviews. This soothed many concerns that I may have biases one way or
the other. Though I did get the sense that many wondered why I would be interested in such a subject having no personal links to it.

The life stories approach utilized is defined by specific assumptions and methodological procedures. Two of these assumptions are particularly important, the first being that an interview is a dialogic process (Elliot George Mishler, 1986). Interviews are an intricate sequence of exchanges through which the interviewer and interviewee negotiate in advance some degree of agreement on what will be talked about and how the material will be approached. In this case the respondents’ accounts of their life experiences are situated in that context and can be seen as co-produced (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). Through doing this one seeks to bypass a problem that is often recognized in survey research, namely, that too much is often inferred by taking answers at face value to questions of suspicious value, since answers can vary depending on the way the question is framed (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Secondly, narratives are social acts. Through speaking, an individual performs their identity, making various “moves” along the landscape of social relationships (Found in: Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). This pragmatic view of language underscores what social actors are doing in their selection and organization of discourse to tell stories in ways that fit the occasion and are appropriate for specific intentions, audiences, and contexts.

This research aims to thematize the 34 narratives of the academic participants of this research. To do this the research must be rooted in a set of assumptions that guides a dialogue with participants. Michael Polanyi (1958) first elaborated on this in his rejection of positivists’ notions of objectivity based on sense data in favour of a commitment to what he called the “rationality of theory”, often described as cognitive maps, or, dare one say, abstractions, through which one apprehends the world (Found in: Burawoy, 1998, p. 5). Through “dwelling in theory” (See: Burawoy, 1991, 1998, 2009; Burawoy & Skocpol, 1982) this research forms the basis of a reflexive model that embraces engagement with the messiness of narratives as a way of understanding them. This is a reflexive approach to narratives as a means of extracting the general from the specific; that is, this research looks to use the micro to connect to the macro, and in doing so connect the present to the past. For example, in this text you will read of the personal reflections by scholars like Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry who reflect on their personal engagements with consociational theory and its application to Northern Ireland as a means of showing the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. By employing the “narrative as praxis” framework, one operates under the idea that personal stories are socially situated actions, life
performances, and fusions of both form and context that allows researchers to identify patterns from the micro and connect them to the macro.

**QUESTIONS OF STRUCTURE VS AGENCY**

A central concern in asking how an epistemic community emerges is whether academics act as innovators or simply respond to a changing political and social landscape. That is, do groups of (or individual) academics emerge simply as a response to the political events on the ground or do they, in fact, shape them? This is important in the case of Northern Ireland (as well as other areas of protracted conflict) as upon simple observation one simply could argue that the emergence of the epistemic community was a result of the peace process and the signing of the Agreement. Yet it is important to highlight the fact that the current peace process and the peace deal agreed to in 1998 were not Northern Ireland’s first. There was also a peace process in the 1970s, which resulted in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973–1974. The 1980s also saw a process that culminated in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Both peace processes and agreements were the result of British and Irish government initiatives, as well as political developments on the ground. Yet why, considering these events, did the study of Northern Ireland remain an “eccentricity” (English, 2015) in British and Irish political science?

In addressing such questions this research comes into contact with age-old debates over structure and individual agency (Dahms, 1997). These debates somewhat resemble the classic question “which came first, the chicken or the egg”? Yet the question of how and why an epistemic community emerges aims to see not just which came first but also the relationship between the “chicken and the egg”. Also, to what extent do these two variables interact with and influence one another. It is not a case of “either/or” but rather “both/and”. This study is interested in how the chicken relates to the egg and vice versa; it assumes a synergetic relationship. There is the acknowledgement and premise that scientific activity is socially rooted. Recalling that Marx (1975) himself stated that:

> When I am active scientifically – an activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others – then my activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is a social activity and therefore that which I make of myself; I make of myself for society being (p. 298).

Individuals in a knowledge community do not escape their social character or the greater socials influences and barriers they exist within. Instead there is an acceptance of the
symmetry between structure and agency, in that knowledge carriers in any society will have to overcome and/or adjust to certain limitations due to the inherent and pre-existing social/economic/political structures (William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). For example, scholars like Brendan O’Leary and other were interested in understanding and researching Northern Ireland long before the peace process. With the social and institutional stigma within academia, they were warned by their supervisors and department heads of “being labelled Irish” (O’Leary, 2015) in terms of their research focus. Therefore, during this time scholars pursued more mainstream topics in British political science in efforts to establish and cement their careers in the academy with the intention of pursuing the subject later.

In the relationship between structure and agency is an emphasis on praxis. Praxis looks at the interplay between knowledge carriers’ positions as subjects – looking to actively affect the world they change – operating in the context of external social conditions. Actors must respond to, adapt to, make, and remake these conditions in efforts to transform not only themselves but the conditions they face (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). This elevates the actions (or agency) of knowledge carriers by making them purposeful and contextually situated. That is, this research sees academics actions as responses to a series of personal, political, professional, and social conditions. In doing this it acknowledges that these individuals are not cultural zombies, mindlessly restricted to a limited cultural/social script in the roles they play. Knowledge carriers adapt to, resist, and selectively appropriate various cultural and social changes that present themselves at various times.

However, speaking to this one must also address issues of reflexivity, i.e. asking knowledge carriers to examine their own general philosophic premises (William T. Lynch, 1994). Here it is argued that reflexivity doesn’t contribute to a tendency toward a “fictionalist” understanding of the knowledge carrier’s role as scholar (See: Latour & Woolgar, 1986; M. Lynch, 2000; William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). This is because ideas are always rooted in real social activity. If one can point out the limitations of certain forms of knowledge, it is not due to one’s sheer brilliance of intelligence but rather that social change brought about by contradictions in society makes these new insights possible. As Marx and Engels put it (Marx & Engels, 2008, p. 29):

When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.
With this understanding one can reveal how the materialization of social processes\textsuperscript{7} leads to the development of certain cultural products.\textsuperscript{8} These products are often seen as taking on a life of their own, apart from the very social processes that created them. For example, in looking at knowledge carriers there is a precedent set in Marx’s critiques of religion. In this analysis Marx claimed that “the foundation of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion; religion does not make man” (Marx & O’Malley, 1970, p. 131). But this does not mean that religion doesn’t matter. The asocial quality that religion takes on must itself be understood as produced socially by humans. This is because “religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself again... this state, this society, produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness because they are an inverted world” (\textit{ibid.}).

This line of reasoning also applies to scientific knowledge and its carriers, the religion and priests of conventional societies (Althusser, 2001). Academics make up the academy. But while the individuals make up the whole, this doesn’t mean that the whole can’t exert influence on the individual. The academics studying Northern Ireland (and academics generally), the knowledge they produce, and the institutions they belong to are often seen as existing beyond the fray of disputing social interests. This research seeks to deconstruct these myths. By saying this, it sides with scholars such as Lynch & Fuhrman (1991), who argued that the alleged “objectivity” and “impartiality” of science is itself a datum in need of explanation. The roles of knowledge carriers do not fully conform to deterministic laws, nor are they always self-consciously and successfully able to pursue their interests. This study acknowledges that these “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 2005, p. 103).

This challenges the naïve views concerning actors espoused in some of the new sociology of knowledge programs. For example, programs emphasizing laboratory studies have focused on the locally constructed character of knowledge, underestimating the extent to which actors, though able to engage their culture in an active manner, still cannot avoid responding to the historical and disciplinary contexts in which they find themselves (K.

\textsuperscript{7} For example, the peace process, developments within and around higher education, and the marketization of research.

\textsuperscript{8} Like the emergence of a specific epistemic community, research emphasis on aspects of knowledge, the knowledge industry, and transitioning lines between politics, power, and academia.
Knorr-Cetina, 1999; K. D. Knorr-Cetina, 2007; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). This research sees context and structure affecting what it is an actor “freely decides” to do. One must acknowledge it is similarly naïve, though, to assume that actors will easily be able to decide what their interests are and successfully pursue them. The social and historical conflicts and contradictions existing in a society at any given time can and often do hide actors’ real interests and/or threaten their conscious intentions to pursue them. The risk here is of overemphasizing the extent to which ideas produced by a society tend to uniformly support the “ruling class”, to borrow a term from the Marxist lexicon. Yet to this point one recalls research by Fuller (2002), who revealed that ideas produced to support one set of interests can and are often used to support another, even opposed set of interests. The position here is then that knowledge and its carriers are not detached from social interests, but rather that an understanding of these actors, their emergence, and how that knowledge is developed and evolves over time is made possible by discovering their interests, how they conflict, and at times coincide.

ARGUMENTS

Having said all of this, this research aims to test and argue several positions. It acknowledges the obvious fact that the advent of the Troubles complicated British and Irish intellectuals’ engagement with the Northern Ireland issue. Given the localized nature of the conflict and academics’ close geographic and social proximity to it would have likely caused any of their findings or positions concerning the Troubles to be seen as subjective, polemic, and/or partisan. Such positions and research could have been viewed as supporting one or the other partisans’ viewpoints. This would have caused reputational harm to intellectuals, and potentially also physical harm. However, with onset of the peace process and the engagement of some scholars such a Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry with consociationalism provided an opportunity to overcome such obstacles. This is our first assumption, that the onset of the peace process and scholars’ engagement with consociationalism provided the necessary boundary objects that allowed intellectuals to address and debate the various aspects of the conflict without risk of falling into the ideological pitfalls.

Next, because of the localized nature of the Northern Ireland conflict and its proximity to the U.K. and Ireland, the conflict was viewed as a regional dispute, anomalous and unique to the U.K. and Ireland. The localized and, according to some (Cox, 1997), provincial way in which the conflict was understood was further complicated by the existing international conflict management norms of the time. In the context of the Cold War
international conflict management took place on a self-help basis (Crawford, 2000). Here it is also important to highlight the fact that the dominant intellectual consensus on Northern Ireland was that the conflict had no solution (Guelke, 1994; R. Rose, 1976a). This changed with the ending of the Cold War and the internationalization of conflict resolution.

This research argues that these events changed the general intellectual and political habitus towards and paradigms for approaching conflict management. One of the main consequences of this was that many conflicts previously seen as regional or civil wars were now understood and treated as international conflicts that should be placed in and understood in a comparative framework (O’Leary, 2015). With these shifts academics began to understand, approach, and research the conflict in Northern Ireland in a different way. The internationalization of conflict management also had the consequence of raising the profile of academics who researched and/or attempted to study the Northern Ireland conflict as new resources (and a wider audience) emerged.

This coincided with the mass expansion of higher education in the U.K. and Ireland. The advent of neo-liberal education reforms in the 1980s and 1990s introduced new forms of “managerialism” in higher education, shifting the culture of universities from institutions of public learning to what some have called “academic enterprises”(Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch, Grummell, & Devine, 2012). The emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community began in the early 1990s. It further coalesced with the signing of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement of 1998. And following the signing of the Agreement and within the context a rapidly changing university environment, the utility offered by consociationalism, comparative methods, and the peace process aided in the expansion of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

**THESIS LAYOUT**

To present its findings, the first chapter of this research begins with a survey of the literature and debates around Northern Ireland. This includes a survey of the fundamental ideas associated with consociation theory and the various debates that arose out of its application to the Northern Ireland conflict both before and leading up to the Agreement. By looking at the literature which has arisen following the implementation of the Agreement it shows the shift in the emphasis of academic focus from historical interpretations and debates regarding consociationalism to an emphasis on interpreting and explaining the success of the Agreement and the peace process which has followed. This section of the chapter reveals that though the scholarship on Northern Ireland following the Agreement has been painstaking in
its efforts to explain and analyse various aspects of the Northern Ireland peace process and the ongoing peace building transition taking place in the region, there has been lack of focus and analysis on the transition of the academics and policymakers involved in this process. This will be accompanied by a general outline and review of the literature surrounding the role, nature, and study of knowledge in the social sciences. A review of this literature is important as this research is interested in the ways by which knowledge is produced in an academic discipline and how external forces might affect, shape, and link both knowledge and its producers.

This is folded in with the further conceptualizing of the boundary object. This thesis will be putting forward modifications to the interessement model discussed by Latour, Callon, and Law (Callon, 1999; Callon & Law, 1997; Latour, 1981, 1988; Law, 1986), urging a more holistic approach. It looks to utilize this concept in a way which displays that disciplines such as political science, much like the politics they study, are often marked by and develop alongside great internal conflict.

Chapter 2 lays out and details the method used for this research. At its very core this method is nothing more than a tool. This tool will act to “keep us erect while we navigate a terrain that moves and shifts as we attempt to pass through it” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 19). The tool utilized is a reflective method that uses narrative interviews. The structure of these interviews allows respondents to give their own account – to tell a story – of the various stages of their professional and personal development as a means of extracting the general from the unique or, rather, using the “micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009). In doing this it will also display the utility of employing such a technique.

The substantive chapters of this text will first look at what I call the “pre-epistemic community” period of the 1970s and 1980s. This is Chapter 3. This chapter will focus on the academic and political environment surrounding the study of Northern Ireland during this time. It aims to investigate why and how, irrespective of the various peace processes taking place during this period, no apparent epistemic community emerged. This will be supported using both interview materials and empirical evidence found (or rather not found) in publications emanating from the U.K. and Ireland. In this section, the argument will be put forward that irrespective of the peace processes taking place there was no clear episteme in relation to the study of Northern Ireland. This chapter will show that though no community existed regarding the study of Northern Ireland that the emergence and presence of a small cluster of actors existed. These scholars, though seen as an “eccentricity” (English, 2015), were writing on and addressing the issues concerning the North Ireland conflict. This chapter
will therefore look at the influence of such actors on the creation and emergence of the epistemic community that developed later.

Chapter 4 will focus on the emergence and development of the epistemic community during the late 1980s and into the 1990s leading up to the signing of the Agreement. Focusing specifically on the development of the peace process, changes in the academic and political environment, and the emergence of the various debates concerning solutions to the Northern Ireland issue. The goal here is to identify and address the central research question: *How and why does an epistemic community emerge?* But also, this chapter looks to identify and point to the greater socio-political changes taking place around academia in the U.K. and Ireland. It will identify and outline distinctions between the two areas as well as how this changing political and social environment affected academics and the political science discipline. It also seeks to analyse how academics are able (or unable) to navigate their own personal/political ties and background with Northern Ireland and how and if these variables impact their research.

Chapter 5 will focus on the community as it exists today and where it goes from here. It looks at the implications of the changing academic environment and the impact of variables such as the REF, the new managerialism of academic institutions, and increasing pressures regarding funding on research and researchers. The aim here will be to display the robustness of the boundary object in helping scholars adapt to such a changing environment. This will include its implications for the epistemic community and its evolution as the Northern Ireland case has increasingly becomes folded into wider discussions of conflict management.

Chapter 6 of this dissertation will address the notion of insiders and outsiders and the utility of the boundary object in bridging the two together. This discussion will largely be focused on the internal dynamics – and tensions – of the epistemic community. The aim will be to elicit further insights into the state of the “community” around this community. Whereas the other chapters are largely focused on addressing the central question of this thesis – *how and why does an epistemic community emerge?* – this chapter looks to investigate the boundaries of this community, as well as how members determine their (as well as others’) position(s) as an insider and outsider in relation to Northern Ireland and the members of the epistemic community.

Chapter 7 will be the conclusion of this text. It looks to review and re-assert the fundamental arguments and findings of this dissertation as well as address its limitations and ways forward for future research.
CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the knowledge surrounding the subject of Northern Ireland in the discipline of political science. But in looking at Northern Ireland one must look at the study of knowledge more generally. In looking at Northern Ireland, though, it should be made clear that the aim here is not to engage in a historical revision of the Troubles or the Northern Ireland peace process. This research does not wish to engage with the various historical (re)interpretations of the conflict, nor is it interested in “root” causes or conditions of the conflict. Neither does it look to position itself within the debates concerning the consociational makeup and effectiveness of the Agreement and the peace process which has followed. This has been done and will continue to be done for some time (For notable examples see: Horowitz, 2002; John McGarry & O’Leary, 2004; Taylor, 2009a). But this research will use this literature on Northern Ireland to assist in the overall aim of this project. This is to understand and uncover the processes, practices, and shifts in political science that explain the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

Firstly, this chapter looks at the ideas associated with consociation theory. It looks at the various debates (and complications) that arose out of its application to the Northern Ireland conflict both before and leading up to the Agreement. This work is important as it displays a series of intellectual shifts that have occurred prior to peace process as well as those following the implementation of the Agreement. The next step is to confront the role, nature, and study of the key piece to this research puzzle: knowledge. This is the literature on the sociology of knowledge. This literature is essential, as the ways by which knowledge is produced and how external forces affect and shape that production and its producers is key to understanding how and why an epistemic community emerges. This study particularly looks at the ways in which the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics has been explored and, in doing so, raises question regarding the ways these relationships might affect intellectuals’ choice and production of knowledge. In doing this it will highlight influence of

9 Recall from the introduction that this thesis utilizes Haas’ (1990, 1999; 2014) notion of “epistemic communities”, which constitutes “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (1989, 1992).
Bourdieu on this literature and its emphasis on intellectual choice as being based on the pursuit of intellectual status. In doing this the aim is to highlight the need for alternative understandings. Specifically, arguing for alternatives that consider that intellectuals’ individualized stories of selfhood may sometimes centre on their position in intellectual fields or other aspects of their reputations, but that academics’ considerations of status do not usually comprise the entirety of such narratives. Lastly, this chapter will develop its theoretical concept for explaining how and why the Northern Ireland epistemic community developed and what made this possible. This is the boundary object concept.

**Northern Ireland**

Northern Ireland is one of many examples of democratization, since the fall of Soviet Union, which has sought to utilize international support and intervention as a means of ending and managing protracted ethno-national conflict. These efforts at conflict management have adopted various theories of democratization. Northern Ireland is an example of a top-down approach that utilizes political accommodation mechanisms (Taylor, 2009a, p. 16). Similar approaches can be found in the South African (Taylor, 1992) and Bosnian peace agreements (Sandler & Schoenbrod, 2003), to name a few.

This literature has been informed greatly by theories utilizing “internal” democratic mechanisms for managing conflict groups in divided areas. Consociationalism is one of most influential among these. Arend Lijphart developed this theory through his investigation of democratic stability in the divided Dutch political system (Lijphart, 1969). Consociationalism has since been an important evolution in conflict regulation theory. It is rooted in the thinking of Carl J. Friedrich (1950), E. E. Schattschneider (1960), and Bernard Crick (1962), who stressed the idea that both conflict and reconciliation are essential to the democratic process.

For Lijphart, the Dutch example was evidence that conflict could be institutionalized into an existing political system as a means of creating peace and stability in divided societies. Liphart’s findings were consistent with previous research in the United States by David B. Truman (1951) who attributed the vitality of American democratic institutions to the citizens’ “multiple membership in potential groups” (p. 514). Similarly, Seymour Martin Lipset (1963) identified stable political relationships in America as having “crosscutting politically relevant associations” (p. 88). And Robert A. Dahl (1961) observed that democratic stability requires a commitment to democratic values or rules, not a commitment on the part of the electorate at large but on the part of the professional politicians who are connected through effective ties of political organization, that is, on the part of elites. These
ideas have formed the basis for consociational – also known as power sharing – thinking and is foundational for democratization and conflict management theory and practices not only in Northern Ireland but in Iraq, Kurdistan, Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Lebanon, and, more recently, Colombia (Sriram, 2008).

The utility of these ideas is that many can and do work harmoniously with each other and also be held independently (Rustow, 1970). This synthesis has resulted in an enormous body of writing that spans across political science and its subdisciplines. Dahl (1956), for instance, was one of the first to propose that in a polyarchy – system where minorities rule – the policies of successive governments tend to fall within a broad range of majority consensus. This thinking was revolutionary at the time, as it departed with the preoccupation with consensus in the World War II years. It accepted that democracy is a process of “accommodation” involving a combination of “division and cohesion” and of “conflict and consent” (Dahl, 1967; Rustow, 1970).

Lijphart’s application of his specific theory began as a critique of Gabriel Almond’s typology of democratic systems. Almond asserted that division in a democracy would lead to institutional instability and result in conflict. Lijphart claimed, however, that the history of Dutch democracy suggested something different. Again, he asserted that despite the Netherlands’ long history of religious and class cleavages, Dutch institutions prevailed. Lijphart concluded that Almond’s analysis failed to recognize that elite cooperation could result in long-term settlements and political stability. The term consociational democracy was coined in his later work, which utilized the term “power-sharing” more broadly to encapsulate various forms of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977).

Lijphart’s consociational model for democracy contains four main features: (1) “grand coalitions”, (2) “mutual veto”, (3) “proportionality”, and (4) segmental autonomy. In addition to this Lijphart lists other “favorable conditions” that might incline divided societies to adopt the consociation model. These include items such as numerical balance among groups, a multi-party system with dominant parties in each segment, small-country, crosscutting cleavages, overarching loyalties, and a tradition of elite accommodation (Lijphart, 1977).

When Lijphart began applying this theory to the Northern Ireland case he noted that consociation principles were already present in its previous failed peace attempts, such as the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973–1974. Regardless of its failure, Northern Ireland was evidence that governments can promote consociation in certain circumstances (Lijphart, 1975a). This application to Northern Ireland came under immediate criticism. Brian Barry
Lijphart’s theoretical application to Northern Ireland faced a much greater problem though. This was the prevailing intellectual and social paradigm which saw the region’s conflict as one with no enduring solution. At the time Lijphart began applying his theory to Northern Ireland, neither intellectuals or elites believed a consociational (or any other) model would offer a solution to the conflict (For example, Guelke, 1994; R. Rose, 1971, 1976a; Whyte, 1990). Lijphart himself admitted that though a consociational model was the best fit for Northern Ireland, it wasn’t likely to work given the longevity of the conflict and the regions culture of division (Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1975a). Though the discussions were earnest about different “solutions” to the problem – from power-sharing and joint authority, to legislating for equal rights and integrated education – none of them seemed viable in light of events on the ground and prevailing intellectual paradigms (J. Ruane & Todd, 1996). Because of the depth of the divide between the two communities and the fact that the costs of the conflict were never enough to force either of the protagonists to the negotiating table led many scholars to conclude that the conflict in Northern Ireland would persist indefinitely (Cox, 1997; O'Malley, 1993).

And, from an international point of view, the Troubles took place during the Cold War. International relations scholars such as Waltz (2008) have noted that during this time nation states took a “self-help” approach to international conflict resolution. Nations by and large stayed out of the internal affairs of others nations to avoid major conflicts that might ultimately involve the two dominant superpowers of the time (Waltz, 2008). Yet even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and following the settlement of other regional disputes in the
1990s, intellectuals remained unoptimistic regarding Northern Ireland. One prominent academic lamented that in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the wave of democratization taking place across the globe, and the possibility of achieving true peace in the Middle East and South Africa, such good fortune was probably beyond the realm of possibility in Northern Ireland (Guelke, 1994). This sense of what has been termed “widespread despair” based on “solid empirical foundations” was perpetuated by the belief that the main culprits of the conflict – the Provisional IRA – either could not or would not call off its campaign of military violence (B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993, p. 325).

Then John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary published *The Future of Northern Ireland* (1990b) with the aim of laying out the case for consociationalism in Northern Ireland. They specifically used consociationalism as a means of taking on the dominant paradigm that “the problem with Northern Ireland is that there is no solution” (R. Rose, 1976a, p. 139). This sparked a series of debates and controversies. The pair first began by re-evaluating the merits of consociationalism to Northern Ireland (See: B. O'Leary, 1989b; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1990).

Looking at O’Leary & McGarry’s work one can see striking parallels with Lijphart’s (1968) “politics of accommodation” model. Their modification to Lijphart’s theory makes a point to address previous criticisms by emphasizing the ethno-national nature of the conflict, noting that elites in Northern Ireland are not interested in assimilating the “other” group, at least in the short-term (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993). For this reason, McGarry and O’Leary emphasize the need for creating conditions which allow elite maneuverability regarding national allegiances through shared sovereignty, not as a transitional arrangement to a united Ireland or United Kingdom but as a durable settlement that could be changed only by weighted majorities (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995, 1996; B. O'Leary, 1993; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993). The aim of this is not to allow one group to oppress another but to achieve equality and proportionality between divided communities. They argue that this results in the eroding of discrimination and unrestrained majority control while also permitting cultural autonomy (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996; B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993).

Yet this theory was not without its critics in its application. Opponents of the model primarily argued that the consociational framework propagated the very divisions it was supposed to be disentangling. Paul Dixon (1996), for example, argued that such elite-centred models actually promote a non-representative form of democracy that would enhance hostilities between various ethnic groups by institutionalizing the segregation of the
populations. Consociationalism was therefore seen as rejecting the “one community” approach to politics offered by Northern Ireland’s existing political centre (Evans & Tonge, 2003). And scholars such as Dixon went so far as to argue that, given the intermixed nature of the ethno-national groups in Northern Ireland, consociationalism would result in a form of “ethnic cleansing” which segregationist models such as these could be seen as condoning (Paul Dixon, 1996).

By institutionalizing ethno-national cleavages in Northern Ireland many argued that the Agreement would ensure that, at least in the formalized political arena, possibilities for cultivating a political atmosphere that supersede ethnic divisiveness would be greatly hindered (McCann, 1993; McGovern, 1997; Wilford, 1992a). Similarly, scholars such as Wilford (1992a) argued that because the consociationalist supporters assume that ethno-nationalisms are primordial and exclusive, rather than relational, they advanced “a rather bleak view of humanity” and threatened to cast such divisions in stone (p. 31).

The debates became increasingly hostile between advocates of the differing prescriptions for the conflict, prime examples being those between Paul Dixon, Brendan O’Leary, and John McGarry in journals such as Irish Political Studies (See: Paul Dixon, 1996; John McGarry & O’Leary, 1996). These debates weren’t limited to the dispute between two or three individuals, though. Rather they formed a staple of the political diet for many in Northern Ireland throughout the 1990s. Its framework was not just condemned by and debated between academics but by Irish republicans, by unionists, and by the political parties that represented what they insisted was the “middle ground” between the two ethno-national blocs (e.g. members of the Alliance, Democratic Left, and the Women’s Coalition) (See for example: J. McGarry & O’Leary, 2006).

O’Leary and McGarry were seen as, among other things, developing an “uncritical acceptance of the primacy and permanency of ethnicity” (Taylor, 1994). Several scholars maintained that a consociation would not resolve the conflict but instead would “institutionalize” divisions, casting them in “marble” (Rooney, 1998). Its basic principles were seen as incompatible with democratic stability and, therefore, a consociational democracy in Northern Ireland would be “impermanent”, “dysfunctional”, and “unworkable” and was declared a “macabre” parody of “real democracy” (McCartney, 2000). And some went so far as to claim that consociationalists – especially O’Leary – were “segregationists”, whose message could be “condoning… ethnic cleansing” (Paul Dixon, 1996; P. Dixon, 2000).

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10 Other such debates can be found in (Paul Dixon, 1997a; Gilligan & Tonge, 1997; McGovern, 1997, 2000).
Viewing the Northern Ireland conflict in this way was seen by many scholars as “presumptive, inscriptive and far from progressive” (See arguments in: Taylor, 2006, p. 223). While its supporters, such as O’Leary (1999), asserted that such claims are “either utopian, myopic, partisan or a combination of all three” (Found in: McGovern, 2000, p. 141).

Yet irrespective of these disagreements there is one consensus among these academics – that consociationalism has played a central part in Northern Ireland’s intellectual and political discourse. The evidence of this can be found in the fact scholars have developed a name for these debates. They call it Northern Ireland’s “meta-conflict” – the intellectual debates about the nature of the conflict and developing the appropriate prescriptions to tackle it (John McGarry & O'Leary, 1995, pp. 320-326, 334-338). Proponents of the theory point to its success as it has widely been exported for establishing power-sharing agreements in various divided societies, also, pointing out the success of Northern Irish political parties negotiating a consociation. The achievement of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement in 1998 certainly confronted criticisms against consociationalism which claimed that it is only achievable in societies where divisions are moderate (For example, Horowitz, 2002). They advocate that the framework of the Agreement, and its subsequent success, has reversed the trends of criticisms against political science by scholars such as Thomas A. Spragens (1973) and David M. Ricci (1984). These individuals claimed that political science has long suffered from a shortage of useful findings or meaningful research. The success and endurance of the Agreement and the consociational principles that underpin it demonstrate that the discipline has created something that matters. Critics and advocates of the theory agree that it has created the necessary links between empirical enquiry and normative theory (Munck & Snyder, 2007; Taylor, 2008, 2009a).

In lieu of the Agreement and following the apparent success of consociationalism, one notices a shift in the scholarship on Northern Ireland. Before the Agreement and the process that led to it, Northern Ireland was widely seen as a region plagued by conflict with no solution in sight. During this time analyses focused on explaining the root causes of the conflict, discussions which largely took place between historians rather than political scientists (English, 2015). Then, as we have discussed with the onset of the peace process and the application of consociationalism political scientists in the region focused discussions on the merits of various “power-sharing” models. From there the analyses have shifted to those that emphasize and explain the importance of “external” state relations as a way of explaining

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11 For example, other power-sharing models have been utilized and compared with Northern Ireland in places such as Bosnia & Macedonia (J. McEvoy, 2015), Iraq (Nations, 2004), and Lebanon (M. Kerr, 2006).
the successful implementation of the Agreement. These approaches have sought to expand on
the existing consociational framework, placing emphasis on the links between the “internal”
power-sharing elements and the “external” variables of intergovernmentalism as way of
examining and explaining the Northern Ireland peace process (Sircar, 2006). Such
approaches draw on the frameworks found in the comparative politics literature as well as
writings on nationalism.

As an example, Stefan Wolff’s (2003) examination of the roles that “external” powers
played in the power-sharing settlements in Northern Ireland, as well as a breadth of other
case studies. Wolff’s work reflects the influence on research by Rogers Brubaker (1996),
which utilized a triptych understanding of ethno-national conflicts. Wolff’s theoretical
framework focuses on the ethno-territorial nature of cross-border conflict by examining the
external conditions that ensure the long-term stability of a settlement. Wolff pays a
considerable amount of attention to the role the international community plays in ending
conflict. Out of this framework he offers three possible explanations for stable solutions: (1)
Internal settlements, either through integration or consociation; (2) External settlement,
secession/irredenta – implying a change in the sovereignty over a debated territory; (3)
Bilateral settlements – consociation with permanent and formal external involvement along
with a democratized condominium – a system where a territory is ruled by two or more
nations. Condominium is a possibility when the definitive aims of both groups are at such
opposite extremes with respect to one another that there are only a limited number of
possibilities for jointly executing territorial power sharing (Kogej, 2006; Sircar, 2006, pp. 17-

Wolff presents the Northern Ireland settlement as a consociation with the permanent
institutional involvement of the external ethnic minority’s kin-states – Ireland and the United
Kingdom – that was reached through the Agreement in 1998. The involvement of the U.S.
and the EU furthered external pressures exerted on both communities, allowing a political
agreement to be reached. Wolff’s interpretation presents Northern Ireland within a now
popular comparative analysis of various other settlements that had proven to be successful.

This comparative theme has been overwhelmingly adopted by academics in Northern
Ireland and beyond. Michael Kerr’s (2006) examination of the power-sharing agreements in
Northern Ireland and Lebanon is an example. Regarding Northern Ireland, Kerr concludes
that regional stability was supported by the “intergovernmental unity of purpose” represented
by the London–Dublin joint strategy for settling the region’s constitutional dispute between
“British” and “Irish” ethno-national aspirations (M. Kerr, 2006). This work brings together
the connections between “external” intergovernmentalism and “internal” power-sharing as means of explaining the peace process.

While Sicar (2006) expanded consideration of ethno-territorial conflicts – Northern Ireland and Bosnia – in which there are two conflict groups with corresponding “reference states”. “Reference states” are internationally recognized states with co-nationals residing in a disputed territory. Arguing that much of the focus on Northern Ireland has centred on elite accommodation within the conflict zone, viewing other agents as “external” to the dispute. The settlement following the Agreement exhibits the traits of transnational consociation, with the strong intergovernmental Dublin–London axis acting as the reliable long-term guarantors of the settlement (Sircar, 2006).

A more recent example is Joanne McEvoy’s (2015) investigation of international organizations and institutional rules in promoting cooperation between political elites representing the contending groups in divided societies – Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and Bosnia. McEvoy argues that Northern Ireland, alongside the others, offers a prescriptive example of how internal and external incentives provide a unique political space of joint governance or accommodation – consociation – between political elites. The success of Northern Ireland’s consociation is the outcome of multilateral bargaining among internal and external actors. The bargaining over rewards (e.g. arms decommissioning, devolution, and all-Ireland institutions) and compliance with external incentives for power sharing ultimately helped elites negotiate the constitutional issue (J. McEvoy, 2015).

The emphasis on analysis and explanation of the peace process and its success is not limited to book and article publications. It is also reflected in the PhD research projects that focus on Northern Ireland in the post-Agreement period. Dissertations emanating from U.K. and Irish institutions have produced a number of research projects that look to explain the success of the peace process by looking at the design of executive formation under the Agreement (J. McEvoy, 2006), building and sustaining trust in local district councils alongside the structural reforms arising from the Agreement (Goldie, 2008), the role of exogenous actors – such as British, Irish, and U.S. officials – in providing incentives and disincentives to share power (Clancy, 2010), and the role of third-party mediators in implementing various stages of the Agreement (Walsh, 2014). Yet this is only the tip of the iceberg. Peer-reviewed articles published in leading Irish, British, and North American academic journals examining and comparing the merits of the Northern Ireland model and
various aspects power sharing in the last decade alone number almost three hundred. These figures are visualised in Table 2 below.\textsuperscript{12}

**Table 2: Articles Comparing Northern Ireland’s Power-Sharing Model to other Regions Since 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Articles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ProQuest (2016)*

In addition to the articles published on the success of power-sharing in Northern Ireland, a multitude of research centres have been established throughout the U.K. and Ireland since the Agreement. Many of these enterprises have focused their efforts on research pertaining to power-sharing and comparative applications of aspects of the Northern Ireland case to areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia as means of successful peace building (see Table 2.1). Many institutes, such as the Centre for the Study of Divided Society at Kings College London, see themselves as platforms and flagships for the development of scholarly enterprises to further knowledge on ethnic-conflict regulation, peace processes, third-party intervention and truth and reconciliation processes (Kings, 2016). And, as with many of these institutes, Northern Ireland is at the centre of these analyses. Research efforts on Northern Ireland are therefore aimed at explaining the success of the peace process in Northern Ireland, identifying the variables that made it possible, and placing them in a comparable context (For example: Drake & McCulloch, 2011; John

\textsuperscript{12} The chart displays only peer-reviewed articles, in major political science journals, from the U.K., Ireland, the United States, and Canada, from 2006–2016. The publications are specifically about the topic of Northern Ireland and power-sharing. It should be noted that in these articles Northern Ireland may not be central topic but its model is the central point of (favourable) comparison for other countries related to power-sharing. Again with this chart publications from PSI were excluded given the journals (lack) of international ranking and due to complicaitons with factors concerning impact as referenced in table 1.1.
This above table displays some 13 organizations established in the last 18 years in the U.K. and Ireland. Five of these 13 organizations were set up in 2012 alone and more than half of these institutes have been established in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The importance of research pertaining to power-sharing and comparative applications of aspects of the Northern Ireland case to these institutes is displayed not only in their inception but also in the funding they have received from the governments. The Tony Blair Chair at University of Liverpool (est 2008) is an example of this. Despite being established during the onset of the global financial crises and during a time of dramatic austerity measures in the Republic of Ireland, the Blair Chair received a €7.5 million grant from the Irish government. This grant displayed the governments recognition of the necessity and centrality of Irish Studies and understanding the peace-building programmes within communities experiencing conflict (Purcell, 2008).

The literature on the peace process from its initiation in the early 1990s until the signing of the Agreement reveals several things. The first is the aforementioned intellectual schisms arising between academics who adopted different approaches and perspectives in their interpretations of the Troubles and their mixed, and sometimes hostile, responses to the proposed power-sharing agreements. A prime of example of the hostile positions taken

### Table 2.1: List of Research Institutes & Centres Established in the U.K. and Republic of Ireland Since 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Research Organization</th>
<th>Year Est</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trinity College Dublin</td>
<td>Centre for Post-Conflict Justice</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College Dublin</td>
<td>Institute for British Irish Studies</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin City University</td>
<td>Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University of Ireland, Galway</td>
<td>Whitaker Institute for Innovation and Societal Change</td>
<td>2012</td>
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between the differing academic interpretations of the conflict and animosities over different prescriptions for the conflict can be seen in the debates between Paul Dixon, Brendan O’Leary, and John McGarry in journals such as *Irish Political Studies* (B. O'Leary, McGarry, & Šālih, 2005). Yet the differences over consociational versus civil society and integrationist approaches to conflict resolution were only some of the cleavages between academics during this time (Paul Dixon, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; John McGarry & O'Leary, 1996; N. Porter & Aughey, 1997). Other areas of dispute were focused on issues like whether security efforts designed to alter allegiances of militaries and paramilitaries could be successful (McSweeney & Smith, 1996), perceptions of Northern Ireland as a part of greater neo-liberal peace agendas (Crighton, 1998; Lipschutz et al., 1998), and the role of potential third party actors in mediating the Agreement (Arthur, 1997; Byrne, 1995; MacGinty, 1997; O'Clery & Guelke, 1997). These are only a few of the examples.

What is important about these disputes is not that they took place. Academics arguing is hardly unique to either Northern Ireland or political science literature. Rather, what is needs highlighting is the way they fell to the wayside following the success of the Agreement. Looking at this literature in the post-Agreement era there was, and continues to be, a widespread theme whereby the Agreement became the framework for peace in Northern Ireland (and beyond). Today, the Agreement is the centrepiece of political and conflict analysis in the region and a piece of public policy that almost every academic in the field of political science goes along with. The nexus of this acceptance centers on scholar’s acknowledgement that through the Agreement’s multi-layered institutional power-sharing arrangements, a unique political space for the people of Northern Ireland has been created. This arrangement has allowed the region to gain greater autonomy and has, in turn, created significant cross-border opportunities for co-operation (P. Bew, 2006; Evans & Tonge, 2003; Hazelton, 2000; Kaufmann & Patterson, 2006; John McGarry & Bose, 2002; J. Ruane & Todd, 2001; Tannam, 2001).

It should be made clear here that whether the impact and effectiveness of the Agreement has been debated or not within and between the various disciplines is not under

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13 Other debates can be found between Paul Dixon (1996) and McGarry & O’Leary (1996) in *Irish Political Studies*.

14 There are dissenting opinions and critics of the Agreement and the peace process who reject both it and the literature on it on the basis that the political class simply act(ed) to reinforce Northern Ireland’s union with the United Kingdom, at the expense of Irish Republicanism, and aims to further greater neo-liberal economic agendas. Yet these views are not expressed within the mainstream of academic writing but can be found in alternative sources such as *The Blanket* and *The Pensive Quill* and often by individuals who do hold doctorates in political science but do not hold positions within academic institutions (e.g. Anthony McIntyre, 2008; O Ruairc, 2014).
question (For examples see: Coakley, 2011; Paul Dixon, 2013; Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson, 2007; Horowitz, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2006; John McGarry & O’Leary, 2004; Robin Wilson, 2009). Yet even these debates fall within research themes that look at the theoretical merits and critiques of consociationalism (and consociationalists) and its influence on the peace process. Yet nowhere within these debates do the constitutional merits of the Agreement come into question. Since the Agreement was implemented it has been widely embraced and overwhelmingly endorsed by the academic and political community. Scholars and politicians like Lord Professor Paul Bew, David Trimble as well as a host of others acknowledged that “the Agreement ‘ended the Cold War’ within the Island of Ireland” (Belfast Telegraph, 2013). Even the most ardent critics of consociationalism note that they “never questioned the merits of the Agreement. It’s great. I just argue that the Agreement isn’t a consociational one” (Dixon, 2015). The point is that the characterization of the Northern Ireland conflict and the subsequent peace process has shifted drastically since the Agreement. What was once seen as an insurmountable conflict is now seen as a leading method for conflict resolution. Since the signing of the Agreement in 1998 applying Northern Ireland’s lessons to other global conflicts has been widely touted, for better or worse, as a veritable cottage industry and the only export in the region (For a few examples see: Paul Dixon, 2011; Knox, 2001; Lustick, 1997).

THE KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE

This naturally raises question as to the conditions that establish such norms and how certain forms of knowledge become dominate (or exportable) in a discipline. The existence of hierarchies among knowledge carriers and how knowledge within a discipline becomes dominant has been of concern within the sociology of knowledge. The earliest writings in this field suggest that thinkers’ desire for movement within those hierarchies (search for status) could influence the ideas they hold and promote (See for example: Gouldner, 1967; Mannheim, Wirth, & Shils, 1936). Yet although these scholars understood the quest for status to be important, no overarching theory of intellectual life centred on this objective emerged until the 1970s. Since then three powerful theoretical themes have emerged.

The first of these was Collins’s (1975, 1998) theory that intellectual life revolves around a view of the emotional dynamics underlying all face-to-face encounters (R. Collins, 1987). Whatever an encounter’s manifest purpose, its participants are driven to come away either feeling solidarity with other participants or feeling dominant over them. According to Collins, encounters in the intellectual arena that generate emotions of these kinds are those in
which thinkers are recognized, because of their ideas, to be members of an intellectual group or intellectual leaders. He therefore reasons that intellectuals formulate their ideas with the aim of winning the “attention” of their colleagues – a willingness to “listen to” (Collins, 1998, p. 38) and seriously engage with another’s arguments.

The second theme is associated with the sociology of ideas. It attends to thinkers’ quests for status (Bourdieu 1971, 1988, 2000; also, see Ringer 1990). Bourdieu (1988) argues that as the relative independence of intellectuals from the realms of economic or political power was institutionalized in the modern university, what came to be prized in intellectual fields was “scientific success and specifically intellectual prestige” (p. 99). Yet the autonomy of intellectual judgement is never complete. For Bourdieu, intellectuals are not vulgar apologists for their class. Their socio-economic backgrounds do however endow them with different kinds and amounts of social, cultural, and intellectual capital. Scholars such as Peter Shirlow and Aaron Edwards, as examples, noted that it was their backgrounds in various “working class” unionist areas of Northern Ireland which affords them a certain “insider” access to these communities. This social location gives them a certain capital in terms of conducting research on and developing insights regarding such communities. These scholars note that this capital advantages or disadvantages them in the ongoing struggle to secure prestigious disciplinary and institutional affiliations (see also Gross 2002; 2008). This struggle takes place subconsciously, and because of this an intellectual “knows nothing of the base calculations of careerist ambition” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 37). Academic institutions and departments also struggle for prestige by strategically emphasizing certain intellectual orientations, approaches, and concerns. Everything else being equal, Bourdieu suggests, individual thinkers tend to be drawn toward the intellectual approaches associated with their current institutional locations or with the institutional locations to which they aspire. Because this is so, and because an intellectual’s socio-economic background affects his or her chances of securing an academic post, homology comes to be established between positions in social space and positions in the space of ideas (Bourdieu 1988).

The third theme emphasizing status-based choice underwrites many of these studies in the sociology of knowledge and has been greatly influenced by the previous work of Bourdieu. These studies have set out to show that knowledge claims can only be effectively advanced if, in the eyes of various audiences, the claims-makers possess “credibility” (See: Charmaz, 2011; Collins, 1998; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Shapin, 1994). Credibility is understood as a characteristic or status that some agents – by the practices they engage in, their institutional position, prior research record, or other qualifications – are judged to have.
Credibility serves to guarantee the veracity of their claims, even when others do not scrutinize these claims. Credibility is a valuable commodity for which thinkers contend. This also what Bourdieu (1986) referred to as “capital”. In certain circumstances, thinkers may choose between otherwise equally plausible ideas depending on how those choices would affect their stocks of credibility (Camic, 1992).

These theories of status-based choice have provided analytical weight in relation to explanations concerning knowledge claims in professional literature. This has been particularly apparent in evidence-based practices in the field of social work (Hyland, 2003), the effects of performance-based research funding on academic elites within the university system (Gambrill, 2011), the developments in knowledge selection and the evolution of international political economy field (Cohen, 2011), and the implications of entrepreneurialism and the seeking of prestige in higher education institutions (Breault & Callejo-Pérez 2012) (Hicks, 2012) (Hicks, 2012). Breault & Callejo-Pérez’s (2012) work is of particular interest as they show that prestige, a term they link with status under a Bourdieuan framework, is the modern currency in U.S. universities. Intellectual elites and administrators are constantly seeking this capital to enhance the status of their institution. Prestige creates meaning for the members within the institution and also secures the future of the university by enabling it to bring in top students and top grant-writing faculty. Considering such findings, researchers have begun to ask whether desires for power and status are the only social factor that directly influences intellectual choice?

In the last two decades’ theoretical trends have roughly sought to answer such questions with an ardent no. Gross (2002, 2008) became increasingly interested in the role that individualized stories about who one is, one’s past experiences, and one’s plans for the future play in human life (for earlier influences see also Castells 1997; Giddens 1991; Lash and Urry 1987; Levine 1995; Sennett 1998). This literature has largely argued that self-narratives are crucial points where the individual and society intersect. Scholars like Cohen (1994), Gross (2002), and Camic (1995, 2008) have called for some new avenues in the sociology of ideas. Avenues that bring to reality the experiences individuals have not only provide the “facts” that their self-narratives make sense of, but they also provide the concepts, categories, metaphors, frames of meaning, and plot lines that underpin them.

This becomes important to the study of Northern Ireland because an academic field may be said to exist when a coherent body of knowledge is developed to define a subject of inquiry (Cohen, 2011). Out of this body of knowledge, recognizable standards are developed to train and certify “specialists”, employment opportunities arise within universities, learned
societies are created to promote study and dialogue, and publishing sites are set up to disseminate new ideas and analysis. An institutionalized network of scholars is born that has its own distinct set of boundaries, rewards, and careers.

The Northern Ireland epistemic community offers an interesting case in relation to this. Irrespective of the fact that Northern Ireland as a subject of inquiry has existed for more than forty years, a recognizable institutionalized network of scholars has only come into being in the last twenty-five. Can this emergence be explained simply by the status-based calculations of a few individuals? If so, how were incentives and disincentives, which may or may not have existed before the emergence, overcome? And, as highlighted previously, during a substantial part of this period, the scholars were largely divided across this field. Because an academic field rests on ideas that train them how to think about incidents (i.e. how they work, are evaluated, explained, or resolved), a sociology of ideas that looks at scholars individually and the community of scholars collectively adds to an understanding of where a field of ideas comes from, how it originated, and how it develop(ed) over time.

Nothing within the analyses on Northern Ireland explains how academic debates that once seemed either so resolved or so contentious in their respective interpretive camps before the Agreement have acquiesced so markedly to interpretations of the process that has followed its implementation. Though many of the works reviewed here offer a variety of insights into the apparent success of the Northern Ireland peace process, they don’t offer explanations of the processes that made this academic transition possible. Any writings concerning Northern Ireland aiming to explain or account for the lack of academic literature and publication on this subject prior to the current (and ongoing) peace process have only touched upon the lack of engagement on the Northern Ireland issue on the part of British journals (e.g. Cox, 1998; S. Porter & O'Hearn, 1995), and they only done so superficially – stating more personal reflection than empirical findings.

Nor has there been anything written which addresses and looks at the role (and at times absence) of academics in the U.K. and Ireland studying Northern Ireland. What where the barriers (personal, professional, or political) that prevented this, if any? What changed and how?

Certain pioneering academics in the field of Northern Ireland have recently voiced their personal reflections. Richard Rose (2014), for example, recently released a series of memoirs reflecting on his research and contribution in this field. Yet this work has not looked at the greater community nor sought to elicit insights into how the landscape of political science has changed in relation to this subject. Early work by scholars such as Rupert Taylor
(1988) touch on this subject through his investigation of Queens University of Belfast. This research highlights the challenges the university faced during the period of the Troubles and how the external societal issues that plagued Northern Ireland found their way into the university. Taylor (1988) specifically highlights how the conflict eroded the university’s national standing and points to the disproportionate increase in internal promotions of Protestants as compared to Catholics.

More recent work done by Lynch, Grummel, & Dympna (2012) has revealed the influences of neo-liberal marketization on the higher education in Ireland. They display how the “new managerialist” approach to higher education has altered the culture of universities and lead to major gender biases in female academic appointments. But the emphasis of this research has focused on individual and country-specific universities rather than the knowledge producers within these institutions and the disciplines that they reside in. Thus, there is a lack in exploring the “human quality” of the Northern Ireland epistemic community of political science.

AGENTS, STRUCTURES, AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION

This “human” relationship with and development of knowledge has been a philosophical problem in political writings since Graeco-Roman times. Plato in *Theaetetus* was perhaps the first to address this issue by adopting a scientific approach to knowledge, resting his ontology on epistemological foundations (Found in: P. Stern, 2008). Thematic to this literature is the acknowledgement that all social differences have social origins and are thus subject to human control (Stehr & Meja, 2005). A wide range of social, economic, and political factors can shape the origin, structure, and content of human consciousness. Traditional social science analyses have focused on questions such as the relationship between knowledge and ideology (Bershady, 1973), how valid and reliable knowledge claims pertaining to the external world are based on sense perceptions (See writings in: Greenough, Pritchard, & Williamson, 2009), the presuppositions required for the production of knowledge (Turner, 1993), and the use of language in constructing knowledge claims (Chomsky, 1985, 1988; Marques & Venturinha, 2012). In most of these analyses, knowledge, knowing, and the knower are reduced to the relationship between ideas and theory or between individual subjects (knowers) and objects (the known) (Stehr & Meja, 2005).

One of the first explanations is Marx’s sub-and-superstructure scheme. This position argues that there is, under certain historical conditions, a predominance of economic realities and a determination of the ideological superstructure by socio-economic processes (Marx,
Engels, & Hobsbawm, 1998). Marx’s conception of the relationship between social structure and culture remains a major leitmotif in the relationship between knowledge and its producers, though these explanations are often complex, as his positions changed somewhat over time (Coser, 1977). Simply put, though, Marx asserts that knowledge can be traced to the life conditions and the historical situations of those who uphold and produce it. This is true whether the knowledge produced is considered revolutionary or conservative. For Marx:

the existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular age presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class. The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of the ruling class. When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence (Taken from: Coser, 1977, p. 53).

Academics (whom Marx refers to as ideologists) and the political representatives of a class need not share in all the material characteristics of that class. What they share and express is the overall cast of mind of that class.

Conversely there are the contributions of the German Sociologist, Karl Mannheim. Mannheim asked where the existential bases of cognitive products were located, what the correlation between these cognitive products and existential bases were, and under what conditions or at what point such correlations could be observed. This scholarship highlighted that knowledge in the social and political world is connected to being (seinsverbunden) rather than class. Knowledge can therefore vary according to an individual’s social location (Mannheim, 1930; Meja & Stehr, 1990). There is a distinction between “static” and “dynamic” thinking that recognizes the social characteristics of knowledge and adapts to them. Knowledge in the present is characterized by a competition between three alternative interpretations of existence.15 This hermeneutic problem is based on the relationship between the whole (structure) and its parts (agents). Mannheim suggests that the differences between art, the natural sciences, and philosophy regarding “truth claims” are that science, unlike art, always tries to prove or disprove a theory. Art can coexist with more than one world view and philosophy falls somewhere in between the two extremes (Longhurst, 1988). Mannheim’s work suggests the “danger of relativism”, where a historical process yields a cultural product. Scholars like Longhurst (1988) have argued that if thought is relative to a single historical period, it may be unavailable to another historical period (pp. 7-9). But if

15 These include “the knower”, “the known”, and “the to be known”, which were based on psychology, logic, and ontology.
knowledge and ideas are bound to a specific location within social structures and historical processes, there is a “universal relativism”. If this is so and if all truth is relative and all thought existentially determined, how can anyone’s thoughts claim immunity from this (Coser & Merton, 1975)?

These debates go on ad infinitum (See: Morgan, 2016). Yet a consensus has developed that knowledge can become functionalized with increased social conflict, differences in group values, attitudes, and modes of thinking about other groups. These differences often developed to the point where the orientations that groups previously had in common become increasingly overshadowed by incompatible differences (R. K. Merton, 1957, pp. 367-369). Therefore, not “only do groups develop different universes of discourse, but the existence of any one universe challenges the validity and legitimacy of the other” (Stehr & Meja, 2005, p. 10). This sparked new interests in understanding the variety and forms of contested knowledge that science has made available (See: Shapin, 1995). Science, in its various disciplines, has become the chief source of knowledge in society. As the availability of knowledge continues to increase, it drastically widens the possibilities of social action and therefore suggests that the investments in, production, distribution, and reproduction of knowledge have greater social implications (Stehr, 2005; Stehr & Meja, 2005). This increases the need for investigating knowledge, its creators, and the social contexts and events they exist within.

The problematization of the societal role of knowledge will be thematic in this discourse on Northern Ireland. Norbert Elias (1987) investigated the social role of the carriers of knowledge, such as intellectuals, professionals, and cultural elites, and the civilizational transformation in forms of knowledge. Such research focused on the consumption of knowledge, conceptualizing knowledge as something like a dependent variable. Yet over last several decades the emphasis of research has shifted almost entirely to the production of knowledge (For example see work by: Gibbons, 1994; Latour, Woolgar, & Salk, 1986; M. Lynch, 2005; Stehr & Grundmann, 2011). The claims here being that the societal orientation of science will assure what kind of knowledge we have in science and what social processes are responsible for the inner structure of knowledge and its conceptual apparatus.

The transformation of modern societies into knowledge societies has given experts an increased impact and influence on economic, technological, and public policy issues (Stehr & Grundmann, 2011). This transformation has caused science, and scientists, to have an increasingly co-determinate role in setting the political agenda (Stehr & Meja, 2005). Science is often responsible for discovering the problems that a society must address, or solutions to
them. This has developed into a field of political activity that Stehr (2005) has called “knowledge politics”. It calls on researchers to present new questions on the social role of knowledge and knowledge carriers in the field of politics. This has resulted in an array of research focusing on policy issues such as biotechnology (Stehr, 2004), climate change and the environment (Grundmann, 2007; Sarewitz, 2004), and new “converging technologies” (Fuller, 2009), as well as a host of other topics.

Yet the development of these knowledge societies and knowledge politics have occurred alongside great social changes. The advent of various peace agreement and accords following the Cold War in places such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and South Africa are among some of these. Northern Ireland is just one example of a society plagued by acute social conflict coupled with abundant social disorganization and reorganization. As mentioned previously, research by Merton (1972; 1957) noted that during such times of polarization and conflict in a society, contending claims of truths also become polarized. In this way knowledge, and the products of knowledge, become functionalized, interpreted, and funnelled through various social movements in terms of their presumed social, economic, political, and psychological sources and functions (R. Merton, 1972).

With the advent of large social changes one comes upon the contemporary relevance of longstanding problems concerning knowledge and knowledge carriers, namely, patterned differentials among social groups and strata in access to certain types of knowledge. This is what some have termed “insider doctrines” (Anderson & Herr, 1999; Griffith, 1998; R. Merton, 1972). Social movements, particularly within knowledge communities, both during and following social conflicts, are often formed based on ascribed status. Inclusion in these movements is based on who you are rather than what you are. This involves public affirmations of pride in an individual’s ascribed status and solidarity with collectivities that have long been socially and culturally downgraded (See: R. Merton, 1968; R. Merton, 1972; Michael Polanyi, 1959, 1964, 1973).

In extreme forms, knowledge groups can exert epistemological claims that they have monopolistic access to a field or type of knowledge. The weaker more empirical forms of these claims assert that some groups possess a privileged access to knowledge, with other groups having the ability to obtain that knowledge for themselves but at greater risks and costs (R. Merton, 1972, pp. 10-11). Marx (1936) first highlighted this noting that after a capitalist society reached its pinnacle of development, the location of one class of individuals would enable it to achieve an understanding of society exempt from false consciousness (See: Lukács, 1971, pp. 47-81, 181-209), while Weber’s (1922) notion of Wertbeziehung suggested
that differing social locations affect how problems are selected for investigation (pp. 146–214). These knowledge doctrines can crudely be vernacularized into “you got to be one to understand one” or “you got to be one to understand what’s worth understanding”.

Early studies of the epistemological doctrines of “insiderism” were linked to forms of ethnocentrism. Here insiderism “views things where one’s own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” and, going further, where “a group nourishes its own pride and vanity . . .” (Sumner, 1940, p. 13). Caplow (1964) spoke of the tendency of members of an organization to upwardly distort or overestimate its prestige and value. This is what he called “aggrandizement effect” (ibid.). Lasswell (1935) similarly spoke of the tendency of any social formation to bellicosely glorify and extoll their status and collectivity. This is important to the study of Northern Ireland’s epistemic community since this research shows that these tendencies are exacerbated under extreme situations (such as the outbreak of conflict or peace), as scientists have often allowed their status as nationals to dominate their position as scientists (R. Merton, 1972).

This all simply suggests that the epistemological claims of an insider group to have monopolistic or privileged access to social truth develop under certain social and historical conditions. Under these conditions the social groups and/or strata that are seen to be “on the rise” develop a revolutionary élan. They often do so with ambitions for larger shares of influence, power, and control over their social and political domain, finding various expressions, among them claims to a unique access to knowledge (R. Merton, 1968, 1972; R. K. Merton, 1957).

The explorations into the relationship between power, knowledge, and politics have been inspired by the thinking of Foucault (1970; 1979; 1987) and his contemporaries. His research discovered that the growth of the state, the development of the disciplines of administrative and civil services, and the rise of professionals intrinsically linked to state projects, plans, and practices often conduct the conduct of subjects (Foucault, Rabinow, & Rose, 2003, pp. vi-xxxii). This work brought into question the “knowledge of life and the government of life” (Foucault et al., 2003, p. xxii). Foucault stresses that to analyse the routes that link knowledge to practices of normalization or government is not to reduce the truth to a mere effect of such practices. Rather, this research suggests that truth is often a mere legitimation or functional support for power. Knowledge is governed by rules, and rule-makers, that exist on various hierarchal planes and rest along various epistemological boundaries. An individual’s position on this plane often determines what can be said truthfully at any given time, the criteria of evidence for establishing the truth, forms of proof,
and the very objects of which they speak. This is even found in the knowledge of the positive sciences which takes humans in their various states of reality as its object (Foucault et al., 2003). In any case, once an institutionalized network of scholars is born they develop their own distinct set of boundaries, rewards, and careers.

**Boundaries and Objects**

Northern Ireland as a region and a subject is familiar with boundaries. From a disciplinary standpoint, Northern Ireland exists within a subdiscipline of political science that is conducted by an extremely diverse group of actors. These actors consist of researchers from different disciplines, amateurs, politicians, and professionals making the discipline ever more heterogeneous. Despite this heterogeneity the discipline requires cooperation. Cooperation enable individuals to create common understandings, to ensure reliability across domains, and to gather information that retains its integrity across time, space, and local contingencies. This creates the inevitable tension between those with divergent viewpoints and their need to collaborate and develop generalizable findings.

There seems to be a myth surrounding academia that it is characterized by a collective consensus. But examining the actual work organization of scientific enterprises, there is no such consensus (See: M. Kerr, 2006; John McGarry & O’Leary, 2007; B. O’Leary, 2005; Taylor, 2009a). Disciplines like political science, much like the politics they study, are often marked by and develop alongside great internal conflict. What researchers have shown in examining disciplines such as biology and zoology is that scientific work neither loses its internal diversity nor is consequently retarded by lack of consensus (See for example: Hughes, 1971; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; J. M. Ruane & Cerulo, 2008). Consensus is not necessary for cooperation and the successful conduct of scientific research.

This fundamental sociological finding which holds true in the life and health sciences also applies to the Northern Ireland epistemic community and the discipline in which it is situated. Yet unlike in other disciplines, political scientists are focusing on and, often, located within specific areas of conflict. This presents unique problems in trying to ensure integrity of information in the presence of diversity and, at times, controversy. One way of describing this is to say that the actors trying to solve and understand various socio-political problems often come from different social worlds. Irrespective of these differences actors are able to

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16 See the chapter “Questions of Method”.
17 For an excellent example of this in the British context see Grant’s (2010) accounts of the conflicts and diversity of thought in the formation and evolution of Political Studies Association.
establish a mutual *modus operandi* (Star & Griesemer, 1989). As an example, Marxist political historians looking to understand and explain the relationship between Republicanism and Socialism in Irish politics operate within a different paradigm and pursue a different set of tasks than the political comparativist aiming to put Northern Ireland’s peace process in a more global context with that of other peace accords.

In a discipline and subject where these differing worlds intersect, difficulties are inevitable. This is because the creation of new scientific knowledge depends on communication as well as on creating new findings. Yet because the subjects and methods of inquiry often mean different things in different worlds, actors are regularly faced with the task of reconciling these meanings if they wish to cooperate or come together. This reconciliation requires substantial labour on everyone’s part. Therefore, political scientists and other actors contributing to the development of literature and research in the discipline must find the need to translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate, and simplify to work together in and across various institutional settings.

**Translation problems**

The problem of translation as described by Latour (1981, 1986), Callon (1988, 2005), and Law (1999; 1989; 1986) is central to this reconciliation. In order to create scientific authority, researchers gradually enlist participants (or to borrow Latour’s (1986, 2012) word, “allies”) from a range of locations. These allies reinterpret the researchers’ concerns to fit their own programmatic goals and then establish themselves as gatekeepers to particular avenues of knowledge within a discipline (in Law’s ([2005]) terms, as “obligatory points of passage”). The authority they derive may emanate from either substantive or methodological claims. Akrich, Callon, and Latour (1986, 2012) notably labelled this process *interessement*, to indicate the translation of the concerns of the non-scientist into those of the scientist.

The Northern Ireland epistemic community is an ideal example of this. The members of this community not only come from more than one social world but from different disciplinary and methodical backgrounds as well. The empirical chapters of this research show, as an example, that members of this community come from Protestant and Catholic backgrounds from inside and outside Northern Ireland. They consist of political scientists, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers, some of whom were active members of dissident groups during the Troubles. Others are members of the political class, straddling the boundaries of the political and academic. Thus, this is not just a case of
interessement from non-scientists to scientists but between political scientists who not only
come from various methodological, academic, and political backgrounds but who are trying
to conduct translations while simultaneously, at times, inhabiting different worlds (i.e. the
political, the personal, and the academic). In this process, each translator must maintain the
integrity of his own research while looking to ensure the interests of the other audiences to
retain them as allies. And all this is ideally done in such a way as to increase the centrality
and importance of their work. Yet at times this process fails to come about. What has been
described as the n-way nature of the interessement (or one could say, the challenge
intersecting social worlds pose to the coherence of translations) cannot be understood from a
single viewpoint (Akrich et al., 1988). It requires a more holistic analysis of the sort Everett
Hughes’ (1971) described in his analysis of the ecology of institutions:

In some measure an institution chooses its environment. This is one of the
functions of the institution as enterprise. Someone inside the institution acts as
an entrepreneur . . . one of the things the enterprising element must do is
choose within the possible limits the environment to which the institution will
react, that is, in many cases, the sources of its funds, the sources of its clientele
(whether they be clients who will buy shoes, education or medicine), and the
sources of its personnel of various grades and kinds (Found in: Star &

An advantage of such an analysis is that it does not presuppose an epistemological
primacy for any one viewpoint; the viewpoints of the consociationalists are not inherently
better or worse than that of its critics, for instance. Latour (1986) reminds us that important
question concern the flow of concepts through the network of participating actors and the
social and intellectual worlds they occupy. The holistic viewpoint is therefore anti-
reductionist in that the unit of analysis is the whole enterprise.

The boundary object concept as it is used here differs from the Callon, Latour, and
Law model of translations and interessement in a few distinct ways. First, their model is a
kind of “funneling” – reframing or mediating the concerns of several actors into a narrower
passage point. The narrative in Callon, Latour, and Law’s case is predominately told from the
point of view of one passage point – usually the manager, entrepreneur, or scientist. The
analysis proposed here still contains what one could call a scientific bias, in that the stories of
the academics constituting Northern Ireland’s epistemic community are those who reside
within various political science departments across the U.K. and Ireland and are members of
the Political Science Association of Ireland. But it is a many-to-many mapping, where several
obligatory points of passage are negotiated with several kinds of allies – both pro and anti-
consociationalists alike, for example.
The coherence of sets of translations depends on the extent to which academic efforts from multiple worlds can coexist, whatever the nature of the processes or individuals that produce them. Translation here is indeterminate, in a way analogous to Quine’s philosophical dictum about language.\(^ {18} \) There is an indefinite number of ways in which academics from each cooperating social world may make their own work an obligatory point of passage for the whole network of participants. Because of this there is an indeterminate number of coherent sets of translations. The problem for actors in a community, including researchers, is to (temporarily) reduce their local uncertainty without risking a loss of cooperation from allies. Once the process has established an obligatory point of passage, the job then becomes to defend it against other translations threatening to displace it. My interest in this problem of coherence and cooperation in political science is shaped by trying to understand the historical developments of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

**CONCEPTUALIZING THE CONCEPT**

A boundary object is an analytic concept. A scientific object or set of objects that inhabits several intersecting social worlds. It satisfies the informational requirements of these worlds and the actors in them, ultimately bringing them together (Latour, 2005). A boundary object is therefore plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the various parties employing them, yet it is robust enough to maintain a common identity across multiple spectrums (social, political, intellectual). This object is weak in structure when in collective use, but then takes on a strong structure in individual use. The object(s) can be abstract or concrete and can, and often do, have different meanings in different social worlds, but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable – that is, a means of translation (Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989). Understanding the creation and management of a boundary object is a key process in developing and maintaining its coherence across intersecting social worlds (Leigh Star, 2010). On this point, it is now important to focus on the architecture of the boundary object concept.

To begin with, there is the aspect of interpretive flexibility, which exists with any object. Star & Griesemer (1989) noted that a map could point the way to a campground for one group, while this same map may follow a series of geological sites of importance for

\(^ {18} \)According to Quine, the acquisition of language is a process of conditioning the performance of verbal behaviour. Words for concrete or abstract objects may be learned by a process of reinforcement and extinction, whereby the meaning of words may become more clearly understood (See: Grant, 2010).
scientists. Maps may resemble each other, overlap, and even seem indistinguishable to an outsider’s eye (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Their difference therefore depends on the use and interpretation of the object. This aspect of boundary objects is hardly new in philosophy or history, as interpretive flexibility has been one cornerstone behind much of the “constructivist” approach in the sociology of science (Leigh Star, 2010).

The two other aspects of our employment of boundary object that need clarification are (1) its material/organizational structure and (2) the question of scale/granularity. Recall that a boundary object is a sort of arrangement that allows different groups to work together without (necessarily having a) consensus. The forms this may take are not arbitrary, though. They are essentially organic infrastructures that have arisen out of what has been referred to as “information needs” (See: Golinski, 1998, 2005; Schmidt, 2012) and later revised to “information and work requirements” (See both: Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). These needs are perceived locally and by the groups who wish to cooperate. “Work” is also a word that stretches to include cooperation around serious “work/play endeavours”. These can include conferences, research retreats, entertainment, and conversations in the pub (here I borrow from research by Becker [(1986)] who noted that the work–play relationship is a continuum). Nevertheless, what is important is how practices, structure, and language emerge from gathering and doing things together (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010).

The words “boundary” and “object” need some fleshing out as well. Often, a boundary implies something like edge or border, as in the edge of a cliff or the border of a state. Here, however, it simply means something that occupies a shared space. Such a common object(s) forms the boundaries between groups through flexibility and shared structure – “they are the stuff of action” (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989).

The term object is used in a social scientific and pragmatist sense, as well as in the material sense. An object is something people act towards and with (Leigh Star, 2010, p. 603). Its materiality derives from action, not necessarily from a sense of prefabricated stuff or “thing”-ness. For this research, consociational and/or power sharing theory acts as a powerful object in political science, especially concerning Northern Ireland. Although a theory is embodied, discussed, printed, and named, it is not the same thing as, say, a constitution (like GFA, etc.). This is indeed a boundary object, but only when it is used between groups in the
ways described above. The important point is that a boundary object is simultaneously temporal, based in action, subject to reflection, and local, tailoring and distributed throughout all of these dimensions (Bowker & Star, 1999; Leigh Star, 2010). They are thus multidimensional.

In the original formulation of the boundary objects concept Star & Griesemer (1989) suggested four traits that an object might adopt, based on forms of action and cooperation. In this employment of the boundary objects concept these analytical traits should be briefly fleshed out. In doing this, though, these distinctions are not meant to be exclusive to any boundary object but, depending on the type of action and cooperation, the nature and form of the object can and often will adopt multiple traits. This keeps with the multidimensional nature of boundary objects.

The first distinction that is made is that of “repositories”. Repositories are classified as ordered “piles” of objects that are often indexed in a standardized fashion (Star & Griesemer, 1989). This standardization is established to deal with problems of heterogeneity caused by differences in unit of analysis (ibid.). Examples of repositories used in this research will be an association and a journal, as they have the advantage of being modular. This means that various actors from different worlds can use, borrow from, or contribute to the “pile” for their own purposes without having to directly negotiate differences in purpose. This develops out of the need in science for an assembly of things that allows for a heterogeneity of ideas (internally) while maintaining cooperation across boundaries. The heuristic advantage of a repository is therefore encapsulation of internal units. The instance-based work and information needs – ontology – of the repository are well suited for conducting private research (individually or collaboratively) and controlling the nature of commentary or debate. This is not initially a formalized sort of work process looking to drop away particulars but instead an iterative one that preserves particulars (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

The “ideal type” is the next trait. This is an object such as a process (i.e. peace process) or a diagram of sorts that does not in fact accurately describe the details of any one locality or thing. Ideal types are abstracted from all domains and may be fairly vague (Bowker & Star, 1999). However, an idea type is adaptable to a local site precisely because it

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19 Bowker & Star (1999) go to great pains to discuss and outline what they term the “four-dimensional” and often complex meanings of both boundary and object (see Chapter 9 specifically).

20 For example, Star (Quine, 2013) notes that the pages of a book are bound by covers or electronic conventions; the limits of a Web site by the initial URL.
is vague; it serves as a means of communicating and cooperating symbolically – in application to Northern Ireland the term “a good enough road map for all parties” comes to mind. The example of an ideal type in this research I am proposing is the evolving and ongoing notion of the Northern Ireland peace process. This is a concept that in fact described no specimen, which incorporates both concrete and theoretical material, and which serves as a means of communicating across multiple disciplines. The utility of this distinction is that ideal types arise with differences in degree of abstraction and, because of this, result in the deletion of local contingencies from the common object and has the advantage of adaptability (Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989).

“Coincident boundaries” are the third trait here and are identified as common items that have the same boundaries but different internal contents. They arise in the presence of different means of aggregating data and when work is distributed over a large-scale geographic area (Briers & Chua, 2001; Star & Griesemer, 1989). The result is that work in different locations and with different perspectives can be conducted independently while cooperating parties share a common referent (ibid.). The advantage is the resolution of different goals. Here I assume that the coincident boundary is the framework of the Agreement. The Agreement was created by the politicians and professional policymakers. Its framework resembles similar road maps to peace in other areas like Bosnia and Macedonia (J. McEvoy, 2015), for example, and sets up institutional rules for promoting cooperation. Yet the theoretical frameworks of these agreements were created by academics and fall under the tent of consociationalism.

Lastly we have “standardized forms”. This trait is devised as a method of common communication across dispersed work groups. This is useful for our applications to Northern Ireland because the research is conducted at distributed locations and by a variety of different people, rendering standard methods essential. The results of this type of boundary object are what Latour (1981) called “immutable mobiles” – objects that can be transported over a long distance and convey unchanging information (p. 7–13). The advantage of this is that local uncertainties are often deleted, and the people who inhabit more than one social world – marginal people21 – face comparable situations. The distinguishable trait here is whether

21 Traditionally, the concept of marginality has referred to a person who has membership in more than one social world, such as a person whose mother is white and father is black (2010). Park’s (1928) classic work on the “marginal man” discusses the tensions imposed by such multiple membership, problems of identity, and loyalty. Marginality is a critical concept for understanding the ways in which the boundaries of social worlds are constructed and the kinds of navigation and articulation which individuals with multiple memberships must undertake. I argue in this study that the strategies employed by marginal people to manage their identities –
similar strategies exist among those creating or managing a joint object across social world boundaries. In political science, researchers often stake out territory, either in a literal or conceptual sense, to claim as their own and establish themselves as experts in. If a state of war does not prevail, then institutionalized negotiations manage ordinary affairs when different social worlds share the same territory. These negotiations often include a degree of conflict and are constantly challenged and refined (Leigh Star, 2010). Everett Hughes (1971) described such overlaps and termed the organizations that manage collisions in space sovereignty as “inter-tribal centers”. Similarly, Gerson’s (1984) early analysis of resources and commitments provided a general model of sovereignties based on commitments of time, money, skill, and sentiment. Here the central cooperative task of social worlds, which share the same space but different perspectives, is the “translation” of each other’s perspectives.

So in saying all of this let’s just take a moment to spell out exactly what the boundary objects of this research are. These objects, like the community they bind, exist on multiple planes. On the macro level, it is obvious that region of Northern Ireland itself is a boundary object for the epistemic community. It is the location and subject by which all political, social, and cultural analysis focuses on in a variety of different ways. Though a location, this object is mobile in the sense that it can be studied by a sociologist, anthropologist, or political scientist. It is also an area that almost all the academics are attached to in one way or another. This connection is by biography, birth, marriage or combinations of all three.

Zooming this in more the peace process leading up to and, subsequently, the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) are also boundary objects that exist within the region of Northern Ireland. The ongoing peace process that follows GFA also fits within this. All three events and documents act points and products (in the case of GFA) of analysis whereby academics can, safely, come together and agree as well as, more importantly, disagree with one another in ways that weren’t possible before around the study, analysis, and understanding of events in Northern Ireland creating objective frameworks and whereby knowledge could be understood, developed, and refuted by academics in the community in ways that weren’t possible during the Troubles.

The final micro (one could say) object for the Northern Ireland epistemic community is consociationalism. In many ways, this micro object is the centre piece of this epistemic community and responsible for its emergence in the context of the peace process. Consociationalism has been the main theoretical framework used by Northern Ireland

activist, academic, personal affiliations, etc. – provide a provocative source of metaphors for understanding objects with multiple memberships.
political scientists to understand, analyse, and debate the ongoing peace process in the region as well as the constitutional merits of GFA. Since its (re)application to Northern Ireland by O’Leary and McGarry consociationalism has been a central staple in the Northern Ireland political science diet, one which has been responsible for an almost endless litany of publications and debates. It arose out of “information needs” given scholars frustration with existing paradigms that the conflict in the region was one without a solution and has resulted in a level of interpretive flexibility with scholars at it often takes on different forms and understandings depending on the context which it is applied. Consociationalism, thus, allows a many-to-many mapping by scholars, dissidents, and practitioners in a variety of disciplines and locations as it offers multiple obligatory points of passage that can be negotiated with a variety of allies and adversaries – both pro and anti-consociationalists alike.

**SUMMARIZING**

Recall that here we are interested in that sort of multidimensional translation that includes scientific objects. We are interested in the kinds of translations scientists perform to craft objects containing elements which are different in different worlds – objects marginal to those worlds, or what we call boundary objects. In conducting research, people coming together from different social worlds frequently have the experience of addressing an object that has a different meaning for each of them. The actors from these social worlds have partial authority over the resources represented by that object, and mismatches caused by the overlap become problems for negotiation. Here I must note that the situation of marginal people who reflexively face problems of identity and membership is not like the objects with multiple memberships, as such objects do not change themselves reflexively or voluntarily manage membership problems. While these objects have some of the same properties as marginal people, there are crucial differences that I should mention.

For example, for an individual, managing multiple memberships is a volatile, elusive, and confusing process, as navigating more than one world is a non-trivial mapping exercise. People resolve problems of marginality in a variety of ways: by passing on one side or another, denying one side, oscillating between worlds, or by forming a new social world composed of others like themselves (Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). However, researchers negotiate the management of these objects – including construction of them – only when their work coincides. The objects thus come to form a common boundary between worlds by inhabiting them both simultaneously. Scientists manage boundary objects via a set of strategies only loosely comparable to those practiced by marginal people.
Intersections place demands on representations, and on the integrity of information arising from and being used in more than one world (Callon & Law, 1997; Leigh Star, 2010; Star, 1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Because more than one world or set of concerns is using and making the representation, it must satisfy more than one set of concerns. When participants in intersecting worlds create representations together, their different commitments and perceptions are resolved into those representations – in the sense that a fuzzy image is resolved by a microscope (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). This resolution does not mean consensus but, instead, the representations encompass at every stage traces of these multiple positions, translations, and ongoing conflicts. For this research, the boundary object is the means of satisfying and mediating these conflicting sets of concerns.

WRAPPING IT UP

Next we set out to employ my methodological framework explaining how an epistemic community emerges. In doing this, recall that Marx (Marx, 2005, p. 103) noted that:

men make their own history [and knowledge] but they do not make it just as they please; they don’t make it under circumstances always chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain.

The next chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to issue of and choice of methods.
CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

It is easy to get hung up on the question of methodology. In the social sciences, particularly political science, the method issue is one on which countless books and arguments, and arguments about those arguments, have been written.22 This is particularly true of qualitative methods, a category which this research falls into. One of the aims of this dissertation is to show that the issue of method need not be so painful. At its very core, method is nothing more than a tool, which acts to “keep us erect while we navigate a terrain that moves and shifts as we attempt to pass through it” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 19). In choosing this tool, one must proceed with caution, as the signs along the way read, “Danger, trouble ahead!”

In order to account for the potential pitfalls and dangers associated with this endeavour, the primary aim of this chapter is three-fold:

1.) It outlines the respective tools utilized in this study. The tool employed to “keep us erect” on this path is a reflective one. It uses interviews in a way that allows respondents to give their own account – tell a story – of the various stages of their professional and personal development, as a means of extracting the general from the unique; or rather, using the “micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009).

2.) It will display the utility of this technique. This method is both phenomenologically rich in data, as well as corroborated by existing literature from various fields of the social sciences.

3.) To address the potential, or perhaps inevitable, limitations of adopting such an approach and the criticisms that accompany them.

We now begin with a discussion about the first aspect of our methodological tool, abstracting.

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22 For a few examples, see: (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Michael Polanyi, 1958; Popper, 1963; Schram & Caterino, 2006).
ABSTRACTING

Let us begin with reflecting on a comedian who once remarked, in jest of course, that he had a “life-sized map of the world”. Such a statement sounds ridiculous. Yet ironically, this anecdote reflects the desire, and barrier, of the political scientist. The comedian, because of scope, time, and lack of materials, is prevented from owning a “life-sized” world map. The social scientist, because of the expanse of history and limited (or in some cases, lack of) information, cannot understand everything about any given epoch or incident. To understand it all would require the recapitulation of every detail, discussion of every nuance, full explanations of human psychology and sociology—and to do all this in real time. It would be to tell a story that would literally never end. The historian, John Lewis Gaddis (2002), put it this way:

To try to represent everything that's in a landscape would be as absurd as to attempt to recount everything that happened, whether at Waterloo or anywhere else. Such a map, like such an account, would have to become what it represented... (p.32)

Thus, it is safe to say that such a prospect is impossible. Fortunately, this totality of information is not a necessity. In political science, one does not need to reproduce events to understand or gain insights into them; one only must be able to represent them. We are very much like historians - who have always been, in this sense, abstractionists; concern for the literal representation of reality is not theirs (Gaddis, 2002, p. 17).

In this attempt to understand how epistemic communities emerge and how they have developed over time, we are faced with various challenges: one of which is to determine how one selects and measures the variables in question. As in social science research, the selection and measurements of variables can be infinitely divisible, we are left with no choice but to attempt to sketch what we cannot precisely delineate; to generalize, to abstract. In creating these abstractions, we should be free to combine a variety of interdisciplinary techniques: including those of the biologist, sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist (See: McGraw, 1996; Schatz, 2009; Yin, 2003). Indeed, Gaddis (2002) argues that because scientists have discovered that “what exists in the present has not always done so in the past, they have “begun to derive structures from [past] processes” and in doing so have “brought history into science” (p. 39).

This brings into question purely reductionist approaches adopted in social science as a means of making sense of human societies: many of which have run into major problems
given the complexities involved in human relations and the political, religious, and economic interactions between them (Gaddis, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; A. Wendt, 1992; A. E. Wendt, 1987). After all, societies are not “complicated” in the way a nuclear reactor is complicated, can be broken into its constituent parts and understood; rather, they are highly “complex”: involving interdependent variables that interact, often in irregular ways, over any given period.

This complexity which exists in the political/social realm suggests that a more ecological, rather than reductionist, lens is more appropriate when considering the “how” and “why” of individual interactions and the various ways these develop over time, often becoming systems – or dare I say, communities? – whose nature cannot be defined through the mere calculation of their parts. Yet the complexity involved in this process of coming together leaves us to grapple with the inevitable issues of causation and contingency. To properly sketch out and control for this complexity, one must employ dynamic methods for organizing knowledge, which rely on the micro rather than the macro. It is here where the use of narrative storylines, the tool of choice for this research, brings a force and utility.

From a theoretical standpoint, narrative accounts and research offer a wide range of diversity, depth and scope in their theoretical mapping. Within an individual – micro – narrative can be found Hobbesians, Marxists, Weberians, or even Foucaultians, to the extent that these representations converge and bring one closer to the realities which they seek to account. Through the employment of narrative, a respondent is free to describe, evoke, quantify, qualify, and even reify if these techniques serve to improve the fit which we aim to achieve through their account, or re-account. It has long been acknowledged that at the convergence of a plurality of paradigms, we can both test the boundaries of the theory as well as attain a closer fit between reality and representation (Burawoy, 2009; Forester, 1999; Elliot George Mishler, 1986, 1999a; Whewell & Butts, 1968).

In saying this, we recognize that narrative research is an encompassing term that covers an ever-widening and diversifying range of approaches; because of this, specificity is needed (Some notable examples are: Andrews, Squire, & Tamboukou, 2008; Elliot George Mishler, 1986, 1999b; M. Patterson & Monroe, 1998). The narrative approach employed here is a sub-genre that uses life-stories, defined by specific assumptions and methodological procedures.

Two of these assumptions are particularly important and worth mentioning briefly. The first is that an interview is a dialogic process (Elliot George Mishler, 1986). This means that when we speak of interviews, we are talking about an intricate sequence of exchanges:
through which the interviewer and interviewee negotiate some degree of agreement on what will be talked about and how the material will be approached. In this case, respondents’ accounts of their life experiences are situated in that context and can be seen as co-produced (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). In this co-production, the interviewer acts as intervener into the life of the interviewee, facilitating movements with “the participants through their space and time” (Burawoy, 2009, p. 13). This position of “interviewer as intervener” permits one to explore how a respondent’s story might be influenced by their location during the interview, given the social relationship established during its course. In doing this, we look to overcome a principal problem long recognized in survey research: that too much is often inferred from answers taken at face value to questions of suspicious value, as answers can vary depending on the way that the question is framed.

The next assumption is that narratives, as well as other discourse genres, are social acts. As Langellier has noted, through speaking, we perform our identity by making various “moves” along the landscape of social relationships (Found in: Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). This pragmatic view of language underscores what we as social actors are doing in our selection and organization of discourse, to tell stories in ways that fit the occasion and are appropriate for our specific intentions, audiences, and context. Both of these assumptions of narratives as dialogue and performance place it within the social field and constitute the methodological framework of this dissertation, which Mishler (1999b) has termed “narrative as praxis”.

**Narrative as Praxis**

The development of the “narrative as praxis” framework reflects the growing expansion of narrative studies in the last thirty years within the social sciences. Freeman (1994) called this expansion a virtual “narrative mania”; while others, far from positivists in their own domains, have criticized this. Several scholars have noted that this “narrative mania” has resulted in the emergence of an “interview society” within the social sciences, which is particularly obsessed with confessions and personal tales; which they perceive as reflecting the West’s valorisation of individual agency, so much so that critical analyses of macro-structural features of society have fallen by the wayside, deflecting attention from important issues such as power and coercion (See: Atkinson & Delamont, 2006; Atkinson & Silverman, 1997; Denzin, 2001). In addition, and in light of the sheer breadth of studies which have fallen into this “narrative mania”, attempts to create a canonical definition of what “narrative” means are quite
difficult; as are efforts to standardize the ways in which we analyse such accounts (Riessman, 2013).

In acknowledging these criticisms and difficulties, we must assert that our purpose here is not to attempt to police or rein in the boundaries of this umbrella term, as any efforts to do so would be misguided and useless. Quite the contrary: this research takes the position that one of the exciting and useful things about performing narrative research lies in the multiplicity of approaches and perspectives which encompass it. This is not to deny the potential handicaps of such a multitude of approaches; but like all handicaps, it can be dealt with in two ways: by containing it or turning it to our advantage (Burawoy, 1998). Through a containment approach, we can look to control participation with subjects by interrogation via intermediaries. Instead of engaging in the “messiness” of our subjects’ personal narratives, we seek to insulate ourselves from participants, standardize the way we collect their information, place brackets around external conditions (such as the political, social, and institutional environment), and go through great efforts to make sure our sample is representative. This is common practice in the positivist approach to survey research. Here though, we prefer the latter strategy.

To properly embrace the “messiness” and complexity of narratives offered by this strategy, we must thematize the world under study. To do so, we must root ourselves in a set of assumptions that guide our dialogue with participants. Michael Polanyi (1958) first elaborated on this in his rejection of positivist notions of objectivity based on sense data, in favour of a commitment to the “rationality of theory”: described often as cognitive maps, or dare we say abstractions, through which we apprehend the world (Found in: Burawoy, 1998, p. 5). Thus, through what Burawoy often referred to as “dwelling in theory” (See: Burawoy, 1991, 1998, 2009; Burawoy & Skocpol, 1982), we form the basis of our reflexive model of science: which embraces engagement with the mess as the way towards understanding. This reflexive approach to narratives is a means of extracting the general from the unique; that is, we will use the micro to connect to the macro, and in so doing, connect the present to the past. Furthermore, by employing the “narrative as praxis” framework, we operate under the assumptions that personal stories are socially situated actions, life performances, and fusions of both form and context: that allow us to thematize patterns from the micro and connect them to the macro. Before adding more nuance to these assumptions, let us take a moment to discuss what we mean by our employment of the term “praxis”.

By using the term “praxis”, we employ a Marxist vocabulary that, in our understanding, refers to the dialectic interplay between our dual positions as subjects –
actively making and transforming the world – which then become the “objective” conditions to which we must respond as we adapt, make, remake, and transform ourselves and these conditions (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). This concept is relevant to our narrative research because it elevates the status of narratives to purposeful and contextually situated human action, therefore countering poststructuralist views of a disembodied discourse or “grand narrative” that speaks through individuals (See for example: Kraus, 2006; Søndergaard, 2002). We also recognise that individuals are not cultural zombies who mindlessly act out the cultural/social scripts in the stories of our lives; but rather, we adapt to, resist and selectively appropriate cultural and social rules that present themselves at various stages in our development. Such logic is useful, as it extends to arguments made by Schiffrin (1994) regarding the “reflexivity of coherence assessments”. This assumes that coherence does not depend simply on predetermined verbal forms and meaning, but on how individuals work together within certain social and cultural frameworks of interpretation: bringing about achievements in our joint production, and understanding of stories through our dialogue with each other.

With regards to the first assumption of this section, that narratives are socially situated actions, we draw on Mishler (1986, 1999b; 2006), who referred to narrative life stories as “speech events” – a dialogic process, whereby the meaning of questions and answers are negotiated throughout the context of the interview. Emphasis on the “socially situated” nature of narrative accounts directs attention to the interviewee’s location within an ongoing stream and evolution of social interaction, and how these unfold throughout the context of the interview. It acknowledges that one must attend not only to the story being told, but that story’s placement within the sequential order of events which unfold throughout the storying process: what we refer to as turning points. Here, negotiation of meaning is mediated not by the interviewer per se, but through the interviewee’s reflexive engagement and struggle within their own personal accounts, and how they make sense of them.

The next assumption of the “narrative as praxis” framework is that narratives are in fact identity performances. Individuals express, exhibit and make claims for both who they are and who they would like themselves to be through the stories they tell. In other words, we perform our identities! Richard Bauman (1986) made reference to this when noting that oral performances are rooted in form, meaning and function in culturally defined scenes and events. Other scholars have remarked that the full meaning of narrative is performative rather than semantic (See essays in: Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001). Thus, by taking this performative approach to narratives, we recognize the uniqueness of each individual’s
performance and the multiplicity, fragmentary, often contradictory, and inherently unfinished nature of their narrative identity. Identity is an unstable performative struggle; a notion we will return to momentarily.

This instability and multiplicity – terrain constantly shifting beneath our feet – forces us to focus our attention on the rhetorical strategies which individuals employ to speak their identities. This requires an analysis that allows us to account for the different ways in which stories may be organized and put together by directing participants to contextualize their performative process, and having them reflect on the ways they have navigated various identity negotiations and conflicts encountered. Simply put, we need a means of studying the details that illuminate how participants in the Northern Ireland epistemic community collectively co-produce the world around them.

This need is satisfied within the “narrative as praxis” framework through its final assumption that narratives are fusions of form and content. Here, we reflect for a moment on Hayden White (1990), who viewed the role of historians as retelling individual and collective stories in a narrative, “the truth of which would reside in the correspondence of the story told to the story lived by real people in the past” (p.X). He explains that narratives are not simply forms of discourse which can be filled with various contents; but have a content which exists prior to any given actualization of it; “content of the form” (H. V. White, 1990).

In order to discover this “content of the form” as regards my early analogy about life-sized maps, we must emphasize the structure through which these narratives are constructed and analysed. This is how we “fuse form to content”: focusing on specific events and incidents at various points in these academic’s paths. We ask for specific cases, events, and interactions – personally and professionally – which Northern Ireland academics found fascinating, engaging, challenging and intriguing: both in their studies on Northern Ireland, as well as their interactions in academia in the British Isles before, during and following the peace process. Through first-hand accounts, we learn not only about the difficulties, obstacles, challenges, openings, promises, and opportunities which participants were presented with; but also how they were able, or unable, to navigate them, as well as how they built relationships, managed trust and suspicion, and learned as they went along: inquiring sometimes by themselves, at others facilitating inquiry by others with whom they collaborated.

Through the “narrative as praxis” framework, we have a way of organizing and approaching the complexity, multitude and messiness of narrative accounts, by elevating the status of these to their rightful place. In utilizing this tool, we neither valorise individual
agency to the extent that extra-local forces are ignored, nor diminish this agency to the extent that we reduce participant narratives to being storied by these forces. By recognizing the dialogic, social and performative nature of personal narratives, we cannot only thematize commonalities between a multitude of accounts, but also fuse their form with content; and in so doing, are able to abstract – identify – and use the micro to connect with the macro. That is, we can then generalise.

With this use of narratives this research places itself under the methodological umbrella of ethnography. Though it is different in the sense that conventional ethnographic studies confine themselves to the claims and behaviours of individuals within the features of the everyday worlds they examine them in. To do this anthropologist traditionally use interviews and participant observation (Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1963; Lakatos, 1978; Burawoy, 1998, 2003). There is much utility in both approaches; however, my interest was to extend beyond the limits of traditional ethnography. This “extension” was inspired by the Manchester School of social anthropology and Michael Burawoy (2008) who insisted that instead of simply collecting data about what participants ought to do they looked to gather data and tell stories about what individuals were actually doing! This is a story. The use of narratives story telling allowed me as an interviewer to extent myself into the everyday experience of Northern Ireland academics, gathering rich accounts of the real events, struggles, and dramas that took place over space and time. The use of this storytelling technique follows an efficient self-generating schema in that these narratives are detailed in their texture, they are fixated in a relevant context, and they close problems of Gestalt – all stories and events have a beginning, middle, and an end with a natural flow (Bauer, 1996).

The next section deals with identity.

IDENTITY

The notion of identity and, more specifically, identity formation has been mentioned much here. This is because identity formation is a secondary concern in this study. More precisely, we are interested in how my participants’ identity - not only as academics, but Irish in a British context, and/or British in an Irish context (with or without certain political leanings) -

23 Specifically see the work of Kingsley Garbett (1970) and Max Gluckman, both of whom are leading figures and contributors to this discipline as well as more recent reviews of this work by Andrew Abbott (2007).

24 For more fleshing of these details and the utility and pitfalls of this method see the writings from the LSE methodology institute on interviewing techniques, particularly those regarding storytelling. I particularly found the essays by Martin Bauer (1987, 1996) to be very useful.
were shaped, achieved, and mediated over time; in other words, the trajectories of identity formation. As an example, scholars such as Professor Brendan O’Leary narrative displays how experiences of living in Nigeria during its civil war, being the only Irish born catholic in a protestant school, first being warned of being labelled “Irish” in terms of his research interest, and finally being called the “green Machiavelli” in regards to his analysis of Northern Ireland display a trajectory in his professional and personal story. In attempting this, we recognize the enormous amount of research already on this concept of “identity” within social science literature.\textsuperscript{25} For the sake of time and space, we do not wish to review or nuance this literature in any detail; but think it useful to briefly discuss how this concept will act as scaffolding to our methodological approach.

When dealing with a topic as slippery as identity formation, complexities will inevitably emerge, quickly. One of the problems is that professional identity formation and development does not take place in a linear fashion. For example, the erratic career trajectories of our participants were often marked by shifts in interests and focus – in terms of research as well as social, political and institutional participation and activism – which seem unrelated and difficult to connect at times. For example, Lord Professor Paul Bew’s participation as an activist and protester with the Workers Party in Northern Ireland to being a special advisor to UUP leader David Trimble and, then, Life Peer in the House of Lords.

Another issue is the degree to which participants’ work identities will appear as only one of a series of separate and sovereign axes of self-definition. These complexities direct us to a concept of identity that rejects the singular notion of an all-encompassing IDE\textit{\text{N}}ITY (Elliot George Mishler, 1999b). Instead it recognizes the plurality of sub-identities which, metaphorically speaking, sing together, sometimes surprisingly, as a collective choir: which constitute “the self” who give space, at various times and durations, for baritone and soprano solos.

Such is this multiplicity and complexity, we consider that Mishler (1999b)’s concept of identity, which states that it should be seen as a dynamic organization of sub-identities that might conflict with or align with one another, is appropriate. The desire here in utilizing this concept is to focus our attention on the process – the how – of identity formation; rather than an individual’s identity at times: the what. In having a process-oriented focus, we will still see what individuals’ identities are at particular moments in time; but more than this, how

\textsuperscript{25} Some notable works on identity literature relevant to Northern Ireland are: (Cairns & Mercer, 1984; Graham, 1998; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; McGlynn *, Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel, 2010)
they came to “be” in particular circumstances, and how they navigate the boundaries of this “being”. Again, we stress the importance of this model in mapping the formation and achievement of professional and other sub-identities of British and Irish academics by looking at life-course disjunctions, discontinuities and transitions; and thematizing them.

We must also acknowledge the social and group aspect of identity, and the role it will play in this process and framework. The social aspect of identity should be understood as that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership in a particular social group(s), together with the significance attached (Tajfel, 2010, p. 2). This understanding fits within our conceptualization of identity and affords us further opportunity to thematize how individuals form groups, behave in and towards specific groups; as well as how they modulate and define the boundaries of their personal identities within and outside these settings.

We thus fit our methodological model within the individual and group identity frameworks. This framework is used to map and thematize the trajectories and critical junctures in the lives of members of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. It affords us the ability not just to identify the how of the Northern Ireland epistemic community – how it emerged, has developed and changed over the years – but to abstract and locate the exact episteme26 of this community. That is, it will display where the ideas of this community are and have been located as well as how such ideas bind them together or (potentially) keep them apart. This is made possible not by suppressing – what positivists often refer to as controlling for – the variability among participants in how they achieve and perform their identities, but by retaining and respecting these differences, and addressing them within a comparative framework.

In closing this section I would be remise if I did not speak of my own identity for a moment and the challenges and possibilities this afforded me. From the onset, I had to contend with the fact that I was very much an outsider to this academic community. For one I am an American with no Irish or Northern Irish connection whatsoever. As mentioned before this lack of biological or biographical connection was somewhat puzzling to the academics I interviewed. I am, however, from the South-Eastern U.S. – a place accustomed to troubles, issues of segregation, and a lack of willingness to face up to the longstanding impacts of these issues and how they have (and often not) been addressed. Though the differences in these two areas are stark I do feel this background gave me a basis for which to observe and

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26 This is the historical a priori which grounds knowledge and its discourses, and therefore represents the condition of their possibility within particular epochs (Foucault, 1973b).
listen to my respondents. But a major challenge I had to contend with was the reality that the individuals that I was interviewing had far more sensitivity to, familiarity with, and knowledge of the subject matter and cultural nuances in question. For example, I could hardly challenge Brendan O’Leary on consociationalism nor Anthony McIntyre on the impacts or reality of the IRA armed struggle.

My status as an outsider became apparent to myself in the many stumbling’s of this research. At one point my lack of sensitivity to language and issues cost me an interview and greatly offended a prominent Professor in the discipline. After he informed me I could go “fuck myself” I realised my lack of sensitivity as well as the complications of the interviews to come. Yet in the end it was my outsider status and my position of (one could say) weakness that really displayed the strengths of the narrative method employed. This is because storytelling is a competence that is (relatively) independent of education, language, or cultural competence (Schuetze, 1977). As an interviewer one simply guides the retelling of events that can be rendered either in general or indexical terms. Indexical stories were specifically useful because they allowed the interviewees references to be grounded to concrete events in specific places and times.

In this research, the Northern Ireland academics narrations were rich in indexical statements, grounded in personal experiences which were, by virtue, detailed in focus and attention. This was important in helping me get out of my own way in the interview process. I quickly discovered once the participants began talking and narrating their stories these stories had a sequential logic to them. This sequence forces (often unbeknownst to the narrator) to give a structure, context, and personal evaluation and reflection of the outcome as well as the underlying motivations and the participants own symbolic system for orienting these stories in the context of my research (Lamnek, 1989). The utility of this method is thus that actors begin to tell on themselves in the telling of their stories and it is through this that I could use these micro events and happenings in the lives of individuals to point to greater macro trends and developments within the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

**THE HOW OF THIS METHOD**

Until now, we have discussed the intellectual scaffolding and framework which make up our methodological model. It should be clear that the method adopted centres on the gathering, telling, and interpretation of individual stories. This path of storytelling is travelled to make sense of the puzzle: *How and why do epistemic communities emerge?* In this section, we
therefore want to look at more practical aspects: such as how participants are selected, from where, the types of questions employed, and how.

We wish, first, to reassert that our aim is to learn through the friction of actual practitioners’ struggles and experiences. As in any field of practice we would like to explore – post-conflict mediation, policing, political strategy, or community building – we begin by identifying our selection criteria for interviewees. Here, we look for academics who by both reputation and role, have been deeply immersed in various problems, research, debates, and institutions concerning the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process. More specifically, because we are looking at the emergence of the epistemic community within the U.K. and Ireland, we focus on academics emerging from within British-Irish academia; in other words, British and Irish academics. Though not all the academics interviewed come from the United Kingdom and/or Ireland. Several of the scholars interviewed were born in Germany, South Africa, and North America, yet even these individuals have some Anglo-Irish roots. The only exception to this is Stefan Wolff, a German academic at University of Birmingham. All participants did their PhD’s and started their careers in British or Irish universities. Many of their origins are traced to Queens University Belfast. Several of the scholars interviewed currently reside outside of the U.K. and Ireland. In these cases, interviews were conducted via Skype. All other interviews were conducted face to face. This was perhaps the most difficult aspect of the process – arranging, scheduling, travelling to, and coordinating the interviews.

The practitioners (as we shall call them), we identify for this research are not only kind enough to offer us their time, but willing to speak about their own practice(s) and involvement in research and research institutions within the British Isles: discussing what they’ve tried, what they might have done differently, what they’ve found surprising, how they adapted, changes they have seen in the academy, and so on. Scholar’s biographical information, professional background, and university affiliation is placed within footnotes. This was done to maintain the flow of the main text while also giving readers the necessary background and biography to give context and make sense of “the messiness” of these scholars’ personal narratives. These scholars were identified, over in total 50, based on their publication and research contributions to the subject of Northern Ireland as well as their membership and participation (both current and past) in the Political Studies Association of Ireland (PSAI). We also relied greatly on snowballing in identifying participants. Once participants engaged in their personal reflections the interview often prompted them to say, “oh, you must talk to… he or she would be really useful”. Of these 50 individuals, 34
participants within the British-Irish academy were willing to participate (See Appendix 1). Only five women agreed to participate. Though they were clearly the minority within the community and the discipline.

Also, of all the academics approached female academics were the demographic which pushed back the most. They were the most apprehensive to participate in the research. Interestingly, this was based on their questions concerning their affiliation with the Northern Ireland community as well as the political science discipline. They also showed the most thoroughness in terms of editing texts, omitting information, and (carefully) choosing their words. This was not the case with all female participants but it was a theme. Yet the lack of female academics’ narratives and their reluctance to participate did prove to complicate this research and sheds light on their position and lack of representation within the discipline.

Once contacted, these experienced practitioners are asked if they can speak about two or three specific cases regarding their involvement within British-Irish academia, based on a series of questions which we have developed. These questions are administered a week prior to the interviews, giving the participants ample time to reflect and develop their stories. Interviewee were explained that the questions administered were not strict guidelines but, instead, were meant to act signposts to help them with the narrating of their lives (See Appendix 2 for a list of questions).

We do not merely ask these participants for success stories. Instead, we ask for cases that the practitioner themselves finds fascinating, engaging, intriguing and/or challenging - because these stories teach us about the difficulties and obstacles, challenges, openings, promises and opportunities of their actual work; as well as how they define themselves, and the boundaries of their relationships with others. In conducting these interviews, the role of the interviewer is to allow respondents to freely articulate narrative accounts of such instances: prompted and at times interrupted by being asked to specify “how?” rather than “why?” Copies and files of these interview transcripts can and will be made available upon request.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has been concerned with the sometimes overly complicated issue of method. It has outlined the tool to be utilized, as painlessly as possible, in addressing the central question of this research: *How does an epistemic community emerge?* The tool employed to

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27 See Annex for the list of questions.
“keep us erect” on this path will be a reflective one, which uses interviews in a way that allows respondents to give their own account – tell a story – of the various stages of their professional and personal development as a means of extracting the general from the unique; using the “micro” to account for the “macro” (Burawoy, 2009).

In outlining this interview method, the chapter has also displayed the utility of employing such a technique: which is not only phenomenologically rich in data, but can be corroborated by existing literature from various fields in the social sciences. In doing so, it has addressed the limitations and criticisms of adopting such an approach. Let us now commence on the substantive part of this dissertation, and test the utility of this chosen method, as well as the theoretical framework adopted to make sense of this puzzle.
CHAPTER 3

THE ABSENCE OF AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY & PRESENCE OF A CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters of this research have been aimed at setting up the context and intellectual scaffolding of this research. Up to this point it has been focused on laying out what the question is, why that question is important, the literature that supports its importance, and the theory and method that will be to answer and explain – how an epistemic community emerges. Now we get into the meat of this subject. That is, this is the point where we delve into the interviews and take, in stages, the various points, events, and times that show the development and evolution of the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

And to this point, it is important to note our basic premise is that scientific communities matter. Scholars have long noted that the enduring, growing importance of scientific journals, research centers, university departments, peer reviews and conferences all point to the growing influence of science and expansion of the “knowledge-driven economy” (See for example: Chomsky, 1997; Drucker, 1993; C. Kerr, 1995, 2001; Washburn, 2005). 20 years into what management expert Peter Drucker termed the post-capitalist knowledge society, knowledge institutions and carriers have become the central wealth creators of the developed world (Drucker, 1993, p. 8). Knowledge has thus become one of the most important factors of production and valuable assets to corporations and nation states.

Along with the enhanced utility and value of knowledge has come the inevitable increase in the profile and value of knowledge carriers and communities: bringing into question their ethics, practices, relationships and origins. When asking questions such as “how and why does an epistemic community emerge”, a special emphasis is therefore placed on the how. By focusing on the how, we are looking to uncover not only the when of a community – the time it emerged – but what conditions were needed for a community to emerge, why it failed to emerge previously, how that community develops, operates, and adapts to specific settings once it is established, and how it changes alongside its
environments. In looking at these differing facets, we must not dwell much on the notion of episteme or community; but look to the ic in epistemic.

Scientific communities often develop around a perceived problem (the - ic) – and look for solution(s) to that problem. Staying with the notion of ic, attention is drawn to persistent problems with treatments but not necessarily solutions; there is an emphasis on process. For example, in treating the alcoholic, the diabetic, or any other patient with a chronic disease, medical practitioners place emphasis on various treatment processes that address the symptoms, though permanent solutions (which address root causes and conditions) or preventions have yet to be discovered and continue to be debated (Brown, 1995). Similar claims can be made about other disciplines and communities that look at things such as environmental change (Toke, 1999) and business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), to name but a few.

The same is true for practitioners and researchers into systemic socio-political problems, such as conflict. This has been the concern of much of the literature concerning both democratization and Northern Ireland: both, indeed, involve processes through which protracted conflict can be ended and political stability maintained. Here, the point of agreement, which researchers come together on, is the recognition of a problem; the best solution exists through the application of some form of democratic process. Unlike medical scientists, however, political scientists are not charged with and often do not develop solutions to socio-political problems. This is the role of politicians. This is not to say that political scientists are not consulted with about such problems, but the resolution of conflict is ultimately seen as a responsibility of the state and its officials. In this sense, political science looks to understand and critique socio-political behaviour and policy; as well as inform and (attempt to) predict future state strategy. Yet such has been the expansion of the “knowledge economy” and elevation of knowledge carriers and creators, the lines between academia are becoming ever more porous.

This chapter investigates and explains the seeming lack of relationship between political science in the U.K. and Ireland, and the events taking place in Northern Ireland; the chicken and egg’s apparent divorce from one another. It is dedicated to exploring the what, why, and how of this disconnect, bringing into focus the lack of community and scholarship in relation to the Northern Ireland issue in the British and Irish political science academies. When considering “how and why an epistemic community emerges”, it is necessary to understand the conditions which make scholarship and community around a subject possible, as well as those which do the opposite.
**CONTEXT – DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE U.K.**

We must begin here by stating the obvious; the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s created a significant level of difficulty concerning any social science research in the area. This issue of research silence has been addressed, briefly, by Schubotz (2005), who noted that “the everyday military presence of the British army, curfews and paramilitary threats, the absence of democratic means of participation, the threat of falling victim to shootings or bombings” might have contributed (p. 6). Such was its deep socio-religious segregation, social research in Northern Ireland had been sensitive long before the outbreak of violence (*ibid*). Social researchers, whether from the U.K. or Ireland, had always had to position themselves within the sectarian “us-versus-them” divide and found themselves positioned there by others, not least those they researched (Tonge, 2015). Professor’s Brendan O’Leary and Jonathan Tonge recalled that political scientists at the time of the Troubles were conscious of being labelled “Irish” – a term that indicated an automatic affiliation with republicanism – in terms of research on Northern Ireland. Professors John Doyle and John Coakley note that in the Republic of Ireland, academics went to great pains to avoid research or making claims which might have seen them depicted as sympathizers with Sinn Féin or any other fractious groups.

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28 Brendan O’Leary is perhaps the discipline’s most prominent scholar, and one of Consociational Theory’s most ardent advocates. A Republic of Ireland native, born in Cork, O’Leary moved to Carrickfergus – a town 11 miles outside Belfast, on the north shore of Belfast Lough – after spending a considerable portion of his childhood in Nigeria during its civil war, with his father a scientist for the United Nations initiative there. O’Leary went to the prominent Roman Catholic grammar school, St MacNissi’s College, in Carnlough, County Antrim (also known as Garron Tower), along with his colleague John McGarry; and was the first from this school to attend Oxford: where he studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. In 1981, he began his PhD at the London School of Economics, under the supervision of Professor Tom Nossiter.

29 Jonathan Tonge is Professor of Politics at Liverpool University and has written well over a hundred publications on the Northern Ireland peace process and elections (See: Liverpool, 2016). Tonge is a British native from Liverpool, raised in the working class Irish Catholic area of Merseyside; he attended Catholic primary school in Southport, on the Lancashire/Merseyside border. In 1994, Tonge began his PhD at London Southbank University under the supervision of the famous gay activist, historian, and sociologist, Jeffery Weeks; his dissertation was on anti-poll tax movement.

30 Professor John Doyle was born in County Wexford in the Republic of Ireland, is the Director of the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, and Executive Dean of Dublin City University (DCU)’s Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Doyle was previously Head of the School of Law and Government; and before this, was founding co-Director of the Centre for International Studies at DCU. He currently acts as Editor of Irish Studies in International Affairs. He did his PhD at Queens University under the supervision of Liam O’Dowd.

31 John Coakley is a native of the Republic of Ireland and Emeritus Professor of Politics at University College Dublin (UCD) and Queens University Belfast. He is former Head of the School of Politics and International Relations (2008-09) at UCD and former Director of the UCD Institute of British-Irish Studies (1999-2005, 2006-08). One of the discipline’s most eminent political scientists, Coakley acted as Secretary-General of the International Political Science Association (1994-2000), and was the former President and founding member of the Political Studies Association of Ireland (1988-90).
In a practical sense, the Troubles made contacting people “from the other side” highly precarious; a state of affairs which applied to researchers and respondents. This may also have contributed to many feeling unable to engage in empirical research (Nagle & Clancy, 2012; Schubotz, 2005). Conditions were unfavourable for any form of critical social research, but particularly problematic for political science projects: especially qualitative ones, which could have put participants at risk if identified. Since Northern Ireland is a very small and closely-knit society, the risk of identification would have been relatively high.

The difficulties with research can certainly be seen in British publications: from 1969 until 1995, prominent journals such as *The British Journal of Political Science* (BJPS) only produced two articles on Northern Ireland.32 Aside from the odd piece of anomalous research, such as Richard Rose (1971)’s *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*; or Paul Bew and Henry Patterson (1985)’s *The British State & The Ulster Crisis*, Northern Ireland seemed to be *terra incognita* to political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland, even though it was referred to as the one of the most researched conflicts in history prior to the peace process (Whyte, 1990). Before the latter commenced, the topic in fact received the scantest mentions in standard works on British history; while the handful of special studies produced over the 50 years prior to the outbreak of The Troubles only looked at the literary theory of the Constitution: the institution set up in 1920 and the principles governing their operation (See: C. O’Leary, 1972).

Of course, there are anomalies to this pattern. Scholars such as Frank Wright’s (1973) ground breaking analysis of the structure and historical continuity of Protestant political ideology is a case in point. Wright was mentioned often, and favourably, by most the scholars interviewed. Wright and Adrain Guelke (both of whom were at Queens University Belfast) are often credited with pioneering the comparative approach towards Northern Ireland. Scholars pointed out that Wright was one of the few who looked at Northern Ireland not as a unique and anomalous social and political problem, but sought to find parallels with other divided societies forged by history on the frontiers between different cultures and societies (Jay, 1993). Yet all the academics interviewed noted that such analyses, especially within the U.K. and Ireland, were the exception rather than the rule during this time.

Thus, when talking to scholars about what Brendan O’Leary called “the absence of community” in the pre-peace process political science academy, academics such as Professor

32 These articles were James Russell (1977)’s *Replication of Instability: Political Socialization in Northern Ireland*; and Arend Lijphart (1975b)’s *Northern Ireland Problem – Cases, Theories, & Solutions*. Although they did not adopt any of the sectarian stances found in NLR, they were submitted by academics and universities from outside the U.K. and Ireland.
Richard English\textsuperscript{33} noted that “we all felt that the political scientists in most of Britain and Ireland had grotesquely neglected the subject” (English, 2015, p. 2). Moreover, Lord Professor Paul Bew\textsuperscript{34}, Professor of Irish Politics at Queens University since 1991, reflected that during the early 1970s, when he was a PhD student and aspiring academic studying in Cambridge:

Nobody had a developed interest in Northern Ireland anywhere [in the U.K.] really at that time. It was all… I mean when I was a student [at Cambridge], there were actually these old hands at Cambridge… Mansergh was there – Martin Mansergh – and his father, Nicholas, was a Master at my college and every [year], he did teach a course of lectures [on Ireland] and all, my supervisor and he published the Penguin History of Modern Ireland but it didn’t really address the Northern Issue.”

Bew goes on to highlight that:

“There was a kind of [minor] interest by academics in the U.K. in the [Republic of] Ireland [at that time]… In later decades this developed further but it took a long time, you know. We really did not… just the first few years of the Troubles [went on] with no impact (Bew, 2015).

All academics interviewed acknowledged that collectively, the discipline had neglected the subject; and that there was nothing like a community of scholars within the U.K. or Ireland during that time. There was, though, strong consensus over exactly why political scientists had neglected the conflict; with many acknowledging Schubotz (2005)’s findings, and noting that several academics received death threats from dissident groups based on opinions they had openly expressed (either in print or during talks). Brendan O’Leary, Richard English, Rupert Taylor\textsuperscript{35}, Henry Patterson\textsuperscript{36}, Pete Shirlow\textsuperscript{37} and others

\textsuperscript{33} Professor Richard English is Wardlaw Professor of Politics at the School of International Relations and Director of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. He is a Belfast native and son of the Methodist scholar, preacher, author, evangelist, church statesman and broadcaster, Donald English. English attended Oxford and did his PhD in History at Keele University in 1986 under the supervision of the prominent English historian, Charles Townshend. English worked at Queen’s University between 1989 and 2011, and is author of several books related to Northern Ireland, including the award-winning \textit{Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA} (2003); and \textit{Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland} (2007).

\textsuperscript{34} Lord Professor Paul Bew is a Belfast native and perhaps the most prominent political historian and academic on Northern Ireland in the U.K. Lord Professor Bew did his BA and PhD at Pembroke College, Cambridge under the supervision of Edward Nolan. He has been an academic at Queens University, Belfast since 1979. He participated in the People’s Democracy marches in 1969 and along with his colleague Professor Henry Patterson, was briefly a member of the Workers’ Association and the Workers’ Party of Ireland: a Republican Organization which advocated the Two Nation Theory of Northern Ireland. During the peace process, Bew served as an adviser to David Trimble. His contributions to the Good Friday Agreement were acknowledged with an appointment to the House of Lords as a life peer in February 2007; currently, he acts as Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, an advisory non-departmental public body of the U.K. Government.

\textsuperscript{35} Professor Rupert Taylor is a Devon-born British native who attended the London School of Economics and did his PhD in Sociology at the University of Kent in 1986. Taylor’s doctoral dissertation highlighted the problems confronting Queen’s University Belfast in seeking to maintain a liberal position in a deeply divided
pointed to this; the murder of Edgar Graham\textsuperscript{38} and Eric Davy\textsuperscript{39}; as well as the shootings of Adrian Guelke\textsuperscript{40} and Bernadette Devlin McAiskey\textsuperscript{41}. Reflecting on this, Jonathan Tonge explained the very real sense which academics experienced: he received death threats and was harassed well into the period of the peace process by various dissident groups, who objected to opinions he expressed in news publications, as well as magazines such as \textit{Fortnight} (Tonge, 2015). Richard English, an academic at Queens from 1989 to 2011, recalls that many scholars forget:

How ominous it all seemed, studying it when people were getting shot. So you’d find those people would be, I remember seeing people at conferences when I’d be talking to someone who was there [in Belfast], and there’d be some people across the room slightly out the side of their head, you know, they didn’t know, I didn’t know really what they thought, he’s an IRA man. Who’s that bloke? Is he here too, it was just a conference? But it struck me that there was a way, once everyone thought well, the IRA is not going to kill you, or loyalists aren’t going to kill you, it became easier to discuss it (English, 2015).

Lord Professor Bew was one of the few who deviated from this position: arguing that even though lack of engagement from political scientists persisted well into the 1980s, this was not due to any meta-socio-structural issues or restraints, such as censorship from the society, and helped initiate reform of sectarian employment practices in higher education in Northern Ireland. In 1984, his research findings were reported in the British and Irish media, and stimulated a Fair Employment Agency enquiry which resulted in new employment equity guidelines (Taylor, 2015). Taylor is currently Professor of Political Studies and former Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, where he has resided since 1987; he has remained one of Consociationalism’s most ardent critics.

\textsuperscript{36} Henry Patterson is a Belfast native from the working-class Protestant area of Bangor. Patterson did his PhD and BA at Queens University in the late 1960s and, together with Lord Professor Paul Bew, was a member of the Worker’s Party in Ireland. He is currently Professor of Politics at University of Ulster.

\textsuperscript{37} Professor Pete Shirlow is currently the Director and Blair Chair at the University of Liverpool’s Institute of Irish Studies. Shirlow was born and raised in a working-class Protestant family in East Belfast, but attended a Quaker grammar school. He did his BA at Queens University Belfast, and his PhD in Economic Geography at the University of Liverpool. Shirlow returned to Queens in 1993 as a Professor of Politics, and was Deputy Director of Queens Institute for Conflict Transformation and Social Justice (2013-2015). His research has been focused largely on political violence, post-conflict transformation, policing and the community in Northern Ireland; he has published more than 80 pieces of work, including the recently acclaimed monograph, \textit{The End of Ulster Loyalism?} (2012).

\textsuperscript{38} Edgar Graham was an Ulster Unionist assembly member and Law Lecturer at Queens University Belfast, shot dead by two IRA gunmen on December 7, 1983.

\textsuperscript{39} Eric Davey was a scholar and political activist, shot in his car in County Derry in 1989.

\textsuperscript{40} Adrian Guelke is a South African native and Emeritus Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen’s University Belfast. He did his PhD at London School of Economics; his research focused mainly on the comparative study of ethnic conflict, particularly the cases of Northern Ireland, South Africa and Kashmir. A longstanding expert on Northern Ireland, he survived an assassination attempt by Ulster Defence Association (UDA) members at his home in Belfast in 1991. The incident occurred following a leaked false police report, which described Guelke as an academic known to be involved in the IRA. The attempt failed because the gun used by the would-be assassin jammed. The UDA later realized that the claims regarding Guelke were false (Guelke, 2004).

\textsuperscript{41} Bernadette Devlin (as she is commonly known as) is an Irish socialist and republican political activist, who was shot multiple times along with her husband by Ulster Freedom Fighters in her home on 16 January 1981.
British or Irish state(s) or threats from dissidents. Bew recalled that in relation to his own work on Northern Ireland at the time – when he would have been one of the few academics writing on the subject – and his activism within organizations like the Workers’ Party\(^\text{42}\), the British “state couldn’t care less” (Bew, 2015). This was echoed by other scholars involved in similar activities, such as Professor Paul Arthur\(^\text{43}\) (who gave political education courses to active members of the UDF in the 1980s) and Henry Patterson (who was involved in the Workers’ Party with Bew). Although Bew did acknowledge the physical threats posed by the conflict, in his experience, the lack of research and community owed more to academics in Northern Ireland and the U.K. taking no interest; they were more concerned with mainland British issues, such as class and party politics. “Academics had interest in what the problem was, for example, with why the Labour Party rose or the Liberals fall or, you know, big structural questions of change in mainstream, mainland British politics” (Bew, 2015). Taking a Hegelian stance, he noted that regarding academic research, “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk” (ibid). Mockingly, he recalled:

> That is what’s remarkable in academics… is how long it takes for a paradigm to change in terms of what they think is important to teach. So the fact that bombs are going off, they can go off for ten years and nobody thinks – ‘Shit, we should have a course on that’… but after 20 years, the penny kind of drops. That’s the way it works with academic life (Bew, 2015).

Professor Paul Arthur reflected an almost identical sentiment, recalling that “during the 70s, 80s there have would have been almost zero interest in the U.K. or Ireland, for that matter, [on the Northern conflict] other than the odd book written by people like Richard Rose, who is an American, outside of that… no interest whatsoever” (Arthur, 2015). He goes on:

> I mean I remember expressing my disgust on the day that the IRA planted the Brighton bomb\(^\text{44}\), I got a call from a very senior academic in a British

\(^{42}\) The Workers’ Party was first known as Official Sinn Féin, and is a Marxist political party in Ireland. It originated out of Sinn Féin (founded in 1905) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as the split took place with the Provisionals within the republican movement at the onset of The Troubles in 1969–70. It rebranded itself as Sinn Féin, the Workers’ Party in 1977; and then the Workers’ Party in 1982, but it has been consistently associated with the Official Irish Republican Army, and was an open advocate of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.

\(^{43}\) Paul Arthur is a preeminent Northern Ireland scholar and practitioner in international conflict resolution. Arthur describes himself as a “child of The Troubles”, born into a Catholic/nationalist working class family in Derry’s Bogside. He was educated at Queen’s University Belfast (BA & MSc), and did his D.Litt at National University of Ireland (NUI) Maynouth. Arthur is an Emeritus Professor of Politics, Emeritus Director of the Graduate Program in Peace and Conflict Studies, and INCORE (International Conflict Research Institute) Honorary Associate at University of Ulster, where he has worked since the 1980s.

\(^{44}\) An IRA bombing took place at the Brighton Hotel in 1984. It was intended to assassinate Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and members of her Cabinet; and while Thatcher escaped unharmed, resulted in five deaths, including two high profile members of the Conservative Party, and 31 people being injured.
institution and said – ‘I guess we’re going to have to pay attention’, he was a political scientist, very senior, had a senior job at Oxford saying ‘we’re going to have to pay attention to Northern Ireland’ (ibid).

Academics in Ireland, such as Professor John Doyle, reflected that “it wasn’t that there was so much a resistance or reluctance to [studying Northern Ireland] but just a sense you don’t need expertise [on it]. You don’t need to do research…” However, Professor Doyle reflected that beyond a sense of institutionalized arrogance around the subject of Northern Ireland – individuals didn’t feel that it warranted empirical research “because we know about this stuff [already]” (Doyle 2015) – there were certain restraints which caused academics to shy away from the subject. On this, Doyle points to several examples, reflecting:

So the average student at UCD in the 1980s could talk very intelligently about the entire division of the South African Liberation Movement but would repeat tabloid rubbish about Northern Ireland. Because they had no capacity to engage this issue… mostly because of censorship [name omitted], for example, refused to take part in RTE’s personal question time, because it was known the audience was [being] vetted by the [British] special branch.

[And] that is a sense of how close it was! How difficult it was! Dennis O’Hearn who was in Queen's for a number of years in the sociology department when I was there. I didn’t realize when Dennis told me that New Left Review never publish an article in Northern Ireland.
The entire academy of Ireland… concerning the conflict, they just totally refused to [engage]. I mean, look at people on the progressive side of U.K. politics, Hobsbawm himself, you know, the man's an immense intellectual, and Mary Calderon in LSE took a very Metropolitan/Imperial view of the Northern Ireland conflict. So, Calderon/Hobsbawm didn’t think that it was English nationalism – a British nationalism, at least – that wasn’t considered writing on the North. As if nationalism only existed in Celtic fringes…so it’s the Scottish nationalist, Wales’s nationalist and Irish nationalist who are primordial and backward and missing the class dimension to politics. But they knew that British politics was above all of that…that's a classic Imperialist view.

And they used their influence in the more progressive end of the academy to sort of silence the debate on Northern Ireland. And then the impact of censorship and the conflicts together, you can't separate the two. [This] meant it also wasn’t a wise career choice for young academics.

What you had is two combinations. You had everyone thinks they know about Northern Ireland so if you were a head of department going…you’re looking to pick up a new hire, you wouldn’t pick an expert on Northern Ireland because everyone in the department already thinks they can teach it even though nobody was.

So it wasn’t that there was so much a resistance or reluctance to it but just a sense you don’t need expertise. You don’t need to do research. You don’t need evidence because we know this stuff.
I used to do a trick with students at UCD… I used to test them out of the blue, asking – ‘which is further away Kerry or Belfast?’ And they almost uniformly thought Belfast was further away. Because you [would] go on holidays to Kerry, but none of them had been North of Dundalk… In fact, most of them hadn’t been North of Drogheda.

I did a survey at one stage, taking the population from Galway to Dublin and sort of making a rough route of that… and if you lived North to that then you’d probably end up crossing the border just to have convenience at some stage. But if you're living South of the Galway-Dublin line, you got to choose to cross the border and a majority of people South of that line will never cross the border. I did the survey… [it] was like in the early '80s and the number people who ever crossed the border was miniscule.

So we had censorship, non-traveling, the psychological impacts of pretending the violence is further away than it actually is. So for Americans like 90 miles to a warzone is like commuting distance! But it got magnified, the impacts of censorship and the conflict itself forced people to push it [away]. And that’s why they didn’t want to address it (Doyle, 2015).

Thus neglect of the subject owed to a combination of dismissal by many within the political science academy, censorship and monitoring of the media, and academics’ fear of being perceived as sympathizing with or aligning their views with dissident groups. Other, rather more redundant themes emerged too. For example, Professor Richard English noted that Northern Ireland “seemed for a long time a problem without a solution, partly because there was a hint of it being dangerous, the stuff that was happening” (English, 2015). Certainly, this was the dominant point argued by scholars at the time (For example, see: Lijphart, 1975b; R. Rose, 1971; R. Rose, 1976b; Whyte, 1990). In Britain, per English and others, there was a sense of Ireland being “mystifyingly inexplicable and violent and wanting to separate from it because it didn’t fit [in with] patterns of British politics” (English, 2015).

He went on: “When people wrote – brilliant scholars like David Miller writing about national identity based in Oxford, Northern Ireland seemed to cut against the model, which you were describing if you worked in Britain for example [at the time]” (ibid). The situation was similar in Ireland, because for “people talking about the development of state democratic politics in the Republic of Ireland, the North was a problem for that [model]. So conveniently it was ignored” (English, 2015). As evidence, look at table 3 below:
This highlights that following the outbreak of the Troubles in October of 1968 throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s articles on the subject in British and Irish political science journals were scarce. This is especially apparent in the 1970’s and early part of the 1980’s when the Troubles were particularly troublesome. This period included major political events such as the infamous Battle of the Bogside in 1969, the later deployment of British troops to the region, the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, the hunger strikes of 1981, and the attempted assassination of Margaret Thatcher with the Brighton Bombings of 1984, to name only a few. To further contextual the lack of publications from the U.K. and Ireland during this time scholars have noted that from 1969 to 1987 some 5,000 serious publications appeared on Northern Ireland from places such as the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe (B. O'Leary, 1989a; Wright, 1988). Yet despite the litany of political developments and controversies emanating from the region there was a lack of analyses within the U.K. and Irelands leading political science journals until the latter part of the 1980’s when the current peace process began.

Brendan O’Leary recalled that “the bulk of British academy, if they thought about Northern Ireland at all, coded it as a residual, primarily religious, conflict to be accounted for

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Table 3: Pre-Peace Process Publications in the U.K. & Ireland

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Source: *Reuters, Web of Science (2016)*

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45 The figures in this table are derived from bibliometric data found on Reuters, Web of Science database. The search criteria were limited to peer reviewed journal articles in major British and Irish political science journals, other countries were excluded. Book publications were also excluded from this search. Publications were identified with its engagement about Northern Ireland, the Troubles, IRA, terrorism, peace process, and political violence. It is also of note to reiterate the point that despite the previous peace processes of the 1970’s and 1980’s (both of which involved the British and Irish governments) that sparse research was conducted during this time.
by the bigotry of Ulster Protestants, which they saw as very like that of Scottish Protestants, and partly triggered by what they saw as the vehement Catholicism of the Irish” (pp. 8 & 9). O’Leary’s view highlights controversies which emerged in a leading journal of the British left, the New Left Review (NLR), also referred to by Doyle. A scathing 1995 article noted that between November 1970 and October 1994 (immediately following the IRA ceasefire), the NLR had not published any articles which engaged with Britain’s problem in Northern Ireland (S. Porter & O’Hearn, 1995). Prior to the 1994 ceasefire, the only article to be published in NLR remotely touching on the issue was Peter Gibbon’s (1969) analysis of religion and class in Ireland: which described the political situation through what the 1995 authors depicted as a typical British classist/imperialistic view.46

Academics writing on Northern Ireland since the late 1970s and early 1980s, like Bew, Arthur and Patterson made similar references: referring to the British academy’s tendency to class issues in the North as both “residual” and “provincial”, not warranting any real attention or explanation. Michael Cox47 notes that Northern Ireland was, for a long time, “the ugly duckling of regional conflicts [in the British academy]… occasionally mentioned in passing, but not much…” (Cox, 1998, p. 326); while Tonge records that for a long time, Irish studies were generally seen as the “redheaded stepchild of British political science” (2015).

Attempting to put this into historical perspective, Bew reflects that:

The academics don’t – I mentioned before, academics like the first 10 years of the Troubles in – they think that they have to write. The bombs went off and about 800 people were dead, but did they – no. And then it becomes another… there are two seminars a week when it's over. That's academics! It's – Hegel is right, ‘the owl of Minerva is always there post-festum’.

With Northern Ireland this has to do with the fact that they had a set of concerns, which they had developed in post-war England. In Churchill's reign, actually in parallel in 1937-38, he said. ‘The youth of today does not understand how important Ireland was in the United Kingdom.’ But Churchill is actually annoyed about this partly because Churchill’s career has got a lot of Gamma Alpha before. Now, he's held big offices. They've done some really good things but also in the Home Office during the war, the First World War, he'd done some good things — and also people thought some crappy things. And the one thing he absolutely takes over is the policy in 1921-22 towards Ireland, and he gets it right – right, from the British point of view. He gets the deal done with Ireland and these states come out [of it]. And that's the one

46 It should be noted that NLR published a short scanner piece on the IRA split in 1970 (See: Gibbon, 1970); and in the same year, reprinted an interview with the Chief of Staff of the Official IRA (Goulding, 1970).
47 Michael Cox is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at LSE and Director of LSE IDEAS. Cox did his PhD at the University of Reading and is a former Professor of Politics at Queen's University Belfast (1972–1995). He is also a former Chair at LSE’s Department of International Relations and helped establish the Cold War Studies Centre at LSE in 2004.
thing we're lucky to have. It's not Gamma Alpha. It's not gated…boom it worked. He’s got it bared in his mind; ‘this is what we're going to do,’ boom, and it worked. And so Churchill kind of then felt by 1937 when he was in the wilderness. ‘I did this big thing alone but nobody gives a damn about it anymore’. They've just gone off the topic… and you could see when he writes about Parnell, it's not just saying we should remember but what he's saying is the youth of today have no sense of importance about what happened in Ireland. The youth that Churchill was writing about in 1937 were the people of today or the sort of people who were Professors in Cambridge when I got there. And to them Ireland is this off-a-quaint-place which you might have gone to on your holidays, if you're unlucky… You know, and stuff like that. And aside from one or two people because there are quite a lot of Anglo-Irish people in Cambridge, Mansergh for example had family connections with, but basically that was [it] – it was off the mainstream. What Churchill was writing about was the emergence of the working class, the emergence of the labor movement, the Tory vote in the suburbs, the Tory working man [and] these were the issues of the day but that's it (Bew, 2015, pp. 8-9).

Thus, the attitude amongst academics – as well as the public – towards Northern Ireland was that it was yesterday’s news, and a subject which the discipline had simply moved on from. The historical longevity of the dispute, coupled with the depth of the divide between the two communities, also seemed to suggest that the conflict would persist indefinitely. This was certainly the dominant view among academics, even as the settlement of other regional disputes began in the early 1990s; scholars did not express optimism regarding Northern Ireland (For instance see: O'Malley, 1993). Indeed, Guelke (1994) noted that while real peace might be possible in the Middle East and South Africa, it was probably impossible in Ulster. The general consensus was that unrest would continue until either exhaustion overcame the protagonists, or “demographic, economic and wider political changes which are not programmed with a view to peace” changed “the nature of the questions people ask about Northern Ireland” (English, 1997).

Certainly, the impact of censorship and monitoring of the media – by both state and paramilitaries – would have greatly exacerbated individual inclinations against conducting research, as well as reinforcing existing attitudes towards the conflict. Irrespective of the views of Bew and others that the state “couldn’t have cared less” in relation to research, it has long been acknowledged that in Northern Ireland, routine public relations were dedicated to promoting the view that the conflict was caused either by deep and irreconcilable divisions between Irish Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, or simply by “terrorism”. In either case, the
situation was often framed via what former IRA member and scholar Anthony McIntyre described many times as the “internal conflict model”; namely, that the conflict had nothing to do with the relationship between Britain and Ireland, but was between internal fractious groups, with Britain a neutral arbiter (McIntyre, 2015).

In any case, a number of official attempts were made to impose tight controls on media and social practice in both the U.K. and Ireland (See: Miller, 1993; Miller, 1995). This was done both through the law and routine government intimidation of the media, as referenced in Doyle’s account. In the former case, the number and severity of powers available to circumscribe the media had steadily increased in relation to Northern Ireland from the 1970s onwards. In the U.K., this included the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA), the Official Secrets Act (OSA), and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PCEA), all passed and/or tightened following the increase of violence in the 1970s (O Maohin, 1989). In 1976 in Ireland, under Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act (BAA) of 1960, the state issued strict orders that Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) not broadcast, “any matter that could be calculated to promote the aims or activities of any organization which engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the attaining of any particular objectives by violent means” (Miller, 1995). In the U.K., the 1989 revision of the PTA allowed the police to demand access to any journalistic material should they believe it likely to have “substantial value” in a terrorist investigation. In the same year, OSA further narrowed the sphere of debate by making it illegal for anyone associated with intelligence or security matters to speak or be reported in the media. Brendan O’Leary recalled that:

There is a fertile engagement with the history of Ireland in the past. Economic history, cultural history, all that is taking place, but if anything the atmosphere is Cold War-ish with anybody who appears to be sympathetic to Northern Nationalists gets coded as an IRA supporter and dangerous, and doesn’t have a good career. It was a chilling atmosphere as a result of censorship, that was a revert censorship of Republicans.

For instance, there was a broadcast in that. Take, Connor Cruise O’Brien, like a major intellectual, was in transition from being a left wing Irish Nationalist to being a right-wing Unionist and he ended up in the same political party as Robert McCartney – the United Kingdom Unionist Party. [Connor Cruise

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48 Anthony McIntyre is a former Provisional Irish Republican Army combatant. McIntyre was imprisoned for murder for 18 years in Long Kesh (Maze) Prison in Northern Ireland. Following his release from prison in 1996, he completed a PhD in Political Science at Queens University Belfast under the supervision of Paul Bew. Since completion of his dissertation, McIntyre has worked as a journalist, historian, researcher, and activist: remaining consistently and ardently critical of Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin, the Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland Peace Process. His most prominent work is a collection of his journalism and criticism entitled Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism (2008).
O’Brien helped and advised in the Republic of Ireland to implement a very vigorous censorship program (O’Leary, 2015).

The “Cold War-ish” nature of academia around Northern Ireland is reminiscent of that of the 1940s and 1950s at American universities under McCarthyism: whereby groups and individuals were reluctant and urged not to express left-wing views, as they might be seen as anti-state and pro-communist (Schrecker, 1986). John Regan (2013) has called attention to similar developments in Ireland: noting that the advent of the Provisional IRA and rapid collapse of Northern Ireland’s political institutions led some to fear the stability of the Irish state; and thus forced many academics to adopt and adhere to historical meta-narratives better suited to the times. These new narratives had a modi-operandi of focusing on Irish state institutions and relocating the origins of the state from “the un-mandated republican violence of 1916 to the civil war of 1922-23 fought by a democratic state against a public tyranny” (Regan, 2013, p. 3).

Following the outbreak of violence, the dominant view in Ireland thus became that history had a sort of agency which could translate into political action and, potentially, political violence. Prominent intellectuals of the time such as Connor Cruise O’Brien – mentioned by O’Leary – blamed the outbreak of The Troubles on the hero worship of individuals such as Patrick Henry Pearse, brought on by the Jubilee commemorations of the Easter Rising in 1966 (O’Brien, 1972, p. 150). Reflecting the temper of the time in 1976, O’Brien, then a Cabinet minister, attempted to introduce legislation into the Dáil that would “punish teachers who lead classes in IRA ballads and history teachers who glorify the Irish revolutionary heroes” (Taken from: Regan, 2013, p. 5).

Though not as pronounced as in Ireland, censorship was also reflected in the U.K. by grant bodies such as the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the largest funding body for social science research in the U.K.. In the 1970s, it issued strict guidelines which determined that it would not fund research projects in Northern Ireland which focused on issues around the conflict. Thus one of the most important social problems in the U.K. was excluded from funding by a major government research body (Schubotz, 2005, p. 3).

49 The ESRC was initially founded in 1965 as the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). However, following Thatcher’s election in 1979 – and her reservations about the value of research in the social sciences and the extent to which it should be publicly funded – it was decided that while the Council should remain, its remit should be expanded beyond the social sciences (hence, the addition of ‘Economic’ to its title). The ESRC was established to ensure that more “empirical” research geared towards issues addressing “public concern” was conducted (SSRC/ESRC: the first forty years, 2011).
Although the ESRC ban was lifted in 1980, the first funded project which dealt directly with the political conflict in Northern Ireland was not awarded until 1984.\(^{50}\)

We must also take into consideration that even though the ESRC relaxed its funding restrictions in 1980, Margaret Thatcher’s administration began to implement drastic changes and funding cuts aimed at universities. From about the mid-1980s onwards, Thatcher’s government began to behave as though education were an ailing, near-bankrupt industry. Its policy became to challenge, even denigrate, the views of “insiders”, demand value for money, impose performance management, root out endemic “failure”, and insist on what it viewed as customer satisfaction in relation to students (Wilby, 2013). Thus even after the ESRC restrictions were lifted, they had already had knock-on effects on academic institutions’ engagement with Northern Ireland. Moreover, the new policies imposed on universities and university professors would have created an environment of risk aversion to examining what was widely regarded as a politically unpopular and unsolvable conflict.

Ulster University Professor of Politics, Arthur Aughey\(^ {51}\), noted that the general climate within Northern Ireland during the time of The Troubles created a culture of “paranocracy”: what he described as extreme paranoia about providing or revealing any information, or being “too honest” in interviews. In an example of this:

I mean myself and a colleague were contracted by a European Research Program [in the early 1980’s] which was centered in Mannheim in Germany, and what they were looking at and what they were attempting to survey was what they called in their Germanic fashion, “Middle level elites”, to gain ideas about their political parties, their social background, their Legist attitudes, their political attitudes, their ideological dispositions, attitudes on the economy and so on.

That was a framework which would apply with the degree of credibility to let's say the Socialist Party in Germany or the Labor Party, the Conservative Party in GB, but sort of applying it to a small regional parties like the Ulster Unionist Party, the SDLP there were certain difficulties that sort of questionnaire that is required of them because the idea of a middle level elite didn’t really seem to apply in the same organizational way. But anyway we were charged with going along to the various party conferences making

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\(^{50}\) This project was awarded to Queens University Belfast and looked at youth culture in Northern Ireland and its relationship to sectarianism. It examined the role of Protestant working class youth culture in transmitting loyalist ethnic and political identity (See: Willis, 1984) However, it is important to note that it was conducted by a sociologist, rather than political scientists.

\(^{51}\) Arthur Aughey is a Belfast native from a Protestant family and Professor of Politics at University of Ulster. Aughey did his undergraduate degree in History and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast; and graduate and doctoral research (the latter on British Conservatism) at the University of Hull, under the supervision of Philip Norton. He has published widely on Northern Irish politics, British Conservatism and constitutional change in the U.K., with one of his best known publications being *The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement* (2005).
ourselves known as academics, explaining the research program, distributing the questionnaires and you know waiting their completion. Here, the completion rate was about one or two percent. People I thought were relevant didn’t want to provide any information or give its people [because] the use of which they weren't certain about or had no control over. So it was – in the end it was completely a waste of time (Aughey, 2015).

These claims are highlighted by several early studies which bring home the sensitivity which research concerning Northern Ireland’s political, social and economic discrimination involved. For example, a report produced by the Fermanagh Civil Rights Association in 1969, concerning discrimination against Catholics in Fermanagh Council and focusing on the housing and employment situation showed that although the County's population was almost evenly made up of Catholics and Protestants, only 32 of the Council’s 370 employees were Catholic (Smyth & Darby, 2001). A larger research project undertaken in 1973 showed that Protestants were over-represented at all levels in the Northern Ireland Civil Service; particularly at senior level, where over 80% were Protestant and less than 20% were Catholic. Furthermore, a two-year study was conducted by the Guildhall Group in Londonderry to investigate inner city population migration in 1994, just following the IRA ceasefire: revealing that sectarian divides were increasing, with large numbers of Protestants leaving the predominantly Catholic city side of Londonderry and settling in the largely Protestant Waterside, or leaving the city altogether (Found in: M. Smyth, 1995).

What is significant here is not the consistent findings of segregation and discrimination – though we can certainly deduce that with such a preponderance of discrimination within the public sector, it would inevitably have filtered into other aspects of the labor force, such as higher education – but that particularly with regards to meetings of the Guildhall Group, research and meetings had to take place secretly: because some of the researchers held positions in their communities which could have been compromised had it become known that they were meeting with the “enemy”; while the findings of the other reports went largely unaddressed by British government until the peace process began (M. Smyth & Darby, 2001).

The effect of such laws, as well as fear of intimidation and/or incrimination, was that a culture of self-censorship developed: whereby individuals and institutions became risk averse in addressing or taking on the subject. Rupert Taylor speaks to this: noting that when he began his PhD at the University of Canterbury in the early 1980s, he was dumbfounded by “the aversion and the lack of interest in the problem that was going around [Queens] University” in Belfast. Taylor goes on to recall that because of this aversion, he decided to alter his “PhD [topic] to look at the way in which the university (Queens) interacted with the
Troubles” (Taylor, 2015). However, upon investigating this material, he discovered that the topic was “quite controversial”; as the dominant view was that [anything on Northern Ireland] wasn’t going to be a topic that would get you appointed to a mainstream British, American or European university because it would be seen to maybe too controversial or too political” (Taylor, 2015). Indeed, several academics attempted to prevent his research: “Roy Wallis, who was the Professor of Sociology at Queen’s at the time, called up my supervisor, who he knew from their Oxford days together way back when, and said that what I was doing was not a legitimate subject for enquiry”; there were “several academics at Queen’s and people who thought that I shouldn’t be doing this” (Taylor, 2015) and urged him to stop.

In further highlighting the environment of the time, Taylor points to one chapter of his dissertation – which looked at the way Queen’s University interacted with The Troubles – on the academic labor market. When doing his research, he ran into other barriers because “the university position was that they didn’t keep figures on the numbers of Catholics and Protestants, but through analysing Senate meetings and talking to key informants, I was able to get the figures…” (Taylor, 2015) The official stance of the university was that it was non-sectarian and non-discriminatory with regards to Catholics, who were highly discriminated against in other sectors of the labor market; however, Taylor’s research soon revealed that “this university, Queen’s, was not as non-sectarian as it portrayed, because out of 110 professors, only 10 were Catholic” (Taylor, 2015). During his research, he found it surprising how “difficult it [was] to maintain genuine relationships with Catholics and Protestants, but it was also the case in terms of the academic staff at the time” (ibid).

Richard English noted similar experiences when discussing his time at Queen’s. He described the general environment there when he began his academic position in 1989 as “fractious. Fractious. Everything in Queen’s is fractious. And it’s a university that I love, but obviously, it reflects the society in which it found itself” (English, 2015). He noted that scholars, both inside and outside the university, had to be conscious that “people will be listening to hear, [for example] people say the North or Northern Ireland, but they’re saying Ulster or the six counties or they’re saying Derry or Londonderry. There was a kind of social sophistication of watching who was who – partly, not to give offense, partly self-protection” (English, 2015). Moreover:

Any lecture you gave, you knew somebody in the audience, quite a few people in the audience, would have lost someone to The Troubles. A number of people in the audience would have killed someone in The Troubles. Some people in the audience would have definitely done time in jail. Some people in the audience would be about to do time in jail. One of my first students was
lifted early on in one of the master’s classes I was teaching and subsequently did time in jail for paramilitary activity. So it was close to the material. And so someone like Paul, for example, my colleague Paul Bew I worked with for a very long time, was always conscious that any conversation you had had a kind of explosive capacity. So nothing was neutral (Ibid).

Expanding on this a bit further, he explained that academics had to monitor themselves:

Because the cost of people letting arguments explode was so great, that certain kinds of courtesy or distancing were necessary. You found it grouped around certain departments, more likely that the sociology department, this is a generalization, but it’s an element of it, more likely the Sociology department would tend towards more Republican orientation, the History department towards more Unionist. That’s a big simplification, but not entirely without some grounding. And that then replicated itself in terms of graduate students, for example. Generally speaking, there was a kind of professional courtesy, which obtained, which was admirable and necessary. Sometimes it would bubble over in review essays, sometimes it would bubble over in arguments at a book launch, sharp edged questions at a seminar or lecture. But generally speaking what I would find is that people would, in Queens as in Northern Ireland society more broadly, would try to avoid punches having to be landed because they knew the consequences of starting a fight, whether it would escalate quite quickly (Ibid).

Also at this time, as Brendan O’Leary alluded to, scholars in Northern Ireland would have felt very exposed to the “moral” and “normative” malaise of the issues surrounding the conflict; and universities often did not speak out on their behalf. For example, when Professor Adrian Guelke was shot at Queen’s, “his vice chancellor did not protect him, did not [come out and] say, ‘this is a scholar. Of course, he’s not a South African Spy and of course, he’s not a Republican. He’s a professor’” (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary noted that because scholars couldn’t expect to get “that elementary protection of what one would expect from an institution… or even the [acknowledgement that] you’re not in favour of your staff being shot”, that many were reluctant to tackle the issues in ways that others outside Northern Ireland might have been willing to.

However, this was not limited to Queen’s University or Northern Ireland alone. Several of the scholars from Northern Ireland noted that upon leaving and studying at mainland U.K. universities – including Oxford and Cambridge, as well as others – during the 1970s, 1980s, and even well into the 1990s, they remained very aware of the stigma attached to the Irish issue. One scholar from Belfast, who requested to remain anonymous, recalled that they were doing their graduate work at a prestigious British university when the IRA ceasefire broke down in 1984; and they became acutely aware that they were “the only Irish person in the college”. During this period, they spent a lot of time trying to explain what the
issues were to both British professors and students; “not to justify why anything would happen”, but to supply additional context, because the issues weren’t covered in England in the same way as in Northern Ireland. However, in doing this, they noted a great deal of prejudice with regards to the subject (Anonymous, 2015).

O’Leary made similar references: when he began his PhD at the LSE in 1981, “I proposed to study British policy in Northern Ireland and its impact on Great Britain. My argument was that there had been very little research on it”. However, after a lengthy meeting with his supervisor, he was told, amongst other things, that “you’re very bright, but don’t get labeled as Irish. Prove that you’re a general political scientist and then the world’s your oyster. Do something general, do something comparative. Come back to Ireland when you’ve already established yourself” (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary “thought [seriously] about that and I decided, yes. All right, I’ll follow the advice. I’ll stay interested in Irish matters; I’ll keep reading” (Ibid), but decided to change focus. Thus, to both avoid the label as well as meet his supervisor’s criteria, his PhD was on: “Why did India have no communist revolution whereas China did?” – a popular and well received topic given the Cold War context (O’Leary, 2015).

Paul Arthur, in a telling example of the environment of the time, reflected that:

So I’m there at Queen’s doing research and getting involved – I was involved in direct action, then comes time to get a job and I couldn’t get a job anywhere, and eventually I got a job in ah – I was the only Catholic employed in a Protestant school in high school in Belfast, 1972-1974, teaching politics. It was very very dodgy. The atmosphere inside the school was very good, but walking into school every morning, on the big gable wall, there was a sign, which says… there was a Scotch whisky called Haid, and the slogan was – Don’t be vague, drink Haid. And this slogan says don’t be a vaig spelt v-a-i-g, shoot a Taig, and you know what a Taig is… And as the only Taig boy in there, of course, it wasn’t the most comfortable [environment]. I remember, I was living in a very Protestant area, I was living in the seaside resort, which was overwhelmingly Protestant. Uh and it was not a good time, my wife travelled to teach in a Catholic school in the next town and she used to get abused on the bus. They assumed I was Protestant because my name was such … it was a neutral name, and I was teaching in a Protestant school, and when I was teaching in that school, this formed me hugely, because I had to be able to adapt to the circumstances, and I think I learned qualities of empathy, of putting yourself in another person’s shoes, in order to survive, you had to understand the way they thought. Um, and when I first went there it was – of course, the boys, they want to know your background, [and it was a while] before they discovered I was a Catholic… [But following that] I walked into my classroom one morning and someone [got] a knife and scored with the knife on my desk: Arthur is a Taig. And then it began with photographs of me at civil rights demonstrations etc. But it was a wonderful education for me, so I promised – when the headmaster appointed
said to me, he said ‘I am taking a huge risk appointing a Catholic – will you promise you will stay for two years?’ and I said ‘I will’. And I stayed for exactly two years, but it was getting too mean and I resigned before – I had another job, and I knew my book was coming out, and I knew it was going to get publicity, so I knew it was going to get quite difficult. So I stayed the two years and on the back of the book coming out I got a job in the Ulster Polytechnic [what became University of Ulster]. I was now into third level education and it was not involved in politics at all… But you have to remember the university environment [was no better] at that time… It wasn’t good at all. It wasn’t good.
The tension on the ground was very very bad, and for example during the hunger strikes, trying to teach classes was very very difficult, the Republicans were very assertive and the lawyers were very sullen and I had most of my classes in the afternoon [with these people and one student] who was a Senior member of the UDA- he was very open about it. And so there was a real tension there was quite uncomfortable…” (Arthur, 2015)

Arthur drew attention to the tensions and divisions not just existing in terms of the external environment surrounding universities, or between differing departments within them; there were open and obvious ideological fissures between academics within political science departments. Throughout the interview, he frequently stated how often he had disagreed with and felt at odds with ideological perspectives within the Northern Irish political science academy: which, he argued, very much reflected the society it existed within. When asked about his personal experience on this, he commented:

Well there were probably – the common feature was hostility; each side was very hostile towards the other. I have – there’s a handbook of modern Irish history, I have got a chapter in it beginning with the early years. At the very end we were asked to sum up the state of play and I was quite open in my disagreements with Bew and Patterson and Aughey who was also in our department. And our department wasn’t helped by the fact that, not only did Bew and Patterson have their jobs there, but despised me. So I was very much isolated, and I moved out of the Jordanstown campus [at University of Ulster] and moved to teaching politics in Derry because that’s where we had established our Peace Studies – our Master’s in Peace Studies and that was 1987. I was still based in Jordanstown but I moved eventually to Derry. So there was no question that I – you had animosity at the level of political debate in Northern Ireland (Arthur, 2015).

These accounts are reinforced by research by Whyte (1990) and Rose (1971; 1976): who highlighted that elements of censorship, both individual and structural, have existed since Northern Ireland’s creation. It has also been acknowledged that Northern Ireland was a fundamentally unjust society, in which Catholics and Irish Nationalists were openly discriminated against; while ruling Unionist governments regarded Northern Ireland as a state founded for Protestants and run by Protestants. “Catholics [at all levels of society] were
discriminated against because they were perceived as disloyal nationalists/republicans” (John McGarry & O’Leary, 1995, p. 205). Of course, this discrimination was not entirely one-sided: Protestants/Unionists were also discriminated against in Catholic/Nationalist-dominated areas of society (R. Rose, 1971). Nevertheless, one of the main areas of discrimination was in the employment sector, reflected in the higher education system: where the vast majority of professors within Northern Irish universities – not just Queen’s – were Protestants (Schubotz, 2005; Taylor, 1988).

With such social and political variables at play, it is surely understandable that research scrutinizing sectarian division and conflict, as well as ways of addressing such inequalities, would have avoided: as it would have likely been met by severe opposition from the government in Northern Ireland; and unease from both Westminster and within the universities themselves.

We should also note that until Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement began in the mid-1960s, there was little in the way of organized opposition to, or national awareness of, the way in which Northern Ireland was run. Before the outbreak of open civil unrest, the general consensus was that it was best left to be dealt with by the local government (Regan, 2013). Then following the start of The Troubles, when Northern Ireland was governed via direct rule from London, little criticism was openly voiced about the way its affairs were now being run: because any disapproval could have been “weaponized” by political republicanism and nationalism, and in turn undermined the morale of the British troops and Royal Ulster Constabulary (John McGarry & O’Leary, 1995; Schubotz, 2005; Whyte, 1990).

**BRINGING IN THE INTERNATIONAL**

A larger international dimension should also be considered. Without exception, all scholars interviewed noted that to understand the British and Irish academies’ attitude towards Northern Ireland, we also have to appreciate the context within which the conflict was taking place: namely, the Cold War. Although The Troubles may have dragged on for nearly 30 years, resulting in over 3,500 deaths, Northern Ireland did not compare – at least through the prism of fatalities – to the American experience in Vietnam, that of the USSR in Afghanistan, Israel in the Middle East, the various liberation movements in Latin America, or even the subsequent massacre in Rwanda and genocide in Bosnia. Indeed, in 1997, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) compiled a report on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, which ranked and categorized “major conflicts” over the previous 20 years. In that study, remarkably, Northern Ireland was not even mentioned (SIPRI, 1997).
Not only the size of the conflict, but also its nature rendered it as less interesting to the political science community. Professors John Doyle, Brendan O’Leary, Richard English, John McGarry, Jim Hughes, and Jonathan Tonge all highlighted that although the subjects of “identity” and “ethnicity” are taken seriously in the discipline today, it has not always been so; and to most scholars, The Troubles always looked like a very narrow, parochial affair, with nothing to do with the international system or politics. O’Leary provides an interesting account of this time:

I mean it’s difficult for you to recall, but in the late 1980s before the Soviet Union collapses, before Germany is unified, LSE professors around at a dinner table. It’s Gordon Smith’s inaugural lecture and I’m the one guest who isn’t a German specialist were talking about what’s happening in Germany in early ’88. Gorbachev made it clear that there isn’t going to any kind of military intervention in his tenure.

Late or early ’89—I may have the date wrong—I am the only person in the room who thinks that German unification is going to happen very soon. And I’m condemned for it. I’m accused of projecting my wishes for Ireland and to Germany, whereas in fact, my analysis would be Germany’s homogenous, Ireland isn’t, which is why unification would be extraordinarily difficult in Ireland, but not in Germany.

I didn’t say this, but they would be saying. ‘Wir sind ein Volk,’ very, very quickly. This was shocking. All the German professors—good Germans, post-basic law Germans didn’t want anything to do with nationalism—Two systems, two states. Even if the Soviets go, ‘We’ll have two separate systems’. The Western specialists devoutly wanted them to be true. And here is this rude Irish man suggesting, ‘It doesn’t matter. What you want, it will be a unified Germany, right?’

So, that was probably quite well known and I got it right. And the LSE community came out to be an example. It’s a very good example of how a genuine community — because I don’t think there was a Northern Ireland epistemic community, certainly not at that time.

There was a community of scholarship in Germany. It was absolutely convinced that German unification was going off the horizon. It took somebody who wasn’t in that culture to see what was blinding the obvious. At least, it seemed to be blinding the obvious to me. If I had been wrong, maybe I would have revised my opinion, but it seemed to me, obvious that German unification will take place.

Jim Hughes is a Northern Ireland native from the Republican area of Anderstown, Belfast; Professor of Comparative Politics, Convenor of the MSc in Conflict Studies, and Director of the Conflict Research Group at LSE. He took his BA in Political Science and Ancient History at Queen’s University, Belfast, in 1982; and his PhD at LSE (1982-7) in Soviet History. He has authored, co-authored and edited seven books: which include a critique of international conditionality and intervention during EU enlargement, The Myth of Conditionality (Palgrave, 2004); and the EU’s developing conflict resolution capacity, EU Conflict Management (Routledge, 2010). Hughes has published more than 40 articles and chapters, including analyses of the EU’s role in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. He joined LSE as a Lecturer in 1994 and was promoted successively to Senior Lecturer (1998), Reader (2002) and Professor (2007). He previously taught at Surrey, Keele and Trinity College Dublin (LSE, 2016).
So the scholarship of political science except where was focused on post-colonial countries, was not deeply interested in questions of nationality, ethnicity, and religion – with the exception of the small numbers of people like Richard Rose, like Ian McAllister, Anthony Noonan and others, [these questions had] influenced many of them.

There was a small literature interested in the new nationalisms that developed in the West. Not violent, but the democratic nationalisms of Flanders, of Scotland, of Wales, of Catalonia, and so on. That was there in the background, but it certainly wasn’t mainstream (O’Leary, 2015).

This context is important because the Provisional IRA did not begin life in 1970 as a fully formed nationalist guerrilla organization, but as a fledgling, poorly equipped group, whose first task was to defend the besieged Catholics of the North against the perceived threat posed by the Protestant majority (Cox, 1997). Those who created the Provos also regarded their job as rebuilding a movement which, in their view, had moved too far to the left in the 1960s and thus become too involved in normal politics. This apolitical (almost anti-political) stance was well captured in an article published in the republican newspaper, An Phoblacht, which asserted that the primary concern of the movement was not with politics, but rather with the preservation of the purity of republican principles (Found in: M. L. R. Smith, 1995, p. 108).

Moreover, there was no need for republicans to look outside Ireland for inspiration or guidance, as with other national revolutionaries of the time. In 1971, for example, when leading republican militants were asked what inspiration Irish revolutionaries drew from struggles in other parts of the world, they replied “in Ireland… we have no need of your Che Guevaras and your Ho Chi Minhs. We have Wolfe Tone, Robert Emmett, O’Donovan Rossa, Cathal Brugha and many others” (Quote found in: Halliday, 1996, pp. 123-124). This reflects the literal interpretation of the meaning of Sinn Féin (’ourselves alone’), reinforced in part by oddly optimistic assumptions which Provos held about the possibilities of victory over the U.K. One of the republicans flown to London in 1972 to negotiate what he and others (including the young Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness) hoped would be a British declaration of intent to leave Ireland, expressed this optimism: “If we could continue to inflict high British casualties and step up the sabotage campaign, it would be difficult for them to bear the strain and drain on their economy, and no government could be prepared to continue indefinitely in such a situation” (Macstiofáin, 1975, p. 261).

Given this mentality, it was not necessary to look to external support and validation from other like-minded revolutionaries. Also, even though some in the IRA may have regarded Che Guevara as an effective militant and even applauded the Vietnamese for their
guerrilla tactics, for the staid (often, religiously devout) leaders of the Provisional IRA, these other movements in distant lands seemed irrelevant (Cox, 1997, 1998).

With these variables at play, many scholars noted that Northern Ireland, in the context of the Cold War, was viewed as simply a “regional” or “local” rather than an international conflict. Given this, the subject lacked an element of prestige and international significance within the political science sphere; and such was what seemed to be the “ourselves alone” mentality of the republican movement, the close affection and connection many within it had with the U.S., and the almost banal attitude they had regarding the USSR, it seemed a conflict without comparison, at a time other national liberation movements were aligning within the global bi-polar paradigm.

Moreover, while the conflict was something of a human tragedy, in global terms, little seemed to be at stake. The region had no major assets, such as oil; was located on the edge of Western Europe, within an icon of Western democratic longevity and stability, the U.K.; it produced no refugees; and the superpowers took little interest in it. As Professor Michael Kerr noted, “you have to think of it in this context… this is the United Kingdom, it’s Northern Ireland, the strategic backwater that is Northern Ireland, the small teeny, little three quarters of the province of Ireland that is so significant” (Kerr, 2015). Even though events such as “Bloody Sunday” and the “Hunger Strikes” attracted a great deal of international and media attention, especially in the U.S., and were a source of embarrassment to the British government:

Was that pressure on the U.K. government intense enough for it to really change course? It influenced or it definitely pressured the U.K. government at certain points into taking actions and reacting. For [example], it wouldn’t have entered Northern Ireland in the first place in ’69 with the British Army if it could have avoided it. I don’t think [international pressure] was strong enough, no. Jimmy Carter’s presidency, they talked about it, they didn’t do anything. Reagan, there was a little pressure here, maybe, ‘Margaret, do you really think…?’ It wasn’t until Bill Clinton’s time, until after the Cold War…where you saw an American president that was actually willing to consider election

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53 Michael Kerr is a Belfast native from a middle class, Protestant family, raised in what he described as the “leafy suburbs” of Belfast. Kerr attended the prestigious grammar school, Campbell College, before moving to Essex University, where he conducted his undergraduate studies in Politics. His graduate and PhD work was performed at LSE under the supervision of Brendan O’Leary; he performed a comparative analysis of the power-sharing agreements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. He also acted as a staffer and assistant to David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) during his time at LSE. He is now Professor of Conflict Studies, Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, and the Centre for the Study of Divided Societies, at Kings College, London.
pledges that he’d made that he was willing to follow up and actually act on them (Kerr, 2015).

In fact, the conflict has often been treated almost as a success of the British government: in terms of how well it was managed and what little impact it had on the world outside. Thus it was perceived as an “internal” or at most “Anglo/Irish” affair (B. O'Leary & McGarry, 1993, 1996, 2005). The proficiency with which it was managed coincided with the prevailing “self-help” paradigm of the Cold War: whereby conflicts inside nations, particularly those existing within the respective Western and Eastern blocs, were expected to be dealt with internally. Professors O’Leary, John McGarry, English, and Tonge concur that because of the way in which Northern Ireland was perceived both at home and abroad, comparing it to other major conflicts of the time was particularly difficult.

TYING IT TOGETHER

In attempting to link these accounts to this research’s theoretical explanation, it is important to remind ourselves of a common myth surrounding science and scientific cooperation: namely, that there is a natural consensus amongst scholars; and through this, knowledge is created (Star & Griesemer, 1989). If anything, the opposite is true. Science and its development have been marked by various conflicts and controversies. This is how most scientific theories are developed and honed: by arguing about them. Consensus is not necessary for cooperation, nor is it detrimental to the development of theory or empirical research. This is what the boundary object concept is about: the ability to discover some kernel which individuals can come together around, open a forum where they can discuss (and disagree on) issues openly with each other, and sustain these interactions once they have begun.

54 John McGarry is a Belfast native who grew up in Ballymena and attended the Catholic grammar school, St MacNissi’s College, in Carnlough, County Antrim (also known as Garron Tower), with his contemporary, Brendan O’Leary. McGarry attended Trinity College, Dublin (1979) for his undergraduate studies; and did his PhD on Nationalism in Scotland and Wales at the University of Western Ontario (1987). He has published extensively on power sharing in Northern Ireland, many of his pieces co-authored with O’Leary. His work has had an important public policy dimension and impact. McGarry and O’Leary’s Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a New Start (1999) significantly influenced the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. McGarry has appeared as an expert witness before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress; participated in briefings of the UN Security Council; and worked with several governments around the world. In 2008-9, McGarry served for 15 months as “Senior Advisor on Power-Sharing” to the United Nations (Standby Team, Mediation Support Unit), the first person appointed to this position. He is currently the lead advisor on power-sharing and governance in the UN-backed negotiations on Cyprus (Queens, 2016).
The interim period of the 1970s and 1980s was marked by stark consensus concerning Northern Ireland amongst political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland: specifically, that it was a (minor) conflict without a solution. The few scholars in the locale researching the conflict at the time arrived at this conclusion; and given the social as well as structural barriers which existed, challenging this consensus was problematic. That said, these barriers were not imposed by the academics themselves; all scholars interviewed indicated that everyone would have liked to have seen matters resolved. Instead, they noted structural barriers: such as overt censorship in the Irish and British media; and in the case of the U.K., restrictions on funding bodies such as the ESRC.

All this was undoubtedly compounded by continued outbreaks of violence in a country which is geographically small, and within communities which are extremely tight knit. This alone made qualitative research difficult - because individuals, including researchers, were fearful that their identities and hence, their safety might be compromised: either by dissident groups or state police agencies. Yet this was not limited to qualitative projects; as Tonge points out, “during this time the main survey research firms wouldn't touch [Northern Ireland]. You had to use local ones. And they – you go in and ask them questions. Who do you – which party would you support? Asked them questions about attitudes towards political violence, ask them questions about attitudes towards policing. Paramilitaries would wonder who the hell you are” (Tonge, 2015).

Other interviewees highlight the shootings of various academics at Queen’s University, Belfast; as well as prejudice towards to the subject within the greater discipline and desire to avoid “being labeled Irish” (O’Leary, 2015), given the culture of “paranocracy” (Aughey, 2015) surrounding the whole issue. The minority opinion of Lord Paul Bew, Paul Arthur and Henry Patterson pointed more towards to the general tendency of academics to be slow on the uptake in terms of recognizing the necessity and importance of taking up a subject – “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk” (Bew, 2015) - which adds some nuance to this picture; however, it is surely more likely that the owl of Minerva spreading its wings at dusk had more to do with the conditions of the day than some natural preference for nocturnal flight.

These points are important because under the boundary object framework, the creation of new scientific knowledge is centred on communication and new findings. Objects and methods mean different things in different worlds; thus, if they are to cooperate, scholars must find ways of reconciling these meanings. This laborious effort is contingent upon the ability to translate, negotiate, debate, triangulate and simplify to “work” together (Leigh Star,
Translation is key to this, because gaining authority in a respective discipline requires the ability to enlist “allies” who can re-interpret concerns to fit their own programmatic goals, and then establish themselves as gatekeepers: an obligatory point of passage (Laws, 1987). This process of *interessement* allows gatekeepers from different cultural and intellectual worlds to develop multiple translations of meaning simultaneously, while maintaining the interests and integrity of other translations, but increasing the centrality and importance of the individual argument (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011; Leigh Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989).

However, for *interessement* to occur, the individual argument or point of inquiry must be important; the meaning must be meaningful. All learning and knowledge creation therefore involves the development of boundaries. The boundary of a specific domain, discipline, or community is constitutive of relevant episteme and epistemology. In this sense, a boundary acts as a socio-cultural distinction which can lead to continuity or discontinuity in action or interaction (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011). Simply, a boundary defines what is meaningful, as well as what belongs within a discipline. Given the general view of the British academy that the conflict was a “provincial” (O’Leary, 2015) “sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015); as well as it being seen, internationally, as the “ugly duckling of regional conflicts” (Cox, 1998) – and according to SPIRI (1997), not even a “major conflict” - a boundary has been established in the case of Northern Ireland.

Coupled with the “fractious” (English, 2015) and “hostile” university environment in Northern Ireland, divided along the same ideological lines and susceptible to the same sectarian forms of discrimination as other sections of society, this suggests that bridging such boundaries was improbable. Translations, challenges or solutions to existing paradigms, and general engagement with the subject material, all could have compromised academics’ reputations or personal safety; and clearly made the gathering of “allies” extremely difficult. Further, such was the “lack of community” and the “Cold War-ish” (O’Leary, 2015) atmosphere surrounding the subject material, on top of lack of prestige and funding, there was a lack of engagement with one another at conferences, collaborative research projects, and the like. Star (2010) notes that the relationship between information needs and work is usually mediated and facilitated within various repositories: which can serve the function of facilitating and moderating the commentary of debates, and conducting private research (either individually or collectively). They serve a bridging function which allows for heterogeneity of translation without confrontation, and act as knowledge infrastructure.
This infrastructure – visible and invisible – is important, because artefacts (both physical and theoretical) and organizational arrangements are the *sine qua non* of membership in a community of practice (Leigh Star, 2010; Lykke & Braidotti, 1996). Strangers and outsiders to a discipline often encounter this as a target object to be learned about; thus, new participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members (Leigh Star, 2010). This knowledge infrastructure links them with various conventions of practice which are both shaped by and shapes the conventions of a community of practice. For example, most social scientists utilizing statistics learn how to use SPSS for analysis purposes; its limitations are inherited by the version in use, then by advances in methodologies, modelling and software. Yet this infrastructure does not grow *de novo* but wrestles with the inertia of the existing base of knowledge, often inheriting strengths and limitations from this base.

In the case of “how an epistemic community emerges”, the development of such infrastructure and hence, the emergence of a community, becomes visible when new bases of knowledge begin to emerge and challenge existing paradigms. In the case of Northern Ireland, the “lack of community” and knowledge infrastructure around the subject is visible in terms of both the limited research and number of scholars focused on subject in the U.K. and Ireland; as well as the somewhat parochial and localized view of the conflict itself.

The invisible – or perhaps, taken for granted – quality of working infrastructure becomes visible only when it breaks down; in other words, when a bridge washes out or there is a power blackout. However, in such cases, back-up mechanisms or procedures further highlight the now-visible infrastructure. In Northern Ireland, the lack of community and knowledge infrastructure becomes visible not when it breaks down, but when one seeks to utilize it. In this respect, it amounts to the difference between driving on a major motorway or a gravelled country road. The former is wide, roomy, and well-travelled, with much investment in its upkeep, many different avenues to enter and from, and one is sure to be surrounded by fellow motorists. In contrast, the latter receives little, if any, upkeep or attention; is largely unknown, not connected to any mainstream routes, and the driver is likely to travel alone.

During this period, then, Northern Ireland was the road less travelled in both British and Irish political science communities. This chapter then largely dealt with the lack of community and research around the study of Northern Ireland. It focused on local, national, and international context to which the Northern Ireland “problem” was viewed (or rather not viewed) during Cold war period in British and Irish academia. This was a time where both
locally and internationally academics saw Northern Ireland either not an issue worth exploring or simply a conflict without a solution. Though some scholars like Lord Paul Bew assert this paradigm and lack of engagement from the community stemmed from some Hegelian disposition of academics being like “the owl of Minerva” who “spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk”. Yet this chapter has explained that the lack of community and research on Northern Ireland in British and Irish political science had more to do with the political, economic, social issues on the ground during the Troubles rather than a preference for nocturnal flight. Because of these conditions there was a lack of knowledge infrastructure and objects of which academic could gather around and travel down collectively. Thus, research on the subject was seen as an eccentricity of which a only a few academic no-mads decided to engage with. However, leading up to and following the end of Cold war this all began to change. The next chapter displays this and how a subject developed by the epistemic community made its transition from a small obscure path to an academic superhighway.
CHAPTER 4

A COMMUNITY EMERGES

INTRODUCTION
The last chapter highlighted the long-time lack of academic community around the study of Northern Ireland. Recall that it laid out the context and barriers that existed concerning research engagement on Northern Ireland from British academics. Specifically, it talked about the (potentially) dangerous and hostile – physical, social, and professional – environment that academics faced during the time of the Troubles. This environment was complimented by a lack of knowledge infrastructure as well as entrenched paradigms that saw the conflict in Northern Ireland as one without a solution. All of this made the studying of Northern Ireland an eccentricity and showed a lack of objects, ideas, scholars as well as any sense of an epistemic community being possible. Our next aim then is to display the points at which this community did begin to emerge. This chapter therefore outlines how and when this community ultimately emerged: locating its emergence in relative time and space, along with the conditions and (boundary) objects which made this possible.

In doing this we will also display the internal struggles and conflicts which in many ways defined and developed this discipline and the academics that study it. We not only develop an understanding of the community that emerged, but to look at the various boundaries and objects which have come to define and unite it. This will shed light on our research puzzle – how an epistemic community emerges – as well as test the explanatory power of our employment of the boundary object concept.

THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMUNITY
There is little consensus amongst academics as to exactly “when” this community of scholars came about. As we noted, communities of practice and knowledge infrastructure do not develop de novo, but wrestle with the inertia of the existing knowledge base in any discipline. In this respect, there is some degree of consensus as to how the development of the community happened. More senior scholars, such as Henry Patterson, Lord Paul Bew, and Paul Arthur, all of whom bring different perspectives and come from different backgrounds in terms of politics and religion, have all noted and been credited with working on and around
the conflict as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s. Both Patterson and Bew are from middle class, Protestant backgrounds; both admitted to a more “orange” interpretation of the conflict, and did a lot of work with the Workers Party\textsuperscript{56}, which afforded them various avenues of research (Patterson, 2015). Arthur, a Catholic from a working-class family in Derry’s infamous Bogside\textsuperscript{57}, referred to his publication of \textit{Government and Politics of Northern Ireland} in 1980, which led to his giving political education classes to members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). However, both Arthur and Patterson noted that this type of work was “totally unique” and “unheard of at the time” (Arthur, 2015). Patterson commented that despite an almost complete lack of interest from academics in the Republic of Ireland during this time, there was much more of an interest from within the U.K., particularly Northern Ireland. Almost all interviewees acknowledged that engagement came mainly from historians, rather than political scientists.

In attempting to contextualize this, and reflect on the formation of a community, John Coakley noted the relative infancy of political science as a coherent discipline across Europe (Coakley, 2015). For instance, the French Political Science Association (l'Association Française de Science Politique) was not established until 1949, the German Political Science Association (Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft) until 1951, the British Political Science Association – originally named the Political Studies Association (PSA) – until 1950, and the Irish Political Studies Association (PSAI) until 1982. This contrasts with the U.S.: where the American Political Science Association (APSA) was founded in 1903, and helped political science become a firmly established, embedded discipline within American academia, epistemologically and methodologically, before the 1920s (Jewett, 2012).

\textsuperscript{55} In Northern Ireland, interpretations regarding the conflict are typically distinguished along a “green” and “orange” spectrum. Green interpretations are typically associated with republicanism, while orange interpretations are associated with unionism.

\textsuperscript{56} The Workers' Party was originally known as Official Sinn Féin and is a Marxist political party in Ireland. Originating out of Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Workers’ Party split with Provisionals within the republican movement at the onset of the Troubles in 1969–70. The Officials’ founders were Cathal Goulding and Tomás Mac Giolla. The party name was changed to Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party in 1977; then to the Workers' Party in 1982. Throughout its history, the party has been closely associated with the Official Irish Republican Army.

\textsuperscript{57} The Bogside is a historically Catholic neighborhood outside the city walls of Derry/Londonderry. In 1969, local Catholics in the area became engulfed in a fierce three-day battle against the RUC and local Protestants – known as the Battle of the Bogside - which is generally seen as a key starting point of The Troubles.
Most senior academics interviewed, many of whom are highly regarded political scientists in this field, did not consider themselves political scientists: but described themselves as “political historians”, all having written their PhDs in history departments. Similarly, several female academics interviewed, such as Dr. Katy Hayward at Queens University Belfast, Dr. Maria Power at University of Liverpool, and Dr. Sandra Buchannan of the Donegal Education and Training Board's Adult Education Service, identified themselves as political sociologists or historians. Professor Michael Cox noted that even today, in both the U.K. and Ireland, political science does not exist as a discipline in the same way as it does in the U.S. Professors Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, Pete Shirlow, and Jonathan Tonge made similar references to this: “One must realize that many within the British and Irish, for that matter, academy, don’t class themselves as political scientists… look at LSE… It’s the London School of Economics and Political Science but where is the political science department at LSE?” (O’Leary, 2015) Moreover, it is the “politics department at Liverpool” (Tonge, 2015); while at Queen’s University Belfast, it is the “school of politics, international studies, and philosophy” (Shirlow, 2015).

Speaking more specifically on this point, Paul Mitchell, Associate Professor of Political Science at LSE, a self-identified “pure” political scientist and one of the few Northern Ireland experts that almost exclusively utilizes quantitative research methods, noted that:

58 Katy Hayward is an English born academic (from Newbury, near Reading) and Senior Lecturer in the School of Sociology, Social Policy, and Social Work at Queens University Belfast. Hayward attended University of Ulster, Magee College in Derry (BA) and did her PhD on Northern Ireland at University College Dublin (UCD) under the supervision of Tom Garvin in 1999.
59 Maria Power is Lecturer of Religion and Peacebuilding in the Irish Studies Institute at University of Liverpool. Power is the daughter of Irish parents raised in the heavily populated Irish community in North London; and took her undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral studies at Royal Holloway University under the famed historical Professor John Turner – the biographer of Lord David Lloyd-George - in Irish History.
60 Sandra Buchannan is a native of Ireland, who grew up and still lives on the Inishowen Peninsula in County Donegal. Buchannan is the only academic interviewed who comes from a mixed marriage background – her mother is Protestant and her father Catholic – which she described as a “very political household”. She did her undergraduate studies in History at UCD, where she began engaging on Northern Ireland in class with Jennifer Todd; and her PhD at University of Ulster, MaGee Campus under Professor Paul Arthur on cross-border education. Buchannan continues to work in this field with the Donegal Educational and Training Board’s Adult Education Service, and is author of Transforming Conflict Through Social and Economic Development: Practice and Policy Lessons from Northern Ireland and the Border Counties (2014).
61 Paul Mitchell is an English native with a Scottish father and Northern Irish mother. Mitchell was born in the Middle England town of Corby – known for its’ largely Scottish and Northern Irish demographics - and raised in Scotland. Mitchell attended Manchester University (undergraduate), LSE (Master’s), the European University Institute (PhD), and the University of Michigan ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods. He joined the faculty of Queens University Belfast in 1992 and remained there until 2000, when he became a lecturer at LSE.
There was quite a lot of, I'll put it politely, there was [always] quite a lot of scepticism about political science [at Queens and in Irish academia]. Historically, for example, the Department [at Queens] had been labelled 'The Department of Political Science' but they changed it to 'The Department of Politics' I think it's called. It's now called something else because it's a school of something now.

There weren't very many people who would have considered themselves to have been trained in political science and who saw themselves mainly as political scientists. There was always a strong political theory group in the department. In a U.K. context a political theory group would absolutely be regarded as political scientists as well. Some of them were that way but others were post-modernists of various types that have debates about whether facts exist and things like that whereas, to me, that wasn't really what political science is mainly about.

If we leave the theory and philosophers aside and move to the more empirical part of social science study, the Department was undoubtedly dominated by people whose disciplinary predispositions were really of an historical nature. That would be especially true in the cases of the people who were actually studying Ireland (Mitchell, 2015).

Mitchell went on to explain that:

Don't get me wrong, they are good historians in many cases. There was Paul Bew, Margaret O'Callaghan, Richard English and a number of others, Graham Walker, etc. I never had any personal objection to any of these people or to their craft as historians but my objection was that they should be in the History Department.

There is no reciprocity in the sense that it would be inconceivable to imagine that the Department of History, in its hiring process, would hire, you can always have one or two exceptions, but the Department of History would not decide *en masse* to hire non-historians. They'd be hiring people with PhDs in History predominantly, and that's what they do. It's partly why they're strong.

Under the guise of pluralism, I have always felt that some of the Political Science Departments in Ireland have failed to protect and promote their professional discipline. That's because, of course, they are not political scientists in the first place. That was always going to be a reason why I would be looking to leave at some point because I want to be in a Department where political science is the default thing to do (Mitchell, 2015).

The problem identified at the time, but which continues, and is not specific to the study of Northern Ireland, but political science generally, lies in separating it from the strong traditions of historicism, philosophy, and sociological methodologies which have long dominated Irish and U.K. political research traditions.
Both Coakley and others pointed to the foundation of the Political Science Association of Ireland (PSAI) in 1982 and its journal *Irish Political Studies* (IPS) (established in 1986), of which he was a founding member, as indications that a community of scholars was beginning to emerge as a more distinct political science cohort in the early-to-mid 1980s. O’Leary, Arthur, Shirlow, Rupert Taylor, Eamonn O’Kane62, and Tonge pointed to the work of Coakley and Michael Laver in developing the PSAI and how it had contributed to the discipline; however, O’Leary noted that its main success was “producing a decent journal of high-caliber, differentiating Irish political studies from Irish historical studies” (O’Leary, 2015). Before the journal’s publication, there was little in the way of distinguishing the differences, at least methodologically, between political science and historical analysis of Irish political research. The PSAI journal allowed political science, and its practitioners, to begin to distinguish themselves and Irish political studies as a specific and legitimate discipline.

Certainly, in terms of articles from IPS in 1986, 1987 and 1988, several pieces focus solely on political topics in Northern Ireland: an analysis of the religious values of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (C. Smyth, 1986); the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 (Arthur, 1987); and the Scottish Orange Order’s reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Gallagher, 1988), all of which adopted more of a political science approach. Arthur, who was integral in establishing the journal and wrote the foreword to the first publication, noted that the subject, and the journal for that matter, was not in the mainstream of British or Irish political science. Moreover, in the late 1980s, the time of PSAI’s initial development, research on Northern Ireland was still limited to individual “clusters” of people, rather than anything like a “community”; and it still held a strong tradition of historicism (Arthur, 2015). Arthur reflected that several academics, notably Aughey, declined initially to contribute to PSAI because of its Irish-centric focus, its orientation towards more political science research methods, and their personal interest in mainstream British political research (Arthur, 2015).

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62 Eamon O’Kane is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and War Studies in the School of Social, Historical, and Political Studies at University of Wolverhampton. O’Kane is a London native with Irish roots. His mother is from the West of Ireland and father from Northern Ireland. He studied at University of Hull (undergraduate), Queens University Belfast (Masters), and University of Wolverhampton (PhD). His doctoral dissertation was on Anglo-Irish relations, written under the supervision of Northern Ireland historian, Christopher Norton. He has collaborated with scholars such as Paul Dixon on publications like *Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980*; and *The Totality of Relationships* (2007), and is currently co-convener of PSA’s Irish Politics Group (along with Professor Alan Greer), whose constitution was established in 2010.
Others noted that the “clusters” of academics working on Northern Ireland – both in the U.K. and Ireland – were composed of “people from Northern Ireland or for some people [originally] from outside” the U.K. and Ireland (Patterson, 2015). English reflected that “when I was in Oxford in the mid-80s, studying Ireland [in general] was an eccentricity”; and not until the 1990s was there mainstreaming of the study of Ireland in mainstay British institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge (English, 2015). This was echoed by O’Leary and Bew, who both did their PhDs at these institutions. Patterson pointed out that Coakley – another founder of the PSAI and IPS, acknowledged as the “backbone” of its initial operation (Arthur & Lover, 1986) – had no real interest in issues concerning Northern Ireland. Instead, he wanted IPS to deliver research on Southern Irish political scholarship, much in the same way as mainland British politics was covered in academic journals such as Political Studies and British Journal of Political Science. Patterson also noted that Coakley did not study Northern Ireland until much later (Patterson, 2015); Coakley himself commented that he had never wished to distinguish himself as an expert on Northern Ireland.

That said, according to Coakley and Arthur, the founding of the PSAI and launch of its journal were important developments in the beginnings of a community of academics regarding Northern Ireland. Almost all interviewees agreed that from its outset, it was obvious that research on Northern Ireland would be a part of PSAI’s research agenda and a central topic at its conferences.

Now, academics reflected on developments around the peace process which began taking shape during the early to mid-1980s, resulting in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. O’Leary and Aughey noted this was the point when real research became possible; their interest now began to be provoked. O’Leary’s “first real research experience as opposed to simply reading materials and a sense of doing interviews and field research came after Anglo/Irish Agreement of ’85” (O’Leary, 2015). Thus he applied for a grant made available through “the Nuffield foundation… to interview people who’ve been involved in the making of the agreement [and] what were their objectives” (O’Leary, 2015); and was able to apply political science methods by using Graham Allison (1971)’s “rational actors” model in cases of decision making. Aughey concurred that the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave him “the incentive… academic incentive or an intellectual incentive as well as the props of publishing, and you can see here was an opportunity” [to understand] “the nature of unionist politics then and what the options, what options were open [to them]” (Aughey, 2015). He also now had
the chance to write and publish the book which linked this process to mainland British politics: *Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement* (1989).

Yet Bew, Patterson, McIntyre, and even O’Leary highlighted that the failure of this agreement to bring an end to political violence simply reinforced the existing narrative that Northern Ireland was “a sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015). O’Leary explained how different the Anglo-Irish Agreement and abortive 1970s peace process was compared with what finally resulted in the 1990s; because the breakdown of the Sunningdale Agreement meant political failure (O’Leary, 2015). McIntyre and Arthur also noted that none of the previous processes had “delivered Sinn Féin” (McIntyre, 2015).

However, O’Leary and others reflected that while there was still no real community of scholars on Northern Ireland at the time of the Anglo/Irish Agreement, especially in terms of conferences and suchlike, they could see developments on the horizon which pointed to its emergence. The appearance of publications such as IPS, as well as scholarly contributions to *Fortnight*\(^\text{63}\) magazine greatly assisted in this.

Of particular importance during this period were the personal contributions made by O’Leary and McGarry in terms of their (re)engagement with consociational theory. Even scholars who were quite critical of the pair and their application of the theory, of which there are many, noted their vital contribution to the discipline. Both Bew and Patterson, for example, credited O’Leary for:

> More generally, believing you got the minutiae, the details, some of the things that Brendan wrote about consociation, some… which I would accept but the general idea, that he promoted the idea, he kept it alive for a long time when other people like myself went through periods of not believing it. I think it's enormously to his credit (Bew, 2015).

Arthur, another critic of the pair, nonetheless noted that the consociational model contributed to the “coming together” of the discipline and the study of Northern Ireland

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\(^{63}\) *Fortnight* was a monthly political and cultural magazine published in Belfast. It was founded in 1970, with the aim of providing analysis and criticism of politics, culture, and the arts from those both inside and outside Northern Ireland. *Fortnight* was read and contributed to by politicians, academics, and journalists from across the political and cultural spectrum. These included notable political figures such as David Trimble – ex-leader of the Ulster Unionist Party – and Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland (1990-1997). It stopped publication in 2012 following a large decline in readership and subscriptions, which some scholars equated with the success of the peace process (Shirlow, 2015).
(Arthur, 2015). Tonge, Mitchell, English, Doyle, Naill O'Dochartaigh64, and Shirlow all pointed to the importance and influence of O'Leary and McGarry in bringing what one called “a forensic political science analysis” to a subject hitherto dominated by historians (Tonge, 2015). Academics who began or finished their PhDs at various points in the 1990s all referenced O’Leary and McGarry’s work – such as The Future of Northern Ireland (1990) and Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) - as major influences on their research; while others, such as Dr. Brendan O’Duffy65 and Dr. Etain Tannam66, who took their PhDs at LSE during the early 1990s, noted that O’Leary’s methodological approach had brought them there. O'Duffy commented that:

[I came] to LSE because I mean O’Leary was at LSE at that time. So I came basically at that point – I think if you’re serious you’re sort of applying to institution matters. But the PhD the supervisor matters more. So I had begun in doing some research part of my Master’s and I came across work by O’Leary… But I happened to be persuaded because he was trying also to do – he was basically approaching the Northern Ireland subject from a more comparative perspective, more so than compared to a lot of his contemporaries. So the initial stuff I read was kind of engaging in consociational theory. To me it was satisfying and seemed more appealing than some of the narrower or even broader social science approach that I may have been tempted to do. [For example,] I had a place at Nuffield College at Oxford and maybe I would have gone to a really completely different direction if I were down there. Because there wasn’t anyone with that kind of expertise in that area and they were almost certainly encouraging me to kind of continue with my current quantitative large and macro approach. So O’Leary’s works appealed. So I thought that makes sense for what he was describing during that period of the post Anglo/Irish Agreement and the beginning – we now kind of see it as the beginning of the framework of the consociational plus settlement (O’Duffy, 2015).

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64 Naill O’Dochartaigh is a Galway native who was a member of the Irish Labour Party. He did his studies (undergraduate and Master’s) at National University Ireland (NUI), Galway. O'Dochartaigh took his PhD at Queens University Belfast under Bew’s supervision, and looked at the escalation of conflict in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s: which was later turned into From Civil Rights to Armalites (1997). He is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at NUI, Galway.

65 Brendan O’Duffy is an American native of Irish descent from Rochester, Minnesota. O’Duffy studied Sociology and History at Boston College (undergraduate); a Master’s in Political Sociology at McGill (Montreal); and a PhD in Government at LSE under the supervision of Brendan O’Leary: a historical institutionalist analysis of the causes and dynamics of political violence in Ireland. He is Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London; and author of British-Irish Relations and Northern Ireland: From Violent Politics to Conflict Regulation (2007).

66 Etain Tannam is an Irish native raised in what she referred to as a “moderate nationalist” household, with family connections (on her mother’s side) to Northern Ireland. Tannam received her BA in Economics and Political Science from Trinity College Dublin, her MA in West European Politics from University of Essex, and her PhD from LSE. The latter was supervised by O’Leary, and looked at EU policy in relation to Northern Ireland. Tannam is Associate Professor and Course Coordinator of International Peace Studies at Trinity College, Dublin’s Irish School of Ecumenics.
O’Leary acknowledged that “I think McGarry and I not only applied consociational theory [to Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it. And I don’t want to say that we [started] major intellectual revolution, but we did help transform the conversation on Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015). McGarry felt that the claims that he and O’Leary “kept power sharing alive” or brought it to life were overstated, noting that “it was Brussels, it was the politicians realizing that this was a way to get it done, to satisfy both parties involved” (McGarry, 2015). He did explain, however, that following his first publication on Northern Ireland, The Anglo-Irish Agreement and The Prospects for Power Sharing in Northern Ireland (1988), he was contacted by O’Leary, whom he had gone to primary school with - who stated that, according to O’Leary’s account, “I really agree with what you’re saying here” (O’Leary, 2015).

Thanks to this interaction, they worked together on and released The Future of Northern Ireland (1990a) (McGarry, 2015). According to McGarry, their work on this brought together “about 12 people who were engaged in different ways of finding…finding a way out of the Northern Ireland conflict” (John McGarry, 2015). Not only was this the first work to challenge the dominant view of Northern Ireland as a conflict without solution, but it brought together a collaboration of scholars: “Paul Bew and Henry Patterson were involved in that and I believe Anthony Kenny67 who was at Oxford, people from Dublin such as Anthony Coughlan68”. Though these academics had different views on possible solutions and varying historical interpretations regarding its origin, they began to interact more closely, and “a lot of us wrote various articles for this magazine called Fortnight, which was very important in the 1990s” (McGarry, 2015).

McGarry and O’Leary reflected that through publications such as Fortnight, as well as conferences, these scholars began “commenting on each other’s work or refuting each other’s work” (McGarry, 2015). In looking to highlight the elevation in interest in Northern Ireland – from both academics and politicians – he went on to discuss one specific experience:

I remember going to conference in around 1990, that was on South Africa and the Middle East, and Northern Ireland and it took place in Boston, it was

67 Sir Anthony John Patrick Kenny is a prominent English philosopher and former Roman Catholic priest.
68 Anthony Coughlan is an academic, Secretary of the National Platform for EU Research and Information Centre, and a retired Senior Lecturer Emeritus in Social Policy at Trinity College, Dublin. A native of Cork, Coughlan began lecturing at Trinity College, Dublin; and in the 1960s, was heavily involved in the Wolfe Tone Society, which campaigned for civil rights in Northern Ireland and supported the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (CAIN, 2015).
organized by Paudrich O’Mally, who was at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. At this conference was Peter Robinson, first minister and another prominent member of the DUP, they were representing the Unionist cause and we had Mark Durkin from the SDLP, so I mean that was ground breaking. Mandela was being released for instance in South Africa. So right there and then, there was a… there was a network of scholars involving in the United States, Northern Ireland, from Canada, Ireland, and Scotland, a few from England (McGarry, 2015).

O’Leary confirmed that *Fortnight* and his publications on Northern Ireland helped link him with other scholars, such as Paul Mitchell and Geoffrey Evans⁶⁹, in the early 1990s; and develop parallel theories around consociationalism:

> I think the work that I did with Geoff Evans and Paul Mitchell on electoral behaviour overtime was important. I would claim it immodestly, but I think correctly. And [we were] the first to publish on the growth of the Northern Nationalist in *Fortnight* magazine way back in early 1991 or so, what the long-run implications of that transformations are—with Mitchell and Evans. Also, we make a nice contribution to showing how high the theory of Shepsle and Rabushka, which implies that you can’t have a democracy amid deep ethnic divisions because you will perpetually have a lot of flanking. You’ll have civil war and a lot of flanking. Our efforts to try and show how that might not be true, if you get to development of tribune parties, I think that’s a contribution to the discipline (O’Leary, 2015).

Many interviewees, including Mitchell, noted the importance of publications such as *Fortnight* and the contribution which O’Leary and McGarry’s theoretical application brought to the study of Northern Ireland in the early 1990s. Dr. Paul Dixon⁷⁰, one of O’Leary and consociationalists’ most ardent critics, referred to the publication as a “lifeline” to scholars in the U.K.; it allowed to them to stay connected to developments in the North, as it was not covered very well in British or Irish media (Dixon, 2015). Although it was not an academic publication, *Fortnight* allowed scholars and journalists to refute and review one another’s work in a way which wasn’t possible in other outlets.

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⁶⁹ Professor Geoffrey Evans is a political scientist and Official Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford. Evans specializes in elections, is long-standing editor of the journal, *Electoral Studies*, and has extensively published on British, Scottish, and Northern Ireland elections, together with individuals such as Paul Mitchell and Brendan O’Leary (For example, Paul Mitchell, Evans, & O’Leary, 2009).

⁷⁰ Paul Dixon is a native Londoner from Southfields, with an Irish Catholic family; and was educated at a Roman Catholic primary school. Dixon attended Manchester University (BA), where he studied Politics and Modern History (1986); and did his PhD at Bradford University (1993) under Tom Gallagher, where his dissertation focused on the Labour Party and Northern Ireland. Dixon is now Professor of Politics at in the Department of Economics, Politics, and History at Kingston University, London; an active member and contributor to the Political Science Association, Ireland and its journal; and a regular participant at PSAI conferences. Dixon has published pieces on Northern Ireland and its peace process which critique consociationalism and its supporters (For a listing see: Kingston, 2014).
Moreover, we can also identify evidence of a rise in discussions on consociationalism and Northern Ireland. In April 1988, for example, O’Leary presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London on *The limits of Coercive Consociationalism*; and was invited to speak on various British policy practices and limits in Northern Ireland in March and April 1989 at the Joint Convention of the British International Studies Association and International Studies Association in London, as well as the European Consortium for Political Research in Paris. Then, following the release of their book in 1990, O’Leary and McGarry gave a series of public lectures throughout Ireland, the U.K., Europe, and North America: talking about and debating their explanations and proposed solutions (See: Pennsylvania, 2013).

Moreover, the book’s publication presaged multiple reviews and refutations of their work (See: Guelke, 1991; H. Patterson, 1993). O’Leary began to correspond regularly with established academics such as Richard Rose71, John Darby72, and Jonathan (John) Whyte73; “there [was] such a demand for matchers so I would be invited to many, many places in London and around the region to give a talk on Northern Ireland, to explain it…” (B. O’Leary, 2015).

During this time, there was an increase in conferences, general discourse and in student appetite for Northern Ireland, both in the U.K. and Ireland, to which professors began to respond. The rise of discourse on consociationalism coincided with several other variables which increased academics’ general interest. Mitchell, then at Queens University Belfast, and

71 Richard Rose is an American-born political scientist and pioneering scholar on Northern Ireland and comparative politics. He is Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy and Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde, Scotland. Rose was a student at Johns Hopkins University (BA), and wrote his PhD at the University of Oxford. Though his research on Northern Ireland was highly influential in the 1970s and 1980s, he has largely abandoned the subject and currently focuses on EU enlargement, democratization, elections and voting, and policy transfer. Rose was Professor of Politics at the University of Strathclyde from 1966 to 2005; and Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester, from 1961 to 1966 (CSPP, 2016).

72 John Darby was distinguished scholar on Northern Ireland. Darby was born in Belfast, attended Queen’s University Belfast (BA) and began his teaching history in Belfast in the 1970s; however, following the outbreak of The Troubles, he began researching and publishing for the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission. His first book, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarized Community* (1976) was one of the early influential contributions to understanding the conflict. Darby was appointed Lecturer in Social Administration at the University of Ulster at Coleraine, and helped establish INCORE. In 1999, Darby was appointed Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, where he remained until 2011 (Dunn, 2012).

73 John Whyte was an Irish historian and political scientist who wrote extensively on Northern Ireland as well as other divided societies. Whyte was Professor of Empirical Politics at University College, Dublin (UCD) from 1962 to 1966: when he moved to teach Irish Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, and remained there until 1982. Whyte returned to UCD in 1984, where he chaired the Politics Department and wrote his seminal treatise *Interpreting Northern Ireland* (1990).
Tonge, then at Liverpool, both pointed towards high student turnout and the development of class modules dedicated to Northern Ireland, which compared it with other conflicts of the time. Many interviewees also highlighted the foundation of various research institutes - such as University of Liverpool’s Institute of Irish Studies in 1988, and Ulster University’s International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE) in 1993 - as benchmarks in bringing the study of Northern Ireland, as well as other Irish political and social topics, to the mainstream of British academia.

In trying to explain the “why”, English and Tannam also noted the changes taking place in the late 1980s/early 1990s, which brought Irish studies and Northern Ireland to the forefront. Pointing to the beginnings of the peace process, with Peter Brooke’s famous statement in 1990 that the British government had no “selfish economic or strategic interest” in Northern Ireland and would accept the unification of Ireland by consent, followed by the Downing Street Declaration in 1993, and the rise of the Celtic Tiger, many noted that Ireland had started to become “doubly ‘cool’ because it was moving toward peace and because the economy seemed to be doing well” (English, 2015). Tannam provided further context: highlighting the major shifts taking place in Europe, with the implementation of the Single European Act:

The Single European Act in 1987 that was – well, it did create a European market. It was one of the most – I would say the most fundamental acts in EU history. It was – it changed decision-making procedures in the European Union to increase majority voting so, in other words, it was more easy to pass through common policies without having national vetoes and it was extended to different aspects to economics to create a single market so that there would be no quality barriers to importing goods into the EU. And Thatcher signed up to it which was surprising and that was because the financial services sector in London was set to gain from it and it really did contribute to their success with even more success. But their side payment made to Spain and Portugal was that regional policy being formed because those regions were poor, so was Ireland, so Ireland would get and Northern Ireland, subject to which region was the poorest, would get large sums of money – most of EU regional policy money. In fact, all of it was to be concentrated on a small number of poor regions including Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland… It became a symbol of a post-nationalist world where ethnic conflict should not matter as

74 INCORE was established in 1993 and is a joint project of the United Nations University and the University of Ulster. INCORE’s remit is to look at the causes and consequences of conflict in Northern Ireland and internationally, as well as promote conflict resolution management strategies. INCORE is located within the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ulster and co-ordinates varied peace and conflict-related activity across the University. It incorporates a number of disciplines and has been a starting point for many scholars in the Northern Ireland epistemic community.

75 Peter Brooke was a Conservative MP and Secretary of State of Northern Ireland from 1989 until 1992.
much because they cooperated according to economics and EU logic rather than nationalist logic. So that became extremely fashionable [to study] (Tannam, 2015).

Tannam noted also that around this time, because of the Single European Act and the investment that came along with it, the EU began to play a more prominent role in the relationship between Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the U.K.; and this got the attention of the academic community. She recalled that while on her PhD in around 1990 or 1991:

I remember my first conference paper, which I was terrified about giving, and was – I can't remember… I think it was on regional policy – it was my first publication – was on regional administrative cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and how the EU was improving it, and there was this huge interest. I remember loads of established academics coming up to me afterwards to get my card and, of course, I hadn't got a card so just my number, and it was absolutely overwhelming. And then somebody from…I can’t remember, but they knew O'Leary asked if, would I submit the paper to Governance, the American journal that was just starting that now is established, and it got published. Just like that (Tannam, 2015).

Doyle, Arthur, and Mitchell all highlighted the research money being made available to the subject at this time: both because of the buoyancy of the Irish economy, and an infusion of EU funds. All interviewees agreed on the importance of this: “I mean no one was getting rich off of studying Northern Ireland…” but that it’s “easier to study something when there is interest in it and money made available than not” (Anonymous, 2015).

Tannam, English, and Arthur concurred that involvement from the EU and its regional policy raised the profile of the Northern Ireland conflict from a regional to international one. American involvement following the election of Bill Clinton also meant that Northern Ireland started being viewed as more internationally relevant. Historically, the U.S.-U.K. “special relationship” and Cold War context usually trumped any American desire to intervene in Northern Ireland and reflected the doctrine of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of nations (T. J. White, 2013). The first real break with this came after Clinton’s election and the end of the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, unification of Germany in 1990 and demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a major shift in international politics and academia. Following the Cold War, there was an explosion of interest intellectually and academically in the notion

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76 For instance, from 1988 – following the Single European Act – to 1993 the EU invested €795 million into various community initiatives and organizations: including the International Fund for Ireland, as well as research into various regional and community policy initiatives (See: McCaffery, 2013).
and study of nationalism and ethnic conflict, a subject which had not been taken that seriously before. Mitchell noted that before the Cold War ended, sub-disciplines within political science, such as “peace studies” or “conflict studies”, simply did not exist (Mitchell, 2015). The end of the Cold War also led academia to shift from major conflicts between nations to the study of civil wars, including Northern Ireland. “The end of the Cold War means that almost every single war in the world right now is a civil war…” (Mitchell, 2015): which greatly increased the ability of political scientists to make comparisons and apply theories such as consociationalism, furthering both the theory and the discipline.

O’Leary echoed this, pointing out that “as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc… There’s a whole set of unemployed Sovietologists and Yugoslav specialists” (O’Leary, 2015) who needed new material to work with. The study of ethnic conflict and civil war seemed to be an increasingly propitious area. O’Leary and McGarry were at the forefront of attempting to normalize both the study of Northern Ireland and comparative politics by emphasizing its primarily ethnic/national character and comparing that with other conflicts (O’Leary, 2015). McGarry, O’Leary, Arthur, English, Bew and a host of others highlighted that this rise in popularity and profile can be understood in the level of interest amongst academics and its media profile. Many recalled that from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, they made regular appearances on television, radio, and wrote regular pieces for publications such as The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Times, and other Irish, British, and international publications. In a specific example, O’Leary recalled that:

You can’t tell from the web, but if I have been—I suppose from ’87 to 2001, I would have had at least one appearance a week on radio or television and quite a few op-ed so I was actively in the media. I was a regular on the BBC world service. As I got older with higher academic status, I was a regular on the Today Program, Northern Radio, the 10 o’clock radio news on Radio 4. I did BBC 2, Channel 4. When I was in ’95 or ’96, the Guardian publishes celebrity Dons and I’m in the first 10-celebrity Dons (O’Leary, 2015).

The rise in popularity was also because Northern Ireland is a relatively easy case study for somebody who speaks English and does not want the difficulties of learning, for example, Uzbek or Ukrainian. Individuals eager to research the conflict could do fieldwork relatively easily, as it is located inside Western Europe. Perhaps most importantly, scholars moving into the field focused on a new, “interesting question to answer, that is – why does it appear that this ethnic conflict might be capable of resolution compared to other?” (O’Leary,
2015) However, despite this paradigm shift from Northern Ireland as a conflict without a solution and a subject to avoid to “fashionable” (Tannam, 2015) and even “sexy” (Kerr, 2015), with peace now seen as a possibility, there was hardly consensus amongst academics as to how this “interesting question” could be answered.

In fact, the division that had come to define Northern Ireland was reflected and embedded within the academic debates that developed throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Certainly, O’Leary and McGarry both talked about their experience in beginning to publish and discuss their work on consociationalism, and how their ideas were met with fierce criticism from many within the academic community. McGarry recalled that:

Even though we were all engaged in trying to improve things in Northern Ireland, thinking of a way of resolving this conflict, we genuinely believed that the approach taken by the outside or some of the other sides... and it’s...well sometimes those debates could be quite vitriolic. I can remember one academic who is English, I believe... writing, I won’t mention names because I don’t want to restart a debate, but accused O’Leary and me of supporting ethnic cleansing because we supported power sharing. And I don’t know how you get from supporting power sharing to supporting ethnic cleansing but his thinking was that both the fall the reification of groups that comes and once you started thinking in terms of groups, you’re down a slippery slope to the Holocaust (McGarry, 2015).

O’Leary was a little more reluctant to discuss the level of “vitriol” surrounding criticisms of his work or the debates which took place; but did explain that while he was at LSE and began appearing regularly on the media, it evoked different reactions from his fellows. He reflected that people he would have regarded as authentic scholars “would genuinely praise me for being clear, lucid, detached and obviously, not British... giving a perspective that was not the mainstream British one” (O’Leary, 2015). However, other individuals, like a former “Director of LSE at one point. This is second hand so I don’t know if he said it for certain. [but allegedly said] ‘We even have a very good Sinn Féin (SF) professor’” (O’Leary, 2015). O’Leary was not and had never been a member of Sinn Féin or a supporter of any dissident group; but because he and McGarry took a “greener” perspective than many mainstream British interpretations, they received a lot of abuse. He recalled another example where:
Kevin McNamara, then Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, accompanied by Christopher McCrudden⁷⁷, see a presentation that I gave in London at the Advanced Institute of Equal Studies. I don’t recall whether it was in ’87 or ’88. I think it’s probably ’87.

And Kevin asked was I subsequently… willing to advise. I wasn’t sure at that time and I talked with Chris then I decided. So I became part of a small community, a real community face-to-face interaction, not the more abstract notion. And we drafted policy papers for future Labour government… I was the principal drafter of a document that’s trying to gloss over two difficult positions. The Labour party had committed itself to Irish unification by consent. So the question is, ‘What did that consent mean?’ and another question is, ‘What did you do in the interim if you were a Labour government?’

So, what McCrudden and I really cared about was the radical reform of Northern Ireland so that we were intent on radical peace reform, formative administration of justice, equal funding for education, a vigorous affirmative action program for fair employment, and devolved government.

But we also were asked to think about what else we could do if there was no support for a devolved government. And that’s when I had the mission basically to think through how joint sovereignty over Northern Ireland might work. And although people have denied this, I know it to be true that Neil Kinnock⁷⁸ approved these papers before the 1992 election, which Labour was expected to win, but didn’t…

Shortly afterwards, the paper that I had, being the lead drafter—I wasn’t alone. Others were involved but I don’t think anybody would deny I was the lead drafter. It’s leaked. So in response to this sensible decision is made, that the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) will ask for a version of the document to be published as a short book I co-author, Northern Ireland Sharing Authority (1993).

And that gets very significant media attention. It may have been the most useful thing I ever did on Northern Ireland, not because it was implemented. It wasn’t, but for two separate long run reasons: One, it made Unionists generally anxious that if there were a Labour government, there were people crazy enough to go ahead with joint sovereignty. So it might make more sense for them to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement within the UK with cross-border institutions rather than something worse happening.

Peter Hain, Mo Mowlam, Claire Short, Jimmy Marshall, Roger Stott, and a whole range of Labour MPs were a sounding board for both the document and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) text as it developed.

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⁷⁷ Christopher McCrudden is Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law at Queen’s University Belfast; and William W Cook Global Law Professor at the University of Michigan Law School. Until 2011, he was Professor of Human Rights Law at the University of Oxford, and a Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

⁷⁸ Neil Kinnock is a British Labour Party politician and was Leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition from 1983 until 1992, making him the longest-serving Leader of the Opposition in British political history.
Two of them, Hain and Mowlam went on to be Secretaries of State. I don’t know what direct influence that document had. I mean, it had a significant influence on Mo. Peter Hain, I don’t know what long-run impact it had. But there was a view, a theory among the unionists that there was a serious possibility of joint authority might be considered by British government.

That needed the acceptance of something like what happened in the framework documents in the ’95 and the ’98 agreements, much easier for them to accept influence by consociational thinking, but also a fresh institutional design (O’Leary, 2015).

Both because of his work with the Labour party, as well as the consociational framework he was advocating, O’Leary “took a fair share of abuse” from many of his colleagues (O’Leary, 2015). He recalled “Ruth Dudley Edwards—known as Ruth ‘Deadly’ Edwards to her friends, called me the ‘Green Machiavelli’ in the Sunday Times” (O’Leary, 2015) for his academic and political contributions. McGarry recalled that he and O’Leary were once referred to as “academic carnivores” for the positions they were defending and their critique of existing paradigms (For example, see references in: Cochrane, 1997, pp. 60-62). Many of these debates took place at various conferences and across different publications: to the extent that a book was written about the debates themselves:

Rupert Taylor in particular who was – and is an English person who I think did a pretty solid contribution when I think about it and he also edited the book on consociational thinking and he brought together a lot of these different perspectives – it’s called Consociational Theory (2009) and it involves the debates between these different perspectives, some of which were pretty heated (McGarry, 2015).

Moreover, individuals like “Robin Wilson, for example, who writes in this volume as well as a former editor of Fortnight and a person with very good intentions, and good ideas. But he just didn’t agree with anything we said at all. He just said it was sectarian; it was ethnocentric, segregationists, etc etc…” (McGarry, 2015). However, in retelling these accounts, both scholars recognized that they gave criticism just as much as they received it; their “reaction wasn’t the New Testament reaction to turn the other cheek, but to take on criticism and to respond to it… and we did so – we gave as good as we got” (McGarry, 2015).

79 Ruth Dudley Edwards is a writer, journalist, and media broadcaster in the UK and Ireland. She is also a columnist and regular contributor in the conservative-leaning Sunday Independent (Ireland).

80 Robin Wilson is an independent political scientist who did his PhD at Queen’s University Belfast and was former editor of Fortnight Publications (1986-1995) and Director of Democratic Dialogue (1995-2006). Wilson has written extensively against consociationalism: including The Northern Ireland experience of conflict and agreement: a model for export? (2010).
Taylor, Shirlow, Arthur, Dixon, and others, all noted the sometimes-intense nature of these disagreements, the often-combative nature of the pair, and how in many ways they came to define the discipline. Nevertheless, Taylor recognizes O’Leary and McGarry’s approach to consociational theory as probably having “the biggest influence on developing, academically in political science, the study of Northern Ireland”; but “identified [himself] as being a critic of consociational theory and in favour of a more transformative agenda” (Taylor, 2015). Despite his disagreements with O’Leary, McGarry, and consociationalism generally, the framework did give scholars a “foundation” which they could build on; while the notion of “power-sharing” created a debate that “actually left the academy…in the Belfast Agreement”. These ideas influenced political figures at Stormont and in the British Labour Party (Taylor, 2015).

Bew, though, disputed this: arguing that the influence of consociationalism, O’Leary, McGarry, and other academics was greatly overstated. He argued that while O’Leary and McGarry played an important role in the theoretical debate surrounding Northern Ireland, their influence within and on the politics around the conflict was miniscule. “I was the only one in the game... there was no other academic in the game...” “scholars like Brendan O’Leary... I think Brendan is a great scholar, a great man. And he is in the game, for example, on the Kurds [In Iraq], right? But is he in the game – on Ireland? No” (Bew, 2015). Bew went on to explain that O’Leary could have been involved but for a clash of personalities with Mo Mowlam81 and her team: “Mo and Mo's people didn't like Brendan… [so...] end of story [he was out]” (Bew, 2015).

According to Bew’s account, he was the only academic who was, in a practical sense, involved in the negotiations and talks around the peace process and the Agreement of 1998. He and other interviewees, such as McIntyre, Patterson, Arthur, and Aughey, all noted the tendency for scholars at the time of the peace process and following the Agreement in 1998 – and even today – to “overstate” and/or “exaggerate” their role and influence in the events taking place. Bew’s credibility here does seem valid given his role as an advisor to David Trimble during the peace process, and the fact that this later made him a lifetime peer in the House of Lords. Yet similar claims were made by Arthur, O’Leary, Shirlow, and Kerr: who

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81 Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam was a Labour Party politician and MP for Redcar from 1987 to 2001 and served in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mowlam's time as Northern Ireland Secretary oversaw the signing of the historic Good Friday Peace Agreement in 1998.
all, in one way or another, noted the utility and uniqueness of their respective roles in either shaping ideas around the peace process or with the political figures involved. For example, Arthur recalled that:

When the ceasefires were in 1994, the most fascinating three days of my life was in chairing a meeting for the combined Loyalist Military Command, as they had to work out what they wanted to do. It was three intense days. The UDA, the UVF, the Progressive Unionist Party, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party all in the hotel and they broke up into four separate groups after the session, and they discussed the way to move forward, at the very end of it, I was called in, and 6 questions were put to me, and they said to me: on the basis of how you answer these 6 questions, we will be able to decide how we will be able to move on. So that was both fascinating and very scary. So that's part of... so at the end of it I began to get involved in exercises (Arthur, 2015).

He went on to point out that:

From the 90s, from 1990 onwards, and I’ve written about this, I was one of the few people who had approached, and established enough rapport with people like Peter Robinson, for example, and the whole point of trying to... has to be transparent, it becomes transparent – absolute trust, and they found that what we said amongst ourselves was confidential.

So my career was, to a large extent, as a practitioner, as much about being an academic and in that respect, I was unlike, virtually everyone else that you’ve spoken to, with the exception of Antony McIntyre who clearly was in the IRA and who became very close to David Trimble, but hadn’t really been involved in a way that I would have been involved in these sort of things. So that was my trajectory, if you like (Arthur, 2015).

In seeking to explain such differing accounts, Aughey made an interesting point, albeit indirectly, about the concept of “fantasy echos”: noting that when individuals, even scholars, look at the past and their role in it, they often conjure up wondrous images when trying to understand their relationship to it (Aughey, 2015). He explained that the echoes coming from the past are real, “but how we understand them were fantastic, there's something real about it… there's a real echo there, but it's a sort of a fantastic interpretation” (Aughey, 2015). Yet even if some of these interpretations are indeed fantastic, the desire of academics to attach themselves to the subject of Northern Ireland and promote themselves as having an influence in the political process marked a dramatic, almost unrecognisable shift given what had gone before.

Irrespective of the influence which consociationalism and O’Leary and McGarry had on political figures in Northern Ireland, it undoubtedly influenced scholarship. Looking at the
literature on the peace process from its initiation in the early 1990s until the signing of the Agreement, the intellectual schisms between academics who adopted different approaches and perspectives and their mixed, and sometimes hostile, responses to the proposed power sharing agreements – which would later comprise the Good Friday Agreement – are very apparent. This is commonly described as Northern Ireland’s “meta conflict”: the intellectual debate about the nature of the conflict and the appropriate prescriptions to tackle it (John McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). As an example of the hostile positions taken, a majority of interviewees pointed specifically to the debates between Dixon, O’Leary, and McGarry in Irish Political Studies (See: Paul Dixon, 1996; John McGarry & O’Leary, 1996).

The anti-consociationalism, implicit or overt, camp was not limited to a dispute between two or three individuals, but formed a staple of the Northern Ireland political diet throughout the 1990s. Its framework was not only condemned by academics; but by Irish republicans, unionists, and political parties: who represented, or so they insisted, the “middle ground” between the two ethno-national blocs (e.g. members of the Alliance, Democratic Left, and the Women’s Coalition) (See for example: J. McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). The framework was opposed by think tanks, who accused O’Leary and McGarry of developing an “uncritical acceptance of the primacy and permanency of ethnicity” (Taylor, 1994); and conveying a “rather bleak view of humanity” (Wilford, 1992b).

Several scholars maintained that consociation would not resolve the conflict but instead would “institutionalize” divisions, casting them in “marble” (Rooney, 1998); that its basic principles were incompatible with democratic stability; and therefore, a consociational democracy in Northern Ireland would be “impermanent”, “dysfunctional”, “unworkable” and a “macabre” parody of “real democracy” (McCartney, 2000). And as O’Leary and McGarry noted, Dixon went so far as to claim that consociationalists – especially O’Leary – were “segregationists”, whose message could be “condoning . . . ethnic cleansing” (Paul Dixon, 1996; P. Dixon, 1998). The level of disagreement and potential for the subject to arouse controversy was so profound that when several of those involved in these debates and in this community were approached to be interviewed for this research, they either outright refused to participate or declined to allow any of the material discussed in interviews be used.

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82 Other such debates can be found in: (Paul Dixon, 1997a; Gilligan & Tonge, 1997; McGovern, 1997, 2000).
83 It is also noteworthy that they requested that their names not be used or unofficial comments regarding them be referred to anywhere within this thesis.
When pressed on “why” these debates were so heated and “what” the science was behind disagreements which seemed more personal than empirical, several responses were provided. Patterson – who was pointedly critical of O’Leary and McGarry in the interview – simply claimed, “There was nothing scientific about it all…it’s mostly ideological” (Patterson, 2015). This was echoed by several interviewees: who highlighted that most of those who were actively engaging with the debates were either from Northern Ireland or had spent a significant amount of time there. Even McGarry noted, “where you stand is dependent on where you sit, and that explains, I think, much about Northern Ireland scholarship and about academic scholarship anywhere, that perspective is sort of determined by your sociology” (McGarry, 2015). Taylor and Arthur made similar references to this, but pointed out that such prejudices had existed previously, in “academic debates at Queen’s in the 1970s and early 1980s where people’s reading of the conflict would often create situations where colleagues wouldn’t talk to each other or would even fight with each other because they disagreed about how they should understand it from either a Marxist, non-Marxist, Nationalist or Unionist point of view” (Taylor, 2015).

Certainly, individuals’ personal biographies matter; most of those interviewed were quite open about their backgrounds and locations within the various communities of Northern Ireland. Patterson, English, Aughey, Shirlow, Edwards, and Kerr all noted in one way or another that their respective unionist backgrounds shaped and influenced their views and opinions on Northern Ireland. Kerr, a self-identified unionist from a middle-class Protestant background in Belfast, noted his engagement in unionist politics, working for David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in the early 2000s; while Shirlow remarked that his background and upbringing in a Protestant, working class area in Belfast afforded him the opportunity and interest in conducting research with various Loyalist groups and organizations. English spoke at some length about this:

To engage with a subject, you have to realize that your own history and background plays a part. I’m sure that people who disagree with my work would say that I have not done well enough in accounting for this. I’m reminded, for example, with the book on the IRA which I published in 2003, Edwards is a Senior Lecturer in Defense and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Edwards was born and raised in the Northern Belfast area of Rathcoole. Edwards was born in 1980 (making him one of the younger academics interviewed) and grew up in what he described as a “working class Protestant” background and a largely military family (Edwards, 2015). He attended Sandhurst Military Academy, serving in the Military, as well as University of Ulster, Curran Campus (BA). His graduate work (MA & PhD) was conducted at Queens University Belfast under the supervision of Richard English, where he wrote on the Northern Ireland Labour Party.
that was a book which was deliberately written about people who aren’t my relatives in the sense and so far, as I have a connection with them. My mother was a Belfast Protestant. Relatives of mine were in the police. So insofar as the IRA were involved in my personal family life, it would have been possibly to try and kill my cousin, rather than because I was a supporter. And it seemed to me that writing books about people who are not your relatives and trying to do it empathetically, and I did my best in that book to be as empathetic as I could towards the group which I disagreed with, seemed to me to be useful. Put another way, if there were more empathetic books on the shelf about unionism written by republicans, we’d be in a better place. If there were more empathetic books written about republicans by people who were not from that tradition, we’d also be in a better place. I tried to do what I could there. Having said that, it’s clear that my politics are, broadly speaking, I think that the shift the republicans have made towards recognizing the consent principle of unionists is a good one. So in that sense I’m a unionist. I’m not a unionist in the sense of being a capital ‘U’ unionist, but a republican would recognize that my politics are not a matter of modern nationalism. And I’m sure in the ways that all of us reflect and refract our political views there are elements of that (English, 2015).

Kerr and Shirlow made similar comments – that they are also unionists without a capital ‘U’ - and this in some ways influenced what they had looked to research. Conversely, Tonge openly acknowledged that he held more republican – with a small ‘r’ – views, but these are not reflected in his scholarship (Tonge, 2015). Tonge also noted that the number of scholars with more republican-leaning views is minimal in both the U.K. and Ireland. Indeed, none of Coakley, O Dochartaigh, Tannam, Dawn Walsh85, or Doyle indicated or referred to holding any republican-leaning views; nor would this be apparent in their work. The only notable, and obvious, exception to this was McIntyre, a former IRA member who does not hold an academic position at present. Dixon, however, pointed to what he saw as the domination of the republican/nationalist view in academia: through consociationalist thinkers such as O’Leary, McGarry, and their followers (Dixon, 2015).

In any case, these accounts do not indicate that the prejudice and sectarianism which exists around the politics of Northern Ireland is also apparent in the political science academy. For example, Bew and Patterson supervised Anthony McIntyre: with whom they had developed a relationship while he was in prison. McIntyre recalls that:

85 Dawn Walsh is an Irish-born academic at the University of Birmingham. Walsh attended Trinity College Dublin (BA & MA) in Political Science from 2003 to 2007, and wrote her PhD at Dublin City University under the supervision of John Doyle. She defended her thesis in Politics and International Relations at DCU in April 2014; O’Leary was the external examiner. Walsh is currently an Irish Research Council-Marie Curie Elevate post-doctoral fellow at Birmingham. She collaborates on her research at the University of Birmingham with Prof Stefan Wolff; and at DCU, with Dr John Doyle. This is largely focused on complex power-sharing institutions in post-conflict societies: including Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova and Burundi.
I’m a former member of the IRA, and I served eighteen years in prison for IRA activity. I did a first class honors degree, in international politics in prison. Local politics, general politics… then I won out the PhD. I acquired the grant, got the grant from… an institution in Northern Ireland. And I spoke with Henry Patterson, an academic and friend whom I had been in contact with while I was in prison. And, we came up with the title “A Social Analysis of Modern Irish Republicanism”. I did understand republicanism, because I’d been a member of the IRA and in a way, sort of knew about it but also because I wanted to more about it. And basically that’s how I got interested in it… through being in it.

Now I didn’t study under Henry Patterson, I just went to him with the idea. He and I discussed the idea; I wanted to do a PhD in an area that could be researched. And I wanted to sort of kind of explain the Provisionals, and an idea about Provisionals. But, not a response, not a judicial Republican response to British State strategy, or sorry, not to the presence of British, but a response to how the British did behave while they were here. And therefore, if that was the cause of the Provisionals, then you can predict that the British would not leave, to bring the Provisionals to an end, they would really have to modify their behavior, which is what they did in the Good Friday Agreement.

So, he and I discussed this, and then I applied to Queens, and Queens appointed Paul Bew as a supervisor. So Henry didn’t have an input as such.

So Paul was my supervisor. But I had been in touch with both Paul and Henry in and out of prison, and I’m grateful to them…

But as I’d focus on [my PhD topic], I began to write an awful lot about an awful little. Which was a whole lot about a few years, but it was all about the Provisionals and a better understanding of them. I didn’t want to make the classic mistake of academics… staring away and scratching their ass.

So, I had a chance to tread along, effects period, and what was the formative years of the Provos. Now Paul was laissez faire in that he was always there. But he didn’t interfere, he didn’t come down with a heavy hand, saying “I want you to do this, or maybe you should do that. Or take it this direction.”

He allowed me to take it in the direction that I wanted. Make it on my own, make it on the ordering. And he was quite fair…

But I mean, I could’ve met him for a drink, or a chat, or we discussed politics, and that… But he would ask me how it was going on. You know, I could’ve been sitting at home, scratching my balls. And doing that. Nevertheless, but he knew I wasn’t screwing around with him, and I delivered this massive book at the end of it all…

And I mean the analysis [I gave] was different, my background’s obviously different [from theirs], but my attitude is obviously different. I mean, I was still a member of the IRA when I was doing this PhD…” (McIntyre, 2015)
Irrespective of his background, his differing political views and disdain for the peace process, which Bew was playing an active role in, McIntyre continued:

I mean Bew and Patterson were somewhat on the outside, because they had all the, they’re kind of gauging this relationship with me, where we were challenging their views, and making criticisms… And…And, I mean Paul Bew once wrote about two years ago, in the Irish Independent, that I was his own personal introduction to the peace process, because at the time when everybody was suspicious, I was busily saying the leadership are selling out. And he was saying, well that, you know… the argument that the war was over.

But I hadn’t introduced him to the peace process, because I had never been involved in the peace process.

But what I persuaded him, he had said this, which I don’t take credit for it, but he has argued in public that, I… [for example], when people were saying about myself and Ed Maloney they were just anti-peace process journalists, blah blah blah, that Gerry Adams had sold out….he had said, well, ironically enough, it was myself who had persuaded him, that the peace process as genuine. [He stood up for me.] Not that I agreed with [the peace process], I just believed, [it was] genuine. It was genuine bollocks, but genuine nonetheless… (McIntyre, 2015)

Many academics followed the examples of Bew and Patterson and engaged with, at a supervisory and professional standpoint, individuals whom they held dramatically different political and intellectual views from. We should also remember that both Patterson and Bew, despite unionist backgrounds and views, were also previously involved with the Workers party, a Marxist political organization with historical ties to Official Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland; and actively participated in the civil rights marches and peace demonstrations during the 1960s. Similarly, O’Leary and Arthur, academics identified on the “green” end of the spectrum, related that they too had supervised and collaborated with a number of scholars with whom they significantly differed. “You must be conscious of your own prejudices” (Arthur, 2015).

O’Leary was Kerr’s supervisor when he interrupted his PhD to work for David Trimble and the UUP. Kerr noted that he knew O’Leary held very different political views, but was supportive of his academic and professional development; he had immense respect for O’Leary’s scholastic ability and his application of consociationalism (Kerr, 2015). Arthur echoed similar sentiments regarding his educational work and engagement with leaders and members of the UDF. When considering how someone manages their personal views alongside their intellectual pursuits and research, English reflected that “I’ve tried as far as
possible to let the evidence take you, even if it doesn’t take you in places you’d like it to take you, to go with the evidence” (English, 2015).

Elaborating on this, as well as the nature of the debates between O’Leary, McGarry, and Dixon during the 1990s, Tonge commented:

Dixon had an insurmountable argument that consociational rules were so lax now that any form of power sharing was being labeled as consociation. I mean, he had a point but I think he missed the big picture. Well, most of Lijpharts models, most of them are already there in Northern Ireland. So, you know, it was dancing on the head of a pin. But I think that with academics getting ridiculously wound up about their own positions, it’s normal.

Academics have a crazy determination to prove they’re right and [generally have a] lack of receptiveness to other arguments.

I was there at the PSAI conference when there was the historic handshake between O’Leary and Dixon. That's how they kissed and made up. But, they had a friendly chat in the bar. And this is normal [in academia].

I mean, you know, it's nonsense because there was no need.

I mean, I would disagree politically with a lot of the people I work with. I mean, you know, people I've worked with, Jim McCauley from a loyalist background which would not be my background, Tom Hennessy of where there is very much unionist sympathy in his writings. Whereas I would be instinctively sympathetic towards republicanism.

And I think I have done a good job not reflecting that in my scholarship. I'm trying to do. The one thing I'm trying to do is really challenge my own prejudice… (Tonge, 2015)

Not all interviewees were convinced of the ability, or necessity, of academics to challenge their own prejudices. Mitchell and Dixon openly acknowledged that their background and political affiliations greatly shaped their views, but argued that this was not necessarily a bad thing. In any case, these views and backgrounds do vary. For example, Mitchell mentioned growing up in a “Catholic” background in a sectarian area of Scotland, but that:

I'm always a bit sceptical if anyone self-consciously claims that they're normatively neutral. I think that's a tough claim and almost a philosophical question, which is hard to answer. I'm not sure it's connected with statistics.

I think that I've never been a partisan in the conflict. There are some advantages in having some detachment from it. Even though you can read family histories and things like that, I did not grow up there [in Northern
Ireland]. That makes an enormous difference to how you internally see the world.

I don't see the world in sectarian terms. I've observed sectarianism, of course, but I've never been that way, I don't think. I've certainly never, at least consciously in any of my academic writings, been motivated to try and contribute to a victory by one side or the other. I think that would be a bad analysis of the conflict.

I very much subscribe to the McGarry/O'Leary line that the whole thing historically is a clash of two nation-building failures that has left a small strange place, which then became the localised conflict zone. I think both sides have valid points of view. I always thought that. Therefore, it's for others to judge whether I have been or not but I've tried to be fair. I've been interested in conflict resolution, not in helping one side or the other win (Mitchell, 2015).

This was also reflected by McGarry and O'Leary: who both noted that having left Northern Ireland and taken position in universities outside of it helped them achieve an objective distance in analyzing the situation. While accepting that their reading and analysis were sometimes “greener” than many within mainstream British academia, they do not see themselves as nationalist or sympathetic to dissident republicans; but, irrespective of this, nationalist concerns and perspectives must be included in debates and solutions on Northern Ireland. Dixon – who was born in London, raised Catholic, educated in the U.K. and, like O’Leary, is a Labour party supporter – argues, however:

I think we construct our realities. The problem is that when you look at quite a few of – I don't think we stand outside the world that we’re studying. So, you know, of course I see my background, my experiences, as shaping the way that I would write. Now, a lot of academics don't want to admit that because they like the rhetorical power of being able to say, ‘Look, I'm an objective academic. I'm not a member of a political party. I am apolitical. I am giving you the objective view of this’, but I think that is an untenable position to hold because everyone does have their politics. It’s just some people try to conceal that and it gives them rhetorical weight whereas others are more open about it (Dixon, 2015).

However, these disputes around consociationalism and scientific objectivity, which led up to the Belfast Agreement and beyond, are not unique to Northern Ireland or political science generally. Certainly in other disciplines, such as International Relations, we can note the sometimes heated, passionate debates which took place between (neo) realists and constructivists throughout the 1980s: some which seemed particularly pointed between prominentrealist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, and constructivists like Richard Ashley (For instance see debates in: Keohane, 1986). Also, as one put it, “academics are notorious
bickerers and can lapse into self-indulgent defense of their work and its ‘value’”. But “hopefully, at times they can challenge views and readings that they find difficult without falling into hapless folly” (Shirlow, 2013).

Moreover, a majority considered the debates, vitriolic or not, as healthy, necessary, and, again, normal. O’Kane commented that regardless of the rhetoric around them, “I don’t ever think they were particularly problematic and I remain of that view. I think they’d been very, very healthy because this is what an academic discipline is about” (O’Kane, 2015). He acknowledged that at times, the discussion became more personal than necessary, but:

It was ever thus; I mean academics we tend to have strong opinions or many academics tend to have strong opinions. We tend to perhaps take things a little bit too far. We might not be as subtle as we should be. Generally, I remember, and also there’s obvious, and I don’t want to stereotype here, but I think it was helpful and healthy; there’s also been a backdrop of alcohol and conversations.

In any case, this helps create a sense of community:

[The] good thing about conferences [is] some of the best debates you have at the bar after the panels. That’s always been a very strong element of those working in Irish politics. I don’t mean that in the context of we’re all a load of drunks, but I do think that generally even given the differences that existed within, and continue to exist within the academic community, there has been a willingness to engage socially to an extent. I’m not saying we’re all bosom buddies, people aren’t, but generally I never felt it was problematic. I never felt that the divisions between people because of perceptions about the conflict were spilling over to create a poisonous atmosphere within those who are working on this.

Don’t get me wrong. There is some enmity between people, but I don’t think political scientists are exceptional there. If you look at any large institution office politics and discipline politics are in play you’re never going to get a bunch of people who are of strong opinion, who are intelligent, informed and articulate and very often confutative, because they believe strongly in this stuff. You’re never going to get harmony and agreement. Indeed, academically nor should we, because otherwise it would be a pointless discipline to be involved in (O’Kane, 2016).

Moreover, because of the theoretical framework which O’Leary and McGarry developed, referred to as “top class” (Anonymous, 2015), “robust” (O Dochartaigh, 2015), and “sophisticated” (Taylor, 2015), an objective point of reference could now be worked around and debated safely, without these becoming overtly personal. Taylor recalled that debates around consociationalism were always, for the most part, “very collegial”; scholars
often “agreed personally but disagreed academically [or theoretically]” (Taylor, 2015). He and others reiterated that everyone had a shared interest and desire for the violence to come to an end, but simply differed as to how this could or should come about. Consociationalism thus “provided a context in which you could come and make your own argument. It provided a context around a key set of arguments laid down by Lijphart” (Taylor, 2015). Speaking to this more directly, O’Leary highlighted that in terms of his research and writing and the normative arguments which it spurred:

I don’t think a political science that completely divorces the empirical and the normative would have much longevity. Explanation and prescription are linked. They’re not automatically linked. You can explain how something works, but not approve of it. You may even explain how something works and then think about how you stop it. So, political science has both of those characteristics, the empirical, the normative, and I think it always will have (O’Leary, 2015).

O’Leary and McGarry also noted the need to account for or being aware of one’s own bias; the comparative methodology which they utilized helped hugely to account for this:

I became a comparative political scientist. I have a comparative formation. I’ve been comparing all my life. I grew up in multiple environments and I believe that comparisons extremely helpful for checking your prejudices, for checking your intuitions, checking your priers. And a political science that is informed by comparative thinking is the only kind of political science that’s worthwhile (O’Leary, 2015).

Other scholars agreed that O’Leary and McGarry’s comparative model helped move the discipline along substantially. Mitchell believes that because of this method and the end of the Cold War, the discipline “has evolved quite a lot” (Mitchell, 2015). Before the end of the Cold War, by contrast, “with a couple of rare exceptions or a couple of early scholars but there wasn't really a profession of peace studies in quite the same way”; “I don't want to overly generalise but at least in Ireland [and the UK] I don't think it was a big study. The study of politics was historians studying politics essentially” (Mitchell, 2015). Most interviewees acknowledged that the growth in this area was not specific to Ireland, but across the board in terms of conflict studies. However, one of the most “oversubscribed degrees at the LSE right now is the one that I teach on, which is effectively, comparative conflict analysis. We didn't [even] have a Master’s degree in conflict analysis back in the 1980s” (Mitchell, 2015). All participants concurred that Northern Ireland and consociationalism now form a central part of this conflict analysis.
Yet there remain dissenting opinions about the benefits and influence of consociational foundation on political science on Northern Ireland. Dixon regards consociationalism as “a complete disaster” (Dixon, 2015), because “science [doesn’t] progress, by this endless reproduction of a paradigm that was really written in the 60s and 70s and continues to just morph into different forms, different labels for all the various variations of it” (Dixon, 2015). McIntrye posits that the debates around consociationalism simply reinforce the existing “internal conflict model” paradigm which has long dominated political and academic explanations for the Northern Ireland conflict. Similar points were made by Patterson and Bew: who argue that the discipline has become stale, and simply replicates theoretical claims by using a comparative method that “doesn’t tell us anything new” (Patterson, 2015) about Northern Ireland. This is a point which academics inside and outside the community have been expressing for some time: going so far as to term the scholarship around Northern Ireland as stuck in a form of “intellectual internment” (See: Edwards, 2007; M. L. R. Smith, 1999).

Apart from the contribution, and controversy, which consociationalism played in the formation of the academic community around Northern Ireland, all agreed that the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (the Agreement) in 1998 contributed significantly to the development of the discipline and enhancement of the political science community. Tonge, Kerr, and John Bew®, son of Paul Bew, all noted the importance of the Agreement to the discipline and its “expansion” of the Northern Ireland academic community: it opened new avenues and possibilities for research which had not been possible beforehand. Tonge explained that the Agreement:

Opened up a lot of new possibilities. I mean, there, there were so many angles on how you study Northern Ireland created by that deal. Firstly, there's the, the comparative devolved concept, devolution in the UK, because you then have Northern Ireland with localized power shared with other local political institutions. So, you can do important comparisons, which is something that has been done under Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland around devolved power and the English question… So, you've got the devolution comparative aspect. Then, you've got the peace process comparative aspect. Then, you've got the intellectual questions about consociation versus integration. So, you’ve

® John Bew is the son of Lord Professor Paul Bew and Reader in History and Foreign Policy at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. Bew is a Belfast native and completed his education at Pembroke College, Cambridge: doing a BA in History, an MPhil in Historical Studies, and completed his PhD in 2006 on nineteenth century Belfast. Bew was the youngest holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy at the John W. Kluge Center at the US Library of Congress (2013-14); and is co-author, along with Martin Frampton, of Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (2009).
got a whole range of issues as well as issues such as, you know, management of political violence. You've got political parties in a post-conflict politic. You've got so many different angles to tackle all of that once you get to the Good Friday Agreement (Tonge, 2015).

Seasoned academics like Shirlow or English; as well as younger contemporaries, such as Kerr, Buchannan, or Andrew Mumford, all of whom entered the academy over the last 10 to 15 years, acknowledged that their research was largely made possible by the new avenues and opportunities opened up by the Agreement. Specifically, Kerr noted that the Agreement made his PhD and work with the UUP possible, as it allowed him to make comparisons with other countries in a way which hadn’t been utilized before. Reflecting on this, he recalled that “the Belfast Agreement had just happened so that was a ripe opportunity to do some research on that”; and because of his interest in O’Leary’s consociationalism and his comparative methodology, he contacted him: stating that he wanted to do something on the Agreement. “Brendan said, ‘Yes, why don’t you make a comparative. Good idea,’ and I said, ‘Yes, okay.’ I fired back straight away because I’d just done it the week before, ‘What about Lebanon?’ and he said, ‘Oh, Lebanon, no one’s done that before,’ so that was it” (Kerr, 2015). Joanne McEvoy, Buchannan, and O’Kane had similar experiences with their PhDs: the financial and intellectual opportunities available from 1998 made researching the subject much easier and more lucrative in terms of potential career opportunities.

There was thus a “buzz” around the study of Northern Ireland during this time. Arthur highlighted that “on the day that the Agreement was signed, I sat on the television all day just doing a rolling commentary on it, and I was very very positive about everything” (Arthur, 2015). O’Leary, McGarry, Tonge, and Bew recalled that they appeared regularly in the media and received numerous invitations to speak at conferences and on panels looking to “explain” the success of the process and the various stages of it. Tonge observed that events put on by the PSAI were often oversubscribed and had scholars from various disciplines and across the globe; whereas beforehand, they had been “fairly drab” affairs, with a small cohort of

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87 Andrew Mumford is an English native from North Yorkshire. Mumford attended Sheffield University (BA), where he studied History; and did his PhD at Warwick University under the supervision of Caroline Kennedy, focusing on the history of terrorism. He is currently Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at The University of Nottingham.

88 Joanne McEvoy is from Newcastle, Northern Ireland, an area she described as very mixed and middle class. McEvoy attended Queens University, Belfast for her BA and PhD. Her research was supervised by Rick Wilford and looked at the Northern Ireland power-sharing executive. McEvoy did her post-doctoral work on power sharing with Brendan O’Leary at the University of Pennsylvania in 2007/2008; after which, she co-edited *Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places* (2013) with O’Leary; and more recently, published *Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland* (2015). She is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in The School of Social Science at the University of Aberdeen.
academics, mainly from Northern Ireland (Tonge, 2015). Meanwhile, political science organizations such as the PSA and its journal, Political Studies, began covering the topic in a way which hadn’t been done before.89 “We thought the whole world was looking at Northern Ireland at the time” (Arthur, 2015).

Following the Agreement, there was an influx of money into British and Irish universities: aimed at looking at the peace process and lessons which could be learned from it. Many interviewees highlighted that this money was made available to academics and universities because of the EU’s Peace and Reconciliation Fund and Irish Department of Foreign Affairs Reconciliation Fund, both of which received massive budget increases following the Agreement (Trade, 2015). Arthur recalled that following the Agreement, many academics were approached by these agencies - because organizations such as Department of Foreign Affairs in Ireland simply did not have enough staff to properly utilize the resources now available to them (Arthur, 2015). Coakley and Tonge noted that these agencies were greatly responsible for a proliferation of research institutes throughout the U.K. and Ireland following the Agreement, to study the “Northern Ireland laboratory” (Tonge, 2015). Examples included the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict (Est.1998) at Queens University Belfast; the Institute for British Irish Studies (Est. 1999) at University College Dublin; and the Transitional Justice Institute (Est. 2003) at the University of Ulster.

The Agreement and infusion of funds and international attention which followed placed the study of Northern Ireland within the “peace industry”. One scholar, who asked to remain anonymous, commented that when he came onto the academic scene in 1999:

The British and Irish governments, and the European Union, and Atlantic philanthropies lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money. And [because of the Agreement] created huge civil society, which could be interviewed and re-interviewed, and re-interviewed... [Because of this] you had multiple research projects... of which I’ve benefitted from, but virtually every other academic I know at Queen’s and UU [and others] benefitted from. Which were all looking at Northern Ireland (Anonymous 2, 2015).

Buchannan, the only interviewee who works outside academia, reflected that funding from the EU through its PEACE I and PEACE II programs was what made her PhD research possible in 2002; that during this time, there was a huge appetite for “anything related to

89 To put this into perspective, Political Studies produced only six articles on Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1994 (For example: Bruce, 1987; Laver, 1976; Mac Iver, 1987; McAllister, 1983; B. O’Leary, 1989b; H. Patterson, 1976); but it has published some 25 articles on the subject since 1998.
Northern Ireland”, and many of these projects were funded by and through such initiatives (Buchannan, 2015). Moreover, local community councils and other Northern Ireland civil society organizations were also now able to seek out academics, universities, and research institutes in order to conduct studies on a variety of issues, such as shared space, interface areas, and building good relations (For example see list in: Community Relations Council, 2015). Tonge, who admitted “ashamedly” to being a part of the peace industry which developed, said that he did not think this was necessarily a bad thing - because:

Northern Ireland [became] this great sectarian laboratory that was testing around for which is the better approach [to conflict management] consociational management of division or integration that's trying to eradicate division. And that has helped academics [and academia]. I think the academic community in that sense flourished. You probably got more people working on Northern Ireland now in academia than was ever the case. You’ve more academics with funding to study in Northern Ireland than ever before, and it used to be called the most over-researched conflict in…well, it's now the most over-researched partial conflict or it's the most over-researched analysis of sectarianism that, that you would get (Tonge, 2015).

In the words of Kerr:

[Because of the Agreement] I think [Northern Ireland] became very much in vogue because here is a conflict that couldn’t possibly be fixed, it was beyond everybody’s understanding. It was just intractable and yet, with a new set of circumstances and a lot of will, a lot of growing up and a lot of advances in Anglo-Irish relations, here we had a peace process that we’re predicting it’s going to collapse and Trimble is going to fall, it’s never going to work.

Yet it begins to walk on its own two feet. Okay, it’s still got stabilisers and stanchions on either side of it. Then people start to think, “Wow. If that can work in Northern Ireland, if you take that set of variables, what is there in the Northern Ireland case that might be replicated elsewhere, or if it can’t be. What’s so illustrative about the Northern Ireland case which might explain why (Kerr, 2015)?

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90 PEACE I funding for Northern Ireland was made available from 1994 to 1999, and through this stream alone, dispersed some €400 million on various projects; while PEACE II, which focused on developing the Northern Ireland Community Support Framework, lasted from 2000 to 2006 and distributed €425 million. Between 1994 and 2006, the EU funded over €3 billion worth of programs and initiatives aimed at peace building, reconciliation, transitional justice, and community building in Northern Ireland (McCaffery, 2013).
EXPLAINING WHAT HAPPEN WITH THEORY

As knowledge communities do not develop de novo, but rather crawl (sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly) out of the primordial ooze of the inertia of existing knowledge, the ability to identify specific dates or the “when” of knowledge communities is problematic. This is compounded in Northern Ireland’s case, because this sub-discipline and scholars in political science are often at odds on where their work lies. Many interviewees refuted the idea of the “scientific” nature of political research in Northern Ireland over the last few decades; Bew, Patterson, and Arthur regard the debates as based more on ideology than epistemology. It is certainly telling that none of English, Arthur, Lord Bew, Patterson, Aughey, John Bew, McGrattan or identify themselves or their scholarship particularly within the field of political science; but rather, assert that they were historians residing in politics departments. Similarly, female academics like Buchannan, Power and Hayward identified themselves and their work as existing more within sociology, anthropology, and theology rather than political science; Hayward, indeed, is in the Sociology Department at Queens University Belfast.

This issue is not limited to the study of Northern Ireland; it reflects the heterogeneous, interdisciplinary struggle of political science in the U.K. and Ireland. The discipline of political science is still in its relative infancy in Ireland and the U.K., and has often had a difficult time distinguishing itself from counterparts with deep roots in the British and Irish academy, such as history and philosophy. Some interviewees even questioned whether it truly exists as a discipline in the U.K. at all. Mitchell, O’Leary and Tonge – none of whom regard themselves as political scientists, but who have adopted political science methodologies for studying Northern Ireland – all noted that the U.K. has very few institutions with political science departments; they are often labelled simply “Politics”. Mitchell pointed to the proclivity of politics departments at Queens and elsewhere as having been weighted more towards historians and political theorists. This is especially true in Ireland: where Mitchell and Coakley note that the discipline has long been dominated by historians as well as philosophers. Ironically, even O’Leary pointed out that iconic institutions for political science like LSE did not, and still do not, have a clearly identifiable political science department.

In this respect, the study of Northern Ireland lacked the capacity to be properly translated, as it sat on the nexus of history, sociology, philosophy and political science. The
success of translation centers on the ability of scholars to reconcile meanings between
disciplines and develop new findings (Star & Griesemer, 1989). The aim is to enlist “allies”
from various locations and disciplines to create authority over a specific subject area, then to
reinterpret this in a way that fits the individuals’ goals or aims. However, uncertainties
around a particular discipline and its epistemological relevance have been shown to challenge
the authority of knowledge in various scientific domains, making the recruitment of allies
problematic (Shackley & Wynne, 1996).

This level of uncertainty around Northern Ireland was apparent through the failure of
previous peace processes in the 1970s and 1980s, confirming to many that it was a “sinkhole
of sectarianism” (Patterson, 2015); but also because paradigms which might have been
employed to explain the situation, such as nationalism and ethnic conflict, were not taken
seriously (O’Leary, 2015; Mitchell, 2015). This is certainly confirmed in the literature on
nationalism, for example: which prior to the collapse of the USSR, was mainly seen as a rare
phenomenon to be studied by a handful of scholars in sociology, anthropology, and history
(See: Hutchinson & Smith, 2002; A. D. Smith, 1998).

Yet paradoxically, this uncertainty is helpful in identifying the “when” and “how” of
the emergence of a knowledge community: one could say, the various stages emerging out of
the ooze. In this respect, scholars pointed to the establishment of PSAI and its journal, IPS, as
a significant development in the academy, as its purpose was to distinguish Irish political
studies from history and other disciplines. The creation of the PSAI and IPS marked a level
of modularity regarding the study of Irish politics generally and Northern Ireland specifically,
as it created a forum – both through the sponsoring of conferences and publications in the
journal – where the “clusters” of scholars working on the subject, from a range of disciplines,
could come together, share and refute each other’s work. It indicates ontologically that the
development and appetite for information needs were emerging enough that scholars sought
to begin controlling the nature of commentary and debate. In this sense, they had the feature
of repositories: in that they looked to create specific databases or “piles” of research (Star &
Griesemer, 1989), which others could borrow from; and expressed the emergent need or
desire to conduct research in these specific areas. It was also a way in which the community
could begin to identify and locate other members.

However, gaining allies who could participate and contribute to these organizations
was problematic. As Arthur highlighted, initially, several of the already few academics
working on Northern Ireland declined to join or contribute. In terms of empirical research, Aughey did not contribute to IPS until 1996; Lord Bew only contributed one article, in 1988; while Patterson has only provided two articles, one in 2008 and again in 2012 (See: Aughey, 1996; P. Bew, 1988; H. Patterson, 2008, 2012). In addition, following the organization’s establishment, academics working on Northern Ireland still weren’t in the “mainstream” of British political science, and continued to be viewed as an “eccentricity” (English, 2015).

Yet not long after the establishment of the IPS in 1987 came McGarry and O’Leary’s engagement with Consociational Theory. As we have noted, many interviewees argue that O’Leary and McGarry’s contribution brought a “forensic” (Tonge, 2015) political science approach to the study of Northern Ireland. O’Leary acknowledged that he and McGarry “not only applied consociational theory [to Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it”; and because of this they “transformed the conversation on Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015).

The individual contributions of these scholars to the theory and its application to Northern Ireland can be traced back to McGarry’s publication of *The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Prospects of Power Sharing in Northern Ireland* (1988); and O’Leary’s *The Limits of Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland* (1989), which brought the two academics’ attention to one another. They henceforth began their working relationship on developing their theory and its application. From that time, McGarry recalled that they began collaborating with Lord Bew, Arthur, Patterson and others on various projects: which led to the book *The Future of Northern Ireland* (1990), a collection of essays which debated the merits and plausibility of consociationalism in Northern Ireland, and challenged prevailing paradigms on the conflict.

The rise of McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociationalism coincided with a variety of other factors which also challenged existing intellectual paradigms, as well as raised the profile of Northern Ireland. Tanname, English and others pointed to the changing economic conditions in the Republic of Ireland during the early 1990s, the Single European Act in 1987, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, all of which raised the profile of Northern Ireland: it was no longer viewed as a local conflict within the U.K., but a regional conflict taking place in the context of and alongside the outbreak of various other ethnic conflicts.
Major international political change was also underway in terms of how nation states could deal with civil wars and ethnic conflicts; before the end of the Cold War, these states had largely been left to deal with these issues internally (P. C. Stern & Druckman, 2000). This meant that most conflicts being studied were now civil wars; thus there was a large increase in interest in and study of ethnic conflict. O’Leary and McGarry were at the center of efforts to normalize the study of Northern Ireland by using comparative methodologies which emphasized the ethnic/national character of the conflict and how it, and potential solutions to it, compared with other conflicts.

Another vital development was, of course, the peace process. Although there is no general agreement among scholars on its exact start date, they credit its development with greatly assisting the study of Northern Ireland and development of its knowledge community. Some people regard the process as dating back to 11 January 1988 when John Hume, then leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had a meeting with Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF). This was the first of a series of discussions which took place between the two men between 1988 and 1993, and eventually led to the Hume/Adams initiative based on a document (the Hume / Adams Document) agreed by the two leaders. Elements of this document were to find their way into the Downing Street Declaration, made jointly by the British and Irish governments in 1993 (CAIN, 2006).

Others cite the announcement of the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994 as the end of one part of the process and the beginning of another. Nonetheless, interviewees concur that a combination of the peace process; buoyancy of the Irish economy; and extra-national developments, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and greater influence of the EU made the study of Ireland and Northern Ireland “doubly cool” (English, 2015), while also raising “interesting questions” as to how the issue of ethnic conflict could be addressed.

Interviewees pointed almost unanimously to pieces by McGarry and O’Leary, such as Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993) and Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (1995) as setting the stage for the discussions and debates around the conflict, and solutions to it. This resulted in an increase in the study, significance, and intellectual relevance of Northern Ireland to the British and Irish political science academy. There was a proliferation in research, attendance and presentations looking to “explain” Northern Ireland at conferences and in the media: with O’Leary, Arthur, and others regularly appearing on and publishing in various outlets.
Conceptually, several traits, or boundaries, need to be detailed here. The first is the context in which these events took place: the peace process of the 1990s. In this respect, the “vagueness” and uncertainty of the process, debates on what “peace” might look like and how it might be achieved, allowed a level of adaptability around the study of Northern Ireland which had not existed beforehand. As we have seen, prior to the peace process, Northern Ireland was largely regarded as a conflict without any possible solution. Many subscribed to sectarian interpretations of historical events. Such was the general climate during this time, engagement was potentially dangerous to scholars, both professionally – painting them as dissident sympathizers, and leaving them unable to have their work published or promoted, because the subject wasn’t viewed as mainstream or relevant in British/Irish academia – and physically: several academics in the field were murdered. Thus the notion and idea of a “process” symbolically communicated developments and events which adopted (potential) theoretical and concrete explanations which scholars, irrespective of methodological training or disciplinary affiliation, could communicate and debate.

In this respect, the peace process acted as a diagram which did not describe the details of any one thing but – with the application of consociational theory and comparative methodology – allowed for the deletion of local contingencies from the common object, Northern Ireland. It accompanied the rise of a distinct community which, while it hosted very different visions as to what the solutions might look like, was offering clear alternatives to existing assumptions.

Thanks to both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociational theory, an objective “framework” or “foundation” was established which academics could review, debate, and refute. That said, many debates became heated and at times seemed more personal than empirical, with anti-consociationalism a “staple of the political diet of Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015); McGarry and O’Leary took on a series of challenges inside and outside the academic community. O Dochartaigh (2015) noted that much of this was because McGarry and O’Leary had moved the center of the debate from a strictly unionist interpretation to inclusion and acknowledgement of nationalist discourse and concerns.

However, this does not suggest that the debates on Northern Ireland were simply drawn along sectarian lines. Certainly, when reviewing the interviewees’ narratives, it was apparent that where they stood and the issues they researched were informed by their
personal sociologies: with several acknowledging the little “u” and “r” of their alignment with unionist and republican perspectives. However, O’Leary, Bew, Patterson, Kerr, Tonge, McIntyre and others displayed the ability to engage with those who adopted alternative interpretations and political alignments in both collaborative research and supervision.

Not all were convinced of the ability or necessity of academics to divorce themselves, either partially or entirely, from their personal history and bias; but that this did not handicap the debates. O’Leary and others highlighted the importance of making normative arguments and taking such positions in political science, because “explanations and prescriptions are linked”, as one can “explain how something works but not approve of it” (O’Leary, 2015). Others considered that, however heated and occasionally vitriolic, the debates never got out of hand and were, in many ways, “healthy”; such arguments were par for the course for any academic discipline, let alone Irish politics.

In this way, consociational theory and the application of comparative methods allowed for common communication to begin taking place across dispersed academic groups with varying and often conflicting interpretations of what prescriptions and explanations should be utilized. The standardization of the comparative method used to explain and apply consociationalism to Northern Ireland and other conflicts had Latour (1981)’s trait of “immutable mobility”: meaning that its ideas and information could be transported and translated between and across various disciplines. In this sense, the debates not only had the boundary object quality which scholars could gather around, but also a boundary crossing quality which, in the context of the peace process, opened various new avenues for interpretation and investigation on Northern Ireland, across disciplines. Debates around consociationalism were housed within political science, but included and utilized scholarship, researchers, and methods from history, philosophy and sociology. This reflects not just the heterogeneity of the discipline around the study of ethno/national conflict, but the utility of the theory and method to translate these concerns and findings across a variety of disciplines and actors.

Star (2010) has noted that the utility and robustness of a boundary object is often tested by the way in which it is managed in the negotiation of translations across various social worlds or disciplines. As academics are somewhat tribal - they often stake out territories which they claim as their own, and establish themselves as experts within these domains - the outbreak of conflict and disagreement within and across disciplines is
inevitable: as often, these tribal leaders fear dethronement. Thus the functionality of a boundary object is to reduce local, or tribal, uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war, and manage these various tribal boundaries when there is territorial overlap in a way that maintain allies as well as expands the existing base of knowledge (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

Both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociational theory served this purpose, as it allowed these scholars to establish themselves as experts on the application of the theory and use of comparative methods; but also allowed them to include and navigate, sometime tenuously, the tendency towards tribal conflicts which many had always defined the study of Northern Ireland by, as well as garner “allies” from other disciplines and even those from differing tribal camps who proposed different paradigms and solutions. This is perhaps best reflected by Taylor and McGarry, who noted that precisely 

because

of the disagreements around consociationalism, they were able to collaborate with various counterparts from differing disciplines, and utilize different methods in order to expand the knowledge base. As an example, they cited Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict (2009), where these debates were explained and expanded upon by various pro- and anti-consociationalists. Thus, the framework acted within what Hughes (1971) referred to as an “inter-tribal center”, which could manage and house various territorial collisions, as well as allow them a sovereignty.

Also, despite the contention between and around consociationalist explanations of Northern Ireland, the accounts point to the emergence of various work/play relationships around this scholarship. Many interviewed noted that although individuals would disagree intellectually with one another on what the solutions might look like, these disagreements were not personal: everyone wanted to see the situation improve. So much so that after conferences put on by organizations such as PSAI, and research centers such as INCORE and the Institute of Irish Studies, many debates continued into “the pub”, where those involved gained greater understanding of each other’s backgrounds and intellectual positions (Dixon, 2015).

This is significant in terms of the development of a knowledge infrastructure and structures. Star & Greisemer (1989)’s boundary object emerged out of the historical and institutional developments of natural history research museums: which marked a new stage in the professionalization of natural history work, as well as the changing relationship between biologists, zoologists, and scientific researchers. They noted that these institutions developed
largely out of displays of wealth and popular cultural developments, which provoked interest in viewing such displays and created increased demand for these museums. As these institutions were established by wealthy collectors who contributed substantially to their funding and operation, an increase in demand for scientific cooperation emerged out of individuals “doing things together” (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

This is very much like the “buzz” around Northern Ireland: whose status rose from “local”, “provincial” conflict to a regional one thanks to the collapse of the USSR and EU involvement. It went on to enjoy international attention and financial backing through various initiatives from the EU, U.K. and Ireland; as well as various Atlantic philanthropists, given the subsequent involvement of the U.S. in the peace process. This process followed the same popular cultural trend described by Star & Griesemer (1989): it mainstreamed the study of ethno/national conflict and civil war in British and Irish academia, and placed Northern Ireland within the context of greater post-Cold War peace building and democratization strategies: transforming it into a “cool” and “sexy” subject. Not only did this generate huge demand for new research around this area, with large sums of money made available to community councils and research institutes through new funding opportunities, but it also greatly increased student appetite and coverage of events such as the ongoing peace process in various media outlets.

There was also a rise in the status of academics who studied Northern Ireland: with O’Leary making the list of “celebrity dons” in The Guardian, and Lord Bew becoming an advisor to David Trimble during the peace process and following the Agreement. This “buzz”, as well as the “new and interesting questions” and inferences to be derived from comparing this ethnic conflict and its potential for peace to that of other conflicts led in many ways to the professionalization of the study of ethnic conflict, which placed Northern Ireland and the academics working on it at the very center of these questions. Such professionalization creates the need for both method-standardization as well as boundary objects as a way of accommodating and housing multiple identities and disciplines in a many-room political mansion.

Of course, the signing of the Agreement in 1998 exponentially increased the “buzz” around Northern Ireland, as there was a shift towards deriving and understanding “lessons learned” from the peace process; and how both the process and its end result could be applied successfully to other arenas of conflict. Following the Agreement, there was a proliferation of
research institutes in the U.K. and Ireland, which sought to investigate new avenues for research in what Tonge (2015) referred to as the “great sectarian laboratory”.

Additionally, Kerr, Buchannan, McEvoy and O’Kane all noted that because of the Agreement, the funding and research opportunities which followed from it, their PhD research and professional prospects were made possible and greatly enhanced respectively. Moreover, the Agreement furthered the discipline of political science as it relates to Northern Ireland, through the exploration of devolution, policing, shared space, reconciliation, as well as the ongoing intellectual and normative consociation versus integration paradigms.

In this chapter, we have discussed the slow and often painful developments which made up the emergence of the Northern Ireland epistemic community. These events and variables included the thawing and then ending of the Cold War, developments within Irish academia (IPS), and the re-introduction and application of consociationalism to the Northern Ireland problem. These all challenged existing paradigms as well as introduced new thought, energy, and interest in the study of Northern Ireland. This was all complimented by the further neo-liberalization of academia and the infusion of international funding for the study of ethnic conflict all of which transformed the study of Northern Ireland. This all culminated in GFA in 1998, making the region and the (theoretical) model for peace an international success. The significance of these developments, and how both these and the academic community further progressed, will be explored in more detail in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER 5
A COMMUNITY EVOLVES

INTRODUCTION

As laid out in the previous chapter the intellectual and political environment in Northern Ireland began to change greatly with ending of the Cold War, the application and debates around consociationalism re-introduced by O’Leary and McGarry, and the commencement of the peace process and signing of the Agreement in 1998. As one academic noted this all exponentially increased the academic “buzz” and research around Northern Ireland. Recall that initially this “buzz” centered on “new and interesting questions” (O’Leary, 2015) and inferences which could be derived from comparing the Northern Ireland conflict and its potential for peace to that of other ethnic conflicts. The theoretical framework developed by McGarry and O’Leary and the rise of comparative methods within political science greatly assisted in establishing an intellectual platform: through which academics began reviewing, refuting, and debating the emerging literature on Northern Ireland in a wholly new way. By the time the Agreement was signed, an academic community had developed begun to expand. Interviewees acknowledge the proliferation of literature and research institutes, which sought to apply and compare Northern Ireland to other ongoing and resolved ethnic conflicts.

Tonge (2015), of course, noted that thanks to the Agreement, Northern Ireland became this “great sectarian laboratory”, with new funding and research opportunities available for issues such as devolution, policing, shared space, and reconciliation. In the wake of the Agreement, that there was a major spike in interest because:

It opened up a lot of new possibilities. I mean, there were so many angles to how you study Northern Ireland, created by that deal. Firstly, there’s the comparative devolved context, devolution in the U.K., because you then have Northern Ireland with localized power sharing. With local political institutions, where you’ve not had for 25 years. So you can do important comparisons, which is something of an underdog in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Plus the English question of course. Okay, so you’ve got the devolution comparative aspect, then you’ve got the peace process comparative aspect, then you’ve got the intellectual questions about consociation versus integration, so you’ve got a whole range of, and then you’ve got issues such as the management of political violence, you’ve got political parties in a post-conflict polity. You’ve got so many different angles to tackle Northern Ireland, once you get to the Good Friday Agreement, you’ve got for the historians as well, the
comparison, Good Friday Agreement versus Sunningdale in fact (Tonge, 2015).

Thus this chapter looks at how this community and the object(s) which bound it together evolved in the post-Agreement environment, and the implications of this for both the discipline and individuals.

**POST-GOOD FRIDAY AND THE EVOLUTION OF A DISCIPLINE**

The importance of the Agreement and its impact on the Northern Ireland academic community was acknowledged by most scholars interviewed: all of whom noted that the Agreement laid the foundation for future analysis on Northern Ireland. Yet irrespective of the euphoria inaugurated by the Agreement, there was skepticism amongst academics around a political environment and peace settlement which many described as uncertain. O’Kane recalled that:

> To an extent there was euphoria and I shared that, but maybe it’s traditional of cynical academics and also maybe it goes back to the point I was making a moment ago about my [and others] inability to predict things [in the region]. I remember thinking at the time and saying to several people in conversation, in fact at academic conferences and elsewhere that I thought to an extent that [the Agreement] was the “easy part”. I use easy there in huge inverted commas, I’m not saying it was easy, but it was almost easier I thought to get the Good Friday Agreement than to actually get stable, devolved government to Northern Ireland (O’Kane, 2015).

Dixon, Patterson, English, Coakley and O’Duffy, amongst others, all noted this uncertainty of the initial years of the post-Agreement era, and the difficulties which the phases of implementation faced. For example, Kerr, who worked for David Trimble, recalled that the political environment was still extremely cynical with regards to “selling” various aspects of the Agreement:

> I mean I would have been an Ulster Unionist, a yes voter [for devolved government] and was keen to sign up and promote the yes agenda. Little did I know, I thought I’d be joining up with the hordes of David Trimble supporters that were out there fighting for power sharing and for the Agreement but there was very, very few of them.

I started working for him and his staff in Westminster, writing speeches and showing people round the House of Commons. Then a couple of years later I was over fighting the 2001 general election with him as his gopher and attendant. Then four years later again, I’d been there working with him for two years’ full time with a break from academia and then he lost the 2005 election. I got involved in practicing what I was preaching but of course whenever I began, and right through that period, the (Ulster Unionist Party) UUP was split. I was working in an office full of people and MPs, 10 MPs, 50% of them
were against the Agreement and would like to burn David Trimble at the stake.
The other 50%, well 20% of them were ardent supporters like me and unequivocally in favor of the theory and practice of power sharing and engaging with not just the SDLP but going the whole hog with Sinn Féin. The other 30%, well they could have gone either way. Some hedged their bets.

[In 1999] I joined a group of people that were very sceptical and I don’t really think my view changed a great deal during that time. [Some think] it ended in a failure. It ended in a success because the peace was consolidated, but it ended in electoral failure so that all those around me were, “There he is, he’s the Sinn Féin wing of the UUP.”

You imagine knocking on somebody’s door and saying, “We should go into government with Sinn Féin,” [this was] a couple of months after they’ve done the biggest bank robbery in Northern Ireland history and murdered somebody outside a bar in Belfast, slit his throat and stabbed him in the chest and then cleaned the place up. Yes, I mean that doesn’t work in Unionist areas. It doesn’t work in some other areas as well (Kerr, 2015).

O’Kane reflected that he and others were “sceptical even as late as 2005, 2006 [when] you get the St Andrews deal, even that the St Andrews deal would then pan out to devolved government [was fairly circumspect]” (O’Kane, 2015). Well into the 2000s, there was “still the looming threat of a reversion back to sectarian violence” (Tonge, 2015).

There was nothing especially unique about the skepticism regarding the longevity or impact of the Agreement: it reflected a level of “traditional or academic naysaying” (O’Kane, 2015). All interviewees acknowledged that the Good Friday Agreement was a wonderful achievement and supported it in principle; but saw it as the beginning, not the end of something. This uncertainty and skepticism still obtains today: “All you have to do is turn on the TV or read the news in Belfast to realise the fragility of the whole thing” (Anonymous 1, 2015). Indeed, various U.K. and international interventions into Northern Irish affairs have sought to resolve executive impasses and political uncertainty: resulting in the Stormont House Agreement in December 2014, the Hillsborough Agreement in 2010, and the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 (See: Birrell & Gormley-Heenan, 2015). Interestingly, Lord Bew remarked on multiple occasions that when he was advising Trimble and others on the framework of the Agreement, they “never intended [it] to bring about peace” (Bew, 2015); but instead hoped it would help bring political parties together and put a halt to political violence and killings.

Lord Bew, O’Leary, McGarry, and even Dixon commented that regardless of the difficulties which the post-Agreement peace process has faced, they were all confident “in the overall trajectory of the process” (O’Leary, 2015). Lord Bew spoke in depth about his involvement with Trimble and the British Government during this period: noting that even
though there were various periods of uncertainty and confusion regarding how each strand of the Agreement would be implemented, most were certain the process would continue nonetheless. He recalled:

[It was] a gamble [I made] that turned out to be right. And that was the biggest gamble for me, you see, because I did understand the British government. I did understand the local Unionists. At least I understood what UUP was, and I did understand Dublin and what Dublin wanted out of this. The biggest gamble I made probably believe was reading the Provos. And in that case, people like Sean O’Callaghan and Anthony McIntyre in particular were very good guides. Maloney, and they would say – whatever he says, Maloney has his critics but Maloney knew an awful lot about them, more than any one human being.

I got it when it was going to be a deal and what the shape of it was. The one thing that I got wrong was I thought that – I mean for example, I got the North/South thing quick and the broad constitutional structure. If you look at – I would say now if you look at the articles I wrote from time the Framework Document went through, I got it. And I was the only person writing at that time saying this is a sham, but the one thing that I got wrong was the actual – and I was stupid – slightly stupid there because people like Maurice Hayes who did understand this strand one damage and better than me. He did convey it to me in the weeks before the end.

I thought that it might be possible still to have a strand one closer to the actual Framework Document, which would have avoided the [chaos] where you had decentralized local structure but decentralized power structure and committee chairmanships which would have avoided a lot of the problems that would have been there about calling people Minister of Education [for example]. That's what it really meant – it would've been, but avoided all the problems then by being in government and having guns or whatever.

My personal view is strand one of the Framework Document is actually better than what's negotiated in the point of view of the English leadership. What they actually negotiated by returning to a cabinet government raised all these difficult issues in terms of well, once these guys have decommissioned, then they were in government without guns and legal – and Paisley, you see, was right about this. Paisley said in 1994 if I didn't know right – he said that they would be able to [in] the reading of the Downing Street Declaration was they'd be able to enter talks without giving up their guns, which turned out to be completely true.

The Downing Street Declaration called for a permanent renunciation of violence, says the Irish prime minister and the Irish Parliament on the day by the handing over of weapons. This does – this is a process that was not completed for another, was it 11 years, by everybody's account now.

And it's what killed Trimble; it was… that it was dragged out for so long. But I got that at the [time] you know, that was sort of the process of them hanging on to guns for so long and combined with the fact that they had these titles of minister of this and minister of that was too much for mainstream Unionism to bear. Had you had a system of chairmanships, I think it might have been easier to do, and certainly that's what strand one of the Framework Document talks about.
So, that was [what]… I kind of assumed that's what they might go for with the negotiation but they didn't. But it's all… it doesn't matter now because we're exactly in the position we would be anyway, whatever it was about. But strand two I got and strand two – and East-West I got [and we knew it was going to happen] (Bew, 2015).

McGarry and O’Leary highlighted that intellectually, the signing of the Agreement and uncertainty of the ongoing peace process opened up various battlegrounds. An overwhelming majority of interviewees noted that the major battles continued to occur between pro and anti-consociationalists long after the Agreement had been signed. McGarry, for example, regarded the Agreement and its implementation, though rocky at times, was “a vindication of consociation theory”; “there were academics that promised that consociationalism would end in disaster” (McGarry, 2015). As it had not, they began applying the theory to a host of other conflict areas. Dixon, who argues that the Agreement is not consociational, asserts that although the peace process has been largely successful, the application of consociational theory to Northern Ireland and other conflicts has been “disastrous” for the discipline of political science, because:

What [has] happened is that you’ve got [people like] Lijphart, powerful, prominent name, then you’ve got McGarry and O’Leary and then you’ve got their acolytes. So what happens is that you’ve got plenty of PhD students who are doing PhDs on consociationalism and who are developing multiple definitions of what consociationalism is but if you’re a PhD student working for someone who’s a consociationalist, are you really going to turn around and say, “Actually, this doesn't make much sense to me”? I just find it stultifying because surely that’s not how science progresses, by this endless reproduction of a paradigm that was really written in the ‘60s and ‘70s and continues to just morph into different forms, different labels for all the various variations of it (Dixon, 2015).

Yet interviewees, pro- and anti-consociationalist, overwhelmingly disagreed with Dixon’s view; and instead credited the theory and O’Leary and McGarry’s work as a major contribution to the discipline and community. That said, many also took note of the “endless reproduction of research” following the Agreement which has either sought to (re)explain the various consociational elements of it and the peace process, and/or rehash the seemingly endless debates between pro- and anti-consociationalists and about the historical roots of the conflict.

Yet academics who entered the field following the Agreement, such as McEvoy, Kerr, Hayward, Mumford, and Walsh, all highlighted that these debates as well as the new, ongoing literature focusing on Northern Ireland and its consociational elements has more to
do with it being a process constantly in flux. The consensus and utility of this process is that it can be studied using comparative methods and from a variety of disciplines and perspectives; it is more than a mere replication of literature, but an expansion of the boundaries of the discipline. Regarding his research, which focuses on British military history, Mumford noted that:

I am someone who takes a close interest in Northern Ireland so I can build the bigger picture of British responses to violence and what have this and other thematic elements that have emerged like negotiations and like torture. That has very much been my way into a lot of this [recent] Northern Irish research – focusing on themes rather than the conflict specifically. From a generalist perspective I think its transition from a focus of conflict studies to a focus of peace studies is largely reflected in what I see going around the conferences [and literature] that is focusing on Northern Ireland now. I would see a shift in the way Northern Ireland is being used as a comparative tool. It is very much now what can we learn from Good Friday? What can we learn from the devolution process that was put in place? What can we learn from utilising [various] party actors in peace making processes? Rather than looking at specific military operations or looking at IRA bombing tactics and that sort of thing. I think that is to be welcomed because there are huge controversies to whether the British military operations in Northern Ireland could ever be deemed successful, for example. I think perhaps Good Friday had more success in terms of its objectives being reached than the British military’s. If I look at the big journals for example the leading political studies journals in the area. Northern Ireland reaches a prominence in these journals predominantly when peace making had been discussed. The peace process is being discussed and consociationalism is being discussed and the sociological element is being discussed [and they will continue to be discussed (Mumford, 2015).

Kerr and McEvoy considered that much of what has been written in the last 15 years and, indeed, what is currently being produced (including their own work) is not focused solely on Northern Ireland, but looks to place and compare the (success of) the peace process within a wider context and framework of other ethnonational conflict scenarios and peace processes (For example see: M. Kerr, 2006, 2013; J. McEvoy, 2015). In similar vein, Walsh pointed out that:

…What I'm trying to do [with my own work] is expand two cases which I think have similarities and I can bring my [Northern Ireland] expertise to them. The obvious one is Bosnia. But you’ve also got Cyprus, you've got Macedonia and Moldova. My postdoc is looking at projects that have a power sharing element and a territorial self-government element. I think they are the key parts of the institution in Northern Ireland (Walsh, 2015).

O’Leary, McGarry, Tonge, English, and Taylor, the latter a critic of consociationalism, contested that much of what is being written is about the “intricate complexities of the
relationships between cultures and institutions” (O’Leary, 2015). These debates are equivalent to “chicken or egg” arguments in terms of what comes first and “will likely be debated forever” (Taylor, 2015).

Shirlow and Hughes consider that the controversy around consociationalism and the debates which developed post-Agreement were simply reflections of the ideological divides which had always defined the discipline. Shirlow highlighted that controversy and ideology are actually what brings academics together, arguing that scholars “always love being together, because they actually love the argument [maybe] more than the academic experience. Academics like an argument” (Shirlow, 2015). Mitchell agreed that there is nothing special about academics holding onto or failing to change their intellectual or ideological positions, and that:

I don’t know if there has been an evolution [in my views about Northern Ireland] in the sense that many may mean it. I suspect this is quite true of quite a lot of academics as well. There are some academics that radically change the subject matter that they're studying every five years. Genuine polymaths who pick on one thing and do the best they can with it for five years and then think, ‘Fine, I'm done with that. I'll now go on and do something completely different.’ Even within political science I mean, not necessarily across disciplines because that would be tougher in professional terms. I suspect that a lot of us, in different ways, work away at the same problem for many decades. I probably haven't reflected enough on this as to why that would be the case but I know of lots of people who started out with an initial problem and have never satisfactorily answered it. They keep coming at it [and debating it] in different ways (Mitchell, 2015).

Indeed, at conferences held by organizations such as PSAI, “the usual suspects” could frequently be found, often (re)-engaging in debates on consociationalism; but these arguments often seemed seeped in personal and ideological positions which many described as “vitriolic” at times. Yet the interviewees overwhelmingly concurred that generally, scholars got along with one another and could cooperate on a professional level. One academic credited this largely to the Agreement, noting that it “[provided] a foundation that they could kind of reconcile themselves to and then build off of intellectually” (Anonymous 1, 2015). Others argued that as the peace process began to stabilize and conditions on the ground improved, “the debates have become politer as the conflict itself has become politer” (Taylor, 2015).

Moreover, the debates between pro- and anti-consociationalists are only one part of the scholarship which has developed. Tonge and Hayward noted that these debates were largely focused between a handful of scholars (Tonge, 2015; Hayward, 2015), but the
discipline and community has expanded beyond that. Mitchell, Power, and others who asked to remain anonymous mentioned that many new opportunities in the “great sectarian laboratory” (Tonge, 2015) had emerged. Following the Agreement, “opportunities for research opened up for academics in ways that never existed before” pointing to the different sub-sections of political science such as “terrorism, policing, reconciliation, issues of identity, education, etc etc…” (Power, 2015)

Power recalled that when she arrived at University of Liverpool’s Institute for Irish Studies in 2003, there was a major interest and demand in “the research I was doing [which was] all about religion and peace, religion and conflict and how you can bridge the gap between the two. And [from this] I became very interested in evangelicals at that point because they have mass influence in Northern Ireland politics” (Power, 2015). Power has gone on to publish multiple books and articles (See: Power, 2005; Power, 2007).

Similarly, Cathal McCall91 noted when he arrived at Queens University Belfast in 2003, he was brought into its Institute of European studies, later incorporated into the politics department, because of his research on borders, European integration, and identity politics in Northern Ireland (McCall, 1999, 2014; McCall & Wilson, 2010); while an anonymous scholar related that their position at INCORE was a “peace process job”, as it “was funded ultimately by, and through the European Union, and the Northern Ireland office, and it was as part of a research project to look at comparative approaches to peace processes” (Anonymous 2, 2015).

In explaining the development of such opportunities and the expansion of the community of academics and their research on Northern Ireland, interviewees pointed to several variables. Some noted sardonically that it could be attributed to:

A huge range of factors. Among them, it comes from a feeling that everyone from a conflict-affected society has the idea that their conflict is the most interesting one in the world. They also feel that their grievances are bigger than others, hence the phrase that my friend Feargal Cochran uses, which is ‘People in Northern Ireland think that they are MOPEs – The Most Oppressed People Ever’. But it also comes down to the physicality of Northern Ireland. It’s a very small place, with just two universities. People are reticent to leave it. The concentration around South Belfast, for example, of academics, and coffee shops, is remarkable, so it’s insularity within Northern Ireland, not just

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on the Northern Ireland basis but generally. But also, a political economy grew up, that reinforced that interest in Northern Ireland.

The British and Irish governments, and the European Union, and Atlantic philanthropies lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money. And [the Agreement] created a huge civil society, which could be interviewed and re-interviewed, and re-interviewed to death. [It was also one] that could come to the same workshops and same seminars.

[Take for example], that you have multiple research projects over the past 20 years, of which I’ve benefitted from, but virtually every other academic I know at Queen’s and UU benefited from, which were all looking at Northern Ireland.

All of those research projects needed money [which] was all funded by the [British or Irish] governments, the European Union, or these other philanthropies. They all relied on research and somehow the fiction that this research would aid community relations for the peace process, or some political good, in a normative way.

And it really did create this political economy, in which you had the same people, the usual suspects, seeing each other twice or three times a week, at different workshops, seminars, and conferences in Belfast (Anonymous 2, 2015).

English reflected that:

Things evolved in three main ways over my professional career. One is the number of people studying Northern Ireland has grown hugely [since the Agreement]. So if you look at something like the Conference of Irish Historians in Britain, which was set up in the 1970’s and which I first went to in the late 80’s, was quite a small-scale operation. Now it’s much bigger because there are far more people studying Irish things in Britain, and similarly in the Republic. There are also variables such as since the Agreement things have become less bloodstained; there’s been a growth.

The second thing that’s happened in terms of change has been that because rather than being seen as something which is depressing, which you’d rather not happen, the Northern Ireland conflict seemed to be something where you can almost export lessons, which is why turning towards peace has been an internationalization of it. So that’s been something where people are happier to say I studied the Northern Ireland conflict, because they can say how do we look at conflict resolution? Which is a nicer thing to say than how do we explain why three people have been murdered yesterday. It, also, became more international, when people say how do conflicts end? They say Northern Ireland seems to have ended, let’s look at that. And because it was in the English language, it also made it easier to study than some other conflicts for many people.

And the third thing was that 9/11 made a big difference, and the American academic life became much more interested in terrorism than it had been beforehand. So you found that there were people who were studying this in the U.S. And that had a big knock on effect in the academic community over here. Why? Because journals were more interested and staff publishers’ thought they could sell more things through invitations to go and lecture [on things such as terrorism and conflict resolution]. So it used to be the case before 9/11, my invitations to America tended to be to go and talk to audiences
interested in Ireland about Irish things. After 9/11 that still happened, but it was also the case people would say, can you come and give a lecture on how terrorism ends? Can you come and give a lecture on the dynamics of counter-terrorism?

The Irish thing might be an example of it, but they weren’t really interested in Ireland. They were interested in how terrorism ends because of the thing that had happened in September 11, 2001 and in Belfast in 1998. So all of those things made a big difference.

So my experience was that it was those things coming together that made this a more auspicious place to study things. And therefore the number of conferences, which were interested in people studying these things, has grown which has also increased the amount of enthusiasm there was for supervisors saying this is a good thing to study.

Another experience quite often I find is that there are people from the U.S., [students and academics] who aren’t interested in Ireland at all that are interested in why certain rebel groups become powerful and certain ones don’t. Or being told to read your book about the IRA the same way they’d be told to read someone else’s book about Hamas. This is a case study of some terrorist phenomenon, whereas it [before] would have been much more of a cult - terrorism studies in America was a bit of a pagan religion until 9/11, and then it became a mainstream religion. This did make a big difference in the study of Northern Ireland and it made a big difference to funding. Suddenly there was much more funding in the study of this thing in the wake of 9/11. So all those things made a difference, and I think because I’ve, in the long period I’ve been studying these things, it’s become more recognizable to people who don’t have a particular interest in Ireland, that there’s something happening in Northern Ireland that was kind of world historical, whereas I think it was previously seen more as an eccentricity (English, 2015).

Mitchell, O’Leary, Arthur, Aughey and others all agreed that the success of the Agreement prompted intellectual engagement with the subject and affiliation with it: “Victory has a thousand fathers” (Aughey, 2015). Beyond this, the Agreement changed the conversation around Northern Ireland, because it placed it within a wider international field; while within British academia:

What the Agreement did was awakened the British Academy, I suppose, or the British academic kind of core, to the idea that Northern Ireland was part of the U.K. and that if you have a journal, say, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, you couldn't understand British politics and say Northern Ireland was a place apart anymore. This was particularly so after 1998 with devolution because everywhere was different, we were seeing Scotland and Wales and London devolved as well and that had been the case pre-1998 where we [in Northern Ireland] were always just [seen as] the ones that were different. So the constitutional reform that took place in '98 changed the way that people wrote about Northern Ireland because the landscape became different and it was how we stood in relation to everything else, not how we stood apart anymore.
So, you know, the phases of the Good Friday Agreement really opened people's eyes to that. [People began to ask], hold on. There's the east/west access here. What does the British/Irish Council actually mean? What does a joint ministerial council actually look like? What…. so we started to look a little bit more at the structures that had been put in place in the Agreement as opposed to the bigger question of what is the constitutional options for Northern Ireland. Once that had been settled with the Agreement then the focus went on to all of these other things and that became more mainstream in UK politics because it had relevance for U.K. politics, the broader readership of the journals and so could say, but, yeah, it's Northern Ireland that's different. No, it's not. It's the same as in devolution applies here, here, here and here, and how is London going to handle that when it comes to welfare reform or whatever else (Anonymous 1, 2015).

The expansion of the scholarship on Northern Ireland following the Agreement is therefore not only due to its success, but to several other factors too. These include the internationalization of conflict studies, comparisons and inquiries on what events in Northern Ireland could inform scholars and policymakers about other conflict areas, as well as Northern Ireland being brought into the fold of mainland British politics.

However, this also took place within the context of a changing university environment, where the influences of and need for money as well as new demand for academics to publish placed new pressure and had a significant impact on researchers. Participants have had varying experiences. For example, Tonge referred to Northern Ireland as a “honey pot” in terms of its funding opportunities: noting somewhat sarcastically that after the Agreement, it seemed like “you needed Northern Ireland on an ESRC or Leverhulme grant application if you wanted it to be successful” (Tonge, 2015) which he acknowledges he benefited greatly from.92 Various governments and philanthropies “lavished academia in Northern Ireland with money” (Anonymous 2, 2015): resulting in what many referred to as the growth of the Northern Ireland “peace industry” (Bew, Patterson, Arthur, McIntyre, Tonge, 2015). This “industry” was alluded to when scholars noted the replication of research which sought to (re)explain various aspects of Northern Ireland’s peace process and its consociational elements. In this respect, the “community of scholars” around Northern Ireland appear to have been somewhat opportunistic in terms of their research and ideas; the influence of money has had a narrowing effect on the scholarship being produced.

McIntyre was quite critical of all academic work on the peace process generally and consociationalism in particular: arguing, pace Dixon, that “it [the peace process] can mean

92 Tonge has received over £200,000 in research grants from the ESRC as well as Leverhulme since 2006; and been awarded grants from the British government and American Political Science Association for his work on Northern Ireland (See: U. o. Liverpool, 2016 ).
everything to everybody. That it can be what you want [to get] out of it… And then it is widely touted, as a model for what was seemingly a problem beyond resolution, has suddenly been resolved. Therefore, we will talk it up, put bells on it, and try and sell it to the rest of the world. Just becomes a nice word for industry”, which looks to export Northern Ireland’s “internal conflict model” (McIntyre, 2015) around the world. McGrattan and Patterson similarly referred to the “transitional justice”, “terrorism”, and “peace process industry”, all of which have developed out of the Agreement: noting that there has been a widespread “marketization” of research and academia not just in terms of Northern Ireland, but also universities generally, leading to a narrowing of work produced. Another participant lamented that:

For a long time, we have been in essentially neo-liberal universities. Northern Ireland was somewhat odd in that it has been lavished by this money, so it is Keynesian neo-liberalism, in the sense it has been funded by outsiders. But often there were competitions for these grants, in the neo-liberal way of sharing resources. And with REF and RAE before that it creates a target driven society, it creates a political economy. People who are after targets, they’re encouraged to go after targets by the institution, because linked to that is career progression, promotion, esteem, etc. We’re also encouraged to have links with civil society, to be able to demonstrate impact. Impact obviously must be socially responsible, it has to be politically in keeping with the time, and that is pro-peace process, by virtue. There is no accident that the projects that were funded were those that generally said the peace process is a good thing.

…And I think that’s something that we can see throughout academia, on these islands, but it was brought into sharper relief in Northern Ireland because there was (a) an on-going peace process, and (b) there was the money to tell nice things about that on-going peace process (Anonymous 2, 2015).

This scholar went on to highlight that:

I don’t think I have avoided it. In fact, I have been the recipient of external funding, to look at the peace process, and so I am implicated with others, in that. I hope I have been true to my own intellectual scepticism, and have not merely been the handmaiden of policy. But ultimately, is it too much to say that large parts of academia, including myself, at certain times, have been bought. I don’t think it is (ibid).

However, others regarded these claims as over-stated: “I don't think anybody is going to make their fortune out of working on the Northern Ireland conflict, you know, because no matter what book you sell it's going to sell way less than a general textbook on British politics, for example, so I don't think anybody is going into it thinking, you know, I'll make my fortune here” (Anonymous 1, 2015). O’Duffy reflected that while working with O’Leary and applying for research grants, when they did receive funding, “it was never large”. “I
remember for [this one particular project he was working on] O’Leary complaining about a lot of good reviews for his grant applications with ESRC or whatever its equivalent was then. Good reviews but high failure rates” (O’Duffy, 2015).

Others reflected favorably on REF\(^9\): claiming it has had positive effects on academia in the U.K., as it has introduced more “objectivity” in assessing academic contributions and how the promotion process takes place within universities (Mitchell, 2015). Young scholars such as John Bew spoke very positively:

I’m a hundred percent grateful [for the REF]. I’m very productive, I write a lot. I mean that’s the one thing I’m very good at. So, in that sense, I’m a beneficiary to the REF. I’m also for very lucky that I had a two-year post doc in Cambridge and then a two-year teaching job, which was not teaching intensive [so I could publish]. So, I have benefited personally from the REF because I had a very lucky start to my academic career where I had two, almost four years where I can really get ahead… I mean, that’s where I [did] my first book. So like it’s been personally by complete luck, pretty useful for me. I think my parents [who are both academics] are going to make [a

\(^9\) In the U.K., the origins of work on research evaluation and assessing the impact of research on the economy and society can be traced back to the late 1970s/early 1980s and the Thatcher administration. There was significant debate and interest amongst scientists regarding the issue of ‘science and society’ (H. Rose & Rose, 1969), and the social responsibility of the scientist (Nelkin, 1979). Pioneering work by radical scholars like Bernal (1939) and others (See: Werskey, 1971) raised skepticism as to whether science was being used for the full benefit of humanity. The 1970s also oversaw a succession of economic crises, resulting in severe public expenditure cuts: increasing the pressure to ensure that the scarce funds available for research were spent as wisely as possible (Martin, 2011).

During this time, most decisions in academia were made within universities and on the basis of peer review alone. Partly because of the limitations of this, it was argued that the decision-making process needed to be opened up, providing a more public form of accountability (Martin, 2011). For that to be achieved, data on the inputs to and outputs from research were required. These early efforts encountered opposition from academics, who were concerned about politicians and bureaucrats encroaching on their terrain and challenging the authority of peer review as the primary decision-making mechanism (for promotion and academic assessment) in universities (Martin, 2011). Under political and economic pressure, funding bodies such as UK research councils began to adopt more systematic approaches to research evaluation; and over time, these became more extensive.

For example, in 1986, the University Grants Committee (UGC) recognized that a more selective approach was required to fund British university research, and launched the Research Selectivity Exercise (Martin, 2011). Initially, this process was comparatively simple: panels carried out a peer review assessment of short submissions from each university department (or research unit) and that department’s best five publications. However, criticism from academics forced UGC and its successor, the University Funding Council (UFC) to make the approach in the 1989 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) more rigorous and labor intensive in terms of preparing each unit’s submission and carrying out the assessment (Martin, 2011). The pattern was to be repeated over each successive RAE, with criticisms of the previous exercise resulting in ever more refinements being introduced to the next one (Martin and Whitley, 2010).

The pressures to perform well in the RAE increased, so universities and their departments came to put growing levels of effort into preparing for the next exercise. While early RAEs brought significant benefits in terms of greater attention to published research and a more strategic approach by universities and departments, these began to diminish. After intensive debates on the cost and benefits of administering the RAE, the UK Treasury proposed that perhaps this peer review-based assessment could be replaced simply by metrics such as the funding received from research councils and other funding bodies (HM Treasury, 2006). However, this led to fierce opposition from academics, loath to see the disappearance of peer review from the process. Instead, HEFCE and the other funding councils decided to replace the RAE with the Research Excellence Framework (REF), a combination of the previous peer-review-based exercise with some form of impact assessment.
difference here as they] probably stressed the importance of publications. I also think what the hell is the point in doing it? Unless you’re publishing stuff and closely into public debate but that’s a personal thing, you know (J. Bew, 2015).

Shirlow related that he too has never had an issue getting his work published, but that he has noticed:

“The marketization [of academia and the REF have] …. what you would find is some people may be cut corners to get published, because they are under so much pressure. They are maybe not doing as much collecting enough information or data to really produce good work, maybe as well. They are getting published, but there is a long tale now in journals. You have got to realise, when I was at university there were nowhere near the number of journals. The Internet has changed all of this. I have a journal sometimes now, I come across something that somebody has written and I have never heard of the journal. It is like journal [of whatever], volume two and volume three and volume four. So it is different from my generation, we had to start off in a very, very tight range of journals. You are told to publish in at least third level journals, and that has gotten much more difficult, because there is much more competition because that is what the REF has done. So you are seeing a lot of younger staff that are publishing in journals. "What is that journal, I have never heard of that?" So all these things like impact factors, citations, all of that is increasingly accretion. My generation was the first one, which was put under the RAE/REF and it put a lot of pressure on us and now with the introduction of new things like three-year contracts etc. I think it is probably not a very pleasant place to be [for new scholars], which may encourage you to go more for volume as opposed to going for [quality], you need four pieces of [top quality] work. I don't think any of the young people would risk going for four pieces of work. I think they would probably try to get as many pieces of work done as possible. I also know from some journals up in the North that rejection rates have risen and that is probably not a very healthy terrain for people to be in as well... [I mean] I have published about 100 things, I have had two papers rejected, I have been very, very lucky” (Shirlow, 2015).

The pressure on academics to publish and its effect on quality was certainly a theme throughout the narratives. An anonymous participant highlighted that because of things like the REF, scholars tended to think more “strategically” about what and where they published; elements such as “impact” have influenced academia:

The requirement of academics to publish a lot more than they did. So in the olden days during the conflict somebody like, you know, Cornelius O'Leary, who was the head of the department [at Queens University Belfast], could work his entire life on his one big book, or John White, right. You know, they published one thing, but they still were the world’s experts on it, right. They just talked about it a lot. They didn't actually have to commit anything to paper because they didn't have a head of school saying get it out 'cause we
need it! So there is a… that spike that you see you will see in relation to a lot of other sub-disciplines as well that you might have noticed beforehand simply because the research exercise, which started in 1998, or 96 (Anonymous 1, 2015).

As a result, academics no longer had the:

Opportunity now to write the big opus on a piece of work. For example, the opportunity to do what a John White did or Cornelius O’Leary did and work for years on your big, big book is lost. [Today] most universities will not afford you that luxury to sit down and really think about the bigger picture and how all of the different pieces [fit] together. So what tends to happen now is everybody does their bit and if you put all the bits together it makes up the whole whereas in the past a scholar would have had the opportunity to sit down and look at the whole by themselves. So what has happened has been we’ve become much more [specialized] experts in sub-parts of individual areas (Anonymous 1, 2015).

Moreover, as noted above, the development of the RAE/REF has resulted in a proliferation of academic journals as well as a growth in undesirable practices such as the replication of research in different guises in different journals (Elton, 2000; Martin, 2011). Pressure to publish has restricted and disadvantaged “long term” research, as academics now felt required to be “research active” and publish widely. Failure to do so could result in financial penalties; with research in interdisciplinary fields particularly hindered, as it became more difficult to establish new research fields (Elton, 2000; Martin, 2011; NAPAG, 1996).

English, John Bew, Kerr, Power, O’Duffy, and Hayward all largely echoed similar statements. Often, the research and research centres which emerged following the Agreement were not nearly as well funded as some may have suggested; continue to have wide research agendas (not solely focused on Northern Ireland); and the impact and implementation of “neo-liberal” policies on universities had existed long before the peace process began. In fact:

One is there was a kind of Northern Ireland Troubles mania [in the 1980’s]. So during the period when [bombings and such] were happening in English cities, there was a sense that if you pumped money into Northern Ireland it might make it less awful. So motorways being built, community centers being built, Queens was better funded than an equivalent university would be in England during the 80’s in terms of library, provisional jobs or whatever, because there was a sense that you put money into the society in the hope of assuaging some of the difficulties. Whether that worked or not is another question, but that’s what happened. So there was money pumped in it that way.

[Next]A lot of the institutions that are set up when you look close [at them] there’s not as much money in them as you’d like. And with a lot of them there’s a good reason for that, because they’re not that great. But what should happen in academic life is that there’s less reinvention all the time. People tend to say, let’s merge these departments together, let’s set up a new institute,
or let’s rebrand this. Quite often it seems to me that just concentrating on people doing as well as they can on the work that they do with the institutions that exist would make more sense. Part of that is the dynamic that if someone wants to be the vice chancellor of Queens, if they turn up and say, here’s my vision of a restructured place that will be blah blah blah, it’s more likely they’ll get the job than if they turn up and say look, the structures we have may be imperfect but what we need is to raise morale and give people more autonomy and let them do as good work as they can. But that’s just not the dynamic of appointment to jobs (English, 2015).

It is important to note here that the experience and accounts of academics in Ireland was very different to that of academics in the U.K. and Northern Ireland. For example, Ó Dochartiagh pointed out that:

First of all, we were [and are] under far less pressure here, in terms of rigid agendas and regulation. So until very recent years, I felt I had immensely more freedom than colleagues in the U.K., and maybe in other institutions like UCD and TCD in terms of research and publishing. I always felt we were encouraged to do certain things, we were pushed in certain directions, but it wasn't ever very rigid (Ó Dochartiagh, 2015).

Similarly, Tannam noted that even at institutions like Trinity College Dublin (TCD), there was not the same pressure to publish or bring in money as at U.K. universities. When she returned to Ireland in 1995 from the LSE:

I was shocked when I came back here because there was nothing of that [publishing] culture [in Ireland]. And it's changed now, but it's still wouldn't be anything like the UK, and at the Irish School of Ecumenics (ISE) at Trinity it would be even less so it is kind of part of a different tradition and it’s changing as well now, but, I mean, there's no research rating in Ireland. There's no ranking system. It's beginning to be done, but when I came back to Ireland in '95 and there wasn’t really - there was substantial pressure on people to be active in research so it was quite different.

She went on to state that:

There was [some pressure] in one way that if you wanted to be a good department, like political science here [at Trinity], then you did need – and UCD – you needed to be active, but there wasn't any financial penalty, which in the U.K. there was, so I think that was a different kind of thing and you wouldn't be judged cause there's league table. [In fact], when Michael Marsh, and here it was very contentious amongst academics, created lead table of individual academics and how much they published and how much they were being cited under Google Scholar. They did that about seven years ago and it’s, you know I’m not actually not great naming people but there was huge trouble about it, where they identified the top academics in Ireland per Google Scholar and other citations, but there is nothing governmentally driven like
that. So it’s not like, it’s still not like the U.K. and it was most definitely wasn’t in 95 (Tannam, 2015).

Coakely and Doyle both concurred that although their academic environment has begun to move towards a more U.K.-oriented system, pressure on academics in terms of research, attracting funding and publications has been much less in Ireland. That said, a “new managerialist” form of education has taken effect in Irish academia, and been accused of importing Anglo-American neo-liberal policies (Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch et al., 2012). Thus in Ireland too, academia has moved towards a focus on outputs over inputs; and begun to use narrowly defined arguments of “efficiency”, “value for money”, and “relevance”, turning Irish higher education into a commodity (K. Lynch et al., 2012).

Speaking more about the publishing culture which has developed around Northern Ireland, English noted that:

In terms of the publishing and it being a fashionable area, that didn’t use to be the case. So it used to be the case that people used to say, don’t write on Northern Ireland, it’s a horrible subject. Whereas now people say it’s a quite jazzy subject [though less so now]. I think that’s caught on. Partly it’s self-reinforcing in that if people who have studied it then become successful, if people who studied it become professors at the university level, people around it who are following them, you tend to get a replication. And so I think that that means that this is a self-fulfilling quality, just as if there were certain trends in a certain kind of, there was a kind of series of waves of Foucaultian scholarship not long ago in the social sciences. It went on but there was a way in which it all self-replicated for a while, so departments with professors who were Foucault scholars tended to appoint other Foucault scholars, and then they appointed the grandchildren of Foucault scholars and it went on. And then these tides and pendulums shift. In terms of Northern Ireland, you’re right. If you look at mainstream politics journals, mainstream history journals, there’s far more on Northern Ireland than there used to be. How many of the articles are great is another question. Some of them are very, very good, some of them if they weren’t written on Northern Ireland, would they get published? Possibly not now. But then you could argue that the pendulum just swung another way. It used to be the case where things were too harsh, and now they’re too generous (English, 2015).

English’s account echoes the concerns of Dixon, McIntyre and others regarding a favorable replication and representation of consociationalist paradigms. Academics such as O’Leary have supervised, examined, or assisted several of those interviewed in this research: including O’Duffy, Kerr, and Tannam. They also wrote their PhDs and have published favourably on some aspect of consociationalism; and in turn, have supervised multiple PhD students interested in consociationalism and/or comparative case studies of conflict regulation (See: M. Kerr, 2006; O’Duffy, 2007; Tannam, 1998). Others, such as Mitchell, Walsh,
McEvoy, Taylor (a critic of consociationalism) and Ó Dochartaigh have all published and/or collaborated with O’Leary and McGarry, as well as cited the influence and impact of their research on their own work (See: J. McEvoy & O’Leary, 2013; P. Mitchell, O’Leary, & Evans, 2001; Paul Mitchell, O’Leary, & Evans, 2005; Taylor, 2009b).

McEvoy and Walsh both noted the influence of O’Leary on their research and academic careers. “I would put my cards on the table and say that there is no point in saying I'm not a consociationalist because my work would disagree with the records” (Walsh, 2015). Yet that said, “I wouldn't see myself as some blinding advocate for consociationalism. I see myself as someone who sees this as the kind of solution that has been used and something that should be studied by political scientists” (Walsh, 2015). Similarly, other scholars “weren’t cheerleaders for Brendan or consociationalism” (Tonge, 2015); but consider that both have contributed greatly to political science and provided a very useful framework for analysing and understanding Northern Ireland and other conflicts.

In any case, it should be noted that O’Leary, the comparative methodology he largely utilizes, and concosocationalists generally are not overly represented in the Northern Irish academic community. Dixon, McIntyre, John Bew, McGrattan, Aughey, Ó Dochartaigh, English and others also point towards the influence and contributions of Patterson and Lord Bew: in particular, their utilization of historical methods and case studies; supervision, references, and publications. The impact of Arthur, Coakely, Todd, and English, was also highlighted: particularly by Hayward. After her PhD, “I had a brief post-doc on what was then called Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions (PRTLI)\(^95\), a three-year project that Jennifer [Todd] and John [Coakley] helped me get and were running, that actually did expand into other opportunities for me” (Hayward, 2015). Additionally, Hayward and Ó Dochartaigh are working on a project which amounts to somewhat of a commemoration of Coakley, recognizing his contribution to political science.

In this respect, the epistemological divide noted in the last chapter between political science and historiography is still in existence today. For example, those who spoke favorably of and published on consociationalism and O’Leary all identified themselves as political scientists and often utilize comparative political science methods; whereas critics of

\(^{94}\) Moreover, Joanne McEvoy did her Post-Doctoral research at the University of Pennsylvanian (UPenn) under O’Leary, and has published on consociationalism with him (J. McEvoy & O’Leary, 2013); while Walsh’s PhD thesis was examined by O’Leary, and her current research at the University of Birmingham is supervised by Steffan Wolff, a former doctoral student of O’Leary’s.

\(^{95}\) PRTLI is an Irish government programme that provides financial support for institutional strategies, programmes and infrastructure to ensure the formulation and implementation of research strategies in the humanities, science, technology and social sciences.
consociationalism, O’Leary, and the former’s over-representation within and contribution to the discipline align themselves with historical methods:

I suppose it’s a fairly traditional path of an academic development for people in these groups, i.e. a supervisee then continues on in his supervisor's traditional and supports what that person was saying, albeit for a slightly different audience. He's well networked, because his supervisor has linked him in with these groups. You just see the way that it perpetuates itself (Hayward, 2015).

Scholars acknowledge that the Northern Irish academic community is not a single one; but rather, a series of communities linked together. One interviewee commented that when talking about the Northern Ireland “political science academy”, we should think about the different individuals who make it up. When thinking about “the political history of Northern Ireland, I would say Henry Patterson and Paul Bew. For that sort of broad, general overview [of the conflict] John Tonge. For paramilitaries and things like Republicanism, Loyalism and so on, John Tonge, Jim McCauley, Pete Shirlow. For the British-Irish connection, Kevin Bean and Eamonn O’Kane… I can tell you of all of them [and where they fit] if you give me list of names I could put [their] sub-discipline beside them all and say oh, Kevin does this and so-and-so does this and so-and-so that. But when you put it altogether that makes up the Northern Ireland political academy” (Anonymous, 2015). Similarly, Power reflected that:

There is a community of scholars and they seem to just gather around Northern Ireland. And, there is a sort of ethnic scheme that unites this community [in that] they are mainly from Northern Ireland or the South and are white, mainly middle class, and predominately male… But I think there are a series of communities within this so, Historians are one community. And I think you’ve got to have your battle claws to establish yourself there, it’s tough. And you have people that are obsessed with terror. Like, seriously, religious about the study of dissidents. Right, you’ve got them. And they’re interested in terror. A lot of them make careers of themselves as kind of terror experts. So you see them as a distinct community. And, you’ll see them branching out and writing books about other issues to do with terrorism and then kind of comparing it to Northern Ireland. Then there is the likes of me, who does some kind of community engagements. So research at the grassroots level, where ordinary people were during The Troubles, looking at kind of peace more than conflict. So, I am interested in the process of how peace occurs. So this is a distinct community of scholars that work in that kind of field. We all talk to each other. We all know one another. Well, ideologically we will be poles apart. We're not in that other group on who is interested in the whole issue of consociationalism, for instance. We all think that all spirals and we want, you know, we want to try and move the conversation on. There will be a lot of
these guys at the political studies Ireland (PSAI) conference, at least a part of it…. There is another group of terror-logists – the terrorist group which focus on the communities. The community relations people, they are people who want to look at how can we transform the conflicts? How can we transform the lives of ex-paramilitaries or what they call from commands? There’s what we call transitional justice, who look at kind of grassroots organizations and looking how the peace process can be imbedded. And then you’ve got, you know, your people that are interested in institutions, etc (Power, 2015).

Indeed, participants noted the tendency of individuals to specialize in specific areas of expertise; and that the overwhelming majority of academics working on Northern Ireland were either from or had some family connection to it. “Many of these people who are researching Northern Ireland [today] are from Northern Ireland”; with a good number of these “jolly chaps” individuals from “posh”, “middle class”, largely Protestant backgrounds (Shirlow, 2015). Hayward, Walsh, Power, and Buchanan all noted, meanwhile, the gender disparity within the community: reflecting that the academy was one of “masculine bonding”; and that women “have struggled to… It's important to be aware of the significance of gender and how [it plays a role]” (Hayward, 2015). Further:

For example, [in participating in recent conference panels] I hated being the person to say, "Are there going to be women on this panel?" When I was a PhD student, or a postdoc I remember coming back from the PSA, the Political Studies Association conference – God, I don't know when it would have been; maybe 2007 or something – just absolutely despairing about the potential for me to ever get a job after seeing all the young female PhD students, and then all the old male lecturers and professors. I remember talking to Richard English about it, because I just suddenly had this revelation that, “Actually, it is really significant; gender is significant” (Hayward, 2015).

When discussing gender, many female participants attributed much of intellectual combativeness to a form of masculine/macho posturing prevalent within a male-dominated community. It is also significant that of the individuals asked to participate in this study, female academics (particularly those in senior positions) either outright refused to participate and/or speak off the record about their experiences; or asked to be anonymized and/or expressed the desire to both edit and omit significant parts of their interview. Existing literature has attempted to understand the cultural codes enshrined in senior appointments at universities in the U.K. and Ireland: which effectively define the culture of universities and valorise a highly competitive, combative intellectual environment (K. Lynch et al., 2012). The Anglo-Irish university environment has long been described as one of “homo sociability”
(with a tendency is to select the candidates most like the assessors, ensuring access to power and privilege to those who fit in, those of their own kind). This is having a negative impact on the appointment of women to senior positions at all levels of education (Dunne, 2013; K. Lynch et al., 2012); and indeed, none of the female participants interviewed hold senior academic positions within their respective departments. Furthermore, all female participants agreed that because of such “macho posturing”, they had somewhat distanced themselves from or did not feel a part of the specific Northern Ireland community; and rather, identified themselves with their wider disciplinary affiliation (political scientist (Walsh, 2015); political sociologist (Hayward, 2015); and ecumenicalist (Power, 2015)).

Again though, this distancing is not limited to female academics only, particularly in the modern academic environment. Almost every interviewee expressed, sometimes quite adamantly, that they either never saw or no longer see themselves as Northern Ireland specialists; but had aligned themselves within wider disciplines, or had or were largely moving on from the subject area. Both McGarry and O’Leary consider that in many ways, they have “moved on from [Northern Ireland]” (McGarry, 2015). As they view the problem as mostly having been resolved, they are “more interested in places like Syria, and Yemen, and Iraq and Cyprus in particular” (McGarry, 2015): where they can begin to apply their consociational framework. O’Leary commented that he is a “comparativist”; before the end of his career, “I would have written as much about Kurdistan, as I will have about Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015). That said, Northern Ireland and its consociational framework continue to be a useful foundation for making comparisons in the modern day, because:

Civil wars have become a subject matter for international relations — comparative civil wars, studying insurgence, studying their grievances, questioning their grievances, asking what resolves civil wars, now by and large the security paradigm that informed a lot of work in the area, it’s the balance of forces. People make peace when they think they can’t win by war. That kind of grim realism has a certain merit to analyzing ethnic conflict, but it’s no good at institutions. And it is very interesting to see that literature now interested in why do peace agreements emerge? When do they work? Do the content of those agreements matter? If so, in what way? And you can see a set of results out there that are not resolved. Result number one: Power-sharing reduces the likelihood of recurrence of violence. It doesn’t guarantee it. What happen again? It reduces the likelihood of violence. Result number two: If you have power-sharing arrangements inside your democracy, your democracy will perform better against a range of predictable indicators than democracies that do not have these power-sharing characteristics. So, better democracies, better outputs. A third result that we can be fairly confident of: If you have proportional representation institutions, combined with some kinds of power-sharing, the
likelihood of there being ordinary, not organized, but ordinary mass political violence, riots and so on is reduced. These kinds of general large-end results, I think are pretty robust. They give us confidence that power-sharing should be part of the repertoire of applied political science, but they don’t tell us what power-sharing is best or if any power-sharing resolution is best. What’s the appropriate medicine to be attached to particular malady? Those questions require further thinking and detailed work (O’Leary, 2015).

In similar vein, Tonge pointed out that:

I don’t teach dedicated Northern Ireland politics modules any more. I haven’t done since about 2006, and that’s because I think there has been a general waning of interest in more recent years, okay. And so I’ve adapted personally, by making Northern Ireland part of a comparative agenda. I teach it as part of (a) a devolution module, and (b) to final year students as part of comparative peace processes, so looking at conflicts and looking at consociations in Bosnia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland. So I don’t think there’s the market [for Northern Ireland] in the last few years that there used to be, I sense a slight waning for dedicated Northern Ireland modules. I wouldn’t want to teach a full, dedicated Northern Ireland module, in a way that I would have done even five years ago (Tonge, 2015).

With regards to the British/Irish labor market, aspiring academics concurred that “when you're looking at jobs [today], you don't see jobs in Irish or U.K. universities advertised for Northern Ireland specialists. You see jobs advertised for people who are interested in conflict resolution or peace study specialists” (Walsh, 2015). In terms of her experience in the academy, McEvoy explained:

We can talk about the extent to which academics want to be associated with the label, ‘Oh, she works on Northern Ireland.’ I had decided or certainly I was of the view that even though I’d done my PhD on Northern Ireland, I did not then want to continue as someone who solely works on Northern Ireland. I was much more an area studies kind of approach. I wanted to be more of a political scientist or social scientist being driven by the conceptual analytical questions where Northern Ireland happens to be a case of something more interesting. So that’s why then when I was at UPENN, and that was what the proposal was to do, was to compare Northern Ireland with other cases of power sharing, which then turned out to be Bosnia and Macedonia. So in that sense that time at UPENN really helped me move on from [Northern Ireland]. I hope it’s reflected in that way, that I’m not somebody who works solely on Northern Ireland. That I do other things and I’m seeking to do other things (McEvoy, 2015).

Collectively then, scholars expressed a desire to affiliate themselves within wider areas of expertise: pointing to both a waning of interest over recent years on Northern
Ireland, as well as the need to remain relevant and impactful within their own discipline. Shirlow elaborated:

[Previously, there was a big interest in Northern Ireland, it was like a laboratory, lots of people did come here and study and you did get these Americans and others who came here for six months. Interviewed a few people and then left and wrote a book about it. I am not criticising that either but there was a lot of people that came here. From what I see you don't get that same volume now, that same intensity of people (Shirlow, 2015).

This was not just an issue in academia, either:

See journalism is not interested in Northern Ireland anymore either, really. There is not much journalism here now. Most of the main papers don't have a journalist in Northern Ireland any more. They might have an Irish journalist but they don't have a Northern Ireland one. Across the board you are not going to build your career studying Northern Ireland are you really? In terms of what you would have done. There is no cache in it, when there once was (Shirlow, 2015).

This is certainly apparent in the BBC. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as Northern Ireland remained the biggest domestic story, the BBC’s presence and operations in Belfast grew steadily. Since the turn of the millennium, its Northern Ireland facility has faced a series of cutbacks: with some £19 million shaved off its budget during the lifespan of the current license fee alone, and more cuts on the horizon (Geoghegan, 2016). Moreover, as the sectarian conflict is no longer the headline-grabbing story it once was – as the paucity of Northern Irish coverage on network news bulletins attests to – the number of BBC journalists has been scaled back: with staff down 22% since 2007, and further job losses likely in the coming years (BBC, 2015; Geoghegan, 2016).

Lord Bew stated bluntly that “it’s over and they’re over, though some of them may not know it yet”: referring to academics he viewed as “clinging” onto the subject and attempting to “milk” the system in terms of funding and research opportunities (Lord Bew, 2015). Bew noted that interest in Northern Ireland has waned: “[Tony] Blair gave 40% of his time to this issue. [David] Cameron, quite right, he doesn’t give 4% of his time” (Lord Bew, 2015). Bew’s position is somewhat extreme one in comparison to that of other academics; who hold that despite the waning of interest, “it isn’t over” (Tonge, 2015).

The consensus is not that there has been a wholesale abandonment of the subject by academics; but that the subject is being placed within a wider comparative and theoretical framework. Kerr, for example, notes that Northern Ireland is “a subject that is not really in a singular discipline either so it’s interdisciplinary and comparative”, and that:
I mean I published a book in 2011 on Northern Ireland but research had started a long time ago. I do intend to write a book about the Thatcher years, in the future, and the Northern Ireland peace process in future history books. I mean those are projects that I will do on top of what my main job is, which is the Middle East. I mean I made a conscious choice 10 years ago to go the Middle East track. I mean I began teaching on the Middle East in 2001. And I mean you have to think strategically about this stuff. Obviously, there is personal interest as well. For example, in 2001, I mean I didn’t know the Middle East was going to be like it is today but yes, I mean it was. I mean obviously Northern Ireland and my PhD was more than just a case study, one of two case studies.

I mean I’m writing about where I’m coming from and I care about it. You can’t separate yourself from where you come from, even with the greatest intellectual endeavour. Yes, I mean I was aware that this is not a career choice. For me, I didn’t see it as a career choice. I mean if you put a gun to my head and said, ‘What would you like to do?’ yes, I’d like to sit in an office in Central London with archival material around me for the next 20 years and write books on Northern Ireland. Well I’m afraid that’s just not realistic, because instead of running a course on political Islam at LSE or at Kings at Master’s level, I’d get maybe three or four students. Teaching [Northern Ireland] comparatively, teaching power sharing arrangements in deeply divided societies in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Bosnia, Lebanon, Iraq, then yes, you get 30 students coming and they are like, ‘Wow, this is interesting’. Some of them are more interested in Northern Ireland, some Lebanon and some Bosnia but looking at it in a comparative framework, yes, I still teach Northern Ireland within a Middle Eastern studies department, by stealth (Kerr, 2015).

Newer academics such as Edwards and McGrattan noted similar experiences: although research and teaching solely focusing on Northern Ireland has waned, the peace process and theoretical debates around it remain relevant for scholars today. Edwards remarked that while he was not an advocate of consociationalism or in agreement with much of the literature:

It has moved on a continuum, so, we’re moving in the conversation from a kind of activist agenda (focused solely on Northern Ireland) towards a more generalized political science. And I think that there has been a popularization of concepts from political science generally in regard to concepts like consociationalism, power sharing, you know, institution building, ethnicity and ethnic politics and understanding the variables that [go into studying things like] political positions, political parties.

I mean, for example, I wrote a PhD on the Northern Ireland Labour Party [insert author], of course I had to look at trade-offs political parties made in order to get elected. Of course I had to look at general things like, you know, my whole thesis was looking at the variables of ethnicity in class and how they interacted. And accounting for the rise and the fall of the political party. So, you know without consociationalism, without its movement in political science the pro of those generic concepts from outside, I could not have
written my PhD in the way that I did. Even though I disagreed with the positions they took on the Northern Ireland Labour Party. Of course, I disagree with Brendan O’Leary and John McGary [on that]…

He went on to acknowledge:

But consociationalism really made it possible for me [and others] after the Good Friday Agreement to conduct our research. Because it has been seriously analyzed and debated. You know, when comparing some other deals to Good Friday and looking at the analyzed Agreement and looking at these kinds of agreements and looking at the idea of institution building, consensus, conflict, cooperation. I think that all of that entirely aided me and assisted me in the writing of my PhD and in subsequent research. I mean I knew how to review articles because of that. Looking at this idea of consociationalism versus social transformationalism and you know, I kind of have friends and colleagues but I was never a militant or ardent activist about any specific paradigm, because, I think that I’m much more pragmatic and for me as a historian you’re identified with someone who is coming from that position and therefore, not that people wouldn’t engage with you, but, they will look seriously at the agenda that you’re trying to push. So, in strict academic terms, that anybody who writes about conflict resolution or transformation must engage with the debates about consociationalism and power sharing absolutely, and no matter what Northern Ireland will always play a part in that (Edwards, 2015).

Reflecting on the current and future state of Northern Ireland, Arthur related:

About 5 years ago I got asked to direct a program called the Mountain of Man program, which was bringing American students over, bringing them here to London and giving them a grounding in the conflict of Northern Ireland and then bringing them over to Northern Ireland, which I’ll do next week, for a few days, and meet the players on the ground. And then we go off to the Middle East. So we use the experience of the Northern Ireland conflict in the Middle East [as a comparative base]. And I remember when we were trying to sell this program, I did scour conferences with a university in the US to gain support and one of them summed up [the state of Northern Ireland] beautifully, they said ‘Y’know for our students, conflict in Northern Ireland is ancient history’. So in that sense you could say its redundant [to study it]. But I think that where Northern Ireland remains important is as a model of the life cycle of conflict.

[For example], Johann Galton speaks of the life cycle [of conflicts] being: diagnoses, prognoses, and therapy. I describe it as analysis, negotiation and implementation. But [maybe] therapy is a much better word. And we’re in the therapeutic stage at the moment. But the fact is, we’ve gone through all three, which makes it a very interesting case study [and it will remain so for some time] (Arthur, 2015).
WHAT HAPPENED?

As the previous chapters explain, knowledge communities do not develop *de novo*, but emerge and evolve from the inertia of existing knowledge. They develop out of a struggle; and through that, must cross over established boundaries into new territories. In the case of Northern Ireland, the emergence of the academic community took place in the context of a heterogeneous political science discipline (which some question the existence of even today), dominated by methods of historicism, ideological divides which in many ways reflected those of the conflict itself, and a paradigm which viewed it as intractable. Yet with the commencement of the peace process and the application of consociationalism, a new paradigm was introduced: which allowed scholars to begin reconciling meanings and enlisting “allies” (Star & Griesemer, 1989), in order to create and establish a new intellectual authority around the subject.

The utility and resilience of a boundary object resides in its ability to maintain communication, interpretation, and (sometimes) utilization between various communities, while minimizing uncertainty: particularly in times of strife and insecurity (Kimble, Grenier, & Goglio-Primard, 2010). In this respect, participants pointed to several obstacles which had faced the discipline since the Agreement. Despite the initial period of euphoria, there was a prolonged period of uncertainty and skepticism with regards to implementing the various phases. This uncertainty existed not only at intellectual level, but at political and social level: Kerr highlighted the difficulties of “selling” the Agreement publicly and politically. McGarry and O’Leary noted that this period both opened up new avenues and opportunities, as well as reviving existing battlegrounds on consociationalism. Moreover, these developments took place within a university culture which was undergoing and continues to experience drastic transformation.

There were also new challenges over the “endless” replication of existing paradigms and research by scholars within the consociationalist camp. This was largely credited to what many referred to as the “marketization” of academic research generally, and the “peace process industry” which emerged following the Agreement, attributed to the neo-liberal policies adopted by British (and subsequently Irish) governments towards higher education.

That said, the uncertainty during the post-Agreement period was different from that pre-peace process, in that scholars were very confident in the “overall trajectory” (O’Leary, 2015), regardless of the challenges which the process encountered. The signing and
implementation of the Agreement was a “vindication” (McGarry, 2015) of consociationalism and consociationalists.

As we have seen, the successful translation of an object rests on the ability of scholars not only to reconcile meanings between disciplines, but to also to develop new findings and enlist allies to create authority over a subject area (Star & Griesemer, 1989). When uncertainties are enough to challenge this authority and question its epistemological relevance, the recruitment of allies and expansion of existing paradigms into different social worlds becomes problematic (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011; Shackley & Wynne, 1996).

Yet the consensus amongst interviewees is that during the post-Agreement period, there was a massive expansion of research agendas and publications which utilize consociationalism and comparative methodologies. Mumford, Kerr, McEvoy and a host of others noted the centrality which these now enjoyed in understanding the process taking place in Northern Ireland, which had begun being applied to other areas outside the Anglo-Irish sphere. Even critics such as Taylor and [redacted] acknowledged the centrality and importance of these debates in expanding the literature on Northern Ireland and understanding other conflicts and peace arrangements around the world.

More latterly, the application of this paradigm has “moved on” (McGarry, O’Leary, 2015) from Northern Ireland and begun being applied, comparatively, to a variety of other places (such as FYR Macedonia, Lebanon, Bosnia, and Iraq); as well as other subject areas, such as terrorism, transitional justice, and mainland British politics. As O’Leary put it, the debates around Northern Ireland could and should be placed and understood within wider discussions regarding the “intricate complexities of the relationships between cultures and institutions” (O’Leary, 2015).

This indicates an ontological development, whereby the appetite for information needs – which hitherto had not existed and then, through the emergence of the peace process, developed in Irish studies – had begun to expand into other fields and be applied to other areas following the Agreement. Interviewees’ widespread acknowledgement of the “peace process industry” and the replication of literature and the application of “the Northern Ireland model” to other conflicts points to the mobility and utility of consociationalism, and the authority with which its architects had come to command within the wider discipline. This is significant: boundary objects have a role in supporting the different forms of coordination found in collaborative and multidisciplinary workings. This can sometimes be one of simple information transfer; but often, as complexity increases, actors need to establish common meanings which can be shared and transferred between varying groups and disciplines.
(Carlile, 2002; Kimble et al., 2010; Leigh Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Greater informational richness must be available to support the process of translation, negotiation and compromise which takes place during this transition.

A boundary object also needs to be flexible enough to allow for what Carlile (2002) termed “pragmatic coordination”: processes involving change or transformation. This coordination is difficult to achieve, as change can be costly to actors with a stake in the established ways of doing things; thus, there is an essentially political nature to these processes, as the positions held by actors can become divergent and contradictory (Carlile, 2004).

This complexity (and utility) is evident not only in the discourse and research concerning Northern Ireland beginning to be situated in wider international frameworks and folded into the now expanding field of conflict studies; but also in a changing university environment, where new pressures on academics for both funding and publications had increased. Interviewees highlighted the impact of neo-liberal education policies on the “marketization” of education, as well as the pressure created by the RAE/REF. Although they provided mixed interpretations of the effects of such variables (some negative, some positive) on scholarship, they collectively acknowledged a narrowing and replication of research and ideas.

However, they also pointed towards the ongoing nature of the process in Northern Ireland. In addition, consociationalism and the comparative method used to analyse and apply this theory now had a trait of immutable mobility: the ability of an idea and its information to be translated and transported across disciplines and fields to a variety of cases (Latour, 1981). The replication and (re)application of the consociational paradigm to various conflicts, and the centrality with which Northern Ireland has come to play in these analyses demonstrates the durability and adaptability of this paradigm: not only in maintaining existing allies in a changing, more competitive environment; but in enlisting new allies as the discipline (and its disciples) seek to align and establish themselves in wider areas of expertise.

With regard to scholars’ claims on the “marketization” of research and potential for “opportunism” and competition, the literature concerning boundary objects and their development within knowledge fields largely view and explain knowledge creators as entrepreneurs and knowledge institutions as enterprises (Star & Griesemer, 1989). This is important in our understanding of the Northern Ireland community; in some ways, actors and institutions choose the environment within which they operate. This is one of the functions of the institution as an enterprise and actor as an entrepreneur (Hughes, 1971Chpt 6; Star &
Griesemer, 1989). In other words, someone inside the institution acts as an entrepreneur (i.e. the academic looking to attract funding, fulfil external and internal institutional requirements and quotas, and maintain relevance within their field); while enterprising actors must choose, within the possible limits, the environment to which the institution will react to these conditions. In many cases, this concerns how and where they will attract funding, address the needs of clientele (students, journals, and research bodies), and the sources which can be drawn from to accomplish these goals (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

Tonge, for example, was “ashamedly… part of the peace process industry”, and had “benefited largely” (Tonge, 2015) from the funding culture – albeit, the lucrative nature of this was somewhat overstated – which had developed around it. Combined with new pressures to attract funding and the utility of Northern Ireland in achieving these goals, and their widespread acknowledgement that the student and publication appetite had waned over the years, academics are thus largely folding the subject and their expertise into wider and comparative discussions on more relevant topics, such as the Middle East (Kerr, 2015). This is also apparent the acknowledgement that the community of academics on Northern Ireland is not, in fact, a single community any longer; but rather, a series of communities, specializing and focusing on their own sub-fields (i.e. terrorism, transitional justice, devolution), dispersed across a variety of disciplines (Sociology, Political Science, History, Philosophy).

Thus in efforts to adapt to the ever-changing “markets” of the university enterprise, knowledge entrepreneurs utilized a boundary object(s) (i.e. consociationalism, the Northern Ireland Peace Process Model, and comparative methodologies), which has the trait of “immutable mobility”; while negating local uncertainties of the often “tribal”96 domains of existing scholarship, avoiding epistemological warfare as a means of incorporating new “allies” within and across the domain, and expanding its clientele, sources of information and opportunities97. Irrespective of this, as and Arthur referred to, that engagement with and understanding of consociationalism (and its debates) and the Northern Ireland process remains (and will continue to be) essential reflects both the entrepreneurialism of scholars within their respective enterprise, and the robustness of the boundary object.

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96 See the previous chapter’s discussions on tribalism in History, Sociology and Philosophy, which continue to exist within the Anglo-Irish Political Science Academies.
97 Power and others point to various areas of specialization: such as Border Security (Cathal McCall), Terrorism (Pete Shirlow & Jonathan Tonge), Transformative Justice & Integration (Rupert Taylor), Community Relations (Maria Power), and Social Identity (Katy Hayward).
This expansion also explains the pervasiveness and continuity of the debates on consociationalism, and why the Northern Ireland model has established itself as a central aspect in conflict analysis. Marginality has been used to refer to persons with membership in more than one social world (for example, historians, sociologists, and philosophers in political science) (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Often, these “marginal individuals” experience tension regarding multiple memberships in terms of both identity and loyalty (i.e. their ideological and biographical identity and adherence – loyalty – towards epistemological doctrines). The strategies employed by marginal people to manage their identities is usually to “stake out” territories, either literal or conceptual, recruit “allies”, then establish institutionalized ways of negotiating and managing intellectual affairs when different social worlds share the same territory; that is, the tribal leaders act as boundary brokers (Kimble et al., 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). In these negotiations between brokers, conflict is inevitable, and paradigms are constantly challenged and refined.

Thus the central cooperative task involves the “translation” of one another’s perspectives to existing allies and potentially new ones, while managing conflicts and avoiding all-out war. The extent to which this succeeds reflects the robustness of the boundary object, its ability to co-exist between and across multiple boundaries and be utilized by a variety of marginal individuals. In the case of Northern Ireland, this is apparent in the epistemological (and ideological) divides which still exist between historicism and comparative methodologies, as well as the criticisms around consociationalism and the ongoing interpretations (debates). Yet despite these tensions and conflicts, analyses of the peace process and the Northern Ireland model have successfully expanded into wider discussions of conflict management by “allies” of initial boundary brokers (i.e. the contemporaries of individuals such as O’Leary), while maintaining relationships and collaborations with scholars who oppose such paradigms.

In such regard, Walsh, Kerr, O’Duffy, Tanname, and McEvoy all noted the influence and impact of O’Leary, McGarry, and comparative methodologies on their work; and how they are utilizing these paradigms in a series of other areas, such as Macedonia and Bosnia (J. McEvoy, 2015; J. McEvoy & O’Leary, 2013); Lebanon and Syria (M. Kerr, 2006, 2013); Iraq and Kurdistan (B. O’Leary, 2009; B. O’Leary et al., 2005); Cyprus (John McGarry & Loizides, 2015; O’Duffy, 2003); and Sri Lanka (O’Duffy, 2003).

Others, from historical and other disciplines, even when fiercely critical of consociationalism (such as John Bew, Power, Taylor, or consider nonetheless acknowledge the influence and impact of this paradigm, as well as the need to engage with such debates
and scholars to develop fundamental and deeper understandings of sociopolitical and historical developments taking place in Northern Ireland and more generally.

Yet irrespective of this, these scholars can still maintain their own intellectual agendas, (critical) positions on the discipline, and new sub-areas of focus which they find relevant. This highlights the capacity of the Agreement and peace process to “[provide] a foundation that they could kind of reconcile themselves to and then build from intellectually” (Anonymous 1, 2015); and “not just pass by each other like ships in the night” (Edwards, 2015). In lieu of which, “the debates have become politer” (Taylor, 2015).

Recall again this research is concerned with how an epistemic community emerges. So far it has displayed a lack of community, the (slow) emergence of the epistemic community, and how it has developed and responded to a shifting and uncertain academic and political environment. This chapter has largely displayed the uncertainty in the initial post-Agreement environment as well as the utility and robustness of consociationalism as an analytical tool for both uniting the community in sometimes contentious disagreement as well as consensus. Through this contention, we have begun to gain insight into the nature of the community as well as the epistemic, personal, professional, and political identity struggles and pitfalls academics. The next chapter looks to delve further into this looking specifically at how scholars define themselves in relation to the community they greatly attached to but see themselves as distant from.
CHAPTER 6

A COMMUNITY THEY’RE ALL APART OF AND APART FROM

INTRODUCTION

The last chapters have largely looked to answer the question of *How an epistemic community emerges*. They focused on explaining how, why, and when this community emerged and outline the struggles and events surrounding and explaining these developments. This chapter focuses on the individuals in the community itself and how they define themselves personally and in relation to the discipline they belong to and its other members. To explain these events the notion of insiders and outsiders, and the utility of the boundary object will be of importance.

It considers the internal dynamics – and tensions – of the epistemic community, and elicits further insights into the state of the “community” around this community. Whereas the last three chapters have been largely focused on addressing the central question of this thesis – *how and why an epistemic community emerges* – this chapter investigates the boundaries of this community, as well as how members determine their (as well as others) position(s) as an insider and outsider.

As this community has emerged within the context of great political, social, institutional, and academic change, there is an inevitable problem of patterned distinctions among social groups and strata in access and claims to types of knowledge. In their most potent form, these claims are put forward as a matter of epistemological principle: namely, that certain individuals have a monopolistic access to particular kinds of knowledge (Foucault, 2001; R. Merton, 1972). The empirical argument usually holds that a group or individual may have a privileged access to the truth, with others able to obtain it but at greater risk (*ibid.*).

THE COMMUNITY THEY’RE ALL IN BUT NOT A PART OF

As highlighted in the previous chapter, many academics, such as John Bew, made it clear that “I don’t want to regard myself as part of an academic community studying Northern Ireland” (J. Bew, 2015). Indeed, most interviewees went to great pains in distancing themselves from
“Northern Ireland specialists”. Hughes reiterated several times that his PhD was in Soviet history; his research interests and publications in Soviet politics and following the fall of the Soviet Union, issues of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe; he did not want to be affiliated with a community of scholars “dominated by unionists” (Hughes, 2016). Lord Bew claimed that he never considered himself part of the Northern Ireland academic community; but was instead a “British historian” (Lord Bew, 2015): a sentiment echoed by Patterson, English, and John Bew, among others. Even the standard bearers of the subject, O’Leary and McGarry, plainly stated that although they considered their work on Northern Ireland as influential, they had largely “moved on” from the discipline and the individuals studying it; and never affiliated themselves with the community, but as comparative political scientists (McGarry, 2015; O’Leary, 2015).

What is interesting in these accounts is not necessarily the desire of academics to separate themselves – voluntarily or involuntarily – from the discipline; or for that matter, cast themselves largely as outsiders, who do not subscribe to the same epistemological, ideological or biographical predispositions as other members of the Northern Ireland political science community. Simultaneously, these scholars went to similar lengths to highlight their unique insider perspectives, experiences and insights regarding the conflict and the study of the peace process. Take, for example, O’Leary’s account:

So, unlike some people who have written extensively on Northern Ireland, I wasn’t born there. I was born in Cork, in the Irish Republic. Both my parents were from that city. But unlike any in Northern Ireland, I experienced ethnic conflict at an early age. So my family was in Nigeria at the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war. Both my parents behaved very honorably during that civil war.

To take my mother first, on one occasion, a young Hausa man came down a dusty road near our bungalow. He was carrying a machete. My sister and I were young. I would have been about 8, she could have been about 7, I can’t be precise. He asked us where Adolfus, the Ebo cook was, and we knew he was up to no good, so we ran into the kitchen screaming, ‘Mommy! Mommy! There was a man with a machete who wants to see Adolfus.’ Adolfus, who’s Ebo. Plainly we knew from our experience that he was Hausa by background. He could have been Fulani, but I think he was Hausa.

He comes in to the kitchen and he indicates to my mother that she should get out of the way. My mother has pushed Adolfus into the pantry and she’s standing in front of it. We cower in her skirt and she refuses to give way. My mother’s eyesight was very poor, she didn’t have her glasses on, but she was adamant that she wasn’t going to make way.

So after a while, he thought better of it and left. My mother was able to call my father. He arrived shortly, at least arrived shortly after that. And my mother couldn’t describe the man because her eyesight was very poor. We
could picture him. We were taken around in Eastland Rivers, to local villagers to identify what today would be called an ethnic clan. It looked as if everything was going to be unsuccessful. We returned home, but my sister spotted him hiding in a ditch. It definitely was him. I don’t forget things like that and we weren’t imagining things. So statements were made to the police and the police held him overnight, but my father told me later he was released because children’s evidence would but be sufficient to convict him.

The following day, my father took Adolfus to the train which took him to Enugu, the Capital of Biafra, which failed to be. My father rescued a whole range of Ebo professionals, including those who were have worked on his laboratory. My father was a geo-chemist and he rescued servants, put them on the train to Enugu.

So I had examples in my own life of honorable combat in the midst of ethnic conflict (O’Leary, 2015).

O’Leary went on to explain that despite not being from Northern Ireland, he already had some unique and direct experiences of sectarianism when moving there:

So my sister and I had the unusual experience of being cultural Catholics from the South being sent to State primary schools, Protestant primary schools, in Northern Ireland. And I remember the first day; a very kindly Mr. Wilson was taking the register and new people who lined up in the queue.

‘So, young man, who are you and where are you from?’

He was taking religious identifications not because there was anything anti-Catholic about this but he needed to know which Protestant sect people belonged to. So that when they did religious instructions, some would be sent into different rooms, but others would participate in the class. So I said, in a very English voice—exactly bought up with English kids in Nigeria, ‘I’m Brendan O’Leary.’ And I turned to my sister and I said, ‘Aren’t you too? I don’t know Mary, but I think we’re Roman Catholics.” You could hear the silence in the class, I was an alien being.

So [after that] I had to fight every boy in the school up to my height and a little bit beyond before I was in the fact, accepted after that initial encounter, almost persecution—difficult to differentiate from the kind of persecution that the new boy experiences anywhere, or the new girl.

But it was plainly emphasized because I had this peculiar combination of a Southern name and an English voice. So from the point of view of the locals, I sounded like a smug, I sounded English; I was superior, culturally to them in my voice, but by name I was a Fenian and a Southern Fenian not even a local Fenian which is where I first learned the word Fenian. We were called Fenians. Now that seemed to be some kind of ugly insect. I was never quite sure what it meant at the time. But to receive political, ethnic or a sectarian abuse in quite an early age, yes, it has an impact on you (O’Leary, 2015).

O’Leary’s story continues with his experiences of leaving Northern Ireland to study at Oxford, then LSE, taking up a position at the latter, and finally moving to the U.S. to teach political science at the University of Pennsylvania (UPenn). He made a point of highlighting
his roles as an advisor to the Labour Party on Northern Ireland; and the UN on divided societies and civil war in Iraq and Kurdistan. Both O’Leary and McGarry consider that their geographical distance and “unique” background gave them “intimate local knowledge that only an anthropologist can quickly replicate”, coupled with “the advantages of being out of it” (O’Leary, 2015). This allowed them to take on “mainstream British” analysis and adopt “greener” interpretations of the conflict (O’Leary, 2015; McGarry 2015).

This storyline of a “unique” or “unusual” experience as both “outsider” and “insider” is echoed in the narratives of various scholars. Mitchell, for example, stated that “I’ve observed sectarianism”; but was somewhat outside the Northern Ireland community, because he was a pure political scientist and not born in the region (Mitchell, 2015). In Hughes’ case, more than his research interests made him see himself as both an outsider to the community, but also someone with unique insider experience and knowledge:

I was born in Belfast, in Andersonstown [which] was one of the most violent parts of Northern Ireland, during the war, and it was also, pretty much, a heartland of support for the provisional IRA. I’m old enough to remember the time when there was no war, and there was no provisional IRA, so I was about, I was still in primary school when the conflict started, so most of my formative years as a teenager, through University, were spent living in West Belfast, in Andersonstown, so I experienced the worst of the insurgency, and the worst of the counter insurgency (Hughes, 2016).

This experience made Hughes feel an outsider within the greater university environment: particularly at Queen’s University Belfast, largely dominated by “unionists and unionist positions” (albeit he also felt this was now changing) (Hughes, 2016). His experience as an outsider continued on arrival at LSE: where he described a process of being “vetted” by his interviewees for his PhD based on his background:

I wrote a letter, and then I was called for an interview, and now this is something which is always kind of interesting, because I mean, I had been travelling back and forth to England, partly because of this girl, and so, at that time, the way that you have this securitization around Muslims now, that was the case for Irish in the ‘70s and ‘80s, right the way through to the Peace Agreement.

So all the ports, airports, were securitized, if you were coming from Ireland, you were stopped, you were searched, and of course, with someone like me, from Andersonstown, I got stopped every time, as soon as they put in your address. If I was a Protestant from County Down somewhere, of course, you get waved through.

But if they check your address, well, I always got stopped and questioned, sometimes held, and delayed, and things like that, so I was running that kind of gauntlet, on a regular basis. And so I was called over for the interview, and I was interviewed by –omitted- and –omitted- and I knew nothing about the
politics of Soviet, the study of Soviet politics, in Britain, to me it was just an interesting puzzle that I had.

And I was good at history, and so forth, so I came over, and I talked to – omitted- in particular, and – omitted- and they both liked it, liked the idea. Now, I knew nothing about them, I knew nothing about LSE, and I knew nothing about Soviet studies in Britain, and the reason I’m saying all of that, is because it was even more, you think that Northern Ireland is a political minefield, well the study of the Soviet Union has a lot to teach ethnic politics in Northern Ireland (laughter).

Because it was totally politicized, and polarized, ideologically, so you had certain universities that were associated with more left wing, or Communist. I mean, in those days, academics would be members of the Communist party, in Britain, not in the United States.

There was an ideological difference in the States too, between what were called the social and revisionist historians, and the more totalitarian school. But here, it really was ideological, during the Cold War, you had Communist versus critics of Communism, and that was, it just completely was like a huge chasm in the study of the Soviet Union.

And I didn’t know anything about this, and LSE of course, was, it turned out, for me, was the kind of, it was like the mother lode of anti-Communism in England. And now, I was kind of fairly left wing then, and but what I wanted to study, was not a left wing driven puzzle, it was actually something that was very critical of Stalinism.

So that’s why – omitted- and – omitted- liked it, and of course Shapiro was still alive then, and they were regarded as pathologically anti-Soviet. So they accepted me, and I came to do a PhD, but I only found out all of this, obviously later. But, what I wanted to say to you was, and this was something that I got, then became a pattern, when you go even from that first interview, and I’m sure – omitted- and probably – omitted- would not object to me saying it, but they did ask me about Northern Ireland, they asked me what my views were, on the situation, and that is something that is a regular feature then, thereafter, academically.

So they basically want to make sure, it’s a bit stupid, because anybody with any sense of course, is not going to say, ‘Well, I support the IRA’, right, anybody with any sense, is going to say, ‘Well, I want a peaceful solution’, blah, blah, blah. So, I always tried to give a fairly nuanced, which is what my position was actually, fairly nuanced reply to that kind of question.

If I had wanted to, if I supported the IRA, I would have joined the IRA, it’s as simple as that; I didn’t join the IRA, the reason I didn’t join the IRA was not because I didn’t agree with all of their aims or objectives, but simply because I didn’t like their methods, but you couldn’t really say even that, at that time. Because the level of hysterical, anti-Irishness in a way, and anti-IRA-ness was huge.

You had to take up a fairly nuanced, well you had to say that you did not support the IRA, that’s one thing, you had to make that clear, and then, you had some latitude to provide some nuance, that you could say this and that (Hughes, 2016).
Hughes’ experience continues in many ways today. He reiterated that he was unique in terms of his experience and analysis of Northern Ireland – being what he described as outside the British mainstream – as the community was dominated by unionists and unionist ideas. He suggested this was probably the basis of many of the attacks and criticism aimed at O’Leary and McGarry, who both challenged dominant unionist paradigms (Hughes, 2016).

Yet similar narratives were expressed among scholars who might be viewed as “unionist leaning”: such as Edwards who candidly discussed his unionist background, regarding all this as making him, too, an outsider of the discipline and the community:

I was born in [redacted] which is the old maternity wing. Born 29th of March 1980. I guess that was in the middle of The Troubles in the midst of it. I come from a [redacted] background. My [redacted] and but, we have been quite, well, a working class area in North Belfast [redacted]. And, it’s near this city center right to the north.

And, I guess that my upbringing really screwed me in Northern Irish politics in the sense that we have quite, we lived with people who were quite strong views and were prepared to kill and die for those views. And, I think that because the area I come from - the people predominantly were semi-skilled or unskilled or skilled laborers. So, they’re working very experienced in various industries right on the [redacted] which were, I guess, a product of the kind of post war peace evident that came gradually slow in Northern Ireland. Large U.S. factories that then set up making everything from cigarettes to components for telephones.

And so, that background solely working class and I suppose Labour oriented and the results also from the 1960s involvement of Parliamentarism in that area as well as people who joined the army and people who joined the police. So [redacted]. But, fiercely working class, I suppose, would be the background and the kind of socio economic decision.

And I lived there all my life until I was 20 years old, and then I left Northern Ireland to come here [redacted]. But before I came here I moved to Derry, Londonderry and worked for Anchor. I always had interest in history. So, Northern Ireland history. Irish history more generally. And, when I went to the [redacted] jumbled forward and back a little bit but, just, to sort of pigeon picture the higher [redacted]. And, so, in the late 1990s, I went to study at the University of Ulster in Curran and because of my upbringing because of politicization that people had gone through and that kind of society in that community, I didn’t really want to study Irish politics in any great depth.

I went to [redacted] – in the North of Northern Ireland – specifically because they offered a broad modern contemporary history course, which is by the international history… [but] I think it was unavoidable for me to become interested in it. There is a lot of conflict in the 1980s and 1990s [in Northern Ireland] and we were more out in the front line of that [where I came from] and so assassination was kind of an everyday occurrence. And, violence and
public disorder was huge absolutely huge, and it wasn’t always directed at the outer community – it was directed inside the community.

So, for example, at the minute I’m writing a book on the Ulster Volunteer Force [UVF] and one of the things I’m looking at is social control within communities and it’s pretty evident from the community I came from. It was the largest housing state in Western Europe at that time, over 10,000 people living in it. It was pretty evident that two factions, paramilitary factions, controlled it – the UVF and the UDA, so that’s the environment that I grew up in.

The kind of ordinary people who were not involved but because of the small community everyone was connected in one-way or another. So, you can’t avoid it and it’s one of the motivating factors is trying to hide and get away from that sort of education process and you know, perhaps even leave Northern Ireland.

But, actually I wasn’t destined for an academic job. I went to a school that was well guarded but not a grammar school not a high school, it was a secondary school and very rural. And, again it was afflicted by the Troubles and it was predominantly Protestant. I went to that school and after many levels I went to one school in Curran.

And then when I was at Curran in my last year, my undergraduate thesis was on the Curran Unionist Party and that was in 2001. And around that time I made contact with Richard English at Queen’s and then Richard recruited me into the MA program. I moved back to Belfast where my parents are from. And, I should say, my father is from Scaldun from Edinburgh my mother is from North Belfast. So, I came back home and then I remained there when I did my Masters and PhD.

My PhD was on Northern Ireland Labour Party. So, again, Northern Ireland Labour Party had quite a strong following and youth following in North Belfast. And that’s why I wanted to study the Northern Ireland Labour Party because I knew the people who were out here that were associated with it [and could offer original insights].

So, for example, I came from an area that is fiercely working class and Unionist and so I would say, Loyalist, but, there remains a Labour tradition there and so I wanted to explore this. So, I looked at the conflict, not just between Protestants and Catholics or Unionists and Nationals but also between people who were Labour and people who were Loyalist. And, that’s something I’m still, I still write about today.

I suppose that’s really where my upbringing directly influenced all of the research that I did subsequently, and, I think that, because of my security forces connection it still influences me today, most of the work that I do would be on security forces connection it still influences me today, most of the work that I do would be on... In fact, I am the only person who has written from that [kind of] background. There are other people who study it but not from the point of view of close orders and wing people personally... So, for example, people who are assisting me with the book at the minute. I’ve known all my life. But, yet, they become respondents so they become interviewees and they become people who feature in one way or another in the book or at least in terms of my research.
So, I’m unique in that respect because people don’t have that connection. They generally don’t have a connection with the communities that they study (Edwards, 2015).

Due to this background and his placement within Sandhurst, Edwards sometimes felt an outsider in the academic community. He noted, understandably, that “because of the nature of my institution”, he would not be invited to certain conferences (not including PSAI), because it could put people in an “awkward situation”. He was often on the outside of the academy in terms of pressure for publications, looking for grants, or the need to collaborate on research (Edwards, 2015). Yet his unique background and connection with the community he grew up in afforded him the ability to do original work and develop insights which other academic analysis lacked. He spoke, for example, of his work on UVF decommissioning:

I see things that are wrong in the community that I come from, and have done [original things in academia] over the years since (because of that). [for example,] I became involved with the Progressive Unionist Party and the UVF, working on decommissioning. Okay, so the first problem in disarmament being organization, reintegration, disarmament. So we worked on that. So I worked with them on that. And I suppose you could say I’m [also] an optimist. I suppose what led me into working and I know several other academic colleagues who have started off there but for me it was always based on being someone who worked on community relations. And we also worked on, which I’ve written about it several times. I’ve carried that forward into academic work so far as -- and some of the -- a couple of journal articles and the chapter I talked about the process with an academic involved in that type of work, which is very dangerous, very risky, and I think no one else was doing it (emphasis added) … So the outcome of that was the UVF decommission in 2008. So I was involved in that process and continued to and offer advice along the way when I’m asked, and that’s totally unique (Edwards, 2015).

Edwards’ narrative also reflects that of Shirlow: who was recently appointed Director and “Tony Blair Chair” of the Institute for Irish Studies at University of Liverpool; and is former Deputy Director of the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at Queen’s University Belfast (2013-2015). Yet in spite of this, Shirlow noted on multiple occasions his feeling and perception of himself as an outsider in relation to the community, as well as his “unique insider position” (Shirlow, 2015). Much like Hughes and Edwards, he was even an outsider to the community in which he was born:

I grew up it was like a working-class Protestant community, there were a couple of things in my life which were slightly different than the people I
grew up with. I went to grammar school and I went to a Quaker grammar school, so I was one of the few working class lads who actually went to the grammar school.

You were in the minority when you went to the grammar school. You were in the minority in your community because you came from a community where nobody went to grammar school, or very few.

That was very influential on me, the Quakers’ ideas of liberalism, tolerance, respect, that did have an impact upon me.

In the sense that obviously the conflict was a plague in all houses. That there was no settled route to the conflict, that there was no perspective which was right. There were these competing ideologies which were being performed through violence and the violence was not justified. The violence certainly was not permitting any sort of transformation in society.

So I would have had a very strong sense of that. The Quakers actually taught us Irish history, warts and all. So there was that kind of interest why I went to university. How many people, irrespective of whether they were Republicans or Unionists, they didn't really know Irish history very well, whereas I had been taught Irish history.

I was taught things like Ulster Unionist conferences were in the 1890s when they used Irish, or I was told about Catholics who were in the British Army. I was told about that sort of really, runny, messy nature of what Irish history was.

Whereas everybody else was probably being taught the Irish out of Britain history or the God Save the Queen and the Empire history. So that was interesting as well.

My father was actually a peculiar man. He wasn't very sectarian amongst his peers, which came from a sort of trade union background. His family had always been known as being not sectarian.

So Shirlow is a very rare name, but when I was young the older men would say to me, ‘Which Shirlow are you? Who is your grandfather?’ I would say, ‘Joe Shirlow’. They would go, ‘The Communists’? So you were understood as different (Shirlow, 2015).

Again paralleling his counterparts, Shirlow went on to discuss how his background and education allowed him to be an insider:

I was employed at Queen’s; my first job was at Manchester as an economic geographer. Then I went back to Queen’s as an economic geographer. That was 1993 when I went back to Queen’s, then the people I used to serve in the bar, the Loyalists, a guy rang me up one day, who is a very senior Loyalist and said, ‘Pete you are an academic aren't you?’ I went, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘Will you help us out with the peace process?’ I went, ‘I am an economic geographer, I don’t have the slightest idea.’

He said, ‘No Pete, you know us, we trust you, you’re different’. So it was actually through that I kind of got involved. Then I went along, so ’94 we had the ceasefires and then after that I was involved behind the scenes talking to people, building up trust, talking about different issues, themes, how the peace process was, how to move it forward.

Then I got a phone call one day, ‘Would you go to the prisons and do this over a year. Talk to all the different groups in the prisons?’ So I did that, and then
when I came out I was involved in different schemes and initiatives behind the scenes…

It was actually that phone call, I had no real desire to get engaged with this at all. It is a peculiar biography (Shirlow, 2015).

This biography gave him a distinct advantage and insight regarding the conflict:

It actually helps in a way, because everyone else had their ideas made up and their theories. Whereas I was coming out doing stuff on the ground, [so my work is reflective of my background and is unique because] it comes from the ground.

It is from the ground, so there are no preconceived [notions] – I was proved right, consociationalism is the model, for example.

What I actually tried to do is report and record what is actually observed. A little bit of theoretical jazzing around it to give it some sort of academic validity. But I am not tied to any model or framework or idea. Consociationalism you get those people who are like, ‘I must defend consociationalism, I must condemn consociation’. Why?…

[Yet] one of the criticisms that Colin Caldry [and myself] made a few years ago, about O'Leary and McGarry's book, *Explaining Northern Ireland* [and consociationalism], they never mentioned class.

I know Colm, who is a mate of mine, wrote that material in Capital & Class and then he repeated it in his book about the sociology of Northern Ireland. Now Colm like me comes from a Protestant working class community. For [people like] us we understood class as the motivating factor, not only for violence, but also the fact that we were treated differently because we were working class, that was a very strong thing.

The Prods that were working class were treated badly. So whenever you had pompous lecturers telling you that there was no discrimination in Northern Ireland when you were sitting in a lecture. I could connect with the guy from West Belfast, because I knew what discrimination was. I knew the guy in the golf club got the job. I knew the son of the Judge that got the job. I knew the person whose dad owned the factory, got the last place in the school and paid fees to get it. I knew all these things.

So I wasn't discriminated against because of my religion, but I was certainly discriminated against because of my class and whilst at grammar school I had been treated differently because I was working class.

These were very strong things for us. So when you were sitting in the class and somebody would say, ‘There was never discrimination in Northern Ireland.’ And you are sitting going, ‘You what?’ So I can sympathise.

The irony of course is the Loyalists are thinking loyalist. Of course they knew there was discrimination in Northern Ireland. They actively said there was discrimination in Northern Ireland. You look at common sense, you look at the UVF publications from the ‘80s, they say, ‘These people have been discriminated against.’

Now the desire for constitutional realignment or constitutional change in Ireland was wrong. But the fact that they had been discriminated against, we understand.

People like me understand that, you know. So there are things like that. So I could bond with somebody from West Belfast then and say, “You hear that
silly old toff, he says there's no such thing as discrimination. We know what discrimination is” (Shirlow, 2015).

Shirlow emphasised his background and experiences several times throughout his narrative, reiterating that:

…You have also got to factor into [this], there are [only a few of] us who are academics now [studying Northern Ireland] that come from working class backgrounds. And there were almost none from working class backgrounds 30 and 40 years ago. There is a difference there [in terms of analysis] … If you went to Queen's University in the '80s they were all chaps, most of them were [posh] chaps [and they didn’t understand or include things like class in their research] …

So I [was and am] different in many respects because I understand the conflict would be about class, I didn't understand the conflict would be about religion [so I’ve always been different] (Shirlow, 2015).

Yet academics like _____ and Shirlow, who come from similar backgrounds and claim to have insider insights - which both perceive as getting to the “truth of the truth” (R. Merton, 1972) - often find their versions of the truth in conflict with one another. For example, Edwards noted his contentious disagreements with individuals like Shirlow regarding their interpretations, analysis, and research on the conflict and peace process; but actually questioned his legitimacy as an “insider”. When _____ was asked about Shirlow’s working class, Protestant background, connection and work with ex-combatants, he simply stated that “he was not like me” (_____ 2015). While Shirlow did not make similar comments regarding _____ he often employed the notion of “we”: underscoring his solidarity with working class unionists and unionist communities, and simultaneously depicting his separation from the rest of the academy.

Evidence of conflict and contention between the two is more explicit in academic disputes: in which Shirlow is accused of “perpetuating terroristic narratives” (_____ & McGrattan, 2011, p. 358); while _____ along with McGrattan’s research is argued to be riddled with “factual inaccuracies, false dichotomies, and tendentious claims” (K. McEvoy & Shirlow, 2013, p. 161). This is a continual theme throughout the narratives: interviewees not only asserted their claims as outsiders, but also question inherited insider insights, findings and/or status of other academics within the community. Yet the elements which constitute an “insider” change according to the narrative concerned.

By way of reminder, Lord Bew asserted that “I was the only one in the game” (Lord Bew, 2015) when challenging claims which O’Leary (as well as others) made of being a part of the actual political process. Academics view their influence and impact on the peace
process and politicians involved as another characteristic which makes them an outsider to the community of scholars and gives them an insider’s edge and credibility in terms of research and analysis: not only on Northern Ireland, but other regions of conflict. This was also consistent with other interviewees’ criticisms of “ivory tower” academics: many, in their view, of those theorizing on Northern Ireland and conflict resolution. Take, for example, McGarry’s experience:

Unlike many other academics that study Northern Ireland I was never interested in academic work that was solely of the theoretical abstract side... the ivory tower. Or however you want to put that. I was only interested in Northern Ireland so far it could make a difference to policy... and have an effect. So, I got involved in minor ways in the debate in Northern Ireland in the policing question, I think in a relatively important way but after 1998, I began to get involved in the sort of practice of conflict resolution by advising government and writing reports for... well public policy reports. In 2008, I was appointed as senior advisor on power-sharing to the mediation support unit of the United Nations and I was the first person appointed to that position. Brendan is the second person appointed to the position. And in that capacity, I worked with the UN on a number of different cases mostly on Cyprus where I’m still working and – but also in other places like Iraq, Yemen, Kenya and different places. And so, I find this hugely interesting and also it’s a two-way street, I find no conflict involved, if you’ll excuse the pun there, between the academic work and the practical work. The one informs the other. Your academic research into these conflicts informs your policy work and your policy experience, your work in the field... it informs your academic research.

So, I find given my type of research that these two go hand-in-hand and they’re hugely interesting and fairly unique. I find that’s been a tremendous privilege to have been able in the last eight or nine years to be exposed to the real world of politics. To be in negotiations and trying to work out compromises between different parties and to come up with approaches and the language etc institutional to science that both sides can accept.

And it’s tremendous – nothing more gratifying than to even see one small change come about as the result of something you did or said or wrote and... I’ve got 12 or 13 books, and written dozens of articles, chapters and things, but you know when I see wording in an agreement that is there because I suggested it... that that means more to me than all the other stuff. Maybe other academics wouldn’t feel that way but I always prefer practical oriented work and it’s worked out for me, I would say that, and it’s wonderful! I hope to continue doing it.

And my role in the political world actually has increased... it’s made me a better academic.

For example, I will just give you one instance, working on power-sharing theory and lot of the debates that goes on is between Liphart on the one-hand and Donald Horowitz on the other. They are different views in that, one of them says that power-sharing coalitions should be restricted to moderate politicians, that’s Horowitz, and Liphart says that coalitions should include everyone, regardless, as far as a democratic gain. So there are radicals, and
that’s fine as long as they accept constitutional politics, so anyway, that’s been a big debate in the discipline and over here in Cyprus the last couple of years, I’ve seen Horowitz’ approach being tried and its falling apart and…it made me think, WOW! That is what’s wrong with that theory. And so I’ve written on this…there is an article coming in it in the International Journal of Constitutional Law this year sometimes. And that’s a way in which being in the field can inform your theory and since, because I saw that approach focus on moderates, it’s pretty plausible that you’d want your coalition limited to moderates. They’re more likely to work with each other...But when I see that kind of approach falling apart, then I cannot only write on it, I can contribute to science here that there are flaws they could think of it, and it allows me say something a bit different. So and that’s up to them what they do with those ideas…but that informs my writing, my research, and my practice (John McGarry, 2015).

Shirlow, Patterson, Arthur, Hayward, Doyle, Tonge, Power and others made similar comments: namely, that their engagement with local communities (often aided by their biographical make-up) as well as politicians greatly assisted their research, separating them from the academic herd (so to speak), giving them unique insights and findings. Patterson and Lord Bew repeatedly noted their engagement with and activism within the civil rights marches of the 1960s and the Workers Party: affording them “unique research opportunities” and insights (Patterson, 2015; Lord Bew, 2015). Bew went on to discuss his work as an advisor to Trimble on the peace process, his position as a life peer in the House of Lords, and even his current position as chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life – the body that advises the U.K. government on ethical matters; all aspects which not only set him apart from other academics on Northern Ireland – “the only one in the game” – but gave him insights into the peace process which other academics could not possibly have because “I was there” (P. Bew, 2015).

Most participants made some reference to their engagement in some form of local activism and political engagement: either with the peace process, community organizations in Northern Ireland, or some form of policy advice at Westminster (i.e. “being there”). These statements were often made as a means of both noting their academic and research stature and legitimizing their insider status: differentiating them from the other scholars and work on Northern Ireland. In other words, in one way or another, this made them “the only one[s] in the game”. Shirlow detailed his work with unionist communities, explaining:

I’m what you could call a political academic. I’m not, I wouldn’t be politically affiliated, but I think probably motivated in terms of an activist agenda. But I know friends of mine who are much more activists than me. They would be, you know, writing about Ireland.
…I’m a public servant. So as a public servant, I serve the public, regardless of whether they want to be in the United Kingdom or not. So, therefore, I’m obligated according to my terms of academia to be – to offer impartial advice, to interact with people on the basis of integrity and trust, and I think that it’s fair to say that if you would ask people who came from a Republican background or Unionist background, they would say that, yes, I am someone, you know, of that persuasion because I have to be, and I think as a citizen but also as a civil servant. And I would see myself much more as a public servant than any of the academics that you talk to.

And, therefore, I see things that are wrong in the community that I come from, and have done over the years since 2002. I became involved with the Progressive Unionist Party and the UVF, working on decommissioning. Okay, so the first problem in disarmament being organization, reintegration, disarmament. So we worked on that. So I worked with them on that. And I suppose you could say I’m an optimist. I suppose what led me into working at INCORE at the University of Ulster, and I know several other academic colleagues who have started off there but for me it was always on the basis of being someone who worked on community relations. And we also worked on this decommissioning project, which I've written about it several times.

I’ve carried that forward into academic work so far as I’ve written a couple of journal articles and a chapter where I talked about the process with an academic involved in that type of work, which is very dangerous, very risky, and I think no one else was doing it. So someone had to do it, and we got some good people together and we pursued that. So the outcome of that was the UVF decommission in 2008. So I was involved in that process and continued and offer advice along the way when I'm asked. And that is simply from the point of that in the United Kingdom there is only one rule of law and there is only one government, and there is only one government that has the legitimate use of armed force at its disposal, and not as an old parliamentary organization in Northern Ireland as part of the U.K.

So my motivating factor I suppose as being an activist is to take that out of the equation, to see how the organization transitions out of violence because it's still there. And the fact that, for me, this is a big part of the problem with academia, in general, they don’t make the connection. They are prepared to invest in building a better society. So, if we go back to the terms – conditions of the Good Friday Agreement – it says something along the lines of decommissioning section that people should use it to move things towards a normalization process. And I think that I'm one of those people. I have taken that seriously.

Now I want to just pause for a moment and talk about the people that are prepared to be contrarian in terms of their approach, Polemical. I mean, they'd be accused of… that I've read recently would suggest that Henry Patterson, for example, is determined to be polemical, even today. But I don’t think that's the case. I think that they're not prepared to buy into the myth. The myth of The Troubles, and that it's simply a conflict. If you ask Republicans, a conflict between Republicans and the oppressed Northern Irish minority, and the Brits, or, you know, it's something else. And then my – and I've had arguments with Republicans that you can't characterize the conflict as just being between one group and another, the Brits oppressing the Catholic
masses, because that's not evidenced by reality. The reality is that there are multiple conflicts. So what I'm saying is by introducing complexity into it, then you're going to be contrarian, because you're not buying into the myth that has grown up and the propaganda and the slogans that have the grown up. And, quite frankly, it’s nonsense because academics need to challenge that and most don’t. And I say academics broadly, relevant scholars on Northern Ireland. I think with scholars and historians, there are conventions that you need to adhere to. Whereas I'm talking specifically about those people here that kind of are at the forefront of policy and academics and where they connect. For the sake of doing it because it had to be done because it hadn’t been done before, because of originality. Because the fact is that we have one way of looking it and I’m one of the few that challenge that (Edwards, 2015).

Shirlow made similar claims in relation to his work on policing reform, community work and programs in unionist areas; as did Kerr regarding his work with Trimble, the UUP and the peace process; and Buchannan on her work on education and development in border counties.

Scholars connected to the subject as well as the area therefore see their relationship to the communities from which they came and their engagement within these as something which not only enhances their research and differentiates them from other academics – rendering them an outsider in terms of challenging existing paradigms or developing “original” or “unique” findings – but also makes them insiders in the sense of holding a specific form of credentialism on the subject. This is centered on early socialization in the culture: which they view as providing them with readier, more inherited access to certain kinds of understanding, individuals, and phenomena within the area or their location to the political class (R. Merton, 1972; Naples, 1996). The insider claims of scholars are based, then, on the understanding that certain types of knowledge and truth regarding specific group life can only be unearthed by those who are directly engaged as members of this group, at least to some degree.

Dixon, however, deviated from this; his position as an outsider centred on challenging what he saw as mainstream insider doctrines, which he regarded as dominated by republican and consociational claims:

From my perspective, the problem with talking about science is it’s got these connotations of objectivity and impartiality. Brendan and John would come much more from that school that sees themselves as impartial objective observers of social reality. That’s a very powerful rhetorical device. Part of my review, I think, of their work was saying, ‘Hang on a minute. Brendan’s an advisor to the Labour Party and it just happens that the Labour Party and Irish nationalism get a pretty free go here. They’re not particularly criticised. How
do we relate these things? Is not the fact that you’ve got a position as advisor to the Labour Party not likely to constrain what you say about Northern Ireland, because, politically, that can be used? ’

By all means let’s debate the strength of arguments, but let’s not pretend that some of us or these guys and the consociationalists happen to be somehow standing outside of the world. Well, no. You live in this world and you’re constructed by it. Is it any surprise? When you look at their work, their argument seems to be, ‘Well, pretty much all academics are either unionists or nationalists,’ apart from them. That’s the ethnic conflict paradigm. We’re all explicable by our ethnicity and you can read off our politics from our ethnicity, except for somehow these consociationalists who - yet, when you hear about what they will say at sometimes academic conferences or privately, it’s quite clear that McGarry and O’Leary, they’re nationalists.

But it suits them better to say, ‘Oh no, we are political scientists and these are impartial accounts,’ because out there in the world people somehow believe that academics are more credible or have credibility because they’re impartial and neutral. Well, yes I think academics should be listened to, but let’s not be naive and think that they don’t have a politics. So like when you were reading some of the stuff and then you’ve spoken to the academic that’s written that, it’s only by understanding where they’re coming from and that their private politics that you’ve got from conversations that you can then re-read their work and see, ‘Oh, actually, now I can see where they’re coming from.’ It seemed to me to be that as well.

I turn up to the Political Studies Association of Ireland and you have a few drinks and you go in the pub and you’re arguing with people over politics. All of a sudden the whole political science bullshit drops and you really see what they really think. But because they want to play this academic game, there’s a certain lingo that they use and certain distance that constrains, or they perceive as constraining what they’re going to say. I don't want to hear someone telling me why republican dissidents are so great in a pub at the PSAI. I want them to write that in a journal article and then I can reply to it. Academics who are re-interpreting the history of Northern Ireland, from a particular political perspective, but if you don't know where they’re coming from and if they’re not explicit about it, you don't get what they’re doing. I think that’s deeply misleading. I would rather people were a lot more upfront (Dixon, 2015).

Dixon differentiates himself: arguing that aside from being one of the few scholars not from Northern Ireland and without family connections there:

I’d say I am more upfront than most people, basically, but how do I explain it? To me it’s really important for academics to reflect and for their position to change. So, the articles on Labour’s Irish policy I wrote over 20 years ago now. I was influenced by some unionist arguments at that point that I now reject. I think were wrong. Although I’m a supporter of the Labour Party and I’m a member of the Labour Party, if the Labour Party is saying something that I think is wrong I’ll say something. I’ll say, ‘I think that’s wrong.’ I think it’s the job of academics to be honest. As much as they can be honest about what they’re saying.
I suppose the most important thing, what I would say about my book on Northern Ireland, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (2001), is in that book, each chapter, at the beginning, I will present you with different perspectives. I will show you how nationalists and unionists, various academics, have portrayed a particular episode in Northern Ireland’s history. At the end of it I will conclude with what I think, but that means that if you disagree with me, you know what a nationalist argument, or a republican argument, or what the other arguments are, and you can actually follow those up. I’ve tried to represent those arguments as reasonably as I can do. Sure, I’m not objective. The words that I choose, the language that I choose, what I cite and choose not to cite, what I’m silent about, what I’m open about, that’s going to influence what I write, but the principle there is that I am saying, “Look, there are different interpretations of this and that part of what we do is a fallible process” (Dixon, 2015).

However, Dixon noted that his status as an outsider and challenging of what he views as mainstream doctrines such as consociationalism has hindered, not enhanced, his position within academia:

> The problem is [for me] that because consociationalism is so powerful, you just have trouble getting published. I’ve had referees who’ve likened me to Ian Paisley and this and that and the other. That’s really how academia works. It’s not very edifying. Fortunately, there are colleagues who will publish me. It gets easier as you get along, but still it can be very difficult to get published. Some journals, Lijphart’s on the editorial board, or McGarry and O’Leary, or the editors, they’re connected. To me that’s kind of how it operates. They will publish each other’s work and they will cite each other [but that excludes me]. I don't want to over-egg it. I do get published, but it is sometimes pretty difficult because of my positions. Often if it’s an academic journal, if you get one bad referee’s report, and if I’m writing about consociation, the chances are they’re going to send it to consociationalists. The chances are they’re going to know who it is. That’s the kind of thing that happens, I’m afraid (Dixon, 2015).

In a different vein, McIntyre, with an insider’s experience and background in the realist sense – as a former member of the IRA – noted that he often felt an outsider to the community *because of being an insider*, as well as the only scholar who was “pro peace but anti the peace process” (McIntyre, 2015). He noted that:

> I’ve always been an outlier in that sense, both by temperament and by political persuasion. But they, see what we have in Northern Ireland, academia to some extent, is an acquiescence, and the intellectual hegemony of Francis Fukuyama, who says that we’re at the end of history. Probably most of them may not’ve even heard of Francis Fukuyama. That’s neither here nor there. It’s his idea. Which is more or less an evolvement of Daniel Bell’s idea in the 1950s, the end of ideology. But in a sense, they, you know, it’s a standard they actually believe it. But they, it’s the position that they tend to have to hold to. Because they hold on to it for fear of worse.
The peace process has become battery but, that, you know. It’s, they don’t even have to call you an enemy of peace any longer. They just call you an enemy of the peace process.

And I have always said that, and one of my reasons for opposing the peace process is that it’s not an indivisible concept. That the peace process carried off with the premise of the provisional IRA, the provisional campaigns.

To strategically use the process beyond the name of peace. So by, my point would be, is that, because of the peace process become like Lord of the Flies (1963), by William Golding, where, whoever grabs the conch is in a position of authority. So everybody has to associate the peace process, and it’s created a big regime prison. Therefore, if you dissent from it, you’re immediately a bastard.

So they always just say, ‘he is an enemy of the peace.’ But the… when I said, well I had a public record, one for an end to all violence. All Republican violence, and have all proportion delivered it. For Republicans, it’s never again to use guns to achieve their goals.

Look at that, I’m still called an enemy of the peace process. But I’m happy to be an enemy of the peace process, providing I’m not an enemy of peace. And, because there is this fear that they do not worship at the altar of the peace process. And somebody else is going to come along with a false god. And it may drop all the people away from God and peace process to worship it, then, there’s some problems.

[For example], there’s a recent article by, it appeared on our blog [the Pensive Quill], about the (Police Service Northern Ireland) PSNI, and it’s funded for publication in academic journal by two senior lecturers at Solon University, it’s a top university, Solon. And they basically argue that the PSNI were not what the PSNI were claiming to be, and that they have fallen far short this time.

Why did that article have to go to my blog, and not an academic journal? [It’s because] that sort of thinking is not encouraged (McIntyre, 2015).

Such has been McIntyre’s experience as an insider and his push against academic insiders and established paradigms, he has become a true outsider:

I can’t get work, so that’s how I, that’s how… I don’t think it’s because I’m a lazy bastard or I can’t deliver. I think there’s so much time, there’s a combination of past record, and prison record. And also, my views. I think that people make, I know I’ve been refused work on that basis, I won an interview panel one time. To do community research. And they discriminated against me, despite me coming first, and other views, on the business of making these remarks so controversial.

And the sad thing is, this comes from a guy who’s gay. He, I mean, he should’ve been defend[ing] fucking controversial views, rather than punish others that were punishing others. But I don’t even …

Well I don’t want to be using that as an excuse. I can’t get work in academia. I mean there’s an old joke of Belfast, I don’t know if you heard it, it’s what sort of something. It’s about a guy, he went in for a job, and, he had a stutter. And he went in for a job, in the BBC. And he was having a drink with a guy before, and he says, ‘I’m going for a-a-a job’.

And the man says, ‘what are you trying to get’?
And he says, “n-n-news repor-por-porter’.
Right. So when the guy got back around [to the pub] he says, “Did you get the job’’?
He says, “N-n-n-no, but we fucking Catho-Catholics didn’t have a chance” (McIntyre, 2015).

**LINKING IT TOGETHER: INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS & BOUNDARIES**

The growth of knowledge hinges on the complex, often turbulent social relations which develop between scholars and/or scientists. Individuals have limited experience of the truth in any society and must therefore trust others for the remainder of it. This relationship of mutual reliance is one of the main functions of any society - but as cleavages exist within groups, this process often becomes problematic. This is further complicated within academia, where there is a tendency towards a particular form of separatism in the intellectual domain that leads to claims to group-based truth: “Insider truths that counter outsider untruths and outsider truths that counter insider untruths” (R. Merton, 1972, p. 11). Among the Northern Ireland epistemic community, interestingly, this separatism is often used to validate the “outsiderness” of insiders and “insiderness” of outsiders. In both cases, these claims are used to elevate and differentiate scholars from others within the community, legitimizing them in so doing.

Lord Bew and his son, John, opened their narratives explicitly stating: “I don’t want to regard myself as part of an academic community studying Northern Ireland” (J. Bew, 2015). McIntyre proclaimed his status as an “outlier” in the sense of being an “enemy of the peace process” (McIntyre, 2015). To a greater or lesser degree, the academics’ narratives overwhelmingly display an express desire to place and position themselves as outsiders to the academy to which they belong. Their narratives are reminiscent of the old Groucho Marx line, “I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member”.

Yet dichotomously, this separatism from the Northern Ireland community is based on claims of early socialization and experience in the various communities and organizations in Northern Ireland. They largely see this affiliation as providing them with readier, more inherent access to certain kinds of understanding, individuals, and phenomena within the area: making them insiders (R. Merton, 1972; Naples, 1996). Academics often noted their location to and relationships with and within the political class, both during and after the Agreement, as a means of highlighting their insider status, while simultaneously confirming their positions as outsiders (being the only one in the game).
Moreover, these insider/outsider disputes were not limited to academics from opposing camps (i.e. individuals from Republican and Unionist backgrounds). To be sure, as anticipated, scholastic separatism based on ideological lines was apparent in individual accounts. For example, Hughes’ outsider position and distance from the discipline was largely because he regarded it as being “dominated by unionists” (Hughes, 2016). Dixon made similar statements on his criticism of consociationalism’s ubiquity within a discipline which he regarded as largely dominated by republican interpretations driven by O’Leary and McGarry (Dixon, 2015). These accounts largely reinforced narratives from, among others, Patterson (2015): who observed that much of the discourse and contention between the community was based on ideological lines. English (2015) and Arthur (2015) also noted that in many ways, the Northern Ireland epistemic community reflected the society it sought to study, particularly in terms of ideological divisions. However, as English and others posited, these ideologies were hardly sectarian; but reflected republicanism with a small “r” and unionism with a little “u” (English, 2015).

Competition existed, with more intensity, between scholars who held claims to “the real truth”; we might say, an authentic insider’s perspective on the communities in which they originated or their role in the peace process. For example, the cleavages highlighted between Shirlow and were largely along the lines of who was the “true” insider, in the sense of having an authentic socialization and background within the working-class unionist society which each sought to study. (2015)’ claims that “[Shirlow] was not like me” indicated that he was the “only one in the game” in terms of true access and insights to forms of knowledge within this community. Shirlow’s narrative expressed again and again the uniqueness of his biographical background; and because of this, his special access to communities: because they trusted him. These narratives counter the societal claims famously made by Max Weber, who noted “one need not be Caesar in order to understand Caesar” (Quoted in: Michels, 2002, p. li).

In any case, as we have seen, English (a small “u” unionist) is best known for his work on IRA terrorism (English, 2003); while Tonge, who acknowledged small “r” republican views, has written on and collaborated with unionist-leaning scholars on the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (Tonge, Braniff, Hennessey, McAuley, & Whiting, 2014), as well as the Orange Order (McAuley, Tonge, & Mycock, 2013). This is also true of scholars with no connection to Ireland or the U.K.: such as German native, Stefan Wolff, who has written extensively on power sharing in Northern Ireland and divided societies generally, and is a former student of O’Leary’s (Cordell & Wolff, 2009; Neuheiser & Wolff, 2002;
Wolff & Yakinthou, 2012). Thus, there is the prospect and acceptance of outsiders achieving creditable insights and establishing truth claims in aspects of historical inquiry, as well as understanding social and political phenomena within the community.

It is important to note, though, that scholars’ relationship to or sense of being Caesar was not just linked to their biography and background; but also, their position, influence and proximity to the political process and political elites around Northern Ireland. Lord Bew’s assertions that “I was there” and was the “only one in the game” aimed to legitimize his scholarship on the peace process, his critique of the community’s analysis of it, and his ability to brand himself as an outsider to that community. Similar sentiments were evoked by Arthur in relation to his work with the UVF leaders; Edwards to his work on decommissioning the UVF; Shirlow to his work with unionist communities and policing reform; O’Leary and McGarry’s work with the Labour party and subsequent work with the UN; Buchannan’s position outside academia and work with community organizations on education and development in border counties; and Power’s community engagement and work with church organizations and clergy.

The connection between these narratives is the scholarly desire to demarcate themselves from the rest of the community as not being an “Ivory Tower” academic. Yet their biography, participation in, and (at times) position within local communities and the political class afford them direct engagement and thus, privileged access to knowledge not availed to others. On the one hand, they see their outsider status and detachment from the “Ivory Tower” as allowing them to be freer, practically and theoretically, to survey and analyse conditions with less prejudice, granting them greater objectivity and ensuring that they are not tied down by habit, piety or (theoretical or epistemological) precedent (Ray, 1991; Simmel & Wolff, 1950). On the other, they affirm and present themselves as insiders: not so much by implying “I am Caesar”; but that because of their insider position, others “don’t know Caesar the way I know Caesar”.

In these respects, the narratives show the degree of academic tribalism noted by Star (2010), who claimed that academics often look for various ways to stake out territories which they can claim as their own and establish themselves as experts within. These domains of expertise, or “intertribal centers” (Star, 2010), often rest along disciplinary and epistemological boundaries, around which the outbreak of conflict and disagreements is inevitable. In each specific domain where academics look to stake out their tribal claims, they often encounter existing or competing tribal leaders who also claim legitimacy: as
underscored by the accounts of Shirlow and Edwards. These claims are often based on competing narratives regarding their access to certain privileged forms of knowledge.

In some ways, this draws parallels to the imagery evoked by McIntyre (2015) in his reference to the characters in William Golding’s *Lord of the Flies* (1963), all of whom are in competition for the “conch”. He who controls the conch controls the tribe (McIntyre, 2015). However, because of the “great sectarian laboratory” (Tonge, 2015) brought about by the peace process and signing of the Agreement, the Northern Ireland epistemic community is not a single tribe but rather, a series of tribes. It is better to look at the academic landscape of Northern Ireland and the conflicts and competition between scholars more in the sense of *Game of Thrones* (GoT) than *Lord of the Flies*.

GoT is set in a world divided into seven kingdoms. Competing elites jockey for control of the various kingdoms and, ultimately, to rule all of them. These kingdoms border one another; the overall land mass is defined by its northern border, divided by a large ice wall which demarcates the kingdoms from external threats. Each kingdom, and the rulers within them, is in a perpetual state of competition with one another over the boundaries of each kingdom and who has legitimacy to the main, dominant throne. Yet amidst this constant conflict, they can still collectively come together to defend against external threats from “beyond the wall”: would compromise all the kingdoms, ending the game completely.

Much like Northern Ireland academics, the competing elites in GoT base their claims to each respective kingdom on biography (being one of the people), as well as their status as an elite and/or their relationship to other elites. These claims are based on the legitimacy of the individual either as a “true” insider – being Caesar – or their involvement with political elites and the governing process in some respect – being close to Caesar – as a means of de-throning the other individual or maintaining their seat on their respective throne. They present their experience, research, and findings as unique in the sense of offering alternative interpretations to the “mainstream” academy and departing from the conventional dogma which, many lament, clouds the objectivity of scholarship: enabling them to truly understand Caesar. Yet despite intra- and inter-tribal conflicts and competing claims to the truth, the scholars all show commitment to the process itself; the analysis of which (although contested at times) in fact expands the base of knowledge.

The functionality of a boundary object is measured to the extent that it can reduce local, or tribal, uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war, then manage these various tribal boundaries when there is territorial overlap in a way that maintains allies and expands the existing base of knowledge (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Moreover, as we have noted,
Northern Ireland’s epistemic community is divided into various concentrations: which focus on unionism, republicanism, power-sharing/consociationalism, transitional justice, and community relations, among others. Academics, then, define themselves not only through their areas of focus, identification with communities, proximity and status to political elites and the political process; but also by their disciplinary affiliation (historian, sociologist, political scientist, etc.).

The Game of Thrones in which scholars compete takes place in the realm of looking to discover and claim reign over the “truth”. As the internal divisions and polarization of society at large stand in the way of realizing this, each respective camp and the individuals within them look for confirmation to affirm their status as both an insider and outsider; which in turn, validates ideas and information pointing to this truth, while discrediting the ideas and information of others. This results in the members of each group scanning, reviewing, and gathering data: to find ammunition with which to wage a campaign against the respective “other”, legitimizing their position as an insider and outsider, as well as claiming access to the truth.

Though this process may play out in contested, often conflicting ways, scholars must maintain interaction and dialogue to keep these debates ongoing; and hence avoid a state of all-out war while expanding the base of knowledge. Furthermore, due to these conflicts, scholars can find, recruit, and maintain allies – individuals they would also regard as true insiders or outsiders – with which they can wage their campaign.

The linking element or boundary which allows these academics to define themselves by, as well as the basis for all scholastic analysis, is the peace process. This is the overwhelming thread throughout this research: the linking element which both institutionalizes the rivalry between differing camps and sub-disciplines and defines the boundaries of such debates as “something all scholars can get behind”.

In this sense, the only true “outsiders” are those against the peace process - as they look to compromise the entirety of the game by not recognizing the legitimacy of the Agreement and the political process which has played out since. This would explain why McIntyre, who admitted he was an “enemy of the peace process” and the only true insider in the sense of being a former active member of the IRA, noted that “I can’t get work” within the academy. Conversely, others, even when criticized as “not being Caesar” or “not understanding Caesar”, are not barred from the study of the peace process or a place within the political science academy. Even if they see themselves as marginalized at times (such as in Dixon’s case), as their analysis and views are within the boundaries of this process, no
matter their differing theoretical and empirical claims, they agree on the relative domain of knowledge.

Such is the complexity of social differentiation in disciplines dealing with zones of conflict, the functional autonomy of science (and individuals within a scientific community) is episodically subject to great stress, given individuals’ various backgrounds, ideological, epistemological, and theoretical commitments (R. Merton, 1972; Michels, 2002). Yet it is precisely this autonomy which enables scholars to transcend these variables in pursuit of truth. As Polanyi (2013) notes, academics, more than most, are “people who have learned to respect the truth”; and because of this “will feel entitled to uphold the truth against the very society which has taught them to respect it. They will indeed demand [and look for] respect for themselves on the grounds of their own respect truth, and this will be accepted, even against their own inclinations, by those who share these basic convictions” (pp. 61-62).

Perhaps this explains why John Bew (2015) noted in closing that the only thing left to be written about Northern Ireland was “the truth”. The peace process is the object which makes the pursuit of this possible.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation has sought to understand exactly how and why an epistemic community emerges. In doing so, it has focused on the puzzle of knowledge; its custodians, creators and carriers, and under what circumstances and how these develop.

We have operated on the premise that scientific communities matter. In the “knowledge economy”, where information is power, the enduring, growing importance of scientific journals, research centres, university departments, peer reviews and conferences all point to the growing influence of science and scientists (See for example: Chomsky, 1997; Drucker, 1993; C. Kerr, 1995, 2001; Washburn, 2005). In Drucker’s post-capitalist knowledge society, knowledge institutions and carriers have become the central wealth creators of the developed world (Drucker, 1993, p. 8): the modern temples where people go to make sense of the world. Knowledge therefore has become an important factor of production; and one of the most valuable assets in society today.

The enhanced utility of knowledge has increased the profile and value of knowledge carriers and communities: bringing into question the ethics, practices, relationships and origins of these communities. In looking at how and why an epistemic community emerges; this research was particularly interested in how. By focusing on this, we could uncover not only the when of this specific community – the time it emerged – but the conditions needed for it to emerge; why it failed to do so previously; how that community has developed, operated, and adapted to changes in its environments.

The aim here is to address several major themes of this dissertation: the first of which discusses findings on how and why this epistemic community emerged. Next, we will discuss the type of community which academics are a part of and, in many ways, see themselves as apart from; as well as what motivates them: the personal, professional and biographical drivers behind their research interests and pursuits. The thesis concludes with some personal reflections on its limitations, challenges, and the direction which future studies might take.
REVIEWING THE THEMES

In looking at how and why an epistemic community emerges, external, structural conditions help explain the failure of the community to emerge previously. These structural barriers include: overt censorship in the Republic of Ireland and U.K.; both in the media and, in Britain’s case, restrictions on funding bodies such as the ESRC investigating anything related to Northern Ireland. The continued outbreaks of violence in an area which is geographically small, within communities that are extremely tight knit, made conducting research difficult: researchers were fearful that their identities and safety might be compromised by dissident groups or state police agencies.

During The Troubles, the main survey research firms “wouldn't touch [Northern Ireland]. You had to use local ones. And they – you go in and ask them questions. Who do you – which party would you support? Asked them questions about attitudes towards political violence, ask them questions about attitudes towards policing. Paramilitaries would wonder who the hell you are” (Tonge, 2015). Then there was the shooting of various academics at Queen’s University Belfast, as well as prejudice towards the subject within the greater political science discipline, a desire to avoid “being labeled Irish” (O’Leary, 2015), and the culture of “paranocracy” (Aughey, 2015) surrounding the subject.

Internal intellectual barriers were also in place. For example, when the conflict was at its worst, from the 1970s through the 1980s, it was marked by stark consensus among political scientists in the U.K. and Ireland. One might even argue that this was why The Troubles were so troublesome: the consensus (both intellectually and politically) was that it was a conflict without a solution. Given the societal and institutional barriers that existed, challenging this consensus was problematic (For example: J. P. Darby, 1976; Lijphart, 1975a; R. Rose, 1971, 1976a; Whyte, 1990).

The boundary of a specific domain, discipline or community constitutes relevant episteme and epistemology. In this sense, a boundary acts as a socio-cultural distinction, which can lead to continuity or discontinuity of action or interaction (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011): it defines what is meaningful as well as what belongs within a discipline. Given the general view held by the British academy that the conflict was a “provincial” (O’Leary, 2015) “sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015); not to mention Northern Ireland being seen, internationally, as the “ugly duckling of regional conflicts” (Cox, 1998), and not even a major conflict in any case, a boundary was thereby established.
The emergence of a community becomes visible when new bases of knowledge begin to appear and challenge existing paradigms and boundaries. Northern Ireland’s absence of such a community is thereby explained by its lack of knowledge infrastructure around the subject: visible in terms of limited research, scholars’ lack of focus on the subject within the U.K. and Ireland, the somewhat parochial, localized view of the conflict, and social and institutional barriers: which made committing to and conducting research both taboo and problematic.

In identifying the development of this knowledge infrastructure, we looked to display the struggles (both internal and external) which scholars faced in building these bridges and roads, as well as denoting when the emergence of this epistemic community took place. That is, we displayed the when of this community – locating its emergence in relative time and space – as well as how this community became one, and the conditions and (boundary) objects which made this possible.

Northern Ireland represents a knowledge community which did not develop de novo, but instead crawled out of the primordial ooze of inertia of existing knowledge. This made the ability to identify specific dates - the when of this epistemic community - problematic. This sub-discipline and the scholars within its greater discipline – political science – were and largely remain at odds over where their work lies. Significantly, many interviewees refuted the “scientific” nature of political research on Northern Ireland over recent decades: focusing on ideology, rather than epistemology. Prominent scholars such as English, Arthur, Lord Bew, Patterson, Aughey; as well as relative newcomers such as John Bew, McGrattan, and did not identify themselves or their scholarship particularly within the field of political science; but saw themselves as historians who happen to reside in politics departments. Moreover, female academics such as Buchannan, Power, and Hayward highlighted a gender element too: they saw themselves and their work as existing more within sociology, anthropology and theology than political science.

In this respect, the Northern Ireland experience highlights the interdisciplinary struggles which heterogeneous disciplines such as political science have undergone in the U.K. and Ireland over the last 30 to 40 years. The narratives recounted its relative infancy in both Ireland and Britain, and difficulties in distinguishing itself from other disciplines with deep roots in the academy, such as history and philosophy. Some continued to question whether it truly exists as a discipline in the U.K. at all. This all constitutes a further internal structural barrier: for some considerable time, Northern Ireland lacked the allies and objects
allowing it to be properly translated by scholars. Instead, study of the conflict sat on the nexus of history, sociology, philosophy and political science.

This was important in explaining the *how*, as translation centres on the ability of scholars to reconcile meanings between disciplines, develop new findings (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and enlist “allies” from various locations and disciplines: creating authority over a specific subject area and reinterpreting information in a way that fits individual goals and aims. The level of uncertainty around Northern Ireland was apparent through the tenacity and perpetuation of the conflict, confirming that it was a “sinkhole of sectarianism” (Patterson, 2015). But this uncertainty also existed because paradigms which might have been used to explain it, such as nationalism and ethnic conflict, were not taken seriously (O’Leary, 2015; Mitchell, 2015). This is certainly confirmed by the literature on nationalism: which prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union was essentially viewed as a phenomenon studied by a handful of isolated scholars in sociology, anthropology and history (See: Hutchinson & Smith, 2002; A. D. Smith, 1998).

Yet paradoxically, this uncertainty helped identify the *when* and *how* of the emergence of the epistemic community. We identified points of emergence through developments within and around the discipline: comprising various stages emerging out of the ooze and developing a knowledge infrastructure.

The first development was the establishment of the PSAI in 1982, and its journal, IPS, in 1984. This was the first real attempt to distinguish Irish political studies from history and other disciplines. The creation of the PSAI and IPS marked a level of modularity regarding the study of Irish politics generally and Northern Ireland specifically: through the sponsoring of conferences and publications in the journal, it created a forum whereby “clusters” of scholars working on the subject could come together, share and refute each other’s work.

This development indicated, at least ontologically, that information needs were emerging: scholars could at least look to begin controlling the nature of commentary and debate. It showed the need for repositories which could act as specific databases or “piles” of research (Star & Griesemer, 1989), which scholars could borrow from. It also enabled the community to begin identifying and locating other members. Moreover, certain media publications such as *Fortnight* acted as an unofficial repository, which allowed debates and discussion on the subject to take place both before and after the founding of IPS. Yet this was
only a beginning; the narratives highlighted that Northern Ireland remained largely outside the “mainstream” of British political science, with its researchers considered an “eccentricity” (English, 2015).

The next major development occurred in 1987, through McGarry and O’Leary’s engagement with consociational theory. O’Leary accepts that he and McGarry “not only applied consociational theory [to Northern Ireland], I think we partially developed it”; because of this, they “transformed the conversation on Northern Ireland” (2015). The individual contributions of these scholars to this theory and its application to Northern Ireland can be traced back to McGarry’s *The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Prospects of Power Sharing in Northern Ireland* (1988), and O’Leary’s *The Limits of Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland* (1989): which brought them to the attention to one another. Henceforth, they began their working relationship. From this point, collaborative efforts began taking place between various academics: leading to the seminal work, *The Future of Northern Ireland* (1990), a collection of essays which began debating the merits and plausibility of consociationalism in Northern Ireland, and looked to challenge prevailing paradigms which had so long viewed it as an insoluble conflict.

This coincided with a variety of other structural factors: including the Single European Act of 1987; changing economic conditions in the Republic of Ireland during the early 1990s; and major changes in the international order, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. All these had knock-on effects. This once provincial conflict was now viewed as a regional one, occurring in the context of various other ethnic conflicts which followed the demise of the USSR. Change was also underway in terms of how nation states should now deal with civil wars and ethnic conflicts; during the Cold War, these states had largely been left to deal with such issues internally (P. C. Stern & Druckman, 2000).

This period also marked the beginnings of the peace process. This helps point towards the *when*: albeit, there were several key dates. These range from the 11 January 1988 meeting between John Hume and Gerry Adams, to the IRA ceasefire on 31 August 1994. The narratives all point to the combination of the peace process, buoyancy of the Irish economy, extra-national developments such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and growing influence of the EU as helping make the study of Ireland and Northern Ireland “doubly cool”; the latter
seemed to be moving towards peace, the former was doing increasingly well economically (English, 2015).

There was an uptick in academic pieces produced on Northern Ireland: notably McGarry and O’Leary’s Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993); and Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (1995), which set the stage for many discussions and debates. There was a parallel increase in the study, significance and intellectual relevance of Northern Ireland to the British and Irish political science academy: with a proliferation in research, attendance and presentations looking to “explain” Northern Ireland at conferences and in the media, with O’Leary, Arthur, and others regularly appearing on and publishing in various media outlets. The consensus here is that both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociational theory created an objective “framework” or “foundation”, which academics could review, debate, and refute. This is how the Northern Ireland epistemic community emerged. Yet these explanations of how fail to adequately explain the why.

In asking why we were especially interested in discovering whether groups of (or individual) academics emerge as a response to political events on the ground; or do they, in fact, shape them? Here, the question of why becomes a little more complicated. On simple observation of Northern Ireland (as well as other areas of protracted conflict), we might argue that the emergence of the epistemic community was purely a result of the peace process and the signing of the Agreement, a response to events rather than a shaping of them. Yet the peace process and 1998 agreement was not Northern Ireland’s first. There had also been a peace process in the 1970s, resulting in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973-4; and the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed in 1985. Both had been the result of British and Irish government initiatives, as well as political developments on the ground. Yet why, considering these events, did the study of Northern Ireland remain an “eccentricity” (English, 2015) in British and Irish political science?

Events such as the breakdown of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and its failure to bring an end to political violence simply reinforced existing paradigms that Northern Ireland was “a sink of sectarian violence” (Patterson, 2015). O’Leary explained how different the Anglo-Irish Agreement and abortive 1970s peace process was compared with what finally resulted in the 1990s; the breakdown of Sunningdale meant political failure (O’Leary, 2015). McIntyre and Arthur highlighted that the 1990s-peace process was different, because none of
its forebears had “delivered Sinn Féin” (McIntyre, 2015). Yet in terms of explaining why this community could form and flourish, this is not sufficient. O’Leary and Aughey both noted that research opportunities had been opened by the Anglo-Irish Agreement; while despite the hopes brought about by the inclusion of Sinn Féin and success of peace processes in South Africa and the Middle East during this time, the prevailing view remained that peace in Northern Ireland was still highly unlikely, if not impossible (Guelke, 1994; Cox, 1996).

In this respect, consociational theory and the application of comparative methods are essential in explaining why an epistemic community emerges. These display the ability of academics to not just respond to events on the ground, in terms of interpretation, but to act as innovators in the sense of utilising theories and methodologies to “change”, “challenge” “move” the discourse and paradigms along in relation to Northern Ireland. This allowed common communication to take place across dispersed academic groups: which had varying, often conflicting, interpretations of what prescriptions and explanations should be utilized. The standardization of the methods utilized in applying consociationalism to Northern Ireland and other conflicts had Latour (1981)’s trait of “immutable mobility”; its ideas and information could be transported and translated between and across various disciplines in ways not availed previously. The debates around consociationalism not only acted as a boundary object which scholars could gather around; but also, had a boundary crossing quality which, in the context of the peace process, opened various new avenues for interpretation and investigation, across disciplines in ways that had not existed previously. They incorporated scholarship, researchers and methods from history, philosophy and sociology. This reflects not only the heterogeneity of the study of ethno/national conflict, but its innovation in translating these concerns and findings across a variety of disciplines and actors.

Here, individual agency was vital. Interviewees overwhelmingly highlighted the personal contributions made by O’Leary and McGarry as explaining why the community not only emerged but remained. Even those who were quite critical of the pair and their application of the theory noted their vital contribution to the discipline and development of the community. Lord Bew, Patterson, and Arthur credited both with keeping the theory alive: acknowledging the huge contribution of the consociational model. Tonge, Mitchell, English, Doyle, O’Dochartaigh, and Shirlow all pointed to the importance and influence of O’Leary and McGarry in bringing “a forensic political science analysis” to a subject hitherto
dominated by historians (Tonge, 2015). They were innovators to the discipline. Academics who began or finished their PhDs at various points in the 1990s all referenced O’Leary and McGarry’s work – such as The Future of Northern Ireland (1990) and Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) - as major influences on their research; while others, such as Brendan O’Duffy and Etain Tannam, who took their doctorates at LSE during the early 1990s, explained that O’Leary’s methodological approach had brought them there.

McGarry and O’Leary acknowledged their contribution: “I don’t want to say that we [started] a major intellectual revolution, but we did help transform the conversation on Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015). This process began when McGarry published his first piece on Northern Ireland, The Anglo-Irish Agreement and The Prospects for Power Sharing in Northern Ireland (1988), and was contacted by O’Leary. Their interaction led to the publication of The Future of Northern Ireland (1990a), which brought together “about 12 people who were engaged in different ways of finding a way out of the Northern Ireland conflict… Paul Bew and Henry Patterson were involved in that and I believe Anthony Kenny who was at Oxford, people from Dublin such as Anthony Coughlan” (McGarry, 2015). Although these academics had very different views on the conflict’s origins, they now began to interact more closely, and debates around potential solutions began to emerge.

When the community started to take shape, in many ways, it reflected the society under study. Debates quickly became heated and, at times, seemed more personal than empirical: with anti-consociationalism becoming a “staple of the political diet of Northern Ireland” (O’Leary, 2015); and McGarry and O’Leary taking on a series of challenges from those inside and outside the academic community.

This was perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the narratives: specifically, that however vitriolic and ideological the debates could sometimes be, they were not drawn along or attributable to sectarian lines. Interviewees made clear that where they stood and the issues they researched was in many ways informed by their personal sociologies, with several acknowledging the little “u” and small “r” of their alignment with unionist and republican perspectives. Yet all displayed the capacity to engage with those who adopted alternative interpretations and political alignments, in terms of both collaborative research and supervision. Even though some were not convinced of the ability or necessity of academics to divorce themselves, either partially or entirely, from their personal history and bias, the overwhelming evidence is that personal biography did not handicap debate on Northern
Ireland. Mainstays like O’Leary made clear the importance of normative arguments: “Explanations and prescriptions are linked”, as you can “explain how something works but not approve of it” (O’Leary, 2015).

Certainly, the failure of this community to emerge during The Troubles highlights the extent to which actors are able to fully engage their culture in an active manner; if opportunities for engagement arise, they cannot avoid responding to the historical, disciplinary contexts in which they find themselves (William T Lynch & Fuhrman, 1991). Both The Troubles and the state, cultural and academic sanctions in place during this time clearly affected what academics “freely decided” to engage with. This also debunks assumptions that academics can easily decide what their interests are and successfully pursue them. If anything, the Northern Ireland experience shows that social and historical contradictions hid individuals’ true interests and/or subverted their conscious intentions to pursue them. In this respect, Northern Ireland is likely to be no different from other areas of long protracted conflict during this time such as South Africa, Sri Lanka, or Bosnia where the outbreaks of violence and civil unrest as well as the international order created complications for researchers and academics in the regions. This is a point that we hope future research and researchers will take up and analyse.

Nonetheless, the accounts and controversies that emerged over consociationalism reflect what Star (2010) notes: the utility and robustness of a boundary object is often tested by how it is managed in the negotiation of translations across various social worlds or disciplines at times of uncertainty. As academics are somewhat tribal, in the sense that they often stake out territories which they claim as their own and establish themselves as experts within these domains, conflict and disagreement within and across disciplines is inevitable: very often, these tribal leaders fear dethronement. Thus the functionality of a boundary object is to reduce local or tribal uncertainty enough to avoid a state of all-out war; and when there is territorial overlap, manage these boundaries in a way that maintain allies and expands the existing knowledge base (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

Both the peace process and McGarry and O’Leary’s application of consociational theory served this purpose. It allowed these scholars to establish themselves as experts on the application of the theory and use of comparative method; but also to include and navigate, sometime tenuously, the tendency towards tribal conflicts, garnering “allies” from other disciplines and even those from differing tribal camps, who proposed alternative paradigms
and solutions. This is perhaps best reflected by Taylor and McGarry: who noted that precisely because of the disagreements around consociationalism, they could collaborate with various scholars from differing disciplines, via different methods, expanding the knowledge base in so doing. Specifically, they pointed towards the publication of *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict* (2009), where the debates were explained and expanded upon by various pro and anti-consocationalists. Thus the framework acted in what Hughes (1971) refers to as an “inter-tribal centre”, which could manage and house the various territorial collisions within a disciplinary space of sovereignty.

This is significant in displaying why the why matters as means of explaining how the development of a knowledge infrastructure and structures was successful. Star & Greisemer (1989)’s utilization of the boundary object concept emerged out of the historical and institutional developments of natural history research museums: which marked a new stage in the professionalization of natural history, as well as the changing relationship between its various scientists and researchers. These institutions developed largely out of displays of wealth and developments in popular culture which prompted interest in viewing such displays, creating increased demand for these museums. As these institutions were established by various wealthy collectors, who contributed substantially to their funding and operation, increased demand for scientific cooperation emerged out of individuals “doing things together” (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

This very much mirrors the “buzz” which scholars of Northern Ireland highlighted: it rose in status from “local” and “provincial” conflict to a regional one. It garnered international attention and financial backing through various initiatives from the E.U., U.K., and Ireland; to say nothing of Atlantic philanthropy, given the subsequent involvement of the U.S. in the peace process. This followed the same popular culture trend described by Star & Griesemer (1989): it mainstreamed the study of ethno/national conflict and civil war in British and Irish academia, while placing Northern Ireland within the context of greater post-Cold War peace building and democratization strategies: transforming it into a “cool” and “sexy” subject.

These developments generated huge demand for new research: with large sums of money made available to community councils and research institutes; many more funding opportunities; and much greater student appetite and coverage of events such as the peace process in various media outlets. This demonstrates that knowledge productions are not
completely detached from social interests; they are made possible by individual interests - but individuals, again, do not always have agency or awareness in creating or identifying what these interests are. Knowledge production and communities develop out of a series of struggles; part of this involves developing ways of crossing over established boundaries into new territories and determining what their interests are. The onset of the peace process and application of consociationalism introduced new paradigms, allowing scholars to begin reconciling meanings and enlisting “allies” (Star & Griesemer, 1989): establishing a new intellectual authority around the subject and branching into new territories. This made the development of such knowledge infrastructures possible.

However, even following the Agreement, scholars still faced a series of obstacles. Despite the immediate euphoria which followed its signing in 1998, there was a prolonged period of uncertainty and scepticism regarding the implementation of its various phases. This uncertainty existed at intellectual, political and social level; Kerr reflected on the difficulties of “selling” the Agreement publicly and politically. As McGarry and O’Leary noted, this period revived existing battlegrounds around consociationalism, as well as opening new avenues and opportunities for research; and took place within a university culture undergoing dramatic transformation.

There were challenges regarding the “endless” replication of existing paradigms and research by scholars in the consociationalist camp. This was largely credited to what many referred to as the “marketization” of academic research and the “peace process industry” which had emerged following the Agreement, attributed to the neo-liberal policies adopted by British (and subsequently Irish) governments towards higher education.

Evidence of this can be seen in the wide consensus among interviewees: during the post-Agreement period, there was a massive expansion of research agendas and publications utilizing consociationalism as well as comparative methodologies. Rising academics such as Kerr and McEvoy highlighted its centrality in understanding what was taking place in Northern Ireland; and it had also begun to be applied to areas outside the Anglo-Irish sphere. Even critics accepted the importance of these debates in explaining the why of the expanding literature on Northern Ireland; understanding and analysing other conflicts and peace arrangements in, for example, FYR Macedonia, Lebanon, Bosnia, and Iraq; as well as other subject areas, such as terrorism, transitional justice, and mainland British politics.

All of this points to the mobility, utility, and innovation of consociationalism, and the authority which its architects had come to command within the wider discipline. Northern
Ireland’s post-Agreement innovation and utility is therefore evident in its capacity to be placed within wider international frameworks and folded into the now expanding field of conflict studies in a changing university environment, where new pressures and pushes on academics for both funding and publications had increased. It further shows that consociationalism and the comparative method had the trait of immutable mobility: the ability of an idea and its information to be translated and transported across disciplines and fields to a variety of cases (Latour, 1981). The replication and (re)application of consociationalism to various conflicts outside the Northern Irish context, and the centrality which Northern Ireland has come to play in these analyses, demonstrates the durability and adaptability of this paradigm: not only in maintaining existing allies, but enlisting new ones.

It is also important to note scholars’ claims regarding the “marketization” of research, potential for “opportunism”, competition amongst and between the community. The literature concerning boundary objects and their development within knowledge fields largely views and explains knowledge creators as entrepreneurs, and knowledge institutions as enterprises (Star & Griesemer, 1989). This is important to our understanding of the why of the Northern Ireland community: in some cases, actors and institutions choose the environment in which they operate. This is among the functions of the institution as an enterprise and actor as an entrepreneur (Hughes, 1971Chpt 6; Star & Griesemer, 1989). In other words, someone inside the institution acts as an entrepreneur (i.e. the academic looking to attract funding, fulfil external and internal institutional requirements and quotas, and maintain relevance within their field); while enterprising actors must choose, within the possible limits, the environment to which the institution will react. This encompasses how and where it will attract funding, the needs of its clientele (students, journals, and research bodies), and the sources it can draw from (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

Northern Ireland’s epistemic community, though, is not a single, standalone one; but rather, a series of communities, each specializing and focusing on its own sub-fields (i.e. terrorism, transitional justice, devolution), dispersed across a variety of disciplines (i.e. Sociology, Political Science, History, Philosophy). This was explained through actors’ ability to adapt to the changing “markets” of the university enterprise. Northern Ireland academics therefore act(ed) as knowledge entrepreneurs utilizing a boundary object(s) (consociationalism, the Northern Ireland Peace Process Model, and comparative methodologies): which had the trait of “immutable mobility”, as well as the capability to negate local, “tribal” uncertainties of existing scholarship. This allowed them to avoid
epistemological warfare, incorporate new “allies” within and across the domain, expand their clientele, sources of information and opportunities.

Regardless, that engagement with and understanding of consociationalism (and its debates) and the Northern Ireland process remained (and will continue to remain) essential reflects the entrepreneurialism and innovativeness of scholars, and the robustness of the boundary object. This helps explain the pervasiveness and continuity of the debates on consociationalism, and why the Northern Ireland model has established itself as a central part of conflict analysis.

A purely structural understanding of why knowledge communities emerge miscalculates the extent to which ideas produced within a society uniformly support the ruling class. Marx (1975) posited that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (p.59). In other words, the class which has the ruling material force of society is, at the same time, its ruling intellectual force. Yet Northern Ireland shows that ideas produced to support one set of interests can also be used to support, and even be opposed to, another set. Our analysis reveals that members of its epistemic community are not fully detached from social interests and forces, nor is their research completely shaped by these interests. This shows that actors often lack agency in creating opportunities within a structure; but once these are created, they can exert agency over how these are utilized and navigated. But what kind of community is this; and what motivates its members?

If academics act as entrepreneurs and universities as enterprises, does this mean that this community and its members can be reduced to a group(s) of opportunists motivated by power, profit and prestige? To this, the answer is a resounding “no”.

The narratives overwhelmingly indicate that financial incentives and calculations were marginal in research calculations. True, attracting and obtaining funding was an essential part of the research process, and a consequence of the neoliberal reforms in higher education, but “nobody was getting rich studying Northern Ireland” (Anonymous 1, 2015). Even at the height of the peace process, when many claimed the discipline was being “lavished with cash” (Anonymous 2, 2015), funding proposals continued to be met with high rates of rejection and, even when successful, the rewards were often small in comparison to other scientific disciplines.

This is consistent with empirical findings across all social science domains. As a current example, of the £4.8 billion which the U.K. government budgeted for 2016/17 science and research funding, only £155 million (3%) was allocated to the entirety of the social sciences and humanities (Government, 2016). If this provides evidence of anything, it is the
sardonic statement that “the reason the infighting in political science is so fierce is that the stakes are so small” (Banks, Gruberg, & Kaufman, 1977, p. 511).

“Marginality” refers to those with membership of more than one social world (for example, historians, sociologists and philosophers in Political Science) (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Often, these “marginal individuals” experience tension in terms of both identity and loyalty (i.e. scholars’ ideological and biographical identity and adherence – loyalty – towards epistemological doctrines). The strategies employed by marginal people to manage their identities are usually to “stake out” territories, either literal or conceptual; recruit “allies”; then establish institutionalized ways of negotiating and managing intellectual affairs when different social worlds share the same territory: in other words, tribal leaders act as boundary brokers (Kimble et al., 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989).

In these negotiations between brokers, conflict is inevitable, and paradigms are constantly challenged and refined. Thus, the central cooperative task of marginal individuals is the “translation” of one another’s perspectives to existing allies and potential new ones, while managing conflict and avoiding all-out war. The extent to which this is successful reflects the robustness of the boundary object, its ability to co-exist between and across multiple boundaries, and be utilized by a variety of marginal individuals.

In the case of Northern Ireland, this is apparent in the epistemological (and ideological) divides which still exist between historical approaches and comparative methodologies, as well as the criticisms around consociationalism and its ongoing interpretations (debates). Yet despite these tensions and conflicts, analysis of the peace process and Northern Ireland model has successfully expanded into wider discussions of conflict management by “allies” of initial boundary brokers (i.e. the contemporaries of individuals such as O’Leary), while maintaining relationships and collaborations with scholars who oppose these paradigms. There is an overarching commitment and dedication amongst and between the community’s members to understanding and discovering the “truth” of the peace process in Northern Ireland and the theories and conditions (consociational or not) which make peace possible (inside and outside Northern Ireland).

Scholars have limited experience of the “truth” in any society, and must therefore trust and enrol the help of others for the remainder of it. This relationship of mutual reliance is a main function of any society; but as cleavages exist within groups, this process often becomes problematic. This is further complicated in academia: where there is a tendency towards a particular form of separatism, which leads to claims of group-based truth: “Insider
truths that counter outsider untruths and outsider truths that counter insider untruths” (R. Merton, 1972, p. 11).

Yet this research shows that among the Northern Ireland epistemic community, this separatism is used to validate the “outsiderness” of insiders and “insiderness” of outsiders. It reveals, to a greater or lesser degree, scholars’ desire to position themselves as outsiders to the academy to which they belong, to preserve their integrity and proximity with the truth. Academics’ affiliation with this community are reminiscent of the old Groucho Marx line: “I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member”. Yet dichotomously, their separatism from the Northern Ireland community is itself based on claims of early socialization and experience in the various communities and organizations in Northern Ireland. They view this affiliation as providing them with readier, more inherent access to certain kinds of understanding, individuals, and phenomena: making them insiders (R. Merton, 1972; Naples, 1996).

In such regard, interviewees often noted their location to and relationships with and within the political class both during and after the Agreement: a means of demonstrating their insider status, while simultaneously insisting upon their position as an outsider to the community (i.e. “the only one in the game”). Interestingly, these insider/outsider disputes were not limited to academics from opposing camps (i.e. individuals from republican and unionist backgrounds). Instead, much of this separatism was based on ideological (with a small “i”) lines. Hughes (2016)’ outsider’s position and distance from the discipline was largely because he regarded it as being “dominated by unionists” (2016). Similar convictions were held by Dixon (2015): whose criticisms of consocationalism’s ubiquity linked with what he perceived as the domination of republican interpretations driven by O’Leary and McGarry. This lends credence to the idea that the Northern Ireland epistemic community largely reflected the society it sought to study, particularly in terms of ideological divisions.

However, that ideological divisions did not inhibit scholastic collaboration, nor did they completely shape academic behaviour and dictate research, sheds some light on the nature of this community and its members. Scholars’ personal and professional identities were greatly mediated through their academic training, engagement with other scholars and within various institutions. This vindicates the argument that individuals are not cultural zombies who mindlessly act out the cultural/social scripts in the storying of their lives; but adapt to, resist, and selectively appropriate various happenings at different stages in their development, including how they define themselves in relation to these people and events. This is true of both ideology and epistemology. Contemporaries and understudies (what we
might call allies) of O’Leary and McGarry made it clear that they were not “cheerleaders” (Tonge, 2015) of either consociationalism or its founders; but found utility in their comparative model and the “truths” brought about by utilising it. Moreover, even major critics recognized the major contribution of the pair in “changing the conversation” on Northern Ireland, garnering a deeper understanding of the peace process and its application to other areas of conflict.

In fact, much more competition existed between scholars who held claims to “the truth” in terms of the communities they originated from or their role in the peace process. The cleavages highlighted between Shirlow and [name], for example, were largely along the lines of who was the “true” insider, in the sense of an authentic socialization and background within working class unionist society. [name] (2015)’ insistence that Shirlow “was not like me” was intended to reiterate that he was the “only one in the game” in terms of true access and insights to forms of knowledge within this community. Shirlow’s narrative expressed again and again the uniqueness of his biographical background; and hence, his special access to communities, because they trusted him.

These narratives counter Max Weber’s famous claim that “one need not be Caesar in order to understand Caesar” (Quoted in: Michels, 2002, p. li). Yet they also display the acceptance and prospect of outsiders (such as Rose or Wolff) obtaining creditable insights and establishing truth claims in historical inquiry, social and political phenomena. Furthermore, Lord Bew’s supervision of Anthony McIntyre’s PhD, former IRA member and ardent critic of the peace process; and O’Leary’s supervision of UUP member and former Trimble staffer, Michael Kerr, are highly indicative of the tolerance and inclusion of wildly differing viewpoints and individuals.

What we identified as the sense of “being Caesar” was therefore not only linked to personal biographies – having come from or having relationships to the communities in Northern Ireland – but emanated from participants’ position, influence and proximity to the political process and elites. Lord Bew’s assertions that “I was there” and the “only one in the game” sought to legitimize his scholarship on the Northern Ireland peace process, critique of the community’s analysis of it, and branding of himself as an outsider. Similar sentiments were invoked by Arthur in relation to his work with UVF leaders; [name] to his work on decommissioning with the UVF; Shirlow to his work with unionist communities and on policing reform; O’Leary and McGarry’s work with the Labour Party and UN; Buchannan’s position outside academia and work with community organizations on education and
development in border counties; and Power’s community engagement and work with church organizations and clergy.

The link between these narratives is the desire of academics to demarcate themselves from the remainder of the community: they do not want to be known as one of those “Ivory Tower” academics. Yet paradoxically, their biography, participation in, and (at times) position within local communities and the political class affords them direct engagement and thus, privileged access to knowledge not availed to others. On the one hand, our interviewees view their outsider status and detachment from the “Ivory Tower” as allowing them to be freer, practically and theoretically; survey and analyse conditions with less prejudice; and enabling them to have greater levels of objectivity, not tied down by habit, piety or (theoretical or epistemological) precedent (Ray, 1991; Simmel & Wolff, 1950). In this sense, academics perceive that the further away from the “Ivory Tower” they are, the closer they are to the truth. Yet on the other, they affirm and present themselves as insiders: not so much by implying “I am Caesar”; but instead, because of their insider position, that others “don’t know Caesar the way I know Caesar”.

This tribalism reflects a Game of Thrones scenario. Competing academics base their claims to each respective “kingdom” on biography (i.e. being one of the people), their status as an elite and/or their relationship to other elites. This is based on the legitimacy of the individual, either as a “true” insider – being Caesar – or their involvement with political elites and the governing process in some respect – being close to Caesar – as a means of dethroning the rival individual or maintaining their seat on their respective throne. They present their experience, research, and findings as unique: offering alternative interpretations to the “mainstream” academy and departing from the conventional dogma which, many lament, clouds the objectivity of scholarship - thereby enabling them to truly understand Caesar. Yet despite intra and inter-tribal conflicts and competing claims to the truth, all our scholars demonstrate a commitment to the process itself; the analysis of which (although contested at times) is successfully expanding the knowledge base.

This Game of Thrones in which academics compete supersedes their efforts to discover the “truth”. As the internal divisions and polarization of society stand in the way of realizing this, each respective camp and the individuals within them seek confirmation: affirming their status as both insider and outsider; validating ideas and information pointing to this truth; and discrediting the ideas and information of others. This results in the members of each group scanning, reviewing and gathering data, to find ammunition for a campaign against the respective “other”. Shirlow’s observation that “academics love to argue” holds
credence. Yet while this process may play out in a contested, often conflicting way, scholars maintain enough interaction and dialogue to keep these debates going: avoiding a state of all-out war and expanding the knowledge base. The ability to and love of argument is a way through which academics can come together.

The linking element or boundary which allows these scholars to define themselves and provides the basis for all analysis (and arguments) is the peace process. This institutionalizes rivalry between differing camps and sub-disciplines; links scholars’ commitment to peace in Northern Ireland and its maintenance; defines the boundaries of such debates, and prevents them from deteriorating into all-out warfare. It is, in other words, “something all scholars can get behind”.

**REFLECTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS**

This dissertation has been concerned with an epistemic community, which developed out of a conflict; or to put it more accurately, out of a peace process seeking to respond to a conflict. This community largely reflects the society it endeavours to understand; and like those touched by The Troubles, has struggled to adapt and come to terms with a changing environment and landscape.

In reflecting on the outcomes of this research and its findings, it is apparent that communities are complex, develop slowly, and the relationships between members have the potential to be contentious, competitive, collaborative and cooperative. Like all relationships, those between academics are defined and shaped by a complex, at times confusing, combination of biography, sociology, location and situation. These communities not only develop out of, alongside, or within institutions; but shape their institutions: shifting often unknowingly between the roles of pilot and passenger.

This was the major challenge which became apparent in the method, navigation and articulation of this research: how to account for and be sensitive to such a complex pattern of variables. Looking back over this thesis, the choice of narrative stories certainly helped navigate a path which was constantly shifting underneath us. This was apparent during the initial approach of scholars: it quickly became clear that, like all individuals, they are complicated, with diverse, at times contradictory experiences, beliefs, and ideas. Academics are often sensitive and tend to be reactive (allergically so) to personal reflexivity regarding
their own lives and especially, their own work; yet the amount of resistance and reluctance which this research met with still came as something of a surprise.

Having said this, it was clear that much of this resistance and reluctance was because of how close many of the academics were to the region they studied (both biographically and geographically). Many of them bear the scars of having lived through the Troubles; some losing friends, family members, and colleagues. It was moving and, at times, heart breaking to hear some of these accounts. It was clear that, to at least some extent, these experiences shaped many of their lives and the direction of their research. However, I never stopped being impressed by these individuals’ ability to hold themselves (and others) accountable for their biases. It was on these points that individuals’ professionalism and academic training was really on display. Most were keenly aware of their biases and able to acknowledge and account for them in the interviews and after. One account with Henry Patterson stands out. Though hyper critical (and outspoken) about Brendan O’Leary in his interview: Patterson, following his interview, emailed me to thank me for our discussion and acknowledged that he may have been overly critical of O’Leary. In this exchange, he acknowledged his contribution to the discipline but noted that “I liked him better when he was a Marxist historian” (Patterson, 2015). This showed me that though scholars disagree there is a level of professional respect they hold for one another. Though at times they sometimes cross these lines. Academics are passionate people. One must be if they are to dedicate large portions of their professions and life to writing and researching on one subject or area. I have learned this first hand over the past four years. Looking back, much of the resistance from scholars in participating in this research was based on their concerns that speaking frankly about these issues might disrupt or break with this professionalism.

The sample number of respondents was more than adequate to identify themes among the narratives, the point of emergence of this community, the problems it had faced in (and before) its emergence, and how it had evolved and adapted to a changing environment. However, this sample could have benefited from more of a female presence, as well as a larger proportion of pioneering scholars.

As noted above, many academics, particularly female and more senior ones, were adamantly opposed to (if not clearly offended by the prospect of) participating. They were resistant at best to what might involve personal commentary or opinions on other academics or themselves; or even downright annoyed at the prospect of being affiliated with the
Northern Ireland epistemic community, or political science discipline. In some cases, the reassurances of confidentiality, anonymity, and agency – in terms of editing texts – insisted upon proved painstaking indeed. This was particularly true of female scholars: who either refused to participate or were legitimately fearful that their identities might be compromised.

These all comprised substantial obstacles. This means there is only limited insight on what this community can tell us about the role (or lack thereof) of women in the emergence and evolution of the Northern Ireland epistemic community; and their role and representation in political science in the U.K. and Ireland generally. We must therefore acknowledge the lack of a feminist critique within this research. Our hope is that further works will delve deeper into these issues, investigating questions such as: what role do women play in the emergence of an epistemic community? How have feminist scholars shaped the evolution of the political science discipline in the U.K. and Ireland? And to what extent does the dominance of patriarchal-oriented interpretation and analysis of Northern Ireland contribute to the perpetuation of conflict within the discipline? This would help provide greater nuance on the how of an epistemic community’s emergence and development; as well as insight into whether the dominance of roosters alters the chickens’ relationship with the egg.

Similarly, the inclusion of more senior, pioneering scholars would have painted a more in-depth, colourful account of the pre-epistemic community environment; and provided more detail on the personal obstacles faced by academics when attempting to research this subject during The Troubles, and how they overcame (or otherwise) these. This would have also given us further insight on the evolution of the discipline, and how scholarship on Northern Ireland was so dramatically altered by the peace process and signing of the Agreement in 1998.

Other research should look at the role of politicians and civil servants within the discipline. Political figures such as Jeffrey Donaldson, Bertie Ahern, George Mitchell and Jonathan Powell, have become sources of “expert” advice, often establishing consultancies, think tanks, and resting on the board of research institutes and universities. How these political actors see the epistemic community is important: do they see a different episteme, do they value its input, what boundaries between the academic and scientific worlds do they recognise?
From a methodological and research design perspective, survey questionnaires and more structured interviews might therefore have soothed anxieties regarding issues which participants deemed sensitive or difficult. It would have enabled a further level of anonymization for respondents: structured questionnaires would have made it possible to depersonalize often quite personal discussions and reflections; and generated a variety of numerically measurable data.

Yet by the same token, this would have diminished the research’s ability to thematize and identify “turning points” in scholars’ personal narratives. Indeed, it must be doubtful whether such an approach would have delivered the insights, complexities and contradictions which made up our participants’ stories.

The last point on which I would like to reflect is concerning the production of knowledge in academic disciplines. What this research displayed was that the production of knowledge and the development and emergence of a knowledge community was largely the result of an emergent demand within the international, political, and academic landscape. Here I would reassert what I have claimed throughout this research is that both structure and agency are important! Northern Ireland academics, for example, DO have agency in the sense that once this demand has been established it is up to them to decide how and in what ways they will look to meet those demands and adjust to the new academic market, for lack of better words. In this way, they help shape the structure once it has been established.

In this respect, I think Northern Ireland is similar not only to other areas of protracted conflict in the post-Cold War era but also other scientific disciplines. I’m sure, for instance, that if one were to look at the study of Bosnia and compare it to the Northern Ireland experience the parallels would be quite similar. But I hope future studies will look at research disciplines surrounding the emergence of epistemic communities around issues of say climate change and medical issues, like research around the AIDS epidemic in the early 1980’s and 1990’s. It is likely that upon investigation one might find that structural demands largely shaped and accounted for the emergence of these epistemic communities. Particularly around socially taboo issues such as the AIDS epidemic in the 1980’s it would be interesting to know what the sexuality and overall make-up of the scientists studying these issues were and what their interests were in challenging existing paradigms around this issue. Also, it is likely that these actors and disciplines emerged because of social, political, and financial demands which then impacted (both positively and negatively) academic institutions creating
opportunities for actors to exert agency in ways which weren’t possible before. How would these events and actors shape and determine such structures and how do such structures, in turn, shape these actors?

It is my hope that future research will look to answer such questions and bring them into further light and understanding. In this research, we have sought to look at one community, the Northern Ireland political science community. I have shown that these communities develop slowly and painfully. I hope that the pains of other communities are explored and that, through this, we gain further insights into the nature of knowledge; how we shape it and, ultimately, how it shapes us.
## APPENDICES:

### APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEE’S (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Interview Place</th>
<th>Role and University</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous 1</td>
<td>16-Oct-15</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Edwards</td>
<td>11-Nov-15</td>
<td>Sandhurst</td>
<td>Lecturer, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Mumford</td>
<td>22-Oct-14</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Lecturer, University of Nottingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony McIntrye</td>
<td>04-Sep-15</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Activist, Writer: Pensive Quill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Aughey</td>
<td>06-Oct-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Professor of Politics, Ulster University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brendan O’Duffy</td>
<td>01-Jun-15</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Professor, Queen Mary University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brendan O’Leary</td>
<td>12-May-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Professor, University of Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathal McCall</td>
<td>27-Feb-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Professor, Queens University Belfast</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cillian McGrattan</td>
<td>17-Jan-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Lecturer of Politics, Ulster University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn Walsh</td>
<td>03-Apr-15</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Post-Doc, Political Science, University of Birmingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eamonn O’Kane</td>
<td>11-Nov-14</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Reader in Conflict Studies, University of Wolverhampton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etain Tannam</td>
<td>03-Nov-14</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, International Peace Studies, Trinity College Dublin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Patterson</td>
<td>27-Feb-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Emeritus Professor of Politics, Ulster University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Hughes</td>
<td>10-Jan-16</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Professor of Comparative Politics, London School of Economics</td>
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<td>Joanne McEvoy</td>
<td>27-Feb-15</td>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen</td>
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<td>John Bew</td>
<td>12-Oct-15</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Professor of History and Foreign Policy, Kings College London</td>
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<td>John Coakley</td>
<td>03-Sep-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Professor of Politics, University College Dublin</td>
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<td>John Doyle</td>
<td>02-Oct-15</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dublin City University</td>
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<tr>
<td>John McGarry</td>
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<td>Professor of Political Studies, Queens University, Canada</td>
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<td>Jonathan Tonge</td>
<td>22-Oct-15</td>
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<td>Maria Power</td>
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<td>Lecturer Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool</td>
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<td>Michael Kerr</td>
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<td>Niall O'Dohartaugh</td>
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<td>Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Sociology, NUI Galway</td>
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<td>Paul Arthur</td>
<td>04-Jun-15</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Emeritus Professor of Politics, Ulster University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Dixon</td>
<td>09-Sep-15</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Reader in Politics and International Studies, Kingston University London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Mitchell</td>
<td>03-Mar-15</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pete Sharlow</td>
<td>05-Feb-15</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>Director, Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard English</td>
<td>25-Feb-15</td>
<td>St Andrews</td>
<td>Professor of Politics, University of St Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupert Taylor</td>
<td>01-May-15</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Professor of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra Buchanan</td>
<td>13-Mar-15</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Trainer, Donegal Education &amp; Training Board (ETB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Wolff</td>
<td>15-Jan-16</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, University of Birmingham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

PERSONAL BACKGROUND
- Place and year of birth
- What was it like growing up during the time of “the Troubles” in this area?
- Most interesting memories during school/growing up?
- What were the topics of discussion and subjects that interested you?
- Do you think that your parents’ job, life style or conversations became one of the models for your life?

INTEREST AND ENTRY TO THE DISCIPLINE
- PhD - university, topic, supervisor
- What was it that motivated/provoked you to begin studying in this subject?
- What barriers and/or obstacles did you face in initially addressing this topic?
- How did you overcome them?
- What and where was your first academic post?
- What was the academic/university environment like for you upon your entry into it?
- If you have ever paid attention to what other scholars thought about you and your work, what did they say?
- What did try to do to affect change in this area or influence the thinking around the conflict at this time?

PRIOR TO THE PEACE PROCESS
1. Background and beginnings
   - What, in your own experience, was the intellectual climate in the UK and Ireland like concerning Northern Ireland before and leading up to the peace process? (An example)
   - How did you come to develop your views and theories on possible causes and solutions to the Northern Ireland Conflict, what events/experiences shaped/formed these ideas?
   - How often did you interact and gather with other academics on this subject during this time (i.e. participation/attendance at conferences, collaboration with research projects, and participation in research institutes)?
   - What/How would PEACE have looked to you at this time?

2. Issues of Disagreement
   - What were the main areas of disagreement between yourself and other academics around the conflict? Which of these were seen as critical? Why?
   - What, from your own experiences, was at the root of the conflict about the conflict between academics (yourself included) at this time?
   - Were there institutional problems like morally wrong management, discrimination, bias or mistrust?
   - How did you identify and respond to these conflicts/issues?

3. Political/Academic
• How much interaction did you have with political actors/organizations/institutions at this time?
• What was the nature of this interaction?
• What was the role of universities and/or research centres in these interactions?
• What were the barriers/challenges (real or perceived) in these interactions?
• How, from your experience, was Irish studies and research concerning the Northern Ireland conflict treated at this time?
• How often did you (attempt to) publish and/or write on the conflict? What was the nature of such publications? What did you explore in them? Where were they published at?
• Did you find difficulties getting articles on this subject published during this time? (example)
• How did you navigate/overcome such difficulties?

**Peace Process**

1. Early Stages
• How did you view the peace process in its early stages? Was this view shared by others academics?
• What were the mains points of contentions between academics concerning the peace process? Concerning proposed political solutions for Northern Ireland?
• What were your views on this? How did you come to develop such views?
• What role, if any, did you play in the peace process?
• Did this process create a new role for academics that had not previously existed? How so?
• Did the frequency of interaction between academics on this subject increase during this time, as opposed to previously?
• How did this process affect the academic material being produced on Northern Ireland?
• What, from your experience, did the peace process do for the discipline of Irish studies and academics – such as yourself – who researched the conflict?
• What did you find challenging/surprising/interesting during this time? (Examples)

2. The way to resolve conflicts
• If you needed conversation/interactions with the opposite group(s), what were the typical patterns and outcomes of these? How had this differed from before?
• What were the personal rules or principles that influenced how you perceived, analysed, and decided on the direction of studying the conflict during this time?
• What were the important issues, if any, in reconciling your relationships with opposite groups? What was your effort?
• How did you handle inter/intra personal/departmental/institutional conflicts concerning notions of power sharing and/or other political solutions?
• When people distrusted, attacked, or competed with each other (or you), how did you work practically to reconcile these differences? That is, what did you DO?
• How did you talk to and interact with individuals – pro and con – to your opposition?
• What did you learn from these interactions?
• What would you have done differently, if you could have done something else?

THE AGREEMENT

• What were your reactions/responses/thoughts in regards to GFA?
• How have these changed over time?
• Would you say these reactions were shared by your peers and colleagues?
• How did GFA differ from your previous notions of peace, if at all?
• What affect did GFA – from an epistemological standpoint – have on the way you approached and analysed the conflict? Was there a paradigm shift?
• Would you say this was shared by others in the discipline?(examples)
• What affects did GFA have on Irish and British academics and academic institutions? How?
• Where they noticeable and, if so, in what way? (Examples)
• How has GFA affected you in your career/professional (i.e. did/has it provided opportunities for you and other academics that might not have existed before)?
• Would you say GFA offer(s/ed) a framework which yourself and other academics are reconciled to?

POST-GFA & TODAY

• How you say the discipline of political science has changed in relation to NI? How have you changed as a political scientist? What forces – economic, institutional, etc would you say are responsible for this?
• Do you see and or experience a changing role in the relationship between politics and political science? Does this differ from before? How so, example?
• Does your definition and/or understanding of peace now differ than that of what you started out?
• What relevance do you see in NI and its peace process in political science today? The role of power sharing in other conflict zones?

Reflecting back on your role in this process what have you learned about yourself as both an individual and a political scientist? Limitations, pitfalls, strengths, etc. How do you separate these?
Bibliography


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Gill and Macmillan.

